Engaged Citizens: A Tale of Status, Satisfaction or Structure?

A Study of Citizens' Willingness to Participate in Mini-Publics

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Abstract

Based on the reported participatory shift from traditional political channels to non-traditional channels, scholars are emphasising the importance of continuously developing the political channels through which individuals are able to act in order to maintain levels of political participation and political satisfaction. In 2017, Bergen municipality formed the Local Democracy Committee to investigate the need for democratic reform in the city, and despite finding stable levels of political participation, they recommended the implementation of mini-publics to ensure that the level of political participation and satisfaction is maintained. Incorporating such democratic innovations necessitates a knowledge of who wants to engage, who does not, and how they should be created to pique citizens' interest. The aim of uncovering determinants of the wish to participate is pursued using a OLS regression as well as a conjoint analysis utilising data from a Bergen-specific sample and the broader Norwegian population.

Because there is no explicit theoretical framework for this type of participation, the analysis controls for internal and external levels of political efficiency as potential causal mechanisms for participation in mini publics, which have been heavily emphasised as important determinants in classical political participation theory. The findings indicate that internal efficacy may be an insufficient explanation for the wish to participate, as its impact on the wish to participate varies depending on the population investigated. This was also the case when analysing political satisfaction as a source of external political efficiency. A significant finding, however, suggests that younger people are more inclined to participate. The structural components of mini-publics, on the other hand, were employed as sources of external efficacy and were discovered to be influential predictors of the willingness to participate.

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1 Introduction

With decades' worth of contributions from innumerable scholars and researchers, the study of political participation is a fundamental subject of political science, expanding our understanding of contemporary representative democracy (McClurg 2003, 449). As scholars are reporting concerns of declining attachment to political parties (Miller 1974, 990; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002, 22), decreasing electoral turnout (Gray and Caul 2000, 1095[1]), and politically disengaged citizens (Putnam 2000, 35), David Van Reybrouck (2016, 15-16) argues that this is a result of citizens feeling that conventional electoral systems are not sufficient in representing the citizens' opinions, popularly referred to as the "electoral fatigue syndrome". Scholars such as Cain, Dalton and Scarrow (2003, 251-252) and Dalton, Burklin and Drummond (2001, 1149) endorses potential remedies such as the implementation of more democracy and allowing citizens to participate in a more direct manner. Several proponents of enhanced opportunities of participation promote the incorporation of deliberative democracy (Wang, Fishkin and Luskin 2020, 2162), which was referred to as a "school of public spirit" by John Stuart Mill (2009, 86), stating that by participating, the individual "… is made to feel himself one of the public and whatever is their interest to be his interest."

In 2017, Bergen municipality appointed a Local Democracy Committee assigned to investigate local democracy reform in the city. In sum, the committee found that inhabitants of Bergen experience a strong sense of belonging to the city and they are generally pleased with the municipality's communication with the people and its level of local services. They also found that Bergen experiences less differences in political participation than what is typical in larger cities. In other words, there was found no reason to assume that the democracy in Bergen is in decline (Lokaldemokratiutvalget 2017, 18, 24). However, the committee argued that democracy must constantly be renewed to maintain the support of the population. Therefore, it was recommended that the municipality should employ mini-publics to the democratic process, a democratic innovation of a diverse public body randomly selected to discuss a public matter, in order to maintain the stable levels of political participation within the municipality (Lokaldemokratiutvalget 2017, 3; Universitetet i Bergen 2019; Smith and Setälä 2018, 300). Ensuing the successfully executed mini-public in 2018, the DEMOVATE project was

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[1] In their study of electoral turnout from 1955-2000, they found that 16 out of 18 studied democracies had declining turnout rates (Gray and Caul 2000, 1095).

established in order to continue investigating from 2019 to 2022 (Arnesen 2021). Democratic processes such as mini-publics are referred to by Graham Smith (2009, 1) as institutions created with the goal of increasing and deepening citizen engagement in the process of political decision-making. However, for such processes to fulfill their purpose of increasing participation, we need no know which mechanisms drive individuals to such forms of engagement. Previous literature on political participation states that cleavages have contributed to political fragmentation throughout history as social, economic, and religious factors, which is found to have a significant impact on the motivation to participate in politics (Rokkan and Lipset 1967, 17). Today, scholars refer to political efficacy as a prerequisite of political participation (e.g Finkel 1985, 891; Morell 2003, 598) which is the individual's own perceived comprehension and genuine influence on political matters as well as their confidence in their power to alter the government (Balch 1974, 2). Simultaneously, the willingness to participate in politics is claimed to be affected by the extent to which the institutional framework for political participation we live in allows for political engagement (Verba and Nie 1972, 13).

1.1 Research Question

Despite the well-established theoretical basis for determinants of political participation, there is a shortage of research on such determinants in the context of mini-publics. Huntington and Nelson (1976, 14) highlight the demand to expand the scope of research on political participation, stating that the concept of political participation is "nothing more than an umbrella concept which accommodates very different forms of action constituting differentiated phenomena, and for which it is necessary to look for explanations of different nature". Melo and Stockemer (2014, 38) further argues that narrow definitions of political participation have confused our understanding of how and when individuals engage in the political process, and voting may be an imperfect and misleading indicator of political engagement. Therefore, the ultimate objective of this thesis is to contribute to the field of political participation by closing a gap in existing literature by providing a general perspective of which individuals who are willing to participate in mini-publics, and how mini-publics can be organised in order to capture the greatest possible interest. This will potentially serve a starting point for further investigation, so that an explicit theoretical foundation for participation in mini-publics may be developed in the future.

Previous research has largely focused on political participation in relation to more traditional channels of participation, commonly electoral participation, and much of it is mainly focused on the assumption that participation is influenced by factors at the individual level such as demographic background (e.g Franklin 2004, 16), socioeconomic levels (e.g Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, 4), and education (e.g Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 18), but also more structural factors such as the electoral system (e.g Eisinger 1973, 11-12). With this thesis, I seek to investigate whether these assumptions are also applicable when researching participation in mini-publics, which will be achieved in two steps that I will further elaborate on. Therefore, the research question is the following:

What affects people's willingness to participate in democratic innovations such as mini-publics?

To answer the research question, I use survey data drawn from two different populations[2], where the assumptions of individual-level determinants will first be tested by conducting an OLS-regression to find out if these are as important prerequisites in this form of participation as in traditional political participation. The second part takes into account the potential structural attributes of mini-publics, and how it might alter the likelihood of participation. In this case, structural attributes refer to the compositional features of the mini-public, such as the number of participants or the time of the event. While there already exists expansive research on how individual-level determinants affect the wish to participate, our understanding of the degree to which structural attributes of mini-publics affects this wish is limited. However, a well-established argument in the research of political participation is that electoral systems affect turnout, and therefore, it may be presumed that a similar relationship will be found in this incident. Based on recent research on the structural design of different forms of mini-publics, the relationship between structural determinants and likelihood of participation will be analysed in a conjoint analysis, based on the results of a survey experiment included in both sets of data. This allows for determining whether participation in mini-publics is influenced by characteristics of the individual or by its structural design, or whether we should suspect an interdependency between the two. It should be noted that the purpose of the thesis is to uncover determinants of the *willingness* to participate, as there is a difference between claiming the willingness to participate, and actually participating when given the opportunity (Webb 2013,

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[2] Bergen municipality exclusively, and the general Norwegian population.

765). However, there is a limited amount of available data, and it would be challenging to measure the effect of minor changes in the mini-public's structural composition on actual participation. As such, this thesis' results can shed light on which structural composition of a mini-public would be most beneficial for participation, as it revolves around a hypothetical case.

1.2 Contribution

The thesis fills a gap in the current literature on political participation by providing a starting point for future research on a topic that lacks an explicit theoretical framework, specifically, attitudes towards political participation in regard to democratic innovations such as mini-publics. By implementing an exploratory study, I identify the key influencing factors on attitudes towards participation in mini-publics. I utilise the current literature on traditional political participation as a starting point, thus testing some of the major explanations of the willingness to participate in politics within the literature, namely internal and external levels of political efficacy. I use survey data and an OLS regression to uncover whether the traditional individual-level determinants of participation in traditional political channels are also important factors for participation in mini-publics, and data from a survey experiment is used to assess patterns of complex, multidimensional structural composition favourability in a conjoint analysis.

I also perform six further conjoint regressions on the structural preferences based on subgroups, allowing me to draw conclusions about subgroup variations in preferences and identify potential connections between individual determinants and structure attributes. The study is carried out twice, on two distinct sets of data, one of which comprises samples of respondents from a single municipality in Norway, and the other of which has respondents from the whole Norwegian population. As a result, I am able to compare attitudes towards participation in mini-publics across contexts. This represents a unique methodological approach which to my knowledge has never been done before. The results emphasise the need for further research on the phenomenon, as they reveal that this is a unique form of political participation that cannot necessarily be explained in terms of existing theory.

1.3 Main Findings

When investigating the results from my analysis, I find that the relationship between determinants at the individual level and the likelihood of participation is somewhat contradictory in that the correlation of the majority of the significant findings varies according to the population being investigated. However, I do find that regardless of population, younger individuals are more inclined to participate in mini-publics. This is not in line with existing literature on conventional political participation, however, it is argued that this can be explained by findings suggesting that younger generations are frequently at the forefront of participation in newer channels, whereas they participate in formal politics at a rate of 10% or less, meanwhile, 40 to 50% are involved in informal political activities (Fimreite and Ivarsflaten 2020, 34).

Furthermore, the conjoint analysis offers more coherent results. The results establish that respondents are more inclined to participate if participants are recruited by invitations from random selection, they are less likely to wish to participate if their opinions are made public, and finally, a significant incentive for participation is found to be financial compensation for participation. This finding is significant in both samples. The additional analysis measuring participatory inclination in accordance with structural composition, based on subgroup affiliation, give rise to some noteworthy findings. However, no significant variations in the preferences of the subgroups are found, the findings are inconsistent between samples, and no significant results are found.

1.4 Structure

In chapter 2, I aim to set the stage, and facilitate the necessary background information for the motivation behind the research question. In chapter 3 I introduce some of the schools of thought in the study of political participation, followed by the theoretical framework in chapter 4. Here, the most notable findings in the field are presented, and where the distinction internal and external political efficiency is further elaborated on. In chapter 5 I introduce the methodological approach that is used to answer the research question, the data used in the analysis, and a brief introduction to OLS regression and conjoint analysis. A brief explanation of the operationalisation of the variables is also included. I dedicate chapter 6 to the analysis, while the results are further discussed in chapter 7. Ultimately, the thesis is concluded in chapter 8.

2 Conceptual Framework

2.1 Political Participation in Decline?

In order to answer the research question, it is highly beneficial to elaborate on the historical development within the field of democracy and political participation. A large number of frequently cited scholars have studied the democratic attitudes of citizens and their political behaviour; however, the majority of their research has focused on electoral participation as the standard mode of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Campbell et al. 1960; Rokkan and Lipset 1967). On the basis of the alleged declining levels of political participation in the form of lower voter turnout and decreasing trust in politicians and the representative system, several scholars are now emphasising the establishment of newer forms of participation and argues that the decline in political participation is simply a participatory shift from what is referred to as conventional participation, to unconventional participation (Ekman and Amnå 2012, 283; Norris 2002a, 8; Putnam 2000, 55-57; Stolle and Hooghe 2005, 150).

Scholars such as Sabuecdo and Arce (1991, 93) questions the explanatory power of studies that report decreasing levels of political participation but utilises electoral turnout as their sole unit of measurement, thus not paying enough attention to the evolvement and diversification of political participation. There is a reported increase in political participation in non-traditional channels such as political parties and public bureaucracies, especially in Western Europe, and therefore, in order to improve the comprehension of the growing phenomena, social scientists must acknowledge and include new forms of political participation in their conceptualization by defining new categories of participation (Milbrath 1981, 478; Copeland 2014, 258; Dalton 2008a, 10; Norris 2002a, 4-5; Kriesi 2008, 147).

2.2 Conventional and Unconventional Participation

With the contributions of countless scholars and researchers, political participation is said to be at the heart of democratic theory (Verba and Nie 1972, 4; Teorell, Montero and Torcal 2007, 335; Kavanagh 1983, 1). There are numerous contributions in the attempt to define the concept of political participation. Verba and Nie (1972, 2) presents what is possibly the most frequently cited conceptualisation of the term, arguing that political participation "…refers to those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of

governmental personnel and/or the actions they take". In other words, political participation encompasses acts that aim at influencing governmental decisions.

As previously stated, voting is only one of many ways individuals are able to influence the direction of politics, and the significance of acknowledging and including new forms of political participation in research by defining new categories of participation is important if one wishes to have truly representational data (Sabucedo and Arce 1991, 94). A widespread method of categorising participation is between conventional and unconventional forms of political participation, a distinction first used and popularised by Barnes and Kaase (1979, 84), who originally distinguished between unconventional forms of political participation as those that did not involve electoral participation, and conventional participation primarily of those acts directly or indirectly related to the electoral process, which later has been adopted by many authors (Quaranta 2012, 252).

Stockemer (2014, 202) defines conventional political activities as voting, joining a political party, and attending a political rally, in general, actions aimed at influencing the political process, whereas unconventional political participation is defined as non-institutionalised actions aimed at influencing politics (Copeland 2014, 259). On the other hand, Topf (1995, 52) highlights that it has become common for scholars to identify all other political activities other than electoral participation as being unconventional. There is a high degree of uncertainty regarding which activities qualify as unconventional, as activities previously regarded as unconventional such as boycotts and demonstrations, are commonly accepted means of participation in modern times, and these distinctions fall victim of accusations for being rooted in narrow, outdated interpretations (Dalton 2008a, 92; Ekman and Amnå 2012, 288).

As unconventional forms of participation become increasingly recognised as modes of political participation, the political system opens up to new types of engagement, which frequently become more moderate and less prominent (Kriesi 2008, 157). Unconventionality encompasses what is new and innovative in regards of opportunities for political participation, as a result of change and development (Pitti 2018, 13). Geissel and Newton (2012, 4) argue that "the cure for democracy's ills is more and better democracy", and deliberative processes and democratic innovations are being implemented in the democratic process as a way of boosting citizen involvement as traditional platforms engaging fewer individuals (Geissel and Newton 2012, 4). Based on a somewhat insufficient understanding of determinants of unconventional

participation, my hypotheses will be constructed on the basis of the extensive research on general political participation. Thus, it will be appropriate to explore whether these conditions and patterns can be found when exploring the determinants of the wish to participate in mini-publics, a concept I further elaborate on in the following subchapter.

2.3 Deliberative Democracy and Democratic Innovations

As mentioned in chapter 1.0, scholars have emphasised deliberation as a remedy to the decline in political participation, which would appeal to increased citizen participation in the dialogue of the future of their community (Wang, Fishkin and Luskin 2020, 2162; Fishkin 2009, 1). Deliberative democracy is a type of democracy in which participants are able to create reasonable answers to societal challenges on the basis of collective thought (Niemeyer 104, 2011; Reybrouck 2016, 109). Parkinson and Mansbridge (2012, 4-5) define deliberative system as "one that encompasses a talk-based approach to political conflict and problem-solving - through arguing, demonstrating, expressing and persuading", which serves as a kind of experiment that may be implemented to shed light on certain elements of political behaviour (Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell 2002, 459)

A central part of deliberative systems is what is referred to as democratic innovations. In his book "Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation", Graham Smith (2009, 1) defines democratic innovations as "institutions that have been specifically designed to create and deepen citizen participation in the political decision-making process". He identifies a variety of democratic traits, involving the range of inclusiveness, popular control, in other words, the degree of the citizens' abilities to influence the decision-making process, and finally, considered judgement, regarding the participant's ability to make reflective judgements based on the perspectives of others (Smith 2009, 12). He utilises these democratic qualities as a method for analysing four different democratic innovations: popular assemblies, mini publics, direct legislation and e-democracy (Smith 2009, 6-7). Among the numerous democratic innovations addressed by Smith (2000), I will further investigate mini-publics as a channel for political participation, a decision justified by its form of recruitment in the following subchapter.

2.3.1 Mini-Publics

Smith (2009, 21) argues that when analysing political participation in democratic innovations, it is beneficial to determine the unit of analysation (popular assemblies, mini publics, direct legislation and e-democracy) based off of its level of inclusiveness. If we are to map determinants of the wish to participate on the individual level, it is important that the sample represents all members of society. In order to determine which democratic innovation is better suited for institutionalising effective participatory inclination for all groups of society, we have to look at its selection procedure, its level of fairness and the people's right to participate (Smith 2009, 21). Mini-publics is the democratic innovation that best satisfies the standards of inclusivity, since its form of selection is its most distinguishing feature, enacting the concept that every citizen has the right to run for political office. They differ from other democratic innovations in that their participants are chosen at random (Smith 2009, 72). Smith (2009, 79) quotes Barber (1984, 293) stating that "Where every citizen is equally capable of political judgement and equally responsible for the public good, the rotation of responsibilities amongst citizens chosen by lot becomes a powerful symbol of genuine democracy".

Designed to be small enough to truly be deliberative, and representative enough to be democratic, mini-publics have been claimed to be "among the most promising actual constructive efforts' that promote deliberative democracy" (Fung 2003, 339). They were first referred to by Robert Dahl (1989, 340) as a minipopulous, where its duty is to reflect on a particular political problem and thus to announce judgments, deemed supplementary to the legislature. Goodin and Dryzek (2006, 219-220) distinguish between different kinds of mini-publics, such as deliberative polls, consensus conferences, citizens' juries and planning cells among others (Felicetti, Niemeyer and Curato 2016, 427). Mini-publics act on behalf of the public, and the participants can be regarded as representatives of the wider public (Aars and Fimreite 2005, 245). Based on the diverse and large amount of previous research political participation, it is possible to construct a picture of potential determinants of an individual's inclination to cast their vote in electoral contexts, or participate in other traditional forms of political participation. However, as previously mentioned, the aim of this thesis is to answer whether these determinants are also crucial for an individual's wish to take part in mini-publics.

2.3.2 The Case of Norway

As previously stated, participants in mini-publics are selected by random selection and so brought together for the facilitation of knowledge on an issue. Experts are chosen on behalf of their expertise on different aspects of the issue, and their function is to provide the participants with knowledge (Coote and Lenaghan 1994, 8; Smith and Wales 2000, 55). However, there are scholars who remains sceptical to the legitimacy and effectiveness of mini-publics. For instance, O'Neill (2001, 2001, 484) questions its representativeness, arguing that despite the random selection of participants, the capacity and willingness to accept the invitation depends to a large degree on demographic background and social class (O'Neill 2001, 484). Lafont (2015, 41) also states that rather than increasing democratic legitimacy, it reduces it. Scholars such as Setälä (2017, 856, 860) are generally concerned with their outcome, arguing that one of the biggest drawbacks of mini-publics is their lack of impact on actual decision making, and emphasises that the proposals that are generated from mini-publics needs to be taken into account by politicians, not just when they are outlined (Setäla 2017, 856, 860).

My analysis is based upon the implementation of mini-publics in Bergen municipality, Norway. Aars (2003, 200) argues that the study of local politics is necessary as it is the primary level of democracy, providing the individual with greater opportunities to participate, and everyone is affected by the public services provided by their municipality in their lifetime. He further argues that there are developmental features of the participation in local election that make them important to study. The political system in Norway is built upon a unitary political system, consisting of municipalities, counties and central government. The local government has a dual character whereas it is a political institution with popularly elected local council on the one hand, but on the other hand, it is an administrative body with the responsibility of implementing policies (Pettersen and Rose 2017, 53). Bergen municipality is governed by a parliamentary model and is one of only two municipalities in Norway with such a system[3], whereas Bystyret is the municipalities highest political body, and the majority in the Bystyret elects Byrådet (Loodtz 2019).

In a collaboration between the Bergen Municipality, NORCE and University of Bergen, Bergen Byborgerpanel (Bergen mini-public) puts theory in practice by inviting a random sample of residents in Bergen to discuss and advise politicians on specific issues in mini-publics. After

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[3] Oslo and Bergen.

following a recommendation from the City Council's Byrådet, in 2016, the City Council's Bystyret decided to appoint a Local Democracy Committee (Lokaldemokratiutvalg) led by Anne Lise Fimreite, as part of a broader research into a local democracy reform in the city of Bergen, as briefly mentioned in chapter 1.0. In April 2017, Byrådet was handed a report from the committee, who found no evidence of an alarming decline in political participation. However, large variations in political participation among citizens were highlighted, and the committee put forward a proposal to create a mini-public that represents a cross-section of the population, which should be able to provide input on political issues, in order to ensure that the level of political participation and satisfaction is maintained (Lokaldemokratiutvalget 2017, 3-4). The same year, Bystyret approved the proposition of incorporating mini-publics as a tool to shed light on the issue of local democracy reform, before reaching a final decision the following year (Bystyresak[4] 231/17).

In 2018, 433 citizens of Bergen were invited to participate in a mini-publics, whereas 76 participants accepted the invitation and attended[5] the event, where they were given the opportunity to express their opinion on local democracy and give feedback to politicians on how Bergen should be governed politically, regardless of their gender, age, ethnic background, political interest or social network (Universitetet i Bergen 2018; Buller 2020; Universitetet i Bergen 2019; Arnesen, Fimreite and Aars. 2018, 9; Lokaldemokratiutvalget 2017, 3). Consequently, in order to elaborate on this experience, the research project "Democratic innovation in practice: Research on participation and legitimacy in municipal decision-making processes functions" (DEMOVATE), was implemented as a follow-up on the Byborgerpanel, from the fall of 2019 to the fall of 2022[6] (Arnesen 2021).

The purpose of this chapter was present mini-publics as a form of democratic innovation, and to briefly justify the reasoning behind selecting it as the mode of participation to be studied. The attention will now be specifically put towards the inclination to participate in politics. In the following chapter, I carry out a literature review where key scholars and previous research that has greatly influenced the field of research on political participation are identified, which does not serve as the main explanation in the thesis, but for which I argue is necessary to address as the results of the analysis could potentially be interpreted in light of them.

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[4] City Council Issue
[5] 87 participants accepted but 11 did not attend (Arnesen, Fimreite and Aars 2018, 9).
[6] Further information about the project can be found at: https://demovate.netlify.app

3 Literature Review

As mentioned in chapter 2.1, the concept of political participation has been a topic of research in political science for decades, and scholars have contributed to the field with numerous attempts to measure and conceptualise its causes. Before moving on to the primary theoretical explanations in Chapter 4, the goal of this section is to situate the research in the academic landscape by outlining and reviewing alternative explanations proposed by scholars, which in this case is the Michigan model of party identification and the contextual model of political participation (Randolph 2009, 2).

3.1 The Michigan Model of Party Identification

Over 60 years ago, it was proclaimed by Campbell et al. (1960, 121) in their seminal work, *The American Voter,* that "Few factors are of greater importance for our national elections than the lasting attachment of tens of millions of Americans to one of the parties", which lays the foundation for what is referred to as the Michigan model of political participation. Thus, the subsequent decades of academic research on voting behaviour emphasised the fundamental importance of what is referred to as partisan loyalties (Bartels 2000, 36). As the name suggests, the Michigan model was developed at the Survey Research Centre in Ann Arbor, focusing mainly on party identification, or the personal attachment towards a political party (Aardal 2015, 108; Dalton 2008b,177; Campbell and Valen 1961, 505).

In order to analyse attitudes of political participation, Campbell et al. (1960, 25) illustrates a funnel of causality. In the funnel, events that ultimately promotes political participation is illustrated as factors spread out on a time axis. Conditions positioned at the narrowest end are the immediate determinants, such as the individual's perceptions of candidates or campaigns. However, at the wider end of the funnel, the broader, underlying factors of willingness to participate in the political process are positioned. This could potentially be the individual's inherited social background, educational levels or parental influence (Aardal 2015, 109, Dalton 2008b, 179). However, in the Michigan model of political participation, party identification is highlighted as the dominating determinant of political participation and is stated by Campbell et al. (1960, 121) to influence our attitude and behaviour.

Furthermore, scholars such as Abramson and Aldrich (1982, 502) regard political parties as influential on attitudes towards political participation, connecting declining rates of participation to diminishing party loyalties. Political parties engage and mobilise citizens, thus playing a crucial role in engaging the electorate and their will to participate (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992, 70). On the other hand, the model does suffer from certain weaknesses when applied to several countries outside of the United States, as highlighted by Campbell and Valen (1961, 523-524). Firstly, in two-party systems, both parties tend to be close to each other on policy issues, so that they become almost indistinguishable. However, in a multiparty system, the parties wish to reflect special interests that can be found within the electorate, which suggests that the distinctiveness between them would be greater than with American parties. In this case, Campbell and Valen (1961, 525) compares Norway to the United states, arguing that the Michigan model is non-applicable in the Norwegian case where there is a close connection between parties and the social class, and it is thus difficult to isolate the independent effect of party identification (Aardal 2015, 109).

3.2 The Contextual Model

A majority of research conducted on the determinants of political behaviour and attitudes toward participation regards individuals independently of their social environment, thus overlooking the broad historic background and social relations within their society. Consequently, individual-level traits are commonly regarded as the only determinants of political behaviour (Przeworski 1974, 27). However, scholars such as Przeworski (1974, 28), and Putnam (1966, 640) argue that as political action rarely happens in a social vacuum independently of social interactions, the social context plays an important role in determining the extent to which individuals wish to participate in politics. Treating individuals within the context of their social interaction is argued to be crucial in order to understand political behaviour (Huckfeldt 1979, 579).

Przeworski (1974, 29) argues that based on contextual models, one can claim that the behaviour of individuals is a result of their own personal characteristics, in addition to the attributes of other individuals within their society. Their behaviour is susceptible to external influences, as some encounters potentially result in behavioural changes. By studying the influence of environmental characteristics on voting behaviour, Wright (1976, 204) found that context influences voting by affecting the individual's attitudes and their perceptions of political

candidates. In his work, Putnam (1966, 641) proposes the social interaction theory, arguing that community influence is reflected through interrelationships among its members, whereas common political attitudes receive public support, and ideas that differ from the general opinion are weakened. Individuals' attitudes toward political participation are thus influenced by the dominant attitude in their community.

However, there are also some concerns raised about the applicability of the geographical component of political participation. When analysing the contextual influence of political behaviour, variables describing groups of individuals rather than the individuals themselves are implemented, thus termed as ecological. As a result, critics of the contextual approach argue on the basis of ecological fallacy, whereas inferences about individual behaviour drawn from data about aggregates, thinking that relationships observed for groups hold for individuals (Piantadosi, Byar and Green 1988, 893; Bowler 1991, 92). There is also criticism grounded in issues of theory, as some doubt that the persistence of spatial distributions of opinion or behaviour reflect an underlying distribution of individual characteristics. Apart from certain characteristics such as occupation or race, geography may or may not have any impact on individuals (Bowler 1991, 92). As a result of these shortcomings, the contextual model will not serve as the main explanation in the analysis, however, it is worth considering as both samples are drawn from different populations, and the results may be influenced by contextual determinants of the populations. Although the contextual model and the Michigan model are not directly transferable to this research question, it is appropriate to discuss them so the results could potentially be discussed in light of them.

4 Theoretical Framework

As previously stated, the field of political participation in the context of democratic innovations lacks an explicit theoretical framework, which can be explained by the fact that the study is still in its early stages. The purpose of this chapter is further elaborate on my main theoretical explanation of political participation, namely, political efficacy. The term was first presented in chapter 1, conceptualised as the individual's own perceived comprehension and genuine influence on political matters as well as their confidence in their power to alter the government (Balch 1974, 2), and is regarded a prerequisite for widespread political participation, thus providing a potentially reasonable explanation for the desire to participate in mini-publics. First, internal political efficacy is introduced as to which degree individual-level determinants of subjective political competence have an impact on political participation (Craig 1979, 226), and the literature places particular emphasis on educational levels and socioeconomic status as sources of internal political efficacy. Secondly, external political efficacy is introduced as the individual's belief in the responsiveness of the political system (Finkel 1985, 892-893), which is claimed to be a result of the individual's level of satisfaction with their political system, and the structural features of the political system they act within. The presented previous findings lay the foundation for a number of hypotheses introduced along the way. It should not be ruled out that participation in mini-publics may be influenced by factors that are not included in the main explanations, but it is argued by Christensen (2011, 211) that "the literature on political participation is virtually endless, it is impossible to cover all aspects".

4.1 Internal and External Political Efficacy

Although there still remains a lot to learn about the causes of political involvement, Levy (2013, 1) claims there is widespread consensus that at its theoretical core, political participation is strongly related to political efficacy. Political efficacy is conceptualised as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, that is, that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties" (Campbell et al. 1954 cited in Craig 1979, 225). In other words, it refers to their perceptions of their own personal impact in the political realm. Political efficacy can be regarded a prerequisite for widespread political participation, however, scholars such as Finkel (1985, 891), Balch (1974, 2) and Morrell (2003, 598) emphasise its explanatory abilities of variations of political participation, and not the individual's sense of efficacy in itself. This theoretical framework will serve as the main

theoretical explanation of the thesis because it considers not only determinants at the individual level, but also the fact that institutional structures influence our political attitudes. As a result, it is best suited to answering the research question, as it allows for the investigation of several potentially contributing factors.

4.2 Internal Efficacy

The first form of political efficacy regards internal political efficacy. Internal political efficacy regards the individual's perception of their own political competence and capabilities, which in turn determines whether or not they feel capable to participate in political procedures (Craig 1979, 226; Niemi, Craig and Mattei 1991, 1407; Karp and Banducci 2008, 8). There are numerous factors that could potentially influence the individual's own sense of political competence and their perception of their own influential capabilities, and as a result, I will utilise this section of my thesis to investigate the two most commonly applied variables in studies of individual-level determinants of political participation: educational level and socioeconomic status. I will also introduce two alternative explanations for political participation at the individual level, namely, age and gender which will be used as control variables.

4.2.1 Educational Levels

According to scholars such La Due Lak and Huckfeldt (1998, 567), education is regarded as one of the most reliable estimators of attitudes towards political participation, as it is human-capital enhancing, thus increasing the likelihood of being involved in political activity (Berinsky and Lenz 2010, 357; Sunshine 2005, 25; Kam and Palmer 2008, 612), which is a widely uncontested statement. Additionally, when other socioeconomic factors are considered, education has proven to be the strongest predictor of participation (Sunshine 2005, 26; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, 271). This statement is based on several factors. According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), one of the most important benefits of education political participation is the facilitation of political learning. Krosnick (1990, 71) stated that "the more education one receives, the more one is trained to analyse human societies and to speculate about how life should be lived" (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 18). Therefore, we may argue that education leads to an increased likelihood of political participation as it provides individuals with civic education (Sunshine 2005, 27).

Formal education is argued by Sunshine (2005, 27) to foster the development of critical cognitive abilities that help individuals in deciphering complicated political information, such as political language, and in picking an appropriate candidate or political party. Additionally, it enhances verbal cognitive competence, enabling the ability to understand the political language. This rise in knowledge and political awareness has the potential to improve people's ability to become politically active, in other words, to make sense of politics. Higher education fosters the information, skills, and political familiarity needed to navigate the political arena, as well as the understanding of the relationship between political engagement and the maintenance of a democratic system (Denny and Doyle 2008, 293).

As stated by Denny and Doyle (2008, 293), our ability to gather information, classify facts systematically, and efficiently process additional knowledge is dependent on formal education. Meanwhile, P.E. Converse (2006, 30) argues individuals who are poorly educated have been shown to be inarticulate, having difficulties when verbally conveying their particular political beliefs (Sabucedo and Arce 1991, 93). To sum up, one of the main justifications for measuring how educational levels affects political participation is its ability to enhance cognitive proficiency and analytic stability, and education thus becomes an indicator of a citizen's ability to understand the political world process political information (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996, 40-41; Whiteley 2010, 28).

Furthermore, formal education involves socialising people to value civic participation, which in turn, improves our civic skills and orientations (Krosnick 1990, 71; Kam and Palmer 2008, 613). The formation of civic skills and orientations through civic participation is commonly referred to as social capital (Putnam 1995, 67). Putnam (2000, 24-25) defines to social capital as "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit". Individuals with higher levels of formal education are found to be more likely to be informed about a wide variety of policy issues and are thus more likely to form preferences. On the other hand, lesser educated people are not as likely to have any policy opinions since they lack the required information (Krosnick 1990, 72). Studying the interdependence of educational levels and respondent indifferences on poll questions, J.M. Converse (1976, 516), found a strong correlation between educational level and the range of opinions among respondents. As educational levels decreased, the likelihood of respondents expressing indifference on political issues increased.

Education can also improve the perceived advantages of civic engagement by encouraging democratic illumination or changing individual preferences for civic activities, allowing individuals to efficiently distribute their time and resources efficiently in the political climate (Denny and Doyle 2008, 293; Dee 2004, 1699; Emler and Frazer 2010, 260). Not only does formal education enhance political competence and sense of efficacy, but it also increases political interest, encouraging a sense of civic duty, making us more inclined to interact with politics (Kam and Palmer 2008, 613). Simply put, education decreases the cost of political participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 18). Based on the previous studies of formal education's effect attitudes towards political participation, where scholars have claimed that an increased understanding of the political system and the democratic process increases the likelihood of an individual to participate in politics, I present the first following hypothesis:

H1: *Individuals who have obtained higher levels of formal education are more likely to be willing to participate in mini-publics.*

4.2.2 Socioeconomic Status

"Some citizens have the resources needed for participation (skills, time, and money); others do not" (Verba and Nie 1972, 13). In the majority of literature on attitudes toward political participation, socioeconomic status has become one of the most important predictors of participation (Quintelier and Hooghe 2012, 273). In their seminal work, "Participation in America", Verba and Nie (1972, 13) built their explanation of the inclination to participate on what they called a "baseline model" consisting of income, occupation, and education. Later this model has been referred to as the SES model, which is a universal measurement of an individual's economic and social position and is one of the dominant explanations of individual turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Parry, Moiser, and Day 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).

Previous research has found that throughout history, deep cleavages have contributed to the political division of voters, through social, economic and religious dimensions (Rokkan and Lipset 1967, 17). According to the SES model, political involvement may be explained by examining an individual's socioeconomic position in terms of their income, commonly known as socioeconomic status (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, 271). It has previously been found

that socioeconomic status is a major determinant on political participation, whereas those individuals with higher status is reportedly more active in politics than those of lower status (Milbrath and Goel 1977, in Beck and Jennings 1982, 96; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, 4). It is also argued by Frey (1971, 101) to be one of the best-established findings in political science. Ever since Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels elaborated on their distinction between the bourgeoise and the proletarians in 1848, it has become apparent how much it has altered in recent decades. Now, the term includes dimensions of occupation,, income, location, and living circumstances, which now are all common indicators of social class (Engels and Marx 2017, 2-3, 8; Sørensen 2000, 1526).

Perceptions of social class have been consistently found to be related to political participation, and that social class enhances political efficacy, as individuals from lower social classes lack access to the required financial means and social capital to engage successfully (Piff, Kraus and Keltner 2018, 84). Verba and Nie (1972, 14) found that individuals with higher levels of social status are able to develop civic attitudes which expands their concern for political issues, its outcome and processes, in turn increasing the likelihood of developing a concern for politics, its outcomes and its processes, which in turn leads to increased likelihood to participate in politics. When discussing *why* socioeconomic status matters, we are provided with numerous explanations. Verba and Nie (1972, 133) emphasise the social environment of those of upper status, as they socialise with other individuals who participate politically, while Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg and McKee (2017, 11) argue that this link is based on economic self-interest, with individuals choosing policies that benefit them financially, translating into political action. Other explanations connect the availability of resource and skills to participation, arguing that upper-status citizens have the time, the money, and knowledge to be politically effective, while others connect links between the psychological characteristics of upper-status citizens and participation, stating that they are more likely to be concerned about political problems, and they are more likely to feel influential (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, 274; Norris 2002a, 93; Verba and Nie 1972, 126). Furthermore, social class also encompasses the individual's self-perceived rank within the social hierarchy, and their self-assessment. Persons in the lower social classes have been found to have less social control and opportunities, causing them to be more critical of their surroundings (Kraus, Piff and Keltner 2009, 992-993; Piff, Kraus and Keltner 2018, 57). This could potentially discourage them from participating in the political process. On the other hand, literature have underlined the increased

sense of control and self-sufficiency among those who identified with the top social class, which in turn affects their actions (Piff, Kraus and Keltner 2018, 58).

Resources, defined by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995, 274) as money, time and civic skills, is claimed to be the most important component of political participation, and among those, money and time are regarded as being most directly connected to political activity. Individuals of higher social status have greater stakes in politics, as they are provided with greater political skills, a greater apprehension of political matters, and are more exposed to political socialization as they are more likely to communicate with other participants. Additionally, money has the direct function in certain types of activities, it also serves as an indirect influence on participation as an important indicator of socioeconomic status (Norris 2002a, 93; Verba and Nie 1972, 126).

Time as a resource of political participation is constrained by the fact that it is limited, and citizens must choose to sacrifice it for the benefit of political participation. Money fosters political participation as it reduces the cost. People with a higher income are able to take time off work to participate, and they can also afford expenses such as transportation to get to political event. We can also argue that those who possess higher income levels are not distracted by the need to provide food on the table or earn money for rent, and time as a resource is thus closely connected to income levels. But although those with income and wealth evidently have more money to spare for politics, it is less clear if they have more time to devote politics (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, 288-291; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 134-135).

Individuals with a higher income are often faced with a lower cost of participation, and are thus more involved in social groups with like-minded people, and they have an increased concern for political issues (Quintelier and Hooghe 2012, 273; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, 288-291). Thus, it is plausible that an individual's socioeconomic status impacts political involvement based on their access to material goods, as well as their subjective sense of efficacy as a result of their perceived status. Hence, I present the following hypotheses:

H2: *Individuals who identify with the lower levels of social class are less willing to participate in mini-publics.*

H3: *Individuals with lower income levels will be less willing to participate in mini-publics.*

4.3 Control Variables

In addition to my main explanations, it is necessary to control for other factors that may influence citizen participation. The demographic traits of gender and age have been closely examined in previous research, and their relationship with political participation will also be controlled for in the analysis.

4.3.1 Age

 "Age governs the opportunities that people have had to receive an education and become embedded in social structures" (Franklin 2004, 16). Age is claimed by scholars to be one of the most fundamental predictors of political participation (Norris 2002a, 89). According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 37), political participation is traditionally expected to be lower at the early stage of life, increasing throughout the middle age, and once again, declining as we get old People's participation in politics grows deeper as they get older; a connection potentially explained by the life-experience theory, stating that as people become older, they get more familiar with the political system, its procedures, political parties, and their candidates, gaining the resources needed for involvement (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 137).

Younger generations have been referred to as the "Achilles' heel of conventional political participation" (Melo and Stockemer 2014, 33). Their rate of electoral involvement is diminishing as they have been found to be the least likely to vote in elections, and party membership among younger generations is plummeting (Norris 2002am 89). They are also accused of being uninterested in politics, uninformed, indifferent, and having low degrees of interest (Quintelier 2007, 165). Furthermore, in their study of younger people's interest and involvement in politics between the ages of 14 and 24, White, Bruce and Ritchie (2000, 29, 25) found that younger people are largely critical towards politicians as they have a lack of faith in them, a perception of them as unresponsive, all of which contribute to a disincentive to become involved in politics. They further argued that politicians fail to listen to their problems because they are too preoccupied with their own interests.

4.3.2 Gender

"In all societies for which we have data, sex is related to political activity; men are more active than women." (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, 234). Compared to women, Verba, Burns and

Schlozman (1997, 1051) argue that men are more knowledgeable about politics, and have higher interest levels, making them more likely to feel politically efficacious. They found these gender differences to persist as significant even after controlling for levels of education, institutional affiliations and psychological involvement in politics (Norris 2002a, 90). Although gender differences have reduced since the 1980s and 1990s, women, especially older, continue to prove slightly less interested in conventional politics than men (Norris 2002a, 90-91).

Despite that the gender gap is a recognised attribute of the political landscape in America, and that there are large amounts of studies on the subject, the causes for the current gender gap remain a mystery (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 98). Verba, Nie and Kim (1978, 245) found that variations in the individual-level dynamics that influence political involvement, such as educational levels and socioeconomic resources, cannot entirely clarify gender differences in political engagement. Their research indicates that women would still be less engaged even if they had the same amounts of resources. When they took institutional affiliation into account, the variations in electoral participation were minimal, and the increase in voting participation that came with institutional affiliation was roughly equal for men and women (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, 250). Furthermore, they found that being female results in lower levels of political involvement, even if one has the same level of education, connections to political institutions, and interest in political matters (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, 268).

However, in recent decades this notion has been challenged, as rates of female voting turnout was equal to those of men until 1980s presidential election, and by 1990 women in the US were found to be equally as likely as men to engage in other types of political activities[7] (Conway 2001, 231; Vaus and McAllister 1989, 241). Fuelled by generational change, long-term secular trends in social norms and structural lifestyles have contributed to the withdrawal of many factors that has previously hindered female participation in the past. However, Norris (2002a) also states that as women get older, they become slightly less interested in conventional politics than men (Norris 2002a, 90-91; Norris 2002b, 96).

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[7] Women have generally surpassed the number of men in the electorate, thus exceeding them in every American presidential election since 1964, in 1996 the difference was of 7.2 million votes (Norris 2002b, 96).

4.4 External Political Efficacy

As the most emphasised sources of internal political efficiency have been identified, it is time to map out the causes of external political efficacy, which concerns the belief that the authorities or regime is responsive to attempted influence, or system responsiveness (Finkel 1985, 892-893). Based on this analytical review of previous research, I conclude that institutional determinants are potential key factors affecting the wish to participate in politics. The impact of external political efficacy on political participation will therefore be measured through the individual's level of satisfaction with the political system, and structural components of mini-publics as possible incentives for participation.

4.4.1 Political Satisfaction

The discussion regarding the correlation between political satisfaction and political participation appears to be split into two main arguments. Miller (1974, 992) found in his research that some individuals have reported to dislike politics as they feel politicians are unresponsive to their concerns, distant from the population and only involved for their own self-interest. If political leaders experience high degrees of trust from citizens, it increases the likelihood that their actions will be accepted as legitimate and worthy of popular support. The weakened trust between citizens and political parties, politicians and institutions have affected nearly all advanced industrial democracies, allegedly changing the future of the democracy. Why participate if you do not trust that the political system and the decision-makers will act according to your expressed preferences? (Miller 1974, 989; Dalton 2004, 4; Jacquet 2017, 651).

Sofie Marien and Marc Hooghe (2013, 133) state that one of the most widely used arguments in this debate is that citizens need to be positively oriented towards the political system, because negative attitudes involve a potential detachment which will eventually influence the effectiveness and legitimacy of the democratic system, ultimately leading to democratic instability. Citizens who support the political system are thus predicted to be more politically active as a result of their democratic values (Quaranta 2015, 53). On the other hand, scholars such as Boulianne (2019, 6) claim that dissatisfaction could potentially encourage political participation and can also serve as a resource and a motivating factor. Furthermore, Warren (1999, 4) refers to this relationship as rather paradoxical. People who completely trust political institutions would avoid participation because they assume the institutions will represent their

own interests with uncritical trust, ultimately leading them to decline to participate in processes of decision-making (Hooghe and Marien 2013, 133

As the bond between parties, politicians and the electorate become weaker, electoral participation is now being replaced by forms of political participation regarded as unconventional, as voters are no longer being mobilised by political parties and its representatives. Scholars have justified the emergence of these forms of participation as a result of this value change, which is also arguably the cause of recent demands of political reforms (Dalton 2004, 11; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, 60-61; Miller 1974, 989; Inglehart 1999, 236). In other words, this alienation from political institutions is associated with the rejection of conventional channels of participation, and those who distrust it are more likely to participate in unconventional channels (Hooghe and Marien 2013, 131).

As argued by Inglehart (1999, 243), the sole reason why modern industrial society was created in the first place, was because of the production assembly line, enabling the processing of large numbers of both products and people. Although they have functioned as highly efficient tools, they contributed to a reduction of individual autonomy and are ultimately becoming less accepted in modern society. Furthermore, he argues that the rise of these values lessens approval rates on authority in general, which in turn, leads to declining trust in institutions. Although citizens appear to be less engaged in political participation, Norris (2002a, 4-5) claims that rather than by casting votes in elections, engagement can be found in other forms of activities. The popularity of alternative forms of political participation has experienced an increase over the last several decades, in turn, leading to growth in the support of citizen groups, public interest organisations and non-governmental organisations. Western publics have also become likely to partake in forms of political participation regarded as elite-challenging, largely as a result of the weakened bond between citizens and the people (Inglehart 1999, 242).

As political identities are becoming fragmented, it becomes more difficult for political parties and politicians to reach a collective (Cain, Dalton and Scarrow 2003, 251-252). Signs are pointing towards an increase of public democratic discontent, and some argue that it highlights the need for a more participatory form of government (Dalton, Burklin and Drummond 2001, 149). This discontent may lead to an expansion of the democratic process, "Thus, current public dissatisfaction with the functioning of the democratic process may generate the reformist pressures to expand and strengthen the process", as political action can be seen as a method of

expressing dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions (Dalton 2004, 13; Quarantana 2015, 53). In sum, the theory so far suggests that dissatisfaction in in politicians and political institutions may ultimately lead to pressures from the electorate to reform and expand the democratic process (Dalton 2004, 13). This lays the foundation of my first hypothesis:

H4: *Individuals who report dissatisfaction with the political system are more likely to be willing to participate in mini-publics.*

4.4.2 Institutional Structures

Although the willingness to participate in politics to a large extent can be traced back to characteristics of both individuals and their social and political environment, Aardal (2002, 34) claims that we still find the greatest differences in turnout between countries where the institutional framework conditions are different. As beforementioned, external political efficacy refers to a system-oriented sense of efficacy (Kenski and Stroud 2006; Finkel 1985, 892; Niemi, Craig and Mattei 1991, 1407). The importance of institutional and contextual settings for understanding patterns of citizen political involvement has been emphasised (Pettersen and Rose 1996, 51), and as argued by Verba and Nie, "some citizens live in circumstances where participation is made easy by institutional structures; others live circumstances where they are surrounded by institutions that inhibit participation" (Verba and Nie 1972, 13).

In the theory of political participation, it is commonly argued that institutional structures affecting external political efficacy is largely related to electoral systems. The widely accepted claim in this regard states that the proportional electoral system enhances voter turnout, in contrast with the majority system, and there are several arguments as to why this is the case (Jackman and Miller 1995, 32; Aardal 2002, 34). Firstly, voters in proportional systems are able to vote for smaller parties without feeling as if their vote is wasted, secondly, in PR systems, parties have more of an inclination to campaign everywhere as districts are non-competitive and certain areas are not written off as hopeless, and finally, the number of parties in the PR system provides variety of options among which voters can choose. These three factors are claimed to promote voter turnout (Blais 2010, 169; Blais and Carty 1990, 167; Powell 1986, 21). However, these claims are not uncontested, whereas scholars have also argued that the single member plurality system is straightforward and easier to understand as the candidate with the most votes wins, which may in turn increase turnout (Blais and Carty 1990, 167).

As argued in chapter 3.2, contextual settings have been found to establish contexts within politics, which become evident when the elements are conceived as components of the particular structure of political opportunities for the community. There exists no straightforward instruction describing out how mini-publics should be designed and ran, and the difficulty of its designed lies with the age-old problem of how-to bring fairness to the exercise of power (Crosby 1995, 160). Therefore, based on the claim that electoral turnout is affected by electoral systems, it is beneficial to investigate whether the assumption can be applied to studies of influences on attitudes towards participation in mini-publics. Electoral systems can affect the proportionality of the ratio between votes to seats, and when this distribution is unequal, it could alter people's perceptions of their external political efficiency. Individuals who favour smaller parties may feel unfairly represented if election systems shift votes to seats unevenly, leading to decreased levels of political involvement (Karp and Banducci 2008, 312). Despite the fact that this explanation regards political participation as the act of voting, and not necessarily the desire to participate in political processes, it can be assumed that the type of mini-public is decisive for individuals' desire to participate, as could affect the extent to which this will be a legitimate process that actually represents their opinions. This is emphasised by Smith and Setäla (2018, 301), and will be further elaborated on in the following chapter.

4.4.3 Structural Features of Mini-Publics

The structural makeup of mini-publics can take several forms, commonly identified as citizens' juries, conferences of consensus, deliberative polls and so on (Lafont 2015, 40). Even if different forms of mini-publics differ in many respects, Grönlund, Setäla and Herne (2010, 96), emphasises that their procedures are largely similar. They all consist of small-group deliberations with randomly selected citizens, who meet in smaller groups to discuss political issues. The participants are given information about the issue to be discussed, they listen to experts and are allowed to ask them questions and discuss further in small groups in order to finally reach a decision, usually as a common statement or by voting. The outcome is then communicated to the public and to politicians and decision-makers (Grönlund, Setäla and Herne 2010, 96). Please refer to appendix A for a brief overview of a selection of mini-public, presenting some of their differing key qualities. The goal is not the provision of detailed information on all existing types of mini-publics, but rather to provide the reader with information on how they differ according to essential structural features. Furthermore, Smith (2009, 82) highlights certain key structural features of mini publics as positive incentives for

participation in mini-publics, namely: a formal invitation, a feeling that they are being invited to partake in an important political process and a modest honorarium (Smith and Setälä 2018, 300-301), which are assumptions that will be further elaborated on.

The first central structural determinant put forward by Smith (2009, 82) states that a formal invitation is a positive incentive for participation in mini-publics. The act of recruiting participants based on random selection was emphasised as the most striking attribute of mini-publics in subchapter 2.3.1. Crosby (1995, 157) refers to mini-publics as microcosms of their community, and numerous theorists who research the subject highlight the need of a representative group of individuals with a wide range of experience and backgrounds. Participants are commonly chosen using a quota system that considers factors such as age, gender, education, and race (Crosby 1995, 158). Thus, the equal chance of participation is replaced with the equal likelihood of recruitment, and the evasion of consistent exclusion of particular social groups is secured[8] (Smith 2009, 79). In addition, Farrell et al. (2019, 5) argues that random selection drives the idea of inclusivity to life by ensuring that attendees are more than "the usual suspects". Setälä (2017, 843) also states that because the participants are randomly selected, they most likely do not know each other beforehand, thus preventing group thinking. Smith (2009, 82) found that random selection was found by to be a significantly motivating factor for participation, as citizens perceive it as a rare opportunity to engage in a politically significant process. This lays the foundation for the following hypothesis:

H5: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if they are invited after a random selection, as opposed to public registration.*

Furthermore, Smith (2009, 82) emphasises that individuals are more willing to participate in mini-publics when they feel they are being invited to an important political process. This can be connected to the perceived legitimacy of the mini-publics, which depends on to which degree its findings are legitimate, and the suggestions are worthwhile to pursue. It is significant because it indicates that the platform is regarded as having a legitimate position in the democratic process (Curato and Böker 2015, 178-179). First of all, the number of participants to recruit in the mini-public has been claimed to be a crucial choice (Böker and Elstud 2015, 132). As

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[8] Smith (2009, 80) however, emphasises that mini-publics utilises "near-random selection", as it is an element of self-selection as participants can accept or deny their invitation.

illustrated in Appendix A, groups of mini-publics such as citizens' juries/reference panels and consensus conferences have a notably lower number of participants than the other forms. Fishkin (2009, 57) elaborate on the effect of the number of participants in mini-publics, arguing that the benefit of lower numbers of participants is that it can continue for an extended period of time. An additional argument that promotes smaller numbers of participants emphasises that mini-publics are built on the assumption that a smaller number of well-informed citizens is more beneficial than hundreds or thousands of uninformed citizens (Lenaghan 1999, 50; Smith and Wales 2000, 57; Crosby 1995, 161).

On the other hand, Fishkin (2009, 57) further argues that small numbers of participants also count as a limitation, as it does not establish a statistical representativeness, and the groups are too small for there to be a scientific basis for connecting their conclusion to an entire population. In addition, the amount of impact mini-publics make mainly determined by the number of participants. As it is more difficult to ignore the perspectives of hundreds of participants, mobilizing a large number of people on an issue can have a substantial influence on how the macrosystem handles the problem (Goodin and Dryzek 2006, 235). Based on Smith's (2009, 82) premise that the sense of being invited to an important political process is crucial for the wish to participate, it is plausible to infer that a greater number of participants enhances this feeling. As a result, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H6: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics when there is a greater number of participants.*

Another common attribute of mini-publics highlighted by Setälä, Grönlund and Herne (2010, 689), is the small-group deliberations, and the provision of information from experts. Because mini-publics are founded in the ideal of deliberative democracy, it promotes reasoned and informed debates where members of the public are brought together and offered a structured atmosphere in which key information by experts can be discussed (Gooberman-Hill, Horwood and Calnan 2008, 273, 277). The fundamental goals of democratic debate and deliberation are to expand our knowledge of all members of society's interests, and we wish to promote those interests in a fair and impartial manner (Christiano 2012, 27). Jacquet (2017, 647, 654) discovered that a valuable reward of participating in mini-publics is the potential improved understanding of the public decision-making process, which shows that participation in a

deliberative process for the sake of deliberating may be appealing in and of itself. Drawing on these findings, I present the following hypothesis:

H7: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if they get to take part in a deliberative process*

Smith's (2009, 82) final argument takes financial compensation for participation into account. This has been found in previous research to increase the motivation to engage in mini-publics. For example, Fourniau (2019, 3), experienced difficulties recruiting participants for the consensus conference on the Cigéo project, as a result of the time-demanding nature of the event. A great effort was expected from the participants, who were asked to devote three full weekends at conferences. However, it was argued that this was a result of the lack of financial compensation of the participants, which was considered an essential ethical condition for genuine involvement of citizens. Pritchard (2015, 7) argues that the practice of paying people to make policy decisions has a long history whereas financial compensation for participation in the democratic process was seen as a vital aspect of democracy in ancient Athens, as the poor lacked the leisure to engage in the democracy as they were dependent on their income. Thus, they were financially compensated for the benefit of expanding democracy. On this premise, the cost of participation is demonstrated to be a link between time and income, in the sense that citizens are unwilling to sacrifice working hours for participation since it results in loss of income. Thus, the following hypothesis will be studied:

H8: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if they receive financial compensation.*

As we are on the subject of financial compensation for participation, it leads us to additional structural attributes worthy of consideration. Mini-public requires a certain level of commitment and time, and time has been highlighted as a vital aspect of the wish to participate in mini-publics. Reybrouck (2016, 27) emphasises the cost of participation as an obstacle for the likelihood to participate in mini-publics, and the cost can in many cases be interpreted as time. These democratic processes usually require much of the participants' time, and it is reported by OECD (2020, 10) that most of non-participation can be traced back to conflicting schedules. Therefore, mini-publics are commonly held on weekends in order to attract as many participants as possible (Reybrouck 2016, 28; Jacquet 2017, 648). Through a qualitative

analysis of individuals who denied the invitation to participate in mini-publics, Jacquet (2017, 13) found that some interviewees who worked as freelancers found deliberative mini-publics to be possible distractions from their jobs, as they tend to work any day of the week. In other words, one cannot assume that citizens are willing to sacrifice working hours for the benefit of mini-publics, and it is therefore appropriate to hold the event on weekends when the majority have time off work. Thus, the following hypothesis will be examined:

H9: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if it takes place during a weekend, as opposed to a weekday.*

Furthermore, mini-publics vary according to how they convey, as well as achieve, their output. For example, consensus conferences and citizens' juries resemble in that they don't use secret ballot, ultimately demanding that the group reach a consensus exposing the participants to social pressure towards conformity. By contrast, the deliberative poll employs a secret ballot by confidential questionnaires at the end of the weekend (Fishkin 2009, 57). Smith (2009, 88) further argues that a public vote comes at the expense of a consensus, and that social pressure could ultimately result in conformism in fear of disagreement. By using public votes, participants are more likely to adopt opinions regarded as politically correct, rather than establishing their own. In other words, the public gaze could drive them towards socially acceptable behaviour and therefore produce a disposition to conformism (Engelen and Nys 2007, 162). Secret votes would create an environment free of influences that potentially impair honest opinions among citizens (Smith 2009, 100). Furthermore, public voting might discourage participation, and claims that it benefits highly educated and self-confident individuals as they are better suited to defend their choices (Engelen and Nys 2007, 163). Based on this, I present the final hypothesis:

H10: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if it involves secret votes as opposed to public votes.*

In sum, scholars have found that structural attributes such as recruitment form, number of participants, decisional basis, financial compensation, the time of the event and ultimately, the public vote have found to influence people's wish to participate in mini-publics.

4.5 Summary of Theoretical Framework

This chapter's ultimate objective was to present prior findings in the area, defend the logic behind my hypotheses, and identify viable explanations for the research question. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the hypotheses. Because of the structure of the analysis, the determinants are categorised in accordance with their measurement level, namely individual and structural level, meaning that political satisfaction is assessed as a source of external political efficacy, it is presented along with individual-level factors that measure internal political efficacy. First, it was found that it is commonly assumed that our participatory inclination comes from our own sense of political efficacy, commonly divided into the sense of internal and external efficacy. Educational level and socioeconomic status have been identified as sources of levels of internal political efficacy, while satisfaction with political system and the institutional structures has been identified as influential factors of external political efficacy. The literature also established that levels of external political efficacy are largely affected by our satisfaction with the political system, and the structure of the electoral system we act within.

	Hypotheses
Individual -level Determinants	H1: *Individuals who have obtained higher levels of formal education are more likely to be willing to participate in mini-publics.* H2: *Individuals who identify with the lower levels of social class are less willing to participate in mini-publics.* H3: *Individuals with lower income levels will be less willing to participate in mini-publics.* H4: *Individuals who report dissatisfaction with the political system are more likely to be willing to participate in mini-publics.*
Structural Determinants	H5: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if they are invited after a random selection, as opposed to public registration.* H6: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics when there is a greater number of participants.* H7: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if they get to take part in a deliberative process* H8: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if they receive financial compensation.* H9: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if it takes place during a weekend, as opposed to a weekday.* H10: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if it involves secret votes as opposed to public votes.*

Table 4.1: Overview of hypotheses

5 Data and Research Design

5.1 Data

In this section, I introduce the two datasets utilised in the analysis, namely the DEMOVATE data and the Norwegian Citizen Panel. Subsequently, I introduce the variables that will be used as potential determinants of participation in mini-publics, and the operationalisation of said variables.

5.1.1 DEMOVATE Data

My first dataset contains survey data collected by Respons Analyse on behalf of NORCE and DEMOVATE[9], in the time-period of December 16th to January 13th in 2020. 900 respondents above the age of 18 were interviewed over telephone with the purpose of preparing for upcoming mini-publics, where residents of Bergen are invited to have their say on selected issues that concern the city's population and politicians. This survey served as support in order to determine which issues were to be addressed in said mini-public, and how the event would to be organised. The dataset includes information regarding the respondents' demographic backgrounds, their level political satisfaction, and ultimately, the results from a survey embedded conjoint experiment. The survey experiment involved presenting respondents with different variants of democracy events to measure whether certain variants are better suited to increase participation. However, rather than the more commonly used choice-based design, the experiment's design is ratings-based, whereas the respondents were presented with one profile at a time, and then asked whether or not they would have participated. Arnesen, Johannesson and Linde (2019, 185) argues that the ratings-based design is a more accurate approximate of the circumstance we wish to study. Thus, when analysing the results, these evaluations functions as the dependent variable in a regression analysis, whereas the attributes of the citizens' panel functions as the independent variables.

Each profile were different variants of a mini-public, in order to measure whether certain variants are better suited to either increase participation or the legitimacy of the event among the citizens. The description of the citizen panel varies somewhat between the different respondents, but all descriptions fit the definition of a mini-public. Simultaneously, in order to gather more observations, the experiment in the DEMOVATE survey was conducted three

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[9] This project is presented in chapter 2.3.2

times on each respondent, so each dataset contains unique information about individuals' attitudes to participation in mini-publics. Furthermore, a randomised half of the sample were asked how much emphasize they think should be put on the results from the citizens' panel when politicians make decisions, and the other half were asked about the probability of them participating in a hypothetical mini-public. Therefore, I will utilise the DEMOVATE data in order to measure citizens' willingness to participate in mini-publics as it is a unique study of citizens' opinions on mini-publics and contains extensive background information on the respondents.

5.1.2 The Norwegian Citizen Panel

As the DEMOVATE dataset contains 900 respondents (Arnesen, Fimreite and Aars 2020), I will conduct an additional analysis on supplementary data provided by round 18 of Norsk Medborgerpanel (The Norwegian Citizen Panel/NCP). The implementation of a dataset with a larger N will be beneficial for the OLS analysis. The NCP is an internet-based survey administered by the Digital Social Science Core Facility (DIGSSCORE) established in 2013, which maps out the attitudes of Norwegians regarding important social issues and represents the views of 12727 individuals (The Norwegian Citizen Panel 2020). Thus, the sample in the NCP data is representative of the population, which in this case is Norway in general. I use this additional dataset with the intention of improving the representativeness of the analysis, as it contains a larger N, improving external validity. This will be further elaborated in chapter 5.5.1 (Gerring 2012, 363, 365).

The NCP participants represent a cross- section of the Norwegian population who are invited to answer an online questionnaire on a regular basis[10], and the main themes of these questionnaires are trust and political participation, climate and environment, and diversity and welfare. The participants are randomly selected from the National Population Register, and are invited by email three times a year to respond to online surveys developed by Norwegian and international researchers (Universitetet i Bergen 2020). The derivable information from the NCP dataset is largely consistent to the DEMOVATE data, as it contains information about respondent demography and political trust levels. In addition, the NCP survey data contains an analogous survey experiment, performed on a handful of participants.

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[10] The analysis will be supported by Medborgerpanelet round 18, collected in June, 2020.

The main difference between the two experiments is the amount of hypothetical mini-publics the participants are exposed to, whereas participants in the NCP survey are introduced to only one hypothetical mini-public with randomised variables, while the DEMOVATE experiment was conducted three times with the same participants in order to generate more observations. In other words, respondents in the NCP survey calculated their probability of participation on behalf of one hypothetical mini-public with a given composition, while the participants in the DEMOVATE survey stated the probability of their participation three times in accordance with three individual hypothetical citizens' panels. The NCP dataset can be used parallelly to the DEMOVATE dataset in the analysis, as it contains the same information about citizens beyond the borders of Bergen, and a larger N, which may in turn enhance the validity of the analysis as more evidence is available (Gerring 2012, 364).

5.2 Dependent variable

In order to measure citizens' willingness to participate in mini-publics, the results from the experiment will function as the dependent variable, specifically, those respondents who were asked about the probability of their willingness to participate in mini-publics. As mentioned, in the DEMOVATE survey, a total of 900 respondents were interviewed, and among those, 441 were asked about their wish to participate in mini-publics (Arnesen and Instebø 2020). These 441 respondents were asked the following question: "Bergen municipality has decided to implement so-called citizen panels in the future. This is a project where a group of residents in the municipality are invited to discuss and form an opinion on a political issue. I will read out some ways this citizen panel can be implemented, and would like to know how likely it is that you would have participated if it was implemented as I describe it" (my translation). In the NCP survey however, among 12727 respondents, a total of 1648 respondents were asked the following question: "We now want to hear your opinion on the use of so-called citizen panels in Norwegian municipalities. This is a scheme where a group of residents in the municipality are invited to discuss and form an opinion on a political issue. We now present a way in which the citizens' panel can be carried out, and ask you to decide whether you would have participated if it had been carried out as we describe" (translation from NCP codebook).

The description of the hypothetical mini-public that followed was based on randomly drawn attributes which are presented in Table 5.2. As mentioned, the participants in the DEMOVATE

experiment were presented with three hypothetical mini-publics with varying compositions. This randomisation when assigning attributes fulfils the assumption of the conjoint design by guaranteeing that the respondent's possible choice patterns are never correlated with the profiles they view in the experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2013, 9). As a result, the dataset includes three individual variables of likelihood of participation. As I wish to focus on the respondents' demographic backgrounds and political satisfaction, I only choose one of the experiments in my analysis. While the experiment variables vary, the respondent's background does not, and since the experiment variables are randomised and expected to be evenly distributed regardless of which experiment variant chosen, it is arguably of little importance which one is chosen to be utilised as dependent variable.

In the DEMOVATE study, respondents were asked to state the probability of their participation ranging from zero percent to a hundred percent. On the other hand, the respondents in the NCP survey were asked how likely is it that they would have participated in a mini-public on a scale from 0 to 10, whereas 0 states that the respondent certainly would not have participated, and 10 states that the respondent certainly would have participated. The dependent variable in the DEMOVATE dataset has been recoded to range from 1 to 10, as it allows for more intelligible graphic illustrations, and eases interpretation as both dependent variables are categorical. I do find that the data suffers from somewhat of an abnormal distribution of the observations, which also serves as a supporting argument for recoding. The frequency distribution of the DEMOVATE variable is illustrated in Figure 5.1, displaying an uneven distribution, whereas a substantial majority of the respondents were sceptical about participating in a mini-public. On the other hand. Figure 5.2 illustrates the frequency distribution of the NCP variable, displaying more evenly distributed preferences of participation, whereas the majority of the respondents answered that they certainly would have attended. It is important to take into account that the respondents in the NCP survey have already signed up and agreed to participate in NCP surveys, and we can assume that these respondents are more prone to express their opinions than the NCP respondents who were called without an advance notice

Respondent distribution on dependent variable, DEMOVATE

Legend:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

10.73%
2.08%
5.88%
6.92%
3.11%
12.46%
5.19%
6.92%
5.54%
41.18%

Figure 5.1: Distribution of the respondents' willingness to participate in citizens' panel, unweighted DEMOVATE data. Source: Arnesen, Fimreite and Aars (2020).

Respondent distribution on dependent variable, NCP

Legend:
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

17.42%
5.89%
12.38%
9.41%
5.16%
13.23%
4.43%
7.1%
6.25%
4.67%
14.08%

Figure 5.2: Distribution of the respondents' willingness to participate in citizens' panel, unweighted NCP data. Source: Norwegian Citizen Panel (2020), wave 18.

5.3 Operationalization of Explanatory Variables

In this chapter, I present the independent variables utilised in the analysis that will function as explanations of unconventional participation. The variables to be employed are levels political satisfaction, social class, income level, educational levels, age and gender. As there is some inconsistency between the two datasets regarding levels of measurement on the variables, I consider it appropriate to execute the analysis twice, once with each individual dataset, rather than recoding each variable to the same levels of measurements. I do this to avoid misinterpretations of the results, and the potential loss of information as a consequence of placing respondents into categories that may not be truly representative of their opinions. As a consequence, this entails slightly greater challenges when results are to be presented graphically. Both datasets have been harmonised, so that the variables measure correlations in the same direction. The variable measuring satisfaction with the political system in the NCP data originally measured satisfaction on a scale from 1-5, where 1 indicated high satisfaction and 5 indicated low satisfaction. However, in the DEMOVATE data, satisfaction increases parallelly as the value increases in the variable, whereas 1 indicates low satisfaction and 5 indicates high satisfaction. Thus, the variable in the NCP data is recoded to match the measures of the DEMOVATE data. This direction also had to be reversed in the age variable, where an increasing value in the age variable in the NCP data set indicated decreasing age,

Political Satisfaction

Chapter 3 starts off by describing external efficacy as a system-oriented sense of efficacy and political satisfaction and is conceptualised as the belief that the political system is working in accordance with one's expectation of how it is supposed to function (Miller 1974, 989). In order to measure the individuals' level of external political efficacy, I use a variable measuring the respondents' satisfaction with the political system. I have included differing variables from the two datasets in the analyses. From the NCP survey, I have included a variable whereas respondents were asked to rate to which degree they feel the political system allows them to influence their local authorities. The respondents of the DEMOVATE survey were asked: *To what extent would you say that the political system in Bergen gives people like you influence the local authorities?* and were requested to place themselves on a scale from 0 to 10, ranging from "not at all" to "fully and completely". However, due to a lack of observations, this variable

has been recoded, ranging from 0-10 to 1-5, where respondents who ranked their levels of satisfaction from 0-2 were recoded to rank 1, 3-4 as rank 2, 5 as rank 3, 6-7 as rank 4, and finally 8-10 as rank 5.

On the other hand, although the same question was included in the NCP survey, only a small sample of the respondents were asked the question, and the inclusion of said variable in the multivariate analysis dramatically reduced the number of observations. In order to maintain the advantage to using a larger dataset, an alternative variable was included instead functioning as a replacement, which was democratic satisfaction. Respondents were asked: *How satisfied are you with the way in which democracy works in Norway?* and to place themselves on a scale from 1 to 5 ranging from "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied". The following interpretation will take into account the reduced comparability of these different indicators of democratic satisfaction[11]. As the function of multivariate regression is to control for possible confounders, rather than excluding a central explanatory variable in the field of political participation, this alternative variable provides us with a general overview of the respondents' attitude towards the political system as a whole. While the DEMOVATE variable measures the respondents' own perceived ability to genuinely influence local authorities, the NCP variable will measure how satisfied the respondents are with democracy in general.

Education

According to the theory on political participation, formal education is arguably the strongest predictor of political engagement, as it enhances cognitive skills, verbal competence and encourages civic participation, in turn enhancing internal political efficacy (Sunshine 2005, 27; Denny and Doyle 2008, 293). A concrete conceptualisation of the concept of trust can be found in chapter three. Based on the claims by scholars such as La Due Lak and Huckfeldt (1998), Sunshine (2005) and Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) of the positive correlation between higher educational levels and political participation, I have included the individual's level of education as an explanatory variable in the analysis (La Due Lak and Huckfeldt 1998, 567). In the NCP dataset, educational levels are measured on a scale from one to eleven, ranging from "no education", to "university 5-6 year education". Meanwhile, the DEMOVATE variable is on a scale from one to four, ranging from "no education" to "a university/college degree of more than two years". Based on the argument by Krosnick (1990) presented in chapter 3.2.1, I

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[11] See Linde and Ekman (2003).

have chosen to dichotomise the education variable, either as no higher education (0) or higher education (1). As the theory states that individuals with higher levels of formal education are more likely to form political preferences than those who are least educated, I am theoretically interested in this particular divide, and not necessarily the divide between vocational or general fields of study.

Socioeconomic Status

Rather than combining aspects of socioeconomic status such as income, occupation and social class, I have chosen to treat them as separate dimensions relating to social stratification (Rose, Harrison and Pevalin 2009, 3). Thus, in order to measure the respondents' socioeconomic status, I rely on the following independent variables: social class and annual income.

Social class

In order to appropriately measure the respondents' levels of internal political efficiency, I have included the social class variable whereas respondents were asked the following question: *We sometimes talk about whether or not there are different social groups or classes. If you were to place yourself in such a social class, which one would it be?* The class ranking in both datasets is divided into six categories, ranging from lower class, lower middle class, middle class, upper middle class, upper middle class, and finally, upper class. Due to lack of observations in the highest and lowest levels of social class, the different classes have been merged into three categories where level one consists of the lower class and lower middle class, level two of the middle class and upper middle class, and ultimately, level three of upper middle class and upper class.

The concept of individuals being assorted into distinct social classes, as well as its analytical utilisation has been victim of dispute. As there is no scholarly agreement on the division of social classes, we do not necessarily share a universal understanding of the prerequisites for class-membership. As a consequence, social classes are flawed reflections of socioeconomic status, as people with identical levels of income and the same occupation could have different understandings of 'working class' and 'middle class', thus identifying themselves with different social classes. Andersen (1984, 243) argues that social class is gradually losing its significance as a determinant of political participation (Walsh et al. 2004, 472). Despite this, the variable might still contribute as a decent indicator of the individuals' subjective views of their status.

Annual income levels

As the theory indicates a positive relationship between income levels and political participation, the analysis will include a variable regarding the respondents' levels of annual income. 150,000 Norwegian Kroner, (NOK), to more than NOK 1 million. Income levels are measured by asking respondents about their current annual income, whereas respondents are asked: *What is your current income?* Both surveys utilised an eight-point scale, ranging from up to NOK 150 000 to more than NOK 1 million. As stated by Piff, Kraus and Keltner (2018, 54-55), one may often find that people are hesitant to share personal information regarding their wealth, occupational prestige and accomplishments, and it may be regarded a taboo subject for many. Therefore, I expect that these variables will to some extent contain fewer respondents than the other variables.

5.4 Control variables

Age

Firstly, age is included as a control variable in the analysis as it is a factor that have had a significant explanatory factor in previous studies[12]. In both datasets, the respondents' age is split into age groups. In the DEMOVATE dataset, respondent age is split into four groups, ranging from under 30 years, 30-44 years, 45-59 years, and 60 years or above. Meanwhile, respondents in the NCP dataset are split into seven groups, ranging from 30 years or younger, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70, 71-80, and ultimately, 81 or older.

Gender

The second control variable, and final variable of the analysis, will control for the respondents' gender. Based on the theoretical framework and previous research in the field, the relationship between gender and political participation is affected by time and location and could provide interesting results to the analysis. In both datasets, gender is turned into a dummy-variable, whereas 0 indicates male and 1 indicates female. For a clear overview of the operationalization of the individual-level explanatory variables, please refer to Table 5.1

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[12] See Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980).

	DEMOVATE data				NCP data			
	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max
External political efficacy								
Political Satisfaction	2.75	2.36	1	5	3.77	0.83	1	5
Internal political efficacy								
Educational level	0.72	0.97	0	1	0.54	0.49	0	1
Income level	4.52	2.02	1	8	4.52	1.99	1	8
Social class	1.98	0.53	1	3	2.02	0.58	1	3
Control variables								
Age group	1.98	1.10	1	4	3.73	1.66	1	7
Gender	0.46	0.50	0	1	0.49	0.50	0	1

Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of individual-level variables

5.5 Structural Features

When investigating consumer preferences in conjoint analyses, Wittink and Cattin (1989, 46) emphasises the need to incorporate those attributes most important to potential consumers, which can also be manipulated by the producers. In chapter 4.4.3, it is found that in mini-publics, structural attributes such as the number of participants, the day of the event, the form of recruitment, financial compensation, decisional basis and the potential publication of votes as crucial factors for potential participation. All these are included in both datasets, and they are nearly identical with the only exception being the case to be discussed in the mini-publics, which is exclusive to the DEMOVATE survey- and described only in the NCP survey as a major housing project in the respondent's municipality and does not function as a variable in the analysis, as these questions were included in DEMOVATE survey to determine which cases should be included in future mini-publics. These traits will function as independent variables in the conjoint analysis, whereas the respondents' likelihood of participation functions as the dependent variable. After the initial conjoint analysis has been presented, the subset analysis will follow whereas the MMs are calculated for each subgroup. A clear overview of the available structural composition traits used as independent variables in the conjoint analyses is presented in Table 5.2, with the exception of financial compensation. This has been recoded to represent the division between receiving and not receiving financial compensation for participation. Rather than investigating which the level of financial compensation cultivates

participation, we are more interested in finding out whether compensation in general is a decisive factor for encouraging participation in mini-publics.

Variable	Value	
Number of Participants	-	12
	-	100
	-	300
Day	-	Weekday
	-	Weekend
Form of Recruitment	-	Registration is open to all residents of the municipality until it is full
	-	The participants are drawn at random among all the inhabitants of the municipality
Compensation	-	No compensation
	-	Compensation of NOK 200 per hour
	-	Compensation of NOK 500 per hour
	-	Compensation of NOK 1000 per hour
		(Recoded to no compensation/compensation for analysis)
Decisional Basis	-	Own assessments and preferences
	-	Credible information from independent experts
	-	Exchange of views between the participants in small groups, where the discussion is led by independent moderators
Publication	-	Who participated in the citizens' panel and how they voted will be public
	-	Who participated in the citizens' panel and how they voted will not be public
Case *(DEMOVATE survey only)*	-	Housing construction on Store Lungegårdsvann
	-	Ban on begging in Bergen
	-	Implementation of tourist tax

Table 5.2: Experimental stimuli randomly inserted in vignette text, and overview of structural-level variables.

5.6 Methodological Approach

The aim of this chapter is to present the research design and the methodological approach that will be utilised in order to answer the research question. In order to test whether the traditionally claimed sources of internal political efficacy, education and socioeconomic status, affects the wish to participate in mini-publics, I use an OLS-regression. The second part is more exploratory, as I test out new explanations in a relatively new territory (Gerring 2012, 28). I do this by performing a conjoint analysis, where a wide range of potential structural compositions of a mini-public is included to control for their influence on the willingness to participate. Once

the choice of research methods has been introduced and justified, there will be a subsequent presentation of the cross-sectional data used in said analysis. Subsequently, the data and its measurement are presented, with a clarification of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables used to measure the individual's inclination to participate in mini-publics.

5.5.6 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Cross-Sectional Data

Quantitative research is the leading methodological approach used by scholars when studying voting behaviour (Dean 2003, 45), and it is also the analytical approach best suited for answering the research question, as the goal of my analysis is to draw inferences on behalf of the sample to the general public. It is the best equipped method for processing large amounts of data and in turn, generalising the results. By encompassing as many phenomena as possible, the analysis will provide us with more information about the world (Bryman 2008, 156; Gerring 2012, 62). In order to take a closer look at the relationship between individuals' levels of political efficacy and their willingness to participate in mini-publics, I carry out a multivariate analysis by utilizing cross-sectional survey data. The multivariate regression is the most common statistical technique when there is a set of two of more independent variables. This allows me to analyse the data across units and examine the variation between individuals in the dependent variable and provides a complete and comprehensive image of the circumstance (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, 95; Midtbø 2012, 97).

Often referred to as a survey design, the cross-sectional analysis is the study of the population at a single point in time and is highly useful when studying the association and correlation between variables of individual, also described as taking a "snapshot" of a group of individuals (McMillan and McLean 2009, 128; Carlson and Morrison 2009, 77). This approach allows me to examine under what conditions we can expect an individual to be inclined to participate in mini-publics and is also the most relevant design when assessing the prevalence of attitudes. Cross-sectional analyses also often benefit from strong external validity, when the sample from which data is collected has been selected randomly (Carlson and Morrison 2009, 77). However, this snapshot of society is claimed by Ringdal (2007, 128) to be a weakness of the cross-sectional as it is unsuitable for making conclusions about processes that unfold over time (Ringdal 2007, 128).

Regressions re sensitive to the variables that are included in it. To avoid multicollinearity, which reduces any single independent variable's predictive power by the extent to which it is associated with the other independent variables, regression will be best when each independent variable is strongly correlated with the dependent variable but uncorrelated with other independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 2006, 122). In order to be able to draw credible conclusions from the OLS, the models should comply to certain assumptions (Hair, Black and Babin 2010, 71; Hermansen 2019, 167). Skog (2004, 237) highlights that the residuals in the regression models should be homoscedastic, independent, and normally distributed. Secondly, the relationship between the variables must be linear. This will be further discussed when the results are presented in chapter 6 (Midtbø 2012, 105-106).

5.5.7 Conjoint analysis

The theoretical framework and previous findings illustrate a relationship between levels of external political efficacy and institutional structures, such as electoral systems and the value of voting, and it is therefore appropriate to examine whether this assumption can be applied to participation in mini-publics. Therefore, several conjoint analyses are executed in order to investigate whether, and how, the structural composition of mini-publics affects the individual's inclination to participate. They will also be carried out for each subgroup of individual-level determinants which will provide us with a detailed overview of the relationship between likelihood of participation and structural composition, in accordance with subgroup affiliation. It also allows us to study how certain structural compositions can promote or inhibit participation for specific social groups, and infer subgroup differences in preferences toward particular features, and model comparisons to infer subgroup differences across many features (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020, 216).

Also known as factorial survey experiments and vignette analysis, the conjoint analysis can be described as a hybrid type of multivariate techniques for estimating conditions. Described as a robust method for generating preferences regarding multidimensional objects, the conjoint analysis has become a common tool when studying preferences, as it combines the traditional regression analysis, but stands out as it is able to estimate results for each respondent separately (Bansak et al. 2018, 113). This provides us with which an analytical tool that is capable of helping us understand choices and preference structures, combining the internal validity of experiments with the external validity of representative surveys (Hair, Black and Babin 2010,

272; Arnesen, Johannesson and Linde 2019, 185). Conjoint experiments were first introduced in the early 1970s and are widely used in marketing in order to measure consumer preferences (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014, 2). The two main goals of a conjoint analysis are claimed to be to assess causal effects and describe consumer-preferences. As stated by McCullough (2002, 19), the term has it's supposed origin from the words "considered jointly", which illustrates the foundational objective of the technique. In traditional choice-based conjoint design, participants are faced with a choice between profiles, listing a range of attributes whereas the level for each attribute in each profile is randomly assigned. The respondent must then consider jointly all the attributes of a profile. In the study of consumer preferences, the purpose of conjoint analyses is to find the combination of attributes that provides the consumer the most utility, and to determine the relevance of characteristic attribute combination that gives the consumer the most utility and to determine the relevance of characteristics in regard to their total utility, so the best product profile can be identified (Murphy et al. 2000, 3). In this case however, numerous aspects of mini-publics were evaluated in order to determine the optimal structure to elicit interest of participation.

When conducting a conjoint experiment, the researcher must take several points into consideration. This includes the number of attributes that are to be included in the experiment, to achieve enough observations, and ultimately, how the data is to be analysed. The last point is commonly done by estimating the average marginal component effects (AMCEs), whereas the marginal effect of one attribute is averaged over the joint distribution of other attributes (McCullough 2002, 19; Leeper et al. 2020, 209; Knudsen and Johannesson 2018, 262-265). AMCEs have clear causal interpretations, however, many chooses to use AMCEs to describe preferences, often resulting in comparisons of AMCEs between respondent subgroups. However, Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2020, 207-208) argues that the descriptive use of conditional AMCEs can be significantly deceiving about the levels of agreement or disagreement between the subgroups. The reference category used in the regression analysis can strongly affect interactions, which in turn leads to inconsistent sign, size and significance on inferences of subgroup preferences. They further argue that comparing AMCEs does not provide us with inference into differences between subgroups' favourability toward a conjoint feature, and by using differences in AMCEs rather than marginal means (MMs), the size of the subgroup differences along with its direction can be misleading. In addition, they argue that all of the information offered by AMCEs is produced by mms, and more (Leeper, Hobolt and and Tilley 2020, 208). To prevent the misinterpretation of differences between subgroups, I have

chosen to analyse the data by estimating the MMs rather than AMCEs, which represent the mean outcome across all appearances of a particular conjoint feature level, averaging across all other features (Cran.R 2020).

There are several potential pitfalls to be aware of when executing a conjoint analysis. Most commonly, the method has raised concerns about the validity of its conclusions, as what people state in surveys may differ from actual decisions. This concern is similar to the concern that there may be certain attitudes that cannot be communicated through ranking or rating alternatives. Conjoint survey experiments have also been accused of making the assignment difficult for the respondent, as they must consider several factors at once. And lastly, several scholars are also concerned with the significant computer programming required to conduct a conjoint analysis, and researchers may lack sufficient resources or background to implement the design (Hainmueller et al. 2014, 27; Green and Srinivasan 1978, 108).

Nevertheless, the popularity of conjoint designs is increasing because of its advantages. First of all, it allows researchers to test a large number of causal hypotheses in a single study, making it a cost-effective alternative to traditional survey experiments. This is because it allows the researcher to include more factors to study multidimensional choices, without having to test one isolated factor at a time and is cost effective. Compared to the traditional survey experiment, conjoint design's strengths lie in its capacity to include more factors and to study multidimensional choices (Knudsen and Johannesson 2019, 260-261; Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014, 1-3). There are also reasons to believe that conjoint analysis is the superior survey experiment with regards to external validity, as it may capture the decision-making process in information-rich environments more efficiently than traditional survey experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014, 27).

5.7 Data Considerations

Good data is a prerequisite of useful results, and therefore, it must meet certain criteria in order to ensure its quality. Grønmo (2004, 217) highlights these prerequisites the demand for reliability and validity.

5.7.1 Reliability and Validity

Reliability is conceptualised as the extent to which the analysis will produce similar results in different circumstances. In other words, its repeatability and accuracy (Grønmo 2004, 224, 220; van Thiel 2014, 48; Bryman 2008, 149). The extensive employment of survey data has left a critical research issue regarding measurement errors that has the potential of biasing estimates. Surveys are one of the most influential means of data collection of opinion, and the effects of measurement error could potentially be considerable (Kaiser 2019, 1602).

According to Biemer et al. (1991, xvii), survey measurement error refers to error in survey responses arising from the respondent, or the questionnaire. It could potentially be a result of respondent confusion or dishonesty, or an error with the interviewer, and all these factors may intervene and interact to degrade response accuracy. For instance, it is mentioned that explanatory variables such as respondents' self-reported levels of income may suffer from hesitation to share personal information regarding wealth (Piff, Kraus and Keltner 2018, 54-55). It must therefore be taken into account that levels of wealth could be regarded as a delicate topic for some, and some respondents may not answer truthfully. In addition, Collins (1996, 3) states that the respondents answer depends on their understanding of terms such as 'income', 'net' and 'gross'. It is also taken into account that individuals tend to regard themselves as belonging to the middle of the social hierarchy, regardless of their objective placement. Additionally, new forms of social stratification are emerging, and the division of individuals into social classes has been deemed an increasingly outworn concept, as major social changes have occurred since the writings of Marx (Evans and Kelley 2004, 3; Clark and Lipset 1991, 397, 401). There are no clear guidelines for the requirements for the various social classes, and thus several respondents may have placed themselves in a social class to which they do not actually belong.

I will also take into account the arguments of Linde and Ekman (2003, 406) who highlights the need for multiple indicators for each level of support in order to connect survey items the political support. They state that only with multiple indicators are we truly able to assess the validity and reliability of a measurement of the popular belief in the democratic legitimacy. However, the variables are chosen on behalf of previous research and traditional theories of political participation, and the variable will be implemented order to attain a general sense of the respondents' attitudes towards how the current political system works, although with an

awareness of its insufficient measure. Additionally, according to Karp and Milazzo (2015, 100), measuring political satisfaction with such variables nevertheless captures attitudes towards democratic practices and performance.

In addition, I argue that although I am unable to conduct an assessment of reliability such as the test-retest method, or the intersubjectivity method, I partially check the robustness by conducting the same analysis on two sets of data measuring the same phenomenon. This allows me to compare the results of from each dataset, and check for continuity (Grønmo 2004, 224). Additionally, both datasets contain data collected by legitimate sources, and although some variables were recoded to better fit my research, recoding has been kept to a minimum.

Validity regards the validity of the data material for the research question that is to be answered. Internal validity refers to the connection between the conceptualisation and the operationalization of the problem, for example, how one has proceeded to measure the phenomenon one is investigating (Grønmo 2004, 221). As both analyses are based on surveys conducted at a single point in time with randomly selected participants, the validity is not particularly exposed to sources of error as a result of maturation, selection, or participant withdrawal. However, a researcher would like to be able to say that X is the cause of Y, while in reality, such conclusions must be drawn with clear reservations as other influential variables may have created the effect on Y (Ringdal 2018, 131). Although the variables included in the analysis are carefully selected on the premise on previous research in the well-established field of political participation research, I take into account that there is little to no existing research on to which degree the existing theory of political participation can be sufficiently applied to explain participation in mini-publics. Therefore, I cannot state with full certainty that all possible explanations are covered in the analysis.

As the analysis is conducted on behalf of survey-generated data which has subtracted probability samples from a population, I also emphasise the demand for external validity. The most important criterion of external validity is sample representativeness, which indicates whether the results can be generalised to the actual population and are not valid solely under artificial circumstances of research (Grønmo 2004, 233; Gerring 2012, 85). As the sample in both datasets is drawn randomly from a larger population, the generalisation of the analysis is enhanced if the sample is as similar as possible to the population (Gerring 2012, 86-87; Hoyle et al. 2001, 42).

We can observe some skewness in the representation of educational levels, whereas 71% of the DEMOVATE sample has obtained higher education in contrast to the actual 44.1% of the population in Bergen. The NCP data suffers the same, whereas 62.5% of the sample has obtained higher education, contrasting to the 34.6% of the general Norwegian population. However, external validity can be improved by increasing the N in the sample. If the main goal of the sample is to be representative to the population, a large N is beneficial. It also means that more evidence is available to test a given hypothesis, providing insurance against errors caused by the presence of random variation (Gerring 2012, 365). Therefore, the implementation of a dataset with greater N is advantageous as it potentially improves generalisability. Please refer to Appendix C, tables C1, C2 and C3, for a clear overview of the distribution in the samples compared to the actual distribution in both populations. The tables indicate that both datasets score fairly well regarding demographic representation of their population.

Another concern regarding the study's external validity takes into consideration the number of attributes included in the conjoint analysis. As mentioned in chapter 5.5.7, it is important to consider the number of characteristics used to characterise each profile, as having too many could potentially lower the levels of external validity, as respondents could feel overwhelmed (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2013, 9). Bansak et al. (2018, 118) reported that choice tasks with up to 30 characteristics do not lead to substantial changes in the assessment of relative importance, nor do either of the two survey experiments included in the study surpass this number.

5.7.2 Weights

As we are on the subject of validity and reliability, it is appropriate to address the issue of weighting data. Although the respondents in both surveys were recruited through random sampling, somewhat of a skewed subgroup distribution is observed when compared to the population. In both cases, the most evident example is the skewed distribution between higher educated individuals and those with no higher education (Skjervheim et al 2020, 12). The ideal survey sample is one that is truly representative for the rest of the population, and the generalisability of experimental findings depends crucially on the population studied, however, true generalisability can only be accomplished by studying the entire population. As this is often unrealistic, numerous scholars recommend the implementation of weights when using survey data. Numerous scholars claim that by applicating weights in the analysis we can correct for

disproportionality with respect to the target population, and to improve the quality and analytic strength of survey data (Pfeffermann 1993, 317; Mutz 2011, 112).

Both the DEMOVATE and NCP data includes weights, however, I have chosen to execute the regression with unweighted variables in the main text, as there is some disagreement about its benefits. Weighting related to multivariate analysis demands cautionary use in order to avoid unintended impacts (Gelman 2007, 163). Although weighting is a useful technique in estimating population quantities, it can potentially introduce bias and also be used as a researcher degree of freedom (Franco et al. 2017, 161). There are legitimate reasons for applying weighting techniques in the context of a survey experiment, and there are also reasons for not using them. Although the OLS regressions are conducted with unweighted data, the weighted estimates are also reported in Appendix D, Table D1 and D2.

5.8 Layout of Analysis

The analytical presentation will be twofold in accordance with the research question, as it incorporates two parts: (1) What are the determinants of individuals' inclination to participate in mini-publics, and (2) how does the structural composition of the mini-publics affect individuals' inclination to participate according to their affiliation to societal subgroups? Existing research and previous literature served as the decisional basis for the selection of independent variables, with the ultimate goal of making inquiries into the driving forces behind the dependent variable, specifically the wish to participate in mini-publics. Emphasis has been placed on the division between internal and external levels of political efficacy as explanatory factors of political participation, this chapter will present the results in which these dimensions were used as explanatory factors for the inclination to participate in mini-publics (Powell 1986, Verba and Nie 1972; Pettersen and Rose 1996).

Before the results from the OLS-regressions on the DEMOVATE and NCP data are presented, their diagnostics are inspected. Subsequently, the results are presented parallelly, where the results from both samples are presented simultaneously rather than separately. As mentioned in chapter 4.5, although political satisfaction functions as a measure of external political efficacy, it is presented alongside the other individual-level determinants, and a distinction is rather made between determinants at the individual level and the structural level. In order to clarify the correlations within the data, illustrative plots of the bivariate conditions will be presented as the

results are introduced. Secondly, the conjoint analyses are presented, addressing the relationship between the wish to participate in mini-publics based on their structural composition. The structural attributes are the recruitment form, number of participants, decisional basis, financial compensation, the time of the event and ultimately and the public/secret vote. Finally, in order to get a further insight into how various subgroup affiliations react to certain structural attributes, additional conjoint analyses are presented.

6 Results

6.1 Individual-Level Determinants

Hypotheses were generated by using assumptions from previous work, and as expressed in H1, H2 and H3, I anticipate that individuals with higher levels of socioeconomic status and education are more inclined to participate than those at the lower levels. I also expect higher levels of satisfaction with the political system to be negatively correlated with the likelihood to participate. The regression coefficients are presented in Table 6.1, however, before discussing the outcomes, a few comments regarding model diagnostics are required.

6.1.1 OLS- Assumptions

The purpose of this section is to outline to which degree both models in Table 6.1 satisfies the requirements of an OLS-regression. After running model diagnostics, no results indicate that we should be concerned about the validity of the models. The Breusch-Pagan tests illustrated in appendix B, Table B1 and B2, suggests that both models are homoscedastic as they show a p-value above 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity as both datasets had a insignificant p-value (Midtbø 2012, 106- 109; Hair, Black and Babin 2010, 74). Although the assumption of non-correlated residuals is more pertinent in time series and panel analyses where units are arranged in terms of time, autocorrelation can occur within groups of units, and was also controlled for in the data (Midtbø 2012, 112). By applying the Durbin-Watson test, the tables included in appendix B, Table B3 and B4, illustrate that the D-W in both models were close to 2, with scores of 1.9 in both models. This suggests that the residuals are independent from each other, and that there is no autocorrelation in the models employed (Fomby and Guilkey 1978, 203). The third and final residual-specific assumption presumes that the residuals are normally distributed and is tested by constructing histograms and Quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plots shown in appendix B, Figure B5 and B6. The graphs demonstrates that the assumption of normality is not necessarily fulfilled in the DEMOVATE data, however, the presupposition of normality is not particularly important, and is perhaps also superfluous, and has been described as the least important of the regression assumptions. Logit and squaring of variables were attempted in order to increase normality but was shown to have no effects (Midbtø 2012, 106, 114).

The assumption of linearity is assessed by a residuals vs. fitted plot in appendix B, in Figure B7 and B8, which shows that linearity holds reasonably well in both models. The distribution of the residuals follow somewhat of a pattern as several key variables are categorial (Hermansen 2019, 178; Hair, Black and Babin 2010, 76). Finally, the data is controlled for multicollinearity. A suitable measure of multicollinearity is VIF (Variance Inflation Factor), where the higher the values, the higher the multicollinearity. It is difficult to determine what is too much multicollinearity, but according to a rule of thumb, VIF greater than 10 is problematic. Therefore, we can conclude that our data does not suffer from multicollinearity, as the VIF scores of all variables in both datasets does not exceed a score of 1 (Midtbø 2012, 129). An overview of all VIF scores can be found in appendix B, Table B9 and B10.

	Dependent variable:		
	Willingness to participate in mini-public		
Model 1:		**Model 2:**	
DEMOVATE data		**NCP data**	
(Intercept)	7.103***	(Intercept)	6.976***
	(1.174)		(0.601)
Age group	-0.338**	Age group	-0.230***
	(0.164)		(0.055)
Gender	-0.200	Gender	-0.224
	(0.365)		(0.189)
Educational level	-0.047	Educational level	-0.008
	(0.450)		(0.198)
Income level	-0.154	Income level	0.034
	(0.101)		(0.051)
Social class	-1.039***	Social class	0.371**
	(0.359)		(0.167)
Political satisfaction	0.396**	Political satisfaction	-0.315***
	(0.184)		(0.110)
Constant	6.575***	Constant	6.790***
	(0.973)		(0.543)
Observations	307	Observations	1.453
R^2	0.083	R^2	0.020
Adjusted R^2	0.064	Adjusted R^2	0.016
Residual Std. Error	3.094 (df = 300)	Residual Std. Error	3.411 (df = 1446)
F Statistic	4.496*** (df = 6; 300)	F Statistic	4.841*** (df = 6; 1446)
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Table 6.1: Regression result from DEMOVATE and NCP data. Standard errors are presented in brackets.

6.1.2 Educational levels- DEMOVATE and NCP

Figure 6.1 illustrates that the distribution of the two subgroups of education variable is generally more evenly distributed in the NCP data than in the DEMOVATE data, which may explain why the effect is slightly weaker, as there is an overrepresentation of individuals with higher education in the DEMOVATE data.

Figure 6.1: Barcharts displaying the distribution of the respondents' likelihood to participate in mini-publics according to subgroups of educational level, DEMOVATE data


Figure 6.2: Barcharts displaying the distribution of the respondents' likelihood to participate in mini-publics according to subgroups of educational level, NCP data

The regression results in Table 6.1 indicates that there is no statistically significant relationship between educational level and the willingness to participate in mini-publics, however, educational levels are negatively associated with the dependent variable in both regressions. These findings are contrary to findings from previous research, and the hypothesised suggestion in H1, as the numbers indicate that a one unit increase in educational levels leads to a -0.04 unit change in the regression using DEMOVATE data, and a -0 unit change in the regression using NCP data. In other words, these results suggests that the wish to participate in mini-publics slightly decreases when obtaining higher education. As previously mentioned in chapter 5.8.2, the most evident example of skewed distribution in the data concerns the divide between individuals with higher education and those who have no higher education, which could potentially have affected the results.

6.1.3 Socioeconomic Status- DEMOVATE

Moving on the second source of internal political efficacy, namely socioeconomic status, the results presented in Table 6.1 illustrate a consistent negative relationship between socioeconomic status and the dependent variable in the DEMOVATE model. The social class variable indicates a significantly negative correlation with the dependent variable and is in fact the strongest correlation in the entire analysis with a coefficient of -1.03. It is also statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The results in the DEMOVATE analysis suggests that people who identify themselves with a social class of a lower level, are more inclined to participate in mini-publics. This is the strongest correlation found in both regressions, with a 1.03-point reduction in the dependent variable if social class increases by one point. These results are contrary to a broadly accepted relationship in the field of political participation, namely that higher levels of socioeconomic status promote political participation, and these results does not support the expectations from H2. This negative relationship is also illustrated in Figure 6.3, where the respondents who identify themselves as part of the lower class and working class report a higher probability of participation in mini-publics, and the group with the lowest median for participation was the upper middle class and upper class.

DEMOVATE data

Figure 6.3: Distribution of each subgroup of social class and their likelihood to participate in mini-publics, from DEMOVATE data.

Moreover, the negative relationship between socioeconomic status and the willingness to participate remains negative, as income level is found to negatively and non-significantly correlate with hypothetical participation, however, a coefficient of -0.15 implies somewhat of a weak negative effect. This indicates that we cannot assume that higher income levels increase the individual's desire to participate in mini-publics, but rather negatively affects it. This suggests that in the case of the Bergen-specific population, income level cannot be assumed to have a strong influence on the desire to participate, and the results do not support the expectations of H3. The series of boxplots in Figure 6.4 reveals a somewhat uneven distribution of preferences among income levels in the DEMOVATE data. The majority of the boxes are relatively tall in comparison to income level 4 and 8, suggesting that these respondents hold quite different views. The median value of probability of participation appears to be the highest among those respondents who classify in income level 1 and 2 and remains relatively low as income levels rise (with the exception of income level 5). In the boxplots, the box represents the middle 50% scores of the group, and the line dividing the box indicates the median of the data. The upper and lower whiskers represent scores outside the middle 50%.

DEMOVATE data

Figure 6.4: Distribution of each subgroup of income level and their likelihood to participate in mini-publics, from DEMOVATE data. The white dots represent outliers.

6.1.4 Socioeconomic Status- NCP

Moving on to the NCP sample and the relationship between socioeconomic status and the wish to participate, the relationship is found to be positive. The social class variable positively correlates with the dependent variable, with a coefficient of 0.37, and significance level at 5 percent. This suggests that in the NCP sample, higher levels of social class have a positive effect on individuals' willingness to participate in mini-publics. This finding is in line with the broadly accepted relationship in the field of political participation that higher levels of social class promote political participation and is in line with the expectations of H2. The distribution illustrated in the Figure 6.5 appear to support these findings, as the median for likelihood of participation among the various social classes turns increases evenly parallelly with the class level.

NCP data

Figure 6.5: Distribution of each subgroup of social class and their likelihood to participate in mini-publics, from NCP data.

The relationship between income level and the willingness to participate in mini-publics in the NCP data deviates from the DEMOVATE results. Income level has a weak, insignificant correlation with the dependent variable with a coefficient of 0.03. Despite its weak correlation, the relationship is positive, which is in line with the expectations based off of previous research and H3. This finding suggests that in the NCP sample, representing the general population of Norway, individuals who have higher income levels are more likely to be willing to participate in mini-publics. By referring to Figure 6.6, one can assume from the figures that in the NCP data it is those who place themselves at income level 1 and 8 who are most likely to participate in mini-publics, with a median at around 7. The desire to participate reduces as we go from income level 1 to 2, where the median for income level 2-4 stays at 5, but jumps to 6 at income level 5-7, at 6 and ultimately increases back up to 7 at income level 8. There are no obvious differences between the box plots, as they largely remain at the same level.

Figure 6.6: Distribution of each subgroup of income level and their likelihood to participate in mini-publics, from NCP data.

6.1.5 Political Satisfaction – DEMOVATE

Moving on to the final individual-level determinant of the wish to participate, Table 6.1 illustrates a positive relationship between political satisfaction and the dependent variable. The coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that if political satisfaction increases with one point, the likelihood of wishing to participate in mini-publics increases with 0.39 points. This is not in line the theory stating that higher levels satisfaction with the political system decreases the individuals' inclination to participate in political processes, and ultimately does not support the expectations of H4. In Figure 6.7, the correlation between political satisfaction and the likelihood to participate is illustrated, and it is apparent that the group that has reported the highest probability of participation in mini-publics are those who ranked a satisfaction with the political system at level 5, where they fully believe that the political system in Bergen them genuine influence on the local authorities.

Figure 6.7: Distribution of each subgroup of level of political satisfaction and their likelihood to participate in mini-publics, from DEMOVATE data.

However, the positive effect of satisfaction with the current political system persists only in the DEMOVATE data, as the results from the NCP analysis are quite dissimilar. In Table 1.6, a negative correlation between satisfaction with the political system and willingness to participate in mini-publics is found. In other words, in the NCP data, when satisfaction with the political system increases with one point, willingness to participate in mini-publics decreases with 0.31 points, which is in line with the expectations of H4. This relationship is also significant at the 1 percent level. This negative correlation is illustrated in Figure 6.8, where the median for participation is 8 for level 1 for satisfaction but has a gradual reduction to about 4 to level 4 for satisfaction, despite a small jump to just over 4 in satisfaction level 5.

Figure 6.8: Distribution of each subgroup of level of political satisfaction and their likelihood to participate in mini-publics, from NCP data.

6.1.6 Control Variables- Age and Gender

So far, the presence of internal political efficacy (or lack thereof) generally correlates with the likelihood to participate, but how and to what extent it affects attitudes towards participation is difficult to determine as the direction of the relationship varies between the two samples. However, throughout the analytical models, there is one variable that remains as the most robust and coherent predictor of inclination towards participation across both regressions, which is one of the control variables, age group. In both regressions, age group is consistently negative and significantly correlated with the dependent variable, with a significance of a 5 percent level in the DEMOVATE model, and 1 percent level in the NCP model. In other words, as age group increases with one point, its correlation with willingness to participate reduces with 0.33 points in the DEMOVATE data, and 0.23 points in the NCP data, meaning that we can assume younger individuals are more motivated to participate in mini-publics.

Figure 6.9: Distribution of each subgroup of level of age groups and their likelihood to participate in mini-publics, from DEMOVATE data.

Figure 6.10: Distribution of each subgroup of age group and their likelihood to participate in mini-publics, from NCP data.

In the DEMOVATE data, the highest median participation rate is of those under 30, which is at 5, while the lowest is 0 for the age group 60 and over. The same trends can be observed in Figure 6.9 of the NCP data, where the highest median is found among the age group under 30, which is 7. The lowest median is found in the last three age groups, 61-70 years, 71-80 years and 81 years and above, all of which have a median of around 5.

Moreover, the second control variable, gender is found to correlate similarly to hypothetical participation in both regressions. Conclusions cannot be drawn from these results to the same degree as with the age variable as the findings are insignificant, however, both regressions indicate a negative correlation between the wish to participate and gender, and the coefficients are also roughly at the same level at -0.20 in the DEMOVATE regression, and -0.22 in the NCP regression. As mentioned in chapter 5.4, the variable is coded so that 0 represents male respondents and 1 represents female respondents, and therefore the results indicate that men are more likely to be inclined to participate in mini-publics than females. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.11 and 6.12.

Figure 6.11: Barchart displaying the distribution of the respondents' likelihood to participate in mini-publics according to subgroups of gender, DEMOVATE data

Figure 6.12: Barchart displaying the distribution of the respondents' likelihood to participate in mini-publics according to subgroups of gender, NCP data.

6.2 Structural Determinants

Moving on to the second half of the analysis results, I present the results from the conjoint analyses that further investigates the relationship between the compositional structure of mini-publics and the likelihood to participate. First, two models are presented, illustrating the variation in the probability of participation depending on varying attributes of mini-publics, and is conducted on behalf of data from the entire sample in both datasets. Additional models are presented in order to further elaborate on these findings, illustrating the same phenomenon, but in accordance with subgroup affiliation. It is expected that individuals are more likely to participate if the mini-public's form of recruitment is random selection, if the number of participants is high, if it is held on a weekend, if participants receive financial compensation, if their votes are kept secret, and if they are given the opportunity to take part in a deliberative process. The conjoint analysis was completed using Leeper's package '*cregg*' in the statistics software R. This enables the analysis and visualization of conjoint (factorial) experiments, as well as the estimation and display of average marginal component effects (Leeper 2020, 1).

Compositional Preference of DEMOVATE and NCP Samples

Figure 6.13: Marginal means of likelihood of participation if the mini-public contains a given attribute. The left model shows the results from the DEMOVATE data, while the right shows NCP data. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

As stated in chapter 5.5.7, in the traditional choice-based conjoint design participants are faced with a choice between profiles, and in conjoint designs where respondents are introduced to two profiles per choice task. In that case, the MMs will average between values of 0.5, whereas values greater than 0.5 points to a rise in favourability, while values less than 0.5 suggests a fall. However, as we are utilizing ordinal outcomes, the MMs can take any value within the outcome's range (Cran.R 2020). Therefore, the value-range of each model will vary.

First, both models illustrate that respondents are more likely to participate if the participants are recruited by random invitation, as opposed to open registration, which is in line with the expectations expressed in H5. This finding cannot be assumed to be significant in the DEMOVATE sample, however, the NCP model illustrates that the relationship is significant. Secondly, there is no obvious preference regarding the number of participants among the respondents. The DEMOVATE sample appears to have a slight preference toward 100 participants, with the least preference toward 12 participants. The NCP sample, however, shows the opposite preferences. They are the most motivated to participate if the number of participants is 12, and the least motivated when it is 100. However, neither sample seems to prefer the highest number of participants, namely 300, thus the findings does not support the expectations of H6. However, this finding is not significant in either model.

Furthermore, Figure 6.13 illustrates that out of all potential decisional basis, the deliberative process is not shown to be the most preferred alternative. According to the responders, it makes little difference whether the decisional basis is by their own assessments, by information from experts or by a deliberative process. However, it seems like respondents in the DEMOVATE sample has a slight preference towards their own assessments as a decisional basis, while the NCP prefers the expert information. These findings are not in accordance with the predictions of H7, but these results are also non-significant. On the other hand, the models demonstrate that out of all the potential features of the mini-publics, the most important motivator for participation is financial compensation, which is also a significant finding which applies to both models and is in line with the expectations of H8.

Moving on, the respondents appear to be fairly apathetic in regard to the time of the event, although the DEMOVATE sample appears to prefer it to be held on a weekend, which is in keeping with the expectations of H9. Their preference, however, is modest, and the finding in both models is non-significant. The final attribute taken into consideration regards the potential publication of the votes. In both models, respondents are found to favour that their votes are kept secret as opposed to them being public, which is also a significant finding in the NCP model, and partially supports H10.

6.2.1 Marginal Means of Subgroups

In order to further elaborate on the findings from the conjoint analysis presented in chapter 6.1, subsequent regressions have been implemented, analysing the relationship between the mini-publics' potential structural composition, but also whether these preferences vary according to subgroup affiliation. In other words, the aim is to further investigate whether the treatment effect is differs depending on theoretically relevant subgroups (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014, 22). The subgroups that were examined were educational levels, income levels, social class affiliation, levels of satisfaction with the political system and ultimately, age and gender. It should also be noted that in this section, the categorisation of certain subgroups covers a broader range of respondents, for illustrative purposes and more intuitive interpretations. I will further elaborate on this as the results are being presented.

First and foremost, no significant variations in structural preferences were identified among subgroups of political satisfaction, age, and gender, and these results are thus illustrated in Appendix E. The political satisfaction model, which is displayed in Figure E1, demonstrates that the groups differ between models as individuals with greater levels of political satisfaction in the DEMOVATE data prefer a group size of 12, as well as secret votes. However, according to NCP respondents, the number of participants should be 300, and votes should be made public. Furthermore, in both models, those with lower levels of political satisfaction prefer that votes be kept secret, that participants be rewarded monetarily, and that participants be chosen at random. These findings, however, do not appear to be significant.

Furthermore, some noteworthy findings in the gender subgroup suggest that females prefer the mini-publics consists of 300 participants, as opposed to males, who prefer 100. There were found few differences between the preferences of males and females, however, they differ in that the DEMOVATE data have a small inclination towards 300 participants, but are seemingly indifferent towards publication, but prefer that the number of participants is at 300. On the other hand, males in the NCP data prefer 100 participants. Women in the DEMOVATE sample prefer that the deliberative process serve as the foundation for decision-making, whereas males prefer that it be based on their personal evaluations, while males and females are more in agreement on this matter in the NCP data. These findings are illustrated in Appendix E, Figure E3. In sum, there appears to be little variation in the structural preferences within subgroups of educational

level, age groups and gender. However, some differences in structural preferences were discovered within the subcategories of income levels, social class, and levels of education.


Figure 6.14: Compositional preference grouped by subgroups of income level. The left model shows the results from the DEMOVATE data, while the right shows NCP data. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.14 illustrates the favorability of structural features of among subgroups of income level. The income level-variable is presented in four levels, where the income levels is ranges from NOK 150,000 to NOK 300,000, NOK 301,000 to NOK 500,000, NOK 500,001 to NOK 700,000, and ultimately, NOK 701,000 to over one million. Once again, it appears to be no significant differences between the subgroups, however, there is a notable difference between the models, as the individuals with the highest income level in the DEMOVATE data are the least motivated by financial compensation, while in the NCP model they are the most motivated by financial compensation out of all the levels of income. Furthermore, the individuals with the lowest income level in both models prefers the higher numbers of participants, that the votes are kept secret and the decisional basis to be their own assessment. The remaining results are inconsistent.

The structural favorability among subgroups of social class is illustrated in Figure 6.15. In both models, the lower middle class and the middle class are the most motivated by financial compensation, while in the case of the DEMOVATE data, the group that is the least motivated by financial compensation is the higher class/upper class. Furthermore, the higher class/upper class prefers that the votes are made public, while the lower/middle class and lower/working class prefer it is kept private. In the NCP data, all groups of social class prefers secret votes. In addition, the higher class/upper classs in the DEMOVATE data prefers the event takes place on a weekday as opposed to a weekend, contrary to the preferences of the two other groups. Once again, the findings are contradictory in the NCP data, where the lower class/working class are more inclined to participate on a weekday, as opposed to the two remaining groups.

Figure 6.15: Compositional preference grouped by subgroups of social class. The left model shows the results from the DEMOVATE data, while the right shows NCP data. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Respondents with higher levels of education in the DEMOVATE sample were shown to be less likely to participate if no financial compensation was offered than those with no higher education. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.16. Furthermore, Figure E2 reveals that the youngest individuals in both samples prefer the decisional basis to be their own assessment, and to be financially compensated for their participation. The youngest age group, 30 years or younger, are the only age group in the DEMOVATE sample who are more inclined to participate if the event takes place on a weekday, while the NCP respondents appear to be somewhat indifferent. The models differ in that the DEMOVATE sample's oldest respondents wish for the decisional basis to be based on expert information, the event to be held on a weekend, and the number of participants to be set at 100. On the other hand, the older age groups in the NCP sample prefer the decisional basis to be their own assessment, the event to take place on a weekday, and the number of participants to be limited to only 1

Figure 6.16: Compositional preference grouped by subgroups of educational level.

In sum, the conjoint analysis yielded results which demonstrate that the individual's wish to participate in mini-publics, as is the case with electoral systems, is impacted by their structural makeup. It was discovered that respondents were more inclined to participate if they were provided financial compensation for their time, if participants were chosen at random, and their votes were kept secret. The subgroup analysis yielded no significant findings, nor was any apparent differences between the groupings found. However, some noteworthy discoveries were made, such as that the respondents in both datasets who reported low levels of political

satisfaction prefer that their votes be kept secret. The individuals who identified with the highest level of social class in the DEMOVATE sample was also shown to be the least motivated by financial compensation, while in the case of NCP sample, this turned out to be the lower class/working class. The same contradiction unfolds when examining subgroups of income level, where those with the highest income are least motivated by financial compensation in the DEMOVATE sample, while they turn out to be most motivated by financial compensation in the NCP sample.

6.3 Summary of analysis

The goal of this chapter was to form a foundation for the coming discussion of the potential determinants explaining willingness to participate in mini-publics. The effects of the determinants that were expected to explain this phenomenon were tested using an OLS-regression on the individual level determinants. However, the OLS-regression analyses yielded contradicting results, and only partly support the entry argument that attitudes towards participation in mini-publics is dependent on individual-level determinants (e.g Verba and Nie 1972; La Due Lak and Huckfeldt 1998; Hooghe and Marien 2013). The OLS-results were followed by conjoint analyses uncovering the relationship between the dependent variable, and varying structural attributes of hypothetical mini-publics. First, the mean outcome of each structural preferences of the total population in both datasets was calculated, followed by an in-depth analysis of these preferences in accordance with subgroups. A significant relationship was found between the likelihood of participation and financial compensation in both samples. Positive incentives for participation were also found the be random selection and secret votes. There were also some noteworthy findings in the subgroup analysis. In the following chapter, these results will be further elaborated on.

7 Discussion

The theoretical framework of the thesis presented the widely accepted claim that the likelihood to participate in politics depends on the individual's sense of political efficacy. This argument frequently emphasises the contrast between internal and external levels of political efficacy, with internal efficacy attributed to socioeconomic status and educational levels, and external efficacy attributed to satisfaction with the political system and electoral systems. Due to the lack of an explicit theoretical framework for attitudes of participation in democratic innovations such as mini-publics, this existing theory of political efficacy was utilised to address the influential factors of people's willingness to participate in mini-publics. The purpose of this chapter is to further elaborate on the findings presented in the previous chapter. The findings of the OLS-regression will be the main focus of the first part, which begins with an assessment of the hypotheses developed on behalf of the individual-level determinants. The outcomes are discussed in greater depth and compared to the theoretical framework. The second part includes an assessment of the hypotheses developed on behalf of the structural level determinants and will also incorporate a further discussion on the findings.

7.1 Evaluation of Individual-Level Hypotheses

	Hypotheses	DEMOVATE	NCP	Total Sample
Individual Level Determinants	*H1: Individuals who have obtained higher levels of formal education are more likely to be willing to participate in mini-publics*	Rejected	Rejected	Rejected
	H2: Individuals who identify with the lower levels of social class are less likely to be willing to participate in mini-publics than those who identify with higher levels of social class	Rejected	Supported	Partially supported
	H3: Individuals with lower income levels will be less willing to participate in mini-publics	Rejected	Supported	Partially supported
	H4: Individuals who report dissatisfaction with the political system are more likely to be willing to participate in mini-publics	Rejected	Supported	Partially supported

Table 7.1: Evaluation of individual-level hypotheses.

If the hypotheses are to be considered as supported in the total sample, it is required that the correlation is significant, and that it has the same directional relationship in both samples. According to the results illustrated in Table 7.1, none of the hypotheses developed at the individual level were shown to be fully supported by the findings in the analysis.

7.1.1 Education

First and foremost, no support was found for H1, and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Despite that education has been found to be one of the most reliable determinants of political participation (La Due Lak and Huckfeldt 1998, 567), no significant correlation was found between levels of education and participation in mini-publics. Contrary to the expectations generated on behalf of the existing theory which emphasises education as the strongest predictor of participation (Sunshine 2005, 26; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, 271), It can be recalled from chapter 4.2.1 that scholars claim that levels of education can be used as an indicator of citizens' abilities to understand politics (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996, 40-41; Whiteley 2010, 28), thus enhancing their wish to participate in in. Given that the analysis revealed a negative relationship between education and the desire to participate in mini-publics, this may mean that mini-publics is a form of political participation that does not alienate those with lower levels of education.

However, scholars such as Ronald Inglehart (1977, 293) have argued that educational levels may not tell the whole story and is merely one aspect of a broader underlying concept. Recent studies have argued that this relationship may rather be spurious than causal, whereby some unobserved characteristics drive both educational attainment and electoral participation (Denny and Doyle 2008, 291). Some scholars have pointed out that higher education is not necessarily a direct cause of political participation but is rather correlated with other variables (Kam and Palmer 2008, 612; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 10). It has been demonstrated by previous research that individuals that most frequently participates in the political sphere are not only the educated, but the wealthy. Verba and Nie (1972, 125) found that citizens that belonged to higher social and economic status were more likely to participate more in politics, a claim that is well-established in previous literature, and will show a positive correlation when measuring social status by education, income, or occupation (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1969, 365).

7.1.2 Socioeconomic Status

Great disparities are found between the two samples when moving on to the next individual-oriented variable. A significant relationship between social class and willingness to participate was found in both samples, however, the direction of the relationship diverges. Contrary to the NCP sample, the DEMOVATE sample shows support for the expectations of H2. Despite the negative non-significant relationship between income level and the willingness to participate in mini-publics, the same trends are found here as in the result for social class, where the DEMOVATE sample meets the expectations in H3, but not those in NCP the sample. These findings are only partially in line with the literature and the SES model developed by Verba and Nie, stating that individuals with higher levels of socioeconomic status is more likely to be active in politics than those with lower levels, and that higher levels of social class enhances political efficacy (Verba and Nie 1971, 13; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, 4), however, the results diverge depending on the inspected sample.

Scholars such as Pettersen and Rose (1996, 51, 53) and Ringdal and Hines (1995, 183) argues that in Western democracies, structural cleavages appear to be less of a significant determinant for electoral participation. While individual socioeconomic levels may explain a large part of political participation, there are reasons to assume that such factors may be less significant in Norway. Social democratic states such as Norway experience lower levels of socioeconomic disparity, which in turn leads to higher levels of political and public participation as a result of a growing new middle class where economic resources have less of a significance than other countries. It is also highlighted that class voting is rather being replaced with other factors such as values (Parvin 2017, 34; Ringdal and Hines 1995, 183; Hout, Manza and Brooks 1995). Although socioeconomic levels potentially play less of a role in Norway than in some other nations, Ringdal and Hines (1999, 181) highlights a divide between scholars suggesting a decline in class in the Western democracies, and those who challenge this statement. As an example, Hout, Manza and Brooks (1995 ,148, 155) argues that the claims of decreased class voting are misleading, as analytical results are being misread as declining rather than a trendless fluctuation meaning that significant increases often follow significant decreases. It is also worth noting that the majority of the research on which this thesis is based on is relatively old, and cannot necessarily assume that the work of Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978), which is more than 40 years old, necessarily represents current societal tendencies.

7.1.3 Satisfaction with the current political system

When inspecting the relationship between levels of satisfaction with the current political system and the willingness to participate in mini-publics, the results in both samples the relationship was found to be non-significant, and only the NCP sample supports H4 with a positive relationship. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. While the current argument in the theory of political participation states that democratic scepticism potentially increases the likelihood of citizen participation, Norris (1999, 259) argues that critical citizens may be more drawn towards the political process as detachment from the democratic process could potentially be mobilizing citizens to express their dissatisfaction. As stated in chapter 4.4.1, the relationship between political satisfaction and political participation is a paradox as citizens who blindly trust institutions potentially trust blindly that they act in their favour, thus refraining from political participation (Hooghe and Marien 2013, 133; Warren 1999, 1,3). Additionally, when studying preferences for direct citizen participation, Bowler, Donovan and Karp (2007, 351) distinguishes between what they refer to as engaged and enraged citizens, arguing that engaged citizens feel competent enough to have a say, while enraged citizens are politically dissatisfied. It could potentially be argued that enraged citizens who are dissatisfied with representative democracy may wish for a transformation, and thus favour alternative forms of participation (Bedock and Pilet 2020, 2-3). As was assumed by H4, this correlation is negative, and the findings in the NCP model does support the hypothesis while the DEMOVATE model does not.

7.1.4 Age and Gender

The only consistent and significant correlation in both models resulted from one of the control variables, namely, the age variable. This outcome is not in accordance with the existing theory presented in chapter 4, as scholars such as Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) have argued that political participation increases with age. However, Fimreite and Ivarsflaten (2020, 34), highlight that as the decline in conventional political participation leads to other forms of participation Norway and other established democracies, younger generations often lead the way in the trend. The proportion of Norwegians who participate in formal politics lies only at 10% or less among young people, whereas between 40 and 50 percent have been engaged in informal political.

Melo and Stockemer (2014, 39) also claim that young people are largely political in other ways than those of conventionality. According to Dalton (2008a, 76), young people are gravitating towards unconventional politics as the pattern of duty-based citizenship is giving way to active citizenship, as a result of the rise of post-materialist ideals among them. The idea that younger individuals are less engaged in formal politics and are more worried with issues that go beyond the conventional understanding of politics is a growing consensus among scholars. For example, Henn, Weinstein and Wring (2002, 168) found that younger people are commonly concerned with single-issues that are disregarded by major political parties such as animal welfare and climate issues, and we may assume they resort to the unconventional as a result of this alienation. The allure of new forms of political engagement leads them away from conventional kinds and toward, among other things, single-issue politics (Quintelier 2007, 165-166). Furthermore, younger generations were referred to by Henn, Weinstein and Wring (2002, 187) as engaged sceptics, as they are engaged in politics, but suspicious of people who are elected to positions of authority. They also discovered that, though they may reject much of what could be described as "formal" or conventional politics, they are interested in a different style of politics that is more interactive and focused on localised, immediate (and some post-material) concerns. Because of this, the nature of mini-publics as forums for specific single-issues may potentially act as an incentive for younger people to participate. Thus, despite that the findings contradict classical participation theory, it can be expected that young people are more motivated to participate in other forms of participation.

Additionally, gender was found in both models to negatively correlate with the likelihood to participate in mini-publics. Thus, the results are in line with previous research stating that the diminishing gender differences since the 1980s and 1990s have not necessarily decreased the differences between genders in political engagement, as women are still proven to be less interested than men in conventional politics (Norris 2002a, 90-91), and the results may suggest that this also applies to participations in mini-publics. However, this relationship was not found to be statistically significant in the analysis, and its explanatory power is thus uncertain. Gender aspects in mini-publics is still an uncommon topic of study, with inconsistent results (Harris et al. 2020, 181). Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker (2012, 534, 544) found that in mixed-gender dialogues, women speak less and have less of an impact, and are typically disadvantaged in speech participation. Scholars state that this could potentially be a caused by an unequally distributed political knowledge between the genders, as communicative skills, political knowledge, and information considerably facilitates giving a statement and expressing

preferences (Fraile 2014, 373; Gerber, Schaub and Mueller 2019, 176). As a result, there is a possibility that deliberation could potentially worsen already existing disparities by giving less of a voice to those who already have less power in the political world, namely women (Fraile 2014, 375).

7.2 Evaluation of Structural-Level Hypotheses

	Hypotheses	DEMOVATE	NCP	Total sample
Structural Level Determinants	H5: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if they are invited after a random selection, as opposed to public registration.*	Partially supported	Supported	Partially Supported
	H6: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics when there is a greater number of participants.*	Rejected	Rejected	Rejected
	H7: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if they get to take part in a deliberative process*	Rejected	Rejected	Rejected
	H8: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if they receive financial compensation.*	Supported	Supported	Supported
	H9: *Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if it takes place during a weekend, as opposed to a weekday.*	Partially supported	Rejected	Rejected
	H10: Individuals will be more inclined to participate in mini-publics if it involves secret votes as opposed to public votes.	Partially supported	Supported	Partially supported

Table 7.2: Evaluation of structural-level hypotheses.

As stated in chapter 4, there is currently no clear theory explaining how structural characteristics of democratic innovations might promote or reduce the wish to participate in mini-publics (Christensen 2011, 212; Eisinger 1973, 11-12). Due to this, the discussion of the conjoint analysis will have more of an explanatory basis rather than a theoretical one. At the same time, some key structural characteristics have been identified as particularly important influential factors of an individual's willingness to participate. Smith (2009, 82) argues that in order to

increase public interest in participating, citizens should receive a formal invitation, they should be left with the impression that they are being invited to an important political process and offered a modest honorarium for participating. Furthermore, support was found for the claim that the timing of the event (OECD 2020, 10; Reybrouck 2016, 28; Jacquet 2017, 648), as well as the potential publication of their votes (Engelen and Nys 2007, 162-163; Smith 2009, 88), may influence the motivation to participate. The condition mentioned in chapter 7.1 still applies in this case, which stated that hypotheses are deemed supported in the whole sample if the correlation between the dependent and independent variables in both samples is substantial and has the same directional connection in both samples.

Table 7.2. indicates that H8 is the only hypothesis that is entirely supported in both samples, as the respondents demonstrate a notable inclination towards the provision of financial compensation as opposed to the alternative. This correlation is significant, and the null hypothesis is therefore rejected. This implies that, out of all of the investigated potential causal mechanisms for the desire to participate in mini-publics, financial compensation largely acts as a positive incentive, and is in line with the theoretical framework. This finding can also be generalised both to the specific Bergen population and to the general population of Norway. This lines up with the claim made by Smith, who found random selection to be a particularly motivating factor for participation (2009, 82). Furthermore, the results indicate that in both samples, the respondents are more likely to participate if they receive a formal invitation through random selection, and if their votes are kept secret, however, H5 and H10 can only be partially supported as the findings are non-significant in the DEMOVATE sample, as opposed to the NCP sample. This implies that in this case, Bergen potentially differs from the general Norwegian population, indicating that the findings are not applicable to the total population from which the samples were extracted. Therefore, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected.

H6, H7 and H9 are ultimately rejected, as the results are neither significant nor suggest that the variables correlate as expected. One can thus not assume that the desire to participate in democratic innovations, such as mini-publics, is particularly influenced by the decisional basis, the day of the event, nor the number of participants, and we are unable to reject the null hypothesis. On the other hand, it can be pointed out that the literature by Jacquet (2017, 651), in which he examines the most common cause of non-participants in mini-publics, focuses on actual participation, while this analysis is related to the respondents' attitudes towards participation. It is also worth mentioning that the literature does not explicitly express that the

number of participants directly affects the individual's desire to participate, but rather that they are influenced by the impression that the mini-public is an important political process (Smith 2009, 82; Curato and Böker 2015, 178-179), and it was therefore mentioned that the number of participants can affect the event's perceived legitimacy. Aside from a few noteworthy observations, the study did not show any significant variations in structural preferences among subgroups. The results were also non-significant, and therefore not generalisable.

Moving on to the subgroup analysis, there were no apparent differences uncovered between subgroup affiliations, however, some noteworthy discoveries were mentioned in chapter 6.2. Respondents who identified with the highest level of social class in the DEMOVATE sample was shown to be the least motivated by financial compensation, while in the case of NCP sample, this turned out to be the lower class/working class. The same contradiction unfolds when examining subgroups of income level, where those with the highest income level are least motivated by financial compensation in the DEMOVATE sample, while they turn out to be most motivated by financial compensation in the NCP sample. The relationship between secret votes and the wish to participate was to a large extent linked to the pressure caused by the public gaze, and that public votes favour of the highly educated who are better equipped to defend their arguments (Engelen and Nys 2007, 162-163). However, the analysis revealed that, despite the fact that both levels of obtained education preferred secret votes, those who had no higher education in both samples were the least discouraged from participating if their votes were made public. The results indicate that those who reported lower levels of political satisfaction in both samples prefer that their votes be kept secret, and in the NCP data, respondents who reported higher levels of satisfaction favoured the public vote.

In sum, the findings suggests that it is not necessarily appropriate to assume that participation in mini-publics depends on the level of political efficacy to the same degree as traditional political participation. The contradictory results in the OLS regression suggest that internal levels of political efficiency are not necessarily sufficient explanations of participation in democratic innovations and emphasises that the phenomenon is too complex for us to be able to directly apply the well-established theoretical framework of political participation to predict participation in democratic innovations such as mini-publics, and that it thus deserves more attention from researchers. It is revealed, however, that mini-publics are a political phenomenon that engages the younger population, despite the fact that well-established literature has categorised them as politically uninterested, uninformed and indifferent (Quintelier 2007, 165).

Even though the political scene to a large degree has been dominated by older age groups, mini-publics is a political channel that appeals to younger generations who commonly abstain from conventional channels of participation such as elections. Based on the findings of the analysis, is could be reasonable to assume that mini-publics are capable of capturing the opinions of individuals who do not feel that their opinions are heard through traditional channels. In addition, certain structural components of mini-publics have the ability to increase or decrease individuals' desire to participate, who are mostly affected by financial compensation, and to some extent, the impression of it being an important political process.

7.3 Limitations of the Analysis

My analysis does suffer from certain weaknesses that needs to be addressed, and the results should be considered accordingly. First of all, it must be taken into account that the analyses are produced on the basis of two different sets of data, with some deviation in the formulation of the survey questions, particularly the variable measuring political satisfaction. Because there was not a large enough proportion of respondents in the NCP data who were both exposed to the survey-experiment, and also asked to what extent they felt the political system provided them with influence on authorities, political satisfaction was in this case measured based on their level of satisfaction with democracy in Norway. While the first question regards the respondent's sense of genuine influence on authorities, Grönlund and Setälä (2007, 404) states that satisfaction with democracy could be interpreted as the perception that the political process works according to democratic norms and principles. In other words, both variables measure external levels of political satisfaction, but to a certain extent, differing aspects of it. This may have had an impact on the contradictory results in the OLS regression, and ideally, this phenomenon should have been measured using identical survey questions.

It must also be taken into account that the contradictory results could potentially result from the sample being based on different populations, as Pettersen and Rose (1996, 82) emphasised that some types of political participation appear to be less frequent in larger more urban municipalities, whereas others are more common in larger and more densely populated urban areas. Due to the fact that the research is only limited to Norway, it cannot be assumed that the results are applicable to other geographical areas. It is also necessary to consider that several of the variables have been recoded to have fewer categories. This applies to the social class variable in both datasets, which was reduced from six to three categories, the political

satisfaction variable in the DEMOVATE data, which was reduced from ten to five, and the dependent variable in the DEMOVATE data which originally measured the percentage probability of participation from 0-100, was recoded to 1-10. As previously mentioned, recoding categorization always implies a loss of information, and it could potentially lead to misleading results. The discretization reduces measurement accuracy, underestimates the magnitude of the coefficients of bivariate relationships, and lowers statistical power. Also, the artificial transformation of quantitative measures into groups may lead to biased coefficients and unreliable standard errors in multivariate models. However, this recoding was necessary due to lack of observations (Fernandes et al. 2019, 1520).

Furthermore, in chapter 5.1 it mentioned that the case-variable regarding the case to be discussed in the mini-public is excluded from the NCP data, and therefore not included in the analysis. As a consequence, I am unable to control for its potentially decisive influence on participation. It should also be noted that the data is based on people's willingness to engage in mini-publics, and the results are not based on those who actually participated. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that there will be a disparity between the number of people who say they will attend and those who really do.

7.4 Suggestions for Further Research

The study of political participation in mini-publics is a growing field, which has been shown to be a phenomenon that requires further research and attention. In this thesis, I found that the well-established traditional theory on determinants of political participation is not necessarily applicable when predicting political participation in democratic innovations such as mini-publics, since the phenomena is far too complex, and I have formed an overview of the existing gaps in the subject for future research. First and foremost, I wish to emphasise the argument by Linde and Ekman (2003, 406) presented earlier who stated that in order to measure support, we need multiple indicators to measure the popular belief in democratic legitimacy. Thus, further research could potentially benefit by presenting respondents with a list of various characteristics generally considered to be defining properties of democracy, and only then can we truly assess the validity and reliability.

As mentioned, the exclusion of the case variable could potentially have weakened the study as its potential influence is not controlled for. Thus, further research will have the advantage of

controlling to what extent the theme of the event can have a bearing on the willingness to participate. Pettersen and Rose (1996, 62-63) found in their study that the perception of relevance of local politics for one's daily life displays a fairly consistent relationship across their surveys. Furthermore, one could question whether the character of citizen activity relating to the local level as opposed to national political levels is essentially similar, or whether there are important variations depending on the level involved. Further research could potentially benefit from studying whether people are more concerned with local issues or national politics, and to what extent they function as incentives for participation in mini-publics.

Future research on this subject could also potentially benefit from the implementation of qualitative methods. The results from the analysis shows that the wish to participate in mini publics is such a complex topic that a multi-method research (MMR) on the topic could be advantageous. Although quantitative approaches are frequently used to identify patterns, our capacity to conduct research and analyse our findings necessitates some attention paid towards an understanding on the microlevel. We could potentially greatly enhance our understanding by combining small-n and large-n studies, where one strategy controls for the weakness of the other (Lieberman 2015, 242; Rohlfing 2008, 1493; Ragin 1987, 70; Kuehn 2013, 52). If I had supplemented the quantitative analysis of survey data with qualitative in-depth interviews with participants who chose to refrain from participating, I could have filled certain gaps in my results. As pointed out in chapter 1, the aim of the thesis is to uncover the determinants of the wish to participate, as opposed to individuals who have actually participated. Further research could thus potentially benefit from the comparison of actual participation with hypothetical participation.

Finally, an interesting contribution to the study would be to evaluate the participants' sense of political efficacy over time, both before actually participating, and after. It may be assumed that participation in deliberative mini-publics enhances external efficacy because it increases participants' self-confidence with respect to what they can achieve in politics (Gastil 2000, 119). However, it could also lead to a reduced sense of external efficacy (Grönlund, Setäla and Herne 2010, 98-99).

8 Concluding Remarks

The aim of this thesis was to address a gap in the existing literature on political participating by focusing on the determinants of participation specifically in regard to democratic innovations such as mini-publics. The traditional, well-established theory of political participation functioned as a starting point, and arguments were built upon the widespread argument that stresses political efficacy as a significant factor in the desire to participate in politics. The research question answered in the thesis is as follows:

What affects people's willingness to participate in democratic innovations such as mini-publics?

Educational level and socio-economic status were emphasised as sources of internal political efficiency, which provided conflicting results. However, the control variable, age, was shown to be an important determinant, indicating that younger people are more likely to participate in mini-publics. Satisfaction with the political system and institutional structures, more specifically, the structure of mini-publics was used as sources for external levels of political efficiency. Satisfaction with the political system also produced conflicting results, while the wish to participate turned out to vary according to the structural composition of mini-publics. Thus, the analysis confirmed that the desire to participate in democratic innovations such as mini-publics is to some extent influenced by a combination of determinants at the individual level as well as structural determinants, but the lack of findings in the analysis of structural preferences according to subgroup affiliations also proved to produce mixed results. What the analysis confirms is that the individuals who want to participate in more conventional political processes are not necessarily the same who want to participate in mini-publics, and thus emphasise the need for further research in the field, and the formation of an explicit theoretical framework.

8 References

8.1 Literature

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8.2 Documents

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Appendix

Appendix A: Overview of Mini-Publics

	Number of participants	**Time**	**Output**
Citizens' jury/reference panels	12-36	2-5 days	Recommendation in a citizens' report
Planning cells	25 in each cell, but run in parallel or series to include 100s	2-7 days	Citizen report collates findings from different cells
Consensus conference	10-24	3 days (plus preparatory weekends)	Recommendation in a citizens' report
Citizens' assembly	99-150	Series of weekends	Recommendation
Deliberative poll	200+	Weekend	Post-deliberation survey
G1000	1000	1 day	Series of votes on proposals

Table A1: Overview of different forms of mini-publics and their characteristics. *Source*: Smith and Setäla 2018, 301.

Appendix B: Model Diagnostics

Studentized Breusch-Pagan test Data= Demovate		
BP = 5.6192	df = 6	p-value = 0.4672

Table B1: Studentized Breusch-Pagan test, DEMOVATE. Homoscedasticity assumption.

Studentized Breusch-Pagan test Data= NCP		
BP = 3.5487	df = 6	p-value = 0.7375

**Table B2:** Studentized Breusch-Pagan test, NCP. Homoscedasticity assumption.

Durbin Watson test		
Lag 1	D-W Statistic 1.934604	p-value 0.602

Table B3: Durbin Watson test to check for independency/autocorrelation, DEMOVATE. Independency assumption

Durbin Watson test		
Lag 1	D-W Statistic 1.900651	p-value 0.06

Table B4: Durbin Watson test to check for independency/autocorrelation, NCP. Independency assumption

Fig. B5: Normality, DEMOVATE. Normality assumption

Fig. B6: Normality, NCP: Normality assumption

Fig. B7: Residuals vs Fitted plot, DEMOVATE. Linearity assumption

Fig. B8: Residuals vs Fitted plot, NCP. Linearity assumption.

Age group	1.06
Gender	1.06
Educational level	1.28
Income level	1.33
Social class	1.27
Political satisfaction	1.05

Table. B9: VIF test for multicollinearity, DEMOVATE data

Variable	VIF
Age group	1.04
Gender	1.09
Educational level	1.21
Income level	1.30
Social class	1.18
Political satisfaction	1.04

Table B10: VIF test for multicollinearity, NCP data

Appendix C: Distribution in Samples Compared to Both Populations

	DEMOVATE	Population (Bergen)
18-29 years	21.11%	23.32%
30-59 years	50.78%	50,68%
60 years and above	28.11%	26%
	NCP	Population (Norway)
18-29 years	7.7%	19.81%
30-59 years	48.5%	50.78%
60 years and above	43.8%	29.39%

Table. C1: Distribution of age subgroups in net sample vs. population. The DEMOVATE sample distribution is compared to the true distribution within the population, which is inhabitants of Bergen above the age of 18. The NCP sample distribution is compared to the true distribution within the population in 2020, which is inhabitants of Norway in general above the age of 18. (*Source:* Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2021).

	DEMOVATE	Population (Bergen)
Female	49.11%	49.90%
Male	50.89%	50.10%
	NCP	Population (Norway)
Female	50.54%	49.81%
Male	49.46%	50.19%

Table. C2: Distribution of gender subgroups in net sample vs. population. The DEMOVATE sample distribution is compared to the true distribution within the population, which is inhabitants of Bergen above the age of 18. The NCP sample distribution is compared to the true distribution within the population in 2020, which is inhabitants of Norway in general above the age of 18. (*Source:* Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2021).

	DEMOVATE	Population (Bergen)
Higher education	71%	44.1%
No higher education	29%	55.9%
	NCP	Population (Norway)
Higher education	62.5%	34.6%
No higher education	37.5%	65.4%

Table. C3: Distribution of educational subgroups in net sample vs. population. The DEMOVATE sample distribution is compared to the true distribution within the population, which is inhabitants of Bergen above the age of 18. The NCP sample distribution is compared to the true distribution within the population in 2019, which is inhabitants of Norway in general above the age of 18. *Source:* Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2021).

Appendix D: OLS Regression on Weighted data

	Dependent variable:
	Participation
Age group	-0.021**
	(0.010)
Gender	-0.201
	(0.366)
Educational level	-0.004
	(0.451)
Income level	-0.171*
	(0.100)
Social class	-1.007***
	(0.359)
Political satisfaction	0.406**
	(0.184)
Constant	6.664***
	(0.990)
Observations	307
R^2	0.085
Adjusted R^2	0.066
Residual Std. Error	3.105 (df = 300)
F Statistic	4.626*** (df = 6; 300)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table. D1: OLS regression with weighted data, DEMOVATE

	Dependent variable:
	Deltakelse
Age group	-0.276***
	(0.056)
Gender	-0.284
	(0.190)
Educational level	0.092
	(0.219)
Income level	0.077
	(0.052)
Social class	0.455***
	(0.159)
Political satisfaction	-0.260**
	(0.106)
Constant	6.320***
	(0.495)
Observations	1,453
R^2	0.030
Adjusted R^2	0.025
Residual Std. Error	3.507 (df = 1446)
F Statistic	7.328*** (df = 6; 1446)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Table. D2:** OLS regression with weighted data, NCP

Appendix E: Compositional Preference According to Subgroup Affiliation

Figure E1: Compositional preference according to subgroups of political satisfaction. Individuals who placed themselves at satisfaction level 1-2 were categorised as having lower levels of political satisfaction, 3 as moderate levels, and 4 and 5 as higher levels.

Figure E2: Compositional preference according to subgroups of age.

Figure E3: Compositional preference according to subgroups of gender.