

# The Political Inclusion of Youth

Quotas, Parties, and Elections in Democratic and Democratizing States

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Jana Birke Belschner

Thesis for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor (PhD)  
University of Bergen, Norway  
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## List of Dissertation Articles

- [1] Belschner, Jana 2018. “The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings”. In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, DOI: 10.1080/21565503.2018.1528163.
- [2] Belschner, Jana and Marta Garcia de Paredes (2020). “Hierarchies of Representation: The Re-distributive Effects of Gender and Youth Quotas”. In: *Representation*, DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2020.1778510
- [3] Belschner, Jana (2020). “Empowering Young Women? Gender and Youth Quotas in Tunisia”. In: *Double-Edged Politics on Women’s Rights in the MENA Region*. Ed. by Hanane Darhour and Drude Dahlerup. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 257–278.
- [4] Belschner, Jana (under review). “Electoral Engineering in New Democracies. Parties, Quotas, and Institutional Uncertainty”.
- [5] Belschner, Jana (under review). “Youth Advantage vs. Gender Penalty: Selecting and Electing Young Candidates”.

## Abstract

This cumulative PhD dissertation studies the political inclusion of young men and women in democratic and democratizing states. It compares three aspects of political inclusion on the macro, meso, and micro levels of analysis: quotas, parties, and elections. The articles in the dissertation ask where and why states adopt quotas for youth, how parties implement the regulations, and how young candidates' age impacts their electoral performance. With its focus on youth, the dissertation explores the under-representation of a group that has, so far, received little scholarly attention. While existing research has focused on describing and explaining cross-national patterns of political youth representation, this dissertation aims to unpack processes and factors leading to representational outcomes. It does so by focusing on the entry and inclusion of youth into politics, which, arguably, precede and condition their descriptive representation. The dissertation as a whole builds on and contributes to the literatures of gender & politics, political parties, and electoral studies. It is composed of five independent articles, of which two are published in peer-reviewed journals and an edited volume, and three are currently under review.

The first article, "The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings", was published in *Politics, Groups, and Identities* and compares the actors and processes leading to the adoption of gender and youth quotas in Tunisia and Morocco (Belschner 2018). The second article, "Hierarchies of Representation: The Re-distributive Effects of Gender and Youth Quotas", co-authored with Marta Garcia de Paredes, is in the second round of R&R at *Representation* and explores the intersectional effects of paired gender and youth quotas cross-nationally and in three case-studies of Tunisia, Morocco, and Sweden. The third article, "Empowering Young Women? Gender and Youth Quotas in Tunisia", was published in Darhour and Dahlerup 2020 and investigates the backgrounds of young female MPs and their positions in the Tunisian parliament (Belschner 2020). The fourth article, "Electoral Engineering in New Democracies. Parties, Quotas, and Institutional Uncertainty" is currently under review. It focuses on Tunisian local elections and asks under what conditions parties are willing and able to comply with quotas for multiple groups. The fifth article, "Youth Advantage vs. Gender Penalty: Selecting and Electing Young Candidates" is under review as well and analyses the conditions for young candidates' electoral success in Irish local elections.

Theoretically, methodically, and empirically, all articles stand on their own. To varying degrees, they all employ quantitative as well as qualitative data and while some are classical (comparative) case-studies, others take a cross-national



perspective to address the above-mentioned research questions. Geography-wise, the articles focus on North Africa, particularly Tunisia, and Western Europe, particularly Ireland. Tunisia is one of the few countries that has legislated youth quotas both on the national and the local level of politics. It is a suitable case to explore how newly founded parties in a recent democratic system approach the issue of political youth inclusion, which seems particularly pressing in light of the 2011 youth-led revolution. Ireland complements the accounts from Tunisia, being an industrialised democracy with a very low proportion of youth in formal politics. Political parties here are longstanding and while there are no youth quotas in Ireland, parties have to deal with the inclusion of the politicized 'post Economic Crisis' youth generation.

The dissertation as a whole offers a comparative perspective on processes of political inclusion. While its main focus is on youth, the analyses are conducted through an intersectional lens exploring the different conditions for young men and women. Specific theoretical contributions of the articles include a strategy for measuring and comparing the descriptive (under-)representation of intersectional groups (article 2), which may be used beyond the study of gender/age groups, as well as a theoretical framework to study parties' compliance with electoral quotas in new democracies (article 4). A further theoretical contribution is the conceptualization of electoral resources as factors mediating young candidates' electoral performance (article 5).

Empirically, the dissertation finds that youth quotas have, so far, always been introduced in addition to simultaneously or previously adopted gender quotas. Unlike the latter, youth quotas have been top-down initiatives by the domestic political elites rather than the result of demands made by civil society movements in Tunisia and Morocco (article 1). When faced with paired gender and youth quotas, parties tend to enact these in a strategic manner that, depending on the specific design of the regulations, can favour the selection of young female candidates over middle-aged female and, in particular, young male candidates (article 2). This, however, does not automatically lead to young women being empowered in parliament, where middle-aged legislators, especially men, continue to occupy positions of power (article 3). This dissertation also finds that, in the context of new democracies, parties deal with high degrees of institutional uncertainty. They may, therefore, not be equally able to comply with electoral quotas, meaning that organizationally stronger parties benefit from competitive advantages (article 4). Finally, the dissertation suggests that, when endowment with electoral resources is accounted for, being young may provide a net electoral advantage to candidates. However, this advantage appears to be gendered, and more accessible for young men (article 5).

In sum, the dissertation contributes to the emerging research agenda on the political representation of youth. Taking an intersectional, gender-sensitive perspective, it adds theoretical and empirical knowledge about processes conditioning different levels of the descriptive representation of youth. It thereby also contributes to the gender and politics literature as well as research into political parties and electoral studies. Given the legitimacy challenges currently facing both developing democracies with large youth populations and established democracies with ageing societies, the dissertation is an important step towards understanding the conditions for the political inclusion and descriptive representation of youth in both those settings.

# Contents

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Is Age like Gender? Theoretical and Normative Perspectives</b>	<b>7</b>
Defining “Youth” in Politics . . . . .	7
Normative Perspectives on Youth Inclusion . . . . .	12
<b>Youth in Politics: From Representation to Inclusion</b>	<b>19</b>
An Empirical Overview . . . . .	19
Previous Research . . . . .	23
Research Design . . . . .	25
<b>Case Selection, Data, and Methods</b>	<b>30</b>
Case Selection . . . . .	30
Data and Methods . . . . .	34
Limitations . . . . .	38
<b>Results: The Political Inclusion of Youth</b>	<b>39</b>
Quotas: Legislating Youth Inclusion . . . . .	39
Parties: Implementing Youth Inclusion . . . . .	42
Elections: Running for Youth Inclusion . . . . .	46
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>Articles</b>	<b>59</b>

## Introduction

The question of who is present - and re-presented - in formal politics (Fisher 2012) is fundamental to any contemporary democracy. What Pitkin termed the ‘descriptive representation’ of groups (Pitkin 1967), i.e., their presence in parliaments, governments, and bodies with decision-making power,<sup>1</sup> has become integral to the domestic and international legitimacy of political systems. For instance, the proportion of female and ethnic or national minority members of parliaments (MPs) is regularly evaluated by global democracy indices (e.g. V-Dem 2019).

Whereas the idea that a democracy could and should be ‘representative’ has emerged relatively recently, it is central to normative discussions about the over- and under-representation of groups in parliaments and governments. Scholars first began framing women’s absence from political decision-making as democratically problematic in the 1990s (Phillips 1995). This paved the way for the rapid growth of a new field of research spanning comparative politics and related disciplines: Gender and Politics (G&P).

Parallel to this new field, a literature on the political representation of ethnic and racial groups has developed (Kymlicka 1996; Urbinati 2008). Since the first decade of the 2000s, these literatures have become more interconnected, and now offer comparative perspectives on issues of political inclusion and representation (Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2010, Htun 2004). Theoretical and normative discussions focused on

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<sup>1</sup>Pitkin’s definition of different aspects of representation furthermore includes substantive and symbolic representation. Simply put, substantive representation can be defined as representatives *acting for* a specific group’s interests. Symbolic representation refers to the *perceived* representativeness of a political body.

*why* the political presence of groups is important, with central arguments on ‘equal chances’ (Murray 2014; Murray 2015) and/or ‘substantive representation’ (Allen and Childs 2019; Celis and Mazur 2012; Kroeber 2018; Mansbridge 1999). Some works also reflected on *which groups* should be descriptively represented in political bodies (Phillips 1995; Taylor, Appiah, and Habermas 1994; Williams 1998).

In the second decade of the 2000s, a new, connected research agenda emerged. This body of literature focuses on the presence - or absence - of young people in political decision-making (Joshi 2013; Joshi 2015; Joshi and Och 2014; Stockemer and Sundström 2018a; Stockemer and Sundström 2019). It reflects a growing interest among International Organizations about how the inclusion of young adults into democratic and democratizing states’ polities might enhance the legitimacy of political systems and the decisions they make (EU and UNDP 2017; UNDP 2013). The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), one of the main international advocacy organizations promoting gender equality in political representation, chose youth representation as its second focal point. Since 2014, the IPU has released biannual reports mapping the proportion of young<sup>2</sup> MPs in parliaments worldwide (IPU 2014; IPU 2016; IPU 2018). This is a new perspective on the topic of youth and politics that has, so far, focused overwhelmingly on young citizens’ political *participation*. Most of these studies analyse youth’s behaviour as (non-)voters (Albacete 2014; Grasso 2014; Grasso 2016) and, to a lesser extent, their membership in political movements (Sloam and Henn 2018) and parties (Bruter and Harrison 2009; Harris 2009).

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<sup>2</sup>The IPU defines ‘youth’ in different age brackets, but the most commonly used definition spans from 20 to either 40 or 45 years of age. Please see the following section of this introductory chapter for a more extensive discussion of the definition of ‘youth’ in political representation.

The IPU figures show that MPs worldwide are seldom younger than 40 years old (15.5% on average) and almost never under 30 (2.2% on average). Whereas women constitute about 50% of almost all populations, and a measurement of their (un-)equal representation is relatively straightforward, the proportion of young citizens varies considerably between countries and regions. In fact, there is a negative correlation between the proportion of young MPs in parliament and the proportion of young citizens in populations (IPU 2018, 26). Young people are thus indeed an ‘excluded majority’ in many states (Joshi 2015, 224).

Studies describing and explaining cross-national patterns of youth representation have found that the degree of under-representation varies by electoral system, voting age, party factors, and gender (IPU 2018; Stockemer and Sundström 2018a; Stockemer and Sundström 2019). However, little is known about the causes of those patterns. As is often the case, politics has outpaced political science. A growing number of countries and parties in all world regions have adopted the most popular ‘fast track’ policy (Dahlerup 2006) to increase groups’ descriptive representation in politics: Electoral quotas for youth. Again, little is known about those policies and their impact.

This dissertation is a contribution to the emerging research agenda on youth in politics and aims to take the field a step further by focusing on processes of political inclusion, which, arguably, precede and condition patterns of descriptive representation. It investigates the political inclusion of youth under three different aspects: Quotas, parties, and elections. The articles in this dissertation all refer to one or several of the following research questions.

- **RQ1:** Where and why are electoral quotas for youth adopted and how are they designed? (articles 1,2)
- **RQ2:** How do political parties implement electoral youth quotas and how do they include youth in general? (articles 2,3,4,5)
- **RQ3:** How do candidates' age and gender affect their electoral performance? (article 5)

Theoretically, methodically, and empirically, all articles stand on their own. To varying degrees, they all employ quantitative as well as qualitative data and, while some of them are classical (comparative) case-studies, others take a cross-national perspective. All articles include a proper theoretical framework, separate literature reviews, and empirical analyses. Table 1 (p.6) provides a synopsis of the articles.

In sum, the dissertation finds that youth quotas have, so far, always been introduced in addition to simultaneously or previously adopted gender quotas. While legislated youth quotas have mainly been adopted in democratizing or autocratic states in the Global South, a number of parties in established democracies have as well adopted voluntary regulations in recent years (articles 1 and 2). In Tunisia and Morocco, youth quotas have been top-down initiatives by the domestic political elites rather than the result of demands made by civil society movements - unlike the respective gender quotas (article 1). When faced with paired gender and youth quotas, parties tend to enact these in a strategic manner that, depending on the specific design of the regulations, can favour the selection of young female candidates over middle-aged female and, in particular, young male candidates (article 2). This, however, does not

automatically lead to young women being empowered in parliament, where middle-aged legislators, especially men, continue to occupy positions of power (article 3). This dissertation also finds that, in the context of new democracies, parties deal with high degrees of institutional uncertainty. They may, therefore, not be equally able to comply with electoral quotas and thus nominate fewer young or female candidates even if they are ideologically supporting equality policies (article 4). Finally, the dissertation explores the conditions for young candidates' performance in local elections in the context of the established democracy of the Republic of Ireland. Article 5 finds that, in a context without youth quotas, young candidates may profit from a net electoral advantage once accounting for differential resource access. However, this advantage appears to be gendered.

The next section of the introductory chapter outlines some general theoretical and normative underpinnings of the dissertation as a whole. I first examine definition(s) of "youth" in politics and discuss to what extent age differs from gender when it comes to normative arguments for their political inclusion. The subsequent section gives an empirical overview of the proportions of young female and male MPs worldwide and how they vary. I then review existing literature on youth representation, before outlining the research design of the dissertation as a whole. The following section describes the data and methods the articles in this dissertation rely on, as well as limitations related to specific methodological choices I made. The 'results' section then summarizes the articles' findings concerning the overarching research questions. Finally, I discuss the general implications of the dissertation. The introductory chapter is followed by all five articles in full length.



Table 1: Synopsis of articles

#	article	focus	case(s)	data	findings
(1)	Belschner, Jana (2018). "The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings". In: <i>Politics, Groups, and Identities</i> (online first).	quotas	TUN, MOR	text (Di) interviews (Diii)	Why do states adopt youth quotas? Using causal process tracing, this article compares the adoption of youth quotas in Tunisia and Morocco after the Arab uprisings in 2011. The findings suggest that, contrary to the respective gender quotas, youth quotas were not part of civil society movements' agendas, but initiatives from domestic political elites.
(2)	Belschner, Jana and Marta Garcia de Paredes (R&R). "Hierarchies of Representation: The Re-distributive Effects of Gender and Youth Quotas. In: <i>Representation</i> (R&R).	quotas, parties	World, TUN, MOR, SWE	dataset (Dii)	This article investigates how paired electoral quotas re-distribute parliamentary seats between majority and minority groups. Focusing on gender and youth quotas, we analyse the descriptive representation of intersectional groups. We find that paired quotas tend to re-distribute power among women and youth rather than challenge middle-aged men's parliamentary dominance.
(3)	Belschner, Jana (2020). "Empowering Young Women? Gender and Youth Quotas in Tunisia". In: <i>Double-Edged Politics on Women's Rights in the MENA Region</i> . Ed. by Hanane Darhour and Drude Dahlerup. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 257–278.	quotas, parties	TUN	observational data	The chapter analyses the implementation of gender and youth quotas in Tunisia. While both have the potential to alter patterns of political recruitment and representation, the analysis of MPs' socio-economic background, their activity in parliament, and their presence in leadership positions shows however that young women remain excluded from inner-party and parliamentary power.
(4)	Belschner, Jana (under review). "Electoral Engineering in New Democracies. Parties, Quotas, and Institutional Uncertainty."	quotas, parties, elections	TUN	electoral data interviews (Diii)	This article investigates the causes of parties' varying strategies when implementing electoral quotas. Whereas previous research has focused on the reasons for parties' willingness to comply, this article sheds light on their ability to do so. In the context of new democracies, parties deal with high institutional uncertainty. Novel electoral systems and quota rules may then be easier to strategically implement for organizationally stronger parties. In Tunisia, multiple quotas were highly effective in securing group representation but had repercussion effects on party and party system consolidation.
(5)	Belschner, Jana (under review). "Electing Young Candidates. Name Recognition, Electoral Resources, and Newcomers' Entry to Politics."	parties, elections	IRE	interviews (Div) dataset (Dv)	Young women and men are underrepresented in formal politics. While this may be a mere projection of their lack among voters and party members, this article investigates whether young candidates face specific structural disadvantages once they run for election. Based on a mixed-methods study of the 2019 Irish local elections, the findings suggest that being young can provide a net electoral advantage to candidates. It does however only do so for young men. In contrast, young female candidates appear to be advantaged by their age but penalized by their gender.

## **Is Age like Gender? Theoretical and Normative Perspectives**

In this section, I intend to discuss theoretical and normative aspects of the central topic of this dissertation: “youth” in political representation. I start by presenting different ways of conceptualizing youth in politics. Next follows a discussion on the extent to which normative arguments underpinning most research on (descriptive) group representation can be applied to youth. This refers back to the above-mentioned question of which groups should be entitled to a proportional presence in political institutions and whether the young should be considered one of these groups.

### **Defining “Youth” in Politics<sup>3</sup>**

There are various ways of conceptualizing age groups. This dissertation relies on three approaches, of which all are to varying degrees present in the articles: Age as a numerical span of years, age in the sociological sense, and age as related to distinctive generations. Although these approaches are sometimes portrayed as competing, I understand them to be complementary rather than exclusive.

The first approach, the definition of age groups in terms of a numerical span of years, is the most commonly used and most prominent in all articles. There are two specific reasons why I (and most others studying youth representation) prefer to treat age as a categorical rather than as a continuous variable. The first reason is of a pragmatic nature: Exact age data (i.e., birth years) of MPs, candidates, or party members are seldom available. While the gender of a specific person can be guessed based on their

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<sup>3</sup>Note that this subsection partly relies on ideas expressed in article 3, p.265-66.

first name or appearance, this is not the case for age. Furthermore, while some age data may be available, analyses would have to rely on the birth year in order to account for the natural change of this variable by the ageing of individuals. The second reason is that a categorical conceptualization makes the most sense when thinking about dynamics of political inclusion and representation. Rather than in age *per se* (for instance, being 26 years old), researchers are interested in age as it constructs a group identity: What matters is *being identified* as ‘young’ or ‘middle-aged’ - and the respective consequences. While, arguably, there are persons who might be identified as younger or older than they are, the categorical definition that I employ in this dissertation (young vs. middle-aged to old defined by different cut-off ages) should be highly correlated with this identification.

The articles (2,3, and 5) conceptualise the age of candidates and MPs within the broad dichotomous categories of ‘young’ and ‘middle-aged to old’. The question remains, then, how to delimit these categories. United Nations bodies commonly define ‘youth’ as the age span of 15 to 24 years. However, some parliaments have relatively high minimum age requirements and, in general, young people rarely gain office before the age of 35 (IPU 2016, 5). Thus, referring back to the aspect of individuals’ *identification* as young or middle-aged, higher limits may seem appropriate - at least in some contexts.

The articles in this dissertation, therefore, use different definitions of youth, involving different cut-off ages depending on context and research questions. For example, article 2 provides a global overview of the political representation of gender and age groups worldwide. Here, the cut-off is set at 40 years of age, reflecting the most

common definition in research on youth representation (see for example Stockemer and Sundström 2018a). 40 is also the cut-off used in article 5 on Irish politics and when analysing the Moroccan youth quota with its official age threshold of 40 years (article 2). In the same vein, I use 35 years as a cut-off age when analysing youth in Tunisian politics (articles 2 and 3), as this is the upper age limit established by the Tunisian electoral youth quota law. Article 2 furthermore includes a short case-study of Sweden, where the cut-off age is lowered to 30. This reflects the fact that Sweden has a comparatively proportion of young people involved in politics and the identification of someone as young may follow a different logic than in a country where most representatives are aged 60+.

While the cut-off ages used in the articles may seem high, and therefore the definition of 'youth' very broad, it is analytically preferable to a too narrow definition. If 40-year olds are underrepresented, this will arguably also be true for 30 and 35-year olds, but not vice-versa. Furthermore, reducing the age cut-off would result in considerable reductions in overall variation, and exclude cases from the analysis - as, unfortunately, about a third of all parliaments do not have one single MP under 30.

I include gender in the analysis by categorizing the groups in articles 2, 3, and 5 as middle-aged to old men (mam), middle-aged to old women (maf), young men (ym), and young women (yf). This allows me some opportunity to include an intersectional perspective in my analyses - referring to the question to what extent conditions and experiences of young men and women differ. Yet the inclusion of gender also makes the task of analysis more complex and hinders a more fine-grained, holistic discussion of age. Therefore, the dissertation and its articles should be read as focused on

youth, with gender as an integrated perspective, rather than as providing a complete picture of age dynamics in political representation.

A second way of defining ‘youth’ is to treat it as a sociological category (Fisher 2012). Here, youth stands in opposition to ‘adulthood’ and, thus, involves a notion of inequality. For instance, theories on definitions of democracy emphasize that the *adult* population should be allowed to participate in elections (Paxton 2008, 49). Who, then, is considered part of the adult population? Under what conditions individuals are considered ‘mature’ is highly dependent on the historical and cultural context. The status of adulthood may for instance reflect factors other than the age of an individual. Someone may be considered youth as long as they live in their parents’ home, or until they are married, have children, and/or enter into permanent employment. With regard to political inclusion, Harris notes that:

The period of youth has been constructed as a time of citizenship training, during which young people are taught about political participation rather than facilitated to engage in it (Harris 2009, 302).

Political office, in particular, seems to be reserved for ‘adults’. This is reflected in the fact that most young MPs (according to the numerical definition) tend to be aged between 30 and 39 and often already have a career, a family, and an adult life. A third approach distinguishes youth in terms of generations, claiming that the identities and challenges of each youth generation are unique and related to the political context in which they are young (Grasso 2016). A number of the articles in this dissertation focus on the Tunisian context. Here, the generational approach seems highly relevant, considering that generational thinking is part of most Tunisians’ identity.

People who are, today, about 50 years or older count themselves as the ‘Bourguiba’ generation, with own memories of the first Tunisian president’s rule (1957-1987), which is often portrayed as a glorious period in Tunisian history. Tunisians between the ages of roughly 30 and 50 are seen as a ‘lost generation’ who experienced the fully-fledged authoritarian rule of Bourguiba’s successor, Ben Ali (1987-2011), and were socialized into a political system where political participation meant either exile or collaboration with the regime. Lastly, those under 30 are seen as the generation who carried the 2011 revolution and the hope for a democratic future in Tunisia.

A generational understanding of youth is also relevant for the second main case studied in this dissertation: the Republic of Ireland. Ireland’s present youth generation who experienced the economic crisis in 2008 and two successful, progressive referenda in recent times (on same-sex-marriage in 2015 and on legalizing abortion in 2018) seems much more ‘politicized’ than previous generations. Voter registration rates in the age group of 18 to 25 considerably increased in the run-up to both referenda,<sup>4</sup> as did voter turnout in this age group.<sup>5</sup> Youth has thus become a more important group to consider for political parties.

The generational question is important, especially when discussing the substantive and symbolic elements of representation. Arguably, one would expect young MPs of today to substantively and symbolically represent the current youth generation, whereas an identity such as gender - and therefore the link between descriptive and substantive representation - could be expected to be more stable over time (see also

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<sup>4</sup>from 70% to 78% between 2014 and 2017 according to the National Youth Council of Ireland.

<sup>5</sup>see Irish Times: <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/education/voice-of-youth-meet-the-first-time-voters-1.4153060>.

the discussion on this point in the next section).

As said, the articles in this dissertation rely, to varying extents, on all of these definitions. Articles 2,3, and 5 measure descriptive youth representation by conceptualizing age as a categorical variable with different numerical cut-off points. Articles 1,3,4, and 5 supplement the analysis with more qualitative material that to some extent includes sociological and generational understandings of youth. For instance, article 3 provides background information on young MPs and finds that they tend to be highly educated and have similar professional experiences as older MPs. It, thus, seems likely that their perceived ‘adulthood’ facilitated their initial nomination and election to parliament.

### **Normative Perspectives on Youth Inclusion**

Writing a dissertation about the political inclusion of youth implicates a normative desirability of young peoples’ political presence. In the following, I discuss some of those arguments explicitly. This discussion is by no means exhaustive and primarily serves to emphasise the relevance of the topic for broader discussions of the representativeness and inclusiveness of political systems.

Importantly, this section does not reiterate arguments for youth representation that aim to establish a link between descriptive and substantive and/or symbolic representation. For example, one could argue that youth have distinctive preferences, e.g. regarding education, pensions, or environmental policies (Sørensen 2013) that are more likely to be represented by young MPs. It has also been argued that an increased presence of youth in parliaments and governments may encourage more young people

to vote and to get involved in politics (Stockemer and Sundström 2018a), hinting at a link between descriptive and symbolic representation. In general, the empirical evidence on the link between youth's descriptive and substantive/symbolic representation remains mixed (Alesina, Cassidy, and Troiano 2019; Kissau, Lutz, and Rosset 2012). Furthermore, the articles in this dissertation touch only briefly on substantive and symbolic representation and primarily focus on processes conditioning and preceding the descriptive representation of youth.<sup>6</sup>

Normative political theorists have argued that some groups - those who are 'marginalized' (Williams 1998) - deserve proportional political representation *regardless* of an empirical link to substantive and/or symbolic representation. This builds on Phillips' argument about the politics of presence, where she argued that members of historically disadvantaged groups, and their specific perspectives, could *not* be adequately represented by non-member representatives lacking those experiences and perspectives (Phillips 1995). So, my aim in this section is to discuss to what extent age is like gender in this regard. Or, put differently, are youth a societal group that can be understood as historically disadvantaged and that *should* be descriptively represented, i.e., present, in politics?

The exclusion of women from political power has, so far, been the focus of most theoretical reflections on descriptive group representation (for an overview, see for example Goertz and Mazur 2008; Kantola and Lombardo 2017). There is also a considerable body of literature on the normative dimension of the presence and absence of ethnic groups in politics (Kymlicka 1996; Urbinati 2008) as well as comparative

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<sup>6</sup>For a detailed discussion of the dissertation's research design see the following section.



(Mansbridge 1999; Mansbridge 2003; Young 2002) and intersectional approaches (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013; Hancock 2007; McCall 2005). However, unequal political representation on the basis of age has so far seldom been the focus of theoretical discussion (a notable exception is Trantidis 2016). Importantly, this dissertation focuses on the representation and political inclusion of the young rather than the elderly.

Regarding descriptive representation, the central question is how to define and delimit the systematic under-representation of a societal group as democratically problematic. Melissa Williams, in her theory of fair representation, defines groups as marginalized if (a) patterns of inequality reflect the lines of group membership, if (b) membership is not usually experienced as voluntary, if (c) membership is not experienced as mutable, and if (d) negative meanings are assigned to group identity by the broader society (Williams 1998, 15–16).

First, as detailed in the following section, young people are politically underrepresented in almost all countries worldwide - even if the cut-off is set as high as 45 years of age. In general, this does not only apply to their presence in elected bodies but also in institutions responsible for political inclusion at the pre-representation stage, i.e., in political parties (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). The existence of patterns of inequality in political representation and inclusion along the lines of group membership (condition (a)) can thus be safely assumed. The extent of this inequality varies however depending on the respective context. Whereas populations tend to be considerably younger in the Global South, their proportion is rapidly declining in the ageing societies of the Global North. In this regard, youth is probably more

comparable to ethnic identity - leading to being an (excluded) majority in some cases and a proportionally present minority in others.

Second, membership in the group of youth is not voluntary but set by the personal age and/or society's attitudes towards the conditions for passing the threshold into political adulthood. Several parliaments, and particularly Upper Houses, set minimum age requirements above the voting age, which leads to a virtual exclusion of a group of people based on their age. Condition (b) is thus fulfilled.

Arguably, condition (c) does not apply to youth. On the individual level, group membership is not immutable, because 'age is special' (Daniels 1988; Jecker 1989). Whereas, for example, gendered and racial structures of inequality affect individuals throughout their lives, age-based identification changes during the life cycle. This is to say that everyone was young and might have been treated unequally, but most have the chance to grow older and (potentially) gain advantage then (Bidadanure 2015). This is also Anne Phillips' argument for claiming that age is *not* like gender:

Consider the parallel under-representation of the very young and very old in politics. Most people will accept this as a part of a normal and natural life-cycle, in which the young have no time for conventional politics, and the old have already contributed their share; and since each in principle has a chance in the middle years of life, this under-representation does not strike us as particularly unfair (Phillips 1995, 63).

Thus, a fundamental difference between youth and gender/race is that, whereas the latter are clearly and immutably connected to the individual, the first makes most sense as a *group* identity. In other words, while youth may continue to be an underrepresented group over time, individuals' 'membership' in this group is inherently temporary.

However, this is mainly true if one employs a numerical or sociological definition of youth. When thinking of youth in a generational sense, membership does, indeed, take on an immutable aspect. Consider, for instance, the issue of climate change. The current youth generation will prospectively have to live with the consequences of what politicians decide today. However, when they reach the middle-age in which they have a greater chance to get individually involved in politics, their actions may come too late for their generation.<sup>7</sup>

I continue by discussing Williams' condition (d) - the extent to which negative meanings are assigned to group identity by the broader society. This has previously been formulated as a benchmark to ascertain to what extent the political underrepresentation of a group covered by condition (a) is simply the result of voluntary, individual deliberation or the consequence of structural inequalities erecting barriers to groups' access to representation, decision making, and power (Trantidis 2016). It is, in fact, an empirical question. Consider, for instance, the current high levels of mobility among young people, which, arguably, make it harder to build up and sustain local political networks. To what extent should these be framed a structural constraints? Do they simply reflect individual life-choices? For, while there are indications that a person identified as young may face specific (discriminatory) barriers, they may also enjoy advantages when entering or acting in the political space.

On the one hand, both party elites and voters may be sceptical of younger people's suitability for political office. Age is often viewed as a proxy for competence, and young candidates could be viewed as 'too young' or 'immature', with limited political

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<sup>7</sup>Thanks to Aaron Spitzer for pointing this out.

track records making them appear less qualified (IPU 2016, 6). The issue of whether an individual is qualified for a role in politics and how this can be ascertained is, indeed, a thorny one that I will not discuss here in depth (but see Murray 2015 for an excellent discussion of meritocratic arguments in political representation). I would, however, like to point out that most young MPs as well as party members and election candidates, are between 30 and 39 years old rather than between 20 and 29. As such, they would rarely be considered too young to become CEOs, football managers, or university professors - so one may assume that there would be enough qualified young candidates to proportionally fill a representative body (Stockemer and Sundström 2018a).

At the same time, young people may also profit from competitive advantages in nomination and election processes. They tend to be more flexible in terms of the time they can dedicate to politics - especially before assuming care responsibilities - and may for example profit from (the ascription of) better skills in digital communication and campaigning. In general, there is a growing concern among political parties to demonstrate the inclusion of young people and youth perspectives. This is the case both in developing democracies with proportionately high youth populations and, thus, potential voters (and revolutionaries, as during the Arab uprisings of 2011) and in the ageing societies of industrialized democracies currently facing youth movements centred around climate change and environmental issues.

Within parties, youth inclusion has previously often been achieved by creating youth wings representing young members' voices and serving as 'breeding pools' for parties' political offspring (Hooghe, Stolle, and Stouthuysen 2004). In the context of elec-

tions, young people may also benefit from positive stereotypes, such as the notion that they are ‘dynamic’ and bring ‘fresh ideas’ into the system. Indeed, many of the young candidates that I interviewed during the 2019 Irish local elections reported this to be the case (article 5). More generally, experimental studies on voter choices do not find a negative bias towards younger candidates (Campbell and Cowley 2014). The extent to which negative (or positive) meaning is assigned to group identity by broader society may also differ crucially for young men and women. While this is, again, an empirical question, gendered structures of inequality could also be expected to influence the young. For instance, young women, in particular, may be subject to assumptions that they are inexperienced reflecting more general negative stereotypes about women in politics. This is coupled with gendered patterns of work-care-responsibilities. These may favor young men’s entry into politics between 30 and 35 years of age, whereas this is often a period in which young women assume additional household and childcare responsibilities. Indeed, the empirical analyses in this dissertation find that gender is a significant factor to take into account when reflecting upon the political inclusion of youth (see the ‘results’ section of this introductory chapter).

In sum, while conditions (a) and (b) apply to youth, conditions (c) and (d) seem to be much more conditional on the particular definition of youth employed, as well as on the specific empirical context in question. For the remains of this introductory chapter and the dissertation as a whole, I, therefore, suggest a careful and conditional ‘yes, but...’ as an answer to the question of whether youth should normatively be considered a marginalized group in politics. Accordingly, the articles in this disserta-

tion employ a context-specific and gender-sensitive understanding of youth's political status rather than ex ante assuming a general status of marginalization.

## **Youth in Politics: From Representation to Inclusion**


This section first provides an empirical overview of youth representation worldwide, before reviewing existing studies that seek to explain these patterns. Based on the current literature, I develop the research design this dissertation relies on. I suggest that research on the political representation of youth can be further advanced by studying and comparing processes of political youth inclusion under the aspects of electoral quotas, political parties, and elections.

### **An Empirical Overview**

The map in figure 1 visualizes how the proportion of young MPs (under 40 years of age) varies across countries. What is interesting about these data is that there are no clearly identifiable geographical patterns. Latin American and European states, especially the Nordic countries, exhibit comparatively high shares of young MPs in their lower houses of parliament (expressed by darker shades in the figure). Strikingly, most African countries have few young representatives, even though these nations have the youngest populations.


Figure 2 illustrates how the proportion of young MPs varies in different electoral systems and by gender. As can be seen, young male MPs consistently outnumber young female MPs. However, both the overall share of young MPs and the gender balance between them tends to be higher in countries with Proportional Represen-

Figure 1: Proportion of young MPs Worldwide (percentage)



tation (PR) and mixed electoral systems than in majority-plurality (MP) systems. However, the data are relatively spread out. Thus, there seems to be considerable variation across countries also within electoral systems.

Figure 2: Proportion of young MPs by gender and electoral systems (n=142)




Data source: IPU dataset (D2); IDEA Electoral systems database

Figure 3 depicts the ratio of young male over young female MPs within countries and how it co-varies with a regime's degree of electoral democracy, here expressed as V-Dem's electoral democracy index EDI (lower values correspond to lower degrees of electoral democracy). It thus describes the degree of male over-representation among young MPs. The dashed line indicates a ratio of 1, i.e., gender equality. While the fitted line tends to be closer to equality in autocratic regimes and consolidated democracies (towards the left and right end of the x-axis, respectively), the gender imbalance among the young is highest in hybrid regimes (in the middle of the x-axis). Here, young male MPs outnumber young female MPs by an average factor of 5.



Figure 3: Ratio young male MPs to young female MPs by electoral democracy index (n=140)



Interestingly, of the 17 countries that have more young female than young male MPs (situated under the dashed line in figure 3),<sup>8</sup> four employ youth quotas and thirteen have legislated gender quotas.


Figure 4 provides an overview of how many of these policies have been adopted over time.<sup>9</sup> So far, youth quotas have been categorized as either legislated candidate quotas (LCQ), reserved seats (RS), or party quotas (PQ); thus following the most common typology for gender quotas (Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009). As can be seen from the chart, youth quotas are a relatively recent policy. Whereas Sri Lanka and

<sup>8</sup>Rwanda, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Bolivia, China, Suriname, South Korea, Israel, Seychelles, Jordan, Ecuador, Tanzania, Finland, Belgium, Cuba.

<sup>9</sup>Country codes according to the international naming convention.

Uganda were early adopters of legislated youth quotas in the 1990s, more countries and parties in all world regions followed suit in the 2000s, particularly after 2010. While, to my knowledge, the total number of countries and parties that have, so far, adopted youth quotas is 29, 13 party quotas are not displayed in figure 4, as I was unable to find reliable information on the date of their respective adoption. It can, however, be assumed that the total number of parties employing any form of youth quota is still underestimated. This is due to the general lack of systematic information on quotas employed at the party level, as these internal policies can be adopted quickly and are often more or less informal.

Figure 4: Count of youth quotas by type and year of adoption



Data source: IPU (2014, 2016, 2018); own research

## Previous Research

The empirical research on youth representation is limited but growing. Most published studies focus on exploring and analysing the cross-national patterns of youth's descriptive representation, as described above (IPU 2014; IPU 2016; IPU 2018; Stockemer and Sundström 2018a). Some studies have a regional focus on Europe (Stockemer and Sundström 2018b) or Asia (Joshi 2012). Furthermore, they often employ intersectional perspectives, combining the analysis of MPs' age with class, ethnicity, and/or gender (Joshi and Och 2014; Randall 2016; Stockemer and Sundström 2019). A separate strand of research focuses on young politicians' actions in parliaments and governments, only sometimes framing this in terms of 'substantive representation' (Alesina, Cassidy, and Troiano 2019; Erikson and Josefsson 2019; Kissau, Lutz, and Rosset 2012; Van Gyampo 2015; Winsvold, Ødegård, and Bergh 2017).

Studies on the descriptive representation of youth often depart from the G&P literature. Similar to cross-national studies comparing women's shares in legislatures, it is consistently found that the proportion of young MPs tends to be higher in PR- and mixed electoral systems compared to majoritarian systems (Joshi 2013; Joshi 2015; Stockemer and Sundström 2018a). G&P has argued that this is related to parties' rationality in candidate selection and placement: While majoritarian systems tend to be competitive both in nomination and election and the 'normal' middle-aged male candidate might be preferred as a safe winner, parties in PR-systems with higher district magnitudes might have incentives to 'balance' their electoral lists so that they can appeal to a wide range of voters. Thus, they might complement the usual candidates with those from under-represented groups (Celis and Erzeel 2017). If

this assumption also applies to youth - i.e., whether parties take candidate age into account when composing their lists - has, so far, seldom been tested empirically (for an exception, see Freidenvall 2016).


Another robust finding is that the gender balance seems to be greatest among younger cohorts of politicians, although women are underrepresented throughout all age groups (IPU 2018; Stockemer and Sundström 2019). However, it is unclear to what extent this effect is temporary. For instance, it could be the case that an increase in societal gender equality evened out inequalities in the current generation, and that politics in 30 years will, hence, be more gender-balanced than today. A more pessimistic view could, in contrast, hypothesize that the entry to political careers has become more equal but that women may drop out of politics more frequently than their male colleagues (e.g., due to parental leave regulations, gendered harassment, or unfavourable re-election rates). This would suggest that the gender-age balance in politics may be related to life-circle, rather than generational, effects.

Third, some studies suggest that leftist parties send higher numbers of young MPs to parliaments (Joshi 2015; Stockemer and Sundström 2018b). Again, whether the causal factors reflect those underlying gender (in)equality has not yet been investigated (Kenny and Verge 2016; Verge 2018). Interestingly, and in stark contrast to findings about gender quotas, Stockemer and Sundström 2018a do not find that electoral quotas for youth systematically correlate with higher proportions of youth in parliaments. What is more, a state's level of democracy, *per se*, has no robust effect on the proportion of young MPs (Stockemer and Sundström 2018a), echoing findings on women's representation (Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010).

## Research Design

These previous studies represent an important first step towards an understanding of cross-national patterns of youth representation. The studies do, however, also point to the many follow-up questions that remain unexplored. This dissertation specifically aims to investigate processes of the political inclusion of youth, which precede and may, therefore, explain some of the above-mentioned findings. In particular, I set out to focus on three aspects of political inclusion that have proved highly important for analysing gender (im-)balances in politics: Electoral quotas, political parties, and elections. Figure 5 presents a schematic layout of the dissertation's research design.

Figure 5: Research Design



While these processes are certainly overlapping and intertwined, I here conceptualize political inclusion as preceding and conditioning descriptive representation.<sup>10</sup> I suggest analyzing the political inclusion of youth on three specific levels of analysis: the macro, meso, and micro level.

First, on the macro level of analysis, I focus on political inclusion through the State, i.e., on legislation, electoral systems, and quotas. Second, the meso or organizational level of analysis scrutinizes inclusion through political parties and their processes of recruitment, candidate selection, and candidate placement. Third, I focus on the individual or micro level of analysis by analysing voters and young candidates in elections. In general, these aspects of political inclusion have been analysed previously with a focus on women but remain relatively unexplored for youth.

Legislated electoral quotas have become the most prominent ‘fast track’ approach to the political inclusion of groups at the level of the state, i.e., legislatures. However, so far, very little is known about electoral youth quotas and to what extent they are different from the ‘prototype’ of gender quotas. While there exists one edited volume on youth quotas (Tremmel et al. 2015), the chapters mainly present normative arguments about the importance of youth’s perspectives, without touching upon political representation and/or inclusion. This is partly because electoral youth quotas - provisions that mandate the share of young candidates on electoral lists or reserve parliamentary seats for them - are, empirically, a recent phenomenon. While the IPU reports provide biannual overviews over existing youth quotas, political scientists have only recently begun to investigate their adoption and implementation

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<sup>10</sup>While one could as well analyse the connection(s) between political inclusion and substantive/symbolic representation, this dissertation focuses on descriptive representation.

from an analytical point of view. Electoral youth quotas can be regarded as the chief policy for the political inclusion of youth at the state level. This dissertation thus focuses on exploring where and why states adopt youth quotas and how they design the regulations.

These are particularly interesting research questions for comparative politics in that the same questions have been addressed exhaustively for gender quotas (see, for instance, Bush 2011; Celis, Krook, and Meier 2011; Hughes et al. 2019; Kang and Tripp 2018) and, to a lesser extent, for ethnic minority provisions (Bird 2014; Htun and Ossa 2013). Yet, comparative accounts treating the adoption of quotas as an inclusion policy that can, potentially, apply to all societal groups, are rather scarce (but see Htun 2004; Krook and O'Brien 2010; Krook and Zetterberg 2014). More extensive literature reviews of (gender) quota adoption and design are provided in articles 1 and 2.

Second, G&P research has established that political parties are crucial actors in the political inclusion of women through processes of political recruitment, candidate selection, and the placement of candidates on electoral lists (Caul 1999; Krook and Mackay 2010; Lovenduski and Norris 1993). While there is considerably less research on youth than on women in political parties, there are some notable exceptions. First, Bruter and Harrison 2009 present an extensive analysis of young party members' incentives to join party politics and to (not) aspire to a political career, thus mostly focusing on young peoples' *entry* into (party) politics. Second, Hooghe, Stolle, and Stouthuysen 2004 go a step further towards investigating the *career perspectives* of young party members, in their study about the different functions of political parties'

youth wings. Based on an empirical analysis of career paths in Belgian local politics, they argue that party youth wings fulfil an important recruitment function and, at the same time, boost the political careers of young party members by providing opportunities for network building and training (Hooghe, Stolle, and Stouthuysen 2004, 196). What are, to my knowledge, still lacking, are systematic *comparative* accounts of how the age of party members features in inner-party processes of candidate selection and placement. These processes are also central to the implementation of electoral quotas, conditioning, to an important extent, the provisions' effectiveness in eventually securing group representation (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016; Murray 2007; Schwindt-Bayer 2009). Thus, this organizational or meso-level of analysis offers fruitful approaches to the study of youth representation both in contexts with and without electoral quotas. Specifically, this dissertation asks why parties do (not) comply with electoral youth quotas, how they implement the regulations, and how they include young candidates in contexts without quotas. More extensive literature reviews on political parties' compliance with and implementation of electoral quotas are provided in articles 2, 3, and 4.

Elections represent a third aspect of the political inclusion of youth. Conceptualizing age as a feature of the individual candidate allows to determine which role it plays for voting and electoral success. Ultimately, young candidates' success in an electoral race will determine their descriptive representation. G&P studies focusing on female candidates have investigated the extent to which gender exerts a direct influence on electoral success (Brooks 2013; Kanthak and Woon 2015) and how it may correlate with structural factors conducive to electoral success, such as incumbency (Fulton



2012; Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 2014) or access to campaign funding (Speck and Mancuso 2014). Furthermore, several experimental studies have attempted to identify voter biases towards hypothetical candidates (Benstead, Jamal, and Lust 2015; Campbell and Cowley 2014; Clayton et al. 2019) but do usually not find a negative bias towards youth.

This dissertation, thus, aims to investigate how candidates' age and gender impacts their electoral performance. Article 5, which also includes an extensive literature review on gender and age in electoral studies, addresses these questions in an analysis of the 2019 Irish local elections. In many countries, local elections are the main entry point into politics. Researching the conditions for the electoral chances of young candidates may not only tell us something about the effects of age, *per se*, but also about how age and gender are correlated to other factors and resources conducive for electoral success.

Before summarizing the findings of the articles with respect to the three aspects of youth inclusion this dissertation focuses on, the next section provides a short overview of cases, data, and methods.

## **Case Selection, Data, and Methods**

This section discusses the case selection for this dissertation, the types and sources of data I have collected during my doctoral work, the methods I have used to analyse the data, and limitations related to specific methodological choices I made. Again, each article has a proper methods section, where those aspects are discussed in depth. Table 2 presents an overview of the cases, data, and methods the articles rely on.

Table 2: Cases, data, and methods per article

art.	case(s)	unit of analysis	research design	data	methods
(1)	TUN, MOR	state	comp. case study	460 newspaper articles	causal process tracing
(2)	World TUN, MOR, SWE	state party	cross-national comp. case study	cross-national dataset (n=146)	descriptive statistics
(3)	TUN	state	case study	Parliament observational data	descriptive statistics
(4)	TUN (local)	party	case study	electoral data 25 interviews	descriptive statistics content analysis
(5)	IRE (local)	candidate	case study	candidate-level dataset (n=1884) 33 interviews	multivariate regression content analysis

### Case Selection

The case selection in this dissertation is motivated by my intention to analyse the political inclusion of youth on three (vertical) levels of analysis (macro, meso, micro) in both democratizing and democratic states (see table 3). Selecting cases on those vertical and horizontal axes allowed me to explore the subject in a multidimensional way, while gaining comparative insights into the similarities and differences of political youth inclusion in two different contexts. Democratizing states tend to have high shares of youth populations and may have different needs - primarily related to legitimizing recent political changes - than societies that experience demographic ageing.

The selection of cases was initially based on the observation that several North African countries (Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt) had recently adopted electoral quotas for youth. That all three countries introduced youth quotas in the aftermath of

Table 3: Case selection

	democratizing states	democratic states
macro (quotas)	art. 1, 2	art. 2
meso (parties)	art. 3, 4	art. 5
micro (elections)	art. 4	art. 5

the Arab uprisings in 2011 was surprising, given the very different trajectories of the uprisings themselves and the political aftermath. Tunisia is currently considered the most democratic country in the MENA region (V-Dem 2019) and is held up as a model for the benefits of electoral engineering. The country has been hailed, domestically and internationally, for its post-revolution process of democratic institution-building and the provision of representational guarantees to women (Gana 2013; Shalaby and Moghadam 2016). At the same time, youth are a crucial societal group that need to be ‘won over’ if democratization is to be sustainable: Youth were prominent actors during the revolution, suffer collectively from high unemployment rates, and comparatively many young Tunisian men have emigrated to Syria to fight for ISIS (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016; Thyen and Gerschewski 2017).

The task of engaging with youth as a politically relevant group must be assumed by a newly created political system, a number of new parties, and a traditionally old and male political elite. Those aspects make Tunisia an interesting and relevant case in which to study both the dynamics underlying the adoption of electoral youth quotas and the implementation of these quotas by political parties. Seen from a research design perspective, Tunisia also offers opportunities for cross-national comparisons

with other countries in the region (as in article 1 and 2) and within-case comparisons, as it employs electoral youth quotas at both the national level (analysed in articles 1,2,3) and the local level (article 4). It is also a suitable case to study youth inclusion on the party level, since it employs closed PR-list electoral systems on all levels of government, meaning that parties are the main gatekeepers to political office (Bjarnegård and Kenny 2015).

Tunisia and the North African region provide important insights into the dynamics of youth inclusion in states at different stages of democratization and high proportions of youth in populations. In many ways, Western European countries, with their established democratic political systems and their rapidly-ageing populations, are complementary cases. Yet there are pronounced differences in terms of youth representation also within Western Europe. For example, while the Scandinavian states - among them Sweden, which features in the analysis in article 2 - have high proportions of young MPs, this is not the case in Ireland, which is the second Western European case-study in this dissertation.

Ireland lags in terms of both female and youth representation<sup>11</sup> and is characterized by the presence of longstanding parties with potentially ‘sticky’ institutional routines in candidate selection and placement (Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell 2010). Furthermore, Ireland employs a PR-STV<sup>12</sup> electoral system. It thereby provides a particularly interesting opportunity to study young candidates in elections, as it

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<sup>11</sup>12.6 percent of all Irish MPs are young men, 3.3 percent are young women (under 40 years of age).

<sup>12</sup>Proportional representation with single transferable vote. Irish voters elect individual candidates and can indicate which candidate they wish their vote to be transferred to in case their first preference candidate is not elected. See a detailed description of PR-STV and its implications for parties’ candidate selection and placement in article 5 (p.5).

allows to distinguish between the effects of party selection vs. voter preferences on candidates' electoral performance. Finally, yet importantly, studying youth inclusion in Ireland is politically relevant. Ireland was hit hard by the economic crisis in 2008 and is currently facing several generation-specific political challenges, including the housing crisis and youth unemployment. This is paralleled by a process of societal modernization, expressed in two successful referenda on the legalization of same-sex marriage in 2015 and the decriminalization of abortion in 2018. Both of these referenda were overwhelmingly supported by young Irish citizens and contributed to unusually high registration rates among this voter group<sup>13</sup>. Subsequently, political parties were motivated to include young peoples' faces and preferences in their ballots and agendas.<sup>14</sup>

## Data and Methods

I have collected and analysed five main primary sources of data for this dissertation: text data from 460 newspaper articles from Tunisia and Morocco (Di), a cross-national dataset comprising the proportions of gender and age groups in parliaments of 146 countries (Dii), 25 interviews with local election candidates, policy experts, and party selectors in Tunisia (Diii), 33 interviews with local election candidates, politicians, and young party members in Ireland (Div), and a candidate-level dataset comprising a close to full sample ( $n = 1884$ ) of candidates running for the 2019 Irish

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<sup>13</sup>from 70% to 78% between 2014 and 2017 according to the National Youth Council of Ireland.

<sup>14</sup>While only one article in this dissertation focuses on Ireland, compared to four that more or less feature the Tunisian case, this is primarily due to the sequential nature of a cumulative thesis. While I do plan to publish further papers based on my research on Ireland, I had to make a cut at some point in order to not overload the format of an article-based dissertation.

local elections (Dv). Tables 4 and 5 provide brief overviews of the interview data and the datasets. All data, coding, and sources are described extensively in the respective articles and the appendices.

Table 4: Interview Data

data	n	time of collection	place	duration	language	interviewees	further info
Diii	25	Nov 2017; Apr 2018	Tunis; Sousse	20-45 min.	FR	policy experts (10) party selectors (10) candidates (12)	app. art. 1, 4
Div	35	Sep 2018; Feb - Apr 2019	Cork; Dublin; Bergen	20-45 min.	EN	party members (6) politicians (10) candidates (17)	app. art. 5

All of the articles rely, to varying extents, on combinations of these data sources, and I often complemented primary qualitative or quantitative data with secondary data of the opposite type. This general choice of a mixed-methods approach was motivated by three main considerations: Complementarity, triangulation, and theory development (Greene, Caracelli, and Graham 1989).

First, a lot of the available quantitative data did not allow for sophisticated statistical analyses. For instance, while the Dii dataset was useful for identifying global and regional trends, the number of country-cases that had adopted (differently designed) youth quotas became too small to estimate (robust) regression models. Therefore, me and my co-author *complemented* the analysis of descriptive statistical data with three in-depth case-studies, where we could include a time-trend in the analysis (article 2). Similarly, in article 4, I had at my disposal figures aggregated on the national level, but not the figures per municipality. Thus, I had to base the analyses on the available aggregated data and use the qualitative interview material to explain pat-

Table 5: datasets

data	unit	sources	main variables	further info
Dii	state	IPU; UN Statistics; IDEA Electoral systems; QAROT data	MPs by gender/age (nr. and %); gender/age groups in population (%); presence of youth/gender quota (0/1) and type (LCQ—RS—PQ) electoral system (PR—MP)	app. art. 2
Dv	candidate	Electoral data Ireland; electionsireland.org; parties' candidate profiles; newspaper articles	electoral success (0/1); share of first preference votes (%); candidate gender and age group (mam—maf—ym—yf); incumbency (0/1); incumbent status (exp./co-opted); challenger status (exp./newcomer); family relations (0/1); campaign spending (Euros); party affiliation; district controls	app. art. 5

terns I found in the quantitative data (article 4).

Second, I combined data types and methods to *triangulate* information that was difficult to access. For example, article 1 is primarily based on a content analysis of 460 newspaper articles that I searched to trace the process of the adoption of youth quotas in Tunisia and Morocco. While I initially had expected to find a bottom-up process, with youth activists and international donors asking for political youth inclusion, I could not find evidence in support of this assumption in the newspapers. In Tunisia, there seemed to have been no public discourse - at least, none reported by local newspapers - on a quota for youth or anything similar before the policy was adopted. When I did a first round of expert interviews with heads of youth organizations, internationally-funded political foundations, and development actors, this was confirmed: Many of them were not even aware of this policy and did not claim

to have demanded it. When I subsequently began to search Twitter, I discovered protocols from several parliamentary committee sessions in spring 2014, right before the adoption of the electoral code, where a group of MPs suggested the adoption and design of an electoral youth quota. The process thus turned out to be a top-down initiative, which could explain the results from the different data sources.

Third, mixed methods seemed an appropriate approach to *develop* and *test* theories about youth inclusion on the party and candidate levels (Kenny and Verge 2016). Particularly with regards to youth inclusion within political parties, I could not rely on previous theories that I would then test empirically. As argued above, while G&P has informed much of the research presented in this dissertation, age is unlike gender in many regards. Thus, rather than simply testing whether variables that have been found to impact women's inclusion would do so, equally, for youth in the context of parties and elections, I decided to start from scratch and conduct explorative interviews in order to identify additional and/or different variables. In article 4, I developed a theory about parties' (non)compliance with electoral quotas in new democracies based on electoral data and interview material (Diii). While most G&P studies explain parties' non-compliance with electoral quotas referring to electoral strategy and/or sexism, i.e., a lack of willingness to comply, my interviews pointed to a lack of organizational strength and resources, i.e., of ability. I could, thus, inductively develop a theoretical approach, which might be tested on a larger scale in future analyses.

Article 5, in my opinion, presents a best practice example of my methodological approach. Here, I formulated hypotheses based on the inductive analysis of 33 inter-



views (Div) that I then tested on a large-n dataset (Dv). The interviews allowed me (a) to identify relevant variables for (young) candidates' electoral performance and (b) to formulate hypotheses about how these variables hang together. The sequencing of data collection - first the interviews, then the dataset - thus allowed me to approach the interviews without data-based expectations, identify relevant variables to collect, and avoid the collection of tautological data.

### **Limitations**

In general, all of the data and methods I used were chosen based on the research design and question of the specific articles, the availability of the data, and the desire to integrate in-depth, qualitative insights into a new topic with broader statistical information. That said, there are some limitations related to this pragmatic approach. As pointed out above, a good share of the articles' findings should be read as inductively created insights that await further testing on a larger scale. For example, gender quotas were first meaningfully examined cross-nationally and over time once they had been adopted by a large enough number of states and had been used for a significant number of electoral cycles. Thus, youth quotas may need a little more time to spread before they can be examined on a larger comparative scale. I am, nevertheless, confident that some of the results generated by my case-specific analyses of processes of youth inclusion through quotas on the state level (article 1,2) and within political parties (article 3,4) will inform future research on the topic. In the same vein, my study of young candidates in Irish local elections (article 5) should be understood as a first exploration of how age impacts electoral performance that has

identified factors and correlations that could potentially be tested cross-nationally and/or over time.

Finally, a mixed-methods approach often involves some trade-offs concerning data collection and analysis. For example, I did not do extensive fieldwork in either Tunisia or Ireland but collected and analysed the interviews in a relatively straightforward manner. Similarly, if I had written the dissertation based exclusively on quantitative data, I could potentially have invested more time into data collection and in some cases may have used more sophisticated models. In sum, my pragmatic and inductive approach to the collection and analysis of data may, on the one hand, have limited the methodological depth of this dissertation. On the other hand, since the field is so new, the gain in breadth was worth the trade-off and allowed me to present novel insights into a new area of research. As I was continually triangulating qualitative and quantitative data, I am also confident that I did not miss out essential parts of the story I set out to tell.

## **Results: The Political Inclusion of Youth**

This section provides a summary of the articles' results relating to the three overarching research questions this dissertation focuses on. In particular, I use this section to draw comparisons between the articles' findings on the respective topics in transitional and established democracies.

## **Quotas: Legislating Youth Inclusion**

The first focus of the dissertation are processes of youth inclusion on the macro-level of analysis, i.e., the state. Here, I aimed to compare electoral youth quotas with provisions for women. Asking where and why quotas for youth are adopted and how they are designed, articles 1 and 2 find several similarities, but also differences to gender quotas. The articles map youth quotas' empirical occurrence geographically, over time, and with respect to the specific design of the provisions. Tabular overviews can be found in article 1 (p.3) and article 2 (p.9). First, I find that youth quotas have, to date, always been adopted in addition to or along with gender quotas: All states and parties that employ youth quotas also employ gender quotas. While some countries (Sri Lanka, Uganda, Rwanda) were the forerunners of legislating youth inclusion via quotas in the 1990s and early 2000s, a surge of adoption, on both the state and the party levels, started after 2010. In particular, three North African states (Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt) adopted electoral quotas for youth in the aftermath of the 2010/2011 Arab uprisings.

This was the incentive to trace and compare specific adoption processes of youth and gender quotas across and within cases in Tunisia and Morocco (article 1). Here, I was interested in the extent to which actors and processes preceding youth quota adoption were similar to or different from the respective gender quotas. Second, I wanted to know to what extent adoption processes followed a similar logic in the Tunisian new democratic system and the Moroccan electoral autocracy. I first generated hypotheses based on the extensive G&P literature regarding critical actors in processes of (gender) quota adoption. I then tested these hypotheses based on a

content analysis of 460 newspaper articles, expert interviews, and social media data, in order to establish when and by whom electoral youth quotas were introduced to the political agenda in both countries. Interestingly, given the youth-led uprisings in both countries, the article finds that there were no public demands for a youth quota from the broader youth movements in either country. In Tunisia, a group of deputies in the constitutional assembly initiated the introduction of a youth quota during the compilation of the electoral code in the last phase of the immediate transition process. In Morocco, King Mohammed VI suggested introducing a youth quota as a reaction to publicly-raised demands by youth members of political parties. I argue in the article that both initiatives should be understood as efforts of legitimization and stabilization after the uprisings, albeit with different focuses.

Article 2 explores how electoral youth quotas are designed and how they impact the chances of members of particular gender and age groups for being present in parliament. It finds that, similar to gender quotas, youth quotas occur as legislated candidate quotas (LCQ), reserved seats (RS), and party quotas (PQ). In the vast majority of cases, legislated youth and gender quotas are similarly designed: Either they both occur as legislated candidate quotas (LCQLCQ) or both as reserved seats (RSRS). In article 2, me and my co-author then analyse how different constellations of paired electoral youth and gender quotas impact gender and age groups' odds for representation in 146 countries worldwide. We termed the resulting rank-orders between young women, young men, middle-aged to old women, and middle-aged to old men 'hierarchies of representation' (HoR). Consistent with previous research, we find that youth quotas do not lead to significantly higher proportions of young MPs.

Our findings indicate, however, that youth quotas, depending on their design, can impact the parliamentary HoR, i.e., the rank order *between* groups. To further investigate this dynamic, we conducted three case-studies of the impact that gender and youth quotas have on HoR in Tunisia (paired candidate quotas, LCQLCQ), Morocco (paired reserved seats, RSRS), and the Swedish Social Democratic Party (paired party quotas, PQPQ).<sup>15</sup> Here, we compare how the introduction of a youth quota, in addition to an existing gender quota, has changed the resulting HoR. In sum, we find that the specific configuration of paired quotas tended to increase young women's chances of election. However, it did so mainly at the expense of middle-aged to old women and, in particular, young men. Thus, we argue that paired quotas tend to re-distribute seats between minority groups rather than challenging the parliamentary over-representation of majority groups (i.e., middle-aged to old men).

While articles 1 and 2 both focus on youth quotas in democratizing states, their findings also tell us something about the adoption and design of this policy in established democracies. Youth quotas are in use in both democratic and democratizing states. What differs is the type of policy: Whereas, to date, legislated youth quotas (LCQ or RS) have been exclusively adopted by democratizing states in the Global South, in established democracies it tend to be one or more parties employing them (PQ). This is a finding consistent with the research on gender quotas, where there is a similar empirical pattern (Rosen 2017). An interesting avenue for future research could be to take a closer look at youth quota adoption on the party level and compare arguments, actors, and processes to inner-party gender quotas.

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<sup>15</sup>Note that the case-study of the Swedish Social Democratic Party has been moved to the article's appendix during the R&R process.

## **Parties: Implementing Youth Inclusion**

While article 2 assumed that the re-distributive effect of paired electoral quotas could be explained by parties' logic of candidate selection and placement, articles 3 and 4 move on to analyse and compare parties' rationalities when implementing electoral quotas for youth and other underrepresented groups.

Article 3 develops the short Tunisian case study from article 2 into an in-depth exploration of parties' strategies of candidate selection for the national elections in 2011 and 2014 and the subsequent parliamentary positions of young MPs. First, the analysis traces how the nested design of the paired gender and youth quotas encouraged the political parties to nominate a relatively high number of young female candidates who could fulfil both quotas at once. I show that young female candidates were commonly placed on positions 2 or 4 of the electoral lists, thus fulfilling both the gender parity and youth quotas. I then compare Tunisian MPs' socio-economic backgrounds and their patterns of parliamentary activity (presence in plenary sessions and committees, participation in votes, membership in committees) based on their age and gender. I find few significant differences between young men, young women, middle-aged women, and middle-aged men. However, leadership positions in the parliament and the political parties are predominantly occupied by middle-aged men and, to a lesser extent, middle-aged women. I conclude that, in the short-term, the over-representation of young women compared to middle-aged women may harm women's substantive representation, as the former are potentially easier to sideline from power than the latter. The near absence of young men from the Tunisian parliament, who are commonly understood as the group that drove the revolution, may

furthermore harm the symbolic representation of youth.

While article 3 concentrates on national politics, article 4 analyses parties' recruitment and candidate selection at the local level. Focusing on the 2018 Tunisian local elections, it investigates the causes of parties' varying strategies when implementing electoral quotas for youth, women, and people with disabilities (PwD). Whereas prior research has primarily focused on the reasons – be they ideological or strategic – that parties' are willing to comply with quotas, this article sheds light on the parties' ability to do so. I argue that, in the context of new democracies, parties deal with high levels of institutional uncertainty resulting from new electoral structures and rules. While organizationally strong parties can choose long-term electoral strategies, weaker parties may sacrifice long-term benefits for the sake of the party to short-term calculations of single lists. The argument is substantiated by a comparative analysis of Tunisian parties' strategies of quota compliance. Whereas the Islamist party, Ennahda, was able to fully comply with all quotas, small secular parties lost a considerable number of lists and significant state funding due to non-compliance. I argue in this article that this was mainly due to un-coordinated candidate selection processes and a lack of territorial spread, rather than the result of discrimination against female, young, or disabled candidates. The article's findings caution us that, even if macro-level policies for political inclusion are effectively designed, they may have repercussive effects on party and party system consolidation in new democracies.

Whereas articles 3 and 4 again focus on Tunisia and its context of a transitional democracy, articles 2 and 5 complement these findings with insights into parties'

rationale behind the implementation of youth quotas and the general inclusion of youth in established democracies. Article 2 includes an analysis of candidate selection and election in the Swedish Social Democratic Party under different constellations of electoral quotas. Comparing the odds of election for young female, young male, middle-aged female, and middle-aged male candidates, we find that middle-aged men continuously form a stable majority among candidates and MPs. The introduction of a youth quota in addition to a gender quota increased young women's chances of selection and election relative to young men and middle-aged women. This corroborates the findings from Tunisia and Morocco, that parties tend to follow the logic of 'killing two birds with one stone' even when they deal with the implementation of voluntarily adopted quotas.

Moving on, article 5 provides insights into how parties select young candidates in a context without quotas. Two findings deserve specific mention: First, the vast majority of candidates and young party members that I interviewed felt as a popular group sought after by the political parties and experienced their age as an advantage in selection processes. Indeed, the statistical analyses do not show any discrimination of young candidates due to selection effects that have previously been found for female candidates: Parties do not place them in particularly competitive constituencies and provide them with similar amounts of financial support for their campaigns. However, again, the crux of the matter is *which* young candidates are given preference. In a context without gender and/or youth quotas, parties seem to continue to prefer young male over young female candidates. The former outnumber the latter both among selected and elected candidates. Furthermore, a disproportionate num-



ber of young candidates have a known family name and profit from dynastic ties in (party) politics. While this effect is particularly driven by the two big centrist parties (Fianna Fail and Fine Gael), other dynamics do not seem to differ based on party ideology. In particular, almost all parties have a stable majority of middle-aged male candidates - the only exception being the recently founded left-wing Social Democratic Party.

### **Elections: Running for Youth Inclusion**

The third aspect of youth inclusion focuses on young candidates in electoral races and how their age influences their decision to run, electoral campaigns, and candidates' eventual electoral performance. Article 4, as mentioned above, explores how parties strategically identified and placed young candidates on their electoral lists in the 2018 Tunisian local elections, i.e., in a context with youth quotas. While the small parties, in particular, struggled to identify enough female and PwD candidates, this was not the case for young candidates. In the interviews, Tunisian party selectors reported that youth were a yielding pool of candidates. Often, youth had fewer time constraints than female (particularly middle-aged) candidates, because they were students, unemployed, and/or very active in civil society organizations. A particularity of Tunisian electoral law made them particularly attractive candidates, who were, at times, used to fill up the lists: For a candidate to be accepted by the Independent Electoral Authority (ISIE), he or she has to have paid their taxes. Yet, students do not pay taxes and are therefore exempted from this rule. Indeed, an impressive majority of 52% of the candidates running for election were under 35 years

old, and 37% of those youth were eventually elected to the Tunisian local councils. Young candidates themselves also were highly motivated to compete in the elections and often saw themselves as the backbones of parties' electoral campaigns. They were often the ones effectuating door-to-door campaigns, organizing events, and collecting donations.

Article 5 shifts the analysis into the context of Irish local elections, asking which individual factors conditioned young candidates' selection, their electoral campaigns, and their electoral performance. In particular, I was interested to identify structural and individual variables that correlate with candidates' age and gender, and to examine how these variables would impact electoral success. In Ireland, local politics is the most common entry to a political career. Furthermore, its PR-STV electoral system allows to distinguish between party selection effects - 'who runs?' - and voter preferences - 'which individual candidate receives the first preference vote?'

Drawing on 33 interviews with party members, local politicians, and election candidates, the article identifies access to political, dynastic, and financial resources as important criteria in candidate selection. These resources, in turn, mediate a good share of the impact of age and gender on electoral performance. The hypotheses are subsequently tested on an original dataset of over 1880 local election candidates. The findings suggest that, when controlling for access to electoral resources, being young can in fact provide a net electoral advantage to candidates. It does however only do so for young men. In contrast, young female candidates appear to be advantaged by their age but penalized by their gender.

In sum, young candidates seem however to do quite well both in Tunisia and in

Ireland. They are a group sought after by the political parties acting in PR electoral systems. Parties are aware of a need to diversify their lists and/or to comply with youth quotas. Interestingly, and perhaps counter-intuitively, there seem to exist more structural barriers for young candidates - especially young females - in the Irish system. While young candidates have more time, are more active in civil society, and are, therefore, seen as resourceful candidates in Tunisia, this is not the case in Ireland. Here, young females and those aged around 30, in particular, cite time constraints resulting from family and career commitments as a primary reason for the low supply of young candidates and as a central concern for those deciding whether or not to run for election. Furthermore, the incumbency disadvantage creates barriers for young candidates aspiring to be selected and elected, the exception being those who have access to alternative resources such as a known family name.

In contrast, there were no incumbents in the new Tunisian local political system and, as the parties had to operate under gender and youth quotas from the beginning on, the next elections could happen with an impressive share of 47% female and 37% young incumbents. The only fly in the ointment for the political representation of youth in Tunisia may be the large disconnect between politics and society. Despite the high proportion of young candidates running and campaigning, less than 30% of Tunisian young citizens voted in the election. As stated in the articles, it remains to be seen - and researched - to what extent and under which conditions the descriptive representation of youth achieved by quotas in Tunisia can guarantee sustainable political careers as well as substantive youth representation.

## Conclusions

This dissertation set out to explore the political inclusion of youth via quotas, parties, and elections. It does so by comparing processes and actors in democratic and democratizing states, with a specific focus on Tunisia and Ireland. While an emerging literature on the descriptive representation of youth has, so far, described and explained cross-national patterns of young MPs' presence in parliaments, this dissertation aims to shed light on processes preceding and conditioning such patterns.

Building on the G&P literature, the articles in this dissertation have investigated where and why quotas for youth are adopted, how parties include young candidates in contexts with and without quotas, and which factors influence young candidates' electoral performance. The dissertation's findings primarily rely on (comparative) case-studies and represent an inductive and pragmatic approach to the collection and analysis of data. Arguably, these traits limit the generalizability of its findings. The articles do, however, offer a broad account of political youth inclusion in varying contexts and identify a number of fruitful avenues for further research on this topic. As I have often used theories derived from the literature on women and ethnic groups' political representation as a starting point for my investigations, the dissertation's findings not only inform the research on youth representation but also have implications for comparative research on the political inclusion of groups.

First, the discussions presented here caution us to not assume that all underrepresented groups are under-represented for the same reasons. In the articles, it became obvious that youth seem to be a sought-after group of candidates among parties and voters (article 4, 5). While they may be subject to structural disadvantages,

such as a lack of time and limited access to political networks and experience in some contexts, they seem to meet less direct discrimination than other marginalized groups. At the same time, and consistent with previous research, the dissertation emphasizes the need for intersectional perspectives when analysing youth inclusion and representation. Being young can play out very differently for men and women, whose experiences in political processes will be shaped by, i.a., the specific context as well as the electoral system and its regulations.

A second important implication of the dissertation as a whole refers to the use of electoral quotas as a means of political inclusion. My analyses have shown that electoral youth quotas are often modelled on the respective regulations for women, and that they, so far, have been adopted in addition to or at the same time as gender quotas. While G&P has argued convincingly that parties and states usually adopt gender quotas when pressured by political competitors (Weeks 2018), international donors (Bush 2011), and/or civil society actors (Kang and Tripp 2018), youth quotas appear to be more of a symbolic policy, serving purposes of regime stabilization and legitimization. While my empirical analysis has traced the top-down, elite-driven nature of their adoption in Tunisia and Morocco, the fact that legislated youth quotas are mainly adopted in less democratic countries and that they do not correlate with higher shares of young MPs in parliaments is an indication that those motives could play a role also in other countries.

Third, the dissertation has important implications for policy-makers. In particular, it points to the absolute necessity of thinking through the design of electoral youth quotas in a very detailed way. Particularly when the regulation is added to

a gender quota, the quotas need to be understood as interconnected policies that work in conjunction with the electoral system. Taking into account parties' routines and rationales for candidate recruitment and selection is crucial when estimating the quotas' re-distributive effects on dynamics of (descriptive) minority and majority representation. While this is true for new and established democracies alike, one important finding of this dissertation refers to a specific challenge for quota implementation in democratizing states. Since parties are often relatively new and lack organizational strength and resources, they may be overburdened by the implementation of multiple and complex quotas. So, while G&P research has made the valid point that quotas need to be designed strictly and ambitiously in order to secure gains in group representation (Hughes et al. 2019; Schwindt-Bayer 2009), those designs may also harm political competition and party system consolidation in new democracies. Article 4, therefore, suggests the adoption of incremental quota designs that become increasingly strict over time, giving parties more time to adapt, as a potential remedy for this dilemma.

In terms of policy relevance, this dissertation also investigated which factors, beyond quotas, could lead to more young candidates being elected. Consistent with previous research, I showed that, rather than age *per se*, young candidates' lacking access to electoral resources like political status and experience complicate the start of young peoples' political careers. For parties wanting to increase the share of young women among candidates, the dissertation made a strong case for a gender- and life-cycle-sensitive understanding of political youth inclusion. For instance, the bracket of 20 to 29 years of age - rather than the much more common 35+ years - seems to be

optimal for starting a political career. As students, and before beginning families, young people can invest much more time into developing political networks and other relevant resources like local name recognition. In their 30s, the ‘rush hour of life’, time for (voluntary) political engagement tends to be limited by family and work commitments. Furthermore, life gets more gendered, leaving women in their 30s as one of the least likely groups to start a political career.

While this dissertation provides important insights into the relatively novel field of political youth inclusion, it also highlights several promising avenues for future research. First, as mentioned multiple times throughout this introductory chapter, many of the inductively generated results should be tested and analysed in a larger, possibly cross-national fashion in order to gain further insight into the relationship between political youth inclusion and patterns of descriptive representation. Second, some important questions have only been touched upon in this dissertation: How does the descriptive representation of youth and the method of their inclusion condition substantive and symbolic aspects of youth’s political representation? For instance, to what extent could youth quotas lead to a tokenization of young (female) MPs, leaving them without real political power and vulnerable to constant replacement in order to fulfill youth quotas, rather than facilitating sustainable political careers? Also, how can political parties in both democratic and democratizing states credibly represent current youth generations and their specific political demands? Researching these questions will certainly advance the comparative literature on political inclusion and representation. But it may also provide some answers about how representative democracies could and should look in the future.

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# The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings

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## ABSTRACT

The adoption of electoral quotas for politically under-represented groups has become a prominent policy worldwide. An increasing number of states have adopted youth quotas, which aim to foster the election of young members of parliament under 35 to 40 years of age. To date, youth quotas only occur in tandem with simultaneously or previously adopted gender quotas. Why do states adopt youth quotas? Are the driving actors similar as in the adoption of gender quotas? Using causal process tracing based on a qualitative content analysis of newspaper articles, parliamentary debates, and interviews, this article investigates the adoption of youth quotas in Tunisia and Morocco after the Arab uprisings in 2011. The findings suggest that, contrary to the respective gender quotas, youth quotas were not part of civil society movements' agendas, but top-down initiatives from actors from within the domestic political elites.

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## Introduction

The adoption of electoral quotas that aim to broaden and deepen the political representation of different identity groups has become a popular policy. Legislated gender quotas exist today in about 50 states worldwide. A more recent and regional trend is the adoption of legislated youth quotas. According to data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 2014/2015, legislated youth quotas are to date operational in eight countries (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016, 17). The quotas commonly define youth as those not older than 35 to 40 years of age. All states that have adopted youth quotas previously or simultaneously also adopted gender quotas and did so preferably during political transitions.

In general, the adoption of youth quotas is as puzzling as the adoption of gender quotas. First, youth form a considerable part of world populations but are under-represented in politics.<sup>1</sup> Hence, predominantly middle-aged legislators passed electoral quotas that may eventually unseat themselves. Second, youth's shared identity is non-permanent and a common interest in political representation may be more difficult to identify and to mobilize. Third, youth often lack societal resources and power, particularly in the "Global South" (Abbink 2005). It should hence be difficult for youth as a group to exert

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pressure for the adoption of electoral quotas. Therefore, why do states adopt youth quotas? Gender and politics research has identified three kinds of actors driving quota adoption: Women groups and movements mobilizing bottom-up for better representation, international actors diffusing norms favorable to the political inclusion of women, and domestic political elites pursuing strategic goals and initiating quotas top-down (Celis, Krook, and Meier 2011; Krook 2004, 2007). Particularly in authoritarian and hybrid settings, studies have emphasized the strategic value of gender quotas for regime stabilization and legitimization (Muriaas and Wang 2012; Welbourne 2010). This article engages with this literature by asking if the same actors and dynamics behind youth quota adoption can be identified.

It presents the results from a comparative case study of gender and youth quota adoption in Tunisia and Morocco based on the qualitative analysis of newspaper articles and social media data, law texts, and interviews, complemented by quantitative survey data. The article aims to explain why two substantially different regimes – the Moroccan monarchy and the post-revolution Tunisian Republic – both decided to adopt youth quotas after the Arab uprisings in 2011. This is a puzzle in itself, since Morocco is usually framed as part of the “monarchical exception” during the Arab uprisings. Several studies find that all of the Arab monarchies – Jordan, Morocco, and the GCC states – managed to mitigate the impact of the uprisings and largely achieved to maintain the status quo, while the republics – Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya – experienced full-blown revolutions and regime changes (Barari 2015; Lucas 2014; Yom and Gause 2012). Indeed, Morocco adopted the youth quotas in the course of minor constitutional revisions within 6 months after the uprisings, while Tunisia came to this decision after a three-year long process of constitution writing and the designing of a new post-revolution political system. Considering that both the regimes types and the scope of the transitions differ substantially, a comparison of these two cases thus allows exploring potentially different paths and motivations to similar policy choices.

The findings suggest that there were no public demands for a youth quota from the broader youth movements in either country. In Tunisia, a group of deputies in the constitutional assembly initiated the introduction of a youth quota during the compilation of the electoral code in the last phase of the immediate transition process. In Morocco, the King Mohammed VI suggested introducing a youth quota as a reaction to publicly raised demands by youth members of political parties. I argue that both initiatives should be understood as efforts of legitimization and stabilization after the uprisings, albeit with different focuses.

The article unfolds as follows: The first section maps youth quotas and the structural conditions for their adoption. The next section presents theoretical arguments for the introduction of electoral quotas that mainly derive from gender and politics research. I then transfer those theories to youth quota adoption in the form of hypotheses on actors, strategies, and motivations potentially driving youth quota adoption. It follows the process-tracing analysis of youth quota adoption and a comparative discussion of the findings. The conclusion qualifies the study’s findings and the scope of my argument.

## **Mapping youth quotas**

Youth worldwide are practically absent from formal politics, considering that only 14% of the world’s Members of Parliament (MPs) are aged under forty (Inter-Parliamentary

Union 2016). Table 1 lists the states that have so far adopted legislated youth quotas to counter this under-representation. Seven of them are African states; with a regional focus on East and North Africa. The neighboring states of Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya were at the forefront of adopting youth quotas; and they all did so in the aftermath of conflict and the following (re-)writing of constitutions. A second important wave of youth quota adoption was apparently triggered by the youth-led uprisings in North Africa in 2011, when Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt all introduced youth quotas in their revisited constitutions. However, it is noticeable that other Arab countries that experienced uprisings in 2011 – Libya, Syria, Jordan, and the GCC countries – did not make this policy decision.

The Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem) index for liberal democracy in the respective year of quota adoption shows that youth quotas have mostly been adopted by semi-democratic and authoritarian regimes. However, governments tend to introduce them in post-conflict periods that may in some cases be framed as democratization processes – indicated by a positive change in the V-Dem index two years after quota adoption. The dynamics of political transition have been shown to be particularly favorable for the adoption of electoral quotas, for example by initiating a process of constitutional revision and the creation of new electoral laws (Anderson and Swiss 2014; Hughes 2009; Tajali 2013).

All of the states listed in Table 1 have previously or simultaneously also adopted gender quotas. Both legislated youth and gender quotas occur either as candidate quotas (LC) that regulate the targeted groups' share on electoral lists, or as reserved seats (RS), for which these groups compete in separate elections. Most quotas define an age limit of 35 to 40 years. This reflects a particular understanding of “youth” when it comes to political representation. Many United Nations Bodies define youth as aged 15–24, but since young people rarely gain office before the age of 35, an age threshold of 40–45 years has become common in defining MPs as young (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016, 5). The last column in Table 1 indicates (potentially eligible) youth's share in population and in parliament. It shows that all the countries in question have high proportions of citizens aged 20–39, a phenomenon that has been coined the African “youth bulge”. Broader statistical analyses of the relationship between demographics and youth representation have found no significant correlation between a young median age and youth representation (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016, 16). However, as the second part of this column

**Table 1.** Countries with legislated youth quotas on the national level.

Country	YQ adoption	V-Dem index $t_0$	Change V-Dem index ( $\Delta t_1 t_0$ )	Youth quota	Age limit	Youth (20–39y.) in population /parliament <sup>a</sup>
Egypt	2014	0.10	+/-0.0	13% LC	n.d.	34% / n.d.
Gabon	2015	0.25	+0.01	20% LC	40	31% / 9%
Kenya	2010	0.36	-0.01	3–4% RS	35	32% / n.d.
Kyrgyzstan	2010	0.23	+0.08	15% LC	35	35% / 35%
Morocco	2011	0.24	+/-0.0	8% RS	40	34% / 18%
Rwanda	2003	0.14	+0.02	8% RS	35	32% / 22%
Tunisia	2014	0.63	+0.03	25% LC	35	32% / 23%
Uganda	1995	0.24	+0.01	1% RS	30	30% / 22%

Note:  $t_0$ : Year of quota adoption;  $t_1$ : 2 years after quota adoption.

Sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016; V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (from 0.0 – least democratic to 1.0 – most democratic); see <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>; World Bank.

<sup>a</sup>world average: 31% / 14%.

shows, most countries with legislated youth quotas do exhibit higher youth representation in parliament than the world average, although the quotas usually still fall short to mirror accurately the high proportions of youth populations.

### Actors driving youth quota adoption

How, then, do those structural conditions – demography, exposure to international pressure, and dynamics of transformation – translate into facilitating the adoption of youth quotas? Research engaging with the dynamics behind gender quota adoption has argued that quotas need to be actively lobbied for and identified three main groups of key actors driving gender quota adoption: civil society movements, international actors, and domestic political elites (Celis, Krook, and Meier 2011; Krook 2004). This is particularly relevant for countries in political transition processes. Whereas electoral reform is typically the prerogative of governments, political transitions open distinct spaces of opportunity for a variety of actors outside formal politics to push for electoral reform (Arendt 2018; Bauer and Burnet 2013; Muriaas, Tønnessen, and Wang 2013). In general, newly emerging institutions should be understood as the outcome of strategic interactions of key actors during transformation processes (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016, 5). Since we lack theoretical and empirical accounts of youth quota adoption (for an exception see Trantidis 2016), I suggest transferring assumptions on gender quota adoption to youth quotas, asking if we can identify similar patterns of actors, strategies, and motivations.

The first account puts emphasis on identity groups and movements, who may mobilize to claim representational guarantees bottom-up. With regard to the Arab uprisings, Asseburg and Wimmen have coined the term “mobilized public”, which they define as to “include any collective of citizens that becomes active and mobilizes others to do so with the explicit objective of exerting [...] influence on the political process” (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016, 9). Youth quota adoption may thus be linked to youth groups and movements who claim political inclusion and representation. In terms of strategies, identity groups will usually opt for visible public action and civil society mobilization in order to obtain broad support, and hence leverage, for their claims (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016, 9). The building of alliances between (parts of) identity groups and political elites as well as with international actors is also a suitable strategy. Regarding their motivation and argumentation, proponents for youth quotas commonly refer to a narrative of generational justice. Youth quotas are thus seen as a means to foster youth’s *collective* representation rather than to counter *individual* discrimination (Reyes 2015; Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger Generationen 2015). In Tunisia and Morocco, youth were an important part of the mobilized publics that drove the Arab uprisings, as well as a considerable part of the population as a whole. The first hypothesis is:

H1: Youth movements publicly sought better political representation of young citizens and mobilized for the introduction of youth quotas in Tunisia and/or Morocco.

Second, international actors and donors may support and encourage youth quota adoption. There is a growing international interest in the political inclusion and representation of youth, motivated by the belief that a better mirroring of young voters in parliament may for instance encourage them to participate more actively in politics (European

Commission and UNDP 2017). The inclusion of youth into parliaments is also promoted to change a state's political culture, render political institutions more inclusive, and strengthen democratization (UNDP 2013). In terms of strategies, international donors primarily rely on the issuing of declarations, making recommendations, and sharing of good practices, i.e. norm diffusion. Particularly during and after the Arab uprisings, international actors and donors were present both as consultants in the processes of constitution writing and as project partners for local NGOs and had considerable influence on the outcome of the respective transformation processes.

H2: International actors issued recommendations and/or supported domestic claims for the introduction of youth quotas in Tunisia and/or Morocco.

Finally, youth quotas may as well have been initiated top-down by domestic political elites. For the purpose of this article, I use political elites as a conceptual category comprising a multitude of actors with potentially differing and even conflicting interests, but united by their capacity to directly influence policy-formulation and adoption. For example, governments, political parties, and deputies in legislative bodies are conceptualized as belonging to the political elites.<sup>2</sup> Actors in that category may not just react to claims for quotas raised by identity groups or international actors, i.e. bottom-up, but also have reason to initiate youth quota adoption themselves, i.e. top-down. As the idea of political elites encouraging reforms that may unseat themselves is quite counter-intuitive, most of the literature assumes that their motivation to do so is based on strategic cost-benefit calculations which can render quota adoption attractive to them (Celis, Krook, and Meier 2011). This is particularly relevant considering that most of the countries with legislated youth quotas are authoritarian or hybrid regimes.

I argue that the adoption of youth quotas may serve two main strategic purposes: Legitimization and stabilization (Gerschewski 2013). On the one hand, youth quotas may be a means to win the political support of the domestic youth population. Youth represent a considerable share of the electorate in the countries in question and are thus an important audience both for single political actors, e.g. parties, as well as for a regime as such. As Murphy (2012, 14) describes, Arab regimes have reacted to the demographic youth bulge and youth's self-removal from politics – both as voters and as members of political parties – with attempts to reintegrate youth into their national projects by proactive efforts to reach out to them. Youth quotas could thus be understood as one of those efforts. Furthermore, considering international actors and donors' positive attitudes towards quota policies, the political elites may also seek legitimacy from those actors. Related to legitimacy-seeking efforts is a concern with political stability. Considering that youth are involved to important degrees in opposition politics, labor unions, and student movements (Abbink 2005, 13), youth quotas could be inspired by the idea that guaranteeing youth a voice in conventional politics will dampen their urge to revolt. Increasing youth's share in parliament may as well be an effective way to co-opt potential opposition groups and maintain control over rivals (Baldez 2003), a logic that Murphy (2012, 6) describes as “fencing” youthful population in formal – and restrictive – political structures. Accordingly, this is the third hypothesis to be tested:

H3: Actors from the domestic political elites initiated the youth quotas in Tunisia and/or Morocco with an interest in regime legitimization and stabilization.

## Case selection, methods, and data

Both Tunisia and Morocco experienced political turmoil and (partial) democratization in spring 2011 and subsequently introduced youth and gender quotas. Although the cases do thus not vary on the dependent variable, they do vary considerably in terms of the nature and outcomes of the respective transitions, as well as with regard to regime type. Whereas Tunisia experienced a complete regime change followed by a profound democratization process, the Moroccan king could comparatively quickly stem the uprisings by conceding minor constitutional revisions that did not substantively challenge the monarchy. The research design is therefore based on most different systems – similar outcome approach. It employs a comparative case study approach, which allows to focus on actors, motivations, and logics of acting to trace how structural conditions may translate into specific opportunity structures. A structured and focused comparison of Tunisia and Morocco can yield useful insights into the dynamics of regime persistence and change that are related to electoral reform and quota policies.

The study employs causal process tracing to investigate the actors and factors driving youth quota adoption. Causal process tracing is a suitable method in this respect, as it aims to measure and test competing hypothesized causal mechanisms to make inferences about the causal explanations of a case (Bennett and Checkel 2015). The study relies on data from a qualitative content analysis of the relevant Tunisian and Moroccan law texts (constitutions, constitutional drafts, and electoral codes), 460 newspaper articles on youth and gender quotas,<sup>3</sup> and interview and social media data in the Tunisian case – complemented by quantitative survey data regarding overall attitudes in the youth population. The data was coded qualitatively to capture the point in time when demands for gender and youth quotas were firstly raised, which actors did so, and how they proceeded their demands. As Asseburg and Wimmen (2016, 11) suggest, the analysis focuses on the examination of crucial turning points in the post-uprising period, since calculations and priorities of actors are likely to become most apparent then.

### Tunisia: The complementary youth quota

The self-immolation of the Tunisian citizen Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 triggered the Arab uprisings. Tunisia subsequently embarked on a profound transition process that can be divided into three sub-phases: (Pre-)election of the Constitutional Assembly (January to October 2011), Constitution writing (October 2011 to January 2014), and the compilation of the electoral code (January to October 2014).

The first phase is the transition from revolution to the election of a National Constituent Assembly (NCA). During this phase, the Higher Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition (HIROR) was responsible for the compilation of an interim electoral code. The Tunisian women's movement then became a visible and influential part of the post-revolution public (Antonakis-Nashif 2016). Through networks and contacts to the domestic political elites and to international organizations, feminist movements were granted a voice on HIROR. Side by side with other secular forces that dominated the commission, they achieved the adoption of gender parity as one of three basic principles in the interim electoral code for the upcoming elections of the NCA (Zemni 2015) – although only 55% of female and 37% of male



Tunisians were in favor of parity (Le Temps/El Menzah, May 5 2011). Art. 16 of the decree law (République Tunisienne 2011) clarifies that lists that don't respect gender parity (i.e. a 50% share of candidacies for each gender) and alternating placement of men and women on the lists will be rejected. There is also a vague provision for youth representation: Art. 33 states that "every list ensures that [at least one of] their candidates [...] is younger than 30 years old." No sanctioning mechanism was attached to this provision.

Whereas HIROR was dominated by secular actors and Tunis-based elites, the young, often unemployed and marginalized men who had been important drivers behind the Tunisian revolution, had nearly disappeared from the political scene. Studies investigating the post-revolution engagement of protestors characterize it as taking place outside civil society and political party organizations, concentrated on the local context, and poorly informed (Allal 2011; Allal and Geisser 2011; Korany and El Sayyad 2017). As Collins (2011, 5) describes, young Tunisians, in general, were wary about the political process and the role of the current élite, including the mainly Tunis-based youth organizations which were perceived as elitist themselves and not representative of the youth who effectuated the revolution (see also The Carter Center 2014, 9). Just before the elections in October 2011, only 38% of Tunisian youth aged 18–24 correctly identified its purpose: to choose an assembly that would write the new constitution (Hoffman and Jamal 2012, 172).

The second phase of transition, constitution writing, lasted nearly three years. The Islamist party *Ennahdha* won the elections in October 2011 and formed a so-called Troika-government with two smaller secular parties. The political representation and participation of women became one of the most debated issues (Charrad and Zarrugh 2014). Table A2 (see Appendix 3) summarizes propositions in all constitutional drafts relating to women and youth's political representation. The first draft issued in August 2012 clearly was the most conservative concerning women's rights, evoking the notion of the genders as "complementary" instead of equal. Women's movements, supported by domestic NGOs, led massive demonstrations against complementarity and *Ennahdha* in general, culminating on the Tunisian Women's Day (August 8 2012). The domestic and international environment subsequently became unfavorable for *Ennahdha*, and the notion of complementarity disappeared from all following constitutional drafts, which began carrying the signature of a growingly influential civil society (Netterstrøm 2015). International actors and donors explicitly expressed their support for gender parity. The European Union and its sub-organizations,<sup>4</sup> single countries such as the US,<sup>5</sup> Germany,<sup>6</sup> and South Africa,<sup>7</sup> international organizations such as the United Nations Development Program and UN Women<sup>8</sup> and global NGOs such as Amnesty International<sup>9</sup> all voiced explicit support for parity rules during the process of constitution writing. On January 9 2014, after heated debates, article 46 and the parity-paragraph were adopted by a majority of 127 "yes" votes in the Constitutional Assembly.

No such public support by international actors can be found for the introduction of a youth quota or even for a general promotion of youth political participation. Youth as a marginalized group in politics were also literally absent from the domestic debate on political representation. Although their role in "building the nation" was mentioned by constitutional drafts (see Table A2), the provisions concerning their political involvement and representation were both more limited in scope and vaguer concerning the degree of the state's responsibility in comparison with the regulations concerning women. There was a

strong tendency to view youth as a disadvantaged group that needed education, guidance, and most of the all, employment, more than political involvement.

M. Al Barazanji [head of a Tunisian NGO, author] insists on the embedment and orientation of youth so that they become more able to face the challenges of democracy. (AllAfrica.com, July 23 2011)

Unlike for the women's movement, there is no evidence that youth, at any point during the constitutional process, raised demands for an electoral quota. Whereas there are 146 references in newspaper articles and law texts concerning the gender quota, there are only 27 related to youth's political representation. One of them describes the results of a workshop of local youth associations of the Northern and North-Eastern parts of the country.

The youth active in civil society insisted on the fact that they are not depoliticized, but that they wish an institutional renewal of politics [...]. Petitions, the accession to associations and political parties, voting, and standing for elections are supported. Specifically, the youth suggested actions aiming at youth's mobilization to participate in elections, both as voters and candidates. (Le Temps/El Menzah January 2 2013)

It is noticeable that the youth associations do not claim a quota or representational guarantees for youth, although they recognize the importance of youth's presence among the candidates for elections. At this point in time, youth activists and NGOs in general focused on a claim for employment and the improvement of their socio-economic situation (Collins 2011). As youth activists stated in interviews, "we cannot talk about youth participation when basic needs are not provided – income, employment, social status" (Boubakri and Bouzidi 2017). It is noticeable that the constitutional text only mentions youth from the third draft on. To guarantee their political representation – restricted to local councils – is the only constitutional provision concerning youth's involvement in formal politics. As Moncef Al Charni, one of the few young deputies in the NCA, asserted during a plenary session on July 2 2013: "Not enough attention has been paid to youth in this constitutional project" (Majles ANC 2013). On January 4 2014, a constitutional amendment to Article 8 stipulating "youth's integration and representation in professional, political, and decision-making bodies shall be facilitated" was rejected, mainly by the votes of Ennahdha. It had been suggested by Nadia Châabane, a (middle-aged female) deputy from the opposition.

After the adoption of the final constitutional text, the third transitional phase started. A new electoral code, based on the principles the constitution had laid down, had to be written and adopted by the NCA. Only now was a youth quota concretely debated, mainly with reference to Art. 8 of the Constitution. The Tunisian NGO Al Bawsala as well as single deputies twittered statements and results from debates inside the respective commissions.<sup>10</sup> Table 2 lists those interventions.

Youth's political representation in general, and a possible quota in particular, has been discussed in 5 inner-commission debates between February and April 2014, before a final version was voted on in the last plenary debate on this subject the end of April 2014. As Table 2 illustrates, a rather small group of deputies regularly recalled the subject and argued for the adoption of some form of youth quota. Most of them belonged to government parties, particularly to Ennahdha. Interestingly, the majority of them are middle-aged. According to the arguments revealed in the tweets, the quota shall serve to

**Table 2.** Debates and interventions on the youth quota in the Tunisian constitutional assembly.

Date	Location of debate	Intervening deputies <sup>(a)</sup>	Intervention
13.2.14	Commission for general legislation	Imen Ben Mohamed (gvt., 30) Soulef Ksantini (gvt., 45) Mongi Rahoui (opp., 50) Salha Ben Alcha (gvt., 41)	Recalls youth's representation in elections Recalls youth's representation on electoral lists Declares that the youth need to be targeted by a quota Declares that the first three candidates on each list should be youth of about 30 years of age
19.2.14	Commission for general legislation	Selim Ben Abdessalem (gvt., 44) Najla Bouriel (opp., 44) Hanan Sassi (opp., 34) Tahar Iliahi (opp., 45) Imen Ben Mohamed (gvt., 30)	Suggests that, to guarantee youth's inclusion, a limit for the average age of the first three candidates on a list should be calculated Speaks out for youth's representativeness on electoral lists, and the establishment of a quota Argues for the representation of youth and horizontal parity Advocates for more flexibility concerning youth representation on electoral lists, demanding that 0.5 of the first three candidates should be youth Suggests to offer financial incentives for the lists that achieve to nominate an important share of youth
10.3.14	Commission for rights and freedoms	Mahmoud Gouiaa (gvt., 49) Mahmoud Gouia (gvt., 49) Sonia Toumia (gvt., 38)	Suggests a postponement of the issue of the youth quota Considers that the youth interested in public affairs are in the process of receding from the political parties Argues that a youth quota would need a placement mandate (at least third position); if not they will be placed at the bottom of lists
26.3.14	Plenary debate	A citizen Samir Ben Amor (gvt., 46) Karim Krifa (opp., 41)	Asks about youth's representativeness on electoral lists Declares that youth are still reluctant towards political action and that they need more experience. Declares also that the envisaged electoral law must be adequate to the constitution's provisions. Answers that for the youth, there will be rule that guarantees their presence on electoral lists.
19.4.14	Consensus committee on the electoral law	Lobna Jeribi (gvt., 41) Lobna Jeribi (gvt., 41)	The parties have to be obliged to place at least one youth among the first three candidates on the electoral lists, in order to maximize their chances for being elected. The refusal to add an amendment on youth's representativeness is in my opinion anti-constitutional (art. 8 of the constitution)
29.4.14	Plenary debate	Lobna Jeribi (gvt., 41)	Consensus now: at least 1 youth under the age of 35 among the first 4 on the electoral lists (instead of the first 3, our suggestion)

Source: Twitter Accounts of AlBawsala, Lobna Jeribi, Nadia Châabane.

<sup>a</sup>gvt: government; opp: opposition; age of the deputy in parentheses.

“guarantee youth’s inclusion” and to counter their tendency to recede from the political parties. Furthermore, the deputies argue that a quota which aims at maximizing youth’s chances for being elected would need a placement mandate to prevent political parties of placing them at the bottom of electoral lists. Since the constitutional provision on youth’s political representation is weaker than the one regarding women, the deputies are divided on the interpretation of the constitution. While Lobna Jeribi, a proponent of the quota, argues that “the refusal to add an amendment on youth’s representativeness is in my opinion anti-constitutional”, Samir Ben Amor requests against the introduction of a youth quota that “the envisaged electoral law must be adequate to the constitution’s provisions”. Furthermore, he contends that youth need more political experience, before they can be regarded as candidates.

Concerning the design of a possible youth quota, several different propositions were discussed both in the commissions and in the final plenary debate for the adoption of the electoral law. They varied from the obligation to have at least one youth in the first half of the electoral list to the adoption of a RS quota (Majles ANC 2014). The social democratic party Ettakatol, part of the ruling coalition, had suggested to guarantee the presence of one youth within the first three list positions. Eventually, this quota was voted to apply to the first four list positions, which had to contain at least one candidate under 35 years. The quota was enforced with a financial sanction which deprives lists of 50% of their state funding in case of noncompliance with the youth quota (République Tunisienne 2014, Art.25). Gender parity, on the other hand, was adopted in the same form that had been valid for the last elections: It requires a 50% share and alternating placement for both genders on electoral lists, which are rejected in cases of noncompliance (République Tunisienne 2014, Art.24).

### **Morocco: The co-opted youth quota**

As with Tunisia, Morocco has experienced a transition process since the Arab spring, although comparatively swift and with differing outcomes. Inspired by the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, Moroccan youth started a series of protests in February 2011. Joined by human rights organizations, NGOs, and unions, the protestors demanded constitutional reforms, but explicitly did not call for a removal of the monarchy (Thyen 2017). The king reacted quickly, announcing in a speech on March 9 2011, the forming of an expert commission comprising political parties’ and civil society representatives to revise the Moroccan constitution. In this speech, he explicitly addressed three groups that could potentially threaten his rule: the political parties, trade unions, and “our ambitious youth” (Thyen 2017, 333). This commission introduced several middle-ranged political reforms, which were directed at a clearer separation of the king’s and the government’s competences.

The revised constitution also scrutinizes the political participation of both women and youth, with slightly different accents, however (Royaume du Maroc 2011a). Article 19 states: “The Moroccan State shall work to realize parity between men and women.” Article 30 concretizes that provision, stating that “[...] the law provides provisions to promote the equal access of women and men to elective functions.” The provisions concerning youth’s political involvement are weaker and less extensive than the articles on women’s participation. Article 33 of the constitution stipulates that the public authorities

shall take measures to “[...] extend and generalize youth’s participation in social, economic, cultural, and political development [...].”

A popular referendum on July 1 2011, approved the new constitution. Subsequently, the parliament drafted a new electoral law establishing a system of tandem quotas, which reserves sixty seats for women and thirty seats for male<sup>11</sup> candidates under 40 years of age in the Moroccan House of Representatives (Royaume du Maroc 2011b, Art. 23). The law thereby codified and amplified a “gentlemen’s agreement” between the Moroccan parties, who had reserved thirty seats for women elected on one national list composed of only women candidates since 2002. Several studies have thoroughly traced the adoption and implementation of Morocco’s subsequent forms of gender quotas, finding that the main actors pressuring for the adoption of a codified gender quota law in 2011 were women’s organizations (Darhour and Dahlerup 2013; Sater 2012). They joined forces with the King Mohammed VI, who promoted the inclusion of women into the political system as part of an agenda oriented towards international standards of modernity and democraticness (Desrues and Kirhlani 2010). None of these studies elaborates more on the Moroccan youth quota, though. Although a broad literature on Moroccan youth’s activism before and during the Arab spring does exist (Desrues 2012; Hegasy 2007; Zerhouni and Akesbi 2016), youth are primarily seen as activists outside the political sphere and the youth quota is seldom scrutinized.

The Moroccan youth movement was indeed distinct and well organized. They named themselves the “20<sup>th</sup> February movement”. A list with the claims of the movement was published on March 13 2011, and focuses on better access to social services, the reduction of graduate unemployment, and the necessity for political reforms (Desrues 2012, 32). There was no mention of youth’s exclusion from power, nor a claim for electoral guarantees.

Demands to include a youth quota in the new electoral law were first raised in late summer 2011, after the constitution had been adopted and come into operation, but before the compilation of the electoral law. On August 20 2011, in his speech for the 58th anniversary of the “Revolution of the King and the People”, the king announced:

Our major asset [...] consists in the creative dynamic of our youth [...]. It is important that the political parties give youth and women a chance in order to promote the emergence of qualified elites, capable of bringing new blood into politics and the constitutional institutions. (Mohammed VI 2011)

Just one day later, these demands of the king were echoed and concretized by youth members of political parties. A newspaper article from August 21 2011, notes that

Youth organizations have called for the establishment of a youth quota on the electoral lists for the legislative elections anticipated for the 25th November, to contribute to the rejuvenation of the political class in Morocco [...]. This call was launched by fourteen youth sections of political parties (majority and opposition) during a meeting in Rabat. (L’Orient le Jour, August 21 2011)

Interestingly, the king had called for a better representation of women and youth already before 2011. In his throne speech in 2003, he had rhetorically asked

But what can be the power of parties if they do not assume their role of representing citizens, and youth in particular, and if they do not contribute to the fortification of the authority of the State and to a climate of trust towards its institutions? (Mohammed VI 2003)

The king had thus positioned himself above conventional (party) politics, which made him a credible ally for young party members' claims to help them circumvent disadvantageous political party structures (González and Desrués 2018).

### **Taming the unruly: The strategic adoption of youth quotas**

As the comparison of quota adoption processes within and across cases has demonstrated, there are important differences between youth and gender quota adoption in Tunisia and Morocco. Both gender quotas were actively demanded by domestic women's movements and civil society organizations and framed with reference to the originally French concept of "parity."<sup>12</sup> In Tunisia, civil society's primary ally were international actors that accompanied the process of constitution writing and intervened with surprisingly open statements in favor of parity. In Morocco, women's organizations and women in political parties sought the king's solidarity and made him a speaker for their demands. Arguably, the gender quotas in neither country would have come about without the pressure of the domestic women's movements that achieved to build strong alliances to international actors in Tunisia and to the king in Morocco.

Concerning the question why youth quotas were adopted additional to the gender quotas, I could not find convincing evidence for the hypothesis H1 that youth movements had mobilized for the adoption of an electoral quota. Despite the background of youth-led protests that engendered the subsequent (partial) democratization processes and although political reforms were part of youth activists' agendas in both countries, no explicit requests for a youth quota were voiced. As survey data collected by the Arab barometer in 2011 indicates, the main reasons for Tunisian youth to having participated in the protests were "demands for improving the economic situation" (most or second important reason for 77% of protestors), followed by "combating corruption" (most or second important reason for 60%) and eventually "demands for civil and political freedom" (most or second important reason for 50%) (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 4). Accordingly, as Collins has found in focus group interviews with Tunisian youth in 2011, priority areas identified by youth for the post-revolution period were corruption and unemployment, rather than constitutional reform (Collins 2011, 11). In line with those structural conditions, neither in the direct aftermath of the revolution, nor during the long phase of constitution writing, did mobilized youth and/or youth organizations publicly voice the demand for a youth quota in the explicit way that women's organizations did for a gender quota.

In Morocco, on the other hand, demands for a quota were publicly raised by a group of youth. However, it was a limited circle of members from the youth wings of political parties, who should rather be framed as part of the domestic political elites. This is also supported by the fact that youth from all Moroccan parties – government and opposition – voiced this claim together. Again, the youth who had mobilized during the 2011 uprisings had focused on economic demands and not on specific representational guarantees (Lucas 2014, 197). Furthermore, the 20th February movement had quickly been marginalized during the process of constitutional revision due to what many authors describe as an appropriation and reframing of the reform process by the Moroccan king (Thyen 2017, 335). The adoption of the Moroccan youth quota can be seen as part of this strategy.

The study's findings suggest that actors who can be categorized as belonging to the domestic political elites were at the origin of youth quotas in both countries (H3 confirmed). In Tunisia, deputies in the Constitutional Assembly, both from government and opposition parties, evoked the introduction of a youth quota first during the third phase of the transitional processes, after the adoption of the constitution and during the compilation of the electoral code. During the debates, arguments focused on the necessity to grant youth political inclusion and representation, as well as to enable them to circumvent disadvantageous recruitment structures within the political parties. A former member of the CA stated in an interview: "They did the revolution, they deserve political inclusion." At the same time, she points to youth's destabilizing potential: "The youth are dangerous [...] they can 'explode'. States have always been afraid of that social category" (Interview 8, Nov. 2017, Tunis). Youth activists and policy consultants, on the other hand, hint to the importance of international norms and pressures: "I don't have the impression that the deputies introduced the youth quota out of conviction, but mainly to satisfy some international partners" (Interview 1, Oct 2017, Tunis). Additionally, they assume that the elites may have seen the strategic and symbolic value of a youth quota and its potentially legitimizing function: "It is also a way to say 'voilà, it's the youth's revolution, we shouldn't be ungrateful to them' ... it is a symbolic policy" (Interview 3, Oct 2017, Tunis). I therefore argue that the Tunisian youth quota addressed both the domestic population and the international community and was mainly intended to legitimize and stabilize the new democratic political system – both domestically and internationally. In this sense, international recommendations and norms, although not voiced as explicitly as in the case of the Tunisian gender quota, may also have been a secondary influence factor for the adoption of the Tunisian youth quota (H2 partly confirmed for Tunisia). This is in line with other studies' findings that the Tunisian constitution making process in general was heavily influenced by international experts (The Carter Center 2014, 6–7).

In Morocco, the King Mohammed VI was an important driving force behind the youth quota and a powerful ally for the group of politically engaged youth that eventually demanded the quota. The electoral reform seemed beneficial for both sides. While it facilitated youth's access into political power, circumventing disadvantageous party structures, it also allowed the king to co-opt an influential and, at this point in time, potentially dangerous group into the political system. He had frequently addressed youth as a group in his throne speeches and was highly aware of their potential to threaten his rule. The youth quota was adopted by adding RS to the parliament, which potentially empowers supporters of the king – the youth members of political parties who are in general not opposed to the monarchy, but "part of the game" themselves – within the legislature and the political parties. This shows that the adoption of youth quotas in Morocco is in line with the king's overall policy goal of legitimizing and stabilizing the autocratic status quo after the uprisings. As described by Barari (2015, 103), the king sought to take the momentum away from protesters by placing himself at the forefront of political reform and to outmaneuver the opposition by offering limited and managed concessions. This strategy, in contrast to the Tunisian case, was directed much more towards a domestic than an international audience (H2 disconfirmed for Morocco). In summary, the policy choice of introducing electoral quotas for youth had proved similarly attractive to a newly democratized and an enduring autocratic regime – albeit for different reasons.

## Conclusion

This article has investigated the relatively new policy of electoral youth quotas. It has shown that legislated youth quotas to date have been mainly adopted by hybrid or authoritarian regimes with high proportions of youth in their population; preferably in contexts of political transitions and always additional to previously or simultaneously adopted gender quotas. Asking which actors drove youth quota adoption in Tunisia and Morocco, the article has found that the youth quotas were initiatives of the domestic political elites in both countries. Both the new Tunisian Republic and the autocratic Moroccan monarchy employed the youth quotas as part of their legitimacy-seeking and stabilization-oriented policies – although with reversed algebraic signs. While the adoption of the Tunisian youth quota was seen as a way to demonstrate the new regime’s commitment to domestic and international norms of democracy and inclusion, the Moroccan quota was part of the king’s strategy to legitimize and stabilize the autocratic status quo. The processes leading to the adoption of youth quotas thus confirm other studies’ findings on policy choices of post Arab-spring regimes, where political elites attempted to “use mobilized publics to generate evidence of popular legitimacy for themselves and their agendas” (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016, 9).

By unpacking the processes and identifying the mechanisms that have led to similar policy choices in two quite different regimes, the article has shed light on the conditions under which elites may be willing to cede power to groups – even if those are not publicly demanding it. The article thus adds to the literature on the strategic value of electoral policies, particularly in regimes facing political transition processes, as well as on the literature investigating the dynamics emanating from the so-called Arab spring uprisings in 2011 (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016; Barari 2015; Welbourne 2010).

This study is among the first to empirically analyze the adoption of electoral youth quotas. It has to be said that it is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate or judge the effectiveness of either gender or youth quotas regarding women and youth political representation, or, even less, their positive or negative impact on democratization. However, the fact that political elites seem to have mainly seen the symbolic importance of youth quotas and may have less interest in youth’s substantive representation certainly encourages further inquiries into youth quotas’ differential designs and impacts.

## Notes

1. People between the ages of 20 and 44 make up 57% of the world’s voting age population but only 26% of the world’s MPs (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016, 3).
2. I here follow the concept of ‘politically relevant elites’ (PRE) established by Perthes (2004, 5).
3. Tunisia: 340 newspaper articles on gender quota, 89 newspaper articles on youth quota adoption. Morocco: 31 articles on youth quota adoption. I limited the analysis to articles that appeared between 11/01/01 and 14/12/31 (Tunisia) and, respectively, 11/12/31 (Morocco; see Appendix 1). As the content analysis led to inconclusive results for the adoption of the youth quota in Tunisia, I complemented the data with evidence from Twitter as well as with eight in-depth interviews (see Appendices 1 and 2).
4. *Le Temps/El Menzah*, September 15 2011.
5. AllAfrica.com, May 6 2011.
6. AllAfrica.com, June 29 2011.
7. AllAfrica.com, June 26 2011.



8. Le Temps/El Menzah, June 21 2011.
9. AllAfrica.com, December 11 2011.
10. See more information on the Twitter evidence in appendix A.
11. This has changed: Since 2016, at least one person of each gender must be represented within the seats reserved for youth.
12. For a discussion of the parity concept and its normative foundations see (Bereni 2007).

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## Appendix 1. Newspaper articles and Twitter data.

I used the ProQuest database to search for relevant newspaper articles concerning the adoption of youth quotas in Tunisia and Morocco. I limited the search to French speaking newspapers.

**Table A1.** Search strategy for newspaper articles.

	Tunisia	Morocco
Time frame	11/01/01–14/12/31	11/01/01–11/12/31
Search words	parité AND Tunisie*; "femme* AND Tunisie" "jeune* AND Tunisie OR Maroc"; "quota AND Tunisie OR Maroc"	
Newspapers	AllAfrica.com; L'Expression; Le Monde; L'Orient le Jour; Le Temps/El Menzah	AllAfrica.com; Le Monde; L'Orient le Jour; Le Temps/El Menzah [not searched]
Number of articles analyzed for gender quota	340	
Number of articles analyzed for youth quota	89	31

The Twitter evidence was gathered by using Twitter's advanced search function. I searched after the terms "quota" AND "jeun\*" in the period between 1.1.2011 and 31.12.14. I then filtered the results geographically to only obtain the tweets relating to Tunisia. I relied on Twitter's translating function in order to also capture tweets in Arabic.

## Appendix 2. Interviews

Interviews were held in October and November 2017 in Tunis. It follows the (anonymized) descriptions of interview partners.

Interview 1: male, Tunisian, president of a non-governmental youth association.

Interview 2: female, Western-European, employed by an international development agency and head of a project aiming to motivate female candidates to stand for local elections.

Interview 3: male, Tunisian, policy consultant (focus: political parties) for a German political foundation.

Interview 4: female, Tunisian, policy consultant (focus: women and youth) for a German political foundation.

Interview 5: female, Tunisian, president of a Tunisian governmental research institute focusing on women's issues.

Interview 6: male, Tunisian, policy consultant (focus: political parties and international cooperation) for a German political foundation.

Interview 7: female, Tunisian, policy consultant (focus: political participation of women and youth) for a German political foundation.

Interview 8: female, Tunisian, former deputy of the Constitutional Assembly, had a leading position in the Commission for women's rights.

### **Appendix 3. Constitutional drafts and debates in the National Constitutional Assembly.**

**Table A2.** Provisions regarding the political representation of women and youth in Tunisian constitutional drafts.

	Women	Youth
First draft (08/12)	<p>10. The state shall protect the rights of women as well as protect family structures and maintain the coherence thereof.</p> <p>28. The state shall guarantee the protection of the rights of women and shall support the gains thereof as true partners to men in the building of the nation and as having a role complementary thereto within the family.</p> <p>- The state shall guarantee the provision of equal opportunities between men and women in the bearing of various responsibilities. [...]</p>	-
Second draft (12/12)	<p>5. All citizens, women and men, shall have the same rights and the same duties. They shall be equal before the law without any discrimination.</p> <p>7. The state shall guarantee the protection of the rights of women and shall support the gains thereof.</p> <p>37. The state shall guarantee the provision of equal opportunities between men and women in the bearing of various responsibilities. [...]</p>	-
Third draft (04/13)	<p>6. All citizens, women and men, shall have the same rights and the same duties. They shall be equal before the law without any discrimination.</p> <p>11. Women and men shall be associated in the construction of society and the state.</p>	<p>12. Youth are an active force in building the nation. [...]. The state shall advocate establishing favorable conditions for the expression of their capacities and their assumption of responsibilities.</p>
Fourth draft (06/13)	<p>45. The state shall guarantee the protection of the rights of women and shall support the gains thereof. The state shall guarantee the provision of equal opportunities between men and women in the bearing of various responsibilities. [...]</p>	<p>12. Youth are an active force in building the nation. [...]. The state shall advocate for youth to assume responsibilities and for enlarging youth's participation in social, economic, cultural, and political development.</p> <p>130. The electoral code shall guarantee the representation of youth in local councils.</p>
Constitution (01/14)	<p>34. [...] The state seeks to guarantee women's representation in elected bodies.</p> <p>46. The state commits to protect women's accrued rights and works to strengthen and develop those rights. The state guarantees the equality of opportunities between women and men to have access to all levels of responsibility in all domains. The state works to attain parity between women and men in elected assemblies. [...]</p>	<p>8. Youth are an active force in building the nation. The state seeks to provide the necessary conditions for developing the capacities of youth and realizing their potential, supports them to assume responsibility, and strives to extend and generalize their participation in social, economic, cultural and political development.</p> <p>133. The electoral code shall guarantee the representation of youth in local councils.</p>

II





# Hierarchies of Representation: The Re-distributive Effects of Gender and Youth Quotas

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## Hierarchies of Representation: The Re-distributive Effects of Gender and Youth Quotas

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### ABSTRACT

This article investigates how paired electoral quotas re-distribute parliamentary seats between majority and minority groups. Focusing on gender and youth quotas, we use the concept of Hierarchies of Representation to analyse the political inclusion of intersectional groups. We use a dataset of 146 countries and two case studies to explore quotas' effects on HoR under different quota constellations. We find that paired quotas tend to re-distribute power among women and youth rather than challenge middle-aged men's parliamentary dominance.

### KEYWORDS

Intersectionality; quotas; gender; women; youth

### Introduction

The under-representation of youth in formal politics is nearly as striking as the lack of women: people between the ages of 20 and 39<sup>1</sup> make up over 40% of the world's voting age population, but only 17% of members of parliament (MPs) (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018, p. 8). Young women appear to be doubly disadvantaged, providing only about 2.3% of the world's MPs (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018, p. 19). Several states, mostly in the Global South, as well as political parties have recently introduced electoral quotas to increase the political representation of young citizens (Belschner, 2018). To date, youth quotas exclusively occur in tandem with gender quotas: All parties with youth quotas also apply gender quotas and all states with legislated youth quotas simultaneously or previously adopted quotas for women. Is this institutional configuration a remedy against young women's underrepresentation?

Research has shown the significant impact of gender quotas on the share of women MPs (Dahlerup, 2008; Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, & Zetterberg, 2019; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Tripp & Kang, 2008) and their intersectional effects, mostly with a focus on gender and ethnicity (Bird, 2014, 2016; Htun, 2016; Hughes, 2011, 2016). Especially when dealing with multiple quotas for different groups, the question of quotas' re-distributive power arises. If minority groups gain parliamentary seats, where do those come from? Or, put differently: 'If women win, who loses?' (Childs & Hughes, 2018, p. 284).

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This article suggests a conceptual framework to systematically measure and compare descriptive group representation at the intersection of identities that we term ‘hierarchies of representation’ (HoR). Theoretically, the concept relies on intersectionality approaches to political representation, claiming that hierarchies *within* groups are as influential for representational outcomes as hierarchies *between* groups (Hancock, 2007; Htun & Ossa, 2013; Mügge, Montoya, Emejulu, & Weldon, 2018; Mügge & Erzeel, 2016).

HoR are conceptualised as minority and majority groups’ odds for representation, i.e. a specific group’s chances to be elected to parliament relative to another group. It contributes to intersectional analyses of group representation by offering a consistent way to measure and thus compare the extent and direction of under- and overrepresentation of any identifiable societal group<sup>2</sup> across space and time, because it includes a variable for groups’ actual share in populations. While the share of women in populations tends to be at a stable 50%, this is not the case for most other groups. For example, (specific) ethnic groups’ or also youth’s share in populations will differ both over time and across states and regions. HoR accommodates for this fact and is thus particularly applicable for the *comparative* study of intersectional groups’ representation.

Empirically, we analyse how paired quotas for women and youth are connected to gender and age groups’ odds for representation and thus the HoR between and within groups. First, we use an original dataset based on survey data from 146 parliaments worldwide to explore the HoR between gender and age groups across space, i.e. under different combinations of institutional settings and quotas. We find that, while youth quotas do not significantly increase young peoples’ nor young women’s absolute share in parliaments, they do affect the seat distribution among minority groups.

In order to investigate how the pairing of differently designed quotas moderates those findings, we complement the analysis with a comparative case study of gender and youth quotas’ intersectional effects in Tunisia and Morocco. The cases each represent a specific combination of paired quotas (legislated candidate quotas in Tunisia and reserved seats in Morocco)<sup>3</sup> and allow us to compare quotas’ effects in varying contexts. Both countries employ PR-list electoral systems, have first introduced single gender quotas, and later added youth quotas. Both did so in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 (Belschner, 2018). While the countries are comparable in terms of geographical location, sharing regional and cultural proximity, they differ in the degree of democracy and societal gender equality.

Using electoral data over time, we compare how the HoR between young and middle-aged to old women and men changed after the introduction of a youth quota additional to an existing gender quota. The findings suggest that paired gender and youth quotas tended to re-distribute power between minorities, but did not challenge middle-aged to old men’s overrepresentation. While both paired quotas increased young women’s odds for representation considerably, they did so mostly at the expense of young men rather than middle-aged men.

The article complements accounts about ‘what kinds’ of – male and female – candidates benefit from electoral quotas (Franceschet, Krook, & Piscopo, 2012, p. 10; Freidenvall, 2016) and sheds light on the dynamic nature of quotas’ impact on intersectional patterns of representation.

Several studies have demonstrated that the institutional conditions under which candidate selection processes take place influence parties’ logics of acting (Bird, 2016; Childs &

Hughes, 2018; Htun & Ossa, 2013; Randall, 2016). At times this means privileging minority men over women (Black, 2000; Hughes, 2016), supporting the ‘double jeopardy’ hypothesis (Mügge & Erzeel, 2016), and at others privileging minority women, exemplifying the ‘multiple advantages’ hypothesis (Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Freidenvall, 2016). This article aims to reconcile those two hypotheses by offering a concept that encompasses the ‘it depends’ component and that tries to accommodate for dynamic rather than static hierarchical relations between and within groups (Bird, 2014; Htun & Ossa, 2013). By focusing on age as a structuring element of (dis)advantage in politics, the article also adds to the emerging literature on youth’s political representation (Belschner, 2018; Erikson & Josefsson, 2019; Joshi, 2015; Stockemer & Sundström, 2018, 2019).

### **Hierarchies of Representation: Measuring and Comparing Descriptive Representation**

A considerable body of literature deals with the specific conditions for the political representation of minority groups. While analyses initially focused on the separate study of groups like women, ethnic minorities, and youth, a growing literature rooted in Black Feminism investigates structural inequalities of groups located at the intersection of several (group) identities (Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013; Collins & Bilge, 2016; Hancock, 2007). Intersectionality upholds that the experiences of structural group belonging can be marginalising and privileging at the same time and that ‘social groups and individuals are fundamentally hybrid’ (Htun & Ossa, 2013, p. 6; Weldon, 2008).

With regards to the political representation of intersectional groups, there tend to be two opposing hypotheses about how individuals belonging to two marginalised groups at a time are structurally affected (Mügge & Erzeel, 2016). On the one hand, they may be ‘doubly jeopardised’ meaning that representational disadvantages may be cumulative. On the other hand, there may also be ‘complementarity advantages’ available to these individuals (Celis & Erzeel, 2017).

While there is empirical evidence for both of these hypotheses, we suggest that outcomes of political representation for groups at the intersection of inequalities are dependent on context and, crucially, on the answer to the question of ‘who should be compared to whom?’ (Freidenvall, 2016, p. 359). Therefore, we introduce the concept of HoR that allows measuring and comparing the varying hierarchies between and within groups’ descriptive representation across space and over time.

Inspired by Hughes (2011), we define HoR as the odds for representation<sup>4</sup> of different, mutually exclusive groups, accounting for their share in population or among candidates. In general, the odds are the ratio of the probability that an event occurs to the probability that it does not, or, in our case, the likelihood to be represented in parliament for a reference group vs. a comparison group (Bland & Altman, 2000). Methodologically speaking, the odds ratio is a conditional probability and calculated as  $a*d / b*c$ . For our purposes,  $a$  is the number of MPs in the reference group,  $b$  is the number of the reference group in population (or candidates),  $c$  is the number of MPs in the comparison group, and  $d$  is the number of the comparison group in population (or candidates). This way, we are able to calculate a *relative* chance of an individual belonging to a specific (intersectional) group to be elected to parliament compared to another individual – and to see how the odds for each group change under different institutional settings. Whereas an odds

ratio of 1 signifies equal chances for both groups to be represented, a value smaller/greater than 1 means worse/better chances for the reference group, respectively. For example, an odds ratio of 0.5 would translate into a 1:2 chance for the reference group to be represented relative to the comparison group.

While the idea of hierarchies between and within groups is well established in the literature on intersectionality (Htun & Ossa, 2013; Hughes, 2016; Mügge & Erzeel, 2016; Weldon, 2008), our concept of HoR formalises the dynamic structure of those hierarchies by including variables of reference and comparison of group's shares in populations/candidates connected to their political representation. In contrast to for example QCA-based approaches (Lilliefeldt, 2012), the odds ratio is variable-centred and can thus potentially be applied to analyse representational dynamics in any country or party case.<sup>5</sup>

HoR thus has two specific offers: First, it allows comparing different intersectional groups' representation across space. Whereas women constitute more or less 50% of all populations worldwide, other marginalised groups' share in populations considerably varies between cases and regions. For example, youth's share in populations in the Global South tends to be higher than in countries of the Global North – thus, equal representation of groups would require higher shares of young parliamentarians in the former countries. Second, HoR allow examining change in intersectional representation over time within cases.

While the under-representation of women in politics is the subject of a large body of literature and some studies have focused on elder women politicians (Randall, 2016), research on youth in formal politics is only emerging (Joshi, 2013, 2015; Stockemer & Sundström, 2018). A good share of this literature indeed takes an intersectional approach to the study of youth, recognising the specific conditions for young women's representation (Erikson & Josefsson, 2019; Evans, 2016; Joshi & Och, 2014; Stockemer & Sundström, 2019).

Since 2014, the Inter-Parliamentary Union conducts biannual surveys on the share of gender and age groups in parliaments worldwide (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2014, 2016, 2018). While the conceptualisation of age groups is less straightforward than when talking about gender or ethnic minority/majority status, a common definition of 'youth' in political representation spans from 20 to 39 years of age. This allows taking into account that some parliaments have relatively high minimum age requirements and that, in general, young people rarely gain office before the age of 35 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2016, p. 5). Accordingly, in this study, we use 40 as the main cut-off age between young and middle-aged. While this definition seems broad, it is preferable over a too narrow definition – if 40-year olds are underrepresented, this will arguably also be true for 30- and 35-year olds, but not vice-versa. Furthermore, 40 is the maximum cut-off age employed in the design of youth quotas.

For the purpose of this article, we have conceptualised gender and age groups as middle-aged to old men ( $\geq 40$  years of age), middle-aged to old women, young men (20–39 years of age), and young women. One limitation of our approach to measure hierarchies of representation as an odds ratio is that it works best with dichotomous groups that are cross compared to each other. While we concede that a more fine-grained conceptualisation of age groups, differentiating for example further between the middle-aged and the elderly, would offer further insights into the representational dynamics at play, it would also complicate the analysis to an important degree.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, the results

presented in the following should be read as being focused on youth and gender, rather than providing a complete picture of age dynamics in political representation.

## The Intersectional Effects of Gender and Youth Quotas

Gender quotas have become one of the most popular electoral reforms worldwide: In more than 130 countries, some kind of gender quota is in effect (Hughes et al., 2019). There is also a growing consensus about the importance to include youth in institutionalised politics, that is, in parties and parliaments (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018; UNDP, 2013). By 2018, eight states have adopted legislated youth quotas; and so did (at least) 16 individual parties in different countries (see overview in Table 1).

As stated, youth quotas so far always occur together with gender quotas (Belschner, 2018). Table 1 displays the distribution of youth and gender quotas according to the respective quota types. Youth quotas, like gender quotas, take the form of legislated candidate quotas (LCQ), reserved seats (RS), or Party quotas (PQ) (Krook, 2014). LCQ and RS are both legislated and thus apply to all parties in a political system, whereas party quotas are adopted internally. Legislated gender and youth quotas are so far always designed similarly. Except for Rwanda, where there exists a double gender quota, states either adopt candidate quotas for both women and youth (LCQLCQ) or reserve parliamentary seats for both groups (RSRS). This is an important difference to paired quotas for women and ethnic minorities that tend to be more heterogeneous in their designs, even if they both occur in one country (Bird, 2014, 2016; Htun, 2004). The composition of gender/youth quotas on the party level is more mixed: A number of European countries, as well as Mozambique and Viet Nam, have at least one party that uses both gender and youth

**Table 1.** Youth and gender quotas after quota type.

YOUTH QUOTA TYPE*	GENDER QUOTA TYPE		
	Legislated Candidate quota	Reserved Seats	Party quota
<b>Legislated Candidate quota</b>	Egypt Gabon** Kyrgyzstan Tunisia <b>(LCQLCQ)</b>		
<b>Reserved seats</b>	Rwanda***	Rwanda*** Kenya Morocco Uganda <b>(RSRS)</b>	
<b>Party quota</b>	Angola Croatia El Salvador Mexico Montenegro Nicaragua Senegal <b>(LCQPQ)</b>		Cyprus Hungary Lithuania Mozambique Romania Sweden Turkey Ukraine Viet Nam <b>(PQPQ)</b>

Sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union; International IDEA

\* The Philippines is the only country that employs a mixed quota applying at women and youth at the same time and is therefore excluded here.

\*\*Gabon has adopted both gender and youth quotas adopted in 2015, but not yet enacted in the electoral law.

\*\*\*Rwanda has both an LCQ and a RS quota for women.

quotas (PQPQ). On the other hand, some Latin American and African countries as well as Croatia and Montenegro employ legislated gender quotas and one or several parties additionally adopted internal youth quotas (LCQPQ).

Previous research on the intersectional effects of electoral quotas has so far mainly studied gender and ethnic quotas. Focusing on the re-distributive effects of quotas, Hughes finds that, as standalone policies, both gender and ethnic minority quotas tend to benefit primarily majority women and minority men, respectively (Hughes, 2011, p. 616). The explanation Hughes provides is that a gender quota forces the political parties to nominate more women. They will choose 'majority women', i.e. those with the highest political capital who have the greatest chance to win elections. This refers back to the 'double jeopardy' hypothesis and may as well translate to a preference for middle-aged women when speaking about the effect of single gender quotas on age groups' odds for election.

H1 (double jeopardy): Single gender quotas privilege the representation of middle-aged women over young women.

In the same vein, single youth quotas (that empirically do not exist to date) would be expected to benefit young men.

In contrast, Hughes finds that when quotas are paired, minority women's parliamentary representation increases over-proportionally. She argues that parties will strive to fulfil both quotas by nominating one candidate – a minority woman – to unseat fewer incumbents. This would resonate with the 'complementary advantages' hypothesis (Celis & Erzeel, 2017).

As Bird (2016) points out, the intersectional effects of paired quotas may however be influenced by the type and design of the quotas under question. She differentiates between 'dual' and 'nested' paired quotas for women and ethnic minorities. Dual quotas co-exist and operate independently from each other,<sup>7</sup> whereas nested quotas mutually apply to each other (Bird, 2016, p. 289). Only nested quotas should in this perspective be expected to produce favourable outcomes for minority women, i.e. complementarity advantages, whereas dual quotas must analytically be treated as doubled single quotas, continuing to favour majority women and minority men, respectively. In the case of gender and youth quotas, the differentiation of dual/nested quotas mostly corresponds to reserved seats/legislated candidate quotas. Whereas reserved seats for women and youth exist independent from each other – meaning that there are commonly no reserved seats for youth among the women's seats, nor reserved seats for women among the youth seats<sup>8</sup> – legislated candidate quotas usually apply to the same party lists and can thus be regarded as nested. Accordingly, we expect the following:

H2 (complementary advantages): Nested candidate quotas for women and youth (LCQLCQ) privilege young women's representation relative to middle-aged women and young men.

H3 (double jeopardy): Dual reserved seats for women and youth (RSRS) privilege the representation of middle-aged women and young men over young women, respectively.

Thus, we hypothesise that paired quotas' effects on the HoR between and within groups – conceptualised as double jeopardy or complementary advantages for young women – vary depending on the specific quota system in place.

In the following, we will first provide information about the methods and data used in this article, before we empirically explore the variation of gender and age groups' representation in parliaments worldwide. We then continue with our case studies to trace the working of gender and youth quotas over time.

## Methods, Data, and Case Selection

This article combines the exploration of an original dataset on youth representation with two case studies, where we compare the intersectional effects of differently designed gender and youth quotas over time.


The dataset is composed of survey data collected by the Inter-Parliamentarian Union (IPU) from 2015 to 2017. It provides the (aggregated) number of members of parliaments (MPs), divided after gender and age groups, in 146 parliaments worldwide. This data is so far unpublished and has been provided to the authors by the IPU. We then supplemented data on youth's share in the population<sup>9</sup>, electoral systems, and the different electoral quotas in use. Population data was collected from the UN Statistics division. We always recorded the newest available data and aggregated population figures for the following groups: Middle-aged to old men, middle-aged to old women, young men, and young women. Information about the electoral system in place, coded as Proportional Representation (PR), Majority-Plurality (MP), or mixed, was obtained from the International IDEA Electoral Systems database (Electoral System Design Database | International IDEA). We also included a variable on if a country has an effective gender quota in place, taken from the recent QAROT dataset (Hughes et al., 2019),<sup>10</sup> as well as information on the types of gender and youth quotas employed. The quantitative analyses rely on that dataset compiled in spring 2019.

The dataset is useful to explore general dynamics of representation regarding age and gender but reaches its limits when analysing the specific impact of paired gender and youth quotas. Since only eight countries so far have introduced national youth quotas and since those are differently designed, the number of cases becomes too small for cross-country regressions. Therefore, we continue with two case studies to trace how different forms of legislated paired quotas affect HoR within cases over time. Tunisia and Morocco are selected as representative cases for the two above-mentioned legislated quota configurations (LCQLCQ and RSRS).<sup>11</sup> Since LCQLCQ and RSRS are legislated quotas, we analyse them on the country level and include groups' share in populations in the calculation of the resulting HoR.<sup>12</sup>

The cases of Tunisia and Morocco allow us to compare HoR before and after the introduction of a youth quota additional to an existing gender quota and thus to test the hypotheses formulated above. Both countries employ a PR list electoral system and introduced electoral youth quotas additional to existing gender quotas after the Arab Uprisings in 2011. While the quotas take the form of legislated candidate quotas (LCQLCQ) in Tunisia, they occur as reserved seats for both groups (RSRS) in Morocco.

## The Political Representation of Gender and Age Groups Worldwide

This section explores gender and age groups' representation in parliaments worldwide. [Figure 1](#) provides an overview of the share of young parliamentarians worldwide.




**Figure 1.** Shares of young parliamentarians worldwide ( $n = 146$ ).

The plots visualise variation in different electoral systems and in countries with or without youth quotas. Similar to what we know about women's representation, proportional representation and mixed electoral systems seem to be slightly more favourable for higher shares of young parliamentarians.<sup>13</sup> The second plot in Figure 1 reveals that countries where a youth quota is in place do not have higher shares of youth in parliament, on average.


Figure 2 further differentiates the age groups (young and middle-aged to old) after gender. Visualising the shares of intersectional gender and age groups in parliaments, it shows that middle-aged to old men form the great majority of MPs in almost all cases, followed by middle-aged to old women, young men, and young women. Thus, although the *gender* imbalance is more pronounced among the middle-aged to old MPs than among the young MPs, the *combined* gender and age imbalances clearly show that young women are least represented.<sup>14</sup>

Figure 3 then focuses on young women's odds of representation relative to the other groups in varying regions and under different institutional conditions. The dotted line delimits an odds-ratio of 1, i.e., equal chances. As shown for youth in general, PR and mixed electoral systems are also comparatively more favourable for young women's chances to be represented than majoritarian systems. Across world regions, young women's odds for representation are steadily lowest when compared to middle-aged men. However, their odds compared to other groups vary. Interestingly, they have comparatively better chances relative to middle-aged to old women than relative to young men in Europe. Put differently, in Europe, the gender disadvantage seems to be more



**Figure 2.** Shares of parliamentarians by gender and age groups worldwide ( $n = 146$ ).





**Figure 3.** Young women's odds for representation worldwide.

pronounced than the age disadvantage. In the other world regions, in contrast, the age disadvantage seems to weigh more heavily. Here, young women's chances for election are higher relative to young men than relative to middle-aged women.

Besides demography – the fact that young peoples' share in population is much lower in Europe than in Africa and Asia – this could be an effect of the high prevalence of electoral gender quotas in the latter regions. Indeed, as shown by the third plot in Figure 3, effective gender quotas (only GQ) slightly reduce young women's chances to be represented relative to middle-aged women but increase them relative to young men.

The plot also confirms that HoR vary under different combinations of gender and youth quotas. Nested legislated candidate quotas (LCQLCQ) seem to increase young women's chances for representation relative to young men, while their chances relative to middle-aged women and men slightly decrease. In contrast, in countries employing reserved seats for both women and youth (RSRS), young women's chances are lowest. Party quotas, that usually are candidate quotas and can thus also be conceptualised as nested (PQPQ), are the only institutional configuration where young women's odds for representation are increased relative to all other groups, and where they have about equal chances as middle-aged to old women. However, since the case numbers in all of those categories are low, multivariate regression analyses to assess the significance and strength of those institutional effects are unfortunately little robust at this point in time.

### Case Studies: Gender and Youth Quotas Over Time

To take the analysis one step further, we suggest zooming in on two case studies. We compare the working of legislated candidate quotas in Tunisia and reserved seats in Morocco over time in order to explore when and how HoR changed under different combinations of electoral quotas in both countries. As the dynamics on the party level, especially in the case of voluntarily adopted quotas, may considerably differ, we do not include a case of paired party quotas here.

### Legislated Candidate Quotas in Tunisia

The Tunisian electoral system is based on proportional representation, with closed electoral lists to be voted on in each of the thirty-three constituencies. The first post-revolution election took place in 2011, when the Tunisians elected the Constituent Assembly (CA). A gender quota was already in place, requiring a 50% share and alternating placement for both genders on electoral lists (Charrad & Zarrugh, 2014; Debuysere, 2016; Gana, 2013). The youth quota was introduced in 2014 and applied for the first time in the election of the newly created parliament (Belschner, 2018). It requires that at least one person younger than 35 years must be placed in one of the first four list positions. In cases of non-compliance, parties lose 50% of their state funding (République Tunisienne, 2014). In terms of mechanisms linking the institution of LCQ to its effects on youth’s descriptive representation, we therefore distinguish between the 2011 election, where a single LCQ for women and no youth quota was in place, and 2014, when two nested quotas regulated the composition of candidate lists. It is striking to compare groups’ odds for representation in 2011 and 2014 (Figure 4).

The first plot focuses on middle-aged to old women: In 2011, they had the best chances to be represented compared to young women but fared worse compared to middle-aged to old and young men. In 2014, under a system of paired candidate quotas for women and youth, their chances relative to middle-aged men decreased, while those relative to young men nearly doubled. The next plot shows young women’s odds for representation: While these were very low compared to all other groups in 2011, the introduction of the paired quota boosted them in particular relative to young men, and slightly compared to middle-aged women. Like for middle-aged women, their chances relative to middle-aged men decreased. Finally, the third plot confirms the tendencies of the first two, namely that young men were the group at the expense of which the paired candidate quotas worked. While young men had a 1:2 chance to be represented relative to middle-aged men, and even better chances than middle-aged women and young women in 2011, their odds dramatically decreased with the introduction of the paired gender and youth quotas. Finally, the




Figure 4. Odds for representation in Tunisia

fourth plot depicts middle-aged to old men's odds for election. While their chances to be represented are consistently highest compared to all other groups, the change from a single gender quota to a nested candidate quota has not levelled the playing field but in contrast considerably increased the odds for the already majoritarian group. The most significant increase is relative to young men but also relative to middle-aged women.

The introduction of the youth quota additional to a gender quota in Tunisia had thus three main effects: First, it increased the odds for representation of middle-aged men relative to all other groups. Second, it increased young women's odds slightly compared to middle-aged women and considerably relative to young men. Third, it dramatically decreased young men's odds for representation.

Interestingly, the Tunisian parties seem to have followed a similar logic when implementing the paired quotas. As seen in Figure 5, small parties have sent considerably less young deputies to the 2014 Tunisian Assembly than the then government parties, the Islamist Ennahda and the secular Nidaa Tounes.

As Belschner (2020) argues in a recent study, this may be due to the fact that all parties alike selected a middle-aged male top candidate for the majority of their lists. Only the parties winning several seats per constituency – mainly Ennahda and Nidaa – would then get candidates further down on their lists, on positions 2, 3, and 4, elected. In contrast, the smaller parties would mostly only get elected one or two candidates per constituency – most often a middle-aged to old men on the first, and a middle-aged woman on the second position.

### Reserved Seats in Morocco

Morocco introduced gender quotas for the first time in 2002, when the political parties agreed to introduce 30 RS for women (of 325 seats) in the lower house of parliament. In 2011, in the context of the Arab Spring, 30 additional RS were adopted for women as well as 30 RS for male youth under 40 years of age. In addition to those 60 additional seats, the total number of seats in the lower house increased to 395. Although Morocco holds multiparty elections with a varying degree of freedom and regularity, 'the autonomy of the government and the parliament remain subordinated to an executive and legislative





Figure 5. Shares of gender and age groups by party (Tunisia 2014, LCQLCQ).

monarchy that enables a limited political competition’ (Feliu & Parejo, 2013, p. 94). As in Tunisia and Sweden, elections are held under PR with closed and blocked party-lists.


Since 2011 (see Figure 6), the electorate vote for the party of their choice in two different lists: one for the open seats (OS) constituencies (305 seats distributed over 92 constituencies), and the other one for the reserved seats (90 seats in total under one single, national constituency). The results obtained in the RS constituency are then distributed proportionally between the allocated seats for the women and the youth. Since 2016, youth RS are open to women and every party must at least nominate one female candidate in the electoral list. Technically, this transforms the dual quota into a nested one.

How then did the HoR change under the different quota arrangements? So far, research on group representation in Morocco has focused on gender quotas (Darhour & Dahlerup, 2013; Sater, 2007), largely overlooking the intersectionality between age and gender.

The first plot in Figure 7 focuses on middle-aged to old women. In 2007, with a single gender quota in place, they have the highest odds to be represented. This advantage is slightly reduced by the introduction of an additional RS quota for young men in 2011 (RSRSd), but most considerably with the transformation of the dual quota to a nested RS quota (RSRSn) in 2016. The second plot focusing on young women confirms this tendency. While young women clearly are the most disadvantaged group under all quota systems, their odds have considerably risen by 2016 – especially in comparison to the other underrepresented groups (middle-aged women and young men). The third plot focusing on young men shows that they have, in total, the second-best chances to be represented, although we observe that differences are most pronounced compared to young women. In particular, young men benefited from the dual RS quota in 2011, but this benefit was reduced significantly in 2016. Finally, the fourth plot in the figure confirms



**Figure 6.** Structure and election of the House of Representatives in Morocco.




**Figure 7.** Odds for representation in Morocco.

that the most privileged group in all legislatures are middle-aged to old men. While they had the highest odds for representation under single gender quotas (2007), the introduction of RS for youth did indeed lower their chances for representation compared to both young men and women, although in 2016 they are still about 8 times more likely to be represented than the latter.

However, it should be noted that the increase of young women's share in the 2016 parliament is mostly due to the electoral strategy of one party, the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM). This party obtained the second position in the 2016 elections and fulfilled the youth quota with a majority of female candidates, placing the only young male candidate at the bottom of the list. As it is, 7 out of 11 young women MPs were elected on the PAM list.

In general, we do not observe major differences in the gender and age composition between the different parties. This is due to the characteristics of the electoral system and the party system which, due to the small size of the constituencies and the high number of parties, results in the majority of parties only obtaining one or two deputies per constituency, being in their majority men of medium or advanced age. However, some of the variations observed are fundamentally due to the ideological positioning of some parties. On the one hand, small parties<sup>15</sup> and the secular PAM<sup>16</sup> have a higher proportion of young people and women, while at the opposite pole the moderate Islamist PJD<sup>17</sup> and the ideologically centre-right medium sized parties<sup>18</sup> are characterised by a higher representation of middle-aged to old men. [Figure 8](#).

In summary, young women were less likely to be represented compared to middle-aged to old women and young men under the Moroccan single gender quota (RS before 2011) as well as under the dual gender and youth quotas (RSRSd before 2016). The double jeopardy hypothesis is thus confirmed. However, after the establishment of nested gender and youth quotas in 2016 (RSRSn), we observe that young women profit from multiple advantages and increase their odds for representation compared to middle-aged to old women and young men. Throughout all situations, the dominance of middle-aged to old men in parliament is however maintained.



**Figure 8.** Shares of gender and age groups by party (Morocco 2016, RSR5n).

## Discussion and Conclusion

In a worldwide perspective, both youth and women are considerably underrepresented in politics. In order to study systematically how paired electoral quotas re-distribute seats between intersectional groups, we suggested the concept of hierarchies of representation, HoR. Recognising that group representation is a relative rather than absolute as well as a dynamic concept and building on Hughes (2011), we defined HoR as one group's odds for representation in relation to other groups. This allowed us to compare gender and age groups' changing chances for representation both across space, i.e., under different contexts and institutional settings, and over time.

In our empirical analyses, we first set out to explore groups' odds for representation in different electoral systems worldwide, before studying to what extent paired quotas for women and youth could be a remedy against young women's political underrepresentation. The findings show that young women are indeed doubly disadvantaged when it comes to their descriptive representation in parliaments. Although their odds for representation relative to other groups vary dependent on electoral systems, world regions, and quota systems, they are mostly still far from competing on equal terms with middle-aged to old men, middle-aged to old women, and young men.

In the comparative case study of Tunisia and Morocco, we then attempted to trace the re-distributive effects of different combinations of electoral quotas. Based on the existing literature on intersectionality in political representation, we first hypothesised that single gender quotas would privilege the election of middle-aged women over young women (H1), leaving the latter doubly jeopardised. This hypothesis was confirmed in both case studies, with middle-aged women's odds for election being 5 (Morocco) to 1,5 (Tunisia) times higher than the ones of young women under single gender quotas.

Additional to existing gender quotas, both countries had introduced youth quotas in the wake of the Arab Uprisings in 2011. While the age limits and the concrete share of the quotas differed, we here focused on the differentiation of nested vs. dual paired quotas to determine how the quotas would influence the resulting parliamentary hierarchies. We hypothesised that nested candidate quotas for women and youth (LCQLCQ) would raise

young women's odds for representation relative to those of middle-aged women and young men (H2), thus providing complementarity advantages to those individuals belonging to two marginalised groups at a time. This hypothesis could be partly confirmed in the cases we studied. Indeed, in Tunisia, young women's chances over middle-aged women slightly increased under the paired quotas compared to elections under single gender quotas. However, they are still less than equal. In contrast, young women's odds for election increased considerably relative to young men. In Tunisia, young women have had 2 times better chances to be elected than their young male counterparts.

Our third hypothesis assumed that reserved seats for women and youth (RSRS) existed besides each other (dual quotas) and would thus privilege the election of middle-aged women and young men over young women, respectively (H3). This hypothesis was confirmed for the case of Morocco in 2011, where middle-aged women and young men both trumped young women's chances for election by 4:1. In 2016, the dual reserved seats were transformed to a nested quota, since it is now regulated that parties' youth lists must include (at least one) candidate from each gender. Now, although young women continue to have the lowest odds for election of all groups, their chances relative to young men and middle-aged women have tripled compared to 2011. Interestingly, and different than in Tunisia, the nested reserved seats quotas for women and youth have even considerably lowered middle-aged men's odds for representation.

In sum, however, the paired quotas in both cases tended to re-distribute seats among minorities rather than challenge the overrepresented group of middle-aged to old men.<sup>19</sup>

The empirical findings in this study thus confirmed hypotheses derived from studies on the intersection of gender and ethnic identity, showing that individuals at the intersection of inequalities can be doubly jeopardised at times, or profit from complementary advantages at others – dependent on context and institutional setting and contingent over time (Htun & Ossa, 2013).

The findings have three main implications regarding the effectiveness of electoral quotas in tackling parliamentary inequalities between majority and minority groups. First, paired quotas are indeed most useful to support doubly underrepresented groups if they are nested – either as paired candidate quotas or in the form of nested reserved seats. Second, policy makers should be aware that parties tend to enact quotas in a manner that will protect majoritarian groups in parliament. Thus, if young women win, young men and, potentially, middle-aged women might lose. Third, the findings should encourage further enquiries into the effect of paired quotas on the substantive and symbolic representation of intersectional groups and the extent to which an increased presence of young women actually leads to their political empowerment.

## Data Deposition

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author, J.B., upon reasonable request.

## Notes

1. We use 40 as the main cut-off age between young and middle-aged and thus follow the suggestion of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018) and the recent literature on youth

representation (Joshi, 2013; Stockemer & Sundström, 2018). The lower threshold of 20 years is intended to separate young adults with voting rights from children and youth without voting rights. Please also refer to section two for a detailed discussion of age cut-offs.

2. Although it is arguably best suited for the intersectional analysis of dichotomous groups.
3. We also provide an additional case study of paired party quotas in Sweden in the appendix to this article.
4. Hughes speaks of odds for election. We differentiate between the odds for representation when referring to the whole population, i.e., the state level, and of odds for election when referring to electoral candidates, i.e., the party level.
5. The downside is that the odds ratio – in contrast to a QCA based method – cannot *explain* any representational dynamics, but simply describe it. This is however exactly the purpose of this article.
6. If one wants to compare all group combinations to each other, a three-level age variable would result in 15 instead of 6 comparisons.
7. Which means that the gender quota is not applied to the reserved ethnic seats, nor is the ethnic quota applied to the reserved women seats.
8. With the exception of the Moroccan youth quota since 2016, when 1 seat (out of 30) of the youth quota was reserved for young women.
9. Youth in population is defined within the same age span, 20 to 39, as youth in parliaments.
10. The QAROT (Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time) dataset provides detailed information about quota designs and their development over time worldwide. In particular, it includes a variable (0/1) if a country has an “effective” gender quota, thus setting a higher bar than the simple existence of a law. A gender quota is coded as effective if it includes strong placement mandates and/or strong sanctions (for LCQ), or a strong reserved seat quota (one that specifies some mechanism to fill the reserved seats and that reserves at least 10% of seats for the targeted group) (Hughes et al., 2019, p. 11).
11. We also provide an analysis over time of paired party quotas (PQPQ) in Sweden in the appendix of this article. We here modify our method and define the reference group as the share of groups among candidates. The results corroborate our findings about the working of paired legislated candidate quotas in Tunisia.
12. We did not include a case of the LCQPQ form (legislated gender quota and party youth quota), since that would involve different levels of analysis.
13. Only the difference between PR and MP system is statistically significant to  $p < 0.01$ .
14. Differences of means statistically significant to  $p < 0.01$ .
15. The small parties (less than 15 deputies) come mainly from the secular left (PPS, PGV, PSU). They represent only 5% of the total number of seats.
16. This party was created by personalities close to the palace to counteract the electoral advance of the PJD - moderate Islamist - through a feminist and secular discourse. The PAM concentrates 26% of the seats in the current legislature.
17. With 31.6% of the total seats, it is the first party in the lower house.
18. With between 15 and 40 representatives, these parties are mainly centre-right (PI, RNI, MP) and represent 37% of the total number of seats.
19. Interestingly, we found this effect in our case study of paired candidate quotas in the Swedish Social Democratic Party as well (see appendix).
20. <https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/zL6MoK/sa-ska-lofven-vinna-valet>.

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## Appendix

This appendix provides an additional case study over the working of gender and youth quotas on the party level. As the Swedish context does however considerably differ from Tunisia and Morocco in terms of context and since comparability of party and legislated quotas is contested, we did not include this case into the main text.


In general, the results confirm the results found in the main analysis, with paired candidate quotas for women and youth having privileged the selection and election of young women over young men in the Swedish Social Democratic Party.

### **Party Quotas in the Swedish Social Democratic Party**

Sweden employs a PR electoral system with closed party lists elected in 29 constituencies. Unlike Tunisia and Morocco, Sweden does not employ any legislated electoral quotas. However, the share of both women and youth in parliament is among the highest worldwide. Women today make up 43% of all MPs, and an impressive share of 34% are younger than 40 years old.

The Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna) are historically the dominant party in Sweden and hold a relative majority of 100 seats (out of 349) in the current parliament (elected from 2018 to 2022). The party has employed an internal 50% gender candidate quota since 1993. In 2012, as a run-up to the elections in 2014, the party additionally introduced an internal 25% youth quota for their candidate lists.<sup>20</sup> While it was initially thought to apply to those under 35 years of age, the party constitution does not set a formal cut-off age, and party selectors even speak of a 50% quota for those aged under 40 (Freidenvall, 2016, p. 362).

To assess the impact of the youth quota on candidate selection, we therefore suggest calculating groups' odds for election in the Social Democratic Party for candidates younger than 30 years. Lowering the cut-off age makes sure that those young candidates are truly 'quota candidates', and also takes into consideration the lower age average among the Swedish MPs. Furthermore, since we analyse quotas' impact on the party level, we suggest calculating the odds ratio not based on



**Figure A1.** Odds for election in the Swedish Social Democratic Party

groups' shares in population but on their shares among candidates. This allows for a more specific analysis, since it focuses on those aspiring to be elected to parliament.

Figure A.1 thus compares groups' odds for election, accounting for their share among candidates in the Social Democratic Party for the elections in 2010 and 2014. While the first were still held under a single gender candidate quota, the latter were held under nested gender and youth quotas.

The first plot in the figure focuses on middle-aged women. Their odds for election were comfortable under the single gender quota, with nearly equal chances relative to middle-aged men. The introduction of the youth quota further increased their chances relative to young men but decreased them slightly relative to middle-aged men and considerably relative to young women. Young women's odds for election, as visualised in the second plot, were increased relative to all other groups with the introduction of a youth quota. In 2014, the chances of a young female candidate to be elected to parliament were 4 times higher than those of young male candidates; while both groups had had about equal chances in the 2010 elections. This could be a hint that parties strategically placed young women on better list positions than young men, since they fulfilled both the gender and the youth quota at the same time (therefore, the youth quota also reduced the chances of middle-aged women relative to young women). Those results are in line with the findings of previous studies on candidate selection processes in Sweden. While most parties in Freidenvall's study agreed that gender and age are very important or important criteria for candidate selection, the Social Democratic selectors stressed the double quota regulations as guiding principles (Freidenvall, 2016, pp. 360–62). The third plot confirms the tendency of the first second, with young male Social Democratic candidates having the worst chances to be elected relative to the other groups. Unlike as in the other cases, though, some of young women's higher chances for success were taken from middle-aged male candidates. In the 2014 elections, young women's chances relative to middle-aged men slightly increased. However, so did middle-aged men's relative to middle-aged women and young men.

In summary, middle-aged women candidates were most privileged in the 2010 elections, under a single gender quota. Young women candidates were the biggest profiteers of the double quotas in 2014. The increase in their odds for election was for the most part due to a reduction of young men's chances, as well as middle-aged women's. As in Tunisia, paired candidate quotas most considerably decreased young men's chances to be elected relative to all other groups. In contrast, and counter-intuitively, paired quotas for women and youth did not substantially decrease middle-aged male candidates' odds for election.





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