

Department of Comparative Politics



University of Bergen

From Russia with Cleavages

A Study in Party System and Voting Behaviour in Post-Communist
Russia

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1.0 Introduction

On December 12th 1993 the Russians were about to elect their new national assembly: The State Duma. Nearly 106 million registered voters were allowed to participate in the election. This was the first election contested by several political parties since the early experiences in the beginning of the 20th century.

Since then Russia has been through three presidential elections and three parliamentary elections as well as local parliamentary elections. According to many observers the transition is still going on and not completed (See for instance Rose and Munroe 2002, Herspring (Ed) 2005 and Sakwa 2002). Democracy is not yet “the only game in town”. Others claim that Russia has made serious steps towards a democratic society and that the elections have proven to be fair.

The question to be asked is: what kind of electoral pattern has emerged? Can we talk about some kind of stable relationship between party preference and demographic attributes and opinions? In other words are the parties represented in the Duma a manifestation of latent cleavages in the Russian society?

The question of cleavage is what this thesis intends to explore. We will try to uncover the Russian society, by trying to find cleavages in it, and to examine how these are manifested in the political spheres with specific attention to political parties.

There are several ways to approach a problem like this. What we intend to do is to find out what characterises the voters of the respective parties represented in the Russian State Duma. By using surveys we shall be able to track down demographical, geographical as well as attitudinal characteristics.

We can roughly say that there are three issues to be taken into considerations in this thesis:

- I. What kind of latent cleavages exist in the post communist Russian society?
- II. What kind of latent cleavages have managed to manifest themselves as political parties?
- III. Can this manifestation lead to a stabilised democracy in Russia?

The question of how to measure cleavages and what a cleavage is will be further discussed in the theoretical and the methodological chapter.

1.1 Why Russia?

Why is Russia an interesting case in this the context of cleavage? Russia is interesting for numerous reasons. But one of my main ambitions was that I'd like to make a conceptual travel to Russia. My luggage was loaded with concepts initially developed for a Western European space. When Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset viewed the European political landscape at the end of the 1960s they were struck by the similarities they found with the political landscape in the 1930s (Aardal 1994). In the same fashion I will try to look at the political landscape in present Russian society. I expect to find patterns that can be explained by conflicts that have historical roots. One could also expect to find patterns whose origin is rooted in the post communist period and which do not necessarily reflect any historical roots per se.

One interesting aspect with Russia is its geographical position. We can argue that Russia is located in two different ways. The country is situated both between Europe and Asia, and it is European and Asian. Following this you can view Russia as an exceptional country not belonging to any of the parts, and a country belonging to both areas. This has been an important aspect for the Russian identity. The question of where to look, whether to the westwards, eastwards or inwards, is always crucial for the Russian society.

Russia is often criticised for not fulfilling the democratic norms. Russians and President Vladimir Putin usually respond that Russia will develop its own kind of democracy based on Russia's own tradition and culture (Shevtsova 2005). From a comparative perspective we might ask whether we are dealing with a subtype of democracy or just mixing oranges and apples. To answer this question one must decide how to view democracy. Is it a dichotomous variable meaning that a system is democratic or not, or is democracy a continuous variable where you have a scale from 1-10 judging the degree of democracy within a given society?

Although the main focus in this thesis will rest on the parliamentary elections, it is important to stress the institutional design of the Russian Federation. Russia is usually described as a semi presidential regime with a very strong president (see for instance Brown 2001 and

Sakwa 2002). This will be further elaborated in the next chapters but for the moment we can assume that the presidential elections have important consequences for the Duma elections. These consequences are not only limited to the election results, i.e. who is elected president, but the very circumstances before and after the elections. This institutional design also plays a major role in determining how the political parties are organised. In addition the institutional approach is useful in explaining the parties' behaviour both towards the electorate and on the parliamentary arena.

As mentioned above one interesting aspect of studying a case like Russia is to see how it develops according to established theories and models originally used on the developed world. In this respect the thesis will not limit itself to the concept of cleavage but include general theories of party development as well. This will also include the effect of election procedures and methods.

We will specifically deal with political parties represented in the Russian State Duma. By analysing a wide range of opinion and exit polls it will be possible to get an understanding of how the Russian political society has developed so far, both at a macro and micro level.

The discourse between micro and macro is in general a very interesting topic. How were the political parties established? How do parties respond to public demands? How are the political parties organized? These are just a few of many questions concerning this discourse. This topic is however beyond the scope of this thesis, but some points will be included. First of all it is important to note how the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy was conducted. Was it coming from below or was it a staged *coup d'état*? The immediate reactions in the aftermath of the transition are also of crucial importance. The way the political parties are organised will also be given some attention.

1.2 The structure of the thesis

The next chapter will deal with a very short history of Russia. Chapter three will present the theoretical framework of the thesis. In particular three aspects will be covered. First we will study party and party system theory. The second part will deal with legislative theory and how parties respond to different institutional mechanisms. The last part of our theory chapter will deal with a conceptualization of the concept of cleavage. In chapter four this theoretical

framework will be applied on the Russian case. The next chapters will deal with how the Russian political system has developed since the collapse of the communist regime. Here we will specifically look at how the State Duma is organised. Furthermore we will study the election results to the Duma in detail, and present the most important political parties contesting them. The methodological issues dealt with in chapter seven will provide the reader with an insight into how we are going to measure cleavage. In chapter eight we will study the cleavages using the tools presented in the methodological and theoretical chapter. In the final chapter we will discuss results as well as prospects for the future.

2.0 Empire-, State- and Nation building in Russia: A brief history

In the following chapter we will try to track down some important aspects of the history of the Russian society. More specifically we will deal with the evolution of the political system.

This will of course be a selection of important independent variables, and many scholars will argue a biased selection. But again the purpose is not to cover the entire Russian history, but to try to find some explanations of the pattern we find in the Russian society. Broadly speaking we are seeking to clarify two aspect of society. First of all we will seek explanations for the institutional design of today's Russia. Why did Russians choose a strong presidency? Why a federal state system and not a unitary system.¹ The second aspect of Russian society which we will seek to explain (with history) is located at the micro-level. Why do certain people display some attitudes while others not. In other words, why are there latent cleavages among some people in a given area, while these do not exist in others?

2.1 Russia's geographic position

Broadly speaking we can distinguish between two main categories that constitute the evolution of regime types. First of all we are dealing with factors that are, at least at the beginning beyond human control and influence. These are natural factors like climate, vegetation, rivers, landscape and so on. The second main category includes factors that humans do control. Here we deal with choices by the rulers or the ruled.

As Richard Pipes wrote 30 years ago:

The contemporary western reader has little patience for physical geography, and understandably so, because science and technology have to an unprecedented degree liberated him from dependence on nature (Pipes 1995:2).

The geographical variables are very important when viewing Russian history. Simply put we can say that Russia is an enormous country in terms of size. If including the Kaliningrad enclave Russia has eleven time zones. When the voter in Vladivostok votes for a parliament situated in Moscow, it would almost be the same as a Norwegian voter in Bergen voted for a parliament situated in Chicago (US).

¹ Here we must distinguish between a de facto and a de jure federal system. Many will argue that Russia is a de facto unitary political system, with all powers located in Moscow.

The most usual way of viewing Russia is by dividing the country in three zones using vegetation as a criterion. The first zone is the tundra positioned north of the arctic circle. This area is characterised by sparse resources and cannot support human life. About 15 percent of Russia can be characterised as tundra. South of the tundra we find Taiga, the forest zone. This zone is divided in two parts, one which consists of pine forest and one consisting of mixed trees. This is the largest zone in Russia stretching from the western to the eastern border. The last zone is the steppe zone. When considering the soil and its fertility the steppe zone differs from the others. It is here that we find the black earth called *chernozem*.

The climate in Russia is not very suitable for agriculture. The climate is characterised as a continental one, meaning cold winters and hot summers. In Russia the winter is indeed cold but also long. At the same time the rain comes at the “wrong” time of the year, during the harvest. The net effect of the climate and the vegetation is an agricultural system that hardly grows and cumulates. This in turn effected the societal development as Pipes writes:

Unfavourable natural conditions made for low yields; low yields resulted in poverty; poverty meant that there were no buyers for agricultural produce; the lack of buyers discourages yield improvements (Pipes 1995:9).

The political consequence of the poor soil was expansion. The need for new land was always present, and the direction of the expansion went from west to the south and eventually south east. The enormous territory had to be governed, and the size, vegetation and climate partly explain the political system in tsarist Russia.

One can appreciate, if not accept, the opinion of those thinkers, prominent in the Enlightenment and present in other periods, who related the system of government of a country directly to its size and declared despotism to be the natural form of rule in Russia (Riasanovsky 1993:8-9).

Hence the Russian expansion remained quite different from the Western European expansion/colonization of the third world. As Pipes wrote:

...unlike the great European powers and Japan whose imperialism represented an overflow of national wealth in search of profitable investments outlets or fresh markets, Russian imperialism was an escape from poverty (Pipes in Dalin and Lapidus 1991:23).

We have thus so far briefly touched the geographic variable and its consequence on the Tsarist regime. Again it is not my intention to summarise the Russian history between these pages, but there is one further element of the Tsarist regime that needs some considerations. The regime was not static in terms of institutional design. In particular the 19th century was quite dynamic witnessing many reforms which were highlighted in the 1860s. “In spite of the obvious limitations, these reforms mark a watershed in Russian history. They represent the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Russia (Egge 2002:29 own translation). It is also worth to give heed to the fact that the 19th century also saw the rise of some oppositional forces within the society, what is usually described as the *intelligentsia*. An important discourse from this period is a conflict between the so called Westernisers (Zapadniki) and the Slavophiles. This conflict will be studied in detail in chapter four.

Russian pre communists (and communist as well) history is characterised by its expansion. The expansion required a centralised state. This centralisation was established in many ways. What is highlighted as one of the main distinctions of Russia was the fact that the nobility was not able to consolidate their position in Society.

2.2 Communist regime

There is a wide range of literature on the communist period in Russia. The limitations (both in time and space) of the thesis force us to deal with this in a short manner. The communist legacy is very important when studying cleavages in post communist Russia. The question is however what kind of legacy?

Pipes argues that the totalitarian tradition of the Soviet Union does not come from the political ideology itself: “...the explanation for Soviet totalitarianism must be sought not in socialism but in the political culture which draws on socialist ideas to justify totalitarian practises” (Pipes in Dalin and Lapidus 1991:19). In particular there are two traditions lacking

in the Russian context: the right of private property and human rights. Given these two fundamental rights socialism in Western Europe took another shape and direction. The Russian revolution of 1917 once again put Russia against Western Europe. Bjørn Nistad argues that the Zapaniki-Slavophile dimension vanished from the political debate, to return after the fall of communism (Nistad 2004).

The communist experience in Russia failed to accomplish what it according to Marxian theory should have accomplished. The classless and democratic society did not develop. However if there are some positive elements derived from the previous system, then the education system stands out. The Russians are a highly educated people. Unfortunately the potential that lies herein is not fully realised.

A more direct inheritance from the Soviet Union is its foreign economic debt. Boris Yeltsin declared that the loans that Gorbachev had acquired were to be paid for by the Russian Federation. When Putin became president Russia had \$154 billion in foreign debt (Rose and Munroe 2002:41). Rose and Munroe summarise the legacy into two words: economic debt and corruption.

The legacy of the Soviet Union might be twofold. First of all it is the system in itself. It seems that although the system was authoritarian, many Russians had a better lifetime during the communist period. A common sentiment among the average Russian seems to be that although we were not free at least we had a job. As Millar writes:

The severely negative economic consequences of shock therapy for the majority of Russian citizens soured most on market reform and created political opposition to further reforms in the Duma and in the various republics of Russia (Millar in Herspring 2005:129).

A second legacy is of a psychological character. The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the end of Russia as a great super power in the world. The loss of many former autonomous republics was also difficult to bear. One example could be such “hard losses” was Ukraine, which is seen as the cradle of Russia. The consequences of these legacies might be a twofold nostalgia. One kind that seeks a revival of the old system and, and one which seeks a

restoration of Russia as a superpower. In other words we have an economic on the one hand and a militaristic/ cultural nostalgia on the other.

2.3 The transition

Judging from a state and nation building perspective the fall of the Soviet Union represented a tremendous crisis for Russia². The difference between the new Russian Federation, Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia is that the two latter states dealt with Empire Building. The post communist Russian Sate however had a nation building task.

Tuminez argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union represented an anti-imperial event. The collapse had two major consequences. First of all it reduced the ethnic heterogeneity. Secondly the Russian Federation became a geo-political reality (Tuminez 2000:271).

The dissolution from the Soviet Union went peaceful, and there were little causality. Despite this, the creation of the Russian state did not produce the same result. The crisis culminated in the storming of the parliament building causing the death of 146 people (Sakwa 2002:53).

Linz and Stepan claim that Yeltsin's priorities were executed in the wrong order. "...Yeltsin's choice to privilege economic restructuring over democratic state restructuring weakened the state, weakened democracy and weakened economy" (Linz and Stepan 1996:392).

In addition to the problem of putting economic reforms before democratic reforms, came the problems with the constitution. The break with USSR was acknowledged but there was no new constitution. Russia used the same constitution that was implemented in the Brezhnev era. Hence the relationship between the executive and legislative powers was not handled in a proper way. The period from December 1991 to 1993 is by Richard Sakwa described as a "phoney democracy" (Sakwa 2002:45).

One of the striking differences between Russia and other transiting countries is the unusual path chosen by the men behind the *coup*. In most of the post soviet countries elections were

² In his annual address to the Federal Assembly 25th of April 2005 president Vladimir Putin called the collapse "...a major geopolitical disaster of the century. For the Russian nation it was a genuine drama." (www.kremlin.ru)

held immediately after the coup and those who initiated the coup won the elections. An example of this could be Poland, where the group called *Solidarity* started the coup and won the following election. When Boris Yeltsin looks back on the time after the coup he writes:

I believe the most important opportunity missed after the coup was the radical restructuring of the parliamentary system. I have a sneaking suspicion though, that society might not have been ready to nominate any decent candidates to a new legislature. The idea of dissolving the congress and scheduling new elections was in the air (as well as a constitution for the new country) although we did not take advantage of it (Linz and Stepan 1996:394).

Linz and Stepan argue that this quotation shows that democratic parties were not part of his world and that he was reluctant to take a chance on elections. The last point is important because "...democracy building is precisely a process in which political leaders have to accept the uncertainty of elections" (Linz and Stepan 1996:394). Andrei Melville argues that there is only one argument that can explain why Yeltsin refused to hold elections at the early stage: "...his reluctance to share the laurels of the victory with the persons who were only recently his close associates in the democratic movement" (Melville in Nagel 2000:479-480).

Summary – State and Nation building

The problem with state and nation building in Russia is the fact that both the nation and the state are lacking a base foundation. Although Russia is not as ethnically heterogeneous as the Soviet Union it still has problems with defining the nation's key elements. The solution with asymmetric federalism did not turn out to be the key solving this problem. As an example, albeit an extreme example, the Chechnya problem is still a problem. In the state-building process Russia has thus not yet gained monopoly on violence. But also in the economic sphere the monopoly has not been established. For example the Russian State has problems with collecting taxes from its inhabitants. The introduction of a tax reform, in 2001, with flat taxes was one effort of dealing with this problem. It is in this context that democracy must struggle.

3.0 Theoretical chapter

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will deal with the theoretical framework for this thesis. The emphasis will not only be on reviewing previous research on similar subjects, but also on presenting the models that the analysis will be based on.

The question is how the research should deal with theory. Should we start with theory and then test these established theories? Or should we analyse the data and then use theory to explain the results? This distinction is not of primary concern in this thesis. However the thesis will have a sort of test design. First of all we must review established theories in the field on political parties, legislative theory and cleavage. This in turn is used to suggest a model for the Russian case. The analysis, using this model as a basis, will then reveal answers which in turn will be explained by the theories and Russian history, culture etc.

In the following we will firstly discuss political parties. Secondly we will deal with institutional design and its consequences. In the third part of this chapter we will critically assess the concept of cleavage. In the chapter following the theoretical assessment the task is to apply the theoretical framework on the Russian case.

3.2 Liberal Representative theory

The idea of representation, rest on the fact that it is not possible for everyone to participate in the daily political life. Hence a given community sends a representative to the national capital in order to speak their case.

Through the selections of representatives, political representation is a mechanism that gives the citizens the possibilities to participate indirectly in governing their living society (Østerud et al. 1997:208 own translation).

Political representation involves the permanent transfer of government to ‘a small number of citizens elected by the rest’. It involves representatives acting as the trustees of the electors, making up their own minds and exercising their own judgement about their constituents’ interests and how these might most appropriately be met.

(Held 1999:92)

We can distinguish between a trustee and a delegate. A trustee is supposed to act at one's own conviction, whereas the delegate is bound to the instructions from the voters.

From the perspective of the trustee the, question of representation is a value in itself. The political decisions are decided by people more qualified than the voters. The delegate on the other hand is more a reflection of the population.

...since representatives, once elected, remained under the control of party managers and activists, as a result of the party's internal discipline, the autonomy previously enjoyed by representatives during their term appeared to be violated. And political platforms seemed to further restrict the freedom of action of representatives.

(Manin 1997:194-195)

There might be an argument that liberal representation theory is of historical interest, since most proponents of the theory came before the establishment of political parties. That being said, one can argue that the recent increase in mixed-member electoral systems might be a revival of liberal representation theory.

The question of representation is closely related to the choice of one of the most important institutional designs of a democratic system, namely the election law. This issue will be addressed in the review of legislative theory as well as the study of parliamentary elections in Russia.

3.3 Political parties

In order to compare parties from different countries, one must have a set of features defining what is to be compared. The problem in this case is that there is no consensus of what a party exactly is. There are several definitions given by different scholars on what a party is. There is however a widely held belief that parties seek to influence a state, and often this influence is through competing for governmental rule. This last feature, to compete for governmental rule, characterise most European countries. It is also believed that a party usually consists of more than one specific interest. That is because once in parliament one is faced with other issues than those one was elected on.

Although there is no common agreement of what a party is, many if not all argue that parties are a necessary part of a representative democracy. As Budge et al. writes:

There is little dispute nowadays that modern democracy is essentially party democracy. That is, it depends on political parties to present alternative for electoral choice and to organize government afterwards so as to bring electorally preferred policies into effect (Budge et al. in Keman 2002:65-66).

A party is thus believed to be the link between the people and the rulers. This feature of a party is, as we shall see in the next chapter, problematic in the Russian context. Theoretically democracy does not require parties, however there is an empirical fact that modern democracies are characterised by multiparty competition. As Richard Sakwa puts it: “In the world today there are no democracies without parties; but of course not all systems with parties are democracies” (Sakwa in Flikke 2004:64). The reasons that modern democracies are characterised by participating parties are two important features of democracy. First of all, democracy includes a collective right to express one’s opinion. Secondly democracy includes the right to establish free and independent organisations.

There are, as stated above, several definitions of what a party is. One way of clarifying the concept of political parties is to look at what functions they have. Giovanni Sartori claims that the fundamental functions of parties usually are:

...connecting civil and political society by crafting a government accountable to the people; advancing the perceived interests of individuals, groups and social strata while aiming consciously to develop these constituencies; and providing a link between civil society and the state, espousing the claims of the one and enforcing the rules of the other (Sakwa in Flikke 2004:64).

According to Joseph Schumpeter “A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power” (Schumpeter 1992:283). Richard Rose elaborates Schumpeter’s elitist view by claiming that:

Supply and demand considerations are combined by Joseph Schumpeter into an elitist theory of democracy, where oligopolistic elites supply voters with parties among which they can choose (Brown 2001:215).

Schumpeter's way of viewing parties is perhaps more adequate when used on the Russian case. As we saw in the conceptualization of cleavages many parties *do* present themselves *de novo* at each election.

In the Russian case and other post communist countries one faces the term "bloc" as well as "alliances". These electoral actors must in my mind be viewed as something qualitatively different from the term "party". Not only are we facing a different term but we are also entering the field of institutional interference. Who decides whether a group is to be called a party or a bloc? The institutional interference is crucial when interpreting voting behaviour as well as party behaviour. This will be discussed further in the chapter on institutional design. Alan Ware's definition is:

A political party is an institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and (b) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to aggregate interests.
(Ware 1996:5)

Our working definition for the moment would be: "A political party is a manifestation of a cleavage, and once the cleavage is manifested as a party it seeks influence in governing the state." This definition is depending on the connotation as well as denotation of the concept cleavage which will be addressed further.

3.4 Institutional Design

It is not enough knowing how political parties function we must also take a look at where parties function. To put it another way, we must study how the political parties compete against each other and on what arena this combat takes place.

The structure of the state has been given much attention in the studies on transitional countries the last decades. Particularly when comparing the transitional states with the mature

democracies this attention becomes interesting. As mentioned in the introduction the breakdown of the USSR and its firm grip on Eastern Europe made it possible to test established political scientific theories. How would the voters in these new democracies react to their new institutions? How would the market liberalisation reform be implemented?

There are several aspects worth studying in this field. The focus in this thesis will be on Russia's national assembly, in particular the lower house, the state Duma. The reason for this is that this is where party competition in Russia takes place. In addition we must cast into light three other aspects concerning the institutional arrangements. First of all we will consider difference between a presidential regime and a parliamentary regime. Secondly it is important to recognise how the question of territoriality is organised. Here we are interested in the difference between a unitary and a federal structure. Thirdly we will deal with the election laws and their implications on the party system.

Governance style: presidentialism and parliamentarism

The problem with presidential systems is according to Juan Linz the possibilities of conflict between the legislative and the executive power. Both institutions can claim legitimacy.

One of the advantages with presidentialism is that it is supposedly more efficient and stable. In a transitional country this is rather important, since the new regime must perform economically. Freedom of speech does not put food on the table. One reason for this argument is that the President can appoint whoever he wants without considering "... the demands of coalition parties or even powerful personalities or factional leaders in their own party assures greater cabinet stability" (Linz 1994:31). The problem of course is if the President "picks the wrong guy". The system opens at least in theory for a possibility that the president uses cabinet positions as a payback for previous help (for instance during campaign).

The consequence of Presidentialism and a multi party system is that the president does not favour or endorse any of the parties. "It is not only personalities and political culture, but also political structures that explain why presidents have acted against parties" (Mainwaring in Linz 1994:35-36).

The advantage of parliamentarism is that the threshold for representation is rather low. It is easier for different groups in a society to get their voices heard when different parties compete. The trade-off may be an unstable, often coalition-government. The parliamentary way of governing often produces instable and sometimes unaccountable government. The unaccountable aspect enters when parties form government at the expense of the voter's wishes. Presidentialism on the other hand produces more stable governments.

Semi-Presidential systems

There are also countries that combine the two aforementioned systems of governance. This system is described as semi-presidential, a concept introduced by Maurice Duverger. Duverger introduced the concept to describe and compare the French Fifth Republic.

For him, this 'new' regime type has three characteristics: the president is 'elected by universal suffrage', has 'quite considerable powers' and faces 'a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show opposition to them' (Duverger (1980:166) referred in Siaroff 2003)

Territorial structure: federalism versus a unitary state

The question of the territorial structure is usually answered in the immediate aftermath of a regime change. The way the new leaders deal with this question will determine whether the outcome of the transition will be bloody or not. At the extreme this can lead to a civil war.

The territorial consolidation might not be settled once the structure is decided and may be peacefully negotiated for months if not years after the regime change.

Election laws: rules of the game

There is a wide range of election system throughout the world. In the literature it has been common to distinguish between systems based upon the so called "First past the post" system (FPTP) and systems with proportional representation (PR). In the FPTP one usually has single mandate districts, which means that each district sends one representative to the national assembly. The candidate who gets most votes wins the seat. This means that if there are two candidates and candidate A gets 55 % of the votes and candidate B gets 45%, then candidate A wins and the votes for candidate B are "wasted". In the PR system the votes are distributed

proportionally. The districts are no longer single mandate, but multi-seat districts. If we use the same example here and assume that instead of candidates we now have parties, then party A gets 55% of the seats in the national assembly and party B gets 45%. These are two very broad categories, and within these there are quite a few variations.

In the later years, however it has become more common to have so called Mixed-Member systems. These systems are hybrids of the two aforementioned systems, and here the variations within the category are perhaps even more complex. The possibilities of how to mix the system are numerous but:

...in general electoral formulas break down into nominal vs. list systems (...) there are (at least) two separate overlapping tiers, one of which employs allocation of seats nominally while another employs allocation to party lists. (Shugart and Wattenberg 2003:11)

The way votes are counted and how they are transferred into parliamentary seats, is crucial in influencing how parties compete. One of the most famous social “laws” in political science is Duvergers Law. This law is defined as follows: “A system with simple majority in one round election tends to develop a two party-system” (Kunhle, in Larsen 2003:68 own translation). A two-party system is defined as: “a system where the government power changes between to large independent parties.” (Ibid 2003:69). This “law” has created a vast literature of discussion. According to Kunhle there has developed a distinction between Duverges Law and Duvergers hypothesis. The hypothesis claims that elections with proportional representation (PR) leads to a multiparty system. Since most of the post-communists states have developed a mixed-member system, one could expect the following results: the development of multiparty system in the PR elections and the development of two-party system in the majority elections.

The FPTP and PR election system represent one of the most significant mechanisms that can be used in order to establish a party system. It is therefore reasonable to ask, who decides what electoral system should the regime have? It is quite clear that in transitional countries this is one of the most important questions that need to be considered. The reason for this is that herein lays a vast opportunity for what we can call institutional engineering.

There is in addition to the two election system, or the combination of them, other mechanisms that determine parties and party system development. One of these, which are limited to the PR system, is thresholds. In order to avoid a number of small parties entering the parliament, it is useful to have a threshold in pct. This threshold says that if a party do not cross for instance 4 pct. then it will not gain representation in parliament. The higher this threshold is the more difficult it is for small parties to gain representation. Another area of influence is the question of districts. How many election districts should there be? What is the size in terms of area and population? An interesting country in terms of threshold and district is the Netherlands. In this electoral system there is no threshold and only one district. With a population of around 16 million and a 150 seat parliament, you only need around 0,67 pct of the votes which is about 107 thousand votes to get a seat.

3.5 Civil Society - the glue between institution and parties?

This is the feature in which the parties can affect the most. Whereas the two foregoing conditions, governance style and election system, are more like “rules of the game”, this point is more like “tactics of the game”. To put it differently, parties foster a nation’s citizens and teach them how to behave in a democratic manner. But civil society can also affect political parties. As Karen Dawisha notes: “...a strong civil society is necessary but not a sufficient condition for a strong party and system and it is difficult to examples where parties have been established in states with weak civil cultures” (Dawisha 1997:55). From this perspective parties are viewed as a dependent variable. But parties can also be viewed as an independent variable in the sense mentioned above, as a democratisation of the nation/ people. Richard Ross argues that from this perspective (parties as independent variable) institutional factors matter. “Hence before parties can play their vital role in the process of consolidating democracy, parties themselves must be institutionalised and consolidated” (Ross 2002:38).

In the part on institutional features we mentioned the danger of corruption and personal contacts in presidential system. This becomes particularly dangerous if the presidential regime is centred on a populist and charismatic leader. As Gill notes:

The important point about a charismatic tie is that it is immediate and direct, with the relationship between leader and followers based upon emotional commitment to the leader not mediated through any organisational structure. (Gill in Flikke 2004:53)

When the means for press one's interests is through personal contacts, and not through formal channels then it undercuts the rationale for political organisation.

3.6 Cleavage

In political sociology *Party Systems and Voter Alignment* edited and contributed by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, represents a milestone. Published more than 35 years ago it is: "... one of the most central references, when it comes to the concept cleavage" (Aardal 1994:219). However it is far from agreed what (a) cleavage is. Lipset and Rokkan even use synonyms like conflicts and oppositions. The problem is that although Lipset and Rokkan provided an important theoretical as well as empirical framework in understanding political behaviour, they did not explicitly define the concept of cleavage. One of the most widely used concepts in political science was therefore not defined and has since been used in many different ways.

What we can say however, is that cleavages represent the raw material of politics. Broadly speaking, we deal with something that separates "us" from "them". All societies have cleavages, what varies is the intensity and frequencies. This can be ordinary matters such as difference in age, gender and so on. Moving further to more seemingly complex cleavages we find for instances differences between territorial units. This can be two villages separated from each other by a river, a fjord or a mountain. These types of cleavages can, if driven to the extreme, result in armed conflicts or they can result in harmless myths for instance that highlanders are mean (in economic sense) and the lowlanders are big spenders.

When Max Weber tried to reach a definition of the spirit of capitalism he did not define the concept straightforward:

Die endgültige begriffliche Erfassung kann daher nicht am Anfang, sondern muß am Schluß der Untersuchung stehen: es wird sich m. a. W. erst im Lauf der Erörterung und als deren wesentliches Ergebnis zu zeigen haben, wie das, was wir hier unter dem "Geist" des Kapitalismus verstehen, am besten - d. h. für die uns hier interessierenden Gesichtspunkte adäquatesten - zu formulieren sei. (Weber 1999:30 [Online])

It is in the same manner that we will try to reach an understanding of what a cleavage is. By discussing the concept as well as implementing the concept to the empirical case we might be able to get a better insight in the concept.

Lipset and Rokkan argued that there were four critical junctures in European history that had major consequences for the party systems. This can be summarized in the table below.


Table 1 Cleavages and critical junctures

Critical juncture	Cleavage	Central conflicts
Reformation/ Counter reformation 16 th – 17 th centuries	Periphery centre	National vs. supra national religion
National revolution 1789 and after	Church vs. state	Secular vs. religious control of mass education
Industrial revolution 19 th century	Primary sector Secondary sector	Toll politics: free trade vs. protection of agricultural products
	Employee vs. employer	Employees vs. employers rights
Russian revolution 1917 and after	Communism vs. socialism	Integration in national state vs. support for international revolutionary movements

Source: Flora in Hagtvet 1992:123 and Lipset and Rokkan 1967:47

These conflicts can again be structured along two dimensions the centre-periphery and the culture – economy.

Figure 1 Lipset and Rokkan's cleavage structure



Latent and manifested cleavages

On a general basis we distinguish between two types of cleavages, i.e. latent and manifest cleavages. Latent cleavages are those which exist within a given society. Manifest cleavages are cleavages which are being translated into political action. This translation can take various shapes, for instance a political party, demonstrations, and various voluntary organizations to mention a few. The main focus in this thesis will be on political parties. Political parties are seen as the main agent of political conflict.

The distinction between latent and manifest cleavages is important. Often when scientists write about cleavage they mean the manifest cleavage. For instance Geir Møller defines political cleavage:

Political cleavage may be defined as established and recognised divisions between parties. These cleavages represent fundamental ideological identities that clarify choices made by the parties, and when these choices are understood by the mass public, also generate voter support. (Møller 2000:190)

Quite clearly Møller here talks about manifest cleavages. We also get a notion of some latent cleavages that the parties represent. Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair stress the importance of separating the concepts political cleavages and cleavages. They claim that those who use this concept, for instance Robert Dahl, removes social structure and "... end up by failing to distinguish the notion of political cleavage from other concepts such as political opposition or political division." (Bartolini and Mair 1990:213)

The question of diversity within a society has always produced extensive literature. It would be fair to say that the production increased alongside with the expansion of the industrial society. The great sociological thinkers such as Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim put heavy emphasis on the diversity within a society. The industrial revolution is also seen as a crucial variable in the Lipset and Rokkan book. Hence the industrial revolution did not only change society on a macro level like changes in economic production, but it also produced changes at the micro level among society's individuals. Lipset and Rokkan's aim is to link the pattern of party formation to societal changes (Ware 1996).


The relationship between micro and macro is in fact the core of the matter. What impact has the individual on parties and vice versa? Bartolini and Mair argue that:

The essential problem with the concept of cleavage lies in its intermediary location between the two main approaches of political sociology: that of social stratification and its impact on institutions and political behaviour, on the one hand, and that of political institutions and their impact on social structure and change on the other. (Bartolini and Mair 1990:213)

When viewing Møllers definition of a political cleavage we might believe according to his definition that once a cleavage has been manifested it has freed itself from its social structure.

In the discussion above we see that the problem lies mainly in interpreting the micro macro conflict. In my view Bartolini and Mair have a very vibrant solution to this problem (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 The elements in Bartolini and Mairs Definition of the Cleavage concept.



Source: Skare 1998:176

They claim that cleavages consist of three elements: an empirical, a normative and an organisational element. This model provides us with a dynamic understanding of the concept.

Once a cleavage is manifested it is not freed from its empirical element. In fact it is even more bound to its empirical element in the sense that the manifest cleavage must respond to the demands from the bottom. However to say that the manifest cleavage is solely dependent on the latent cleavage is wrong. A political party can and will try to influence the public in order to gain more votes at the election day.

The Bartolini and Mair model does not suggest a difference between latent and manifest cleavage.

...The term 'cleavage' should be restricted to the indication of a dividing line in a polity which refers to and combines *all* three aspects, and that alternative terms should be adopted when referring to objective social distinctions or to ideological, political and organisational division *per se*. (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 216)

The Bartolini and Mair model suggests that a cleavage must combine all three aspects. Following this prerequisite the conflict is not a cleavage until there has been established as a political party or some kind of organisation. This might be one of the weaknesses of the definition. One of the purposes with a definition or a conceptualisation is to distinguish a concept from others. This means that it must have some characteristics that separate it from other concepts. Otherwise the concept will encompass all possible aspects of phenomena. The Bartolini and Mair model fails to separate between significant and insignificant cleavages.

The Bartolini and Mair approach provide us with an inductive way of understanding the concept of cleavage. The Lipset and Rokkan model gives us a deductive way of analysing cleavages. By combining these theories we will try to achieve a better understanding of the Russian voters.

The question of measuring cleavages

The cleavages must be translated into variables in order to measure them. There are several ways of measuring cleavages; however I believe that there are two ways which must be combined. These two ways are what I call an explorer's way and an experimenter's way. The explorer does not assume anything as a matter of course. He tries to include as many variables as possible in a model. The experimenter on the other hand "knows" what the matter of

course is and merely tests it. The challenge is to combine these to extremes when analysing for instance voting behaviour.

One could argue that cleavage is something located at a macro level, but needs to be studied at a micro level. For my part this is partly true, but I believe that cleavage can simply be put between the voters and parties. Neither voters nor parties are passive actors in the electoral game. Both seek to improve their life condition. In this perspective a cleavage is both a constraint as well as a catalyst.

Although this thesis primarily rests on the study of voting behaviour this does not imply that I believe that cleavages are solely defined by the voters. Cleavages must be understood as a reciprocal relationship between parties and voters. Neither parties nor voters are passive actors in the political play. Cleavage must therefore be placed between the voters and the parties. The voter defines a cleavage just as much as the parties do. It is important to note that this is an ideal type and it should be used with caution. The voter decides what to vote all by himself. The model suggests a rational view of the actors.

Since the possibilities of studying the cleavages are partly limited to the data available, it is important to grasp a coherent picture of the system that is studied. This thesis will solve this problem through a qualitative study of political parties, and a quantitative study of voting behaviour. The study of voting behaviour and political parties is not enough in order to reveal the cleavages in a society. This is a point where I agree with the Bartolini and Mair model i.e. the fact that a cleavage consist of all three aspects (an organizational, a normative and an empirical element). Therefore when studying cleavages in a society one must also analyse the institutional design and the society's history.

4.0 Applying the theoretical framework on the Russian Case

It is a challenge to structure this chapter in a lucid and logical way. The reason for this is that these three categories (cleavage, parties and institutions) are so closely intertwined with one another. They are not mutually exclusive categories and the way they are ranged in terms of beginning and end does not suggest a hierarchy of importance. Therefore this presentation will sometimes repeat itself.

4.1 Cleavages in Russia

The problem with applying the theoretical framework presented above, to the Russian case can be summarized into one word: *time*. The major difference between Russia and Western Europe is its experience with democracy both in time and space. Many of the political parties that exist in present European party systems have more than 50 years of experience. This problem can be linked with what Stein Rokkan called the four institutional thresholds. In this respect we can say that all these thresholds were open to all political parties, at least in theory, once the Soviet Union was history. This means that from a western European perspective the political parties had not enough time to build a large base of support from the voters. In other words there were a shortage of time to build a cleavage alignment between parties and voters.

Russian politics can be characterised as Figure 3 shows. There are four main cleavages. The first cleavage is the one between Kremlin and the periphery. The concept of periphery is used here in its broadest sense, and not primarily focused on geographic location. In fact, as we shall see, the political periphery is not located in the rural areas, but in the urban areas of Russia. This cleavage has similarities with the Lipset and Rokkan's centre – periphery axis still there are some differences. The most important difference is of institutional character. Since the Kremlin is headed by an elected president, it has so far been difficult for the political parties to pass the fourth of Rokkans institutional thresholds, namely the translation of parliamentary strength into executive power (Rokkan 1970:79-80). In the chapter on institutional design in Russia this will become more evident. There might be an argument that since this axis is incarnated in one person i.e. the president, it does not represent a cleavage. Nonetheless I believe that this axis goes beyond a support for the president. The reason for this is that it does not only imply who you support but it also implies how you think that Russia should be governed.

The second cleavage is the Zapadniki - Slavophile dimension. This is an old and historic division and it can be traced back to the 1840s. The conflict here deals with what direction to look either to the east or to the west. The Zapadniki (which is the Russian for Westerners), believed that Russia should try to copy Western-Europe, while the Slavophiles thought that Russia should follow its own path based on their own culture and tradition (Nistad 2004). Bjørn Nistad characterises this conflict in the 19th century as "...probably the most important battle in Russian ideological history. Every political movement later up to the Russian revolution in 1917 had to deal with this conflict" (Nistad 2004:64). Nistad also claims that after the collapse of the Soviet Union this conflict has seen its revival.

...Today when the communistic internationalist slogans have been discarded, the conflict between proponents and opponents of whether Russia should bind its future in collaboration with Western-Europe and USA, is without doubt the most important conflict in Russian politics. (Nistad 2004:64)

This cleavage does not bear any immediate resemblance to the Lipset Rokkan model for Western Europe. Nevertheless it might be argued that this is a cultural cleavage. Originally the slavophiles endorsed a religious dimension. The slavophiles argued that Russia was distinct from Western Europe because of the role of the Orthodox Church. As Pipes writes:

According to Slavophile theory, all essential differences between Russia and the west were ultimately traceable to religion. (...)Thanks to Orthodoxy, Russians have managed to retain 'integral' personalities in which logic and faith fused to produce a superior kind of knowledge which Alexis Khomiakov, Slavophilism's outstanding theorist, called 'living knowledge' (zhivoe znanie). (Pipes 1995:266-267)

The Zapadniks seek a more secular approach. Historically the Zapadniki were not as coherent as a group as the Slavophiles. Yet there were some broad elements most of them embraced.


...the Westernizers took a positive view of Western political development and criticised the Russian system (...) whereas the Slavophiles anchored their entire ideology in their interpretation and appraisal of Orthodoxy, the Westernizers assigned relatively little importance to religion. (Riasanovsky 1993:364)

The third cleavage is founded on a judgement of the past. In particular we are here dealing with the previous communist regime. Either you are nostalgic towards it or you reject it and seek other possibilities. Another option is to be satisfied with the present situation. People who are satisfied with the status quo will therefore position themselves in the centre of this axis. This axis is also an extension of the market vs. state economy cleavage in the sense that it clearly correlates with one another. If you are nostalgic towards the past communist regime it is reasonable to expect that you also endorse a state controlled economy. There might also be a more cultural form of nostalgia. This kind might be labelled power nostalgia, thus seeking a restoration of Russia as a super power.

The last cleavage is the question of what economic system Russia should have. The counterparts here are market liberalism and planned economy. This is a cleavage in concert with what Lipset and Rokkan label "Owner-Worker Cleavage" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:47). One of the problems with this axis is that the industrialisation of Russian happened in authoritarian regimes. This means that both in the Tsarist and communist regime the possibilities to establish a workers party, such as the Social Democratic parties in Western Europe, were absent. The alignment of workers happened on quite different premises.

Quite clearly these conflict lines can, and frequently do, overlap and cross cut each other. It seems for instance plausible that people who support a market economic reform, at the same time reject the previous anti-capitalistic regime. Although a cleavage may overlap, it is the model's intention to suggest a hierarchy of cleavages i.e. that some cleavages are more important than others.

Figure 3 A intuitive cleavage model for the Russian case



- K=Kremlin**
- P=Periphery**
- Z=Zapadniki**
- Sla=Slavophile**
- M= Market Economy**
- Sce= State Controlled Economy**
- F = Future oriented**
- N= Nostalgia towards Communist regime**

This model of the cleavages is supposed to cover the most significant cleavages in the Russian Society. One might ask whether there are other cleavages. Quite clearly there are but it is the author's view that the most significant cleavages are represented here. The goal is to present a model as simple as possible, but at the same time an explanatory model as possible. The model is not thought to be a deterministic one.

There are two reservations for the model. First of all it is not directly transferable to real life.³ For instance the economy axis is not thought to suggest that there are a sizeable group of people that wants a return to fully state controlled economy. Most Russians today acknowledge that chances for a return to the past are diminished. At the same time there are strong differences between the parties' economic platforms. The second reservation for the model is that the axis can have different denotations for various parties. Two parties can represent nostalgia but they are nostalgic of different parts of the past. The question of what nostalgia they represent is not so important however. It is the fact that they are nostalgic that is of interest.

4.2 Russian parties and party system

Before classifying the Russian Political parties, it would be useful to present the parties as well as tracking their electoral history. As mentioned above this thesis focuses on political parties that are represented in the State Duma. Two reasons can justify this selection. The first reason is of parsimonious character. The State Duma elections are contested by more than 20 different political parties and electoral blocs and taking all those into consideration will not provide us with a better understanding of the Russian party system. As with the cleavage model the goal is to explain as much as possible with a model that is as simple as possible. Secondly it can be justified from a theoretical perspective. Representation is a form of manifestation of cleavage. In other words only the most important cleavages manage to pass the institutional and societal barriers and gain representation.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)

Contrary to many reformed communist parties in Eastern Europe the KPRF can still be labelled as communistic. This is the largest successor of the former CPSU. Its economic

³ A model does not reflect the entire reality in the same way as a painting will never grasp the entire landscape.

platform focuses on a planned market economy with a powerful state. Although they still are labelled communistic, they have reformed to a certain degree. The party does not oppose private ownership, and will process reform without a shock therapy. The party's leader, Gennadi Zyuganov, talks of reforms "...with a 'human face' and being more 'socially orientated' " (Jeffries 2002:469). In our classification of the party system this party is categorised as a nostalgic opposition party. Since the KPRF is the former regime party it is determined to be a nostalgic party. The party is a manifestation of the nostalgic cleavage as well as the classic Lipset and Rokkan workers-employers cleavage. In addition it is a party that stands out as *the* opposition party. Another important feature of this party is that it is perhaps the strongest party in terms of organizational capacity.

Party of power

The Kremlin has in each election sought to establish a "party of power", who would dominate the State Duma with a considerable number of seats.⁴ This party was to be a party that was loyal to the president and ensuring governmental economic reforms to be carried out.

To simplify the differences between Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin we can say that Putin managed to create a successful party of power in the State Duma, whereas Yeltsin did not.

The term party power is used to describe a party that supports the government without being a ruling party. As Stanovaya writes: "...a party of power is one that represents the interests of the authorities. Its main distinction from a ruling party is that the decision-making nucleus remains outside the party." (Stanovaya 2005 [online])

The first attempt of establishing a loyal party was in 1993 with Russia's Choice (VR) headed by Yegor Gaidar. The candidates listed included many members of the pre election cabinet. The party supported the market economic reform line. In the next Duma election Kremlin once again failed to establish a parliamentary strong party power. *Nash Dom Rossia* was sometimes nicknamed *Nash Dom Gazprom* because of its leader Viktor Chernomyrdin who also headed the state owned oil company Gazprom.

The 1999 campaign developed to become a showdown between Unity and Fatherland - All Russia (OVR). Unity was established three months before the election "...and served as a means to neutralise the overtly anti-Kremlin governors' bloc OVR." (Petrov 2004:97)

⁴ Boris Yeltsin also tried to establish a "loyal opposition" in the 1995 State Duma election. Yeltsin wanted a two-party system with a party of power headed by Ivan Rybkin. The party was named "The Ivan Rybkin Bloc".

The two parties merged into one in 2000 under the name Unified Russia (UR). This party won the election in 2003, winning her meaning in absolute terms. When the elected candidates from the SMD tier revealed their party affiliation UR had a 2/3 majority in the State Duma, and thereby the possibilities to make constitutional changes.

What we must bear in mind is the question of how disciplined these party organizations are once in parliament. When having a directly elected president as the Russian case, one should expect according to Moser, less cohesive parliamentary parties (Moser 2003).

Union of Right Forces (SPS)

This party emerged on the political stage in the 1999 Duma election. As the party name denotes this is a union of various groups with a right wing oriented policy. The party is partly rooted in the early reform oriented parties, like Russia's Choice in 1993 and Democratic Choice or Russia in 1995 headed by Yegor Gaidar. Many of the candidates from this party have previously governmental experience. One of the top candidates on the federation list in 2003 was Anatoly Chubais who is seen as one of the most important men behind the privatization of Russia.

Yabloko

Together with the LDPR and the KPRF this party has contested each election since 1993 and has gained representation in the state Duma. It failed to pass the five pct threshold in the 2003 and won four seats in the SMD. Yabloko, which is the Russian word for "Apple", was named after the founders and was called the Yavlinsky - Boldyrev - Lukin Bloc. This party is often characterised as the only real liberal political party in the Western European sense. It advocates market liberalism as well as human rights.

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia is perhaps one of the most misleading names in the history of political parties. This party is known as anything but liberal and democratic. There are two main features that are attached to this party. First of all it is a nationalistic party, often described as "extreme nationalist" (White et. al 1997:114) or "ultra-nationalistic and anti-Semitic" (Jeffries 2002:467). The second feature is the person who advocates the nationalistic policy of the party, namely its leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Among its early party platforms Zhirinovsky stated: "How I dream of our Russian soldiers washing their boots in the warm

waters of the Indian Ocean” (Jeffries 2003:468). It is worth noting that this is one of the oldest parties in Russia, established in 1990.

Rodina

This is a newcomer in Russian politics and was established in August 2003. The party or electoral alliance consists of many different leftist parties and organisations. Its leader, until the presidential election 2004, Sergey Glazyev is a former member of the KPRF.⁵ The party is sometimes labelled “left patriotic” (see for example Clem and Craumer 2005), because it advocates a leftist economic platform at the same time as it campaigns on nationalistic issues. Rodina is often believed to be a party established by Kremlin in order to compete for the votes of the KPRF (Moscow Times 2004 [online]).

The political parties can be placed in four categories:

Table 2 Russia’s Party System

Nostalgic Opposition	Pro Kremlin/ Party of Power	Liberal Opposition	Nationalistic parties
KPRF (1993-)	VR (1993-1995)	Yabloko (1993-)	LDPR (1993-)
	NDR (1995-1999)	SPS (1999-)	Rodina (2003-)
	Unity (1999-2003)	----- OVR (1999-2003)	
	UR (2003-)		

This classification of the Russian parties does not differ remarkably from other classifications (see for instance Clem and Craumer, Remington and Oates in Flikke).

⁵ After the presidential election Galzyev left the party and formed another. Dimitir Rogozin is now the leader of the party Rodina

4.3 Russia's Institutional Design

The Origins of Russian Semi-Presidential System

Russia is usually described as a semi-presidential system with a powerful president. Eugene Huskey traces the origins of the semi-presidentialism back to the end of the communist period. Towards the end of perestroika Gorbachev wanted to create institutional arrangements “that would enhance regime legitimacy and offer the leader an additional base outside of the party [CPSU]” (Huskey in Brown 2001:29). It is also worth noting that Gorbachev did not manage to combine the chairman of the new congress of people's deputies' post with this communist party office. Gorbachev wanted a more dignified and powerful constitutional office. The changes were partly based on the experiences from the French 5th republic; in particular the division of responsibilities between the president and prime minister. In this model the PM dealt with economic and social politics whereas the President dealt with foreign and national politics. This stimulated Gorbachev's passion for foreign politics and aversion for budgets.

The Soviet leaders appeared in the end of the 1980s to have given little thoughts to the issue of *cohabitat* i.e. a divided executive. The new institutional arrangements reflected lack of precision and coherence, "But the Soviet Union's new and confusing political system was also a product of Gorbachev's leadership style" (Huskey in Brown 2001:32).

The years of 1992-1993 are described as the crisis of semi-presidentialism. The problem was vested in the fact that both institutions, i.e. the president and the parliament, claimed legitimacy. The crisis ended with the storming of the assembly-building in the autumn of 1993. The referendum held in December later that year had a constitution which granted the President an enormous amount of power. The turnout was 53 per cent, which was scarcely enough. The elections have been view as flawed (White, Rose and McAllister 1997).

One of the reasons why the Russian federation went the presidential path was the results of the power struggle between Boris Yeltsin and the Congress of Deputies. Both institutions claimed legitimacy and a mandate from the Russian people. In the end Yeltsin took control over the military and commanded the storming of the White House where the deputies had barricaded themselves. The result was the bloodiest street fight in Moscow since the

Bolshevik revolution. "By demonstrating his superior force, Boris Yeltsin lived up to the Russian notion that power is not given by law but taken." (Rose & Munro 2002:30)

The design of the second republic (1993-)

Main Features:

- A directly elected President who shares the executive power with the Prime minister.
- Prime minister needs support from parliament, and is proposed by the President. If the parliament rejects the PM three times, the President can dissolve the parliament and hold new elections.
- Ministers (except PM) are not subject to parliamentary confirmation. However the ministers are part of the parliamentary practice such as questioning time in Duma
- Parliament can impeach the President but the rules and procedures for that are complex and "almost" impossible to achieve.

This design exhibits many features of what O'Donnel calls "delegative democracy".

Delegative democracies rest on the premises that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term in office. (O'Donnel in Brown 2001:38)

The dangers with a strong president might therefore be twofold. First of all, the problem with too much power in one position and secondly a fixed term office that makes it almost impossible to change a leader even if this is necessary.

The argument is therefore that when the power is vested in one person only (almost all power) this will discredit the regime in the eyes of the opposition. One must give the anti-democratic forces something, so that they stay in the political game (and not entering other arenas to express their discontent/ grievances). Huskey argues that:

Yeltsin seem to have understood that (...) [and] before the appointment of a Communist minister in December 1994, Russia had in a place a de facto coalition government, wither ministers representing various political perspectives and sectoral interests. (Huskey in Brown 2001:43)

What is important about a presidential election according to Moser is a concentration of votes into a choice for a single individual to fill a single office. This will narrow the options for the voters. An important institutional feature of the Russian presidential election is the two-round election. As Linz writes: “A two-round election with a runoff between leading candidates reduces the uncertainty and there by might help produce a more rationally calculated outcome” (Linz 1994:21).

The second point is more difficult. Since the President is elected on a fixed term, it is very difficult to replace the elected office other than through a new election. This can only be done through impeachment, which is nearly impossible in Russia. If the president were subject to impeachment this “...is likely to provoke a regime crisis” (Linz 1994).

As pointed out above in the theoretical chapter the claimed advantage of presidentialism is a stable executive. Nichols argues that: “*presidentialism is more likely than other arrangements to preserve processes of democratic consolidation in societies that are characterized by a lack of social trust* (Nichols 2001:7 [Italics in original]).

The effect on the Party System

Raymond Aron writes that

The President of the republic is the supreme authority as long as he has a majority in the national assembly, but must abandon the reality of power to the prime minister if ever a party other than his own has a majority in the assembly. (Aron 1982:8)

Applying this to the Russian case is interesting because it is partly true and partly false. First of all the president in Russia has not an own party in the formal sense. Both Yeltsin and Putin avoided to be labelled as party candidates and ran on independent grounds. Nevertheless both candidates endorsed some parties both explicitly and implicitly. Neither Yeltsin nor Putin has abandoned the reality of power to the prime minister. Once that being said, if one compares the Yeltsin years and Putin’s second term the difference is rather striking. Yeltsin had to deal with a Duma where his “own” party was far from majority and his fierce opponents, the communist party in particular, were the largest bloc. Putin on the other hand managed to secure a 2/3 majority in the Duma, something which quite clearly puts him in a better position

than that of Yeltsin. The argument therefore is that it is not necessarily the presidential design in itself that affects the party development; rather it is the behaviour of those who have held the presidency.

Both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have refused to formally link their electoral campaign to political parties. While Putin has officially endorsed one party he has never campaigned for presidency with its logos. Bjørn Nistads argues that it might be fruitful to compare Putin and Charles De Gaulle. “As with Putin, de Gaulle appealed to the patriotism of his country compatriots, and he as well tried to make the president a national icon raised above party politics.” (Nistad 2004:306)

Russia is perhaps best compared to the French fifth republic. In both cases a territorial crisis called for a system change. In Russia it was the fall of Soviet Union, in France it was the loss of Algeria. However there are important differences as Sakwa writes: “The separation of Algeria or Ireland did not strike at the very heart of the identities of France or Britain, But Russia appeared to lose part of its soul” (Sakwa 2002:263).

Until now we have not taken into considerations whether the Russian semi-presidential system, meets the minimal definition of a parliamentary democracy. The minimal definition of parliamentary democracy provided by Strøm, Müller and Bergman says that:

Parliamentary government is a system of government in which the Prime minister and his or her cabinet are accountable to any majority of the member of parliament and can be voted out of office by the latter, through an ordinary or constructive vote of no confidence. (Strøm et al. 2003:13)

Quite clearly one can argue that this is not the case in Russia. The possibilities of rejecting a PM and his or her cabinet in Russia constitute an enormous challenge for the political parties in the State Duma. The one time that this nearly happened, was in April 1998 when the Duma deputies twice rejected the proposed PM Sergei Kiriyenko. This time the Duma and the president repelled force with force.

The Electoral System

The election system in Russia will be elaborated in the election chapter, but there is one aspect that needs to be taken into consideration. That is the fact that parties are not allowed to organize around so called “sectional” interest. As is evident in the figure displaying cleavages in Russia, we see that there is no religious cleavage in Russia that has manifested itself as a political party. The reason for this is to be found in the institutional design of the election system. The institutional mechanism does not provide the option of establishing a party on religious grounds. As Richard Sakwa argues:

Parties are not allowed to appeal to sectional interest and those advancing religious, racial, ethnic and professional causes are forbidden. Russian parties are thus prohibited from drawing on the power of the cleavages that have shaped Western Party system. (Sakwa 2004:81)

This means that the peripheral-cultural axis in the Lipset and Rokkan model has not managed to legitimise itself. Since this cultural periphery is located outside party competition, it is tempting to suggest that party politics is moved toward the economic centre.

Summary Institutional Design

The consequences of the semipresidential system are weak political parties. The reasons for this are twofold. First of all it is because the parties do not form the cabinet. Secondly the Presidents elected so far have refused to endorse political parties in the sense that they run on the Party ticket in the elections. They rather seek to distinguish themselves and run as independents.

4.4 Civil Society in Russia

In his article on civil society Graeme Gill concludes that

Russian civil society remains stunted in the sense that the mass of civil society organizations and groups do not interact in a meaningful way with the polity and are unable to exercise much restraining power upon the political leadership.

(Gill in Flikke 2004:61)


One of the reasons for this is the development of the presidential regime. What characterised the Yeltsin era was the development of a personalistic and charismatic leader. Yeltsin referred to himself as “Tsar Boris”. Gill notes that “This personalist appeal was inherently anti-institutional, rejecting the importance of institutional regularity and of institutions linking populace and polity” (Gill in Flikke 2004:54). Accordingly Putin “...has merely replicated the institutional barrier for civil society growth by the personalistic nature of Yeltsin regime.” (Ibid:60).

4.5 Expectations for the analysis

By examining the various aspects of the Russian political system, from institutional design, civil society and political parties we have thus presented a qualitative understanding of the Russian society. In chapter 5 and 6 we will penetrate deeper into party politics in Russia, studying the parliament and the elections. In the analysis chapter we will make a shift from the organisational and institutional level to the level of voting behaviour. In other words the focus will be on the voters. It is therefore useful to present the reader with the expectations for this analysis.

If there are cleavages in the Russian electorate then this will be showed through distances between the different parties’ respective voters. In other words some parties will advocate the proposed cleavages more than others. Simplifying the argument we can use the intuitive cleavage model presented in Figure 4 and place the parties inside the figure (see Figure 3 for explanations of abbreviations).

Figure 4 Placing the Party Categories in the Intuitive Cleavage Model



Here we have placed the party categories and not the parties themselves. The reason for this is that one of the purposes of the analysis is to locate the parties.

Party of Power


The question that arises is whether there are differences between the different parties of power? A simple answer could be that the party of power depends on the popularity of the power, i.e. the President. Nevertheless this issue is about turnout and the numerical strengths of a party, and not necessarily about cleavages. Therefore we do not expect differences between the different parties of power, other than numerical strengths of the variations. The variations are therefore expected to fall along the same lines. Taking this a step further we expect that the parties of power consist of non nostalgic voters. The reason for this is that it seems reasonable that a support for the present regime is also a rejection of the previous regime. If you neither support the present regime nor the previous one, then you vote for another party.

Communist

The Communists are expected to be strongly against the present regime. This is most likely displayed in two ways. First of all the communist voters will be strongly against the Kremlin. Secondly the very same voters will claim that “everything was better before”, meaning a strong nostalgic sentiment for the past. We thereby expect that the Communists will display oppositional results towards the Party of Power.

This relationship between the Communists and the Party of Power we can assess in a more detailed figure:

Figure 5 Expected placement of the Party of Power and the Communists



Liberals


We expect that there are little distance between the two liberal parties. As we have discussed above the major difference between SPS and Yabloko is their stance towards Kremlin. It will be very interesting to see if the voters recognise this difference between the two liberal parties. It is expected that both parties will display a voter profile with strong elements of Zapadniki.

Nationalist

As for the nationalistic voters we anticipate that these voters are oppositional to the Liberals. To put it differently, we expect the nationalistic voters to locate themselves at the end on the Slavophile axis. Their judgment of the Kremlin is likely to be negative. The reasons for expecting this could be that the nationalistic voters are not satisfied with the Kremlin’s effort in strengthening the Russian state both in domestic as well as international areas.

As with the Party of Power and the communists we can try to place these party categories within a figure that defines a political space.

Figure 6 Expected placement of the Liberals and the Nationalists



These expectations are based on the assumptions of voters, placing the parties purely on the basis of a perceived party space in reality. We will expect voters also to be influenced by more short term effects. When a party move to occupy a portion of the cleavage place, from one election to another, it will not be unreasonable to expect that change of cleavage placement for one party might change the placement of other parties.

5.0 The State Duma

In December 1993 Russians for the first time since 1917 had a multiparty election. In this chapter we will track down some important elements in the first experience with national elections from 1905 to 1917. Thereafter we shall examine how the present state Duma functions. In particular the focus here will rest on the development of factions.

5.1 *The history of the State Duma*

The first Russian State Duma was convened on May 10, 1906. This had happened after a period characterised by strikes, an aborted revolution, and a lost war against Japan. Tsar Nicholas II issued on October 30th, what is later to be called the October Manifesto. This document

...guaranteed civil liberties to the Russians, announced a Duma with the true legislative function of passing or rejecting all proposed laws, and promised a further expansion of the new order in Russia. In short, the October Manifesto made the empire of the Romanovs a constitutional monarchy. (Riasanovsky 1993:407-408)

The first Duma did not produce the desired outcome and was dissolved after 73 days. The second Duma did not last very much longer and ended after 3 months. The two unsuccessful Dumas led by Tsar Nicholas II and his government changed the election law. To put it briefly most levels of society that had previously gained representation lost it except for the gentry who increased its representation.⁶ As Walsh puts it: “The new law gave disproportional representation to the large landowners and to the wealthy urban class” (Walsh 1950:147). This change gave the wanted results and the third and fourth Duma were composed of “men of substance” (Walsh 1950). According to Riasanovsky the last two Dumas did not produce any significant change in the Russian society:

Only Stolypin’s [Prime Minister] controversial agrarian legislation attempted a sweeping change in the condition of the Russian people, and even that legislation had perhaps too narrow a scope. (Riasanovsky 1993:415)

⁶ The changes were justified by: “...his [Tsar Nicholas II] historic power, his right to abrogate what he had granted, and his intention to answer for the destinies of the Russian state only before the altar of God who had given him his authority!” (Riasanovsky 1993:411)”

These developments in the early Dumas reveal a pattern quite similar to the present Dumas. First of all it is the undesired outcome that the centre did not want. The elections produced a Duma that consisted of a majority of oppositional parties. Secondly the attempts from the executive to control or create a loyal legislative assembly are also in accordance with the post communist Dumas. The crafting element in making electoral laws in order to create a favourable outcome is however not peculiar to the Russian case.

There is an important lesson from these early experiences with elections that should be noted. It is a popular view that Russians display an authoritarian mind, and seek to be ruled by an authoritarian leader. The years of Tsarist Rule and the communist regime are taken as evidence. Even though there were many complexities and limitations the election law of the first two Dumas were rather liberal in terms of suffrage. Walsh takes the participation in the elections as a rejection of the authoritarian notion. As he writes:

The wide-spread participation of the peasants in the elections to the first two Dumas is contra-proof to the claim that the Russian people never took any interest in governing themselves. (Walsh 1949:112)

5.2 The post communist Duma's Role

Duma's role according to Sakwa: "The heart of the legislative process, drafting and endorsing laws and issuing directive" (Sakwa 2002:127). Among its task is adopting the budget and approving the prime minister candidate that is proposed by the President. Furthermore the Duma amends or rejects legislative initiatives of the President. The Duma can together with the Federation Council override a Presidential veto, providing that they have a 2/3 majority. According to Rose and Munro "The powers of the Duma are thus greater than those of the British House of Commons, but much less than those of the United States Congress" (Rose and Munroe 2002:110).

The Duma's role has changed rapidly since the 1999 election. The two first Dumas from 1993 to 1999 had a significant proportion of anti Kremlin Parties, making it difficult for the executives to cooperate with the legislatives. The two last Dumas from 1999 to the present have shown an opposite trend. This had led many to conclude that Duma's role has been declining. As Sakwa writes: "For many this represented a decline in the Duma's role. One

commentator argued that ‘today the Duma play a significantly smaller role than under Yeltsin or Nicholas II’ ” (Sakwa 2002:133). After the 2003 election the role of the Duma was further diminished by the fact that the United Russia faction managed to get a 2/3 majority, as Hale notes: “The Duma as an independent institution emerged weakened from this electoral cycle” (Hale 2005:381).

The Duma represents an organ that (should) foster democracy and teach Russians democratic procedures. The problem is that the voters do not have sufficient information about what is going on inside the assembly. Most Russians cannot afford to buy several newspapers, which is required if one is to get at least some information about all the parties in the Duma. Therefore the medium that most Russians receive information from is the television. It would be an understatement to claim that the TV-situation is problematic. Most TV-stations which cover all of Russia are state owned and/ or controlled (see chapter 6).

5.3 Factions

After the election members of the Duma begin to negotiate membership in a faction. Factions allow deputies to serve as chairman or deputy chairman of committees. This gives greater access to microphone during floor debates. Each faction has a vote in the state Duma Council which sets the agenda. A faction must have at last 35 members. It is in the factions that the independents can join.

Table 3 Number of Factions in the different Dumas

Duma	Number of Factions
1993	11
1995	7
1999	9
2003	4

The number of parties gaining representation in the Duma nearly doubled from 12 in 1993 to 22 in 1995, whereas the number of factions actually decreased from eleven to seven.

The factions also provide the representatives with organizational resources such as telephones, research and clerical staff, budgets, offices and so on. “Therefore, both for

ideologically motivated and office-seeking parliamentary factions, factional status is a resource for future reelection” (Remington 2001:189).

The fact that members of the parliament change side is however not an unknown phenomenon in other democratic systems, for instance the US congress or the House of Commons in UK. What is special with the Russian is the “institutionalization” of party switching. This might be a reasonable explanation for the high amount of independents being elected from SMD?

Unity success and Putin's presidency made the executive-legislative relations harmonious. These developments produced new models of coalition politics. As Remington remarks: “As in previous elections parties' political tendencies in 1999 could be classified in four basic categories: "pro-reform, communist, nationalist and pro-government/ party of power”. Remington furthermore notes that to label party of power as centrist is misleading because those adherent to this party “...are a residual category composed of pragmatics who prefer office to any policy commitments” (Remington in Hesli and Reisinger 2003:235).

Rose and Munroe argue that we must distinguish between electoral parties and Duma parties.

The definition of a party in Duma differs fundamentally from the ballot definition. Duma parties, officially known as fractions, are groups that have at least 35 members, 7,8 per cent of the assembly's total. (Rose and Munroe 2002:106)

There is a difference between what you say you'll do and what you actually do. In a system where voters have perfect information about what elected representatives do, the voter would reward or punish the representatives (or parties) on the basis of their voting record. However in the Russian case “...it is virtually impossible for constituents to know their representatives' voting record” (ibid 239). It does not seem like the candidates' voting record is an important part of the campaigns. Neither is it used by opponent candidates. This is a striking difference with the US experiences, where a candidate who is seeking re-election must either defend his or her voting record or express it. An example of that could be John Kerry who during the presidential campaign was constantly attacked for his positions on the Iraqi war.

Deputies that are elected to the State Duma seek to influence public policy as well as taking advantage of being in office. In other words they want policy and reelection. The factions

offer both these possibilities. As Remington writes: “They [deputies] affiliate for both policy-based and office-based reasons; factions, in fact, may be characterized by whether they tend to emphasise one or the other set of interest” (Remington 2001:187). This is in line with what Strom observes “some parties are more office motivated, others more concerned about the pursuit of voters or policy” (Remington in Hesli and Reisinger 2003:238) We see here two goals that might have an trade-off but not necessarily. It might be useful to join a faction in order to ensure that your policy view is implemented, at the same time as you want reelection. In order to be reelected it would be an advantage to have access to the benefits of office facilities. Remington suggests that we have three policy oriented parties. That is: KPRF, Yabloko and SPS. The other parties (including LDPR) don't have a distinct left-right division.

One problem with the factions is that the memberships are floating. The discipline within these factions does not seem to be striking. One of the reasons for this lies in the nature of election. The deputies elected from the single mandate districts are mostly labelled as independents. In fact viewing the distribution of independents seats in the four Duma elections, that is before affiliating with factions, the independent category counts for between 15 to 30 percent. The trend is wavelike, meaning that the number of independents dropped in 1995 and then rose in 1999 and then dropped in 2003.

When debating about factions and their role in 1993, Zhirinovskiy argued that those elected from the SMD and were independents could not join any group as he said:

As far as there are independent deputies they wish to form into groups. But naturally, these will be formations based on regional characteristics, professional, even perhaps gender, but under no circumstances political, because the voters have already rated you as independent, non-party deputies, who do not join any party in our country. If you join, it means that you are violating the will of your voters. (Haspel in Löwehardt 1998:185)

Again we see that some elements of the liberal representative theory are evident in how the candidates from SMD are viewed. In this case the argument is that if the independent candidates join party factions then they violated the voters' will. The alignment between voter and candidate does not occur until after the election, and thereby the candidate breaks an important link. On the other hand, one might ask what kind of independence we should allow

these independent candidates to have. Do the voters send the candidate as a delegate or a trustee?

Summary

The history of the Duma demonstrates that electoral engineering and crafting institutions is not new in the Russian society. At the same time it is worth noting that those who had the possibility to participate did so.

The factions do provide a possibility for the deputies to avoid accountability to the voters, which is a consequence of the alignment after election. Nevertheless I agree with Remington on the fact that factionalism has increased the power of Council of the Duma and thereby replacing the heavily centralized system that prevailed in the former legislative assemblies in Russia and USSR. The factions can therefore also be viewed as a means of not only increasing party cohesion but also a degree of democratisation of deputies. Factionalism is indeed a means of strengthening the political parties.

6.0 Elections in Russia: from 1993 to 2003

In the Bartolini and Mair model of cleavages the institutional level is important. We have thus so far focused on the institutional design when it comes to the division of power. In the first part of this chapter we will further narrow the institutional scope to the electoral system. The reason for including a detailed description of the electoral system is twofold. First of all it is because this institutional feature has direct consequences for the political parties and shapes their behaviour. Secondly this is closely related to the Kremlin-Periphery cleavage in the model presented in chapter four.

In the second part of this chapter, the parliamentary elections from 1993 to 2003 will be studied. Here the focus will rest upon the campaigns, conduction of the election day, results etc.

6.1 Rules of the Game – the election law

The parliamentary elections to the state Duma from 1993-2003 have been what Moser and Thames call mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral system. (Moser and Thames 2003:255) Of the Duma's 450 members half are elected in proportional elections. The other 225 members are elected through majoritarian elections in single mandate districts.

The early drafts

There were a lot of to and fro about the election law. The early drafts took shape in the Congress of People's Deputy. Viktor Sheinis who later co-founded Yabloko, became the chief architect of the MMM system (Moser and Thames 2003:260). Yeltsin and the drafters had two competing goals; to establish political parties and to assure a reformist majority in the state Duma. The MMM must be seen as a consequence of these two goals. For instance the SMD was included because it was believed that the reformist parties would not do well in PR. Another argument was that it would be easier to pressure SMD candidates with "pork barrel" means.

The arguments for the different election laws varied from strengthening the reformist parties, as well as making sure the districts of Russia were represented. Almost all drafters' maintained a common argument; majoritarian election in SMD was needed because of the weaknesses of Russian political parties. This argument bears some resemblance to the liberal

representation theory. The assumptions are (or were) that parties cannot represent the people, so the people elect whom they think can represent their village or their opinions best.

In a comparative perspective the mixed-member is not new.

One western European country which practices this mixed-member electoral system is Germany. Still there are two major differences between Russia and Germany:

First of all in Germany there are separate party list in each *Land*. The Russian drafters rejected this option because they feared that this rule would produce regional parties.

Secondly the seats that German parties earn in districts are subtracted from those received on the party lists vote in a region. In Russia these are added. The last point is important as:

This rule created a powerful reason for a party to nominate all the strong candidates on its list as candidates in the districts as well. This in turn created powerful incentives to form local branches that could nominate and support candidates. (Hough in Colton and Hough 1998:52)

It is important to note that the candidates in SMD do “...not appear on the ballot paper as a party standard-bearer, as the law on elections specified that such candidates were to be described by name, date of birth, occupation, and place of residence, but not by party affiliation” (White et al. 1997:124). This has serious consequences since the alignment between parties and voters occur after the elections. The district candidates do not reveal their party affiliation until they are in the parliament and the faction-building takes place. (See chapter 5)

Changes in the electoral law from 1993 to 1995

Yeltsin did not want a strong party representation, and he wanted first and foremost a loyal Duma. One of his wishes was therefore to increase the number of SMD and decrease the PR-seats. The majority of the State Duma on the other hand wanted a somewhat different election law. The main arguments for each of the election tier can be summed up in the table below. The different tiers do not necessarily represent either the President or the Duma, but it seems obvious that the parties elected on the Proportional list in 1993 advocated the PR tier arguments.

Table 4 Summing up the electoral system arguments

SMD Arguments	PR arguments
In 1993 Russia's Choice win 30 seats in SMD, a change into a 150/300 split would favour the party of power.	PR, imposing party discipline
Russian Parties were insufficiently developed to justify party-list elections	Stronger parties, stronger leaders, greater voice in setting the political agenda
Increase in the SMD would improve quality of voter representation	Rewriting election law destabilized the political system
PR-list were biased in the sense that most of the candidates were from Moscow (in 1993 135 of 225 were from Moscow)	

Eventually Yeltsin came up with an election law that suggested a 300:150 ratio of SMD to PR seats. This was rejected by the State Duma, who then came up with a law that suggested a 225:225 ration of SMD to PR seats.

The result from the battle between the Duma and the President was a continuation of the election system implemented in 1993. Parties that were against the Presidential version were most notably KPRF Yabloko and LDPR⁷. There were however some changes in the new law. One of these was the change in signature requirements. To be allowed to stand as a party list one needed 100.000 signatures in 1993. No more than 15 percent of these could come from one region. This was changed in 1995 and the number of required signatures increased to 200.000 and no more than 7 percent in each region.

⁷ For a more detailed voting record on the different versions see Moser and Thames chapter 12 in Shugart and Wattenberg 2003.

The important lessons from the struggle over election law in 1995 was that it showed the strength of party/ faction cohesion. In other words the debate over the electoral law forced the parties to act as parties, as well as coordinate their actions with other parties. As Moser writes:

The outcome of this long drawn-out struggle between the Duma, Federation council, and President Yeltsin over the electoral law was the maintenance of Russia's MMM system. Given the assumed dominance of the Russian presidency, it is interesting that the State Duma was the winner of this battle. (Moser in Shugart and Watterberg 2003:274)

Changes from 1995 to 1999

One of the main changes from 1995 to 1999 was the allowance to deposit an amount of money instead of collecting signatures. The level of these payments was \$ 7,000 for a single mandate candidate and \$170,000 for a party list. (Respectively 2,000 and 50,000 times the minimum wage).

The rigid threshold at 5 percent was replaced with a "floating" threshold at 5 percent. Parties gaining 3% in the PR would be allowed representation if the combined votes of all parties gaining 5% or more was less than 50%. This means that if the parties that managed to pass the 5 pct threshold together accounted for less than 50% of the total votes cast, then the small parties passing 3 pct would get access. In 1995 those parties that passed the threshold accounted 51,1 percent. So if for instance the Communist Party received 21,2 instead of 22,3 pct of the votes parties like Women of Russia and the Agrarian Party would have been allowed seats on the PR list (these parties got 4,6 and 3,8 pct of the votes respectively).

The Law on Basic guarantees of Electoral Rights is a federal but not constitutional law. Article 108 states that a law is considered constitutional if it gets 2/3 majority in both houses.⁸ Although this is not likely the election-law can therefore conflict with other federal laws. The Basic Guarantees however stipulate that the law should prevail if conflicting with other laws.

⁸ For English translation of the constitution see <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/ConstMain.shtml>.

It is not clear how this stipulation would stand up if legally challenged in the face of contradictory federal laws bearing the same rank, or if a “constitutional law” were ultimately passed that dealt with similar issues in a different way (OSCE 2000:5)

OSCE argues that the most significant changes were that the law laid down the framework for equal participation. This is reflected in that the new law includes “...registration procedures, and campaigning finance, financial disclosure and media provision that are generally consistent with international standards have been entered in the electoral law” (OSCE 2000:6).

Changes from 1999 to 2003

During this period the criteria for being accepted as a political party were changed. In the previous election law the requirements were signatures. Now the organizations must have at least 10,000 members with no less than 100 members in each of at least 45 of the union subjects. This is an important change because the definition of what a party is becomes more precise. At the same time this gives the parties more organizational challenges. It is harder to recruit members than to allocate signatures.

Summary Election law

The evolution of the electoral law in Russia is interesting because it shows how the different political actors struggle for their own very existence. The struggle between the President and the Duma made the parties act like cohesive actors and forced the opposition parties to collaborate.

The different arguments of having majority elections in single mandate districts that were presented above are rather interesting in when viewing the political theories on parties. Given the antiparty nature in the vast majority of the Russian electorate, it seems quite reasonable that many felt that the parties could not represent the voters in a sufficient manner. The problem is that many of those elected in the SMD do not reveal their affiliation until after they have been elected. The alignment between voter and party therefore can said to take place after the election.

The battle between The President and the State Duma is also important in the shaping of the Kremlin-Periphery cleavage. As we have seen neither the Kremlin nor the Periphery are

passive actors in the fight over institutional thresholds. Both seek to maximise their chances for survival and influence. In this review we have seen how the actors at the macro level have acted. It will be interesting to see in the analysis chapter how the voters respond to this. As we noted parties like KPRF, LDPR and Yabloko were taking a strong position against the election law suggested by Yeltsin in 1995. One could therefore expect that voters that display anti-Kremlin sentiments would vote for these parties.

6.2 Parliamentary elections in Russia

The 1993 Duma election

The election on the 12th of December in 1993 took place after a period of dramatic events in the Russian society. The creation and election to the State Duma came as a consequence of a power struggle between President Boris Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. The problem was that both institutions, the president on the one hand and the legislative on the other, claimed a legitimate mandate from the people. On September 21st 1993, Yeltsin announced the dissolution of the Parliament and called for new elections in December. The result was that many deputies, with Rutskoi and Kasbulatov in the lead, seized the White House, which housed the parliament. The conflict ended on October 4th “...when the army (around 1300 troops) blasted the White house into submission with the aid of tanks” (Jeffries 2002:458). What one might label the “second” transition was far more violent than the first. The death tolls were estimated by the prosecutor general to be 123. (Jeffries 2002).

Thirteen registered parties or blocs managed to contest the election of December 12th. Of these thirteen, eight managed to pass the five pct threshold. Ten years later only four of these eight are still represented in the State Duma.⁹ The turnout was 54,3 pct.

The results were devastating for the Kremlin. The openly Kremlin backed party Russia’s Choice (VR), gained 15,5 pct of the proportional votes and 11,4 pct of the seats in the State Duma. It was expected that the party would do well in the SMD but they only managed to win 25 of 225 districts.

The “Independents” could claim the victory in the 1993 election. They received 30% of the seats in state Duma. This should however not surprise anyone. As we have seen the setting for

⁹ These four parties are: KPRF, LDPR, Yabloko and APR. Of these only two managed to pass the five pct threshold. Yabloko secure four seats in the Single Mandate District election, whereas the Agrarian party managed one seat.

this election was quite remarkable. Two years had passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The country was on the edge of a civil war, and now Russians were supposed to vote for parties they had never heard of until two months before the election.

The 1993 election is characterised as a transitional one, by White et al. (White et al. 1997:107). However it is important to note that the election was held two years after the *coup*. This fact has several consequences. First of all, the immediate popular success of the *coupers* had waned. In many Eastern European countries those who initiated the *coup* also won the first election. Thereafter they implemented economic reforms, often through a “shock therapy”, and in the next election they lost.

The 1993 Duma included many antigovernment members. Still the Duma passed some elements of Yeltsin’s economic program as well as compromising on a new electoral law.

The 1993 election is claimed to have significant fraud. For instance there are doubts that the turnout for the constitutional referendum passed 50% (as required). The fact that the Central Election Committee never published complete results questions the validity of this election.

(...) there were doubts about the authenticity of the voting figures and allegations of misreporting in order to produce the official (that is, government-desired) result. (...) Observers at the polls estimated that between 38 and 43 percent had voted, well short of this figure [50 pct]. (White et al. 1997:100)

The 1995 Dumaelection

There are three differences between the 1993 and the 1995 elections. First of all this election was guided by an election law which was debated in the State Duma. In 1993 the election was held through a decree which stipulated how the seats were allocated and how the parties could register themselves. Secondly there were more parties on the ballot. In the 1995 43 parties had registered by the deadline 22nd October. As became evident, the amounts of wasted votes were far more numerous than in 1993. In 1993 the parties that passed the five pct threshold accounted for 87,1 pct of the votes. In 1995 this measure was 51,1 pct, meaning that half of those who voted in the PR tier “wasted” their votes. The third difference was the introduction of an election cycle in Russia. As Belin and Orttung writes: ”One of the most important

functions of the December 1995 Elections was to set the stage for the Presidential election on 16th June 1996” (Belin and Orttung 1997:4)

The informal primary election character is important to stress. The success of KPRF in the election made Yeltsin adopt many points from the party’s platform in the presidential campaign. Yeltsin clearly drew on the lessons from the 1995 election (Belin and Orttung 1997:166).

The 1995 election did not produce the Kremlin loyal Duma that Yeltsin wanted. Instead it became more hostile signified by the remarkable progress of the Communists. The party of power did once again fail. The KPRF became the winner with 22,3 pct of the votes in the election. There seem to be two main explanations for this. First of all the organizational strength of the KPRF had been reinforced (Belin and Orttung 1997). Secondly the KPRF gained votes among those who had not benefited from the economic shock therapy implemented by the Kremlin (CSCE 1996).

The 1999 Duma election

This election is characterised by OSCE as:

...a benchmark in the [Russian] Federation’s advancement toward representative democracy (...) [and furthermore] the State Duma elections marked significant progress in consolidation representative democracy in the Russian Federation.
(OSCE 2000:1-2)

Judging from the election results there were three new significant parties that managed to gain representation in the State Duma. Those parties were Unity, Fatherland All-Russia (OVR) and Union of Right Forces (SPS). Only three parties from the 1995 election managed to renew their representation. Those were the Communist party, the Liberal Democrats (albeit running under the banner “Zhirinovsky Bloc”) and Yabloko¹⁰.

¹⁰ The party “Our Home is Russia” also managed to win some single mandate districts.

As in the previous elections the relationship with Kremlin is one of the fundamental questions. The main struggle was between OVR and Unity. This struggle can best be viewed in the fact that the state Duma elections are primary elections to the forthcoming presidential election. As the Economist wrote before the election: "...the presidential candidates whose popularity will be tested in Sunday's vote are Mr Putin [then prime minister] and Yevgeny Primakov" (The Economist 1999 [Online]).

The fact that Kremlin did so well was rather surprising. OSCE describes the year leading to the election as "turbulent, with major recession further eroding Russia's economic stability, scandals, allegations of corruption, international money laundering, and rapid changes in the cabinet with a succession of prime ministers" (OSCE 2000:9) In other words this should be an election where the Russians could express their dissatisfaction with Kremlin. But that did not happen. Although KPRF gained more votes in the PR tier (up 2 percent from 1995 election) they lost the number of seats. This was because more parties managed to cross the five percent threshold. In the 1999 election those who managed to pass the 5 pct threshold together accounted for 81 percent of the votes, which is a clear increase from the 1995 level. Comparing these numbers with the fact that parties contested the elections dropped from 43 in 1995 to 26 in 1999, we can conclude that both parties and voters learned from the 1995 election.

The pattern from 1993 to 1999 suggests a very rational development. First of all we have the efforts in establishing a strong party power. It might not be a very democratic way to use institutional mechanisms to accomplish this, but it is rational. On the other hand institutional engineering is common in mature/ established democracies as well. So it might be argued that this is an inherent part of democracy. Another rational development is the fact that oppositions gain strength through collaborating with other parties, in order to achieve decisions that are favourable to themselves. The increase in number of parties from 1993 to 1995 can partly be explained by the fact that the timing was much more suitable. So people had time to collect signature and raise money. The decrease in the number of parties from 1995 to 1999 was determined by the experiences from 1995 and that many parties build coalitions such as SPS and OVR.

The 2003 Duma election

In 2003 The Kremlin finally managed to achieve a loyal Duma. The merger between Unity and Fatherland-All Russia resulted in around 38% of the votes in the PR tier and 46 in the SMD. In addition quite a few of the independent deputies from the SMD tier chose to join the United Russia coalition. In this way Kremlin managed to secure a 2/3 vote in the state Duma.

Many commentators have considered Yabloko's and SPS' failure to pass the 5% threshold as a sign of a weakening democracy in Russia. Yabloko has now four representatives and SPS has two. The liberal parties' failure was seen as a "prove" that liberalism had failed, and authoritarianism had prevailed. Henry Hale argues that liberalism as a social cleavage does exist in the Russian society. Hale contends that Yabloko's failure started in the 1999 campaign, and that lack of organizational resources is one of the reasons.

The nationalistic parties did very well in this election The LDPR witnessed a political revival and doubled their share of seats from around four to eight pct. Rodina was a newcomer in the Russian party system and did fairly well gaining around 9 pct of the list votes.

Prospects for the 2007 election: what will be the effects of the new electoral reform?

Quite clearly with the absence of SMD and a threshold at seven pct the number of parties gaining representation will be low. If these rules were applied to the 2003 election results (without including the SMD results), the Duma would have had four parties (KPRF, Rodina, LDPR and United Russia). The party of power however would not claim a super majority as it does now; neither would it claim a simple majority.

The media situation

One of the major obstacles towards the consolidation of free and fair elections in Russia is the media situation. There are three main TV channels which most Russian can receive. Two of these are state controlled, that is ORT and RTR. The independent channel NTV was owned by Vladimir Gusinsky. The TV situation is important because it is the main medium from where most Russian get their information. During the Yeltsin period NTV and Gusinsky's Media-MOST had a high degree of independency. An example of this independence was how the TV channel negatively viewed the first Chechen war (1994-96). According to Lipman and McFaul this had a profound effect on Russian public opinion. "By January 1995, only 16 percent of the Russian populace supported the use of force in Chechnya while 71 percent

opposed the war” (Lipman and McFaul in Herspring 2005:59). After Putin came to power the state owned oil-company Gazprom became the largest stakeholder in NTV. Still many of the printing press companies are independent and rather critical to the Kremlin. The problem is that the circulations of these newspapers are mostly limited to the big cities, and most Russians do not use newspapers as their main source of information.

7.0 Methodological Chapter

The main methodological approach in this thesis will be logistic regression. In this chapter this method will be presented in detail, explaining why and how this method is used. The analysis will also be supplemented with other methods such as cross tabulations and frequencies studies when appropriate.

7.1 Why logistic regression?

As stated earlier the dependent variables in this thesis are political parties represented in the Russian State Duma. These will be coded as dummy variables in the analysis. The value 1 represents the party that is examined, 0 represents “Other parties”, “Independents” and the label “Against All”. The “Did not vote” category is usually excluded unless otherwise is noted.

The reasons for using logistic regression instead of ordinary regression are located in the dependent variable. As mentioned above the dependent variables are dummy variables, which varies between 0 and 1. This has consequence for the assumptions that follow ordinary regression analysis. Firstly the assumption of homoscedasticity is violated. This assumption means that the variance around the regression line is the same for all values of the predictor variable (X). As Ringdal writes:

The variance of the residuals depends on predicted Y and X(...) The consequence is that one cannot rely on the estimated coefficients of the standard error and by that not the statistical test's that these are built upon. (Ringdal 2001:428 own translation.)

The second assumption that is violated is the assumption that the effect of X is constant. The problem that we are facing here is of a more serious character. This because of the possibilities that a value on X can predict probabilities outside the 0-1 interval (Ringdal 2001).

The violations of these assumptions are solved when using logistic regression. Simply stated we change the probabilities to odds. The next step is to make the dependent variable a logit which is the natural logarithm of the odds for Y-1. The logistic regression model can be defined as:

$$L_i = B_0 + B_1X_{i1} + B_2X_{i2} + \dots + B_{K-1}X_{iK-1}$$

In this model the logit is a linear function of the X-variables. This means that the probabilities are a non-linear function of the x-variables. The predicated probabilities in the figure can never exceed the 0-1 interval. (Ringdal 2001:429)

The problem with the assumption of homoscedasticity is solved by the fact that logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) instead of the ordinary least square (OLS). MLE does not have the assumption of equal variance.

The Data-sets

The data that the analysis is based on come from four different sources. Two of these datasets are surveys conducted in 1994 and 1996 (Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994 and Monitoring Russia 1996).¹¹ The numbers of respondents in these surveys are around 3500 and 2500 respectively. The two last sources are exit polls conducted in the 1999 and 2003 Duma elections.¹² These polls include a large number of respondents ranging from 7.700 in 1999 to 12.700 in 2003.

In the science of statistics the problem of the “band wagon” effect is well known. This is particularly important in election studies. Surveys conducted after an election tends to give the winner of the recent election better results. In other words, when asked “What party did you vote in the recently held election?”, the respondent might answer that he or she voted for the winning party, rather than the losing party. The band wagon effect is absent in the exit polls since no one knows who is going to win. This is one of the advantages of using the exit polls. The disadvantage is that the exit polls usually contains fewer questions, and thereby limits the possibilities of creating interesting indexes.

It is important to note that since this thesis is based on different surveys conducted from different pollsters and at different times the independent variables used will not be the same from analysis to analysis. I have tried to recode variables so that they are as similar as possible.

¹¹ The surveys were conducted by “The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)”

¹² The data of Exit Polls were conducted by CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

The analysis step by step

The first task is to locate variables that fit our cleavage model. This is however in most cases problematic. Quite often one is dealing with data that do not include all variables that “should” be included within the model. A social scientist is thus often faced with a trade off: many variables few cases on the one hand and few variables many cases on the other hand.

In this thesis there are four models that are being reported. These models are multiple regressions meaning that more than one independent variable are included. The advantage of using a multiple regression model is that you find effects that are controlled by the other independent variables. The first model consists of demographic variables. Depending on what variables that are included in the datasets, the variables included are: Age, Gender, Education and Geography. The second model includes four indexes (except for the 1996 survey). These four indexes are Nostalgia, Individualism, Authoritarianism and Kremlin. The third model combines all the variables. The fourth model is determined by the significant from the bivariate regressions. In other words, we regress each independent variable against each political party included as dependent variables. The purpose of doing this is to see which variables are significant. The independent variables failing to meet the 0,05 significance level will not be included in the multiple regressions. In the multiple regressions we must also expect that some of the independent variables are not significant. Again we must extract insignificant variables from the model until all the independent variables are significant.

Now we have four different models that show the regression coefficients, standard error, significance level and the odds ratio. We must now find the probability scale for each independent variable. This is done through two series of operations. First of all we find the predicated logits based on the estimated equation. The constant is added or subtracted from the control variables’ coefficients and then multiplied with their respective means. The sum of this is used to find the predicated logits for the variable we are examining. By adding or subtracting the coefficient with the sum of the equation and multiplied by the values of the variable that is studied we find the predicted logit.

Now we can find the predicated probabilities by using the formula of the inverse transformation, which is:

$$P = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-L}}$$

The last method that will be used is a party pair analysis. Here the purpose is to measure the distances between voters. Whereas in the previous analysis we recoded the dependent variable as 1=Party A and 0=Others, we now recode the dependent variable as 1=Party A 0=Party B. The result from a logistic regression here provides us with the difference between the voters of Party A and Party B respectively. The logic here is that if we increase the value in the independent variable then the distance between the voters will increase. Since the category “Others” is not included then the number of respondents within the dependent variable will vary from party pair to party pair.¹³

Selection of Variables

For each survey being analysed, there is a list of variables showing which variables that were included, their names, and values. In order to achieve a parsimonious design the analysis will focus on the significant parties, that is parties that gained representation in the PR-tier. The independent variables used in the analysis will vary depending on what surveys are being used. But we will try to use variables that are as similar as possible. All analysis will include demographic variables, like gender and age.

¹³ Since this method is a bit complicated it might be useful to read how others have applied this method. See for instance Evans and Whitefield *The Structuring of Political cleavages in Post-Communist Societies: the Case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia* 1998

Table 5 Analysis used in thesis

Analysis	Variables included	Purpose	Measurements
Logistic Regression Party by party 1=Party A 0=Others	Model 1 Demographics	Finding party support bases	Odds Ratio, Wald, predicted probability, standardised coefficients
	Model 2 Indexes		
	Model 3 All variables		
	Model 4 Only significant variables		
Logistic Regression Party pairs 1=Party A, 0=Party B	Indexes	Finding differences between voters for each party pair	Odds, Wald, Unstandardised coefficients

The interpretation of logistic regression

There are three main scales of interpreting the results in logistic regression. These are the logit-, odds- and the probability scale. In the first of these, the logit scale, it is only possible to say something about the significance and the direction of the interaction between the dependent and independent variable.

The odds scale gives us more possibilities. Here we can study the increase and decrease of probabilities when changing the value of the independent variable. Let us for instance assume that we have an independent dummy variable such as gender where 1 is male and 0 is female. The dependent variable, i.e. what we want to be explained, is the education level among the respondents. If we the results give us an odds ratio at 1 then this means that gender does not play a role in determining the education level. An odds ratio greater than 1 tells us that the education level increases when the independent variable increases. In other words if you are male then your education level will raise.

The last source of interpretation is the probability scale. Particularly when using continuous independent variables this technique becomes useful. Here we can also make diagrams that

make it easier to view the effects. The details of probability scales will be elaborated later, now we focus on a stepwise description of the analysis.

In addition to these three scales it is possible to find the standardised coefficients. This is not done by SPSS, so we have to calculate the coefficients by hand.¹⁴ This gives us a valuable source of understanding the interactions between the dependent and independent variables, since it reveals the relative strength of the different independent variables. In other words, by including the standardised coefficients we are able to distinguish between important and less important variables. The interpretations of the coefficients are quite similar to how we interpret these in OLS: “A 1 standard deviation increase in X produces a b^* standard deviation change in logit (Y)” (Menard 2001:53).

The question of measuring cleavages

Since one of our main data source is the two exit polls conducted in the 1999 and 2003 Duma election we are facing a problem which can be summarised as: many cases, few variables. One way of solving this problem is by creating indexes. This thesis operates with a model with four indexes. These four are: Nostalgia, Individualism, Authoritarianism and Kremlin.¹⁵ The intention is that these indexes should represent the four axis in the figure presented in chapter four (see Figure 3). For the 2003 exit poll we also have a variable that measures the voters' attitudes on how involved the state should be in the economy. This variable is used to measure the economic cleavage.

¹⁴ Scott Menard gives a detailed introduction in how to calculate the standardised coefficients. See in particular Menard 2001:53

¹⁵ For a more detailed description of how the indexes were created and what variables that constitute the indexes see Appendix B.

8.0 Analysis: what do the Russians say?

In this following chapter we will study in detail what the Russian voters “say”. Until now we have focused on political parties, different political institutions and elections. In other words we have studied the Russian society from above. It is now time to move to the voter level and take a more “from below” perspective. The question we ask is what do the Russians say?

This chapter is organised into two main parts. First of all we will examine the results from each party. All together the analysis consists of four main models that are as similar as possible in each dataset. In addition there are some models that are specific for the datasets, if there are any other variables that need to be included. Secondly the different parties will be studied by using different party pairs as dependent variables instead of the vote/non-vote dichotomy.

8.1 Studying party voting through different models

The structure here is to first present the different models, then explaining the expectation of the correlation between the independent and dependent variables.

Model 1 The demographics of the Russian Voter

Our first model is a demographic as well as geographic one. This model consists of four variables: age, gender, education and geography. Two of these variables are not mobile, that is age and gender. By saying that they are not mobile we mean that the parties cannot do anything to change these variables per se. This is not to say that parties are not able affect these variables, but they cannot stop the voters from ageing or being male or female. They can, however, for instance promise the voters that life will be better for pensioners and women. The two last variables, education and geography, are mobile in the sense that voters can change them. Voters can move from rural to urban areas, as well as achieve more education. At the same time parties can for instance promise voters improved chances of education, and easier communication between different areas of the country.


This model is not an operationalisation of the cleavage model presented in chapter four. (see Figure 3) Nevertheless it is an important model that should be included in order to get a better understanding of the Russian electorate. The question that arises is therefore the following: why are demographics important? First of all they are important because they reveal a rock bottom structure of society. If there is a pattern among demographic variables then there is a

possibility that there are some deep cleavages that might be correlated with other cleavages. In post authoritarian countries demography, in particular age, is extremely important because it includes the validation of the past. As times goes you will have a divided electorate – those who experienced the former regime and those who did not.

The analysis of model 1 is of a descriptive character in the sense that we do not have any specific expectations for this analysis. That being said, we can make some general expectations. There might be an urban-rural cleavage such as the one Lipset and Rokkan suggested (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). For instance we could expect that the parties that we could label as liberal parties do well in urban areas.

The relationship between the dependent and independent variables can be viewed in the figure below. Education is important because this criterion reveals some information about how the intellectual “elites” vote. Geographic relationship can also be a deep historical cleavage, as well as an indication of the centre-periphery dimension.

Figure 7 Expectations for Model 1



As can be seen from the figure the model also stipulates some expectations on the relationship between the independent variables. The reason for this is that it is important to view how the independent variables affect each other. Another aspect is the fact that if a party has the “wrong” combination of for instance highly educated and old aged voters, then this result reveals an interesting pattern, since it goes against the trends from the relationship between

the independent variables. Furthermore such a combination also narrows the scope of electoral support. For instance if the electoral support is among young and uneducated then it is quite likely that this party is unique, which would be reflected in campaigning slogans and party manifesto.

The correlation analysis between the independent variables supports our expectations on the relationship between the independent variables. Age and education correlates negatively throughout the surveys and exit polls. The same goes for education and places where respondents come from. In other words, high aged and rural voters correlate negatively with education.

The results

If there is one aspect of Russian politics that remains virtually stable, it is the fact that those who vote for the Communist Party are old aged. This aspect is demonstrated in many ways. The age variable is significant and positive in all the surveys analysed.

Whereas the Communist Party attracted the old aged voters, the LDPR bring to light a somewhat opposite pattern. The results from the 1994 study show a positive but insignificant result. The age distribution in 1994 is more even than uneven. In 2003 we see that around 1/3 of the LDPR voters were below 30 years old. As we can see from the standardised coefficients, the age variable increases in importance from 1994 to 2003. Zhirinovskiy and his party have been able to turn its support from old and middle aged voters to the younger part of the electorate. Studying the party power as an identical analytical unit, this story goes for them as well. The first survey in 1994 indicates that the party of power did well among the old aged.

Table 6 Results from Logistic Regressions (Model 1) showing standardised coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis)

Party Category	Nostalgic Opposition		Party of Power		Liberal Parties		Nationalist	
	1994	1996	VR	NDR	1994	1996	1994	1996
Party		KPRF		NDR	YABLOKO		LDPR	
Year			1994	1996	1994	1996	1994	1996
Age	0,153** (0,028)	0,237** (0,023)	0,059* (0,019)	0,040 (0,023)	0,034 (0,025)	0,025 (0,024)	0,003 (0,021)	-0,053* (0,036)
Gender	0,049* (0,145)	0,002 (0,126)	0,000 (0,107)	0,016 (0,139)	0,013 (0,139)	-0,002 (0,141)	0,097** (0,120)	0,079** (0,206)
Education	0,068** (0,071)	-0,002 (0,017)	0,082** (0,054)	0,005 (0,019)	0,061* (0,070)	0,095** (0,018)	-0,023 (0,061)	-0,093** (0,037)
Geography	0,003 (0,079)	0,397** (0,376)	-0,075** (0,058)	-0,267** (0,068)	-0,059* (0,075)	-0,107 (0,068)	0,078** (0,069)	0,164* (0,106)

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

Table 7 Results from Logistic Regressions (Model 1) showing standardised coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis)

Party	Nostalgic Opposition		Party of Power		Liberal Parties		Nationalistic		Others									
	KPRF	1999	2003	UNITY	1999	2003	SPS	1999	2003	YABLOKO	1999	2003	LDPR	1999	2003	OVR	1999	2003
Age	0,267** (0,028)	0,243** (0,011)	-0,129** (0,026)	-0,088** (0,007)	-0,154** (0,038)	-0,107** (0,014)	-0,054** (0,039)	0,017 (0,014)	-0,188** (0,053)	-0,157** (0,010)	0,092** (0,011)							
Gender	0,068** (0,055)	0,037** (0,054)	-0,021 (0,055)	-0,095** (0,039)	-0,029* (0,077)	-0,013 (0,078)	-0,019 (0,083)	0,004 (0,079)	0,155** (0,114)	0,088** (0,059)	0,023* (0,060)							
Education		-0,050** (0,020)		-0,038** (0,015)		0,076** (0,032)		0,090** (0,031)	-0,081** (0,023)		0,076** (0,023)							
Geography	0,085** (0,032)	0,050** (0,030)	0,140** (0,032)	0,060** (0,021)	-0,120** (0,044)	0,087** (0,043)	-0,073** (0,047)	-0,117** (0,044)	0,052** (0,062)	0,032* (0,033)	-0,142** (0,043)	-0,033* (0,033)						

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

This model shows a clear and distinct difference between the parties of power in the Yeltsin period and in the Putin period. The VR and the NDR in the Yeltsin period both had significant and negative signs on the geographic variable. This means they attracted support in larger cities rather than in the countryside. The geographic variable might reveal an important explanation for success for the party of power in 2003. In 1999, Unity for the first time revolts this trend and the support for party of power now comes from rural areas. In 2003 the results are still negative but not so strong. One explanation for this might come from the fact that OVR attracted urban voters. It seems plausible that when two parties with different electoral support merge, then the potential for gaining more votes together are higher. In other words, one explanation for UR success in 2003 was that Unity had the rural votes whereas OVR had the urban votes.

The liberal parties do well in the central parts of Russia and in the metropolis in particular. In the exit polls it is possible to study the voting behaviour by regions. Although the variable records four rather crude categories, it represents a common way of dividing Russia. In 1999 the Yabloko votes are distributed evenly on three different regions, together accounting for three quarters of their total vote. The fourth region, Eastern Siberia/ Far east, constitutes the smallest share of votes with around 13 pct. The SPS follow the same trend, but is more biased towards the North/ Central European part. In 2003 this changes dramatically as both parties are losing support in all the three regions except for the North/ central European part. Still it is important to bear in mind that the liberal parties lost a considerable amount of votes in the North/ Central European part. Most notably it seems that these parties lost a great deal of votes to the newcomer Rodina. This is in line with the findings from Clem and Craumers analysis (Clem and Craumer 2003).

Is there a gender cleavage in Russia? Among the different parties it is the LDPR that produces the strongest showings. In the four different datasets taken into consideration the LDPR shows positive and significant results in all of them. This means that throughout its electoral history the LDPR has managed to consolidate itself a “male voter party”. For the other parties we see that the results are mixed. The KPRF have also mostly support from male voters. As


for the party power the UR shows a fairly strong and negative coefficient. Both the liberal parties tend to gain support among the female voters.

The education level among the voters of the different parties shows an interesting relationship between the Communist, nationalist and party of power on one hand and the liberals and Rodina on the other. The LDPR and Yabloko voters differ from each other on education throughout the study. The Communist and party of power however have gone from highly to lowly educated voters since 1994.

Before we move on to the next model it would be useful to display some of the findings graphically. Here we approach two different ways of doing this. Firstly we can study the findings through predicted probabilities. The second way of doing this is by taking the standardised coefficients as a point of departure.

The detailed discussion of how to find the predicted probabilities was dealt with in the methodological chapter. The advantage of using this method is simply that we can see the distribution of voters on the different values on the independent variables.

Figure 8 Party choice distributed by age using predicted probabilities (Source: Exit Poll 2003)



If we look at the distribution of party choice by age the communist voters differ from the other voters by the sharp increase as the age value grows. This finding is also strengthened by looking at the youngest age group (18-24 years). Here the communists have the lowest predicted value. The difference between the liberal parties is also interesting since their lines cross each other at the age of 50.

Figure 9 Party choice distributed by places using predicted probabilities (Source: Exit Poll 1999)






Figure 10 Party choice distributed by places using predicted probabilities (Source: Exit Poll 2003)



The figures also indicate the numerical strength of the respective political parties. As is shown in the figures from 2003 exit poll, the party of power, the United Russia has far more support than the other parties. A comparison between the 1999 and 2003 figures disclose a continuous relationship between the liberal parties on the one hand and the party of power, communist and LDPR on the other. As is mentioned above there might be a possibility that the merger between Unity and OVR has led to a more even distribution of voters by geography for the UR party. The figure might support this prospect. The slope of the UR line is not increasing so much as the Unity slope.

We have so far focused on the distribution of voters by looking at predicted probabilities. If we use the standardised coefficients we can produce some more interesting graphs by combining two different variables. This is a more coherent and way of doing this since we can combine two variables by using simple scatter plots. The graphs thereby create a two dimensional political space which consists of four different “kinds” of voters. The figure includes all the dependent variables used from the surveys and exit polls analysed. We must therefore view this figure with caution since the different results come from different variables. The reason why we are using this is to asses a picture of how the parties have developed in terms of voter support. The figure also includes the insignificant results. In practise, values below 0,030 on the axis are usually insignificant. In other words the closer the unit move towards the zero value of the axis the more likely the result is insignificant.

Figure 11 Voters on the age and geographic variable (Standardised coefficients)




The graph shows, as stated earlier, that there is a difference between the parties of power in the Yeltsin and the Putin period respectively. We also note the distance between Unity and OVR, which may be a plausible explanation for the position of UR. The SPS voters are young and urban, whereas the Yabloko voters tend to be older but still urban. The KPRF clearly represent an “outlier” in this scatter plot. A substantial explanation why the KPRF in 1996 is located so far to left on the place variable, might be that they unleashed the huge support among voters who reside in the red-black belt. This belt is a band of units that stretches:

...along the southern arc of oblast stretching from Tver’ and Smolensk in the west and extending through Bryansk, Kaluga, Orel, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Lipetsk and Tambov oblast, down into the North Caucasus foreland, then across the Volga region, thence along the southern tier of units in Siberia (Clem and Craumer 1995:604).

The belt is named “red” after its political colour and “black” after the colour of the soil. As we have discussed earlier in the election chapter, KPRF’s electoral success in the 1995 Duma election might be as a result of the fact that the party had an organisational advantage that was used efficiently.

Figure 12 Voters on the education and place variable (Standardised Coefficients)



The figure reveals that the education variable is less important than the geographic variable. This is reflected in the fact that the units are not scattered far from each other on this axis. The differences are strongest between the liberal parties and the LDPR.

How well does the model function? This question is best answered when we include model 1 and model 2, resulting in Model 3. Here we can test if the new model entered represents a significant change.

Model 2 the attitudes of the Russian voters

In this model we try to operationalise the cleavage model that was presented in chapter four. The model consists of four different indexes that seek to measure different attitudes among the voters.


The datasets available limit us to measure the different cleavages directly. The individualism and authoritarian index might be considered as operationalisations of the Zapadniki Slavophile axis. This is a rather crude operationalisation, but it seems plausible that a Zapadniki minded voter is more individualistic at the same time as a Slavophile is more authoritarian. It has not been possible for the author to create indexes that measure the economic view of the voters. The exceptions are for the 2003 exit poll. The findings from this index are presented later in model five. The table below intends to summarise the combination between individualism and authoritarianism.

Table 8 Suggesting the relationship between Individualism and Authoritarianism

	Not authoritarian	Authoritarian
Individualistic	Democratic minded voters (Zapadniki)	Individualistic authoritarian
Not Individualistic	Indifferenced voters	Anti Democratic voters (Slavophile)

We expect a negative correlation between individualism and authoritarianism. The reason for this is that they represent different values. An individualist is measured whether he or she endorses democratic values such as freedom of speech and human rights. Authoritarian voters on the other hand sacrifice these views in support for a more centralised state and a strengthening of the state in military power. The relationship between the Kremlin and the Nostalgia index is also believed to be negative. Since nostalgia is a way of endorsing the past it seems logical that the same voters would reject the present regime.

Figure 13 Expectations for Model 2




—————▶ = positive

-----▶ = negative

Thus the model suggests that if you have negative values on one of the indexes then this will affect the opposite index positively which again will effect party voting. This can be exemplified in the figure below.

Figure 14 An example of two different voters



—————▶ = positive

-----▶ = negative

The Nostalgia and Kremlin index is more traceable to the cleavage model presented in chapter four. Simply stated we can say that the nostalgic index is a judgement of the past and the Kremlin index is a judgement of the present.

The results

Taking the individualism and authoritarian index as a starting point, we must begin by searching combinations so that we can place the parties on Zapadniki Slavophile axis. The first impression from the results when viewing the significance levels is that these indexes are less important than the other indexes. The individualism and authoritarian index have more insignificant results than the nostalgia and Kremlin index.¹⁶ A tentative conclusion can therefore be that the Zapadniki Slavophile cleavage is less important than the other cleavages such as the economical, nostalgia and the centre periphery cleavage. Still we must also view the importance of the variables in concert with other variables. The standardised coefficients allow us to draw some conclusions on the importance of the variable compared to the other. The most important cleavage in 1994 seems to be the one between the past and the present. This is hardly surprising since the election 1993 was a transitional one. The former Soviet regime was still fresh in the voters mind. As time goes by the positive attitudes towards the past will probably decline and more negatively attitudes will rise. In 1999 the individualism index increases its importance, in particular with the liberal parties on the one hand and the Communist and Unity on the other. In 2003 both individualism and authoritarianism decreases except for the liberal parties.

The individualistic voters tend to vote for the liberal parties. This is a result that was expected. One of the parties that gain support from more collectivistic minded voters is the KPRF. Given the collectivistic nature of the communist regime, it is reasonable to expect this. As for the different parties of power the results are mixed. In particular the difference between Unity in 1999 and UR in 2003 is striking. Here the direction of the relationship has changed. The voters of Zhirinovskiy do not show significant results on the individualism index until the 2003 exit poll. Here the results are negative and rather weak.

¹⁶ Not counting the 1996 survey, the Individualism index has seven insignificant results, Authoritarianism three, Nostalgia two and Kremlin two.

Table 9 Results from Logistic Regressions (Model 2) showing standardised coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis)

	Nostalgic Opposition		Party of Power		Liberal Parties		Nationalist	
	Party	Year	VR	NDR	YABLOKO	LDPR	Year	Year
Nostalgia	KPRF	1994	1994	1996	1994	1996	1994	1996
Individualism		0,269** (0,115)	-0,221** (0,077)		-0,118** (0,084)		0,033 (0,069)	
Authoritarianism		-0,039 (0,153)	0,012 (0,106)		-0,010 (0,127)		-0,002 (0,120)	
Kremlin		-0,073** (0,147)	-0,079* (0,121)		-0,064* (0,139)		0,087** (0,110)	
Future		-0,162** (0,180)	0,179** (0,057)	0,220** (0,060)	-0,011 (0,075)		-0,120** (0,104)	-0,077* (0,172)
		-0,078** (0,086)	0,115** (0,070)		0,029 (0,076)			-0,008 (0,124)

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

Table 10 Results from Logistic Regressions (Model 2) showing standardised coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis)

Party	Nostalgic Opposition		Party of Power		Liberal Parties			Nationalistic		Others							
	KPRF	1999	2003	UNITY	UR	2003	SPS	2003	YABLOKO	1999	2003	LDPR	1999	2003	OVR	1999	2003
Nostalgia	0,249** (0,074)	0,193** (0,055)		0,147** (0,047)	0,058** (0,032)		-0,111** (0,061)	-0,132** (0,066)	-0,087** (0,067)	-0,112** (0,064)		-0,043** (0,085)	-0,107** (0,046)		-0,099** (0,062)	0,021 (0,048)	
Individualism	-0,265** (0,052)	-0,064** (0,040)		0,203** (0,047)	-0,065** (0,028)		0,184** (0,064)	0,139** (0,048)	0,089** (0,062)	0,115** (0,049)		0,009 (0,079)	-0,021* (0,039)		-0,004 (0,056)	-0,005 (0,041)	
Authoritarianism	-0,049** (0,053)	0,041** (0,042)		0,101** (0,057)	0,036** (0,030)		0,007 (0,079)	-0,041** (0,056)	-0,014 (0,078)	-0,083** (0,059)		0,029* (0,096)	0,043** (0,042)		-0,005 (0,068)	-0,033* (0,045)	
Kremlin	-0,164** (0,043)	-0,182** (0,050)		0,385** (0,045)	0,392** (0,038)		0,105** (0,057)	0,025 (0,070)	-0,103** (0,059)	-0,129** (0,069)		-0,052** (0,072)	-0,191** (0,051)		-0,157** (0,053)	-0,091** (0,052)	


* significant at p < 0,05

** significant at p < 0,01

If we combine the results with the authoritarian index the picture becomes even more complex. Only KPRF and SPS in 1999 display the expected and significant outcome. The KPRF are collectivistic and authoritarian whereas SPS voters are the opposite. As for the Zhirinovsky party the findings are as expected positive and significant.


As we did with the analysis of model 1 we can try to illustrate the relationship between the different independent variables using line graphs and scatter plots. Starting with the individualism index from the 2003 exit poll we see quite clearly which parties that display individualist voters (see Figure 15). Another striking feature of the graph is how close the Yabloko and SPS voters are located on the line.

Figure 15 Party choice distributed by degree of individualism using predicted probabilities (Source exit poll 2003)



As for the authoritarian index the graph displays a divided electorate (see Figure 16). Again it is interesting to see how close the liberal lines are to each other.


Figure 16 Party choice distributed by degree of authoritarianism using predicted probabilities (Source exit poll 2003)



It would be fair to say that the LDPR shows authoritarian tendencies because of the party’s leader, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Does the correlation go beyond the admiration of the party’s charismatic leader? It seems that there is a xenophobic wave coming in over Russia. The Moscow Human Rights Bureau estimated that there were around 50.000 skinheads in Russia.¹⁷ Many interpreted the revival of LDPR and the strong showing of Rodina in 2003 as a sign that nationalism is on the march. On the other hand a survey of more than 1500 youths across Russia gave ground for a more moderated view. This survey was conducted in 2004 and concluded that: “aggressive xenophobia (...), has become a marginal phenomenon and extremist ideologies have lost their sway among the overwhelming majority of young people” (Bransten 2004, RFE/ RL).

¹⁷ Figures were reported in a Report on neo-Nazi trends in Russia. See http://antirasizm.ru/english_rep_007.doc.

Figure 17 Voters on the individualism and authoritarian index (Standardised coefficients)



What can be seen from this scatter-plot is that the 2003 exit poll marks a sharper cleavage between the liberals and the other parties. The exception is Rodina which has significant negative sign on the Authoritarian index and negative, but not significant, on the Individualism index. This might be viewed in light of what was suggested by Clem and Craumer that the liberals lost some votes to Rodina.

The Nostalgic and the Kremlin index are perhaps the most important variables throughout the surveys that are studied in this thesis. This is seen through the standardised coefficients. Almost all parties throughout the various analyses of the different datasets have either the Kremlin or the Nostalgia index as the most important variable.

The KPRF stands out as the most nostalgic party in our analysis. This is one of the most important variables that explain the voting behaviour of this party. It is interesting to see that

the voters recognise both Unity and UR as nostalgic. This can imply that their support for the Kremlin parties are based upon a belief that these parties together with President Putin are able to give them the economic security they once had in the previous regime. As with the geographic variable there is a difference between the parties of power from the Yeltsin and Putin period. VR did not display nostalgic attitudes, at the same time as NDR were more optimistic towards the future.¹⁸

As expected both Yabloko and SPS voters are right through negative towards the past. It would be strange if a nostalgic voter should vote for parties that advocate an abrupt change from the past. Furthermore the importance of being non nostalgic tend to increase from 1999 to 2003.

We note that the LDPR voters in 94 displayed a nostalgic, albeit insignificant view towards the past. This was not the case in 1999 and 2003. Here the results are negative and significant. The nationalistic voters share the same trend as the liberals in that the negative attitude to the past increases over time.

The Kremlin index justifies the categorisation of VR, NDR, Unity and UR as “Party of power”. We see that all the parties except VR have the Kremlin variable as the most important variable. As for VR it is the Nostalgia variable that is most important. This can partly be explained by the fact that the need for the Party to distance itself from the past was more important than supporting the Kremlin. On the other hand, a strong aversion for the past might also be a strong support for the present.

The SPS voters might give us an indication of how the Russian party system has developed between the two last Duma elections. This thesis has discussed the stance of SPS towards Kremlin. Many of its top candidates had previous experience inside the governments, as well as top positions in state firms. In 1999 this was reflected by the voters given the fact that the results were positive and significant. In the last election this index was still positive but not significant. This might be a result of a sharper polarization on the Kremlin axis, and that the SPS has not succeeded in choosing either to be a fully liberal and oppositional party or a

¹⁸ In the 1996 we do not have an operationalisation of nostalgia, individualism and authoritarianism. In stead the model consist of a Kremlin index and a variable that measures the voters view on how the future will turn out economically.

liberal “loyal” party. Yabloko voters distinguish themselves from SPS in that they are negative towards Kremlin. The LDPR voters are together with the KPRF negative towards Kremlin.

Figure 18 Voters distributed by stance towards Kremlin using predicted probabilities (Source Exit poll 1999)






Figure 19 Voters distributed by stance towards Kremlin using predicted probabilities (source Exit Poll 2003)



These two graphs quite clearly demonstrate how the two parties of power in the Putin period have been successfully aligning the pro-Kremlin voters.

Displaying the results from the Nostalgia and Kremlin index in a scatter-plot we see that here the cases are more spread than the individualism-authoritarianism scatter-plot.¹⁹ In other words, the Nostalgia and Kremlin indexes have a more polarising effect on the voters.

Figure 20 Voters on the Nostalgia and Kremlin index (Standardised coefficients)



Model 3 Towards a more coherent model?

In this model it is possible to achieve a more coherent picture of the Russian voters. By including both models into one, we will be able to see in a more detailed manner how the different variables affect each other. In other words, the multiple model gives results for each independent variable that are controlled for by the other variables.


¹⁹ The reader should note that the two different scatter plots have different scales on the X and Y axis. This means that in the Individualism –Authoritarian scatter plots the case are closer the centre than is showed. The reason for this is of practical character. By decreasing the scales on the axis it becomes easier to see the labels of each party.

Most importantly the standardised coefficients make it possible to study which variable explains most of the variance in the data. In other words do we have cases in which the demographic variables explain more than the indexes and vice versa?

In all analyses the extending of the model, i.e. combining Model 1 and Model 2, gives a clear increase in level of significance. We can thereby conclude that extending the model to include both Model 1 and Model 2 gives us a better understanding of voting behaviour.

This model allows us to see how the relationship between the indexes and the demographic variable is. One obvious comparison is the one between Age and Nostalgia. Again the picture seems clear that the KPRF are moving upwards on the age scale whereas the LDPR are going downwards.


Figure 21 Voters on the Age variable and the Nostalgia index (Standardised coefficients)



Another interesting combination is the Kremlin index and the geographic variable. The scatter-plot reveals that the support for parties that endorse Kremlin has gone from urban to rural areas since 1994. As we mentioned above in the analysis of model 1 there is a clear and distinct difference between the parties of power in the Yeltsin period and the Putin period. This becomes more evident in this scatter-plot.

We also see that the three longest surviving parties, Yabloko, LDPR and KPRF are clearly divided on the geographic variable. The parties stay in their categories throughout the datasets that are analysed. This is an important observation since it gives an indication of a stable and possibly deep cleavage between the oppositional parties.

Figure 22 Voters on the geographic variable and Kremlin index (Standardised coefficients)



Model 4 A more Robust Model


This model is constituted of variables that were significant in the bivariate regression. The reason for using this model is to exclude variables that are not significant and thereby having a model that explains more of the variation in the different datasets. This model is therefore more robust, since the results are more reliable.

The results from model 4 do not reveal any significant new changes. The directions of the relationships between the various dependent and independent variables are the same. The changes are found in the strengths of the relationships.

Model 5 Including the Economic Cleavage

This model is based on variables that are unique in the sense that they do not exist in the other datasets. There are two different variables from the 96 and 03 datasets that are of interest. In the 1996 dataset there is no operationalisation of nostalgic, individualism or authoritarianism indexes. There is however a future index that is included, in addition to the Kremlin index. We have not included the economic cleavage so far but this potential is realised in the 2003 exit poll. To measure the economic cleavage we here use a question of how much the state should involve in the economy.²⁰ Again if we examine the relationship through various scatter plots and linear graphs, another interesting pattern emerges.

Figure 23 Voters distributed by economic stance using predicted probabilities (Source Exit Poll 2003)



²⁰ The results can be viewed in Appendix E.

First of all it seems that the voters do not recognise the Kremlin backed party as a pro market economic party. Based on the fact that the United Russia did not have any particularly clear cut party programme this might not be surprising. The party makes general statements on economic issues rather than specific. An example of this is could be one of its economic statements: “The development of an economy based on powerful production potential, modern technologies and the efficient use of natural resources” (RenCap 2003 [online]). The parties that share this negative view of market economy are KPRF and Rodina. This is expected since they both are campaigning on leftwing economic issues. The parties that favour the market economic reforms are the Yabloko, SPS and LDPR. Interestingly enough we see that both LDPR and SPS cross the UR line on the “Strong pro market” category. This means that although the UR is a strong party in numerical sense, it is not so strong that it covers a vast majority of the Russian voters. When including the economic variable, we have found another polarising effect on the Russian party system. The voters are clearly divided on the economic issue. Be that as it may, most Russians are not in favour of the market economy.²¹

²¹ On the economy index used in exit poll 2003 only 5,8 pct of the respondents can be labelled as pro market economy in that they did not want that the government should involve in the economy.

8.2 Studying distances between voters through party pairs

So far we have focused on each party's voters. We have been able to show how the respective parties' voters respond to the indexes. In addition we have cast into light the demographic variables and their effect on party choice. The dependent variables have been based on whether the respondent voted for the party or not. It is now time to look at distances between different voters.²²

Rather than discussing the findings for each variable, the intention here is to study the analysis through different sets of party combinations. There are four different models that stand out as the most interesting ones. First of all it is the difference between the three longest surviving parties, KPRF, LDPR and Yabloko. Since they have been participating in all elections it sounds reasonable that these parties also have developed a stable distance between each others. The second party pair model that needs attention is the one between Yabloko and SPS. Since both are labelled as liberal we must search for what their respective differences. The third model deals with the problematic classification of Rodina. In the classification of the Russian party system (See Table 2 in chapter four), the question of whether Rodina should be classified as a nostalgic oppositional party or a nationalistic party was raised. In this analysis at least the voters might give us a lead. The last and fourth model is taking the "parties of power" into consideration.

Model 1 KPRF versus LDPR versus Yabloko

If we look at the parties that have contested all four elections, KPRF, LDPR and Yabloko, we see a certain degree of stability. For most of the variables the signs are the same. Those that have changed have not been significant. The differences between the communists and the liberals are continuous, in that the communist voters are always more nostalgic, less positive towards Kremlin and less individualistic than the Yabloko voters. The distance between the communists and the nationalists are first and foremost based on the nostalgic variable. The results from the other variables are mixed.

²² In the following I shall use the words "strong" and "weak" when I comment results that show big distances between the parties. This might not be the proper words to use, since the unstandardised coefficients can not predict the strength of the relationship between the dependent and independent variable. Nevertheless a high unstandardised coefficient means that there is a "high" distance between the respective voters.

Table 11 Model 1 the distance between KPRF, LDPR and Yabloko from 1994 to 2003 (Unstandardised Coefficients)

Year	1994			1999			2003		
Party Pair	KPRF LDPR	KPRF YABLOKO	YABLOKO LDPR	KPRF LDPR	KPRF YABLOKO	YABLOKO LDPR	KPRF LDPR	KPRF YABLOKO	YABLOKO LDPR
Nostalgia	0,928**	1,427**	-0,550**	1,010*	1,158*	-0,129	0,990**	1,029**	-0,117
Individualism	-0,237	-0,334	-0,017	-1,077**	-1,477**	0,332*	-0,232**	-0,885**	0,634**
Authoritarianism	-0,820**	0,133	-0,697**	-0,446**	-0,194	-0,227*	0,026	0,706**	-0,577**
Kremlin	-0,027	-0,837*	0,638**	-0,291*	-0,235*	-0,090	-0,124	-0,301**	0,126
Initial -2log Likelihood	392,728	260,077	448,202	1698,118	2108,508	1328,868	3966,79	2330,256	2563,58
Model chi square	81,755	169,049	68,781	390,949	813,711	25,819	429,464	654,197	167,157
N	351	311	376	2358	2620	1026	3231	2430	2317

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

The examination of the different Yabloko-LDPR pairs, give ground for concluding that there might be a Zapadniki-Slavophile cleavage among the Russian electorate. The LDPR voters are more authoritarian and less individualistic than the Yabloko voters. In fact if we include the results for the SPS-LDPR pairs in 1999 and 2003 the same pattern emerge.²³

Model 2 The fight between the liberals(?)

We must not forget that this is the voter's view of the national politics. The expectations for Yabloko and SPS are that their respective voters will display similar attitudes on most of the indexes. This is reflected if the regression produces weak (values near nil) coefficients and insignificant values.

²³ A regression with the SPS-LDPR pair (SPS=1 and LDPR=0) shows positive and significant coefficients on the individualism index and negative and significant coefficients on the authoritarian index. See Appendix H

Table 12 Model 2 the distance between Yabloko and SPS from 1999 to 2003


Year	1999	2003
Party Pair	YABLOKO SPS	YABLOKO SPS
Nostalgia	0,058	0,085
Individualism	-0,419**	-0,061
Authoritarian	-0,163	-0,169*
Kremlin	-0,775**	-0,704**
Initial -2log Likelihood	1778,63	1878,24
Model chi square	171,564	128,534
N	1415	1517

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

What is interesting is that the voters are able to recognize the differences between the parties so clearly. The Yabloko - SPS distance is very low with exception of one aspect that is the stance towards the Kremlin. Judging from the coefficients and the significance level the Kremlin index is what separates the liberal opposition from each other. Although this might lead us to believe that the Russian voters are well informed about what goes on in Moscow, we must remember from the analysis of demographics that the SPS and Yabloko voters are well educated and live in the metropolis.

Figure 24 Distance between Yabloko and SPS showing predicted probabilities (Source Exit Poll 2003)



The figure shows the relationship between the liberals on the indexes. The further you move to the right along the X-axis the more positive you are on the index. Another aspect that is captured in the graph is that if the lines are above 0,5 it is more likely that one votes Yabloko. As we see both the Authoritarianism and Individualism indexes, which are not significant, lie around the 0,5 line. The Nostalgic index which is positive and significant show a slow increase, meaning that the more nostalgic you get the more likely it is that you will vote for Yabloko. The most important information from this graph is how the Kremlin line dramatically drops as the stance becomes more positive.

If we compare the results from the two different exit polls we see that the distances are decreasing from 1999 to 2003. This could indicate that the voters are becoming more “united” in the fight against anti liberal forces. Still the major difference between the liberal parties are how to view the Kremlin, this seems to be the major obstacle in the prospect for a coalition between them.

Model 3 Rodina a nostalgic or a nationalistic party?

As we have mentioned above it is believed that Rodina is a “brain child” from Kremlin. The party’s purpose is to “steal” voters from the KPRF so that the largest opposition party would be weakened. When we compare the Communist party and Rodina the strongest difference between the parties is how to judge the past. Rodina voters are also more liberal-minded than the KPRF in that they are more individualistic and less authoritarian. This goes for the

comparison with the LDPR voters as well, albeit here the individualist index is not significant. Whereas the communist are more nostalgic this is not the case for the nationalist. Here the Rodina are more nostalgic.

Table 13 Model 3 The distance between Rodina, KPRF and LDPR

Year	2003	
	KPRF RODINA	LDPR RODINA
Nostalgia	0,600**	-0,379**
Individualism	-0,284**	-0,108
Authoritarian	0,303**	0,322**
Kremlin	-0,378**	-0,234**
Initial -2log Likelihood	3875,73	3687,32
Model chi square	281,574	65,729
N	2865	2752

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

It therefore seems that the Rodina voters lie between the Communists and the Nationalist. The exception is on the Kremlin index, here Rodina attract voters that are less sceptic towards the Kremlin. Still as we remember from the previous analysis the Rodina voters are negative towards Kremlin. The voters therefore have given us a clear cut answer of how to categorise this party. The party display nostalgic attitudes and thereby compete for the communist voters. The Rodina voters are also not supportive towards the Kremlin, and not authoritarian. If we base our classification of the Russian party system on the voters' perspective then it seems more reasonable to categorise Rodina as a nostalgic opposition.

Model 4 Party of power

The party pair analysis demonstrates, once again, that it seems quite clear that the Russian voters have no problem with identifying the party of power. In all the datasets studied here the results are positive, significant and strong. In addition we see that the distance is increasing. This might underline the polarising effect of the Kremlin-Periphery axis.

As we have commented earlier it is possible to distinguish between the Party of power during the Yeltsin and the Putin period. In the 1994 survey, the party of power is less nostalgic than KPRF and Yabloko. In both the 1999 and the 2003 exit poll the results are the same for the pairs including KPRF, but for the other pairs the results are positive. This means for one thing that the party with the most nostalgic voters are without doubt the KPRF, but it also shows that the voters who endorse Putin do not necessarily reject the Communist regime.

Table 14 Model 4 distance between different "Parties of Power" and various opposition parties

Year	1994				1999				2003					
	VR KPRF	VR YABLOKO	VR LDPR		UNITY KPRF	UNITY SPS	UNITY OVR	UNITY LDPR	UNITY YABLOKO	UR KPRF	UR SPS	UR RODINA	UR LDPR	UR YABLOKO
Nostalgia	-1,597**	-0,184	-0,672**		-0,672**	0,797**	0,738**	0,494**	0,696**	-0,665**	0,736**	0,066	0,491**	0,669**
Individualism	0,470	0,099	0,097		1,640**	-0,168*	0,687**	0,482**	0,234*	0,196**	-0,678**	-0,097*	0,081	-0,656**
Authoritarian	-0,042	-0,073	-0,706**		0,645**	0,298*	0,469**	0,171	0,482**	-0,124*	0,268**	0,229**	-0,118*	0,481**
Kremlin	1,157**	0,501**	1,090**		1,621**	0,531**	1,664**	1,215**	1,351**	1,920**	0,788**	1,400**	1,667**	1,610**
Initial -2log Likelihood	247,470	546,246	473,512		3206,61	2909,672	2564,28	1794,17	2391,021	5200,10	3825,42	5283,76	5560,75	3472,44
Model chi square	2887,071	38,907	183,351		2018,35	230,170	672,793	229,617	427,221	2185,28	372,123	754,905	920,773	665,249

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

9.0 Conclusion

How well did the intuitive model perform - towards a revised model?

If we look at the suggested cleavage model for the Russian case in chapter four, there are at least two of the proposed cleavages that perform well. These are the Kremlin and Nostalgia cleavage. As for the Zapadniki-Slavophile cleavage, we have been limited by the variables included in the various datasets. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the authoritarian and individualism index might give us a hint of where to locate the parties. The economic cleavage that was measured in the last exit poll did not produce strong results. This could be taken as evidence that the owner-worker cleavage that has been crucial in the formation of the various party systems in Western-Europe does not play a similar role in the Russian Party System. In other words the left-right dimension is not suited to the Russian case. There are several reasons for this. One plausible explanation might be the weak Labour Unions, and thereby weak relationship between employers and employees.


One of the most interesting findings in our analysis is the nostalgic attitudes of the two parties of power in 1999 and 2003. These were as we have seen positive and significant. This is not in line with our expectations. Probably some parts of the party, that is candidates, MP's, leaders etc. will consider the UR as a modernising party, in reforming Russia towards a market economy. But the voters do not seem to agree with this picture.

The voters of the liberal parties seem to fit in to our model. Both parties have display positive and rather high results on the individualism index. As for the Nationalists and LDPR in particular we are a bit struck by the combination of high scores among the younger part of electorate and their authoritarian values.

The Communists are mostly characterised by an old aged and nostalgic electorate. It will be interesting to see how the KPRF will manage to cope with this challenge in the future. In my view it is too early to consider the Communists as a waning actor on the political scene. The reason for this is twofold. First of all it is still the largest oppositional party, secondly it has huge organizational resources to draw on.

Based on the various analyses we can now revise our intuitive cleavage-model presented in chapter four. First of all we have certainly located a strong and polarising cleavage in the Kremlin-Periphery. This cleavage is the strongest and most enduring cleavage among the Russian voters. Secondly the analysis has shown a cleavage on the Nostalgia variable. The third observation is a clear cultural cleavage between the Liberals on the one hand and the Nationalist on the other. This can be expressed in our revised cleavage model:

Figure 25 A revised cleavage model



The logic in this model is not the same as in the Lipset-Rokkan model showed in chapter four (see Figure 1). The horizontal axis can be viewed as one linear continuum. On the left side of the vertical axis we find the parties that are nostalgic. Here the KPRF are the most nostalgic party. On the right side of we find parties that are not nostalgic towards the former communist regime.

The vertical axis is quite similar to the Centre – Periphery cleavage that the Lipset-Rokkan model suggests. The difference is that this cleavage does not necessarily resemble the Urban-Rural cleavage. As we have seen the party of power in the Putin period have a voting support that is located in the rural areas rather than the urban areas of Russia. This cleavage is therefore more a question of political power and the control the executive. The horizontal axis

is dividing the parties that are pro- and anti-Kremlin. The model thus distinguishes between the two different liberal parties. As we see SPS is positive and Yabloko is negative towards the Kremlin.

The model is also incorporating the Zapadniki-Slavophile cleavage. This is marked with the stippled vertical axis. Most importantly divides the liberals from the nationalistic party. This pattern is in line with the expectation that was presented in the last part of chapter four. It is perhaps not so difficult to understand that this historical cleavage still plays a vital role in the Russian political system. As we mentioned in the chapter two the Russian state- and perhaps more important nation-building is an unfinished task. As a result the disagreement, on which path the Russian State should take or follow, becomes an important question for many Russian voters.

There are two more observations from the incorporation of the stippled axis that should be noted. First of all the axis indicates that all parties right to the stippled axis are not Zapadniki oriented. Secondly, and following this argument, this also means that the parties that advocate such a policy are a minority in the Russian political system.

The parties are placed within this figures based on the observations from the quantitative analyses and the qualitative analyses in chapter four and six. The party that was difficult to figure where to place was Rodina. The reason for this is twofold. First of there has been done little research on this party. This is probably because the party is newly established. Secondly the results in chapter eight did not provide us with a particular clear picture. On the one hand the party seems to be somewhat similar to the KPRF, but on the other it also seems to share some of the Liberal voters' attitudes. The Rodina-voters are a bit nostalgic and old aged, but at the same time urban and highly educated.

The future of the party system in Russia

The 2007 parliamentary election will have an electoral system that uses PR and a 7 pct threshold. One thing that is evident from the discussion on electoral systems and the history of the State Duma, is the fact that the reform from above does not necessarily produce the

wanted outcome. The Party of power will most likely not be able to secure their two-third majority in the State Duma.²⁴

The 7 pct threshold may also force the two liberal parties Yabloko and SPS to cooperate and contest the elections on the same ballot. On the other hand the distances between these parties might be too far. In a study of the two parties' election manifestos Hale argues that this distance is evident. According to Hale Yabloko stresses to move from "an oligarchical system to a welfare state for citizens" and an elimination of poverty, whereas SPS had a more philosophical discourse that was distant from the average Russian voter (Hale 2005:375). Furthermore as our analysis has shown there is a difference between the liberal voters on how to judge the Kremlin. A merger between these parties will probably alienate some of the SPS voters to the party of power.

As for the other parties it is even harder to predict how this will develop. If we are to judge from the age variable, then the KPRF will lose more votes and LDPR will increase its share of the electorate. Rodina seems even harder to predict since the party has not, at least in our analysis, established a clear alignment to the voters. In the aftermath of the presidential election in 2004, the top candidates were divided on which path the party should take.

Democracy in Russia

It is my view that one of the major obstacles for consolidating democracy in Russia lies within the anti-party nature of the presidents elected so far. Boris Yeltsin himself admits that there were lost opportunities (Linz and Stepan 1996). Since the presidents so far have refused to be officially and formally linked with parties, then parties do not play such an important role in the political sphere since.

The rather stable alignment between the parties and voters is thus therefore a rather promising prospect for democracy in Russia. As we saw in chapter 5 on the Russian State Duma, the parties are capable of acting in a coherent way and thereby making the Parliament a stronger institution. This gives ground for optimism because the Russian political system thereby has an inbuilt dynamic which cannot be controlled by one or few persons alone.

²⁴ An average of electoral support in surveys conducted by Levada shows around 39 pct for 2005. (See <http://www.levada.ru/reitingi2005.html>)

The missing cleavage (?)

Through the analysis of a wide range of surveys we have been able to demonstrate that there are significant cleavages within the Russian electorate. This is positive in the sense that it is possible to manifest them, and cultivate them in a parliamentary democracy. The stabilising effect of such a manner is important to stress. A deep cleavage is not a value in itself; it is the manifestation of it that becomes important.

We are thus faced with an important theoretical as well as empirical dilemma: how do we deal with non-manifested but still significant latent cleavages? As we have seen through the theoretical as well as analysis chapter, the peripheral cultural axis is missing in the Russian party system. Russia is more ethnically homogeneous than the Soviet Union. Still approximately 20 pct of the Russian population are not what we can call ethnic Russians. One might argue that extremist organizations should be banned because democracy does not tolerate parties and organizations that do not respect human rights. If we extend the argument we could also say, that allowing such interest to participate, is a way of legitimising such societal forces, and even reinforcing them. On the other hand, if the Russian minorities are not allowed to organise on sectional interest, why should they accept parties that lash out at them. Is it democratic to allow the parties to organise on “Russification” of the minorities?

How well did the Lipset Rokkan framework perform in the Russian case?

Studying the Russian Political system through the concept of cleavage has proven to be very vibrant. The analysis in chapter eight has revealed a pattern of stability. In particular the centre-periphery axis has an important explanation for the development of the political parties in Russia. As have been stated several times in this thesis the centre-periphery axis must be understood in terms of political power and not necessarily in terms of geography.

This thesis has demonstrated that although the party system in Russia might seem unstable, the voters reveal a remarkably stable relationship. It seems clear that the alignment which is an ongoing process has, if not stabilised, then at least developed a pattern. We can thus conclude that cleavage both as a concept and as an analytical tool provides a better understanding of Post Communist Russia.

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Appendix A List of Abbreviations

CPSU – Communist Party of Soviet Union

KPRF – Communist Party of the Russian Federation

LDPR – Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation

NDR – Our Home is Russia

OVR – Fatherland – All Russia

RODINA – Motherland

SPS – Union of Right Forces

UR – United Russia

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VR – Russia's Choice

Yabloko- Yavlinsky – Lukin – Boldyrev Bloc

Appendix B List of indexes

Most indexes consist of more than one variable. The exceptions are the Nostalgic index in 1999 and 2003, and the Economic index in 2003. The process of creating the indexes was the following:

- Firstly the selected variables were recoded as dummy variables.
- The second step was to compute the new dummy variables into one variable. For instance: Individualism = Indi_dummy_1 + Indi_dummy_2 + Indi_dummy_3.
We thus have a scale that range from zero to three. Where the value zero indicates that the respondent did not answer value 1 on any of the dummy variables, and value three indicates that respondent answered the value 1 on all the dummy variables.

Political and economic problems Russia 1994			
<i>Index</i>	<i>Variable index were created from</i>	<i>Old Values</i>	<i>New Values</i>
Nostalgia	Variable 30 “Where would you place the 1989 socialist economy on this scale?”	1. The best/highest mark 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Good enough 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Neither good, nor bad 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. Bad enough 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. The worst/lowest mark	1 = 1-10 0 = 11-21
	Variable 33 “If you compare your family’s modern economical situation with your economical situation five years ago, could you say that it was...”	1. Much better 2. A little better 3. Same 4. A little bit worse 5. Much worse	1 = 1, 2 0 = 4, 5
	Variable 82 “It would be better to restore the former communist system?”	1. Absolutely agree 2. Rather agree 3. Rather no 4. No	1 = 1, 2 0 = 3, 4
Individualism	Variable 50 “Who is to blame for your economic problems? And how much? - We, Russians, ourselves”	1. A lot 2. Some 3. A little 4. No 8. Difficult to answer 9. NA	1 = 1, 2 0 = 3, 4

	<p>Variable 66 It is most important to save silence and order in our country. It is most important to have personal liberty, the right to do everything one wants without state interference.</p>	<p>1. I absolutely agree with what is written first 2. I am basically in favour of what is written first 3. I am basically in favour of what is written second 4. I absolutely agree with what is written second 5. Both top and bottom variants 9. NA</p>	<p>1 = 3, 4 0 = 1, 2</p>
Authoritarianism	<p>Variable 83 "Army must rule the state"</p>	<p>1. Absolutely agree 2. Rather agree 3. Rather no 4. No 8. Difficult to answer 9. NA</p>	<p>1 = 1, 2 2 = 3, 4</p>
	<p>Variable 84 "We do not need neither parliament, nor elections, but a strong person who can find decisions and who embodies them quickly."</p>	<p>1. Absolutely agree 2. Rather agree 3. Rather no 4. No 8. Difficult to answer 9. NA</p>	<p>1 = 1, 2 2 = 3, 4</p>
Kremlin	<p>Variable 40 Who is to blame for your economic problems? And how much? - The President</p>	<p>1. A lot 2. Some 3. Little 4. No 8. Difficult to answer 9. NA</p>	<p>1 = 3, 4 2 = 1, 2</p>
	<p>Variable 41 Who is to blame for your economic problems? And how much? The Government</p>	<p>1. A lot 2. Some 3. Little 4. No 8. Difficult to answer 9. NA</p>	<p>1 = 3, 4 2 = 1, 2</p>

	<p>Variable 87 There are various social institutions in Russia such as legislative and executive bodies, government, court, militia. Please value in a 7-mark-scale how strong is your own confidence in these social institutions. (1 means that you do not trust maximally, 7 means that you do trust maximally.) – President Yeltsin</p>	<p>1. I do not trust maximally 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.</p>	<p>1 = 5, 6, 7 0 = 1, 2, 3, 4</p>
	<p>Variable 92 There are various social institutions in Russia such as legislative and executive bodies, government, court, militia. Please value in a 7-mark-scale how strong is your own confidence in these social institutions. (1 means that you do not trust maximally, 7 means that you do trust maximally.) – The Government</p>	<p>1. I do not trust maximally 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. I do trust maximally</p>	<p>1 = 5, 6, 7 0 = 1, 2, 3, 4</p>

Monitoring Russia 1996			
<i>Index</i>	<i>Variable index were created from</i>	<i>Old Values</i>	<i>New Values</i>
Future	Variable 59 “In your opinion, will our life more or less get moving, or not improve at all during the next twelve months?”	1. Our life will more or less get moving 2. Our life will not improve at all	1 = 1 0 = 2
	Variable 168 “As far as the economic situation in the country as a whole is concerned, in your opinion will the next twelve months be a good or bad time for the economy of the country?”	1. A good time 2. A good time, but not in all things 3. Not good, not bad 4. A bad time, but not in all things 5. A bad time	1 = 1, 2 0 = 3, 4, 5
	Variable 169 “Will the next five years be a good or a bad time for the economy of the country?”	1. A good time 2. Not good, not bad 3. A bad time	1 = 1 0 = 2, 3
	Variable 391 In your opinion, which will be your position on this scale in five years time?	1. High social position 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Low social position	1 = 1-5 0 = 6-10
Kremlin	Variable 52 “What is your personal opinion of the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin?”	1. I support him completely in all he does 2. I do not agree with what he does 3. I think that he should resign	1 = 1 0 = 2, 3
	Variable 54 “What is your personal opinion of the Russian government?”	1. I support it completely in all he does 2. I do not agree with what it does 3. I think that it should resign	1 = 1 0 = 2, 3

	<p>Variable 112 Which rating between 1 and 10 would you give Yeltsin's work as President of Russia?</p>	<p>1. Lowest rating 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Highest rating</p>	<p>1 = 6-10 0 = 1-5</p>
	<p>Variable 113 Which rating between 1 and 10 would you give Chernomirdin's work as Prime Minister?</p>	<p>1. Lowest rating 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Highest rating</p>	<p>1 = 6-10 0 = 1-5</p>

Exit Poll 1999			
<i>Index</i>	<i>Variable index were created from</i>	<i>Old Values</i>	<i>New Values</i>
Nostalgia	Variable C: When were you and your family better off?	1.Under socialism before perestroika 2.Now 3. Not Much Difference	-1 = Now 0 = Not much difference 1 = Under Socialism before Perestroika
Individualism	Variable F "What type of government is best for Russia?"	1.Socialism, as it was before Perestroyka 2.Socialism, made more modern 3.Democracy in its present form 4.Democracy, with many changes 5. Some other way	1= 3, 4 0= ELSE
	Variable G "Who will be most responsible for improving your future economic condition?"	1.Boris Yeltsin 2.The new President elected next year 3.The Duma 4.Business leaders 5.The work of you and your family	1 = 5 0 = ELSE
Authoritarianism	Variable E "Do you approve or disapprove of the Russian government's military action in Chechnya?"	1. Approve 2. Disapprove	1 = 1 ELSE = 0
	Variable F "What type of government is best for Russia?"	1.Socialism, as it was before Perestroyka 2.Socialism, made more modern 3.Democracy in its present form 4.Democracy, with many changes 5. Some other way	1 = 1, 2, 5 0 = ELSE
Kremlin	Variable C "When were you and your family better off?"	1.Under socialism before perestroika 2.Now 3. Not Much Difference	1 = 2 0 = ELSE
	Variable D: "If the election for President were being held today, would you vote for?"	1.Yuri Luzhkov 2.Yevgeny Primakov 3.Vladimir Putin 4.Vladimir Zhirinovsky 5.Gennadi Zyuganov 6.Grigory Yavlinsky 7.Alexandr Lebed 8.Some other candidate/WHICH 9.Against All/ would not vote	1 = 3 0 = ELSE

	<p>Variable E "Who will be most responsible for improving your future economic condition"</p>	<p>1. Boris Yeltsin 2. The new President elected next year 3. The Duma 4. Business leaders 5. The work of you and your family 6. The economic condition will not improve</p>	<p>1 = 1, 2 0 = ELSE</p>
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Exit Poll 2003			
<i>Index</i>	Variable index were created from	Old Values	New Values
Nostalgia	Variable D: When were you and your family better off?	1.Under socialism before perestroika 2.Now 3. Not Much Difference	-1 = Now 0 = Not much difference 1 = Under Socialism before Perestroika
Individualism	Variable B “Which Issue was most important to you vote today?”	1.War in Chechnya 2.Fighting crime 3.Fighting corruption 4.Economy and jobs 5.Strengthening the position of Russia internationally 6.More civic freedoms and democracy 7.Control of Business	1= 6 0= ELSE
	Variable E “Who will be most responsible for improving your future economic condition”	1.Vladimir Putin 2.The newly elected State Duma 3.Business leaders and companies 4. Regional Leaders 5.The work of you and your family 6. The economic condition will not improve	5 = 1 0 = ELSE
	Variable H “What should the government do about democratic reforms in Russia?”	1.The government should provide more civic freedom and democracy. 2.Freedom and democracy are OK as they are now. 3.The government should take more control so there is more order and stability, even if we lose some civic freedom and democracy	1 = 1 0 = ELSE
Authoritarianism	Variable B “Which Issue was most important to you vote today?”	1.War in Chechnya 2.Fighting crime 3.Fighting corruption 4.Economy and jobs 5.Strengthening the position of Russia internationally 6.More civic freedoms and democracy 7.Control of Business	1 = 1, 5, 7 0 = ELSE

	Variable G “What should be the role of the government in Russia’s business?”	1. The government should take control of all businesses 2. The government should only control oil, gas and electricity, but nothing else. 3. The government should not intervene in any Russian business	1 = 1 0 = ELSE
	Variable H “What should the government do about democratic reforms in Russia?”	1. The government should provide more civic freedom and democracy. 2. Freedom and democracy are OK as they are now. 3. The government should take more control so there is more order and stability, even if we lose some civic freedom and democracy	1 = 3 0 = ELSE
Kremlin	Variable C Who would you vote for if the Presidential election be held today?	1. Sergei Glaziev 2. Vladimir Zhirinovsky 3. Gennady Zyuganov 4. Vladimir Putin 5. Aman Tuleev 6. Sergei Shoigu 7. Grigory Yavlinsky 8. Other /SPECIFY 9. Against all/ would not vote	1 = 4 0 = ELSE
	Variable D ”When were you and your family better off?”	1. Under socialism before perestroika 2. Now 3. Not Much Difference	1 = 2 0 = ELSE
	Variable E “Who will be most responsible for improving your future economic condition”	1. Vladimir Putin 2. The newly elected State Duma 3. Business leaders and companies 4. Regional Leaders 5. The work of you and your family 6. The economic condition will not improve	1 = 1 0 = ELSE

Appendix C The Mean and Standard deviation of the independent variables

Here the means and the standard deviation of the different independent variables from the different datasets are reported. The reason for reporting this is twofold. First of all I want to show the reader the differences between the datasets both in terms of minimum and maximum values and the differences in the independent variables. As stated in the methodological chapter I have tried to compose a research design that is as similar as possible.

Secondly the means and standard deviation are reported because they are important in calculating the predicted probabilities and standardised coefficients.

Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age	3535	1	10	5,30	2,993
Gender	3535	0	1	,46	,498
Education	3535	1	4	2,52	1,052
Geography	3505	1	4	2,79	,917
Nostalgia	2855	0	3	1,34	1,107
Individualism	2908	0	2	,75	,648
Authoritarianism	2760	0	2	,63	,647
Kremlin	3535	0	4	,65	1,001

Monitoring Russia 1996					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age	2380	1	10	5,03	2,964
Gender	2405	0	1	,43	,495
Education	2351	1	36	12,11	3,528
Geography	2405	1	4	2,57	1,052
Future	2405	0	4	,82	,930
Kremlin	2336	0	4	,56	,985

Exit Poll 1999					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age	7711	1	4	2,55	1,056
Gender	7539	0	1	,47	,499
Geography	7770	1	4	2,72	,877
Nostalgia	7454	-1	1	,45	,755
Individualism	7770	0	2	,77	,733
Authoritarianism	7770	0	2	,73	,552
Kremlin	7770	0	3	1,10	,836

Exit Poll 2003					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age	12657	1	10	5,79	2,965
Gender	12369	0	1	,46	,499
Education	12553	1	5	3,16	1,359
Geography	12719	1	4	2,74	,941
Nostalgia	12373	-1	1	,22	,843
Individualism	12719	0	3	,78	,770
Authoritarianism	12719	0	3	1,00	,689
Kremlin	12719	0	3	,92	,758

Appendix D Results from Logistics Regressions

The tables report following results:

b = Unstandardised coefficients

S.E. = Standard Error

Wald = Wald chi square used in testing the null hypothesis

Sig. = two tailed p-value used in testing the null hypothesis

Exp(B) = The odds ratios for the predictor

B* = Standardised Coefficients

KPRF 1994						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	,213	,028	59,876	,000	1,238	0,153
Gender	,407	,145	7,866	,005	1,502	0,049
Education	,259	,071	13,376	,000	1,295	0,068
Geographys	,014	,079	,029	,865	1,014	0,003
Constant	-4,934	,404	149,270	,000	,007	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
NOSTALGIA	1,143	,115	98,017	,000	3,136	0,269
INDIVIDUALISM	-,283	,153	3,412	,065	,754	-0,039
AUTHORITARIAN	-,528	,147	12,865	,000	,590	-0,073
KREMLIN	-,760	,180	17,795	,000	,468	-0,162
Constant	-4,031	,320	158,593	,000	,018	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
AGE	,154	,037	17,361	,000	1,167	0,103
Gender	,584	,193	9,097	,003	1,792	0,065
Education	,395	,095	17,316	,000	1,485	0,093
Geographys	,014	,104	,017	,896	1,014	0,003
NOSTALGIA	1,155	,124	87,137	,000	3,174	0,286
INDIVIDUALISM	-,281	,161	3,055	,080	,755	-0,041
AUTHORITARIAN	-,481	,157	9,336	,002	,618	-0,070
KREMLIN	-,777	,184	17,810	,000	,460	-0,174
Constant	-6,420	,617	108,188	,000	,002	
Modell 4 (Significants)						
AGE	,115	,032	12,804	,000	1,122	0,087
GENDER	,556	,181	9,493	,002	1,744	0,069
NOSTALGIA	1,112	,112	99,328	,000	3,041	0,308
AUTORITARIAN	-,595	,144	17,168	,000	,551	-0,096
KREMLIN	-,744	,171	18,935	,000	,475	-0,186
Constant	-5,132	,333	237,170	,000	,006	

Source: Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994
The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)

VR 1994

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	,057	,019	9,033	,003	1,059	0,059
Gender	-,002	,107	,000	,985	,998	0,000
Education	,225	,054	17,456	,000	1,252	0,082
Geography	-,236	,058	16,517	,000	,790	-0,075
Constant	-2,301	,272	71,772	,000	,100	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
NOSTALGIA	-,574	,077	55,145	,000	,563	-0,221
INDIVIDUALISM	,051	,106	,238	,626	1,053	0,012
AUTHORITARIAN	-,351	,121	8,412	,004	,704	-0,079
KREMLININDEX	,514	,057	82,208	,000	1,673	0,179
Constant	-1,701	,165	106,655	,000	,182	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
AGE	,131	,027	24,221	,000	1,139	0,136
Gender	-,071	,141	,256	,613	,931	-0,012
Education	,083	,072	1,317	,251	1,086	0,030
Geography	-,097	,077	1,602	,206	,907	-0,031
NOSTALGIA	-,632	,080	63,005	,000	,531	-0,243
INDIVIDUALISM	,080	,108	,546	,460	1,083	0,018
AUTHORITARIAN	-,382	,124	9,467	,002	,683	-0,086
KREMLININDEX	,509	,057	78,526	,000	1,663	0,177
Constant	-2,256	,396	32,527	,000	,105	
Modell 4 (Significants)						
NOSTALGIA	-,630	,067	89,597	,000	,533	-0,240
KREMLIN	,524	,050	109,621	,000	1,688	0,181
Constant	-1,823	,103	312,374	,000	,161	

Source: Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994
The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)

YABLOKO1994

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	,045	,025	3,299	,069	1,046	0,034
Gender	,106	,139	,579	,447	1,111	0,013
Education	,226	,070	10,500	,001	1,254	0,061
Geography	-,253	,075	11,367	,001	,776	-0,059
Constant	-2,882	,351	67,313	,000	,056	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
NOSTALGIA	-,395	,084	22,384	,000	,674	-0,118
INDIVIDUALISM	-,059	,127	,218	,640	,942	-0,010
AUTHORITARIAN	-,366	,139	6,901	,009	,693	-0,064
KREMLININDEX	-,096	,080	1,440	,230	,909	-0,026
Constant	-1,706	,189	81,411	,000	,182	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
AGE	,060	,031	3,842	,050	1,062	0,048
Gender	-,143	,164	,762	,383	,866	-0,019
Education	,185	,085	4,767	,029	1,203	0,052
Geography	-,262	,090	8,481	,004	,769	-0,064
NOSTALGIA	-,405	,086	22,265	,000	,667	-0,120
INDIVIDUALISM	-,058	,129	,199	,656	,944	-0,010
AUTHORITARIAN	-,273	,141	3,736	,053	,761	-0,047
KREMLININDEX	-,097	,080	1,467	,226	,908	-0,026
Constant	-1,798	,454	15,685	,000	,166	
Modell 4 (Significants)						
GEOGRAPHY	-,265	,081	10,538	,001	,768	-0,059
NOSTALGIA	-,358	,073	23,748	,000	,699	-0,096
Constant	-1,499	,223	45,264	,000	,223	

Source: Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994
The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)

LDPR 1994

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	,004	,021	,038	,846	1,004	0,003
Gender	,705	,120	34,546	,000	2,024	0,097
Education	-,079	,061	1,674	,196	,924	-0,023
Geography	,310	,069	20,175	,000	1,363	0,078
Constant	-3,381	,321	111,015	,000	,034	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
NOSTALGIA	,117	,069	2,875	,090	1,124	0,033
INDIVIDUALISM	-,010	,120	,006	,936	,990	-0,002
AUTHORITARIAN	,535	,110	23,424	,000	1,707	0,087
KREMLININDEX	-,476	,104	20,809	,000	,622	-0,120
Constant	-2,530	,194	169,629	,000	,080	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
AGE	-,001	,028	,001	,974	,999	-0,001
Gender	,688	,156	19,571	,000	1,990	0,090
Education	,001	,079	,000	,988	1,001	0,000
Geography	,305	,089	11,731	,001	1,356	0,073
NOSTALGIA	,101	,072	1,959	,162	1,107	0,029
INDIVIDUALISM	-,014	,122	,014	,906	,986	-0,002
AUTHORITARIAN	,455	,115	15,620	,000	1,576	0,077
KREMLININDEX	-,503	,105	22,858	,000	,605	-0,132
Constant	-3,695	,450	67,476	,000	,025	
Modell 4 (Significants)						
GENDER	,748	,137	29,700	,000	2,112	0,015
GEOGRAPHY	,266	,077	11,918	,001	1,305	0,137
AUTORITARIAN	,508	,098	26,762	,000	1,661	0,193
KREMLIN	-,455	,090	25,832	,000	,634	-0,160
Constant	-3,567	,259	190,394	,000	,028	

Source: Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994
The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)

KPRF 1996

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	,243	,023	115,617	,000	1,275	0,237
Gender	,011	,126	,007	,932	1,011	0,002
Education	-,002	,017	,014	,906	,998	-0,002
Geography	,407	,065	39,356	,000	1,502	0,397
Constant	-4,300	,376	130,997	,000	,014	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Future	-,422	,086	23,993	,000	,656	-0,078
Kremlin Index	-,751	,117	41,045	,000	,472	-0,148
Constant						
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
AGE	,247	,024	106,199	,000	1,280	0,182
Gender	,043	,129	,110	,741	1,044	0,005
Education	-,008	,018	,221	,638	,992	-0,007
Geography	,318	,068	21,917	,000	1,375	0,234
Future	-,195	,089	4,769	,029	,823	-0,045
Kremlin	-,761	,118	41,502	,000	,467	-0,186
Constant	-3,609	,395	83,414	,000	,027	
Modell 4 (Significants)						
AGE	,250	,023	120,039	,000	1,284	0,183
GEOGRAPHY	,333	,064	27,155	,000	1,396	0,244
FUTURE	-,199	,088	5,163	,023	,820	-0,046
KREMLIN	-,781	,118	43,742	,000	,458	-0,573
Constant	-3,728	,256	211,854	,000	,024	

Source: Monitoring Russia 1996
The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)

NDR 1996

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	,044	,023	3,522	,061	1,045	0,040
Gender	,103	,139	,549	,459	1,108	0,016
Education	,005	,019	,067	,795	1,005	0,005
Geography	-,295	,068	18,522	,000	,745	-0,267
Constant	-1,777	,370	23,112	,000	,169	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Future	,301	,070	18,523	,000	1,351	0,115
Kremlin Index	,545	,060	81,609	,000	1,724	0,220
Constant	-2,934	,111	701,265	,000	,053	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
AGE	,062	,025	6,261	,012	1,064	0,071
Gender	-,014	,147	,009	,923	,986	-0,003
Education	,001	,021	,004	,949	1,001	0,001
Geography	-,134	,072	3,456	,063	,875	-0,155
Future	,347	,073	22,559	,000	1,415	0,126
Kremlin	,513	,063	67,117	,000	1,670	0,197
Constant	-2,926	,410	51,019	,000	,054	
Modell 4 (Significants)						
FUTURE	,301	,070	18,523	,000	1,351	
KREMLIN	,545	,060	81,609	,000	1,724	
Constant	-2,934	,111	701,265	,000	,053	

Source: Monitoring Russia 1996
The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)

YABLOKO 1996

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	,025	,024	1,052	,305	1,025	0,025
Gender	-,011	,141	,007	,935	,989	-0,002
Education	,079	,018	18,833	,000	1,082	0,095
Geography	-,106	,068	2,412	,120	,899	-0,107
Constant	-3,048	,361	71,284	,000	,047	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Future	,100	,076	1,724	,189	1,105	0,029
Kremlin Index	-,036	,075	,231	,631	,965	-0,011
Constant	-2,252	,095	562,592	,000	,105	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
AGE	,029	,025	1,378	,240	1,029	0,029
Gender	-,035	,142	,062	,803	,965	-0,006
Education	,076	,018	17,119	,000	1,079	0,091
Geography	-,108	,070	2,384	,123	,897	-0,109
Future	,089	,080	1,237	,266	1,093	0,028
Kremlin Index	-,063	,079	,649	,420	,939	-0,021
Constant	-3,031	,379	64,126	,000	,048	
Modell 4 (Significants)						
EDUCATION	,088	,018	24,461	,000	1,092	0,104
Constant	-3,317	,241	189,001	,000	,036	

Source: Monitoring Russia 1996
The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)

KPRF 1999						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	,617	,028	490,216	,000	1,852	0,267
Gender	,333	,055	36,340	,000	1,395	0,068
Geography	,237	,032	56,316	,000	1,267	0,085
Constant	-3,532	,130	741,988	,000	,029	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Nostalgia	1,129	,074	235,586	,000	3,093	0,249
Individualism	-1,238	,052	559,967	,000	,290	-0,265
Authoritarianism	-,305	,053	32,682	,000	,737	-0,049
Kremlin	-,671	,043	247,992	,000	,511	-0,164
Constant	-,190	,098	3,787	,052	,827	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	,353	,032	119,008	,000	1,423	0,110
Gender	,544	,064	71,450	,000	1,722	0,080
Geography	,179	,037	23,764	,000	1,196	0,046
Nostalgia	1,034	,075	190,688	,000	2,813	0,230
Individualism	-1,122	,054	424,517	,000	,326	-0,242
Authoritarianism	-,347	,057	37,019	,000	,707	-0,056
Kremlin	-,676	,044	232,398	,000	,509	-0,166
Constant	-1,869	,175	114,215	,000	,154	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Same as Modell 3						

Source: Exit Poll 1999

CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

UNITY 1999						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	-,294	,026	124,606	,000	,745	-0,129
Gender	-,101	,055	3,365	,067	,904	-0,021
Geography	,383	,032	141,063	,000	1,467	0,140
Constant	-1,436	,117	150,913	,000	,238	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Nostalgia	,527	,047	124,639	,000	1,694	0,147
Individualism	,750	,047	254,386	,000	2,117	0,203
Authoritarianism	,498	,057	76,403	,000	1,646	0,101
Kremlin	1,249	,045	772,373	,000	3,488	0,385
Constant	-3,974	,117	1149,709	,000	,019	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	-,222	,031	52,651	,000	,801	-0,084
Gender	-,180	,062	8,403	,004	,835	-0,032
Geography	,418	,037	128,832	,000	1,519	0,131
Nostalgia	,509	,049	106,436	,000	1,664	0,138
Individualism	,734	,049	219,812	,000	2,083	0,193
Authoritarianism	,502	,060	71,083	,000	1,652	0,099
Kremlin	1,241	,046	714,104	,000	3,458	0,372
Constant	-4,489	,183	601,308	,000	,011	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Age	-,218	,030	52,358	,000	,804	-0,083
Geography	,410	,036	128,109	,000	1,507	0,130
Nostalgia	,508	,049	109,149	,000	1,662	0,138
Individualism	,723	,049	220,408	,000	2,061	0,191
Authoritarianism	,483	,058	69,468	,000	1,621	0,096
Kremlin	1,244	,046	738,705	,000	3,471	0,374
Constant	-4,533	,179	641,439	,000	,011	

Source: Exit Poll 1999

CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

SPS 1999						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	-,466	,038	152,161	,000	,628	-0,154
Gender	-,184	,077	5,706	,017	,832	-0,029
Geography	-,438	,044	97,432	,000	,645	-0,120
Constant	,174	,151	1,334	,248	1,190	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Nostalgia	-,455	,061	54,886	,000	,635	-0,111
Individualism	,779	,064	148,146	,000	2,179	0,184
Authoritarianism	,037	,079	,222	,637	1,038	0,007
Kremlin	,391	,057	47,783	,000	1,478	0,105
Constant	-3,336	,146	520,522	,000	,036	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	-,266	,042	40,975	,000	,767	-0,089
Gender	-,314	,084	14,121	,000	,731	-0,049
Geography	-,344	,048	52,042	,000	,709	-0,095
Nostalgia	-,346	,063	29,666	,000	,708	-0,082
Individualism	,689	,066	108,801	,000	1,992	0,159
Authoritarianism	,048	,080	,357	,550	1,049	0,008
Kremlin	,452	,058	60,713	,000	1,571	0,119
Constant	-1,683	,216	60,600	,000	,186	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Age	-,262	,041	40,501	,000	,770	-0,087
Geography	-,352	,047	55,048	,000	,703	-0,097
Nostalgia	-,338	,063	29,012	,000	,713	-0,080
Individualism	,689	,065	110,799	,000	1,992	0,159
Kremlin	,456	,058	62,596	,000	1,578	0,120
Constant	-1,799	,202	79,180	,000	,166	

Source: Exit Poll 1999

CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

YABLOKO 1999						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	-,189	,039	23,394	,000	,828	-0,054
Gender	-,139	,083	2,815	,093	,870	-0,019
Geography	-,311	,047	43,866	,000	,733	-0,073
Constant	-1,002	,164	37,448	,000	,367	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Nostalgia	-,389	,067	33,738	,000	,678	-0,087
Individualism	,414	,062	45,218	,000	1,512	0,089
Authoritarianism	-,088	,078	1,296	,255	,915	-0,014
Kremlin	-,419	,059	51,081	,000	,657	-0,103
Constant	-2,098	,127	271,911	,000	,123	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	-,072	,043	2,722	,099	,931	-0,021
Gender	-,158	,087	3,300	,069	,854	-0,022
Geography	-,211	,049	18,590	,000	,810	-0,052
Nostalgia	-,336	,069	23,479	,000	,715	-0,072
Individualism	,385	,064	35,888	,000	1,469	0,080
Authoritarianism	-,052	,080	,421	,517	,949	-0,008
Kremlin	-,401	,060	44,845	,000	,670	-0,095
Constant	-1,333	,218	37,519	,000	,264	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Geography	-,216	,048	20,205	,000	,805	-0,054
Nostalgia	-,342	,068	25,589	,000	,711	-0,073
Individualism	,405	,062	43,076	,000	1,499	0,084
Kremlin	-,400	,059	46,081	,000	,670	-0,095
Constant	-1,625	,163	98,979	,000	,197	

Source: Exit Poll 1999
CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

LDPR 1999						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	-,473	,053	79,253	,000	,623	-,118
Gender	,979	,114	73,266	,000	2,661	0,115
Geography	,253	,062	16,763	,000	1,288	0,052
Constant	-3,101	,230	181,824	,000	,045	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Nostalgia	-,248	,085	8,531	,003	,780	-0,043
Individualism	,051	,079	,413	,520	1,052	0,009
Authoritarianism	,229	,096	5,628	,018	1,257	0,029
Kremlin	-,271	,072	14,308	,000	,762	-0,052
Constant	-2,748	,162	288,801	,000	,064	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	-,467	,057	66,769	,000	,627	-0,120
Gender	,987	,119	69,249	,000	2,682	0,120
Geography	,283	,064	19,431	,000	1,328	0,061
Nostalgia	-,183	,087	4,433	,035	,832	-0,034
Individualism	-,122	,082	2,182	,140	,885	-0,022
Authoritarianism	,024	,099	,061	,806	1,025	0,003
Kremlin	-,295	,074	15,990	,000	,745	-0,060
Constant	-2,738	,291	88,585	,000	,065	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Age	-,489	,054	83,501	,000	,613	-0,125
Gender	,981	,114	73,478	,000	2,667	0,118
Geography	,264	,062	18,172	,000	1,302	0,056
Kremlin	-,244	,065	14,252	,000	,784	-0,049
Constant	-2,844	,238	142,354	,000	,058	

Source: Exit Poll 1999

CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

OVR 1999						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
AGE	,089	,036	6,276	,012	1,093	0,034
Gender	-,049	,075	,430	,512	,952	-0,009
Geography	-,453	,043	111,165	,000	,636	-0,142
Constant	-1,143	,152	56,516	,000	,319	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Nostalgia	-,437	,062	49,343	,000	,646	-0,099
Individualism	-,019	,056	,114	,735	,981	-0,004
Authoritarianism	-,029	,068	,185	,667	,971	-0,005
Kremlin	-,627	,053	139,446	,000	,534	-0,157
Constant	-1,268	,109	136,256	,000	,281	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	,139	,040	12,370	,000	1,150	0,047
Gender	-,080	,079	1,023	,312	,923	-0,013
Geography	-,407	,045	82,983	,000	,666	-0,114
Nostalgia	-,403	,065	37,895	,000	,668	-0,097
Individualism	,000	,059	,000	,999	1,000	0,000
Authoritarianism	,009	,071	,016	,898	1,009	0,002
Kremlin	-,607	,055	122,227	,000	,545	-0,162
Constant	-,629	,198	10,135	,001	,533	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Age	,145	,038	14,597	,000	1,156	0,049
Geography	-,409	,044	86,662	,000	,664	-0,065
Nostalgia	-,408	,059	47,390	,000	,665	-0,099
Kremlin	-,600	,053	128,115	,000	,549	-0,161
Constant	-,669	,155	18,671	,000	,512	

Source: Exit Poll 1999
CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

KPRF 2003						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
Age	,249	,011	543,880	,000	1,283	0,243
Gender	,223	,054	16,996	,000	1,250	0,037
Education	-,113	,020	30,712	,000	,893	-0,050
Geography	,163	,030	29,060	,000	1,178	0,050
Constant	-3,651	,158	536,972	,000	,026	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
NOSTALGIA	,886	,055	259,005	,000	2,426	0,193
INDIVIDUALISM	-,324	,040	64,390	,000	,723	-0,064
AUTHORITARIAN	,228	,042	28,971	,000	1,256	0,041
KREMLININDEX	-,931	,050	340,428	,000	,394	-0,182
Constant	-1,632	,076	459,582	,000	,196	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	,189	,012	260,892	,000	1,208	0,151
Gender	,185	,057	10,475	,001	1,204	0,025
Education	-,075	,022	11,657	,001	,928	-0,027
Geography	,084	,033	6,688	,010	1,088	0,021
NOSTALGIA	,740	,058	164,450	,000	2,097	0,168
INDIVIDUALISM	-,182	,043	17,855	,000	,834	-0,038
AUTHORITARIAN	,214	,045	22,778	,000	1,239	0,040
KREMLININDEX	-,887	,053	282,651	,000	,412	-0,181
Constant	-3,021	,182	274,194	,000	,049	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Same as Model 3						

Source: Exit Poll 2003
CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International
(USA)

UR 2003						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
Age	-,064	,007	94,235	,000	,938	-0,088
Gender	-,408	,039	109,967	,000	,665	-0,095
Education	-,060	,015	16,426	,000	,941	-0,038
Geography	,136	,021	40,869	,000	1,146	0,060
Constant	-,238	,101	5,519	,019	,788	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Nostalgia	,164	,032	26,873	,000	1,178	0,058
Individualism	-,200	,028	50,862	,000	,819	-0,065
Authoritarianism	,125	,030	16,986	,000	1,133	0,036
Kremlin	1,229	,038	1030,964	,000	3,417	0,392
Constant	-1,846	,060	944,122	,000	,158	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	-,026	,008	11,952	,001	,974	-0,032
Gender	-,408	,043	92,173	,000	,665	-0,084
Education	-,085	,017	26,421	,000	,918	-0,048
Geography	,217	,024	84,633	,000	1,242	0,084
Nostalgia	,156	,033	21,955	,000	1,169	0,054
Individualism	-,147	,030	24,834	,000	,863	-0,047
Authoritarianism	,098	,031	9,883	,002	1,103	0,028
Kremlin	1,243	,040	990,014	,000	3,468	0,389
Constant	-1,877	,128	215,712	,000	,153	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Same as model 3						

Source: Exit Poll 2003

CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

SPS 2003						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
Age	-,149	,014	119,351	,000	,862	-0,107
Gender	-,105	,078	1,794	,180	,900	-0,013
Education	,229	,032	52,990	,000	1,258	0,076
Geography	-,379	,043	78,816	,000	,684	-0,087
Constant	-1,744	,197	78,188	,000	,175	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Nostalgia	-,548	,066	68,994	,000	,578	-0,132
Individualism	,629	,048	170,891	,000	1,876	0,139
Authoritarianism	-,206	,056	13,324	,000	,814	-0,041
Kremlin	,116	,070	2,773	,096	1,123	0,025
Constant	-3,308	,111	887,968	,000	,037	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	-,088	,015	35,956	,000	,916	-0,074
Gender	-,154	,081	3,648	,056	,857	-0,022
Education	,133	,033	16,437	,000	1,143	0,051
Geography	-,307	,044	47,829	,000	,736	-0,082
Nostalgia	-,448	,068	43,079	,000	,639	-0,107
Individualism	,500	,050	98,185	,000	1,649	0,109
Authoritarianism	-,156	,057	7,403	,007	,855	-0,030
Kremlin	,078	,071	1,230	,267	1,082	0,017
Constant	-2,315	,232	99,571	,000	,099	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Age	-,085	,015	34,641	,000	,918	-0,071
Education	,136	,033	17,543	,000	1,146	0,052
Geography	-,311	,044	50,338	,000	,733	-0,083
Nostalgia	-,497	,050	99,825	,000	,608	-0,119
Individualism	,494	,049	100,245	,000	1,639	0,108
Authoritarianism	-,155	,057	7,423	,006	,857	-0,030
Constant	-2,317	,211	120,546	,000	,099	

Source: Exit Poll 2003
CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

YABLOKO 2003						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
Age	,023	,014	2,870	,090	1,023	0,017
Gender	,035	,079	,191	,662	1,035	0,004
Education	,271	,031	75,483	,000	1,312	0,090
Geography	-,476	,044	117,206	,000	,621	-0,109
Constant	-2,680	,207	167,923	,000	,069	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Nostalgia	-,496	,064	59,168	,000	,609	-0,112
Individualism	,558	,049	128,807	,000	1,747	0,115
Authoritarianism	-,450	,059	58,014	,000	,637	-0,083
Kremlin	-,640	,069	85,194	,000	,527	-0,129
Constant	-2,266	,098	529,563	,000	,104	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	,051	,015	11,715	,001	1,052	0,042
Gender	-,078	,081	,908	,341	,925	-0,011
Education	,208	,032	41,207	,000	1,232	0,078
Geography	-,429	,045	89,791	,000	,651	-0,111
Nostalgia	-,497	,068	53,826	,000	,608	-0,115
Individualism	,447	,052	73,983	,000	1,564	0,094
Authoritarianism	-,353	,061	33,619	,000	,702	-0,067
Kremlin	-,680	,072	90,127	,000	,507	-0,142
Constant	-2,107	,236	79,710	,000	,122	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Age	,052	,015	12,394	,000	1,053	0,042
Education	,211	,032	43,007	,000	1,235	0,078
Geography	-,435	,045	94,402	,000	,647	-0,111
Nostalgia	-,493	,067	53,786	,000	,611	-0,113
Individualism	,450	,052	75,870	,000	1,569	0,094
Authoritarianism	-,367	,061	36,694	,000	,693	-0,069
Kremlin	-,692	,071	94,857	,000	,501	-0,143
Constant	-2,133	,229	86,761	,000	,118	

Source: Exit Poll 2003
CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International
(USA)

LDPR 2003						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
Age	-,164	,010	266,828	,000	,849	-0,157
Gender	,549	,059	87,282	,000	1,732	0,088
Education	-,184	,023	62,326	,000	,832	-0,081
Geography	,107	,033	10,750	,001	1,113	0,032
Constant	-1,196	,152	62,332	,000	,302	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
Nostalgia	-,381	,046	67,194	,000	,683	-0,107
Individualism	-,081	,039	4,361	,037	,922	-0,021
Authoritarianism	,188	,042	19,734	,000	1,207	0,043
Kremlin	-,761	,051	226,121	,000	,467	-0,191
Constant	-1,446	,073	396,337	,000	,235	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	-,196	,011	318,222	,000	,822	-0,193
Gender	,531	,060	77,204	,000	1,701	0,088
Education	-,157	,024	41,596	,000	,855	-0,072
Geography	,074	,034	4,783	,029	1,077	0,023
Nostalgia	-,193	,049	15,347	,000	,825	-0,054
Individualism	-,147	,042	12,401	,000	,863	-0,037
Authoritarianism	,130	,044	8,898	,003	1,139	0,030
Kremlin	-,765	,052	213,621	,000	,465	-0,192
Constant	-,343	,172	3,970	,046	,709	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Age	-,192	,011	307,748	,000	,825	-0,188
Gender	,521	,060	74,542	,000	1,683	0,059
Education	-,171	,024	50,764	,000	,842	-0,077
Geography	,083	,034	6,056	,014	1,087	0,026
Nostalgia	-,169	,049	12,081	,001	,844	-0,047
Authoritarianism	,092	,042	4,785	,029	1,097	0,021
Kremlin	-,742	,052	204,114	,000	,476	-0,186
Constant	-,447	,170	6,912	,009	,640	

Source: Exit Poll 2003
CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

RODINA 2003						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 1 (Demographics)						
Age	,100	,011	88,142	,000	1,106	0,092
Gender	,149	,060	6,157	,013	1,160	0,023
Education	,179	,023	61,821	,000	1,196	0,076
Geography	-,111	,033	11,389	,001	,895	-0,033
Constant	-3,123	,163	368,562	,000	,044	
MODEL 2 (Index)						
NOSTALGIA	,090	,048	3,473	,062	1,094	0,021
INDIVIDUALISM	-,023	,041	,302	,583	,978	-0,005
AUTHORITARIAN	-,168	,045	13,668	,000	,845	-0,033
KREMLININDEX	-,424	,052	66,751	,000	,654	-0,091
Constant	-1,653	,077	457,402	,000	,192	
MODEL 3 (Mix)						
Age	,071	,012	37,925	,000	1,074	0,062
Gender	,128	,061	4,371	,037	1,137	0,019
Education	,197	,024	69,775	,000	1,218	0,079
Geography	-,143	,034	17,953	,000	,866	-0,040
Nostalgia	,062	,051	1,486	,223	1,064	0,015
Individualism	-,067	,043	2,373	,123	,936	-0,015
Authoritarianism	-,127	,047	7,431	,006	,880	-0,026
Kremlin	-,439	,054	67,152	,000	,644	-0,098
Constant	-2,392	,183	170,487	,000	,091	
MODEL 4 (Significants)						
Age	,079	,011	54,225	,000	1,082	0,070
Education	,180	,023	63,460	,000	1,197	0,073
Geography	-,146	,032	20,250	,000	,864	-0,041
Authoritarianism	-,138	,044	9,849	,002	,871	-0,028
Kremlin	-,470	,043	121,965	,000	,625	-0,107
Constant	-2,307	,169	186,831	,000	,100	

Source: Exit Poll 2003
CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

Appendix E Results from logistic regressions with model 5

KPRF 2003						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 5						
Nostalgia	,841	,056	226,125	,000	2,318	0,191
Individualism	-,255	,040	40,920	,000	,755	-0,053
Kremlin	-,932	,051	333,026	,000	,394	-0,191
Economic	-,427	,057	56,065	,000	,653	-0,068
Constant	-1,712	,080	461,778	,000	,180	

UR 2003						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 5						
Nostalgia	,134	,032	17,326	,000	1,144	0,048
Individualism	-,147	,028	28,326	,000	,863	-0,048
Kremlin	1,227	,039	998,371	,000	3,412	0,391
Economic	-,290	,037	62,272	,000	,748	-0,072
Constant	-1,942	,061	1000,017	,000	,143	

SPS 2003						
Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 5						
Nostalgia	-,469	,067	48,845	,000	,626	-0,118
Individualism	,520	,048	119,597	,000	1,681	0,120
Kremlin	,158	,070	5,097	,024	1,172	0,036
Economic	,564	,058	95,859	,000	1,758	0,100
Constant	-3,174	,108	865,385	,000	,042	

YABLOKO 2003

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 5						
Nostalgia	-.432	,066	42,911	,000	,649	-0,102
Individualism	,407	,048	71,262	,000	1,503	0,087
Kremlin	-.621	,070	78,432	,000	,537	-0,131
Economic	,552	,058	89,782	,000	1,736	0,091
Constant	-2,297	,096	575,029	,000	,101	

LDPR 2003



Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 5						
Nostalgia	-.379	,048	63,423	,000	,685	-0,106
Individualism	-.040	,038	1,089	,297	,961	-0,010
Kremlin	-.762	,051	220,749	,000	,467	-0,191
Economic	-.105	,051	4,330	,037	,900	-0,021
Constant	-1,351	,072	348,114	,000	,259	



RODINA 2003



Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	B*
MODEL 5						
Nostalgia	,089	,049	3,248	,072	1,093	0,021
Individualism	-.070	,041	2,990	,084	,932	-0,015
Kremlin	-.424	,052	65,431	,000	,655	-0,091
Economic	,086	,051	2,809	,094	1,090	0,014
Constant	-1,718	,077	500,588	,000	,179	

Appendix F Predicted Probabilities based on Model 4 (the significant results)



Results from Exit Poll 1999












Results from Exit Poll 2003









Appendix G Correlations between the independent variables

These tables report the correlations between the independent variables, using Kendall's Tau B. As is seen there is a positive relationship between the individualism and authoritarian index. This is somewhat disturbing, but there might be two explanations for this. First of all it might be because the indexes are created from the same variables, using different values. The second reason, which is of a more substantial character, might be because you might have voters who both endorse authoritarian and individualist values. We could for instance imagine that a communist voter would display both individualistic and authoritarian attitudes. Some communist voters might feel that the Kremlin has left them and therefore the work of me and my family becomes more important in improving ones economy. At the same time they want democratic right to protest against this new regime.

Political and economic problems in Russia 1994									
	Age	Gender	EDUCATION	Geography	NOSTALGIA	INDIVIDUALISM	AUTHORITARIAN	KREMLIN	
Kendall's tau_b									
Age	Correlation Coefficient	1,000	-.248(**)	,085(**)	,177(**)	-.091(**)	,093(**)	-.021	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,209	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,117	
Gender	Correlation Coefficient	-.018	,045(**)	-.001	-.054(**)	,044(*)	-.021	,039(*)	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,209	,004	,974	,002	,014	,247	,014	
EDUCATION	Correlation Coefficient	-.248(**)	1,000	-.144(**)	-.115(**)	,084(**)	-.185(**)	,020	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,004	,000	,000	,000	,000	,170	
Geography	Correlation Coefficient	,085(**)	-.144(**)	1,000	,130(**)	-.086(**)	,133(**)	-.038(**)	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,974	,000	,000	,000	,000	,009	
NOSTALGIA	Correlation Coefficient	,177(**)	-.115(**)	-.130(**)	1,000	-.183(**)	,152(**)	-.209(**)	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,002	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	
INDIVIDUALISM	Correlation Coefficient	-.091(**)	,044(*)	,084(**)	-.183(**)	1,000	-.082(**)	,031	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,014	,000	,000	,000	,000	,062	
AUTHORITARIAN	Correlation Coefficient	,093(**)	-.021	-.185(**)	,133(**)	-.082(**)	1,000	-.073(**)	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,247	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	
KREMLIN	Correlation Coefficient	-.021	,039(*)	,020	-.038(**)	-.209(**)	-.073(**)	1,000	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,117	,014	,170	,009	,062	,000	,000	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Monitoring Russia 1996							
Kendall's tau_b		Age	Gender	Education	Geography	Future	Kremlin
	Age	1,000	-,044(*)	-,106(**)	,022	-,189(**)	-,014
	Gender	-,044(*)	1,000	-,009	,167	,068(**)	,411
	Education	,012	-,009	1,000	,388	,112(**)	,654
	Geography	-,106(**)	,593	-,198(**)	1,000	-,083(**)	,037(*)
	Future	,022	,016	-,198(**)	,000	,000	,028
	Kremlin	,167	,388	,112(**)	-,083(**)	1,000	-,173(**)
		-,189(**)	,068(**)	,037(*)	-,173(**)	,252(**)	,000
		,000	,654	,028	,000	,000	1,000
		,411					

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

		Exit Poll 1999						
Kendall's tau_b		Age	Gender	Geography	Nostalgia	Individualism	Authoritarianism	Kremlin
	Age	1,000	-.058(**)	-.011	,218(**)	-.268(**)	-.085(**)	-.039(**)
			,000	,259	,000	,000	,000	,000
	Gender	-.058(**)	1,000	,011	-.064(**)	,051(**)	,166(**)	-.002
		,000	.	,302	,000	,000	,000	,869
	Geography	-.011	,011	1,000	,104(**)	-.087(**)	-.026(*)	,034(**)
		,259	,302	.	,000	,000	,012	,001
	Nostalgia	,218(**)	-.064(**)	,104(**)	1,000	-.374(**)	-.129(**)	-.307(**)
		,000	,000	,000	.	,000	,000	,000
	Individualism	-.268(**)	,051(**)	-.087(**)	-.374(**)	1,000	,052(**)	-.021(*)
		,000	,000	,000	,000	.	,000	,039
	Authoritarianism	-.085(**)	,166(**)	-.026(*)	-.129(**)	,052(**)	1,000	,109(**)
		,000	,000	,012	,000	,000	.	,000
	Kremlin	-.039(**)	-.002	,034(**)	-.307(**)	-.021(*)	,109(**)	1,000
		,000	,869	,001	,000	,039	,000	.

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Exit Poll 2003									
Kendall's tau_b		Age	Gender	Education	Geography	Nostalgia	Individualism	Authoritarianism	Kremlin
	Age	1,000	-,071(**)	-,117(**)	-,054(**)	,243(**)	-,163(**)	-,019(**)	-,155(**)
			,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,009	,000
	Gender	-,071(**)	1,000	-,035(**)	,033(**)	-,029(**)	,049(**)	,015	-,026(**)
		,000		,000	,000	,001	,000	,067	,002
	Education	-,117(**)	-,035(**)	1,000	-,211(**)	-,130(**)	,170(**)	-,038(**)	,089(**)
		,000	,000		,000	,000	,000	,000	,000
	Geography	-,054(**)	,033(**)	-,211(**)	1,000	,075(**)	-,079(**)	,024(**)	-,059(**)
		,000	,000			,000	,000	,002	,000
	Nostalgia	,243(**)	-,029(**)	-,130(**)	,075(**)	1,000	-,144(**)	,029(**)	-,551(**)
		,000	,001	,000	,000		,000	,000	,000
	Individualism	-,163(**)	,049(**)	,170(**)	-,079(**)	-,144(**)	1,000	,189(**)	,003
		,000	,000	,000	,000	,000		,000	,673
	Authoritarianism	-,019(**)	,015	-,038(**)	,024(**)	,029(**)	,189(**)	1,000	,004
		,009	,067	,000	,002	,000	,000		,622
	Kremlin	-,155(**)	-,026(**)	,089(**)	-,059(**)	-,551(**)	,003	,004	1,000
		,000	,002	,000	,000	,000	,673	,622	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix H Results from logistic regression with party pairs (Unstandardised coefficients)

	KPRF VR	KPRF LDPR	KPRF YABLOKO	YABLOKO LDPR	YABLOKO VR	LDPR VR
Nostalgia	1,597**	0,928**	1,427**	-0,550**	0,184	0,672**
Individualism	-0,470	-0,237	-0,334	-0,017	-0,099	-0,097
Authoritarian	0,042	-0,820**	0,133	-0,697**	0,073	0,706**
Kremlin	-1,157**	-0,027	-0,837*	0,638**	-0,501**	-1,090**
Initial -2log Likelihood	247,47	392,72	260,07	448,20	546,24	473,51
Model chi square	2887,07	81,75	169,04	68,78	38,90	183,35
N	415	351	311	376	440	480

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

Source: Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994 The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)

	KPRF NDR	KPRF LDPR	KPRF YABLOKO	YABLOKO LDPR	YABLOKO NDR	LDPR NDR
Future	-0,576**	-0,262	-0,428**	0,227	-0,208*	-0,456*
Kremlin	-1,145**	-0,068	-0,616**	0,560*	-0,514	-1,084**
Initial -2log Likelihood	585,01	496,41	726,07	416,10	603,84	348,75
Model chi square	199,94	4,12	53,55	16,59	54,62	86,23
N	579	450	576	346	475	349

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

Source: Monitoring Russia 1996 The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)

	KPRF UNITY	KPRF LDPR	KPRF YABLO	KPRF SPS	KPRF OVR	UNITY SPS	UNITY OVR	UNITY LDPR	UNITY YABLO	YABLO LDPR	YABLO SPS	YABLO OVR	SPS OVR	SPS LDPR	LDPR OVR
Nostalgia	0,672**	1,010*	1,158*	1,209**	1,148**	0,797**	0,738**	0,494**	0,696**	-0,129	0,058	0,040	0,031	-0,224*	0,146
Individualism	-1,640**	-1,077**	-1,477**	-1,769**	-0,963**	-0,168*	0,687**	0,482**	0,234*	0,332*	-0,419**	0,462**	0,858**	0,674**	0,110
Authoritarianism	-0,645**	-0,446**	-0,194	-0,335*	-0,205	0,298*	0,469**	0,171	0,482**	-0,227*	-0,163	-0,008	0,118	-0,142	0,245*
Kremlin	-1,621**	-0,291*	-0,235*	-0,941**	0,015	0,531**	1,664**	1,215**	1,351**	-0,090	-0,775**	0,262*	1,069**	0,657**	0,344**
Initial -2log Likelihood	3206,61	1698,12	2108,51	1774,38	2771,86	2909,67	2564,28	1794,17	2391,02	1328,87	1778,63	1956,04	1835,90	1305,97	1477,30
Model chi square	2018,35	390,95	813,711	1486,78	591,96	230,17	672,79	229,62	427,22	25,82	171,56	42,98	357,54	158,58	19,55
N	3775	2358	2620	2747	2788	2570	2611	2181	2443	1026	1415	1456	1583	1153	1194

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

Source: Exit Poll 1999 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)

	KPRF UR	KPRF LDPR	KPRF YABLO	KPRF SPS	KPRF RODIN	UR SPS	UR RODIN	UR LDPR	UR YABLO	LDPR RODIN	YABLO LDPR	YABLO SPS	YABLO RODIN	SPS RODIN	SPS LDPR
Nostalgia	0,665**	0,990**	1,029**	1,078**	0,600**	0,736**	0,066	0,491**	0,669**	-0,379**	-0,117	0,085	-0,470**	-0,522**	-0,185*
Individualism	-0,196**	-0,232**	-0,885**	-0,816**	-0,284**	-0,678**	-0,097*	0,081	-0,656**	-0,108	0,634**	-0,061	0,568**	0,576**	0,642**
Authoritarianism	0,124*	0,026	0,706**	0,418**	0,303**	0,268**	0,229**	-0,118*	0,481**	0,322**	-0,577**	-0,169*	-0,244*	0,101	-0,352**
Kremlin	-1,920**	-0,124	-0,301**	-0,982**	-0,378**	0,788**	1,400**	1,667**	1,610**	-0,234**	0,126	-0,704**	-0,111	0,561**	0,798**
Initial -2log Likelihood	5200,10	3966,79	2330,256	1949,54	3875,73	3825,42	5283,76	5560,75	3472,44	3687,32	2563,58	187,24	2440,40	227,55	2385,51
Model chi square	2185,28	429,464	654,197	1072,80	281,574	372,123	754,905	920,773	665,249	65,729	167,157	128,534	169,038	413,151	378,594
N	6165	3231	2430	2431	2865	5252	5686	6052	5251	2752	2317	1517	1951	1952	2318

* significant at $p < 0,05$

** significant at $p < 0,01$

Source Exit Poll 2003 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International (USA)