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Cleavages and party systems in post-communist Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria

Master thesis

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Abbreviations of party names

Bulgarian parties:

BBB	Bulgarian Business Bloc
BSP	Bulgarian Socialist Party
BZNS-DP	Popular Union of Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Democratic Party
DPS	Movement for Rights and Freedoms
NMS	National Movement for Simeon IInd
ONS	Alliance of National Salvation
SDS	Union of Democratic Forces/Alliance of Democratic Forces

Romanian parties:

CDR	Democratic Convention of Romania
FDSN	Democratic National Salvation Front
FSN	National Salvation Front
PDSR	Romanian Party of Social Democracy
PNL	National Liberal Party
PRM	Greater Romania Party
PUNR	Party of Romanian National Unity
UMDR	Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania
USD	Social Democratic Union

Hungarian parties:

FIDESZ	Alliance of Young Democrats
FIDESZ-MPP	FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party
FKGP	Independent Smallholders Party
KDNP	Christian Democratic People`s Party
MDF	Hungarian Democratic Forum
MSZP	Hungarian Socialist Party
MSZMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers` Party
SZDSZ	Alliance of Free Democrats
MIEP	Party of Hungarian Life and Justice

Introduction

The following paragraph about party systems in Central and Eastern Europe sums up much of the main problem in the following pages:

> [Party systems] respond more to elite-level changes in configurations of alliances than to shifts in the electoral 'base', and in many states individual politicians rather than political parties constitute the basic building blocks of politics. Yet this does not necessarily imply that political competition in post-Communist Europe lacks the structure we generally ascribe to Western party configurations; it simply suggests that such structures do not reside where we most often look for it – in stable patterns of electoral competition between institutionalised political organisations. The challenge for students of post-communist politics is to discover just how these systems do work and where their regularities lie (Birch 2001:13).

Without necessarily sharing Birch`s view on party systems, this thesis will attempt to find such structures and regularities by focusing on cleavages and the distinction between horizontal and vertical voter alignment. Under the assumption that structured voter alignments are important for the development of stable party systems, expected cleavages will be used as explanatory variables for voting behaviour in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in their first four post-communist parliamentary elections.[1] This will be tested by logistic regression models, thus giving the thesis a solid quantitative foundation. The *cleavage patterns* that are identified in this part of the analysis will then be used in an attempt to explain the *party systems* in the three countries.

The scope and extension of the thesis makes it sensible to limit the selection of countries. Despite their geographical proximity, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have different historical backgrounds, ethnic and religious compositions, as well as different economic profiles. There were also significant differences in their respective experiences with communist rule and transition to democracy. The party systems in the three countries differ from each other, both in terms of stability, level of fragmentation and structure of

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[1] Later elections are not included because data where not available when the work with this thesis commenced in August 2004. Also, the 1990 election to the Grand National Assembly in Bulgaria is excluded, making the parliamentary election in 1991 the starting point for this country.

competition. These factors should allow for considerable variation on both the independent and dependent variables, and make for suitable test cases of the hypothesis. The thesis can therefore be classified as a comparison of few countries, where the aim is to account for the differences in party systems through differences in cleavage structures (Landman 2003:29).

Hypothesis

The main question in this thesis is what impact cleavages have on the development of party systems, and more specifically, the stability of these systems in post-communist East Central Europe. My approach to finding regularities and stable patterns begins with the voters. We need to identify the variables that cause, or do not cause, voter alignment. This will be done by distinguishing conceptually between alignment between groups of voters, i.e. horizontal alignment, and alignment between voters and parties, i.e. vertical alignment. The assumption here is twofold: 1) That horizontal alignments exist because of cleavages, and 2) That horizontal voter alignment is important for the stability of the party systems even if it is not identifiable as steady vertical alignment to a single party over time. In other words, groups of voters can change behaviour coherently and still be a stabilising factor for the party systems.

Hypothesis:

H1: Cleavages are expected to have been a decisive factor for voting behaviour in post-communist Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

H2: Party systems that are based on cleavage structures are more stable than party systems that are not.

These two expectations about the importance of cleavages in party systems are to a large extent based on the experiences from Western Europe as first described by Lipset and Rokkan in their foreword to *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). I will not attempt to predict a new freezing of party systems, but I am interested in testing the importance of cleavages in a political environment that lacks the history of gradual development of civil and political rights, which Rokkan describes as passing the four

institutional thresholds of legitimacy, incorporation, representation and access to executive power (Rokkan 1970:79).

This leads us to possible objections to my expectations. It has been suggested that communism eradicated historical structural differences in these societies with the result that voter preferences are not based on cleavages and therefore fluctuating greatly (Elster et.al. 1998:131-140). Whitefield, whose approach to the topic is close to the approach in this thesis, sums up this notion of *flattened societies* (Wessels and Klingemann 1994) well:

> The flattening of the social and ideological landscape was anticipated as an effect of the policies of the communist party state that had supposedly atomized social relationships, disaggregated social classes, destroyed or inhibited the formation of civil society, and caused citizens to retreat from the public to the private domain (Whitefield 2002:184).

Finding empirical support for sociological background variables as stable predictors of voting behaviour should consequently prove very difficult if all or some of these assumptions are correct. Furthermore, this would also predict that, if present, a high degree of stability in party systems would have to be products of other factors, like for instance institutional arrangements.

More moderate objections to my hypothesis are also possible. It can be argued that sociological structures can have an impact on voting behaviour and political stability without necessarily being cleavages, but rather more transitional divides (Kitschelt et.al. 1999: 63).

Yet another perspective is offered by Enyedi, who argues that a cleavage structure is a result of the interplay between political entrepreneurs, sociological structures and institutional arrangements (Enyedi 2005:700). This implies a different definition of the concept of cleavages than the one developed and applied here, but Enyedi`s perspective is interesting as he tries to synthesise the factors that are most relevant for the development of party systems. Enyedi also has a greater emphasis on the elites than I do, and thus a wider scope.

It should be noted that conclusions on presence or absence of cleavages in post-communist Central and Eastern-Europe varies greatly from scholar to scholar. Some find that there is a

large number of cleavages present in Central and Eastern Europe (Berglund et.al. 2004:602), while others find that it is hard to identify cleavages in the region at all (Lawson et.al. 1999: 31-33). Not surprisingly, the majority of scholars take an intermediary position. These variations are probably to a large extent caused by different understandings and operationalisations of cleavages as a concept. A thorough review of previous research would therefore have to account for the different scholars` use of the concept in addition to their conclusions.[2] Rather than summing up the conclusions of other scholars, I have chosen to elaborate on the definition of cleavages and make reference to other findings where relevant throughout the text.

Delimitations

The conceptual limitations will be dealt with as the main concepts are defined and operationalised below. In particular, this applies to how the concepts of cleavages, parties, and party systems are treated. However, it could be useful to underline what this thesis does not attempt to do already at the outset.

Whereas this thesis ultimately sets out to map out the importance of cleavages in the formation of stable party systems, I do not aim at providing the reader with a full account of the dynamics of the party systems in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Such an endeavour would drastically increase the scope of the thesis due to the need for further control variables and a wider theoretic framework.

Institutional arrangements, and in particular distribution of seats and electoral thresholds, are important explanatory factors for party systems. Nevertheless, this will not be introduced directly as control variables when analysing the importance of cleavages for party system stability. It should also be noted that one could argue that institutions make more of a difference *after* the first years of democratisation in this regard (Ware 2003:200).

Transition theory per se is not the focus of this thesis. Transition theory will only be relevant to the extent it can explain possible cleavages and no attempts of systematically defining or

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[2] This would also apply to different contributors to the same volume, as for example in the case of the *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (Berglund et. al. 2004).

explaining the transitions in the three countries will be made. As a continuation of this, I will not evaluate the quality of the elections with regards to how they meet democratic standards. The selection of elections in the study, in particular the exclusion of the 1990 elections in Bulgaria, is motivated by the desire of studying the emergence of party systems in the early post-communist period. The 1990 elections in Bulgaria stands out as somewhat premature in this respect, even if the General Assembly came to function as the Parliament until the next election in 1991. A case could also be made for also excluding the first election in Romania, but the 1990 election has been included because of the possible loss of information that would be likely to follow as the next election only took place in 1992.

Furthermore, the focus is on elections to the lower chamber in Parliament. All other elections are excluded, and only mentioned when particularly relevant to party development and the relationship between the parties. Hungary has a mixed proportional electoral system, but only votes for party lists are measured. The definition of relevant parties, i.e. the parties included in the study, is elaborated below.

Finally, this thesis does not set out to present a model for predicting voting behaviour. Identifying cleavage patterns as relevant for choice of party is not the same as giving a complete explanation of why citizen X votes for party Y. Whereas this causes certain challenges with regards to control variables, it does not interfere with the main problem in the thesis, which is identifying cleavage patterns and their effect on party systems.

Structure of the thesis

The next chapter will elaborate on and define the relevant concepts, as well and discuss the adoption of these concepts to our context, post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, this chapter will deal with the measurement of the main dependent variable, the characteristics of the party systems, in greater detail.

With the hypothesis and the conceptual framework in place, the second chapter will address the foundations of cleavages in each country, with an emphasis on the 20th century. At the end of the chapter, expected patterns of cleavages for each country will be presented.

The third chapter is a narrative and descriptive analysis of the elections, with a particular focus on the relevant parties and party system development. Volatility and party replacement scores will also be addressed here. At the end of the chapter, the party systems will be described and classified according to the degree of openness in their structures of competition and level of fragmentation.

The methodology chapter will present logistic regression as the statistical tool of choice for analysing voter alignment. There is a sound intuitive logic in using support or no support for one party in one election as the dependent variable in each regression. After all, this is what elections are about, either you vote for a specific party or you do not vote for this party. The validity and reliability of the regression models will also be discussed.

Chapter five presents the findings in the multivariate logistics regressions, and offers an interpretation of these findings based on the developed theoretical framework. The presence and/or absence of cleavage patterns will then be used as explanatory variables for the party systems that were identified in Chapter 3.

Finally, the conclusion will be presented together with a few suggestions for further research in the field.

Chapter 1. Conceptual framework

A theoretical approach to the concept of cleavages

Rokkan and Lipset`s classical conceptualisation of cleavages from 1967 has been accused of lacking precision, with a certain extent of conceptual confusion being the unfortunate result (Skare 1998: 163). Apparently, there is a consensus that cleavages seem to address something very fundamental in terms of social structures and patterns of identification. Furthermore, Rokkan and Lipset showed that these structures are likely to have an impact on the political landscape as long as they are present in pluralistic regimes (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). A disclaimer is due though: As we have already noted above, the notion of frozen party systems was an analysis of the development in Western Europe and it is therefore an inherent risk of overstretching the concepts when attempting to apply these concepts in other contexts. On the other hand, Rokkan was concerned with making models that could be applied to new settings, i.e. they were not closed theories (Aardal 1994:222). His use of concepts, like cleavages, could therefore be interpreted within this framework.

The classical response to the challenge of creating a concept that can travel well in time and space is to limit the number of defining attributes of the concept (Sartori 1970:1044pp.). There is great distance on both the time and space dimension from Lipset and Rokkan`s work on Western Europe to an analysis of post-communist Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. A high level of abstraction is necessary, but it is important to avoid a sub-minimal definition, which could lead to simpler and less durable divides being recognised as actual cleavages. Neither is a maximalist definition more useful, as a definition that is overburdened with attributes would be of little analytical use due to the problems of making the concept measurable (Munck and Verkuilen 2002:9). The guideline that was laid out by Sartori on how conceptualisation stands prior to quantification is still relevant in this respect (Sartori 1970:1038).

The potential pitfall when using loosely defined concepts is lack of precision. Noteworthy efforts have been made in giving the concept of cleavages a clarification by starting with the attributes of the concept. Bartolini and Mair`s (1990) and also Knutsen and Scarbrough`s (1995) contributions to the debate can be interpreted in this tradition of extensional definitions

(Skare 1998:176-186). This is visible in their focus on the different dimensions of the concepts, where Bartolini and Mair argue that a cleavage has three characteristics that must be present:

> 1. An empirical element, i.e. the phenomenon must be identifiable in socio-structural terms.
> 2. A normative element, i.e. a set of values and beliefs that gives a sense of identity to a group.
> 3. An organisational/behavioural element, i.e. that the cleavage leads to the development of an organised effort by the individuals (Bartolini and Mair 1990:215).

Knutsen and Scarbrough`s main objection to this is that it is not sufficient to have these characteristics present, but they must also be associated with each other and not have internal autonomous variation (Skare 1998:181).

An alternative approach that is suggested, but not put into practise by Skare is to define a cleavage intentionally (Skare 1998:187p.). An intentional definition sets out to identify the theoretical content or meaning of the concept. As Skare points out himself, there is also an intentional aspect in Bartolini and Mair`s definition (Skare 1998:179). The main challenges in developing an intentional definition are how to distinguish between cleavages and alignment, and how to deal with the retrospective approach favoured by Rokkan (Skare 1998:188).

Developing the concept of cleavages

In this thesis, an extensional definition will be developed and applied. While intentions are the point of departure for understanding where to start the selection of relevant attributes, the attributes are nevertheless what distinguish one concept from another. Without clearly defined attributes, it becomes very difficult to measure the concept and this would create great challenges for a comparison across time, space, or both.

I believe that Bartolini and Mair, as well as Knutsen and Scarborough, have a common problem in their level of abstraction. It is simply too low to incorporate the intentions of Lipset and Rokkan. After all, they are claimed to be writing in the Lipset-Rokkan tradition

(Skare 1998:176). If we accept that the intention of Lipset and Rokkan was to create a concept that could be useful in a flexible model with capacity for conceptual travelling, it is likely that the origin of the concept was set at a high level of abstraction. This does not necessarily make it a less precise concept, but it leaves room for making it more specific. For example, a socio-economic cleavage would then be a cleavage that has all the attributes of the concept cleavage, but also additional attributes that distinguishes it from other cleavages.

In my understanding of the concept then, a cleavage is a concept directed at the macro-level in an analysis insofar as we are talking about the origin of the cleavage. I agree with Bartolini and Mair that cleavages are related to both identification and a dimension of competition (Bartolini and Mair 1990:45) . The difficulty with using their three attributes is the behavioural/ organisational element that they require present together with the two other attributes. It is premature to reject a possible cleavage if the sociological structures are present without actually being manifested in an *organised* effort by the members of the group. If cleavages are indeed something fundamental, collective identification should be recognisable without being limited to studying the phenomenon top-down. For instance, a cleavage can hypothetically have an impact on the support bases for different parties at different times. Cleavages are based on, and refer to, the masses and not to the elites in this respect, and a collective identity can be noticed with different outcomes over time, for example when a party dissolves or splits because of conflict at the elite level. This is especially important in the post-communist setting.

The third attribute proposed by Bartolini and Mair is closely associated with the difference between latent and manifest cleavages. The approach that will be used here simply postulates that a cleavage can be manifest even though it is not visible as support for the same party over time. A cleavage is manifest as long as collective identification triggers collective action, but this action can vary with time.

The time dimension is particularly challenging when it comes to newly democratised countries. This has also caused some disagreement between scholars on when it is appropriate to apply the concept. Kitschelt et. al. avoids using the word because of uncertainty of whether or not the sociological divides that have become political in the post-communist countries are transitional rather than durable (Kitschelt et.al 1999:63). However, it is also possible to see three or four elections as sufficient empirical evidence to draw conclusions from (Whitefield

2002:181, 189, 195-196). It has been claimed that Lipset and Rokkan used the terms "cleavages" and "divides" interchangeably themselves (Meisel 1974:6 cited in Kitschelt et.al 1999:63). Even if this is the case, it is fruitful to draw a clear line between what Kitschelt et.al refers to as a divide and a cleavage. The time dimension is the difference, and this is after all a challenge that was less problematic to Rokkan and Lipset when they wrote about pre- and interwar developments in the 1960s. A compromise between the Whitefield and Kitschelt approach is to be very careful with using the term cleavages. In conceptual terms, a divide is a more general concept than cleavage, with looser requirements on the time dimension. A conclusion on the existence and importance of a divide could therefore be a tentative conclusion on a possible cleavage.

The applied definition of cleavages

My first attribute of a cleavage is empirical in the sense that a cleavage must be identifiable as a sociological structure. The first attribute that we seek to identify is a characteristic that makes an individual a member of a group and likely to behave accordingly to this membership because of his or her social background. However, this attribute would only constitute a divide if it stands alone. Hence, while being a necessary, it is not a sufficient attribute.

The second attribute of a cleavage is a first step in distinguishing a cleavage from a divide. The origin of a cleavage must have a historical and theoretical explanation. If we can not explain why it is likely to be more than a temporary divide, it should be classified as a cleavage neither. This captures the *intention* of Rokkan and Lipset of studying fundamental historical developments and incorporates the idea of cleavage based model building.

The third attribute, and the second difference between a cleavage and divide, relates to the time dimension. The requirement that a cleavage is persistent over time does of course not imply that it will last forever. However, it should imply that cleavages will need time to disappear, by eroding over time. If a phenomenon disappears overnight as a determining factor for voting behaviour it was most likely never a true cleavage at all. Hence, resilience over time is a necessary but not sufficient attribute of the concept.

These three attributes must all be present in a cleavage. The challenge of retaining the intentions of Lipset and Rokkan have been met within a conceptual framework that is largely extensional in design and set at a high level of abstraction. The most challenging attribute included in the definition is the requirement of a meaningful theoretical explanation of the origin of a cleavage. Theoretical justifications have been seen as the most challenging or most disputed aspect in analysing cleavages also when it is not included as a defining attribute (Whitefield 2002:183). I would argue that this perspective legitimises the attribute, as this also strengthens the applicability of the concept in operational terms, by providing a more solid base for falsification or strengthening of a hypothesis.

Consequences of a new conceptualisation of cleavages

The immediate consequence of removing the organisational attribute from the definition of the concept is that the focus shifts from the elite level to the mass level. Cleavages are the structures that create the space in which the elites can play out their strategies. The first alignment we should look for is therefore *horizontal alignment*, i.e. voters identifying with each other because they have something fundamental in common. *Vertical alignment*, between groups of voters and the political parties, is the second dimension where cleavages can have an impact on the party system. However, this is where intra-elite conflicts, institutional arrangements, and poor communication may interfere in the relationship with the voters. As follows from my hypothesis, the horizontal alignment can still matter even when the vertical alignment to the parties is weak. As long as groups of voters behave similarly, and we can explain their behaviour with the cleavage theory, it is meaningful to say that cleavages matter as a stabilising element. Figure 1 illustrates this model:

Figure 1. Possible effect of a cleavage on horizontal and vertical voter alignments.

This is not to say that cleavages do not have effect on the formation of parties, but the model recognises that the horizontal alignment between voters stands prior to the vertical alignment.[3] This assumption rests on the definition of a cleavage that was outlined above, and the high level of abstraction we are operating with is also a precondition for the model.

The organisational element from Mair and Bartolini`s definition of cleavages is not irrelevant, but it appears to be directed at the explaining vertical alignment. The most important consequence of the model, which is also highly relevant to the hypothesis, is that it is possible to have relative stable horizontal alignment, even when vertical alignment is volatile. This can be illustrated with a hypothetical, and simplified, example: Let us imagine that there is an urban-rural cleavage in a country. The strength of the cleavage creates horizontal alignment, which causes urban voters to behave similarly and rural voters to behave similarly. Most likely, these groups of voters will align vertically towards two parties and vote for an "urban party" and a "rural party". However, these parties might be a disappointment to the voter groups, and the groups might look elsewhere in the next election. This would be vertical dealignment. On the other hand, if the voter groups continue to vote coherently, but for parties "X" and "Y" instead of the original "urban" and "rural" parties, it would be fair to conclude that the horizontal alignments have not been weakened. Following the definition of a

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[3] It is also possible to argue that horizontal and vertical alignment could happen more or less in parallel, for example during a revolution, but horistontal alignment would still be a precondition for vertical alignment in such cases.

cleavage, one would then have to conclude that not only do cleavages matter, but they also have a stabilising effect in terms of structuring the electorate, and hence the party system.

The vertical alignment has quite a few challenges. There is interplay between the electorate and the party elites between elections, and in the Western European example, also on the party formation stage. This interplay takes place in what could be described as political space. This space is also influenced by institutional arrangements in the sense that alterations in the rules of the game might give both voters and parties different incentives for their behaviour. In this respect, Figure 1 is more of an illustration than an exhaustive model, something which also follows from the thesis` limitations.

The applied conceptualisation of cleavages, and in particular the distinction between horizontal and vertical alignment, is key to understand how this analysis will differ from other scholars` work on the same topic. One example is Kay Lawson, who sums up a volume compromising studies on Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland by writing about an: ”...*uncoupling of the forces of electoral democracy*, of parties from cleavages and of voters from parties...” (Lawson et.al 1999:33). Apparently, Lawson concludes on both horizontal and vertical alignment here, but without addressing the distinction conceptually. The consequence is that horizontal alignment is ignored.

Parties

One way to approach a definition of a party is to look at its functions. A minimum definition should also be limited to the purpose of distinguishing a party from any other organisation with similar functions. Giovanni Sartori identifies the party's functions as being representative agencies and a channel for expression of interests, and he emphasises the latter (Sartori 1976:27).

A party is nevertheless more than an organisation that voices opinions in the society. A party is an institution that seeks influence in the state (Ware 1996:5). Also, different beliefs can be voiced within a party. This is Ware`s second point as he points out how a party usually

attempts to aggregate interests (Ware 1996:5). Based on Ware`s ideas, the following definition of a party will be applied in this thesis:

> A party is an institution where interests and beliefs are aggregated as a mean for its members and supporters to channel their voices and maximise their influence in the state.

As relatively few voters in general, and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular, are members of a party, elections stand out as the arena for interaction between the party and the supporters. With regards to elections in Central and Eastern Europe, it should also be noted that it has been quite common for different parties to engage in electoral coalitions. These coalitions are then an even greater aggregation of interests, but of course also more diversified in interests. The question is whether these coalitions can be treated as parties or if they need to be disintegrated to the parties that participated in the coalition. The first option would imply a stretching of the definition, but not necessarily a violation of it.

Defining relevant parties

I have chosen a numerical definition of relevant parties, i.e. the parties included in the study. Instead of examining the potential of the parties as coalition partners in government or their blackmail potential for bringing down governments, we can set a limit of percentage of seats in the lower chamber of the parliament. Therefore, a relevant party in this thesis is a party which won a minimum of 5% of the seats in the given election. This is in part motivated by the limitations in scope and extension of the thesis.

There is of course a risk of loosing cleavages by setting the threshold this high. At the same time, as we are looking at the effect of the cleavages on the party systems, it does make sense to focus on the larger parties.

Party systems

Parties are part of a party system when they interact and compete as parts of a system (Sartori 1976:4). Consequently, there must be more than one party, because what we study in a party system is how the different parts of the system relate to each other (Sartori 1976:4). Bakke suggests that party systems have contents, which makes the parties belong to party families, and form, which can be identified as the number of parties, their relative size and their degree of polarization (Bakke 2006:17p.). However, such "classical" definitions of party systems have recently been challenged by Bardi and Mair, who, in part based on the experiences from post-communist Europe, suggest that this approach needs revision (Bardi and Mair 2008). Their main message is that we should a) distinguish between sets of parties and systems of parties, and b) distinguish between vertical, horizontal and functional systems of parties (Bardi and Mair 2008:147pp.). Their conclusion is that a multidimensional approach is necessary to capture possible different dynamics of party systems, which may operate in parallel (Bardi and Mair 2008:161p.). One dimension which is relevant here, is awareness of possible differences in electoral and parliamentary party systems (Bardi and Mair 2008:158). An example of this could be if a party entered a coalition government after an election, but in doing so, also cut across the cleavages that had defined the electoral base of the party. This party would then risk being punished by their core electorate in the next election, because of differences in the electoral and parliamentary party systems. The attention to the potential difference between horizontal and vertical alignment should therefore be well suited to catch possible differences in electoral and parliamentary party systems over time, although without addressing this issue directly.

The horizontal dimension, i.e. different party systems on different levels in a polity, becomes less relevant as this thesis is limited to studying elections to the lower chambers of Parliament alone.

In an earlier work, Mair focuses on to which extent the structures of party competition are "open" or "closed" (Mair 1997). Mair argues that consolidation of a party system can been seen as a closing process of the structures of competition, thus creating greater predictability (Mair 1997:214). He also suggests that lack of closure has created lack of stability in post-communist Europe, leading to less stability in party systems in the region (Mair 1997:191).

Table 1. Closed and open structures of competition

Closed structure of competition	Open structure of competition
Wholesale alternation in office, or non-alternation in office	Partial alternation in office, or mix of both partial and wholesale alternation
Familiar governing formulae	Innovative governing formulae
Access to government restricted to a limited number of parties	Access to government open to (almost) all parties

(Mair 1997:212)

As I interpret Mair to be talking primarily about the parliamentary dimension here, this distinction between open and closed structures of competition strikes at the core of the dependent variable in the thesis. In the following, party systems will therefore be discussed on the basis of the degree of openness, as well as measures of fragmentation like the effective number of parties and the relative size of the parties. The number of effective parties is found using Laakso and Taageperas formula: $1/S^2$, where S is the percentage of seats for each of the parties represented in Parliament (Laakso and Taageperas 1979, cited in Bakke 2006:271).

Volatility and party replacement

Volatility and emergence of new parties can not be disregarded as signs of instability per se. It is therefore necessary to take a closer look at these features, in order to get a clearer understanding of the extension of these two measures of change.

Commonly defined as changes in party support from one election to the next, volatility is particularly difficult to assess in the post-communist context because of the large degree of splits and mergers between the parties (Birch 2001: 1). It could therefore be useful to distinguish between changes based on voter movements between continuous parties and shifts to new parties. Birch names the latter party replacement, which she defines as: "...the sum of the vote shares won by electoral contenders at election *t+1* that had not contested election *t*" (Birch 2001: 4). Volatility is defined as "...a measure of changes in the electoral fortunes of existing players in the electoral game..." (Birch 2001: 4).

It has been argued that there is a significant difference in the effect on the party system between the cases where voters shifts from parties within a block and the cases when voters shift across blocs (von Beyme 1985: 304). This observation fits the perspective laid forward here as well, but it is important to underline that it is the movement of voters as a block that is of interest. Bartolini and Mair argue that block volatility and volatility within blocks are the most appropriate measures of cleavage structure (Bartolini and Mair 1990:36). However, the concept of blocks becomes problematic when it relates to parties rather than the voters, as it is then presupposed that the parties themselves can be organised in blocks.

Short distance voter movements from one election to the next do not necessarily signal lack of or weakened cleavages. In the cases where a given party has ceased to exist because of a split or a merger, the voter would even be forced to vote for a different party than the one he or she voted for in the previous election. In terms of volatility then, which is most often seen as an indicator of instability, the main interest in the post-communist context should be to identify the nature of voter movements and party development.

Chapter 2. Historical foundations for expected cleavages

The definition of cleavages applied in this thesis emphasises the origin of the cleavage. The aim of this chapter is therefore to identify the historical developments in the three countries that may have created lasting cleavages. The chapter focuses on state- and nationbuilding and the development of economic structures, and the approach is thematic rather than strictly chronological.

While state- and nationbuilding have certain historical critical junctures, these are also continuous processes. In this respect state- and nationbuilding returned to the political scene under new conditions at the collapse of communism. Together with regime change in itself, and the introduction of market economy, state- and nationbuilding constitute what has become known as the triple transition (Offe 1992:14). This triple transition should be considered a possible arena for emergence of new cleavages, though great care should be exerted regarding their expected durability.

The challenge in formulating expectations of potential cleavages in post-communist Europe is to make a framework which allows for both long-term interregional variation and the impact of communism. On what I believe would be valid for all three countries, Karasimeonov notes that Bulgarian history has seen several periods where different cleavages have shaped political behaviour, though primarily on the elite level (Karasimeonov 1999:39). The pre-communist history also differs substantially from country to country. The communist period clearly had a major impact on the societies. Old cleavages are likely to have been affected, but not necessarily eradicated, by the communist regimes. However, we know that there were differences in the degree of self-determination that Moscow allowed its satellites. Kitschelt et.al. make a useful distinction between three types of communism in this respect: Bureaucratic-authoritarian, national-accommodative, and patrimonial communism, and place Hungary in the first category, while Romania and Bulgaria both fit under the label of patrimonial communism (Kitschelt et. al. 1999:23pp.)The differences between these categories relate to the economic sphere, historical background, and the degree of pluralism.

Territory, identity, and religion

Hungary`s history as a regional player from the state formation process in the 10th century and onwards should be considered in terms of the strength of nationalist sentiments. The defeat for the Ottoman empire at Mohács in 1526 marks the first of two main national traumas (Seim 2006:27). The Habsburg empire acquired Hungary from the Ottoman empire in 1699, and as the uprising in 1848-49 was unsuccessful, the Hungarian elites had to wait for self-governance until 1867, when the Habsburg empire split in two. The second trauma, the loss of land after the peace accords in Trianon in 1920 is probably of greater interest here, as these borders also define the Hungarian state today (Seim 2006:27). The peace of Trianon meant that Hungary lost substantial territory, and a Hungarian diaspora was created in the neighbouring countries. It is likely that this created a cleavage between those who have strong ties to the diaspora or believe that the Hungarian state should compromise the whole Hungarian nation on one side, and those who feel that present-day Hungary is consolidated on the other side.

Romania is one of the countries with a large Hungarian minority, based in Transylvania. According to the 1992 census, Hungarians constituted 21% of a total population of 7,7 million in this region (Romanian Institute for National Statistics: http://www.recensamant.ro/). After centuries with different rulers in different parts of the country, Romania was able to consolidate "Greater Romania" in the interwar era. However, Romania also lost Bessarabia to the Soviet Union as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The issues between the Romanian province of Moldova and the Republic of Moldova are still important in the bilateral relationship between the two countries, and a possible cleavage in this respect should be tested.

Bulgaria was the last nation-state to come out of the Ottoman empire, following the Russo-Turkish war in 1878. Russia was instrumental in securing Bulgarian independence, and the Russians also refrained from heavy interference in the subsequent state- and nationbuilding processes (Karasimeonov 1999:38). Positive or negative attitudes towards Russia were important in defining the political actors before WWI, but lost relevance after the war (Karasimeonov 1999:40p.). When discussing the relevance of such a cleavage today, one would also have to take the effects of communism into account. Considering the poor state of the Russian Federation after the transition, I would therefore believe that a cleavage here

would relate to communism-related nostalgia rather than to Slavophil versus western orientation.

The borders of Bulgaria changed with the varying fortunes in the Balkan wars, where the tripartite alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece had initial success against the Ottoman empire after war broke out in 1912. However, Serbia and Greece turned against Bulgaria a year later, which implied not only a loss of territory, but also lead to Bulgaria joining Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans towards the end of World War I. Finally, the borders of Bulgaria were dictated in the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919, resulting in yet another loss of land. Although one would be hard pressed to draw the same conclusions in terms of the effect of Treaty of Neuilly compared to the effect of Treaty of Trianon in Hungary, Bulgaria was clearly severely punished (Karasimeonov 1999:43). A possible cleavage on the nationalist dimension in Bulgaria would therefore be likely, primarily because of the Turkish minority and the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, the Pomaks, in the country, but also because this could reinforce sentiments similar to those expected in Hungary. After all, one poll showed that 51% of the respondents expressed territorial dissatisfaction in 1991 (Von Beyme 1996:51p.)

Summing up, the diaspora issue is expected to be most salient in the Hungarian case, but nationalist cleavages could also matter in the two other countries. The strength of the Hungarian and Turkish minorities in Romania and Bulgaria could possibly overlap with these issues and mutually reinforce such cleavages. Furthermore, ethnic and religious minorities became more visible in the interwar period, and most elites embarked on assimilation policies between the wars (Berglund et.al 2004:18). In Bulgaria, the assimilation policies towards the Turkish minority saw renewed strength in the 1980s (Karasimeonov 1999:44). This could also possibly overlap with an authoritarian versus pluralism cleavage, with minorities being distinctly anti-authoritarian.

The history before 1920 is also interesting in terms of the relationship between the borders of the contemporary states and the influence from the Western and Eastern traditions of division versus concentration of power (Berglund et.al 2004:14p.). This overlaps with the religious dimension, where Western and Eastern Christianity follow much the same geographical division, and creates space for potential cleavages where the contemporary polities have populations with origins from both sides of this watershed. In the sample of countries that is

used here, it is thus likely that Romania could have a religion cleavage as the country has roots in both traditions, corresponding to the minority cleavage. Furthermore, the interwar failure of communist parties in Romania can to a part be attributed to the strength of orthodoxy, particularly in the rural areas (Datulescu 1999:98). It is also likely that orthodoxy survived to a greater extent in rural areas during communism, possibly cutting across other urban-rural dimensions.

As a predominantly counter-reformation country, Hungary could have a potential cleavage with origin in the conflict between modern secularity and Catholicism. Moreover, there is a relatively large Calvinist population in Hungary, which could reinforce the secular-believer cleavage, while at the same time splitting Calvinists and Catholics. The different denominations in Bulgaria are expected to reinforce a cleavage between the titular nationals and the Turkish minority. Overall, the long-term effects of the division between Western and Eastern Christianity should also be visible with regards to degree of authoritarianism and relevant for the degree of communist penetration. In other words, it could be expected to find reinforced cleavage patterns when these dimensions are examined below.

Authoritarianism versus pluralism: Explaining nostalgia?

The Habsburg and Ottoman spheres of influence have different traditions with regards to pre-democratic pluralism. The former had earlier experiences of nation- and statebuilding in comparison with the more authoritarian rule in the east. Hungary does not share Bulgaria`s and Romania`s clientelistic and patrimonial heritage from Ottoman rule. This perspective may serve as an overarching framework for possible regime-related cleavages.

All three countries had experiences with pluralism and different degrees of democracy in the first half of the 20th century. Also, all these democratic systems broke down before the communist period. Hungary had very turbulent years after declaring independence at the end of WWI. Béla Kun became de facto leader and an alliance with the Soviet Union was the overarching principle for a few months in 1919 (Seim 1994:167p.). The struggle between communist and anti-communist forces, the "red-white terror", continued in the early 1920s, and also turned into a more regular military operation, with Romanian forces standing more

or less on the outskirts of Budapest (Seim 1994:167p.). Admiral Miklós Horthy took power from the communists and became Regent of Hungary in March 1920. Horthy also came victorious out of a struggle for power with King Karl IV, who had not resigned from the throne. The elections in 1920, in which the communists were banned and the social-democrats intimidated from active participation, eventually produced some degree of stability. The smallholders and conservative forces took the reigns, and István Behlen became Prime Minister, a position he kept from 1921 to 1931 (Seim 1994:172pp.). This would prove to be a period of efficient, though authoritarian, governing, as well as a period of marginalisation of extreme political forces. However, the regime became more authoritarian when Gyula Gömbös was appointed Behlen`s successor in 1932. Civil liberties were further reduced and increasing anti-Semitism showed signs of where Hungary was heading. The fascists emerged as a leading political force after Gömbös died in 1936, and Hungary entered World War II as an allied of Germany (Seim 1994:223pp.). Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the Arrow Cross Movement, eventually became "Leader of the Hungarian Nation" in 1944 and stayed faithful to Hitler until the end of the war.

The communist period started later in Hungary than in the two other countries. The armed forces and the security apparatus came under Soviet influence early, but it was the Smallholders party that won the election in 1945, mainly because they were the clearest anti-communist alternative (Seim 1994:354). Later, the Hungarian demands for free elections, withdrawal of Soviet troops, and a free press in 1956 ended in violence and the death of Prime Minister Imre Nagy. Still, Hungary could experiment with "reform-communism" under János Kádár, and opposition movements were also in play. In sum, and in comparison with the rest of the region, there was both considerable experience and a certain pluralism to draw upon when the roundtable negotiations started in 1989. The roundtable format also proved to work well, ensuring a comparatively smooth transition.

Political parties were present since independence in Bulgaria, but democratic ideas had varying fortunes also before WWI. Stefan Stambolov came to power in 1889 and his rule, which lasted until 1894, was characterized by a step towards authoritarian rule through passing of anti-democratic laws (Karasimeonov 1999:40). Political pluralism returned after his fall, but Bulgaria remained an elite-dominated polity for some time.

It was the agrarian movement that came to lead the first elected interwar government in Bulgaria. Prime Minister Stamboliski soon had strong adversaries, and a coup d'état was carried out by parts of the army in 1923, ending with torture and murder of Stamboliski (Seim 1994:182p.). Other political forces were far more radical than the agrarians. Macedonian extremists (IMRO) were a factor in the coup in 1923, and the communists were banned and prosecuted after a spectacular, but partly failed, attempt of killing the entire political elite in Sofia (Seim 1994:182p.). One could argue that Bulgaria faced a dilemma between freedom-or-modernisation in this period, with the agrarians representing the more political liberal anti-modernisation force (Karasimeonov 1999:43). Democracy did return briefly in 1929, but authoritarian rule was re-established with what Karasimeonov describes as "a dictatorial monarchic regime" under King Boris, which lasted from 1934 to WWII.

The transformation to totalitarian communist was rapid in Bulgaria (Berglund and Aarebrot 1997:63). The communist decades in Bulgaria were marked by loyalty to Moscow and regime stability (Janos 2000:321). Todor Zhivkov led the country for almost three decades, until 1989. In addition to being totalitarian, and I concur with Berglund and Aarebrot here, the communist regime was also characterized by nepotism. Kitschelt`s description of patrimonial communism as a mixture of repression and clientelistic co-optation fits Bulgaria well (Kitschelt 1999:24).

The Romanian interwar regime history is another examply of limited pluralism and democratic breakdown. The agrarian party entered government in 1920, but King Ferdinand dissolved this government in an undemocratic fashion. The political parties reflected the social elite structures, and were founded as early as in the mid-nineteenth century (Datulescu 1999:96). The main conflicts were between different categories of landowners, with nationality playing a role, and also between urban bourgeoisie and rural Romania. However, it was clear that this was an elite project, with farmers and workers being "mere spectators" (Datulescu 1999:95). The other important political force in Romania before WWII was the royal family. King Carol IInd found himself in uneasy and shifting alliances with the other elites, and this power struggle eventually ended with the establishment of a monarchic dictatorship from 1938 to 1940 (Datulescu 1999:99). Popular mobilisation did return in the 1930s, partly with origins in the peasantry, but also with urban elements (Datulescu 1999:99). The successful mobilizer was the fascist movement known as the Iron Guard. However, the fascists did not come to power until WWII broke out.

In Romania, Nikolae Ceausescu operated relatively independently from Moscow after he took over the leadership of Romania after Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965. At the same time, he created one of, if not *the*, most repressive regimes behind the Iron Curtain. The Romanian communist regime had many common traits with the Bulgarian, although there were significant differences in the degree of loyalty to Moscow. The sudden and violent overthrow testifies to the nature of the Ceausescu regime, and also to the weakness of civil society at the time of transition. Structures from the previous regime could use the state apparatus when they took over and consolidated power before and in the founding elections.

The authoritarian experiences from the interwar period in Hungary, with extreme radicalism both on the left and right side of the political spectrum could of course have created a cleavage that deeply divided the nation. At the same time, it could also be seen as a valuable lesson of the costs of extreme positions, to a certain extent comparable with the West-German experience after WWII. The salience of the expected nationalism cleavage based on the diaspora is most likely not compromised by the latter perspective, although one could expect to find a rather clear difference between moderate and radical nationalists. It is also interesting that there was some degree of pluralism, particularly in the 1920s. Though dominated by the elites, the masses were also parts of Hungarian politics in the interwar period, to some extent through the communist period, and as stakeholders in the transition process. This could imply that there was greater potential for consensus on the regime dimension than in other countries, making a nostalgia cleavage less likely.

In sum, the level of authoritarianism in Bulgaria and Romania is striking. Various strongmen and elites, although representing very different backgrounds, have been dominant in the political life in the countries for most of the 20th century. The nature of the communist regime could have created space for a nostalgia cleavage in these two countries, with certain parts of the electorate favouring stability and communist ideals over experiments with a new kind of pluralism. This could also apply to those who were favoured through clientelistic networks in the old regime. However, this would probably have to correspond with economic cleavages for such a cleavage to matter. If present though, such a cleavage would be strong because of the reaction from those who value pluralism and meritocracy. However, there are also important differences between Romania and Bulgaria in this respect. The patrimonial aspect appears to be somewhat stronger in the Romanian case, based on the position that Illiescu

gained through the transition. Although being a key member of the old regime, he and FSN managed to distance themselves efficiently from Ceausescu. The aspect of continuation was stronger in the case of BSP in Bulgaria.

In other words, pre-communist traditions appear to have had some relevance for the type of communism rule that was established in the three countries, as illustrated by how civil society is most developed in the parts of Central Eastern Europe that has roots in Western Christianity (Berglund et. al 2001:166).However, I believe that it is first and foremost the communist regimes and the modes of transition that can be said to have created space for cleavages in the polities of today. Finally, and although it can not be classified as a cleavage, the patrimonial heritage in Romania and Bulgaria could also have paved way for a greater political space for new political "strongmen".

Economic structures

Although communism reshaped the economic structures of the three countries dramatically, possible cleavages on the economic dimension from before this period should be considered. For example, the role and status of the peasantry faced challenges on the centre-periphery dimension in this period. An economic cleavage between rural and urban parts could very well have developed into lasting cleavages where strengthened by ethnic, religious or economic structures like ownership and mode of production. There were also big differences between the three countries in this regard.

Hungary had considerably more industry than Romania and Bulgaria already at the dawn of the 19th century, and also saw workers mobilise to a greater extent than in the other two countries (Seim 1994:162). Urbanisation in Hungary also happened before communism, and the percentage of people living in cities with a population of more than 100 000 actually declined from 1950-1976 (Berglund et.al 2004:39). Hungary had a considerable middle class and the largest industrial worker class in the region at the time (Seim 1994:352). At the same, ownership mode and power structures in the countryside changed less, land reforms were modest and the aristocratic social order were still in place at the end of the interwar period (Seim 1994: 173,176).

During the communist period, the agricultural sector underwent collectivization at first, but like in other economic spheres, there was a liberalisation of the regime here as well from the late 1950s. When the New Economic Mechanism was implemented in the late 1960s, with certain market-oriented solutions and decentralised decision-making, Hungary in reality took a step towards the transition, which Romania and Bulgaria had to wait another 20 years for (Seim 1994:440p.). The reforms were slowed down in the mid-1970s, but picked up the pace again later (Seim 1994:440p.).

With a comparatively developed economy, one could therefore expect a traditional left-right cleavage to be of importance in Hungarian post-communist politics. This cleavage would be expected to revolve around the issue of social protectionism and state regulation versus liberal market economy. Also, since the different occupational groups have long been mobilised to a certain degree, we could expect to find a relevant urban-rural dimension here. Differences in income levels might cut across other cleavages.

Romania was one of several countries in the region with more than 70% of the population working in the agricultural sector in the interwar period (Seim 1994:184). Only 45 000 people worked in modern factories in 1910 (Janos 2000:128). The major landowners and aristocrats managed to avoid major land reforms, and the tendencies to radicalisation of the peasants were also tamed through cooptation of their leaders (Seim 1994:190p.). However, these social structures were to large extent to be eradicated when collectivization of the agricultural sector in Romania was completed.

While the interwar level of industrialisation in Romania was relatively low, urbanisation increased also before the communist period (Datulescu 1999:94). The industrialisation during the communist decades was an important factor in reshaping the economic structures of the country. Connected with both education and accelerated urbanisation, this could very well have reinforced existing urban-rural cleavages. About half the Romanian workforce was employed in the industrial sector in 1985 (Datulescu 1999:102). The industrialisation of Romania was a deliberate policy choice that was not welcomed in Moscow in the 1960s, when the Soviet leadership envisaged greater regional specialisation instead of reliance of heavy industry (Seim 1994:426). There was therefore a distinct national element in the Romanian industrial policy, which was taken to the extremes under Ceausescu. The country eventually became the poorest in Europe, with farmers increasingly returning to manual

labour (Datulescu 1999:91). The down payment of all foreign debt in the early 1980s added to this burden, but also reinforced the national aspect.

In terms of economic cleavages then, one could clearly argue that Romania was a very flat society in 1989. However, I do believe that there is reason to expect an urban-rural cleavage, based on the economic dimension, as urban and rural populations would have different needs after the transition. The rural populations could be more dependent on state intervention, while urban (elites) would favour liberal economic policies. Also, the economic transition would probably have created income differences, which could qualify as a cleavage, and possibly reinforce a cleavage between the few privileged and the masses from the previous regime. The nationalist dimension of the economic policies in Romania could also have survived, and strengthen the urban-rural cleavage.

Bulgaria was also predominantly rural and agricultural before WWII. The land reform in 1920 reached quite far, and some land was redistributed to the peasants. Also, the agrarian movement had a clear program, they believed in the right to private property of the land, combined with cooperation between farmers in order to make use of the effect of larger networks in production and sales (Seim 1994:178). However, as we have seen above, the agrarians only had influence in a limited period of time. The deep rift between wealthy, powerful elite and the masses was therefore quite intact in a less than modernised Bulgaria at the end of the interwar period.

The economic structures in Bulgaria changed completely after WWII, as the ideas from Moscow were followed both in ideas and implementation. Berglund et.al. emphasises how industrialisation, urbanisation and education also was a modernising project (Berglund et.al.2004:38). Although these ideals faded somewhat after the death of Stalin, Bulgaria never let up on the centralised planning of the economy. The result was not only a complete transformation of the economic structures of the society, but also the creation of a new elite, the nomenklatura (Berglund et.al.2004:38). This is visible in the mode of transition, and in the election to the Grand Assembly, where the communists had legitimacy to negotiate and take part in the transition. The communists represented a force that claimed to be sustaining welfarism in respect (Sakwa 1999:80).

The likelihood of economic cleavages is high in Bulgaria, particularly with respect to opinions on the degree of state intervention in the market. Like in Romania, there could be a cleavage between old and new elites. The history also makes a case for an urban-rural cleavage, despite the transformation during communism. In this respect, rural voters are expected to demand social protection, while urban voters are expected to be more liberal. The farmers are an interesting category, which is not entirely covered by the urban-rural dimension. If present, the agrarian history could lead to coherent voting behaviour in this particular group.

Expected patterns of cleavages

Cleavages do not operate in a vacuum, they reinforce each other when the same values on the cleavage variables overlap and cut across each other when values on one cleavage overlap while values on a second cleavage do not. This has been demonstrated when describing the expectations above, and the main expectations are summed up in Table 2. The interpretation of the table is relatively straightforward, as "reinforcing cleavage patterns" are expected to split to the electorate in two, and "cross-cutting cleavages" are expected to create further splits within these categories. However, this is a deliberately crude approach, as it is of course also possible that only a few of the "reinforcing cleavages" are important to different voters. For example, Table 2 should not be interpreted categorically in the sense that a Hungarian voter needs to be nationalist, religious, rural and economic liberalistic to vote for a party. These are archetypes, and in reality it should rather be expected that two or three of these cleavages matter to each voter, thus determining horizontal alignment and, probably, voting behaviour.

Table 2. Expected cleavage patterns

	Hungary		Romania		Bulgaria	
Reinforcing cleavage patterns	Nationalist Religious Rural Economic liberalism	Not nationalist Secular Urban State intervention	Rural Nostalgia Nationalist State intervention Low income	Urban Not nostalgic Not nationalist Economic liberalism High income	Rural Nostalgic State intervention Secular	Urban Not nostalgic Economic liberalism Religious
Cross-cutting cleavages	Denomination Income		Ethnic minority Religiosity Denomination		Ethnic minority Farmer/not farmer Income	

To conclude, different cleavage patterns are expected in the three countries. Bulgaria is expected to be most clearly affected by communism, while the nostalgia dimension is largely expected to be absent in Hungary. The ethnic minority issue stands somewhat alone in Romania and Bulgaria, and it is classified as a cross-cutting cleavage because the minorities are likely to vote coherently regardless of their values on other variables. The strong reinforcing cleavage pattern in Romania suggests a clear difference between voters with scepticism towards modernity and liberal, urban voters. However, the expectations of cross-cutting cleavages suggest that it is possible with many different constellations of horizontal voter alignment. In Bulgaria, a similar pattern is expected, but with a clearer emphasis on the communist past. Hungary is also likely to have a mainly two-dimensional space, which is based on nationalism, religion and residence, rather than nostalgia.

Cleavages or issues?

A few words should also be said about issues, which may be political salient, but are not tested as cleavages below. First of all, there is the issue of European and trans-atlantic integration through EU and NATO membership. There has been little controversy and mobilization on these issues in the three countries. To the extent that these issues divide the populations, it is more likely a matter of strengthening existing cleavages such as nationalism and social protectionism versus market economy.

Secondly, it could be argued that there is an age cleavage because of different experiences from communism, and in some cases even from the interwar period. For example, there could be an important difference between cohorts born before 1956 in Hungary and those born later. Again, I would argue that this would be an underlying dimension in the tested cleavages, like for example nostalgia. In the same fashion, education is likely to be an underlying dimension of the urban-rural and income cleavages.

Chapter 3. Elections, parties and party systems

This chapter intends to describe the relevant parties and the party systems in the three countries. The aim is to get a clearer picture of how the parties have performed, how governments have been formed, and the nature of the different party systems before we turn to the analysis in Chapter 5.[4]

Hungary

All non-communist party activity was suspended in Hungary in 1948 (Tóka 2004:291). Still, Hungary saw the earliest development of parties in the East-Central European countries towards the end of communism, with parties starting to form in 1987 and 1988 (Lewis, Lomax and Wightman 1994:157p). This happened in parallel with reformist trying to change the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) from within, and the period leading up the election in May 1990 was marked by hectic political activity. The National Roundtable Negotiations was the key arena, where not only the features of the transition to democracy was worked out, but also because it was the central arena for testing strength and acquiring legitimacy as political players before the first election. The Opposition Roundtable (*Ellenzéki Kerekasztal*, EKA) was founded in the spring of 1989, and saw the participation of SZDSZ, FIDESZ, MDF, FKGP, the Hungarian People's Party, the Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society, and the Democratic Trade Union of Scientific Workers. At a later stage the League of Free Trade Unions and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KNDP) were invited (Falk 2003:149). It should prove difficult to keep EKA together, and it did also split over differences on accepting Imre Pozsgay as President. However, agreement was reached to hold the free and fair elections in May 1990 (Grzymała-Busse 2002:109) .

At the same time, the three main actors, MDF, SZDSZ, and FIDESZ also had to figure out how to distinguish themselves from each other. MDF and SZDSZ both had rather longstanding ties with dissident movements, while FIDESZ sprung out a milieu of students and young professionals, which had started to form in second half of the 1980s (Tóka 2004:293p.). The initial membership in FIDESZ was low, only 37 people participated in the

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[4] Elections results can be found in Appendix 1 while government compositions can be found in Appendix 2.

founding meeting (Lomax 1996:35). Tóka argues that these three parties started to position themselves tactically, particularly in the cases of MDF and SZDSZ. The former appeared to be a centre-right, patriotic Christian party, while the latter was characterized by being cosmopolitan, agnostic and radical (Tóka 2004:292). In comparison, the historical parties and the reform socialist were much more tied up by predetermined attitudes (Tóka 2004:292).

As mentioned, the reform communist, lead by Imre Pozsgay, took their time before they finally broke out of MSZMP and created the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in October 1989. It should prove hard to for the generation of reform communists to make up for the lost time in the first elections (Lewis, Lomax and Wightman 1994:159). However, MSZP has been a key player in Hungarian politics since.

Coming out of the first elections, the origins of a pattern emerged. Jósef Antall and MDF formed a coalition government with FKGP and KDNP, which clearly signalled a Christian-national platform (Tóka 2004:297). The events during Antall`s (and Boross`) governments are key to understand the continued development of Hungarian party politics. FKGP formally left the government a little less than two years later after a short and troubled companionship. Some members of FKGP remained in government, and they were subsequently excluded from their party. MDF also had to live with major internal difficulties, some of which were clearly ideologically founded. The party's vice-President, István Csurka, came out strongly in favour of a clearer profile in the national-populist *népi-nemzeti* direction, which in turn gave birth to the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIEP) (Tóka 2004:300p.).

The 1994 elections led to a change of government. MSZP and SZDSZ formed a government, while FIDESZ continued, and accelerated, their own transformation. The 1994 election is therefore an important milestone in the relationship between SZDSZ and FIDESZ. SZDZS would subsequently learn the difficulties of being the junior partner in a coalition, much like FKGP did in the previous round (Tóka 2004:307.). On the other hand, MSZP managed to secure their position as a modern social-democratic option. MDF did a poor election, and would come to face increased pressure as FIDESZ changed name to FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP) in 1995. This was a manifestation of the Christian-National platform of the new party.

The election campaign in 1998 was therefore clearly influenced by the experiences from the first two government formations. MDF more or less split over disputes on choice of coalition partners, while FKGP aligned with FIDESZ-MPP. The socialists did very well in the first round of the elections, but lost out when FIDESZ-MPP, FKGP and the remnants of MDF showed strong willingness to form a coalition. MIEP secured their first seats in Parliament, and it is interesting that this party was not seemed as an appropriate coalition partner.

The vulnerability of small parties because of the five percent threshold would also see MDF forming an electoral pact with FIDESZ-MPP in 2002. Furthermore, FKGP had to deal with several financial scandals in the period, and plummeted in the polls as a result. Apparently, this was not without the interference of FIDESZ-MPP officials, who saw an opportunity for further strengthening their own party (Tóka 2004:311). The 2002 election marks the endpoint for this study, and it produced another change of government. MSZP and SZDSZ won a very close-fought election, where MIEP narrowly missed the electoral threshold.

Summing up, it should be safe to say that there has been considerable stability in the patterns of competition in Hungarian party system in the first four elections. The transformation of FIDESZ is striking, and could of course be taken as an argument for fluid politics. On the other hand, this also underlines the main dimension of conflict, which we will return to later.

Romania

The transition to democracy in Romania differs considerably from the Hungarian case presented above. The Ceausescu regime was repressive to the very end, and the regime change was violent and highly dramatic. Former Politburo member Ion Iliescu headed the National Salvation Front (FSN), which initially claimed to be a non-political entity when taking provisional control of the country on 22 December 1989 (Eyal 1993:122). FSN quickly called for elections to be held in April the following year, elections in which they made promises not to take part in. However, FSN reversed their position only a month later, when they announced their intention of participating in the first elections after all. Though FSN would eventually dissolve, Ion Illiescu came to be a dominating factor in Romanian politics both through the successor parties of FSN and his persona, and what started as an interim

regime at the time of the execution of Nikolae and Elena Ceausescu turned into a main political force in Romanian politics.

The interest for participating in the founding election was great, with more than 70 parties running for seats in the legislature (Crowther 2004:367). Most of them bear little relevance to this study, but it is interesting to note how quickly the historical parties re-entered the arena (Cotta 1994:113).   .

When presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 20 May 1990, it became clear that nobody could match FSN and Illiescu. Public demonstrations and further violence in the capitol did not damage Illiescu`s popularity and he received 85,1% of the votes in the presidential election. FSN`s strong showing in the parliamentary election also illustrates the character of the limitations of this first election, which was completely dominated by FSN`s position and resources. FSN won 66,31 % of the votes, as the only party to win more than 10%. UDMR also had reason for satisfaction, as they succeeded in finding their place as the party for the Hungarian minority. The historical parties all performed rather poorly.

It would only take two years before the second elections were to be held. FSN came under pressure both from internal strides and from public unrest. The streets of Bucharest filled up with angry protesters again in the autumn of 1991, with demands of the resignation of the Prime Minister and President. Prime Minister Roman resigned, and he was succeeded by Teodor Stolodjan. The internal issues in FSN centred on the reform agenda. Petre Roman headed a group calling for more rapid and extensive reforms, and he was elected chairman of the party when finally confronting Illiescu in March 1992 (Crowther 2004:369p). Illiescu subsequently founded the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN), which went on to win the parliamentary elections in November 1992. The 1992 elections had several interesting features. Even though both FSN and FDSN won a considerable number of seats, they came nowhere close the numbers from the 1990 election. The newly introduced thresholds[5] also helped limit fragmentation.

The formation of the Democratic Convention (CDR) before the local elections earlier the same year was the first successful attempt of forming a large coalition with the purpose of

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[5] Thresholds were 3% for a single party, while another percentage point was added for each party in a coalition.

challenging FDSN and FSN. CDR did achieve a decent result, but would come back in a much stronger fashion two years later. Though aligned with CDR, UMDR did not partake in the coalition in the parliamentary election. This was probably a wise decision, as they manifested their position as the party for the Hungarian minority. The final feature of the second elections, which should be mentioned, is the importance of the "red-brown" nationalist parties. Nationalism became a factor not only through the Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the Party for Romanian National Unity (PUNR), but also through these parties` links to Iliescu and FDSN (Crowther 2004:370). In comparison with the completely FSN-dominated founding elections, the 1992 election therefore illustrates clearer political competition.

The next elections were held four years later, four years in which Romania struggled economically. FDSN merged with three smaller parties and changed name to the Party of Romanian Social Democracy (PDSR). Iliescu, who was re-elected President in 1992, continued to work with the nationalist parties, and PUNR had two ministers in the government from 1994 (Crowther 2004:383). However, the cooperation resulted both in lack of fiscal prudence and in unpopularity among other European leaders. PDSR therefore moved away from their allies from the far right towards the 1996 elections, and the days of red-brown companionship appeared to be drawing to an end (Crowther 2004:383).

The opposition parties on their side continued to work together, and were able to present a stronger and more coherent CDR in 1996. In addition, a new coalition was born when Petre Roman`s new party, the Democratic Party (PD), and the Social Democratic Party (PSDR) formed the Social Democratic Union (USD). CDR won both the parliamentary and the presidential elections, and Romania saw the first complete transfer of power since the revolution. PDSR and PUNR were the losers, while Vadim Corneliu Tudor`s PRM showed more stability.

CDR quickly ran into trouble when they assumed office. Expectations were high, but the point of departure for their reform agenda was less than ideal. Inflation rose to 151 % in 1997 as a result of implementation of liberalization policies (Crowther 2004:387). The immaturity of the political elite in terms of corruption and cronyism did not serve CDR well neither. The government was hardly able to govern efficiently, something which three changes of Prime Minister in the course of four years testify to.

PDSR on their side emphasised their role as providers of social protection, and paved the way for a solid comeback in the 2000 elections. Disillusionment was widespread in the public, and turnout dropped further, to a meagre 58,4 %. CDR and USD fell apart, leaving PNL and PD to fill this space together with UDMR. PDSR won the parliamentary elections and Illiescu also returned to the presidency. The other winner was PRM, which benefited from blaming minorities for the hardships "ordinary Romanians" faced. Tudor was also the main challenger to Illiescu in the race for the presidency. It should not be underscored that PDSR had increasingly succeeded in creating a more modern social democratic alternative. The reform wing of the party saw this as the way forward, with a combination of continued reform, European integration and social protection. The choice of Adrian Nastase as Prime Minister underlines this, despite continued troubles of widespread corruption on the elite level. After the 2000 elections, yet another name change occurred and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) was born in June 2001.

Internal strife, shifting alliances and allegations (and convictions) of corruption are all still important dimensions of Romanian politics today. Concerning the first four elections three things are particularly striking. Firstly, all four elections were to a large extent about whether or not those who took control in the revolution were fit to lead the country in a democratic setting. Secondly, the stable performance of UMDR, the varying fortunes of the nationalist parties, and the attempts of forging a red-brown coalition suggest that nationalism is an important factor in Romania. Finally, it seems like Illiescu and his affiliated parties have managed to modernise over the first decade.

Bulgaria

The reintroduction of political parties in Bulgaria followed neither the Hungarian nor the Romanian path. In some respect, the events in 1989 and 1990 is somewhere in-between the negotiated solution in Hungary and the revolution in Romania. When the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) was founded in late 1989, this large gathering of opposition forces resembled other alliances in the region (Waller 1994:51). However, due to the repressive nature of the communist regime under Todor Zhivkov, this happened late and without the same tradition of opposition work that EKA benefited from in Hungary. SDS consisted of

historical parties, dissidents, and new political formations, which found common cause in ridding the country of communist rule. On the other side, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) lived on under the new label of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)[6], and the adversaries for the first rounds of elections were set.

Although the 1990 election to the Grand National Assembly is excluded from this analysis, this first round is interesting as it suggests that BSP enjoyed substantial popular legitimacy. The Turkish minority managed to gain political representation through Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), which was founded in 1990 and had 140 000 members by 1991 (Millard 2004:235). Coming to the parliamentary elections in 1991 then, it was nevertheless clear that this was first and foremost a contest between two blocks, the ex-communists and their opposition. Both sides had internal differences. BSP was divided between the conservatives parts of the old nomenclature and the reformist wing, and SDS struggled with personal ambitions and conflicting views on how far one should go in anti-communist rhetoric (Karasimeonov 2004:420). The result of the 1991 election showed signs of a quite evenly divided electorate, and DPS became a welcome supporter for SDS when the latter formed government.

Bulgaria remained a heavily bureaucratic state for years to come. The SDS government faced constant pressure from BSP in the period leading up to the next elections, and also saw a change of Prime Minister after Philip Dimitrov lost a vote of confidence.

The 1994 elections shifted power back to BSP. Karasimeonov argues that this proved BSP`s efficiency in playing the different parts of SDS against each other, and that the result was the defeat of the radical anti-communist faction in SDS (Karasimeonov 2004:421p.). Two new actors entered Parliament, namely the Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB) and the Popular Union of Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Democratic Party (BZNS-DP). DP was previously part of SDS, while the agrarian party also saw the need for an allied if they were to acquire representation. It has been claimed that BBB was a party of a more populist orientation, which also made some use of nationalist rhetoric (Karasimeonov 2004:422; Ganev 2001:188). DPS manifested their position as the party for, and by, the Turkish minority.

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[6] Formally, BSP has had different partners in several parliamentary elections, but BSP will still be treated as one party here due to the dominating role it has played in these "coalitions".

BSP should prove unable to meet the expectations from the public. Together with Romania, Bulgaria struggled with modernising the economy, with dramatic consequences for large parts of the population. Another unfortunate common trait with their neighbour to the north was the widespread corruption and lack of accountability outside elections. The dissatisfaction culminated with public demonstrations in 1997, and this led to early elections being held in April the same year.

Power shifted back to SDS, and this party, together with their new partner BZNS-DP, won an absolute majority in Parliament (Karasimeonov 2004:422). In addition, DPS chose not to run alone this time, but instead spearheaded a new and successful coalition, the Alliance of National Salvation (ONS) together with the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union – Nikola Petkov (Karasimeonov 2004:422). BBB secured representation for four more years, while a new social democratic alternative, Euroleft, also managed to win 14 seats. While BSP still received over 20% of the votes, the 1997 election was a clear signal that confidence in the electorate was fading.

SDS made use of the majority won in 1997 to implement a number of successful reforms, both in the fields of social policy and economic liberalization (Karasimeonov 2004:433). Also, and again like Romania, the external pressures that came with ambitions of membership in the EU and NATO, gave legitimacy to reforms as there was consensus on these issues of European and Trans-Atlantic integration.[7] Nevertheless, the ruling coalition once again suffered from declining popularity, and corruption and clientelism were the main reasons (Karasimeonov 2004:433). The most disappointed voters would probably say that the first decade of democratic elections had produced little more than a new elite, whose main interest was self-interest, or, in familiar wording, a new nomenklatura.

Disillusionment with the two dominant factors paved way for a remarkable new force in Romanian politics in the 2001 elections. The ex-king Simeon II answered to the call, and the National Movement Simeon IInd (NMS) swept into the arena, winning more than 40 % of the votes and 50% of the seats in the parliamentary elections. He did so in part because of his charismatic persona and an untainted reputation, but also because he addressed what he saw

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[7] In the Romanian case, this became more evident with the PSD government headed by Nastase, and it is therefore not elaborated upon above.

as a morally corrupt new elite. At the same time, he avoided the nostalgic and nationalist rhetoric of Tudor in Romania and Méciar in Slovakia (Karasimeonov 2004:433).

After four elections, the party system in Bulgaria appeared to have drastically altered. At the time of writing, we know that the 2005 elections produced another change of government, and also introduction of further new elements to the political landscape.

Party systems in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria

Summing up the descriptive analysis above, it is clear that there are signs of both stability and instability. The first step in systematising these trends is to take a closer look at the differences in volatility and party replacement, as this was defined in chapter 2.

Table 3.   Volatility and party replacement in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 1990-2004

	First-Second Election		Second-Third Election		Third-Fourth Election	
	Volatility	Party Replacement Score	Volatility	Party Replacement Score	Volatility	Party Replacement Score
Hungary (PR ballot)	24,98	5,64	30,69	2,22	Data missing	Data missing
Romania	56,52	41,77	16,34	14,69	30,88	32,89
Bulgaria	10,94	58,09	20,92	55,63	25,10	12,34
Mean Central-Europe[8]	25,56	41,03	18,48	19,27	20,42*	26,77*

*Lacking data for Poland and Hungary   Source: Birch 2001

Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary all have high volatility scores in the elections Birch studies, but Hungary has a lower party replacement score than the other two countries (Birch 2001:

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[8] Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia

16-17).[9] Interestingly, volatility increased steadily in Bulgaria, while it has been fluctuating more in the two other countries (Birch 2001: 17). Still, the lack of clear patterns would support an argument towards overall instability both on the elite level, and in terms of vertical voter alignment. The question remains if this also means that there is less reason for expecting strong horizontal alignment, i.e. between different voters who share values on cleavage variables? Following the theory set forth below, this is not necessarily the case. In this regard, it is important to note that it has be argued that as much as three-quarters of mean volatility in Central and Eastern Europe has been caused by party change (Rose and Munro 2003:82).

The next question is how the pattern of fragmentation has developed. The number of effective parties gives information about fragmentation on the parliamentary level, with the benefit of taking both the number of parties and the relative size of the parties into account (Bakke 2006:271). However, it should also be pointed out that large differences in the sizes of the parties will result in a lower effective number of parties than a more even-sized parliament. Although it is not the primary focus here, I have also classified the countries` party systems by Ware`s categories, both when considering and not considering relative party size in Table 4 (Ware 2003:158 pp.). This has been included primarily to illustrate that numerical measures alone only provides part of the picture. The parties` behaviour is likely to be influenced by the relative size of the parties, which in turn could influence the structures of competition (Ware 2003:161).

Table 4 shows that the level of fragmentation is lower in Hungary and Bulgaria than in Romania. Bulgaria has also produced a predominant party system in each election, but as we know, this relates to three different parties, and the overall impression is therefore one of instability. Considering relative size, the overall impression of Hungary is one of a system of two large parties, with other parties playing support roles in government formation processes and coalition-building. Romania also appear to have a lower level of stability than Hungary, both due to the higher level of fragmentation and in light of the undefined party system, when considering the relative size of the parties.

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[9] Birch has data on the first five elections for Bulgaria, the first four elections in Romania, and the first three elections in Hungary.

Table 4. Parties and party system in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 1990-2004

	Number of parties gaining representation[10]	Effective number of parties[11]	Percentage of seats held by the largest party	Party system, not considering relative size	Party system, considering relative size
Hungary 1990[12]	7	3,79	42,49	More than five parties	System with two large parties
Hungary 1994	7	2,11	54,15	Predominant party system	Predominant party system
Hungary 1998	8	3,08	34,72	More than five parties	Even multiparty system[13]
Hungary 2002	4	2,21	48,70	Three to five parties	System with two large parties
Romania 1990	27	2,20	66,41	Predominant party system	Predominant party system
Romania 1992	20	4,81	35,67	More than five parties	Even multiparty system
Romania 1996	21	3,94	35,57	More than five parties	Even multiparty system
Romania 2000	23	3,53	44,93	More than five parties	System with two large parties
Bulgaria 1991	3	2,92	52,08	Predominant party system	Predominant party system
Bulgaria 1994	5	2,73	57,55	Predominant party system	Predominant party system
Bulgaria 1997	5	2,47	50	Predominant party system	Predominant party system
Bulgaria 2001	4	2,92	66,41	Predominant party system	Predominant party system

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[10] No threshold is applied for measuring relevant parties, and the table therefore includes the minority seats in the Romanian legislature.
[11] Based on percentage of seats in Parliament, not counting independents and joint candidates.
[12] Independent candidates are not counted
[13] Very close to be classified as a system with two large parties

Returning to Mair`s classification of open versus closed structures of competition, which remains the primary focus in the evaluation of the party systems here, we should have sufficient information to classify the overall impression of the party systems after the first four elections.

Table 5. Party systems and structure of competition

Structure of competition	True	Partly True	False
Wholesale alternation in office, or non-alternation in office	Hungary Romania Bulgaria		
Familiar governing formulae	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria
Access to government restricted to a limited number of parties	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria

Although Romania had to wait until the third election, all three countries have had wholesale alternation in office. The variation on the familiarity with governing formulaes is interesting. Hungary has, since the transformation of FIDESZ was consolidated, seen such familiarity in the government formation processes. Romania has been more open, but the clear division between FSN/FDSN/PDSR and an alternative suggests that there is some degree of predictability on this dimension. However, the varying fortunes of the red-brown coalitions do to a certain extent contradict this. The 2001 election in Bulgaria clearly underlines that the governing formulae are not predictable in this country. The same differences between the countries apply to access to government.

Summing up, Hungary can be said to have a party system with a closed structure of competition and low level of fragmentation. The Romanian party system is fragmented, but shows tendencies to a closed structure of competition, while Bulgaria, despite a low level of fragmentation has an open structure of competition. In stability terms, Hungary therefore appears to be stable and Bulgaria unstable, with Romania in an intermediary position.

Chapter 4. Methodology[14]

This chapter will elaborate on the choice of method for analysing the presence and effects of cleavages, as well as present the measures that will be interpreted in the multivariate logistic regression analysis. Issues relating to the validity and reliability of the analysis will also be discussed.

Data and operationalisation of the cleavages

Cleavages have been defined as historically founded sociological structures that shape voting behaviour over time. This gives us a natural dichotomous dependent variable, as one can only voter for one party at the time. The independent variables are operationalisations of the possible cleavages identified in Chapter 2. The codebook for operationalisations of the cleavages can be found in Appendix 4. Different datasets have been used for the different elections and countries, and the details are available in Appendix 4.[15] This has posed quite a challenge in terms of recoding the data in order to make them comparable. The independent variables have been dichotomized as well, in order to simplify the comparisons and raise the level of abstraction. This should also add to the reliability of the analysis, as long as the same level of abstraction is kept. However, one can not reject the possibility of different results if the cleavages are measured on another scale.

The operationalistation of the variables also raises the question of the validity of the data, in the sense that it is important that the variables actually measure the cleavages they are intended to measure (Ringdal 2001:168). The applied definition of the concept and the historical foundation of the expected cleavages have been the guidelines for my selection of

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[14] I worked closely with a fellow student, Bjarte Folkestad, in the initial stages of writing this thesis. As he was doing a similar study of cleavages in post-communist Russia, we cooperated extensively on developing a suitable methodology for our purpose. Hence, this chapter bears significant resemblance to Folkestad`s chapter on methodology (Folkestad 2005:59pp.).

[15] Some of the data that have been used in this thesis have been compiled from the Eurobarometers of the EU. The data have been made available by Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste (NSD). Neither the EU nor NSD have responsibility for the analysis or findings in this thesis. The other data have been made available with the kind assistance of Wissenchaftzentrum für Sozialforschung in Berlin (WZB) during my stay as a Ruhrgas scholar there August-September 2004. The responsibility for the analysis or findings in this thesis is mine alone also when based on these data.

variables. The main challenge has been that it has not been possible to use the same variable for each cleavage in all the elections, and this remains an issue with regards to the validity.

Furthermore, a filter for relevant parties is applied in the datasets, so that only the voters who voted for the relevant parties are counted as units. The rationale for this is that we want to focus on the voting behaviour that has defined the party systems in the study.

The question of which cleavages to test is important, and it is hard to avoid errors in this respect. The possible errors can be separated in two types: Type I errors in the cases were cleavages, which in fact are true cleavages are not tested, and Type II errors where structures, which are not true cleavages are included in the models (Przeworski et.al. 2000:23). Following the rather rigid definition of cleavages that is presented above, this analysis appears to be better guarded against Type II errors than against Type I errors. This is a deliberate choice as the model could then rather be extended to include more variables in the future.

Design

It is also clear that voting behaviour can not be accounted for by cleavages alone. There are many different approaches to explaining voting behaviour, and it could also be argued that the experience from the West suggest that different forms of rational choice theory are best suited for analysing voter behaviour because they explain changes (Evans and Whitefield 1993:527p.). However, I would argue that cleavages play some role for voting behaviour if they are present, even when they are not analysed at the level of abstraction that is used here. As explained in the introduction to the thesis, it is far beyond the scope of the thesis to develop a completely satisfactory statistical model for explaining voting behaviour. The focus here is to identify cleavages and examine their effect on the party systems. That does of course not relieve us of the dilemma of control variables. As long as it is an assumption that cleavages alone are insufficient for explaining voting behaviour to a full extent, it is an inherent weakness that there will be errors. Not measuring the effect of the institutional design, particularly salient issues, or the state of the economy are a few examples in this respect. The assumption is that it is possible to obtain a meaningful understanding of the relationship between the cleavages and voting behaviour without these control variables.

Although table analysis would give valuable information with the basic design described above, there are clear arguments in favour of using regression analysis. In order to assess the presence and importance of the cleavages, the outputs of interest are primarily level of significance, and the direction and strength of the correlation between the variables. At the first step of the analysis, bivariate logistic regressions will be used to map out the significant variables, as well as whether the correlation is positive or negative. The level of significance is defined as the chosen probability level for accepting a false rejection of the assumption that the correlation between the independent and dependent variables is zero (Skog 2003:176). The variables that are significant on a 5% level, i.e. less than 5% probability for rejecting a correct assumption of no correlation, in the bivariate regressions will then be used to make multivariate models. The standardised logistic regression coefficient Beta will also be reported in the multivariate regressions in order to evaluate the strength of the relationship, controlled for the effect of the other variables.

The design furthermore rests upon a systematic interpretation of the findings in the multivariate models. Tables and scatterplots showing the resilience of significant variables over time will create a framework for interpreting the patterns of cleavages. This will provide us with a good basis for a substantial interpretation of the findings within the developed theoretical framework, and enable us to examine the effects of cleavages on the party systems in the countries in question.

Logistic regression

An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression would be a problematic solution when working with a dichotomous dependent variable, and I have therefore decided to run logistic regression analysis throughout the thesis. The two main problems with using a linear regression model with a dichotomous dependent variable are that the statistical tests of significance may be unreliable, and that predicted probabilities may exceed the interval between 0 and 1 (Ringdal 2001:428). The most fundamental problem is that the linear regression model assumes that the effect of X is constant, which enables predicted probabilities to exceed the interval between 0 and 1. Logistic regression offers a solution to this for a dichotomous dependent variable through the logit-transformation. According to Ringdal this is done by firstly transforming

probabilities to odds, and then making the natural logarithm of the odds of Y=1 (logit L_i) the dependent variable. The logistic regression model can then be defined as:

$L_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + ... + \beta_{K-1} X_{iK-1}$, where L_i is a linear function of the x-variables and the probabilities are non-linear functions of the x-variables (Ringdal 2001:429).

The second problem of using a linear regression model in our case is that the assumption of equal variance around the regression line for all values of the independent variable(s) is not met. This problem of lack of homoscedastity is solved by logistic regression because it does not apply Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for estimating the coefficients. Instead, the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) technique is based on identifying the estimates of the coefficients with the greatest probability for creating the results in the selection, and thus avoids this (Ringdal 2001:429).

Most likely, some of the independent variables that were significant on a 5% level in the bivariate regressions will not remain significant at the same level when controlled for the effect of the other independent variables in the multivariate models. The multivariate models presented below are therefore the models that proved most robust, without being subject to multicollinearity.

In the multivariate regressions, the logistic regression coefficients will also be standardised, in order to enable us to evaluate the strength of the correlations, when controlled for the effect of the other variables. Standardising the logistic regression coefficient (B) is not done automatically in SPSS. These have therefore been computed manually by:

1. Saving the predicted values of Y when running the logistic analysis in SPSS, in addition to keeping the unstandardised regression coefficient (b)
2. Saving Nagelkerke R^2 (other measures of R would also work)
3. Calculating the predicted value of logit(Y) by using the equation logit logit($\hat{Y}$)=ln($\hat{Y}$/1-$\hat{Y}$)
4. Calculating $S_{\text{logit}\hat{Y}}$, the standard deviation of logit($\hat{Y}$).
5. Calculating the standard deviation (s_x) of the independent variables in the equation
6. Calculating the standardised logistic regression coefficient by using the following formula $B_{yx}=(b_{yx})(s_x)(R)/ S_{\text{logit}\hat{Y}}$ (Menard 2001:52pp).

The values of the parameters necessary ((b_{yx}),(s_x),(R), and ($S_{\text{logit}\hat{Y}}$)) for calculating the Beta values (*B*) will all be reported as output in the multivariate models below for the sake of transparency. However, the interpretations of the findings will be based on the level of significance and the direction and strength of the Beta values alone. The standardised logistic regression is interpreted much like the interpretation of the standardised regression coefficient in a linear regression. An increase of 1 standard deviation in X produces a *B* standard deviation increase in logit(*Y*) (Menard 2001:53).

Chapter 5. Analysis

The findings from the bivariate regressions are not presented in detail here, but incorporated in the text where necessary. Output from the bivariate regressions can be found in Appendix 2. The focus here is on the multivariate models and the relationships over time. The country- and party specific analysis come first, before cleavage patterns in the three countries are compared. Finally, we turn to the question of the relationship between the cleavage patterns and party systems.

Hungary

The three parties that have obtained representation in all four elections will be discussed first, before turning to the other parties. A comparison of the findings from the different party analyses should help to identify the most clear-cut patterns. If the multivariate logistic regression models give similar results over time, this would be a clear indication that cleavages have an important role for the support base of the party in question and thus for the political system.

Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)

MSZP was established in October 1989 and distanced itself from Marxist-Leninism from the outset (Tóka 2004:291). One of the interesting questions relating to this party is if the break with the past is also visible in their voters. The multivariate models are presented in Table 6:

Table 6.   Multivariate logistic regression analysis for MSZP support

	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
MSZP 1990							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Religiosity	-0,584	0,280	0,284	0,753	0,351	0,037	**-0,077**
Nationalism (is harmful)	0,370	0,154	0,284	0,753	0,498	0,016	**0,069**
Nostalgia	1,587	0,151	0,284	0,753	0,363	0,000	**0,217**
Farmer	-0,712	0,339	0,284	0,753	0,297	0,036	**-0,080**
Market economy is positive	-0,433	0,156	0,284	0,753	0,490	0,006	**-0,080**
Constant	-2,652	0,141				0,000	
MSZP 1994							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Religiosity	-0,888	0,201	0,297	0,750	0,341	0,000	**-0,120**
Nationalism (is harmful)	0,400	0,103	0,297	0,750	0,498	0,000	**0,079**
Nostalgia	1,143	0,114	0,297	0,750	0,365	0,000	**0,165**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,512	0,116	0,297	0,750	0,466	0,000	**-0,095**
Income in the lowest quartile	-0,404	0,127	0,297	0,750	0,427	0,001	**-0,069**
Market economy is positive	-0,543	0,106	0,297	0,750	0,493	0,000	**-0,106**
Constant	-1,385	0,096				0,000	
MSZP 1998							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Religiosity	-0,758	0,246	0,287	0,676	0,353	0,002	**-0,114**
Nostalgia	1,104	0,193	0,287	0,676	0,456	0,000	**0,214**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,593	0,158	0,287	0,676	0,499	0,000	**-0,126**
Constant	-0,960	0,192				0,000	
MSZP 2002							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Religiosity	-0,832	0,197	0,159	0,331	0,319	0,000	**-0,128**
Urban	0,265	0,140	0,159	0,331	0,433	0,058	**0,055**
Income in second quartile (difficult to live on income)	0,315	0,133	0,159	0,331	0,468	0,018	**0,071**
Income in lowest quartile (very difficult to live on income)	0,396	0,203	0,159	0,331	0,306	0,052	**0,058**
Constant	-0,092	0,093				0,318	

The multivariate logistic regressions still show that nostalgia is an important and stable predictor for support for this party in the three first elections, controlled for the effects of the other variables in the models.[16] Moreover, it is also consistently the strongest variable when measured by the Beta values. As expected, the religiosity variable is significant and negative over time, when controlled for the other variables in the models. It is interesting that the

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[16] No relevant variable is available for the 2002 analysis.

market economy variable only is negative and significant in the two first elections in the multivariate models. The variable is also significant on the 5% level in the bivariate analysis in 1998, but in this election it is omitted from the multivariate model because it is not longer significant when controlled for the other variables. This may indicate a weak economic cleavage or that the anti-market voters have left MSZP. Other variables are less stable in the multivariate models, but it should be noted that the voters are significantly anti-nationalist in the two first elections, other variables held constant. Furthermore, the significant negative Beta value on the farmer variable in 1990 and the positive Beta value on the urban variable in 2002 can be interpreted as a reflection of a pattern of an urban support base. This is also supported by the findings in the bivariate models, where the urban variable is positively significant on a 10% significance level in all four elections.

Overall then, the multivariate models first and foremost give a strong incentive not to reject the notion of a nostalgic dimension and it also suggests that this dimension is reinforced by secularity. The economic cleavage is interesting as the leftist attitude appears to be confirmed in the first two elections, but it disappears from the multivariate models later. A tentative conclusion here could be that while economic policy attitudes are not insignificant for voting behaviour, they are not dominant. In the sense that this issue is not capable of creating a stable common identity and behaviour among the groups of the electorate, it should not be considered cleavage. However, this needs to be interpreted in light of the findings for the other parties.

Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDZS.

SZDZS has seen a dramatic decline in support over from the 1990 election to the 2002 election. As it was noted above when discussing volatility, this is interesting from a cleavage perspective because it is a promising test case for the defining cleavages of the core electorate of the party.

Table 7.   Multivariate logistic regression analysis for SZDZS support

SZDZS 1990							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Religiosity	-0,308	0,170	0,160	0,457	0,351	0,071	**-0,038**
Urban	0,306	0,119	0,160	0,457	0,484	0,010	**0,052**
Income in the third quartile	0,585	0,130	0,160	0,457	0,421	0,000	**0,086**
Income in the highest quartile	0,496	0,129	0,160	0,457	0,431	0,000	**0,075**
Farmer	-0,670	0,249	0,160	0,457	0,297	0,007	**-0,070**
Market economy is positive	0,149	0,108	0,160	0,457	0,490	0,167	**0,026**
Constant	-1,953	0,127				0,000	
SZDZS 1994							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Religiosity	-0,972	0,274	0,186	0,696	0,341	0,000	**-0,089**
Nationalism (is harmful)	0,625	0,144	0,186	0,696	0,498	0,000	**0,083**
Urban	0,623	0,167	0,186	0,696	0,481	0,000	**0,080**
Capitol and surroundings	0,300	0,153	0,186	0,696	0,407	0,050	**0,033**
Nostalgia	-0,790	0,216	0,186	0,696	0,365	0,000	**-0,077**
Market economy is positive	0,328	0,133	0,186	0,696	0,493	0,014	**0,043**
Constant	-3,166	0,173				0,000	
SZDZS 1998							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Calvinist	0,755	0,342	0,158	0,560	0,383	0,027	**0,081**
Capitol and surroundings	0,789	0,335	0,158	0,560	0,395	0,018	**0,088**
Income in the third quartile	0,725	0,313	0,158	0,560	0,489	0,021	**0,100**
Constant	-3,435	0,277				0,000	
SZDZS 2002							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Catholic	-1,038	0,365	0,212	0,3307	0,4984	0,004	**-0,331**
Nationalism	-1,160	0,606	0,212	0,3307	0,4006	0,056	**-0,297**
Urban	0,969	0,302	0,212	0,3307	0,4335	0,001	**0,269**
Income in the third quartile ("coping")	0,833	0,336	0,212	0,3307	0,5002	0,013	**0,267**
Constant	-3,496	0,329				0,000	

The urban and/or capitol variables are important and significant in all elections. There is also a pattern of secularity among the voters, as negative values on church attendance is significant in 1990 and 1994, while catholic denomination is negative and significant in 2002. The positive Beta value for Calvinism in 1998 disturbs this picture somewhat, but overall there are similarities to the finding in the MSZP models for these two cleavages. Moreover, the voters also appear to be anti-nationalist, although this variable is only significant in two of the multivariate models.

A positive attitude to market economy is visible in the multivariate models for the first two elections. However, it should be noted that the variable is only significant on a dubious 17% significance level in 1990 and that the Beta-values are relatively modest compared to the other variables in the respective models. Although with opposite directions on the correlations, this variable follows the same development as in the MSZP analysis by loosing significance after the 1994 election. In this respect, it supports the preliminary conclusion that economic policy attitudes are part of the political agenda in Hungary, but not fundamental enough to produce a cleavage.

SZDZS appear to have a stable support base in the group of people with an income in the third quartile. This variable is significant in the 1990, 1998 and 2002 elections, when controlled for other variables. A somewhat surprising finding is that negative values on the nostalgic variable are not particularly visible. It appears only in the multivariate model for 1994 and it is not significant in the bivariate analysis for 1990 and 1998. This could have been a cleavage that would have cut across other similarities with MSZP, but the conclusion must be that this is not a defining dimension for SZDZS support.

Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) and FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party(FIDESZ-MPP)

There is wide consensus on the substantial change in policy and image that FIDESZ underwent before the elections in 1998, when the party also was renewed in name as a result of a merger.

Table 8 shows that the changes on the elite level are also clearly visible on the level of the voters. When controlled for the other variables in the models, the multivariate models show that while secularity and low church attendance explained FIDESZ support in the 1990 and 1994 elections, high church attendance becomes positive and significant in 1998 and 2002, when controlled for the other variables in the models. Furthermore, catholic denomination is also positive and significant in the multivariate model for 2002. A similar pattern can be observed on the urban-rural dimension. The capitol variable is positive and significant in multivariate model for 1990, while the urban variable is negative and significant in multivariate models for 1998 and 2002. Despite being fundamental, the changes therefore appear to have been coherent.

Table 8.   Multivariate logistic regression analysis for FIDESZ and FIDESZ-MPP support

Fidezs 1990							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Religiosity	-0,949	0,300	0,144	0,572	0,351	0,002	**-0,084**
Secular	0,354	0,145	0,144	0,572	0,500	0,015	**0,044**
Capitol and surroundings	0,421	0,158	0,144	0,572	0,406	0,007	**0,043**
Nostalgia	-0,624	0,222	0,144	0,572	0,363	0,005	**-0,057**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,449	0,170	0,144	0,572	0,449	0,008	**-0,051**
Market economy is positive	0,369	0,140	0,144	0,572	0,490	0,009	**0,045**
Constant	-2,408	0,139				0,000	
Fidesz 1994							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Religiosity	-0,614	0,223	0,183	0,582	0,341	0,006	**-0,066**
Secular	0,615	0,113	0,183	0,582	0,500	0,000	**0,096**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,249	0,120	0,183	0,582	0,466	0,038	**-0,036**
Income in the lowest quartile	-0,302	0,140	0,183	0,582	0,427	0,031	**-0,041**
Farmer	-0,659	0,242	0,183	0,582	0,293	0,006	**-0,061**
Market economy is positive	0,420	0,108	0,183	0,582	0,493	0,000	**0,065**
Constant	-2,043	0,114				0,000	
Fidesz-Mpp 1998							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Religiosity	0,431	0,224	0,332	0,732	0,353	0,055	**0,069**
Nationalism	0,321	0,162	0,332	0,732	0,496	0,048	**0,072**
Urban	-0,375	0,175	0,332	0,732	0,458	0,032	**-0,078**
Nostalgia	-0,613	0,174	0,332	0,732	0,456	0,000	**-0,139**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,963	0,165	0,332	0,732	0,499	0,000	**0,218**
Income in the third quartile	0,414	0,164	0,332	0,732	0,489	0,012	**0,092**
Constant	-0,634	0,234				0,007	
Fidesz-Mpp-MDF 2002							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Catholic	0,285	0,126	0,176	0,331	0,498	0,023	**0,076**
Religiosity	0,698	0,194	0,176	0,331	0,319	0,000	**0,119**
Urban	-0,474	0,146	0,176	0,331	0,433	0,001	**-0,110**
Constant	-0,480	0,093				0,000	

A second interesting observation is that the economic policy dimension also changes. The multivariate models for 1990 and 1994 shows that a positive attitude to market economy had a positive and significant effect on FIDESZ support, when controlled for the other variables in the model. As for the other parties, this variable is no longer significant when tested with control variables in 1998 and 2002.

The feature that is most consistent over time is the negative value on the nostalgia dimension. The anti-communist attitude is significant in the multivariate models for both 1990 and 1998.

Independent Smallholders Party, FKGP

This historical agrarian party gained representation in the three first elections, but lost all their seats in 2002. The history and profile of the party delivers promises of a clear cleavage based existence, and this could of course point to the conclusion that the 2002 election represents a de-alignment. However, this would be a premature conclusion as both underlying assumptions in such an argument need an empirical assessment. First of all, we need to determine the factors that secured support in the three elections when FKGP won seats in Parliament, and secondly, we need to determine if these factors have been important for a different party in 2002. If the latter is the case, the cleavages have probably proven more resilient than the party itself.

Table 9. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for FKGP support

FKGP 1990							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Calvinist	0,593	0,207	0,238	0,926	0,307	0,004	**0,047**
Religiosity	0,350	0,188	0,238	0,926	0,351	0,063	**0,032**
Urban	-0,466	0,169	0,238	0,926	0,484	0,006	**-0,058**
Capitol and surroundings	-1,015	0,331	0,238	0,926	0,406	0,002	**-0,106**
Nostalgia	-1,034	0,334	0,238	0,926	0,363	0,002	**-0,096**
Income in the second quartile	0,641	0,195	0,238	0,926	0,436	0,001	**0,072**
Income in the lowest quartile	0,714	0,191	0,238	0,926	0,441	0,000	**0,081**
Farmer	0,655	0,201	0,238	0,926	0,297	0,001	**0,050**
Constant	-2,628	0,171				0,000	
FKGP 1994							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Urban	-0,539	0,194	0,168	0,887	0,481	0,006	**-0,049**
Capitol and surroundings	-0,825	0,352	0,168	0,887	0,407	0,019	**-0,063**
Nostalgia	-1,498	0,460	0,168	0,887	0,365	0,001	**-0,103**
Income in the lowest quartile	0,748	0,182	0,168	0,887	0,427	0,000	**0,060**
Farmer	0,435	0,236	0,168	0,887	0,293	0,066	**0,024**
Constant	-2,762	0,152				0,000	
FKGP 1998							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Religiosity	0,860	0,340	0,191	0,700	0,353	0,011	**0,083**
Nationalism	-0,711	0,321	0,191	0,700	0,496	0,027	**-0,096**
Urban	-0,603	0,337	0,191	0,700	0,458	0,074	**-0,075**
Farmer	0,621	0,332	0,191	0,700	0,466	0,061	**0,079**
Constant	-2,392	0,356				0,000	

The multivariate models show an expected pattern of reinforcing cleavages that defines a support base. The rural and agrarian profile of the voters is significant in all the multivariate models. Furthermore, religiosity is also positive and significant in 1990 and 1998. It is noteworthy that the income variables from the first and second quartile are significant and positive, when controlled for the other variables. This is probably due to an overlap effect with the agrarian profile of the voters, and it is interesting that the relationship is robust enough to withstand the test of control variables in the multivariate model, without being subject to multicollinearity.

The nostalgia variable is significant and negative in the multivariate models for 1990 and 1994. It is still negative in the bivariate regression for 1998, but not significant on a 5 % level. This fits with the overall impression of an re-enforcing cleavage structure that distinguishes these voters from the MSZP voters. The comparatively high Beta values on the variable in 1990 and 1994 make it somewhat surprising that the variable is no longer significant in 1998.

Christian Democratic National People`s Party (KDNP)

Although this party was only represented in 1990 and 1994 and with around 5 percent of the seats in the Parliament, it is another interesting party from a cleavage perspective.

Table 10. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for KDNP support

KDNP 1990							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Religiosity	1,841	0,222	0,301	1,035	0,351	0,000	**0,019**
Catholic	1,316	0,256	0,301	1,035	0,482	0,000	**0,185**
Constant	-4,465	0,220				0,000	
KDNP 1994							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Catholic	0,863	0,225	0,316	0,974	0,482	0,000	**0,135**
Religiosity	2,108	0,211	0,316	0,974	0,341	0,000	**0,233**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,460	0,198	0,316	0,974	0,466	0,020	**0,070**
Constant	-4,481	0,206				0,000	

The findings are very much as expected with catholic denomination and religiosity as strongly positive and significant variables in the multivariate models, other variables held constant. The bivariate models also show significant negative values for nostalgia and positive values

for the lowest quartile of income in both elections, but these variables are not significant when controlled for the effect of the religion variables and thus omitted from the final multivariate models. Although the KDNP voters gave a clear indication of an important religious cleavage in the first two elections, it is once again necessary to look at the bigger picture to understand the importance of the religious dimension.

Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)

Table 11. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for MDF support

MDF 1990							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Catholic	0,194	0,097	0,132	0,285	0,482	0,047	**0,043**
Religiosity	-0,275	0,138	0,132	0,285	0,351	0,046	**-0,045**
Nostalgia	-0,305	0,132	0,132	0,285	0,363	0,021	**-0,051**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,532	0,097	0,132	0,285	0,449	0,000	**0,111**
Constant	-1,069	0,069				0,000	
MDF 1994							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Calvinist	0,520	0,187	0,261	0,837	0,308	0,006	**0,050**
Secular	-0,697	0,156	0,261	0,837	0,500	0,000	**-0,109**
Nationalism (is harmful)	-0,335	0,139	0,261	0,837	0,498	0,016	**-0,052**
Capitol and surroundings	0,446	0,156	0,261	0,837	0,407	0,004	**0,057**
Satisfaction with democracy	1,162	0,139	0,261	0,837	0,466	0,000	**0,169**
Income in the lowest quartile	0,330	0,151	0,261	0,837	0,427	0,029	**0,044**
Market economy is positive	0,534	0,141	0,261	0,837	0,493	0,000	**0,082**
Constant	-2,947	0,163				0,000	

The findings from the multivariate models for MDF are challenging to interpret. The one variable that is positively significant in both multivariate models is interesting in this respect. Satisfaction with democracy can be viewed as a transition-based cleavage, and it seems clear that MDF benefited from this in the first two elections. On the other hand, the next elections reveal that this proved to be a temporary base of support, especially as the transition in general terms went smoothly in Hungary.

The picture gets more complex when we take the bivariate findings into consideration . A number of variables are significant in both the 1990 and the 1994 elections. The catholic and Calvinist denomination, religiosity, urban, lowest quartile of income and market economy all

have positive regression coefficients, while nostalgia and secularity are negative. The multivariate model for 1994 matches this picture pretty good as the Calvinist, urban, lowest quartile of income and market economy variables stay significant when controlled for the effect of the other variables in the model, though all with low Beta values. The multivariate model for 1990 is more of a puzzle in this respect as the model reveals a more confusing pattern on the religion dimension with religiosity turning out to have a negative effect and catholic denomination staying positive when the control variables are introduced. A possible interpretation of this is of course that the most devout Catholics went elsewhere, for instance to KDNP with their votes. The negative effect of nostalgia is still significant when controlled for the other variables. Overall, this may taken as support for the perspective that the democracy attitude was the overshadowing factor that had effect on voting for MDF, particularly in 1990. The Beta values for the satisfaction with democracy variable confirm this by being by far the highest in the multivariate models for both 1990 and 1994.

Cleavage patterns in Hungary

The findings from the regression analysis confirm the changes in the political landscape starting with the 1998 election. Moreover, it also confirms that the cleavages have been more resilient than some of the parties. In the following, we will leave the focus on the specific parties and examine the cleavages over time in cross tables and scatterplots that have been designed on background of the findings in the multivariate regressions.

Religion
The overall impression is that religion, and especially the cleavage between those with and without a strong belief, is an important dimension for voting behaviour in Hungary.

Table 12. The religiosity cleavage in Hungary

Religiosity	1990	1994	1998	2002
Positive significant	KDNP, FKGP	KDNP, FKGP	FIDESZ-MPP	FIDESZ-MPP-MDF
Negative significant	MSZP, MDF, SZDZS, FIDESZ	MSZP, SZDZS, FIDESZ		MSZP

The change of electoral base for FIDESZ-MPP is clearly visible in Table 12, as this party replaces KNDP and FKGP in this dimensional space. The negative significant findings are also important as it shows that weekly church attendance not only significantly increases the probability for voting for certain parties, but also that it decreases the probability for voting for especially MSZP.

Urban-rural

Furthermore, we see a similar pattern for the community size variable. The most interesting finding here is that it overlaps well with the religiosity dimension, something that is visible when we plot the Beta values from the multivariate models for the two variables in a scatterplot with the different parties in the different years as units.

Figure 2. Scatterplot of the urban-rural and religiosity cleavages in Hungary

Although we loose information because of some parties` lack of significant results on both variables, the scatterplot clearly paints a picture of an important dimension in Hungarian politics. Moreover, when replacing the urban variable with nostalgia on the X-axis, while at the same time keeping Figure 2 in mind, we get a picture of a more complex cleavage pattern.

Figure 3. Scatterplot of the nostalgia and religiosity cleavages in Hungary

When seen in connection with Figure 2 it is clear that the nostalgia cleavage cuts across the religiosity cleavage and in practise becomes a main difference between the MSZP voters and the other secular voters. At the same time, we also know that the rural electorate, in addition to being more frequent churchgoers, also display significant anti-nostalgic attitudes. For the rural segment of voters then, the nostalgia dimension reinforces the urban-rural cleavage.

The lack of importance of economic policy attitudes in the last two elections is an indication of the absence of a traditional economic left-right cleavage in Hungary. Even when the pro-market attitudes were significant in the multivariate analysis for SZDZS, the Beta values were comparatively low, thus indicating that the effect was not very strong when controlled for other variables. From a voter perspective then, it seems plausible that SZDZS never has been seen as a party on the right in the political spectrum by their core electorate and the coalition governments with MSZP have not been a gamble in this respect. This corresponds with what has been said about economic policy not being a primary dimension of differentiation in the party system when examined from the elite level (Kitschelt et.al 1999:313pp.). An economic dimension which appears to be more important is income, where SZDZS has firm support in the (upper) middle class.

FIDESZ-MPP managed to capitalise on the existing cleavages and take over, firstly, the religious vote from KDNP and, later, even more of the rural vote from FKGP. Instead on being marginalised as party with a secular appeal, the cleavage structure made it possible to

survive with a new electoral base. The two other parties that have survived had less to fear. The nostalgia cleavage clearly separated their respective electorate bases, while the convergence on the urban and religion dimensions made them possible coalition partners.

Romania

The party by party approach that was applied in the analysis of Hungary is even more challenging to work with in the Romanian case. When Ion Iliescu was replaced by Mircea Geoana as the leader of PSD in the spring 2005, the speculations on whether or not the strongman of Romanian politics would found yet another party were widespread. Iliescu, who celebrated his 75th birthday a few weeks before loosing his position in his own party, would indeed have had the experience to do so. What does this tell us? First of all, the triple transition has been a longer process in Romania than in most other post-communist countries. This may also be visible in the analysis through weak or absent transition-related cleavages. On the other hand, the important difference between the stability of cleavage on the mass and elite levels should once again be a main concern.

National Salvation Front, Demoratic National Salvation Front and Romanian Party of Social Democracy (FSN, FDSN, PDSR)

There are obviously differences between the FSN that participated in the 1990 election and its successor parties. A common denominator is nevertheless that they were centred around Ion Iliescu. From a cleavage perspective it is therefore interesting to examine if there are coherent underlying dimensions that create a space that Iliescu and his parties have managed to occupy. The analysis of FSN in 1992 has also been included in Table 13, in order to examine differences between those who voted for this party and FDSN in the 1992 election.

Table 13. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for FSN, FDSN and PDSR support

FSN 1990							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Orthodox	1,521	0,290	0,498	1,248	0,332	0,000	**0,201**
Urban	-0,916	0,189	0,498	1,248	0,498	0,000	**-0,182**
Satisfaction with democracy	1,166	0,182	0,498	1,248	0,500	0,000	**0,233**
Farmer	0,482	0,185	0,498	1,248	0,500	0,009	**0,096**
Market economy is positive	-1,150	0,181	0,498	1,248	0,500	0,000	**-0,230**
Constant	-0,497	0,344				0,148	
FDSN 1992							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Orthodox	2,263	0,351	0,402	1,189	0,425	0,000	**0,325**
Urban	-0,459	0,206	0,402	1,189	0,483	0,026	**-0,075**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,975	0,195	0,402	1,189	0,462	0,000	**0,015**
Income in the third quartile	0,647	0,226	0,402	1,189	0,408	0,004	**0,089**
Market economy is positive	-0,615	0,205	0,402	1,189	0,434	0,003	**-0,090**
Constant	-2,449	0,383				0,000	
FSN 1992							
Variables in the Equation	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Titular national	1,579	0,730	0,132	0,643	0,360	0,030	**0,117**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,688	0,295	0,132	0,643	0,462	0,020	**0,065**
Constant	-4,295	0,729				0,000	
PDSR 1996							
Variables in the Equation	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Hungarian minority	-2,471	0,732	0,327	0,950	0,257	0,001	**-0,219**
Urban	-0,459	0,188	0,327	0,950	0,497	0,015	**-0,079**
Nostalgia	0,602	0,179	0,327	0,950	0,499	0,001	**0,103**
Farmer	0,586	0,255	0,327	0,950	0,362	0,021	**0,073**
Market economy is positive	-1,001	0,175	0,327	0,950	0,487	0,000	**-0,168**
Constant	-0,636	0,193				0,001	
PDSR 2000							
Variables in the Equation	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Orthodox	0,733	0,316	0,435	1,026	0,372	0,020	**0,116**
Nationalism	0,941	0,209	0,435	1,026	0,499	0,000	**0,199**
Nostalgia	0,820	0,212	0,435	1,026	0,486	0,000	**0,169**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,477	0,264	0,435	1,026	0,412	0,071	**-0,830**
Market economy is positive	-0,980	0,224	0,435	1,026	0,458	0,000	**-0,190**
Constant	-1,081	0,360				0,003	

The multivariate cleavage analysis confirms that the bases of support for FSN in 1990, FDSN in 1992 and PDSR have very much in common. A negative value on the market economy variable significantly increases the probability of voting for these parties in all four elections,

other variables in the models held constant. The rural support is also important, and this is significant when controlled for the other variables in the model in the first three elections. The rural variable is also significant on the 5% level in the bivariate regression for the 2000 election. The parties` space on the urban-rural dimension is further strengthened by the significant positive values for farmer support as this appears in the multivariate models for 1990 and 1996.

An interesting finding is the development on the nostalgia dimension. Regardless of what perspective one has on whether the events of Christmas 1989 was the beginning of a "stolen revolution" or not, it is clear that FSN was the principal actor in the overthrow of the old regime. Thus, it also makes sense that nostalgic attitudes were not significant for this party in the early elections. The finding from the multivariate models for PDSR is that nostalgia sentiments towards the communist part become positive and significant in the 1996 and 2000 elections, when controlled for the other variables. Seen in connection with the other variable that concerns regime attitude, i.e. satisfaction with democracy, the picture becomes somewhat clearer. A positive value on this variable was a significant predictor for FSN support in 1990 and for FDSN support in 1992, when controlled for the other variables. Measured by the Beta values, it was in fact the strongest variable in the model for FSN in 1990. However, in 2000 the same variable is negative and significant (on a 7% level). This development might be interpreted as a change of electoral support base, but as other cleavages like the rural and anti-market characteristics seem to be persistent, it could very well be that the regime attitudes has changed within the same stable electorate. After all, cleavages that are related to attitudes concerned with the transition process would be likely to change more in the Romanian than for instance the Hungarian setting, as the development has been slower and with more challenges. In this sense, it could be argued that while the Iliescu leadership was credited by parts of the electorate as representatives of a new era in the early nineties, it was also seen as the party that could secure the aspects that filled the same parts of electorate with disillusionment or disappointment in the end of the nineties. The regime cleavage is then an important one, caused by both the peculiarities of the Ceausescu regime and the difficult transition process.

The question of whether or not Iliescu has targeted nationalist sentiments in the electorate is not easy to answer on background of the findings here, partly because of lack of relevant data for the first two elections. It has been argued that there is a distinct red-brown dimension in

Romania, and that Iliescu has targeted this to various degrees in the elections (Crowther 2004: 384-386). Pride of citizenship is positive and significant in the multivariate model for 2000, and positive and significant on a 10% level in a bivariate model for 1996. To a certain extent then, especially as it is also visible that the orthodox and ethnic Romanians are important, it can be cautiously argued that this is a cleavage that to a certain extent reinforces the other cleavages that predict support for Iliescu`s parties.

The split in FSN that was caused by the internal power struggle between factions centred around former Prime Minister Petre Roman, who argued for a more pro-reform policy, and Iliescu`s supporters, led to FSN competing with FDSN in the 1992 election. The multivariate analysis for FSN in 1992 shows that ethnicity remains a significant predictor, when controlled for other variables, while other variables no longer are significant. It is especially interesting that a main predictor for the Iliescu parties, i.e. negative attitudes to market economy is not significant for support for Petre Roman`s FSN in 1992.

National Liberal Party and Democratic Convention of Romania (PNL and CDR)

Due to PNL`s important role in CDR, these are interpreted together here. The 1990 election was difficult for PNL and the poor result suggested that this founding election was completely centred around and dominated by FSN. However, the Table 14 shows an interesting pattern of a clearly defined support base. It can be argued that cleavages are never more visible than in difficult times for a party, as the most typical voters are the first to arrive and the last to leave. The multivariate model show that the variables that were significant predictors for FSN support in 1990 to a large extent are the same variables that predict the probability for PNL votes, but of course with different direction on the correlation. This clearly suggest that these two parties are on the opposite ends of a set of reinforcing cleavages.

When controlled for the effect the other variables in the model, it is visible that urban residence and pro-market attitudes significantly increased the probability for voting PNL in 1990, when controlled for the effect of the other variables in the model.

Table 14. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for PNL and CDR support

PNL 1990							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Religiosity	-1,237	0,427	0,383	1,187	0,395	0,004	**-0,158**
Urban	0,625	0,254	0,383	1,187	0,498	0,014	**0,100**
Satisfaction with democracy	-1,157	0,253	0,383	1,187	0,500	0,000	**-0,187**
Farmer	-0,771	0,252	0,383	1,187	0,500	0,002	**-0,124**
Market economy is positive	1,284	0,246	0,383	1,187	0,500	0,000	**0,207**
Constant	-2,019	0,308				0,000	
CDR 1992							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Protestant	0,899	0,330	0,296	0,761	0,259	0,007	**0,091**
Urban	0,596	0,185	0,296	0,761	0,483	0,001	**0,112**
Satisfaction with democracy	-1,345	0,236	0,296	0,761	0,462	0,000	**-0,242**
Market economy is positive	0,460	0,223	0,296	0,761	0,434	0,039	**0,078**
Constant	-1,321	0,207				0,000	
CDR 1996							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Religiosity	0,292	0,175	0,266	0,581	0,439	0,096	**0,059**
Secular	1,484	0,785	0,266	0,581	0,126	0,059	**0,086**
Urban	0,500	0,152	0,266	0,581	0,497	0,001	**0,114**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,408	0,199	0,266	0,581	0,384	0,040	**0,072**
Nostalgia	-0,538	0,151	0,266	0,581	0,499	0,000	**-0,123**
Market economy is positive	0,591	0,155	0,266	0,581	0,487	0,000	**0,132**
Constant	-0,378	0,175				0,031	
PNL 2000							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Nationalism	-1,192	0,481	0,137	0,803	0,499	0,013	**-0,101**
Market economy is positive	0,974	0,629	0,137	0,803	0,458	0,122	**0,076**
Constant	-3,321	0,613				0,000	

The multivariate model for CDR in 1992 resembles the model for PNL in 1990 in some, but not all aspects. Pro-market attitudes remain a significant variable, when controlled for the other variables. However, when measured by Beta values it is clear that while this was the strongest predictor for PNL in the 1990 model, it is only the fourth strongest for CDR in 1992. A negative value on the satisfaction with democracy is more important. When controlled for other variables, this appears to be the main common denominator for CDR

voters. As we saw above, this clearly separates them from the FDSN voters. Furthermore, the urban dimension is confirmed from the 1990 analysis for PNL. A difference is that whereas religiosity significantly decreased the probability for voting for PNL in 1990, a protestant denomination is a significant and positive variable in the CDR model for 1992, other variables held constant. This is probably a result of the participants in the alliance, but it is interesting as it suggests that a protestant denomination and strength of belief are not cross-cutting cleavages, insofar as they are cleavages at all.

The 1996 elections were a watershed in Romanian post-communist politics. Not only did CDR win the Presidential election with Emil Constantinescu this year, but the victory in the Parliamentary election and the support from UMDR and USD enabled them to create a government with Victor Ciorbea as Prime Minister. Overall, the multivariate analysis for this election and the 2000 election confirm the importance of a positive attitude towards market economy. The nostalgia variable is negative and significant, when controlled for the effects of the other variables, in this election. This strengthens the assumption that CDR represented the liberal alternative to the FSN derived parties. At the same time, PNL performed poorly in 2000, which was also an election with a much lower turnout than the previous elections. The liberal alternative appeared to be weakened, but the data in this analysis do not allow for conclusions on voter movements per se. It is therefore also difficult to assess why community size is no longer relevant in the multivariate models for either the relevant parties.

Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UMDR)

Regression analysis is hardly needed to support the understanding of how the Hungarian minority votes coherently for UMDR. The Hungarian minority is also a religious minority in the sense that they are not orthodox like the majority of Romanians. Furthermore, this ethnic cleavage is confirmed by significant negative values on the pride in citizenship variable, something that places these voters on one end of a possible nationalism dimension. The other findings are more incoherent, and likely to be reflections of the dramatic shifts in the country`s development.

Table 15. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for UMDR support

UMDR 1990							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Catholic	1,531	0,553	0,648	1,992	0,168	0,006	**0,084**
Orthodox	-4,176	0,643	0,648	1,992	0,332	0,000	**-0,450**
Market economy is positive	2,165	0,695	0,648	1,992	0,500	0,002	**0,352**
Constant	-2,659	0,706				0,000	
UMDR 1992							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Hungarian minority	5,531	0,540	0,731	0,349	0,349	0,000	**4,046**
Constant	-5,070	0,502				0,000	
UMDR 1996							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Religiosity	-0,959	0,545	0,251	3,043	0,261	0,078	**-0,021**
Nationalism	-3,429	1,017	0,251	3,043	0,499	0,001	**-0,141**
Market economy is positive	-0,944	0,354	0,251	3,043	0,487	0,008	**-0,038**
Constant	-1,811	0,235				0,000	
UMDR 2000							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Catholic	6,525	1,091	0,834	2,485	0,292	0,000	**0,638**
Protestant	6,492	1,222	0,834	2,485	0,162	0,000	**0,353**
Nationalism	-1,276	0,745	0,834	2,485	0,499	0,087	**-0,214**
Farmer	2,381	1,243	0,834	2,485	0,341	0,055	**0,272**
Constant	-5,299	1,050				0,000	

Party of Romanian National Unity and Greater Romania Party (PUNR and PRM)

The parties that have labelled as nationalist are PUNR and PRM, and they are therefore analysed together here. Although their electoral fortunes have changed, with PUNR being a relevant party in 1992 and 1996 and PRM in 1996 and 2000, these parties have been important parts of the post-communist political landscape in Romania.

Unfortunately, we are missing data on the nationalism dimension in the 1992 election, and all we can tell from Table 16 is that negative values on the capitol variable and on the nostalgia dimension were significant for PUNR votes in the multivariate model.

Table 16. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for PUNR and PRM support

PUNR 1992							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Capitol and surroundings	-1,566	1,022	0,150	0,721	0,297	0,125	**-0,097**
Not nostalgic	-1,084	0,315	0,150	0,721	0,487	0,001	**-0,110**
Constant	-2,032	0,195				0,000	
PRM 1996							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Nationalism	0,808	0,378	0,070	0,403	0,499	0,032	**0,070**
Constant	-3,837	0,305				0,000	
PUNR 1996							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Income in the second quartile	1,601	0,640	0,053	0,801	0,500	0,012	**0,000**
Constant	-5,067	0,579				0,000	
PRM 2000							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Orthodox	2,038	1,020	0,100	0,758	0,372	0,046	**0,100**
Constant	-4,511	1,005				0,000	

The analysis of PRM support in 1996 and 2000 do not explain all too much about the electoral base for the party. Although, the nationalism variable is positive and significant in a bivariate analysis in 1996, it is only significant on an 8% level in 2000 in the bivariate analysis. In 2000, it is instead orthodox denomination that is the sole significant predictor. It should be kept in mind that PRM did a very good election in 2000, and probably won voters outside their previous core electorate. A more diverse electorate could also make it more difficult to identify strong patterns of cleavages. Clearly, this could make a case for arguing a weak cleavage structure, but at the same time it should not be forgotten that increased diverse support blurs the picture of the core support, which may still be cleavage-based. Other factors can not be ruled out as explanations for this success. For example, PRM leader Vadim Tudor is a political character that draws extensively on his persona.

It would nevertheless be premature to reject nationalism as a cleavage on background of these regression analyses alone. The pure existence of these parties can be interpreted as signs of a nationalistic dimension. At the same time, this could also be an aspect of the ethnic cleavage between the titular nationals and the Hungarian minority. In this sense, the findings suggest

that this rift is stronger and more coherent on the elite than on the mass level. Furthermore, it seems plausible that both the PRM and the PUNR voters distinguish themselves from the supporters of FSN derived parties by being more explicitly anti-establishment, in addition to more extreme on the nationalist issue.

Social Democratic Union (USD)

As mentioned above, USD formed government with CDR and UMDR after the 1996 election. The multivariate model shows that this was quite understandable considering the significant variables.

Table 17. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for USD support

USD 1996							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Catholic	-1,867	1,018	0,182	0,985	0,252	0,067	**-0,087**
Farmer	-1,921	0,725	0,182	0,985	0,362	0,008	**-0,128**
Market economy is positive	0,988	0,298	0,182	0,985	0,487	0,001	**0,089**
Constant	-2,759	0,268				0,000	

The findings overlap considerably with the multivariate model for CDR and it is interesting that there are no cross-cutting findings between CDR and USD. From a cleavage perspective, this could imply that it would be hard for both of them to survive in the future, and USD did split again before the 2000 election when the Democratic Party (PD) decided to run alone.

Democratic Party (PD)

PD qualifies as a relevant party in the 2000 election, where it won one more seat than PNL to become the third largest party in the legislature.

Table 18. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for PD support

PD 2000							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	BETA
Religiosity	0,672	0,379	0,122	0,441	0,427	0,076	**0,079**
Nostalgia	-0,682	0,417	0,122	0,441	0,486	0,102	**-0,092**
Constant	-2,700	0,248				0,000	

The multivariate model for PD is simple, but interesting. The negative value on the nostalgia variable places the voters in the liberal spectrum. The multivariate model also shows that religiosity is significant when controlled for the effect of nostalgia. At the same time, and as

can been seen in Appendix 3, neither community size nor views on the state role in the economy are significant in bivariate models. The positive direction of the religiosity variable is an important difference from the PNL models.

Cleavages patterns in Romania

When turning to the overall picture from the first four elections, the alternation of power between FSN and its successor parties on one side, and the liberal opposition on the other side that is most striking. The first split in FSN before the 1992 election is interesting in itself, as it appears like the division on the elite level over economic reform is clearly reflected in the analysis. The traditional left-right cleavage in terms of views on the state`s role in the economy has been a defining factor for the two main contenders in the Romanian party system. At the same time, it should be noted that income levels have little relevance.

Table 19. The economic liberalism cleavage in Romania

Market economy is positive	1990	1992	1996	2000
Positive significant	PNL, UMDR	CDR	CDR, USD	PNL
Negative significant	FSN	FDSN	PDSR, UMDR	PDSR

A second cleavage, which overlaps and reinforces the economic cleavage, is community size. The FSN derived parties appear to have stable rural support, while urban voters look to the PNL and CDR. However, community size is not relevant as a predictor for any of the parties in the 2000 election. This could be an indication of a weak or absent urban-rural cleavage, but seen in connection with the clear pattern from the first three elections, it would also be premature to conclude that this has lost relevance.

Table 20. The urban-rural cleavage in Romania

Urban	1990	1992	1996	2000
Positive significant	PNL	CDR	CDR	
Negative significant	FSN	FDSN	PDSR	

After all, based on the first three elections, a pattern of two reinforcing cleavages appears to be as strong in Romania as in Hungary. By plotting the pairs of relevant Beta values, this is clearly visible in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Scatterplot of the economic liberalism and urban-rural cleavages in Romania

The clear differences between the two main contenders is further strengthened by the regime variables. While nostalgic sentiments are positive and significant for PDSR voters in 1996, they are negative and significant for CDR in the same election. The effect of the "satisfaction with democracy" variable varies both in significance and direction for the parties, but again a pattern of opposition emerges. The transition should therefore be taken into account when explaining the emerging party system in Romania, and, more importantly, it should be seen in connection with the state-market and urban-rural cleavages. When USD and PD became relevant parties in 1996 and 2000 respectively, they also shared positive attitudes toward market economy as positive predictors for votes, controlled for other variables in the models. Religion on the other hand, has different directions for these two parties, indicating a cross-cutting cleavage among the economic liberal voters.

A third consistently relevant part of the Romanian party system is the representation of the Hungarian minority. UMDR has a clearly defined electorate, and the party`s position in the

system is in the vicinity of the liberal parties as a natural consequence of the more nationalist features of the FSN-derived parties, PRM and PUNR.

The final steady component in the Romanian party system is the presence of parties with a clear nationalist identity, even to the extent that it is reflected in the names of the parties. The electoral fortunes of PRM and PUNR have been changing, but the 2000 election underlines the importance of this dimension in the party system. At the same time, it is clear that the multivariate models are unable to explain this success. In this respect, we might have turn to dimensions that are not measured here to find the answer.

One cleavage that does less to define patterns of party support than expected is religiosity. Though secularity and strong beliefs matter for different parties at different times, it is hard to identify a clear pattern. Overall then, one might be tempted to conclude that whereas religion matters to the Romanian voter, religiosity as cleavage is not strong enough to consistently rank as the defining cleavage in cases of cross-cutting cleavages.

Bulgaria

One of the main questions when turning to the analysis of the Bulgarian elections, is to which extent the emergence of the National Movement for Simeon the IInd (NMS) in the 2001 election can be explained by cleavages. At first glance, it seems like the 2001 election turned the Bulgarian party system upside-down. Ex-King Simeon IInd returned to politics with full force and won half of the seats in Parliament. Of course, the question is how this was possible? Did NMS benefit mainly from another party`s electorate, or did they transcend the previous party system altogether? Based on NMS`s electoral victory, a new variable was also introduced in the analysis after careful consideration.[17] "Expectations of a better personal economic future" is not an operationalisation of a cleavage, and was only included in the model after thorough testing of cleavage-based models.

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[17] Although this can be seens as a deviation from the structure in the thesis, the variable is reported because it adds information about an extraordinary election, in which the cleavages alone could not explain voting behaviour.

However, in order to answer the main question, the effect of cleavages on the party system as a whole, we will have to start in 1991. Unfortunately, it proved more difficult to find good datasets for Bulgaria than for the other two countries. This particularly applies to the 2001 elections. I therefore refer the reader to Appendix 4 for more details on which data are missing, and how the different cleavages have been operationalised.

Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)

BSP and Coalition for Bulgaria are analysed together in the following. As we will see, the findings firmly place BSP on the traditional political left in many respects in terms of core electorate characteristics. This is of course not to say that BSP has been a modern European socialist or social-democratic party since the transition. Quite on the contrary, one could clearly argue that the origin in the communist party, the continued presence of parts of the old nomenklatura and the bureaucratic structures of the Bulgarian state administration all point in the direction of BSP being, at least at first, little more than an old structure with a fresh layer of paint.

There is a pattern of secularity being a significant predictor for party support, when controlled for the effect of the other variables in the first three elections. The same applies to favouring a strong state over privatization. The 1994 and 1997 analysis show relevance of an urban-rural dimension, and the 1997 election also find that voters in the lower and middle income groups are more likely to vote BSP, other variables held constant.

Interestingly, the nostalgia dimension also appears to be relevant. Positive attitudes towards the communist regime are significant predictors for BSP support both in 1991 and 1997, when controlled for the other variables in the model. A possible interpretation of this is that the previous regime did provide social security and that BSP is seen as a positive continuation in this respect. The findings on the satisfaction with democracy variable in 1994 and 1997 support this.

Turning to the dramatic 2001 election, the footprints of previous patterns appear to have weakened. The rural dimension is still valid, although with a low Beta-value, but secularity is no longer significant on a 5% level.

Table 21. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for BSP support

BSP 1991							
Variables in the Equation	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Religiosity	-0,545	0,167	0,413	0,943	0,259	0,001	**-0,062**
Turkish minority	-1,454	0,187	0,413	0,943	0,255	0,000	**-0,162**
Nostalgia	1,293	0,162	0,413	0,943	0,270	0,000	**0,153**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,307	0,087	0,413	0,943	0,482	0,000	**0,065**
Partly satisfied with material welfare	0,406	0,090	0,413	0,943	0,473	0,000	**0,084**
Satisfied with material welfare	0,830	0,105	0,413	0,943	0,414	0,000	**0,150**
Market economy is positive	-1,331	0,084	0,413	0,943	0,500	0,000	**-0,291**
Constant	-0,184	0,089				0,040	
BSP 1994							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Turkish minority	-2,252	0,377	0,450	1,043	0,283	0,000	**-0,275**
Urban	-0,660	0,200	0,450	1,043	0,457	0,001	**-0,130**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,637	0,302	0,450	1,043	0,316	0,035	**-0,087**
Market economy is positive	-1,522	0,188	0,450	1,043	0,489	0,000	**-0,321**
Constant	1,127	0,137				0,000	
BSP 1997							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Secular	1,205	0,612	0,443	1,370	0,182	0,049	**0,071**
Rroma minority	1,117	0,525	0,443	1,370	0,225	0,033	**0,081**
Nationalism	0,572	0,269	0,443	1,370	0,426	0,033	**0,079**
Capitol and surroundings	-1,726	0,626	0,443	1,370	0,332	0,006	**-0,185**
Nostalgia	0,842	0,270	0,443	1,370	0,497	0,002	**0,135**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,823	0,402	0,443	1,370	0,400	0,041	**-0,106**
Income in the lowest quartile	1,359	0,536	0,443	1,370	0,483	0,011	**0,212**
Income in the second quartile	0,936	0,521	0,443	1,370	0,500	0,072	**0,151**
Market economy is positive	-0,927	0,298	0,443	1,370	0,494	0,002	**-0,148**
Constant	-2,408	0,564				0,000	
BSP 2001							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Urban	-0,910	0,236	0,150	1,060	0,497	0,000	**-0,064**
Expectation of better economic future	-1,094	0,304	0,150	1,060	0,444	0,000	**-0,069**
Turkish minority	-3,200	1,021	0,150	1,060	0,298	0,002	**-0,135**
Constant	-0,504	0,151				0,001	

Union of Democratic Forces/Alliance of Democratic Forces (SDS)

The Union of Democratic Forces and the Alliance of Democratic Forces are also analysed together, and abbreviated SDS throughout.

Table 22. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for SDS support

SDS 1991							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Secular	-0,548	0,092	0,433	1,067	0,463	0,000	**-0,103**
Turkish minority	-0,984	0,207	0,433	1,067	0,255	0,000	**-0,102**
Capitol and surroundings	0,231	0,124	0,433	1,067	0,359	0,061	**0,034**
Urban	0,252	0,096	0,433	1,067	0,496	0,009	**0,051**
Nostalgia	-1,178	0,209	0,433	1,067	0,270	0,000	**-0,129**
Satisfied with material welfare	-0,473	0,109	0,433	1,067	0,414	0,000	**-0,079**
Farmer	-0,365	0,155	0,433	1,067	0,318	0,018	**-0,047**
Market economy is positive	1,419	0,085	0,433	1,067	0,500	0,000	**0,288**
Constant	-1,073	0,087				0,000	
SDS 1994							
Variables in the Equation	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Urban	0,719	0,209	0,281	0,691	0,457	0,001	**0,134**
Market economy is positive	1,101	0,206	0,281	0,691	0,489	0,000	**0,219**
Constant	-2,007	0,164				0,000	
SDS 1997							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Orthodox	0,550	0,290	0,403	0,906	0,415	0,058	**0,101**
Urban	0,550	0,205	0,403	0,906	0,500	0,007	**0,122**
Income in the lowest quartile	-0,540	0,221	0,403	0,906	0,483	0,014	**-0,116**
Market economy is positive	1,380	0,201	0,403	0,906	0,494	0,000	**0,303**
Constant	-1,309	0,295				0,000	
SDS 2001							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Capitol and surroundings	1,090	0,268	0,075	0,518	0,358	0,000	**0,056**
Income in the lowest quartile	-0,628	0,280	0,075	0,518	0,447	0,025	**-0,041**
Constant	-1,276	0,139				0,000	

The multivariate models for SDS confirm that BSP had one main opponent in the first three post-communist elections. A positive attitude to privatization has been a positive and significant variable with consistent high Beta-values in 1991, 1994, and 1997, other variables in the models being controlled for. The second consistently significant independent variable

in the first three elections is community size, where it is evident that urban residence significantly increases the probability for voting SDS, other variables held constant. In the fourth election, community size has been replaced by whether or not the respondent lives in the capitol and the surrounding area. This variable is also significant when controlled for the effect of the other variables, and further strengthens the impression of an urban-rural cleavage in Bulgaria.

There are also signs that the SDS voters are not secular, but this appears to be more of a matter of denomination than religiosity. To the extent that denomination is a significant variable for voting denomination, this is interesting as it reinforces the anti-nostalgia cleavage.

National Movement for Simeon IInd (NMS)

It is difficult to explain the success of NMS by the cleavage model presented in Table 23. Although the three variables above are significant when controlled for the effect of each other, they do not reflect a clear pattern when compared to the models for the other parties. It is interesting that a belief in an improved personal economic situation is positive and significant, particularly as the same variable is negative and significant in the multivariate model for BSP. However, the Beta-values are low, and the success of NMS and the change in the Bulgarian party system must be accounted for by other means.

Table 23. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for NMS support

NMS 2001							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Orthodox	-0,970	0,295	0,087	0,556	0,772	0,001	**-0,116**
Capitol and surroundings dummy	0,689	0,237	0,087	0,556	0,150	0,004	**-0,016**
Expectation own economic future better	0,766	0,210	0,087	0,556	0,269	0,000	**0,032**
Constant	-1,043	0,219				0,000	

Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS)

Quite similarly to the Hungarians in Romania, the Turkish minority has been successful in gaining representation through their own party in all four elections. DPS participated in the Alliance of National Salvation (ONS) in 1997, this coalition is analysed here.

Table 24. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for DPS support[18]

DPS 1991							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Religiosity	0,596	0,334	0,721	1,963	0,259	0,075	**0,057**
Secular	-0,983	0,345	0,721	1,963	0,463	0,004	**-0,167**
Turkish minority	3,261	0,368	0,721	1,963	0,255	0,000	**0,305**
Capitol and surroundings	1,530	0,762	0,721	1,963	0,359	0,045	**0,202**
Urban	-1,022	0,436	0,721	1,963	0,496	0,019	**-0,186**
Nostalgia	-1,580	0,611	0,721	1,963	0,270	0,010	**-0,157**
Farmer	0,576	0,280	0,721	1,963	0,318	0,040	**0,067**
Market economy is positive	-0,744	0,264	0,721	1,963	0,500	0,005	**-0,137**
Constant	-2,684	0,365				0,000	
DPS 1994							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Turkish minority	3,302	0,731	0,746	2,305	0,283	0,000	**0,303**
Urban	-2,636	0,864	0,746	2,305	0,457	0,002	**-0,390**
Income in third quartile	-1,841	0,797	0,746	2,305	0,408	0,021	**-0,243**
Constant	-1,910	0,618				0,002	
DPS 1997							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Turkish minority	4,197	0,429	0,715	2,451	0,330	0,000	**0,404**
Urban	-2,888	1,052	0,715	2,451	0,500	0,006	**-0,421**
Farmer	0,950	0,529	0,715	2,451	0,482	0,073	**0,134**
Constant	-4,477	0,606				0,000	
DPS 2001							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Turkish minority	5,258	0,803	0,627	1,566	0,298	0,000	**0,627**
Constant	-4,714	0,710	0,502			0,000	

The multivariate models are consistent with expectations, and show that the Turkish minority votes coherently for DPS, also in the 2001 election. The model for the 1997 election furthermore suggests that DPS` participation in the coalition was "safe" in terms of

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[18] Other significant variables from the bivariate regression models omitted because of multicollinearity.

mobilizing a wider rural electorate without alienating core voters, as both these variables remain significant when controlled for the other variables in the model.

Popular Union of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Democratic Party (BZNS-DP)

While the 1991 election was more of a bipolar contest, with the Turkish minority as the exception, five parties or coalitions managed to win seats in 1994, BZNS-DP among them. These two parties participated in larger coalitions in other elections, but is analysed alone here.

Table 25. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for BZNS-DP support

BZNS-DP 1994							
	b	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,914	0,390	0,202	0,586	0,316	0,019	**0,100**
Farmer	1,269	0,563	0,202	0,586	0,182	0,024	**0,080**
Market economy is positive	0,824	0,329	0,202	0,586	0,489	0,012	**0,139**
Constant	-3,225	0,262				0,000	

The multivariate model is interesting because both agricultural background and a positive attitude towards market economy have positive and significant logistic regression coefficients, when controlled for the effect of each other and satisfaction with democracy. This suggest that the there is a significant split in the rural electorate, where some farmers are clearly not nostalgic and anti-capitalist.

Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB)

BBB also won more than 5% of the seats in the 1994 election.[19] However, it should prove impossible to build a multivariate model based on the tested cleavage with significant variables. A significant positive attitude to market economy is noteworthy, but it seems plausible that this party does not have a clearly cleavage-based support group.

Table 26. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for BBB support

BBB 1994							
	B	S.E.	R	SlogitY	S.X	Sig.	**BETA**
Market economy is positive	1,193	0,364	0,139	0,584	0,489	0,001	**0,139**
Constant	-3,404	0,293				0,000	

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[19] BBB also won seats in the 1997 election, but not enough seats as to qualify as a relevant party.

Cleavage patterns in Bulgaria

The multivariate analysis confirm the lack of overall structure when the 2001 election is taken into account. However, when looking at the first three elections, there are some interesting pattern of stable cleavages that shaped voting behaviour.

First of all, the urban-rural cleavage shapes voting behaviour in all four elections. Urban voters are more likely to vote for SDS throughout, also when controlled for the effect of the other variables in the multivariate models. The variable is also quite consistently negative and significant for BSP, DPS and NMS.

Table 27. The urban-rural cleavage in Bulgaria

Urban	1991	1994	1997	2001
Positive significant	SDS	SDS	SDS	SDS*
Negative significant	DPS	BPS, DPS, BZNS-DP	BPS*, DPS	BPS, NMS*

*Measured as residence in Sofia

There is also consistent difference between the supporters of SDS and BSP on the view of market economy in the first three elections.

Table 28. The economic liberalism cleavage in Bulgaria

Market economy is positive	1991	1994	1997	2001
Positive significant	SDS	SDS, BZNS-DP, BBB	SDS	
Negative significant	BSP, DPS	BSP	BSP	

As expected, those who voted for BSP have negative and significant Beta-values on this variable. Interestingly, this cleavage looses significance in all the multivariate models in 2001, again underlining the effect of NMS.

There is also consistency on the regime dimension, with BSP voters expressing positive sentiments towards the previous regime and SDS voters either being anti-communist or

simply positive to democracy. Other cleavage variables appear in accordance with the expectations from time to time, but the lack of consistency makes it hard to classify these as cleavages. This applies to nationalism, income, and religiosity.

Summing up, it does seem like the nostalgia, economic ideology and urban-rural cleavages have reinforced each other, and that this has contributed to the sharp divide between BSP and SDS in the first three elections. However, only the urban-rural cleavage maintains significance with the emergence of NMS, indicating that also the horizontal alignment is weak. With the exception of the analysis of BZNS-DP in 1994, there is also a lack of clearly defined cross-cutting cleavages.

The minority cleavage is clearly present, and the strong horizontal alignment between the members of the Turkish minority is also manifested in strong and consistent vertical alignment to DPS.

Expectations and findings

Returning to the expectations of cleavage patterns presented at the end of Chapter 2, it is clear that all expectations have not been met. The lack of stable cleavage patterns in Bulgaria is most striking, although it should be pointed out that the analysis from the first three elections fit the expectations quite well. With the exception of the Turkish minority, the electorate appears to have been divided along reinforcing cleavages, which all can be traced to the communist period and in some cases with origins in the pre-communist history. I interpret the 2001 election to have revealed both weak horizontal and vertical alignment. The cleavages that were significant in the first three elections mainly created alignment on two sides of one dimension, the nostalgia-modernity dimension, and this proved insufficient in the longer run. Nevertheless, both the urban-rural cleavage and the ethnic minority cleavage maintained significance in the 2001 election.

Hungary is quite the opposite in this respect. Again, some of the expected reinforcing patterns are confirmed, with the nationalist, urban-rural and religiosity cleavage clearly shaping horizontal alignment. This pattern is strong, and explains why FIDESZ-MPP manages to

secure success on a new platform in 1998. It also explains why KDNP and FKGP could loose influence, without this being particularly dramatic for the structure of competition in the party system. Nostalgia is more important than anticipated, particularly because it cuts across the religiosity cleavage. Surprisingly, the economic dimension is less relevant.

The expectations for Romania are also met to a certain extent. There are clear and consistent differences between those who vote for the parties that have formed or participated in government. The ethnic minority cleavage is present and strong. There is also a strong reinforcing pattern of cleavages dividing the titular national electorate in two, particularly pertaining to the state role in the economy and urban-rural cleavages. Somewhat surprisingly, nationalism was not consistently confirmed as a significant cleavage, and it also proved harder than expected to identify religiosity as a cross-cutting cleavage.

Overall, it should therefore be possible to conclude that the first hypothesis (H1), that cleavages are expected to have been a decisive factor for voting behaviour, is strengthened by the findings.

Cleavage structures and party systems

The second hypothesis (H2), that party systems founded on cleavage structures are more stable than party systems that are not, has a clear comparative component. We have identified the cleavage structures in all three countries, and the challenge is therefore to explain why the party systems differ in terms of structure of competition and fragmentation.

Hungary appears to be a case in point for the second hypothesis. The cleavage structures are strong, not least in terms of horizontal alignment, and consistent over time. The importance of the strong horizontal alignment as a source of party system stability is evident. With this in place, parties would run great risks if they were to experiment with governing formulaes or open access to government to parties in conflict with the cleavage structures of their own electorate. Furthermore, parties that did not have sufficient cleavage-based support, like MDF, did not survive, while smaller parties, like SZDZS survived because of cross-cutting cleavages. The result is a relatively closed structure of competition and limited fragmentation.

The Romanian party system has greater fragmentation and a more open structure of competition than the Hungarian party system. The nationalist cleavage appear to be less than clearly defined both in the electorate and in the party system. This suggests that the lack of a clearly defined (yet probably significant) cleavage creates openness in the structure in competition. However, the main dimension in the structure of competition, the support for either one of the FSN-derived parties or PNL/CDR is based on a reinforcing pattern of cleavages. Once again, the importance of horizontal alignment is clear, as the same cleavages have been significant for different parties or constellations over time. In addition, the strength of the ethnic minority cleavage has been a stable component of the party system. Overall, it should be safe to state that the cleavage structures in Romania has contributed to party system stability.

The Bulgarian case is different. Cleavages mattered in the three first elections, when the party system also showed signs of stability. The 2001 election disrupts this picture by disclosing a party system with an open structure of competition. It also showed that the previous cleavage patterns were unable to explain the emergence of NMS. In one sense, the lack of cleavages in the 2001 election does support that party systems that are not founded on cleavage structures are likely to be less stable than those that are. On the other hand, this does not explain why cleavages were important in the first three elections. One possible explanation is of course that what we measured in the first three elections were not actual cleavages, but rather transitional divides, thus supporting Kitschelt et. al. (1999). The main objection to this perspective is the strong theoretical basis for expecting a reinforcing cleavage structure, centred on attitudes towards the communist past. A different explanation could therefore be that while the cleavages were present and mattered in the first three elections, the pattern of reinforcement was weaker than anticipated. Although the cleavages could explain the splitting of the electorate in a bipolar contest for government, they would be insufficient to create both significant horizontal and vertical alignment when the bipolarity was challenged. Nevertheless, both the ethnic minority cleavage and the urban-rural cleavage maintained relevance, and particularly the former added to an element of stability also after 2001.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

By focusing on the voters, and by emphasising the importance of horizontal alignment, cleavage patterns have been identified as important for voting behaviour and party systems, the latter measured through openness in structures of competition and degree of fragmentation. The mere identification of cleavage patterns significantly weakens the notion of flattened societies. Furthermore, the first hypothesis, that cleavages have been a decisive factor for voting behaviour, has been strengthened by the multivariate logistic regression models.

The second hypothesis, that party systems based on cleavage structures are more stable than party systems that are not, has also been strengthened. The difference between the three countries is important in this respect, because it is the country with the most clearly defined cleavage structures, Hungary, that exhibits the most stable party system, while Bulgaria, where the cleavage structure is weaker, has the most unstable party system. The distinction between horizontal and vertical alignment has been key to identifying stability, because it has been clear that the same cleavages have been significant predictors for support for different parties over time in Hungary as well as in Romania. This has not been the case in Bulgaria, where cleavages could not explain the emergence of NMS in 2001.

These findings also have some implications for further research. First of all, it would be interesting to apply the approach on other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on the variation between the three cases in this thesis, other countries could be expected to fit the model quite well. Furthermore, the difference between horizontal and vertical alignment could benefit from further research. For example, elite and mass values on cleavage variables could be compared in greater detail, also with regard to Bardi and Mair`s attention to different party systems on different levels in the polity (Bardi and Mair 2008).

Finally, and as the Bulgarian case clearly illustrates, more elections in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe will add information and probably help explaining the importance of cleavages and the features of the still relatively young party systems in greater detail.

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Appendix 1. Election Results

All election results are from the website of the University of Essex` project *Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe,* http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/

Hungary 1990
Election dates: First round 25 March 1990; Second round 8 April 1990
Turnout: 65.09 % (first round)

PARTY/GROUPING	% LIST VOTES	REGIONAL LIST SEATS	SINGLE MEMBER SEATS	NATIONAL LIST SEATS	TOTAL SEATS	%SEATS
MDF - Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum)	24.73	40	114	10	164	42.49
SZDSZ - Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége)	21.39	34	35	23	92	23.83
FKgP - Independent Small Holders Party (Független Kisgazdapárt)	11.73	16	11	17	44	11.4
MSZP - Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt)	10.89	14	1	18	33	8.55
FIDESZ - Federation of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége)	8.95	8	1	12	21	5.44
KDNP - Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt)	6.46	8	3	10	21	5.44
ASZ - Agrarian Alliance (Agrárszövetség)	3.13	0	1	0	1	0.26
Independents (199 first round; 11 second round)		0	6	0	6	0
Joint candidates*		0	4	0	4	1.04
TOTAL	100	120	176	90	386	100

Hungary 1994

Election dates: First round 8 May; Second round 29 May 1994

Turnout: 68,92% (first round)

PARTY/GROUPING	% LIST VOTES	REGIONAL LIST SEATS	SINGLE MEMBER SEATS	NATIONAL LIST SEATS	TOTAL SEATS	%SEATS
MSZP - Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt)	32.99	53	149	7	209	54.15
SZDSZ - Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége)	19.74	28	16	25	69	17.88
MDF - Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum)	11.74	18	5	15	38	9.84
FKgP - Independent Small Holders Party (Független Kisgazdapárt)	8.82	14	1	11	26	6.74
KDNP - Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt)	7.03	5	3	14	22	5.7
FIDESZ (Federation of Young Democrats)	7.02	7	0	13	20	5.18
ASZ - Agrarian Alliance (Agrárszövetség)	2.1	0	1	0	1	0.26
Joint candidate: VP, FIDESZ, SZDSZ, ASZ			1		1	0.26
TOTAL	100	125	176	85	386	100

Hungary 1998

Election date: 20 May 1990

Turnout: 56,7% (first round)

PARTY/GROUPING	% LIST VOTES	REGIONAL LIST SEATS	SINGLE MEMBER SEATS	NATIONAL LIST SEATS	TOTAL SEATS	% SEATS
MSZP - Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt)	32.92	50	54	30	134	34.72
Fidesz-MPP [ex-FIDESZ] Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Párt)	29.48	48	55	10	113	29.27
FIDESZ-MPP - MDF joint candidates	-	-	35	-	50	12.95
FKgP - Independent Small Holders Party (Független Kisgazdapárt)	13.15	22	12	14	48	12.44
SZDSZ - Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége)	7.57	5	2	17	24	6.22
MIEP - Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja)	5.47	3	0	11	14	3.63
MDF - Fidesz-MPP joint candidates	-	-	15	-	15	3.89
MDF - Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum)	2.8	0	2	0	2	0.52
Independents (53 first round, 11 second round)	-	-	1	-	1	0.26
TOTAL	~100	128	176	82	386	100

Hungary 2002

Election date: 20 May 1990

Turnout: 50,53% (first round)

PARTY/GROUPING	% LIST VOTES	REGIONAL LIST SEATS	SINGLE MEMBER SEATS	NATIONAL LIST SEATS	TOTAL SEATS	%SEATS
MSZP - Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Part)	42.05	69	78	31	178	46.11
FIDESZ-MDF - joint list of FIDESZ - Hungarian Civic Party and Hungarian Democratic Forum (Fidesz- Magyar Polgari Part es Magyar Demokrata Forum)	41.07	67	95	26	188	48.70
SZDSZ - Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokratak Szovetsege)	5.57	4	2	13	19	4.92
MSZP-SZDSZ - joint candidates of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats	0	0	1	0	1	0.26
Total	100	140	176	70	386	100.00

Romania 1990
Election date: 20 May 1990
Turnout: 86,19%

PARTY/GROUPING	VOTES	% VOTES	SEATS	% SEATS
FSN – National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvarii Nationale)	9089659	66.31	263	66.41
UDMR/ RMDSZ – Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din Romania)	991601	7.23	29	7.32
PNL - National Liberal Party (Partidul National Liberal)	879290	6.41	29	7.32
MER - Romanian Ecological Movement (Miscarea Ecologista din Romania)	358864	2.62	12	3.03
PNTcd – National Peasants Party – Christian Democrat (Partidul National Taranesc – Crestin Democrat)	351357	2.56	12	3.03
AUR - Alliance for Romanian Unity (alianta pentru Unitatea Romanilor)*	290875	2.12	9	2.27
PDAR – Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania (Partidul Democrat Agrar din Romania)	250403	1.83	9	2.27
PER – Romanian Ecological Party (Partidul Ecologist Roman)	232212	1.69	8	2.02
PSD - Romanian Socialist Democratic Party (Partidul Socialist Democratic Roman)	143393	1.05	5	1.26
PSDR – Romanian Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat Roman)	73014	0.53	2	0.51
Democratic Group of the Centre (Grupul Democrat de Centru)	65914	0.48	2	0.51
TOTAL	13707159	100	396	100

Romania 1992
Election date: 27 September 1992
Turnout: 76,29%

PARTY/GROUPING	VOTES	% VOTES	SEATS	% SEATS	% SEATS2[20]
FDSN - Democratic National Salvation Front (Frontul Democrat al Salvarii Nationale)	3015708	27.72	117	35.67	34.31
CDR – Democratic Convention of Romania (Conventia Democrata din Romania)*	2177144	20.01	82	25	24.05
FSN – National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvarii Nationale)	1108500	10.19	43	13.11	12.61
PUNR - Party of Romanian National Unity (Partidul Unitatii Nationale Romane)	839586	7.72	30	9.15	8.8
UDMR/RMDSZ - Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din Romania)	811290	7.46	27	8.23	7.92
PRM - Greater Romania Party (Partidul Romania Mare)	424061	3.89	16	4.88	4.69
PSM - Socialist Party of Labour (Partidul Socialist al Muncii)	330378	3.04	13	3.96	3.81
TOTAL	10880252	100	341	100	

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[20] This Figure represents the % seats for each party that passed the threshold, calculated from the total number of seats (328), thus excluding the minority seats.

Romania 1996

Election date: 3 November 1996

Turnout: 76,01%

PARTY/GROUPING	VOTES	% VOTES	SEATS	% SEATS	% SEATS2[21]
CDR – Democratic Convention of Romania (Conventia Democrata Romana)[1]	3692321	30.17	122	35.57	37.2
PDSR – Romanian Party of Social Democracy (Partidul Democratiei Sociale din Romania)[2]	2633860	21.52	91	26.53	27.74
USD – Social Democratic Union (Uniunea Social Democrata)[3]	1582231	12.93	53	15.45	16.16
UDMR/RMDSZ - Democratic Alliance of Hungarian in Romania (Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din Romania)	812628	6.64	25	7.29	7.62
PRM - Greater Romania Party (Partidul Romania Mare)	546430	4.46	19	5.54	5.79
PUNR - Party of Romanian National Unity (Partidul Unitatii Nationale Romane)	533348	4.36	18	5.25	5.49
Total	12238746	100	343	100	100

Romania 2000

Election date: 26 November 2000

Turnout: 65,31%

PARTY/GROUPING	VOTES	% VOTES	SEATS	% SEATS	% SEATS2
P.D.S.R. - Democratic-Social Pole of Romania (Polul Democrat-Social din Romania - PDSR)	3968464	36.61	155	44.93	47.26
PRM - Greater Romania Party (Partidul Romania Mare)	2112027	19.48	84	24.35	25.61
PD - Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat)	762365	7.03	31	8.99	9.45
PNL - National Liberal Party (Partidul National Liberal)	747263	6.89	30	8.7	9.15
UDMR/RMDSZ - Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din Romania)	736863	6.8	27	7.83	8.23
TOTAL	10839424	100	345 (327+18)	100 (of 345)	100 (of 327)

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[21] This Figure represents the % seats for each party that passed the threshold, calculated from the total number of seats (328), thus excluding the minority seats.

Bulgaria 1991

Election date: 13 October 1991

Turnout: 83,87%

PARTY/GROUPING	VOTES	% VOTE	SEATS	% SEATS
SDS - Union of Democratic Forces (Suyuz na demokratichnite sili)	1903567	34.36	110	45.8
BSP - Pre-electoral Union of the BSP, BLP, OPT, KhRP, NLP 'St. Stambolov', SMS, FBSM, SDPD,	1836050	33.14	106	44.2
DPS - Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi)	418168	7.55	24	10
TOTAL	5540837	100	240	100

Bulgaria 1994

Election date: 18 December 1994

Turnout: 75,23%

PARTY/GROUPING	VOTES	% VOTES	SEATS	% SEATS
BSPASEK - Coalition of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union 'Alexander Stamboliiski' and Ecoglasnost Political Club (Koalitsiya - BSP, BZNS 'Al. Stamboliiski' i PK 'Ekoglasnost')	2262943	43.5	125	52.08
SDS - Union of Democratic Forces (Suyuz na demokratichnite sili)	1260374	24.23	69	28.75
BZNS-DP - Popular Union of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Democratic Party (Naroden suyuz - BZNS-DP)	338478	6.51	18	7.5
DPS - Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi)	283094	5.44	15	6.25
BBB - Bulgarian Business Block (Bulgarska biznes blok)	245849	4.73	13	5.42
Total	5202065	100	240	100

Bulgaria 1997

Election date: 19 April 1997

Turnout: 58,87%

PARTY/GROUPING	VOTES	% VOTES	SEATS	% SEATS
ODS - Alliance of Democratic Forces - SDS, DP, BZNS,	2223714	49.15	137	57.55
DemLev - Democratic Left - Bulgarian Socialist Party, Ecoglasnost Political Club (Demokratichna levitsa - BSP, PK 'Ekoglasnost')	939308	22.44	58	25.03
ONS - Alliance of National Salvation - Bulgarian Agrarian National Union - Nikola Petkov, Movement for Rights and Freedoms, Green Party, Party of the Democratic Centre, New Choice, Federation of the Bulgarian Kingdom (Obedinenie za natsionalno spasenie)	323429	9.44	19	9
EvroLev - Euroleft (Evrolevitsa)	234058	5.57	14	4.4
BBB - Bulgarian Business Block (Bulgarska biznes blok)	209796	5.27	12	4.02
Total	4255301	100	240	100

Bulgaria 2001
Election date: 18 June 2001
Turnout: 66,77%

PARTY/GROUPING	VOTES	% VOTES	SEATS	% SEATS
National Movement Simeon the Second	1952513	42.74	120	50
United Democratic Forces - UDF, People's Union: BAPU - PU and DP, BSDP, National MRF	830338	18.18	51	21.25
Coalition for Bulgaria	783372	17.15	48	20
MRF (MRF - Liberal Union - EuroRoma)	340395	7.45	21	8.75
Total	4568191	100	240	100

Appendix 2. Government compositions

Government compositions after elections in Hungary 1990-2002

Time	Parties	Prime Minister	Comments
23.05.1990-15.07.1994	MDF,FKGP,KDNP	Jósef Antall (MDF) Péter Boross (MDF)	FKGP formally left the coalition on 21.02.1992. Antall passed away on 12.12.1993.
15.07.1994-08.07.1998	MSZP and SZDSZ	Gyula Horn (MSZP)	
08.07.1998-27.05.2002	FIDESZ-MPP, FKGP, MDF	Viktor Órban (FIDESZ)	
27.05.2002-29.09.2004	MSZP and SZDSZ	Péter Medgyessy (MSZP) Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP)	Ferenc Gyurcsány replaced Medgyessy in 2004.

Source: Tóka (2004:332)

Government compositions after elections in Romania

Time	Parties	Prime Minister	Comments
May 1990-27.09.1991	FSN	Petre Roman (FSN)	Government fell as result of FSN splintering
17.10.1991-20.11.1992		Teodor Stolojan (formally unaffiliated)	
20.11.1992-12.12.1996	FDSN/PDSR	Nicole Vacariou (formally independent, but aligned with FDSN/PDSR)	
12.12.1996-16.04.1998	CDR	Victor Ciorbea	
16.04.1998-14.12.1999 16.12.1999-28.12.2000	CDR	Radu Vasile (CDR) Mugur Isarescu (CDR)	Vasile`s government replaced by Isarescu because of internal conflict.
28.12.2000-21.12.2004	PSD	Adrian Nastase (PSD)	

Source: Crowther (2004:404)

Governments after elections in Bulgaria[22]

Time	Parties	Prime Minister	Comments
08.11.1991-30.12.1992	SDS	Philip Dimitrov	
30.12.1992-17.10.1994		Lyuben Berov	
17.10.1994-25.01.1995		Reneta Indzhova	Interim Prime Minster
25.01.1995-13.02.1997	BSP	Zhan Videnov	
13.02-1995-21.05.1997	SDS	Stefan Sofiyanski	Interim Prime Minster
21.05.1997-24.07.2001	SDS	Ivan Kostov	
24.07.2001-17.08.2005	NMS + DPS	Simeon Sakskoburggotski	

Source: Karasimeonov (2004:443)

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[22] Table limited to the elections included in the thesis. In addition Andrey Lukanov and Dimitar Illiev Popov`s served as head of government before Dimitrov.

Appendix 3. Results from bivariate logistic regressions

The results from the bivariate regressions are presented below. The Tables are organized by country, party and election. The unstandardized regression coeffecient b, standarderror and significance are reported, and findings which are significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold.

Hungary

Dependent variable:	SZDSZ 1990				SZDSZ 1994		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	-0,136	0,110	0,213		-0,237	0,137	0,085
Calvinist	-0,323	0,186	0,082		-0,245	0,227	0,280
Secular	0,207	0,104	**0,047**		0,284	0,129	**0,028**
Religiosity	-0,463	0,168	**0,006**		-1,017	0,272	**0,000**
Nationalism	0,222	0,106	**0,036**		0,728	0,140	**0,000**
Urban	0,449	0,113	**0,000**		0,803	0,155	**0,000**
Capitol and surroundings	0,425	0,120	**0,000**		0,606	0,141	**0,000**
Nostalgia	-0,265	0,153	0,083		-0,592	0,213	**0,005**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,112	0,118	0,344		0,023	0,138	0,869
Quartiles of mean income:							
Lowest	-0,534	0,131	**0,000**		-0,538	0,173	**0,002**
Second	-0,319	0,127	**0,012**		-0,127	0,154	0,412
Third	0,408	0,117	**0,000**		0,071	0,148	0,633
Highest	0,397	0,115	**0,001**		0,431	0,135	**0,001**
Farmer	-0,974	0,240	**0,000**		-1,049	0,329	**0,001**
Market economy positive	0,240	0,105	**0,023**		0,515	0,129	**0,000**

Dependent variable:	SZDZS 1998				SZDZS 2002		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sign.
Catholic	-0,570	0,302	0,059		-1,233	0,360	**0,001**
Calvinist	0,771	0,331	**0,020**		-0,132	0,394	0,737
Secular	0,055	0,535	0,918		0,343	0,364	0,346
Religiosity	-0,897	0,604	0,137		0,074	0,446	0,869
Nationalism	-0,072	0,309	0,815		-1,385	0,601	**0,021**
Urban	-0,566	0,378	0,134		1,200	0,294	**0,000**
Capitol and surroundings	0,734	0,324	**0,024**				
Nostalgia	0,169	0,327	0,605				
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,588	0,312	0,059				
Quartiles of mean income dummies:							
Lowest	-0,276	0,447	0,537		-1,764	1,015	0,082
Second	-0,676	0,328	0,039		-0,929	0,392	**0,018**
Third	0,829	0,307	**0,007**		1,059	0,329	**0,001**
Highest	-18,113	14210,361	0,999		0,178	0,535	0,739
Farmer	-0,652	0,378	0,084		-0,966	1,019	0,343
Market economy positive	0,409	0,318	0,197		-0,038	0,377	0,920

Dependent variable:	FIDESZ 1990				FIDESZ 1994		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	-0,303	0,148	**0,041**		-0,418	0,114	**0,000**
Calvinist	-0,445	0,261	0,088		-1,046	0,243	**0,000**
Secular	0,527	0,140	**0,000**		0,768	0,108	**0,000**
Religiosity	-1,128	0,291	**0,000**		-1,025	0,214	**0,000**
Nationalism	0,077	0,138	0,579		0,252	0,106	**0,018**
Urban	0,328	0,148	**0,027**		0,254	0,112	**0,023**
Capitol and surroundings	0,471	0,154	**0,002**		0,088	0,126	0,485
Nostalgia	-0,477	0,219	**0,030**		-0,279	0,154	0,070
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,429	0,167	**0,010**		-0,258	0,117	**0,027**
Quartiles of mean income dummies:							
Lowest	-0,256	0,164	0,119		-0,499	0,137	**0,000**
Second	0,142	0,153	0,355		-0,137	0,125	0,274
Third	0,022	0,162	0,892		0,245	0,118	**0,037**
Highest	0,097	0,156	0,535		0,260	0,113	**0,022**
Farmer	-0,358	0,262	0,171		-0,853	0,238	**0,000**
Market economy positive	0,397	0,138	**0,004**		0,428	0,105	**0,000**

Dependent variable:	FIDESZ-MPP 1998				FIDESZ-MPP-MDF 2002		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sign.
Catholic	0,106	0,143	0,461		0,424	0,121	**0,000**
Calvinist	-0,023	0,179	0,896		0,061	0,156	0,697
Secular	-0,195	0,255	0,446		-0,215	0,169	0,201
Religiosity	0,449	0,183	**0,014**		0,812	0,188	**0,000**
Nationalism	0,438	0,137	**0,001**		0,102	0,149	0,494
Urban	0,310	0,145	**0,033**		-0,512	0,144	**0,000**
Capitol and surroundings	-0,270	0,178	0,130				
Nostalgia	-0,302	0,141	**0,032**				
Satisfaction with democracy	1,033	0,143	**0,000**				
Quartiles of mean income dummies:							
Lowest	-1,191	0,244	**0,000**		-0,029	0,197	0,882
Second	-0,132	0,139	0,340		-0,029	0,129	0,824
Third	0,659	0,141	**0,000**		-0,032	0,120	0,791
Highest	0,957	0,711	0,178		0,192	0,233	0,410
Farmer	0,233	0,144	0,105		0,254	0,270	0,347
Market economy positive	0,575	0,147	**0,000**		0,043	0,153	0,778

Dependent variable:	MSZP 1990				MZSP 1994		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		B	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	-0,40	0,153	**0,008**		-0,383	0,101	**0,000**
Calvinist	-0,27	0,249	0,273		0,057	0,151	0,707
Secular	0,46	0,141	**0,001**		0,362	0,094	**0,000**
Religiosity	-0,92	0,274	**0,001**		-1,166	0,196	**0,000**
Nationalism	0,49	0,146	**0,001**		0,460	0,097	**0,000**
Urban	0,34	0,151	**0,024**		0,246	0,100	**0,014**
Capitol and surroundings	0,19	0,165	0,238		0,239	0,111	**0,031**
Nostalgia	1,71	0,148	**0,000**		1,287	0,110	**0,000**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,32	0,166	**0,051**		-0,646	0,111	**0,000**
Quartiles of mean income dummies:							
Lowest	-0,31	0,169	0,060		-0,503	0,121	**0,000**
Second	0,17	0,155	0,269		0,069	0,108	0,526
Third	-0,24	0,175	0,169		0,050	0,109	0,649
Highest	0,31	0,153	**0,038**		0,302	0,102	**0,003**
Farmer	-0,91	0,331	**0,006**		-0,312	0,175	0,074
Market economy positive	-0,40	0,149	**0,007**		-0,506	0,099	**0,000**

Dependent variable:	MSZP 1998				MSZP 2002		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sign.
Catholic	0,042	0,159	0,794		-0,203	0,119	0,087
Calvinist	0,028	0,197	0,889		-0,102	0,153	0,504
Secular	0,072	0,277	0,796		0,168	0,163	0,303
Religiosity	-0,727	0,239	**0,008**		-0,848	0,196	**0,000**
Nationalism	-0,115	0,153	0,453		0,120	0,148	0,418
Urban	-0,299	0,169	0,076		0,219	0,137	0,109
Capitol and surroundings	0,097	0,190	0,610				
Nostalgia	1,152	0,190	**0,000**				
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,690	0,153	**0,000**				
Quartiles of mean income dummies:							
Lowest	0,733	0,217	0,001		0,270	0,195	0,165
Second	0,137	0,154	0,377		0,225	0,127	0,076
Third	-0,497	0,162	0,002		-0,220	0,118	0,063
Highest	-20,666	20096,485	0,999		-0,244	0,233	0,295
Farmer	-0,140	0,163	0,391		-0,028	0,270	0,919
Market economy positive	-0,366	0,170	**0,031**		-0,157	0,151	0,297

Dependent variable:	MDF 1990				MDF 1994		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	0,450	0,145	**0,002**		0,376	0,133	**0,005**
Calvinist	0,735	0,191	**0,000**		0,827	0,171	**0,000**
Secular	-0,889	0,157	**0,000**		-0,877	0,144	**0,000**
Religiosity	0,461	0,181	**0,011**		0,573	0,166	**0,001**
Nationalism	-0,256	0,144	0,075		-0,293	0,132	**0,026**
Urban	-0,042	0,148	0,778		0,036	0,137	0,791
Capitol and surroundings	0,480	0,161	**0,003**		0,411	0,149	**0,006**
Nostalgia	-0,502	0,232	**0,031**		-0,399	0,204	**0,051**
Satisfaction with democracy	1,283	0,146	**0,000**		1,294	0,135	**0,000**
Quartiles of mean income dummies:							
Lowest	0,303	0,155	**0,050**		0,399	0,143	**0,005**
Second	-0,061	0,167	0,713		0,108	0,150	0,473
Third	-0,115	0,175	0,510		-0,191	0,161	0,235
Highest	-0,155	0,172	0,367		-0,331	0,158	**0,037**
Farmer	0,331	0,218	0,129		0,193	0,211	0,362
Market economy positive	0,710	0,145	**0,000**		0,599	0,132	**0,000**

Dependent variable:	KDNP 1990				KDNP 1994		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	1,880	0,240	**0,000**		1,520	0,207	**0,000**
Calvinist	-0,870	0,463	0,060		-0,157	0,238	0,626
Secular	-1,751	0,282	**0,000**		-1,638	0,253	**0,000**
Religiosity	2,303	0,209	**0,000**		2,477	0,197	**0,000**
Nationalism	-0,084	0,201	0,676		0,024	0,188	0,897
Urban	-0,218	0,203	0,282		0,125	0,198	0,528
Capitol and surroundings	0,084	0,242	0,728		0,060	0,227	0,790
Nostalgia	-0,821	0,372	**0,027**		-1,294	0,422	**0,002**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,366	0,210	0,082		0,671	0,188	**0,000**
Quartiles of mean income dummies:							
Lowest	0,540	0,208	**0,009**		0,610	0,196	**0,002**
Second	-0,142	0,237	0,550		-0,090	0,223	0,687
Third	-0,115	0,245	0,639		0,021	0,218	0,923
Highest	-0,400	0,258	0,121		-0,645	0,249	**0,009**
Farmer	0,093	0,326	0,776		0,491	0,270	0,069
Market economy positive	-0,159	0,208	0,445		0,117	0,188	**0,535**

Dependent variable:	FKGP 1990				FKGP 94		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	0,185	0,152	0,222		0,265	0,175	0,130
Calvinist	0,687	0,199	**0,001**		0,361	0,249	0,148
Secular	-0,638	0,157	**0,000**		-0,376	0,177	**0,034**
Religiosity	0,667	0,179	**0,000**		0,508	0,219	**0,020**
Nationalism	-0,213	0,149	0,153		-0,539	0,175	**0,002**
Urban	-0,950	0,152	**0,000**		-0,894	0,175	**0,000**
Capitol and surroundings	-1,561	0,314	**0,000**		-1,274	0,331	**0,000**
Nostalgia	-1,300	0,330	**0,000**		-1,666	0,458	**0,000**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,109	0,163	0,502		0,013	0,185	0,946
Quartiles of mean income dummies:							
Lowest	0,649	0,154	**0,000**		0,885	0,177	**0,000**
Second	0,351	0,161	**0,029**		0,160	0,195	0,411
Third	-0,543	0,204	**0,008**		-0,390	0,225	0,083
Highest	-0,817	0,216	**0,000**		-0,974	0,256	**0,000**
Farmer	1,219	0,184	**0,000**		0,984	0,219	**0,000**
Market economy positive	-0,132	0,154	0,390		0,077	0,175	0,661

Dependent variable:	FKGP 1998		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	0,119	0,305	0,697
Calvinist	-0,211	0,396	0,594
Secular	-0,835	0,734	0,255
Religiosity	0,922	0,324	**0,004**
Nationalism	-0,706	0,314	**0,025**
Urban	1,051	0,288	**0,000**
Capitol and surroundings	-0,663	0,444	0,135
Nostalgia	-0,402	0,295	0,174
Satisfaction with democracy	0,058	0,286	0,840
Quartiles of mean income dummies:			
Lowest	0,188	0,402	0,640
Second	0,330	0,294	0,262
Third	-0,442	0,318	0,165
Highest	-18,606	20096,485	0,999
Farmer	0,947	0,287	**0,001**
Market economy positive	-0,069	0,316	0,828

Romania

Dependent variable	FSN 1990				FDSN 1992		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	-2,161	0,458	**0,000**		-1,677	0,477	**0,000**
Protestant					-3,436	1,012	**0,001**
Orthodox	1,708	0,211	**0,000**		2,066	0,283	**0,000**
Calvinist	-2,390	0,548	**0,000**				
Secular	-0,368	0,275	0,180		0,040	0,513	0,938
Religiosity	0,098	0,175	0,575		-0,027	0,186	0,887
Titular national					2,669	0,465	**0,000**
Hungarian minority					-3,115	0,591	**0,000**
Urban	-1,043	0,143	**0,000**		-0,606	0,166	**0,000**
Capitol and surroundings					-0,008	0,260	0,976
Nostalgia	0,658	0,194	**0,001**		0,047	0,161	0,771
Satisfaction with democracy	1,224	0,148	**0,000**		0,798	0,165	**0,000**
Income:							
Lowest quartile	0,256	0,196	0,191		-0,532	0,179	**0,003**
Second quartile	0,002	0,146	0,991		-0,236	0,180	0,190
Third quartile	-0,278	0,178	0,118		0,689	0,188	**0,000**
Highest quartile	0,200	0,353	0,571		0,226	0,195	0,246
Farmer	0,674	0,141	**0,000**		-0,048	0,869	**0,003**
Market economy positive	-1,294	0,161	**0,000**		-0,655	0,181	**0,000**

Dependent variable	FSN 1992		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	-0,640	0,736	0,385
Protestant	-1,416	1,020	0,165
Orthodox	1,097	0,479	**0,022**
Calvinist	0,617	0,767	0,421
Secular	0,417	0,321	0,194
Religiosity			
Titular national	1,547	0,729	**0,034**
Hungarian minority	-2,184	1,015	**0,031**
Urban	-0,467	0,323	0,149
Capitol and surroundings	-1,753	1,018	0,085
Nostalgia	0,060	0,300	0,841
Satisfaction with democracy	0,661	0,294	**0,024**
Income:			
Lowest quartile	0,210	0,313	0,504
Second quartile	-0,155	0,345	0,652
Third quartile	0,237	0,347	0,495
Highest quartile	-0,404	0,420	0,336
Farmer	-18,598	-18,598	0,999
Market economy positive	0,040	0,359	0,910

Dependent variable	PDSR 1996				PDSR 2000		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	-0,999	0,384	**0,009**		-1,833	0,443	**0,000**
Protestant					-20,920	10377,780	0,998
Orthodox	1,249	0,292	**0,000**		1,341	0,284	**0,000**
Calvinist							
Secular							
Religiosity	-1,673	1,035	0,106		-0,487	0,251	0,053
Titular national	0,013	0,165	0,938		0,016	0,201	0,935
Hungarian minority							
Urban	1,631	0,430	**0,000**		1,423	0,299	**0,000**
Capitol and surroundings					0,152	0,612	0,804
Nostalgia	-2,564	0,721	**0,000**		-2,751	0,600	**0,000**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,247	0,146	0,092		1,170	0,182	**0,000**
Income:	-0,440	0,162	**0,007**		-0,369	0,174	**0,034**
Lowest quartile					0,078	0,260	0,763
Second quartile	0,675	0,163	**0,000**		1,145	0,186	**0,000**
Third quartile	-0,404	0,207	0,052		-0,514	0,222	**0,021**
Highest quartile							
Farmer	0,284	0,150	0,058		0,732	0,226	**0,001**
Market economy positive	-0,139	0,149	0,350		0,224	0,188	0,235
Catholic	-0,491	0,296	0,097		-0,062	0,190	0,745
Protestant	0,033	0,589	0,955		-0,891	0,246	**0,000**
Orthodox	0,881	0,183	**0,000**		0,701	0,307	**0,022**
Calvinist	-0,992	0,160	**0,000**		-1,169	0,198	**0,000**

Dependent variable:	PNL 1990				CDR 1992		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	-0,333	0,615	0,588		-0,302	0,350	0,389
Protestant					1,132	0,286	**0,000**
Orthodox	0,032	0,295	0,913		-0,327	0,189	0,085
Calvinist	-0,093	0,622	0,881				
Secular	0,406	0,363	0,263		0,162	0,539	0,764
Religiosity	-1,294	0,376	**0,001**		-0,052	0,202	0,795
Titular national					0,049	0,233	0,833
Hungarian minority					-0,047	0,240	0,846
Urban	1,123	0,217	**0,000**		0,596	0,169	**0,000**
Capitol and surroundings					0,562	0,258	**0,030**
Nostalgia	-0,325	0,277	0,241		0,221	0,178	0,213
Satisfaction with democracy	-1,411	0,237	**0,000**		-1,346	0,229	**0,000**
Income:							
Lowest quartile	-0,317	0,303	0,295		0,317	0,181	0,080
Second quartile	0,213	0,218	0,327		-0,204	0,196	0,297
Third quartile	0,067	0,262	0,799		-0,426	0,225	0,058
Highest quartile	-0,534	0,610	0,381		0,225	0,208	0,279
Farmer	-0,866	0,215	**0,000**		1,044	0,821	0,204
Market economy positive	1,298	0,234	**0,000**		0,466	0,213	**0,029**

Dependent variable:	CDR 1996				PNL 2000		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	-0,762	0,263	**0,004**		-0,938	1,031	0,363
Protestant					-18,178	10377,780	0,999
Orthodox	0,268	0,184	0,147		-0,241	0,514	0,638
Calvinist	0,018	0,644	**0,035**		0,069	0,559	0,902
Secular	0,348	0,147	**0,018**		-0,242	0,510	0,635
Religiosity	0,659	0,232	**0,004**		0,787	0,747	0,292
Titular national	-0,975	0,266	**0,000**		-18,265	5277,596	0,997
Hungarian minority	0,001	0,129	0,995		-1,350	0,476	**0,005**
Urban	0,241	0,136	0,077		-0,025	0,412	0,953
Capitol and surroundings					-0,042	0,629	0,947
Nostalgia	-0,622	0,138	**0,000**		-0,883	0,511	0,084
Satisfaction with democracy	0,614	0,175	**0,000**		0,195	0,484	0,687
Income:							
Lowest quartile	0,249	0,134	0,063		-0,111	0,557	0,842
Second quartile	-0,325	0,131	**0,013**		-0,278	0,478	0,560
Third quartile	0,272	0,235	0,248		-0,521	0,509	0,306
Highest quartile	-0,014	0,522	0,979		0,577	0,460	0,209
Farmer	0,019	0,176	0,915		-18,249	5684,144	0,997
Market economy positive	0,661	0,143	**0,000**		1,180	0,623	0,058

Dependent variable:	UDMR 1990				UDMR 1992		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	3,859	0,410	**0,000**		2,109	0,321	**0,000**
Protestant					1,515	0,335	**0,000**
Orthodox	-5,320	0,606	**0,000**		-20,764	1682,023	0,990
Calvinist	4,160	0,473	**0,000**				
Secular	-0,164	0,610	0,788		-18,943	9748,227	0,998
Religiosity	0,993	0,290	**0,001**		0,709	0,270	**0,009**
Titular national					-5,340	0,536	**0,000**
Hungarian minority					5,531	0,540	**0,000**
Urban	0,602	0,284	**0,034**		0,235	0,257	0,360
Capitol and surroundings					-1,366	0,728	0,061
Nostalgia	-0,669	0,441	0,129		0,758	0,306	**0,013**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,849	0,299	**0,004**		0,363	0,263	0,168
Income:							
Lowest quartile	-0,649	0,481	0,177		0,844	0,270	**0,002**
Second quartile	0,317	0,308	0,304		0,003	0,299	0,993
Third quartile	0,179	0,354	0,612		-0,472	0,374	0,206
Highest quartile	-0,892	1,024	0,383		-1,097	0,477	**0,021**
Farmer	-0,488	0,287	0,089		0,683	1,103	0,536
Market economy positive	2,623	0,606	**0,000**		0,539	0,359	0,133

Dependent variable:	UDMR 1996				UDMR 2000		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic	4,153	0,371	**0,000**		4,271	0,417	**0,000**
Protestant					2,803	0,546	**0,000**
Orthodox	-5,265	0,731	**0,000**		-21,072	1867,926	0,991
Calvinist	0,338	1,044	0,747		0,584	0,382	0,126
Secular	-1,328	0,529	**0,012**		1,122	0,324	**0,001**
Religiosity	-21,296	1340,511	0,987		-21,180	1857,921	0,991
Titular national	21,791	1328,739	0,987		22,256	1802,901	0,990
Hungarian minority	-3,710	1,014	**0,000**		-2,094	0,449	**0,000**
Urban	-1,680	0,528	**0,001**		-0,237	0,318	0,457
Capitol and surroundings					-18,871	4838,665	0,997
Nostalgia	-0,585	0,330	0,077		-1,515	0,488	**0,002**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,180	0,420	0,668		-0,176	0,408	0,666
Income:							
Lowest quartile	-0,711	0,373	0,057		-0,510	0,489	0,298
Second quartile	0,760	0,346	**0,028**		0,172	0,340	0,613
Third quartile	-0,141	0,612	0,817		-0,068	0,354	0,847
Highest quartile	-18,079	10377,780	0,999		0,464	0,368	0,208
Farmer	-0,658	0,531	0,216		0,777	0,437	0,075
Market economy positive	-1,061	0,344	**0,002**		0,777	0,427	0,069

Dependent variable	PUNR 1992				PUNR 1996		
Independent variables:	b	S.E	sign		b	S.E	sign
Catholic	0,610	0,460	0,185		-0,219	1,037	0,832
Protestant	0,338	0,493	0,493		-17,220	40192,970	1,000
Orthodox	0,029	0,341	0,932		-0,583	0,575	0,310
Calvinist	-18,635	9748,227	0,998		-17,236	10048,243	0,999
Secular	-0,324	0,378	0,391		0,087	0,531	0,869
Religiosity	0,344	0,447	0,441		17,312	4334,119	0,997
Titular national	-0,253	0,447	0,571		-17,294	4803,979	0,997
Hungarian minority					-0,322	0,488	0,509
Urban	-0,201	0,306	0,510		0,713	0,476	0,134
Capitol and surroundings	-1,045	0,732	0,153				
Nostalgia	-1,109	0,314	**0,000**		0,208	0,498	0,676
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,073	0,318	0,819		-1,330	1,032	0,198
Income:							
Lowest quartile	0,210	0,313	0,504		-1,656	0,756	**0,028**
Second quartile	0,381	0,314	0,226		1,601	0,640	**0,012**
Third quartile	-0,311	0,399	0,436		-0,430	1,037	0,678
Highest quartile	-0,592	0,447	0,186		-17,224	10377,780	0,999
Farmer	-18,619	16408,711	0,999		-17,391	3249,409	0,996
Market economy positive	-0,238	0,343	0,488		0,839	0,655	0,201

Bulgaria

Dependent variable	SDS 1991				SDS 1994		
Independent variables:	**b**	**S.E.**	**Sig.**		**b**	**S.E.**	**Sig.**
Secular	-0,626	0,084	**0,000**				
Religiosity	-0,103	0,145	0,477				
Titular national	0,756	0,117	**0,000**		0,677	0,340	**0,047**
Rroma minority	-0,633	0,242	**0,009**		-1,798	1,029	0,081
Turkish minority	-1,268	0,193	**0,000**		-0,558	0,396	0,158
Bulgarian muslim	-0,260	0,260	0,317				
Nationalism is negative	0,222	0,075	**0,003**				
Urban	0,762	0,075	**0,000**		0,943	0,200	**0,000**
Capitol and surroundings	0,656	0,100	**0,000**		1,235	0,250	**0,000**
Nostalgia	-1,549	0,198	**0,000**		0,052	0,212	0,807
Satisfaction with democracy	0,500	0,079	**0,000**		0,040	0,303	0,895
Quartiles of mean income dummies							
Lowest					-0,378	0,228	0,097
Second	0,694	0,075	**0,000**		-0,254	0,212	0,231
Third	-0,186	0,079	**0,019**		0,360	0,237	0,128
Highest	-0,828	0,099	**0,000**		0,882	0,302	**0,004**
Farmer	-0,939	0,138	**0,000**		-1,798	1,029	0,081
Market economy positive	1,627	0,082	**0,000**		1,236	0,201	**0,000**

Dependent variable	SDS 1997				SDS 2001		
Independent variables:	**b**	**S.E.**	**Sig.**		**b**	**S.E.**	**Sig.**
Catholic					-19,994	23205,422	0,999
Protestant					0,527	1,229	0,668
Orthodox	0,898	0,197	**0,000**		0,272	0,266	0,305
Muslim	-1,122	0,244	**0,000**		-0,705	0,396	0,075
Secular	-1,116	0,506	**0,027**		0,131	0,352	0,709
Religiosity	-0,301	0,208	0,148		0,348	0,462	0,452
Titular national	1,318	0,233	**0,000**		0,854	0,393	**0,030**
Rroma minority	-0,946	0,388	**0,015**		-0,293	0,789	0,710
Turkish minority	-1,469	0,293	**0,000**		-1,034	0,485	**0,033**
Nationalism is negative	-0,060	0,176	0,735		-0,123	0,214	0,566
Urban	0,931	0,154	**0,000**		0,563	0,215	**0,009**
Capitol and surroundings	0,906	0,229	**0,000**		1,202	0,263	**0,000**
Nostalgia	-0,788	0,155	**0,000**				
Satisfaction with democracy	1,509	0,217	**0,000**				
Quartiles of mean income dummies							
Lowest	-0,848	0,162	**0,000**		-0,939	0,355	**0,008**
Second	0,541	0,151	**0,000**		-0,790	0,275	**0,004**
Third	0,975	0,340	**0,004**		0,013	0,214	0,952
Highest	1,926	1,098	0,079		0,605	0,240	**0,012**
Farmer	-0,422	0,155	**0,006**		0,527	1,229	0,668
Market economy positive	1,470	0,194	**0,000**				
Optimist own economic future					0,079	0,238	0,739

Dependent variable	BSP 1991				BSP 1994		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Religiosity	-0,563	0,150	**0,000**				
Titular national	0,349	0,106	**0,001**		0,862	0,252	**0,001**
Rroma minority	0,546	0,209	**0,009**		1,119	0,519	**0,031**
Turkish minority	-1,193	0,177	**0,000**		-1,689	0,360	**0,000**
Bulgarian muslim	0,347	0,242	0,151				
Nationalism is negative	-0,145	0,074	0,051				
Urban	-0,215	0,073	**0,003**		-0,824	0,181	**0,000**
Capitol and surroundings	-0,228	0,103	**0,026**		-1,194	0,265	**0,000**
Nostalgia	1,490	0,149	**0,000**		-0,734	0,183	**0,000**
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,140	0,075	0,062		-0,865	0,269	**0,001**
Quartiles of mean income dummies							
Lowest					0,516	0,181	**0,004**
Second	-0,630	0,075	**0,000**		0,205	0,171	0,229
Third	0,122	0,076	**0,109**		-0,594	0,206	**0,004**
Highest	0,733	0,087	**0,000**		-0,915	0,302	**0,002**
Farmer	0,051	0,114	0,655		-0,179	0,445	0,687
Market economy positive	-1,297	0,077	**0,000**		-1,425	0,176	**0,000**

Dependent variable	BSP 1997				BSP 2001		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic					0,562	1,230	0,647
Protestant					-19,959	23205,422	0,999
Orthodox	0,363	0,219	0,098		0,375	0,274	0,171
Muslim	-1,114	0,319	**0,000**		-1,804	0,603	**0,003**
Secular	1,415	0,413	**0,001**		-18,728	5801,356	0,997
Religiosity	-0,010	0,233	0,967		-1,936	1,027	0,059
Titular national	-0,103	0,219	0,639		1,164	0,443	**0,009**
Rroma minority	1,469	0,335	**0,000**		0,710	0,636	0,264
Turkish minority	-0,857	0,323	**0,008**		-2,743	1,016	**0,007**
Nationalism	0,386	0,193	**0,045**		0,500	0,217	**0,021**
Urban	-0,782	0,179	**0,000**		-0,756	0,230	**0,001**
Capitol and surroundings dummy	-1,685	0,431	**0,000**		-0,470	0,335	0,161
Nostalgia	0,854	0,175	**0,000**				
Satisfaction with democracy	-1,420	0,318	**0,000**				
Quartiles of mean income dummies							
Lowest	1,009	0,176	**0,000**		0,682	0,228	0,003
Second	-0,584	0,174	**0,001**		0,514	0,264	0,052
Third	-1,452	0,607	**0,017**		0,216	0,216	0,318
Highest	-20,101	16408,711	0,999		-1,255	0,351	**0,000**
Farmer	0,194	0,181	0,284				
Market economy positive	-1,248	0,252	**0,000**				
Optimist own economic future					-1,041	0,299	**0,000**

Dependent variable	DPS 91				DPS 94		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Secular	-1,234	0,262	**0,000**				
Religiosity	1,576	0,209	**0,000**				
Titular national	-4,908	0,369	**0,000**		-4,225	0,441	**0,000**
Rroma minority	0,544	0,403	0,177		0,301	0,760	0,692
Turkish minority	5,338	0,273	**0,000**		4,622	0,428	**0,000**
Bulgarian muslim	-0,053	0,597	0,929				
Nationalism is negative	-0,098	0,178	0,582				
Urban	-2,196	0,304	**0,000**		-2,300	0,729	**0,002**
Capitol and surroundings	-2,157	0,586	**0,000**		-18,813	4493,711	0,997
Nostalgia	-1,113	0,512	**0,030**		0,485	0,388	0,211
Satisfaction with democracy	-0,732	0,173	**0,000**		0,756	0,397	0,057
Quartiles of mean income dummies							
Lowest					0,510	0,318	0,109
Second	-0,478	0,184	**0,010**		0,257	0,315	0,414
Third	0,236	0,177	0,182		-1,361	0,607	**0,025**
Highest	0,399	0,399	**0,037**		-0,814	0,738	0,270
Farmer	1,875	0,181	**0,000**		1,157	0,579	**0,046**
Market economy positive	-0,909	0,187	**0,000**		-1,341	0,420	**0,001**

Dependent variable	DPS 1997				DPS 2001		
Independent variables:	b	S.E.	Sig.		b	S.E.	Sig.
Catholic					-18,625	23205,422	0,999
Protestant	-5,760	1,014	**0,000**		-4,357	0,738	**0,000**
Orthodox	6,541	1,019	**0,000**		5,627	0,756	**0,000**
Muslim	-18,807	8038,594	0,998		-18,728	5801,356	0,997
Secular	1,358	0,289	**0,000**		0,197	0,76	0,796
Religiosity	-3,827	0,398	**0,000**		-4,554	0,56	**0,000**
Titular national	-18,828	6436,026	0,998		-18,642	12118,636	0,999
Turkish minority	4,614	0,414	**0,000**		5,258	0,583	**0,000**
Rroma minority	-2,281	0,725	**0,002**		-1,775	0,492	**0,000**
Nationalism	-3,666	1,012	**0,000**		-1,662	0,492	**0,001**
Capitol and surroundings dummy	-18,916	4190,407	0,996		-1,864	1,022	0,068
Nostalgia	-0,480	0,286	0,093				
Satisfaction with democracy	-2,319	1,018	**0,023**				
Quartiles of mean income dummies							
Lowest	0,766	0,273	**0,005**		0,614	0,361	0,089
Second	-0,642	0,280	**0,022**		0,866	0,385	**0,025**
Third	-18,830	6355,067	0,998		-0,198	0,357	0,580
Highest	-18,778	16408,711	0,999		-1,611	0,736	**0,029**
Farmer	1,543	0,410	**0,000**		1,916	1,238	0,122
Market economy positive	-0,877	0,444	**0,048**				
Optimist own economic future					-1,104	0,541	**0,041**

Dependent variable	BZNS-DP 1994		
Independent variables:	B	S.E.	Sig.
Titular national	1,905	1,019	0,062
Rroma minority	-0,418	1,037	0,687
Turkish minority	-18,712	5469,570	0,997
Urban	0,365	0,329	0,267
Capitol and surroundings	0,778	0,383	**0,042**
Nostalgia	0,863	0,366	**0,018**
Satisfaction with democracy	1,116	0,376	**0,003**
Quartiles of mean income dummies			
Lowest	-0,595	0,387	0,124
Second	0,247	0,322	0,443
Third	0,311	0,367	0,396
Highest	0,299	0,499	0,549
Farmer	1,522	0,539	**0,005**
Market economy positive	0,920	0,324	**0,004**

Dependent variable	NMS 2001		
Independent variables:	b	S.E	Sign.
Catholic	-0,276	1,228	0,822
Protestant	1,119	1,228	0,362
Orthodox	0,664	0,232	0,004
Muslim	-0,737	0,314	0,019
Secular	-0,515	0,332	0,121
Religiosity	0,441	0,419	0,293
Titular national	0,556	0,289	0,054
Rroma minority	-0,144	0,634	0,820
Turkish minority	-0,776	0,346	0,025
Nationalism	0,025	0,183	0,890
Urban	0,132	0,184	0,471
Capitol and surroundings dummy	-0,848	0,288	0,003
Quartiles of mean income dummies			
Lowest	0,109	0,241	0,650
Second	0,031	0,184	0,867
Third	-0,015	0,205	0,941
Highest	-0,032	0,221	0,886
Optimist own economic future	0,748	0,205	0,000

Dependent variable	BBB 1994		
Independent variables:	**b**	**S.E.**	**Sig.**
Titular national	1,708	1,021	0,094
Rroma minority	-18,460	8770,825	0,998
Turkish minority	-18,521	5469,570	0,997
Urban	0,179	0,365	0,624
Capitol and surroundings dummy	0,083	0,498	0,868
Nostalgia	0,852	0,398	**0,032**
Satisfaction with democracy	0,263	0,500	0,599
Quartiles of mean income dummies			
Lowest	-0,600	0,435	0,168
Second	-0,148	0,372	0,691
Third	0,195	0,420	0,642
Highest	0,837	0,476	0,079
Farmer	-0,223	1,039	0,830
Market economy positive	1,193	0,364	**0,001**

Appendix 4. Codebooks for logistic regression models

Hungary

Election:	Hungary 1990	Hungary 1994	Hungary 1998	Hungary 2002
Data source:	Election Studies. ZA1945.	Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 1997	Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 1997	European Social Survey 2002 (Interviews conducted in 2003)
Dependent variable:	Which party did you vote for in 1990? (All relevant parties dichotomised)	Which party did you vote for in 1994? (All relevant parties dichotomised)	Which party do you intend to vote for in the next election? (All relevant parties dichotomised)	Which party did you vote for in the last national election? (All relevant parties dichotomised)
Independent variables:				
Religion	Catholic (1=Yes, 0=No) Calvinist (1=Yes, 0=No) Secular (1=Yes, 0=No)	Catholic at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) Calvinist at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) Secular (1=Yes, 0=No)	Catholic at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) Calvinist at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) Secular (1=Yes, 0=No)	Catholic (1=Yes, 0=No) Calvinist (1=Yes, 0=No) Not at all religious (1=Yes, 0=No)
Religiousity	Weekly or more frequent church attendance (1=Yes, 0=No)	Do you follow church regularly? (1=Yes, 0=No)	Do you follow church regularly (1=Yes, 0=No)	No data available
Minority	Not included	Not included	Not included	Not included
Nationalism	Statement: Nationalism is harmful (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	How proud are you of your citizenship? (1=Very proud, 0=All other values)	How proud are you of your citizenship? (1=Very proud, 0=All other values)	Statement: Better if almost all share values and traditions (1=Strongly agree, 0 =All other values)
Urban-rural	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)

Cont.	Hungary 1990	Hungary 1994	Hungary 1998	Hungary 2000
Capitol and surroundings	Area of residence (Capitol and surrounding=1, All other areas=0)	Area of residence (Capitol and surrounding=1, All other areas=0)	Area of residence (Capitol and surrounding=1, All other areas=0)	No data available
Nostalgia 1	Previous member of communist party (1=Yes, 0=No)	Statement: Communism is a good idea (1=Yes, 0=No)	Statement: Communism is a good idea (1=Yes, 0=No)	No data available
Nostalgia 2	Satisfaction with democracy (1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 0=All other values)	Satisfaction with democracy 1=rated 5-10 on ten point scale, 0=rated 0-4 on ten point scale)	Satisfaction with democracy 1=rated 5-10 on ten point scale, 0=rated 0-4 on ten point scale)	No data available
Income	Income divided in four quartiles, which all were dichotomised[23]	Income divided in four quartiles, which all were dichotomised	Income divided in four quartiles, which all were dichotomised	How are you living on present income? Four categories were dichotomised: -very difficult -difficult -coping -comfortably
Agrarian	Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 0=No)	Agricultural production main source of income (1= Yes, 0=No)	Agricultural production main source of income (1= Yes, 0=No)	Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 0=No
Left-right	Statement: Privatisation is positive (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	Statement: Free market is right (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	Statement: Free market is right (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	Statement: Government should not intervene in economy (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)

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[23] All four dichotomies were not included simultaneously in multivariate models.

Romania

Election:	Romania 1990	Romania 1992	Romania 1996	Romania 2000
Data source:	Post-Communist Citizen Survey 1990-92. Election studies	Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 3	Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 1997	European Value Survey 1999
Dependent variable:	Which party did you vote for in 1990? (All relevant parties dichotomised)	Which party did you vote for in 1992? (All relevant parties dichotomised)	Which party do you intend to vote for in the next election? (All relevant parties dichotomised)	Which party do you intend to vote for in the next election? (All relevant parties dichotomised)
Independent variables:				
Religion	Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) Catholic (1=Yes, 0=No) Calvinist (1=Yes, 0=No) Secular (1=Yes, 0=No)	Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) Catholic at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) Calvinist at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) Secular (1=Yes, 0=No)	Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) Catholic at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) Calvinist at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) Secular (1=Yes, 0=No)	Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) Catholic (1=Yes, 0=No) Calvinist (1=Yes, 0=No) Not at all religious (1=Yes, 0=No)
Religiousity	Do you follow the teachings of the church? (1=Yes, 0=No)	Do you follow church regularly? (1=Yes, 0=No)	Do you follow church regularly (1=Yes, 0=No)	Weekly or more frequent church attendance (1=Yes, 0=No)
Minority	No data available	What is your primary language? Hungarian and Romanian dichotomised	What is your primary language? Hungarian and Romanian dichotomised	What is your primary language? Hungarian and Romanian dichotomised
Nationalism	No data available	No data available	How proud are you of your citizenship? (1=Very proud, 0=All other values)	How proud are you of your citizenship? (1=Very proud, 0=All other values)
Urban-rural	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)

Cont.	Romania 1990	Romania 1992	Romania 1996	Romania 2000
Capitol and surroundings	No data available	Area of residence (Capitol and surrounding=1, All other areas=0)	No data available	Area of residence (Capitol and surrounding=1, All other areas=0)
Nostalgia 1	Statement: Speed of change is too fast (1=Agree, 0=All other values)	Statement: Previous system was bad (1=Yes, 0=No)	Statement: Communism is a good idea (1=Yes, 0=No)	Do you view the political system as good? (1=Yes, 0=No)
Nostalgia 2	Satisfaction with democracy (1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 0=All other values)	Satisfaction with democracy (1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 0=All other values)	Satisfaction with democracy 1=rated 5-10 on ten point scale, 0=rated 0-4 on ten point scale)	Satisfaction with democracy (1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 0=All other values)
Income	Income divided in four quartiles, which all were dichotomised[24]	Income divided in four quartiles, which all were dichotomised	Income divided in four quartiles, which all were dichotomised	Income divided in four quartiles, which all were dichotomised
Agrarian	Do you produce agricultural goods? (1=Yes, 0=No)	Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 0=No)	Agricultural production main source of income (1= Yes, 0=No)	Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 0=No
Left-right	Statement: Capitalist economy is best for the country (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	Statement: Capitalist economy is best for the country (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	Statement: Free market is right (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	Statement: Private ownership is good (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)

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[24] All four dichotomies were not included simultaneously in multivariate models.

Bulgaria

Election:	Bulgaria 1991	Bulgaria 1994	Bulgaria 1997	Bulgaria 2001
Data source:	Election Studies. ZA study number 1945.	Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 6	Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 1997	European Value Survey 1999
Dependent variable:	Which party did you vote for in 1990? (All relevant parties dichotomised)	Which party did you vote for in 1994? (All relevant parties dichotomised)	Which party do you intend to vote for in the next election? (All relevant parties dichotomised)	Which party do you intend to vote for in the next election? (All relevant parties dichotomised)
Independent variables:				
Religion	Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) Other data not available	Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) Other data not available	Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) Muslim (1=Yes, 0=No) Secular (1=Yes, 0=No)	Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) Catholic (1=Yes, 0=No) Muslim (1=Yes, 0=No) Not at all religious (1=Yes, 0=No)
Religiousity	Weekly or more frequent church attendance (1=Yes, 0=No)	No data available	Do you follow church regularly (1=Yes, 0=No)	Weekly or more frequent church attendance (1=Yes, 0=No)
Ethnic minority	What is your primary language? Turkish, Rroma and Bulgarian dichotomised	What is your primary language? Turkish, Rroma and Bulgarian dichotomised	What is your primary language? Turkish, Rroma and Bulgarian dichotomised	What is your primary language? Turkish, Rroma and Bulgarian dichotomised
Nationalism	Statement: Etnic relations are bad (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	No data available	How proud are you of your citizenship? (1=Very proud, 0=All other values)	How proud are you of your nationality? (1=Very proud, 0=All other values)
Urban-rural	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)	Community size (1=population more than 50 000, 0=population less than 50 000)

Cont.	Bulgaria 1991	Bulgaria 1994	Bulgaria 1997	Bulgaria 2001
Capitol and surroundings	Area of residence (Capitol and surrounding=1, All other areas=0)	Area of residence (Capitol and surrounding=1, All other areas=0)	Area of residence (Capitol and surrounding=1, All other areas=0)	Residence in Sofia (Yes=1, No=0)
Nostalgia 1	Statement: Former party leadership was good (1=Agree, 0=All other values)	Statement: Development is going the right direction (1=Yes, 0=No)	Statement: Communism is a good idea (1=Yes, 0=No)	Do you view the political system as good? (1=Yes, 0=No)
Nostalgia 2	Statement: Multiparty system is good for the future (1=Agree, 0=All other values)	Satisfaction with democracy (1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 0=All other values)	Satisfaction with democracy 1=rated 5-10 on ten point scale, 0=rated 0-4 on ten point scale)	Satisfaction with democracy (1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 0=All other values)
Income	How satisfied are you with material welfare? (Three categories were dichotomised: Not satisfied, partly satisfied and satisfied)	Income divided in four quartiles, which were all dichotomised	Income divided in four quartiles, which were all dichotomised	Income divided in four quartiles, which were all dichotomised
Agrarian	Are you an agricultural worker? (1=Yes, 0=No)	Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 0=No)	Agricultural production main source of income (1= Yes, 0=No)	Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 0=No
Left-right	Statement: A wide development of private property based business is good (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	Statement: A free market is best for the country (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	Statement: Free market is right (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)	Statement: Private ownership is good (1=Agree, 0=Disagree)
Expectations for the future (not a cleavage variable)	Not included in the analysis	Not included in the analysis	Not included in the analysis	Do you expect you economic future to be better? (1=Yes, 0=No)