Attitudes towards Immigration and National Identity
A Comparative Study of Italy and Norway

Cand. Polit. Thesis in Sociology

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May 15, 2001

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Rune Sakslind and Johs. Hjellbrekke for good guidance in the process of writing this thesis, especially in the finishing stages.

My gratitude also goes to my mother for constant encouraging me and to my sisters for critical reading and helpful suggestions. Fellow students at the department of sociology have made these years enjoyable. I am especially indebted to Kristin for inspiring discussions and good friendship.

Thanks to the Centre for Clinical Research at Haukeland for copying and binding this thesis.

And last, but not least, thank you Roy - for your invaluable emotional support, patience and help.

The data material used in this thesis is "National Identity 1995", a survey from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) passed on to me by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). ISSP and NSD are neither responsible for the analyses nor the interpretations that I have done in this thesis.

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1. Introduction

Hostile sentiments against immigrants are an increasing problem in contemporary modern nation states. At the same time, the need for people to leave their homes because of war, starvation or political persecution also steadily increases. With increased immigration and increased hostility towards immigrants, there is a growing need to understand how and why such negative attitudes arise.

Research in this field may facilitate a less conflict-ridden multicultural society than most Western immigration countries are today. The fight against racism is usually directed against extreme and violent groupings in society. However, equally important as the small extremist groups is everyday racism. In any modern immigration society, there are many nationals who are sceptic and hostile towards immigrants. In this thesis I will attempt to discover what kind of people it is that has a distinct anti-immigration attitude. I will also try to uncover who the people with a pro-immigration attitude are. This information may have practical use in for instance the planning of anti-racist campaigns, as well as contribute to a broader understanding of attitudes towards immigrants in general.

Nationalism, national devotion and xenophobia constitute a relatively new research field in sociology. Theoretical contributions concerning this topic did not accelerate until the 1980s. Although much has been discovered, there is still a long way ahead to reach a complete understanding of this field. A strong hatred or fear of strangers or foreigners - *xenophobia* - is influenced by many factors. Some (Hernes and Knudsen, 1997; Gellner, 1983) claim that negative attitudes towards immigrants are mainly triggered by lack of personal resources like income and education. Others (Billig, 1995; Doob, 1964) believe that xenophobia is closely linked to a sense of devotion for one's nation. Immigrants entering a nation will according to this be perceived as a threat to the well-being of the nation, and nationals will react with scepticism and hostility.

To understand attitudes towards immigration, it is likely that we have to keep in mind both national devotion and background information like income and education. National devotion as a sense of belonging to a national community can also be referred to as

national identity. Even if national identity or devotion is closely linked to attitudes towards immigration, this does not mean that a strong and positive national identity inevitably leads to xenophobia. Love for one's country is sometimes, but definitely not always, accompanied by a perception of foreigners as undesirable - perhaps as a threat that one's beloved nation will not be as unique if it is filled with people from many different and distant cultures. National identity is a highly complex phenomenon. Previous research has shown that some parts of national identity have an including effect on attitudes while other parts have an excluding effect (Hernes and Knudsen, 1997; Grytten, 1998; Hjerm, 1998).

1.1 Stating the Problem

The theme of this thesis is national identity and attitudes towards immigration. I will study a Southern European nation state - Italy - and a Northern European nation state - Norway - on the basis of material from the International Social Survey Programme ISSP. The material is the survey "National Identity 1995". My main objective can be summed up in three points:

- *To reveal Italian and Norwegian attitudes towards immigration.* Based on statistical analyses I will comment on what is the dominant attitude in each country. Based on traditional background variables like age, income and education, I will also discuss what kinds of people are usually hostile towards immigrants and what kinds of people are usually tolerant.

- *To understand why different types of attitudes arise.* I will look at the attitude patterns in connection with background variables and national identity. With the aid of national history and theoretical contributions I will present some plausible explanations for the co-variation between a certain attitude, a certain national identity, and certain background categories. This will enable me to say something about why the different types of attitudes arise, both positive and negative.

- *To compare attitudes and their links to national identity and background variables in two different nation states.* A comparison of my results in Italy and Norway will shed some light on whether factors that influence attitudes are universal, or if they are dependent on the nationality of the respondents. It is possible that for instance different

parts of national identity will trigger intolerance in countries that differ from each other culturally.

The reason why I chose to study and compare a Southern European country and a Northern European country, is that I wanted to study two countries that differ from each other historically and culturally, but that nevertheless have certain structural features in common. Italy and Norway are both immigration countries and they are both industrialised Western nation states. They are furthermore both young nations in the modern sense of the word. I chose to study Italy and Norway simply because they are the two European countries I had best knowledge of beforehand. After repeated visits to Italy during the last decade, I also had a six months long stay in Padova, Italy in connection with the work on this thesis. Because of my knowledge of these two countries, I believe myself to be more able to understand attitudes and identity in Italy and Norway than in any other countries. Of course, there is always a risk that my interpretations will be coloured of my underlying assumptions of these two nation states. However, the results of the ISSP survey are the same independent of my distance or lack of distance to the subjects of study.

In order to understand a population's perception of its nation and its attitudes towards immigration, historical knowledge is important. Each nation has been formed continuously since its beginning, and what has happened in the past influence the present. The nation's history is reflected in contemporary society. National identity and perception of foreigners do not take the shape they do just because of contemporary events and structural features in society. Italy has for instance a massive cultural legacy from the past, and this legacy most likely engenders pride in contemporary Italians. And Norway has had a repeated struggle for independence from Denmark, Sweden and Germany that has probably influenced contemporary Norwegians to cherish the value of national independence (Grytten, 1998). Both sociological theory and national history will be used in my attempt to understand attitudes towards immigration in contemporary Western nation states.

1.2 The Contents of this Thesis

I will start this study by giving a brief outline of Italian and Norwegian national history, from their beginning as independent nation states in the modern sense of the word and up to contemporary times. Since a national history contains a vast amount of information, I limit the outlines down to some parts of national history that can be linked to national identity and attitudes among contemporary inhabitants. The outline of Italian and Norwegian history will not be directly comparable to each other, but they will each contribute to a better understanding of these nations today. The national histories as presented in this thesis are not meant to explain contemporary attitudes towards immigration and national identities in a deterministic manner. Rather, the incentive is to let history illustrate the plausibility in contemporary attitudes and identities.

From the outlines of national histories I will move on to discuss relevant international theoretical contributions. I will present the theories of Ernest Gellner, Anthony D Smith, Benedict Anderson, Michael Billig and Leonard Doob. These five contributions have much in common at the same time as they differ substantially from each other. The theories of Gellner, Smith and Anderson all have their starting points in the formation of nations. Gellner (1983) stresses that nations arose with industrialisation, Smith (1991) claims that pre-national ethnic groups that had existed for a long time created the modern nation states, and Anderson (1989) emphasises the importance of language through the art of printing in the formation of nations. Billig and Doob are more preoccupied with contemporary everyday reproduction of patriotism and national devotion. The theoretical contributions are all important for an understanding of national identity and perception of immigrants.

After the chapter on theoretical framework, I will dedicate a chapter to a discussion of research that has been done with the same material that I will analyse. Hernes, Knudsen, Grytten and Hjerm have all studied Norway and Sweden based on the ISSP survey material, and Hjerm has in addition conducted a study of four other Western nation states. Their main focus has been xenophobia, and the mechanisms lying behind it. The discussion of this research will provide some preliminary assumptions to what we can expect to find - especially in Norway.

National identity will in this thesis consist of four aspects: *membership identity*, *chauvinistic identity*, *civic identity* and *cultural identity*. These four aspects will be elaborated based on preliminary statistical analyses of the survey material, sociological theory on nations and national devotion, and previous research of the survey material. I will undertake a thorough discussion of the identity aspects in the research chapter. At the end of the chapter I will create a model to sum up the focus in this thesis.

Before proceeding with analyses of the material, several methodological issues need to be discussed. In the chapter on methodological framework I will look at the ISSP survey "National Identity 1995" that will be used in my analyses, and discuss potential reliability and validity problems concerning data gathering methods and overall response rates in Italy and Norway. After this, the need to make national identity and attitudes towards immigration operational is evident. I will present the questions I have chosen from the ISSP survey to represent each identity aspect and attitudes, and give theoretical and practical reasons for my choices. Several variables will together measure each entity, and therefore I will conduct reliability tests on them to assess whether they have sufficient co-variation.

In a chapter on methodological framework in a cross-cultural study, a discussion of comparability is necessary. Comparability is a relevant topic for discussion even if one does not undertake a comparative study. As May states, *"no social phenomenon can be isolated and studied without comparing it to other social phenomena"* (May, 1993:155). I will discuss comparability in general, and comparability in cross-cultural research in particular before I move on to present the statistical technique I make use for in this investigation: correspondence analysis. This is an analysis technique that is especially suitable for categorical data. One of its greatest advantages is that it presents complex numerical information through relatively easy interpretable graphics (Greenacre and Blasius, 1994:vii).

With national histories, relevant theories, previous research and methodological issues covered, I proceed with the analyses. I dedicate a chapter each to Italy and Norway, before I compare the two in my third analytical chapter. In both the Italian and the Norwegian chapters, I will start by conducting a correspondence analysis of traditional background variables like age, income and education. This analysis will give us an overview of

noteworthy structural oppositions in each nation. I will also present frequency analyses of attitudes towards immigration and all four identity aspects in order to assess the dominant pattern of attitudes and national identity in each nation. Later on, I move on with correspondence analyses of each aspect of national identity together with attitudes. The explanatory variables from the background analysis will be included as passive variables so that I can assess whether the structural oppositions discovered in the beginning of each analytical chapter are reflected in the mental patterns of attitudes and national identity. I will be able to say something about what kinds of people have different types of attitudes and different types of national identity; if they share a certain education level, income, age and so forth. I will also be in a position to say something about the relations between attitude and identity in each nation.

After analysing Italy and Norway separately, I turn to a comparison of the two countries based on the information the first two analytical chapters have yielded. I will start the comparison by looking at similarities and differences in the dominating answering patterns of each country. In the main part of the comparative chapter I will compare Italians and Norwegians with different kinds of attitude in order to find out whether the background variables and the different parts of national identity are related to attitudes in the same way in a Southern European and a Northern European nation state. I will make use of both national histories and theoretical contributions in my presentation of possible reasons for the observed similarities and differences.

At the end of this thesis I will briefly sum up the results from all my analyses. I will furthermore discuss the practical use a thesis such as this can have, and I will also present some suggestions for future research in the field of national identity and attitudes towards immigration.

1.3 Attitudes towards Immigration and National Identity

Before I start my investigation of attitudes and national identity, a brief presentation of these key concepts is in order. When I speak of attitudes towards immigration, I refer to both positive and negative sentiments that members of a nation may have in connection with people from other countries coming to settle.

National identity is a concept that is far more difficult to grasp. An individual's personal identity will entail many different components that together constitute the individual's unique personality. In different social situations, different parts of the identity will dominate. Gender identity and identities based on education and employment can be seen as examples of the parts constituting identity as a whole. At work, a person will emphasise different parts of his/her identity than at home with the family. National identity is also part of a person's identity, although it is often not consciously contemplated. Michael Billig (1995) claims that national identity is part of everyday life in any nation-state. National identity becomes part of our "second nature.

I have already mentioned that a sense of belonging to a national community is closely associated to a person's national identity, and that research has shown that some parts of national identity affects attitudes towards immigration in a negative manner while other parts affect attitudes positively. Because of its complexity, I have chosen to let four different identity aspects constitute national identity as a whole. Also previous research contributions that I will discuss in a later chapter have divided national identity into different parts. I will directly use some of the aspects that previous research has developed, while modifying other aspects in order to make them suitable for the study of both Italy and Norway.

- **Membership identity**

    This aspect of national identity entails certain criteria that nationals often consider important to fulfil before a person can be accepted as a true member of the national community. Examples of such criteria are national citizenship and knowledge of the language spoken in the nation. The importance of these criteria in a national population will reflect how difficult it is for outsiders to be accepted.

- **Chauvinistic identity**

    This identity aspect implies a strong national devotion that places one's own nation above other nations. In a comparison of nations, people with a positive chauvinistic identity will favour their own nation. They will consider their nation to be unique and superior to others. A person will have a positive chauvinistic identity if he/she for instance believe that the world would be a better place if other people were more like

his/her fellow nationals and that his/her nation is generally speaking the best nation in the world.

- **Civic identity**

  This aspect refers to the pride people take in national civic institutions. Examples of such institutions are the social security system and national democracy. Civic institutions like these constitute the state. In most countries - especially modern Western countries - the state is inextricably linked to the nation. Indeed, nationalism has been defined as *"the striving to endow a culture with its own political roof"* (Gellner, 1983:43). With this line of reasoning, pride or lack of pride in civic institutions will inevitably be part of a person's national identity.

- **Cultural identity**

  This identity aspect refers to pride in national cultural institutions. Cultural identity deals with national culture both in a historic and a contemporary sense. National art and literature often stem from the past, while for instance achievements in science and technology can be of a more contemporary nature. In theory, cultural identity entails all national cultural achievements. Of course, in order to analyse it practically I have to limit it down to a few representative cultural institutions. Such limitations must also be done with the other identity aspects.

When I speak of national identity in general in this thesis, the concept entails all the four identity aspects presented briefly above. In the chapter on theoretical framework I will furthermore account for how relevant theoreticians use the concept.

I will now begin my investigation with an outline of Italian history. Because of the limitations of this thesis, I have to narrow my historical presentation down to only including events and circumstances that may have an effect on contemporary national identity and attitudes towards immigration in Italy. I will start with the beginning of Italy as a nation state in the 1860s. Although it is tempting to also discuss the cultural legacy from the Roman Empire, I have chosen not to go that far back in time.

2. Italian History

In order to understand a population's perception of its nation and its attitudes towards immigration, historical knowledge is important. A lot of a nation state's history is reflected in contemporary attitudes and senses of identity. With this in mind, an outline of Italian history will enable me to extract certain hypotheses concerning the Italians' national identity and attitudes towards immigrants. The outline will also facilitate a general understanding of the empirical data presented later in this thesis.

The following outline is based mainly on a book on Italian history by Mario B. Mignone (1995). To found an historical overview on one main source entails certain risks that the overview will not be neutral. Especially when it comes to the relation between the North and the South of Italy, the outline may seem normative. I nevertheless consider Mignone's historical contribution to be suitable for my purposes. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, I will use national history simply to illustrate the plausibility of contemporary attitudes and national identities. Mignone's outline on Italian history presents a general picture of the past in Italy that is useful in a thesis such as this, as long as we keep in mind that the picture may at certain points be somewhat normative.

A country's history entails a vast amount of information, and I have chosen to limit the outline to the following subjects: the Italian unification, the gap between Southern and Northern Italy, politics and terrorism from 1945 onwards, national economic development and the welfare state, and Italian immigration history.

2.1 Il Risorgimento – the "Resurrection" of Italy

In March 1861 a new nation state appeared under the name of "Italia" (Peri, 1992). The state's first prime minister was Camillo Cavour, who one assumes was the leading architect behind the unification of many small states to one nation - a process called "il Risorgimento", "the resurrection" (Riall, 1993). Cavour started his work in Piemonte in the 1850s, with a complete modernisation of the state. A liberal constitution was drafted, and

with it an independent parliament and a modern justice system. The state also intervened to encourage economic growth, and modern infrastructures were built (ibid.).

The unification of Italy was supposed to involve a similar modernisation of all the small states, but that never happened. An important figure in the process of il Risorgimento was Giuseppe Garibaldi. Garibaldi was a radical without official backing from Cavour and King Victor Emmanuel 2 of Piedmont-Sardinia, although they stood ready to assist if he proved successful (britannica.com). Even though Garibaldi was very popular among the peasants in the south of Italy, the area was on the brink of civil war after he had conquered it in the summer of 1860. Garibaldi's popularity did not automatically lead to loyalty to a united Italy. The inhabitants of the south did not at all feel as part of a new state, but rather as the subjects of a colony. The economic conditions in the south were very poor, and the peasants were systematically exploited, which made them very hostile towards the new state (Mignone, 1995:126-130). Because of the situation in the south, Cavour decided to go through with an efficient and highly centralised unification, without the step by step modernisation he had successfully implemented in Piemonte. However, Camillo Cavour died in June 1861 before he had managed to finish the process of il Risorgimento (Riall, 1993). Cavour's Moderate Liberal Coalition Government - *Destra Storica* - ("historical right") - continued il Risorgimento after the prime minister's death. The administrative unification between 1861 and 1865 was enforced without consulting local or regional interests. For a long time after 1860 the different parts of the new state did not benefit from any of the promised modernisation processes (ibid.).

After 1865 the new nation state expanded it's territory. The army of king Victor Emmanuel conquered Veneto in 1866 and Rome in 1870. Prior to this the Pope had ruled Rome, and he reacted with fury when Italy conquered his territory. He locked himself inside the Vatican as a "prisoner" of the Italian state, and refused to have anything to do with this state (Mignone, 1995:5).

The new nation state had no common traditions and language (Peri, 1992). Gradually Tuscan became the "Italian" language (Billig, 1995). By 1870 Italy had 25 million inhabitants (Mignone, 1995). It was a monarchy and had a parliamentary government, but it was highly centralised. The political rulers had no contact with the people, and only 2% of the population were entitled to vote (ibid.).

The Italian sociologist Antonio Gramsci has called il Risorgimento a "passive revolution" (Riall, 1993:49). According to him it was a revolution controlled by the upper classes, where the lower classes were excluded and oppressed in the process. The lower classes throughout the country were consequently hostile towards the new nation state, partly because of their exclusion from the unification process, and partly because they did not get the social and political reforms they had been promised (Riall, 1993). The people's mistrust led to an Italian identity which was far more regional than national (Vasta, 1993:92). The political rulers were aware of the lack of unity in the Italians' identity quite early. Indeed, after il Risorgimento was finished the Italian nationalist Massimo d'Azeglio exclaimed: "We have made Italy, now we have to make the Italians" (Mignone, 1995:4).

In the early period of the Italian state there is very little evidence to suggest a strong tie between state and people, and many still assume that Italian identity is regional rather than national (Vasta, 1993; Mignone, 1995). This indicates that throughout Italian history there has been a wide gap between rulers and ruled in Italy. Most Italians feel strongly connected to the village or local area that they come from. Significant to their sense of identity is also whether they come from northern or southern Italy. I will examine the gap between these two parts of the country in more detail below. All of this indicates that a foundation for a negative attitude towards the state and Italian civic institutions was laid in the late 19th century. Other aspects of Italian history render it plausible that the attitudes towards the state may have remained negative ever since. To what extent this proves to be accurate will be apparent when we confront the national history with the empirical data from 1995.

2.2 The Wealthy North and the Poor South

The Southern history is very different from the Northern one, and deserves an outline of its own. When we refer to Southern Italy, we usually mean the southernmost six regions in addition to the islands of Sicily and Sardinia (Mignone, 1995:129). In other words, Southern Italy is the area from the bottom of the "boot" on the map all the way up to Rome.

Today there is an enormous gap between the North and the South of Italy, and many northerners have almost a racist attitude towards their countrymen from the South (Mignone, 1995:142-145). Personal conversations with several northerners reveal that some have a tendency to regard the gap between the South and the North as equivalent to the gap between Africa and Europe. This outline will show that such attitudes probably date back a long time.

Centuries before Rome started her conquests, what is now Southern Italy actually belonged to Greece and was a brilliant and very wealthy civilisation. But when Rome later governed the area, the inhabitants were exploited in farming. After Rome the South was invaded and dominated for centuries by different groups of people (Mignone, 1995). Ever since the unification of Italy the North has discriminated against the South. Industrial developments and civic investments have always been concentrated in the North at the expense of Southern development (Vasta, 1993:92). At one point the South was also deemed to be so unattractive for settlements that Mussolini - while he governed the country - sent "dangerous" individuals in exile there (Mignone, 1995:128).

In order to minimise the constantly growing difference in wealth between the North and the South, a subsidy fund was established in 1950 - Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. However, this fund did not manage to improve the situation on a permanent basis. While people in the South received financial support, the North drained the South for human labour in order to rebuild its own financial wealth after the war. A great part of the financial support helped to improve the poor infrastructures in Southern Italy, but little or nothing was done with the unemployment problem in the area.

In addition, some subsidies from this fund went indirectly to the North, because the state encouraged and supported financially Northern companies who were willing to start up factories in the South in the 1960s. It later turned out that these new factories did not blend in with the rest of the Southern working life at all. Management and all the necessary technical personnel were brought in from the North, and Northern investments had no connection to the rest of the local economy (Mignone, 1995:129-136).

Simultaneously it was very difficult for southerners to get work in the South, a fact that had two main consequences. Firstly, many moved north in the 1960s in order to find work.

Secondly, the number of disablement benefits in the South exploded at the same time. These benefits were easy to achieve since all you needed was a friendly doctor (Mignone, 1995:135).

There still exists a huge division between Northern and Southern Italy. The inhabitants in the North feel closer connected to their neighbouring countries than they do to the South. Many of them feel that the southerners have ruined their dream of becoming the richest country in Europe (Mignone, 1995: 125). This feeling is reflected in Lega Nord's popularity - the biggest political party in the North. This party's aim is to make Northern Italy a new independent nation state, in other words to separate the region from the rest of the country.

The huge gap between the North and the South contributes even more to the weakening of the national identity of Italy, since it results in a strong regional identity for the inhabitants in both parts of the state. Furthermore, this part of the history might also enlighten us from a new angle in understanding the Italians' lack of trust in the state's efficiency concerning internal problems. However, this aspect of Italian history also demonstrates potential problems with the survey material in this thesis. The questions in the survey do not account for the enormous differences between the North and the South, because they treat the country as one unity. It is therefore impossible based on the survey alone to become aware of the fact that northerners often treat southerners as "immigrants" from a different culture. Questions concerning attitudes towards immigration obviously only deal with attitudes towards foreigners. However, when it comes to the Italian case, some questions concerning attitudes towards other regions within the country ought to be included.

2.3 Political Immobility, Terrorism and the Mafia

The political situation in Italy in the period after World War 2 was in theory much different from the situation at the time of il Risorgimento. From being a highly centralised and undemocratic country, Italy established a new constitution after the war that made sure that the nation should be a democratic nation ruled by the people. But theory and practice can be two very different things, and the country struggled for a long time with the same

troublesome distance between rulers and ruled as they did in the 1870s, although the ideology now was almost the opposite (Mignone, 1995).

In the period 1946-1993 a common complaint among the Italians was that the country's politics suffered under "immobilismo" (immobility). Although the governments constantly changed and general elections were held almost on a yearly basis, the same politicians kept running the country. This led to a kind of dictatorship in an officially most democratic system (Mignone, 1995:17-37).

The general elections in Italy up to 1993 were easily predictable for several reasons. Firstly, according to Italian law it was not illegal to exchange services for votes, and corruption was widespread (ibid:30). Nearly 20% of the Italian work force is employed in the public sector, and most of these work there because other people (politically active family members or friends) have done them a favour. Consequently, the employees are loyal to their benefactors and the political parties that these belong to (Mignone, 1995).

It also seems that the tense relationship between Christian-Democrats and Communists contributed to locking the political system in "immobilismo". As good as every election resulted in victory for the Christian-Democrats, closely followed by the Communists. The Christian-Democratic party has in the period 1946-1995 led 49 of 52 coalitions (Mignone, 1995). The fear of communism seems to have kept the Christian-Democrats in power, and discontent with the government seems to have kept the Communists strong. A contributing factor to why the Communists never gained government power despite their size is undoubtedly the US. The US has been deeply involved in Italy's internal politics in order to prevent communist participation in an Italian coalition. Since Italy is a key nation in the NATO, the US regarded the strong communist party as a threat to the alliance and to the security of the Western world. This intervention from the US enhanced the already existing "immobilismo" problem in Italian politics (Mignone, 1995:71-72).

When communism lost its grip in Eastern Europe, the Communist Party in Italy weakened and US interventions ceased. Italian politics got somewhat more unpredictable. The substantial turning point in Italian politics, however, came in April 1993. A referendum was held, and 82% of 35 million voters voted for a transition from proportional representation to a majority system at the elections. The old election system made sure that

a party, who received many votes from one region, was represented in parliament even if it did not get any votes at all in the rest of the country. This was a major reason why small parties with a very local agenda flourished in Italy, and the number of parties represented in parliament varied between 12 and 16. Because of the numerous parties Italians could not realistically vote for the future government at elections; they could only influence a potential coalition by strengthening a particular party's parliamentary representation (Mignone, 1995:17-37). The transition to a majority system at the elections entailed that ¾ of the members of parliament (472 out of 630) should be elected according to the "first past the post" method, a system used for instance also in Great Britain and the US. In order to protect the interest of the smaller parties, it was also decided that the remaining ¼ should be elected proportionally amongst all parties with more than 4% of the votes. The votes that were used to place the first ¾, could not be used a second time to place the last ¼. The fact that political parties now had to have more than 4% of the general election votes in order to be represented in the parliament, resulted in a large reduction of the number of parties (Mignone, 1995:46-48).

At the same time as this transition was implemented, quite a few other weaknesses connected to the political system was also straightened out. It was legislated that the Civil Service no longer was allowed to support political parties economically, three departments of the government were dissolved because of corruption and abuse of public spending, and the legislative and the executive branches of Italian authority were divided. Earlier these two branches were one, and this had resulted in too much power in the hands of too small a group of politicians.

All the changes mentioned above have resulted in a substantial weakening of the immobility of Italian politics, which again has motivated the Italians to experiment more at elections (Mignone, 1995:46-46).

Political history does not simply deal with political parties and election routines. Problems concerning terrorism and organised crime have also played an important part in Italian political history. It is assumed that in the period 1969-1985 more than 14 000 terrorist actions were performed in Italy, both by left-wing radicals and right-wing extremists. The best known group of the left wings is undoubtedly the Red Brigade, where several of the founders were sociology students at the university of Trento. This terrorist group became

infamous worldwide in 1978 after the kidnapping and execution of prime minister Aldo Moro. Right-wing terrorist groups were even more difficult than the left-wing groups for the state to handle, because they picked their victims completely at random. Their aim was to prove that the state was unable to take care of social chaos and violent crimes, and so they put bombs in public places like train stations and outdoor markets (Mignone, 1995:55-60).

Organised crime in Italy is dominated by the mafia (Sicily), the camorra (Naples) and the 'ndrangheta (Calabria). The mafia is the largest of these three. Mussolini almost succeeded in eradicating the mafia in the 1930s, but American mafia supported by the US military re-established it during World War 2 in order to help fight the nazis. The Italian mafia quickly regained its power and was allowed to flourish since it helped political parties with votes and campaign funding. In contemporary Italy the Mafia has become a major participant in drug trading, and has consequently taken up a much more violent behaviour. Most Italians wish that the mafia didn't exist, but the state still has a long way to go before it succeeds in solving this problem. The main problem seems to be that the mafia has infiltrated regional politics - and thereby controls it (Mignone, 1995:62-65).

In the period after 1945 the problems with "immobilismo", terrorism and mafia have been prominent in Italy. The political history shows us that many Italians will probably not blindly trust the Civil Service in general and the politicians in particular when it comes to an efficient solution to the country's internal problems. The new election system implemented after the referendum in 1993 may have led to a more friendly attitude towards the political system, and may also to some extent have bridged the distance between rulers and ruled. A certain scepticism toward the system will probably nevertheless remain for a while after such reforms.

2.4 "The Italian Miracle" and the Welfare State

A nation's economic history also contributes to a people's national identity. If the economy has progressed positively, it may give the population a positive attitude towards this particular aspect of their identity. If it, on the other hand, has developed negatively, and

one has experienced extensive crisis along the way, this might give the population a negative attitude.

In 1945 Italy was one of the poorest countries in the West. In 1947 she was forced to pay more than 300 million dollars in war damages to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Albania in addition to the enormous costs of rebuilding the country after the war. At the same time the new constitution of 1/1-1948 ambitiously proclaimed that Italy was to be a welfare state, which would ensure that her inhabitants received a basic standard of living (Mignone, 1995).

After the war Italy rebuilt herself at an incredible pace, a fact that has been referred to by foreigners as "the Italian miracle". This economic miracle took place especially in the period 1958-63, when Italy changed into a consumer society along American lines. At the beginning of the 1960s Italy had one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The vast growth was mainly based on low salaries due to high unemployment in the South, weak labour unions, high population mobility, and international monetary stability. By 1963 the total unemployment in the country was at an all time low at 3,6%. Despite the lack of natural resources Italy has in the post-war period managed to become one of the top five industrialised countries in the world. The South is still a lot poorer than the North, but everywhere there have been huge improvements (ibid.).

However, towards the end of the 1960s Italy experienced an economic and social crisis. The low unemployment in the early 1960s led to a breakthrough for the labour unions. They achieved substantial raises, which were naturally followed by a decrease in industrial profits. The private consume rose and the result was high inflation. The crisis reached its peak in the autumn of 1969, with students' and workers' rebellions. After these rebellions the government decided to go through with a highly advanced social legislation. The ideology behind it was that laws should ensure equality in *results* rather than equality in *opportunities*. Rules were implemented to protect people in the work life, and the new legislation provided large unemployment benefits. But this advanced - and expensive - legislation was not sustained for long, since the Italian economy suffered serious setbacks when the international oil prices rose in 1973. Italy imports about 85% of her energy.

In the middle of the 1980s Italian economy struggled due to high unemployment, work costs, huge welfare spending, and inflation. Simultaneously, however, the nation experienced a new industrial export record, and a general feeling of wealth spread across the country (Mignone, 1995). Today the public service is the sector of Italian economy that is most in need of improvements. Transportation with the railway system is in desperate need of improvements, and when it comes to mail services it is not uncommon that it takes a whole week to send a letter from one side of Rome to the other (Mignone, 1995:118-119).

Despite the economic crisis in the 1970s and a partially difficult period in the 1980s, it is "the economic miracle" (1958-63) which people remember the most. Evolutionary speaking Italy has changed more in the last 50 years, than she has done in the previous 2000 years. Even though the country struggles with budget deficiencies, economic waste in the public sector and inflation, it is still - as mentioned above - one of the top five industrialised countries of the world. This indicates a fairly successful economic development (ibid.).

As part of the economic aspect of a nation's history, the development of the welfare state should also be accounted for. The constitution of 1948 was the starting point for Italy as a welfare state. This gradually influenced the Italian family structure. The traditional extended family in Italy has drastically declined. In 1971, households with 5 or more members were twice as many as households containing only one person. Today the situation is reversed in Northern Italy, probably because welfare benefits lessen the economic dependency people used to experience in relation to their family networks (Mignone, 1995:185-186).

From time to time the welfare costs in Italy has hurt the economy badly, and in the beginning of the 1990s welfare was one of the most troublesome areas in Italian social politics. One of the reasons was the low age of retirement; 60 for men and 55 for women. Another contributing factor is that as many as 10% of the population receive disability benefits. Most of these people can be found in the South, where the unemployment is so extensive that disability pensions are chosen as a way of income by normal, healthy people. A third reason for the difficult economic situation of the Italian welfare state, is the large amount of taxdodgers. Most Italians regard their politicians as a bunch of thieves

because of the widespread corruption in the Civil Service, and consequently many Italians feel that "none of my money will go into this rotten system" (Mignone, 1995:117).

A substantial decline in welfare costs took place when Italy had to fulfil her obligations in accordance with the European monetary union. Italy was told she had to lower her annual budget deficiency down to 3% of the gross national product, and the national debt should not exceed 60% of the GNP. The prime minister - socialist Giuliano Amato - raised the retirement age to 65 for both men and women, he made severe cuts in the health funding, and speeded up the privatisation of public companies. This has led to a stability in the country's economy, but it has also led to an Italian welfare state that today just barely exists (Mignone, 1995).

Considering the economic history in general, the Italians have reason to feel positive about their national identity, despite some weaknesses over the years. But when we look at the development of the welfare state in later years it is more likely that the majority of the Italians feel discontented. This shows us how the national economy and the condition of the welfare state contrasts each other, which in turn can result in a divided civic identity among the inhabitants. It is likely that the typical Italian will take more pride in the national economy than in the welfare state. I will bare this in mind in my analysis of Italian civic identity later on in this thesis.

2.5 From Emigration to Immigration

The previous aspects of Italian history give us the opportunity to extract hypotheses concerning Italian national identity. Immigration history, on the other hand, can assist in shedding some light on contemporary Italians' attitudes towards immigrants.

After its formation, Italy remained an emigration country for a very long time. Between 1876 and 1965 about 25 million Italians left their homeland (Vasta, 1993). In the period prior to World War 2 most of these emigrants headed for the US. These people were mainly from the South of Italy, and they left their country because of poverty, unemployment and famine. After the war there was a new wave of emigration, and also this wave contained people from poor rural areas in the South. This time, however, they

did not seek a better life in the US, but in other European countries. Italy is the only nation in the advanced industrial world that has experienced massive emigration and rapid economic growth concurrently (Mignone, 1995). Of the work immigrants coming to Western Europe in the time before 1970, most of them were Italians (Fassmann and Münz, 1994). Germany, France and Switzerland were popular targets for the emigrants. About 1/3 of today's foreigners in Switzerland are Italians (ibid). This human flow changed direction in 1973, when the number of Italians returning home exceeded the number of Italians leaving Italy. This change of events can be traced back to an international economic crisis which made host countries like West-Germany send the immigrants out of the country (Mignone, 1995).

From 1978 onwards Italy became a country of immigration rather than emigration for several reasons (Hall and White, 1995). Firstly, the economic situation and the living conditions in Southern Europe gradually improved in this period, and, secondly, it was an unforeseen effect of the immigration stop in Great Britain, France, Germany and Switzerland (Barsotti, 1994). At the same time as these countries became very restrictive in their immigration policies, Italy made it much easier for people to get visas (Mignone, 1995). Besides this, political conflicts, civil wars and economic crisis in the Middle East, South America and Africa created a substantial immigration flow to Southern Europe (Fassmann and Münz, 1994). The largest groups of legal immigrants from countries outside the EU in the late 1990s came from Morocco, Tunisia, the Philippines and Senegal.

In addition to the legal immigrants, Italy also has a large group of illegal immigrants due to the difficulties of controlling her long coastline (Brochmann, 1993). Ever since Italy became a country of immigration this has presented a big problem, which became especially visible when the requirements for visas were made less strict (Mignone, 1995:145-149). On several occasions Italy has carried out "regularisations" in order to make the illegal immigration visible and in the process achieving better opportunities to master it. In these regularisations illegal immigrants have been given the chance to register without risking penalty or eviction. In 1986 and in 1990 respectively 105 000 and 216 000 immigrants from countries outside the EU regularised their status in Italy (Barsotti and Lecchini, 1995).

Recently there has been two immigration waves from Albania: march 1991 and august 1991. Italy was totally unprepared for this, and returned the refugees from the second wave (Vasta, 1993). Italy decided it was better to give Albania economic assistance for food and medicines than letting the refugees in (Mignone, 1995:146). This damaged the picture Italy had created of herself as a tolerant and helping nation, and the country had to realise that she had been completely unprepared politically, psychologically, culturally and bureaucratically for large waves of immigration (ibid.).

Most immigrants in Italy today are work immigrants. Family reunions are just getting started. When it comes to asylum applicants, Italy has one of the highest rejection rates in Europe. For instance only 800 of 26 000 asylum applicants got their applications granted in 1991 (Hall and White, 1995). However, because of the vast amount of illegal immigrants the number of legal immigrants does not mirror reality. It is impossible to estimate the exact number of immigrants in Italy. The Italian legislation concerning immigration consists of two laws both of whom are very restrictive. Nevertheless, immigration has increased steadily for the past 20 years. When we look at the Italian case it is obvious that restrictive legislation can exist together with a liberal practice regarding illegal working power (Brochmann, 1993).

For a long time the Italians have considered themselves as being tolerant towards immigration, and less conscious of colour than inhabitants in other European countries (Mignone, 1995:146). Lately, though, the unceasing flow of illegal immigrants and the two waves of Albanian refugees in 1991 have made it harder for Italians to maintain this image. Racist attitudes have increased notably in Italy, and political parties with immigrant-hostile agendas are becoming more and more popular (Hall and White, 1995:165). But this rise in negative attitudes is probably more closely connected to the authorities' lack of control over immigration than it is to the immigrants themselves (ibid.).

The history of immigration strengthens the assumption that Italians are not very proud of their state and their politicians, at least in relation to how the authorities deal with immigration - both legal and illegal. One can furthermore hypothesise that Italians will experience a certain hostility towards immigrants, but that their tradition as a friendly and tolerant nation will ensure - at least in principle - a positive attitude towards immigration. Since the survey investigated in this thesis dates back to 1995, the respondents probably

clearly remember the two Albanian waves of refugees in 1991 and all the chaos that stemmed from these incidents, and this might have influenced negatively on their attitudes - both towards state and immigrants.

2.6 Conclusion

This short outline of Italian history is especially valuable in understanding Italian civic identity as presented in the introductory chapter. Every aspect of Italian history renders it likely that the typical Italian of today will not be especially proud of national civic institutions.

The unification of Italy in the 1860s laid the foundation for an insurmountable distance between a governing elite and the people. The new nation was centralised, and ordinary people had very little say in the state of affairs. The traditional gap between the South and the North has existed for a long time, and state authorities have yet not succeeded in bridging it despite attempts such as the subsidy fund from 1950.

Immobility, terrorism and problems with the Mafia has probably further weakened Italian civic identity. The implementation of a new election system and several other reforms within the political system may have a counter-effect in the long run, but since these reforms were made in 1993 a positive effect on Italian civic identity is probably hard to detect in the survey conducted only two years later.

The Italian economic miracle in the post-war period should have a positive effect on civic identity, but at the same time the welfare state has experienced serious crisis during the last decades. Within the civic identity, I expect to find some discrepancy between how proud people are of national economy and how proud they are of the welfare state.

Finally, immigration history has also contributed in rendering a negative civic identity likely. Problems with illegal immigration and the chaos that stemmed from the two Albanian refugee waves in 1991 have probably not made Italians very proud of the authorities' ability to control unexpected situations of this kind. We have also seen that racist attitudes have increased in Italy lately. However, Italy's tradition as a tolerant and

helpful nation probably prevents the typical attitude towards immigrants from being mainly negative in contemporary Italy.

When I in the following chapter give an outline of Norwegian national history, my objective is not to present two national histories that are directly comparable with each other. A nation's history – or rather, the events that have been chosen to represent a nation's history – is an important component of that nation's distinctive quality. National histories from different countries will therefore never be directly comparable. In the outline of Italian and Norwegian histories in this thesis, I concentrate on events that may have influenced contemporary national identity and attitudes. Although there will always exist certain differences and similarities that can be commented on, such a discussion is not the main objective of this thesis.

3. Norwegian History

National histories are not directly comparable to each other. In the previous chapter I discussed the Italian unification process, the gap between Northern and Southern Italy, the political history coloured by political immobility, terrorism and Mafia, the Italian economic miracle, and the crisis in the welfare state. Neither of these finds their identical counter-parts in Norwegian history. In a study such as this, I am bound to limit the presentation of national history. I have chosen certain areas for each nation that are likely to influence contemporary identities and attitudes. As mentioned, the purpose is not to be able to compare the two national histories. Rather, the objective is to use the national histories to better understand identities and attitudes in Italy and Norway today.

In this chapter I will cover the following components of Norwegian history: political history from 1814 onwards, the construction of national culture from late 18th century onwards, the historical urban/rural dimension, economic history with emphasis on the development of the welfare state, and immigration history.

3.1 The "Embetsmann" State and Social Democracy

Broadly speaking, the Norwegian political history is characterised by two main phases: struggle for freedom and independence and the development of the social democracy. I believe there to be traces of both phases in contemporary Norwegian mentality.

As a result of the Kiel peace treaty of 1814, Denmark renounced Norway to Sweden. Norway rebelled against this and proclaimed Norway to be an independent state with a constitution of its own. This led to a brief war with Sweden, until October 1814 when the Norwegian parliament succumbed and agreed to join the union with Sweden (caplex.net). During the first decades after 1814, the Norwegian state was characterised by a strong personal monarchy under the ruling of the Swedish king Carl Johan. He selected his own ministers, and thereby controlled the government. If disagreements between him and the government should occur, he reserved the right to make the final decision. In addition he made several attempts to change the constitution to the benefit of the Crown. The main

reason why he did not succeed in this, however, can be found in the strong position the civil servants came to enjoy in both Norwegian government and parliament. Since Norway had no aristocracy who could participate in politics, the civil servants did not have competition in political life. They were appointed by the king and could not be dismissed. Through their positions they controlled recruitment to their own ranks to a substantial degree.

Even though the civil servants owed their power to the king, they gradually managed to force back the personal power of the monarchy for their own benefits, and after 1814 what has later been labelled the Norwegian "*embetsmann* state" (civil servants state) came into existence. In the period 1814-1884 the civil servants, in effect, ran the country. They were in government, and managed to continue recruiting their own members (Danielsen et al, 1995:229). In this period Norway experienced economic growth and material well being, and this probably accounts for much of the general popularity the civil servants' policies enjoyed. Their main objective was to develop Norway. They abolished privileges, liberalised trade, made it easier for new businesses to flourish, and built new roads and railways (Seip, 1996).However, although this was a stable political period it was not a completely harmonious one. The civil servants were opposed both by peasants, who entered parliament in the 1830s, and by popular protest movements that revolted against bureaucracy and capitalism. The mentioned abolishing of privileges was first and foremost a result of pressure from these oppositional groups, rather than the result of an independent initiative of the civil servants (Pryser, 1996).

In the 1870s a constitutional conflict arose between the government and the opposition. The core issue was whether or not the Crown had a power of veto. This conflict lasted until the early 1880s, and traditional groupings dissolved as parliament divided into two parties. Based on this division, the conflict ended with the creation of two parliamentary parties in 1883-84: the Liberals and the Conservatives. This laid the foundation for a new system – the parliamentary system – and the end of the *embetsmann* state. Franchise was extended and the parliament became the source of governmental power, instead of the king. This made the position of the civil servants substantially less secure. The two new parties dominated the political scene until 1918 even though several other parties were formed shortly after 1884 (Danielsen, 1995).

In 1885 the union question became an issue, after a Swedish initiative involved a Swedish organisation of Norwegian foreign relations. Political opinion concerning the union was radicalised and strengthened in the following years. Because of a growing national self-esteem this type of subordinate position in the union was not acceptable. The conflict culminated in 1905, when the king vetoed a parliamentary decision to establish a separate Norwegian consular service. The veto was performed against the advice of his cabinet. According to the parliament, a royal veto in disagreement with the cabinet was unconstitutional, and therefore the king could no longer be king. According to the Norwegian interpretation the king was the only common tie between Norway and Sweden, and therefore the union should come to an end (Danielsen, 1995:306). A referendum was held where an overwhelming majority of the Norwegian people voted in agreement with the parliament and after two months of negotiating Norway and Sweden agreed to dissolve the union peacefully. Already in the beginning of the negotiations, Sweden was quite positive towards the idea of dissolving the union because there was not much to be gained by continuing it. This probably accounts for the peaceful conclusion of the matter. A few months later Norway chose a Danish Prince to be the new Norwegian king (Nerbøvik, 1996).

Up to 1918 governmental power – mostly Liberal – was based on solid majorities in parliament. In the period between the two World Wars, however, the state experienced frequent changes of minority governments. A solid one-party majority in parliament was resumed after the Second World War, as a result of the Labour Party's growing popularity in the 1930s. The Labour Party was in government until 1965 with one brief break. With this new socialistic governmental stability came a marked growth in the state's ambitions to run the national economy. The government introduced numerous reforms like worker protection, benefits for the disabled and the retired, sickness insurance and unemployment insurance (Danielsen, 1995). Unemployment after the war was practically non-existent, and loyalty towards the system and a strong feeling of national unity made the reconstruction of the country an easier task. Social democracy rapidly became the dominating ideology. From 1945 to 1973 Norway experienced a continuous period of growth, and the 1960s was the first decade of general prosperity. The consensus in the broad centre of Norwegian politics was further strengthened in the 1950s and 1960s. There was broad agreement about the expansion of the welfare state and about the need for regional policies in order to achieve an egalitarian society (Danielsen, 1995). This period

probably laid the foundation for ordinary people to be proud of their state and identify with it.

The Labour Party lost its majority in the 1960s. Around 1970, political stability became gradually undermined. In the period 1971-1991 Norway had 10 governments headed by 6 different Prime Ministers. From 1970 onwards the support of social democracy and the welfare state declined (Grytten, 1998). In the middle of the 1980s the welfare crisis was visible through widespread protest reactions against the generosity of the welfare state. The economic consequences of social policies had become straining and in the 1990s the country experienced an economic crisis (ibid.). Political life after the era of Labour Party dominance is characterised by economy and welfare state policies, and will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Repeated struggle for independence - from Denmark, Sweden and during the Second World War from Germany - has affected the Norwegian mentality continuously. The EEC referendum of 1972 and the EU referendum of 1994 may be seen as examples of this. It has become part of Norwegian identity to cherish independence and freedom, and the majority of the population is not eager to enter a union where national independence might be at stake - although the majority in the 1994 referendum was just barely over 50%. Of course, there are also other reasons for the reluctance to join the European Union. A plausible reason is that Norway is wealthier than many other European countries. Many will probably consider it in the best national interest to stay out of the union so that Norwegians themselves can govern national income and resources. Another reason is most likely the solidarity large parts of the urban population have had with the peasants. I will return to the Norwegian alliance between centre and periphery in the section regarding the Norwegian urban/rural dimension.

"The civil servants state" was a period of development in Norway and, as such, it gave reason for a positive identification with the nation. However, it was not particularly democratic and probably did not lead to a strong positive civic identity. Both peasants and workers, who together represented a vast majority of the Norwegian population at the time, protested against the civil servants rather than identified with them.

The era of the Labour Party, which took place 1945-1965, probably gave much more favourable conditions for a positive civic identity to flourish among the people. The reconstruction of the country after the war united the people. The ideology of social democracy diminished the distance between rulers and ruled at the same time as the state got more and more influence on society. I do not find it unlikely that these circumstances led to a positive civic identity that may still be found in Norwegians of today.

3.2 The Peasant as a National Symbol

Norway in the 18th century was more a heterogeneous collection of small societies than it was a nation (Christensen, 1993). Pre-national states in Europe did not demand that their inhabitants should belong to one specific culture. With modernisation, however, the creation of a homogeneous national culture became an important political project. A common culture facilitated mobility among the work force and byalty from the people to the abstract societal system (Hylland Eriksen, 1993). This common culture was created mainly by the modification of dialects into one national language and by compulsory education where language and national history were important components. Norway's history was constructed in order to make Norway distinctly different from other European countries, especially Sweden and Denmark (ibid.). I consider especially two phases of the construction of Norwegian national culture to be interesting in this thesis.

The "civil servants state" which can be dated approximately to the period 1814-1884, was dominated by a small group of people with the same type of education and strong internal ties. This political elite initiated policies to develop the country. It is under this program that the construction of national identity accelerated (Pryser, 1996). The civil servants maintained a relative Norwegian national independence towards Sweden while focusing internally on the development of national identity and national culture. They carried out a continuous appeal to a common past and a common identity. Gradually this appeal became part of the teaching in schools (Danielsen, 1995). The national romanticism was a powerful feature of European cultural life, with an emphasis on idealised rural life. Norway was no exception in this respect. An idealised abstraction of the peasant and the landscape surrounding him was constructed to represent the national culture. The peasant was thought of as a romantic figure that lived in between majestic mountains and beautiful

fjords. This abstraction had very little in common with the real life of Norwegian peasants, who at the time made up approximately 90% of the population (Christensen, 1993).

In the 1860s the civil servants gradually began to lose their power both politically and culturally. Peasants entered national politics, and the elite from the cities was divided. The old elite consisting of civil servants became dependent on the Swedish king and the union to stay in power, and this previous pro-national elite was now considered anti-national. In the early 1870s the liberals attained the right to define the national, and this marks the beginning of the second phase of the construction of Norwegian national culture. The liberal ideology opposed the civil servants state and was highly controversial. Because of its democratic characteristics, however, the new nation building project gained widespread popularity among the people. This resulted in an extensive cultural self-enlightenment in the rural areas. There was a close co-operation between local and regional elites consisting of teachers and peasants and the liberal elite of the capital city (Nerbøvik, 1996). Norwegian national culture was still thought of as rural, but this time it was not a culture forced upon the people by the civil servants' ideals of national romanticism. National culture and identity was now to a much greater extent administered and controlled by the peasants themselves, or at least by their representatives in the cities. (Seip, 1996). This second phase of culture construction is characterised by isolation. Ever since 1905 political opinion thought of Norway as an entity that should be rebuilt from within and that should not be dependent on Europe in any matter. Even though Norway was culturally speaking characterised by isolation in this period, it is important not to exaggerate the meaning of "isolation". Foreign capital was for instance important in this period. Foreign interests invested heavily in Norwegian companies (Danielsen et. al., 1995).

The first construction phase described above did not involve active participation from the people. The construction of a national culture was mainly an elite project. This does not imply that the people had no say: the ideals of the elite would not have become widespread unless the people themselves to some extent agreed upon their value (Pryser, 1996). An example of this is the idea of scandinavism, which at least parts of the elite advocated strongly in the 1840s and 1850s. Behind the notion of scandinavism was the idea of a closer political co-operation between Norway, Sweden and Denmark. This was an ideal that never received widespread support from the people, and it quickly lost its relevance. The construction of culture and national identity was far from as authoritative as it had

been in Italy (Chapter 2, p.13-15). Nevertheless, most decisions were made by an elite and as such we can not call it a democratic project in the modern sense of the word. The national culture that the political elite advocated with the peasant as its most important national symbol had little in common with reality. The project might have given at least some strata of society a positive *cultural* identity, but there is no reason to assume that it laid the foundation for a positive *civic* identity. There was a clear distance between the public authorities and the people, and the majority of the people did not yet have the opportunity to influence politics. As late as in 1882, less than 8% of the population were entitled to vote (Danielsen, 1995:267).

In the second phase, however, the trend turned. The people became more influential and although the national symbols were the same - dominated by rural nature - they were now more in touch with reality. The democratic ideals gradually gave the majority political rights and opportunities to influence public matters, and the foundation for a modern egalitarian society was laid. Simultaneously the construction of culture in this phase was a strictly domestic project where independence from all other countries was highly valued. Civic identity probably strengthened as the gap between rulers and ruled diminished during this period. Because of the self-chosen cultural isolation from other countries it is likely that national identity in general also strengthened.

3.3 Egalitarian Ideology and the Urban/Rural Dimension

Norwegian national identity is closely bound up to the political centre/periphery dimension (Grytten, 1998). Romantic abstractions of rural nature and the peasants living in it were used by the elite to construct a national Norwegian culture. During the earlier mentioned era of the civil servants the urban and the rural represented a conflict dimension. When the liberals continued the construction of national culture and identity from the 1870s onwards, however, the gap between the people and the elite narrowed. And when power was passed on to the Labour Party, the foundation was laid for a political and cultural alliance between peasants and town radicals. What was once a conflict dimension has later created opportunities for solidarity and unity. Examples of this are the referenda in 1972 and 1994 concerning membership in the European Union, where large parts of the urban population voted against membership because of solidarity with the peasants (ibid.). The egalitarian

ideology of the social democracy has made it important to even out differences in resources and wealth between centre and periphery. Throughout the post-war period the state has given special priority to the north of Norway through subsidies and other forms of support. This aid has helped maintain a highly decentralised settlement pattern in Norway compared to other countries. The ideological emphasis on universal rights for everyone in the welfare state have further contributed to solidarity within the nation and to the people's identification with the state (ibid.).

The relatively small distance between people and government and the egalitarian regional policies may suggest that also national identity should be quite evenly distributed in Norway, more so perhaps than in Italy because of Italy's huge differences between the southern and the northern part of the country (Chapter 2, p.15-17). Whether this hypothesis is accurate or not will be established in my analysis of national identity in the two countries in a later chapter.

3.4 Depression, Labour Party and the Welfare State

In the early nineteenth century most Norwegians worked within agriculture, fishing or forestry. This changed in the period 1875-1920, when Norway entered an era of mechanisation and industrialisation. This was an unstable period with many ups and downs in the national economy. Foreign capital was important throughout the period. Foreign interests invested substantially in Norwegian companies, at the same time as the Norwegian state and local authorities borrowed large amounts of capital abroad to build up the national infrastructure.

During the First World War we can see the beginning of the interventionist state. It took complete control over the national economy. It regulated prices and conditions for sale, and it forbade or demanded the production of certain goods. The inter-war years was a period filled with economic ups and downs. Depression and economic growth went hand in hand, so to speak. In the early 1920s, one in five members of the trade union were unemployed. The state's unemployment scheme ran empty in a couple of years. By 1930 Norway had the world's most efficient fleet. At the same time whaling increased, which contributed to economic growth. Another factor contributing to growth was rationalisation.

This new idea led to a marked growth in output, but no increase in employment. The worst year of the depression was 1931. In 1933 one in three members of the trade union were unemployed (Danielsen, 1995).

The economic growth Norway experienced alongside the depression led to increased income for the state. The authorities raised wages, reduced the working week, and gave many workers holidays with pay. But these reforms only benefited those who were already working. None of the long-term unemployed received a better living standard because of these social reforms. As in most European countries in the inter-war years, unemployment and depression eradicated the belief many had held in market self-regulation. It thereby laid the foundation for increased state control of national economy.

In 1935 the Labour Party formed government, and as a consequence the state's ambitions to run the national economy grew. Additionally, many new social initiatives were released; sickness benefits, pensions for the disabled and the unemployed, worker protection and old age pensions. After these reforms came into existence, Norway became one of the leading countries in social policies (Danielsen, 1995).

The post-war reconstruction mentality in Norway lasted long after the reconstruction was complete. After the war production increased markedly and the 1960s was the first decade with general prosperity in the country. The state, governed by a stable and popular Labour Party, influenced society more and more. The period from 1945 to 1973 is the longest period of continuous economic growth in modern national history. Unemployment was low, the average wages doubled, and there was a general increase in material well being among the people (Danielsen, 1995).

In the 1950s and 1960s Norway became a fully developed welfare society. The ideology behind it was that welfare and material goods should be evenly distributed among the people. The state engaged in a substantial redistribution of wealth from the strong to the weak. The public sector was large and expanding, and a comprehensive network of health and care institutions along with a safety net of social benefits developed.

The social benefits were first introduced by local authorities that were strong on initiative, and after a few years the state - anxious to spread the benefits as evenly as possible - made

them national. Welfare benefits were soon viewed as a universal right and not as a form of charity. In 1970 15% of the population received pensions of some kind. The society had become much more egalitarian. During the development of the welfare state, the state gradually took over many of the tasks that had previously been the responsibility of the family. It was taken for granted that public authorities should support the individual in need (Haagensen et al, 1990).

After the war housing was the state's highest priority. In 1946 the National Housing Bank was established. It gave cheap loans to people who wanted to build good but simple homes. Also education was prioritised in this period, and gradually higher education became available for the people, and not only for an elite. Most of the new educational possibilities were organised and paid for by public authorities. The third main area of post-war social policy was regional equality. The egalitarian ideology has triggered most of the state's priorities in the post-war period.

In 1972-74, the industrial growth came to a halt in Norway as a result of the international oil crisis. From the end of the 1970s onwards there was increasing unemployment in the country, and it rose steadily throughout the 1980s. The welfare society had expanded gradually, and in some areas reached its peak in the 1970s. Later it declined, and is now not able to take care of all its citizens in the way it could earlier. The rising unemployment and an increase in the number of elderly people who needs to be taken care of strained the resources of the welfare state (Grytten, 1998). Economic crisis of the 1990s worsened the situation further. As a result, there has been much popular protest against the interventionist state in general and the welfare state in particular.

This recent development might affect Norwegian civic identity in a negative way. However, the continuous period of growth from 1945 to 1973 should have affected civic identity in the opposite way. Of course, civic identity is not purely economic. Economy and the welfare state are merely two components in this identity type. Rather than one period countering the other leading to a neutral sense of pride concerning national economy and the welfare state, I would expect to see differences in pride in different generations in Norway. I find it likely that the oldest in society are prone to not being especially proud of these components. These are in a phase of life where they, according to the ideology of the welfare state, should be taken care of by the state. With the lack of

public resources in the 1990s, they do not receive as much support as they perhaps had hoped for and expected. At the same time, I expect that especially middle-aged people with sufficient personal resources take pride in civic institutions like national economy and the welfare state. They have experienced the golden age of these areas and are not dependent on material help from the state in order to survive.

3.5 Immigration History

The immigration histories of Italy and Norway have some noteworthy similarities. Both started out as emigration countries, and both became immigration countries at a late point compared to many other Western countries. But there are also substantial differences between them. Italy remained an emigration country until 1973, much longer than Norway, and the extent of immigration also varies between the two countries. Far more immigrants come to Italy than to Norway, both because of differences in political practice and because of Italy's vast problem with illegal immigration (Chapter 2, p.23-26).

As mentioned above, Norway was a country of emigration for a long time before it became an immigration country. In total, half a million people emigrated to America in the period 1875-1920 (Hovland, 1995). Most of the Norwegian emigrants were peasants. Although the emigrants outnumbered the immigrants, the parliament legislated a law to restrict work immigration in 1927 (Kjelsaas, 1992). This initiative was triggered by domestic consequences of the big depression with its massive unemployment in the 1920s. When general prosperity spread in the 1950s, however, a new law legislated in 1956 made it easier for foreigners to obtain working and residence permits (ibid.). At this time there was also considerable migration between the Nordic countries as a result of the 1954 Nordic work market treaty (Haagensen et al, 1990). It was not until 1966 that immigration exceeded emigration for the first time (Sevaldson, 1993). Immigration to Norway after this turning point can be divided into three phases.

The first phase was characterised by work immigration. The immigrants were of two kinds. Male work immigrants from countries like Pakistan, India and Turkey were employed as unskilled workers in the industry and service sectors. Experts from countries like the US,

Great Britain and Germany, on the other hand, came to Norway to participate in well-paid oil drilling (Haagensen et al, 1990).

In 1974 Norway, along with most Western European countries, legislated an immigration stop as a result of the international oil crisis (Sevaldson, 1993). This immigration stop was initially meant to be temporary, but in 1988 it was integrated permanently in the law. Exceptions from this restriction are key personnel, family reunion, refugees and people who seek asylum for humanitarian reasons. Asylum is granted to those who are persecuted in their homeland by the authorities there. Since key personnel is the only possibility for work immigration, work immigration has turned out to be a humanitarian discriminative project. Relatively resourceful people have been allowed to enter the country, while the weaker have often been excluded (Bakke, 1993).

The second phase of immigration occurred after the immigration stop was legislated in 1974, and was characterised by family reunions (Haagensen et al, 1990).

The third phase started in the late 1970s, and has continued to grow ever since. This wave of immigration is caused by refugees and asylum seekers. As a result of public integration policies influenced by egalitarian ideology, this last group of immigrants has been placed all over the country (ibid.). The work immigrants from the first immigration phase in Norway settled mainly in the larger cities and were later joined by their family members. The refugees and asylum seekers of today are to a great extent being put in the more peripheral areas of the country.

Any foreigner, except those from the other Nordic countries, who wants to stay in Norway for more than three months, must apply for a permission to stay. After three years foreigners can apply for a residence permit and after seven years they can usually obtain Norwegian citizenship if they want to. After 1986 immigration to Norway from culturally distant continents became visible in society, and the first organised resistance towards immigration started (Skirbekk, 1993). The Norwegian immigrant policy is based on a pluralistic ideology. It aims at giving the ethnic minorities the opportunity to maintain and develop their own culture at the same time as the immigrants have to fulfil some requirements. They are for instance required to have some knowledge of the Norwegian

language (Haagensen et al, 1990). Whether this pluralistic policy has been successful or not has been subject to many debates during the last decades.

Some theorists have claimed that people will have a more positive attitude towards immigrants if they have direct contact with immigrants than if they do not. This line of thinking often implies that people in urban areas should have a more positive attitude than people in rural areas, since immigration usually affects cities rather than peripheral areas. It also suggests that countries with much immigration should be more positive than countries with little immigration. Consequently, Italy should in general have a more positive attitude towards immigrants than Norway. As a counter-argument it can be said that Italy's problems with extensive illegal immigration to the already densely populated country may lead to a negative attitude towards foreigners among Italians.

In Norway regional equality has been prioritised in politics to a much greater extent than in Italy. During the last decades immigrants have been placed both in rural and urban areas as a result of Norwegian regional policies. Although there remains a tendency for immigrants to be over-represented in the capital and other large cities as opposed to in the periphery, I would expect there to be less discrepancy in the attitudes towards them in Norway than in Italy. I will return to these hypotheses later, in my analyses of attitudes towards immigration.

3.6 Conclusion

Immigration history has shown that immigration in Norway is a recent and limited phenomenon. Restrictive policies and the country's geographical position in the outskirts of Europe are probably the two most important reasons why immigration to Norway is small in an international context. As mentioned, little contact with immigrants is said to increase the risk of a negative attitude. Based on this line of reasoning, I would expect the typical Norwegian attitude to be somewhat more negative than the typical Italian attitude, although the problems with illegal immigration and the chaotic experience of the Albanian refugee waves in 1991 may have had a negative impact on Italian attitudes.

While the outline of Italian history enabled me to deduce certain hypotheses regarding civic identity, this outline of Norwegian history engenders hypotheses regarding all four identity aspects, as presented in the introductory chapter. I expect national identity in general to be roughly the same throughout the country. The political egalitarian ideal and the regional policies that stem from this ideal should have given people both in urban and rural areas the same sense of belonging and identity to a greater extent than in Italy with her huge differences between the North and the South.

We have seen that during the "embetsmann" state there was a gap between the group of civil servants that ruled the country and the people. After the era of the civil servants this distance gradually decreased, and after the Second World War a popular Labour Party and its ideology of social democracy probably secured the foundation for a positive civic identity in Norway. The economic history has, however, made me modify my hypothesis regarding a positive civic identity. Because of the setback in national economy and the welfare state in the 1990s, I expect the older segment of the population who do not have strong personal resources like education and income to have a negative civic identity. These people are in a stage of life where they expect to enjoy the universal rights of the welfare state. With the decline in the welfare state, they may not get as much support as they had expected.

The peasant as a national symbol has been important throughout the construction of a Norwegian national culture. In the beginning he was merely a romantic abstraction and did not have much in common with real Norwegian peasants. After the implementation of the parliamentary system and a democratisation of the state, the national symbols got more in touch with reality. National symbols from the beginning of the 20th century onwards should therefore be easier for the people to identify with and feel good about.

The self-chosen cultural isolation period Norway entered after the end of the union with Sweden in 1905 may have laid a foundation for a positive membership identity and chauvinistic identity in Norway. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, both these identity types are based on the distinction between "us" and "them". Membership identity has to do with the set of criteria a population believes others need to fulfil in order to become accepted as members of the community, while chauvinistic identity involves agreeing in statements favouring one's nation in an international context. When a nation

values independence and isolates herself during the construction of a national culture, it probably facilitates the creation of mental boundaries between that nation and other nations. I will go more into detail about the mechanisms behind membership identity and chauvinistic identity in the following chapter, which deals with the theoretical framework of this thesis. I will discuss all four identity aspects in the light of international theoretical contributions on nationalism and recent research on the 1995 survey material. An outline of the two countries' national histories and of relevant theory on the subject will enable me to shed some light on contemporary national identity and attitudes towards immigration in Italy and in Norway.

4. International Theoretical Contributions

Nationalism has been defined as an ideology with the principle that the nation-state should form a political community based on ethnic belonging and a shared cultural identity (Finke, 1997:217). This definition illustrates the strong relation that exists between nationalism and national identity. National identity will exist where the nationalist principle has been fulfilled, when a political community is congruent with the boundaries of a cultural identity. The preservation of national identity will at the same time be a preservation of the nationalistic principle.

There also seems to be a link between nationalism and xenophobia. It may be risky for a people who wish to preserve its social and ethnic distinctiveness to mingle with alien cultures and ideals. The more a group is exposed to foreign ideals and cultures, the more difficult it would seem from a nationalist point of view to preserve the original characteristics of this people. However, this does not imply that a strong national identity categorically leads to negative attitudes towards immigrants. Previous research has shown us that national identity consists of both excluding and including components (Hernes and Knudsen, 1997; Grytten, 1998).

In this chapter I will account for important international theoretical contributions in the field of nationalism. The theorists that will be discussed are Ernest Gellner, Anthony D. Smith, Benedict Anderson, Michael Billig and Leonard W. Doob. Not all of them have emphasised attitudes towards immigration in connection with national identity, and only parts of their theories will be applicable to the results of my analyses. It is nevertheless important to develop a general understanding of the research field before undertaking a specific investigation. On the whole, their contributions will provide a theoretical framework for this thesis.

4.1 Ernest Gellner

Ernest Gellner was a modernist in that he believed the nation to be something new and constructed (Kumar, 2000). According to him, industrialism causes nationalism and nationalism engenders nations.

Gellner defines nationalism as *"the striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof"* (1983:43). According to this definition, nationalism is mainly a political principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger when this principle is violated, or the feeling of satisfaction when it is fulfilled. Gellner claims that nationalism is a specific form of patriotism, which becomes dominant under certain social conditions in the modern world. Cultural homogeneity, literacy and anonymity are characteristic for the societies nationalism prevails in (Gellner, 1983).

Nationalism is the driving force of nation building. The transition from agrarian society to industrial society necessitated a unifying ideology, and this ideology was nationalism. Variant factors created a situation in the newly industrialised societies where political and cultural borders became mainly congruent, where the nationalist principle was fulfilled. The most important of these factors were universal literacy, mobility and individualism, political centralisation and the need for an expensive mass educational system. In a society characterised by these factors, the state acts as a protector of a culture, and a maintainer of homogeneous and standardised education. This process, however, did not run smoothly. The transition period was filled with conflicts and violence caused by the readjustment of either political boundaries or cultural ones (Gellner, 1983).

Roughly speaking, nationalism is a general imposition of a high culture on a society where low cultures had earlier taken up the lives of the population. Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a folk culture. It draws its symbolism from a romantic image of the rural life of the peasants. The components of this symbolism have been chosen very selectively, and are often changed radically in order to give the people a positive image of "their" culture. Nationalism seems to erase differences among people, and creates a sense of unity and solidarity within the nation (Gellner, 1983:55-57). But through the selection and transformation of symbols, what the nationalists claim is the local folk culture actually

turns into a rivalling new high culture in society. When nationalism prospers, it is able to eliminate the dominating high culture. Instead of replacing it with the local folk culture, however, nationalism imposes the new high culture on the population. While claiming to protect an old folk society, nationalism in fact helps to build up an anonymous mass society suitable for the needs of the industrial age (Gellner, 1983).

In an established modern nation, the perpetuation of a national culture is dependent on a centralised educational system to socialise the population into this culture. Additionally, the perpetuation of culture is a necessary prerequisite for the state's economy since economy depends on mobility and communication between individuals (Gellner, 1983). Mobility and communication are difficult if the individuals have different cultural background and different rules of life. The culture that schools teach usually becomes the core of the people's identity once they have learned it. Individuals in the modern world are dependent on education for the construction of their identity, dignity and material security. In perpetuating national identity and nationalist thinking in a society, the mass media is also of crucial importance. Only those who can understand the language and style of national mass media are included in the national community, while those who cannot grasp the contents are excluded. According to Gellner (1983), the messages that are transmitted through mass media are of minor importance compared to the general understanding of the medium.

When Gellner speaks of a national culture, he refers to a "high" culture. This implies that the culture is literate and specialist-transmitted, and here is the main reason why such a culture could not cover as large a geographical area in other stages of history as it can in the modern world. The high cultures were important and, in one sense, dominant also during the agrarian era of human history. The population considered them authoritative, but the population did not feel as part of the high cultures. When virtually everyone became literate in the industrial age, the high culture was universalised and the population could identify with it. The extension of high cultures made it possible to define nationality in terms of a shared culture. The need for a state to protect this culture politically was evident (Gellner, 1983:50-55).

In dealing with nationalism, Gellner also pays attention to attitudes towards immigration. He emphasises individuals that differ from the majority in skin-colour. He mentions

cultural differences as well, but since these according to him usually can be overcome in the course of a generation, he does not stress their relevance to the same degree. To explain negative attitudes towards certain immigrants, Gellner introduces the concept of *entropy-resistant classifications*. A classification is entropy-resistant *if it is based on an attribute, which has a marked tendency not to become, even with the passage of time since the initial establishment of an industrial society, evenly dispersed throughout the entire society* (Gellner, 1983:63). Skin-colour is such a classification. These classifications constitute a severe problem if they can be attached to a certain societal status. If the lowest stratum in society seems to be composed of a random sample of the population, then the prejudice against them cannot spread to some other specific trait. But if many of those at the bottom have a different skin-colour than the majority of the population, then the prejudice which is engendered among slightly higher strata against those below them by the fear of being pushed downwards, inevitable spreads to skin-colour (ibid.). This corresponds with the theory of relative deprivation, which I will return to later in the subsequent chapter.

The concept of entropy-resistant classifications introduces the part of Gellner's theory that has the strongest focus on xenophobia. But also other points in his general theory on nations and nationalism contribute to illuminate attitudes towards immigrants, although not explicit. The role of a standardised educational system and the mass media is to transmit and maintain national devotion and identity for all nationals. Through this process, all others are excluded. Adult immigrants will not have the opportunity to be included in the national community through education where all nationals learn about their culture and history. And immigrants who do not know the language sufficiently will be excluded from understanding national mass media. Both education and mass media contributes in drawing a line between nationals and "others. Immigrants will be regarded as outsiders by the nationals, and the sense of unity within the nation may lead to negative attitudes to people who do not fit in.

Also in the nation forming process, a foundation for exclusion has been established, perhaps mainly through the creation of the mass education system. When Gellner speaks of a national culture, he refers to a "high" culture, which is literate and specialist-transmitted. Through learning it in school, people from the very beginning of the nation onwards learned to identify with it, and in this manner early nationalism created unity and solidarity within the nation. From this line of reasoning, it is likely that a mental boundary between

nationals and others was established in the early stages of modern nations. The distinction between "us" and "them" is important in the understanding of attitudes towards immigration, and will be elaborated further when I account for the contributions of Michael Billig and Leonard Doob.

4.2 Anthony D. Smith

Anthony D. Smith was Gellner's student. Smith has a primordialist perspective on nations and nationalism (Kumar, 2000). The concept of primordialism involves a belief that nationalism has existed for a very long time, and that it is universal. Smith agrees with most other theoreticians that nationalism as an ideology stems from the end of the 18th century. Before the period of the French Revolution there were only vague expressions of the nationalistic ideology with its emphasis on the autonomy of culturally distinctive nations. However, he advocates that nationalism in itself, based on ethnic identities, existed a long time before this (ibid.). According to Smith, pre-modern ethnic identities are essential in the understanding of why and how nations and nationalism emerged, at least in Europe. He does not consider nationalism as simply an ideology, but treats it as a cultural phenomenon as well (Smith, 1991).

Smith defines modern nationalism as *an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential "nation"* (Smith, 1991:73).

Nationalism as an ideology is closely related to national identity. To fully understand the phenomenon of nationalism, Smith advocates the need for an historical sociology of the bases and formation of national identities. Broadly speaking, nationalism is a form of historicist culture and civic education. It replaces old religious cultures and familial education. In this line of reasoning, the nation is a type of identity presupposed by nationalism as culture, and one can assume that the nation and national identity is a creation of nationalism. Anthony Smith's view on nationalism is thereby that it has created nations and national identities, but that it is itself created by pre-modern ethnic identities that resemble what we today call national identities (Smith, 1991).

Smith defines a nation as *a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members* (Smith, 1991:14).

He refers to the pre-modern group of people who share an ethnic identity as *ethnie*. Ethnie is the French term for ethnic community. What characterises this community is a collective name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific "homeland", and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. As we can see, this definition resembles Smith's definition of nation. However, there are important differences between the two. The ethnie does not need to possess a territory or "homeland" of its own. A symbolic or historical territory is sufficient. While a nation is constituted by both cultural and political elements, the ethnie is only comprised of cultural elements. It is not dependent on a shared economy or common legal rights and duties to exist (Smith, 1991).

According to Smith, the ethnie has two ways to create a nation, and thereby achieving a territory of its own with civic rights and duties for its members. Firstly, the dominant ethnie in a geographical area can attract or annex other ethnies or fragments of ethnies into the state to which it gives a name, a cultural character, economic unity and universal legal rights. A public socialisation through the mass educational system is carried out to create and maintain a national consciousness and sense of unity in a new nation state (Smith, 1991).

Secondly, an ethnic separatist movement can succeed in rising from passive subordination to active political assertion. The movement manages to introduce economic unity and legal rights to its ethnic members. As was the case with the first variant, education is important. Here the purpose is to celebrate the masses by re-educating them in national values, memories and myths. National identities that stem from this kind of nation forming are usually more intense and often more inward-looking than territorially based national identities. Norway's struggle for independence in the 19th century is roughly consistent with this variant of nation forming (Smith, 1991).

Every form of nationalism contains both civic and ethnic elements. One can make a typology of different kinds of nationalism based on whether the civic or the ethnic

elements dominate it. The civic type is more territorial while the ethnic type is more genealogical. The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism corresponds with Hans Kohn's concepts of Western and Eastern nationalism. Smith uses these models to describe both nations and nationalism. When we talk about nations, the models are also roughly equivalent with the classical distinction Friedrich Meinecke drew in 1908 between the *Staatsnation* and the *Kulturnation* (Smith, 1991).

Intellectuals have always played an important part in shaping the concepts of nation and nationalism. The nationalist educator-intellectuals had social and political purposes rather than academic ones. Their aim was to purify and activate the people. One common way to achieve this was to teach them about their glorious past with the aid of national myths. In such myths, facts and legends are fused into a picture of national values, heroes and resistance to tyranny (Smith, 1991:66). The uses of ethno-history were always selective. It was as important to forget certain things as to remember others. Throughout, the basic process was one of vernacular mobilisation of a passive ethnie, and the politicisation of its cultural heritage through standardised education. As mentioned in the descriptions of how ethnies created nations, this schooling took place through a public mass educational system. Through education, national consciousness was created and maintained once a nation state had been formed. This process continues also after the nation state has been securely established. Schools enable the state authorities to inculcate children with national devotion and a sense of belonging to a distinct and homogeneous culture. The state authorities usually spend considerable energy on this process, under the influence of nationalist ideals of cultural authenticity and unity. It is by learning that they belong to a shared and unique culture members of a nation state are enabled to know "who they are" in the contemporary world. This process of self-definition and location is in many ways the key to national identity (Smith, 1991).

Nationalism has created national identity in the modern sense of the word, and it has to continuously maintain it in order to flourish. It does so in a variety of ways. The nationalist language and symbolism connect the ideology of nationalism to "mass sentiments" through slogans, ideas, symbols and ceremonies. It emphasises the resemblance between the nation and a family, and evokes sentiments concerning territory, history and community. A strengthening of national identity is typically generated by war, exile and enslavement, immigration and religious conversion (Smith, 1991). When a nation experiences

immigration of people who differ from the nationals culturally speaking, the difference between nationals and others probably become more visible than when "the others" are located in other countries. The nation as a family may feel invaded by the newcomers, and react with hostility.

Smith does not focus explicitly on xenophobia, but his theoretical contribution will nevertheless be useful in my study of attitudes. As Gellner, Smith stresses the importance of a standardised educational system that teaches the nationals devotion for their country and a national consciousness. Through such education, the nationals learn "who they are". This has the same implication when it comes to immigrants as I have already mentioned in my discussion of Gellner. Adult immigrants will be excluded from the national community, since they do not get the opportunity to develop an understanding of the nation in the same way as the nationals have. Language and culture is transmitted mainly through education, and nationals implicitly also learn the national codes for everyday behaviour through mass schooling. Smith also states that language makes people see a resemblance between nation and family. An example of this is when the nation is said to be the "motherland". As mentioned, immigrants can be perceived as a threat to this "family" of nationals.

Another parallel to Gellner's contribution is the foundation for a distinction between "us" and "them" in the early stages of nation forming, when mass education was established to inculcate the population with a sense of unity and a shared cultural character. This education is equally important in both ways of nation forming described by Smith. When a dominant ethnie annexed others, mass education had the purpose of securing unity in the new nation. When the nation was a result of an ethnic separatist movement rising to political assertion, standardised education had the purpose of re-educating the population in national values and memories. In any case, it is plausible that the foundation was laid for a sense of distinct national unity and solidarity, and the exclusion of people who did not belong to the national community.

4.3 Benedict Anderson

Benedict Anderson is a modernist like Ernest Gellner, but even though they belong to the same perspective their theories differ from each other. Gellner has stated that capital and capitalism are overrated categories when it comes to understanding the rise of nations (Gellner, 1983:97). For Anderson these concepts are of vital importance.

Benedict Anderson defines a nation as *an imagined, political community, which is perceived as both limited and sovereign*. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nations will know only a few of their fellow citizens. Most of them will never meet and never even hear of each other, but they will nevertheless be capable of imagining themselves as parts of the same community. The nation is limited because even the greatest nation has a finite border. Outside this border lie other nations. According to Anderson, the nation is perceived as sovereign because the concept of nation was coined in an age where enlightenment and revolution had destroyed the legitimacy of divine rule. And finally, the nation is defined as a community because it is thought of as a deep, horizontal comradeship (Anderson, 1996:19-21).

Anderson explains the rise of nations with capitalism in general and the art of printing in particular. The reason why capitalism and printing are emphasised, is because of the immense importance language has in his theory. According to him, the most important quality of language is its ability to generate imagined communities, to create solidarity. By knowing that "everyone" in a society reads about the same events in the newspapers, individuals can imagine each other as members of the same nation even though most of them will never actually meet. Another example is when a national anthem is sung on a national holiday. In these ways language can provide us with a unique, contemporaneous sense of fellowship (Anderson, 1996).

Prior to the breakthrough of the art of printing, there were numerous oral languages. The linguistic variety rendered large imagined communities impossible. Through book-publishing businesses, capitalism united related popular languages. This set the stage for the modern nation. The written languages that were being printed created uniform trading and communication areas (Anderson, 1996).

As literacy increased, it became easier everywhere for authorities to arouse popular support. Through printing, the masses discovered a new glory in the languages they had humbly spoken all along. Since literacy is strongly linked to mass education, the progress of schools and universities measures that of nationalism (Anderson, 1989).

New nationalistic movements in Europe thought of themselves as awoken of a long deep sleep, and they almost immediately started constructing their nation's history. In this kind of history construction forgetting is as important as remembering. According to Ernest Renan in his "*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*" of 1882, the foundation of every nation is that its members have a lot of things in common while they at the same time have all forgotten certain things. Events of the past that could make people proud of their forefathers were remembered, while embarrassing and regretful events were collectively forgotten. The national history did not have a starting point - the nation has "always" existed (Anderson, 1996).

Language is important in the construction of history, since it is the medium through which the national history is recorded for future generations. The printing capitalism made the languages unchangeable to a much greater extent than earlier. In the long run this led to an image of language as ancient, which became central for the perception of the nation as something that had "always" existed. Since people think nations have always existed, and since the good things are remembered and many of the bad things are forgotten, nations usually inspire a deeply felt, self-sacrificing love. The cultural products of nationalism: poetry, prose, music and paintings portray this love in a variety of ways. The people experience a sense of belonging to the nation and the nation is part of their identity (Anderson, 1996).

Anderson does not agree with many other theoreticians that nationalism is closely linked to racism. While racism inspires fear and loathing, nationalism inspires love for one's nation. The ideas of racism have their origin in ideologies of *class*, rather than in ideologies of nation: above all in claims of divinity among rulers. It is therefore no surprise that, on the whole, racism manifests itself within national borders rather than across them. They justify domestic repression and domination rather than foreign wars (Anderson, 1989:129-136). Since Anderson believes that racism has little to do with nationalism and national devotion,

his theoretical contribution to the field of nationalism does not focus on xenophobia. At face value, his contribution seems to imply that there is no link between national identity and attitudes towards immigration. However, I have already suggested that a mental boundary between nationals and "others" probably affects attitudes. If we assume that such a mental boundary plays a part in the understanding of attitudes, Anderson's contribution increases in relevance. The nation is first and foremost an imagined community, and Anderson uses the term "community" because he claims that it is thought of as a deep, horizontal comradeship. From this line of reasoning, I expect that nationals will tend to stand together like friends if they face any threats from the outside and that they will be sceptical to who they accept as members of the community. Anderson stresses the vital importance of language in the creation and maintenance of national devotion. Language creates a particular form of solidarity within the nation, a sense of unity that does not include immigrants unless they have sufficient knowledge of the language.

Education has ever since the beginning of nations been a major reason why a whole nation can unite, since it is the most efficient way of teaching the nationals the national language. It also teaches national history, which is also highly valuable in creating a sense of comradeship throughout the nation. Anderson has described how the construction of history involves a collective remembering and forgetting, and that the language it is transmitted through gives it an ancient quality. When taught to nationals in all eras, it is very likely that the nationals will feel like part of a unique - often even superior - community. And this may lead to a derogatory view of immigrants. It is important at this point to stress that these are speculations based on my interpretation of Anderson. He himself has clearly stated that racism has nothing to do with nationalism. However, attitudes are much more than racism. According to my interpretation here, a moderate scepticism towards newcomers seems likely to be connected to feelings of national devotion.

4.4 Michael Billig

Michael Billig treats nationalism as a recent phenomenon in his book "Banal nationalism" (1995), and thereby advocates the modernist perspective. He especially emphasises the subtle reproduction of nationalism and national identity in our time. National identity is not something that is created once and for all with the beginning of nations. It is a continuous process of construction and maintenance.

Billig deals with the unnoticed nationalism of everyday life. The term "banal nationalism" is meant to cover *the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced* (Billig, 1995:6). This form of nationalism is produced and reproduced without people consciously registering it. As an example, Billig mentions the national flag hanging unnoticed on a public building. This means that "banal" refers to everyday mechanisms in this context. The banal nationalism is an "everyday nationalism".

Nationalism includes the principle that peoples should have their own states, and this principle is maintained just as effective as national identity is. Through nationalism, a world without nations seems unthinkable and unnatural. After nations established all over the globe, the theory of nationalism has been transformed into familiar common sense (Billig, 1995). According to Billig, the most important thing to understand within the field of nationalism and national identity, is why people in the modern world do not forget their nationality. National holidays are often thought of as memorable, but these occasional events cannot be sufficient to sustain a continuingly remembered national identity. Billig believes that national identity is part of the everyday life in a nation-state, and that this is the reason why people never forget their national identities (Billig, 1995).

Billig agrees with Benedict Anderson's definition of nations as "imagined communities". He believes that we must examine forms of social life in order to understand national identity. A core component in this theory is that the remembering of national identity happens without conscious awareness (Billig, 1995).

The construction of a nation is a battle for hegemony. A part claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national essence. This construction phase has usually been

accompanied by the triumph of official national languages and the suppression of rivals. These rival languages have been demoted to the status of dialects. For example, although the Risorgimento process started in Piemonte, the Piedmontese language was relegated to the status of dialect after Tuscan succeeded in becoming the language of Italy (Billig, 1995:27-32).

The battle for hegemony also engenders the national history. Different fractions of the population struggle for the power to speak on behalf of the nation. Shifting power balances in society reflect the national history, which is continually re-written. The creation of a national history implies a collective memory, and this is an important foundation for national identity. Collective remembering and collective forgetting are equally important parts of the national history. Celebrating its antiquity, the nation forgets its historical recency. When the nation-state gradually becomes established and safely sovereign, it usually faces little internal challenge. The symbols of nationhood displayed so consciously in the nation forming process become absorbed into everyday life. Such symbols are for instance flags, coins and bank notes (Billig, 1995).

In established nations, language is important in the "banal" everyday reproduction of nationalism. Commonly used small words are as important as the nation's name when it comes to arouse unregistered sentiments of devotion. Examples of such words are "we", "this", "here" and "the". In their small way, they help to reproduce the nation as the place in which "we" are at home. When meteorologists talk about "the" weather, we all know that it is "our" weather, the nation's weather that is being forecasted (Billig, 1995:93-117).

Politicians are important in the daily reproduction of nations. In the electronic age, they are familiar figures whose words reach mass audiences. They often use the phrase "the nation" to refer to "our" nation, as do journalists and the media. Sports is another central factor in the reproduction process. Personal sacrifice in the cause of the nation is applauded on the sports pages. Often sports and politics are mixed together. In Italy, media entrepreneur and owner of a football team Silvio Berlusconi successfully campaigned for the presidency using the symbols associated with the national football team. His television commercials culminated in the football chant "Forza Italia". The constant flagging in the media, in politics and in everyday life ensure that we do not forget our homeland (Billig, 1995).

Attitudes towards immigration are closely linked to the daily reproduction of national identity. To imagine "our" community is impossible unless we can imagine "them" from whom "we" are distinct. There can be no "us" without a "them". To achieve a necessary positive identity, groups will tend to compare themselves favourably with contrasting outgroups. Stereotypes are shared, cultural descriptions of social groups. Usually one uses stereotypes to distinguish between "us" and "them". Through this distinction "we" can claim a unique identity. The stereotypes are more often ascribed outgroups than ingroups. Usually "we" assume "ourselves" to be the natural standard against which "their" deviations become visible (Billig, 1995:78-81). According to this line of reasoning, immigrants will typically be an out-group in a nation. Immigrants that differ from the nationals in appearance and culture will be compared to the nationals, and any differences will be perceived as the immigrants' deviations. We have seen that Billig defines nationalism as the everyday reproduction of national identity. If this reproduction is dependent on a mental boundary between "us" and "them" and immigrants are perceived as not normal because they differ from the nationals who claim to be the standard all others should be measured against, then banal or everyday nationalism entails banal or everyday racism.

Billig has argued that the construction of a nation is a battle of hegemony where one part of the population claims to represent the national essence and to speak on behalf of the people. But for Billig the construction of a nation is not an event that just happens once. The nation is constructed over and over again with shifting power balances in society, and the national history is being re-written every time the power balance alters. With the previous theoretical contributions I have speculated in the mechanisms that lay the foundation for a mental boundary between nationals and others in the forming of a nation. With Billig's contribution the forming of a nation happens on a daily basis. It is no point in elaborating what happened a couple of centuries ago when it happens in the same way today. I have already discussed the daily mechanisms of everyday life in the reproduction of national identity.

In order to understand a theoretical field as vast as that of nationalism and national identity, it is enlightening to look at contributions from several different disciplines. A social psychological contribution worth having a look at in this context is Leonard Doob's book "Patriotism and Nationalism" dated 1964.

4.5 Leonard Doob

Leonard Doob (1964) defines nationalism as *the set of more or less uniform demands (1) which people in a society share, (2) which arise from their patriotism, (3) for which justifications exist and can be readily expressed, (4) which incline them to make personal sacrifices on behalf of their government's aims, and (5) which may or may not lead to appropriate action.* This definition implies a strong connection between nationalism and patriotism. Doob considers patriotism to be a shared psychological state within all individuals.

He defines patriotism as *the more or less conscious conviction of a person that his own welfare and that of the significant groups to which he belongs are dependent upon the preservation or expansion (or both) of the power and culture of his society* (Doob, 1964:6). According to him patriotism varies in degree and can be both positive and negative. Zero patriotism is considered unlikely.

According to this theory, mass media plays a major part in the production and reproduction of patriotism. The media spreads patriotic and nationalistic communications to the people on a regular basis. The people receive it in various contexts, with the result that love of country becomes linked to many different events in a person's life. Media especially suited for children are of the highest importance in this process. When the children grow up, knowledge of their country's importance, history, songs, flags, holidays etc. will be incorporated in their second nature. Through media, patriotism is present and strengthened on almost every significant occasion (Doob, 1964). To fully comprehend patriotism and nationalism, we therefore have to take into consideration how the media of communication operate.

When patriotic convictions are so strong that they give rise to demands for action, nationalism comes into existence. Nationals become nationalists when they are so discontent with their present mode of life or with the observed changes in their environment that they deliberately seek the action they believe will correct the situation. These actions can be directed inwards at one's own culture and compatriots, or outwards at

immigrants and foreigners who the nationals perceive as a threat to the national welfare. Since strong patriotism is a prerequisite for nationalism, conditions promoting strong patriotism directly increase the probability of nationalism (Doob, 1964).

As mentioned earlier, the mass media plays a vital part in the production of patriotism. The patriotic communications in a country form a coherent view of the society over time. Its content is not advanced; virtually everyone can understand it. Patriotic communications use symbols that can be easily understood, like national anthems and flags. The name of the country is also a frequently used symbol. It serves the purpose of personifying the nation, which is important to simplify the identification process. The nation is often personified as a woman (motherland) who is the head of a large family that includes all nationals. Implicit in this metaphor lies the assumption that the members of a nation should stay together in the same way as the members of a family do (Doob, 1964).

The belief in a national character is vital for patriotism. Every person will inevitably display some fragments of the national character sufficiently frequent to be identified as a national. Within a society the focus will be on similarities rather than differences. The population of a country will think of themselves as distinct in comparison with other nations. The common language and culture are relevant factors in securing this sense of distinctiveness (Doob, 1964).

Patriotism consists of several components, and an individual will emphasise certain components more than others according to his personal priorities. If economic pursuits are more important to a person than political ones, he will emphasise the economic component in patriotism more than the political. A look at the generally accepted values in a country will enable us to deduce the most typical components of national patriotism (Doob, 1964:105).

Patriotism is dependent on a reference to the past in order, for example, to justify that all nationals descend from a common origin. Pride in one's ancestors is an integral part of nationalism and common culture. The people feel comfort in knowing that they are all part of a process that originated in the past and will continue into the future, perhaps without ever ending (Doob, 1964). Through socialisation the members of a nation gradually acquire patriotic predispositions. With every new experience, the individual's

predispositions are affected in a positive or negative direction. Through these experiences, patriotism grows stronger or weaker in the course of events (ibid.).

The role of an outsider is essential in the establishment, the functioning, and the preservation of nationalism. Immigrants often serve as scapegoats in society. It is not unusual that nationals look at immigrants in order to find the explanation for negative societal developments and events. An example of this is unemployment. There seems to be a clear connection between stigmatising an outgroup and expressing chauvinistic sentiments for one's country. If responsibility for all negative things in society is handed to outsiders, than the nationals can continue to appreciate the societal benefits that still exist. They do not have to blame their society for all that is not well. The greater the threat which the outgroup seems to pose, the more significant this group becomes in facilitating both patriotism and nationalism (Doob, 1964:253-257).

Because the nationals have been carefully inculcated with a national identity and devotion through for instance the mass media throughout their lives, the distinction between nationals and others are easy to draw. Also Gellner emphasised the importance of mass media, but he discussed its part in excluding people who could not understand it because they lack sufficient knowledge of the national language and the national code and style the media transmits through. Doob discusses in particular the ease with which the nationals comprehend the communications from the mass media. Once the mental boundaries between in-group and out-group is established, Doob points to the link between perceiving an out-group as a threat and strengthening one's patriotism. He mentions the personification of the nation and the resemblance between the nation and a family as a mechanism that eases the identification process for the nationals. The metaphor of the nation as a family probably facilitates the envisioning of clear borders between themselves and people who "do not belong". Immigrants will typically be perceived as such people. Doob claims that nationals become nationalists when they reach a certain level of discontentment with their environment and seek actions to rectify the situation. Such actions can be directed against immigrants who are perceived as a threat to the national welfare.

4.6 Some Unifying Remarks on International Theoretical Contributions

Although the five theoretical contributions outlined above are very different from each other, they nevertheless have some elements in common. Most of them seem to agree that nationalism is a political principle concerning the congruence of cultural and political boundaries, and both Gellner and Smith emphasise that nationalism engenders nations instead of the other way around.

Several conditions for nationalism are repeatedly mentioned in most of the contributions. The creation of national history is dependent on a collective forgetting as well as remembering. The culture remembers historical elements it can take pride in, while conveniently forgetting the most embarrassing events. The culture needs a glorious past to ease its preservation. National history is transmitted through a national language, which is one of the most central conditions for nationalism. The creation and maintenance of nations and national identity would be impossible without language. The literary language gives the culture an image of antiquity and eternity. National identity gains its position at the core of an individual's identity through language, which is the medium with which the society can socialise its members into the culture. This socialisation would be a hopeless task for the state without another of the conditions facilitating nationalism: a standardised mass educational system. Mass education ensures that all nationals learn the same cultural ground rules and foundation. When national identity is integrated in the individual through schooling in the national language, mass media helps maintain it. Smith and Doob emphasise the image of the nation as a family as an additional condition for nationalism. The idea of common genealogical ties strengthens the sense of belonging.

I have discussed the part that national language, a standardised educational system, mass media and a perceived resemblance between the nation and a family play in the creation of mental boundaries that include all nationals in a national community while excluding others. In my opinion, the distinction between in-group and out-group is important to understand attitudes towards immigration. Both an anti-immigration attitude and a pro-immigration attitude presupposes that there is a distinction between immigrants and nationals, that the immigrants are outsiders. Without such a distinction, attitudes would be directed against individuals and not groups of people. All the five theoretical contributions

I have accounted for in this chapter shed some light upon how the mental boundaries are created and upheld. In this way they are valuable for my study even though some of them do not focus explicitly on xenophobia. Each and every one of the theories presented in this chapter also contributes with valuable insight in national identity that is not necessarily linked to distinctions between "us" and "them". I will find use for all five of them in the interpretations of my analyses of national identity and attitudes in Italy and Norway.

Previous research using the same 1995 ISSP survey material that I am going to analyse is also valuable to study before embarking on the analyses. The following chapter is dedicated to a presentation of such relevant research. Based on the theoretical contributions presented in this chapter together with preliminary analyses and previous research, I will also undertake a thorough discussion of the four aspects I have chosen to represent national identity as a whole – membership identity, chauvinistic identity, civic identity and cultural identity.

5. Previous Research

In this thesis I am going to analyse the 1995 ISSP survey "National Identity". This material has been analysed by others before me, and I will use this chapter to give an outline of relevant previous research before undertaking a discussion of the survey itself in the chapter on methodological framework. I will depict the perspectives and findings of Gudmund Hernes, Knud Knudsen, Nina A. Grytten and Mikael Hjerm. They all have their choice of countries to study in common: Norway and Sweden – although Mikael Hjerm has also done some research on other Western countries as well. Accounting for their results will lead to certain expectations concerning my analyses later in this thesis, especially regarding Norway.

This chapter will furthermore focus on the four aspects I have decided to split national identity into: membership identity, chauvinistic identity, civic identity and cultural identity. Based on theories accounted for in the previous chapter, preliminary statistical analyses and the previous research outlined in this chapter, I am able to describe and justify the four identity aspects. The four identity aspects I have chosen will also shed some light on the similarities and differences between this thesis and previous research.

5.1 Research Based on the 1995 ISSP Survey "National Identity"

According to Gudmund Hernes and Knud Knudsen (1997) the concept of national identity implies an idea about common definitions regarding who we are as members of a nation-state. They consider national identity as comprised of two different dimensions: national chauvinism and regime legitimacy. National chauvinism reflects to which degree members of the nation see their country's qualities as unique and more advanced than others. This dimension is associated with exclusion and negative attitudes towards foreigners. Regime legitimacy involves support for democratic institutions and is associated with inclusion and positive attitudes towards foreigners. In their study, however, regime legitimacy is operationalised to include support and pride in cultural institutions as well as in civic and democratic institutions.

Based on factor analysis, Hernes and Knudsen have studied the two dimensions of national identity and their effect on xenophobia in Norway and Sweden. The analysis showed that Norwegians have a stronger positive national identity than the Swedes, both when it comes to chauvinism and regime legitimacy. Norwegians also have higher xenophobia than Swedes. Further analysis shows that national chauvinism tends to go hand in hand with negative attitudes towards immigrants, while regime legitimacy is useful in explaining positive attitudes. Knudsen and Hernes also analyse structural individual characteristics and conclude that higher education decreases the risk of xenophobic attitudes (Hernes and Knudsen, 1997:182-186). Although both national chauvinism and regime legitimacy are useful in the study of xenophobia, analysis show that they are not as important as education is. Hernes and Knudsen explain this with the thesis of relative deprivation. This theory stems from classical attitude formation theory, and has much in common with Gellner's concept of entropy-resistant classifications. According to the theory of relative deprivation, those who feel left behind economically or socially will react negatively to groups they perceive as threats. People with strong personal resources will on the other hand be more tolerant. The theory deals with individual structural characteristics and personal resources (ibid.).

In a slightly later article, Knudsen (1997) develops the analysis further with fewer variables in the indexes for national chauvinism and regime legitimacy. In this study Knudsen has reduced regime legitimacy to include support for and pride in civic institutions only. He has removed the variables concerning cultural institutions, which we have seen that Hernes and Knudsen included in their concept of regime legitimacy in the study discussed earlier. Statistical analysis shows that national chauvinism co-varies positively with xenophobia, while regime legitimacy co-varies negatively with it. At the same time, however, national chauvinism and regime legitimacy are positively correlated to each other. Of explanatory variables, education is the most important. Key explanatory variables from the relative deprivation thesis do not lose their relevance even when aspects of national identity are taken into account, but their effect is more indirect. They influence the aspects of national identity, and thereby they influence xenophobia. The Norwegians have clearly more negative attitudes towards immigrants than Swedes also when country differences in aspects of national identity are statistically controlled for. According to Knudsen this is a clear evidence for the need of historical and structural explanations to play an important part in the study of xenophobia (Knudsen, 1997:232-239).

Nina A. Grytten (1998) undertook a study on national identity and attitudes towards immigrants in Norway and Sweden, based on the same 1995 survey material. Her objective was to describe national identity with the help of history, immigration history and contemporary structural tendencies. She stresses the importance of historical struggle for independence in the national consciousness of contemporary Norwegians and the importance of social democracy in the national consciousness of Swedes (Grytten, 1998:2-8).

Grytten divides national identity into three aspects: regime legitimacy, chauvinism and traditionalism. The two first concepts are identical with the aspects of national identity used by Hernes and Knudsen. Traditionalism refers to an orientation of values towards traditional ethnical and political institutions. Operationalised this aspect implies self-categorisation, and is similar to my concept of membership identity which I will return to later in this chapter. By using factor analysis the three aspects of national identity, xenophobia and structural background characteristics were studied in a comparative perspective. Like Hernes and Knudsen, Grytten also establishes that national identity is constituted by both excluding and including components. A strong national identity does not necessarily imply a negative attitude towards foreigners. Grytten found that traditionalism and chauvinism tend to trigger intolerance, while regime legitimacy tends to engender a tolerant attitude towards immigrants. In general, Norwegians are attached to their nation to a greater degree than the Swedes, and they are more intolerant (Grytten, 1998).

According to Grytten, intolerance as a result of chauvinism and traditionalism can be best understood if we look at these two identity aspects as a categorisation of immigrants in order to ease internal categorisation based on social comparison and competition. She similarly explains tolerance associated with regime legitimacy with social psychological mechanisms. Immigration strengthens the national self-esteem because it indicates a caring and universal welfare state (Grytten, 1998:138).

A major finding in her thesis is that Norwegian intolerance can be described as a cultural conflict, while Swedish intolerance best can be depicted as a conflict of interests. Intolerance as conflict of interests is closely associated with the thesis of relative

deprivation. Norwegian intolerance, on the other hand, is influenced by culture and by a collective identity orientated towards tradition. According to Grytten, age, church attendance and employment are structural characteristics that to a certain degree explain intolerance in Norway. National identity is more excluding the older you are, although the age difference is more visible in Sweden than in Norway. Church attendance in Norway seems to strengthen a more including national identity. When it comes to employment, it seems that the Norwegian primary sector is characterised by a strong intolerance. Structural characteristics influence intolerance both directly and indirectly, via national identity (Grytten, 1998).

Mikael Hjerm (1998) conducted a study about how different kinds of national attachments relate to xenophobia in Australia, Germany, Britain and Sweden. Through cluster analysis he discovered four types of national identity: an ethnic and a civic identity in Smith's sense of the words, a multiple identity that combines ethnic and civic elements, and a weak or absent sense of national identity – pluralistic identity. After operationalising the concepts, Hjerm's multiple identity corresponds roughly with my concept of membership identity, which I will elaborate further later in this chapter. In his analysis, Hjerm discovered that people with multiple national identity had the highest proportion of xenophobia, and the pluralists had the lowest proportion. Civic identity also decreased the risks of negative attitudes towards immigration. Ethnic national identity was not important by itself, but as a component of multiple identity it increased the risk of having xenophobic attitudes significantly (Hjerm, 1998:338-341).

Mikael Hjerm also brought national pride into the analysis. As we shall see later, his operationalised concepts of political national pride and natio-cultural national pride are equal to my concepts of civic identity and cultural identity. He found that the greater the political pride, the smaller the risk of experiencing negative attitudes towards immigrants. Simultaneously, the greater the natio-cultural pride, the more xenophobic the respondents were. When looking at the proportions of the four national identity types and the two types of national pride, Hjerm did not find any clear differences between Australia, Germany, Britain and Sweden. He concluded that there are profound similarities between the Western countries (Hjerm, 1998:344-345).

In another article, the same author conducted a comparative study of nationalist sentiment and xenophobia in Norway and Sweden, again based on the 1995 ISSP survey material. His operationalisation of nationalist sentiment corresponds with my concept of chauvinistic identity. Through statistical analysis he found strong support for the assumption that the more nationalistic one is, the higher is the risk of being xenophobic. Additionally he discovered that education and age are the two most important determinants of nationalism in both Norway and Sweden. In both countries the elderly are more nationalistic than other age groups are, while higher education has the exact opposite effect. Hjerm concludes that people in Norway and Sweden have nationalist sentiments to almost the same extent, regardless of different historical circumstances (Hjerm, 1998:9-12).

5.2 Aspects of National Identity

I have decided to let four different identity parts constitute national identity as a whole: membership identity, chauvinistic identity, civic identity and cultural identity. In the 1995 ISSP survey membership identity, chauvinistic identity and national pride are three distinct entities. I have divided the section concerning national pride into civic and cultural identity. There are several reasons why I have divided national identity into the four aspects mentioned above. First of all, preliminary correspondence analyses indicated patterns of co-variation within each aspect. The answering categories of the different questions within each aspect were directly comparable to each other, and together they formed coherent oppositions in the material. Secondly, I have studied the results from previous research on this 1995 ISSP material. The different researchers have all used indexes to measure national identity. I draw directly on some of these indexes in establishing my aspects of identity, while I modify other indexes. The modification of indexes brings me to the third reason for my choice of aspects. Measures of national identity must be adjusted to the specific nations one studies. Aspects of national identity suitable for describing one country may be unsuitable for other countries. The previous research I have looked at, do not deal with Italy. A comparison of for instance Norway and Sweden will necessarily emphasise slightly other aspects than a comparison of Norway and Italy. There is an element of relativism here. What seems distinct for one nation is to some degree dependent on which other nation you compare it with. The national histories of Norway and Italy together with the preliminary analyses have pointed me in the direction of the four identity aspects I use in this thesis.

Membership identity deals with the requirements nationals think people have to fulfil before they can be accepted as true nationals. These conditions tell us something about which membership criterions are the dominant ones in a given nation state. According to Anthony Smith (1991), an individual's self-definition as a member of a larger community is the key to understanding national identity. I expect to find some sort of statistical correlation between this aspect of identity and attitudes towards immigrants. If a person considers various membership criteria to be of the utmost importance in order to be accepted in a nation state, it is plausible that he/she will have a negative attitude towards immigrants living in his/her country and not fulfilling these requirements. Grytten (1998) used these variables to measure traditionalism in her thesis on national identity in Norway and Sweden, and Hjerm (1998) used them to measure his concept of multiple identity. Preliminary correspondence analysis showed a neat pattern of co-variation between the membership questions. This strengthened my view on membership identity as an independent entity also in the comparison of Norway and Italy.

Chauvinistic identity implies a strong national devotion that places one's own country above all others. A sense of belonging constitutes the core of national identity in general and chauvinistic identity in particular. According to John Rex (1996) one way of obtaining this sense of belonging is comparing one's own nation to other nations and morally or aesthetically favour one's own nation. As we have seen, Knudsen and Hernes (1997) associate this type of identity with an exclusion of strangers, i.e. a negative attitude towards immigrants. My operationalisation of chauvinistic identity corresponds with the concept of national chauvinism as used by Hernes, Knudsen and Grytten, and the concept of nationalist sentiment as used by Hjerm. Correspondence analysis indicates that it can fruitfully be analysed as a separate entity also in the comparison of Norway and Italy.

Civic and cultural identity in this thesis both deal with national pride. **Civic identity** refers to the respondents' feeling of pride concerning political and public aspects of their nation; its political institutions, economy and welfare system. **Cultural identity** refers to how the people feel about what they have accomplished culturally speaking, how they feel about their cultural practice and history. These aspects correspond with Hjerm's concepts of political national pride and natio-cultural national pride.

Hernes, Knudsen and Grytten have let questions concerning both civic and cultural pride constitute their index of regime legitimacy. As we have seen earlier they have all conducted comparative studies of Norway and Sweden. When the second case of the study is Italy, however, I believe a division of this index into a civic and a cultural part is in order. This has to do with the element of relativism I have commented on above. Although most of the Norwegian respondents are equally proud of the civic and the cultural part of their nation, Italian national history indicates that there is a substantial gap between the civic and the cultural aspect when it comes to feelings of pride. Correspondence analysis strengthened this assumption further. Combining the civic and the cultural into one aspect would cover up a distinct feature of Italian national identity.

5.3 Conclusion

An all-encompassing description of both national identity and attitudes towards immigration and the link between these would be far too complex for the limits of a study such as this. One has to simplify the picture and concentrate on a few central factors. In this thesis I focus on how national history, individual structural characteristics and the different aspects of national identity influence attitudes towards immigrants. The underlying assumption is that national identity influences attitudes towards immigrants. Simultaneously national history and structural characteristics influence both national identity and attitudes towards immigrants. In other words, history and structural characteristics influence attitudes both directly and indirectly through national identity.

As will be shown in detail in the following chapters, there are differences between Norway and Italy concerning national identity and attitudes towards immigrants. The majority of Norwegians have a positive civic identity, while the majority of the Italians have a negative civic identity. Other interesting results in my analyses show that Italy has a more positive cultural identity than Norway, and that Norway has a slightly more positive membership identity than Italy. Both countries display an ideal-typical attitude towards immigrants consisting of both positive and negative elements. However, there are differences between them when it comes to the composition of these elements. The ideal of assimilation seems more valued in Norway, while prejudices concerning crime and unemployment seem more widespread in Italy. This may indicate that negative attitudes

towards immigrants are more ideologically founded in Norway, and that negative attitudes in Italy are more based on prejudices concerning everyday life. I will go through these results in detail in the following chapters. I will also illustrate plausible structural and historical reasons for Italian and Norwegian national identity, as well as present some possible ways history and structural characteristics may directly influence attitudes towards immigration. The focus in this thesis, as outlined above, is illustrated in the model given in figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Model of expected influences on attitudes towards immigration.

Through my analyses of national identity, traditional explanatory variables and attitudes towards immigration, and with the aid of the national histories and the theoretical contributions accounted for in this chapter, I will attempt to explore this model. However, before presenting the results of my analyses, I will discuss some methodological issues that are relevant for this study.

6. Methodological Framework

In any empirical sociological study there are methodological issues that need to be accounted for, both concerning the material that is being analysed and the statistical technique that is being used. The main part of this chapter will revolve around the 1995 ISSP survey material I use in my investigation. I will discuss the organisation's reliability requirements for member states in general, and the different data gathering methods used by Norway and Italy in particular. The Norwegian part of the survey is based on self-completion questionnaires, while the Italian part is based on face-to-face interviews. This presents potential reliability and validity problems, which I will try shedding some light on. In order to assess whether the material is representative I will compare gender, age groups and geographical area of residence in Norway and Italy with the Norwegian central register of persons 1994 and an Italian census 1991. Additionally, I will examine the response rates from the two countries and compare them with other Norwegian/Italian ISSP survey response rates.

I have decided to let four different identity parts constitute national identity as a whole: **membership identity**, **chauvinistic identity**, **civic identity** and **cultural identity**. I have briefly accounted for these aspects in the introduction, and discussed their contents from a theoretical point of view in the previous chapter. Under the heading "making the concepts operational" I present the survey questions I have chosen to measure each of the four aspects of national identity and attitudes towards immigration, as well as the explanatory variables used in this study. I will discuss whether these questions are relevant for my theoretical objectives: whether they are valid. Furthermore, the reliability test Cronbach's alpha will be assessed for each aspect of national identity and for the questions chosen to measure attitudes towards immigration. The reliability of the survey will be discussed, and the different data gathering methods in each country as well as different historical circumstances will be taken into consideration. This inevitably leads to a discussion on comparability, comparative research and the question of meaning-equivalence. Finally I will present the method I use in this thesis – correspondence analysis – and explain the most important concepts and why this is a fruitful method for this type of survey material.

6.1 International Social Survey Programme

The 11th module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in 1995 dealt with the topic of national identity. It assesses nationalism and patriotism, localism and globalism, and diversity and immigration (www.issp.org). With these concepts in mind, I believe the module will constitute a useful basis for my attempts to describe national identity and attitudes towards immigration in a cross-national perspective.

Equally important, however, is reliability. Reliability refers to whether the collection, registration and analyses of data have been performed with accuracy in such a way that we can rely on the information they yield. The members of ISSP have to fulfil certain reliability requirements. Most relevant in this context are that they must use a probability method when performing their surveys, and that they in addition to using the standard ISSP questions, must make sure that background, demographic, social and economic variables are comparable in a cross-national perspective. The samples should be 1400 respondents, with 1000 respondents as a required minimum (www.issp.org).

Although the surveys in Norway and Italy both meet with the requirements of ISSP and are identical in content, the methodological approach in the two countries differ. In Norway, the survey was sent out as self-completion questionnaires, while in Italy face-to-face interviews were conducted. Both of these are *methods of gathering information from a number of individuals, a sample, in order to learn something about the larger population from which the sample is drawn"* (May, 1993:65). However, even though both approaches are probability methods, they influence the respondents differently. This in turn may affect reliability. When the theme of the survey is of a potentially sensitive nature, as is the case with attitudes towards immigrants, self-completion questionnaires have the advantage of total anonymity. Face-to-face interviews, however, might influence respondents with strong feelings on the subject to answer more in line with what they feel is politically acceptable than they otherwise would. Simultaneously, face-to-face interviews provide the researcher with the opportunity to make sure all respondents understand the questions in the same way, and she can probe beyond the given answers if necessary. For researchers who conduct a self-completion questionnaire survey, this is not a possibility (Mordal, 1989:31). They have little control over the completion of the survey once the

questionnaires have been sent out (May, 1993:72). We have no guarantee that although the questionnaires are identical, all the different respondents may understand the questions in exactly the same way.

The potential reliability problem due to the different approaches to data gathering can also affect the survey's validity. As mentioned above, we risk that Norwegian and Italian respondents respond systematically different to the same questions, not because of different opinions in the two countries but because they understand the questions differently and are not affected in the same way by an interviewer and a self-completion questionnaire. If this is the case, then it is not certain that the questions shed light on my theoretical objectives equally well in both countries. I can not establish without a doubt whether the different data gathering methods affect the validity of the project. I can, however, establish with some certainty if they affect reliability by assessing Cronbach's alpha for the different question groups. The alpha values will indicate whether the questions in Norway and Italy are equally consistent internally. If so, this would imply that respondents from the two countries have not understood the questions so differently after all. And if this is true, the validity will also be strengthened in this respect. However, even if reliability is sufficient, validity does not necessarily need to be. Although respondents understand all questions identically, the questions do not necessarily answer the theoretical objectives. In this particular situation I will have to look at what is theoretically ideal and practically feasible. And in order to write this thesis I have to choose what is feasible.

6.2 The 1995 Survey

In order to find out if the data material from the survey is representative in both countries, I have looked at the variables gender, age group and geographical area. I have compared the Italian data with a census performed in 1991, and the Norwegian data with the central register of persons 1/1-1994. Both sources come from the ISSP 1995 National Identity Codebook. There are only marginal differences in the three variables in either country, and so the data material seems to be fairly representative. We can safely assume at this point that the ISSP 1995 survey is not biased in any of these three directions. Of course, I have no guarantee that the material is not biased in any other directions. For instance, a common problem with surveys is that respondents with less education have a low response rate, and

it is common that members of the working class are reluctant in returning self-completion questionnaires (Grytten, 1998:43).

The overall response rate was 70,9% in Italy and 66,4% in Norway. In Norway, this was 5% higher than previous ISSP surveys (Skjåk and Bøyum, 1995). The high response rate might indicate that national identity is a topic of broad interest to the public. This possibility is strengthened by the fact that the sample was not biased regarding gender, age and geographic area. EURISKO in Milan told me that the interviewers who conduct the Italian ISSP modules do not reveal the subject of the survey until the respondents have agreed to answer. In this way the overall response rate is somewhat independent of the theme of the survey. When I compared the Italian response rate with other Italian ISSP surveys I found that in 1994 the ISSP module "Women, work and the family" obtained a 69,3% response rate, and in 1996 the ISSP module "Role of Government 3" obtained a 48,4% response rate. The low response rate on the 1996 module is due to a high proportion who did not fulfil valid recruiting conditions.

A particular problem for the 1995 survey and the subject of my thesis is the strained relationship between Northern Italy and Southern Italy, which I have accounted for in the chapter on Italian history (Chapter 2, p.15-17). The negative attitudes Northerners have towards Southerners do not show in my material, but it is important to keep in mind that in many cases Southern Italians are treated as immigrants and discriminated against by Northerners (Mignone, 1995). In my analyses I have not discovered any substantial differences in the answers Southerners and Northerners have given to questions concerning national identity and attitudes towards immigrants, but I still think that this point is of importance in understanding the Italian cultural setting. It makes the concept of "national identity" particularly difficult because it reflects what several researchers have claimed; that the regional identity is stronger than the national identity in this country (Vasta, 1993; Mignone, 1995).

In the 1995 survey I have found several questions I hope can suitably illustrate Norwegian/Italian national identity and attitudes towards immigration. In the following, I turn to these questions for a critical discussion of their suitability for my project.

6.3 Making the Concepts Operational

As mentioned earlier, membership identity, chauvinistic identity, civic identity and cultural identity together constitute national identity in this thesis. In the following I will explain why I think the questions I have chosen from "Aspects of National Identity 1995" ensure the validity of the project. Validity refers to whether the data are relevant for the theoretical objective.

Table 6.1: Membership identity

	Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Italian/Norwegian. **Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?**
Birth	To have been born in Italy/Norway
Citizenship	To have Italian/Norwegian citizenship
Language	To be able to speak Italian/Norwegian
Respect	To respect Italian/Norwegian political institutions and laws
Sentiment	To feel Italian/Norwegian

Together these variables cover a broad area of membership criterions. Following Smith's (1991) division of ethnic and civic national identity, to have been born in Norway/Italy would clearly fall into the ethnic model, while to have Norwegian/Italian citizenship and respect these countries' political institutions and laws would belong to the civic model. However, as Cronbach's alpha tests will show later in this chapter, all of these variables are correlated with each other. Therefore I let all five variables together represent membership identity. By uniting them like this, I agree with Hjerm (1998:340) that *it is possible for an individual to base her/his national identity on both civic and ethnic factors at the same time.* Hjerm (1998) has used the same variables in his comparison of four Western countries on the subject of national identity and xenophobia.

Table 6.2: Chauvinistic identity

	How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Rather live	I would rather be a citizen of Italy/Norway than of any other country in the world
More like us	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Italians/Norwegians
Italy/Norway better	Generally speaking, Italy/Norway is a better country than most other countries
Support nation	People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong
Proud of sports	When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be Italian/Norwegian

Agreement in four of these statements imply a strong national devotion that places one's own country above all others, which is the definition of chauvinistic identity as mentioned earlier in this thesis. Agreement in the statement regarding support of one's own country even when it is in the wrong, however, implies a sense of loyalty to one's nation state. At first glance, loyalty to one's country does not seem to fit into the definition of chauvinistic identity, because it does not directly compare and favour one country to another. However, at the core of national loyalty lies the assumption that one's own country is worth being loyal to. It is possible that the country is not regarded as worthy of this loyalty unless it is considered better than others.

Sports is a universal trigger of chauvinistic sentiments. International sports championships have been said to be similar to wars because different nations oppose each other and demonstrates their strength (Eliassen and Meland, 1997). Although I do not expect to find any substantial differences of agreement in the statement concerning sports in the two countries, reliability analysis proved it to strengthen the reliability of chauvinistic identity. Therefore I have chosen to include this variable in my analyses.

Chauvinistic sentiments and nationalism are often regarded as something negative. For Europe this has been especially true from the Second World War onwards. With Italy's feeling of guilt regarding the war one might expect that it is less acceptable for Italy to openly express chauvinistic sentiments than it is for Norway. Norway has never directly experienced the negative consequences of its own nationalism, with the result that such sentiments are closer associated with positive feelings of patriotism. It is therefore plausible that Norway has a stronger chauvinistic identity than Italy.

Table 6.3: Civic identity

	How proud are you of Italy/Norway in each of the following?
Democracy	The way democracy works
Political influence	Its social security system
Economic achievements	Its political influence in the world
Social security system	Italian/Norwegian economic achievements
Fair treatment of all	Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society

These variables are exactly the same as the ones Hjerm (1998) used to measure Australian / German / British / Swedish political national pride, and they are part of the index Grytten (1998) used to measure Norwegian and Swedish patriotism. In this thesis they are used to

measure civic national identity, since I have already stated that civic and cultural identity in this context deal with national pride.

Put together, these five items measure pride in one's country in both a domestic and an international perspective. The item concerning pride in the state's political influence in the world places one's own country directly in an international context. Although the other items deal with strictly domestic public institutions, pride in these will also to some extent imply a comparison with public institutions in other countries. For instance, one cannot be proud of the way democracy works unless one has a perception of how other countries' democracies work.

I expect that both historical circumstances and present structural conditions will influence the answers people give to these questions. It is not likely that the majority of a population will take great pride in the civic aspect of their nation unless there is at least a vaguely objective reason for it. I would therefore expect that Norway has a more positive civic identity than Italy. Among other things, Italian problems with corruption in the public sphere and their vast bureaucracy have probably not increased the Italians' confidence in their state. Norway's social democratic restructuring of the country after the Second World War, and the stable political environment for the last 50 years may on the other hand have given Norwegians a sense of security and made them take pride in their state.

Table 6.4: Cultural identity

	How proud are you of Italy/Norway in each of the following?
Technology and science	Its scientific and technological achievements
Sports	Its achievements in sports
Art and literature	Its achievements in the arts and literature
National history	Its history
Armed forces	Italy's/Norway's armed forces

Hjerm (1998) used the exact same variables to measure natio-cultural national pride. Regarding the sports dimension I do not expect to find any differences in pride, but reliability tests showed that this variable strengthens the reliability of cultural identity. Technological achievements, art and literature, and national history are all suitable for describing how the people feel about their cultural practice and history. As the items constituting civic identity these are all part of the public sphere. However, they are linked to the nation state as a nation of people, rather than as a political state. The variable

concerning national armed forces is more ambiguous. On one hand it is controlled by the state, but on the other hand it is often perceived as defending the people (Hjerm, 1998:343). Reliability tests proved that for both countries the armed forces variable strengthened the index reliability for cultural identity, and weakened it for civic identity. I have therefore made it a constituting part of cultural identity.

Table 6.5a: Attitudes towards immigration

	How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Assimilation	It is impossible for people who do not share Italian/Norwegian customs and traditions to become fully Italian/Norwegian
Diversity	Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions
Crime	Immigrants increase crime rates
Take jobs	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Italy/Norway
Bad for economy	Immigrants are generally not good for Italy's Norway's economy
Not open to new impulses	Immigrants do not make Italy/Norway open to new ideas and cultures

Table 6.5b: Attitudes towards immigration

Assimilation or diversity	Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?

The four last statements in this section may seem as if they are not expressed in a balanced, objective way. This is because two of them are originally differently scaled. When people answered this survey, the statements in question were: *"Immigrants are generally good for Italy's/Norway's economy"* and *"Immigrants make Italy/Norway more open to new ideas and cultures"*. In order to make them more directly comparable to the other two statements, however, I made the responses negative instead of positive. Together these four statements illustrate the amount of prejudice in the population. The other variables in this section measure whether the respondents favour assimilation or multi-cultural integration.

It is difficult at this stage to anticipate which country will have the most negative attitude towards immigrants. For a while now Italy has struggled with extensive illegal immigration, and rightwing political parties who wish to end all immigration have received massive support in some areas. However, Italy has also a long-standing reputation for being tolerant and helpful to newcomers. Norway is an egalitarian society with a well-functioning welfare system and very few immigrants compared to other Western countries,

but still it has been shown how its population is more xenophobic than for instance the Swedish (Grytten, 1998; Knudsen, 1997).

In addition I look at several background variables in connection with aspects of national identity and attitudes towards immigrants. These variables are age, marital status, education, household income, employment status, which part of the country the respondent lives in, and whether the respondent lives in an urban or a rural area. The respondents' gender and church attendance frequency will also be added, but not as active variables. This has to do with the type of analysis I have chosen. In correspondence analysis a coherent group of variables should be of the same kind. Church attendance frequency measures the respondents' conscious actions in a way age, marital status etc. do not. Also, dichotomous variables like gender will easily dominate and destabilise a correspondence analysis.

By analysing all these variables, I will be able to say something about typical Norwegian and Italian identities and attitudes, and typical identities and attitudes for subgroups identified by explanatory variables in each country. According to theory of relative deprivation, which I accounted for in the previous chapter (Chapter 5, p.66), individuals who feel surpassed economically or socially will be the most xenophobic in a society (Hernes and Knudsen, 1997). As mentioned, earlier research on xenophobia in Scandinavian countries (Knudsen, 1997; Grytten, 1998) has shown that the relative deprivation thesis does not lose its explanatory power when aspects of national identity are taken into account. I therefore expect to find the relative deprivation thesis useful in the analyses of the Norwegian material. Whether or not it will have explanatory power in Italy as well, remains to be seen.

6.4 Reliability Analysis

By running reliability analyses in SPSS 10.1, I was able to assess Cronbach's alpha for the different aspects of national identity and for attitudes towards immigration. The "can't choose" categories have been left out in the analyses for all indexes except membership identity and cultural identity in the Norwegian material. In these two indexes, the alpha value was lower without the "can't choose" categories.

Table 6.6: Reliability analyses

	Norway	**Italy**
Membership identity	,6867	,7031
Chauvinistic identity	,6652	,6992
Civic identity	,7370	,8010
Cultural identity	,6035	,6045
Attitudes towards immigration	,7788	,6925

Ideally the alpha value should exceed 0,7 in order for an index to be sufficiently reliable. Norwegian membership identity, Italian chauvinistic identity and attitudes towards immigration in Italy do not exceed 0,7, but since they are very close I do not consider them to be a major reliability problem in this thesis. Indeed more problematic are Norwegian chauvinistic identity and Norwegian/Italian cultural identity. Cultural identity has the lowest alpha values: barely higher than 0,6 in both countries. This may very well indicate that the variables I have chosen to measure cultural identity do not have sufficient covariation, and represent a reliability problem.

As mentioned earlier, Anthony Smith – one of the leading theorists in the field of nationalism and national identity – distinguishes between civic and ethnic (cultural) national identity. This distinction between a civic and a cultural identity part is dominant in most writings on the theme, and it has turned out fruitful for the understanding of national identity. I cannot theoretically justify ignoring this division between civic and cultural in a thesis on national identity. But at the same time I cannot theoretically justify indexes with such low alpha values either. There is obviously a clear gap here between what is theoretically ideal and what is practically feasible. In order to write this thesis based on the 1995 ISSP survey I see no other option than to make use of the cultural identity index although the alpha value is not theoretically acceptable. The questions I have chosen to measure cultural identity have previously been used by for instance Hjerm (1998) in his study of national identities, national pride and xenophobia in Germany / Australia / Britain / Sweden. I have not found the alpha values for these countries, and therefore I cannot say whether he has made the same theoretical questionable decision that I have made about using this particular index for measuring cultural pride. I will, nevertheless, keep in mind that the scale reliability is far from optimal for cultural identity in the interpretations of my results.

There is also a reliability problem concerning Norwegian chauvinistic identity. Although the alpha value is higher here than it was for cultural identity, it presents a potentially more important problem because the questions seem to be unequally reliable in Norway and Italy. The same index for Norwegian chauvinistic identity has been used previously by Hjerm (1998) who mentioned the alpha value of 0,66 but did not see it as a potential problem. The main reason why it represents a problem here is that the index seems to be suitable for describing Italian chauvinistic identity but not Norwegian. We should keep this in mind in the interpretations of my analyses later in this thesis.

If I am to write a thesis on the different aspects of national identity, I ought to use all of the indexes mentioned above: even those with low alpha values. Although I take both validity and reliability into consideration, I would rather be careful with my interpretations of the indexes than to not say anything about them at all. If I remove cultural identity and chauvinistic identity from the analysis, I will not have much left to illustrate national identity with.

6.5 Comparability

The reliability problem concerning chauvinistic identity makes comparability less straightforward, but the comparative aspect of research would anyway need to be dealt with in this chapter. A discussion on comparability is relevant in all social research, and in cross-national studies like this it is compulsory. It is important to keep in mind that comparability presents both potentials and problems in a study, and that certain presuppositions regarding comparability lie behind every comparative study.

One of the main objectives of cross-national comparative analysis is to understand and explain difference. Different societies have variable historical conditions leading to current attitudes and practices. By understanding what circumstances lead to specific social systems and cultural ways of behaving, we are able to reflect more upon the basis of our own practices (May, 1993:157). In this lies the potential to challenge our "background assumptions". Additionally we gain knowledge of a society different from our own, which adds to increased general knowledge of the world we live in. Comparative analysis will enable me both to discover which general factors influence national identity and attitudes

towards immigration, and which factors particular for each cultural setting influence these phenomena.

As mentioned earlier, a common disadvantage with self-completion surveys is that different types of respondents may understand identical questions differently. But also with other survey types this problem is self-evident when we are dealing with cross-national studies. Meanings vary between cultures. Meaning-equivalence is important for the survey's validity, and we cannot be sure that for instance Norwegian and Italian respondents interpret the same questions in exactly the same way. For instance it is difficult to establish whether Norwegians and Italians think of the same type of people when they answer questions about immigrants. It seems that Norwegian attitudes are often more negative if people think of immigrants as black people with a different culture and religion than if they think of immigrants as Northern European individuals. Simultaneously it seems that Italians feel more hostile towards Albanian immigrants (who form an ethnic group not much different from themselves) than they do towards black people with a different cultural and religious background. Meaning-equivalence in cross-cultural research can never be guaranteed. However, to be able to conduct comparative studies, one has to presuppose that there is a sufficient degree of meaning-equivalence.

The relevance of a comparability discussion is not restricted to cross-national research only. When a social researcher chooses to study a phenomenon, *the choice always represents a comparison of the selected phenomenon under observation in relation to other social phenomena…No social phenomenon can be isolated and studied without comparing it to other social phenomena…*(Øyen, 1990 in May, 1993:155). Any researcher will, implicit or explicit, compare the normal with deviations from the normal. Any decision he/she makes in a field of research and any results he/she finds will involve comparison of some sort. We all have preconceptions of the world, and whatever we study will be compared to these. A study of Norwegian national identity alone would not involve a cross-cultural comparison, but the results would nevertheless be compared to the researcher's preconceptions of the phenomenon. Although I undertake a cross-national comparison in this thesis, it is important to be aware that the comparative element is closely associated to every kind of social research.

An additional potential comparability problem with the 1995 ISSP module is that data gathering has been performed differently in Norway and Italy. As mentioned earlier self-completion questionnaires and face-to-face interviews may effect respondents differently. I cannot determine with absolute certainty that the Italian and the Norwegian material are comparable. Chauvinistic identity will perhaps be especially problematic in this respect, since reliability tests have shown that the index for this aspect of identity is not equally reliable in Norway and Italy. I will nevertheless attempt in this thesis to give a description of national identity and attitudes in the two countries. On the basis of such a description I may be able to undertake a comparison. To make these descriptions – or illustrations – of national identity, I have chosen to analyse the 1995 ISSP survey material using a statistical technique with somewhat intuitive interpretable graphics. The remainder of this chapter revolves around this specific method.

6.6 Correspondence Analysis

According to Greenacre (1993), correspondence analysis is simply a means for transforming numerical information into pictorial form. By using correspondence analysis you can communicate complex cross-tabular data to non-specialists through relatively easy interpretable graphics. Correspondence analysis is intended to reveal structures in the data rather than to confirm or reject hypotheses about the underlying processes that generate the data by testing these hypotheses against an a priori given mathematical model (Greenacre and Blasius, 1994). It is useful to all who collect categorical data, for example data collected in social surveys. In this thesis I work with categorical data, and my intention is exploratory rather than governed by a priori specified hypotheses about causal relations within a closed system of variables. I wish to identify underlying structures in the data material, and the graphic display of correspondence analyses makes this task easier. My intention is to map different types of national identity and structural characteristics, and see if and how they are related to attitudes towards immigration. Instead of communicating the information of the material in a complex cross-tabular form, I want to make the results more accessible. This is why correspondence analysis is highly useful in this thesis. I can make use of the elegance of the graphical display, without losing any information. In my analyses in this thesis I have used the French correspondence analysis computer program SPAD 3.5.

The concepts in correspondence analysis differ somewhat from the concepts used in other statistical techniques. I therefore think that an explanation of the most important concepts in correspondence analysis is useful. The plotting system of correspondence analysis is called the **barycentric coordinate system** (Greenacre, 1993). The barycentre is the origo of the coordinate system, and all answering categories - **points** - can be located based on their distance to this centre (Hjellbrekke, 1999). The **axes** in the maps are of utmost importance for the interpretation of correspondence analysis. The shorter the distance is between points, the more likely it is that these points can be grouped together to form an answering pattern for a group of respondents. Points in the opposite direction of each other – on each side of an axis – represent most unlikely answering combinations, and usually oppose each other. On the basis of such oppositions, we can identify internally coherent groups of respondents who oppose each other. We must at all times remember, however, that interpretations in correspondence analysis are not clear-cut and absolute. The pattern points form only represents answering *tendencies*. The first axis demonstrates the most important oppositions of the material, the second axis then demonstrates parts of the oppositions axis 1 failed to illustrate, and so on until all of the **inertia** is covered (Hjellbrekke, 1999). The higher the value of the inertia, the greater the association between the variables (Greenacre, 1993). In this thesis I am using multiple correspondence analyses and the inertia in itself will be of very little use because the number of variables and variable categories determines it. Every axis "covers" part of the inertia, and this is much more useful for my purposes. The part of inertia an axis covers is called the axis' **eigenvalue** (Hjellbrekke, 1999). The higher the eigenvalue, the more capable the axis is in separating between the different subgroups of respondents that can be formed on the basis of variable categories.

Absolute contributions form another example of decomposing inertia in correspondence analysis. This is the contributions of the points to an axis. The point's mass and position determine the size of these contributions. A point's **mass** in correspondence analysis is the same as "weight" in other statistical techniques (Greenacre 1993:19). That a point contributes to an axis means in short that it influences the construction of it; the bigger it is and/or the more extreme position it has in the map, the more it orientates an axis in its direction. Points with high absolute contributions to an axis are called this axis' **explaining** points. In the appendix in this thesis result matrixes with all categories with absolute

contributions above average from my analyses can be viewed. Explaining points are usually simultaneously **explained**; they receive high **relative contributions** from an axis.

The variables I analyse can be divided into two main types: attitudinal and classificatory variables. Normally in the analysing process when you have different types of variables, you would keep the one set of variables (preferably the classificatory set) active, and the other set (the attitudinal set) passive. Passive points are also referred to as **supplementary** points. A supplementary point has no mass and can consequently not orient an axis in its direction. It adds information to the analysis without jeopardising its internal stability. If classificatory variables were active, and attitudinal variables were supplementary, we could get information on how well the classificatory variables explain the variation in attitudinal variables. However, in my analyses this division turned out not to be technically satisfactory. The passive attitudinal variables did not express any pattern at all in correspondence with the active classificatory variables. Prior research on national identity and attitudes towards immigration in Norway based on the same survey I use (Hernes and Knudsen, 1997; Grytten, 1998; Hjerm, 1998) has proved that statistical connections between classificatory and attitudinal variables indeed exist. Although the ideal technical solution would have been to analyse the classificatory background variables as active and the attitudinal variables as passive, I decided to reverse it. In the analyses in the following chapters background variables are passive and attitudinal variables are active. In this context I refer to both variables measuring attitudes towards immigration and variables measuring national identity as attitudinal variables. They will be analysed together as active variables later on. Although they differ in content, they are scaled roughly the same way, and they both deal with opinion questions. I will analyse attitudes together with each identity aspect. This will lead to a certain degree of stability from analysis to analysis. Background categories that are statistically significant in every analysis is likely to be related to attitudes towards immigration regardless of the aspects of national identity.

6.7 A Closing

Throughout this chapter I have focused on methodology in general and reliability and validity in particular. I started by accounting for the International Social Survey Programme, and especially the different data gathering methods used in Italy and Norway.

In Italy the 1995 ISSP survey I use in this thesis was conducted through face-to-face interviews, while in Norway data was gathered through self-completion questionnaires. I discussed pros and cons with each of these, based on how they can affect the reliability and validity of the data.

In order to establish whether the Italian and Norwegian data were representative for the Italian and Norwegian populations I have compared age, gender and area of residence for the respondents with the entire population's distribution on these categories. I concluded that the data material was sufficiently representative.

Attitudes towards immigration and the four identity aspects presented in the chapter on previous research were operationalised with questions from the 1995 survey. I referred to theoretical contributions and previous research in this process. I furthermore presented traditional explanatory variables that I will use in my analyses. On the basis of the variables I have chosen I will in the following chapters study national identity and attitudes on two different levels: I will attempt to reveal typical Italian and Norwegian identities and attitudes, and typical identities and attitudes for subgroups within each nation.

I have checked the reliability of the four identity aspects with Cronbach's Alpha tests and discussed the problems concerning low alpha values. Especially cultural identity in both countries did not successfully pass the alpha test. Also chauvinistic identity in Norway seemed problematic in this respect. I continued with a discussion of comparability, where I emphasised that although comparability is usually thought of in the context of cross-cultural studies, an element of comparability will be involved even when the study is limited to one case. Every person will have a particular perception of the world against which he/she compares the results of a study. I accounted for some of the pros and cons with a comparison of nations. Especially meaning-equivalence is difficult to guarantee between cultures. For example, I cannot say for certain that Italians and Norwegians interpret the same survey questions in the same way. The advantage of comparative research is of course first and foremost increased knowledge. In addition to gaining knowledge of a society that differs from our own, we have the opportunity to challenge some of our own "background assumptions" concerning our own society. This enables us to look at our own society in a different light when compared to a contrasting society.

Finally, I accounted for correspondence analysis, which is the statistical analysis technique used in this thesis. This is a fruitful technique when you do not have rigid a priori hypotheses, but are more interested in revealing the structures of a data material. Based on the historical chapters and the chapter on theoretical framework I have developed some assumptions concerning what I expect to find through my analyses, but none of these are hypothesis that needs to be tested against an a priori mathematical model. Correspondence analysis is thought of as useful in the analysis of categorical data like the 1995 ISSP survey.

With the national histories, the theoretical contributions and the previous research in mind, and with methodological issues accounted for, it is time to move on to the analyses of national identity and attitudes in Italy and Norway. I will dedicate one chapter to each nation, and sum up the analysis in a comparative chapter later on.

7. Analysis of Italian National Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

The analyses I have conducted of national identity and attitudes towards immigration yield vast amounts of information. Due to the limits of a thesis such as this, I will only present the major results.

I will start each analytical chapter with a correspondence analysis of traditional background variables. The oppositions I find through such background analyses will enable me to form a picture of structural groupings in each nation. The main parts of the analytical chapters will revolve around correspondence analyses of each identity aspect and attitudes towards immigration. Also these analyses will entail the traditional explanatory variables from the background analysis. However, in the analyses of identity and attitudes all background categories are supplementary as discussed in the chapter on methodological framework (Chapter 6, p.87). The analyses I am about to conduct will enable me to assess whether the social structures I discover in Italy and in Norway are reflected also when national identity and attitudes towards immigration are concerned. My focus is in other words on whether or not structural oppositions in the material remain the same when we investigate mental oppositions regarding identity and attitudes in Italy and Norway. After exploring this for each nation, I will have sufficient information to undertake a comparison of Italy and Norway in chapter 9.

The attitudinal variables will stay the same from analysis to analysis. This will inevitably lead to a certain degree of stability in the different analyses. As discussed earlier, the reason why I have chosen to analyse each aspect of national identity together with attitudes is partly theoretical and partly practical. In the chapter on theoretical framework I have argued that attitudes towards immigration is likely to co-vary with national identity. In the chapter on methodological framework I have argued that the variables that measure national identity and the variables that measure attitudes in the 1995 survey are the same kind of variables in that they measure mental categories and have roughly equivalent answering categories. By looking at national identity and attitudes together, it will be possible to deduce what kinds of identity go together with which types of attitude. I will

compare the oppositions of the supplementary background categories with the initial background analysis in order to shed some light on how well such categories can contribute to the understanding of attitudes towards immigration.

Before I embark on the analyses of national identity and attitudes, I will begin this chapter with accounting for the structural oppositions in the Italian material. I will thereby present a picture of typical contemporary Italian attitudes and national identities based on frequency analyses. Together, they will provide a suitable starting point for the main part of this chapter – the analyses of national identity and attitudes towards immigration.

7.1 Structural Oppositions in Italy

Correspondence analysis of background variables revealed that the age dimension along the first axis is the most important structural feature in contemporary Italy, followed by an employment dimension along the second axis. We are able to say something about what kind of person an Italian is likely to be based on his/her age and employment status. The map given in figure 7.1[1] illustrates these two dimensions.

From the map we can see that the main opposition in this material is between the youngest and the oldest of the Italian respondents. Several of the background categories on each side of the age dimension are logically associated with age. The oldest of the Italians are for instance more often than others retired from work or housewives. They are furthermore often widowed, and attend church regularly at least once a week. They are more often women than men. They have lower education and a low monthly income of less than 1 500 000 lire. The youngest, on the other hand, are more often than others unmarried students. They are often men who seldom or never go to church.

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[1] The map has been edited to facilitate interpretation. Categories that are not of analytical relevance in this context, for example area of residence, has been removed. It is important to keep in mind that all categories, included those edited away for educational purposes here, have played their part in the construction of the map. The map without editing can be viewed in appendix B. This appendix also contains a result matrix with all categories with absolute contributions above average.

On the negative side of the employment dimension given by the second axis of the analysis, these two groups are combined since none of them are in traditional employment. On the positive side of this axis we find the full-time working people. They are more often men than women. They are furthermore often 36-45 years old and married, and they attend church regularly several times a year.

Figure 7.1: Map of background variables in Italy.

Background variables: Employment (circle), Marital status (triangle), Age (square), Education(X), Income (right arrow), Church attendance frequency (empty triangle), Gender (empty square).

The correspondence analysis of Italian background variables has enabled me to identify three structural groups in the material: older retired women, male students and full-time working men. I will keep the oppositions accounted for here in mind when I later analyse national identity and attitudes towards immigration. If the passive background variables from these coming analyses form the same oppositions as already presented above, it implies that traditional explanatory variables are important in the understanding of attitudes towards immigration. If the oppositions vary depending on the specific aspects of

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national identity that are being analysed together with attitudes, this will indicate that the type and degree of national identity is also important and that background variables are not alone sufficient in explaining and understanding attitudes.

7.2 A Picture of Italian Attitudes and National Identities

Before I conduct the correspondence analyses of national identity and attitudes towards immigration, I will present an overview of Italian attitudes and identity based on frequency analyses. Such an overview will be a suitable starting point for the later correspondence analyses. Knowledge concerning what type of national identity and what kind of attitude the majority of contemporary Italians have may facilitate the preservation of a broader perspective when I later go into detail concerning the mental oppositions in the material. In addition to being a suitable starting point, a general picture of national identity and attitudes in a nation is also relevant for the later comparison of Italy and Norway.

7.2.1 Italian Attitudes towards Immigration

The frequency analyses[2] below show perhaps not surprisingly that the typical Italian answering pattern consists of both positive and negative elements. We cannot say that the typical Italian is neither totally negative nor totally positive towards foreigners settling in Italy.

Table 7.1a: Frequency analyses of attitudes towards immigration in Italy.

"Agree strongly" and "agree" have been combined, and "disagree" and "disagree strongly" have been combined.

	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree
Assimilation	46 %	17 %	35 %
Diversity	59 %	16 %	22 %
Crime	64 %	15 %	21 %
Take jobs	37 %	17 %	45 %
Bad for economy	57 %	18 %	21 %
Not open for new impulses	37 %	17 %	43 %

Table 7.1b: Frequency analysis of attitudes towards immigration in Italy. "Either - or" variable.

	Maintain distinct customs	Adjust to society	Can't choose
Assimilation or Diversity	33 %	56 %	11 %

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[2] Complete variable formulations for all attitude and identity variables can be seen in chapter 6, p. 77-80.

The frequency analysis in table *7.1b* tell us that a majority of the Italian respondents believe that immigrants should adapt and blend into the larger society rather than maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Simultaneously, however, we can see from the analyses in table *7.1a* that the majority agrees in that immigrants should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions. Further, the majority agrees in statements that immigration increases crime rates, and that immigrants are not good for the Italian economy. On the other hand, almost half of the respondents think that immigrants make Italy more open to new ideas and cultures, and they disagree in that immigrants take jobs away from Italians.

Italy has traditionally thought of herself as a friendly and tolerant nation (Mignone, 1995). This indicates that the typical Italian attitude should be positive. However, this image has been increasingly hard to maintain during the last decades. The survey material I analyse in this thesis dates back to 1995. In 1991 Italy experienced two waves of Albanian refugees. Italy was totally unprepared for this, as we have seen in the chapter on Italian history, and responded to the refugee crisis by sending the second wave back to Albania. It is likely that the Italian attitudes are somewhat coloured by this Italian unpreparedness for massive immigration, since the survey was conducted only four years later. Additionally, during the last decades Italy has struggled with the problem of vast illegal immigration. It has been impossible for state authorities to successfully monitor all of the coast-line surrounding most of the country, and therefore it is fairly easy for refugees to arrive by boat without being discovered. Racist attitudes have increased in Italy lately (Mignone, 1995), and the two points mentioned here are most likely two of the reasons for this. This indicates recent historical incentives for a negative Italian attitude.

7.2.2 Italian Membership Identity

The majority of the Italians have stated that they think it is important to have been born in Italy, to have Italian citizenship, to be able to speak Italian, to respect Italy's political institutions and laws, and to feel Italian, for being truly Italian.

Table 7.2: Frequency analyses of membership identity in Italy.

"Very important" and "fairly important" have been combined, and "not very important" and "not important at all" have been combined.

	Important	Not important
Birth	77 %	22 %
Citizenship	82 %	17 %
Language	86 %	14 %
Respect	87 %	12 %
Sentiment	91 %	8 %

The criterion considered the least important in table 7.2 is that one has to be born in Italy in order to be accepted as a fellow national. Nevertheless, more than three in four Italians regard also this criterion to be of importance. On the whole, the frequency analyses reveal that Italian membership identity is overwhelmingly positive.

According to among others Anthony D. Smith, education plays an essential part in the creation and maintenance of national devotion. By learning that they belong to and share a unique culture, the members of a nation-state learn something about who they are in the contemporary world. According to Smith, this process of self-definition is an essential foundation for national identity (1991:17). To be capable of feeling as part of a unique culture, there must be some sort of mental boundaries surrounding this culture. There must be certain things that separate the culture from other cultures. A typically distinct feature with a national culture is language. As Anderson has emphasised, language provides a unique sense of fellowship (1996:141). In order to know who they are, they must know who they are not. In other words, to achieve this process of self-definition, one must acknowledge certain criteria that must be fulfilled in order to be a true member of the nation. Such criteria constitute my concept of membership identity. These criteria are important in the process of self-definition. Since this process is a foundation for national identity, it is hardly surprising that a vast majority of nationals find the membership criteria important. This aspect of national identity is likely to be positive to some degree in every modern nation-state.

7.2.3 Italian Chauvinistic Identity

When we look at Italian chauvinistic identity the general pattern is not at all as positive as it was for membership identity.

Table 7.3: Frequency analyses of chauvinistic identity in Italy.

"Agree strongly" and "agree" have been combined, and "disagree" and "disagree strongly" have been combined.

	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree
Rather live	61 %	19 %	19 %
More like us	21 %	25 %	51 %
Italy better	36 %	27 %	35 %
Support nation	36 %	14 %	48 %
Proud of sports	77 %	13 %	9 %

According to Doob, a population will always think of itself as distinct in comparison with other nations (1964:86). Common language and culture strengthen this sense of distinctiveness. But although all members of a nation will consider themselves as part of a distinct nation in comparison with others, the comparison is as we can see from table 7.3 not necessarily favourable to the nation they themselves belong to.

If we refer to the majority opinion as the opinion of a "typical" Italian, the typical Italian would rather live in Italy than any other place in the world and is proud to be Italian when Italy does well in international sports. Simultaneously he/she does not agree that the world would be a better place if people in other countries were more like the Italians. The Italians are divided when it comes to the other statements measuring chauvinistic identity – that Italy is generally a better country than most other countries and that one should support one's country even if the country is in the wrong.

As was the case with membership identity, a distinction between "us" and "them" is the core also in chauvinistic identity. To achieve a positive national identity, according to Billig, groups compare themselves favourably with contrasting outgroups. Through this distinction, they can claim a unique identity (Billig, 1995:78-81). However, this does not necessarily imply agreeing in the chauvinistic statements mentioned above. It is likely that nationals will compare themselves favourably with certain contrasting out-groups even though they do not favour themselves in comparison with the rest of the world. And as the frequency analyses of Italian chauvinistic identity have shown, the Italians are divided when it comes to claiming a superior nationality in an international context.

7.2.4 Italian Civic Identity

The majority of the Italians does not take pride in national civic institutions like the democracy, Italy's political influence in the world, national economic achievements, Italy's social security system and its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society.

Table 7.4: Frequency analyses of civic identity in Italy.

"Very proud" and "somewhat proud" have been combined, and "not very proud" and "not proud at all" have been combined.

	Proud	Not proud
Democracy	25 %	74 %
Political influence	21 %	74 %
Economic achievements	39 %	58 %
Social security system	27 %	70 %
Fair treatment of all	21 %	78 %

National economic achievements are by far the part of Italian civic culture that engenders the most pride among the respondents. From table 7.4 we can see that almost two in five Italians take pride in the economy. The other parts of civic culture listed here make only a minority of the respondents proud. In the chapter on Italian history I pointed out that contemporary Italians have reason to take more pride in national economic achievements than in the welfare state. As the frequency analyses in table 7.4 demonstrate, substantially more of the respondents have stated that they are proud of national economic achievements than of the Italian social security system. Although the social security system is just one of the parts that constitute a welfare state, the frequency analyses support my assumption. I cannot exclude the possibility that the majority of the Italians take pride in other parts of the welfare state. However, with Italian history in mind, I do not find this possibility very likely. I have in this context chosen to let the social security system serve as an indicator of the more general concept of welfare state.

On the whole, the chapter on Italian history demonstrated that there are various reasons for Italians to have a negative civic identity, and not many reasons why they should be proud of their civic institutions. The unification of Italy in the 1860s laid the foundation for a wide gap between rulers and ruled, a gap that has not narrowed sufficiently afterwards. The state's lack of ability to even out the differences between the wealthy North and the poor South may have led to both a strengthening of regional identities at the cost of national identity, and a negative civic identity. Repeated problems with corruption in the Civil

Service, immobility in politics despite of frequent elections and changes of governments, together with terrorism and the infiltration of regional politics by the mafia are likely to have further diminished many Italians' faith in the Italian state. During the last decades a lack of state control over illegal immigration has probably also contributed to contemporary Italians not taking pride in civic institutions.

7.2.5 Cultural Identity

With the exception of the national armed forces, a vast majority of the Italians is proud of national cultural institutions.

Table 7.5: Frequency analyses of cultural identity in Italy.

"Very proud" and "somewhat proud" have been combined, and "not very proud" and "not proud at all" have been combined.

	Proud	Not proud
Technology and science	79 %	17 %
Sports	87 %	10 %
Art and literature	93 %	4 %
National history	87 %	10 %
Armed forces	41 %	53 %

From table 7.5 we can see that only two in five Italians are proud of the armed forces. When we compare it with the pride Italians take in for example national art and literature, the difference is striking. Historically, it is likely that the cultural legacy from the Roman Empire has affected contemporary Italian cultural identity where art, literature and to some degree history are concerned.

Most of the theoreticians discussed in the chapter on theoretical framework agree that a standardised mass educational system facilitates the creation and maintenance of national devotion and identity. A shared socialisation process is essential in teaching ever new generations national culture and consciousness. As I have operationalised cultural identity in this thesis, it comprises national history and cultural achievements in art, literature, science and so forth. Most of these cultural achievements can be said to be part of the national history. As we have seen in the chapter on theoretical framework, national history involves collective forgetting as well as collective remembering. As Anderson stressed, people remember the good things that have happened and that make them proud while they

forget the more embarrassing national events. When this glorious national history is then passed on to new generations with the means of a standardised educational system, and many of the components of cultural identity are to some degree comprised by national history, it is no wonder that members of a nation – any nation – achieve a positive cultural identity.

7.3 A more thorough Investigation of Italian Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

In the previous section I have formed a general picture of national identity and attitudes in Italy. It is now time to move on to more complicated analyses in order to shed some light on the relationship between national identity and attitudes. The following analyses will also enable us to understand the potential influence background categories may have on both identity and attitudes. I will keep in mind the main structural oppositions in Italy, as revealed in the initial correspondence analysis of background variables in the beginning of this chapter.

7.3.1 Membership Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

The correspondence analysis of membership identity and attitudes in Italy reveals that people who think that fulfilling membership criteria is very important for being truly Italian, more often than others strongly agree in derogatory statements concerning immigrants. People who consider membership criteria to be fairly important, on the other hand, more often than others have moderately anti-immigration opinions. That a positive membership identity has a negative effect on attitudes is hardly surprising. A person who considers being born in Italy, having Italian citizenship, speaking Italian, respecting Italian laws and political institutions, and feeling Italian, as important criteria to fulfil to be accepted as a genuine Italian, is likely to hesitate to accept immigrants as fellow nationals. Being born in Italy and feeling Italian are probably the most difficult criteria to fulfil for immigrants. The distance seems short from not accepting a person as member of the

community to harbouring negative sentiments for him/her. The results of the analysis are illustrated in the map given in figure 7.2[3].

Figure 7.2: Map of Italian membership identity and attitudes.

Membership identity variables in the map: Birth (square), Citizenship (circle), Language (triangle), Respect (reversed triangle), Sentiment (checkers).
Attitude variables in the map: Crime (cross), Bad for economy (X), Take jobs (right triangle), Not open for new impulses (left triangle).

The first axis represents an intensity dimension, where people with strongly anti-immigration attitude are distinguished from the rest by their location on the negative side. The second axis is an agreement dimension. We can see from the map that the people with moderately anti-immigration attitude are situated on the negative side of this axis, while those with strongly pro-immigration attitudes can be seen on the positive side of the agreement dimension. The main trend is that the more positive membership identity one

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[3] I have simplified the map by removing the "can't choose" and the "neither nor" categories. Although these categories helped constructing the map together with the other categories, they are not of analytical importance in this chapter. The map with all active categories and a result matrix with categories from this analysis with absolute contributions above average can be found in appendix B.

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has the more negative attitude one tends to display, and vice versa. In addition to the mentioned results, the analysis furthermore reveals that people who do not find membership criteria at all important to fulfil more often than others have a strongly pro-immigration attitude.

If we look at the earlier presented theory of Michael Billig (1995), not accepting immigrants as fellow nationals appears to be a prerequisite for the maintenance of national identity. There can be no "us" without a "them". The nationals will tend to assume that they are the natural standard against which outsiders are unfavourably measured. In this way immigrants strengthen national devotion (Chapter 4, p. 56-58). Also Leonard Doob emphasises the role of an outsider as essential for the preservation of national identity. According to him, nationals often look at immigrants in order to find the explanation for negative societal developments and events. By blaming immigrants for things they are not happy with – for instance unemployment – their positive belief in their own nation can be re-established. Both of these contributions seem to agree that the strengthening and maintenance of national identity are dependent on the existence of contrasting outgroups within the national borders. These out-groups are subject to a comparison process favouring the nationals. Implicit in this comparison lies a negative attitude towards the out-group. And in order for them to stay outgroups, they cannot be accepted as fellow nationals. In this line of reasoning, it makes sense that a negative attitude towards immigrants co-varies with a positive membership identity.

In the map given in figure 7.3[4] below we can see the background categories that are linked to the groups based on membership identity and attitudes discussed above. The first dimension in this map is an age dimension. At the left we find the people with a very positive membership identity and a strongly anti-immigration attitude. They are the oldest of the respondents. They are widowed and retired from work, and are more often than others religious people who live in urban areas. They furthermore more often than others have lower education and a low income.

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[4] The map has been edited so that only categories of analytical relevance are visible. The map with no editing can be found in appendix B.

Figure 7.3: Map of Italian membership identity and attitudes with focus on relevant background categories.

Background variables: Employment (circle), Marital status (triangle), Age (square), Urbanity (reversed triangle), Education (X), Part of country (checkers), Income (right arrow), Church attendance frequency (triangle), Gender (square).

The second axis is an educational dimension. The people with strongly pro-immigration attitude more often than others have achieved higher education on university level, and are situated on the positive side of this axis. They are more often than others non-religious people in that they never attend church, and they have a high income.

The people with a moderately positive membership identity and a moderately negative attitude towards immigration can be seen on the negative side of the second axis. They have high age in common with the people with a strongly anti-immigration attitude. They are also more often than the pro-immigration people widowed. They often have a low income and lower education. These are also categories they have in common with the strongly anti-immigration people. In addition, the moderately anti-immigration people more often than others live in the South of Italy.

The analysis has shown that people who have a hostile attitude towards immigrants more often than others lack strong personal resources like higher education and high income. These results are in accordance with the thesis of relative deprivation. Those in a society who feel left behind economically or socially will react negatively to groups they perceive as threats. It is not unusual that immigrants constitute such a group. The older people who have either a very negative or a moderately negative attitude do not have much money, and they lack higher education. They are retired and widowed, and many of them will be dependent on social benefits in order to maintain a certain standard of living. They are likely to perceive immigrants as someone they have to compete with for scarce resources from the welfare state. They will probably not be inclined to accept this group as a member of their own community, and if they perceive the group as a threat, they will be inclined to have a negative attitude towards it. As we have seen in the beginning of this chapter, the theoretical contribution of Ernest Gellner also presented arguments similar to the thesis of relative deprivation. People at the bottom of society will always compete with each other for the scarce resources. It is usually the case that immigrants are over-represented in the lowest social stratum. This inevitably engenders prejudice concerning skin-colour or cultural differences among slightly higher strata by the fear of being pushed downwards.

The social structures discovered in the background analysis in the beginning of this chapter are only partly recovered in this analysis of membership identity and attitudes. Apart from the gender category, the people with strongly anti-immigration attitude correspond with the older women on the negative side of the age dimension in the background analysis. The young students on the other side of the age dimension and the full-time working men we found on the one side of the employment dimension, however, do not reappear in this analysis. It seems that background variables are important in understanding a strongly anti-immigration attitude. That the structural groupings discovered in the background analysis are not mirrored when it comes to other degrees of attitude, may be an indication that membership identity is more valuable than traditional background variables in the understanding of more friendly attitudes towards immigration.

7.3.2 Chauvinistic Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

The map given in figure 7.4[5] below illustrates the main results of the correspondence analysis of chauvinistic identity and attitudes towards immigration. To ease the interpretation of the map, I have removed all active categories that are not connected with these results. As mentioned in connection with the map on membership identity and attitudes, it is important to remember that all categories have played their part in the construction of the map, even though I have edited some of them away here for educational reasons.

Figure 7.4: Map of Italian chauvinistic identity and attitudes.

Chauvinistic identity variables in the map: Ratherlive (reversed triangle) more like us (checkers), Italy better (slash), Support one's country (small star) Sports pride (square)
Attitude variables in the map: Diversity (circle), Assimilation (square), Crime (cross), Bad for economy (X), Take jobs (right triangle), Not open for new impulses (left triangle).

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[5] The map without editing can be viewed in appendix B, together with a result matrix with all categories with absolute contributions above average.

The first axis represents an attitudinal intensity dimension. On the negative side of this axis we can see that people who strongly disagree in statements favouring Italy compared to other countries more often than others have either a very positive or a very negative attitude towards immigrants. It seems that not favouring one's own nation compared to other nations at all leads to more extreme attitudes towards immigrants, in both a positive and a negative direction. We can see a Guttman effect in this analysis; the categories in the map have taken the shape of a horseshoe. This indicates that the variables are related to each other in a non-linear manner. The most extreme attitudes and opinions can be found in each end of the horseshoe on the negative side of the first axis, while more moderate attitudes and opinions cluster in the middle of the formation.

The two other results of this analysis are consistent with each other. The more chauvinistic you are the stronger anti-immigration opinions you have. The respondents who have agreed in the chauvinistic statements and thereby have a moderately positive chauvinistic identity, more often than others have a moderately negative attitude towards immigrants. They are situated on the positive side of the intensity dimension. The respondents who have agreed strongly in statements favouring Italy in an international context, on the other hand, often have a very negative attitude. This group is visible on the negative side of the second axis, which is an agreement dimension. These two results are supported by the results from researchers who have investigated other Western countries using the same ISSP survey material. Knudsen, Hernes, Grytten and Hjerm have all drawn the conclusion that a positive chauvinistic identity is statistically correlated with xenophobia. This correlation is also supported by the contributions discussed in the chapter on theoretical framework. Earlier in this chapter we have seen that immigrants often constitute an out-group in society. According to Billig, groups compare themselves favourably with contrasting outgroups in order to achieve a positive identity. And according to Doob, there is a clear connection between stigmatising an out-group and expressing chauvinistic sentiments for one's country. The more threatening an out-group appears, the more it will be stigmatised by the nationals. And because of the link between xenophobia and chauvinistic sentiments, Doob states that the greater the threat of the out-group the more important a part this out-group plays in facilitating patriotism and nationalism.

Important background categories of the analysis are visible in the map in figure 7.5[6]. The first axis is an age dimension also in this analysis. The map shows that people with a very negative chauvinistic identity more often than others are situated on the negative side of this axis. They belong to the younger half of the population. They are often separated and never go to church. They more often than others work part-time and live in the North East of Italy. They furthermore have often accomplished higher education and have a high income, more than 4 500 000 lire a month.

Figure 7.5: Map of Italian chauvinistic identity and attitudes with focus on relevant background categories.

Background variables: Employment (circle), Marital status (triangle), Age (square), Urbanity (reversed triangle), Education (X), Part of country (checkers), Income (right arrow), Church attendance frequency (triangle), Gender (square).

Among the older respondents on the positive side of the age dimension we find the people with a moderately positive chauvinistic identity and a moderately negative attitude towards

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[6] Categories that are not of analytical relevance in this context have been edited away from the map. The map without such editing is located in appendix B.

immigration. They more often than others live in the South of Italy, and have lower education and a low income. Compared to their younger and highly educated counterpart, this group more often attends church.

The third group I have presented here is made visible by the second axis of the analysis, which is an educational dimension. The people with a very positive chauvinistic identity and a strongly anti-immigration attitude have more often than others achieved elementary education only. This group can be seen on the negative side of the second axis. They are among the older half of the population. They are more often than others retired from work or they work at home as housewives. They are often widowed or divorced, and live in urban Southern areas. They more often than others have a low income. We can see that these people are roughly the same as those with moderately positive chauvinistic identity mentioned above. As was the case with the analysis of membership identity and attitudes, they resemble the structural group of older women discovered in the background analysis in the beginning of this chapter. As discussed earlier, this makes sense according to the thesis of relative deprivation. Those who feel left behind economically or socially will react the most negatively against outgroups they perceive as threats. With their low income these people are likely to feel left behind, at least economically. That the South stands out as a significant category among the people with a negative attitude towards immigration also supports the thesis of relative deprivation. We have seen in the chapter on Italian history that the South is substantially poorer than the North. It is not surprising if Southerners, based on their general poverty, perceive immigrants as more of a threat than the relatively wealthier North.

So far, we have seen that both positive membership identity and positive chauvinistic identity have a negative influence on attitudes towards immigration. The dynamics in these links are the same, which is hardly surprising. Having a positive membership identity involves drawing a line between who belongs to the national community and who does not. A direct consequence is that the people who do not fulfil existing membership criteria, are excluded from the community. The distance is often short between exclusion and negative sentiments. The same is true for chauvinistic identity. Having a positive chauvinistic identity involves favouring one's own country compared to other countries. This implies that the nationals have already got some idea about what the differences between various countries are. This idea necessarily involves a view of one's own country as distinct and

superior. This has probably been learnt, at least partially, through a mass educational system socialising all young nationals into "good" countrymen. Boundaries and exclusion of others are essential in both these identity aspects. It is therefore no surprise that they co-vary with negative attitudes.

7.3.3 Civic Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

The correspondence analysis of civic identity and attitudes shows that there is a clear correspondence between a person's attitude and how proud he/she is of national civic institutions. This strengthens the assumption that one can say something about what attitude people are likely to have based on the strength of their civic identity and vice versa.

Negative attitudes have increased notably in Italy recently. According to Hall and White, the attitudes have more to do with the authorities' lack of control over immigration than they have to do with the immigrants themselves (1995:165). This suggests a strong link between civic identity and attitudes towards immigration. As immigration history has shown us in the chapter on Italian history, Italians have certain reasons to mistrust the authorities when it comes to controlling and regulating immigration. Due to its geographical position and the long coastline, Italy has experienced substantial problems with illegal immigration ever since it became a country of immigration in 1978. It has proven to be an insurmountable task for the authorities to monitor the extent of illegal immigration. In addition, when Italy decided to send back the second of the two waves of Albanian refugees in 1991, it was clear that the authorities were not on top of things concerning immigration.

Two results of this correspondence analysis are especially noteworthy. A very negative civic identity goes hand in hand with a strongly anti-immigration attitude, and a very positive civic identity is linked to a very positive attitude. In other words, people who are not proud at all of national civic institutions are prone to being strongly prejudiced when it comes to immigrants. And those who are very proud of civic institutions are inclined to accept immigrants with open arms.

The map given in figure 7.6[7] reveals these results. I have chosen to let a map with the second and third axes of the analysis illustrate my results, since they become more visible along these axes than along the first and the second. The second axis represents an attitudinal intensity dimension. People with strongly anti-immigration attitudes dominate the map on the positive side of this axis, although people with strongly pro-immigration attitudes are also situated here. The third axis is an agreement dimension and distinguishes between people with strongly pro-immigration attitudes and the rest. Those who disagree strongly in derogatory statements concerning immigrants can be seen on the positive side on this axis. To make the map as comprehensible as possible, I have edited away all categories that are not of analytical relevance in this context. The map without editing can be viewed in appendix B.

Figure 7.6: Map of Italian civic identity and attitudes.

Civic identity variables in the map: Democracy (square), Political influence (triangle), Economic achievements (checkers), Social security system (reversed triangle), Equal treatment (cross)
Attitude variables in the map: Crime (cross), Bad for economy (X), Take jobs (right triangle), Not open for new impulses (left triangle).Diversity (circle), Assimilation (square)

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[7] "Very proud" categories dominate the analysis and lead to an unbalanced graphical representation. Technically, an ideal solution would be to make these categories supplementary. However, since they are of analytical importance, I have chosen to keep them active. A result matrix with all categories with absolute contributions above average can be found in appendix B.

Earlier research has demonstrated that a link between a positive civic identity and positive attitudes towards immigrants exists not only in Italy. Hjerm discovered in his study of Australia, Germany, Great Britain and Sweden, that the greater the political pride, the smaller the risk of xenophobia. Knudsen studied Norway and Sweden, and concluded that his concept of regime legitimacy - which is equivalent with my concept of civic identity - is correlated positively with attitudes.

The map given in figure 7.7[8] gives an overview of background categories that are relevant in this analysis.

Figure 7.7: Map of Italian civic identity and attitudes with focus on relevant background categories.

Background variables in the map: Employment (circle), Marital status (triangle), Age (square), Urbanity (reversed triangle), Education (X), Part of country (checkers), Income (right arrow), Church attendance frequency (triangle), Gender (square).

The second axis is the most important analytically speaking in this context. It represents an age dimension. The people who are not proud at all of civic institutions and who have a strongly anti-immigration attitude are located on the positive side of the second axis. They are more often than others more than 46 years old. They are furthermore often married and go to church approximately once a week. They have lower education more often than people with a positive attitude, and they more often live in the South of Italy. They are also

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[8] In accordance with the map in figure 7.6, this map is also presented with the second and third axis for analytical purposes. The map without editing can be seen in appendix B.

more often men than women. The people with a strongly pro-immigration attitude and a very positive civic identity, on the other hand, can be seen on the positive side of the third axis, which is an educational dimension. They have higher education more often than others, and they are 26-45 years old. They are more often men than women. To a greater extent than others, these people never attend church, and they often work part-time. They have a medium high income compared to others.

As was the case in the analyses of membership identity and chauvinistic identity, the thesis of relative deprivation renders a plausible explanation for my results. Although income does not characterise the group with strongly anti-immigration attitudes here, their education level suggests that these people do not have strong personal resources. The people with strongly pro-immigration attitude, on the other hand, more often than others have achieved higher education. According to the thesis of relative deprivation and the theoretical contribution from Gellner, people in lower societal strata will be inclined to reacting the most negatively towards immigrants because they perceive them as a threat in the competition for scarce resources like employment and income. Also in this analysis, this seems to be accurate in contemporary Italy.

7.3.4 Cultural Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

The main result of this correspondence analysis deals with the more extreme identity types and attitudes. People who are either very proud or not proud at all of cultural institutions like art and history have a tendency to have either a very positive or a very negative attitude towards immigrants. They are all mixed together, so we cannot say anything about what kind of cultural identity goes together with what kind of extreme attitude. The only conclusion I can draw at this point is that a person who has answered the questions regarding pride of cultural institutions in an extreme fashion – no matter what the direction – more often than others has a somewhat extreme attitude towards immigration.

There is also a correspondence between being somewhat proud of cultural institutions and being moderately tolerant towards immigrants. Another result shows that people who are very proud of national culture more often than others have a strongly pro-immigration

attitude. The map given in figure 7.6[9] illustrates the main trend of this analysis. People with more extreme attitudes are located on the negative side of the first axis, which is an attitudinal intensity dimension. People with a moderately tolerant attitude, on the other hand, can be seen on the positive side of this axis. The second axis is an agreement dimension. People with strongly pro-immigration attitudes form a group in the map on the positive side of this dimension. To facilitate interpretation, I have edited away all categories that are not of analytical relevance in this context. As mentioned before, it is important to keep in mind that all categories have played their part in the construction of the map even though I have removed some of them at this point.

Figure 7.8: Map of Italian cultural identity and attitudes.

Cultural identity variables in the map: Technology (square), Sports (circle), Armed forces (triangle), Art (checkers), History (left arrow)
Attitude variables in the map: Crime (cross), Bad for economy (X), Take jobs (right triangle), Not open for new impulses (left triangle).Diversity (circle), Assimilation (square)

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[9] The map with all categories present and a result matrix with all categories with absolute contributions above average can be found in appendix B.

As mentioned above, the concept of regime legitimacy used by Knudsen, Hernes and Grytten include both civic and cultural identity. Apart from the result concerning more extreme identity types and attitudes, the result of this analysis is congruent with their results on Norway and Sweden. Cultural identity seems to be positively correlated with attitudes towards immigration. Hjerm, on the other hand, concluded that cultural pride leads to negative attitudes in Australia, Germany, Great Britain and Sweden. This is not the case in Italy. The major result of my analysis implies that I cannot say with any certainty what links exist between more extreme cultural identities and attitudes. But the minor results contradict the assumption that the same correlation exists in Italy as in the four Western countries of Hjerm's study. The majority of Italians have a positive cultural identity. With the aid of theoretical contributions we have seen that every nation is likely to have a positive cultural identity due to standardised socialisation through a mass education system and the mass media. However, the specific link between xenophobia and cultural identity is not emphasised in any of the contributions I have discussed. It is plausible that pride in cultural institutions strengthens and secures national self-esteem. Cultural pride may facilitate nationals' sense of belonging to a unique nation. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Italian cultural identity is overwhelmingly positive. This may give the Italians a sense of security that causes them not to feel threatened by immigration. Cultural institutions are massive and alive in contemporary Italy, and do not risk being ruined by limited influx of foreign cultures. This is one possible explanation why Italians with a positive cultural identity tend to have a positive attitude towards immigrants.

Figure 7.9[10] entails a map over relevant background categories linked to the groups discussed above. The people with a moderately positive cultural identity and a moderately positive attitude are located on the positive side of the first axis, which is an urbanity dimension. They are more often than others young unmarried people who live in small towns or suburbs in the North West of Italy. They attend church several times a year. On the other side of this urbanity dimension we find the people with more extreme attitudes and cultural identities, both in a positive and a negative direction. They live in urban areas. They are more often than others divorced and have a high income of more than 4 500 000

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[10] Background categories that are not of analytical relevance have been edited away in this map. The map without such editing can be seen in appendix B.

lire a month. They never go to church, unlike their more moderate counterparts mentioned above.

The second axis in the map given in figure 7.9 is an educational dimension. Those who are very proud of Italian cultural institutions and have a very positive attitude towards immigrants have more often than others accomplished higher education and are situated on the negative side of the second axis. They are more often men than women, and are 26-45 years old. Compared to others, they often have an income above average, and they never go to church. They have their age, marital status and gender in common with the structural group discovered by the employment dimension in the background analysis. However, they do not work full-time more often than others and their church attendance frequency differs.

Figure 7.9: Map of Italian cultural identity and attitudes with focus on relevant background categories.

Background variables: Employment (circle), Marital status (triangle), Age (square), Urbanity (reversed triangle), Education (X), Part of country (checkers), Income (right arrow), Church attendance frequency (triangle), Gender (square).

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The social structures that I uncovered in the beginning of this chapter are not on the whole mirrored in this analysis. The older women and the young male students from the background analysis do not reappear in this analysis, although those with a moderately positive attitude are more often than others young and unmarried. As was the case with the analysis of civic identity, I believe also cultural identity to be of greater importance in the understanding of attitudes than traditional background variables in general.

Nevertheless, certain background variables have recurred in the analyses of national identity and attitudes. We cannot categorically dispose of their explanatory value in neither of the correspondence analyses I have conducted. The remaining part of this chapter will be dedicated to a summing up of my results, with emphasis on what types of national identity and what kinds of background categories that go together with the different types of attitudes towards immigration.

7.4 Concluding Remarks on Italian Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

Based on the correspondence analyses I have conducted of each identity aspect and attitudes towards immigration, a pattern emerges concerning characteristics that can be attached to different types of attitude. In this section I will concentrate on the types of national identity and the background categories that best seem to describe people with anti-immigration and pro-immigration attitudes. That the set of attitudinal variables has been analysed repeatedly together with shifting aspects of national identity enables me to identify the background categories that can be associated to types of attitude regardless of national identity.

In the following, I will use the information gained from the correspondence analyses to discuss people with a negative attitude and people with a positive attitude as two distinct groups. My descriptions are not meant to imply that all people with a certain attitude towards immigration are of the same kind when it comes to their national identity and their structural characteristics. The groups of people presented below rather indicate that people

with a certain attitude *more often than others* have a certain type of national identity and certain structural characteristics.

7.4.1 Anti-Immigration Attitude

In this chapter we have seen that Italians who are hostile towards immigrants tend to have a positive membership identity, a positive chauvinistic identity and a negative civic identity. They think that certain membership criteria like citizenship and knowledge of the language are important to fulfil if a person is to be accepted as truly Italian. They agree in statements favouring Italy in an international context, and believe in general that Italy is a better country than most others. At the same time, however, they do not take pride in national civic institutions like the social security system and the way democracy works. These people are more often than others 56 years old or more. They have retired from work life and are widowed. They have elementary education of 8 years at the most, and their income is low. They generally live in urban areas in the South of Italy.

This group of people is with a few exceptions a mirror of one of the structural groups discovered in the background analysis in the beginning of this chapter. The people with an anti-immigration attitude are both men and women, while the old people who lacked personal resources like education and income in the background analysis were more often women than men. These women also went often to church. The last noteworthy discrepancy between the two groups is that the people with a negative attitude more often than others live in the South of Italy. The old women in the background analysis lived all over Italy.

Despite of some differences, I conclude at this point that the group from the background analysis turned out to be quite congruent with xenophobic Italians. These people are typically weak on personal resources like income and education. If we keep the thesis of relative deprivation and the theoretical contribution of Gellner in mind, it is not surprising that these harbour the most negative sentiments against immigrants.

I have made use of the contributions of Billig (1995) and Doob (1964) in order to better understand the link between positive membership and chauvinistic identities and negative attitudes towards immigration. A distinction between "us" and "them" is the core of both

these identity types, and a mental boundary such as this is greatly facilitated by the presence of immigrants. Both Billig and Doob seem to agree that the strengthening and maintenance of national identity are dependent on the existence of contrasting out-groups within the national borders. I have not made use of any theoretical contribution to explain the correspondence between a negative civic identity and negative attitudes. Instead I referred to recent Italian immigration history. The state authorities have not had sufficient control with the immigration situation in Italy, and I argued that this may account for at least part of the link between how proud people are of civic institutions and how hostile they are against immigrants.

7.4.2 Pro-Immigration Attitude

Italians with a friendly attitude towards immigrants more often than others have a negative membership identity. They can accept someone as true members of the Italian community even if he/she does not fulfil certain criteria like citizenship or knowledge of language. Pro-immigration people furthermore have a positive civic identity and a positive cultural identity. They take pride in both civic and cultural institutions.

Background categories that are associated with a pro-immigration attitude in most of the analyses imply that regardless of national identity, the people with a positive attitude have accomplished higher education of at least 14 years. They furthermore have a high income, they are young and they never go to church. They are in other words wealthy, non-religious people.

That they are young and do not attend church make them resemble the young male students discovered in the background analysis at the beginning of the chapter. However, apart from age and church attendance frequency, they are not the same kind of people. The social structures from the background analysis are better reflected in people with anti-immigration attitudes than in people with pro-immigration attitudes. The background categories were more stable from analysis to analysis when we looked at the people with a negative attitude.

It is clear at this point that both national identity and traditional background variables are necessary in order to understand attitudes towards immigration. It furthermore appears that people with negative attitudes are more homogeneous, structurally speaking, than people with positive attitudes are. Positive civic and cultural identities are closely associated with a positive attitude, while positive membership and chauvinistic identities are most connected to anti-immigration attitudes.

I will now move on to investigate Norwegian attitudes and national identity. I expect membership identity and chauvinistic identity to be excluding also in Norway, and civic identity and cultural identity to be including. This would be congruent with the findings of Hernes, Knudsen and Grytten. But the combinations of identity types and their links to background variables are not necessarily the same in Italy and in Norway. In the following chapter I will analyse Norway in the same manner as I have analysed Italy. This will enable me to make a comparison of the two countries afterwards.

8. Analysis of Norwegian National Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

A survey such as the national identity survey I investigate in this thesis gives us an idea of attitudes and opinions at a given point in time. National and international events and circumstances often affect people's opinions and attitudes both in a short-term and in a long-term perspective. Without identical surveys conducted at other points in history to compare it to, it is most difficult to postulate whether the trends one discovers in an investigation such as this are stable, or whether they are simply a result of specific circumstances and will change in the course of time.

It is possible that Norwegian national identity at the time of this survey – 1995 – was especially positive based on the 1994 winter Olympics at Lillehammer. With a population of barely 4,5 million people, an international event like this arose a strong sense of fellowship among the Norwegians. It is possible that most Norwegians were extra proud of being Norwegian at this point in time. To say this with any certainty, I would have to compare the 1995 survey with an identical survey conducted at another point in time. However, since the next national identity survey from ISSP is not due until 2003, I am not in a position to state how strong an effect an event like the Olympics has had on a population like the Norwegian.

Like in the previous chapter, I will start the analysis of Norwegian attitudes with a correspondence analysis of background variables. Such an analysis enables me to draw a picture of structural groupings in Norway. When I later analyse each identity aspect together with attitudes towards immigration, I will be able to see if the social structures in Norway are reflected in the mental patterns that national identity and attitudes constitute. Based on a comparison of Norwegian social structures and the patterns background categories form in the attitude analyses, I can say something about the importance of traditional explanatory variables in the study of Norwegian attitudes towards immigration. Furthermore, the analyses of each identity aspect together with attitudes will make the association between national identity and attitudes visible. In addition to correspondence analyses I will also dedicate a section of this chapter to frequency analyses of attitudes and

the four aspects of national identity. Based on these, we get an overview of the typical identity and attitude in contemporary Norway.

8.1 Structural Oppositions in Norway

The map given in figure 8.1 gives an illustration of Norwegian social structures. The most important structural opposition in the correspondence analysis of background variables in Norway is found along the first axis, which is an educational dimension[11]. People with lower education are situated on the negative side of this axis, while people who have accomplished higher education on university level can be seen on the positive side. The second axis represents an age dimension, and is also important in the understanding of Norwegian structural groupings.

The people with lower education on the negative side of the first axis are more often women than men. They are often older widows. Compared to their higher educated fellow nationals, their income is more often low. The people with higher education on the positive side of this axis, on the other hand, are more often men than women. They work full-time and have a high annual income of at least 400 000 NOK. They are furthermore more often than others 36-45 years old. The older women and the full-time working men discovered along the educational dimension constitute the main opposition of the analysis, and are as such the most important features in this analysis of contemporary Norway.

As mentioned, the second axis represents an age dimension. People who are 36 years and older are situated on the negative side of this axis, while the youngest of the Norwegians can be seen on the positive side. The youngest are more often than the rest unmarried men. They are often unemployed and thereby have a low annual income. We see in the map given in figure 8.1 that these men are also more often than others students. This group of people is on the whole more often than the older part of the population not religious. They never go to church. On the negative side of the second axis we can see that the people who

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[11] The analysis of background variables was at first utterly dominated by an opposition between the youngest and the oldest of the respondents. These two categories made it impossible to read further information from the analysis, and I therefore chose to make them supplementary. They are still in the map, but they have not contributed actively in the construction of it. A result matrix with all categories with absolute contrubutions above average can be found in appendic B.

are 36 years old and more are often married, and they have a medium high income. They more often than their younger fellow nationals attend church on special occasions, several times a year.

Figure 8.1: Map of background variables in Norway.

Background variables: Employment (circle), Marital status (triangle), Age (square), Education (X), Income (right arrow), Church attendance frequency (empty triangle), Gender (empty square).

Four main structural groupings are in other words visible in this correspondence analysis. The older women and the full-time working men were the most important of these. I will keep all four groups in mind when I later conduct analyses of each identity aspect together with attitudes towards immigration. The background variables from the analysis above are kept also in later analyses as passive variables. If they form similar patterns in these analyses as they have done here, it is an indication that traditional explanatory variables are of important value in the understanding of Norwegian attitudes towards immigration. In the Italian analyses we learnt that both background variables and aspects of national

identity were important in the study of attitudes. I expect this to be the case also where Norway is concerned.

8.2 A Picture of Norwegian Attitudes and National Identities

8.2.1 Norwegian Attitudes towards Immigration

Frequency analyses show that the typical Norwegian attitude consists of both positive and negative elements. We can not say that the typical Norwegian is neither overwhelmingly positive nor negative in his/her attitude towards immigrants. The results of these analyses are given in table 8.1a and 8.1b.

Table 8.1a: Frequency analyses of attitudes towards immigration in Norway.
"Agree strongly" and "agree" have been combined, and "disagree" and "disagree strongly" have been combined.

	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Can't choose
Assimilation	65 %	17 %	15 %	3 %
Diversity	19 %	21 %	53 %	5 %
Crime	66 %	19 %	11 %	4 %
Take jobs	19 %	27 %	48 %	5 %
Bad for economy	44 %	31 %	11 %	12 %
Not open for new impulses	19 %	25 %	47 %	8 %

Table 8.1b: Frequency analysis of attitudes towards immigration in Norway. "Either - or" variable.

	Maintain distinct customs	Adapt to society	Can't choose
Assimilation or Diversity	21 %	62 %	15 %

The frequency analysis in table 8.1b shows that more than 6 in 10 Norwegians agree that immigrants should adapt and blend into the larger society rather than maintain their distinct customs and traditions. From table 8.1a we can see that assimilation as an ideal seems valued in Norway also when other questions are concerned. The diversity variable reveals that the majority disagrees that immigrants should get government assistance to preserve their culture. If the "typical" Norwegian has the opinions and attitude of the majority, we can say that the typical Norwegian thinks immigrants should adopt Norwegian culture and follow Norwegian regulations and guidelines of conduct in everyday life. He/she is negative towards the idea that immigrants should be allowed to maintain their own culture.

The typical Norwegian furthermore agrees in that immigration increases crime. Almost half of the respondents disagree in that immigrants take jobs from Norwegians and that immigration do not make Norway more open towards new ideas and cultures, but they agree in that immigration is generally not good for the national economy. It seems that the typical Norwegian attitude is ideologically negative to some degree, and that it is divided when it comes to everyday prejudices like unemployment and crime.

A glance at immigration history in Norway, as outlined in the chapter on Norwegian history, shows that immigration to Norway is a recent and relatively limited phenomenon. Norway was not an immigration country until 1966, and the country introduced a temporary immigration stop already in 1974 as a result of the oil crisis (Grytten, 1998). The immigration stop became permanent in 1988. In other words, immigration policies were liberal only in the first small decade after immigration had exceeded emigration in Norway. In addition to the restrictive immigration policies, Norway's geographical position in the outskirts of Europe has limited immigration also of natural causes. Considering immigration being a recent and limited phenomenon, one should think that attitudes towards it would not be negative. The frequency analyses indicates that this is not entirely true. According to Skirbekk (1993), the first organised resistance towards immigration started in the late 1980s, when immigrants from distant cultures became visible for the first time.

8.2.2 Norwegian Membership Identity

As discussed in the previous chapter, mental boundaries surrounding a culture are necessary for people to feel as part of a unique community. There must be certain distinct features that draw a line between one national culture and other national cultures. We have seen that Smith (1991) stated that defining oneself as member of a community is a foundation for national identity. In the previous chapter I concluded that membership identity is likely to be positive in any given nation state (Chapter 7:96). As we can see from the frequency analyses in table 8.2, a vast majority of the Norwegians considers membership criteria important to fulfil to some degree. Membership identity is on the whole positive in both Italy and Norway.

Table 8.2: Frequency analyses of membership identity in Norway.

"Very important" and "fairly important" have been combined, and "not very important" and "not important at all" have been combined.

	Important	Not important
Birth	61 %	37 %
Citizenship	86 %	12 %
Language	94 %	4 %
Respect	95 %	3 %
Sentiment	87 %	9 %

If we refer to the typical Norwegian as a person with the opinions of the majority, we can see from table 8.2 that the typical Norwegian will hesitate to call a person truly Norwegian unless he/she fulfils certain requirements. The majority considers it important for a person to be born in Norway, have Norwegian citizenship, speak Norwegian, respect Norwegian laws and political institutions and feel Norwegian, if this person is to be accepted as truly Norwegian. It is, however, noteworthy that being born in Norway is regarded important by considerably fewer respondents than the other criteria are.

In an historical context, the foundation for a positive membership identity was probably laid as early as in 1905, when the union with Sweden came to an end. As we have seen in the chapter on Norwegian history (Chapter 3:34), Norway entered a state of self-chosen cultural isolation after 1905. The nation should be rebuilt from within and not be dependent on Europe in any matter (Danielsen, 1995). In this period of isolation, the distinction between nationals and others probably became more rigid than it had been earlier. Since the distinction between "us" and "them" is the essence in membership identity, it is likely that Norwegian membership identity became stronger in this period than it had been in the union period. One could argue that membership identity was likely to be positive earlier than this, when Norway was governed by Denmark and Sweden. Being ruled by foreigners, we might suspect that the Norwegians developed a national consciousness and a sense of fellowship among themselves as a protest against a foreign governor. However, although the civil servants who ran the country from 1840 to 1884 managed to make Norway a country of economic growth and material well being, there was a distance between them and the people that did not make the people identify with the state. The civil servants were opposed by both peasants and popular protest movements who campaigned against bureaucracy and capitalism. Such oppositions within the nation probably made it difficult to develop a clear sense of "us" and "them" based on national boundaries.

After the foundation for a positive membership identity had been laid in the period following 1905, it was probably substantially strengthened after the Second World War. After the war there was an immense feeling of national solidarity in Norway, and national identity on the whole was positive and strong. It is likely that all four identity types were strengthened in the aftermath of the war. We see a repeated struggle for independence in the Norwegian history, resulting in independence from Denmark in 1814, Sweden in 1905 and Germany in 1945 (Grytten, 1998). It is likely that these struggles have affected the Norwegian mentality also in contemporary society. The EU referenda in 1972 and 1994 may serve as examples of at least half of the Norwegian population cherishing the national boundaries and not willingly enter into a union where national independence might be at stake.

8.2.3 Norwegian Chauvinistic Identity

Most of the Norwegians do not uncritically favour their own nation. Although they would rather live in Norway than in any other country in the world, they will not support Norway if the country is in the wrong. The majority of the population thinks Norway is generally better than most other countries and feels proud to be Norwegian when Norway succeeds in international sports. But most Norwegians do not agree that people in other countries should be more like the Norwegians. The frequency analyses presented in table 8.3 demonstrate that Norwegian chauvinistic identity contains both positive and negative elements.

Table 8.3: Frequency analyses of chauvinistic identity in Norway.

"Agree strongly" and "agree" have been combined, and "disagree" and "disagree strongly" have been combined.

	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Can't choose
Rather live	77 %	16 %	6 %	1 %
More like us	21 %	33 %	38 %	6 %
Norway better	64 %	22 %	10 %	3 %
Support nation	25 %	18 %	52 %	3 %
Proud of sports	79 %	14 %	4 %	1 %

The historical mechanisms I have suggested may have contributed to the foundation of a positive Norwegian membership identity, are also likely to have influenced chauvinistic

identity. As is the case with membership identity, the distinction between "us" and "them" is essential for chauvinistic identity as well. A repeated struggle for independence coupled with the self-chosen cultural isolation period Norway entered after 1905 to rebuild the nation, are likely to have made the Norwegians conscious of the distinction between nationals and others. That the majority has said no to the European Union twice is not an indication that most Norwegians uncritically favour their own nation compared to other nations. However, it does indicate that many Norwegians believe that Norway is "better off" on its own, and definitely do not find it to be inferior in a European context. With this in mind, it makes sense that the majority would rather be a citizen of Norway than of any other country in the world, and that most of the respondents think that Norway is a better country than most other countries. The welfare state with its emphasis on social benefits as a universal right rather than an act of charity has probably also contributed to a positive chauvinistic identity. Of course, there can be mentioned a variety of things that in the course of history have affected national identity. The fact that Norway has managed to become a wealthy industrialised country – to a large extent based on oil – may in itself be sufficient for people to develop at least a slightly positive chauvinistic identity.

8.2.4 Norwegian Civic Identity

The majority of the Norwegians have a positive civic identity. They are proud of the way democracy works, of Norway's political influence in the world, its economic achievements and its social security system.

Table 8.4: Frequency analyses of civic identity in Norway.

"Very proud" and "somewhat proud" have been combined, and "not very proud" and "not proud at all" have been combined.

	Proud	Not proud	Can't choose
Democracy	75 %	19 %	4 %
Political influence	70 %	20 %	7 %
Economic achievements	73 %	19 %	7 %
Social security system	58 %	36 %	5 %
Fair treatment of all	42 %	49 %	8 %

The civic institution that engenders the least pride among the Norwegians is by far Norway's fair and equal treatment of all groups in society, where only 4 in 10 state that

they are proud. The other civic institutions analysed in table 8.4 make substantially more people proud. Almost twice as many are for instance proud of the way democracy works.

With the introduction of a parliamentary system in 1884 and the extended franchise following this process, the distance between rulers and ruled decreased and probably laid a foundation for a positive civic identity in Norway. With socialistic governmental stability and the development of social democracy as a dominating ideology after the Second World War, a positive civic identity is likely to have been more firmly established. And with the steady period of economic growth from 1945 to 1973 and the development of the welfare state in the same time span, there are not many historical reasons why the Norwegian civic identity should be negative. Of course, recent economic crisis and decline in certain areas of the welfare state (Grytten, 1998) may have weakened the civic identity, but the fact remains that Norway is still a wealthy country with a functioning social security system. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of the Norwegians even today take pride in national civic institutions.

8.2.5 Norwegian Cultural Identity

Most Norwegians have a positive cultural identity. With the exception of the armed forces, they take pride in national cultural institutions.

Table 8.5: Frequency analyses of cultural identity in Norway.

"Very proud" and "somewhat proud" have been combined, and "not very proud" and "not proud at all" have been combined.

	Proud	Not proud	Can't choose
Technology and science	69 %	17 %	12 %
Sports	87 %	9 %	2 %
Art and literature	62 %	21 %	15 %
National history	70 %	18 %	9 %
Armed forces	33 %	44 %	21 %

Norwegian success in international sports engenders by far the most pride in Norwegian respondents. Almost 9 in 10 is proud of Norway's achievements in sports. The relative frequencies in table 8.5 furthermore tell us that the vast majority is proud of Norway's scientific and technological achievements, its art and literature and its national history. The

least popular cultural institution is the national armed forces where only 1 in 3 states that he/she is proud.

According to Gellner (1983), a homogeneous national culture facilitates mobility and communication between individuals. Belonging to the same culture, people have the same frame of reference and are able to understand and to some extent predict each other's actions under given circumstances - regardless of geographical distance. A person can move from one side of the country to the other because of a new job, and still be able to comprehend what people around him are saying and doing, and why. Gellner also claims that the state's economy and thereby also the state's existence are highly dependent on mobility and communication. Hence we can say that the maintenance of a national culture is a prerequisite for the state. From this theoretical point of view, a positive cultural identity is important for the state to maintain its existence. Without pride in cultural institutions, the population would perhaps not be willing to identify with a homogeneous national culture. This could lead to a pre-modern situation where identity was regional and limited. In such a situation, people within the borders of a state would differ from each other so much that communication and mobility would be difficult, and it would not be easy for the state to survive in the long run. In other words, it is a national necessity for the majority to have a positive cultural identity.

A standardised mass education system socialises the population into a national culture. An important tool in this education process is national history. The construction of national history, as discussed in the chapter on theoretical framework, involves a collective remembering and a collective forgetting. As among others Benedict Anderson has emphasised, national history consists of events and persons that the contemporary nationals can be proud of, while more embarrassing events and persons have been conveniently forgotten (Chapter 4:54). This facilitates a positive cultural identity, in that almost exclusively cultural elements to be proud of are taught to the nationals. In other words, it is hardly surprising that a majority of any given population has a positive cultural identity. However, these theoretical speculations suggest that cultural identity should be equally positive throughout the entire population, regardless of age, income and other background categories. As we shall see from the correspondence analysis later in this chapter, this is not the case.

8.3 A more thorough Investigation of Norwegian Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

The general overview over Norwegian attitudes and national identity presented in the first part of this chapter has shown that most Norwegians have a positive membership identity and that they take pride in both civic and cultural institutions in Norway. The chauvinistic identity is more divided, but most Norwegians think Norway is generally better than most other countries, and they would rather be a citizen of Norway than of any other country in the world. The typical Norwegian attitude towards immigration is composed by both negative and positive elements. I have now accounted for general tendencies in contemporary Norway. Based on the frequency analyses, however, we can not say if there is a link between national identity and attitudes. We need more detailed analyses to establish information of such a link, and to be able to say anything about whether the social structures discovered in the beginning of this chapter are reflected in the mental patterns of attitudes and identities. The remaining part of this chapter will revolve around correspondence analyses of each aspect of national identity together with attitudes, and with traditional explanatory variables as passive categories.

8.3.1 Membership Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

The main result of the correspondence analysis of attitudes and membership identity in Norway reveals that those who have a very positive membership identity are more often than others very hostile to immigration. They think it is very important to be born in Norway, to have Norwegian citizenship, to speak Norwegian and to feel Norwegian, for being truly Norwegian. At the same time they strongly agree that immigrants increase crime rates, that immigrants take jobs away from Norwegians, that immigrants are generally bad for the national economy and that immigrants do not make Norway more open to new ideas and cultures. They agree strongly that it is impossible for people who do not share Norwegian customs and traditions to become fully Norwegian, and they disagree strongly that ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.

Those who have answered that it is fairly important to be born in Norway, have Norwegian citizenship and feel Norwegian to be considered a fellow national, also more often than others agree in most of the derogatory statements about immigrants. There is a correspondence between a moderately positive membership identity and a moderately negative attitude towards immigrants. The results of this analysis can be viewed in the map given in figure 8.2[12].

Figure 8.2: Map of Norwegian membership identity and attitudes.

Membership identity variables in the map: Birth (square), Citizenship (circle), Language (triangle), Respect (reversed triangle), Sentiment (checkers)
Attitude variables in the map: Crime (cross), Bad for economy (X), Take jobs (right triangle), Not open for new impulses (left triangle). Diversity (circle), Assimilation (square), Assimilation or Diversity (square)

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[12] I have edited away categories without analytical relevance in this context. The map without such editing and a result matrix with all categories with absolute contributions above average can be found in appendix B.

The categories in the map have the form of a horseshoe. This indicates a Guttman effect; that the variables are related to each other in a non-linear way. The most extreme attitudes and identity types are located on each end of the horseshoe, while more moderate categories are found between them. The people with a very positive membership identity and a very negative attitude are located on the positive side of the first axis, which is an agreement dimension. Those with a moderately positive membership identity and a moderately negative attitude are situated on the positive side of the second axis, which represents an attitudinal intensity dimension. The map furthermore reveals that people who do not consider membership criteria to be especially important to fulfil, more often than others have a pro-immigration attitude. This trend is however not statistical significant in the way the other results are, and must only be interpreted as a tendency supporting the main results.

My concept of membership identity roughly equals Grytten's concept of traditionalism. In her study of Norwegian attitudes and national identity, she found that traditionalism triggers xenophobia (Chapter 5:67). This is in accordance with the results in my correspondence analysis above. That a positive membership identity go together with anti-immigration attitudes is hardly surprising. A person who considers membership criteria like citizenship and knowledge of language to be important to fulfil before he/she can accept an immigrant as truly Norwegian, will per definition hesitate to accept immigrants in general as fellow nationals. Not accepting a person as a fellow national is likely to imply a normative judgement.

The map given in figure 8.3 reveals the background categories associated with the people with positive membership identity and negative attitude towards immigration. As was the case with the background analysis in the beginning of this chapter, the first axis is an educational dimension while the second axis shows an age dimension. To make the map easily interpretable, I have edited away background categories that are not of analytical interest in this context. The map without such editing can be viewed in appendix B.

From the map in figure 8.3 we see that people with a very positive membership identity and a strongly anti-immigration attitude are located on the positive side of the educational dimension presented by the first axis. These people have lower education and are more

often men than women. They are often 56 years old or more and have retired from work. Furthermore they are more often than others widowed, and have a low annual income.

People who consider membership criteria to be fairly important and who have a moderately negative attitude towards immigration are situated on the positive side of the age dimension on the second axis. They are among the older part of the population. They more often than others work full-time, have a medium low income and seldom go to church.

Figure 8.3: Map of Norwegian membership identity and attitudes with focus on relevant background categories.

Background variables: Employment (circle), Marital status (triangle), Age (square), Education (X), Income (right arrow), Church attendance frequency (triangle), Gender (square).

Although this analysis revealed the same main dimensions as the background analysis in the beginning of the chapter, the structural groupings from the background analysis are not entirely mirrored in this analysis of membership identity and attitudes. The older men with a strongly anti-immigration attitude are with the exception of gender roughly equivalent

with the older women discovered in the background analysis. The full-time working people with a moderately negative attitude, on the other hand, are not a reflection of the initial structural groups. This may indicate that traditional explanatory variables are better suited in describing very negative attitudes, while more moderately negative attitudes are more closely associated with membership identity.

Especially the result concerning people with a strongly anti-immigration attitude is in accordance with the thesis of relative deprivation. At this point it seems likely to suggest that people in the lower strata of society feel more threatened by immigrants than people higher up in society do, and that they thereby display more scepticism towards immigrants. Gellner's conception of entropy-resistant classifications is also useful in an attempt to explain the older Norwegians' negative attitude. As we remember, it has much in common with the thesis of relative deprivation. It postulates that a classification such as skin-colour presents a serious problem if it can be attached to a certain societal status (Chapter 4:47-48). Also cultural differences can cause the same problems. Gellner stresses that cultural differences are not so serious as differences in skin-colour because they can be overcome in the course of a generation. But the immigrants have per definition not been in the new country this long, and so the same line of reasoning can apply to cultural differences. If many people in a low stratum differ culturally and/or in skin-colour from the majority of the population, then people in slightly higher strata will develop prejudices against them in the fear of being pushed downwards. The older men with lower education and a low income are likely to feel more directly threatened by immigrants than full-time working people with strong personal resources.

Membership identity does not contribute to the explanation of people who have a pro-immigration attitude. Even though the map given in figure 8.2 illustrated a tendency that people with negative membership identity more often than others harbour positive sentiments for immigrants, this was not statistically significant in the way the other results were. Hence, we can not say for certain that the more positive membership identity a person has, the more xenophobic he/she will be. This would imply that people with a negative membership identity have a positive attitude, and the analysis does not yield sufficient information regarding this. Nevertheless, the fact remains that different degrees of positive membership identity go together with different degrees of negative attitudes.

8.3.2 Chauvinistic Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

There is a clear association between chauvinistic identity and attitudes towards immigration. The map given in figure 8.4[13] illustrates the results of this correspondence analysis.

Figure 8.4: Map of chauvinistic identity and attitudes.

Chauvinistic identity variables: Rather live (square), More like us (circle), Norway Better (triangle), Support country (left arrow), Pride in Sports (right arrow).
Attitudinal variables: Assimilation (checkers), Assimilation or Diversity (square), Diversity (cross), Immigrants increase Crime (X), Immigrants take Jobs (reversed triangle), Immigrants are bad for economy (#), Immigrants do not make Norway more open (¤).

Judging by the horseshoe formed by the categories, we are also here dealing with variables that are related to each other in a non-linear manner. We can see from the map that the more positive chauvinistic identity one has, the more hostile one is to immigrants. If a

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[13] "Neither nor" and "can't choose" categories have been edited away from the map because they are not of analytical relevance in this context. The map without editing and a result matrix with all categories with absolute contributions above average can be found in appendix B.

person agrees in statements favouring Norway compared to other countries, he/she more often than others also agrees in derogatory statements concerning immigrants. From the map given in figure 8.4 we can see that the people who agree strongly in chauvinistic statements and who more often than others have a strongly anti-immigration attitude are situated on the positive side of the first axis, which represents an agreement dimension. The people who have a negative chauvinistic identity and a pro-immigration attitude, on the other hand, can be seen on the negative side of this axis. The second axis is an attitudinal intensity dimension. The people mentioned earlier with a moderately positive chauvinistic identity and a moderately negative attitude are located on the negative side of this intensity dimension, at the bottom of the map.

The results of this correspondence analysis are not surprising when we take earlier research and theoretical contributions into consideration. As we have seen in the chapter on previous research, Hernes, Knudsen, Grytten and Hjerm have all concluded that positive chauvinistic identity triggers intolerance. According to Doob (1964), immigrants often serve as scapegoats in society. It is not unusual that nationals look at immigrants in order to find the explanation for negative societal developments and events. An example of this is unemployment. Doob claims that there is a clear connection between stigmatising an out-group and expressing chauvinistic sentiments for one's country. If responsibility for all negative things in society is handed to outsiders, than the nationals can continue to regard their nation as unique and superior. They do not have to blame their society for all that is not well.

The map in figure 8.5 presents the background categories associated with the results accounted for above. Like in the previous maps, I have also here edited away categories that are not of analytical importance in this context.

The analysis of chauvinistic identity and attitudes yields the same main dimensions as the background analysis in the beginning of the chapter. The first axis represents an educational dimension, while the second axis is an age dimension. On the negative side of the first axis we can see the people with a moderately negative chauvinistic identity and a moderately pro-immigration attitude. They have more often than others higher education, and they are less than 56 years old. They are more often women than men, and they are students or work full-time. They are furthermore more often than others separated or

unmarried, and they have a high annual income. Apart from the gender category, they resemble the full-time working men discovered in the background analysis. So far, the social structures seem to be reflected in the mental patterns of chauvinistic identity and attitudes.

Figure 8.5: Map of Norwegian chauvinistic identity and attitudes with focus on relevant background categories.

Background variables: Employment (circle), Marital status (triangle), Age (square), Education (X), Income (right arrow), Church attendance frequency (triangle), Gender (square). Urban (left arrow)

Xenophobic people with very positive chauvinistic identity, on the other hand, are situated on the positive side of the educational dimension. They more often than others have lower education and a low income. They are more often men than women, and they seldom go to church. They are 56 years old or more, and are more often than their higher educated counterparts unemployed, work at home or live in retirement. They are furthermore more often than others widowed. Also this group resembles a group from the background analysis. Apart from the gender category, they are roughly the same kind of people as the older women described in section 8.1. That the main opposition in this analysis is a

reflection of the main opposition in the background analysis is an indication that traditional explanatory variables are of important value in a study of attitudes towards immigration. The two results presented here support the thesis of relative deprivation and the theoretical contributions of Gellner discussed in connection with the previous section. It is clear that people who lack personal resources like income and education have the most negative attitudes towards immigration.

On the negative side of the second axis, we see that people with moderately anti-immigration attitudes are among the older part of the population. They more often than others work full-time and seldom attend church. They have often attended gymnasium, and they have a medium low annual income. This group is not a reflection from the background analysis. Neither is this result entirely in accordance with the thesis of relative deprivation and the contribution of Gellner since the people in question often have accomplished medium high education. It thereby seems that we need both background variables and information on national identity to understand the complex phenomenon of attitudes.

8.3.3 Civic Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

The main tendency that became visible in the correspondence analysis of civic identity and attitudes towards immigration, is that the less pride a person takes in national civic institutions like democracy, political influence and the social security system, the more negative sentiments he/she will have towards immigrants. People who do not at all take pride in civic institutions more often than others have a strongly anti-immigration attitude, and people with a moderately negative civic identity more often than others have a moderately anti-immigration attitude. This opposition is illustrated by the map given in figure 8.6[14]. I have edited away the "can't choose" and "neither nor" categories since they are not of analytical relevance in this context.

The pattern the categories in the map form resembles a horseshoe. As in previous analyses, this indicates that the variables are related to each other in a non-linear manner. The

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[14] The map without editing and a result matrix with all categories with absolute contributions above average are in appendix B.

spectre goes from extreme attitudes to moderate ones. Extreme attitudes form each end of the horseshoe, while moderate attitudes are found in the middle of it.

Figure 8.6: Map of Norwegian civic identity and attitudes.

Attitude variables: Crime (cross), Bad for economy (X), Take jobs (right arrow), Not open for new impulses (left arrow), Diversity (circle), Assimilation (square), Assimilation or Diversity (square)
Civic identity variables: Democracy (square), Political influence (triangle), Economic achievements (checkers), Social security system (reversed triangle), Equal treatment (cross)

The first axis in this map represents an agreement dimension. The people with a strongly anti-immigration attitude are situated on the positive side of this dimension. The second axis, on the other hand, is the attitudinal intensity dimension causing the horseshoe pattern. The ones with a moderately anti-immigration attitude can be seen on the positive side of the second axis. The map also reveals that there seems to be a tendency for people who are proud of civic institutions to more often than others have a positive attitude towards immigration. However, these categories have not been as statistically important as the categories concerning negative attitudes and negative civic identities.

The main tendency in this analysis is in accordance with previous research. Both Hjerm in his study of Australia, Great Britain, Germany and Sweden, and Knudsen in his study of Norway concluded that political national pride decreased the risk of xenophobia.

The map given in figure 8.7[15] presents a picture of the background categories associated with the results of this analysis.

Figure 8.7: Map of Norwegian civic identity and attitudes with focus on relevant background categories.

Background variables: Employment (circle), Marital status (triangle), Age (square), Education (X), Income (right arrow), Gender (square)

The first axis represents an age dimension, where people over 56 years of age are situated on the positive side, while the other age groups are located on the negative side. The

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[15] The map has been edited to facilitate interpretation. The map without such editing can be seen in appendix B.

second axis is an employment dimension, with full-time working people on the positive side and people who are not in employment for various reasons on the negative side. Unlike the previous analyses I have conducted of identity aspects and attitudes, this analysis does not entail the same dimensions as the background analysis in the beginning of this chapter.

The older people on the positive side of the age dimension are more often men than women, and they are often widowed. They are more often than others not in employment, in that they are unemployed, work at home or have retired from work. They often have lower education and a low annual income. These are the people with a strongly anti-immigration attitude as discovered in the analysis of civic identity and attitudes.

On the positive side of the employment dimension we find the people with a moderately negative civic identity and a moderately anti-immigration attitude. They are more often than others full-time working people. They are furthermore often more than 55 years old and divorced. This group of people is not congruent with any of the groups discovered in the background analysis in the beginning of the chapter. However, they have employment status in common with the results regarding moderately anti-immigration attitudes in the analyses of membership identity and chauvinistic identity. This indicates that employment status is of importance in understanding attitudes. That the other background categories vary from analyses to analyses when it comes to describing the people with moderately negative attitudes indicates the relevance of national identity in an investigation of attitudes towards immigration.

Even though the dimensions in this analysis were not equivalent with the dimensions of the background analysis, the people with the most negative attitude are still roughly equivalent with the older people with lower education and low income who constituted one part of the main structural opposition in contemporary Norway. Once again, this supports the thesis of relative deprivation and the contribution of Gellner. It appears that background variables do not lose their explaining power when it comes to xenophobia, no matter what aspect of national identity we enter into the analysis.

We have seen that the less income and education one has, the more negative civic identity one tends to have. People who do not have strong personal resources will be more

dependent on civic institutions than others. It is not surprising that those depending on civic institutions like the social security system more often than others will experience the institutions' shortcomings in practice, and thereby not be as proud of national civic institutions as people with strong personal resources who do not need these institutions' help. Furthermore, people in lower societal strata who are not wealthy on material goods are not likely to be proud of for instance the national economy.

8.3.4 Cultural Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

A correspondence analysis of cultural identity and attitudes reveals that Norwegians who are very proud of their national culture more often than others have a very negative attitude towards immigrants. This result is visible in the map given in figure 8.8[16].

The people with very positive cultural identity and strongly anti-immigration attitude are situated on the positive side of the first axis. This axis represents an agreement dimension. People with a very positive cultural identity and a very negative attitude towards immigration are situated in the positive side of this axis.

The second axis represents an attitudinal intensity dimension. It illustrates the opposition between people who answer "can't choose" and the rest, and is not of analytical relevance in this context.

That positive cultural identity is related to negative attitudes is supported by Hjerm's study of four Western countries. As outlined in the chapter on previous research (Chapter 5:68), he concluded that the more cultural pride a person has, the more xenophobic he/she is.

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[16] I have edited away "somewhat proud" categories in the map to ease interpretation. The map without editing and a result matrix with all categories with absolute contributions above average can be seen in appendix B.

Figure 8.8: Map of Norwegian cultural identity and attitudes.

Attitude variables in the map: Crime (cross), Bad for economy (X), Take jobs (right triangle), Not open for new impulses (left triangle).Diversity (circle), Assimilation (square), Assimilation or Diversity (square)
Cultural identity variables in the map: Technology (square), Sports (circle), Armed forces (triangle), Art (checkers), History (left arrow)

The map given in figure 8.9 presents a picture of the background categories associated with the people with a very positive cultural identity and a very negative attitude. Like the other maps in this chapter, it has been edited to facilitate interpretation. The map without such editing can be found in appendix B.

Figure 8.9: Map of Norwegian cultural identity and attitudes with focus on relevant background categories.

Background variables: Employment (circle), Marital status (triangle), Age (square), Education (X), Income (right arrow), Church attendance frequency (triangle), Gender (square)

As was the case with the background analysis in the beginning of this chapter, the most important structural features are located along an educational dimension, and the second axis represents an age dimension. The people with a strongly anti-immigration attitude are situated on the positive side of the first axis and the negative side of the second axis. They more often than others have lower education, and they are often more than 56 years old. They are more often than the rest of the respondents not in employment: they have either retired from work or work at home as housewives. They are often widowed and they have a low annual income. Compared to the structural groupings discovered in the background analysis, we find once more that these people with a strongly anti-immigration attitude are roughly equivalent with the older women with lower education and low income.

8.4 Concluding Remarks on Norwegian Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

Based on the information from the correspondence analyses in this chapter, I will dedicate the remainder of this chapter to sum up who the people with anti-immigration and pro-immigration attitudes are likely to be. The following description of people with different kinds of attitude should not be interpreted to imply that all people with a certain attitude will be of the same kind when it comes to their national identity and background categories like education and income. Rather, it implies that these people *more often than others* have a certain national identity and can be characterised by certain background categories.

8.4.1 Anti-Immigration Attitude

The correspondence analyses of Norwegian national identity and attitudes towards immigration have revealed that people with a strongly anti-immigration attitude more often than others have a very positive membership identity, a very positive chauvinistic identity, a very negative civic identity and a very positive cultural identity. They believe that the fulfilling of certain membership criteria is of utmost importance if a person is to be considered truly Norwegian. They agree strongly in statements favouring Norway in an international context, and they are very proud of national cultural institutions. They are, however, not proud at all of national civic institutions like the way democracy works and the Norwegian social security system. When it comes to background categories, every analysis in this chapter has showed us that people with a strongly anti-immigration attitude are more often than others older men. They are widowed, have retired from work or work at home. They have completed lower education, and they have a low annual income.

Age, marital status, education and income for this group are congruent with one of the groups discovered in the background analysis in the beginning of this chapter. But while the people with strongly anti-immigration attitudes are more often men than women, the people with lower income and education in the background analysis were more often older women. Nevertheless, I conclude at this point that one of the groups from the background analysis has been reflected in the analyses of attitudes. Traditional explanatory variables

like age, income and education do not seem to lose their explanatory power even when different aspects of national identity is taken into consideration. The thesis of relative deprivation and the theoretical contribution of Gellner have turned out to be highly useful in the understanding of attitudes in both Italy and Norway. However, this is not to say that national identity is superfluous in the understanding of attitudes. Correspondence analyses have revealed clear associations between the various identity aspects and attitudes.

People with strongly anti-immigration attitude have a generally strong national identity, although it is somewhat weakened by their very negative civic identity. These people were children and young adults when the Second World War came to an end. The youngest witnessed the reconstruction of the country in the period after the war, and the oldest of them participated in it. As we have seen in the chapter on Norwegian history, the sense of national unity and solidarity was enormous after the war. The rebuilding of the nation most likely triggered a strong sense of fellowship among the participants. The results of this reconstruction are still visible in society. The basis for modern Norway in among other things housing and infrastructures was laid during this reconstruction. Also the central place the Second World War unsurprisingly has in contemporary history books may enable the older Norwegians to sustain their national identity from that period. We have seen earlier that national identity on the whole - and particularly membership identity and chauvinistic identity - was strengthened after the war.

We have also seen in this chapter that people with a moderately negative attitude more often than the people with a very negative attitude work full-time. They are also often above 56 years of age, and they seldom attend church. They have a medium low annual income. Moderately anti-immigration people more often than others have a positive membership identity, a positive chauvinistic identity and a negative civic identity.

In Grytten's analysis of xenophobia in Norway, she found that the older a person is, the higher is the risk of being xenophobic. This is in congruence with my analysis. Grytten also discovered that being a woman and attending church often have a positive effect on attitudes towards immigration. In my study of Norwegian attitudes I have concluded that the people with the most negative attitude are more often men than women. This is in accordance with Grytten's analyses. Church attendance frequency, on the other hand, has not proven to be a significant category in my analysis of attitudes. Although we have seen

that people with a moderately negative attitude more often than others seldom attend church, church attendance frequency does not characterise the people with a very negative attitude and the people with a positive attitude.

8.4.2 Pro-Immigration Attitude

Of the four aspects of national identity analysed in this chapter, chauvinistic identity was the only one associated statistically with a positive attitude towards immigration. Norwegians who are tolerant towards immigrants more often than others have a negative chauvinistic identity. They disagree in statements favouring Norway in an international context. The people with a positive attitude and a negative chauvinistic identity are more often women than men. Their age ranges up to 55 years old. They are more often than others employed in full-time work or students. They have higher education on university level and their annual income is high. They are often separated or unmarried. These women have strong personal resources in the form of education and income. Following the thesis of relative deprivation, they have no reason to feel threatened by immigrants, and will thereby not react negatively towards them. If we take into consideration the people with anti-immigration attitudes, we remember that they lacked higher education and income. My analyses have thus revealed that such personal resources have a clear effect on attitudes towards immigration.

Since the only analysis that yielded information of pro-immigration people was the analysis of chauvinistic identity and attitudes, it is hard to tell whether the background characteristics presented above have more to do with these people's chauvinistic identity than with attitudes. Income, education, employment status and to a certain extent age are equivalent with the group of full-time working men discovered in the background analysis in the beginning of this chapter. However, while the structural group from the background analysis was constituted by men rather than women, the people with a positive attitude have turned out to more often be women than men. Apart from the gender category, this group from the background analysis was reflected in the analysis of chauvinistic identity and attitudes. Nevertheless, it seems that Norwegians with a positive attitude are more heterogeneous than people with a negative attitude are regarding both national identity and background variables.

Considering the groups I have discovered in my analyses, it becomes clear that both a positive membership identity and a positive chauvinistic identity have an excluding effect on people's perception of immigrants. The more people stress the importance of membership criteria and the more people agree in statements favouring Norway in comparison with other countries, the bigger is the risk for harbouring a hostile attitude towards immigrants. A negative civic identity has a somewhat including effect on attitudes since lack in civic pride triggers intolerance. It is more difficult to say something about the effect of cultural identity. We have seen that people who are very proud of national cultural institutions often have a strongly anti-immigration attitude, and this implies that positive cultural identity has an excluding effect on attitudes. But there was only one noteworthy result from the analyses of cultural identity and attitudes, and therefor I dear not state categorically that cultural identity has a clear-cut effect on attitudes towards immigration.

In the analysis of Norwegian and Swedish attitudes towards immigration, Grytten (1998) concluded that Norwegian intolerance can be described as a cultural conflict, while Swedish intolerance can best be depicted as a conflict of interest. This indicates that national identity is best suited to explain attitudes in Norway, while background variables have more explaining power in Sweden. My analyses have shown that both background variables and aspects of national identity are important tools in describing Norwegian attitudes in general. As mentioned above, we have seen that strong intolerance co-varies with very positive membership identity, very positive chauvinistic identity, very negative civic identity and very positive cultural identity, but that roughly the same background categories are significant in all the analyses. This indicates that we must take into consideration both national identity and traditional explanatory variables in a study of Norwegian attitudes.

The results of my Norwegian analyses have both similarities and differences compared to the Italian results discussed in the previous chapter. In the following chapter, I will undertake a comparison of Italy and Norway where I attempt to explain and illustrate both similarities and differences with the aid of national histories and theoretical contributions. The main focus will be on anti-immigration attitudes, since most results of the correspondence analyses of both countries have dealt with people with negative attitudes. However, before I compare the correspondence analyses of each nation, I will start the

comparative chapter by looking at the overviews of national identity and attitudes presented in the first part of the Italian and the Norwegian analyses. In the comparison of two nations with the main focus directed towards people with an anti-immigration attitude, it is important to keep in mind that these groups of people do not necessarily represent the majority of the populations. The general overviews of contemporary Italian and Norwegian national identities and attitudes facilitate the preservation of a more general perspective in a study such as this.

9. A Comparison of National Identity and Attitudes in Italy and Norway

Based on the previous chapters I will now undertake a comparison of Italy and Norway. I will move on from the investigation of differences and similarities between groups of people *within* a nation to a study of differences and similarities *between* nations. I will start by presenting the answering patterns of the majorities in each country. These will be referred to as the "typical" national identity and the "typical" attitude for each country. If more than half of the respondents in a country have for instance a positive membership identity, the typical membership identity in that country will be characterised as positive. Such a general overview of Italian and Norwegian national identities and attitudes will provide a suitable starting-point for a more detailed comparison of nations based on the information engendered by the correspondence analyses conducted in the previous chapters.

When I later go into detail concerning the differences and similarities between Italy and Norway, I will focus on the groups of people that I have identified based on their attitudes towards immigration. In the Italian analyses I described people with moderately and strongly anti-immigration attitudes as one group, because correspondence analyses revealed that they were roughly the same kind of people regarding national identity and background characteristics. In the Norwegian analyses, on the other hand, I distinguished between people with a strongly anti-immigration attitude and people with a moderately anti-immigration attitude. In addition, I described people with pro-immigration attitudes in both countries. In this chapter I will discuss whether anti-immigration people and pro-immigration people are the same kinds of people in Italy and Norway, or whether they constitute particular groupings depending on their nationalities.

9.1 Typical Italian versus Typical Norwegian

As mentioned above, "typical" national identity of a country will in this chapter refer to the national identity characterising a majority of the population. In the discussion of what is typical Italian and what is typical Norwegian, I will thereby not take into account the

specific attitudinal groups identified in the previous analytical chapters. I consider it worthwhile to get a rough overview of the phenomenon in question before moving on to a detailed comparison of the people with anti-immigration and pro-immigration attitudes in both nations.

Most of the Italians have a positive membership identity and a positive cultural identity. They think certain membership criteria are important to fulfil for a person to be accepted as a true Italian, and they are proud of their cultural institutions like art, sports and national history. The typical Italian furthermore has a negative civic identity, he/she is not especially proud of Italian civic institutions like the social security system and Italian political influence in an international context. His/her chauvinistic identity is not as clear-cut as the other identity aspects. The typical Italian would rather live in Italy than anywhere else and is proud when Italy does well in international sports. But a majority of the Italians would not prefer that other people were more like the Italians, and almost half of them do not agree that people should support their country even if it is in the wrong.

A majority of the Norwegians has a positive membership identity, a positive civic identity and a positive cultural identity. They believe it is important to be born in Norway, have Norwegian citizenship, speak Norwegian, respect Norwegian laws and civic institutions, and feel like a Norwegian, to be a true fellow national. They are proud of national civic institutions like economy, Norwegian political influence and social security system, and of national cultural institutions like art and literature, science and history. The typical Norwegian chauvinistic identity is partly positive and partly negative. The typical Norwegian would rather live in Norway than anywhere else, he/she thinks that Norway is better than most other countries, and he/she feels proud when Norway does well in international sports. Simultaneously more than half of the Norwegian respondents do not think that one should support one's country blindly, and almost 4 in 10 Norwegians disagree that the world would be a better place if other people were more like the Norwegians.

The typical Italian and the typical Norwegian have three of the four identity aspects in common. They both value membership criteria, they both take pride in national cultural institutions and they both agree in some chauvinistic statements and disagree in others. The only noteworthy difference at this point is their civic identity. A typical Italian does not

take pride in the way democracy works, Italian political influence in the world, national economic achievements, the social security system and the fair and equal treatment of all groups in society. The typical Norwegian, on the other hand, is proud of such civic institutions with the exception of the equal treatment of all groups.

In the previous chapters I have made use of theoretical contributions in the field of national identity and nationalism, in order to argue that membership identity and cultural identity are likely to be generally positive in any modern nation state.

Following the arguments of Anthony D. Smith, the state authorities will through a mass educational system socialise children into good citizens with national devotion and a sense of belonging to a homogeneous and unique culture. According to Smith, it is by learning that they belong to a unique culture that people understand "who they are" in the world. And Smith is of the opinion that this process of self-definition is the key to national identity. While Smith stresses the importance of schools in this context, Leonard Doob emphasises mass media in the national maintenance of patriotism. Through media, a sense of devotion for one's nation will be incorporated in the second nature of children growing up. Mass media spreads patriotic communications on a regular basis, and people receive it in various contexts with the result that national devotion becomes linked to many different events in their lives. Most of the patriotic communications are subtle, and we do not think about it as particularly national. Both Smith and Doob also comment on the image of the nation as a family, and how this image facilitates the development of a sense of belonging. When the nation is personified as the motherland, it implies that all nationals belong to the same "family" and should stay together like the members of a real family do.

In addition to schools and mass media, I reckon that parents and other people surrounding the children will also contribute in the process of inculcating children with a sense of belonging to a unique culture, since they have themselves been socialised into the national community. For the most part, the incorporation of individuals into the national community happens without anyone consciously registering it. As Michael Billig states, patriotism and national devotion becomes part of peoples' second nature. It has in the course of time been transformed into familiar common sense.

In order to have a sense of national belonging, the individuals must inevitably make the distinction between "us" and "the others". The concepts of in-group and out-group are of great importance in this context. Especially Doob and Billig underline the role of an out-group in the preservation and functioning of nationalism and patriotism. By assigning stereotypical traits to other groups of people – in this context people who are not fellow nationals – we become aware of who we are not.

To be able to make the distinction between "us" and "them", there has to exist some criteria that can determine who is accepted in the in-group and who is not – certain criteria for in-group membership. In the context of this thesis where we are focusing on national identity, the criteria that draw the line between "us" and "them" constitute – as we have seen in the previous chapters – my concept of membership identity. It seems self-evident that every modern nation must have a positive membership identity in order for the population to feel a sense of belonging and devotion to the nation. And as we have seen, the membership identity is on the whole positive in both Italy and Norway. Nevertheless, the typical membership identities in these countries differ from each other. Respect for national law and political institutions is the most valued criterion in Norway, while feeling like a member of the nation is the most important in Italy. And although being born in the country is considered the least important of the five criteria in both Italy and Norway, almost 8 in 10 Italians find it important versus only 6 in 10 Norwegians. Since this is definitely the most difficult criterion to fulfil for an immigrant, it looks as the mental boundary between "us" and "them" is more rigid in Italy than in Norway.

While membership identity deals with who can cross the line from out-group to in-group, chauvinistic identity deals with comparison of in-group and out-group. Billig states that to achieve a positive identity, groups tend to compare themselves favourably with contrasting out-groups. Stereotypical traits are more often assigned to out-groups than in-groups, and "we" often claim to be the natural standard against which "their" deviations can be measured (Billig, 1995). Nevertheless, a majority of the population will not necessarily harbour a blind sense of loyalty to its nation and compare it favourably in all respects to other nations.

The typical Italian and the typical Norwegian both state that they would rather live in their country than in any other country, and they are proud to be Italian or Norwegian when

their country does well in an international sport event. But while a clear majority of the Norwegians thinks that Norway is in general better than most other countries, less than 4 in 10 Italians think the same about Italy. On the other hand, substantially more Italians than Norwegians consider it right to support their nation even when their nation is in the wrong. It cannot be said that one country is more chauvinistic than the other based on my analyses, but we can see that the contents of the chauvinistic identity differ slightly in Italy and in Norway.

In the previous chapters I have commented on various historical events and circumstances that may have led to a negative civic identity in Italy and a positive civic identity in Norway. I will not repeat the line of reasoning, it is sufficient at this point to say that based on the national histories of the two countries, an Italian negative civic identity and a Norwegian positive civic identity did not come as a surprise. The fair and equal treatment of all groups in society is the least popular civic institution in both countries, although Italian political influence in the world triggers the same lack of pride among the people. Even though the equal treatment of all groups is far less popular than the other civic institutions in Norway, more than twice as many Norwegians than Italians say that they are proud of it: more than 4 in 10 Norwegians versus 2 in 10 Italians.

The typical cultural identity is positive in both Italy and Norway. A vast majority of both populations are proud of national cultural institutions, with the exception of national armed forces. I have earlier mentioned that it can be discussed whether or not national armed forces is in fact part of a nation's cultural institutions. Much can be said for and against, but based on the reliability analyses I have accounted for in the chapter on methodological framework, I chose to group national pride into the same clusters that Mikael Hjerm (1998) did in his investigation of four Western countries.

When we compare the frequency analyses for Italian and Norwegian cultural identity, we see that although the typical cultural identity is positive in both countries, substantially more people take pride in cultural institutions in Italy than in Norway. For instance, 9 in 10 Italians are proud of Italian art and literature, while only 6 in 10 Norwegians are proud of Norwegian art and literature.

Civic pride is an important part of the Norwegian national identity, while the Italian national identity has a strong cultural element. Of course, we must not forget that Norwegian cultural identity is mainly positive. However, compared to Italy, the Norwegian cultural identity is not remarkable in its positivity. Anthony D. Smith (1991) typologises nations and forms of nationalism into a civic model and an ethnic model. He claims that every nation contains both civic and ethnic elements, but that one can categorise the nations based on whether the civic or the ethnic elements dominate them. The models are roughly equivalent with the *Staatsnation* and the *Kulturnation* as advocated by Friedrich Meinecke in 1908. The forms of nationalism accompanying civic and ethnic nation models, has been called Western and Eastern nationalism (Chapter 4:49-53). According to my interpretation of Smith's civic and ethnic models, a country where the vast majority takes great pride in civic institutions can be said to be nearer the civic than the ethnic model. Likewise, a country where the vast majority takes pride in cultural institutions is nearer the ethnic model. With the positive civic identity that characterises Norway, and the positive cultural identity that characterises Italy, these models are useful in my comparison.

Also prior research has placed Italy and Norway into similar models. In the investigation of the 1995 survey material, Paolo Segatti (1999) discovered that Italy belongs to a cultural nation model together with most Eastern European countries, while Norway belongs to a political-economic nation model together with Western European countries and the US. According to Segatti, prior research have reached the conclusion that Italians in general have a weak national identity, and there has been talk about "the death of a nation". This prior research has apparently defined national identity as devotion to a political community. In his article Segatti stresses that the Italian identity is on the contrary strong, but that it is not directed towards the sense of belonging to a political community. It is directed towards the sense of belonging to a fellowship where its members share cultural origin, history and traditions.

Segatti's investigation included 19 countries. It is interesting that his results placed Italy with the Eastern countries, and Norway with the Western. This is in accordance with the use of the terms Eastern and Western nationalism as mentioned above. Italian and Norwegian histories have presented numerous reasons why Italians do not have as much reason to be proud of civic institutions as the Norwegians have. And with the cultural legacy from the Roman Empire in mind, strong cultural pride in Italy does not seem far-

fetched. The concepts of Eastern and Western nationalism and their corresponding nation models are of course not to be taken literally. They are analytical tools, developed as ideal-types based on features that are typical for Eastern countries and typical for Western countries. Although Italy is a Western country, the survey has shown that the Italians have more in common with typical Eastern populations than with Western populations when it comes to their sense of national devotion and identity.

Based on this overview of typical Italian and typical Norwegian national identity, certain noteworthy similarities and differences have been revealed. The typical Italian and the typical Norwegian both consider membership criteria important to fulfil for a person to be accepted as a fellow national. And they both agree in some statements favouring their nation, while disagreeing in other chauvinistic statements. The typical Norwegian is proud of Norwegian civic institutions like democracy, economy and the social security system, while the typical Italian is not. Both of them are proud of cultural institutions like national art, history and science, but the majority is substantially bigger in Italy than in Norway.

I have argued that membership identity is likely to be positive in all modern nation-states because of the importance of a mental distinction between "us" and "them" in the development of a general sense of national belonging. I have also discovered certain differences in the contents of typical Italian and typical Norwegian chauvinistic identities although they both contain some positive and some negative elements. And with the aid of theoretical contributions and previous research I have argued that Italy is closer to the Eastern nation model while Norway is closer to the Western because of the differences in civic identity and cultural identity. I will now move on to look at the typical attitudes towards immigrants in Italy and Norway.

9.2 Typical Attitude in Italy and Norway

The typical attitude towards immigrants is partly positive and partly negative in both countries. Some of the variables that have been chosen to measure attitudes deal with whether or not assimilation is a valued ideal, while other variables have to do with everyday prejudices regarding for instance crime and unemployment. Although both Italy and Norway have a typical attitude that is both negative and positive at the same time, the

populations differ from each other in what questions they answer in a positive way and what questions they answer in a negative way.

Assimilation seems to be a more valued ideal in Norway than in Italy. The majority of the Norwegians think that it is impossible for people who do not share Norwegian customs and traditions to become fully Norwegian. Only 2 in 10 Norwegians think that ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions. In Italy, 6 in 10 support the preservation of ethnic minority cultures.

The outlines on national histories revealed that immigration has become a much larger phenomenon in Italy than in Norway. It is often assumed that the more direct contact one has with immigrants the smaller the risk is of being xenophobic. It is clear that Italians have more contact with immigrants than Norwegians do, due to the amount of immigrants in Italy. This does not necessarily mean that most Italians have close personal contact with immigrants, but they inevitably relate to immigrants in different situations in everyday life. The lack of contact with immigrants in Norway presents a plausible reason why the Norwegian attitude is ideologically speaking more negative than the Italian attitude. Immigration is both a recent and a limited phenomenon in Norway, and the attitude is probably affected by this. The Norwegians do not have much experience in relating to immigrants – at least not in an international perspective. A negative attitude in Norway can therefore seldom be based exclusively on personal experience. Norway is still a culturally homogeneous nation compared to other countries, and this renders it likely that there exist clear mental boundaries between "us" and "them". Immigration may present a threat to this homogeneity, and a likely reaction to such a threat would be to insist that immigrants should adapt completely to the Norwegian society once they had entered, and that they should strive to adopt Norwegian customs and traditions rather than maintaining their original culture.

In Italy, a negative perception of immigrants becomes more visible in everyday prejudices than in political ideals like assimilation. A majority agrees that immigration increases crime and does not think that immigrants are good for Italian economy. While only 2 in 10 Norwegians agree that immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Norway and that immigrants do not make their nation more open to new ideas and culture, almost 4 in 10 Italians agree in the same statements. Although less than the majority agrees in such

everyday prejudices, it becomes a visible feature of the Italian attitude when we compare it to Norway. What seems distinct for one nation is to some degree dependent on which other nation one compares it with. Compared to Norway, Italy has stronger prejudices against immigrants in issues concerning everyday life.

That everyday prejudices seem more widespread in Italy than in Norway may have something to do with the amount of immigrants, which is much larger in Italy than in Norway. Italians in general will inevitably have more direct contact with immigrants than Norwegians will. As mentioned above, more direct contact should decrease the risk of xenophobia. At first glance, this should imply that Italy has less everyday prejudices than Norway. However, although direct contact will most likely increase the understanding of different people and their backgrounds, lack of state control over immigration – especially the illegal part of it – may have led to conflicts between Italians and immigrants. The amount of immigrants can therefore be said to increase the risk of everyday conflicts, for instance in the competition for work. However, everyday conflicts are not equally likely to arise in all societal strata. Certain groups of people will be more inclined to react with fear and hostility than others in the meeting with immigrants. I expected that this would particularly affect people who lacked personal resources like income and education, and the analyses of the survey material proved this assumption to be right. I will discuss this point more in detail later in my comparison of Italy and Norway, when I move on to investigate the people with anti-immigration attitudes.

The typical Italian attitude is to some extent ideologically positive. A majority agrees that ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions. However, when forced to choose between whether immigrants should adapt and blend into the larger society or whether they should maintain their own culture, they choose assimilation. It seems that their ideological attitude is positive up to a certain point. If a multi-cultural community stands in contrast to the traditional Italian community, they choose the Italian community. This is in accordance with what I have said earlier in the outline of Italian history. Italy has traditionally taken pride in being a tolerant nation that is less conscious of skin-colour than other nations she usually compares herself with. And although racist attitudes have increased in Italy during the last decades, Italy still tries to maintain the image of a helpful nation. However, the image is not maintained at all costs.

9.3 Anti-Immigration and Pro-Immigration Groups in Italy and Norway

9.3.1 Anti-Immigration

The most visible group of people based on the correspondence analyses I have conducted in the previous chapters consists of people with a very negative attitude towards immigration, and is structurally speaking roughly the same in Italy and in Norway. It is most visible in the sense that it recurs in all of the analyses and that it is described by the first axis in most of these. In the chapter on methodological framework I gave a brief explanation of correspondence analysis where I among other things discussed the parts the different axes play in this kind of analysis. The first axis in every analysis enables us to see the most important opposition of the material (Chapter 6:86).

According to the thesis of relative deprivation, it is expected that the people with the most negative attitude should be people in the lowest societal strata. Those who feel left behind socially or economically will react negatively to groups they feel threatened by. As we have seen, this appears to be accurate in both Italy and Norway. Strongly anti-immigration people are in both countries usually more than 56 years old. They are widowed and have retired from working life. They have lower education and a low annual income. So far, the structural characteristics describing the people with a very negative attitude are identical in the two countries. However, in Italy, people with strongly anti-immigration attitudes more often than others live in urban areas in the South. In Norway, strongly anti-immigration people do not more often than others live in a particular geographical region. And in Norway the people with a very negative attitude are more often men than women, while I did not discover a similar gender difference in Italy.

In both countries, these people have a very positive membership identity. They consider membership criteria like citizenship and knowledge of language to be of utmost importance to fulfil if a person is to be accepted as a true member of the national community. They also more often than others have a very positive chauvinistic identity, they agree strongly in statements favouring their nation in an international context. Their civic identity is very negative in both countries. They are not proud of civic institutions like the way democracy works and the national social security system. In Norway, the

people with strongly anti-immigration attitude furthermore more often than others have a very positive cultural identity. They are very proud of national cultural institutions like Norwegian art and literature and national history. Anti-immigration Italians, on the other hand, do not more often than others have a particular cultural identity.

Membership identity and chauvinistic identity have an excluding effect on attitudes towards immigration in both countries. We have seen that the more important a person thinks membership criteria are to fulfil, the more hostile he/she is towards immigrants - whether he/she lives in Italy or in Norway. The study Hjerm (1998) conducted of Australia, Germany, Britain and Sweden also resulted in a statistical correlation between xenophobia and positive membership identity - what Hjerm called multiple national identity - regardless of nationality. It seems that there are profound similarities between the Western countries regarding the association between membership identity and attitudes towards immigration. Also the correspondence I discovered between chauvinistic identity and attitudes are supported by previous research. Hernes, Knudsen and Grytten have all discovered that there is a statistical correlation between positive chauvinistic identity – what they have labelled national chauvinism – and xenophobia.

We have seen so far that people with a strongly anti-immigration attitude are roughly the same kind of people regardless of nationality. Old age and the lack of personal resources seem to trigger a very negative attitude in both countries, and with the exception of cultural identity, the same kind of national identity goes together with xenophobia whether the person in question is Italian or Norwegian.

Only two important structural differences between xenophobic Italians and xenophobic Norwegians are rendered visible in my analyses. The Italians live in urban areas in a specific geographical area – the South – while the Norwegians are not associated with a specific geographical area. Norwegians with a strongly anti-immigration attitude are more often men than women, while gender did not turn out to be relevant in the description of their Italian counterparts. Xenophobic Norwegians are as we have seen in addition characterised by their very positive cultural identity, while xenophobic Italians do not share a specific kind of cultural identity. In other words, positive cultural identity seems to have an excluding effect on attitudes in Norway, while it has no visible effect on Italian xenophobia.

9.3.2 A Theoretical Discussion of Anti-Immigration Attitude

If we look past national identity for a moment, and focus exclusively on explanatory variables, we have seen that xenophobic people regardless of nationality are usually older people with lower education and a low annual income. Several of the theoretical contributions I have accounted for earlier in this thesis can shed some light on this phenomenon. I have especially focused on the thesis of relative deprivation and the theory of Ernest Gellner. The theory of relative deprivation states that those who feel left behind socially or economically will react negatively to groups they perceive as threats (Chapter 5:66). Immigrants typically constitute such perceived threatening groups. According to Gellner, people in lower strata in society will inevitably have prejudices against those who are in even lower strata. These prejudices are engendered by the fear of being pushed downwards. If many of those at the bottom have a skin-colour that differs from the majority such prejudices will spread to skin-colour. Prejudices can also be attached to cultural differences between those at the bottom and the majority of the population, but Gellner does not consider cultural differences to be as important as skin-colour since they can be overcome in the course of a generation. In this context cultural differences are nevertheless important, since immigrants are not per definition immigrants after the course of a generation. Widespread negative sentiments against Albanians in contemporary Italy can serve as an example of conflicts based on cultural differences between people with the same skin-colour. Both the thesis of relative deprivation and the contribution of Gellner imply that people in lower strata of society will feel threatened by newcomers. If material goods and jobs are scarce, it is hardly surprising that one does not welcome strangers in the already hard competition.

In the light of these theoretical contributions it is not surprising that older people with weak personal resources were identified as the people with the most negative attitude towards immigration in both Italy and Norway. These people are in a low societal stratum in that they are far from wealthy and well educated. Many of them are most likely dependent on financial support from the welfare state or their families in order to maintain a sufficient standard of living. The competition for jobs does not affect them substantially, since they are more often than others retired from working life. But they may consider

other goods like pensions and decent housing conditions as threatened by immigrants, and therefore react in a negative manner.

As the analyses have demonstrated, there is a clear link between positive membership identity and xenophobia in both Italy and Norway. Knowing that we belong to a unique culture – knowing "who we are" – has been said to be the key to national identity (Smith, 1991:17). Knowing who we are involves knowing who we are not. The sense of belonging to a unique culture presupposes a clear distinction between "us" and "the others". And as I have argued earlier, such a distinction between "us" and "them" constitutes the core of membership identity. If people are hostile towards immigrants they will not be inclined to accepting them as fellow nationals. It is therefore likely that people with anti-immigration attitudes will consider membership criteria to be important to fulfil.

As Doob stated already in 1964, there is a clear connection between stigmatising an out-group and expressing chauvinistic sentiments for one's country. The link between positive chauvinistic identity and xenophobia appears to exist regardless of nationality. Previous research by Knudsen, Hernes, Grytten and Hjerm have all shown that chauvinistic people are the most xenophobic both in Norway and Sweden. And as I have shown, the same applies to Italy. People with a positive chauvinistic identity consider their own nation to be superior in comparison with other nations. When immigrants from such other nations enter the country, it is hardly surprising that chauvinistic people will have a derogatory attitude towards the new inhabitants. The negative attitude towards immigrants may further have a strengthening effect on national identity. According to Doob (1964), nationals can preserve the faith in their nation by blaming immigrants for the wrongs in society. By blaming immigrants for crime and unemployment, for example, these problems are no longer considered results of the nation's shortcomings.

In this comparison I focus especially on Italians and Norwegians with a very negative attitude. The reason for this is that the xenophobic people constituted the overall clearest results in my correspondence analyses of each nation. Structurally speaking, Italians with a moderately anti-immigration attitude and Italians with a strongly anti-immigration attitude are roughly the same kind of people. In Norway, we have seen that while people with a very negative attitude were more often than others older men with lower education and low income, people with a moderately negative attitude were more often than others older full-

time working people who had a medium low income and seldom attended church. Age and to some extent income were the same for strongly anti-immigration Norwegians and moderately anti-immigration Norwegians, but employment status and church attendance frequency made me view them as two distinct groups.

There are similarities regarding the national identity of people with moderately anti-immigration attitude. Both Italians and Norwegians who are sceptical to immigration more often than others have a positive membership identity and a positive chauvinistic identity. They think being born in Italy/Norway, speaking the language, respecting national laws, having Italian/Norwegian citizenship and feeling like an Italian/Norwegian are important criteria to fulfil for a foreigner to become accepted as a fellow national. They would rather live in their country than anywhere else, and they generally think that their nation is better than most other nations. I have accounted for some possible reasons for the correspondence between positive membership identity, positive chauvinistic identity and negative attitudes towards immigration in the theoretical discussion of strongly anti-immigration attitude above. The same line of reasoning will apply to the people with a moderately negative attitude.

Norwegians who are sceptic towards immigration also have a tendency to not being very proud of the way democracy works, Norway's political influence in the world, its social security system and its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society. They have a negative civic identity. This kind of correspondence between a negative civic identity and a negative attitude has not been discovered in the Italian analyses.

Italians with a negative attitude - whether it is very negative or only moderately negative - do not share a distinct form of cultural identity. We cannot say based on my analyses that they more often than others are proud of national cultural institutions. In Norway the xenophobic people had a very positive cultural identity. In Hjerm's study of four Western countries, he concluded that negative civic identity and positive cultural identity co-vary with xenophobia in Australia, Germany, Great Britain and Sweden. The Norwegian results are on the whole in accordance with this conclusion. The Italian results, however, are only partly congruent with the situation in the countries Hjerm studied. Xenophobic Italians have a very negative civic identity. But when it comes to cultural identity, it looks as it is not universally connected with attitudes in the Western world. In the chapter on Italian

analysis, we saw that the connection between cultural identity and attitudes actually went in the opposite direction compared to the four countries in Hjerm's study - a positive cultural identity went hand in hand with a positive attitude towards immigration.

9.3.3 Pro-Immigration

In both Italy and Norway people who are positive towards immigrants more often than others have achieved higher education and have a high annual income. People with strong personal resources appear to be the most tolerant towards immigration regardless of nationality. The thesis of relative deprivation and the theoretical contribution of Gellner have been used repeatedly in the discussion of anti-immigration attitudes. They also apply to pro-immigration attitudes. The people with higher education and high income do probably not feel threatened by the influx of immigrants. They do not have to compete with immigrants for work or social benefits since they are likely to be in higher social strata.

Apart from income and education, pro-immigration Italians and pro-immigration Norwegians are not the same kind of people. The Italians in this group more often than other Italians have a negative membership identity, a positive civic identity and a positive cultural identity. They are furthermore more often than others young people who never attend church. Norwegians with a moderately positive attitude, on the other hand, more often than others have a negative chauvinistic identity. They disagree in statements favouring Norway in an international context. Apart from their chauvinistic identity, their national identity is not statistically distinguishable from other Norwegians' national identity. This indicates that some people with a tolerant attitude are proud of civic and cultural institutions while others are not, and that some pro-immigration people think membership criteria are important to fulfil while others do not. In addition to having higher education and a high income, Norwegians with a moderately positive attitude more often than others work full-time or occupy themselves with studies on university level. Their age ranges from 16 to 55 years old, and they are more often than others separated or unmarried. They are furthermore more often women than men. As discussed in the chapter on Norwegian analyses, I am not in a position to state that these background categories have more to do with attitudes than with chauvinistic identity. People with a positive attitude in

Norway stood out as an identifiable group of people only in the analysis of chauvinistic identity, and not in the analyses of any of the other identity aspects. People with a strongly pro-immigration attitude were not distinguishable at all in Norway. In Italy we have seen that people with a very positive attitude more often than others have higher education and a high income, they are less than 45 years old and never attend church. That strongly pro-immigration people were visible in my analyses of Italy and not in my analyses of Norway is probably the most striking difference I have discovered between the two countries. In table 10.1 in the concluding chapter I will schematically sum up the results of my analyses. In such a table it will be easy to view the differences and similarities between the two countries.

As discussed above in relation to anti-immigration attitudes, people who are hostile towards immigrants think in the terms of "us" and "them", and favour their own nation in comparison with other nations and the people constituting them. From this line of reasoning it seems likely that people who are tolerant towards immigrants do not use the same rigid distinction between "us" and "them" as anti-immigration people do. And when the mental boundaries are not as dear-cut, it makes sense that people with a positive attitude will not favour their own nation to the same degree. This line of reasoning also applies to membership identity. If we presuppose that people with a positive attitude towards immigration do not operate with as rigid distinctions between "us" and "them" as people with a negative attitude, it is probable that they will not consider membership criteria as important to fulfil as people with a negative attitude will do. I would expect both membership identity and chauvinistic identity to be negative for the people with pro-immigration attitudes regardless of nationality. However, this has not proven to be accurate. Pro-immigration Norwegians have a negative chauvinistic identity while pro-immigration Italians have a negative membership identity.

We have seen that Italians with a positive civic identity more often than others have a positive attitude towards immigration. Civic identity has turned out to have an including effect on attitudes also in many other Western countries studied by Knudsen and Hjerm. Knudsen found that civic identity had an including effect also in Norway. With the link between negative civic identity and negative attitudes in Norway, I will not entirely contradict his results. But a correspondence between positive civic identity and positive attitudes has not been visible in my analyses of Norway.

As mentioned above, in Italy people who have a moderately positive attitude also display a positive cultural identity. As we have learnt from Hjerm's study, this is in contradiction with the pattern of other Western countries where a positive cultural identity seems to trigger xenophobia and not tolerance. I am not in a position to give a clear reason why Italian cultural identity has a different effect on attitudes than what is common in large parts of the Western world. However, we have seen that Italian national identity has more in common with Eastern European countries than with Western (Segatti, 1999). Following Smith (1991), we have seen that Western nations tend to value civic traditions and ideals, while Eastern nations tend to cherish their cultural traditions and sense of a common origin. This is a plausible reason why Italy is not like the other Western countries in the 1995 survey. Although I can not state it as an undeniable fact, I find it likely that the cultural legacy from the Roman Empire has contributed in giving contemporary Italians a high self-esteem regarding their national culture. Perhaps this high self-esteem decreases the perception of immigrants as a threat. I suggest here that the particular form of pride Italians take in cultural institutions prevents them from fearing that immigrants and their foreign cultures and traditions will do damage to Italian culture. The more secure the Italian faith in cultural institutions is, the less of a threat immigrants will present, and the more tolerant the Italians will be. Of course, there are exceptions. We know from preliminary frequency analyses that there are more Italians with a positive cultural identity than there are Italians with a positive attitude. This means that there are bound to be some Italians who are proud of cultural institutions at the same time as they are hostile towards immigration. However, the typical pattern is that a positive cultural identity goes hand in hand with a positive attitude. Based on Segatti's study, a more thorough investigation of Italy compared to Eastern European countries may be fruitful, especially regarding cultural identity and its effect on attitudes towards immigration.

9.4 Conclusion

I have used this chapter to discuss the similarities and the differences between Italy and Norway regarding national identity and attitudes towards immigration. In the beginning I looked at the typical national identity of each country, with "typical" being defined in this context as the national identity belonging to the majority of the populations. Both Italy and Norway in general had a positive membership identity, a positive cultural identity and a

chauvinistic identity consisting of both positive and negative elements. I argued that the typical membership identity in any modern nation state was likely to be positive based on the need to make a mental distinction between "us" and "them" in order to create a sense of belonging to one's nation. I have also discussed the need for a positive cultural identity in order to create national devotion, and how the foundation for both these identity aspects are laid with the aid of a standardised education system and the mass media. I have furthermore noted that a larger majority of the Italian population has a positive cultural identity compared to the Norwegians, and that the typical Norwegian civic identity is positive while the Italian civic identity is overwhelmingly negative. A discussion of Smith's use of the terms "civic" and "ethnic" nation models together with Segatti's research on national identity in 19 countries led me to the conclusion that Norway is closer to the civic model and that Italy is closer to the ethnic model.

I proceeded by looking at the typical attitude towards immigration in Italy and Norway. It appeared that the typical Norwegian values assimilation, while Italians to a greater degree display everyday prejudices. That everyday prejudices were less widespread in Norway could have something to do with little direct contact between immigrants and the population due to immigration being a recent and limited phenomenon. Because of this, a negative Norwegian attitude seemed more likely to be based upon ideological values like assimilation than on conflicts of everyday life. I argued that Italian everyday prejudices could have arisen as results of such conflicts, for instance in the job market. A lack of state control over immigration to Italy and the vast amount of illegal immigrants that have entered the country during the last decades made me consider such conflicts to be more plausible in Italy than in Norway. Italy's tradition as a tolerant nation may nevertheless have preserved the Italian attitude ideologically positive, at least up to a certain point.

I dedicated a large part of this chapter to a discussion of anti-immigration attitudes in Italy and Norway. People with the most negative attitudes towards immigration were roughly of the same kind in both countries. In both Italy and Norway they were more often than others older people who had a low income and lower education. They had a very positive membership identity, a very positive chauvinistic identity and a very negative civic identity. Xenophobic Norwegians furthermore more often than others displayed a very positive cultural identity.

I used the thesis of relative deprivation and the theoretical contribution of Ernest Gellner to shed some light on anti-immigration attitudes. The theories both implied that people in the lower strata of society would feel more threatened by immigrants than people in higher strata, and that people who lacked personal resources would therefore react the most negatively towards immigrants.

Previous research has shown that the connection between membership identity and attitudes exist for various other Western countries as well, and that the link between chauvinistic identity and negative attitudes is also the same in Sweden as in Norway and Italy. Together, this indicates that membership identity and chauvinistic identity have an excluding effect on attitudes towards immigration regardless of nationality.

People with a tolerant attitude had higher education and a high income in both Italy and Norway. In Norway tolerant people more often than others had a negative chauvinistic identity, while their Italian counterpart more often than others had a negative membership identity, a positive civic identity and a positive cultural identity. I argued that cultural identity may have a different effect on attitudes in a country more similar to the Eastern than to the Western nation model. I furthermore argued that people with strong cultural pride in a nation like Italy might be inclined to a high self-esteem that is not threatened by the entrance of immigrants.

At this point, the results of my analyses have been summed up. In the last chapter I will draw a conclusion of this study. The conclusion will not be yet another presentation of my statistical results since they have all been accounted for. Rather, it will be a general discussion of the conclusions already made, and some ideas concerning the road ahead. A study such as this enables us to point out concrete needs for future research based on the increase in information it has yielded.

10. Concluding Remarks

In this thesis I have conducted numerous correspondence analyses of material from the ISSP survey "National Identity 1995". Correspondence analysis has enabled me to discover tendencies about attitudes towards immigration and national identity in Italy and Norway. I have made use of Italian and Norwegian history and sociological theories in my attempt to explain identity and attitudes.

I have discussed that contemporary attitudes and opinions to a certain extent have been shaped by the nation's history. With this in mind one can not develop a general understanding of identity and attitude unless one takes the studied nation's history into account. In the analyses of Italy and Norway I have chosen certain events from each nation's history to contribute with plausible reasons for the tendencies I have discovered. The two historical chapters in the beginning of the thesis entails much more than the limited amounts of events I have discussed as possible influences on the present's attitudes and national identities. The events I have emphasised as important for contemporary Italy and Norway belong to a wider historical context. They would not have made sense in this thesis if I had not given a general outline of Italian and Norwegian history. It is, however, important to keep in mind that I have presented historical circumstances only as plausible reasons for contemporary identities and attitudes, and not as undeniable truths.

In chapter 4 I presented several theoreticians who have contributed to the field of nationalism and national identity. Together, the outline of these gives a theoretical background understanding for the theme of this thesis. They all have certain things in common, for instance the mechanism of creating a mental boundary between "us" and "them" as essential in the creation and maintenance of the individual's sense of belonging to a distinct national community. This is a prerequisite for national identity. Of course, they also differ from each other on several points. I have made use of each of them in the interpretations of my results, and together they have rendered most of my results plausible from a theoretical point of view. As was the case with the national histories, the outline of these theoretical contributions in chapter 4 entails much more than the limited parts of the theories I have used in my interpretations. Although not all parts of all theories were

applicable in my specific analyses of attitudes and national identity, the contributions as a whole has given a necessary background understanding of the phenomenon of modern nations and the psychological mechanisms related to them.

The results of my analyses in this thesis must not be thought of as absolute truths. In chapter 6 I wrote about correspondence analysis and explained how the results this statistical technique yields are to be interpreted in relation to each other. When I have discovered for instance that older Italians with lower education are the most xenophobic people in Italy, this does not mean that all older Italians are hostile towards immigration. It simply means that they *more often than others* have a strongly anti-immigration attitude in Italy.

Before I discuss any practical usefulness of this thesis, and before I present any suggestions concerning ideas for future research, I will turn once more to what I have discovered about attitudes towards immigration in this study. All main trends of my analyses of attitudes towards immigration are summed up schematically in table 10.1. The similarities and differences between Italy and Norway as presented in the previous comparative chapter are easily visible here. Although all results have already been accounted for, I find it useful to sum up the results in an easily understandable table format. In order to discuss practical use and make suggestions regarding the road ahead, it is important to keep all main tendencies fresh in memory. The main concern of this thesis was attitudes towards immigration, and therefore the results in table 10.1 are listed according to attitude type. I use the same distinction between attitudes as I have done in the analytical chapters, and I think it is important once more to stress that the four groups are statistical categories, and that they do not reflect absolute truths.

From table 10.1 we can see that there is a tendency structurally speaking for the same kind of people regardless of nationality to have a certain attitude. This applies to strongly anti-immigration and moderately anti-immigration attitudes in both countries. Especially education, income and age seem to have a somewhat universal effect on attitudes towards immigration. Also types of national identity appear to be related to anti-immigration attitudes in roughly the same way regardless of nationality.

Table 10.1: Results of my analyses of attitudes towards immigration in Italy and Norway

	Italy	**Norway**
Strongly anti-immigration		Men
	56 years old or more	56 years old or more
	Retired from work	Retired from work or work at home
	Widowed	Widowed
	Lower education	Lower education
	Low income	Low income
	Urban areas	
	South	
	Very positive membership identity	Very positive membership identity
	Very positive chauvinistic identity	Very positive chauvinistic identity
	Very negative civic identity	Very negative civic identity
		Very positive cultural identity
Moderately anti-immigration	56 years old or more	56 years old or more
	Widowed	Full-time
	Lower education	Seldom in church
	Low income	Medium low income
	South	
	Positive membership identity	Positive membership identity
	Positive chauvinistic identity	Positive chauvinistic identity
		Negative civic identity
Moderately pro-immigration		Women
	18-35 years old	55 years old or younger
	In church several times a year	Full-time work or students
	Unmarried	Separated or unmarried
	Small town/suburbs	Higher education
	North West	High income
	Positive cultural identity	Negative chauvinistic identity
Strongly pro-immigration	26-45 years old	
	Never in church	
	Higher education	
	High income	
	Very negative membership identity	
	Very positive civic identity	
	Very positive cultural identity	

At first glance, table 10.1 reveals more similarities than differences between Italy and Norway. As mentioned, people with anti-immigration attitudes – both moderately negative and very negative attitudes – are roughly the same kinds of people regarding background variables and national identity in both Italy and Norway. However, if we look at people with pro-immigration attitudes, the differences between Italy and Norway are more striking than the similarities. Regarding background characteristics, moderately pro-immigration Norwegians have more in common with strongly pro-immigration Italians than with moderately pro-immigration Italians. And in the Norwegian case, the analyses did not yield information about strongly pro-immigration Norwegian at all.

The comparison of Italy and Norway presupposes that we have meaning-equivalence in the 1995 ISSP survey. As discussed in the chapter on methodological framework, meaning-equivalence in cross-cultural studies can never be guaranteed. However, if I did not presuppose that Italians and Norwegians have interpreted the survey questions in roughly the same way, it would be meaningless to undertake this kind of comparative study.

National identity and attitudes towards immigration are highly complex phenomena, and a thesis such as this can only offer a limited contribution to a full understanding of them. There is need for a lot more research in this area. For instance, a more thorough investigation with the focus exclusively on strongly anti-immigration attitudes, and with more explanatory variables than I have chosen to have in this study, would be interesting. There is probably a lot more that can be said about the older xenophobic people. Also the other attitude types would be useful to have a closer look at. To figure out how one can decrease negative attitudes in a society, knowing what triggers tolerance is just as important as understanding what causes intolerance.

The study of Segatti (1999) that I presented in the previous comparative chapter, would also serve as a fruitful starting point for further research. His analysis of national identity placed Italy together with Eastern European countries and Norway together with other Western countries. An analysis of Italy and some of the Eastern European countries would be interesting, especially when cultural identity is concerned. We have seen that cultural pride in Norway triggers xenophobia, and that this is in accordance with what Hjerm discovered in his investigation of four Western countries. Quite the opposite is true for Italy - Italians who are proud of national cultural institutions have a tendency to have pro-immigration attitudes. I can not say whether this is because Italy has more in common with Eastern than Western European countries, or whether Italy is special in an international context. I would need a closer investigation of Italy and Eastern European countries in order to find out whether Eastern European cultural pride differs substantially from Western European cultural pride.

This thesis has been preoccupied with national identity and attitudes in 1995, since the ISSP survey was conducted in this year. I have discussed that it is possible that certain societal circumstances immediately before the survey was conducted may have influenced the attitudes and opinions of the respondents. Examples of such circumstances are the

Olympics in Norway in 1994 and the two Albanian refugee waves to Italy in 1991. Whether my results reflect stable tendencies or whether national identity and attitudes have changed during the last few years in Italy and Norway is impossible for me to say at this point. ISSP is planning an identical survey in 2003. A study of this together with the 1995 survey would be immensely valuable. With a period of 8 years in between the surveys, we could establish whether national identity and attitudes have been stable or whether they have changed.

At this point, the conclusion of the study must be the results summed up in table 10.1 above. Even though this thesis has its limitations, it has contributed with one more piece in the complex jigsaw that attitudes towards immigration is.

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Figures and Tables

Appendix A – Transcripts of result matrixes SPAD 3.5

Background variables Italy

```
ANALYSE DES CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES
APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES
SEUIL (PCMIN)  :      2.00 %      POIDS:      21.88
AVANT APUREMENT :      7 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        33 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
APRES          :      7 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        31 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS :   1094.00
TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES


VALEURS PROPRES
APERCU DE LA PRECISION DES CALCULS : TRACE AVANT DIAGONALISATION ..   3.4286
                                     SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES ....   3.4286
HISTOGRAMME DES 24 PREMIERES VALEURS PROPRES
+--------+-----------+---------+---------+
| NUMERO |  VALEUR   | POURCENT.| POURCENT.|
|        |  PROPRE   |         | CUMULE  |
+--------+-----------+---------+---------+
|   1    |  0.3754   |  10.95  |  10.95  | ********************************************************************************************
|   2    |  0.2725   |   7.95  |  18.90  | ******************************************************************
|   3    |  0.1932   |   5.63  |  24.53  | ***********************************************
|   4    |  0.1754   |   5.12  |  29.65  | ******************************************
|   5    |  0.1734   |   5.06  |  34.70  | ************************************
```

COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRES DES MODALITES ACTIVES
AXES 1 A 5

MODALITES				COORDONNEES					CONTRIBUTIONS					COSINUS CARRES				
IDEN - LIBELLE	P.REL	DISTO	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
40 . Employment																	
MO01 - Full-time	5.81	1.46	0.25	0.57	0.18	0.29	0.43	1.0	7.0	0.9	2.7	6.2	0.04	0.22	0.02	0.06	0.13
MO02 - Part-time	1.42	9.04	0.39	0.56	-0.57	-1.02	-0.32	0.6	1.6	2.4	8.4	0.9	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.11	0.01
MO03 - Less then part-time	0.38	36.72	0.41	-0.04	0.03	0.36	0.77	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.3	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
MO04 - Unemployed	0.37	38.07	0.64	-0.35	1.01	-0.32	0.13	0.4	0.2	1.9	0.2	0.0	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00
MO05 - Student	1.01	13.21	1.82	-1.57	-0.33	0.08	-0.67	8.9	9.1	0.6	0.0	2.6	0.25	0.19	0.01	0.00	0.03
MO06 - Retired	2.13	5.71	-1.28	-1.09	-0.80	-0.22	0.70	9.3	9.2	7.0	0.6	6.0	0.29	0.21	0.11	0.01	0.09
MO07 - Housewife	2.74	4.21	-0.76	0.20	0.43	0.09	-1.04	4.2	0.4	2.6	0.1	17.1	0.14	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.26
MO08 - Other, not working	0.43	32.15	1.35	-1.46	0.59	-0.22	-0.79	2.1	3.3	0.8	0.1	1.5	0.06	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.02
			CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =					26.6	30.8	16.2	12.5	35.5					
41 . Age																	
AL01 - 18-25 years	2.61	4.47	1.44	-1.10	0.12	0.08	-0.26	14.5	11.5	0.2	0.1	1.1	0.46	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.02
AL02 - 26-35 years	2.69	4.31	0.27	0.48	0.62	0.22	0.51	0.5	2.3	5.4	0.8	4.0	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.01	0.06
AL03 - 36-45 years	2.89	3.95	0.07	0.97	-0.05	-0.28	0.18	0.0	9.9	0.0	1.3	0.5	0.00	0.24	0.00	0.02	0.01
AL04 - 46-55 years	2.61	4.47	-0.28	0.57	-0.23	0.33	-0.71	0.5	3.1	0.7	1.6	7.7	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.11
AL05 - 56-65 years	2.12	5.75	-0.99	-0.45	-0.16	-0.29	-0.39	5.6	1.6	0.3	1.0	1.8	0.17	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.03
AL06 - 66-75 years	1.37	9.42	-1.36	-1.26	-0.65	-0.19	1.08	6.8	8.0	3.0	0.3	9.2	0.20	0.17	0.04	0.00	0.12
			CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =					27.9	36.3	9.6	5.0	24.3					
42 . Marital status																	
SI01 - (Living as) married	9.11	0.57	-0.34	0.49	-0.02	-0.07	-0.09	2.9	7.9	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.21	0.42	0.00	0.01	0.01
SI02 - Widowed	0.95	13.99	-1.52	-1.44	-0.49	0.14	0.66	5.8	7.2	1.2	0.1	2.4	0.16	0.15	0.02	0.00	0.03
SI05 - Unmarried	4.22	2.39	1.09	-0.73	0.15	0.13	0.05	13.3	8.2	0.5	0.4	0.1	0.50	0.22	0.01	0.01	0.00
			CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =					22.0	23.3	1.7	0.8	2.9					
47 . Urban or rural																	
BY01 - Urban	2.69	4.31	0.11	0.09	-0.35	-0.52	-0.41	0.1	0.1	1.7	4.1	2.6	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.04
BY02 - Suburb, small town	9.18	0.56	-0.02	-0.01	0.13	-0.24	0.18	0.0	0.0	0.8	3.0	1.7	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.10	0.06
BY03 - Rural	2.42	4.91	-0.05	-0.04	-0.11	1.49	-0.24	0.0	0.0	0.1	30.4	0.8	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.45	0.01
			CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =					0.1	0.1	2.7	37.6	5.1					
48 . Part of country																	
RE01 - North West	3.76	2.80	0.05	0.09	-0.66	-0.15	0.21	0.0	0.1	8.4	0.5	1.0	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.01	0.02
RE02 - North East	2.66	4.36	-0.04	0.03	-0.49	1.32	-0.27	0.0	0.0	3.3	26.4	1.1	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.40	0.02
RE03 - Centre	2.70	4.29	-0.01	0.09	-0.02	-0.43	-0.02	0.0	0.1	0.0	2.8	0.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00
RE04 - South + islands	5.16	1.77	-0.01	-0.13	0.74	-0.35	-0.01	0.0	0.3	14.7	3.5	0.0	0.00	0.01	0.31	0.07	0.00
			CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =					0.0	0.5	26.3	33.2	2.1					
55 . Education																	
SK01 - Compulsory 1-8	5.60	1.55	-0.81	-0.20	0.20	0.09	-0.39	9.9	0.8	1.2	0.3	4.9	0.43	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.10
SK02 - Gymnasium 9-13	4.96	1.88	0.34	0.18	0.24	0.30	0.69	1.6	0.6	1.5	2.5	13.5	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.25
SK03 - Higher education 14+	3.72	2.84	0.77	0.07	-0.62	-0.53	-0.33	5.8	0.1	7.5	6.1	2.4	0.21	0.00	0.14	0.10	0.04
			CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =					17.3	1.5	10.1	8.8	20.7					
56 . Income		[BM] en classes ... en classes															
MO01 - Up to 15	2.26	5.32	-0.79	-0.76	0.61	0.22	-0.10	3.8	4.8	4.3	0.6	0.1	0.12	0.11	0.07	0.01	0.00
MO02 - 15-30	6.76	1.11	-0.04	-0.03	0.42	-0.16	-0.11	0.0	0.0	6.2	1.0	0.5	0.00	0.00	0.16	0.02	0.01
MO03 - 30-45	3.50	3.08	0.40	0.40	-0.49	0.04	0.54	1.5	2.1	4.3	0.0	5.9	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.10
MO04 - More than 45	1.76	7.10	0.37	0.30	-1.42	0.24	-0.52	0.6	0.6	18.5	0.6	2.8	0.02	0.01	0.28	0.01	0.04
			CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =					6.0	7.5	33.3	2.2	9.3					

COORDONNEES ET VALEURS-TEST DES MODALITES
AXES 1 A 5

MODALITES	VALEURS-TEST	COORDONNEES	

```
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE        EFF.    P.ABS  |  1     2     3     4     5  |   1      2      3      4      5  | DISTO.  |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------|
|  37 . Gender                             |                                |                                  |         |
| KJ01 - Male           527    527.00 |  4.3   2.6  -2.4   0.0   7.1 |  0.14   0.08  -0.07   0.00   0.22 |   1.08  |
| KJ02 - Female         567    567.00 | -4.3  -2.6   2.4   0.0  -7.1 | -0.13  -0.07   0.07   0.00  -0.21 |   0.93  |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------|
|                                          |                                |                                  |         |
|  45 . Church attendance frequency        |                                |                                  |         |
| KI01 - Once a week or more  370  370.00 | -6.1  -3.2   0.7   1.2  -0.7 | -0.26  -0.14   0.03   0.05  -0.03 |   1.96  |
| KI02 - 2-3 times a month    77   77.00 | -2.1   0.2   1.0  -0.8  -1.9 | -0.23   0.02   0.11  -0.09  -0.21 |  13.21  |
| KI03 - Once a month         72   72.00 |  1.2  -1.2   1.5   0.9  -0.3 |  0.13  -0.13   0.17   0.10  -0.04 |  14.19  |
| KI04 - Several times a year 199  199.00 | -0.8   2.7   0.6   1.2   1.0 | -0.05   0.17   0.04   0.08   0.06 |   4.50  |
| KI05 - Seldom              237  237.00 |  5.7   1.1  -0.4  -1.4   0.2 |  0.33   0.06  -0.02  -0.08   0.01 |   3.62  |
| KI06 - Never               130  130.00 |  3.3   0.5  -3.3  -1.3   1.0 |  0.27   0.04  -0.27  -0.11   0.08 |   7.42  |
|  45_ - reponse manquante     9    9.00 |  0.1   1.3   0.3  -0.6   1.2 |  0.02   0.43   0.10  -0.19   0.40 | 120.56  |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------|
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Membership identity and attitudes towards immigration Italy

```
CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES AVEC CHOIX DES MODALITES
APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES
SEUIL (PCMIN)   :       2.00 %      POIDS:       21.88
AVANT APUREMENT :     9 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        54 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
APRES           :     9 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        40 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS :   1094.00
TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES


VALEURS PROPRES
APERCU DE LA PRECISION DES CALCULS : TRACE AVANT DIAGONALISATION ..   3.4473
                                     SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES ....   3.4473
HISTOGRAMME DES 40 PREMIERES VALEURS PROPRES
+--------+-----------+---------+---------+----------------------------------------------------------------+
| NUMERO |  VALEUR   | POURCENT.| POURCENT.|                                                              |
|        |  PROPRE   |         | CUMULE  |                                                                |
+--------+-----------+---------+---------+----------------------------------------------------------------+
|   1    |  0.3052   |   8.85  |   8.85  | ************************************************************************** |
|   2    |  0.2509   |   7.28  |  16.13  | ********************************************************************   |
|   3    |  0.2329   |   6.76  |  22.89  | ***************************************************************       |
|   4    |  0.1802   |   5.23  |  28.11  | *************************************************                     |
|   5    |  0.1656   |   4.80  |  32.92  | *********************************************                        |
+--------+-----------+---------+---------+----------------------------------------------------------------+

COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRES DES MODALITES ACTIVES
AXES  1 A  5
+----------------------------------------+----------------------------------+----------------------------+----------------------------+
|              MODALITES                 |            COORDONNEES           |        CONTRIBUTIONS        |       COSINUS CARRES        |
|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE          P.REL DISTO |  1     2     3     4     5  |  1     2     3     4     5 |  1     2    3    4    5 |
+----------------------------------------+----------------------------------+----------------------------+----------------------------+
|  5 . How important is birth            |                                  |                            |                            |
| FØ01 - Very important     4.90  1.27 | -0.80  0.17  0.26  0.02 -0.02 | 10.2  0.6  1.5  0.0  0.0 | 0.50 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 |
| FØ02 - Fairly important   3.80  1.92 |  0.53 -0.74 -0.10  0.43  0.14 |  3.5  8.4  0.2  3.9  0.4 | 0.15 0.29 0.01 0.10 0.01 |
| FØ03 - Not very important 1.96  4.66 |  0.82  0.64 -0.27 -0.94 -0.59 |  4.4  3.2  0.6  9.6  4.2 | 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.19 0.08 |
| FØ04 - Not important at all 0.46 22.98 |  0.58  1.67 -0.83  0.22  1.71 |  0.5  5.1  1.4  0.1  8.2 | 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.13 |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 18.6 17.3  3.6 13.7 12.8 +------------------------+
|  6 . How important is citizenship      |                                  |                            |                            |
| ST01 - Very important     5.03  1.21 | -0.82  0.17  0.30  0.11 -0.06 | 11.1  0.6  1.9  0.3  0.1 | 0.56 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 |
| ST02 - Fairly important   4.22  1.63 |  0.58 -0.60 -0.18  0.36  0.12 |  4.7  6.1  0.6  3.0  0.4 | 0.21 0.22 0.02 0.08 0.01 |
| ST03 - Not very important 1.67  5.67 |  0.96  0.82 -0.30 -1.21 -0.37 |  5.0  4.5  0.7 13.4  1.4 | 0.16 0.12 0.02 0.26 0.02 |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 20.8 11.3  3.2 16.7  1.8 +------------------------+
|  7 . How important is language         |                                  |                            |                            |
| SP01 - Very important     5.32  1.09 | -0.65  0.13  0.25  0.11 -0.03 |  7.3  0.4  1.5  0.4  0.0 | 0.39 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.00 |
| SP02 - Fairly important   4.28  1.59 |  0.63 -0.40 -0.20  0.13 -0.01 |  5.5  2.7  0.7  0.4  0.0 | 0.25 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00 |
| SP03 - Not very important 1.24  7.95 |  0.49  0.51 -0.19 -0.66 -0.36 |  1.0  1.3  0.2  3.0  1.0 | 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.02 |
| SP04 - Not important at all 0.34 31.39 |  0.51  1.47 -0.94 -0.87  2.08 |  0.3  2.9  1.3  1.5  9.0 | 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.14 |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 14.1  7.3  3.7  5.2 10.0 +------------------------+
|  8 . How important is respect          |                                  |                            |                            |
| RE01 - Very important     5.62  0.98 | -0.39  0.35  0.28  0.09 -0.10 |  2.7  2.7  1.9  0.2  0.3 | 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.01 |
| RE02 - Fairly important   4.15  1.68 |  0.47 -0.55 -0.14  0.12  0.02 |  2.9  5.0  0.3  0.3  0.0 | 0.13 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.00 |
| RE03 - Not very important 0.94 10.76 |  0.15 -0.09 -0.35 -0.64 -0.17 |  0.1  0.0  0.5  2.2  0.2 | 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 |
| RE04 - Not important at all 0.43 24.78 |  0.27  1.15 -1.59 -0.81  1.61 |  0.1  2.3  4.7  1.6  6.8 | 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.10 |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  5.9 10.0  7.4  4.3  7.2 +------------------------+
|  9 . How important is sentiment         |                                  |                            |                            |
| FØ01 - Very important     6.37  0.74 | -0.50  0.19  0.28 -0.02 -0.07 |  5.2  0.9  2.1  0.0  0.2 | 0.34 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.01 |
| FØ02 - Fairly important   3.83  1.90 |  0.62 -0.62 -0.23  0.29 -0.03 |  4.8  5.9  0.9  1.8  0.0 | 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.05 0.00 |
| FØ03 - Not very important 0.62 17.00 |  1.03  1.01 -0.69 -1.29 -0.59 |  2.1  2.5  1.3  5.7  1.3 | 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.02 |
| FØ04 - Not important at all 0.29 36.82 |  0.44  2.00 -1.65 -0.51  3.29 |  0.2  4.7  3.5  0.4 19.2 | 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.29 |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 12.3 14.1  7.7  7.9 20.7 +------------------------+
|  29 . Increased crime                  |                                  |                            |                            |
| KR01 - Agree strongly     3.03  2.67 | -0.79 -0.18 -0.82 -0.15 -0.18 |  6.2  0.4  8.7  0.4  0.6 | 0.23 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.01 |
| KR02 - Agree              4.11  1.70 |  0.00 -0.31  0.32 -0.05  0.41 |  0.0  1.6  1.8  0.1  4.2 | 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.10 |
| KR03 - Neither nor        1.66  5.71 |  0.65  0.25  0.34 -0.13 -0.81 |  2.3  0.4  0.8  0.1  6.5 | 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.11 |
| KR04 - Disagree           1.62  5.84 |  0.53  0.16  0.60 -0.16  0.01 |  1.5  0.2  2.5  0.2  0.0 | 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 |
| KR05 - Disagree strongly  0.68 15.26 |  0.73  1.67 -0.69  1.65  0.35 |  1.2  7.6  1.4 10.4  0.5 | 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.01 |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 11.2 10.1 15.3 11.2 11.8 +------------------------+
|  31 . Not good for national economy    |                                  |                            |                            |
| AN01 - Agree strongly     2.20  4.05 | -0.60 -0.16 -1.34  0.13 -0.45 |  2.6  0.2 17.1  0.2  2.7 | 0.09 0.01 0.45 0.00 0.05 |
| AN02 - Agree              4.25  1.61 | -0.14 -0.33  0.28 -0.49  0.44 |  0.3  1.9  1.5  5.6  5.0 | 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.12 |
| AN03 - Neither nor        2.04  4.44 |  0.48  0.05  0.45 -0.03 -0.53 |  1.5  0.0  1.8  0.0  3.5 | 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 |
| AN04 - Disagree           2.22  4.00 |  0.43  0.64  0.34  0.68  0.09 |  1.4  3.7  1.1  5.6  0.1 | 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.00 |
| AN06 - Can't choose       0.37 29.44 | -0.01  0.27  0.30  0.50 -0.07 |  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.5  0.0 | 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  5.8  5.9 21.6 12.0 11.3 +------------------------+
|  32 . Take jobs                        |                                  |                            |                            |
```

```
| TA01 - Agree strongly       1.24    7.99 | -0.90 -0.38 -1.38 -0.17 -0.78 |  3.3  0.7 10.1  0.2  4.5 | 0.10 0.02 0.24 0.00 0.08 |
| TA02 - Agree                2.88    2.86 | -0.33 -0.48  0.04 -0.16  0.61 |  1.0  2.7  0.0  0.4  6.4 | 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.13 |
| TA03 - Neither nor          1.92    4.77 |  0.35 -0.36  0.07 -0.27 -0.10 |  0.8  1.0  0.0  0.8  0.1 | 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 |
| TA04 - Disagree             3.48    2.19 |  0.28  0.27  0.61 -0.25 -0.10 |  0.9  1.0  5.6  1.2  0.2 | 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.01 |
| TA05 - Disagree strongly    1.59    6.00 |  0.25  1.05 -0.46  1.30 -0.09 |  0.3  7.0  1.5 14.9  0.1 | 0.01 0.18 0.04 0.28 0.00 |
+-----------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  6.3 12.4 17.2 17.5 11.4 +-------------------------+


|  34 . Not open                                                                                                                      |
| AN01 - Agree strongly       1.38    7.07 | -0.71 -0.15 -1.58  0.03 -0.55 |  2.3  0.1 14.7  0.0  2.5 | 0.07 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.04 |
| AN02 - Agree                2.83    2.93 | -0.30 -0.50  0.05 -0.56  0.69 |  0.9  2.8  0.0  5.0  8.1 | 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.16 |
| AN03 - Neither nor          1.94    4.73 |  0.10 -0.29  0.19 -0.04 -0.18 |  0.1  0.7  0.3  0.0  0.4 | 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 |
| AN04 - Disagree             4.11    1.70 |  0.34  0.35  0.48  0.15 -0.25 |  1.6  2.0  4.0  0.5  1.6 | 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.04 |
| AN05 - Disagree strongly    0.67   15.54 |  0.34  1.45 -0.65  1.10  0.28 |  0.3  5.6  1.2  4.5  0.3 | 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.00 |
| AN06 - Can't choose         0.28   39.30 |  0.12 -0.54  0.35  0.98  0.20 |  0.0  0.3  0.1  1.5  0.1 | 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 |
+-----------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  5.1 11.6 20.4 11.5 13.0 +-------------------------+

COORDONNEES ET VALEURS-TEST DES MODALITES
AXES  1 A  5
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+---------------------------------------------+---------+
|               MODALITES                   |          VALEURS-TEST        |                 COORDONNEES                 |         |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE              EFF.    P.ABS  |  1    2    3    4    5        |   1      2      3      4      5              | DISTO.  |


|  37 . Gender                                                                                                                          |
| KJ01 - Male                 527   527.00  |  0.9  1.7 -0.5 -1.3  0.2  |  0.03  0.05 -0.01 -0.04  0.01  |   1.04  |
| KJ02 - Female               567   567.00  | -0.7 -1.1  0.1  1.4  0.1  | -0.02 -0.03  0.00  0.04  0.00  |   0.89  |

|  40 . Employment                                                                                                                     |
| MO01 - Full-time            445   445.00  |  1.7  1.5 -1.5 -4.1  1.5  |  0.06  0.06 -0.05 -0.15  0.05  |   1.41  |
| MO02 - Part-time            109   109.00  |  2.3  1.6  0.2  2.4  1.3  |  0.21  0.14  0.02  0.22  0.12  |   8.84  |
| MO03 - Less then part-time   29    29.00  |  2.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6  0.0  |  0.49 -0.01 -0.11 -0.10 -0.01  |  36.00  |
| MO04 - Unemployed            28    28.00  |  0.7 -0.8  1.0  0.1  0.3  |  0.13 -0.16  0.18  0.02  0.05  |  37.32  |
| MO05 - Student               77    77.00  |  0.7  2.4  2.2 -0.8 -1.8  |  0.08  0.26  0.25 -0.09 -0.19  |  12.94  |
| MO06 - Retired              163   163.00  | -4.3 -1.7  0.2  2.2 -0.9  | -0.31 -0.13  0.02  0.16 -0.06  |   5.58  |
| MO07 - Housewife            210   210.00  | -1.8 -1.8 -0.6  1.4 -1.0  | -0.11 -0.11 -0.03  0.09 -0.06  |   4.11  |
| MO08 - Other, not working    33    33.00  |  0.3 -0.4  0.2  1.4  0.6  |  0.06 -0.07  0.03  0.23  0.10  |  31.52  |

|  41 . Age                                                                                                                            |
| AL01 - 18-25 years          200   200.00  |  2.0  0.5  1.0 -5.1 -0.3  |  0.13  0.03  0.06 -0.33 -0.02  |   4.37  |
| AL02 - 26-35 years          206   206.00  |  4.0  1.0 -0.5  0.0  2.0  |  0.25  0.06 -0.03  0.00  0.12  |   4.21  |
| AL03 - 36-45 years          221   221.00  |  2.9  1.1 -1.4  0.7  0.5  |  0.17  0.07 -0.09  0.04  0.03  |   3.86  |
| AL04 - 46-55 years          200   200.00  | -1.8  2.0  0.2  1.0 -2.1  | -0.12  0.12  0.01  0.06 -0.14  |   4.37  |
| AL05 - 56-65 years          162   162.00  | -4.4 -2.3  0.2  2.1 -0.7  | -0.32 -0.16  0.01  0.15 -0.05  |   5.62  |
| AL06 - 66-75 years          105   105.00  | -3.8 -2.2  0.3  2.1  1.1  | -0.36 -0.21  0.03  0.19  0.10  |   9.22  |

|  42 . Marital status                                                                                                                 |
| SI01 - (Living as) married  689   689.00  | -0.2  0.5 -1.2  3.1 -0.3  | -0.01  0.01 -0.03  0.07 -0.01  |   0.56  |
| SI02 - Widowed               63    63.00  | -2.8 -2.4  1.0  0.4  0.6  | -0.34 -0.29  0.13  0.05  0.08  |  16.03  |
| SI03 - Divorced              15    15.00  | -0.9 -1.6 -2.0  2.9 -0.5  | -0.22 -0.40 -0.51  0.74 -0.14  |  70.54  |
| SI04 - Separated             16    16.00  |  0.6  2.9 -1.2 -0.1  2.8  |  0.14  0.71 -0.30 -0.03  0.69  |  66.06  |
| SI05 - Unmarried            311   311.00  |  1.9  1.0  1.2 -4.1 -0.3  |  0.09  0.05  0.06 -0.20 -0.01  |   2.45  |

|  45 . Church attendance frequency                                                                                                    |
| KI01 - Once a week or more  370   370.00  | -2.1 -0.6  3.1  1.9 -0.9  | -0.09 -0.02  0.13  0.08 -0.04  |   1.90  |
| KI02 - 2-3 times a month     77    77.00  | -0.9 -0.9 -0.4  0.0 -0.4  | -0.10 -0.10 -0.04  0.00 -0.04  |  12.94  |
| KI03 - Once a month          72    72.00  | -0.6 -1.7  0.3 -0.6  0.7  | -0.06 -0.20  0.03 -0.07  0.07  |  13.90  |
| KI04 - Several times a year 199   199.00  |  0.9 -0.6  1.1 -0.1  1.3  |  0.06 -0.04  0.07  0.00  0.08  |   4.39  |
| KI05 - Seldom               237   237.00  |  0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -2.8 -0.5  |  0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.16 -0.03  |   3.53  |
| KI06 - Never                130   130.00  |  3.3  4.8 -5.7  1.0  1.1  |  0.27  0.40 -0.47  0.08  0.09  |   7.25  |
| 45_  - reponse manquante      9     9.00  | -0.3  0.9 -1.3  1.6 -1.4  | -0.10  0.29 -0.43  0.53 -0.48  | 118.23  |

|  47 . Urban or rural                                                                                                                 |
| BY01 - Urban                206   206.00  | -2.4  0.4 -2.9 -0.4  0.1  | -0.15  0.02 -0.18 -0.03  0.01  |   4.21  |
| BY02 - Suburb, small town   703   703.00  |  2.5 -0.8  2.1  1.7  0.8  |  0.06 -0.02  0.05  0.04  0.02  |   0.53  |
| BY03 - Rural                185   185.00  | -0.4  1.3 -0.1 -1.6 -0.8  | -0.03  0.09  0.00 -0.11 -0.05  |   4.80  |

|  48 . Part of country                                                                                                                |
| RE01 - North West           288   288.00  |  0.9  0.7  2.2  1.0 -0.9  |  0.04  0.04  0.11  0.05 -0.04  |   2.73  |
| RE02 - North East           204   204.00  | -1.2  1.9 -0.9 -1.6 -1.3  | -0.07  0.12 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08  |   4.26  |
| RE03 - Centre               207   207.00  |  0.5  1.5 -0.6 -0.4  1.0  |  0.03  0.09 -0.04 -0.02  0.06  |   4.18  |
| RE04 - South + islands      395   395.00  | -0.1 -2.8 -1.1  0.8  1.3  |  0.00 -0.11 -0.04  0.03  0.05  |   1.72  |

|  55 . Education                                                                                                                      |
| SK01 - Compulsory 1-8       429   429.00  | -5.9 -7.1 -2.3  1.4  0.6  | -0.22 -0.27 -0.09  0.05  0.02  |   1.50  |
| SK02 - Gymnasium 9-13       380   380.00  |  0.5  1.1  0.6 -2.4 -1.3  |  0.02  0.04  0.02 -0.10 -0.05  |   1.82  |
| SK03 - Higher education 14+ 285   285.00  |  6.1  7.4  1.5  1.2  1.1  |  0.31  0.38  0.08  0.06  0.05  |   2.77  |

|  56 . Income              [BM] en classes ... en classes                                                                             |
| MO01 - Up to 15            173   173.00  | -2.9 -3.7 -0.3 -0.1  0.1  | -0.20 -0.26 -0.02  0.00  0.01  |   5.20  |
| MO02 - 15-30               518   518.00  |  0.6 -2.3 -0.7  1.5  0.7  |  0.02 -0.07 -0.02  0.05  0.02  |   1.07  |
| MO03 - 30-45               268   268.00  |  1.0  3.6  1.0 -1.8  0.3  |  0.05  0.19  0.05 -0.10  0.01  |   3.00  |
| MO04 - More than 45        135   135.00  |  1.2  3.7 -0.4  0.4 -1.2  |  0.10  0.29 -0.03  0.03 -0.09  |   6.95  |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------------+--------------------------------+---------+
```

Chauvinistic identity and attitudes towards immigration Italy

```
CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES AVEC CHOIX DES MODALITES
APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES
SEUIL (PCMIN)   :      2.00 %      POIDS:        21.88
AVANT APUREMENT :    11 QUESTIONS ACTIVES          73 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
APRES           :    11 QUESTIONS ACTIVES          59 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS :   1094.00
TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES


VALEURS PROPRES
APERCU DE LA PRECISION DES CALCULS : TRACE AVANT DIAGONALISATION ..   4.3663
                                     SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES ....   4.3663
HISTOGRAMME DES 59 PREMIERES VALEURS PROPRES
+--------+----------+----------+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NUMERO |  VALEUR  | POURCENT.| POURCENT.|                                                                        |
|        |  PROPRE  |          |  CUMULE  |                                                                        |
+--------+----------+----------+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|    1   |  0.2886  |   6.61   |   6.61   | ******************************************************************************** |
|    2   |  0.2582  |   5.91   |  12.52   | ************************************************************************ |
|    3   |  0.1697  |   3.89   |  16.41   | *********************************************** |
|    4   |  0.1519  |   3.48   |  19.89   | ****************************************** |
|    5   |  0.1517  |   3.48   |  23.36   | ****************************************** |
+--------+----------+----------+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+


COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRES DES MODALITES ACTIVES
AXES  1 A  5
+------------------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
|                 MODALITES                |          COORDONNEES          |          CONTRIBUTIONS        |         COSINUS CARRES        |
|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE        P.REL DISTO|   1     2     3     4     5    |   1    2    3    4    5    |   1    2    3    4    5    |
+------------------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
|   10 . Rather live                       |                               |                               |                               |
| HE01 - Agree strongly  2.55   2.57|  0.15 -0.78  0.57 -0.23 -0.37 |  0.2  6.0  4.8  0.9  2.3 | 0.01 0.24 0.12 0.02 0.05 |
| HE02 - Agree           3.08   1.95|  0.36  0.08 -0.02  0.41  0.25 |  1.4  0.1  0.0  3.5  1.2 | 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.03 |
| HE03 - Neither nor     1.71   4.32| -0.08  0.45 -0.55  0.15 -0.33 |  0.0  1.4  3.0  0.3  1.2 | 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.02 |
| HE04 - Disagree        1.12   7.14| -0.23  0.66 -0.42 -1.05  0.35 |  0.2  1.9  1.2  8.1  0.9 | 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.02 |
| HE05 - Disagree strongly 0.64 13.12| -1.75  0.42  0.06  0.41  0.52 |  6.8  0.4  0.0  0.7  1.2 | 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   8.7  9.8  9.0 13.4  6.8 +-----------------------+
|   12 . More like us                      |                               |                               |                               |
| LI01 - Agree strongly  0.34  25.50| -0.02 -1.83  0.80 -0.91 -1.83 |  0.0  4.5  1.3  1.9  7.6 | 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.13 |
| LI02 - Agree           1.62   4.61|  0.57 -0.54  0.45  0.57  0.12 |  1.8  1.8  1.9  3.5  0.2 | 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.00 |
| LI03 - Neither nor     2.33   2.91|  0.37  0.13  0.02  0.58 -0.30 |  1.1  0.2  0.0  5.2  1.4 | 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.03 |
| LI04 - Disagree        3.24   1.81|  0.06  0.35 -0.38 -0.63  0.06 |  0.0  1.6  2.8  8.5  0.1 | 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.22 0.00 |
| LI05 - Disagree strongly 1.45  5.28| -1.46  0.11 -0.08  0.11  0.38 | 10.8  0.1  0.0  0.1  1.3 | 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 |
| LI06 - Can't choose    0.18  50.23|  0.66 -0.65  1.87 -0.44  2.45 |  0.3  0.3  3.6  0.2  7.0 | 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.12 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  14.0  8.4  9.7 19.3 17.6 +-----------------------+
|   13 . Italy better                      |                               |                               |                               |
| IT01 - Agree strongly  0.59  14.50|  0.17 -1.16  1.40 -0.75 -0.96 |  0.1  3.0  6.8  2.2  3.5 | 0.00 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.06 |
| IT02 - Agree           2.72   2.34|  0.40 -0.25  0.18  0.43  0.20 |  1.5  0.6  0.5  3.3  0.7 | 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.02 |
| IT03 - Neither nor     2.50   2.64|  0.22  0.17 -0.15  0.29 -0.33 |  0.4  0.3  0.3  1.4  1.8 | 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 |
| IT04 - Disagree        2.36   2.85| -0.15  0.39 -0.39 -0.71  0.06 |  0.2  1.4  2.1  7.8  0.1 | 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.00 |
| IT05 - Disagree strongly 0.82 10.06| -1.77  0.05 -0.09  0.32  0.65 |  8.9  0.0  0.0  0.5  2.3 | 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  11.1  5.3  9.8 15.2  8.4 +-----------------------+
|   14 . Support one's country             |                               |                               |                               |
| ST01 - Agree strongly  0.76  11.03| -0.06 -1.08  1.07 -0.79 -0.75 |  0.0  3.4  5.1  3.1  2.8 | 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.05 |
| ST02 - Agree           2.58   2.52|  0.33 -0.22  0.23  0.15  0.13 |  1.0  0.5  0.8  0.4  0.3 | 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 |
| ST03 - Neither nor     1.29   6.04|  0.33 -0.06 -0.02  0.33  0.05 |  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.0 | 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 |
| ST04 - Disagree        2.86   2.18|  0.25  0.48 -0.30 -0.23 -0.04 |  0.6  2.5  1.5  1.0  0.0 | 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.00 |
| ST05 - Disagree strongly 1.57  4.81| -1.28  0.07 -0.33  0.27  0.15 |  8.9  0.0  1.0  0.7  0.2 | 0.34 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  11.0  6.4  8.4  6.1  3.3 +-----------------------+
|   15 . Sports pride                      |                               |                               |                               |
| BR01 - Agree strongly  3.65   1.49|  0.15 -0.39  0.29 -0.11 -0.35 |  0.3  2.1  1.8  0.3  2.9 | 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.08 |
| BR02 - Agree           3.38   1.69|  0.25  0.17 -0.12  0.13  0.32 |  0.8  0.4  0.3  0.4  2.3 | 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 |
| BR03 - Neither nor     1.19   6.64| -0.31  0.47 -0.24  0.02  0.19 |  0.4  1.0  0.4  0.0  0.3 | 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 |
| BR04 - Disagree        0.39  22.49| -0.56  0.67 -0.28 -0.45 -0.16 |  0.4  0.7  0.2  0.5  0.1 | 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 |
| BR05 - Disagree strongly 0.44 19.45| -1.77  0.08 -0.41  0.18  0.14 |  4.8  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.1 | 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   6.7  4.2  3.1  1.3  5.6 +-----------------------+
|   26 . Assimilation                      |                               |                               |                               |
| FO01 - Agree strongly  1.00   8.12| -0.34 -1.01 -0.07 -0.40 -0.11 |  0.4  3.9  0.0  1.1  0.1 | 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.00 |
| FO02 - Agree           3.19   1.85|  0.42 -0.09 -0.16  0.12  0.11 |  1.9  0.1  0.5  0.3  0.2 | 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 |
| FO03 - Neither nor     1.52   4.98|  0.19  0.17 -0.13  0.44 -0.29 |  0.2  0.2  0.2  1.9  0.9 | 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 |
| FO04 - Disagree        2.28   2.99| -0.08  0.41  0.04 -0.52 -0.04 |  0.1  1.5  0.0  4.1  0.0 | 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 |
| FO05 - Disagree strongly 0.93  8.78| -1.32  0.12  0.39  0.58 -0.10 |  5.6  0.0  0.8  2.1  0.1 | 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 |
| FO06 - Can't choose    0.22  39.75|  0.58 -0.42  1.62  0.06  2.11 |  0.3  0.0  3.4  0.0  6.5 | 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.11 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   8.4  5.7  5.0  9.5  7.8 +-----------------------+
|   27 . Diversity                         |                               |                               |                               |
| MA01 - Agree strongly  1.14   6.97| -0.94 -0.26  0.63 -0.19 -0.51 |  3.5  0.3  2.7  0.3  2.0 | 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.04 |
| MA02 - Agree           4.25   1.14|  0.27  0.26  0.17 -0.07  0.07 |  1.0  1.1  0.7  0.1  0.1 | 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 |
| MA03 - Neither nor     1.45   5.26|  0.28  0.16 -0.30  0.68 -0.29 |  0.4  0.1  0.8  4.4  0.8 | 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.02 |
| MA04 - Disagree        1.49   5.09| -0.05 -0.14 -0.63 -0.33  0.02 |  0.0  0.1  3.5  1.1  0.0 | 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 |
| MA05 - Disagree strongly 0.51 16.90| -1.03 -1.05 -0.83  0.27  0.16 |  1.9  2.2  2.1  0.3  0.1 | 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 |
| MA06 - Can't choose    0.31  28.23|  0.41 -0.93  1.19 -0.36  2.06 |  0.2  1.0  2.6  0.3  8.7 | 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.15 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   7.0  4.8 12.3  6.4 11.7 +-----------------------+
|   29 . Increased crime                   |                               |                               |                               |
| KR01 - Agree strongly  2.49   2.66| -0.10 -1.02 -0.43 -0.05 -0.05 |  0.1 10.0  2.6  0.0  0.0 | 0.00 0.39 0.07 0.00 0.00 |
| KR02 - Agree           3.35   1.72|  0.34  0.10  0.04  0.04  0.33 |  1.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  2.4 | 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 |
| KR03 - Neither nor     1.36   5.70| -0.04  0.68  0.02  0.49 -0.85 |  0.0  2.4  0.0  2.1  6.4 | 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.13 |
| KR04 - Disagree        1.32   5.87|  0.17  0.67  0.22 -0.75 -0.02 |  0.1  2.3  0.4  4.9  0.0 | 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.00 |
| KR05 - Disagree strongly 0.56 15.13| -1.92  0.59  1.03  0.67  0.34 |  7.2  0.7  3.5  1.7  0.4 | 0.24 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.01 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   8.8 15.6  6.6  8.8  9.4 +-----------------------+
|   31 . Not good for national economy     |                               |                               |                               |
| AN01 - Agree strongly  1.79   4.06| -0.58 -1.10 -0.64 -0.01  0.00 |  2.1  8.5  4.3  0.0  0.0 | 0.08 0.30 0.10 0.00 0.00 |
| AN02 - Agree           3.47   1.62|  0.41  0.04 -0.20 -0.15  0.28 |  2.1  0.0  0.8  0.5  1.8 | 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.05 |
| AN03 - Neither nor     1.67   4.44|  0.19  0.53  0.10  0.50 -0.61 |  0.2  1.8  0.1  2.8  4.1 | 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.08 |
| AN04 - Disagree        1.82   4.00| -0.29  0.52  0.70 -0.14 -0.16 |  0.5  1.9  5.2  0.2  0.3 | 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.01 |
| AN06 - Can't choose    0.30  29.56|  0.10  0.01  1.17 -0.28  1.22 |  0.0  0.0  2.4  0.2  2.9 | 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   4.9 12.2 12.9  3.7  9.1 +-----------------------+
```

```
|           MODALITES              |        COORDONNEES        |      CONTRIBUTIONS       |      COSINUS CARRES       |
|----------------------------------+---------------------------+--------------------------+---------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE     P.REL DISTO   |  1    2    3    4    5     |  1    2    3    4    5    |  1    2    3    4    5     |
+----------------------------------+---------------------------+--------------------------+---------------------------+
|  32 . Take jobs                  |                           |                          |                           |
| TA01 - Agree strongly  1.01 8.03 | -0.30 -1.47 -0.71 -0.18 -0.16 | 0.3  8.5  3.0  0.2  0.2 | 0.01 0.27 0.06 0.00 0.00 |
| TA02 - Agree           2.35 2.88 |  0.45 -0.36 -0.03  0.20  0.59 | 1.6  1.2  0.0  0.6  5.4 | 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.12 |
| TA03 - Neither nor     1.57 4.80 |  0.31  0.21 -0.26  0.35 -0.30 | 0.5  0.3  0.6  1.3  0.9 | 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 |
| TA04 - Disagree        2.85 2.19 |  0.13  0.60  0.11 -0.42 -0.24 | 0.2  4.0  0.2  3.3  1.1 | 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.03 |
| TA05 - Disagree strongly 1.31 5.95 | -1.27  0.22  0.65  0.28 -0.05 | 7.3  0.2  3.3  0.7  0.0 | 0.27 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 |
+----------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  9.9 14.1  7.1  6.1  7.6 +---------------------------+

|  34 . Not open                   |                           |                          |                           |
| AN01 - Agree strongly  1.13 7.03 | -0.61 -1.41 -0.68 -0.15 -0.03 | 1.5  8.7  3.1  0.2  0.0 | 0.05 0.28 0.07 0.00 0.00 |
| AN02 - Agree           2.31 2.94 |  0.43 -0.22 -0.45 -0.10  0.45 | 1.5  0.4  2.7  0.2  3.1 | 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.07 |
| AN03 - Neither nor     1.58 4.77 |  0.39  0.12 -0.03  0.85 -0.38 | 0.8  0.1  0.0  7.4  1.5 | 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.03 |
| AN04 - Disagree        3.37 1.70 | -0.03  0.53  0.30 -0.30 -0.28 | 0.0  3.6  1.8  2.0  1.8 | 0.00 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.05 |
| AN05 - Disagree strongly 0.55 15.45 | -1.71  0.41  0.65  0.29  0.19 | 5.6  0.4  1.4  0.3  0.1 | 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 |
| AN06 - Can't choose    0.22 40.38 |  0.48 -0.44  2.32 -0.32  2.08 | 0.2  0.2  7.0  0.1  6.3 | 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.11 |
+----------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  9.5 13.3 16.0 10.2 12.7 +---------------------------+

COORDONNEES ET VALEURS-TEST DES MODALITES
AXES  1 A 5

+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|              MODALITES               |        VALEURS-TEST         |         COORDONNEES         |          |
|--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE        EFF.    P.ABS   |  1    2    3    4    5       |  1     2     3     4     5   | DISTO.   |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|  37 . Gender                         |                             |                             |          |
| KJ01 - Male           527    527.00  | -0.2  0.7 -2.0  0.3 -4.0    | -0.01  0.02 -0.06  0.01 -0.13 |  1.04  |
| KJ02 - Female         567    567.00  |  0.1 -0.8  2.3 -0.2  4.3    |  0.00 -0.02  0.07 -0.01  0.12 |  0.90  |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|  40 . Employment                     |                             |                             |          |
| MO01 - Full-time      445    445.00  | -1.0  1.3 -2.6 -0.1 -1.4    | -0.04  0.05 -0.10  0.00 -0.05 |  1.42  |
| MO02 - Part-time      109    109.00  | -2.1  2.9  0.8 -1.1  0.0    | -0.19  0.26  0.07 -0.10  0.00 |  8.87  |
| MO03 - Less then part-time 29   29.00 | -0.8  1.8 -0.6 -0.2 -0.2    | -0.15  0.32 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 | 36.10  |
| MO04 - Unemployed      28     28.00  |  0.5  1.9 -0.8  0.7 -0.5    |  0.09  0.35 -0.15  0.14 -0.08 | 37.42  |
| MO05 - Student         77     77.00  | -1.3  3.9 -1.2 -1.0 -1.5    | -0.15  0.43 -0.13 -0.11 -0.17 | 12.97  |
| MO06 - Retired        163    163.00  |  1.7 -5.2  2.3 -0.5  0.4    |  0.12 -0.37  0.17 -0.04  0.03 |  5.60  |
| MO07 - Housewife      210    210.00  |  2.5 -3.1  2.2  1.7  2.4    |  0.15 -0.19  0.14  0.11  0.15 |  4.12  |
| MO08 - Other, not working 33  33.00  | -0.6  0.0  0.1  0.7  1.0    | -0.10 -0.01  0.02  0.11  0.17 | 31.60  |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|  41 . Age                            |                             |                             |          |
| AL01 - 18-25 years    200    200.00  |  1.3  2.9 -2.5  0.7  0.0    |  0.08  0.19 -0.16  0.04  0.00 |  4.38  |
| AL02 - 26-35 years    206    206.00  | -2.5  5.0 -2.1  1.4  0.4    | -0.16  0.31 -0.13  0.09  0.02 |  4.22  |
| AL03 - 36-45 years    221    221.00  | -2.8  2.1 -0.9 -0.4 -0.7    | -0.17  0.13 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 |  3.87  |
| AL04 - 46-55 years    200    200.00  | -0.9 -2.5  2.7 -2.5 -0.6    | -0.05 -0.16  0.17 -0.16 -0.04 |  4.38  |
| AL05 - 56-65 years    162    162.00  |  2.9 -4.3  1.8  0.5  1.0    |  0.21 -0.31  0.13  0.03  0.07 |  5.64  |
| AL06 - 66-75 years    105    105.00  |  2.9 -4.8  2.3  0.6  0.5    |  0.27 -0.44  0.21  0.05  0.05 |  9.25  |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|  42 . Marital status                 |                             |                             |          |
| SI01 - (Living as) married 689 689.00 | -0.5 -1.0  1.4 -1.5  0.3    | -0.01 -0.02  0.03 -0.03  0.01 |  0.56  |
| SI02 - Widowed         63     63.00  |  2.8 -3.3  1.3  1.7  0.2    |  0.34 -0.40  0.15  0.21  0.03 | 16.08  |
| SI03 - Divorced        15     15.00  | -1.4 -2.7  1.8  0.1  3.3    | -0.36 -0.69  0.47  0.03  0.86 | 70.72  |
| SI04 - Separated       16     16.00  | -2.7  0.6 -0.6  0.0  0.1    | -0.67  0.16 -0.16  0.00  0.02 | 66.24  |
| SI05 - Unmarried      311    311.00  |  0.1  3.2 -2.1  0.8 -1.1    |  0.00  0.15 -0.10  0.04 -0.05 |  2.46  |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|  45 . Church attendance frequency    |                             |                             |          |
| KI01 - Once a week or more 370 370.00 |  1.3 -1.1  2.5 -0.4 -0.9    |  0.06 -0.05  0.10 -0.02 -0.04 |  1.91  |
| KI02 - 2-3 times a month 77   77.00  |  1.2 -1.5  0.5  0.6  0.9    |  0.13 -0.16  0.05  0.06  0.10 | 12.97  |
| KI03 - Once a month    72     72.00  |  1.7 -0.5 -0.9 -0.1  1.5    |  0.19 -0.05 -0.11 -0.01  0.17 | 13.94  |
| KI04 - Several times a year 199 199.00 | 2.1  1.5  0.5  0.2  0.6    |  0.13  0.10  0.03  0.01  0.04 |  4.41  |
| KI05 - Seldom         237    237.00  |  1.2 -0.1 -1.8 -0.5 -0.4    |  0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 |  3.54  |
| KI06 - Never          130    130.00  | -7.5  1.2 -0.8  0.0 -0.2    | -0.62  0.10 -0.07  0.00 -0.02 |  7.28  |
| 45_ - reponse manquante  9     9.00  | -3.1  0.5 -1.4  2.5 -0.5    | -1.01  0.16 -0.47  0.83 -0.15 | 118.53 |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|  47 . Urban or rural                 |                             |                             |          |
| BY01 - Urban          206    206.00  | -1.0 -3.6 -0.6  0.0 -2.3    | -0.06 -0.23 -0.04  0.00 -0.15 |  4.22  |
| BY02 - Suburb, small town 703 703.00 |  1.7  3.6  0.3 -0.6  1.8    |  0.04  0.08  0.01 -0.01  0.04 |  0.53  |
| BY03 - Rural          185    185.00  | -1.2 -0.8  0.7  0.9  0.5    | -0.08 -0.05  0.04  0.06  0.04 |  4.81  |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|  48 . Part of country                |                             |                             |          |
| RE01 - North West     288    288.00  |  0.3  3.9 -1.9  1.8 -1.6    |  0.01  0.20 -0.09  0.09 -0.08 |  2.74  |
| RE02 - North East     204    204.00  | -3.4 -1.0 -1.1 -1.5 -0.3    | -0.21 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 |  4.27  |
| RE03 - Centre         207    207.00  |  0.5  0.0  0.6 -0.6  2.0    |  0.03  0.00  0.04 -0.03  0.13 |  4.20  |
| RE04 - South + islands 395   395.00  |  2.0 -2.8  2.4  0.1  0.4    |  0.08 -0.11  0.10  0.01  0.01 |  1.72  |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+

+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|              MODALITES               |        VALEURS-TEST         |         COORDONNEES         |          |
|--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE        EFF.    P.ABS   |  1    2    3    4    5       |  1     2     3     4     5   | DISTO.   |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|  55 . Education                      |                             |                             |          |
| SK01 - Compulsory 1-8  429    429.00 |  6.3 -10.7  3.0  3.7  3.0   |  0.24 -0.40  0.11  0.14  0.11 |  1.51  |
| SK02 - Gymnasium 9-13  380    380.00 | -1.0  2.8 -2.9 -1.7 -1.2    | -0.04  0.12 -0.12 -0.07 -0.05 |  1.83  |
| SK03 - Higher education 14+ 285 285.00 | -6.0  8.8  0.2 -2.1 -1.8   | -0.31  0.45  0.01 -0.11 -0.09 |  2.77  |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
|  56 . Income            [BM] en classes ... en classes                                               |
| MO01 - Up to 15       173    173.00  |  2.8 -5.1  2.3  1.4  3.5    |  0.19 -0.35  0.16  0.10  0.24 |  5.22  |
| MO02 - 15-30          518    518.00  |  1.5 -0.9  0.1  1.0  0.3    |  0.05 -0.03  0.00  0.03  0.01 |  1.08  |
| MO03 - 30-45          268    268.00  | -1.8  3.6 -1.5 -1.3 -0.7    | -0.10  0.19 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 |  3.01  |
| MO04 - More than 45   135    135.00  | -3.0  2.3 -0.4 -1.2 -3.0    | -0.25  0.19 -0.03 -0.10 -0.24 |  6.97  |
+--------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+----------+
```

Civic identity and attitudes towards immigration Italy

```
CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES AVEC CHOIX DES MODALITES
APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES
SEUIL (PCMIN)  :      2.00 %      POIDS:       21.88
AVANT APUREMENT :    11 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        67 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
APRES        :    11 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        40 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS :   1094.00
TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES


VALEURS PROPRES
APERCU DE LA PRECISION DES CALCULS : TRACE AVANT DIAGONALISATION ..   2.6830
                                     SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES ....   2.6830
HISTOGRAMME DES 40 PREMIERES VALEURS PROPRES
+--------+-----------+---------+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NUMERO |  VALEUR   | POURCENT.| POURCENT.|                                                                              |
|        |  PROPRE   |         | CUMULE   |                                                                              |
+--------+-----------+---------+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|   1    |  0.3013   |  11.23  |  11.23   | ********************************************************************************* |
|   2    |  0.1969   |   7.34  |  18.57   | ***************************************************** |
|   3    |  0.1535   |   5.72  |  24.29   | ***************************************** |
|   4    |  0.1466   |   5.47  |  29.76   | *************************************** |
|   5    |  0.1367   |   5.09  |  34.85   | ************************************** |
```

COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRES DES MODALITES ACTIVES
AXES 1 A 5

MODALITES			COORDONNEES					CONTRIBUTIONS					COSINUS CARRES				
IDEN - LIBELLE	P.REL	DISTO	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
16 . How proud of democracy																	
DE01 - Very proud	0.32	27.00	-0.60	3.01	-0.49	-0.82	-2.61	0.4	14.9	0.5	1.5	16.2	0.01	0.33	0.01	0.02	0.25
DE02 - Somewhat proud	2.17	3.19	-0.72	0.45	0.14	0.48	0.74	3.7	2.2	0.3	3.4	8.8	0.16	0.06	0.01	0.07	0.17
DE03 - Not very proud	3.98	1.29	-0.29	-0.42	-0.32	-0.48	-0.08	1.1	3.6	2.7	6.2	0.2	0.07	0.14	0.08	0.18	0.01
DE04 - Not proud at all	3.38	1.69	0.87	-0.01	0.37	0.25	-0.10	8.4	0.0	3.0	1.4	0.3	0.44	0.00	0.08	0.04	0.01
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	13.7	20.7	6.5	12.6	25.4					
17 . How proud of political influence																	
PO02 - Somewhat proud	1.91	3.76	-0.73	0.74	0.02	0.45	0.58	3.4	5.3	0.0	2.7	4.7	0.14	0.14	0.00	0.06	0.09
PO03 - Not very proud	4.15	1.19	-0.31	-0.49	-0.33	-0.36	-0.04	1.3	5.0	2.9	3.7	0.0	0.08	0.20	0.09	0.11	0.00
PO04 - Not proud at all	3.29	1.77	0.87	0.07	0.50	0.17	-0.13	8.3	0.1	5.3	0.6	0.4	0.43	0.00	0.14	0.02	0.01
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	13.0	10.4	8.2	7.0	5.2					
18 . How proud of economic achievements																	
ØK01 - Very proud	0.45	19.14	-0.68	2.22	-0.87	0.12	-1.68	0.7	11.2	2.2	0.0	9.3	0.02	0.26	0.04	0.00	0.15
ØK02 - Somewhat proud	3.43	1.65	-0.56	0.25	0.04	0.07	0.50	3.6	1.1	0.0	0.1	6.3	0.19	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.15
ØK03 - Not very proud	3.32	1.74	-0.17	-0.54	-0.23	-0.36	-0.19	0.3	4.9	1.2	3.0	0.9	0.02	0.17	0.03	0.08	0.02
ØK04 - Not proud at all	2.51	2.62	1.12	0.08	0.48	0.24	-0.12	10.4	0.1	3.8	1.0	0.3	0.48	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.01
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	15.0	17.4	7.2	4.1	16.7					
19 . How proud of welfare state																	
VE02 - Somewhat proud	2.46	2.70	-0.80	0.52	0.01	0.49	0.35	5.2	3.4	0.0	4.0	2.2	0.24	0.10	0.00	0.09	0.05
VE03 - Not very proud	3.97	1.29	-0.25	-0.45	-0.29	-0.42	0.03	0.8	4.0	2.2	4.8	0.0	0.05	0.15	0.07	0.14	0.00
VE04 - Not proud at all	3.06	1.97	1.01	0.07	0.44	0.12	-0.12	10.4	0.1	3.8	0.3	0.3	0.52	0.00	0.10	0.01	0.01
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	16.5	7.4	6.0	9.0	2.6					
25 . How proud of equal treatment																	
RE01 - Very proud	0.30	28.87	-0.97	3.45	-0.78	-0.39	-2.40	1.0	18.4	1.2	0.3	12.9	0.03	0.41	0.02	0.01	0.20
RE02 - Somewhat proud	1.77	4.13	-0.70	0.22	-0.07	0.70	0.63	2.9	0.4	0.1	6.0	5.1	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.09
RE03 - Not very proud	3.88	1.34	-0.40	-0.34	-0.14	-0.28	-0.09	2.1	2.3	0.5	2.1	0.2	0.12	0.09	0.01	0.06	0.01
RE04 - Not proud at all	3.85	1.36	0.80	0.02	0.26	-0.08	0.03	8.3	0.0	1.7	0.2	0.0	0.48	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	14.2	21.1	3.5	8.6	18.2					
26 . Assimilation																	
FO01 - Agree strongly	1.07	7.51	0.51	0.62	-0.79	-0.56	0.62	0.9	2.1	4.3	2.3	3.0	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.05
FO02 - Agree	3.57	1.55	0.04	-0.13	-0.14	0.54	-0.13	0.0	0.3	0.5	7.1	0.5	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.19	0.01
FO03 - Neither nor	1.67	4.44	-0.02	-0.35	0.11	-0.10	-0.26	0.0	1.1	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.02
FO04 - Disagree	2.46	2.70	-0.25	-0.04	0.34	-0.30	-0.02	0.5	0.0	1.8	1.5	0.0	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.00
FO05 - Disagree strongly	0.95	8.61	0.01	0.77	0.45	-0.69	0.39	0.0	2.8	1.3	3.1	1.0	0.00	0.07	0.02	0.06	0.02
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	1.4	6.3	8.0	14.2	5.3					
27 . Diversity																	
MA01 - Agree strongly	1.19	6.62	0.29	0.90	0.33	-0.85	0.16	0.3	4.9	0.8	5.8	0.2	0.01	0.12	0.02	0.11	0.00
MA02 - Agree	4.67	0.95	-0.31	-0.03	0.15	0.22	-0.05	1.5	0.0	0.7	1.5	0.1	0.10	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.00
MA03 - Neither nor	1.61	4.64	-0.06	-0.36	-0.08	0.11	-0.43	0.0	1.1	0.1	0.1	2.2	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.04
MA04 - Disagree	1.67	4.44	0.40	-0.18	-0.32	-0.16	0.21	0.9	0.3	1.1	0.3	0.5	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	2.7	6.3	2.6	7.8	3.1					
29 . Increased crime																	
KR01 - Agree strongly	2.75	2.31	0.58	0.37	-0.76	-0.04	0.34	3.1	1.9	10.2	0.0	2.4	0.15	0.06	0.25	0.00	0.05
KR02 - Agree	3.81	1.39	-0.17	-0.19	0.12	0.23	-0.28	0.4	0.7	0.4	1.3	2.2	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.06
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	3.5	2.6	10.6	1.4	4.5					
31 . Not good for national economy																	
AN01 - Agree strongly	1.93	3.72	1.01	0.49	-0.72	-0.44	0.48	6.6	2.4	6.6	2.5	3.2	0.28	0.06	0.14	0.05	0.06
AN02 - Agree	3.89	1.34	-0.07	-0.29	-0.20	0.53	-0.19	0.1	1.6	1.0	7.5	1.0	0.00	0.06	0.03	0.21	0.03
AN03 - Neither nor	1.82	4.00	-0.42	-0.06	0.38	-0.24	-0.35	1.0	0.0	1.7	0.7	1.6	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.03
AN04 - Disagree	1.94	3.69	-0.46	0.25	0.77	-0.48	0.22	1.3	0.6	7.4	3.1	0.7	0.06	0.02	0.16	0.06	0.01
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	9.0	4.6	16.7	13.8	6.5					
32 . Take jobs																	
TA02 - Agree	2.66	2.41	0.14	-0.07	-0.54	0.66	-0.09	0.2	0.1	5.2	7.8	0.1	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.18	0.00
TA03 - Neither nor	1.76	4.17	-0.09	-0.15	-0.07	-0.18	-0.33	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.4	1.4	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.03
TA04 - Disagree	3.16	1.88	-0.36	-0.10	0.62	-0.22	0.01	1.3	0.2	8.0	1.1	0.0	0.07	0.01	0.21	0.03	0.00
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	1.6	0.4	13.2	9.3	1.5					
34 . Not open																	
AN01 - Agree strongly	1.21	6.49	1.26	0.45	-0.79	-0.58	0.85	6.4	1.3	4.9	2.8	6.5	0.24	0.03	0.10	0.05	0.11
AN02 - Agree	2.64	2.45	0.20	-0.31	-0.44	0.61	-0.31	0.3	1.3	3.4	6.7	1.9	0.02	0.04	0.08	0.15	0.04
AN03 - Neither nor	1.73	4.26	-0.24	-0.06	-0.16	0.17	-0.42	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.3	2.3	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04
AN04 - Disagree	3.64	1.49	-0.44	0.10	0.61	-0.31	0.10	2.3	0.2	8.9	2.4	0.3	0.13	0.01	0.25	0.07	0.01
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	9.4	2.8	17.5	12.2	10.9					

COORDONNEES ET VALEURS-TEST DES MODALITES

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+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|              MODALITES                  |          VALEURS-TEST             |            COORDONNEES                  |          |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE          EFF.    P.ABS    |  1     2     3     4     5        |   1      2      3      4      5          |  DISTO.  |
+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+


|   37 . Gender                           |                                   |                                         |          |
| KJ01 - Male             527    527.00   | -0.7   2.7   2.5  -1.3   0.6      | -0.02   0.07   0.07  -0.04   0.02       |   0.70   |
| KJ02 - Female           567    567.00   |  0.5  -0.1  -2.0  -1.6  -0.6      |  0.01   0.00  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01       |   0.58   |
+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|   40 . Employment                       |                                   |                                         |          |
| MO01 - Full-time        445    445.00   |  0.1   0.9   0.8   1.2  -0.1      |  0.00   0.03   0.03   0.04   0.00       |   1.01   |
| MO02 - Part-time        109    109.00   | -0.8   1.5   3.4  -1.9  -0.1      | -0.07   0.14   0.31  -0.17  -0.01       |   7.22   |
| MO03 - Less then part-time 29   29.00   |  0.3  -0.4   1.1  -1.4   0.0      |  0.06  -0.07   0.21  -0.26  -0.01       |  29.90   |
| MO04 - Unemployed        28     28.00   | -0.4  -1.4   1.7  -1.5  -0.6      | -0.07  -0.27   0.31  -0.28  -0.12       |  31.00   |
| MO05 - Student           77     77.00   | -2.6  -1.0   1.6  -1.4  -0.2      | -0.28  -0.11   0.17  -0.16  -0.02       |  10.64   |
| MO06 - Retired          163    163.00   |  0.9   1.7  -1.9  -0.2   2.6      |  0.07   0.12  -0.13  -0.01   0.18       |   4.50   |
| MO07 - Housewife        210    210.00   |  0.9  -0.1  -3.4  -0.6  -1.6      |  0.05  -0.01  -0.21  -0.03  -0.10       |   3.27   |
| MO08 - Other, not working 33    33.00   |  0.5   1.5  -0.2  -0.7  -0.2      |  0.08   0.25  -0.03  -0.12  -0.03       |  26.15   |
+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|   41 . Age                              |                                   |                                         |          |
| AL01 - 18-25 years      200    200.00   | -1.6  -1.9  -0.1   1.2  -1.2      | -0.10  -0.12  -0.01   0.08  -0.07       |   3.48   |
| AL02 - 26-35 years      206    206.00   | -0.3  -2.3   2.7  -0.9  -1.3      | -0.02  -0.14   0.17  -0.06  -0.08       |   3.35   |
| AL03 - 36-45 years      221    221.00   |  1.0   1.5   2.8  -2.3  -0.2      |  0.06   0.09   0.17  -0.13  -0.01       |   3.05   |
| AL04 - 46-55 years      200    200.00   | -0.6   2.9  -0.3  -3.0   1.1      | -0.04   0.18  -0.02  -0.18   0.07       |   3.48   |
| AL05 - 56-65 years      162    162.00   |  0.9   1.7  -3.1  -0.1   0.7      |  0.06   0.12  -0.22  -0.01   0.05       |   4.53   |
| AL06 - 66-75 years      105    105.00   |  0.6   1.6  -2.3   2.3   1.4      |  0.05   0.14  -0.21   0.21   0.12       |   7.53   |
+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|   42 . Marital status                   |                                   |                                         |          |
| SI01 - (Living as) married 689 689.00   | -0.9   5.1   0.7  -3.0   1.4      | -0.02   0.09   0.01  -0.05   0.03       |   0.30   |
| SI02 - Widowed           63     63.00   |  0.9  -0.5  -2.5   1.1  -0.5      |  0.12  -0.07  -0.31   0.13  -0.06       |  13.22   |
| SI03 - Divorced          15     15.00   |  2.7   1.1  -1.2  -1.1   0.7      |  0.69   0.29  -0.31  -0.29   0.17       |  58.74   |
| SI04 - Separated         16     16.00   |  1.0   1.9   0.5  -1.0  -2.8      |  0.24   0.46   0.11  -0.25  -0.70       |  55.00   |
| SI05 - Unmarried        311    311.00   | -0.9  -2.5   1.5  -0.3  -0.3      | -0.04  -0.11   0.07  -0.01  -0.01       |   1.88   |
+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|   45 . Church attendance frequency      |                                   |                                         |          |
| KI01 - Once a week or more 370 370.00   | -3.8   4.1  -0.9   0.2  -1.5      | -0.15   0.16  -0.04   0.01  -0.06       |   1.42   |
| KI02 - 2-3 times a month  77    77.00   |  0.0  -0.5  -1.2  -0.1   2.5      |  0.00  -0.06  -0.13  -0.01   0.27       |  10.64   |
| KI03 - Once a month       72    72.00   | -0.4  -1.8  -1.9   0.2   1.4      | -0.04  -0.20  -0.22   0.03   0.15       |  11.45   |
| KI04 - Several times a year 199 199.00  | -0.3  -0.9   1.8   1.0  -0.9      | -0.02  -0.06   0.11   0.06  -0.05       |   3.50   |
| KI05 - Seldom           237    237.00   | -0.1  -1.0  -1.5  -0.1  -1.1      | -0.01  -0.06  -0.08   0.00  -0.06       |   2.78   |
| KI06 - Never            130    130.00   |  5.9   1.4   4.5  -4.6   1.5      |  0.48   0.11   0.37  -0.37   0.12       |   5.89   |
|   45_ - reponse manquante  9     9.00   | -0.4   1.8  -1.7  -2.5   0.0      | -0.13   0.59  -0.55  -0.83  -0.01       |  98.56   |
+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|   47 . Urban or rural                   |                                   |                                         |          |
| BY01 - Urban            206    206.00   |  6.3   0.7   0.8  -1.5  -1.1      |  0.39   0.04   0.05  -0.09  -0.06       |   3.35   |
| BY02 - Suburb, small town 703  703.00   | -4.5   1.0   0.7  -0.7  -1.3      | -0.08   0.02   0.01  -0.01  -0.02       |   0.27   |
| BY03 - Rural            185    185.00   | -2.2   1.4  -0.8  -1.1   2.5      | -0.15   0.09  -0.05  -0.07   0.16       |   3.84   |
+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|   48 . Part of country                  |                                   |                                         |          |
| RE01 - North West       288    288.00   | -2.5  -1.8   1.0  -1.0  -0.4      | -0.12  -0.09   0.05  -0.05  -0.02       |   2.11   |
| RE02 - North East       204    204.00   |  0.1   0.9  -0.8  -3.4   3.7      |  0.01   0.05  -0.05  -0.21   0.23       |   3.39   |
| RE03 - Centre           207    207.00   |  0.0  -0.2   0.3   0.3   1.3      |  0.00  -0.01   0.02   0.02   0.08       |   3.33   |
| RE04 - South + islands  395    395.00   |  2.0   3.6   0.0   0.8  -3.8      |  0.07   0.13   0.00   0.03  -0.14       |   1.27   |
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+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|              MODALITES                  |          VALEURS-TEST             |            COORDONNEES                  |          |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE          EFF.    P.ABS    |  1     2     3     4     5        |   1      2      3      4      5          |  DISTO.  |
+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|   55 . Education                        |                                   |                                         |          |
| SK01 - Compulsory 1-8   429    429.00   |  2.2   2.8  -9.0   4.4   0.4      |  0.08   0.10  -0.32   0.15   0.01       |   1.09   |
| SK02 - Gymnasium 9-13   380    380.00   |  1.2  -1.4   2.8  -1.8  -0.4      |  0.05  -0.05   0.11  -0.07  -0.02       |   1.36   |
| SK03 - Higher education 14+ 285 285.00  | -3.9   1.1   7.3  -5.7   0.2      | -0.19   0.05   0.36  -0.28   0.01       |   2.14   |
+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|   56 . Income          [BM] en classes ... en classes                                                                          |
| MO01 - Up to 15         173    173.00   |  1.6   1.4  -3.4   1.7  -1.3      |  0.11   0.09  -0.23   0.11  -0.09       |   4.18   |
| MO02 - 15-30            518    518.00   | -0.7   0.9  -1.7  -0.7  -0.4      | -0.02   0.02  -0.05  -0.02  -0.01       |   0.73   |
| MO03 - 30-45            268    268.00   | -0.8  -0.8   3.9  -0.8   1.6      | -0.04  -0.04   0.20  -0.04   0.08       |   2.34   |
| MO04 - More than 45     135    135.00   | -0.1   1.8   1.9  -3.7   0.1      | -0.01   0.14   0.15  -0.29   0.01       |   5.64   |
+-----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
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Cultural identity and attitudes towards immigration Italy

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CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES AVEC CHOIX DES MODALITES
APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES
SEUIL (PCMIN)   :      2.00 %      POIDS:      21.88
AVANT APUREMENT :     11 QUESTIONS ACTIVES          68 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
APRES           :     11 QUESTIONS ACTIVES          56 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS :   1094.00
TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES


VALEURS PROPRES
APERCU DE LA PRECISION DES CALCULS : TRACE AVANT DIAGONALISATION ..   4.0936
                                     SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES ....   4.0936
HISTOGRAMME DES 56 PREMIERES VALEURS PROPRES
+--------+----------+----------+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NUMERO |  VALEUR  | POURCENT.| POURCENT.|                                                                        |
|        |  PROPRE  |          | CUMULE   |                                                                        |
+--------+----------+----------+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|    1   |  0.2520  |   6.16   |   6.16   | ********************************************************************** |
|    2   |  0.2220  |   5.42   |  11.58   | ***************************************************************        |
|    3   |  0.1945  |   4.75   |  16.33   | *******************************************************                |
|    4   |  0.1740  |   4.25   |  20.58   | *************************************************                      |
|    5   |  0.1384  |   3.38   |  23.96   | *******************************************                            |
+--------+----------+----------+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+


COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRES DES MODALITES ACTIVES
AXES  1 A  5
+----------------------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
|               MODALITES                      |         COORDONNEES           |      CONTRIBUTIONS       |      COSINUS CARRES      |
|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE             P.REL  DISTO |  1     2     3     4     5  |  1    2    3    4    5  |  1    2    3    4    5  |
+----------------------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
|  20 . How proud of science/technology                                                                                          |
| TE01 - Very proud          1.56   4.82 | -0.81 -0.41 -1.12 -0.55 -0.03 | 4.1  1.2 10.1  2.7  0.0 | 0.14 0.04 0.26 0.06 0.00 |
| TE02 - Somewhat proud      5.72   0.59 |  0.26  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.23 | 1.6  0.1  0.1  0.3  2.2 | 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.09 |
| TE03 - Not very proud      1.14   7.00 |  0.13 -0.14  0.50  0.50 -0.78 | 0.1  0.1  1.5  1.6  5.0 | 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.09 |
| TE04 - Not proud at all    0.43  19.90 | -1.07  0.22  1.11  1.17 -0.58 | 2.0  0.1  2.8  3.4  1.1 | 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.02 |
| TE05 - Can't choose        0.28  31.10 |  0.08  1.43  1.60 -2.87 -0.47 | 0.0  2.6  3.7 13.4  0.5 | 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.27 0.01 |
+----------------------------------------------+------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   7.7  4.1 18.1 21.5  8.8 +-------------------------+
|  21 . How proud of sports results                                                                                              |
| SP01 - Very proud          2.60   2.49 | -0.56 -0.13 -0.84 -0.41 -0.08 | 3.2  0.2  9.4  2.5  0.1 | 0.13 0.01 0.28 0.07 0.00 |
| SP02 - Somewhat proud      5.39   0.69 |  0.38  0.11  0.17  0.14  0.21 | 3.1  0.3  0.8  0.6  1.8 | 0.21 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.07 |
| SP03 - Not very proud      0.57  14.89 | -0.17 -0.33  0.39  0.82 -0.59 | 0.1  0.3  1.8  2.2  1.4 | 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 |
| SP04 - Not proud at all    0.28  31.01 | -1.60 -0.13  1.51  0.23 -0.71 | 2.9  0.0  3.3  0.1  1.0 | 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02 |
| SP05 - Can't choose        0.30  29.39 | -0.19 -0.18  1.44 -0.79 -1.35 | 0.0  0.0  3.2  1.1  3.9 | 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.06 |
+----------------------------------------------+------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   9.3  0.9 18.6  6.5  8.3 +-------------------------+
|  22 . How proud of art and literature                                                                                          |
| KU01 - Very proud          4.20   1.17 | -0.35 -0.44 -0.46 -0.22 -0.13 | 2.1  3.6  4.6  1.2  0.5 | 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.04 0.01 |
| KU02 - Somewhat proud      4.30   1.11 |  0.38  0.32  0.29  0.34  0.29 | 2.4  1.9  1.9  2.9  2.6 | 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.08 |
| KU03 - Not very proud      0.27  32.81 | -0.19  0.14  0.88  0.79 -1.20 | 0.0  0.0  1.1  1.0  2.8 | 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 |
| KU05 - Can't choose        0.28  31.89 |  0.02  1.47  1.36 -2.94 -1.23 | 0.0  2.7  2.6 13.7  3.0 | 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.27 0.05 |
+----------------------------------------------+------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   4.6  8.3 10.2 18.8  8.9 +-------------------------+
|  23 . How proud of armed forces                                                                                                |
| MI01 - Very proud          0.75  11.20 | -0.83 -0.39 -1.17 -0.79 -0.30 | 2.0  0.5  5.2  2.6  0.5 | 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.01 |
| MI02 - Somewhat proud      3.02   2.01 |  0.23  0.25 -0.23 -0.03  0.60 | 0.6  0.8  0.8  0.0  7.7 | 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.18 |
| MI03 - Not very proud      2.76   2.30 |  0.28 -0.08 -0.02  0.14 -0.20 | 0.9  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.8 | 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 |
| MI04 - Not proud at all    2.05   3.44 | -0.52 -0.16  0.47  0.48 -0.35 | 2.2  0.2  2.3  2.7  1.8 | 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.03 |
| MI05 - Can't choose        0.53  16.01 |  0.33  0.12  1.30 -1.36 -0.55 | 0.2  0.0  4.7  5.7  1.2 | 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.02 |
+----------------------------------------------+------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   6.0  1.7 13.1 11.4 12.0 +-------------------------+
|  24 . How proud of national history                                                                                            |
| HI01 - Very proud          3.53   1.58 | -0.47 -0.34 -0.54 -0.20 -0.08 | 3.1  1.8  5.2  0.8  0.1 | 0.14 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.00 |
| HI02 - Somewhat proud      4.48   1.03 |  0.36  0.24  0.25  0.15  0.33 | 2.2  1.1  1.4  0.6  3.5 | 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.10 |
| HI03 - Not very proud      0.76  10.89 |  0.12 -0.14  0.62  0.63 -0.78 | 0.0  0.1  1.5  1.7  3.4 | 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.06 |
| HI05 - Can't choose        0.21  42.85 |  0.45  1.20  1.35 -2.43 -2.61 | 0.2  1.3  1.9  7.0 10.2 | 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.16 |
+----------------------------------------------+------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   5.6  4.4 10.1 10.1 17.2 +-------------------------+
|  26 . Assimilation                                                                                                             |
| FO01 - Agree strongly      1.00   8.12 | -0.91  0.47  0.00  0.01  0.13 | 3.3  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 | 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 |
| FO02 - Agree               3.19   1.85 |  0.26  0.36 -0.17  0.08 -0.08 | 0.8  1.9  0.5  0.1  0.1 | 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 |
| FO03 - Neither nor         1.52   5.00 |  0.21 -0.01 -0.19  0.17  0.13 | 0.3  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.2 | 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 |
| FO04 - Disagree            2.27   3.00 |  0.15 -0.41  0.07  0.01 -0.34 | 0.2  1.7  0.1  0.0  1.9 | 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.04 |
| FO05 - Disagree strongly   0.93   8.81 | -0.79 -0.87  0.65 -0.12  0.30 | 2.3  3.2  2.0  0.1  0.6 | 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.01 |
| FO06 - Can't choose        0.23  39.25 |  0.51  0.55  0.51 -1.91  1.72 | 0.2  0.3  0.3  4.7  4.8 | 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.08 |
+----------------------------------------------+------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   7.1  8.1  3.1  5.2  7.8 +-------------------------+
|  27 . Diversity                                                                                                                |
| MA01 - Agree strongly      1.13   7.05 | -0.95 -0.73  0.26 -0.22 -0.14 | 4.1  2.7  0.4  0.3  0.2 | 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 |
| MA02 - Agree               4.24   1.14 |  0.34 -0.13 -0.18 -0.08  0.10 | 2.0  0.3  0.7  0.2  0.3 | 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 |
| MA03 - Neither nor         1.45   5.26 |  0.40  0.15 -0.01  0.26 -0.02 | 0.9  0.2  0.0  0.6  0.0 | 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 |
| MA04 - Disagree            1.49   5.11 | -0.17  0.28  0.02  0.41 -0.67 | 0.2  0.5  0.0  1.4  4.8 | 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.09 |
| MA05 - Disagree strongly   0.51  16.86 | -1.46  0.54  0.51  0.49  0.95 | 4.3  0.7  0.7  0.7  3.3 | 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 |
| MA06 - Can't choose        0.32  27.61 |  0.04  1.42  0.77 -2.06  0.87 | 0.0  2.9  1.0  7.7  1.7 | 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.15 0.03 |
+----------------------------------------------+------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  11.4  7.3  2.7 10.9 10.3 +-------------------------+
|  29 . Increased crime                                                                                                          |
| KR01 - Agree strongly      2.48   2.67 | -0.79  0.73 -0.14  0.16 -0.08 | 6.1  6.0  0.3  0.4  0.1 | 0.23 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.00 |
| KR02 - Agree               3.35   1.72 |  0.30  0.12 -0.17 -0.10 -0.07 | 1.2  0.2  0.5  0.2  0.1 | 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 |
| KR03 - Neither nor         1.35   5.72 |  0.38 -0.60 -0.16  0.04  0.40 | 0.8  2.2  0.2  0.0  1.5 | 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.03 |
| KR04 - Disagree            1.33   5.86 |  0.64 -0.40  0.19  0.11 -0.26 | 2.2  0.9  0.2  0.1  0.7 | 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 |
| KR05 - Disagree strongly   0.56  15.20 | -0.86 -1.59  1.49 -0.28  0.43 | 1.6  6.4  6.4  0.3  0.7 | 0.05 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.01 |
+----------------------------------------------+------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  11.8 15.7  7.5  0.9  3.2 +-------------------------+
|  31 . Not good for national economy                                                                                            |
| AN01 - Agree strongly      1.79   4.08 | -1.12  0.71  0.15  0.40  0.31 | 8.9  4.0  0.2  1.6  1.2 | 0.31 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.02 |
| AN02 - Agree               3.47   1.62 |  0.31  0.31 -0.30 -0.06 -0.45 | 1.3  1.5  1.6  0.1  5.0 | 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.12 |
| AN03 - Neither nor         1.67   4.46 |  0.46 -0.44 -0.15  0.03  0.23 | 1.4  1.4  0.2  0.0  0.6 | 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 |
| AN04 - Disagree            1.82   4.00 |  0.09 -0.84  0.34 -0.07  0.18 | 0.1  5.7  1.1  0.1  0.4 | 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.01 |
| AN06 - Can't choose        0.30  29.13 |  0.35  0.19  0.94 -1.36  0.75 | 0.1  0.0  1.4  3.2  1.2 | 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.02 |
+----------------------------------------------+------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  11.8 12.7  4.4  5.0  8.6 +-------------------------+

|  32 . Take jobs                                                                                                                |
```

```
| TA01 - Agree strongly       1.01  8.04 | -1.28  1.02 -0.22  0.26  0.11 |  6.5  4.7  0.3  0.4  0.1 | 0.20 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 |
| TA02 - Agree                2.34  2.88 |  0.19  0.65 -0.23 -0.09  0.13 |  0.4  4.5  0.6  0.1  0.3 | 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.01 |
| TA03 - Neither nor          1.57  4.79 |  0.32  0.10 -0.15  0.02 -0.10 |  0.7  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1 | 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 |
| TA04 - Disagree             2.84  2.20 |  0.42 -0.50 -0.02  0.08 -0.37 |  2.0  3.2  0.0  0.1  2.8 | 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.06 |
| TA05 - Disagree strongly    1.30  5.98 | -0.73 -1.00  0.82 -0.19  0.58 |  2.7  5.9  4.6  0.3  3.2 | 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.01 0.06 |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 12.3 18.3  5.7  0.9  6.5 +-----------------------+
```

```
+-------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
|          MODALITES          |   COORDONNEES                |       CONTRIBUTIONS      |     COSINUS CARRES       |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE      P.REL DISTO |  1    2    3    4    5    |  1    2    3    4    5   |  1    2    3    4    5   |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|  34 . Not open                                                                                                                     |
| AN01 - Agree strongly       1.13  7.06 | -1.38  0.99  0.40  0.34  0.37 |  8.5  5.0  0.9  0.7  1.1 | 0.27 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.02 |
| AN02 - Agree                2.30  2.95 |  0.20  0.59 -0.30  0.21 -0.52 |  0.4  3.7  1.0  0.6  4.4 | 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.09 |
| AN03 - Neither nor          1.58  4.75 |  0.31 -0.23 -0.01 -0.01 |  0.2  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0 | 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 |
| AN04 - Disagree             3.36  1.71 |  0.29 -0.59 -0.04 -0.07  0.11 |  1.1  5.3  0.0  0.1  0.3 | 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.01 |
| AN05 - Disagree strongly    0.55 15.49 | -0.88 -1.31  1.05 -0.18  0.19 |  1.7  4.3  3.1  0.1  0.1 | 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.00 |
| AN06 - Can't choose         0.22 39.71 |  0.40  0.67  0.90 -2.38  1.30 |  0.1  0.4  0.9  7.2  2.7 | 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.04 |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 12.4 18.6  6.5  8.7  8.7 +-----------------------+
```

COORDONNEES ET VALEURS-TEST DES MODALITES
AXES 1 A 5

```
+-------------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+----------+
|                MODALITES                        |         VALEURS-TEST           |          COORDONNEES           |          |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE          EFF.    P.ABS |   1     2     3     4     5     |   1     2     3     4     5     |  DISTO.  |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|                                                                                                                               |
|  37 . Gender                                                                                                                  |
| KJ01 - Male              527   527.00 | -1.8  -2.3  -3.2   4.4  -1.9   | -0.06 -0.07 -0.10  0.14 -0.06  |   1.05   |
| KJ02 - Female            567   567.00 |  1.6   2.1   3.5  -4.4   1.8   |  0.05  0.06  0.10 -0.13  0.05  |   0.90   |
|                                                                                                                               |
|  40 . Employment                                                                                                              |
| MO01 - Full-time         445   445.00 | -0.4  -1.0  -3.3   3.4  -1.1   | -0.02 -0.04 -0.12  0.12 -0.04  |   1.42   |
| MO02 - Part-time         109   109.00 |  0.3  -3.1   2.1  -1.3  -0.7   |  0.03 -0.28  0.19 -0.12 -0.06  |   8.90   |
| MO03 - Less then part-time 29   29.00 |  0.0  -1.1   1.2   0.3  -0.5   |  0.01 -0.21  0.22  0.05 -0.10  |  36.20   |
| MO04 - Unemployed         28    28.00 |  1.0  -0.3   1.7  -1.2  -0.9   |  0.18 -0.05  0.31 -0.22 -0.17  |  37.52   |
| MO05 - Student            77    77.00 |  1.4  -3.2  -0.3   1.6   0.3   |  0.16 -0.35 -0.03  0.17  0.03  |  13.01   |
| MO06 - Retired           163   163.00 | -1.6   3.2   0.7  -1.3   1.4   | -0.12  0.23  0.05 -0.09  0.10  |   5.62   |
| MO07 - Housewife         210   210.00 |  0.6   3.6   1.4  -2.9   1.4   |  0.04  0.22  0.08 -0.18  0.09  |   4.14   |
| MO08 - Other, not working 33    33.00 | -1.0  -0.8  -0.1   0.1  -1.1   | -0.18 -0.13 -0.01  0.02 -0.19  |  31.69   |
|                                                                                                                               |
|  41 . Age                                                                                                                     |
| AL01 - 18-25 years       200   200.00 |  2.2  -0.4  -2.7   0.7   0.3   |  0.14 -0.03 -0.17  0.04  0.02  |   4.39   |
| AL02 - 26-35 years       206   206.00 |  1.5  -2.7   1.6   0.8  -1.4   |  0.10 -0.17  0.10  0.05 -0.09  |   4.24   |
| AL03 - 36-45 years       221   221.00 | -0.6  -2.5   1.2   1.9  -1.3   | -0.04 -0.15  0.07  0.11 -0.08  |   3.88   |
| AL04 - 46-55 years       200   200.00 | -1.9  -0.4   0.3  -1.1   0.6   | -0.12 -0.02  0.02 -0.07  0.04  |   4.39   |
| AL05 - 56-65 years       162   162.00 | -1.3   3.8   0.0  -2.0   1.7   | -0.10  0.28  0.00 -0.15  0.12  |   5.66   |
| AL06 - 66-75 years       105   105.00 | -0.4   3.1  -0.2  -0.8   0.4   | -0.04  0.29 -0.02 -0.07  0.03  |   9.27   |
|                                                                                                                               |
|  42 . Marital status                                                                                                          |
| SI01 - (Living as) married 689 689.00 | -1.5  -0.8   0.1   0.3   0.5   | -0.03 -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.01  |   0.57   |
| SI02 - Widowed            63    63.00 |  0.3   3.4   0.0  -2.7  -0.4   |  0.04  0.42  0.00 -0.33 -0.04  |  16.12   |
| SI03 - Divorced           15    15.00 | -2.4   1.6   2.0  -2.2   1.9   | -0.62  0.42  0.51 -0.56  0.48  |  70.91   |
| SI04 - Separated          16    16.00 | -1.5  -1.2   1.6   0.2  -1.4   | -0.38 -0.30  0.39  0.06 -0.34  |  66.42   |
| SI05 - Unmarried         311   311.00 |  2.2  -1.2  -0.6   1.5  -0.5   |  0.10 -0.06 -0.03  0.07 -0.03  |   2.47   |
|                                                                                                                               |
|  45 . Church attendance frequency                                                                                             |
| KI01 - Once a week or more 370 370.00 |  0.2  -0.9  -1.7  -2.2  -0.1   |  0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.01  |   1.92   |
| KI02 - 2-3 times a month  77    77.00 | -0.1   1.8   0.4  -0.3   0.4   | -0.01  0.20  0.04 -0.03  0.04  |  13.01   |
| KI03 - Once a month       72    72.00 |  0.9   1.8  -1.8   0.3   1.8   |  0.10  0.21 -0.20  0.03  0.20  |  13.98   |
| KI04 - Several times a year 199 199.00 |  2.4  0.6   0.1  -1.8   1.5   |  0.16  0.04  0.01 -0.12  0.10  |   4.42   |
| KI05 - Seldom            237   237.00 |  0.3   0.8  -1.3   1.9  -2.1   |  0.02  0.05 -0.07  0.11 -0.12  |   3.55   |
| KI06 - Never             130   130.00 | -4.0  -3.2   5.4   2.8  -0.9   | -0.33 -0.27  0.44  0.23 -0.08  |   7.30   |
| 45_ - reponse manquante    9     9.00 | -2.0  -1.3   0.7   0.6   1.0   | -0.66 -0.45  0.23  0.21  0.33  | 118.85   |
|                                                                                                                               |
|  47 . Urban or rural                                                                                                          |
| BY01 - Urban             206   206.00 | -3.4   1.7   1.9  -0.3  -2.5   | -0.22  0.10  0.12 -0.02 -0.16  |   4.24   |
| BY02 - Suburb, small town 703  703.00 |  2.8  -1.9  -1.7   1.2   2.1   |  0.06 -0.04 -0.04  0.03  0.05  |   0.53   |
| BY03 - Rural             185   185.00 | -0.2   0.5   0.6  -1.4  -0.1   | -0.02  0.04  0.04 -0.09  0.00  |   4.83   |
|                                                                                                                               |
|  48 . Part of country                                                                                                         |
| RE01 - North West        288   288.00 |  2.0  -1.5   2.2  -0.6  -3.5   |  0.10 -0.08  0.11 -0.03 -0.18  |   2.75   |
| RE02 - North East        204   204.00 | -1.8   0.2   1.1   1.1   0.6   | -0.11  0.02  0.07  0.07  0.04  |   4.29   |
| RE03 - Centre            207   207.00 |  0.1   0.0   0.2  -0.4   1.5   |  0.00  0.00  0.02 -0.03  0.09  |   4.21   |
| RE04 - South + islands   395   395.00 | -0.7   1.1  -2.8  -0.1   1.5   | -0.03  0.04 -0.11  0.00  0.06  |   1.73   |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
```

```
+-------------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+----------+
|                MODALITES                        |         VALEURS-TEST           |          COORDONNEES           |          |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE          EFF.    P.ABS |   1     2     3     4     5     |   1     2     3     4     5     |  DISTO.  |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|                                                                                                                               |
|  55 . Education                                                                                                               |
| SK01 - Compulsory 1-8    429   429.00 | -0.3  11.2  -0.8  -4.2   3.7   | -0.01  0.42 -0.03 -0.16  0.14  |   1.51   |
| SK02 - Gymnasium 9-13    380   380.00 |  0.1  -2.1  -1.9   2.1  -0.8   |  0.01 -0.09 -0.08  0.09 -0.03  |   1.84   |
| SK03 - Higher education 14+ 285 285.00 | -0.1 -10.3  3.3   2.4  -3.3   | -0.01 -0.52  0.17  0.12 -0.17  |   2.78   |
|                                                                                                                               |
|  56 . Income           [BM] en classes ... en classes                                                                         |
| MO01 - Up to 15          173   173.00 |  0.6   6.4   1.3  -5.2   0.5   |  0.04  0.44  0.09 -0.36  0.03  |   5.24   |
| MO02 - 15-30             518   518.00 |  0.1   0.8  -1.0   1.2   1.3   |  0.00  0.03 -0.03  0.04  0.04  |   1.08   |
| MO03 - 30-45             268   268.00 |  0.7  -2.8   1.0   1.9  -0.5   |  0.04 -0.15  0.05  0.10 -0.03  |   3.02   |
| MO04 - More than 45      135   135.00 | -2.2  -4.8  -0.6   1.3  -1.8   | -0.17 -0.39 -0.05  0.11 -0.15  |   6.99   |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
```

Background variables Norway

```
CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES AVEC CHOIX DES MODALITES
APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES
SEUIL (PCMIN)   :     2.00 %      POIDS:     30.54
AVANT APUREMENT :     7 QUESTIONS ACTIVES         42 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
APRES           :     7 QUESTIONS ACTIVES         30 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS :   1527.00
TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES


VALEURS PROPRES
APERCU DE LA PRECISION DES CALCULS : TRACE AVANT DIAGONALISATION ..   3.3556
                                     SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES ....   3.3556
HISTOGRAMME DES 30 PREMIERES VALEURS PROPRES
+--------+-----------+----------+----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| NUMERO |  VALEUR   | POURCENT.| POURCENT.|
|        |  PROPRE   |          | CUMULE   |
+--------+-----------+----------+----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
|    1   |   0.2673  |   7.97   |    7.97  | ********************************************************************************** |
|    2   |   0.2120  |   6.32   |   14.28  | ****************************************************************** |
|    3   |   0.1912  |   5.70   |   19.98  | *********************************************************** |
|    4   |   0.1860  |   5.54   |   25.53  | ********************************************************* |
|    5   |   0.1675  |   4.99   |   30.52  | *************************************************** |
```

COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRES DES MODALITES ACTIVES
AXES 1 A 5

```
+----------------------------------------+----------------------------------+----------------------------------+--------------------------------+
|              MODALITES                 |            COORDONNEES           |           CONTRIBUTIONS          |         COSINUS CARRES         |
|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE        P.REL  DISTO     |  1     2     3     4     5       |  1     2     3     4     5       |  1     2     3     4     5     |
+----------------------------------------+----------------------------------+----------------------------------+--------------------------------+
|  35 . Age                                                                                                                                       |
| AL02 - 26-35 years      3.59   2.98    | 0.30  0.94  0.02 -0.37 -0.46    | 1.2  14.9  0.0   2.6   4.6      | 0.03 0.29 0.00 0.05 0.07      |
| AL03 - 36-45 years      3.62   2.95    | 0.53 -0.52 -0.02 -0.25  0.64    | 3.8   4.7  0.0   1.2   8.9      | 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.14      |
| AL04 - 46-55 years      2.93   3.88    | 0.24 -0.65  0.58  0.94 -0.07    | 0.6   5.8  5.2  13.8   0.1      | 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.23 0.00      |
| AL05 - 56-65 years      1.99   6.19    |-1.18 -0.69 -0.39 -0.41 -0.44    | 10.3  4.5  1.6   1.8   2.3      | 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03      |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 16.0 29.8  6.9 19.4 16.0 +------------------------------+
|  36 . Marital status                                                                                                                            |
| SI01 - (Living as) married  9.48  0.51 |-0.03 -0.49  0.12 -0.30 -0.03    | 0.0  10.8  0.7   4.5   0.1      | 0.00 0.48 0.03 0.17 0.00      |
| SI02 - Widowed          0.56  24.44    |-2.55 -0.17 -1.83  0.44 -0.03    | 13.7  0.1  9.8   0.6   0.0      | 0.27 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.00      |
| SI03 - Divorced         1.22  10.68    |-0.01 -0.31  0.84  2.11  0.18    | 0.0   0.5  4.5  29.3   0.2      | 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.42 0.00      |
| SI05 - Unmarried        4.60   2.11    | 0.11  1.19 -0.30  0.07  0.02    | 0.2  30.7  2.2   0.1   0.0      | 0.01 0.67 0.04 0.00 0.00      |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 13.9 42.2 17.2 34.5  0.3 +------------------------------+
|  39 . Husstandens samlede inntekt 1994                                                                                                          |
| IN02 - 50 000 - 99 000 NOK   0.71 19.03|-1.45  1.26 -0.93  0.86  0.87    | 5.6   5.4  3.3   2.8   3.2      | 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04      |
| IN03 - 100 000 - 149 000 NO  1.10 12.02|-1.42 -0.25  0.39  0.66 -0.19    | 8.3   0.3  0.9   2.5   0.2      | 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00      |
| IN04 - 150 000 - 199 000 NO  1.25 10.42|-0.85  0.00 -0.84 -0.23 -0.25    | 3.4   0.0  4.6   0.4   0.5      | 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.01      |
| IN05 - 200 000 - 249 000 NO  1.67  7.56|-0.23  0.70  0.84 -0.06 -0.58    | 0.3   3.9  6.1   0.0   3.4      | 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.05      |
| IN06 - 250 000 - 299 000 NO  1.60  7.94| 0.10 -0.03  0.59  0.05  0.55    | 0.1   0.0  2.9   0.0   2.9      | 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04      |
| IN07 - 300 000 - 349 000 NO  1.93  6.38| 0.04  0.21  0.45 -0.60  0.60    | 0.0   0.4  2.0   3.8   4.2      | 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06      |
| IN08 - 350 000 - 399 000 NO  1.71  7.36| 0.31 -0.17  0.36 -0.27 -0.07    | 0.6   0.2  1.2   0.7   0.1      | 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00      |
| IN09 - 400 000 - 499 000 NO  2.32  5.15| 0.77 -0.20 -0.51 -0.43 -0.47    | 5.2   0.5  3.1   2.3   3.1      | 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04      |
| IN10 - 500 000 NOK or more   2.04  5.99| 0.75 -0.49 -0.75  0.56  0.06    | 4.2   2.3  6.0   3.4   0.0      | 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.00      |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 27.7 13.0 30.1 15.9 17.6 +------------------------------+
|  46 . Employment                                                                                                                                |
| MO01 - Full-time        8.99   0.59    | 0.46 -0.06 -0.16  0.00  0.01    | 7.2   0.1  1.1   0.0   0.0      | 0.36 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00      |
| MO02 - Part-time        1.21  10.80    |-0.28 -0.48  0.58 -0.05  0.31    | 0.4   1.3  2.2   0.0   0.7      | 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01      |
| MO04 - Unemployed       0.56  24.34    |-0.30  1.68  0.92  1.12  1.09    | 0.2   7.5  2.5   3.8   4.0      | 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.05      |
| MO07 - Housewife        1.13  11.60    |-0.79 -0.26  1.17 -0.84 -0.72    | 2.7   0.4  8.1   4.3   3.5      | 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.04      |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 10.4  9.3 14.0  8.1  8.2 +------------------------------+
|  53 . Education                                                                                                                                 |
| MO01 - Compulsory 1-9   1.87   6.63    |-1.68 -0.33 -0.65  0.11  0.12    | 19.8  1.0  4.2   0.1   0.2      | 0.43 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00      |
| MO02 - Gymnasium 10-12  5.38   1.66    |-0.22  0.15  0.77 -0.10  0.13    | 1.0   0.6 16.8   0.3   0.5      | 0.03 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.01      |
| MO03 - Higher education 13+ 6.44 1.22  | 0.60 -0.14 -0.47  0.05 -0.15    | 8.8   0.6  7.5   0.1   0.8      | 0.30 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.02      |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 29.5  2.2 28.5  0.5  1.5 +------------------------------+
|  54 . Part of country                                                                                                                           |
| MO01 - East             7.00   1.04    | 0.08  0.03 -0.22  0.42  0.01    | 0.2   0.0  1.8   6.7   0.0      | 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.00      |
| MO14 - West             4.22   2.38    |-0.15  0.24  0.20 -0.47 -0.43    | 0.4   1.2  0.9   5.0   4.6      | 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.08      |
| MO16 - North            3.06   3.67    |-0.16  0.17 -0.09 -0.22  1.09    | 0.3   0.4  0.1   0.8  21.8      | 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.32      |
| MO05 - South            1.76   7.10    |-0.37 -0.36  0.13  0.07 -0.87    | 0.9   1.1  0.1   0.0   8.0      | 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.11      |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  1.7  2.7  3.0 12.6 34.4 +------------------------------+
|  56 . Urban or rural                                                                                                                            |
| MO01 - Urban            7.25   0.97    | 0.01  0.16  0.00  0.38 -0.52    | 0.0   0.9  0.0   5.7  11.9      | 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.28      |
| MO02 - Rural            8.80   0.62    |-0.15 -0.01 -0.08 -0.27  0.44    | 0.8   0.0  0.3   3.3  10.1      | 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.31      |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  0.8  0.9  0.3  9.0 21.9 +------------------------------+
```

COORDONNEES ET VALEURS-TEST DES MODALITES
AXES 1 A 5

```
+----------------------------------------+-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------+----------+
|              MODALITES                 |            VALEURS-TEST             |             COORDONNEES             |          |
|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------|
|  34 . Gender                                                                                                                   |
| KJ01 - Male              766  766.00   |   4.2   6.9  -6.8   1.6   1.3       |  0.09   0.14  -0.14   0.03   0.03   |   0.46   |
| KJ02 - Female            761  761.00   | -13.9   1.8   0.7   2.1  -1.2       | -0.28   0.04   0.01   0.04  -0.02   |   0.47   |
+----------------------------------------+-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------+----------+
|  44 . Church attendance frequency                                                                                              |
| KI01 - Once a week or more  57  57.00  |  -3.2   1.2  -1.8  -0.4  -4.1       | -0.41   0.15  -0.24  -0.05  -0.53   |  18.56   |
| KI02 - 2-3 times a month  59  59.00    |  -4.3  -0.2  -1.6  -2.4  -1.8       | -0.54  -0.03  -0.20  -0.30  -0.22   |  17.90   |
| KI03 - Once a month       30  30.00    |  -1.1   1.4  -1.6  -0.5   0.7       | -0.21   0.25  -0.30  -0.09   0.13   |  36.17   |
| KI04 - Several times a year 162 162.00 |  -3.2  -3.6  -0.7  -1.2   1.8       | -0.23  -0.26  -0.05  -0.08   0.13   |   5.88   |
| KI05 - Seldom            685  685.00   |  -2.0   0.7   1.6   0.3   3.6       | -0.05   0.02   0.04   0.01   0.09   |   0.63   |
| KI06 - Never             516  516.00   |  -0.1   9.1  -4.3   5.4  -2.1       |  0.00   0.29  -0.14   0.18  -0.07   |   1.16   |
| 44_ - reponse manquante   18  18.00    |  -4.0  -0.2  -1.9  -0.2  -1.1       | -0.94  -0.05  -0.44  -0.05  -0.25   |  60.95   |
+----------------------------------------+-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------+----------+
```

Membership identity and attitudes towards immigration Norway

```
CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES AVEC CHOIX DES MODALITES
APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES
SEUIL (PCMIN)   :      2.00 %      POIDS:     30.54
AVANT APUREMENT :    12 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        71 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
APRES           :    12 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        46 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS :   1527.00
TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES


VALEURS PROPRES
APERCU DE LA PRECISION DES CALCULS : TRACE AVANT DIAGONALISATION ..   2.8571
                                     SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES ....   2.8571
HISTOGRAMME DES 46 PREMIERES VALEURS PROPRES
+--------+-----------+----------+----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NUMERO |  VALEUR   | POURCENT.| POURCENT.|                                                                                  |
|        |  PROPRE   |          | CUMULE   |                                                                                  |
+--------+-----------+----------+----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|   1    |  0.3338   |  11.68   |  11.68   | ********************************************************************************* |
|   2    |  0.1879   |   6.58   |  18.26   | ********************************************** |
|   3    |  0.1348   |   4.72   |  22.98   | ******************************** |
|   4    |  0.1177   |   4.12   |  27.10   | **************************** |
|   5    |  0.1053   |   3.68   |  30.78   | ************************** |
```

```
COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRES DES MODALITES ACTIVES
AXES  1 A  5
+------------------------------------------+----------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
|           MODALITES                      |        COORDONNEES         |     CONTRIBUTIONS        |    COSINUS CARRES        |
|------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE          P.REL DISTO |  1     2     3     4     5  |  1    2    3    4    5   |  1    2    3    4    5   |
+------------------------------------------+----------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
|  6 . How important is birth                                                                                              |
| FØ01 - Very important    2.99  1.79 | 0.79 -0.22  0.31  0.05  0.02 | 5.5  0.8  2.2  0.1  0.0 | 0.35 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 |
| FØ02 - Fairly important  2.41  2.45 | -0.07 0.51 -0.23 -0.02  0.70 | 0.0  3.4  1.0  0.0 11.1 | 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.20 |
| FØ03 - Not very important 2.33 2.58 | -0.53 0.08 -0.12 -0.41 -0.36 | 2.0  0.1  0.2  3.4  2.8 | 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.05 |
| FØ04 - Not important at all 0.96 7.67 | -1.04 -0.91 -0.08 0.90 -0.90 | 3.1  4.3  0.0  6.6  7.5 | 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.11 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 10.7  8.5  3.4 10.0 21.4 +-------------------+
|  7 . How important is citizenship                                                                                        |
| ST01 - Very important    5.25  0.59 | 0.44 -0.01  0.38 -0.05  0.06 | 3.0  0.0  5.5  0.1  0.2 | 0.32 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.01 |
| ST02 - Fairly important  2.41  2.45 | -0.54 0.33 -0.64 -0.10  0.28 | 2.1  1.4  7.3  0.2  1.8 | 0.12 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.03 |
| ST03 - Not very important 0.79 9.53 | -1.07 -0.58 -0.45 0.06 -0.49 | 2.7  1.4  1.2  0.0  1.8 | 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.03 |
| ST04 - Not important at all 0.25 32.37 | -0.93 -1.48 -0.09 1.89 -2.14 | 0.6  2.9  0.0  7.6 10.9 | 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.14 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  8.5  5.7 14.1  7.9 14.6 +-------------------+
|  8 . How important is language                                                                                           |
| SP01 - Very important    6.45  0.29 | 0.28  0.01  0.27 -0.08 -0.08 | 1.5  0.0  3.4  0.3  0.3 | 0.27 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.02 |
| SP02 - Fairly important  1.92  3.33 | -0.81 -0.04 -0.71  0.02  0.38 | 3.7  0.0  7.2  0.0  2.6 | 0.19 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.04 |
| SP03 - Not very important 0.31 25.51 | -1.12 -0.38 -0.90 1.42 -0.54 | 1.2  0.2  1.9  5.4  0.9 | 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.01 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  6.4  0.3 12.5  5.7  3.8 +-------------------+
|  9 . How important is respect                                                                                            |
| RE01 - Very important    7.03  0.19 | 0.10  0.00  0.22 -0.12 -0.11 | 0.2  0.0  2.6  0.8  0.8 | 0.05 0.00 0.27 0.07 0.07 |
| RE02 - Fairly important  1.40  4.97 | -0.42 0.05 -0.96 0.46  0.29 | 0.8  0.0  9.5  2.5  1.1 | 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.04 0.02 |
| RE03 - Not very important 0.21 37.85 | -0.77 -0.46 -0.33 0.85  2.04 | 0.4  0.2  0.2  1.3  8.5 | 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.11 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  1.3  0.3 12.2  4.6 10.4 +-------------------+
| 10 . How important is sentiment                                                                                          |
| FØ01 - Very important    5.34  0.56 | 0.30 -0.10  0.37 -0.04 -0.04 | 1.4  0.3  5.3  0.1  0.1 | 0.16 0.02 0.24 0.00 0.00 |
| FØ02 - Fairly important  2.42  2.44 | -0.46 0.35 -0.58 -0.24 0.50 | 1.6  1.6  6.0  1.1  5.7 | 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.10 |
| FØ03 - Not very important 0.63 12.28 | -0.71 -0.36 -0.59 0.69 -1.22 | 0.9  0.4  1.6  2.6  8.9 | 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.12 |
| FØ04 - Not important at all 0.20 40.96 | -0.45 -0.95 -0.66 1.82 -0.73 | 0.1  0.9  0.6  5.6  1.0 | 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.01 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  4.0  3.3 13.6  9.4 15.7 +-------------------+
| 26 . Assimilation                                                                                                        |
| FO01 - Agree strongly    2.03  3.10 | 1.04 -0.54 -0.24 -0.09  0.08 | 6.6  3.2  0.9  0.1  0.1 | 0.35 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00 |
| FO02 - Agree             3.77  1.21 | 0.02  0.45  0.32  0.24  0.06 | 0.0  4.1  3.0  1.9  0.1 | 0.00 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.00 |
| FO03 - Neither nor       1.46  4.69 | -0.68 0.11 -0.52 -0.66 -0.29 | 2.0  0.1  2.9  5.4  1.2 | 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.02 |
| FO04 - Disagree          1.16  6.17 | -0.95 -0.54 0.04  0.21  0.05 | 3.2  1.8  0.0  0.4  0.0 | 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 11.7  9.2  6.8  7.9  1.5 +-------------------+
| 27 . Assimilation or diversity                                                                                           |
| UL01 - Maintain customs  1.82  3.57 | -0.95 -0.64 0.14 -0.05 0.30 | 5.0  3.9  0.3  0.0  1.6 | 0.25 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.03 |
| UL02 - Adjust to society 5.67  0.47 | 0.33  0.17 -0.02 0.03 -0.13 | 1.9  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.9 | 0.24 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.03 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  6.8  4.9  0.3  0.1  2.5 +-------------------+
| 28 . Diversity                                                                                                           |
| MA01 - Agree strongly    0.22 36.46 | 0.00 -1.29  0.75  0.18  0.55 | 0.0  2.0  0.9  0.1  0.6 | 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 |
| MA02 - Agree             1.45  4.75 | -0.84 -0.61 0.49 -0.20 0.53 | 3.1  2.9  2.6  0.5  3.9 | 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.06 |
| MA03 - Neither nor       1.91  3.36 | -0.33 0.27 -0.20 -0.10 0.04 | 0.6  0.7  0.6  0.2  0.0 | 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 |
| MA04 - Disagree          3.06  1.72 | 0.08  0.48  0.10 0.15 -0.24 | 0.1  3.8  0.2  0.6  1.7 | 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.03 |
| MA05 - Disagree strongly 1.79  3.66 | 0.83 -0.49 -0.43 0.02 -0.20 | 3.7  2.3  2.4  0.0  0.7 | 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.01 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  7.5 11.6  6.7  1.3  7.0 +-------------------+
| 29 . Increased crime                                                                                                     |
| KR01 - Agree strongly    2.28  2.66 | 1.03 -0.54 -0.38 -0.09 0.04 | 7.3  3.6  2.5  0.2  0.0 | 0.40 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.00 |
| KR02 - Agree             3.63  1.29 | -0.02 0.58  0.19 0.34  0.03 | 0.0  6.4  1.0  3.7  0.0 | 0.00 0.26 0.03 0.09 0.00 |
| KR03 - Neither nor       1.67  3.98 | -0.67 0.10 -0.09 -0.78 -0.45 | 2.2  0.1  0.1  8.7  3.3 | 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.05 |
| KR04 - Disagree          0.78  9.73 | -1.30 -1.17 0.29 0.38  0.77 | 3.9  5.7  0.5  0.9  4.4 | 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.06 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 13.4 15.7  4.1 13.5  7.7 +-------------------+
| 31 . Take jobs                                                                                                           |
| TA01 - Agree strongly    0.42 18.84 | 1.63 -1.59 -1.01 -0.83 0.26 | 3.3  5.7  3.2  2.5  0.3 | 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.00 |
| TA02 - Agree             1.28  5.53 | 0.76  0.11  0.08 0.63  0.52 | 2.2  0.1  0.1  4.3  3.2 | 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.05 |
| TA03 - Neither nor       2.47  2.37 | 0.17  0.50 -0.46 0.11 -0.26 | 0.2  3.3  3.9  0.3  1.5 | 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.03 |
| TA04 - Disagree          3.50  1.38 | -0.44 0.06  0.35 -0.31 -0.03 | 2.0  0.1  3.2  2.9  0.0 | 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.00 |
| TA05 - Disagree strongly 0.79  9.50 | -0.97 -1.27 0.24 0.49  0.04 | 2.3  6.8  0.3  1.6  0.0 | 0.10 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.00 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 10.0 16.0 10.7 11.6  5.1 +-------------------+
| 49 . Not good for national economy                                                                                       |
| MO04 - Disagree          0.94  7.88 | -0.92 -0.82 0.67  0.11  0.76 | 2.4  3.3  3.1  0.1  5.1 | 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.07 |
| MO03 - Neither nor       2.88  1.89 | -0.42 0.24  0.01 -0.45 -0.24 | 1.5  0.9  0.0  5.1  1.5 | 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.03 |
| MO02 - Agree             2.82  1.96 | 0.28  0.47 -0.06 0.57  0.01 | 0.6  3.3  0.1  7.9  0.0 | 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.00 |
| MO01 - Agree strongly    1.15  6.23 | 1.28 -1.02 -0.62 -0.30 -0.04 | 5.7  6.4  3.3  0.9  0.0 | 0.26 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.00 |
+------------------------------------------+-------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 10.3 13.9  6.5 13.9  6.6 +-------------------+
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| 50 . Not open                                                                                                                                    |
| MO04 - Disagree         3.75    1.22 | -0.52 -0.13  0.35 -0.14 -0.05 |  3.0  0.3  3.5  0.7  0.1 | 0.22 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.00 |
| MO03 - Neither nor      2.24    2.72 |  0.11  0.64 -0.31 -0.17 -0.23 |  0.1  4.9  1.6  0.6  1.1 | 0.00 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.02 |
| MO02 - Agree            1.30    5.42 |  0.88  0.13 -0.27  0.88  0.45 |  3.0  0.1  0.7  8.6  2.5 | 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.04 |
| MO01 - Agree strongly   0.44   17.92 |  1.56 -1.53 -0.98 -1.07  0.07 |  3.2  5.5  3.2  4.3  0.0 | 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.00 |
+-------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  9.3 10.8  9.0 14.1  3.8 +-------------------------+
```

COORDONNEES ET VALEURS-TEST DES MODALITES
AXES 1 A 5

MODALITES			VALEURS-TEST					COORDONNEES					
IDEN - LIBELLE	EFF.	P.ABS	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	DISTO.
34 . Gender													
KJ01 - Male	766	766.00	2.1	0.6	-2.3	1.6	2.4	0.05	0.01	-0.05	0.04	0.06	0.74
KJ02 - Female	761	761.00	-2.7	-1.9	2.6	-1.1	-1.6	-0.06	-0.05	0.06	-0.03	-0.04	0.75
35 . Age													
AL01 - 16-25 years	292	292.00	-3.0	-2.2	-4.1	1.2	-0.6	-0.16	-0.11	-0.21	0.06	-0.03	3.57
AL02 - 26-35 years	296	296.00	-4.5	-0.7	-0.2	0.5	-1.3	-0.23	-0.04	-0.01	0.02	-0.07	3.51
AL03 - 36-45 years	294	294.00	-4.1	-1.0	-1.3	-1.3	-0.4	-0.21	-0.05	-0.06	-0.07	-0.02	3.54
AL04 - 46-55 years	246	246.00	-1.4	-0.5	0.6	1.6	0.3	-0.08	-0.03	0.04	0.09	0.02	4.43
AL05 - 56-65 years	176	176.00	6.8	1.7	1.7	-1.5	0.9	0.47	0.12	0.12	-0.11	0.06	6.59
AL06 - 66 years or more	223	223.00	7.3	1.5	4.4	0.1	2.4	0.45	0.09	0.27	0.00	0.14	4.99
36 . Marital status													
SI01 - (Living as) married	836	836.00	1.8	1.5	2.4	-1.3	-0.1	0.04	0.03	0.05	-0.03	0.00	0.60
SI02 - Widowed	67	67.00	3.4	-0.1	2.4	-0.6	1.1	0.41	-0.02	0.28	-0.08	0.13	18.93
SI03 - Divorced	107	107.00	0.5	0.4	0.2	1.0	-0.8	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.09	-0.07	11.48
SI04 - Separated	19	19.00	-2.2	0.2	-1.4	0.1	1.5	-0.51	0.04	-0.32	0.03	0.35	69.26
SI05 - Unmarried	498	498.00	-3.7	-3.1	-3.0	1.5	0.4	-0.13	-0.11	-0.11	0.05	0.02	1.68
44 . Church attendance frequency													
KI01 - Once a week or more	57	57.00	-1.3	-2.7	-0.2	1.3	-0.6	-0.17	-0.35	-0.03	0.17	-0.08	22.42
KI02 - 2-3 times a month	59	59.00	-0.1	-0.4	2.8	-1.2	1.9	-0.01	-0.05	0.36	-0.15	0.24	21.63
KI03 - Once a month	30	30.00	-1.7	-0.3	2.1	0.5	2.0	-0.30	-0.06	0.37	0.09	0.36	43.50
KI04 - Several times a year	162	162.00	-1.2	-0.1	3.0	-0.7	1.4	-0.09	-0.01	0.22	-0.05	0.10	7.24
KI05 - Seldom	685	685.00	1.6	3.4	-0.4	-1.8	0.8	0.04	0.09	-0.01	-0.05	0.02	0.95
KI06 - Never	516	516.00	-1.1	-3.1	-3.1	2.7	-2.1	-0.04	-0.11	-0.11	0.09	-0.07	1.59
44_ - reponse manquante	18	18.00	2.9	-1.2	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.69	-0.28	-0.02	0.00	0.02	73.17
46 . Employment													
MO01 - Full-time	737	737.00	-7.1	2.2	-1.8	1.3	-1.8	-0.17	0.05	-0.04	0.03	-0.04	0.81
MO02 - Part-time	101	101.00	0.3	-0.5	0.9	-2.6	0.2	0.03	-0.05	0.09	-0.25	0.02	12.22
MO03 - Other, not working	15	15.00	-0.1	-0.8	-0.1	0.5	0.2	-0.01	-0.20	-0.02	0.13	0.06	88.00
MO04 - Unemployed	50	50.00	1.9	-1.2	-0.4	1.4	-0.1	0.26	-0.17	-0.06	0.19	-0.01	25.70
MO05 - Student	199	199.00	-7.1	-3.0	-1.8	1.3	0.3	-0.47	-0.20	-0.12	0.09	0.02	5.71
MO06 - Retired	327	327.00	10.4	0.5	3.7	-0.1	3.3	0.50	0.02	0.18	-0.01	0.16	3.08
MO07 - Housewife	93	93.00	2.7	-1.4	-0.4	-1.2	-1.2	0.27	-0.14	-0.04	-0.12	-0.12	13.35
MO08 - Missing	5	5.00	2.1	-1.2	0.6	-1.5	-0.4	0.94	-0.56	0.26	-0.65	-0.18	266.00
53 . Education													
MO01 - Compulsory 1-9	186	186.00	7.5	-0.5	1.4	0.4	2.3	0.51	-0.04	0.10	0.02	0.16	6.18
MO02 - Gymnasium 10-12	470	470.00	7.8	1.8	-1.8	0.9	-0.9	0.29	0.07	-0.07	0.03	-0.03	1.84
MO03 - Higher education 13+	538	538.00	-10.1	-0.1	3.2	-2.3	-0.9	-0.34	0.00	0.11	-0.08	-0.03	1.48
MO05 - Still in school	199	199.00	-7.1	-3.0	-1.8	1.3	0.3	-0.47	-0.20	-0.12	0.09	0.02	5.71
53_ - reponse manquante	134	134.00	2.9	-0.7	-1.3	1.2	1.2	0.23	-0.06	-0.11	0.10	0.10	8.96

MODALITES			VALEURS-TEST					COORDONNEES					
IDEN - LIBELLE	EFF.	P.ABS	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	DISTO.
54 . Part of country													
MO01 - East	669	669.00	0.0	-0.6	2.4	-0.2	-1.8	0.00	-0.02	0.07	0.00	-0.05	1.00
MO14 - West	396	396.00	0.5	0.0	-3.0	-0.2	0.5	0.02	0.00	-0.12	-0.01	0.02	2.37
MO16 - North	289	289.00	-2.2	-0.8	1.1	-0.3	2.1	-0.11	-0.04	0.05	-0.02	0.11	3.62
MO05 - South	173	173.00	1.0	-0.1	-0.4	1.7	0.7	0.07	-0.01	-0.03	0.12	0.05	6.72
55 . Income													
MO02 - Up to 149	219	219.00	3.5	-2.7	0.8	0.6	1.1	0.21	-0.17	0.05	0.04	0.07	5.10
MO03 - 150-299	422	422.00	2.1	2.2	0.0	0.5	2.0	0.09	0.09	0.00	0.02	0.08	2.16
MO04 - 300-399	317	317.00	-0.2	1.0	-0.7	0.2	-0.2	-0.01	0.05	-0.03	0.01	-0.01	3.21
MO05 - More than 400	372	372.00	-8.1	-1.0	1.0	-1.1	-2.5	-0.36	-0.05	0.05	-0.05	-0.11	2.59
55_ - reponse manquante	197	197.00	3.1	-1.9	-1.0	0.6	0.8	0.21	-0.13	-0.07	0.04	0.05	5.78
56 . Urban or rural													
MO01 - Urban	695	695.00	-1.0	-1.4	0.7	2.5	-1.0	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.07	-0.03	0.92
MO02 - Rural	832	832.00	0.4	0.1	-0.4	-2.0	1.8	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.04	0.04	0.60

Chauvinistic identity and attitudes towards immigration Norway

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CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES AVEC CHOIX DES MODALITES
APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES
SEUIL (PCMIN)   :      2.00 %      POIDS:     30.54
AVANT APUREMENT :    12 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        76 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
APRES          :    12 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        59 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS :   1527.00
TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES


VALEURS PROPRES
APERCU DE LA PRECISION DES CALCULS : TRACE AVANT DIAGONALISATION ..   3.9270
                                     SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES ....   3.9270
HISTOGRAMME DES 59 PREMIERES VALEURS PROPRES
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NUMERO	VALEUR PROPRE	POURCENT.	POURCENT. CUMULE	
1	0.3389	8.63	8.63	***
2	0.2253	5.74	14.37	***
3	0.2144	5.46	19.83	**
4	0.1300	3.31	23.14	********************************
5	0.1234	3.14	26.28	******************************

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COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRES DES MODALITES ACTIVES
AXES  1 A  5
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MODALITES			COORDONNEES					CONTRIBUTIONS					COSINUS CARRES				
IDEN - LIBELLE	P.REL	DISTO	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
11 . Rather live																	
HE01 - Agree strongly	3.82	1.18	0.49	0.11	-0.05	0.01	0.13	2.7	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.20	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02
HE02 - Agree	2.76	2.01	-0.28	-0.31	-0.03	-0.10	-0.31	0.6	1.1	0.0	0.2	2.2	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05
HE03 - Neither nor	1.34	5.20	-0.48	0.08	0.11	-0.11	0.51	0.9	0.0	0.1	0.1	2.8	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05
HE04 - Disagree	0.40	19.99	-1.00	0.77	0.26	0.86	-0.68	1.2	1.1	0.1	2.3	1.5	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.02
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	5.4	2.4	0.3	2.6	7.1					
12 . More like us																	
LI01 - Agree strongly	0.42	18.69	1.52	1.32	-0.09	-0.92	-0.60	2.9	3.3	0.0	2.8	1.2	0.12	0.09	0.00	0.05	0.02
LI02 - Agree	1.43	4.81	0.62	-0.19	-0.03	0.60	-0.10	1.6	0.2	0.0	3.9	0.1	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.00
LI03 - Neither nor	2.85	1.92	0.16	-0.45	0.10	-0.23	0.53	0.2	2.5	0.1	1.1	6.6	0.01	0.10	0.00	0.03	0.15
LI04 - Disagree	2.32	2.59	-0.53	-0.05	0.02	-0.18	-0.52	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.6	5.2	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.11
LI05 - Disagree strongly	0.95	7.78	-1.01	0.94	0.24	0.56	0.06	2.8	3.7	0.3	2.3	0.0	0.13	0.11	0.01	0.04	0.00
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	9.5	9.8	0.4	10.7	13.1					
13 . Norway better																	
NO01 - Agree strongly	1.45	4.76	0.92	0.68	-0.04	-0.27	-0.27	3.6	3.0	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.18	0.10	0.00	0.02	0.01
NO02 - Agree	4.11	1.03	0.05	-0.32	-0.04	0.17	0.13	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.9	0.5	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.03	0.02
NO03 - Neither nor	1.90	3.38	-0.44	-0.05	0.09	-0.35	0.20	1.1	0.0	0.1	1.8	0.6	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01
NO04 - Disagree	0.64	11.95	-0.85	0.46	0.31	0.42	-0.88	1.4	0.6	0.3	0.9	4.0	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.06
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	6.1	5.5	0.4	4.4	6.0					
14 . Support one's country																	
ST01 - Agree strongly	0.50	15.52	1.36	1.01	-0.20	-0.68	-0.22	2.7	2.3	0.1	1.8	0.2	0.12	0.07	0.00	0.03	0.00
ST02 - Agree	1.63	4.12	0.45	-0.14	0.03	0.56	0.19	1.0	0.1	0.0	3.9	0.5	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.01
ST03 - Neither nor	1.58	4.28	0.09	-0.41	-0.05	-0.32	0.70	0.0	1.2	0.0	1.2	6.2	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.02	0.11
ST04 - Disagree	3.22	1.59	-0.31	-0.21	0.07	-0.11	-0.48	0.9	0.6	0.1	0.3	6.0	0.06	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.14
ST05 - Disagree strongly	1.25	5.67	-0.56	0.83	0.19	0.24	0.23	1.2	3.8	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.06	0.12	0.01	0.01	0.01
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	5.8	8.1	0.4	7.7	13.3					
15 . Sports pride																	
BR01 - Agree strongly	2.82	1.96	0.49	0.30	0.03	-0.20	0.15	2.0	1.1	0.0	0.9	0.5	0.12	0.04	0.00	0.02	0.01
BR02 - Agree	4.03	1.07	-0.18	-0.31	-0.04	0.07	-0.06	0.4	1.7	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.03	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00
BR03 - Neither nor	1.19	6.02	-0.38	0.10	0.09	0.08	-0.11	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
BR04 - Disagree	0.25	32.85	-0.67	0.56	0.18	0.81	-0.08	0.3	0.3	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	3.2	3.2	0.1	2.3	0.7					
26 . Assimilation																	
FO01 - Agree strongly	1.94	3.29	1.05	0.57	0.26	-0.06	-0.03	6.3	2.8	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.33	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.00
FO02 - Agree	3.63	1.30	0.00	-0.45	-0.02	0.33	-0.07	0.0	3.2	0.0	3.0	0.2	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.08	0.00
FO03 - Neither nor	1.42	4.87	-0.56	-0.16	-0.04	-0.83	0.73	1.3	0.2	0.0	7.5	6.2	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.14	0.11
FO04 - Disagree	1.12	6.45	-0.96	0.34	0.12	-0.07	-0.87	3.1	0.6	0.1	0.0	6.8	0.14	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.12
FO05 - Disagree strongly	0.19	41.96	-0.99	2.00	0.42	0.97	1.06	0.6	3.4	0.2	1.4	1.8	0.02	0.10	0.00	0.02	0.03
FO06 - Can't choose	0.20	39.85	0.02	0.41	-3.60	0.13	0.16	0.0	0.1	12.4	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.00
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	11.2	10.3	13.2	12.1	14.9					
27 . Assimilation or diversity																	
UL01 - Maintain customs	1.75	3.75	-0.94	0.61	0.14	-0.09	0.01	4.6	2.9	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.24	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00
UL02 - Adjust to society	5.37	0.55	0.33	-0.17	0.13	0.14	-0.12	1.7	0.7	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.20	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03
UL03 - Can't choose	1.27	5.55	-0.08	-0.07	-0.84	-0.42	0.54	0.0	0.0	4.2	1.7	3.0	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.03	0.05
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	6.3	3.6	4.8	2.6	3.7					
28 . Diversity																	
MA01 - Agree strongly	0.22	37.37	-0.21	1.49	0.11	0.56	0.86	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.5	1.3	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.02
MA02 - Agree	1.42	4.88	-0.83	0.52	-0.05	-0.13	-0.02	2.9	1.7	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.14	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00
MA03 - Neither nor	1.86	3.49	-0.25	-0.26	0.02	-0.39	0.46	0.3	0.6	0.0	2.2	3.1	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.06
MA04 - Disagree	2.91	1.87	0.07	-0.47	0.16	0.24	-0.23	0.0	2.9	0.3	1.3	1.3	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.03
MA05 - Disagree strongly	1.69	3.92	0.79	0.43	0.05	-0.18		3.1	1.4	0.0	0.4		0.16	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.01
MA06 - Can't choose	0.38	20.75	0.30	0.39	-2.91	0.19	-0.12	0.1	0.3	15.1	0.1	0.0	0.00	0.01	0.41	0.00	0.00
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	6.5	8.9	16.3	4.4	6.2					
29 . Increased crime																	
KR01 - Agree strongly	2.16	2.85	1.07	0.48	0.29	-0.07	0.02	7.3	2.2	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.40	0.08	0.03	0.00	0.00
KR02 - Agree	3.49	1.39	-0.02	-0.49	0.02	0.36	-0.13	0.0	3.7	0.0	3.5	0.5	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.09	0.01
KR03 - Neither nor	1.61	4.17	-0.62	-0.26	0.03	-0.88	0.13	1.8	0.5	0.0	9.5	0.2	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.18	0.00
KR04 - Disagree	0.75	10.07	-1.32	1.08	0.18	0.33	0.21	3.9	3.9	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.17	0.12	0.00	0.01	0.00
KR06 - Can't choose	0.35	22.84	-0.27	0.30	-2.93	-0.07	-0.20	0.1	0.1	14.0	0.0	0.1	0.00	0.00	0.38	0.00	0.00
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	13.1	10.5	14.9	13.7	1.1					
31 . Take jobs																	
TA01 - Agree strongly	0.40	19.97	1.64	1.44	0.31	-1.09	-0.28	3.2	3.6	0.2	3.6	0.3	0.13	0.10	0.00	0.06	0.00
TA02 - Agree	1.23	5.77	0.77	-0.03	0.04	0.62	0.17	2.1	0.0	0.0	3.6	0.3	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.01
TA03 - Neither nor	2.35	2.54	0.25	-0.53	0.20	-0.02	0.45	0.4	3.0	0.4	0.0	3.8	0.02	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.08
TA04 - Disagree	3.36	1.48	-0.48	-0.10	0.07	-0.23	-0.56	2.3	0.2	0.1	1.3	8.6	0.16	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.21
TA05 - Disagree strongly	0.79	9.54	-1.07	1.33	0.13	0.57	1.08	2.6	6.2	0.1	2.0	7.5	0.12	0.19	0.00	0.03	0.12
TA06 - Can't choose	0.38	21.11	0.64	0.24	-3.01	0.22	-0.26	0.5	0.1	15.9	0.1	0.2	0.02	0.00	0.43	0.00	0.00
							CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =	11.1	13.1	16.7	10.7	20.7					

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+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------------------+
|              MODALITES                   |          COORDONNEES           |      CONTRIBUTIONS       |        COSINUS CARRES           |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE        P.REL DISTO |  1     2     3     4     5  |  1    2    3    4    5  |  1    2    3    4    5  |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------------------+
| 49 . Not good for national economy                                                                                                 |
| MO04 - Disagree         0.90  8.26 | -1.04  0.79  0.22  0.37  0.05 | 2.9  2.5  0.2  0.9  0.0 | 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.00 |
| MO03 - Neither nor      2.73  2.05 | -0.38 -0.30  0.23 -0.46  0.08 | 1.1  1.1  0.7  4.4  0.1 | 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.00 |
| MO02 - Agree            2.68  2.11 |  0.31 -0.42  0.14  0.48  0.01 | 0.7  2.1  0.2  4.8  0.0 | 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.00 |
| MO01 - Agree strongly   1.09  6.68 |  1.25  0.92  0.42 -0.32 -0.32 | 5.0  4.0  0.9  0.8  0.9 | 0.23 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.02 |
| MO06 - Can't choose     0.99  7.40 | -0.25  0.24 -1.80 -0.01  0.05 | 0.2  0.3 15.0  0.0  0.0 | 0.01 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.00 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 10.0 10.0 17.0 11.1  1.1 +------------------------+
| 50 . Not open                                                                                                                      |
| MO05 - Disagree strongly 0.49 16.02 | -1.20  1.88  0.11  0.98  1.23 | 2.1  7.7  0.0  3.6  6.0 | 0.09 0.22 0.00 0.06 0.09 |
| MO04 - Disagree         3.58  1.33 | -0.52  0.00  0.09 -0.20 -0.34 | 2.8  0.0  0.1  1.1  3.4 | 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.09 |
| MO03 - Neither nor      2.13  2.91 |  0.15 -0.59  0.14 -0.24  0.34 | 0.1  3.2  0.2  1.0  2.0 | 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.04 |
| MO02 - Agree            1.22  5.85 |  0.87 -0.16  0.34  0.90  0.15 | 2.7  0.1  0.6  7.5  0.2 | 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 |
| MO01 - Agree strongly   0.42 19.04 |  1.65  1.37  0.42 -1.14 -0.27 | 3.3  3.5  0.3  4.1  0.3 | 0.14 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.00 |
| MO06 - Can't choose     0.65 11.81 |  0.52  0.07 -2.16  0.26 -0.24 | 0.5  0.0 14.1  0.3  0.3 | 0.02 0.00 0.39 0.01 0.01 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 11.6 14.6 15.5 17.7 12.1 +------------------------+
```

COORDONNEES ET VALEURS-TEST DES MODALITES
AXES 1 A 5

```
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
|              MODALITES                   |          VALEURS-TEST          |           COORDONNEES          |           |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE       EFF.    P.ABS |  1     2     3     4     5  |   1     2     3     4     5  |  DISTO.  |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
| 34 . Gender                                                                                                            |
| KJ01 - Male           766    766.00 |  2.4  -0.8   1.6   2.3  -1.8 |  0.06 -0.02  0.04  0.06 -0.04 |   0.88   |
| KJ02 - Female         761    761.00 | -2.3   2.1  -3.4  -1.9   1.9 | -0.06  0.05 -0.08 -0.05  0.05 |   0.89   |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
| 35 . Age                                                                                                               |
| AL01 - 16-25 years    292    292.00 | -2.3   3.2   0.3  -2.0   5.3 | -0.12  0.17  0.02 -0.11  0.28 |   3.92   |
| AL02 - 26-35 years    296    296.00 | -3.7   0.7   0.9  -0.6  -1.2 | -0.19  0.04  0.05 -0.03 -0.06 |   3.86   |
| AL03 - 36-45 years    294    294.00 | -3.4   0.2   1.8  -0.4  -2.2 | -0.18  0.01  0.09 -0.02 -0.11 |   3.89   |
| AL04 - 46-55 years    246    246.00 | -2.3  -0.2   0.8   1.7  -0.7 | -0.13 -0.01  0.05  0.10 -0.04 |   4.84   |
| AL05 - 56-65 years    176    176.00 |  6.0  -2.0  -0.4   0.0  -1.8 |  0.43 -0.14 -0.03  0.00 -0.13 |   7.17   |
| AL06 - 66 years or more 223  223.00 |  7.5  -0.8  -6.2   2.2   0.4 |  0.46 -0.05 -0.38  0.14  0.02 |   5.44   |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
| 36 . Marital status                                                                                                    |
| SI01 - (Living as) married 836 836.00 |  1.5  -1.8   0.5   2.0  -2.9 |  0.03 -0.04  0.01  0.05 -0.07 |   0.72   |
| SI02 - Widowed         67     67.00 |  3.4   0.0  -4.3  -0.1  -0.3 |  0.40  0.00 -0.51 -0.01 -0.03 |  20.45   |
| SI03 - Divorced       107    107.00 |  0.8  -1.4  -0.2   0.3  -1.0 |  0.07 -0.13 -0.02  0.03 -0.09 |  12.43   |
| SI04 - Separated       19     19.00 | -2.3   0.3   0.1  -0.1  -0.8 | -0.53  0.07  0.03 -0.02 -0.18 |  74.64   |
| SI05 - Unmarried      498    498.00 | -2.8   3.9  -0.4  -1.8   4.0 | -0.10  0.14 -0.01 -0.06  0.14 |   1.89   |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
| 44 . Church attendance frequency                                                                                       |
| KI01 - Once a week or more 57  57.00 | -0.9   3.0  -0.3   0.3  -2.0 | -0.12  0.40 -0.04  0.04 -0.26 |  24.21   |
| KI02 - 2-3 times a month 59   59.00 |  0.2   0.0  -2.3  -1.3   0.0 |  0.02  0.12 -0.29 -0.17  0.00 |  23.36   |
| KI03 - Once a month    30     30.00 | -1.7   0.5   0.4   0.6   1.0 | -0.30  0.09  0.08  0.10  0.18 |  46.91   |
| KI04 - Several times a year 162 162.00 | -1.7 -0.4  -3.9  -0.5  -0.6 | -0.13 -0.03 -0.29 -0.04 -0.05 |   7.87   |
| KI05 - Seldom         685    685.00 |  2.2  -2.4   0.9  -0.7   1.3 |  0.06 -0.07  0.03 -0.02  0.04 |   1.10   |
| KI06 - Never          516    516.00 | -1.1   2.0   1.0   1.9  -0.4 | -0.04  0.07  0.03  0.07 -0.01 |   1.79   |
| 44_ - reponse manquante 18    18.00 |  3.4   1.2  -1.0  -0.5   0.1 |  0.80  0.28 -0.24 -0.11  0.03 |  78.84   |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
| 46 . Employment                                                                                                        |
| MO01 - Full-time      737    737.00 | -6.3  -3.1   5.7   1.0  -1.2 | -0.16 -0.08  0.15  0.03 -0.03 |   0.95   |
| MO02 - Part-time      101    101.00 | -0.2   0.0  -1.4  -1.2  -1.2 | -0.02  0.00 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 |  13.23   |
| MO03 - Other, not working 15  15.00 | -0.3   0.6   0.5   1.1   0.5 | -0.08  0.17  0.13  0.27  0.13 |  94.81   |
| MO04 - Unemployed      50     50.00 |  2.3   1.2  -2.2   0.5  -0.3 |  0.32  0.17 -0.31  0.07 -0.04 |  27.74   |
| MO05 - Student        199    199.00 | -6.5   3.6  -1.3  -1.3   3.0 | -0.43  0.23 -0.09 -0.08  0.20 |   6.22   |
| MO06 - Retired        327    327.00 | 10.3   0.7  -5.3   1.8  -0.1 |  0.50  0.03 -0.26  0.09 -0.01 |   3.40   |
| MO07 - Housewife       93     93.00 |  2.6   1.3  -1.2  -1.7  -0.1 |  0.26  0.13 -0.12 -0.17 -0.01 |  14.45   |
| MO08 - Missing          5      5.00 |  2.4   1.0  -0.3  -1.8  -0.5 |  1.05  0.46 -0.15 -0.81 -0.20 | 286.44   |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
```

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+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
|              MODALITES                   |          VALEURS-TEST          |           COORDONNEES          |           |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE       EFF.    P.ABS |  1     2     3     4     5  |   1     2     3     4     5  |  DISTO.  |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
| 53 . Education                                                                                                         |
| MO01 - Compulsory 1-9  186    186.00 |  8.2   1.7  -4.2   1.9   1.8 |  0.56  0.12 -0.28  0.13  0.12 |   6.73   |
| MO02 - Gymnasium 10-12 470    470.00 |  7.9  -2.0  -0.4   1.4   0.3 |  0.30 -0.07 -0.01  0.05  0.01 |   2.06   |
| MO03 - Higher education 13+ 538 538.00 | -10.9 -1.0  3.6  -1.8  -3.2 | -0.37 -0.04  0.12 -0.06 -0.11 |   1.67   |
| MO05 - Still in school 199    199.00 | -6.5   3.6  -1.3  -1.3   3.0 | -0.43  0.23 -0.09 -0.08  0.20 |   6.22   |
| 53_ - reponse manquante 134   134.00 |  3.9   0.8  -1.9   0.8  -0.7 |  0.32  0.07 -0.16  0.06 -0.05 |   9.73   |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
| 54 . Part of country                                                                                                   |
| MO01 - East           669    669.00 | -0.8   0.2   2.1   1.2  -0.6 | -0.02  0.01  0.06  0.03 -0.02 |   1.15   |
| MO14 - West           396    396.00 |  1.2   0.5  -1.7  -0.8   0.8 |  0.05  0.02 -0.07 -0.04  0.04 |   2.63   |
| MO16 - North          289    289.00 | -1.3  -0.1  -0.6  -0.8   0.2 | -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04  0.01 |   3.97   |
| MO05 - South          173    173.00 |  1.3   1.1  -2.7   0.9  -0.3 |  0.09  0.08 -0.19  0.06 -0.02 |   7.31   |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
| 55 . Income                                                                                                            |
| MO02 - Up to 149      219    219.00 |  4.3   3.8  -4.2   0.2   1.1 |  0.27  0.24 -0.26  0.02  0.07 |   5.56   |
| MO03 - 150-299        422    422.00 |  2.6  -2.2  -0.6   0.3   0.7 |  0.11 -0.09 -0.03  0.01  0.03 |   2.41   |
| MO04 - 300-399        317    317.00 |  0.2  -1.4   2.6   0.2  -1.1 |  0.01 -0.07  0.13  0.01 -0.05 |   3.53   |
| MO05 - More than 400  372    372.00 | -8.6   0.7   3.5   0.1  -1.4 | -0.38  0.03  0.16  0.00 -0.06 |   2.86   |
| 55_ - reponse manquante 197   197.00 |  3.0   1.5  -4.9  -0.4   1.0 |  0.20  0.10 -0.33 -0.03  0.07 |   6.30   |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
| 56 . Urban or rural                                                                                                    |
| MO01 - Urban          695    695.00 | -1.9   1.1   1.2   2.6  -1.5 | -0.05  0.03  0.03  0.07 -0.04 |   1.07   |
| MO02 - Rural          832    832.00 |  2.0   0.2  -3.0  -2.2   1.6 |  0.05  0.00 -0.07 -0.05  0.04 |   0.73   |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+-----------+
```

Civic identity and attitudes towards immigration Norway

```
CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES AVEC CHOIX DES MODALITES
APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES
SEUIL (PCMIN)   :      2.00 %      POIDS:      30.54
AVANT APUREMENT :     12 QUESTIONS ACTIVES          71 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
APRES           :     12 QUESTIONS ACTIVES          53 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS :   1527.00
TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES


VALEURS PROPRES
APERCU DE LA PRECISION DES CALCULS : TRACE AVANT DIAGONALISATION ..   3.4323
                                     SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES ....   3.4323
HISTOGRAMME DES 53 PREMIERES VALEURS PROPRES
+--------+----------+----------+----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NUMERO |  VALEUR  | POURCENT.| POURCENT.|                                                                            |
|        |  PROPRE  |          | CUMULE   |                                                                            |
+--------+----------+----------+----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|    1   |  0.2930  |   8.54   |   8.54   | *************************************************************************** |
|    2   |  0.2025  |   5.90   |  14.43   | *****************************************************                       |
|    3   |  0.1973  |   5.75   |  20.18   | ***************************************************                         |
|    4   |  0.1727  |   5.03   |  25.21   | *********************************************                               |
|    5   |  0.1270  |   3.70   |  28.92   | *********************************                                           |
+--------+----------+----------+----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
```

```
COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRES DES MODALITES ACTIVES
AXES  1 A  5
+------------------------------------------+---------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
|              MODALITES                   |           COORDONNEES           |       CONTRIBUTIONS      |      COSINUS CARRES      |
|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE         P.REL DISTO       |   1     2     3     4     5      |   1    2    3    4    5  |   1    2    3    4    5  |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
|  16 . How proud of democracy                                                                                                   |
| DE01 - Very proud          1.61   4.19   | -0.07 -1.13 -0.59  0.14 -0.66   |  0.0 10.1  2.8  0.2  5.5 | 0.00 0.30 0.08 0.00 0.10 |
| DE02 - Somewhat proud      5.02   0.66   | -0.16  0.14 -0.13  0.02  0.43   |  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.0  7.1 | 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.27 |
| DE03 - Not very proud      1.43   4.85   |  0.44  0.70  0.84  0.00 -0.68   |  0.9  3.5  5.2  0.0  5.2 | 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.10 |
| DE04 - Not proud at all    0.23  35.39   |  1.41 -0.11  1.90 -1.13 -0.45   |  1.6  0.0  4.2  1.7  0.4 | 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.01 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   3.0 14.1 12.6  1.9 18.2 +-------------------------+
|  17 . How proud of political influence                                                                                         |
| PO01 - Very proud          1.57   4.31   |  0.02 -0.89 -0.63  0.10 -0.65   |  0.0  6.2  3.1  0.1  5.2 | 0.00 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.10 |
| PO02 - Somewhat proud      4.70   0.77   | -0.20  0.15 -0.11  0.03  0.41   |  0.6  0.5  0.3  0.0  6.2 | 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.22 |
| PO03 - Not very proud      1.51   4.51   |  0.29  0.39  0.68  0.13 -0.47   |  0.4  1.1  3.5  0.1  2.7 | 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.05 |
| PO04 - Not proud at all    0.29  27.54   |  1.24  0.15  1.88 -0.72 -0.78   |  1.5  0.0  5.2  0.9  1.4 | 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.02 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   2.6  7.8 12.2  1.1 15.4 +-------------------------+


|  18 . How proud of economic achievements                                                                                       |
| ØK01 - Very proud          1.69   3.92   |  0.34 -1.01 -0.65  0.14 -0.48   |  0.7  8.5  3.7  0.2  3.1 | 0.03 0.26 0.11 0.00 0.06 |
| ØK02 - Somewhat proud      4.78   0.74   | -0.16  0.18 -0.07 -0.02  0.37   |  0.4  0.8  0.1  0.0  5.3 | 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.19 |
| ØK03 - Not very proud      1.48   4.62   |  0.05  0.50  0.83  0.15 -0.61   |  0.0  1.9  5.2  0.2  4.3 | 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.08 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   1.1 11.1  8.9  0.4 12.7 +-------------------------+
|  19 . How proud of welfare state                                                                                               |
| VE01 - Very proud          0.98   7.53   |  0.01 -1.28 -0.77  0.36 -0.94   |  0.0  8.0  2.9  0.7  6.8 | 0.00 0.22 0.08 0.02 0.12 |
| VE02 - Somewhat proud      4.13   1.02   | -0.28  0.00 -0.19 -0.03  0.42   |  1.1  0.0  0.8  0.0  5.7 | 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.17 |
| VE03 - Not very proud      2.50   2.33   |  0.13  0.39  0.33  0.03 -0.13   |  0.1  1.9  1.4  0.0  0.4 | 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.01 |
| VE04 - Not proud at all    0.66  11.54   |  1.24  0.34  1.22 -0.33 -0.76   |  3.5  0.4  5.0  0.4  3.0 | 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.05 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   4.7 10.2 10.1  1.2 15.8 +-------------------------+
|  25 . How proud of equal treatment                                                                                             |
| RE01 - Very proud          0.66  11.61   |  0.23 -1.47 -0.52  0.33 -0.98   |  0.1  7.1  0.9  0.4  5.0 | 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.08 |
| RE02 - Somewhat proud      3.06   1.72   | -0.25 -0.10 -0.47  0.11  0.30   |  0.6  0.1  3.4  0.2  2.1 | 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.05 |
| RE03 - Not very proud      3.21   1.60   | -0.09  0.30  0.17 -0.04  0.10   |  0.1  1.4  0.5  0.0  0.3 | 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 |
| RE04 - Not proud at all    1.14   6.31   |  0.67  0.26  1.18 -0.06 -0.59   |  1.8  0.4  8.1  0.0  3.1 | 0.07 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.05 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   2.6  9.0 12.9  0.7 10.5 +-------------------------+
|  26 . Assimilation                                                                                                             |
| FO01 - Agree strongly      1.98   3.21   |  1.04 -0.51 -0.08  0.16  0.42   |  7.3  2.6  0.1  0.3  2.8 | 0.34 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.06 |
| FO02 - Agree               3.69   1.26   | -0.07  0.32 -0.30 -0.07 -0.16   |  0.1  1.8  1.6  0.1  0.7 | 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.02 |
| FO03 - Neither nor         1.46   4.71   | -0.55 -0.16  0.26 -0.10 -0.08   |  1.5  0.2  0.5  0.1  0.1 | 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 |
| FO04 - Disagree            1.16   6.20   | -0.74 -0.20  0.56  0.15 -0.17   |  2.2  0.2  1.8  0.2  0.3 | 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  11.0  4.8  4.0  0.6  3.8 +-------------------------+
|  27 . Assimilation or diversity                                                                                                |
| UL01 - Maintain customs    1.81   3.61   | -0.84 -0.40  0.71  0.28  0.04   |  4.4  1.4  4.6  0.8  0.0 | 0.20 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.00 |
| UL02 - Adjust to society   5.46   0.53   |  0.34  0.14 -0.20  0.08 -0.04   |  2.2  0.5  1.2  0.2  0.1 | 0.23 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.00 |
| UL03 - Can't choose        1.26   5.59   | -0.24 -0.09 -0.13 -1.01  0.13   |  0.2  0.0  0.1  7.5  0.2 | 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   6.8  2.0  5.9  8.6  0.3 +-------------------------+
|  28 . Diversity                                                                                                                |
| MA01 - Agree strongly      0.22  36.55   | -0.06 -1.52  0.50  0.34 -0.05   |  0.0  2.5  0.3  0.1  0.0 | 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 |
| MA02 - Agree               1.45   4.75   | -0.90 -0.40  0.59  0.08  0.20   |  4.0  1.1  2.6  0.1  0.5 | 0.17 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 |
| MA03 - Neither nor         1.89   3.42   | -0.35  0.11 -0.27 -0.03 -0.03   |  0.8  0.1  0.7  0.0  0.0 | 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 |
| MA04 - Disagree            2.97   1.81   |  0.07  0.43 -0.28  0.10 -0.17   |  0.0  2.7  1.1  0.2  0.6 | 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 |
| MA05 - Disagree strongly   1.73   3.82   |  1.04 -0.23  0.21  0.18  0.14   |  6.4  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3 | 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 |
| MA06 - Can't choose        0.36  22.36   |  0.08 -0.59  0.07 -2.97  0.05   |  0.0  0.6  0.0 18.2  0.0 | 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.39 0.00 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  11.2  7.6  5.1 18.9  1.4 +-------------------------+
|  29 . Increased crime                                                                                                          |
| KR01 - Agree strongly      2.20   2.78   |  1.12 -0.42  0.00  0.17  0.43   |  9.4  1.9  0.0  0.4  3.1 | 0.45 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.07 |
| KR02 - Agree               3.55   1.35   | -0.06  0.45 -0.32 -0.02 -0.25   |  0.0  3.5  1.8  0.0  1.7 | 0.00 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.05 |
| KR03 - Neither nor         1.63   4.11   | -0.61  0.15  0.07  0.06 -0.20   |  2.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.5 | 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 |
| KR04 - Disagree            0.78   9.74   | -1.14 -0.72  1.07  0.38  0.26   |  3.5  2.0  4.5  0.6  0.4 | 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.01 |
| KR06 - Can't choose        0.34  23.85   | -0.47 -0.65  0.22 -3.19 -0.03   |  0.3  0.7  0.1 19.8  0.0 | 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.43 0.00 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  15.2  8.3  6.5 20.9  5.8 +-------------------------+
|  31 . Take jobs                                                                                                                |
| TA01 - Agree strongly      0.40  19.95   |  1.89 -0.97  0.74  0.04  0.99   |  4.8  1.8  1.1  0.0  3.1 | 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.05 |
| TA02 - Agree               1.24   5.71   |  0.74  0.18 -0.20 -0.24  0.26   |  2.3  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.7 | 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 |
| TA03 - Neither nor         2.39   2.48   |  0.20  0.35 -0.44  0.13 -0.03   |  0.3  1.4  2.4  0.2  0.0 | 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.00 |
| TA04 - Disagree            3.46   1.41   | -0.45  0.05  0.07  0.07 -0.29   |  2.4  0.0  0.1  0.1  2.4 | 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 |
| TA05 - Disagree strongly   0.81   9.34   | -0.87 -0.93  1.02  0.25  0.60   |  2.1  3.4  4.2  0.3  2.3 | 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.04 |
+------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =  12.0  6.9  8.0  1.0  8.4 +-------------------------+
|  49 . Not good for national economy                                                                                            |
| MO04 - Disagree            0.94   7.85   | -0.95 -0.70  0.64  0.46  0.20   |  2.9  2.3  1.9  1.2  0.3 | 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.01 |
| MO03 - Neither nor         2.78   2.00   | -0.41  0.25 -0.04  0.27 -0.17   |  1.6  0.9  0.0  1.1  0.6 | 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 |
```

```
| MO02 - Agree                  2.72  2.06 |  0.29  0.41 -0.36  0.03 -0.08 |  0.8  2.3  1.8  0.0  0.1 | 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.00 |
| MO01 - Agree strongly         1.12  6.44 |  1.55 -0.56  0.47  0.24  0.44 |  9.1  1.7  1.3  0.4  1.7 | 0.37 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 |
| MO06 - Can't choose           0.96  7.72 | -0.46 -0.47  0.02 -1.95  0.03 |  0.7  1.1  0.0 21.0  0.0 | 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.49 0.00 |
------------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 15.1  8.2  5.0 23.7  2.8 +------------------------+
```

```
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------+
|            MODALITES                   |        COORDONNEES           |      CONTRIBUTIONS       |    COSINUS CARRES       |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE        P.REL DISTO |  1     2     3     4     5   |  1    2    3    4    5   |  1    2    3    4    5  |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------+
|  50 . Not open                         |                              |                         |                        |
| MO05 - Disagree strongly      0.51 15.46 | -0.96 -1.35  1.41  0.32  0.71 |  1.6  4.6  5.1  0.3  2.0 | 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.03 |
| MO04 - Disagree               3.67  1.27 | -0.52 -0.05  0.06  0.13 -0.17 |  3.4  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.8 | 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 |
| MO03 - Neither nor            2.16  2.85 |  0.11  0.51 -0.36  0.08 -0.10 |  0.1  2.7  1.4  0.1  0.2 | 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.00 |
| MO02 - Agree                  1.25  5.68 |  0.92  0.29 -0.20  0.19  0.34 |  3.6  0.5  0.2  0.3  1.1 | 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 |
| MO01 - Agree strongly         0.42 18.91 |  1.99 -0.92  0.84  0.25  0.45 |  5.6  1.8  1.5  0.2  0.7 | 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 |
| MO06 - Can't choose           0.61 12.76 |  0.29 -0.37 -0.33 -2.38 -0.13 |  0.2  0.4  0.3 19.8  0.1 | 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.44 0.00 |
+----------------------------------------+--------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 14.5 10.0  8.7 21.0  4.8 +------------------------+
```

COORDONNEES ET VALEURS-TEST DES MODALITES
AXES 1 A 5

```
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|            MODALITES                   |         VALEURS-TEST          |              COORDONNEES                 |          |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE        EFF.    P.ABS |  1     2     3     4     5   |   1      2      3      4      5    | DISTO. |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|  34 . Gender                           |                              |                                         |          |
| KJ01 - Male             766    766.00 |  3.2   1.8   0.8   0.2   0.5 |  0.08   0.04   0.02   0.01   0.01 |   0.81 |
| KJ02 - Female           761    761.00 | -2.7  -2.8  -0.4  -4.4  -0.4 | -0.06  -0.07  -0.01  -0.11  -0.01 |   0.82 |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|  35 . Age                              |                              |                                         |          |
| AL01 - 16-25 years      292    292.00 | -1.1  -1.6   1.4  -1.7   0.8 | -0.06  -0.08   0.07  -0.09   0.04 |   3.74 |
| AL02 - 26-35 years      296    296.00 | -3.4  -0.5   0.0   0.9   0.1 | -0.17  -0.02   0.00   0.05   0.01 |   3.67 |
| AL03 - 36-45 years      294    294.00 | -3.1   0.1   0.8   1.4   1.7 | -0.16   0.01   0.04   0.07   0.09 |   3.70 |
| AL04 - 46-55 years      246    246.00 | -1.3   0.8   1.5   1.0   0.2 | -0.08   0.04   0.09   0.06   0.01 |   4.62 |
| AL05 - 56-65 years      176    176.00 |  5.5   2.0  -1.6  -1.0   0.5 |  0.39   0.14  -0.11  -0.07   0.04 |   6.86 |
| AL06 - 66 years or more 223    223.00 |  5.5  -1.9  -2.1  -6.4  -3.4 |  0.34  -0.11  -0.13  -0.39  -0.21 |   5.20 |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|  36 . Marital status                   |                              |                                         |          |
| SI01 - (Living as) married 836  836.00 |  0.9   0.0  -2.0  -0.1  -0.1 |  0.02   0.00  -0.04   0.00   0.00 |   0.65 |
| SI02 - Widowed           67     67.00 |  2.7  -2.1  -0.7  -4.3  -2.6 |  0.32  -0.25  -0.08  -0.51  -0.31 |  19.64 |
| SI03 - Divorced         107    107.00 |  0.7   2.9   0.3  -0.4   1.3 |  0.07   0.27   0.03  -0.04   0.12 |  11.92 |
| SI04 - Separated         19     19.00 | -1.6   0.3   1.0   0.0   1.1 | -0.36   0.08   0.23   0.01  -0.11 |  71.77 |
| SI05 - Unmarried        498    498.00 | -1.6  -1.8   2.3  -2.1   0.8 | -0.06  -0.07   0.08  -0.08   0.03 |   1.78 |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|  44 . Church attendance frequency      |                              |                                         |          |
| KI01 - Once a week or more  57   57.00 | -0.2  -1.4   1.6  -1.1  -0.2 | -0.02  -0.18   0.20  -0.14  -0.02 |  23.26 |
| KI02 - 2-3 times a month  59   59.00 | -1.7  -1.9  -0.3  -2.3   0.1 | -0.21  -0.24  -0.03  -0.29   0.01 |  22.44 |
| KI03 - Once a month      30     30.00 | -2.0  -0.4   0.0   0.4  -0.2 | -0.36  -0.08   0.00   0.07  -0.04 |  45.09 |
| KI04 - Several times a year 162 162.00 | -2.5  -2.6  -1.0  -2.7  -1.6 | -0.18  -0.19  -0.07  -0.20  -0.11 |   7.53 |
| KI05 - Seldom           685    685.00 |  1.2   1.7  -3.2  -0.2   0.8 |  0.03   0.05  -0.09  -0.01   0.02 |   1.02 |
| KI06 - Never            516    516.00 |  1.7   0.7   4.0  -0.8   0.3 |  0.06   0.02   0.14  -0.03   0.01 |   1.68 |
| 44_  - reponse manquante  18   18.00 |  2.5  -1.0  -0.7  -0.9   0.8 |  0.59  -0.24  -0.17  -0.20   0.19 |  75.81 |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|  46 . Employment                       |                              |                                         |          |
| MO01 - Full-time        737    737.00 | -4.8   3.7   0.3   5.0   0.3 | -0.12   0.09   0.01   0.13   0.01 |   0.88 |
| MO02 - Part-time        101    101.00 | -0.5  -0.8  -0.2  -2.0   1.1 | -0.05  -0.08  -0.02  -0.19   0.11 |  12.69 |
| MO03 - Other, not working 15   15.00 |  0.2  -1.4   0.5   0.1  -1.1 |  0.05  -0.35   0.13   0.02  -0.29 |  91.18 |
| MO04 - Unemployed        50     50.00 |  2.2  -0.6   0.1  -2.5   0.4 |  0.30  -0.08   0.01  -0.35   0.06 |  26.65 |
| MO05 - Student          199    199.00 | -5.6  -2.2   2.3  -1.9   0.3 | -0.36  -0.15   0.15  -0.12   0.02 |   5.95 |
| MO06 - Retired          327    327.00 |  8.8  -1.9  -1.3  -5.7  -2.1 |  0.42  -0.09  -0.06  -0.28  -0.10 |   3.23 |
| MO07 - Housewife         93     93.00 |  2.1  -1.2  -0.7  -2.1   1.3 |  0.21  -0.12  -0.07  -0.21   0.13 |  13.87 |
| MO08 - Missing            5      5.00 |  1.1   0.0  -0.4   0.0   2.7 |  0.51   0.01  -0.17  -0.02   1.18 | 275.53 |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|  53 . Education                        |                              |                                         |          |
| MO01 - Compulsory 1-9   186    186.00 |  6.2  -3.0  -2.1  -5.0   0.0 |  0.42  -0.20  -0.14  -0.34   0.00 |   6.43 |
| MO02 - Gymnasium 10-12  470    470.00 |  8.1   1.7  -1.9  -1.7  -0.3 |  0.30   0.06  -0.07  -0.06  -0.01 |   1.94 |
| MO03 - Higher education 13+ 538 538.00 | -9.7  -1.5   2.7   3.6   0.2 | -0.33   0.06   0.09   0.12   0.01 |   1.57 |
| MO05 - Still in school  199    199.00 | -5.6  -2.2   2.3  -1.9   0.3 | -0.36  -0.15   0.15  -0.12   0.02 |   5.95 |
| 53_  - reponse manquante 134  134.00 |  3.2  -1.1  -0.9  -2.3   0.0 |  0.27  -0.09  -0.07  -0.19   0.00 |   9.32 |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
```

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+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|            MODALITES                   |         VALEURS-TEST          |              COORDONNEES                 |          |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE        EFF.    P.ABS |  1     2     3     4     5   |   1      2      3      4      5    | DISTO. |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|  54 . Part of country                  |                              |                                         |          |
| MO01 - East             669    669.00 |  0.3   0.3   0.2   1.6  -0.2 |  0.01   0.01   0.01   0.04   0.00 |   1.07 |
| MO14 - West             396    396.00 |  1.5  -0.2   0.3  -3.1   0.4 |  0.06  -0.01   0.01  -0.13   0.02 |   2.49 |
| MO16 - North            289    289.00 | -2.7  -0.3  -0.1  -1.2   1.3 | -0.14  -0.01  -0.01  -0.06   0.07 |   3.78 |
| MO05 - South            173    173.00 |  1.6  -1.4   0.0  -3.0  -1.7 |  0.12  -0.10   0.00  -0.22  -0.12 |   6.99 |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|  55 . Income                           |                              |                                         |          |
| MO02 - Up to 149        219    219.00 |  3.4  -3.4   0.6  -4.9  -0.9 |  0.21  -0.21   0.04  -0.30  -0.05 |   5.31 |
| MO03 - 150-299          422    422.00 |  1.3   0.7  -3.2  -1.5   1.3 |  0.05   0.03  -0.13  -0.06   0.05 |   2.28 |
| MO04 - 300-399          317    317.00 |  0.0   0.5  -2.1   2.0   0.7 |  0.00   0.03  -0.10   0.10   0.04 |   3.36 |
| MO05 - More than 400    372    372.00 | -6.6   1.2   3.4   3.5  -0.4 | -0.29   0.05   0.15   0.16  -0.02 |   2.72 |
| 55_  - reponse manquante 197  197.00 |  3.8  -1.0   2.2  -5.7  -1.0 |  0.25  -0.06   0.14  -0.38  -0.07 |   6.02 |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
|  56 . Urban or rural                   |                              |                                         |          |
| MO01 - Urban            695    695.00 |  0.0   0.6   2.2   0.1  -0.5 |  0.00   0.02   0.06   0.00  -0.01 |   0.99 |
| MO02 - Rural            832    832.00 |  0.5  -1.7  -1.8  -4.3   0.7 |  0.01  -0.04  -0.04  -0.09   0.02 |   0.66 |
+----------------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+----------+
```

Cultural identity and attitudes towards immigration Norway

```
CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES AVEC CHOIX DES MODALITES
APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES
SEUIL (PCMIN)   :      2.00 %      POIDS:      30.54
AVANT APUREMENT :    12 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        71 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
APRES           :    12 QUESTIONS ACTIVES        49 MODALITES ASSOCIEES
POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS :   1527.00
TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES


VALEURS PROPRES
APERCU DE LA PRECISION DES CALCULS : TRACE AVANT DIAGONALISATION ..   3.1201
                                     SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES ....   3.1201
HISTOGRAMME DES 49 PREMIERES VALEURS PROPRES
+-------+----------+----------+----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NUMERO|  VALEUR  | POURCENT.| POURCENT.|                                                                     |
|       |  PROPRE  |          | CUMULE   |                                                                     |
+-------+----------+----------+----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
|   1   |  0.2908  |   9.32   |   9.32   | *********************************************************************|
|   2   |  0.1909  |   6.12   |  15.44   | ***************************************************                  |
|   3   |  0.1847  |   5.92   |  21.35   | *************************************************                    |
|   4   |  0.1618  |   5.18   |  26.54   | *******************************************                          |
|   5   |  0.1216  |   3.90   |  30.44   | *********************************                                    |
+-------+----------+----------+----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------+


COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRES DES MODALITES ACTIVES
AXES  1 A  5
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+--------------------------+--------------------------+
|                 MODALITES                 |         COORDONNEES          |       CONTRIBUTIONS       |      COSINUS CARRES       |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| IDEN - LIBELLE          P.REL DISTO        |  1     2     3     4     5    |  1    2    3    4    5    |  1    2    3    4    5    |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+--------------------------+--------------------------+
|  20 . How proud of science/technology                                                                                        |
| TE01 - Very proud         1.46   4.72 |  0.53  0.01 -0.71  0.79 -0.69 |  1.4  0.0  3.9  5.7  5.7 | 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.10 |
| TE02 - Somewhat proud     4.93   0.69 | -0.04 -0.19  0.11  0.02  0.32 |  0.0  0.9  0.3  0.0  4.1 | 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.15 |
| TE03 - Not very proud     1.44   4.80 | -0.36  0.80  0.39 -0.60 -0.32 |  0.6  4.8  1.2  3.2  1.2 | 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.02 |
+-------------------------------------------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =    2.1  5.7  5.5  8.9 11.0 +--------------------------+
|  21 . How proud of sports results                                                                                            |
| SP01 - Very proud         4.24   0.97 |  0.26 -0.15 -0.28  0.39 -0.29 |  1.0  0.5  1.8  4.0  2.9 | 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.09 |
| SP02 - Somewhat proud     3.72   1.24 | -0.21 -0.07  0.19 -0.28  0.46 |  0.6  0.1  0.7  1.9  6.6 | 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.17 |
| SP03 - Not very proud     0.57  13.57 | -0.71  1.04  0.41 -1.00 -0.89 |  1.0  3.2  0.5  3.5  3.7 | 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.06 |
+-------------------------------------------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =    2.5  3.8  3.1  9.4 13.2 +--------------------------+
|  22 . How proud of art and literature                                                                                        |
| KU01 - Very proud         1.47   4.65 |  0.21  0.12 -0.82  1.00 -0.80 |  0.2  0.1  5.4  9.1  7.8 | 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.22 0.14 |
| KU02 - Somewhat proud     4.29   0.94 | -0.14 -0.21  0.08  0.08  0.46 |  0.3  1.0  0.1  0.2  7.6 | 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.23 |
| KU03 - Not very proud     1.70   3.90 | -0.17  0.43  0.47 -0.69 -0.32 |  0.2  1.6  2.0  4.9  1.4 | 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.03 |
| KU04 - Not proud at all   0.31  25.47 |  0.58  1.17  0.65 -1.09 -1.26 |  0.4  2.3  0.7  2.3  4.1 | 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.06 |
+-------------------------------------------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =    1.0  5.0  8.3 16.5 21.0 +--------------------------+
|  23 . How proud of armed forces                                                                                              |
| MI02 - Somewhat proud     2.55   2.26 |  0.19 -0.45 -0.14  0.41  0.25 |  0.3  2.7  0.3  2.7  1.3 | 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.03 |
| MI03 - Not very proud     2.82   1.95 | -0.09  0.10  0.32 -0.13  0.14 |  0.1  0.2  1.6  0.3  0.4 | 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 |
| MI04 - Not proud at all   1.32   5.33 | -0.38  1.01  0.07 -0.70 -0.68 |  0.6  7.0  0.0  3.9  5.0 | 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.09 0.09 |
+-------------------------------------------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =    1.0  9.8  1.9  6.9  6.7 +--------------------------+
|  24 . How proud of national history                                                                                          |
| HI01 - Very proud         1.87   3.46 |  0.58  0.05 -0.69  0.83 -0.64 |  2.2  0.0  4.8  7.9  6.3 | 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.20 0.12 |
| HI02 - Somewhat proud     4.66   0.79 | -0.09 -0.20  0.08 -0.02  0.42 |  0.1  1.0  0.2  0.0  6.8 | 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.22 |
| HI03 - Not very proud     1.47   4.67 | -0.35  0.51  0.51 -0.61 -0.20 |  0.6  2.0  2.1  3.3  0.5 | 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.01 |
| HI04 - Not proud at all   0.22  37.40 | -0.40  1.57  0.68 -1.21 -2.27 |  0.1  2.8  0.5  2.0  9.2 | 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.14 |
+-------------------------------------------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =    3.1  5.8  7.6 13.3 22.7 +--------------------------+
|  26 . Assimilation                                                                                                           |
| FO01 - Agree strongly     2.03   3.10 |  1.13  0.41 -0.28  0.06  0.14 |  8.9  1.7  0.8  0.0  0.3 | 0.41 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 |
| FO02 - Agree              3.86   1.16 | -0.06 -0.36  0.28 -0.09 -0.20 |  0.1  2.6  1.7  0.2  1.2 | 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.03 |
| FO03 - Neither nor        1.51   4.51 | -0.60 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05  0.09 |  1.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 | 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 |
| FO04 - Disagree           1.19   6.00 | -0.86  0.42 -0.27  0.25  0.28 |  3.0  1.1  0.5  0.5  0.8 | 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 |
+-------------------------------------------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   13.9  5.4  3.0  0.7  2.4 +--------------------------+
|  27 . Assimilation or diversity                                                                                              |
| UL01 - Maintain customs   1.86   3.49 | -0.91  0.62 -0.34  0.30  0.14 |  5.3  3.8  1.1  1.0  0.3 | 0.24 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 |
| UL02 - Adjust to society  5.68   0.47 |  0.35 -0.09  0.20  0.00 -0.08 |  2.4  0.3  1.2  0.0  0.3 | 0.27 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.01 |
| UL03 - Can't choose       1.31   5.37 | -0.21 -0.55 -0.65 -0.59  0.09 |  0.2  2.0  3.0  2.8  0.1 | 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.00 |
+-------------------------------------------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =    7.9  6.1  5.4  3.9  0.6 +--------------------------+
|  28 . Diversity                                                                                                              |
| MA02 - Agree              1.51   4.52 | -0.91  0.51 -0.53  0.22  0.11 |  4.3  2.1  2.3  0.5  0.2 | 0.18 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.00 |
| MA03 - Neither nor        1.96   3.26 | -0.30 -0.31  0.05  0.19  0.15 |  0.6  1.0  0.0  0.4  0.3 | 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 |
| MA04 - Disagree           3.11   1.68 |  0.07 -0.30  0.43  0.04 -0.25 |  0.0  1.4  3.1  0.0  1.5 | 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.04 |
| MA05 - Disagree strongly  1.79   3.65 |  0.97  0.55 -0.01 -0.20  0.13 |  5.8  2.8  0.0  0.4  0.2 | 0.26 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 |
| MA06 - Can't choose       0.37  21.62 |  0.09 -1.20 -2.17 -1.84  0.03 |  0.0  2.8  9.4  7.7  0.0 | 0.00 0.07 0.22 0.16 0.00 |
+-------------------------------------------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   10.7 10.1 14.9  9.1  2.3 +--------------------------+
|  29 . Increased crime                                                                                                        |
| KR01 - Agree strongly     2.28   2.65 |  1.16  0.44 -0.19  0.00  0.23 | 10.6  2.4  0.5  0.0  1.0 | 0.51 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02 |
| KR02 - Agree              3.72   1.24 | -0.06 -0.42  0.40 -0.04 -0.25 |  0.0  3.5  3.2  0.0  1.9 | 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.05 |
| KR03 - Neither nor        1.70   3.90 | -0.65 -0.01  0.00  0.23  0.01 |  2.4  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0 | 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 |
| KR04 - Disagree           0.78   9.64 | -1.26  0.99 -0.60  0.26  0.44 |  4.3  4.0  1.5  0.3  1.2 | 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 |
| KR06 - Can't choose       0.35  22.81 | -0.53 -1.19 -2.25 -1.95 -0.07 |  0.3  2.6  9.6  8.3  0.0 | 0.01 0.06 0.22 0.17 0.00 |
+-------------------------------------------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   17.8 12.5 14.7  9.2  4.0 +--------------------------+
|  31 . Take jobs                                                                                                              |
| TA01 - Agree strongly     0.41  19.08 |  1.77  1.32 -0.66 -0.49  1.20 |  4.5  3.8  1.0  0.6  4.9 | 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.08 |
| TA02 - Agree              1.31   5.37 |  0.72  0.21  0.08 -0.31 -0.20 |  2.4  0.2  0.0  0.8  0.4 | 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 |
| TA03 - Neither nor        2.50   2.33 |  0.26 -0.37  0.41  0.08 -0.01 |  0.6  1.8  2.3  0.1  0.0 | 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 |
| TA04 - Disagree           3.59   1.32 | -0.48  0.02  0.00  0.15  0.01 |  2.9  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0 | 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 |
| TA05 - Disagree strongly  0.81   9.29 | -0.89  0.99 -0.74  0.15 -0.13 |  2.2  4.1  2.4  0.1  0.1 | 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.00 |
+-------------------------------------------- CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE =   12.5  9.9  5.7  2.1  5.5 +--------------------------+



|  49 . Not good for national economy                                                                                          |
| MO04 - Disagree           0.96   7.71 | -0.97  0.78 -0.40  0.39  0.18 |  3.1  3.0  0.8  0.9  0.2 | 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.00 |
| MO03 - Neither nor        2.90   1.87 | -0.42 -0.03  0.26  0.29 -0.02 |  1.7  0.0  1.0  1.5  0.0 | 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 |
| MO02 - Agree              2.85   1.93 |  0.32 -0.38  0.41 -0.02 -0.26 |  1.0  2.2  2.5  0.0  1.6 | 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.04 |
```

			COORDONNEES					CONTRIBUTIONS					COSINUS CARRES				
MO01 - Agree strongly	1.17	6.12	1.42	0.98	-0.25	-0.25	0.58	8.1	5.9	0.4	0.4	3.2	0.33	0.16	0.01	0.01	0.05
MO06 - Can't choose	0.97	7.56	-0.44	-0.81	-1.53	-1.11	-0.13	0.6	3.4	12.3	7.5	0.1	0.03	0.09	0.31	0.16	0.00

CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 14.6 14.4 17.1 10.3 5.2

MODALITES			COORDONNEES					CONTRIBUTIONS					COSINUS CARRES				
IDEN - LIBELLE	P.REL	DISTO	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
50 . Not open																	
MO04 - Disagree	3.84	1.17	-0.54	0.11	-0.09	0.24	0.08	3.9	0.2	0.2	1.4	0.2	0.25	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.01
MO03 - Neither nor	2.27	2.68	0.14	-0.39	0.48	0.05	-0.13	0.1	1.8	2.8	0.0	0.3	0.01	0.06	0.08	0.00	0.01
MO02 - Agree	1.30	5.42	0.93	-0.04	0.40	-0.16	-0.02	3.8	0.0	1.2	0.2	0.0	0.16	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00
MO01 - Agree strongly	0.44	17.96	1.79	1.46	-0.55	-0.29	0.97	4.9	4.9	0.7	0.2	3.4	0.18	0.12	0.02	0.00	0.05
MO06 - Can't choose	0.63	12.19	0.31	-1.16	-1.53	-1.43	-0.51	0.2	4.5	8.0	7.9	1.3	0.01	0.11	0.19	0.17	0.02

CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 12.9 11.4 12.9 9.8 5.3

COORDONNEES ET VALEURS-TEST DES MODALITES
AXES 1 A 5

MODALITES			VALEURS-TEST					COORDONNEES					
IDEN - LIBELLE	EFF.	P.ABS	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	DISTO.
34 . Gender													
KJ01 - Male	766	766.00	1.9	2.4	4.8	-5.8	1.5	0.04	0.06	0.11	-0.13	0.03	0.66
KJ02 - Female	761	761.00	-1.7	-3.4	-9.4	2.9	-2.1	-0.04	-0.08	-0.22	0.07	-0.05	0.67
35 . Age													
AL01 - 16-25 years	292	292.00	-1.2	2.5	-3.0	-1.4	-4.0	-0.06	0.13	-0.15	-0.07	-0.20	3.35
AL02 - 26-35 years	296	296.00	-3.2	0.9	-1.0	2.1	-1.4	-0.16	0.05	-0.05	0.11	-0.07	3.29
AL03 - 36-45 years	294	294.00	-3.1	2.0	0.8	-0.6	1.6	-0.16	0.10	0.04	-0.03	0.08	3.32
AL04 - 46-55 years	246	246.00	-1.7	0.2	1.0	-0.1	2.0	-0.10	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.11	4.16
AL05 - 56-65 years	176	176.00	5.6	-2.1	0.7	-0.9	1.5	0.39	-0.15	0.05	-0.07	0.11	6.22
AL06 - 66 years or more	223	223.00	5.3	-5.6	-4.1	-2.9	0.0	0.32	-0.34	-0.25	-0.17	0.00	4.70
36 . Marital status													
SI01 - (Living as) married	836	836.00	1.0	-2.3	1.0	-0.6	3.9	0.02	-0.05	0.02	-0.01	0.08	0.52
SI02 - Widowed	67	67.00	2.5	-2.6	-4.2	-1.5	-0.6	0.30	-0.31	-0.50	-0.18	-0.08	17.96
SI03 - Divorced	107	107.00	0.7	-0.5	0.3	0.2	-0.9	0.07	-0.05	0.03	0.02	-0.09	10.87
SI04 - Separated	19	19.00	-1.9	-0.6	0.1	0.0	1.8	-0.43	-0.13	0.03	0.01	0.41	65.87
SI05 - Unmarried	498	498.00	-1.9	2.9	-3.8	-1.7	-4.0	-0.07	0.10	-0.13	-0.06	-0.14	1.55
44 . Church attendance frequency													
KI01 - Once a week or more	57	57.00	-0.4	2.5	-2.0	-1.5	-3.3	-0.05	0.32	-0.26	-0.19	-0.42	21.29
KI02 - 2-3 times a month	59	59.00	-1.0	-0.1	-3.6	0.4	-1.1	-0.13	-0.10	-0.45	0.05	-0.14	20.53
KI03 - Once a month	30	30.00	-2.4	-0.2	0.1	0.3	1.2	-0.44	-0.03	0.02	0.05	0.22	41.35
KI04 - Several times a year	162	162.00	-2.0	-2.8	-4.5	1.4	0.6	-0.15	-0.20	-0.33	0.10	0.04	6.84
KI05 - Seldom	685	685.00	1.9	-3.6	0.7	1.4	0.9	0.05	-0.09	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.85
KI06 - Never	516	516.00	0.3	4.1	0.4	-4.7	-0.8	0.01	0.14	0.01	-0.16	-0.03	1.46
44_ - reponse manquante	18	18.00	2.9	-0.6	-1.3	-0.8	1.9	0.68	-0.14	-0.31	-0.20	0.45	69.59
46 . Employment													
MO01 - Full-time	737	737.00	-5.6	1.5	6.2	1.9	0.4	-0.13	0.04	0.15	0.04	0.01	0.72
MO02 - Part-time	101	101.00	-0.1	-0.5	-2.9	0.2	0.6	-0.01	-0.05	-0.28	0.02	0.06	11.58
MO03 - Other, not working	15	15.00	-0.2	1.8	-0.3	-0.8	-2.2	-0.05	0.46	-0.08	-0.22	-0.56	83.70
MO04 - Unemployed	50	50.00	2.2	-0.4	-1.9	-2.5	-0.3	0.31	-0.05	-0.26	-0.35	-0.04	24.41
MO05 - Student	199	199.00	-5.9	2.0	-4.2	-0.7	-2.2	-0.38	0.13	-0.27	-0.04	-0.14	5.38
MO06 - Retired	327	327.00	8.7	-3.9	-3.9	-3.4	0.0	0.41	-0.19	-0.19	-0.16	0.00	2.89
MO07 - Housewife	93	93.00	2.8	-0.8	-3.0	-0.5	1.6	0.27	-0.08	-0.30	-0.05	0.16	12.66
MO08 - Missing	5	5.00	1.9	0.4	-1.2	0.8	0.7	0.84	0.17	-0.55	0.38	0.30	253.11
53 . Education													
MO01 - Compulsory 1-9	186	186.00	6.9	-2.5	-4.1	-3.9	-0.8	0.47	-0.17	-0.28	-0.26	-0.05	5.83
MO02 - Gymnasium 10-12	470	470.00	8.5	-3.0	1.2	-1.6	0.1	0.31	-0.11	0.04	-0.06	0.00	1.70
MO03 - Higher education 13+	538	538.00	-10.8	3.1	1.6	3.2	0.8	-0.36	0.10	0.05	0.10	0.03	1.36
MO05 - Still in school	199	199.00	-5.9	2.0	-4.2	-0.7	-2.2	-0.38	0.13	-0.27	-0.04	-0.14	5.38
53_ - reponse manquante	134	134.00	3.5	-1.3	-2.0	-1.9	1.2	0.28	-0.10	-0.16	-0.15	0.10	8.48

MODALITES			VALEURS-TEST					COORDONNEES					
IDEN - LIBELLE	EFF.	P.ABS	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	DISTO.
54 . Part of country													
MO01 - East	669	669.00	0.0	1.4	0.4	1.3	-1.2	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.90
MO14 - West	396	396.00	1.2	-0.5	-1.4	-3.9	0.2	0.05	-0.02	-0.06	-0.16	0.01	2.21
MO16 - North	289	289.00	-2.1	-0.9	-3.0	1.5	0.6	-0.11	-0.05	-0.16	0.08	0.03	3.40
MO05 - South	173	173.00	1.2	-1.6	-1.5	-2.5	0.0	0.09	-0.11	-0.11	-0.18	0.00	6.34
55 . Income													
MO02 - Up to 149	219	219.00	2.9	-0.4	-5.0	-4.2	-0.3	0.18	-0.02	-0.31	-0.26	-0.02	4.80
MO03 - 150-299	422	422.00	2.5	-3.2	-0.4	-0.4	-0.2	0.10	-0.13	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	2.01
MO04 - 300-399	317	317.00	1.2	-1.2	0.3	4.2	1.2	0.06	-0.06	0.01	0.20	0.06	3.01
MO05 - More than 400	372	372.00	-8.4	4.4	3.5	0.1	-0.4	-0.37	0.19	0.15	0.00	-0.02	2.42
55_ - reponse manquante	197	197.00	3.1	-0.8	-5.1	-4.2	-1.2	0.20	-0.06	-0.33	-0.27	-0.08	5.45
56 . Urban or rural													
MO01 - Urban	695	695.00	-0.9	1.4	0.3	-2.2	-0.6	-0.02	0.04	0.01	-0.06	-0.02	0.83
MO02 - Rural	832	832.00	1.2	-2.5	-5.0	-0.6	0.0	0.02	-0.05	-0.10	-0.01	0.00	0.53

Appendix B – Maps and result matrixes of explaining points

Correspondence analysis of background variables Italy

Negative coordinates	Axis 1	Positive coordinates
Retired 9,3 (0,29)		Student 8,9 (0,25)
Housewife 4,2 (0,14)		
56-65 years old 5,6 (0,17)		18-25 years old 14,5 (0,46)
66-75 years old 6,8 (0,20)		
Widowed 5,8 (0,16)		Unmarried 13,3 (0,50)
Compulsory education 9,9 (0,43)		Higher education 5,8 (0,21)
Up to 1 500 000 lire per month 3,8 (0,12)		
	Axis 2	
		Full-time 7,0 (0,22)
Student 9,1 (0,19)		
Retired 9,2 (0,21)		
Other, not working 3,3 (0,7)		
18-25 years old 11,5 (0,27)		36-45 years old 9,9 (0,24)
66-75 years old 8,0 (0,17)		
Widowed 7,2 (0,15)		(Living as) married 7,9 (0,42)
Unmarried 8,2 (0,22)		
Up to 1 500 000 lire per month 4,8 (0,11)		

Correspondence analysis of membership identity and attitudes towards immigration Italy

Negative coordinates	Axis 1	Positive coordinates
Very important Birth 10,2 (0,50)		Fairly important Birth 3,5 (0,15)
		Not very important Birth 4,4 (0,15)
Very important Citizenship 11,1 (0,56)		Fairly important Citizenship 4,7 (0,21)
		Not very important Citizenship 5,0 (0,16)
Very important Language 7,3 (0,39)		Fairly important Language 5,5 (0,25)
Very important Respect 2,7 (0,15)		Fairly important Respect 2,9 (0,13)
Very important Sentiment 5,2 (0,34)		Fairly important Sentiment 4,8 (0,20)
Agree strongly Crime 6,2 (0,23)		
Agree strongly Bad for economy 2,6 (0,09)		
Agree strongly Take jobs 3,3 (0,10)		
Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 2,3 (0,07)		

	Axis 2	
Fairly important Birth 8,4 (0,29)		Not very important Birth 3,2 (0,09)
		Not important at all Birth 5,1 (0,12)
Fairly important Citizenship 6,1 (0,22)		Not very important Citizenship 4,5 (0,12)
Fairly important Language 2,7 (0,10)		Not important at all Language 2,9 (0,07)
Fairly important Respect 5,0 (0,18)		Very important Respect 2,7 (0,12)
Fairly important Sentiment 5,9 (0,20)		Not very important Sentiment 2,5 (0,06)
		Not important at all Sentiment 4,7 (0,11)
		Disagree strongly Crime 7,6 (0,18)
		Disagree Bad for economy 3,7 (0,10)
Agree Take jobs 2,7 (0,08)		Disagree strongly Take jobs 7,0 (0,18)
Agree Not open to new impulses 2,8 (0,08)		Disagree strongly Not open to new impulses 5,6 (0,14)

	Axis 3	
Not important at all Respect 4,7 (0,10)		
Not important at all Sentiment 3,5 (0,07)		
Agree strongly Crime 8,7 (0,25)		Disagree Crime 2,5 (0,06)
Agree strongly Bad for economy 17,1 (0,45)		
Agree strongly Take jobs 10,1 (0,24)		Disagree Take jobs 5,6 (0,17)
Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 14,7 (0,35)		Disagree Not open to new impulses 4,0 (0,13)

Correspondence analysis of chauvinistic identity and attitudes towards immigration Italy

Negative coordinates	Axis 1	Positive coordinates
Disagree strongly Rather live 6,8 (0,23)		
Disagree strongly More like us 10,8 (0,41)		Agree More like us 1,8 (0,07)
Disagree strongly Italy better 8,9 (0,31)		
Disagree strongly Support nation 8,9 (0,34)		
Disagree strongly Proud of sports 4,8 (0,16)		
Disagree strongly Assimilation 5,6 (0,20)		Agree Assimilation 1,9 (0,09)
Agree strongly Diversity 3,5 (0,13)		
Disagree strongly Diversity 1,9 (0,06)		
Disagree strongly Crime 7,2 (0,24)		
Agree strongly Bad for economy 2,1 (0,08)		Agree Bad for economy 2,1 (0,11)
Disagree strongly Take jobs 7,3 (0,27)		
Disagree strongly Not open to new impulses 5,6 (0,19)		
	Axis 2	
Agree strongly Rather live 6,0 (0,24)		Disagree Rather live 1,9 (0,06)
Agree strongly More like us 4,5 (0,13)		
Agree More like us 1,8 (0,06)		
Agree strongly Italy btter 3,0 (0,09)		
Agree strongly Support nation 3,4		Disagree Support nation 2,5 (0,10)

(0,10)
Agree strongly Proud of sports 2,1
(0,10)
Agree strongly Assimilation 3,9
(0,13)
Disagree strongly Diversity 2,2
(0,06)

|	
Agree strongly Crime 10,0 (0,39)	Neither nor Crime 2,4 (0,08)
	Disagree Crime 2,3 (0,08)
Agree strongly Bad for economy 8,5 (0,30)	Neither nor Bad for economy 1,8 (0,06)
	Disagree Bad for economy 1,9 (0,07)
Agree strongly Take jobs 8,5 (0,27)	Disagree Take jobs 4,0 (0,16)
Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 8,7 (0,28)	Disagree Not open to new impulses 3,6 (0,16)

Correspondence analysis of civic identity and attitudes towards immigration
Italy

| Negative coordinates	Axis 1	Positive coordinates
Somewhat proud Democracy 3,7 (0,16)		Not proud at all Democracy 8,4 (0,44)
Somewhat proud Political influence 3,4 (0,14)		Not proud at all Political influence 8,3 (0,43)
Somewhat proud Economic achievements 3,6 (0,19)		Not proud at all Economic achievements 10,4 (0,48)
Somewhat proud Social security system 5,2 (0,24)		Not proud at all Social security system 10,4 (0,52)
Somewhat proud Fair treatment of all 2,9 (0,12)		Not proud at all Fair treatment of all 8,3 (0,48)
		Agree strongly Crime 3,1 (0,15)
		Agree strongly Bad for economy 6,6 (0,28)
		Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 6,4 (0,24)
	Axis 2	
Not very proud Democracy 3,6 (0,14)		Very proud Democracy 14,9 (0,33)
Not very proud Political influence 5,0 (0,20)		Very proud Political influence 5,3 (0,14)
Not very proud Economic achievements 4,9 (0,17)		Very proud Economic achievements 11,2 (0,26)
Not very proud Social security system 4,0 (0,15)		Somewhat proud Social security system 3,4 (0,10)
		Very proud Fair treatment of all 18,4 (0,41)
		Disagree strongly Assimilation 2,8 (0,07)
		Agree strongly Diversity 4,9 (0,12)
	Axis 3	
Not very proud Democracy 2,7 (0,08)		Not proud at all Democracy 3,0 (0,08)
Not very proud Political influence 2,9 (0,09)		Not proud at all Political influence 5,3 (0,14)
		Not proud at all Economic achievements 3,8 (0,09)
		Not proud at all Social security system 3,8 (0,10)
Agree strongly Assimilation 4,3 (0,08)		
Agree strongly Crime 10,2 (0,25)		
Agree strongly Bad for economy 6,6 (0,14)		Disagree Bad for economy 7,4 (0,16)
Agree Take jobs 5,2 (0,12)		Disagree Take jobs 8,0 (0,21)
Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 4,9 (0,10)		Disagree Not open to new impulses 8,9 (0,25)
Agree Not open to new impulses 3,4 (0,08)		

Correspondence analysis of cultural identity and attitudes towards immigration Italy

Negative coordinates	Axis 1	Positive coordinates
Very proud Technology and science 4,1 (0,14)		
Not proud at all Technology and science 2,0 (0,06)		
Very proud Sports 3,2 (0,13)		Somewhat proud Sports 3,1 (0,21)
Not proud at all Sports 2,9 (0,08)		
Very proud Art and literature 2,1 (0,11)		Somewhat proud Art and literature 2,4 (0,13)
Very proud Armed forces 2,0 (0,06)		
Not proud at all Armed forces 2,2 (0,08)		
Very proud National history 3,1 (0,14)		Somewhat proud National history 2,2 (0,12)
Agree strongly Assimilation 3,3 (0,10)		
Disagree strongly Assimilation 2,3 (0,07)		
Agree strongly Diversity 4,1 (0,13)		Agree Diversity 2,0 (0,10)
Disagree strongly Diversity 4,3 (0,13)		
Agree strongly Crime 6,1 (0,23)		Disagree Crime 2,2 (0,07)
Agree strongly Bad for economy 8,9 (0,31)		
Agree strongly Take jobs 6,5 (0,20)		Disagree Take jobs 2,0 (0,08)
Disagree strongly Take jobs 2,7 (0,09)		
Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 8,5 (0,27)		
	Axis 2	
		Can't choose Technology and science 2,6 (0,07)
Very proud Art and literature 3,6 (0,17)		Somewhat proud Art and literature 1,9 (0,09)
		Can't choose Art and literature 2,7 (0,07)

Very proud National history 1,8 (0,07)	
Disagree strongly Assimilation 3,2 (0,09)	Agree Assimilation 1,9 (0,07)
Agree strongly Diversity 2,7 (0,08)	Can't choose Diversity 2,9 (0,07)
Neither nor Crime 2,2 (0,06)	Agree strongly Crime 6,0 (0,20)
Disagree strongly Crime 6,4 (0,17)	
Disagree Bad for economy 5,7 (0,18)	Agree strongly Bad for economy 4,0 (0,12)
Disagree Take jobs 3,2 (0,11)	Agree strongly Take jobs 4,7 (0,13)
Disagree strongly Take jobs 5,9 (0,17)	Agree Take jobs 4,5 (0,15)
Disagree Not open to new impulses 5,3 (0,20)	Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 5,0 (0,14)
Disagree strongly Not open to new impulses 4,3 (0,11)	Agree Not open to new impulses 3,7 (0,12)

Axis 3	
Very proud Technology and science 10,1 (0,26	Not proud at all Technology and science 2,8 (0,06)
	Can't choose Technology and science 3,7 (0,08)
Very proud Sports 9,4 (0,28)	Not very proud Sports 1,8 (0,04)
	Not proud at all Sports 3,3 (0,07)
	Can't choose Sports 3,2 (0,07)
Very proud Art and literature 4,6 (0,18)	Somewhat proud Art and literature 1,9 (0,08)
	Can't choose Art and literature 2,6 (0,06)
Very proud Armed forces 5,2 (0,12)	Not proud at all Armed forces 2,3 (0,06)
	Can't choose Armed forces 4,7 (0,11)
Very proud National history 5,2 (0,18)	Can't choose National history 1,9 (0,04)
	Disagree strongly Assimilation 2,0 (0,05)
	Disagree strongly Crime 6,4 (0,15)
	Disagree strongly Take jobs 4,6 (0,11)
	Disagree strongly Not open to new impulses 3,1 (0,07)

Facteur 2

Can't choose — Can't choose
Agree strongly ...oose Can't choose

Agree strongly
◄ ► Agree strongly

Agree strongly
× +

0.75

◆ Agree strongly
Disagree strongly   Divorced   Up to 15   Agree — Can't choose
                                        Agree Can't choose
Not proud at all   Somewhat proud 56-65 years Widowed omewhat proud
Not very South + islands ◄Compulsory 1-8 Once a month oose roud
                                                          nonth
0   N... d at all – Not pr... Several Rural No Centre: ld
    Urban   15-30 run West II town se
Not proud at all   Very proud Gymnasium 9-13 30-45 -35 years
▲   sNever 30-45 -35 years
Not proud at all   Very proud ▲ □ reponse Hi... More than 45 14+ her nor e nquante
Very proud

◆ Agree strongly   Disagree c manquante
■ Disagree strongly   ◄ ⊥ Disagree
-0.75 ►   reponse manquante
                         Disagree strongly   Disagree
Disagree strongly
×   ◄ Disagree strongly

-1.50   ± Disagree strongly

-1.5   -1.0   -0.5   0   0.5   Facteur 1

Correspondence analysis of background variables Norway

| Negative coordinates	Axis 1	Positive coordinates
56-65 years old 10,3 (0,22)		36-45 years old 3,8 (0,10)
Widowed 13,7 (0,27)		
50-99 000 NOK 5,6 (0,11)		400-499 000 NOK 5,2 (0,12)
100-149 000 NOK 8,3 (0,17)		500 000 + NOK 4,2 (0,09)
150-199 000 NOK 3,4 (0,07)		
		Full-time 7,2 (0,36)
Compulsory education 19,8 (0,43)		Higher education 8,8 (0,30)
	Axis 2	
36-45 years old 4,7 (0,09)		26-35 years old 14,9 (0,29)
46-55 years old 5,8 (0,11)		
56-65 years old 4,5 (0,08)		
(Living as) married 10,8 (0,48)		Unmarried 30,7 (0,67)
200-249 000 NOK 3,9 (0,06)		50-99 000 NOK 5,4 (0,08)
		Unemployed 7,5 (0,12)

Correspondence analysis of membership identity and attitudes towards immigration Norway

Negative coordinates	Axis 1	Positive coordinates
Not important at all Birth 3,2 (0,14)		Very important Birth 5,3 (0,32)
Not very important Citizenship 2,6 (0,11)		Very important Citizenship 2,9 (0,29)
Fairly important Language 3,5 (0,18)		
Disagree Assimilation 2,9 (0,13)		
Maintain distinct customs Assimilation or diversity 5,1 (0,26)		Adapt to society Assimilation or diversity 2,1 (0,24)
Agree Diversity 3,2 (0,15)		Disagree strongly Diversity 2,5 (0,18)
Neither nor Crime 1,9 (0,09)		Agree strongly Crime 6,8 (0,36)
Disagree Crime 4,2 (0,18)		
Disagree strongly Take jobs 2,8 (0,12)		Agree strongly Take jobs 2,9 (0,12)
		Agree Take jobs 2,2 (0,10)
Disagree Bad for economy 2,6 (0,12)		Agree strongly Bad for economy 5,3 (0,24)
Disagree strongly Not open to new impulses 2,3 (0,10)		Agree Not open to new impulses 3,0 (0,14)
Disagree Not open to new impulses 2,6 (0,18)		Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 2,9 (0,12)
	Axis 2	
Not important at all Birth 2,7 (0,07)		Fairly important Birth 2,5 (0,08)
Not important at all Citizenship 2,0 (0,05)		
		Fairly important Sentiment 1,9

|	
	(0,06)
Agree strongly Assimilation 3,4 (0,11)	Agree Assimilation 3,3 (0,14)
Disagree strongly Assimilation 4,1 (0,10)	
Maintain distinct customs Assimilation or diversity 3,0 (0,09)	
Agree strongly Diversity 2,2 (0,06)	Disagree Diversity 3,2 (0,12)
Agree Diversity 2,0 (0,06)	
Disagree strongly Diversity 2,2 (0,07)	
Agree strongly Crime 3,8 (0,12)	Agree Crime 5,3 (0,22)
Disagree Crime 4,5 (0,12)	
Agree strongly Take jobs 5,0 (0,13)	Neither nor Take jobs 2,8 (0,09)
Disagree strongly Take jobs 7,5 (0,20)	
Disagree Bad for economy 2,9 (0,08)	Agree Bad for economy 2,4 (0,08)
Agree strongly Bad for economy 5,7 (0,16)	
Disagree strongly Not open to new impulses 8,5 (0,22)	Neither nor Not open to new impulses 4,0 (0,13)
Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 4,9 (0,12)	

Axis 3

Can't choose Assimilation or diversity 4,8 (0,13)
Can't choose Diversity 14,7 (0,36)
Can't choose Crime 16,5 (0,40)
Can't choose Take jobs 19,4 (0,47)
Can't choose Bad for economy 17,3 (0,45)
Can't choose Not open to new impulses 17,3 (0,43)

Correspondence analysis of chauvinistic identity and attitudes towards immigration Norway

Negative coordinates	Axis 1	Positive coordinates
		Agree strongly Rather live 2,7 (0,20)
Disagree More like us 1,9 (0,11)		Agree strongly More like us 2,9 (0,12)
Disagree strongly More like us 2,8 (0,13)		
		Agree strongly Norway better 3,6 (0,18)
		Agree strongly Support nation 2,7 (0,12)
		Agree strongly Proud of sports 2,0 (0,12)
Disagree Assimilation 3,1 (0,14)		Agree strongly Assimilation 6,3 (0,33)
Maintain distinct customs Assimilation or diversity 4,6 (0,24)		Adapt to society Assimilation or diversity 1,7 (0,20)
Agree Diversity 2,9 (0,14)		Disagree strongly Diversity 3,1 (0,16)
Neither nor Crime 1,8 (0,09)		Agree strongly Crime 7,3 (0,40)
Disagree Crime 3,9 (0,17)		
Disagree Take jobs 2,3 (0,16)		Agree strongly Take jobs 3,2 (0,13)
Disagree strongly Take jobs 2,6 (0,12)		Agree Take jobs 2,1 (0,10)
Disagree Bad for economy 2,9 (0,13)		Agree strongly Bad for economy 5,0 (0,23)
Disagree strongly Not open to new impulses 2,1 (0,09)		Agree Not open to new impulses 2,7 (0,13)

Disagree Not open to new impulses 2,8 (0,20)	Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 3,3 (0,14)

Axis 2	
Neither nor More like us 2,5 (0,10)	Agree strongly More like us 3,3 (0,09)
	Disagree strongly More like us 3,7 (0,11)
Agree Norway better 1,9 (0,10)	Agree strongly Norway better 3,0 (0,10)
	Agree strongly Support nation 2,3 (0,07)
	Disagree strongly Support nation 3,8 (0,12)
Agree Proud of sports 1,7 (0,09)	
Agree Assimilation 3,2 (0,15)	Agree strongly Assimilation 2,8 (0,10)
	Disagree strongly Assimilation 3,4 (0,10)
	Maintain distinct customs Assimilation or diversity 2,9 (0,10)
Disagree Diversity 2,9 (0,12)	Agree strongly Diversity 2,1 (0,06)
	Agree Diversity 1,7 (0,05)
Agree Crime 3,7 (0,17)	Agree strongly Crime 2,2 (0,08)
	Disagree Crime 3,9 (0,12)
Neither nor Take jobs 3,0 (0,11)	Agree strongly Take jobs 3,6 (0,10)
	Disagree strongly Take jobs 6,2 (0,19)
Agree Bad for economy 2,1 (0,08)	Disagree Bad for economy 2,5 (0,08)
	Agree strongly Bad for economy 4,0 (0,13)
Neither nor Not open to new impulses 3,2 (0,12)	Disagree strongly Not open to new impulses 7,7 (0,22)
	Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 3,5 (0,10)

Axis 3	
Can't choose Assimilation 12,4 (0,33)	
Can't choose Assimilation or diversity 4,2 (0,13)	
Can't choose Diversity 15,1 (0,41)	
Can't choose Crime 14,0 (0,38)	
Can't choose Take jobs 15,9 (0,43)	
Can't choose Bad for economy 15,0 (0,44)	
Can't choose Not open to new impulses 14,1 (0,39)	

Facteur 2 Still in school
Student

2.0 — ◆ Disagree strongly
¤ Disagree strongly
× Disagree strongly

Agree strongly
+   Agree strongly
1.5   Agree strongly ▼¤
Disagree strongly   ▼ Disagree strongly # Disagree strongly   Agree strongly
▶   Agree strongly
▲ Disagree strongly   Agree strongly ◀
Disagree
|×   # Agree strongly
◆ Disagree strongly
1.0   ◆   ■ Disagree strongly
Disagree #■ Disagree ◀ Disagree strongly   Agree strongly
Maintain customs ■   Disagree   ▶ reponse manquante ▲ Agree strongly
0.5 + Agree Once a week or more Disagree strongly ◆ Agree strongly
▲   ☐ ◆ Car reponse m   ¤ Missing
◆ Disagree   ×   reponse reponse manquante
Disagree   ☐ Can't choose Up to 149   reponse manquante
Separated 25   Other pot
More than 400 reponse manquante   '-9
0   Disagr 36-45 ye Url Rural
Disagree ▼ Dis Higher e Gymnasium 10-12 ore
Full 150-299 divorced   ¤ Agree
Neither nor ◆ + Neither nor   Agree
Neither n   Neither nor ee
-0.5   Agree × + Disa Neither nor
Neither nor ¤

        -0.75   0   0.75   1.50
                                      Facteur 1

Correspondence analysis of civic identity and attitudes towards immigration Norway

| Negative coordinates	Axis 1	Positive coordinates
		Not proud at all Social security system 3,5 (0,13)
Disagree Assimilation 2,2 (0,09)		Agree strongly Assimilation 7,3 (0,34)
Maintain distinct customs Assimilation or diversity 4,4 (0,20)		Adapt to society Assimilation or diversity 2,2 (0,23)
Agree Diversity 4,0 (0,17)		Disagree strongly Diversity 6,4 (0,28)
Neither nor Crime 2,1 (0,09)		Agree strongly Crime 9,4 (0,45)
Disagree Crime 3,5 (0,13)		
Disagree Take jobs 2,4 (0,14)		Agree strongly Take jobs 4,8 (0,18)
Disagree strongly Take jobs 2,1 (0,08)		Agree Take jobs 2,3 (0,10)
Disagree Bad for economy 2,9 (0,11)		Agree strongly Bad for economy 9,1 (0,37)
Disagree Not open to new impulses 3,4 (0,21)		Agree Not open to new impulses 3,6 (0,15)
		Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 5,6 (0,21)
	Axis 2	
Very proud Democracy 10,1 (0,30)		Not very proud Democracy 3,5 (0,10)
Very proud Political influence 6,2 (0,18)		
Very proud Economic achievements 8,5 (0,26)		Not very proud Economic achievements 1,9 (0,05)
Very proud Social security system 8,0 (0,22)		Not very proud Social security system 1,9 (0,07)
Very proud Fair treatment of all 7,1		

(0,19)	
Agree strongly Assimilation 2,6 (0,08)	
Agree strongly Diversity 2,5 (0,06)	Disagree Diversity 2,7 (0,10)
Agree strongly Crime 1,9 (0,06)	Agree Crime 3,5 (0,15)
Disagree Crime 2,0 (0,05)	
Disagree strongly Take jobs 3,4 (0,09)	
Disagree Bad for economy 2,3 (0,06)	Agree Bad for economy 2,3 (0,08)
Disagree strongly Not open to new impulses 4,6 (0,12)	Neither nor Not open to new impulses 2,7 (0,09)

Axis 3	
Very proud Democracy 2,8 (0,08)	Not very proud Democracy 5,2 (0,15)
	Not proud at all Democracy 4,2 (0,10)
Very proud Political influence 3,1 (0,09)	Not very proud Political influence 3,5 (0,10)
	Not proud at all Political influence 5,2 (0,13)
Very proud Economic achievements 3,7 (0,11)	Not very proud Economic achievements 5,2 (0,15)
Very proud Social security system 2,9 (0,08)	Not proud at all Social security system 5,0 (0,13)
Somewhat proud Fair treatment of all 3,4 (0,13)	Not proud at all Fair treatment of all 8,1 (0,22)
	Maintain distinct customs Assimilation or diversity 4,6 (0,14)
	Agree Diversity 2,6 (0,07)
	Disagree Crime 4,5 (0,12)
Neither nor Take jobs 2,4 (0,08)	Disagree strongly Take jobs 4,2 (0,11)
	Disagree Bad for economy 1,9 (0,05)
	Disagree strongly Not open to new impulses 5,1 (0,13)

Axis 4	
Can't choose Assimilation or diversity 7,5 (0,18)	
Can't choose Diversity 18,2 (0,39)	
Can't choose Crime 19,8 (0,43)	
Can't choose Bad for economy 21,0 (0,49)	
Can't choose Not open to new impulses 19,8 (0,44)	

Facteur 2

Correspondence analysis of cultural identity and attitudes towards immigration Norway

Negative coordinates	Axis 1	Positive coordinates
		Very proud National history 2,2 (0,10)
Disagree Assimilation 3,0 (0,12)		Agree strongly Assimilation 2,2 (0,10)
Maintain distinct customs Assimilation or diversity 5,3 (0,24)		Adapt to society Assimilation or diversity 2,4 (0,27)
Agree Diversity 4,3 (0,18)		Disagree strongly Diversity 5,8 (0,26)
Neither nor Crime 2,4 (0,11)		Agree strongly Crime 10,6 (0,51)
Disagree Crime 4,3 (0,16)		
Disagree Take jobs 2,9 (0,17)		Agree strongly Take jobs 4,5 (0,16)
Disagree strongly Take jobs 2,2 (0,09)		Agree Take jobs 2,4 (0,10)
Disagree Bad for economy 3,1 (0,12)		Agree strongly Bad for economy 8,1 (0,33)
Disagree Not open to new impulses 3,9 (0,25)		Agree Not open to new impulses 3,8 (0,16)
		Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 4,9 (0,18)
	Axis 2	
		Not very proud Technology and science 4,8 (0,13)
		Not very proud Sports 3,2 (0,08)
		Not proud at all Art and literature 2,3 (0,05)
Somewhat proud Armed forces 2,7 (0,09)		Not proud at all Armed forces 7,0 (0,19)
		Not very proud National history 2,0 (0,06)

	Not proud at all National history 2,8 (0,07)
Agree Assimilation 2,6 (0,11)	
Can't choose Assimilation or diversity 2,0 (0,06)	Maintain distinct customs Assimilation or diversity 3,8 (0,11)
Can't choose Diversity 2,8 (0,07)	Agree Diversity 2,1 (0,06)
	Disagree strongly Diversity 2,8 (0,08)
Agree Crime 3,5 (0,14)	Agree strongly Crime 2,4 (0,07)
Can't choose Crime 2,6 (0,06)	Disagree Crime 4,0 (0,10)
	Agree strongly Take jobs 3,8 (0,09)
	Disagree strongly Take jobs 4,1 (0,10)
Agree Bad for economy 2,2 (0,08)	Disagree Bad for economy 3,0 (0,08)
Can't choose Bad for economy 3,4 (0,09)	Agree strongly Bad for economy 5,9 (0,16)
Can't choose Not open to new impulses 4,5 (0,11)	Agree strongly Not open to new impulses 4,9 (0,12)

Axis 3	
Very proud Technology and science 3,9 (0,11)	
Very proud Art and literature 5,4 (0,15)	Not very proud Art and literature 2,0 (0,06)
Very proud National history 4,8 (0,14)	Not very proud National history 2,1 (0,06)
Can't choose Assimilation or diversity 3,0 (0,08)	
Agree Diversity 2,3 (0,06)	Disagree Diversity 3,1 (0,11)
Can't choose Diversity 9,4 (0,22)	
Can't choose Crime 9,6 (0,22)	Agree Crime 3,2 (0,13)
Disagree strongly Take jobs 2,4 (0,06)	Neither nor Take jobs 2,3 (0,07)
Can't choose Bad for economy 12,3 (0,31)	Agree Bad for economy 2,5 (0,09)
Can't choose Not open to new impulses 8,0 (0,19)	Neither nor Not open to new impulses 2,8 (0,08)