HISTORY, THEORY AND THE RESURRECTION FAITH

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A note re this e-edition (2021):
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FOREWORD

This study began as a graduate seminar paper at the University of California; Santa Barbara, in the Fall 1983. It developed into a lengthy paper at the University of California, Berkeley, in the Spring 1984. The latter was accepted as a basis for my "hovedfags oppgave" at University of Bergen. It has since been revised and expanded into this present form. My studies at University of California were made possible through an exchange scholarship given to me by the University of Bergen, as part of the Education Abroad Program.

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INTRODUCTION

This is a study where history, philosophy and theology meet. It deals with the theoretical aspects of historical inquiry ('history' is a Greek word which simply means investigation or inquiry), applied to the Jesus of history in general, and the resurrection faith in particular. It has a double concern insofar as I want to discuss the epistemological problems of historical inquiry for its own sake, as well as to inquire what historical explanation(s) the resurrection faith of the earliest Christian communities calls for. As this is a work within theory of history, the theoretical aspects will be focused more or less all the way. I hope to clarify both the interrelatedness between theoretical presuppositions and empirical facts for historical inquiry in general, and the particular theoretical issues that are involved in such a touchy topic as the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

My subject is thus not a philosophical or theological interpretation of history as such. The meaning of history in its totality traditionally belongs to philosophy of history, while the theory of history is a sort of philosophy of science applied to the particular field of historical inquiry: What is the relation between historical reality and historical inquiry? What ontological and epistemological presuppositions do the professional historian apply in his general method and particular techniques?

The questions above account for the philosophical aspects of the present work. The theological aspect refers to the very topic of the Jesus of history and the subsequent resurrection faith of the early church, which both are of obvious interest to Christian theology. I am not dealing with particular theological issues however, unless they are involved in the presuppositions of one or both of the historical-theological research programmes I construct. As to the historical questions, I want to inquire whether certain events happened, without raising the question of their theological value.

I do not pretend to give an exhaustive account of the current state of the discussion of the historical Jesus. Rather, I will attempt to unravel a few of the theoretical issues that are involved as seen from a historiographical viewpoint, and so reveal why nothing less than a systematic treatment of the matter is required. My aim for this systematic treatment is to grasp the essence of the problem and to present the material in logical form. Along the way I hope to relate certain well-known empirical propositions to well-known theoretical presuppositions in a new and revealing way.

The first six chapters may be read as a basically theoretical preliminary to the last three chapters which deal with concrete historical evidence. The former are necessary because of the general problems which an historical examination of 'supernatural' events raise. They are also necessary in view of the particular theological and hermeneutical positions involved in the topic of the resurrection of Jesus. In chapter 1 I shall thus discuss the very concept of the resurrection of Jesus. Some interpret it as an historical event, others as mythological symbol. I will side with the first group, thereby indicating a particular view on the relationship between

Christian faith and history in general, where the latter is a necessary, if not sufficient ingredient to the former.

If this is the case, there is an obvious need to clarify the concept of historical inquiry in order to understand its relation to a historical resurrection faith. I shall argue, in ch. 1.3, that the specific object of historical inquiry is the human past, excluding any inquiry into alleged actions of supernatural agents, but not excluding the possibility of their existence as such. Historical inquiry is immanent, but not atheistic. The key issue, then, is what a historian is to do with an event in the human past for which there seems to be no natural, human explanation. May a historian, both in principle and in practice, confirm the factuality of a 'supernatural' event?

How is a supernatural event to be understood anyway? If the concept of miracle can be shown to be contradictory to human experience in general; i.e. to the laws of nature as Hume forcefully claimed, or impossible in view of our concept of causation, then my whole enterprise will be doomed from the start. I will argue in ch. 2, however, that these objections can be met in a philosophically quite satisfying way. But even if the way is cleared, philosophically speaking, the issue has to be related to the desk of the practical historian. And such persons have traditionally seldom cared too much for specifically philosophical arguments. In chapter 3.1 and 3.2 I will therefore deal with historical method in general and rules of source criticism in particular, trying to keep an eye along the way on the questions which later will arise in my assessment of the NT gospels as historical sources. The principle of analogy in 3.3 picks up the thread from Hume and I shall argue in favor of an 'open' conception of history. Unique, i.e. underivable-and-new aspects of the past are not to be excluded a priori, even if the event in question does not fit a secular conception of reality, where supernatural events are excluded in principle. If historical inquiry is a basically empirical activity, then any alleged event is to be considered primarily in view of the existing evidence, not in view of a priori world views. And if the evidence is strong enough, it may yield the conclusion that a supernatural event really took place, even if this event is unexplainable, historically speaking, and even if does not correspond to any other known historical event.

This brings up the problem of historical objectivity. By saying that any event should be considered in view of the evidence and not in view of a priori world views, I might give the impression that theoretical presuppositions are clearly subordinated to the facts of the matter. But this is at best an over-simplification, and often a caricature of practical historical inquiry. The relationship between theory and facts is much more intricate. Certain historical 'facts' may turn out to be no more than a deduction of preconceived assumptions, and not the logical consequence of empirical evidence, as which it is presented. Nevertheless, I will argue in ch. 5 that even if theory and facts are closely connected, they are not totally interdependent. There is a real possibility of showing that one reconstruction makes better sense of the evidence than a rival one, since the dependence between theoretical presuppositions and empirical evidence varies. Different perspectives may be compared in view of the same evidence. When the historian asks specific questions, the latter does, to some extent, 'speak for itself'. If it doesn't, why ask in the first place?

Whether it speaks of the past as an objective reality independent of our linguistic minds, or whether it reflects human language, as a prison ambigously constructed and post-modernist deconstructable, is another question. If the latter is the case, an enterprise aiming at a reconstruction of the basis for the historical resurrection faith would again be undermined. So

prior to the discussion in ch. 5 of the objectivity of historical writing, I want to argue in ch. 4 in favor of the realist idea of an objective history as such. My overall purpose is to combine the realism of the historian whose ultimate aim is to discover 'wie es eigentlich gewesen' with a skepticism towards positivism and empiricism.

In chapter 6 I present the philosophy of science of Imre Lakatos and his methodology of scientific research programmes. This model reveals in a sophisticated way the intricate relationship between empirical facts and theoretical assumptions under a realist heading. I therefore apply Lakatos to the research on the historical Jesus and the resurrection faith by constructing two rival 'historical-theological research programmes'. I do this for three reasons. (1) I want to show how theoretical interest and empirical evidence are closely connected within this field of research, (2) how one of these research traditions nevertheless in my view may claim a higher degree of empirical corrobation than the other one, and (3) simply in order to organize the huge amount of literature which exist on the subject. (An extensive bibliography on the resurrection of Jesus Christ is offered in Ghiberti 1974.)

As far as I am aware, no model from philosophy of science has so far been applied directly to the quest of the historical Jesus, nor to historical explanations of the resurrection faith. Efforts have been made, as in Barbour 1980, to illuminate the epistemological status of Christian belief or religious belief in general through the philosophy of science of Thomas Kuhn and his basic concept of paradigms. Others, e.g. Hollinger 1973, have in different ways discussed Kuhn in relation to historical inquiry in general, but not explicitly to the historical basis of the Christian faith. Lakatos, however, seems to have been largely ignored within the field of theory of history.

Accordingly, when presenting the evidence of the historical Jesus in chapter 7, I make an effort to show how the two research programmes assess these sources, what conclusions their competing hard cores of fundamental assumptions, protective belts of auxiliary hypotheses and positive heuristic with its set of problemsolving techniques lead up to. As the resurrection faith needs to be explained primarily on the basis of what the NT gospels can tell us of the matter, there is a need for a rather thorough inquiry into their historical worth in general. This is the reason for the relatively lenghty size of ch. 7. It functions as a necessary background for the more detailed examination in ch. 8 of the material which particularly deals with the resurrection of Jesus. I apply the same method here, showing what concerns the two programmes have, how they deal with the evidence and how the evidence deals with them.

This is no neutral presentation. I am explicit about my affiliation to 'Historic Christianity', trying to substantiate why I believe this research programme on an overall estimate ought to be considered the progressive or scientific one, to use Lakatos' terminology, leaving 'the Bultmann School' behind (for the time being) as degenerative or pseudo-scientific.

In my last chapter I will discuss different explanations of the resurrection faith on the basis of those historical 'facts' which the preceeding two chapters have left us. As the weaknesses of the hypotheses which deny a physical resurrection are pointed out, I more or less try to eliminate them as plausible historical explanations. The one hypothesis remaining; that Jesus actually did rise from the dead in space and time, thus gains in force indirectly as the others are discredited. The whole question is clearly a matter of probability, especially in this case as basic metaphysical presuppositions are involved. No sensible historian should claim that the resurrection of Jesus has been proven in a strict sense of the word. Nevertheless, this study

concludes that the balance on the scale of probability rationally supports the historical foundation of an existential, Christian resurrection faith.

1. THE JESUS OF HISTORY AND/OR THE CHRIST OF FAITH?

"Jesus Christ rose from the dead". How is a historian to understand this statement which lies at the very center of the Christian faith? Is it a historical statement purporting to tell us what factually happened to the Jesus of history, or is it a mythological statement; a non-historical, existential expression concerning the Christ of faith? To put it in other words, is the resurrection to be interpreted historically of mythologically?1 What general hermeneutical questions are involved?

Besides, what kind of general perspectives on the relationship between Christian faith and history2 are underlying the different answers? Is the existential aspect of faith to be stressed to the point where its seemingly historical content becomes irrelevant or even non-existent? Or is faith and historical knowledge integrated, in the sense that the 'encounter'-aspect of Christian faith is dependent upon certain historical propositions being true? Whether they are true or not, however, is then a historical and not a theological question. But in order to answer it, I first need to classify the object and limitations of historical inquiry in general.

1.1 The Concept of Resurrection and Hermeneutical Theory.

Theologians who believe in the historical resurrection of Jesus will argue that according to the New Testament (NT), the persistence of Jesus' personality is necessarily tied up with the resurrection of his body.3 Not only the context of late Judaism, but also the general usage of biblical literature and the conventions governing the recognitions of words strongly suggest that the NT writers meant just what their words about Jesus' resurrection said: In a new and glorious existence Jesus presented himself bodily alive to those who had known him to die by crucifixion. He had not been resuscitated, nor resurrected 'spiritually'. The empty tomb was not a proof of his resurrection, but a witness to its nature. If Paul and the Gospel-writers had wanted to write primarily about the rise of their faith, they could have done just that. Appropriate words were available. 'Faith' ('pistis'), 'to believe' ('pisteuein'), and their synonyms are among the commonest words in the NT. 'Pistis' turns up 243 times and 'pisteuein' 241 times.4 Instead, we find that in their resurrection narratives, they wrote about things like spices and stones and sweatbands. To these theologians, this was never part of a stock of symbolic imagery, and would not have been taken as such.5

To interpret the resurrection mythologically, however, has a very old tradition. The gnostic Christians of the first centuries A.D. insisted that it was not a unique event in the past. Instead, it symbolized how Christ's presence could be experienced in the present. What mattered was not literal seeing, but spiritual vision.6 In Treatise on Resurrection, Rheginos' teacher tells his student that the resurrection is "the revealing of what truly exists ... and a migration (metabole: change; transition) into newness." The resurrection is understood as a person's moment of enlightenment. Rhegionos can be 'resurrected from the dead' right now: "Are you the real you mere corruption? ... Why do you not examine your own self, and see that you have arisen?" (Pagels

1981, 14.) True reality for the gnostics was non-material; salvation or enlightenment was brought about when one realized the eternal Godhead within oneself, a Godhead different from and independent of all matter. The NT could not be understood historically if making sense within the gnostic world-view.7

The position of Rudolf Bultmann, the 20th-century theologian and philosopher, has according to some critics a certain resemblance to the theology of the second century gnostics. 8 For Bultmann, Jesus rose into the kerygma; the early Christian preaching about Jesus.9 Through the hearing of this kerygma (whose content is not historical, apart from the bare minimum that Jesus lived and was crucified), man may gain an 'authentic self-understanding'. This self-understanding can not be normatively specified, i.e. to be a Christian can really mean anything as long as every individual is authentic about it. The Bible basically consists of non-propositional myths and symbols. It can be said to be the word of God only insofar as it generates an authentic, completely subjective response to its hidden meaning, i.e. as it is demythologized.10

Back in the nineteenth century, David Friedrich Strauss had also given a mythological interpretation of the NT. To Strauss, the very fact that Jesus was portrayed as a supernatural being was proof enough that the Gospels were of a thoroughly mythological nature, i.e. historically untrustworthy.11 The distinction between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith corresponded to the distinction between historical man and the ideal image of how man ought to be. The Christ of faith was an expression of the religion of humanity; the ideal man. 12 The supernatural (the resurrected Christ) can thus be seen as the way in which the ideal makes its appearance in human affairs;13 a symbol of the union of the spirit of man with the infinite spirit.14

From this perspective, Ludwig Feuerbach makes perfectly sense: "The dogma that Christ arose from the dead is a result of wishful thinking: Men want to be certain of a continued existence after death." (Feuerbach 1957, 37.) So does the Freudian view that "religious ideas have arisen from the same need as have all other achievements of civilization: from the necessity of defending oneself against the crushing superior force of nature." Protecting himself against his own weaknesses and against nature, man creates the idea of God as a single person, so that "man's relations to him could recover the intimacy and intensity of the child's relation to his father." (Freud 1961, 30;27.)

Theoretically speaking, the coin may just as well be turned, and the resurrection faith seen, not as illusion, but as the historically true and God-given answer to man's inherent longing for the ideal and for ulitmate 'belonging'. My point, however, is that as soon as the resurrection is interpreted mythologically, the focus of an historian will necessarily turn away from the historical Jesus. He will instead focus on the early church, seeing the resurrection faith as an expression through which the members of these communities have interpreted their experience for the sake of themselves or for others' sake.15 This experience is not primarily an experience a subject has of an object, as Peter and others would have had if the risen Christ is interpreted historically. It may rather be called a second-order reference, "which reaches the world not only at the level of manipulable objects, but at the level Husserl designated by the expression Lebenswelt, and which Heidegger calls being-in-the-world." (Ricoeur 1974, 79.)

This is the position of philosophical hermeneutics, where the historical text of the resurrection faith (and any other text) is seen as having a surplus meaning over that of the intention of the author(s), or even the original meaning given by the original historical context.16 Thus, one

does not have to argue against those who interpret the resurrection narratives as originally intended to be understood as factual, historical reports. By no longer defining hermeneutics as the search for another person's psychological intentions, as hiding behind the text, nor for the conscious communal understanding of a certain text in a certain historical setting, nor as the identification of structures; a historian would not try to re-cognize it. The aim of interpretation would rather be "to explicate the sort of being-in-the-world unfolded in front of the text. ..., what is to be interpreted in a text is a proposed world, a world that I might inhabit and wherein I might project my ownmost possibilities. This is what I call the world of the text, the world probably belonging to this unique text." (Ricoeur 1974, 79.)

To many historians this may sound more like literary criticism than historical methodology. What relevance could it have for at historian trying to account for the resurrection faith? He could, like the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, conclude that in order to understand a certain cultural or historical setting one must start with a picture of the whole, which leads the investigator to look for symbolic forms through which and in which the conceptions of the person, the social order and the cosmology are articulated and displayed.17 If the resurrection faith can be seen as such a symbolic form, maybe as expressed through the rituals of a worship-service in the early church, the historian would then want to understand it "in terms of how it functions in concrete situations to organize perceptions (meanings, emotions, concepts, attitudes)..." (Geertz 1973, 449;n.38).18 These cultural forms could than be treated as "texts, as imaginative works built out of social materials" (Geertz 1973, 218). The aim of such a study on history and the resurrection faith would then be to explicate context and 'world', not to discuss the evidence for the facticity of a historical resurrection.

1.2 The Relation between Christian Faith and History.

I don't think Geertz necessarily need to be understood as a priori excluding a factual, historical resurrection, at least not as a possible, supplementary object of historical inquiry. Gadamer and Ricoeur, however, both want to get beyond a way of posing the questions which focuses on first-order, subject-object language.19 Their way of looking at history is more related to what the later Heidegger said about the mystique of language. Moving beyond the subject object distinction has profound consequences for the relationship between Christian faith and history. According to both dialectical and existentialist theologians, God is not an object of rational knowledge, nor can God's self-revelation be accurately described in subject-object language, neither in historical events nor in concepts or words.20

The resurrection faith is thus seen as being independent of, and indifferent to, the historical accuracy of the resurrection narratives in the NT. It is rather a matter of believing the proclamation which these narratives enshrine, no matter how untrustworthy they might be as factual historical reports.21 From this perspective, religious faith is not based on any factual knowledge. The proclamation of the early church; the kerygma, is according to Bultmann and his followers quite independent of historical facts. Likewise, the historical confession of Israel's faith did not have its roots in what actually took place at that time, but in how they 'existentially' interpreted otherwise 'ordinary' historical events.

Faith is here seen as a venture, a commitment made in answer to a call. The alleged legitimation of Jesus' claims through the event of his resurrection would be incompatible with this venture. It is not that faith goes beyond evidence; it excludes evidence. Rational appeal would distort faith. To believe because one accepted the testimony of those witnesses who

met Jesus alive after his death render a truly trusting commitment to Jesus' challenge impossible.22 From a 'subject-object point of view', the resurrection faith is thus emptied of its content, and there is no reason for the believer to pay attention to history. What is important to the 'new questers' of the historical Jesus is not a question of getting behind the kerygma or even a reduction of the Gospels to the historical Jesus. It is not a matter of grounding faith historically. But it is a matter of critically distinguishing true from false proclamation.23

What then is the norm of this distinction? And why is the Christian message to be preferred to, say, the Buddhist, or the secular humanist one? Gadamer did not see that Bultmann gave any answer to this question.24 I don't even see how he could, given the ontological structure of his thinking. From the perspective which sees the Jesus of history as an integral part of the Christ of faith, however, the answer to this is deliberately given through subject-object categories. The object of faith is experienced as being outside the believer: 'extra nos', and its truth as existing prior to our believing it; 'ante nos'. True proclamation of the resurrection must be in accordance with the factual history of the resurrection, with its 'event-nature'. The resurrection faith is, and must be, grounded in history.

In most cases, however, a Christian conviction is primarily based upon a personal experience: 'You ask me how I know He lives? He lives within my heart!'25 This experience is then more or less closely related to the message of the Bible, taken as Holy Scriptures empowered by the Holy Spirit. To believe in the resurrection of Jesus Christ in the full biblical sense is to view it as the emergence within history of the life of the world to come. The resurrection can be seen as redemption, as revelation, as grounding faith, as a promise which grounds hope and as initiating the kerygma.26 Do 'orthodox' Christians then believe that the reality of their risen Lord substantiates belief in the historicity of Jesus? Is the facticity of Jesus' resurrection established by means of spiritual perception? Does the event-nature of the resurrection wholly depend upon faith? Just what is the ultimate ground of the resurrection faith?

If the entire Christian tradition which has claimed that the resurrection story has a foot in public history is correct, then it must, contra Bultmann & co., be open and vulnerable to the historian's scrutiny. This is part of the risk of a religion of the Word made flesh.27 In this view, the historian can neither give nor directly take away the faith, but he can "indirectly render the credibiblity-gap so wide that in fact men cease believing." (John Robinson 1977, 128.)

I personally accept this position, presupposing that the proper object of interpretation is to state what the text meant in its original historical setting. If historians came up with a completely convincing 'natural'28 explanation of the resurrection faith, my evangelical faith would be shaken. On the other hand, if historical research can be seen to give a fairly high degree of probability to the explanation that Jesus bodily rose from the dead, my faith is being reinforced by history. The question of how I know my experience of the risen Christ to be true; to be connected to the historical Jesus, is a historical one. The historical verdict cannot be refuted in spiritual terms. To use the philosophers' distinction, the historical evidence is not sufficient, but it is necessary. If the 'Good News' of the 'performative' language of the NT ('your sins are forgiven!'; 'the Kingdom of God is at hand!') is to function effectively, other statements ('Jesus rose from the dead') have to be true in a factual, historical sense.29 In practical life, articles of faith are of no value to me if proven irrational,30 or if they stand in evident contradiction to the factual.

1.3 The Object and Limitations of Historical Inquiry.

What then, does historical inquiry31 say about this allegedly historical event? Or first, what can it say, given its established rules? Can a historian, as a historian, say that God raised Jesus from the dead, that his resurrected, 'spiritual body' (I Cor. 15:44) is a body "transformed by the life-giving Spirit of God adapted for the new redeemed order of the Age to Come?" (Ladd 1976, 117.) Clearly not. These are judgements of faith. Given the commonly established rules of the historical profession, historical inquiry deals with human actions of the past, not God's.32 This can be understood in two ways, either as a metaphysical assumption about the totality of reality, or as a methodological convention of the discipline of history.

In the first case historical writing is to be understood as all-inclusive in the sense that there is no realm of the past from which historical inquiry in principle is excluded. The historian deals with all there is, and if she or he does not deal with God (except as a sociologically interpreted object of faith, i.e. purely as part of certain people's belief-systems), then there simply is no God.33 God or other supernatural agents of the biblical writers become phantoms of pre-scientific thinking.34

I would prefer the second option, acknowledging that historians should be aware of their limitations. The historian cannot pronounce whether there exist other personal agents than the human, be it God, the devil, angels, demons or whatever. Whether or not supernatural beings exist is a question of metaphysics, not of historical research. The latter deals with empirical evidence of human events and/or conditions of the past,35 independent of whether (some of) these ultimately are caused by any supernatural power or not.

An important problem remains, however, even if we choose this second option. Are historians restricted to so-called 'normal' historical events, or is it possible, in principle, that some events, if well-attested, can be affirmed as being both historical and 'supernatural', i.e. unexplainable through 'natural' categories? If we simply say that the historian's business is to interpret the available sources for whatever they suggest happened to humans (or in nature) in the past, then that could possibly also include the bodily resurrection of the historical person Jesus of Nazareth, yet excluding explanations of this event in relation to any concept of God. But as a bodily resurrection seems to be unexplainable in 'natural' terms, we then have to face the key question: Can a historian allow for the category of the supernatural (miracles) in history if evidence should defy natural explanations? To answer, I first of all need to take a closer look at the concepts of 'miracles', 'causation' and 'laws of nature'.

NOTES

1. In German theological literature one will find a distinction between history as 'Geschichte' and as 'Historie'. The former refers to history as encountered existentially for the meaning it conveys, subjectively, to each individual person, while the latter refers to history examined critically for its mere factuality. As myths normally concern events which are not thought of as having happened in the past, but in a time which is sacred and which exists either beyond or side by side with profane time (cf. Vansina 1965, 157 and Eliade 1959, ch. II), I take it that to speak of the resurrection of Jesus as (only) 'geschichtlich' or 'mythological' will imply the same basic perspective of its non-factuality.

2. The concept of 'history' has a double meaning in English usage. It can refer to (1) the actual past, i.e. any set of historical events, or (to (2) historical research and writing; i.e. any set of historical propositions. (Cf. Lakatos 1978a, 121, n.l.) In the following I will use 'history' in the first sense, and historical inquiry, research or writing in the second sense. In this particular instance, however, 'history' can be understood in either way.
3. For a more detailed discussion of the nature of the resurrection body, see ch 8.1.1; below. Let me quickly note here that according to Judaism, the resurrection body will either be identical with the mortal earthly body (2. Macc. 14:46),or the same body will be raised and later transformed (Apoc. Baruch 50:2). Cf. Ladd 1976, 51-59. According to Historic Christianity, the body is transformed at the moment of resurrection. Cf. the way Jesus' resurrected body is portrayed as knowing no physical hindrances (Luke 24:31; 36, John 20:19f), although he bears the physical marks of crucifixion (Luke 24:39, John 20:24-28). As to the various expressions of 'body' or 'bodily' in the Old Testament (OT) and the NT, see Gilbrant & Odeberg 1967, "legeme" and "legemlig"; 2564-2568. On 'soma' specifically, see Gundry 1976.
4. See O'Collins 1978, 46.
5. Cf. John Robinson 1977, 128.
6. See Pagels 1981, 12.
7. This of course brings up the question of whether the Bible has its own particular world-view, or whether its message can be integrated into competing metaphysical systems, with equal claim of rendering its meaning correctly. I would disagree with the latter position, in line with e.g. Valen-Sendstad 1973. For an English statement of his key argument, see Grødal 1985.
8. Cf. Borchert 1964 and Rordorf 1967.
9. Bultmann 1964, 42. To Bultmann, the resurrection faith does not relate to any isolated, spacial-temporal event that took place after the crucifixion of Jesus, i.e. after his death. It is nothing else than a faith in what took place on the cross, i.e. in the existential meaning which is conveyed through the preaching of this event. "Der Auferstehungsglaube ist nichts anderes als der Glaube an das Kreuz als Heilsereignis, an das Kreuz als Kreuz Christi". Bultmann 1948, 50. Cf. Marxsen 1979, 184: "Jesus is risen in that his offer meets us today and in that, if we accept it, he gives us this new life".
10. According to Tillich 1957, 183;184 "the resurrection of the Christ does not report an isolated event after his death". Instead, it "shows the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as victorious over the existential estrangement to which he has subjected himself". A somewhat similar view is presented by Koester 1971b, 223: "Resurrection is thus a mythological metaphor for God's victory over the powers of unrighteousness."
11. Cf. Strauss 1977, 161. Strauss' main work was Strauss 1970, orginally published in 1835-6.
12. "Jesus is to be regarded as a person, as a great and as far as I am concerned, the greatest personality in the series of religious geniuses, but still only a man like others." Strauss 1977, 161.
13. Cf. Renan 1863, passim.
14. Cf. Niebuhr 1957, 7.
15. See e.g. Ricoeur 1974, 80.
16. See notably Gadamer 1981, passim, e.g. 264: "The meaning of a text goes beyond its author not sometimes but always. .... One understands differently when one understands at all." . For an 'anti-Gadamer' argument (an argument which is compatible with 'Historic Christianity'; see ch. 6.2 below), see Betti 1980 and Bleicher 1980, ch. 2;

27-50.
17. See Rabinow & Sullivan 1979, 19. For an exposition by Geertz of his method and assumptions, see his Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in Geertz 1973, ch. 1; 3-30. A modestly critical assessment of Geertz's influence on historians is provided by Walters
1980.
18. Ch. 15: Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight. The study of religion in Geertz's language involves tracing "the socially available systems of significance beliefs, rites, meaningful objects in terms of which subjective life is ordered and outward behaviour guided." Geertz
1971, 95. This kind of analysis which quite a few historians have taken over from Geertz will thus move away from expressions of faith (e.g. the doctrine of the historical resurrection of Jesus, as such) to an assessment of inward emotional significance and outward to social consequences. Cf. Walters 1980, 540.
19. Ricoeur gives an example of how to deal with the distinction between immanent meaning (sense) and historical, empirical reference ('aboutness'): "The attempt to bracket reference and to keep sense, i.e. to raise questions about historical reality, fails somewhere, because it runs against my main contention that even fictions are about a world. One of the ways out of this labyrinth would be to say that the world displayed by biblical stories and which shatters our ordinary beliefs about the "real" world, is not a historical world, a world of real events, but the world of the text. This kind of answer is similar to the one that a modern critic would give concerning the "world" displayed by an abstract painting. It depicts no object of the real world but it generates an emotional model which reshapes our whole world view." Ricoeur 1980, 44. My italics.
20. Cf. Kösemann 1964, 62: "For whether the word of God is identified with the canon or, in a supreme effort at simplification, sought only in the Jesus of history, in both cases the thought is present that it is possible to present the Gospel objectively; and in both cases the attempt is made to guarantee faith by reference to an objectively measurable quantity. But neither miracle nor the canon nor the Jesus of history is able to give security to faith. For our faith there can be no objectivity in this sense." See also Henry et. al. 1979, 85. As to the relationship between faith and history in Karl Barth, the founder of dialectical theology, the picture is possibly more positive than in existentialist theology, cf. Hafstad 1981. Barth was e.g. able to say that it is "the fact that the risen Christ can be touched which puts it beyond all doubt that He is the man Jesus and no one else. ... For unless Christ's resurrection was a resurrection of the body, we have no guarantee that it was the decisively acting Subject Jesus Himself, the man Jesus, who rose from the dead". Barth 1960, 448, quoted in Harvey
1967, 155. Whether this bodily resurrection can, or should be made an object of historical inquiry is another question, however. It is one thing to affirm that such and such is or was the case, quite another to decide how we know that this is a true statement. Jacob Jervell, e.g., affirms that Jesus rose from the dead, but denies that this is a statement that can be substantiated by historical research. It is made by faith only: "Kristendommen står og faller med om visse ting er skjedd. Dette nemlig .... at han oppsto fra de døde. ... Hvor historievitenskapen kan si at der oppsto en tro på at Jesus var oppstanden fra de døde, sier kirken at oppstandelsen har skjedd. ... Dette skulle gjøre klart den grenselinje som går mellom historisk vitenskap og kirkelig tale, mellom "forskning og forkynnelse". Jervell 1978 ,
114;111. The tendency among some orthodox theologians to accept such a division can be traced back to Köhler 1896, who gave up to find the historical Jesus; i.e. the Jesus of 'Historie' (cf. n. 1 above), and concentrated on the Jesus of 'Geschichte'; the Jesus of the faith of the early Christian communties. The real Christ thus becomes the preached Christ.
21. See Fuller 1980, 8.

22. So e.g. Günther Bornkamm, a follower of Bultmann: "Certainly faith cannot and should not be dependent on the change and uncertainty of historical research." Bornkamm 1979, 9. Cf. Jervell 1978, 112: "Man kan aldri ved hjelp av vitenskapelige midler begrunne eller legitimere den kristne tro. Like så lite som man kan fornekte og avvise den på et slikt grunnlag."
23. Cf. James Robinson 1959, 44: "The historical Jesus as a proven divine fact is a worldly security with which the homo religious arms himself in his attempt to become self-sufficient before God, just as did the Jew in Paul's day by appeal to the law. ... To require an objective legitimization of the saving event prior to faith is to take offence at the offence of Christianity and to perpetuate the unbelieving flight to security, i.e. the reverse of faith."
24. Gadamer 1981, 295 ff.
25. Another example of this attitude is found in the song 'Pressing On' in Dylan 1980: When his former friends after his conversion demand him to "show them his (Jesus') sign", Bob Dylan's answer is: "What sign may that be, when it all comes from within?"
26. Cf. O' Collins 1978, ch. 1; 7-40.
27. "The fact that Jesus can be made an object of historicoscientific research is given with the incarnation and cannot be denied by faith, if the latter is to remain true to itself". Astrup Dahl 1962, 161, quoted in Moule 1967, 78; n.2.
28. Such an explanation would then have to exclude a bodily resurrection. However, science may, now or in the future, provide help to understand the transformation and the continuity between the risen life and the old earthly existence of Jesus, e.g. by some elaboration of man's genetic structure. Cf. O'Collins 1978, 76-81. Maybe the distinction between 'natural' and 'supernatural' ultimately will be unwarrented? Etymologically a 'miracle' (Latin 'miraculum', or 'mirari') is an object of wonder, a marvelous event (J.M.Thompson 1912, 1), or a wonderful work or supremely gracious act of God (John Robinson 1977, 108). But even if God was the agent who caused this event to happen, that does not necessarily exclude a 'natural' description of the event, cf. below, ch. 2.2.
29. 'Truth' is used in the Bible in many ways, one being correspondence with the facts of the matter. Cf. Thiselton 1980, 411-415. This naturally brings up the whole problem of how to decide whether propositions in general, and biblical propositions in particular, correspond with the facts. My point here is to clarify the view of the Bible that is implied in a historical interpretation of the resurrection. This view would acknowledge the Bible not only as a place where a person can 'encounter' God, but also as a place where one can read and cognitively comprehend communicated knowledge from God to man. The sound herumenentical principle of interpreting each unit or text according to its individual literary form or genre (cf. below, ch. 7.3.2) still stands. The basic idea is that God, through the Bible, has communicated with man (created in His own image) in a way which gives man precise, if not exhaustive knowledge about both transcendent and immanent reality. To define revelation exclusively as symbol and myth is to push the concept of God in the direction of 'the wholly other', beyond precise description in subject-object language. The Bible is thus seen as a book whose main body is characterized by concrete, realistic descriptions of distinct content. This would give the reader "a publicly accessible tradition of behavior and language-uses" (cf. Wittgenstein II), especially by "the Old Testament accounts of God's saving acts in the life and traditions of Israel." Ibid., 444.
30. The very conception of a bodily resurrection may seem irrational: "Tertullian expects the idea of Christ's suffering, death and resurrection to shock his readers; he insists that "it must believed, because it is absurd! (De Carne Christi 5.)" Pagels 1981, 5. Unless we employ

a physicalistic or naturalistic world-view, however, this is not a necessary conclusion. There are different standard of rationality available, cf. J. Smith 1979, 47 ff.

31. I refrain from writing the 'historical game' or the 'game of history' instead of 'historical inquiry', because of the Wittgensteinian connotations of 'game'. According to the fideism of the later Wittgenstein, every language-game is absolutely true given its own rules; there is no common ground between the different language-games of, say, historical inquiry and religion. Cf. Wittgenstein n.d., 57. I do not accept fideism, nor 'hard perspectivism', cf. below, ch. 5.3.

32. Cf. e.g. Collingwood 1980, 9: "What kind of things does history find out? I answer, res gestae: actions of human beings that have been done in the past." So also Beard 1959, 140: "History as past actuality includes..... all that has been done, said, felt and thought by human beings on this planet since humanity began its long career." Collingwood contrasts this kind of historical writing to a theocratic one; in which "humanity is not an agent, but partly an instrument and partly a patient, of the actions recorded", and to myth; "which is not concerned with human actions at all", and whose recorded divine actions are not dated in the past, but in a dateless past which is so remote that nobody knows when it was". Collingwood 1980, 15. Cf. above, note 2.

33. Seip 1983, 110, can be understood to imply such a view, when he states that the sociological perspective of historical inquiry is an enemy of religious belief. Cf. below, ch. 3.3: n. 77.

34. E.g. Langlois & Seignobos 1897/1912, 178/207: "L'existence du diable serait inconciliable avec les lois de toutes les sciences constitu≠es"./"The existence of the devil would be irreconcilable with the laws of all the established sciences."

35. The problem of the relationship between events and conditions has been accentuated through the more structurally oriented historical research of the 'histoire de la longue dur≠e' of Fernand Braudel in particular, and the French 'Annales'-school in general. For a Scandianvian presentation of the Annales-school, see Le Goff & Nora 1978.

2. THE CONCEPT OF MIRACLE, THE CONCEPT OF CAUSATION AND THE LAWS OF NATURE

In the next chapter I will discuss the relationship between history and the 'supernatural', focusing on historical methodology as such. In this one, however, I shall have do deal with the more philosophical and scientific aspects of the problem of miracles in history. The key concepts here are 'miracles', 'causation' and 'laws of nature'. What do we mean by a miracle? How can a miracle by caused? Are personal agents (e.g. God) able to cause events through their acts of volition, or are all events, including our own decisions, determined, i.e. mechanically caused by other events and/or by the laws of nature? And, most important; how is a miracle to be understood in relation to the laws of nature?

Morton Smith is probably expressing the view of quite a few historians when he implies that to accept the miraculous as a possibiblity in history is to admit an irrational element which cannot be included under ordinary laws of nature.1 The whole historical process is seen as a closed unity where the continuum of historical happenings cannot be rent by the interference of supernatural powers, simply bacause the activities of such agenst are contradicted by well-attested laws of nature. The historian is left powerless to deal with a situation in which anything can happen. Historical probability becomes totally arbitrary when the laws of cause and effect break down. But do they really?

2.1 A Humean Position.

David Hume certainly thought they did. In his famous essay On Miracles (1748), he argued that if anyone believes in a miracle, he does so in the face of all scientific evidence ever to be collected: "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can be imagined." (Hume 1962, sec. X; 119.) This is so because all scientific experience conforms to the uniformity of natural cause and effect, i.e. the explanation of natural events (human and physical) by means of other natural events.

According to Hume, "every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it." (Hume 1962, sec. 8; I; 93.) Any human action is a consequence of initial conditions outside our control by way of causal laws that are also outside our control.

Underlying this uniformitarian causal presupposition of both the natural and social sciences,2 is a picture of the universe as a vast machine, where all events ultimately are determined by previous events and causal laws.3 The determinist will hold that both causal propositions and those expressing laws of nature are falling under the genus nomological.4 Likewise, he will hold that if it is a necessary truth that if an agent isn't caused to perform an action, either by causal laws or by previous events, then this action isn't caused at all, and is therefore a mere matter of chance.5 But "chance", according to Hume, "is universally allowed to have no existence" (Hume 1962, sec. 8; I; 105), so either an event was caused by laws of nature or previous events, or it never existed.

To a Humean then, scientific thought reveals to us the laws of nature to which there cannot be exceptions. Still, we must recognize that science is based on induction from experience, and can therefore never give us universal knowledge that is more than probale. Hume accordingly grants the theoretical possibility of a miracle happening. But being inconsistent with the laws of nature, such an occurrence is so improbable that no possible testimony could convince us of it.

Modified in this way, a law of nature will according to Hume tell us, given certain circumstances,6 what in practice must happen. But then in a miracle what must happen, does not happen. Therefore I can either believe the miracle to have happened and thereby throw all of science overboard, or I can believe the sum total of human scientific experience to be true, as against the superstitions of religious irrationalism. This is how I read Hume, and given those options, 'The Will to Believe' of a William James would be of little comfort for me. An irrational or anti-scientific faith is a poor faith.

2.2 Some Middle Ground on Miracles and Laws of Nature.

But I do not accept the options given by Hume. The main reason has to do with the concept of 'laws of nature'. One way of avoiding the dilemma altogether would be to reinterpret a miracle as a conjunction of natural circumstances which is so unexpected and improbable compared with the expected cource of events that the religious believer might see in it a supernatural ordering of circumstances.7 And if a natural law had denied the possible occurrence of such

an event, this would only mean that the law had previously been inadequately formulated and needed revision. Since natural laws are statistically based, i.e. their predictive character are based on past observation, they should be modified whenever new evidence suggests so. All the same, we are still within the borders of natural events, and Humes's principle of universal uniformity of cause and effect as a requirement of science has not been challenged.8

Of course, it is quite possible, and by no means irrational, to interpret natural events, be they expected or unexpected, as results of God's agency. This is a choice between metaphysical assumptions; either a naturalistic (or agnostic) or a theistic (or deistic) one. There might even on the whole be better reasons for accepting one of them, but as far as this argument goes, my initial problem remains. What about a miracle which is unexplainable within the natural order9, as the alleged resurrection of Christ? God's action is here theologically understood as 'direct', cf. Acts 3:15, Romans 6:4b, as opposed to where his action is restricted to the establishment of the initial conditions of natural events.10 Is this very concept of miracle irrational, or at least scientifically impossible? I think not. Even if a miracle was a violation of a law of nature, it would only be an impossibility within the natural order, not an unqualified impossibility. A Christian, from his own perspective, could say that God, the omnipotent author and sustainer of that order, is not bound by it; He is free to act outside its constraints as well as within.

2.3 An Anti-Humean Position

But more important here is to ask why it should be against our actual scientific experience to believe in miracles? Can the scientific enterprise, as such, allow for the possibility of interventions by God? If it cannot, a case for the historicity of the resurrection would be doomed, from a scientific point of view, before it ever got started. But there is no need to regard God's direct action on the world as a violation of a law of nature in the first place.11 It all depends on the forms that laws of nature take. If scientists were able to specify unqualified sufficient conditions, any direct action of God would be a violation of the law. But scientists, as scientists, have never been able to do that.

The most we so far are ever justified in accepting, is a law that specifies what must consequently take place in the absence of any other relevant factors than those specified in the law. To say that such and such will happen under appropriate conditions implies that part of what is meant by appropriate conditions is that other things remain equal (the 'ceteris paribus' clause). No scientific law has ever been able to take account of all possible influences. It has never been shown that in a particular instance the outcome was causally determined in the last detail. Thus it can hardly be claimed that the law will be violated if a divine outside force intervenes, since the scientific laws make (implicit or explicit) provision for interference by outside forces unanticipated by the law.

To make this argument complete, one also has to dispense with Hume's deterministic notion of causality.12 Contra Hume, we may very well reject the absolute regularity of natural causation, i.e. universal causation by laws of nature or previous events. Likewise, one may reject the idea that if an event isn't caused by other events and/or the laws of nature, then its occurrence is merely a matter of chance. The reason is that there is a very real posibility that events in the physical world have been caused simply by an agent's undertaking to do something. The performance of such an action by the agent in question is not something that

just happens to him or her, even if the same action was not caused by laws of nature or previous events. The action happens because the agent decides to make it happen.

In a non-mechnical world-view, acts of volition thus have causal efficiacy. They may form the starting point in a causal link, without being themselves determined by something else. Events in the physical world which seem unexplainable through 'natural' causation may thus be caused by a supernatural agent's (e.g. God's) undertaking to do something, without overriding neither the laws of nature nor the concept of causality.

I guess any critic at this point would protest to say that this is not the sort of outside force scientists normally envisage in their work. Of course not. But so what? The important thing is that they cannot, on any scientific basis, suppose that science has identified or can identify all the factors that can influence the outcome it studies. Therefore scientists likewise are in no position to specify in advance what outside forces they are prepared to recognize; i.e. they cannot as scientists exclude any possible outside force, like God. What science can do, and normally does, is to restrict its field of research to whatever natural causes can be found. And if some given evidence seems to be unexplainable within the natural order, then that should only remind us that the scientific enterprise by no means is dependent on the idea of a universal 'closed system' of natural causes, as Hume, Bultmann and others would argue.

In saying this, I should acknowledge the possibility that future developments might place us in a position where a unified science might state unqualifiedly sufficient conditions, which would make any belief in miracles ('supernaturally' understood) irrational or antiscientific. However, "I take the dream of a unified science in which all possible influences are systematically integrated to be just that, a dream." (Alston t.b.p., sec. III, last sentence.)

NOTES

1. See M. Smith 1968. For similar positions, cf. e.g. T.A. Roberts 1960, 172; Bultmann 1960, 291 f.; Bloch 1953, 135 f;, Harvey 1967, 15 and Erslev 1975, fi94; 92. A somewhat more open stand is taken by Dahl 1976, 70-71. For a historical exposition of the problem of miracles, see C. Brown 1984.
2. Cf. Hume 1962, sec. 4; I; 48: "All reasoning concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses." Cf. Flew 1967, 350.
3. Cf. Plantinga 1984, 265.
4. Cf. Flew 1967, 351f.
5. Cf. Plantinga 1984, 266f.
6. These circumstances include not only the material, but also the psychological: "According to Hume, we act on beliefs caused by nature. A belief about a matter of fact (or a value judgement) 'is the necessary result of placing the mind in (certain) circumstances'. The sceptic then claims that all statements of matter of fact 'are evidently incapable of demonstration', but they are capable of proof, in the sense that they can be supported by such 'arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.' ... The criterion of 'proof' is, however, psychologistic ... and this psychologism is indistinguishable from justificationist psychologism. The Humean separation of theory and practice is in fact a separation of a sceptical theory and a dogmatist practice based on 'morally certain hypotheses'." ... "Humean psychologism... joined forces with dogmatism: human reason may not give assent to Newton, but human nature must. But then the study of (unchanging,

external, universal) human nature will lead us to a theory of (monolithic) 'healthy' belief." Lakatos 1978a, 200f; 221.

7. Cf. C. Brown 1976, building upon Swinburne 1970.

8. Cf. Flew 1967, 352: "Perhaps the historian may ask himself whether the nomological propostion that precludes this event is after all true. It could, in priciple at any rate, be further tested. If, as is possible, it were shown to be false after all, then perhaps the event so strongly evidenced did indeed occur. But by the same token,that event could now no longer be described as truly miraculous. This,surely, is what has happened in the case of so many of the reports of astonishing psychosomatic cures, which Hume himself, in his capacity as a historiographer, too rashly dismissed (e.g. .. sec. X of his first Enquiry)."

9. Once again bearing the reservation in mind that the distinction between 'natural' and 'supernatural' ultimately may be unwarranted, through an ever widening of our understanding of what is 'naturally' explainable. Still, as the matter stands today, I find it appropriate to use this distinction in order to clarify how different positions oppose each other.

10. For an elaboration of this point, see Alston t.b.p.

11. Cf. ibid. My concluding view on miracles in relation to laws of nature which I present in ch. 2.3 is heavily dependent on Alston's article. For a similar position (very briefly stated), see Pannenberg 1965, 135 and Pannenberg 1977, 98.

12. Cf. Plantinga 1984, 267f.

3. HISTORICAL METHOD, SOURCE CRITICISM AND 'SUPERNATURAL' EVENTS

Having argued that miracles in nature are possible from a scientific or philosophical viewpoint, the question remains whether that would render the task of a historian completely arbitrary. Morton Smith puts it this way: "The historian does require a world in which these normal phenomena are not interfered with by arbitrary and ad hoc divine interventions to produce abnormal events with special historical consequences. This is ... a matter of ... professional necessity, for the historian's task ... is to calculate the most probable explanation of the preserved evidence. Now the minds of the gods are inscrutable and their actions, consequently, incalcuable. Therefore, unless the possibility of their special intervention be ruled out, there can be no calculation of most probable causes there would always be an unknown probability that a deity might have intervened." (M. Smith 1968, 12.)

Smith gives the historian two options; either to calculate the most probable explanation of the preserved evidence or to claim that a deity might have intervened. I would suggest that we stick to the first option, but in a way which does not make the conception of the historically possible so narrow that events which may be inexplicable through "the (coherent) web of natural causes and consequences" (M. Smith 1968, 13) are excluded a priori. I am not arguing for accepting such events by way of reference to some deity. A Christian would therefore have to say that the resurrection of Jesus has no historical cause.

I will thus in the following argue for a historical methodology whose main concern is to explain the evidence and thus reconstruct the past, applying critical, but non-positivistic1 rules of source criticism where necessary. Stressing the empirical element in historical research, I oppose the principle of analogy being used in a dogmatic way to a priori exclude non-analogous historical events. Given sufficient historical evidence, a critical historian can apply a limited principle of analogy (indeed, he must do so) and still be able to conclude that historically inexplainable events actually seems to have taken place, if no other historical reconstruction fits the evidence.

3.1 The Method of Historical Inquiry.

So how is the method of historical inquiry basically to be understood? How does the historian decide what the factual evidence is, and what its relationship to the actual past is? The old-fashioned way was to concentrate on the reports found in the various documents, and then treat them as small pieces of the actual past itself. Any historical account thus had to be based on the explicit testimony of contemporary or at least primary sources.2 The basic problem such a historian was facing was how to decide whether a certain piece of testimony should be rejected as false or accepted as true. In order to decide upon such matters he depended on what was seen as the neutral technique of source criticism.

To Ch. Langlois and Ch. Seignobos, the French authors of the famed handbook on historical method written in 1897, the historian was not restricted by the explicit testimonies of primary documents. Once he knew which testimonies were true and which were false, he should be able to make his own conclusions regarding matters which did not have to be explicitly mentioned in the primary sources. Nevertheless, Langlois & Seignobos were in line with the 'oldfashioned' methodology in one important aspect. Both 'schools'3 believed that their

treatment of the evidence would leave the historian with a collection of individual propositions about the past. These individual propositions would then form the basis of the construction of a synthetic account of the particular subject, where the latter more or less naturally gave itself from the individual facts themselves, independent of any subjective perspective of the historian himself.4

From this perspective of historical method,5 the goal of an objective universal historical account, written once-and-for-all, was clearly achievable. Such an account was 'hidden' in the sources themselves, ultimately consisting of all true statements in all historical documents, and could be discovered through the 'cleansing' of source criticism.6 Technical source criticism, in the sense of testing the reliability of historical reports or testimonies, was thus seen as basically identical with historical method itself.

R.G. Collingwood labeled this method as "scissors-and pastehistory" (Collingwood 1980, 257), where excerpts from a source is either put in the scrap-book or consigned to the waste-paper basket. Before Collingwood, however, the Dane Kristian Erslev had already introduced a broader outlook on historical method, where the historian was allowed a somewhat more active function. To Erslev, historical evidence could be treated in two different ways, depending on what kind of question the historian had in mind.7 In addition to the old way of asking whether a certain report was true or not, the historian could treat the report as an event in itself, and ask what this remnant revealed of its author, his interests, perspective, social and political environment etc., independent of whether the report was true or not.8

But even if Erslev allowed the historians to base their theories not only on the trustworthy parts of historical reports, but also on their own direct inferences from the sources (utilized as remnants) to the actual past, he nevertheless continued to view source-criticism as a basically technical tool, which excluded subjective influences and guaranteed the same objective results as in other sciences, e.g. biology and astronomy.9 And although he stated that historical inferences were based on the historian's present experience of life (ibid., fi92); that the sources were not enough in themselves, the historian had to bring in the scientific knowledge of his own time;10 so that the whole process of historical research was ultimately made dependent on the presuppositions of the historian, his understanding of man and his world view ("Menneskekundskab og Verdensforstaaelse", Erslev 1975, fi˘96), he nevertheless still upheld a basic distinction between the way the historian established single historical facts, and the way he formed a synthetic, integrating account of his subject.11

The different pieces of historical knowledge, although pieces of a mediated kind of knowledge,12 thus make up the hard, firm brickstones of the historian's building, both the old one of Langlois & Seignobos, and the more recent one of Erslev. A jig-saw puzzle is perhaps an even better analogy.13 The different pieces are the different historical facts, cleansed through the purgatory of technical source-criticism,14 so that its true surface may appear, and the historian may put them together in the right way. Thus one may claim that history is a science, insofar as historians follow the strict canons of the critical method, and refuse to give in to the temptations of a subjective analysis. 'Facts are sacred, opinion is free.'

Neither the old historical method of exclusively utilizing historical reports, nor the more modern one of also exploiting the same sources as remnants, do in themselves necessarily imply a positivist theory of history however, where a mechanical source criticism will establish 'brute' historical facts, ¢ la Langlois and Seignobos15, Erslev and Lauritz Weibull16. In the following I shall describe a sound historical method, as I see it, focusing on the

'remnant'-aspect of historical sources ¢ la Erslev, but in a way which tries to replace the technical or positivist flavour Erslev gave to it with a more balanced view, where objective, empirical 'data' and subjective, theoretical perspectives can be distinguised in principle but never quite separated in practice.

It may be a necessary ingredient in the work of any historian to critically establish the trustworthiness of a testimony, but in the opinion of most modern historians it is not his essential function. His aim is not to reveal or explain the past on the basis of his sources. It is rather the other way around: To reconstruct the past in a way which explain the sources as rationally as possible.17 Confronted with ready-made statements about a certain subject, the historian should primarily ask himself what this statement means. I.e., what light is thrown on the subject by the fact that this person made this statement, meaning by it what he did mean?18 Statements are here primarily not treated as factual statements, but as evidence; "not as true or false accounts of the facts which they profess to be accounts, but as other facts which, if the historian knows the right questions to ask them, may throw light on those facts." (Collingwood 1980 275.) This methodological difference, as Erslev pointed out, is not due to the attributes or characteristica of the sources themselves, but corresponds to two ways in which a historian may wish to make use of them; i.e. as reports and as remnants.

In forming a theory or hypothesis of the past, a historian may or may not include 'reliable' excerpts (depending on whether they are contemporary, firsthand, independent of other sources, confirmed, etc.) from different sources. Our source-critical judgments concerning the reliability of historical reports, however, are also based on a causal way of reasoning, (as when we utilize sources as remnants). The historian will try to find explanations of certain elements in the documents, e.g. inconsistencies. Certain forms of agreements between documents are explained by assuming some kind of dependency between them, while in other cases the fact that one document confirms the report of another can only be explained by assuming that both reports tell the truth.19

My point here is to distinguish between the formation of a theory and its confirmation (understood in a broad sense). It is confirmed when the historical past (as described and narrated by the historian) explains, or makes sense of, the relevant historical evidence (as described and assessed by the historian). In other words: Historical theories and historical evidence are supposed to mutually explain each other. The event is here seen as the reason or (non-deterministic) cause for the exsistence of the evidence.20 We can then define certain 'data' as relevant 'data', explainable through our historical hypothesis, and relevant as products of that particular part of the past which we are interested in.

It is therefore not decisive whether the theory confirms the statements of a testimony, but whether it makes the testimony, as an event in itself, meningful.21 The fact that there may be special cases where the testimony is meaningless unless its statements are true does not imply a return to the 'scissors-andpaste'-attitude. Source criticism, in the sense of testing the reliability of a certain report, forms a necessary part of the picture. But the historian should also be able to explain why a certain agent understood or expressed the situation in the particular way he did. It is not enough that the exposition of the historian is not contradicted by those statements which seem reliable from the point of view of source criticism.

Written sources exhibit not so much unrelated facts as a unified purpose; an integrated view where the different parts make sense because of the purpose or function of the source as a whole.22 A successful historical reconstruction will thus be able both to identify this function,

taking into consideraion its different, maybe (seemingly) inconsistent parts, as well as to explain it in relation to the 'actual' historical situation (as the historian sees it). The purpose or bias of the source and the truth of its statements are not independent of each other. Their relation must be made explicit.

This historical method does not reach the past more 'directly' than the 'scissor-and paste' variant. We still have to settle for thoughts about the past, but it is the historian's own thoughts and his own conclusions that decide the matter, not those of more or less reliable witnesses. Or, to put it in other words, historical facts have to be established by an active inquiring subject; the historian. They are never simply given through the application of a technical method which supposedly is able to do away with the influence of the inquiring subject. A truly historical way of reasoning is referential;23 built upon a logic of questions and answers.24

Evidence is evidence only when it is contemplated historically, i.e. when one critically asks what the statement meant in its particular historical setting. For what purpose was it written, and what light does this throw on our historical problem? If we focus exclusively on whether something is literally true or not, we risk throwing away statements which might otherwise reveal quite important information about other matters, if approached by a different question. There might even be a well-established way according to the custom of the time it was written of saying something which the historian, through ignorance of that custom, does not automatically recognize as its meaning. All these considerations suggest to me a historical method broader in perspective than both the strictly 'yes-no business' of the old 'scissors-and-paste' approach, and of a postivist historiography which requires the establishing of hard facts through a strictly technical or intersubjectively neutral purification of the sources.

3.2 Rules of Source Criticism.

This does not imply that the canons of source criticism are to be disregarded. They form an essential and useful tool, even in a 'functional' perspective, where the sources can de dealt with in different ways, depending on the historian's questions.25 The aim of source criticism is to (1) examine documents as to their origin, including restoring the original form of wording if necessary (external or 'lower' criticism), and to (2) examine statements as to their meaning and thrustworthiness (internal or 'higher' criticism).26 Source criticism should be seen as an auxiliary, but not independent discipline. Its function is primarily critical in a negative sense, i.e. it helps the scholar to eliminate factual errors in other people's testimonies (as well as in his own work). As such it is a tool for logical and analytical reflection.27

This so-called 'historical-critical method'28 has been applied in different ways by different historians. According to the old positivistic view, a statement had to be provable if it was to be accepted. Non-provable statements were seen as worthless from the historian's point of view, although they might be true. Historical writing, in this positivistic sense, was built upon facts, and a fact was established by proof only.29 What would then constitute a historical proof? According to old authorities like C. Langlois & C. Seignobos and E. Bernheim30, and in Scandianvia, Erslev and L. Weibull,31 for a historical statement to be accepted, it had to rest upon the independent testimony of two or more reliable witnesses, which were contemporary to their subject. I may add that to a modern 'Weibullian', a historical fact can not be based upon any tendentious or biased witness.32

Other historians tend to accept those statements which we have no particular reason to doubt. We may thus accept non-provable statements in a source, unless the author disqualifies himself by contradictions or known factual inaccuarcies, if the statements otherwise fit into the generally accepted theories of the time.33 Such a basic difference in attitude is likely to produce a basic difference between adjacent historical reconstructions. Nevertheless, most historians would probably agree that the more detailed that statement is, the more it needs to be tested.34

There is further a distinction to be made between on the one hand a tendency to harmonize seemingly inconsistent parts, either in a single source,35 or between different sources,36 and on the other, to sharpen them so as to appear almost as logical contradictions, thereby downright excluding all possibilities of harmonization. Likewise one can choose to test the trustworthiness of the source 'en bloc', or its singular statements one by one. In the latter case a historian may wish to trust those parts which stand up to his standards regardless of whether there may be other statements in the same source found guilty of error. Or, he may choose to reject the source as a whole (as regards the trustworthiness of its statements) as soon as one of them is found to be incorrect.37

Even one and the same historian may apply source criticism in different ways, depending on the kind of sources he is working with, as well as his personal attitude to the prevailing historical theories. There is a necessary connection between one's view of the sources and one's view of the historical setting in which they were produced.38 When testing the date of a document, whether it is authentic or spurious, or whether its commentary on the past is trustworthy, one has to presuppose certain 'facts' about the time it was made, and the way it was made. The way we view a certain source will thus be dependent on these more general historical 'facts'.

Regarding e.g. written sources dependent on oral tradition, any historian has to make up his mind about how this tradition is supposed to have been produced and how it is supposed to have been transmitted. These considerations, which will greatly influence the assessment of the trustworthiness of the source, may be made explicit, or they may be done implicitly or hidden.39 They may have a universal character,40 or they may be limited to a particular historical environment.41

There is thus an element of circular reasoning involved between the assessment of the trustworthiness of the sources and the assessment of the historical setting in which they were produced.42 Furthermore, the sources are evaluated in dependence of both our theories about a whole lot of other historical sources, as well as of our theories about the human condition in general. The latter, for one, includes metaphysical perspectives, for example 'dead men never rise' (the laws of nature are all-encompassing), or 'dead men may rise' (the laws of nature are not all-encompassing). Instead of a positivistic craving for a non-existing Archimedes' point, isolated, provable, and independent of value-laden theoretical presuppositions,43 we need to approach source criticism as necessarily involving a more holistic view.44 The different (explicit as well as implicit) parts in a historical argument form an interconnected chain, where each part ultimately will be unable to stand alone, but requires the mutual support (to various degress) of all the others.

Let me then return to the working principles of source criticism. In order to extract what is reliable from historical testimonies, we prefer the authentic, non-spurious document which is closest in time, space and witness-relation to the subject in question. Older testimonies are

preferable to younger, a primary (first-hand) witness to a secondary45 (secondhand) witness. In case of dependence between different written documents, we prefer the least dependent one available, which hopefully does not build upon other sources, but directly reports the event itself.46

Normally we expect adapters to continually add to the original, rather than subtracting from it. This implies that the most restrained (and often least improbable) text is the oldest. Sometimes this is true, but we also know of the opposite taking place.47 A historian should not take for granted that an imitator acts in a certain way. "Ways of imitating ... vary with the individual, and sometimes with the vogue common to a whole generation." (Bloch 1953, 117.)48 What seems natural to do for me may seem rather strange to, say, a first-century Jew.

One of the most important rules of source criticism is to discriminate between those witnesses who have both the ability and intention of telling the truth, and those who does not meet either one or the other of these requirements. The discrimination is likely to be one of degrees, not a strictly yes-or-no question. It involves the 'personal equation'49 of the witness; his bias, prejudice, motives and/or personal interests towards his subject, including those persons his report describes and those intended to read it.

As to statements in contemporary sources that were publicly known, one has to assume that there was a very real limit to what the author(s) could get away with regarding distortion of the truth, since other people with firsthand knowledge would report its mistakes (unless they for other reasons were threatened to silence, or simply removed from the scene by force). Such a consideration forms an example of the internal control of a testimony.50 A historian may claim to have (positive) external control when there are statements in another, independent source which confirm the former statements.

When a source reports on matters of common knowledge, and especially when these are commonplaces, one may take the absence of contradictory evidence in other sources as another kind of positive external control. When there is reason to believe an extraoridnary matter, though commonly known, the argument from silence ('argumentum ex silentio') works the other way: If a statement of something extraordinary is not corroborated in other sources that would be likely to have mentioned it, we have a possible negative external control. Possible, because such a control presupposes two things; that we know how the relevant sources would report on such a matter, and that all these sources are available to us.51

A witness is considered interested or tendentious when either the witness himself, a friend or some cause dear to him, may benefit from a perversion of the truth.52 The historian accordingly views his testimony with some calculated suspicion. However, very few, if any,53 historical witnesses reveal no personal interest towards their subject, since a bias is a natural leaning towards one's own interests, group or ideas, and influences even those who desire to weigh all evidence fully and honestly.54 A biased person is thus distinguished from a prejudiced person, who makes up his mind on his subject regardless of the evidence, or even before it is presented.55 Such a person is not a reliable historical witness. But what about the person with an obvious bias? His testimony should be met with suspicion, but should it necessarily be rejected?

It seems dangerous to conclude that since certain statements are (or at least seems to be) in favour of the author's interest, they are not true. They might be both true and profitable to the author, his friend(s) or his cause. The fact that a certain report seems appropriate for use in a

particular situation does not mean that it was necessarily created, like a fiction-story, in that situation. Likewise, as the truth-value of a historical work is to be decided on the basis of its content, not in view of the motivation which the historian had for writing it, one would not necessarily judge a historical source untrustworthy if its author has revealed a particular motivation or interest/bias.56 This is not to say that the importance of bias should be minimalized. Any professional historian would then have to protest. His concern, by the way, is not that biased statements necessarily are false, but whether the probability of them being so is too high for him to build upon them in his professional work.

My point, however, is that our judgements concerning the influence of bias are not made in isolation from considerations of other relevant factors. To check whether a certain statement is false, we need to know more than what the author's personal bias was. A critical mind should pose a lot of inter-related questions. Was the informant an eye-witness? It not, what were his sources of information? When did he write his account; how much time elapsed between the event and the record? Does other evidence exist to confirm or disconfirm his statements? Is his information probable in view of our general impression of the informant's character? Does his information fit into our general historical knowledge of his subject?

For such a procedure to have any sense, the historian must not treat a biased witness as a priori unreliable. I disagree with a rule which demands that "the historian must remove all statements and all parts of statements which are in line with the bias of the author" (Torstendahl 1966, 106).57 Such an unqualified rule58 to me smacks of positivism, and is likely to produce too sceptical results. Whether a biased witness is trustworthy or not is likely to vary from case to case, and should thus be decided upon in each particular case.59 Still, we may state as a rule of thumb, that the stronger the bias of the source, the stronger the suspicion of the historian should be.60

To the extent, however, that the aim of any set of source-critical rules ever was to get down to those statements that were not theory-laden, i.e. which were independent of a theoretical horizon or perspective61 and conveyed nothing but hard factual information, they would only lead historians to a dead end. Human language is not connected to reality sentence by sentence, but as a whole, relative to an integrated horizon.62 This is now a generally accepted verdict even on a strict empiricist language.63 Likewise, no source-critical rule functions as a strictly factfinding device. Any empirical rule, including those that deal with the influence of bias or interest, are formed within a theoretical perspective. In a certain way, the biased statements of a particular source can only be extracted through the perspective of a different kind of bias, or of a different theoretical perspective.

No single rule of source cirticism, then, should be taken as an absolute norm (except that forgeries are excluded as factual reports of their professed subject) in isolation from other considerations. No historian will make up his mind concerning a single document or a single statement in isolation from a broader theoretical context. This context includes his expectations of what is likely to occur,64 as seen from the perspective of other historical theories about this time (non-reducable to a series of singular facts), as well as from metaphysical assumptions about reality in general.65

3.3 A Humean Principle of Analogy.

Returning to the question of miracles in history, where does this discussion leave us? Granted that a miracle is possible and does not contradict the laws of anture, and granted (for the sake of argument66) that there may be cases were the most plausible explanation of the known historical evidence (source-critically tested) is to conclude that a miracle has occurred.67 Nevertheless, does not the Humean principle ('there will never be enough empirical evidence to rationally make the case that a miracle in fact has occurred') still operate in historical research? To most historians, I think it does.68 The reason lies within the metaphysical assumptions which are entailed by their understading of historical method.69

Faced with a possible impressive case, say, for the historical resurrection of Christ, a 'Humean' historian would probably respond by asking a simple question: 'Tell me, what are the chances that a man dead for three days would live again?' The probability he assigns to the statement 'Dead men stay dead' is seen as too high for him to seriously consider a historical bodily resurrection. Even if the believer's case is strong, and even if the Humean historian cannot say what happened, the latter would still say that the most sensible position is to deny that the resurrection occurred.70

The Humean historian is here applying a notion of empirical impossibility, based upon the so-called principle of analogy, which states that all historical events are analogous to those in the present and that it is only on this assumption that statements about them can be assessed at all.71 If this principle said no more than that one might expect always to find this or that similarity between historical events despite all their dissimilarity, there would be nothing to say against it. To Ernst Troeltsch, however, it meant that all differences should be comprehended in a uniform, universal homogeneity.72 Instead of pointing out analogies from case to case, letting the available evidence decide to what extent, if any, a certain event is analogous to other known events, Troeltsch's Humean understanding of analogy takes the form of a dogmatic world view which purports to constrict historical method. It does so by postulating a fundamental homogeneity of all reality with the current range of experience and research, teaching us to see contents of the same kind in nonhomogeneous things.73

From a naturalistic viewpoint the continuity of the causal nexus will prevent any evidence to persuade us of a supernatural event having happened.74 Such a historian will find no place for it when he is arranging and relating various phenomena to each other, simply because it has no parallel and thus is unexplainable through its 'natural' antecedents and consequences (cf. the principle of correlation75). If historical explanation is reductive, proceeding exclusively by comparison of repeatable types of occurrences, then the alleged unique and unrepeatable event of a miracle must either be ignored, or reinterpreted as a purely 'natural' event, most often in psychological categories.76

This principle of analogy thus becomes an enemy of a supernaturalist religious faith.77 If so, the statement 'Jesus rose from the dead' cannot be understood as a factual historical statement. A historian who adheres to the basic ontological criteria of Newtonian science i.e. only that is considered real which correlate to its antecedents and consequences, and which is analogous to other known phenomena, and which can be causally explained 78 will conclude that the historical witnesses were influenced by religious or mythological world-views which made them make a mistake, and then deal with this mistake (i.e. their assertion of a bodily resurrection) as a historical fact that has to be explained in its own right.79

For R.G. Collingwood80 and others81, this understanding of the principle of analogy leads to a basically non-historical way of reasoning. To practically exclude the category of singularity

and the 'underivable-and-new' is to sell out to a category of universality based upon a dogmatic conception of reality. The dogmatism appears when a historian on the one hand claims that his principle of analogy is based upon the sum total of historical facts, and on the other, that no possible testimony of historical experience can make him change his view of what is possible.

I agree with this critique. Historical thinking as such requires an openness to the uniqueness and novelty of past events, and no historian should dogmatically and in advance rule out the possibility of such events. However, while a linear understanding of time makes each occurrence unique and 'einmalig', it does not make it one of a kind completely. Each occurrence and phenomenon is unique in some sense, but at the same time similar to others of its kind in another sense.82 What is unique or nonanalogous, and what is common or similar has to be decided a posteriori; on the basis of the evidence in each particular case, not a priori, through a dogmatic Humean pinciple of analogy where the evidence has no chance whatsoever of convincing the historian that something he previously didn't believe could happen, really did happen. Where the sources are silent, however, and we are left to make our historical inferences on the basis of our present knowledge and experience in general (which may vary from person to person), we rightly do so on the principle that the future will resemble the past, and the unknown the known. As John Locke formulated it: In Things which Sense cannot dicover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability." (Locke 1968, 412.)

In making a historical case for a bodily resurrection, we may therefore assume, in line with a limited principle of analogy, that in certain aspects it is similar to other events. The criteria by which we assess the testimonies regarding the resurrection faith is thus similar to those applied in other cases. Most of the terms relevant to this assessment; e.g. 'empty tomb', 'stone', 'spices', 'women', 'identification', 'recognition', 'flesh', involve and appeal to nonunique aspects of human experience. Besides, a unique historical event is incompatibe with contradictory terms.83 If not, it would be impossible to understand what we were talking about, simply because a unique event would mean anything or nothing.84

Nevertheless, a historical resurrection would challenge a naturalistic principle of analogy which assumes that every historical happening is part of an unbroken sequence of historical causation,85 it cannot be conformed to it. But in this sense the resurrection represents a problem of all historical understanding, i.e. how to understand the singular and unique86. To say that no possible evidence would convince us of miracles happening does not work, since all knowledge of historical facts should be based on evidence. Therefore, "what is true in principle in the extreme case of a miracle is true in principle of any event whatever" (Collingwood 1980, 139).87 An appeal to the uniqueness of the resurrection88 does not undercut the formalities of a historical argument.

The fact that a truly supernatural event would have no purely historical explanation89 is not a problem either, unless one wants to argue that the goal of historical explanation is some form of historical determinism in which all possible influences are systematically integrated, so that the actions of every agent are explained as the necessary outcome of their historical context.90 This is a very problematic understanding of the historical inquiry, however, and is certainly not entailed by the very concept of historical explanation.

When a historian has to decide whether some evidence defy a 'natural' explanation or not, he is not only concerned with the evidence itself, the 'brute' facts of the matter. He is also a philosopher, applying a world-view based upon a certain 'form of life'.91 What we consider to

be an extraordinary, and consequently doubtable event, certainly has to do with the way we look at the world, what our experiences and belief-system tell us to expect. Any historian needs to have a certain bias against accepting claims that extraordinary events have occurred. The problem, however, appears if and when well-established evidence in favor of such an event X is beginning to pile up. At what point should the bias against X be laid aside, and the claim that X has occurred be accepted? To answer such a question, one has to consider both the strength of the bias against X, the weight of evidence in favour of X, and the possibility of alternative explanations.92

Probably each individual historian would respond in his or her own particular way to a situation where the basic foundations of their belief-system were on the line. A change of basic convictions93 is rarely affected by rational argument alone. It involves one's entire personality and one's whole way of perceiving and responding to the world. And, since there are always intellectual doubts to be faced, a historian may be somewhat justified in resisting the conclusions of a challenging argument, however convincing it may seem at first sight.94 If at the outset he excludes miraculous events as a possibility, maybe no amount of historical evidence would be sufficient to necessitate belief. But if so, why take history seriously at all? This brings up the whole problem of objectivity in history; the objective existence of the actual past itself, and the objective truth of historical writing.

Excursus: On Collingwood's Idea of Historical Method.

To Robin George Collingwood,95 history is the history of thought, i.e. the thoughts of historical agents. To be able to re-think these thoughts on the basis of the available evidence, they have to be intersubjectively available. They can not be seperated from any subjective thought-process, but they may, in their purely intellectual aspect, be seperated from subjective feelings or sensations. In his 're-enactment', the historian may include other thoughts at the same time, placing it in a larger frame. His aim is to reconstruct the rationality of the historical agent's thoughts (as expressed in his actions or writings), in relation to a particular problem-situation. To the extent that the historian reaches the same conclusion as the agent, he has understood the rationality of the agent's action, re-enacted his thoughts; given a true historical explanation.

This historical method may be criticized to the extent that it assumes that all of history may be explained or understood through the rational motives of individual historical agents, cf. the 'verum factum' principle of Vico.96 To understand the past (as well as the present) we also have to take into account the tension between on the one hand the human urges for coherent life and thought, and on the other the limitation forced on all human beings by our involvement in bodily, social, historical existence. There are spritual, material and structural factors outside the control, or even the knowledge of an individual. But as the historian in his consciousness can include more than the reenactment of individual agents' thoughts, he may, by hindsight, be able to account for these factors as well. (Just precisely how is then the crucial question.)

But as Collingwood seems to identify the rationality of an action with its success, he may not be able to understand that an action may be rational, given the specific problem-situation, yet still lead to consequences that were unintended and unwanted from the same starting-point. Besides, by insisting that every problem or question has only one rational answer, Collingwood concludes that we either understand a historical action as totally rational or not at all. But an action may be rational from one set of presuppositions, and irrational from

another (although the prime aim of Collingwood is to reconstruct the particular presuppositions of the historical agent). There may be degrees of rationality to a historical action, or it may even be completely irrational. The historian should consider it his task to account for both.97 NOTES

1. By positivistic methodology I shall mean a method which will settle for 'hard' facts and nothing less. Positivism in historical research has otherwise been connected to the search for specifically historical laws, cf. e.g. the dialectical historical materialism of Marx and Engels. As to general laws in history; laws which might govern the particular events of the past, see Hempel 1942. E.g. ibid.,
35: "general laws have quite analogous functions in history and in the natural sciences."
2. "Den ældre (skole) ... kan ikke komme bort fra, at historikeren som grundlag for sin oppfattelse alltid må have et samtidigt eller dog primært kildested, hvor nettop denne bestemt udtales; quod non est in actis, non est in mundo." Arup 1930, 47-48. ("The older school was stuck with the historian's obligation to base his judgments on a contemporary or at least a primary source, where this judgment would be firmly expressed; what is not in the sources, is not in the world.")
3. According to ibid., Langlois & Seignobos were exponents of the 'new' French-critical school, while historians like Aage Friis and Vilhelm la Cour belonged to the 'old' German-critical school. Cf. Jens Chr. Manniche: Tysk kritisk skole og fransk kritisk skole, in Christensen et al
1979, 203 ff.
4. "The materials of Historical Construction are isolated facts." Langlois & Seignobos 1912, xxiii, III, I, 1. Cf. ibid., book 3.
5. This position is labeled as 'source-positivism' ("kildepositivisme") by Thorborg 1977, 2.
6. "History is only the utilisation of documents... When all the documents are known, and have gone through the operations fit for use, the work of critical scholarship will be finished." Langlois & Seignobos 1912, 315.
7. Erslev 1975, fi 6; 6: "Forskjellen i Virkeligheden ligger i vor forskellige Maade at benytte Kilden paa."
8. Erslev 1975 (written 1926) was, according to Dahl 1966, 6, the first to distinguish between the sources in this way. A testimony exploited as evidence (in Collingwood's sense) is in Norwegian called a 'levning' (remnant). Exploited as a factural historical statement it is called a 'beretning' (account, report), cf. Dahl 1976, 37-39 and Langholm 1977,
29-53. The Swedish equivalence is 'kvarlevor' and 'tradition' (Renvall 1965, 85) or 'kvarlevor' and 'historiska påståenden' (Torstendahl 1966, 73-88). The Danes use the same terms as the Norwegians, cf. Clausen 1968, 61f., except Erslev, who talked about 'Frembringelse' on pair with 'Levninger', cf. Erslev 1975, fi 53-64; 63-75. As for German and French literature (cf. Dahl 1966, 9-11), the relevant distinctions of Droysen 1868, 14-15 (fi 21-26) were 'Ueberreste', 'Denkmöler' and 'Quellen'. Bernheim
1908 distinguishes between 'Ueberreste'; "alles, was unmittelbar von den Begebenheiten übriggeblieben und vorhanden ist" (ibid., 255), and 'Tradition'; "alles was unmittelbar von den Begebenheiten überliefert ist, hindurchgegangen und wiedergegeben durch menschliche Auffassung" (255 f.). Bauer 1961, 328 f., prefers 'Zeugnis' to 'Tradition' ("die Zeugnissen wören unterzuteilen in a) kontrollierte, b) unkontrollierte"). Langlois and Seignobos 1897 had basically one category; 'documents', which was defined as "les traces qu'ont laisses les pensees et les actes des hommes d'autrefois" (ibid, 1). ("The traces which people of the past have left concerning their thoughts and actions.") Of different types of documents, Langlois and Seignobos concentrated on 'textes'. The equivalance to 'levning' in English is 'evidence'

according to Collingwood, cf. e.g. Collingwood 1980, 257. His term for 'beretning' is probably 'source'; ibid., 259. His key point, however is that all historically relevant material should be dealt with as evidence, with no room for a separate category ¢ la 'beretning'. Barzun and Graff
1957, 133, divides the evidences of history into 'records'; intentional transmitters of facts, and 'relics'; unpremediated transmitters of facts. Nugent
1973, 54, distinguishes between '(primary) sources' and '(secondary) material or commentary', while Seip 1983, 11, translates 'levning' into 'event'.
9. Erslev 1975, fi 97; fi 40. Cf. Erslev 1921, 505; 506: "Kildekritikken leder os frem til det enkelte historiske Faktum ... Medens Kildekritikken er ejendommelig for Historien, nettop fordi Historiens Ejendommelighet er, at den sysler med det forbigangne, er det næppe under Historikerens videre Arbejde nogen Metode, der er særegen for ham. Hvad han kan udlæse af de enkelte Fakta, gør han ved en mere eller mindre stringent Benyttelse af de Metoder, som hersker i de Videnskaber, der behandler samme Genstande i Nutiden som i Fortiden; han er skiftevis Psykolog, Jurist, Økonom osv." ("Source cirticism leads us to the singular historical fact... While source cirticism is peculiar for history, just because the peculiarity of history is that it deals with what is of the past, there is hardly any other method which is peculiar to the historian in his further work. His conclusions based upon sigular facts are reached through a cogent employment of those methods which are used in sciences which deal with the same objects in the present as in the past; he is alternately a psychologist, lawyer, economist etc.") Erslev's successor as professor in Copenhagen, Erik Arup, put it this way: "Historikerens arbejde går ud på af de samtidige eller dog primære kilder gennem kildekritikk at udsondre sikre kendsgjerninger, ud fra hvilken han skriver sin skildring og danner seg sin oppfattelse af begivenheder og personer, uansett om denne hans oppfattelse allerede er formet i ord i en eller annen af selve de samtidige eller dog primære kilder, hvilket alltid vil bero på en tilfældighed, eller ikke." Arup 1930, 48. ("The work of the historian is to excrete brute facts from contemporary or primary sources, from which he writes his description and forms his understanding of events and persons, independent of whether this understanding already has been put in words in one or another of the contemporary or primary sources, which always will be a matter of coincidence.")
10. Erslev 1975, fi 92; fi 94. Cf. ibid., fi 94; 92: "Historikeren kan ikke nøjes med selve Kilderne; allevegne maa han medinddrage sin og sin Tids Viden og Videnskab", and Langlois & Seignobos 1912, 317: " History must always combine the knowledge of the particular conditions under which the facts of the past occurred with an understanding of the general condition under which the facts of humanity occur."
11. This position is labeled as 'fact-positivism' ("kendsgerningspositivisme") by Thorborg 1977, 4. To Erslev, technical source cirticism formed only the introductory part of historical method. "Den må ikke forveksles med den Fremgangsmaade, historikeren må følge for at bearbejde Fortiden videnskabeligt." Erslev 1975:, fi 97;94. ("It must not be confused with the line of action the historian must take to work with the past scientifically.") Cf. note 3 above; Erslev 1921, 506. Distinguishing between "begrunnelse av elementære beskrivelser" ("the basis of elementary descriptions") and "begrunnelse av sammenfattende beskrivelser" ("the basis of summarizing descriptions", Langholm 1977, 54-68, contra Erslev, saw the latter as being somewhat more dependent on each historian's particular presuppositions than the former was, see ibid.,
68. Seip, by the way, finds it impossible to draw a line between the establishing of historical facts on the one hand, and on the other, the rest of the historian's work; see Seip 1983, 121.
12. "The indirect method of history is always inferior to the direct methods of the sciences of observation." Langlois & Seignobos 1912, 207. "Man kunde sige, at den historiske

Undersøgelses Teknik overhovedet er Tekniken ved middelbare Iagttagelser." Erslev 1975, fi 98;95. ("One could say that the technique of historical inquiry overall is the technique applied to mediated observations.")
13. Cf. Skovgaard-Petersen 1972, 9. She applies this analogy, not only to the old "naive" methodology as Erslev does in Erslev 1975, fi 73;81, but also to Erslev himself. The basically pro-Erslev Thorborg 1977, 1-4, confirms, with some qualifications, that Erslev is a proponent of the same basic 'jig-saw puzzle'-methodology. Erslev 1975, by the way, has been called "a Bible to our profession" ("en bibel i vårt fag") by one of the top authorities among Norwegian historians; Seip 1981!
14. "A historical "fact" may thus be defined as a particular derived directly or indirectly from historical documents and regarded as credible after careful testing in accordance with the canons of historical method." Gottschalk
1963, 140. For a very influential 'fact-positivist' methodology (regarding singular historical statements) in Scandinavia, see Weibull 1948b, written in 1913. This method was applied in his 'paradigmatic' work; Weibull 1948a, written in 1911. For a modified Kuhnian (cf. Kuhn 1970) interpretation of Weibull and the Swedish 'historical school', see OdÆn 1981, especially 50, and OdÆn 1975. If the 'historical-critical school' (with its positivist influence) is a research-tradition which replaced an earlier tradition (cf. Liedman 1975), it may consequently itself be succeeded by a different tradition, cf. Helge Paludan: Planer og planløshed i kildearbejdet, in Christensen et al 1978, 133. (Cf. the discussion between different research programmes regarding the historical Jesus, below; ch. 6-8.) A more modern Scandinavian textbook basically in line with the radical critical method of Weibull is Torstendahl 1966.
15. To Langlois and Seignobos, "the only sure results of criticism are negative." Langlois & Seignobos 1912, xxiii; II, VII, 2. The statements of authors, taken singly, could not rise above probability.
16. Thorstendahl 1964, 357; 363 ff., and other places, showed that the new easpect of the method of the Weilbull brothers in Sweden in the early 1900s was not their source criticism per se, but the way they tied it to the theory of historical inquiry as a pure science: A historical exposition had to be built upon strictly provable facts, and nothing less.
17. Cf. e.g. Langholm 1977, 17.
18. The historical text is thus used as evidence to identify the author's intended meaning. The latter and the meaning of the text itself may differ, however. (Cf. Hoy 1982, 25-35.)Other evidence than the text may be used to identify what the author had in mind when he wrote the text, e.g. his actions or statements about him by persons who knew him well.
19. Cf. Dahl 1984, 33.
20. Cf. Poulsen 1972. Dahl 1966, 5, mentions four possible ways of exploiting a source ('kilde'); (1) as part of a whole, (2) as effect of a cause, (3) as part in a goaloriented activity (produced by human intention), and (4) as a report, account ('beretning'). Cf. his definition of a source ('kilde') as "a specific and available observation-datum, understood as a remnant, a trace or a product of a past situation, which can be used to, test, or give reasons for our answers to historical problems." Ibid. ("Et konkret foreliggende observasjondatum, oppfattet som en rest, et spor eller et produkt av en fortidig situasjon, som kan utnyttes til å prøve eller begrunne svar på historiske problemer".)
21. Cf. Poulsen 1972, 71.
22. Cf. Renvall 1965, 112 and ch. 4 and 5, passim.
23. Cf. Collingwood 1980, 252.
24. Cf. Collingwood 1978, ch. V; 29-43.
25. The 'absolute' (non-functional) perspective on historical sources presupposed that the characteristica of a source could be defined or classified once and for all, implying a more or

less 'absolute' evaluation of its significance as historical evidence, while the 'functional' perspective sees all historical propositions as answers to specific questions, questions which are relative to specific pro blems and specific presuppositions. Cf. Nilsson 1973, 173 f., and Uffe Østergaard: Forord; Indledning, in Christensen et al 1979, 6f.; 17.
26. Cf. Hockett 1963, 14.
27. Cf. Dahl 1966, 3.
28. For a list of different meanings of this ambigous term, see Baasland 1981, 218 ff.
29. Gottschalk 1963, states that "any document should be regarded as guilty of deceit until proven innocent" (144), since "the common human inability to see things clearly and whole makes even the best of witnesses suspect" (153).
30. Ibid., 166, is here referring to Bernheim 1908, 195f.;
545, and Langlois and Seignobos 1912, 199-205.
31. Cf. Erslev 1975, fi 70; 71; and OdÆn 1975, 196; on Weibull.
32. See Torstendahl 1966, 105-107, cf. below; note 44.
33. Regarding to what extent the Norse sagas can be seen as trustworthy historical testimonies, Blom 1970, 229, claims (maybe too hesitantly) that where there is no obvious misunderstanding, literary construction or anachronism, a historian should be allowed to trust a later, single unconfirmed testimony, if warranted by our general knowledge of the subject. ("Der det ikke foreligger en åpenbart misoppfattet overlevering eller en like åpenbar litterær konstruksjon eller anakronisme, mener jeg det med reservasjoner må være tillatt å bruke en ikke-kontrollerbar beretning, dersom denne synes rimelig utfra hva man ellers tør slutte om forholdene i tiden.") Sveaas Andersen 1977,
24, confirms that few modern historians working on early Norwegian history have applied the radical source criticism of L. Weibull in their practical work with the Norse Sagas. Maybe the 'paradigmatic' effect of Weibull 1948a has been more of a theoretical kind than practical?
34. Cf. e.g. Dahl 1976 , 71, and Torstendahl 1966, 94.
35. E.g. by referring to the function of the source as a whole, c.f. Renvall 1965, 114.
36. This necessarily involves the question of (in)dependency between the sources. In order to harmonize seemingly in consistencies between them, one should be careful not to take any answer to this question for granted.
37. So L. Weibull, cf. OdÆn 1975, 191f. For the whole of this paragraph of mine, cf. Dahl 1970, 199.
38. Cf. Renvall 1965, 172 f.
39. L. Weibull is an example of the latter case, see OdÆn
1975, 201.
40. So Curt Weibull and Charles Seignobos, according to ibid.,
201f.
41. An example of such a theory is Gerhardsson 1961, 1964 and
1977.
42. Cf. below, ch. 6-8, where the 'Bultmann School' requires a radical source-critical approach to the gospels, because they are seen as basically non-historical constructions, even if the sources for the historical Jesus and the early church mostly are identical. Likewise, 'Historic Christianity' views the gospels as basically trustworthy, applying source criticism in a different way than the other 'research programme'.
43. The roots of this 'craving' go back to the inductivist program of Francis Bacon, where the choice and combination of facts were unproblematical and presuppositionless. The established theories of the scientist (and of the historian) which guided his research were thus ignored. Cf. Nilsson 1963, 142. A 'scissors-and-paste method' ¢ la L. Weibull may easily fit in here. What basically matters is "an evaluation of the sources on objective grounds" ("en på objectiva grunder fÃretagen vördesöttning av köllorna"), Weibull 1948b, 427, which to

Weibull meant that not only the falsity has to be proved, but also its correctness: "Finnur Jonssons ord, att det måste krövas positiva bevis fÃr att vad skalderna meddela ör oriktigt, tål en omkastning. Det måste i regel krövas bevis fÃr att vad de meddela ör riktigt." Ibid., 458. Weibull's evaluation tells us to copy only those statements which are confirmed by two independent, contemporary witnesses, who in their testimonies reveal no personal interest ('tendens') in the matter, and then put these together. Cf. OdÆn 1975, 196.

44. In this particular sense I would say that any historical reconstruction will in itself expose a certain 'world', 'lebenswelt' or 'being-in-the-world'. To go even further in a commentary, to claim a holistic perspective (of whatever kind) is not necessarily to approve of the 'New Age Paradigm'. According to Wilber 1982, 265: "Reality is not holistic; it is not dynamic, not interrelated, not one and not unified all of these are mere concepts about reality.... to say that all things are one is just as dualistic as to say that all things are many." (Ch. 10; 249-294: Reflections on the New Age Paradigm: A Conversation with Ken Wilber.) Instead, what the New Age Paradigm is about is the reality described by perennial philosophy. "The perennial philosophy ... the transcendental essence of the great religions has as its core the notion of advaita or advaya "nonduality", which means that reality is neither one nor many, neither permanent nor dynamic, neither separate nor unified, neither pluralistic nor holistic. It is entirely and radically above and prior to any form of conceptual elaboration. It is strictly inqualifiable." Ibid., 249f. For a 'New Age' perspective on cosmology through modern physics, with Gestalt-theoretical affinities, see Capra 1983.

45. For this use of the primary-secondary distinction, see Gottschalk 1963, 53.

46. The question of how historians decide whether one source is dependent upon another, i.e. which one is the most original, is very relevant in the case of the resurrection narratives in the NT, cf. below; 7.3.1 and 8.2. Here I will only make a few remarks on the general problem of dependency: When external criteria, such as relative dates, are lacking, one has to make use of the internal characteristica of the objects of the texts through a psychological analysis. When there is a similarity word by word, sentence by sentence, or paragraph by paragraph, it seems obvious that at least one of the documents lacks originality in these parts. And sometimes there are mis takes that cannot be explained unless one assumes that a certain text has been duplicated. As to common topics of content, common structure of exposition or motives in the text of more literary sources, these factors will for some historians (cf. Torstendahl 1966, 98-101) point towards dependence. Whether this dependence amounts only to stylistic forms, or whether it also includes the empirical content of the statements is a more open question which to me cannot be answered in isolation from other considerations.

47. See Bloch 1953, 117.

48. Cf. the conclusion reached by E. P. Sanders on the development of the post-canoncial synoptic tradition. It developed in opposite directions, became both shorter and longer, both more and less detailed, and more and less Semitic. The form of these traditions therefore gives no clue as to their relative dates. Cf. Sanders 1969, 272 ff.

49. "The ability and willingsness of a witness to give dependable testimony are determined by a number of factors in his personality and social situation that together are somethimes called his "personal equation", a term applied to the correction required ... to allow for the habitual inaccuracy of individual observers." Gottschalk 1963, 148.

50. Cf. Renvall 1965, 119.

51. As to the argument from silence, cf. Gottschalk 1963,
162f., and Erslev 1975, 88.

52. Cf. Gottschalk 1963, 156.

53. Cf. Torsteindahl 1966, 105: "Mycket få beröttelser fyller kravet om att inte vara tendentiÃsa." ("Very few reports meet the requirement of being non-interested.")

54. Cf. Gottschalk 1963, 156f.: "Studium and odium, bias for and bias against, frequently depend upon the witness's social circumstances and may operate in a fashion of which he himself may not be aware. It becomes important to the historian to know what the witness's Weltanschauung (or "frame of reference") may be, as well as his religious, political, social, economic, racial, national, regional, local, family, personal and other ties (or "personal equation"). Any of these factors may dictate a predilection or a prejudice that will shade his testimony with nuances that otherwise might have been absent." Or rather, I might add, that otherwise would have been replaced by another set of the same factors, only of a different shade.
55. Cf. Hockett 1963, 55.
56. Cf. Marshall 1977, 172f., and Dahl 1984, 105.
57. The Swedish test runs like this: "historikern måste såla bort de påståenden och delar av påståenden som ligger i linje med fÃrfatterens tendens." Edwien 1978, 26, brings this position towards its logical conclusion regarding the historical Jesus: "En skulle tro at når en kirke forlanger at vi ... skal vurdere og ta stilling til Jesus person og til kirkens maksimale titulasjon av ham, så måtte den i det minste kunne gi oss full anledning til personlig og direkte, på objektivt grunnlag altså uten disipler og andre tilhengeres formidling å kunne ta fritt og selvstendig stilling til alle sider ved hans personlighet!" (The latter italics mine.) (Edwien is therefore incosistent, when he in ibid., 31, confirms that the synoptic account of Jesus' teachings is historically trustworthy.)
58. His only exception to this rule is when two reports of opposite bias conveys the same piece of information, cf. ibid., 107.
59. Cf. Fink et al 1978, 19.
60. Cf. ibid., 18.
61. A theoretical perspective is here understood as being nonreducable to whatever empirical content it conveys.
62. Cf. Quine 1951 (reprinted in Quine: From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univeristy Press, 1953,
20-46).
63. Carl Gustav Hempel puts it this way: "The cognitive meaning of a statement in empiricist language is reflected in the totality of its logical relationships to all other statements in the language and not to the observation sentence alone." Hempel 1952, 181. The best alternative to positivism, or objectivism, is in my opinion not relativism, but a realist, 'soft' perspectivism which would take the theory-ladenness of all empirical propositions into consideration, but still hold a place for the empirical evidence to decide between competing theories, as Imre Lakatos does in his 1978a and 1978b. For a stimulating discussion of modern aspects of this epistemological problem, see Bernstein 1983.
64. Such an expectation should in any case not be applied too rigidly, otherwise, nothing unusual or unexpected would ever be allowed to have occurred in history! Cf. Bloch 1953, 120f.
65. Cf. Dahl 1976, 70f.; 70f.
66. This is in one way misleading, since if a miracle is impossible in light of naturalistic presuppositions, there just could not be, theoretically speaking, any evidence for it, as far as people who ascribe to naturalism is concerned. Cf. Danto 1965, 107.
67. Hume himself refers to cases which seem to come close to this, see Hume 1962, 128 ff.
68. According to R. F. Atkinson, " history does operate within a secular conception of the possible which excludes the event some people believe to have happened on the first Easter Day." This is not meant as a metaphysical statement, but as a conventional principle of method: "I do not deny that a religious believer may, quite consistenly, employ an extended,

'supernaturalist' criterion of the possible; my present point is only that he will not find it already there." Atkinson 1978, 91f., cf. T.A. Roberts
1960, 173. Remember though, that what this 'secular' historian finds 'there', fellow 'secularists' have already placed 'there'.
69. Two obvious candidates in his discussion are naturalism and supernaturalism (cf. the definitions in Davis 1984,
154). A naturalistic world-view can be roughly defined by the following statements: (1) Nature (including man) alone exist. (2) Nature is eternal. (3) Nature is uniform. There are no non-natural events (e.g. miracles); rather, nature is regular, continuous. (4) Every event is explicible. In principle at least, any event can be explained in terms of nature or natural processes. A supernaturalistic worldview would hold that (1) something beside nature exist, viz. God; (2) that nature depends for its existence on God; (3) that the regularity of nature can be and occasionly is interrupted by miraculous acts of God; and (4) that such events are humanly quite unpredictable and inexplicable.
70. For an exposition of this view, see Davis 1984, 153 ff.
71. Cf. Bradley 1968, and Harvey 1967, 5, referring to Troeltsch 1913 and 1914. See especially Troeltsch 1913,
731ff.. Thus ibid., 732: "Analogy with what happens before our eyes and what is given within ourselves is the key to criticism. Illusions, displacements, myth formation, fraud, and party spirit, as we see them before our eyes, are the means whereby we can recognize similar things in what tradition hands down. Agreement with normal, ordinary, repeatedly attested modes of occurrence and conditions as we know them is the mark of probability for the occurrences that the critic can either acknowledge really to have happened or leave on one side. The observation of analogies between past occurrences of the same sort makes it possible to ascribe probability to them and to interpret the one that is unknown from what is known of the other." (Translation taken from Pannenberg 1970, 43f.)
72. Troeltsch 1913, 732: "an omnipotence of analogy. ... a fundamental homogeneity of all historical events, which, to be sure, does not amount to identity, buth rather allows all possible room for distinctions, although in general it presupposes each time a core of homogeneity in common, from which the differences can be grasped and felt." (Translation in Pannenberg 1970, 45f,)
73. Cf. ibid..
74. Cf. Davis 1984, 154. So e.g. Flew 1967, 351: "For it is only and precisely by presuming that the laws of nature that hold today held in the past and by employing as canons of all our knowledge or presumed knowledge of what is probable or improbable, possible or impossible, that we can rationally interpret the detrius of the past as evidence and from it construct our account of what actually happened." Generally, of course, this is true, but regarding unique, possible miraculous events, Flew's position turns into a dogmatic naturalism since for him, "a miracle involves an alleged overriding of a law of nature". Ibid., 347. (Which I have argued it doesn't, see above; ch. 2.3.).
75. To Ernst Troeltsch, the principle of correlation focused upon the relatedness and interdependence of the phenomena of man's historical life. Historical explanation would therefore necessarily take the form of understanding an event in terms of its antecedents and consequences; no event could be isolated from its historically conditioned time and space. Cf. Harvey 1967, 15. The immanent uniqueness of, say, a literary work is thus denied, in so far as the work is reduced to a sociohistorical product of its antecedents and its milieu, cf. Hoy 1982, 131.
76. Both Rudolf Bultmann and Willi Marxsen deny a historical understanding of the resurrection-event when they interpret the resurrection faith. Thus Bultmann: "Ja, der Auferstehungsglabe ist nicht anderes als der Glabue an das Kreuz als Heilsereignis, als das

Kreuz als Kreuz Christi." Bultmann 1948, 50. ("Indeed, faith in the resurrection is really the same as faith in the saving efficiacy of the cross, faith in the cross of Christ.") And Marxsen: "Talk of the resurrection is an interpretation designed to express the fact that my faith has a source and that source is Jesus. ... Jesus is risen in that his offer meets us today and in that, if we accept it, he gives us this new life." Marxsen 1979, 143; 184.

77. "De religiøse opplevelser og former må oppfattes som psykologiske og sosiale fenomener, og studeres som sådanne. Man kan nok tenke seg at denne innstilling det sosiologiske moment ved historieforskningen i det lange løp må være en farligere og dyperegående fiende av religiøs tro enn den mere spesielle kildekritikk." Seip 1983, 110. (Kirkelig historieteori og kirkelig historieforskning. Reprinted from Historisk Tidsskrift (Oslo) vol. 33, 1944) ("Religious experiences and forms must be understood as psychological and social phenomena, and studied as such. One may see this attitude the sociological element of historical research as in the long run a more dangerous and profound enemy of religious belief than the more limited source criticism.") Seip gives us an example of what such an attitude can result in when he in the same article (which is really a review of a history book on the first missionary organization in Norway) asks why the missionary-movement in Norway broke through as a mass movement relatively early. His answer is rather different from the answer which the author of the book, John Nome, gave, namely that the people involved had been awakened to the missionary command found in the NT. Thus Seip: " 'Ideologier' av denne art, som ikke står i åpenbar sammenheng med et eksistensgrunnlag, kan være hensiktsmessig å betrakte som tomhetsfenomen. Noe skal folk ha å tenke på. ... Misjonstanken ... gav ... et grunnlag for samvær, et motiv for handling og et system av tanker som det kunne leves på. .... etter en lang depresjonstid gav nu et økonomisk overskudd kraft til å tenke på annet enn det nødtørftige utkomme. Og i denne situasjonen kunde hedningemisjonen ha en egen appell." Ibid, 131. ("It seems suitable to view 'ideologies' of this sort, which is not obviously related to any basis of material existence, as an expression of a void, or lack of activity. People need something to think about. The missionary movement provided something to gather around, a motive for action and a thought-system to live by. After a long period of economic depression, the new economic growth now gave people the power to think of something else than their basic material needs. In such a situation, gentile mission was a thing to catch on to.") There are certain similarities to Geertz here; cf. above, ch. 1; n. 17-18, although Seip has his own particular materialist flavour. For a psychological explanation of the missionary activities of the earliest Christian churches, see Gager 1975, ch. 2, where he applies the theory of cognitive dissonance. As to Nome's deeply reflected view on historical criticism and writing, and its relationship to the Christian faith, see Kolsrud & Nome 1943, Nome 1943 and Nome 1947. For an American historian whose position on this matter is close to Nome, see Russell 1962.

78. Cf. Nome 1966, 49.

79. Cf. Collingwood 1980, 138, referring to Bradley 1968, Cf. ibid., 107f: "To be critical we must stand on our own experience, that an extended experience is ours when we make it, and that the matter of testimony, where it does not become ours in such a manner as to be valid of itself and directly, must be valid and ours indirectly by an inference from the basis of our present knowledge. Such conclusion is an analogy,and by a mere analogical argument you cannot conclude to a non-analogous fact."

80. See Collingwood 1980, 138-140.

81. E.g. Niebuhr 1957, ch. VI; 162ff.

82. Cf. McIntire 1980, 5, and Dahl 1956, 77f.

83. A paradox, however, like 'Jesus is both God and man', is not a logical contradiction. On paradoxes, see Valen-Sendstad 1979, 85f.

84. Besides Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction (both A and non-A cannot be true at the same time and place), cf. also the philosophical 'principle of non-vacuous contrast', which states that for a term to have any meaning, we must be able to compare and contrast it with its oppostive. If there is no contrast to a unique event, simply because it is compatible to any set of terms, then a historian, for one, can make nothing out of it. Cf. Fischer 1970, 99f.
85. Cf. David Friedrich Strauss: "All things are linked together by a chain of causes and effects, which suffers no interruption." Strauss 1970, fi 14; 59. And Rudolf Bultmann: "the historical method includes the presuppostion that history is a unity in the sense of a closed continuum of effects in which individual events are connected by the succession of cause and effect", a continuum that "cannot be rent by the interference of supernatural, transcedent powers." Bultmann 1960, 291 f. To Bultmann, the belief in miracles and the belief in, say, electric light, is a matter of either-or: "Man kann nicht elektrisches Licht und Radioapparat benutzen, in Krankenheitsföllen moderne medizinische und klinische Mittel in Anspruch nehmen, und gleichzeitig an die Geister-ˇund Wunderwelt des Neuen Testements glauben." Bultmann 1948,
18. ("It is impossible to use electrical light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the NT world of spirits and miracles.") Van A. Harvey seems to agree, see Harvey 1967, 114 f.; 229.
86. To answer that "the historian is not really interrested in the unique, but in what is general in the unique" (Carr
1980, 63) is no solution to this problem, only a denial of its importance. Likewise, a 'fideist' position which applies a Humean principle of analogy within 'ordinary' history, but not to the NT because the latter is seen as the authoritative Word of God is a sort of schizofrenic solution as far as historical methodology is concerned. An example of this is Wisløff 1984: "Som historiker opererer jeg også med loven om kausalitet og loven om analogi. For eksempel: Når beretningen om Hellig Olav forteller at han helbredet tungen til en mann som hadde fått den kuttet av, da tror jeg ikke på det, men betrakter det som en legende. Men når jeg i evangeliene leser at Jesu mor ikke hadde forbindelse med noen mann, så tror jeg det fordi jeg leser det i Den Hellige Skrift". I would say that neither the reported miracle by St. Olav nor the virginal conception of Jesus should be judged untrue, historically speaking, a priori. The matter would have to be decided on the basis of the sources as a whole, and even if a historian has to conclude that the evidence far from allows him to view the event as historically established, they might still be true. A Christian historian can thus believe in the virginal conception of Jesus without being an intellectual schizofrenic. (For a critical evaluation of the historical tradition of the virginal conception of Jesus, see R. Brown 1973, 21-68.)
87. Cf. Pannenberg 1970, 49; note 90: "Does not the postulate of the fundamental homogeneity of alle events usually form the chief agrument against the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus, for example? But if it is so, does not the opinion, which has come to be regarded as virtually self-evident,that the resurrection of Jesus cannot be a historical event, rest on a remarkable weak foundation? Only the particular characteristics of the reports about it make it possible to judge the historicity of the resurrection, not the prejudgement that every event must be fundamentally of the same kind as any other."
88. Even if there were a basis for a category including several bodily resurrections (the resurrection of Jesus is not the only one reported in the NT; cf. John 11; Mark 5:35 ff.; Acts 9:36 ff., and there are reports of similar occurrences in recent literature, cf. Koch 1972, 54f.. To decide upon the trustworthiness of such reports, however, is not my business here), the resurrection of Jesus Christ, through its theological significance, should not be subsumed under such a general class of resurrections, cf. Richardson 1964, 215-217. As the definite act

of salvation, it is, so to speak, "uniquely unique" (ibid.) Its uniqueness does not concist of its "novelty of arrangement" alone, but also of its "intrinsic newness" (Popper 1945, 84). Besides, the resurrected Jesus did not die again, the other people reportedly raised from the dead obviously did; the were merely temporarely resusciated.

89. "Although it was an event in history, Jesus' resurrection had no antecedent historical cause a sequence which the historian assumes. ... The Resurrection meant the radical transformation of the body of Jesus from the world of nature to the world of God. Nature knows of no bodies like Jesus' resurrection body: it was utterly unique. History has no analogy for it." Ladd 1976, 125.

90. Cf. Tracy 1984, 32.

91. For a discussion of how history and philosophy are related, see Næss 1972.

92. Cf. Davis 1984, 149.

93. McClendon and Smith 1975, 7, define a conviction as "a persistent belief such that if X (a person or a community) has a conviction, it will not easily be relinquished and it cannot be relinquished without making X a significantly different person (or community) than before."

94. Cf. Mitchell 1973, passim, where he makes a case for a rational, cumulative justification of basic convictions. Human judgment, not stricly logical rules, is seen as the final arbiter between competing systems of belief.

95. Cf. Collingwood 1980, pt. 5.

96. Cf. Jay 1981.

97. Cf. Skagestad 1977, 28-37.

4. HISTORY AS OBJECTIVE REALITY OR LITERARY CONSTRUCTION?

Part of my basic concern in this work is to inquire into the truth-claims of the resurrection faith in the NT. To ask whether a certain historical statement is true or not, however, involves the question of whether history exists objectively in itself, independent of human consciousness about it, or whether, even if it does, it is unknowable as such. If the actual past is unknowable in principle, then my inquiry into the historical basis of the resurrection faith would simply be undermined.

First, I would at the very outset have to settle for the linguistic or literary characteristics of the resurrection narratives, to see what personal and communal needs were revealed in these sources. The question of what reason a historian might have to accept or deny a historical resurrection of Jesus would then simply be irrelevant, or rather, impossible. And secondly, my own work would have to be viewed as a purely literary construction within the 'historical' genre, not as, among other tings, a discussion of the historical resurrection faith of people in the Middle East in the first century A.D. The objective existence of history is thus a rather fundamental topic, and needs to be considered at some length.

4.1 Idealist, structuralist and post-structuralist positions.

Is history objective? Can historical writing describe the objective external reality of the past, or is it primarily a construct of the human mind, in the sense that the past is unknowable in itself? According to Kantian idealism, reality is not so much non-existent as 'noumenal'; impossible to describe in itself. To philosophers of history associated with the 'new idealism', as Hayden White1 and Peter Munz2, this means that the historical past is not so much a purely fictional construction as unidentifiable outside of constructed accounts.13 An historical account, in this view, is constructed by filtering the chaotic jumble of raw data, i.e. the reports of witnesses and other historical evidence, through some a priori set of criteria which determine what sorts of entities and relations which will be recognized as real.4 If the raw, or 'brute' data are in a chaotic jumble, then the concept of an unmediated historical process becomes absurd. Historical narratives are functions of our cognitive sensibilities only, rather than of any attempt to depict the past as it actually happened.5

Hayden White's works focus on the use of literary 'tropes'; forms of comprehension and expression, or linguistic deep structures that enable "different strategies for constituting "reality" in thought" (H. White 1978, 22).6 At the same time he is reluctant to abolish the notion of knowledge of an independent, real world,7 as Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida persistently do. Nevertheless, White's contention that "there is no way, finally, to check stories about the past against the fact of the matter" (in Randall 1984, 31) seems to have certain affinities with the closed, self-referential schema of structuralism ° la Roland Barthes.8 Barthes speaks of "the referential illusion" of historical discourse, which is a "confusion of meaning and referent" (Barthes 1970, 443; n.10). The referent 'outside' of historical discourse can never be reached. A historical 'fact' exists only in the language of the historian. When he or she asserts that so and so was the case, then the only meaning conveyed is that the historian is making this assertion.9

Michel Foucault argued that "the stage of 'things themselves'" had to be suppressed (Foucault 1972, 48). Instead of "the enigmatic treasure of 'things' anterior to discourse," one should substitute "the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse" (ibid., 47).10 With post-structuralist writers like Foucault and Derrida, we see the conscious refusal to elevate

any types of representation over any other. Representations can never refer to an objective reality outside, or independent of themselves, they are all equally illusory.11 It is the act of appropriating the 'fact' that makes it 'factual', nothing else.12

If we were to follow what Foucault claims to be his own critical principles, we could not ask whether his statements are true or false, whether his interpretations are valid, or whether his reconstructions of the historical record are plausible. This is so because Foucault denies the concreteness of the referent, and rejects the notion that there is a 'reality' which precedes discourse and reveals its face to pre-discursive 'perception'.13 History written with a 'realist' flavor is a delusion.

Jacques Derrida goes even further through his deconstructionism. To deconstruct a text, or a discourse, "is to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies." (Culler 1983, 86.) The philosophy asserted is logocentricm, whose concern is with truth, rationality, logic and the 'word'. Its hierarchical oppositions include truth/fiction, reality/appearance, literal/metaphorical, signified/signifier, speech/writing, where the left-hand term is the prior one. The text is undermined, or deconstructed, when the logic of the argument is demonstrated to 'undo' itself through a central paradox or self-contradiction. Derrida's strategy to undermine logocentrism is first to reverse the hierarchy by showing that the right-hand term is really the prior term, i.e. the left-hand term is only a special case of the right-hand term, and then displace or restitute the entire system of values expressed by the classical hierarchical oppositions.14

The crucial point for Derrida is that the meaning of any text, including a historical document, can never be a simple presence, something given in and of itself, but is always part of a system of 'traces' and contrasts which exceeds any present instant.15 This may sound somewhat familiar to the basic insight of Saussure, that language consists of a system of elements whose qualities or essential functioning depend on the differences between the elements of the system.16 However, from the Saussurian fact that the elements function the way they do because of their relations to other elements, it does not follow that "each 'element' phoneme or grapheme is being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain of the system," nor that "nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere simply present or absent." (Derrida 1981, 26.)17

How, then, is the post-structuralism of Foucault and Derrida to be appropriated? Foucault's conception of culture as magical, spectral and delusory18 was obviously accepted by Foucault himself, but does that make it valid? And what about Derrida's deconstructionism? To be able to tell us that any text under closer scrutiny really 'explodes', i.e. to re-contextualize a certain meaning in the sense that it is seen to undermine itself, is to imply the very same metaphysics of presence, simply in order to communicate the meaning of the deconstructionism itself.19 But does that make deconstructionism invalid? Derrida is aware of this irreducible paradox of his own postion,20 yet he continues to deconstruct. Foucault was aware of his specific rhetorical notion of language,21 yet he didn't elaborate his theory in order to validate it. And why should he? Why should anyone ask for a validation of anything? Why do I want to ask the question "Did Jesus really rise from the dead, or did his disciples only believe so?" ?

The reason has to do with the difference between truth and falsity, a difference which to me is both theoretical and practical. John Searle thinks that the problem which led Derrida into claiming that "there is nothing outside of the text (there is no outside-text; il n'y a pas de hors-texte)" (Derrida 1976, 158) is the old search for foundations; metaphysically certain

foundations of knowledge, foundations of language and meaning. Derrida is correct that there are no such foundations of knowledge, but then makes the fatal conclusion that truth and reality therefore is undermined and lost.

But why should they be? Even if all our factual propositions, including our historical descriptions, are infused with our linguistic and social practices, and thus unseparable from theory, that does not mean that each historian is 'creating' his or her own past by a free play of linguistic imagination. His theories are restricted by the evidence history has left us, evidence of historical reality. History 'as it actually was' can still be seen as an independent factor. The truth of the past is simply what was, is and will be the case, whether or not anyone can believe or validate it. If an historical assertion is true, it is true forever.

Basically this is a matter of choice. We do not have any blueprint of the universe, nor any a-historical perspective on the sum total of history. But neither do we have a basis for dismissing all our scientific and historical theories as equally unrelated to the Truth of the matter, for the same reason. I think the bottom line is how we, both individually and socially as a community, experience the world in our everyday life. If our experience tells us that we can basically trust our senses and our critical judgments, that there is a very real and practical difference between truth and falsity, then I, for one, would like to believe that our conceptual framework is able to fit the world. If not, language may well be seen as arbitrary, as a prison-house from which there are no windows to anything 'out there', only mirrors reflecting our own minds.

4.2 Realism.

Realism is a philosophical position which distinguishes between what is subjective in the sense of being 'ours', and what is objective in the sense that it exists independent of us. History thus exists independent of the historian, and insofar as he is able to gain knowledge of history, his knowledge is one of objects or processes that exist independently of his own thoughts; i.e. his historical writing.

This kind of historical knowledge is attainable in principle when, to use Kantian language, the mental categories are seen as forms of things-in-themselves (noumena) as well as forms of thought, or of things as they appear to us (phenomena).22 The universals which historians employ in ordering the different empirical particulars, i.e. in making sense of an otherwise chaotic flow of basic sense-impressions, are held to be inherent in sensible experience itself. It is in this view misleading to argue, ¢ la Munz 1977, as if historical writing is a construction on top of an incoherent mass of chaotic particulars of evidence. To observe a discrete particular of historical evidence, as e.g. the information in a source that NN was 'paying rent', is already to have become conscious of how different aspects of simple facts relate to each other and make a particular piece of information meaningful. To say that NN is 'paying rent' doesn't make sense apart from a certain system of rights and duties.23

The point is that relations and connections are ingredient within the simplest of historical facts, they are not imposed upon them in a purely theoretical way, as if the facts themselves were devoid of them. That would be to presume that the world consists of discrete 'raw' (non-theoretical) bits that can be fused only by the superordinate, meta-empirical powers of the human mind.24 On the contrary, it is precisely because even the most basic sense data are infused with our linguistic and social practices that a realist can maintain that order or form is not so much imposed upon the data, as discovered in it. The logical inseparability of

observational and theoretical terms does not imply their dissolution into the imagination (contra empiricism and logical positivism).

How, then, is the form of some evidence, like 'paying rent', to be specified, to be described? The realist's answer25 is that form itself cannot be specified. The only way to indicate form is to do it indirectly, through the descriptive representation of the parts that make it up. At this point, however, an idealist would probably protest and reply that the notion of description is quite problematic. To specify form, one is dependent on a correct description of its parts. But description itself is not a descriptive notion. To the idealist it is an abstract, non-empirical criterion which purports to distinguish between legitimate empirical accounts and so-called interpretations, thus begging the question through an a priori notion of description.

The realist has to concede that the notion of description is not itself a descriptive notion. How, then, can we describe how our descriptions describe what they claim to describe? The realist's answer is that we cannot. The criterion of description is really unstateable, it is presupposed by descriptive narration but is not itself an item that can be described in such narration26. A historian can describe something truly or falsely, but he cannot describe how it is that he can truly or falsely describe it. All he can do is to invite the idealist to experience the primitive representational power of certain statements by saying: "Look at this case, and that case", and so on. The realist has in this sense no 'outside' standard to judge his representations. To say that the standard simply is the facts of the matter is to beg the question, since the very problem just is what the facts are.27

All he can do is to invite any inquiring person to look at the appropriate evidence and see for themselves whether the representations of the historian display the truth-value they purport to display. Having said this, one should still bear in mind that historical writings are not reducible to atomic propositions that correspond to discrete impressions or sense data (as the empiricist notion of knowledge would require). The representational power of historical descriptions may therefore vary quite a bit. Rules of source criticism and theories of verification or falsification are thus vital 'to see for oneself' whether the evidence matches an historical account or not.

4.3 The relation between past and present.

To Leon J. Goldstein,28 the fact that historical evidence is not simply reproduced, but critically assessed and thus marshalled into theoretical constructs, is taken to mean that the past itself is theoretically constituted by the agreed principles of historical method, i.e. non-existing apart from these principles. Since no body of historical evidence is naturally ordered (i.e. all set to be simply reproduced by the historian), Goldstein concludes that historical writing does not describe any past existing independently of it.29

Jack W. Meiland's 'contructionist' theory of history30 shares the same fundamental aim of Godstein's 'constitutionist'-theory, namely to make sense of historical writing without assuming that the historian is trying to discover facts about an independently existing realm of past events. To Meiland, the historian is rather trying to tell a coherent story that accounts for the existence and nature of presently existing objects, namely, historical documents. By giving an account of those parts of the world which indicates something about the past, the historian is giving a coherent account of the present world rather than of the world in the past. In this sense the goal of historical writing is to construct accounts of the past that will answer to present interests, as Benedetto Croce stated it.31

Goldstein seems to mistakenly equate realism with empiricism. I see no reason to deny the historian the possibility of gaining true knowledge of the past simply because his work involves theoretical procedures. So does all human knowledge. The alternative of a simple reproduction of historical evidence 'as it is', is naive. We cannot conceive of history (or anything) without organizational schemes, nor of historically organizing schemes apart from specific human interests.32 This is true also regarding the cognitive content of the historical documents themselves. Any historical witness employs a kind of organization of the topic on which she or he is reporting. To demand that a historian should abandon any rules of historical method is impossible. The fact that any historian does employ methodological criteria or organizational schemes is no evidence that the actual past is thereby made unknowable.

I think the basic, and, in my view, false assumption of Meiland and Goldstein(and others)33 is their almost water-tight distinction between history-as-actuality and history-as-record. To consider historical evidence as a mere trace or imprint of past events which are themselves finished or done with, is to distinguish between evidence and event in an arbitrary way, as if evidence were a contingent and inconsequental by-product of some original but no longer present event.34

The past and the present is distinguished from one another, but they are not to be divided into two quite separable compartments. When we experience the present world, we always do so in a logical and causal context which is connected with past objects and events, and hence with reference to objects and events which we cannot be experiencing at the time we are experiencing the present.35 The past, in this sense, is thus existing in the present in a direct and material sense, even if the past may be layered-over, distorted, or partially erased.36 We simply could not experience the present as we do if we did not also know the past. To say that all we experience is the present is to assume, falsely, a temporally neutral sort of experience. Time itself is not a stream of ever-vanishing moments of temporal units. It is rather to be seen (as in modern physics) as a function of events, events which include the temporal aspect of both past and present.

NOTES

1. See H. White 1973 and 1978. For a discussion of 'The New Idealism', cf. McLennan 1981, 81 ff.
2. See Munz 1977. To Munz, empirical experience is but a chaotic flow of temporal particulars which cannot be made coherent except by subsumption under non-empirical, nontemporal universals. Cf. ibid., 36.
3. Cf. McLennan 1981, 85f.
4. Cf. Kuzminski 1979 b, 319.
5. Cf. Kuzminski 1979 a, 61.
6. For an explication of how four different tropes fit in to a chart of explanatory strategies, see H. White 1973, Introduction; 1-42, especially 29.
7. "To say that we make sense of the real world by imposing upon it the formal coherency that we customarily associate with the products of writers of fiction in no way detracts from the status of knowledge which we ascribe to historiography.... If historians were to recognize the fictive element in their narratives, this would not mean the degradation of historiography to the status of ideology or propaganda." H. White 1978, ch. 3: The Historical Text as a Literary Artifact; 99.

8. See Barthes 1970. However, if it is senseless to ask of ordinary, first-order historical narrativies whether they are true or false as accounts of real past events, "then it seems equally senseless to ask of White's or any other second-order meta-historical narrative whether it is true or false as an account of real first-order historical works. For White's work also displays the 'referential illusion'; it too is written as if it were a descriptive account ... of certain 19th century historians and philosophers." Kuzminski 1979b, 325, on H. White 1973.
9. Barthes 1970, 153-154
10. My italics. Regarding his history of madness (Foucault 1965), the 'later' Foucault denied that this is to be seen as a 'realist' historical work: "In the descriptions for which I have attempted to provide a theory, there can be no question of interpreting discourse with a view to writing a history of the referent. We are not trying to find out who was mad at a particular period, or in what madness consisted, ... We are not trying to reconstitute what madness itself might be." Foucault 1972, 47. For a critique of Foucault's position regarding historical writing, see Megill 1979.
11. Cf. Kuzminski 1979b, 321.
12. Their positions can perhaps be seen as a variant of 'creative antirealism', which according to Plantinga 1984, 269, is presently popular among philosophers. Creative antirealism is the view that "it is human behaviour in particular, human thought and language that is somehow responsible for the fundamental structure of the world and for the fundamental kinds of entities there are." Ibid.
13. Cf. H. White 1979, 85.
14. Cf. Culler 1979, 159 and Searle 1983, 74.
15. Cf. Culler 1979, 159. In Derrida's own words: "The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and of itself, referring only itself. Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not present." Derrida 1981, 26. For an example of how Derrida's deconstructionism can be applied to biblical texts (the Gospel of Mark), see Kermode 1979, especially ch. 5; 101-124. Cf. Greenwood 1983.
16. "Phonemes are characterized not, as one might think, by their own positive quality but simply by the fact that they are distinct. Phonemes are above else opposing relative and negative entities. ... In language there are only differences." Saussure 1960, 119-120.
17. My italics.
18. Cf. H. White 1979, 114.
19. For a deconstruction of deconstructionism with the appropriate technical language, see Searle 1983, 78.
20. Cf. Culler 1979, 174-175.
21. Cf. H. White 1979, 114.
22. For an explication of this crucial point, see Hackett 1982, 46 ff.
23. Cf. Passmore 1982, 151.
24. Cf. McLennan 1981, 75.
25. See Kuzminski 1979b, 338ff.
26. Cf. Wittgenstein 1974, 26: "4.12: Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it logical form. In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world. 4.121: Propositions cannot represent logical form, it is mirrored in them. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the

logical form of reality. They display it." There are works in modern semantics, however, which try to do the very thing Wittgenstein thought was impossible, i.e. to describe the logical form of description. See Barwise & Perry 1983.

27. In one important sense, then, we employ both the correspondence and the coherence theory of truth; a factual proposition is accepted; (1) if its truth-value is displayed, and (2) if is coherent with our total body of accepted propositions.

28. Cf. Goldstein 1976.

29. "No experimental sense is to be made of the claim that in choosing his subject the historian makes assumptions about its reality. Such "reality" as it has is always the outcome of his intellectual labors." Ibid, 58.

30. Cf. Meiland 1965, especially ch. 11; 189-199.

31. First and foremost in Croce 1921. In Croce 1955, he developed this theme into the contention that history must be considered primarily as the history of liberty, which operates through all human events.

32. Cf. Danto 1965, 111.

33. For a clear example, see Beard 1959, 140.

34. Cf. Kuzminski 1979b, 344.

35. Cf. Danto 1965, 93.

36. Present factors tend to distort our statements about the past, but likewise, also "past factors tend to distort our experience of the present." Ibid., 94.

5. HISTORICAL WRITING AS OBJECTIVE TRUTH OR RELATIVE PRESPECTIVISM?

In one way, doubt about the reality of the past is too general to be argued against in a direct way. It may be extended to any premises from which one seeks to negate it, including those mentioned above. But if so, its generality makes it insignificant and it is reduced to "a rather pointless recommendation to change our normal way of speaking." (Atkinson 1978, 53.) In the following, I shall presuppose that the proper object of historical writing is the objectively existing historical past. The question then is, can historians, in practice, attain objectively, i.e. inter-subjectively true accounts of that past? And if so, in what sense and to what extent?1

5.1 Presuppositions and selection.

To those who use this 'normal way of speaking', the vast majority of historians are probably included.2 They still adhere to the "reality rule"; the rule that historians must and can tell "the best and most likely story that can be sustained by the relevant extrinsic evidence." The historian seeks, in short, to render "the best account of the past as it really was." (Hexter 1967, 5.) What matters is the facts of the matter, not whatever subjective theories the historian may adhere to independently of the relevant empirical evidence. This way of perceiving the relation between theory and facts in historical writing is governed by the spirit of Ranke's famous dictum, that over against attempts to stand in judgement over the past or to draw lessons for the future, the historian "will bloss zeigen, wie es eigentlich gewesen." (Ranke 1874, vii.)3

However, historical writing is not a pure chronicle of historical facts, where the historian, presuppositionless and quite passively, is merely copying any evidence that lends itself trustworthy, in the right chronological order. Even if Ranke may have been understood in this way, the 'reality rule' does not imply such a view. It is important to remember that historical reconstructions depend upon both particular sources, general historical knowledge, research made by other academic disciplines, general assumptions about human behaviour, and logical and causal presuppositions. Historical method does not consist of an assemblage of facts, each capable of being ascertained or investigated without reference to the others.4 The various possible perspectives5 and questions that are used will certainly make a difference to what the historian will conclude about what 'actually happened'.

Any written history involves the selection of a topic and a delimitation of its borders. Within these borders the historian is selecting and organizing the facts. To Charles A. Beard, this single act of selection and organization "will be controlled by the historian's frame of reference composed of things deemed necessary and of things deemed desirable." (Beard 1959, 151.) Beard's point is that historical significance is dependent upon the personal, subjective attitutdes and interests of the historian. Our entire mode or organizing the past is causally involved with our own local interests, whatever they may be.

So far, I see no reason to argue against Beard. The problem arises if and when selection is understood as necessary involving distortion. The interest and purpose of the historian are then taken as antithetical to objectivity: Every historical account is, as a consequence of unexpungeable personal factors, a distortion of how it really was,6 and hence not quite true. However, distortion is a term which logically requires its polar opposite, according to the principle of non-vacuous contrast. If we have no idea of what an undistorted statement about the past is like, what sense is there in speaking of 'distorted statements'? If we do have such an idea, then we can in principle produce instances of more or less undistorted statements, and the argument is wrong. If we can't, it is meaningless. So, either the argument is meaningless, or it is wrong.7

The fact that all historical accounts are based on certain presuppositions and that they apply criteria of selection is thus no argument against their possible truth-value, as 'hard' perspectivism would have it.8 Any inquiry is selective, and the historian has an obligation to refer only to those facts which in some way bear upon the story he is telling.9 On this background one can understand why "each age writes the history of the past anew with reference to the conditions uppermost in its own time." (F. Turner 1938, 52.) Our contemporary interests determine what we select for consideration from the past, and as these interests change over time, new aspects of past events are brought to the forefront. Nothing of importance about the nature and status of historical inquiry follows from this fact.10 A legitimate description does not have to be totally exhaustive, and different perspectives on the same event or topic, focusing on different aspects of it, do not have to contradict one another. Rather, they often prove to be complementary.

To others, however, selection raises a serious objection to historical objectivity, because it involves an "arbitrary delimitation of its borders" (Beard 1959, 151, my italics), either through the open domination of grand philosophy or through the more hidden or half-conscious narrow, class, provincial or regional prejudices. This was the way Benedetto Croce11, Raymond Aron12, Charles Beard13 and Carl Becker14 saw it. The need to select arises not only in the choice of topic, but also in the course of the inquiry itself.15 The factors

chosen as 'relevant' for an explanation in historical writings may be loaded with tacit, inarticulate assumptions.16

Ernest Nagel argued against the view that every termination of description is arbitrary.17 Even though every event is related to every other event, B may be no less a cause of A simply because B has its own causal antecedents. Causal importance, however, is not the only criterion of selection in descriptive historical writing.18 Morton White, in a search for objective criteria short of "full description",19 suggests that a historian, within his self-imposed limits of scale and subject matter, aims at what he conceived to be the "deepest" or most "representative" truths. Still, he has to concede that these latter notions cannot be analyzed non-evaluatively; they are just concealed ways of referring to judgments of importance.20

Nevertheless, Beard and Becker wanted to avoid hard perspectivism by reaching for some middle ground between the polemics against the pretensions of a somewhat positivistic scientific ideal of historical inquiry on the one hand, and on the other their awareness that some standard of truth and objectivity are necessary in order to be a responsible historian.21 Becker thus confirmed that both the actual event, as well as the mind of the historian, contributes to our imagined pictures of history22, and Beard stated that the scholar, by classifying and broadening his interests, would come nearer to the actuality of the past as it had been.23 To Beard, particular facts could be established by scientific method, but their meaning in a coherent and meaningful whole depended on each historian's overarching scheme of organization, which had to go beyond what was 'objectively' given. He concluded, however, that "through the discussion of such questions the noble dream of the search for truth may be brought nearer to realization, not extinguished." (Beard 1973, 328.)

5.2 Partial facts and perspectival wholes.

An influential discussion of epistemological relativism is found in the work of Karl Mannheim,24 who 'founded' the sociology of knowledge. He presented a proposal of a kind of 'meta-objectivity' in relation to the problematic relation between perspectival wholes and partial facts. Through a synthesis of the different perspectives,25 one could attain objective knowledge on a higher, 'meta-level, where all perspectives were represented through a conscious reflection of, and thereby a control of, their presuppositions.26

In the dialectical Marxist materialism of Gyorgy Lukacs,27 however, there is no possibility of an integration of different competing perspectival wholes. He confirmed the necessity of a total historical perspective, since for him, historical reality is precisely the totality of the historical process. The key point is that limited aspects of this totality; partial historical facts, are constituted through one's understanding of historical totality.28 These facts or aspects are not neutral. If integrated into one view of the historical totality (e.g. Marxism) they look quite different from the way they are seen through another one (e.g. liberalism or capitalism).

The only possible 'meta-perspective' is not a theoretical one, as Mannheim suggested, but a practical political one. For a Marxist, the present modes of production are basic to a theoretical understanding of society and history. As long as capitalism with its inherent paradoxes prevails, one will find a variety of theoretical perspectives, all of which will function as 'ideologies', i.e. as distorters, rather than revealers of objective truth. The only exception is Marxism, whose class-basis and interests are potentially universal. If, or when, the universal proletariat defeats capitalism through concrete political action, the condition

from which to understand historical totality will be fundamentally changed. The communist mode of production will then form an objective, or inter-subjectively valid basis for one perspective of totality, i.e. the Marxist one.29

It is hard to argue against a semi-prophetic statement of how people will view history if such and such changes appear. What disturbs me is the totalitarian aspects which is inherent in a position which first states that isolated facts are not understandable apart from a total view of history,30 and then takes political revolutionary action to be their primary weapon in arguing for the truth of their own particular view.31 This revolution will, according to this perspective, form an objective basis for a homogenous understanding of the 'new' society, and thereby the historical past. That is to say, as it is described by their own particular total view.

If all knowledge is constituted by a total view, and if one group or party believes academic historical discussions to be but an aspect of the fundamental political class-struggle, then theoretical opposition to a Marxist theory of history is really reactionary counter-revolutionary propaganda, and should therefore be treated as such. Orwell's 198432 has made this aspect of totalitarianism all too clear.

If all knowledge ultimately is a function of the modes of production; of how society is organized and controlled by the state, i.e. of political power, then the scene is really set for Big Brother, who by controlling the present will control (i.e. distort) the past, or rather: the writing of history.33 If truth lies in power, then there is no possibility of a rational universal standard of historical truth, or of any other truth for that matter. A Marxist plea for objectivity which demands that any historian must incorporate all relevant facts and sources that are known to him, without forcing them to fit his own perspective, and that previous theories must be tested before they can be rejected,34 simply does not make sense if there are no 'inter-perspectively' determined facts or sources to consider, or test theories against.

To test the content of a historical theory, one cannot argue in a 'genetical' way like the (vulgar?) Marxist does when he rejects or accepts theories by reference to their genetical origin. All theories, or ideologies, have in such a view their origin in limited class-interests, and are therefore false. Marxism, however, has its origin in the working class, whose interests are universal, i.e. corresponding to the objective interests of all mankind, and which therefore as the only class can form a universally true theory.35

5.3 The problem of incommensurability.

Even if we reject a 'genetic' validation of a theory, and demand that a test of historical truth-claims be applied to what is being affirmed or denied,36 the problem of incommensurability between competing perspectives on history remains to be considered. In the meta-historical perspective of Hayden White, the Marxist insistence on the modes of production as the most basic or revealing of all the facts of societal life is but one of several possible interpretations of history. The particular tropes which a historian chooses to use will a priori determine or constitute the sorts of fundamental entities and relations which he or she will recognize in their subject matter.37 "Thus any theory which is framed in a given mode is foredoomed to failure in any public which is committed to a different mode of prefiguration." (H. White 1973, 430.) The choice between competing historical perspectives will be made on "ultimately aesthetic or moral rather than epistemological grounds." (Ibid., xii.)

Even if historical research and writing may be described as story-telling based on evidence, one could argue, like W.H. Walsh,38 that the historian's way of forming significant narratives always involve a value-laden perception of what constitutes particular historical 'wholes'. According to Walsh,39 it is through the introduction of 'dominant concepts' and 'leading ideas' that the historian moves from a merely 'plain narrative' or what happened to a 'significant narrative' in which we are able to see why it happened, i.e. to see it as a part within a larger intelligible whole. The dominant concepts and leading ideas are introduced by the historian's own choice, as Walsh sees it. They are not just found, passively, in the data with which the historian is working.

Whereas Walsh can be placed somewhere in-between relativism and objectivism40 (maybe as a 'soft' perspectivist?), Hayden White's account of historical narratives has an explicitly relativistic flavor: "In metahistory ... the explanatory and the interpretive aspects of the narrative tend to run together and to be confused in such a way as to dissolve its authority as either a representation of "what happened" in the past or a valid explanation of "why it happened as it did." (H. White 1978, 52.) His conclusion is that "there can be no proper history without the presupposition of a full blown metahistory by which to justify those interpretive strategies necessary for the representation of a given segment of the historical process." (Ibid.)

The problem of incommensurability has been much debated in modern philosophy of science, especially in the aftermath of Kuhn 1970.41 The primary champion of incommensurability has been Paul K. Feyerabend,42 with his 'epistemological anarchism'. A comparison of Hayden White with Feyerabend suggests itself in the following features of White's account of historical 'paradigms':43 (1) The paradigms are incommensurable gestalts and their truth or falsehood is not decidable 'on the evidence'. (2) The construction and choice of paradigm is determined by social, moral and aesthetic considerations. (3) The imaginative core of 'objective' knowledge is laid bare. (4) The state of "conceptual anarchy" (H. White 1973, 13) in historiography, entailed by White's position, is held to be both theoretically appropriate and intellectually emancipatory.

However, if there is no point in asking which of the competing historical descriptions, accounts, reconstructions or narratives are right (or at lest which is more right than the others), if "each point of view was the only one possible for the man who adopted it" (Collingwood 1980, xii),44 if "in history... there is no way of establishing what will count as a 'datum' and what will count as a 'theory' by which to 'explain' what the data 'mean'" (H. White 1973, 429), then there is no way to distinguish White's own historical account of certain 19th century historians and philosophers from pure fiction.

The absention from judging historians in terms of truth and correctness is a form of the 'ironic' consciousness. But White acknowledges that irony is not the only possible prefigurative mode. His own 'referential illusion' even shows that it is maybe not the most useful one either. Allowing other frameworks than irony,45 White has to presuppose that discursive frameworks might be commensurable in key respects after all, and that the choice between them, at least in these respects, can be made on empirical grounds.

Likewise, even Feyerabend doesn't advocate a total notion of incommensurability. This would in any case be inconsistent with the fact that he is explicitly arguing against competing views on the history and theory of science, since there can be genuine disagreements only where there is some kind of common ground, and only where one may bring things into logical

opposition.46 Both scientific and historical research are thus practiced on a basic common ground. If not, there would be no discussion at all.

5.4 The possibility of commensurability.

The issue, then, is whether there are some standards for adjudicating historical disputes. Can we simply look and see whether the hypothesis 'corresponds with the facts', as these are dug up by the archeologist or archive-ransacker? It may not be quite as simple as that. In ordinary life, for example, we may believe a testimony because the story has a familiar pattern. Our standard of truth implies some criteria of normal behavior. These criteria will then be crucial as to whether we accept an historical explanation as adequate in light of the evidence. Adequate explanations, therefore, often rest not on a purely 'scientific' reasoning, but "on our experience in general, on our capacity for understanding the habits of thought and action that are embodied in human attitudes and behavior, or what is called knowledge of life47, sense of reality" (Berlin 1977, 60).

If historical writing goes 'beyond' a 'purely' empirical level of description, if it is both art and science, then one could demand, rather, that the historian say nothing that he knows to be contrary to the facts. This is in accordance with Karl Popper's criterion of error; "clashes arising within our knowledge, or between our knowledge and the facts." (Popper 1970, 193.) In this way historical knowledge can grow through the critical examination of error (cf. the rules of source criticism), when and if the theories have specified in advance what possible facts would contradict the theory. If "the quixotic48 alone will deny the existence of "hard" data in history" (Hughes 1964, 18), then one could get a firm footing by "demonstrating which of two conflicting interpretations is patently untenable." (Ibid, 19.)

The existence of 'hard' data, however, in both historical research and the natural sciences, is hardly denied by the 'quixotic' alone. Even the one-time champion of logical positivism, A. J. Ayer, recognized that: "Once it is established what is to count as fact, that is once the criteria are settled, it is an empirical and not a philosophical question whether they are satisfied. But adoption of these criteria implies the acceptance of a given conceptual system, and the appraisal of conceptual systems does fall within the province of philosophy." (Ayer 1963, 21.) The data may still be data, in the sense that they simply (objectively; in the realist sense) are the case, i.e. true. What is denied here is their 'hardness' or 'bruteness' in the sense that they are either unimpregnated by expectations,49 or provable. A 'datum' in historical writing is a proposition, and propositions cannot be derived from facts. One cannot prove statements from experiences. The statement may very well correspond to the experience, but the correspondence cannot be proved by another statement, only assumed in the first place.

The conclusion, as formulated by Imre Lakatos with respect to theory of science, is relevant, I believe, also to the theory of history: "If factual propositions are unprovable then they are fallible. If they are fallible then clashes between theories and factual propositions are not 'falsifications', but merely inconsistencies. Our imagination may play a greater role in the formulation of 'theories' than in the formulation of 'factual propositions', but they are both fallible. Thus we cannot prove theories and we cannot disprove them either. The demarcation between the soft, unproven theories and the hard, proven 'empirical basis' is non-existent: all propositions of science are theoretical, and incurable, fallible." (Lakatos 1978a, 15-16.)50

Although factual historical propositions are theoretical, we still distinguish between these and historical 'theories' or 'interpretations' in our everyday language, e.g. in historical debates,

thereby revealing a feeling that the word 'fact' cannot simply be subsumed into that of 'interpretation' or 'theory' without a certain loss; a feeling that the word 'truth' cannot be defined simply in terms of the coherence of a perspective. If 'facts' were non-distinguishable from 'non-facts', Nietzsche was correct in denying man sufficient possibilities of self-transcendence to arrive at unpleasant truths.51

The reason that we demand that the historian should be 'honest' or 'fair' in his presentation of the evidence,52 is that there are 'degrees' of objectivity, i.e. of how well historical theories are seen to be corroborated by empirical evidence. Even if there is a mutual dependence between theory and facts, even if the facts don't speak for themselves, only "when the historian calls on them", deciding "to which facts to give the floor, and in what order and in what context" (Carr 1980, 11)53, this does not imply that all historical 'knowledge' is placed within a tightly closed system where all the different parts are dependent on each other in the same way; logically or causally.54.

In order to distinguish between degrees of probability regarding the truth-claims of historical accounts, one must presuppose that logical or causal connections vary as to how 'necessary' the connections are. One can thus employ theories or limited perspectives without having to imply a total perspective on the whole of the universe, including all of history. The particular evidence which a certain theory is tested against is not necessarily causally dependent on the same theory. As the dependence between theory and facts is not absolute, but one of degrees, the hypothetical-deductive method still has its rightful place in the testing of historical theories.56 The 'data'; the historical sources (contra Lukacs, White and others), remain the same, to various degrees, when seen from the viewpoint of competing theoretical perspectives. The circularity between facts and theory stated by hard perspectivism, or relativism, may, and should, be avoided.57

Objectivity for the historian is thus an ideal which it is possible to obtain to a certain extent.58 It depends on both to what extent the facts are independent of the theory which is tested, to what extent there is agreement regarding the 'facts' themselves, as well as regarding the relation between the theory59 (or hypothesis) and the facts, i.e. how well the theory is corroborated by these facts. Through rational discussion, it is possible to increase inter-subjectively agreement on these matters.

The arbitrariness of historical theories or perspectives may thus be 'controllable', or at least limited, through the 'facts' of the matter. But what about those historical questions that involve "basic decisions" (Danto 1965, 109f.); a "hard core" of "moral and metaphysical beliefs" (Walsh 1968, 105f.),60 e.g. extraordinary events or miracles, like the alleged resurrection of Christ? This was the problem that led up to my discursion through general problems of historical objectivity in the last two chapters. If such a basic decision tells a historian that "dead men stay dead, no matter what!", then what?

All I can say, again, is that we live in the same world,61 no matter how different the 'hard core' of our basic decisions are. Therefore these decisions are not arbitrary in a strict sense of the word. They are made with all kinds of reasons, although not according to specified rules or criteria.62 They are made here, here in this world, and can thus be changed in this world, if the interpretations they entail appear so strained that the assumptions on which they rest become discredited, even if that should make those involved 'significantly different persons'. It is impossible to prescribe in advance what would affect such a change of the 'hard core' , as this is a deeply personal issue. It would probably include both cognitive and emotional,

'rational' and 'irrational' aspects. But then an historical inquiry, if called for, may also have an important effect, if not the decisive one, to the more basic issue involved. NOTES

1. For a clarifying discussion of different interpretations of 'objectivity', as regards the activity and results of social scientists, see Bergstrøm 1976.
2. For a typical example, see Elton 1982, passim.
3. "The sole aim of the historian is to show how it really was."
4. Such a mechanical methodology was typical of positivist historians like Henry Thomas Buckle (cf. Stern 1973, ch.8; 120-137) and J.B. Bury (cf. Collingwood 1980, 147-151).
5. Any given perspective contains a number of logical types of assertions. Perspectives are field-encompassing. They contain factual judgements, value-judgements, estimates of importance, metaphysical beliefs, assumptions about human nature, as well as procedural rules. Cf. Kennick 1955.
6. This understanding of the problem of selection goes back to Ren≠ Descartes: "Fables make one imagine many things to be possible that are not, and even the most accurate historical accounts, while neither changing nor amplifying the value of things in order to make them more worth reading, at least always leave out the basest and least illustrious circumstances, with the result that what remains does not appear as it really is." Descartes 1968 (1637), 31.
7. See Danto 1965, 31 f., cf. also Atkinson 1978, 78.
8. Harvey 1967, 295 ff., offers a precise presentation of 'hard' perspectivism.
9. According to Fischer 1970, 99-100, "there are a few constant and comprehensive rules of thumb for the determination of sound criteria of factual significance... These criteria must be (1) formed from the nature of the subject itself and from the purpose from which it is studied, (2) empirical, (3) capable of fulfillment, (4) made explicitly ...., (5) not violate the principle of nonvacuous contrast." The crucial problem, however, is how we decide that these (or other) criteria in a certain case is fulfilled.
10. Cf. Passmore 1982, 159 and Hook 1963, 254 ff.
11. See Croce 1921, passim. According to Collingwood 1966, 18, Croce identifies science with the generalizing activity of the mind, while "history is the internal and individual understanding of an object into which the mind so enters that subject and object can no longer be separated; it is real thinking."
12. See Aron 1961, passim; e.g. 290: "Historical reality cannot be broken up into relationships because it is human, and men, actors or victims, are in any event its living center. One does not rise from perceptive reality to objective relationships transcendentally relative, but to a historical relativity; the scholar expresses himself and his universe in the past which he choices. The relativity is comparable to that in physics. The object, inseparable from the observer, is different depending on the level at which it is grasped; the relativity is also basically original, since, when all is said and done, it is due to the ambiguity of the intellectual development and the incompleteness of evolution."
13. "Into the selection of topics, the choice and arrangement of materials, the specific historian's 'me' will enter ... The past as it actually was cannot be known." Beard 1973, 324; 325.
14. "The actual past is gone, and the world of history is an intangible world, re-created imaginatively, and present in our minds." Becker 1977, 96. This is not necessarily a relativistic position, however, at least not as an isolated statement.
15. Cf. Dray 1964, 31.
16. "At least in an important type of historical writing, the model, the narrative, is the central thing; and a 'relevant' fact is one which can be employed in the construction of a

model ... The engineer, however, can test his model: ... What, if anything, corresponds in history, to this testing process? Unless there is some test, it would seem, one model is as good as another." Passmore 1982,
153f. The test of the historian, however, will be of a more evaluative kind than that of the engineer, cf. Berlin
1977.
17. Nagel 1959. Cf. Harvey 1967, 210.
18. Cf. Dray 1964, 32 ff.
19. M. White 1963, 11 ff.
20. Cf. Walsh's concept of 'colligation', in Walsh 1968,
23-25; 59-63.
21. Cf. Meyerhoff 1959, 138.
22. See Becker 1977, 96.
23. See Beard 1973, 328.
24. See Mannheim 1936.
25. 'Perspectives' are here, and in the following, understood as basic metaphysical and methodological ideas about history and historical inquiry.
26. Cf. Krogseth 1984, 153. Whether Mannheim's 'Hegelian' proposal actually can be applied in a successful way, is another question, which I believe must be answered in the negative. At least if the different perspectives are to be respected for what they claim to be, and not perverted through some forced meta-synthesis. Toynbee, however, claimed to have reached a meta-religious historical perspective on the rise and fall of civilizations, see Toynbee 1958, although his meta-philosophy of history has been severly critized on empirical grounds, see e.g. Geyl
1958, ch. V-VIII; 109-202.
27. See Lukȼcs 1971.
28. "Det viser seg at innføyingen i totalitetskategorien (som har som forutsetning den antakelse at den egentlige historiske virkelighet nettopp er helheten av den historiske prosessen) ikke bare endrer avgjørende på vår bedømmelse av det enkelte fenomen, men at den gjenstandsmessige struktur enkelt-fenomenenes innholdsmessige karakter, som enkeltfenomen med dette går gjennom en grunnleggende endring." Lukȼcs 1971, 148. ("It is apparent that subordination into the category of totality (whose presupposition is the assumption that the fundamental reality of history is the totality of the historical process) not only decisively transforms our apprehension of the singular phenomena, but that the structure of objects as objects the substantial character of the singular phenomena, as singular phenomena through this is being fundamentally transformed.")
29. "Historia forstått som totalitet blir altså like "objektiv" som den menneskelige praksis. Den som skaper "historie" her og no skapar også vilkåra for biletet av historia som totalitet. Den som får rett i samtida og framtida, vinn og kampen om fortida.... Ei materialistisk historieoppfatning med klassekampsynet som det sentrale, blir såleis "objektiv" ved at kampen blir ført fram til frigjeving slik at den blir det "intersubjektive" grunnlag for å forstå historia som totalitet." Furre 1973, 65. "Ei objektiv historieframstilling finst (ikkje) i ei endelig faktisk form, men er historisk relativ." Berntsen 1969, 434, cf. Berntsen 1976, 11-31; 126-138.
30. "Det umiddelbart gjevne i isolert faktaform er i prinsippet uforståeleg." "Heilskapen er ikkje noko vilkårleg ..., men ... det verkelege i historia som gjer einskildhendingane meiningsfulle og verkelege... ." "Utforskinga av det einskilde fenomen føreset denne totalitet og tenar til å gjera denne totalitet tydeleg." "Objektiviteten ved framstillinga av eit delfenomen står og fell med objektiviteten ved framstillinga av totaliteten, fordi forståinga av delfenomentet avheng av forståinga av totaliteten." Furre

1973, 49; 53; 54; 55.
31. "Ein finn ikkje verifikasjon i samsvar med røyndomen, men ved å forandre røyndomen" (Mao Zedong). "Til no har filosofane tolka verda, det det gjeld, er å forandre henne" (Karl Marx). Quoted in Berntsen 1969, 434. ("Verification is not found in correspondence with reality, but in changing reality" (Mao Zedong). "Until now the philosophers have interpreted the world, what is required, is to change it" (Karl Marx).
32. Orwell 1984.
33. Foucault indirectly advocated the strategy of Big Brother: "Memory is actually a very important factor in struggle ... If one controls the memory of the people, one controls their dynamism... It is vital to have possession of this memory, to control it, administer it, tell it what it must contain." Foucault 1975, 25-26. Although Foucault in this interview spoke against conservative propagandizing in French cinema, he did not distinguish between true and false memory, and thus accepted the Orwellian justification for the historical enterprise, as Nietzsche had done before: "The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement:... The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding." Nietzsche 1978, 17. What is lifeadvancing to Big Brother, however, may not be so in the eyes of everyone else. For a brief taste of how Big Brother's tactics have been practiced in Moscow and Beijing, see J. Skard 1983.
34. Furre 1973, 80, adheres to "eit krav om ei sakleg haldning bak teoriane at det vert teke omsyn til alle kjende relevante fakta og kjelder, at ein ikkje underslår slikt "for å få det til å stemma", og at tidlegare teorier vert prøvde og eventuelt avviste. Dette kravet må truleg oppfyllast om det skal bli reelt at teorien er diskuterbar." "A demand that the theories are backed up by a scholarly attitude that all the known relevant facts and sources are considered, that nothing is subdued to "make things fit", and that previous theories are tested and possibly rejected. This requirement must probably be fulfilled if a theory is to be criticizable.") Cf. ibid., 41.
35. See Dahl 1984, 106.
36. As e.g. Mandelbaum 1977, 150, does.
37. "The historical field is constituted as a possible domain of analysis in a linguistic act which is tropological in nature. The dominant trope in which this constitutive act is carried out will determine both the kinds of objects which are permitted to appear in this field as data and the possible relationships that are conceived to obtain among them." H. White 1973, 430.
38. Walsh 1968, 23-25; 59-63.
39. Cf. Mandelbaum 1977, 164.
40. "Whilst denying the proposition that historians know any absolutely certain facts about the past and arguing with the coherence party that all historical statements are relative, we nevertheless agree with the supporters of the correspondence view in asserting that there is an attempt in history, as in perception, to characterize an independent reality." Walsh 1968, 69.
41. A key example is Lakatos and Musgrave 1978. Another good discussion is found in Jones 1977, who argues against incommensurability.
42. See Feyerabend 1975.
43. McLennan 1981, 85.
44. Editor's preface; Collingwood once held this view according to T. M. Knox.
45. See White 1973, 434.
46. Cf. Danto 1965, 108. Among the different possible levels of disagreement, one may for example distinguish between "disagreement over historical statements, over presuppositions, and over criteria for a given set of presuppositions." Ibid.

47. To Wilhelm Dilthey, the very concept of history was "dependent on that of life. Historical life is part of the whole of life which is given in experience and understanding. Life, in this sense, therefore, exists over the whole range of objective mind accessible to experience... Life is that which is known from within, that behind which we cannot go. Life cannot be brought before the judgement seat of reason." Dilthey 1962, 73.
48. In The American Heritage Dictionary, a 'quixotic' person is defined as "impractically romantic or idealistic".
49. "There are and can be no sensations unimpregnated by expectations and therefore there is no natural (i.e. psycho logical) demarcation between observational and theoretical propositions." Lakatos 1978a, 15. Passmore 1982, 155, gives a description of how different psychological expectations may affect the conclusion: "If a reader is convinced by my interpretation (of Hume), this will be because he has himself been puzzled by passages in Hume, and my interpretation solves his puzzle for him. If, on the other hand, he approaches the book 'cold', with no problems of his own, it is bound to strike him as ad hoc, being at best ingenious, at worst wholly factitious." Psychological justificationists (classical inductivists, dogmatists), like Isaac Newton, tried to avoid the problem that the human faculties (the senses, the intellect) might be deceived by introducing an 'ad hoc' psychological theory: "Human faculties do not deceive when they are in a 'healthy', 'right', 'normal', or, as they said later, 'scientific' mind." Lakatos 1978a, 196, cf. ibid., 209. If two scientists, however, both claiming a perfectly 'healthy' mind, disagree concerning an empirical 'fact', what then?
50. This conclusion does not make Lakatos (nor me) a scepticist, however. Although all propositions are fallible, we still have a legitimate need to justify our knowledge. Lakatos wants to link the scientific (and historical) 'game' as a whole to the rational purpose of approaching the Truth of the universe (and the past), cf. ch. 4, above. To do this, he needs an 'inductive principle' which can tell us when our knowledge grows, and when they don't. (It is not enough to believe that it can grow, as with Popper, whose rules of science can only tell us whether a particular move is proper or scientific, but say nothing about the rational purpose of the 'game' as a whole.) Otherwise the rules of e.g. the historical enterprise lacks support, they are like feet dangling in midair. Lakatos therefore introduces "an inductive principle which interprets the rules of the 'scientific game' as a conjectural theory about the signs of growing verisimilitude of our scientific theories." Lakatos 1978a, 156. This is clearly a metaphysical postulate, but for a fallibilist, that is no argument against it, "as long as there is no serious alternative offered." Ibid., 166.
51. "My memory said I did this. My pride tells me I could not have done this. My memory succumbs, and my pride remains inexorable." Nietzsche 1978, II, paragraph 68.
52. Dishonesty or unfairness may be both active (distortion) and passive (omission of relevant information). According to Føllesdal et al. 1984, 283, an objective account requires that "de oppfatninger og holdninger den skaper hos mottakeren ikke ville forandres dersom man tok med flere opplysninger." ("those impressions and attitudes which it creates in the person receiving it, will not be changed if more information were included.")
53. Cf. Dahl 1969, 577: "Det er etter mitt syn umogeleg å etablera teoriar om "fakta" utan teoriar om den sammenheng dei står i." ("It is impossible in my view to establish theories about "facts" apart from theories of the connection they are part of.")
54. See Dahl 1984, 27; 80.
55. "Det er en forutsetning for menneskelig erkjennelse at de logiske (og kausale) sammenhenger er begrenset, av skiftende styrke, m.a.o. at erkjennelse og virkelighet har en (relativt) pluralistisk karakter." Dahl 1984, 27.
56. It may not therefore have a rightful place within the field of hermeneutics, at least as pictured by the position of philosophical hermeneutics, of which Hans-Georg Gadamer is the foremost exponent (cf. Gadamer 1981), and of which Rabinow & Sullivan 1979 is an example

of how it can be made applicable to social science. Within the hermeneutical circle, a pre-understanding of the text as a whole is understood differently by Gadamer than the relation between whole and part (hypothesis and fact) as the hypothetical-deductive method pictures it. Within the hermeneutical process of understanding, one doesn't often find explicit hypoteses, consciously described and discussed. Neither is there a clear temporal succession of first establishing a hypothesis and then testing it. The relationship between whole and part in hermeneutical understanding, to Gadamer, is 'internal'; in the form of an inner dialectic between presuppositions (in Gadamer's language; 'prejudices') and experience, i.e. between one's pre-understanding of the text and of its different parts. Cf. Krogseth 1984, 151 f.. Dahl 1984, 88, understands Gadamer to be more in line with a basically hypothetical-deductive way of reasoning, while Hirsch
1967, appendix 2; 245-264, contra Dahl, is rejecting Gadamer's hermeneutics because it is seen as basically subjectivistic and relativistic, cf. Betti 1980.

57. "Historikerens balansgång blir en balansgång mellan två ytterligheter som kan rubriceras som ideologisk och deskreptiv historieskrivning. Den ideologiske historikaren vögrar att lyssna pa köllmaterialet og vögrar att ifrågasötta den teori han med ofta stor medvetenhet har vallt att betrakta som etablerad. Den deskriptiva lyssner döremot alltför villigt til köllmaterialet utifrån omedvetna och dörför lött upplesta bindingar till etablerad teori. Både typarna har sina fördelar. Den ideologiske historikern har sin medvetenhet og konsekvens, men om köllorna er mer begåvada enn historikern er den deskriptiva att føretrekka." Nilsson 1973, 198f.

58. "If the test of objectivity is that there are regular ways of settling issues, by the use of which men of whatever party can be brought to see what actually happened, then I do not see how one can doubt the objectivity of history." Passmore 1982, 158.

59. A 'theory' may even be defined as "a widely applicable hypothesis that serves as an explanatory framework through which a variety of observations... can be connected to each other." Mandelbaum 1977, 156.

60. As to historical perspectives on religion, a Marxist, for example, believes that all religious ideas are but epiphenomena of the class struggle. A Freudian believes that these ideas are but the manifestation of unconscious psychological drives, and an existentialist understands them as possibilities for existential self-understanding. The corresponding questions and interpretations of three such historians are thus likely to be primarily intelligible in terms of their own particular viewpoint. Cf. Harvey 1967,
320. For a Norwegian historical debate involving two competing perspectives on the basis of political power; on the relationship between political ideology and class or group-interests, see on the one side Seip 1974, 61-115; Maurseth 1981a and Maurseth 1981b, and on the other, Sejersted 1979 and Sejersted 1981. A philosopher's analysis of the tacit assumptions of Seip 1974 is found in Skjervheim 1981.

61. At least I believe so.

62. Cf. Mitchell 1973.

6. FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE TO THE JESUS OF HISTORY

The resurrection faith is an issue which easily may reveal competing hard cores of moral and metaphysical beliefs. I think this is a reasonable explanation of the fact that historical verdicts on this issue vary to the extreme. According to some, "if the event of the Easter Day is in any sense a historical event additional to the event of the cross, it is nothing else than the rise of faith of the risen Lord" (Bultmann 1953, 39), while for others "the bodily resurrection of Christ is the only adequate explanation to account for the resurrection faith and the admitted 'historical' facts" (Ladd 1976, 27).

To the extent that these conclusions are connected to competing 'hard cores'; e.g. criteria of historical possibility or impossibility ¢ la 'dead men never have nor will rise' vs. 'dead men may rise', how can a discussion of the historical evidence regarding the resurrection faith avoid circularity in all important matters? How can its conclusions possibly favor one 'hard core' rather than another?

In order to show how this may be possible, at least theoretically, I choose to apply the philosophy of science of Imre Lakatos (1), i.e. his methodology of scientific research programmes. There is a wide range of literature discussing the validity of Lakatos' position on the theory and history of science (2), which I cannot go into here. The reason why I choose Lakatos is that his realist position combines the acknowledgement of the theoretical moment in all human knowledge (including the writing of history (3)) with an emphasis on the independence of empirical evidence. In doing this, I hope to bear in mind the obvious danger of over-simplifying or even distorting historical and theological positions by applying a model from the philosophy of the natural sciences.

6.1 The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.

Lakatos claims that his theory of science blends different traditions. "From the empiricist it has inherited the determination to learn primarily from experience. From the Kantians it has taken the activist approach to the theory of knowledge (stressing the importance of the conceptual schemes of the knowing subject - TSG.) From the conventionalists it has learned the importance of decisions in methodology." (Lakatos 1978a, 38.)

First of all, the unit of appraisal is not an isolated hypothesis or even a conjunction of hypotheses; "a research programme is rather a special kind of 'problem-shift'." (Ibid., 179) It consists of a developing series of theories which we might call a general theory or even a 'super-theory', having three basic structural elements: (1) A 'hard-core' of fundamental assumptions which cannot be abandoned or modified without repudiation of the whole research programme. (In Newtonian science, the three laws of mechanics and the law of gravitation together form the 'hardcore'.) (2) This hard core is then "protected from refutation by a vast 'protective belt' of auxiliary hypotheses." (Ibid., 4) (3) Through a positive 'heuristic', which includes a set of problem-solving techniques, anomalies are digested and even turned into positive evidence. "Anomalies are not taken as refutations of the hard core but of some hypothesis in the protective belt. Partly under empirical pressure (but partly planned according to its heuristic) the protective belt is constantly modified, increased, complicated, while the hard core remains intact." (Ibid., 179.)

How do we then differentiate between scientific (or progressive) and pseudo-scientific (or degenerative) research programmes? How does Lakatos formulate a universal standard of scientific rationality when, as he confirms, all theories at any stage of development have unsolved problems and undigested anomalies? If no historical perspective can account for all the 'facts', how do we distinguish between valid or invalid historical theories? Lakatos here brings in the concept of 'novel' facts or predictions. A research programme "is theoretically progressive if each modification leads to new unexpected predictions and it is empirically progressive if at least some of these novel predictions are corroborated. One research programme supersedes another if it has excess truth content over its rival, in the sense that it predicts progressively all that its rival truly predicts and some more besides." (Ibid.)4

A historical problem-shift is theoretically progressive if some of its historical factual predictions (or 'postdictions') are novel. To be novel, Lakatos first decided a prediction had to be inconsistent with previous expectations and unchallenged background knowledge, or, where possible, forbidden by rival theories. At the same time, a new 'problem-shift' must be able to explain all the accepted facts which the previous problem-shifts explain (i.e. it must have excess empirical content). It may then turn out to be empirically progressive if some of its novel predictions are corroborated through new research and/or the discovery of new important historical sources, as mentioned above.

But on this view (applied to the natural sciences), the Copernican programme became empirically progressive only in 1616, when the prediction of phases of Venus was corroborated.5 When two rival programmes try to explain the same range of empirical evidence, i.e. when there is no new discoveries of facts, can we still demarcate between progressive and degenerative theories? Lakatos accepted Elie Zahar's modification of the conception of 'novel fact' in order to make this possible.6

A programme is progressive (also) if there exist already known facts which are (1) straightforward consequences of, or unintended by-products of, or predictable prior to observation by (in historical inquiry: prior to research, in a broader sense) the new programme, and (2) these facts play no role whatsoever in the original design of the programme. (3) These facts must be explainable only in an 'ad hoc' way by the competing programme(s). If a theoretical adjustment in the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses is 'ad hoc', it will either not predict any new facts besides the one that required the theoretical adjustment, or, if predictions are made, they will not be corroborated, or, if corroborated, these predictions are not made according to a preconceived unifying idea, laid down in advance in the positive heuristic of the research programme.7

In other words, "the weight of evidence is not merely a function of falsifiable hypothesis and the evidence; it is also a function of temporal and heuristic factors." (Ibid., 180). If a research programme deals with novel facts only after they are 'discovered', or anticipates them only through a patched-up development, it is degenerative. If, on the other hand, the new evidence is, as it were, 'produced' by a theory, then it has the progressive mark of a scientific research programme.

A historical theory may thus be judged progressive (and scientific) even if it is unable to account for all the true consequences of a rival theory. There may be logical or empirical problems yet unsolved. "What matters is a few dramatic signs of empirical progress" (Ibid., 179): (1) New research may corroborate explicit novel predictions. (2) Already known facts

may yield 'dramatic' support if one theory unintendedly 'postdicts' or makes sense of historical facts which rival theories have had a hard time explaining. The latter case may prove fruitful in order to judge between competing historical accounts where new evidence is hard to come up with.

In a fallibilist methodology, however, any reference to 'the facts' are more or less problematic. Neither scientific nor historical facts are 'given', they are relative to theories. The truth-value of both 'observational' and historical propositions have to be decided. In the pluralistic model of Lakatos, therefore, "the clash is not 'between theories and facts' but between two high-level theories: between an interpretative theory to provide the facts and an explanatory theory to explain then, and the interpretative theory may be on quite as high level as the explanatory theory." (Ibid., 44.)8 This is another way of saying that philosophical metaphysics is an integral part of science, since every metaphysical system9 prescribes criteria for what, in terms of the system, are to be regarded as 'facts', as well as what the legitimate criteria of assessment are. (Or maybe a more accurate description would be to call it a partly unsystematic world view; a 'form of life'?)

Thus, there may even "be conflicting views about whether an accepted basic statement expresses a novel fact or not." (Ibid., 117; n.4.) With no 'instant' rationality at hand, Lakatos allows for a real possibility of appeal, even through a criticism of the law itself (the universal methodological rule). But as historians normally agree concerning individual 'facts', there is probably a good chance that they could agree upon 'novel facts' as well. This might establish an inter-subjective ground from which to demarcate between progressive and degenerative historical theories (given Lakatos' methodology as such was accepted).

Even so, this task is difficult, and, it takes time. The unit of appraisal is itself a historical one; a series of connected theories, not a single theory. The epistemology which Lakatos proposes needs time to work: A given historical fact or event is explained rationally (leaving the question open if, and to what extent, historians apply a 'covering-law' model10) only when a 'new' fact is explained at the same time. When 'old' facts are unable to yield 'dramatic' support (in Zahar's sense), we consequently have to wait for the verdict until one of the programmes has some of its excess empirical content confirmed. Lakatos' standard of rationality is not combined with a time limit. What looks like a degenerating problemshift may be the beginning of a much longer period of advance, as Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn point out in their critique of Lakatos.11 But the latter thinks his opponents are wrong when they demand that a methodological appraisal of a programme should include firm heuristic advice about what to do: "One may rationally stick to a degenerating programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after. What on must not do is to deny its poor public record... . It is perfectly rational to play a risky game. What is irrational is to deceive oneself about the risk." (Ibid., 117.)

6.2 Two Historical-Theological Research Programmes.

In order to apply these rules of appraisal to the historical question of the resurrection of Jesus, I will in the following reconstruct two distinct 'historical-theological research programmes'.12 In modern Western intellectual history, there has been a dualism of the human and natural sciences; 'res cogitans' and 'res extensa' (Descartes), the logic of reason and the logic of heart (Pascal), of existential-personal and objective relations. This methodological dualism has since been applied to theology, and there with the distinction between the historical Jesus and

the Christ of faith it has led to a dual form of access to Jesus: an historical, rational mode, and an inward higher, mental-spiritual, existential-personal, faithful mode.13

Francis A. Schaeffer has elaborated this analysis.14 Separated by what he calls the 'line of despair', there are two different storeys of human experience and knowledge. In the 'lower storey', the rational and logical reign supreme. The result has been that there are only particulars, no purpose, no meaning. Man is a machine. But because man needs values and meaning in order to live, there is a need for an 'upper storey' of the non-rational and non-logical. Here is where any existential experience belongs; any hope, meaning, any faith and any real values are safely secluded from rational criticism.

But to exclude a belief from rational critique means that the question of truth is answered blindly. My thesis then is: If historians and theologians a priori decide that 'dead men don't rise', that "a historical fact, which involves a resurrection from the dead is utterly inconceivable" (Bultmann 1953, 39), because of a closed system of (natural) cause and effect, then this will function as a 'hard core' of a historical theological research programme. Consequently, "all that historical criticism can establish is the fact that the first disciples came to believe in the resurrection." (Ibid.) This belief will then have to be placed in the upper storey. And this is in fact what is done by very many theologians today.

In the 'old' quest for the historical Jesus,15 the aim was to get away from the dogmatic ecclasiastical picture painted by credulous early Christians and their modern successors, in order to reach Jesus 'as he really was'. Implicit in this demand in its more extreme form was the assumption that the 'real' Jesus would be somehow free from what the old questers thought of as mythological elements found in the typical Christian picture of him. The real Jesus was a religious genius, but still only a human being, and it would therefore be possible to explain the rise of religious faith in him in terms of ordinarily psychological and sociological processes. This quest was a failure, however, because the supernatural and the natural was found to be too intertwined to separate. The result was that "each successive epoch of theology found its own thoughts in Jesus," and "each individual created Him in accordance with his own character." (Schweitzer 1968, 4.)16

To avoid this, critical scholars in the twentieth century who are skeptical about Jesus' resurrection seldom propose classic naturalistic theories to explain the gospel accounts. Instead, they interpret the supernatural elements not as accounts of factual miraculous events, but as attempts to reveal, disclose or indicate the transcendent, eschatological, mythical or existential significance of Jesus as a pointer to another dimension of reality. This is a line of thought which links back to D. F. Strauss in the
1830-ies.

The 'hard core' remains the same. A historical understanding of the resurrection is excluded, and whatever religious faith may be attached to the resurrection belongs in the 'upper storey'.17 The kerygma where the Christ of faith is preached has very little empirical, rational link to the Jesus of history. The 'new' quest of the historical Jesus18 is not interested in what actually happened to Jesus' body after the crucifixion. Their aim is to reconstruct the experience of faith of Jesus and his disciples. These experiences are then asserted as both normative and historical, but the biblical accounts are faulty cultural expressions of that day and need not be taken literally. Their language (like Heidegger's concept of language would inform us) may rather be seen as a means towards a present existential experience. The meaning of their words are not reduceable to what these words actually meant then and there.

But then the kerygma might just as well be empty of content, and the faith of Jesus and his disciples be taken to mean anything19 or nothing.

The 'hard core' of the other historical-theological research programme would then consists of an 'open' concept of reality, in the sense that supernatural events inexplicable by natural or historical causes are allowed for, if supported by empirical evidence. The 'line of despair' between faith and reason is not accepted. Instead, 'Historic Christianity' (to borrow Schaeffer's term as a label for this programme) asserts that faith starts from knowledge, even if it reaches beyond it, and its character as faith is not destroyed by its association with knowledge. The purpose of the written gospels in the NT was to preach the good news on the basis of what purports to be historical information about Jesus. "The message contained historical facts as a basis for faith." (Marshall 1979, 83.) This approach would treat the stories of the miracles of Jesus and his resurrection as having a historical basis, events which "cannot be explained away as non-events or as ordinary events falsely interpreted as miraculous events." (Ibid., 246.) To use the technical technological terms, the events of 'Heilsgeschichte' (salvation-history) are not to be spoken of in terms of 'Urgeschichte' or 'metahistory' (Karl Barth), but in terms of the facticity of 'Historie'.20

If these are the 'hard cores', what about the 'protective belt' of auxiliary hypotheses and the positive heuristic; the problem-solving techniques? These deal first and foremost with the understanding of the sources of the NT and the apocryphal gospels. In addition there is the 'external' evidence of non-Christian (bracketing the question of whether the apocryphal gospels may be called genuinely Christian) sources. The first research programme, which I hereafter label 'the Bultmann School', regard the 'theological' sources (NT and the apocrypha) as basically theological documents concerning the historical Jesus, rather than historical ones. As historical sources they can tell us about the life of the early church, but the circumstances in which the tradition was produced militate against its reliability as historical sources for the person of Jesus: "The various images of Jesus, whatever their relation to the historical Jesus of Nazareth, are in the first instance reflections of the communities that preserve and transmitted the Gospel traditions. Their world was projected onto the person of Jesus and thus given the highest form of legitimacy." (Gager 1975, 8f.)

The other 'programme', that of 'Historic Christianity', is opposed to this understanding of the sources. Rather than using the fact that the transmission and recording of the traditions were theologically motivated as a proof that the tradition was distorted, their hypothesis is that the NT authors "sought to maintain a distinction between traditions from the earthly Jesus and those also mediating the 'mind of Christ' created in the post-resurrection mission." (Ellis 1983, 54.) The NT thus contains historical reminiscence of what Jesus said and did to a much higher degree than what the Bultmann School is prepared to accept.21 According to Historic Christianity, the historian properly fulfills his task when he, as Ernst Bernheim stated it, tests the genuineness and demonstrates the un-genuineness of his sources.22 Since the gospels represent themselves to be an account of the earthly Jesus, they should be tested within that context. For various reasons (cf. below; 7.2 ff.) their genuineness, i.e. historical trustworthiness can be assumed "unless there are clear signs to the contrary; in general these signs are lacking." (Marshall 1977,
200.)

From these two opposing views come two quite different 'positive heuristics', two sets of problem-solving techniques. For the Bultmann School, it is the historical authenticity of the Gospel tradition that must be demonstrated, not the inauthenticity. Through the different

techniques of internal and external source criticism, the nature of the gospels is portrayed in such a way that "the burden of proof will be upon the claim to authenticity. (Perrin 1976, 39.)23 Since these documents generally are the product of the early church, and since the early church and the NT are indebted at very many points to ancient Judaism, then "if we are to ascribe a saying to Jesus, and accept the burden of proof laid upon us, we must be able to show that the saying comes neither from the Church nor from ancient Judaism." (Ibid.)

Of course, there may be some material which might be both genuine and in line with the 'life setting' (Sitz im Leben) of the early church, or influenced by ancient Judaism. But the only circumstance that would justify abandoning, or even loosening, the above mentioned criterion of dissimilarity as the sole methodological basis for the quest, would be a dramatic shift of consensus concerning the reliability of the gospel tradition.24 Only a different general understanding of the sources could dictate a change of methodology. But then, as seen from this historical-theological research programme, "the brutal fact of the matter is that we have no choice. There is simply no other starting-point that takes seriously enough the radical view of the nature of the sources which the results of contemporary research are forcing upon us." (Ibid., 43).

In the other camp, however, 'contemporary research' takes a somewhat different form. According to Jeremias 1971, 37, "in the synoptic tradition (Matthew, Mark and Luke) it is the inauthenticity, and not the authenticity, of the sayings of Jesus that must be demonstrated." John Robinson 1977, 132, goes further: "As authenticity is understood in John (which is certainly not literalistically), I believe that it is just as applicable to this material."25 Again, the opposition to the Bultmann school, who talks about "the completely unhistorical Gospel of John "(Käsemann 1964, 60), is rather clear.

From a sustained study by means of the same critical tools as the Bultmann School employs, Historic Christianity claims that one can discern and discount the influences at work in the NT tradition. To a large extent one can see what has been shaped and conditioned by subesequent reflections on prior events or by the later experiences of the church.26 Yet, the shaping of an already existing tradition and the creation of a new tradition are two different things. To conclude that the more the Gospels have to tell us about the early church, the less they have to tell us about Jesus, is thus seen as unwarranted skepticism about the historical value of this tradition, a skepticism which the most rigorous demands of historical science27 hardly can justify.28

NOTES

1. As presented in his posthumously published Lakatos 1978a, and Lakatos 1978b, chapters 6 and 11.
2. See especially Cohen et al 1976. Feyerabend 1975 was written explicitly against the position of Lakatos, originally intended as the first half of one book, where Lakatos were meant to defend his views and counter-attack Feyerabend in the latter part. Unfortunately, Lakatos died (in 1974) before he had the chance to complete the project.
3. See Lakatos 1978a, ch. 2; History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions; 102-138.
4. Lakatos assumes that his methodology of research programmes will function as a valid reference for making the content of different scientific theories comparable. Cf. the problem of incommensurability; ch. 5.3, and 5.4, above.
5. Cf. Lakatos 1978a, 178-184.
6. Cf. ibid., 184-188.
7. Cf. ibid.,p. 112, n. 2; p. 149.
8. Cf. Hayden White's position, above; ch. 5.4. The difference to Lakatos, however, will be clear in the following, where Lakatos claims to have an empirical basis for judging which theory is scientifically progressive and which is scientifically degenerative.
9. Cf. Ayer 1963, 21.

10. For an overview of the basic competing perspectives involved in this problem, see Von Wright 1971, ch. 1; 1-33.
11. Cf. Feyerabend: Consolations for the Specialist (especially p. 215) and Kuhn: Reflections on my Critics (especially p. 239) in Lakatos and Musgrave 1978, 197-230 and 231-278.
12. My reconstruction of two competing historical-theological research programmes will be 'normative', in the sense that I identify different positions as being part of one and the same programme, because they logically and methodologically belong there, even if the programme has not consciously been developed in this way. Cf. Lakatos 1978a, ch. 2; History of science and its rational reconstructions: One and the same scholar may even be an exponent of both programmes. E.g., both Wolfhart Pannenberg and Reginald Fuller argues in favor of the spiritual, non-physical nature of the resurrection body of Jesus, ° la the Bultmann School, as well as of the historicity of the empty tomb, ¢ la Historic Christianity, cf. below; ch.
8. The scholars of one programme do not necessarily connect to, or build upon the work of their forerunners in the same programme. This does not preclude, however, that certain basic metholodogical assumptions were shared and can be reconstructed, independent of the 'chronological' development of the various components of the programme. The references and quotations I make are thus chosen insofar as they are typical of one particular historicaltheological research programme, not necessarily because they are the 'primary' or best known sources regarding their own 'programme'.
13. Cf. Kasper 1975, 30. An example of how the 'spiritual' access is cut loose from the historical, rational one: "The forms and phrases by which a religion is transmitted must be regarded as nothing more than the symbolic expression of a spiritual reality. As that expression is of a quite different order from factual knowledge, the one cannot in any way confirm or invalidate the other." Goguel
1964, quoted in Finley 1977, 174.
14. See Schaeffer 1968a, Schaeffer 1968b and Schaeffer 1972.
15. Cf. Schweitzer 1968.
16. To Schweitzer, therefore, "there is no historical task which so reveals a man's true self as the writing of a Life of Jesus." Ibid., 4.
17. "But how can we conceive of the occurrence of a revelatory event? It is not an event unequivocally belonging to the eschatological future yet occurring within this world or within this time, for that is impossible: that cannot happen until the End. What can happen within this age is a certain event which is perfectly explicable as a historical event, yet is a disclosure of the transcendent and eschatological to the eye of faith. ... What the transcendent or eschatological reality defined in ontological categories really 'is' or how it is to be described is by definition beyond our present knowledge." ... "It is ... impossible to categorize the Easter appearances in any available this-worldly language, even in that of religious mysticism. ... The ultimate reason for this difficulty is that there are no categories available for the unprecedented disclosure of the eschatological within history." ... "Resurrection faith ... becomes not a matter of believing in the historical accuracy of these narratives but of believing the proclamation which these narratives, for all their differences, enshrine." Fuller 1980, 181; 33 and 8.
18. Cf. James Robinson 1959.
19. Cf. the 'leftist' critique of Bultmann by Karl Jaspers, and that of Paul Tillich and others by the 'Death-of-God'-theologians of the sixties.
20. Cf. Pannenberg 1970, ch. 2; 15-80: Redemptive Event and History, and Pannenberg 1979, Introduction; 1-22 and ch. IV: Dogmatic Theses on the Concept of Revelation; 123-158. A radical statement of this view is found in Montgomery

1969, 117: "there is no tertium quid. Either the events of Heilsgeschichte, such as the resurrection, are in the full sense Historie or they are not. If they are not, then of course they are not subject to attack. ... But then the affirmation that 'the Word became flesh' has only mythical significance, and we are still in our sins."

21. Cf. Käsemann 1964, 59f.: "It was not historical but kerygmatic interest which handed the individual units of Gospel tradition on. From this standpoint it becomes comprehensible that this tradition, or at least the overwhelming mass of it, cannot be called authentic. Only a few words of the Sermon on the Mount and on the conflict with the Pharisees, a number of parables and some scattered material of various kinds go back with any degree of probability to the Jesus of history himself. Of his deeds, we know only that he had the reputation of being a miracle-worker, that he himself referred to his power of exorcism and that he was finally crucified under Pontius Pilate." Cf. Bultmann 1962, 8 and A.E. Taylor 1954, 11 f., for even more sceptical statements.

22. Bernheim 1908, 332: "Wie man in verschiedenen Föllen die Echtheit prüft und die Unechtheit nachweist." 'Zu prüfen' in Norwegian means to 'anvise'; 'påvise'; 'godtgjøre'; 'bevise', while 'zu nachweisen' is translated into 'prøve'; 'eksaminere'; 'undersøke'.

23. Building upon Kösemann 1964, ch. I: The Problem of the Historical Jesus; 37. This chapter was originally given as a lecture at the reunion of old Marburg-students of Bultmann, on October 20, 1953. First published in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, vol. 51, 1954, 125-53.

24. Cf. Gager 1974, 259.

25. Cf. Dodd 1963 and Carson 1981.

26. In the words of John Robinson 1977, 132: "To a good extent we can see where 'points' become 'stars', and why and how."

27. There are profound differences between a 'historical science' and the natural sciences. Both of the terms, however, can be subsumed under a general concept of science. According to Næss 1980, 84f, the transition to scientific activities in any cultural tradition is marked by the following characteristica: 1. An increasing degree of generality. 2. Independence (in principle) of practical application. 3. An accelerated development of institutions and (scientific) traditions. 4. A higher degree of systematization, thouroughness, and depth in perspective (causally, structurally and historically) than what is required in everyday-life. 5. More specialization.

28. Cf. Marshall 1977, 36f.

7. THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE HISTORICAL JESUS

It is now time to take a closer look at the evidence concerning the historical Jesus, and see what the two different programmes are making of it. After discussing the apocryphal writings touching upon the resurrection, I will deal with the NT gospels from the point of view of external criticism. How well attested are their original form and wording, i.e. what conclusions can be drawn from textual criticism? And what can be said as to their origin as far as dating and authorship are concerned?

Internal criticism deals with the meaning and trustworthiness of sources. As a primary (firsthand) source is more trustworthy than a secondary (secondhand) one, I first discuss the so-called synoptic problem, the question of inter-dependency between the first three gospels. The meaning of a literary source involves the question of genre. Dealing with the gospels as narratives and as different, more specific genres, I concentrate on the relevance of this discussion to the issue concerning historical authenticity. The latter is then faced head-on in the more extensive part on tradition criticism and oral tradition: What is the origin and the method of transmission of the NT gospel tradition ? What does the characteristics of oral tradition in general tell us? To what extent is this applicable to the gospel tradition, and what is the basis for claiming that the latter is historically trustworthy? Finally, I discuss what information can be found in external evidence (apart from the NT apocrypha), i.e. historical evidence concerning Jesus outside the NT.

7.1 New Testament Apocrypha

The word 'apocryphal', according to The American Heritage Dictionary 1983, 32, stands for something which is either "of doubtful authorship or authenticity", or "false; counterfeit". Whether this is an accurate description of all the NT apocrypha is a discussion which is more or less tied up to the problem of the NT canon, i.e. why these apocrypha were excluded from the NT as we have it, a problem which I need not go into here.1 In ch. 8, however, I will deal with the resurrection faith almost exclusively on the basis of the NT material. I therefore need to present the apocryphal writings which deal with the resurrection of Jesus here, in order to show why I consider them to be secondary documents compared to the cannoncial gospels.

There are four NT apocrypha which deals with the resurrection of Jesus.2 The Gospel of Peter3 is a fragment found in Upper Egypt in 1886 which dates back to the 8th or 9th century. The fact that it presupposes a knowledge of all four canonical gospels sets its time of writing at the earliest at that time when these were known.4 Its upper limit is set about 170 AD through the reference to it in early Christian writings. Its date is then estimated to be the middle of the 2nd centry, possibly some time further back. Its origin is to be sought in Syria, probably in gnostic circles.5

The Gospel of Peter marks a further development of the traditional resurrection material of the NT. Two things stand out here. First, its docetic character (according to the doceting teaching, the humanity of Jesus was not real but only apparent) appears in the statement that Jesus, while being crucified, "remained silent, as though he felt no pain" (v.6/ch.4), and in the account of his death, where it says "he was taken up" (v.19/ch. 5), as though his soul or spiritual self was assumed direct from the cross to the presence of God.6 Second, the resurrection takes place openly before the heathen soldiers and Jewish authorities, i.e. the

enemies of Jesus, this being recorded in such a detailed way which betrays a certain legendary or mythic character.

The Gospel of the Hebrews7 was supposedly used by Egyptian Jewish-Christians, and appears to have been a paraphrase of the Gospel of Matthew. Its Jewish-Christian character, however, was comprised by syncretistic-gnostic elements. Its date of origin cannot be determined more clearly than the first half of the second century.8 Its last fragment speaks of an appearance of Christ to James, the first one after his resurrection. Such an appearance is witnessed in 1 Cor. 15:7, but not as the first appearance of the risen Christ. The implication of the Gospel of the Hebrews that James was present at the last supper is also contradicted by the NT.

Epistula Apostolorum9 (Epistle of the Apostles), written in Coptic and Ethiopian, was found in Cairo in 1895, but it is not mentioned anywhere in the literature of early Christianity. It is a document which reveals a strong opposition against gnosticism and docetism, seen through its detailed emphasis of the corporate or bodily character of the risen Christ, as he appears first to the three women and then to the disciples. The opposition against a gnosticism that still exercises a strong influence puts the writing in the second century, probably the first half due to the free and easy way with which the author uses and treats the NT writings. The reason why this writing was dropped in a later period is probably the strange thought forms and strange views which it reveals. (This letter from the eleven disciples, addressed to the Christians of the four regions of the earth, presents a dialogue between Christ and his disciples that took place after his resurrection, in which he gave them revelations concerning various heavenly things.) Although fighting gnosticism, its thought forms did not arise from the soil of ordinary Christianity, but from gnosticism itself.10

The Acts of Pilate or the Gospel of Nicodemus11 is believed to have been published as counterpropaganda to the pagan Acts of Pilate which was published in A.D. 311 by the emperor and persecutor Maximinus II. The oldest manuscript goes back to A.D. 445, but there is reason to believe that its core goes back to some time prior to A.D. 178.12 The main part presents an expanded version of the trial and death of Jesus, based mainly on the narratives in Matthew and John. Regarding the resurrection we are told how the Jews after the death of Jesus put Joseph of Aritmathea (who buried Jesus) in prison, how he miraculously escaped, and how the Roman guards reported how an angel had descended from heaven, rolled away the stone and announced the resurrection of Jesus to the women at the tomb; building upon Matthew. Further, how the guards were bribed by the Jewish leaders to keep quiet about this, and how the latter were informed about Jesus having given the missionary command to his disciples on a mountain in Galilee.

Where these apocryphal writings do not simply expand upon the resurrection narratives of those found in the NT (as the Acts of Pilate), they reveal gnostic influences in various ways.13 This dependence upon the NT sources justifies that I in the following concentrate on the NT and other external evidence. As to the relationship between gnostic influence and historical accuracy, the attitude of the Bultmann school and Historic Christianity may differ quite a bit.

The key question if whether the original teaching of Jesus corresponded, at least partly, not to what his apostles were preaching, but rather to the gnostic concept of salvation, where man is freed from the bondage of the material order by the reception and application of true knowledge (Greek: gnosis). The main point of focus is the Gospel of Thomas,14 a fourth

century Coptic manuscript whose Greek original is suggested dated at A.D. 140. It is a collection of 114 sayings of Jesus, none of which deals directly with the resurrection. (It contains no narrative material nor Passion and Easter narratives.) Their interpretation is not made explicit, but left to be inferred. Still, it seems reasonable to assume that their interpretation was controlled by the gnostic or quasi-gnostic views of the groups for which they were compiled and in which they circulated.15

Koester 1971a has argued that the collections of sayings in this gospel may include some traditions even older than the gospels of the NT, possibly as early as the second half of the first century. His conclusion is that it is Q (the non-Marcian source behind Matthew and Luke) and the Gospel of Thomas which primarily preserve and expand the earliest recorded sayings of Jesus.16 This is a highly controversial statement, and one which is opposed by that of the proponents of 'Historic Christianity', who regard Thomas as either wholly or partly dependent on the canonical tradition,17 and who view possible primary elements in Thomas (those being independent of other known sources) as basically untrustworthy, historically speaking, due to its gnostic influence.

The reason for treating gnostic traditions with suspicion as to historical accuracy has a basis in the way the gnostics themselves understood their writings. Gnostic Christians "assumed that they had gone far beyond the Apostles' original teaching", they "anticipated that the present and future would yield a continual increase in knowledge." (Pagels 1981, 25.) The Bultmann School could here counter-attack by referring to statements in NT, which in their view implies the same kind of idea of inspired doctrine; e.g. John 16:12-13 where the Holy Spirit is said to come, after Christ's ascencion, and guide the disciples "into all the truth".

To Historic Christianity however, the continued revelations or inspiration to the apostles and NT writers were exclusively normed by the historical teachings and actions of Jesus. Cf. John 16:14 where Jesus states that "everything (the Spirit of truth) makes known to you he will draw from what is mine." To include gnostic elements into 'all the truth' would be self-contradictory, as the NT hardly is compatible with gnosticism.

On the other side, if Koester is right, then the exclusion of Thomas from the NT canon can be seen as the product of an ecclesiastical censorship which did not pay any attention to historical authenticity, but to purely "theological and political conditions in the second, third and fourth centuries." (Gager 1975, 4.) This fits Bultmann's position, which, by the way, can be said to stand quite close to the gnosis of the second century in its denial of the historical foundation of salvation.18

It does not fit Historic Christianity, however, because of the way this remains bound to the criterion of the historical Jesus. If our knowledge of the latter, including his bodily resurrection, can be shown to be non-existent, or highly problematic, then this 'programme' is facing serious problems. If, on the other hand, the knowledge of the historical Jesus has a fairly well-attested basis, the main problems belong to the Bultmann School. It is thus time to take a closer look at the NT sources, in particular the four gospels.

7.2 NT External Criticism

7.2.1 Conclusions from Textual Criticism.

An important part of external ('lower') criticism is to analyze the textual tradition by which a document reached us in order to determine as exactly as possible the original words of the documents in question. There is little disagreement between the two competing programmes regarding this bibliographical test. The textual authenticity of the 27 books of the NT has been well established.19

Although the original documents of the NT have been lost, no other literature of the ancient period are as well attested as to the age and number of the handwritten texts. The oldest papyri-fragment (P52 from John 18) is dated c. 125 AD,20 and there are more comprehensive texts from around 200 AD. Complete manuscripts go back to the middle of the 4th century.21 Altogether we have about 5000 Greek handwritten texts of the NT of different scope and value, while the earliest substantial manuscript known of e.g. the History of Thucydides (c. 460-400 BC) is known to us through eight manuscripts, the earliest belonging to c. AD 900, and a few papyrus scraps belonging somewhere around the year 1. The same goes for the History of Herodotus (c. 488-428 BC).22

There are still minor problems left concerning the original wording of the NT, but these are so limited that if the relevant texts were to be changed, an ordinary bible-reader wouldn't even notice it.23 Any skepticism, therefore, regarding an edition like Nestle-Aland 1979, would allow all of classical antiquity to slip into obscurity.

7.2.2 The Dating of the Gospels

Whereas NT textual criticism is a field where there is not too much to quarrel about, the question of when the originals were first written invites to substantial disagreement. This is so because there is not a single book of the NT that dates itself from internal evidence, and the external testimony, with the single exception of the Revelation of John, is virtually worthless.24 With so little evidence available, the firm dating which has been offered is not so much based on 'hard' scientific facts, as resting on deductions from deductions (as arguments from silence), where the pattern of argument is self-consistent but circular.

About 1800,25 when the historical study of the NT as we know it has hardly begun, the span of time for the composition of the NT was about fifty years; from 50 to 100 AD. By 1850, however, the picture looked very different. The scene was dominated by the Tübingen school, under the leadership of F.C. Baur. Baur's reconstruction was dominated by the Hegelian pattern of thesis (the narrow Jewish Christianity of Jesus' original disciples, represented by Peter and John), antithesis (the universalistic message preached by Paul) and synthesis (early catholicism).26 The span of time was determined by the intervals supposedly required for this to work itself out. Romans, I and II Cor., Galatians and Revelation were dated in the 50s and 60s, the rest were composed up to or beyond 150 AD. The fact that the gospels and other NT books were quoted by Irenaeus27 and other Church fathers28 towards the end of the second century alone set an upper limit; the Gospel of John was dated c. 160-170.

Around 1900 this schema had in turn been fairly drastically modified, especially through the work of J. B. Lightfoot29 and Adolph von Harnack30. As to those books particularly dealing with the resurrection, Harnack dated I Cor. at 52, Mark 65-70, Matthew 70-75, Luke + Acts 79-93 and John 80-110. While radical critics were still swinging back and forth at this period, the gap between radical and conservative had narrowed considerably by 1950, and the fairly high degree of consensus in the following years can be represented by Kümmel 1975, who

dates I Cor. at 53-6, Mark around 70, Luke at 70-90, Matthew at 80-100 and John at 90-100.31

The dating issue is important, since there is obviously less likelihood of distortion the shorter the interval is between the reported event and the date of the writing of the document. If one is dealing with a gap, say, of thirty years, there is a good deal of built-in control in the form of living memory.32 If the NT gospels are dated prior to 70, this means they are first-generation testimony.

One of the oddest facts about the NT is that what would appear to be the most datable and climactic event of the period the fall of Jerusalem in AD 70 (the Jewish war started in AD 66) is never once mentioned as a past fact. The silence is significant and calls for an explication. Assuming that a late dating fits the protective belt of the Bultmann School better than it does Historic Christianity, I will ty to explain how the positive heuristic of each programme deals with this question.

The Bultmann School offers two ways to digest the fact of the silence in the NT of AD 70 as a past event, which to this programme is an anomaly. The first one is to create an ad hoc-hypothesis which assumes that Jesus and the Palestinian church was linked to the Zealot cause and its political rebellion against the Roman occupation. Everything from the Gospel of Mark onwards can thus be studied as a rewriting of history, done after AD 70, to suppress the truth that Jesus and the earliest Christians were identified with the revolt that failed, a revolt which ended in the collapse of institutional Judaism based on the temple.33 The simple reply of Historical Christianity is that the sympathies of Jesus and the Palestinian church with the Zealot cause are entirely unproven.34 Jesus was not a political revolutionist, and the pre-70 dating remains intact.

The second 'digestion' offered is to claim that the synoptic gospels (Matthew, Mark and Luke) clearly reflect the siege and destruction of Jerusalem in AD 66-70, which they present after the event (ex eventu); as prophecies on the lips of Jesus, e.g. in Luke 19:43f, 21:20;24, Matthew 22:7, 24 and Mark 13. This claim too is denied by the competing programme.35 The details of the prophecies of the fall of Jerusalem in Luke are derived not from what happened in AD 66-70, but rather from Old Testament (OT) language about the capture of Jerusalem in 586 BC. Matthew 22:7 is not detailed enough to reflect AD 70, and why should the evangelists in AD 80-90, if having the events of AD 66-70 in mind, include then still unfulfilled prophecies like Matthew 10:23, 16:28, 24:29; 34, Luke 9:27 and 21:32 ? To Historic Christianity, the best explanation is that these are apocalyptic prophecies, and that the silence of the events in AD 66-70 are due to the fact that there is little, if anything in the NT written later then AD 70.

John Robinson, for these and other reasons,36 has thus offered a radically revised perspective on NT dating, where, apart from the other NT books dated c. A.D. 50-69, the synoptic gospels were written in the period A.D. 40-60. The Gospel of John represents a tradition that basically took shape like the other gospels in the 40s and 50s, although its final stages reflect slightly later developments; hence its being written last; ca. A.D.65.37 If John Robinson is correct, this would narrow that gap between the crucifixion and the written records from some 35 to 70 years on the usual reckoning, to little more than 30, with most of the material traceable a good deal further back.

7.2.3 The Authorship of the NT Gospels.

The question of how the gospels originated, i.e. the question of authorship, is very much part of the greater question of the authenticity and reliability of the Christian tradition. The key question here is whether the gospels primarily are the result of a mostly anonymous community tradition (the Bultmann School), or whether they contain substantial eyewitness tradition (Historic Christianity). If the gospels contain primarily community tradition, then the historian must handle them in one way. But if they contain a substantial and identifiable amount of eyewitness material, then they may be utilized in a more simple and direct fashion.38

Assuming that the gospels originally circulated anonymously, the Bultmann School tells us that they only later, in the second century, were attributed to authoritative names from the early days of the church, for mainly ecclesiastical-political reasons.39 Fighting what they believed to be heresies, the 'mainline'-church needed to validate their own 'canonical' gospels, and the best way of doing this was to ascribe them to someone who had been a personal disciple of Jesus (Matthew and John), or a disciple of an apostle (Mark and Luke).40 Thus, the NT gospels were attributed to apostles or followers of apostles "in the same way as the gnostic authors attributed their secret writings to various disciples." (Pagels 1981, 20.)

There is no doubt that gnostic writings were often attributed to Jesus' disciples. A gnostic living in the second century could write the Apocrypha (Secret Book) of John because he saw his own communion with Christ as a continuation of what the apostles enjoyed, therefore he might as well cast the dialogue of his work into a literary form where the apostle asked the questions to Jesus, not the dialogue's gnostic author. The title of these works indicate that they were written 'in the spirit' of John, Peter, Philip or even Mary of Magdala. The Book of Thomas the Contender (which included the Gospel of Thomas41), attributed to Jesus' 'twin brother', suggests that it is the reader who is Jesus' real twin brother; whoever understands these books understands, like Thomas, that Jesus is his 'twin', his spiritual 'other self'.42

Defending its 'protective belt', Historic Christianity may very well call attention to the marked difference between gnostic and NT mentality as to attribution of authorship, due to their opposing ways of perceiving the relationship between spirit and matter, and between faith and history.43 This was also acknowledged by the author of the Secret Book of John, who considered the (orthodox) Christians, who accused him of forgery, to be 'literal-minded'.44

In his Libros Quinque Adversus Haereses, 3.1-4 (c. AD 190), Irenaeus argues against the gnostic writings. The way he does this is significant. His arguments are not primarily theological, but historical. He refers e.g. to the apostolic origin of the tradition behind his own teaching; John-Polycarp-Irenaeus, and although the chain may be questioned since Polycarp died when Irenaeus was quite young, the basic historical attitude remains. As to the gnostic´s claim of having received secret traditions from the apostles, Irenaeus does not first argue against the theological content of these traditions. Instead he questions their historical basis: If there exist such secret teachings, would it not be reasonable to assume that the apostles would have given these to the leaders of the churches which they themselves founded? But the leaders of these churches have not recognized the gnostic writings, therefore these writings should be considered heretical.

But why did the gospels originally contain no explicit reference of authorship? First of all it should be noted that in Antiquity it was not uncommon that the author of a book refrained from identifying himself. Literary ambitions were different than today, in the first centuries

AD the author would seem to need a particular reason for identifying himself, not the other way around as is the case today. This gives some of the general background. Besides, writing a gospel in the first century was not a task which anyone would be likely to undertake. There is not a slightest hint in any given source that there were other gospels available at this time than the four canonical ones. Most of the apostles and the earliest disciples were still alive, or had only fairly recently died, and the oral tradition still had a prominent place in the life of the Christian communities. If a gospel were to be published with any ambition of being accepted as authoritative, it therefore would be likely to have originated from an apostle or from the people close to him, who knew his teachings. A gospel presenting stories or teachings unknow to the apostolic circles would had had a very poor chance of being accepted as an authentic presentation of the life and teachings of Jesus.

The anonymity of the gospels also makes sense when we understand that these writings were not typical works of individual authors, but written in the context of a community of Christians, where the gospel were used in the different aspects of the life of the community. Again, such a gospel would not easily be accepted and spread unless there was apostolic authority behind it. What is the alternative? It takes quite a lot of speculative energy to believe that there was an indefinite number of totally unrecorded and unremembered figures in the history of early Christianity who have left no mark except as the supposedly anonymous authors behind the gospels (notably John and Matthew). The Bultmann School conjures major theologians or spiritual giants out of thin air. Not only did these authentic authors (or editors) die as if they had never been known, they were also later claimed to be the apostles (or disciples of apostles) who over-shadowed them, without such a practice being remarked upon or noticed except negatively in any early Christian writers.45 The credulity of assuming pseudonymity of the NT in general, and especially for the gospels, thus seems pretty far-streched.

There is one exception to the gospels' community-based context of authorship. The Gospel of Luke is the only gospel which presents itself, so to speak, as other books on the public marked in Antiquity. In his introduction (1:1-4), the author seems to give an apology for his individual authorship, explaining the purpose and background of the book, addressing himself to 'Teophilus'; probably the person who had made the publication of the book financially possible.46 One may ask if this is some of the reason to why the Gospel of Luke is noticeably less quoted in second century Christian literature than the Gospel of Matthew (whose material also includes nearly all of the gospel of Mark).47

The question of reliability and authority of the canonical gospels as against apocryphal and heretical gospels in the second and third centuries A.D. made the question of authorship far more important than it had been in the first century. But if names were attached to the gospels purely to strengthen their ecclesiastical authority, would not Peter and Paul be a better choice than Mark and Luke? Mark even has some disgraceful information attached to his name, as he had left Paul and Barnabas in the middle of their first missionary journey, cf. Acts 15:37-40. If there are fabrications, it would be just as reasonable to assume that it is incorrect that Mark was the disciple of Peter (cf. I Peter 5:13), than that the authorship of the second gospel is fictional. The arguments of the Bultmann School makes it very hard to explain why Peter's name was not attached to any of the canonical gospels, as it was to the docetic Gospel of Peter in the middle of the second century.

Instead, Historic Christianity refers to the fact there is general agreement in early Christian sources that all four gospels derived from well known, reliable traditionists who stand at one

or two removes from Jesus Christ. Concerning Mark, Papias (ca. AD 140 or earlier) says that he copied down accurately what he remembered of Peter's teaching concerning what was said or done by the Lord, although not in chronological order. Luke's Gospel is said by Irenaeus to be a definitive written version of the gospel proclaimed by Paul. Of Matthew, Papias says that after a long period of teaching, he assembled or edited the holy words "in the Hebrew manner of delivery" (Gerhardsson 1961, 196) or, "in the Hebrew language" (Eusebius 1965, 206). And John, who is said constantly to have made use of the method of oral proclamation, published his spiritual Gospel at the end of his life, at the request of his friends.48

Justin Martyr, in his Dialogue with Tryphon, ch. 100 ff. (c. 150-160 AD), uses the same technical term when he describes the canonical gospels as was used of Xenophon's work on Socrates, viz. the Latin 'memorabilia' (Greek: 'apomnemonevmata'). Xenophon's Memorials was in Antiquity, if not now,49 regarded as an eyewitness testimony of the trial and death of Socrates. When the learned Justin designated the gospels as the 'memorials of the apostles', he is therefore making quite specific claims as to their source and historical reliability.

There is an account in Tertullian's De Baptismo, ch. 1f. (c. 190200 AD) which likewise reveals something of the attitude towards history in the Christian communities. Apocryphal Pauline writings were circulating in the second century, among them a biography of Paul. When it was discovered, c. 150 AD, that the author of this pious novel was a presbyter in a church in Asia Minor, he had to resign, even if his book was widely used and even if he defended himself by saying that he had done it out of his love for Paul. To the church leaders it was obviously more important that he had written a book professing to contain the authentic sayings and doings of an apostle, when there was inadequate historical basis to do so. This critical attitude does not fit the picture painted by the Bultmann School of church leaders fabricating gospel authors for purely strategical reasons.

The Bultmann School finds all these testimonies basically unacceptable. Apart from their general view on the formation of the NT tradition (cf. 7.3.3, below), this reflects their understanding of what an eyewitness might be expected to say about the historical Jesus.50 To use Mark as an example, the sections which Manson 1962 had identified as 'Petrine' include stories like the feeding of the 5000 (6:30-44), the walking on the water (6:45-22), the Passion predictions (8:31, 9:30-32, 10:32-34), the strange exorcist (9:38-41) and the withered fig tree (11:12-14; 20-25). And in Matthew's two first chapters we find elements like the Virgin Birth, the story of the Magi, the murder of the innocents and a genealogy which is different from that of Luke. To account for what is believed to be myth, 'ex post facto' predictions and contradictions, one either has to assume that they were not written by eyewitnesses, or, even if they were, that these witnesses was neither able nor willing to restrain the creation of fanciful and nonfactual narrative material.51

Now if reports of miracles and fulfilled prophecies a priori are taken to be myths and 'ex post facto' predictions, then this is clearly an example of how different sets of metaphysical presuppositions can result in different sets of historical judgements. According to the other 'programme', if a report includes stories about miracles or fulfilled prophecy, this is not in itself a proof that the author is untrustworthy. Such matters have to be decided on a broader source-critical basis. As to cases like the murder of the innocent children or the genealogies of Matthew and Luke, the question here is whether such an event would be improbable in view of our general knowledge of Roman rule in Palestine, or whether the genealogies necessarily contradict each other.52

To Historic Christianity then, the evidence suggests that the Gospels of Mark (within the context of his community) and Luke were written by the men whose names they bear, while Matthew53 and John54 to a large extent influenced the traditions recorded in the gospels ascribed to them.55 And where the NT gospels were not actually written by eyewitnesses of Jesus, they are still seen as embodying a tradition which in its oral (and written) form was controlled by the knowledge of eyewitnesses.56 This conclusion thus functions as an auxiliary hypothesis in the protective belt of one of our two research programmes.

7.3 NT Internal Criticism

7.3.1 The Synoptic Problem: Who is Dependent on Whom?

The relationship of the gospels to one another was of interest already to the patristic church,57 but it is only in the modern period that the question has been addressed in terms of written sources behind the gospels. The theory of gospel sources started off with the supposition of an original 'original gospel' ('Urevangelium') first made by G.E. Lessing in 1784.58 In recent synoptic scholarship,59 the so-called 'two-document hypothesis' of the 19th century has continued to have a wide following. The two documents were identified with on the one hand an 'Ur-Markus' or essentially Mark, and on the other a sayings (logia) source designated Q (from the German 'Quelle').

The two-document hypothesis thus states that Mark is the oldest gospel which has been woven into Matthew and Luke, although in characteristically different ways. Apart from Mark, Matthew and Luke used another common source; the hypothetically deduced Q. Out of the three synoptic gospels, one is thus left with two independent sources, Mark and Q.

This view has been challenged in different ways. As regards the number of independent sources, the 'four-document hypothesis'60 argues that Matthew and Luke, apart from the material taken from Mark and Q, provide special and important material of their own. To decide whether the particular character of the material found only in Matthew and Luke satisfied the criteria of being primary sources, one necessarily has to build upon a general assessment of the history of the gospel tradition (ef. below, ch. 7.3.3). There is thus ample opportunity that the presuppositions found in the two competing 'protective belts' will influence the verdict.

Regarding the priority of Mark, one of the principal arguments for the two-document hypothesis has always been the phenomenon of order in the different synoptic gospels. But this can only prove that the source used by all three of our gospels was most faithfully preserved by Mark with regard to order and length. It can not prove that Mark is prior to Matthew and Luke. E.P. Sanders concluded his careful study of the tendencies of the synoptic tradition that while some of the criteria he found useful supported Mark's priority, others did not.61 Both Matthean priorists and Lukan priorists can find support in his study. The evidence simply does not warrant the degree of certainty with which many scholars, notably from the Bultmann School,62 have held the two-document hypothesis.

Further, there are several objections to the hypothetical source Q. Q has never been shown to be one document, and its character and limits are difficult if not downright impossible to establish.63 The mixed order/disorder of the Q material in Matthew vis-a-vis Luke64 speaks against the unity of Q and is more readily explained by Matthew and Luke's independent use of several tracts or cycles of tradition.

The field thus seems opened for a new view of the synoptic problem, since the two-source theory (and the variant four-document hypothesis) seem too simple to account for all the literary facts in the three first gospels. A new view will necessarily be more complex and flexible than the tidy old one.65 The most primitive state of the triple, or 'Markan', tradition (as most scholars agree also in relation to the double, or 'Q', tradition) is not consistently or exclusively to be found in any one gospel, to which we must then assign over-all temporal priority. There was written (as well as oral) tradition underlying each of the gospels, and this tradition is sometimes preserved in its most original form by Matthew, sometimes by Luke, but probably most often by Mark.

If so, one cannot simply answer the question of dependency in a linear way, where one gospel simply 'used' another and therefore has to be considered as secondary (second-hand), historically speaking. Instead, we must be prepared to allow for cross-fertilization between the ongoing traditions at any stage in their development. This does not preclude the possiblity that two or more gospels which confirm each other on a particular point have taken their information from sources that ultimately was independent of each other. There were several people who had had first-hand knowledge concerning Jesus. The different gospels, however, as historical sources in themselves, are not independent of each other in so much as the traditions of Jesus had been the subject of much public teaching continously since the day of the Pentecost, and much of what is included in the gospels was common knowledge.66 But none of the gospels is an adaption of one of its predecessors, even if, as is probable, these were known to the later writer(s). In this sense, therefore, any gospel may, depending on the particular issue, turn out to be independent of the others. I suspect this fits the programme of Historic Christianity better than it does the Bultmann School.

7.3.2 Genre Criticism: The Gospels as Narratives.

A basic feature of source criticism is to establish the meaning of the sources in question. In this case the documents consist of the NT gospels. To the extent that all verbal meaning is necessarily genre-bound, 67 the gospels, as members of a particular literary genre, cannot be properly understood or interpreted unless that genre is recognized and its conventions understood. 68 This is so because «an interpreter´s generic conception of a text is constitutive of everything that he subsequently understands, and ... this remains the case unless and until that generic conception is altered.» (Hirsch 1967, 74). The identification of genre, which is essentially a descriptive notion, will thus have definite normative implications. By classifying the gospels according to genre, one may also qualify their interpretation as historical sources through the notion of what is appropriate and inappropriate to the genre in question. 69

Before going into the specific genres which have been proposed, some comments must be made on the gospels as narratives, i.e. on a 'meta-genre' level, as one can put different genres within the more general concept of narrative. Aristotle divided literature into three basic categories: epos, drama and poetry.70 Modern literary theory tend to use the concept of narrative to designate what Aristotle meant by epos.71 According to a well-established authority, a narrative statement is "the oral or written discourse that undertakes to tell of an event or a series of events." (Genette 1980, 25.)72

My concern here is not to discuss the basic constituents and techniques of narrative.73 The relevant point is rather that any narrative is primarily a linguistic construction, whose aim is to tell a story, regardless of whether the narrated events actually happened or not.74 A narrated

world is not the same as the real world; it is not a simple retelling of actual events as they 'really were'. The events are told in accordance with certain generic laws and from a certain 'point of view', a narrative perspective, which more or less explicitly reveals the author's 'ideology' (or 'values').75 This 'ideology' is shown through the specific kind of rhetoric he has chosen to employ.76

As far as the gospels are concerned, scholars tell us that the notion of 'point of view' enables us to see that e.g. Mark's gospel is a carefully and integrally composed narrative.77 Mark employs conceptual, imaginative and verbal means in order to introduce his readers to a narrative world, and to lead them through it. The intrusive omniscience of the narrator in the gospels is the principal quarantee that serves to characterize them as literary narratives. In Genette's vocabulary, Mark is a "non-focalized extradiegetic78 narrative" (ibid., 189); where the omniscient narrator is outside the story. His implied presence as invisible observer in the events he narrates, his ability to understand the mental processes and motivations of his characters is only shared with the character 'Jesus'.79 'Jesus' thus becomes the voice and perspective of the 'point of view' of this narrative, a voice given to him by the narrator; the evangelist.

It is a particular problem in genre criticism to grasp the narrative's world and the events this world purports to portray. The rhetoric point of view will help us enter the narrative world which the evangelists invite us to. It will enable us to understand what the narrator wants to say. Read in this way the gospel is understood as an integral and sophisticated narrative system, not as a compilation or edition of independent oral units, each with a life-setting of their own, as in form criticism of the Bultmann School. Nor is it read as a redaction, where the focus is on the redactor's use of an already established tradition, even if redaction criticism emphasize the gospel-authors as self-conscious writers with literary pretensions.

Such a narrative reading, however, can not help the historian distinguish what is fictional from what is factual. To demonstrate the congruence of a narrator with an historian, or of a narrative world with the real world, we need other information than the isolated narrative. The person who tells a story may be inventing what he tells us, as in fairy tales and novels. He is not, as a narrator, engaged in an inquiry which aims to establish what did in fact occur. This is the historian's proper task; to do research, to weigh alternative possibilities and to marshall evidence in favor of one rather than another of these possibilities.80 A strictly historical work is thus judged by different criteria than a narrative, unless one agrees with the 'new idealism' (cf. above; ch. 4.1), whose standards for historical narratives are moral and aesthetic: interest and intelligibility.

According to Petersen 1978, 115, "Mark's rhetoric is the rhetoric of fiction".81 This does not, however, disallow the possibility of some correspondence between Mark's (or any of the other evangelists') narrative world and the real, historical world to which he seems to refer.82 The rhetoric of the narrative is evidence with regard to the person who wrote it, and the time of writing, but not to the time to which the writing refers.83 It can tell us that the gospel authors integrated history and theological interpretation in their narratives, but not whether the supposedly historical material is authentic. The only possible way to measure the historical value of narrated material is to weigh its evidential value, i.e. by comparing one gospel to other NT sources on the background of the formation of the NT tradition in general, and to external evidence outside the NT.84

By classifying the gospels as narratives I have thus not altered the historical problem of their relationship to the 'real' world they talk about. Within the general concept of narrative, however, there is room for several types of more literary sub-genres. And as different scholars specify and explain the gospel genre in different ways, there are different conceptions involved as to what is historically reliable in the gospels, and what is not.

Traditional genre usage provided a means of identifying and classifying literary works and periods. More recently, the discussion has focused on the interpretive role of genre, as the means by which one comprehends a literary work.85 On the one hand, genre designates a certain text as a whole,86 its literary structure and organization, and its content with various levels of possible meanings. On the other, it describes its relation to other similar or dissimilar texts, since it is a comparative or derivative concept.87

According to the majority of present critics the gospels constitute a unique genre in the history of literature.88 They claim there is no parallel to the gospel form as a whole in ancient literature. It would be a grave mistake, however, to equate uniqueness with truth. One would then have to take the same attitude towards all the other new genres which were constantly emerging during the Graeco-Roman period, i.e. if by 'new' or 'unique' we mean a recombination of earlier forms into novel configurations.

There are two key explanations of the uniqueness of the gospel genre which oppose each other strongly as to the historicity of the gospel material. The Bultmann School views the gospels as the final phase in the evolution of early Christianity, with the kerygma of the primitive church as its core.89 The separate units in the gospel tradition were transmitted only by illiterate, unknown persons who could not be regarded as authors. The evangelists collected these units and compiled their gospels which therefore should be viewed as popular cult legends, as 'Kleinliteratur' and not 'Hochliteratur'.90

The gospels are thus untrustworthy as sources for the historical Jesus. They are purely theological documents arising out of the worshipping church as anonymous texts. The passion narrative, for instance, goes back to neither an historical event nor any literary form, but to living, popular cultic tradition.91 "The Christ who is preached is not the historical Jesus, but the Christ of the faith and the cult .... the kerygma of Christ is cultic legend and the Gospels are expanded cult legends." (Bultmann 1963, 371.)

Although the Bultmann School does not require any parallel to the gospel as a whole, it regards the various oral forms reflected in the gospels as dependent on patterns found in Graeco-Roman culture.92 Historic Christianity, however, (while affirming the 'sui generis' of the gospel genre) regards the OT as the primary source of synoptic patterns of composition.93

There are parallels to be found in Jonah, the biographies of the prophets, the Elisha-story, the Exodus account and the Passover 'haggadah'.94 These are traditionally placed within the historical works of the OT, where historical narratives and theological interpretation intermingle, i.e. where historical events are crucial to the story being told and the lessons being taught.95 As to the life-setting of the continuity between the OT and NT, both were used as teaching material; the OT in the Synagogue and both in Christian services.96

First and foremost, Historic Christianity takes issue with the competing programme concerning the question of origin and historicity of the gospels. The gospel genre is seen as basically the product of the apostolic preaching of Jesus from which it developed.97 It still

has a definite kerygmatic character, but the kerygma is integrally related to an essentially historical outline of Jesus' life, death and resurrection.

In one way, Historic Christianity agrees with the insight of redaction criticism that each gospel reflects a careful literary production by the respective writer.98 It certainly agrees when this insight is used to disprove the form critical position of the Bultmann School which saw the gospels as the final stage of the development of an anonymous and legendary cult tradition. But redaction criticism per se does not imply an affirmation of historical tradition in the Gospels. Even if it states that the gospels qua gospels are not cult legends, their constituent traditions may still have originated and functioned in this manner.99 Historic Christianity confirms that as Mark (or Matthew or Luke) gave his gospel a written form he created a new literary genre. At the same time, however, the necessary formal and material components were already at hand in the tradition. The evangelist created the 'whole' from which the different parts of these components were represented in narrative form.100 But the key question here is what the historical basis for this 'whole' was; what relation existed between these parts and the object they described; the historical Jesus.

There are two basic answers to this question. The Bultmann School tend to view the NT gospels as historically unreliable sources; i.e. as basically mythological products of the early Christian communities,101 where the distinctions between past, present and future are lost.102 Historic Christianity tend to see them as a theological interpretation of actual history,103 where the theological element does not necessarily invalidate historical authenticity and where the historical element is essential to the theo logical explications. To substantiate these positions, and to specify what is historical and what is not, the two programmes apply different 'positive heuristics'. In ch. 7.3.3 I shall discuss how these heuristics make different use of the problemsolving technique of tradition-criticism (including form and redaction criticism).

The question of the historicity of the gospels is relevant also when they are aligned with other literary genres, i.e. when the gospel genre is not seen as 'sui generis' but analogous to another, already existing genre. One way of shaking a gospel free from its authorial intent and historical context is to impose a structuralist-existentialist grid on the text.104 This is done through a synchronic approach, in which organization and structure are emphasized, rather than time and place as in a diachronic, historical study.

From this viewpoint, the story of Jesus took the shape it did "because the comic genre a deep, generative structure of human mind generated the Gospel of Mark as a performance text, a transformation of itself." (Via 1975, 93.) The death and resurrection of Jesus are here important as structural components only. As these components reverberated in the mind of the gospel writer, they activated the comic genre whose nucleus also is death and resurrection.105 A structuralist approach thus ignores and even undercuts any relationship between the text and the world it refers to.

Different scholars who apply a diachronic approach (just as the proponents of the gospel genre as 'sui generis' do), have placed the NT gospel into different analogous genre in ancient literature. Some of these imply a quite negative view of the historicity of the gospels. This would be in line with the 'hard core' of the Bultmann School, and thus applicable to its 'protective belt' as possible 'ad hoc' hypotheses which could replace the old views of Schmidt, Dibelius and Bultmann if needed. Other genre-characteristics, however, fit Historic

Christianity better. They imply a more integral relationship between history and theology in the gospels.

In the first group there are scholars who find antecedents for the gospel genre in Graeco-Roman (Hellenistic) literature. The suggestions offered include various types of biography, particularly the lives of the philosophers, the tragedy (i.e. as a 'closet' drama not intended for actual performance), the aretalogy (a narrative of the miraculous deeds of a god or a hero), the memoir and the Socratic dialogue.106 The list is not complete, and illustrates the complexity of the problem of determining the generic affiliation of the gospel form. I shall only make a couple of points concerning biographies and aretalogies.

According to Talbert 1977,107 the synoptic gospels must be classified among Graeco-Roman 'Lives' (biographies) on the basis of their mythical structure, cultic function and attitude. A widespread myth, the myth of the immortals, governs both the synoptic gospels and the Hellenistic memoirs and lives. The non-historicity of the gospel material is here simply assumed (mostly by reference to the 'miracles' reported), and the Gospel of Mark, as a biography, is thus explained through its (assumed) function as "a myth of origins for an early Christian community." (Ibid., 134.) Like certain Hellenistic philosophers, the story of Jesus is constructed to portray him as a true image for his disciples to follow.

Talbert's thesis have been heavily criticized on literary-historical grounds.108 The basic critique from the viewpoint of Historic Christianity is that the biographical elements in the NT gospels are not mythic, but historical. The Jesus-image which functioned as a model for the lives of his disciples was not fictional, but in line with the actual life of a historical person. The great diversity within the category of 'biographical' literature, both in antiquity and in modern times, ought to preclude an a priori mythic designation of its material.

As aretalogies, the gospels are seen as a product of specific Hellenistic influence. When the tradition concerning Jesus moved out into the wider Hellenistic world, aretalogists109 spun miracle stories around him in order to portray him as a wonder-working divine man. These fiction-stories originated from the need of early Christian groups to gain prestige. This need in turn made them write a type of propaganda which would be acknowledged in their non-Christian, non-Jewish environment.110 Thus the aretalogies-genre.

According to Kee 1973, however, so-called aretalogies include such a diversity of material that the lumping together of these writings into one specific genre is unwarranted. If so, the Bultmann School might respond by putting in an extra ad hoc hypothesis: The gospels are not aretalogies, but they were based on pre-canonical collections of fabricated miracle-stories. Mark, then, responded by correcting the Christology of these miracle collections by means of the 'messianic secret' 111, an attempt to play down the glory of Jesus' ministry in the tradition of miracles.112 John, in his own way, corrected the aretalogical aspect of his sign-source by means of spiritualizing the mighty works of Jesus, exposing the inadequacy of faith in miracles alone.

This would be an anomaly to Historic Christianity. The process of digestion thus continues, where each research programme, partly planned and partly unplanned, tries to turn anomalies into positive evidence by modifying, increasing or complicating the protective belt. Thus Historic Christianity: The theory of Jesus' Messiah-consciousness being a fictional product of early Christianity, speculative in itself,113 does not in any case fit the gospels being based on collections of miracles. Why? Simply because Mark did not develop the 'messianic secret'

with any consistency, as Wrede himself confirmed. And even if the gospels were based on such collections, stories of miracles are not untrustworthy per se, cf. above, ch. 2.3 and 3.3. Even more important, however, is the fact that in literary circles of the first century, Hellenistic divine men gained authentication from their examplification of moral virtue. Only in the literature of the late second and third centuries A.D. did miracles play a difference as to who were considered to be divine.114 So why should either the evangelists or the early Christian community create such stories if they had no acknowledged propaganda-function? Why not rather explain them as built upon a historical trustworthy tradition, as other considerations (below; ch. 7.3.3.3 and 4) suggest?

And if the gospel genre turns out to be analogous after all, why not rather place it within Semitic literature in general and OT historical works in particular? That is to say, in case the protective belt of Historic Christianity had to be modified as to the genre question, why not read the gospel as a whole as an OT historical work115, in line with the more hermeneutical understanding of genre, even if this interpretation turned out to be unsatisfactory both formally and materially as a traditional classification of genre?116 When the literary question of the gospel genre touches upon their status as historical documents, there are thus ample opportunities for two competing historical theological research programmes to maneuver their protective belts so that their hard cores remain intact. How then, do these programmes treat the specifically historical question of the formation of the NT tradition?

7.3.3 Tradition Criticism and Oral History.

Tradition criticism seeks to trace the history of a particular tradition in the process of transmission. As the NT pre-canonical gospel tradition was at least partially oral, NT tradition criticism will to various degrees involve the question of oral transmission in general. Tradition criticism, as I will use the term, 117 also includes redaction/composition criticism, which deals with the contribution of the evangelist (or final editor) himself to the present form of a gospel, and form criticism, which seeks both to establish the original setting of the gospel-sources and to trace the history of the oral and literary forms in which the words and deeds of Jesus were transmitted.

7.3.3.1 Basic Differences in Perspective.

It is generally recognized by both programmes that the early church shaped the oral tradition to meet its particular needs and that the evangelists were not only purveyors of tradition, but also theologians in their own right.118 The original intention of the gospel narratives can thus be seen as vehicles for proclamation or testimonies of faith.119 They never intended to give a dis-interested, 'purely' historical portrait of Jesus. Whatever was told of Jesus' words and deeds was always intended for preaching and exhortation in order to convert unbelievers and confirm the faithful. Christianity was not founded on a chronicle of 'neutral' events, but through the confidence that the content of the 'Good News' was salvation; the story of Jesus marked the decisive beginning of the End.

The fundamental differences arise when we again ask the simple question: Does a given saying or act in the gospels accurately reflect a moment in the career of Jesus? My former distinction between the Jesus of history and/or the Christ of faith is again brought to the front. And again my two research programmes give two basically opposing answers. The Bultmann School tend to think that the early Christian sources show no interest in the actual life and personality of Jesus.120 The preaching about him has supplanted his own preaching and his

own acts.121 Our historical knowledge of early Christianity thus begins with the (mythological) Easter faith of the disciples, not with Jesus of Nazareth. The gospels are theological documents, useful as remnants to inform us about the sociological life-setting ('Sitz im Leben') of the early church, but not (or only to a very small degree) as historical reports about the Jesus of history. The early Christians portrayed him in their own likeness; the sources are thus so heavily biased that we are precluded from any real access to Jesus.

One possible practical effect of this kind of analysis, as an example of a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses, is to transpose it into the framework of early Christianity as a 'new world' coming into being.122 The gospels are seen as religious or mythological charters which is approached in order to reconstruct the social world of early Christianity. The important point here is not that the Bultmann School employs the gospels as 'remnants' (cf. above, ch. 3.1). So does the other programme. The Bultmann School, however, does it in a way which to a very high degree concludes that the same sources are untrustworthy as 'reports'.

The aim of their historial reconstruction is to show that in general the early church's interest in Jesus arose basically out of its own situation.123 Their sociological-theological practice produced their theological ideology.124 Their 'ideology', as revealed in the gospels, functioned as a means of legitimation or rationalization of the life of Christian communities. The form-criticism of the Bultmann School thus moves in a circle. The forms of the literary tradition is used to establish the sociological influences operating in the life of the community, and the life of the community is used to render the forms themselves intelligible.125 The gospels are untrustworthy historical reports, and the 'fact' that the Christian communities were disinterested in the historical Jesus is used to render this former 'fact' intelligible.

The attitude of Historic Christianity may be seen as circular too. To protect the hard core which rejects the antithesis of history or theology, the auxiliary hypothesis in the protective belt claims that the creation of the early church is historically inexplicable apart from the existence of historical knowledge of Jesus. The church arose as a result of a theological interpretation of historical facts, notably the resurrection. The aim of the Christian communities was to proclaim the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, rather than to reflect on its own problems.126 The starting-point is their proclamation, which explains their practice. Their practice then renders the proclamation, i.e. the gospels and the tradition behind it, intelligible insofar as it is based upon the historical Jesus.

The question then is, what empirical evidence can these two competing programmes offer to back up their respective conclusion? As to the transmission of the gospel tradition, the Bultmann School claims that the written gospels were based on an exclusively oral tradition which was handed down by anonymous and miscellaneous individuals. It had the characteristics of "primitive story telling" (Bultmann 1963, 7), and conformed to "laws which operate as formative factors in popular tradition" (Dibelius 1935, 7f.). In short, we are talking about an uncontrolled folkloric transmission; a 'biology of the folk-tale' where the spiritual vital communities of early Christianity both created new traditions and moulded old ones to freely fit their various needs, all in accordance to various psychological natural laws among non-literary, anonymous crowds.

Historic Christianity is fundamentally opposed to such a perspective. 127 The limited chronological framework does not inspire confidence in the analogue of folk tradition. The

development of 'holy word'-traditions over a few decades in a relatively small and closely knit religious group is quite a different matter from the development of folk traditions over a century or more. The Bultmann School is furthermore at odds with conceptions about the transmission of religious traditions in early Christianity and rabbinic Judaism, and it has a hard task trying to account for the transition from folkloric (communal) oral transmission with its milieu and technique to the (individual) written result in the gospels with its milieu and techniques. But before I go into this discussion more thoroughly, I will first take a closer look on oral tradition in general to see what some folklorists and oral historians have to say about its historical value.

7.3.3.2 On Oral Tradition in General.

The value of oral tradition can be classified through two categories: 'information' and 'attitude'.128 To the extent that an oral source is able to report on historical facts, it can be used as 'information'. It is valuable as 'attitude' to the extent that it can tell us about the attitude or interest of the people who produced and transmitted it; i.e. of the environment where it fulfilled a function. The value of an oral source thus equals its information plus its attitude.

In all oral tradition one will find that its key function lies at the cross-section between these two categories.129 The facts of the matter form the necessary startingpoint, but they are not enough in themselves. To get the tradition started, the traditionists and their environment must be able to convey a certain attitude toward the story they are telling. The story must satisfy a particular need. The amount of 'information' in oral tradition is dependent on how many historical facts the traditionists need in order to convey their own 'attitude'. A key to an analysis of oral tradition is thus to understand its particular function. Hence, if one succeeds in finding definite indications of the existence of given purposes pursued or functions fulfilled, a historian may be able to infer which parts of the tradition are likely to have been distorted and what kind of distortions are likely to have occurred.130

To what extent does the function of the tradition necessitate stability in its 'information'? If the function fulfilled is dependent on a certain amount of historical facts being conserved, and if the function is vital to the communities which keep the tradition alive, then the tradition is likely to be trustworthy in its 'informational' aspect.131 A tradition which forms the very basis of existence to its traditionists and its communities is not easily changed. If it is changed, their lives will be deeply affected. Applied to the gospel tradition, Historic Christianity claims that it formed the very life-line of the early church.132 Without any knowledge of Jesus, there would be no Christian communities. And if the tradition about what Jesus said and did was to be changed, the church would loose its identity. So either the tradition had to be kept basically as it was, or, it had to be thoroughly revised. The gnostics chose the latter option, and remained on the outskirts of Christianity, never being an accepted part of it.

Besides, the folklorist Dieter Glade has listed twelve factors which perform a stabilizing function to folk traditions: "Mehrmaliges Hören... ; 2. Mehrmaliges Erzählen; 3. Einfluss von Varianten; 4. Einfluss gleichen, polygenetisch erstandener Erzählungen; 5. Einfluss des Formel-´und Motivschatzes anderer Erzählungen; 6. Einfluss schriftliche Fassungen; 7. ErinnerungsvermÃgen; 8. Optische EinflËsse; 9. Tradtionsverpflichtungen; 10. Form-´ und Stilgesetze; 11. Modernisierungen; 12. Die beharrende Tendenz des Hörerkreises." (Glade 1966, 235 f.)133 Both programmes agree that several of these factors were operative in the formation of the gospel tradition. But whereas the Bultmann School have taken them as

indications of an accidental transmission-process,134 Historic Christianity may refer to Glade for 'inside' folkloristic support to the opposite conclusion.

Form critics of the Bultmann School attributed an active role to the community and a passive role to the scribe, satisfied to put down traditions largely as they came to him135. Modern studies of folklore, however, indicate that passivity characterized the community which wants to hear her traditions told and retold with little change.136 Creativity belongs on the side of the storyteller, who may exercise his creativity as far as the conservatism of the community will permit him. This, by the way, puts the onus of responsibility for the writing of the gospels on the evangelists rather than on the communities and their traditional kerygma.137

Likewise, the form critics of the Bultmann School assumed a graduality in the bits of pieces of tradition, "with the result that our present gospels grew like Topsy with little rhyme or reason." (Gundry 1974, 102.) More recent folkloric studies,138 on the contrary, disprove the theory of graduality in the association of small units. Such associations take place suddenly and on a large scale.

One basic criterion of oral authenticity judgments is the 'laws of tradition'. The 'laws' which the Bultmann School adheres to does not always hold water, however, as already indicated. A comparison will show striking differences between, say, principles of remembering in Bartlett 1932, and principles of the transmission of the narrative material which govern the conclusions of Bultmann Scholl-form criticism.139 Assuming that the changes which are likely to occur in oral transmission are viewed as similar to those which often140 occur in written documents, Dibelius concluded that the simpler version represented the original, and Bultmann stated that names, times and places nearly always are secondary additions to the primitive tradition.141

The assumption based on written documents remains ungrounded, however, and is contradicted by Bartlett's study, which states that the simpler form represents the end of a process of change. In other words, as oral information is transmitted, the general form or outline of the story remains intact, but fewer words and fewer original details are preserved.142 This conclusion is supported by Vansina 1965, who found that conclaves are sometimes held among preliterate tribes in Africa for the express purpose of settling agreement on the content of tribal tradition. The result of such meetings is that the ensuing tradition always tends to be a "minimum statement" (ibid., 28), even though nearly everyone present can cite more details. Allport and Postman 1965 and V. Taylor 1933 made similar observations from their own experimental evidence, 143 as did Gerhardsson 1961 concerning Talmudic literature.144

Continuing on the comparison between the Bultmann School and Bartlett, the former argues that unfamiliar material is added in the process of transmission,145 whereas according to the latter, unfamiliar material is reduced in the process of remembering.146 According to the former, particular statements tend, with the passage of time, to become general, and local references to become universal.147 According to the latter, general statements almost invariably tend to become particular. Thus, if a general statement is found in a remembered narrative, it is likely to belong to an early stage in the process of remembering. To Bartlett then, the process of remembering always tends to produce a shortened and simplified version of the original.148 But this shortening process does not go on indefinitely. Eventually it stabilizes into a genuinely conventionalized representation, i.e. a story which can be faithfully

reproduced by rote memory.149 Hence, it no longer needs to become subject to change or distortion.

Another important criterion in accepting material as authentic, or at least very early in the tradition, is whether it contains any underlying mnemonic devices.150 If it does, it is likely to have survived the process of 'simplification'. One mechanical means of aiding memory and thus safe-guarding information is to relate testimony through rhyme or rhytm.151 Another one is repetition. Where statements appear in such a way that the exact words are repeated in the same order, a historian may conclude that this is a fixed text of a tradition or a standardized formula.152 Some remarks are also more likely than others to be retained simply because they "catch the attention of each successive listener." (Allport & Postman 1965, 52.) An example of this would be Matt. 5:22, where the Aramaic word 'raca' (fool) occurs when Greek would have done just as well. The most probable explanation of this linguistic survival is simply that its cacophonous sound lingered in the listener's mind.153

Allport and Postman found that in the transmission of oral testimony, "unfamiliar vocabulary, subtle verbal twist, individuality of interpretation are all deleted. When diverse personalities spread a tale, only the least common denominator can survive. The story sinks in verbal simplicity to the level of the least educated, and verbally least gifted, member in the chain of transmission." (Allport & Postman 1947, 156.) Now regarding the presence of semitisms in the gospel tradition, these would therefore be likely to have disappeared if they had not been an authentic part of the original tradition material.154

In the opposite manner, "we perceive and remember not what comes to our sense organs alone but likewise what our linguistic and cultural habits and past experiences predispose us to perceive and remember." (Ibid., 143.) Some scholars have therefore felt that Mark's style, characterized as "colloquial, repetitious, often rough and ungrammatical, picturesque and direct" (Abel 1971, 279) reflects the primary gospel sources more clearly than the other synoptic gospels.

To sum up, there are thus several decisive factors to consider as regards the trustworthiness of oral tradition. Who are the traditionists; do they belong to a closed circle or can anyone transmit the tradition authoritatively? Is the traditionist a mere purveyor of tradition or does he creatively transform it? What is its structure and form; what function does it have? In what kind of community or milieu is it retold, and what role does the community have in relation to the traditionist's retelling of the tradition?155

According to P. Thompson 1978, there are three basic methods to check the reliability of oral source material.156 The first is the assessment of internal consistency, which means that each source must be read as a whole. The second consists of a crosscheck with other sources, if possible. According to Jan Vansina,157 any evidence (written or oral) which goes back to one source only should be regarded as on probation until corrobation for it can be found. To Thompson, however, this dictum may be of more general relevance to oral tradition handed down over several generations than to direct life-story evidence.

His third method places the evidence in a wider context, from where one can identify whether the source reveals a general absence of reliable detail, anachronistic attitudes or incongruous linguistic phrasing. Jan Vansina concludes that when a historian is unable to find "any definite indications of distortion, he must accept the text as being reliable." (Vansina 1965, 95.) In other words, falsification of oral tradition must not be postulated a priori. International

research has shown that where oral tradition and contemporary written sources can be compared, the former has in various cases turned out to be trustworthy as 'information', although it generally includes a lot of fabrications.158

Anyway, oral traditions vary as to the society in which they flourish, they do not transcend the boundaries of the social system in which they exist.159 This means that if a certain type of tradition is discovered in one society, e.g. eighteenth-century Norway, with certain characteristics and certain methods of transmission, these findings do not necessarily apply to another society, e.g. first-century Palestine. In order to see what light general folkloristic research, including memory and rumor transmission, throws on NT tradition criticism, one therefore first have to inquire into the particular characteristics of this tradition and its historical milieu. This includes some knowledge of its culture, social and religious institutions, the traditionists, their motivation, the possible necessity of a thorough learning, or memorization of the tradition, as well as its function in the milieu generally and the transmission-situation particularly.160

Let me illustrate this. General folkloristic research states that the more a certain tradition reflects a particular historical event or particular historical problems, the less chance it has to survive. If, however, the story reflects more or less universal problem-situations and carries an appeal which is independent of a concrete episode in a concrete historical setting, it is more likely to be kept alive unchanged.161 The Bultmann School would then say that this insight fits the stories of Jesus in the gospel tradition as being basically mythological or symbolic expressions of a universal spiritual reality.162 Historic Christianity, on the other hand, would ask why these traditions were written down, and why they were written so early; 20-60 years and roughly one (Matthew, John), two (Mark) or three (Luke) links behind the person they describe? The 'fact' is that the gospel tradition does reflect particular events in the particular historical life of Jesus, and still it was kept very much alive, because of the universal meaning attached to this particular historical person. There is thus a real need to see what was meant by 'tradition' in this particular milieu (i.e. the Jewish milieu in the highly diversified Hellenistic world at the dawn of the Christian era and the NT-milieu, as early as the Pauline epistles), and how, practically speaking, they set about transmitting their verbal traditions (i.e. articulated; oral or written).

7.3.3.3 The Method of Gospel Transmission: A Scandinavian Hypothesis

According to Historic Christianity, we must seek the origin of the gospel tradition ultimately in the historical Jesus. The Swedish scholars Harald Riesenfeld and Birger Gerhardsson,163 among others,164 have argued that Jesus is not only the object of a later faith, which on its side gave rise to the growth of oral and also written tradition. Jesus is, as Messiah and teacher, the object and subject of a tradition of authoritative and holy words which he himself created and entrusted to his disciples for its later transmission in the epoch between his death and his return.165 The gospel tradition was thus handed down in a mannr analogous to the transmission of rabbinic tradition, where each pupil accurately learned by heart what he heard from his teacher, and then passed it on.

To the early church, the oral Jesus-tradition was a higher equivalent of the oral Torah.166 The transmission of this 'New Torah'167 was a distinct didactic activity entrusted to special persons. All our sources from the early church tell us that certain key teachers and preachers were in an authoritative position within the communities even from the very start, and that

these men were in contact with each other. Common social psychology confirms such a development within different communities.

Now one of the factors which made a man authoritative within the early church was obviously his knowledge of Jesus. In the NT, the closest disciples of Jesus are particularly respected simply because they had lived together with Jesus in a direct disciple relationship (cf. Acts 1:21f.). They had not only seen and heard him, but received his teachings in a closed circle. Thus the twelve apostles possessed such a living impression of the life and work of Jesus as to qualify for being authoritative transmitters of the holy tradition, as the second link in the chain of transmission which began with Jesus himself.168

Critical examination of the material preserved from Jesus and the early Christian doctrinal authorities shows that it is stamped to no small degree by that type of learning which was to be found in the milieu to which Jesus and his disciples belonged. To ascribe this 'learned' character in its entirety to later teachers and traditionists would imply that those men who were of the highest repute in early Christianity were ignorant, romantic and shadowy figures which lacked any rationally understandable competence. This is scarcely to work with the hypothesis which best makes sense of the evidence.169

The 'Sitz im Leben', or 'life setting', and the original source of the gospel tradition was thus not the mission preaching nor the communal instruction of the primitive church, as the Bultmann School would have it. According to Historic Christianity, the primary Sitz im Leben of the earliest transmission of the gospel tradition was the transmission itself: a conscious, technical pedagogical act, first performed by Jesus himself, and later by the apostles onto their disciples, and so on.170 The proclamation of the NT is not to be causally reduced to consequences of certain social conditions, nor to a means of legitimizing the 'praxis' of the 'primitive' church, rather, the historical Jesustradition is to be seen as the very origin or foundation of the church.171

In order to withstand criticism, the 'Scandinavian hypothesis' of Riesenfeld & Gerhardsson must answer three basic questions: (1) To what extent did pharisaic teachers apply the rabbinic principles of pedagogics during the first century A.D.? (2) To what extent are we justified in regarding the pedagogics we find among the pharisaic teachers as representative of the normal practices of the Jewish milieu as a whole, i.e. even outside the bounds of pharisaism proper? (3) To what extent did the teaching and transmission of Jesus and the early church follow the principles of practical pedagogics which were common in their milieu, and to what extent did they create new forms?

First, it has been claimed that the evidence for the rigidity of rabbinic tradition is comparatively late; c. AD 200, and therefore "to read back into the period before 70 the developed rabbinic technique of 200 is a gross anachronism." (M. Smith 1963, 169.) According to Smith 1963 and Neusner 1971, the rabbinic memorization technique one finds around AD 200 was created and developed for the first time during the second century A.D. After crushing any opposing evidence in rabbinic sources, in Josephus and in the NT, Neusner is left only with the assertion that the rabbis introduced a brand new technique after the fall of the temple in AD 70, with no more than guesses to explain why this happened.172

Considerable changes took place during the revolutionary epoch between AD 65 and 135. But to claim that development was so uniform that changes in social and religious organization necessarily led to changes in other fields, as e.g. pedagogics, is to go too far. There is reason

to believe that continuity was not broken between the basic element of pedagogics of fully stabilized rabbinism AD 200 and the pharisaic teachers of the period of the temple prior to AD 70. There was some transmission of oral tradition both within the proto-rabbinic movement in particular and Judaism in general during the NT period. Likewise, the scriptures where memorized as part of normal elementary schooling, and the mnemonic and exegetical forms used in the later periods of Jewish literature were alive and well.173

The basis of the pedagogic of the rabbis was provided by hereditary, popular educational practice, where numerous analogies can be drawn from the surrounding milieu, before, during and after the periods in question. Generally speaking, pedagogics in antiquity were characterized by a remarkable degree of conservatism. It is thus possible to grasp the fundamentals of the old 'layers' of the rabbinic tradition, and to find correspondences in older literature, often as far back as the OT.

Even so, Smith argues that the history of the change from the pharisaic to the rabbinic legal tradition after AD 70 shows a general failure to preserve the 'ipsissima verba' of the early teachers, and a free production of new legal texts to meet the new needs of the party.174 To Gerhardsson, however,175 Smith's argument misses the point because he regards the preserved traditions as being the sum total of all relevant traditions that ever existed. When the subject of discussion if pedagogical methods, one has to take account of the different reasons why traditions lapse and become distinct. An analysis of the mechanics of the process of oral transmission thus reveals three main functions: (1) A creative function, where traditions are created, grow and pass through fruitful changes. (2) A purely preservative function where traditions are preserved and transmitted without either positive or negative changes. And (3) an annihilating function, where traditions lapse and become extinct, either by accident or design.

As to the second question, Smith claims that there were enormous differences which separated "the small, exclusive, sectarian pharisaic party of the temple period" (M. Smith 1963, 171) from the rabbinic organization of the third century (which was established by Roman law and given authority over all Roman Judaism). According to the protective belt of Historic Christianity,176 however, three separate groups of sources rabbinic literature, NT documents and Josephus all reveal, independent of each other, the dominance of Pharisaism during the first century. The evidence points to the fact that the pedagogics of the pharisaic teachers were representative of the methods common among Palestinian teachers during this period,177 even though the transmission of early traditions was not necessarily oral nor carefully controlled.178

As regards the third, perhaps most important question, the task of comparing early Christian to contemporary pharisaic or later rabbinic transmission techniques can be undertaken in two ways. One method concentrates on the differences, and points to the distinctive features of the two bodies. The other seeks to determine the resemblances, both in form and content, that are in fact there; this applies particularly to questions connected with period and background, with general customs and practices.179

As a rule, historical sources are likely to tell us more about the original aspects of a new movement than about the aspects they shared with their surroundings. Since the sources are not very extensive, it is risky to draw conclusions 'ex silentio'. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that if the teaching methods used by Jesus and the early church had been radically new, something of this would have been seen in the documents which have

been preserved. But there is no trace of this. Therefore the formal teaching methods seems to have been of minor interest to Jesus and early Christianity.

Nevertheless, since both Jesus and his apostles taught, it is necessary to determine how they taught. If neither themselves nor their contemporaries regarded the methods they used as being out of the ordinary, then these methods probably resembled those used by other teachers in the same milieu, notably pharisaic teachers who exercised great authority and influence.180

The differences between the pharisaic teachers on the one side and Jesus and the early church on the other have been stressed through the fairly common view that Jesus, the twelve apostles and the other leaders of the early church were, and remained, simple and unlearned men of the people. It is quite impossible to regard the leaders of the early church, and in particular the apostles, as being as uneducated at the end of their lives as they were when they started to follow Jesus. They had led the work of the church for twenty to sixty years, preaching, teaching, searching the Scriptures, discussing doctrinal questions and passing judgments on them, exercising discipline and defending the belief on the church. This learnedness naturally produced a specifically Christian exegesis and theology down to the time when the gospels were put into writing.181

On the other hand, one may ask, again concentrating on the differences, whether the spontaneous, charismatic aspect of Jesus and early Christianity ruled out acceptance of traditional forms, conscious technique and reasoned behavior. Jesus was in his activities a charismatic in the full sense, at the same time he was a teacher who in this upbringing had been schooled in the Scriptures and in their traditional interpretation.182 In all likelihood he was also knowledgeable in the methods of transmission of religious teaching used in Torah-centric Judaism.183 There are Jewish parallels for practically every style of preaching attributed to Jesus, and most of these are derived from rabbinic literature, not from the prophets or the apocalyptic.184

After Pentecost, the leaders of the early church manifested the same spiritual power, zeal and exalted states.185 It would be a grave mistake to regard the work carried out on the word by the first Christians as a purely intellectual activity of the modern, secularized academic type. Nevertheless, the rational mechanisms operative in the activity of the early church should not be underestimated. Enthusiasm was not without its logic, nor was zeal in preaching unaccompanied by its pedagogics.186 The charismatic character does not exclude an authoritative tradition and a technical method of transmission. Paul, who, 'walked in the Spirit',187 consciously handed down traditions to his communities which he demands they guard as authoritative norms for their lives.188

The spiritual and the legal, the spontaneous and the didactic, the charismatic and the ordered, thus existed side by side from the very beginning. To answer which of these elements are the more original will probably in the last resort depend on an a priori argument. Historic Christianity, as opposed to the Bultmann School, finds the nearest formal equivalents of the sayings of Jesus in the Jewish didactic tradition. 189 But the mere possibility that some early Christian teachers taught in accepted traditional forms is sufficient to motivate an inquiry into the question of whether the gospel tradition as we have it has been transmitted in this way. 190

If the gospel tradition had the character of being a 'holy word'; as the word of God and as something parallel to the holy writings of the OT, then our knowledge of the Palestinian milieu would imply that the words and deeds of Jesus were not just improvised. There would be no question of freely narrating or inventing, even when the spaker was possessed by the Spirit. On the contrary, the strict laws relating to holy tradition will have prevailed from the outset and determined both what was uttered and what was transmitted.191 It is a grossly over-simplification to suppose that since 'all things were made new in Christ',192 every resemblance between the early church and its milieu was a secondary condemnable influence.

Nevertheless, it is one thing to try to determine what the customs and methods were which set their mark on teaching and transmission in early Christianity; another to determine the extent to which the preserved traditions of Jesus were actually formed and transmitted according to these principles. To do this, Morton Smith compares the material preserved in the gospels with that in rabbinic literature. This comparison in his view reveals "differences which indicate that both the original natures of the material and the methods of transmission differed widely." (M. Smith 1963,172.) In his case there is no question of outlining the basic features of traditional rabbinic pedagogics and comparing these with the methods of transmission used in the early church. Instead he prefers to compare the rabbinic material as we have it; i.e. as finally edited, written down and preserved after several centuries, with the early Christian material as we have it, which was finally fixed and written down much earlier, after a relatively very short process.193

Smith presents the two groups of material as standing in striking contrast to each other.194 This effect is gained in the first place by ignoring all the material that shows any degree of resemblance. Secondly, he concentrates on the strictest legal aspect, the most scholastic attitude and the most advanced techniques to be found in the rabbinic material. This means that for the most part he makes use of the latest 'layers' of the different rabbinic sources, ignoring earlier phases where a tradition is first created and then grows, passing through fruitful changes along the way.195

Even so, when considering some examples of comparison,196 one will see that written versions were of greater importance for the final redaction of the gospels than that of rabbinic collections. It is nevertheless far-fetched to draw a sharp contast in the way Smith does.197 Through its positive heuristic, Historic Christianity counteracts Smith's 'anomaly' by referring to Matthew and Luke who both bear witness of the role played by oral tradition, alongside written versions, down to the last phase of the history of the synoptic gospel tradition.198

Both the Bultmann School and Historic Christianity agree that it is impossible to regard the gospels as we have them as transcripts of complete, mechanically produced tape recordings of

Jesus' teachings or of first-hand eyewitness testimonies of his acts.199 One can see, by comparing parallels between the gospels, that the Jesus-tradition, even if originally created by Jesus' own teachings and eyewitness-accounts of his works, had passed through some changes on its way towards our written gospels. Does not this fact falsify the thesis that the earliest Christians transmitted the gospel tradition as memorized texts?

Historic Christianity claims that it does not. Even the Rabbinic tradition is somewhat changed as time passes.200 Oral transmission through memorization does not exclude some changes being made in the texts. Radaction-history cannot be restricted to the final phase in the process; the actual transfer from memory to manuscript, neither in the transmission of pharisaic-rabbinic tradition nor of the early Christian tradition. Instead, one must take account of an ongoing interplay of tradition-history and redaction-history.201

How then, can one uphold the idea that the Christ-tradition originally was a fixed, tangible 'Holy Word', quite isolated from any redactionary adaptions?202 Gerhardsson claims, however, that he never intended to suggest such a thesis.203 The early church did not from the beginning have a unified 'Urevangelium'. The twelve apostles and the other authoritative teachers were not traditionists only. They worked on the 'Holy Word'. They worked on the Scriptures (O.T.) and on the Christ-tradition, which was originally oral. They gathered and formulated a narrative tradition. They interpreted, adapted, developed, complemented and put together collections for various definite purposes.204

Whatever the different purposes were, however, the Jesus-tradition, partly memorized and partly written down in notebooks and private scrolls, was nevertheless invariably isolated from the teachings of other doctrinal authorities.205 The traditionists have nothing to say about any creative contribution made by a Peter, a James or a John to the teaching of Jesus Christ. So great is the concentration on the words and works of Jesus that even the contribution of these three 'pillars' is without interest. This does not mean, contra Davies 1964, that the Jesus-tradition was protected from undergoing certain adaptions. The point is that the early Christian collection of traditions of Jesus are exclusive in the sense that no attention is paid to the sayings of other doctrinal authorities. What is quoted is what is felt to be Jesustradition; words of Jesus206 and stories about Jesus. Whether the evangelists' claim to transmit only what Jesus said and did is justified is another matter.

With the latter question in mind, we must take a number of factors into consideration when we look at variations between different parallel gospel traditions.207 First, we must be sure that we are actually dealing with variations of one and the same basic saying or event, or whether we are dealing with sayings delivered by Jesus himself in more than one version, or works of similar nature done by Jesus more than once. Second, most of the gospel material is 'haggadic', and 'haggadic' material is often transmitted with a somewhat wider margin of variation in wording than 'halakic' material.208

Third, certain variations are probably due to adaptions carried out at an early stage when the traditional material was gathered, notably translations from Aramaic and Hebrew to Greek. Even though Palestine was multilingual at this time (the material was from the beginning partially in Greek, cf. below; 7.3.3.4), no translation fully corresponds to the original, and two or more translations are never identical. Besides, there is always the possibility of faulty memorization, even though the technique was practiced particularly strictly in this milieu.

A more important factor is the changes that have taken place through the ongoing effort to understand the words and works of Jesus more and more thoroughly, and thus to communicate their meaning in relation to the contemporary problems and questions of the early Christian communities. The principles of redaction used by the different evangelists are obviously connected to this point.

It is therefore one thing to understand why and how the traditions have been marked by the milieu through which they passed, quite another to claim that they were simply created in this secondary milieu. The exact wording of the Jesus-tradition, expecially the sayings of Jesus, reflect an overall respectful and careful transmission.209 As Jesus did not leave any writings behind him, and since the key part of the gospels focus on the passion story and his resurrection, it naturally was his disciples that first formulated the narrative traditions about him. It is thus significant that the sayings of Jesus vary much less than the narrative material and the redactional framework.

There are examples where even the exact wording of the Jesus-sayings seems to have been changed in order to clarify its meaning. But more often the evangelists reveal their various understandings of a saying of Jesus through the context it is placed within, or through peripheral remarks and reformulations of narrative material. As a rule, the different synoptic versions of one and the same tradition are formed through additions or deletions, or punctual revisions of a wording which otherwise is left unchanged.210 The earliest Christians did not have a static conception of the 'whole truth' (cf. John 14:26). Their understanding, primarily based on the resurrection, was subject to a maturing process of which we see traces in our written gospels. This process, however, was always normatively related to the facts of what Jesus said and did, thus remaining unified in its diversity.211

The Bultmann School, of course, takes the resurrection narratives to be false accretions to the tradition simply because they, like the birth stories, the nature miracles and so on, are seen as incredible judged by their standards of common sense.212 If they are false accretions, they thus bear witness to the 'fact' that there was a great lack of concern for the preservation of authentic material in the gospel tradition, and a lack of memorization technique to safeguard its transmission.213 Based upon a Humean conception of miracles and laws of nature, as well as a Humean principle of analogy, this research programme thus protects its hard core through a series of theories which to Historic Christianity seems quite unwarranted. The authenticity of the NT miracle stories, notably the resurrection narratives, are not to be ruled out in advance. And if they are, then this fact bear witness to the 'ad hoc'-nature of the auxiliary hypotheses of the Bultmann School, not to the lack of concern for the preservation of authentic material in the gospel tradition.

If authentic material was preserved, one would expect to find traces of the methods of teaching and the mnemonic techniques which rabbinic literature often mentions and always presupposes.214 Against the claim that this is not the case,215 Historic Christianity refers to the sayings of Jesus in the synoptic gospels; texts which are short, sparing of words and wellbalanced, giving clear, emphasized statements in a pregnant and poetic form. The artistic subtleties appear clearly in Greek, and even more so if the texts are translated into Aramaic.216

Gerhardsson thus describes Jesus as a 'moschel'; 217 a man who formed small, key teachings, proverbs and parables. This charactertizes the formal aspects of his oral teaching. It is therefore reasonable to assume that his disciples fixed this kind of teaching into their minds.

The form of the sayings of Jesus shows that they were not originally an integral part of a broad, consecutive account. The evidence suggests that devoted disciples learned them by heart at the very time when their master produced them, and that they therefore form the oldest elments of the gospel tradition.218

M. Smith 1963, 175, responds to any traces of rabbinic technique as are to be found in the gospels as "suspect because of the wellknown increase of Pharisaic and of Essene influence on the church in Jerusalem during the period prior to AD 70." This is another example of an 'ad hoc'-auxiliary hypothesis in the Bultmann-programme, an adjustment made in its protective belt due to the mnemonic aspects of the sayings of Jesus, but without any corroborated empirical predictions (or postdictions) made according to a preconceived idea in the positive heuristic of the programme.219

Still, the traditionists' work on the Jesus-tradition does not provide a simple and perfect parallel to the Rabbis' work on the Torah tradition. There are important differences.220 It is therefore an historical over-simplification to regard Jesus as a Jewish rabbi among many Jewish rabbis and the early church as one Jewish sect among many others. But it is equally far removed from historical truth to describe Jesus as "vÃllig alein in seiner Zeit, sterneinsam in seinem Volk" (Stauffer 1959, 10), completely unaffected by his social and religious environment. A reasonable historian would steer clear of these extremes and choose a middle way, where the structural parallelism between much in early Christianity and pharisaic Judaism is recognized.

The work of Gerhardsson and other scholars associated with the 'Scandinavian hypothesis' thus lends credence to the claim of Historic Christianity that the gospels place us within the hearing of the authentic voice and within sight of the authentic activity of Jesus of Nazareth,221 and that the burden of proof should rest on those who reject the authenticity of the statements contained in the gospel tradition, as we have them in the NT.222

7.3.3.4 Additional Points on Historical Reliability

This conclusion is reinforced by various other considerations. First, the gospels and epistles of the NT have recently been recognized to display affinities that suggest a similar context and process of transmission of their respective traditions:223 Both are attributed to persons in the same or related apostolic circles. Both are, in part, products of a corporative enterprise in which an apostolic figure as the leading contributor and overseer is aided by and uses traditions composed by others. Both give indications that their traditions were composed by the same or related circles of highly gifted pneumatics, i.e. prophets and teachers, who sought to maintain a distinction between traditions from Jesus and those created in the post-Easter period.

Another point which distinguishes the formation of the earliest Christian tradition from popular folk tradition in general is that the former took place in close relation to already existing authoritative, holy Scriptures (OT). The latter influenced the former (cf. especially the Gospel of Matthew), while at the same time it obviously functioned as a strongly stabilizing factor in the process.224

Besides, to utilize the romantic notions of folklore (that go back to J.G. Herder; 1744-1803) in explanation of the gospels fails to take account of the fact that the gospels were put into

written form. To the form critics of the Bultmann School, the writing of the oral tradition seems to have come about almost by accident. But why were these traditions written so early, rather then carried on in an oral fashion for centuries, as often is the case with popular 'Kleinlitteratur'?

To explain this, the Bultmann School modifies (or complicates) its protective belt by stating that the gospel tradition began to be fixed only when the early Christian expectation of a soon end to the world faded.225 This supposition foundered with the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls. The Qumran sect viewed itself to be in 'the last generation', expected an imminent end, but nevertheless produced a large body of literature.226 This 'novel' fact fits the programme of Historic Christianity, which claims that at least some probably all of the gospels, were written prior to AD
70.227 Apocalyptic expectations of a near end was not uncommon in the Jewish milieu. These expectations were kept alive without any dead-line. That is why the focus on and the longing for the imminent return of Jesus did not fade after the first generations of Christian had died.228

The writing of the gospels seems to have been an emergency measure due to a general scepticism to the written word, which was a commonplace recognized from elsewhere in Antiquity. The idea was stressed that what can be learnt from the written page cannot be compared with that which may be learned from the lips of a living person. Writing was mainly used to help a failing memory to retain the lessons learnt orally from a master, in which the pupil received not only texts, but also interpretation.229

Historic Christianity thus strengthens its protective belt (according to a pre-conceived heuristic) through the hypothesis that the circumstance that gave rise to written teachings in early Christianity was geographical distance.230 With the expansion of the church there developed a need for written versions of the 'holy word' for the sake of widespread availability. Written material came into being, not only because of chronological distance, i.e. the death of eyewitnesses, but also because of the absence of authorized teaching leadership which was due to geographical distance. Examples of the latter are evident in the case of Paul's letters and of the Jerusalem Decree in Acts 15, but a similar situation on a smaller scale was present already at the time of Jesus.

Furthermore, there is a considerable degree of probability for some written transmission of gospel traditions from the time of Jesus' earthly ministry, contra the hypothesis of the Bultmann School that the traditions had an extended initial period of exclusively oral transmission.231 Schürmann 1968 has shown that there were sufficient sociological conditions for the formation of gospel traditions in the community of disciples of Jesus during his lifetime. Both teachings for outsiders and guidance for the inner life of the group of disciples were required during the ministry of Jesus.

There are several reasons why this tradition probably was transmitted in writing as well as orally.232 Literacy233 was widespread in Palestinian Judaism, and the occasion that necessitated written teachings in early Christianity; the seperation of believers from the teaching leadership, was already present in the earthly ministry of Jesus, in Galilee and also in Judea. Besides, the bilingual background of his followers would have facilitated the rapid written formulation and transmission of at least some of his teachings. Even the teaching process among the establishmentrabbis of the first century was apparently not totally oral.234 This point should be noted also in relation to my previous discussion of oral tradition. Other

things being equal, the reliability of oral tradition is much greater in regions or periods where writing was known than where it was not in use at all. The control exercised by written documents, i.e. by scribes or archivists, who must have had some preparation to use them, is by no means negligible, as archaeological research has demonstrated.235

If the transmission of the gospel tradition was done through a conscious, controlled process, then the idea of totally isolated units gradually coalescing from a fluid state to a fixed form in larger collections236 falls somewhat by the wayside. Historic Christianity claims that there was an ongoing interaction between the whole and the parts in the formation of the tradition.237 The total perspective on Jesus and the discrete units mutually influenced each other all along the way.

The key question here is whether the unified presentation of the life of Jesus, which we find in our written gospels, with its geographical and chronological framework, rested on historical memories, or whether it was wholly the editorial creation of the evangelists. The Bultmann School claims that the different units of the gospels consist of 'pericopae', i.e. brief anecdotes which each contained the person and history of Jesus in its entirety. "None requires explanation in terms of previous happenings. None is directed at later events for the unfolding of what has gone before. We are always being held in the beam of this scene and this scene only." (Bornkamm 1979, 25). The larger space and timeframework is thus a later addition without any trustworthy historical basis.238

This dialectical opposition of tradition and redaction does not hold water. For example, the central section of Luke (9:51-19:44), the so-called 'travel narrative', is at it stands a Lukan editorial arrangement. Yet, assuming (for the sake of argument) Luke's dependence on Mark according to the two-document hypothesis, it is also traditional, being built upon the framework he found in Mark
10-11 (and Q?).239 More important is the 'fact' that early Christianity seems to have formed a unified, 'whole' conception and a rough biographical outline of Jesus already in its first phases of development, focusing on his death and resurrection. Contra Bornkamm, Gerhardsson thus claims that many elements in the gospel tradition, as we have them, clearly presuppose or point towards other elements in the same tradition.240

The two basic clefts which, according to the Bultmann School, separate the gospels from the historical Jesus came about through a two-stage development. First, there is the cleft between Jesus and the post-Easter Palestinian church, and second, the cleft between the latter and the later Hellenistic church which took over the traditions of the eschatological Palestinian tradition and reformed it through new motives of their own.241 The testimony of the NT, besides the growing weight of contemporary evidence from outside it, suggests, however, that it is far too facile to assume that 'Hellenistic Christianity', with its use of the Septuagint (LXX; the Greek translation of the OT c. 200 B.C.), was a secondary phenomenon confined to the gentile churches.242 There is no specifically 'Hellenistic Gentile Christianity' to be found in the NT. No single NT document can be labelled as basically gentile, but for almost every document it is possible to demonstrate its mixed Jewish-gentile character. It is thus impossible to draw a rigid distinction between earlier Jewish and later gentile elements in the early church.

At the time of Christ Palestine had been a part of the Hellenistic world for over three centuries, and had experienced not only the immigration of many Greek-speaking gentiles, but also the resettlement from the diaspora of thoroughly Hellenized Jews. Even the Aramaic-

speaking Jews had been somewhat penetrated by the Hellenistic culture.243 Schools were used, as a particularly efficient means, to spread and consolidate this influence, and according to the Books of the Maccabees,244 Hellenistic gymnasia for young men already existed in Palestine in the second century B.C. One of the aspects of this Hellenizing is seen in the exegetic and dialectic methods taken from Aristotle which were employed by the Pharisees in developing the ritual law.245 The emphasis on the value of systematic study and on the widest possible scope of education was foreign to early Israel and to the ancient Orient in general, but was part and parcel of the liberal Hellenistic ideal.246

The Qumran discoveries likewise reveal to us a Palestinian Judaism that is much more speculative and much more penetrated by outside influence than the rabbinic literature had previously led one to suspect.247 As mentioned earlier, first-century Palestine was bi-lingual. Greek was widely used by the people, it was not just the language of commerce or of the upper classes, but in many instances it was the primary or only language of ordinary Jews.248 Greek was thus spoken from the earliest days of the church and its spiritual majority was probably made up of people who also (or most naturally) spoke Greek, whether they were from Galilee, Jerusalem or the diaspora.249 There is thus "nothing inherently impossible about the notion that the first draft of the gospel of John could be very Jewish and very early and be written in Greek." (John Robinson 1976, 347.)

Just as no hard and fast distinction can be made between Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism, a rigid twofold (or threefold250) schematization of thought in the early church is unsubstantiated. This means that out of two basic clefts between the gospels and the historical Jesus to be considered, only the first remains. Most of the present chapter has already dealt with the question of the historical reliability of the post-Easter picture of Jesus in the gospels. Nevertheless, there are some points left to ponder.

Both our historical-theological research programmes agree that a clear distinction between the early church and Jesus is problematical. The problem is one of circularity since the sources for our knowledge of the earliest Christian communities are identical with the sources for the quest of the historical Jesus. To Historic Christianity, there is no general rule that will enable us to decide whether a particular narrative or saying is trustworthy as a historical report, or whether it only reflects the situation of the church, as a remnant of the latter.251 Such a rule would require knowledge which we do not have: knowledge that a given controversial situation was typical of the life of the earliest church, but could not have happened in the lifetime of Jesus. On the contrary there is ample reason to assume that the same sorts of conflicts which Jesus experienced would arise in the time of the post-Easter church, since Jesus obviously was the inspiration of the latter.252

According to Historic Christianity, a historian would be thus wise not to judge sayings and works of Jesus as being untrustworthy or fabricated only because they were useful to the person or communities who reported them. A biased source should not, per se, be judged untrustworthy. It needs to be assessed on a broader source-critical basis cf. above; ch. 3.2.252 The fact that something is found to be useful in a particular situation does not necessarily mean that it was created in that situation.

At the same time, Goppelt 1962 and notably Roloff 1970253 have shown that many gospel texts, even those considered among the oldest, reveal a clear historical distinction between traditions from the earthly Jesus and the post-Easter 'life setting' of the church. There are several examples of situations in the life of Jesus portrayed in the gospels which do not reflect

the situation of the early church. These were hardly produced because of the specific sociological needs of the latter. So why were they included in the tradition, if not because of their historical value?

For instance the Jewish Sabbath and Lent were observed in the early church, while the gospels portray Jesus as criticizing the way the Jews fasted and kept the Sabbath (Mark 2:18 ff.).254 The key Christological term in the synoptic gospels is the 'Son of Man'. This term was hardly applicable in a non-Jewish milieu. It is hard to understand and even misleading in Greek. Nevertheless, it is used 69 times in the synoptic gospels (and 12 times in John), while the early church hardly used it at all.255 Again, if the gospels are the products of the life-setting of the post-Easter church, why did they keep an uncomfortable term if not for historical conservatism and traditional continuity?

The Bultmann School labels all Messianic features in the gospels as secondary, untrustworthy additions.256 This is done on the assumption of an original non-messianic tradition, where Jesus viewed himself only as the herald of the imminent end of the world, announcing the coming of the heavenly Son of Man as another than himself.257 The original kerygma, to Bultmann, was that Jesus, "in his own person signifies the demand for decision insofar as his cry, as God's last word before the End, calls men to decision." (Bultmann 1974, 9.) The basis of a unified 'Messianic' Jesus-tradition was first laid in the Hellenistic church through the myth of the crucified and risen Lord.

But if this 'high-christology'258 is a fictional product of the Church, then why didn't it penetrate the gospels? The 'Kyrios' title is used in a divine sense in the epistles and Acts (meaning 'Jahve', 'Adonai' or 'world-ruler'), while in the gospels it is merely an expression of politeness or respect, similar to 'rabbi'.259 In the latter, Jesus is likewise portrayed as being very reluctant to reveal his Messiah-consciousness (cf. John 10:24). This is historically understandable in view of contemporary Jewish concepts of the Messiah a political liberator who would crush the Roman oppression and establish Jewish hegemony, along with the more spiritual blessings of 'shalom'260 but not in view of Christian communities who needed to exalt their mythic object of faith as much as possible.

As Jesus' Messiah-consciousness did not conform to contemporary ideas of who Messiah was to be, it took some time for his disciples to fully develop the 'high-Christology' we find in the NT epistles and Acts. Nevertheless, its 'raw material' was present in the traditions of the earthly Jesus,261 with its characteristic features of his Palestine mission. Both the pre-Easter community and the post-Easter church thus creatively interpreted and elaborated this historical tradition into specifically theological concepts of Jesus.

If Historic Christianity is right about this, then Jesus, through his Messianic self-consciousness, must have foreseen a period after his own death when the disciples would continue his work. This is in line with the conclusion of ch. 7.3.3.3 where Jesus is portrayed as a teacher; the exclusive bearer of revelation and the exclusive bringer of the new law who taught his disciples to learn by heart.262

The opposition between our two protective belts may be described by a further point. The hypothesis that the early church was capable of creating sayings of Jesus, like the gnostics consistently did, is in accordance with the hard core of an antithesis of history or theology. It is thus assumed that Christian prophets spoke on behalf of the risen Lord. Their utterances were spoken as if by Jesus himself, as 'sentences of holy law', just as the OT prophets spoke

as the mouthpieces of God. They were not regarded as a separate category from the earthly sayings of Jesus, and both types were therefore mixed up in the tradition.263

The technique by which supporting evidence is 'discovered' is form criticism. Features in individual sayings are held to reflect the period after the death of Jesus. This is an example of Lakatos' claim that 'explanatory' and 'interpretative' theories may be on the same level. The interpretative theories which provide the 'facts' (sayings of Christian prophets were mixed up with the sayings of Jesus) are closely related to the hard core of the Bultmann School. The whole programme prescribes criteria for what may be regarded as 'facts', as well as what the legitimate criteria of assessment are. Through the heuristic of Historic Christianity, however, the evidence which has been produced dwindles away under examination through a different set of explanatory and interpretive theories.264 The key question is which programme has excess truth content over its rival.

First, the relevant sayings referred to (which are few) proclaim the eschatological divine judgement.265 But there is no reason, according to Historic Christianity, to assume that charismatic endowment and prophetic authority were required to recognize the meaning of divine judgment and proclaim it in the churches, It did not take a prophet to speak, instruct and warn the Christian communities. Second, if Bultmann can say that the words of prophets only gradually became words of the historical Jesus, this in fact presupposes that the community was able to make a distinction between the two.266 Moreover, if words of the risen Lord uttered by prophets had the same value as the sayings of the earthly Jesus, then there is no reason for the projection of the former into a pre-Easter setting in the first place.267

Third, the place given by Bultmann and others to the Christian prophets is precisely that occupied by the gnostic authors of apocryphal gospels. In these works it is not the Jesus of history who teaches by action and by word, but the resurrected Lord who conveys truths and revelations to this or that privileged disciple. There is no evidence, however, that the gospel tradition was formed in this way. In putting forward their view that "the distinction between the exalted and the earthly Lord very quickly disappeared" (Käsemann 1964, 60), the Bultmann School has not taken with sufficient seriousness the part played by tradition in the early Christian community and the importance of the twelve apostles as witnesses of Jesus' words. The followers of Jesus accorded to his remembered teaching authority and took care about its accurate transmission. Nor should it be forgotten that the pre-Easter teaching and preaching activity provides a probable 'Sitz im Leben' for the initial collection and systematization of the Logia-tradition.268

On this background it seems hardly likely that the post-Easter communities took up sayings which were in circulation, and placed them in the mouth of Jesus,269 nor that they mixed words of the exalted Jesus through Christian prophets indiscriminately among the traditioned words of the earthly Jesus. Prophets and other teachers in the Christian community may have played a part in the process whereby 'logia' of Jesus were adapted to the post-Easter situation270 in a manner similar to the 'pesher'-technique at Qumran, whereby the authoritative message of Scripture was applied to the situation of the sect. But then to adapt a given tradition is not the same as creating it, 'de novo'.271 The church may, of course, have erroneously confused prophetic sayings with sayings of Jesus, but it certainly did not mix the two categories deliberately.272

The possibility that the sayings of Jesus were deliberately created by persons who made no claim to be prophets is unlikely in view of another factor. The interpretative fact is that various traits emerge in the gospels which provide a picture of one person, traits which hardly can have arisen in a collection of sayings from a group of early Christian prophets or others.273 Joachim Jeremias has drawn up careful lists of characteristic ways of speaking which are to be found in sayings of Jesus. Some of these are Aramaic forms of expression, others appear to be found only, or almost exclusively, in sayings attributed to Jesus.274

The combination of stylistic peculiarities testify to the particular manner of speaking of one person. There is sufficient evidence to isolate a group of sayings which have these characteristics, and examine them from other points of view to see whether the core of the group of sayings makes the best historical sense if it is attributed to Jesus.275 The Bultmann School, on the other hand, claims that the 'Aramaisms' will not work as hard evidence of authenticity, and should rather be employed as negative evidence in the sense that if a saying shows no sign of Aramaic grammar or diction, the burden of proof shifts to the claim of authenticity.276 In this case, however, the strategy of converting anomalies into positive evidence misses the point of Jeremias' argument, which is that the combination of stylistic peculiarities points to the hypothesis of one person behind all the sayings.

The picture in the gospels of an individual man is explained by Historic Christianity as an example of unintentional information which is provided by the tradition, and is therefore all the more worthy of credence. If the tradition was basically concerned with the theological significance of Jesus, then it is striking that it has preserved these non-theological motifs. Even if the church had a broader historical interest in Jesus, the fact is that material preserved because of its 'content' as teaching of Jesus nevertheless preserves incidentally something of the 'form' of the teacher who gave it. Now if the tradition has accurately preserved these incidental features about the character of Jesus, it follows that the tradition itself must also report what Jesus actually said in its theological significance with comparable faithfulness.277

All these considerations support the main contention of Historic Christianity, that the history of Jesus, even as history, was of decisive importance for the tradition. In the preaching of the early church, the life, death and resurrection of Jesus were held to be the climax of history; the coming of the Kingdom of God. The relative short interval between the formation and writing of the gospel traditions and the events they describe support the claim that they largely represent eyewitness testimony,278 cf. above; ch. 7.2.2 and 3.

By the very nature of their programme, most form-critics in the Bultmann School are not predisposed in favor of eyewitnesses. They like to deal with oral forms shaped by nameless individuals. The recognition of persons who could enrich the tradition by their actual recollections comes as a disturbing element to the smooth working of their heuristic. By its neglect of this factor, the Bultmann School gains in internal coherence, but it looses its power to accomplish its main task which is to describe the 'Sitz im Leben' of the tradition.

If the interest of the early church was molded more or less completely by its own 'Sitz im Leben', then one might as well assume that "the disciples must have been translated to heaven immediately after the resurrection." (V. Taylor 1933, 41). Instead, it is reasonable to assume, as even Dibelius acknowledged; that "at the period when eye-witnesses of Jesus were still alive, it was not possible to mar the picture of Jesus in the tradition. Chronology furnished a criterion for judging the evangelical tradition." (Dibelius 1935, 293.) For at least a generation,

the presence of eyewitnesses would serve as a check on corruptions innocently due to the imagination. And in many cases, hearers would not receive a story from one source alone, thus being able to control the testimony of first-hand witnesses against each other.

Likewise, it was not only friendly eyewitnesses which the early Christian preachers had to reckon with. There were individuals, notably among the Pharisees, who had been eyewitnesses of Jesus' ministry and death and were antagonistic to Christianity. It is unlikely that the disciples could afford to risk willful inaccuracies or manipulation of the facts with the possible presence of hostile witnesses in mind. The latter would probably be glad to expose any false statements and thus ridicule the Christian kerygma. On the contrary, one of strong points in the original apostolic preaching is the confident appeal to the knowledge of the hearers. They not only said: "We are witnesses of these things," but also; "as you yourselves know." (Acts 2:22.)

This is an example of one kind of internal control of a testimony: what a source can be expected to get away with in its original situation, seen on its particular background. It is thus hardly likely that Paul, around AD 55, would refer to more than 500 people whom he claims all have seen the risen Christ, "of which most are still alive" (I Cor 15:6), if these people actually did not exist to confirm his statement.279 Otherwise, why take such a stupid risk on such an important point?

Of course, the fact that a certain source contains eyewitness testimony is not a proof that it is reliable per se. What is seen, heard and reported is not only determined by the objective facts of the matter. It is also influenced by the predispositions of the eyewitness.280 Certain things are left out, others are simplified and even somewhat changed as familiar patterns are impressed on groups of sensations and ideations. To a certain extent this is necessary in order to get a meaningful impression of any event. But there are examples where a person's perception is distorted through bias or prejudice to the point where she or he actually perceives the opposite of what actually occurs.

This does not mean that any eyewitness report has to be treated as false until otherwise proved, only that a historian is wise to consider the possible influence of wishful thinking even on sense perceptions and reports thereof. This again brings up the question of the relation between our understanding of the whole and our understanding of the different parts, cf. above; ch. 5.2. Is the NT picture of Jesus a basically non-historical product of a preconceived conception of the person and mission of Jesus the Messiah; the fulfiller of OT prophecies (The Bultmann School)? Or is it in line with his actual words and deeds, which then are used to reinterpret the OT prophecies of the Messiah (Historic Christianity)? Is the resurrection faith an effect of his disciples' pre-understanding or mental pre-dispositions (the Bultmann School), or is an historical resurrection the very cause of their subseequent 'wholistic' conception of Jesus (Historic Christianity)?281

On the basis of the previous considerations, I agree with Historic Christianity in concluding that the portrait of Jesus given in the NT gospels is based on historical information. It is not likely to be the result of wishful thinking, i.e. non-historical pre-apprehensions. Proponents of the Bultmann School nevertheless choose to perceive the gospel sources as products of legend and rumor transmission.282 Distortion in perception, according to Allport & Postman 1947,283 occurs in proportion to the ambiguity of the topic and its importance for the individuals involved. John Gager therefore concludes that "what is seen and remembered,

what is heard and reported (by the eyewitnesses of Jesus) is very much a function of the seer and the hearer." (Gager 1974, 255. My italics.)

Just why the historical Jesus was a particularly ambiguous object to his contemporaries is not so clear, however. And as to the importance of a topic, this same factor in oral tradition in general is seen as the reason why something was remembered and recorded in the first place.284 It would thus be ridiculous to judge a report as untrustworthy because it was of particular importance to the individual(s) who recorded it. The conclusion of Gager thus makes better sense if placed inside the research programme of the Bultmann School, with its series of theories; its hard core, protective belt and set of problem-solving techniques:

As faith and reason, as well as theology and history, are independent of each other, the gospel tradition is best seen as mythological cult legends; products of vital religious communities in need of an 'ideology' clothed in historical vocabulary. The only hope of reaching the Jesus of history is therefore attached to the criterion of dissimilarity. Due to its skeptical starting-point, the Bultmann School will, in a positivistic-like manner, eliminate all material as inauthentic which may be derived either from Judaism or from primitive Christianity.285 And then even the few parts that meet this test are subject to the suspicion of being just as much a product of the alleged eyewitnesses as of history 'as it really was'.286

The criterion of coherence will not work. To allow a saying that is simply consistent with or does not contradict another saying is to open a floodgate since the range of such a criterion has no boundaries. The criterion of multiple attestation will not establish anything beyond its early date. To reach the Jesus of history, the Bultmann School again requires that the test of dissimilarity is applied.287 And the criterion of Aramaisms is, as already noted, rejected as a positive criterion of authenticity.

Where does this leave the 'new quest' of the historical Jesus? The key points in James Robinson 1959 is that the only trace which Jesus has left behind is the faith of his disciples. He takes effect in history only by virtue of that faith. The goal is therefore to discover the act of intention, the commitment, the meaning for the participants behind the external occurrence. The 'selfhood' of Jesus; his understanding of existence and his self-understanding, can be deduced from his intentions revealed in his sayings. Thus, in this higher sense his life is a possible subject of historical research.

John Gager's consistent demand for a heuristic of 'brute' facts within his own research programme does not leave much hope even for this approach.288 In his view, the most telling weaknesses arise at the point of practical application: The existential selfhood of any person in the past cannot be grasped except by inferences drawn from so called external biographical data, among which it is important to establish chronological relationships. And the warrants which license conclusions about 'deep-lying intentions' of past persons are such that, in the nature of the case, these conclusions must be made with the greatest caution and sometimes not at all. Now the 'new quest' requires precisely that kind of biographical data, which, according to James Robinson, the gospels cannot provide. To Gager then, the absence of such hard data thus becomes the final stumbling block even in the 'new quest' of Jesus' deep-lying intentions.

Historic Christianity has a different view on the criteria of authentic Jesus-material.289 The criterion of dissimilarity provides us with what was distinctive in the proclamation of Jesus, but only in the sense of what was unique, not at all what was characteristic. That would be to

assume that Jesus´ teaching and works took place in a historical vacuum; no connection with Judaism, no connection with Christianity. In any case, this criterion must not set the limits of contemporary Judaism or the early church too narrowly. The way the Bultmann School has applied it seems to assume that their supposedly accurate knowledge of first-century Judaism and early Christian theology (unlike any portrait of Jesus gained from the gospels) has come about in some direct and unmediated fashion. But our knowledge of first-century Judaism is still far from being complete. And the knowledge of the early church sketchy and partial as it is practically 100% derived from primary source materials that have as their thesis the essential unity that existed between Jesus of Nazareth and the earliest body of his followers.

The criteria of dissimilarity may thus also be applied in a modified form:290 Where there is an overlap of interest between the gospels and the early church, but a marked difference in the scale of treatment, we can be reasonably sure that we are on firm historical ground. Besides, there are instances where it may be properly applied (alongside other criteria) to compare between a saying in question and other known teaching on the subject. Such a comparison may then suggest which form of the sayings is the most primitive.291

The criterion of multiple attestation points to the fact that sayings which appear in several sources (Mark, Q (?), M, L and John)292 must have been important for the early church. On the background of the whole of the present chapter, Historic Christianity then claims that their high degree of importance is best explained by assuming that the recorded words were actually spoken by Jesus. The same point will apply to narratives about Jesus from different sources which illustrate the same motifs in his activity.293

Besides, C. H. Dodd294 argued that if a motif is present in several different literary forms, even though within a single source, it is more apt to be authentic than if it appears in only one such form. While the variety of literary forms does not prove that a characteristic of the ministry of Jesus is authentic, it does prove that it were deeply embedded in the tradition and not simply editorial additions of the final author or editor. The probability of a motif occurring in all strands of the gospel tradition without being authentic is by Historic Christianity judged to be rather small, seen on the general background of the origin and transmission of this tradition. On the other hand, as selection often is at work on the traditions, there is no compelling reason to reject a tradition merely because it appears in one stream, provided it is not intrinsically improbable or contradicted by the others.295

The criterion of coherence is valid to the extent that several sayings (and narratives) internally consistent with one another is a mark of common origin. As I have tried to show, there is hardly any evidence to suppose that at the very basis of the gospel tradition there is to be found a remarkably successful novelist or fiction writer. On the contrary, we have a set of traditions underlying the gospels, and it is the basic agreement between them which requires explanation. The point of common origin is better identified with Jesus than with anything or anyone else.

The redactional criterion of unintentionality focuses on material which appear in the gospels even though it does not suit the purpose of the storyteller. To Historic Christianity this is taken as a testimony to the authenticity of that material, or at least to the inclusion of it in the gospel tradition in such a clear and consistent way that the redactor or evangelist hardly could omit it, even though it was at variance to some degree with the stance of his gospel.296 An example is Jesus' attitude to women which did not serve the particular purpose of the tradition

and which might even stand in certain tension with it, given the contemporary cultural situation.297

The criterion of Aramaisms deals with the Semitic features (i.e. Aramaic and Palestinian forms) in the teaching of Jesus in gospels written in Greek. To Joachim Jeremias,298 the retention of such features is of great significance for the question of the reliability of the gospel tradition. In general terms, the closer the approximation of a passage in the gospels to the style and idiom of contemporary Aramaic, the greater the presumption to authenticity, even though it is not clear that there is evidence of an Aramaic original behind the Greek words.299

One should note, however, without negating the general thrust of the evidence, that the Aramaic and Palestinian forms may have arisen under septuagintal influence or because of a Jewish-Greek idiom current in the day, and do not therefore necessarily indicate an earlier Semitic tradition.300 And even if they generally do the Aramaisms would in any case be a sign only that the material went back to the Aramaic-speaking church, not a proof that we had the actual words of Jesus.

In any case, each of the criteria which Historic Christianity acknowledges is not to be applied in a mechanical fashion. They serve as general guides. Considered separately each of them falls short of its intended demonstration of authenticity, though in concert with other criteria the degree of probability is heightened.301 The proposed criteria thus have a positive value in establishing a "critically assured minimum" (Alstrup Dahl 1962, 156) of authentic material in the gospels by means of cumulative probability arguments. On the other hand, there is hardly any basis for ruling out 'inauthentic material' by means of a negative use of these or other criteria, even to scholars of the Bultmann School who feel justified on general grounds for their skeptical approach to the gospels.302 The relatively small quantity of sources available by which to make comparisons, as well as our lack of adequate knowledge as to the evangelists' respective purposes suggest that such a method should be abandoned and only positive criteria should be employed.

Any evaluation of the reliability of the gospel tradition necessarily involves judgements of a personal nature, judgements which may fit into a particular research programme. The criterion of 'traditional continuity' sums up the core of Historic Christianity's approach.303 Facing the tradition of what Jesus said and did, in its earliest ascertainable form, the historian must ask: What historical cause must be postulated in order to explain the origin of this tradition? Why not suggest that the basis for a reported saying is an actual saying of Jesus, or an actual action of Jesus to be the basis of a reported story about him? Such a conclusion is strongly supported by considerations of time, geography, personell, content and form. The gap between the earliest forms of the tradition and the ministry of Jesus is too short to allow for substantial distortion. The traditions developed in basically the same linguistic and cultural environment as that in which he lived. The key followers during his ministry were involved in the foundations of the church. The message of the early church was most probably closely connected to that of Jesus himself. And the form of the material gives the impression of a particular style of life and teaching, reflecting the thought of a single individual.304

To render this perspective historically improbable, the Bultmann School would have to suppose that the influence on his followers was minimal, somewhat comparable to the original reaction in a nuclear explosion which releases forces far greater than itself. In that case, a historian would have to ask what other forces were present in the environment to

catalyze the massive chain reaction. But historical study has not produced any plausible answers to this question.305 The evidence for a group of Christian prophets at the base of the tradition is non-existent. And even if we postulated a group of such people, what could have led them to commence their activity? The only possible cause was Jesus and a belief in the resurrection. But the less scope we afford to Jesus, the less likely is his activity to have led to belief in his resurrection or the belief in the importance in his teaching and the desire to expand it.

Is this a piece of circular reasoning, where one is historically sympathetic to elements in the tradition which account for the church's resurrection faith, instead of assessing them critically? I think not, because in addition of the criterion of traditional continuity there are the other criteria mentioned, and when the results of applying these coincide, as I believe they do here, there is good reason to trust the conclusion. Furthermore, the question was not what the church believed to be necessary to establish its own faith, but rather what historical causes a historian needs to postulate to account for the rise and development of that faith.306 On this general background it seems understandable how the church in the first centuries could claim sufficient reason to reject the apocryphal writings as lacking historical basis and apostolic authority. In particular the gnostic gospels were rejected as basically speculative, at least where they did not repeat the already existing canonical tradition.

7.4 External Evidence.

What about external evidence? Does other historical material confirm or deny the internal historical testimony of the NT documents? First, there is the early rabbinical writings of the Mishnah and the Talmuds.307 The Mishnah is a law-code completed about AD 200, and the Talmud include commentaries on this code. The Jerusalem or Palestinian Talmud was completed about AD 350, the much larger Babylonian Talmud continued to grow for some generations more, before it was reduced to writing c. AD 500.

It is not surprising that this tradition should tell us little about Jesus. As commentaries on a law-code, there is little occasion for reference to Christianity in the Talmud, where historical matters are merely incidental. Besides, Jesus lived in that stormy period when the conflict had begun with the Roman Procurators. Attention was concentrated on events which seemed more important. When Christianity had become powerful the memories of Jesus in Jewish circles had probably become vague and indefinite.

The few references we do find are from the period of the Tanna'im; AD 70-200. The historical interest of the witness of these ancient rabbis lies in the fact that although they are writing against the Christian tradition they do not deny it. In a certain sense they confirm the testimony of the gospels as they interpret it in a manner which would lead to the destruction of the basis of the Christian faith. What is said of Jesus amounts to this: Jesus practiced magic, poured scorn on the words of the wise men, led the people astray, and claimed that he had not come to take anything away from the Law, but to add something to it. On the eve of the Passover he was hung on a charge of heresy and of leading the people astray. His disciples, who numbered five, cured sick people in his name. In any case, the Talmud-references make it quite clear that there is no reason at all to doubt the historical existence of Jesus.

The earliest testimony to Jesus on the non-Christian side, if it were authentic, would be that of the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus (c. 38-after 100 AD). In the eighteenth book of his Jewish Antiquities, whose twenty books were completed AD 93 or 94, Josephus gives an account of various troubles that befell the people of Judaea during the governorship of Pontius Pilate (AD 26-36). Paragraphs 63-64 contain the so-called Testimonium Flavianum:308

"About this time there lived Jesus, a wise man, if indeed one ought to call him a man. For he was one who wrought surprising feats and was a teacher of such people as accept the truth gladly. He won over many Jews and many of the Greeks. He was the Messiah. When Pilate, upon hearing him accused by men of the highest standing amongst us, had condemned him to be crucified, those who had in the first place come to love him did not give up their affection for him. On the third day he appeared to them restored to life, for the prophets of God have prophesied these and countless other marvelous things about him. And the tribe of the Christians, so called after him, has still to this day not disappeared."

The passage occurs in all the three manuscripts we possess of the Antiquities, but none of these goes back further than the eleventh century. Eusebius quotes it in his Ecclasiastical History, written about AD 325.309 Origen of Alexandria (185-254), however, who preceded Eusebius by a century, appears to have been unaware of its existence. For if he had read it in the text of the Antiquities which he used, how could he state that Josephus "did not believe in Jesus as the Christ"? (Origen 1953, I, 47.)310 This contradicts the statement in the paragraph quoted above that "He was the Messiah (Christ)". Furthermore, if Josephus had actually said about Jesus: "if one ought to call him a man", if he had really mentioned the resurrection on the third day, the miracles, and the fulfilment of prophecy, he would most probably have been a Christian. But he was not, he was a Pharisee of priestly descent, who nevertheless seems to have portrayed the emperor Vespasian as the promised Messiah.311

The text thus bears obvious marks of a Christian interpolator, who between the time of Origen and the time of Eusebius either fabricated the whole passage or altered and adapted it because, in the original, it said something different from that which he wished it would say. In favor of the first hypothesis, which fits the Bultmann School better than it does Historic Christianity, it has been noted that the passage breaks the continuity of the narrative, which tells of a series of troubles which arose among the Jews in Palestine. fi 65 would then belong directly after fi 62. fi 65-80, however, deal with a scandal taking place in Rome which was of no interest to the Jews, and in fi80-84 there is a narrative of events which would interest no one save Jews living in Rome. Hence the argument seems rather artificial.

While there are stylistic peculiarities in the references to the Jews which does not fit Josephus, other expressions are certainly in his style. For instance, to describe Jesus as a "wise man" agrees perfectly with the tendency of Josephus to represent movements like those of the Pharisees, Saducees and Essenes as though they were schools of philosophical thought. A Christian would hardly be expected to choose such an expression. The hypothesis of adaption is likewise confirmed by the passage in Antiquities XX, fi 200, where there is mention of "a man named James, the brother of Jesus who was called the Christ".312 This phrase in this passage, whose authenticity there is little, if any reason to doubt,313 implies that Jesus has already been named and that the surname 'Christ' has been explained.

A new direction in clarifying the problems of what might have been Josephus' genuine version has been pointed out by Pines 1971, where he announced the finding of an Arabic version of the Testimonium Flavianum, which forms part of a universal history, written by

Agapius, a 10th-century Christian Melkite historian of Phrygia, Asia Minor, for Arab-speaking eastern Christians. The passage here lacks all those Christian characteristics found in the version quoted above.314 The Agapius text is thus regarded as a version that escaped Christian censorship to a greater extent than the traditional Greek text. The censorship in question was an attempt at Christianization of the original version which was unfavorable to Christians, and which may have been known to Origen.

The discussion of Agapius' source is not at an end, but its existence lends further credence to the adaption-hypothesis. Historic Christianity thus claims that Josephus in the Antiquities bears witness to Jesus' date, to his being the brother of James the Just, to his reputation as a miracle worker, to his crucifixion under Pilate as a consequence of accusations brought against him by the Jewish rulers, to his claim to be the Messiah, and to his being the founder of the 'tribe of the Christians',315 possibly also the resurrection faith.316

The references to Jesus in the Slavonic version of Josephus' The Jewish War317 are generally taken as later interpolations into the Greek manuscripts from which the Old Russian translation was made. As interpolations, Christian318 or Jewish,319 some of them have an interest of their own because they represent significant traditions. Still, they cannot be used as contemporary or even near-contemporary evidences for the historical Jesus or Christian beginnings in general.320

Admitting the authenticity of the text of the passage in Book XX of the Jewish Antiquities, and something at least of the Testimonum Flavianum , the brevity and the very summary allusions of Josephus to Jesus requires some explanation. The same goes for the fact that, apart from these passages, Josephus does not allude in ny way to the Christian movement, although it is impossible that he knew nothing about it. In general, he scarcely mentions the Messianism which occupied such a prominent position in Jewish history during the first century. The explanation of this silence lies in the character of Josephus and the aim of his work.321

Josephus, who addressed both the Antiquities and The Jewish War to a Roman-Greek audience, as well as to the well-read Jews of the diaspora, wanted to flatter the Romans and present Jewish history as favorable as possible to them. To speak of the Messianists, and in particular the group called Christians, would call attention to their ardent hope of the destruction of all earthly empires, on the ruins of which the kingdom of the Messiah was to be established. Since he felt it difficult to mention Christianity shorn of its Messianic element,322 Josephus preferred to be mostly silent in order not to expose Judaism to the accusation of a compromising connection with a movement which was recognized as one of the fundamental causes of the Great Revolt in AD 66-70, and thus hateful in the eyes of the Roman ruling classes. It is thus possible that the tampering of the original texts was not restricted to interpolations. It may have included the removal or modification of expressions, even concerning Christ and Christianity, which were felt to be offensive.323

The only reference made to Christianity in any extant non-Christian Gentile writing of the first century is in the fragments of the historian Thallus, identified with a Samaritan who is mentioned by Josephus as being a freedman of the emperor Tiberius.324 The fragments of Thallus is cited by the Christian Julius Africanus c. AD 221, and preserved by the Byzantine chronicler George Syncellus.325 Julius says that when Thallus discussed the darkness which fell upon the land after Jesus died on the cross, he, "in the third book of his history, calls this darkness an eclipse of the sun, but in my opinion he is wrong." If Thallus had been writing

merely as a historian who mentions an eclipse which occurred in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius, Julius would have used his evidence to confirm the Christian tradition. But since Thallus interpreted an occurrence which Christians believed to be miraculous as a natural phenomenon,326 he obviously was aware of this Christian tradition.

Since a small detail of this kind probably had not been preserved save within the setting of a narrative of the Passion, and since Thallus probably wrote his Chronicle at Rome around the middle of the first century, it may be inferred that the gospel tradition, or at least the traditional story of the Passion, was known in Rome in non-Christian circles towards the middle of the first century.327 However, if the enemies of Christianity tried to destroy this particular tradition of the three hour darkness after the death of Jesus (Luke 23:44) by giving a natural interpretation of the facts it reported, it may be difficult to explain why Pliny the Elder did not do so in the chapter on eclipses in his Natural History, since the alleged darkness took place within his lifetime.328

Apart from he fragments of Thallus, there is another possibly early reference to Jesus in a Syriac manuscript in the British Museum preserving the text of a letter written at some indeterminate time later than AD 73.329 The letter is written from prison by a Syrian to his son, encouraging the latter by reminding him of the misfortune that befell those who persecuted wise men. Among these are the Jews, who executed "their wise King." The writer was scarcely a Christian, or he would have said that Christ lived on by being raised from the dead, not "in the teaching which he had given." He was more probably a gentile philosopher, who, in placing Christ on a comparable footing with Socrates and Pythagoras, led the way in what later became a common gentile way of perceiving Jesus of Nazareth.

The first Latin passage in which Christ is mentioned dates from c. AD 110-112. It is a letter in which Pliny the Younger, who was then governor of Bithynia, consults the emperor Trajan about the line of action he should take with regard to the Christians.330 The only point to note here in what he says about the practices of the Christians is that they "met regularly before dawn on a fixed day to chant verses alternately amongst themselves in honor of Christ as if to a god." (Pliny 1981, 294.) The expression 'as if to a god ('quasi deo') may be explained by pointing to one fact which distinguished Christ from all other 'gods', viz that he had lived upon earth.331 The passage from Pliny is not a piece of independent evidence of the Christian tradition, however, since his source of information was the Christians themselves.

The most important evidence among early gentile writers comes from the Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus, dated c. AD 115-117. Tacitus points out that the name of the Christians comes to them from "Christ, who had been executed in Tiberius' reign, by the governor of Judea, Pontius Pilate." (Tacitus 1959, 354.)332 Pilate's execution of Christ, and any report that he may have sent to Rome about it,333 would never have been heard of again, if in fact that execution had put an end to the movement which Christ began. But when that movement advanced to Rome and attracted imperial attention, there was some reason for investigation its origins. This is what Tacitus seems to have done.334

Tacitus hardly built upon a Christian source, since the leading idea in his mention of Christianity is that this movement, suppressed by the execution of its founder, did not reawaken until a little before the year 64 (the fire of Rome). Besides, the whole passage is strikingly anti-Christian in its attitude. Neither can Tacitus have procured his information from a Jewish source. When referring to the 'detestable superstition' which reawakened simultaneously both in Judaea and in Rome some time before AD 64, he does not distinguish

between the two forms of Messianism which were represented by Christianity and Judaism. The phrasing "not only in Judaea" obviously refers to the outbreak of nationalism which provoked the Jewish revolt and the Jewish war. A Jewish document would never have represented Judaism as united with Christianity, nor would it have called Jesus the "Christ", i.e. Messiah.335 For the pagan Tacitus, however, Christ was simply a proper name.

It has been objected, as an argument against the evidential value of Tacitus, that the name 'Jesus' is not mentioned. In a period of messianic fervor, so the argument goes,336 it is quite likely that many individuals were declaring themselves to be the Messiah, and that possibly Tacitus is referring to one of these. This is a conjecture for which there does not exist any positive evidence. There are no known sources which indicate that an 'other' Messiah, who also had been crucified under Pilate, had gotten a following in Judaea and "even in Rome" after his death. To me this is a typical example of an 'ad hoc' hypothesis in the protective belt of a research programme whose hard core is confirmed through a skeptical attitude towards the historical Jesus. On the other hand, if Tacitus knew a document which was neither Jewish nor Christian, but pagan, which connected Christianity with the Christ who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, then this is of obvious value to the competing programme.

In AD 49 a wave of riots broke out in the very large Jewish community in Rome. The Emperor Claudius (41-54) found the trouble so intractable that he decided to banish all Jews from the city. Among the ancient writers who mention this incident is Luke,337 another is the Roman author Suetonius (A.D. 65-135). In his The Twelve Caesars, dated c. A.D. 120, he says of the emperor Claudius: "Because the Jews at Rome caused disturbances at the instigation of Chrestus, he expelled them from the City." (Suetonius 1962, 197.)338 'Chrestus', a common slave-name, was also a variant spelling of Christ in gentile circles.339

Historic Christianity340 explains this 'remnant' as a result of the recent introduction of Christianity into the Jewish community of Rome, with all the controversy and quarrelling that followed. Police action was called for, and when the biographer-historian Suetonius several decades later had occasion to mention the incident, the police records probably provided one of his sources of information. As a detached outsider, however, Suetonius seems to have thought that 'Chrestus' actually was in Rome at this time. If so, this shows how little the Romans thought of the traditions to which the Christians referred.

The testimony of the Latin authors to Jesus does not amount to very much. Apart from Tacitus, all it does is to reveal the existence of groups of believers bearing the name of Christ. But the reason for the paucity of references to Christianity in the classical literature c. A.D. 30-130 is not hard to find. The importance assumed by Christianity later makes it very easy to fall into an error of perspective. From the standpoint of imperial Rome, including a Pliny or a Tacitus or a Suetonius, Christianity in its first hundred years of existence was an obscure, disreputable, vulgar oriental superstition.341 It was ignored, except when it proved the occasion for political and social unrest. It is from this point of view alone that Pliny, Tacitus and Suetonius speak of it, the two latter probably building upon official 'police'-records in the imperial archives. It is thus natural that they did not take the trouble to collect and examine the traditions to which those whom they regarded as agitators referred.342

Seen in this way, Historic Christianity takes these passages as valuable supportive evidence for the historical reliability of the NT.343 Jesus was not the only religious leader with a following who was executed in Palestine in those days. But when his followers, claiming that he had risen from the dead, began to proclaim him as the deliverer and Lord of mankind,

when their mission met with astonishing success,344 when it was carried, not only to Antioch and Alexandria, but to Rome itself, then the name of Christ and the followers bearing his name became familiar at the heart of the Roman Empire. As these developments took some time, the dating and nature of the references in Pliny, Tacitus and Suetonius roughly correspond to what a historian can expect to find within this field of external evidence. The silence of other Roman historians of the first century A.D. is not perceived as an anomaly.345

To other scholars, however, the value of the external evidence equals zero: Asking himself how to make a history out of such "historiographically unpromising materials" as the NT gospels, Moses Finley answers: "There are no others. A handful of sentences in pagan writers, wholly illuminating, and a few passages in Josephus and the Talmud, tendentious when they are not forgeries, are all we have from non-Christian sources for the first century of century and a half of Christianity. It is no exaggeration to say that they contribute nothing. One must work one's way as best one can with Christian writings, with no external controls." (Finley 1977, 177.) The two opposing 'techniques' of, say, Bruce vs. Stroll/Finley thus serve to make sure that the external evidence is seen as supportive evidence for the historical-theological research programmes they respectively belong to; either to confirm or disconfirm the reliability of the NT.

Moving into another field, the former programme is confirmed by our knowledge of the Hellenistic and Roman setting of Acts and the synoptic gospels, and especially the legal and administrative background.346 The degree of confirmation in Graeco-Roman terms is less for the gospels than for Acts, but this is due to their difference in regional setting. As soon as Christ enters the Roman orbit at Jerusalem, where references are made to the Roman criminal procedure of the provincial procurator-governor, and the administrative system in general, the confirmation begins. "For Acts the confirmation of historicity is overwhelming. Yet Acts is, in simple terms and judged externally, no less of a propaganda narrative than the Gospels, liable to similar distortions. But any attempt to reject its basic historicity even in matters of detail must now appear absurd. Roman historians have long taken it for granted." (Sherwin-White 1963, 189.)

The basic reason for the confidence in our knowledge of ancient history is the existence of external confirmations and the working of the synoptic principle.347 There are external contemporary evidence of a sort less warped by the bias of personalities, e.g. the texts of laws and public accounts, which confirm the conclusions drawn from the critical study of literary sources. This kind of evidence lends credence to results in the larger fields where there is no such confirmation. Source criticism equally tends to reveal the existence of a basic unitary tradition beneath the manifold divergences of detail in rival narratives, which is often the product of their particular bias.

So, as Graeco-Roman historians have been growing in confidence, Historic Christianity claims to have a similar basis for its confidence in the historicity of the gospel narratives.348 Even if the Roman historical writings and the NT gospels belong to different kinds of literature, even if the interest of the gospel writers was parabolical and didactic rather than 'purely' historical, it can be maintained that those who had a passionate interest in the story of Christ was not thereby led to pervert and destroy the historical kernel of their material.

There are even revealing parallels to be found between the authors of the gospels and Herodotus, the 'father' of historical inquiry. In his History,349 he is writing about the period of the Persian wars and the preceding generation, forty to seventy years after the events, and

after the tales he builds upon has been remodeled by at least one generation of oral transmission. There are thus certain similarities to the NT gospels. Both Herodotus and the gospel writers regard their material with enthusiasm rather than detached criticism. Both are the first to produce a written narrative of great events which they regard as a mighty saga, national or ecclesiastical and esoterical as the case may be. For both, their story is the vehicle of a moral or religious idea which shapes the narrative. Yet the material of Herodotus presents no intractable difficulty to a critical historian. The material has not been transformed out of all recognition under the influence of moral and patriotic favor, even if it reveals major mistakes.

Furthermore, Historic Christianity may claim a good deal of support from archeological evidence in general, which, although limited, seems to conform to the information given in the NT. Manuscripts (papyrus documents), coins, inscriptions, sepulchers, assuaries, inscribed potsherds, ancient buildings and ancient cities all make their small contribution.350 The new counter-argument of the Bultmann-School would probably be that what this evidence confirms is of very little theological importance, it mainly deals with non-controversial issues.351 So even if no anachronisms or other factual errors can be identified in the NT, this is not evidence that it is generally reliable. Only the reverse is true.352 Again; two different 'techniques'.

There is, however, another piece of archeological evidence which might even give support to Historic Christianity in the form of a Lakatosian 'novel' fact (cf. above; ch. 6.1). It is called the Shroud of Turin.353 This cloth is a strip of linen 14.25 feet long and 3.58 wide. The linen is woven in a fine, durable, three-to-one herringbone twill. Faintly visible on one side of the cloth are images of the front and back of a human body. These images, described by various modern investigators as 'straw yellow' or 'sepia yellow' in color, are oriented on the cloth in a head-to-head fashion: If a human body actually caused these images, it would have to been placed on its back on one half of the linen fabric. The remaining portion of the cloth would then have been drawn up over the head and face and stretched out over the trunk and legs to form a complete burial shroud. The body is that of a 5-foot-11-inch bearded male Caucasian weighing about 170 pounds.

The body images reveal wounds and bruises. A number of them are associated with what appear to be bloodstains.354 Moreover, they conform to what we would expect from the gospel accounts of Jesus' crucifixion.355 The shroud first emerges on the stage of history in the mid-14th century, in the town of Lirey, France. A British writer, Ian Wilson, believes he can trace the shroud all the way from Jerusalem to Edesa (now the town of Urfa, Turkey), where an image-bearing cloth was famed, thence to Constantinople and eventually to Lirey. But Wilson himself admits that the connections are exceedingly tenuous and circumstantial.

How old is the shroud? A radiocarbon (or carbon 14) analysis has not been done because permission has so far not been given by the church authorities (it is now the Pope who owns the shroud) probably because independent tests would each require a piece of material which then would be destructed. In lack of a carbon-test, other efforts have been made to date the shroud. The tree-to-one herringbone weave of its linen fabric is known to have been utilized in Roman times (but woven in silk rather than linen). Stray cotton fibers were detected in the shroud's weave suggesting that its linen fabric had been woven on a loom used also for the weaving of cotton. Wilson and others then concluded that the shroud had to have come from the Middle East, since cotton is not grown in Europe. Wild does not accept this, because Middle Eastern cotton fiber began to appear in southern Europe in the 12th-century. A 14th-

century European piece of linen could thus contain stray cotton fibers just as well as a first-century Palestinian cloth.

Various samples of pollen were also collected from the shroud and among them were distinctive pollen from six desert plants native only to the Palestine region. Some see this as a strong indication of the shroud's authenticity, others argue that this object could have picked up airborne pollen from the Middle East at those times when it was put on display and that pollen from various sources could have been transferred to the shroud by the many objects which people took and touched it with.

It is also claimed that what seems to be coins placed over the man buried in the shroud, by means of analysis and computer enhancement, accurately fit the size of the 'lepton' of Pontius Pilate, minted between 14 and 37 AD. Archeological evidence supporting such a tradition of placing coins on top of the eyes of the person being buried was later seen to be unwarranted.356 Granted that it is most unlikely that a later artist or forger would have known of lepton-coins, it may still be questioned whether not the shadowy photographs of one of these alleged coins reflected in the shroud is more a product of what people want to see rather than what is there.357

The first aspect of the shroud that caught the interest of modern scientists was in 1898, when the first photographs of the relic revealed it as a negative image. The obvious question was how a medieval artist could have produced a negative image, and why he would have chosen to do so. Then, over 75 years later, two American scientists processed the pictures of a 1973-investigation of the should with the VP-8 Image Analyzer, a sophisticated instrument to convert image intensity to vertical relief. To their surprise they found that the shroud contains accurate three-dimensional data, something ordinary photographs or paintings do not have. With the computer information they were able to construct a three-dimensional model of the image.

In 1978 these two scientists headed a large expedition which thoroughly investigated the relic with the most modern scientific equipment available.358 The nature of the image was confirmed to be completely superficial; it lies on the very topmost fibrils of the threads, and has not penetrated at all. Moreover, water thrown on the burns to put out the fire of 1532 would have caused inks to run. Clearly that did not happen. According to one of them, nearly all of the participants of the 'Shroud of Turin Research Project' (STURP) of 1978 believe that the shroud is not a painting. "Even for a small amount of iron oxide we find no pigment. And we do no think that either liquid or vapor could have produced the image we see." (Weaver 1980, 751.)359

What then is left to explain the image? The findings from various instruments suggest that the image is like a faint scorch. Unlike pigments, scorch would have gone through the 1532-fire without changing color. It could also have been subjected to water without fading or running. But what scorching mechanism could have produced the delicate image we see on the shroud has not been determined.360

To Wild, however, there are enough difficulties attached to the shroud to indicate that it is not the shroud of Jesus, but 'the work of a 14th-century artist or forger'. These difficulties include the implausibility of the bloodstains,361 iconographic and anatomical irregularities, anomalies with respect to the Biblical evidence, and the early history, or rather the lack of it, of the shroud.

His suggestion is that an artist (or forger) scorched a linen cloth with a properly heated statue, or more likely, a pair of bas-reliefs, using whole blood to create appropriate stains. Such a technique would explain the lack of paintbrush marks, the unusual 'photographic' negative and the image's three-dimensionality. But it does not account for the fact that ultraviolet light caused the portions of the shroud which was scorched in the fire of 1532 to fluoresce, but did not cause the body images to do so, although they too would have been produced at an earlier period by a scorching technique.

If the shroud remains a fascinating, unfinished puzzle, unexplainable by 'natural' causes, and if (despite Wild's arguments and the fact that the case is far from closed) it can be seen as to a large extent an accurate picture of the passion and death of Christ as the NT portrays it, then I would describe it as a 'novel' fact which gives 'dramatic' support to Historic Christianity. It is a known fact which is a straight-forward consequence of, an unintended by-product of, and predictable prior to research by, this particular historical-theological research programme. It plays no role whatsoever in the original design of the programme, and the questions it raises are explainable only in an 'ad hoc' way by the competing programme.

NOTES ch 7

1. For somewhat different perspectives on the history of the formation of the NT canon, see Sundberg jr. 1976, Hennecke & Schneemelcher 1973, 28-60, Campenhausen 1976, ch. IV-VII; 90-225, Hartmann 1973, 93-105 and Bruce 1974, ch. III; 21-28. In my mind, there seems to have been one sufficient criterion of canonicity in the patristic church; apostolic origin. Two auxiliary hypotheses were used, negatively, to identify apostolic origin: If a certain writing failed in doctrine, it could not be apostolic. If it failed as to 'catholicity', i.e. if it was not generally accepted and used in the different churches, it was not apostolic in origin.
2. Collected and reprinted from Hennecke & Schneemelcher 1973 in Fuller 1980, 189-197. See also Seidensticker 1967, 55 ff.
3. Hennecke & Schneemelcher 1973, 183-187.
4. Two Harvard dissertations, however, Johnson 1966, 88-91, and Hutton 1970, 105-109, argue that the Gospel of Peter is a synoptic witness independent of Matthew, Mark and Luke, and that the story of the guard at the tomb and their confesssion that Jesus is Son of God witness to a pre-Matthean stage of the tradition that develops into the story of the resurrection of the saints. Cf. Nickelsburg
1980, 184; n. 86.
5. Cf. Hennecke & Schneemelcher 1973, 180.
6. Cf. Bruce 1982, 93. Hennecke & Schneemelcher 1973, 181 f. is more reserved as to docetic and gnostic influence: "All these references ... show no articulated Gnostic theology, but indicate that such a theology is already on the way, since the representation is taken out of the framework of the divine act of revelation and set in that of a Gnostic myth. Thus the Gospel of Peter stands on the one hand through its comparative sobriety nearer to the canonical Gospels than to the later Gnostic embellishments, but on the other hand it prepares a way for them". Ibid., 182.
7. Ibid, 163-165; the relevant fragment is no. 7; p. 165.
8. Cf. ibid., 160-163, and Bruce 1982, 99-100.
9. Hennecke & Schneemelcher 1973, 191-227. Only chapters 9-12 are relevant here; pp 195-197.
10. Cf. ibid, 190f.
11. Ibid., 449-484. The relevant material is found in XI.3-XIV.2; 460-462.
12. Cf. ibid., 444f.
13. In addition to the four apocrypha mentioned, there are two obviously gnostic reports of post-Easter appearances in the Pistis Sophia and the Sophia Jesu Christi, where Jesus teaches his disciples the secret doctrines of gnosticism (in the former this is done over period of 11 years). See Seidensticker 1967, 69-75 and Hennecke & Schneemelcher
1973, 243-248; 250-259.
14. Ibid., 278-307, and Bruce 1982, ch. VII; 110-156. The latter has the complete text, along with his own commentaries. A Scandinavian translation of Thomas, together with an introduction and a commentary is provided by Giversen
1959.
15. Cf. e.g. Bruce 1982, 155, Bornkamm 1979, 221, and Pagels
1981, passim.
16. "The Gnosticism of the Gospel of Thomas appears to be direct continuation of the eschatological sayings of Jesus. ... The honor of having continued and developed the tradition about Jesus' original works and words must go to the more primitive gospel sources and to the apocryphal gospels. The continuation of Jesus' teaching is present in the gospels which preserve and expand his sayings (Q and Thomas)." Koester 1971a, 175; 203.

17. A representative bibliography of the three different positions on Thomas (as (1) dependent, (2) essentially independent or (3) partly dependent, partly independent, of the canonical tradition) is provided in Perrin 1976, 253 f. Schrage 1964, for instance, argues that the Aramaisms in Thomas (which, by the way, is not found in its gnostic parts) were taken from Coptic translations of Greek synoptic gospels where the original Aramaisms thus had survived both translations.
18. Cf. Cullmann 1967, Prologomena; ch. 2., and Rordorf 1967.
19. As to handbooks on NT textual criticism, see Metzger 1977 and Colwell 1969. My own presentation is mainly based on Hartmann 1973.
20. A Spanish papyrologist, JosÆ O'Callaghan, claimed to have found a fragment of Mark 6:52f in 1972, which he dated c.
50 AD. Both the identification and the dating of the papyrus has been critized, however. The discussion is, according to Hartmann 1973, 107; n.1, still going on, and an intersubjective verdict on O'Callaghan's conclusions have not been reached. The death of Jesus, by the way, is believed to have taken place at AD 29, 30 or 33, cf. Hoehner 1974.
21. For a specified list of the oldest Greek texts, see Hartmann 1973, 110-112. To date handwritten texts, scholars of paleography pressupose that the form of the letters developed in a way which was dictated by specific rules. By comparing all the texts available, they gain an idea of which period each text belong to, and are thus able to tell where a particular NT-appyrus fit in. Cf. ibid., 109.
22. Cf. Kenyon 1912, 4, and Bruce 1974, 16. For the essence of the texts of Thucydides and Herodotus, see Finley 1966.
23. Cf. Hartmann 1973, 124.
24. Cf. John Robinson 1976, 337 f.
25. For my presentation of the development of NT chronology, see ibid., 3 ff.
26. See Eusebius 1965, bk. V, ch. 8; 298.
27. Papias: ibid., bk. III; ch. 39, 206, and Clement: Eusebius
1969, bk. VI, ch. 14; 27.
28. Cf. Kümmel 1972, 162-184.
29. Cf. Neill 1964, 33-60.
30. Cf. Harnack 1897, 717 ff. The total time span was c. 20-30 years; I and II Thess. 48-9; II Peter 160-75.
31. Cited in John Robinson 1976, 7. Total time span: c. 20-95 years: I and II Thess. 50-1; II Peter 125-150.
32. Cf. above; ch. 3.2, and the general remarks in Renvall
1965, 119.
33. Cf. e.g. Brandon 1961 and Brandon 1967.
34. Cf. e.g. Hengel 1969 and Hengel 1976. One important point is that nothing that Josephus wrote lends support to Jesus as a supporter of the Zealots. "The relatively friendly attitude of Josephus towards Jesus contrasts with his severe stricture of the Zealots and kindred activist groups among the Jews responsible for encouraging the pepole to defy Roman rule." P. Winter, quoted in John Robinson 1976, 13; n.2.
35. Cf. John Robinson 1976, 15-30. Besides, there is likely to be disagreements between the two programmes regarding the possibilities of real prophecies coming true, i.e. whether a prohecy has to be explained as being 'ex eventu' if the event referred to did take place as described in the prophecy.
36. See ibid., passim. Cf. John Robinson 1977, ch. 4; 62-79. Robinson addressed himself primarily to a reconstruction of the historical setting of the NT books in their relationship to one another and to certain external events. He gave less attention to a second factor, the background and development of the literary criticism of the NT. Yet it is this factor that has

been largely responsible for the post-70 dates often assigned to many NT writings. Historic Christianity concludes, however, that "the literary criticism of the NT accepted by most scholars today, and the NT chronology based upon it, has underpinnings that are tenuous and that in some cases can be shown to be historically false. If this is so, the dating of the documents must perforce rely rather more upon the books' ascriptions of authorship, upon ancient tradition and upon historicl correlations such as those that J.A.T. Robinson has pointed to." Ellis 1980, 501. For substantiation of this conclusion, see ibid., passim, with further references.

37. For a full chart of Robinson's chronology, see John Robinson 1976, 352 f. As to Mark, previous dating, "when it has not merely been held to reflect the progress of the Jewish war (66-70), whether finished or unfinished, has been made to turn on the report that it was written after the death of Peter or even on the a priori assumption that the death of Peter would (only then?) have led to the need for a written record whereas the tradition that it was written during the lifetime of Peter is just as strong, if not stronger." Ibid., 341f., cf, Eusebius 1969, Bk. VI, ch. 14; 27 and Eusebius 1965, Bk. II, ch. 15; 110.

38. Cf. McArthur 1965, 202 ff.

39. Cf. e.g. Perrin 1974, 169: "Like all the gospels, the gospel of Matthew originally circulated anonymously, and its ascription to Matthew is no more than a guess." (My italics.) For an exposition of the 'politics of monotheism' in the early church, see Pagels 1981, ch. I-II.

40. Bishop Irenaeus, who supervised the church in Lyons, c.
180, wrote five volumes entitled The Destruction and Overthrow of Falsely socalled Knowledge, where he declared that the gnostics "really have no gospel which is not full of blasphemy. For what they have published ... is totally unlike what has been handed down to us from the apostles."
3.11.9., quoted in ibid., 20.

41. Cf. ibid., xiii.

42. See ibid., 21f.

43. The gnostics believed these pair of concepts to be opposed to each other, while the NT sees them as interrelated, cf. the concept of incarnation and a bodily resurrection.

44. Cf. ibid., Pagels, by the way, confirms that "the accusation that the gnostics invented what they wrote contains some truth: Certain gnostics openly acknowledged that they derived their gnosis from their own experience." Ibid., 21.

45. Cf. John Robinson 1976, 347 f.

46. As to how books were publicized in the early church, see Alstrup Dahl 1968.

47. The frequency of quotations is carefully presented in Massaux 1950. (It should be noted that an alternative explanation of the dominance of quotations from Matthew, is that the heretic Marcion favoured Luke. This may have made quotations from Luke look somewhat ambigous.)

48. Mark: Eusebius 1965, bk. III, ch. 24. Cf. Irenaeus in ibid., bk. V, ch. 8, and Clement of Alexandria in ibid., bk. II, ch. 15 and in Eusebius 1969, bk. VI, ch. 8. Luke: Eusebius 1965, bk. V, ch. 8. Matthew: Ibid., bk. III, ch. 39; cf. ch. 24. John: Ibid., bk. III, ch. 24 and Eusebius 1969, bk. VI, ch. 14.

49. Cf. A. E. Taylor 1954, 13-25. As to the whole of this paragraph, as well as other major points in ch. 7.2.3, I am indebted to fakultetslektor Oskar Skarsaune.

50. Cf. Mc Arthur 1965, 205 and Gager 1974, 256.

51. Cf. Abel 1971, 274.

52. Haley 1977, 325 f., Archer 1982, 316 and Mc Dowell 1972,
377, all argue that they do not: Matthew refers to Jesus' judicial line through Joseph who adopted him as his legal heir, while Luke refers to Jesus' biological line through Mary. As to the contents of Mt. 1-2 (and Lk. 1-2), France

1981 argues that the most plausible origin from a literary point of view is in the historical occurrence of the events narrated. A critical consideration of these events (the virginal conception, the visit of the Magi, the massacre in Bethlehem, the flight to Egypt, etc.) has to him suggested that, unless supernatural occurrences are ruled out 'a priori', they could well have happened. France's article is thus a 'prima facie' case for the historicity of the story-line of Matthew's infance narratives, in line with the protective belt of Historic Christianity.

53. Manson 1962 argued that Papias' statement ("Now Matthew compiled the oracles ('ta logia') in Hebrew language, and each one interpreted them as he was able." Eusebius 1965, bk. III, ch. 39; 206) is inappropriate if applied to Matthew's gospel, but wholly appropriate if applied to an Aramaic Q document, written by Matthew which underwent various translations into Greek. The apostle's name was thus subsequently transferred to the gospel we know under his name. The hinge of this argument is whether Manson is correct in his contention that the expression 'the oracles' ('ta logia') cannot refer to a gospel containing a mixture of narrative and sayings. Besides, even if Manson is correct in this, he does not thereby validate that Papias' comment was originally intended to describe a quite different document, and that this document is to be identified as Q. Cf. McArthur
1965, 204 f. and Leon-Dufour 1976, 109f.

54. John Robinson 1977, 90, finds "apostolic authorship, within the context of an ongoing missionary community, the hypothesis which presents the least difficulties (concerning the authorship of the Gospel of John)." Cf. Morris
1969, 139-292.

55. Cf. e.g. Marshall 1977, 145-151, Bruce 1974, ch. IV; 29-61 and LÆon-Dufour 1976, 78 ff., 108 ff. 126 ff., 139 ff. for various statements of this general position.

56. Cf. e.g. Ladd 1976, 76. For the question of NT oral tradition in general, see below; ch. 7.3.3.

57. According to Eusebius 1969, bk. 6, ch. 14; 27, Clement of Alexandria cites a tradition that the gospels with geneologies, i.e. Matthew and Luke, were written first, that Mark wrote the substance of Peter's preaching during the apostle's lifetime, and that John (the non-synoptic gospel), knowing the others, wrote a spiritual gospel.

58. For the history of the synoptic problem, see Farmer 1964, Kümmel 1972 and Neill 1964.

59. For a brief overview, see Ellis 1983, 34 ff. The first three NT gospels bear the name 'the synoptics' because their records run parallel to each other and agree to such a degree that it is possible, for easier comparison, to put their texts together in a 'synopsis' (= seeing together), as in e.g. Madsen 1967.

60. Streeter 1961, ch. IX.

61. Sanders 1969, 276 ff. The different criteria are specified in ibid., 276, n.1 and 2.

62. E.g. Bornkamm 1979, 216 f.

63. The contradictory scholarly opinion concerning Q is summarized in Petrie 1959, 29f: Q is a single document, a composite document, several documents. It incorporates earlier sources; it is used in different redactions. Its original language is Greek; it is Aramaic, Q is used in different translation. It is the Matthean Logia, it is not. It has shape and sequence, it is a collection of fragments. It is a gospel; it is not. It consists wholly of sayings; it includes narrative. It is all preserved in Matthew and Luke; it is not. Matthew's order of Q is correct; Luke's is correct; neither is correct. It is used by Mark; it is not used by Mark.

64. Cf. Ellis 1983, 36 f.

65. Cf. Sanders 1969, 278, Boismard 1980 and John Robinson
1976, 94.

66. From a source-critical point of view, this means that when the same information is found in more than one gospel, the different accounts can not be taken to independently confirm each other.
67. Hirsch 1967, 86.
68. Cf. Aune 1981, 9.
69. Cf. Guelich 1983, 184. For a bibliography on the genre of the gospels, see Vorster 1984, 2f.
70. Cf. Aristeles: Om diktekunsten, in Aarseth et al 1970,
23f.
71. Cf. e.g. Rimmon-Kenan 1983.
72. There are two other possible meanings of 'narrative'. One is the succession of events, real or fictitions that are the subjects of a narrative discourse, and their several relations of linking, opposition, repetition etc. The other is the act of narrating taken in itself, cf. Genette 1980, 25 ff. Genette uses the term in the meaning referred to in my text, i.e. as the narrative statement, and considers this the "only one" (ibid., 27) of the three levels that is directly available to textual analysis.
73. For a systematic theory of narrative, see ibid.
74. See Rimmon-Kenan 1983, 1-5.
75. Genette claims that traditional theory of narrative has suffered from a regrettable confusion of what he calls mood and voice, a confusion between the question of (1) who is the character whose point of view orients the narrative perspective?, or who sees?, and the question of (2) who is the narrator? or who speaks? Thus, if a story is told from the point of view of a particular character, the question whether this character is also the narrator, speaking in the first person, or whether the narrator is someone else who speaks of him in the third person, is not a question of point of view, which is the same in both cases, but a question of voice. Cf. ibid., ch. 4 and 5;
161-262.
76. Cf. Booth 1961, 20; 149: "The author's judgment is always present, always evident to anyone who knows how to look for it. .... though the author can to some extent choose his disguises, he can never choose to disappear .... the author cannot choose to avoid rhetoric; he can choose only the kind of rhetoric he will employ." There are some similarities here to the discussion in ch. 5.1, above.
77. Cf. Petersen 1978, Vorster 1983, Guelich 1983, Rhoad and Michie 1982 and Kermode 1979.
78. 'Extradiegetic' means that there is no first person author which idenfifies himself by using 'I' in the text, referring to himself. On Mark as a 'extradiegetic' author, see Starobinski 1973, 333 f.
79. Cf. Petersen 1978, 97, Starbonski 1973, 334 and Rhoad and Michie 1982, 36-38.
80. Cf. Mandelbaum 1967, 414. Mandelbaum, by the way, is rather critical to the use of historical narratives in general: "We must make reference to social situations in which ... choices took place. Thus, to understand the story of a man's life we must understand a great deal about his society and his place in that society, and the essential background is not itself formulated in terms of narrative. ... those who look upon history as narrative mistakenly believes that the historian's primary concern is what they look upon as causes, not conditions." Ibid., 417.
81. See also Kermode 1979.
82. Cf. Vorster 1983, 91: "The gospels are narratives, made-up stories where theology and proclamation, history and interpretation form part of the functions of the text as a process of communication. A narrative such as a gospel involves a narrator's choice. Even if it reports actual events, it involves the narrator's point of view. By definition it requires a story and a

story-teller. This is why the narrative character of the gospel genre calls into question both kerygma and history as distictive characteristics of the gospel genre."
83. Cf. above; ch. 3.2, where I discussed the difference between using historical sources as 'remnants' or 'reports' (Norwegian: 'levninger' and 'beretninger').
84. Cf. below; ch. 7.3.3 and 7.4. As regards external evidence, I have already considered the NT apocrypha in ch.
7.1, above.
85. Cf. e.g. Hirsch 1967, 86, who defines an "intrinsic genre", i.e. the genre germane to the text, as "that sense of the whole by means of which an interpretation can correctly understand any part of its determinancy", and Kermode 1979, 162-163; n.20, who describes a genre as "a context of expectation, an 'internal probability system'" that helps one comprehend a sentence, book or life.
86. A 'genre' has to do with whole texts, while 'form' relates to smaller units in the text. Cf. Hartmann 1978, 13.
87. Cf. Guelich 1983, 183 f.
88. Cf. e.g. Aune 1981, 12; 48 and Guelich 1983, 216. According to ibid., 217, the gospel genre can be described in this way: "Formally, a gospel is a narrative account concerning the public life and teaching of a significant person that is composed of discreet traditional units placed in the context of the Scriptures (OT). ... Materially, the genre consists of the message that God was at work in Jesus' life, death and resurrection, effecting his promises found in the Scriptures." Cf. Leon-Dufour, 1976, 155. The term 'gospel' was first used by Justin c. 150 AD to describe what now is the four first books in the NT. Before that, a 'gospel' was simply the 'good news' of Jesus Christ, as in Paul's early letters and Mark 1:1, cf. Hartmann 1978, 9.
89. Notably Dibelius 1935, Bultmann 1963, Schmidt 1919 and Schmidt 1923.
90. See ibid., 76. 'Kleinlitteratur' is defined as folk litterature which exhibits universal characteristics; cf. ibid., 84. To Schmidt, the gospels are cult legends only because they are seen as the products of the activity of the anonymous community, cf. ibid., 100; 117.
91. See ibid., 78.
92. Cf. Bultmann 1963, 373 f.: "While we need analogies for understanding the individual components of the synoptic Tradition we do not need them for the Gospel as a whole. The analogies that are at hand serve only to throw the uniqueness of the Gospel into still stronger relief. It has grown out of the imminent urge to development which lay in the tradition fashioned for various motives, and out of the Christ-myth of Hellenistic Christianity. It is thus an original creation of Christianity."
93. Cf. e.g. Hartmann 1978, 14; 18.
94. The 'Haggadah' is a type of scriptural exegesis, homiletic and edifying rather than logical or legalistic in character, as the 'Halakah'; a legal binding decision derived by Rabbinical logical processes from the written Torah. Cf. Klausner 1925, 15. Concerning the OT parallels, see Guelich 1983, 188 and Aune 1981, 10, for references. On e.g. the OT prophetic books, see Riesenfeld 1957, 5.
95. I am not sure whether the book of Jonah fits this description. As to parallels in historical literature outside the OT, a brief outline of the parallel technique between the synoptic writers and Herodotus (the 'founder' of historical inquiry) in their anecdotal conception of a narrative is offered in Sherwin-White 1963,
192.
96. Cf. Hartmann 1978, 19 f.
97. Cf. Dodd 1936 and Dodd 1953, 1-11. The latter (The Framework of the Gospel Narrative) was first published in Expository Times (London) vol. 43. (1931-32), 396-400.
98. Cf. e.g. Güttemanns 1970.
99. Cf. Aune 1981, 38.

100. Cf. Guelich 1983, 213.
101. "I do indeed think that we can now know almost nothing concerning the life and personality of Jesus, since the early Christian sources show no interest in either, are moreover fragmentary and often legendary..." Bultmann
1962, 8. This is probably a too radical statement to be representative for the Bultmann School as such. It is instructing as an indication of the direction of its position however.
102. According to Perrin 1969, 76 f., the gospels reflect "a situation in which distinctions between past, present and future tended to be lost as the present experience of Jesus as risen led to a new understanding of the future and of the past."
103. Cf. Hartmann 1978, 22: "Evangelietexterna som helheter ör inte att jamstölla med historieskrivares kröniker eller biografier. ... I den mån historia ligger under ör det altså en tillömpad, tolkad historia. ... tolkning, förkunnelse och historia ör en enhet i texten." An even more affirmative, and perhaps better statement is found in Gundry 1974, 114: "The spread of the Church far from its place of origin and the dying off of Jesus' original disciples created a felt need for records. Since Christians has not yet divorced theology and history, those records turned out to be both theological and historical. Theological concerns for the present required editiorial activity and resulted in differences among the gospels; historical concerns for the past forestalled fantasizing and resulted in commonalities among the gospels."
104. This, of course, can be seen as an oversimplification of the relation between on the one hand authorial intent or historial context, and on the other, a literary interpretation, e.g. through a structuralist existentialist 'grid'. At least Kermode 1979 would suggest so. In any case, one may well ask to what degree it is possible to interpret a NT text on a purely structural basis.
105. Via 1975, 93. Cf. Robbins 1980, 387 and Guelich 1983,
194-6. In structuralist demythologization, existentialist analysis has given way to discovery of the 'deep structure' of the documents. Thus, when all irrelevant specifics have been stripped away, the gospels stand before us as, say, tragedies with comic endings. Cf. Gundry 1974, 110.
106. Cf. Aune 1981, 10 and Guelich 1983, 188 ff. For references, see Aune 1981, 50 f.; n. 12.
107. Cf. Robbins 1980, 388.
108. See Aune 1981, passim, and Guelich 1983, 189 ff.
109. An aretalogi is an "interpreter of miraculous events, and hence, by extension, a teller of miracle stories." M.˘Smith 1971, 175.
110. Bultmann 1963, 254 ff., held this view concerning particular units in the gospels.
111. Wrede 1901 states that the theory of Jesus' 'hidden' Messiah-consciousness is a purely theological construction with no historical basis. That is to say, Jesus did not think of himself as the Messiah at all. It was only the disciples who, after Easter, attributed such a self-image to him. They did so for psychological reasons, to uphold their own faith. Cf. ibid., 79: "Ein geschichtliches Motiv (für die Selbstverhüllung des Messias') kommt wirklich gar nicht in Frage, positiv: die Idee des Messias geheimnisses ist eine theologische Vorstellung." Cf. Bultmann 1974,
26-32.
112. Conzelmann 1968, discussed in Gundry 1974, 104; 108.
113. Cf. M. Müller 1981, 6-8, and Mc Dowell 1975, ch. 25;
277-280. Cf. below; ch. 7.3.3.4.
114. Cf. Tiede 1972, referred to in Gundry 1974, 108; no page-reference.
115. I.e., where 'history' not only refers to that which is written, but also to that which is written about.

116. Cf. Guelich 1983, 186 f. Apart from OT historical works, critics who emphasize the Semitic background have suggested that the chief influence on the form and content of the gospels derive from early Judaism, either as a Christian surrogate for the Passover haggadah or as a misdrashic interpretation of the life of Jesus structured in accordance with the Jewish lectionary cycle or the festal cycle readings in ancient synagogues. Others associate the Gospel of Mark with apocalyptic thought and literature, or OT biographies of righteous persons. For references, see Aune 1981, 10 and Guelich 1983, 186-188.
117. Cf. Ellis 1983, 38; 32.
118. Ladd 1976, 74 (Historic Christianity).
119. Fuller 1980, 172 and Dibelius 1935, 295 (Bultmann School).
120. Bultmann 1958, 8.
121. Kösemann 1964, 60, cf. ibid., 235.
122. Cf. Gager 1975, 8.
123 Cf. e.g. Bultmann 1963, 4.
124. For a critical discussion of this methodological assumption, see Aagedal 1981.
125. Bultmann 1963, 5.
126. E.g. Marshall 1977, 189, Stanton 1974, 9. Compare Roloff 1970, passim.
127. Cf. Ellis 1983, 42 and Mc Arthur 1965, 203. For a textbook-presentation of form-criticism and the synoptic traditions based upon K.L. Schmidt, Dibelius and Bultmann, see Lohse 1981, ch. V; 106-120.
128. Cf. Hodne 1973, 26 f.. Compare the distinction between 'reports' and 'remnants' above, ch. 3.1.
129. Cf. Hodne 1972, 22; 142; 197 and Hodne 1981, 43.
130. Vansina 1965, 112, cf. Hodne 1973, 27.
131. Cf. ibid, 191; 27.
132. Cf. Baasland 1980, 654 ff.
133. Glade notes that these factors varies both as to origin and influence: "Der Einfluss des jeweils auftretenden Faktoren ist verschieden." Glade 1966, 236.
134. Cf. Baasland 1980, 652.
135. Notably Schmidt 1923; Dibelius 1935, Bultmann 1963.
136. E.g. Hodne 1972, 135: "Selve det overleverte mønster for en gitt fortelling representerer kontinuiteten og er et konserverende element. Dette mønster gjelder både emne, komposisjon og et fast sett av tradisjonelle uttrykksmåter av språklig art. Og over dette tradisjonsmønster våker miljøet. I sin utvelgelse av hva som skal fortelles og hvordan det skal framføres, er miljøet en sterk konservativ garanti."
137. Gundry 1974, 102.
138. Cf. ibid., referring to Boman 1967 and Güttemanns 1970.
139. See W. S. Taylor 1959, 474 f.
140. Often, but not always. Cf. Bloch 1953, 116 f., and Sanders
1969, 272 f.
141. Dibelius 1935, quoted in Abel 1971, 275, no page-reference. Bultmann 1966, 32: "When narratives pass from mouth to mouth, or when one writer takes them over from another, their fundamental character remains the same, but the details are subject to the control of fancy and are usually made more explicit and definite." Cf. Erslev 1975, 67: "Ved muntlig Overlevering spiller Hukommelsens Mangler stærkt ind. Enkelte Træk glemmes, andre forvanskes eller forbyttes; ofte udfyldes derved fremtrædende Hull saa ved ny Sagndannelse."
142. Cf. Abel 1971, 276.

143. Allport and Postman report that as rumor is transmitted, "it tends to grow shorter, more concise, more easily grasped and told. In successive versions, fewer words are used and fewer details are mentioned." Allport and Postman 1965, 51. V. Taylor 1933, app. B; 202-209, concluded that the tendency of oral transmission is, in spite of explanatory or inferential additions, to become shorter and less detailed. Relating his experiments to the gospel tradition, Taylor takes them to "suggest that longer miraclestories, which are not the product of literary art, stand near the records of eyewitnesses, and that the shorter and more conventional stories have passed through many hands before they were committed to writing." Ibid., 125.

144. In talmudic texts one finds "material freed from all unnecessary detail; all explanations and comments are presented in a highly concentrated form." (Gerhardsson 1961, 141.) "If a teacher failed to express himself with the required brevity, his sayings could be abbreviated by teachers and pupils at a later stage in the transmission process." (Ibid., 142.) Thus, a typical pedagogic talmudic precept states: "A man should always teach his pupils in the shortest way." (Pes. 3b, quoted in ibid., 137).

145. E.g. Kösemann 1963, 20: "To state the paradox as sharply as possible: the community takes so much trouble to maintain historical continuity with him who once trod this earth that it allows the historical events of this earthly life to pass for the most part into oblivion and replaces them by its own message."

146. Erslev 1975, 67, formulates a somewhat different principle, which may possibly be taken to support Bartlett here: " Hvor man kan følge Sagnudvikling i historiske Omgivelser, vil man se de samme Momenter gøre seg gjældende, som vi kender fra enhver Genfortælling, blot i endu stærkere Grad. Fortællingen bliver bredere og mere sammenhængende; Hovedtraaden drages stedse kraftigere frem, og de Enkeltheder, der ikke ret passer dermed, skydes til Side eller helt ud." My italics.

147. Cf. ibid.: "Særlig preges folkelig Overlevering ved, at den søger Motiver i personlige og almennmenneskelige Forhold, mindre i de skiftende ydre Kaar." According to Bø 1976, 117, "a tradition has both an inner and an outer motivation. .... the outer motivation is controlled by geography, by nature, while the inner motivation is affected by social conditions and presuppositions in the milieu."

148. Cf. W. S. Taylor 1959, 473.

149. Cf. Abel 1971, 276. According to Hodne 1981, 39f., a 'memorat', i.e. a story of supernatural experiences, either of the story-teller or of others, is likely to be transmitted through 3 or 4 links before it starts getting stereotyped.

150. Cf. Erslev 1975, 64: "Udpræget i en fast Kunstform vil ˇMundtlig Overleveringˇ ikke undergaa saa stor Endring som hvis den kun findes i løsere Fortællerskikkelse."

151. Cf. Vansina 1965, 39.

152. Cf. ibid., 56. By this criterion the historian would also have to conclude that the declaration "Do this in remembrance of me", which Paul quotes twice 1. Cor. 11:24-25, is an integral and probably authentic part of what occurred during the Last Supper. (The exact same phrase also appears in Justin Martyr's Apology, 1.66.3). See Abel 1971, 278.

153. Cf. ibid.

154. It is generally assumed that passages with a definite Aramaic background are likely to be authentic, or at least very early in the gospel tradition, since it does not seem probable that Greek writing and speaking scribes would have introduced 'Semitisms' into their work. Therefore material with such a background had a good chance of coming from a primary source. However, this argument is not as poignant as it once was. Sevenster 1968, 96-175, e.g., has made it increasingly evident that first-century Palestine was actually multilingual.

Nevertheless, it is still reasonable to assume that most of the earliest traditions were formulated in the country's native language. Cf. Abel 1971 278.
155. Cf. Hodne 1981, 40. As to types of communities, Erslev
1975, 64, noted that "en snævert afgrænset Kreds byder mere Sikkerhed og Fasthed end en stor og ubestemt."
156. P. Thompson 1978, 209-211.
157. Vansina, quoted in P. Thompson 1977, 22.
158. Hodne 1972, 130. According to Kjeldstadli 1981, 73, several of the Norwegian inquiries show that the core structure or "'beingrindi' kunne bevares fordi tradisjonen levde under spesielle sosiale vilkår. I tette og statiske bygdemiljøer kunne tradisjonen holdes oppe og bevares noenlunde korrekt gjennom gode tradisjonsbærere og et interessert fortellermiljø, gjennom ættekjensla, ved at gjenstander, steder o.l. som var knyttet til personene holdt historiene ved like, ved at historiene ble fortalt i sosiale sammenhenger og ved at miljøet utøvde kontroll. Om noen fortalte feilaktig ville andre korrigere. Likevel er ikke sagnene spesielt gode kilder .... som beretninger. Derimot har de verdi som levninger". Cf. Hodne 1973, 197f.
159. Cf. Vansina 1965, 172; 202. Bø 1976, 125, puts it this way: "There is little advantage in speaking about the relation between history and legend, about whether so and so many percent of corresponding accounts are worthy of living further in tradition. The local milieu is sovereign in its selection."
160. Hodne 1972, 142 f.
161. Cf. ibid., 136 f.
162. Goguel 1964, second last sentence, quoted in Finley 1977,
174.
163. Riesenfeld 1957, Gerhardsson 1961; 1964 and 1977.
164. Notably Riesner 1981, Cf. also Cullmann 1956.
165. Riesenfeld 1957, 30.
166. Gerhardsson 1961, 334, cf. Riesenfeld 1957, 20: "The words and deeds of Jesus are a holy Word, comparable with that of the O.T."
167. Ibid., 22.
168. Ibid., 21, Gerhardsson 1964, 37 f.; 40, Gerhardsson 1977,
49. Ibid, 49f. gives an example of subsequent links: "Vi ser tradisjonskjeden avtegne seg i materialet: Peter var Jesu disippel, Paulus kjente Peter (Gal. 1:18; 2:1-14), Timoteus var Paulus' disippel och tradent (1. Kor. 4:16f) osv." Likewise, we find in the Pauline letters that at least a certain type of transmission was regarded as being such a distinct activity that a technical terminology was used in order to refer to it; see Gerhardsson 1961, 14. Paul says clearly that he already has transmitted the basic authoritative tradition to his congregations; e.g. II. Cor.
11:2; 23, 15:1 ff, Gal. 1:9, Phil. 4:9, Col.,
2:6, II. Thess. 2:13, 4:1, II. Thess. 2:15, 3:6. An analysis of his arguments shows that he often builds on a number of doctrinal postulates which his listeners are assumed to share. The core of this tradition which Paul had handed down was provided by a corpus containing sayings of, and about Christ. Cf. ibid., 291; 295. Paul, by the way, was not among the twelve apostles listed in Acts 1:13;26. But whereas 'the twelve', under the leadership of Peter, were to preach for the Jews, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel (Mt.
10:6, 19:28), Paul was considered as the apostle of the gentiles, on pair with Peter as to apostolic authority. In Polycarp's Epistle to the Philippians, pt. 9, c. 130-150, Paul is the only apostle named (Staniforth 1968, 147). Ignatius, c. AD 110, from Antioch, writes about the apostles Peter and Paul (Epistle to the Romans, pt. 4; Staniforth 1968, 104 f.), as does

Clement c. AD 96, from Rome, in The Epistle to the Corinthians, pt. 5 (Staniforth 1968, 25). Cf. Gal 2:7. I am indebted to fakultetslektor Oskar Skarsaune for this latter point.
169. Ibid., 13. According to Gundry 1974, 101; n. 15, Boman
1967 assigns the tradition in the gospels to a special class of narrators instead of Jesus' closest disciples. Thus the semi-rabbinical, semi-academic setting is exchanged for that of cathetical classes in which subordinates to the apostles performed the menial task of instructing new converts. Having drawn their information from Jesus' closest disciples, these narrators arranged it into sources of the gospels and the gospels themselves. Insofar as Boman orients his hypothesis to studies of Scandinavian folklore rather than Jewish pedagogics, his presentation lacks some of the cogency of Riesenfeld and Gerhardson's hypothesis. The distinction between apostolic eyewitnesses, who did not rehearse dominical information, and subordinate narrators, who did a distinction crucial to Boman seems very doubtful.
170. Riesenfeld 1957, 16, Gerhardson 1964, 26. Cf. Riesner
1981, passim. This includes not only the synoptic tradition, but also the tradition underlying the Gospel of John. According to Riesenfeld 1957, 28, "it is characteristic of the Johannine mode of presentation that the words and deeds of Jesus are, so to speak, commented on, that they become the object of 'meditations' ... the Gospel of John rests on an independent line of tradition which had its original starting point in the activity of Jesus, and which then ran parallel with the synoptic line of tradition. And here the starting point is to be found in the discourses and 'meditations' of Jesus in the circle of his disciples, such as certainly took place side by side with the instruction of the disciples proper, with its more rigid forms. Such a view is not incompatible with this line of tradition having also undergone a long and complex development."
171. Cf. Baasland 1984, 66.
172. For a summary of Neusner's conclusions, see Neusner 1971, vol. III; ch. 22; 301-319. For the critique of Smith 1963 and Neusner 1971 as to the first question, see especially Gerhardsson 1964, 13 ff. and Gerhardsson 1977, 16.
173. Cf. Davids 1980, 76-82 and Boman 1967, 9-28.
174. Smith 1963, 170.
175. Gerhardsson 1964, 37 f; 88.
176. Cf. Gerhardsson 1964, 20 f.
177. Paul and the evangelists were well aware that the contemporary Jews had a tradition, including several traditions, which they consciously kept alive, cf. e.g. Acts 22:3,
28:17, Mark 7:3-5, 8f; 13 and Matthew 15:2.
178. Cf. Davids 1980, 79-82.
179. Cf. Gerhardsson 1964, 32.
180. Ibid., 22f.
181. Ibid., 25.
182. Cf. Hengel 1981, 63-71 (Jesus the charismatic), and Riesner 1981, 206-275 and Gerhardsson 1961, 225 ff.,
324-335 (Jesus the teacher). Cf. Ellis 1983, 44.
183. See ibid. for examples.
184. Gerhardsson 1964, 27.
185. E.g. Acts 4:8; 5:3; 13;1 ff; 9ff., 16:18; 26:12-24; II Cor. 12, cf. Lk 21:15; Jn 7:38 f.
186. Gerhardsson 1964, 46f. points out that all traditional societies rely on accurate oral transmission of tradition. Thus Israel would have been exceptional if it did not have some oral traditions at this period of a character later called halakic and haggadic.
187. Gal 5:16.
188. See Gerhardsson 1977, 19, 27.
189. Gerhardsson 1964, 27.

190. Cf. ibid., 29.
191. Riesenfeld 1957, 21f.
192. II Cor. 5:17, cf. Gerhardsson 1964, 31.
193. Ibid., 32 f.; 46.
194. M. Smith 1963, 172 ff.
195. Gerhardsson 1964, 33, 37 f.
196. Cf. ibid., 33-35.
197. M. Smith 1963, 173.
198. Gerhardsson 1964, 35.
199. The key tradition concerning the resurrection which Paul repeats in I Cor. 15:3 ff can be found in the gospels, cf. Luke 24:45 f; 34:36, John 20:19 ff and also Acts 2:24. However, not all the traditions clothed in associative wording have been preserved in the synoptic gospels. "Dette ör ett memento, som visar att vi inte can setta något enkelt likhetsteken mellan de jesustraditioner som Paulus ÃverlömnadeÌ til sina fÃrsamlingar i begynnelsen och något av våre synoptiska evangelier eller alle tre tilsammans." Gerhardsson 1977, 27.
200. Ibid., 53.
201. Gerhardsson 1964, 38 f.
202. See the criticism of Gerhardsson 1961 in Davies 1964, e.g. p. 469.
203. Gerhardsson 1964, 91, referring to Gerhardsson 1961, 333 f. Cf. Gerhardsson 1964, 40.
204. The arrangement of the Jesus-tradition among the disciples of Jesus is perhaps a matter of the psychology of memory. On the basis of the Jewish parallel material, one might expect two different methods of grouping; the 'midrashic' and the 'mishnaic'. In the former case, the groupings of the Jesus-traditions would have been based on their association with the consecutive text of the Scriptures (OT), with passages or selections from this text. In the latter, 'mishnaic' case, sayings of Jesus were grouped in more or less extensive blocks, 'tractates'. These were put together for various purposes, for instance at a fairly early stage for the use of missionaries and teachers who went out from Jerusalem. They were arranged on various principles, either factual or mnemo-technical. One can catch glimpses of such 'tractates' in the written gospels. e.g. the instruction of the apostles (or missionaries) in Mt 10 with parallels (par) (cf. Schürmann 1968), the parable tractate in Mk 4 with par, and 'the bread tradition' in Mk 6:31-8:26 with par. See Gerhardsson 1961, 333.
205. See ibid., 335, Gerhardsson 1964, 41 f; 99f. Davis 1980, 90, concludes that the early transmission of the gospel tradition was probably more in writing than Gerhardsson allows.
206. This seems to be in accordance with one of the best established rabbinic precepts, according to M. Smith 1963, 171, that "a saying should always be reported in the name of the speaker."
207. Cf. Gerhardsson 1961, 334 f., Gerhardsson 1977, 51 f.
208. Cf. Gerhardsson 1961, 96 ff and 146 ff. For definitions of 'haggadic' and 'halakic', see note 94 above.
209. Cf. Gerhardsson 1964, 43 f. John seems in key parts to have built upon another branch of the tradition than the synoptics, and reveal a more unrestricted way of communicating the meaning of his material. Cf. Gerhardsson 1977, 53; 50.
210. Ibid., 53.
211. Now and then the evangelists took great artistic liberties in order to convey deeper meanings of certain events, cf. the baptism and temptation of Jesus. For the latter, compare Mt 4:1-11 and Lk 4:1-13. Cf. ibid., 54. Albright

1957, 387, puts it this way: "The characteristics of oral transmission ... appear clearly in the synoptic gospels: tradition has exercised its selective and refining influence, eliminating sayings and stories which did not suit the idea of Christ which the early Christians acquired from the mass of first-hand tradition about Him as well as from their vital religious experience of conversion through faith in Him. In some respects tradition may have idealized; in other respects it just as certainly failed to grasp the true stature of Jesus. The beneficial effect of oral transmission more than outweighs the slight historical loss, through refraction, combination and formation of doublets."
212. M. Smith 1963, 173.
213. Ibid., 176.
214. Cf. Hodne 1973, 192: "Analysene har vist oss at sagn kan bevare replikkene korrekt, da særlig replikker med en viss utforming som er lette å huske og særmerkte i sitt innhold", and Albright 1957, 65 f.: "The ease of success of transmission without the aid of writing depends largely upon the stylistic medium. Here it is generally recognized that the verse form (with its stylistic uniformity) is much better adapted for oral transmission than is any kind of prose".
215. M. Smith 1963, 174.
216. Gerhardsson 1977, 43.
217. Ibid., 44.
218. Ibid., 45 f. E.g.: "Om Jesus pröglade maschaler under sin offentliga verksomhet måste dessa rimligen ha blivit bevarade av hans lörjunger önda från första stund, de måste ha pröntad in dem i minnet och grubblat over dem og diskuterat dem. I annat fall hadde de inte varit hans lörjungarna för påsk?"
219. Cf. Lakatos 1978a, 112; n.2, 149.
220. Cf. Gerhardsson 1964, 40. One of the differences is that the gospel material is predominantly narrative ('Haggada'), while the rabbinic material predominantly expository ('Halacha'; legal religious traditions), cf. M.˘Smith 1963, 173.
221. Davies 1964, 480, agrees. Part of the reason is that 'the Scandinavian hypothesis', contra Gager 1974, 252, provides some information about the initial observers, the social institutions and the culture during the period of oral transmission. Cf. the conclusion regarding Gerhardsson's lasting contributions in Davids 1980, 89 f.
222. Cf. above; ch. 6.2.
223. Cf. Ellis 1983, 45-54.
224. Gerhardsson 1977, 50.
225. Cf. Ellis 1983, 39.
226. 1 Qp Hab 2.7; 7.2, cf. Ellis 1978, 242f. For an English translation of the non-biblical parts of the Dead Sea Scrolls, see Vermes 1966.
227. Cf. above; ch. 7.2.2.
228. Fakultetslektor Oskar Skarsaune made me aware that Justin, in the middle of the second century, likewise expressed expectations of an imminent 'parousia' (return of Jesus): "... there is only a short time left for conversion. If Christ should come again before your conversion, you will weep and repent in vain, for then He will not heed you." Falls 1965, 189 (Dialogue with Tryphon, 28:2).
229. Cf. Gerhardsson 1961, 196 f., and LÆ on-Dufour 1976, 39f., who as an example refers to Eusebius, who, citing a passage from Clement of Alexandria, tells us that when Mark put his gospel into writing, Peter himself was slightly worried, and apprehensive of possible dangers. Still, Gerhardsson's argument for the preference of the oral word as the primary means of transferring the tradition hs not found wide acceptance, according to Davids 1980, 89.

230. Ellis 1975, 306. Cf. e.g. John Robinson 1976, 346, Riesenfeld 1957, 23 and Gundry 1974, 101f.
231. Cf. John Robinson 1976, 346; Ellis 1983, 39f.; Ellis 1978,
247; Gerhardsson 1977, 33 and Davids 1980, 90.
232. Cf. Ellis 1978, 242-247. (New Directions in Form-Criticism: 237-253.)
233. Contra Dibelius 1935, 8: "The issue is concerned with laws which operate in popular tradition. The ultimate origin of the Form is primitive Christian life itself. To understand the categories of popular writings as they developed in the sphere of unliterary people we must enquire into their life and .... into the customs of their worship." My italics.
234. Cf. Ellis 1983, 40, with further references.
235. Cf. Albright 1957, 72 f.
236. Cf. e.g. Bultmann 1963, 3. The Passion story is the only allowed exception to the tradition originally being transmitted as isolated units.
237. Cf. Gerhardsson 1977, 48.
238. Cf. Kösemann 1964, 59: "The synoptic Gospels as we have them today are the product of a tradition which was at least forty years in process of formation and the material of which is composed of very small units. At first it was individual sayings and isolated stories which were handed on; later, these were collected together probably for preaching purposes; this made it possible for the Evangelists, in a third and final stage, to set the appearance of Jesus on earth within a framework of space and time. It is thus quite impossible to extract from our Gospels anything resembling an historical sequence or even a biographical development and all efforts of this were, and remained, flights of fancy." Cf. Schmidt 1919, passim. Bornkamm's position, if not Käsemann and Schmidt's, seems to stand in contradiction to my previous discussion of the gospels as narratives, cf. above, ch. 7.3.2.
239. Ellis 1983, 41. The way the Bultmann School builds upon the two-document hypothesis, by the way, reveals the important, but unfounded presumption that once the period of writing began, the traditions were transmitted and mutually influenced almost exclusively by the processes of literary dependence, as one writer used, copied or altered another. Cf. John Robinson 1976, 346.
240. Gerhardsson 1977, 47 f. Cf. Riesenfeld 1957, 27 f: "It is self-evident that the molding of the tradition ... came about gradually in the life of the primitive Church. The essential point is that the outlines, that is, the beginnings of the proper genus of the tradition of the words and deeds of Jesus, were memorized and recited as holy Word. We should be inclined to trace these outlines back to Jesus' activity as a teacher in the circle of his disciples." If so, there would be a solid historical basis for the ongoing development of a 'wholistic' conception of Jesus' teachings and works. Davids 1980, 90, even concludes that 'the Scandinavian hypothesis' has not gone far enough here: "More of the larger structures than Gerhardsson admists appear to have a Sitz-im-Leben Jesu."
241. Cf. Bultmann 1963, 337-350; 368-374, cf. Bultmann 1974 ,
33-183. This scheme has later been refined into a threestage development in the pre-Pauline church: Palestinian Jewish Jewish Hellenistic Hellenistic Gentile, see Hahn 1963, 11f.
242. Hengel 1972; Marshall 1973 and Marshall 1974, cf. John Robinson 1976; 8, Gerhardsson 1977; 33 and Ellis 1980,
497.
243. Cf. Hengel 1974; Marshall 1973; Ellis 1978, 119; 125; 245 ff.
244. I Mac. 1:14 and II Mac. 4:9-10; Jerusalem Bible 1968, 570;
609.
245. Cf. Albright 1957, 354.
246. See Angus 1975, cf. Albright 1957, 355. According to ibid., 354, "in spite of the fact that it was the Sadducees who first came under strong Hellinistic influence because of their

patrician connection, it was the Pharisees who eventually became more thoroughly Hellenized. In fact, we are hardly going too far if we say that the Pharisaic movement represents the Hellenization of the normative Jewish tradition." Cf. the Pharisees' anthropology and their view of the state after death; Ellis 1980, 497; n. 56.
247. Cf. ibid., 497; Trocme 1973, 7 and Marshall 1973, 275. The Dead Sea Scrolls provide evidence that the Greek OT (LXX) was used in first-century Palestine even among very strict Jews.
248. Cf. Sevenster 1968, especially 96-175. Part of the evidence is all the ossurary and sepulchral inscriptions made in Greek. Cf. Ellis 1980, 447 for further references.
249. Cf. e.g. Marshall 1973, 277 ff, who concludes that the distinction between Aramaic-speaking and Greek-speaking Jews was a fluid one; there was no rigid separation between two different linguistic groups in the Jerusalem church (278f.); the hypothesis of a theological distinction between Aramaic-´and Greek-speaking sections of the Jewish church rests on inadequate grounds (280). If Historic Christianity is correct about this, Semitisms may point to an ultimate background in Palestine or Syria, but correct Greek does not in itself point to a background in the diaspora. Cf. Ellis 1980, 497.
250. Palestinian Jewish Christianity Hellenistic Jewish Christianity Hellenistic Gentile Christianity; Hahn 1963,
11f..
251. Cf. Marshall 1977, 187.
252. Cf. ibid. 172f. Marshall refers Daube 1973, who has shown that Jewish rabbis were held responsible for the behavior and teaching of their pupils. Hence, the fact that Jesus is asked about his disciples' conduct rather than about his own is not a sign of the lateness in the construction of the narrative; on the contrary, if the event had actually happened, this is how it probably would have happened.
253. Cf. Gerhardsson 1977, 29f. and Baasland 1984, 60.
254. Cf. Roloff 1970, 85-88.
255. Only in Acts 7:56, Revelation 1:13; 14:14. Cf. Utnem 1966,183 and Gerhardsson 1977, 36.
256. Notably Wrede 1901, and Bultmann 1974, 26-32.
257. Cf. the discussion of source criticism in relation to general assumptions of how the sources were formed (and developed) in ch. 3.2; above.
258. 'Christ' is the Greek translation of the Hebrew 'Messiah'.
259. Cf. Utnem 1966, 185 f.
260. Cf. Ladd 1975, ch. 6; 60-73, Gerhardsson 1977, 35, and Flusser 1982.
261. See Fuller 1956, passim; cf. Gerhardsson 1977, 33-36; 50. The claim that "the post-Easter interpretation was only a re-discovery of what had already been there in the teaching of Jesus" (Moule 1967, 46) implies that we can know something about when and to what extent Christian reflection took up the enormous implicit claims of Jesus' language, and still more of his actions, and made them explicit. In other words, we should be able to tell what is to be understood as literal history and what is to be taken as creative interpretations "whose points is not to distract from the history, nor again to be taken simply as history, but to draw out the divine significance of the history." John Robinson 1977, 96.
262. Cf. Riesenfeld 1957, 28f. and Vincent 1964.
263. Cf. Bultmann 1963, 127 f.: The Church drew no distinction between such utterances by Christian prophets and the sayings of Jesus in the tradition, for the reason that even the dominical sayings in the tradition were not pronouncements of a past authority, but sayings of the risen Lord, who is always a contemporary for the Church." Cf. Käsemann 1964, 60.
264. See Neugebauer 1962, Hill 1974 and Hill 1979, 146-185.
265. Cf. Hill 1974, 265 ff.

266. Cf. Neugebauer 1962, 219.
267. Cf. Hill 1974, 264.
268. Schürmann 1968.
269. Cf. Käsemann 1964, 60, and notably M. Smith 1956, 94, 95: " In general good sayings went about the ancient world looking for good fathers, and it often happened that they found several. ... Jesus' name may have attracted to itself a number of famous sayings which were current in Judaism of that age." Part of his evidence of inauthentic sayings of Jesus seems to build on Gnostic sources: "Fragments on papyrus of examples from second-century Christianity prove that the Christians went on attributing to Jesus sayings which pretty certainly were not his."
270. Cf. the detailed explanations of certain parables in the gospels.
271. Cf. Hill 1974, 264 and Gerhardsson 1977, 30; 50.
272. Cf. Neugebauer 1962.
273. Cf. Dodd 1970, ch. 3. E.g. ibid., 21f.: "When all allowance has been made for these limiting factors the chances of oral transmission, the effect of translation, the interest of teachers in making the sayings "contemporary", and simple human fallibility it remains that the first three gospels offer a body of sayings on the whole so consistent, so coherent, and withal so distinctive in manner, style and content, that no reasonable critic should doubt, whatever reservations he may have about individual sayings, that we find reflected here the thought of a single, unique leader."
274. Jeremias 1971; ch. 1; 1-41. Cf. Jeremias 1953, where the usage of the Aramaic 'abba' and the Hebrew 'amen' (both of which terms, attributed to Jesus, have been retained in the Greek NT) is related to standard Jewish. According to Jeremias, a significant change has occurred suggesting the creative action of some outstanding individual. The use of 'amen' in the phrase, 'Truly, I say unto you' reflects Jesus' sense of unique authority; while the new use of 'abba' in prayer to God reflects his sense of unique intimacy with God.
275. Cf. Marshall 1977, 198.
276. Gager 1974, 261.
277. Marshall 1977, 198.
278. Cf. Dodd 1936, 128f., V. Taylor 1933, 41 ff; 208, Bruce
1974, 45 f., Utnem 1966, 172 and Gerhardsson 1977, 41. For several relevant citations, see Mc Dowell 1975, 262-267.
279. I shall argue in ch. 8.1.1 and 8.2.2 that the appearances were not visionary in nature, even the appearance to Paul was accompanied by extra-mental phenomena. The appearance to the 500 was thus not understood as a vision or experience that took place only inside the minds of these people.
280. Cf. Trankell 1972, 13-20; P. Thompson 1978, 100 ff. and Kjeldstadli 1981, 66 ff.
281. This question will be dealt with thoroughly below; chs. 8 and 9. Kjeldstadli 1981, 70, by the way, mentions two factors in oral tradition which seem to strenghten the trustworthiness of the resurrection narratives as to the basis of precise memories of what happened at the Passover when Jesus died: "Tidspunkter glemmes, begivenheter stokkes og lignende hendinger trekkes sammen til ett beginvehetsforløp. Dersom noe fant sted i nærheten av private eller offentlige merkedager er sjansene bedre. ... Men det er ikke slik at det er en skala med rutiner som mest pålitelige og enkelthendinger som mest tvilsomme. Vi synes også å feste oss ved det usedvanlige, det oppsiktsmessige, det sjokkartede, det som nettopp brøt med hva en vanligvis opplevde." Remember however, that the Bultmann School does not argue against the factuality of the resurrection narratives on the basis of lack of accurate memory, but because the narratives are believed to be the products of later, legendary constructions.

282. Gager 1974, 253 takes the definition of rumor and legend in Allport & Postman 1947 to "indicate clear parallels between rumor transmission and oral tradition in early Christianity."
283. Allport and Postman express their thesis in the formula "that the amount of rumor in circulation will vary with the importance of the subject to the individuals concerned times the ambiguity of the evidence of the evidence pertaining to the topic at issue." Ibid., 33 f. The same formula is later applied to the amount of distortion in the transmission of rumors, cf. ibid., 44 f.
284. Cf. above; ch. 7.3.3.2. Kjeldstadli 1981, 70, in a slightly different context, puts it this way: "Hvilke handlinger vi husker, er ikke bestemt av antall ganger vi utførte dem, men av hvilken interesse vi omfattet dem med, hvilken betydning de hadde."
285. E.g. Perrin 1969, 71: "Material (as to content) may be described to Jesus only if it can be shown to be distinctive to him, which usually will mean dissimilar to known tendencies in Judaism before him or the church after him." The criterion of dissimilarity is thus used to exclude material which may be authentic, but which the Bultmann School does not accept because, it does not meet its' poisitivistic' standard of accepting hard facts only.
286. This is the radical view of John Gager, and to a lesser degree Rudolf Bultmann and Norman Perrin. Few others within the Bultmann School would go so far, but Gager's argument is consistent given their commonly accepted starting-point.
287. Gager 1974, 260. For Bultmann, another decisive factor in judging authenticity was whether or not an individual saying originally appeared in a futuristic context, or reflects a 'proleptic' (i.e. anticipated) eschatological temper. If it does, it is probably authentic. Cf. Longenecker 1975, 220. The criterion of 'the tendencies of the developing tradition' (cf. Stein 1980, 238-240) is still another criterion, by which the form critics of the Bultmann School used to remove later accretions and modifications of the early tradition by applying certain laws by which the gospel tradition was passed on. Cf. Bultmann 1966, 32-35. E.P. Sanders. however, have shown that such laws never existed, cf. Sanders 1969, 272-275. The synoptic tradition developed in opposite directions, therefore this critierion has to be applied with utmost care and reserve, if at all.
288. Gager 1974, 270 f., cf. Mc Arthur 1965, 218. Compare Käsemann 1964, 45.
289. Cf. e.g. Longenecker 1975, Marshall 1977, 200-211 and to some degree Stein 1980. James Robinson 1959, 99, suggests that a saying which Jesus never spoke "may well reflect accurately his historical significance, and in this sense be more "historical" than many irrelevant things Jesus said." (Compare Bornkamm 1979, 21.) The ambiguity of the term 'authentic' is avoided if the latter is reserved for those words which Jesus actually spoke (and those acts he actually performed). This corresponds to the way I use the term. Cf. Calvert 1972, 209.
290. Cf. Turner 1963, 74 f.
291. For an example of this, see Marshall 1977, 202f.
292. The growing feeling that the synoptic problem is still with us and that the two-source theory is no longer adequate, makes it more difficult to build up a criterion on this basis in the way usually done (Mk, Q, M and L) than previously assumed. Cf. above; note 287 and ch. 7.3.1.
293. Marshall 1977, 204.
294. Dodd 1938, 91-103. For instance, where the same application of one of Jesus' parables appears in more than one gospel, it probably appeared in the source or sources employed by the evangelists. But where it appears in only one of the gospels, it may be considered the work of that writer himself.
295. Cf. Moule 1967, 71 and Mc Arthur 1965, 212.
296. Cf. Calvert 1972, 219 and Moule 1967, ch. 4; 56-76.

297. This is relevant also to the resurrection narratives, where women, whose testimonies generally were not acknowledged in courts of law, were the first to witness both the empty tomb and the risen Jesus.
298. Jeremias 1971, 3-37 and passim. Cf. Turner 1963, 77f. and Black 1967.
299. Calvert 1972, 218, cf. Black 1967, 51.
300. Cf. Sanders 1969, 194 ff.
301. It should be remembered that the ultimate purpose of historical inquiry is not to get down to brute, provable historical facts, but to rationally explain the existing evidence, critically assessed. Cf. above; ch. 3.1. (The interrelatedness of the different criteria is particularly obvious when the criterion of coherence (or; consistency) is related to material established as authentic by other criteria. In this case there is the risk that if any of the latter have been misapplied, the former only compounds the error.)
302. See Calvert 1972, 211-213 for a treatment of different criteria negatively applied. For instance, John Gager proposed the criterion of Aramaism to be used in this way, cf. Gager 1974, 261. But much that was originally spoken in Aramaic and structured along Hebraic lines would invariably have been transformed into more appropriate Greek dress in the proclamation to the Jewish diaspora and among Gentiles. This was done either by early Greek speeking believers or by the evangelists themselves. Therefore, while Semitic elements in gospels written in Greek may be suggestive of an earlier stratum of tradition, the lack of such elements cannot be said to indicate the reverse. Cf. Longenecker 1975, 224. Contra Calvert, Stein 1980, 253, argues that four criteria, with important qualifications however, can be used to argue for the inauthenticity of a saying of Jesus: the criterion of the tendencies of the developing tradition, the criterion of modification by Jewish Christianity, the criterion of environmental contradiction, and the criterion of contradiction of authentic sayings. Cf. Westerholm 1978,
6-7.
303. Cf. Marshall 1977, 207 ff.
304. Historic Christianity claims that as the Christian communities had several traditions in its possession, these were used for different purposes. Difference in form is thus due to difference of function rather than to difference in origin, contra Trocme 1973. The fact that for the most part the essential substance of Mark's account (assuming the two-documentary hypothesis) has been retained by the later evangelists confirms this. Cf. Marshall 1977, 157 f; 210. Remember however, that this explanatory theory is related to the interpretative theory of what is a rational exegesis of the gospels. Within this programme, then, one may affirm that "in the NT itself we have evidence not only of what the sayings of Jesus meant in the situation of his ministry, but also of how they were understood some decades later in the early church." Bruce 1982, 155.
305. This is not to say that other explanations for the rise of early Christianity have not been offered. Gager 1975, e.g., suggests that the main origin and function of the great missionary efforts was to explain and relieve emotional tensions felt by the Christian communities because of the delay of the parousia (the return of Jesus). Cf. Allport and Postman 1947, 49. A rather bizarre theory is offered by Allegro 1970, whose principle thesis is that Christianity is the resurgence of an ancient Mesopotamian cult based on the ecstasy produced by eating a sacred mushroom. (Maybe Allegro is the ultimate source of the aggressive claim which my wife was confronted with as a seventh-grade student, viz. that it was now proven that the NT was written under the influence of drugs!) The evidence for Allegro's theory is based on extravagant etymologies which are far from being convincing, though they would have to be overwhelmingly so to carry weight against much more probable constructions which pay attention to the content of the gospels and the earlier tradition. Cf. Trocme 1973, 9. Bultmann, on the other hand, frankly states that the particular question of the

origin of the resurrection faith is impossible to answer, and in any case rather unimportant: "How the Easter faith arose in individual disciples, has been obscured by tradition and is not of basic importance." Bultmann 1974, 45. Why is it unimportant? Because in existentialist theology the kerygma is independent of history, faith independent of reason.
306. Cf. above; ch. 3.1.
307. See e.g. Herford 1903 and Klausner 1925, 18-46; cf. Goguel
1960, 70-75, and Bruce 1982, 54-65.
308. Quoted from Josephus 1965, 49;51. For my discussion of Josephus, cf. ibid., 49; 496, Goguel 1960, 75-82, Bruce
1982, 32-41, Cornfeld 1982, 188-190 and Schalit 1971.
309. Eusebius 1965, bk. 1; ch.11. It is also quoted in his Demonstration of the Gospel (Dem.ev.) III, 5.105., written somewhat earlier.
310. Quoted in Bruce 1982, 38. Cf. Origen 1953, II, 13, and Origin: Commentary on Matthew, X, 17.
311. Jewish War, III; 392-408; Josephus 1981, 209-212.
312. Josephus 1965, 497.
313 If it had been a Christian interpolation it would, in all probability, have been more laudatory of James, cf. ibid.,
495; 497.
314. The Agapius text, as quoted in Cornfeld 1982, 189, runs like this: "At this time there was a wise man who was called Jesus. And his conduct was good, and (he) was known to be virtuous. And many people from among the Jews and the other nations became his disciples. Pilate condemned him to be crucified and to die. And those who had become his disciples did not abandon his discipleship. They reported that he had appeared to them three days after his crucifixion and that he was alive; accordingly he was perhaps the Messiah concerning whom the prophets have recountered wonders."
315. Bruce 1982, 40 f. Cf. the conclusion of Louis H. Feldman in Josephus 1965, 49.
316. Cornfeld 1982, from a non-Christian, Jewish standpoint, takes the Agapius-text to support the idea that Josephus was familiar with the Christians' resurrection faith, and even knew that this tomb was empty: "What no one has yet pointed out is the remarkable fact that Josephus does not seek to scotch the resurrection claim by any information at his disposal that Jesus' body still lay in his grave. Certainly this is an argument from silence, but the silence is especially eloquent in view of Josephus' known habit of roasting false Messiahs elsewhere in his books." Ibid.,
184.
317. Josephus 1981, 397-401.
318. Cf. Bruce 1982, 42-53, especially 44 f.
319. Cf. Goguel 1960, 82-91, especially 90 f.
320. An example of the opposite position is found in Josephus
1981, 396 f., where G.A. Williamson argues in favor of the authenticity of the Slavonic additions (as well as the Testimonum Flavianum). If correct, Williamson's argument would be of great value to Historic Christianity, but such a typical exponent of this programme as F.F. Bruce states that "it is as certain as anything can be in the realm of literary criticism that they (the Slavonic extracts) were not part of what Josephus wrote at all." Bruce 1982, 42. Oscar Cullmann, on the other hand, suggests that there might well be a kernel of reality underlying them; see Cullmann 1957, 49.
321. The summary nature of the evidence of Josephus is less astonishing considering that he does not name a doctor like Hillel, nor makes any allusion to the Jewish heretical schools. Cf. Goguel 1960, 81, n. 1.

322. There is no question of Messianism in what Josephus says about John the Baptist; see Jewish Antiquities 18, fi
117-119; Josephus 1981, 81-85.
323. Cf. Perry 1959, 48. Williamson suggests that the Slavonic additions to The Jewish War correspond to the first Greek version of the original Aramaic to which the preface refers, published before AD 79 in Titus' reign and followed in Domitian's reign by a considerably revised second edition, forming our present Greek text. See Josephus
1981, 396.
324. Jewish Antiquities, XVIII, 6.4; Josephus 1965, 107 f. The scholars who have made this identification did not perceive the interest which the evidence of Thallus possesses for the history of the Christian tradition. In consequence, their proposed identification can hardly be suspected of having been constructed to meet the needs of Christian apologists. Cf. Goguel 1960, 92.
325. C. Müller 1849, 517-519. Abridged English translation in Goguel 1960, 91.
326. Mistakenly, according to Julius Africanus, since a solar eclipse could not take place at the time of the full moon, and it was at the season of the Paschal full moon that Christ died. Cf. Strauss 1970, 787.
327. Cf. Goguel 1960, 93.
328. Cf. Stroll 1969, 214, referring to Gibbon 1952, II, ch. XV, 69 f. One explanation, which favors the suspectability of the Thallus-fragments in Julius Africanus, would thus be that Pliny the Elder did not know of any such tradition, simply because it is a later legendary creation of the Christian communitites. Another one, countering the former, would be that Pliny did not mention it since he knew, as an expert, that it could not have been an eclipse because of the particular time it took place. Cf. n. 326; above.
329. British Museum Syriac MS. Additional 14, 658. The relevant passage is quoted in Bruce 1974, 114, and Bruce
1982, 31. The date of the ms. is seventh century; the letter itself is probably from the second or third century.
330. Pliny the Younger 1981, 293-296: Book 10.96-97.
331. Cf. Goguel 1960, 94.
332. Ch. 15:44. The relevant passage runs like this: "To suppress this rumor (which accused him of having set fire to Rome), Nero fabricated scapegoats and punished with every refinement the notoriously depraved Christians (as they were popularly called). Their originator, Christ, had been executed in Tiberius' reign by the governor of Judaea, Pontius Pilatus. But in spite of this temporary setback the deadly superstition had broken out afresh, not only in Judaea (where the mischief had started), but even in Rome. All degraded and shameful practices collect and flourish in the capital." Tacitus 1959, 354.
333. Justin Martyr took it for granted that Pilate's report was filed somewhere in the imperial archives. In his First Apology, dated c. AD 150 and addressed to the emperor Antonius Pius, he refers to "the 'Acts' which were recorded under Pontius Pilate." (Ibid., 35. 7-9, cf. 48.3 and
38.7; see Falls 1965) in order to support what he says about the miracles and the Passion of Christ. The matter is far from certain, however. It is quite possible that in the eyes of Pilate the verdict passed on Jesus and his execution were simply an administrative act incurred in the discharge of the duty of policing Palestine, of which he was in no way bound to render an account. And Jesus was an 'alien'; a person who did not possess the status of Roman citizenship. Besides, Pilate has been accused of having regularly put to death, time after time, people whose sentence was even illegal (Philo: Legatio ad Cajum, 38, cf. Goguel 1960, 100). On the general background of the anxiety of the procurators to prevent their administration from being considered brutal (or weak), Pilate in particular can not be expected to have

reported to Rome anything which might reveal his fraudulent and brutal transactions. The existence at Rome of a report concerning the death of Jesus thus remains at least problematical. Cf. ibid.
334. The remarks about Christ in Tacitus' passage may have been drawn from a documentary source, since there is no word like 'dicunt' or 'ferunt' being used, which would have justified that Tacitus was speaking from hearsay. Cf. ibid., 95.
335. Cf. ibid. As to the suggestion that Tacitus made use of Josephus' Jewish Antiquities, the differences between the passage in Josephus and that in Tacitus are too great to suppose that the one might have been the source of the other. Josephus says that the death of Jesus did not cause the faith of his disciples to break down; according to Tacitus Christianity vanished for a time after the death of its founder. Assuming the authenticity of Antiquities XVIII, 3.3; fi63-64, Josephus' attitude towards Christianity is on the whole favorable; that of Tacitus is wholly contemptuous. Finally, Tacitus uses the word 'Christ' as a proper name, while Josephus knows that the leader of the sect was called Jesus, and that the word Christ carried a particular dignity. Cf. ibid., 96.
336. Stroll 1969, 215.
337. In Acts 18:2 we are told that when Paul arrived in Corinth (c. A.D. 50), he found there "a Jew named Aquilla, a native of Pontus, lately coming from Italy with his wife Priscilla, because Claudius had commanded all the Jews to leave Rome."
338. Ch. V: Life of Claudius; pt. 25. In his Life of Nero; Suetonius 1962, 217, (ch. VI, pt. 16), he mentions the persecution of the Christians, but without saying anything about him whose name they bore: "Punishments were also inflicted on the Christians, a sect professing a new and mischievous religious belief."
339. Cf. Goguel 1960, 98. Robert Graves, who translated Suetonius 1962, likewise notes in the text that 'Chrestus' means 'Christ', see ibid., 197; n.1.
340. See Bruce 1982, 20.
341. The "foreign supestition" with which Pomponia Græcina (the wife of the conqueror of Britain, Aulus Plautius) was charged in AD 57 (Tacitus 1959, 288; 13:32) was probably Christianity. This is, according to Bruce 1976 , 137 f., supported by the evidence of early Christian cemeteries in Rome. Hence, when the accused Christians were distinguished enough, the police records became part of history.
342. Cf. Goguel 1960, 98 f.
343. See Bruce 1982, 17f., cf. Dodd 1938, 42.
344. This is a disputed claim, cf. Gager 1975, Pagels 1981 and especially Wilken 1972, e.g. 33.
345. Avrum Stroll, on the other hand, uses this silences as an argument against the evidential value of Josephus' references to Jesus, see Stroll 1969, 213.
346. Sherwin-White 1963, passim. Cf. ibid., 191 f: "The impression of a historical tradition is nowhere more strongly felt than in the various accounts of the trial of Christ, analysed in Roman terms ... Consider the close interdependence of Mark and Matthew, supplementing each other even in particular phrases, yet each with his particular contribution, then Luke with his more coherent and explicit account of the charges and less clear version of the activity of the Sanhedrin, finally John, who despite many improbabilities and obscurities yet gives a convincingly contemporary version of the political pressure on Pilate in the age of Tiberius."
347. Cf. ibid., 186 f.
348. Cf. ibid., 187 f: "The story of his (the emperor Tiberius, the contemporary of Christ) is known from four sources, the Annals of Tacitus and the biography of Suetonius, written some eighty or ninety years later, the brief contemporary record of Velleius Paterculus, and the third century history of Cassius Dio. These disagree amongst themselves in the wildest possible fashion, both in matters of political action or motive and in specific details of minor

events. Everyone would admit that Tacitus is the best of all the sources, and yet no serious modern historian would accept at face value the majority of the statements of Tacitus about the motives of Tiberius. But this does not prevent the belief that the material of Tacitus can be used to write a history of Tiberius. The divergences between the synoptic gospels, or between them and the Fourth Gospel, are no worse than the contradictions in the Tiberius material." Sherwin-White likewise refers to the similarities between the internal synoptic divergences in the four narratives of the trial of Christ in the NT, and those that Roman historians meet in the study of the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus, cf. ibid., 188.

349. See Finley 1966, 27 ff., cf. Sherwin-White 1963, 189 f.

350. See e.g. Finegan 1969, Keller 1977, 281-341 and J.A, Thompson 1972, 291-444. Cf. Cornfeld 1982, passim.

351. This can not be claimed for Haas 1970 and Tzaferis 1970 however, cf. below; note 355 and ch. 8.2.1. Another possible exception is the question regarding the enrolment referred to in Luke 2:1-6, which forms the background for Jesus' birth in Bethlehem, not Nazareth. Three questions in particular are raised by Luke's account. First, could a census have been held by the Roman Emperor in Judaea at a time when Herod ruled that territory as a nominally independent king? Second, is there evidence of such an empire-wide enrolment at that time? Third, would such a census have involved the return of every householder to his original home, as Luke implies? Bruce 1982, 192-194 claims there are evidence to answer all of these questions in the positive. As to the third, he refers to a papyrus document of A.D. 104 from Egypt preserving a decree of the prefect of Egypt embodying just such a direction for householders in his province. As such evidence is most easily preserved in Egypt, the practice need not have been confined to Egypt. Nevertheless, even if Bruce was proven right in his opinion, a historian belonging to the opposite research programme could again simply state that "even if all the problems here could be solved, it would merely be incidental to the central part of the narrative." (H. Turner 1963, 35.)

352. Cf. McArthur 1965, 210.

353. In the following I take the descriptions from Wild 1984 and Weaver 1980. The important books include (chronological-wise) Wilson 1978, Stevenson and Habermas 1981, Heller
1983 and Tribbe 1983. Wild is the only author here who argues directly against the authenticity of the shroud as a burial garment of Jesus. He also has a bibliography of valuable articles on the shroud; Wild 1984, 46; n. 2.

354. Heller 1983 is primarily an account of how the blood tests were conducted, and how he and Alan Adler analyzed the results and reached their conclusions. The conclusion seems to be that no test so far decrees that the 'blood' is not blood. On the other hand, a number of tests suggest that it could be.

355. Cf. e.g. Wild 1984, 32, and Stevenson/Habermas 1981, ch. 3 and 4; 41-68. One example: In 1932, the French surgeon Pierre Barbet sought to verify the anatomical accuracy of the marks on the shroud by experiencing with cadavers. He quickly learned that nails in the palms will not support a man's body. On the other hand, a nail in the wrist or forearm will not tear out. This knowledge made the case for the shroud's authenticity seem stronger. For the mark of the nail on the shroud image is not in the palm, as it is traditionally seen in paintings of the crucifixion, but in the wrist area. A medical hoaxer would presumably have based his image on what he had seen in paintings and on the fact that the gospels speak of nail holes in the hands. He would not likely have known that the Greek word for hand, 'cheir', can include wrist and forearm as well. Although the Romans put many thousands of victims to the cross, no skeletal remains were known until the unearthing of a cemetry in Jerusalem in 1968. In one ossuary archeology found the bones of a man named Jehohanan. The nail driven into the right arm had left a clearly defined scratch and worn place on the inside of the radius, close to

the wrist. Archeology had thus confirmed that this part of the medical evidence of the shroud's image is correct. See Tzaferis 1970 and Haas 1970.
356. Cf. Wild 1984, 43 f.
357. "The image of the shroud is very faint. For the naked eye the optimal viewing distance is about six to ten feet away; closer up the image blurs and dissolves. The eye of the camera, on the other hand, tends to enhance the actual light-dark contrasts and to produce a clearer-than-life image. But the photographic image that clarifies can also deceive." Ibid., 44.
358. For a list of their methods, see Weaver 1981, 750.
359. Weaver names all the members and their profession in his article.
360. Two auxiliary hypotheses to support the authenticity of the shroud as external evidence confirming the reliability of the NT portrait of the death of Jesus: In 1902 a French biologist theorized that myrrh and aloes; spices used with oil in ancient burial rites, might sensitize burial garments. He knew that morbid sweat from a tortured body produces urea, which in time gives off ammonia vapor. This vapor, he reasoned, would cause the impregnated cloth to turn brown. He tried an experiment and succeeded; he produced an image of sorts. Thus the 'vaporograph' theory was born. In Pliny the Elder, a reference was found to the use of a substance called 'struthion' (a soapwort), for washing and softening fabrics. Through experiments it was seen that saponaria-treated swatches schorched much more rapidly and deeply than the untreated samples. Thus, if the shroud had ever been washed with saponari, it would have been rendered quite susceptible to scorching. Saponaria is a toxic to lower forms of life and is a fungicide. That, perhaps, can explain why the shroud shows no obvious mold or mildew despite having been kept for long periods in damp and musty churches.
361. The bloodstains present a series of problems related to the fact that their outline is so clear and precise and that they flow in the wrong direction. Accordingly, to accept the shroud as authentic one must argue that Jesus' body was not washed before burial and that the shroud therefore reflects blood flows that occurred mostly before Jesus' death on the cross. Even if we accept as a fact that this is correct, and Wild is hesitant to do so (cf. Wild 1984, 39-40), we must then also suppose, given the fact that the bloodstains are precisely defined, that the nails were pulled from Jesus' hands and feet and that his body was then taken down from the cross, carried some distance to the tomb and laid upon the linen shroud, which was wrapped around the body together with large quantity of spices (John 19: 39-40), all without smearing or rubbing the bloodstains. For Wild, this stretches credibility to the breaking point.

8. A SOURCE-CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE NT RESURRECTION MATERIAL

The evidence concerning the historical Jesus suggests that the NT tradition is better thought of as "a resonably solid mass with fuzzy edges" (Marshall 1977, 241), than a cloud of shifting composition and uncertain size. In ch. 9 I hope to build upon this conclusion, and ask the question what historical explanations may be postulated by a historian to account for the rise and development of the (bodily) resurrection faith.

But before that, I need to take a closer look at the resurrection material in the NT. Elaine H. Pagels, for instance, claims that the gospel narratives are divided even on the key point of the nature of the resurrection. In her view, some accounts insist on a historical, bodily resurrection, whereas Mark and partly Luke lend themselves to different interpretations.1 Is this an example of the NT resurrection tradition being so diverse that it is incapable of being reduced to unity? Or can all key aspects be harmonized, and their diverse accounts be seen as evidence for the literary independence of the gospels, suggesting that the points on which they agree are likely to be all the more trustworthy?

Again, the question concerns the relationship between theological proclamation and historical facts. Did the authors of the texts want to give information about certain past events in order that faith might be awakened through these events (Historic Christianity)? Or were the writers of the texts issuing a call to faith through certain information which they presented (Bultmann School)?2 The difference is subtle, but crucial. According to the former perspective it is only because of the fact that Jesus is physically risen from the dead that one may undertake the venture of faith in him, whereas to the latter perspective people are invited to undertake the venture of faith in Jesus because he did not remain among the dead but is alive however on may care to think of this as taking place.

To Historic Christianity, it is not essential to belief in the resurrection that the witnesses be faultless, but the whole case is gravely impaired if they can be shown to be seriously unreliable.3 Not necessarily so to the historians of the Bultmann School, however. To them,4 resurrection faith is not a matter of believing in the historical accuracy of the NT resurrection material, but of believing the proclamation which these narractives, for all their diferences and inconsistencies, enshrine. The gospels and I Cor. 15 can not be read as direct accounts of what happened, nor as historical documents for proof of the resurrection. They are theological documents using the resurrection story to convey theological and apologetic teaching.

Christian faith is thus cut loose from the belief that certain things happened, such that the women found the tomb empty and that the disciples saw Jesus risen from the dead. In other words, the reality of the resurrection is separated from the supposedly factual information of the texts, what they are talking about. At the same time it is made inseparable from the testimoty itself: the factuality of the testimonies as such. This means that in considering the resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Bultmann School is not considering a unique and finished, identifiable fact of the past, but a present reality: whether it is seen as the eschatological importance of the cross (Bultmann), a way of saying that the cause of Jesus continues (Marxsen), or a new way of relating to God where faith becomes as investment in a community that shares the capacity of creating new visions or images of a meaningful life.

Basic theological concerns are thus quiding the historical research of the resurrection. To Historic Christianity, the Bultmann School is confounding cause and effect. The eschatological importance of the cross, the new way of relating to God or the fact that the cause or activity of Jesus continues are all dependent on the factuality a historical proposition: that Jesus physically rose from the dead. In other words, something happened between God and Jesus on Easter Day, and not only between God and the disciples, i.e. the production of their faith. The disciples' faith is the result of their seeing the risen Jesus, not identical with that seeing.5 But if so, it becomes relatively important whether the resurrection material is historically reliable or not, since Christian faith necessarily is tied to historical events.

The physicalism of the gospels's portrayal of Jesus' resurrection body probably accounts more than any other single factor for critical scepticism concerning the resurrection narratives. Consequently, scholars whose positions on this point belong to the Bultmann School have either denied the historical resurrection altogether, or they have interpreted the risen body of Jesus to be of a spiritual, non-physical nature. The resurrection thus does not entail an empty tomb, since the spiritual body is altogether independent of the old 'earthly' body of Jesus and the appearances have to be understood as some sort of visions, narrated in metaphorical language.6 The key source to be considered here is the apostle Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians, chapter 15.

8.1 I Corinthians 15

The authenticity of I Cor. has seldom been doubted even by very sceptical scholars. It was written c. AD.55,7 and so has usually been held, at least prior to John Robinson 1976, to antedate the gospels by one or more decades. Its treatment of the resurrection is thus regarded as of particular importance.

Writing from Ephesus, Paul reminds the Corinthians of the traditions which he had delivered to them when he had established the community there in A.D. 49-51: "First and foremost, I handed on to you the facts which had been imparted to me: that Christ died for our sins, in accordance with the scriptures; that he was buried; that he was raised to life on the third day, according to the scriptures; and that he appeared to Cephas,8 and afterwards to the Twelve. Then he appared to over five hundred of our brothers at once, most of whom are still alive, though some have died. Then he appeared to James, and afterwards to all the apostles. In the end he appeared even to me." (I. Cor. 15: 3-8.)

Paul could have received the formula9 at any time or place between his conversion near Damascus A.D. 3310 and his arrival in Corinth c. A.D. 49. According to Gal. 1:18f he was in Jerusalem three years after his conversion. It is hardly conceivable that he should have received the formula any later than this, for it contains the names of the two leaders, Cephas (Peter) and James, whom he saw on that visit. These leaders of the Jerusalem church would surely have shared the basic kerygma, including the formula, with Paul, regardless of whether he knew it from Damascus or not. If Jesus' death is to be put in the year 30, then Paul would have been in Jerusalem c. six years after the events. The statements in I Cor 15 are thus very close to the events themselves, and even more so as he uses formulations coined previously.11 Even if the formula does represent a Hellenized form, the substance of the tradition goes back to the earliest Aramaic-speaking church.12 The assumption that appearances of the resurrected Jesus were really experienced by a number of members of the

earliest Christian community and not freely invented in the course of later legendary development thus has good historical foundation.13

8.1.1 Paul and the Nature of the Resurrection Body.

The key point here, however, is not whether or not it is possible to correlate the Pauline list with the gospel appearances. The first question is how Paul, who himself claims to have seen the risen Jesus, understands the nature of Jesus' appearance(s). The evidence for this is found in the rest of I Cor. 15 which deals with the resurrection of Christian believers; a resurrection patterned on the resurrection of Jesus (cf: Phil. 3:21f.; Rom 8:
11), and in Acts, where Jesus' appearance to Paul is recounted three times (9:1-19, 22:3-16; 26:9-23).

The Bultmann School claims that Paul's information, in contrast to the gospels, indicates that Jesus possessed a purely spiritual resurrection body. One of the arguments of their reasoning14 is that Paul equated the appearance of Jesus to him with the appearances of Jesus to the disciples.15 Since the appearance of Jesus was a non-physical appearance,16 the resurrected Christ, as he was manifested to the other disciples, is thus a spiritual, nonphysical body.

Regarding the non-physicality of the appearance to Paul, appeal is made to the accounts in Acts where the appearance is interpreted as a visionary experience. In all three accounts, however, it is accompanied by extra-mental phenomena; the light and the voice, which were experienced by Paul's companions. The Bultmann School dismisses these as due to Luke's objectifying tendencies.17 Historic Christianity counteracts by pointing out that Luke's concern was to objectify the pre-ascencion, not the post-ascencion appearances. If Luke had no tradition that included Paul's companions, then one would have expected another vision like Stephen's (Acts
7:55-56), lacking extra-mental phenomena. Besides, if Luke had invented the extra-mental aspects of the appearance to Paul, he would have been likely to be more consistent and not construct such discrepancies, as that Paul's companions heard and did not hear the voice, Acts 9:7; 22:9 (Luke is generally considered the author of Acts as we have it). Thus, an appeal to the accounts of the appearance to Paul in Acts can hardly be made a proof that the appearance was purely visionary in nature.

Paul himself gives no firm clue as to the nature of Christ's appearance to him, but when he speaks of his "visions and revelations of the Lord" (II Cor. 12:1-7), he does not include Jesus' appearance to him. Paul and the early Christian community as a whole were familiar with religious visions and sharply differentiated between these and an appearance of the risen Lord.18

Since there are reports of religious visions of the exalted Christ (cf. Stephen's vision and the book of Revelation) and of appearances which lacked the element of commisioning (the Emmaus disciples, the 500 brethren), Historic Christianity19 claims that the distinctive difference between an appearance and a vision of the risen Christ is that whereas the former involved extra-mental phenomena; that something actually appeared, the latter, even if caused by God, took place purely inside the mind.20

But suppose the appearance to Paul was purely visionary, what grounds are there for believing that Paul equated the appearance of Jesus to him with the appearance of Jesus to the disciples? The Bultmann School appeals to the fact the Paul places himself in the list of witnesses of the appearances; hence, the other appearances must also have been visionary like his own. To Historic Christianity this does not seem to follow. First, in placing himself in the list of witnesses, Paul does not imply that the foregoing appearances where the same sort of appearance as the one to him. He is concerned with who appeared, not how. Second, Paul is not trying to put the appearances to the others on a plane with his own. He is rather trying to level up his own experience to the objectivity and reality of the others. This is reasonable in view of the fact that Paul's detractors doubted or denied his apostleship.21 To have seen the risen Jesus would thus be an important argument in his favor.22 If his opponents tended to dismiss Paul's experience as a mere subjective vision, not a real appearance, Paul would be likely to explicity include himself with the other apostles as a recipient of a genuine, objective appearance of the risen Lord.23

The second main argument for a purely spiritual resurrection body of Jesus relates to I Cor. 15:35-57 where Paul discusses the resurrection of Christian believers, equating their future resurrection bodies with Jesus' resurrection body (15:20). He sums up his argument by saying, "sown as an animal body ('soma psychikos'), it is raised as a spiritual body (soma penumatikon)" (15:44). The Bultmann School takes this to mean that the believers' resurrection bodies, and therefore also the resurrection body of Jesus, are non-corporeal. The truth of this conclusion, however, depends upon how one defines Paul's key anthropological terms 'soma' (body; vs. 74), 'sarx' (flesh; vs. 39) and 'psyche' (soul; animate being; vs. 45).

During the nineteenth century, under the influence of philosophical idealism, theologians interpreted the 'soma' as the form of a thing and the 'sarx' as its substance.24 In this way they could avoid the objectionable notion of a physical resurrection, for it was the form that was raised from the dead endowed with a new spiritual substance.25 Even if this understanding now has been abandoned, the Bultmann School still avoids the idea of a physical resurrection. Under the influence of existensialism they take 'soma', when used theologically, as the whole person conceived abstractly in terms of personal identity or self-understanding.26 Thus, 'soma' does not equal the physical body, but the person. A bodily resurrection therefore means, not a resurrection of the physical body, but of the person; the 'I'; the ego.

Historic Christianity, on the other hand, has argued that existentialist treatments of 'soma', as much as idealist treatments, have been a hindrance to accurate historical-critical exegesis of I Cor
15 and have sacrified theology to a philosophical fashion that is already passÆ.27 In a major work on the subject, Robert H. Gundry concludes that 'soma' is never used in the NT to denote the whole person in isolation from his physical body, but is much more used to denote the physical body itself, or the man with special emphasis on the physical body.28 This is not to say that the word cannot be used as a synecdoche to refer to the whole man by reference to a part,29 nor does it preclude metaphorical use.30 What it precludes is an ego, an 'I', or a 'person' abstractly conceived apart from the body.

'Sarx', or flesh, is sometimes used to denote the evil proclivity within man.31 One should be aware, however, that to disassociate from any doctrine that the flesh as a morally evil principle will be resurrected is not to deny a bodily resurrection as such, since Paul often uses 'sarx' in a non-moral sense simply to mean the physical flesh or body. I Cor. 15:39 is an example of this, where he speaks of the flesh of birds, animals and fish, which would be

absurd in a moral sense. Hence, understood in a physical sense, the resurrection of the 'sarx' simply means the resurrection of the body.

The third term 'psyche' or soul, lies at the root of 'an animal body' in I Cor. 15:44 ('soma psychikos'), denoting our present mortal bodies. It is more often translated as 'a physical body', making the complete sentence appear quite favorable to the Bultmann School: "It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body." The translation is misleading however, if interpreted as 'It is sown a corporeal body, it is raised a non-corporeal body.' As a matter of fact, the Greek word 'psychikon' has no equivalent term in English. Its root word 'psyche' means soul, or life, but the physical, corporeal body is not made of 'psyche'; it is a body animated by 'psyche'. In the same way the resurrection body will not be made of 'pneuma'; spirit. 'Pneuma' to Paul is God's 'pneuma'; the Holy Spirit. The resurrection body will be one which is completely animated and empowered by the Spirit of God. Hence the contrast is not between physical body/non-physical body, but between naturally oriented body/spiritually oriented body.32 As Paul in his teaching on the resurrection contemplates no release of the soul from the prison house of the body, Historic Christianity proposes another translation of I Cor. 15:44 which is more in line with the structure of his thought: 'It is sown a natural body, it is raised a supernatural body.'33

In 15:50 there is a phrase which on the surface looks like a clear anomaly to Historic Christianity: "Flesh and blood can never possess the kingdom of God, and the perishable cannot possess immortality." Does not this clearly indicate that the resurrection body will be immaterial? No, it does not. Paul is not speaking of anatomy here; 'flesh and blood' is a typical Semitic expression denoting the frail human nature.34 It emphasizes that mortal human beings cannot enter into God's eternal kingdom, therefore they must become imperishable (15:50b, cf. 15:53). This imperishability does not connote immateriality or unextendedness however.35

There is thus no contradiction between the evidence of Paul and that of Luke and John, whose gospels most clearly emphasize the physical character of the appearances of Jesus. Luke, for instance, reports the risen Jesus as saying: "Look at my hands and feet. It is I myself; no ghost has flesh and bones as you can see that I have." (Luke 24:39-40.) The Bultmann School claims this is completely against Paul; the first and oldest witness.36 In fact, Paul speaks of 'flesh and blood', not 'flesh and bones'. The difference is significant, since the former is a Semitic expression for mortal human nature and has nothing to do with anatomy. But neither is 'flesh and bones' meant to be an anatomical description. Rather, proceeding from the Jewish idea that it is the bones that are preserved and raised,37 the expression connotes the physical reality of Jesus' resurrection. The point of Jesus' utterance, according to Historic Christianity, is to assure the disciples that this is a real resurrection, in the proper, Jewish sense of that word,38 not an appearance of a bodiless spirit.39 Though it stresses corporeality, its primary concern is not on the constituents of the body. Thus, neither Paul nor Luke are talking about anatomy here. Still they agree on the physicality and the supernaturalness of Jesus' resurrection body.

Thus, we may conclude, like Historic Christianity does, that the physicalism of the gospels cannot be explained away as a late legendary or theological development. On the contrary, what we see from Paul is that it was there from the beginning:40 The assertion of the Bultmann School that these aspects are the result of an anti-docetic41 apologetic is furthermore at odds with I Cor

15:35, which seems to imply that it was the crass materialism of resuscitation of corpses that Paul's Corinthian opponents could not accept. So Paul found it necessary to emphasize the transformation of the earthly body into a supernatural body. An anti-docetic apologetic, however, would have been counterproductive.

As to the gospel narratives, there are other reasons to think that they have not been influenced by an anti-docetic bias. First, for a Jew the very term 'resurrection' necessarily entailed a physical understanding. Therefore, when the earliest believers claimed that Jesus was risen and had appeared, they had to understand this in physical terms. There was no other way to express to themselves, nor to their fellow Jews, that they had encoutered him. It was Docetism, as a later reaction of as a theological and philosophical reflection, which was the response to this physicalism, not the other way around.

Second, if the report of purely spiritual appearances had been original, it is difficult to see how physical appearances could have developed. The offense of docetism having been removed, the doctrine of physical appearances would nevertheless have been counter-productive as an apologetic, both to Jews and pagans. It would have no effect on Jews because they did not accept an individual resurrection within history,42 nor to pagans because their belief in the immortality of the soul could not accomodate the crudity of a physical resurrection. The church would therefore have retained its narratives of purely spiritual appearances, if these were primary.

Third, docetism was mainly aimed at denying the reality of the incarnation of Christ,43 not the physical resurrection. According to Irenaeus,44 some docetists even held that after the Spirit had deserted the human Jesus at the crucifixion, the human Jesus was left to die and then be physically raised. An anti-docetic apologetic aiming at proving a physical resurrection therefore misses the point.

Fourth, the demonstrations of corporeality and continuity in the gospels do not evince the rigorness of an apologetic against docetism. Neither Luke nor John portay the disciples or Thomas as actually accepting Jesus' invitation to touch him and prove that he was not a spirit, in contrast to Ignatius who explicitly does so.45 As an anti-docetic apology, the gospel narratives would probably have had to do more than picture Jesus' merely showing the wounds. Physicalism was rather a natural presupposition of these accounts; revealed in an incidental, off-hand manner.46

In conclusion, I agree with Historic Christianity that the critical argument of the Bultmann School designed to drive a wedge between Paul and the gospels is fallacious. Neither the argument from the appearance to Pual nor the argument from Paul's doctrine of the resurrection body serves to set Paul against the gospels. Quite the opposite, Paul's evidence confirms the gospel's narratives of Jesus' bodily resurrection. The authenticity of their physicalism, as primary historical reports, is historically wellfounded.47

8.1.2 Paul and the Empty Tomb.

If Historic Christianity is correct about the sources portraying a physical resurrection, then both Paul and the evangelists naturally presupposed that Jesus' tomb was empty. But why then is Paul, the presumable earliest witness, silent about the empty tomb? Why doesn't he mention the visit of the women to the tomb on Easter morning which we find in all the four gospels?

One of the auxiliary hypotheses of the Bultmann School is that if Paul had believed in the empty tomb, then he would have mentioned it explicitly, either in the kerygmatic formula of I Cor
15:36-5,48 or in the second half of I Cor 15.49 The fact that he does not is thus ample evidence that Paul's resurrection faith is wholly independent of an empty tomb; i.e. he probably assumed that the body of Jesus remained in the tomb.50 I will return to the kerygmatic formula later, but independent of whether or not it indirectly implies a knowledge of the empty tomb, Historic Christianity tries to digest whatever abnomalies there are, and even turn them into positive evidence where possible.

The Bultmann School's claim that the silence of the empty tomb in the second half of I Cor 15 is an instructive omission, since the empty tomb would have been a knock-down argument against those who denied the bodily resurrection, is turned back upon the same programme.51 For if Paul did not believe in the empty tomb, and if he knew of the claim that Jesus was physically resurrected (implying an empty tomb), which is likely given the general Jewish notion of what a resurection meant, then why did he not mention the (allegedly) purely spiritual appearance of Christ to him as a knock-down argument for the immateriality of Christ's resurrection body? To reply that Paul did not appeal to his vision because the meeting eluded all description,52 does not work, since Paul elsewhere described that he saw a heavenly light and heard a voice.53 In fact the very ineffability of the experience would have been a positive argument for immateriality, since a physical body is not beyond all description.

Besides, Paul's intention in I Cor 15:35-56 is not to prove that the resurrection body was physical. That was presupposed by everyone and was probably what the Corinthians recoiled at. He wants to prove that the body is in some sense spritual, i.e. transformed. Hence, a mention of the empty tomb would be beside the point since this issue touches upon the physicality of the resurrection body. Neither is he trying to convince the Corinthians that the Lord was risen. He is only reminding them of that which they already believed.54 There would thus be no reason to mention the details of the empty tomb here, but good reason to appeal to his vision, which he does not do.

In order to interpret Paul as asserting belief in the resurrection but not implying self-evidently that the tomb was empty, the Bultmann School has to establish two things. First, in contemporary Jewish thought there existed a possible understanding of a resurrection without an emptying of the tomb. Second, Paul in his thought stood in relation to those Jewish circles that had a conception of the resurrection that does not require an empty tomb. These two requirements have not been met. And as long as they are not, Historic Christianity is correct to assume that Paul, as a Jew of his time, counted on the emptiness of the tomb, whether he knew the Jerusalem tradition of the tomb or not.55

If Paul believed in the empty tomb, however, it is likely that he became acquainted with its tradition when he spent two weeks in Jerusalem three years after his conversion56, staying with Peter two weeks and also speaking with James. This may be so, even if Paul never did refer to this tradition, even implicitly.It was possible to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ without explicit reference to the women's story. But it was not possible to preach his resurrection without, indirectly or directly, also asserting his tomb being empty. In Rom. 6:4, for instance, Paul compares Christian baptism to being buried with Christ, "so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in the newness of

life."57 And Luke even tells us that Paul in his preaching referred specifically to the sepulchre of Jesus.58

But let us return to the formula of I Cor 15:36-5 and ask whether it in some way bears witness to the tradition of Jesus' empty tomb. As mentioned earlier, the position of Historic Christianity on Paul's belief in the empty tomb is independent of this question. Nevertheless, it would obviously be strengthened if the formula can be shown to indirectly refer to the empty tomb.59

Som exegetes have maintained that the statement of the formula 'he was buried' implies, standing as it does between the death and the resurrection, that the tomb was empty.60 Other have argued that the burial does not stand in relation the resurrection, but to the death, as in the common phrase, 'he died and was buried,' and as such serves to underline and confirm the reality of the death of Jesus.61 One may ask, however, why Paul should go out of his way to say that Jesus was buried in order to confirm the reality of Jesus' death when dead men normally are buried. Nevertheless, the close connection between the death and burial is evident in Rom. 6:3, where to be baptized into Christ's death is to be baptized into his burial. But in baptism the burial looks forward with confidence to the rising again; as in Rom 6:4 and Col 2:13.

The empty tomb thus seems to be implied in the sequence of events related in the formula, if not in the 'he was buried' clause itself.62 For in saying that Jesus died was buried was raised appeared, Paul automatically implies that the empty grave has been left behind.63 The four-fold 'hoti' ('that') serves to emphasize equally each of the chronologically successive events, thus prohibiting the subordination of one event to another, e.g. the burial to the death.64 And even if one denied the authenticity of the chronological sequence, e.g. by arguing that 'hoti' is here used simply to combine different, otherwise unrelated traditions,65 the very idea that a dead-and-buried man was raised itself implies an empty grave.

A second possible reference to the empty tomb is the phrase 'on the third day' (v.4). As no one actually saw the resurrection of Jesus, how could it be dated on the third day? Historic Christianity argues that it was on this day that the women found the tomb empty, so the resurrection came to be dated on that day. Some of its exponents thus argue that the phrase 'on the third day' not only pressupposes that a resurrection leaves an empty grave behind, but is a reference to the historical fact of Jesus' empty tomb.66

While there are other ways to interpret this phrase,67 the serious atternative seems to be the theory that 'the third day' is a purely theological code word. It is not an ordinary time-indicator, but a theological interpretation indicating God's salvation, deliverance and manifestation; referring to the term between the final disaster and the dawn of final salvation as in Jewish apocalyptic literature. The evidence is primarily taken from the LXX (the Greek translation of the Hebrew OT c.200 B.C.), Jewish' Midrash' (commentary on, or exegesis of Scripture) and other rabbinical literature, which then is taken to illuminate I Cor. 15:4.68

The dates of the citations from Talmud and Midrash, however, are hundreds of years behind the NT period. The suggestion that these citations embody traditions that go back orally to the Christian era does not fit the fact that these motifs are conspicuously absent in Jewish literature contemporary with the NT; viz. the Apocrypha and the Pseudoepigrapha. Historic Christianity may therefore claim with some assurance that the third day motif or the

association of the resurrection with the third day is a pecularity of later rabbinical exegesis of the Talmudic period. Moreover, there seems to be no indication that the NT writers were aware of such exegesis.69

The interpretive 'fact' of the Bultmann School that 'the third day' phrase is no time-indicator is clearly tied up to the presupposition that the gospel traditions concerning the discovery of the empty tomb and the first appearances are false, historically speaking. For if these traditions are accurate, then the events of Easter morning could not but have had an effect on when the early believers thought the resurrection had taken place. On the other side, it is just as clear that the interpretative 'fact' that 'the third day' phrase do refer to the empty tomb is connected with the presupposition that these gospel traditions are thought to be credible.

I will discuss the two presuppositions in some detail in ch.
8.2.1, but even if the former is correct, there is still something to be said for 'the third day' being a precise time indicator. Luke certainly understood it in this way, for he writes "But on the Sunday morning (or: On the first day of the week) .... That same day ... this is the third day since it happened ... the Messiah is to suffer death and to rise from the dead on the third day." (Luke 24:1; 13;21;46.) The response of the Bultmann School is that Luke as a Gentile did not understand the theological significance of the third day, which would have been clear to his Jewish contemporaries, and so mistook it as a time indicator.70 But there is hardly any evidence to warrant the isolation of Luke from all his Jewish comtemporaries. Besides, John too takes the three day figure as a time indicator by contrasting it with the 46 years it took to build the temple (John 2:20).

This suggests that our sources assume that the historical events of Easter provided the basis for dating the resurrection. The women are reported as finding the tomb empty 'on Sunday morning/ the first day of the week,' but the language of the 'third day' was adopted because the first day of the week was in fact the third day subsequent to the crucifixion, and because the third day in the LXX was a day of climax and of God's deliverance.71

Consequently, the phrase 'on the third day' in the formula of I Cor 15 is a time indicator for the events of Easter, including the empty tomb, employing the language of the OT concerning God's acts of deliverance and victory on the third day.72 The phrase is thus a fusion of historical proposition plus theological interpreation. All of this implies that although the empty tomb is not explicitly mentioned in the early Christian kerygma of I Cor 15:3-5,it is nevertheless implied. For a historian trying to account for the resurrection faith, this is obviously of some importance.

8.2 The Gospel Narratives.

The question of the dating and authorship of the gospels have been dealt with earlier, in ch. 7.2.2 and 7.2.3. At this point something needs to be said about the general problems attached to their resurrection narratives. The evangelists' Easter stories, both the stories about the tomb and the stories about the appearances, have presented substantial difficulties as the four accounts differ from each other to an astonishing degree. The basic question is whether we are dealing with historical accounts, or at least accounts with an historical core (Historic Christianity), or whether we are dealing with legends, which express beliefs in the form of narratives (Bultmann School). Are the Easter stories a product of Easter faith or its historical origin?

First, how is a historian to account for the diversities in the resurrection narratives? The subtantial degree of variation suggests that there were multiple traditions available, probably in the form of separable units. 73 What then is the origin of these multiple traditions? To the Bultsmann School,74 the diversity of the accounts is the result of the diversity of early Christian communities; their different theological needs (e.g. missionary preaching, catechesis, worship) as well as the different bearers of the underlying tradition, which for a quite long time (up to c. AD 70-100) was in a fluid state. As the recounting of the resurrection narratives changed greatly in form and substance over the years, the details and sequence of these stories are therefore seldom of historical worth. They are legendary additions. Changes introduced by one evangelist when using the work of another are seen as dogmatically motivated and can therefore be left out of consideration for a historical inquiry.

Historic Christianity agrees that the tradition lying behind the resurrection narratives must be supposed to have been from the first manifold, rich in variety, complex, and maybe not even wholly consistent in detail.75 The peculiar elements which we note in one gospel and another are no doubt in part due to development under the influence of detecable motifs. At the same time many (if not all) of the pecularities are remnants of an original, authentic complexity, rather than of later legendary accretions.

The whole matter is seen in a different way if we adhere to the protective belt of Historic Christianity. The gospels are taken to be apostolic in origin, even if not apostolic in actual authorship, and stemming from witnesses who worked together for a good many years and who in many cases participated in the same events they wrote about. The choice of words of the various evangelists was conditioned by their knowledge of the historical facts, and statements by one evangelist, if true, were bound to limit or fill out the statements made by another.76

This issue of interdependence and independence between the gospels was discussed in ch. 7.3.1. under the heading of the synoptic problem. The disagreement between our two programmes on this question is carried over to the resurrection narratives. Are we dealing with reports from four different witnesses, more or less interrelated (Historic Christianity), or are we basically dealing with two primary sources, viz. Mark, who knew nothing of the appearances (Matthew and Luke being later, secondary alterations and expansions), and John, who reveals a long process of transmission, and is not an eye-witness testimony (Bultmann School77)? From the point of view of Historic Christianity,78 it is unwarranted to dogmatically assume that because one writer made use of the work of another (Matthew or Luke vs. Mark), his alterations and additions are therefore simply inventions out of his own head. He may have had other firsthand sources of information, and in some cases he may even have been an eyewitness himself. Although source-critical rules seen in isolation tend to make historians sceptical on this point, the question has to be addresed on a general background of the formation and transmission of the involved sources. In this case then (cf. ch. 7.2 and 7.3), the problem is more open.

In any case, the resurrection accounts show that Matthew and Luke go their own ways, forsaking their Markan source, in spite of their general adherence to the Markan pattern. In the two brief passages where Matthew and Mark are parallel (Mt. 28:1; 5-8), there are only a few words reflecting interdependence.79 As the empty tomb tradition probably is to be included into the pre-Markan passion story (cf. below; ch. 8.2.1.1), it is also noteworthy that C. H. Dodd have presented cumulative evidence which shows that the Johannine version of

the passion narrative represents an independent strain of the common tradition, differing from the strains of tradition underlying Mk, Mt. and Lk., though controlled by the same general schema. Its apparent contacts with the Jewish tradition, and the appreciation it shows of the situation before the great rebellion of AD 66, make it prob able that this tradition was formulated, substantially, before that date, and in Palestine.80 Where its data differ from the synoptics, they thus deserve to be treated with respect.

As the resurrection narratives, at least partly, represent distinctly different traditions and present such diverse accounts, the points at which they agree are likely to be all the more historically reliable. It is noteworthy that it is the general schema, or pattern, that is common to the different traditions, and not a residuum left after the elimination of all peculiarities in one gospel or another.81 In other words, these (primitive?) traditions concur with another in their testimony to the main events, viz. that on the first day of the week Mary Magdelene and/or certain women found the tomb empty, and then were either told or else dicovered that Jesus was alive. Later, also the male disciples saw their risen Lord, either in Jerusalem or in Galilee or both (cf. below; ch. 8.3).

Can a harmony of the different accounts be constructed? Although the vast majority of scholars depict this as an impossible task, others argue that it is not.82 Perhaps a better way of posing the problem, more in line with the general historical method advocated in ch. 3.1, is to ask how we can account for the plan adopted by each evangelist. The two research programmes give different answers to this question.

The basic assumption of the Bultmann School83 is that the accounts reveal such severe problems that the events of Easter morning cannot longer be reconstructed. This can be accounted for, however, since the evangelists had to work from the existing units of tradition without any clear knowledge of how they fitted together. Neither did they know the accounts given in all the three other canonical gospels. Their plan was thus to establish the supposedly correct order in a complete account, the best way they could. Both in view of the time gap (auxiliary hypothesis: c.35-70 years) between the death of Jesus and the writing of the gospels, and of the 'fact' that the tradition included later, legendary additions, it is easy to see why the different accounts lack both in consistency and historical credibility. The stories of the tomb, e.g. even if they are quite old, were not connected with the tradition of the appearances until much later.

Historical Christianity,84 as already stated, finds it reasonable to assume that the evangelists had access to firsthand apostolic information, stemming from witnesses who worked together for many years. In such a situation these writers were not likely to attempt a leisurely account of the whole history of the resurrection. They were more like advocates in a court of law, with limited time and space, trying to summon the most telling evidence. Being able to confine themselves to what served their particular purpose, they omitted a multitude of details and qualifications irrelevant to that purpose, no matter how important they may have been in other connections. This explains the diversity of their accounts. Whereas the empty tomb stories necessitate the intricate interweaving of four overlapping, but largely independent accounts, the difficulties of the accounts of the appearances are not due to overlapping, but to intense compression. (John and Acts both stress that much is left out: Jn 21:25, Acts 1:3).85

If we want to discover the actual course of events, we must therefore synthesize and arrange the material. In this way we give the texts a fair chance of showing their worth, by working on the supposition, even if only as an experimental exercise, that the evangelists may have got

their facts right, and see what happens. This is one of the basic ingredients in the protective belt of Historic Christianity (cf. below; ch. 6.2), viz., from the basis of a certain perspective on the origin and transmission of the gospel tradition (cf. ch. 7.2 and 7.3) to start with what these sources say, and then criticize them and to reject what appears to be improbable. The burden of proof should thus rest on those who from the beginning reject the statements in these sources.86 (Note the specific background; I do not think this burden of proof-principle should be applied in general regardless of one's idea of the formation and transmission of the relevant sources.)

Whether these gospel sources are worthy of such a method needs to be seen. The Bultmann School, which would rather assume their untrustworthiness until otherwise proved, flatly states that to synthesize the texts on the hypothesis of a prior selection by the authors "proves completely untenable, ... if we are prepared to take the texts as they stand." (Marxsen 1979, 71.) As the texts stand, however, the empty tomb stories are prior to the accounts of the appearances. If Historic Christianity is right about the nature of the resurrection (cf. above, ch. 8.1.1.); viz. that the physicality in the accounts are primary aspects in the sources, then the stories of the empty tomb could well belong to the earliest strata of the tradition.

Whereas the Bultmann School looks upon these stories as a result of later, legendary additions,87 Historic Christanity argues that even if the empty tomb was not an essential part in the earliest kerygma, and even if there was a tendency in the historical development of the tradition to draw the two complexes of the empty tomb and the appearances closer together to an increasing extent, the empty tomb nevertheless remained an undisputable fact. Without this fact the kerygma of the risen Christ would be discredited at once. The chronological sequence remains self-evident if the sources have any historical worth whatsoever. I shall therefore first deal with the narratives of the empty tomb.

s. 169: Kopi av skjema over The Variant accounts of Resurrection Appearances
i R. Brown 1968, 793.

8.2.1 The Empty Tomb

The gospel texts of Mk. 16:1-8, Mt. 28:1-8, Lk. 24:1-12 and Jn. 20:1-13 are well established in their critical text.88 The only significant question arises in connection with the so-called "Western non-interpolations" of Lk. 24:3, 6, 9 and 12.89 The authenticity of these verses have been questioned in whole or in part. Although it was fashionable in the early part of the century to dismiss them as scribal additions, their presence in the more recently discovered second-century papyrus P75 have made many re-think this position. The latest critical edition of the Greek NT; Nestle-Aland 1979, have thus accepted these verses as part of the authentic text of Luke. I shall consider them in the same way.

The empty tomb narrative shows sure evidence of traditional material in the agreements between the synoptics and John.90 It is certain that the traditions included that on the first day of the week women, at least Mary Magdalene, came to the tomb early and found the stone taken away. They saw an angelic appearance, they informed the disciples, at least Peter, who went, found the tomb empty with the grave clothes still lying in the grave, and returned home puzzled. The women saw a physical appearance of Jesus shortly thereafter, and Jesus gave them instructions for the disciples. Not all the synoptics record all these traditions, but John does, and at least one synoptic gospel confirms each incident. Thus, given John's probable

independence from the synoptics, these incidents are traditional. Whether they are historical is another question.

8.2.1.1 Textual Context

The context of the empty tomb tradition is important here insofar as its inclusion into the pre-Markan passion story would further strengthen its early dating. Not surprisingly, Historic Christianity affirms this inclusion,91 while the Bultmann School denies it,92 claiming independence of the tomb passage from both the passion story and the accounts of the appearances.

The latter programme points to two reasons which indicate the original independence of the tomb visit and the burial narrative. One of them is the purpose of the women's visit to the tomb on Easter morning. The question is whether some of the gospels depict the women as coming to the tomb in order to complete the burial by anointing the body of Jesus. If yes, this would seem to clash with the burial narratives which do not indicate anything lacking in the manner of the burial, and where John even speaks in detail about the spices (19:39-40). Historic Christianity, on the other hand, concludes either that there seems to be no indication that the women were going to complete Jesus' burial (Craig 1981, 184), or, that the anointing motif does not clash with the burial narratives (Wenham 1984, 65-67). In both cases the consequence is that the argument for the independence of the tomb stories falls. To substantiate this claim I refer to my treatment of the purpose of the women's visit, below; ch. 8.2.1.4, in its chronological setting.

The other argument concerns the Markan triple list of the women who witnessed the crucifixion (15:40: Mary of Magdala, Mary the mother of James the Younger and of Joseph, and Salome, and several other women) and the burial (15:47: Mary of Magdala and Mary the mother of Joseph), and later went to the tomb (16:1: Mary of Magdala, Mary the mother of James and Salome).93 To the Bultmann School, the repetition of the names with variations in the two consecutive verses (15:47 and 16:1) indicates the independence of the empty tomb story (starting at 16:1) from that of the burial (ending at 15:47). 15:40-41 is seen as a harmonizing, later addition, built upon an isolated piece of tradition.94

But the latter verses, which first name the women, cannot be an independent piece of tradition, since it makes sense only in its context. Neither can these verses be editorially constructed out of 15:47 and 16:1 because then the appellation 'the younger' is inexplicable, as is the fusion of what would normally designate the wife of James and the wife of Joseph into one women; the mother of James and Joseph. But if 15:40-41 are part of the pre-Markan tradition, then so are probably 15:47 and 16:1. For rather than repeat the long identification of Mary in 15:40, the tradition names her by one son in 15:47 and the other in 16:1; thus 15:47 and 16:1 actually presuppose each other's existence. And their juxtaposition is by no means a useless duplication. The omission and re-introduction of Salome's name suggests that the witnesses to the crucifixion, burial, and empty tomb are being recalled here.95 At the very most, therefore, the argument of the Bultmann School could only force Historic Christianity to explain one or the other of the lists as an editorial addition. But it can not serve to break off the empty tomb story from the passion narrative.

But neither does this conclusion of itself show the interdependence of these two narratives. However, positive reasons do exist for such a position. The empty tomb story is tied to the

burial story by verbal and syntactical similarities.96 More important is that it seems unthinkable that the passion story could end in defeat and death with no mention of the empty tomb and the resurrection. The passion story is incomplete without victory at the end. A further confirmation of the inclusion of Mk 16:1-8 in the pre-Markan passion story is the remarkable correspondance to the course of events described in I Cor 15: died was buried rose appeared. All these elements appear in the pre-Markan passion story, including Christ's appearance (Mk 16:7).97

8.2.1.2 The Time of the Visit of the Women

At what time did the women arrive at the tomb? The four reports run as follows: Mt: "The Sabbath had passed, and it was about daybreak on Sunday, when Mary of Magdala and the other Mary came to look at the grave" (28:11). Mk: "Very early on the Sunday mor ning/the first day of the week, just after sunrise, they came to the tomb" (16:2). Lk: "But on the Sunday morning/the first day of the week very early they came to the tomb" (24:1). Jn: "Early on the Sunday morning/the first day of the week, while it was still dark, Mary of Magdala came to the tomb" (20:1).

Although it is unusual that all the evangelists should give the chronological detail of the day of the week, it is even more surprising that each should more precisely determine the time of the day for the approach of the women to the tomb of Jesus. The testimonies show a fairly close agreement ("about daybreak", "very early ..... just after sunrise", "very early", "while it was still dark") except for Mark, who has the appearance of contradicting himself.98 In the ancient world "very early" would hardly describe what we understand by "just after sunrise". Nowadays sunrise denotes the moment when the upper limb of the sun appears to be on the horizon, which is broad daylight. In biblical usage, however, sunrise means break of day.99 So Mark is not contradicting himself, he is referring to a time when day had broken.

Bode offers another explanation, contradictory to the firstone:100 Often in the gospels when two time references are given in what looks like a pleonasm, the second is intended to determine more exactly the first. Thus the two time phrases in Mk 16:2 would combine to mean the morning after sunrise. If Bode is right, however, he would have to apply the same general observation to Matthew. Instead he presents the two time designations in this source as a problem. The first phrase; 'opse sabbaton', can be understood as both 'late on the Sabbath' and 'after the Sabbath'. The second phrase; 'about daybreak on Sunday' would thus according to Bode's general observation indicate that the first phrase is taken to mean 'after the Sabbath'. Yet Bode concludes that "Matthew apparently sets the visit to the tomb in the spring twilight that followed the official close of the Sabbath at sunset". (Bode 1970, 12f.)

If Matthew was using the solar calender (day beginning at sunrise), the meaning of 'opse sabbaton' is clear, namely; late on the Sabbath when the sky was beginning to grow light on the first day of the week, i.e. shortly before dawn on Sunday. If he was using the lunar calender (day beginning at sunset), the general observation of NT time references again points to the translation of 'opse sabbaton' into 'after the Sabath'. In either case, there is no discrepancy between Mt and the three others.

The distinctions between Matthew's "about daybreak", Mark's and Luke's "very early" and John's "while it was still drk" are perhaps too fine to be noteworthy. Darkness and light are relative terms and it would be perfectly possible, and not inaccurate, for one person to

describe the time "about daybreak" which another described as "still dark". In any case, it needs to be remembered that it could have been undeniable dark on the women's departure and undeniably light on their arrival, depending on the distance they walked.101 This brings up the question of the precise number of the women who visited the tomb, and, possibly, whether they went in separate groups, from different places.

8.2.1.3 The Number of the Women

There is clear divergence among the four gospels as to the number of the women who made the visit. Matthew names two: Mary of Magdala and the other Mary (28:1). Mark lists three: Mary of Magdala, Mary the mother of James, and Salome (16:1). Luke says the women were Mary of Magdala, Joanna, and Mary the mother of James, and they, with the other women (plural), told the apostles (24:10). John gives only one name; Mary of Magdala (20:1).

It is possible that there are different ways of naming the same person by different evangelists.102 A key to the identification of Matthew's 'other Mary', Mark's 'Salome' and John's 'Mary wife of Clopas' (19:25) is to be found in the descriptions of the women at the crucifixion given in the same gospels. If the three women identified in Matthew and Mark and the three women mentioned in John (besides the mother of Jesus) are the same, we get the following descriptions: (1) Mary of Magdala: so called in all three gospels. (2) One called by Matthew: 'the mother of the sons of Zebedee' (27:56); by Mark: 'Salome' (15:40), by John: 'Jesus' mother's sister' (19:25). (3) Mary, called by Matthew: 'the mother of James and Joseph' or 'the other Mary' (27:56;61;28:1); by Mark: 'the mother of James the younger and of Joseph' (15:40) or 'the mother of Joseph' (15:47) or 'the mother of James' (16:1); and by John: 'wife of Clopas (19:25), the brother of Joseph, Jesus' mother's husband.103

The fourth woman mentioned explicitly is 'Joanna'; in Luke only. According to Lk 8:3 she was the wife of Chuza, a 'steward'104 to Herod Antipas, ruler of Galilee and Peraea. As Herod was in Jerusalem at this time (Lk 23:7), Joanna and Clopas were thus living at the royal residence; the Hasmonean palace, when Jesus was crucified. Luke listed Mary of Magdala, Mary the mother of James, Joanna and other women. It is reasonable that one of the other women was Salome,105 but this still leaves one unnamed woman to account for. A possible guess is the well-to-do 'Susanna' who is linked with Joanna in Lk 8:3, though there is no means of verifying this conjecture.106

Two groups of women among those associated with the life of Jesus can thus be identified, namely, those associated with the family of Jesus and those who were converts. Among the former are Mary the mother of James the younger and Joseph (sister of Joseph the foster-father of Jesus), Mary the wife of Clopas (sister-in law of Joseph) and Salome (sister of Mary the mother of Jesus).107 Among the converts would be Mary of Magdala, Joanna and Susanna.

There seems to be no difficulty in imagining a handful of women going to the tomb.108 Even John records Mary's words as "we do not know where they have laid him" (20:2). Semitic usage could permit the first person plural to mean simply 'I' (cf. Jn 3:11; 32), but not only does this seem rather artificial in this con text, we would then also have to expect the plural in v. 13, where 'I' is used. In any case, this ignores the synoptic tradition and only makes an isolated grammatical point. When we have independent traditions that women visited the tomb, then the weight of probability falls decisively in favor of Mary's 'we' being the remnant

of a tradition of more than one woman. John has perhaps focused on her for dramatic effect, maybe because it was Mary alone who ran on ahead, to tell Peter and the 'beloved disciple' of the empty tomb (20:2).

This would be the 'soft' solution of Historic Christianity, possibly somewhat compatible with a 'soft' hypothesis of the competing programme; viz. that the women's names reflect a diversity of tradition rotating around some fixed names such as Mary of Magdala and the other Mary.109 The Bultmann School, however, would deny any justification of a 'hard' solution by Historic Christianity of the problem of the number of the women.110 Such a solution has been offered in a careful harmonization of the different accounts, which is too detailed and complex to fully discuss here.111 Its conclusion, however, is that two distinct groups came to the tomb. The first one consisted of Mary of Magdala, the other Mary and Salome, coming first from Bethany (the two Mary) via John's house in Jerusalem (with Salome). In the other group, who arrived a bit later, were Joanna and Susanna (?), having departed from the Hasmonean palace in Jerusalem.

In order for the Bultmann School to reject such an explanation without a detailed critique of its argument, it has to refer to "the established methodological principles and conclusions of the past four decades of gospel research." (Bode 1970, 26: n.1.)112 These principles presuppose that the gospel texts do not reach directly to the events described because of later developments in the Christian communities as well as because of editorial work. However, the same principles are not likely to be considered as 'established' by the other research programme, which through its use of the same problem-solving techniques, viz. form and redaction criticism, reaches a far more positive conclusion as to the historical reliability of the gospel texts (cf. ch. 7). In such a view, any informed attempt of harmonization, involving some detective work for hidden clues afforded by apparently insignificant details of the text,113 needs to be considered seriously. Even if any harmonization remains a conjecture, such a conjecture if successful, would nevertheless be strong evidence against any argument presupposing gospel discrepancies.

8.2.1.4 The Purpose of the Visit

Mark begins the story of the empty tomb by relating that when the Sabbath was over, the women bought aromatic oils intending to go and anoint the body of Jesus (16:1). Luke implies the same purpose of the visit (23:56; 24:1). Matthew simply states that the two Mary "came to look at the grave" (28:1). John likewise gives no special motivation of the visit, but does record that the anointing took place at the time of the burial (19:39-49).

The women's intention to anoint the body has caused an endless controversy. As mentioned earlier, it is often assumed that the women were coming to finish the rushed job done by Joseph and Nicodemus (Jn 19:39) on Friday evening. This is said to be inconsistent with the statements in Mk 15:46 and Jn 19:39-40, according to which the body was carefully buried, along with the huge quantity of dry spices bought by Nicodemus.114

The problem has been challenged by Historic Christianity in two ways, either by accepting or rejecting the motive of the women just mentioned. Accepting the motive, but rejecting the discrepancy with the burial narrative, John Wenham115 proposes that on his return from Pilate, Joseph of Aritmathea took urgent counsel with Nicodemus and the women present about what to do in the short time before nightfall and on the onset of the Sabbath. In the

ordinary way the body would have been washed and anointed with perfumed oils before being dressed in a clean outer garment. But since there was clearly insufficient time to do all this, Joseph probably agreed to get a large linen cloth from the market to wrap the body in (Mk 15:46), and Nicodemus to get a liberal supply of dry spices to pack around the body to act as a partial anti-putrifacient as a temporary measure, while the women agreed to return to the tomb at the first possible moment after the Sabbath was over to anoint the body properly.

William Lane Craig,116 on the other hand, rejects the idea that the women were about to complete a burial task poorly done. To him Mark gives no hint of hurry or incompleteness at the burial. That Luke says the women saw 'how' the body was laid (23:55) does not imply that they saw a lack which they wished to remedy. It merely means that they saw it was laid in a tomb, not buried in a common grave in the ground, as was customary for criminals, thus making possible a visit to anoint the body. Such a motive would not contradict the burial narratives, unless one sees the women's purpose as completing the burial itself. Instead, what the women were probably doing, according to Craig, was precisely that simple act of devotion which otherwise is described in the Mishnah, namely the use of aromatic oils and perfumes that could be rubbed on or simply poured over the body.

Another possibility is that the women primarily were following the Jewish custom of reconfirming the death of a relative within three days after burial (cf. Cornfeld 1982, 176). According to Mishna Semahot, 8; "one should go to the cemetry to check the dead within three days and not fear that such smacks of pagan practices; it once happened that a (buried) man was visited and went on to live another twenty-five years." This regulation shows that it was customary to go and verify that the buried was really dead; for as burial followed death so qucikly, errors might sometimes occur. Besides, graves were not filled with dirt, as today, but only blocked with moveable boulders. It is not impossible that the practice became customary even when the fact of death was known with complete certainty.

Without giving any verdict here as to which of these theories are right or wrong, my point is that there seems to be ample evidence for Historic Christianity to digest the anomaly of the alleged discrepancy between the anointment motif and the burial accounts, simply by modifying, increasing or complicating the auxiliary hypothesis in its protective belt.

There are other questions connected with the purpose of the women's visit, however. It is often said that the Palestinian climate would make it impossible to anoint a corpse after three days.117 This would then explain why Matthew and John leaves out the anointment motif. But Mark and Luke, who also lived in the Mediterranean climate, would surely also have realized this fact, if true. In fact Jerusalem, being 700 meters above sea level, can be quite cool in April. It is interesting to note the entirely incidental detail mentioned in Jn 18:18 that at night in Jerusalem at that time it was cold, so much that the servants and officers of the Jews had made a fire and were standing around it warming themselves. When we add to this the information that the body, interred Friday evening, had actually been in the tomb only a night, a day, and a night when the women came to anoint it early Sunday morning, that a rock-hewn tomb in a cliff side would naturally stay cool, and that the body may have already been packed around with aromatic spices, one can see that the intention of the women to anoint the body should not be ruled out in advance.118

The argument that Jesus had been anointed at Bethany prior to the passion story (Mk 14:3-9), rendering any further anointing superfluous,119 is turned into positive evidence of the

historicity of the women's motif, simply by arguing that Mark would thus have had little reason to invent a second and superfluous anointing by the women.120

The same devotion which led the women to visit the tomb could further have induced them to go to try to open the tomb together, despite the size of the stone. That Mark only mentions their worry of the stone on their way to the tomb (16:3) does not mean that they had not thought of it before, as the Bultmann School claims.121 The obvious reason of mentioning it in 16:3 is that it serves a literary purpose here to prepare for 16:4 (their discovery of the stone already having been rolled away).

As to the alleged Jewish repugnance for tombs and ritual abhorrence for things associated with death (which should make the women's motif event more unlikely),122 it was Jewish practice, as already noted, to open tombs to allow visitors to view the body or check against apparent death.123 The women's intention was not extraordinary. It is true that anointing could be done on the Sabbath,124 but this was only for a person lying on the death bed in his home, not for a body already wrapped and entombed in a sealed grave outside the city. It would have been against the Jewish law even to carry the 'aromata' to the grave site, for this was 'work'.125 Thus, Luke's comment that the women rested on the Sabbath (23:56) would probably be a correct description.

8.2.1.5 The Guard at the Tomb

While the women rested, Matthew reports of certain events taking place elsewhere; "Next day, the morning after Friday, the chief priests and the Pharisees came in a body to Pilate. 'Your Excellency,' they said, 'we recall how that impostor said while he was still alive, "I am to rise after three days". So will you give orders for the grave to be made secure until the third day? Otherwise his disciples may come, steal the body, and then tell the people that he has been raised from the dead; and the final deception will be worse than the first.' 'You may have your guard,' (or: 'You have a guard') said Pilate: 'go and make it secure as best you can.' So they went and made the grave secure; they sealed the stone, and left the guard in charge." (27:62-66.)

Later, after Matthew has told about the empty tomb: the earthquake, the angel and Jesus appearing to the women, he continues his story of the guard: "The women had started on their way when some of the guard went into the city and reported to the chief priests everything that had happened. After meeting with the leaders and conferring together, the chief priests offered the soldiers a substantial bribe and told them to say, 'His disciples came by night and stole the body while we were asleep.' They added, 'If this should reach the Governor's ears, we will put matters right with him and see that you do not suffer.' So they took the money and did as they were told. This story became widely known, and is current in Jewish circles to this day." (28:11-15.)

The distrust of the Bultmann School of the story of the guard seems to be based upon two points.126 (1) The story bears marks of being apologetic in character and was therefore constructed at a later time. (2) The story is improbable in itself and is inconsistent with the ascertained realities of the situation.

In 27:64 the implication seems to be that the first deception of Jesus was his claim to be the Messiah. The Bultmann School denies any such pre-Easter Messiah-proclamation, as well as

any pre-Easter predictions of Jesus' resurrection (27:63).127 Consequently, this is evidence that the whole story is a post-Easter insertion into the tradition. In ch. 7.3.3.4, however, I have shown that such assumptions about the formation of the gospel tradition are challenged with success from the competing perspective of Historic Christianity. I see no reason to grant any value to the same assumption here.

It is clear from 28:15 that the story functions as a defense against the Jewish claim that the disciples stole the body. As Matthew was particularly written to be used by Jewish Christians, it is understandable why the story of the guard at the tomb is only mentioned here. It thus has an apologetic character, but is it also a legend? As a piece of Christian apologetic, the story of the setting of the guard is quite remarkable. It bristles with apparent improbabilities at every point. The Sabbath visit to the governor, the great earthquake, the flashing angel rolling back the stone, the reporting to the chief priests instead of Pilate, the bribe of soldiers to tell the tale that they were asleep on duty, all this seems to invite incredulity, not belief. Having introduced the useful apologetic idea of a closely guarded tomb, why would the evangelist give such an obvious handle to the opposition by hinting that the guards did not do their job? Besides, a guard which could be bribed to say that the disciples stole the body while they slept is no more reliable than an honest guard which really did drop off to sleep. And if they slept while the disciples stole the body, their testimony is really only an inference; a conclusion which could be drawn just as well without them. At whatever date it was written,128 this seems like a worthless piece of Christian apologetic, unless it simply happened to be true.

The second point concerns the claim that the members of the Sanhedrin (the Jewish council) took such alarm that even though it was Sabbath they sent a deputation of Pharisees and Sadducees to Pilate. How does Historic Christianity account for this remarkable move? Since Jeremias'129 researches into the exceptions permitted to the Sabbath law one should not attach too much weight to this apparent breach of the Sabbath, but the approach to Pilate still calls for an explanation.130

The position of the Jews in relation to the remains of Jesus was peculiar, and in a certain sense delicate. Although he was a Jew and had been prosecuted at the instance of the Jewish leaders, the punishment and sentence was Roman. Technically, the body of Jesus was Roman property and the disposal of it a Roman concern.131 Had any unruly demonstrations taken place, either at the place of crucifixion or of the subsequent burial, the governor, not the Jewish leaders, would have had the responsibility to suppress them, if necessary by armed force. But the body of Jesus had again become a Jewish responsibility by the wholly unforeseen act of Joseph of Artimathea in asking for its custody. So, if the chief priests were unable to prevent the burial of Jesus in Joseph's tomb, then we can readily understand their desire to gain control over the situation as soon as possible by risking a further interview with Pilate to obtain a detachment of soldiers to serve as guard, despite the earlier rebuff over the wording of the superscription on the cross (Lk 23:28; Jn 19:19-22).

The Jewish authorities seem to have had a deep underlying fear of Jesus. It was not only that they had feared an uprising by the people, which Jesus could easily have provoked at the time of excitement (cf. Mk 11:1-16 par.), but they probably also feared Jesus' own powers, as his reputation as a miracle-worker was well known. They had arrested Jesus only after Judas had brought them the news that Jesus was ready to accept death (Lk 22:4-6; Mt 26:20-25). And if there is any historical truth whatever in the report of the tearing curtain of the temple and the three-hour darkness that fell over the land in the afternoon when Jesus was crucified (Mt. 27:45; 50-51, Mk 15:33, Lk 23:44-45),132 this would have strengthened

the concern of the Jewish leaders to avoid the consequences of a successful plot to simulate a resurrection. This concern, however, is not dependent on the facticity of the reported signs at the time of Jesus' death.

From the viewpoint of source criticism, it is at best questionable and at worst totally irresponsible to accept as historically established a statement like "the graves opened, and many of God's people arose from sleep; and coming out of their graves after his resurrection they entered the Holy City, where many saw them" (Mt 27:52-53), on the basis of a single, tendentious report. Whether the fact that Matthew contains such a statement is evidence against the general historical reliability of this source is another question, whose answer is largely dependent on one's world-view (cf. above; ch. 3.3). In any case, we should be careful to distinguish between the question of the possibility of such things taking place, and the question of whether there is a source-critical basis for arguing that it in fact did/did not take place. I believe it is possible that the reported signs actually did take place, but the empirical basis for confirming this as a historian is clearly lacking.

There is no reason why the Jewish authorities should not have heard talk about a resurrection on the third day. In their search for evidence to incriminate Jesus they must have weighed every word, and although Jesus' predictions were made mainly to his followers, and not to the public,133 it is noteworthy that right back in the earliest accounts of this trial there is the persistent assertion that the whole case against Jesus hinged upon a sentence containing those cryptic words: 'in three days'.134 It is quite possible that Jesus' saying about his rising on the third day would have come to their ears. If so, it is reasonable that they would be concerned not to give the disciples a chance of faking a resurrection by stealing the body, e.g. in connection with a visit to reconfirm his death (cf. above; p. 277). Thus the rationale of a guard at the tomb.

Besides, the problem was, as already stated, that for any trouble occurring which had to do with the body of Jesus, the Jews would be held responsible as Joseph was a member of the Sanhedrin. Since Caiphas the High Priest could only fall back upon the Temple Guard, probably a rather inadequate force in the event of dangerous trouble arising, it would seem reasonable to request Pilate to undertake the protection of the tomb through his military forces. No one at that early stage could predict what was happening in the minds of the multitudes who, a few days earlier, had hailed Jesus as their political deliverer (Mk 11:1-16, Mt 21:1-11. Lk 19:28-40, Jn 12:12-16). To leave the tomb utterly unprotected was to invite the very thing which they were most anxious to avoid.135

It is not wholly clear in what terms Pilate responded to their request as his reply is ambiguous in the Greek. It could be either: "You (already) have a (Jewish) guard," or "Have/take a (Roman) guard" (Mt 27:65). The first translation is perhaps grammatically better, and the context is in favor of it.136 Pilate could have been telling the priests in exasperation to look after their own affairs with their own Jewish temple guard, and not to pester him for a Roman one, even if the Romans had participated in the arrest of Jesus.137 In this case, it would not be so surprising that next day the temple guards could tell their tale that they had fallen asleep (this being true or not), since they were probably already utterly weary with their exhausting Passover duties, which had unexpectedly included the unusual task on the previous Thursday night.

Negligence so gross as sleeping on duty would be punished in the Roman army by death.138 So long as the guard is thought of as a Roman detachment, the guarantee offered by the priests to protect them from the wrath of Pilate if he came to hear what had happened, seems quite unreasonable, since neither Caiphas, Annas nor any member of the Sanhedrin had the power to protect a single Roman soldier from punishments by his superiors. But Caiphas, as the acting High Priest and the supreme arbiter of the civil destinies of Judea, did possess the power to protect a member of his own entourage, acting under orders, in the very unlikely event of Pilate interesting himself in a matter which he had expressly deposited in Jewish hands.139 On this background it is also understandable why the guard went to report what had happened to the chief priests, and not to Pilate the governor.

One final point on the question of the guard. The Bultmann School has often suggested that if the women knew, as can be expected, that the tomb was guarded, then they would not have set out upon their mission in the first place.140 So long as the guard is loosely thought of as being set with full public knowledge throughout the whole period after the burial, it will of course be impossible to find room for the visit of the women. But according to Mt it was not set in this way. Its necessity was not recognized until the day after the burial (27:62). The chances that the women knew what had been going on secretly at the governor's residence and thereafter are not necessarily overwhelming, especially if the group mentioned (Mk 16:13) came from Bethany, and if all the women went to bed early in preparation for their work at dawn.141

8.2.1.6 The Angelic Appearance

What, then, does our sources say of the order of events at the tomb early on Easter Sunday morning? The key issue, again, is whether the stories contradict each other and/or whether they can be believed per se. Matthew 28 reports of an earthquake, the descending of an angel who rolled back the stone, sat on it and scared the guards half to death. Then follows his conversation with the two women. Mark 16 tells the story of how the three women discovered that the stone had already been rolled back. Entering the grave, a young man is sitting inside on its right side, telling them that Jesus is resurrected. In Luke 24 the women also find the stone removed from the entrance. Inside the sepulchre,142 two men all of a sudden appear in shining clothes, telling them of the resurrected one. Mary of Magdala is the only women mentioned in John 20. She finds the stone removed, runs away to tell the disciples, returns to enter the grave and finds two angels in shining clothes sitting where Jesus had been laid, asking her why she is weeping.

The Bultmann School sees a discrepancy here insofar as Matthew describes or at least implies that the women themselves saw the stone rolled away by an angel, whereas in Mk, Lk and Jn the stone has been rolled ways upon their arrival.143 On such a reading the earthquake took place after the women had arrived; the quards laying prostrate on the ground while the angel delivered his message.

Historic Christianity,144 on the other hand, suggests that Matthew intends us to understand that after the earthquake and after the angel had rolled back the stone, the guards left shortly before the women arrived. Their seeking of an interview with some of the chief priests then coincided with the women's reporting to the disciples. The angel had sat in awesome splendor on the great gravestone, making it clear that no one could replace it, frightening the guard away. Then he presumably went into the tomb not to frighten the women unecessary.145 In

other words, the angel rolled back the stone, not to let the body out, but to let the witnesses in, in proof of the resurrection that had already taken place.146

To back up that this really was Matthew's intention, Historic Christianity accounts for why he wrote so ambigously.147 Their explanation refers to the fact that first-century writers had to work without the help of such modern aids as paranthesising brackets. Besides, since Greeks cared little about relative time, the use of the pluperfect tense was much more favored by them than by us. Often in the NT the aorist tense needs to be rendered by an English pluperfect.148 So Mt 28:2-4 could be inserted in brackets and translated in the pluperfect sense with no impropriety.149

Such a translation, however, exaggerates the element of relative time in a manner alien to the Greek (and the Semitic) mind. The early Greek chroniclers sometimes incorporated in a single story a number of actions and speeches which had a common theme, not indicating at all the time of the occurrence. Sometimes they jumped back and forward between two or more parallel sequences of events, leaving it to the reader to understand that each item was, as it were, a flash on a cinema screen. The notion of chronological order was thus somewhat different from that of a modern historian.150 Consequently, the violent earthquake151 may, from the point of view of the texts, well have taken place before the arrival of any of the women, and the guards may already have left when they arrived.

The approach of Historic Christianity is to interpret one source (Mt) in view of other sources dealing with the same topic (Mk and Lk), thus harmonizing seemingly discrepancies. This is a disputable method from the point of view of source criticism, cf. above; ch. 3.2. The question of whether to harmonzie or sharpen apparent inconsistencies has to be settled in relation to one's general assessment of the formation of the sources, not iso lately as a 'neutral' problem of source critical rules. Nevertheless, Historic Christianity's approach seems to have a certain 'ad hoc' flavor here.

If Matthew's account can be understood as mentioned above, it is possible to interpret it as complementary to the other accounts of the angelic appearance.152 Mark 16:5 states that the women upon entering the tomb found 'a young man' ('neaniskos') sitting on the right side, robed in a white garment. Although it has been suggested that the person in 16:5 is the same young man who appeared in Gethsemane (14:51),153 since these are only two places where 'neaniskos' is used by Mark, several reasons converge convincingly to indicate that the young man represents an angel.154 First, a precedent is found in II Maccabees 3:26, 33-34, where two 'neaniai' appear twice in the role of bearing a divine judgement and message. Second, Mk 9:3, Daniel 7:9 and Revelation 3:4; 5; 18; 7:13 suggest that the young man's white garment symbolizes the dress of heaven. Third, his message conveys a divine revelation, the kerygmatic announcement of the resurrection of Jesus. Also, the women's reaction of fear indicated that they had understood the young man as a heavenly messenger. Fourth, if Mark is the primary source here, the other gospels understood Mark's figure as an angel. In Luke 24:4-5 it is even more clear that his two men are believed to be angels.155 Their dazzling apparel and the reaction of the women their fear and bending their faces to the ground both point to this conclusion.156 So does the fact that Luke's Emmaus story notes that the women referred to what they experienced as a vision of angels (24:23).

Only Luke says explicitly that the women had gone into the tomb before the appearance of the angels. Matthew and Mark is not clear on this point, but both stress the awesomeness of the figures they encountered. Had the women seen such dazzling figures from the doorway, they

might have been too frightened to have ventured in. Of Matthew's angel it was also said that "his face shone like lightning, his garments were white as snow" (28:3). I have already argued that it is quite possible to read the text as if he had withdrawn into the cave before the women arrived, so that his "Come, see the place where he was laid" (28:7a) is not an invitation to enter the tomb,157 but to put away their fears and take a close look at the grave space, now empty save for burial linen.

The mention by one evangelist of two angels and by another of one do not necessarily constitute a contradiction. If there were two, there was also one. Contradiction would only be created if the writer who mentioned the one should go on to say explicitly that there was one. In a scene where one person is the chief speaker or actor it would be natural to omit reference to the irrelevant fact that he had a companion. The notion that Luke or Matthew doubled the angels only to heighten the miraculous, in line with the common folk motif of pairs of figures,158 only makes sense if the veracity of the writer is denied. It is important to remember that we are dealing with descriptions of an event, not with witnesses replying to cross-examination. If witnesses, who had been in the tomb at the same time, had been asked independently; 'Precisely how many men/angels did you see?', and had given different answers, that would have shown one or both to be unreliable. But these witnesses are not answering the question 'how many?', they are giving incomplete descriptions of a complex event.

My point in arguing in favor of a possible harmonization of the different accounts159 is again to show that on the basis of the sources things could have happened in this way, not that it is historically established that they actually did so. (I am aware, of course, that the main task of any historian is to argue, empirically, what most probably did happen, and why.) In any case, any story involving the agency of (supernatural) angels cannot, by the definition of historical inquiry,160 be confirmed by a historian as a historian. Whether or not angels exist is a question which lies outside the realm of historical research.161 The problem here was whether the stories of the angelic appearance necessarily contradict each other. If Historic Christianity is correct that this is not the case, one of the arguments of the Bultmann School162 as to the historical untrustworthiness of these documents have been digested. If containing inner contradictions, a story cannot in any case have actually taken place as it stands. If it does not, it may or it may not be true. What the sources reasonably do establish to have happened here, is that the women found the tomb empty, whether the stone had been removed by an earthquake or not,163 and that they met one or two men whom they and the evangelists164 believed to be angels,165 telling them that Jesus was resurrected.

8.2.1.7 The Conversation

The major difference in the accounts of the conversation between the angels and the women is between the synoptics and John. In 20:1-13 John says that Mary of Magdala runs to find Peter and the 'beloved disciple' as soon as she has discovered that the stone had been removed. Only after the two disciples had come and gone from the tomb does she peer into the tomb and see two angels who talk to her.

According to that reconstruction of Historic Christianity which includes two separate groups of women arriving at the tomb, John's account fits well in with the others.166 Mary of Magdala, the other Mary (from Bethany) and Salome (from John's house) had come to Joseph's garden through the Gennath gate.167 After seeing that the stone had been removed,

Mary of Magdala jumps to the conclusion that the body had been taken. She runs off to tell Peter and John, leaving the other Mary and Salome standing there discussing what to do. Then Joanna and 'Susanna' arrives, having come from the Hasmonean palace via the Ephraim gate. The newcomers, who had already been inside the tomb on Friday evening (cf. Lk 23:55), had no indecision. They insisted to go in to actually see whether the body had gone. Then, after the four women have left the garden, John's story continues.

As to the angels' conversation to the women (not to Mary of Magdala; Jn 20:13), Luke's account (24:3-8) is different from those of Matthew (28:5-7) and Mark (16:5-79. There is no 'Fear not' (Mt 28:5, Mk 16:6) no invitation to see where he was laid (Mt 28:7, Mk 16:6), no command to tell the disciples (Mt 28:7, Mk 16:7), and no promise of seeing him in Galilee (Mt 28:7, Mk 16:7). Instead the messengers say, "Why search among the dead for one who lives?" (Lk 24:5) and in place of Mark's "You will see him there, as he told you" (16:7), they say "Remember what he told you while he was still in Galilee, about the Son of Man: how he must be given up into the power of sinful men and be crucified, and must rise again on the third day." (Lk 24:6-7).

The different reference to Galilee is noteworthy. Whereas Matthew and Mark look forward to Jesus about to go ahead of them to Galilee, Luke looks back and refers to what Jesus told them when they were together in Galilee (cf. Mk 14:28; Mt 26:32). To Historic Christianity there are enough links between Luke and Mark/Matthew to show that Luke is describing the same happening as the other two.168 But at the same time the differences suggest that we are dealing with two independent traditions of the same event, not different elaborations from one common source (oral or literary), as the Bultmann School claims.169

With regard to Matthew and Mark the resemblance between the two conversations is quite close. But whereas the Bultmann School explains the resemblance as due to the 'fact' that Matthew, with minor alterations, is copying Mark,170 Historic Christianity explains it through the opposing 'fact' that the two accounts derive from a time when the apostles heard the story in similar words.171 The account in Matthew could be very close to the way the apostle Matthew first heard it, and Mark's to the way Peter first heard it which included 'Go tell his disciples and Peter' (16:7a). On the background of the general discussion of the historical reliability of the gospel tradition in ch. 7, I find the latter explanation just as plausible, if not more. As to the question of discrepancies, there is nothing in any of the three conversations which is contradictory to anything in either of the others; the matter is complementary.

To the Bultmann School it is quite essential that Mk 16:7 ("But go and give this message to his disciples and Peter: 'He will go on before you into Galilee and you will see him there, as he told you.'" Cf. Mt 28:7) is a Markan interpolation into the pre-Markan tradition.172 It is the editorial work of the writer of Mark's gospel, not what the women actually reported as having heard. The fundamental assumption is that there existed in the beginning no appearance narratives. Mk 14:28 ('Nevertheless, after I am raised again I will go on before you into Galilee.'), to which 16:7 refers, is therefore believed to be an insertion, as consequently also 16:7 is.

The literary evidence for taking 14:28 as an insertion is digested and even turned into positive evidence for its authenticity by Historic Christianity.173 The key argument of the opposing research programme is that if we remove 14:28, "verse 29 follows smoothly upon verse 27"

(Fuller 1980, 60). But this is a quite weak reason for suspecting an insertion, especially since the verses read just as smoothly when v. 28 is left in. The fact that a sentence can be dropped out of a context without destroying its flow may be entirely coincidental and no indication that the sentence was not originally part of that context. Instead, there are positive reasons for believing that 14:28 is not an insertion.

It continues the image of the shepard in v. 27; 'go on before you' in Greek is a technical term of sheparding, cf. John 10:4, 27. The emphasis of Jesus' words lies not on v. 27, but on v. 28: the sheep will not only be scattered but reassembled.174 The death and resurrection are counter-balanced through the agency of God: God strikes the shepard, but raises him up. In contrast to the scattering of the disciples is Jesus' reassembling them in Galilee.175 Furthermore, it is not just 14:28 and 16:7 that presuppose each other. It is death and resurrection of Christ that is predicted, so that 14:27 and 16:6 belong together as well. It therefore does not work to object that in 14:29 Peter only takes offense at 14:27, not 14:28, for of course he only objects to Jesus' telling him they will all fall away, and not to Jesus' promise to go before them.

There thus seem to be no good reasons to regard 14:28 as a redactional insertion and good reasons to see it as firmly welded in place. If there is an insertion, it is all of 14:27-31 (cf. Lk 22:31-34 and Jn 13:36-68). This means that 16:7 is also in place in the pre-Marcan tradition of the passion story. The content of the verse reveals a very early knowledge of a resurrection appearance of Christ to the disciples in Galilee.

8.2.1.8 The Reaction

The women's reaction to the angels' message is given by the synoptists. In Mark 16:8 they fled trembling and astonished, and said nothing to anyone, for they were afraid. In Matthew 28:8 they went away quickly with fear and great joy, and ran to tell the disciples. In Luke 24:9-12 the women left and told the Eleven and all the others, who did not believe them. Peter, however, ran to the tomb, saw the linen wrappings and was amazed.

Mark's version, supposedly the earliest and most authentic account, has received the greatest attention, not only because it seems to be a very odd note on which to end a book,176 but also because the other gospels agree that the women did report to the disciples. But the reaction of fear and awe are typical Marcan motifs of divine encounter and were probably not meant to imply an enduring silence.177 The meaning of 'trembling and astonishment' may not be so very far from Matthew's 'fear and great joy'. So presumably they said nothing to anyone else on the way to tell the disciples. But as the account is part of the pre-Marcan passion story (cf. 8.2.1.1; above), the whole story must have come out eventually.

According to Luke the disciples do not believe the women's report (24:11). But Luke and John agree that Peter and at least one other disciple rise and run to the tomb to check it out (Lk 24:12; 24, Jn 20:2-10). As noted earlier,178 the presence of Lk 24:12 in the second-century papyrus P75 has convinced most scholars of its authenticity as an original part of the Gospel of Luke. This is quite significant, as it proves that there was tradition not only that the disciples were in Jerusalem (contra the flight to Galilee hypothesis179), but also that they knew of the empty tomb.

To harmonize John and the synoptists as to the reports of Mary of Magdala and of the other women, one must assume that Luke's account in 24:8-12 slide in overlapping sections;180 i.e. he telescopes the coming of Mary of Magdala to Peter and John181 (giving her pride of place in the list of women) and the coming of Johanna and the other women to the eleven and the rest. As these problems are tied up with the reports of the first appearances, I will deal with them more in detail in the following discussion of the appearances.

8.2.2 The Appearances

The Gospel texts which narrate the appearances of the risen Jesus are Mt 28:8-20, Mk 16:9-20, Lk 24:13-53 and Jn 20:10-21:25. In addition, Acts 1:1-11, written by the same author as the Gospel of Luke,182 talks of the appearances and the ascension. There are problems as to the textual authenticity of Mk 16:9-20, Lk 24:36, 40, 51f. and the origin and authorship of Jn 21.

The verses that conclude the Gospel of Mark in most bibles; 16:9-20, called the Marcan Appendix; the Longer ending of Mark or the Canonical ending of Mark, are missing from most of the earliest manuscripts remaining; including the Codices Vaticanus and Sinaiticus. Although the vast majority of manuscripts end the final chapter at verse 20, nearly all scholars in recent years have regarded the last twelve verses as an addition composed considerably later, neither written nor authorised by Mark.183

There are three types of explanation as to how the supposedly abrupt ending at 16:8 arose. Some have argued that it was deliberately intended, in line with Mark's abrupt beginning, as a highly dramatic (if indirect) way of announcing the resurrection: the women are speechless with awe at the empty tomb and the angel's message. But this seems rather sophisticated for Mark's down-to-earth gospel, and it is at least problematical to believe that he did not go on the tell of Jesus' appearance.184 Another obstacle to this hypothesis is that the ending is far more abrupt in the Greek than in the English, since it concludes with the conjunction 'gar' ('for'), which normally occurs at second place in a Greek sentence: 'enphobounto gar'; "for they were afraid". While examples of sentences ending in 'gar' can be produced, no one has as yet come up with a 'gar' at the end of a book.185

The second explanation argues for an accidental premature conclusion. The author was, against his intention, prevented from finishing his work, i.e. he died, whether in a persecution or from other causes, or he was forced to flee for his life before he was able to finish his book. But in this case one would expect those who knew his mind and had the custody of his manuscript to have completed it before allowing its publication.

According to the third hypothesis the author did fulfill the ostensible intention of 16:7 and did continue to narrate appearances in Galilee to Peter and to the Twelve, but the ending was removed, either by accidental mischance or through deliberate mutilation. If the former, one would have to explain several things: (1) why the end, which would have been inside the scroll role, was lost rather than the beginning, which would have been on the outside and as such would have been much more liable to loss; (2) how it came about that all the manuscripts were broken at the same place; (3) how the break came precisely at the end of a sentence and the end of a passage, especially in view of the ancient papyrus writing which did not even leave space between words. In either case the damage would have had to have been done very early if we are to account for the 'fact' that all lines of transmission of the

original manuscript were destroyed. But if the loss occurred so early, one would have expected those responsible for publication to have produced new, undamaged copies in order to perpetuate the true tradition.186

In spite of these difficulties the scholarly consensus that Mark's work ends at 16:8 prevails. It has been sharply challenged, however, by Farmer 1974,187 and it seems reasonable to seriously consider the possibility that 16:20 might after all be the true end. In any case, it is probably not an artificial summary of the appearance stories in the other gospels, for a close vocabulary comparison suggests that the author of 16:9-20 may, at least in part, have drawn on sources similar to the canonical gospels rather than on the gospels themselves.188 Besides, the last twelve verses are an early witness (although the date is difficult to determine) which was accepted by the early church to be read with the gospel, and as such it has a standing above any of the clearly uncanonical, apocryphal writings. Altogether, it therefore seems right to give serious consideration to the information taken from the Marcan Appendix , with obvious observations in mind, instead of taking the easy way of leaving it out of account. (Mk. 16:11 seems to be a flat contradiction of Lk 24:33-35, cf. below; 8.2.2.3.)

The problems of Luke 24:36, 41, 51 and 52 can be dealt with in the same way as 24:3, 6, 9 and 12 in ch. 8.2.1. Their presences in the second-century papyrus P75 have made it far more probable that they are part of the authentic text of Luke's gospel, as confirmed by Nestle-Aland 1979. In any case, the inclusion or exclusion of these verses are of minor importance to the topic of this study.

The problem of John 21 concerns its origin and authorship in relation to the rest of the gospel. There is scholarly agreement that chapter 21 has been added somewhat late to the gospel. In spite of the fact that manuscript evidence universally includes it, it seems to be extraneous, separate from ch. 20 which is a closely bound unity ending with the probably intentional conclusion to the gospel (20:30-31), and it is introduced by phrases which most likely point to a later decision to add the section.189 The major debate with respect to the chapter as a whole centers upon its authorship. While probably most scholars today tend to see it as appended by a different author (belonging to the same 'Johannine' School as the author of ch. 1-20),190 others argue that the Gospel of John can best be explained as the work of a single evangelist, i.e. as a literary unit.191

In any case, the author of the last chapter in John has drawn upon traditions of an Easter appearance in Galilee which contain an appearance to seven disciples (21:1-14) and continues in a dialogue between the risen Jesus and Peter (21:15-23). The key question of the historicity of John 21 is somewhat bound up with the question of authorship. Even if another author added the last chapter to an already finished gospel, his material may still be based on eyewitness testimony by the 'Beloved Disciple' (21:20).192 Nevertheless, if John 21 is an epilogue added by a redactor after the primitive form of the Gospel of John had been completed by the evangelist (Bultmann School), it is easier to question its historicity than if it was appended by the evangelist himself (Historic Christianity).193 I will deal with this problem more closely in the following examination of the appearance narratives.

The methodological attitude of our two historical theological research programmes towards these narratives are rather different. The Bultmann School claims that the earlier strata of the NT had no narratives of appearances. Those we have in the NT are theological products of later Christian communities: stories through which mythological and kerygmatic points are conveyed.194 The disciples obviously had some kind of experience that Jesus was still alive,

however one may want to understand this. But the 'fact' remains that none of the particular accounts of the appearances are true in a historical, literal sense. These accounts are legendary, and together they reveal non-harmonizable discrepancies.195

The basic assumptions of this position has already been criticized in ch. 7. Historic Christianity's main point is that history, tradition and theological redaction co-exist on the gospel pages. They are interrelated, meaning that there is a historical foundation lying behind the way the evangelists have narrated their traditions, including the traditions of the post-Easter appearances. As such, the historical veracity of these accounts, as account of events in space and time, needs at least to be seriously considered. On the basis of the previous discussions in chs. 6, 7 and 8, they should be taken as historical documents (also196), unless compelling evidence forces otherwise. Whether, and to what extent the difficulties may be solved, e.g. as due to intense compression, needs to be seen.

8.2.2.1 Mary and the Other Women

The texts concerning the appearances to the women are found in Matthew, Mark and John. Mt. 28:8-10 tells of how the women, after having been addressed by the angel, "hurried away from the tomb in awe and great joy, and ran to tell the disciples. Suddenly Jesus was there in the path. He gave them his greeting, and they came up and clasped his feet, falling prostrate before him. Then Jesus said to them, 'Do not be afraid. Go and take word to my brothers that they are to leave for Galilee. They will see me there.'"

In the Marcan appendix (16:9-11) we are told that Jesus, "when he had risen from the dead early on Sunday morning, appeared first to Mary of Magdala, from whom he had formerly cast out seven devils. She went and carried the news to his mourning and sorrowful followers, but when they were told that he was alive and that she had seen him they did not believe it."

After Peter and the other disciple have seen the empty tomb, John 20:10-18 continues: "So the disciples went home again; but Mary stood at the tomb outside, weeping. As she wept she peered into the tomb; and she saw two angels in white sitting there, one at the head, and one at the feet, where the body of Jesus had lain. They said to her, 'Why are you weeping?' She answered, 'They have taken my Lord away, and I do not know where they have laid him.' With these words she turned around and saw Jesus standing there, but did not recognize him. Jesus said to her, 'Why are you weeping? Who is it you are looking for?' Thinking it was the gardener, she said, 'If it is you, sir, who removed him, tell me where you have laid him, and I will take him away.' Jesus said, 'Mary!' She turned to him and said, 'Rabbuni!' (which is Hebrew for 'My Master'). Jesus said, 'Do not cling to me (or: Touch me no more), for I have not yet ascended to the Father. But go to my brothers, and tell them that I am now ascending (or: I am going to ascend) to my Father and your Father, my God and your God! Mary of Magdala went to the disciples with her news: 'I have seen the Lord!' she said, and gave them his message."

The main question here is whether the texts can be seen as supplementary to each other, and thereby possibly historically reliable accounts, or whether they reveal unharmonizable inconsistencies typical of non-trustworthy reports. The Bultmann School opts for the latter position, as e.g. D.F. Strauss clearly expressed regarding the text of Mark: "We find it so incoherent, and composed of materials so little capable of being fitted together, that such a relation (being the nearest to the fact) is not to be thought of." (Strauss 1970, 817.) The

alleged contradictions referred to by Strauss197 can be resolved, however, if the women came in two groups (one from Bethany), if Mary of Magdala departed from and returned to the tomb alone, if the apostles on Sunday morning partly were located in Jerusalem (Peter and John) and partly in Bethany (the other nine), and if the appearance to the women (not the one to Mary of Magdala) did not take place in the garden but on the way to Bethany from Jerusalem.198

Insofar all these 'ifs' imply ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses, critical suspicion naturally arise that we are dealing with anomalies which Historic Christianity has not been able to digest, or rationally explain. But again one must relate the problems to the general assessment of the sources and their historical setting. Since the sources contain eyewitness testimonies, and since one in ancient times did not pay as much attention to chronological order as modern historians do; sometimes incorporating in a single story a number of actions which had a common theme and sometimes jumping back and forward between two or more parallel sequences of events,199 the different accounts may turn out to be complementary even if they at first sight seem contradictory.

There are several indications in the texts that the appearances of angels to Mary of Magdala and to the other women are distinct. The appearance to Mary was after she had reported to the apostles, to the others before. Mary apparently saw the angels from the entrance, the others after they had come inside the tomb. The discourse in the two cases is also quite different; Mary sees Jesus after she answers the angels' question; the other women make no reply to the angelic message, and they leave the tomb without seeing Jesus. The distinctness is shown at this particular point in the story by the subtle change from the first person plural to the first person singular. When Mary told her story to the apostles she had just left the other women and could say "We do not know where they had left him" (Jn 20:2), but now she is quite on her own and says "I do not know where they have laid him" (Jn 20:13).

Likewise the appearance of Jesus to Mary (in Mk and Jn) seems quite distinct from his appearance to the other women (Mt). The first is individual, the second is collective; in the first Jesus comes up quietly from behind, in the second he meets them and hails them. The discourse in the two cases is also quite different. There is also a difference, at least superficially, in the way Mary is told not to cling to Jesus, whereas the other women clasp his feet without rebuke.200

As the two appearance are distinct, Mark 16:9 may be right in putting the one to Mary of Magdala first, if the other one occurred at a sufficient interval after the women's flight from the tomb to allow for all the comings and goings recorded by John. A possible harmonization would thus picture Peter and the Beloved Disciple /John setting off from John's house for the tomb through the Gennath Gate, followed shortly by Mary of Magdala who had told them that it was empty (Jn 20:1-9, Lk 24:12). In the meantime the other women return from the tomb, lead by Joanna back into the city by the way she had come from the Hasmonean palace, through the Ephraim gate, and eventually find their way to John's house where Jesus' mother (cf. Jn 19:25-27) and Clopas are staying. As Peter and John return home, Mary of Magdala lingers behind. She sees the angels in the tomb and Jesus appears to her. Then she returns to John's house as the first witness of the risen Christ,201 finding a group of excited women and a group of confused and somewhat sceptical men. Again, such a reading demands that the information given in one source normatively decides how one understands the information

given in another source. Even on a background (cf. above; ch. 7) which generally warrants historical reliability, this is a disputable method.

Except for Peter and John (?) who followed at a distance (cf. Jn.18:15), Jesus' closest disciples had deserted him when he was arrested at Gethsemane and taken inside the city walls (Mk
14:50;53f). The obvious line of retreat for the nine apostles would be in the opposite direction to that by which Judas and his company had come; that is, away from Jerusalem up the familiar rough track which led from the Kidron valley over the Mount of Olives in the direction of Berthany, where their friends Lazarus, Martha and Mary (of Magdala?202) lived (cf. Jn 11:1-44). In the early part of the week Jesus and his disciples had gone out in the evening and spent the night in Bethany (cf. Mk 11:11f., 19f, 27; 13:3; 14:3, 16). So we may assume that nine of the apostles set off in the direction of this village, which was nearly two miles from the city of Jerusalem, and laid low there on Good Friday and over the Sabbath. The commission to the women at the tomb was not fulfilled with nine disciples in Bethany still uninformed, so it is plausible that two or more of them agreed to go on and tell them the news.

Matthew's account of Jesus' appearance to the women which does not really indicate the precise time and place of the occurrence, fits in here. One may picture this meeting somewhere on the track between Jerusalem and Bethany (c. 2 km's distance); on some part of the Mount of Olives. So far it thus seem possible, at least hypothetically, to reconstruct the order of events in a coherent way, given some knowledge of which actors were involved at which places at which time. To what extent this knowledge in turn is based on pure conjectures is another question. However, if the harmonization of the accounts is coherent in itself and if it does not contradict the existing NT internal and external evidence, Historic Christianity has succeeded in showing that the charge of irreconciliability brought against the resurrection stories by the Bultmann School has not in any sense been 'proved'.

It might be argued against the historicity of the two disciples' visit to the tomb that the disciples had fled Friday night to Galilee and so were not present in Jerusalem.203 But not only does Mk 14:50 (which tells of their flight) not contemplate this, but it seems unreasonable to think that the disciples, fleeing from the garden, would return to wherever they were staying in or near Jerusalem, grab their things, and keep on going all the way back to Galilee, leaving their women-companions behind (Salome was the mother of two of the apostles!). To support such a flight, the Bultmann School has to argue that the denial of Peter in the courtyard of the High Priest in Jerusalem (Mk 14:54; 66-72 par.) is unhistorical. But there is good reason to regard this tradition, attested in all four gospels, as historical. It is quite improbable that the early Christians should invent a tale concerning the apostasy of the man who was their leader.

The Bultmann School claims that the disciples could not have been in Jerusalem, since they are hardly mentioned in the trial, execution, or burial stories.204 Only with regard to John does it establish a tendency of the tradition to bring the disciples into connection with the cross. But all the gospels record the denial of Peter while the trial of Jesus was proceeding; John adds that there was another disciple with him, probably the Beloved Disciple (Jn 18:15). According to Luke 23:49, his friends stood at a distance and watched the execution of Jesus. John 19:26f., 35 says that the Beloved Disciple was at the cross with Jesus' mother and bore witness to what happened there. So it is not true that the disciples are completely absent during the low point in the course of events prior to the resurrection. There are traditions that

at least two of them were in Jerusalem during the weekend; that they also visited the tomb cannot therefore be excluded.

If the women actually did find the tomb empty on Sunday morning, as I think Historic Christianity has made historically plausible, and if this was reported to the disciples, then it seems unreasonable that the disciples would sit idly by, not caring to check out the big news. It is rather likely that one or two disciples should run back to the tomb, even if only to satisfy their doubts that the women were mistaken. Hence the historical credibility of the story.205

The relative absence of the disciples is explained by a clear indication in the gospels themselves; they were hiding for fear of the Jewish authorities. There is no reason why the passion story would want to portray the church's leaders as covering in seclusion while only the women dared to venture about openly, were this not historical. The disciples could thus have been made to flee to Galilee while the women stayed behind,206 but this is contradicted by the evidence mentioned above, as well as by the message at the tomb ("But go and give this message to the disciples and Peter: 'He will go before you into Galilee and you will see him there, as he told you!'" Mk 16:7) and Jesus' own words to the women ("Go and take word to my brothers that they are to leave for Galilee. They will see me there." Mt 28:10). This does not make sense if the disciples already had departed for Galilee. The explanation that best fits these aspects of the sources is therefore that the women were to deliver their message to the disciples which were in or near Jerusalem, but lying low.

Does the message to the women imply that the first appearances to the disciples took place in Galilee? If so, there is contradictory evidence in Luke 24:13-35 and John 20:19-23, where different appearances in or nearby Jerusalem are recounted, all of which took place at Easter day or night.207 But if the latter reports are basically correct, how could Jesus refer them to a promised appearance in Galilee, when he had the intention of showing himself to them that very day in and near Jerusalem?

The first thing to note here is that the emphasis in Jesus' words in Mt 28:10 is more on proclamation and promise than on direct command. The sentence might be translated: "Announce to my brothers that they are to go to Galilee and they will see me there." According to Historic Christianity208 it is a message for the brothers generally and not only for the eleven. The message of the angel had been "Go quickly and tell his disciples" (Mt 28:7, cf. Mk 16:7); 'disciples' being a broader term than 'apostles', representing probably hundreds of followers, not just eleven. This 'generalization' of the message may be questioned, however. The context of Mt 26:31-32 and Mk 14:28 (cf. Mk 16:7) suggests a smaller group; the eleven apostles.

Anyway, the apparent tardiness209 of the apostles in responding to the message has to be explained. Historic Christianity argues that the message of the angel, ending with 'as he told you' (Mk 16:7), refers to an earlier saying of Jesus which implied not a first appearance in Galilee but a movement to Galilee from Jerusalem:210 "They went out to the Mount of Olives. And Jesus said, 'You will all fall from your faith; for it stands written: "I will strike the shepherd down and the sheep will be scattered". Nevertheless, after I am raised again I will go on before you into Galilee." (Mk 14:26-27.) As noted earlier,211 the imagery is that of a shepherd. Jesus had led the disciples from Galilee to Jerusalem, 'going before them' (cf. Mk 10:32). And after the resurrection he will go before them like a shepherd once more, leading them into Galilee to regather his flock.

This did not imply that the only appearances were to be in Galilee, nor that the disciples were to leave immediately. (But neither, of course, does it imply that Luke presupposed his readers to be familiar with the appearances in Galilee, nor that Matthew presupposed his readers to be aware of the appearances in Jerusalem.) To leave immediately would have been quite contrary to what was expected of a devout Jew, who in the ordinary way would stay in Jerusalem to observe the six days of unleavened bread which followed the feast of the Passover, and the disciples evidently did not understand the angel's message to mean that. This may account for Matthew's silence about when they went, and it conforms to John's explicit narrative. Even Jesus' words to the women recorded in Matthew; 'Go and take word to my brothers that they are to leave for Galilee' (28:10), are more the announcement of a thrilling promise than the issuing of a precise command.

8.2.2.2 On the Road to Emmaus

The next appearance is alluded to in Mark 16:12, which says: "Later he appeared in a different guise to two of them as they were walking, on their way into the country." Luke 24:13-31, however, tells the full story of how Jesus appeared to two of the disciples, one called Cleopas, on the way to a village called Emmaus. He conversed with them, explaining from the OT how the Messiah was to suffer before being resurrected, but they did not recognize him until he broke the bread and offered it to them at their meal in Emmaus. "Then their eyes were opened, and they recognized him; and he vanished from their sight" (24:31).

There seems to be fairly good reasons for identifying Cleopas with John's Cleopas, whose wife was at the cross (Jn 19:25), and who was the brother of Joseph of Nazareth.212 He may well have been located in the house of his Zebedee relatives (John's house) in Jerusalem on Easter day, witnessing the coming and goings of Mary of Magdala, Peter and John, and the other women, including his wife, Mary. There are some details in Luke's account that supports this theory.213 Cleopas says that "some women of our company ... had seen a vision of angels who told them he was alive" (24:22-24). Luke had already mentioned that Peter had run to the tomb and seen the linen cloths; he now shows that he was aware that Peter was not the only man there by quoting Cleopas as saying, "Some (plural) of our people went to the tomb and found things just as the women had said."

He then adds; "But him they did not see" (24:24). The Bultmann School reads this as an explicit contradiction of the appearance to the women at the tomb.214 But Historic Christianity has argued that it is quite possible that the appearance to the women (plural) did not take place in the garden, but later, on the way from John's house in Jerusalem (where Cleopas probably had met them) to Bethany. Even so, if the verse may be read as paraphrased by Marxsen; "other disciples had ... seen the empty tomb but ... no one had seen Jesus (24:24)" (Marxsen 1979, 72), the contradiction to the account of the appearance to Mary of Magdala remains. But the verse does not say that no one had seen Jesus, it says "him they did not see." With such an emphasis the reading rather suggests that the disciples had heard not only the report about angels, but also the fantastic tale of Mary of Magdala that she had seen Jesus.215

The identity of the companion of Cleopas has been a matter of much speculation.216 Among the suggestions have been Luke himself, Cleopas' son Simeon who in AD 61 succeeded James as bishop of Jerusalem,217 and Cleopas' wife Mary. Anyway, this is of minor importance to the story itself,218 which is one of the most vivid narratives in the whole Bible.

To Historic Christianity, this story is too dignified and restrained to be called a legend, just like that. As a modern novelistic, realistic narrative, it is true to life and psychology.219 The whole technique of novelistic, realistic narrative is a modern invention, however, which when found in the ancient world means that there is a good chance that the reportage is pretty close to the facts.220 Nevertheless, the question of historical reliability is not a question of literary genre as such, cf. above; ch. 7.3.2.

The realistic characteristics hardly include the sudden disappearance of Jesus (24:31), but otherwise the Bultmann School points at the fact that he appears as an unknown traveller who is only recognized by peculiar characteristics (the breaking and blessing of the bread), and concludes that the story has the character of a true legend.221 The outline of the story is strictly analogous to the oldest stories of the appearance of God, as e.g. in the story of Hagar in Gen. 16:7 ff. and of the three men that visited Abraham in Gen. 18:1 ff. Whether these stories in their turn are legendary is an open question, however. Simply to refer to them as evidence of the legendary characteristics of Lk. 24:13-35 is not enough. Besides, identification of a certain literary pattern does not explain the reason why the story was narrated in the first place.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the disciples on the way to Emmaus did not recognize their risen master. How could this be? Luke gives the impression that this lack of recognition is a failure on the part of Jesus' followers; "something held their eyes from seeing who it was" (24:16), whereas the Marcan Appendix offers a somewhat different explanation; "he appeared in a different guise" (16:12). It seems to be characteristic of some of the resurrection appearances that Jesus was not immediately and fully recognized. It was true of Mary in the garden (Jn 20:14), of the eleven in the upper room (Lk 24:37) and (with some reservations, cf. 8.2.2.4; below) of the seven in the fishing boat (Jn 21:4).

The reason may have had to do both with a change in Jesus appearance, as Mark indicates, and an inhibition in the disciples themselves, as Luke suggests. The NT depicts throughout an element of continuity and an element of discontinuity between Jesus' body before and after the resurrection. The discontinuity is heightened by his ability to vanish (Lk 24:31) and reappear elsewhere (Lk 24:36), seemingly without traversing the space in between. He is thus able to appear in the middle of a room whose doors are shut (Jn 20:19, 26). The continuity is depicted insofar Jesus nevertheless is recognized, and in that he shows the marks of the crucifixion to prove his identity, challenging them to touch him and eating before their eyes to prove that he is no ghost (Lk 24:39-43). Equally the NT suggests that recognition of Jesus can be hindered in those who are 'slow of heart to believe' (Lk 24:25). This slowness of recognition is somewhat understandable if, as seems evident, the disciples were deeply depressed and confused, not at all expecting to meet Jesus physically resurrected, something which seemed 'too good to be true' (cf. Lk 24:41). All the same, the inability of the two disciples to recognize the risen Jesus (why did they fail to see the scars in his hands and feet?) during a fairly long walk on the country road remains an anomaly to the protective belt of Historic Christianity which have been not fully digested.

Luke's "village called Emmaus, which lay about seven miles (sixty 'stadia') from Jerusalem" is difficult to identify. A number of Emmaus's are known in Palestine. Eusebius identified it with cAmwas, which is about fourteen and a half miles to the west of Jerusalem, and some manuscripts have been amended from sixty stadia to a hundred and sixty accordingly.222 But

apart from the distance being wrong, cAmwas was a town rather than a village. It would be better to look for a site nearer the city, but remembering that the village may have entirely disappeared. Another possibility is the military colony of Vespasian called Ammaous,223 known today as Kaloniye. The standard text of Josephus gives the distance of this place as only thirty 'stadia' from Jerusalem, however, but there is one manuscript which reads "sixty," the same distance as the Emmaus of Luke 24.

When they reached Emmaus, the disciples invited Jesus to stay overnight as "the evening is drawing on and the day is almost over" (24:29). If so, how could they after the meal manage to walk the two-hour journey back to Jerusalem in time before the gates closed at nightfall?224 'Toward evening', however, need not mean any more than 'after noon'; the sun being on its way down. Neither ought the phrase 'the day is almost over' to be taken quite literally. It is typical of Eastern hospitality to ask guests to stay in a manner like 'Night is failling, you can start out again tomorrow', even if it is no later than two in the afternoon.225 If the two disciples thus had prepared a late midday meal, they would still have time to walk back the seven miles to Jerusalem in time to get into the city, consequently finding the other disciples (including those that had come from Bethany after the women told their news to them there) gathered for their evening meal (cf. Mk 16:14).

8.2.2.3 In Jerusalem

Luke continues the story: "They found that the Eleven and the rest of the company had assembled, and were saying, 'It is true: the Lord has risen; he has appeared to Simon.' Then they gave their account of the events of their journey and told how he had been recognized by them at the breaking of the bread" (24:33-35). Mark's short notice is quite different: "These also went and took the news to the others, but again no one believed them" (16:13).

The confident-sounding affirmation about Simon Peter in Luke seems to contradict the statement of Mark that their report was greeted with unbelief, though it should be noted that Luke himself says shortly afterwards that even with Jesus present, "they were still unconvinced, still wondering, for it seemed too good to be true" (24:41). If Mk 16:13 is authentic, the problem may perhaps be solved (in an ad hoc way?) insofar the apostles present were in various states of part-belief and part-unbelief.226

When the women first told their story they were doubtless greeted with incredulity (cf. Lk 24:11). Although Jn 20:8-9 pictures the faith of the Beloved Disciple as beginning to recover when he saw the grave-clothes, it is clear that the empty tomb in itself did not create faith in the resurrection. It is likely that those who had not seen the risen Jesus still kept the big news on arm's length, even after Cleopas and his companion allegedly had added fuel to the claim of Peter and the women. Psychologically speaking, it seems plausible that the apostles' unbelief, momentarily intensified by the terror of the sudden apparition, was finally overcome only by seeing and talking with Jesus himself.

The relationship between the faith of the disciples and the appearances of Jesus does not fit the modern 'faith creates results' schema. The gospel accounts indicate just the opposite, examples of disciples not quick to believe are found in Mt 28:18b; Mk 16:13-14; Lk. 24:25, 41 and Jn 20:15, 25b, 27. While there are no narratives of Jesus appearing to any unbeliever, there are thus abundant evidence that in the gospel narratives

Jesus appeared to disciples who were not in a state of eager expectation and who did not quickly believe that it was him they were seeing.227 This is hardly a literary trick as there are strong reasons to accept that the disciples really were disillusioned, fearful and confused after Jesus had died, cf. below; ch. 9.1.4. A risen Messiah in the middle of history was not what anyone expected at that time.

The reference to an appearance to Peter is confirmed by Paul's direct statement "that he appeared to Cephas" (I Cor 15:5), referring to him by the Aramaic form of the name which Jesus is said to have given him. The appearance comes first in Paul's list, but Paul does not say that it was the first time that Jesus was seen by anyone. He may have been the first 'official' witness, however, considering that women has no right to bear witness in Jewish courts, but neither Paul nor Luke contradicts the chronological priority of the appearance to Mary of Magdala, as the Bultmann School claims.228 There is nothing in Luke's account that forces the conclusion that the intention of the disciples is to assert the chronological priority of the appearance to Peter.

Mark 16:7 can possibly be read as a hint to a later appearance to Peter, but the gospels are completely silent as to where this meeting took place or as to what occurred at it. As Peter became the leader of the Christian church, both research programmes agree on the decisive importance which the appearance to Peter must have had. But from there on the agreement ends. Willi Marxsen, an exponent of the Bultmann School, proposes in a long and difficult argument that it was only Peter who had, or thought he had, a vision of the resurrected Christ.229 Through whatever he experienced, Peter came to believe that Jesus was resurrected. It was only through Peter's communication of his experience to the other disciples that they, too, came to believe. In turn they expressed their belief in Peter's language, asserting that they, too, had seen Jesus risen. What they actually meant however, was that they had come to Easter faith; i.e. that they had faith that the 'cause of Jesus' still went on. "Their faith, the manifold functions they exercised, are all in the ultimate resort based on the first appearance to Peter. They are all summed up in this appearance." (Marxsen 1979, 92.)

But why should only the appearance to Peter be constitutive for the faith of the disciples? And, most important, why should the phrase 'having seen Jesus' be equivalent to 'having come to believe'?230 The trouble with this kind of argumentation, according to Historic Christianity, is both the unnecessary skeptical attitude to the traditional basis of Paul's list in I Cor 15 and the gospels' appearance narratives and that it confuses cause with effect. Peter's believing, as the parallel case of Paul also demonstrates, is the result of his seeing the risen Jesus, not the same thing.231 Although Marxsen tries to prove otherwise through his torturous arguments, he cannot but fail to make sense of the evidence in this very basic way.

Turning back to the chronology of the narratives again, Historic Christianity argues that the appearance to Peter took place sometime during the afternoon of Easter Day. After the nine apostles, less Thomas (Jn 20:24), have come in from Bethany and gathered with Peter, John and others in Jerusalem, Cleopas and his companion return from Emmaus and join them. Then Jesus appears. Two accounts of what happened are given by Luke and John.

Luke says (questioned verses in parenthesis): "As they were talking about all this, there he was, standing among them. (And he said to them, 'Peace be with you!') Startled and terrified, they thought they were seeing a ghost. But he said, 'Why are you so perturbed? Why do questionings arise in your minds? Look at my hands and feet. It is I myself. Touch me and see; no ghost has flesh and bones as you can see that I have.' (After saying this he showed

them his hands and feet.) They were still unconvinced, still wondering, for it seemed to good too be true. So he asked them, 'Have you anything here to eat?' They offered him a piece of fish they had cooked, which he took and ate before their eyes."(24:36-43.)

John tells this story: "Late that Sunday evening, when the disciples were together behind locked doors, for fear of the Jews, Jesus came and stood among them. 'Peace be with you!' he said, and then showed them him hands and his side. So when the disciples saw the Lord, they were filled with joy. Jesus repeated, 'Peace be with you!', and then said, 'As the Father sent me, so I send you.' He then breathed on them, saying, 'Receive the Holy Spirit! If you forgive any man's sins, they stand forgiven, if you pronounce them unforgiven, unforgiven they remain" (20:19-23).

Mark and Paul refer to the same incident. Mk 16:14: "Afterwards while the Eleven were at table he appeared to them and reproached them for their incredulity and dullness, because they had not believed those who had seen him risen from the dead." Paul follows his mention of the appearance to Cephas by: "Then to the Twelve" (I Cor 15:5).

From Matthew and John it is clear that two of the twelve, Judas Iscariot (Mt 27:1-5) and Thomas (20:24) were not there, and from Luke (24:33) that there were others present in addition. Luke calls them 'the Eleven' (and the rest of the company). Mark also speaks of 'the Eleven' (16:14). John uses the expression 'the Twelve' in 20:24, but here he uses the term 'disciples' (20:19f.), probably referring to the wider company which Luke mentions. Why then does the formula in I Cor 15:5 speak of 'the Twelve'? It has thus been claimed that the appearance to the Twelve is an anachronism, since, at the time referred to, the election of Matthias (Acts 1:21-26), the substitute of Judas, had not yet taken place.232

To Historic Christianity, this is hypercritical.233 'The Twelve' is the title of a body of men who were originally twelve in number, but it had become a conventional name, referring to the apostolic body collectively, and bore no necessary relation to the exact number at any given moment. Paul thus means the men who were known as 'the Twelve', and is not concerned with the arithmetical accuracy of the phrase. He may in fact be telescoping two or three successive appearances, neither of which was precisely to the twelve (cf. Jn 20:24-27; 21:1 ff.) since his next reference is to a far larger gathering (over five hundred of our brothers).

The common features of the accounts in Luke and John stress the materiality of the risen Jesus. He could be touched, he had flesh and bones and ate in their presence. Nevertheless his body was a transformed body, which could appear and disappear at will.234 This fits Paul's notion of the resurrection body in I Cor 15.235 It takes more than a quick reference to Hellenistic Greek beliefs of religious heroes overcoming death as spiritual beings for the Bultmann School to be able to explain (away) this part of the narrative as an apologetic legend.236 If purely 'spiritual' appearances had been original, as this view implies, then it is difficult to see how such legends of physical appearances could have developed. For the offense of Docetism and similar Greek thought-forms would then be removed, since the Christians, too, believed in purely spiritual appearances. Likewise, stories of physical appearances would have been counter-productive as an apologetic both to Jews and pagans; to Jews because they did not accept an individual resurrection within history, and to pagans because their belief in the immortality of the soul could not adapt the crudity of a physical resurrection.

The Bultmann School claims that the accounts of Luke and John differ to such a degree that one has to choose between them if any of them should be taken as a correct report of the appearance.237 Were the disciples first doubtful (Lk 24:37-41) or were they immediately overjoyed (Jn 20:20)? Did Jesus breathe on them, giving them the gift of the Holy Spirit (Jn 20:22), or not until fifty days later (Acts 1:1-2:4)? A research programme whose protective belt states that the choice of words of the various evangelists was conditioned (also) by their knowledge of the historical facts, and that statements in one gospel therefore limit or fill out statements in another, cannot accept this way of interpreting the texts.238

To digest these anomalies, Historic Christianity distinguishes between the conferral of the Spirit (at Easter Day) and the filling/outpouring of the Spirit (at Pentecost). Jesus' breathing on the disciples points towards, but does not equate the event at Pentecost where they were to be "armed with the power from above" (Lk 24:49).239 Jn 20:22 may still be seen as the time when the Spirit of God was conferred to the disciples, taking place simultaneously with the missionary command of 20:21.240 This fits the general post-Easter picture of Jesus preparing the disciples for their coming mission starting at Pentecost; recalling the teaching which he had given to them about the necessity for the fulfilment of the prophecies concerning him in the OT, and outlining to them the gospel which was to be proclaimed to the world (cf. Lk 24:44-48; Jn 20:23; Mk 16:15-18).

As to the first anomaly, there is no contradiction, but a difference of emphasis. Putting the two accounts together, Luke emphasizes the disciples' starting hesitance of believing that it really was Jesus, since 'it seemed too good to be true,' while John recounts how, after Jesus had showed them his hands and his side, the disciples (finally) were filled with joy. This is clearly an example of the difference of methodological assumptions. If the narratives are compared as if each of them more or less told the whole story, they can easily be made to contradict each other. But if they are compared through a perspective of 'temporal depth' which allows for narrative compression (cf. Jn 20:30; 21:25; Acts 1:3), two pieces of information which to one research programme are contradictory may be argued to be complementary by the competing one.241 Historic Christianity thus concludes that there is nothing in the different accounts of the first appearance to the 'Twelve' which necessarily contradicts what is said in the others (even if we include Mk 16:15-18 here); they rather illuminate and modify one another so the scene comes even more to life.

Only John relates the second appearance in Jerusalem to the 'Twelve', including the doubting Thomas, a week later (20:24-29).242 As there are no other accounts to compare with, and as the corporality of the resurrection body has been dealt with earlier, the problem for Historic Christianity here is how to reconcile John's time-table with Matthew 28 and Luke 24.243 In Matthew 28 the disciples are told to go to Galilee, which they do, without any appearances in Jerusalem being recounted. In ch. 24, Luke takes the reader right through from Easter Sunday evening to the Ascension morning without mentioning any second appearance to the Twelve, and without a hint of any departure from Jerusalem to Galilee. Furthermore, at that point he says; "Stay here in this city until you are armed with the power from above" (24:49).

Mt 28:7 ('Tell his disciples: "He has been raised from the dead and is going on before you into Galilee; there you will see him"') and 28:10 ('Go and take word to my brothers that they are to leave for Galilee. They will see me there') reads as a proclamation to all the 'brothers' or disciples of Christ that they were to return to Galilee and see him there. The proclamation was thus not necessarily directed only to the apostles,244 although they were naturally the first to be told. Matthew records the journey of the 'Eleven' to Galilee (28:16), but at no time does he

state or imply that their departure was immediate. Without any other information, however, one might be inclined to read such an immediate departure into his account. But if John is correct, it is clear that the apostles did not return to Galilee for more than a week. As stated earlier, this fits what would be expected of devout Jews, who normally would stay in Jerusalem to observe the six days of unleavened bread which followed the feast of the Passover. Matthew, which obviously has no intention of mentioning appearances to men in Jerusalem,245 thus chooses a convenient form of words which may be accurate at the same time as it gives continuity to his story.246

What Luke says in his second book (Acts 1:3) implies to Historic Christianity247 that the account in his gospel is highly condensed. What might appear to have taken places in a single day in Lk 24 was in fact spread over forty days; during which Jesus presented himself alive by many proofs. There is no compelling reason to assume that he means the contents of all of his gospel's last chapter to have taken place in a direct and rapid sequence, thus contradicting Acts 1:3.248 The two concluding paragraphs in Lk 24 begin, according to the Revised Standard Version: "Then he said to them ..." (24:44; "And he said to them" in the NEB) and "Then he led them out ..." (24:50, same in NEB). These 'thens' however, give a much sharper suggestion of chronological continuity than what the Greek justifies. The paragraphs are linked with a weak connective non-temporal particle ('de') which would be better left untranslated.

Luke 24:44ff. may thus be read as if the author here leaps ahead and spans the whole fifty day period from Easter to Pentecost in ten verses. Side by side he puts a highly condensed account of Jesus' teaching and of the disciples' growing understanding during the period which began that day with the opening of their minds to the scriptures, and which ended on Ascension Day with the command to await their enduement with power (24:44-49); and a short account of the ascension and of the conduct of the disciples in the days immediately following (24:50-53). He is not packing into one day or even into one day and one night all the events between resurrection and ascension, and there is thus no necessary discrepancy in relation to John's story in 20:24-29. Nor is Luke necessarily excluding appearances in Galilee. His omission of any Galilean tradition can be explained insofar as it is upon Jerusalem his theological thoughts are centered: Jerusalem is the place from where salvation history goes to the ends of the earth, cf.
24:48.249

To the Bultmann School, however, the chronology in the appearance narratives is too confused and contradictory to be of any historical value. But even if this were to be granted, and there are source-critical reasons to do so, the (common?) historical core of (some of?) the different narratives could still be upheld. They may be seen as separable units largely transmitted with no inherent chronological context: "Only in the Fourth Gospel is something apparently preserved of the chronological structure characteristic of other parts of the Passion narrative." (Dodd 1963, 143.)

8.2.2.4 In Galilee

It is in connection with the locality of the appearances that the difficulty of harmonizing the sources has been most apparent. The Bultmann School claims that there is a major discrepancy between the tradition of appearances in Galilee (Mt 28:16-20 and John 21, cf. Mk 16:7) and the tradition of appearances found in Luke 24 (+ Acts 1), John 20 and possibly

Mark 16:9-20.250 The main reason for this discrepancy is that the evangelists, who were not eyewitnesses themselves, lacked information to put the traditions that had come down to them into correct chronological and topographical order.251 There was no intrinsic necessity for a sequence in the post-resurrection narratives, as opposed to the Passion story. Each community would tend to preserve the memory of an appearance to apostolic figures and put this into a suitable topographical setting. It is even argued that as far as substance is concerned, all the gospels are narrating the same basic appearance to the Twelve.252 Whether or not this is correct, the point here is that the two locales of Jerusalem and Galilee are thought of as mutually exclusive. In choosing between them, the Bultmann School opts for Galilee.

If one first accepts the claim that the texts reveal unsolvable discrepancies, then it is far easier to explain how stories of appearances in Galilee might come to be transferred to Jerusalem, the subsequent center of the church, than to explain how the Galilean tradition arose if the appearances were in Jerusalem.253 The empty tomb tradition, which the Bultmann School believe to have come into existence independently of the tradition of the appearances,254 likewise points towards an appearance in Galilee as the climax of its own story, cf. Mk 16:7; Mt 28:7.

Some argue that the disciples had fled away from Jerusalem, either at the time of the crucifixion or after the feast was over, and had disillusioned sought back to their former way of life in Galilee.255 Others reject this 'flight to Galilee' hypothesis as a 'legend of the critics'.256 In the opinion of Campenhausen 1958 the disciples were first given cause to go to Galilee by the discovery of the empty tomb.257 At a point where there were no appearances of Jesus, Peter seems to have understood the empty tomb as a pledge that the resurrection had occurred, and led the others to Galilee in hope of meeting Jesus there. Still others argue that the return to Galilee took place independently of the discovery of the empty tomb, and that the disciples, as pilgrims to the Psssover feast, returned to Galilee simply because they sooner or later had to come home. 258

To Historic Christianity, however, the theory of appearances only, or at least first, In Galilee is vulnerable. 259 It is true that the empty tomb tradition, including Mk 16:7 which is authentic, reveals a very early knowledge of a resurrection appearance of Jesus to the disciples in Galilee, 260 but the instruction of the angels (nor that of Jesus) does not preclude that there would be
appearances in Jerusalem prior to the one(s) in Galilee. As argued above; in ch. 8.2.2.1, the message to the women had a character of a promise of the risen Jesus to all his disciples of going before them to Galilee, as a shepherd, to regather his flock there. It was not a precise command of leaving the city immediately, which in any case would be contrary to the Jewish expectations of a devout pilgrim to stay in Jerusalem to observe the six days of unleavened bread which followed the feast of the Passover.

But if the disciples collectively twice saw Jesus in Jerusalem; speaking and eating with him, how can it be that they had to take the 2-3 days journey into Galilee in order to see him there, before they again returned to Jerusalem to be 'armed with the power from above'?261 Historic Christianity tries to absorb the anomaly in this way:262 The instruction/promise to the women of an appearance in Galilee was not limited to 'the Twelve', but directed to all the disciples/brothers of Jesus. Pauls' mention of an appearance to "over 500 of our brothers" (I Cor 15:6) after the appearance to 'the Twelve', may well refer to this meeting in Galilee. Although the post-resurrection witness was to begin in Jerusalem (cf. Lk 24:48f.), the strength of the movement of Jesus lay in his native Galilee, where he had spent most of his time as a

preacher. His purpose may thus have been to regather his scattered flock there, as their shepherd, nearby where most of them were staying at the time, and to recommision them to 'make all nations to my disciples' from the 'heathen Galilee'. The question, then, is not so much why the apostles should have to go to Galilee to meet the risen Jesus when they already had done so in Jerusalem, as why the 500 disciples, most of them already staying in Galilee, should have to go down to Jerusalem to see Jesus there when they could do so in their home province. That Galilee also was a symbol of the Gentile world which waits to be evangelized (cf. Mt 4:15f. and Isaiah 9:1-2) fits the character of the Galilean appearances as being bound up with the disciples' mission and vocation. They include the words in Mt 28:16-20 about preaching the gospel to every creature and John's account of Peter's commission to feed Christ's sheep (21:15-17).

To exclude experiences of appearances in Jerusalem involves a pretty extreme skepticism concerning the Lucan and Johannine traditions and their historical reliability. I have already argued that Lk 24 does not necessarily exclude Galilean appearances. Why then exclude the ones in Jerusalem? It is likely that the apostles remained in Jerusalem a week after Passover,263 and given the historicity of the empty tomb itself, it is harder to account for their ignorance of this fact than it is to account for their knowledge of it, especially if the ones who discovered it were women of their own company. On the other hand, as the apparrent discrepancies between the appearance narratives nevertheless weaken the case for their trustworthiness, a comparison of the different traditions as to historical reliability may perhaps be seen as somewhat irrelevant to the other programme.

Anyway, Campenhausen 1958 argues that it was the empty tomb in itself which made the disciples return to Galilee, excluding any such instruction from either angels or the risen Jesus. To Historic Christianity, however, the gospels are unanimous that the empty tomb in itself did not create faith in the resurrection. Lk
24:12 does not say that the empty tomb suggested the resurrection to Peter, only that it filled him with wonder. In the case of Jn
20:8-9 it was not the empty tomb as such that aroused faith, but the position in which the linen clothes lay.264 When Peter is referred to in Lk 24:34, however, it is because Jesus is said to have appeared to him, and this appearance, if historical, must have occurred on Easter Sunday in Jerusalem.

Mark records that not even the announcement of the angels that Jesus had arisen was believed. On the contrary, the women were filled with astonishment and fear (16:8). The two disciples on the Emmaus road had apparently heard that the tomb was empty but they were still filled with doubt (Lk 24:21). Luke records that when the women found the disciples and told them of finding the tomb empty, "the story appeared to them to be nonsense, and they would not believe them" (24:11). The empty tomb in itself only witnessed that something happened to the body of Jesus, it did not say what happened, even if the first thought that came to Mary of Magdala's mind was that "They have taken my Lord away, and I do not know where they have laid him" (Jn 20:13). The hypothesis proposed in Campenhausen 1958 does not account for these aspects of the sources.265

As to the appearances to the women in Jerusalem, which the 'Galilean theory' also seems to reject, it is remarkable that the testimony of women, who had no right to bear witness in Jewish courts, both to the empty tomb and to the resurrection itself, play so large a place in the gospels. If these appearances were the fictional products of later Christian communities which tried to construct a link between the empty tomb and the appearances, then we would

have expected the primary witnesses to have been apostles instead of women. To Historic Christianity, the only intelligible reason for the primacy of the testimony of the women is that it is historically sound. (Naturalistic explanations of the empty tomb will be dealt with below; ch. 9.2.1-3.) There is therefore altogether sufficient reason for believing that appearances took place both in Galilee and Jerusalem.

Some scholars, however, have suggested that the Galilean tradition is due to a linguistic confusion, owing to the similarity of words meaning a district and Galilee.266 Isaiah 9:1 would thus be taken to mean 'the district of the heathens' not the 'heathen (province of) Galilee'.267 In the LXX-translation of Ezekiel 47:8, the 'Galilah Kadmonah' is equated with the eastern surroundings of the temple area in Jerusalem; i.e. the district which included Bethany and the Mount of Olives. This theory is supported by medieval traditions268 which bear witness to a place near Jerusalem called Galilee. 'Galilee' has been suggested to be a location on the Mount of Olives also because it was the regular place of encampment of Galilean pilgrims.269

The main problem with these theories, however, is that there is no evidence that the early Christians confused Galilee with anything else. In order to explain the Galilean appearances as due to linguistic and historical ignorance on the part of the evangelists,270 one has to assume a far wider cleft between the gospels and the actual events than the discussions in ch. 7; above, calls for. Besides, the medieval traditions does not necessarily show anything more than that the traditions of appearances in Galilee and Jerusalem had led medieval men to harmonize the two by bringing Galilee to the Mount of Olives. As to the latter being called Galilee becase it was the place where Galilean pilgrims camped, it is intrinsically improbable that the Galilean disciples of Jesus would stay in Jerusalem for forty days after the Passover feast, and John 21 explicitly denies it. Also, if the nine disciples had fled to Bethany at the time of Jesus' arrest, they were already at a point on the far side of this 'Galilee' from the place where Jesus was buried, and he could thus hardly be described as going ahead of them to reach it (Mk 16:7). So 'Galilee' must be given its ordinary meaning, and the question of why Luke said nothing of appearances in Galilee retains its importance (cf. above; n.249).

Before going specifically into the accounts of the two appearances in Galilee, the basic attitude of Historic Christianity, as opposed to the Bultmann School, is thus that although there may be room for several hypothetical reconstructions of the whole story, it is not legitimate to press any of them so as to reject apparently good traditions which do not fit into it. The different traditions, including those of appearances in Galilee, should be assessed in view of the 'fact' that the evangelists were either eyewitnesses themselves or building upon other eyewitnesses. Unreliability should therefore not be too quickly asserted if the different accounts allow for a plausible perspective where they complement each other. This is not a question of being so liberal, source-critical speaking, that virtually any set of historical reports turn out to be trustworthy. The point is rather to consciously integrate the more detailed application of source-critical rules with previous conclusions as to the general origin, background and transmission of these specific sources (cf. above; ch. 7.2 and 7.3). Unreliability must thus in these cases be established, not just made possible per se and then assumed. (What this specifically means, however, in each particular case, is likely to be a disputable point.) The narratives must be given a fair chance; 'man muss dem Text einen Vorsprung geben.'

The internal succession of the two appearances in Galilee is made clear by Jn 21:14, which states that the appearance to the seven disciples by the Sea of Tiberias271 was "the third time

that Jesus appeared to his disciples after his resurrection from the dead." This does not imply ignorance of the individual appearance to Peter or to Cleopas and his companion (nor to the women), but refers to collective appearances to the apostles. After the Passover festival was over, it was time for the apostles to return to their home country in the north where Jesus, according to Mk 16:7, Mt 28:7 and 28:10, was to meet his 'disciples' or 'brothers'. With no particular commission to fulfill other than waiting for this to happen, the fact that Peter and the others wanted to take a boat out for a night of deep-sea fishing is not evidence that the Jerusalem-appearances had "absolutely no influence on the events in John 21." (Marxsen 1979, 74.) They do "go about their old daily tasks" (Peter, Andrew, John and James were fishermen), but not necessarily "as if nothing had happened" (ibid.), although the narrative in itself does not suggest any specific plan or expectation on their part.

What then of 21:4, which states that "Jesus stood on the beach, but the disciples did not know that it was Jesus"? If they do not recognize him, how could they already have met him twice in Jerusalem, talking and eating with him?272 The text, however, does not say that they did not recognize him, just like that. The distance between the beach and the boat has to be taken into consideration; as "about a hundred yards" (21:8) may well have been too far away for immediate recognition. It is only after they have caught all the fish on Jesus' command that the Beloved Disciple recognizes him, and Peter plungs into the sea.

The parallels between Jn 21:1-14 and the story of the draught of fishes in Lk 5:1-11 have led the Bultmann School to posit a common origin for the two.273 If Luke is to represent the more primitive tradition, the historicity of Jn 21 would clearly be undermined. But even when Jn is taken to be the more primitive, this is not taken as evidence of the factuality of the story. It is e.g. suggested that both Lk 5:1-11 and Jn 21 stem from the 'lost' account of the first appearance to Peter mentioned by Paul and Luke.274 To Historic Christianity, however, the notable differences between the two stories are sufficient evidence that the one narrative cannot be an edited version of the other.275 This points towards another possibility, rejected by the Bultmann School, that the two represent separate events. Further, Jn 21: 1-14 shows itself to be an integrated whole and does not combine two or more separate traditions.276

Although there is a definite redaction seen in the terms chosen and the structural development of the narrative, this does not undermine the historical nucleus lying behind the tradition. Whereas the Bultmann School tend to treat redactional and traditional/historical aspects as mutually exclusive, and try to separate them from one another, Historic Christianity argues that history, tradition, redaction and theology co-exist in the appearance narratives, as they do in the gospels in general.277 Tradition and redaction are interdependent. One does not simply eliminate all redactional emphases in order to arrive at the traditional core, for often the so-called 'redaction' is a paraphrase rather than a wooden addition to the sources.278

Redaction and tradition, history and theology can thus be shown to co-exist and supplement one another, both in Jn 21:1-14 as in 21:15-17; 18-19; 20-23 and 24-25.279 The redactional nuances have not obviated the historical nucleus of the pericopes, but have been used to highlight the ecclesiological interpretation inherent in the events themselves.280 There is good reason to believe that there is a primitive source behind the appearance by the Sea of Galilee. In 21:3 the disciples seem to be without a plan and expect noting. This is highly unlikely in a later resurrection narrative and is similar to Mark's discipleship motif, i.e. an accent on their failure.281 Moreover, although Luke 5:1-11 is a different event, the criterion of multiple attestation282 would still

apply. The miracle of a great catch of fish was so important to the early church that two divergent episodes are recounted. Of those criteria which point to a later or non-traditional pericope,283 only one may apply at all to 21:1-14; the criterion of the tendencies of the developing tradition, i.e. signs of later reflection or creation. However, this shows only redaction, not inauthenticity.284 Historic Christianity concludes that it is reasonable to maintain a positive appraisal of historical reliablity regarding the traditions behind the ecclesiological message in John 21.

The second account of an appearance in Galilee is told in Matthew 28:16-20: "The eleven disciples made their way to Galilee, to the mountain where Jesus had told them to meet them. When they saw him, they fell prostrate before him, though some were doubtful. Jesus then came up and spoke to them. He said: 'Full authority in heaven and on earth has been committed to me. Go forth therefore and make all nations my disciples; baptize men everywhere in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and teach them to observe all that I have commanded you. And be assured, I am with you always, to the end of time."

The Bultmann School suggests that this pericope is a redactional variant of the story of the transfiguration of Jesus on the mountain in Mk 9:2-8. 285 Again, the opposing research programme argues that it is a mistake to identify two different narratives.286 The transfiguration is precisely dated, and is followed in Mt and Mk by a command from Jesus not to tell anybody about it until be has been raised from the dead. Besides, form critical analysis shows that there is no resemblance in form whatsoever between the narratives of the transfiguration and those of the appearances. None of the latter speak, like the former, of Jesus appearing in supernatural glory. The only apparent exception is "they fell prostrate before him/they worshipped him (King James version)" in v. 17, but this does not imply that Jesus appeared to be any different from what he had always been. Worship was offered to him during his pre-Easter ministry, and Peter and Paul had to resist being treated in the same way.287 Matthew's words can thus not be used to show that the risen Jesus is thought of as transfigured in the second Galilean appearance.

The reference to "the mountain where Jesus had told them to meet them" (28:16) is understood in two opposing ways by the two research programmes. The Bultmann School takes it to be an ostensible discrepancy, since neither 28:10 nor 26:32, to which 28:16 is a cross-reference, mention any mountain.288 Further, as Matthew marks this appearance as the one to which both the angel and Jesus had referred on the morning on the resurrection, without mentioning any other meeting in Galilee, 28:16-20 has to be understood as the first in Galilee, thus contradicting Jn 21:14.289 "An unforeseen earlier meeting is incompatible with the evangelical idea of Jesus." (Strauss 1970, 830.)

Although this appearance in Galilee is the only one to men mentioned in Matthew, Historic Christianity interprets his wording in
28:16 to contain a hint of an earlier meeting:290 Thus far Matthew had spoken only of the message that they were to see Jesus at an unspecified place in Galilee. Now he speaks of the mountain to which Jesus had directed them. It thus seems likely that Matthew was thinking of an occasion at which Jesus himself had told them precisely where and when to assemble. The meeting with the seven fishermen in Jn 21:1-14 could well fit in here. So, given the unspecified character of the earlier message to go to Galilee, a meeting in Galilee prior to the one in Mt 28:16-20 would not be incompatible with 'the evangelical idea of Jesus', and the fact that Matthew does not mention such a meeting does not in itself imply that there was no

such meeting. The discrepancy to the possible cross-references of 26:32 and 28:10 thus disappears on closer examination.

The matter is a good example of how two opposing programmes can make one bit of evidence appear as saying quite opposing things. Mt 28 does not demand only one appearance in Galilee, but it may be read that way, which would then contradict Jn 21:14. This fits the protective belt of the Bultmann School, which thrives on historical discrepancies in mythological gospel texts. Mt 28 does not mention any prior appearance in Galilee to the one in vs. 16-20, but one may read the text in a way which makes room for this to have taken place. This fits the protective belt of Historic Christianity, which thrives on the internal consistency of NT sources pregnant with historical information.

The direction in Mt 28:16 to a location in the Galilean hills would suggest that the assembly was not to be a small one, for a dozen or more could easily have met privately indoors. In this respect, Mt 28:16-20 may have been the occasion of the appearance to "over five hundred brothers at once" mentioned in Paul's list in I Cor 15:6.291 There is no point in the forty days of Jesus' appearances where a chance gathering of 500 'brothers' can be plausibly imagined. Jn 21:14 implies that this meeting was after the appearance to the seven apostles at the Sea of Galilee, and thus after the dispersal of the Passover festival crowds in Jerusalem. A chance gathering of the latter would in any case not have been composed exclusively of 'brothers', as most Galilean pilgrims were not believers in Jesus. It is difficult to imagine such a large crowd chancing to assemble in Galilee and even more so that it should consist only of believers.

The information given in Acts 1:15 that just after the ascension the Jerusalem church was only 120 men strong has led some scholars to suppose that the appearance to the 500 occurred at Pentecost, ten days after Luke's forty-days period (Acts 1:3).292 But Acts 1:15 refers explicitly to the Jerusalem church, and there were probably more followers of Jesus in his native Galilee, where he spent most of his time, than in the south. Besides, a large gathering would excite far less attention in the provinces than at the capital. Altogether then, the appearance with more than 500 brothers, if historical, must have been a convened meeting in Galilee, where the apostles probably were made the instrument for regathering the scattered believers.

Although Matthew does not mention any large gathering, only that "the eleven disciples" went to the Galilean mountain (28:16), he does, according to Historic Christianity, indicate the presence of others beside the apostles. His words are; "When they saw him, they fell prostrate before him, though some were doubtful" (28:17). As the Bultmann School is quick to point out, given prior appearances in Jerusalem, it is quite unlikely that the apostles should have doubted the identity of their risen Lord at this moment. To this programme, then, the net result is a contradiction between John 20:19 ff. and Luke 24:33 ff. on the one hand, and Matthew 28:16-20 on the other.293

But if the latter is an account from a large gathering, as the identification with I Cor 15:6 implies, the matter stands different. 'Some' may have doubted, but not the apostles. Historic Christianity finds linguistic reasons to support this reconstruction.294 The only men specifically referred to in 28:16-17 are the eleven disciples, who are said to worship Jesus. Then Matthew goes on to say, "though some were doubtful/but others doubted (R.S.V.)." His precise form of words at this point is important. The nearest parallel is Mt 26:67, where it says; "Then they spat in his face and beat him with their fists; and others ... struck him." The

Greek construction which is used here normally signifies a change of subject, and the standard grammar translates it at both points "but others".295 In neither case does the language demand that those mentioned in the first part of the sentence and the 'others' mentioned in the second part should be regarded as completely mutually exclusive. Instead, it is natural to take them as referring to different groups. This means that 28:17 can be read as 'some others of those present were doubtful'. As it is evidently no part of Matthew's plan to write either about the experiences of the men in Jerusalem or about the experiences of the wider company of believers in Galilee, he chooses a form of words which describes the faith of the Eleven and only hints at the presence of others with doubts.

The Bultmann School asks why the missionary charge in Galilee has to be repeated if it already had been given in Jerusalem (cf. Jn20:21-23), 296 thereby implying that the Great Commision in this setting is a Matthean redactional composition void of historical basis.297 The fact that the pericope is impregnated with Matthean style and vocabulary, however, is in itself no evidence to Historic Christianity against its historical basis.298 The fact that Matthew attaches particular theological significance to the mountain as a place of revelation299 is not in itself evidence that such a topographical location is fictional. Besides, with over 500 disciples present, the Great Commission is no mere repetition of what had already taken place in Jerusalem. As already noted, the strength of the Christian movement lay in Jesus' native Galilee, and it makes good sense that he would want to regather and recommission his scattered disciples here. Such a great assembly was quite unlike any of the other appearances. It would have had a unique place in providing a strong base in the church as a whole for the resurrection faith.300

Galilean appearances make sense also in view of the prevalent notion of a temporal Jewish Messianic kingdom. Once his followers had grasped the 'fact' that Jesus has conquered death, they would be inclined to establish his throne in Jerusalem without delay, cf. Luke 24:21. The promise on Thursday (Mk 14:28) and the announcement on the resurrection morning (Mk 16:7; Mt 28:7;10) would counter this reaction and instead direct their minds to Galilee. In Galilee the apostles and the more than 500 disciples would be more likely to be weaned afresh from the idea of a temporal Jewish Messianic kingdom, till ready to be sent back to Jerusalem to start proclaiming Jesus as the risen Messiah from there onwards. (Acts 1:6 shows, however, how the old notions somehow lingered on.)

What about the Great Commission itself? There are two problems here, one general to all appearances and one more specific. The first concerns whether the risen Jesus can be thought of as communicating with words at all. The Bultmann School, which separates any revelation of the 'eschatological' from tangible spacetime history, answers no.301 The words spoken by the risen one are thus not to be taken as equal to or even based upon what was actually said by him, but as verbalizations of the community's understanding of the import of the resurrection. Whether or not this in turn was based upon "some type of intuitive communication by Jesus" (R. Brown 1973, 107) is here totally irrelevant.

But if the 'eschatological' is really separated from space-time history, then even the appearances as such must be beyond the reach of man's 'ordinary' visio-sensory appartus, and the whole matter is moved up into the higher spheres of visions and intuitive communication.302 This fits a mystical religion, but not a historical one like Christianity. The other programme therefore confirms, in principle, the possibility that the risen Jesus actually spoke recognizable words, in the same way as he did before his death. The body was transformed, but the person was the same. This, however, does not imply that the words

attributed to the risen Jesus have to be understood as if they were tape recordings, historically correct to the least detail. Each evangelist may have phrased the different motifs (of mission to the world, of preaching and teaching, of the forgiveness of sins, of baptism, and of the giving of the promised Holy Spirit) in different ways and often in a style characteristic of the respective evangelist, and yet have been true to the historical nucleus of these sayings. Even if "in Matthew it is evidently a Matthean Lord who speaks, in Luke a Lukan Lord and in John a Johannine Lord" (Evans 1970, 67), the motifs may still be based on the actual words of the risen Lord.

The specific problem refers to whether the motif of the universal mission, as authorized by Jesus in Mt 28:18-20, Lk 24:44-49 and Acts 1:48, was known in the primitive church at all. The Bultmann School claims no; such a motif is a quite late achievement of the Christian communities.303 If Jesus gave the command of universal mission, why was the decision to preach to the gentiles in Acts 10, 11 and 15 based not on the risen Jesus' missionary command, but on the new revelation to Peter? Why did Paul refer to the leaders in Jerusalem acknowledging him as being entrusted with "the Gospel for Gentiles", whereas "Peter had been entrusted with he Gospel for Jews" (Gal 2:9)? Why did not Peter and the apostles set about fulfilling the alleged command to preach to non-Jews right away?

To Historic Christianity, however, the discussions in the 'primitive' or early church did not revolve around if gentiles were to receive the gospel or not, but when and how.304 Paul's work among the gentiles was questioned by those who argued that all Jews had to be evangelized before the gospel should be taken to the gentiles, who then would be drawn to Christ through the redeemed people of Israel. It is against this understanding of the strategy of world mission that Paul argues in Romans 9. The second impediment to gentile mission was the notion that Gentile Christians had to be circumscribed, i.e. grafted to the Jewish people in order to be saved. Peter did not change his attitude on this point until he had received a particular vision (Acts 10), whereupon the leaders of the Jerusalem church were also convinced, as also is reflected in Gal. 2:1-9. The explicit command of universal mission was given by the risen Jesus, its practical application involved further discussions.

8.2.2.5 The Departure.

There may have been further unrecorded appearances in Galilee throughout an extended period,305 to which the appearance to James (I Cor 15:7b) probably belongs.306 To Historic Christianity it is clear, however, that the final appearance of Jesus took place in Jerusalem, "to all the apostles" (I Cor 15:76), not on Easter Day, but after the period of the Galilean appearances.307 The relevant passages are found in Mk 16:15-20, Lk 24:44-53 and Acts 1:1-14.308

The term apostle is occasionally used of others than 'the Twelve', but it seems likely that the reference in Acts 1;2 and I Cor 15:7b is to the remaining eleven, who are in fact named in Acts 1:13. I have earlier309 argued on linguistic grounds that Lk 24 does not enforce a rapid sequence of events. There is thus no necessary contradiction, as the Bultmann School claims,310 between the instruction on Easter Day to go to Galilee (Mk 16:7; Mt 28:7;10) and the command given prior to the ascension311 to remain in Jerusalem until Pentecost (Lk 24:49). The latter had evidently made the apostles return from Galilee to Jerusalem to wait for the final event which were to prepare them for their mission, starting in Jerusalem.

In his gospel Luke gives no hint of instructions to return to Galilee or of further appearances either there or in Jerusalem. He simply records that they are to stay in the city until they are 'armed with the power from above.' In Acts, however, he makes it clear that Jesus appeared to them over a period of forty days.312 That he should have mentioned only two313 appearances in the gospel does not mean that he is unaware of others. As Paul's companion he must have known of the six appearances listed in I Cor. 15. If he knew Mark's gospel he would have known of a promised appearance in Galilee, if he knew Matthew's he would have known of its fulfilment. Nor is it necessary to suppose that Luke heard new stories between the writing of the two books as he is probably telescoping a long and complex series of events.

The account in the Marcan Appendix also spans the whole period from Easter Day to Ascension Day. The commission which is recorded in 16:15-18 is introduced by "Then he said to them" in the New English Bible (cf. n. 308), thus placing this commission at the Easter Sunday meal in the upper room (and the ascension on Easter Day? 314). But this is to read too much into the story. The 'then' (Greek: 'kai'), which is really an 'and', does not necessarily tie what follows to what has gone before. It is quite a habit of Mark to start a new paragraph with an 'and' which in idiomatic English is often best left untranslated. 315 Historic Christianity therefore regards 16:15-20 as a single unit, telling of the final instructions to the eleven immediately before the ascension.

It is possible that Mk 16:15-18 is an independent report of the teaching of Jesus on the mountain in Galilee (Mt 28:16-20). But this is unlikely given three things. Mark's account does not appear to move outside the Jerusalem area, the two accounts have little in common verbally; and the emphasis in Mt is on the authority of the risen Christ, while in Mk it is on the miraculous powers which are to be granted to those who believe. The former emphasis seems more suitable to those who are beginning to learn the meaning of the resurrection, the latter to those who at the end of the forty days are looking forward to the outpouring of Pentecost. Contra the Bultmann School,316 Mt 28:18-20 does not preclude any later appearances, nor does it preclude Jesus from giving the final charge in Jerusalem, emphasizing the power which would be given them to fulfill the command in Mt 28:18-20; cf. Acts 1:8.317

Both programmes agree that the notion of ascending to heaven (cf. the longer text of Lk 24:51, and Mk 16:19) implies figurative language, for heaven is not really to be thought of as above the earth.318 The disagreement concerns the ascension, in the sense of Jesus' final departure, as a separate event. The Bultmann School claims that originally there was no difference between the resurrection (understood mythologically) and his ascension; The distinction arose as a consequence of the Easter legends,319 whereas Historic Christianity takes the ascension to denote a historical event distinguished from the resurrection, signaling the end of Jesus' appearances.320 I have already argued in favor of the latter position in relation to the reports of appearances in Galilee and Jerusalem. But the Bultmann School claims there are explicit and implicit references to Jesus' ascension having taken place prior to the time related in Luke 24:50-53 and Acts 1:6-9, thus contradicting the latter.321

In Jn 20:17 Jesus says to Mary "Do not cling to me, for I have not yet ascended to the Father. But go to my brothers, and tell them that I am now ascending/I am going to ascend to my Father..." As the first part can be paraphrased as 'You do not need to hold on to me, I haven't left you yet',322 the context implies that the ascension will not take place until after Jesus also have met his disciples, thus the translation, he is going to ascend' (not now, but later) is

preferable. According to Mt 28:18 Jesus was exalted and glorified before he appeared to his disciples on the mountain in Galilee, for he claimed "Full authority in heaven and on earth has been committed to me." Historic Christianity, however, distinguishes between the exaltation, which was an integral part of the resurrection (as a sort of 'theological ascension'), and the ascension as the historical terminus of the post-Easter appearances.323 Thus the consistency of the sources is maintained even on this point.

8.3 Conclusions.

In this chapter I have argued, in line with Historic Christianity, that the NT resurrection material warrants the following conclusions: Paul's evidence serves to confirm the gospels' narratives of Jesus' bodily resurrection. Paul's testimony likewise implies the historicity of the empty tomb. The presence of the empty tomb pericope in the pre-Markan passion story points to the primitiveness of the tradition, as does the use of 'the first day of the week' instead of 'on the third day'. The nature of the empty tomb narrative in Mark is theologically unadorned and non-apologetic and the discovery of the tomb by women is highly probable given the low status of women in Jewish society and their lack of qualification to serve as legal witnesses. There are also good reasons that some disciples investigated the empty tomb. In any case it would have been impossible to proclaim the resurrrection in Jerusalem, as the disciples after Pentecost actually did, had the tomb not been empty. The latter is also presupposed by the Jewish polemic against the resurrection belief.324

As to the appearances, both historical-theological research programmes agree that the sources establish beyond doubt that many members of the earliest church, especially the apostles, were convinced that they had witnessed at least one appearance of the risen Jesus.325 The Bultmann School claims that the different appearance narratives are irreconcilable. What kind of historical core remains intact, other than that the apostles and other disciples had such experiences is a disputed question. Historic Christianity, on the other hand, has argued against the irreconcilability of these sources, defending the historical reliability of their underlying traditions. According to one exponent of this programme,326 the sources exhibit at first sight great disharmony, but on close examination the details gradually fall into place. The chronology of the appearances in the gospels likewise fit the chronology of the list in I Cor 15.

But many aspects are uncertain. Ad hoc hypotheses seem to play a necessary part in harmonizing the apparent discrepancies in the different accounts. To a historical-theological research programme such an acknowledgement is not fatal, however. All research programmes have unsolved problems and undigested anomalies at any stage of development. No historical perspective can account for all the 'facts' at any particular time. This is not to say that the appearance narratives are necessarily irreconcilable, as the Bultmann School has it, but that so far Historic Christianity has not produced a source-critically convincing reconstruction of a harmonized order of events. Even if the texts may be harmonized, apparent discrepancies do make a difference as to the question of historical reliability. Nevertheless, to a historian who wants to account for the origin of the resurrection faith, it is not of basic importance exactly where or to whom these appearances occurred, as long as it is clear that some disciples, notably the apostles, encountered certain experiences which they took to be appearances of Jesus risen from the dead.

NOTES ch. 8

1. Pagels 1981, 5 f. Cf. Elliott 1979, 216: "The NT gospels' Easter stories appear to reflect here two different traditions one spiritual, one physical. The Christians' attempt in the NT to preserve this essentially Jewish concept of describing life after death (in physical terms) is the reason why so many of the gospels contain contradiction and difficulties."
2. The formulations are taken from Marxsen 1979, 30.
3. Cf. e.g. Wenham 1984, 9.
4. Cf. e.g. Elliott 1979, 219, Fuller 1980, 8; 172; 183 and Kasper 1976, 129.
5. Cf. Fuller 1980, vii, contra Marxsen's main thesis. Fuller is here an example of a scholar whose positions sometimes belong to Historic Christianity (as in this case), sometimes (and most often) to the Bultmann School (cf. e.g. the previous note).
6. Cf. notably Grass 1970, passim, and, e.g. J.M. Thompson 1912, 170-172, Perry 1959 103-119; R. Brown 1973, 85-89; Kapser 1976, 139 f.; Pannenberg 1977, 99; Marxsen 1979, 69 f.; Fuller 1980, 33. Küng 1978, 366 expresses the point clearly: "To maintain the identity God does not need the relics of Jesus' earthly existence. We are not tied to physiological ideas of the resurrection. There can be identity of the person even without continuity between the earthly and the "heavenly", "spiritual" body. Resurrection is not tied to the substantum ... or the elements of this particular body. The corporality of the resurrection does not require the tomb to be empty. God raises the person in a new, different, unimaginable "spiritual corporality"."
7. John Robinson 1976, 352. (Wenham 1984, 51, dates it to AD 54; Craig 1981, 173 to AD 56-57 and Strauss 1970, 833 to AD 59.)
8. Cephas is the Aramaic equivalent to Peter.
9. According to Fuller 1980, 11, we are left with 1 Cor 15: 3b-6aand 7 as the original pre-Pauline tradition. As to the question of whether the kernel of Paul's statement involves a unified formula or a combination of a plurality of formulae, see ibid., 11-14; Pannenberg 1977, 90 f; R. Brown 1973, 83; n. 141 and Wilckens 1963, 63-81.
10. See ibid., 90.
11. The Greek words for "I handed on" and "had been imparted to me" ('paredoka' and 'parelabon') are equivalents of the technical rabbinic terms ('masar le' and 'qibbel min') which denotes receiving and handing on oral tradition. Cf. Fuller 1980, 10.
12. Cf. ibid., 11. (Bearing the reservations of the cultural and liguistic distinctions in ch. 7.3.3.4; above, in mind.)
13. Building upon this, Pannenberg 1977, 97, states that "the appearances to 500 brethren at once cannot be a secondary construction to be explained by the development of the history of traditions, because Paul calls attention precisely here to the possibility of checking his assertion by saying that most of the 500 are still alive." Cf. ibid., 91. To Bultmann, on the other hand, the appearance to Peter which we read of in I Cor 15:5 has a legendary character; see Bultmann 1963, 290.
14. For the structure of the argument of a spiritual resurrection, see Craig 1980, 49. In the following (8.1.1) I will draw heavily upon Craig's essay, as an exponent of the position of Historic Christianity on this matter. Cf. also Ladd 1976, 104-131 and to some degree Rengstorf 1964, 100-120.
15. Cf. e.g. Strauss 1970, 848; Klausner 1925, 359 and Pannenberg 1977, 92f.
16. Cf. e.g. Lake 1907, 266; 13-43; J. M. Thompson 1912, 202˘ff.. Edwien 1978, 202 even claims that what made Saul (later: Paul) stop on his way to Damascus was a psychological shock, an epileptic attack which became the mystic's encounter with 'the eternal' (cf. ibid., 192 f.)!

17. Grass 1970, 222. Grass maintains that Luke had before him a tradition of Paul's experience that could not be assimilated to the more physical appearances of Christ to the disciples and that therefore the tradition is reliable; the extra-mental aspects are the result of mythical or legendary influences (ibid., 219f.). But Craig 1980, 50, points out that precisely the opposite might as well be true: Because the appearance to Paul is a post-ascension experience, Luke is forced to construe it as a heavenly vision, since Jesus had already physically ascended. Cf. ibid., 51.
18. Grass 1970, 189-207, cf. Kasper 1976, 138. Edwien 1978, 189-204, has missed this point completely.
19. Craig 1980, 51, contra Grass 1970, 229-232.
20. Pannenberg 1977, 93-94, opts for a middle position by stating that "the character and mode of the Easter appearances ... may have involved an extraordinary vision, not an event that was visible to everyone," nevertheless "this does not necessarily mean that what was seen was imaginary." Cf. Pannenberg 1965, 133. The reason for the hesitance of the Bultmann School to accept the physicality of the risen body of Jesus is probably that the transcendent or eschatological "can be suggested only by way of myth (as in Jewish acopalyptic) or analogies (as in philosophy of religion). "This kind of language is not literal description." (Fuller 1980, 182.) But if the revelation or appearance of the transcendent/eschatological in immanent, this-wordly reality is unable to be described literally, how can one believe in the Jesus of history as God incarnate in the first place? The unwillingness to accept the physicality or tangibility of the appearances of the risen Jesus to me points in the direction of docetism; the seperation of spirit from matter, of God from space-time history.
21. I Cor. 9:1-2; II Cor. 11:5; 12:11.
22. Gal. 1:1; 11-12; 15-16; I Cor. 9:1-2; 15:8-9.
23. I.e., if the 'levelling-up'-premice is accepted in the first place. Whether Paul actually would be willing to present his own seeing the risen Jesus as an appearance if he himself knew it to be a vision, even if that would be decisive for his authority as an apostle, is another question.
24. See Craig 1980, 52; note 12 for references.
25. Cf. Ramsay 1946, 54, who identifies the presuppositions of a spiritual resurrection which are tied up with Greek idealism in general: "The body has no place in man's future life. ... The human race is destined for a spiritual immortality through the survival of the soul after death. ... The Resurrection of Jesus is ... an exemplary edifying symbol of our survival after death."
26. Cf. Bultmann 1974, 192 ff; Küng 1978, 351; Marxsen 1979, 69f.
27. Gundry 1976, 167.
28. Cf. ibid., 50: "The 'soma' denotes the physical body, roughly synonymous with 'flesh' in the neutral sense. It forms that part of man in and through which he lives and acts in the world. It becomes the base of operations for sin in the unbeliever, for the Holy Spirit in the believer. Barring prior occurrence of the Parousia, the 'soma' will die. That is the lingering effect of sin even in the believer. But it will also be resurrected. That is its ultimate end, a major proof of its worth and necessity for its sanctification now."
29. "The 'soma' may represent the whole person simply because the 'soma' lives in union with the soul/spirit. But 'soma' does not mean "whole person", because its use is designed to call attention to the physical object which is the body of the person rather than the whole personality." Ibid., 80.
30. E.g. 'the body of Christ' for the church. Nevertheless, this is a physical metaphor; the church is not the 'I' of Christ.

31. E.g. John 3:5 ff; Rom. 7:18; 25; Gal. 2:20. This touches sensitive nerves in German theology because the Creed in German states that I believe in the resurrection of the 'Flesch' ('flesh'), not of the 'body', as in the English translation.
32. Even if some Greek philosophers thought of 'pneuma' as a very fine, invisible, celestial substance capable of interpenetrating all other forms of being, virtually every commentator agrees that Paul is not talking about a rarefied body made out of spirit or ether; he means a body under the lordship and direction of God's spirit. 'Psyche' and 'pneuma' are not substances out of which bodies are made, but dominating principles by which bodies are directed. Cf. Ladd 1976, 116 and Craig 1980, 57-59.
33. See Hering 1959, 147; Craig 1980, 59.
34. Cf. Matt. 16:17; Gal. 1:16; Eph. 6:12; Heb. 2:14. See also Strack and Billerbeck 1969, 730 f., 753 and Craig 1980, 72 f; note 27.
35. Paul's doctrine of the world to come is that the resurrection bodies will be part of, so to speak, a resurrected creation; Rom. 8:18-23. The universe will be delivered from sin and decay, not materiality, and our bodies will be part of that universe.
36. Cf. Pannenberg 1968, 11; O'Collins 1978, 49 and Fuller 1980, 172 f.
37. E.g. Ezekiel 37:1-10, Genesis 50:25. Jesus sided with the Pharisees on this basic issue, cf. Mt. 23:37 with Jn. 5:28.
38. In Semitic anthropology there was no dualistic concept of body and soul; rather an animated body was the whole man. The concept of survival after death is in Hebrew thought necessarily expressed in the form of resurrection of the body, for without a body the person simply would not exist. Cf. R. Brown 1967, 235. Although it was a widespread belief in Jewish circles at this time to imagine life after death as some kind of resuscitation of the body (Dodd 1972, 166), cf. the Pharisaic doctrine that the raised will each beget a thousand children, it is a false generalization to say, like Rengstorf 1964, 120 (1952;88), that the NT is independent of its Jewish origin in everything it says about the corporeality of those who are resurrected. Paul's conception of the resurrection body (like that of the evangelists) as a powerful, glorious, imperishable, spirit-directed body, created through a transformation of the earthly body or the remains thereof, made to inhabit the new universe in the eschaton was not unusual in the Judaism of Paul's day. It is remarkably similar to that of the contemporary Syriac Baruch; see II Baruch 50-51. Cf. Pannenberg 1977, 75; 79-81 and Craig 1980, 55. Jesus, too, understood the condition of the resurrection life as transformed in contrast to the present life, cf. Mark 12:25: "When they rise from the dead, men and women do not marry; they are like angels in heaven." This fits the apocalyptic passages that say that the resurrected will be transformed to the "radiance of the angels" (Daniel 12:3; Enoch 51:4; 104:2; IV Ezra 7:97; II Baruch 51:51;10); cf. Matthew 13:43. The transformed resurrection body is nevertheless material, and neither Paul's (I Cor 15:44, 50) nor Jesus' (Mk. 12:25; Mt. 13:43) understanding of the resurrection as such, contra O' Collins 1978, 49, and Fuller 1980, 173, contradict the accuracy of the physical details in the Easter narratives of Luke and John. Like Paul, the evangelists rather steer a careful course between gross materialism (resuscitation of a corpse) and the immortality of the soul.
39. Contra Perry 1959, who compare the resurrection with apparitions of the dead. According to his telepathic theory of the resurrection appearances, "Jesus died on the cross, but was raised from the dead by his Father. In his new state he was no longer clothed by the old material body of his incarnate life, but by some kind of spiritual body such as St. Paul attempts to describe for us. Without a body of flesh, Jesus wished to convince his disciples that he was alive and had transcended death, ... Jesus therefore communicated with his disciples we do not know how, so we call it 'telepathy' and caused their minds to project an apparition of his body as they had known it." Ibid., 194 f.

40. The first century Christians apparently understood Paul in the same way: the letters of Clement and Ignatius prove early wide acceptance of the doctrine of the physical resurrection in first century churches, including the very churches where Paul himself taught. See Staniforth 1968, 5-132; passim.
41. Cf. e.g. J. M. Thompson 1912, 197. Docetism is the belief that Christ only seemed to have a human body and die on the cross; the Greek 'dokein' = seeming; apparent. Cf. B. Skard 1971, 27-30.
42. Cf. Ladd 1976, 60-73.
43. Cf. I John 4:2-3, II John 7.
44. Against Heresies 1.26.1, referred to in Craig 1980, 67.
45. The Epistle to the Smyrnaens, 3; Staniforth 1968, 119 f.
46. The women's grasping Jesus' feet (Mt. 28:9) is not a polemical point, but their response of worship. When Jesus says "Do not cling to me" (Jn. 20:17), Mary is not explicitly said to have done so. The appearance on the mountain (Mt 28:16-20) and by the Sea of Tiberias (Jn. 21:1ff) just naturally presuppose a physical Jesus; no points are trying to be scored against docetism.
47. Craig 1980 even concludes that "Paul's doctrine of the resurrection body is potentially more physical than that of the gospels, and if Christ's resurrection body is to be conceived in any less than a physical way, that qualification must come from the side of the gospels, not of Paul." Ibid., 65.
48. J. M. Thompson 1912, 64f.
49. Grass 1970, 146f.
50. Cf. Küng 1978, 363; J. M. Thompson 1912, 172.
51. See Craig 1981, 1972.
52. Grass 1970, 172.
53. Acts 22:6f.; 26:13 f.
54. Cf. Ramsay 1946, 72 (referring to Lake 1907); Perry 1959, 92. Besides, the empty tomb did not in itself imply a resurrection. The far most prominent part of the evidence was the appearances, cf. e.g. Rengstorf 1964, 81f.
55. Cf. Pannenberg 1968, 11 and Pannenberg 1965, 134. As to the key point of how Jesus' disciples, and later also Paul, could have proclaimed his resurrection if they could constantly have been refuted by the evidence of the tomb in which Jesus' corpse lay, see below; ch. 8.2.1. and 9.2.
56. Cf. Gal. 1:8 f. This, of course, presupposes that the story, or stories, of the empty tomb belong to the early stratum of the gospel tradition. This is a disputed claim, cf. R. Brown 1967, 234, who takes the fact that Paul mentions no appearance to the women as evidence that this story belongs to a later stratum of the tradition, cf. J.M. Thompson 1912, 165. Wenham 1984, 53, however, suggests that Pauls's failure to mention the women in I Cor. 15:5-8 is not surprising, since in Jewish law a woman's witness was not readily accepted in court. In listing numbers of resurrection appearances, Paul concentrated on Jesus' officially commissioned representatives, not necessarily because he himself was unwilling to accept the witness of women in such cases, but because some of his readers might have been. Cf. n. 201; below.
57. Cf. Col. 2:12.
58. Acts 13:29: "And when they had carried out all that the scriptures said about him, they took him down from the gibbet and laid him in a tomb. But God raised him from the dead; ..." Craig 1981, 182, asks: "Indeed, is it too much to imagine that during his two week stay (in Jerusalem six years after Jesus' death) Paul would want to visit the place where the Lord lay? Ordinary human feelings would suggest such a thing. In fact, it could be argued that if Paul was in Jerusalem prior to his trip to Damascus, as Acts reports, then he probably would have heard of the empty tomb then, not, indeed, from the Christians, but from the Jewish

authorities in whose employ he was. For even if the Christians in their entusiasm had not checked to see if the tomb of Jesus were empty, the Jewish authorities could be guilty of no such oversight. So, ironically, Paul may have known of the empty tomb even before his conversion."

59. I am here building upon Craig 1981, 173-176.

60. Cf, e.g. Ramsay 1946, 72; Ladd 1976, 106.

61. Cf. Campenhausen 1958, 27.

62. According to Fuller 1981, 16 (building upon Wilckens 1963), the phrase 'he was buried' must be taken as an independent statement standing on its own since it occurs within its own 'hoti' (that) clause. As such he takes it to summarize an earlier form of the burial pericope found in a later and developed form in Mk. 15:42-26, and denies that it can be used to imply a knowledge by Paul or by the pre-Pauline tradition of the story of the empty tomb. The key assumption here, that there are four different traditions underlying the four 'that' clauses in I Cor15:3b-5, may be questioned however. R. Brown 1973, 83; n.141, e.g., finds it "too demanding on coincidence, ... that four independent formulas would have resulted in the careful balance of alternating length now found in the "that" ("hoti") clauses of I Cor 15:3-5.

63. Ibid., 83 f., claims that the continuity between the events "is an important element in the idea of bodily resurrection, but it tells us nothing of the empty tomb." He can say this, of course, only because he mistakenly believes Paul rejected the idea that the risen body of Jesus was physical; see ibid., 85. Rengstorf 1964, 81, on the other hand, claims that even if 'he was buried' can not be taken as a proof that Paul referred to the empty tomb, the combination of I Cor. 15:4 and Rom. 6:4f makes it at least probable that Paul knew its tradition, and that it was an essential element in his kerygma.

64. Cf. Craig 1981, 195; n.3 for references.

65. Cf. Wilckens 1963, 63-81.

66. Notably Craig 1981, 176-181, which I draw upon here.

67. The third day dates the first appearance of Jesus; because Christians assembled for worship on the first day of the week, the resurrection was assigned to this day; parallels in the history of religions influenced the dating of the resurrection on the third day; the dating of the third day is lifted from OT scriptures. For a searching criticism of these theories, see Lehmann 1968, 176-261 and Bode 1970,110-117.

68. As argued, notably by Lehmann 1968, 262-290, and also by Bode 1970, 119-126. (Cf. also Fuller 1980, 26f.) As for the Jewish Midrash, the mention of the offering of Isaac on the third day is thought to have a special influence on Christian thought.

69. For details, see Craig 1981, 179 f., who argues that the interpretation of the offering of Isaac on the third day does not play any role in the NT, contra Lehmann. The evidence is precisely to the contrary. As to the LXX, it may have provided the language for the NT dating of the resurrection. But this is no evidence against the historical basis for dating the resurrection on the third day, i.e. "on the Sunday morning ... " (Luke 24:1).

70. Cf. Lehmann 1968, 174; Bode 1970, 125f.

71. The basic dichotomy between historical factuality and theological significance typical of the Bultmann School is all the more suspect on this point since the Rabbis cited in the Talmud and Midrash no doubt believed both that the events in question really happened on the third day and that they were theologically significant. They include in their lists of events that occurred on the third day not only events in which the third day was important theologically, but also events in which the third day was not charged with theological significance, as in the story of Rahab and the spies (Joshua 2:16;22). (Full citations from the Talmud and Midrash may be found in Lehmann 1968, 26-290.)

72. Notably in Hosea 6:2 and Jonah 2:11. The argument found in J. M. Thompson 1912, 165, that Paul "dates the resurrection by an inference from the scriptures, and for no other

reason" ('on the third day, in accordance with the scriptures'), is thus not valid. The NT writers did not interpret the OT by the historical method like a modern scholar does. They interpreted it in the light of Christ (cf. Ladd 1976, ch. 6; 60-74). That Paul interprets the third day as a fulfilment of the scriptures without mentioning the testimony of the (legally unqualified) women is no evidence that he did not know the empty tomb tradition. As mentioned earlier, the reason why the empty tomb is not explicitly mentioned in the short formula of Paul may simply be that it was regarded as a matter of course, given the resurrection and appearances of Jesus. Or again, it may be that the evidence of the appearances so overwhelmed the testimony of legally unqualified woman to the empty grave that the latter was not used as prime evidence. Nevertheless, notably the Gospel of Mark shows that the empty tomb was important to the early church, even if it was not appealed to as evidence in evangelistic preaching. (Acts 2:29 ff may be taken as as exception: "The patriarch David died and was buried, and his tomb is here to this very day ... The Jesus we speak of has been raised by God, as we can all bear witness.")

73. Cf. Dodd 1963, 142 f.

74. Cf. e.g. Küng 1978, 363, Bornkamm 1979, 182 f., Marxsen 1979, 76 f. and Pannenberg 1977, 102.

75. Cf. Dodd 1963, 150; n.1. In this connection, Dodd asks a revealing question: "When did a number of witnesses of strange and rapidly moving events ever give an exactly identical *précis* of the sequence before there was time to collate and unify their stories?"

76. Cf. Wenham 1984, 128. The gospels are thus not independent insofar as the later writers knew what their predecessors had set down, and in so much that the resurrection had been the subject of public teaching continuously since the day of Pentecost, and much of what was included in the various gospels was common knowledge. But even if the resurrection narratives overlap, none of them is actually dependent upon an earlier gospel, or can properly be called an adaption of one of its predecessors. Cf. ibid.,150; n.24.

77. Cf. Fuller 1980, 131 and Marxsen 1979, 37 f.; 76 f.

78. Cf. Wenham 1984, 127. Cf. the conclusion in ch. 7.3.1: The most primitive state of the triple, or 'Markan' tradition is not consistently or exclusively to be found in any one gospel, to which we must then assign over-all temporal priority. There was written as well as oral tradition underlying each of the gospels, and this tradition is sometimes preserved in its most original form by Matthew, sometimes by Luke, but probably most often by Mark. The cross-fertilization between the ongoing traditions at any stage in their development means that all of the synoptic gospels, depending on the particular issue, may turn out to be independent of the others. Cf. Dodd 1963, 144 regarding the appearance narratives.

79. Cf. Ladd 1976, 84.

80. Dodd 1963, 150f. Cf. ibid., The Narrative; passim.

81. Cf. ibid., 150; n.1.

82. Ladd 1976, 91-93, Perry 1959, 65-81 (with the exception of Mt. 28:9-10 vs. Mk. 16:9), and notably Wenham 1984, passim. The latter claims that "these resurrection stories exhibit in a remarkable way the well-known characteristics of accurate and independent reporting, for superficially they show great disharmony, but on closer examination the details gradually fall into place." Ibid., 11. Ladd, on the other hand, is more careful: "This harmonication does not mean that the author intends to suggest that the events actually happened in this order. We cannot know." Ladd 1976, 93.

83. C.f. e.g. Marxsen 1979, 71; 76f.; 68 and Kasper 1976, 127;129.

84. Cf. Wenham 1984, 52; 128.

85. Wenham gives an example; "It is unthinkable that Luke, who knew Paul's teaching about the resurrection and who himself was to state in Acts that Jesus appeared during forty days, could have supposed (or intended his readers to suppose) that the events between the

resurrection and the ascension were crowded into one day, even though his account could be read that way." Ibid., 52.
86. E.g. Gerhardsson 1963, 43, n. 104 and Osborne 1981, 319; n.3. Cf. 'Dem Text einen Vorsprung geben' (Peter Stuhlmacher).
87. E.g. Bultmann 1963, 290, Bornkamm 1979, 183 and Küng 1978,364.
88. Cf. Nestle-Aland 1979.
89. For a more extensive treatment of the problem, see Snodgrass 1972. Cf. R. Brown 1973, 98f.
90. Craig 1981, 182.
91. Cf. ibid., 182f. and Dodd 1963, 143.
92. Cf. Bode 1970, 18-23, Fuller 1980, 52 and Bultmann 1963, 284f.
93. Mk 15:40 (the crucifixion) names Mary of Magdala, Mary the mother of James the Younger and of Joseph, Salome and several other women from Galilee. Mk 15:47 (the burial) names Mary of Magdala and Mary of Joseph, and Mk 16:1 (the visit to the tomb) names Mary of Magdala, Mary of James, and Salome.
94. Bode 1970, 20f., cf. Bultmann 1963, 284 f.
95. Craig 1981, 196; n. 14.
96. Cf. Pesch 1977, 2:519f.
97. Craig 1981, 183, contra Bode 1970, 19f. Mk 16:7 is by the Bultmann School considered a redactional insertion (cf. e.g. Fuller 1980, 53 and Pannenberg 1977, 102f.); an example of how a research programme through its positive heuristic, which includes a set of problem-solving techniques (here: redaction criticism) can digest anomalies and even turn it into positive evidence (the structural non-correspondence between I Cor. 15 and the passion story).
98. Cf. Wenham 1984, 81 (contra Strauss 1970, 810)
99. Cf. Judges 9:33, which gives an account of a dawn attack taking place "as soon as the sun is up", and Psalm 104:22 which refers to the night animals returning to their liars "when the sun rises".
100. Wenham 1984, 81 vs. Bode 1970, 11.
101. Furthermore, the words 'went' in the Revised Standard Version (RSV) of Mt, Mk and Lk translate the same verb as the 'came' in Jn. Either translation would be possible in any of the cases, depending on what standpoint the writer is thought to be adopting. In any case, we get a consistent and coherent picture if we see the first departure as being in the dark and the last arrival as being before sunrise. Cf. Wenham 1984, 81 ff, who argues for two distinct groups of women arriving at the tomb. That the Church of the Holy Sepulchre is the place where Jesus actually was buried seems to be confirmed by archeological and historical evidence; cf. Cornfield 1982, 199-217.
102. Cf. Bode 1970, 13, Perry 1959, 66f. and especially Wenham 1984, 22-42.
103. According to Hegesippus, a second-century historian, quoted by Eusebius 1965, bk. III, ch. 11, cf. ibid., bk. IV; ch. 22.
104. A 'steward' here means a permanent and senior member of Herod's court, see Hoehner 1972, 303f.
105. Cf. Wenham 1984, 35f.; 56-71.
106. Joanna, a member of Herod's court, would probably have been on easy terms with Joseph of Aritmathea, the prominent Sanhedrist. It could thus very well be, to continue the conjecture (cf. ibid., 64), that she and her friend Susanna are the women mentioned in Lk. 23:55 "who had come with him from Galilee" and followed Joseph; "taking note of the tomb and observing how his body was laid." (Matthew and Mark mentioned Mary of Magdela and the other Mary as sitting opposite the grave, seeing where he was laid, but not how as in Luke, the latter implying a viewpoint inside the grave, as opposed to the outside 'where'). To

Historic Christianity, Acts 13:29 is an anomaly in this connection: "They ("those who lived in Jerusalem and their rulers,"
13:27, i.e., the same parties who had initiated the crucifixion of Jesus in 13:28) took him down from the tree, and laid him in a tomb." How does this tradition relate to that of Joseph of Aritmathea? For an answer by the Bultmann School, see Fuller 1980, 54f.
107. Cf. ibid., 36-39. Since it is quite unlikely that the Virgin Mary had a sister also called Mary, the argument of equating 'his mother's sister' with 'Mary the wife of Cleopas' (Jn. 19:25) falls.
108. Cf. Craig 1981, 185 and Morison 1978, 72-75.
109. Bode 1970, 13.
110. Ibid., 14.
111. Wenham 1984, 60 ff.
112. The context of the quotatin from Bode is his critical note on Morison 1978, which, from the same perspective would be applicable to Wenham 1984 as well.
113. Cf. the application of historical methodology in the detective story given by Collingwood 1980, 266-8. ('Who killed John Doe?')
114. Cf. note 92, above.
115. Wenham 1984, 64-67, cf. the evidence of the Shroud of Turin that the body was not washed before burial; ch, 7.4; n.361; above. J.M. Thompson 1912, 173 argues that there was not time to embalm the body on Friday evening (contra Strauss 1970, 800, by the way): The women, who were watching Joseph's action (Mk 15:47), see that this has not been done, and therefore come with spices on Sunday morning for this very purpose (16:1). Fuller 1980, 51, however, claims that the embalming of bodies was apparently not in accord with contemporary Jewish custom.
116. Craig 1981, 184.
117. Cf. e.g. Elliott 1979, 211, Marxsen 1979, 45 and Fuller
1980, 51f. But even if the corpse had begun to decay, that would not have prevented the simple act of devotion planned by the women, as portrayed above by Craig.
118. Craig 1981, 184f.
119. E.g. Elliott 1979, 212.
120. Cf. Craig 1981, 185 and Bode 1970, 16.
121. Fuller 1980, 51: "The perplexity of the women as to who should roll away the stone is inexplicable as a historical fact: why did they not think of this difficulty earlier?" Wenham 1984, 83, proposes that they were reassured by the recollection that Joseph had a gardener (or a night watchman) who could well still be on duty. Cf. Jn 20:15 where Mary of Magdala mistakes the risen Jesus for the gardener.
122. Elliott 1979, 211f.
123. Mishna Semahot 8; Ebel Rabbathi 4.11, cf. Strack & Billerbeck 1969, 1048. See also Craig 1981, 184 and Bode
1970, 15. Besides, we have preserved a Roman imperial decree against grave robberies on a slab of marble from Palestine in the first century (cf. Bruce 1982, 195f. and Pannenberg 1977, 100f.), which does not exactly suggest a taboolike fear surrounding graves and corpses.
124. Mishnah Shabbath 23:5, cf. Bode 1970, 14f.
125. Jeremiah 17: 21-22; Mishnah Shabbath 8:1. Cf. Blinzler 1974, 83; n.83.
126. Cf. e.g. Strauss 1970, 804-809, Fuller 1980, 72-73, and Marxsen 1979, 46.
127. Fuller 1980, 72f.
128. The Toledoth Jeshu (a Jewish, anti-Christian book about Jesus from some time after the 5th century) also gives the report that the guards had been bribed to say the disciples stole the body, cf. Klausner 1925, 357. Justin the Martyr wrote in Ephesus c. AD 155 his Dialogue with Tryphon the Jew, in which he said, obviously without fear of contradiction; "You have

sent chosen and ordained men throughout all the world to proclaim that ... his disciples stole him by night from the tom." (Ibid., 108, cf. Falls 1965). As giving the Jewish version of the events this is a back-handed testimony to the fact of the empty tomb, corroborated by the remarkable fact that Josephus (cf. ch. 7; n. 316) does not seek to scotch the resurrection claim by any information at his disposal that Jesus' body still lay in his grave. Cf. Cornfeld 1982, 184. However late we place Matthew, his report is thus likely to have an early origin. Cf. below; ch. 9.2.

129. Jeremias 1966, 75-79.

130. Cf. Morison 1978, 151 ff.; Wenham 1984, 71 ff., Cornfeld 1982, 178 and Perry 1959, 97 ff.

131. Cf. Cohn 1972, 238f. Morison seems to be guilty of a contradiction here, insofar as he on the one hand argues that the priests had to go to Pilate because of their concern with the tomb, since the tomb was his legal responsibility (Morison 1930, 152), and on the other, that the granting of the body to Joseph for burial made the protection of the tomb a strictly Jewish responsibility, which is why the Jews went to Pilate (the same visit) with a request that the military authorities should undertake temporarily the protection of the garden (ibid., 153f.).

132. Cf. ch. 7.4; the fragment from Thallus cited by Julius Africanus; C. Müller 1849, 517-9 and Goguel 1960, 91. The Gospel of Peter (c. A.D. 150) has some independent features which may represent genuine historical recollections, although the general reservations against its docetic and mythological features mentioned in ch. 7.1 makes this problematical. In any case, the gospel says that there was great disquiet among the people at the crucifixion of Jesus and at the 'great signs' which accompanied it (cf. Mt 27:45; 51-54), and that this murmuring of the people made the Jewish leaders afraid. It then goes on to say that a crowd gathered at the sepulchre on Saturday morning. If the authorities sensed a growing public sympathy for Jesus and a growing condemnation of their actions, the prospect of what might happen when the restraint of the Sabbath observance was over would alarm them. This theory (cf. Wenham 1984, 72), however, remains a rather thin conjecture.

133. Mk 8:31; 9:31; 10:34 with parallels in Mt and Lk.

134. Mk 14:58 par. Morison 1978, 156, observes: "We are not dealing with unsophisticated or half-educated people in this very able bit of political statecraft, but with some of the subtlest and most observant Jewish intellects of their day. Behind all their maneuvering for position, the search for actual witnesses, and the sudden dropping of the charge when the witnesses failed to agree together, is the evident historical fact that Jesus on some memorable occasion made use of a phrase containing these words, a phrase which clearly infuriated the Sadducean leaders, but which would not stand the literal meaning which the witnesses tried to give it."

135. It has usually been contended by the Bultmann School (cf. e.g. Strauss 1970, 805) that the excuse given to Pilate; that the disciples might steal the body, is wildly improbable since the behavior of the disciples had shown that they had not apprehended or believed Jesus' predictions of his resurrection. But even if the Jews were fairly convinced that there was nothing to fear from his closest disciples, they still had to consider the unpredictable attitude of the people who had come to Jerusalem for the feast of Passover (including the Galileans, known for their political zealots, cf. Vermes 1973, 46-48), and even more so when the restraint of the Sabbath observance was removed.

136. Cf. Perry 1959, 98f. and Morison 1978, 155; 189f., contra Wenham 1984, 73-75, who argues in favor of a guard consisting of both Roman soldiers and the Jewish temple guard.

137. Cf. John 18:12 and Mt 27:19 (the dream, if historical, would seem to imply that Pilate's wife knew what was about to happen).

138. Cf. Acts 12:19.

139. The very words "If this should reach the Governor's ears ..." (Mt 28:14) thus show how remote this contingency actually was felt to be.
140. E.g. Strauss 1970, 806.
141. Cf. Wenham 1984, 68-71, 81f.
142. The characteristic Herodian tomb has a low entry, closed by a large, roughly shaped stone, which is pushed like a bottle-stopper right into the hole. (The millstone type, flush with the wall, running in a sloping channel and covering up the entrance, was rare.) Often a central pit provides standing room, and usually there are flat ledges round the walls where bodies may be temporarily laid and oven-like recesses in the walls into which they will finally be put. A number have antechambers and these too usually have one or more flat rock-hewn ledges. While these are the commonest characteristics of Herodian tombs, there are wide differences of design at any one period (varying particularly with the wealth of the owner), and often there are great uncertainties about dating. (An example of a Herodian tomb can be seen today inside the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem.) Cf. Wenham 1984, 20f. and Cornfeld 1982, 199-217.
143. Cf. Strauss 1970, 810 and Elliott 1979, 212.
144. Cf. Wenham 1984, 77.
145. It is thus right to take Mt's 'You have nothing to fear' (28:5) as being expressed with emphasis. Though the allusion would at the time have been lost on the women (who did not know about the guard), it was meaningful both to the angel and to Matthew's readers and would in due course have been meaningful to the women themselves.
146. Contra J.M. Thompson 1912, 205. If Thompson were right, Jesus would be expected to have come forth when the angel opened the tomb. Rather, he is already gone.
147. See Wenham 1984, 77f.
148. Generally in subordinate clauses, but sometimes also with the main verb, e.g. Mt. 14:3; Mk 8:14; Lk 8:27b. Ibid., 154; n.3.
149. "(And behold there had been a great earthquake. For an angel of the Lord had descended from heaven, and had come and rolled back the stone, and sat upon it. His face shone like lightning; his garments were white as snow. At the sight of him the guards had trembled and become like dead men.)"
150. Cf. W. Brown 1955, 46f. and Sherwin-White 1963, 192.
151. 'Violent' is of course a relative term, but a tremor in pitch darkness, accompanied by the sudden arrival of what seemed to be an angel in brilliant white, whose 'face was like lightning', might well be deemed 'violent', even if its effects were light and localiced. Anyway, that the geological structure in Jerusalem is conductive to violent shocks at the place of Jesus' tomb can be confirmed by any visitor who have seen the Church of the Holy Sepulchre shored up because of seismic damage. The rending of the massive curtain in the temple which divided the Holy Place from the Holy of Holies at the time of crucifixion may also, if historically correct, have been caused by earth tremors.
152. Cf. Wenham 1984, 85-88, contra e.g. Strauss 1970, 810 ff.
153. Cf. e.g. Morison 1978, 159-165.
154. Cf. Bode 1970, 27.
155. Cf. ibid., 59f.
156. In the OT the recipient of an angelic message is often said to bow his face to the ground in veneration: Gen 18:2; 17:3, Joshua 5:14, Judges 13:20. Cf. Lk 1:12-13; 29-30, 2:9-10 in the NT.
157. In this instance, 'come' has little sense of motion, cf. Mt 21:38: 'Come, let us kill him.'
158. Cf. Bultmann 1963, 314-317.
159. Piecing together the parts so far, it would seem that there were two angels, one more prominent than the other. During or after the earthquake, they (or he) first lifted the great

stone and rolled it from the entrance and then sat upon it till the guards had left. They then retired inside and were invisible when the first women arrived. They made themselves visible to them and delivered their message. (Later, when Peter and John arrived they were again invisible, but they had reappeared when Mary of Magdala looked into the tomb.)
160. Cf. above, ch. 1.3.
161. The skepticism about angels who conveniently appear and disappear as required is reasonable enough for those who deny the supernatural altogether. But for Christian theists the matter is more open, especially in this case where the testimony supposedly comes from the very women who reported the appearance of Jesus.
162. Cf. Marxsen 1979, 45, who states that the questions of discrepancies in the story of the empty tomb are "not merely unimportant features, which might be depicted differently by different narrators, according to the position from which they experienced the event. These stories cannot be harmoniced and the differences cannot simply be brushed aside as unimportant, if one starts at all to go into the question of what really happened." If so, the reports "can hardly be eyewitness accounts" (ibid., 44).
163. Morison 1978, 190-192 suggests that it was the guards who 'moved the stone' after Jesus first had appeared to one of them; 'the servant of the priest' (cf. the Gospel of the Hebrews); i.e. 'Malchus', whose ear was cut off by Peter and healed by Jesus in Gethsemane when the latter was arrested. If this imaginative but somewhat intriguing conjecture bears enough weight, the question of which source of information Matthew had for his knowledge of the guard (27:62-66;28:11-15) could be answered.
164. An exclusion of the angelophany from the pre-Markan passion story is arbitrary, since the earliest Christians certainly believed in the reality of demons and angels and would not hesitate to relate such an account as Mk 16:5-8. It is quite unlikely that the pre-Markan tradition lacked the angel, for the climax of the story comes with his words in 16:5-6, and without him the tomb is ambiguous in its meaning. Besides the synoptics, John confirms that there was a tradition of the women seeing angels at the tomb (20:12), especially in light of the fact that he keeps the angels in his account even though their role is oddly superfluous. Cf. Craig 1981, 185.
165. Dodd 1972, 165 comments that where angels are introduced in the Bible, "it is very often an intimation that a truth is being conveyed which lies beyond the reach of the senses, a "revelation". We might think of a discovery made by an imaginative, or "inspired", leap beyond the immediate data, to be verified by subsequent experiment. On this analogy, what the women saw brought only perplexity; then by a leap beyond the evidence of the senses, they knew what it meant. But it still awaited verification from later experience". Cf. R. Brown 1973, 122. If angelic appearances lies 'beyond the reach of the senses', however, then so does probably the appearances of the risen Jesus. But if they do, there would be no possible 'verification from later experience', at least if such verification involved the senses. And if it didn't, what would the meaning of 'verification' be? The question of angels is not crucial to the protective belt of Historic Christianity, but I presume its position here is better represented by Wenham 1984, 86, who states that "if the testimony (of the women) is true, angels look like men; they move; they speak; and they disappear at will." The Bultmann School, on the other hand, flatly states that "the angelophany is patently a legendary feature, as is the miraculous rolling away of the stone." Fuller 1980, 51.
166. Cf. ibid., 82-84 and ch. 1-7 in general. This may be the case also when the harmonized reconstruction is made on the assumption of only one group of women, including Mary of Magdala, cf. Ladd 1976, 92 and Perry 1959, 66-68.
167. For the different topographical references of Jerusalem and its eastern environments, see the map in Wenham 1984,14.

168. Cf. ibid., 84 f. Wenham suggests that Luke is relating Joanna's story (Mark and Matthew that of the other Mary and/or Salome).
169. Cf. Fuller 1980, 97; who states that except for 24:5, Luke has completely re-written the Markan text which he had before him because of certain editorial requirements; he is going to report a series of appearances in or around Jerusalem, not Galilee.
170. Cf. ibid., 75-77.
171. Cf. Wenham 1984, 85.
172. Cf. Fuller 1980, 53; 57-64 and Bultmann 1963, 287.
173. Cf. Craig 1981, 186.
174. Cf. Jeremias 1971, 282 (2nd German ed. 1973).
175. Cf. Pesch 1977, 2:381f.
176. Cf. below; ch. 8.2.2, on the problem of the Markan appendix (16:9-20).
177. Cf. Wenham 1984, 88f.; Craig 1981, 186f.; Bode 1970, 37-44 and Fuller 1980, 64-68. For references to scholars who argue that the gospel ends with the women keeping lasting silence, see Bode 1970, 39 ff. An example is Kasper 1976, 127.
178. See ch. 8.2; cf. Snodgrass 1972.
179. Cf. Grass 1970, 116 (3rd ed; 1964).
180. Cf. above, ch. 8.2.1.6; note 150, and Wenham 1984, 89.
181. Luke 24:24 makes it clear that Peter did not go to the tomb alone; John names his companion as 'the disciple whom Jesus loved' (20:2). This would suggest that John intends this disciple to be a historical person, and his identification may well be correct, cf. R. Brown 1970, 1119f. The authority of the beloved disciple stands behind the gospel as the witness to the accuracy of what is written therein (21:24), and the identification of his role in the two disciples' visit to the tomb could be the reminiscence of an eyewitness. So although only Peter was named in the tradition, accompanied by an anonymous disciple, the author of the fourth gospel claimed to know who this unnamed disciple was and identifies him. Whether this identification is correct or not, it seems to be clear that the beloved disciple was thought to be a historical person who went with Peter to the empty tomb and whose memories stand behind the fourth gospel as their authentication. Cf. Craig 1981, 187.
182. Cf. e.g. Marshall 1980, 44-46
183. For my treatment of the Marcan Appendix, cf. Fuller 1980, 64ff., Wenham 1984, 45 f., Bode 1970, 44-48, R. Brown 1973, 97 f. and Ladd 1976, 79, 83 f.
184. There are several explanations offered as to why Mark ended his gospel at 16:8. Three examples: Fuller 1980, 66 f. argues that 16:7 is a reference not to appearance narratives, but to an appearance list like the one I Cor 15:5. Mark did not narrate any appearances simply because there were no appearance stories available at this stage in the formation of the gospel tradition, (cf. the protective belt of the Bultmann School e.g. in ch. 7.3.3.4). Lightfoot 1950, 80-97; 106-116 states that Mark already has given full expression to the resurrection in the tomb message. Other promises are recorded in the gospel without express mention of the fulfillment. Mark may have been willing to leave the reunion in Galilee unrelated partly because the divine word in 14:28 and 16:7 had already guaranteed it and partly because the event did not lend itself to narration in a book. The reader is turned back by 16:7 to the ministry of the early chapters in Galilee. This is the ministry to be fulfilled henceforth by the Lord, unhampered and unrestricted, in and through his disciples who now represent him in the world. Thus the book is seen to be complete. Bode 1970, 48, claims that 16:8 as an ending fits within the pattern of the motifs found within his gospel, viz. the fearful reaction to the divine actions and teachings as well as the paradoxical human disobedience to the divine commands. Moreover, the end of the gospel could possibly be indicated by the inclusion existing between 10:32 where the passion begins with Jesus going before his disciples, who follow with fear, to Jerusalem and 16:7-8 where the resurrection is heralded as Jesus' going

before his disciples back to Galilee while the women who receive the message tremble, are bewildered and afraid.
185. If there are sentences ending in 'gar' however, the Bultmann School would see no reason why a work of Kleinliteratur (cf. above; ch. 7.3.3.3) of the type that the Gospel of Mark represents should not have concluded thus. Cf. Fuller 1980, 65.
186. To avoid this conclusion, Grass 1970, 17 (2nd ed. 1962) has suggested, in accordance with some of the auxiliary hypotheses of the Bultmann School (cf. above; ch. 8.1.1), that with its developing conceptions of the resurrection appearances (they were now being conceived in more physical terms), the early Christian community could no longer accept the more 'spiritual' account in Mark. But apart from it the implausibility of this basic assumption (cf. above; ch. 8.1.1), is hardly possible that the post-Markan community should very soon have wished to shift the locale of the appearances from Galilee to Jerusalem (where the more 'physical' appearances took place), as this argument implies, since Matthew and even the apocryphal Gospel of Peter continue to maintain the Galilean tradition. It did not disappear overnight.
187. Cf. Wenham 1984, 147; n.8, for some brief comments, and references to a critical review and reply by Farmer. Farmer concludes his study thus: "While no final results have been produced, this exploratory study clearly supports the view that we should consider the last twelve verses of Mark 'still open'. ... Neither the external nor the internal evidence can be said to be decisive. Furthermore, to the extent that either on balance weighs for or against the originality of the present ending of Mark, this study finds that each, considered separately and taken together, argues for inclusion of these verses. The order of probability claimed for these findings is not high, and it is conceivable that further study may lead to their reversal."
188. Cf. Fuller 1980, 156f.
189. Cf. Osborne 1981, 294.
190. E.g. Fuller 1980, 146 f. and R. Brown 1974, 246.
191. E.g. Osborne 1981, 294-296. There is a list of different scholars opposing or favoring unity of authorship in ibid., 319; n.6.
192. Cf. Jn 21:24 which assigns the gospel to the disciple whom Jesus loved; "It is this disciple who attests what has here been written. It is in fact he who wrote it, and we know that his testimony is true." As to the historicity of the 'Beloved Disciple'; see Craig 1981, 187-189. As to his identification as the apostle John, see Osborne 1981, 300f.
193. The Bultmann School argues that the Galilean appearance(s) narrated in Jn 21 did not follow the Jerusalem appearances in Jn 20, but is actually a re-worked account of the first appearance to Peter (cf. I Cor 15:5 and Lk 24:34), cf. R. Brown 1974, whereas Historic Christianity concludes that it is reasonable to maintain a positive appraisal of historical reliability regarding the traditions behind the ecclesiological truths conveyed by the redactor of Jn 21, see Osborne 1981.
194. A typical example of how this methodology can be applied is Perrin 1977, see e.g. ibid., 74-76.
195. E.g. Bultmann 1963, 290. This verdict of the discrepancies is e.g. also found in Marxsen 1979, 45, 74; Perrin 1977, 5; Evans 1970, 3; Elliott 1979, 215; Benoit 1969, 254; Küng 1978, 347 and Fuller 1980, 2. Ibid., 173 states two reasons why Christians cannot be required to believe that the risen Jesus e.g. literally walked on earth in an earthly form as in the Emmaus story, or that he physically ate fish as in the Lucan appearance to the disciples at Jerusalem, or that he invited physical touch as in the Thomas story. The first is that the resurrection faith of the earliest community, "conceived in apocalyptic terms as transformation into an entirely new (eschatological) mode of existence," directly contradicts it. The second is that the evangelist are here taking up popular stories, forged in the milieu of the 'divine man' concept, and using them for purposes of their own. The first argument has

already been countered by Historic Christianity above, in ch.8.1.1, the second in ch. 7.3.2. Besides, hardly the slightest traces of cults of dying and rising gods can be demonstrated in first-century Palestine, cf. Pannenberg 1977, 91.
196. As the stories are told, the appearances entail a sight that goes beyond the ordinary experience of 'we have seen Jesus' to a confession that involves 'relation': "We have seen the Lord" (Jn 20:18;25; 21:7, Lk 24:34); 'the Lord' being a Christological evaluation of Jesus. Cf. R. Brown 1973, 112 f.
197. The statement that Jesus first appeared to Mary of Magdala (Mk 16:9) does not, according to Strauss, suit the foregoing narrative, "because this is not formed on the supposition of an appearance specially intended for Mary Magdalene: on the contrary, as she is said to be informed by an angel of the resurrection of Jesus, together with two other women, Jesus could not have appeared to her beforehand; while afterwards, on her way to the city, she was in company with the other women, when according to Matthew they were all actually met by Jesus." Strauss 1970, 818. Cf. ibid., 827.
198. Cf. Wenham 1984, 13-22; 59f; 90-99.
199. Cf. W. Brown 1955, 46 f., Sherwin-White 1963, 192 and above; ch. 8.2.1.6.
200. Mary, upon recognition of Jesus, had apparently tried to seize Jesus in a clasp of loving embrace as though she would never let him get away from her again. Jesus is not forbidding her to touch him, but merely replies 'You do not need to hold on to me, I haven't left you yet.' (Jn
20:17 paraphrased). He is giving her a gentle reassurance that she need not fear to leave him and to tell her good news to others, for his ascension to the Father is yet to be. There is therefore no contradiction between Jesus' prohibition to Mary and his direct permission to the other women to touch his feet in worship and his direct appeal to Thomas to touch his scars (Jn 20:27). The motifs of the three incidents are quite different. Cf. Ladd 1976, 129. C.H. Dodd, however, states from another form-critical viewpoint that if a traditional unit underlies the dialogue between Jesus and Mary, "then it has been fairly completely remolded." (Dodd 1963, 146.) Whether or not this a disputed claim, the historicity of the main content of the dialogue is not thereby undermined.
201. The reason why Mary is not mentioned in the list of people who had seen Jesus in I Cor 15:5 ff. is probably that she was a woman. The list obviously also had a judicial purpose as the Christians were being persecuted and tried before different courts and councils (cf. the trials of Paul himself in Acts 23-26). Paul's failure to mention the women is thus not surprising, since in Jewish law a women's witness was not readily accepted in court. Cf. Stauffer 1960, 175. As to literary evidence that I Cor
15:3-5 is not a complete list, see J.M. Thompson 1912, 167; n.1.
202. Cf. Wenham 1984, 22-33.
203. Cf. Lake 1907, 218 and Grass 1970, III.1; 113-127 (3rd ed., 1964).
204. Ibid., 116 (3rd ed., 1964).
205. Cf. Craig 1981, 188 f. Dodd 1970, 164, comments that the story of the two disciples running to the tomb is told with the dramatic realism of which the author of the fourth gospel is a master. It looks like something as near first-hand evidence as we could hope to get. "Perhaps it is," he concludes, "and if so, it becomes the sheet anchor of belief in a bodily resurrection." (Ibid.)
206. The 'flight to Galilee' hypothesis would even have had the advantage (to Historic Christianity) of making the appearances unexpected by keeping the empty tomb unknown prior to the appearances to the disciples.
207. To Simon (Lk 24:34), to two disciples on the road to Emmaus (Lk 24:13-35), to the Eleven minus Thomas (Jn 20:19-23). To the Bultmann School, the promise of an appearance in Galilee contradicts the first appearances in Jerusalem, cf. Strauss 1970, 821 ff.

208. Cf. Wenham 1984, 97.
209. Jn 20:26-29 tells how Jesus appeared to the disciples, including Thomas, in Jerusalem one week after Easter day, presumably without the disciples having rushed forth and back from Galilee in the meantime. (The walking distance from Jerusalem to Galilee is ca. 3 days.)
210. Cf. ibid., 97-99 and Ramsay 1946, 70.
211. In ch. 8.2.1.7.
212. Cf. Wenham 1984, 37-29 and Perry 1959, 70 f. Perry even concludes that if we do not suppose that Cleopas was present at the Last Supper, we cannot explain why he and his companion saw such significance in a purely routine 'grace before meals' (cf. Lk. 24:30-32) that they recognized Jesus by it. Ladd 1976, 86, on the other hand, is sceptical to the identification of Cleopas with Cleopas, Jesus' uncle (Jn 19:25) (cf. Fuller 1980, 107), and argues that the 'fact' that this appearance occurred to two utterly insignificant disciples is evidence that the story possesses historical substance.
213. Cf. Wenham 1984, 100 f.
214. Marxsen 1979, 72.
215. Cf. Wenham 1984, 100.
216. Cf. ibid., Perry 1959, 70 and Fuller 1980, 107 f.
217. According to Eusebius 1965, bk. III, ch. 11.
218. The identity of Cleopas and his companion is important insofar it would be somewhat unexplainable if Jesus had appeared to people who makes no more than this single fleeting entry on the stage of the NT. (Remember Ladd's comment, however; n.212 above.) It makes better sense if Cleopas, at least, was a key figure among the people who followed Jesus. But if so, it may be difficult to explain why Cleopas is not mentioned in the pre-Pauline list in Cor 15:5-7, even if this list is not exhaustive. Cf. Fuller 1980, 108 f.
219. Cf. Wenham 1984, 100-102 and Anderson 1968, 6.
220. Lewis 1967, 155.
221. Cf. Bultmann 1963, 286, Evans 1970, 105 and Fuller 1980,
106; cf. ibid., 104. The outline of the story is analogous to the oldest stories of the appearance of God, as e.g. the story of Hagar in Gen. 16:7 ff. or of the three men that visited Abraham in Gen. 18:1 ff. Whether these stories in their turn are legendary, however, is an open question. To simply refer to them as evidence of what is legendary will not do the job. Anyway, an account of a supernatural being who companies naturally as a man with mortals and converses for a considerable time with men who entertain him unaware of his identity is no more supernatural than the inexplicable appearances of Jesus to his disciples behind closed doors (Jn 20:19; 26). To call it a legend on a technical, literary basis prejudices the case against its truthfulness. Cf. Ladd 1976, 86. Its 'genre' may even be taken as evidence of the opposite conclusion, cf. the proceeding paragraph in the text.
222. Cf. Kopp 1963, 396 ff.
223. Josephus 1981, VII, 6.6. Cf. Fuller 1980, 107. 'Emmaus', by the way, means a place of warm springs, and the village might possibly have had a reputation as a place of healing. Cf. Wenham 1984, 101.
224. Cf. the suspicion of the Bultmann School: "Luke's account where all the appearances take place in one day requires truly extraordinary efforts on the part of the two disciples who were in Emmaus at evening and yet managed to get back to Jerusalem before the disciples had finished supper!" R. Brown 1967, 234.
225. Benoit 1969, 276. According to Wenham 1984, 157; n. 11, there is an interesting parallel in Joseph and Asenath, a Jewish work probably of the first century AD, where in ch. 9 Joseph is invited to stay the night at the end of what chapters 3 and 10 show to have been the midday meal.
226. Cf. Wenham 1984, 104 f.

227. James and the other brothers of Jesus (cf. Acts 1:14) may provide marginal exceptions. There is no clear tradition of when they turned from unbelief to faith, but in James' case it must have been prior to Ascension Day, cf. I Cor 15:7. They may have been converted on seeing the risen Jesus or it may have happened earlier, before the crucifixion.
228. There is a particular background to the claim of the Bultmann School that Peter was the first witness of the resurrection (cf. Bornkamm 1979, 182). The exclusive interpretation of a physical resurrection by the orthodox church is seen as a function, not of historical and theological content, but of church politics; the ecclesiastical need to fight the many heretics who challenged the authority of the bishops and other church leaders. The apostolic succession of bishops was thus mainly validated by Peter as the first witness of the bodily resurrection; see Pagels 1981, 7-9. Her conclusion seems to follow more from preconceived assumptions than empirical evidence, however, if it is correct that there is "no Catholic theologian or writer who clearly fastens on the priority of witness to Christ's resurrection as the key to Petrine, and papal authority." O' Collins 1978, 94. Even if the original intention of some appearance formulas was the legitimation of an individual or a group under presupposition of the reality of Jesus' resurrection, the Christian mission, and in any case Paul in I Cor 15, nevertheless collected such formulas in order to prove their presupposition; the resurrection of Jesus. Cf. Pannenberg 1977, 40 f. As to the claim that Luke contradicts the priority of the appearance of Jesus to Mary of Magdala (including the one to the women, as this too is taken to have happened at the tomb), see Marxsen 1979, 72.
229. Ibid., ch. III; 70-97.
230. "After Good Friday, Simon was the first who arrived at faith in Jesus. But we must not phrase this historical conclusion as 'Simon was the first to see Jesus.' The relationship between believing and seeing must be expressed as follows: Simon was the first to believe; the reason for his having believed is expressed by saying that Simon saw Jesus." Ibid., 95f.
231. Cf. Fuller 1979, 95.
232. Cf. Marxsen 1979, 92f.
233. Cf. Lake 1907,37, Perry 1959, 75 and Wenham 1984, 106. Even Strauss 1970, 822 agrees here.
234. Many commentators, including Wenham 1984, 106, , states that Jesus came through the closed doors, but neither John nor Luke says this. Rather Jesus simply appeared in the room; as contrasted with the pagan myths of gods entering rooms like fog through the keyhole! (Homer: Odessey 6.19-20; Homeric Hymns 3. 145.) Cf. Craig 1980, 68.
235. Cf. ibid., passim and ch. 8.1.1; above, contra e.g. Fuller 1980, 115.
236. As Perrin 1977, 66f. does. On the other hand, a realistic interpretation of the appearance narratives in Luke and John logically leads to peculiar problems of its own, like the digestive capacity of a risen body, and, as already stated, the failure of the disciples on the Emmaus road to notice that the stranger had hands and feet marked by crucifixion. Cf. O' Collins 1978, 47. (Remember however, that the nails were not put through the palm, but through the wrist area, cf. above; ch. 7.4; n. 333. The wrist of the stranger might have been covered by his clothes.)
237. Marxsen 1979, 73.
238. Cf. Wenham 1984, 127f.
239. Cf. ibid., 107.
240. Cf. the conferral of the spirit of authority taking place simultaneously with the sending forth of missionaries in Mt 10:16, Mk 6:7 and Lk 9:2.
241. Cf. Ladd 1976, 91.
242. "One of the Twelve, Thomas, that is 'the Twin', was not with the rest when Jesus came. So the disciples told him, 'We have seen the Lord.' He said, 'Unless I see the mark of the nails on his hands, unless I put my finger into the place where the nails were, and the

hand into his side, I will not believe i.' A week later his disciples were again in the room, and Thomas was with them. Although the doors were locked, Jesus came and stood among them, saying, 'Peace be with you!' Then he said to Thomas, 'Reach your finger here: See my hands; reach your hand here and put it into my side; be unbelieving no longer, but believe!' Thomas said, 'My Lord and my God!' Jesus said, 'Because you have seen me you have found faith. Happy are they who never saw me and yet found faith!" John 20:24-29.

243. The Bultmann School, of course, finds them contradictory, cf. e.g. Strauss 1970, 821-832.

244. This has some importance in relation to the appearance to "over five hundred of our brothers at once" (I Cor 15:6).

245. Wenham 1984, 44 identifies three primary concerns in Mt 28. One is to counter the false story circulating in Jerusalem about the disappearance of Jesus' body, the second is to tell of the experiences of the Galilean women and the third is to express with great conciseness the terms of the momentous recommissioning on the mountain in Galilee.

246. Cf. ibid., 97f.

247. Cf. ibid., 107, Ramsay 1946, 65, Ladd 1976, 91-93 and Perry 1959, 73-75.

248. Contra e.g. R. Brown 1973, 102 f. The Bultmann School suggests that the Lucan forty days in Acts 1:3 is to be understood as a theological code meaning the term between the final disaster and the dawn of final salvation. And as the 'eschatological' should not be put into categories of time (and space), this code (cf. Moses on Mt. Sinai and Jesus in the wilderness) cannot be taken as a time designation in an ordinary, historical sense. Cf. Küng 1978,363 and R. Brown 1973, 104.

249. Cf. Ramsay 1946, 66: "Luke's ... theme is the going-up of Jesus to Jerusalem to die, the redemption wrought in Jerusalem, the continuity of the divine purpose through the events in Jerusalem, the mission of the Church from Jerusalem, the advance of the Gospel from Jerusalem to Rome. That is Luke's theme; he is absorbed in it; he telescopes his story in accordance with it; he omits what would be a diversion of it."

250. Cf. e.g. Marxsen 1979, 74, R. Brown 1973, 99-104, Grass 1970, III. 1, Bultmann 1963, 285 f., Strauss 1970, 821-826 and Lake 1907, 206-219.

251. Cf. R. Brown 1967, 234 and R. Brown 1968, 794. Dodd 1963,
148, states that the semblance of a continuous narration in the Johannine stories of appearances of the risen Christ is "largely due to the 'editorial work' of the evangelist, ... he had before him a collection of units of tradition." This, however, does not necessarily imply that the chronological and topographical setting of the different parts of the narrative is untrustworthy, even if the narrative as a continuous whole is a purely editorial product.

252. Cf. R. Brown 1973, 106-108; R. Brown 1968, 794. Marxsen
1979, 79-97, argues as already noted, that all the 'appearances' of the disciples are based upon Peter 'having seen' Jesus.

253. Cf. e.g. Strauss 1970, 826. Perrin 1977, 56 f., on the other hand, explains the Galilean setting of the Matthean 'foundation myth of Christian origins' (28:16-20) in this way: After Jerusalem had fallen to the Romans in A.D. 70, the Temple lay in ruins. To the Matthean community, the new navel of the universe became the story of Jesus, who in himself became the new temple and the new Mount Zion. The myth of the appearance on the mountain in Galilee shows that the Temple was not needed any more. The story of Jesus could be received, read and interpreted anywhere and everywhere.

254. Cf. e.g. J.M. Thompson 1912, 191f., Grass 1970, 119 (3rd ed.) and Pannenberg 1977, 105.

255. Cf. Lake 1907, 218, Gardner-Smith 1926 and Bultmann 1963, 285. The position taken by Gardner-Smith; that the disciples fled to Galilee only when the feast was over, is

believed to be supported by a tradition found in the apocryphal Gospel of Peter, for whatever it is worth. Cf. Ramsay 1946, 68.
256. Campenhausen 1958, 44; n.174.
257. Cf. ibid., 44 ff. It is noteworthy that von Campenhausen replaces the instruction of the angels to the women (Mk16:7; Mt 28:7) with Peter's reflection on the empty tomb.
258. Cf. Pannenberg 1977, 105.
259. Cf. Ramsay 1946, 69-71, Perry 1959, 72-75. Ladd 1976,88-90 and Wenham 1984, 97 ff. (Ladd also refers to C. H: Dodd (1970, ch. 9) and C. F. D. Moule for some support.)
260. Cf. the conclusion in ch. 8.2.1.7; above.
261. Cf. Strauss 1970, 823 and R. Brown 1967, 233.
262. Cf. Wenham 1984, 115 and Ramsay 1946, 71.
263. Contra Grass 1970, 116 (3rd ed) and Pannenberg 1977, 105. I have already argued, in ch. 8.2.2.1, that there are traditions of at least two disciples, one of them Peter, being present in Jerusalem during the weekend, and that John was present at the cross, cf. Mk 14:65-77 par., Jn
18:15;19:26f., 35 and Lk 23:49.
264. Cf. Hooke 1967, 79, Ladd 1976, 94 and Wenham 1984, 92.
265. Neither does the critique of Campenhausen 1958 in Pannenberg 1977, 105, which states that if the disciples had known that the tomb was empty while being in Jerusalem, they would probably have remained there in order to await the end of the world, thus implying, as Campenhausen, that the empty tomb in itself would create faith in the resurrection.
266. Cf. Lapide 1980, 65-67 and A. Resch; referred to in Lake 1907, 208f.
267. Even if the latter meaning is upheld, 'heathen Galilee' has by Hoskyns 1923 been taken, not as a geographical description, but as a symbol of the whole Gentile world. Cf. Perry 1959, 72 f.
268. For references, see Lake 1907, 209; n. 1.
269. Bornhöuser 1958, Excursus 2, App. 17., cf. Wenham 1984, 98.
270. Cf. Lapide 1980, 66: "Dieser "Bezirk Jerusalem" (Galilah Jeruschalajim) konfrontierte anscheinend die spöteren Griechen-Evangelisten, die mit den topographischen Bezeichnungen ihrer jüdischen Vorlagen nicht vertraut waren, mit einem Rötsel, das Lukas durch die Verlegung der Begegnungen des Auferstandenen nach Jerusalem, Mattöus und Johannes hingegen nach Galilöa zu lÃsen versuchten."
271. John 21:1-14: "Some time later, Jesus showed himself to his disciples once again, by the Sea of Tiberias; and in this way. Simon Peter and Thomas 'the Twin' were together with Nathanael of Cana-in-Galilee. The sons of Zebedee and two other disciples were also there. Simon Peter said, 'I am going out fishing'. 'We will go with you', said the others. So they started and got into the boat. But that night they caught nothing. Morning came, and there stood Jesus on the beach, but the disciples did not know that it was Jesus. He called out to them, 'Friends, have you caught anything?' They answered 'No.' He said, 'Shoot the net to starboard, and you will make a catch.' They did so, and found they could not haul the net aboard, there were so many fish in it. Then the disciple whom Jesus loved said to Peter, 'It is the Lord!' When Simon Peter heard that, he wrapped his coat about him (for he had stripped) and plunged into the sea. The rest of them came on in the boat, towing the net full of fish; for they were not far from land, only about a hundred yards. When they came ashore, they saw a charcoal fire there, with fish laid on it, and some bread. Jesus said, 'Bring some of your catch.' Simon Peter went aboard and dragged the net to land, full of big fish, a hundred and fifty three of them; and yet, many as they were, the net was not torn. Jesus said, 'Come and have breakfast.' None of the disciples dared to ask 'Who are you?' They knew it was the Lord. Jesus now came up, took the bread, and gave it to them, and the fish in the same way. This makes the third time that Jesus appeared to his disciples after his resurrection from the dead."

272. Cf. R. Brown 1967, 234 and R. Brown 1974, 246.
273. Cf. Osborne 1981, 296 f., and e.g. Fuller 1980, 160f. For other references see Osborne 1981, 320; n.15.
274. Cf. J. M. Thompson 1912, 199 f. and R. Brown 1974, 259.
275. Cf. Osborne 1981, 297 and Dodd 1963, 144.
276. See Osborne 1981, 297-306. Peter, frustrated after a night without success, could easily have failed to note similarities between events months (or even years) apart. The only common feature is the command to let down the nets, hardly enough for Peter to draw the parallel. Besides, the two different traditions are likely to have influenced one another. If John knew the Gospel of Luke, he could easily have consciously drawn parallels between the first 'call' and the final 'recommissioning' of the disciples. Further, Luke's scene shows no formal signs of a resurrection story. To Historic Christianity, it is therefore plausible that these are separate traditions which reflect distinct historical incidents. Cf. ibid., 297 f.
277. Cf. the explication of these differences above; ch. 6.2. A typical example of a study in line with the methodology of Historic Christianity is Marshall 1970, especially ch. 2.; of the Bultmann School, Perrin 1977 and Fuller 1980. Ibid., 122, gives an example: "Is then Luke 24:50 as a whole redactional, or is it based on earlier tradition?" (My italics.)
278. Cf. Osborne 1981, 306.
279. Cf. ibid., 296-318. John 21:15-25: "After breakfast, Jesus said to Simon Peter, 'Simon son of John, do you love me more than all else?' 'Yes, Lord', he answered, 'you know that I love you.' 'Then feed my lambs', he said. A second time he asked, 'Simon son of John, do you love me?' 'Yes, Lord, you know I love you.' 'Then tend my sheep.' A third time he said, 'Simon son of John, do you love me?' Peter was hurt that he asked him a third time, 'Do you love me?' ' Lord,' he said, 'you know everything; you know I love you.' Jesus said, 'Feed my sheep. 'And further, I tell you this in very truth; when you were young you fastened your belt about you and walked where you chose; but when you are old you will stretch out your arms, and a stranger will bind you fast, and carry you where you have no wish to go.' He said this to indicate the manner of death by which Peter was to glorify God. Then he added, 'Follow me'. Peter looked round, and saw the disciple whom Jesus loved following the one who at supper had leaned back close to him to ask the question, 'Lord, who is it that will betray you?' When he caught sight of him, Peter asked, 'Lord, what will happen to him?' Jesus said, 'If it should be my will that he wait until I come, what is it to you? Follow me.' That saying of Jesus became current in the brotherhood, and was taken to mean that the disciple would not die. But in fact Jesus did not say that he would not die; he only said, 'If it should be my will that he wait until I come, what is it to you?' It is this same disciple who attests what has here been written. It is in fact he who wrote it, and we know that his testimony is true. There is much else that Jesus did. If it were all to be recorded in detail, I suppose the whole world would not hold the books that would be written."
280. Osborne 1981, 317 f., 306.
281. Strauss 1970, 828, by the way, suggests that the (apparent) contradiction between Mark 16:12-13 and Luke 24:33-35 "probably proceeds from an exaggeration of Mark, who will not lose hold of the contrast between the most convincing appearances of Jesus and the obstinate unbelief of the disciples."
282. Cf. above, ch. 7.3.3.4 and Marshall 1977, 204. If, one the other hand, the Bultmann School is right in claiming a common source of Lk 5:1.11 and Jn 21:1-14, the two accounts would strengthen the historicity of this one event if they were independent of each other. But to this programme they are probably not so, and even if they were, the story in Jn 21 would not then be more reliable as an appearance narrative, since Luke's acount appears in a context which has nothing to do with the appearances. But again, this way of reasoning is undermined insofar as Lk 5 and Jn 21 represent separate events, cf. n.276; above.

283. Cf. Stein 1980, 253 and Westerholm 1978, 6f., and note 302; ch. 7.3.3.4 above.
284. That redaction and tradition is interdependent is further shown in that the theological stress in the periocope is not restricted to those points unique to the evangelist. Likewise, the tendency to focus upon individuals in the tradition, here the 'Beloved Disciple' and Peter, is likely to be a personal reminiscence and therefore redaction, yet at the same time it is probably authentic history. Personal reminiscence bridges the gap between history and redaction. Cf. Osborne 1981, 306.
285. Cf. Mt 17:1-8; Lk 9-28-36. See Fuller 1980, 81; 165 f. for a critical appraisal of Mk 9:2-8 as a transposed resurrection narrative.
286. Cf. Dodd 1955, 24f. and Perry 1959, 80.
287. Mt 2:11; 8:2; 9:18 etc. (Jesus), Acts 10:25 (Peter), Acts 14:11-18 (Paul and Barnabas).
288. Fuller 1980, 80f.
289. Strauss 1970, 830.
290. Wenham 1984, 113.
291. As to the reasons for translating the Greek into 'at once', instead of 'once for all; finally; needing no repetition' which would mean that Paul was referring to Christ's final appearance; the ascension, see Perry 1959, 76f. For the identification of Mt 28:16-20 with the appearance to the more than 500 brothers, see ibid.,
75-77 and Wenham 1984, 112f.
292. E.g. Lake 1907, 202-205. The only evidence that there was a vision of Christ at this time is the tenuous argument from the text "the Lord ... is the Spirit" (II Cor 3:17), according to which an original reference to a manifestation of God the Son became transformed into one of God the Holy Spirit. According to Perry 1959, 76, this is mere text-jugglery. Jn 16:7 denies such interpretations, where Jesus is reported as saying that "If I do not go (leaving the disciples), your Advocate (the Holy Spirit) will not come, whereas if I go, I will send him to you."
293. Cf. Strauss 1970, 831 and R. Brown 1967, 233.
294. Cf. Wenham 1984, 114 and Perry 1959, 77.
295. Funk 1961, 131. Cf. N. Turner 1963, 37: "It usually marks a change of subject."
296. Marxsen 1979, 74.
297. Cf. Fuller 1980, 80-93. Grass 1970, 30 (2nd ed. 1962) even claims that the doubt motif in 28:17 is a creation of later apologetic with no historical basis. He fails, however, to provide any 'Sitz im Leben' for this apologetic motif. Fuller 1980, 209; n.16, therefore "wonders where he finds the evidence for his historical certainty if every single mention of doubt is attributed to apologetic motifs. This is an excellent example of the determination to be skeptical at all costs."
298. Cf. Osborne 1981, passim, and Marshall 1970, ch. 2.
299. The location of the Great Sermon on the mountain in 5:1 ff is part of Matthew's Mosaic typology; the new law, like the old one on Sinai, is delivered on a mountain. The transfiguration-story also takes place on a mountain, cf. 17:1-8.
300. Cf. Wenham 1984, 115, 123, contra Strauss 1970, 828.
301. Cf. Fuller 1980, 172; R. Brown 1973, 107 f.; Evans 1970, 67 and Elliott 1979, 213. The concept of 'eschatological event' has a particular meaning within the theology of the Bultmann School: 'Saving event' stands over against a linear, causally connected, evolutionistic view of history, and accentuates the vertical aspect of the encounter with the kerygma; the proclamation of the Christian church. Such an encounter is 'eschatological', a term which now stands in antithesis to 'historical'. 'Historicity' does not characterize that which is encountered, but rather the attitude of him who enters the encounter. As such, it is a definition of faith. The norm of Bultmann's theology is to be found within the correlation between 'eschatological event' and 'historicity'. The 'eschatological event' is the encounter

with the message of the opportunity or the freedom to be found in accepting one's death. This message is the real message of 'the resurrection', or rather; the kerygma. (Cf. Bultmann 1964, 42; stating that to say 'Jesus is risen' is to say that Jesus is risen into the kerygma.) The kerygma must pro claim that God is encountered within one's historical existence. It is in this carefully defined context that a 'historical' encounter is indispensable to Bultmann. But such a context does not necessitate a history of Jesus. Cf. James Robinson 1971, 17 f.

302. Cf. Kasper 1976, 139: "In the appearances we are not dealing with tangible events. The observer from a neutral distance will find no point of contact. We have before us a total state of being possessed by Jesus, a state of impact and absorption, the awakening of faith."

303. Cf. e.g. Bultmann 1963, 289 and O' Collins 1978, 53-55.

304. For this point I am indebted to fakultetslektor Oskar Skarsaune.

305. Cf. Jn 20:30; Acts 1:3; 13:31.

306. Cf. Perry 1959, 78 f. and Wenham 1984, 116 f.

307. Cf. ibid., 117-122, which I am building upon, and Perry1959, 72;79.

308. Mark 16:15-20: "Then he said to them: Go forth to every part of the world, and proclaim the Good News to the whole creation. Those who believe it and receive baptism will find salvation; those who do not believe will be condemned. Faith will bring with it these miracles; believers will cast out devils in my name and speak in strange tongues; if they handle snakes or drink any deadly poison, they will come to no harm; and the sick on whom they lay their hands will recover.' So after talking with them the Lord Jesus was taken up into heaven, and he took his seat at the right hand of God; but they went out to make their proclamation everywhere, and the Lord worked with them and confirmed their words by the miracles that followed." Luke 24:44-53: "And he said to them, 'This is what I meant by saying, while I was still with you, that everything written about me in the Law of Moses and in the prophets and psalms was bound to be fulfilled.' Then he opened their minds to understand the scriptures. 'This', he said, 'is what is written: that the Messiah is to suffer death and to rise from the dead on the third day, and that in his name repentance bringing the forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed to all nations. Begin from Jerusalem; it is you who are the witnesses to all this. And mark this: I am sending upon you my Father's promised gift; so stay here in this city until you are armed with the power from above. Then he led them out as far as Bethany, and blessed them with uplifted hands; and in the act of blessing he parted from them (and was carried up into heaven). And they (worshipped him and) returned to Jerusalem with great joy, and spent all their time in the temple praising God." Acts: 1-14: "In the first part of my work, Theophilus, I wrote of all that Jesus did and taught from the beginning until the day when, after giving instructions through the Holy Spirit to the apostles whom he had chosen, he was taken up to heaven. He showed himself to these men after his death, and gave ample proof that he was live: over a period of forty days he appeared to them and taught them about the kingdom of God. While he was in their company he told them not to leave Jerusalem. 'You must wait', he said, 'for the promise made by my Father, about which you have heard me speak: John, as you know, baptized with water, but you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit, and within the next few days.' So, when they were all together, they asked him, 'Lord, is this the time when you are to establish once again the sovereignty of Israel?' He answered, 'It is not for you to know about dates or times, which the Father has set within his own control. But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit comes upon you; and you will bear witness for me in Jerusalem, and all over Judaea and Samaria, and away to ends of the earth.' When he had said this, as they watched, he was lifted up, and a cloud removed him from their sight. As he was going, and as they were gazing intently into the sky, all at once there stood beside them two men in white who said, 'Men of Galilee, why stand there looking up into the sky? This Jesus, who has been taken away from you up to heaven, will come in the same way as you have seen him go.' Then they returned to Jerusalem from the hill called

Olivet, which is near Jerusalem, no farther than a Sabbath day's journey. Entering the city they went to the room upstairs where they were lodging: Peter and John and James and Andrew, Philip and Thomas, Bartholomew and Matthew, James son of Alphaeus and Simon the Zealot, and Judas son of James. All these were constantly at prayer together, and with them a group of women, including Mary the mother of Jesus, and his brothers."
309. Cf. above; ch. 8.2.2.3, p.316.
310. Cf. e.g. Strauss 1970, 821; R. Brown 1973, 102 f., Fuller 1980, 122.
311. Although Lk 24 telescope a series of events, this command is put right at the end of Jesus' instructions and immediately before he leads them out towards Bethany. In Acts the command not to depart from Jerusalem is put after the mention of the appearances during the forty days and immediately before the final exchange which presides the ascension. It seems reasonable then to place it among the final instructions given in the 'upper room' (Acts 1:13, cf. Lk 22:11-13) before the apostles went out to witness the ascension.
312. It is not very important whether 'forty' is to be taken as an exact figure or as an approximate one. As there were seven weeks between Easter and Pentecost and there was a time of waiting between the day of Ascension and Pentecost, during which there was sustained prayer and the election of a new apostle (Acts 1:14-26), 'forty days' is at least a close approximation, at the same time as it also has a theological importance in itself, cf. the Israelites in the wilderness, Moses on Mt. Sinai and Jesus in the desert.
313. He mentions three, if the appearance to Simon (24:34) is included; four, if the appearances on Easter Day (24:1-43) and Ascension Day (24:44/50-53) are separated out.
314. As R. Brown 1973, 795 does.
315. Cf. e.g. Mk 14:3, 10, 12, 22, 27, 32, 43, 51, 53, 66;15:1,21, 33, 42, 16:1 in the United Bible Societies' Greek NT (3rd ed.).
316. Strauss 1970, 831.
317. In Acts 1:8 Jesus makes no mention of Galilee. He describes their sphere of witness as "in Jerusalem, and all over Judea and Samaria, and away to the ends of the earth." Is this perhaps because by then (cf. Mt 28:16-20) Galilee already had hundreds of commissioned witnesses? Matthew may have seen his record of the Great Commission as an encouragement to the members of the Jerusalem church who had been forcible scattered by persecution to view their dispersion as a God-sent opportunity to get on with the task. Cf. Wenham 1984, 115.
318. Cf. e.g. ibid., 122 and R. Brown 1968, 795. This does not preclude that Jesus actually was levitated from the ground, however, as described in Acts 1:9.
319. Bultmann 1963, 290, cf. Pannenberg 1977, 92 and Perrin 1977, 72.
320. Ladd 1976, 128. With one exception; to Paul on the road to Damascus. (This occurrence might be called an objective vision rather than an appearance, however. Cf. ch. 8.1.1.)
321. Cf. R. Brown 1973, 111f.
322. Ladd 1976, 129, cf. above; ch. 8.2.2.1; n. 200 .
323. Ibid., 128, cf. R. Brown 1968, 795.
324. Cf. Craig 1980, 69f; Craig 1981, 189-194, Bode 1970,155-175 and Stein 1977.
325. Cf. e.g. Strauss 1970, 832 and Ladd 1976, 93.
326. Wenham 1984, 124 and passim. There are apparent discrepancies in the empty tomb stories too, but these are generally of minor importance and harmonizable with less difficulty than the ones in the appearance narratives.

9. EXPLANATIONS REGARDING THE RESURRECTION FAITH

My concern now is to enquire into the different historical explanations which may be postulated to account for the origin of the resurrection faith. The obvious fact is that the early church proclaimed that Jesus Christ was risen from the dead. But to Rudolf Bultmann, this is as far as we can go: "How the Easter faith arose in individual disciples, has been obscured in the tradition by legend and is not of basic importance." (Bultmann 1974, 45.) To say that Jesus is risen is therefore to say that Jesus is risen into the kerygma; the proclamation of the church.1 The two can not be separated. The community created the kerygma of the resurrection of Christ for some unknown reason, and even if this reason could be identified, this "historical problem is scarcely relevant to a Christian belief in the resurrection." (Bultmann 1953, 43.)

An historian working with the origins of early Christianity, however, ought to recognize the importance of explaining the genesis of the resurrection belief. To be concerned only with the identification and function of early Christian beliefs in a way which exclude the question of whether they are true or not, is to have a basically non-historical attitude insofar as these beliefs involve historical propositions. The early Christians proclaimed the resurrection of Jesus as a supernatural event actually having taken place, and this is a question of historical 'fact'. 2

In the following I will show how the Bultmann School (apart from Bultmann himself3) in different ways have tried to explain the origin of the resurrection faith at the same time as a historical, bodily resurrection is explicitly denied. To Historic Christianity, on the other hand, such explanations require (to various degrees) ad hoc adjustments. As noted in ch. 6.1, a theoretical adjustment in the protective belt is 'ad hoc' if it either does not predict any new facts beside the one that required the theoretical adjustment, or, if predictions are made, they will not be corroborated, or, if corroborated, these predictions are not made according to a preconceived unifying idea, lad down in advance in the positive heuristic of the research programme. The question, then, is which programme has 'excess empirical content' over against the other; the one which explains the resurrection faith as a mythological product of the believing communities, or the one that argues that the most probable 'cause' of the resurrection faith simply was that Jesus bodily rose from the dead.

The most radical theory which would kill any belief in the historical resurrection is, of course, the one that explains the apostolic resurrection faith as a legend in itself; cropping up years after the time of Jesus. The approach to the resurrection faith which grew out of the study of comparative religions, popular in the early 1900s, implied that the earliest Christian message of 'Jesus' resurrection emerged out of parallel pagan legends and mystery cults surrounding the dying and rising gods, e.g. Attis, Tammuz, Adonis, Osiris and Dionysus.4 The idea of resurrection found in many of the myths of the ancient world is always connected with the annual cycle of agriculture; winter-death, spring-resurrection. Moreover, in these myths resurrection is only for the gods and not for men. These goods were personifications of passing away and becoming in nature; a goddess, a wife or a mother, was connected; and the resurrection was often brought about through a wizard. The intention behind these myths, as well as the connected rituals, was that the individual should obtain salvation. But this salvation bears little if any resemblance to the Christian understanding of salvation;

forgiveness of sins and fellowship with God through faith in the risen Christ. Besides, hardly the slightest traces of cults of dying and rising gods can be demonstrated in first-century Palestine.

Anyway, if it had been possible to date the NT records a century or two after the alleged event, the suggestion of comparative religion might appear more plausible. But such attempts have decisively failed, crushed under a weight of contrary evidence. As argued in the two proceeding chapters, the testimony to the resurrection of Jesus can be traced back to the first decades after the event (cf. especially 8.1). We are dealing with traditions which ultimately originated from eyewitnesses, even though the different accounts to various degrees have been reshaped during the process of transmission and editing. The Bultmann School largely disagrees with this position, but hardly any critic today denies that the apostles firmly believed that their Master had 'risen from the dead'. The real point of dispute is not whether their belief, as such, is a legend, but to what extent the resurrection accounts reveal legendary aspects. Was the historical resurrection faith of Jesus' disciples a subjective conviction only, or did it correspond to external historical facts, and if so, what 'facts'?

9.1 Occupied Tomb.

The so-called 'natural' explanations of the resurrection faith can be divided into two major groups. The first argue on the basis that the body of Jesus remained in its tomb, whatever and wherever this actually was. The second group seeks to explain the resurrection faith as false in the historical, factual sense, even it grants that the tomb of Jesus actually was empty on Easter Day.

9.1.1 Unknown tomb.

The first theory to consider which rejects the empty tomb and thereby a bodily resurrection is that the tomb of Jesus was and is unknown. Jesus' body was thrown into a common pit for the executed, probably by the executioners, not in a separate, new tomb as the gospels assert.5

It is true that Roman law demanded that a convict, after execution, might not be buried; the crucified, in particular, were left on the cross until beasts and birds of prey devoured them.6 Guards were mounted on duty at the cross to prevent kinsfolk or friends from taking down a corpse and burying it; unauthorized burial of a crucified convict was a criminal offense. The emperor or his officers, might, however, exceptionally, grant kinsfolk or friends authorization to bury the convict,7 and what in Rome was the imperial prerogative was in a province the right of the governor. What Joseph of Aritmathea, according to Mt 27:57-61, Mk 15:42-47, Lk 24:50-54 and Jn 19:38-42, asked of Pilate, was therefore nothing unusual. The fact that Pilate is reported to have granted this wish without any difficulty presents no historical problems. We know from Josephus that the Jews were always very solicitous and particular about burying their dead, and those especially whom Roman crucifixions had killed.8 We do not know whether they sought and got special burial permits in each individual instance, but the view that all people crucified were tossed into a common pit was proved wrong when in 1968 the remains of Jehohanan Ben Ha'galgal, who had been crucified, were found in a family tomb outside Jerusalem.9 This is a discovery which as a 'novel' fact, in Lakatos' original sense, yields 'dramatic' support to the hypothesis of a bodily resurrection.

Hence Historic Christianity concludes that Joseph of Arimathea was not a figment of Christian imagination.10 He was remembered precisely because he had a prominent role in the burial of Jesus, and thus there was at least one person who knew exactly where Jesus had been buried. Even leaving aside the women who is said to have watched the burial (Mk 15:47 par.), as well as Nicodemus (Jn 19:39), this point is enough to refute the variant of the wrong tomb theory which states that the disciples, who had fled to Galilee before Jesus' death, did not return until several weeks later, at which time "no certain information about the whereabouts of the body was to be obtained." (Grass 1970, 184.) 11 And even if one decides against the probability for the historical kernel of the gospels' burial tradition, it is not possible to take the alleged legendary character of the story of the burial 12 as given, in order to base further hypotheses upon this about the impossibility of discovering Jesus' corpse after his disciples had returned from Galilee. Besides, in the Jewish polemic it was asserted that the disciples themselves had removed the body, not that Jesus' grave had remained unknown.13

9.1.2 Wrong Tomb.

The wrong-tomb theory advocates that when the women returned on Sunday morning to honor Jesus, they went to the wrong tomb.14 Because of Jesus' hasty burial and the fact that they came in dim morning light, the women, who were visitors in the city, were not sure exactly which of the many rock-hewn tombs in the area was Joseph's. When they examined the wrong one, which was empty, they were startled by a gardener or grave worker who guessed their mistake. "He is not here,", the gardener advised, and then pointed to the correct sepulcher; " there is the place where they laid him" (cf. Mk 16:6). But the women panicked and fled and kept silence. They did not report their discovery to the disciples right away, since the latter already had fled to Galilee. The apostles were only told when they returned to Jerusalem after an interval of some weeks, having experienced 'appearances' of their risen Lord in Galilee. The women thus came to believe that the young man was something more than what they first had seen; that he was an angel announcing Jesus' resurection.15

The theory demands a remarkable set of coincidences, viz. that the women erred,16 the tomb they visited was open and empty, someone was there at the time and this stranger instantly perceived what they were doing and tried to correct them. Besides, the complete text of Mk 16:6b reads: "He has risen; he is not here; look, there is the place where they laid him." The first part is considered unreliable without any particular justification.

Anyway, it is more important to ask why all the disciples should have left so soon. As I have argued earlier,17 the absence or inaccessibility of the disciples on Easter Sunday, so vital to the wrong-tomb theory, is historically doubtful. As to explicit basis in the sources, it rests only upon the (broken or partly completed sentence) in Mk 14:50 which say "Then the disciples all deserted him and ran away." On the other hand, it rejects off hand the historical tradition behind the story of Peter's denial and repentance at the Jewish midnight trial of Jesus in Jerusalem, as well as the presence of the 'Beloved Disciple' at the crucifixion and the visit of these two men to the tomb on Easter Day.18 To Historic Christianity,19 the far best explanation of the fact that the story of Peter's denial, so damning and derogatory to the repute of one of the leading apostles, got into the first Christian accounts of the Passion, is that it was an ineffaceable memory of an actual event.

Besides, the behavior of the women themselves, according to this theory, is curiously unnatural and strange. Remember that we are not dealing with mere acquaintances of the

apostolic band, but with their own kin and fellow companions. Salome was the mother of two of the twelve disciples (James and John) and Mary, the wife of Cleopas, of James the Younger (apostle).20 Moreover, they did not normally reside in the city,21 but had come up specially for the Passover Feast. If the disciples as a body were in any pressing kind of danger, their womenfolk were in like peril. To simply leave them behind would be more than ordinarily cowardly and unchivalrous. Although the apostles hardly appear as particular brave and faithful men after failing to support Jesus in his last ordeal, it is plausible to assume that some attempt was made to secure their women a safety and speedy withdrawal from the city. But if so, the women did not visit the tomb at all, and the wrong tomb theory falls.

To make sense, the theory demands not only that the women were present in Jerusalem until Sunday morning, but that they remained there for several weeks while the disciples returned to their homes, had certain experiences, and came back to the capital. This stretches credulity to the breaking point. Even if the disciples had fled and left the women behind, the latter would in any case have followed them later, at least not later than one week after the Passover festival which was the time when observant pilgrims left Jerusalem. If the disciples felt Jerusalem an unhealthy place to stay in at this time, what then about the women who accompanied them, having been left behind in a foreign town, with every instinct and domestic tie pulling them northward?

There is still another difficulty, more profound than the others.22 If the disciples really had fled, if the young man really were a gardener, and if the women really went to the wrong tomb, why did not the priests produce this young man and explode the whole delusion? It is historically incredible that this ever was done in view of the content of the apostolic preaching. Jewish beliefs and the subsequent growth of the Christian church in Jerusalem. How could the disciples have preached that Jesus was 'buried and raised again' (I Cor 15:4) in Jerusalem without implying that the empty tomb found by the women was the authentic tomb of Jesus? But, if so, why did not the priests (nor Joseph of Aritmathea!) point to the true tomb, or even produce the body itself? Given the prevalent Jewish notion of resurrection, this would have killed the new movement in its very start. But there is no trace of anything like this having taken place, only the echo of the original charge that the disciples themselves had abducted the body. The silence of the authorities speak louder than the voice of the apostles.

9.1.3 Spiritual Resurrection.

A third 'occupied tomb' theory states that Jesus' body decayed in the grave and that his real resurrection was spiritual.23 On top of the difficulties which the two prior theories have not been able to account for, this one has a particular one of its own. The main problem is that a spiritual resurrection would not be considered a resurrection at all in view of Jewish apocalyptic and later Talmudic writings.24 Since the NT documents generally are seen as standing in the tradition of this apocalyptic,25 this is quite important. The predominant eschatological teaching of apocalyptic and Talmudic writings is the resurrection of the body. Sometimes this is described in gross physical terms, as a resuscitation of the buried body, sometimes in terms of some sort of transformation of the body. However, the Jewish hope of resurrection is an altogether eschatological hope; the resurrection of the righteous at the last day. The apocalyptic resurrection hope was not a purely this-worldly materialistic hope of the resuscitation of corpses, but the raising of the dead to a new and utterly transformed existence.

When the kerygmatic summary of I Cor 15:4b asserted that Jesus "was raised", it therefore means not that his body was resuscitated, but that his whole self in his entire psychosomatic existence was transformed and thereby entered into the 'eschatological' existence. The truth of the Jewish expectation of the universal resurrection of the righteous was already presupposed in order to understand the particular message of the resurrection of Jesus. The latter depends, as far as language in which it is expressed is concerned, on the validity of the apocalyptic hope. This explains Paul's surprising statement: "If there be no resurrection, then Christ was not raised" (I Cor. 15:13).26

Maybe this particular form of resurrection faith can be seen as a possible construction, due to Jesus' self-understanding, which the disciples after his death put into the concept of a suffering and dying Messiah which then was presented as having risen? In other words, is it possible that the apostles' (including Paul27) belief that the body of Jesus had been raised from the tomb was a false inference derived from Jewish presuppositions as to what a resurrection meant, whereas in fact the resurrection was a survival of the spirit of Jesus? If so, the origin of the resurrection faith may be described in the following way:28

The resurrection faith arose first among those who had known Jesus in his lifetime. After his death, they had a vivid and personal feeling that Jesus was in some sense still with them and still guiding them. Jesus had built himself, unconsciously to them and perhaps also to him, so completely into them that he was even then living in them. Jesus was 'risen' because his message, personality, power and influence continued after his death. Jesus' guidance and inspiration outlived him, and for the believer he was still living. The resurrection faith a symbol of the 'revelation' that the death that Jesus died was a life-giving expression of true freedom (Bultmann); an almost ecstatic experience where Jesus became Christ; the Messiah (Wrede); the flash of insight by theological and existential reflection upon Jesus' life,29 or some other understanding was the natural first century Jewish way of describing this continuing influence. In a historical milieu where the dogma of the 'eschaton' (the future kingdom of God) belonged to the spirit of the age, the 'real' resurrection was the lingering of the eschatological mood.30

The 'fact' however, which this theory is not able to account for, is that we nowhere in the OT nor in contemporary Jewish hopes find the explicit expectation of a Messiah whose fate is to suffer and die. Both 'Messiah' and 'Son of Man' in the OT and in Judaism were eschatological figures associated with the establishment of the Kingdom of God, the gathering of Israel into the Kingdom through religious, sosial and political redemption, and the judgment and punishment of the wicked. In all Jewish literature, there is a dying Messiah only in IV Ezra 7, and there his death has no saving power. Jesus' use of the Son of Man concept was novel and perplexing to contemporary Jews. A suffering and dying Messiah or Son of Man was unheard of and seemed to be a flat contradiction of the contemporary Holy Scriptures, acknowledged by Jews and Christians alike.31 The apostles' preaching about the eschatological resurrection of Jesus, with a temporal interval separating it from the universal resurrection of the righteous, is from the point of view of the history of religions something new, also in the framework of the apocalyptic Jewish tradition.32

Given the non-derivability of either a spiritual or bodily resurrection faith from the OT or from Phariseeism, it is more likely that something specific happened in order for the apostles to proclaim the entry upon eternal life by an individual, before the wind-up of history. It is not enough to refer to the fact that Jesus had deeply influenced the lives of his disciples 33 in an age of dominant eschatological beliefs. To Historic Christianity, the best way to explain the

Easter-belief is to say that it was triggered off by certain sense perceptions of the risen Jesus which then gave unity and coherence to their understanding of the life of Jesus and thereby the OT.34 But to the Bultmann School, purely psychological explanations of the appearances fit their hard core of fundamental assumptions35 in a much better way.

9.1.4 Subjective Visions or Hallucinations.

The most prevalent 'occupied tomb' theory is that the people only thought they had seen Christ. In reality they were hallucinating; experiencing subjective visions.

The word 'hallucination' is an Anglicized form of the Latin term 'alucination', which means a wandering of the mind; idle talk; prating. Hallucination didn't become a technical term in psychology and medicine until the 19th century and has remained essentially unaltered for about hundred years; defined as a false sensory perception in the absence of actual external stimulus. From the point of view of the observing person making the judgment, the hallucinator is imagining but claiming to be perceiving; he is responding to stimuli that are not there.36 The same can be said of (subjective) visions:37 An apparent act of vision takes place when there is no corresponding external object. The optic nerve has not been stimulated by any outward causes, but has been excited by a purely inner psychological cause. At the same time the sense-impression of sight is accepted by the one who experiences the vision completely as if the object of his vision actually were before him.

Accordingly, to this psychological explanation of the resurrection faith the various 'appearances' were simply subjective visions generated by the imaginations of the disciples out of an intense state of emotion or expectancy. In a state of fervent devotion they imagined that they saw Jesus. When one of the women claimed to see the resurrected Jesus, the experience became contagious and soon others 'saw' him, too, including finally the disciples also. Jesus' prophecies of his triumph over death had primed his followers to expect exactly that, and so the whole myth began with the visions of 'a half-frantic woman'; Mary of Magdala, of whom Jesus had exorcized seven spirits (Mk 16:9).38

Others, such as David Friedrich Strauss,39 have suggested that Peter sustained the original hallucination. According to this scenario, the Eleven fled to Galilee after the crucifixion, where they finally calmed down and reflected on Jesus. The impulsive Peter in particular was mediating on his dead master when suddenly he had a sensation or vision of Jesus' surviving presence. Peter himself could not know that this was just a fantasy of his own imagination because, like his contemporaries who believed in ghosts and spirits, he would have been unable to distinguish between a real incursion from another dimension and a subjective hallucination. Peter's enthusiasm quickly became contagious,40 the hallucination was repeated, this time by the whole company, and when confused and exaggerated reports were received from the women in Jerusalem, the disciples, clutching at every resurrection rumor, turned joyously to the Holy City and proclaimed the new faith which spread like wildfire. No amount of cool reasoning could check it, it was even "no longer possible by the sight of the body of Jesus either to convict themselves, or to be convicted by others." (Strauss 1970, 851.)

This does not imply that disciples were frauds or liars, however. They held to their beliefs in all honesty and good faith. The process of development was probably largely unconscious; the disciples loved Jesus fervently and had been longing for him to return. They had everything to gain by a resurrection, for if the movement had died out after Christ's death, his followers

would have been exposed to ridicule by those of their acquaintances who had not fallen under the spell of this new prophet. To reduce their 'cognitive dissonance',41 they clutched at any straw of rumor and refused to be convicted that their faith was a projection of wish fulfilment. Unconsciously, they began pushing back the date of Peter's vision until it was fixed at the third day after crucifixion, influenced by such prophecies as Hosea 6:2: "On the third day he will rise up ..." The resurrection narratives are thus reliable only to a small extent; the details may have been written to provide support for the belief that supported them,42 e.g. to supply clearer symbols or allegories of the 'truth' conveyed. Even if they were written on the basis of eyewitness testimony, they are still basically mistaken insofar as visions are presented as external appearances.43

The Bultmann School thus assumes that the appearances really were religious visions, where the interpretative work; i.e. the theological and psychological expectancy of the disciples, was, both logically and chronologically, prior to the Easter experiences.44 But to Historic Christianity this explanation does not hold water.45 It is true that subjective visions or hallucinations are generated only when the recipients are in an agitated state of expectancy and in hopes of seeing their wishes fulfilled,46 but this was a mood diametrically opposite from that of the disciples. The disciples were not in an excitable state of expectancy after the crucifixion. Jesus' death exposed the faith of the disciples to the most severe stress. The narratives emphasize that which even D.F. Strauss acknowledges "is in perfect accordance with the nature of the case" (Strauss 1970, 846), viz. that the followers of Jesus were in a state of sorrow, hopelessness, bewilderment and despair. News of the resurrection nearly had to be forced on them in face of their obvious disbelief.47 Their hope that "he was the man to liberate Israel" (Lk 24:21) was crushed when he was put to death on a tree, as accursed of God.48

What then of the numerous occasions where Jesus allegedly had predicted his death and resurrection? If these sayings are historical, as Historic Christianity claims them to be, how can the disciples after the crucifixion be described as being utterly unprepared for that event? The answer is most probably that Jesus' predictions did not adequately condition his disciples for his death. The OT prophets do not predict the sufferings and death of either 'Messiah' or 'Son of Man', but of an unnamed undesignated 'Suffering Servant' (Isaiah 53, cf. Psalm 22). Contemporary Jewish literature did not reflect the hope of a suffering redeemer. In fact, Jesus' mission of suffering and death was contradictory to everything the disciples previously knew about Messiah; the person who through his life would redeem Israel, both spiritually and politically. It was only after the appearances that the apostles began to make the connections; remembering what Jesus had said about himself as the Messiah, seeing that the Son of Man must fill the role of the Suffering Servant of Isaiah 53 before he comes in the power and glory of God's Kingdom (Daniel 7). In this light, the story as told in the gospels is psychologically sound.49

People who came from the Jewish eschatological tradition would not have conceived of linking the death of Jesus to the end of history without compelling reasons. Something had to happen to create their resurrection faith that their crucified, dead 'Messiah' had returned to life. A historian can hardly expect that their interpretative frame of mind, their theological preunderstanding ('Vorverständnis') produced confirmatory experiences for such a faith. To the opposite, early Christianity required a long time to learn that with Jesus' resurrection the Messianic kingdom had not yet begun in general, and still would not arrive for an indefinite time (cf. e.g. Lk 24:21; Acts 1:6; II Thess. 2:1-3; I Thess.5:1f.). As an account of an eschatological event that happened (in space and time) to Jesus alone, the Easter message

took shape in the horizon of Jewish apocalyptic tradition. Even more so then, it could not have arisen as a purely mental reaction to Jesus' catastrophe. Far from reflecting the disciples' own ideas, the appearances led them beyond themselves into new and unexpected theological apprehensions.50

As to parallels in the history of religions, I have already (above; ch. 9) stated that it is an idle venture to explain the emergency of the resurrection message as due to such influence, if it exists at all. J. Leipoldt, who has traced in detail the possible importance of motifs from the "history of religions" environment for the primitive Christian message of Jesus' resurrection, confirms this conclusion emphatically.51 The question can only be if and to what extent the formal language of the religious environment has been used in the formation of the tradition of the appearances. But since hardly any traces of cults of dying and rising gods are to be found in first-century Palestine,52 such influences may be assumed only in the case of completely unambiguous similarities to motifs from the religious environment that cannot be explained from Palestinian presuppositions.53

If the narratives of the appearances were really based on uncontrolled hallucinations (or alleged pagan mythological parallels54) one would have expected them less prosaic than they actually are.55 These are not the sort of visions that an inflamed fanatic is likely to conjure up into his imagination. Instead of a gross material body with unhealed wounds, one would rather expect that their imagination had produced something like Jesus in a glorious throne with all the splendors of the highest heaven, as appearing through the opened sky. Instead, the NT clearly separated the resurrection appearances from ecstatic visionary experiences as the one Paul relates in II Cor 12. If Jesus' appearances were of one kind with subjective visions, then the form of something like Peter's vision (Acts 10), the dream sequences in the infancy narratives (Mt 1-2) or Stephen's vision (Acts 7:54-56) could have been utilized to describe them. But the evangelists did not do so, thereby indicating that Jesus' appearances were of a different quality.56

The second principal difficulty of the subjective vision hypothesis consists in the number of the appearances, their temporal distribution and the number and psychological character of the people reporting to have experienced them. To begin with the latter, hallucinations and similar phenomena tend to be confined to persons of a particular psychological make-up. They are those that one would describe as 'high-strung', highly imaginative and very nervous.57 Even though we do not know much of their psycho logical characters, it seems implausible to reduce all those who claimed to have seen the risen Jesus to any such classification:58 There was Mary of Magdala, who formerly may have had psychic problems (cf. Mk 16:9) and the eager but unreliable Peter (cf Mk 14:66-72), but there was also a doubting Thomas, a hard-headed tax-collector (Mt 9:9-11 par) and a number of down-to-earth fishermen, as well as a heterogeneous crowd of some five hundred people. The appearance to the latter cannot be a secondary construction to be explained by the development of the traditions, because Paul calls attention precisely here to the possibility of checking his assertion by saying that most of the five hundred are still alive (I Cor 15:6). Besides, there was a reportedly variety of mood when the appearances were experienced. Mary of Magdala was weeping (Jn 20:15), the women were afraid and astonished (Mk 16:8, Mt 28:8), Peter was full of remorse (Mk 14:66-72 par) and Thomas of incredulity (Jn 20:24-25). The Emmaus pair were distracted by the events of the week (Lk 24:18-24) and the disciples in Galilee by their fishing (Jn 21:2-5).

Hallucinations are usually restricted to when and where they occur. They are usually experienced in a place with a nostalgic atmosphere or at a time which particularly brings the person to a reminiscing mood.59 The time of Jesus' appearances and their location, as reported in the gospels, can hardly have conduced the witnesses to hallucinate. Outwardly favorable circumstances were missing.60 The appearances did not all take place in one or two particularly sacred places which may well have been hallowed by memories of Jesus, as e.g. the upper room (cf. Jn 20:19-29). Instead, the gospels report appearances at a variety of times and places; early in the morning at the tomb (Jn 20:10-17); on the road to Emmaus one afternoon (Lk 24:13-33), one or two private meetings, probably in broad daylight (Peter: Lk 24:34; James: I Cor 15:7); by the lake, early one morning (Jn 21:1-23) and on a Galilean mountain (Mt 28:16-20).

As to their temporal distribution, hallucinations usually tend to recur over a long period of time with noticeable regularity. They ither recur more frequently until a point of crisis is reached, or they occur less frequently until they fade away.61 But in this case all the accounts suggest that the appearances of the risen Jesus came to a relatively early end; Acts 1:3 describes an abrupt end six weeks after the crucifixion. The question is, if the appearances really were hallucinations, why did they stop so suddenly? If other appearances did occur after the ascension, they would most likely have been reported, but we hear nothing of such taking place neither in Acts nor in the epistles:62 After the five hundred had been brought under their sway, one would have expected that the hallucinations should have kept going for a long time. But after the ascension the phantom seems to have disappeared all of a sudden, whereas such subjective entities normally fades away gradually. It there actually was an abrupt end to the appearances then, this is evidence that their object was not a self-produced phantom.63

Historic Christianity argues against the assumption of a mental chain reaction of subjective visions by referring to individual appearances which did not follow quickly upon one another.64 But in most of the reported instances, the Easter phenomena were seen collectively. As noted earlier,65 this is normally taken as evidence against the subjective vision theory, since hallucinations are known to be very individualistic and extremely subjective. Neurobiological research has concluded that variability and inconstancy represent the most constant features of hallucinatory and related phenomena, whose instability reflects the instability of the factors and conditions associated with its origin.66 Nevertheless, a few instances of collective hallucinations have been reported.67 But in the case where a person-like figure is involved, it appeared as vague, still and silent. No conversation or any other form of communication was involved. These hallucinations, shared by two or three people, were presumably uncaused, whereas the delusions of the ill or insane are grotesque and never shared with others.

Another type of known hallucination which can be collective is caused by something like mass hysteria. This is close to the type which the Bultmann School's theory of subjective visions requires. The Fatima case 68 involves a certain aspect which is a case in point. My concern here is not those who claimed to have seen Virgin Mary. One may argue whether these were cases of purely internal or subjective visions seen by those of the crowd who had become sufficiently worked up, or whether they were true revelations of Jesus' mother. The sign which the Virgin had promised, on the other hand, could hardly have been other than subjective, and is thus a good example of a hallucination which originated in a time of emotional stress within a situation where there was a firm expectation that something unusual was about to occur.

On May 13, 1917, three Portuguese peasant children (aged 7-10) had a vision of the Virgin Mary at Fatima. She promised to return to them on the 13th of every month until that October, when she would give a convincing sign. So far however, not all the children saw or heard the same things. 69 By October 13, a crowd of estimated 70.000 people had assembled at the site of the expected appearance. Various witnesses claimed that they had seen the Virgin, with St. Joseph and the child Jesus, but their reports do not tally. The sign which the Virgin had promised, however, appears to have been seen by all those present without exception: As the ten-year old girl called out 'Look at the sun', the message spread through the crowd, which reportedly saw the sun whirling dizzily around, detaching itself from the sky and then spin down towards them so that it looked as if they were going to be crushed underneath it.

According to this report, we thus have a truly collective hallucination in which everybody saw the same thing. But the emotional conditions were quite unusual. The atmosphere in the vast crowd must have been emotionally supercharged: the tense feeling of expectant excitement mounting as the time drew near. Those who were close to the children reported to have heard them conversing with the Virgin and some of them claimed to have seen her themselves. As the little girl cried 'Look at the sun!', the hallucination spread like wildfire till everyone present were affected. Such extraordinary emotional conditions do not seem to have been present in the narratives of the appearances of Jesus, however, where slow recognition and even doubt are common features. The only possible exception is the appearance to over five hundred disciples at one, at a convened meeting (cf. above; ch. 8.2.2.4) where the apostles had experienced prior appearances and thus could have 'prepared' the others. Still, some reportedly doubted (Mt 28:17).

Historic Christianity thus cannot say that phenomena such as those which the subjective vision theory of the Bultmann School require never have occurred. Nevertheless, they are very unusual given the most constant features of hallusinations, and occur in conditions of intense expectancy which were not fulfilled in the case of most of the appearances of the risen Jesus. Collective hallucinations like the one in the Fatima-case thus hardly seem relevant to explain the Easter-belief. 70 The apostles who had been meeting behind locked doors in fear for their lives were transformed into the forthright and bold witnesses we read of in Acts, most of them dying for their faith. James, the brother of Jesus, had disowned him and did not believe that he was the Messiah (Jn 7:5). The crucifixion had brought a disgrace on his family which could never be removed. It would seem to take more than a self-produced subjective vision to explain that he could become within a few years the acknowledged leader of the Jerusalem Christians and a martyr for the resurrection faith.71 Historic Christianity's conclusion is well-attested: The apostles were not the victims of delusion; neither through collective nor individual hallucinations. 72

9.2 Empty Tomb.

I have thus argued that none of the above theories offers any solid base for a historical reconstruction of the origin of the resurrection faith. Each of them raise more difficulties than they solve. But even though the Bultmann School primarily tries to account for the resurrection faith on the assumption that the empty tomb stories are secondary legends,73 there are other auxiliary hypotheses available which acknowledge that the original tomb of Jesus was found empty, but still deny the resurrection to have taken place. These will be dealt

with in the following, but first I will elaborate on some of the reasons why the assumption of an occupied tomb appears to be more a legend of the critics than a legend of history.74

Apart from the explicit assertions of the NT,75 important historical evidence can be assembled to show that the tomb was empty on Easter morning. (The empty tomb, by the way, does not prove the resurrection. Most of those who claimed to have seen it on Easter morning were confused rather than convinced that Jesus was risen. On the other hand, an occupied tomb would effectively disprove a bodily resurrection.) The main point is that what happened in Jerusalem seven weeks after Easter could only have taken place if Jesus' body was missing from Joseph's sepulcher. Beginning at the festival of Pentecost and continuing in the weeks thereafter, Peter and the other apostles sustained transformations inexplicable apart from their blazing faith in the resurrection. Abandoning their fear of the Jerusalem authorities, they boldly began preaching a resurrected Christ from no less a forum than the Temple itself.76 To Historic Christianity, this is in itself evidence of the resurrection, but it is the reaction of the priestly authorities that, even for a non-believing historian, must constitute evidence for an empty tomb. The Temple establishment did not do the obvious to counter the apostles' preaching. They did not lead an official procession out to Joseph's tomb, where, for all to see they could have delivered the death blow to Christianity by opening Joseph´s sepulcher and revealing the moldering body of Jesus of Nazareth. To assume that this was done just does not fit any of the existing evidence available.

Even if one grants, for the sake of argument, that the bodily resurrection faith needs to be demythologized, the situation still remains that the contemporary Jews of Jerusalem with their notion of the resurrection would have got around rather quickly to investigate the tomb of Jesus. This was not Athens, where philosophers for a long time had taught the immortality of the soul and the dualistic concept of man that followed from it. If the resurrection first had been proclaimed here, it would naturally have been understood as a spiritual resurrection of the soul with the body so unimportant that few, if any, would have bothered to check the tomb. But not so in Jerusalem, not among Jews who believed that the resurrection was nothing if it did not involve the body. By their manner of thinking, the tomb would have to be empty if anything like a resurrection actually had happened. Its emptiness did not prove the resurrection, but its fullness would have ruled it out. Thus the Temple establishment, enemies of the new movement, is bound to have checked the tomb. The resurrection faith "could not have been maintained in Jerusalem for a single day, for a single hour, if the emptiness of the tomb had not been established as a fact for all concerned." (Althaus 1940, 22.)

It is true that the record of the apostles preaching a resurrected Jesus and the supposed failure of the authorities to produce the body rests only on NT sources biased in favor of Christianity. But it does not rest only on them. Some important evidence derives also from purely Jewish sources and traditions. Such sources understandably reveal and hostile attitude towards Christianity, yet in none of the early Jewish writings77 is the statement made that the body of Jesus was still in its tomb that Sunday morning. Rather, Jewish polemic shared with Christians the conviction that the sepulcher was empty, but gave natural explanations for it. And such positive evidence from a hostile source is a strong kind of evidence. If Jewish sources affirming an occupied tomb ever existed, one may wonder to what extent they were likely to have been destroyed by Christians. But even if this possibility is granted, why did not the Jewish sources which do remain claim the same? If the tomb really was occupied, this would have been common knowledge among the Jews. It thus seems unexplainable why any genuine Jewish source would have settled for anything less in its polemic against the Christians' resurrection faith.

Some Jewish sources treat the matter neutrally. Josephus' statement that "He was the Messiah ... for he appeared alive again on the third day" (Josephus 1965, XVIII, 63) is properly regarded as an early Christian interpolation since it is extremely unlikely that any professing 'Judaistic' Jew could have written such a statement. In the 'Agapius'-manuscript, however, the same passage states "His disciples ... reported that he had appeared to them three days after his crucifixion and that he was alive; accordingly, he was perhaps the Messiah." 78 This may be the original version, as a non-Christian Jew might have used such language with less difficulty than in the former case. The point, however, is the remarkable fact that Josephus does not seek to scotch the resurrection claim by any information at his disposal that Jesus' body still lay in its grave. Certainly this is an argument from silence, but the silence is eloquent in view of Josephus' known habit of roasting false Messiahs elsewhere in his books.

Well into the second century AD the Jerusalem authorities continued to admit an empty tomb by ascribing it to the disciples' stealing the body. In his Dialogue with Trypho,79 Justin Martyr, who came from neighboring Samaria, reported c. AD 150 that the Jewish authorities even sent specially commissioned men across the Mediterranean to counter Christian claims with this explanation of the resurrection.

Early Jewish traditions regarding Jesus were later gathered also in an anti-Christian fifth-century compilation called Toledoth Jeshu ('Generations of Jesus'), which offered a garbled but interesting version of Jesus' burial:80 The disciples planned to steal the body of Jesus so they could claim a resurrection. But Judah a gardener, overheard their plans, so he dug a grave in his own garden, stole Jesus' corpse from Joseph's tomb and then laid it in a newly dug pit. When the disciples came to the original sepulchre and found it empty, they proclaimed Jesus' resurrection in Jerusalem. The Jews, who also found the tomb empty, were perplexed and in mourning until Judah wondered why everyone was so longfaced. Upon learning the cause, he smiled and conducted them to his garden where he unearthed the body of Jesus. Overjoyed, the priestly authorities bought the body for thirty pieces of silver, and then dragged it through the streets of Jerusalem.

Jewish scholars today regard the Toledoth Jeshu with total disdain, but it still remains that this compilation, which reflects early traditions, vague Talmudic references, and the 4th century Jewish historian Josippon, agrees that Jesus' original tomb was empty. The Jewish polemic is not likely to have developed a great length of time after the preaching of the resurrection. After a certain time there would not have been much point in arguing about an empty tomb; too many things could have happened to explain its being empty. Besides, as the Christian movement could not have grown, or even emerged, if Jesus' tomb was occupied, there is every reason to assume the Jewish polemic to be just as old as the tradition behind the empty tomb narratives. The polemic did develop and so must have developed early. The fact that the enemies of Christianity felt obliged to explain away the empty tomb by the theft hypothesis shows not only that the tomb was known (confirmation of the burial story), but that everyone knew it was empty.

Hence, both the preaching of the resurrection in Jerusalem81 and the polemic of the Jews strengthen the protective belt of Historic Christianity. With these arguments in mind there is even less cause to doubt the basic story of the finding of the tomb as recorded by the evangelists. Why, then, was the tomb empty? To the Bultmann School there has to be some natural cause. To Historic Christianity the preternatural cause that Jesus actually rose from the dead better explains the evidence.

9.2.1 Stolen by Disciples

The earliest attempt to explain the phenomenon of the empty tomb is, naturally, the one reflected in the Jewish polemic. In Mt 28:11-15 we are told that the Jewish leaders bribed the guard which had been set to watch the sepulcher to say that the disciples had come by night and stolen the body. This may have been a suitable claim at the very start of the Christian movement, but given the way the disciples responded to pressure and persecution in the following decades, there are very few, if any scholars who hold this theory today.82

Origen's answer still stands.83 Men do not risk their lives and suffer martyrdom for a deliberate lie. The enthusiasm of an ultimate devotion in the face of all obstacles which leads to sacrificing one's own life could not arise out of deceit. It would be incredible both in view of ethics, psychology and the rules of evidence applied in courts of law. If the disciples had expected a resurrection of Jesus there would have been a certain possibility, if not so much of an intentional deception, yet of an involuntary self-delusion on their part. Being utterly convinced that Jesus was resurrected, no matter what, they could thus have stolen the body simply to convince others of the same through an empty tomb. But this possibility vanishes to the extent that the disciples lost all hope after his death. From the psychological point of view, they would have been too depressed and shaken to be capable of such a dangerous undertaking. But above all, since neither they nor anyone else expected a resurrection, there would have been no purpose in faking one.

One then has to imagine the apostles raiding the tomb by night, stealing the body,84 burying it furtively in some place, and then proceeding to foist the resurrection fraud on the world. But this would run totally contrary to all we know of the quality of their lives, including their ethical teaching and their steadfastness in suffering and persecution (cf. e.g. Acts 7:60, 12:2). Even Edward Gibbon acknowledged that one of the reasons for the relatively rapid success of Christianity was "the purer but austere morality of the first Christians." (Gibbon 1952, 179.)

9.2.2 Removed by Authorities

It may seem better to suggest that the body might have been moved to another grave, for some reason or other, on the orders of the chief priests or the Roman procurator, or even by Joseph of Arimathea. The case for an official removal of the body breaks down, however, when it is confronted by the situation after Pentecost where Jerusalem was seething with the apostles' preaching of the resurrection.85 They were proclaiming it to the great discomfort of the chief priests, who were being accused of having conspired to crucify the "holy and righteous" one, whom "God raised from the dead."86 Why, then, is there not the slightest hint in any early source that the empty tomb was officially denied by stating that the body had been removed on the Priests' order, with or without the procurator's authorization?87 If this would not have sufficed, they could have called as witnesses those who had carried it away. If this was not enough, they could have pointed to its final resting-place, or even produced the body itself.

As the Jewish authorities were prepared to go to almost any length to stamp out this heretic preaching,88 it is their complete failure to produce the remains, or to point to any tomb, official or otherwise, in which they were said to lie, which destroys the credibility of this

theory. The continuing growth of the Christian movement is sufficient evidence that this was never done. Again, an appropriate argument from silence.

What then of Joseph of Arimathea? It is argued that he thought it unfitting that one who had been crucified should remain in his own ancestral tomb. It was used since it was close to the scene of crucifixion and the Sabbath was quickly approaching (Jn 19.42). At the close of the Sabbath Joseph therefore secretly removed the body and buried it in an unknown grave.89

It is disputable, however, whether there was so much urgency involved when Jesus was buried.90 It was urgent that the body be removed from the cross before the Sabbath, as Jewish law prescribed that the body of a person executed might not remain on the instrument overnight.91 But once this was done, there was a rule around AD 200, which, if effective in Jesus' time, would relieve some of the time-pressure: On the Sabbath, or the eve of the Sabbath, "they may make ready all that is needful for the dead body and anoint it and wash it." (Mishna Shabbat 23.5.) If then, the body had been buried according to the proper rules,92 there would be even less reason to remove it for burial elsewhere. Besides, if the story of the women's visit to the tomb is basically reliable, the only time Joseph could have moved the body would necessarily have been between the close of the Sabbath and the first sign of dawn. This in itself would have been a rather strange time for a respected leader of the people to choose for an otherwise legitimate operation which could have been performed much better at the break of day.93

There are two ways of regarding Joseph of Arimathea. Either he was a secret follower of Jesus who now performed this service to a person he previously had hesitated to acknowledge openly; or he was a pious Jew who agreed to bury the body in this own tomb that it might not hang on the cross on the Sabbath day.94 But if he was a Christian it is unlikely that he would have moved the body without consulting the apostles first, and even more so that he would not have told them afterwards, when they were preaching the resurrection up and down the city. Yet this would lead to the impossible hypothesis that the apostles themselves were blatant deceivers preaching a miracle which they knew perfectly well had never happened.95

If, one the other hand, he was just a pious Jew, then it is unlikely that he would have moved the body without the permission of the chief priests, and it is incredible that he would not have told them afterwards, when they were so upset by the proclamation of the resurrection. But then the same arguments may be applied here as those noted earlier against the theory of an official Jewish96 removal of the body. The Temple authorities could easily have annihilated the new heresy at its very inception by calling Joseph as an official witness of the body's new whereabouts. The fact that the Christian movement grew in strength is sufficient evidence that this was never done.97 Again, the silence of the authorities speak louder than the voice of the apostles.

In addition, these explanations also have to deal with the reports of the appearances of the risen Christ. So would a possible fourth proposal; suggesting that extremist fanatics of a rival Galilean nationalist group could have remedied the procurator's unusual decision to release the body by removing the corpse under cover of night to one of the criminals' graves. But as such people were not disciples of Jesus, would they not have revealed where the remains of Jesus were to be found when the Christians began preaching the resurrection of their dead master? Or, one may fall back on the assumption that the removal was done by an unknown person without any particular motive; that he let no one know what he had done, and left Jerusalem for good after stealing body. No one can deny that this is a possible explanation.98

But is it likely? Apart from being a pure conjecture, how does it account for the heavy boulder, or rolling stone, blocking the entrance of the sepulcher; 99 the report of the guard and the appearances?

9.2.3 Temporal Resuscitation

The only 'natural' cause which seems to account for both the empty tomb and the reappearances of Jesus is the physical survival of a Jesus who did not succumb to crucifixion but rather revived to live on. Various forms of this 'swoon' theory have been suggested ever since the Roman pagan philosopher Celsus first proposed it in the second century AD,100 through Venturini in the early nineteenth century,101 and even up until the present:102

Jesus only appeared to die on the cross.103 He lingered on in a state of suspended animation perhaps due to the effect of some deep narcotic given to him on the cross. After his entombment, the cool of the tomb and the healing effect of the spices wrapped around his body revived him. Exchanging his grave clothes for those of a gardener, he either managed to crawl out of the sepulcher or he was taken out and then encountered Mary of Magdala. After her glad recognition he was taken to Joseph or the disciples, who nursed him back to health and presented him as the risen Lord. Forty days later, his strength was exhausted. The farewell scene gave rise to the mistaken impression of his ascension. Just before he expired he assembled the disciples on a mountain and parted from them by walking into a cloud. Though he was crawling off to die, the apostles believed he had ascended to heaven.

To explain the continuity of the Christian movement, the real Easter 'miracle' is thus identified, not in a changed Jesus, but in metamorphosed disciples. It was of fundamental importance to the early church to have had the experience of seeing Jesus alive after death and burial (cf. Lk 24:28). It is therefore conceivable that a belief in the resurrection among those who continued Jesus' ministry, including healing and exorcism, had a retroactive effect on the formation of the resurrection preaching.104 After the crucifixion and the probable removal of Jesus to Emmaus and possibly later to Galilee, where he could be cared for and protected, the movement he had initiated revived after going underground for a period. Jesus had left behind hundreds of disciples both in Jerusalem and Galilee. These people were receptive to stories about him. The story of his miraculous105 survival, treated as a resurrection, made a tremendous impact. It may have been perceived as a parallel to the story of the great OT prophet Elijah, who 'was carried up to heaven.' (II Kings 2:1-12.)

The evidence against the survival of Jesus, however, is according to Historic Christianity quite formidable.106 All the sources, the NT gospels and epistles and the rabbinical tradition alike, state that Jesus died on the cross. The centurion in charge of the execution detail is prominently cited in the synoptics as present to witness and guarantee the success of his mission, the failure of which would have had dire consequences to himself (cf. Mk 15:44f.) Pilate would not have granted Joseph the body if the centurion had not confirmed that life was extinct. The Fourth Gospel also involves the spear thrust (Jn 19:34), followed by blood and water from Jesus' side. From a medical standpoint, this indicates either pericardial fluid or extravasated blood that was separating into its constituent red cells and plasma, both, however, betokening death.107 The total absence of respiration in Jesus, in contrast to the two men crucified on either side of him, made the 'crurifragium'; the breaking of legs to speed up the death process, necessary. It was, however, administered to the two others, a practice

confirmed by the discovery in 1968 of the bones of a crucified victim in northeastern Jerusalem.108

As to Jesus' comparatively short time on the cross; from 9 a.m. till 3 p.m. (Mk 15:25, 33-37; cf. 15:44: "Pilate was surprised to hear that he was already dead"), it seems obvious that he was in much worse physical condition than is generally assumed. Besides the agony of the sleepless night at Bethsemane and the following mistreatment at the High Priest's house, there was excessive scourging and punishment administered by Pilate's troops on Friday morning, the tiring processions to and from the Hasmonean palace for the hearing before Herod Antipas, and finally such fatigue on the way to the cross that Jesus even stumbled under the weight of his 'patibulum' or crossbeam, which probably was not all that heavy a timber.

Crucifixion, intended to assure a long and lingering death, was not a treatment from which it was easy to escape alive, however short might be the victim's time on the cross. Josephus109 tells of an occasion when he saw a number of captives being crucified, and recognized three friends of his among them. At his request they were taken down and given the greatest medical care, but only one survived. Josephus does not mention how long these people had hung on the cross, but is seems from the account that this could not have been more than a day, and probably only for a few hours.110 The incident is thus taken by Historic Christianity, not as evidence in favor of the swoon theory,111 but as an in diction of how unlikely it would be for a crucified man to survive his experience, even if he were given full medical treatment.112

Anyway, if Jesus had been nursed back to health, he could hardly have appeared so rapidly to his disciples in a 'resurrected' physical condition already on Easter Sunday evening, only forty-eight hours after death.113 The swoon-theorists therefore propose a slow recovery in Emmaus or Galilee and deny the historical reliability of the gospel stories of the first appearances. To Historic Christianity such auxiliary hypotheses reveal a clear ad hocˇ-ˇcharacter; creating more problems than they solve.114 If the evangelists115 were guilty of so general a 'cover up' concerning Jesus' survival rather than his resurrection, the pattern of their falsehood and its consequences would follow the 'lies-beget-more-lies' phenomenon: A twisting of all post-crucifixion events into a hopelessly divergent jumble, far more serious than the present problems of sequence in the gospel sources.

The Bultmann School may reply that the gospels were written much later than the claimed phenomena of the first Easter, when there was time to sort through such a jumble. But then the evidence of I Cor. 15 must stand instead. Nineteen or twenty years after the crucifixion Paul refers to the tradition which earlier had been imparted to him; that Christ died, was buried, raised to life on the third day and appeared to Cephas, the Twelve, to over five hundred of our brothers ... (I Cor 15:3 ff.).

Furthermore, it seems quite difficult to understand what sense a sickly, barely surviving or crippled rabbi could have for his followers as a champion who 'conquered death'? Could a seriously wounded Jesus inspire in his disciples the founding of a faith based on his resurrection? He must have been extremely weakened when he recovered consciousness in the cold damp tomb. At whatever time he left the tomb,116 how could he possibly suggest that he was risen and glorified? Even D. F. Strauss ironically opposed such an idea.117 The exhausted appearance of a person who has only narrowly escaped death is very different from the triumphant aspect of one who has conquered the grave so that it has no more dominion over him. Besides, if he knew he had not died, why did Jesus withhold the truth from his

disciples? It would go against the whole of his known character to do so. If he ever genuinely thought he had died and risen again, he only had to consider his physically exhausted condition to be immediately disillusioned. He would be incapable of deceiving himself, let alone his disciples.

As it is clear that the resurrection faith was not a post-apostolic legend (cf. Cor. 15), it would take more than a deliberate lie concerning Jesus' temporal survival in order to launch a movement based on his 'resurrection'. Would the apostles have gone on to court, danger, persecution and even death itself for something which they knew to be a hoax? No. Liars do not make martyrs.

A modern twist of the resuscitation theory has been proposed in Schonfield 1967.118 Historic Christianity agrees with Schonfield in insisting that the Jesus of the NT gospels is explicable only on the basis that he was profoundly convinced that he was the promised Messiah, and that he understood his Messiahship in terms of the suffering Servant in Isaiah 53. But from here on the agreement ends. According to the reconstruction of Jesus' Passover plot, Jesus felt himself called as a prophet to preach repentance in Israel, but his mission did not succeed. He therefore decided to stage what would appear to be a sacrificial death in accordance with OT predictions, although he planned in fact to survive.

Jesus provoked Judas to betray him to the council, who in turn handed him over to Pilate under the accusation of political sedition. Jesus so cleverly plotted that he brought about his crucifixion at the hands of Pilate on Friday, in the confident expectation that his body would not be left on the cross beyond sunset of the Sabbath. He carefully concealed this plan from the apostles and revealed it only to Joseph of Arimathea and one or two unknown friends in Jerusalem. At a given signal, 'I thirst' (Jn 19:28),an emissary of Joseph administered a powerful drug on a sponge to Jesus which immediately sent him into a death-like trance; but he was not dead. Joseph rushed to Pilate to ask for Jesus' body, and was granted his request, whereupon Joseph promptly took down the body and laid it in a tomb.

The plan then was that Joseph and Nicodemus, after dark on Saturday night, would reopen the tomb, carefully remove the bandages from Jesus, and convey him from the tomb to a safe place where Essene doctors would be in attendance to give their expert medical attention. After Jesus had revived, the Essenes would arrange for his convalescence, possibly at Qumran, and then he would be reunited with his disciples in Galilee.119 But an unforeseen incident occurred. While he was still on the cross, Jesus' side was pierced by a soldier's lance (Jn 19:34). This added to his weakness. In any case, he was taken from the tomb after a few hours. The persons in the plot managed to resuscitate Jesus for a period of about half an hour, in which Jesus begged his friends to deliver a message to his disciples that he would meet them in Galilee. But then he died, and was reverently buried on the spot, leaving the original tomb empty. Peter and John came to the tomb, and suddenly John imagined that Jesus had risen. Unbalanced Mary also came to the tomb, and in a "half-crazed condition" (Schonfield 1967, 169) she saw a young man near the tomb, either the gardener or an Essene who had assisted Joseph, and identified him as Jesus. The two disciples on the Emmaus road met a stranger who tried to bring them the dying Jesus' message and later concluded that it was Jesus. This young man followed the apostles who had gone to Galilee, and there twice delivered the message to Peter and the other ten that Messiah had risen. "Now-born hope and wish fulfilment caused the messenger to be identified with the Master." (Ibid., 173.)

To Historic Christianity, Schonfield's theory is marked throughout by a willingness to stress the merest detail in the gospel sources where this assists the theory and to reject everything, however important, which points the other way.120 He rejects one thing; the guard at the tomb, because it is only recorded once, by Matthew, while accepting another, the thrust of the spear (a major premise in his argument), which is only recorded by John. The important witness of Paul is altogether ignored, the theory does not even try to explai nhow Jesus could have 'appeared' to over five hundred disciples at once (I Cor 15:6; written at a time when the majority of these were alive to confirm Paul's claim).

We are also asked to believe that the radical transformation of the disciples were due to the appearance of the young man whom they confusedly believed to be Jesus, just like that, and to eradicate any historical core in the story of the guard and all but four of the appearance narratives. Neither does it seem probable that the body of Christ could be kept hidden without any knowledge of its whereabouts being revealed to the authorities or the public.121 Given the controversy caused by the preaching of the apostles, any rumor of such a kind would probably have caught the spotlight of the whole city of Jerusalem.

Needless to say, a Passover plot would involve Jesus in a colossal hoax completely contrary to everything else written about him. It hardly seems plausible to assume that Jesus provoked Judas to betray him, nor that he kept his plot utterly secret to his closest disciples. And what if the plot had succeeded? What would have happened if Christ had apparently come back to life? Would he then have told the eleven, and if so, what would have been gained? To such questions Schonfield's theory provides no real answer.122

9.2.4 Resurrected?

In accordance with the historical-theological resarch programme of Historic Christianity,123 I will thus conclude that none of the above naturalistic theories provide an adequate explanation for the rise of the resurrection faith. No one theory explains all parts of the sources, and it would take an incredible combination of several of them to begin to do so. On the other hand, all of them raise more difficulties than they solve, as often is the case with 'ad hoc' hypotheses.

The evidence for the historical, bodily resurrection of Jesus is thus indirect. The more thoroughly naturalistic explanations are refuted, the higher the probability for the resurrection becomes. But there is also positive, circumstantial evidence to be used in its favor. There are four 'facts' which nowadays are generally accepted as historical, independent of which research programme the particular scholar belongs to.124 These are roughly that Jesus died by crucifixion;125 that certain people had experiences which they believed to be appearances of the risen Jesus; that these experiences were the reason for the subsequent transformation of these men (including Saul of Tarsus) and that Jesus' resurrection was the heart of the message of the church they founded.126 As I have argued earlier, the appearances can hardly be explained away naturalistically, and without a Jesus who was raised from the dead it is very difficult, if not impossible, to explain the change and the actions of the disciples, including Paul, and the movement they launched by their teaching. Even the most skeptical historian has to postulate "a something" (Dibelius 1949, 141) to account for the complete change in the behavior of the disciples.

To Historic Christianity,127 then, a true historical perspective suggests that it would be nearer to truth to say that the historical resurrection, crucial to the early Christian proclamation of Christ, created the Christian community, than to say that the community created the kerygma. The church formulated it, no doubt, but except upon the hypothesis that the apostolic preaching originated in an historical event, it seems very difficult to assign an adequate reason for the emergency of the Christian church. The resurrection of Jesus can thus be designated as a historical event in the following sense: If the origin of the resurrection faith seems to be historically unexplainable, in spite of all critical examination of the sources, unless one examines it in the light of the Jewish eschatological hope for a bodily resurrection,128 i.e. unless Jesus actually did (bodily) appear to the disciples after his death, then an event like the resurrection of Jesus,129 expressed in the language of the eschatological expectation, is to be asserted as a historical occurrence. The cause of such an event, however, cannot be identified by historical inquiry, insofar as such a cause remains indescribable in 'natural' categories.

Does this mean that the resurrection has been proved? Apodictic certainty is certainly not available, but such is hardly a problem for one would be hard pressed to produce such total, indisputable proof for any historical 'fact', or of any other area of factual certainty for that matter. Yet this is no way impedes historians from being quite sure of many historical events of the past. If a certain historical theory is supported by a high degree of probability plus the exclusion of viable rational or factual doubt, then this theory would be 'demonstrated', if not 'proven' in a strict sense, by accepted historical standards.130

Is the resurrection of Jesus 'demonstrated' then? I think not.131 The discussions in chs. 7-9; above, warrant Historic Christianity to conclude that the assertion of Jesus' historical resurrection appears as historically quite probable,132 and in historical inquiry this implies that it is to be presupposed until contrary evidence appears. But it does not imply that viable rational or factual doubt is excluded, especially as this matter involves basic convictions as to what is historically possible or not. From a naturalistic viewpoint, contrary evidence is available.

I have shown, in ch. 2.3; above, that supernatural miracles can occur, i.e. they do not necessarily contradict the generally accepted laws of nature.133 Likewise, a historian should, in principle at least, be open-minded to all possibilites and not exclude certain alleged events, viz. miraculous ones, a priori, cf. above; ch. 3.3. The real question, however, is whether a miracle such as the bodily resurrection of Jesus actually did occur. To settle that question any historian obviously looks to the general evidence of human experience for and against purported miracle claims. As bare, uninterpreted experience or historical evidence is non-existent, any historian likewise evaluates the evidence concerning the resurrection of Jesus in a way which to a certain extent depends on his or her world-view, i.e. whether or not one thinks miracles are possible or even, in some cases, probable.

There are obviously a lot of possibilities that virtually every historian is quite reluctant even to consider. For example, it is possible that Adolph Hitler actually was a cleverly disguised agent from another planet, or that Napoleon Bonaparte is still alive, at the age 216, and hides in the Gobi desert, or perhaps in Vennesla, Norway. On the other hand, in cases where conjectures of miracles are backed by existing evidence, a supernaturalist historian belonging to Historic Christianity would agree that if after careful examination one finds that by far the best explanation of a given phenomenon is one that involves a miracle, then a historian ought to swallow any reluctance, and hold that a miracle occurred. The point, however, is that to a naturalist historian belonging to the Bultmann School, the idea that Jesus was physically

raised from the dead is just as ridiculous as the ridiculous possibilities mentioned above. The 'we should be open-minded to all possibilities' argument in favor of the resurrection will not be convincing to such a person. This is why certain believers think the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus amounts to 'demonstration',134 while certain nonbelievers think it perfectly absurd that a man dead for three days lived again, no matter what the evidence amounts to.

Now if the resurrection of Jesus could be demonstrated from the facts which nearly all scholars agree on, then the apparent discrepancies in the resurrection narratives could be ignored. But the fact that these historical propositions are (almost) universally agreed upon is evidence that the resurrection is not deducible from them, at least not in any strict logical sense. If they were, they would simply no longer be generally agreed upon. The alleged discrepancies are therefore still relevant.135 Historians and theologians of the Bultmann School can use them to argue that the resurrection accounts are diverse, inconsistent, late and unreliable.136 If so, we may be too far removed from the events following the death of Jesus to conclude with any significant degree of probability what happened. Or, there may be naturalistic theories not discussed by me nor even yet invented that account for the accepted facts and still exclude a historical resurrection.

As a 'soft' exponent of Historic Christianity,137 I would thus acknowledge that the historical proposition 'Jesus was raised from the dead' is not the only rational conclusion to be drawn from the existing evidence. Nevertheless, I believe the preceding parts of ch. 9 have shown that the evidence yields 'dramatic' support to Historic Christianity insofar as the theory that Jesus physically rose from the dead unintendedly 'postdicts' or makes sense of historical 'facts' which the rival research programme has a hard time explaining.138 The assertion that Jesus is literally alive is thus not only rational, it even turns out to be part of a progressive research programme.

NOTES ch. 9

1. Bultmann 1964, 42.
2. Cf. M.Smith 1968, 12, who advocates this methodology for the study of religion in general. I am aware, of course, that what questions a historian wants to answer is dependent on what kind of problems he wishes to address. It is certainly legitimate to deal with the development of Early Christianity without addressing the question of the truth-claims of early Christian beliefs. What is not legitimate is to exclude the relevance of this question as such.
3. Bultmann was not quite without opinion on the matter however: "The historian can perhaps to some extent account for that (resurrection) faith from the personal intimacy which the disciples had enjoyed with Jesus during his earthly life, and so reduce the resurrection appearances to a series of subjective visions." Bultmann 1953, 42 f. (Yet he appears to have been unsatisfied with the subjective vision hypothesis, cf. the way Helmut Thielicke quotes him in the same volume, p. 152. The agnosticism of Bultmann 1974, 45 seems to have been his last position on the matter.)
4. Cf. Leipoldt 1948, 738; Pannenberg 1977, 90f., R. Brown 1967, 233 and Hooke 1967, 1-3. For a presentation of the methodological presuppositions involved, see de Vries 1977, 91-94. A typical example of an assault on the historicity of the resurrection through comparative religions is S. Reinach: Orpheus, published in 1909.
5. Cf. e.g. Guignebert 1956, 500.
6. Digesta 48.24.1; Tacitus 1959, 6.29; Cicero: Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo, 5.16. For most of this paragraph, I am building upon Cohn 1972, 238, where further references are noted.
7. Digesta 48.24.1 (Ulpian); 48.24.3 (Paulus).
8. Josephus 1981, 4.5.2. In the case of executions by Jewish courts, the normal procedure in pre-Roman times would have been to dump the corpse in a common burial place reserved for malefactors, cf. Deuteronomy 21:23 and M. Sanhedrin VI, 5.
9. Tzaferis 1970 and Haas 1970.
10. Cf. e.g. R. Brown 1973, 113-115 and Pannenberg 1977, 103f.
11. 3rd ed. 1964; translation taken from Pannenberg 1977, 103. Grass continues: "Inquiry by friend and foe remained fruitless, and in any case it also was not pursued with particular zeal by Jesus' friends, since they were certain of the resurrected Lord through the appearances." Cf. Küng 1978, 364f. Again, the assumption is that Jesus was buried as a criminal in just any tomb that happened to be empty or even in a mass grave without anyone having taken the trouble to inform Jesus' followers of its location.
12. As Grass 1970, 173-183, argues (3rd ed.).
13. It is also of some importance here that archeological evidence seems to confirm the Church of the Holy Sepulcher as the historical location of the tomb of Jesus; cf. Cornfeld 1982, 199-217 and Wenham 1984, 18 f.
14. Luke 1907, 68f., 250-253; cf. Gardner-Smith 1926.
15. The 'lettuce' theory is an alternative to the above: the gardener was so piqued at curiosity-seekers trampling over lettuce seedlings that he had planted in the garden around Joseph's tomb that he removed the body of Jesus and reinterred it elsewhere. But still visitors came to the now-empty sepulcher and proclaimed the resurection. Crude as this hypothesis is, it was in fact one of the early non-Christian explanations for the resurrection, and the 2nd century church father Tertullian records it in De Spectaculis, 30. This theory, however, remains somewhat ridiculous. For one thing, the versatile gardener (who evidently transplanted bodies as well as lettuce) would have had some answering to do to the owner of the sepulcher, to say nothing of his having been prevented by the Jewish guards in the first place. Cf. Cornfeld 1982, 180; 182. To Schonfield 1981, 46-50, however, the Jewish

suggestions of what happened after Jesus' entombment, including the theory that the gardener removed the body, "are no more fanciful than what the gospels, especially Matthew, describe." Ibid.,
49.
16. Hooke 1967, 129, McDowell 1981, 80 and Cornfeld 1982, e.g., argue that the women, who are said to have watched the burial and noted the location of the grave (Mk 15:47), would not have made such a mistake. And even if they had, Joseph of Arimathea would have corrected them.
17. Cf. above; ch. 8.2.2.1-3.
18. Cf. Jn 18:12-27; 19:25f., 20:1-9; Mk 14:66-72 par; Lk 12:12,24.
19. Cf. e.g. Morison 1978, 100.
20. Cf. Wenham 1984, 34-42.
21. Notice how this point, used by the Bultmann School to support that the women mistook the tomb of Jesus, is digested and turned into positive evidence by Historic Christianity. Cf. Morison 1978, 101.
22. Cf. e.g. ibid., 101f; Ramsay 1946, 72 and Anderson 1972, 95. This point applies to all of the 'natural' explanations of ch. 9.1.
23. Cf. the position of the Bultmann School as stated above; ch. 8.1.1. Typical examples; "The real Jesus was not the flesh and blood and the bone and the skin, but that something which had the power to reproduce itself in them, that lived in them." Enslin 1961, 212. "The spiritual body (that is, the 'I' in a completely different and inconceivable mode of existence) does not, however, pressupose that flesh and blood, the body which was laid in the earth, is filled with new life." Marxsen 1979, 70.
24. Cf. Ladd 1976, ch. 5; 51-59 and Pannenberg 1977, 79-81. The apocryphal and pseudepigraphal literature discussed are Ecclasiasticus, or the Wisdom of Jesus, the Son of Sirach (the only book here to hold a Sadducaic attitude towards death and afterlife; denying any form of resurrection); II Maccabees; the Apocalypse of Baruch; the Apocalypse of Ezra (IV Ezra, included in II Esdras); the book of Enoch (I Enoch) and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. All these are included in Charles 1913.
25. Cf. Ladd 1974.
26. Cf. Fuller 1980, 18 and Pannenberg 1965, 130 f.
27. Cf. above; ch. 8.1.1.
28. Elliott 1979, 219 Cf. e.g. Enslin 1961, 212 f.; Kapser 1976, 139 and Marxsen 1979, 77f.
29. Cf. Moule & Cupitt 1972, 509; 513 and M. Müller 1981, 13. Compare e.g. Pagels 1981, 6, who suggests that the disciples, "in moments of great emotional stress, suddenly felt that they experienced Jesus' presence. Paul's experience can be read this way." To Historic Christianity (cf.8.1.1 above), this sounds more like a gnostic principle than an historical explanation of the relevant evidence.
30. Cf. Schweitzer 1968, ch. 19; 330-397 and especially ch. 20; 398-403. "But the truth is, it is not Jesus as historically known, but Jesus as spiritually risen within men, who is significant for our time and can help it. ... Jesus as a concrete historical personality remains a stranger to our time, but His spirit, which lies hidden in His words, is known in simplicity, and its influence is direct. ... But in reality that which is eternal in the words of Jesus is due to the very fact that they are based on an eschatological worldview." Ibid., 401f. Cf. Niebuhr 1957,
132-134.
31. Gager 1975, 42 f., takes off from here to suggest that the death of Jesus created a sense of 'cognitive dissonance' (cf. Festinger 1976), in so far that it disconfirmed the belief that Jesus was the Messiah. Even the 'event' of the resurrection did not eradicate this dissonance

according to Gager. The zeal with which Jesus' disciples pursued their mission can thus be understood as an effort to reduce dissonance, not just in the early years but for a considerable time thereafter. Why the resurrection faith occurred in the first place is not made clear by Gager, however, who elsewhere (Gager 1974) clearly implies that the alleged resurrection of Jesus never actually took place.

32. Cf. Ladd 1976, ch. 6: 60-73; 37; Moule and Cupitt 1972,
508, Pannenberg 1977, 96. It is sometimes suggested (cf. Allegro 1964, 175) that Jesus' career had a historical counterpart and forerunner in the career of the Righteous Teacher of the Qumran community (Dead Sea Scrolls), who was crucified and whose resurrection was expected by his disciples after his death. "The fact", however, according to R. Brown 1973, 233, "is that there is not the slightest proof for either of these affirmations about the Teacher." Cf. Bruce 1982, 66-76. As to the question of how Jesus' predictions of his death and resurrection can be historical if they were totally unprepared, cf. below; ch. 9.1.3 and 9.1.4.

33. Enslin 1961, 212, rightly affirms that it would be absurd to think that the disciples would remain untouched or unchanged after their fellowship with Jesus was ended through the crucifixion. But this is no argument in favor of the spiritual resurrection-theory where the disciples consequently believed that Jesus somehow still lived in them, as Enslin thinks. What has to be explained is not that the disciples was changed through the followship with the 'earthly' Jesus, but that they were transformed, after Easter, from being discouraged hopeless and fearful to the point of being willing to die for their (bodily) resurrection faith.

34. Cf. e.g. C.F.D. Moule's way of reasoning, in Moule and Cupitt 1972, passim.

35. Cf. above; ch. 6.2.

36. Cf. Sarbin and Juhaz 1975, 242 f.

37. Cf. Weiss 1959, 287.

38. This theory was advocated by Celsus already in the 2nd century, cf. Origen 1953, II; 55, 70 (A.D. 249). A similar position is found in Edwien 1978, 183-188.

39. Strauss 1970, 741-744; 848-858, cf. Perry 1959, 121-123. Very similar views is found in Marxsen 1979 and Guignebert 1956, 500-523. The basic assumption that the appearances can be reduced to subjective visions is also found in e.g. Weiss 1959, 30, Enslin 1961, 213, Kapser 1976,
139 and Perrin 1977, 83. The same may be said of Allegro 1970, which explains the genesis of Christianity as based on the ecstasy produced by eating a sacred mushroom! For a critique of the attempts to explain the experiences of the resurrection appearances in terms of mental and historical presuppositions on the side of the disciples (excluding the reality of the resurrection), see Grass 1970, III. 5; 233-249 (3rd ed., 1964).

40. Cf. Guignebert 1956, 515, who claims that in the excitement of enthusiasm, visions are easily contagious. This is a highly disputable claim, however. Mass hysteria has been shown to be 'infectious'; cf. Phoon 1982, as well as Colligan et al. 1982 at large; analyzing mass psychogenic illness, defined as "the collective occurrence of physical symptoms and related beliefs among two or more persons in the absence of an identifiable pathogen" (ibid., 33). Hallucinations, however, are, according to Mourgue 1932, very individualistic and extremely subjective. Variability and inconstancy represent the most constant features of hallucinatory and related phenomena. Hallucination is not a static phenomena but a dynamic process, whose instability reflects the very instability of the factors and conditions associated with its origin. Cf. Hoch et al. 1965, 18. Quotation given in Mc Dowell 1972, 259.

41. Cf, Festinger 1976.

42. Cf. e.g. Guignebert 1956, 514.

43. Even if Historic Christianity fervently denies that the appearances are reducable to subjective visions, it still acknowledges the fact that memory can play tricks on eye-witnesses. Any historian thus have to consider the possibility that the disciples unconsciously

invented or distorted some details in their accounts, cf. Perry 1959, 122f. Trankell 1972, III; 67-160 argues that statements which are at least subjectively true may be distinguished from statements which are invented or are deliberate distortions of real events by certain reality criteria and control criteria. Reality criteria function to test the validity of what the witness claims as truth, and control criteria function to test the probability that alternative hypotheses are false. Each type of criteria is analyzed formally through an examination of the logical structure of a witness's statements and concretely by isolation of the contents of the statements. Trankell's study is based on court-room cases (cf. Yarmey 1979, which also deals with the psychology of eyewitness testimony), and is not always easily applicable to the problem of the historical resurrection faith. Still, it is interesting for comparison, and certain of his characteristics of descriptions of real observations fit the authenticity criteria of ch. 7.3.4.4, above, e.g. the tendency of true descriptions to include details which have no implications for the central content of the account, cf. ibid., 125 f.

44. Cf. Don Cupitt in Moule & Cupitt 1972, 514. A religious vision is thus structured by, and gains even its content from, the previous life and thought of the person who experiences the vision, cf. ibid., 518.

45. Cf. e.g. Pannenberg 1977, 96-98, Perry 1959, 123-133, Habermas 1976, 127-145, Anderson 1972 , 97-99, Cornfeld 1982, 182 and McDowell 1972, 257-265.

46. Cf. Peru 1939, 97-99.

47. Cf. Lk 24:11 f., 21, 25, 41; Jn 20:13-15, 19, 24f., Mt 28:17.

48. Deuteronomy 21:22 f.: "If a man have committed a sin worthy of death, and he be put to death, and you hang him on a tree, his body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but you shall bury him the same day; for he that is hanged is accursed of God." Cf. Gal. 3:13.

49. Cf. Ladd 1976, 60-73. There is thus little reason to assume Jesus' predictions of his death and resurrection to be literary tricks; projections into the pre-Easter setting of post-Easter discussions concerning the meaning of the resurrection. Besides, if the apostles did not distinguish between subjective visions and external appearances (since they believed in spirits and ghosts as the Bultmann School argues, cf. Strauss 1970, 741-744), it would be futile to explain the reports of their disillusionment and despair after the crucifixion as apologetic constructions to strengthen the case for the reliability of the appearance narratives. The early Christians, having the same belief-systems as the apostles, simply did not have the competence to invent such apologetic distortions. Cf. the 'competence criterion' in Trankell 1972, 128.

50. This, of course, goes even more for Paul (independent of whether he experienced an objective vision or an appearance), who was a fervent enemy of the Christian faith, and James the brother of Jesus, who probably was an unbeliever before Jesus is reported to have appeared to him (John 7:5; I Cor 15:7). It is worth noting that if the Bultmann School had been correct, contra Historic Christianity, in affirming that the disciples returned to Galilee ignorant of the women's story of the empty tomb, this would make the disciples' frame of mind even less liable to produce visions of the risen Jesus than if Historic Christianity is correct in affirming the historicity of the disciples' (Peter and John) visit to the tomb. Cf. Pannenberg 1977, 105: "If the appearance tradition and the grave tradition came into existence independently, then by their mutually complementing each other they let the assertion of the reality of Jesus' resurrection appear as historically very probable. ... The so-called subjective vision theory then becomes even more questionable than it already seemed to us above."

51. Leipholdt 1948. Cf. ibid., 737: "One cannot doubt that the disciples were convinced that they had seen the resurrected Lord. Otherwise the origin of the community in Jerusalem and with it the church becomes an enigma". Translation taken from Pannenberg 1977, 91.

52. Cf. Kittel 1937, 91.

53. Cf. Pannenberg 1977, 91f.
54. Cf. above; ch. 8, note 234 and Schonfield 1981, 115..
55. Cf. Perry 1959, 125. For a contrary viewpoint, see Schonfield 1981, 115-117.
56. Habermas 1980, 27, cf. Elliott 1979, 219. Pannenberg 1977, 94f. is aware of the distinction, but hesitant to draw conclusions concerning the modes of experience from it (other than to exclude the appearances being understood as subjective visions), since "the question about how it was understood in primitive Christianity is difficult to answer."
57. Cf. Peru 1939, 97-99. Paranoid and schizofrenic individuals are particularly susceptible to hallucinations, especially the latter group.
58. Cf. e.g. Anderson 1972, 97f., Cornfeld 1982, 182 and Stott 1971, 57.
59. Cf. Peru 1939, 97-99.
60. Cf. Stott 1971, 57 and Anderson 1972, 98.
61. Cf. Peru 1939, 97-99.
62. Again, Paul's experience on the road to Damascus (cf.Acts 9:3-6; I Cor 15:8) is the only possible exception to the 'abrupt end' of the appearances, leaving the question open here as to whether this was an appearance as those reported in the gospels, or an 'objective' vision. As to visions of Christ, these were willingly reported, cf. Acts 7:55, 22:17-21, 23:11 and Revelation 1:10-19.
63. Cf. Lewis 1947, 152 f., Mc Dowell 1972, 264 f. and Anderson 1972, 98 f.
64. Pannenberg 1977, 97. In placing the appearance to Peter in Galilee, and equating the substance of Paul's vision to the pre-Pentecost appearances, however, Pannenberg's way of reasoning does not conform to the protective belt of Historic Christianity, cf. above; ch. 8.1.1 and 8.2.2.3 and 4.
65. Note 40; above.
66. Mourge 1932, cf. Hoch et al. 1965, 18.
67. Alderson 1888 and Chesters 1954, cf. Perry 1959, 127-129.
68. Martindale 1950, cf. Perry 1959, 129f., 132.
69. Cf the visions of the Virgin in Dordogne, France in 1889; Marilllier 1891, cf. Perry 1959, 127. These visions began with an 11-year old peasant girl and rapidly spread to many others, both children and adults. "Several children and several women saw the Virgin at the same time. She did not, however, appear to all of them under the same aspect. Some saw her in white and some saw her in black. For some she was wrapped in veils; for other her face was bare. ... Each hallucination is the individual production of the person who experienced it." Marillier 1891, 69.
70. Cf. Perry 1959, 132 f. and C. F. D. Moule in Moule & Cupitt 1972, 519.
71. Cf. Josephus 1965, XX, 9.1. According to Fuller 1980, 37, one would have had to postulate an appearance to James if Paul had not already included it in his list, simply in order to account for his conversion and the speed with which he acquired a position of leadership in the early church.
72. On the basis of my prior discussions the 'objective vision' theory (cf. Pannenberg 1977, 92-95) or the 'telepathic' theory (Perry 1959, 194 f., cf. Strauss 1970, 847; referring to e.g. Baruch de Spinoza) do not require extensive treatment here. If the tomb was empty (Perry 1959, 167 f., 218; Pannenberg 1977, 100-106) and the appearances were not subjective visions (Perry 1959, 120-133; Pannenberg 1977, 95-98), why then deny that it was the actual risen body of Jesus which appeared to the disciples, as Perry 1959, 198 does, or claim that the appearances were objective visions of a non-corporal body, contra the evidence of Paul and the gospels (cf. ch. 8.1.1 and 8.2.2.3), as Pannenberg does? Parapsychology may have reopened the question of the objective reality of unusual occurrences (cf. Pannenberg 1977, 95), but it is hardly an established scientific discipline from which well-established factual positions can be deduced to support the 'objective'

content of the appearances á la Pannenberg's theory, or the external reality of apparitions of the dead which Perry's telepathic theory requires. Cf. Ladd 1976, 138f. Perry's theory even reminds of early Jewish anti-Christian polemic, insofar as the latter reinterpreted the 'appearances' to be nothing but an occult, magical performance by Jesus, who during his life-time was said to have practiced sorcery and called upon the dead, cf. Stauffer 1960, 177. Against such polemic the gospels emphasize the inseparable connection between the appearances and the empty tomb, as well as the physical aspects of the appearances which distinguished them from non-corporeal apparitions, cf. e.g. Lk 24:37-43.

73. Cf. e.g. Bultmann 1963, 290; Grass 1970 (3rd ed.), 23, 173, 183 f; Guignebert 1956, 496, 499 f. and Küng 1978, 364f. There are two basic premises in the argument that verification of the empty tomb-story was difficult. The first is that the interest in the empty tomb developed later than the Easter faith; i.e. at a time when no more encounters with the risen one were had, and when the corporeality of the risen Jesus began to be conceived in a more realistic way than in Paul's letters (c.f. e.g. Grass). The second is that the disciples fled/returned to Galilee at a time when the story of the women were either non-existent or unknow to them, and that their proclamation of Jesus' resurrection in Jerusalem several weeks later scarcely created much stir in the beginning or called for public control by checking the tomb (cf. e.g. Küng). These assumptions have been dealt with earlier; in ch. 8. The latter part of the second premise will be discussed more in depth in the following.

74. Cf. e.g. Cornfeld 1982; 83-186 and Bode 1970, 162-164. Compare ch 8.3; above.

75. Many “facts” from antiquity rest on just one ancient source, while two or three sources in agreement generally render the fact unimpeachable. In case of the empty tomb there are at least seven different sources; the four gospels, Acts and the letters of Paul and Peter, but this has not led to a general acceptance of the empty tomb as a historical 'fact'. To what degree these sources are independent of each other on this point is disputed but the main reason obviously has to do with the nature of the case. The more extraordinary the story is, the more evidence is required to support it.

76. Cf. Acts 2-4, whose historical core is hardly disputed.

77. Strack & Billerbeck 1969, cf. Klausner 1947, 18-54; Goguel 1960, 70-90, Bruce 1982, 32-65 and Stauffer 1960, 168-170.

78. See Pines 1971; quotation given in Cornfeld 1982, 189. Cf. above; ch. 7.4.

79. See Falls 1965; Dialogue with Trypho, ch. 108. Cf. Origen 1953, II, 56.

80. Cornfeld 1982, 184f., cf. Klausner 1947, 47-54.

81. What consequently happened to the Christian movement itself also speaks for an empty tomb. Its seedbed was in Jerusalem and some months later the authorities were so desperate to stop the movement that they even resorted to persecution. If the tomb was unknown or occupied, how could this have happened?

82. Edwien 1978, 181, is an exception: "Hvis det er historisk korrekt at graven er tom, så må de som har fjernet liket sannsynligst ha vært Jesu egne tilhengere (bare de hadde interesse av det). Hensikten har kanskje vært å holde øye med om han "sto opp". Da de så tvert om så at liket gikk all kjødets gang og ikke brøt med naturens lover ble de bestyrket i den oppfatning at himmelfarten var foregått slik som ovenfor beskrevet." Edwien puts this claim within his theory that Jesus taught his disciples that at his death the angel within him would immediately ascend to God in the form of the Son of Man-figure (cf. Daniel 9:26), and that he was not to appear again until judgment day. In other words, the apostles did not believe in a bodily resurrection of Jesus, nor did they experience anything like 'appearances'; only hallucinations of the apocalyptic figure 'Son of Man' (of whom Jesus was believed to be an 'incarnation'), as Stephen's vision in Acts 7:56. Cf. ibid., 178-183, 186. I mention this theory here to explain the context of Edwien's 'theft'-hypothesis, not to refute it since this already has been done, cf.

specially 8.1.1 and 9.1.3 and 4. After Celsus in the third century (cf. Origen 1953, II, 56,63), the theft-explanation has been occasionally defended up to modern times, as in Reimarus 1778, 450, 60, 92 ff.

83. Origin 1953, II, 56,63. Cf. e.g. Strauss 1970, 846 f.; Vermes 1973; 40, Pannenberg 1965, 135; Greenleaf 1965, 29, Anderson 1972, 92; Maier 1973, 105-122 and Klausner 1947, 414.

84. To the extent that Historic Christianity has been able to argue in favor of the historicity of the guard at the tomb, cf. above; ch. 8.2.1.5, there is additional historical evidence against the theft-theory.

85. Cf. e.g. Morison 1978, 94-96 and Anderson 1972, 92 f.

86. Acts 3:14f. (For comments on the linguistic difference in the NT between Jesus 'raised' (passive; by God) or 'risen' (active) from the dead, see R. Brown 1968, 794f.

87. Even if the legal responsibility of Jesus' body had been transferred to the Jews by Joseph burying the body (cf. above; ch. 9.1.1), Pilate's authorization would probably still be needed because of the Roman edicts against grave violations. The inscription against grave robbery found on a marble slab in Nazareth in 1878 (cf. ch. 8.2.1.4; n.123), probably derived from the reign of Tiberius (AD
14-37) or Claudius (41-54), stiffened the penalty from large fines to capital punishment. (It may, according to Cornfeld 1982, 185 and Stauffer 1960, 170 f., be used as (problematic) evidence of the Jewish claim of the disciples stealing the body and thus also of the empty tomb.)

88. Josephus 1965, XX, reports that the Roman governor Albinus was so angry because the high priest and the Sanhedrin in his absence had stoned James, the brother of Jesus and 'bishop' of the Jerusalem church, to death in AD 62, that the high priest was disposed because of unlawful execution.

89. Cf. Klausner 1947, 357.

90. Cf. Cornfeld 1982, 174, 176.

91. Deuteronomy 21:22.

92. Cf. the discussion above; ch. 8.2.1.4.

93. Cf. Morison 1978, 90.

94. Cf. the discrepancy between Mt 27:57; Jn. 19:38-40 and Acts 13:29. (See R. Brown 1973, 114-116 for a proposed solution to this problem). If Joseph was only a pious Jew, however (cf. ibid.), who buried Jesus because Jewish law enjoined burial before sunset, why is there no suggestion that Joseph occupied himself or even gave a thought to the remains of the two other men who were crucified? In any case, why should an honorable councillor and a member of the great Sanhedrin have undertaken with his own hands a menial task which could more appropriately have been left to the civil guard? For further evidence that Joseph was a secret disciple of Jesus, see Morison 1930, 92f.

95. As Klausner himself acknowledged, a few sentences before he claims that Joseph, as a secret disciple of Jesus, secretly removed the body: "That is impossible: deliberate imposture is not the substance out of which the religion of millions of mankind is created." Klausner 1947, 357.

96. Even the Romans must have been somewhat disturbed by the proclamation that a person recently executed as a criminal now was proclaimed to be alive as Lord and King, in apparent rivalry of the Emperor. If the body had been removed by Roman orders, then, the procurator would have every reason to show that the apostles' preaching was without foundation by revealing the removed body, if not for anything else than to get things back to 'normal'.

97. Besides, there is no record of any tomb or shrine having been venerated on the ground that it contained the relics of Jesus. This may be hard for the Bultmann School to explain if

Christianity was founded on a 'spiritual' resurrection, and Jesus was known to have been buried elsewhere than in the vacant tomb. Cf. Morison 1978, 94. As to the main arguments against the body being removed by Joseph of Arimathea, see ibid., 89, Anderson 1972, 93 and Strauss 1970, 848.

98. Even if the body of Jesus never was produced, this isolated 'fact' will not prove that it could not have been produced, "any more than the absence of Hitler's corpse to this day proves that he rose from the dead." John Robinson 1977, 122.

99. The Tosefta Ohiloth, 3,9 gives a lifelike description of a burial which took place in the Beth Dagon (Southern Plain). Because the burial took place on the eve of Passover, and the men had to avoid incurring impurity through contact with the dead, the women took care of the burial and tied ropes around the entrance boulder, so that the men could pull it while remaining outside. It thus took the combined effort of a few people to move such a stone. Cf. Cornfeld 1982, 176. (Jn 19:38-39 tells that Joseph was joined by Nicodemus when he buried Jesus. He may also, as a member of the Sanhedrin, easily have had access to servants or others who could help move the stone.)

100. Cf. Origen 1953, II, 56. Celsus claimed that the appearances were on a pair with other cases where "impostors had disappeared for a certain time, and secretly withdrew themselves from the sight of all men, and gave themselves out afterwards as having returned from Hades." Ibid.

101. Venturini 1806, cf. Schweitzer 1968, 46f.

102. Cornfeld 1982, 176 f., 187 f., 195. The swoon-theory is loudly advocated by the Ahmadiyah movement; an Islamic sect totally rejected by orthodox Islam, who claims that Jesus died in Kashmir. The Kashmir story arose in the late 19th century with the birth of the movement, but there is hardly any evidence to support it, cf. Axheim 1977.

103. My presentation here is based on Cornfeld 1982. Venturini's theory is slightly different. He replaces the disciples with Essene brothers who first nursed Jesus inside the sepulcher, together with Joseph of Arimathea, and then removed him to a secure place nearby.

104. Cf. Vermes 1973, 41.

105. Cf. Cornfeld 1982, 176: "The body had been removed to preserve the life of a man crippled, but possibly not bereft of life by crucifixion. ... This was a case of survival, so strange that it really was miracoulous and it lent the crucified Jesus an aura of indestructible holiness, even immortality." Cornfeld thus gives the impression here that the resuscitation of Jesus has no natural cause. This is confusing, however, as he earlier refers to Josephus' account of how one man had survived crucifixion as lending "credence to the 'swoon' theory". Ibid., 177.

106. Cf. Maier 1982, 228 f.; Perry 1959, 86-89, 100f.; Morison 1978, 96 and Mc Dowell 1972, 203-208.

107. Cf. E. Thompson 1904. Both Thompson and the Dublin physiologist Samuel Houghton concluded that the medical evidence recorded in the gospels implies that Jesus died because of a combination of the crucifixion torture and a rupture of the heart; see Perry 1959, 87 and Mc Dowell 1972, 206f. It should be mentioned that the Bultmann School tends to take the incident of the blood and water as symbolical rather than historical; the blood of life (cf. Genesis 9:4) and the water of baptism into Christ's death (cf. Romans 6:3). But to Historic Christianity (cf. Perry 1959, 87f.) this is only a conjecture. The author of the gospel clearly intends us to take it as a literal event with symbolical meaning, cf. Jn 21:24.

108. Cf. Haas 1970.

109. Josephus: Vita (Life; Autobiography), ch. 75: "And when I was sent by Titus Cæsar with Ceralius and 1000 horsemen, to a certain village called Thecoa, in order to know whether it were a place fit for camp, as I came back, I saw many captives crucified, and remembered three of them as my former acquaintance. I was very sorry at this in my mind,

and went with tears in my eyes to Titus, and told him of them; so he immediately commanded them to be taken down, and to have the greatest care taken of them, in order to their recovery; yet two of them died under the physician's hand, while the third recovered." Translation taken from Strauss 1970, 844.

110. By stating that he saw the crucified on his return, Josephus implies that they have been crucified during this expedition and as the distance between Jerusalem and Thecoa is insignificant, cf. ibid., this expedition would not have taken more than a day.

111. Cornfeld 1982, 177; Schonfield 1981, 62 f.

112. Perry 1959, 86f.

113. In Mt 12:40, Jesus is reported as saying that the Son of Man will be three days and three nights in 'the bowels of the earth'. Jesus was crucified and buried on Friday, before sundown, which is the beginning of the next day for the Jews, and was allegedly resurrected on Sunday before sunrise. This puts Jesus in the grave for part of Friday, the entire Sabbath, and part of Sunday. Since this is not three full, 24-hour days, there seems to be a conflict with the prophecy of Jesus in Mt 12:40. 'One day and one night', however, was an idiom employed by the Jews for indicating a day, even when only a part of a day was indicated; cf. I Samuel 30:12f. and Genesis 42:17. The phrases 'after three days' (Mk 8:31) and 'on the third day' (Mt 16:21) are not contradictory, neither to each other nor with Mt 12:40, but simply idiomatic, interchangeable terms, as a common mode of Jewish expression. Besides, in the Jewish method of reckoning time, any part of a period was considered a full period. Cf. Mishnah, Third Tractate; B. Pesachim: "The portion of a day is as the whole of it," and Tractate J. Shabbath, ch. IX, par. 3: "A day and a night are an Onah (a period of time) and the portion of an Onah is as the whole of it." As the Jewish day starts at 6 p.m., from the Jewish point of view it would make 'three days and three nights from Friday afternoon until Sunday morning. Thus there is no problem with the time-indication in Mt 12:40. Cf. Mc Dowell 1981, 121-123.

114. Maier 1982, 229.

115. It seems fanciful to suppose that he could have been hidden by secret followers unknown even to his disciples. If the crucified Christ was taken care of medically by Essenes, called upon by Joseph of Arimathea (cf. e.g. Venturini 1806 and Schonfield 1981, 63), this must have been known by his disciples.

116. The only possibility, given the size of the stone (for one thing), is that Joseph of Arimathea must have found that Jesus was alive and helped him away, either alone or with the help of his disciples (and/or some Essenes). Anyone involved in or watching (cf. Lk 23:55, Mk 15:47, Mt 27:60f.) such an operation must then have kept total silence about it. What then of the story of the women visiting the tomb on Easter morning; historically plausible in itself? Would Joseph have thought of rolling the stone in place to prevent the loss being discovered? Would he have wasted time to leave the graveclothes in a position which suggested that the body had dissolved away from within (Jn 20:7)? If it is correct that a guard was stationed there, the first thing they would do on arrival would be to inspect it to make sure they were not already late. Historians who argue in favor of both the guard and the resuscitation-hypothesis, á la Cornfeld 1982, 176; 178, would thus have to assume that the tomb was found empty as soon as they arrived, though it was not till Sunday morning that the women discovered this.

117. The following passage is a favorite quotation of Historic Christianity (cf. Morison 1978, 96; Anderson 1972, 64; McDowell 1981, 98 f. and Maier 1982, 229): "It is impossible that a being who had stolen half-dead out of the sepulcher, who crept about weak and ill, wanting medical treatment, who required bandaging, strengthening, and indulgence, and who still at last yielded to his sufferings, could have given to his disciples the impression that he was a conqueror over death and the grave, the Prince of Life: an impression which lay at the

bottom of their future ministry. Such a resuscitation could only have weakened the impression which he had made upon them in life and death, at the most could only have given it an elegant voice, but could by no possibility have changed their sorrow into enthusiasm, have elevated their reverence into worship." Strauss 1865, I, 412. Admittedly, the resuscitation theory may posit a quicker and better recovery of Jesus ("a survival so strange that it really was miraculous"; Cornfeld 1982, 176), not necessarily terminating in his proximate death.
118. Cf. Schonfield 1981, chs. 10-14; 67-113. The basic idea is not new, however. There are similarities to be found in Bahrdt 1792, cf. Strauss 1970, 844 and Schweitzer 1968, 38-44. Schonfeld, by the way, dates the NT gospels to the period between AD 75 and 115 (!); Schonfield 1967, 236. Luke, e.g. is supposedly written A.D. 105; ibid., 246.
119. Schonfield 1981, 112.
120. Cf. Ladd 1976, 135 f., Anderson 1968, 8f, Anderson 1972, 64f. and McDowell 1981, 99-101.
121. Contra Schonfield 1981, 113: "Once faith in the resurrection had taken hold on the disciples, it was impossible to disclose where Jesus was interred or how it came about that the tomb near Golgatha was found open and empty. As for Joseph of Arimathea, legend has it that he sailed for Britain, and the Essenes were trained to keep silence."
122. The only design proposed by Schonfield is that after Jesus had reunited with his disciples in Galilee, God would be expected to disclose His will to His faithful servant; ibid., 112.
123. Cf. e.g. Maier 1973, 113; Ladd 1976, 139; Habermas 1976, 114-171 and Habermas 1980, 32f. Proponents of the Bultmann School partly agrees; cf. Tillich 1957, 153-158 and Bornkamm 1979, 180-186.
124. Among those basically belonging to the Bultmann School include Bultmann 1953, 34-42, Bultmann 1974, 44f., Tillich 1957, 153-158, Bornkamm 1979, 179-186, Moltmann 1967, 197-202, Fuller 1980, 27-49 and R. Brown 1973, 81-92.
125. Obviously, Cornfield 1982 and Schonfield 1967 are modern exceptions here. So is the belief, popularized by Islam, that Jesus was taken up to heaven prior to crucifixion. God substituted someone else, who everyone thought to be Jesus. Cf. The Koran, Surah 4, verses 155-158: "They the people of the Book; the Jews denied the truth and uttered a monstrous falsehood against Mary. They declared: 'We have put to death the Messiah Jesus son of Mary, the apostle of Allah.' They did not kill him, nor did they crucify him, but they thought they did (or, literally; he was made to resemble another for them). Those that disagreed about him were in doubt concerning his death, for what they knew about it was sheer conjecture; they were not sure that they had slain him. Allah lifted him up to His presence; He is mighty and wise." Koran 1977, 382.
126. Cf. e.g. Habermas 1980, 38. Besides, Historic Christianity argues that the sources agree on several points which a historian may take as being historically credible, and which provide cumulative evidence of the reality of Jesus' rising from the dead. These include (1) that a dying and rising Messiah was utterly unexpected; (2) that Jesus was dead; (3) was buried; (4) that the disciples were disheartened and discouraged; (5) that on Easter Sunday the tomb was found empty; (6) that the empty tomb was not itself a proof of the resurrection (Mary thought the body had been stolen); (7) the disciples encountered certain experiences which they took to be appearances of Jesus risen from the dead; (8) the disciples proclaimed the resurrection of Jesus in Jerusalem, near where he had been buried; and his body was never produced; (9) the use of Sunday instead of Saturday as the Christian day of worship (cf. Acts 20:7, I Cor 16:1-2), based on the appearances on the first Easter Sunday; and (10) the conversion of Saul of Tarsus, the known persecutor of Christians. See Ladd 1976, 93, 132 f. and Habermas 1980, 25, 33-36.

127. Cf. e.g. Dodd 1938, 77f., Niebuhr 1957, 157 f., Bode 1970, 165 and Pannenberg 1977, 98.
128. Cf. I Cor. 15:16, 20: "For if the dead are not raised, it follows that Christ was not raised; ... Christ was raised to life the first fruits of the harvest of the dead."
129. Historical events do not have to be phenomena open to the public. To claim so, one would have to ascribe to the old-fashioned positivism for which the admissible historical record consists of a concatenation of facts attested by sense experience. Cf. O' Collins 1978, 114, in his critique of Marxsen 1979.
130. Cf. Habermas 1985, 295f.
131. Cf. Davis 1985, passim, which I build upon here.
132. Historic Christianity begins from certain descriptive premises as to what the apostles did, believe and wrote. It then postulates the resurrection-event as the explanation of these 'facts', arguing back from effect to cause. But the inference made the other way, from the cause back to the effects, viz. that the belief of the apostles was historically true, is not made just like that, as Don Cupitt claims in Moule & Cupitt 1972, 517. Before this conclusion is reached, the different alternative explanations of the resurrection faith are considered and refuted. Thus the importance of ch. 9.
133. For primary-source treatments of Strauss, Schleiermacher, Paulus, Bruno, Baur, Renan, Pfleiderer and Harnack as examples of liberal theologians who rejected miracles due to Hume's argument (cf. above; ch. 2.1), see Habermas 1976, 114-117, 151 f., 286-288; for existentialist theologians as Tillich and Bultmann, see ibid., 117 f., 288f.
134. Two examples: Habermas 1980, 42; "Contemporary scholars should accept the historicity of this event the resurrection of Jesus , since it can be demonstrated according to critical and historical procedures." Cf. Habermas 1985, passim. Montgomery 1969, 52; "What, then, does a historian know about Jesus Christ? He knows, first and foremost, that the New Testament document can be relied upon to give an accurate portrait of him, and that this portrait cannot be rationalized away by wishful thinking, philosophical presuppositionalism, or literary maneuvering." Cf. Montgomery 1975, 138f.
135. Contra Habermas 1980, 40; Habermas 1985, 297.
136. As e.g. done in Marxsen 1979, 27; 55; 68; 75f.
137. Cf. Davis 1985, 307f.
138. Cf. Lakatos 1978a, 179.

CONCLUSION

The course of this study has travelled through a rather wide range of areas relevant to the problem of the early Christians' resurrection faith. Added together, they show that such a topic may unravel an almost unlimited number of historical, philosophical and theological problems. I have tried, however, to restrict myself to those questions which are necessary to deal with in a relatively thorough treatment of the subject. I will sum up the results in the following way:

Christianity emerged from a belief that Jesus of Nazareth physically rose from the dead, in space and time (ch. 1.1). To Christian faith, therefore, certain historical propositions are a necessary, if not sufficient ingredient (ch. 1.2). In a religion where 'the Word became flesh', these propositions are open to historical inquiry, and not to be confirmed simply by faith. The resurrection faith may be confirmed or it may be invalidated by historical research. But the exclusive object of historical inquiry is the human past, and no historian can therefore test the truth-claims of propositions where God (or any other supernatural being) is the historical agent (ch. 1.3). Whether or not God exists or acts in history is an open question unanswered by historical inquiry. The resurrection faith, however, is based upon certain historical assertions concerning Jesus of Nazareth and his disciples (whether Jesus was more than human need not be brought in here), and as such they form a legitimate concern to any historian.

The same may be said as to any supposedly supernatural, i.e. inexplicable event. A historian may, both in principle and in practice, confirm the factuality of an event for which the evidence provide no adequate natural explanation. In principle, because a miracle is not contradictory to human experience in general; i.e. the laws of nature, nor impossible in view of the concept of causation (ch.2). The conclusions of natural science have not in themselves rendered the empty tomb suspect. The bodily resurrection of Jesus does not violate the laws of nature because such general laws do not make possible an absolutely certain prediction about the possibility or impossibility of single events, except if allpossible conditions could be taken into account. But no scientist has ever been able to do that. Conformity to the laws of nature embraces only aspects of what happens, not their totality. The judgment whether an event has happened or not is thus in the final analysis a matter for the historian, and cannot be prejudged by the knowledge of natural science.

In practice, the resurrection of Jesus may be confirmed by a historian if the evidence warrants him to do so. The main concern for historical methodology is to explain the sources as meaningful 'events' in themselves and thus reconstruct the past (ch. 3.1), applying critical, but non-positivistic rules of source criticism where necessary (ch. 3.2). Objective, empirical 'data' and subjective, theoretical perspectives can be distinguished in principle but never quite separated in practice. There is an element of circular reasoning involved between the assessment of the trustworthiness of the sources and the assessment of the historical setting in which they were produced and transmitted. No historian makes up his mind concerning a single document or a single statement, e.g. as to the influence of bias, in isolation from a broader theoretical and empirical context. Source criticism is a necessary tool, but the way we apply it is connected to our theories about other historical sources, about the general situation at the time, as well as of our theories about the human condition as such.

Neither the scientist nor the historian possess any scientific knowledge of what can and what cannot happen. All we have are schemes of organization which are intended to make sense of the historical evidence, not the other way around. Where there is insufficient evidence, we rightly make our inferences on the principle that the future will resemble the past, and the unknown the known. But the principle of analogy should not be used in a dogmatic way to a priori exclude non-analogous historical events as e.g. the resurrection of Jesus. Miracles are impossible only if one so defines them, but such definition rules out proper historical investigation. Given sufficient historical evidence, a critical historian may apply a limited principle of analogy and still be able to conclude that an historically inexplicable event actually has taken place, if no other historical reconstruction seems to make sense of the relevant evidence (ch. 3.3).

Most 'naturalistic' historians would probably protest against acclaim that they a priori, i.e. prior to or independent of the evidence, exclude a historical resurrection. The disagreement concerns just what the relevant evidence is, what it means to make sense of it, and what general schemes of organization we are to apply. The relationship between theories and facts, between assumptions and evidence, between world views and experience is a rather complex one, which in turn also makes the problem of objectivity in historical inquiry complex. There is unavoidably a sort of circularity involved. The selection of a certain topic and a delimination of its borders present no problem here. The issue is whether a certain historical perspective through its particular set
of presuppositions render any inter-subjective test of its conclusions impossible. Can two historians, belonging to two competing schools of thoughts, rationally compare the results of their research? This question is particularly relevant as to explanations of the resurrection faith. If and when well-established evidence in favor of an historical resurrection begins to pile up, what is a naturalistic historian applying a Humean principle of analogy supposed to do? At what point should his basic convictions against such an event be laid aside, and the claim that the resurrection probably occurred be accepted? If one at the outset excludes miraculous events as an empirical possibility (or opposite; that the resurrection of Jesus may turn out to be historically disconfirmed), then perhaps no amount of historical evidence will be sufficient to change one´s mind. But if so, why take history and historical inquiry serious at all?

I have argued in chapters 4 and 5 that history and historical inquiry retain their cognitive importance as long as two basic presuppositions are upheld. First, history is an objective reality independent of the human mind. The historian does not create history as such, he creates historical writing, and the latter is, through empirical evidence, normatively connected to the actual past. Human language is not a prison-house with mirrors instead of windows, but a means whereby the external reality of the past may adequately be reconstructed in a way meaningful to our present perspectives and questions.

Secondly, there is a real possibility of showing that one reconstruction makes better sense of the evidence than a competing one. This is so because the dependence between theoretical presuppositions and empirical evidence varies. Different perspectives may be compared in view of the same evidence, since theory and facts are not totally interdependent. Some theories just make better sense of the facts than others do; some facts are more independent of the adjacent theories than others are. A naturalist historian cannot rationally reject the resurrection of Jesus on the basis of any possible configuration of evidence, just as a supernaturalist historian biased in favor of the historicity of Jesus' resurrection cannot rationally upheld his or her view in face of an overwhelming disconfirmation. But exactly

when the evidence is strong enough to change a basic conviction is hard to say. Nevertheless, it is important to examine competing explanations of the resurrection faith to see which of them may claim a higher degree of empirical corroboration than the other one.

Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes has turned out to be helpful in this context (ch. 6.1). It reveals the different methodological, historical, (a)theological and philosophical assumptions involved, at the same time as a metaphysical realism preserves a basic trust that empirical evidence in some way still speaks for itself. From the existing literature, I have constructed two historical-theological research programmes; Historic Christianity and the Bultmann School (ch. 6.2). I have showed how they assess the evidence of the historical Jesus in general and of his resurrection in particular (chs. 7 and 8). Not surprisingly, the competing hard cores of fundamental assumptions, protective belts of auxiliary hypotheses and positive heuristics with their set of problem-solving techniques often lead to quite different conclusions.

To the Bultmann School, faith and reason walk on quite different paths, as do the historian and the theologian. Dead men never rise; the resurrection of Jesus therefore has to be demythologized or in some other way removed from history proper in order to remain a meaningful part of the Christian religion. The voice of the NT gospels is the voice of subjective Christian experience independent of any historical, rational basis. The evangelists and the traditions they represent are indifferent as to whether this experience is ultimately related to anything said or done in Galilea or Judea before or after the crucifixion. The NT, consisting of basically theological and not historical documents, can tell a historian a lot of the early Christian communities, but very little of the historical Jesus. External evidence tells us almost nothing, and the resurrection narratives in particular are quite untrustworthy, filled with internal contradictions and legendary material of late origin.

Historic Christianity does not accept the methodological dualism of existentialist Bible criticism. Christian faith is not separated from history, it originated from historical knowledge and although it reaches beyond it, it contains historical facts as its basis. An existential access to the Christ of faith is dependent on the possibility of a rational access to the Jesus of history. There is no compelling reason to a priori conclude that no man ever rose from the dead. A historical investigation may lend credence to the resurrection faith. The NT contains historical reminiscence of what Jesus said and did to a much higher degree than what the Bultmann School is prepared to accept. Too skeptical assumptions about the origin and transmission of the gospel tradition have led this programme through its problem-solving techniques to demand almost positivistic rules of source criticism in order to accept any NT tradition as trustworthy; assuming inauthenticity until otherwise is proven through the criterion of dissimilarity. But to account for the portrait of Jesus in the gospels by postulating that the evangelists and their communities disregarded history and simply constructed a figure out of their current experience and imagination is to ignore the very remarkable relation between the Jesus of the earliest traditions and the church's faith; a relation exhibiting both continuity and difference. This basic historical continuity is confirmed in the limited yet important amount of external evidence available.

The dating and authorship of the gospels and the origin and transmission of their underlying traditions warrant the positive heuristic of Historic Christianity to assume their basic historical trustworthiness unless there are clear signs to the contrary. In the NT, history and theology, tradition and redaction co-exist in harmony, they are not mutually exclusive. The resurrection narratives, particularly the accounts of the appearances, do contain seemingly discrepancies.

Nevertheless the basic historical nucleus remains that the tomb was found empty and that certain disciples had experiences which they took to be bodily appearancesof the risen Jesus. This is confirmed by Paul's testimony in I Cor. 15.

On an overall estimate I conclude that Historical Christianity has excess empirical content over the Bultmann School. There are still empirical problems yet unsolved, in particular as to the apparent lack of consistency in the appearance narratives. But no research programme can account for all available 'facts'. At any stage of development there are unsolved problems and undigested anomalies. Historic Christianity still has the mark of a progressive research programme. The inquiry in chapters 7 and 8 has produced historical evidence which are either straightforward consequences of, unintended by-products of, or predictable prior to research by Historic Christianity. This evidence play no role in the original design of the programme and is generally explainable only in an 'ad hoc' way by the Bultmann School. Chapter 9 has likewise shown that the already existing 'facts' yield 'dramatic' support to the former programme as the hypothesis of Jesus' bodily, historical resurrection 'postdicts' or makes sense of these 'old' historical 'facts' which rival naturalistic theories have a hard time explaining. It is only with regard to the Shroud of Turin, as well as the archeological discovery of the remains of a crucified man in a family tomb in Jerusalem from the first century A.D., that I have been able to apply Lakatos' original concept of 'novel' evidence in support of Historical Christianity. This may be a weakness in the analysis, but as new empirical evidence is hard to come up with in these matters, I have mainly applied Lakatos' methodological appraisal through Zahar's modification of the concept of novel facts to also include already existing evidence, in the sense mentioned above.

Historians belonging to the Bultmann School will probably stick to certain methodological and metaphysical assumptions and claim that despite the present study (to the extent that the arguments are accepted as valid), future research will provide a 'natural' explanation of the resurrection faith. Such a historian would not be irrational, although he has a severe problem to wrestle with. Lakatos made it clear that one may rationally stick to a degenerating programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after. What one must not do is to deny its poor public record. Itis perfectly rational to play a risky game. What is irrational is to deceive oneself about the risk.

To most 'secular' historians it will probably sound somewhat suspicious, if not downright ridiculous, to conclude a study presented to a department of history at a non-religious University by stating that the hypothesis of a bodily resurrection at the present seems to be the best explanation of the evidence concerning the resurrection faith. I guess it is likely to provoke the reaction that this work smacks of theological bias, as opposed to sober historical method. I acknowledge my personal inclination towards Historic Christianity, but so what? I have reached my conclusion through rational arguments, both historical and theoretical. To rationally reject it, one therefore has to argue against it, not just programmatically set it aside from serious consideration in the (vague) name of historical method as such.

The so-called secular, historical-critical method may even hide a few basically non-historical assumptions of its own. To stress that "theological commitments cannot justifiably set limits to either the methods or the results of the historian's work and that exclusively theological concerns are inappropriate" (Gager 1975,6), may be misunderstood to mean that in 'secular' historical research one is theologically and philosophically blind and solely concerned with the facts and nothing but the facts. Of course this is not the case. Historical events, which in some sense all are unique, are arrived at inferentially, by a process of interpreting the

evidence according to a complicated system of rules and assumptions. And if some rules or assumptions should preclude us from establishing a rational explanation of some historical evidence, then maybe not only these rules or assumptions need to be critically reassessed, but whole historical-theological research programmes.

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