

SEEING LIKE A STATE VS. SEEING LIKE A LOCAL COMMUNITY:

The Case of Dam Construction in Nubian Homeland, Sudan



**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the MPhil Degree in Anthropology of Development**

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Dedication

To Mahas People

&

To the Soul of my Grandmother

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
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Map of proposed and accomplished dams in Sudan



The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Nile Sub-Basins

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| 1 Lower Nile | 6 Sobat |
| 2 Atbara | 7 White Nile |
| 3 Nile | 8 Bar el Ghazal |
| 4 Blue Nile | Upper White Nile |
| 5 Lower White Nile | |

Potential Hydroelectric Sites

- ▲ Major hydroelectric site
- ▲ Minor hydroelectric site

Kilometres
0 100 200 300 400 500
Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area Projection

Sources:
SIM (Sudan Interagency Mapping); FAO; vmap00; NIMA; hydro1k; USGS;
GONU Ministry of Water Resources; UN Cartographic Section; various maps and atlases.

UNEP/DEWA/GRD-Europe 2006

Source: United Nation Environment Programme (UNEP)

List of abbreviations

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DIU	Dam Implementation Unit
GIS	Geographical Information System
WCDs	World Commission on Dams
NCP	National Congress Party
SPLM	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Chapter One

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

General Background of Dam Construction

In the mid-20th century and the subsequent decades, dams were regarded as a neutral development technology which could contribute to progress in developing countries. Economic development depends to a large extent on electricity generation for industry, agriculture and other sectors of the economy. Dam construction for hydroelectric and irrigation purposes was thus portrayed as a cornerstone of progress in many developing countries. But the objectives of development usually addressed the macroeconomic situation rather than focusing on microscale effects, such as impacts on upstream or downstream populations whose areas would be negatively affected. Feasibility studies were concerned with evaluating economic and technical aspects, while ecological and socio-cultural factors were marginalized (Fahim 1981). Although the resources of the local population would be affected by such projects, they were rarely consulted by the planners and decision-makers in national governments. The hegemony of development discourse of the time was primarily glorified scientific knowledge as a guide to development, and looked down upon local and indigenous knowledge, because there was a strong belief in the science and technology, which played an important role in the justification of the new discourse of development (Escobar 1995). Developers therefore refused to allow the presumed stakeholders to participate in the decision-making process.

Dam construction as a developmental project is thus clearly a case of top-down intervention. This era of hegemonic development had devastating consequences by depriving many people of their sources of livelihood leading to their impoverishment (Barth 1997). The World Commission on Dams reported that in the previous three decades almost 80 million people around the world were forced to leave their land due to the construction of large dams. Most of these people have been economically, culturally, and psychologically devastated.¹ Dams, in most cases, were tools for transferring communally possessed resources like water and land to the central government by appropriating them from local people (Shiva 2002). In

¹International Rivers: Affected People 2007. See: <http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/326>

most cases there was a lack of accountability on the part of dam builders, financiers and corrupt representatives of national authorities. Moreover, in most cases local people lacked a voice (Conca 2005). Consequently there were tensions and conflicts in many third-world countries between the government and the local people who suffered such injustices. National governments and policy-makers legitimize these human and social costs as inevitable costs of development and justify them on the basis of national interests.

The past two decades have seen some important changes in this field. Through the emergence of international anti-dam movements, a process has been started that the informed consent of the people affected should become a genuine part of any evaluation of dam projects. The participation of local people in developmental planning is regarded as an important element in bringing sustainable development that will change the livelihood system of the population. Any intervention that is not based on the consent of the local population will probably lead to disputes and the revival of ethnicity problems, threatening stability and security of the country.

Background to, and statement of, the problem

The Current research focuses on such issues in the context of the Nile in the Sudan. The government of the country is involved in building dams² on the part of the Nile that passes through the very north of the country. This area is inhabited by Nubians, one of the oldest African civilizations, dating back to 8000 B.C. Nor is this the first time they experience developments such as the ones described. The Nubians have still not forgotten the destructive consequences of the Aswan dam, which submerged their main city *Wadi Halfa* and uprooted a population of 100 000 from their ancestral land.

The particular focus of my project was an exploration of the debate about the proposed Kajbar dam in the Nubian region of Sudan, with reference to the discourses of various actors – government, opposition movements and local population – regarding the dams' feasibility and future impact. I wish in this way to show how each category of actors evaluates the economic, social, cultural and the environmental impact of the dam differently and the power

² There are four proposed dams in the Northern part of Sudan (Kajbar, Dal, Shereik and Mograt) and has Merowe has already been accomplished, see the map, but I will focus on Kajbar case.

relations of these conflicting visions. Addressing such issues in the case of a country like Sudan is even more important, as the unity of the country is fragile and ethnic loyalties are far stronger than “Sudanese national identity”. In the following section I present some of the arguments that are being used by the actors in the case presented here.

Conflicting visions

The new proposed dams are surrounded by tension and mistrust between the government and Nubians. The government claims that the project will increase agricultural production as well as electricity, which will be critical to the economic progress of the regions. On the other hand Nubians see it as a systematic de-population of the area in order to replace them with Arab groups around the lake. According to local activists, the project is “a series of destructive policies to dismantle Nubian society and assimilate the indigenous people of Nubian into Arabic culture through well-organized programs of cultural cleansing, acculturation and indoctrination”.³ They describe the government's claim that the project will bring development to the area, as an empty promise. When the government tried to start the project without their consent, thousands of people demonstrated against this policy, which they regarded as a violation of their right to remain on their ancestral land. Four people were killed and several injured in that demonstration by the military forces.

Various arguments have been raised for and against the Kajbar dam, depending on the position of the actors involved in the debates. One possible way of exploring these tensions is to view them as an interaction between contradicting elements provoked by the neoliberal era of globalization. On the one hand, such a perspective will link the Nubian case to generally held points of view in the global discourse over resources, one encouraging privatization of communally possessed resources, another focusing on rights-based rules and the advocacy of indigenous rights (Tsing 2005). The fate of such arguments is tied to the source of funding which most often is on the side of privatization, as well as to whether opposing movements, activists and local people are supported by transnational anti-dam movements in their struggle and how far local people are aware of their right to support these organizations. Both sides of

³ Sudan Tribune 2007, [Appeal to Rescue Nubia And to Stop Building the Kajbar Dam](#), Article 22302.

these struggles represent globalizing tendencies, and are expressed through the political struggles surrounding their various positions and activities.

However, the same discourses can also be seen in a nationalist context. This argument sees the main problem to be the appropriation of resources, under the flag of development, by corrupted governments which use state power in favor of the ruling group (Ferguson 1994). This perspective can tell us why the government is insisting on constructing the dam in spite of resistance from the so-called “beneficiaries”. In this context, it is important to understand the government’s interests in the project. Generally speaking, the role of state power and the power relationships of development are very crucial dimensions in any discussion of national developmental policies and how they are being initiated and implemented.

The importance of taking local people’s knowledge and opinions into account in planning and decision-making will allow us to investigate the sources of Nubian knowledge and attitudes about the dam. Local people should not be regarded as being homogeneous in their awareness of and attitudes towards the dam. Many factors may shape their perception of the project. Age, gender, level of education, social position, historical experiences, access to resources and political loyalty; all these factors can influence their perceptions.

Conceptual framework

Here, I discuss the main concepts considered in the course of this project. In brief, these are: development discourse, power, economics-driven rationality and resistance.

Development discourse

This project primarily deals with different viewpoints concerning the feasibility of the Kajbar dam. Evaluation of the success or failure of the outcome of the development project depends on the representations of the different stakeholders (Mosse 2004). It is therefore essential to investigate the discourse of development involved, what language is being used and what is represented by the language. “The language of development constitutes an important representational field in which the meanings and intentions of the development policies can be grasped and analyzed, including the different actors’ perceptions, views, desires and values and how they are framed and defended, or challenged and contested” (Arce 2000: 32). This

perspective on the discourse of development will enhance the possibility of cross-examination of the multi-vocal nature of proposed dam project. Many aspects that are directly related to the dam project can be explored by following different discourses attached to it. The discourse of development in the present case represents more than managerial, professional and authoritative points of view. Such views are certainly there, but so are project-related rumors, songs, poems and jokes as expressed by the local Nubian community and their activists, all of which should be regarded as part of a development discourse. The aim of the study is to understand these discourses rather than to judge their truth. The aim should rather be to examine the influence of a wide range of perceptions and practices on different stakeholders and to understand how they tactically manipulate the same perceptions and practices.

The above view is similar to Escobar's position (Escobar 1995). He argued that the development discourse produces knowledge about, and exercises power over, local populations. From his perspective we can approach the manifestations of mutual interdependence of power and discourse. But unlike Escobar's very wide-ranging concerns, I pay closer attention to the discourse of development and its manipulation at national level in state-society relations, rather than between "developed" and "Third World" countries. I agree that development discourse is maintained by national powers and that "many modern states and governments have grounded their legitimacy on their ability to affect development" (Ludden 1992: 251).

Power of bringing the discourse into being

The question of achieving the outcome that the development intervention looks for is inseparable from the power exercise in its wider sense. I mean power as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants" (Nye 2008:143). This ability is not only through coercive, military, punishment, forceful and threatening but it can also be achieved positively by persuasion and attraction "by making others want what you want" (Nye 2004: 31) This is why many writers have recently started to distinguish between soft and hard power (Nye 2004 & Ilgen 2006). These writers are using the distinction of soft and hard power mainly in the field of the international politics. But I will use them to analyze the power relations, between the state and local community, in the context of developmental intervention.

Soft power

When different discourses are articulated by different actors, it is important to know why a specific discourse is more influential in shaping the development project. It is also important to know how powerful actors legitimize their actions by producing a specific discourse. On the other hand, there are also resistance agents that delegitimize such discourses and practices. “The dominant discourse of the decision makers can be destabilized by creation of counter narratives. This undermines the assumption of decision makers and generates more uncertainty” (Roe 1991:289). From this perspective we can argue that the development discourse is not only the one articulated by powerful agents to facilitate uncritical acceptance of modernists’ project; another is the capacity of the counter-discourse of all critically engaged agents. Both discourses shape the projects under discussion and both draw on global dynamics.

Rationality, calculability and scientific methods have been employed by the “developers” as tools to legitimize their actions. I argue that these tools are no longer exclusive to the proponents of high-modernist schemes but also to the counter-movement of anti-development agents, which also sometimes use the same tools to challenge and question the project. Tsing argued that “globalization implicated both imperial schemes to control the world and libratory mobilizations for justice and empowerment”(Tsing 2005: 9). Alongside her argument I would say that knowledge/ideology links are not exclusive to what powerful agents produce to legitimize their actions, but also that the critical reproduction of knowledge is creating a space in which the forces of resistance and emancipation can play a role.

One of my informants interestingly pointed out that “*science is always incomplete and human beings always find another better opportunity*. Then he asked: *why do not we wait for another alternative even if it has not been discovered yet*”. This shows how the science and technology that are used as tools for normalizing development can be questioned at the local level. And local people are aware of the shortcomings and limitations of the science and technology because they have disappointing experiences of developmental practices in many state-run projects. Developmental practices and their shocking consequences have accumulated and local people are nurturing their imagination about the consequences of developmental interventions. The roles of new channels of communications such as television, Internet are feeding this back to their imagination. Knowledge no longer supports only powerful agents that can generate and utilize it in a particular way.

A large number of recent critical analysts have pointed out that the whole development paradigm today “stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. It is not only development that has failed to deliver the economic growth and socio-cultural modernization that it promised; more fundamentally, the whole ideal of the development can no longer carry any conviction” (Ferguson 1999: 276)

Hard power

This struggle between discourses must not be taken to mean that development interventions are being managed via dialogue. In many countries, “mutual suspicion and mistrust characterize state-society relationships, resulting in the emergence of popular movements that view the state as an adversary dominated by elite groups aligned against the interests of the majority” (Brohman 1996: 348) We have often seen that when ruling elites have failed to legitimize their self-serving, state-initiated, social engineering projects, they have resorted to the use of state coercive power to enforce the realization of their modernist schemes (Ferguson 1994, Scott 1998 & Ake 2000). Ferguson argued that: “By making the intentional blue-prints for the “development” project can end up performing extremely sensitive political operations the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power under the cover of neutral technical mission to which no one can object” (Ferguson 1994: 256). Referring to the experiences of “rural development” in Kenyan large-scale maize farming, Nigerian settlement and irrigation schemes and Tanzanian villagisation, Ferguson showed how development schemes turn out to be a strategy for increasing state control of the peasantry. Few writers have elaborated the concept of “etatization” to explain how the national ruling elite, which is controlling the state power, is appropriating the surplus values of the local communities through developmental intervention (Dutkiewicz & Shenton 1987).

For these critical writers about the development hegemony, “development is not a policy to be implemented but rather a domination to be resisted. Therefore, they sometimes document the whole local resistance movement (against, large dam construction, logging forests, rural resettlement plans) in order to maintain their rights over resources” (Mosse 2004: 5).

“In the 1990s, the growing pressure of globalization rendered homogeneous visions of the nation less and less sustainable. Assimilation, the classic prescription of the past, was denounced as discriminatory, unacceptable and unrealistic. Various marginalized sectors of Latin American society now found room to advocate and push for a pluralist” (McNish 2005: 36). McNish argued that “because of their limitations, neoliberal participatory reforms created an environment of discontent in which indigenous groups, and also other excluded or downwardly mobile sectors, have been rethinking their involvement in social relations. In recent writing there has been an increasing awareness that the same globalization processes that have led to the homogenization of economic, security, and developmental policies have also opened possibilities for cultural political strategies aimed at resisting homogenizing forces and stressing dignity” (ibid 48-49).

Taking these theoretical positions into consideration, a major focus of this study will be the state-society relationship. One of the angles from which anthropologists study state-society relationships is how the state and its actions are perceived in the daily life of the people (Gupta 2006). In the development field it is important to adopt a similar perspective because local people’s evaluations of state-run projects are inseparable from how they perceive the state itself. In the present case, this perspective enables us to elaborate on how the Nubians perceive the state action in this dam project and thus to discuss the nature of the relationship between local people, i.e. the Nubians, and the Sudanese state.

Economic rationality behind the struggle: mistrust between “Developers” and the supposed “beneficiaries”

Promotion of the idea of the economy as a leading force to the reality, not only helps powerful first-world countries, as Escobar has argued, but also clearly acts as a tool for exploitation at the state level in third-world countries. The ruling elite deliberately obscure the identity of their own interests with “national interest” through the manipulation of the idea of economic progress. Other potential philosophies of existence, evaluations and perceptions are undermined if they contradict “national interest”.

The recent idea about the concept of economy “emerged in the mid-19th century among economists, sociologists, national statistical agents, international corporate organizations and

government programmes. All these formulated the concept of the economy as the totality of monetization exchanges, treating the mechanism as a self-contained, self-regulating, internally dynamic and statistically measurable sphere of social actions, scientific analysis and political regulations” (Mitchell 2002: 4).

This economics rationality regards a particular variable to be included in the considerations of economists. There are many examples of ignored (or deliberately excluded) costs of Kajbar dam, such as: environmental costs, psychological impacts on the affected people, the connectedness of people to their land and the Nile, extra economic value of local properties, their history, archaeology, culture, the risks to their standard of living after the disturbance of their livelihood, the spread of diseases like malaria resident in reservoirs, and so forth. The core of the problem is that not all the costs of the projects are included because they are mainly profit-oriented actions. This is why many costs are being ignored by the government at the expense of local communities. These entire “extra economics” variables are not being considered for the interests of the powerful ruling elites. Growth is portrayed in terms of macro-economic measures, while the consequences of the ignored variables (the excluded costs) impoverished the local people; the state authorities celebrate the increase in macro-economic measures such as GDP.

“The organizing ground was the belief in the role of modernization as the only force capable of destroying archaic superstitions and relations, and whatever social, cultural, and political cost. Cultural attitudes and values and the existence of racial, religious, geographic, or ethnic factors were believed to be associated with backwardness. Whatever the traditional ways might have been it is true that massive poverty in the modern sense first appeared when the spread of the market economy broke down community ties and deprived millions of people of access to land, water, and other resources” (Escobar 1995: 39).

The exclusion of these alternatives clearly emerges in this case study. The core of the problem is the vision of the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU), the government planners’ perception of public consultation to be made after the feasibility studies and within very narrow limits, which were the opened negotiable aspect of deciding the resettlement area; locals were not allowed, for example, to dispute the compensation for their properties. That attributes to the agents a particular kind of knowledge (of experts, economists), a particular way of calculating cost-benefit values (economic calculation) as a standard for guiding

development practices. From this perspective, this study critically explores the following main questions: what costs were ignored? And in whom interests? How will this affect the local populations? What counter-reactions are available to challenge this hegemony?

“The market economy requires conventions and powers that enable the completion of an exchange with satisfying the standard of recognition of these externalities” (Mitchell 2002:290). Scott's (1998) concept of simplifying knowledge and narrowing the vision in order to make particular measurements and calculations enables a high-modernist controlling and manipulative position possible. This idea matches Mitchell's argument about cutting out the externalities and failing to calculate all involved costs. These are illuminating perspectives in this case study, because simplification of the costs of the dam project by excluding of the extra-economic costs is a clear aim of the planners' actions.

Barth sees that the anthropologists' method enjoys a great advantage when it comes to understanding the complexities and importance of cultural and social factors in relation to both economic and social welfare, and is also useful as a means of challenging the economists, political scientists and bureaucrats (those who run the world today). Barth thus appeals to us to use our anthropological knowledge to “challenge the idea of progress. If progress implies that something more or better is created, there can be no moral basis on which to dismiss requirement that those whose lives have been shattered crushed by induced changes should be the first to receive shares from that progress dividend” (Barth 1997: 241).

Appadurai (2004) has also discussed why extra economic costs have been trivialized in development planning. He says “culture has been viewed as a matter of some or other kind of pastness; the key words here being habit, custom, heritage, tradition. On the other hand development is always seen in terms of future, plans, hopes, targets. Therefore the cultural actor is a person of the past, and the economic actor is a person of the future. Thus, from the start, culture is opposed to development, as tradition is opposed to newness, and habit to calculation” (Appadurai 2004: 60). What he proposes is that development should build the capacity to aspire which, in my view, portrays poverty as a lack of aspiration. The problem of such a perspective is that it may divert attention from the socio-economic and political forces that underlie poverty. In this case, Nubians do not lack that capacity, as what they propose as an alternative is even larger than life. On the contrary I see the growing but hitherto

unfulfilled aspirations of the local community as the source of the conflict between the local community and the state.

Mitchell (2002) sees that the externalities are treated as a secondary rather than an essential aspect of economic activity. “The negative impacts on the locals are being treated as an individual market failure rather than a failure of the market principle to take into account complex effects whose value can not be monetized. Thus he argues that, since no transaction takes place in a vacuum, all acts of exchange produce external effects and all involve costs that were excluded, probably not being recognized or compensated for” (Mitchel 2002: 90). When many earlier harmful experiences were raised by the Nubians, the government and planners tended to regard them as individual failures, which would not be repeated.

Resistance

Foucault’s concept of governmentality widens our understanding of power to include the forms of social control in disciplinary institutions (schools, hospitals, psychiatric institutions, etc.) as well as forms of knowledge. Power can manifest itself positively by producing knowledge and certain discourses that are subsequently internalized by individuals and that guide the behavior of populations (Foucault 1991). Starting out from Foucault's idea about map-making and particular boundary-related knowledge and its relation to the power of modern countries, in the next chapter we will see how the Sudanese elite is using knowledge production of this sort and its relationship to the exploitation of local resources under the name of national interest, and how this process has been normalized by global developmental policies. The concept of governmentality enables us to understand a considerable part of the power relations (particularly the soft power) of the project. However, it does not help us to grasp the whole of state-Nubian relations in the case studied here. The critique of the Foucauldian concept of power is: “if power is everywhere, how can we resist it? ...For Foucault power does not only discipline, even, the very intimate spaces of subject but also creates the room of resistant within its context” (Nealon 2008: 4).

That sort of “totalizing power” which even creates space for resistance within its context does not seem to be applicable here. The Nubians' anti-dam resistance can not be described as

a resistance from within the same context of power that is being practiced on them. They question and delegitimize the project, the state power and discourses, the “scientific” justifications of the dam, the idea of sacrificing for the nation and the other pro-dam arguments. The Foucauldian perspective of power would be appropriate if they accepted, at least, a part of the above-mentioned discourses while remaining in disagreement with, for example, compensation rates or alternative resettlement areas.

How Sudanese state power is being practiced can also demonstrate that there is little space for resistance in the context of the dam project. Many activists have been detained and tortured, peaceful protestors have been killed by the police, a judge refused to file the case of killing, journalists have been prevented from reporting the case, many anti-dam government employees have been dismissed or exiled to remote places. This is why I am concerned with the concept of hard power. There are many factors that allow the Nubian resistance to operate outside the context of state power, among them the strong sense of belonging to Nubia more than to Sudan, the reproduction of critical knowledge which destabilize the state's and the professionals' discourse, the spread of rights-based advocacy and the political discourse in the Sudanese context after the comprehensive peace agreement.

In the mid-20th century post-colonial countries, any resistance to a state-run developmental project was regarded as anti-state. At that time the discourses of sovereignty and nation-building were overwhelmingly a reaction to colonialism. However, this is not the contemporary situation of state-local community relations. Nationalism and nation “as an imagined community” (Anderson 1991) in the reality of the Sudanese state is not as powerful as is imagined by those who wish to exploit the imagination. For Nubians, the dam project can not be justified as national progress when they are questioning the very basis of nationhood itself. It can thus be disastrous to rely much on imagined community when in reality it does not have that powerful identity. It is frequently asked why the national unity of the country is fragile, because national unity is something taken for granted without questioning the process by which it has been/is being constructed. If we do not critically interrogate this process we will probably end up reproducing the image of a preferable national unity and its progress, measured against the threat of ethnic revival. But the important thing is to see who benefit from national unity, and how this imagined unity is vulnerable when it comes to real experience of the exercise of power and resource allocation in Sudan (Suleiman 2001).

Many foundations of national unity that were normally taken for granted are actually being questioned and challenged by the local people. One of the local people said: *I belong to the Nubian Homeland before belonging to Sudan, and if I lose the first belonging, being Sudanese does not make any sense to me and I can easily work against Sudan.* The idea that the dam will help the nation and the public interest is no longer convincing many anti-dam Nubians. Unlike for the planners, government and pro-dam agents, the national interest for them is always between two brackets. The state always criminalizes the activists and accuses them of working against the forces of this national unity and its interests. State power has been exercised through normalization of its actions on the bases of national progress and execution of anti-dam agents. Nubian activists have been accused of being anti-religion, anti-state and of helping imperial agendas that work against their nation.

The planners (at least some of them) themselves know that what they are trying to represent as national interest is not a true one. This became clear when a prominent NCP member (the former Economic & Financial Minister) presented an economic plan for the transitional period, in which he clearly called for re-allocating the resources of the nation in the interest of the ruling party (NCP) (Hamdi 2005).

Delegitimation of the many forces the “high-modernist ideology”, through questioning nationalism, state interest, science and progress, the ability of the developers and the feasibility of the project, are some of the ways how the Nubian anti-dam movement works.

Regarding the capacity of the counter movement against the hegemonic developmental discourses and practices, my position lies between James Scott's pessimistic position and Ana Tsing's very optimistic depiction of the ability of the forces of resistance to make difference. In his book “Seeing Like a State”, Scott argues that one of the reasons for the failure of the state to run projects is that: “A prostrate civil society which lacks the capacity to resist these plans” (Scott 1998: 5). Scott's underestimation of the counter movements is also very clear in another book “Weapons of the Weak”(Scott 1985). In the present case, Nubian resistance is not that much powerless. The simple evidence is that they have been able to delay the government plan for more than one decade. I am not saying that local resistance was the only factor which constrains the implementation of Kajbar dam, but it has had a very significant outcome. The local resisters are able to spread critical knowledge about the project against

planners' information via the Internet and other media, to speak out when the government controls the national media, and they are also able to mobilize the power of ethnicity, opposing political parties, and to exploit critical newspapers⁴ and international human rights initiatives, and so on, as a way of facing up to the government's use of the state's coercive power. However, we can not go farther and argue that a counter movement has become as powerful as state power. Tsing in her book "Friction" (2005) uses friction as a metaphor for different conflicting agents (which may be anti or pro-dam agents in my case). But she gives the feeling that both conflicting forces have almost the same power. In the above quotation, she writes as if the global forces of emancipation and empowerment have the same power as global imperial dominating schemes. But the two, at least hypothetically, contradicting forces still do not have as same power as she assumes. Rajagopal (2003) illuminatingly represented the problematic relations of global human rights advocacy as an emancipator force, and the development hegemony, as an exploitative apparatus. He explained how human-rights discourses are incapable of bringing empowerment to the development victims, because these discourses share some underlying assumptions of the modernizing tendency (Rajagopal 2003).

In the issue of the dam construction even international legislation that supports the anti-dam agents is still not well established. Nor are there clearly defined rules; for example, the core of the regulations, in my case, is that any dam construction should be preceded by "informed consent" of the people affected. But informed consent itself is a controversial concept. Regarding the relationship of knowledge to ideology, it is important to ask: Who should inform whom? And what kinds of knowledge should be used for this information? What are the criteria that define good information about the project? How can we ensure that the Sudanese government and planners do not easily manipulate this rule and declare they have informed the local community, and therefore have no further obligations or responsibilities? Finally, will this help Nubians to avoid devastating consequences of the project?

Chapter Two will go farther in showing how the conflicting visions, about the feasibility, interacted in the Kajbar dam project. From the ethnographic representation of the stories of the intervention, reactions and descriptions of many events of confrontations, I will discuss

⁴ In the reference page I will refer to many articles published, about Kajbar dam, in the critical news papers.

the power relationships of the project. From contradictory visions in the evaluation of the gains and losses of the project, I explain how each agents attempts to delegitimize the discourse and practices of the other party.

Chapter three is an ethnographic description of the main site area of my study, which comprises the villages affected by the dam in the Mahas area in northern Sudan. The ethnographic description mainly covers the background of the area, the livelihood system and its dynamics, and the factors that are changing in the subsistence economy. Although I pay a great deal of attention to the local communities' economic life and their adaptive strategies, I also try to represent the whole relevant socio-cultural arrangements of their system of livelihood. I argue that their immediate natural surroundings such as their land and the River Nile are not simply economic resources but also defined their belonging, identity, history and their world view. Recognition of this complexity, which has been simplified by "high-modernist" proponents, will give us a deeper understanding of the conflicting visions about the project and its feasibility. I will show the emerging constraints in their economic life, such as the shortage of land, fluctuations in the level of the Nile and disturbances of their livelihood system, the fall in agricultural production and high rate of emigration. This is the economic situation which enables the pro-dam agents to argue for the viability of the dam. Anti-dam Nubians agree that there are serious problems with their economic life, but they perceive these differently when they argue against the dam. In both cases we see the importance of the present situation in perceptions of the project and predictions of how life will be after the project. This background will be used for further discussion in Chapter 4, when we discuss and analyze the conflicting viewpoints and power relationships involved when each party tries to translate its vision into being. The main question in this chapter is to what extent their economic situation and the value of local space has been devalued by pro-dam agents and romanticized by anti-dam agents?

By focusing on the meanings, perceptions and values that Nubians attached to their present being, I will discuss the ignored costs involved in the project. I will show how these costs are being excluded, masked and simplified by planners and pro-dam discourses.

In Chapter 4 on the basis of the second and third chapters' ethnographic descriptions I analyze how the project implementation is going through a complex set of arguments between contrasting knowledge, discourses, and evaluations. This forms the focus of this thesis,

because the global rights discourse has inspired social justice movements and created room for new types of actions. All discourses about human rights, indigenous rights, cultural minority rights and community-based resource management reinforce the efforts of activists who are working against the hegemony of centralized development discourses and practices (Tsing 2005). In the line of Tsing's Perspective, my main argument is that: in this era of globalization, it is not only the state's capacity to produce relevant and facilitating knowledge, nor its monopoly of coercive power that shape the outcome of the development projects, but also the capacity of the alternative counter forces to modify or resist government actions by the production and use of critical knowledge and mobilization of other forces to face this hegemony.

Field settings

The unit of analysis in this research is a dam construction, an event, which needed a multi-sited field work strategy. The data required is based on the dialogue between different stakeholders around the feasibility of the dam and the actions created by these discourses. Thus information can not be exclusively collected from one particular geographical area. The villages in Mahas area, which will be affected by the Kajbar proposed dam, are the main site of my field work. In addition to these villages I visited Khartoum and Dongola which are both the seats for different powerful actors of concern for this study, such as Nubian organizations, associations, and other activists as well as the Dam Implementation Unit.

Negotiating my way in the Field

In this section, I am interested in showing the early aspects of fieldwork, especially my negotiation with important gate keepers. Here, I am also interested in making explicit how my own background i.e. the fact that I am a Nubian has bearing on the research outcome. This is important because, at the ontological level, I believe that the subjective element, as asserted by postmodern theoretical arguments, is influencing the outcome of a research carried out at any point in time (Marcus & Fisher 1999). In acknowledging this, I do not however imply that what I write in this research is subjective discourse bordering to fiction.

My arrival on June 2009 in the capital city of Sudan Khartoum heralded my field work research. In Khartoum I stayed for a month looking for the right research permit that would enable me to move in the Nubian homeland, particularly in villages which fall on the upper stream part of Kajbar dam in Mahas. Simultaneously, I was conducting some interviews with Nubian activists, academicians, and different Nubian's organizations, student associations, and other involved agents like the anti dam committee in Khartoum.

I also searched the libraries of University of Khartoum, and Nubian Study Center to get some relevant local literature. I have collected many reports, little booklets, newspapers, and documents from various sources. Many Nubians intellectuals have showed me their interest in the topic and their willingness to help, and many of them did. They gave me documents and introduced me to other key informants.

The permission procedure was complicated by the fact that the state and relevant institutions like DIU are regarding new dam projects as state secrets. They think the data of newly proposed dams should be secret, thinking that some agents can use it against them. I had a letter from the University of Bergen showing that I am a student there and that I am doing my fieldwork. In addition, I got another letter from the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at University of Khartoum showing that I am Teaching Assistant and doing my fieldwork for my Master degree. The purpose of having the second letter was that the government agents trust researchers who belong to Sudanese Universities more than those who are coming from other countries (particularly European and American universities). They are cautious about allowing such studies. I have also been advised to not reveal that I am coming from University of Bergen, but I never hid my connections to that university.

I have tried different approaches, formal and informal, to get access to DIU data, to win their trust, and to obtain their permission for my field work. The informal approaches helped my purpose more than the formal one. The first day that I went to DIU, having my letters and ID cards with me, an officer said: "don't waste your time - it is impossible to release such documents at this time. We haven't accomplished the project implementation". They were also suspicious about my origins. My Nubian accent, which is clear when I speak Arabic, reflected my identity. This identity made my access to DIU data even more difficult. After I introduced my self to the officers the first question many of them asked me was "are you from that area?" In Sudan the question "where are you from" is synonym with asking about which

ethnic group you belong to. By observing the way they approached me, even their refusal of my requests were very interesting and contained fruitful information.

The DIU visits enlightened the critical questions regarding transparency and accountability in engaging the locals in the development project. In my classes in Bergen, I had taken a very illuminating course in critical anthropological perspectives, and had discussed about neutrality, rationality and objectivity of the developmental discourses and practices. This background helped me to observe and question every sentence the officers made and write it down carefully when I got back to my house. During interviews, they spoke very proudly about how they had used elaborate scientific technologies in their feasibility studies and how accurate and comprehensive they were. After listening to all this, when I asked them if I could see these studies they openly refused or requested me to follow very long bureaucratic ways to obtain permits. This of course was actually another way of rejecting my request.

I realized that the field work permission could be taken from the Northern State government or even local administration. I went “down” to the villages, to the Prefect (Moutamad), who is the head of the locality in Mahas area. One of his friends, who is a well known Nubian academician, introduced me to him. The Prefect welcomed me and showed his appreciation of my work. He wrote a note to the security office introducing me to them and asking them to give me the permission. During the first days they did many security checks and I was interviewed several times by the security. My answers were clear; that my intention was to interview all people, supporters, opponents, men, women, Nubians, non-Nubians, educated, other local leaders, politicians and any category of people which could reflect different view points. They were not at all comfortable about this kind of plan, so they suggested giving me a list of people to visit and interview.

I accepted their lists and asked them that I would also meet and discuss with who ever I wanted, guaranteeing that I wouldn't make any anti-dam activities. Because I knew that they would follow and report me, I discussed methodological issues with them. For example I asked them not to misunderstand me if I faced one of dam supporters by anti-dam arguments. I explained “because this will be helpful to let the informant defend himself and provoke the discussion and get more from him”. “And of course”, I told them, “I will do it other way around and face the opponents by pro-dam arguments”. Such clarifications worked but not

fully. They were still asking me questions like: Did you yourself choose this topic, or did the Norwegians do it for you?

Finally, I managed to get the permission. The local government offered me a vehicle and house to live in, but I refused. That would be on the expense of my access to the information of the anti –dam local people. That kind of support would classify me as a government whom they don't trust. What helped is that I am a Nubian and speak almost the same language as them, with a slight difference in my accent. I am from a place called Sikkoat which is about 120 km. away from Mahas, my main field site. Nevertheless, the local people were still a little bit cautious about me. Particularly the groups in opposition to the project were more skeptical. Many of their leaders had earlier been targeted by the securities, which made them very cautious. Therefore, trust building was the main purpose in the first few weeks, and it was not easy task.

People I had met and lived with in Khartoum, such as our former university colleagues, and all who I had known before, were the best gateways through which I could establish contacts. They facilitated my movements, found me a residence and introduced me to their community saying: “We trust you since you know this guy”, meaning the person who introduced me to them. Such statements were common to hear. My uneasy relations with security and the government also turned out to be in my favor. As for local people my problems with security also meant that I was not a government person. They even started to advise me as to how I could assure my personal safety.

Keeping a good relation with all categories of people was crucial for me. If I spent a night with a government member I should spend another night with one of the resistance leaders, and both of them should know that I was also going to the other “camp”. Once in a village the youth were divided in to two in their discussion about me. Some of them didn't believe me, thinking that I must have something to do with the government, while others believed that I was a researcher. They checked me out with one of the Nubian activist in the Nubian Student Union at University of Khartoum after I had introduced myself as a master student from University of Bergen and teaching assistant at university of Khartoum. Fortunately, the activist whom they contacted was one of my informants when I was in Khartoum, who also had become my friend. He confirmed that I am a researcher and asked them to help me. They later came and told me this story.

I was fully aware that I was being scrutinized and I acted accordingly. For example, I never stepped aside to make a telephone call in the first few weeks. Another thing I needed to be careful about was my use of a motorcycle to move between the villages. This was necessary because the distance between the villages was quit far, but the problem was that riding a motorcycle was strongly associated with security members. Thus to avoid this “stigma” I rented a motorcycle from a well known mechanic in that area. Generally it was important not only to be aware of the socio-cultural and political contexts of the field, but also being self conscious about how I as a researcher located myself in that context. All this affected the type of information I eventually would get.

After a few weeks, I felt that people trusted me well and that I could go and discuss with any body. The mistrust had melted gradually and my interviews and group discussions went very well. I didn’t stay in any particular village, but in every village I visited I had one or two friends who could introduce me to his community. This snowballing method opened the field for me. People even started to volunteer to come and discuss with me and started to ask me about when I would come to their area? I was also helped by asking questions to the pro-dam people and the local administrators. This helped in the trust-building because if I were government’s person or security I would only target the anti-dam agents . Another problem was that when I interviewed pro-dam people the anti-dam locals were curious to know what such a person had told me. I told them “you can’t hear what has been said, it is ethically not good to reveal the secret of people who trusted you and who discussed openly with you. Would you accept it if I revealed what you told me?” This made them respect and trust me even more.

After conducting many individual interviews I organized some group discussions with carefully selected members. I tried to avoid bringing together pro-dam and against-dam people in the same group before making sure that they will not clash. It was an ethical issue for me not to fuel more disputes between the villagers. I also considered the power relations between the members of the discussion groups. For example I did not have a group in which there was a security member and anti-dam farmer, or the leader of the local anti-dam committee with an average pro-dam person in the village. The discussions between those who argued for and against the dam in most cases of group discussions went deeper and were more intensive than when I talked to the same people in individual interviews. I used a digital

recorder with the capacity of recording 288 hours. Of course I only used it after having obtained the consent of the informants and guaranteeing that I would use it only for the research and that their real names would not appear. This small digital recorder had many advantages: It was easy to operate, pause, stop and download the interviews in my laptop.

Chapter Two

STATE INTERVENTION AND LOCAL REACTION

The hegemony of development discourses, as I have discussed earlier, was believed to be overwhelming, also for many anthropologists, as argued by Scott (1998), Escobar (1995) and Ferguson (1994). The local people in the anthropological literature on development have been portrayed as passive recipients of development hegemony. The capacity of local people to resist or to modify this hegemony has not been given much attention. Therefore, in this chapter I will try to prove that the locals are not uncritically internalizing such dominant discourses and this hegemony is no longer going unchallenged. We will see how the locals are producing counter-critical knowledge and discourses. I will try to explore here how these counter tendencies of the locals are destabilizing the state's hegemonic developmental discourse to the extent that their resistance sometimes shapes the outcome of the development project in ways not planned by the state.

To follow this empirically, I will show how the project has been introduced to the local people. I am going to present various stories from different perspectives in which actions, counter-actions, events of confrontation and their ramifications are illustrated. The arguments of the supporters about the project advantages will be presented, as well as the resisters' arguments about the infeasibility of the dam. These conflicting visions will appear in this chapter as various power games between different social forces showing the socio-cultural and political consequences of the project intervention. Ideas and evaluations will appear as power relations between opposing agents. The aim is to follow the power relations of the different stakeholders without underestimating {e.g. (Scott 1998)} or overestimating {e.g. Tsing 2005)} the capacity of the local resistance to modify the outcome of the project.

A Brief History of the Interventions in Kajbar Dam

Ironically, the idea behind the Kajbar dam was first a local demand, mainly to irrigate the *Sahil Koka* area, which has 15 thousands feddans. The technical, hydrological, soil, legal and social studies were all carried out under the supervision of the Mahas Development Committee in 1969 - 1970, and were modified at the Mahas Co-operation Conference 1988.

The plan was to irrigate *Sahil Koka* and provide the *Marian Boud* and *Jami* agricultural schemes with the electric power they needed, in addition to supplying the northern region with electricity for Halfa to Dabba. The Mahas development committee's studies showed all the above would not need a dam more than 3 meters high, so no villages or palm trees would be affected, except that some fields that are very close to the Nile would be submerged. The total area of the fields targeted by the project in the Nubian homeland would increase to 50 thousand feddans. The aim of the Mahas Development Union was to increase the production of wheat and other winter crops, and to cover the area's need for electricity. The overarching aim was to cut the high rate of emigration and facilitate the return of people who had already left. This idea was locally supported and Nubians paid for this project in the home land and in their Diaspora (Salih 1996). Even with all these efforts they were unable to establish the project because of the lack of financial support. Later, under the NCP regime, the Mahas Union and the Mahas Development Committee themselves lost their influence. Many activists argue that this was the first negative policy established by the NCP and that it was aimed at Nubians in the Mahas area.

The local people heard about Kajbar dam again later from Mahmoud Shareif (The Minister of Electricity at that time) in early 1990s. At that time, many locals welcomed it because the plan was not to submerge the whole area. The idea was to generate enough electricity to satisfy local needs but without submerging a wide area. That would reduce the fuel usage of their pumps, which represents three quarters of agricultural costs. Local people say Mahmoud Shareif's idea was to pass two thirds of the Nile water through a channel and use the last third to generate electricity. At least, this was what they had in their mind about the project. At that time they that they were hearing all this from local NCP members, no one came and explained the scheme formally to them. There was no strong opposition movement, no really influential activists working against the project and less critical knowledge about the project, so local people could easily internalize the knowledge they got about the project and they accepted it with little reluctance. After M. Shareif died, the government again raised the project and changed it from rural electricity to a wider national one.

From Demand to Extreme Oppositions

Changing the idea of the Kajbar Dam from a locally oriented scheme, with little submergence of land, to a wider “national” one has been rejected by the locals and their representatives. This is because the later version is going to engulf more than 30 villages in most populated areas of what is left of the Nubian homeland, which has experienced such project four times; the Aswan Dam and its first and second heightening, and the most severe High Dam. Accordingly, the Nubians are well experienced in such projects, and well aware of their consequences. People felt frustrated when the dam was announced and their own activity almost stopped. They lost the courage to farm, plant new palm trees or build houses, as if they were going to be submerged on the next few days. They organized themselves and established committees to work against the new Idea. This time the leading person behind the idea was the former Vice-President Zubair Mohammed Salih. When people protested and showed their refusal to Zubair, in one of his visits he said, “This is your fate you just sit down and discuss; America could not frighten us let alone you. But I can guarantee that no one will be tyrannized. What you should do is to come up with your demands and alternative places for resettlement”.⁵ Zubair tried to convince the public using some Islamic discourses. He argued that even the Prophet Mohammed left Mecca although he loved it. One of the audiences answered him: First, that the Prophet had knew that he would come back again to Mecca and we will never be able to return. Second, that the Prophet had been commanded by God to leave Mecca, and the NCP is not a god.

Adil, one of the villagers who attended this meeting presented the following brief account of the event:

Zubair's language frightened us and we were obliged to accept. Some of the government people scared us, saying, “the upstream people shouldn't fight with the crocodiles in the water”⁶ If the government insists to do they will. So we established our committee and raised our requirements, which were 38 articles. Although we would have preferred to avoid the project altogether, our questions were quite

⁵ This is also the case now, the local people are only allowed to ask for their compensation but they can do nothing to evaluate the whole project. This is something that does no concern them, according to the government and planners' view.

⁶ Some are supporting dam just because they are afraid of the government, they think the government will implement regardless of their view point.

reasonable. For example, the palm trees were valued at million Sudanese pounds, almost 1500 USD, at that time; we would not leave the northern state, the area of resettlement should be suitable for palm trees, the social structure and neighborhoods should be considered in the new villages, the palm trees should be growing and producing dates before we go there. These are examples of our demands; they weren't far-reaching, but they didn't have enough land for us, particularly on the eastern side. As easterners we cannot go and live in the west bank of the river. And we will not be able to live alongside the Nile any more, because it is occupied from Nimuli to Halfa.

After the Zubair meeting people felt some relief, because they thought that Zubair had understood their point. Many committees were established, such as the committee of evaluation to guarantee that no one would be abused by this project. These committees were established because Zubair encouraged the people to do so and he promised to recognize and deal with their representatives. The mandate of these committees was to:

- Evaluate the feasibility of this project⁷
- Evaluate the loses and gains
- Examine the alternatives
- Do the relevant statistics

But without implementing any of these steps, the government sent the enumerators and the locals clashed with them, saying how can you enumerate before the first steps have been taken. This because the feasibility of the project is taken for granted by the government and planners and the local people should not have something to say about it because, in bureaucratic eyes, they do not even have the capacity to say so. According to the local activists, the public consultation to accept or reject the project should have been preceded by other steps, such as informing people about the feasibility of the project and non-feasibility of

⁷ Not to re-evaluate or study and present other alternatives or to modify it, but to just know what the government had already planned. Now the DIU is the only agent to do so, as even the government of the northern state, let alone local people and their representatives, have nothing to say about the feasibility of the project.

other alternatives. It should be unnecessary to add that this should have been the local people demand which came up from below, because this is still a far-reaching goal.

The feasibility is itself a controversial concept: feasible for whom? Mahas? The Nubians? The ruling elites? Or neighbouring countries? In what sense, economical? Humanitarian? And At what local level? National or regional? And which agents should make a decision about this feasibility? The locals? Their representatives? The government? Or regional and global forces?

One of the engineers in DIU in the new projects studies unit said to me: “You are asking about public consultation and such things, but these are European concepts. The public ground in a country like Sudan is unfair. In Europe they consult the public because European farmers can go and buy seeds through the Internet. But how can we consult our farmers who do not know anything about this feasibility research”. Consultation of local people heightens their aspirations and they can demand more and increase the projects’ costs. The DIU's consultants for legal affairs even went farther to argue that such concepts as public consultations are western concepts that place constraints on developmental schemes in our country.⁸

⁸ This is not surprising, since 70% of the Feasibility Studies Unit staff members in DIU are only civil engineers, though of course there are some other types of engineers and scientists. Anthropologists and other social scientists are used to make a little social survey or just to write an article in which they propagandize themselves. There are no anthropologists permanently working in this section of DIU. Even those who collaborate with them for short periods cannot change the main stream. They may be motivated to keep good relations with DIU for the sake of money, rather than performing genuine anthropological research which might be against the DIU policies. This is why the DIU is very proud of conducting its data collection on socio-cultural and environmental assessment by elaborate techniques such as GIS. (see the DIU documents)

A primary school teacher told me “we were called in to a meeting. We did not know the purpose of the meeting till we arrived. At the meeting they asked us to carry out a social survey and we refused. I wouldn’t do things which could be used against our people even if they dismissed us from our jobs”. The social survey they meant at the meeting was a not deeper exploration of the various motivations, attitudes and the whole socio-cultural circumstances involved. It was rather a census of the people and their properties, which is practical step to start the project. This is what they mean by social survey. They wouldn’t recruit untrained people to conduct such studies if they really wanted to gain a deeper understanding of the socio-cultural setting of the project. In the DIU timetable for the project implementation they gave the northern state government five days for public consultation and 10 days to do the relevant statistics (see DIU documents). This

The local people committee members felt that the government was doing unorganized work without taking seriously the issue of their assurances and putting them into effect. At that time they also heard another very arrogant statement from the governor of the northern state, who said, “we do not have to construct houses in advance; they can first live in a tents”.

The local people and their representatives needed to be fully compensated before they would leave their area. At that time they would have accepted the project if the government had given them what they asked for. Their questions were answered very arrogantly by one of the government officials. When the local committees raised their 38 articles of requirements with him he said “these are far reaching demands; let them go and live where the reservoir stops”. This was very annoying for Nubians and they still bring it back again and again. This is one of the reasons which made the local committee changed its name from “Kajbar Dam Affected People Committee” to “Kajbar Dam Resistance Committee”. The latter name has strong connotations of disagreement, distrust and non-compromise.

More Disputes: State’s Excessive Power and Extreme Resistance

What the government did later in 2006-2007 was even worse than what Zubair and his followers did in 1995; they committed more serious mistakes than ever before. When people saw heavy machines and helicopters moving around in the dam site, all governmental levels in northern state including the governor, the Prefect (Moatamed) and the local administrators were asked about this by the local peoples’ representatives. At all these levels the government said that it knew nothing about it and that they had not been informed yet.

There was no transparency. Local people saw the helicopter flying over and landing on the dam site. When their movements become very intense and frightening, people went and asked. They misinformed the locals that they were constructing a new standard village. Gradually machines went into action and started to grind rocks, which was noisy to the

was ironical when you listen to the locals who say we need at least five years to plant our palms in the new areas and be sure of their productivity in these new areas.

villagers close by, who were confused. At this level the old committee came together again and started to chase the government to find out what was going on. This was when the local people were informed that it was a feasibility study for the Kajbar dam. The state ignored them; this was the source of local people's distrust of any government actions. Nubians felt that they were being presented with a *fait accompli*. Local people often use terms like “lack of transparency” when they describe how the DIU came and started the project. The prevalence of such terms shows how the global messages have been incorporated in their language about the development.

When the DIU machines started to work on the site, the owners of the land came and complained and asked the local committee to do something. Many Nubian students also travelled there from Khartoum and put more pressure on the committee to work against what was going on. At that time even the local committee itself was accused of being a government agent. The Committee started to contact government officials in the Northern state and Khartoum in order to obtain clear information about the activities on the dam site. The Governor replied to the letters by saying that he did not recognize the local committee. The only accepted person to contact the Governor was the Prefect (the head of the locality). In this letter the Governor clearly asked the local committee not to repeat such contacts. Then local committee answered that the government would be responsible for whatever consequences might happen.⁹

The story of the exclusion and delegitimization of their representatives was spread among the local people, and they began to gain support among Nubians in Sikkoot, Khartoum, Europe and elsewhere. Because Nubians had already experienced the submergence of Wadi Halfa, they realized that the underdevelopment of this area was because they have been scattered. In a country like Sudan, where ethnic unity plays an essential role in state policies, Nubians are aware that their dispersal through both enforced and voluntary migration is the starting point of their weakness. Now they can not send even one representative from all over Halfa, Sikkout and El Mahas (more than 400 km of the remaining Nubian homeland along the banks of the Nile) to parliament because of the small size of their population. The Nubian homeland election district used to be from Halfa to Tumbos (the southern part of the Mahas

⁹ All the letters exchanged between the Northern state government and the local committee will be attached in this thesis.

area). But in the 2010 presidential election this district has been added to Burgaige locality, which has a majority of non-Nubians. These problems have provoked Nubians to politically oriented efforts, as they believe that the marginalization of Nubian homeland and targeting it by this project should be tackled by the united efforts of the Nubians. This awareness has been supported by the national political discourse on wealth and power sharing, decentralization and global advocacy of human and indigenous rights.

Yaqoub, a local anti-dam activist comments on the situation:

Others ask us: what have you been doing all this time? Have you just found out that you are marginalized? But, he asks, what is the problem if we want to start now?

Most Nubians agree that the problem facing the Nubians' efforts is that there are many fragmented efforts and entities. Most of these bodies have been penetrated by people who are working against their agendas. There is also a consensus that there should not be so many different organizations, associations, committees, political parties, etc., since they all have the same goals. Many Nubian organizations have been established as a reaction of disagreement their founder's with political parties, so they tend to have a political color. Some voices are calling for a collective body such as a Nubian lobby which can demand rights for Nubians, and that it should be far from political parties. Under the current political system it is believed that if you do not have power (including military power) you can not get your rights. There is a Nubian political party but not even all Nubians are united in it.

Many anti-dam activities have been carried out by Nubian organizations in the Mahas area, in Khartoum and in their Diaspora. Many Nubian organizations, political parties, committees, politicians and academics have been heavily involved in anti-project actions. Some Nubian intellectuals and students went to the affected villages and gave public speeches to explain the importance of maintaining their identity, culture and historical heritage. In such meetings there were further clarifications of how the government is targeting Nubians through such projects and the infeasibility of the project and previous Nubian experiences have been thoroughly discussed. Such activities alongside the lack of government transparency and its interventions have heightened the mood of resistance.



Figure 1: Local anti-dam resisters (Source: Nuba Irkinain Group).

All of the affected villages organized a peaceful protest march to the dam site to show their objections. The police stopped the protestors using tear gas, which they had never experienced before that day. The police who were protecting the machines at the dam sites tried to provoke them and let them stay longer, because more support forces were coming from Dongola. They wanted to use more force from the very starting point to silence the protestors. Thanks to their knowledge of their own district, the protestors managed to catch the 38 supporting police officers with their weapons in a very narrow place. They disarmed the police and put them under arrest waiting for government officer from the state level to release them after they had heard what he would say. Eventually, the SPLM mediated and released the police and took the wounded locals to hospitals in Dongola and Khartoum.

Saliheen, a local farmer who participated in the protest marches, strongly denied the state claim about the protest being politicized:

The protest march was like a public consultation which the government didn't like.¹⁰ Therefore they gave orders to the police to shoot and kill because through these protest marches they realized that the majority of the local affected people were united

¹⁰ See: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpQn-c1EfZs>

against the project. Our actions were not politicized at all and people were ready to go without any one pushing them. We could not sleep well for two months because we didn't know how our future will be like. If it had been a politically motivated protest march there would have been deaths on both sides, but it was only they who killed us. Even when we caught those 38 police who came to kill us we were feeding them and healing their wounds till we released them, this wouldn't happen anywhere else in the world, but we are civilized. They were under our arrest for more than fifteen hours; we could just have taken their weapons and killed them. We are civilized and no one is like us, and this the problem with this government; it does not listen to you unless you carry a gun.

These actions have been circulated on the Internet and among Nubians. Critical newspapers wrote about it as another alarm from the north. The northern state governor stated that the project is not their business but DIU's business. One of the DIU representatives went to the affected villages and when people met him protesting he announced that they would stop the activity. The local Committee gave him 72 hours to remove their machines back from the dam site but they did not. After 72 hours they organized another bigger protest marsh.¹¹

What has worsened the situation and deepened the detestation and distrust is that in this second protest the government brought soldiers and killed four young people and wounded more than 20. Before that the government had suppressed many Nubian protest actions in their homeland and Khartoum by using security forces and tear-gas and by arresting the leaders. In this case, the resisters took the dead bodies to the hospital, and tens of thousands of people surrounded the hospital waiting for the doctors to come and report the causes of death, and the journalists to come and report everything.¹² But the government prevented them and arrested more than twenty people on the road between Khartoum and Mahas. The judge also refused to accept the case when they tried to report it to the court. They kept the dead bodies for two days in the hospital till a doctor volunteered to examine them. In this tense situation, one of the known supporters came and said "Didn't we tell you not to resist the government?"

¹¹ See: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SrJFQGw4P1w&feature=related>

And: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UYnNp_ezHKg&feature=related

¹² See: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GQY9X1WNOXE>

The people threw stones at him and chased him away. He ran to the police station for protection but the police themselves were afraid of the public anger and refused to keep him in the police station. This is one of the rare cases in which they harmed the supporters. One of the known supporters could not enter the village during these days and he kept asking by telephone from a distance.

This event was a very crucial point for the villagers to decide who was with them. By definition the government and the pro-dam agents could not be there. Anti-dam locals have also dismissed them but they often say our reaction was nothing comparing the humiliation we faced.

Abdalla, a former soldier in the Sudanese Defense Forces, criticized the government intervention:

They think that we do not understand our rights but our farmers go to their farm with their radios and they are aware of what is going on around the world. We have a right to be informed and discussed with, not to be killed when we oppose, Nubians do not bear humiliations. When they see a government car with a yellow board¹³ the children say “No, no to the dam” and throw stones at the car.¹⁴

They have been humiliated so much by the police in the days following the killing event. The policemen were surrounding the villages and prevented many farmers from going to their fields. They stopped everybody, searched them and shouted at them, using very rude words. The way they have been treated sticks in the minds of those who experienced it, particularly in Sabo, Jaddi and Kajbar villages. In Nubian society there is no subjection to a leader who has absolute power. Even traditional leaders did not have as much power as they had and still have in other areas of Sudan.

The resistors believe that the killing was deliberate. One of their representatives told them that when the committee members went to capital of the northern state government to negotiate with governor, the governor's consultant called him aside and asked him not to

¹³ In Sudan only government cars have yellow boards.

¹⁴ In some villages like Jaddi, government vehicles were not allowed to pass through the village. Sometimes they smashed the cars and threatened the government members to leave the village. These are always narrated as a victory by the locals. They called these areas *Aradhi Moharrara*, meaning liberated lands and free from government forces.

participate in the next protest march because they were going to use guns. He announced this when thousands of villagers were surrounding the hospital after the killing event.

The government justified the killing on the grounds that some opposition political parties provoked the issue and led the local people to confront the soldiers. The government claimed that the protestors aimed to kill those who were working on the dam site and that they were armed.

Osman, a secondary school teacher, angrily explained that they did not have any weapons:

If we had just 1000 weapons we would occupy all the northern state as far as Dongola. Then the government would come and negotiate with us, not to construct a dam but to return us to the state. There are not many military centers in northern state and those few are not fully armed. They lie a lot, and for that reason we do not trust this party; they pretend that they are Islamic but they are as far as it is possible to be from Islam.

The Nubian activists wrote a diplomatic note to the General Secretary of the United Nations Kofi Annan, human rights organizations and UNISCO. They explained that their own existence as an indigenous group and their heritage were being targeted by the Sudanese government, and they asked for direct intervention of the international community to rescue Nubia. Simultaneously, the Kush Movement began strongly to propose military action against the government as the only way to guarantee their rights.

The Ramifications of the events

In the following sections, I discuss state-Nubian relationships as an outcome of the above-mentioned negative interventions of the state in connection with the dam project. The issue has reached far beyond conflicting visions about the dam, as Nubians began to question the legitimacy of the state, and their own identity as Nubians. Ethnic politics and the role of identity and how it has been politicized more than ever before are now topics of discussion. Acting as Nubian is the backbone of the power of the resisters, which has been reinforced by the newly emerging national political discourse and global tendencies of human and indigenous rights.

Government-locals interactions after the events

After the dispute had become intolerable and the Nubian resistance actions widened, the governor of the northern state was changed. Unlike the previous one, the new governor appeared to recognize the local committee and called them in to a meeting. In an introductory meeting with the committee he told them that he wished to visit all the affected villages. The committee welcomed the idea and offered their willingness to help and protect him. The governor refused this in the second meeting. He wanted to go there through his own channels and didn't want to be welcomed by the local committee. He asked to meet all the people in their own villages, so the people from one village should not go to another. The committee then said that they were not responsible for what the locals might do. The committee showed that they will not accept the project any more and that their negotiation is just to demonstrate their refusal to him. The locals interpreted this technique from the governor as a way to reflect in the media that the majority of the local people were supporting the project. The governor needed to meet the villages separately because he wanted to bring his own followers, officers and security members, who would be more than the people of each village at the meetings. So the local people feared that the government's media would claim that the majority were supporting the project.

The first village the governor visited was Sabo, and the opposing group said it was arranged very secretly. Until the morning of the day on which they were going to the villages, even the ministers did not know to where they were going. SPLM minister called and informed the resisters that they were going to Sabo first. The Sabo people asked other villages not to join them, as Sabo and Kajbar have relatively more supporters than other upstream villages.¹⁵

¹⁵ The situation of many supporters in Sabo is that the village has very little farmland, but the resisters do not say that they are supporting the opposition for that reason. They say that many of them had already taken their compensation when the DIU came and started work on the dam site. At first the DIU called in the owners of the land on which they did their studies to compensate them. People first refused to accept their compensation, but an officer spread rumours that the compensation would be 250 Million SD. These people who were in debt to the farmers' bank, and they found that as an opportunity to solve their problems. After they signed the papers, the amount they got was frustrating. The compensation was haphazardly given to those who claimed the ownership, without referring to the land registration documents.

Even so, when the governor went to Sabo he could not speak to the public because the voice of the resistance was so loud. Then he crossed the Nile with all his officials, ministers, security members, local administrators and NCP members. While they were crossing the Nile, the Kajbar people were waiting for them on the other side and barred his way from the river bank to the village. When he reached the bank, the women met him wailing and refused to open the road unless he promised not to stay or to make a speech in Kajbar. They let him go to the mosque and pray but not to speak. When he left the mosque, the women again surrounded him, shouting at him. Security members tried to prevent a local cameraman from taking a video of this but the young people protected him. The governor quarreled with local NCP members who had misled him into believing that the majority in these villages were supporters, and he found a different reality from what he expected.

The DIU depends on the northern state government for public support, and they promised that the northern state would also use its local NCP members, but when they could not change peoples' attitude, they simply misreported the situation. This is one of the reasons why such meetings were so messy. Moreover, the local committee was also pushing in the same direction because they had been marginalized by the state government. The committee showed that they would not accept the project any more and that their negotiation was just to confirm their refusal to the new governor.

The local people then heard the governor on local TV, saying at a press conference that 95% of the people are supporting the dam and welcomed me. A minister from the SPLM, who had been with him on the same visit replied to the governor at the press conference, saying that

However, the case of Kajbar village is that there many Arab families who make up most of the dam supporters in Kajbar. Arabs do not own land or palm-trees and they think that they will have equal access to land in the new resettlement area. The Nubians tell them: "you should be with us because the compensation will be paid according to the previous ownership so you will not be compensated. And if you do not support us we will not let you share with us our new land as we are doing now". This is how the opposition categorizes the dam supporters in Kajbar and Sabo villages. Their categorization is not wrong, but there are some who support the project because they really see that it can positively change their life.

people are opposing the dam for two reasons; either fear of an unknown future or due to their love and strong ties to their homes.¹⁶

One of the local committee members wrote on the Internet about this event as a victory of the local committee and wrote about it as committee work, saying “we, as a committee, defeated the governor and taught him a lesson in Kajbar” This frustrated some Nubian activists, who wished to make it clear that they were not placing constraints on the government negotiations with local people, because they are accused of using delaying tactics ahead of government negotiations, and the supporters argue that they should listen to the government, and that if the government is mistaken they shouldn’t correct a mistake by making another mistake. When the supporters asked opponents why they would not listen to the governor when he came, they replied that they did not want to listen to him because they rejected the idea of the dam at all, so why should they listen.

However, it is clear that the government and planners do not want to have clear, honest and direct negotiations with the locals. The results of the feasibility studies which should have been open to all are held under security in DIU. This was very clear to me when they refused to give me any data concerning the proposed dams even after I followed the whole procedures and gave them whatever information they asked me. Even the local anti-dam committees, although they have been selected from the villagers and are very respected and influential at local level, they could not obtain any information. One rare case when the planners met the

¹⁶ When local farmers hear such speeches from the SPLM party or others they appreciate it much. They accept whatever support they can get from anywhere. The SPLM, for example, took their wounded to the Dongola and Khartoum hospitals. The SPLM spokesman went and gave a speech in the affected villages and offered them the Movement’s full support for their issue. Many other opposition political parties’ leaders also showed their support for the Nubian anti-actions. One of the clearest examples is when the resisters organized a eulogy of the massacres In the Mahas Club in Khartoum, and many leaders of the opposition parties gave speeches. The issue has been politicized, but the opposition parties (SPLM is opposing from within the government) are exploiting the Issue to expand and gain more followers in areas where they did not have any members. The local people and all Nubians are also using them as pressure group to the NCP. SPLM have its offices in the area and there are well recognized SPLM members in the local anti-dam committee. But this politicization also in a sense was against the resistant movement because the government started to portray their actions as purely political actions.

local population was at a meeting in Dongola Airport, when an engineer came from DIU and explained the satellite images of the level of submergence. Instead of talking about the feasibility of the project he merely described which areas would be submerged and which would not. The people at the meeting were the local administrators who are mainly NCP members.

NCP members are not necessarily all supporters. I interviewed many NCP members who oppose the project, and even some of the local committee members are NCP as well. Mashakaila's (the most populated village in Mahas area) three representatives on the local anti-dam committee are NCP members. But some of them who were on the committee have felt marginalized by others at their meetings. One of them stated that "we were from different political colours and the first time that we met we agreed that this was an issue which should not be politicized. So we agreed not mix our struggle in this issue with any other political agendas. It was going well but at some point some guidance started to come from other entities like the Communist Party. I was always arguing against them in the meetings. For instance, at one meeting I argued that we should not organize a protest marsh, it is just a study and they will go away afterwards. When they organize meetings they started to avoid informing me, because they do not want to listen to other voices". There was one person from his village who interrupted him saying; you can not say that you have been marginalized by the committee; we selected you as our representative along with two others. If the people here felt that you were working according to what they wanted you to do they would go and argue with committee and ask why it was neglecting our representative. But people felt that you were doing something else. Let them do that with one of the other two representatives and see what our people here in village will do. You should ask yourself why you have not been supported by the people who sent you. Another thing is that you are saying they did not inform you about the times of meetings and the person who is responsible for information in the committee is NCP member. Then whoever marginalized you is an NCP member like yourself.

The local committees usually did not want to take the responsibility for the actions which took place during the governor's visit even if they were really behind them. Nevertheless, they saw that what happened to the governor was what he deserved, and they do not regret the actions.

Nasir, a farmer in Mashakaila village commented:

why he came suddenly with out informing the villagers. He informed only his own people here and then only in the last few hours before his visit.

They accused the government of visiting the places where they saw that there would be more supporters and avoided going to the villages like Jaddi, Farraig, Mashakaila, Nawri and Diffoy, which are strongholds of the resisters.

The governor again visited a village called Ardowan. It is a chersonese; during the Nile flood season it becomes totally surrounded by the water, but is connected to the mainland by a bridge. The government closed the bridge with police to prevent people from other villages to attend the governor's "public meeting". Thousands of local resisters managed to cross the Nile to Ardowan and disrupted the governor's speech, in which he told them that the dam would be constructed irrespective of their position¹⁷.



¹⁷ See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=45QbnKbeSSU> this was one of the most humiliating and arbitrary speeches, in which the Governor did not pay the slightest attention to local protestors. The people were protesting and the Governor was saying: "We will build the dam and we have decided." Thousands of protestors were saying "The tragedy of Abud, referring to their historical experiences of Wadi Halfa, will not be repeated," and he was arguing that the locals were supporting the scheme.



Figure 2-5 Anti-dam statements (like: no for the submergence of the land of civilizations, no for cultural extermination, nothing compensates home, Nubian homeland is a liberated land) written on the walls of majority upstream houses (Source: Nuba Irkinain Group).

The government has built a road that connects Dongola to Halfa. This road is more than 500 km long and is regarded as an enormous achievement. The road passes through the Mahas area. When a major project has been completed the President is expected to inaugurate it. Such inaugurations are often accompanied by huge public meeting and media attendance, because these achievements are ascribed to the ruling political party and add to its credit in the forth coming presidential elections.¹⁸ The President was supposed to hold inauguration parties and public speeches in Dongola, Delgo and Wadi Halfa. Delgo is the nearest place to the dam site but it is down-stream of it. The northern state took intensive security measures and invited the locals to attend and welcome the President. Rumors were spread that the dam supporters were being gathered by the government and the president would launch the Kajbar dam project as well. The local committee called for an emergency meeting and wrote to the governor that they will welcome the President, providing that Bashir and the dam supporters

¹⁸ They inaugurated Merowe dam even before it was finished, on the day before the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir. They did so to gain the national and regional support for the president against the ICC. On that occasion Bashir's supporters were saying (*elsad elsad elrad elrad*) which means that we are responding to the ICC claims with our achievements. Bashir said that Sudan would not stop the development projects because it had been targeted by westerners for their own agendas: see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WdT_NjkdV4w when he also announced that all dam projects will be completed. The announcement of Bashir annoyed the Nubians.

would not say anything about the Kajbar dam. Otherwise, they said, the government would be responsible for the consequences of what they will do. They started to prepare themselves and brought hats and signs with anti-dam slogans. All of the upstream villages were told to be ready to respond if the dam supporters or the President mentioned anything about the dam. On the day when the President was supposed to go, the government announced that the inauguration party had been postponed. The inauguration party would be altered to a battleground between resisters and supporters.

This has happened twice; the second time, the committee even demanded to have its speech in the ceremony. In this speech they wanted the president to announce that the dam had been stopped and also they wanted to be told about what was happening with the Kajbar Martyrs file. But this would contradict the message that the government wanted to send from this event. Finally, the President did not go there to launch the road. The political game is clear when we remember that the forthcoming presidential election will be in just a few months. The NCP insists on implementing this project even against the will of the local people because they are corrupt. As in every project they will inflate its real cost and empower their members' companies. The Sudanese will be paying for the Merowe dam for tens of years. Some people even went farther, arguing that NCP members have lots of black money, which they whitewash by letting their companies work on such projects.

One of the Nubian intellectuals said that if they are not corrupt, how is it that the DIU, which is supposed to be building dams, is establishing hospitals, air ports, roads, bridges and many other things. DIU is a state within the state, and this unit has the upper hand in the electricity they produce, the land and the new agricultural schemes. They are not accountable to the minister of finance and national economy.

Lahmeyer “a German company” did the feasibility study, but some of the locals think that DIU even does not have research. They see that Lahmeyer has not handed over the study because DIU has not paid for it. Others argue that they have the study but they do not want to give it to them.¹⁹ A local committee member said that governor agreed to bring engineers from their side and from the Nubians' side to evaluate the feasibility study but he did not do

¹⁹ The company which performed the feasibility studies is the one that will construct the dam, which makes the feasibility studies questionable.

so.²⁰ Some of the local opponents accused DIU of doing other business such as searching for metal and archaeological sites in their place when they were doing the studies. There were machine and movements in strange places which could have nothing to do with dam and its reservoir.

Usually the government avoids the local committee when they negotiate with local communities. Once they sent all the northern state ministers to various affected villages. Every time one or two ministers were sent to a village it was described by some locals as a “divide and rule” policy. After the meeting when they go back to the city, local people would hear in the media a different story from what actually happened. The local committees' counter-weapon was the Internet, where they circulated videos and reports.

Ayman, a newly university-graduated, reflects on the government manipulations of such meetings:

They said they were doing feasibility studies, but we know that such studies shouldn't take more than few weeks because they have advanced technologies, but they were there for almost three months. The government cheats via the media; in Darfur, Abd Elwahid, one of the rebel leaders in Darfur, could not show us a video to convince us. But here we have overcome this problem. We punished the governor and before he reached Dongola and made his statement we circulated the video on the Internet.

Identifying and weakening the opponent

The opposition perceives the supporters of the dam as either ignorant or wanting to be rich at the expense of others. They classify the supporters into three main groups; first, some Nubians who have lived in cities for a very long time. Those who have property inheritance problems may also support the project; for example, those who are in Khartoum and do not benefit from their land as much as their cousins do; such person may sometimes think of the project as an opportunity to regain their lost rights or even more, but at the expense of

²⁰ It is still the engineers who would see and evaluate the feasibility studies, socio-cultural, and emotional and other extra economic costs are tare totally ignored. This clearly shows which agent is still has the upper hand in evaluating the feasibility studies, as if everything related to the dam construction are purely technical issues.

others.²¹ Second, non-Nubians who have lived with them for a long time and now speak only Nubian. Some people in this category and the new comers have appreciated that they have been welcomed by Nubians without segregation and collaborated with Nubians against the project. Some, according to the background of experiences, because they do not have lands and or other properties, they become project supporters. The resisters feel that the latter category did not appreciate that they have sheltered them, and given them their land to farm and graze. The third category of supporters (according to the resisters' classification) comprises those who support the project so as not to lose their positions in the government. There are few members of this category, and there are even cases of people resigning from their positions because they did not agree with the government approach. A clear instance of this kind was the resignation of deputy governor and the prefect, head of Wadi Halfa locality, from their positions.

The way in which the dam supporters were treated was often described as a sign of civilization. Nubian activists see that supporters would have been killed in any other part of the Sudan but Nubians merely prevented them from doing things that would harm the case. For instance, some started to collect signatures secretly to report the case and to say that the majority were supporting the dam. They disassociated²² those who were doing this sort of

²¹ Some of those who lived in Khartoum came and established little houses during that time to be compensated.

²² Such practice of disassociation in a sense was very effective tool to treat the supporters among them, but in another sense it had devastating social impacts. Anti-dam committee wrote to the supporters that no one will share your happy and sad occasions. There was dispute between relatives, neighbors and even brothers. A women called his brother, who was a known pro-dam proponent, in Khartoum and told him do not come to home we do not know you and we feel shame of what you are doing there, I am not your sister any more and no one will welcome you if you come to our village. There is man who took his family and went to apologize in a public meeting because he and his family could not bear the disassociation. In Mashakaila village the resisters have through the pumping machine of the one of supporters in the Nile. So it has many side effects and disputes at many levels. There is also clash between up and down stream villages also both of them used to be unified entity and acted as Mahas. The up stream villages blames the down streamers did not supported them in their struggle with state, and even did not come and consoled them when their youth have been killed when other Nubians from farther parts like Halfa and Sikkout others went and supported from farther places.

things, and told them that they had a right to say yes for the project but not to misrepresent the whole society to the government.

Supporters always argue about the anti-dam and Nubian activists who are in Khartoum or abroad, asking if they are interested in the area why they have left it. They should not talk about cultural and identity extermination because they abandoned their homeland and had done nothing to maintain it. Even their sons and daughters do not speak Nubian. Naturally, the anti-dam agents do not agree with such arguments, because they want the collaboration of a wider range of people; even of non-Nubians who are struggling against the construction of other dams, and opposition political parties.



Figure 3 Anti dam activists of Nubian Rescue Organization in Washington DC (Source: Nubian Rescue Organization)

Many of the opposition regard the protests as not only to stop dam construction but also to protect the heritage of thousands of years of civilization. They argue that all humans are responsible for keeping their historical heritage in Nubia. **Ali:** “When we had cities thousands years back, Europeans were still cowboys let alone the Arab”. In spite of all these all-encompassing strategies of the resisters, to include any body that can support them; it is still the upstream affected villages that are the main agents. Although there are many anti-dam committees in Khartoum, Saudi Arabia, Europe and America but the agreement is that the

local committee is the main and most representative one. If there is a contradiction between two committees the last word is what the local committee says.

Many observers discuss the unique position of the DIU in the structure of the state power structure. Instead of being a sub-section in the Ministry of Agriculture or Irrigation or Ministry of Power and Electricity it belongs directly to the national presidency. The executive director of DIU is formerly addressed as Minister but DIU actually has power over other ministries. For example, the electricity which is generated by the Merowe dam belongs to DIU rather than to the Ministry of Power and Electricity. The dam-related land issues are being administered by DIU rather than by the Ministry of Agriculture. It has power even over the Northern State governments. In the Kajbar dam case, the northern state has been given only five days to inform its people. DIU is said to be the financial supporter of the NCP's election campaigns in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010 (Warrag 2010).²³

The government also identifies the local activists and all Nubian anti-dam actors as politically motivated. They are usually portrayed as communists, helping imperialist agendas and working against the "national interest". There is a deliberate confusion between the national interests and special interests of the ruling elites. With regard to the actions of the protest marches in which four people have been killed by the police: A dam supporter told me that a Nubian Communist Party member told the resisters "just go and protest and let them kill only one of you and we will do the rest". Some NCP members went farther saying this is a manifestation of the Israeli dream of expanding its state from the Nile to Furat. Therefore, they accused the resisters of working with the Israeli organizations. The local activists strongly deny this and always claim that the opposing political parties are not taking part in this escalation.

Decision-making at the village level before the dam project was mainly a task for elders, men and educated people. In these events when the people held their meetings, many voices started to argue even against previously powerful agents. Some such changes have been perceived as negative consequences, for example, students arguing against their teachers and youth against certain elders in such meetings. Some described this as unacceptable manners.

²³ Ajras El houria News paper, April 5, 2010.

The elders, for example, could not stop young people from clashing with government and NCP members.

Ali, an active youth in public work in Jaddi village, had a different perspective. He realized that now anybody could speak to the public, unlike the passiveness of many youth and women in the past vis-a-vis public issues. He said:

It used to be hard to get people to come to public meetings, but after this event meetings have been attended by unexpected numbers of people.

Higher-level government officials always avoid visiting the upstream villages when they have public meetings. They go to the downstream villages, but the up stream village people go there too, and if they expect there will be speeches about the Kajbar dam they take their signboards and hats with anti-dam slogans. The government usually looks for and visits areas there they will find many supporters, and the opponents disrupt such meetings. The supporters blame the resistance for spoiling the negotiations that could have had fruitful consequences. The resistance's argument is that if we let them talk to the public in the downstream villages, where the majority are supporters they will use the video that they make there to mislead every one and argue that the supporters are the majority. The opposition believes that if the government really wishes to see the attitude of the affected people they should come to the upstream villages. A public discussion was organized by the government about the Kajbar dam in one of the public halls in Khartoum. The resisters argue that some of those attending were Nubians who had left the area and had been living in Khartoum for centuries. They accused them of having been lured by the government into believing that the compensation would be paid to them as well.

Use of Ethnic Politics

Because of overwhelming domination of ethnic dimensions in the state policies I asked whether the Nubian Influential Nubian figures in the NCP can guarantee full and sustainable compensation. I was interested in this because the northerners have long been taken for granted as a dominant group who reallocate the nation's resources to develop their own area.²⁴ But the existence of members from a particular ethnic group does not necessarily mean that particular ethnic group is dominant. Sacrificing themselves for the country does not make

²⁴ See "The black book : Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan."

sense for the Nubians; they usually say that they belong first to their home then to the village, Mahas, the Nubian homeland and finally to the country. If we lost our homeland we will not have any sense of belonging to Sudan.

Nubians were taken for granted as one of dominant groups in Sudan. One dominant stereotype of Sudanese ethnic politics is that it is dominated by Arabs of the north and subordinated Africans in the south and west (most recently after the Darfur crises). In the history of Sudanese politics after independence there was a Nubian president and many ministers. Although Nubians make up less than 10% of the Sudanese population, they once held more than fifty percent of civil services positions in Sudan. Therefore, many other Sudanese are bewildered when Nubians talk about marginalization. On the other hand, Nubians see that the other Sudanese are debt to Nubians because they taught all over Sudan and served Sudan with conscientious and self-denying attitudes. They feel that other Sudanese have forgotten all these things and do not appreciate them any more, and their resources are being dealt with as if they had no owners. Their archaeological sites have been robbed, damaged, submerged and in most proper cases the finds have been taken to national museums in Khartoum. In all cases, Nubians have not benefited from these resources.²⁵

Mokhtar, a middle-aged man argued that influential Nubians in the NCP do not represent their communities:

Some other Sudanese asked us: how can the government which includes influential Nubians like Barky (Minister of Defense) and Abd Elraheem (former Minister of Interior Affairs and current presidential adviser) can be against Nubians? But we have not elected them and they do not represent us. They are loyal to the NCP which has an anti-Nubian agenda. They are harming us more than others. They have done nothing even for their even own small villages let alone for all of the Nubians. How can we trust them since they have not shown any interest in helping their people here? What they do is just giving some contribution to NCP members who go and beg them

²⁵ Nubians organizations have written a diplomatic note to Kofi Annan the former general secretary of the United Nations to support their right to manage their resources and develop their area.

to contribute to a hospital or school building.²⁶ Why should we beg our rights? Aren't we paying taxes? Aren't we Sudanese?

Nubians tried to use those influential Nubians in the NCP to stop the project but many of them were the most ardent proponents of the project. This was a source of distrust because they have not admitted even that, the DIU approach was wrong. There was no announcement of the project at all and the villagers were surprised by machines that started to work on their land, and they know nothing about what was happening. The government only informed its own followers, administrators and NCP members. After the tensions escalated, rumours were spread and the villagers started to organize themselves for anti-dam actions, then the government started to use NCP Nubians. This has led to more dispute among Nubians themselves to the extent that the Nubians in NCP party were portrayed as the bitterest enemies of the Nubians' own interests. The Nubians who are in the NCP at local level tried to reduce the tensions by explaining, for instance, that what is being done is just a feasibility study and they will not construct a dam now. However, by that time the mistrust had become only guiding force towards the project evaluation.

Nubians are aware that the other Sudanese think of them as racist because they live together in places migrate to like *Elkalakla*, and *Elhajyousif* in Khartoum. **Mamoun** who lived for few years in Khartoum argued this reflects social unity and solidarity among the community members and should not be seen as racism. In such places, he said, we help each other:

If you go and to see any institution in Khartoum if there is one Nubian among the staff you will notice that he is the most beloved and peaceful one. It is the other Sudanese who are racist. They call our language rotana which means incomprehensible sound like birds and animals' one. This is an arrogant of Arabs to regard our language in this way. I get angry with those who are a shamed to speak Nubian and teach their sons only Arabic. Why should we do so if we have a highly evolved language that existed before the Profit Mohammed himself came?²⁷

²⁶ This point needs some elaborations because it reflects how the ruling party NCP is empowering its members through using them as channels of funding on some public services. It has to do with the shrinking state role of new liberal state from its responsibility in provision of social welfare.

²⁷ I have attended an occasion of student competition in which all programs were being presented in Arabic and somebody asked would they fail if they presented in Nubian?

The Nubians lived together for thousands of years, this can one of the reasons behind their unitary and strong love and strong sense belongingness to their home. They think that they can not be compared with other ethnic groups that are weakly connected to each others and their homeland. It is not easy to convince them to leave the land of their fathers.

Abdalla, a well-informed local resister in Jaddi, believes that even if the project is feasible it should not be constructed by this government:

This government has never kept its promises in any agreement. The SPLM which has led an armed conflict in the South for more than 20 years and came to the power through an internationally supported agreement has been cheated by the NCP, and this the case with all agreements with the easterners and Darfurians, so how can we trust them? I will not surrender to this pro-Arab government, it is doing all this because we are not Arab. Their approach showed us that they do not respect us. They came and started as if there were no people living here.

The dam supporters usually refer to the local anti-dam committee members as a politically motivated group. In contrast, the opposing groups see that they have been selected on the bases of honesty and trustworthiness. Even before the dam they were active and prepared to sacrifice their time and money, and no one can buy them. Local people refer to those whom the government can influence in his attitude as unworthy persons who have sold their consciences to the government. Some government officers and those who have positions in the power are accused of being like this. It can look as if Nubian supporters want to let the government submerge their homes.

This perception of the dam supporters is putting constraints on the internal unification, which could find common ground between them. There are many people who have nothing to do with the governments' interests but who have supported the dam from their calculations of the land shortage and belief that it is time to look for other wider spaces to improve their opportunities in life. They think that the project will turn their lives upside down. Many of the locals would accept the dam if they trusted that the government to fully compensate them. They see that the land has been exhausted because they have farmed the same piece of land for thousands of years. One of them said in 1995 I got 25 sacks but in 2009 I got only 6 sacks from the same land. Whatever effort you put will not increase the productivity. Although they

are not many in the upstream affected villages, such reasonable voices to accept the dam should also be heard and reasoned with.

The anti-dam locals refer to the geopolitics of Nubia, and say because we are between Egypt and the Arabs of the central Sudan and they could not arabize us, so they are trying to uproot us instead. The southerners were supported by the neighbouring countries such as Uganda, and the Darfurians by Chad, but our problem is that Egypt is our bitterest enemy. Some of those who have visited Egypt tell stories of how the Egyptian Nubians are being mistreated by the Egyptian government. There are many emerging collaborations between Sudanese and Egyptian Nubians.

Hosain, a member in the local anti-dam committee, discussed how Kajbar dam provoked their political actions:

They think that the Nubians are dangerous to the Arabic culture. Historically, they defeated many civilizations but could not do this with us. We suffered all wars with Egypt and others and we are still united. When they put some Arabs among us to assimilate us they are still isolated, this is the case even in Khartoum. I hope we have not let the Arabs enter Sudan.²⁸ All marginalized people in the east, west and south

²⁸ He refers to the very old history agreement between Nubians and Arabs which called *Boght* agreement. Arab tried to enter Sudan from its northern gate and got into clashes with Nubian kingdom. The war went for long time. Finally they came up with this agreement of *Boght* through which Arab could enter Sudan, and build Mosques and gradually converted Nubian from Christianity to Islam. The agreement was that Arab should pass Nubian area and not settled and Nubians should pay 360 slaves yearly to the Arab. There is a dominating picture about the Nubians by other Sudanese that they are something like half Muslims and some time anti religion. Many jokes about Nubians is reproducing this picture about Nubians, for example they say one religious man told a Nubian that: its you who entered the Islam in Sudan, the Nubian replied; and its we who are going to remove it. But it is more than merely jokes, this how Nubians see themselves in the eyes of others and how most Sudanese sees Nubians.

Depending on such discourses the anti-dam resistors see that, the government is targeting us because they think of us as threatening to Arab and Islam. The NCP often regarded Nubian as communist (communism is mainly perceived as anti-Islam). One of the NCP members described all anti dam movement as that communist are missing their past in which they won the election in Nubian area. He argued that the communist are manipulating this issue to gain the election in the northern part against Islamic awaken which dominated the area. My informants have explained why this stereotype is attached to them differently. Some said because

have won their rights through such rebel movements, and it is only we who have got nothing. We were asleep and they provoked us by this dam. The issue of our massacres has been circulated like the Darfur file.

Activists see that there is a promising future for Nubians because of the emergence of many Nubian societies, organizations and political parties. Still there are some problems of fragmented efforts that should be unified. Some entities like Nubian student associations at Sudanese universities are not fully playing their expected role. Nevertheless, they are becoming more active in public issues outside the universities. Their activities at universities used to be just to welcome the new Nubian students and organize farewell parties for those who had graduated. The Nubian student association at the University of Khartoum established a news paper to work against the project. They also organized many public meetings, workshops and brought Nubian intellectuals to talk to the public. They were organized and fully trained because most of them were political activists, mainly communist, as well. They went to the Mahas area and gave public speeches in every village and provoked the locals.

The dam resisters classify some Nubian organizations which do oppose the project as governmental organizations. They have been organized and are financed by the government, and their members are recognized NCP members. An example of such an organization is “Halfa, Sikkoat Mahas Development Organization”.

The high rate of out emigration is perceived as a deliberate action from the government to depopulate the Nubian homelands. The area was forgotten by all national governments and most of the social services were run by the efforts of Nubians abroad, otherwise life in the homeland would be impossible.

in 1980s the communist nominated person has won in the Halfa Mahas province, which was a rare case in Sudan. Others say because we are open and say our opinion directly without flattering and the government does not want so. **Elsir:** “Once a minister affords to build a mosque and Nubian old man asked him it should school instead of mosque. When they heard such thing they misunderstand us but the old man was not against the mosque building but he was referring to the shortage of schools.

Thinking Through Archeology

The evaluation of the archaeological sites is a controversial issue. Some people do not believe that many archaeological sites will be lost, and they do not actually care very much. There can be a number of factors behind that. Among them, that the state has not given attention to its value. There are many stories detaching people from their ancestral heritages for example, in many areas archaeological sites are believed to be occupied by devils. Other stories describing them as European heritages, and all these are being regarded by activist as a strategic efforts against Nubian identity and to assimilate them. As a reaction they have started to concentrate on the importance of preserving their historical heritages and being proud of it. Many lectures have been organized in the villages to show the significance of historical heritage for their identity and how it can be good source of economic reward to the area. These lectures highlighted what are there as an invisible archeological sites. These lectures greatly helped to mobilize local Nubians to act against the project. The governments' argument is that the project will even help to conserve Nubian archaeology by encouraging archaeological excavations before sites are submerged.

Conclusion

In short, in this chapter I have presented the ethnography of state intervention in the Kajbar Dam project; its history, state interventions, counter-reactions to it and its ramifications. We briefly followed the hegemony of the state and the escalating counter actions of the resistance. The chapter has focused on the power relations of the various stakeholders in the project. The state tried to limit the maneuvering space of the local participants in the opposition to the project. The government officials excluded the local people from discussions about its feasibility, refused to recognize their representatives and started the project without their consent. The government has used the power of discourses of nationalism, religion and economic progress in addition to its control of the media and other state apparatus. In spite of all this soft power, they were unable to persuade the locals to endorse the project. This is because the resisters, as I have showed, were also able to produce critical knowledge which destabilized the state discourse. They were also able to organize and mobilize the forces of rights-based advocacy and the Nubian identity which questioned and delegitimized the state's actions. When the state failed to implement the project through the soft power it exercised coercive state power by using the police force to kill, arrest, target and cover up, in order to suppress the anti-dam activities. These actions have led to farther escalations of resistance at

many levels using different methods that have polarized local, national and global forces which support them in their struggle against the state hegemony. In the last chapter, I deepen my discussion and analysis of these complex interactions. This is to prove that it is not the state power and other forces of implementations which define the outcome of the “developmental” project but also the capacity of the counter actions to modify and resist it.

What the chapter has also shown is that the conflicting visions, discourses and actions I described earlier can not be fully gasped unless we broadly see how each part evaluate the benefits and costs of the project. As we saw, the tensions have escalated because of the state mismanagement of the local reactions. But there have also been tensions from the very beginning due to the underlying economic rationality behind the dam project. Therefore, the next chapter will present more focused reflections on the present economic situation in the area and discuss how the pro-dam and anti-dam people and organizations articulate the situation very differently. We shall see the economic arguments of the state as opposed to a more complex local perception of the natural environment as something embedded in their history and their identity, basic to the present and future well being of the people.

Chapter Three

KAJBAR CATARACT: AN APPROPRIATE NATURAL RESOURCE FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION vs. PRICELESS HOMELAND



Formel 1 Kajbar Cataract (Source: Nuba Irkinain Group).

Abd Elmohsin, a university graduate who works in Khartoum and goes back to his family in Nubian homeland on holidays said:

*The supporters here say that you will be fully compensated. He asked me: you are in Norway; if they gave you a very good position there, providing you will not ever come back to Sudan, would you accept? I replied, no, I wouldn't. He said this is more than an emotional attitude. I have grown up here and when I leave this area to work in Khartoum I miss even our streets' stones here.*²⁹

²⁹ I noticed that this emotional aspect is totally ignored or belittled by the planners. Some times you hear them saying "they are just motivated by their emotions". I have not come across a study or survey that they tried to consider this part. This emotional and cultural aspect does not make sense to those who conduct their data by GIS to do the socio-cultural assessments. The loses and gains for them is just how many feddans, houses and palm trees they are going to lose and how they will be compensated and this only the negotiable part of the project for the planners.

Human life without health cannot enjoy anything, even if you have billion dollars. If you have serious health problems you will not enjoy your life. What will affect us in the resettlement area is not a disease to be treated, but will be a problem that is psychologically deep-seated and not curable. Even if they fully compensated us, that does not mean we will be satisfied.

Through this chapter my main aim is to bring evidence for what I am calling “the economic rationality” behind the struggle. In the Chapter One I discussed the theoretical perspectives of those who argue that development is achievable through the glorification of a particular knowledge and through the employment of specific narrow and simplified calculations (Escobar 1995, Ferguson 1994, Barth 1997, Mitchell 2002, Scott 1998). Following such lines of arguments I want to reflect how the Kajbar dam project is surrounded by contradicting evaluations of the lost and benefits. The government and pro-dam agents are articulating the deteriorating economic situation of the locals, the narrow strips of land, falling agricultural and palm trees production, contrasting this with the economic benefits locals will get as compensation from the dam project. The discourses of agricultural expansion, electricity production and the provision of proper social services are key arguments employed by the State to justify and rationalize their actions. Nevertheless, such discourses are no longer working smoothly. As I argued earlier, this type of hegemonic arguments are now being destabilized by the critical discourses and knowledge by local people. In this chapter I am going to reflect how the anti-dam Nubians, in contrast to the state discourse, highlights the extra-economic values of their land and palm trees, the value of the Nile itself, and the value of the safe and secure life they are living, based on these valued resources. We will see how the local people refuse the evaluation of the project costs and their future wellbeing from a purely economic point of view, replacing this with arguments that stress the deep sociality of land, palm trees, and the Nile and their socio-cultural values for the Nubians.

Agriculture and Living Conditions in Mahas Area

The ethnographic data about the living condition in terms of livelihood was an important aspect to grasp how people are reacting toward the project. For example, which agricultural activities do they proceed with, and how do they cultivate their lands? What are the problems facing the agricultural activities now? What is the condition of Palm trees’ productivity and marketing? The discussion of the situation of public social services in Mahas area was

important as well. I tried to follow what has been changed in their livelihood system by letting them call their memories few decades back.

When it comes to the project evaluation and perception, it has a lot to do with the Nubian consciousness of their current socio-economic situation and the images of the resettlement areas they have constructed. The changing economic situations, reduction of the agricultural production, ecological changes and the disturbance of their livelihood system is not being perceived same by all locals. You hear very different evaluations when you ask about current living conditions as background to their perception of the project. The project opponents reflect their socio-economic situation as if they are living in the paradise.³⁰ On the other hand, the supporters can reflect the area which they have lived for thousand years as if they will not be survive any more with out the dam-project. It is important to understand their perception in the light of the attitude about the dam. Nevertheless, it is also important to see their attitude according to perceptions of the current situation as well. These attitudes say something about how they perceive the present, and how the life will be in their resettlement areas.

Disturbance of Livelihood System as Biases for Pro-Dam Arguments

The Nubians' adaptive strategy, in their homeland, combines agriculture along the banks of the Nile, keeping some livestock for their consumption, and migration to the cities or outside the country. Even though almost all families depend on men who have migrated to other Arab countries, the backbone of their livelihood depends on growing cash crops like beans, wheat and date palms. The cultivable land which they farm beside the Nile does not exceed five *feddans* for each family. The compactness of the Nubian homeland heightens Nubian migration to the cities and outside the country.

However, the relative shortage of cultivable land is not the main problem facing the Nubians. The high fertility of their land which they have farmed for thousands of years has not

³⁰ Of course, they wouldn't reflect their situation as such if there was an organization providing economic help for example. What I am trying to argue here is that how people see and reflect their own being is highly strategic.

decreased because it is renewed every year by the Nile flood which brings silt. They do not need to adopt strategies such as a rotation system to maintain the fertility of the soil, as is the case in many parts of Sudan. The rate of migration has dramatically increased in recent decades because of a high level of taxation and a lack of health and educational and other social services. The costs of these services are high because this area has been neglected by Sudanese governments since independence.

Archaeological finds show that ancient Nubian history has largely been shaped by changes in the level of the Nile. So the “Nubians periods of expansion and decay are best understood in terms of the varying amount of water which would define the area of cultivable land” (Adams & Trigger, in Sørbo 1972: 14). Fluctuations in the flow of the Nile are one of the factors which have a direct impact on agricultural activities, because many of their fields are closely attached to the Nile. Many major agricultural schemes with large pumps have stopped or are working below their capacity because of lack of water and unexpected fluctuations in flow. In many areas with water shortages in the Nile valley, small sandy islands have emerged. Villages with these small islands usually suffer water shortages in the dry seasons.³¹ The water of the small valleys between the villages and the small islands dries up when the river shrinks after the flood season. These villages do not have easy access to water during the winter to grow their main winter crops such as wheat and beans (see figure 4).

³¹ The villages of Habaraab, Saadeeg, Hambikol, Miseda, Sharg faad in the upstream area , called Khour villages are the most affected area by this valley shrinking. They could not farm the winter season for many years. It is hard for them to get drinking water let alone for irrigation. Many people from these villages asked to be resettled in another area, even if the dam project will not be there. This case is being referred to as a solid case for the dam feasibility by the dam supporters, government and planners.



Figure 4 *In some villages it gets completely dry in summer (this is not the main Nile valley).* Source: Nuba Irkinain Group.

Generally speaking, the Nile has shrunk much in recent years due to climate change. However, Nubians in Mahas area have observed very serious Nile water shrinkages during the past few years because of the construction of the Merowe dam. They are in the downstream area of the dam and it is now difficult to predict the fluctuations in flow. They used to organize their agricultural activities in different fields with different crops according to the natural Nile water fluctuation. Now that water control has come under the control of the dam administration³² they experience major disturbances in their agricultural activities, which have consequences for their overall attitudes to agriculture. An interview with a government official in northern state gave me the impression that they are using this as weapon to weaken local resistance to the dam. He said “the opposition now has cooled down and the supporters are growing. We have many signatures of people who want the dam. Now they are facing many problems in their agriculture due to the unexpected Nile water fluctuation”.

³² This area is now a down stream to Merowe dam which has been accomplished few years back.

Now in the course of a single night, farmers are liable to find their fields very far from the water because of the Nile shrinking. The water can leave their pumps dry as it drops by tens of meters. It is difficult to move the pumps to follow the water, as this needs the collaboration of many farmers in a collective effort called “*nafeer or feza*”, which is now reduced because of the domination of the market perspective in their work. They use the labour of newcomers from Darfur, Manaseer, and other places and pay cash for them. Many major irrigation schemes have been stopped because of these unexpected and harmful fluctuations in water level.

To cope with such changes the farmers have adopted various methods. In some villages the farmers use small schemes with artesian well irrigation systems. The large schemes, which all farmers of the village used to farm, have been stopped in some villages or are about to stop in other. Although the artesian irrigation system is costly, it provides constant access to water all year round. These small schemes are becoming more and more popular in the villages. Sudla is a village of less than 8 km in length and with 20 feddans of farmable land, where there are more than eight pumps. The growing number of pumps is closely related to the rise in production costs.

Kolotod is a kind of irrigation system that has been adopted to avoid water shortage problems in the valley. They use two pumps, one from the main water site to another fixed pumps site, so that they always have access to water. This method is more costly than the artesian system. But even with all these they still cannot irrigate their fields properly.

Izzat, a farmer who owns five feddans of land in Farraig, explained the reduction of the agricultural production as follows:

*The fall in wheat and bean production is not only because of the water and land fertility but also because of climate changes. These are winter crops that need cold weather, and the winter is not as cold as it used to be.*³³

³³ Here we can see how the slightest sign of global warming is being felt by the local people. And he might also say so because he heard about the global warming. But it is true that the winter is not so cold now. One of my informants said that he used to have a fire in the middle of the room to keep warm, but now he can sleep even without a bed-cover.

The artesian irrigation system will terminate the fertilization of the land by the Nile silt. But some farmers still do not see this as a serious problem yet because the land is still fertile. What are more problematic for productivity are the insects, grass and weeds that negatively affects crop production.

I asked **Omar**, who has been farming for more than 15 years in Sudla Village, to try to recall the productivity of the same piece of land over the years, for example, how many sacks of wheat and beans he used to harvest from the same area and the same crop since the end of 1990?

I have had a small pump since 2000 and my field is about 7 feddans. In 2000 I got 33 sacks of beans from two feddans, and 44 sacks of wheat from four feddans. After that the production kept falling by one or two sacks a year, until this year I got 18 sacks from the same piece of land. When I saw that the wheat and bean crops were becoming lower and lower I started to gradually replace them by growing some vegetables.³⁴

It was interesting to observe the techniques adopted by the farmers to compensate for the fall in crop production and to see where they market their products.

There is not much diversity in their crops. Most of the farmers are restricted to winter crops, mainly wheat and beans, and dates. It is rare to see a farmer who grows vegetables and sells them in the local markets. Few farmers grow vegetables for their own consumption. They grow only Okra, Jews' mello, *Rigla*.³⁵ Vegetables need investments of time such as weeding. Some farmers have adopted the strategy of fake irrigation to clean the land. In this method, before the start of the growing season they irrigate an empty field before sowing; the weeds grow and they plough them in. This is an efficient and less expensive method than using herbicides, and it kills all weeds.

³⁴ Such a way of adaption within the agricultural production is not so common; they usually perform other non-agricultural activities as well, such as raising sheep and goats, working as a village carrier, running a small shop, fishing and working in a government office. This is to fill the gap of gradually diminishing agricultural production.

³⁵ The range of product is narrow, which means that they depend on a few types of foods. This is because, unlike in the past, they now farm to meet market demand rather than for their own consumption



Figure 5: Farmers are cleaning the land. (Source: Nuba Irkinain Group).

In spite of all these difficulties, many farmers have not totally abandoned agriculture when they started to look for other sources of income. Activities such as fishing, trading, and so on are definitely there because of the impossibility of depending on agriculture alone. There is some diversification of economic activities but still everybody who lives there needs to farm, as they see that without agriculture it is difficult to live. For example some people have cars and working as carriers, but what they earn covers just part of their living costs. However, there are some youngsters who do not farm.

The local administrators once brought some hybrid goats through the farmers' bank as package of a programme called "the productive family" that aims to "help" the families to generate incomes. But the goats did not tolerate the environment and the kind of grasses which they fed them, so they all died, and those who received this package found them selves in debt.

There is another issue of using foreign labor in certain agricultural activities. Those people come from outside Mahas like Manaseer, Nuba, Southerners, Darfurians and central Arabs. The elders always complain about this, saying our youth are not fully committed to agriculture. This is why they give agricultural jobs to the newcomers. For example, when the growing season starts it is a heavy task to prepare the land, so at that stage people pay for external labor. Although it increases agricultural costs, it also gives people a certain prestige

to have workers on their farms. Others are proud of not depending on external labor because they can do everything for themselves. Big families with many young men are unlikely to use external labor, particularly if their land is not big enough, and they do not have many other sources of income. But such families are now rare because of the high rate of emigration, predominantly in the productive age-group.

If the family has many brothers abroad in Saudi Arabia, Khartoum or some other countries, one of them always stays in Mahas. The family encourages him to stay to look after their fields and their families and grow new palm trees for himself and them. They also send him money, sometimes even a car to increase his income. All this is to compensate him. If their brothers are supporting him well he does not need to do the agricultural activities by himself so in such case he uses external labor. This strategy helps to minimize the negative effect of the shortage of land while it also maintains the relationship with the home.

The increase in the use of external labor is closely related to the decrease in collective work *Nafeer*. Families which had problems in doing the heavy tasks of farming their fields because of the death of the breadwinner, health problems or travel used to be helped by relatives and neighbors. Although people talk about how they support each other, such support is not as common as it used to be, if it exists at all. Even in using money for labor they prefer to give it to the newcomers than to their relatives and neighbors, because every Nubian has his own land so they do not need to work for others; working for your relatives and neighbors for the sake of money is what “strangers” do. They may do just the same work to help out, but not in order to earn money.

They do not want to mix market relationships, which they evaluate as superficial and utilitarian, with the social and kinship ones which are, or at least are supposed to be, genuine, strong and collaborative. This is why they prefer economic dealings with non-Nubians. It is difficult for them to bargain over prices of goods or labor value with their relatives. There is an issue of emerging specialization, for instance they see that Arabs can clean palm trees but they do not know other agricultural activities. Farmers know that what they pay for such labor is expensive:

Mohammed, an owner of small pumper, calculated the expenses involved in using external labor in some agricultural activities as follows:

what we give them is not so expensive, but according to what we get from the market we can even lose. It costs 3 Sudanese Pounds to clean one palm tree, so if I clean 10 palms and get 1000 palm branches I can sell them in the market for less than the 30 SDP which I have paid for the worker. The cost is even more than that because we feed him while he is working. Our purchasing power is weak because the area is far from the cities and has less population.

Date production is also falling. Even in the flood season, the water does not reach the level where they plant their palm trees, as it used only a few years ago. The villagers are also complaining about diseases in their palms. They know the symptoms but not the causes. The prices of dates are rising, because the area is now connected to the cities by paved roads. This helps to balance the fall in productivity. The prices increase most during *Ramadan* and *Eids*³⁶ but many families that are in debt cannot wait until then because the traders take their crops from them. The trader can provide goods all year round and get what is due to him at harvesting time. If you have palm trees, you are guaranteed goods, which is another form of the social values of palm trees. One of the anti-dam arguments is that if they do not have palm trees in the new areas, who will guarantee them when they do not have money? The palm tree plays a kind of social insurance role for them in their homelands. They think that people will not trust each other in the new places and relationships will be just like in the city, which they negatively referred to. One of my informants from the Manaseer area, which was affected by the Merowe dam, also said that this is the case for them now. Many people hear such stories from them and start to build up a negative picture of their future resettlement.

Agricultural production is diminishing in all its aspects, as mentioned before. At the same time, there is an increasing trend towards monetization. What the family used to produce for itself has been commoditized. They used to utilize, for example, local fertilizer, get milk from their own goats, collect wood for cooking, make their own furniture, prepare their own medicine and use oil lamps. Now they pay for chemical fertilizers, powdered milk, biogas, ready-made furniture, medical care and many other things from the market. They need more money to face this ever growing demand for products, even while their agricultural production is falling. They adopt a number of different strategies to fill this gap. It used to be filled by what the family member, who was working abroad particularly in Saudi Arabia and

³⁶ Ramadan and Eids are Islamic occasions.

the Gulf countries, could send. This was the main source of income to fill this gap but now they can not help much. They started to depend more on local adaptations such as diversification of economic activities. People take whatever they need from the shops and pay back in kind at the harvest time. The small traders in the villages also are in debt to bigger traders of towns. Not all people wait to the harvesting time to pay back their due. Some sell their animals, do other jobs, and get from a broad or any other source. Those who do so are usually in enough economic situations.

Some farmers generally perceive the economic situation as improving, but say that the socio-cultural situation is getting worse. Economically they have shifted from water-wheels *sagia* to small pumps to bigger irrigation schemes, and these shifts have increased production. But people can still not depend on agriculture alone. The growing gap is not only due to diminishing agricultural production but rather to increasing monetization and market dependence. People breed animals for the fodder which they get when they clean their farms. No one can depend only on animals alone because he can not feed them if he is not farming. This strategy is also not enough, and two- thirds of their money comes from abroad.



Figure 6: *A small pumping machine.* (Source: Nuba Irkinain Group).

Other costs such as health and education have to be paid directly. They complain that the health services are not good and trustworthy.

Mojahid, a father of three, showed his dissatisfaction with the local medical services:

Doctors just try all medicines on you, and you will probably be sent to Dongola or another city for a very minor operation. We suffer much to reach Dongola, when the patient reach there s/he become a hop less case.

But this risk has been reduced much since the construction of the road, in terms of both the time to reach the hospital and the cost. The most common diseases in the region are malaria, various types of cancer and renal failure, caused by pollution of the Nile water. There are no water processing or similar procedures. People simply take their water directly from the Nile and this causes many diseases.

Other costs such as sending children to school are not very expensive; they pay approximately 9SB for book fees, water services and part of the living expenses of the teachers who come from other areas and live among them. However, secondary school is really expensive, particularly if the student lives in an apartment. If the student has to repeat the year in a class he is no longer regarded as a formal student, so she or he pays ten times as much as formal students pay as fees. Some of them cannot pay and may be dismissed. After all this, the level of education is very poor. For more than five years, not a single student has been accepted by the University of Khartoum in a formal bachelor's programme, because their grades are very low. Many people have left the village when their sons reach this level for this reason.

The agricultural predicaments of disturbing the ecology of the Nile and its consequences, such as the relative shortage of farmable land, falling agricultural production, changing attitudes to agriculture, high rate of emigration are all highlighted by pro-dam agents as arguments in favour of the Kajbar dam. This situation is being articulated by pro-dam agents. The government discourse is that the construction of the dam will expand the agriculture by facilitating the irrigation of wider areas of land that have not been cultivated before. According to the government, this will even repopulate the Nubian homeland, which has been largely evacuated. Construction of the dam, according to the government, will realize the Nubian dream of returning to their ancestral land by providing larger farms, appropriate infrastructure and social services.

Emerging Criticism: Beyond Economics

With all these economic predicaments discussed above, when it comes to changing their situation through a project such as dam construction, the local anti-dam people say that their current problems are as nothing compared to what they will suffer in the resettlement areas. They attach little value to the economic aspect; even if there is progress, they highlight the emotional aspect of their connectedness to their land. Unlike the pro-dam agents, they do not calculate the costs and benefits from a purely economic point of view. The economic situation as described above is what the pro-dam agents bring up to support their attitude to the project. The meanings that Nubians attached to their palms, the Nile, the socio-cultural history and the archaeological sites do not make much sense for the pro-dam agents.

The Nubian perception of Land, Palm Trees and living beside the Nile

In addition to their economic value, date palms and dates are of great importance in Nubian every day life. For instance, the products are mentioned in marriage pacts, inheritances, kinship relationships, songs, dance, images of love and other human relationships (Gamal 2008). Losing their home land, their archaeological sites, palm trees and the environment they are used to living in, it is argued, will undermine the existence of “Nubian” as a distinctive identity. In contrast to the bureaucratic perceptions of the government, the argument “The Nile for the Nubians” has taken on a broader meaning, not only as an economic resource but as a total way of life. Many cultural aspects of the life of people, symbolic as well as cosmological, are tied to the people’s interaction with the Nile.



Figure 7: Houses, farms, palm trees and the Nile (Source: Nuba Irkinain Group).

The shortage of the land was an obvious issue in a village like Sabo, but in other villages, such as Mashakaila, some farmers argued that there is even relative abundance of land because many people have abandoned agriculture. The area of land which was occupied by thirty farmers in the 1990s is now being farmed by only nine farmers. The elders regard it as a youth problem rather than land shortage, arguing that young people are no longer fully committed to agriculture.

Yousif, a man in his early sixties, believes that the youth are not interested in working in agriculture:

Now youth do not have the culture and ethics of farming. For example we used to dig out and remove the roots of the wild plants, but now they just cut them. They say we can not depend on agriculture, and it is true that the rewards are not feasible if they are not fully involved in all agricultural activities. These are total undividable activities that require you to clean your palms and grow grass under them and grow some vegetables in Selouka³⁷ beside the main winter crops. In this way you will have

³⁷ *Selouka*, which they also call *ferry*, is the fertile narrow piece of land which appears when the Nile shrinks after the flood season. This piece of land is usually farmed by women. They grow vegetables and some cash crops like lupins and hay for their animals. The agricultural activities of these fields have been severely affected by the construction of the Merowe dam, because they are the most vulnerable to the Nile fluctuations, which have become very unpredictable. They have now almost stopped farming such fields.

good animal production and production from your palms will also increase. You can meet your needs for vegetables, but now our farmers buy vegetables from Karma market. What they do now is just to grow winter crops and out of the work during the rest of the year. The agricultural costs would be nothing compared to what they would produce if they adopted such strategies. But buying fuel and spare parts for just the winter season is not feasible. Our youth are restricted to farming their own field even if their neighbors have left their lands. They spend the whole night watching TV, playing cards or going to weddings, and sleep till late in the morning. How can they be dedicated farmers as their fathers and grandfathers were?

Most young men do not plan to get married unless they can go abroad to other Arab countries. Depending on such viewpoints, some argue that even if they are compensated with more land they will not farm it. This is because it is a matter of rejection of the whole lifestyle of being a farmer rather than a land problem for them. Some mentioned other people who have more than 10 feddans in the *Burgaige* scheme and no-one from their family is still in the area and farming it.



Figure 8: *Relatives are gathered under the palm trees to take their shares.* (Source: Nuba Irkinain Group).

The palm trees are strongly related to the people. They believe that after its owner dies, the palm will not produce well. The palm trees and their dates have even greater social and cultural than economic value. For example when somebody dies, they place green palm branches on his grave, believing that his soul will be in peace and he will not suffer till the branches dry out. Date production no longer satisfies the economic needs of the family as it used to. Nevertheless, the season of the harvest is like a festival, and when relatives come from many places and gather in the village with them they feel warm social relationships. When the Nile floods and the palm harvest come, traders go from village to village with their boats carrying goods. In these economic good times, marriage ceremonies held here and there in the village. Someone told me: this is our festival and ceremony time; not Eid Eladhha and Eid Elfitr³⁸ which we lately started to celebrate. There are Nubians who come from Khartoum and other places to harvest their palms, even though what they earn does not meet their travel costs. They come to satisfy the social needs of reunions with their relatives, neighbors and friends.³⁹

Our Home Always Brings Us Food Security and Peaceful Life

They appreciate the safety of the place; for Muslims safety comes as the seconded basic necessity after food.

³⁸ Eid Eladhha and Eid Elfitr are Islamic festivals. Such statements are usually taken by non-Nubians to mean that Nubians are sort of "half-" or "relaxed" Muslims.

³⁹ This strong connectedness to the palm and river is also getting weakening. Going to the Nile and under palm trees to farm, play, fish and spend most of the day there is no longer common. This is partially because people have shifted their houses from under the palm trees. Some informants argued that their life became boring when we moved our house from under the palm trees to the present space, so what will it be like when we are completely moved from here and thrown away from the Nile and our palms. The closer that Nubians live to the Nile and their palm trees, the safer he becomes. But this is a changing attitude to their environment. Some young men told me they have not seen the Nile and been under the palm trees for more than a month, which means their connectedness is weakening. However, this attitude is found among those who are not active in farming and who work in the village, like school teachers, government officials and others who are working as carriers; this is not the case with the majority of people. In the past it was the only place to work and live, but they have elsewhere and there is diversification of economic activities.

Fatima, a knowledgeable woman in Nawri village, she highlighted the value of the homeland saying:

Have you ever seen someone stealing something here? Somebody killing another? Have they ever told you that this grave is for somebody who died of hunger? Even God said to Goraish in Mecca that "I have saved you from hunger and secured you from fear". In Mecca they are saved from hunger because they have dates. There are no other trees in Mecca except palms. Even the seeds of Mecca palms were taken from Nubia by Sarah, the mother of the Prophet Moses. They were Nubians by the way, in the Quran it is said that when Moses mother threw him in the Nile it took a day and a night to reach the Pharaoh's Palace. If you calculate the distance that something can go with the normal speed of the Nile, to reach the Pharaoh's Palace it is exactly Kusha, which is in the Nubian area where Moses was put into the Nile.⁴⁰

The elders always complain that the new generations do not give palm trees much care. They refer to the messiness of area under the palms, and they say it used to be as clean as our houses. They could just go and sleep or have fun there but now no-one bother to clean much, if they clean at all. This is because the younger generation has started to calculate that palms are not a dependable economic source. Naturally, they are not like their grandfathers, who totally depended on their palms.

One of the socio-cultural values of the palm is that it plays a significant role in the connectedness of Nubians to their homes. It has to do with identity, those who do not have palms and lands are not regarded as Nubians. Other categories of Arabs and Negroes⁴¹ have access to the land and can share the palm with Nubians, but they do not own them. They can share in the dates because they have either irrigated the trees or brought the palm shoots. In such cases they take one third of the production but if the palm dies they do not have the right

⁴⁰ Unlike many tribes in Sudan, Nubians do not trace back their genealogy to the Prophet Mohammeds' kin. Instead they have tendency to include them and say that they themselves or their ancestors were Nubian. You usually hear them saying that Moses was Nubian, Loghman was Nubian, and their inclination is to include them in their identity.

⁴¹ The people they refer to as Negroes have little darker skins than them, they speak nothing except Nubian and they share the economic resources with Nubians. The only differences are the story that they came from another area which neither they nor Nubians know, and that they do not possess land.

to replace it.⁴² They clearly distinguish between sharing the land which is not available to non-Nubians, and sharing the production. This is one of the criteria by which they distinguish between Nubians and other peoples.

Newcomers to the place, those who do not have palms, usually do various kinds of jobs which give them an income on a daily basis because no one guarantees them. They do not let them stay in neighbouring houses but relatively remote ones, and incorporate them gradually into society. The longer newcomers remain in the village and the better known they become, the more access they gain to land and date production. A few weeks before harvest, when the dates become ripe and the wind blows over the trees, the fallen dates are for anybody to collect. They are usually collected by children, women and “strangers”. Sometimes they can earn more than what the owners of the palm themselves get.

People who are living abroad or in Khartoum leave their palms to such newcomers. They stay in their houses, farm their land and send the rent to them. For the dates, they fertilize, clean and harvest the palms and take 15% of the production. To obtain such access is not easy for newcomers, because they scrutinize them for months or even years. Learning Nubian and marrying a Nubian may be the final stage of incorporation into Nubian society. Such cases are very rare, and these families are not considered to be completely Nubian. They remember the history of such families for many generations, and when there is a dispute they bring up such stories. In those days of clashes with government about the project some of the supporters' histories were retold; that they are not Nubian, their father came from such and such a place and this is why they do not care for the home-land. This was the case with many Arabs who

⁴² In Nubian customs they divide the production into three; one third for the owner of the land, the second for the owner of the shoots, and the last third for the person who irrigated the trees; this division is regardless of who are the other partners. However, that does not mean that there is no segregation; until only four decades ago, for example, Arabs were not allowed to build his house with mud as the Nubians did. They were also obliged to build their houses on the outskirts of the villages. Negroes also used to work for Nubians for food and shelter for themselves and their families. This is no longer the case. But because of economic diversification, the palms and dates are not so significant now. In some central markets like the *Shadda* market, the Arabs are dominating the market.

had lived with them for more than fifty years. Bringing up stories to isolate them was a strategy designed to weaken the influence of some Arabs who supported the project.

If they are felt to be reliable and trustworthy they gradually get such access. Some started to complain that the “strangers” are increasing in number and many are accused of bringing drugs and introducing unfamiliar behaviours. I attended an accident in which one of the Hawaweer, a newly came Arab ethnic group, stabbed an “old” Arab youth with a knife. Then the whole Nubian and Arab community, who had lived for a long time with the Nubians, held a meeting in the mosque and decided to expel the Hawaweer. One of the Nubians said that it has never happened that anybody has been harmed by a knife or other weapon in this area. Nubians do not use weapons when they clash with someone. No one takes up a knife or club to protect himself, as happens in many other parts of Sudan. For this reason other Sudanese call them cowards, and argue that they do not bear arms against government like the southerners, easterners and Darfurians.

Fear of losing their way of life

At best, the local people imagine their resettlement area will be like big cities. However, they do not admire the urban way of life. They see that it does not matter whether you have money or not. In both cases you do not suffer to manage day-to-day expenses. But in the resettlement area they think that if they do not have money they will just die.

Hanim, a mother of three boys and two girls, argues that they will not be able to lead a good life in the resettlement area and their morality will be affected:

Here, you can go and eat in any house because all neighboring houses are yours as well. We are not tight-fisted like city people, because we have enough food for the whole year. But the city people, because they buy everything for their meals directly from shops, they are so mean.

Their relatives in the cities would suffer without their support. They send them sheep, dates, vegetable and other things to help them not to have to buy everything from the market. On the other hand, families in Khartoum also support their relatives in Mahas either by bringing their

sons and daughters to school in Khartoum or having them stay with them when they come for a short time for medical care, or to look for a job. So the two types of families do support each other. Collaboration is not only at this level but also at village level, between families, between home-lands and Nubians in Diaspora. The Nubians have very strong associations, organizations and other activities aimed at making life easier in their homeland (Salih 2008).

Not to welcome your relatives when they visit you in Khartoum or in Mahas is unusual and would be stigmatized. However, this has happened between supporters and oppositions of the dam. Some families have refused to receive their relatives who were known to be project proponents in Khartoum. These unexpected practices of non-welcome are common complaints about the families of the cities.

Ali, is a local famer who has been living in Khartoum for a while, put his view point about city life as follows:

In Khartoum, I noticed that your neighbour can be holding a party when you need solace. Here, when you have a fatality you feel that the entire village around you shares your sadness. The dam planners do not understand all this; even if this project is being planned by scholars I do not believe in Sudanese planners as they are only half-educated. Therefore they can ignore our social settings when they design the new areas⁴³. When they mix all of us together it will be like Kalakla (an area in the outskirts of Khartoum)⁴⁴.

⁴³ It is interesting that the role of expertise is being questioned. There is debate about knowledge production and its relation to the ideology and the superiority of particular agents. In the development project, scientific knowledge and purely economic rational calculations have been glorified. This case shows how such superiority is perceived by local populations and how they are challenging its agents.

⁴⁴ Kalakla is outskirts area in Khartoum which is mainly occupied by Nubians who have migrated from their home land.



Figure 7: All village men are gathered to have their food together (Source: Nuba Irkinain Group).

A widow explained to me how she could easily bring up her children, when their father died, without depending much on others. Since she had a piece of land she used to either earn money from selling animals or dates and pay for farm labour and keep all of the produce at harvesting time, or let someone else farm her land and take the rent. The land is divided into different categories. The first is the area which is fertilized yearly by the Nile, they call *Eary*. The second is *Borjuo*, which is relatively far from the Nile, so it is not covered by Nile water even in the flood season. *Eary* is much more productive than *Borjuo*, so the rents charged for the two kinds of land are different. The farmer gives 1/8 of the total production to the *Eary* landowner and 1/12 of the *Borjuo* produce. These rates are fixed and it is the same for everybody, regardless of who farms.

If they do not feel comfortable with strangers, they easily agree to dismiss them, not only from having access to the land and date production but from being among them at all. Part of their anxiety about the resettlement area is that they will lose control over their territory, resources, and identity and that they will lose the peacefulness of their area. They think it will be open to all like in the cities and it will be full of strangers. This is combined with the fear that the government is targeting their identity and will bring in five million Egyptian peasants

to assimilate them. Some women are even more pessimistic and say that they will be servants to others when they leave their homes. Their sons will become thieves when they find nothing to eat, and they will no longer have a peaceful and easy life. Most of these images are based on what their fellow Nubians in New Halfa tell them.

Halfa experiences are not only a historical catastrophe but are part of an ongoing process of impoverishment that has been neglected by central government. These tragic experiences are being represented in intellectual discussions and reproduction of critical knowledge (E.g. see: Ahmed (1997), Sabaar (2008), Ubu Elgasim (1967) and Hashim (2008)). This critical anti-dam knowledge is more than ten times as much as pro-dam agents produce to convince the locals. However, this intellectual debate is not the only source of information for the Mahas, but the songs, poems and jokes of the Halfawiin about their current situation are very influential source of inspiration⁴⁵. When you ask them how their life will be in the resettlement area they almost all talk of the New Halfa experience. Since 1964, Wadi Halfa People have led a gloomy life, with loss of home, having to face a new environment, diseases breaking out because of water pollution, poorer crops, being mixed with other ethnic groups and now lacking even water for irrigation and drinking. For these reasons they have been scattered again in the outskirts of the big cities doing very marginal jobs in the informal sectors to sustain themselves (Ali 2008).

Local farmers reckon that the compensation money will not keep them going for long, and they cannot invest it. The recent Merowe resettlement case is not reliable for some because they regard it as misleading, because the relative prosperity of the economic situation of some of them may be due to the compensation money, rather than to an increase in their real productivity. So they believe that the evaluation of the Merowe resettlement case should come after several years. They are concerned with how sustainable it is. It should not be calculated on the basis of temporary circumstances. Many argue that the compensation will not be sustainable and that it will be divided and delivered in small amounts which they will just use up by the end of compensation period. This vision has largely been constructed from the stories of the people affected by the Merowe dam (i.e. the Manaseer). Many Manaseer now go to Mahas and work for Nubians on their farms and build houses, in order to send money back to their families.

⁴⁵ The songs of Shamandoura, Argeen, Kajbar, Loli Loli, Wetamalo, and many other reflect the Nubians' sufferings.

Nubians feel confidence when they have palms and everybody can grantee them goods even if they do not have money. Unlike palm trees, for them money does not last, and the compensation will be like the money which relative send from abroad; it does not last for a long time. But they see their palms which have been planted 100 years ago, and they still benefit from them.

The tragic stories about the Merowe experience are often referred to. Some Nubians worked as carriers when the dam was being constructed. They tell the relatives about the whole dark sides of the project; for instance, that the houses were not completed or they were cheated in the compensation. The supporters' idea is that such mistakes will not be repeated in the Kajbar case and that people will be given compensation for all their properties and can sure about the appropriateness of the resettlement area⁴⁶. Then after all these they will let them start to build. But this seems to be far-fetched in view of the very tight timetable that the Dam Implementation Unit has put on project implementation.

Collective work, *fza*, is now largely restricted to happy and sad occasions, because the heavy tasks of agricultural work are given to “strangers”. There are emerging differences in the economic situations of the neighbouring families which are linked by kinship relationships. The similarity of family living conditions in the village (*Mar*)⁴⁷ was pervasive

⁴⁶ This is exactly what we have learned from Mitchel in chapter one: that the failure of modernization schemes and the devastation they cause are always being considered as the failure of individual schemes rather than the failure of the market and the principles of profit-oriented activities.

⁴⁷ The Mar was a socio-cultural unit of patrilineal kin living in one big house which was divided into many rooms, where each couple had a room. This unit used to share the same Sagia - traditional irrigation apparatus and- the same land, and it was a joint unit of consumption as well. In such a socio-economic unit they used to share the same living conditions. The elders always return to those days very nostalgically. This way of living was there until a few decades back, when emigration started to increase. Those who had been abroad started to build their own houses away from under palm trees where the mar was. This was not only a shift of houses but also a huge change in the social structure of the Mar. The traditional irrigation system of the Sagia has been replaced by mechanized pumps. The whole Mar, and outsiders in some cases, used to share ownership of the Sagia. The new machines were owned by only one person, usually the person who brought them from abroad, and others become only farmers. At the end of the season he takes half of the farmers' production. These gradual changes in the production and residential systems produced the new villages. The new villages are clusters of neighbouring houses, instead of one big house with many rooms in Mar system. These houses are economically independent units, each containing a nuclear family.

only a few decades ago. Then emigration increased, some people brought their own pumps from abroad, and the collective production and consumption gradually shifted from *Mar* to family. Economic differences between families gradually appeared. This is reflected in such recently introduced commodities as bottled gas, electricity generators, refrigerators, televisions and other house furniture which indicate that some families enjoy more prosperity than others. They like to talk about their shared consumption and their similar Economic situation. This still relatively true but is no longer how it used to be. Their similar economic circumstances have changed from how they used to be. Poor families struggle to fill this emerging gap because of the still dominant mentality of sameness. For example, if the wife whose husband is abroad starts to buy ready bread instead of baking her own bread – *Kabad, Kabeeda or Kabanari*- because either she has money or does not have wheat in her house, other neighbouring women would imitate her even if their family cannot afford to do so. Women in particular are very liable to fill the gap in such a way because their attitude is to have the same things as their neighbours. This sometimes causes quarrels between the couples.

This attitude towards emerging economic differences has pushed young people to think of other careers than agriculture. The majority of young men started to look for ways to go abroad. This has reflected on their education as they began to leave school in order to go to the Gulf States. These have more problems in their economic situation than the land shortage which the government highlights.

The very communal way of life they used live in the *mar* or even in the first decades after they moved to the new houses is becoming more individualized. For instance, the young people in the village used to gather in the village club. In the 1980s and 1990s the club was very active and young people would usually be there in the evenings discussing public issues, organizing parties or comedies, playing games or just watching television. The money earned through holding parties and comedies was spent on village institutions like the school and hospitals. So, villages were competing to make their clubs better than others'. More young people were gathering in the clubs, more activities were under way, more rewards returning to the other village institutions, and more united the village would become. This feeling of unity was not only among those who live in the village but also among its members living abroad. Those who were abroad collected their saving and send them to the youth committee in the village club.

In recent years, however, almost everyone has a TV in the house and has left the club. This has weakened the role of the club in fostering village unity,⁴⁸ but again in the days of high tension between the villagers and the government, the clubs returned to their previous role because there was a need to unify the villages' attitudes and actions. The clubs are where they discuss the issues, held their meetings and bring politicians and activists to talk to the public. Some educated youth wrote to Nubian organizations, asking them to send computers and Internet connections to the village clubs because these would keep young people in the clubs when these have something they do not have at home. They also have other aims, such as teaching people how to write Nubian, reviving forgotten Nubian music instruments, folklores. The awareness of being Nubian and the importance of protecting cultural identity have been heightened since the launch of the dam project. This is one of the main sources of resistance, as we will see in the following chapter.

The images of the resettlement area in local people's minds is that they will start their life from zero till their new palms reach them, though some realize that they will not be able to plant palms in the new areas at all. Their palms can last for 200 years, but how can the government pay five hundred Sudanese pound, 250 USD, or even less than that. They usually compare the resettlement area to the cities, at the best, but they refuse city life as well. They miss the warm social life of the home when they spend time in Khartoum.

Mohammed, a member of the local anti-dam committee, clarified his opposing position:

*Even God knew that this is the most suitable place through which the Nile can pass.
Other areas can be toxic and they construct the dam and take the water to other places*

⁴⁸ This is one of reasons behind why disassociation punishment did not change the attitude of some dam supporters, although it was effective for others. Disassociation was a powerful when the village was strongly united and had a more communal way of life. The individual agents gains more space as village unity becomes weaker. As a consequence of the socio-economic changes in the social structure of the village, not all village members are relating their interests to those of their neighbours. For example, if some body can really lead a secure life through his relation to the government he would not be much affected by the disassociation punishment. Gossiping about his neighbour who is a member of the National Congress Party (NCP), some one said "every time he goes to the town he brings back something with him. The last time he brought a pump. He has not even been to secondary school but he can still sit with the governor himself. The governor tells such people: "You are the leader and it is your responsibility to convince your people about the project. He cannot do any thing here but he misreports us to the government".

where it may defile or pollute the water. Can they cure the contamination of the river water which they caused by Merowe dam? Just look at Wadi Halfa; there is no greenery beside the reservoir at all. That means no animals can be fed, no dogs, so a lot of wolves will come and kill people. God has created the world in a very balanced way, even Europeans harm the environment with their interventions, let alone this chaotic political system. Even God is displeased with them and reduced the rainfall in Ethiopia when they constructed Merowe. Let's say that the new area will be 90% successful. Why should I go there if I am 100% successful here? Why should I take that risk? What I will lose, if I refuse and stay here? If we find that we were wrong and the project would have been in our favour, we will not regret it; what we will do is just to let them build. But after they build it, what if this ten 10% chance of failure takes place? Can we come back to our homes? This random and haphazard political party has never established a successful sustainable scheme⁴⁹, so how can I put my life in their hands?

Local affected people are very concerned that they will lose the Nile and the government will bring them water through canals that animals will drink from and swim in. They have been told that in Merowe the government just gave the keys to those who were going to the new area and didn't consider the older neighborhoods, where Nubians live surrounded by their cousins and uncle, which has a lot to do with helping each other, and controlling deviant behaviors among them. For example, you can not go to your neighbour's daughter and have premarital sex with her, because she is your cousin. Even when they go abroad they do not worry much about their sisters and daughters, because their relatives are protecting them. Even if they put them next to each other as they are there now, this does not leave much space for the coming generations to build close to their relatives, so they will be scattered again.

They are also afraid of being mixed with other ethnic groups in the new places and they think the land will not be in absolute ownership as is the case now. Nubian areas are one of the rare cases in Sudan in which possession of land is absolute, and they know that and its value. The colonials came, found them using their land and registered it because every one knows his own and others' fields. They did not have clashes over land; some of them even left some their land unregistered in order to avoid taxes. This case is unlike what happened in

⁴⁹ They always refer to unsuccessful state-run schemes and corruptions of the government.

many other parts of Sudan, in which the colonial authorities left the communal possession of lands by the whole tribe, administered or supervised by its traditional leaders.

They do not want to be mixed in with others by selling their lands and houses to them. According to Nubian customs no-one can sell his land even if he is going abroad for ever. In such cases he just leaves his land to his relatives to benefit from it, but it is not only the relatives who get it as non-Nubians can also use it. In the new areas they believe their customs will not work and that every one will be able to buy and sell his land. They see that new lands will only be rented for 99 years according to the land possession laws in Sudan. But for them, their land is possessed for ever; this is why they see only one can stop the project. He can argue that if can submerge the whole area with out touching mine you do. Those who want to leave the area are free to do so, but they can not separate out their part and sell it. The land is for those who stay and use it, not those who want to get rid of it.

A committee calling itself the *intelligent committee* went from Khartoum to the affected villages in Mahas to persuade them to accept the project. The committee was mainly made up of Mahas people who have good positions in the government. One of the informants said: when they came here we taught them a lesson, how can you sell your home if you are intelligent? I do not want to sell my piece of land in Khartoum although my ownership is fragile, how can I sell this land which keeps me from hunger, when all of Sudan is suffering from famine⁵⁰; land which sheltered and fed me. The land is like another human being for us. It has provided me with security and food.⁵¹ What is it worth when it is submerged? Why should I let my grandfathers' graves be submerged and kill them once again? I would be ashamed if my sons and grandsons asked me; why has our old home been submerged and

⁵⁰ In this case I have many time heard them repeating a Hadeith, what profit Mohammed said' which says " the house which has date will never face hunger"

⁵¹ There is a very famous Nubian song which says "the homeland (*Irki*) is a human and human is a land then how can human sell himself". The poet who wrote this song has been targeted by the government until he left the country for Saudi Arabia. He became the most famous Nubian poet and singer through what he sings about the Nubian marginalized situation, and calling Nubians to take action so not to lose their rights and keep their home and identity. When he returned from Saudi Arabia he was welcomed and honoured by many Nubians and their organisations as a guiding hero in their struggle, at a big welcome party in the Nubian Club in Khartoum in a very symbolic ceremony. His returning was like victory announcement for Nubian resisters.

what did you do about it at the time? Now I have no respect for the generations of Halfawiin who witnessed the enforced migration and didn't die there before seeing the dam being built. The land is the most precious thing to us. If you lose your brother you can have another one. If you lose your mother, our homeland has nestled thousands of orphans and has not let them beg. They have lived even better than others.⁵² We are just arguing now, but if they put us in the critical situation of the project being built, I swear that I will kill and die before I see this project being built. I will start killing the Nubian dam supporters before others. Because they are misreporting us to the government; for example, when our committee was in debt they wrote to the government, saying that the committee has many funding sources. They even sometimes accused us of getting funds from Israeli organizations. Our committee's sources of fund are only Nubians who are abroad and the villagers' own shares.

Alternative Proposals of the Anti-dam Agents

I have told many dam resisters of the government argument that the Nubian homeland is not contributing to the growth of national income. One of the ministers argued against construction of the road from Dongola to Wadi Halfa and asked: "Why should we construct a road to those areas? To let them visit their relatives?" he means because of their lack of participation in the national income the road is not financially viable. The resisters mentioned how much tax their people abroad pay to the government. They added that if the government started to encourage the metal mining and petroleum exploration and encouraged agriculture and tourism in the area, their region would participate more than other parts of Sudan. Their argument is that: the government is ignoring all these alternatives and imposing these two dams in addition to Merowe which should have been enough for the electricity of the northern state, because they want to erase Nubian civilisation from the memory of the world.

Nubian activists offer very ambitious alternatives. They see that the Nubian basin in the triangle of Wadi Halfa, Dongola and Ewainat is the only opportunity for the development of the area. This area has four million feddans of farmable land and the water is at a depth of two meters in some part of it. The Nubians wish to deal directly with the international community

⁵² Here it is clear that he does not mean only the physical space when he said homeland, but that he was also referring to the whole socio-cultural settings.

to realize this ambition. They carried out some studies for European trade to support and share in this big agricultural scheme. They negotiated with the President of Libya to export their agricultural produce through Libya to Europe.

Hassan, a university student and an active member in the Nubian Student Unity at Al-Neelain University, commented on the infeasibility of the dam:

The electricity is a byproduct of the dam project but this project has another aims. The Egyptian would smash these dams if they felt that their water was being taken away from them. The government has not considered the alternatives; for us, the dams are a form of cultural genocide. Solar electricity generating systems are cheap and clean, but because they want to destroy Nubia they do not consider solar systems. When electricity comes to us factories will come and our young people will find jobs here instead of going abroad. We have the best human cadres in Sudan, our students were the majority at the University of Khartoum before this government targeted and destroyed education here. It is we who taught all Sudanese. When the newspapers and other media spread we were deprived. Only recently did we get television in our area [.....]. The EU is going to support a solar energy supplier in North Africa that will cover North Africa and go 1500 km inside Europe. This means that we can produce more from solar systems. The government is constructing these dams under foreign pressure, particularly from Egypt. It has not presented any feasibility studies to us yet. There are contradictory declarations from here and there about how much area will be submerged. Why do not they use the petroleum we have here at the 14th latitude? Why have they still not explored it? They want to get us out of this area and explore it later.

No one has shown them, but the local resisters say that it will be Sahil Koka where they be resettled. This area is not very far from the villages. Some farmers tried to farm it and the production was poor. On the basis of such findings, the opposition argues that Sahil Koka is not farmable. They also carried out some soil surveys and the farmers can distinguish between good and infertile Lands. For that reason, they are saying this dam is not for agricultural purposes. It is not feasible to submerge all this area with its history, culture and land just for the sake of 400 Mega Watts of electricity. They already have a dam in their province that produces 1250 Mega Watts. What all the northern part of Sudan from Dongola till Halfa needs has been estimated by Nubian organizations to be 87 MW, of which 53 MW will cover present needs and 35 MW would be available for future industry. They always point out that

the land is rich in metals, petroleum at latitude 14 and iron, and they ask why the areas of Mahas, Sikkoat Halfa deprived were from the electricity which is being generated from northern state?

Even if all of the 30 feddans of Sahil Koka are fully fertile, they are not enough for all the affected areas to be resettled there. The planners seem to be calculating the present population of Mahas but their people who are abroad have a right to be considered, because no one will leave his land and property, and it is their right to be taken into account.

Ameer, is a member of the Nubian Language Society, comments on the state's neglect of archaeology which would be crucial for enhancing the economic progress of the area:

Egypt gets 8 million dollars a year through tourism at its archaeological sites. If we got only one million by encouraging tourism at our archaeological sites it would be enough. But instead of developing tourism here they take our archaeological finds to Khartoum's museums. In that sense, all Khartoum museums are ours, what do other Sudanese have to be presented in the museum? They do not even protect our archaeological sites, many sites have been robbed and their artefacts are now in British museums.

An agreement between Egypt and Sudan when they built the Aswan dam was to meet northern Sudan needs for electricity. This agreement is usually referred to by locals as showing that government was not serious about bringing electricity to their area. They ask why government did not pursue this agreement. If they really want to develop us, why should we be injured again and again for the sake of electricity? The Nubians see that the government is not allowing mining and petroleum companies and other companies to work in their area. If they did, it would expand their economy through the taxes they would pay for the sites, the creation of job opportunities and bringing social services. This is regarded by the Nubians as a good strategy to develop the area instead of dams. Mahas union brought many Nubian experts from several disciplines to study the region; the richness of the area has been discussed repeatedly.

Since their clashes with government over the proposed dams, the Nubians have become sensitive to the question of how their resources are being managed. The new political discourse in Sudan since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), accompanied by global messages about indigenous rights, has sensitised the question of resources management. In

Mashakaila village, a company came and started to dig in the mountains. Although this took place relatively far from the village, the villagers quickly gathered and asked the government to stop the company. They saw that the company was mining for metals within their village boundary without sharing with them. Such actions would not be happened if such a company had arrived five years earlier.

One pro-dam argument is that the new areas will be provided with good social services, which locals lacking in the present situation. But the local people are more concerned about the productivity of the land.

Ibraheem, a retired man who worked in the Ministry of Agriculture and spent many years in Saudi Arabia, acknowledge the difficulties of the economic situation, but he sees that their situation will be worse after the dam is built, and does not do not even believe that their income will be increased. He said:

The government realized its mistake and now it is going build a cement factory in Koya village. This will create job opportunities for many of our youth. This will bring income and we do not need the government to provide social services if we have good income, we can afford it. I can send my son to Oxford University if have money, and the best doctors will come to the area because it will make financial sense for them to be here. Providing social services is no use if we do not have good sources of income. In Khartoum people die outside the hospitals, not because of a lack of hospitals but because they can not afford medicine. We used to provide such services in our village by our own efforts. We have never depended on the government. We even didn't know that what we were doing is the government's responsibility.

Although it can be less harmful to them than dam construction, the presence of such companies does not necessarily mean that the income of the families will be increased and out-migration will decrease. The arrival of industrialization all over the world has often been at the expense of the local populations. What should be considered is how they can guarantee their benefits when such companies come. The mere presence of such companies is not enough to guarantee the economic progress of the area. It can even be more exploitative under the corrupt governments which do not make regulations for these companies because of the elites' interest in sharing the profit with them.

Now there are many major Egyptian and Gulf nations' agricultural schemes in the Nubian basin, but the local people have not seen any benefits of them: they have not created good work opportunities. What is being done is that the government has rented these lands to them on 99- year leases, and they will farm them with out being troubled by many regulations. But it does not seem that the Nubians will benefit from these schemes. In an interview with the government officer in northern state level I asked him how the area can benefit from such schemes and he totally denied that such projects are under way in the Nubian basin. He argued it is only a resistance argument against the government. But the locals told me that these schemes have started farming 80 km from their village. I have also interviewed people who work as drivers with them and they described the kind of activities that are going on there. Some of the Egyptians even go to the villages, and their vehicles move around the villages carrying heavy artesian pumps and such equipments. I could not go because it was far in the middle of the Nubian "desert" and the driver who I interviewed told me that they are accompanied by Sudanese security service personnel who wouldn't let me go and see. So it would be very risky to go there and observe, interview or take photos and my whole field-work would be at risk.

The denial of the northern state government that such schemes exist at all is either because the Northern state government itself does not know and has not been consulted, or they do not want to reveal this. In any case, it is difficult to see how the Nubians can benefit from such schemes.

The opposition argued that if they agreed that the study should be done it would suggest to the government that they agreed about the whole project. They will not agree on a project about which they know nothing. After the study they will just come for the next steps to make their calculations and start the actual construction. They perceive that the project is satisfying the interests of the Sudanese ruling elite and the Egyptians.

The Dam is not for us

Historically, Nubian geopolitics on the border with Egypt has played a crucial role in the Nubians existence. Nubia was controlled and occupied by Egyptians many times through its history since the Christian and pre-Christian period (Adams W. 1965 & Haycock 1965 & Morkot R. in Empire). In the relatively recent 1960s, in the case of the Aswan high dam

construction the Egyptian government supported by the Aboud regime in Khartoum depopulated 500km of Nubian homelands along the Nile. Shortly, after the Halfawiin was resettled, the Aboud regime was overthrown. This shows how far Egypt can manipulate Sudanese politics for its own interests (Abu Elgasim 1967)

The Nubian activists have accused the government of selling their land and other resources to the Egyptians. There are promising larger fertile lands for agricultural development around the Nubian lake and Sahil Argin which might represent a Nubian strategic resource for development. But it is also said that these newly opened areas have been given to Egyptian investors and peasants.⁵³ Apart from such areas with new potential for agriculture most of the area at any distance from the Nile is just poor desert sand. To local people this raises the question of where the government is intending to resettle them. Nubian intellectuals see these dam projects as targeting the Nubian people in order to evacuate them from their ancestral lands and replace them with Egyptian peasants. The Sudanese government has already sold 6.1 million feddans to Egyptian investors in Argin in Wadi-Halfa. This area was originally occupied by Nubians who were forced to leave eastern Sudan as a consequence of the Aswan high dam construction in the middle of the last century.

Nubians thus claim that they are being replaced by Arabs in the area around the lake in both Egypt and Sudan and that they are being excluded from the benefits of the lake. They see these newly proposed dams in Kajbar and Dal as repeating the same scenario as in the Wadi Halfa resettlement. This is further strengthened by a new agreement called the Four Freedom Agreement between the governments of Sudan and Egypt, which gives the populations of both nations the freedom of ownership, work, residence and movement in the two countries. But in view of the land shortage in Egypt there is no land in Egypt to be invested in by Sudanese. Therefore, according to some Nubian observers the agreement is nothing more than a formal permission for Egyptian expansion into and occupation of Northern Sudan. According to this argument, five million Egyptian peasants will be settled in the Nubian homeland (Hashim 2006).

⁵³

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5T1h4mXAP5Q&feature=related>

Hashim (Ibid) argued that the construction of the three proposed Dams (i.e. Kajbar, Dal and Merowe) will remove the surplus of Sudan's share in Nile water (4 million cubic meters) through evaporation. The question that Nubians always raise is: Why does Egypt not object these dams? Although they stopped such schemes in the 1990s Egypt does not object to them now.

Egypt accepted them because they prefer to save their water in Sudanese land near Egypt. This is because of the falling capacity of the High Dam because of silting. The Sudanese government has also attracted Egyptians by giving the large areas of farmable land in the Nubian basin in the triangle of Halfa-Ewainat-Dongola, in order to satisfy the ever-growing Egyptian hunger for land for food production and settlement. Hashim (ibid) goes farther to explain the Sudanese government's interest in doing so. Some of the NCP figures were involved in the attempt to assassinate the Egyptian president in Addis Ababa, and the Egyptians are playing this card to influence the Sudanese government. The Sudanese government depends a great deal on Egypt, as the most influential country in the region, to solve its regional and international problems. It depended much on the Egyptian lowering of its tensions with the international community due to the South and Darfur civil wars. Moreover, the majority of Sudan's political parties were established in Egypt. So Egypt supports the Sudanese opposition political parties when their relationships with the central government get worse. This demonstrates the extent to which the Sudanese ruling elites are submissive to Egypt. Halayib is a Sudanese town occupied by Egypt but the Sudanese government is silent about it. However, it is not only submissiveness which has led the central government to accept Egyptian expansion into northern Sudan. The Sudanese government is also interested in counter balancing West African migration to Sudan and the rising awareness of pan Africanism which is threatening the forces of Arabization in Sudan. Because unlike for West Africans the Sudan has lately become less attractive for Arabs to come and settle in (cf. Hashim 2008).

Although the government denies all these accusations, many documents and newspapers (mostly Egyptians) have leaked information to Nubian activists⁵⁴. The most repeated case concerns the visits of former Sudanese defense Minister Abd Elrahim Husain and Dr. Sadig

⁵⁴ To read farther and look for more documentaries in this Issue: See the series of articles written by Muhammed Jalal Hashim the most anti-dam critical writer in Sudan.

Amara. In their discussions with the Egyptian politicians they attracted them with almost depopulated lands in northern Sudan. The defense minister even challenged them, saying that Egypt can not solve its demographic and food problems unless it expands southwards (Hashim 2008).⁵⁵

The interest of the Sudanese ruling elites lies in attracting Arab investors, particularly to agricultural schemes. The oil-rich Arab countries also have great expectations of Sudanese agricultural development, to the extent that Sudan used to be called the “Arab breadbasket” (Yohannes 2008). Egypt does not object to these projects. Rather, it sees them as strengthening “friendship” with Sudan, which is one of the fundamental interests of Egypt (Moussa 2007). In a recent policy paper presented to the National Congress Party (NCP) there is a direct call to attract Arab capital to develop the triangle between Dongola, Sinar and Kordofan (Hamdi 2005). Referring to this paper, Nubian intellectuals argue that since the area north of Dongola is outside of this triangle it can easily be given to an influential Arab country like Egypt.⁵⁶

On this background, Nubians have begun to reinterpret their whole economic predicament and the lack of social services, which have intensified their emigration, as a deliberate plan to empty their homeland.

To summarise, this chapter is mainly concerned with an ethnographic description of those Nubians in the Mahas area who will be affected by the Kajbar dam. In paying close attention to their living conditions, I have shown how these economic predicaments are being articulated by the pro-dam agents to argue for the feasibility of the dam. I have highlighted how the planners, government and all pro-dam agents calculate the losses and gains from a purely economic point of view, and in contrast, how Nubians perceive their socio-cultural and physical spaces as priceless and not compensable values. I have tackled the meanings that Nubians attach to their environment, history, identity, the Nile, their palm trees, peacefulness and way of life. It has been my interest as an anthropologist to show that an evaluation of gains and loss is much too complex than to be reduced to purely economic calculations.

⁵⁶ Nubian Conference: The Dams and Claimed Development (in Arabic), Khartoum, June 2007.

In the last part of the chapter I have followed how local Nubians construct their images about the resettlement areas from the historical experiences their fellow Nubians in earlier cases of resettlement, from the New Halfa experience and the more recent Merowe dam case. The out come of this imaginative process is the strong belief among Nubians that the dam project is actually targeting their existence in order to provide favors to the members of the Sudanese government and also to Egyptians. In the next chapter I will discuss such findings in greater detail and link this to the theoretical discussions and arguments I have raised in the first chapter.

Chapter Four

SEEING LIKE A STATE VS. SEEING LIKE A LOCAL COMMUNITY.

The aim of this study was to understand the highly contested conflict-filled case of the Kajbar dam project, such as the state-society interactions in this project and its ramifications like ethnic politics, state coercive usage of power and Nubians mobilization of the ethnic forces to face the state apparatus. I described how the idea of development is still profitable and profit-oriented action, for the benefit of the national ruling elites and at the expense of the local community. This is why the state bureaucracy is eager to ignore the extra economic costs. I discussed how this economics- driven rationality ignores extra-economic values and treating them as secondary and externals which should be excluded from the development calculations (Mitchel 2002). Scott's (1998) perspective has also explained how the simplification of knowledge and narrowing the vision to make particular measurements and calculations is making high-modernism possible, controlling and manipulative. Local culture has been excluded from developmental and economic consideration, because it has been portrayed as some sort of "pastness, since its keywords are habit, customs and traditions. On the contrary, the development has been represented as something to do with future through its keyword plan, calculation and aspirations"(Appadurai 2004: 60)

Depending on these theoretical perspectives, I have pointed out that for the state, represented by the DIU and the Northern State's government, constitution of knowledge, discourses and practices still carries simplification of the local natural environment as a mere economic resource, which should be economically planned and evaluated. On the other hand, I demonstrated that the Nubians' perception of their land, the Nile and their socio-cultural and fiscal spaces cannot be detached from economic calculations. Consideration of this comprehensive evaluation of the natural environment (i.e. as a total, undividable from the socio-cultural, economic and political history, present and future of the Nubians) would increase the cost of the project. However, the whole intellectual, political and ideological paradigm of the state-run development is based on reduction of the costs. The focal point of the Nubian struggle with the project is the state devaluation of the true cost of the Kajbar dam.

The ethnographic investigation of Nubian living conditions in Mahas area has shown that they are experiencing increasing economic difficulties. Many factors have participated in the deterioration of their livelihood system and the fall in their agricultural production. I have discussed the relative shortage of farmable lands, the lowering of the Nile water level, unexpected fluctuations in the level of the river, increasing wage labour, new generations' changing attitudes toward agriculture and the high rate of emigration. All these are combined with a high rate of commoditization of the goods which they used to provide for themselves heightening the demand for cash. This is the contemporary economic dilemma that is articulated by the pro-dam agents when they argue in favour of the project, through the simplified calculations of purely material costs and benefits sense.

Although the local dam resisters recognize these problems, they perceive the situation differently in their argument against the project. The anti-dam Nubians refuse the purely economic rationality of the government, which evaluates their fiscal, historical and social spaces in a purely economic perspective. They highlight many extra-economic values which are being ignored, excluded or downplayed by the state. I have drawn attention to the socio-cultural values they give to their land and palm trees, the Nile and their present way of life. Although the economic value of palm trees and land is diminishing, they are still satisfying socio-cultural needs. I thus discussed how they are embedded in Nubian marriage, kinship, social security, beliefs, connectedness to the village and identity (a non-Nubian is someone who does not possess land and palm trees). They appreciate the safety of the place, their full control over their resources and the peaceful and secure life they are leading.

For the local community, estimates of the gains and losses of the project went beyond the evaluation of their present way of life. Perceptions of what their life will be like in the resettlement area have a powerful influence on the locals' attitudes to the project. They strongly believe that they will lose control over their resources, territory and their way of life, and that generally speaking; the Nubian existence will be threatened. The money they get will not guarantee their wellbeing and does not compensate for their deep-seated psychological devastation, when the government takes them away from the Nile and leaves them in the middle of the desert. They will have to start a new life from zero; they will be impoverished. These are the negative images which the local people have constructed about their future resettlement.

The image they have constructed about the resettlement is based on how they have built up their knowledge of it? This question highlights the complexity of local perceptions and their attitudes of resistance. This is because these have been reshaped as a result of very complex historical, socio-economic, political and intellectual factors that operate at many levels and nurture their consciousness for resistance to the project. The local communities are most likely to be depicted as passive recipients of development hegemony, and their sources of power to challenge the “high modernist ideology” have been underestimated [e.g. (Scott 1998)].

Sources of the Nubian resistance

As I discussed in Chapter 1, writers who are critical of development (Escobar 1995, Ferguson 1994, Barth 1997, Mitchell 2002) see that development interventions are achievable through an ideological definition of well-being and by offering its prescription. Escobar’s explanation of how the discourses of development and problematization of the local conditions have facilitated the deployment of the development hegemony has illuminated my research. However, through careful study of state-local community interactions in Kajbar dam project; I have realised that this hegemony is no longer going uninterruptedly. We have seen how the governments’ discourses regarding the economic feasibility of the project have been denounced by the local anti-dam people and their representatives. This is why I have tried to build up a general understanding of local critical knowledge and discourses through which people are ‘undermining the dominant discourse and assumptions of the decision makers’ (Emery 1991: 289). Alongside this perspective I have argued that the development discourses are not only what powerful agents are articulating in order to facilitate uncritical acceptance of the development interventions, but also that the counter-discourse of all the critically engaged agents are playing a significant role in the reaction of the local people.

The sources from which the local community are constructing their knowledge of, and discourses about, the project, are the foundation of the resistance that has been provoked by the state's actions. I have described the complex interactions, perceptions surrounding the project, paying particular attention to Nubian resistance. From the Nubians' case I found that these counter-tendencies that resist the actions of the government and planners are supported and fostered by multiple forces, critical discourses and knowledge, operating at different levels that can be summarized in the following:

First: The Nubians were among the first local communities to have experienced submergence and resettlement. Such projects have taken place four times in their home land in the mid-20th century. This is the history that is overwhelmingly present in their collective mind and that has been perpetuated through their songs, poetry and nostalgic stories. When you ask them what their future will be like, the local people are most likely to narrate this Halfa experience of being scattered and impoverished.

Second: Their strong connectedness to their homeland and their love of their physical and socio-cultural spaces and the peaceful, secure life that they lead⁵⁷.

Third: Their own recent experience of the state intervention in Kajbar dam. We have followed the history of the intervention which raised the level of the resistance mood gradually by narrowing its space within the context of state power structure, in addition to the recent Manaseer case in the Merowe dam resettlement experience. This demonstrated that the local people have lost their faith in the state as a developmental force, and suspicion of state actions is rising.

Fourth: Unlike the counter-discourses, the discourses of development and their underlying assumptions are no longer credible. The ideologies of poverty reduction, economic progress, nationalism and scarification for the nation do not carry conviction for the local Nubian community, who are haunted by their past experiences and other current factors. The most influential anti-development discourses that influence the Nubian movements are: their right to participate, the value of their cultural history and maintaining their homeland and identity, the government's deliberate actions to dismantle their society and that they are being targeted by the project. This is what I call the “reproduction of critical knowledge”, which destabilizes the forces of implementation. The embodiment of this critical knowledge greatly supports the resistance on account of the lack of transparency and of information they receive from the state. Many Nubian intellectuals have helped to disseminate such knowledge by the reproduction of their past experiences and the current policies that threaten Nubian existence.

Fifth: The global trend to a participatory approach that denounces the current practice of excluding local communities from taking part in projects that directly affect their wellbeing. Recent decades have seen much global advocacy of democratization, decentralization, transparency, accountability and consideration of human and indigenous rights in economic

⁵⁷ See this video: link: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8B2ROrYKmM&feature=related>

and political decision-making. All these changing global neo-liberal paradigms have raised Nubians' aspirations to participate and affect the dam project which would turn their community upside-down. As I argued earlier in chapter 1, it should not be understood that the neo-liberal participatory, right-based and emancipator paradigms are empowering the local communities. I thus partially accept Tsing's (2005) perspective which gives the feeling that the global forces of emancipation and empowerment have the same power as the global imperial dominating schemes. My focus is on how much this advocacy (of neo-liberal emancipator forces) has inspired the Nubian anti-dam movements, not the actual empowerment that the Nubians receive. Below, I will reflect on the shortcomings of these 'emancipator' forces, which still need more critical exploration.

Sixth: The national political discourse, particularly after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between NCP and SPLM, has sent a clear message to other marginalized ethnic groups, to the effect that the southerners won their rights because they led armed resistance against the government. This is now believed to be the only way for marginalized ethnic groups to reclaim their rights. These beliefs have partially inspired the proliferation of conflicts in Darfur and Eastern Sudan. Many Nubian organizations, associations, committees and political parties have been set up. The main objective of these entities has become unification of the Nubians to protect their right to remain in their homelands and to guarantee their rights in terms of wealth and power-sharing. What I have argued is that there is a redefinition of Nubian identity that is adopting political connotations which have not been the case until recent decades. This aspect of the new Nubian identity has been further reinforced by the regional dimensions and the Nubians' consciousness of their geopolitical situation (i.e. their homeland location bordering Egypt). The most critical belief about the dam and the state's actions is that the government is taking their land and giving it to the Egyptian and allowing their historical enemies to expand into and occupy their territory.

The ideology of the ruling elite is believed to become an ideology of the common that justifies powerful actions through the incorporation of its discourses. But as we discussed in the previous chapter, the legitimacy of the state's actions in the field of development cannot be separated from the legitimacy of the ruling elite and the state itself. Thus, when Nubians discuss Kajbar as a state-run project they always refer to the corrupted government which exploits national resources for its own interests. Then the conflicting visions about the Kajbar dam project have become more than merely a debate over the dam. The delegitimization

process applied not only to the state actions in the dam projects, but will also deneutralize and denormalize the hallmark of the previously taken-for-granted ideology, its paradigms and discourses. I reflected how science, economic progress, nationalism, religion, Arabization or being united with Arabs, expert knowledge and other types of ideological content are being questioned by the local community and their representatives.

The role of the neo-liberal state under the forces of globalization, proliferation of NGOs, which sometimes goes anti-state, and the huge advocacy of decentralization and participation; all these facilitate and maintain ethnic revitalization and local discontent with state policies that do not meet their growing aspirations (Kapferer 2004). The local community should therefore be considered as a genuine contributor to development policies and practices at all stages. Regardless of the shortcomings of the participatory approach, it has heightened local aspirations to take part in the decision making. This was the source of my critique of Appadurai's (2004) argument that raising the capacity of local aspirations should be the goal of developmental. The ethnography of the Kajbar dam has demonstrated that the point of departure of the discontent of local people is their aspirations, which have not been satisfied by the state. Nevertheless, even in the critical literature of the anthropology of development the local counter tendencies against hegemonic practices and their capacity to resist and modify them, have not been seriously tackled.

Dealing with development as macroeconomic growth in a country like Sudan is very difficult. What is being called development, in the macroeconomic sense of the term, in most cases are benefiting the ruling elite. The history of interventions in the Kajbar dam project has made it clear how the local people supported the project when it was still aiming to fulfil their own direct needs for agricultural expansion, electricity supply and repopulation of the area. The aim of my study was to understand how different stakeholders evaluate the feasibility of the dam and its future impact. In my field work, however, I realized that this development project has become a battleground between the development apparatus and the “supposed beneficiaries”. This brought the power relationships between the forces of implementation and resistance to my attention. Therefore I tried to obtain a deeper understanding of the nature of the power and resistance forces involved.

Why does the state not leave much space for the resistance within its context? Is it the nature of the counter movements, which depend on informal channels like ethnicity against formal

one like the state, that enables the resistance operate outside the context of state power? Or it is due to the nature of the state power and how it is exercised?

Power-Resistance for the Development Intervention

Given that the development discourse is no longer convincing, we are about to see growing and spreading resistance and civil violence against hegemonic development intervention. The question of whether the development is through agreed or enforced intervention is directly related to how the state power is exercised. Since the development discourse has lost its conviction, it is important to ask how the development project is being implemented. I have discussed the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, through which he broadens the concept of power. For Foucault (1991) power includes social control through many disciplinary institutions as well as forms of knowledge and discourses which are internalized by individuals and guide the behaviour of the people. This is why many of those who are inspired by Foucault (e.g. Scott 1998) have a tendency to underestimate the capacity of local resistance to the development hegemony. I am sceptical about the underlying assumption that knowledge and discourses will definitely get internalized and guide behaviour. What if they do not? I have thoroughly discussed how classical assumptions underlie development hegemony such as progress in its materialistic sense of macro-economic orientation, rationality, the guidance of “objective” scientific Knowledge and top-down interventions have been criticized not only in the intellectual arena, but also by local communities. Therefore it is important to ask: What if the counter-knowledge and discourse are incorporated into and guide resistance to this hegemony? What kinds of resistance can we have in such cases? The Foucauldian concept of governmentality has a belief in totalizing power that even ‘creates the space for resistance within its context’ (Nealon 2008: 4). My point is that resistance does not always operate within the context of power.

If more space is given to the resistance (through negotiation, consent and participation) to operate within the context of state power, more soft power will operate and the state and its actions become more legitimate. Subsequently, development implementation will be more widely accepted. In contrast, if the space for resistance is checked and prohibited from operating within the power structure, then the power will be delegitimized, and in turn, hard power is most likely to be used. The end result is that the development apparatus and its

actions will be completely rejected. Extreme resistance which operates outside the context of power will become visible. These are two extreme points, and we can find various levels and combinations of power/resistance between them. In the following section I will analyze how the Nubian resistance has gradually been aroused to operate outside the context of the state power, and has delegitimized it.

Nubian anti-dam resistance in its early phase was within the structure of the state power. In the following section I show how the Nubian resistance began to operate within the state structure of power and how it gradually moved to operate outside of this structure. How the delegitimization of the state and its actions increased, and how that relates to the increasing confinement of the space for resistance.

To briefly recall the ethnography of the history of the state intervention in Kajbar dam, which I presented in Chapter 2; the local resisters tried to raise their questions and worries with the state. When the villagers showed their disagreement to Zubair their point was only that the project would devastate their situation. Although they were given an arrogant reply by Zubair “*This is your fate....America could not scare us let alone you..*” they still recognised his authority and established their committee because he asked them to do so. The space left for the local committee to act was very narrow. They were only allowed to negotiate the alternatives of the resettlement areas and the assessment of the value of their property. As far as the government was concerned, Nubians should not be allowed to discuss the feasibility of the project or possible alternatives.

However, the committee still tried to utilize the narrow space since they had been given the opportunity to evaluate what the project would cost them, so they were able to add the extra-economic values of their properties to be included in the compensation. When they raised their estimates of losses and the compensation they wanted from the government, they got another shocking feedback from the authority “*this is far-fetched... go and live where the reservoir stops*”. At this point the resisters realized that even the narrow space left for them by Zubair was not a real, genuine and honest space through which they could make difference. This is why the committee changed its name. They had previously referred to themselves as Northern State, Wadi Halfa Locality, and then, Kajbar Dam Affected Peoples’ Committee. After the resisters realized that the state was restricting even that narrow space, they changed the committee's name. It has become Kajbar Dam Resisters’ Committee. If we closely study

these two names we learn how much the resistance is being pushed out of the state power structure, and how the mutual delegitimization is increasing.

Under the pretence of a participatory approach, national and global discourses, and in spite of the critical knowledge Nubians had built up about the project, the government brought in its machines and started to work on the dam site. The local were even denied access to know what is going on. The starting point of the resistance this time was one of absolute opposition. Even so, the committee tried to contact the governor and asked him to explain what is going on and take the responsibility of what the local people will do.⁵⁸ The governor feedback was that the head of the locality, Prefect “*Moatamad*” is the only person permitted to contact the governor. So he made it clear that he did not recognize the local committee and asked them not to repeat such contacts⁵⁹.

When the Nubians protested, the state used hard power: police, teargas, firearms, arrests, torture and executions, and surrounded the villages with police. They realized that the state can even deny them the right to life if they went any further. The resisters tried to report their case against the state and the judge refused to take up the case; journalists prevented from being present. Nubians activists and their actions have thus been suppressed by the state's coercive usage of hard power. At this point the resistance started to depend on forces such as ethnicity in its extreme distrust with state, civil and political movements, which do not recognize the legitimacy of the state power and its actions. This is clear in many of the confrontations between the government and local resisters. The government denied a voice in the upstream villages, and as a result the President could not go to inaugurate the Wadi Halfa road. On the walls of their houses one can read anti-government statements such as, *Kajbar is Darfur 2, the dam will be built in over our dead bodies, we are free in the Nubian land, We will protect Nubia and we are ready to offer our lives. The person who died protecting his land is martyr.* The children threw stones on the government cars, shouting “no Kajbar dam” This is the embodiment of resistance instead of incorporation of the state discourses and its legitimacy⁶⁰.

⁵⁸ See appendixes 1 and 2.

⁵⁹ See appendix 3.

⁶⁰ What this farmer is saying can summarize my whole discussion; see: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iW5mUtnryZk&feature=related>

After the events I described above, when people go to the governor in his visits to the upstream villages, it is not to hear what he speaks or even to show him their rejection; it is mostly to prevent him from giving a speech. Close analysis of this event that appears in a video posted on youtube⁶¹ reveals how much state and resisters delegitimize each other and operate in two separate domains. The ramifications went even further than that; A Nubian political party, the Kush Movement, appealed to Nubians to protect their land through military actions against the state.

Of course this is not to say that Nubians resisters do not recognize Sudan and will ask for self determination to have their own state. But it is not difficult to envisage such situations, and it is now widely expected that the Southern Sudanese will separate by their own state and that Sudan will be broken into of several antagonistic neighbouring States. This is the level which the extreme resistance may reach after complaints, peaceful resistance, protest marshes, violence, civil war and disengagement from the state. What leads to the escalation of resistance from one stage to the next is the steadily shrinking space left for the resistance to operate within the state power structure. This is because of the lack of democratization, participation, transparency, accountability and freedom of speech, and of other attractive concepts of the neo-liberal era of globalization. All these concepts, in one way or another, mean, at least theoretically, wider spaces for the resistance to operate within the power structure, so that the legitimization of the state and its action would be possible and the soft power could operate easily through the incorporation of powerful discourses and ideology.

The most crucial question to be asked is how much space is left for the resistance within the power structure? In other words, how is state power being exercised, particularly in the fields of economic and development policy? I have abstracted the idea of a consensual-forceful continuum mainly from my own case study of state-society interactions concerning the Kajbar dam. But the nature of power and resistance and how they operate elsewhere is highly contextual. Thus the theorization of findings such as mine needs wider comparisons of different ethnographic cases over space and time.

⁶¹ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=45QbnKbeSSU>

Conclusion

How can I conclude when the reality that I am studying is still in a state of flux?

The interactions between the state and the anti-dam Nubians are still continuing. As we saw, Kajbar dam is still going through a complex contestation of conflicting knowledge, ideology, discourses, evaluations and the use of soft and hard power. The forces of implementation and resistance are still trying to realize their various visions. Adopting the idea of power-resistance interactions at different points along a consensual-forceful continuum, I reflect below on possible two extreme scenarios for the implementation of the Kajbar dam.

First: the state could continue to put the project into practice forcefully, without local consent and lacking serious, honest participation of local people and their representatives in the decision-making process. The local Nubian counter actions will be suppressed by coercive use of the state power. In such a case, even if the project is implemented, it will literally be a bloody development.

Second: The state may recognize the Nubians' rights to engage in the whole process of the planning, evaluations of cost and benefits, and not merely the economic ones, of the project, and guarantee serious local Nubian engagement in the project through their representatives, activists, organizations, committees, political parties, intellectuals and other entities. These negotiations need not only to consider a part of the project as negotiable or the whole feasibility of the dam scheme but must go further to include the alternatives that Nubians are raising, their visions and evaluations. Serious evaluations of the project costs and benefits, including extra-economic values, may be considered. Before that can happen, the state will need to rebuild its legitimacy due to the clear loss of faith in the state's actions as a result of the historical and contemporary experience that I have mentioned above. Serious structural reforms in the state power structure are needed, so that local resistance can be recognized and wider spaces through which local people can make a difference and be convinced by the outcome. Then, after all this, if the dam project or some other alternative developmental scheme has been implemented, the outcome will be a consented development.

Whether the scenario will be a bloody development or a consensual one, or something in between; it is important to appreciate the capacity of the resisting forces to modify the

development outcome. This is the main argument that has been considered throughout this study. The argument is that in this era of globalization it is not only the state's capacity to produce relevant and facilitating knowledge, nor it is the monopoly of coercive power which shapes the outcome of the development projects, but also the capacity of the alternative counter forces to modify or resist government actions by the production and usage of critical knowledge and mobilization of other forces to face this hegemony.

When I started the argument with "in this era of globalization" I am not saying that global forces of emancipation are empowering the locals. Although Nubian activists have taken their case to the United Nations and to the human rights community,⁶² they have not received any support in their struggle. We need to go beyond this single case and ask why the human-rights forces of emancipation are not working properly. What we have seen in the Nubian case is that human rights, participatory approaches and other neo-liberal emancipator discourse only exist to raise the aspiration level of local people. This is not to overlook the effect of such aspiration-raising on local agents as a way of modifying development project outcomes. But they are not taking serious action to empower Nubians in their struggle with state-run development projects.

Important questions also need to be further studied: why are the so-called emancipator paradigms of the globalizing world not making difference for the local people who have been and still are being deprived by development? What we learn from the Nubian case is that the conventional hegemony of developmental discourses and practices is leading to more violence under the "etatization" process of the state.

Rajagopal (2003) has reflected interestingly on why development- and economic-related violence is still invisible and overlooked in human-rights community. He argued that it is partly because of the conviction, even among these 'emancipator' forces, that it is right to turn human beings into economic agents and the responsibility to realize these rights have been assigned to the state. "A human rights discourse is based on the creation of an apparatus of modernity mainly through a process of 'etatization' since the realization of rights is predicated on the moral possibilities of the state and material possibilities of the

⁶² See appendix 7.

market.....The political economy of the human rights discourse makes it less likely to be neutral or impartial in countering the violence of development.” (Rajagopal, R. 2003: 231).

Arguably, it is the same etatization process of the Sudanese postcolonial state that has, at least partially, led to the spread of civil war in the South (due to the appropriation of petroleum and other natural resources). And the Darfur crisis has escalated due to the expansion of highly mechanized agricultural schemes which privatized local resources in favour of the ruling elites. Not only in Darfur and the South; this is the cause of the dispute and tensions in the Eastern part of Sudan and the Blue Nile state (Suleiman 2001). All these disputes, tensions and patterns of violence have to some extent been escalated because of similar discourses regarding the development and progress of the “national” economy.

The proliferation of the discourses of emancipation, counter knowledge and ideology is not enough to empower those who have been and still are being disadvantaged by development projects. Ironically, it is leading to more destruction through the escalation of tension, disputes, violence and the spread of civil war in Sudan. Are the human-rights and other paradigms of emancipation yet other manipulative tools of imperial schemes to intervene and exploit the spread of violence in the previous colonies once again? The anthropology of development, I think, should critically revise international human rights and other legislation in the light of their impact on local people, and we may ask: what are the underlying assumptions of the previous exploitative colonization, modernization and modern globalization that are still shaping the forces of emancipation themselves?

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Appendix -1

السيد / والى

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
اللجنة الشعبية لدرء آثار سد كجبار

التاريخ : ٢٠٠٧/١/١٦ م

السيد / والى الولاية الشمالية
الموقر
السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته
وبعد

باسم لجنة درء آثار سد كجبار نرفع لسعاتكم هذا الطلب مستفسرين كل الحقائق عن مشروع سد كجبار وذلك لأن المواطنين يعيشون في بلبلة للتحركات من جهات مختلفة ورغم إفادتكم لمدوبينا في مقابلتكم بكجبار بأن هذه الأتيام تجرى دراسات للسد .
هذه التحركات أدت إلي عدم إطمئنان المواطنين لما يجرى لغياب الشفافية والتعقيم المستمر عن كل ما يدور بهذه المنطقة . عليه فإننا نطالب سيادتكم تمليكنا كل الحقائق عما يجرى أو توجيهنا عبركم لجهات الإختصاص .

ولكم الشكر وبالله التوفيق

عبد الله آدم
أمين اللجنة

عز الدين إدريس
رئيس اللجنة

صورة إلى :-
السيد / أمين عام حكومة الولاية
السيد / معتمد محلية حلفا
السيد / المدير التنفيذي وحدة فريق
السيد / اللجنة الشعبية للسد بالخرطوم
السيد / لجان الشياخات بالمنطقة

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

اللجنة الشعبية العليا لسد كجبار

التاريخ :- ٢٤/٣/٢٠٠٧م

الأخ / المدير المقيم لوحدة تنفيذ السدود بمشروع سد كجبار
المحترم

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

بالإشارة إلي خطابكم المقدم للجنة الشعبية العليا لسد كجبار بتاريخ ٨/٣/٢٠٠٧م والمتضمن طلبكم بالسماح لكم باستمرار عمل الدراسات بموقع المشروع والذي أكدتم فيه بأنكم تقومون بدراسات جيوتقنية والذي بموجبه تمت الموافقة المشروطة من اللجنة بخطابنا بتاريخ ٨/٣/٢٠٠٧م فقد تلاحظ عدم التزامكم بالشروط الواردة بخطاب الموافقة وتجاوزكم لكل النقاط المتفق عليها ، ولاعتقادنا الأكيد بأن الأعمال الجارية حالياً قد تجاوزت نطاق الدراسات إلي مرحلة تنفيذ جسم السد فقد قررت اللجنة العليا أن يتم إيقاف العمل فوراً وإيقاف كل العمليات والحفريات حتى تتضح الرؤية وطرح الحقائق للمواطنين إما يحفظ حقوقهم من قبل الجهات العليا المسؤولة ونؤكد أنه قد تم إتخاذ القرار بعد معاينة الموقع والأعمال الجارية .

عليه نرجو الالتزام بالقرار أعلاه ونحملكم مسئولية عدم الالتزام به علماً بأننا سنتخذ من الإجراءات والتدابير ما يحفظ حقوق المواطنين .

وبالله التوفيق


اللجنة الشعبية العليا
سكرتير اللجنة
عبدالله آدم
التاريخ

رئيس اللجنة
عز الدين إدريس

- صورة إلى :- والى الولاية الشمالية
- صورة إلى :- معتمد محلية حلفا
- صورة إلى :- المدير التنفيذي لوحدة فريق
- صورة إلى :- مكتب الأمن بفريق
- صورة إلى :- ملف اللجنة
- صورة إلى :- لجنة السد بالخرطوم
- صورة إلى :- لجنة السد بدول المهجر

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Northern State
Wali OFFICE



الولاية الشمالية
المكتب التنفيذي للوالي

التمرة: ١/١/٤٦

التاريخ: ٢٠٠٧/٣/٨

الأخ الكريم/رئيس اللجنة الشعبية العليا لسد كجبار

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

الموضوع: اللجنة الشعبية العليا لسد كجبار

معاد لكم خطابكم بتاريخ ٢٠٠٧/٣/٥، بخصوص الموضوع أعلاه

ونرجو ان نوضح آلائي:-

ان اللجنة الشعبية يتم تكوينها عن طريق المحلية والجهة التي تخاطب
الوالي هي المعتمد وليس اللجنة الشعبية وان تعتمد أي مخاطبة مالم تكن
من معتمد المحلية.

أرجو ان لا يتكرر مثل هذا الخطاب ثانية:

وجزاكم الله خيرا

عبد القادر تيممة
مدير المكتب التنفيذي للسيد الوالي

١٦١٨
١١٧١٧٧٢

صورة للاخ
مدير مكتب معتمد محلية جالما

تلفون: ١٠٧٧٧ فاكس: ٢٢٠٠٠ فاكس: ٢٠٠٢٢

السلامة

١٢/١٦

في ربيع الحار ان سلحت
له وانا لم نقت بلوت

١١٦٦١١٧١٧٢
١٠٧٧٧ فاكس: ٢٢٠٠٠ فاكس: ٢٠٠٢٢


تم تسليم
الاصول لرد
مكتب
١١/١٦

Salih Mohammed Salih
Advocate & Commissioner
for Oaths
Dongola : Tel : 21564- 0912659879



صالح محمد صالح
المحامي وموثق العقود
ومستشار قانوني
بدنقلا : ت ٢١٥٦٤

٢٠٠٧/٦/٤



لدي لجنة إزالة آثار دراسات كجبار

السادة رئيسي وأعضاء اللجنة الموقرين :-

(السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

بكل تقدير واحترام وانا بة عن موكلتي بعض ملاك السواقي ٢ و٣ أشياخة سبو أخطركم بالآتي :-
(١) الإجراءات المتبعة من لجننتكم الموقرة تخالف القانون حيث أن الأراضي المذكورة أراض ملك حر ونزعنا يتم بموجب قانون نزع الملكية سنة ٢٠٠٣ وما يلزمه من إجراءات تصدر مباشرة من رئيس الجمهورية وهذا ما لم يتم وما لا تملكه لجننتكم أو السيد الوالي من سلطات النزع يجعل ما ذكر وجوبيا .
(٢) إجراءات التعويض تكون بعد إستيفاء إجراءات شكلية هامه لبيان الملاك وصفاقم وإثبات الهوية وإثبات الإرث وذلك بموجب مستندات تصدر عن مكتب تسجيلات الأراضي المختص والحكمة المختصة وبكل تقدير تجاهل لجننتكم لهذا الأمر يجعل الإجراءات غير سليمة ولا تتفق مع القانون .
(٣) لكل تلك الأسباب وانا بة عن موكلتي نلتمس وبموجب طلبنا هذا إيقاف الإجراءات وإستيفاء ما ورد أعلاه .

والله من وراء القصر وهو المستعان

المخلص
صالح محمد صالح
المحامي والموثق بدنقلا

Appendix - 5

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الولاية الشمالية
محافظة وادي حنيفة
اللجنة الشعبية العليا لسد كجبار
وقائع المؤتمر الجامع

التاريخ: ٢٠٠٧/٥/١٢م

تم بعون الله وتوفيقه اجتماع اللجنة الشعبية لسد كجبار لكل الشياخات المتأثرة بسد كجبار وعددها ٢٦ شياخة تمثل كل شياخات وحدة فريق الإدارية بالضفة الشرقية ووحدة البركة الإدارية بالضفة الغربية ومثلت كل شياخة بشخصين وكان عدد الحضور (٥٩) مندوب وكان الهدف الأساسي تحقيق وحدة كل المتأثرين بالسد وتوحيد الصف لمواجهة تداعيات مشروع سد كجبار المزمع .
استمع المؤتمر في البداية الى شرح تنويري من رئيس اللجنة الأستاذ / عز الدين الدريس شرح تفصيلي لكل الأحداث من بداية عمل اللجنة وحتى يوم ٢٠٠٧/٥/١١م وبعده تم تحديد أجندة الاجتماع وتم نقاش مستفيض بكل أبعاد قضية السد على خلفية الرفض التام لقيام السد ورفض الدراسات جملة وتفصيلاً وتوصل المؤتمر الى القرارات الآتية :

- ١- تم اجازة الاقتراح على رفض قيام السد ورفض الدراسات بالإجماع .
- ٢- دعم لجنة سد كجبار من باقي الشياخات بواقع شخص واحد من شياخات المنطقة الجنوبية وشخصين من شياخات المنطقة الشمالية ليكون عدد اللجنة التنفيذية ٣٤ شخصا ممثلة لكل الوحدة الإدارية لفريق والوحدة الإدارية للبركة .
- ٣- تقرر أن يتم دعم اللجنة مادياً من كل الشياخات .

Bend

٤- خرج المؤتمر بالتوصيات الآتية :-

- ١/ كتابة مذكرة واضحة توضح فيها القرار برفض السد والدراسات ودعوة الوالي للحضور الى المنطقة وتسليمه هذه المذكرة باسم اللجنة .
- ٢/ كتابة خطاب واضح لوقف كل الأعمال الجارية لمنطقة السد المزمع الى مكتب وحدة السدود .
- ٣/ عدم تسليم الأراضي الملك لوحدة السدود لإجراء الدراسات وعدم تأجير المنازل وإنهاء العقود أو عدم تجديدها .
- ٤/ تسليم المعتمد والجهات المعنية صورة من قرار وقف العمل والدراسات .
- ٥/ وضع لافتة كبيرة في مداخل المنطقة يكتب عليها رفض أبنا المنطقة للدراسات وقيام السد .
- ٦/ التوجه الى كل الأحزاب ومنظمات المجتمع المدني لمساعدتنا ومناصرتنا في القضية وتكثيف الإعلام .
- ٧/ تنوير المواطنين بواسطة المناديب في كل شياخة قبل ٢٤ ساعة من تحرك المواكب والمسيرات تفادياً للمخاطر التي يتعرض إليها المواطنون .
- ٨/ إصدار صحيفة باسم كجبار توزع على نطاق واسع صحيفة جامعة لكل المعلومات .
- ٩/ عدم إعطاء الفرصة لأي جهة سياسية اوخلافها للمتاجرة بالقضية .
- ١٠/ الإسراع بتكوين لجنة منوطة بالنواحي القانونية .
- ١١/ إعتبار يوم ١٢/٥/٢٠٠٧م يوم احتفال سنوي يجسد وحدة المنطقة ومواطنيها
- ١٢/ إعتداد الاسم السابق للجنة (اللجنة الشعبية العليا لسد كجبار) .
- ١٣/ صياغة التوصيات وتوزيعها للشياخات .

وبالله التوفيق

رئيس اللجنة

عز الدين ادريس

سكرتير اللجنة

عثمان ابراهيم

Appendix - 6

التاريخ: 17 رمضان 1429 هـ
الموافق: 17/09/2008 م

السيد / رئيس الجمهورية المحترم
السيد / النائب الأول لرئيس الجمهورية المحترم
السيد / نائب رئيس الجمهورية المحترم

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته

الحمد لله الذي قال " وجعلنا من الماء كل شيء حي " ونصلي ونسلم على المبعوث رحمة لكل حي، محمّد الأمين، وعلى آله وصحبه والتابعين وبعد.

نحن أهل الشمال، أهل المنطقة النوبية نرفع شكوانا وتظلمنا لسُدّة الرئاسة. فإنّ النيل الذي يهبُ بإذن الله الحياة لنا ولمن هم دوننا في مصر صار نذيراً يكاد يُزري بآمالنا ويغرق ما تبقى من أرضنا وزرعنا وتراثنا.

منذ أكثر من مائة عام (عهد خزان أسوان الأول) كلما أنشأ إخوتنا في مصر على النيل صرحاً أو قاموا بتعليقته أغرق النيل أرضنا وهو يهبُ الحياة لمن هم دوننا، حتى كانت الطامة الكبرى بإنشاء السد العالي وضياع جزءٍ أكبر من المنطقة النوبية، إذ فقدنا بوابتنا النوبية المزركشة (وادي حلفا) دون مقابل، بل كان المقابل هو التشرّد والضياع.

أما خصومتنا اليوم فهي مع السدود التي تُنشأ بالجملة لتمحو حضارتنا عن الوجود وتُشردنا في الأرض بعيداً عن شريان حياتنا . إننا نتحدث عن سدّي دال وكجبار وشكوانا حولهما من جوانب عديدة.

أولا نشكو إلى سُدّة الرئاسة السيّد والي الولاية الشمالية والسيد رئيس وحدة السدود والسيد معتمد وادي حلفا. إذ كنا نتقصى عن هذه السدود وخاطبنا ثلاثتهم كتابة لنعلم (فقط قدر ما يعلمون) عن هذه السدود فنحن المكتون بناها أو المبشرون بنعيمها. بعثنا إليهم خطاباً عن طريق السفارة السودانية بالرياض وانتظرناهم ستة أشهر ولكنهم ثلاثتهم سفها أمرنا بمن فيهم ابن بلدنا (المعتمد) والذي تقلد منصبه وهو موجود بيننا في المهاجر . و الذي ماقتى - قبلها - بيكى معنا على أرضه التي ضيعها السد العالي قبل نحو نصف قرن من الزمان.

إزاء هذا التجاهل تقصينا عن هذه السدود ممن أجرّوا الدراسات بشأنها. إن ما توصلنا إليه من هذا التقصي، ومن تفسيرنا لتجاهل أولي الأمر لاستفساراتنا، خلصنا لأن ضياع أرضنا وإرثنا رهينُ بإنشاء هذه السدود، ويتبع ذلك تشرّدنا في الصحارى بعيداً عن نيلنا الذي هو شريان حياتنا.

ولكن لا بُدَّ أن لهذه السدود من منافع، ولكن العاقل من وزن النفع بالضرر. وهذه هي قراءتنا:

-1 فوائد السدود:

معلوماتنا التي نستقيها من مسؤولي الحكومة - وعلى رأسهم السيد وزير الرّي- تقول إنّ السدود في الشمال - ولعلها كذلك في غير الشمال - هي لإنتاج الكهرباء فقط . وتقول التقارير الحكومية صراحة إنّ السدود ليست للرّي . وعلماؤنا أيضاً يقولون إنّ السودان قد استنفذ حصته من مياه النيل أو كاد، وإنّ هذه السدود لن ترتبط بتنمية زراعية تعتمد على مياه النيل لأنه ليست للسودان من حصته بقيّة.

فإن لم تكن هناك تنمية زراعية فلا ندرى أين تكون التنمية. ونطالعنا تصريحات المسؤولين وغير المسؤولين عن التنمية المصاحبة للسدود ولم يُسمَّ أيُّ منهم مشروعاً تنموياً واحداً. إذن فإنّ ما نسمعُ به من تنمية ينحصرُ في توفير قدر من الكهرباء (حوالي 700 ميغاوات للسدّين) فيما نسمع .

2- ثمن السودان أو ثمن الكهرباء:

وفي المقابل فإن لهذه الكهرباء ثمنًا وأي ثمن :
1- غرق المناطق المأهولة بالسكان وبالنخيل وجروف الخير على شريط النيل في منطقة سكوت جرّاء سدّ دال، وغرق منطقة المحس جرّاء سدّ كجبار. ونتيجة للغرق انتزاع الأهالي من أرضهم وتهجيرهم وإعادة إسكانهم (أين لا ندري) ولكن تجربة {أمري} لا تطمئن.

2- ضياع الإرث والحضارة. كم تسوى هذه الآثار؟ وماذا يعني ضياع أول حضارة في التاريخ؟ الحضارة التي سبقت الحضارة الفرعونية؟ إن قيام السودان يعني ضياع الجزء الأكبر من الآثار مهما بُذلت لإنقاذها الجهود. لقد فقدت المنطقة النوبية أفضل آثارها غرقًا بمياه السد العالي رغم انكباب العالم أجمع لإنقاذ آثار النوبة امتثالًا لنداء اليونسكو قبل نصف قرن من الزمان.

ولن يقتنعنا أحد أن جهدًا كذاك الذي بُذل من قبل سيبدل الآن. لذا فإن قيام هذه السودان معناه ضياع هذا الإرث. و لنستمع لما قاله رئيس البعثة الفرنسية التي كانت تنقب عن الآثار في جزيرة صاي والذي قال (إن آثار جزيرة صاي وحدها تحتاج لمائة عام لاكتشافها). ثم إن التجربة الماثلة أمامنا للآثار في المنطقة المغمورة والمتأثرة بسدّ مروي لا تبشّر بخير.

كنا نأمل دومًا أن تلتفت الحكومات للمقومات { السياحية } التي تمتلكها الولاية الشمالية، وأهمّها الآثار. وما هو التهديد لها لتصبح أثرًا بعد عين .

3- ضياع الماء في الهواء:

إن قيام السودان يعني بالضرورة تبخر جزء كبير من نصيب السودان في مياه النيل، في منطقة هي الأعلى حرارة والأكثر جفافًا في السودان (أكثر العلماء تفاؤلاً يقول بتبخر 3 مليار متر مكعب من الماء من بحيرات سدود مروي ودال وكجبار)، وتعلمون أن اتفاقية مياه النيل (1959م) تحمّل السودان كل التبخر الذي يحدث في أراضيها.

-ولكن ما هي تكلفة المياه الآن في عهد شح المياه؟
-وكم دولارًا يساوي المتر المكعب من الماء؟
-و ماذا يعني إهدار المياه في زمن يتوقّع فيه الدهماء - دعك عن العلماء - نشوب الحروب بسبب المياه في العالم خلال السنوات القادمة؟

14- الآثار الاجتماعية والآثار البيئية السالبة وغيرها : ربنا هو الذي يعلم مداها.

السادة رئيس الجمهورية ونائبه

نخاطبكم بكل الاحترام لنقول إن أبناء المنطقة النوبية يرفضون أن يكونوا {الحائط القصير} الذي تطلب منه التضحيات حينًا بعد حين. لقد ضحينا مرة إثر مرة وما نعمنا وما نعم سودائنا بثمرة واحدة من ثمار هذه التضحيات. و لن يصيبنا شيء من التنمية المزعومة من وراء سدي دال وكجبار - حتى وإن حدثت تنمية - حين نضرب نحن في الصحراء أو ننتزع من أرضنا.
إننا نرفض أن يقرر مصيرنا من وراء ظهورنا، ونرفض أقوال السيد الوالي - التي تحضها القرائن - والتي يتحدث فيها عن رضا أهل المنطقة عن السودان.

إننا نرفض لهجة السيد الوالي الذي يُهددنا بالويل والثبور وعظائم الأمور إن رفضنا السودان، و أقواله (المستفزة) بأن السودان قائمة رضينا أم أبينا، وإن {عادت مأساة عبود} أو زالت عن الوجود.
إننا نرفض تصدى قوات وحدة السودان (المدججة بالسلاح) للغزل، بالرصاص القاتل في كجبار ونطالب بالقصاص

ولا نرضى تسوية الجهات المختصة ولا يرضاه أولياء الدم.
ونرفض تعرض القوات للمتظاهرين في صاي وعبري بالهراوات وصدمة بالسيارات .

باختصار إننا نرفض هذه السود جملة وتفصيلا، ونرفض سياسة فرض الأمر الواقع، ليس فقط لأننا نحب أرضنا ونعشق نخيلنا وجروفنا فحسب، أو لأننا نرى ضرر هذه السود أكبر من نفعها فحسب، ولكن لأننا نرى أن السودان جميعه سيدفع بسبب هذه السود ثمنا باهظا يعلو كثيرا على ثمن الكهرباء، حين يحكم على هذه المنطقة بالفناء.

السادة رئيس الجمهورية ونائبه

لقد تعاقبت علينا الحكومات إثر الحكومات وهي تعتبرنا خارج خارطة السودان. فحمل أهلنا بخروجهم المبكر إلى المهاجر العبء عن كاهل الحكومات المتعاقبة التي وكلتنا لأنفسنا .

و حين تثبته الحكومة أخيرا لوجودنا ظننا أنها ستعوضنا عن صبرنا، ولكنها قررت عوضاً عن ذلك أن تزيلنا عن أرضنا.

فإن قصرت عدالة الأرض عن إيفاءنا حقنا، فإن عدالة السماء هي من قبل ومن بعد رجاؤنا، والمولى عز وجل هو حسبنا ونعم وكيل لنا.

ولكننا عندما نخاطب سدة الرئاسة نعلم أننا سنجد الأذان التي تصغي لنا، إذ أننا على يقين من عدالة قضيتنا، كما نتمنى أن تظل هذه الملفات بأيدي العقلاء من أهلنا وهي هكذا حتى يومنا.

وآخر القول:

إن كان هناك من يظن أننا هجرنا أرضنا بهجرتنا المؤقتة عنها فهو لا يعرف النوبيين، وإن كان هناك من يرانا قليل فقد كفانا السمول الرد بأبياته:

ثعيرنا أنا قليلٌ عديدنا *** قلت لها إن الكرام قليلٌ
وما خمدت نارٌ لنا دون طارق *** ولا دمتنا في النازلين نزيلٌ

لقد رفعنا مظلمتنا لمن بيدهم الحل والعقد، ونحن في انتظار الإنصاف المبين بإلغاء هذه السود ونصلي ونسلم على رسولنا الأمين، وآخر دعوانا أن الحمد لله رب العالمين .

لجنة مناهضة سد دال (السعودية) ----- (لجنة مناهضة سد كجبار (السعودية)
(المنبثقة عن اتحاد سكوت)

* هذا وقد سلّمت هذه المذكرة بالسفارة السودانية قبل اسبوعين من تاريخه.

Appendix - 7

To: Worldwide

The International Appeal to Rescue Nubia And to stop Building the Kajbar Dam

Halfa First! Kajbar Next!!
Nubia Drowns and Dies of Thirst!!!

Date: May 12, 2007

To:

- The United Nations Secretary General
- United Nations programs and Specialized Agencies:
- International Labor Organization (ILO)
- UN High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR)
- World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
- United Nations Economic Development Program (UNDP)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- World Tourism Organization (WTO)
- World Health Organization (WHO)
- United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
- The African Union (AU)
- The International Rivers Network
- The Arab League.

We, the signatories on the this appeal, individuals and organizations, call upon the United Nations, its specialized agencies, governments of free nations, human rights organizations, academicians, scholars, and the international community at large to heed to this urgent appeal and rush to the rescue of Nubia from the eminent destruction and devastation by the proposed Kajbar Dam at the Third Cataract on the River Nile which will inundate one of the most precious and invaluable archaeological sites of the world. The international community is urged to exert all possible pressures on the government of Sudan to stop building dams in the Nubian lands without the consent of the Nubians and put an end to decades of intentional marginalization, isolation, cultural and ethnic cleansing which has been practiced by the consecutive governments of Sudan in collaboration with the Egyptian government against Nubians, their culture and heritage. The Nubians have never recovered yet from the devastation of the High Dam of Egypt to their lands and properties in early sixties of last century.

The governments of Sudan and Egypt have jointly and intentionally implemented series of destructive policies to dismantle the Nubian society and assimilate the indigenous people of Nubia into Arabic culture through well organized programs of cultural cleansing, acculturation and indoctrination. It is our believe that the international community has a legal and moral obligation towards preserving and protecting the Nubians as one of the indigenous people of the world, their heritage and culture from the excessive and intentional process of Arabization and cultural cleansing.

Governments of Sudan and Egypt have signed the Four Freedoms Agreement (the freedom to

move, live, work and own.) on April 5, 2004 and the officials of the two governments expressed their desire to bring millions of Egyptian farmers to the Nubian lands of Argeen without the knowledge and consent of Nubians. On the other hand the government of Sudan has issued a presidential decree last year to confiscate the Nubian lands in Wadi Halfa municipality.

Governments of Sudan and Egypt prohibit usage of the Nubian language in their educational curricula and apply disguised and discriminatory measures to deny Nubians from holding sensitive and key governmental positions unless they master Arabic language and get affiliated with the ruling elites and culturally assimilated to the dominant Arabic culture as a precondition for holding senior positions. The systematic depopulation of the Nubians from their lands and gradual replacement of Nubians by non-Nubians is intended to destroy the strongly knitted social fabric of Nubian society and disrupt the long lived harmony and demographic homogeneity of the Nubians, one of the oldest indigenous and distinctive cultural groups in Africa. Nubians as indigenous people are entitled to get international protection according to the international laws protecting the indigenous people, their cultures and heritage.

Last March, the Nubians saw the Sudanese government bringing Chinese workers and equipments being brought to the site of Kajbar Dam and the Nubian organizations and associations organized a big demonstration to protest the building of Kajbar Dam without their consent. They expressed their opposition to the dam and demand immediate removal of equipments from the site. The governor of the Northern Province promised the angry protesters but he reneged and even began to put obstacles to the committees opposing the Kajbar Dam. When the Nubians protested again, the security forces at the Kajbar Dam site used tear gas and live ammunition to disperse the peaceful demonstration injuring several people. During the last few weeks the state authorities deployed more security forces to the site of the Dam and the governor announced that the government will conduct feasibility studies only to decide whether to proceed in building the dam or stop it. The government is trying to fool the people and continue building the dam and force the Nubians to accept the dam as a reality and a status quo matter like what they did at Meroe Dam and to the people affected by the dam.

We call upon the international community to:

- Take every necessary steps to move expediently to stop forthwith the building of Kajbar Dam and any dam in the heartland of Nubia and extend every possible help Nubians are entitled to, by the international laws to get their share in power and wealth as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Naivasha, Kenya between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People Liberation Army/Movement and the agreements signed in Abuja and Asmara between the government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels and the East Front rebels.
- Protect and enable the Indigenous people of Nubia to have the right and freedom to use their ancestral lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, and their right to maintain, control, protect and develop their language, cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions
- Make sure that the Nubians who suffered from forcible relocations for the purpose of building the High Dam of Aswan, the biggest man made dam in the history in their lands be

compensated for their sufferings during the last four decades and that they shall not be forcibly removed again from their lands or territories and that no relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous people of Nubia.

- Insure the right of the indigenous people of Nubia to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures.
- Enable the right of the indigenous people of Nubia to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning.
- Enable the Indigenous people of Nubia who are divided by international borders between Sudan and Egypt, to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as other peoples across borders.
- Insure the right of the Indigenous people of Nubia to have free access to public media or establish their own media in their own languages and to have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without discrimination.

The Nubians, their organizations and association inside Sudan and around the world were asked to organize demonstrations on May 21st, 2007 inside Sudan and in front of Sudanese and Chinese embassies and UN offices worldwide to express their unequivocal opposition to Kajbar Dam and any future plans to build dams in the Nubian lands and spread the word through the international media to expose to the world the hidden war against Nubians and the conspiracy to wipe out Nubia from the map of the world..

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Date: May 14, 2007

Sincerely,