TAMING
THE WAR MACHINE
POLICE, PACIFICATION, AND POWER IN RIO DE JANEIRO

Tomas Salem
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the Master degree
Department of Social Anthropology
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Buenos Aires
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NOTE ON LANGUAGE AND THE USE OF KEY CONCEPTS

POLICE In Brazil, policing is divided between the Federal Police (PF) on a national level, in charge of investigating federal crimes, and the Civil Police and Military Police on a state level. While the Civil Police is in charge of investigations, the Military Police is in charge of day-to-day patrol. As a military institution, the Military Police is characterized by a hierarchical command structure and strict disciplinary code of conduct. The institutional hierarchy is based on the division between low-ranking *praças* and high-ranking *oficiais*. The multiplicity of police institutions and their internal fragmentation challenges the attempt to translate the Portuguese terms that the police use on themselves. Furthermore, some terms were alternately used by the interlocutors of my thesis to refer to the same concept. For instance, *o policial, o policial militar, o militar, o soldado, o oficial, o commandante* and *a praça* were all different ways to refer to police officers. To distinguish between the different police forces and capture the details of the institutional hierarchy of the Military Police, I have chosen to adopt the following terminology consistently throughout the thesis:

Police-soldier [*policial*]. In Brazil, the term generally refers to the Military Police, while Civil Police are called *delegados* [deputies or commissioners].
Police officer [*oficial*]. High ranking officers that carry out commanding functions within the Military Police.
Cop [*praça*]. Low ranking policemen that compose most of the staff at the Military Police and are responsible for patrol duties and administrative chores.
The police [*a policia*]. The Military Police of Rio de Janeiro, also referred to as PMERJ [*Policia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*].

Sometimes I also address the police-soldiers through their formal rank (see Appendix 1), as either **Soldier** [soldado], **Corporal** [cabo], or **Colonel** [coronel], etc. When I do, I have capitalized their title to make this evident to the reader.

STATE In this thesis I actively draw on Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of war machine and state in my analysis of the changes in the exercise of power by the Brazilian state. In order to distinguish between Deleuze and Guattari's analytical concepts, and the state apparatuses of the local and federal government, I consequently refer to the latter either as the **State** (capitalized) when I am referring to the state apparatuses of Brazil in general, the **State of Rio** when I am referring to the local context (the State of Rio de Janeiro) and **Brazilian state** when I am referring to the federal government. The analytical use of the concept is not capitalized.

Ala de serviço	Lit. "shift wing"; group of cops working the same 24-hour schedule and supervised by one or two sergeants
Arrego	Lit. "agreement"; arrangements of weekly payments of bribes by the drug cartels to the police
Asfaltio	Lit. "tarmac"; the *formal* city as opposed to the *informality* of the favelas
Baile funk	Favela block party, traditionally organized by the drug cartels prior to pacification
Bandido	Lit. "bandit"; criminal
Blindado	Armored personnel carrier
Boca de fumo	Lit. "mouth of smoke"; place where regular sale and consumption of drugs take place in the favelas
Bonde	Lit. "tram"; convoy of cars with gang-members from the favelas
Boteco	Bar
Caiverão	Lit. "big skull"; armored personnel carrier
Cara	Guy
Comunidade	Lit. "community"; politically correct term for *favela*, which was often considered derogatory
Cultura do trafico	Lit. "culture of drug trafficking"; used by the police to describe the positive valuation of cultural expressions associated with the drug trade
Desacato	Contempt [for the law] (legal term)
Favelado	Derogatory term for favela resident
Forró	Music and dance genre from northeastern Brazil
Favela	Lit. "shrub"; informal urban settlement characterized by the lack of state regulation and precarious provision of public services
Funk	Music genre from the favelas associated to the drug trade by the police
Ganso	Lit. "goose"; criminal
Gente de bem	Good people
Lei do trafico	Lit. "law of drug trafficking"; laws and social order imposed by the drug cartels in the favelas.
Libertinagem	Profligacy, indecency
Morro	Lit. "hill"; used interchangeably for *favela*
O movimento	Lit. "the movement"; the drug cartels or drug trade
O trafico	Lit. "the traffic"; the drug trafficking, the drug trade, or the drug cartels
Oficial	[High ranking military police] officer
Pô	Short form of *poxa*; exclamation used in oral Portuguese.
Praça	[Low ranking] beat cop, or just cop
Proibidão	Lit. "prohibited, forbidden"; funk music with lyrics that center on violence, the drug trade, and the lifestyle of gang members.
Marginal	Lit. "marginal"; criminal, gang member
Sacanada	Indecency [with sexual connotations]
Sacanagem	Indecency (conjugation)
Traficante	Lit. "trafficker"; drug dealer, gang member
Vagabundo	Lit. "vagabond"; criminal, gang-member
Zona Sul	South Zone (affluent and touristic area of Rio)

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADA *Amigo dos Amigos* (Friend of Friends). One of three main drug cartels in Rio.

ALERJ *Asamblea Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro* (Legislative Assembly of the State of Rio de Janeiro).

BOPE *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* (Special Police Operations Battalion). Part of PMERJ's special units.

COE *Commando de Operações Especiais* (Special Operations Command).

CPP *Cordenaduría da Policia Pacificadora* (Coordinating offices of the Pacifying Police)

CPX *Complexo do Alemão.* Large compound of favelas located in northern Rio.

CV *Commando Vermelho* (Red Command). The largest drug cartel of Rio.

EAT *Estácio de Aplicações Tácticas* (Tactical Applications Training). Week-long tactical training course held for UPP cops at COE.

GPAE *Grupamento Policial em Areas Especiais* (Special Areas Police Unit). Pilot project implemented in selected favelas between 2000 and 2002 based on the paradigm of community policing. Predecessor to the UPP's.

GPP *Grupamento de Policia de Proximidade* (Proximity Police Unit). Unit that carried out patrol by foot at the UPPs.

GTPP *Grupamento Táctico de Policia de Proximidade* (Tactical Proximity Police Unit). Unit that carried out tactical patrol by foot at the UPPs.

LMCO Late modern colonial occupation (Mbembe 2003)

PMERJ *Policia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro* (Military Police of Rio de Janeiro)

SESEG *Secretario de Segurança Publica* (State Secretary of Public Security). Public state authority responsible for PMERJ.

TCP *Terceiro Commando Puro* (Pure Third Command). One of three main drug cartels in Rio.

UPP *Unidade de Policia Pacificadora* (Pacifying Police Unit).

WAGs Wars in the era of globalization (Mbembe 2003)

Chapter 1

PACIFICATION

> Pacification is a process in which the war power is used in the fabrication of a social order of wage labor. This aligns the war power with the police power, and suggests that their interconnection might be understood through the lens of pacification
>
> (Neocleous 2013: 7)

"Look at that!" Sub-Lieutenant Marcio nods towards the maze of red brick buildings clutching the steep hillsides below us, bathed in the scorching evening sun. "That's the neglect of the rulers [*os governantes*]!" Marcio shakes his head:

> For years the state has abandoned a huge part of the population: first they let them build their homes on these hills, and then they leave them there to fend for themselves—without any sanitation system, without electricity, without water, and working for meager wages for the rich living in the *asfalto*![1] And when the State isn't present, others take charge: generations of criminals, passing the torch from father to son, to grandson. Do you think all that can change in just a couple of years?

He looks me in the eye: "Now, I'm not saying the pacification is a bad project—it's a good project, but it's a *failed* project. The police are working here in vain, and the State has abandoned us as well. They've put us here to end *o trafico* [drug trafficking], but they are never here for us! Did you know that we have to buy our own guns? Our own guns!" He shakes his head in contempt. "There is never any money for the police. However, there is plenty of money for corrupt politicians!"

SUBJECT: THE PACIFICATION OF THE OF THE FAVELAS

In Portuguese *favela* is the name of a shrub endemic to Brazil. It grew on the hills surrounding the citadels of Canudos, where the so-called War of Canudos was fought at the

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[1] *Asfalto* literally means 'tarmac', and refers to the formal city, or those parts of the city that are not considered *favela*.

[2] Source: http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o_que_e_upp (last accessed 09/08/16)

end of the 19th century, in the newly founded Brazilian state. Upon returning to Rio de Janeiro the war veterans settled down on the hillsides of *Morro da Providencia*, naming their community *Morro da Favela,* in reference to the shrub. Through the 20th century, urban socioeconomic inequalities crystallized in the landscape through the distinction between *favela* and *asfalto*, between impoverished informal settlements and the formal city, as Rio's favelas grew and expanded wherever state regulations were absent. By and large this meant on the steep slopes of the *morros* [hills] surrounding the city center, where access was difficult and basic services such as light, water and sanitation were improvised or non-existent. With time, the initially small and peripheral squatter communities grew large and were gradually engulfed by the expansion of Rio, creating a unique geography characterized by the proximity between pockets of large and centrally located favelas, surrounded by the luxury of some of the wealthiest urban areas in Latin America. Gradually, they became the targets of state interventions: first in way of forced removals, and later through policies of urbanization and so-called public security policies (Meirelles and Athayde 2014).

In the 1980's, with Brazil's return to democracy, the *favelas* became the stronghold of the city's drug cartels, composed mostly of socially and economically marginalized young men who found in the money, arms and violence of the drug trade a possibility to make claims to status and power (see Zaular 2010). The cartels established what has widely been perceived as a *parallel state* in the favelas, and entered into violent territorial disputes with each other. Soon, they became the targets of heavily militarized public security policies, through the Brazilian state's incipient *war on drugs* unfolding in the favelas. The Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro (*Policia Militar do Estado de Rio de Janeiro*, PMERJ) acted as the state's spearhead in the war against the favela-based cartels. However, while the conflict is often represented as a war between state and non-state subjects, the actual configuration of the conflict was far more complex: Through practices of police corruption and collusion with the cartels, as well as the involvement of police-soldiers in death squads and paramilitary groups called *milicias*, the dynamics of the conflict defies the borders between state and non-state subjectivities. Such contexts, where multiple and antagonizing groups enter into violent contests of power, have elsewhere been coined *multiple sovereignties* (Bertelsen 2009; see Appendix 4).

In the decades following the return of democracy, conflicts and competition between Rio's *multiple sovereignties* lead to a quick escalation in violence and territorial disputes. In January 2009, PMERJ in collaboration with local authorities established the first of a total of 38 Pacifying Police Units (*Unidades da Policia Pacificadora*, UPP's) in selected favelas. The

UPP project is probably the largest-scale police initiative taking place in the developing world at the time (Magaloni, Franco and Melo 2015). By 2014 a total of 9.500 police officers served a population of 1,5 million residents across 264 favelas and neighbor communities.[2] Crucially, the UPP's signaled an important departure from the repressive and militarized police strategy previously adopted in the favelas. I carried out the fieldwork for this thesis from December 2014 through July 2015, following the police-soldiers of three different UPP's on patrol, tracking the ongoing *pacification* of the favelas, and the associated process of reforming PMERJ. Through participation in the everyday routine and work at the bases I got unique access to the perspectives and experiences of the police-soldiers in charge of putting the project into life.

Caption 1: UPP cops on patrol

The UPP's have been closely tied to Rio's preparations to host the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, and address the security concerns surrounding these mega-events. The project centered on reclaiming state control in the favelas, previously dominated by armed groups, bringing peace and security to its residents.[i] It was inspired in a similar policing

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[2] Source: http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o_que_e_upp (last accessed 09/08/16)

initiative in Medellin, Colombia, and involved the creation of permanent police stations within selected favelas. In order to address the growing international criticism of the repeated and severe human rights abuses of Brazilian police forces, and to improve deteriorated police-resident relations, the UPP's adopted a strategy of community policing called *policing of proximity*. Thus, one hundred years after the veterans of Canudos started settling down on the steep hills of Rio, *soldiers* were returning to the favelas to reclaim, occupy and pacify the territories in name of the state.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE

After decades of PMERJ's *war on drugs* against the favela-based cartels, the UPP project represents the most significant change in the State's exercise of power in the favelas since Brazil's return to democracy. It can be seen as a simultaneous attempt to control and contain the multiple sovereignties operating in the favelas, and to modernize PMERJ and transform it into a *citizen police*, governed by the state discourse of public security, and not the belligerent logic of war that characterized the institution.

On an analytical level I approach these dynamics of the *pacification project* as a strategy to examine the recent changes in state power and violence in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil. I follow Kapferer and Bertelsen (2009) who argue that Deleuze and Guattari's (1987 [1980]) conceptualization of *war machine* and *state dynamics* are particularly suited to analyze changes in the exercise of violent state power as well as processes of violent contestation between state and non-state sovereignties.

In Deleuzian philosophy *war machines* are understood as anarchic, heterogeneous, rhizomic, or potentially subversive horizontal networks characterized by their exteriority in relation to the state. On the other hand, *states* are hierarchical, structuring and sedentary assemblages "given to power and oriented to its monopolization and/or regulation" (Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009: 5).[3] Instead of thinking of war machines and states as fixed entities (as in "national governments" or "rebelling groups"), they can be understood as antagonistic *dynamics* or modalities of power that coexist in all social processes and formations. Thus, they help us understand the relation between processes of domination and control (state

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[3] A *rhizome* is an organic root system with no privileged center, as opposed to *arboreic* structures with roots, trunk and branches organized in a vertical and hierarchical order.

dynamics), and the (often violent) resistance towards them (war machine dynamics). The interplay between these two dynamics will therefore be at the center of my analysis of the UPP project and reform of PMERJ.

In Marcio's story at the start of this chapter the contours of these dynamics was traceable in his account of how the drug cartels had taken charge of the favelas in the absence of the state, and the state's attempt to reclaim the territories through the pacification. To capture the changing relation between war machine and state dynamics as they were experienced by the police officers at the UPPs, I have developed the following research question and sub-set of questions that roughly correspond to the chaptered structure of the thesis:

How are changes in the exercise of state power manifested through Rio de Janeiro's pacification project?

a) How has the policing of the favelas been carried out historically, and how has the State's relation to these areas changed with the establishment of the UPPs?

b) What forms of violence characterize the subjectivity of police-soldiers as an open-ended process of becoming?

b) How does UPP police-soldiers enact a new state order in the pacified favelas through repressive and preventive practices of policing, and what are the characteristics of this order?

c) What kind of police subjectivity is produced through the pacification project, and how is the attempt at reforming the police challenged and resisted?

d) How are political and economic processes on national and global scale shaping Rio's public security policies?

Explaining state violence

Approaching these questions and the pacification project as a whole must also take into consideration two prominent and competing analyses the violence of Brazilian police forces:

seeing it either as the result of the government's inability to control its own agents (Brinks 2008; Hinton 2006), or as a violent effect of a highly unequal society (Waqcuant 2003, 2008). The first perspective explains violence as the Brazilian state's failure to monopolize the use of force, while the latter argues that the main purpose of the police is to patrol the divisions that separate the neighborhoods of the wealthy from those of the poor, and that the violence is functional to upholding the Brazilian state order (Penglase 2014).

Depending on the research design and theoretical outlook of the researcher, one explanation might be given priority over the other. However, for the purpose of this thesis, these perspectives are not approached as mutually exclusive, but rather as highlighting complimentary aspects of the power dynamics at the heart of the Brazilian state. Nevertheless, the ethnographic study of the everyday practices of the police-soldiers at the UPP's does privilege explanations of state violence that focus on the dynamics of compliance and resistance of police-soldiers within the institution, downplaying the larger patterns of social exclusion and domination bolstered by elite control. I have tried to balance the potential bias of my chosen research design by taking into consideration the influence of larger social processes, such as class, race, and gender, hoping to ward off explanations that analyze state violence simply as failure of democracy (the *failed state*-paradigm). Furthermore, this approach avoids idealized concepts of democracy as inherently non-violent (implicit in the *failed state*-paradigm), and is suited to explore the ways in which modern, democratic states are engaged in violent exercises of power against their own populations (see also Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009; Arias and Goldstein 2010).

While academic literature on the policing in the favelas have generally been attentive to how class and racial aspects shape the violent expressions of state power, less attention has been paid to the importance of gender, and when it has, it has generally focused on women (see Nordstrom 2005; Goldstein 2003). Contrarily, the influence of social constructions of masculinity and manliness has been paid less attention in studies of the violent exercise of state power in the favelas (see Zaular 2010; Penglase 2010; Jaffa 2014). I have therefore chosen to look at gender, and specifically masculinity or manliness, as a crosscutting dimension throughout the thesis. I draw on perspectives on masculinity that understands gender as a fluid process, and recognize the existence of multiple, contingent, and competing ways of being a man. In other words, perspectives that take both the hierarchizing effects of gender, and its subversive potential into account (see Gutmann 1997; also Connell 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Bourdieu 2001; Butler 1999; Linstead and Pullen 2006)

I will also discuss how different historical and contemporary forces such as Brazil's past as a colonial slave state, the country's socio-economic inequalities, the war on drugs, and the recent and ongoing process of democratization of the Brazilian state's institutions, among others, converged in the pacification project. These changing forces of history and their impact on the exercise of state power can be traced ethnographically through the *effects* they produce on the subjective formation of UPP police-soldiers.

As can be gleaned from the above, the analysis draws on processual, post-structural and phenomenological perspectives on security, state, policing, violence and gender. My overarching goal is to add to the debate and theorizing on state power in situations of democratic transition and economic liberalization, as well as its associated processes of securitization through the case of Rio de Janeiro.

Caption 2: UPP cops patrolling with shotguns with rubber bullets in Santa Marta

Outline of thesis

In the first chapter I discuss some of the methodological challenges of *studying up*, and challenge this anthropological concept from a post-structuralist perspective. I also present an outline of anthropological theories on state violence, policing, security and gender that inform my analysis.

Chapter two provides a brief socio-historical contextualization of Rio de Janeiro's geography of violence and the historical practices of policing in the city, drawing on the

academic debate on policing and violence in Rio and Brazil. I discuss the implementation and expansion of the UPPs in Rio's favelas. I analyze the favelas as *colonial spaces* and draw on Mbembe's (2003) distinction between *wars of the globalization era* and *late modern colonial occupation* to account for the shift between war machine and state dynamics of policing in the favelas.

Chapter three explores the production of the gendered subjectivity of police-soldiers. Through a process that I refer to as *the violent becoming of police-soldiers* I describe how symbolic and everyday forms of violence impact on the subjective formation of the police officers serving at the UPPs.

In the fourth chapter I draw on ethnographic material from the patrol practices of UPP officers in order to describe the processes of state enactment in pacified areas through the *deterritorializing* and *reterritorializing* dynamics of different patrol units. I also show how patrolling police-soldiers enact a *warrior ethos*, signaling the violent potential of masculinity or manliness. Based on this analysis I show that the patrol practices takes the shape of the *policing of a moral order,* as opposed to the policing of a social or legal order, integral to the *civilizing mission* of the pacification.

Next, chapter five analyzes the process of institutional reform as a process that aims to *pacify* the *wild masculinities* of police-soldiers. The main argument is that the police reform can be understood as a *state process of capture* of the war machine dynamics within PMERJ through the gendered disciplining and taming of police-soldiers. However, these attempts are troubled by the UPP's reliance on two conflicting models of policing: PMERJ's traditional militarized model oriented to war, and the dialogue oriented model of citizen police. These two models were in constant tension, and signal the *aporia* of the UPP's (Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009).

In chapter six, I summarize my findings and discuss them against the larger war machine dynamics of Brazilian politics and global capital. I argue that the dynamics of violence in the favelas must be understood against the backdrop of the predatory forms of accumulation that involve both state and non-state sovereignties in Rio de Janeiro. While I vehemently support the attempts to reform PMERJ, I question the UPP's capacity to significantly modify the historical relation between the Brazilian state and the populations living in the favelas.

THEORY: ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE STATE

The changing dynamics of state power has been of central concern to philosophers and social and political scientists, particularly in relation to the constitution of the modern, democratic state order and its modes of legitimation. Social scientists have long struggled to define the state, either understanding it as an abstract idea or as a bureaucratic apparatus composed of state institutions (Sharma and Gupta 2006). Already in *Leviathan* (1651) Hobbes argued that the constitution and legitimacy of the state depend on the provision of security by an absolute sovereign, who's legitimate rule depended on a social contract whereby the sovereign was given absolute power in order to avoid the *state of nature*, which he believed was characterized by a war of all against all. His work continues to be deeply influential in western liberal thought, which widely holds the main responsibility of the state to be security provision.

State, security and the police

In modern states, the military and the police have been charged with the task of such provision through securing the existing state order. Military and police are part of what Althusser (2006 [1971]: 92) calls the *repressive state apparatuses*, which are those institutions (government, administration, army, police, judiciary, prison etc.) where the state exercises its *hard power* through coercion and violence. Thus, a key element of policing as we conceive it today is the organized exercise of coercive power to establish and guarantee a certain social order or, in the case of the democratic state, the *rule of law* (see Grieve et. al. 2007; Fassin 2013). According to Foucault (2007: 6), modern democratic states, which draw their legitimacy from the bio-political paradigm of *governmentality*, are responsible for keeping criminality "within socially and economically acceptable limits and around an average that will be considered as optimal for a given social functioning." In order to do so, it generally recurs to the police. However, while modern states draw their legitimacy from restricting criminality, the police is generally associated with the figure of the sovereign, who establishes his right to rule upon his ability to wield the greatest power: the power to kill (Foucault 1977). Thus, the sovereign exercise of power by the police is in constant tension with the forms of legitimation of modern states (see also Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009).

Similarly, Agamben (2000: 104) has argued that the police comprise "the place where the proximity and the almost constitutive exchange between violence and right that characterizes the figure of the sovereign is shown more nakedly and clearly than anywhere

else." Agamben further argues that when the police exercises its legitimate right to use violence it is not operating within the law, but in a temporary *state of exception* where the *rule of law* is replaced by the *rule of the sovereign*, or the rule of violence. Agamben claims that the *state of exception* has become the central paradigm of government in modern democracies. Coupled with a rhetoric of war (against crime, drugs or terror) the security argument has become an *authoritative argument*: it stops any further discussion and enables perspectives and measures that would never have been accepted otherwise (Agamben 2014). In modern states *security* is consequently employed as an effective tool for the exercise of extended powers: no longer restricted to a state of emergency, but as a permanent governmental technique.

Recently, and informed by such post-structuralist macro-theories of state power, anthropologists have reinvented the ethnographic method, originally developed for the study of small-scale societies, turning their gaze towards the modern state and its institutions. Anthropology's descriptive focus has lead to a rethinking of the concept of the state within the discipline. Principally, the idea of the state as a transparent rational bureaucratic form with territorially fixed boundaries has been challenged. Instead, scholars within the discipline have focused on concepts like state processes, -dynamics, -formations, -practices or -effects (Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009; Sharma and Gupta 2006; Trouillot 2001, 2004). These concepts have facilitated ethnographic studies of the state from below "that center on the subject produced by state effects and processes" (Trouillot, 2004: 95).

Understanding the state as a process manifested through specific effects allow us to trace its dynamics of power in processes of subjective transformation, for example in the attempts at transforming the subjectivity of the police. It also directs our attention towards how state representatives continuously challenge and even undermine state power by disturbing the smooth functioning of its processes. As Sharma and Gupta (2006: 15) point out, "bureaucrats may not carry out the orders of their superiors in a proper manner or they may adhere to the letter but not to the spirit of policy directives [and] officials at lower levels of state bureaucracies may not support programs initiated by others higher up in the hierarchy, and might even actively try to sabotage the execution and goals of initiatives planned from above." Sharma and Gupta argue that inter-bureaucratic conflicts, corruption, and inconsistencies are not symbols of the improper development of states, but that they are central to their institutional organization and reproduction. Their insights help in warding off essentializing descriptions of the state and draw our attention to the permanent conflicts inherent to all state processes.

War machine and state dynamics

Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualization of *war machine* and *state* are particularly well suited to the analysis of state processes and effects, and the resistance and opposition towards these processes. This conceptual pair "raise complex questions of agency and structure, intention and logic, command and leadership" (Hoffman 2011: introduction, 3rd paragraph), and highlight the tensions, contradictions, and often violent power struggles at the heart of most state formations or processes. Although they draw on anthropological literature, Deleuze and Guattari's writings are mainly philosophical, which might explain why I have not found any extensive analysis of the dynamics of violent state power in Rio that draws on their perspectives. However, the framework is explicitly formulated for the analysis of processes of violent state power and its contestations, and is increasingly being used "to think about the confluence between militarization, social movements, global capital, and the state" (Hoffman 2011: introduction, 3rd paragraph; see also Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009; Mbembe 2003).

Deleuze and Guattari (1987 [1980]) develop a rich and complex conceptual toolkit, and I will explain some concepts in detail as they appear in my analysis. However, I want to introduce some key concepts that inform my analysis of the UPP's. The notions of war machine and state have already been briefly defined as two contrasting but coexisting forces: While the state is hierarchical, bounding or *territorializing*, and oriented to the conservation of organs of power, the war machine is a-hierarchical, counter-systemic, boundless or *deterritorializing*, and oriented to the destruction of the structures and hierarchies created by the state (Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009).

War machines, in spite of what their name suggests, do not have war as their primary objective. War is only a consequence, or by-product of their exteriority to the state (Hoffman 2011). This exteriority is not necessarily geographical; it is also an exteriority to its rules and regulations. War machines normally link in illicit or illegitimate ways and engage in predatory and often violent forms of accumulation – the drug economy and arms trade in Rio are clear examples of this, and perhaps less evident, so are the logics of global capital which is continuingly resisting and challenging the rules and regulations of national state orders (see Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009).

Caption 3: The favela of Santa Marta, clutched on the hillsides of Corcovado

However, while war machines do not have war as their object, they can be *captured* by states who seek to harness their destructive potential: "It is precisely after the war machine has been appropriated by the State [...] that it tends to take war for its direct and primary object […] and that war becomes subordinated to the aims of the state" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987 [1980]: 418).[ii] According to Deleuze and Guattari, the militaries are war-machines that have been captured by the state. Understanding military institutions as captured war machines has some important implications: First, it signals the coexistence of war machine and state dynamics within the repressive apparatus of the state. This observation is not trivial. Although war machines and state are conceptualized as antagonistic and, brought to their full potential, mutually annihilating forces, they are not dialectical forces of a Hegelian or Marxian kind, but coexisting dynamics irreducible to each other (see also Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009). The coexistence of these two forces within the apparatuses of the state signals the incapacity of the state to totally command and control the social forces operating within it. This incapacity is at the foundation of *the enduring crisis of modern states*, which has reached particular intensity as the legitimacy of the sovereign power of the state has increasingly been questioned (Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009: 5f).

As I will argue throughout this thesis, the pacification project can be seen as an ongoing state attempt to capture and control both the war machines of the favelas (the drug

cartels) and an attempt to capture the war machine operating at the heart of the repressive apparatuses of the state: specifically within PMERJ.

The concepts of war machine and state allow us to move beyond the Foucauldian notions of sovereign, disciplinary and bio-political power, to understand power not only a centralizing force, but also as a decentralized, *rhizomatically* distributed relation. It also equips us with a powerful conceptual toolkit to analyze and describe violent contestations over power, particularly in contexts where "the agents and organs of state power are effectively at war with the populations over whom they claim control" (Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009: 1). Specifically, I will use the framework to analyze the processes of policing and state enactment in pacified favelas, and the dynamics of capture and escape inherent in the process of reforming the police.

In line with other academics who have argued that the high levels of police violence in Brazil are indicative of the Brazilian state's failure to control it's police force, Penglase (2014: 143) writes that the Brazilian police forces often operate outside of the rule of law, and claims that in situations where "segments of the state act semiautonomously, pursuing their own goals through their ability to mobilize resources for violence" they can be seen as war machines. In other words, while the police produces important enactments of state order, they are also continually challenging this order through excess and transgression. The recognition of aporetic state dynamics, where elements of the police and local drug gangs sometimes act together in collusion, leads Pengalese (2014: 156) to argue that "urban violence in Rio has become an end in itself, a 'war machine' where predation and profit making take precedence over occupation of territory or control over populations." Early evaluations of the impact of the UPPs suggested that their establishment significantly altered this dynamic, reducing police lethality and corruption. The chapters of this thesis will relate to this discussion in my attempt to describe the changing relation between the war machine and state dynamics of the Military Police and the Brazilian State.

METHODOLOGY: STUDYING UP

Implicit in my formulation of the research question is an understanding of the establishment of the UPP's and the associated police reform as an *event*, as defined by representatives of the Manchester school. Following Gluckman's situational analysis, scholars of this tradition have seen events, social dramas, or crises as useful diagnostic tools for complex and diverse large-scale social processes (see Gluckman 1940; Kapferer 2005; Moore 2005; Turner 1974).

Kapferer (2005) combines the focus on complexity and diversity of Gluckman's situational analysis with Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of change. He understands *the event* as a *generative moment* or process, constituted through multiple *lines of flight* or historical trajectories. Thus, he highlights the *potentiality* of the event to reshape and reconfigure social structures and challenge the *status quo* (Kapferer 2005). The usefulness of Kapferer's event-centered approach lies in its capacity to not only capture the changing forces of history that are actualized in events, in this case the UPP project, but also in its potential to provide useful insights on how the UPP's were setting in motion dynamics with the potential to radically reconfigure the exercise of state power in Rio de Janeiro.

One of Kapferer's main critiques of Gluckman is his use of events and situations as merely the raw material of his analysis. He argues that Gluckman's interpretations "sometimes overcomes and reduces the authority of those who are the producers of his raw material [...] excluding the possibilities of the discursive processes that he encounters [and] subsuming them to his own predetermined assumptions" (Kapferer 2005: 102). Kapferer's critique touches a central debate in anthropology, namely anthropology's trouble with truth (see Wilson 2004; Moore 2005). I hardly pretend to make any claims to Truth with a capital "T" in this thesis. The argument I develop here is a partial and contested interpretation and the result of my condition as a foreign social anthropology student with my own subjective trajectories and perspectives. The *scientific objectivity* that I aim for rests on the internal coherence of my argument, the compatibility of the data presented and the theoretical framework applied to analyze it, and my engagement with other literature in the field. I've tried to avoid the ethnocentrism that inevitably comes from being a stranger by engaging with Brazilian and local scholars, and by giving my main interlocutors, the police officers at PMERJ, a voice in the thesis and taking their *discoursive practices* seriously, as Kapferer suggests.

However, studying a powerful state institution like the Military Police poses some methodological challenges that I believe need to be addressed. My discussion on these challenges revolves around the concept of studying up (Nader 1972) and the assumption that studying subjects that occupy positions of power requires a distinctive ethnographic approach.

The challenges of studying up

In her seminal article from 1972 Laura Nader criticized the anthropological tendency to focus almost exclusively on the poor and disadvantaged, calling instead for a need to *study-up*: to "study the colonizers rather than the colonized" and "the culture of power rather than the culture of the powerless", including the institutions that govern everyday life in complex societies (Nader 1972: 289). In the forty years since then there has been a proliferation of ethnographic studies of the state and its institutions, including the police (see, e.g., Castro and Leirner 2009; Fassin 2013; Saborio 2015; Van Maanen 1978).

At first sight, it would seem that studying-up poses some particular challenges not found in classical anthropology. According to Nader the key obstacles to studying up are the problems of access to field-sites, attitudes within the discipline of anthropology, ethics and methodology. In a critique of these assumptions, Priyadharshini (2003) argues that many of the problems of studying up arise out of an understanding of stable or fixed identities. According to her, Foucauldian notions of power trouble the idea that powerful subjects are always powerful, and allow us to understand how powerful subjects occupy dynamic, fractured, and multiple positions. She advocates for a *deconstructive ethnography* that challenges monolithic or fixed understandings of identity, both of researcher and the researched. Instead of an adversarial approach in which researcher and the researched are "pitted against each other", a deconstructive ethnography "alerts us to the possibility of flexible, multiple identities, permitting an inquisitorial approach to power" (Priyadharshini 2003: 434).

The cops that I followed during my fieldwork carried weapons and wielded a significant authority on the streets in the favelas, but were vulnerable in many other situations of their private and professional lives. And while I depended of the goodwill and authorization of the PMERJ to conduct my research, I had significant bargaining power when it came to participating on patrols and interviewing beat cops: low-ranking cops were often *ordered* by their superiors to assist me in my research.

The recognition of the changing character of the subjective position of researcher and the researched in relation to each other blurs the lines between ethnographies of the so-called powerless and powerful, and allows the ethnographer to overcome many of the challenges in the research process drawing on classical ethnography. However, the challenges of access, attitudes, ethics and methodology signaled by Nader still merit a discussion, as they are also universal challenges that all ethnographers must deal with.

Access

According to Nader (1972) one of the main challenges of studying up is gaining access to the field. She notes that people in power often do not want to be studied, and that it can be dangerous to study them (for a short discussion on the dangers in the field, see Appendix 11). Before I left for my fieldwork I knew that gaining access to the UPP's would likely require institutional approval, and was not certain if my project was at all feasible (see Lofhus 2009). However, when I contacted the Public Relations offices at PMERJ I was scheduled a meeting with PMERJs Chief of Staff without delay. He was everything I expected a Colonel from the Military Police *not* to be: a smiling and charismatic intellectual with a degree in Social Anthropology, and greeted me with warmth and attention. I would get access to whatever part of the institution I wanted to study, the only condition was that I send a copy of my thesis to PMERJ upon its fulfillment.

Caption 4: The main base at UPP Alemao

Baffled by the unconditional approval by the Colonel I decided to modify my research design in light of the *carte blanche* that I had been granted. I opted for a *multi-sited approach* (Marcus 1998), and selected three UPP's with varying *operational risk*.[4] I started out at the two extremes: Santa Marta was the crown jewel of the UPP project, the first favela to be

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[4] See Appendix 2 for map of field sites, and Appendix 7 for the operational risk at the UPP's.

pacified, and generally represented as a success story. At the other extreme, Alemão, at the time of research, boosted exorbitant conflict levels, with daily shootouts between police and gang-members that extended for hours, effectively creating a situation of war in the streets of the favela. I would later include Mangueira in my research, a UPP with moderate operational risk, where violence had been on the rise since early 2014 after a territorial dispute between rivaling gangs.

Additionally, I rented an apartment in Chapeu-Mangueira, a small, pacified favela in the affluent *Zona Sul*.[5] I had initially considered following the police in the favela where I lived, but was strongly advised against this approach by Brazilian academics. Among favela researchers it is believed that studying resident perspectives and police perspectives ethnographically are mutually excluding exercised due to the ongoing conflicts between traffickers and police (see also Saborio 2014a; Larkins 2015). However, I found this only to be partially true. Among police officers I was continuously encouraged to interview local residents to capture their perspectives. On the other hand, in my home favela I chose to be discreet regarding my research to avoid problems with local gang members. On two occasions the dealers at the local *boca de fumo*[6] accused me of being a police officer. Although the reason for these accusations eluded me, one of my neighbors assured me that it was safe for me to stay in the favela and that I should not worry.

Attitudes

It is generally assumed that ethnography requires a certain ability to empathize with the research subjects, or to capture the "native point of view." Both Nader (1972) and Priyadharshini (2003) signal a tendency within anthropology to favor the perspective of the underdog, assuming that it is easier to sympathize with the powerless than with the powerful. However, empathy and sympathy should not be confused. Whereas sympathy is about communion with the other, empathy is about understanding the other without losing one's own identity. Anthropological inquiry relies on the ability of the ethnographer to empathize with his research subjects—to be able "to step into someone else's shoes" but not to become someone else (Willerslev and Bubandt 2015: 7). Nor did classic ethnography ever demand

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[5] The city of Rio is normally divided in four zones: *Zona Sul*, *Centro*, *Zona Norte*, and *Zona Oeste*. *Zonal Sul* is the most affluent and touristic area of the city.

[6] Lit. "*mouth of smoke*"; place where regular sale and consumption of drugs take place in the favelas.

the ethnographers' sympathy with his interlocutors—a quick look at Malinowski's field journals attest to that. Siding with the research subjects is also a problem, as most aspiring anthropologists are made aware of when warned of the threat of going native.

Priyadharshini's deconstructive approach brings our attention to the fact that whether they've made a point of it or not, anthropologists have always been exposed to unequal and shifting power relations during their fieldworks: although they immediately strike us as "underdogs," the crack-dealers in Bourgois' *In search of respect* (2002) occupy multiple and shifting subject positions throughout his research period—as unemployed immigrants, street-level dealers, and powerful thugs. Bourgois also writes that his subject position as researcher shifted through the research, and vividly describes the negotiations he had to go through in order to gain access and build rapport with his interlocutors.

Talle (2001) has written about the challenges she encountered as a neophyte ethnographer when witnessing the practice of female circumcision during fieldwork in Tanzania. Female circumcision simultaneously demand and challenged traditional cultural relativist perspectives, and Talle writes that when observing circumcisions it felt safe to be able to rest in the recognition of cultural differences. Adopting a methodological relativist perspective helped me suspend my own passing of judgment while in the field, and focus my attention on understanding the police-soldiers, and seeing the world through their eyes. While cultural relativism can be a powerful methodological research tool, it should not be confused with ethical relativism, and it certainly does not mean that anthropologists should see past or ignore relations of domination. In Rio, and also in PMERJ, an important cultural debate is taking place concerning the policing of the favelas, and I have tried to relate to this debate and incorporate it in my analysis drawing on local scholars and giving a voice to my interlocutors, to compensate for my cultural bias, and ward off ethnocentrism.

Ethics

The question whether the same code of ethics should apply when studying up is heavily contested in anthropology. Some ethnographers recur to *covert ethnography* as a strategy (see Mitchell 1993; Calvey 2013), others engage in debates over how informed *informed consent* needs to be. According to Nader the public-private dimension should be considered when discussing the ethics of studying up: "We should not necessarily apply the same ethics developed for studying the private […] to the study of institutions, organizations, bureaucracies that have broad public impact" (1972: 304f). While I was conscious about the

image I projected, and tried to avoid my personal opinions on issues that I new would be controversial, generally I found the ethical guidelines of the American Anthropological Association to be perfectly compatible with my research project, and was open about my research with my interlocutors.

The biggest ethical challenges I encountered were ironically related to the position of power that institutional approval meant in a hierarchized military institution: as low ranking military personnel, cops had to follow the orders of their superiors under the threat of disciplinary sanctions. Thus, as the upper echelons of the police had already authorized my research, they were simply told by their commanders or supervisors to include me on patrols. This generated tension at first, as many cops did not want to drag me around with them, but I sorted the challenge by asking the cops who showed interest in my research if I could join them *before* I asked the base commanders to join the police on patrol. When I carried out interviews I consulted the cops directly, and I always got their verbal consent to record them. My interlocutors were informed of the purpose of the study, and how I would use the collected material. In addition to my field notes, I recorded 21 semi-structured interviews with cops, and 10 interviews with officers and base commanders. I also carried out 7 group interviews, which I did not record. While some ethnographers prefer not to record conversations as it potentially alters the response of interlocutors, I generally did not find this to be a problem once I had gained their trust. On the contrary I found that it helped create a collaborative spirit with the police-soldiers. Recording interviews or writing notes in front of the police served to make role as researcher explicit, and gave me an *aura of authenticity* as researchers that I think made the cops feel important. Sometimes even, when I did not record or write notes, the cops would comment on this, suggesting that I should take notes.

Furthermore, I followed Gusterson's (1995: 116) suggestion to interact with interlocutors "across a number of dispersed sites, not just in local communities, and sometimes in virtual form" and collect data "eclectically from a disparate array of sources in many different ways." I engaged with my interlocutors through social media (WhatsApp and Facebook) and relied on multiple methods of ethnographic data collection, such as local press coverage of the police, debates and public hearings.

Guaranteeing the anonymity of cops was a prerequisite for their willingness to talk to me and participate in this study. Some police-soldier feared that they could suffer disciplinary sanctions by PMERJ, while were naturally concerned of the reactions of their colleagues if they told me about corruption and misconduct. In order to ensure the anonymity of my interlocutors I have drawn on different situations and subjects to build ethnographic vignettes

that reflect actual events and conserve their essence and meaning, while ensuring the anonymity of my interlocutors. Due to the specificity of the situation in the favelas where I conducted my research, as well as the symbolical meaning they carry, I have decided not to change the names of these communities. The Commanders at PMERJ's public figures, and their identity is not always possible to conceal. Whenever I name the interlocutors that I quote with their real name, I have collected their verbal to do so.

Chapter 2
COLONIAL WARFARE

Rio de Janeiro, 2001. The 3 police vehicles are slowly circling the perimeter of the *Favela da Alegria*.[7] Night has fallen, and the contingent of special unit police-soldiers from the *Grupamento Tactico Movil* (GTAM) are patrolling the area of the 22nd Battalion where groups of traffickers have recently orchestrated a series of attacks from vehicle convoys, or *bondes*. In response to the attacks, the Military Police has copied the *modus operandi* of the *bondes*, creating its police counterpart, the *papa bonde* or *BOPE da rua* [road BOPE], composed of 16 police officers who patrol the entire city with no restriction, chasing the *bondes* of the traffickers.

The young men in the police vehicles are on alert. They've been circling the area for a couple of nights now, with no result, and are anxiously looking for some action and stories to tell. "Where do you think this road leads?" The Soldier driving the lead vehicle takes a right turn, up a narrow road leading to the top of a small hill. The two other patrol vehicles follow. They have passed the top of the hill and are descending down the other side when they realize that they are in the middle of the favela. A group of *marginais* [criminals] sees the vehicles and starts to scatter. The police-soldiers get out of the vehicles and seek cover behind the patrol vehicles. One of the police-soldiers spots a *marginal* attempting to escape, and opens fire. As soon as he pulls the trigger, the police vehicles are showered in a rain of bullets. The police-soldiers panic – bullets are flying through the air, and the vehicles don't offer protection from the rifle ammunition of the *marginais*. One of the cars is parked behind a building, and protected by brick and cement walls, part of the police-soldiers are able to give their exposed colleagues some fire cover. "Get the hell out of there!" they yell. The shooting from the *marginais* cease just long enough for the police-soldiers to turn their vehicles around, and leave the favela. They are euphoric. Tonight's experience will be talked about for months to come.

The spoils of war

Fast forward to 2010, a decade later. The first favelas have been *pacified*—PMERJ's special units have expelled the drug cartels from several communities and established permanent police units in the favelas. When I discussed the pacification project with people in Rio, the invasion of *Complexo do Alemão* (CPX) would often come up. Located in the decaying

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[7] Pseudonym

industrial north of Rio, the neighborhood of CPX is composed of several favelas sprawling across the rolling hills of *Serra da Misericordia*. Traditionally the stronghold of the city's largest drug cartel, *Commando Vermelho* (CV), CPX is infamous throughout Brazil as the epicenter of drug-related violence. In November 2010 a total of 2.700 police officers, supported by the marine, participated in a mega-operation to expel the traffickers from the favelas of CPX and neighboring Penha (Ashcroft 2015b). Among police-soldiers the occupation had an almost mythical status and many I met during my fieldwork had followed the invasion on TV. Many had also just signed up for the police at the time of the occupation and few of them were yet serving. In the following excerpt from my field journal some of the cops working at the UPP at Alemão recall the invasions of CPX and Rocinha:

"Did you participate in the pacification of Alemão?" I'm talking to a couple of cops at Alemão. We're standing below the small terrace at the base, it is Sunday and lunchtime, and I've been invited for a barbecue. One of them looks at me with wide eyes, making a face that expresses the absurdity of what I've just asked. "Do you think we would be here today if we had?" The cops laugh. I don't understand the joke, and ask them to explain. They look at each other, it seems like they doubt whether or not they should tell me. Diogo, one of the most experienced cops, starts to talk. "The guys who participated in the occupation never had to work again!" He tells me that police-soldiers had kept the money, gold and weapons left by the traffickers that fled the favela. Another cop, Glaubir, explains: "They say that during the invasion the streets were full of weapons. Everybody who had a gun in their house threw them out on the streets. Many police-soldiers, I'm not saying all, but many police-soldiers kept the arms. Some handed them in but some... I'm not saying it's right, but what would you do if you found a bag of money on the street? Well, you're Norwegian..." "I'm Argentinean as well", I say so as not to appear judgmental. The cops laugh out loud. "Norwegian, but not dumb, huh?" It is common to think that too much honesty is a sign of stupidity, at least when opportunity presents itself (the key distinction being between intent and opportunity). Marcio continues: "Truth be told, the pacification of Alemão was a mess, it was a generalized mess. [...] I remember seeing people that were not supposed to be there, I saw police-soldiers from other units that had nothing to do in this region, right? I saw people [cops] that were off-duty in their private cars. I heard about police-soldiers that entered the homes of residents and traffickers alike and emptied them. They took TV's, they took electrical appliances, put them in their cars and brought them home, they stole... There wasn't an effective control of that occupation. [...] We hear stories of [the police]

assisting escaping [traffickers], of people that entered in a *blindado* [armored personnel carrier], picking up traffickers and leaving the favela with the traffickers inside the *blindado*. We hear those stories. Now, I can't say if they are true or not, but that the stories exist... they exist. Of traffickers paying a million, two million, three million [reais] in order to leave this place. And there were people that left here rich, that found bags with money. We ended up finding out all of that." Marcio pauses. "That didn't happen in Rocinha. I think it was because of the experience that they [the police] had in Alemão." Diogo interrupts him. He was present when Rocinha was pacified and tells us that it unfolded in a completely different manner: "In Rocinha the planning was better. The Choque Battalion was in charge of the access roads, and only BOPE entered [the favela], only them. So it was much easier to control. I remember that police officers from the 23rd Battalion were arrested for giving fire cover to the traffickers. [...] I remember that there were three police officers on motorbikes that were spotted by one of our *oficiais*, Lieutenant Roque at the time, now he's a Captain. The Lieutenant saw three police officers from the 23rd battalion descending the hill, the *Morro da Rocinha*. Then the Lieutenant stopped the police officers and said *'Pô, what are you doing here?' 'No, pô, it's our patrol sector.' 'Your sector? But who authorized you to enter? Don't you know that there is a closed perimeter watch?' 'No, pô, it's the sector...' 'Ahh, the sector? Then it's all right! Wait up, stay here.'* Then the Lieutenant contacted the supervision of the 23rd Battalion, and asked them to come to identify the police officers. When the supervisor of the 23rd arrived at the place, he looked at the police officers and said 'Ué, what are you doing here? Pô, you're off duty!' Pô, what is the police doing there off duty?" Diogo and the cops laugh, and I laugh with them. Laughing softly, Diogo repeats the words of the supervisor, "*Pô*, you're off duty, what are you doing here?" "They were screwed, right?" I ask. "*Pô*, literally. Another thing that was noted was that that year, specifically that year, at the 23rd Battalion there was no New Year's party. [...] Every year, *every year* their party was a blast. The year of the occupation of Rocinha there was no party. Why [do you think that is]?" "Why?" I ask. Diogo smiles. "What could it be? Could it be that Santa Claus didn't send the little present for the guys there at the 23rd?" he says, rubbing his index finger against his thumb, insinuating that the party used to be paid with the bribes from the traffickers at Rocinha. At Rocinha, the supervision cops had been enforced to avoid repeating the mistakes at Alemão, and the police had even managed to detain Nêm, the *dono* [owner] of Rocinha. Diogo continues: "He [Nêm] believed, at least that's what I think, that he would be able to escape the same way that the guys were able to here in Alemão, paying and leaving... The money [the police found] with his lawyer—certainly he had given it to him so that he would get him out of the favela. The lawyer went over there, got the money, *pá*, and tried his luck. When he

was stopped by the guys from the GTAM, the guys from Choque, he identified himself as the Consul of Congo. Even then, *pó*, the police officer [said] 'Really, consul? No, we have to search [the car].' 'No, the car will not be searched, since it belongs to the consulate, you cannot [do it] since I have immunity.' Ok, fine, but he didn't show any ID. So they contacted the supervisors, who asked for the assistance of Lieutenant Roque, and then the Lieutenant said 'Ahh, *o senhor* is the consul? You wont allow us to carry out the search? Then let's go to the [civil] police station.' I think the lawyer thought that he would be taken to the local police station next to Rocinha, and when he realized that they were heading the other way he entered into despair. That was when he stopped, when he offered money for Lieutenant Roque, the Lieutenant refused it, and ordered him to continue. They arrived at Lagoa (a wealthy nearby neighborhood), he stopped and immediately officers from the Civil Police arrived, a detective from the Civil Police arrived, an inspector from the Civil Police arrived saying that he would take care of the guy: 'No, no, no, I will take care of it, because this and that.' Then Roque said, 'No, listen, we are headed for the police station of the Federal Police.' 'Ahh no, *pô*, I'll take care of it, and whatnot.' Then they started discussing, and one of the detectives from the Civil Police grabbed the car-keys and said 'Doctor, listen, can we take the car? We are going to take the car!' Roque, *Lieutenant Roque,* took a knife that he had and stabbed the tires of the car. He said: 'Are you guys going to take it (the car) now?' That same detective said 'Doctor, we can take it like it is, we don't have any problems at all, we can do it.' Then the Lieutenant went 'Really? You there, take the patrol vehicle and park it here.' He parked the vehicle here (signals with his hand how the vehicle was parked in front of the car so that it would not be possible for the car to leave), really close [to the car], then he said 'I want to see you take the car now! Try taking it now!'" The cops laugh. "There was no way to do it, right?" Diogo explains that they had some contacts in the press due to a recent situation that had received a lot of attention: "So we called the guys from the press and said 'listen, come here now. We've stopped a car here, damn, I think it's Nêm!' When we mentioned Nêm, *pô*, I don't know where they came from..." he laughs. "The guys from the press seemed like they came out of the manholes, of the bushes. They arrived very fast. When they arrived with the cameras, when they turned the spotlight on and such, that was when the guys from the *delegacia* [Civil Police Station], the guys from the Civil Police started to hide. After the press arrived they vanished. That was when the trunk of the car was opened, and out came Nêm..." Nêm offered the small group of police-soldiers one million reais each if they let him go, but the police-soldiers had declined. "The moment we handed Nêm over to the authorities was the proudest moment of my career. I had an incredible sensation of fulfilling my duty [*dever cumprido*]." The people that were present had greeted them with standing

ovations. "What happened to the Civil Police officers that tried to smuggle him out?" I ask. Diogo says that he never heard of them again. He doesn't know if they were planning to release Nêm, or if they simply wanted the Civil Police to get the credit for making the arrest.

The dynamics of policing in Rio de Janeiro

I have chosen to start this chapter with two stories that illustrate the changing dynamics of policing in Rio de Janeiro through the last decades. A veteran cop with a long track record in the Military Police told me the story of the *papa bonde.* It is fairly descriptive of the policing of the city's favelas up until the establishment of the first UPPs in 2009. Up until that moment the Military Police entered the favelas only occasionally, and when they did it generally resulted in heavy shootouts, lest they were there to do business with local drug lords (see also Penglase 2009, 2014). The next story recounts the details surrounding the *pacification* of two of the largest *favelas* or *favela complexes* in Rio, *Complexo do Alemão* (CPX) and Rocinha. I've chosen to let the cops participating in these events tell most of the story in their own words. Theirs is a rich account of the ruptures and continuities with former practices of policing in Rio's favelas. It shows the confluence of illegal practices, of collusion and of crime fighting; the conflicts between the city's multiple police forces; state attempts at enforcing control over its police forces; and the role of the media. What both stories illustrate is the extended powers and relative impunity with which the police operate in the favelas. The uniqueness of the practices adopted by PMERJ in the favelas will be a recurring theme throughout the chapter.

To capture how the changing forces of history have shaped the policing of the favelas I briefly account for the history PMERJ up until the return of democracy in 1985. Then, I show how the emergence of multiple sovereignties in Rio's favelas in the subsequent years and the transnational discourse of the war on drugs shaped the policing of Rio's favelas in the following decades, and finally I outline the dynamics of pacification up until early 2015, when I started my fieldwork.

Finally, I will draw on Mbembe's (2003) elaboration on *colonial modes of domination* as an operationalization of the Deleuzian framework of analysis, in my discussion of the changing dynamics of policing. According to Mbembe (2003: 12ff) the colonies are spaces that are characterized by a permanent *state of exception,* where racism functions as the underlying logic that permits the exercise of extended powers by the state (see also Buck Morss 2009). He writes that "the colonies are the location par excellence where the controls

and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended—the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of 'civilization'" and that they are sites "where 'peace' is more likely to take on the face of a 'war without end'" (Mbembe 2003: 22ff). I will argue that the favelas should be understood as *colonial spaces.* Analyzing the favelas as *colonial spaces* alerts us to the mechanism by which the favelas were configured as the locus of the state's war on drugs, enabling heavily militarized police operations and actions that would never have been accepted in the rest of the city, and how the UPP's legitimize the perpetuation of the war through the rhetoric of pacification (see also Oliveira 2014).

THE MULTIPLE SOVEREIGNTIES OF RIO DE JANEIRO

The Portuguese Crown founded the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1565, and during the colonial era the city became one of the most important slave ports in Latin America. In 1808 Rio became capital of the Portuguese Empire, as the royal family fled from Lisbon after Napoleon's invasion of Portugal. A year later, the Military Division of the Royal Police Guard, a precursor to PMERJ, was founded to protect the recently arrived royal court. With half of the city's population composed of black slaves, the recent slave revolt in Haiti inspired fear among the imperial elite. Thus, from its inception, the police forces of Rio were attributed the responsibility of upholding a hierarchical social order founded on racism and slavery, rather than being concerned with guaranteeing law and order (Ashcroft 2014a). While Brazil gained its independence in 1822, slavery was not abolished until 1888, and throughout the 19th century the police forces were almost exclusively devoted to the repression of a series of slave revolts. After slavery was abolished, the police continued to serve as guarantors of the elite's privileges well into the 20th century, repressing public protests and the discontent of the dispossessed (Mingardi 2015:16).

In the second half of the 20th century the militaries of Latin America established authoritarian governments throughout the continent, including Brazil. From 1964 to 1985 PMERJ was a key player in the *dirty war* against political opponents of the military regime, and was heavily influenced by the *national security doctrine* (Pereira 2015: 43). Torture and assassinations were widespread, and death squads composed mainly by off duty police officers carried out actions of private justice for local businesses, killing alleged criminals— primarily in the favelas and suburbs of Rio (Ashcroft 2014b; Zaular 2007; Misse 2010; Cano and Duarte 2012).

Predatory forms of accumulation in the favelas

In the 1980's the end of Brazil's military dictatorship coincided with the proliferation of drug production and trafficking in the region (Larkins 2015: 33). The economic potential of illegal drug trade, and the Brazilian state's relative absence in the favelas assisted the growth of drug cartels across the city. Early gang leaders had drawn some political inspiration from leftist political prisoners that they had befriended in jail during the military rule, and in many favelas they initially presented themselves as a kind of *welfare state* for poor residents (Penglase 2008). They imposed a parallel social order in the favelas founded on the *law of traffic* (lei do trafico), meting out local justice and punishing transgressors in spectacular displays of sovereign force (Larkins 2015). Three main drug cartels, *Commando Vermelho* (CV), *Terceiro Commando (Puro)* (TCP) and *Amigo dos Amigos* (ADA), competed against each other for territorial control with weapons acquired through the international arms trade, as well as from state security forces (Misse 2010).

Another sovereign force that gained presence in the city was the *milícias*— paramilitary groups composed by off-duty and ex-police officers, (mainly military police) firefighters (who are also militarized in Brazil) and prison guards. These groups evolved from the death squads that had surged in the 60's, 70's and 80's during military rule. In the 90's they started claiming territorial control of favelas in Rio's vast western region, allegedly in order to impede the drug cartels from entering these communities (Zaular 2007; Misse 2010; Cano and Duarte 2012).

However, favela residents soon became hostages to the *milicianos* [militia members] who charged protection money and imposed a strict order upheld by a constant threat of physical violence. Transgressions were punished with beatings, expulsion from the community or torture and death (Zaular 2007: 91). Initially a marginal phenomenon, milícia groups rapidly expanded and during the early 2000's the milícia developed close ties to local politicians, using the electoral base of the areas they control to promote their own candidates for state government and legislation (Zaular 2007: 94). In spite of the clandestine *modus operandi* of the milícias, they have so far not been subject to significant state interventions.

Analytically, the urban violence that characterized Rio during this time can by and large be understood as the result of territorial disputes between *multiple soveregnties* (Bertelsen 2009) trying to impose or assert their authority in favelas where they engaged in predatory forms of resource extraction and capital accumulation associated to the war machine. However, some of these sovereignties, particularly the early form of the drug

cartels, expressed important aspects of the state dynamics, establishing what has later been referred to as a *parallel state* in the favelas.

The war on drugs in Rio de Janeiro

Rather than breaking with the logic of militarized policing common during the years of military rule, the return of democracy in 1985 quickly reconfigured PMERJ into the state's spearhead in the war on drugs:

> The moment we left the dictatorship, we entered into another war, we incorporated this cursed war on drugs. [...] So, the enemy changed, the enemy isn't [...] the subversive, now the enemy is the drug trafficker, and for over thirty years we have been waging war. (Colonel Ibis Pereira)[8]

As can be gleaned from this quote, the *traficantes* [drug traffickers] were soon established as the public enemy number one, and were narrowly conceived of as young, black, male—and *favelado*.[9] In a process that Misse (2010) refers to as *criminal subjection* all favela residents, by extension, where considered enemies of the state. In the public imagination the favelas were constituted as areas of *lawlessness*, *savagery* and the *infinite cruelty* of the *traficantes*. They became the symbolical and actual epicenter in the war on drugs, and the battlefield where new and multiple sovereignties increasingly entered in disputes of power with each other and the state (Zaular 2010; Misse 2010).

The years following the return of democracy were characterized by increasing violence and the crystallization of the conflict between Rio's multiple sovereignties. Death tolls rose on both sides, and PMERJ's reputation as a violent and corrupt state force was corroborated by a series of massacres carried out by police-soldiers on demand from local businesses, or in retaliation for attacks on the police. Among the two best known is the massacre of Candelaria in the center of Rio in 1993, where police officers executed eight homeless children and adolescents, and the massacre of Vigario Geral later that year, when officers executed 21

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[8] Recorded during a public hearing held by the Human Rights Comission at the Legislative Assembly of the State of Rio de Janeiro (*Assambleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*, ALERJ) on the work conditions and violation of right of police officers. Quote translated by author who was present at the hearing. Full quote available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLN-GH6XiGw
[9] *Favelado* is a pejorative term for favela resident.

favela residents in retribution for the murder of 4 military police officers. The investigation that followed suggested that the motive was the breach of a pact of corruption between the police and local traffickers (Rodrigues 2014).

Caption 5: One of PMERJs armored personnel carriers [Caiverao]

Militarized policing and BOPE

By the turn of the century, the militarized and aggressive policing operations of the Special Operations Unit (*Batalhão de Operações Especiais,* BOPE) in the favelas had become commonplace. They took the form of sporadic invasions to apprehend weapons and drugs, and kill alleged *traficantes*, many of them exhibiting signs of summary executions (HRW 2009). These operations received ample support among residents of the *asfalto* who feared the crime and violence of the favelas would spill into the rest of the city. Violent crimes, kidnappings, shootouts and *arrastões* [mass assaults] by assumed *favelados* on the city's beaches, in wealthy neighborhoods and on highways became a constant reminder of the threat.

Situations like the one described in the first vignette at the start of this chapter were characteristic of the time. The police frequently entered into armed confrontations with traffickers, and the cartels retaliated, targeting on and off-duty police officers. Cartels also entered into violent disputes with each other, contributing to the creation of a situation of war in the streets of the city (Leite 2012). "At night I could see the light from the bullets flying

through the air from the window of my apartment in Copacabana", one of my Brazilian friends told me. "The apartment was located in a valley between two *morros* [hills] controlled by rivaling factions, and they would shoot at each other during the night."

The violence of gangs and truculent police action was reflected in a growing sense of insecurity among the public. While BOPE's actions in the favelas were widely acclaimed by resident of the asfalto, the rest of the city's police forces often contributed to the generalized sense of insecurity: a notorious case was the revelation that the civil police's kidnap division was responsible for a series of kidnappings for which they had claimed ransom in the mid 90's (Alves and Evanson 2013 [2011]: 247). People of color were particularly exposed to the actions of the police. One of the Afro-Brazilian cops that I interviewed recalls the urban violence of the 90's the following way:

> When we went out on the streets we even feared the police. We saw a patrol vehicle and felt a certain chill down our spine, a fear of being stopped and searched, of being confused with a marginal, since some of our friends would tell us that they had suffered aggressions, right? (UPP Sergeant)

The feeling that the police was a source of insecurity was still quite common when I carried out my fieldwork, particularly among favela residents which often feared the police more than the drug cartels (Magaloni and Cano 2015).

Between 1995 and 1998 governor Marcello Alencar introduced a system of rewards (*premiação faroeste*, literally "wild-west price") whereby police officers were given accumulative monetary bonuses for "acts of bravery"—including shootouts and confrontations that resulted in the death of alleged criminals (Leite 2000; Mena 2015). The system generated a dramatic increase in deaths at the hand of the police, and some of the cops that I talked to recounted stories of how certain police-soldiers had killed by the dozen, if not hundreds, adding huge bonuses to their salaries, or how they executed homeless people who they would plant guns on in order to cash in the reward. Although the system was later suspended police officers have kept the bonuses they received during this period up until today (Magaloni, Franco and Melo 2015). A less acknowledged result of Alencar's policies is its effect on the relations between drug traffickers and the police. Monetary rewards for armed confrontations with drug traffickers translated into less financial incentives to take bribes from traffickers. As relations of bribery collapsed and favela-based drug traffickers

were killed or imprisoned, younger generations of drug-dealers came to power, further destabilizing the situation (Penglase 2014: 144).

Thus, in the decades following the return of democracy, lethal violence in the State of Rio soared to unprecedented heights, peaking in 1995 with 61,8 homicides per 100.000 inhabitants, among the highest homicide rates in the world (Rodrigues 2014). The police contributed to the high death tolls, with police killings[10] reaching a record high of 1.330 deaths in 2007 alone, making Rio's police forces the most lethal in Brazil (HRW 2009: 1). Police officers were also increasingly being targeted in violent attacks on and off duty, and soon PMERJ earned its questionable reputation as "the police that kills the most and dies the most."[11]

The years preceding the creation of the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) were characterized by increasing confrontations between police and *traficantes*, and the intensification of traditional hard hand approaches. In 2007, the newly appointed State Secretary of Security (*Secretria de Estado de Segurança*, SESEG), José Mariano Beltrame ordered the invasion of *Complexo do Alemão* (CPX) where CV was based, in response to a recent series of violent attacks by the cartel throughout the city. PMERJ invaded the favela using armored personnel carriers (locally known as *caiverão* [big skull]), helicopters, machine guns and hand grenades. The invasion produced high death tolls, and was heavily criticized by human rights organizations (Magaloni, Franco and Melo 2015). Overall, the beginning of Beltrame's administration was characterized by a dramatic increase in violent confrontations throughout the city, and by regular police incursions into the favelas reminiscent of military invasions (Alves and Evanson 2013 [2011]).

Policy makers saw the spiraling violence in Rio as the result of the aggressive militarized policing adopted, and recognized the need to reform the public security policies of the city. Since the return of democracy there have been several unsuccessful attempts at reforming PMERJ, generally running along the lines of two opposing currents: The first is directed towards legal and institutional transformations, such as the demilitarization of the police and the unification of police forces (see Soares 2015; Mena 2015). The second focuses on managerial reforms to increase the efficiency of the police through the improvement of the schooling and training of cops, the increase in resources and personnel, community-oriented

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[10] Death at the hand of on-duty police officers.

[11] *"A policia que mais mata é mais morre"*

models of policing and closer collaboration between the civil and military police within the current institutional framework (Mena 2015: 23). The establishment of the UPP's clearly follows the second tradition.

Caption 6: A Soldier looking out at the favela in Alemao

THE PACIFICATION PROJECT

In November 2008 Santa Marta, a small favela in the affluent neighborhood of Botafogo, was occupied by BOPE in a police operation baptized *Choque de ordem* [Shock of order]. The *dono do morro* [lit. "owner of the hill"; gang leader] was arrested, and the police announced that they would stay in the favela indefinitely to impede the return of gang members who had fled when they entered, and to "impose order" in the community. Simultaneously, *Cidade de Deus*, a favela in western Rio, was also occupied by initiative of the local police battalion. Eventually, SESEG would announce the creation of the UPP project with the establishment of three permanent police bases in Santa Marta, Cidade de Deus, and Batán. Born as an ad-hoc solution to the spiraling violence in the city, the UPPs soon became linked to Rio's preparation to host the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics (Ashcroft and Hilderbrand 2015).

Expansion of the UPP project

The pacification project rapidly gained political and public support, and an ambitious plan to establish 40 UPP's by 2014 was set in motion. Political, social and economic considerations determined which favelas were to be pacified, and with the exception of Batán, the project focused exclusively on favelas dominated by drug cartels, ignoring those controlled by *milicias*.[iii] By and large the UPPs where established in the affluent south zone of the city, around the city center, and in northern Rio, close to the main infrastructural arteries of the city and future Olympic venues (see Appendix 3). The purpose of this militarized approach to urban planning was to create green *safe zones* (inspired by the strategy of the Allied Forces in cities like Bagdad) in central areas of the city.[12]

A three stage strategy of *pacification* was developed: first, the *pacification* of a favela was made public a few days ahead of its occupation to give gang members time to leave the community and avoid confrontations between police and gangs. Second, the favela was be occupied by PMERJs special units (including, but not limited to BOPE) who *stabilized the terrain* and arrested those gang members that had not fled. The third and final stage involved the establishment of a permanent UPP base by PMERJ, and the handing over of control to UPP police-soldiers (mainly Soldiers fresh out of the academy) who were put in charge of day-to-day patrolling (Menezes 2013). The base commanders acquired a salient role as community leaders in pacified favelas, where the UPP's often acted as nexus between the residents of the communities and public service providers (Oliveira 2014).

With few exceptions, the first UPPs were established in smaller, wealthier and centrally located favelas. Although early warning signs of future tensions included reports of authoritarian behavior and torture at certain UPPs, these were not publicized and remained mostly unknown (Ashcroft 2015a). The UPPs were generally conceived of as a broad success: the police received extensive financial support from local economical elites, and the project was met with widespread enthusiasm by the public, and careful optimism among many favela residents. Initial reports have shown that the strategy was effective in keeping the drug cartels out of the pacified territories and in reducing police lethality (Cano 2012).[iv]

However, early critics pointed out that the initial promises of accompanying police action with investments in public services, urbanization and social programs were not followed through. The favelas were to be occupied and controlled by the Military Police, and

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12 Interview with Coronel Laviano, commander of the coordinating offices of the UPPs (CPP).

in some cases economically exploited as exotic tourist destinations, but not to be integrated in the formal city. This has lead some scholar to suggest that the UPP project was akin to a large-scale marketing campaign aimed at improving the bad reputation of PMERJ and Rio de Janeiro as an unequal and violent city (Steinbrick 2013).

The involution of the pacification project

At the end of November 2010, in response to a crime wave and a series of attacks on the police, the State decided to intervene in CPX. Due to the size of the area, the invasion was carried out as a joint effort between the police and the armed forces. On the day of the invasion, *caiverãos* and military tanks rolled through the streets of the favelas. Some scholars have suggested that the use of the Armed Forces to carry out tasks of policing and guaranteeing law and order signaled a democratic setback, reinstating a practice that is associated with the years of authoritarian rule (Samset 2014; Savell 2014).

The live broadcast of the invasion reached a wide national and international audience. Footage showing drug traffickers fleeing the favela quickly became the symbol of the State's commitment to the pacification project, as a spectacular enactment of state power (Larkins 2013; Ashcroft 2014b). The armed forces remained in the favelas of CPX between 2011 and 2012, when a total of 8 UPPs were inaugurated (Savell 2014). Then, in September 2012 the special forces of the PMERJ pacified another populous favela, Rocinha.

At the beginning of this chapter I recounted how the initial stage of the pacification of these two important territories was carried out according to cops that had participated in the occupation. Their stories show that many of the former patterns of predatory accumulation and police abuse that had characterized PMERJ in the preceding decades were reproduced from the onset of the pacification process, as police-soldiers charged bribes to help gang-members escape, or stole goods from the homes of favela residents. However, the difference noted by the cops between the pacification of CPX and Rocinha also signaled an attempt by the state to bring these war machine dynamics under control. Both CPX and Rocinha were important favelas to the city's drug cartels, and as the pacification of these areas advanced, the police was met with significant resistance from local *traficantes* in both areas.

The interventions in these favelas produced a hardening of the pacification project (Magaloni, Franco and Melo 2015: 40). 2013, the year following their pacification, became a point of inflection for the UPP's. One month after the wave of protests that swept through Brazil in June 2013, bringing police violence and repression to the public's attention,

Amarildo de Souza, a bricklayer from Rocinha went missing after having been detained by local UPP police-soldiers. Amarildo's disappearance received massive attention in social media and eventually also in mainstream media, forcing an investigation. Although his body was never found, the investigation suggested that police-soldiers from the local UPP had tortured Amarildo to death, and that the commander at the base had manipulated a witness into giving false testimony.

Amarildo's disappearance was a serious blow to the credibility of the UPP project as a new policing model. The case was later baptized *o estopim* [the hinge], as it marked the end of the optimism surrounding the project, and the beginning of a gradual escalation of violence in the pacified areas accompanied by a much more critical approach taken by the media and the public. It became evident that the social projects that were supposed to accompany the police interventions in the favelas were not being implemented, that public services were scant, and that the ideal of community policing was not being achieved in critical areas (Ashcroft 2015c).

Violence continued escalating in pacified areas throughout 2013 and 2014, when shootouts between drug-dealers and the police gradually became part of the daily routine in many pacified communities:

> I think that 2013 was [the] moment [that] the crisis began. We started attending to police officers here that would [say]: 'listen, the UPP project is very fragile, we are experiencing very difficult situations in the favela' [...] ...if previously the incidents were very limited, they [now] started increasing, increasing, increasing until 2014, when, between the first and second semester there is a surreal, dizzying increase, and it only keeps growing. (Staff Psychologist)

While most of the problems were concentrated in large favelas like CPX and Rocinha, small episodes of armed violence started to take place in small and generally peaceful communities as well, indicating a general deterioration of the UPPs. Death tolls among UPP police-soldiers continued rising through the year, reaching a total of 8 UPP police-soldiers killed on duty in pacified areas in 2014 (Coelho 2015).

The growing death tolls among UPP police-soldiers put a lot of strain on the model of *proximity policing*. SESEG responded assigning a new group of Colonels to assume the command of PMERJ, including some of the Colonels that had been in charge of the early stages of the UPP project. Their main objective was to bring the situation in the pacified

favelas under control and intensify the reform process that the institution is currently transiting. BOPE commanders were transferred to the coordinating offices of the UPPs (CPP) with the objective of strengthening the tactical aspects of patrolling, and improving the security of police-soldiers. Implicitly, this signifies a shift of focus towards urban warfare strategy and tactics in many of the pacified areas. When I started my fieldwork at the UPP's in January 2015 the armed confrontations in several favelas continued to increase, seemingly out of control.

COLONIAL SPACES

As I wrote at the start of this chapter, Mbembe's discussion on colonial modes of domination will guide my analysis of the war machine and state dynamics expressed manifested in the policing of the favelas throughout the last decades. According to Mbembe (2003) the colonial order is founded on racism—broadly understood as the mis-recognition of the common humanity of the *civilized* colonizer and the colonized *savages* (see Buck-Morss 2009). In the preceding pages I have described how Rio's favelas came to be represented as areas of lawlessness, savagery, and the infinite cruelty of the *traficantes* in the public imaginary, and how these representations authorized aggressive and militarized practices of policing in the favelas, articulated through the discourse of the war on drugs.

Conceptualizing the favelas as colonial spaces accentuates the historical continuity between the Brazil's past as a colonial slave state and the current configurations of its urban landscape, characterized by highly segregated areas inhabited by the dispossessed, and policed by PMERJ, formerly dedicated to the repression of slave revolts. Still, I would argue, relation between the modern Brazilian state and these areas is mediated through the historical constellations of colonizer and colonized, of masters and slaves: In modern Brazil, the *favelas* have continued to act as sources of cheap labor for the privileged living in the *asfalto*, and as sites were predatory forms of accumulation take place. Furthermore, the surplus from the illicit drug economy has been channeled into the city's formal economy and, as indicated by one of the opening stories to this chapter, as the police also engaged in predatory forms of accumulation in the favelas, through practices of collusion, looting, bribes and illegal arms trade (see also Penglase 2014; Larkins 2015). These forms of resource extraction are characteristic of the colonies according to Mbembe (2003), and they are also characteristic of the war machines.

Second, it draws our attention to the extended powers that the PMERJ wielded in these areas. PMERJ's extended powers were principally, but not exclusively, exercised through the police's right to wage war against the populations living there, and legitimized through the invocation of representations of the savagery of the favelas in general, and the *traficantes* in particular. With the implementation of the UPPs, the *civilizing aspects* of the war became all the more salient (see Leite 2012; Rodrigues, Siqueira and Lissovsky 2012; Soares da Silva 2014; Oliveira 2014), and the recent involution of the project indicates that the pacification is indeed taking the form of a "war without end" (Mbembe 2003). In addition to the permanent state of war, the singular practices of policing applied in the favelas included intimidations, torture, violent retributions, and summary executions (Human Rights Watch 2015: 115f). These actions have historically been carried out with impunity by state agents, with the support of large segments of Brazilian society.

War in the colonies

According to Mbembe (2003: 25), *colonial warfare* is "not a legally codified activity." Indeed, the academic discussion on the urban violence in Rio has resisted the temptation to accept the colloquial understanding of the situation as a war (see Leite 2012). While the absence of a legally declared state of war has important practical implications as it means that martial laws are not applicable to the actions of the state's security forces, it is this very absence of legal codification that characterizes colonial warfare according to Mbembe. Furthermore, in anthropological literature, war has been defined as "potentially lethal violence between two groups, no matter how small the groups or how few the casualties" (Ferguson 2003: 28). The situation of armed confrontations and open hostility between Rio's multiple sovereignties certainly meets these requirements.

According to Mbembe (2003) war takes on a particular form in the colonies: the borders between combatants and noncombatants, or between enemy and criminal, are erased, making the conclusion of peace with the colonized an impossibility. The distinction between the means and ends of war are blurred, producing a situation of perpetual war where peace is not necessarily the outcome. Instead, colonial wars, if applied to the favela, express an absolute hostility that sets in this case the conqueror, the police, against an absolute enemy, the *traficante* (Mbembe 2003: 24f). Through the process of *criminal subjection* (Misse 2010) referred to earlier in this chapter, the borders between combatants (*traficante*) and non-combatants (residents) were effectively blurred. Coupled with the discourse of war on drugs

this process effectively collapsed the categories of *resident*, *criminal* and *enemy*, curbing any legitimate claims of social justice and inclusion. Thus, rather than understanding the war (against drugs, against crime) as a result of the enmity of the drug cartels, war effectively produced that enmity. Much like the argument put forth by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* (1977: 277) that the prisons "cannot fail to produce delinquents", the war on drugs could not fail to produce the figure of the *traficante* as the absolute enemy of the State.

In colonial warfare, the suspension of all legal and institutional rules grants the sovereign the right to kill at any time and in any manner (Mbembe 2003: 25). The people inhabiting the favelas, and particularly those that met the characteristics of the *criminal subject*, were killable, disposable subjects—what Agamben (1998) refers to as *bare life* (see also Larkins 2013). This was reflected in the adherence by half of all Brazilians to the saying *bandido bom é bandido morto* [a good criminal is a dead criminal] (FBSP 2015: 7). Meanwhile, police impunity in the favelas was sustained through the legal category of *autos de resistencia* [deaths resisting arrest], allowing the police to claim self defense when they kill, even when the victims exhibited signs of summary executions (Amnesty International 2015). In sum, the concept of *colonial warfare* guide our understanding of how police actions that would never have been accepted in the formal city were commonplace in the favelas, and were even celebrated by large segments of the Brazilian public (see Larkins 2013, 2015).

Late-modern colonial occupation and wars in the era of globalization

The changes in the practices of policing in the favela brought on by the establishment of the UPP's can usefully be understood through Mbembe's distinction between different modes of colonial warfare. Here, I use them as an operationalization of Deleuze and Guattari's distinction between war machine and state dynamics, which Mbembe also explicitly draws on. Mbembe (2003) distinguishes between two separate forms of warfare: *late-modern colonial occupation* (LMCO) and *wars in the era of globalization* (WEGs). While the former is characterized by the *territorializing* logic of the state, the latter is "more reminiscent of the strategy of the nomads than of the sedentary nations or the 'conquer-and-annex' territorial wars of modernity" (Mbembe 2003: 31). WEGs "do not include conquest acquisition, and takeover of a territory among their objective" but are generally hit-and-run affairs, where the aim is "to force the enemy into submission regardless of the immediate consequences, side effects, and collateral damage of the military actions" (Mbembe 2003: 29ff).

Mbembe's conceptualization of WEGs best describes the practices of policing in the favelas prior to pacification: the strategy of the intermittent police operations of PMERJ's special units. BOPE's operations in the favelas aimed at (temporarily) forcing the drug cartels into submission through flash invasions, where drug apprehensions were made, and *traficantes* and suspected *traficantes* would be killed on the spot (see Pengalese 2014). The UPP' however, clearly expressed the *territorializing* logic of LMCO. They were founded on the territorializing state dynamics and centered on seizing, delimiting, and asserting control over the physical geographical area of the favelas and "of writing on the ground a new set of social and spatial relations" (Mbembe 2003: 25): the establishment of permanent police units in the favelas, the salient role that the UPP commanders took on as community leaders, and the configuration of the UPP's as the nexus between the community and public service providers, are only a few of the territorializing practices carried out at the UPP's.

CONCLUSION: COLONIAL OCCUPATION

In this chapter I've described the contemporary dynamics of urban violence and policing in the favelas as (a) the product of a hierarchical social order rooted in Brazil's past as a colonial slave-state, and (b) an effect of the predatory forms of accumulation of Rio's multiple sovereignties—state security forces, drug cartels, and milicias. This explanation actively draws on the competing approaches to state violence in Rio (see Penglase 2014).

I have suggested a reading of the favelas as *colonial spaces*. Mbembe's definition of the colonies as areas characterized by a permanent *state of exception* founded on the logic of racism help us understand how Rio's public security policies came to take the form of a *war* against the population living in the favelas. Prior to the pacification this war took the form of heavily militarized and intermittent police operations in the favela, aimed at weakening the power of the drug cartels. However, the implementation of UPP's altered the relation between the Brazilian state and the favelas. The permanent police presence in the favelas was grounded in the territorializing logic of colonial occupation, and was legitimized through a civilizing rhetoric that will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 4. Mbembe's distinction between the warfare strategies of WAGs and LMCO mirror the distinction between war machine and state, and although both modalities coexisted in PMERJ's policing of the favelas, I've argued that LMCO was the dominant logic of the pacification project.

Chapter 3

VIOLENT BECOMINGS

There is both a deterritorialization and a becoming proper to the war machine; the special body, in particular the slave-infidel-foreigner, is the one who becomes a soldier and believer while remaining deterritorialized in relation to the lineages and the State. You have to be born an infidel to become a believer; you have to be born a slave to become a soldier. Specific schools or institutions are needed for this purpose: the special body is an invention proper to the war machine, which States always utilize, adapting it so totally to their own ends that it becomes unrecognizable, or restituting it in bureaucratic staff form, or in the technocratic form of very special bodies, or in "esprit de corps" that serve the State as much as they resist it, or among the commissars who double the State as much as they serve it

Deleuze and Guattari (1987 [1980]: 393)

Belonging to a band of armed men is constituting. Being under the constant possibility of armed conflict presents itself as a mode of being. The everyday realities of war transforms the human soul to stone, produces a kind of suffering capable of altering the framework of reference that banalizes the sense of morality, because it modifies the relation with death and, at the extreme, leads to excess and crime. In those circumstances, when it is possible to make [someone] suffer without condemnation, brutality imposes itself as an axiom. Here we have the manifestation of a terrible power: that of reifying both the victim and the butcher

Colonel Íbis Pereira (2015: 42), Chief of Staff of the PMERJ[13]

Violence

Nordstrom (2002: 5) has pointed out "how the politics of violence at the individual and community level frame larger national wars." For instance, societies that value *honor* highly tend to support forms of violence that enforce social and political control, while they are less likely to support the forms of violence directed at social change or non-honor related aggression (Nordstrom 2002: 8). Thus, following Nordstrom, we should consider how larger historical, political, and social forces, such as race, class and gender, shape the cops exercise of violent power in the favelas, but also, the violent effects of these forces on the subjectivities of cops. Understanding the violence-producing relation between the larger

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[13] Translated from Portuguese

hierarchizing forces of social formation, and the cops' use of violence also troubles traditional distinctions between *victims* and *victimizers*, highlighting the *contingency* and *fluidity* of these categories. Through the notion of *a continuum of violence* this violence-producing relation can be captured (Bourgois 2002). As way of illustrating this point, Bourgois (2002: 228) argues that the idea of a continuum of violence explains "how, under circumstances of extreme misery in the midst of stupendous wealth, victims turn into victimizers." The idea captures the coexistence and transformation of multiple forms of violence along an integrated continuum that should be analyzed in order to understand how violence is produced and reproduced, and rest on an understanding of violence that is not limited to the physical use of force. Bourgois (2002) specifically draws on the concepts of *everyday violence* (Scheper-Hughes 1996), which refers to the interpersonal and institutional violence that is commonly associated with the concept, and includes armed conflict and the physical use of force, and *structural* or *symbolic violence* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2002), generally imperceptible or invisible and exercised on a symbolic level. Also related, Fassin's (2013) concept of *moral violence* refers to assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of worth, or value, of the victim – and typically takes the form of humiliations.

The two quotes that I cited at the start of this chapter highlight different aspects of the points just made. Significantly, both trouble the victim:victimizer dichotomy, alerting us to the ways in which, I will argue, the subjectivities of police-soldiers are continually violated, to the effect of producing a violent soldier-subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari argue that a process of *violent becoming* is characteristic of both war machines and the state's tentative appropriation of these. War machines require a *special body*, they write, namely the body of the slave-infidel-foreigner, which is a body that has been violated, which is external to the state order, which is deterritorialized. Violent deterritorializations and reterritorializations, exercised upon these bodies, violently codes and transforms them into subjects of the state. Such subject-producing aspects of violence are brought to the fore in Pereira's quote, who shows how the constant possibility of armed conflict alters and transforms the moral frameworks of reference of the subjects that suffer the *everyday forms of violence* of war. In this chapter I explore the *productive aspects* of violence, and the generative link between the continuous transformations of violence, and the continuous *becoming* of cops shaped by it.

Subjective formation as an open-ended process of becoming

The dynamic concept of *becoming* can be contrasted to the static concept of *being*: it highlights the fluidity and open-endedness of processes of social formation (Bertelsen 2016; Deleuze and Guattari (1987[1980]). I have chosen to refer to this process as the *violent becoming* of cops knowing quite well that such an approach is, bluntly put, unconventional. Recently, social researchers studying the policing of socially and economically marginalized neighborhoods have focused on how violent state power is exercised upon the populations living in these areas (see Fassin 2013; A. Goffman 2014). These accounts tend to reify the police as perpetrators occupying positions of power. Arguing against such simplifying approaches, this chapter suggests that in order to understand forms of violence traditionally labeled state or police violence, it is necessary to understand the violent processes of becoming of the cops.

For analytical purposes, I've chosen to divide the subjective formation of cops into three overlapping processes. First, they go through the same processes of socialization as their civilian counterparts (in their families, at school, and through participation in civilian social life). At some point, in order to become cops, they enroll in PMERJ, and go through a process of training at the Police Academy (*Centro de Aperfeiçõamento de Praças*, CEFAP) as *cadets*. Eventually they get stationed at a UPP and start working as Soldiers. The ethnography presented in this chapter is structured according to this division. However, although I present these processes separately and in chronological order, their open-endedness means that they also exist as co-temporary, interwoven, and overlapping processes of subjective formation. The main interlocutors of this thesis continually alternate between being cops, parents, sons and daughters, citizens, husbands and wives, powerful and powerless, victims and perpetrators.

"NÃO TODO PRETO É LADRÃO"[14]

Sergeant Nazareth was by all standards a large man. He was one of those men you can easily spot in a crowd, as he reached a head higher than most other men. At the base I would always recognize him since he was one of the few cops who would always wear the uniform beret. Although many of the cops at the base were black, Nazareth was darker than most. Originally

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[14] Not every black [person] is [a] thief

from Minas Gerais, his father had worked in the agriculture. "I remember the first paid job I had", he says. He had still been a child and had been helping out on the fields. "At the end of the day the landowner wanted to pay me." Nazareth leans back in his chair and tilts his head backwards, so that he can look down on me, imitating the posture of the landowner. He acts like he's placing a coin on the table in front of us and pushes it forward with his index finger. "50 cents.[15] He paid me 50 cents! I threw the money back at him." That was the first and last time he ever worked in the fields.

His mother had always reminded him that they were black, and they had always tried to show that "não todo preto é ladrão" (see footnote). "My life was always marked by that, dude, discrimination... Being discriminated I somehow tried to show people that they were wrong [about me] through my actions, right?" He sighs. "My parents always taught me to do things right. And maybe that's where I got my sense of justice from, in the sense of trying to only do what's right." When Nazareth finished high-school, his father had given him two choices: either work in the fields or leave. So he left, and came to Rio 18 years old. The first year was hard. He did not know anyone, and lived out on the streets before he eventually got a job at a beach stall that paid him 300 reais a month, enough to rent a room in a favela. "And now I am a police officer. I didn't turn out a *bandido* [thug], I didn't turn out a *traficante*", he says, with badly hidden pride.

He recalls his first years in the city. He had arrived in the early 90's, during Brizola'a government (see Chapter 2). "It was during those years that the traffickers became powerful." Nazareth raises his voice. "*Poxa* [Damn], there was violence like there has always been, but it was a lot softer, there were still some values that where upheld, right? [...] The *marginals* we had [back then] were the kind of *marginal* that didn't let anything happen within [his] area, right?" The Military Police, however, was *not* soft back then. He recalls a situation that occurred during a carnival block party. There was a street fight, and a patrol car had arrived:

> I think they were two police-soldiers. Two police-soldiers that separated the people that were fighting. One of the police-soldiers grabbed the face of one of the kids that were fighting, he pushed it towards the hood of the vehicle [mimics the gesture]. Like this, on the hood of the car. Then he got his gun and started to smash it into the head of the kid while he yelled at him. All the people watching said that he should stop, and the police

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[15] 50 BRS cents are roughly equivalent to 15 USD cents.

officer saying something like... eh... that he was the authority... kinda like, provoking everybody that were present, right? Really beating him, right? He attacked [him], got his weapon out and... it was really unnecessary. And I think it made an impact on all of us there, right? The police were a lot more truculent back then.

Eventually, Nazareth married and his wife became pregnant. However, he could not raise his child and provide for his family on the paycheck he got from the beach stall. Thus, after having applied for a job in the army without success, he signed up for the public tender of the Military Police:

> I wanted action. Because my idea of the military is the police-soldier that goes to *war* (distorts his voice), right? I wanted to be in the air force or the army because, *pó*, I was always watching war movies and such, thinking 'Damn, that is really cool, if it was me I would do it differently!' So I got frustrated when I didn't get into the army, and happy when I got into the Military Police, right? [...] I entered the Military Police to try to change the world, right? [...] And I wanted to join BOPE since I thought that BOPE was *the real* police, *pó*: 'Ah, the guys from BOPE are good, when you get in it's *tiro, porrada e bomba* (shooting, beating and bombs)' right?

By the time he started working, his first daughter had been born. With his first pay-check he had taken his wife and daughter with him, and moved from the favela to a low-income suburb in northern Rio, far away from the postcard perfect beaches of Copa and Ipanema, but still one of his proudest moments. Now he was finally able to provide for his family.

The violence in social and economic marginalization

Nazareth's childhood background as a poor, black rural worker made him particularly sensitive to the symbolic violence of racism, and to the structural violence of economic dependency and marginalization, at the behest of rich landowners and elites. *Symbolic violence* is defined as the kind of violence that is "exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2002: 167)—Nazareth and his family were not ignorant to the violence of racial relations but they also contributed to its reproduction in their efforts to prove that *not all blacks are thieves*. Similarly, the force of structural violence of in his relation to the landowner is palpable in his account. However, his refusal to accept the payment from the landowner was first and foremost a rejection of the force of the *moral*

violence inherent in the transaction: Nazareth refused to be humiliated by working in the fields under the slave-like conditions—his sense of honor would not allow it. When he eventually moved to Rio, he continued to suffer the structural violence of economic marginalization, living on the street and working for pocket change at a beach stall, but with his *honor* intact, before he joined the police.

Caption 7: The hole from a bullet that has pierced the locker of one of the cops in the common resting quarters at Alemao

THE PRODUCTIVE ASPECTS OF MORAL VIOLENCE

Nazareth already expressed an affinity with the militarism of PMERJ before he enlisted as a recruit. But once he was accepted at CFAP he was exposed to a series of violent processes of subjective formation that are captured through Goffman's (1961) *mortifications of self*. Mortifications are a form of moral violence, and include a series of *humiliations*, *degradations* and *profanations* of the self. According to Goffman they produce radical shifts in the beliefs that someone has concerning themselves and their significant others – in their *moral careers*. Violence in the form of mortifications of self is typically associated with what Goffman refers to as *total institutions*. Prisons, psychiatric wards, and military barracks are paradigmatic examples of total institutions. While PMERJ was not the archetypical case of a total institution, since the separation between the cops' former status as civilians and their new status as police-soldiers is not complete, it did shared some of its defining features: the

strict division between a large managed group of cops, and a small supervisory staff of officers;[v] the coalescence of workplace and residency for prolonged periods of time;[vi] and, principally, the reliance on mortifications of self as a way to violently transform the subjectivity of cops.

The de-subjectification of recruits and the inscription of rank

According to Goffman, total institutions rely on mortifications as a tool to *shape* and *code* the subject while ignoring most of his or her previous bases of self-identification. As such, the logic of de-subjectifying the recruit and subsequently shaping and coding them according to the institutional structure is equivalent to the *deterritorializing* and *reterritorializing* dynamics of war machines and state (see Chapter 4 for a definition of these dynamics). At PMERJ, common practices of mortifications included *admission procedures, obedience tests* and *indignities of speech and action*. These practices were intimately related to the institutional bureaucratic structure of the military and its dependence on hierarchy and discipline for internal control (see Cano and Duarte 2012).

At CFAP, recruits were first subjected to a series of *admission procedures* aimed at adapting them to the smooth routine operations of the establishment, specifically, at inscribing the hierarchy and discipline of the militaries on the bodies of the recruits. All recruits were given a personal identification number that allowed them to immediately identify their hierarchical position in relation to their colleagues of equal rank (based on the principle of seniority), and were to carry name-tags that specified their blood type and rank, and to keep their beard shaved and hair short. This created a rupture between the former civilian identity of recruits and their new military identity codified through rank, which was also reinforced through a common aesthetics.

Following the admission, recruits went through a series of *obedience tests*–some so extreme that they resulted in physical harm. There were numerous reports of abuse and physical or psychological torture of recruits at the CFAP: An alarming 38,8% of Brazilian Military Police soldiers claim to have suffered torture during training or in other professional contexts (Lima, Bueno and Santos 2014).[vii]

Through *indignities of speech and action* recruits were told that he or she had a special low status even in the low group that he is part of (Goffman 1961). Officers would generally address cops by their rank and not their name, reminding them of their hierarchical inferiority, and cops were similarly expected to address their superiors by rank as a sign of

reverence and respect. The division between officers and cops produced a lot of tension, and cops often complained about the way they were treated by their superiors. The production and reinforcement of hierarchy through the moral violence of mortifications had a dramatic effect on the feelings of self-worth and personal safety of many cops:

> [The people in the upper echelons] give the order, sometimes because they want it to be followed in a certain way, and they don't care if you will die or not. They call us, the cops, *massa de manobra* (group of people who are used to serve the interests of others), like we're a group that they can place wherever they find pertinent, or where it might be necessary [...] When [...] one or two die, they simply grab a new one, two new ones, three more, four more, at the academy to replace [them]. The command turns to a blank page, to them it means nothing. [...] We're *massa de manobra*, like I told you, we're only good for obeying orders. [...] We're treated almost like garbage, you know? (UPP Soldier)

This quote illustrates the strong feeling of being de-subjectified shared by many cops, and it also shows how the effects of the violence in the favelas was often amplified by the mortifying effects of PMERJ's hierarchical structure. Under circumstances of the extreme forms of the everyday violence of war, and the de-subjectifying effect of the institutional hierarchy, cops felt very vulnerable indeed.

The moral violence of the *indignities* in the treatment of cops by their superiors was common throughout Brazil's Military Police forces. A former Military Police cop from Ceará (a province in northeastern Brazil) describes the effect that these practices had on him and the recruits:

> Sometimes during lunchtime the superiors would scream in my ear that I was a monster, a parasite. It seemed like they were training a dog. The police-soldier is trained to fear the officer and just that. The training was just messing with your emotions, so that the guy would leave the quartel like a pitbull dog, crazy to bite persons. [...] Today when cops are trained it seems like they're training a dog for a street fight (Barros 2015)

While the previous quote highlighted the de-subjectifying effects of the institutional hierarchy and the vulnerability of cops, this quote shows how the moral violence of mortifications also stimulated the aggressive behavior of cops.

The disciplinary code of conduct

Beyond establishing an institutional hierarchy through the chain of command, obedience was also ensured through the enforcement of PMERJ's draconian disciplinary code of conduct.[viii] The mortifying effects of the code of conduct continued after recruits had left the academy and started working as cops and disciplinary regulations also extend into the private sphere of cops, prohibiting common actions of moral character (see Cano and Duarte 2012). Punishable acts included: assuming debts and commitments beyond the capacity of the cop, thus compromising the reputation of the profession; frequenting places incompatible with the social status and dignity of the profession; spreading rumors or tendentious news; moral offenses through acts, gestures and/or words; talking to or answering superiors in a disrespectful manner; and, authorizing, promoting or participating in any collective manifestation.

These rules evoked a conservative moral order founded on values such as honor, deference to authority, and decorum, and were practically impossible to comply to as they presupposed the ideal of a non-existing moral superman (Cano and Duarte 2012). Through drawing on the application of the code of conduct, officers were able to regulate and sanction minute segments of the cops' activities and ensure the obedience of cops:

> ...you might be stationed a place where the charges are absurd, and you have to be completely within what they call the standard [*padrão*] [...]: greased boots, spotless uniform, with the beret [on], if not you're written up, you know? [...] The [police] demands things from the officer that are extremely unnecessary, in my opinion they are unnecessary. [...] I, for instance, was imprisoned for four days because I was seen without the beret. Under the scorching sun of Rio de Janeiro, 40 degrees, and I have to wear that suede beret. Man, for the love of God! You know what I'm saying? (UPP Soldier)

This testimony shows that transgressions that could be considered trivial from a public security point of view were severely punished with disciplinary reclusion at PMERJ's barracks. Furthermore, the code of conduct was often arbitrarily applied according to the whims, personal style, and mood of superiors. In some cases, cops even preferred to work at high conflict UPPs with frequent armed confrontations, if the officers in command where perceived as just and reasonable. The mortifying effects of the draconian disciplinary code of

conduct generated a feeling of constant persecution and instilled a chronic anxiety of breaking the rules.

"OS GUERRILHEIROS DO ESTADO"

After half a year of training at CFAP, and normally some months of apprenticeship at a regular police Battalion, newly formed Soldiers were stationed at UPP's and were expected to be guarantors of law and order in the pacified favelas, in a context of urban war. I recall one episode vividly, I had been in Rio for some months, and gotten used to the situation at the UPP's, and at Alemão, where I regularly joined a group stationed at one of the advanced bases on patrol. This morning, a female Soldier that I had not met before was joining us up to the container that acted as base. I could see how nervous she was, she was sweating and her hands were shaking. "Are you new here?" I asked. "Yes, I just finished the training at CFAP" she said, with a trembling voice. "And they sent me here! Straight to the war!" She reminded me of how I had felt on my first day in Alemão, when I carried out my first ever group interview as anthropologist during an hour-long, intense shootout in the favela. While did not experience the same panic again, I always felt a lingering, almost imperceptible tension when I was at the base. The following quote is from one of the Soldiers at Alemão. He worked in a trench built with barrels of sand, in one of the most *critical* areas of the favela:

> We [the cops] have lost the fear of dying. Maybe it's just what we are waiting for here in Alemão. We are waiting for our hour to come, doing what is expected of us, and waiting. That's what it's all about: you put up a fight so you won't die, but at any moment the news of your death might arrive at your home. Everybody at home has to be prepared, you know? [...] The Commander at the base once told us *'you have to prepare your family, you have to leave your debit card with your wife, so that if something happens to you she won't have to go through a hard time after your funeral, until she's able to receive the pension that the police has to pay her.'* [...] When I come to work here I don't feel that I'm doing police work, I'm doing guerrilla work. I come here, get my rifle, holster my gun, head for my sector... Do you know where my patrol sector is? It's at the Canitar base [the most critical area in the favela]. I stay in a trench, surrounded by sandbags and barrels, waiting for the attack, or attacking. I'm not there to do anything. You tell me: What kind of police officer can I be there? A proximity police? A pacifying police? In a battalion you attend to occurrences, to domestic disturbances. Here nobody is going to call for you if there is a fight between a husband and wife, they are going to

call for the guys at the *boca*, they aren't going to call for the police, there are even places here we won't enter. So, my service here is practically that of a guerrilla: I grab my rifle and I wait to see if the *vagabundos* attack, you know? They attack us, we attack them, bullet against bullet and that's it. That's it, that's the service I carry out here. I know that that is my job: come here to be shot at and shoot back, that's my service. [...] We are at war, this situation here is an urban war. I am a *guerrilheiro* [guerrilla] *of the State*, and this is an urban war. [...] They say Rio de Janeiro is the marvelous city. Marvelous for whom? For the *gringos* in *Zona Sul*? I'd like to see you in Zona Sul, Copacapana, trying to walk around with a gold-chain around your neck. The *pivetes* [street children involved in robberies and assaults] are turning into a nightmare for the government. Now that the UPPs have been installed they have stopped stealing close to the favela and started stealing in the city center and in *Zona Sul*. The latest fashion seems to be stabbings. For them, for the *pivete* it is normal to stab a knife in a person, it doesn't matter to them. In the past, when we had a different police, there was respect. Today there's not, you know? The respect that we enjoyed in the past was through authority, often with truculence, but it was what had to be done. Today you've got the human rights that only defend the bandit, you know? They don't defend the good citizens; they go to jail to defend the rapist, not the family of the person who was raped. The inversion of values in our society is very big, you know? I see it more and more. (UPP Soldier)

The normalization of violence: "We're the target"

The quote above brilliantly captures the tension of the continuum of violence and the victim:victimizer dichotomy. The Soldier's story starts as a dramatic account of his personal suffering, and ends with an adamant defense of the violent and aggressive assertions of power associated with historical modes of policing in the favelas. Compared to the other UPP's were I carried out my fieldwork, the cops at Alemão were by far those who had been scarred by the everyday violence of war the most. While the UPP's at CPX had never boosted the same levels of success in terms of expelling the *traficantes* from the community, as had been the case in other favelas, the armed confrontations between gang-members and police-soldiers had seen a dramatic increase in the year preceding my arrival in Rio. On the first morning of my arrival at the base in January 2015, the cable car that attends the community had been suspended due to an intense shootout between gang-members and police-soldiers. I tried to get a taxi driver to drive me up to the base, but he refused: "To the hilltop? I'm not going there. You know that there is a war there?" Indeed, I arrived at the UPP in the midst of a commotion. A Soldier resting in the entry hall had been hit in the face by a bullet that had

pierced the walls of the building, and there were specks of blood all over the floor. I was asked to return the next day, as the base commander did not have time to attend to me.

Caption 8: Police entrenchement at Canitar

On my second visit to Alemão I was given a tour of the facilities by one of the cops at the base. In the resting quarters of the cops, the walls were lined with grey aluminum lockers, and the remaining floor space was filled with more rows of lockers. The room had apparently not been designed with this purpose in mind, and the cramped arrangement of the high rows of cabinets strangely reminded me of the improvised constructions and narrow alleyways of the favela. A couple of thin, worn out mattresses, gray with dirt, occupied the narrow floor-space between the lockers. "This is where the police-soldiers rest during 24 hour shifts, but I prefer to sleep on the roof [of the building] since the walls there are made of *alvenaria* [bricks and cement]. It's safer." The cop told me while pointing at a bullet-hole in one of the lockers. The roof and walls of the room were pierced with bullet holes everywhere. In fact, the entire building was peppered with them. Some places it was possible to see styrofoam bubbling out from behind thin sheets of aluminum. Except for the armory, all the walls were made of styrofoam lined with aluminum, which kept the heat out—the bullets, on the other hand, cut through them like butter.

A young cop in sweatpants and t-shirt had just finished cleaning the floor of the wardrobe, and was sitting on a pile of worn mattresses. "You wanted to know how our

working conditions are?" He pointed at the cop. "This police-soldier got shot two weeks ago, and yet here he is cleaning the floors." The cop lifted his t-shirt exposing the wound where the bullet had entered his abdomen. "Do you think he gets to stay at home and rest with his family until he recovers? Maybe in Norway..." His voice was full of sarcasm. The cop who just showed me his wound said that he was sick of the police. My guide interrupts him. "Now imagine what you'd feel if you've taken a bullet to the head?" He removes his dark blue beret revealing a big scar that starts behind his left ear and extends all across the upper part of his head, where it ends above his right eyebrow. The left side of his skull is deformed, and patches of hair are missing. When he looks directly at me it looks like somebody has wedged a sledge right into his head. "The doings of a kid from *Commando Vermelho*", he says.

After my tour around the base I'm introduced to a group of Soldiers who've agreed to participate in a group interview. I've barely had time to introduce myself, and we have not been talking for long when we start to hear heavy shooting close to the base. I immediately start to sweat. "It must be the GTPP [tactical patrol unit] that just left, they said they were heading for Areal", one of the cops says. They tell me that that particular unit "likes war." Soon, one of the cops get up from his chair and leaves the room. "It's a reflex", one of the cops explains. "He's been shot before so he gets a bit nervous, but it's ok. He's still a good police-soldier." The rest of the cops seem relatively unaffected, they keep chatting while the popping sound of bullets closes in and fades away for the next hour or so. "It's normal," they assure me. "Are we safe here at the base?" I ask them. They laugh and one of them says: "Of course we're not. We're the target!"

With time, just like the police-soldiers that I met in Alemão, the sound of bullets did not scare me anymore. I got used to the shootouts, to wearing the bulletproof vest, even inside the base, when attacks in retaliation for police killings were imminent. The violence of Alemão quickly became my new *normal*. In the following quote, on of the Soldiers describes the effects that the normalization of violence had on him:

I have been working for a while now. It's been a while since I've been going through this, and there comes a time when you get used to it. You know that you're going to a place where you can die, where there will be shooting, but you're not afraid anymore, you simply go there. [...] I've gotten used to it. I don't know if it's good, I don't know if it's bad, you know? But I think it's bad, because who would want to get used to that kind of life, right? Of you seeing a man being killed in front of you without feeling anything at all, but if it's one of your colleagues you despair, you want to save his life. If it's a

bandido [criminal] who has been shot you look at him with no remorse, you feel no remorse when killing a *bandido* because the *bandido* wanted to kill you. You take someone's life and it doesn't matter, you know? It is something that you can only understand if you experience yourself (UPP Soldier at Alemão)

Caption 9: At one of the UPP's the cops from the base that have been killed are commemorated as heroes

Everyday forms of violence quickly became routine to the police-soldiers working in critical UPPs. However, while the immediacy of death did not produce panic in experienced police-soldiers, the fragility of life in the midst of a war-zone like Alemão caused constant tension and stress among cops, who felt vulnerable and unprotected. Although many minimized the effects that violence had on them there was an alarming number of mental health issues and suicide attempts among cops. According to the staff psychologists the mental health of cops in UPP's with high conflict levels deteriorated at much faster rates than at the battalions. Cops relatively fresh out of the academy were struggling with problems that were normally only observed after many years in service, and many cops struggled with alcohol abuse, depressions and suicide thoughts (see also Magaloni, Franco and Melo 2015). PMERJ eventually recognized that the high conflict level in Alemão and other UPPs with frequent confrontations between police and cartels were incompatible with proximity policing, and gradually proximity activities were suspended or reduced, while militarized policing modeled on BOPE's urban warfare tactics gained priority (see also Musumeci 2015a).

THE VIOLENT PRODUCTION OF A WARRIOR ETHOS

Above I have described the most salient effects of the *violent becoming* of police-soldiers. Particularly, I have highlighted how symbolic, structural, moral and everyday forms of violence co-produce a military subjectivity founded on formal hierarchy and a strict disciplinary code of conduct. In military institutions, these forms of violence contribute to the production of a professional ethos—a *warrior ethos*—based on an ethics of moral superiority, such as heroism, honor and bravery (Cano and Duarte 2012: 326). However, such a *warrior ethos* of the Military Police was also intimately related to an ethics of masculinity and manliness "forged [...] in the grammar of violent virility" (Mourao 2013: 8). I will now discuss the *violent becoming* of police-soldiers and its relation its the *warrior ethos*.

Masculinity, violence and power: "Pau no lombo, sem masagem"[16]

In *Masculine Domination* (2001 [1998]) Bourdieu notes that patriarchal social structures often produce violence as a result of men trying to live up to the *dominant representations of manliness*, elsewhere referred to as *hegemonic masculinity* (Connell 2005).[ix] He notes that "men are also prisoners, and insidiously victims, of the dominant representation" of what it means to be a man (Bourdieu 2001 [1998]: 49). Bourgois notion of a continuum of violence is a helpful expansion of Bourdieu's point: it explains how, in unequal societies, where aggression and violence are constructed as masculine characteristics, socially and economically marginalized (structurally and symbolically violated) men might recur to violence as a way to make claims to power within the gendered hierarchy of masculinity (see Bourdieu 2001 [1998]; Bourgois 2002; Connell 2005; Hoffman 2011; Jaffa 2014; Kievland 2014; Zaular 2010). In such contexts the economy of violence and the economy of masculinity are intimately connected.

As a careful reading of the ethnography presented in this chapter hopefully indicate, gender was a quintessential component in the violent becoming of police-soldiers. As socially and economically marginalized men, many cops struggled to fulfill their monetary duties as *fathers* and *family providers*. The job stability that the Military Police provided offered them an opportunity to fulfill these duties, but it did more than that: In the words of Nazareth, the

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[16] Lit. "sticks to the back, with no massage"

wielding of a gun gave them power and the possibility to "change the world." His idea of what *real* police work was about—shooting, beating and bombs—was firmly embedded in prevailing notions of manliness as "the capacity to fight and exercise violence" (Bourdieu 2001 [1998]: 51).

Caption 10: A cop shows the scar from a bullet that pierced his skull during an attack

In Rio's favelas, the violent exchanges of turf-wars generated a situation where men's sense of status and self-esteem was "predicated on demonstrations of virility and 'manliness' [and] in one's capacity and willingness to destroy the enemy" (Zaular 2010: 17). Rodrigues (2014: 7) therefore draws parallels between the *hyper-masculinity* or *warrior ethos* of gang-members and the military education of PMERJ cadets, arguing that "both groups experience a virile and violent socialization during the social construction of their respective identities." He suggests that the violence in the *favelas* could be seen "as a specific male generational conflict between young policemen and young local residents" (Rodrigues 2014: 7).

In other words, young men growing up in impoverished neighborhoods could follow two paths to violently assert their masculinity: they could either join a criminal network or one of the state's security forces to tap into the power that comes from wielding a gun. The relation between the use of violence, the assertion of authority, and the demand for respect was expressed in a saying among the cops that "the police is only respected for the harm it can do." They claimed that with the UPP's, gang-members and residents alike had lost their

former respect for the police. The only way to fight crime was with "*pau no lombo, sem masagem*" (see footnote)—only through the sovereign logic of pure force could the police achieve respect from criminals and residents.

Bravery and 'rusticidade'

The *warrior ethos* that motivated many cops to join the Military Police, was one among many available and competing forms of masculinity available to Brazilian men. However, once they entered the police academy the associations between masculinity, violence and respect were intensified and purified, and became dominant or *hegemonic*. Among the police-soldiers, the ability to successfully position themselves as strong, aggressive and brave heterosexual men and warriors was central to their status among their peers. The notion of *rusticidade* [rusticity] was an important component of the *warrior ethos* at PMERJ:

> ...the body [of the police-soldier] needs to be trained, needs to [go through] sacrifices, it needs to be *rusticizado* [hardened, made rustic] so that he can face the complexities of war. That [causes] impacts [...] on the psyche, on the psychology of that police-soldier. We [...] are parting from a hypothesis that our police-soldiers are sick, when they spend a lot of time [with] work conditions [that] produce [illness]. (PMERJ Colonel)

As an inherently male quality (women were not expected to be rustic) intimately associated with the idea of bravery, and with the ability to endure suffering and to hide your fear and face the enemy in battle, it highlights the negative aspects of male privilege manifested "in the permanent tension and contention, sometimes verging on the absurd, imposed on every man by the duty to assert his manliness in all circumstances" (Bourdieu 2001 [1998]: 50). This was also reflected by one of the staff Psychologists:

> The guy thinks that he has to be rustic, that he has to have rusticity to confront, and when he confronts then he is *the guy*, right? He is so much *the guy* that he goes to the favela even with [just] a gun, and ends up in a confrontation with a guy who has a rifle. The trafficker has a weapon that is much better than his, but he is a *man*, he is macho, and he is able to face that guy. So you also have the guy in that completely harmful logic, but who's unable to see it. (Staff Psychologist)

Ironically, therefore, gender dynamics that placed police-soldiers in a position of power also rendered them vulnerable to the expectations and demands to hide their feelings that that position requires of them.

Violent assertions of authority

In the case of the UPP cops the capacity to exercise violence was not only seen as a *male duty*, but sometimes also as a *necessity of survival* that rested on a sovereign logic. Not only did violent displays of force allow the police-soldiers to assert their manliness, they were also believed to serve as deterrents that warded off attacks from armed traffickers. Choosing not to display violence and aggression was represented as dangerous. During a training session of a group of UPP cops, the instructor in charge of the lesson stressed the importance of the ostentation of weapons due to their *psychological factor*. He argued that police-soldiers who carried good equipment and knew how to manipulate it properly imposed more respect: "If you see a group of bandits, who do you kill? You kill the one that looks the weakest! You don't pick the one that looks strongest and toughest. The bandits also think that way." The instructor exemplified his point referring to the American Army's use of Tomahawks (battle axes) in Iraq, and compared it to the choice of armament on patrol in the favela: "Just imagine a GTPP armed with pistols and a GTPP armed with rifles and see what difference it makes!"

In addition to showing how the military subjectivity of Brazilian police-soldiers interact with a global military discourse, the scene illustrates the complexity of the relation between the cops' use of force, the warrior ethos and its associated notions of strength and respect, and the police-soldiers' survival in a situation of armed conflict. Cops might initially have turned to violence in order to assert their status as men, but displays of violence (also those that could be considered abusive) were also a means of protection and self-preservation through the assertion of authority.

Honor and revenge

However, violence was not only a means to assert authority. It was also driven by *desire*. The exposure to the everyday forms of violence of the drug cartels contributed to a vicious circle of violence that fed on the anger of police-soldiers and on their desire for revenge:

> When the police are being hurt and killed the desire for more violence only increases, you know? What I've seen here is that the increase in violence only produces in the police-soldiers a bigger desire of being violent. So those guys who are injured, who are hurt, [...] they tend to return to the terrain, return to work with more anger, with more desire of vengeance, with more desire of [committing] abuses of force. [...] We cannot avoid to address that violence and understand how, when they [the police-soldiers] are marked by it in their bodies, the desire to perpetuate it increases even more (Staff Psychologist)

This desire for revenge also rested on a sovereign logic. Attacks on the police not only violated their physical bodies, it also violated their honor, and vengeance was a way for the police-soldiers to reassert their power and status in the hierarchy of masculinities.

The heroics of killing

Rather than seeing proximity policing a way to reverse the spiraling violence, its softer approach was seen as an impediment that weakened the police's power (to kill). The fact that many if not most UPP cops still saw the aggressive policing of BOPE as *real* police work shows that policing activities in the favelas were still interpreted through the framework of *war* (on drugs, on crime). Within this framework, cops saw themselves as combatants at war, whose main duty was to hunt and kill *criminal-enemies*:

> *Me:* "What do you think of BOPE?"
> *Soldier:* "BOPE is good, they have excellent training, and do *real* police work [...]"
> *Me:* "What is real police work? What is the job of the police?"
> *Soldier:* (Answers without hesitation) "The job of the police is to kill, steal and destroy."
> (I can't conceal the look of shock in my face, and then Soldier quickly corrects himself)
> "…to kill the *vagabundo* who steals and destroys."

In the Soldier's comment above, the conflation of warfare and policing is explicitly expressed through the idea that the job of the police is *to kill* a vaguely defined *criminal-enemy* (as opposed to provide peace and security to the population in the favela). Rather than being an isolated case, this idea permeated the institution. During training, UPP cops were taught that the first priority of patrol was to "capture (if possible) or *neutralize* marginals of the law" (my emphasis), and only in second place, to provide security. Here, *neutralize* carried the

unequivocal meaning *to kill*, which is especially evident as it is contrasted with the impossibility to *capture* the marginal (already defined as *criminal*, and not as *suspect*).

Caption 11: Family members of police-soldier that have been killed stage a protest at Copacabana

Most UPP cops (like Nazareth at the start of this chapter and the Soldier in the dialogue above) talked about BOPE with admiration: one cop told me in awe about a BOPE officer who had killed "over one hundred *vagabundos*" before he admitted that he had also killed, with badly hidden pride. At one point late in my fieldwork, I was at the base when a tactical patrol unit killed a 16-year old boy who had opened fire against the police. I witnessed the euphoric celebration of the Soldiers who had been involved in the shootout. Among police-soldiers, killing in battle was seen as a heroic achievement where the police-soldier put his life at risk for the greater social good. It was the epitome of being a *real* police-soldier and a *real* man. However, and to the cops' frustration, they rarely felt that they received public recognition as heroes (although large segments of the Brazilian public adamantly supported the violence of the police directed as criminals). Ironically, police-soldiers were only awarded with the status as hero by the Military Police once they had been killed.[x]

CONCLUSION: VICTIMS AND VICTIMIZERS

In this chapter I have analyzed how police-soldier subjectivity was violently forged through multiple forms of violence. In order to trouble the distinction between victims and victimizers I drew on Bourgois' concept of a continuum of violence and on the Deleuzian notion of becoming. These concepts shows how the categories of victim and victimizer are fluid and contingent. In a context of war between multiple sovereignties, violence often imposed itself as an axiom, as a necessity of survival and a means of self-preservation, but also as the result of the desire of revenge.

Furthermore, by bringing gender into the analysis, I explained how the warrior ethos connected ideas of masculinity, bravery, honor, respect and heroism to the exercise of violence. And how, in turn, violence became a resource that socially and economically marginalized men could draw upon to make claims to power and reassert their status as men. Thus, I have explained how gender, and specifically the warrior ethos, framed the larger war on drugs and crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas—not only as a male generational conflict as Rodrigues (2014) suggests, but as the by-product of the structural violence of capitalism, the symbolic violence of patriarchy and racism, the moral violence of militarism, and the everyday forms of violence of the war on drugs (and crime).

Please note that I am *not* arguing that violence was the inevitable result of the violent becoming of police-soldiers. As a dominant or hegemonic form of masculinity, the warrior ethos was an ideal that many men strived for, but few of them reached (see Connell 2005). While only a minority of police-soldiers were able to live up to the ideals of the warrior ethos, many of my interlocutors chose to distance themselves from the warrior ethos, remaining as uninvolved in the war as possible to minimize their own personal suffering. Most of the cops were either family fathers, husbands, sons, or alternately, mothers, wives or daughters, and *becoming* a police-soldier was just another way to make a living, and one of many contingent subjective categories that they drew upon.

Chapter 4
STATE ENACTMENTS

In *The spectacular favela* Larkins (2015) argues that BOPE's aggressive policing of the favelas were spectacular enactments of state power that legitimized an otherwise beleaguered Brazilian State. Through heavily mediatized police operations against favela-based drug cartels, the State was represented as powerful and efficient to a wide national audience. However, the same spectacular displays of violence only delegitimized the State in the eyes of favela residents (Larkins 2013; 2015).

Larkins argument is mainly applicable to the situation in the favelas prior to pacification. The establishment of the UPPs marked some important ruptures and continuities with the dynamics that Larkins describes. Significantly, instead of being broadcasted to a national audience, police action in the favelas was now broadcasted and displayed to a global audience, centering its gaze on Rio and Brazil ahead of the World Cup and Olympics. The shift in audience also requested a shift in the ways state power was enacted: No longer predicated on spectacular displays of violence, state legitimacy rested on the state's capacity to seize and control areas dominated by cartels and on its ability to *reduce* the amount of violent confrontations in the favelas. In Foucauldian terms, as a shift from sovereign forms of power to biopolitical forms (Foucault 2007).

In Chapter 2 I argued that the *territorializing* logic of colonial occupation at the UPP's marked a radical departure from BOPE's intermittent operations, which had been characterized by the *deterritorializing* logic of the war machine (see Chapter 2). However, in this chapter I show how the UPP's continued to rely on the war machine dynamics of militarized policing in order to deterritorialize the *parallel state* of the drug cartels. These deterritorializations, I will argue, were followed by immediate reterritoriliztions through the everyday patrol routines carried out at the UPP's, and through the practices of proximity policing, which were effective ways of inscribing the residents of the favelas within the emergent state order of the UPP's. Finally, I will suggest that the state order that the police enacted was based on a Christian-conservative conception of morality, reminiscent of Brazil's authoritarian past.

Deterritorializing and (re)territorializing dynamics

In Chapter 1 I wrote that states are hierarchical and territorializing assemblages oriented to the conservation of their organs of power, while war machines are counter-systemic and deterritorializing, and are oriented to the destruction of the structures and hierarchies created by the state. In order to assert and perpetuate their power, states rely on the production of

striated space (both social and geographic) that limits and directs movement through a territorializing dynamic, while war machines engage in a deterritorializing dynamic in order to attack the structures of control erected by the state and subvert the state order (Deleuze and Guattari 1987 [1980]). Deterritorialization can (in this particular case) roughly be understood as a decontextualization of a space and its associated social relations. Often, and particularly when the state has captured the war machine to harness it's destructive potential (as is the case of the militaries), deterritorializations are followed by immediate reterritorializations, in which the space in question is striated: i.e. imbued with new meanings and with a new set of social relations that are functional to the state order in question. In other words, the production of striated spaces allows the state to control the population and territory over which it reigns. Striations take on both concrete and abstract forms: roads and fences are archetypical examples of space striations, and so are rules and classificatory systems.

Both dynamics were central to PMERJ's enactment of state order in the favelas. Through the ethnography presented in this chapter I will show how the police at times relied on the deterritorializing logic of the war machine in order to attack or destroy the power structures or *parallel state* of the drug cartels through the patrol practices of the Tactical Patrol Units (*Grupamento Tactico de Polícia de Proximidade*, GTPP's). I will also show how the territorializing and sedentary dynamics of the state were put to work in order to impose a new and official state order in the favelas previously dominated by the cartels. For instance, the UPP's erected advanced bases and checkpoints at locations in the favelas that were strategic in to control the movement of people in the community (access roads, high points, important crossroads).

In the following description I alternately draw on and compare ethnographic material collected at *UPP Santa Marta*, *UPP Mangueira* and *UPP Alemão* to highlight some common characteristics across all UPPs, and point out the variations in patrol practices at the UPPs according to the *operational risks*, as defined by PMERJ (see Appendix 7). I will focus on the interplay between *repressive* and *preventive* policing techniques, and show how they mirror the deterritorializing and reterritorializing dynamics of the police. First, however, and by way of contextualization, I will provide an overview of how patrol and policing at the UPPs was generally organized through the example of Alemão.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK AT THE UPP's

Organization of patrol at the 38 UPPs varied according to the size, geography and socio-historical characteristics (i.e. if the favela had previously been dominated by drug cartels or militias, etc.) of the areas they covered. It also reflected the personal style of the officer in command at the base. The number of police-soldiers working at each UPP ranged from 100 to 700 cops. While the administrative staff at the base generally worked normal office hours, most cops cops worked either 12 or 24 hour schedules, on a 1:3 ratio.[17] Additionally, cops were assigned extra shifts through a system called *Regimen Adicional de Serviço* (RAS), which was mandatory when I started my fieldwork, but was gradually discontinued due to the incipient fiscal crisis in the State of Rio.

Caption 12: Weapons used by one of the tactical patrol units at Santa Marta

At Alemão, where approximately 300 cops were employed, the shift arrangements meant that approximately 80-90 cops were on duty on any given day. The UPP was commanded by a *Captain* [Capitão] and two *Sub-Commanders* [Sub-Comandante] with shared responsibilities. Generally at the UPPs the command was composed exclusively of

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[17] Cops working 12-hour shifts alternated between 24 and 48 hours off between the shifts, while soldiers on 24-hour shifts generally had 72 hours off or, exceptionally, 48 hours off between shifts.

officers. although exceptionally *Sub-Lieutenants* [high ranking cops] could serve as Sub-Commander. A group of 8 Sergeants were in charge of four different *alas de serviço* [24 hour shift teams, in the reminder of the chapter referred to as *shifts*] at Alemão: *Alfa*, *Bravo*, *Charlie* and *Delta*. Each of these shifts started at 6 in the morning and lasted for 24 hours. Most cops in charge of patrolling were *Soldiers* [Soldados] fresh out of the academy, or *Corporals* [Cabos].[18] At Alemão, some shifts were known for having an aggressive style of patrolling frequently involved in armed confrontations with traffickers, while other shifts tended to minimize confrontations, avoiding situations held to result in violence. According to the cops, the style of policing carried out by a shift depended on the personal style and preference of the supervisors in charge. In general, although patrol was varyingly organized across different UPPs, at most of them patrol responsibilities were divided between patrol by vehicle, foot-patrol, fixed-point patrol, and tactical patrol. In addition, roughly 10-15% of the cops at the base carried out administrative tasks there, as civilians could not be employed by at PMERJ—a fact testifying, again, to the overall framework of war.

By early 2015 the escalation of violence in the pacified favelas had strained police-resident relations and effectively reduced proximity policing in critical areas in favor of militarized forms of policing (Musumeci 2015a). In January 2015 a new group of Colonels assumed the command of PMERJ with the goal of bringing the situation under control, and the derailed UPP project back on track (see Chapter 2).

REPRESSIVE POLICING: DETERRITORIALIZING DYNAMICS

In spite of a common framework of patrol practices, a key feature of the UPP's was the relative liberty of the commanders to adapt policing according to his or her own considerations. Officers often stressed that each favela required a different approach, and indeed, patrol routines diverged significantly across the UPPs that I followed. For instance, Santa Marta was a small favela that received many tourists. As the *operational risk* at the UPP was low, the patrol units here were generally smaller and often armed with non-lethal arms rather than rifles, or a combination of both. At Mangueira, a large favela where the operational risk had increased significantly over the last year, patrol rounds were coordinated

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[18] On average, roughly 95% of the cops at the UPPs ranked Soldiers, and the remaining 5% were Corporals (Musumeci Mourão 2015).

between several GTPP units that relied on urban warfare tactics during patrol. Shootouts were frequent, but generally limited to critical areas of the favela. At Alemão the GTPP's engaged in daily shootouts, patrol was restricted during the night due to the high risk of confrontations, and involved situations of urban combat that could last for hours. The following vignette is a collage of the tactical patrols that I attended at the different UPP's and captures a variety of ways in which the GTPP's deterritorialized the parallel state.

"Escala de ocupação"[19]

The last weeks at the UPP have been tense. At the end of last month a rival drug faction tried to invade the favela and take control of the local *bocas de fumo*. The police killed 4 *marginais* and captured one. But this is only the last in a series of violent events. Over the course of the last year the cops at the UPP have met increased resistance from *traficantes*, engaging in frequent shootouts during patrol. In several areas of the favela patrol now requires the coordinated efforts of several GTPP's. As a response to the rising tension, the Commander reorganized the work schedule at the base. They call the new arrangements *escala de ocupação* [occupation shift] suggesting that the purpose is to reassert territorial control of the area again, after the recent advances of the *traficantes*. To discourage resistance and minimize the risk of attacks, all the patrol units, roughly some 40-50 police-soldiers in total, leave the base simultaneously.

On this particular day I'm walking in the middle of a long line of police-soldiers. We walk in silence to reduce the chance of being spotted. All of the police-soldiers carry their weapons in firing position, aiming at the terraces and rooftops of the surrounding buildings to give each other cover. We climb the stairs until we reach the top of the community, where the group pauses in a small and protected square that they consider safe. There are fewer cops left now—a couple of units are already at their posts. They will stay there for the next twelve hours, through the night. Occasionally, the police-soldiers stop to check local residents for ID papers or weapons. As a motorcycle driver with a passenger approaches the patrol unit two of the cops point their guns straight at the driver and yells at him to stop. One of them keeps his gun raised as the other quickly orders the driver and the passenger to pull up their t-shirts. They want to check if they are carrying weapons hidden in the waistline of their pants. They

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[19] "Occupation shift"

are not, and the police-soldiers yell at them to keep moving. After the favela got pacified the weapons of choice of the traffickers changed: they now prefer small handguns instead of large assault rifles. While the latter impose a lot of respect, handguns are easier to conceal and allow for quick escapes from the police.

Eventually, the police-soldiers on fixed-point patrol are all in place and I'm left with a group of six GTPP cops. The group keeps the tactical formation as we head in the direction of one of the *bocas de fumo* located in a calm area of the favela. They try to follow different paths on every round, in order to sneak up on and surprise the drug dealers. Sometimes they split up, attempting to chase the dealers in the direction of their colleagues, like a group of hunters would. At other times, they might get off the stairs and alleyways of the favela and search through the sewers and narrow spaces between the houses in the favela for hidden weapons and drugs. Sometimes they even force open the doors to search empty buildings. Finally, we reach the *boca*. There is no one there. The cops take me down a narrow alley to a small opening in between the building. A cement cross has been erected against the wall of one of the buildings. One of the Soldiers calls for me to get closer. "This is where the *traficantes* used to execute their victims," he tells me, and points at the cross.

Deterritorializing the parallel state of the drug cartels

The GTPP's were itinerant patrol units composed by 3 to 6 cops that patrolled large areas of the favela mainly by foot. Foot-patrols were believed to increase proximity between cops and residents, although the urban warfare techniques employed by the GTPP's were difficult to reconcile with the ideals of proximity policing. The itinerant nature of the GTPP's was key to effectively combat the drug cartels who continued to operate within the favela in spite of the police presence, as it increased the likelihood of surprising drug traffickers carrying drugs and weapons, and facilitated the recollection of intelligence through observation. Mirroring the movement of the *nomad* (Deleuze and Guattari (1987[1980]), the GTPP's were not bound to any fixed route within their designated area, and police-soldiers often stressed the need to make frequent variations in their itinerary so as not to lose the element of surprise. Most armed confrontations and apprehensions at the UPP's involved the action of one or more GTPP's.

The relatively unrestricted movement of the GTPP's within their assigned areas of patrol is reminiscent of the war machine's nomadic forms of movement: They did not follow any fixed path, in fact they explicitly avoided creating patterns in their patrol routines,

patrolling at different times of the day. Legal limits where frequently transgressed, for instance through illegal searches of empty buildings. From time to time, the GTPP's would even leave the alleys and stairways of the favelas, and patrol the sewers, the spaces between buildings, or the forest surrounding the community, in search for hidden drugs, weapons, or gang members. These practices were potential deterritorializations of the *parallel state* that the cartels had erected in the favelas in the Brazilian state's absence (see Chapters 1 and 2 for the concept of *parallel state*): if drugs or weapons were found, the deterritorializing potential of the GTPPs was actualized, and the power of the cartels weakened.

Caption 13: Soldier searching for guns or drugs in the space between two buildings.

However, the mere possibility of the police appearing at any moment also challenged the power of the cartels, who had adapted to the new situation—for instance in gang members' increased reliance on smaller handguns rather than large semi-automatic rifles and machine guns. Police-soldiers often expressed the importance of patrolling the *entire* territory of the UPPs to keep the drug cartels from re-emerging. They said that if an area remained unpatrolled for long periods of time, the *traficantes* would return to establish new *bocas de fumo*, and assert their authority and control of the area through the ostentation of weapons. Thus, through frequently patrolling the entire territory the GTPP's discouraged the ostentation of weapons by *traficantes*, and weakened the their assertions of authority through the ostentatious displays of weapons. The militarized policing of the GTPP's, and their

nomadic movement across the favela in search for apprehensions contributed to the deterritorialization of the *parallel state* of the drug cartels.

The special units, BOPE and BOPE light

The special units' deterritorializations and war machine dynamics played a pivotal part in the UPP project from the start. First, through their responsibility for the initial invasion of the favelas selected for pacification, and the arrest and expulsion of *traficantes*. Then, once the UPP had been established the special units continued to act in pacified favelas through occasional police operations designed to quell bursts of gang-related violence, execute apprehensions and seize weapons and drugs. At CPX the special units acted as backup forces to the UPP's for extended periods of time during my fieldwork, participating in day-to-day patrolling in the most critical areas of the vast favela complex.

In response to the rising conflict level in the pacified favelas throughout 2014, officers with longstanding background from BOPE had been transferred to the CPP and put in charge of coordinating the overarching strategy of the UPP's. The commander at CPP at the time of research had formerly been in command of BOPE. Similarly, the warfare tactics of the GTPP's were a blueprint of those employed by BOPE: as one BOPE Soldier told a group of cops working at the UPPs, "the only difference between us and you is [the amount of] training." – However, it must be noted that in spite of their heavy reliance on warfare tactics, the GTPP's use of force was generally *softer* than that of BOPE. Partly, this can be attributed to the colonizing dynamics of the pacification project described in chapter 2, who were not just oriented towards the deterritorialization of the parallel state that the drug cartels had erected in the favelas, but also at the enactment of a Brazilian state order in the pacified areas through the striation and coding of favela spaces into state spaces, and also, police spaces.

Reterritorializations of favela spaces as police spaces

According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987[1980]) the state often engages the deterritorializing practices of the war machine, however, when it does, the deterritorializations are followed by immediate reterritorializations of space as state spaces. Following this logic, the deterritorializations of the parallel state by the special units and GTPP's were followed by immediate reterritorializations of space as state or police space through the patrol practices of fixed point patrol units and foot patrols. As the name indicates, fixed-point patrol units were stationary, and generally remained at strategic points in the favela, such as main access roads

or former *bocas de fumo*. In addition to the permanent presence of fixed patrol units at strategic points, itinerant foot patrol units would engage in similar practices of state enactment. For example, at my home favela the spot where the main *boca* had been located prior to pacification was used by the patrol units as a place to rest during their rounds, and had gradually been reterritorialized—taking on a new meaning as a place primarily used by the police. Similarly, the permanent presence of police-soldiers at the main access roads of pacified favelas were powerful reminders that the favela had been *pacified*, and was now controlled by the state—not by a drug cartel.

The main purpose of fixed-point units was to ensure territorial control in critical areas (for example high terrain or access roads), and to prevent gang-members from controlling the area:

> Today our main objective is to maintain the police-soldier in strategic point in the community with safety. For that we are placing fortified points in these communities. Entrenched points, bulletproof cabins, that aim to guarantee the permanence in the terrain (Major at CPP)

The entrenchment and fortification of these stationary patrol units became powerful symbols of the police's war against the cartels, and imbued the place where the units were stationed with new meanings associated to the ongoing armed conflict.

At CPX one of the advanced container bases that were common across many UPP's sparked local controversy and protests as it was located right next to a local elementary school. The base was frequently targeted by gang-members and at times the battles between police and *traficantes* turned the schoolyard into a war zone. This is a particularly powerful example of the simultaneous deterritorializing and reterritorializing logic of the policing of the favelas: The police seemed oblivious to the local meanings of the space in question— what mattered was the *state meaning* ascribed to the space as a *strategic location* for territorial control. Often, and particularly in the case of CPX, entire favelas were conceived of as *war zones* by police-soldiers, ignoring the local meanings and community relations inscribed in the landscape of the favela. The following comment of a female cop is telling. She was rather unapologetic of the recent death of a 10-year old boy in Alemão during a shootout between a GTPP unit and a group of *traficantes*: why had the parents of the child allowed him play outside? Didn't they know that they were in a war zone?

PROXIMITY POLICING AND STATE ENACTMENTS

Apart from the continuous police presence in areas previously dominated by drug cartels, the innovation of the UPPs was their attempt at reforming the military police, and the attempted substituting of repressive policing techniques for proactive and problem oriented ones (Saborio 2014a). After decades of hostility and distrust between the police and the residents in the favelas, the PMERJ chose to implement the philosophy of proximity policing as a tool to improve police-resident relations and promote collaboration and cooperation at the UPPs (Larkins 2015). Theoretically, the philosophy of proximity policing is a French adaptation of the community policing approach and shares many of its main objectives and key elements, such as the building of positive relations between the police and the local community; the decentralization of decision making; and the focus on preventive and problem oriented policing strategies—but with less emphasis on the collaboration between police and residents in determining the public security needs of the community (Saborio 2014a).[20]

The proximity policing teams

The implementation of practices of proximity varied across the UPP's according to the initiative of each base commander. At each UPP one or two cops from the administrative staff were responsible for the coordination of proximity policing. However, some bases had also designated teams of cops with additional training in practices of proximity. They were exempt from regular patrol and focused exclusively on trust-building efforts. UPP Mangueira was one of the bases with a special proximity policing team.

The tasks of the proximity team bore little resemblance with traditional policing activities: their main responsibility was to coordinate the delivery of social and public services in the favela. Among other things, this included water, electricity, garbage recollection and sewage. For example, if the sewers were clogged, the proximity team would notify the sewer company and have them come and unclog it. Afterwards, they would write a

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[20] The philosophy of community policing originated in the 1970 in United States and Great Britain as an attempt to engage police officers and citizens in common efforts to solve problems related to crime and the fear of crime in areas characterized by urban and social disorder and neighborhood desegregation. It focused on the implementation of law enforcement through the building of positive relations of collaboration between the police and the population. The three main elements of community policing are citizen involvement, problem solving and decentralization (Saborio 2014a; Skogan 2006).

report that would be archived to document all the activities of the team. One of the cops explained the logic of these actions: "Some people think that what we do isn't real police work, but it is! The things we do prevent people from protesting, and when there are protests shots are often fired, or at least tires are burnt on the streets." He argued that their efforts *prevented* situations that would have require *repressive* police actions. It was commonly accepted across PMERJ that social outreach projects effectively reduced the amount of violent confrontations at the UPP's. In sum, patrol at the UPPs was organized in such a way that while a small number of cops engaged in preventive practices of policing, the vast majority of the troop was devoted to repressive policing activities.

Caption 14: Proximity policing team on patrol

Winning allies

Towards the end of my stay the Commander at the Mangueira had reorganized and intensified proximity policing efforts at the base. He created three teams with three cops in each team whose main task was to earn the residents' trust through dialogue, and by helping them access social services when needed. According to one of the cops the initiative "went beyond" previous proximity policing efforts at the base. Their team consisted of two Soldiers, one male and one female, and one male Sergeant in charge of the group. All of them were dressed in white t-shirts, and they told me that the reason was that "white symbolizes peace" while the black color of their former uniform was seen as more aggressive. Although they

had only been working in the proximity team for one week the Sergeant assured me that it had transformed him: he used to "*gostar da guerra*" [like war], but now he was entirely devoted to proximity policing.

We got in a patrol vehicle, and headed for a calm and peaceful area of the favela, where the President of the local Residents Association (*Asociação de Moradores*, AM) and one of his colleagues were waiting. They greeted us, and joined us the direction of an open area in the favela, where a couple of children were playing around with their kites. The area was used as a parking-lot-garbage-dump at the moment, and the proximity team wanted to clean it up and turn it into a playground.

While the cops discussed how the playground should look like, a middle-aged woman approached us. She told us that the property belonged to her mother, who was now sick with Alzheimer. The plot was co-administered by herself and her six siblings, she said, and started giving us a long sermon about her family: one of her brothers had disappeared and nobody knew where he was, and one of the others was a monster, because he didn't take care of his mother, and in her opinion "if you have a family—be it a sibling, child, or parent—and you don't take care of them when they are sick, then you are a piece of S" she said, and asked us to pardon her, because she didn't want to use bad language, but "you're a piece of shit" and there she said it anyways, but we should forgive her, because that kind of person is nothing less than a monster. She talked fast and uninterrupted, and it quickly became clear that she was ill. But the Sergeant was determined to see his plan through. He politely explained that he and the other police-soldiers were from the UPP's proximity team and that they were here to attend to the needs of the community, and help them make improvements. He told the women that the clearing would be of much better use if it was clean and the cars were parked along the fringe of the lot, so that the kids in the neighborhood could use it as a playground. After some discussion the group eventually agreed that the area would be of much better use as a playground, and we headed back towards the office of the residents association.

A group of residents had gathered outside the office, and among them were a woman and her mentally disabled son. The women's body was covered in scars, it looked like she had been severely burned, and her son was hanging on to her neck. His face lit up when he saw the cops. The Sergeant told me that they had helped the woman take her son to the doctor last week, and greeted both of them heartily.

Shortly afterwards, as we left, the Sergeant explained that the key was to make the President [of the AM] *depend* on the police, and not the other way around. He was very pleased with the visit, and enthusiastically exclaimed: "Did you see that? Did you see that

Tomas? That's how things should be done! I've already told them [the residents] that I'll organize a *forró* [a dance genre from northeastern Brazil] in the streets, and I swear I will! *That's how you win allies!*" We had been out on patrol for about an hour and the group had decided to call it a day. In the car, on our way back to the base, the sergeant told me that what counts is not the time they spent out on the streets, but the *quality* of the interaction with the people they meet.

Proximity policing, counterinsurgency, and trust-building

As this story shows the dialogue between the police and residents was unilaterally conceived as a tool to gather intelligence, and not as a way to adapt the policing of pacified areas to the needs of the local community. This might partially be attributed to the vague definition of *proximity policing* at PMERJ as a way to bridge the gap between residents and police. On a general level, the strategy centered on replacing repressive policing techniques with preventive policing techniques. Specifically, one of its main characteristics seemed to be the reliance on trust-building strategies as a tool to gather intelligence about the drug cartels:

> When we enter a pacified community, the population [...] knows exactly where the *marginais* live, where the armory of weapons is hidden, they know. And how can we *conquistar* [conquer, acquire] that information? Only by developing partnerships, approximating, and creating security and tranquility and seriousness through [our] job, because when a person feels [our] firmness he opens up, he talks. And without firing a shot we catch the *marginal*, we seize the gun, seize the drug, and then we start making a new police. It is in that sense that we [are adopting the paradigm] of proximity policing...
> (PMERJ Colonel)

Intelligence-based police work might effectively have reduced the police's use of force in pacified favelas. However, this quote shows that collaboration between police and citizens was (often) unilaterally conceived as a way to facilitate PMERJ's fight against the cartels, even among high ranking officers, and not as a way to adapt policing at the UPP's to the needs of the community, which is arguably the main concern of community policing.

Practices of *proximity* and *prevention* were generally aimed at winning the *hearts and minds* of local residents. As one Soldier in charge of proximity efforts put it, "the UPPs are *also* carrying out a *psychological war* of winning over the population" (the *also* in this sentence meaning "in addition to the *war on drugs*"). Practices of proximity included a series

of social outreach projects [*projetos sociais*]: sports and leisure activities such as jiu-jitsu lessons, gymnastics, excursions and debutant balls (among others); community meetings to channel the public's demands and promote dialogue between the police and residents; conflict mediation to settle minor disputes between residents; and, community events like block parties and Christmas and Easter celebrations organized by the police (see also Saborio 2014a). These were effective ways of striating space and enrolling people within an emergent state order, organizing and directing authorized forms of sociability in the favela.

The lion's share of these efforts were directed towards young children and centered on the attempt to replace the "negative" role model of the *traficante* with the "positive" role model of the *friendly cop*. Police-soldiers claimed that children in the favelas had to be targeted at an early age, before they were swayed by the appeal of the ostentatious lifestyle of *traficantes*. One Soldier in charge of proximity policing told me: "We use to say that the problem starts when they are 7 years old," and added: "Where do you think that *o trafico* [the cartel] feels the impact of the UPPs the most? With the children in the favelas! Now 70% of the children turn into police or workers. Before the pacification 70% turned *bandido.*" However, efforts were short-lived. As children grew older trust-building initiatives were gradually replaced by frequent ID-checks and humiliating searches of male teenagers by less than friendly GTPP police-soldiers.

"THE NEW DONO DO MORRO IS THE UPP!"

The pacification was supposed to represent a radical shift from former repressive forms of policing articulated through the war on drugs. However, the ethnography presented so far in this chapter shows that the linchpin of the UPP's, the social outreach projects, were primarily aimed at gaining the acceptance, support and eventual collaboration from residents, in order to gather intelligence for repressive police action against the drug cartels. Thus, the goal of bringing peace to the favelas was largely pursued through a logic of war.

"A cultura do trafico"[21] and the policing of morality

For the officers in charge at PMERJ, the UPP's were still seen as an opportunity to craft a *positive image* of PMERJ and address the crisis of legitimacy that the institution suffered

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[21] The culture of drug trafficking

from after decades of rampant corruption and soaring levels of violence. The cops at the UPP's on the other hand, saw the project as their chance to *fight* the drug cartels:

> ...we always wanted that direct combat, right? The fact that the traficante stayed on the hill and us knowing that he is [there] and not being able to get to him always bothered all the police-soldiers. So when the project of occupation begun we started to enjoy [our job] more. We were motivated because we always wanted that, quote, "direct combat" with those *marginais* [criminals], to really show them the force of the police. [...] From the beginning it was really very *legal* [cool]. We saw the change in the faces of the residents, right? The calm within the community, the children out on the streets until the early hours of the morning–they started feeling the [pleasures of the good life]. Up until then they were living under the uncertainty, under the lack of security [from living with] the drug cartels. Suddenly another [drug] faction would invade; you'd have shootouts and such. Not to mention that they lived under the rules of o trafico [the cartel], the leis do trafico [laws of the cartel]. (UPP Sergeant)

While the Sergeant quoted saw the residents in the favelas as hostages to the terror of the cartels, most cops argued that after decades of living under the rule of the *traficantes*, favela residents had adopted the frivolous and violent lifestyle associated with the drug trade. They saw it as their task to domesticate the *savage* favela residents. During a tape-recorded interview, I asked a Soldier who used to live in the now pacified favela of Vila Kennedy in western Rio what he thought needed to be done for the police to gain the residents support:

> The [social] projects, you know? Just that it's very complicated, you know? The terrain doesn't help, and then you have the decades of repression by drug trafficking and the culture where the trafficker is the hero. You see that the music in Brazil is permissive with what we call the *MC's* [*funk* rappers], the *funkeros*, letting them sing *funk* vindicating drug trafficking, vindicating crime, vindicating violence, presenting the traffickers as heroes. Within the communities many of them are considered heroes. So as long as they, the residents here and the *MC's*, as long as all of them keep spreading the idea that the trafficker is the hero I will be the villain in the eyes of everybody here, and nobody will help me catch those guys. Nobody. That's it. (UPP Soldier)

This quote shows that the cops often saw (what they called) *the culture of drug trafficking* as obstructing the effective assertion of state authority in the favelas. The escalating violence at

the UPP's was thus attributed to the *moral shortcomings* of favela residents. His interpretation reinforced the idea that the cops were *powerless pawns* with no responsibility for the deteriorated relationship between police and local residents (see Chapter 3). But first and foremost, his answer illustrates the importance and meaning that the police ascribed to the practices of proximity policing as part of the *civilizing* and *moralizing mission* of the UPP's.

Police-soldiers often imagined themselves not only as guarantors of law and order in the favelas, but also as the guardians of a *moral order* that went beyond the *legal order* of the Brazilian State, and included the regulation and control of "good" and "bad" acts:

> ...let's say that one of the kids down the street [...] wants to play music out loud that vindicates crime and *libertinagem* [indecency]: there is no law that allows the police officer to order him to turn the music off. There is no law that forbids people from playing music about promiscuity and homosexuality. So what the police has to do to get the person to turn off the music is to provoke a *desacato* [contempt of the law] to detain him. In the end society loses. They are talking about sex, but the police is not allowed to do its job. Society is doing what is wrong believing that it's right.[22]

According to Van Maanen (1978 in Westmarland 2008; 262) the police often violated the legal codes that they were supposed to uphold "in favor of the unwritten police code of conduct with which they manage the streets." The Corporal's comment above shows the tension between the legal order and the police code of conduct: cops on patrol at the UPP's were not only enacting the legal order of the Brazilian State, but also a Christian-conservative moral order—in opposition to the *culture of drug trafficking*—who's founding pillar was the *respect for authority*. Indeed, when I asked the cops to explain the difference between residents of the favela and the asfalto, they said that the main difference was cultural and, specifying, that residents in the favela did not respect the police, while those of the asfalto did. These moralizing pretensions of the police-soldiers must be understood against the feelings of moral superiority that characterized their military subjectivity; the warrior ethos and its associated notion of *respect*; and, the historical role of the militaries of Latin America,

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[22] *A propria sociedade esta fazendo o errado e achando que é certo*

who have traditionally seen themselves as the repositories of a Christian-conservative moral order of their nations (see Chapter 3; D'Araujo 2014).

At the UPP's, the police deterritorialized the parallel state of the cartels through attacks on cultural expressions associated with drug trafficking, such as the music genre called *proibidão,*[23] or the stops and searches, bordering on harassment, of teenager who's dress and appearance copied the aesthetics of the *traficantes*. The clearest expression of these deterritorializations was perhaps the prohibition of funk parties in pacified favelas, arguing that these were arenas for illegal drug consumption and ostentation of weapons.[xi] This was perhaps one of the most controversial regulations of sociability in the favelas brought on by the UPP's (see Soares da Silva 2014). In early 2015, in response to increasing dissatisfaction with the UPP's among residents, the PMERJ promised to ease up on the restrictions to arrange funk parties in the favelas. However, when I asked one of the cops in Alemão if they were going to allow funk parties in the favela he told me that: "They say that in the newspapers, but we are the ones who decide here. Not even Jesus can go against us." His answer is telling of how the cops understood their own role in the pacified favelas. Another cop was even more explicit: "The new *dono do morro* is the UPP!"

State enactments, mimesis, and alterity

Indeed, the UPP's exercise of power in the favelas mirrored the power of the cartels in more than one way. Proximity policing efforts designed to elicit the support of local residents often copied the ways of gaining support formerly employed by the drug cartels. For example, police-soldiers told me stories about how the traffickers would hand out stolen goods to people living in the favela: children received chocolate, poor residents got food, and alcohol was distributed at the funk parties that the traffickers used to hold. Similar handouts were common across the UPPs. For example, a Soldier in charge of public relations at one UPP explained how he built trust with residents: he would hand out his personal phone number so that they could call in anonymous tips. However, he generally recognized who were calling, and when the base received food baskets to hand out to the residents, he would give them to the people who had provided him with information. At some UPP's, the police organized Easter celebrations were cops dressed up as Easter bunnies handed out chocolate to the

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[23] Lit. Prohibited, forbidden. Ref. to funk music with lyrics that center on violence, the drug trade, and the lifestyle of gang members.

children. Often, handouts were directed at the most vulnerable segments of an already socially and economically vulnerable population (consider for instance how the proximity policing team at Mangueira had accompanied a woman and her disabled child to the doctor).

The AM's, which were the only organ of popular representation in the favelas, were also targeted, although the relation between the cops at the UPP's and the AM's was ambivalent. Prior to pacification, the AM's were responsible for coordinating many of the public services that were insufficiently provided by the state. The AM's had depended on the approval of the cartels prior to pacification, and many police-soldiers therefore saw them as conniving or representing the interests of the cartels (Sørbøe 2013). This caused many police-soldiers to disregard the AM's. At Mangueira, as I've just shown, the police-soldiers approached the President of the local AM to make him *depend* on the police, like he had once depended on the cartels.

Taussig's (1993) notions of *mimesis* and *alterity* are useful to understanding how state enactments, or territorializations, at the UPP's mirrored the enactments of authority of the cartels. Through the concept of *mimesis* Taussig analyses how the colonial powers of Latin America copied and imitated local modes of domination in their attempt to subjugate the continent's indigenous populations. The enactment of a state order in the favelas by police-soldiers thus rested on a *mimetic faculty* where local modes of domination were adopted by the UPP's, who acted as a colonizing power in the favelas (see also chapter 2).

According to Taussig (1993), *mimesis* also rested on a process of differentiation from that which is copied: on the production of *alterity*. At the UPP's a clear example were the small block parties that the police organized for young children, and the debutant balls that they held for teenage girls. These events simultaneously mirrored and displaced the funk parties that the *traficantes* used to hold. Through the organization of parties, police-soldiers took on the role of benefactors in the community, copying the *charismatic authority* (Weber 1922) that drug dealers and their kingpins had enacted through the funk parties, while distancing themselves from the perceived indecency, immorality and illegality that characterized the funk parties.

On another level, the warrior ethos of the drug cartels manifested (among other things) in their ostentatious display of weapons, was also a defining feature of the UPP's, where cops continuously stressed the importance of the ostentation of rifles as a way to impose respect through fear (see also chapter 3 and the *psychological factor* of policing). The enactment of masculine authority was most salient in the GTPP's, which were almost exclusively composed of male cops who exhibited an affinity with warfare and

confrontational styles of policing. They were expected to embody the courage, virility, rusticity and aggression associated to the warrior ethos. Cops that did not live up to these expectations (particularly female cops) where thought to *atrapalhar* [disturb] the work of the entire unit.

However, the cops constantly distanced themselves from the cartels. They stressed that while the gang-members use of guns was unqualified, reckless, and careless with regards to the safety of local residents, their own use of weapons was qualified, cautious, and responsible. Whether this was the case or not was another issue. One Sergeant told me that he had worked with cops who had only fired five shots by the time their training at the Police Academy was over.

Caption 15: Place where the cartels used to execute their victims

Visiting former execution sites, represented another way to distance themselves from the brutality and savagery that they associated with the cartels. The barbaric executions carried out by the cartels at these sites were contrasted to the *heroics of killing* of the police (Chapter 3), who put their lives at risk for the greater good.

In sum, the cops at the UPP's, like the *traficantes*, asserted their authority in the favelas through state enactments where they assumed the role as *benefactors*, and through an

ethics of masculinity and warrior ethos predicated upon the ostentation of weapons and displays of aggression (see also Jaffa 2014). Meanwhile, the cops constantly distanced themselves from the *immorality* of the *culture of traffick,* which they associated with drug consumption, funk parties, indecency and profligacy [*libertinagem*]*,* and the *brutality* of the violence of the cartels. In its place, they invoked a conservative moral order. In other words, while the police often copied the modes of domination of the drug cartels, the moral order that they imposed in the favela was of a radically different kind than that of the traffickers.

CONCLUSION: EMERGENT POLICE STATES

The empirical findings presented in this chapter shows how the deterritorializing logic of repressive and militarized policing continued to be a key component of the UPP project. At the UPP's the GTPP's as well as special unit police-soldiers acted as war machines, staging attacks on the parallel state order that the cartels had established in the favelas in the absence of the Brazilian State. A Deleuzian approach to state enactment at the UPPs highlights the violent potential of the Brazilian State order within the (largely biopolitical) framework of proximity policing, not just as a means to legitimize the state to a larger audience, as Larkins (2015) claims, but also as a way to effectively enact and establish a new state order within pacified areas. The deterritorializations of the GTPP's and special units were immediately followed by reterritorializing practices, or state enactments, through the patrol routines of stationary patrol units, and through practices of proximity policing.

I have also shown how the social outreach projects at the UPP's simultaneously mirrored and displaced the enactment of authority of the drug cartels. They were effective ways to inscribe the populations in the favelas within the emergent state order enacted by the UPP's through authorized forms of sociability organized by the police. This order was deeply moral in kind, and was founded on a Christian-conservative ethics of decency and masculinity, where the respect for authority was highly valued and asserted through the sovereign logic of the *warrior ethos*. Like the drug cartels, the police relied on the distribution of handouts to local residents, sometimes in exchange for information, and other times to create an image of the police as benefactors, copying the forms of *charismatic authority* formerly exercised by the cartels. The limited influence that local residents had on the ways that their communities were policed made the emergent state orders of the UPP's reminiscent of the police state of Brazil's authoritarian past, while also reflecting larger patterns of colonial domination.

Through ethnographic examples I have argued that the UPP's engaged in the *policing of a moral order*, rather than the policing of a legal or social order (cf. Fassin 2013). The analytical implications of my claim thereby serves as a corrective to the argument that police violence in Brazil is simply a violent effect of a highly unequal society—an argument also dealt with in my analysis of state violence in Chapter 1. To be clear, I am not suggesting that socio-economic inequalities are unimportant—quite the opposite as the many examples have shown—but rather that by taking the moral aspects of policing into account we can further our understanding of why some favela subjectivities (specifically those associated to the culture of drug trafficking) were selectively targeted by the police, while others were not. The policing of a moral order transcends the processes that are elsewhere referred to as processes of criminal subjection (Misse 2010), or criminalization of the poor (Wacquant 2003, 2008). This approach also shows the effect that the violent production of a feeling of moral superiority among police-soldiers has on the policing of the favelas, and alerts us to the mechanisms whereby police-soldiers from a socio-economic background similar or equal to the people living in the favelas so vehemently distance themselves from the populations that they are set to police.

Chapter 5
PACIFYING WILD MASCULINITIES

In Chapter 1 I introduced the Deleuzian concept *lines of flight*, defined as socio-historical forces. The process through which the state harnesses the potency of these forces is called *capture* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987 [1980]). To recall, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the militaries are war machines that have been *captured* by the state to harness their *destructive potential*. However, as war machines are always oriented towards resisting and *escaping* state control, the state's appropriation posits a continual source of problems for the state (Deleuze and Guattari 1987 [1980]). In this chapter I will draw on the concepts of *capture* and *escape* to analyze the war machine and state dynamics manifested in the process of reforming PMERJ. These concepts I argue, are particularly well suited to comprehend how the police reform is challenged and resisted from within the PMERJ. Thus, I understand the process of police reform as an open-ended, ongoing process of state capture of PMERJ's war machine dynamics—or, as other scholars have also suggested, as an attempt at *pacifying* the institution (see Henrique and Ramos 2011; Saborio 2015).

Specifically, I want to focus on the gendered aspects of the pacification of the police, which is reflected in the attempted shift from a war-oriented, *masculinized* model of repressive policing, to a dialogue-oriented, *feminized* model of proximity policing. In Chapters 3 and 4 I analyzed how the warrior ethos was produced and enacted through the militarized forms of policing in the favelas. In this chapter I specifically turn the effects of the warrior ethos in the context of the UPP project, and the attempt to reform PMERJ. The hegemonic masculinity expressed through the warrior ethos, I will argue, also expresses important aspects of the war machine.

The concept of the warrior ethos, as I have used it throughout this thesis, refers to a hegemonic or dominant form of masculinity—thus it can be said to represent the state dynamics inherent in gender as a structuring force. In order to highlight the war machine dynamics of the masculinity of police-soldiers I have therefore chosen to introduce the concept of *wild masculinities*, which I believe is better suited to describe the *multiplicitous* and *rhizomic* nature of gender (Linstead and Pullen 2006), while it also acknowledges its hierarchizing and structuring forces—and suggests that the propensity towards either of these dynamics is *situationally determined*. The idea of wildness also suggests an exteriority in relation to the state, and draws, again, our attention to the parallels between state attempts at pacifying the *savages* in the favelas and the police. If, as Robson (2014) argues, Rio's violence can be understood as a male generational conflict (see also Chapter 3), the *pacification* can be seen as a project aimed at the taming of the *wild masculinities* at war with each other, both within PMERJ and in the favelas. However, in this chapter, I will focus

exclusively on the taming of the wild masculinities of police-soldiers, and argue that in order to explain the resistance to the paradigm of proximity policing expressed by many UPP cops, it is necessary to understand the gender dynamics of the UPP project and proximity policing reform.

GENDER AND POLICE REFORM

As shown in Chapter 2, the return to democracy in 1985 also signaled the start of a series of (unsuccessful) attempts at reforming PMERJ. Most of these attempts were varyingly influenced by the paradigm of community policing. However, in spite of the attempts at creating a *citizen police*, the paradigm of war continued to "contaminate" the institution, especially throughout the 90's (Paiva and Karakida 2015). In Chapter 2 I wrote that the attempts ran along two currents: one focused on legal and institutional transformations, such as the demilitarization of the police, and the other on managerial reforms to increase the efficiency of the police through the improvement of the schooling and training of cops and community-oriented models of policing.

The reformists within PMERJ saw the UPP project as a golden opportunity to finally transform the institution into a *citizen police*. In the words of Colonel Robson (2015: 14): "the pacification provided us a legitimacy that we had never achieved. [...] There was the way, the direction, so that we could reformulate the corporation and modernize it at the same time, with that new format." The UPP's was representative of the second current, and was oriented towards the subjective transformation or disciplining of police-soldiers trained in proximity policing techniques. Through the implementation of the paradigm of proximity policing, the reformists hoped to address the protracted crisis of legitimacy that PMERJ was suffering from after years of widespread corruption and of adhering to ineffective and repressive policing strategies.

Gender dynamics at the UPP's

The politics of gender had been a cornerstone in the modernization of the police since the return of democracy. In 1988 the first female police-soldiers were trained at the police academy, and PMERJ had since seen a gradual increase in its female police-soldiers. At the time of research, approximately 20% of recruits were women according to the staff that I interviewed at the Police Academy.

Women also played a pivotal role in the UPPs: one of the key novelties of the project that has often been highlighted was the assignment of a woman as the first UPP Commander. Captain Priscilla became the poster-child of the pacification project when she assumed the command at Santa Marta in January 2009 and symbolized an important change to the gender dynamics of a predominantly male institution. In the first years of the pacification, from 2010 to 2012 the proportion of women at the UPP's increased by 10% (Mourão 2013: 6). The positions assigned to women at the UPP's shows that the politics of gender was a central component of the reform process. Both the selection of female commanders, as well as the increasing proportion of female cops working at the UPP's, suggest that qualities that were traditionally associated to the feminine were considered key components of proximity policing. In the words of one of the staff psychologists: "proximity policing [...] requires approximation, it requires dialogue, it requires listening to the other, things that [...] we still associate a lot more with the woman than with the man."

However, scholars studying the impact of the participation of female cops at the UPP's conclude that the incorporation of women at the UPP's had very limited impacts on existing representations of gender within the police, nor did it contribute to a rupture with a confrontational model of policing in favor of a model of policing based on dialogue with local populations (Jaffa 2014; Murão 2015). My observations support their finding. At the UPP's were I carried out my fieldwork most women carried out administrative chores—for example as secretaries to the commanders—the few women that were assigned to tactical patrol duties generally adopted the same language of violent virility as their male counterparts: Their colleagues described them as *tough* and *courageous* in battle: "even more than many of the men at the base" (UPP Soldier).

The warrior ethos and the fear of the feminine

While the incorporation of women appears to have had a limited effect, the feminine associations with the paradigm of proximity policing seemed to generate significant resistance towards the *softer* policing approach of the UPP's among many police-soldiers. Invoking the warrior ethos, they frequently complained that the UPP cops were not *respected*, and that only a hard-handed policing approach could produce results (see Chapter 3). Similarly, the enthusiasm of the cops at Alemão when were told stop wearing the light blue uniform that UPP police-soldiers had to wear, and start using the dark grey uniforms used

throughout the regular police battalions, was telling of how they felt about the UPP's. One of the officers at CPP explained why the change of uniform was so important to the cops:

> A UPP police-soldier is a new police-soldier and he has in his imaginary the idea that the *real* police-soldiers are those that work in the battalion when in reality there is no troop in the Military Police today that is more *operational* than the UPP's, who deals more with confrontations than the UPP's [...] To wear the uniform that is used by the rest of the Military Police [...] was positive, [it gave them] a sense of belonging: 'I am part of the Military Police' (Major at CPP)

While the Major stresses the cops' sense of belonging, cops that I talked to offered an different explanation: they argued that with the new uniform they enjoyed more *respect* among local residents. One Soldier also told me that he was happy to get rid of that "bus driver uniform." Interestingly, the Major in the quote above stresses that in spite of what the police-soldiers might think of the UPP's, they are the cops that are most frequently involved in armed confrontations across the institution, which suggests that what is resisted is the *soft rhetoric* of proximity policing approach, and not the actual *practice*, which was very hard indeed.

The hegemony of the warrior ethos as the highest valued form of masculinity explains much of this resistance to proximity policing (see also Murão 2013):

> Being a police-soldier is always associated with that: […] with the warrior, with the very masculinized guy, with the guy that is more aggressive [...] like if doing police work was only that. It is very difficult for [the police-soldiers] to understand that you sometimes have to speak to a person, understand [that person], right? [...] That isn't police work to that guy, right? [...] Repression is much more connected [...] to war, to that masculine ethos, of the powerful and such. So it is very difficult to understand that there are other police activities because they are associated with things that don't give as much power, don't give as much status (Staff Psychologist)

Thus, what might at first seem paradoxical–namely a continued adherence to repressive forms of policing by many UPP police-soldiers, can partly be understood as a reaction to the experienced emasculating effects of being a UPP police-soldier, and not a *real* police-soldier and *real* man. The understanding of the UPP cops as *not-real* cops also extended to favela

residents who sometimes asked for "the real police" when the UPP cops arrived. This shows the broad cultural adherence to the warrior ethos in the favelas as well as the police (see Zaular 2010; Jaffa 2014).

Challenges to effective police reform

At PMERJ, the need to create a *new ethos* that valued proximity and dialogue was at the center of the reform attempts. Coronel Robson's comments in this regard are telling: "BOPE was an exaggerated and unnecessary reference [...]. Everybody wants to be BOPE. Everybody needs to want to be UPP" (Coronel Robson in Paiva and Karakida 2015). The Colonel readily acknowledged the challenges that the wild masculinities of the police-soldiers represented for the institutional reform process. These challenges reflected the tensions between state and war machine dynamics within the institution on the one hand, and the deterioration of the situation at the UPP's on the other. They can broadly be summed up as follows:

1. A belligerent institutional ethos: As argued throughout this thesis, the police reform was aimed at replacing repressive techniques of policing with preventive ones. However, the coexistence of two opposing traditions of policing within PMERJ challenged this process. As Cornel Robson has pointed out:

> There are two different cultures [within the police]. One is the belligerent representation of war. The other is the attempt to introduce the concept of citizen police. On a symbolic level there is a conflict between the two. It's one wanting to destroy the other (Colonel Robson in Paiva and Karakida 2015)

The parallels to the war machine and state dynamics in this quote are evident if not explicit. While war is by no means linked exclusively to the war machine, the belligerent "culture" or *institutional ethos* described by Colonel Robson expresses the war machine dynamics within the police, resisting the attempts to limit and constrain repressive police actions by the "culture" that pursues the objective of a citizen police.

2. The increase in armed confrontations at the UPPs: The increase in armed confrontations within pacified areas represented a serious challenge to the implementation of proximity policing, as this paradigm was not perceived as being compatible with the situation of armed confrontations and war in the favelas (see Chapters 3 and 4):

> We prepared the police officer for a [specific] kind of activity, and suddenly he was obliged to carry out actions for which he had not received adequate training. It [the frequent armed confrontations] was everything that we didn't want happening to the police officers in the pacified areas (Colonel Pinhero Neto in Viva Rio 2015: 10).

The situation of war in pacified favelas contributed to an increase in repressive policing to the detriment of proximity policing, and was seen as a major impediment to the effective transformation of the police, as "having to deal with a hostile environment [causes symptoms of post-traumatic stress], and [makes it very difficult] for the police officer to reason, get close to the population and make right decisions" (PMERJ Colonel). As I showed in chapter 4, by 2015 the increase in violence in the pacified favelas had led to the suspension or abandonment of proximity policing efforts at many UPP's.

3. The wild masculinity of cops: Intimately related to the two previous challenges, as both their cause and effect, was the wild masculinity of cops, expressed through the warrior ethos. The perceived *wildness* of cops was captured in the following quotes:

> We are a militarized police and a police that [...] is still preparing for war, right? And that is the thing, war also has a price that has to be paid: the guy is a warrior, he likes to be a warrior, he likes to be the guy that acts, makes things happen, that shoots, that kills. (Staff Psychologist)

> We cannot transgress with the abuse of authority. It is the main question [with regards to the control of the troop], there are a lot of people with a lot of desire and they don't know how to control their desire. So there always needs to be someone with a larger vision, with a cooler head, to orient those police officers. (UPP Sub-Commander)

While the first comment shows how the wild masculinity of cops could be seen as an effect of the warfare-oriented model of policing and the situation of war in the favelas, the second comment brings to the fore the perceived need to *tame* and *domesticate* the wild masculinity of UPP cops, which was expressed through the *desire* to exercise violence. The UPP officers' attempts to direct and *orient* the *uncontrolled* desire of the cops under their command exemplify the dynamics of state capture of the war machine on a micro scale, and will be analyzed in the remainder of this chapter.

"RECYCLING" THE UPP COPS

In order to sort these challenges PMERJ commanders saw it as imperative to guarantee the safety of cops at the UPP's. They argued that the cops at the UPP's had been insufficiently trained to handle the recent escalation in violence in the favelas, and understood that proximity policing techniques could not be implemented unless the safety of cops was guaranteed. Thus, they decided that all (9.500) UPP cops would be re-trained while the special units assisted the UPP's in the re-occupation of the pacified favelas, to quell the resistance of the cartels. They called this approach the *strategic realignment* or *recycling* of UPP cops.

Caption 16: Special unit police-soldiers assisting the UPP's at Alemão

At COE the cops attended a five-day tactical training course where special unit police-soldiers trained them in the same urban warfare techniques that BOPE traditionally employed. Lessons included individual tactics, battlefield first aid and evacuation, shooting practice, stops and searches, vehicle searches, patrol dynamics, non-lethal armament, weapons assembling, and urban patrol tactics. Additionally, they received lessons related to the qualified use of force, such as an ethics lesson and a short introduction to organizational approaches to human error and decision-making. The last day of the recycling was held at the CPP, where the cops attended a series of classroom lessons on proximity policing related

topics. I will now present three vignettes from the week of strategic realignment that show how the attempted *taming* of cops was carried out in practice.

Vignette I: Qualified use of force

We are standing under the shade of a large tree, in a semi-circle around a young and robust special unit Soldier: "Stops and frisks must be carried out vigorously", he says. The cops must not leave any room for hesitation—it can be taken as a sign of weakness. He shows the cops the correct procedure. He raises his gun, points it at a cop that acts as suspect and orders: "Resident! Place your hands on the wall!" His voice is loud, deep, and firm, and emanates authority and force. The cops are reminded to be careful not to hurt the suspect during the search, or else they might get in trouble (with the judge): "The treatment that you give your client depends on what the client asks for. If you make a mess they [the judges] will give you a hard time." To emphasize the importance of proper conduct, he tells them an anecdote of a suspect who was released by the judge due to bruising, and encourages the cops to moderate their use of force in order to avoid situations like these. Force should be applied progressively—the public might accuse them of abuse of force if they go straight for the gun.

Later, after the cops have had a chance to practice, the group gathers for a lesson on the use of so called *non-lethal* armament, held by a senior officer from Choque, the riot police. "If used wrongly, non-lethal armament can kill" he says, and tells us about a Choque police-soldier who killed a 14-year-old boy with a canister of pepper spray. One of them seems to find it funny and laughs. To stress the seriousness of what he is telling them he adds: "The mother of the child pressed charges against the police-soldier when she found out [the details of what had happened]."

A wide array of weapons is put on display for the cops to familiarize themselves with. Different kinds of canisters and grenades loaded with pepper spray, teargas, or pyrotechnics serve different purposes. For example, while pepper *spray* canisters can be used both to incapacitate and disperse a crowd, canisters with pepper *foam* or *gel* are generally used to incapacitate a single individual. The officer uses an example to make his point: gel and foam can be used on a driver who doesn't want to exit his vehicle if his wife and children are in the vehicle. Spraying would target everyone indiscriminately, while foam only targets the driver.

Vignette II: Producing efficient warriors

The crisp sound of shattering dry leaves blends with the steady rhythm of trotting cops. We've all got bulletproof vests on, and the cops carry rifles, a heavy and tricky piece of equipment to trot with. The trot of the Sub-Lieutenant that marks the pace is steady and slow, but several cops are already falling behind, although we can't have jogged for more than 500 meters or so. One of the police-soldiers, a tall, lean and fit black man starts to chant the verses of a rhyme to lift the spirit and *morale* of the group:

There are people that criticize because they don't know how to act
[*Tem gente que critica porque não sabe fazer*]
There are many that admire and even stop to look
[*Tem muitos que admiram e até param para ver*]
Those of you who criticize me come do what I am doing
[*Você que me critica vem fazer o que eu faço*]
Halfway down the road you are going to feel tired
[*No meio do caminho você vai sentir cansaço*]

The group chants back the phrases in unison, but in spite of incentives from their colleagues barely half of the group manages to keep up the pace. Eventually, we arrive at the open field in front of the shooting range where a group of instructors are waiting. They give us no time to think and grab each of us by the neck of our vests. The cops are ordered to load their rifles with ammunition quickly, and then, at the order of the instructors, we are dragged onto the shooting range. The ammunition chamber of one of the cops falls off the rifle as we enter the range. He is taken to the side and reprimanded. I'm forced to the ground behind the cops and told to cover my ears. Each of the cops is placed behind a barrel, fifty meters ahead of seven cardboard figures. They represent possible targets, some holding a gun, others a microphone or a pair of glasses, and some are dressed as police. The cops are quickly ordered to identify and shoot at the targets. Afterwards, I inspect the results with the commander in charge of the exercise. "You killed them all!" I tell one of the Soldiers who's got an embarrassed look on his face. A senior BOPE officer with a large combat knife in the belt of his uniform gathers the cops. He stresses the importance of being able to act quickly and efficiently under stress: "The ideal is that you destroy the enemy and return to your homes!" he says, and adds "We aren't training you to be cowards, we are training you to be combatants!"

Later, to conclude the week of training, the Colonel in command of COE gives a short speech to the cops: "We aren't here to play heroes, we are professionals that work within the framework of the law." He tells the cops that the last shooting exercise was intended to make them reflect on the results, rather than evaluate their skills. "There are no lost bullets, all bullets stop somewhere" he says, and tells the cops to be patient in spite of the recent spur of violence: "The pacification is a 18 year project. [It succeeds] when a new generation of youth has grown up in a stable environment without having to hide under the bed, without having to live with the police coming into their homes with frequency."

Caption 17: UPP Soldier patrolling with his rifle raised in at Alemão

Vignette III: Proximity, dialogue and non-violent communication

The cops have gotten a weekend's rest after last week's the intense training at COE. Today we're at the CPP, the headquarters of the UPP's, where we are given a series of classroom lessons related to proximity policing and the UPP's: *interpersonal relations*, *non-violent communication*, *proximity policing*, *human rights*, and *strategic communication and institutional image*, among others. Before lunch, a staff psychologist hands cops a short questionnaire with questions on their experience of hostility at the UPP's. After filling out the form, he asks them if they are able to separate between the anger directed towards the institution and towards them as individuals. "Studies show that young people are often hostile

to the police because they are used to the 'shooting, beatings and bombs' of the police. Does that make sense?" he asks. "No!" a couple of the cops answer: It's because they are used to partying, smoking marihuana, and that kind of lifestyle, they say. "People are stupid and ignorant, and Alemão still hasn't been pacified. The people there are wrong. To them what is right is wrong."

Next up is a lesson about non-violent communication. The tall and attractive psychiatrist quickly captures the cops' attention. Humans have 3 brains, she says: the first acts by reflex, the second according to emotions, and the third, the neo-cortex, is related to conscious decision making. The action of police-soldiers must be governed by the neo-cortex! "Do you want to be frogs or men? Do you want to be frogs or princes?" she asks rhetorically. If the police treat people correctly they will be able to avoid unnecessary discussions, easing their job.

She says that communication is an extremely powerful tool. Those who dominate the techniques of communication have power: *communication is power*! If the police-soldiers are able to understand the needs and feelings of others they will also be able to control and manipulate them. One of the strategies of communication that they could use is to express their own vulnerability as a way to resolve conflicts. That helps to "humanize the uniform." Expressing frustration with a situation elicits sympathy from the residents. "You have to conquer allies. If the community is your partner you have a chance of winning [the] battle." Above all, the police have to avoid fighting with the residents. "I don't want you entering into [heated] arguments with residents from the communities. There are people filming everything these days." However, there are of course limits to what she's teaching them: "I'm not talking about *vagabundos*. We're talking about residents!"

The dynamics of capture and escape

The three vignettes highlight different and even contradictory aspects of the process of taming of the wild masculinities of cops. Vignette I illustrates the attempt to qualify the cops' use of force, emphasizing a progressive use, for example through recurrence to non-lethal armament. The officers use of examples all stressed the importance of applying force progressively drawing on cases of improper application of the protocols regarding the use of force. Such protocols or guidelines (e.g. for the use of less-lethal arms or the correct procedure during stops and frisks) are paradigmatic cases of space striations and examples of state attempts at commanding and directing the police-soldiers' use of force. They are

examples of how the dynamics of state capture are carried out in practice. However, the vignette also shows that the protocols and guidelines that were taught to the cops were still articulated through a language of force and not of dialogue: in the case of stops and frisks, for instance, failing to give orders in a *forceful* way was presented as a potential threat to the safety of the cops, suggesting that *displays of force* were necessary in order to protect their physical integrity in the favelas. Furthermore, rather than appealing to the rights of suspects—which one would expect to be one of the founding pillars of a citizen police—the instructor highlighted the harm that excessive use of force did to the institutional image, the cops risk of being punished, and the counterproductive effects it had on the possibility of convicting the suspect.

Caption 18: GTPP on patrol in Mangueira

In Vignette II I described an exercise that was meant to make the cops reflect on how easy it was to make mistakes in stressful situations, and the dramatic consequences such mistakes could have. Furthermore, the tension between the warrior ethos, and the failure of many cops to live up to this representation of masculinity, was clearly shown in the contrast between the chant of the cops and their actual performance. Ironically, while the lyrics of the chant highlighted the stamina and endurance of police-soldiers, many of the cops were unable to keep up with the pace of the group; one of them was reprimanded for the sloppy handling of his weapon; and most of them made several mistakes at the shooting range, "killing" innocent

victims. Instead of reading this as a critique of the cops' preparedness (which it surely can), it can be seen as an example of the difficulties that they had in living up to the masculine ideals of the warrior ethos. The vignette also suggests that one of the main purposes of the training was a *more effective and precise application of force*, with less "collateral damage." Rather than proposing a radical break with the war-oriented model of policing, this should be seen as an attempt at perfecting the warfare tactics of UPP cops.

In addition, the tension between the belligerent and citizen model of policing was expressed in the officers' comments: police-soldiers were expected to be *combatants*, not *cowards*, clearly underscoring how specific representations of masculinity were used to perpetuate the belligerent model of policing. Simultaneously, they were told that they should not "play heroes"—a direct attack on the grammar of heroics of the warrior ethos. Such diverging comments highlight one of the major contradictions of the pacification project: In spite of the rhetoric of proximity policing UPP cops were still trained to be warriors, and to kill, or *neutralize* the enemy (see Chapter 3). Both comments implicitly drew on a gendered logic. The first reinforced the association between combatants and the masculine value of bravery (Bourdieu 2002 [1998]), while the latter illustrates how the State's capture of the war machine also drew on a masculine ethos: the importance of acting within the framework of the law appealed to the *sense of honor* of the cops.

While Vignettes I and II depicted scenes from the tactical training at COE, Vignette III depicts two short scenes from the lessons of proximity policing at the CPP. The instruction at the CPP had two objectives: First, to reassure the cops of the importance of their job and to boost their *morale*; second, to teach them communication techniques and skills that could reduce the need to recur to the use of force. The psychologist in the vignette tried to appeal to the empathy of the cops, asking them to assume the perspective of the youth in the favelas in order to understand how the actions of the military police affected them. However, he was met with resistance by several cops, whose responses expressed the ideas of moral superiority characteristic of military subjectivity (see Chapters 3 and 4).

Next, the female instructor tried a different approach. She offered the cops an alternative model of masculinity that, although it was still founded in the language of domination, represented a clear break with the warrior ethos: Asking rhetorically "do you want to be frogs or men?" she suggested that manliness was characterized by conscious and intelligent decision making, and that there were ways to be powerful that did not require the use of violence. Expressing frustration, otherwise perceived as a sign of weakness, was

reconfigured as an act of power—as a strategy of manipulation. This is yet again a clear example of the gendered aspects of the attempts at transforming the subjectivity of cops.

She also gave the cops a second reason to apply the techniques that she taught them: "There are people filming everything these days." While I will not discuss the importance of this comment in detail, as it is a vast topic to be analyzed, suffice to say here that the proliferation of cameras and technology of surveillance, and the possibility of videos going viral in mass and social media represented two of the most significant changes in the field of policing. According to the cops that I spoke to, it was *the* main factor that restricted police misconduct and corruption, producing a significant decline in these practices in recent years. Residents in the favela were painfully aware of this, and at the smallest sign of a conflict involving the police there were immediately a handful of people filming the situation with their phones.[xii] On an institutional level, cameras were seen as both a tool to enforce control and as potential threat to the institutional image.[24] The comments made by the female instructor invokes both of these aspects, as the threat of videos going viral in the media was used as a disciplinary tool to achieve a desired conduct among cops.

Finally, her comments also illustrate the paradoxes of the pacification: first, she recurred to the language of warfare to stress her point, and secondly, she made an important exception to the application of the techniques of non-violent communication—they were only meant for *good residents*, not *vagabundos*. Thus, she left open an important space for the discretionary use of power to determine who were *good* and who were *bad*. Her comment was representative of the general line of thought within PMERJ and even within the favelas. As an officer and member of the command at one of the UPP's told me:

> [I] always try to teach that to the police-soldiers: [apply] the treatment according to the type of person. If they are with a good person [*pessoa de bem*] they give the best possible treatment, they treat them like a client, right? And the client is always right. [...] Our client, our target public is the resident, right? Not the *traficante*. Our service is to improve the life of the resident and not to keep playing cats and mice.

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[24] All patrol vehicles were equipped with cameras, and at the time of research preliminary attempts of equipping soldiers with cameras on their uniforms were also carried out.

Similarly, another commanding officer argued that "the police needs to differentiate who is a resident and who is a marginal element in delinquent practice so that he can give them a differentiated treatment starting from that [recognition]." These comments resonate with the acceptance of police violence among the Brazilian public, who were often complacent to, or even supportive, of police violence as long as the victim was not considered "innocent." Reserving the use of non-violent or less-violent techniques to "good people" might represent an improvement in relation to former practices of policing but was still far from the ideal of a citizen police respectful of the human rights.

In sum, the three vignettes show how the state tried to harness the violent potential of the wild masculinities of police-soldiers. The process of capture was carried out through the teaching of protocols and training in warfare tactics that would increase the *efficiency* and *accuracy* of the police-soldiers' use of force. It was also reflected in the attempt to teach the police-soldiers preventive policing techniques, such as non-violent communication, and in attempts to appeal to their empathy. The goal of this training was to discipline and subjectively transform police-soldiers—*qualifying* their use of force to avoid power abuses that could have negative repercussions on the *institutional image* and trouble reform attempts. However, the *wild masculinities* at PMERJ continually resisted and *escaped* attempts at being tamed through the discursive recurrence to the *belligerent institutional ethos* (see also Chapters 3 and 4).

THE APORIA OF THE STATE

As I have shown throughout this chapter, two interrelated but often conflicting processes converged in the UPP's. First, the process of territorial occupation and colonization of the favelas, and second, the process of reforming the police and creating a new kind of police subjectivity opposed to the logic of confrontational policing and warrior ethos. While the effective territorial occupation of the favelas was primarily pursued through the sovereign logic of militarized policing, the intended institutional reform drew its legitimacy on the rhetoric of proximity policing—on dialogue, cooperation and social inclusion. In consequence UPP cops were trained to be both warriors and diplomats, but were not sufficiently prepared for any of the tasks (as vignette II and III both illustrated). This paradox was also noted by one of the staff psychologists at the CPP:

[The police officer] is trained in a precarious way to act as a citizen and proximity police, but also in a precarious way to act in a technical manner: shooting, progressing in the terrain [...] Since we are in a moment of transition there is a big issue there: how do we prepare that guy who has to be [a proximity and citizen police], that has to carry out a [kind of] policing that's based on dialogue, on conversation, on proximity, but that a moment later may round a corner [...] and be fired at? How to you train that guy for things that at first seem so different? [...] In the end [...] you're not training him well in anything (Staff Psychologist).

Caption 19: Soldiers from a GTPP unit

Gleaned from this quote is the dilemma, contradiction, or *aporia* that is at the center of Kapferer and Bertelsen's (2009) analysis of state violence—and the enduring crisis of the modern state. How can the bio-political state exercise sovereign power without challenging its own legitimacy? How do you violently assert your authority, while raising the banners of dialogue? However, while the psychologist sees the aporia as the result of "a moment of transition," Kapferer and Bertelsen (2009: 6ff) are less optimistic, and argue that power is always "potentially resistant and subversive of state containment and control" and that "no amount of [...] engagement of institutional agencies (e.g., educational, religious, penal) for the capture, production, or confinement of citizens, can yield those who control the state the capacity to encompass totally the forces of social formation." While modernist states try to

overcome "the crisis of power by constituting the social order upon which their power is founded"—in other words, by creating the conditions for their legitimacy—the dynamics of capture and escape are such as to never allow the state to totally command the forces of social formation.

In the case of the UPP's the aporia of the state was expressed in the contradiction between the police-soldiers *desire* to dominate and control the favelas and destroy the power of the drug cartels, violently asserting the authority of the police, and the modes of legitimation of the pacification project, that required the police-soldiers to be diplomats, human rights defenders, and friendly neighborhood cops. Thus, the aporia was, in a sense, embodied by UPP cops, trained to be diplomats and warriors—or executioners and human rights defenders—at the same time. Furthermore, the account of the *violent becomings* of UPP cops in Chapter 3 raises the question of what it is possible to expect (in terms of their *peaceful submission* to the requirements of the state) from subjectivities that have been repeatedly violated through the hierarchical structures of the very same state order that they remain (partly) deterritorialized in relation to.

Throughout the thesis, I've signaled the virtual proximity between the police-soldiers and the traficantes that they fought in the favelas, and indeed, when brought to the extreme, the wild masculinity of police-soldiers could result in the radical deterritorialization from the state, through the discharge of unruly cops. The lack of alternatives due to the stigma of being discharged, as well as an inclination towards predatory forms of accumulation and desire to violently assert their authority, contributed to the enrollment of excluded police officers in the milícias that dominated an increasing portion of Rio's (non-pacified) favelas (see Chapter 2). Thus, at the extreme, the war machine dynamics of gender, and the impossibility of the state to capture them eventually produced their violent escape towards rivaling centers of power, producing a new *crisis of the state*—not through the establishment of cartels, but through the surge of the milicias.

CONCLUSION: TAMING THE WAR MACHINE

It's been two days since the course at COE ended. I'm back at the base with the cops, doing a round of semi-structured interviews in the meeting room, which is practically my office by now. Suddenly one of the cops, Celso, comes rushing in. He starts to scramble around in one of the cabinets, looking for something, and gives the Soldier that I'm

interviewing a series of brief instructions. We leave the room, and the hallway, which was full of cops a short while ago, is now almost empty. I ask one of the reminding cops what has happened. "The police killed a *ganso* [thug]" he says, with a smile on his face. He grabs a worn out, flower patterned tablecloth from the kitchen to carry the body in, and packs it in Celso's backpack as they get ready to assist the cops involved in the shooting. Before they leave Celso turns at me, grins, and says: "The training we got last week is producing results!"

Caption 20: Soldier holding the gun that the teenager his patrol unit shot dead used to fire at the police with.

In this chapter I've analyzed the gendered aspects of the UPP project and associated police reform as a process of state capture, or alternately, as the taming of the wild masculinity of police-soldiers. I have highlighted the parallels between this process, and the pacification of the favelas. Furthermore, I have argued that the attempts at reforming PMERJ were challenged by three different but connected processes: (a) by the prevalence of models of policing oriented to warfare within PMERJ; (b) by existing notions of gender and manliness centered on the warrior ethos, and (c) by the situation of armed resistance in the favelas. I have also signaled the incompatibility between the need to guarantee territorial control in the pacified favelas, and the ideals of proximity policing. The tension between war machine and state dynamics within the police is expressed in the contradicting models of policing that police-soldiers are expected to carry out at the UPP's producing the embodiment of the

aporia of the state in the police-soldiers. The continuing predominance of repressive techniques of policing proves that while the discourse of proximity policing invested the police with an aura of legitimacy to a wider public, the belligerent ethos of confrontational policing—predicated on a certain form of masculinity—was reproduced within the institution.

Chapter 6
INVENTING WAR

Buy when there is blood in the streets.

(Quote attributed to Baron von Rotschild)[25]

Pieces of easy reposition

If we don't invent the war, we don't need to pacify, you know? It may seem like a crazy sentence, but that's what it is, right? Who invents the war? Why do we pacify? If we are going to pacify something it is because that thing is in a state of war, isn't it? What war? What is the war? War against drugs? *Eh*, it's the local version of the famous war against drugs, isn't it? And who is the *traficante*, [...] what is the *locus* of the war against drugs here? [...] The *favelas*! It's curious, right? There's only drug trafficking in the *favela*, right? Is that it? Isn't there in *Zonal Sul*? Isn't there in *Rio Branco*? So in the end... *"Ah, but there are weapons there (in the favela)!"* Are there weapons, is there ammunition? There is ammunition, it's true, that's a problem, right? [...] Now, the [real] question: who is it that put those weapons, that ammunition in the hands of the [...] *traficante favelado*, right? (Pauses to see if I can answer) The corrupt military [officer], the corrupt police [officer]! There are no weapons nor ammunition that gets in the hands of a *traficante* in the *favela*, or of a car thief from the *favela*, or of a kidnapper from the *favela*, [...] that [hasn't gotten there] by the hand of the military—I am talking about the armed forces as well—or from a corrupt police[man]. Are you getting why I'm saying what I'm saying? If we don't invent war, we don't need to pacify, right? It's better not to invent. [I've got] nothing against the pacification! *Pô*, reduce the lethality... [...]. So we arm the *traficante* from the *favela*, we provide [him] with ammunition regularly, sometimes we go there to wage war with him, against him. Isn't it better not to arm [him], not to munition him? (Laughs) *"Ahh, but the traficante is the dono (owner) of the favela!"* Is he the owner of the *favela*? The owner of the *favela*? He lives until he's 24 at the most, dies or is imprisoned. There you have *Nêm*, *Nêm* from *Rocinha*, then it's *Dem*, then comes *Zem*, and then comes *Dum*, *Lum*, *Gum*, right? Pieces of easy reposition. He is the owner. Short life: [...] either he dies at the hand of the police, or he dies at the hand of the *traficante*, or he goes to jail. [...] He is the owner, ok, he is the owner, and he is obliged to pay *arrego*, right? You already know what *arrego* is, corruption [money] for the police, weekly,

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every other week, right? Primarily for the MP (Military Police), right? If I am the owner of something, do I have to pay someone else to stay in my place? How does that work? [He] isn't the owner of anything! That's a lie, that's an invention of the police, of the media, of the politicians, to valorize. Valorize the *arrego*. Corruption valorizes the news, valorizes the "we are confronting, combating", right? [He] isn't the owner of anything, he is the lessee of the moment, he rented that little spot, the tenant, right?

Vinicius George, Public Security expert at ALERJ

Capital and predation

At the start of this thesis wrote that I wanted to address the larger national and global trends were affecting Rio's public security policies. As a way of summing up my findings, I will briefly discuss how the UPP's were framed by the dynamics of national politics and the ebbs and flows of global capital. Kapferer and Bertelsen (2009: 1) argue that "many of the dimensions of intra-state conflict and war are not a function of particular state orders alone but of the larger arenas of political and economic action in which they are set," and I would like to comment on how the war machine dynamics of these two arenas shaped the UPP project, and on the future of Brazilian democracy in light of recent events.

In Rio, the hosting of *mega-events* like the World Cup and Olympics has been part of the city's business strategy to attract global investments (Freeman 2012; Saborio 2013). Particularly, when Rio was awarded the Olympics, the federal government saw it as an opportunity to rebuild the city as a *global capital*, signaling Brazil's rise to power on the global scene as an important economic and political player. The preparation for these events produced a *state of exception* due to the urgency and prestige associated with the events, and justified massive public spending on infrastructure, channeling public funds to private contractors, often ignoring regular demands for public tenders and oversight (see Braathen 2013; Varrell and Kennedy 2011; Williamson 2016).

Furthermore, they served as pretext for huge urban renewal projects, such as the waterfront renewal project of *Porto Maravilha* in a deteriorated area of Rio's city center, and the construction of the Olympic Village in Barra da Tijuca, which was to be transformed into an upscale gated community after the games. The dynamics of urban renewal projects like these is as common as it is simple: private investors buy areas in urban decay at a low price, while public funds are used to build new infrastructure (such as public transportation and

museums) allowing entrepreneurs to reap exceptional profit from their investments (see Freeman 2012; Williamson 2016).

In order for the strategy centered on mega-events like the Olympics, and on urban renewal projects like *Porto Maravilha* to be feasible, the Brazilian state had to address Rio's reputation as a violent city. The UPP project did *exactly* that. Indeed, one of the most notorious effects of the establishment of the UPP's was the dramatic increase in the value of real estate located close to the pacified favelas, and in the city as a whole. It should be no surprise then, that with few exceptions, most UPP's were established close to future Olympic venues and developing urban areas. Thus, the dynamics of war and peace, combined with the possibilities of accelerated economic growth associated to the state of exception installed through mega-events, created business opportunities for entrepreneurs and investors through the fluctuations that it produced in the local real-estate market, and attracted foreign investments (see Braathen 2013; Freeman 2012; Nordstrom 2004; Williamson 2016).

Perhaps unfortunately, or maybe integral to this logic, the massive public spending ahead of the Olympics coincided with one of the worst economic crises in recent Brazilian history, and the most severe political crisis since the return of democracy. Evidence suggests that the impeachment of elected Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff in May 2016 was orchestrated to stop further investigations into the corruption scheme of *Lava Jato* that implicated large parts of the Brazilian Congress, and has rightfully been called a soft *coup d'Etat* by the national political left.[26] It shows the force of the war machine dynamics of the Brazilian political arena. 30 years of democratization has not been able to tame the war machine dynamics of elite control, and its encroachment in Brazilian politics through the influence of large private corporations. With this state of affair, the prospects of democratizing the police seem dim.

The future of the UPP's

George's account at the start of this chapter illustrates the complexities of the Brazilian state's relation to the favelas, and highlights the interconnectedness between war and predation. There are many parallels between his story, and the answer I got form the cops at the UPP's when I asked them what they thought the future of the UPP's would look like. As long as PMERJ responded to the interests of State politicians, they said, the project was

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[26] Lit. Car wash; the corruption scheme was unveiled in 2014 and was based on the funneling of money from the national oil company Petrobras to the political campaigns of large parts of the Brazilian congress.

doomed to fail. In the previous Chapter, the processes through which police-soldiers challenged and escaped state control was at the center of the analysis. However, I warned at the start of the thesis against the bias of my methodological approach, which might prioritize explanations that see violence as the result of the Brazilian state's inability to control its police forces. Georges account challenges such explanations. Instead, it signals the aporetic nature of the Brazilian state order, which has historically been subverted by the war machine dynamics of local and global elites, most recently, through the impeachment of Rousseff. In Brazil, the war machine dynamics are not limited to any single state institution, but permeate the entire state apparatus, from top to bottom. In such a context, the ebbs and flows of war and violence seem to be predicated upon the economic and political interests of the regime in turn (see also Arias and Goldstein 2010).

When I left Rio in July 2015 an incipient turf-war was haunting the favela where my partner and I were living. The small favela had long been considered one of the success stories of the pacification and received a large amount of tourists and backpackers, who often stayed in the dozens of hostels scattered across the hill, or dined at the *botecos* (bars). Prior to our departure, the frequency of shootouts had increased. On one occasion members of a rivaling faction entered the favela shortly after nightfall, and executed a young boy in front of a crowd, in one of the small local bars of the community—an unprecedented event that cast a somber mood on the community. After our departure, inter-gang violence continued to escalate, with more shootouts and deaths.

In May 2016 I talked to one of my friends in the favela and asked him if the violence had ceased. He told me that the community had gone through a difficult time, but that the turf war had calmed after BOPE had "invaded" the favela. Shooting had lasted for hours, and the next morning residents claimed that the police had killed eleven people. "Eleven!?", I exclaimed in shock, recalling how he had proudly told me that nobody had ever been killed in shootouts in the favela when I first arrived in December 2014. "Eleven" my friend confirmed. "And can you believe that none of the news channels even mentioned it?"

He added that with the national economy dwindling, and the State of Rio on the verge of bankruptcy, payment to police-soldiers were being delayed. Rumors in the favela had it that as a result, the police-soldiers at the local UPP had re-instituted the *arrego* with the local *traficantes*. While the rumors were unconfirmed, my friend said that the gang members were displaying a sense of freedom that they hadn't had since before the establishment of the local UPP. They were now visibly armed in the alleys of the favela, and tourists staying the hostels were being stopped and searched by armed teenagers. 8 years after the first UPP's were

established, old patterns of police practices of collusion and of violent assertions of authority by police and *traficantes* alike, still shaped everyday life in the favelas.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have followed Kapferer and Bertelsen (2009: 1) who claim that circumstances of shifting state power, where the agents and organs of state power are at war with the populations that they claim to control, throw into relief "the character of particular state orders, the nature of sovereignty and the manner of their legitimacy." I believe that the establishment of the UPP's in Rio's favelas, previously dominated by armed groups, offers a unique opportunity to analyze the recent transformations of state power in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil. In line with Kapferer and Bertelsen's theoretical approach, I chose to approach the pacification project methodologically as an *event*: as a *generative moment* particularly well suited to analyze the *changing forces of history* that characterize the *exercise of state power* in the favelas, and carry the *potential to radically transform* it (Kapferer 2005).

Thus, in chapter 2 I analyzed how, the historical relation between the state and the favelas had been shaped Brazil's past as a colonial slave state, and how, in a context of multiple sovereignties, the favelas became the *locus* of PMERJ's war on drugs. I suggested that while the territorializing dynamics of the UPP's represented a shift in the state's relation to the favelas compared to previous modes of policing, the discourse of pacification (and I use the word *discourse* in the broadest applicable sense) was articulated through the logic of war, and specifically, as I showed, through the logic of *colonial warfare*. Mbembe's (2003) distinction between two different modes of colonial warfare signals the continuities and ruptures between historical and contemporary practices of policing in Rio's favelas. Furthermore, it alerts us to the predatory forms of accumulation that the *war on drugs* permitted – these are also hinted at in Georges account at the start of this chapter. I also suggested that the *peace* brought to the favelas through the UPP's was more reminiscent of a *war without ends* between the police and the drug cartels. The innovation of the UPP's in this regard, was that through the paradigm of proximity policing, they invoked an egalitarian rhetoric of citizenship, social justice and inclusion, to legitimize the extended powers that the state's sovereign forces wielded over the populations living in the favelas.

In Chapter 3, I showed how the *violent becoming* of UPP cop was shaped by larger national structures of social exclusion and economic marginalization, by the militarization of the police, and by the situation of war in the favelas. I argued that the violent becoming of

cops was productive of a *warrior ethos* that also shaped the forms and expressions of violence of state and non-state subjectivities in the favelas.

Then, in chapter 4, I described how the police enacted an emergent state order in the favelas through diverging patrol practices. Drawing on Taussig's (1993) concepts of mimesis and alterity, I showed how the police-soldiers at the UPP's simultaneously copied and displaced the authority of the drug cartels, territorializing an emergent state order founded on a Christian-conservative morality, characteristic of the Armed Forces of Latin America.

Finally, in Chapter 5, I argued that the pacification project could be seen as an ongoing process of state capture of the war machine dynamics of PMERJ, or as an attempt to pacify the institution through the gendered disciplining of police-soldiers, and showed how this process was challenged by the pervasive effects of the warrior ethos. I suggested that the continuing reliance on militarized models of policing at the UPP's were incompatible with the rhetoric of proximity, and signaled the aporetic nature of the project, embodied in the cops that were expected to be warriors and diplomats at the same time.

Conclusion: Predatory forms of accumulation

The debate surrounding the UPP project is often polarized in a *radical critique* of the project, by scholars who understand it as a militarization of the favelas (Fleury 2012; Saborio 2014b; Oliveira 2014), or highlight its connection to neoliberal market logics (Saborio 2013; Freeman 2012; Steinbrick 2014), on the one hand, and *critical supporters* that signal the flaws of the project (lack of dialogue, poor training of cops, abuses of force, etc.), without challenging the logic of power and domination that it is founded upon. The latter sees the project as an improvement compared to the policing of the favelas prior to pacification, and tends to place emphasis on how the UPP project effectively reduced the lethal violence of the police initially (see Cano et.al. 2012; Ramos 2016; Robson 2014). However, through recent developments the assumption that the UPP's are a way to reduce police lethality are also challenged: In the year following my departure from Rio, police killings increase throughout the city, partly as the result of the rising tensions within pacified communities (HRW 2015). The debate between the *critical supporters* and *radical critiques* partly mirrors the debate between the two currents of police reform (see Chapters 2 and 5). Throughout this thesis I have shown how the UPP's rest on a colonial form of domination, and how, after almost 8 years of *pacification*, the initiative have largely failed to break the logic of war in Rio's favelas. Police-soldiers on patrol in at the UPP's still engaged in daily combat against the

drug cartels and there were no signs of calm neither during my period of fieldwork nor are there any such signs on the horizon. My analysis can thus be read in support of the more critical approach to the UPP's.

Nevertheless, and by way of conclusion, I want to make a comment that I believe might clarify the debate. What is discussed under the umbrella of the pacification project includes, like I have already argued, two separate processes: the establishment of the UPP's and the reform of PMERJ. Perhaps by analyzing these processes separately, some of the dilemmas surrounding the pacification could be solved.

The first process is characterized by the colonization of favela space, and the perpetuation of the *war on drugs* between the PMERJ and the cartels. So far, the war has proven more effective in perpetuating predatory forms of accumulation (either through the favela-based illicit economies, or, more recently, through the boom in real estate and urban development projects) than in bringing peace and security to the populations living in the favelas. This conclusion supports Penglase's (2014) argument (presented in Chapter 1) that Rio's urban violence had become an end in itself, a war machine that thrived on the predatory forms of accumulation of the war on drugs. There are certainly more effective ways to bring peace to the favelas than through the occupation and militarization that the UPP's represent.

In this regard, the ongoing debate on the legalization of drugs taking place in Latin America might be more effective in radically reconfiguring the continent's violent landscapes. Uruguay has been the first country in the region to legalize marihuana, in what can be described as a process of state capture of the illegal economy of the drug trade, and incipient debate is taking place in Brazil as well as in other neighboring countries. Hopes are that by formalizing the drug economy, the war machines that feed on the predatory forms of accumulation associated with the drug trade will be weakened. The argument put forth in this thesis supports this view. Regional democracies would be well advised to follow the Uruguayan experiment closely.

The second process is related to the reformation of PMERJ, and the attempts to transform the institution into a citizen police, more oriented towards preventive policing strategies and techniques and less oriented to war. This process is necessary, and should not hinge upon the future of the UPP's. However, the war machine dynamics at the heart of the Brazilian state suggest that Brazil will have a hard time reforming it state security forces.

My analysis of the Brazilian state's exercise of power at the UPP's, and the associated war on drugs, through the Deleuzian concepts of war machine and state dynamics contributes to the recent anthropological critique of the State as a monolithic, rational-bureaucratic

institution (Das and Pool 2004; Sharma and Gupta 2006), signaling the intimacy of the relation between state and non-state subjectivities, which in my account is fluid and contingent, and might even coexist within the same *person*: exemplified by the police-soldiers deterritorialization in relation to the state (Deleuze and Guattari 1987[1980]). Significantly, the theoretical framework that I have adopted alerts us to the tensions and contradictions that are inherent in all modern states, and shows how these contradictions are productive of violence. Thus, as Kapferer and Bertelsen (2009) argue we avoid the reified understanding of violence as a failure of democracy, and can instead analyze the processes productive of violence in democratic state orders (see also Arias and Goldstein 2010).

Future research

As I briefly signaled in Chapter 5, the recent surge in smartphones and access to social media is already reconfiguring the power dynamics between the police and the populations that they police on the one hand, and between the state and the police on the other (through the implementation of new technologies of surveillance). I have not addressed this in depth in this thesis, but it was a recurring concern among the cops I talked to. They assured me that it was the single most important factor that had limited police misconduct and corruption in the last years. Significantly, social media is radically reconfiguring the forms of political association in Latin American democracies today, as an important site of resistance against the elite control of the traditional mass media, who aided the political right's return to power in Brazil and Argentina, after years of progressive rule. In Argentina, in particular, the social media has been transformed into the main arena of an important political and cultural battle. The role of the social media as a site of political resistance, and its potential to redress the violent exercise of state power in Latin American democracies, as these enter a new cycle of economic recession and neoliberal government, should be an interesting topic for future research.

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[i] The goals of the UPPs were to 1) regain state control over areas previously controlled by armed groups; 2) improve security and bring peace to these communities [favelas] through the reduction of shoothouts and lethal violence; and 3) contribute to breaking the logic of "war" that existed in Rio de Janeiro. However, it did not pretend to 1) end drug trafficking; 2) end criminality; 3) be a solution for all communities; or 4) turn itself into the panacea for all socio-economic problems in the communities (Magaloni, Franco and Melo 2015: 3; Henriques and Ramos 2011). Allegedly, these priorities represented as a radical shift away from a confrontational model of policing and the war on drugs.

[ii] The fact that the military police is composed by a significant proportion of young black men from poor neighborhoods and favelas is a clear example of the process of capture by the state: it is a common conception, even among soldiers, that you either become *traficante* or police.

[1] In particular, favelas controlled by Commando Vermelho, the largest of the city's main drug cartels, and also the cartel that most frequently entered into armed confrontations with the police.

[iii] Among the most significant impacts of the project are less truculent police actions in pacified areas (Penglase 2014; Cano 2012), reduction in the number of *autos de resistencia* (suspects killed by the police), and an overall reduction in violent crimes in pacified and surrounding areas. However, the establishment of UPPs also led to an increase in the reporting of minor crimes and rape. This has been explained either as the result of increased reporting or as the result of increases in these kinds of crimes, which were severely punished by drug-lords prior to pacification, or a combination of both (Cano 2012).

[iv] At PMERJ the admission and training of beat cops and officers was differentiated. Cops were selected through public tenders and received 7 months of training at CFAP, while officers applied through the public university, and received 3 years of higher education before they got their diploma. Officers acted as leaders and commanders, while cops carried out the daily activities of policing. Depending on the number of cops at each of the 38 UPPs, two to three officers were in charge of the command. With a total of 9.500 cops stationed at the UPPs, this means that the ratio of officers to cops was approximately 1:100

[v] During their training at CFAP, recruits lived in the barracks of the academy during weekdays, and were given weekends off. Many cops worked 24-hour shifts, and if they were on sick leave they were often required to recover at the police station. Furthermore, disciplinary transgressions were punishable with days or weeks of reclusion in the barracks.

[1] In Rio de Janeiro one recruit died after an intense physical training session at CFAP in 2013. On the day of the training session that produced the death of the soldier air temperatures had been superior to 40 degrees Celsius. During the session the recruits had been forced to sit on the burning asphalt and subjected to termal shocks with ice water. As a result 32 recruits had required medical attention, 18 of them presenting burns on their buttocks or hands (Barros 2015).

^{vi} Goffman (1961: 38) argues that the minute regulation of activities violate the autonomy of the act of the controlled subject and creates a disruption between the individual's self-determination and his actions. Strict and diffuse regulations are enforced through an echelon authority system where any high ranking official has certain rights to discipline the subjects under control, increasing the probability of sanction (Goffman 1961: 42).

^{vii} The concept of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1995) refers to the dominant position of some forms of being a man. It does so by drawing on the idea of a gendered hierarchy with multiple and competing masculinities. The dominant, or hegemonic form is not necessarily the most common form of being a man, but it is a form that is established as hierarchically superior to others, and many men experience social pressure to conform to the dominant ideas about what it means to be a man. The concept highlights the hierarchical aspects of gender, but has been critiqued for being to static, and ignoring how dominant forms of masculinity are continuously being challenged.

^{viii} Police-soldiers elaborated a series of positive categories of identification that emphasized their own moral superiority, bravery, and heroism, while simultaneously seeing themselves as victims, either of their superiors or of the savagery of the *traficantes*; as heroes who sacrificed their own lives in the fight against evil; or as unrecognized saviors protecting an ungrateful public unworthy of their attention. These tropes were often reproduced through social media such as Facebook and WhatsApp, in the form of short texts, images and videos that emphasized actions of the police that were taken as signs of unquestionable goodness (see Appendix 9). Often, they involved the police carrying out a "good deed" and the beneficiaries where often children, women, the poor and the elderly, reflecting the Christian master trope of the good Samaritan coupled with a masculinized form of heroics.

^{ix} Funk parties were akin to block parties organized by the local *traficantes*, and were important arenas where gang members displayed their status and authority through practices of conspicuous consumption, the ostentation of weapons, and courting of women. These parties generally attracted a mixed crowd of people from the *asfalto* as well as the *favela* (Soares da Silva 2014).

^x The use of camera phones and social media as a tool to limit police abuse of force is increasingly being discussed by academics and in the media. See for example https://news.vice.com/article/brazilians-are-unmasking-police-killings-in-favelas-with-videos-and-whatsapp (last accessed 13/06/16).

Map of pacified favelas and Olympic venues

1: Pacified Favelas and planned Olympic zones. Source:
http_www.economist.com_news_americas_21586322-sensible-security-programme-brazils-
olympic-city-no-longer-enough-satisfy-voters

CARTELS

ADA
Amigos
dos amigos

CV
Commando
Vermelho

TCP
Terceiro
command
puro

MILICIAS

PMRJ
Military police

STATE
SECURITY
FORCES

ARMED
FORCES

FEDERAL
POLICE

CIVIL
POLICE

Rank at PMERJ

Officers [Oficiais]
Colonel [Coronel]
Lt. Colonel [Tenente Coronel]
Major [Major]
Captain [Capitão]
1st Lieutenant [Primeiro Tenente]
2nd Lieutenant [Segundo Tenente]
Aspiring Officer [Aspirante]

Cops [Praças]
Sub-Lieutenant [Sub-Tenente]
1st Sergeant [Primeiro Sargento]
2nd Sergeant [Segundo Sargento]
3rd Sergeant [Terceiro Sargento]
Corporal [Cabo]
Soldier [Soldado]
Cadet [Cadete]

UPP's organized according to operational risk

NÍVEIS DE RISCO OPERACIONAL DAS UPP's

VERMELHO	AMARELO	VERDE
Apresentam níveis consideráveis de risco operacional, tais que indiquem a adoção de rigorosas técnicas de segurança e ocupação tática, inclusive com o eventual acionamento do pop de Operações Especiais, sendo, portanto, desaconselhadas as ações preventivas de proximidade até que os níveis de risco operacional sejam restabelecidos a patamares confiáveis de segurança.	Apresentam níveis moderados de risco operacional, tais que indiquem a adoção de técnicas de segurança e ocupação tática, mas ainda sendo possível a prática preventiva da polícia de proximidade em determinados locais e ocasiões.	Apresentam níveis mínimos de risco operacional, tais que indiquem a priorização das ações preventivas de proximidade.

NÍVEL DE CONFRONTO ↑

VERMELHO
- 2ª UPP/16º BPM – UPP NOVA BRASÍLIA
- 3ª UPP/16º BPM – UPP ALEMÃO
- 2ª UPP/23º BPM – UPP ROCINHA
- 1ª UPP/18º BPM – UPP CIDADE DE DEUS
- 1ª UPP/3º BPM – UPP SÃO JOÃO
- 1ª UPP/16º BPM – UPP FAZENDINHA
- 4ª UPP/3º BPM – UPP CAMARISTA
- 5ª UPP/6º BPM – UPP MACACOS
- 6ª UPP/16º BPM – UPP PO. PROLETÁRIO
- 2ª UPP/4º BPM – UPP SÃO CARLOS
- 3ª UPP/3º BPM – UPP LINS
- 2ª UPP/5º BPM – UPP COROA/FALET
- 1ª UPP/4º BPM – UPP TURANO

AMARELO
- 2ª UPP/14º BPM – UPP VILA KENNEDY
- 1ª UPP/5º BPM – UPP PROVIDÊNCIA
- 3ª UPP/4º BPM – UPP MANGUEIRA
- 4ª UPP/4º BPM – UPP CAJU
- 2ª UPP/19º BPM – UPP PAVÃO
- 3ª UPP/22º BPM – UPP ARARÁ
- 3ª UPP/6º BPM – UPP ANDARAÍ
- 2ª UPP/3º BPM – UPP JACAREZINHO
- 2ª UPP/22º BPM – UPP MANGUINHOS

VERDE
- 5ª UPP/16º BPM – UPP CHATUBA
- 2ª UPP/6º BPM – UPP FORMIGA
- 1ª UPP/22º BPM – UPP ADEUS
- 4ª UPP/16º BPM – UPP FÉ E SERENO
- 4ª UPP/6º BPM – UPP SALGUEIRO
- 1ª UPP/14º BPM – UPP BATAN
- 1ª UPP/15º BPM – UPP MAGUEIRINHA
- 1ª UPP/19º BPM – UPP BABILÔNIA
- 3ª UPP/19º BPM – UPP TABAJARAS
- 1ª UPP/23º BPM – UPP VIDIGAL
- 1ª UPP/6º BPM – UPP BOREL
- 3ª UPP/5º BPM – UPP PRAZERES
- 4ª UPP/4º BPM – UPP TUIUTI
- 2ª UPP/2º BPM – UPP CERRO CORÁ
- 1ª UPP/2º BPM – UPP SANTA MARTA

(Source: The image was handed to me by a PMERJ Sergeant)

The 38 UPPs classified according to the operational risk at each base. Red favelas exhibited high conflict levels, yellow favelas exhibited medium conflict levels, and green favelas had low conflict level at the time of research. Within each category, the UPPs are organized with risk ascending as you move up the list. Thus, at the time of classification, the UPP with least risk was *Santa Marta*, and the UPP with highest risk was *Nova Brasilia* (at CPX). The three favelas were I carried out my fieldwork rank 2nd (UPP Alemão), 16th (UPP Mangueira), and 38th (UPP Santa Marta).