

ATTITUDES TOWARDS
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS A FUNCTION
OF PERSONALITY

BY

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A.S JOHN GRIEGS BOKTRYKKERI, BERGEN

*“— since wars begin in the
minds of men, it is in the
minds of men that the defences
of peace must be constructed”*

Preface

The interplay between theory and empiricism may vary in character, but neither empiricism nor theory can be omitted completely if we are to make use of a scientific approach. We may stress the empirical side and let the theory grow out of the material, or we can let the theory be the leading string and let our empirical material serve exclusively for the testing of predictions derived from special hypotheses. Both approaches are necessary stages of scientific research, even though the junctures at which they are applied will vary somewhat. The empirical-inductive method will come into play at the initial exploratory phase of the investigation of a particular phenomenon. The hypothetical-deductive method, on the other hand, will only be fully applicable when a particular theory begins to take shape and we gradually approach the ideal theoretical structure: a very few general principles, from which it is possible to derive a large number of special hypotheses which in their turn offer possibilities for empirical predictions.

The phenomenon with which we shall deal in this dissertation — attitudes towards international affairs — does not represent a topic never before subjected to scientific research, nor a developed area in a theoretical sense. No cohesive, systematic theory yet exists as to which international attitudes will characterize a person under certain specific conditions. On the other hand theoretical orientations are not entirely lacking. A number of hypotheses exist concerning the significance of various psychological and social factors, and in spite of the fact that these hypotheses are often very imprecisely formulated, there are no grounds for ignoring their existence. On the whole it is our view that this area of research is at the moment in a kind of intermediate position as regards the adequacy of the hypothetical-deductive and the empirical-inductive approach respectively. This view has left its mark on this work to a considerable extent.

We have chosen to divide our presentation into two parts: one part stressing theoretical considerations, and the other stressing the results of our own empirical investigations.

In the theoretical part we shall deal in some detail with the different hypotheses which have been advanced to explain attitudes towards foreign affairs. We shall not attempt to build up any cohesive theoretical structure, but shall limit ourselves to a *descriptive survey* of existing views. Our presentation will be comparatively fragmentary and discursive in regard to certain points, and more systematic on others. We shall attempt to consider the different viewpoints in their relation to each other.

In the empirical part we shall deal with some of the hypotheses presented in the first section. We shall not go to work in a strictly deductive fashion, but present our research purposes more in the form of questions than of empirical predictions. The task of our empirical data will be in part to throw light on various existing hypotheses, in part to give support to the positing and formulation of new hypotheses. We shall therefore work according to both a hypothetical-deductive and an empirical-inductive system. The interplay between theory and empiricism will be present, although in a slightly different fashion than in the "classical" experiment. From a broader point of view the work may be regarded as a progress report, a link in an ongoing process, having as its aim the development of a cohesive social scientific theory concerning the conditions giving rise to various attitude patterns towards outgroups. Our own work offers no final explanation of this extensive and complicated problem area, but it is our hope that on certain points it may prove to be instrumental in promoting further scientific progress.

The point of departure for this dissertation is a deep faith in the relevance and adaptability of the methods of social science in solving the most burning social problems of our time: tensions between groups and nations. This faith has been strongly nourished by the stimulating interdisciplinary milieu at the Institute for Social Research in Oslo, where I have had the privilege of working during the past seven years. I would especially like to mention the importance of innumerable technical discussions with many colleagues at the Institute, the International Research Seminars which were held in 1951 and 1952, the fruitful stimulus of a number of prominent American visiting professors, and the continually inspiring and encouraging attitude of the Director of the Institute, Mr. Erik Rinde.

One of the reasons that my work is anchored so strongly in psychodynamics is my close connection for several years with the Institute for Child Psychiatry in Oslo. My work at this Institute, my many theoretical discussions with colleagues there, and especially with the director, Dr. Nic Waal, have in various respects contributed to the formation of my theoretical orientation.

In connection with the preparation of the present investigation I would particularly like to thank three of my closest colleagues, Mr. Bjørn Killingmo, Dr. Ragnar Rommetveit and Dr. Jan Smedslund. They have all given me many constructive ideas and critical comments. I also wish to express my deep gratitude to the late Dr. Else Frenkel-Brunswik for her many stimulating theoretical points of view and helpful proposals during her stay in Oslo in 1956-7, and to Dr. Irving Janis for much valuable editorial criticism.

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B. C.

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PART ONE

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In newspapers and journals we often find articles and reports on international questions. We read that a country or nation has done something or other, that other nations are astonished, confused, or indifferent. Some years ago we read in the Oslo newspapers that "Soviet invites other nations to a conference on the question of Germany", that "Germany's patience is almost exhausted", and that "France fears a rearmed Germany". During the Korean negotiations of the previous year it was said that "America has shown a new countenance which may suddenly emerge at any time in new conflict-situations", and "Russia is cynically and with all available means trying to sow dissension between England and the United States".

We have become so accustomed to foreign policy statements and formulations that we scarcely reflect upon how America can show a new countenance, how Russia can attempt to destroy a relationship, how Germany can be impatient and France anxious. Through school and upbringing, reading and conversation, we have become so familiar with the existence of nations that we never stop to ask ourselves how a nation can think, feel, plan, or act. The conception of nations as units of action has gradually become a part of our world image. As a result of the tremendous development and extension of the means of mass communication, it seems that international politics is about to become a new dimension in human life.

The policies of various nations are often described and discussed as if we were referring to persons. Occasionally we may find very striking examples of this. We read, for example, that a nation was born under very unfortunate circumstances, that its first years were marked by conflicts and inner tensions, but that it later grew strong and healthy. In other cases old age, sickness, and death become the focus of attention.

We will not pursue the question as to how the idea of nations as realities first comes into being. We must concede that this occurs,

that for most people their nation is a reality, on whose behalf one may act, and concerning whose behaviour in various situations one may have specific preferences.

In the explanation and understanding of international events it is naturally of special importance to be acquainted with the preferences of leading politicians and statesmen who are in a position to make decisions for the nation as a whole, and who have power to translate their preferences into action. The number of persons in such positions is, of course, extremely limited, but in our times practically all citizens of a nation have some conception of their national belongingness, and probably many also have specific opinions about how their nation should act in various situations.

A series of problems presents itself at this point. What is the relationship between leading politicians and people in general? To what extent is it possible for leading politicians to deviate from public opinion and conduct a foreign policy which does not have the direct or indirect support of the great majority of the nation's citizens? There seems to be nowadays an increasingly widespread idea that political leaders are bound by public opinion to a great extent, regardless of the nation's political system. Experience from sociological studies of small groups suggests that group leaders are expected, more than others, to conform to the behavioural standards and norms characterizing the group, and that leaders who do not fulfill these demands and do not live up to the group's expectations in matters of importance to the group, will lose their position. A group leader can initiate, direct and manipulate group activity exclusively within specific limits. Exactly where these limits are drawn depends upon the group's social norms and traditions (139).

It is a common assumption that leaders of countries having a democratic political system are more sensitive than other leaders to public opinion, and that their policies conform more with what people generally wish and think. This seems to be a reasonable assumption. It does not exclude the possibility, however, that leaders of countries having a non-democratic system of government may also have some sensitivity. These views are clearly expressed, for example, in Wendell Willkie's reports from his famous round-the-world trip in the autumn of 1942:

“People in the United States are apt to conclude that there is no such thing as public opinion or the operation of its power in countries under absolute forms of government. As a matter of fact, in every absolutely governed country I visited, the government had elaborate

methods of determining what the people were thinking. Even Stalin had his form of "Gallup poll", and it is recorded that Napoleon at the height of his power, as he sat astride his white horse amid the smouldering ruins of Moscow, anxiously waited for his daily courier's report of what the mobs in Paris were thinking." (154, p. 139).

From history we have reports of the Roman emperors' intelligence services and their use of special observers, *delatores*, to chart public opinion in the homeland. Especially Nero, according to report, had at his disposal a well-developed network of such observers. On the other hand it cannot be denied that a number of individuals have had an enormous influence on world events. A ready example lies in the effect of Stalin and Hitler on world politics in our own times. During his last days, Hitler seems to have lost all contact with public opinion as well as with the world of reality. According to Trevor-Roper, at the beginning of his political career Hitler manifested great patience, the ability to feel his way carefully, and to balance the views and arguments of various professional experts. At first perceiving himself mainly as a mediator, he gradually became the infallible authority. Trevor-Roper writes:

"... no mind, no fact was allowed to contest the dogmas of (his) strategic genius; and at the end, how different had the conference table become! Hitler was still there, still the central figure, still the ultimate authority; but a Chinese wall separated him from the outer world of reality. He listened not to other voices, but to echoes of his own ..." (151, p. 258).

We will not pursue the question as to what extent public opinion affects leaders' attitudes concerning foreign affairs, whether MacArthur and others are right in believing that a modern war cannot be conducted without the support of public opinion. We will assume that public opinion, at the least, plays an essential role in world politics and the international tensions of our times, and that the introduction to UNESCO's charter — "That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed" — has universal validity.¹

¹ On this point we are in complete agreement with the usual psychological view. To quote Stagner: "Psychologists take for granted that aggressive groups are composites of aggressive individuals ... Aggressive policies directed against other nations are possible only when a sufficient number of individuals within the nation endorse the policies. This is generally true whether the government in question is democratic or totalitarian, except that the 'sufficient number' to give control is smaller in totalitarian régimes. War is possible only when a majority accept war as the necessary policy." (145, p. 109).

Given that political leaders are dependent upon public opinion, it follows that we must ask upon what circumstances public opinion depends? Are we dealing with a product of the leaders' manipulations? Was Herman Göring right in his statement from prison in April, 1946:

“Public opinion or no public opinion — people can always be made to obey their leaders. All one has to do is to tell people that they are threatened by attack, and to denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and for putting the Fatherland in danger. It works in the same way in every country.” (109, p. 223).

It may be assumed that just as political leaders may be more or less sensitive to public opinion, opinion may be moulded to a greater or lesser degree by the political leaders.

Public opinion usually refers to a general adherence to a particular alternative in a current choice-situation. This adherence may be to a greater or lesser degree spontaneous; but we must always count on the possibility that in such situations there will be social pressures from one direction or another influencing most people. In this connection it is of interest to note that democracy as a form of government has been defined as “an institutional arrangement for making political decisions, in which individuals obtain the power of decision through competition for the people’s votes”. The basis for social cross-pressures and the “free” formation of opinion lies in just this competition between different alternatives. In general, public opinion will have a temporary character and will be directed towards concrete, current questions of real or imagined significance for the individual. The formation of public opinion is never exclusively a question of propaganda and organized appeal. The effect of a propaganda campaign and other current events will depend upon what attitudes the individuals already hold. In this connection we may refer to various types of attitudes, of receptiveness to particular impressions, and inclination towards particular reactions. Obviously a person may be led by external pressure to act against his own inclination, to accept a point of view which harmonizes very little with his style of living and his basic system of values; but on the whole, public opinion is likely to represent an activation and release of general attitudes with regard to a specific situation.

In terms of what has been said above, we may consider for example public opinion in favour of some specific Norwegian foreign policy in a given international conflict-situation as having various roots,

among which the previous attitudes of the public towards foreign affairs are of central importance.¹ We are referring here to people's general preferences concerning their nation's actions in international conflict-situations where the interests of the nation are threatened in one way or another. We may assume that a disposition to prefer certain national reactions in such situations is not shared by all people, but that exceptions will probably be few amongst people in opinion-forming positions.

We can only ascribe a particular attitude to a person if he shows relatively consistent ways of reacting to a specific type of event. Only if there are general ways of reacting to international conflict-situations, can we speak of people having varying attitudes concerning foreign affairs, so that we can say, for example, that one person is more aggressive than another, that a second person is more apt to blame his own nation than a third, and so on.

Several American investigations have enriched our knowledge about public attitudes towards foreign affairs. In some of these investigations, mainly using students as subjects, a close connection has been shown to exist between reactions towards different social and national groups, indicating very generalized attitudes (22, 82). In one investigation it was actually found that people having an extremely negative attitude towards groups to which they did not personally belong, also tended to have an antagonistic attitude towards fictitious, non-existent groups (62).

The fact that considerable agreement has been found between people's reactions to different national groups does not prevent their attitudes towards certain nations from being more positive than towards others. Investigations of large samples of the American population show that within the same nation there is often remarkable agreement on evaluations of different nationalities, and that these evaluations are strikingly stable over time (139).

We will give a brief presentation in the following chapters of various psychological views concerning the basis of different reaction patterns towards foreign affairs.² This will not attempt to give a

¹ That opinions towards a current conflict-situation are to a great extent dependent upon previous opinions and experiences, and that a current crisis serves to activate and strengthen attitudes which already exist, is indicated in a recent empirical investigation by Lipset (95).

² In what follows the terms reaction patterns or attitudes towards foreign affairs, international reaction patterns, and international attitudes are used interchangeably and in the sense of tendencies to react in certain ways towards international situations.

complete or exhaustive description of the various viewpoints which have been presented in this area, but is intended primarily as a general orientation concerning certain relevant hypotheses. We have decided to denote these views as hypotheses, not in the sense of elaborated theoretical formulations, but rather as general principles of explanation.

By way of introduction we will discuss briefly the relationship between group and individual behaviour.

CHAPTER 2

Personality Centered Theories

A. *The Generalization Hypothesis*

The idea is prevalent that there is a connection between people's attitudes towards foreign affairs and their ways of reacting in interpersonal relationships. This view is based on the assumption that a transfer of reactions from one context to another always occurs, that each personality tends to be consistent, and that consequently there will be a positive correlation between a given person's reactions to conflict-situations in, for example, the everyday, the professional, and the international spheres. This view may be denoted the *Generalization Hypothesis*. It has been given prominence by Stagner (145, 146), Allport (5), and Grace (53, 54) among others. It may also be viewed in the context of modern learning theory. We are especially concerned here with the generalization of responses, with the fact that a reaction (for example aggression) will tend to be released by new stimuli, if the difference in relation to the original effective stimulus is sufficiently small, and the original reaction has been sufficiently reinforced.

We have previously mentioned that opinions towards outgroups, whether national or racial, often tend to be relatively consistent. In everyday interpersonal relationships as well there often seem to be consistent ways of reacting. At any rate in the case of aggressive tendencies several empirical investigations have shown a significant degree of attitudinal consistency (34, 40, 58, 145).

We are however on more uncertain ground in discussing the relationship between reactions to everyday and international issues. But we are not completely without guideposts. Comparative studies of various primitive societies suggest that there is a positive correlation between individual and group aggression. Members of belligerent societies often manifest strong tendencies towards aggressive behaviour among themselves, and aggression is often a central theme in the mythology of such societies. Thus in an investigation by Broggs cor-

relations from .20 to .54 were found between measures of individual, group and ideological aggression, and the conclusion was drawn that aggressive behaviour is either present in a given case or relatively lacking, and when present is highly generalized (5, p. 358). In another investigation, of individuals, it has been shown that self-reproach in everyday situations is reflected in attitudes towards international questions (5, p. 437). And an empirical investigation by Stagner concludes with these words:

“The evidence . . . suggest that individuals who act aggressively in their interpersonal relationships are not thereby rendered less likely to verbalize aggressively about out-groups; on the contrary, most of the comparisons favour a generalization theory rather than displacement or sublimation theories.” (145, p. 118).

Undoubtedly the most systematic testing of the Generalization Hypothesis has been done by Grace. In contrast to the other investigations mentioned above, Grace tries to define approximately equivalent ways of reacting towards everyday, professional and international situations. In relation to each type of situation he works with the same four categories of reaction, namely, autohostile, verbal-hetero-hostile, direct-hetero-hostile, and *laissez-faire* reactions. He finds significant differences between these ways of reacting, but not between the types of situations with which he is dealing. He concludes by saying:

“With reference to the basic hypotheses . . . it has been shown . . . that . . . the three fields of behavior (everyday, professional, and international) . . . appear to be sub-fields of a general field of human social behavior.” (53, p. 44).

The view that a generalization or transfer of ways of reacting takes place, from interpersonal to international relationships, entails a series of practical consequences. According to this view the attempt to prevent the development of aggressive international attitudes should be directed towards people's interpersonal attitudes. Child-training is of great importance in this connection. The more people develop non-aggressive habits of reacting to everyday conflicts, the less inclined will they be to accept aggressive policies in international conflict situations. The most advantageous form of upbringing would be one which emphasizes non-aggressive ideals and teaches children and young people not to manifest aggressive behaviour in relation to their environment.

The Generalization Hypothesis represents, by and large, the

popular conception of the relationship between group and individual behaviour; that is, that a group's behaviour is the expression of the individual group members' manifest reactions, and that a connection thus exists between aggressive group behaviour and the tendency for group members to react aggressively in interpersonal relationships. Several objections have been raised to this conception. In the following section certain other points of view will be discussed.

B. *The Latency Hypothesis*

The assumption of a correlation between latent reaction tendencies and attitudes towards foreign affairs may be termed the *Latency Hypothesis*. This hypothesis, like the Generalization Hypothesis, assumes a correlation between personality and attitudes towards international affairs; but it is distinguished from it by its emphasis on the non-manifest layers of personality.

The origin of the Latency Hypothesis is to be found in various considerations concerning the behaviour of spontaneously formed groups. Some of these considerations will be reviewed briefly in the following section. Next we want to discuss some recent contributions in the area of personality dynamics pertinent to the question of intergroup relations. In this section we shall specially refer to theories concerning the *authoritarian personality*. This will lead us to a section in which we shall try to discuss various conceptions concerning personality development. First we shall give a brief account of classical Freudian views on developmental phases and the position of aggression and destructiveness in human nature, and then we shall present some comments on these views, taking as our point of departure an acceptance of the general features of Freudian "libido theory". Finally, in the last sections we shall review some empirical studies pertinent to the Latency Hypothesis.

Historical Background

Many people have been struck by the fact that groups often act and behave according to norms other than those controlling individual behaviour, and that individuals often think, feel, and act differently in a group situation than otherwise. One of the first to maintain this view on an empirical basis was the French sociologist, Gustave LeBon. In 1895 he published a treatise on the character and behaviour of groups which received considerable attention (89). LeBon's view was briefly that gatherings of individuals produce far-reaching changes in the behaviour of these individuals: membership of a group leads to

increased suggestibility, reduced powers of logical reasoning, and to reduction of the individual's self-consciousness and feeling of responsibility. The behaviour of groups is determined, according to LeBon, not by the everyday reactions of the individuals, but by deep unconscious layers having their origin in a distant past, inherited from generation to generation — a kind of collective and racial unconscious mind. Persons who are extremely diversified as individuals manifest a remarkable similarity as group members; their individual characteristics and control mechanisms are so to speak extinguished, and deeper-seated forces take over.

Many of LeBon's ideas were carried a step further by the psychologist, William McDougall (101). He too emphasizes the importance of suggestibility and increased affectivity. Nevertheless, he makes a clear distinction between different types of groups. LeBon's descriptions only cover spontaneously formed groups, lacking a firm inner organization, according to McDougall. Groups may act in a primitive, uncontrolled, rash and reckless way; but under certain conditions they may also exhibit rational planning, remarkably high morale, self-sacrifice and generosity. The requirements for the latter case are: that the group has a certain material or formal continuity, that there is an interplay between the group and other groups, and that the group has traditions and an inner structure, so that there is a certain amount of specialization of the members' functions.

Spontaneously formed groups, mobs, and crowds, such as LeBon was mainly concerned with, do not draw their strength and power from a collective unconscious, according to McDougall, but from emotional inductions from the most extreme members. Unorganized groups are inconsistent, impulsive, impatient; they are easily influenced, easy to lead, and incapable of any form of complicated reasoning. They are without self-respect, and tend to be dominated by their most inferior members; their behaviour can often be compared with that of an unmanageable child, and in certain cases that of a wild animal.¹

¹ McDougall found the explanation for this in the direct induction of feelings by means of primitive sympathetic reactions. The perception of feelings in others leads to the experience of similar feelings in oneself. The greater the number one perceives to be moved by a certain feeling, the more will one personally be moved by that feeling, and to the extent that one personally shows the same signs of emotion, the more will this in turn affect the others. This interplay gradually intensifies the feelings of all parties concerned. Simultaneously, the more differentiated and refined feelings are gradually extinguished, giving way to the most crude and undifferentiated ones.

McDougall's induction theory has not received general recognition. Not all people are equally receptive to emotional inductions; certain people often show unique powers of resistance. According to Freud (43), the principle of emotional induction represents a description rather than an explanation, it emphasizes the importance of suggestibility, but does not help us to reach deeper understanding of the phenomenon.

In Freud's own explanation of the increased suggestibility of individuals in group situations, the emotional (libidinous) ties which develop in relation to the group leader and between the other group members have a central position. He considers these ties to be an essential characteristic of a psychological group; and he asserts that a group situation has a certain resemblance to hypnosis. The group leader as the hypnotist takes over the functions of the ego-ideal. All criticism and control are swept aside. The members over-identify themselves, in a sense, with the leader, charge him with strong positive feelings at the expense of their own self-esteem (hypercathexis), and develop a kind of love-relationship towards him.¹

We may wonder what makes people submit to a group leader, and charge him with strong positive feelings. Freud mentions the development of sexual instincts inhibited in their aims; but he finally seems to ascribe the main cause to inherited impulse patterns, predispositions created in the very earliest history of the human race. "Just as the primitive man virtually survives in every individual, so the primal

¹ In contrast to a normal love-relationship, this is based exclusively upon inhibited sexual tendencies. A splitting of sexuality into sensual instincts and instincts inhibited in their aim is conceived as a necessary precondition for the formation of groups. The difference between a group situation and hypnosis lies, primarily, in the relationship of the group members to each other. The group members will be characterized by mutual identifications. The basis for these identifications, these temporary changes in the "ego" on the model of others, is found in the members' mutual perceptions of each other as possessing a common emotional quality, namely the love-relationship to the leader. Psychodynamically, these identifications represent to a certain extent a reaction-formation against primary biological tendencies to jealousy and aggression, the wish to displace others in order to obtain the most advantageous position oneself. Identification with other members serves to ward off these impulses and entails an accentuation of the desire for justice and equality, the desire that no one will be more important than or different from the rest. If such identifications are not developed, aggression and aversion will dissolve the group from within.

horde may arise once more out of any random crowd", writes Freud (43, p. 92).¹

Freud's phylogenetic considerations conclude that suggestibility is a universal, inherited predisposition and that group tendencies to spontaneous action, to uniformity of thoughts and feelings, to the accentuation of feelings at the expense of logical reasoning, express a "return" to the characteristics of the primal horde.

This may give the impression that there is a great deal of agreement between the viewpoints of Freud and LeBon. Both emphasize the unconscious layers of personality; but Freud strongly doubts LeBon's theory concerning a collective mind independent of individuals. He agrees with LeBon that persons in a group situation often act in quite other ways than as individuals; but he thinks this can be explained in terms of purely psychodynamic relationships. He writes:

"For us it would be enough to say that in a group the individual is brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinct. The apparently new characteristics which he then displays are in fact the manifestations of this unconscious, in which all the evil of the human mind is contained as a predisposition. We can find no difficulty in understanding the disappearance of conscience or of a sense of responsibility in these circumstances. It has long been our contention that 'dread of society (soziale Angst)' is the essence of what is called conscience." (43, pp. 9-10).

A thorough criticism of LeBon's theories is found in the works of the social psychologist, Floyd H. Allport (4). Allport asserts categorically that it is quite impossible to develop a group psychology which is not basically an individual psychology. A group's behaviour is the sum of the individual members' behaviour. A given person's behaviour may often differ within and without a group; but in principle it is the same. The difference lies, as a rule, in the fact that a person becomes much more intensely stimulated as a member of a group, so that his reactions become more extreme.²

¹ The primal horde, he assumed, was characterized by a narcissistic, omnipotent father-figure, who forced sexual abstinence upon his sons, thereby driving them into an emotional relationship to himself and to each other. All opposition to this primeval father was useless; the only possibility was a passive, masochistic attitude of self-surrender. The archaic experience of the supremely powerful and dangerous father-figure lies buried in the human unconscious, in the form of tendencies towards self-effacing obedience. In hypnosis these tendencies are activated, and the same thing happens in group situations.

² Allport also adopts a very critical position towards McDougall's induction theory. He concedes that a group situation may limit a person's self-control, con-

Allport asserts that a group situation may not only augment the speed and intensity of the reaction, but may also lead to *qualitatively different* reactions. The behaviour of a group can assume a more genuine and unmodified expression of the needs and reaction tendencies of group members than their individual behaviour does. A person will often express tendencies and impulses in a group situation which would otherwise be blocked; and, in doing so, he expresses what he really is. Group situations will often free people of moral inhibitions, of dread concerning social sanctions, and of personal responsibility.¹

There is a striking resemblance between Allport's and Freud's ideas on this point. Both tend to emphasize the freeing of inhibited reactions. On the other hand, there is a certain disagreement in their views of human nature. Contrary to Freud, Allport asserts that there is no innate need for hostility and aggression, that a group's tendency to use violence and destruction is always based upon the experience of external threat, and always directed towards some threatening object. To this extent, Allport is completely in harmony with the views which have later been expressed by many psychoanalytic scholars. In both cases, however, we find the idea that blocking of aggression and moral inhibition are necessary for a person's social adjustment. Egoistic drives, in Allport's sense, are rooted in what Freud has designated the id, and socialized drives in the ego and superego.

consciousness, and field of experience, and increase his suggestibility; but he denies that the perception of feeling in others will necessarily lead to induction. A certain basis for the reaction must always exist in the person himself. The manifestation of a particular feeling in others does not as a matter of course create the same feeling in oneself; but such manifestations may aid in eliciting the feeling if it has been previously blocked, and may even have a strengthening effect on it. There must always be a certain psychological predisposition in order that induction may occur.

¹ Allport distinguishes between egoistic and socialized drives in human behaviour. A person learns, through upbringing and experience, to act in certain ways. He learns to be considerate of others, to respect other people's lives and property and to yield to law and justice. Throughout our lives, expectations of punishment and the disapproval of others will have an inhibiting effect on our egoistic drives.

In a spontaneously formed mob, in an unorganized group or mass, the tension between egoistic and socialized drives may become intolerable; and if the egoistic drives break through in some individuals, their effect on others will seldom fail to appear. The behaviour of the other group members will instantly cause previous ideas about social disapproval to be replaced by ideas of social recognition and support. A person does not thereby lose his identity. It is rather the opposite which occurs. "In the sense of freedom from restraint upon his egoistic drives", writes Allport, "a man becomes far more individualistic in his behaviour in the crowd than when acting alone." (4, p. 312).

We have concentrated above mainly on the rise of so-called unorganized groups, which are usually spontaneous, unique occurrences.¹ Most groups in which people hold membership are of a quite different nature, however, being more organized, permanent, and consistent. To what extent do we find the same dynamic relationship in such groups?

As we have already mentioned, McDougall considered it desirable to distinguish between organized and unorganized groups. Freud, on the contrary, does not seem to admit any really decisive qualitative difference. He believes the characteristics of spontaneously formed groups to be present, less noticeably, in all psychological groups — whether national or international.²

According to Freud, we might expect that unconscious tendencies will influence a person's attitudes towards outgroups generally, that a person's reactions on behalf of his nation will give a more unadulterated picture of his "true" tendencies than reactions on his own behalf in everyday relationships, and finally that people's attitudes towards other nations show a greater correlation with inhibited and repressed impulses than with behavioural ideals rooted in the superego.

Personality Dynamics

The influence of latent personality layers upon attitudes towards foreign affairs can be looked upon from two different angles. 1) When confronted with individuals, most people cannot avoid identifying

¹ The above review cannot be brought to an end without mentioning some recent contributions in the field of crowd behaviour. Two theoretical analyses are especially worth mentioning. Miller and Dollard, from the point of view of systematic learning theory, have attempted to clarify the psychological variables involved in crowd reactions (104). They underline the importance of interstimulation, proximity, numbers, anonymity, prestige of the leader, circular reaction, emotionality, uncriticalness, etc., but think these different phenomena may all be explained by means of three primary variables, i.e., drive stimuli, crowd stimuli, and the strength of response to each. Redl, from the point of view of field theory, has attacked the problems of group behaviour from quite another angle, emphasizing emotional contagion (32). This concept, originally introduced by Freud, seems in the light of Redl's theoretical and empirical studies, to possess many fruitful aspects.

² "Each individual is component part of numerous groups. . . Each individual therefore has a share in numerous group minds — those of his race, . . . of his nationality, etc. . . . Such stable and lasting group formations, with their uniform and constant effects, are less striking to an observer than the rapidly formed and transient groups from which Le Bon has made his brilliant psychological character sketch of the group mind." (43, p. 101)

themselves with the other's "feelings". A foreign nation, in contrast to an individual, is abstract, impersonal, and completely unlike oneself. 2) A person's attitude towards a foreign nation will generally relate to his own nation as the acting agent in such a way that he will be freed from the responsibility and the self-representation which everyday life imposes upon him. Both these circumstances cooperate in making the individual's conscience and control, established in personal relationships, less influential on his behaviour towards other nations.

No *specific* directives for the prevention of aggressive attitudes towards international affairs follow from the Latency Hypothesis if we assume that repressions are unavoidable consequences of any human adjustment to civilized society. Freud's view of culture was in many respects pessimistic. He was very doubtful about the possibility of reducing aggressive tendencies in most people; but he did not exclude the possibility that certain individuals could achieve such restriction of their instinctive tendencies so that their orientation towards life would acquire a predominantly intellectual basis. He considered the prevention of war to be primarily a question of the education of political leaders. The great majority of group members will always need to subordinate themselves to an authority, a leader who can make decisions for them. Freud also emphasizes the positive value of displacement mechanisms. By facilitating the channelizing of aggressiveness against outgroups, unity within a group is increased, solidarity strengthened, and the basis is laid for cultural growth. He writes: "There is an advantage, not to be undervalued, in the existence of smaller communities, through which the aggressive instinct can find an outlet in enmity towards those outside the group. It is always possible to unite considerable numbers of men in love towards one another, so long as there are still some remaining as objects for aggressive manifestations . . ." (44, p. 90).

Freud's considerations follow quite logically from his theoretical assumptions. If it is assumed that human beings are characterized by strong inherent destructive tendencies, it follows that we must emphasize the beneficial importance of such defence mechanisms as intellectualization, identification, and displacement.

Freud's social-psychological views have been met with strong criticism. The criticism has partly been based upon Freud's previous clinical works, where he presents a considerably more environment-oriented view of the preconditions for destructive tendencies. Here

he especially emphasizes early traumatic experiences and enduring frustrations. In many ways Freud's social-psychological observations are devoid of the profound psychodynamic insight which characterizes his clinical works. This is demonstrated not least in this tendency to give phylogenetic explanations of such phenomena as suggestibility, submission to authority, and the splitting of sensual and aim-inhibited sexuality.¹

These personality characteristics are far from equally divided among all human beings. Several scientists have explained this in terms of ontogenetic conditions by referring to Freud's own psychoanalytic principles. Displacements have been regarded not as something unavoidable, something which must characterize all human beings if they are to live in a civilized society, but as the expression of unresolved conflicts created by specific childhood experiences. This point of view is predominant in Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford's studies of the authoritarian personality (3). This personality type manifests many of the traits which Freud, in his social-psychological works, seems to regard as almost universal. The most prominent traits of the authoritarian personality are pronounced tendencies to distinguish between in- and outgroups, to perceive in-groups as exclusively positive and outgroups as exclusively negative, to submit to and identify itself with strong leaders, symbols of power, and social superordinates, and to disapprove of the weak, the helpless, and persons who deviate from the conventional and socially accepted.

The authoritarian personality has been regarded as a social-psychological correlate of the sado-masochistic personality structure (135). In recent years a series of empirical investigations has been made, attempting to distinguish the affective and cognitive characteristics of the authoritarian personality.

By experimental methods, a higher cognitive rigidity and a more stimulus-bound perceptual orientation have been found among authoritarian persons than among non-authoritarian; but this does not always seem to be the case. With this cognitive rigidity there seem to be parallel trends towards a completely fluid, over-plastic and over-flexible organization; while they are extremely stimulus-bound, with an excessively cautious attitude, at the same time there are tendencies towards unrealistic fantasy and over-generalization.

A central characteristic of the authoritarian personality seems to

¹ It is not hereby meant that Freud totally excludes individual differences or the effect of environmental conditions in his social-psychological theorizing.

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be the striking closeness of opposites. Frenkel-Brunswik expresses this in the following way:

“We may rephrase the closeness of opposites, found both within each of the various levels of personality and from one level to another, in the verbal form of a paradox by saying that the authoritarian person tends to be consistently inconsistent, or consistently self-conflicting, in that he combines within himself such traits as: rigidity and extreme fluidity; over-caution with the tendency toward impulsive short-cuts to action, chaos and confusion with control; order and oversimplification in terms of black-white solutions and stereotypy, isolation with fusion; lack of differentiation with the mixing of elements which do not belong together; extreme concreteness with extreme generality; self-glorification with self-contempt; stress on masculinity with a tendency toward extreme passivity; and many other seemingly incompatible opposites, which thus reveal an intrinsic affinity of style to each other.” (42, p. 257).

In other words, an inner split is regarded as an essential aspect of the authoritarian personality. Frenkel-Brunswik distinguishes, in principle, between two subtypes, according to which aspect of the personality is most dominant in manifest behaviour. In the one subtype, which has so far received the most attention, exaggerated control and rigidity are predominant, while the chaotic aspect is repressed and only breaks through in stress situations. In the other sub-type chaos, fusion, and impulsive discharges dominate the manifest personality, while tendencies towards order and control are to a great extent restricted to ideal reflections and value considerations.

The etiological basis for this inner split is assumed to lie in childhood experiences. The dynamic nucleus of the authoritarian personality syndrome is believed to consist of compensatory castration-anxiety, anal conflicts and retentive defence mechanisms, fear of dependency and rejection of “erotic” orality — in brief, of conflicts and personality traits arising in connection with early nourishment, cleanliness, and sexual training.¹

This view puts the relationship between personality and attitudes towards foreign affairs in a clearly ontogenetic perspective. Briefly, we should expect attitudes towards foreign affairs in the first place to be related to a certain personality structure, characterized by permanent conflicts in connection with primary drives, and in the second

¹ The authoritarian personality is characterized by a high degree of ego-defensiveness. In some recent studies, strong vs. low *ego-defenders* are substituted for the terms authoritarian vs. non-authoritarian personalities.

place to certain childhood experiences assumed to cause a lack of psychodynamic integration. Thus we are strictly speaking faced with both a dynamic and a genetic proposition.

By the term psychodynamic integration we refer to an intrinsic coherence of personality functioning, characterized by complete ego-assimilation (lack of enduring "counter-cathexis") of primary drives. There exist no rigid boundaries between ego and id-impulses. Such impulses may be relatively freely admitted to consciousness. We may talk about a conscious access to normally preconscious and unconscious images, or to use a psychoanalytic conceptualization, an ability to relax all types of defensive ego attitudes that normally screen unconscious material seeking passage from the unconscious to the conscious, an ability *to regress in the service of the ego*. Such a regression implies a temporary lack of defence mechanisms and at the same time an ego capacity not to be passively overwhelmed by infantile impulses, but actively to exploit such impulses for creative and adoptive purposes (135).

According to psychoanalytic theory we may talk about various primary drives. It has been considered whether authoritarian attitudes are more highly associated with conflicts in connection with some particular drives than with others, and with some particular types of defence mechanisms.

Frenkel-Brunswik has discussed this problem and emphasized that at present we do have some factual evidence supporting the view that the authoritarian personality has significantly more infantile components than the non-authoritarian, but that we still have no certain knowledge of which types of dynamic conflict in relation to psychosexual phases of development are characteristic of ethnocentric and non-ethnocentric persons (42).

The authoritarian personality's infantile components are usually regarded as the expression of infantile fixations. How these fixations come into being and are retained, raises a central question pertinent to depth-psychological theorizing.

Classical Psychoanalytic Views

Briefly, we may say that a point of departure of Freud's thoughts regarding child development is that in all children regardless of the culture, certain drives and impulse-patterns emerge which any society will have to modify and socialize in order to protect the individual and the society. How this modification takes place will be of the greatest significance for later personality growth.

A child's earliest development passes through various psychosexual phases characterized by the quest for pleasure in relation to specific bodily zones and by the crystallizing of specific modes of behaviour. The very first pleasures are assumed to be of an oral erotic character connected with a narcissistic (autoerotic), pre-ambivalent orientation towards life. Later on the child goes through a late oral phase and anal phases where sadistic impulses and an ambivalent orientation occupy a predominant position. These are also partial components of the phallic phase which follows and forms the transition to the genitality and post-narcissistic orientation of the fully matured personality.

The term "psychosexual phases" alludes to the fact that we are dealing with a sexual development. This development has been regarded as the investment of a special life energy (sexual energy) called "libido" in one bodily zone after another. In one place Freud uses the analogy of an army advancing on enemy territory to explain the libido development; the army leaves behind occupying troops at all exposed points. The greater the force used for such purpose, the smaller the force available for further advance. The more reduced these advancing forces become, the easier it will be for hostile powers to stop all advance and possibly cause a retreat. And such a retreat will probably stop at those points where the strongest occupation force was left behind.

"Occupying troops" refers to libido fixations, and "retreats" to libido regressions. Concretely, the former term means that a person becomes fixated to specific infantile impulses and pregenital zones. A libido-regression, on the other hand, means that a person relapses to impulse forms and erogenous zones which are dominant at earlier stages of development. It is a common assumption that regressions usually take place to earlier fixations. A libido-regression does not mean that an adult begins to behave like a child of, let us say, two, but that the impulses and fears of this age regain such power that the person cannot cope with them in his customary way, but has to resort to special devices, e. g. symptom formations. The ego is so to speak focussed with increasing narrowness on control of an earlier point of libido fixation.¹

A fixation to an infantile stage of development may arise in differ-

¹ Another type of regression has also been recognized. Descriptions of patients whose conflicts concerning genital sexuality have led to oral or anal pleasure-seeking substitute activity are well-known in psychoanalytic literature. Such regression in terms of pleasure-seeking activities in relation to modes and bodily zones which are dominant at an earlier stage of development frequently occurs in descriptions of children too.

ent ways: as the result of excessive satisfactions and gratifications, as the result of excessive frustrations and deprivations, and as the result of oscillation between excessive satisfactions and frustrations.

In general, frustrations are regarded as a necessary precondition for healthy personality development. But these frustrations must not be so strong that the child completely abandons himself to infantile pleasures, nor so weak that he is inadequately stimulated to give up his infantile pleasures for orientation to reality. Schematically, we may say that the classical psychoanalytic view emphasizes a modulated regulation of frustrations.¹

Where infantile sadistic impulses are concerned, the theory maintains that modulated frustrations can establish the foundation for the sublimation of such impulses in intellectual achievements, in sport, and in the mastering of sickness and natural forces. This train of reasoning implies that there is an optimum point, when there is neither too much nor too little repression, in relation to which the maximum amount of sublimation occurs (64).²

At this point it is necessary to inquire a little more deeply into what is meant by sadistic and aggressive impulses. First let us make it clear that Freud altered his conception of aggression several times, in accordance with changes in his other basic theories. One is consequently able to distinguish between several stages in Freud's conception of aggression. In his earliest works aggressive impulses — the manifestation of destructiveness and cruelty — are seen as derivatives of a drive for sexual mastery. Aggression is assumed to be an important component of certain pregenital libidinous impulses. The combination of aggression and libido gave rise to the concept of sadistic partial instincts. Gradually aggression as a reaction to frustration came to

¹ The following remarks by Mahler are fairly representative: "Fortunately, the child's biological and psychological dependency upon his parents has a useful aspect also. It preconditions the child's educability and furnishes the strongest impetus for his socialization. Very soon, the child feels that maintaining his egoistic objectionable habits, pleasurable though they are, is less important than preserving and insuring his mother's love. The ego is that part of personality that executes the normal repressions, that is to say, that thrusts the objectionable infantile wishes gradually into the unconscious in order to comply with the demands of reality and environment." (98, p. 46). "Educability is conditioned by a normal though not excessive fear of loss of love, and by a normal though not excessive fear of punishment." (98, p. 52).

² By sublimation is here meant the withdrawal of energy from a primary impulse pattern in favour of the cathexis of a substitute pattern making possible an adequate discharge of tension.

attract considerable attention. Aggressive impulses were regarded as an important by-product of the ego drives, e. g. drives serving self-preservation seen in contrast to sexual drives serving race preservation through reproduction. With Freud's revision of his concepts of structure in the direction of the ego as a differentiated surface layer of id, and id as the vital sub-structure of personality, aggressive impulses were assumed to be manifestations of an independent, primary (innate) aggressive or destructive drive. The general motive power behind human behaviour was assumed to be libido and aggression (destrudo). At the same time as Freud put forward his new assumptions on the existence of two primary drives, he also introduced some conceptions concerning the ultimate biological meaning of these drives, linking them to strivings towards life and death respectively. According to this view, aggression is to be conceived of as an externalization of the death instincts. "It would seem that aggression", Freud writes, "when it is impeded, entails serious injury, and that we have to destroy other things and other people in order not to destroy ourselves, in order to protect ourselves from tendencies to self-destruction." (45, p. 136).

This latter view implies that the sum total of human beings' inward- and outward-directed destructive tendencies is relatively constant. We find the same train of reasoning in Freud's conception of sexual drives: the sum of interest turned towards one's ego and to outside objects is, for a given time, constant. He who loves himself more, is less interested in outside objects, and *vice versa*.

A number of psychoanalytic scholars have felt ill at ease with Freud's biological speculations. Fenichel believes that the clinical data on self-destruction which provided the basis for Freud's supposition concerning a death instinct does not necessitate such a supposition, and that self-destruction can be regarded as the result of external forces (39). He further believes there is no basis for assuming that aggressive and sexual tendencies represent a genuine and unconditional dichotomy, operative from the very beginning. Fenichel prefers to look upon aggression as originally having no instinctual aim of its own, not as a category of instincts, but rather as a mode in which instinctual drives are sometimes striven for, either in response to frustrations or spontaneously. He further assumes sadism to have a similar basis, representing initially a way of striving for instinctive aims rather than an original instinctual aim in itself. Because of the nature of the emerging pregenital impulses in infancy (incorporation, elimination), he thinks, however, that sadism may be designated as a normal partial instinct, which is present in all children.

Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein also disagree with Freud's biological speculations, but accept his assumptions concerning the existence of a primary drive towards aggression (63). They especially emphasize various types of processes which modify the impact of aggression: 1) aggression may be displaced to other objects (possibly to the self); 2) the aims of aggressive impulses may be restricted; 3) aggressive energy may be sublimated (transformed into neutralized "de-aggressivized" psychic energy at the disposal of the ego for its function in action); and 4) the discharge of aggression may be "fused" with libido. Such a fusion of aggression and libido towards one and the same object will lead to destructive impulses being kept in check, provided that the libido components are sufficiently strong. If this is not the case — and we often find examples of this in childhood — the result will be a sadistic constellation of impulses. Sadism is characterized by a special kind of pleasure in addition to that which is bound up with the discharge of aggression and destruction — namely pleasure at the infliction of pain, at the suffering or humiliation of others. Since this type of pleasure is assumed to characterize the child's relation to his mother, we are here faced once more with a train of ideas in line with Freud's conception of psychosexual development.

A point of view which has won general favour is that the over-severe socialization of aggressive or sadistic impulses will not result in their elimination, but rather in their fixation and possible later discharge in indirect ways; for example, in fantasy or in relation to objects where the possibility of retaliation is non-existent. If anxiety concerning aggressive impulses is sufficiently strong, even aggressive fantasies may be repressed. A certain satisfaction may in this instance be derived from perceiving others as aggressive. "It is often," Fenichel writes, "the specific repression of this (oral and anal) sadistic component of infantile sexuality that later leads to conflicts and thus to neuroses." (39, p. 73).

Further Theoretical Elaborations

Criticism has been raised by a number of scholars against "the libido theory". Today it is not uncommon to divide psychoanalytic theoreticians into those accepting and those rejecting the specific importance of the role of infantile sexuality in personality formation and in the unconscious dynamics of personality functions. The former have often been designated the Freudians or orthodox Freudians in contrast to the latter, the non-Freudians or neo-Freudians. We shall not enter here into any detailed discussion of the different schools

of psychoanalytic thought, but limit ourselves to a short presentation of some viewpoints deviating somewhat from the classical view, but still taking as their point of departure the crucial importance of infantile sexuality. We particularly want to point out that the classical conception of what constitutes natural impulse patterns in children may be questioned, without thereby relinquishing the division into different psychosexual developmental stages.

As mentioned above sadism and ambivalence have been looked upon as normal characteristics of the late oral and anal stages of psychosexual development. Likewise narcissism and self-centrism have been regarded as normal characteristics of the early oral stage. A fixation to one of these stages will, according to classical analytic theory, result in the impulse constellation characteristic of the stage continuing to affect the adult personality. The character of an individual will, according to Abraham, reflect the individual's libidinous structure (1).

Reich's conception of character formation contrasts somewhat with this point of view (127). He believes that an individual's character traits never represent continuing primary impulses, but quite often a defensive reaction against powerful libidinal trends. He emphasizes strongly that this defensive reaction can be as strong instinctually as the impulse that is being repressed, and equally resistant to change. A neurotic character represents a chronic alteration of the ego, which simultaneously brings about manifest adjustment and serves as a sort of armour against those impulses that an individual has come to consider dangerous. According to Reich, many impulses looked upon as primary and normal by the orthodox Freudians are really to be considered secondary defence stratagems.¹ Fixations always imply an

¹ When we refer to defence stratagems these need *not necessarily* constitute manifest facets of an individual's character. This will always be influenced by such defence stratagems, but will at the same time represent an organized whole formed on the basis of the individual's total inner resources and social relationships. An individual's character formation will normally represent a further adaptation and organization of possible early psychosexual conflicts. On the other hand such conflicts will always have a modifying effect on the interplay between the individual and his surroundings and hereby contribute to the distinctiveness of the adult personality. By the term "defence stratagem" (avvergeform) we refer to an impulse pattern which functions as an adaptational system in giving opportunity to non-accepted impulses to obtain secondary gratification by being expressed in a disguised way. For the sake of a general view, by the term "defence mechanism" (forsvarsmekanisme) we refer more specifically to an unconscious device which keeps from consciousness mental processes that are unacceptable to the ego or to the superego.

impairment of natural impulse patterns, and what really become fixated are secondary impulses serving as defences against primary ones becoming charged with anxiety. A precondition for an impulse fixation is a preceding conflict between the child and his environment, resulting in a repressive-defensive adjustment on the part of the child. Active, responding impulses may thus be warded off by holding on to passive receptive tendencies, and aggressive impulses by sabotaging obedience or self-surrendering compliance, and so on. Between primary impulses and manifest character traits, a whole series of varied defence patterns (reaction formations) may be inserted. This viewpoint is in no way incompatible with the classical view. The difference rests primarily upon the question of what constitutes primary (innate) impulse patterns.

Strongly influenced by Reich (126, 127), Erikson (31) and Ribble (128), the following assumptions concerning psychosexual development have been presented in a monograph by Killingmo, Waal and the present writer (21).

Neither sadism nor ambivalence are normal characteristics of any developmental stage, but rather symptoms indicating that primary impulses have become blocked and anxiety-conditioned. The early oral phase is mainly characterized by the emergence of approaching, contact-seeking impulses and a receptive, encountering, responding orientation towards the outside world. Furthermore, the late oral, anal and phallic stages are mainly characterized by the emergence of active incorporative, eliminative-retentive, and introductive impulses respectively; or, in terms of social modalities, of an assertive self-providing, a productive autonomous, and an initiative exploratory orientation respectively. According to this view, harmonious personality growth is not contingent upon efficient partial repressions, but primarily upon an ego-assimilation of infantile impulses.¹ The various

¹ This principle of development implies that educability is not seen as contingent upon fear of punishment or fear of loss of love, but as an expression of basic potentialities for reality explorations and mastery. The development of the ego is viewed as an autonomous process, the fate of which is dependent upon the adequacy of the satisfaction of psychobiological needs. Consequently, the term primary ego autonomy (or ego-actualization) occupies a central theoretical position. By the term assimilation we refer to a process by which emerging primary impulses are incorporated in the ego — giving rise to progressively higher (more complex) levels of psychic functioning. This is a process very similar to what has been referred to as sublimation. In both cases we may talk about an ego exploiting the energy of primary impulse patterns for adaptive and creative purposes; but while sublimation implies a “defensive” change of primary drives, an original impulse vanishing because of

social modalities mentioned above will, in the case of a supporting milieu, give rise to the development of basic ego capacities or qualities. Instead of pointing out the importance of a modulated regulation of frustrations, the emphasis is on self-regulation, on the environment's acceptance and gratification of the child's needs, and upon the child's innate possibilities for growth when its impulses are not rejected and condemned.¹

As far as sadistic impulses are concerned, it cannot be denied that such impulses are common among children in our culture, but this does not justify the conclusion that such impulses represent primary drives or normal partial instincts intrinsically bound to be developed as a matter of course because of the nature of primary drives proper. Granted that sadism represents a fusion of aggression and (pregenital) libidinal drives, it may be questioned under what conditions such fusion takes place. Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein mention the case of strong aggression and libido being discharged on the same object, and stress the fact that sadism is to be viewed only in the context of an already developed object relation (63). Fenichel explicitly points out that experience of frustration seems to be a central factor, but does not specify why frustration in some instances provokes aggression, in others sadism (39). The answer to this question may be found in the nature of the object relation developed. If this relation is established on the basis of a "fear of loss of love" or "a fear of punishment", the child, if frustrated, would probably defend himself by repressing his aggressive impulses. In this way his object relation will acquire an ambivalent quality, and his reactions — as far as the late oral and anal stages of development are concerned — a possessive quality expressed in the form of simultaneous desires to bite and to hang on and to expel and to hold on respectively. In both cases we are facing an aggressive impulse losing its instrumental nature and acquiring an instinctual aim in itself by an admixture of libidinal drives. The specific kind of pleasure accompanying this latter aim we may de-

its energy being withdrawn, assimilation emphasizes more strongly the existence of inborn potentialities for growth — that an impulse will vanish to the extent that it is out-grown.

¹ The term (sexual) self-regulation is not quite appropriate. This concept — initially proposed by Reich — may easily be interpreted to mean "children ought not to be frustrated", which we think is far from the most crucial point in this connection. It is of vital importance that the child's approaching (extending) impulses are encountered by his environment, and that a genuine contact-relationship — a mutual regulation of feelings and expectations — is established between the child and his significant objects. (Cf. 31, p. 64)

scribe as sadistic. Thus a clear distinction is maintained between sadism, which we may consider as a defence strategem, and primary aggression.

As we have mentioned, in his later works Freud assumed the existence of two main instincts or types of instinctual energy in human nature, namely libido (*Eros*) and aggression (*Thanatos*), both intrinsically opposed to each other. In contradiction to this it has been maintained by Karpman that: "... life as a whole may be conceived of as a struggle between positive and negative forces, the one forever life-producing and maintaining, the other life-destroying, one aggressive, the other recessive; and when the latter gains the upper hand, death eventually supervenes." (78, p. 695). The term aggression is here used in a sense interchangeable with libido. "Aggression," writes the same author, "... is not merely necessary to life, it is coeval with life; indeed it is life itself." (78, p. 715). He defines aggression as the expenditure of energy in order to secure what is needed from the environment, and draws a distinction between what he calls primary and secondary aggression, between unconditional and environmentally conditioned "reaching out" for what is wanted. Secondary aggression, according to this author, emerges when difficulties are encountered or when opposition is met in the attainment of the desired object. It is based on and developed from primary aggression.

Our own term primary aggression, used above, is to some extent synonymous with what is here called secondary aggression. We too want to stress the life-producing aspect of aggression, but at the same time we feel that every definition of aggression lacking reference to its affective quality is somewhat inadequate.

Among some psychoanalysts the instinct of aggression is often equated, in part, with an urge to mastery and growth. This is very much in accordance with Freud's earlier view on aggression as a drive serving self-preservation. It has been proposed by Munroe to subsume these "constructive" aspects of aggression under the heading of a special inborn non-aggressive (and non-sexual) mobility drive (111). Munroe asserts that many psychoanalysts seem to interpret aspects of child behaviour as the expression of an urge to destruction, where such an urge is not necessarily present. A child's mobility drive will often have destructive consequences without this being the child's intention. A small child does not properly distinguish between valuable *objets d'art* and objects which it is permitted to bang around. The negativistic stage encountered in the toddler may be looked upon, not

as an expression of aggressive impulses, but as a way of testing out the potentialities of a new dimension — the veto power of an emergent “self”. Often these basically non-aggressive reaction patterns may provoke adult behaviour which in turn may be severely frustrating and alarming to the child. At this very point a certain type of inner tension will be aroused in the child; and, once aroused, this will instigate more or less inborn behaviour patterns aiming at tension reduction. We may refer to rage, with all its concomitant emotional and motor components, as a fairly inborn behaviour pattern in this area, and probably as a prototype of aggression.

When regarded from this angle, aggression may be conceived of as an affective energy mobilization characterized by anger and an orientation towards motor expression (outward-directed activity). We may in fact accept the Freudian view that aggression has a dynamic “drive” quality rooted in inner tensions. But this does not imply our acceptance of an instinct of aggression, the existence of an aggressive energy, which by inheritance is *spontaneously generated* in man. On the other hand, if aggressive impulses — in response to external danger or frustration — are blocked or repressed, aggression may acquire the characteristics of a primary drive system. By stressing the possible self-perpetuating dynamics of aggression under certain circumstances we are in fact ready to accept a number of Freudian propositions concerning personality dynamics. Thus we do not take issue with Freud’s profound clinical insight as to the different ways in which aggressive energy may be channelled. In short, our rejection of aggression as a *primary* self-perpetuating drive does not imply our opposition to the existence of aggressive drives, but we believe them to represent secondary drive systems, the foundation of which is laid in the repression of primary aggression. We shall refer to such secondary aggression as character-conditioned, or latent, aggression.

A number of Freudians, for example Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein, do to a certain extent equate aggression with destruction. This is in accordance with the earlier writings of Freud where he uses the term ‘aggressive manifestations’ almost synonymously with destructiveness or cruelty. We find the same trend in modern learning theory — a trend to define aggression as a desire to destroy, injure or humiliate.

According to our own view, destructive motives are to be considered as secondary as far as primary aggression is concerned. We mentioned above that rage may be considered as a prototype of

aggressive reactions. Through progressive maturation and learning, the rage reaction will normally be highly modified in the adult — and the situations provoking aggressive behaviour will change tremendously. The ability to manipulate symbols, to understand causal relationships and the true properties of objects as well as greater self-confidence, autonomy and physical capacities, will to a great extent dissolve infantile emergency reactions and make such reactions less frequently called for. Granted that the dynamic basis for aggression is present when drives are frustrated, the form of aggression will differ according to the character of the drives in question, the degree of the individual's maturity, and the degree and character of the external obstacle.

The common denominator of aggression, whether the frustration involves oral, anal, phallic or other impulses, whether it is severe or not, may be considered to be a mobilization of energy to overcome the obstacle. Thus aggression may be regarded rather as an instrumental form of behaviour arising from the experience of external threat. In some instances destruction of the obstacle may be required, in other instances not. The crucial point would seem to be that the person is able to react in a manner representing a complete and adequate discharge of the situationally induced tension. A prerequisite for such an adequate discharge in adults seems to be a synthesis of an affectomotor response and an intellectual appreciation of the external situation.¹

In the case of self-perpetuating aggressive drives an actual frustration will often provoke a quite inappropriate aggressive reaction — either being too strong or too weak — and motives of revenge and retaliation will very often be aroused. In this instance the wish to destroy or injure others may assume a central position, and we may in fact equate aggression with an urge to destruction. Theoretically we may talk about aggression without libido. Granted the proposition that destructive forces do emerge to the extent that aggression is not allowed to assert itself, we may in fact accept the view that two energy systems intrinsically opposed to each other often do exist in human beings.

¹ From a theoretical standpoint we may differentiate between different ways of inadequate aggressive tension discharge, e.g. an affective response unaccompanied by "cognitive insight" or an intellectual response unaccompanied by an affectomotor release. The latter mode we may denote intellectualization, the former aggressive acting out.

Character-conditioned aggression will frequently influence an individual's way of reacting in situations where his security is threatened, and will bring to the fore motives of destruction; but, as mentioned above, we do not consider the existence of such motives a sufficient criterion for deciding whether aggression is character-conditioned or not. A non-character-conditioned aggression may, under certain circumstances, include such motives, but must at the same time satisfy some definite criteria, e.g. the following, proposed by Bergler (5, pp. 359–360): 1) it must be based on self-defence or defence of other people; 2) it must be directed against a real enemy — the true source of the frustration; 3) it must be experienced as wholly justified and free of guilt feelings; 4) it must be adequate in amount; 5) it must be expressed at the appropriate time; 6) it must be expressed in such a way that expectations of a successful outcome will be justified; 7) it must not be easily provoked, but only when the offence is considerable; 8) it must not be confused by aggressive reactions arising out of previously frustrating situations.¹

We have identified the affective component of aggression as “anger”. When we are dealing with the desire for destruction or infliction of injury, “hate” would be a more adequate term. Hate expresses a more permanent frame of mind, a more deep-seated emotion. In accordance with the above conceptualization we may distinguish respectively between situational (rational) and character-conditioned (irrational) hate (47).

We mentioned above that a conflict between a child and its environment will give rise to protest, provoke aggression, on the part of the child. A permanent defensive attitude towards primary libidinal impulses will therefore very often be accompanied by a repression of aggression.² Perhaps the more frequent infantile fixations of the authoritarian personality as compared to the non-authoritarian do primarily indicate the presence of the greater amount of character-conditioned aggression in the former personality type.

From this point of view the Latency Hypothesis may especially be

¹ Among these criteria we consider nos. 1, 3 and 8 to be the most basic. Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 may possibly be deduced from them. Finally the validity of criterion no. 2 may be questioned because of its lack of distinction between “rational” and “irrational” perceptual errors.

² This point of view is very much in accordance with Hartmann's elaboration of the Freudian theory of aggression. For example, Hartmann states that it seems likely that defences against instinctive drives (countercathexis) are mostly fed by partly neutralized aggressive energy (64, p. 22).

interpreted as an assumption concerning the social psychological consequences of the repression of aggression. The prevention of destructive attitudes in the international sphere is thus to be viewed very much in the context of child rearing practices.

The task of resolving infantile fixations is partially psychotherapeutic, partially — taking the long term view — social and educational with the aim of revising the attitudes of parents and other authorities towards children, so that the next generation can be less burdened by infantile conflicts than ours. The latter task will entail working for a more ego-promoting type of upbringing, an upbringing characterized by consideration for and acceptance of the child's emotional needs and emerging will-power. Such consideration does not mean subordination to the child's wishes and demands. Many of the desires of a child will often be injurious to others or to himself. In many situations frustration is inevitable. But the environmental attitude towards the child's reaction to frustrations is of decisive importance. An ego-promoting type of upbringing does not mean over-protection of the child. An over-indulgent and over-protective upbringing is probably just as frustrating and non-gratifying from the child's point of view as openly authoritarian pressure. It does, however, mean full acceptance of the child's temper and anger when its wishes are blocked; and it also means that an attempt is made to prevent destructive actions by accepting aggressive manifestations. In the explanation of war and international conflicts, this latter hypothesis has been especially promoted by Durbin and Bowlby (29).

Recent Empirical Findings

The relationships assumed to exist between attitudes towards outgroups, personality dynamics, and childhood influences have in later years attracted considerable research interest. The number of investigations is still, however, fairly small, and the empirical results far from unambiguous, due mainly to the severe methodological problems which are encountered in this area.

Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford demonstrate empirically that there seems to be a correlation between ethnocentric attitudes and perception of one's own childhood (3). Without denying the significance of this finding, obviously those investigations which have attempted to obtain completely independent measures of the respondent's childhood situation call for special attention.

By concentrating on mothers of two extreme groups of children having respectively strong and weak ethnocentric attitudes, Gough, Harris, Martin and Edwards find a more authoritarian attitude towards child rearing among mothers of the most ethnocentric children (52). In an earlier investigation by Frenkel-Brunswik of the relationship between children's ethnocentrism and their family background, the same viewpoint is emphasized, namely, that "warmer, closer, and more affectionate relationships prevail in the homes of the unprejudiced children." (42, p. 236).

Unquestionably the most extensive investigation which has been undertaken so far, concerning the effect of different forms of child-rearing, is Whiting and Child's cross cultural comparison of approximately fifty different primitive societies (153). They start with the assumption that all children, regardless of their cultural setting, develop behavioural patterns which any society would attempt to modify. They assume this to be true of behavioural patterns having their basis in oral, anal and sexual needs, and in needs for dependency and aggressiveness. With regard to each of these behavioural systems they find it feasible to refer to different degrees of "severity of socialization". Consequently they can distinguish between five different areas of child training. They also assume that a specific form of socialization in these different areas is a prerequisite for the maintenance of certain social institutions within a given society.

On the basis of quantitative evaluations of available empirical materials from the field of cultural anthropology, they find a positive correlation between forms of child-rearing and predominant conceptions of the causation of sickness, and between forms of child-rearing and the tendency to perceive the environment as hostile and threatening.

In those societies which generally have the strictest child-rearing practices, they find the most widespread tendency to attribute to other humans or spirits the responsibility for producing sickness. Attitudes towards the child's aggressive impulses seem to be of special importance in this connection. Whiting and Child conclude that their results confirm the existence of projection mechanisms, and that "fear of others" is connected with specific forms of child-rearing.

The work of Whiting and Child can be criticized on various points; but it is nevertheless noteworthy in its attempt to make quantifications in a field which has so far mainly been reserved for qualitative reflections. In this connection we may mention, for example, the works of

Mead and Kardiner, and Erikson's penetrating and impressive analysis of two American Indian tribes, the Sioux and Yurok (31, 77, 103).

One aspect of Whiting and Child's work invokes our attention; their attempt to distinguish between various infantile behavioural patterns or areas of child-rearing. Quite often it seems to be assumed that severity of socialization is a general factor — that, for example, information about forms of punishment provides a sufficient basis for making a judgement about forms of child-rearing, and that the condemnation or rejection of one type of drive is highly correlated with rejection of other types.

Whiting and Child find practically no correlation, however, between severity of socialization in different areas, apart from "dependency" and "orality". Their results suggest that on the whole it is untenable to say that one primitive society is generally more severe in its form of socialization than others. The fact that there is little correlation between severity towards various types of infantile behavioural patterns from one society to another, obviously does not imply that there is a corresponding independence within each individual society. It is quite possible that parents within one and the same society may be relatively more or less severe or tolerant in relation to the existing cultural child-rearing norms; while these norms are without internal consistency.

On the basis of their cross cultural data Whiting and Child also attempted to arrive at an evaluation of the relative severity of socialization in various areas among the societies studied. Although these evaluations may be rather unreliable, it is nevertheless interesting to note that they find on the average the most pronounced severity of socialization with regard to infantile aggression. Among the areas examined they arrive at the following rank order: aggression, dependency, sexuality, orality, anality. For the sake of comparison, they make a similar evaluation of child-rearing practices in typical American middle-class families. Here they find strikingly more severe cleanliness training. The rank-order is: anality, aggression, sexuality, orality, dependency.

It is extremely difficult to draw any definitive conclusions concerning the consistency of child-rearing practices in our society. Nor do we have any reliable data on the prevalence of adherence to liberal or authoritarian child-rearing principles in general.

The results of several interview investigations undertaken at the Institute for Social Research in Oslo do indicate that authoritarian

attitudes towards child-rearing are very widespread even today. Out of a large, representative sample of the adult population of Oslo and vicinity comprising over 500 persons, 67 % in 1951 were partially or completely in agreement with the statement that "It is just as important to teach children order and cleanliness, as it is to give them love" (10). In an investigation in 1953 of a comparatively representative sample of 300 Norwegian elementary school teachers, 75 % were in general agreement with the statement that "The most important thing a child should learn is obedience to his parents", and as many as 93 % were in agreement with the statement that "Nowadays parents give their children much too much freedom" (8).

A Norwegian Gallup report from 1947 states that out of a large nation-wide sample of parents, 48 % declared that they had at some time given their children corporal punishment. In a corresponding Swedish investigation of the previous year, approximately 60 % declared themselves in favour of corporal punishment, and 48 % adherents of the idea that children should be brought up to obey their parents absolutely without further explanation (136).

Obviously we should be careful about drawing direct inferences concerning actual behaviour patterns from marginal percentages, adherence to verbal formulations or from information concerning corporal punishment exclusively.

That traditional authoritarian ways of child rearing are still predominant in the Scandinavian countries is however further indicated by Waal's study of Danish school children in 1950 (152). This study attempted to clarify to what extent "normal" children are normal, in the sense of free from neurotic conflicts, and to what extent a connection exists between the personality structure of children and anamnestic data concerning the form of upbringing applied by their parents.

As "normal material", 78 school children were chosen from alphabetical lists of pupils who, according to their teachers' evaluation, did not show palpable nervous symptoms. Each child was examined by the Rorschach Test, the WSP (a muscular tension test developed by Waal (59)), and a psychiatric observation interview. At the time of these examinations the children's parents were interviewed. On the basis of the interview material Waal asserts that only approximately 16 % of the children had received a consistently non-authoritarian upbringing. On the basis of her diagnostic data she further asserts that only 14.1 % of the "normal material" could be designated as approximately or completely healthy. Among the remainder,

clearly neurotic conflicts were attributed to 56.4 %, and 29.5 % expressed emotional problems. As criteria of mental health, Waal uses the degree of self-representation and self-realization, the ability to experience pleasure, the possession of unimpaired emotional contact, security and plastic adaptability. The group having clearly neurotic conflicts is designated as "statistically normal". Their social adaptability is intact and their neurotic conflicts are effectively compensated; but this very compensation impedes full productivity, and emotional variation and development.

Waal's findings support the genetic proposition of a relationship between personality structure and childhood influences. In the group of approximately or completely healthy children, 80 %, according to the parents' information, received a consistently non-authoritarian upbringing; while the corresponding percentage for the remainder of the sample was 6 %. In the groups which, according to the parents, received a more or less authoritarian upbringing, 3 % were found to be approximately or completely healthy, while the corresponding number for the group having a free upbringing was 67 %.

Waal's study can be criticized on various points. The criteria used to designate personality structure and types of upbringing are rather ambiguous, the number of subjects rather small, and no specific measure of precaution seems to have been taken to secure an independent scoring of the two sets of data. In spite of these obvious shortcomings we think Waal's results are worth mentioning. They at least express the opinion of an experienced psychiatrist concerning the frequencies of psychodynamic conflicts among children in our culture; that such conflicts are not found exclusively among "psychiatric cases", and that the percentage of children who are completely psychodynamically integrated is fairly small.¹

¹ Waal indicates that it may seem sensational and alarming that as many as 86 % of a normal sample of children show neurotic conflicts. In a wider sense, however, she finds the number not unexpectedly high, if one takes into account the frequency of psychosomatic disorders in our culture. In a recent Swedish investigation of a representative sample of 220 boys in Stockholm it was found that only 21% could be classified as without having any nervous symptoms or behavioural problems (76a). We also want to stress here some strikingly similar percentages from quite a different field, namely, the extent of racial prejudice in the United States. In an investigation of a middle class sample, extreme, almost violent antisemitism was found in 16 % of the sample, while only 10 % seemed to be free of prejudice against Jews (5, p. 405). In another investigation of war veterans somewhat more tolerant attitudes towards Jews were found, while on the other hand attitudes towards Negroes showed striking agreement with the above figures: 16 % extremely anti-Negro and 8 % without prejudice (5, p. 77).

In the preceding pages we have dealt with the Latency Hypothesis mainly as a genetic proposition. A series of investigations, strongly inspired by Freud's views, have been undertaken in recent years to clarify the relationship between attitudes towards outgroups and latent reaction tendencies, without paying attention to genetic considerations. In what follows we will in particular attempt to discuss a methodological question pertinent to studies of this type.

The most comprehensive study of the Latency Hypothesis (as a dynamic proposition), is the investigation by Adorno *et al.* (3). An elucidation of the relationship between attitudes towards outgroups and deeper reaction tendencies is attempted here by means of questionnaires, clinical interviewing and projective methods. In spite of the breadth and methodological versatility of the investigation, it gives no conclusive confirmation of the validity of the Latency Hypothesis.

A large part of this investigation consists of a thorough comparison between two extreme groups with regard to racial prejudice and negative attitudes towards outgroups. On the basis of clinical interview data, Frenkel-Brunswik asserts that these two extreme groups show a significant difference in personal aggressiveness. In general, ethnocentric people seem to be much more diffuse in their personal expression of aggression; in these individuals, aggression seems to be more ego-alien and unintegrated. Practically the same sample of persons who were interviewed were also investigated by means of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). On the whole, the data indicated that the extreme group of men having the least aggressive attitude towards outgroups were marked by the strongest need for aggression. In the spontaneous stories of this group, the hero was most often aggressive. On the other hand, the most ethnocentric group showed a greater tendency to describe external objects as aggressive. However, when these men ascribed aggressive behaviour to the hero, this behaviour was more intense, of a more primitive and explosive character; and it was usually immediately condemned, or the stories ended with the hero's punishment for his aggression.

The primary reason why it is so difficult to draw any definite conclusion from the TAT analysis is that we have no sure knowledge of which behavioural level the test has tapped, whether the non-ethnocentric group's greater need for aggression expresses a stronger latent need or stronger manifest reaction tendencies. In the light of the interview results the test seems to have measured relatively manifest

tendencies. If this is the case, the results suggest that many people having extremely strong ethnocentric attitudes are not capable, even in an ordinary projective test, of acknowledging their aggressiveness, but are inclined to transfer such tendencies to the environment. Nor are the interview results free from sources of error. It has been maintained that the interviewers' previous acquaintance with the respondents' attitude towards outgroups may easily have influenced the interviewing process, and thereby indirectly the coding work which followed.

In an investigation by Mussen a significant correlation is found between latent aggressiveness and racial prejudice towards Negroes (116). Mussen too uses TAT in order to measure latent aggressiveness. He finds the greatest "need for aggression" among the most prejudiced; but he also finds that such needs do not exercise unlimited power. Quite often there is a considerable fear of aggression side by side with the aggressive need. The hero in the stories of the most prejudiced people is frequently exposed to aggression from the environment, and usually such aggression is a revenge and retaliation for the hero's own aggressive actions. "These findings," writes Mussen, "support the displaced aggression theory of prejudice." In this connection Mussen points out that no correlation whatsoever could be found between prejudice against Negroes and manifest everyday aggression.

In an investigation by Lindzey comparisons are made with regard to latent aggressiveness in two groups having respectively strong and weak racial prejudice (94). In contrast to Mussen, Lindzey finds no reliable correlation between racial prejudice and the need for aggression, judged by TAT.

Besides TAT, Lindzey also employs Rosenzweig's Picture-Frustration Study. This method does not show any decided differences between the two extreme groups either. Lindzey also refers to an unpublished investigation by Levinson and Strelec. Here too Rosenzweig's frustration test was used, and again no correlation was found between attitudes towards outgroups and personal reaction tendencies.

The latter investigation increases the confusion still more since Helfant, using the same method, has found a positive correlation between personal aggressiveness and aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs (65).

The difference between the result of the TAT analysis in Mussen's and Lindzey's investigations may be due to the fact that the TAT

has not measured the same level of personality in these two studies. Likewise the difference between Lindzey's and Helfant's results may be due to the same fact, i.e. to shortcomings in the P-F method. All the results of investigations made so far concerning the relationship between attitudes towards outgroups and latent reaction tendencies, are to a certain extent of questionable validity because it has not been sufficiently clarified from which level of behaviour the data have been gathered.

Thus we may conclude this section by indicating the urgent need for further research as far as the Latency Hypothesis is concerned.

At this point it is necessary to emphasize that the Latency Hypothesis says nothing about the effect of more situationally-conditioned psychological phenomena, such as everyday frustrations and feelings of insecurity in regard to the future. Neither does the hypothesis take into account the effect of different personal values, interests and knowledge of foreign relations. All these factors are also encompassed by an individual's personality. They will certainly be related in a way to a person's psychodynamic structure; but they will also reflect the external social conditions under which the individual is living, in the same way fundamentally as his psychodynamic structure may be assumed to be determined partly by his psychosomatic constitution, partly by those social conditions to which he was exposed in early childhood.¹

In the following sections we will discuss briefly some further hypotheses concerning the relationship between various psychological characteristics and attitudes towards foreign affairs. In connection with each hypothesis we will indicate some genetic aspects. In so doing we will not be able to avoid some repetition.

C. *The Frustration Hypothesis*

It has been maintained that a one-sided concentration on structural personality factors overlooks the significance of more situationally determined factors. The importance of current frustrations has been particularly stressed by several scholars.

By experimental methods it has been demonstrated that frustration often evokes aggression, and that aggressive tendencies which are denied expression towards a frustrating object will often be direc-

¹ By the term psychosomatic constitution we here refer to "the sum total of the biological-psychological characteristics of the child at birth" (cf. 21, p. 6).

ted to other objects. The same might be the case if the person experiencing frustration is not aware of the true source of the frustration and fails to identify what should be attached. In both instances we are dealing with a displacement of aggression, in the first case with a defensive response, in the second case, with what might actually be an adaptive reaction. Both types of displacements may take the form of aggressive attitudes towards outgroups.

The view that stress and frustration might cause aggressive international attitudes has been presented by Leighton, among others:

“The question of a nation’s potential for aggression . . . is a critical matter . . . when certain stresses exceed the threshold that can be tolerated, one common result is active hostility . . . If this sequence constitutes a universal principle of human behavior, then the reduction of stress throughout the world becomes one of the essential steps toward peace.” (90, p. 106).

The results of several empirical investigations provide considerable support for such a viewpoint. It has been demonstrated experimentally that the blocking of current personal needs and wishes may strengthen existing racial prejudices (105). Likewise, it has been pointed out that for several years a high positive correlation existed between the price of cotton and the number of Negro lynchings in the southern United States (81).

On the other hand several investigations have found no significant correlation between level of income and racial prejudice in the United States (12, 18). The decisive factor does not seem to be what income a person has, but how dissatisfied or disappointed he is with his level of income. Campbell has thus found a correlation between dissatisfaction with one’s own economic situation and negative attitudes towards Jews; and Bettelheim and Janowitz have found a corresponding relationship between racial prejudice and downward socio-economic mobility. Bettelheim, Janowitz and Shils conclude on the basis of their empirical investigations that “ethnic tolerance is not as closely related to apparent or objective barriers, or frustrations, as it is to individually or subjectively defined frustrations.” (11, p. 323).

We shall describe the assumption of a connection between individual frustrations and attitudes towards foreign affairs, the *Frustration Hypothesis*.

The experience of frustration will depend upon various conditions. It will depend upon objective obstacles and hindrances and also upon individual predispositions. The same obstacle or threat will be experi-

enced differently by different people. In general, different people will have varying degrees of tolerance of frustration. The greater the uniformity characterizing the purely external conditions, the more likely is it to assume a decisive importance for this personality factor. Since tolerance of frustration furthermore may be assumed to be related to a person's endurance, his ability to see alternative solutions, and to solve problems — in brief, to his whole emotional and intellectual maturity, and thus his psychodynamic integration, we should, according to the Latency Hypothesis, expect a positive correlation between individuals' tolerance of frustration and their attitudes towards international questions. The fact that this is the case is indirectly supported by empirical data. In an experiment Lindzey found that ethnocentric students had less tolerance of frustration and simultaneously less ability to channelize aggression spontaneously towards relatively close objects than non-ethnocentric students (93).

The above experiment has been frequently cited in recent textbooks on group prejudice (e. g. 5, 139). Allport interprets the low tolerance of frustration in the most ethnocentric students as an expression of lack of inhibition and tendencies towards infantile anger — at the expense of the ability to plan ahead and to take a “philosophical attitude”. A low tolerance of frustration can however also be interpreted to mean that genuine infantile anger has been permanently blocked; while a “philosophical attitude” on the other hand may represent a character defence originally derived from such a blocking. We will not examine these questions more thoroughly at this point.

We began this chapter by pointing out the possible significance of current everyday frustrations. There is reason to ask how much importance can be ascribed to current blockings compared with dynamic personality factors where the inducement of frustration is concerned. It is of course impossible to give any definite answer to such a question. Its importance will most probably vary with different blockings and different personality structures. We shall deal with this question further in a later chapter. Here we only want to stress the hypothetical effect of everyday individual frustrations, whatever their source.

D. *The Insecurity Hypothesis*

Along with frustration, personal insecurity — fear of future blockings of personal needs and desires — has been considered an important factor in connection with attitudes towards foreign affairs.

At the international level one can frequently come across people who bear strong desires for immediate decisions. Such desires have been described as an "Armageddon complex". "At its core seems to lie the drama of the *show-down*, in which the forces of good finally clash on the field of battle with the forces of evil", writes Farber (38). The cause of such a complex is not to be found, he thinks, in the potential enemy or in the external international situation, nor yet in rational considerations or evaluations. Thus in an empirical investigation Farber found no correlation between an Armageddon complex towards Russia, i. e. the desire for an immediate show-down even at the risk of all-out war, and current subjective moods, nor with anti-Communist attitudes in general. On the other hand he found a positive correlation with expectations of an unsatisfying personal life in the next few years (38).

We will call this assumption of a relationship between personal insecurity and attitudes towards foreign affairs the *Insecurity Hypothesis*. This point of view has been maintained by Morgenthau, among others, as well as Farber. "The greater the stability of society and the sense of security of its members", writes Morgenthau "the smaller are the chances for collective emotions to seek an outlet in aggressive nationalism and *vice versa*" (107, p. 76).

The Insecurity Hypothesis, as the Frustration Hypothesis, says in itself nothing about the conditions which create insecurity and frustration respectively.

Morgenthau juxtaposes security and social stability.

On the basis of comparable opinion polls in 1948 in seven different countries Buchanan and Cantril have worked out a National Security Index (17). They find considerable variations between countries. In the sense of confidence in the future, feeling secure enough to make future plans, they find the greatest security in Mexico. Next come Australia, the United States, Norway, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, France and Germany. From these findings it seems that personal security is related to access to food and other socio-economic conditions. Earlier studies of the psychological effect of unemployment definitely suggest that economic chaos and social uncertainty have an influence on personal security (81).

Granted the effect of external social conditions we also have to consider the possible effect of dynamic personality factors. First some words concerning the psychological consequences of personal insecurity in everyday life.

It has been maintained that insecurity, in the sense of fear of future blocking of one's needs and desires, will affect an individual's ability to set himself goals which are adequately related to existing circumstances, and his ability to fulfill his goals without too great a risk or too great an output of energy. In the former case we are dealing with the question of an adequate level of aspiration; in the latter, with the question of an adequate margin of safety.¹

An insecure person will over-evaluate the probability of experiencing disappointments and exaggerate their probable magnitude. Accordingly, an insecure person will take precautions, be overly careful, and exaggeratedly on guard. But insecurity may also be repressed; or it may lead to feelings of inevitability and fatalism, and thereby to headlong uncritical action to terminate the insecurity. Such a cleavage seems to explain Farber's results. We are dealing here with the closeness of opposites which recalls to us the characteristics of the authoritarian personality.

From the point of view of depth psychology it may be maintained that personal insecurity will always contain a psychogenetic aspect. The degree to which social conditions give rise to insecurity will be decided by character-conditioned dispositions in the individual. Thus in psychoanalytic circles stress has been laid in this connection on impressions and influences in earliest infancy; particularly, the degree to which oral needs have been frustrated or satisfied. Adequate satisfaction of oral needs has been considered to be especially decisive for the development of emotional contact, and of positive interest in external events and other persons, for receptiveness to new things, for sociability, genuine helpfulness, and optimism. The lack of such satisfaction, on the other hand, has been assumed particularly to provide the basis for feelings of worthlessness, for narcissistic self-sufficiency and withdrawal, for passive-receptive attitudes and pessimistic expectations of the future.

Our actual knowledge of the effects of oral frustrations are of course still relatively fragmentary. A great deal of research has been

¹ The term "margin of safety" was introduced by Katz at the International Congress of Psychology in Stockholm in 1951. "The margin of safety with regard to any given operation", writes Katz, "is the work done by a person in excess of the minimum required to perform the operation" (80, p. 35). In another context he continues: "It is a waste of psychophysical energy when the margin of safety is made too large, while to make it too low is to run a risk. The neurotic person works with too large a margin of safety, and he consequently exhausts his strength in an unprofitable way" (80, p. 39).

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Our actual knowledge of the effects of oral frustrations are of course still relatively fragmentary. A great deal of research has been

¹ The term "margin of safety" was introduced by Katz at the International Congress of Psychology in Stockholm in 1951. "The margin of safety with regard to any given operation", writes Katz, "is the work done by a person in excess of the minimum required to perform the operation" (80, p. 35). In another context he continues: "It is a waste of psychophysical energy when the margin of safety is made too large, while to make it too low is to run a risk. The neurotic person works with too large a margin of safety, and he consequently exhausts his strength in an unprofitable way" (80, p. 39).

done in this area in recent years, however. Goldman's findings of a statistically significant correlation between pessimism and early weaning, and between optimism and late weaning, is of great interest (50, 51). None of the correlations are particularly high, but no other result was to be expected if it is taken into consideration that weaning time alone is no reliable criterion of the degree of oral frustration. In fact, some earlier studies have indicated a curvilinear correlation between personality traits (timidity, nervousness) and time of weaning (120).

One aspect in particular of the above discussion attracts attention. Pessimistic expectations are often presumed in psychoanalytic quarters to exist side by side with a retiring and resigned attitude towards life. Thus psychodynamic conflicts will not infrequently be connected with an artificial tolerance of frustration — a pseudo-tolerance towards obstacles and difficulties — expressed in the form of an apathetic and reserved style of life. It follows from this, given that we accept the validity of the Frustration Hypothesis, that we cannot always count on finding a correlation between current outer blockings and outgroup attitudes. This fits in with the findings of Bettelheim, Janowitz and Shils that ethnic intolerance is not as closely related to objective barriers as to subjectively defined frustrations.

From the above point of view, pessimistic expectations — i. e. personal insecurity — are presumed to be related in a certain way to a person's tolerance of frustration. It follows from this that insecurity and frustration are not independent psychological phenomena.

It has been maintained that experiences of frustration and privation often show greater correlation with a person's expectations of the future than with his actual situation (37, 91). If we assume that expectations of the future often provide greater opportunity for the play of character-conditioned dispositions than experiences of frustration, we should, according to the Latency Hypothesis, expect outgroup attitudes to be more highly correlated with personal insecurity than with the experience of frustration. This was in fact demonstrated to be the case in an empirical investigation conducted by Morse and Allport (108). Here anti-semitism was found to be more highly correlated with fear of future blockings than with feelings of frustration. As regards the latter factor, no correlation was found at all, and the investigators conclude: "If those who use the frustration-aggression theory to explain anti-semitism mean frustration through conscious inner difficulties and conflicts, i. e. frustration feelings as a characteristic of personality, they are using a theory which has no support at all from our results" (108, p. 226).

The results of those investigations in existence today give no basis for writing off the importance of everyday frustrations where outgroup attitudes are concerned; but current frustrations would seem to play a subordinate role, seen in relation to personal insecurity in the face of the future as long as they are comparatively moderate in character.

We began this chapter by considering Farber's hypothesis concerning a connection between Armageddon complexes and personal insecurity. The possibility exists that the connection is more complicated than Farber seems to assume. Both factors may be determined by a third, namely the expectation of pessimistic international developments.

Most people probably have general expectations not only about being frustrated or blocked personally, but also about the future of their own nation and the possibility of its being involved in conflicts with other nations, being exposed to attack, to natural catastrophes and economic crises, being undermined by spies and foreign agents. National insecurity may possibly affect an individual's personal security as well as his attitudes towards foreign affairs.

Since the war a series of Gallup polls has been undertaken in an attempt to explore expectations in various countries concerning foreign affairs (82). These investigations have concentrated especially on expectations concerning a new war. In general they have shown marked national differences. The expectation of a new World War within 10 years thus showed a variation in 1948 from 28 % in Finland to 67 % in Australia. Other percentages were: in Italy 58 %, the United States 57 %, Canada 56 %, Norway 53 %, the Netherlands 52 %, Denmark 46 %, Sweden 36 %, and Great Britain 35 %. The variations which have been found in the same country over a period of time are of equal interest. Thus the expectation of war within 10 years showed a rise in Australia from 42 % in 1944, to 62 % in 1946, to 67 % in 1948. The expectation of war within 25 years showed a rise in the United States from 40 % in 1945, to 64 % in 1946, to 76 % in 1948.

A comparison between the ranking order above and personal security among populations in different countries as expressed in Buchanan's Index of Security does not imply any connection worth mentioning between expectations of an imminent world war and personal insecurity.

An important argument against the above point of view is that most people are so little interested in international questions that

pessimistic expectations at this level are not likely to affect their personal considerations for the future.

It may be argued that uncertainty in international questions differs in character from uncertainty in personal matters. One of the main points in Fromm's latest works is that an extensive alienation increasingly comes to characterize the relationship of modern man to social, political and international questions, and that "What causes concern and worry (in our time) is the private, separate sector of life, not the social, universal one which connects us with our fellow men" (47, p. 140).

In particular Fromm stresses two points: that there seems to be a split between personal and social feelings, and that worry in personal matters is of much greater intensity than social and national worry. The former point raises doubts as to whether any connection exists between personal and national insecurity; the latter, that if such a connection is found it is considerably more likely to represent a transfer of insecurity from personal to international matters than a transfer the opposite way. In dealing with the Generalization Hypothesis we disregarded the fact that a generalization of reaction patterns can take place from international to everyday situations. We will not thereby deny the possibility of such a generalization taking place under certain circumstances.

If we assume a similar primacy as regards personal insecurity it does not follow that a person's national insecurity is without importance for that person's reaction patterns in foreign affairs. Here we are dealing with a possible association which, however, has no direct connection with the Insecurity Hypothesis. As we have stated, this hypothesis deals solely with the effect of personal insecurity. The factors on which personal insecurity is dependent are strictly speaking irrelevant for this hypothesis.

E. *The Nationalism Hypothesis*

Nationalism has been regarded as a serious hindrance to brotherhood among nations, and efforts to reduce nationalistic attitudes have been regarded as the most important area for the promotion of peace.

Several investigations have been made in an attempt to clarify the relationship between nationalism and attitudes towards out-groups. In an American investigation it was shown that groups having extremely nationalistic attitudes are also extreme in their approval of war (149). In another study, a high positive correlation was found

between patriotism and negative attitudes towards minority groups (3); and in a third study there was found a high positive correlation between nationalism and various forms of anti-semitism (108). The latter investigation, by Morse and Allport, concludes that:

“National involvement is by far the most important factor associated with anti-semitism. This is true both because of the size of its hostility correlation and the fact that it, alone, stands independently as a cause of discrimination and exclusion . . .” (108, p. 232).

Nationalism has been defined by Stagner as “a focussing of attention, drive and positive emotion on the symbols of the nation” (148). The greater the importance attributed to the nation, the more nationalism there will be. A person may to a greater or lesser extent relate his own desires and needs to his nation, be interested in, defend and feel identified with it. Various aspects of nationalism have been emphasized in this connection. Morse distinguishes six such aspects: 1) identification of one’s own interests with the national military forces, 2) identification of one’s own interests with national economic interests, 3) justification of traditional national policies, 4) the perception of one’s own nation as more than its individual citizens, 5) emotional identification (empathy with national victories and defeats), and 6) the perception of one’s own nation as the most important group to which one belongs.

Nationalism will always involve more than simply interest in political and national questions. There must be a certain devotion to national symbols and a certain loyalty to national institutions. The loyalty factor has been emphasized by many as an explanation of the enormous power which nationalism can exert on the behaviour of individual persons. National loyalty need not be connected with illusions of national grandeur and superiority; nevertheless such illusions have often been regarded as a characteristic feature of modern nationalism (148).

It has been maintained that people’s attitudes towards their own nation will determine, to a decisive degree, what position they will take in situations where the nation’s interests are threatened. Even the experiencing of threats and the identifying of national interests will be determined by attitudes towards one’s own nation. We find a parallel in the connection between people’s self-perception and their ways of reacting towards other people in everyday relationships. For example, a positive correlation has been found experimentally in this area between the feeling of pride and the tendency towards threat-

oriented reactions, and between narcissism and aggressive tendencies (130, 131).

We will denote the supposition of a connection between nationalism and attitudes towards foreign affairs as the *Nationalism Hypothesis*. The factors on which nationalism depends are irrelevant in this connection. In spite of its irrelevance we shall deal below with a few of the main viewpoints which have been presented concerning the causes of nationalism.

In our discussion of the Latency Hypothesis we stated that rejective attitudes towards outgroups and idealizing attitudes towards one's group have been regarded as aspects of one and the same personality syndrome. From this angle nationalism represents no single independent causal factor in aggressive international attitudes. This point of view is, however, far from generally accepted.

Some social scientists think that there need not always be any special personality predisposition for a person to be characterized by strong nationalistic attitudes. This idea has been emphasized in Queener's works (122, 123, 124), and also seems to be implicit in Morse's remarks concerning the relationships between nationalism and anti-semitism in the United States (108). Given that no relationship exists between nationalism and psychodynamic factors, we may still of course assume a connection between nationalism and international reaction patterns.

In psychoanalytic quarters, national glorification has been regarded as a compensation for deep-seated feelings of personal inadequacy and helplessness. Identification with national symbols may cancel out the individual's feeling of inferiority and insignificance. The more oppressive the inferiority feeling, the more important it will be that the nation is perceived as maintaining ideal standards, that it is strong and powerful, unsurpassable and unassailable.

Another viewpoint which has been maintained in psychoanalytic quarters is that there is a connection between attitudes towards parents and national symbols (29, 87). It has been pointed out that we find indications of this in everyday language. Terms such as "Fatherland", "Mother Country", "Old Mother Norway", are examples of this transfer of concepts. The fact that emotional displacements also occur is less generally heeded, but is just as evident.¹

¹The relationship between national idealization and aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs has been assumed to operate in the following way: The greater the needs for national idealization, e.g. the more personal feelings of inferiority, the more disposed will a person be to block and rationalize all impressions

Social psychologists have also taken an interest in this problem. Thus Stagner has shown, by means of standardized attitude-scales, that among American students there seems to be a negative correlation between nationalism and opposition to one or both parents (147). Nationalistic students in general revealed themselves to be more identified with their parents, less disposed to emphasize family conflicts, and more satisfied with their own childhood, than students having more international attitudes.

From a depth-psychological perspective, a pronounced and one-sided emphasis on family harmony is often regarded as a superficial attitude, a defence-mechanism against unacceptable aggressive impulses towards parents. Frenkel-Brunswik especially has become the spokesman for this view. In one of her investigations she demonstrates that persons having strong ethnocentric attitudes are considerably more apt to be characterized by conventional idealization of their parents than persons having weak ethnocentric attitudes. The latter seem, on the contrary, to be more characterized by independence, objective evaluation, open repudiation, or genuine love (3). A stereotyped idealization of parents often seems to cover underlying hostility and feelings of having been deceived.¹

It is interesting to recall that Freud considered displacements valuable for unity and solidarity among group members. He regarded the Oedipus conflict as an especially important determinant of attitudes towards family. All children are presumed to pass through an Oedipal phase, a developmental stage in which sexual wishes and impulses are directed towards the parental object of the opposite sex, while jealousy and hate (death wishes) are directed towards the parental object of the same sex. The way in which this phase is resolved will be decisive for the individual's later relationship to his parents.

which do not fit his ideal image. A distance between ideal and reality slowly emerges, and this discrepancy calls for an explanation: The illusion of national grandeur and superiority leads to illusions of persecution. Consequently the person becomes motivated to regard outsiders as hostile, aggressive, wicked people, saboteurs, or directly conspiratorial.

¹ Not only was a relation between ethnocentrism and idealization of family and parents found in this investigation. Of great interest is the finding that self-idealization and self-glorification seemed to be predominant characteristics of many ethnocentric persons, and along with self-glorification on the conscious level, unconscious self-contempt and feelings of insignificance. Thus, in speaking of the compensation of inferiority feelings by nationalistic attitudes, it is necessary to make an important reservation: Very often personal inferiority feelings will be concealed and warded off in compensatory ways in manifest behaviour.

The conflict may be effectively repressed through identification with the parents, preferably with the parental object of the same sex; and the formerly destructive and sexual impulses may be replaced by sensitive and tender object-relations. Or the repression may be defective, resulting in a permanent fixation to the Oedipal phase.

It can be maintained that Freud's concept of identification is too narrow, that it implicitly suggests subordination to the parental authority and system of values, and the need to be taken care of by the parents, and that one finds a pronounced tendency towards ethnocentric attitudes in people characterized by just such identifications. It has been stated that the Oedipus conflict can be resolved without drastic repressions, that discharge of infantile tendencies may lay the basis for a constructive personality formation in which sexuality and aggression are wholly integrated with the rest of the personality, and that identification will not always have the character of a defence mechanism. Thus Frenkel-Brunswik consistently distinguishes between ego-alien and genuine ego-integrated identification (3), and Lair between "defensive" and "developmental" identification (110). Further, it has been maintained that the Oedipus conflict as we know it in our culture is not a universal phenomenon (100), that its form is determined by the dominating family structure, that the conflict itself is culturally determined, and finally that children's sexual impulses towards their parents are caused by the fact that their spontaneous and natural sexual activity has not been channelized in the direction of other children.

The latter point of view has been especially stressed by Reich (125). He does not deny that an unresolved Oedipus conflict is often a conspicuous characteristic of many neurotics. He gives Freud full credit for having emphasized this. But according to him, the Oedipus conflict itself is an indication of a previous blockage. If infantile sexuality is given free expression, Reich maintains, children will not become fixated upon their parents, nor will they later be receptive to propaganda which emphasizes national grandeur and superiority.

Thus from a depth-psychological angle nationalism has been regarded as caused by psychodynamic conflicts, and especially by Oedipal and early-genital conflicts.¹

¹ As previously mentioned (footnote p. 62) national idealization may sometimes lead to illusions of persecution. Such illusions, e.g. paranoid attitudes, have in psychoanalytic quarters been related to repressed homosexuality. The dynamics behind such attitudes are said to be, among other things, a rationalization of one's

One point of view which has been given a certain currency is that the tendency towards authoritarian submission does not necessarily lead to nationalism. A pre-condition for the direction of idealization to national units is that these units culturally and traditionally have a customary place as objects of identification. The need for submission and idealization can lead to specific forms for internationalism, to a desire for an authoritarian world government, or in the direction of a specific national group — be it a political party or a trade union. Whether the nation will appear as a suitable authority will depend upon what ideas are prominent in a person's social milieu and among his circles of friends, and upon the content of the influences the person has been exposed to through education, films, books, and newspapers. It must be assumed that the nation's actual strength and international power position are also essential factors in this connection.

We find this viewpoint in the works of certain authors who have a pronounced psychoanalytic orientation. These writers stress that most people in our culture have a strong need to submit to authority, and that it is impossible to reduce nationalistic attitudes unless new objects of identification are simultaneously provided. Thus Durbin and Bowlby consider the formation of an authoritarian world government as the most effective means, in the short run, against international aggression (29).

It has also been maintained that it is not so much the need for submission which causes nationalism as the overwhelming feeling of living in an insecure and dangerous world. From this point of view nationalism does not represent a submission, but rather an active attempt to create security and stability. It is consequently not the nation as a power which attracts interest, but the nation as an institutional system, something solid and unchangeable.

A distinction parallel to that between different forms of identification has been suggested between two types of nationalism, according to which national symbols, which aspects of the nation, are dominant — whether symbols of power and prestige, or humanitarian values occupy the focus of attention (9). It has also been indicated that national identification may express a feeling of human solidarity based on knowledge concerning the decisive forces in the world, and

own hate, created through a reaction-formation towards homosexual impulses. These impulses, on the other hand, have been regarded as the result of pregenital fixations, especially as the result of early-genital conflicts.

a belief in the possibility of influencing one's own fate, and that such identification may represent an integrated investment of affect (129). It follows from this point of view that nationalism is not necessarily correlated with impaired psychodynamic integration. Again we are faced with a line of reasoning implying that nationalism is not dependent upon any particular psychogenetic disposition.

F. *The Knowledge Hypothesis*

A short time ago it was reported in the Norwegian press that an investigation of a random sample of Americans had shown that only 30 % were able to name the capital of the Soviet Union, and that as many as 70 % of the women in the sample did not know the name of the Soviet Prime Minister. The result is not nearly as sensational as one might think. Other American investigations have indicated widespread apathy and ignorance amongst the majority where foreign affairs are concerned. We may here mention one example: An attempt was made to express Anglo-American aims during the last war in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. A number of investigations of people's opinions and reactions to these declarations of principle took place in the United States during the war. Bruner describes the result in the following way:

"Our attitude toward the great "peace documents" of the war is symptomatic . . . Take, for example, the case of the Atlantic Charter. With the rest of the free world, America was thrilled by the epochal meeting at sea. It had élan. It captured our fancy. A few weeks after the meeting, in August 1941, some three-quarters of the American people knew that a meeting had taken place and knew that a Charter of some sort had emerged . . . Five months later, polls discovered that less than a quarter of the American public claimed they had ever heard of the Atlantic Charter. Tragically, only one in three of the enlightened few could name even one provision." (16, p. 28).

This is an example from a nation with a high average level of education. There are many indications that public interest in declarations of principle is not strikingly greater in the Scandinavian countries. The result of a Swedish opinion survey in 1952 indicates that 61 % of the Swedish population read all or most about crime and accidents in their newspapers, 43 % all or most of the gossip and stories, 39 % all or most of the home news, and only 30 % all or most of the foreign news (150). As many as 68 % state that they have heard or read of the Security Council of the United Nations, but only 27 % can give the names of three member countries. As many as 82 % state

that they have heard or read of the Atlantic Pact, and 53 % that they have heard or read of the Cominform, but only 25 % can give the names of three member countries in the latter organization. Roughly speaking, about a quarter to a fifth of the Swedish population would seem to be fairly interested in foreign affairs. This is indirectly supported by other data from the same survey: 58 % state that they seldom or never discuss the international situation, while this occurs once a week in the case of 21 %.

Large sums have been invested in educational activities attempting to increase popular acquaintance with foreign nations — based on the notion that international knowledge will create positive and understanding attitudes. The assumption of a connection between international knowledge and attitudes towards foreign affairs may be referred to as the *Knowledge Hypothesis*. Scarcely any single hypothesis about the relationship between attitudes towards outgroups and individual traits has attracted so much attention, and several empirical investigations have been made in an attempt to test its validity.

In 1937 Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb wrote:

“... our rather meager present evidence suggests that those who know most about other races and peoples tend to have favourable attitudes about them ... ‘liberal’ attitudes tend to be found among those most adequately informed on relevant issues” (112, p. 1001).

Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb’s suppositions have been supported by later investigations. Allport, summarizing some of the existing literature up to 1954, states:

‘... we may safely conclude that knowledge of other groups derived through free communication is as a rule correlated with lessened hostility and prejudice’ (5, p. 226).

A significant correlation between knowledge and friendly attitudes obviously does not indicate whether knowledge leads to friendliness or friendliness to knowledge. It has for example been asserted in regard to attitudes towards communism in the United States, that the latter relationship is not a rare occurrence (137).¹

¹ Allport makes a certain reservation by stating “as a rule correlated”. It may be assumed that personal contact with members of outgroups generally will increase the amount of knowledge a person has of other groups. Consequently, much expectation has been aroused concerning the effect of personal contact in reducing intergroup tensions. Research studies have shown, however, that personal contact (and thus probably enhanced knowledge) does not always produce equally positive results. Under certain circumstances personal contact may be of practically no importance or may actually increase hostility between groups. We will return to this question later on in our discussion of the Reference Group Hypothesis.

Regarding attitudes towards international matters, it has been pointed out that knowledge is sometimes more apt to cause insecurity than friendliness, and that the inverse relationship between knowledge and hostility does not tend to occur in extreme cases of hostility. Grace and Neuhaus, for instance, conclude by saying that: "... hostility varies inversely with knowledge to the point of least knowledge and directly with knowledge thereafter" (57, p. 544).

Cooper's investigations are of special interest in this connection (25, 26). When, like Grace and Neuhaus, he takes self-ascribed knowledge — presumed knowledge — as his point of departure, his results show the very same tendency. Cooper also finds a clearly curvilinear correlation, a clear cut tendency among his subjects to have more presumed knowledge about nations towards which they felt strongly hostile than about nations towards which they felt relatively indifferent.

Cooper provides a measure of objective knowledge as well as presumed knowledge. The correlation between objective knowledge and hostility turns out to be considerably less than in the former case, and attains no statistical significance. There is still a tendency towards a curvilinear correlation; but this tendency is much less pronounced.

The lower correlation between hostility and objective knowledge indicates, according to Cooper's interpretation, that attitudes towards international matters represent a type of ego-involved attitudes. To the extent that we are dealing with non-ego-involved attitudes, Cooper maintains, the connection between subjective and objective knowledge, and between knowledge and sympathy will be complete. To support his view, he presents correlations between knowledge and preferences for various sports, showing an approximately one-to-one relationship.

As mentioned, Allport not only emphasizes the amount of knowledge, but the way in which it has been acquired. It is not unreasonable to assume that knowledge acquired through free communication has generally a more modifying effect on ego-involved attitudes. According to this view, we should expect to find a closer connection between international knowledge and attitudes towards foreign affairs in those cases where these attitudes satisfy less deeply-rooted personality needs.

The Knowledge Hypothesis can be interpreted as a claim that knowledge about one's own and other nations leads to increased international understanding, and through such understanding, to more

constructive attitudes towards international questions. But this theory can also be regarded from a more limited depth-psychological angle: international knowledge will not as a matter of course create positive and constructive attitudes, but may contribute exclusively to keeping character-conditioned aggressive and destructive tendencies under control. International relations will for many people represent a relatively unstructured situation. Knowledge about international relations will lead to more structured and differentiated conceptions, and thereby to more reality-oriented attitudes.

The latter view causes us to regard knowledge of international affairs as a kind of mediating or channelizing factor, important in determining whether or not deeper layers of the personality will colour an individual's attitudes towards foreign affairs. As we mentioned earlier, Durbin and Bowlby have presented a similar view of nationalism. This issue will be developed further in the next chapter.

G. *The Channelization Hypothesis*

We have stated that both nationalism and knowledge of international affairs can be regarded as mediating or channelizing factors. The *Channelization Hypothesis* refers to a number of different viewpoints having in common the assumption that specific personality traits will have a modifying effect on the relationship between attitudes towards foreign affairs and other personality traits.

Several research scholars have indicated that all people are not related in the same psychological way to foreign policies and international questions. Hyman writes, for example:

“... the view ... that *all* individuals cathect the political and social world with energies derived from basic intrapsychic levels is to ignore the fact (documented a hundred times) that for the great masses of people the political world is too peripheral (perhaps even completely outside the psychological field) for it to *engage* the individual's deeper level of personality” (72, p. 29).

Hyman thinks there is a decisive difference especially between political leaders and ordinary people in this respect.

“... the very condition of leadership necessarily brings politics close to the man every minute of the day, and it is quite likely that leaders can therefore cathect these areas, or use these areas as tension-reducing. That is why Lasswell's early work on agitators, or psychoanalytic

descriptions of political personages, may have little relevance to explaining the politics of *ordinary* people” (72, p. 32).¹

Hyman seems to assume, in other words, that “deeper levels of personality” and “basic intrapsychic levels” will play a relatively greater role the more the person is interested in and concerned about international questions.

According to Smith’s conception, such interest leads to the involvement of personal values (141, 142). If the necessary information is available, Smith maintains, a person’s system of values will determine which aspects of a foreign nation will catch his attention and which attitudes will be dominant. A person’s attitude towards a many-sided social phenomenon will be based upon a hierarchical organization of specific attitudes. The hierarchical position of a specific attitude will be determined by its relative intensity, which in turn will be a function of the degree to which personal values are involved, and the place of these values in the person’s value-hierarchy. Economic security and personal freedom are mentioned as examples of such values.

Concretely, we would thus expect increased knowledge of international relations to lead to the increased influence of personal values on an individual’s attitudes towards foreign affairs.

To the degree that personal values are involved, Smith further maintains, the tendency towards undifferentiated wishful thinking will be correspondingly reduced. Since political leaders must be assumed to have a greater interest in foreign affairs and more knowledge about international relations than most people, we should expect less wishful thinking from them, and that “deeper levels of personality” would be kept relatively more under control.

¹ Lasswell’s viewpoint, stated briefly, is that “the dynamic of politics is to be sought in the tension level of the individuals in society”. A few quotations will illustrate this view: “Political movements derive their vitality from the displacement of private affects upon public objects, and political crises are complicated by the concurrent reactivation of specific primitive motives” (86, p. 183). “The politician displaces his private motives upon public objects, and rationalizes the displacement in terms of public advantage” (88, p. 411). Hyman may probably be completely right in stating that for most people the political world is too peripheral to engage their deeper personality levels, but this does not invalidate Lasswell’s viewpoint. Most people, in spite of not being particularly interested in political issues, nevertheless often take a stand on them, via identification with opinion leaders. Correspondingly, the motives of leaders may have great relevance for explaining public opinion. Here we only wish to recall the tremendous psychological importance which Freud ascribed to the leaders of groups. (Cf. p. 27)

This point of view is apparently the exact opposite of Hyman's. A certain amount of agreement is possible nevertheless, if we consider these views in a wider frame of reference. Smith would probably agree that in the case of persons for whom international questions are so remote that their cognitive processes are scarcely activated by them there will be no noticeable influence of "fantasy life" nor of their deeper layers of personality. If this is the case, we should, according to Smith, expect to find a *curvilinear correlation* between the influence of latent levels of personality and the degree of international knowledge.

It is possible however that Hyman, in his distinction between leaders and ordinary citizens, has been concerned not so much with knowledge, as with differences with respect to identification with national symbols and institutions. In that case, Hyman is in complete agreement with a viewpoint stressed by Stagner and others: that whenever deep loyalty to one group becomes a factor in one's judgements, logic loses ground in favour of wishful thinking (149). Political leaders must be presumed to distinguish themselves from others both with regard to national loyalty and knowledge of foreign affairs. These two factors probably have a decisive effect on tendencies towards projection and displacement of deeper layers of personality; but their effects may work in opposite directions.

A person's everyday reactions must also be assumed to have a modifying effect on the relationship between deeper personality layers and attitudes towards foreign affairs.

We have previously dealt with the hypothesis that unreleased latent aggressiveness will affect a person's attitudes towards foreign affairs. Latent aggressiveness will also influence manifest behaviour in everyday situations; but the connection may often be a very complicated one. A tendency to react aggressively in situations where an individual's security or gratification of needs is threatened does not provide any basis for judging whether latent or character-conditioned aggressiveness is present or not. A manifest aggression may be (a) "self-represented" and rational in the sense of having a direct relationship to an actual frustration, or (b) it may be overwhelmingly programmatic, or (c) have a purely "counterphobic" basis. In the latter cases we are not dealing with a really *affect-releasing* aggressiveness; in the second case at the most with a certain *alleviation of affect*, and in the third case mainly with a *provoking of affect* — in that aggress-

siveness provokes anxiety which seeks to be warded off by further aggressiveness.¹

From a psychodynamic point of view, we may refer to different forms of manifest aggression. Thus Fenichel distinguishes between genuine and neurotic (39), Reich between healthy and pathological (126), Jackson between positive and negative (75), and Allport between adaptive and neurotic aggression (5). We are not dealing here primarily with a classification according to the strength of aggression, but according to its dynamic quality.

The relationship between latent and manifest aggression will differ according to which defence mechanism characterizes an individual. In certain individuals we may find pronounced aggressiveness on the fantasy level but not in overt behaviour, in others, aggressiveness in overt behaviour but not in fantasy, and in still others, pronounced aggressiveness or lack of it in fantasy as well as in overt behaviour. Several research scholars have tried to elucidate the relationship between the strength of latent and manifest aggression. The results of these investigations suggest that no appreciable correlation exists in this area (83, 115, 134).²

If we assume that manifest aggressiveness always represents at least a certain alleviation of affect, it is reasonable to assume that — everything else being equal — a person will tend more to displace latent aggressiveness to the area of foreign affairs, the less he is able to admit and express aggression where it originates in everyday situ-

¹ That aggression can serve as a defence against aggression has long been a well-known clinical phenomenon. Etiologically, this defence-stratagem must be presumed to have its basis in a partial rejection and partial acceptance of infantile aggressiveness. For example, if parents reject an infant's oral aggressiveness (biting impulses) but simultaneously accept more peripheral forms of expression (for example, hitting, sparring and kicking), it seems that the oral aggressiveness may be repressed and displaced to the peripheral system. A later mobilization of it may, under given conditions, entail reactivation of the repressed oral impulses, and thereby an intensification of the defensive reactions.

² It has been pointed out that the relationship between latent and manifest behaviour differs with regard to different personality traits, and that it depends upon the degree to which the environment encourages or discourages the given trait. This may also be true of the same trait in different environments. Mussen and Naylor have demonstrated a significant difference in the relationship between manifest and latent aggression among respondents from middle- and working-class environments (117). In our emphasis of a characteristic lack of correlation, it should be noted that the respondents have overwhelmingly been students from an American middle-class milieu.

ations.¹ Manifest reaction tendencies towards everyday conflicts can thus be regarded as a modifying factor similar to those previously mentioned.

The lack of correlation between latent and manifest aggression brings to the fore the relationship between the Generalization Hypothesis and the Latency Hypothesis.

As we have previously mentioned, some empirical material is at hand suggesting that both displacement and generalization tendencies influence people's attitudes towards foreign affairs. This view has been strongly emphasized by Grace. On the basis of a factor-analytic study of the inter-correlations between reactions to hypothetical everyday, professional, and international verbal situations, Grace concludes:

"In some cases the control of hostility toward others in common situations results in the displacement of hostility on to other nations, while in other instances the expression of hostility toward others in common situations increases the expression of hostility toward other nations. Therefore, both the expression and repression of hostility in everyday affairs are related to the expression of hostility to other nations in international affairs. Further evidence will be necessary before we can identify the situations which elicit a specific type of behavior. At present the educator is at a loss to choose between expression and inhibition of hostility as it may affect international tensions." (56, p. 299-300).

No investigation has been made so far which can answer the question raised by Grace. Practically all empirical studies of the relationship between personality and international attitudes have been directed towards a specific personality trait, while the interplay between various personality traits has been largely neglected.² In addition there has often been a pronounced tendency among research scholars to regard the various theories as exclusive and incompatible.

¹ "From William James down to the present, various psychologists have suggested that a 'moral equivalent of war' might be found in sublimating aggressive urges . . . It has also been proposed by writers of the psychoanalytic school that individuals who release their aggression freely in their personal relationships will have less hostility to displace on to 'outgroups'." (145, p. 116). This view suggests that latent aggression — or "free-floating aggression", as it has also been called — can be drained off in different directions. If the "drainage theory" were unqualifiably tenable, we would consequently expect a high negative correlation between interpersonal and international aggressiveness.

² A prominent exception to this rule is a recent investigation conducted by Smith, Bruner and White (142 a). This investigation, based upon *intensive case studies*, attempts to clarify the relationship between international opinions and individual personality dynamics.

We have already mentioned a number of factors assumed to have an important effect on the tendency to displace latent aggressiveness to the area of foreign affairs.

If we start with the view that the Latency Hypothesis presumes, so to speak, that there is something to displace, we may assume that the Generalization Hypothesis will be the more valid, the less latent aggressiveness is present. The lack of ego-alien aggression does not imply as a matter of course that highly-differentiated or rational attitudes towards foreign affairs exist. A person's tendency towards internal consistency, towards homogeneous reactions in various situations, will probably be just as decisive, unless it is especially counteracted by other factors.

The conditions causing generalization have been much discussed among learning psychologists. It has been indicated that similarity of stimuli (cues or patterns of cues), character of rewards and non-rewards, and strength of drives, are relevant factors. Dollard and Miller distinguish between three "levels of generalization" (27). The most basic one they call *initiate stimulus generalization*, by which they refer to the fact that reinforcement of a certain response in one situation will not only increase the tendency for that situation to elicit the same response, but also the tendency for similar situations to elicit the same response, and the more so, the more similar the situations are perceived. Their second and third levels of generalization refer to the effect of *labelling*, to the fact that attaching the same label to different situations increases the amount of generalization, and that learning to label situations may mediate generalization (or discrimination) of responses.

We mentioned above the likelihood of latent aggression affecting tendencies towards generalization of reaction patterns from everyday to international situations. National loyalty and international knowledge are probably relevant factors also.¹ A person who has a strong sense of identification — a strong feeling of belonging to his nation — will probably also tend to generalize markedly. Here we are probably faced with an approximate linear correlation. The influence of international knowledge we may assume to be somewhat more complicated.

If we suppose that everyday reactions reflect personal values to a certain extent — values ascribed to various ways of reacting — we

¹ Both these factors may possibly affect the similarity of different types of stimulus situations, i.e. subjectively experienced similarity between international and everyday conflict situations.

should expect, according to Smith's line of reasoning, that a person's everyday way of reacting will be more easily generalized to the international sphere, the more information he has concerning international relations. On the other hand, it may be maintained that knowledge and information will underline the difference between everyday and international situations in such a way that we should actually expect more generalization, the less knowledge there is concerning international questions. The two views presented above may both contain a certain core of truth. In which case, we should expect a curvilinear correlation; namely tendencies towards generalization to increase with increasing as well as decreasing knowledge, and that the least tendency towards generalization will occur with moderate knowledge.

This is the exact opposite of the relationship previously assumed to exist between knowledge and displacement tendencies. If a person is unaccustomed to concerning himself with international affairs, it is not unreasonable to assume that tendencies towards generalization will be stronger than tendencies towards displacement. Probably the displacement of latent impulses presupposes a certain familiarity with international relations.

In conclusion it may be mentioned that thorough and detailed knowledge, based on a strong and genuine interest in international relations, may possibly lead to the reduction of both generalization and displacement tendencies in favour of a more independent stand towards foreign affairs.

CHAPTER 3

Social Norm Centered Theories

A. *The Reference Group Hypothesis*

The hypotheses on which we have mainly concentrated so far all maintain that a correlation exists between certain personality traits and attitudes towards international affairs. In other words, these hypotheses can be said to be personality-oriented. In recent years a good deal of criticism has been raised against considering attitudes towards international matters exclusively from this angle. It has been asserted that attitudes towards outgroups are closely connected with an individual's social adjustment, and that a person will internalize the dominant norms of those groups to which he relates himself psychologically (118, 139). According to this point of view a person's group membership rather than his personality traits will be the decisive factor.

An individual's attitudes towards outgroups, from this viewpoint, will be conformity-conditioned. The individual will accept the values and norms of his milieu. These norms not only refer to a person's actions in everyday situations, but also to the actions of his group in relation to other groups. Thus, an individual's position on international questions will reflect the ideas which are predominant in his reference group.

It has been maintained that the general and often irrational nature of attitudes towards outgroups suggests that deeper-lying psychodynamic processes are at work. This view emerges clearly in *The Authoritarian Personality*. On the other hand it has been indicated that neither generality nor irrationality necessarily indicates the presence of such conditions, but may just as well be explained by contact with

corresponding attitudes in the individual's social milieu. Thus Hyman and Sheatsley write:

“That prejudice is irrational when judged against the standard of logic or of the best available knowledge may well be true. But it by no means follows that the judgements of particular respondents are arrived at *in irrational ways* and therefore reflect the operation of underlying non-intellectual processes. To assert this is to ignore the fact that there are social conditions which define knowledge, which define what is rational, which define the information available to any individual when he makes a judgement . . . Of course, it may still be asked how the irrationality originated in the first place, but this is quite a different question from that of the origin of the person's current prejudice . . . That the degree of patterning itself, and not just the content of specific attitudes, varies with different groups, . . . supports the fact that social factors affect generality. Certainly, consistency must be explained, not in terms of the specific objects of prejudice, but as a generalized disposition within the person — but the organizing factor behind this generalized disposition may very well be societal. We are far from being inevitably thrown back on deep personality factors” (73, pp. 108-12).

We will refer to the viewpoint presented above as the *Reference Group Hypothesis*. According to this hypothesis we should expect to find a connection between an individual's attitudes towards foreign affairs and the specific standards and norms dominant in the groups to which the individual relates himself. There will not necessarily be any correlation between attitudes towards foreign affairs and various personality traits. Queener, one of the spokesmen for this hypothesis, maintains:

“For the present it seems best to assume that a variety of personality structures can implement the same (international) attitude . . . The present society offers a wide variety of attitudes which the individual may assume. Which of them the individual will assume . . . depends less upon his personality than upon the cues given him by the sources of reward and punishment” (124, p. 118).

An individual's attitudes towards international affairs will be acquired, according to Queener, by positive imitation of persons to whom prestige is ascribed, and by negative imitation of persons to whom lack of prestige is ascribed. In the latter case, the attitude-formation will often represent a special form of aggression as well.

Efforts to promote non-aggressive international attitudes should be directed, according to the Reference Group Hypothesis, at individuals' attitudes towards international politics. Questions of child-

rearing in a restricted sense, and interpersonal ways of reacting, will be of secondary importance. Really lasting changes in international attitudes would presuppose either a change of norms in a person's reference group or a change in a person's choice of reference groups. It follows from such a view that it may often be easier to produce a permanent change of attitude in a group than in an individual person, and that isolated influences in the form of films, radio programmes, lectures and newspaper articles will ordinarily have little effect (92).

In the realm of intergroup relations this view implies that personal contact will not always produce equally positive results. According to American experiences in attempting to reduce racial prejudice, the question of whether contact takes place between persons of approximately the same social and economic status seems to be of crucial importance (6, 74, 97). Generally it has been maintained that contact between members of different groups will be most effective if it involves participation as members of the same group, sharing norms encouraging such participation (139).

Whether personal contact has any effect on attitudes towards international matters has hardly been clarified at all. Here we will meet with the fact that individuals with whom a person becomes acquainted will easily be regarded as "exceptional cases", and that a person may have completely different attitudes towards a country's governmental and institutional systems and towards its citizens.¹ That personal contact may have an effect in this area as well, is nevertheless suggested by the results of Lysgaard's investigation of perceptions of the United States as reported by 200 Norwegian Fulbright grantees on their return home. Lysgaard writes:

"It is interesting to note that perception of American political institutions is connected with one's impression of the average American . . . Almost half of our Fulbright fellows found American democracy different from their expectations, and most of them were disappointed with what they found. But this disappointment affected to a lesser degree those who were pleasantly surprised with the people whom they met. This suggests that one's impression of democracy in America is connected to some extent with one's adjustment to the more limited situation of the immediate milieu of friends and acquaintances" (96, pp. 5-6).

¹ It is interesting to mention in this connection that lack of discrimination in the perception of attitudes of a foreign country's government and its people in relation to one's own nation, has been suggested as a measure of hostility towards a foreign nation (17, p. 40).

B. *The Functional Relation Hypothesis*

An objection which has constantly been directed against depth-psychological explanations of attitudes towards outgroups is that these explanations are incapable of explaining why certain outgroups become scapegoats more often than others. Different cultures seem, to a certain extent, to designate different "legitimate objects" for aggressive behaviour.¹

It can scarcely be doubted that historical events are of very great importance in this connection; but situationally determined factors may also be taken into account. Sherif has launched a viewpoint maintaining that the norms regulating relationships between groups are a product of current and past interplay between these groups. No matter how thoroughly the analysis of individual members' personality structures, it will yield insufficient evidence to explain attitudes towards outgroups. Sherif writes:

"The norms toward outgroups are primarily determined by the nature of relations between groups. As such, norms toward outgroups need not correspond to the positive or negative nature of relations practised within the ingroup. Norms followed within the ingroup may be democratic and co-operative in nature. It does not follow that norms developed toward outgroups in general will be democratic and co-operative. Depending on the nature of intergroup relations, at times the greater degree of solidarity and cooperativeness within the ingroups may mean more effective friction with outgroups ... Full realization of the fact that developing harmonious ingroup practices need not necessarily resolve intergroup friction has significant theoretical and practical implications. For one thing, this realization will lead us to put greater emphasis on conceptions of "we-ness" and "they-ness", and on functional relations between groups as such" (139, pp. 209-10).

Sherif's point of view implies the application of the frustration-aggression hypothesis to groups as reference units. It follows that the functional relationship between the groups will be of central importance. We will denote this point of view the *Functional Relation Hypothesis*.

Sherif supports this hypothesis with the results of several empirical investigations. He refers to his own study (138), and to an experimental analysis by Avigdor of the relationship between attitudes towards

¹ For that matter, this objection applies just as much to the Reference Group Hypothesis as to personality oriented theories. If we explain the choice of scapegoats on the basis of existing standards and norms, we will inexorably be forced to ask what factors develop and maintain these standards and norms.

outgroups and group interest. The latter investigation demonstrates that if two groups have incompatible goals, so that one group's goal deters or hinders the fulfilment of the other's, these groups will develop negative and hostile attitudes towards each other. If the goals of the two groups are such that fulfilment of one group's goal is dependent upon the fulfilment of the other's, the members of the groups will, on the contrary, tend to develop positive attitudes towards each other.

The importance of the functional relationship of groups can also be demonstrated in the international realm. A summary of den Hollander's study (68) of the way in which Hungarians have been perceived in Northern Europe through the ages provides a striking example:

"... for centuries after the migration of Hungarians to Central Europe they had a bad reputation among other European peoples, they were described as a horde of savage brutes ... inferior to Europeans generally ... During the 15th and 16th centuries, however, the Hungarians represented a sort of 'bastion against the Turks', and the Hungarians were now pictured as a brave, devout, and chivalrous people. By the second half of the 18th century the popularity of the Hungarian had declined and he was now portrayed as savage, lazy, egoistical, unreliable and tyrannous. This picture changed again a little later, when the Hungarian became romanticized and idealized. It seems ... that the image changes in accordance with economic and political conditions ..." (82, pp. 117-8).

Comparable studies of later years also show how attitudes towards foreign nations change with changing interests. We may mention Dudycha's investigation of changes in American students' perceptions of Germans from 1936 to 1940 (28), and Kriesberg's analysis of changes in the *New York Times*' presentation of the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1946 (85).

The Functional Relation Hypothesis implies that a person's interpersonal and international attitudes have different frames of reference. The hypothesis represents so to speak a continuation of the Reference Group Hypothesis. A person's international attitudes will be dependent on his reference group and the norms which characterize it. These norms will in turn be dependent on current international tensions as much as on historical traditions.

On the basis of such an assumption we should expect to find considerable agreement among a nation's citizens in their conceptions of various other nations, granted that for all the citizens their own nation represents a dominant reference group. To the extent they

actually do identify themselves strongly with various subnational groups having different functional relation to national outgroups we should expect considerable disagreement. As previously pointed out, empirical studies have shown that as far as the United States are concerned, a considerable agreement is generally found to be the case (cf. p. 21).¹ On the other hand, it has been demonstrated time and again that significant individual differences exist with regard to hostile attitudes towards outgroups, and that hostile attitudes towards one outgroup are as a rule highly correlated with hostile attitudes towards other outgroups.

There can be no doubt that in many cases historical conditions can explain variations in attitudes towards outgroups. Klineberg, for example, indicates that historical factors can explain most convincingly the marked differences in attitudes towards Japanese and Chinese in California and Hawaii, and towards the Negro in the United States and Brazil. But Klineberg simultaneously stresses that: "The cultural, historical and economic approaches have not fully answered the questions why some nations are aggressive and others are not" (82, p. 193). The historical factors which explain the differences with regard to Negro prejudice in the United States and Brazil should promise a considerable similarity in attitudes towards Negroes in Brazil and Argentina. Nevertheless, in spite of striking historical resemblance, these two countries are very different specifically with regard to Negro prejudice.

¹ This does not of course imply that significant differences between national subgroups have not been found. Both political party and religious affiliations have been shown to be differentiating factors (cf. p. 233).


CHAPTER 4

Summary: The Interaction Hypothesis

Most investigations of attitudes towards outgroups have concentrated on racial minority groups and have been designed in such a way that the subjects' group anchorage has been approximately constant. By concentrating exclusively on individual differences in one group, the effects of various group norms are experimentally excluded, fundamentally in the same way as we exclude the effect of various personality structures in a comparison of groups having different historical backgrounds, but otherwise consisting of members with more or less similar personality structures.

In principle we must allow for the fact that interaction will always exist between group-historical and individual-historical factors on the one hand, and between group norms and conditions pertaining to personality on the other. By the term the *Interaction Hypothesis* we refer to this latter interaction between group norms and personality characteristics. This will be encountered at various levels of analysis. In what follows we shall go into this view more thoroughly in connection with a summary of what we have already written.

We mentioned in our introduction that considerable social pressure with regard to a specific foreign policy orientation may often develop in international conflict situations, and that such external pressure may cause some people to behave more or less contrary to their own dispositions. If we denote the adherence to a particular policy or point of view in a current choice situation as "public opinion", we can present this reasoning in the following way:



It may be assumed that not all persons are characterized by definite attitudes towards foreign affairs. The less definite such attitudes are, the greater potency we may ascribe to current social pressures, and *vice versa*.

In the preceding sections we have concentrated entirely on attitudes towards outgroups and those factors which influence such attitudes. Attitudes towards foreign affairs may represent a comparatively superficial and isolated aspect of an individual's personality, or they may be closely linked with the individual's whole personality. In the former case we are dealing with an imitation of and conformity to environmental standards. An individual grows within a social structure characterized by special values and norms. The individual will take over those norms and attitude patterns which are conspicuous in his social milieu. The acquisition of aggressive international attitudes can undoubtedly have such a background, but we may also imagine another kind of attitude formation. Attitudes can develop to a greater or a lesser extent within the person himself, also nourished by the environment, but not by what the environment may think about foreign affairs. The desire for conformity will play a subordinate role in relation to the individual's need for placement and investment of affect. The attitudes will in this case primarily be linked with psychogenetic and psychodynamic factors.¹

Practically all human beings relate themselves to social groups, but there are large differences regarding the amount of social pressure exercised by these groups where various outgroup attitudes are concerned. Certain groups or milieux make considerably greater demands for conformity than others.

The results of an investigation by Prothro of the relationship between prejudice against Negroes and other minority groups in the southern United States indirectly supports this viewpoint (121). While the investigations by Adorno *et al.* specify a correlation of .74

¹ Allport, for instance, has suggested a corresponding distinction between *adoption* and *development* of prejudices against minority groups. He writes: "A child who adopts prejudice is taking over attitudes and stereotypes from his family or cultural environment . . . Parental words and gestures, along with their concomitant beliefs and antagonisms, are transferred to the child. He adopts his parents' views . . . But there is also a type of training that does not transfer ideas and attitudes directly to the child, but rather creates an atmosphere in which he *develops* prejudice as his style of life. In this case the parents may or may not express their own prejudices . . . What is crucial, however, is that their mode of handling the child (disciplining, loving, threatening) is such that the child cannot help acquire suspicions, fears, hatreds that sooner or later may fix on minority groups" (5, p. 297).

between prejudiced attitudes towards Negroes and other minority groups, Prothro finds a correlation of only .25 in the southern states. Prothro's data imply that negative attitudes towards Negroes exist side by side with positive attitudes towards other minority groups far more often in the southern states than in California. An interesting feature of Prothro's data is that positive attitudes towards Negroes in the southern states are practically always connected with positive attitudes towards other minority groups. It therefore seems as if the milieu is particularly conformity demanding where prejudice against Negroes is concerned. Some individuals seem to give in to the greater social pressure in this field in spite of their non-prejudiced attitude towards minority groups generally. On the other hand there are also those who consistently resist this particular social pressure.

If we assume that strong social pressures in the direction of certain outgroup attitudes may reduce or eliminate the effect of personal predispositions, we may likewise assume that strong personal predispositions may render an individual less easily influenced by social pressures and more determined in his choice of reference group. Not only will the group's demands for conformity vary, but also the individual's needs for group conformity.¹

We can find support for such a point of view in empirical data, provided by an investigation by Mussen (116). We have already mentioned some of the results of this investigation. Its purpose was primarily an attempt to clarify whether latent personality traits are connected with a person's resistance to social pressure; or more specifically, to what extent latent aggressive needs will be decisive in determining whether a person will abandon his prejudice towards Negroes when he is placed in a milieu where such prejudices are not culturally accepted.

Mussen refers to Smith's almost classic study in which it is demonstrated that 40 out of 46 students became less prejudiced towards Negroes after a sojourn in Harlem (140). But what about the 6 students who did not become less prejudiced? Mussen asks. Were they different in terms of personality from the others?

Mussen's investigation deals with the effect — on a sample of

¹ An individual's conformity-needs may be looked upon as a predisposition to be influenced by social pressures generally. In addition to such a predisposition we may specify dispositions to be influenced by certain types of social pressures, i.e. group prejudices. We here want to stress that no differentiation on this point will be made in the present chapter.

boys 8–14 years of age — of a four-weeks' stay in a boys' summer camp. The camp directors had consciously set up a programme attempting to promote tolerant and unprejudiced attitudes. During the whole period the boys lived in intimate contact with Negro boys of a corresponding age.

A correlation was found between latent aggressiveness and racial prejudice, both on arrival and departure from the camp; but the correlation was much more pronounced at the time of departure.¹ Mussen writes:


“Apparently personality structure was not as clearly related to original prejudice status as it was to changes in prejudice and to final prejudice score . . . We may conclude that changes in attitude are closely related to aggressive needs . . .” (116, p. 440).

Several further investigations have attempted to study the relationship between personality traits and receptiveness to social appeals. This susceptibility has been shown to be connected with feelings of social inadequacy, shyness, low self-evaluation, inhibition of aggression, and with a strict and penalizing upbringing (67, 70). In general, authoritarian persons seem to alternate between suggestibility and great receptivity on the one hand, and rigid resistance to propaganda as well as rational argumentation on the other.²

The purpose of the investigations described above was the study of attitudes towards minority groups, but there is reason to assume that we would find the same factors operating in connection with international attitudes. We must assume that this type of attitude will always have its origin partly in the social pressure to which a person is exposed through his environment, partly in the individual's personality. We may illustrate this in the following way:

¹ An interesting result of this investigation is that the camp experience as a whole did not seem to have any appreciable general effect. Approximately one-quarter of the boys were less prejudiced at the time of departure than upon arrival; but roughly the same number showed increased prejudice. Thus, as previously stated, personal contact is no universal remedy for group prejudice.

² According to recent empirical findings, modification of social attitudes depends upon an interplay between personality traits and the type of change procedure applied (79a). Among high-ego-defenders, authoritarian suggestions seem to be more effective than attempts at logical restructuring. Role playing (as a technique for attitude change) seems to be more effective among low-ego-defenders than among high-ego-defenders and the same seems generally to be the case as far as self-insight procedures are concerned.




Not all groups exert definite pressure in the direction of a particular attitude towards foreign affairs. It may be assumed that the less a person relates himself to groups which exert such pressures, the greater potency we may ascribe to various personality factors, and *vice versa*.

An indirect measure of the strength of social pressure present in connection with various attitude patterns can perhaps be obtained by investigating how much agreement exists between a person's perception of his friends' and acquaintances' attitudes and *their* actual attitudes. The greater the agreement present, the more it may be assumed that exchanges of opinion have taken place and that the person has been presented with what is appropriate. If we base our argument on such an assumption, the following results of an American investigation call for attention (155). The agreement between perceived and actual attitudes showed themselves to vary according to the topic in question. Extensive agreement was found with regard to religious questions. The agreement, expressed in the form of a correlation coefficient, was .71. Then came racial questions with a coefficient of .56, economic questions .53, and finally foreign affairs .22. This investigation dates from as far back as 1936 and a generalization of its results to the present situation is therefore unwarranted. On the other hand they imply that international attitudes, at least at that time in the United States, give considerable room for the play of personality factors.

Given that a relationship is found between social pressure and attitudes towards foreign affairs, it may be asked upon what factors this pressure depends. Several hypotheses have been put forward. It has been assumed that the extent of the pressure is a function of 1) perceived differences in opinion among members of a group concerning a certain issue; 2) the relevance of this issue for group goals; and 3) the cohesiveness of the group. As regards the development of social norms pertinent to intergroup relationships, we mentioned

earlier that stress has been laid in certain circles on the functional relationship which is and has been present between the groups. But we also stated that such a sociological functional analysis must be complemented, at least in certain cases, by psychological personality considerations if we are to explain certain outgroup attitudes.

If we transfer this chain of reasoning to the plane of foreign affairs we get the following constellation of factors.



It may be assumed that the same functional relationship between groups may have different effects in terms of emerging social norms, dependent on the personality patterns of the implicated group members. Thus, our ancestors' childhood experiences must be assumed to have had a certain importance for many social norms affecting intergroup relations in our own time.

As a rule attitudes towards outgroups seem to be more determined by contact with prevalent attitudes in a person's social milieu than by contact with the outgroups (69). Given that this is the case, we must remember all the same that a person will to a certain extent choose his social milieu himself according to his personal needs. Most individuals are members of many groups and this membership quite often includes groups which the individuals themselves have helped to form and maintain. We will not deny that ecological, economic and situation-determinant factors are often of decisive importance. Where the formation of attitudes in children and young people are concerned, parents and superiors will usually exert considerable social pressure.

The effect of this pressure as regards attitudes towards foreign affairs is illustrated to a certain degree by an investigation by Helfant (65). As his point of departure Helfant attempts to shed light on the importance of social and personal factors on the attitudes of a sample of high school students towards war, the Soviet Union, and international relations in general. By "social factors" Helfant refers

to the attitudes of the respondent's parents; by "personal factors", to the respondent's own characteristic way of reacting in everyday situations. In general a positive correlation with parental attitudes seems to go hand in hand with a lack of correlation with everyday reactions. An analysis of the data, according to Helfant, provides a basis for the following hypothesis:

"... When social pressures with regard to an attitude are strong, the effect of personality factors is overruled, and conversely when social pressures with regard to an attitude are not strong, the attitude held is more likely to be consistent with the person's characteristic ways of reacting" (65, pp. 17-18).


Attitudes towards the Soviet Union and towards personal participation in war are examples of the type of attitudes presumed to be the object of strong social pressure, attitudes towards ideological international questions on the other hand are presumed to be the object of relatively little social pressure.

Helfant concentrates especially on the relationship between social pressure and the tendency of an individual to generalize his "characteristic ways of reacting". In our view, strong social pressures will not only affect a person's tendency to generalize, but also his tendencies to displace and generally to be influenced by various personality factors.

We have previously dealt with a number of personality traits which were assumed to affect a person's attitudes towards foreign affairs. We also discussed various points of view concerning the way in which these traits are formed. A person's characteristic way of reacting in everyday situations is considered to be the result of interaction between social norms and psychodynamic factors, as is also a person's national identification, and to a certain extent international knowledge. As regards a person's expectations of the future (security vs. insecurity) and current frustrations, his psychodynamic structure interacting with the existing social situation will be of essential importance. On the other hand a person's psychodynamic structure may be regarded as the result of interaction between his psychosomatic constitution and childhood influences.

The above chain of reasoning may be illustrated as shown on the next page.

The figures in brackets refer to the different hypotheses which we have previously discussed: (1) stands for the Knowledge Hypothesis, (2) for the Nationalism Hypothesis, (3) for the Generalization Hypo-



thesis, (4) for the Latency Hypotheses, (5) for the Insecurity Hypothesis, and (6) for the Frustration Hypothesis. As we have stated, we refer by the Channelization Hypothesis to the existence of a certain intrapsychic interaction between (1), (2), (3) and (4).¹

We stated earlier that it may be assumed that strong social pressures in the direction of certain attitudes towards foreign affairs will probably affect a person's tendency to be influenced by different personality factors. We have also touched upon the fact that genuine interest and involvement in foreign affairs and international questions generally may have a similar effect. Such interest and involvement, in

¹ The chart includes the hypothetical influence of various personality traits on attitudes towards foreign affairs. An adequate explanation of such attitudes also has to take into account the influence of specific social norms concerning foreign affairs, and the effect of an individual's psychodynamic structure on his choice of those social groups to which he relates himself psychologically. These latter influences are indicated by the dotted lines on the left side of the chart. Thus the chart presents an elaboration of the chart on page 86. The dotted lines on the right side indicate the influence of national and international events, and more specifically, the influence of national insecurities and expectations, a factor previously discussed (cf. p. 59).

itself a psychological factor, will probably dispose a person to relate himself psychologically to groups having definite norms in this area. In stating that a genuine interest in foreign affairs may possibly lead to an independent, rational stand on such questions, we were referring more to the result of a choice of reference group than to a general resistance to social pressure. It is important to recall that, as has often been stated, there are social conditions which define knowledge. The acquisition of "true" international knowledge will therefore imply for many people the adoption of a critical attitude towards current social conditions. There can be little doubt that psychodynamic factors will often be of central importance in this connection. Regardless of the degree of social pressures, we will always encounter an interaction between group norms and psychodynamic factors.

PART TWO

EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS

CHAPTER 5

Introduction

“Although a good deal is known about some of the influences making for aggression in the individual, the relations, if any, between individual aggressiveness and national aggression are virtually unknown. . .” writes Cartwright in his review of Klineberg’s book, *Tensions Affecting International Understanding* (82). And he continues: “. . . the suspicion cannot be readily put down that the whole approach to the problem has not yet been phrased right. Proper problems for research have not yet been stated.”

Since the publication of Klineberg’s book in 1950, a number of new investigations have been published with the aim of clarifying the cause of international tension and aggression, but it is still an open question whether fruitful formulations for research have been attained.

In the first part of this dissertation we have presented various viewpoints or theories concerning the causation of different reaction patterns towards international matters. We have especially concentrated on hypotheses emphasizing the connection between personality factors and attitudes towards foreign affairs.

Probably no single hypothesis is capable of giving a complete explanation of all individual differences with respect to attitudes towards international conflicts. If, for example, we assume that there is always an interplay between personal and social factors, it follows that it is quite impossible to establish once and for all the *absolute* importance of personal factors. The importance of these factors will vary with varying social conditions.

It may be maintained that the various suggested explanations referring to personal factors are still somewhat unreliable, and that their validity has not yet been adequately demonstrated. In general, we may assume that the validity of these personality-rooted hypotheses will be more readily demonstrable to the extent that we are able to keep constant such social factors as group and social class membership. An empirical investigation will in this case not provide the possibility of drawing conclusions concerning the general importance of various personality factors. Such an investigation will, however, tell us whether these factors are connected with attitudes towards foreign affairs or not. A demonstrable connection represents a necessary precondition for their causal significance.

In the following chapters we shall give a detailed presentation of a series of empirical investigations into the relationship between personality and attitudes towards international affairs. We shall take up the various personality-rooted hypotheses previously discussed, and try to elucidate the empirical tenability of each one.

Applicants to and students of the Military Academy and the Naval Academy in Oslo were used as subjects. The empirical data were collected in two stages: in August and the beginning of September 1952, and at the end of January 1954. In the first session which lasted approximately three hours for each subject, various attitude-scales and questionnaires as well as projective methods were administered. In the second session, which lasted approximately one hour for each subject, two projective techniques and a sociometric scale were given.

In the first stage a total of 103 applicants to the Military Academy and 64 students at the Naval Academy were used. The subjects were divided into groups, with 15–20 persons in each group. The students of the Naval Academy worked under completely anonymous conditions. The applicants to the Military Academy were given repeated assurances that all answers would be strictly confidential, that no names would be mentioned, and that their responses would have no bearing on their admission to the Academy — which they had the opportunity to verify through their own representatives.

The samples of Military Academy applicants had an average age of 23 years. The majority, 84 or 82 %, were between 21 and 24 years of age, and the total ranged from 20 to 30 years. We have no complete specification of the age-distribution for the students of the Naval Academy. However there are many indications that there is no great difference between them and the Military Academy applicants.

The second stage of our data collection occurred exactly a year and a half after the first. This time we used 70 students of the Military Academy in Oslo as subjects. The sample represented a part of our original sample of subjects, specifically, those of the previous applicants who had been accepted by the Academy. The sample included practically all of the students in the second year of training, and the investigation was again based on groups. We worked with three groups in all — three classes — consisting of 21, 24, and 25 students respectively. These three classes were studied successively, and we have every reason to assume that none of the subjects had any prior knowledge of the tests and instruments applied.

In other words, our sample of subjects consists exclusively of men in their twenties. They come from all over the country. They have a similar educational background, all having completed gymnasium.¹ Unquestionably the most striking characteristic is the subjects' specific occupational position.

The fact that they all wanted military training and had roughly the same previous educational background undoubtedly limits considerably the possible variation in group membership. Our subjects represent a very homogeneous sample in many ways; but at the same time — psychologically speaking — a less homogeneous sample than one might be inclined to assume. In informal interviews with some of the subjects, for example, it was clearly evident that their occupational motivations were highly varied. In certain cases distinct signs of "authoritarian" traits could be discerned, the wish to defend King and Fatherland, conventionalism, authoritarian submission and identification with strong leaders. In other cases these motives did not seem to occur at all. The desire for a relatively well-paid and diversified occupation, one offering unique opportunities for exercise and outdoor living, was usually in evidence.

We will not deny the fact that a certain homogeneity exists. Our sample of respondents is by no means representative of the Norwegian population, nor of Norwegian men, nor of Norwegian men of the same age-group and the same general educational background.

The lack of representativeness of this sample naturally makes it exceedingly difficult to generalize our results. If the empirical testing of a certain hypothesis were to obtain a negative result, this would not weaken the hypothesis to any particular extent; the possibility would still exist that the hypothesis was tenable in a more heterogeneous

¹ I.e. secondary school to university entrance standard.

and representative sample of subjects. If the empirical testing were to obtain a positive result, we would have demonstrated the hypothesis' tenability in one case. This would not be a guarantee of the hypothesis' tenability under all circumstances, but we would have demonstrated that the hypothesis at least had a limited tenability. These considerations will in what follows cause us to lay somewhat greater weight on positive rather than negative findings.

CHAPTER 6

The Generalization Hypothesis:
An Attitudinal Analysis

The Generalization Hypothesis maintains that a person's manifest everyday reaction patterns will be generalized to international situations. We should thus expect to find a positive correlation between a person's manifest reactions to everyday conflict situations and his preference for corresponding national ways of reacting in international conflict situations.

In a way the hypothesis takes it for granted that a person reacts consistently in everyday and international situations. It says nothing about whether a complete or partial generalization of reaction patterns will occur; nor does it specify whether generalization will occur to the same extent with all types of reactions.

In the following we shall cite an empirical investigation in an attempt to clarify: 1) whether there are general ways of reacting in everyday and international situations, and 2) if this is the case, whether there is a positive correlation between ways of reacting in these two types of situations.

A. *Procedure*

In what follows we shall firstly give a description of how we actually proceeded in constructing our methods. This presentation is fairly detailed and includes in part a discussion of pretest-experiences. Next, a description will be given of how we finally applied our methods, and at least some methodological shortcomings will be pointed out.

In planning our investigation, our attention was drawn in the direction of verbal inventories. A situational inventory with precoded

response-alternatives would give us a relatively objective instrument, fairly easy to administer. We decided to concentrate on such a procedure.¹ We found it desirable to wait with the formulations of alternative responses until we could build upon empirical material. Likewise we were immediately confronted with the problem of finding suitable situations as inventory items. Here too, we chose an empirical approach.

Our first task was to construct a tentative "open-ended" attitude-scale. By making it relatively extensive, we could later discard certain items without causing the final scale to be too short. All in all, we concentrated on 120 items, 60 everyday conflict situations and 60 international ones.

After each description of an everyday situation, the question followed: "*How would you be likely to react?*" After the description of an international situation: "*How would you prefer Norway to react?*"

All of the everyday situations involved incidents or events which could happen to anyone in the course of an ordinary day's activity. They included such incidents as being splattered with dirty water by a passing car, having some important books mislaid by a friend, having

¹ In our choice of method we are greatly influenced by Grace's study (53, 54). As we have previously mentioned, Grace makes a comparison between reactions to three different types of situations: everyday, professional, and international conflict-situations. Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of Grace's investigation is his attempt to delimit approximately equivalent ways of reacting to the various types of situations. With respect to everyday, professional and international situations, Grace consistently distinguishes between self-reproachful (autohostile), indifferent (*laissez-faire*), and two types of aggressive (verbal hetero hostile and direct hetero hostile) reactions.

Grace's inventory consists of 90 situations in all, 30 from each of these three fields. Immediately following the description of a conflict-situation, four different ways of reacting to the situation are suggested, while the subject is requested to indicate in which of the suggested ways he or she would probably act in that situation. The three types of situations are arranged in random order, and so are the four response alternatives to each situation.

We assumed that, with certain modifications, Grace's method would be well suited to our own research purpose. A direct translation of Grace's inventory would not be satisfactory. First of all, we were exclusively interested in everyday and international reaction patterns. Secondly, we were by no means convinced that Grace's four types of reactions would be adequate under Norwegian conditions. And thirdly, we were not able to use Grace's international situations. All of these refer to American foreign affairs, to international situations where American interests are involved in one way or another, and where the United States as a national unit is embroiled in conflict with other nations.

the door slammed in your face by a bus conductor, having sauce spilled on your clothes by a waiter, having the air-valves on your bicycle tyres opened by boys, getting hit in the back of the neck by a snowball, etc.

All of the international situations referred to international incidents or events in which Norwegian interests were threatened. They all represented hypothetical situations, but were constructed so as to have a certain (even though extremely slight) probability in the light of current foreign affairs in the spring of 1952. They included such incidents as the dynamiting of a Norwegian Consulate building in French North Africa, demands by the United States to station troops on Norwegian territory, Soviet denial of mobility to Norwegian citizens residing in the Soviet Union, English trawlers fishing in Norwegian waters, the launching of a propaganda campaign by Sweden against Norway's tourist trade, the demand by the United States for a 200 % increase in the rental cost of American films, the systematic jamming by a Russian radio station of Norwegian programmes for Norwegians abroad, and so on.

In the choice of both everyday and international situations we emphasized that they should be current, not too unambiguous, relatively diversified, to some extent probable, and appealing enough to evoke "affective" reactions.

The pre-test scale was prepared during the winter and spring of 1952 and administered to a small sample of students and fifth year gymnasium pupils in May and June the same year. Using their responses as source material, various scoring systems were tried out during the course of the summer.

Our first scoring was done on the basis of following four categories: autohostile, verbal heterohostile, direct heterohostile and laissez-faire reactions.¹ Empirically it often proved difficult to distinguish between verbal aggressive and directly aggressive responses.² In many cases unspecific aggressive answers predominated. Likewise there were a number of responses which had aggressive as well as self-reproachful components, without our being able to determine which component was the more predominant. Finally, there were

¹ These categories are the same as those used by Grace in his study. Cf. footnote on the preceding page.

² Grace himself has demonstrated in a later investigation a positive association between verbally aggressive and directly aggressive ways of reacting. His factor-analytic results suggest that we are here dealing with one and the same dimension (56).

certain responses which could not be scored at all in terms of these categories.

In the course of the scoring we became aware of the need for a scoring system which would not only take into consideration the direction of the reactions, whether they were outwardly directed or inwardly directed, or passive and indifferent, but which would also make allowances for the form of the reactions.

Among the outwardly directed responses there was often a striking difference between those oriented in the direction of *blame*, of blaming and reproaching others, and those oriented in the direction of *problem-solving*, of getting others to solve an existing problem. The same distinction could also be maintained with regard to inwardly directed and indifferent reactions. An inwardly directed reaction oriented towards blame, towards self-reproach, differs from an inwardly directed reaction oriented towards problem-solving, to feel and eventually assume responsibility for the solution of an existing problem. In the same way, a *laissez-faire* reaction oriented towards excusing, forgiving, and explaining away something, is different from a reaction oriented towards patience, built upon the expectation that the existing problem will solve itself with time.

The importance of distinguishing not only between different directions of reaction but also between different forms of reaction having the same direction, has been indicated by several researchers. Newcomb, among others, has suggested the differentiation between goal-oriented and threat-oriented reactions (119), which in turn is strongly influenced by Maier's distinction between motivated and frustrated behaviour (99).

The criterion which Newcomb uses is how an individual perceives an obstacle, from which angle it is perceived. "The distinction, in short", writes Newcomb, "is that between perceiving the obstacle in the *frame of reference of the goal* (while persisting in the motive pattern) and perceiving it in the *frame of reference of one's own safety and security*, which becomes the new goal initiating a different motive pattern" (119, p. 351).

Our above distinction between blame-oriented and problem-oriented reactions coincides with Newcomb's. Blame-orientation refers specifically to the fact that an obstacle provokes the need for immediate "ego-satisfaction", which is substituted for a problem-solving orientation. Blame-oriented reactions have their basis in the perception of threat. The component of blame will often be solely implicit. This is especially true in the case of outwardly-directed reactions,

where revenge and retaliation are in the foreground. To avoid obscurity on this point, we will in what follows refer to *threat-* and *problem-oriented* forms of reactions respectively.

Our classification of types of reactions has many similarities with the classification scheme developed by Rosenzweig in connection with his Picture Frustration Study (133). This agreement is not, however, completely accidental. We were influenced in many ways by Rosenzweig's ideas when we began the scoring of our pre-test material.

Our directional dimensions: outwardly-directed, inwardly-directed, and passive-directed, correspond to Rosenzweig's extrapunitive, intropunitive, and impunitive categories; and our form dimensions: problem-oriented and threat-oriented, correspond to Rosenzweig's need-persistence and ego-defence. Besides these two form dimensions, Rosenzweig works with a third one, namely obstacle-dominance, an orientation in the direction of the obstacle itself in the frustrating situation.¹

We found few examples of so-called obstacle-dominant reactions among our responses. Since we were interested in arriving at a set of precoded alternative responses to each situation, we were also unavoidably forced to limit the number of response alternatives as much as possible, so that the subjects could have at hand alternatives among which to choose.

Form I,1. *Final Classification Scheme of Reaction Patterns*

Direction of Reaction	Form of Reaction	
	Threat-oriented (<i>E-D</i>)	Problem-oriented (<i>N-P</i>)
Outwardly-directed (<i>Ex</i>)	Blame ascribed to others (<i>E</i>)	Problem-solving demanded or expected of others (<i>e</i>)
Inwardly-directed (<i>In</i>)	Blame ascribed to oneself (<i>I</i>)	Problem-solving activity imposed upon oneself (<i>i</i>)
Passive-directed (<i>Im</i>)	Blame is indicated in emphasizing forgiveness or absolution (<i>M</i>)	Problem-solving is expected or hoped to take place by itself, with time (<i>m</i>)

¹ This scoring category seems to some extent to have evolved out of the practical work with Rosenzweig's Picture Frustration Study. Some responses did not lend themselves to adequate scoring either as ego-defensive or as need-persistent, but were blocked and exclusively concentrated on the obstacle itself.

Form I,1 presents our final scoring system. Abbreviations for the various categories are given in parentheses. As will be noted we have used a somewhat modified version of Rosenzweig's scoring symbols.¹

It is important to add a few remarks to the preceding ones. The classification represents principles both for the scoring of responses to the individual scale items, and — through the summation of individual scores — for a phenotypical description of an individual's ways of reacting to frustration.

An outwardly-directed threat orientation may be adequate in one situation and inadequate in another — depending upon whether the external object is actually blameable or innocent. In the same way, an inwardly-directed threat orientation will be adequate if current blockings can truthfully be ascribed to one's own misjudgements. We may say that an outwardly-directed threat orientation suggests an aggressive reaction; but we can say very little about the dynamic quality of such a reaction. On the other hand, an inwardly-directed problem-orientation may express both genuine tolerance of frustration, pseudo-tolerance and a defensive intellectualization. The reason why we have concentrated on the above classification scheme in spite of these "psychodynamic ambiguities", is because it most closely corresponds to our empirical material, and especially because we primarily wished to take as our point of departure a "superficial" description of reaction types.

Yet another factor should be mentioned in connection with the foregoing. An inwardly-directed threat-orientation in international situations indicates that blame is directed towards one's own nation. In certain cases the reproaches will be directed towards the nation as a whole, in other cases towards national sub-groups such as the government, the parliament, a political party or a trade union. If a person has no positive identification with these groups, we will be dealing, strictly speaking, not with inwardly-directed, but outwardly directed reactions. We have made no attempt to distinguish between these two types of reactions; and it is therefore important in what follows to be aware that an inwardly-directed threat-orientation has

¹ A comparison with Rosenzweig's classification scheme suggests that in addition to neglecting the obstacle-dominance category, we have also discarded the so-called underlined factors, E and I. In Rosenzweig's work these score symbols denote denials: an aggressive denial of blame, and an acknowledgement of blame but denial of fault (cf. p. 131).

a somewhat wider frame of reference in international situations than it has in everyday situations.

After becoming acquainted with our empirical pretest material, trying out various scoring systems, and finally concentrating on the score categories described above, we began a more thorough analysis of our various situations' (scale items') capability to evoke diversified and scorable responses.

Tentatively we decided to incorporate in the final scale only those situations where at least two-thirds of the responses lent themselves to scoring without difficulty, and where the response material contained examples of at least one outwardly-directed, one inwardly-directed, and one passive-directed reaction type. We then made our final choice from these situations, trying to attain a certain balance between the different types of situations.

It was possible to classify both our everyday and our international situations according to what sort of relationship existed between the subject and the conflict-creating object. With regard to everyday situations we found it possible to distinguish between the following four object-relationships: a) *An impersonal relationship*, characterized by the fact that the conflict-creating object does not refer to a person or persons (for example: avalanche, icy steps, dog, piece of soap, etc.), b) *an adult-child relationship*, characterized by the fact that the conflict-creating object refers to one or several minors (for example: a pupil, child, younger brother, little boys, etc.), c) *an intimate relationship*, characterized by the fact that the conflict-creating object refers to one or several adults with whom the subject has a close personal relationship (for example: a friend, acquaintance, companions, etc.), and d) *a formal relationship*, characterized by the fact that the conflict-creating object refers to an adult with whom the subject has a distant relationship (for example: waiter, unknown gentleman, postman, switchboard operator, etc.).

With regard to international situations we made a classification involving the following five object-relationships: a) *an east-west neutral relationship*, characterized by the fact that the conflict-creating object is independent of the two power-constellations dominating the current international situation (for example: Sweden, Switzerland, India, etc.), or by the fact that the conflict-creating action has no direct relevance to the conflict between east and west and is not enacted by the United States or the Soviet Union; *an east-directed relationship*, characterized by b) the fact that the conflict-creating object is the Soviet

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Union or c) a Soviet oriented nation (for example: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Communist China, etc.); *a west-directed relationship*, characterized either by d) the fact that the conflict-creating nation is the United States or e) a United States oriented nation or group of nations (for example: Canada, West Germany, NATO, etc.).

Our classification of international situations into specific situational types was determined by the desire to obtain a measure of general ways of reacting in the international sphere, as independent as possible of the existing east-west conflict. In part we hoped to achieve this by concentrating on relatively many east-west neutral situations, in part by including in the final scale as many east-directed as west-directed situations.

We did not consider the classification of the various types of everyday situations to be of decisive importance. We were here mainly interested in assuring a certain representativeness of various types of object relationships.

In all, we concentrated on 40 everyday and 40 international situations. We finally decided to incorporate these in two parallel scales, one consisting exclusively of international, and one exclusively of everyday situations.

Table I,1. *Distribution of Types of Situations in the Two Final Scales*

Everyday Situations		International Situations	
Object relationship	Number	Object relationship	Number
a) Impersonal	9	a) East-west neutral	18
b) Adult-child	7	b) East-directed: Soviet Union	7
c) Intimate	13	c) East-directed: Soviet Union oriented nations	4
d) Formal	11	d) West-directed: United States	7
		e) West-directed: United States oriented nations	4
Total	40	Total	40

Table I,1 gives a summary of the distribution of various object-relationships in the two final scales. In the everyday scale (hereafter called the ER scale) the intimate object-relationship occurs most frequently. In the international scale (the IR scale) there are approximately as many east-west neutral as non-neutral situations, and just as many east-directed as west-directed situations.

After having decided what types of situation to include in the two scales, we systematically reconsidered the response-material from the pretests. This was done in order to find responses which exemplified the various scoring categories (reaction types). In the case of certain situations, we found responses illustrating all the six categories, in the case of others, only four or five. Since we were interested in arriving at a complete set of response alternatives for each situation we were occasionally forced to use non-spontaneous responses, i.e. responses constructed by ourselves.

Our next task was to check whether the response alternatives upon which we had concentrated actually covered the scoring categories they were intended to illustrate. In order to investigate this we had the entire material coded independently by three persons.¹ Each one was instructed on the scoring system and requested to read through each situation and the six response-alternatives which followed, and to score these in terms of our scoring categories.²

The scoring of response alternatives to the international situations turned out to be unanimous and in agreement with our own intentions. On the other hand, there was disagreement in the scoring of 5 of the everyday situations. Certain of the responses to these situations were therefore revised, and exchanged in part for other spontaneous responses, in part for newly constructed ones. Then these situations were again presented to the three coders. This time the scoring was unanimous.

We present below two examples of everyday situations with corresponding response alternatives. The prescoring of the various response alternatives is indicated in parentheses.

¹ The coders were cand. psychol. Gert Henrik Vedeler, cand. psychol. Per Olav Tiller, and cand. psychol. Aud Myhr.

² We wish to emphasize one aspect of this procedure. The various response alternatives were inevitably judged in relation to each other. Accordingly the scoring tended to point out which alternative — among the six alternatives — would relatively best cover the various categories. Similar, relative considerations were used in the choice of alternatives. A consistent “construction” of alternatives would from one angle be preferable.

13. You have reserved a table at a restaurant and invited a friend to come with you. When you arrive, you are told by the head waiter that he has forgotten your reservation and has no table available.

In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?

- (a) Feel sorry at having caused the head waiter such embarrassment, order a table for another day. (*i*)
 - (b) Wait and see if a table becomes free. (*m*)
 - (c) Be irritated with myself for having ordered a table at such a restaurant. (*I*)
 - (d) See the manager, demand that a new table be procured. (*e*)
 - (e) Forgive the head waiter; it is human to forget. (*M*)
 - (f) Get angry and rebuke the head waiter for his forgetfulness. (*E*)
21. A friend absent-mindedly puts a lighted cigarette on your table and burns a large hole in the cloth and on the tabletop.
- In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?*
- (a) Reproach him, tell him to look what he is doing another time. (*E*)
 - (b) Ask him to compensate for the damage or see that it is repaired. (*e*)
 - (c) Be annoyed with myself for not having paid more attention. (*I*)
 - (d) Be sorry for my friend, offer to fix myself. (*i*)
 - (e) Say it was just an accident, such things can happen to anybody. (*M*)
 - (f) Take it calmly. (*m*)

Two examples of international situations with accompanying response alternatives are given below.

1. India demands that all Norwegian missionaries leave the country immediately.
- How would you prefer Norway to react?*
- (a) Demand a satisfactory explanation, turn the matter over to the United Nations. (*e*)
 - (b) Introduce restrictions on Indians who wish to live in Norway. (*E*)
 - (c) Blame the activities of Norwegian missions which have made the Indian action necessary. (*I*)
 - (d) Offer to withdraw the missionaries at once. (*i*)
 - (e) Take it calmly; these matters can be settled amicably. (*m*)
 - (f) Decide that there is nothing to be done about it; the Indians must naturally decide on matters affecting their own country. (*M*)
26. A Russian radio station starts jamming Norwegian wave-lengths used for broadcasting to Norwegians abroad.
- How would you prefer Norway to react?*
- (a) Take the matter calmly; wait and see. (*m*)
 - (b) Protest and retaliate on Russian broadcasts in Norwegian. (*E*)
 - (c) Change the wave-length. (*i*)
 - (d) Demand an explanation and bring the matter before an international forum. (*e*)
 - (e) Wonder what reasons the Russians might have for disturbing these broadcasts. (*I*)
 - (f) Do nothing; such things can be due to pure accident. (*M*)

As we have stated, it was evident during the scoring of the pretest, that certain spontaneous responses could only with difficulty be placed in a ready-made category. Certain responses required double-scoring. Sometimes the response lay in between two categories, but usually one category covered it more than the other. Occasionally it seemed as if the subjects had primary and subsidiary attitudes towards conflict-situations, a kind of hierarchical order of inclinations towards reacting in certain ways.

In constructing our final scales, we tried to make allowance for this by requesting the subject to choose two responses for each situation.

With regard to the everyday situations, we asked the subjects to indicate which alternatives they considered most likely and next most likely, to correspond to the way they would react; and with regard to the international situations, which alternative they considered the most preferable and next most preferable ways for Norway to react.

Furthermore, in the analysis of the material we decided to give the first alternative a weight of 2 and the second alternative a weight of 1. This system of weighting takes it for granted that the first alternative is twice as likely or twice as desirable as the second. A more exact procedure would have been to leave the weighting of the two alternatives to the subjects themselves. Such a procedure, however, would have made the administration of the scales and the analysis of the empirical material considerably more complicated and time-consuming.

In any case, our weighting method provides the basis for a certain degree of differentiation. If a person were to feel that one alternative was overwhelmingly the more probable and desirable, he had the opportunity to choose it twice. Furthermore, we decided in advance to score the second alternative like the first in those cases where only one response alternative was indicated in a given situation.

The order of response alternatives to each situation was arranged randomly. Likewise the various types of situations were randomized. Appendix I gives a complete presentation of the two scales.

Our final collection of data took place during August and the beginning of September, 1952. As we have stated, the scales were administered to groups. The average administration time for the ER scale was approximately 25 minutes, and for the IR scale approximately 35 minutes.

Concerning the validity of the two scales, the following remarks may be made:

The IR scale attempts to register preferences with regard to national ways of reacting in international conflict situations. The scale items' "representativeness" and the subjects' willingness to express their "true" reactions are decisive factors in determining the scale's validity. The respondents are presented with hypothetical situations. To the extent that they identify themselves with the situations and react honestly, there is reason to assume that they will answer in accordance with the spontaneous position they would take in real situations. Since the test situations are relatively concrete and not unlike real international events in our times, the subjects are probably capable of making such an identification with these situations. A specific form of validity test would be possible if world events developed in such a way that our hypothetical conflict-situations became real ones. However, we would still be dependent upon the subjects' verbal report.

The ER scale attempts to register manifest ways of reacting to everyday situations. The validity of this scale depends upon the "representativeness" of the scale items, and also upon what is denoted by the term "manifest ways of reacting".

If by this term we mean overt behaviour, the validity of the scale will be a function of the subjects' ability to predict their behaviour inclinations in similar real situations, and furthermore, of their ability to take into account situational barriers which may intervene between inclinations and overt behaviour. We are here referring to various restrictions and expectations which are imposed upon the subject in current situations. We may assume correct anticipations of such barriers to be extremely difficult. On the whole it seems reasonable to assume that the ER scale focusses more on inclinations to overt behaviour than on overt behaviour proper. In what follows we will use the term "manifest ways of reacting" in this former sense. This does not imply that the validity of the ER scale cannot be disputed.

If by the term "manifest ways of reacting" we refer to inclinations to overt behaviour, the validity of the ER scale depends upon the respondents' ability to identify themselves with hypothetical (verbal) situations, upon their insight concerning their own reactions, and finally upon their honesty in describing their own reactions. The subjects' educational background suggests that it should be relatively easy for them to identify with abstract circumstances; the similarity between the test situations and real everyday situations may be presumed to encourage the correct prediction of inclinations, and the anonymous circumstances under which the scale was administered would probably enhance their willingness to give honest responses.

Both the IR and the ER scales contain several potential sources of error. Here we will deal especially with two of these only. Both scales were administered on the same day, and both presuppose the subjects' identification with a series of hypothetical situations. The first condition implies that the psychological mood of the moment, may have affected the replies and made them more homogeneous than is actually the case. This may be true as far as the replies to each individual scale as a unit are concerned as well as the replies to the individual items within the two scales.

The second condition makes it possible that the subjects have constantly been influenced by their own previous responses, that they have not only reacted to the present scale situation, but also to their own reactions to previous scale situations. This phenomenon does not necessarily lead to uniform replies. On the contrary, it has been offered as an explanation of the low internal consistency of certain personality tests (132).

In spite of these evident sources of error, we have assumed that both the IR and ER scales possess sufficient validity to warrant their inclusion in our research design.

B. Results

Our total sample consisted of 167 subjects. An examination of the answer sheets for the ER scale showed that 159 persons had given complete replies, in 7 cases one item was left open, and in one case three items were unanswered. On the IR scale there were 159 complete answer-sheets, three with 1 item left open, and five with 2 or more unanswered items.

In those cases where one item only was left open, we decided to insert so-called adjusted values. By means of Yates' modification of Allan and Wishart's formula for missing responses, we calculated hypothetical scores for 10 items in all.¹ Thus our total material consisted of 166 persons on the ER scale and 162 persons on the IR scale.

¹ Yates' modification of Allan and Wishart's formula (cf. 143, p. 268) has the following form:

$$X = \frac{N \cdot S + n \cdot s - T}{(N-1)(n-1)}$$

where N is the number of subjects, n the number of test items, S the sum of the scores of the subject having a missing score, s the sum of the scores in the item having a missing score, and T the total sum of all the scores. To find the most adequate hypothetical scores, we calculated the X -values for all the primary categories and finally chose the categories having the highest value.

In the following we will give a relatively technical presentation of the ER and IR scales' statistical properties. After first discussing the score distribution on these two scales, we will give a summary of the correlation between the various categories of each individual scale. Next, we will discuss in more detail the reliability and differentiating ability of the various categories. Using this as our frame of reference we will try to elucidate the consistency of different reaction patterns in relation to various everyday and international situations. This will also have a prominent place in the following section where we will analyse the correlation between the different parts of the two scales.

Statistical Properties of the R Scales: Score Distribution

Both the ER and the IR scales consist of a large number of different categories. A number of interesting similarities and differences between everyday and international reaction patterns can be deduced from the score distributions of two scales, provided that both scales are equally representative of their own fields. Here we will concern ourselves with the scales from a purely statistical angle, and concentrate exclusively on the coding symbols of the different categories (cf. Form I,1, p. 101).

Table I,2 gives a summary of the score distribution on the ER scale. The table is divided into three major columns. The first column gives the mean and standard deviation of the score distribution derived from the subject's first choice, the second column those derived from the second choice, and the third column those derived after the scores of the first and second choice have been weighted, i. e. the first alternative given the weight 2, the second alternative weight 1.

Table I, 2. *Score Distribution on Primary Categories of the ER Scale*
($N = 166$)

Categories	First Choice		Second Choice		Weighted Scores	
	M	σ	M	σ	M	σ
<i>e</i>	7.1	3.5	5.7	3.2	19.94	7.96
<i>E</i>	7.4	5.1	3.8	3.3	18.98	11.78
<i>i</i>	6.8	3.5	9.5	3.0	23.00	7.28
<i>I</i>	5.9	2.9	5.2	2.6	16.89	6.55
<i>m</i>	8.1	3.9	8.3	3.3	24.77	9.10
<i>M</i>	4.7	2.5	7.1	3.1	16.36	7.10

The table suggests that with respect to weighted scores there is quite a large variation in all of the categories. The largest variation occurs in the *E* category, the least in the *I* category. The mean score is highest with respect to the *m* and *i* categories, lowest with respect to the *M* and *I* categories.

All of the categories show a relatively symmetrical score distribution.¹ The least symmetrical distribution occurs on the *I* and *E* categories where we find a certain piling up of low scores.

Table I,3 gives a corresponding summary of the score distribution on the IR scale. Here we notice that *i* responses occur most frequently in the first choice, *e* responses in the second choice, and that these two types of responses occur considerably more frequently than others.

Table I, 3. *Score Distribution on Primary Categories of the IR Scale (N = 162)*

Categories	First Choice		Second Choice		Weighted Scores	
	<i>M</i>	σ	<i>M</i>	σ	<i>M</i>	σ
<i>e</i>	13.1	4.7	11.4	3.8	37.83	9.86
<i>E</i>	5.6	4.4	5.3	3.0	16.61	9.23
<i>i</i>	14.4	4.9	10.8	3.5	39.67	8.71
<i>I</i>	2.6	2.2	3.9	2.8	8.70	5.81
<i>m</i>	1.9	1.7	4.4	3.3	7.67	5.74
<i>M</i>	2.7	2.5	4.1	2.6	9.21	6.07

With regard to the weighted scores, the largest variation occurs in the *e* and *E* categories, the least in the *m* and *I* categories.

The latter categories show a skewed score distribution in the direction of low score values. The other categories show a relatively symmetrical distribution.¹

In addition to analysing the material in relation to various categories, we also, as far as weighted scores are concerned, calculated the score frequencies for different items of the two scales.

In the case of both scales we find that different items facilitate particular types of responses, but that all types of responses have been elicited with respect to all the items included in the scales.

If all of the items had equally facilitated all types of responses, we should expect to find a response-frequency of approximately 17 % for the different categories. By and large the ER scale as a whole gives

¹ The raw material on which this statement is based is not presented.

a relatively equal frequency in relation to the various categories. The scale seems to appeal somewhat more to *m* and *i* responses than to *M* and *I* responses, but the difference is not particularly pronounced. The average response-frequency for the first two categories is 21 % and 19 % respectively, for the last two categories 14 %, and for the *e* and *E* categories 16 %. The various items show a rather varied score distribution however. In 9 items we find that one individual category accounts for more than 38 % of the scores, but no item more than 50 %.

Considered as a whole, the various categories of the IR scale show a somewhat more unequal frequency of responses. Here we find a marked overweight of *e* and *i* responses. The average response-frequency for these two categories is 32 % and 33 % respectively. The *E* categories follow with 14 %, and the *M*, *I* and *m* categories with 8 %, 7 % and 6 % respectively. As stated above, all response types have been employed with respect to every item of the scale: but most of the items elicit the *e* and *i* responses disproportionately. In 30 items we find that one individual category has attracted more than 38 % of the scores, but no item more than 55 %.

The above considerations refer to the primary categories of the two scales exclusively. In addition it is possible to operate with secondary categories, i. e. categories which include two or more primary categories (cf. p. 101). In all we can refer to six primary categories and five secondary categories: namely, *Ex*, the sum of *E* and *e* responses; *In*, the sum of *I* and *i* responses; *Im*, the sum of *M* and *m* responses; *E-D*, the sum of *E*, *I*, and *M* responses; and *N-P*, the sum of *e*, *i* and *m* responses. Since *E-D* and *N-P* form a dichotomy, *N-P* will depend upon *E-D*, and *vice versa*. In what follows, we will concentrate exclusively on one of these two categories, namely the *E-D* category. Furthermore we will exclusively concentrate on weighted scores.

Table I,4 provides information about the distribution of weighted scores for the various secondary categories of the ER and IR scales.

Table I, 4. *Score Distribution on Secondary Categories of the R Scales*

Categories	ER Scale ($N = 166$)			IR Scale ($N = 162$)		
	<i>M</i>	σ	<i>P</i>	<i>M</i>	σ	<i>P</i>
<i>Ex</i>	38.86	16.60	.65	54.44	11.06	.16
<i>In</i>	39.92	9.88	.09	48.51	9.21	.84
<i>Im</i>	41.23	12.11	.23	17.04	9.77	.005
<i>E-D</i>	52.23	10.08	.11	34.65	13.32	.12

In addition to means and standard deviations, the table includes measures (P -values based on Chi Square techniques) of goodness of fit of hypothetical normal frequency distributions to the observed ones.

The table suggests that all observed score distributions on the ER scale represent approximately normal distributions. By the usual standards, if P is between .05 and .95, the fit is said to be satisfactory (cf. 102, p. 213). The table further shows that in the case of the ER scale there is a somewhat greater score variation in the *Ex* category than in the other categories. The mean on the *Ex*, *In* and *Im* category is of an approximately equal magnitude. Furthermore the $N-P$ responses seem to be somewhat more preferred than the *E-D* responses.

The distribution of scores on the secondary categories of the IR scale, apart from the *Im* category, all fulfil the criteria of normal distributions. The skewness of the *Im* distribution can probably be attributed to the small number of items which facilitate *Im* responses, which entails a disproportionately high frequency of low scores in this category.

The table also shows that both the *Ex* and *In* categories of the IR scale have a significantly higher mean than the *Im* category. Likewise, the frequency of the $N-P$ responses chosen seems to be considerably higher than the frequency of the *E-D* responses chosen.

On the whole we may say that both the ER and IR scales show a considerable variation of scores. This is true with regard to both the primary and secondary categories. Among all the items of these two scales we find examples of the different types of reactions upon which we have concentrated. On the whole, the score distribution for the various secondary categories seems to be symmetrical and to represent normal distributions.

Correlation Between the Secondary Categories of the R Scales

Both the ER and IR scales include five different secondary categories. We here want to emphasize the fact that not all these categories are independent of each other. Both scales are constructed in such a way that the number of responses within the direction and form categories is fixed. An increase in one category will simultaneously reduce the potential number in one of the two other direction categories and in the other form category. The correlation between the form categories will always be given, and the correlation between the direction categories will be spurious, since we are dealing with a trichotomy, i. e. the score values in the third category will always be

given by the first two. On the other hand, the correlation between the direction and form categories will not be burdened by the same shortcomings.

One question which immediately presents itself for both scales is whether it is necessary to work with all these categories. This is partly a question of theoretical consideration, partly a question of the empirical intercorrelation of the categories.

Table I,5 gives a summary of the correlations between the secondary categories of the ER scale. We have here concentrated on the *Ex*, *In*, *Im*, and *E-D* categories respectively. The table shows that the *Ex* category is negatively correlated with the *In* and *Im* categories, while the latter two are positively correlated. A high *Ex* score seems in a completely different way than a high *In* score to be incompatible with a high *Im* score.

Furthermore, the *Ex* category, in contrast to both the *In* and *Im* categories, shows a high positive correlation with the *E-D* category. Thus a high *Ex* score frequently seems to accompany a high *E-D* score; while a high *In* and especially a high *Im* score generally accompany a low *E-D* score.

Table I, 5. *Correlation (r) Between Secondary Categories of the ER Scale*
($N = 166$)

Types of Reactions	<i>In</i> : Inwardly- directed	<i>Im</i> : Passive- directed	<i>E-D</i> : Threat- oriented
<i>Ex</i> : Outwardly-directed	-.69	-.81	.56
<i>In</i> : Inwardly-directed13	-.27
<i>Im</i> : Passive-directed			-.54

Table I,6 gives a corresponding summary of the correlation between the secondary categories of the IR scale. The table shows that all the direction-categories of this scale are negatively correlated. We find the highest negative correlation between the *Ex* and *Im* categories. Here the association between direction and form categories is less pronounced. The highest association exists between the *In* and *E-D* categories, but neither is especially high.

In the case of the *Ex* category there is no association at all. A high *Ex* score thus seems to accompany a high *E-D* score as often as a low one. The correlation between the *In* and *E-D* categories goes in the same direction as that found on the ER scale, while on the contrary

Table I.6. *Correlation (r) Between Secondary Categories of the IR Scale (N = 162)*

Types of Reactions	<i>In</i> : Inwardly- directed	<i>Im</i> : Passive- directed	<i>E-D</i> : Threat- oriented
<i>Ex</i> : Outwardly-directed	-.55	-.62	.01
<i>In</i> : Inwardly-directed		-.32	-.31
<i>Im</i> : Passive-directed29

the correlation between the *Im* and *E-D* categories goes in the opposite direction.

All in all, we may say that none of the secondary categories shows such a high correlation that we can as a matter of course exclude one of the categories. For that matter, the intercorrelation between the secondary categories seems to be somewhat different in the two scales.

Reliability and Differentiating Ability of the R Scales

In order to examine the reliability of the scales, we used Hoyt's formula, based upon the logic of analysis of variance (71).¹ This method has won a great deal of recognition in latter years.²

Table 1,7 presents a summary of the degrees of freedom and the

¹ A reliability coefficient provides information about how large a portion of the variance in an observed score-distribution can be ascribed to a true variance. Hoyt's method builds directly on variance-reasoning. His reliability formula states that:

$$r_{tt} = \frac{\text{variance between persons} - \text{residual variance}}{\text{variance between persons}}$$

The formula states, in other words, that on the basis of the variance between persons and the remaining variance respectively, we can calculate the reliability coefficient (r_{tt}) for the different categories.

These variances can be calculated by dividing the sum of the squares for persons and residual by their respective degrees of freedom.

² We have concentrated exclusively on the reliability of the scales in the sense of *internal consistency*. With regard to the retest-reliability of the scales, we have no definite evidence apart from the fact that Grace found the retest reliability to be quite moderate in his work with relatively similar scales. A retesting of 135 subjects after 2 months gave an average correlation for everyday reactions of .61, with a range from .52 to .72; and for international reactions, a mean correlation of .68 with a range from .56 to .77 (56, p. 294).

Table I, 7. Sum of Squares on the ER Scale

Sources	df.	<i>e</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>
total	6639-7	4103.96	4151.41	3917.75	3589.59	4447.13	3166.14	7670.56	6207.97	7373.79	6445.38
item	39	787.23	600.80	545.00	575.71	844.72	433.87	1506.68	1145.97	1487.82	741.61
person	165	265.01	566.04	223.20	171.44	337.48	139.54	1142.56	405.07	610.07	421.53
residual	6435-7	3051.72	3014.57	3149.55	2842.44	3264.93	2592.73	5021.32	4656.93	5275.73	5282.24

Table I, 8. Reliability Coefficients and Standard Error of Measurements on the ER Scale (*N* = 166)

	<i>e</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>
r_{tt}	.70	.86	.63	.57	.75	.52	.89	.71	.78	.68
σ_e	4.30	4.27	4.37	4.16	4.45	3.96	5.52	5.31	5.65	5.66

Table I, 9. Sum of Squares on the IR Scale

Sources	df.	<i>e</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>
total	6479-3	4946.55	3458.91	5057.84	1940.11	1606.72	2044.06	6645.58	5759.39	3591.59	5342.27
item	39	750.17	544.55	1115.73	244.65	102.40	239.42	1498.36	1291.19	402.93	572.34
person	161	394.66	342.12	305.23	134.04	124.64	149.66	495.35	342.74	386.27	716.48
residual	6279-3	3801.72	2572.24	3636.88	1561.42	1377.68	1654.98	4651.87	4125.46	2802.39	4053.45

Table I, 10. Reliability Coefficients and Standard Error of Measurements on the ER Scale (*N* = 162)

	<i>e</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>
r_{tt}	.75	.81	.69	.70	.72	.72	.76	.69	.81	.86
σ_e	4.86	4.00	4.75	3.11	2.93	3.21	5.38	5.06	4.17	5.02

sum of the squares for the total, items, persons, and residual respectively on the ER scale. The table shows the sum of the squares for the primary as well as the secondary categories of the scale. The degrees of freedom (df.) for the various sources are given at the left of the table. As may be seen, a subtraction of 7 has been made in connection with the degrees of freedom for the total and residual. This subtraction is a result of the fact that we have calculated adjusted score values for 7 items on this scale.

Table I,8 gives a summary of the reliability coefficients and the respective standard error of measurements for the primary and secondary categories on the ER scale.

The *E* category shows the highest reliability among the primary categories, $r_{tt} = .86$, the *M* category, the lowest with $r_{tt} = .52$. The *En* category shows the highest reliability among secondary categories, $r_{tt} = .89$; the *E-D* category, the lowest with $.68$. Apart from the two primary categories *I* and *M*, all the other categories achieve a reliability coefficient greater than $.60$. The average reliability for all the categories is $.73$, for the primary categories alone $.69$, and for secondary categories alone $.78$.¹

In evaluating the coefficients, we must keep in mind that we are dealing with a relatively short attitude scale, considering that it attempts to register 6 different reaction tendencies simultaneously.

Tables I,9 and I,10 give a corresponding presentation of our reliability analysis of the IR scale. Table I,9 gives a summary of the sums of squares. Table I,10 a summary of the reliability coefficients and respective standard error of measurements.

On the IR scale the *E* category attains the highest reliability coefficient among the primary categories, and the *E-D* category among the secondary categories. The lowest reliability coefficient is found on the *i* category and the *In* category, respectively. The average reliability for all of the categories is $.76$, for the primary categories alone $.73$, and for the secondary categories alone $.79$.

Compared with the ER scale, the IR scale shows a somewhat higher average reliability. None of the categories of the IR scale attains as high a reliability as the *En* category of the ER scale, nor is any so low as the *I* and *M* categories of the ER scale ($r_{tt} < .60$).

It is quite remarkable that the categories of the IR scale in general

¹ All the averages for correlation coefficients are calculated by means of z -transformations. This method is also used in the following chapters. In tables the procedure is indicated by M_z .

attain higher reliability than those of the ER scale, considering that so many items in the IR scale seem to facilitate certain types of responses. Such favouring of responses will always entail a certain reduction of the optimal intercorrelation between items.

Both scales must be said to have relatively satisfactory reliability, especially considering that no previous systematic item analysis had been made. Certain objections may possibly be raised concerning the *I* and *M* categories of the ER scale, but these also possess a certain power of differentiation.

We can obtain a direct measure of the various categories' ability of differentiation by calculating the relationship between the variance between persons and the residual variance (cf. 76, p. 136). If the relationship (*F*) between these two quantities is significant, i. e. if we obtain a *p*-value below the 1 % level of significance, we may say that the ability of differentiation of a category is statistically satisfactory.

An investigation along these lines shows that all of the categories of both scales actually attain *p*-values below the 1 % level of significance. In other words, all of these categories prove capable of differentiating between persons.

A comparison of the reliability coefficients of the ER and IR scales reveals that the *E* category of the ER scale is significantly more internally consistent than the *E* category of the IR scale ($p = .01$). The same is true of the *Ex* category of the ER scale; while on the other hand, the *I*, *M*, and *E-D* categories of the IR scale are all more internally consistent than the corresponding categories of the ER scale. That is, neither one of the scales has generally more consistent categories than the other.

Using the above reliability analysis as our starting point, we shall again draw attention to the content behind our various categories and scale symbols: The results of the reliability analysis suggest that consistent reactions to everyday and international conflict situations do exist. Our data suggest further that there is a certain difference between the degree of consistency of the various reaction patterns. With regard to both everyday and international situations, we find the *E* category — that is, outwardly-directed threat-oriented or *aggressive reactions* — to be the most consistent. Tendencies towards inwardly directed reactions (the *In* category) seem to be the least consistent within both types of situations; while tendencies towards passive directed reactions (the *Im* category) seem to occupy a position between

the former two. The very least consistent tendencies seem to be those of self-reproach and "avoidance of guilt" in everyday situations. Taken as a whole, however, neither everyday nor international reactions seem to distinguish themselves by generally higher internal consistencies.

Correlations Between the Sub-Scales of the R Scales

As previously mentioned, we found it appropriate to refer to various types of everyday and international situations according to the existing relationship between the subject and the conflict-creating object. In the case of everyday situations, we distinguished between 4 different types, namely impersonal (hereafter called the DS_1 scale), child-adult (DS_2), intimate (DS_3), and formal (DS_4) situations. In the case of international situations, a corresponding distinction was made between east-west neutral (IS_1), and east- and west-directed situations. Among the east-directed, the distinction depended upon whether the Soviet Union (IS_2) or a Soviet Union oriented nation (IS_3) represented the conflict-creating object. And among the west-directed, the question was whether the United States (IS_4) or a United States oriented nation or group of nations (IS_5) represented the conflict-creating object.

Thus the ER scale may be regarded as composed of 4 different sub-scales, and the IR scale, of 5 different sub-scales. The calculation of the correlation between the sub-scales within the main scales provides data elucidating the correspondence between ways of reacting to various types of everyday and international situations. In the following, we have limited ourselves to the *E* category of the two scales. As we have mentioned, this category achieves highest reliability among the primary categories of both scales. A sub-scale analysis of this category is of special interest, not least because several previous investigations have been especially concerned with aggressive reaction-patterns.

Table I,11 presents a summary of the correlation between the sub-scales of the ER scale. The table suggests that correlation between the sub-scales reveals remarkable agreement. All of the sub-scales show a positive intercorrelation. We find the highest correlation between impersonal and formal situations, the lowest between formal and adult-child situations.

Meanwhile it is important to be aware that the calculation of corre-

Table I, 11. *Correlation (r) Between the E Category of the Sub-Scales of the ER Scale ($N = 166$)*

Types of Everyday Situations	DS ₂ : Adult-child situations	DS ₃ : Intimate situations	DS ₄ : Formal situations
DS ₁ : Impersonal situations47 (.82)	.53 (.85)	.59 (.86)
DS ₂ : Adult-child situations50 (.82)	.46 (.80)
DS ₃ : Intimate situations49 (.83)

lations in this context does not provide completely comparable data. The sub-scales do not all contain exactly the same number of items. Since a scale's reliability increases with the number of items, and the correlation between two scales with the reliability of the scales, it follows that an exact comparison of the correlation between sub-scales is possible only if we are working with sub-scales of equal size.

To obtain some basis for such a comparison, we calculated the hypothetical correlations between sub-scales lengthened to approximately 40 items.¹ In the table these correlations are presented in parentheses. They show no striking difference in rank-order from the empirical ones.

Table I,12 gives a corresponding summary of the correlation between the various sub-scales of the IR scale. Here too, we have calculated hypothetical correlations for sub-scales lengthened to 40 items. These correlations will be even more hypothetical than those we calculated in the first instance, since several of these sub-scales have considerably fewer items.

The table shows the largest hypothetical correlation between IS₂ and IS₃, between IS₂ and IS₅, and between IS₄ and IS₅. The fact that we find a significant correlation between aggressive tendencies in situations which involve respectively the "Soviet Union" and "Soviet Union oriented nation", "the United States" and "United States oriented nation" — as the conflict-creating objects — is highly comprehensible in the light of current foreign affairs. The high correlation

¹ We have here used Spearman-Brown's formula (cf. 60, p. 419), and taken as our point of departure the average length of pairs of sub-scales, and how many times longer it is necessary to multiply the scales in order to get the average up to 40 items. One precondition for the use of the formula is that the scores on each pair of sub-scales have the same function, i. e. they measure the same quality. This precondition is of course only approximately present.

Table I, 12. *Correlation (r) Between the E Category of the Sub-Scales of the IR Scale (N = 162)*

Types of International Situations	IS ₂ : East-directed situations I	IS ₃ : East-directed situations II	IS ₄ : West-directed situations I	IS ₅ : West-directed situations II
IS ₁ : Neutral situations ..	.52 (.78)	.43 (.74)	.31 (.59)	.37 (.68)
IS ₂ : East-directed situations I59 (.92)	.23 (.63)	.42 (.84)
IS ₃ : East-directed situations II10 (.43)	.26 (.78)
IS ₄ : West-directed situations I35 (.79)

between situations which involve "the Soviet Union" and "United States oriented nation" as the conflict-creating object, is less comprehensible.

The lowest hypothetical correlation is found between IS₁ and IS₄, IS₃ and IS₄, and between IS₂ and IS₄. Again, as we would expect, the lowest correlation is found between reaction tendencies towards "the United States", and "the Soviet Union", and between "the United States" and "Soviet Union oriented nation" as the conflict-creating object. Likewise, as we would expect, there is a relatively low correlation between "United States oriented nation" and "Soviet Union oriented nation". The relatively low correlation between "United States" and "east-west neutral nation" is, however, of considerably greater interest. Thus our data suggest that aggressive tendencies towards "east-west neutral nation" (as the conflict creating object) are more highly correlated with aggressive tendencies towards the "Soviet Union" and "Soviet Union oriented nation" than towards the "United States" and "United States oriented nation" as the conflict-creating object.

Since it is very probable that our respondents are ideologically friendly towards the west and more hostile towards the east, we may interpret our data to mean that the idea of non-friends as enemies is somewhat more dominant than the idea of non-enemies as friends.

But the striking characteristic of our results is the considerable agreement which nevertheless exists between tendencies to aggressive reaction towards international conflict situations involving various foreign nations. All of the sub-scales show a positive inter-correlation.

oh!

Intercorrelation Between the R Scales

In this section we will attempt to explore the extent to which a positive correlation exists between a person's manifest reactions to everyday situations and his preference for corresponding national ways of reacting in international situations.

As the first step in this investigation, we calculated the correlation between all of the secondary categories of the ER and IR scales.

Table I,13. *Correlation (r) Between the Secondary Categories of the ER and IR Scales (N = 161)*

Scale Categories	IR-E	IR-In	IR-Im	IR-E-D
ER-Ex37	-.39	-.08	.28
ER-In	-.27	.44	-.10	-.36
ER-Im	-.32	.18	.20	-.09
ER-E-D	-.14	-.27	.10	.27

Table I,13 gives a summary of the results. The table shows the highest positive correlation nearly always to exist between the corresponding secondary categories of the two scales. Outwardly directed reactions in everyday situations thus seem to accompany a tendency towards outwardly directed ways of reacting in the international sphere, inwardly directed everyday ways of reacting accompany inwardly directed international ways of reacting, and so on. The highest degree of generalization actually seems to exist in the case of inwardly directed reactions, the least generalization in the case of passive directed reactions, while outwardly directed reactions occupy a middle position with respect to degree of generalization.¹

The tables show, in addition, that outwardly directed everyday

¹ Objections may be raised concerning the interpretation of our empirical correlations as indicating *generalization*. The correlation found may possibly be due to a halo effect, the fact that the ER and IR scales were administered on the same day. We have no basis for disregarding the possible effect of a common mood or sentiment having influenced the subject's responses on the two scales, but we do not believe the effect played any significant role. We would like to point out two circumstances which would probably have counteracted such a bias. The scales had quite different instructions, the ER scale continuously encouraging the subject to state how he himself would probably react, the IR scale, how the subject would prefer his nation to react. An equally important factor, we think, is the fact that a considerable time intervened between the administration of the scales. The time interval, which was approximately two hours, was interspersed with the administration of different personality tests and attitude scales.

reactions are negatively correlated with inwardly directed, and to some extent with passive directed international reaction-patterns. We also find a somewhat similar relationship in the case of inwardly directed everyday reactions, such reactions being negatively correlated with outwardly directed, and also to some extent with passive directed international reactions. On the other hand, we do not find such a unidimensional generalization in connection with passive directed reactions. Passive directed everyday tendencies show a positive correlation with both passive directed and inwardly directed international reaction patterns. Persons having a laissez-faire attitude towards everyday conflicts often seem to have just as strong a tendency towards inwardly directed as towards laissez-faire oriented international reactions.

Tendencies towards threat-oriented ways of reacting to everyday conflicts are positively correlated with corresponding international reaction patterns, but also to some extent with laissez-faire oriented international reactions. On the other hand, we find no positive correlation between threat oriented international attitudes and laissez-faire oriented everyday reactions. Tendencies towards outwardly directed ways of reacting to everyday conditions seem to be most decisive in this connection.

We have relied above on a correlation analysis of the secondary categories of the R scales. We have not attempted a complete analysis of the primary categories of these two scales, but have concentrated only on the corresponding ones. Table I,14 gives a summary of the correlation between coupled categories of the R scales. The table

Table I,14. *Correlation (r & r_{corr}) Between the ER and IR Scales ($N = 161$)*

	<i>e</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>
<i>r</i>19	.42	.15	.44	.30	.08	.37	.44	.20	.27
<i>p</i>02	.001	.06	.001	.001	.30	.001	.001	.01	.001
<i>r_{corr}</i>25	.50	.22	.70	.41	.13	.45	.63	.25	.35

shows that the primary and secondary categories of these two scales reach an average correlation of .27 and .33 respectively. The highest correlation among the primary categories exists in the case of the *E*, *I* and *m* category. For these three categories the correlations reach a significance below the 1 % level. The same holds true for the correlations among *all* the secondary categories. Least correlation

exists in the case of the *e*, *i* and *M* categories. Neither of the latter two satisfy the usual standards of statistical significance.¹

None of the categories in these two scales are without some error of measurement. Consequently, we found it interesting to study how high the correlation would have been if all the categories had had optimal reliability. On the bottom rows of the table, a summary of the hypothetical correlations is provided, correlations which have been corrected for attenuation. The average correlation for the primary categories is .39, for the secondary categories, .45.

A comparison between the coefficients in tables I,8; I,10 and I,14 shows that the correlation between the two R scales is considerably lower than each individual scale's reliability or *correlation with itself*. This is especially true of the *e*, *i*, and *M* categories; but the same relationships seem to exist in connection with all the other categories as well.

We tried to explore this matter more thoroughly by investigating whether the differences between the correlations for the two scales and each scale's correlation with itself were statistically significant. Table I,15 gives a summary of the significance of these differences — for the various primary and secondary categories — for the correlation between the two scales and the ER scale's self-correlation.² As the table indicates, we find that with the exception of the *I* category, all the differences reach a statistical significance far below the 1 % level.

Table I,16 gives a corresponding summary of the significance of the differences between the correlation of the two scales and the IR scale's self-correlation. The table shows that here too all of the differences reach a statistical significance far below the 1 % level.

Our empirical material thus indicates that in general a significant

¹ This statement is based upon the use of a two-tail criterion. If a one-tail criterion is applied we get in the case of the *i* and *M* categories, *p* values of .03 and .16 respectively.

² In the table, $D_{z_1-z_2}$, stands for the difference between the correlations in terms of *z* scores, and $\sigma_{z_1-z_2}$ for the standard error of these differences, calculated

by the formula $\sqrt{\frac{2 - 2 r_{z_1-z_2}}{N-3}}$ where $r_{z_1-z_2}$ is assumed to approximate $r_{r_{11} r_{12}}$. The

correlation between the correlations, $r_{r_{11} r_{12}}$, is furthermore calculated by the following formula

$$r_{12} = \frac{r_{11} r_{12} [1 - r_{11}^2 - 2r_{12}^2 (1 - r_{11})]}{2(1 - r_{11}^2) (1 - r_{12}^2)}$$

(cf. 102, pp. 124-5).

Table I,15. *Difference Between the ER and IR Scales' Correlation and the ER Scale's Self-Correlation*

	<i>e</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>
$D_{z_1-z_2}$683	.937	.606	.178	.665	.499	1.023	.400	.840	.556
$\sigma_{z_1-z_2}$105	.098	.107	.093	.101	.109	.100	.094	.104	.102
<i>CR</i>	6.48	9.55	5.68	1.92	6.56	4.57	10.21	4.25	8.02	5.45
<i>p</i>001	.001	.001	.05	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001

Table I,16. *Difference Between the ER and IR Scales' Correlation and the IR Scale's Self-Correlation*

	<i>e</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>
$D_{z_1-z_2}$787	.677	.709	.395	.601	.819	.608	.373	.937	1.001
$\sigma_{z_1-z_2}$106	.097	.107	.095	.101	.110	.099	.095	.106	.104
<i>CR</i>	7.45	6.96	6.63	4.18	5.95	7.48	6.17	3.95	8.87	9.67
<i>p</i>001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001

positive correlation exists between the various categories of the ER scale and corresponding categories of the IR scale, but simultaneously that the correlation for all of the categories is significantly lower than the self-correlation for any individual category.

As mentioned above, certain reaction patterns seem to be more consistent within various everyday and international situations than others. In the case of generalization between everyday and international situations too, striking differences seem to exist between various reaction patterns. The greatest generalization seems to exist in connection with self-reproachful and inwardly directed ways of reacting. The least generalization seems to exist in connection with "pardoning" (explaining away) and tendencies to "take upon oneself the responsibility for the solution of existing conflicts". Concerning the latter two ways of reacting we can scarcely speak of a generalization taking place at all. In addition, our data suggest that practically all of the reaction patterns upon which we have concentrated show a significantly greater degree of consistency among everyday and international situations respectively, than between these situations. In other words, we do not seem to be dealing with a *complete* generalization in the case of any of the reaction patterns.

C. *Summary and Conclusion*

The point of departure for this investigation was an attempt to clarify 1) whether persons have relatively general reactions to everyday and international situations, and 2) if this should be the case, to what extent a correlation exists between persons' reactions to these two types of situations.

A condition for clarifying the latter problem was the possibility of elaborating relatively equivalent reactions in these two fields of behaviour.

Reactions to frustration may be classified in different ways. On the basis of pretest results we arrived at the distinction between outwardly directed, inwardly directed and passive directed ways of reacting; and cutting across these divisions, a division between problem-oriented and threat-oriented ways of reacting. This classification showed itself to be applicable in the scoring of verbal responses to descriptions of everyday and international conflict situations.

For the registering of everyday and international reaction patterns, respectively, we used two newly constructed attitude scales. Each of these scales consisted of 40 items, and each item consisted of a short description of an everyday or international situation, with an invitation to the respondent to choose two out of the response alternatives presented. All of these response alternatives were precoded, based on uniform scoring by three independent judges, and preferably chosen from among the spontaneous responses to the pretests.

In the scale which attempted to register ways of reacting towards international relations (the IR scale), the respondents were urged to report their national action preferences; while in the scale which attempted to register reactions towards everyday conditions (the ER scale) they were urged to report how they actually would react in the existing situations.

The statistical analysis concentrated on the following points: 1) calculation of the score distribution for the individual categories and the individual items on the two scales; 2) investigation of the reliability, the differentiating ability, and the intercorrelation of the individual categories; 3) investigation of the correlation between the scales and between parts of each of the scales; and 4) investigation of the relationship between the intra- and inter-correlation of the scales. The results of our investigations support the following statements:

*general reactions
mediation*

Relatively general ways of reacting exist towards everyday conflict situations.

A person who is more apt than others to react in a certain way in an everyday conflict situation, also seems in general more apt than others to react in a similar way in other everyday conflict situations. But not all reaction patterns seem to be equally consistent. The most consistent seem to be outwardly directed and aggressive reaction tendencies; the least consistent, tendencies towards self-reproach and apologetic ways of reacting.

Relatively general ways of reacting exist towards international conflicts situations. Persons who are more apt than others to prefer their nation to react in a certain way in an international conflict situation, also seem in general more apt than others to prefer such a way of reacting in other international conflict situations. Neither do all ways of reacting seem to be equally consistent here. Tendencies towards threat-oriented and aggressive ways of reacting seem to be most consistent, tendencies towards inwardly directed ways of reacting and taking upon oneself the responsibility for solving existing conflicts, least consistent.

A positive correlation exists between reactions towards everyday and international conflict situations. Persons who are more apt than others to react in a certain way in everyday conflict situations, also seem more apt than others to prefer their nation to react in a corresponding way in international conflict situations. In this context again, there are differences between different reaction patterns. The most pronounced generalization seems to exist in the case of inwardly directed and self-reproachful ways of reacting; the least generalization in the case of absolution directed tendencies and tendencies to self-imposed responsibility for problem solution. In connection with absolution directed reaction patterns we can scarcely speak of generalization taking place at all.

A lower correlation exists between reactions to everyday and international conflict situations than between reactions to different everyday and international conflict situations respectively. In general, on the basis of the way a person is apt to react to an everyday conflict situation, we seem to be able to predict how he will probably react to other everyday conflict situations with considerably greater reliability than how he probably will prefer his nation to react in international conflict situations. Likewise, on the basis of the way a person prefers his nation to react in an international conflict situation, we seem to be able to predict how the person will probably prefer his nation to react in other conflict situations with considerably greater reliability than how he himself will probably react to everyday conflict situations.

Our results thus suggest that no complete generalization of reaction patterns in everyday and international situations occurs. Ways of reacting in everyday relationships and attitudes to international politics do not seem, strictly speaking, to “represent special areas of a person’s general social behaviour”. The Generalization Hypothesis nevertheless seems to have a certain validity, even though it cannot by itself explain all individual differences with respect to national reaction preferences in international conflict situations. The hypothesis seems to have limited validity with regard to tendencies towards offering solutions to conflict situations. Besides, it cannot explain why aggressive reactions do not show highest generalization despite the fact that this reaction type seems to be more consistent than others in both everyday and international situations. We will touch upon this question in later chapters.

CHAPTER 7

The Latency Hypothesis: A Structural Approach

The Latency Hypothesis maintains that a person's latent reaction tendencies will colour his attitudes towards foreign affairs. A structural approach to this hypothesis implies that we take as our point of departure a distinction between reaction patterns on different levels of behaviour. In principle we can distinguish between three different levels of behaviour with regard to personal reaction tendencies: the manifest (actual behaviour level), the ideal (superego level), and the latent (unconscious level).

According to the Latency Hypothesis we should expect to find a positive correlation between a person's latent reaction tendencies in everyday situations and his preference for corresponding national ways of reacting in international situations. The hypothesis, so stated, does not say anything about the dynamic processes involved. Neither does the hypothesis specify whether the same correlation will occur in the case of various reaction patterns.

In what follows we are going to describe an empirical investigation attempting to clarify: 1) whether the connection between everyday and international reactions depends upon the behaviour level to which the former reactions are anchored, and 2) if this is the case, whether a higher positive correlation exists with respect to latent, than with respect to ideal or manifest reactions.

A. Procedure

In the preceding chapter we gave a detailed description of two attitude scales for registering ways of reacting to everyday and international situations. Both scales were constructed so as to provide the

possibility of registering six different types of reactions. When choosing the six categories, we took as our point of departure a classification scheme proposed by Rosenzweig.

In the investigation presented here, we will use the same measure of attitudes towards foreign affairs, while introducing a new method for registering personal reaction patterns, a method better adapted for obtaining data on latent dispositions. We will thus be in the position of having two independent measures of everyday reactions. This will make it possible to investigate the relationship between attitudes towards foreign affairs and everyday reactions on two different levels of behaviour.

The new method which we will employ is Rosenzweig's Picture Frustration Study, hereafter referred to as the P-F Study. This is a projective test which has become very wide-spread in recent years. We will not describe the test in detail here but merely mention that it is a kind of picture association technique, that the test consists of 24 items, and that each item is a picture of the cartoon type depicting two persons who are involved in a mildly frustrating situation of common occurrence. A statement is attributed to the person on the left side of the picture which either serves to define the frustration — or represents in itself a frustrating element. The person on the right side always has a blank caption box above him. The subject is instructed to write his comments in the blank box.

To encourage projection, all facial features are removed and the figures are made to look anonymous. The instruction for the test says:

“In each of the following pictures there are two or more persons. One person is always saying something to the other. In the open space, write *the very first thing which enters your head*. Avoid being humorous. Work as fast as you can.”

The test items are scored individually, i. e. the responses in each individual picture are judged independently. After the responses to each picture have been scored, the scores are added together.

The scoring takes two main dimensions into account, namely: direction of reaction and form of reaction, each of which may be one of three different types.

Since the responses are scored in relation to both form and direction categories, we obtain 9 different combinations or *score factors* in all. A summary of the various scores, their symbols and definitions, are given in Form II,1.

Occasionally answers occur which are difficult to score. In certain

Form II, 1. Rosenzweig's Classification of Responses to the P-F Study

Direction of Reaction	Form of reaction		
	Obstacle-dominant (O-D)	Ego-defensive (E-D)	Need-persistent (N-P)
Extrapunitive (Ex)	(E) The presence of the frustrating obstacle is insistently pointed out.	(E) <i>Blame</i> , hostility, etc. are turned against some person or object in the environment. (E) The subject aggressively <i>denies</i> that he is responsible for some offence with which he is charged.	(e) The subject expects others to solve the frustrating situation.
Intropunitive (In)	(I') The frustrating obstacle is interpreted as non-frustrating or even in some sense beneficial or the subject emphasizes his embarrassment at being involved in instigating another's frustration.	(I) <i>Blame</i> , rebuke, etc. are directed by the subject on himself. (I) The subject admits his guilt, but <i>denies</i> any essential fault by referring to unavoidable circumstances.	(i) The subject offers amends and feels responsible for solving the problem.
Impunitive (Im)	(M') The obstacle in the frustrating situation is minimized almost to the point of denying its existence.	(M) <i>Blame</i> for the frustration is evaded. The situation is regarded as unavoidable. The "frustrating" individual absolved.	(m) The hope is expressed that time or normally expected circumstances will bring about a solution of the problem; patience and conformity are characteristic.

The letters in parenthesis are score symbols for the various response-categories and factors. Combinations of symbols are occasionally necessary in order to cover certain responses completely. *E* and *I* are score variants for *E* and *I*, especially to be used in superego-blocking situations, i.e. situations which do not represent any concrete obstacle but where a challenge, accusation, or complaint is directed against the subject by someone else. The P-F Study includes 8 such situations in all, namely: pictures no. 2, 5, 7, 10, 16, 17, 19 and 21. The two variants are usually considered as "denials".

The scoring symbols used above deviate somewhat from those suggested by Rosenzweig. Instead of *Ex*, *In* and *Im* Rosenzweig uses: *E*, *I*, and *M*. Since the last three symbols are identical with the factor-symbols in the *E-D* category, unnecessary confusion may easily arise.

cases it may thus be desirable to use double-scoring, but most of the responses do not raise any special problems. To simplify the scoring, Rosenzweig has also prepared scoring samples, i. e. examples of what sort of answers should be scored in relation to the various scoring factors (133).¹

When we began planning our investigation of the relationship between latent reaction tendencies and attitudes towards foreign affairs in the winter of 1952, the P-F Study soon came to our attention. It gave the impression of not being too time consuming, its scoring criteria were easily accessible, it was adaptable for use as a group test, and it was already available in Norwegian translation. To be sure, certain of the pictures were not well suited to Norwegian conditions, for example the text on the window in picture no. 9, the telephone box in picture no. 11, and the radio in picture no. 20, but these details were easily modified. When we became acquainted with the existing literature on the test we became less certain that the test was well-suited to our purposes. What primarily created uncertainty were the test's ostensible shifts in the level of behavioural anchorages. After a survey of various studies of validity carried out in the U. S., we came to the conclusion stated in an earlier monograph, that:

“Without knowledge concerning which level of behaviour has been tapped, it is our impression that the P-F Study has very limited applicability. The worth of this test seems to a great extent to depend upon the development of special methods for registering the level of behavioural anchorage in any individual case” (20, p. 81).

A standardized procedure for deciding which level of behaviour is tapped has not yet been elaborated. The applicability of the P-F Study consequently depends upon whether it is possible to develop such a procedure.

If this were possible, and we then found the test did not tap the latent level of behaviour in certain cases, we could discard these cases from our further analysis.

Rosenzweig himself seems to be aware that the test may be anchored on various levels. In an article written in 1950 he points out that it

¹ In addition to the summation of individual scores in relation to the scoring categories and factors, called *profiles*, the individual scores also provide the basis for the calculation of so-called *patterns*, *tendencies*, and a *group conformity rating (GCR)*. Since in our empirical analysis we have limited ourselves to working exclusively with profiles, with the three direction and form categories, we will not go into more detail concerning these other indexes here.

is usual to ascribe the test to the explicit (manifest) level of behaviour, but he simultaneously emphasizes that this is only a working hypothesis which ought to be checked in each individual case. "At the same time," he writes, "there is no guarantee of correctness for this working assumption, and it thus becomes incumbent upon the careful examiner to seek from whatever sources he can all possible supplementary information as to the actual level adopted by the subject in the test performance" (132, p. 70). Rosenzweig mentions that the reaction time may often provide relevant clues and further recommends a short interview after the test has been given.

Since we wished to administer the test to groups, the interview method was not tenable, but we found that a short questionnaire would not involve appreciable difficulties. The questionnaire could easily be added to the test itself, and presented to the subjects immediately after they had answered the 24 test items.

We chose to concentrate on this method and prepared a questionnaire consisting of three questions, which were introduced in the following way: "*On what basis did you answer the questions on the preceding pages?*"

Then followed:

- A. When you wrote in the replies, did you ever think of yourself in the same situation, and what you would have said in that situation?
- B. When you wrote in the replies, did you ever put down what you assumed you *actually would have said* in the same situation?
- C. When you wrote in the replies, did you ever put down what you felt you *ought to have said* in the same situation, with no consideration of how you probably would have acted in that situation?

A 5-point scale was presented after each of these questions: ALWAYS — OFTEN — OCCASIONALLY — SELDOM — NEVER, to which numbers from 1 to 5 were assigned. The instructions given the subjects followed immediately after the first question: "*Put a circle around the number below the answer which you feel fits best.*"

Each of the questions aimed at obtaining information about the extent to which the various levels of behaviour were tapped: question A, to what extent the subject had let unconscious (latent) tendencies slip in; question B, to what extent the responses expressed ordinary, everyday ego-control; and question C, to what extent the subject had been influenced by superego considerations.

By assigning a weight from 1 to 5 to the responses to each of the above questions we hoped to obtain an expression of each subject's inclination towards the various levels. On question A, ALWAYS was thus assigned a weight of 1, and NEVER a weight of 5, while opposite values were given the last two questions.

We have no expectation that this method will always give completely reliable information about the level of behaviour tapped by the test. It obviously needs independent validation.¹

When we started the investigation we hoped that there would be a certain degree of variation in the level reached by the test. This would enable us to control the validity of the method indirectly. If the method were valid, we would expect to find a higher correlation with the ER scale, the more the P-F Study was tapping the manifest level.

The ER scale refers to the method previously mentioned for registering manifest reactions to everyday situations. Supposition that this method has a manifest anchorage is built exclusively on presumption. An examination of our level-determining method would consequently also give us a certain control of the validity of the ER scale. In none of these cases would we be dealing with a really independent validation, but a kind of mutual control.

The above method of level-determination was developed in the spring of 1952, and administered as a part of the P-F Study in collecting our data in the fall of the same year. That is, the P-F Study was administered as a group test which was part of a larger battery of attitude scales. The testing time varied somewhat; on the average it was about 25 minutes.

B. *Results*

The P-F Study turned out to be easy to administer. Some problems arose in connection with the scoring, however. As soon as the collection of data was completed and the scoring was to begin, we were confronted with the choice of using the scoring samples in the American

¹ An objection may be raised to the above procedure of determining the response level applied. What guarantee do we have that the subject is not rationalizing, that he is actually aware of his own level of response, that he answers honestly the questions which confront him?

It is possible to examine at least to some extent whether the subject's answers are reciprocally valid, whether answers indicating frequent use of a certain level are followed by answers indicating infrequent use of the other two levels; but it must obviously be admitted that rationalizations may often be made with perfect logic.

test manual as the basis of our scoring, or of freeing ourselves completely from these and emphasizing exclusively the principal scoring criteria.

We decided to use both methods of scoring in order to find out whether a direct translation of the American scoring samples could be of value under Norwegian conditions. First the P-F protocols were independently scored by two persons, one carefully following the scoring samples, the other exclusively using the fundamental scoring categories. Next, all responses on which complete agreement was not reached were rescored independently by a third person, without the use of the scoring samples.¹ In the cases where the third scorer did not agree with either of the first two, the responses were submitted to joint discussion and scoring. Otherwise, the score agreed upon by 2 out of 3 was retained.

We have given a complete presentation of the results of this reliability investigation in a previous work (20). Here we will merely mention that the agreement between the first two scores was 72 %, the agreement between 2 out of 3 scorers was 92 %, and that the results suggest that the use of a Norwegian translation of the American scoring samples is worth while. In general, our results show that the P-F Study has a relatively satisfactory scoring reliability.²

The reliability in the sense of internal consistency of the P-F categories, on the other hand, does not seem to be so satisfactory. To obtain some measure of this, we again used Hoyt's analysis of variance technique. Likewise we calculated hypothetical scores for the protocols having one unscorable or missing response. In all, our computation of internal reliability was based upon 136 respondents.

Table II, 1 gives a summary of the various categories' mean, standard deviation, reliability coefficient, standard error of measurement, and ability to differentiate — expressed in the form of the statistical significance (p) of the relationship (F) between the person and the residual variance.

Our results suggested that all the categories, except the *In* category, are capable of differentiating between subjects in a statistically

¹ The first two scorers were cand. psychol. Kjell Larsson and cand. psychol. Arne Lie, and the third was the author.

² The various items showed quite a large variation in scoring reliability. Especially items no. 8 and 17 seemed to elicit ambiguous responses. By removing these items the test as a whole would probably gain considerably higher scoring reliability.

Table II,1. *Statistical Data Concerning the Various Score Categories of the P-F Study (N = 136)*

	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>O-D</i>	<i>E-D</i>	<i>N-P</i>
<i>M</i>	11.54	5.84	6.63	4.19	13.30	6.51
σ	2.91	1.70	2.21	1.89	2.54	2.39
<i>r_H</i>53	.14	.40	.28	.27	.43
σ_e	1.95	1.54	.167	1.57	1.98	1.75
<i>F</i> *	2.12	1.16	1.65	1.38	1.57	1.77
<i>p</i>01	—	.01	.01	.01	.01

* For 1 & ∞ df.: $F_{.05} = 1.24$
 $F_{.01} = 1.36$

satisfactory manner. The *In* category, on the contrary, reaches no statistical significance, and we have consequently excluded it from our further statistical analyses.

A closer study of the reliability coefficients shows that the internal consistency of most of the categories is relatively small. The degree of confidence which can be attributed to our registered scores is consequently limited — so limited that, from a psychometric point of view, the test must be described as poorly suited to evaluation of individual persons.¹

This limited reliability can probably be attributed, at least to some extent, to the fact that our sample of subjects is relatively homogeneous; but it is also probable that there are internal weaknesses inherent in the test. Thus an analysis of the distribution of responses to the various items brings to light a very marked favouring of responses to certain of the items.²

Another point of view which may be relevant is that the low

¹ We are here referring exclusively to the P-F Study's secondary categories. Our previous analysis of the ER scale shows that the reliability of the secondary categories is in general higher than that of the primary categories. We have assumed that the same is true of the P-F Study. We have consequently excluded the primary categories (factors) of the P-F Study from our statistical analysis. The fact that the same rank order appears when comparing the internal consistency of the direction categories of the ER scale and the P-F Study calls for attention. In both instances we find that outwardly directed reactions are the most consistent, and inwardly directed reactions the least consistent.

² Those items primarily referred to here are: nos. 7, 10, and 19. An exclusion of these items would seem to increase reliability.

reliability may be a function of the P-F Study's susceptibility to shifts in response levels. We do not have sufficient material to clarify this problem. Nevertheless our data do confirm that the test has an inconsistent behavioural anchorage. Table II,2 gives a summary of the P-F Study's presumed anchorage among our subjects.

Table II,2. *Levels Tapped by the P-F Study (N = 166)*

Question	Presumed Response Level	Inclination Towards the Various Levels					
		1	2	3	4	5	M
A	Latent	30	89	43	3	1	2.13
B	Manifest	2	6	47	82	29	3.78
C	Ideal	36	44	56	25	5	2.51

This table shows the distribution of responses to the three questions which supplement the P-F Study. The distribution suggests that the subjects most frequently used the manifest level of response. The considerable variety which exists is very striking, however. A relatively small number seem to have used the manifest level of response throughout the whole test. Many seem occasionally to have used the ideal and latent levels; and a few seem to have used these levels throughout the whole test.

It is remarkable that the latent level seems to have been rarely tapped. This suggests that the P-F Study has not functioned as a real projective method; that is, that it has registered unconscious reaction tendencies to a very limited extent.

Correlation Between the P-F Study and the ER Scale

As previously mentioned, we expected to find certain shifts of response levels. We in fact hoped to find that some of our subjects had answered the P-F Study on the manifest level, as this would give us an opportunity to control the validity of our level determination. If that were valid, we would expect to find a significant correlation between the P-F Study and the ER scale for the sub-sample which had answered the P-F Study on the manifest level. This follows from our assumption that this level is tapped by the ER scale. The first problem to be tackled in this connection was which response classification we should use to find the pertinent sub-sample. In principle,

we found it possible to distinguish between a relative and an absolute method of classification. The latter differentiates between more or less consistent use of the various levels. Form II, 2 illustrates this method:

Form II, 2. *Scheme for Classification of Subjects According to Degree of Consistency of Responses*

Level	Tendency	Preponderance	Consistency
Latent	$B \leq A \geq C$	$B < A > C$	$A > B + C$
Manifest	$A \leq B \geq C$	$A < B > C$	$B > A + C$
Ideal	$A \leq C \geq B$	$A < C > B$	$C > A + B$

The classification is built upon the individual subject's answers to all three questions. *A* stands for "degree of anchorage" to the latent level, *B* for "degree of anchorage" to the manifest level, and *C* for "degree of anchorage" to the ideal level. By "degree of anchorage" we mean the degree to which the subject has used — or rather, says he has used — the specific level, whether his response has been assigned a weight of 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1, i. e. whether the person in question indicates he has used that particular level always, often, occasionally, seldom, or never.

We have distinguished between tendency, preponderance and consistency. The first step in the classification is taken with regard to tendencies. All those who showed an anchorage to one level of response, as great as or greater than their anchorage to the other two levels, are described as having a *tendency* with regard to that level. Subjects who had an equal anchorage to all levels are described as having a tendency with regard to all levels. Subjects who had a similar anchorage to two levels and a lesser anchorage to the third level, were ascribed a tendency with regard to the two first levels, and so on.

The next step was to differentiate those who not only had a tendency, but a real preponderance for a particular level. We ascribed a *preponderance* to a subject who had a greater anchorage to one level than to the other two.

Finally we distinguished from among those subjects who had a preponderance on one level, those who had consistently made use of that level. We ascribed *consistency* to those subjects who had an anchorage to one level greater than the sum of their anchorages to the other two levels.

Table II, 3 gives a summary of our subjects' levels of response, based on this method of classification.

Table II, 3. *Distribution of Subjects According to Degree of Consistency of Responses (N = 166)*

Level	Tendency	Preponderance	Consistency
Latent	30	6	2
Manifest	149	100	31
Ideal	53	10	0

The table clearly indicates that very few subjects have consistently used one level only. The fact that practically no one seems to have made consistent use of either the latent or the ideal level, and that very few even show a preponderance for these levels, sharply limits the utility of an absolute classification method.

A relative classification method does not have the same limitations. Such a method entails classifying the material in terms of extreme groups on the various levels. Concretely, we proceeded in the following way:

As an extreme group on the manifest level we chose those who answered that they always used the manifest level, that is, those who marked ALWAYS in response to question B. As an extreme group on the ideal level we used those who had marked ALWAYS or OFTEN in response to question C; and as an extreme group on the latent level, those who had marked OCCASIONALLY, SELDOM, or NEVER in response to question A. In a few cases conflicts arose, i. e. when the subjects had marked OFTEN to question C and OCCASIONALLY to question A. In these cases the subject was placed in the extreme group on the ideal level.

It is evident from Table II, 2 that if we start out with all those who answered our level scale, we find 47, 29, and 30 subjects in the extreme groups on respectively the latent, manifest, and ideal levels. These groups are all large enough for statistical analyses.

The relative classification method obviously does not provide a basis for investigating the relationship between manifest and latent tendencies: but it does provide a basis for testing the validity of our level determination. The comparison between extreme groups will inform us as to whether a higher correlation actually exists between the P-F Study and the ER scale, the more we concentrate on those who responded on the manifest level in the P-F Study.

Table II, 4 gives a summary of the correlation between the categories of the P-F Study and the corresponding secondary categories

Table II, 4. *Correlation (r) Between the Secondary Categories of the ER Scale and the Corresponding Categories of the P-F Study ($N = 135$)*

	<i>Ex</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>	<i>N-P</i>	M_z
r43	.32	.11	.16	.26
p001	.001	.20	.06	—

of the ER scale. The table shows a highly significant correlation in the case of direction categories, while the correlation for the two form categories only reaches a statistical significance at the 20 % and 6 % level respectively.¹ The mean (M_z) of the correlations is .26.

Considering the susceptibility to shifts of response levels in the P-F Study we did not expect to find an especially high correlation with the ER scale. On the other hand, the P-F Study's strong tendency to elicit responses on the manifest level should imply a *certain* degree of positive correlation.

By using the relative classification method, we obtain three extreme groups of 33, 24, and 23 subjects respectively. The fact that these groups are somewhat smaller than those mentioned previously is due to the fact that we are now concentrating exclusively on subjects who have given "complete" responses on both tests. When combined, the extreme groups make up 59 % of this sample.

Table II, 5 shows the correlation between the P-F Study and the ER scale, for each of the extreme groups.

Table II, 5. *Correlation (r) Between the P-F Study and the ER Scale, Calculated Separately for Three Extreme Groups*

Category	Latent Extr. Gr. ($N = 33$)	Manifest Extr. Gr. ($N = 24$)	Ideal Extr. Gr. ($N = 23$)
<i>Ex</i>52	.68	.41
<i>Im</i>30	.54	.48
<i>E-D</i>14	.48	.10
<i>N-P</i>12	.34	-.15
M_z28	.52	.23

It is evident from the table that the extreme group with regard to the manifest level of response presents the highest correlations in all categories.

¹ If a one-tail criterion is used, the *N-P* category is also statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Due to the relatively small samples, the significance of the differences between correlations is almost negligible. However, if we compare the extreme group on the manifest level with the rest of the total sample, we find differences reaching a certain degree of statistical significance.

Table II,6 gives a summary of the differences between correlations for these two samples. The table indicates that differences approximating statistical significance occur with respect to the *Ex* and *E-D* categories, and that the differences regarding the other categories are all in the expected direction.¹

Table II,6. *Difference Between Correlations Regarding the Extreme Group on the Manifest Level and the Rest of the Total Sample*

Category	Manifest Extr. Gr. ($N = 24$)	Remainder ($N = 111$)	Diff.	CR	p
<i>Ex</i>68	.38	.30	1.80	.07
<i>Im</i>54	.27	.27	1.37	.17
<i>E-D</i>48	.07	.41	1.90	.06
<i>N-P</i>34	.12	.22	.98	.33

The results strongly indicate the importance of knowing which level of behaviour is tapped by the P-F Study.

The same conclusion may also be drawn from another investigation, which has been treated at length in a previous monograph.² Briefly, this investigation dealt with the relationship between the P-F Study and behavioural evaluations made by psychologists from the Psychological Division of the Norwegian Armed Forces. These behavioural evaluations primarily aimed at rating the subjects' tendency to goal-oriented vs. threat-oriented manifest behaviour. The correlation between this dimension and the *E-D* category of the P-F Study was — .19. Using the absolute classification method mentioned above, we found a variation from + .40 to — .45; and using the relative classification

¹ If a one-tail criterion is used, both the *Ex* and *E-D* categories reach statistical significance below the 5 % level.

² In that monograph (20) we presented a more thorough discussion of the problem-complex of response level. Also included is a systematic comparison between our P-F data and Rosenzweig's norms for adults and the test profiles of a small sample of pupils from a Norwegian reform school.

method, a variation from $+ .18$ to $- .52$. In both cases the differences between correlations were statistically significant, and in both cases we found the highest correlation ($- .45$ and $- .52$) when the manifest level was most consistently used.

Our results suggest that our method for level-determination has some validity if we assume that the ER scale reflects reactions on the manifest level. On the other hand, they suggest that the ER scale does reflect this level, if we assume that our level-scaling gives valid information. We may regard our results as supporting both assumptions.

Correlation Between the P-F Study and the IR Scale

We have so far mainly concentrated on the level anchorage and the statistical properties of the P-F Study. We have concerned ourselves mainly with category designations and left the question of content in the background. We will now reconsider the relationship between everyday and international reactions.

Table II, 7 gives a summary of the correlation between the categories of the P-F Study and the corresponding secondary categories of the IR scale.

Table II, 7. *Correlation (r) Between the Secondary Categories of the IR Scale and the Corresponding Categories of the P-F Study ($N = 135$)*

	<i>Ex</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>	<i>N-P</i>	<i>M_z</i>
<i>r</i>13	-.05	-.003	.03	.01
<i>p</i>13	.55	.98	.70	—

We do not find a significant correlation in connection with any of the categories. The results suggest that apparently no relationship exists between reactions to everyday conflict-situations and preferences for corresponding national ways of reacting in the international sphere.

Thus our results are in complete agreement with Lindzey's (cf. p. 52). As we have stated, Lindzey found no significant correlation between the P-F Study and hostile attitudes towards outgroups. One weakness in Lindzey's investigation, however, is that no check was made on the levels tapped by the P-F Study.

Aided by the relative classification method previously discussed,

we have distinguished extreme groups on the various levels of response in the P-F Study. Table II,8 gives a summary of the correlation between the P-F Study and the IR scale for each of the extreme groups. The groups include exactly the same subjects as in Table II,5.

The table shows that the highest mean correlation between the P-F Study and the IR scale occurs in the extreme groups on the latent and ideal levels. The correlations, however, tend in opposite directions in these two samples. In the extreme group on the latent level, we find only positive correlations; while in the extreme group on the ideal level we find only negative correlations.

Table II,8. *Correlation (r) Between the P-F Study and the IR Scale Calculated Separately for Three Extreme Groups*

Category	Latent Extr. Gr. ($N = 33$)	Manifest Extr. Gr. ($N = 24$)	Ideal Extr. Gr. ($N = 23$)
<i>Ex</i>15	.16	-.42
<i>Im</i>47	-.21	-.19
<i>E-D</i>02	.14	-.13
<i>N-P</i>29	.05	-.26
M_z24	.03	-.25

Table II,9. *Difference Between Correlations Regarding Extreme Groups on the Ideal and Latent Levels*

Category	Latent Extr. Gr. ($N = 33$)	Ideal Extr. Gr. ($N = 23$)	Diff.	<i>CR</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Ex</i>15	-.42	.57	2.07	.04
<i>Im</i>47	-.19	.66	2.43	.02
<i>E-D</i>02	-.13	.15	.52	.60
<i>N-P</i>29	-.26	.55	1.96	.05

Table II,9 gives a summary of the difference between correlations in these two extreme groups. In all the categories, a higher positive correlation occurs in the extreme group on the latent level. In the case of 3 out of 4 categories, the difference is statistically significant on the 5 % level.¹

¹ If a one-tail criterion is used, the three categories reach statistical significance below the 3% level.

Our empirical results suggest that the correlation between the P-F Study and the IR scale depends upon which level of behaviour is tapped by the P-F Study. Or, in other words: the correlation between international and everyday reactions seems to a decisive degree to depend upon the behaviour level to which the latter reactions are anchored. A positive correlation seems to occur when we concentrate on latent tendencies, and a negative correlation when we concentrate on ideal tendencies. This finding indicates that strong latent impulses will often occur with diametrically opposite ideals, and that these two factors will both be associated with attitudes concerning foreign affairs, but their association will be different, the one positive, the other negative. The opposite direction of these correlations brings into mind our previous considerations concerning the inner split characterizing the authoritarian personality and thus bridges the gap between structural and dynamic considerations.

The extreme groups on the latent and ideal levels represent extreme groups with regard to what we may call "ego-control" in responding to the P-F Study. We should thus expect that our third extreme group, on the manifest level, would provide correlations ranging between the other two in size. This we find to be only approximately true.

According to Table II,8 the latent extreme group's average correlation is .24, the manifest extreme group's .03, and the ideal extreme group's -.25. Thus with regard to means, the manifest extreme group occupies a middle position. If we consider the individual categories, the picture becomes more highly differentiated. We are dealing with such small samples here that the reliability of the various correlations is extremely limited. In spite of this, there are a few aspects which attract our attention.

First of all, there is the *Ex* category's positive correlation which is much higher than that of the *Im* category in the manifest extreme group. This supports our previous findings that manifest outwardly directed reactions are more generalized than passive directed ones. Secondly, the difference between the *Ex* category's correlation in the extreme latent and manifest groups seems to be completely insignificant, while we find a significant difference between these two extreme groups in the case of the *Im* category. While in the former case we find an approximately significant difference between the manifest and ideal extreme groups, the difference in the latter case is completely insignificant. Thus, a detailed analysis of our data gives no support to the view that manifest everyday reactions always stand between latent and ideal tendencies.

In general, both latent and manifest everyday outwardly directed reaction tendencies seem to be positively correlated with outwardly directed ways of reacting in the international sphere; while a significantly higher correlation seems to exist between passive directed international reactions and corresponding latent ones, than with corresponding manifest everyday reaction patterns.¹

It is important to reemphasize that our extreme groups having a proclivity for the latent and ideal levels do not consist of subjects who have consistently exposed their latent or ideal levels of behaviour. Strictly speaking, our data do not allow us to make any conclusions concerning the magnitude of correlation between international ways of reacting and latent and ideal reaction-tendencies proper in everyday situations.

It may seem strange that the P-F Study does not show a higher correlation with the IR scale in the manifest extreme group, considering the positive correlation which we have previously found between the P-F Study and the ER scale, and between the ER scale and the IR scale. While the average correlation of the ER scale's secondary categories with the IR scale is .33, the correlation of the P-F Study in the manifest extreme groups is only .03.

Two conditions are especially worthy of consideration in this connection: firstly, the relatively small sample who have responded to the P-F Study consistently on the manifest level; secondly the significantly lower internal consistency of the P-F Study, compared with the ER scale. If we take into account the difference in the latter area, we find quite a large agreement between the two methods. If we assume that these two methods have the same degree of internal consistency in the sub-sample as in the total sample, we obtain for the manifest extreme group when correcting for attenuation an average correlation between them of .96 (cf. 20, p. 111). As shown in Table II, 5 the mean of the empirical correlations attains .52 only. The discrepancy between these two means indicates explicitly the extent to which errors of measurement affect our empirical findings at this point.

¹ The relatively high positive correlation of the *Im* category in the extreme latent group, seen in relation to the very low generalization found in the preceding chapter as far as this category is concerned, might indicate a relatively high penetration of latent impunitive tendencies on to the international sphere. Following this line of reasoning, the relatively low generalization found as regards the *Ex* category in relation to its high internal consistency, might indicate the influence of latent extrapunitive tendencies.

C. *Summary and Conclusion*

The starting point for this investigation was an attempt to clarify whether reaction patterns in international conflict situations are positively correlated with latent reaction-tendencies in everyday situations.

We have previously presented a detailed account of two attitude scales (the ER and IR scales) for registering reactions to everyday and international situations respectively. The former scale was constructed to provide information about manifest reaction patterns. Its scoring categories are generally the same as those used in the scoring of Rosenzweig's Picture Frustration Study.

In planning this investigation, we chose the P-F Study as a method for registering latent tendencies. An examination of various studies of its validity convinced us, however, that the P-F Study probably does not always provide data on latent dispositions. In order to check the level tapped by the test, we developed a level-scale which followed the test as a supplement. This scale attempted to register the degree to which the individual subject had exposed latent, manifest, and ideal reaction tendencies. The test instructions and the text of the pictures were already available in Norwegian translation. In order to adapt the picture material to Norwegian conditions, we made some minor changes.

Our empirical results suggest that the scoring reliability of the P-F Study is relatively satisfactory, but that several of the scoring categories have a low internal consistency. Furthermore, our data suggest that the P-F Study provides very little information about latent reaction-tendencies. In a majority of the subjects, the test seems to have tapped predominantly the manifest level, but some seem also to have been strongly influenced by ideal considerations. The results suggest that the P-F Study is susceptible to shifts in level of behaviour.

We were prepared to find a certain degree of shift, and had planned to profit by this circumstance by reciprocally checking the validity of our level-scaling and the levels tapped by the ER scale. However, we were not prepared to find that practically none of the subjects consistently exposed latent tendencies. This deterred us from clarifying the relationship between latent and manifest tendencies as we originally had planned. Nevertheless, a sufficiently wide variation did exist in the subjects' levels of response on the P-F Study to make it possible to distinguish extreme groups on different levels.

Starting with this distinction, our data indicate that the highest correlation between the P-F Study and the ER scale occurs in the group having an extreme manifest anchorage on the P-F Study. We have interpreted this partially as supporting the validity of our level-scaling, partially as supporting our assumption that the ER scale actually registers manifest reaction patterns.

Furthermore our empirical data support the following statements:

The correlation between international and everyday reactions varies according to the behavioural level upon which the everyday reactions are anchored. While we do not find any correlation worthy of notice between the P-F Study and the IR scale for the sample as a whole, the picture changes when we consider sub-samples according to which level of behaviour is exposed in the P-F Study, whether predominant latent, manifest, or ideal levels are tapped by the test.

International reactions show a significantly higher positive correlation with latent, than with ideal everyday reactions. While in the case of various latent tendencies we consistently seem to find positive correlations with corresponding international reaction patterns, we just as consistently find negative correlations between international and predominant ideal everyday reactions.

Thus our data indirectly support the viewpoint that non-aggressive behavioural preferences in everyday situations often have the same positive relationship to aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs as latent aggressive tendencies. On the other hand, our data give no support to the view that international reactions always show a significantly higher positive correlation with latent than with manifest everyday reactions — or always show a significantly higher positive correlation with manifest than with ideal everyday tendencies. In the latter two cases, we seem to be dealing with significant differences according to which reaction patterns we are studying.

CHAPTER 8

The Latency Hypothesis: A Dynamic Approach

In the preceding chapter our intention was to investigate the relationship between attitudes towards foreign affairs and everyday reaction patterns at different levels of behaviour. The design of the investigation was such that we more or less took it for granted that latent reaction tendencies will always be present, and that there will always be certain inconsistencies between a person's ideal, manifest and latent tendencies.

In the present chapter we shall describe yet another investigation of the Latency Hypothesis, but its point of departure will differ from the foregoing in that this time we shall direct our attention to dynamic personality traits which are presumed to represent nuclei for discrepancies between different levels of behaviour. We shall concentrate on psychodynamic conflicts and regard them as decisive for the degree to which latent aggression exists in an individual. Thus we shall look upon the Latency Hypothesis as an assertion that an association will exist between displacement of aggression on to foreign affairs and the extent to which basic impulse patterns are conflict-charged or not. This follows from our earlier assumption that latent aggression is mainly a result of childhood experiences which have given rise to the repression of aggressive impulses, that such impulses will originally only be mobilized in situations characterized by outer frustrations or dangers, and that the possibility of severe frustrations resulting in permanent repression of aggression is present particularly in connection with the emergence and socialization of basic impulse patterns, i.e. infantile libidinal drives. We will assume further that latent aggression will always influence manifest everyday behaviour, but that

no definite correlation will necessarily exist with tendencies towards overt aggression (in a quantitative sense) in everyday situations.

As regards the relationship between dissimilar psychodynamic conflicts (or psychosexual fixations) we find it reasonable to disassociate ourselves from the conception of a one-to-one relationship between the form of treatment to which an individual has been exposed in connection with a particular impulse pattern and the degree of conflict emerging from it. Constitutional factors and prior influences will always be partly decisive, we think. Following the classic Freudian train of reasoning we believe that early fixation or inhibition of emotional development will lead to reduced resistance towards later "psychotoxic" influences. The fact that the various psychosexual phases of development overlap to a certain extent will have a modifying effect. On the other hand we feel reluctant to go too far in presuming that the result will be the same irrespective of whether an "authoritarian" upbringing is general or particular. It has been assumed, after all, that an intercorrelation exists between different psychosexual fixations (13).

The above comments may be taken to mean that we wish to test certain genetic propositions concerning personality formations. This is not the case. We have referred to them solely as the background for certain dynamic propositions which form the foci for our investigation.

In the following description of our investigation we aim at clarifying in brief outline: 1) how far conflicts in connection with various basic impulse patterns are intercorrelated; 2) how far a relationship exists between basic impulse conflicts and international and everyday reaction tendencies; and 3) whether and how far aggressive international reaction tendencies are more highly associated with conflicts in connection with some particular impulse patterns than with others.

A. Procedure

We will here give a detailed description of our procedure for registering conflicts in connection with basic psychosexual impulses.

The method we have used is a Norwegian revision of Blum's *Blacky Pictures* (13, 14).¹ This is a projective method of relatively recent

¹ Every investigation aiming at the diagnosis of psychodynamic conflicts encounters considerable methodological difficulties. Earlier investigations in this area have been criticized for their lack of unambiguous scoring categories, of demonstrable validity of the methods applied, of independence in the scoring of

date, and the empirical material available for clarifying its validity is limited. A number of empirical investigations undertaken during the past few years have nevertheless given promising results (e. g. 7, 13, 15, 106). At present a total of about thirty scientific works exist in which this method has been used or discussed. Six or seven of these works are doctoral theses. It should be mentioned also that the method has been given a good reception by several clinical psychologists.¹

The validity of a projective test will always be highly dependent on the way in which it is used and on the basic theory behind the interpretation of the raw material. Later on we will summarize our basic theory in connection with a discussion of our scoring principles. First, however, we will give a general description of the method itself and how it was used.

The Blacky method consists of eleven pictures plus an introductory picture. The method differs from the majority of projective personality tests in that it is constructed for the purpose of registering quite definite psychodynamic factors. It aims at giving a coherent summary of the underlying psychosexual aspects of personality, but it is constructed with a view to the elucidation of comparatively limited psychoanalytical dimensions or concepts. Its purpose is to clarify conflicts in the psychosexual development in its widest sense: to what extent there exist fixations in connection with oral, anal and phallic impulses, masturbation conflicts, oedipal conflicts, sibling jealousy, identification problems, guilt problems; what kind of defence mecha-

various categories, and of understanding of the limitations implicit in comparisons of extreme groups (73).

When planning our investigation we tried to take some of these arguments into account. We did not include extreme groups exclusively; instead of clinical interviewing we made use of a projective test; and instead of a molar we used a relatively molecular procedure, i.e. we scored various categories on an independent basis. In this way we avoided knowledge of a subject's answer in one connection influencing the scoring in another connection. On the other hand our investigation is not free of certain sources of error. Our use of a projective method prevented subjective factors intruding on the collected data but the scoring of the data builds on various unproved assumptions.

¹ According to our experience with the method in clinical work it seems to be well suited to the clarification of various forms of conflicts connected with primary impulses. In a number of cases where control was possible it has on the whole given the same results as other more well-known diagnostic methods, and it has also in several cases been possible to verify its results indirectly by later therapeutic observations. Such personal experience is of course far from sufficient for establishing the validity of the method.

nism a person is likely to make use of; and what kinds of ideals, object relationships, and self-image characterize the person in question.

The Blacky method was originally constructed with a view to testing psychoanalytical hypotheses concerning psychosexual sex differences and the interrelation between different psychosexual phenomena. As a result it has been given a more limited theoretical aim than most personality tests. This is both its strongest and its weakest aspect. Among its advantages there is the possibility of reaching conclusions concerning deep-lying motivation processes without putting excessive pressure on the empirical data. Blum mentions this problem as being an important reason behind his construction of the Blacky Pictures. He freely recognizes the value of such well-established methods as the Rorschach and the TAT, and considers a factual knowledge of these methods to be a necessary qualification for the use of the Blacky method in a clinical context; but he emphasizes strongly that he was often struck previously by how great the distance often was between the test data originated by these methods, and their interpretation in the direction of "castration anxiety", "anal super-ego", "narcissistic love-object", etc.

In order to ease the problem of interpretation, Blum adopts a policy, indications of which may be found in Bellak's Children Apperception Test (CAT), but which Blum takes a good deal further, using pictures presenting situations which reflect possible conflict points fairly directly. In this way the picture materials will naturally be exceedingly structured — so much so that one is in fact in danger of losing the possibility of projection mechanism coming into play. In order to compensate for this, Blum makes use of animal themes. Here again he copies one of CAT's main features, but in contrast to the fairy story character of the CAT pictures he chooses cartoons and, in particular, Walt Disney's animal drawings, as his models. It is, however, important to note that the Blacky method is primarily constructed for adults. Blum concentrates on a very small number of animals — a family of dogs — and by means of the test instructions tries to fixate the subjects' identification to one of the puppies; partly by introducing it as the main figure in the cartoon, partly by presenting it as son and daughter in turn for male and female subjects respectively.

The use of drawings of dogs is motivated by the fact that this lessens the possibility of provoking inhibitory resistance, but at the same time has sufficient reality as an identification object, so that the subjects can project their innermost feelings. "It seems almost," Blum

writes, "as if the animal cartoons appeal directly to the residues of childish, pre-logical thinking in adults, despite the added fact that they are telling about themselves. In most cases, insight into the purpose of the procedure seems to have a negligible effect upon performance . . ." (14, p. 2).

The name of the puppy depicted in all the pictures is Blacky — from which the method takes its name. Altogether the pictures aim at illustrating the following dimensions: 1) oral eroticism, 2) oral sadism, 3) anal sadism, 4) oedipal intensity, 5) masturbation guilt, 6) castration anxiety (or penis envy among female subjects), 7) positive identification, 8) sibling jealousy, 9) guilt feelings, 10) ego ideal, and 11) love object.

In addition to the pictures the method includes two sets of inquiry cards, one set for women and one for men. These cards are constructed as a means of follow-up immediately after the recording of spontaneous stories about each picture. Thus each story is followed by a series of questions, usually six, aimed at deepening and clarifying the way in which the subjects have reacted to the picture. Some of the questions are open-ended, but most have four alternative answers for the subjects to choose from.

The scoring of the method is based partly on the spontaneous stories, partly on the answers to the inquiry cards, and partly on picture preferences after the test itself is over. The subject is asked to say which pictures he likes and which he dislikes, and then which picture he likes best and which least. Special scoring criteria are used both in connection with the answers to the inquiry cards and the content of the spontaneous stories.

The first problem to arise when the method was being adapted to Norwegian conditions was that of naming. In addition to Blacky, who is introduced as a male dog to male, and as a bitch to female subjects, some of the pictures also illustrate two older dogs, which are introduced respectively as "Mama" and "Papa", and a younger dog, introduced as "Tippy", without its sex being specified.

When the method was worked out in the United States the name Blacky was chosen because it was empirically shown that most women considered it to be the name of a bitch, while most men regarded it as a male dog's name. The name Tippy was chosen because both men and women thought it to be equally often the name of a bitch and of a male dog.

The importance of associations with the same sex where Blacky

is concerned, and uncertain sex where Tippy is concerned is due to our wish to reproduce certain identification mechanisms.

In transposing the method to Norwegian conditions the questions arose as to whether the names Blacky and Tippy gave rise to the same sex associations here as in the United States. If this were not the case it would be necessary to find new names. In order to throw light on this a questionnaire was worked out in the autumn of 1953 consisting of a list of 40 different names of dogs.¹ The questionnaire was answered by 50 persons of different sex, age and occupation. For each name each person was asked to say 1) whether he or she liked the name, and 2) whether the name stood for a male dog or a bitch.

The result of the investigation was that the name Blacky was retained. It showed itself to be associated just as much with he- and she-dogs by both men and women. This was not an ideal division of answers, but none of the other 39 names produced anything better. Tippy was considered almost unanimously by both men and women to be a female name. It was therefore necessary to find a new name and we decided on Tonny. This name was considered to be a male name by a small preponderance of women, and a female name by a small preponderance of men. In this way we hoped to place the name Blacky in a connection that would make it easy for women to associate it with a female name, and for men to associate it with a male name. Also in choosing the names Blacky and Tonny stress was laid on the fact that both seemed to have a neutral emotional connotation.

The change of name made it necessary to change a couple of the pictures (the introductory picture and picture no. III). Two other pictures (nos. X and XI) were also changed in order to make secondary sexual features more obvious.

In our investigation we concentrated entirely on that part of the method which deals directly with the earliest psychosexual development. Concretely this means that we limited ourselves to working with 5 of the test's 12 pictures, which were: the introductory picture and numbers I, II, III, and VI, which are intended to tap respectively oral eroticism, oral sadism, anal sadism and castration anxiety.

When used as a clinical instrument the method is supposed to be

¹ The Norwegian Kennel Club's archive of names was of great assistance in this connection. Practically all the names chosen were found in both the male dog and bitch sections of the archive.

administered individually, but originally it was in fact constructed for group administration (13).

We again used it as a group test, but did not follow Blum's initial method in every respect. We did not follow up with inquiries immediately after each spontaneous story, but followed the usual Rorschach procedure and administered the inquiries after all the pictures had been shown once and the spontaneous stories recorded.¹ Our instructions therefore differed somewhat from Blum's. They were divided into two parts. The first part read as follows:

"The pictures you are now going to see are very similar to those in comic strips, except that these have no text. You will be shown one picture at a time, and your job is to make up a short story about each one — just describe what is happening in the picture, why it is happening, and so on. Since this is a kind of test of how good your imagination is, you must try to say as much as possible about how the characters feel. You will get 2½ minutes for each story. It is important that you should write down the first thing that comes into your mind all the time. Begin on a new page each time there is a new picture. Before you begin you are going to see the characters taking part in this comic strip."

After these instructions were given the lights were turned down and the introductory picture shown for about 20 seconds, followed by pictures I, II, III, and VI, which were each shown for 2½ minutes. This is a little longer for each picture than the time used by Blum, but the difference probably has no importance. After having scored our spontaneous story material we are inclined to believe that an even longer time would have been desirable under our conditions.²

Like Blum we used a projector, but only for projecting the pictures. The questions and alternative answers were handed out prior to the test in a small stencilled notebook. After picture VI had been shown the light was switched on and the following instructions were given:

"The pictures you are now going to see are exactly the same as the ones you saw before. You are going to see them over again. This time you are not to write a story about each picture, but to answer some questions about them. For some of the questions you have to write down your answer, but in most cases this will not be necessary. After these questions several alternative answers have been set down, and it will be quite enough if you put a circle round the letter to the left of the answer you consider most appropriate."

¹ Others have also been strongly in favour of this form of administration of the Blacky Pictures, Ellis (30) for instance.

² In using TAT as a group test 3½ minutes have been given per picture (23).

Then the lights were turned down again and the pictures shown in the same order as before, but this time only for about 30 seconds each. The questions asked were a somewhat shortened translation of Blum's set of inquiries for men.¹ Most of the questions were of the multiple choice type, and the alternative answers used were mostly direct translations of Blum's alternatives for the respective questions.

No attempt was made to register picture preferences. Since we worked with only four out of the test's eleven pictures the possibilities of choice were strongly reduced and the purely diagnostic significance of the preferences made extremely uncertain.

*

Scoring of the protocols took place as soon as the collection of data was over. Directives had been worked out in advance for scoring the stories on each picture. It had also been decided that major attention should be paid throughout to the spontaneous stories, and that the answers to the questions should be considered consistently as supplementary information, and only allowed to be decisive when the spontaneous stories were short or ambiguous. The reason for this was the desire to concentrate on the most "uncensored" responses. It seems reasonable to assume that the spontaneous story would generally give more projective material, and express more uncritical and unconscious reaction tendencies than replies to questions (*14*).

The scoring itself took place in the following way: first all the data were scored by one person who concentrated on the spontaneous stories about one picture and on the replies to the corresponding questionnaire, and scored them for the whole sample. Then he dealt with the next picture for the whole sample, and so on. The answers on each picture were in other words scored completely independently of the answers on the other pictures. When all the data were scored in this way it was done again by a different scorer, and here again the answers to each picture were scored independently.² In addition the new scorer had no knowledge of the results of the first scoring.

After the data were scored a second time the reliability of the scor-

¹ Cf. *13*, pp. 75-77. For picture I we used questions 3, 4, 5, and 6; for picture II questions 1, 2, 4, and 6; for picture III questions 1, 2, 3, and 4; and for picture VI questions 1, 4, 3, and 5.

² The author was the first scorer and cand. psychol. Arvid Amundsen was the second. Only the former had had previous experience and training in scoring Blacky protocols.

ing was calculated. All disagreements were discussed with the aim of finding out weaknesses in the scoring criteria, some of which were gradually reformulated in an attempt to make them more precise. In order to be quite certain that the scoring was as far as possible in agreement with the revised criteria the data were scored once again by the first scorer. The time lag between the two scorings was, however, several months and the scorer did not have any certain remembrance of the first scoring. Here again the answers to each picture were scored independently.

Then the data were handed over to the second scorer who went through them picture by picture, and compared his opinions on each spontaneous story (and questionnaire answer) with the first scorer's proposals. When disagreement occurred he recorded his own scoring proposals.

There followed a new reliability calculation, and again all disagreements concerning scoring were taken up for discussion with the aim of reaching agreement on each final score.

*

We shall now turn to a presentation of the scoring principles applied. As stated above, the name of the method refers to the name of a puppy which is depicted in all the pictures. The various pictures portray Blacky in situations where certain impulse patterns are manifested, e. g. receiving nourishment, biting, eliminating, attending a symbolic castration scene, etc. The theory underlying the test is that the subjects will identify themselves with Blacky, that the pictures will reactivate the subjects' corresponding impulses, and that the subjects in their responses will express their more or less unconscious attitudes towards their own impulses in question.

We mentioned earlier that a person's dynamic integration will manifest itself in his ability, under certain conditions, to regress in the service of the ego, to relax all types of defensive ego attitudes and to admit (relatively freely) infantile impulses to consciousness. Such ability for ego expansion and imaginal freedom is conditional on the infantile impulses not being permanently cut off as ego alien and held in check by a high counter-cathexis.

A defence against infantile psychosexual impulses can manifest itself in exceedingly different ways. It occurs in the psychoanalytical treatment situation as well as in reactions to the Blacky pictures. Among these reactions we may find examples of such well-known

defence mechanisms as avoidance, defensive regression, intellectualization, reaction formation and projection. The perception of a Blacky picture can be distorted, essential aspects explained away or denied, or the response can be nothing more than a superficial description, a number of evasive details. In this last instance we may interpret the response as indicating that the subject is defending himself by avoiding identification with Blacky altogether.

The response material can form the basis of interpretations in terms of the prominence of defence mechanisms and ego defensiveness, but it can also be regarded from the point of view of defence stratagems and ego achievements. Generally motives and percepts are ascribed to Blacky which seem to indicate the subjects' implicit manner of handling the impulses in question.

As we have previously mentioned, the various stages of psychosexual development may be characterized by the crystallization of certain *social modalities*. These modalities may be regarded as basic to the formation of more lasting *ego capacities*. The oral phase can from this point of view be regarded as decisive for an *ego's basic trust*, the anal for an *ego's autonomy*, and the phallic for *ego initiative*. Basic trust, autonomy, and initiative represent the resulting synthesis, an enduring solution, of early infantile impulses and outer adjustments.

By the term "defence stratagem" we refer to a certain type of such enduring solutions, namely a synthesis masking unsolved impulse conflicts, representing an impairment of optimal ego functioning. Looked upon from this angle, the response material on the Blacky pictures may be scored in terms of various types of enduring solutions.¹

¹ The term "enduring solutions" indicates that we are faced with certain ego organizations assumed to have their etiological basis primarily in the influence to which the individual has been exposed at various developmental stages in early childhood, more particularly at the time when certain impulse patterns emerged. Oral stratagems might be presumed to arise first in early infancy, anal stratagems first at the time when anal impulses crystallized, or in psychoanalytic terms, at the time when the excretory organs became the focus of libido investment, etc. In studying these enduring solutions by means of the Blacky technique we are thrown back on their manifestations on the level of verbal behaviour. Since such solutions might partly be established in pre-verbal phases of development we are presupposing their predisposing effect as far as thought content is concerned. Assuming such relationships, one has to bear in mind the fact that considerable individual differences probably exist as regards propensities towards the symbolic exposure of primary ego disturbances. The work of Spitz on hospitalism is relevant in this connection (144). There is, we feel, an urgent need for further psychological research in this very important area.

In the present investigation we have tried to make use of such an approach. In connection with the response material on each picture we have defined three types of enduring solutions, an optimal solution and two types of defence stratagems, the one representing an active, the other a passive solution. In the case of these latter solutions we have assumed infantile impulse conflicts to be present.

In spite of our own theoretical orientation differing somewhat from that of Blum, there is considerable agreement between our scoring principles and Blum's as regards the assessment of whether disturbances exist or not.

As we have stated above, a special introductory picture was presented before the test pictures, introducing Blacky as being the main figure (the hero) and having the same sex as the subjects. See fig. 1. This was done in order to promote identification with Blacky. In our investigation the picture was accompanied by the following statement:

"Blacky is the name of a dog who appears in all the pictures — Here are Papa, Mama, Tonny and the *son* Blacky, who is the main figure in the cartoons."




Fig. I.

The first picture presented after the introductory picture was removed showed Blacky being suckled by his mother. See figure II. It was introduced with the following remarks:

"Here is the first cartoon. Here is Blacky with Mama —".

The picture might be assumed to reveal attitudes towards oral




Fig. II.

attachment and contact. It shows a situation where the emergence of the impulse pattern "to receive, encounter and respond" is preponderant. In accordance with our theoretical orientation we considered it possible to make a division between answers which seemed to indicate *conflict-free* and *conflict-charged oral trust*.¹ We considered oral trust to be present if the subjects' answers expressed *acceptance of oral attachment, statements that Blacky is satisfied and happy, or statements indicating a harmonious give-and-take relationship between Blacky and his mother*.²

¹ Here we have chosen the more neutral term 'oral trust' instead of the orthodox 'oral eroticism'. Our choice of terms here as well as in the following is strongly influenced by Erikson's conceptualizations (31). Likewise we have chosen the term 'conflict-charged' instead of the term 'disturbance' which is applied by Blum (13).

² It can be objected that these criteria do not exclude wishful idyllization as a rationalization of underlying hostility and disharmony. We have assumed that the Blacky method is sufficiently well-anchored at the latent level of personality for a reaction formation in this direction to be revealed. We would nevertheless stress most strongly that we are here talking of a relative freedom from conflict. It is not unlikely that some subjects, whom we will characterize as relatively conflict-free, would in a more thorough clinical investigation be seen to have conflicts, but it is reasonable to assume that these would be relatively mild and well-compensated. Given that our investigation is not sufficiently thorough to draw definite conclusions concerning the individual subjects, it is our opinion that it is capable of ascertaining significant group tendencies.

The following spontaneous stories illustrate this scoring category: "It is a beautiful Sunday morning. The dogs are running happily about on the mountainside and Blacky is with them. But Mama and Blacky have to rest often because Blacky wants to feed. Here Blacky is lying down enjoying his mother's warm milk." (Subject no. 138) — "Life has its good moments. One of the greatest things that can happen is that one is able to give and able to enjoy . . ." (Subject no. 169) — "Blacky is small and wants food. He is terribly hungry and Mama lets him have a proper meal. She shuts her eyes and enjoys feeding her child . . ." (Subject no. 182) — "Blacky gets a 'drink' from Mama. It looks as if they are both very contented . . ." (Subject no. 202).

Conflict-charged oral contact impulses and disturbance of the ability for a free and trustful approach can express itself in open anxiety or the anxiety can be repressed. In the latter case we will usually find a defence stratagem, a remoulding of the conflict, which gives the basis for a certain substitute satisfaction of the impulses which have been warded off. Such a stratagem can be the development of a passive receptive behaviour pattern, a narcissistic orientation or a compensatory "premature progression" towards a more active incorporative stage.

However, as regards early-oral conflicts we can also probably find repression of anxiety without remoulding. In this case we will meet with a permanent blocking of affective responding impulses, and therefore an affectless orientation towards the environment. The formation of a defence stratagem implies sufficient resources for an 'active' adjustment and a certain ability to remould affects.

The social position of our subjects, together with the fact that they had all previously been found suitable for training as officers by psychologists at the Psychological Division of the Norwegian Armed Forces, made it unlikely that we would find any really deep contact injuries.

Consequently we made a schematic division only between active and passive defence stratagems.

We considered an active defence stratagem to be present if the answers expressed *oral greediness, fleecing tendencies, avoidance or rejection of dependence and attachment.*

The following spontaneous stories illustrate this scoring category: "Blacky is being fed by Mama. He seems to be rather greedy, and as a result she is completely exhausted . . ." (Subject no. 103) — "Oh, that was good, thinks Blacky, the son. But his mother also seems to enjoy the situation, or perhaps quite the opposite, Blacky is large and sucks his mother completely dry." (Subject no. 180) —

“Blacky is hungry. With all his voracity he sucks out all Mama’s strength. One day the result will be that Blacky explodes.” (Subject no. 154) —

“Eat plenty, my sweetheart, so that you will grow big and strong. Remember it will be a long time before you get food again. Ow, don’t bite, you little rogue.” (Subject no. 165).

We considered a passive defence stratagem to be present if the answers expressed *completely passive abandonment, anxiety about not getting enough care, food or nursing, the expression of unwillingness or rejection on the part of the mother, the wish to be always a child, always to eat or suck.*¹

“Blacky is being fed, but his mother is not so amenable . . . there is a certain amount of motherly devotion in her expression but . . . at the same time loathing — never grown-up.” (Subject no. 146) —

“Blacky is a little puppy and is having his lunch. Mama is not particularly interested and in the background Papa is talking to another ‘lady’.” (Subject no. 185) —

“Mama is lying dreaming of the time when she wandered happily about with Papa in the wood.” (Subject no. 170).

The second picture we introduced showed Blacky holding his mother’s collar between his teeth. See figure III. It was introduced with the following statement:

“Here is Blacky with Mama’s collar —”.




Fig. III.

¹ In those cases where an over-indulgence in oral satisfaction is present it is often assumed that a regression has taken place, as a defence of later phase conflicts. We have not tried to distinguish between positive (regressive) and negative (non-regressive) fixations (cf. 153). What we have here described as a passive defence

The picture is designed by Blum to depict oral sadism. In accordance with our theoretical orientation we considered oral sadism to be neither an expression of primary late oral impulses, nor synonymous with oral aggression. In our opinion the late oral phase is characterized primarily by the crystallization of chewing, of "self provision" or active incorporation as the dominating impulse pattern, coincident with a growing ability to perceive outer objects realistically and with an emerging capacity to react aggressively in a self-assertive manner *when being frustrated*. According to our view the heart of oral aggression is "to bite at", in the sense of "to snap back", while the form "to take in order to possess or destroy", or "to bite and hold on", is to be viewed as a defence of primary oral aggression.

The picture of Blacky with his mother's collar between his teeth indirectly suggests a defence pattern, but other conditions probably influence the answers too. The mother's collar can partly symbolize dependence on the mother, and the answers thus express attitudes towards dependence; the collar can also perhaps be partly associated as a penis symbol, and the answers thus express castration fantasies.

In spite of these weaknesses inherent in the picture we tentatively considered it possible to distinguish between answers indicating *conflict-free* and *conflict-charged oral aggression*. In scoring we considered relative freedom from conflicts to be present if the subjects' answers expressed *acceptance of aggression, the expression of direct, non-moral aggression, and no sign of denial or avoidance of aggression*.

The following spontaneous stories illustrate this scoring category:

"I am so big and strong, everyone must see that I have borrowed (stolen) Mama's collar, and there is no dog in the whole world who will be able to take it from me again." (Subject no. 104) —

"Here Blacky has evidently been given strength by his mother's milk and uses up his energy on Mama's property. As ill-mannered and unruly as most puppies are and should be." (Subject no. 117) —

"He sees something shining on Mama's neck. He gets curious, sniffs at it, and tries to bite it. It does not move. Then he gets into a temper and thinks to himself that he will be a match for it and get it off. Finally he tears and worries at it, and suddenly he has it in his mouth and prances around." (Subject no. 134).

It is possible to distinguish between various defence stratagems in connection with oral aggression. The one most often noticed is oral

stratagem includes forms of activity which are very different among themselves. The greater the resignation and passivity, the deeper the conflicts one may assume to be present. In all our response protocols scored "passive", the mother's unwillingness and lack of interest was paramount.

sadism. An underlying ambivalence is here brought out by a simultaneous pinching and active incorporation, a mixture of pleasure and aggressiveness which causes the aggression to lose its instrumental and affect-releasing character. Another stratagem is oral regression, the avoidance of oral aggression, the substitution of taking back by a strikingly passive-demanding (care-seeking) orientation. This stratagem often seems to represent a reaction formation towards an underlying sadistic impulse organization.

In scoring the data we again drew up a schematic division between active and passive defence stratagems.¹

We considered an active defence stratagem to be present if the answers expressed *greed, sucking dry, destruction or revenge*.

"Blacky has stolen Mama's collar and treats it as if it were she herself, in order to pay back his mother's loathing of him." (Subject no. 146) —
 "The black sheep is up to mischief again. Perhaps he didn't get enough from the breast, so he lost his temper and tore her collar off and ran away with it." (Subject no. 184) —

"In all his bloodthirstiness Blacky has swallowed up Mama completely. He only has her collar left: the situation illustrates the brutality of an animal where getting food is concerned." (Subject no. 154) —
 "Blacky is a wild boy and thoroughly bad-tempered. He is bad-mannered too, and is now enormously pleased at having ruined Mama's collar." (Subject no. 193)

We considered a passive defence stratagem to be present if the answers expressed *rejection, condemnation or denial of aggression, passive consideration, the desire for care and protection, projection of aggression or expression of anxiety or diffuse aimless aggressiveness*.

"Mama has been killed by an elephant and after much trouble Blacky has managed to tear off her collar and rush home with it to his mistress." (Subject no. 138) —

"Blacky has found Mama's collar and believes someone has ill-treated her . . ." (Subject no. 143) —

"Only children are always spoiled and Blacky is no exception to the rule. He played and ran about all day long, and now and again his small growing teeth itched so much that he had to take his mother's collar." (Subject no. 152). —

"Blacky has begun to cut his teeth and he likes to bite into everything to stop them itching. He has no respect for valuable things yet and will get a good hiding when Mama comes home." (Subject no. 185)

¹ Our division between "active" and "passive" does not imply anything absolute, but antitheses which often seem to occur close together and can easily replace each other. The nearness of opposites seems often to be a general principle where personality organization is concerned. This principle has been heavily stressed in several works by Frenkel-Brunswik (41, 42).

The third picture presented showed Blacky relieving himself between Mama's and Papa's kennels. See figure IV. It was introduced with the following words:

“Here is Blacky doing his business —”.



Fig. IV.

The anal stage of libido development is often divided into an early anal and a late anal phase. The early anal phase has been characterized by anal eroticism, the late as anal sadism.¹ In our view the former phase is particularly characterized by the crystallization of eliminative impulses, the latter by impulses to form and reform. Both impulse patterns are, we think, closely connected with the intestinal processes and evacuation functions: the former with the feeling of pleasure in letting go and giving away; the latter with the growing ability to expel and retain, to decide time and place oneself, to say no and yes and act accordingly (cf. pp. 42-43).

The picture shows Blacky in a situation where both elimination and evacuation control (letting go and holding on) are in focus. The picture probably gives rise to associations pertinent to both early

¹ By the way, the early anal phase has also sometimes been designated as anal sadistic, giving rise to a division between two anal sadistic phases.

As stated previously we are inclined to consider anal sadism as a specific defence stratagem in the same way as oral sadism. Thus, according to our viewpoint, anal sadism will represent an impulse ambivalence, a simultaneous pinching and pressure, simultaneous impulses towards retention and expulsion. Here too we find a mixture of pleasure and aggression and thus a lack of complete affect-release.

anal and late anal impulse organizations. The successful functioning of the latter presupposes to a certain extent the unharmed functioning of the former. On the basis of our theoretical orientation we have chosen to interpret our subject's answers in the light of whether *anal autonomy* seems to be *conflict-free* or *conflict-charged*. We considered a relatively conflict-free anal autonomy to be present if the answers *expressed a free and unrestricted attitude in Blacky, the perception of cleanliness not as an aim in itself, and a factual attitude towards evacuation, free of guilt, shame, aggression and anxiety.*

The following spontaneous stories illustrate this scoring category:

"And then Blacky does his business, but in order not to dirty the ground in front of his own house he does it between Papa's and Mama's. He has probably seen his parents doing the same thing there many times . . ." (Subject no. 157) —

"As you know, all dogs are very clean in their habits, and Blacky soon found out that he didn't want to do his business near his own house. So he went instead between Mama's and Papa's houses, for it was sheltered and comfortable there too." (Subject no. 164) —

"We must have the place clean, said the old woman, as she swept the dust under the bed.¹ Blacky has eaten well and he must answer the call of nature. Who cares, he says, and does his business in Papa's and Mama's domain . . ." (Subject no. 182) —

"Blacky is smart enough not to be dirty outside his own house . . . when he has finished he will probably dig it over a little and run off carefree." (Subject no. 201) —

"Blacky has done his business. He was lazy and couldn't be bothered to go behind the houses. But as is his habit he covers it over with earth, kicking it up with his forelegs . . ." (Subject no. 107)

Conflicts concerning anal autonomy can find expression in various defence stratagems, and here too we think it is possible to distinguish between two main forms: an active, expulsive defence stratagem, and a more passive, retentive and compensatory one.²

We considered an active defence stratagem to be present if the answers *expressed opposition, spite, triumph or extreme pleasure at evacuation*, as follows:

¹ Literal translation of Norwegian proverb.

² It may be disputed whether a retentive, compensatory attitude can be described as a passive defence stratagem. A retentive attitude can in many ways be regarded as an active orientation. We have chosen to regard it as a passive stratagem in relation to an expulsive impulse organization, where an outwardly directed orientation is present as a rule. An expulsive defence can, however, in our opinion also be manifested in passive indifference.

“When Blacky does his business he can’t be bothered to dig it in properly. Here he does his business between Papa’s and Mama’s houses so that they shall get the blame.” (Subject no. 132) —

“I didn’t ‘go’ between Papa’s and Mama’s houses. Ha ha, I managed to fool them properly.” (Subject no. 165) —

“Ha ha, now we shall have a bit of fun. Mama and Papa will quarrel over who could have been so ill-mannered as to do that sort of unmentionable thing right between the marriage beds. It will be fun to see them working themselves up about it . . .” (Subject no. 168) —

“Blacky has discovered that every time he does something outside his own house he gets a beating or a scolding from his owner. In order to avoid having to go too far away and so that he doesn’t get a thrashing, he puts the blame on Mama and Papa.” (Subject no. 143)

We considered a passive defence stratagem to be present if the answers *expressed some form or another of anxiety, of preoccupation with parent’s wishes, of parsimony, of the urge to collect things, disgust at dirtiness or smell, emphasis on hiding or burying, or avoidance of any reference to anal matters.*

“Unappetising. However, Blacky is clean enough to cover his excrement. He should have kept to his own quarters.” (Subject no. 149) —

“I’m not going to have the smell of the excrement bothering my house. I am a clean dog with a sensitive nose. Besides, the earth by my house is so hard that it is better to dig where Mama and Papa have dug for many years, for the excrement must be covered . . .” (Subject no. 187) —

“Unhygienic just outside the dwelling house. Significantly enough he does not do it where he lives himself. Looks as if he’s afraid some of the others will come along.” (Subject no. 144) —

“Blacky is impossible. He throws things away and then can’t find them again. Has no manners.” (Subject no. 190)

The fourth and last picture we presented showed Tonny with a bandage in front of his eyes and with his tail on a chopping block. See figure V. A little way above the tail is a knife. Blacky stands in the foreground and looks at Tonny. The introduction to this picture was as follows: “Here Blacky is watching Tonny —”.

Traditionally the phallic or early genital stage of libido development has been considered to be the same for boys as for girls as far as emerging impulse patterns are concerned. This can, we think, be somewhat disputed. We will not go into this matter more thoroughly here, but only mention that according to our view the early genital stage in girls might be considered to be more focussed on the crystallization of “inclusive” impulses, in boys more focussed on “introducive” impulses.



Fig. V.

By introductive impulses we primarily refer to impulses towards leading into, expressed in the form of sexual play and curiosity, urges to explore and touch surrounding objects. The term "intrusive" which has been applied by Erikson to characterize the impulse pattern of this phase is, in our opinion, somewhat misleading. It has the connotation of pushing oneself in where not invited or desired, and indicates rather what we would refer to as a defence stratagem. The term 'introductive' refers in a sense to an accommodated intrusiveness.

Conflicts concerning introductive impulses might be assumed to give rise to castration anxieties, and, following Erikson's train of reasoning, to an impairment of ego initiative.

The picture above aims at showing a situation where Blacky is confronted with a symbolic castration scene. The tail is a well-known penis symbol, the falling knife a symbolic instrument of castration, and the blindfolding of Tonny provides further symbolic incitements. The picture presents a situation where Blacky's initiative will be put to the test. Thus the picture might be supposed to reveal whether *phallic initiative* is relatively *conflict-free* or *not*.

In scoring our data we considered a relatively unharmed phallic initiative to be present if the answers stated that *Blacky was actively interested in what was going on without his interpreting the situation as a punishment, and without being afraid of losing his own tail.*

The following stories illustrate this scoring category:

“Blacky is in a rather difficult situation. ‘Tony’ has had his eyes bound and somebody (a human being) is going to cut off his tail. Blacky sees that good advice is precious¹ and will probably bark to frighten Tony away from the dangerous chopping block.” (Subject no. 105) —

“One day Blacky sees Tonny standing with something strange round his head. A boy stands and whets a knife which he suddenly throws at Tonny’s tail, which he has placed on a wood block. Blacky shudders.” (Subject no. 134) —

“Poor Tonny. Now they are going to cut off his tail. That will be sad. Just imagine not having anything to wag when you are happy, or to hang down when you have done something wrong. And how it’s going to hurt. I’m sure he will howl terribly.” (Subject no. 136) —

“My goodness, what’s happening. Blindfold and with the tail on a block. A knife whizzes through the air and will hit Tonny. But why not help. No, he doesn’t have to stand there and wait for the knife.” (Subject no. 107)

Castration anxiety might be viewed as an expression of phallic conflicts. Open castration anxiety occurs extremely seldom; the anxiety will usually be warded off in one way or another. Here too we can distinguish schematically between two different defence patterns: an active stratagem, characterized by forced intrusiveness — fear of passivity — with fantasies in the direction of piercing and conquering; and a passive one, characterized by disgust and disapproval of balanced as well as forced masculinity, with fantasies in the direction of being taken and conquered. The former has often been described as phallic-narcissistic, the latter as feminine-masochistic.

We considered an active defence stratagem to be present if the answers *expressed complete lack of feeling, active distortion of what is going on, a perception of Blacky as the aggressor or castrator.*

“Blacky is a sadist who wants to tyrannize over and torture Tonny. Tonny probably has a more handsome tail than himself, and therefore he wants it to be cut off.” (Subject no. 118) —

“Blacky certainly hates his sister Tonny. He looks as if he has a sadistic disposition.” (Subject no. 120) —

“Blacky obviously has evil intentions. The knife symbolizes this.” (Subject no. 123). —

“Some cruel fellows have hurt Tonny by cutting his long ears with their father’s large knife. Tonny has been bandaged up by his owner and can’t see.” (Subject no. 138) —

“Tonny is to be punished by having her tail cut off. Blacky has for a long time gone around imagining this punishment being executed.” (Subject no. 139)

¹ Literal translation of a Norwegian proverb.

We considered a passive defence stratagem to be present if the answers expressed anxiety that Blacky would lose his own tail, a perception of the situation as one of punishment (without Blacky being the aggressor), an extreme sensitivity or concern for all tails and the possibility that the knife will reach them.

“Well, — Isn’t that my sister Tonny, and there’s that damned farm boy teasing and torturing little Tonny, he has even put her behind on a block and is standing there with a long knife to cut off her behind. That’s what will happen to me if I am not good, thinks Blacky.” (Subject no. 155) —

“Poor Tonny, thinks Blacky. And I have been so unkind to you sometimes. If only I could have it all over again. Perhaps my turn will come one of these days, it is best to watch out in order to avoid such a thing happening.” (Subject no. 175) —

“Blacky wonders what is going to happen to Tonny. He certainly begins to suspect that it is something dangerous. Perhaps it can happen to me too.” (Subject no. 180) —

“Not long now. Soon over. The same fate awaits me. I must get away.” (Subject no. 181).

We concentrated on only a few of the Blacky pictures because of our wish to obtain material on certain fundamental dimensions only in the total functioning of a personality. The assumption basic to our investigation was that conflicts in connection with oral, anal and early genital impulse patterns reflect previous environmental injuries, and that the Blacky method makes it possible to diagnose such conflicts. We have no possibility of expressing an opinion on the tenability of this assumption. As we have stated, Blacky is still in his infancy, and the validity studies to which it has been submitted are still incomplete. In addition, we have used the method in somewhat unusual way. If our results should prove to be negative they should therefore be accepted with a certain reserve. On the other hand, the Blacky method is based on a sufficiently explicit theoretical foundation so that there is reason to interpret possible positive finds as supporting the validity of the method as well as the tenability of the Latency Theory.

B. Results

In what follows we will first deal with the results of our investigation of the scoring reliability of the Blacky Pictures; if this had not shown itself to be sufficiently high, all other results would have built on a very uncertain foundation. Next, we will give a short ac-

count of the absolute and relative frequency of scores with respect to different conflicts and defence stratagems, as these appeared in the score distribution on the various dimensions examined. The score distribution will be able indirectly to give us clues to the evaluation of the soundness of the Blacky pictures — given that we assume earlier investigations to have provided reliable results. The opportunity to assess the probable soundness of the Blacky technique is also partly the reason behind the two next sections: an examination of the correlation between different impulse conflicts and the relationship between such conflicts and everyday reaction patterns.

Scoring Reliability of the Blacky Pictures

As stated above, two separate reliability investigations of the Blacky method were undertaken. Both times a calculation was made of the amount of agreement reached between two independent scorers. Table III,1 and III,2 give a survey of the results as regards the scoring agreement concerning conflict assessment and type of defence stratagem in those cases where conflicts were considered to be present.

Table III,1. *Percentage Agreements in the Scoring of Impulse Conflicts Regarding Various Personality Dimensions*

Picture	Dimensions	1st Investigation	2nd Investigation
I	Oral trust	90	97
II	Oral aggression	91	97
III	Anal autonomy	91	98.5
VI	Phallic initiative	86	89.5
	Average agreement	89.5	95.5

Table III,2. *Percentage Agreement in the Scoring of Defence Stratagems Regarding Various Personality Dimensions*

Picture	Dimensions	1st Investigation	2nd Investigation
I	Oral trust	85	92.5
II	Oral aggression	93	94
III	Anal autonomy	96	98.5
VI	Phallic initiative	97	95.5
	Average agreement	92.8	95.1

The results are based on 67 subjects. Out of our total sample of 70 two of the response protocols were incomplete and one could not be scored. These three were dropped from these and later analyses.

Table III,1 shows that there is a comparatively high degree of agreement with the results of Blum's reliability investigation (cf. 13, p. 30). When scoring spontaneous stories Blum found an average agreement of 93 % between two scorers. This is somewhat higher than we found in our first investigation, while the results of our second investigation were somewhat better than Blum's. It is reasonable to assume that the difference in the first instance is due to the fact that our two scorers' previous experience with scoring Blacky protocols differed considerably. Our second scoring took place according to the criteria described in the previous chapter. In relation to all dimensions the scoring reliability was higher in the second than in the first investigation. This is undoubtedly partly due to more precise scoring criteria, but the increased training of the scorers is also of importance. As we have stated, all disagreements were carefully discussed after the first scoring. It is most probable that as a result of this discussion a common implicit frame of reference was created, and that in addition to the more explicit scoring principles, this laid the basis for increased agreement during the second scoring. It is therefore uncertain how far the average agreement of over 95 % can be unqualifiedly ascribed to the above scoring categories: one would have to use different scorers for both investigations in order to establish this. This was not done, however, as we considered an average agreement of about 90 % which we found in the first investigations to be satisfactory in itself.

The above statement concerning the scoring of impulse conflicts also applies to the scoring of defence stratagems, where average agreement was also higher for the second scoring than for the first, but relatively satisfactory for the first scoring.

Our data must be said to be promising compared with the results from similar reliability investigations of other projective tests (24, 61). It is of interest to recall that in our investigation of Rosenzweig's F-P Study, for instance, we found an average agreement of 72 % between two scorers, and of 92 % between two out of three. The average agreement found in the scoring of the Blacky Pictures satisfies the requirements we can reasonably demand for the scoring of qualitative data of this kind.

Score Distribution on the Different Blacky Dimensions

Table III,3 gives a survey of the percentages of subjects scored as conflict-free and conflict-charged respectively for the different personality dimensions on which we have concentrated.

Our data imply that conflicts seem to occur very frequently in all the dimensions, and most frequently in connection with oral aggression. More than three-quarters of our subjects were scored as conflict-charged in this respect.

Table III, 3. *Percentage Scored as Conflict-Free and Conflict-Charged on Different Dimensions*

Picture	Dimensions	Conflict Free	Conflict Charged
I	Oral trust	35.8	64.2
II	Oral aggression	23.9	76.1
III	Anal autonomy	29.9	70.1
VI	Phallic initiative	31.3	68.7
	Mean	30.2	69.8

A ranking of the different dimensions according to frequency of conflicts is ordered as follows: oral aggression, anal autonomy, phallic initiative, oral trust.

The frequency of conflicts in relation to the different dimensions will not necessarily reflect the relative severity of the socialization process in connection with various psychosexual impulses. In addition to the frequency of existing conflicts their strength is of the utmost importance. It also seems reasonable to assume that some of the Blacky pictures may present more sensitive stimulus material for exposing and revealing conflicts than others; on the other hand there is a quite extraordinary degree of agreement between our ranking order and Whiting and Child's evaluation of the relative severity of socialization concerning different impulse patterns in American society (cf. p. 48). There is a decided difference on one point only: in our investigation oral aggression is found to be more frequently conflict charged than anal autonomy.¹

¹ We have previously noted that 67 % of a representative sample of the adult population of Oslo and the surrounding district stated that they were in complete or partial agreement with the statement that "It is just as important to teach children order and cleanliness as it is to give them love." It is interesting to note the agreement found between the attitudes of residents of Oslo towards cleanliness training and the percentage of our sample which was scored as conflict-charged with regard to anal autonomy.

Among our subjects, seven, or 10.4 %, seemed to be relatively free of conflicts in the areas on which we have concentrated. Conflicts connected with only one dimension were ascribed to 6, or 9 % of our subjects; conflicts connected with two dimensions to 10 (14.9 %); connected with three to 15 (22.4 %); and connected with all four dimensions to 29 (43.3 %).

The majority of our sample, in other words, seemed to be affected by environmental injuries and psychodynamic conflicts.¹

Table III,4 gives the percentages of our subjects who were assigned an active or passive defence stratagem in relation to the various impulse conflicts. The table shows that there was a comparatively even distribution between the two defence stratagems. The difference was greatest in connection with oral aggression. In most of these cases a passive defence pattern dominates.

Table III,4. *Percentages Scored as Active and Passive Defence Stratagems Respectively on Different Dimensions*

Picture	Dimensions	<i>N</i>	Active	Passive
I	Oral trust	43	53.5	46.5
II	Oral aggression	51	41.2	58.8
III	Anal autonomy	47	57.4	42.6
VI	Phallic initiative	46	56.5	43.5

The fairly significant dissimilarity which seems to characterize our subjects' defence stratagems does not suggest without qualification a corresponding dissimilarity in manifest behaviour. In many individuals there exist several layers of defence stratagems, and in scoring projective data it may often be difficult to localize the layer which has been exposed. Conclusions concerning manifest behaviour can therefore often create greater problems than the clarification of whether certain impulses are conflict-charged or not.

As with the scoring of conflicts, it was not possible to avoid stressing relative considerations in scoring defence stratagems. It can hardly be doubted that great differences exist, and it must be considered to be probable that these differences to a certain extent reflect variations in relation to earlier experiences and forms of training.

¹ This, of course, does not imply that the majority is openly neurotic or mal-adjusted in a psychiatric sense.

Correlation Between Conflict Scores on Different Dimensions

There are several uncertainties relating to the validity of the Blacky Pictures: firstly, to what degree the method actually taps stable personality traits and not momentary moods; secondly, to what degree the scoring is independent of slang expressions, e. g. superficial attempts to be “tough” and active; and finally, to what degree reactions to a given picture are “dynamically” independent of reactions to the preceding pictures. We shall attempt to clarify these questions a little further.

We should expect considerable inter-correlation to occur between conflict scores on different test dimensions according to the degree to which the Blacky method is dependent upon momentary moods, slang expressions, and reactions to preceding pictures. We should also expect such correlation, however, if the test gave valid information, on the grounds that a conflict in connection with one primary impulse pattern will reduce resistance towards later stresses, that child training is on the whole most likely to be generally rejective or acceptive, and that the periods for the crystallization of early psychosexual impulses — the period in which the impulses are most vulnerable to conflicts — overlap to a certain extent.

Table III,5 gives a survey of the relationships present between conflict scores on different dimensions. We have here applied the Chi square method in order to illustrate the statistical significance of these associations.

Table III,5. *Associations Between Conflict Scores on Different Dimensions*

Dimensions	χ^2	<i>p</i>
Oral trust and oral aggression	14.0	.001
Oral trust and anal autonomy	4.6	.04
Oral trust and phallic initiative	3.6	.07
Oral aggression and anal autonomy	20.5	.001
Oral aggression and phallic initiative.....	13.7	.001
Anal autonomy and phallic initiative.....	15.0	.001

Our data imply that conflicts connected with one primary impulse pattern generally accompany conflicts connected with other patterns. The association is highest between oral-aggressive and anal conflicts,

and lowest between conflicts connected with oral trust and phallic initiative. Generally speaking there seems to be less association the more different phases of development indicated by the specific conflicts are separated in time. This is clearly illustrated in Table III,6, which gives a survey of the individual associations expressed in tetrachoric coefficients (19). The table is set out with the intention of revealing the relationship between conflicts connected with closely and distantly situated impulse patterns, genetically speaking.

Table III,6. *Intercorrelations (Tetrachoric) Between Conflict Scores on Different Dimensions*

Picture	Dimensions	I	II	III	VI
I	Oral trust	—	.69	.40	.36
II	Oral aggression		—	.78	.65
III	Anal autonomy			—	.70
VI	Phallic initiative				—

It is interesting to note that the correlation between oral-aggressive and phallic conflicts is higher than the correlations between the other distantly situated impulse patterns. This may perhaps be due to weaknesses in the "oral aggressive" picture, to which we have already referred, but it is also possible that it may express special dynamic processes, that conflicts connected with "taking" will easily predispose a fear of "being taken from", and that this fear will in turn create a predisposition for phallic conflicts. In principle we may meet the same dynamism in connection with anal castration anxiety. Conflicts connected with "holding on" may under certain circumstances create a predisposition for a fear of "losing" or "being taken from".

The fact that we find the highest correlation between conflicts connected with impulse patterns genetically most closely situated, and that this coincides with the order in which the test pictures were presented, raises the question whether the different pictures tap different dynamic sources of the personality. Unfortunately there is no possibility of checking directly whether this is the case or not.¹

¹ The relatively high intercorrelation between the dimensions examined do indicate a common dynamic source. On the other hand in a recent investigation aiming at studying attitudes of rejection vs. acceptance among adults towards various psychosexual manifestations in children we obtained intercorrelations, the magnitude of which varied in very much the same ways as those presented above, in spite of each dimension here being registered by a number of randomized scale items.

Our data suggest that neither momentary moods nor tendencies towards stereotyped expressions are decisive factors. If they were we should expect to find a high correlation between types of answers on the individual pictures; for instance, uniform aggressive, "tough" and active answers, or uniform resigned, self-pitying and passive answers. On the whole this does not appear to be the case when we consider the association between defence patterns on the different test dimensions. It appears that, apart from the association between active late-oral and active anal defence, none of the associations achieves statistical significance below the 10 % level. Where the former association is concerned, however, we find statistical significance below the .001 level. This association is of particular interest in that it indirectly confirms Freud's hypothesis that the anal-sadistic impulse organization easily can be regarded as a continuation and development of a corresponding oral one (cf. 1, p. 500).

Correlation Between Conflict Scores and the ER Scale

Our aim in using a shortened version of the Blacky method was to obtain data on certain fundamental dimensions in the total functioning of a personality.

As stated earlier, actual conflicts involving oral, anal and phallic impulses will normally entail an aggressive mobilization of energy, and permanent conflicts in connection with these impulse patterns will probably very often be accompanied by lasting repressions of aggression. Thus the number of basic impulse patterns which are conflict-charged can be considered to give an approximate indication of the degree to which character-conditioned or latent aggression is present. Given that repressed aggression will often be connected with oral, anal and phallic conflicts, the fact cannot be denied that such repressions can also occur independently of these conflicts. The depth of the repression of aggression will not necessarily be greatest in early impulse conflicts. Regarding *the number* of basic impulse patterns scored as conflict-charged as a quantitative index of latent aggression, we must point out that such an index has striking shortcomings in evaluating individuals. For use in comparing groups, however, it may be assumed to possess some validity. In spite of conspicuous shortcomings we shall in the following regard "number of conflict scores" as an expression of latent aggression.

It follows from the above reasoning that we should expect to find a significant positive correlation between "number of conflict scores"

on the Blacky test and number of *E* scores on the P-F Study, provided that we have a sample of subjects with a consistent anchorage on the latent level of personality in the latter test. Unfortunately such a control study cannot be undertaken. Nor is there any particular value in a statistical comparison of whether there exists a higher positive correlation in the sub-sample with extreme latent anchorage than in the rest of the sample, because of limitations inherent in the total sample, which is here only about half its original size. Given the same sampling criteria as before, in this case we would get an extreme group with a latent anchorage of only 18 subjects, all of whom indicate that they have exclusively "now and then" made use of a 'latent level' in responding.¹

An analysis of the correlation between the Blacky test and the ER scale may also indirectly enable us to gather information concerning the soundness of the Blacky pictures. As already stated, several empirical investigations have indicated that there is normally no correlation whatsoever between the strength of latent and manifest aggressive tendencies. Granted that the two methods give valid information, we should thus expect to find a zero correlation between these two measures.

Table III,7 gives a survey of the connection between "number of conflict scores" and manifest reaction patterns in relation to everyday conflict situations. The table includes six everyday reaction patterns, namely, the secondary categories and the two primary categories, *E* and *i*, of the ER scale.

Table III, 7. *Correlation (r) Between Number of Conflict Scores on the Blacky Test and Different Categories of the ER Scale (N = 67)*

	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>r</i>15	-.35	.09	-.05	.03	-.25
<i>p</i>23	.01	-	-	-	.04

The table shows that "number of conflict scores" is significantly negatively correlated with the *In* category, i. e. with tendencies towards inwardly directed ways of reacting; and with the *i* category, i. e. with tendencies towards taking responsibility oneself for solving current everyday conflicts. Particular attention ought to be paid, however, to the insignificant correlation with the *E-D*, *Ex* and *E* categories of the ER scale.

¹ A comparison of the 18 subjects with the rest of the sample ($N = 37$) shows an insignificant difference in correlation in the two samples.

If we regard the “number of conflict scores” as an expression of the degree of latent aggression, and the *E* category as an indication of manifest aggressive tendencies, our data imply that, practically speaking, no correlation exists between the strength of latent and manifest aggressiveness. Latent aggression does not seem to be significantly correlated either with outwardly directed or threat oriented manifest everyday reactions.

In order to study the relationship between manifest aggressive tendencies and the *various* impulse conflicts on which we have been concentrating, we approximately halved the scoring distribution on the *E* category of the ER scale, and with the help of the Chi square method analyzed the association with the conflict scores on each Blacky dimension. Table III,8 shows that the *E* category does not give any significant or approximately significant association with any of the Blacky dimensions. The statistical significance of the association is given at the extreme right of the table.

Table III,8. *Associations Between the E Category of the ER Scale and Conflict Scores on Different Blacky Dimensions*

Dimensions		E-ER Scale		χ^2	<i>p</i>
		Lower 50 %	Higher 50 %		
Oral trust	Conflict charged	20	23	1.58	.22
	Conflict free	15	9		
Oral aggression	Conflict charged	26	25	0.14	.70
	Conflict free	9	7		
Anal autonomy	Conflict charged	25	22	0.06	.80
	Conflict free	10	10		
Phallic initiative	Conflict charged	25	21	0.26	.60
	Conflict free	10	11		

There is one aspect of this investigation which we wish to mention especially. As stated above, the Blacky method was administered 18 months later than the ER scale on a sub-sample of the sample which had earlier answered the ER and the IR scales. The considerable interval between the two data collections makes it possible for us to ignore the influence of temporary moods when we compare the material. The lack of correlation between the *E* category and the Blacky test may be interpreted as indicating that no permanent traits of

personality are tapped. An important argument against this, however, is the correlation mentioned above between the Blacky test and the *In* and *i* categories of the ER scale. The positive correlation found in these two instances confirms our expectations according to theoretical considerations, and indicates that "number of conflict scores" gives a measure of some permanent dynamic properties being present in our subjects. We have regarded this index as an expression of latent aggression.¹ From an *ex post facto* point of view we may tentatively regard it as a rough quantitative measure of ego-defensiveness or psychodynamic disintegration.² In emphasizing latent aggression we confirm, however, the line of reasoning governing our index construction.

Correlation Between Conflict Scores and the IR Scale

We will now consider the problem which was the main point of departure for our application of the Blacky pictures, by studying the relationship between the "number of conflict scores" on the Blacky test and the different categories of the IR scale. As above, we shall

Table III,9. *Correlation (r) Between Number of Conflict Scores on the Blacky Test and Different Categories of the IR Scale (N = 66)*

	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>r</i>13	-.19	.02	.35	.33	-.37
<i>p</i>30	.13	-	.01	.01	.01

¹ It may appear a little puzzling that lack of latent aggression seems to be positively correlated with intropunitive everyday reactions. Very often such reactions are regarded as an expression of an inhibition of aggression, i.e. the result of aggressive tendencies being turned inward. Without denying the occasional existence of this dynamism, we want to stress that inwardly directed tendencies also might be considered to be an expression of emotional maturity.

² Criticism can undoubtedly be raised against the use of "number of conflict scores" as a measure of psychodynamic disintegration on the grounds that a conflict in connection with one and the same impulse pattern can be more or less all-inclusive and massive, and that a conflict at an early stage of development presumably implies a deeper disintegration than a conflict at a later level. At the same time, however, the assertion can be made that a massive conflict in connection with an impulse pattern or an early conflict will always tend to transmit or facilitate conflicts in connection with other impulses. Finally, it is important to stress that "number of conflict scores" does not discriminate between open neurotic conflicts and stabilized and well-compensated neurotic character organizations.

concentrate on the secondary categories and the two primary categories, *E* and *i*.

Table III,9 gives a summary of the correlations and their respective statistical levels of significance. The table shows that a positive correlation exists between the "number of conflict scores" and the *E-D* and *E* categories of the IR scale, and a negative correlation between the "number of conflict scores" and the *i* category.¹

Assuming that a positive relationship does exist between "number of conflict scores" and latent aggression, our data suggest that latent aggression is positively correlated with aggressive and threat-oriented international reaction patterns, and negatively correlated with tendencies to put the responsibility on one's own nation for solving international conflicts. On the other hand, latent aggression does not seem to be correlated with particular directions of reaction. In the case of neither the *Ex*, *In*, nor *Im* categories of the IR scales do we find any significant correlations. With reference to our previous finding concerning the relationship between "number of conflict scores" and various categories of the ER scale, our data give support to the view that latent aggression shows a closer connection with international than with everyday aggressive tendencies (cf. table III,7).

The lack of any correlation with everyday aggressive tendencies does not mean that such tendencies are necessarily unrelated to aggressive international reaction patterns and that the Generalization Hypothesis is invalid. In the preceding chapter dealing with an investigation of the Latency Hypothesis from a structural point of view our data suggested that no difference seems to exist in the correlation between extrapunitive international reactions and predominant latent and manifest extrapunitive reactions respectively in everyday situations, but that

¹ The score distribution (with respect to the "number of conflict scores") on the Blacky test is skewed, with the weight on high score values. Since the product-moment method presupposes a normal distribution the correlation coefficients are somewhat inexact. In order to control this source of error we have also made use of the biserial method in order to calculate the correlation between the *E* category and the frequency of conflict scores on the Blacky test. In this case we obtain a considerable difference in correlation depending on which score value is used as dividing point. If we divide between score value 4 and the rest, and between 3 and 4 on the one hand and 0, 1 and 2 on the other hand, we will obtain biserial correlation coefficients of respectively .23 and .60. In the former case the higher half will have a preponderance of 9 scores, in the latter, the lower half will have a preponderance of 21. From this we should expect the exact correlation to lie closer to the former than to the latter value. Since this is the case with the product-moment method ($r = .33$) we consider its application to be justified.

we seem to be faced with positive correlations in both areas. This fact, as well as our earlier demonstration of a positive correlation between aggressive attitudes towards everyday and international situations, implies that probably both the Latency Hypothesis and the Generalization Hypothesis have a certain validity where aggressive reactions are concerned.

It is less clear what this relationship is in regard to other reaction forms. Our data suggest that latent aggression is negatively correlated with tendencies towards self-imposed responsibility for problem solutions in everyday as well as in international situations, but at the same time we can scarcely speak of generalization taking place between these latter tendencies (cf. p. 123). These findings might indicate that tendencies towards assigning responsibility to one's own nation for solving international conflicts are more highly related to latent dispositions than to manifest everyday reaction patterns.

Quite another relationship might possibly be present in connection with self-reproachful ways of reacting — where we find a fairly high degree of generalization to exist — and in connection with passive-directed reactions where we find neither a pronounced generalization (at least not in the case of absolution-directed tendencies), nor any significant correlation with latent aggression.¹ As far as threat-oriented ways of reacting are concerned, we seem to be facing very much the same relationships as those characterizing aggressive reaction patterns.

These comments are to be considered as tentative suggestions only. What we wish to emphasize is that the validity of the Latency Hypothesis is probably different in connection with different reaction patterns, in the same way as the Generalization Hypothesis.

Correlation Between Different Blacky Dimensions and the IR Scale

It is of considerable interest to question whether certain international attitudes are more correlated with certain conflict areas than with others. This is a problem which coincides with Whiting and Child's analysis of the connection between "fear for others" and strictness of childhood training in different behaviour areas (cf. p. 47).

¹ With respect to passive-directed international reactions we have previously indicated that in this area we seem to find a certain penetration of latent passive-directed tendencies (cf. p. 145). Such tendencies, especially tendencies in the direction of problem-oriented patience, we may regard at least hypothetically as an expression of constitutional factors being unrelated to latent aggression.

In what follows we have concentrated on the *E* category of the IR scale, on the tendency to favour an outwardly directed, threat oriented, i. e. an aggressive, national foreign policy.

In order to study the connection between the *E* category of the IR scale and the conflict scores on different Blacky dimensions we undertook an approximate halving of the score distributions on the *E* category, and on the basis of this divided the total sample into two subsamples and compared them with respect to conflict frequency.

Table III,10 gives a survey of our results. The table is set up in exactly the same way as Table III,8, except that in this case we also undertook an analysis of extreme groups in relation to aggressive international attitudes. The figures in parentheses are based on the highest and lowest quartiles of the score distribution on the *E* category.

Table III, 10. *Association Between the E Category of the IR Scale and Conflict Scores on Different Blacky Dimensions*

Dimensions		<i>E</i> -IR Scale		χ^2	<i>p</i>
		Lower ≈ 50 % (≈ 25 %)	Higher ≈ 50 % (≈ 25 %)		
Oral trust	Conflict charged	21 (7)	22 (13)	2.61 (3.70)	.12 (.05)
	Conflict free	16 (9)	7 (4)		
Oral aggression	Conflict charged	23 (8)	27 (17)	8.47 (8.66*)	.005 (.01)
	Conflict free	14 (8)	2 (0)		
Anal autonomy	Conflict charged	23 (9)	23 (14)	2.26 (1.57*)	.15 (.22)
	Conflict free	14 (7)	6 (3)		
Phallic initiative	Conflict charged	24 (8)	21 (14)	0.43 (3.88)	.50 (.05)
	Conflict free	13 (8)	8 (3)		

* Because the hypothetical frequency in one cell was under 5, Yates' method of correlation was used here (104, p. 207).

An analysis of extreme groups will often give more clear cut results than an analysis of the whole sample. If we concentrate on the extreme groups it appears that the highest association occurs with respect to "oral aggression", the lowest with respect to "anal autonomy". In connection with the Blacky dimensions on "oral trust", "oral aggression" and "phallic initiative" we find consistently significant or approximately significant associations.

A striking agreement with Whiting and Child's cross-cultural data calls for attention. Whiting and Child point out that "fear for

others" shows greatest correlation with severity of socialization of aggression, a little less with severity of socialization of oral and sexual impulses (here too they found significant correlations when analysing especially "fear for human beings"), and finally less correlation with severity of socialization of dependence and anal impulses. In connection with the latter two training areas they found no statistically significant correlations at all.

Furthermore the relationship between our results and the results of Frenkel-Brunswik's dynamic analysis of the authoritarian personality is of interest. Frenkel-Brunswik finds no significant correlation between ethnocentrism and rejection of oral eroticism; but a positive correlation between ethnocentrism and a non-functional, moralising anality, between ethnocentrism and diffuse, non-personal aggressivity, and between ethnocentrism and diffuse, ego-alien dependence. In contrast, our results stress the importance of rejection of oral eroticism, while on the other hand, in accordance with Whiting and Child's finding, anal conflicts do not seem to be a decisive factor.

Frenkel-Brunswik's analysis has been criticised because it is based exclusively on comparisons between extreme groups (73). It has also been maintained that extreme groups can often be more homogeneous than intermediate groups in psychodynamic respects. This criticism can also be applied to our own analysis above.

If we concentrate on the sample as a whole we find that the *E* category of the IR scale is not significantly associated with any of the Blacky dimensions, except "oral aggression".¹ The association between the *E* category and this dimension, however, attains a statistical significance below the .005 level.

Except for "oral aggression" and "anal autonomy" the association between the *E* category and the Blacky dimensions is greatest when using extreme groups. The differences in these two categories are so small, however, that they can be attributed entirely to the statistical corrections used.

Thus, with both procedures, the closest association appears to be present between the *E* category and "oral aggression". This finding suggests that aggressive international reaction patterns are especially associated with conflicts in connection with late oral impulses.

Taking into account the way in which this particular Blacky pic-

¹ The lack of positive correlation with phallic initiative attracts attention in the light of Reich's assumption that conflicts in this very area are of central importance for war-mindedness and aggressive outgroup attitudes (125). Our data gives no support to the theory that phallic conflicts are more decisive than others.

ture is drawn makes it conceivable, however, that we are not obtaining data exclusively about a specific oral impulse pattern. The depiction of Blacky with his mother's collar between his teeth can be associated with attitudes towards dependence, towards giving things away, and towards being taken from. We are not hereby denying the probability that the late oral phase of development might be particularly decisive as regards an individual's later handling of aggression; nor are we questioning the Blacky picture's fitness for giving data on latent aggression — the ambiguities involved may in fact be advantageous in this respect; but we do question the picture's validity for provoking late oral impulses exclusively. Our data do not, we think, offer any conclusive evidence as to the particular importance of conflicts concerning *oral* aggression.

As mentioned above, when scoring the Blacky protocols we made a division between passive and active defence stratagems in those cases where we considered impulse conflicts to be present. It seems reasonable to suppose that what we have described as passive defence patterns in general indicate a stronger inhibition of aggression than active ones. We should therefore expect inclinations towards passive defence patterns to be positively correlated more highly with aggressive international attitudes, because of the higher degree of inhibition of aggression which is present. In other words, we should expect to find that the *E* category of the IR scale is positively correlated more highly with the number of passive than with the number of active defence stratagems.

This seems to be the case, although we do not find any statistically significant difference. The correlation between the *E* category and the "number of passive defence stratagems" gives $r = .26$, and the corresponding correlation with the "number of active defence stratagems", $r = .11$. The former correlation is significant at the 1% level, while the latter does not attain any statistical significance worth mentioning.

Both these correlations are lower than the correlation with the "number of conflict scores". This is because the correlation between the number of active and passive defence stratagems is positive, but comparatively small ($r = .37$).

If we consider the distribution of active and passive defence stratagems on the different dimensions examined, and calculate (by means of the Chi square method) the relationship with the highest and the lowest half of the score distribution on the *E* category of the IR

scale, we find a significant positive correlation solely in connection with "oral aggression" ($p < .01$). There is also a certain tendency in the same direction as regards "anal autonomy" ($p < .10$).¹ In both cases the passive defence pattern is associated with high scores on the *E* category.

The passive anal defence stratagem expresses "a retentive, compensatory attitude". According to the opinion of many psychologists this particular attitude is especially characteristic of the authoritarian personality syndrome. We here want to recall Frenkel-Brunswik's finding of a positive correlation between ethnocentrism and a non-functional, moralising anality. It is highly probable that by these terms she is especially referring to a retentive, compensatory anal defence.

Our findings of a significantly higher association with a passive than with an active defence stratagem towards oral aggression, gives additional support to the Latency Hypothesis. Given that the Blacky dimension "oral aggression" is not exclusively rooted in this personality dimension, our data nevertheless indicate that the more inhibition of aggression exists, the more aggressive international reaction patterns tend to be present.

C. *Summary and Conclusion*

The intention of our investigation was to clarify how far a relationship exists between attitudes towards foreign affairs and psychodynamic conflicts. Investigations into the authoritarian personality structure and comparative investigations of primitive cultures would seem to indicate such a connection.

By psychodynamic conflicts we mean conflicts and disturbances in connection with basic impulse patterns assumed to give rise to various ego organizations. As well as investigating the correspondence with dispositions towards everyday and international ways of reacting, we were also interested in clarifying the interrelationship between conflicts in connection with different impulse patterns, and to what extent conflicts in connection with certain impulse patterns are more decisive than others in shaping international attitudes.

We have concentrated exclusively on impulse patterns which are considered to become crystallized in early psychosexual phases of development. We presumed that conflicts in connection with such

¹ If a one-tail criterion is used we may in fact consider this tendency approximately statistically significant.

impulses were primarily the result of early environmental influences, and that the more such patterns were conflict-charged, the more latent aggression would be present.

In order to obtain data on various impulse conflicts we made use of a shortened Norwegian version of the Blacky Pictures. We chose to work with the following dimensions: oral trust, oral aggression, anal autonomy and phallic initiative. Each of these dimensions pointing to various ego and phase modalities could be scored as conflict-free or conflict-charged, and if conflict-charged it could be indicated whether an active or a passive defence strategem was present.

The Blacky method was administered 18 months after our first collection of data to a sample of our original sample of subjects. The long interval between the two investigations made it possible to ignore the effect of temporary and changing psychological moods.

Our empirical results support the following statements:

Conflicts in connection with a basic impulse pattern are positively correlated with conflicts in connection with other basic impulse patterns. Broadly speaking, the correlation seems to be greatest between the genetically most closely situated impulse patterns. We are not qualified to decide to what degree this may be ascribed to dynamic processes with a generalizing effect, or whether the child training to which our subjects have been exposed has been generally authoritarian or liberal. Furthermore, we wish to emphasize that our data in this area is burdened with some potential sources of error.

Lack of psychodynamic conflicts is positively correlated with tendencies towards taking responsibility oneself for solving everyday conflict situations, and uncorrelated with manifest aggressive ways of reacting in such situations. Broadly speaking, a negative correlation would seem to be present with tendencies towards inwardly directed reactions, while tendencies towards passive and outwardly directed ways of reacting seem to be independent of the types of psychodynamic conflicts examined in our investigation.

Lack of psychodynamic conflicts is positively correlated with tendencies towards assigning responsibility to one's own nation for solving international conflicts, and negatively correlated with preferences for aggressive national reaction patterns. Accepting the assumption of a certain connection between psychodynamic conflicts and latent aggression, our data indicates that the more latent aggression is present the greater is the tendency to prefer aggressive and threat-oriented international reactions, and broadly speaking, the less the tendency to prefer a problem-

oriented foreign policy in international conflict situations. This conclusion is further supported by our analysis of defence stratagems. Here too our findings suggest that the more a person's aggressive impulses are blocked, the stronger will be his tendency towards favouring aggressive attitudes in foreign affairs.

Tendencies towards aggressive international reactions are correlated more highly with conflicts in connection with oral aggression than with conflicts in connection with other basic impulse patterns. Comparison between extreme groups suggests that conflicts in connection with early oral, late oral and phallic impulses dispose a person towards aggressive international attitudes. However, if we consider the whole sample, it appears that it is exclusively conflicts in connection with "oral aggression" which give a statistically significant association. Here especially we wish to point out that, due to the potential shortcomings of the method applied, our data must be interpreted mainly as preliminary suggestions.

As stated previously, the Latency Hypothesis does not specify whether displacement of latent tendencies on to the international sphere will occur in the case of all, or only of specific tendencies. Our data provide some suggestions concerning this, and indicate that the Latency Hypothesis at least seems to have some validity in connection with aggressive reaction patterns.

CHAPTER 9

The Insecurity Hypothesis: An Attitudinal Analysis

The Insecurity Hypothesis maintains that personal insecurity will affect an individual's attitudes towards foreign affairs. We should therefore expect to find a positive correlation between fear of future blocking of personal needs and desires, and preferences for certain national ways of reacting to international conflict situations. As we have discussed previously, we should expect to find in particular a tendency towards aggressive international attitudes.

According to psychoanalytic theory personal insecurity is considered to be rooted especially in oral frustrations in early childhood. An insecure person will be characterized by permanent expectations of again experiencing disappointments and defeat. The individual will have little ability for tolerating frustrations and will tend to try to prevent disappointments by anticipating his environment.

An individual can be more or less insecure on behalf of his nation. He can to a greater or lesser degree be characterized by fear of events detrimental to the national interest. This we will designate national insecurity.

If we regard a person's insecurity concerning personal matters as a particular way of reacting to everyday situations, it is reasonable to expect a certain generalization taking place between personal insecurity and tendencies towards national insecurity.

The latter hypothesis calls for attention because it indicates that the connection between personal insecurity and aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs is possibly more indirect than it is often presumed to be. It is not impossible that the connection is first of all due to a generalization of insecurity from personal to national and inter-

national matters, and that in the first place it is insecurity in the latter context which predisposes an individual towards aggressive international reaction patterns. In this case we should expect a preference for aggressive national ways of reacting to be more highly correlated with national than with personal insecurity. We should also expect this if a generalization of insecurity takes place the opposite way, provided that insecurity predisposes to aggressive ways of reacting.

In what follows we shall describe an investigation having the aim of clarifying whether 1) there exists a general fear of future blocking of personal and national interests respectively, and if this is the case, 2) whether there exists a positive correlation between personal and national insecurity, and 3) between insecurity in these two areas, and certain international reaction tendencies. Finally 4) we shall examine whether a positive correlation exists between personal insecurity and psychodynamic conflicts as they are revealed by the Blacky test.

A. Procedure

In connection with his introduction of the term "margin of safety" Katz refers to some possible ways of registering personal insecurity (30). He gives a number of examples of questions which he considers suitable for procuring data on personal margins of safety; questions concerning: attitudes towards the future, expectations concerning survival after an operation, attitudes towards the use of money and towards living dangerously, vulnerability to accidents, and preoccupation with time. The method not only seems to afford the possibility of being relatively simply administered, but also seems to be appropriate for the investigation of national insecurity.

For registering insecurity concerning personal matters we constructed a special scale (the EE scale), consisting of a series of questions, some with and some without alternative responses. The questions were worked out on the model of Katz' approach.

The instructions for the scale read as follows:

"In this questionnaire you will be asked a series of questions about personal matters. After most of the questions seven different alternative responses are listed. You are to put a circle round the number below the alternative you consider most suitable."

As alternative responses we consistently used a seven point gradation, from "exceptionally well" to "exceptionally badly", from "practically certain" to "practically unthinkable", from "never" to

“exceptionally often”, and so on. In answer to the open questions the subject was asked to reply in terms of a particular measure, for instance, in percentage, days or minutes, but was otherwise left completely free.

A few examples will illustrate the scale:

1. How do you think your personal life will turn out during the next few years?

exceptionally well	very well	fairly well	not particularly well	fairly badly	very badly	exceptionally badly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

8. If you were to train as a military pilot, how great do you think the chances would be of your being killed or seriously hurt during your training?

<i>Give your answer in %:</i>

The scale for registering insecurity concerning national and international matters (the IE scale) was worked out on the model of the EE scale.

Here again we concentrated on questions, some with and some without alternative responses. The instructions for the scale were similar to those for the EE scale, except that it was pointed out in the introduction that the subject would be asked a series of questions concerning national and international relations. Here too the alternative responses covered a seven point gradation.

There follows a couple of examples from the scale:

3. Has the thought ever struck you that the whole of Norway might be destroyed by a natural catastrophe?

exceptionally often	very often	fairly often	now and then	fairly seldom	very seldom	never
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

6. How do you look upon Norway's future as a nation? Do you think Norway will exist as a nation 100 years from now?

practically certain	very likely	fairly likely	not particularly likely	fairly unlikely	very unlikely	practically unthinkable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Most of the alternative responses which follow the questions on the IE scale are placed so that they run from optimism to pessimism.¹ The opposite is the case, however, for items 3, 4, 5 and 8. Since we systematically chose to let a low score value stand for optimism (security), we here had to reverse the score values.

The two scales were worked out during the summer of 1952. In choosing the items stress was laid on illuminating expectation concerning different personal and national areas. We also tried to work out questions which were relatively concrete and which it was reasonable to assume would elicit dissimilar replies.

No systematic pretesting took place with either the EE or the IE scale as was the case with the ER and IR scales. Both the EE and IE scales were built up much more loosely and each consisted of 12 items only. Both scales were originally somewhat longer, but were cut down after the collection of data was finished. The final choice of items was not, however, based on statistical analysis of the items, but upon theoretical considerations. Appendix II gives a survey of the EE and IE scales.

Data collection took place during the autumn of 1952. Administration time for the EE and IE scales was about 10 minutes each.

The validity of the two scales is highly dependent on the subjects giving honest answers. The fact that the scales were administered on the same day means that we cannot ignore the fact that situational conditions will have influenced the answers and made them more uniform than they perhaps would otherwise have been. Nevertheless, the most important criticism which may possibly be made against the scales is that they both have a predominant anchorage on a manifest level of behaviour. They give no possibility of differentiating between a compensated and a non-compensated insecurity: it is reasonable to assume that an outer manifest security in speech and behaviour can often hide considerable inner latent insecurity.

In what follows we have assumed that both scales give valid information. We nevertheless wish to stress most strongly that by the term insecurity we mean manifest attitudinal insecurity.

¹ This is the case, for instance, with item no. 6 above. It may here be objected that low score values would represent an exceedingly pessimistic attitude for an extreme supporter of "One World" (the movement for world government). From this point of view optimism would be linked with expectation of the imminent abolition of all nations. We have assumed that this attitude is met so rarely that this source of error is of theoretical interest only.

B. Results

The first stage in the analysis of our empirical material was the scoring of the answers to the open items. Here too we decided to make use of a seven point gradation as a basis for scoring. The scoring itself took place after we had obtained a survey of the distribution of responses to the individual items and decided upon suitable scoring intervals.

As we have stated our total sample consisted of 167 subjects. A closer study of the questionnaires showed that some subjects had not answered all the questions; in all, 23 had not answered one or more questions on the EE scale, and 5 one or more questions on the IE scale. Since the total number of items on both scales was relatively small, we did not calculate adjusted values for lost responses. Questionnaires with one or several unanswered questions were therefore omitted from further analysis.

Below we shall give a relatively technical presentation of the statistical properties of the EE and IE scales. After dealing first with the score distribution, item discrimination, reliability and differentiating ability of the scales, we will go into further detail concerning the scales' intercorrelation and the correlation of each with the IR scale.

Statistical Properties of the E Scales: Score Distribution

As well as calculating the means and standard deviation for the score distributions on the two scales, we also calculated the hypothetical score distributions on the basis of a normal distribution, and tested the correspondence between the hypothetical and observed score distributions by means of the Chi square technique.

Our results show that generally the score values are higher on the IE scale than on the EE scale. The mean (M) for the IE scale is 49.83 against 38.56 for the EE scale. On the other hand, the score deviation is somewhat higher on the EE scale, where the range of variation runs from 18 to 62 against only 36 to 65 on the IE scale.

Our material on the EE scale comprises 144 subjects, and on the IE scale 162 subjects. The standard deviation (σ) on the EE scale is 6.96 and on the IE scale 5.24.

The result of the Chi square test on the goodness of fit shows that only the score distribution on the IE scale satisfied the requirements for normal distribution ($P = .50$ vs. $P = .01$ on the EE scale). The

distributions on both scales are comparatively symmetrical, however, and the deviation in connection with the EE scale is not so large that we found it necessary to reject our empirical data. However, our results show a definite weakness in the EE scale and indicate that this scale should be revised before being used in a new research project.

Item Analysis of the E Scales

Because of the lack of systematic pretests we considered it to be of great importance to obtain a survey of the differentiating properties of the various items, and their agreement with the scales as a whole.

We obtained an approximate measure for this by calculating the means of each of the quartiles of the total distribution, for each individual item; the differences between the means for the upper and lower quartiles, i. e. the "discriminatory power"; and finally the *CR* of the differences and their level of significance.

Table IV,1 gives a survey of the results of the item analysis of the EE scale.

Table IV,1. *Item Analysis of the EE Scale*

No.	Item	M_{Q_1}	M_{Q_2}	M_{Q_3}	M_{Q_4}	<i>CR</i>	<i>p</i>
1	(Attitude towards the future)	2.92	2.92	2.58	2.53	1.29	.20
2	(Appendix operation)	3.97	3.58	2.97	2.03	2.70	.01
3	(Tram journey)	4.22	3.36	3.42	3.06	3.16	.01
4	(Keeping accounts)	4.61	4.25	4.03	3.39	3.40	.001
5	(Giving a lecture)	4.66	4.53	3.64	3.08	2.72	.01
6	(Becoming an invalid)	3.00	2.11	1.72	1.53	6.68	.001
7	(Dying of cancer)	2.42	1.97	1.78	1.14	6.57	.001
8	(Becoming a military pilot)	5.64	4.50	4.28	2.70	7.69	.001
9	(Unexpected events)	4.27	4.14	3.67	3.31	2.68	.01
10	(Taking a lift)	2.19	1.75	1.67	1.08	5.64	.001
11	(Planning in detail)	5.00	3.42	3.28	2.22	7.45	.001
12	(Surviving a new war)	4.20	3.95	4.03	3.39	3.26	.001

All the items are shown to be positively associated with the scale as a whole. Item no. 1, however, does not satisfy usual statistical demands, attaining a *p* value of just below the 20% level only. This is worth noting. Item. no. 1 aims at registering general expectations of the future. It is possible that the question is formulated in such general terms that it mainly elicits stereotyped and relatively impersonal

Table IV,2. *Item Analysis of the IE Scale*

No.	Item	M_{Q_1}	M_{Q_2}	M_{Q_3}	M_{Q_4}	CR	p
1	(Looking forward to the future) ..	3.62	3.30	3.10	2.90	5.44	.001
2	(Detailed plans)	4.62	4.33	3.60	2.90	4.59	.001
3	(Natural catastrophe)	1.74	1.43	1.33	1.08	4.22	.001
4	(Economic crises)	4.83	4.43	4.35	4.15	4.26	.001
5	(Being attacked)	5.81	5.53	5.40	5.10	3.41	.001
6	(Norway's future)	3.69	2.45	2.25	1.75	7.00	.001
7	(Citizenship).....	5.00	4.80	4.48	3.88	3.17	.002
8	(Saboteurs and spies)	6.07	5.55	5.78	5.30	3.53	.001
9	(New war, when)	4.88	4.45	3.88	3.38	5.28	.001
10	(New war, neutrality)	6.64	6.20	5.83	5.53	5.17	.001
11	(New war, destruction)	6.00	5.83	5.77	5.10	3.88	.001
12	(New war, consequences)	3.50	2.70	2.63	2.18	4.75	.001

answers. The gradation of responses is here particularly rough and the score distribution shows less dispersion than on any of the other items.

Items 8 and 11 are the most discriminating. This is also of interest. Both these items are open and the subject is forced to reply without the aid of any specified gradation. The fact that these two items show highest agreement with the scale as a whole must thus be considered to be of importance as regards evaluation of the validity of the scale.

Table IV,2 gives a survey of the item analysis of the IE scale. The table is set up in exactly the same way as Table IV,1. On the whole the various items on the IE scale show a more uniform differentiation. None of the items reaches such a high CR as items 8 and 11, but none such a low one as items 1,2,3 and 9 on the EE scale. Apart from item no. 7, all the items on the IE scale differentiate with a p value below the .001 level. Item no. 7 also gives a p value considerably below the 1% level of statistical significance.

Items nos. 1 and 6 are the most differentiating on the IE scale. Both of these allude to matters directly concerning Norway's future as a nation, the one in asking about Norway's future prospects, and the other in asking how probable they consider Norway's existence to be as a nation 100 years from now.

In conclusion we may say that the item analyses suggest that all the items on both scales are positively associated with the scales as a whole, and that most of the items possess a satisfactory discriminating

power. In spite of the fact that when working out the scales we had no pretest results on which to rely, the results indicate that both scales have a fairly high inner consistency.

Reliability and Differentiating Ability of the E Scales

In order to obtain a more exact measure of the internal consistency of the E scales we also undertook a special reliability analysis.

Table IV,3. *Analysis of Reliability of the E Scales*

Sources	df.		Sum of Squares	
	EE scale	IF scale	EE scale	IF scale
Total	1727	1943	5085.63	6452.93
Item	11	11	1340.45	3770.40
Person	143	161	581.80	370.26
Residual	1573	1771	3163.38	2312.27

Table IV,3 gives a survey of our results on both scales. In both cases we made an analysis of variance. By means of Hoyt's formula we computed the reliability coefficient of the two scales. For the EE scale we obtained a reliability, $r_{tt} = .55$, and a standard error of measurement, $\sigma_e = 4.67$. The relationship between person and residual variance gives $F = 2.22$, which indicates that the scale is capable of differentiating between individuals in a statistically significant way ($p < .01$).

For the IE scale we get a reliability, $r_{tt} = .48$, a standard error of measurement, $\sigma_e = 3.77$, and an $F = 1.93$. This F value also implies a significant differentiating ability.

The reliability coefficients above must be considered in connection with the fact that both E scales are fairly short and have a very small number of items. The scales are hardly suited to the evaluation of individuals, but their discriminating properties are nevertheless high enough to warrant their employment for research purposes.

The reliability of both scales is relatively good by comparison with the average reliability of the various categories of the R scales. If lengthened to 40 items the EE scale achieves a hypothetical reliability coefficient of .85 and the IE scale a coefficient of .76.

On the whole both personal and national insecurity seem to represent fairly general characteristics.

Intercorrelation Between the E Scales

In all 141 subjects had given complete answers on the EE and IE scales. A calculation of the correlation between the scales gives $r = .27$. This correlation achieves a statistical significance below the .001 level. Optimistic (or pessimistic) expectations concerning personal matters therefore seem to be positively correlated with optimistic (or pessimistic) expectations concerning national matters.

Neither the EE nor the IE scale is free of some errors of measurement. A calculation of the correlation between the scales, when corrected for attenuation, gives $r_{corr} = .53$. A comparison with the corrected coefficients for the correlation between the R scales suggests that we obtain more or less equivalent correlations in both cases (cf. p. 123).

Table IV,4 gives a survey of the relationship between the correlation of the E scales and the reliability or self-correlation of each of the scales.

Table IV,4. *Difference Between the Correlation of the Two Scales and the Self-Correlation of Each (N = 141)*

	EE Scale	IE Scale
$r_{t_1 t_1}$550	.483
$r_{t_2 t_2}$271	.271
$D_{t_1-t_2}$340	.249
$\sigma_{t_1-t_2}$108	.107
CR	3.16	2.32
p001	.02

The difference between the correlation of the two scales and the self-correlation of the EE scale achieves a statistical significance below the .001 level. The difference between the correlation of the scales and the self-correlation of the IE scale also achieves statistical significance but the difference is not quite as significant as in the former case ($p \approx .02$). We may conclude that the relationship between the E scales shows the same tendency as the R scales. In both cases we

find statistically significant differences between the inter- and intra-correlations of the scales.

A tendency towards generalization therefore seems to be present in about as high a degree where expectations regarding future frustrations are concerned, as where ways of reacting towards frustrations are concerned.

Correlation Between the E Scales and the IR Scale

In order to measure the connection between attitudes towards foreign affairs and insecurity towards personal and national matters we have calculated the correlation between the E scales and the IR scale. Here, as previously, we have entirely made use of the secondary categories of the IR scale and the scale's two primary categories *E* and *i*.

Table IV,5 gives a survey of our empirical results. The table shows that extremely small correlations occur throughout.

Table IV,5. *Correlation (r) Between the E Scales and Different Categories of the IR Scale*

Categories of the IR Scale	EE Scale ($N = 157$)		IE Scale ($N = 160$)	
	r	p	r	p
<i>Ex</i>002	—	-.03	—
<i>In</i>	-.04	—	.03	—
<i>Im</i>04	—	.00	—
<i>E-D</i>10	.21	.09	.28
<i>E</i>08	.35	.08	.32
<i>i</i>	-.06	—	-.05	—

With respect to the EE scale we find highest correlation with the IR scale's *E-D* category. Where the primary categories are concerned the *E* category tends very slightly in the direction of a positive correlation, and the *i* category in the direction of a negative one.

Exactly the same pattern appears for the IE scale. Here again the *E-D* category achieves the highest correlation and the direction of the correlations of the primary categories is the same.

A comparison of the correlation of the EE and IE scales with the *E* category of the IR scale shows a striking similarity. The fact that

the IE scale does not show any higher correlation than the EE scale with this category, suggests that insecurity in national and international matters does not represent any predominant predisposing factor for aggressive international attitudes.

Generally we find that the correlations with the IR scale go in the expected direction, but that at the same time — and this is most marked — none of the correlations achieve any kind of statistical significance. Thus neither personal nor national insecurity seem to be significantly correlated with a preference for certain national ways of reacting in international conflict situations.

Correlation Between the E Scales and Conflict Scores on the Blacky Pictures

According to psychoanalytic theory a positive relationship exists between personal insecurity (pessimism) and psychodynamic, especially early oral, conflicts. In other words, we should expect to find that the EE scale and conflicts concerning *basic trust*, as measured by the Blacky test, are positively correlated. From this point of view, the almost insignificant correlation previously found between the EE scale and the *E* category of the IR scale is not very sensational when seen against the background of the very limited association which seems to exist between the *E* category of the IR scale and early oral conflicts (cf. p. 182).

Our empirical results suggest that a certain association exists between the EE scale and "oral trust". The subjects scored as conflict-free as regards "oral trust" generally achieve a lower total score on the EE scale than the subjects who were ascribed conflicts in connection with this dimension. While the mean score for the sample with conflict-free "oral trust" is 35.4, the mean score for the samples with active and passive defence stratagems are respectively 38.0 and 38.5. The differences do not, however, attain any statistical significance. If we take the upper and lower quartiles on the EE scale, conflict-free and conflict-charged answers on the Blacky dimension, we get by means of the Chi square technique an association with a statistical significance of about the 15% level only.

Furthermore the EE scale shows absolutely no correlation with the other Blacky dimensions. The EE scale thus seems to possess very restricted abilities for providing data concerning psychodynamic conflicts generally. On the other hand it cannot be denied that the scale shows a slight tendency to correlate with a certain type of such conflicts.

For the IE scale we find no association with any of the Blacky dimensions.

Our data do not verify the hypothesis of a connection between personal insecurity and early oral conflicts. On the other hand the fact that we found a slight association only with the Blacky dimension which aims at registering this conflict area calls for attention.

C. *Summary and Conclusion*

The purpose of this investigation was to clarify how far a connection occurs between personal insecurity in the sense of fear of future blockings of needs and desires, and reaction patterns towards international conflict situations. In planning the investigation we were aware that it would be desirable not only to clarify the connection with insecurity concerning personal matters, but also with insecurity concerning national and international matters. By obtaining independent measures of both these types of insecurity we would have an opportunity to examine to what extent we do find a generalization in this area parallel to that previously found concerning reaction patterns in everyday and international conflict situations.

A pre-condition for investigating the latter hypothesis depends upon the extent to which we find comparatively general optimistic or pessimistic expectations concerning personal and national matters.

In order to throw light on these problems we constructed two special attitude scales, the EE and the IE scales, each consisting of twelve questions on each of which the subjects had to take a stand. The scales were worked out on the model of Katz' questionnaire for investigating psychological margins of safety. The scales were administered at the same time and on the same sample as for our investigation of reaction patterns towards conflict situations.

Our statistical treatment includes an analysis of the scales' score distributions; the differentiating ability of the individual items and their agreement with the scales as a whole; an analysis of the reliability and intercorrelation of the scales; the correlation of the two scales with the scale for registering international reaction patterns; and finally, the correlation of the scales with the different dimensions of our Norwegian revision of the Blacky Pictures.

Our empirical results support the following statements:

A generalization is present as regards personal and national insecurity corresponding to what we have previously found concerning reaction patterns to-

wards everyday and international conflicts. Relatively general optimistic (or pessimistic) expectations seem to exist towards different personal and national matters respectively. Optimistic (or pessimistic) expectations in the one area seem on the whole to be positively correlated with corresponding expectations in the other. On the other hand a lower correlation seems to exist concerning optimistic (or pessimistic) expectations between the two areas than expectations within each area.

A non-significant correlation exists between personal and national insecurity and reaction patterns towards international conflicts. Our empirical data support neither the hypothesis of a positive connection between personal and national insecurity and preference for aggressive ways of reacting in foreign affairs, nor the hypothesis that it is first and foremost insecurity in national and international matters which predisposes an individual towards aggressive international reaction patterns.

No significant correlations exist between personal insecurity and psychodynamic conflicts. Apart from a weak tendency towards positive association between personal security and oral trust, our results indicate no connection between personal or national insecurity and basic impulse conflicts.

Our empirical data give no basis for concluding that the Insecurity Hypothesis is capable of explaining individual differences with regard to reaction patterns towards international conflict situations.

We will once more stress the fact, however, that by the term insecurity we here refer to manifest insecurity in the sense of pessimistic expectations concerning various matters. We are unable to decide whether the Insecurity Hypothesis has greater validity as regards insecurity in a more genotypical sense, or whether the hypothesis has any validity in a more heterogeneous sample of subjects, given that we were to concentrate on "attitudinal" insecurity. The fact that our empirical correlations go in the expected direction in spite of their not attaining statistical significance, may indicate that the latter suggestion is possible. On the other hand the connection between personal insecurity and psychodynamic conflicts would perhaps appear more significant in a heterogeneous sample, so that we still do not face a really tenable, independent hypothesis, but a special variety of the Latency Hypothesis.

CHAPTER 10

The Nationalism Hypothesis: An Attitudinal Analysis

The Nationalism Hypothesis contends that a person's attitude towards his own nation will affect his attitudes towards foreign affairs. We should therefore expect to find a positive correlation between nationalism and a preference for certain national ways of reacting towards international conflicts.

By nationalism we refer to the investment of positive feelings on to national symbols. Such emotional investment may be exclusive or inclusive, it may be based on a solicitous interest in one's own nation without such interest involving the rejection of other nations, or it may be based on the conception of one's own nation as superior to the rest of mankind. Depth psychological explanations have concentrated on the latter form of nationalism, which is frequently described as patriotism. The importance of oedipal conflicts has been particularly stressed, and also the fact that a person's national idealization is often rooted in his early attitude to his parents or superiors. It is assumed on the whole that national idealization and patriotism are closely related phenomena, both correlated with aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs.

In what follows we will refer to an investigation aiming at clarifying 1) how far a connection exists between national idealization and patriotism; 2) how far these two forms of nationalism are positively correlated with certain international reaction patterns; and 3) how far a positive correlation exists between patriotism and psychodynamic conflicts.

A. Procedure

A detailed description is given below of our procedure in registering national idealization and patriotism respectively.

By national idealization is usually meant a tendency to ascribe chiefly positive traits to one's own nation. By taking such a definition as our point of departure we should therefore obtain a measure of national idealization by confronting a person with a series of national traits and asking him to say which of them he thinks are typical of his own nation.

This method of approach has been utilized to a considerable degree in the study of social stereotypes (cf. 79), but it has also been strongly criticized. Eysenck and Crown, among others, allege that the method "creates" stereotypes: since no distinction is made between traits in which the subjects believe and traits with which they are consciously acquainted as popular stereotypes, it is not surprising if the results imply that the subjects have stereotyped opinions (36).

Eysenck and Crown utilize the method themselves in order to obtain a measure of national preference. They work with a total of 84 traits and ask their subjects to choose the five most characteristic of different nations. Actual judgement of the various traits is left to a group of five psychologists. These judge the single traits on an independent basis, deciding whether they are "desirable", "undesirable", or "neutral". By assigning desirable traits a value of + 1 and undesirable ones a value of - 1, they construct a scale with a maximal range of from + 5 to - 5.

When we came to construct our scale we immediately paid attention to Eysenck and Crown's procedure. We also found it desirable to make a distinction between trait-attributions and value judgements. In principle we decided to ascribe greater national idealization to a person: (a) the greater the value he was inclined to ascribe to traits and the more he considered these traits to be characteristic of his nation, and (b) the less value he was inclined to ascribe to traits, and the less he considered these traits to be characteristic of his nation.

In contrast to Eysenck and Crown we decided to leave the value judgements to the subjects themselves. Furthermore we undertook a finer gradation of values. While Eysenck and Crown use a triple division, we decided to make use of a quintuple division, that is, we decided to invite the subjects themselves to state whether their attitude to the individual traits was very favourable — somewhat favourable — indifferent — somewhat unfavourable — very unfavourable.

We concentrated on a total of 20 traits or national characteristics, as follows:

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. General education | 11. Social insurance |
| 2. Artistic standards | 12. Public welfare |
| 3. Scientific standards | 13. Poverty |
| 4. Educational facilities | 14. Level of production |
| 5. Public security | 15. Standard of living |
| 6. Law-abidingness | 16. Effectiveness of labour |
| 7. Lawlessness | 17. Defence preparedness |
| 8. Corruption | 18. Military discipline |
| 9. Health service | 19. Military strength |
| 10. Standard of housing | 20. Inner disagreement |

Each trait was followed by the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The instructions for the scale read:

“Different people usually evaluate the same national traits in different ways. *How do you evaluate the national traits listed below?* Give your evaluation of the individual traits by putting a circle round the number on the right of the trait which you think best expresses your evaluation.

If your attitude to the trait is *very favourable*, put a circle round 1.

If your attitude to the trait is *somewhat favourable*, put a circle round 2.

If your attitude to the trait is *indifferent*, put a circle round 3.

If your attitude is *somewhat unfavourable*, put a circle round 4.

If your attitude is *very unfavourable*, put a circle round 5.”

After obtaining information on the subjects' evaluations we presented them with the same list of traits, this time instructing them to state their opinion of their own nation in relation to most other nations with regard to each trait.

We again used a quintuple gradation and the instructions were:

“Different people generally judge their own nation in different ways. *How do you perceive Norway in relation to most other nations?* Give your judgement by putting a circle round the number you think best expresses your own point of view. If you think Norway has this trait

to a considerably greater degree than others, put a circle round 1,

to a somewhat greater degree than others, put a circle round 2,

to the same degree as others, put a circle round 3,

in a somewhat lesser degree than others, put a circle round 4,

in a considerably lesser degree than others, put a circle round 5.”

In order to obtain a fairly reliable picture of the subjects' national attitudes it was of course of the greatest importance that the sample

of traits should cover those aspects of the nation which had psychological significance for the subjects. We are not certain whether this was the case in our investigation or not. When formulating the list of traits we attempted to cover the following aspects: traits 1 to 4 cultural; 5 to 8 legal; 9 to 12 welfare; 13 to 16 economic; and 17 to 20 defensive or military aspects.

Another criticism that can be made against our scale construction is that different subjects will undoubtedly have quite different kinds of associations in connection with the concept "most nations", and that a reliable registering of nationalism ought in principle to include a complete set of comparisons: opinions of Norway in relation to Sweden, the United States, the Soviet Union, England, and so on in relation to a representative sample of those frames of reference used spontaneously by the subjects in their daily life.

Originally we decided to work with a total of 40 traits and four different frames of comparisons: most nations, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Sweden, and to compare the mean of the different comparisons. However, this procedure proved to be so time-consuming that we did not consider it worth completing. After a while we discovered yet another objection. Many of the subjects would possibly be inclined to ascribe different values to single traits depending upon which comparisons they were going to make. It follows in fact that we ought to have included value evaluations in relation to each trait-judgement. Starting out with 40 traits and four opinion statements, this would mean that we would have to get each subject to give 360 single responses. This would have meant putting our subjects to too great a test of their patience.

As we have mentioned, we decided to include a quintuple gradation of trait values and trait attitudes. We further decided to work in both cases with scores from $+2$ to -2 , i. e. we gave 1 a weighting of $+2$, 2 a weighting of $+1$, 3 a weighting of 0, 4 a weighting of -1 , and 5 a weighting of -2 . This gave us the possibility of constructing a simple index as a measure of the individuals' national idealization.

A person's national idealization has been defined as greater (a) the greater the positive value ascribed to a trait, and the greater the degree to which the nation is considered to possess that trait; (b) the greater the negative value ascribed to the trait and the greater the degree to which the nation is considered not to possess that trait. From this definition it follows that by multiplying the scores of value and attribution for each trait we may obtain an idealization index.

For each trait we will have a maximum range from +4 to -4, and for the scale as a whole, a range from +80 to -80.

There is one objection which may be raised against this index construction. Indifference towards a trait, regardless of the degree to which the individual considers the trait to be characteristic of his nation, will give exactly the same final score as an exceptionally positive or negative attitude towards a trait if the individual considers the trait to be just as characteristic of other nations as of his own. The two cases are far from being psychologically equivalent. In the latter instance we may be faced with a highly realistic orientation, a balanced opinion of national characteristics. In the former we have a trait which is psychologically indifferent, which lies more or less outside the individual's value orientation. To let this count in the final score would give a distorted picture of the individual's national attitudes. In order to avoid this it was decided to omit all traits from the score calculations which were regarded as indifferent by the individual. So that we could continue to work with comparative total scores we changed over to calculations of means, that is, instead of adding the individual person's trait scores, we only added trait scores for those traits which had been assigned positive or negative values, and divided the sum of the scores by the number of those traits. Theoretically the maximal score distribution for the scale as a whole will then be exactly the same as for each individual trait. The highest possible score on the scale was +4, which meant that a person's evaluation of all those traits to which he was not indifferent was extremely positive or negative, and that he ascribed to his nation to a considerably greater degree than others all the traits which he considered positive, and to a considerably lesser degree than others, all the traits which he considered negative.

The idealization scale, or the NI scale as we will call it, was constructed in the spring of 1952. Before it was finally used, the scale was revised a couple of times on the basis of experiences from pretests.

There is one obvious weakness inherent in the NI scale. The way in which it is constructed leaves no possibility of discriminating between national idealization in the sense of national satisfaction, and national glorification. This weakness is further stressed by the fact that Norway is a comparatively small country which does not represent any international power. In our case, therefore, national idealization scarcely represents a compensatory power identification in line with what is likely within greater nations. We would probably find

very many Norwegians with quite a high national satisfaction without this meaning that they are especially inclined to identify themselves with national symbols.

Nor does patriotism under Norwegian conditions necessarily imply compensatory power identifications. Here too Norway's lack of international power and strength would probably play an important role. On the other hand it is reasonable to assume that patriotic sentiments in our country provide a better measure of what is normally described as *nationalism* than is the case with national idealization.

By patriotism we mean in general tendencies to see one's own nation as superior to humanity. A prominent trait would be a superordinate loyalty to one's own nation in relation to other reference and membership groups. Loyalty to one's own nation will take priority over loyalty to a) national subgroups, b) supra-national organizations, c) national outgroups, and d) humanity as a whole.

In order to obtain a measure of patriotism we constructed a series of statements on which the subject was to express his opinions. In choosing these statements we stressed the importance of working out formulations which reflected all the "loyalty dimensions" listed above. We concentrated on a total of nine statements, as follows:

1. No duties are more important than duties towards one's own country.
2. Norway's frontiers should be open to all those who wish to settle in Norway.
3. When a national government is incompetent, the use of force to remove it can be justified.
4. Norway ought to be willing to give up its independence and submit to the authority of a United States of the World.
5. One should always show greater loyalty to the King and the government than to a national political party.
6. All human beings are equally important. No Norwegian is of more value than any person from any other country.
7. Norway ought to support the establishment of a World Government that could solve international disputes by force.
8. The defence of Norway can never justify the taking of another human life.
9. One should show greater loyalty towards humanity than towards Norway as a nation.

National loyalty in relation to loyalty towards national subgroups is indirectly represented by items number 3 and 5, in relation to supra-national organizations indirectly by nos. 4 and 7, to national outgroups by nos. 1 and 6, and to humanity as a whole by nos. 2, 8 and 9.

After each of the statements we worked out a quintuply divided evaluation scale: *strong agreement* — *moderate agreement* — *slight agree-*

ment — moderate disagreement — strong disagreement, which we weighted from 5 to 1. For some of the items (nos. 1 and 5) “strong agreement” stands for extreme patriotism, and for other items (nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9) the relationship is reversed.

We decided to let each item count equally and consistently to ascribe the highest score to the most patriotic responses. Since for practical reasons it was simpler to let the response alternatives always begin with “strong agreement”, and to give the different alternatives a fixed score value, it was therefore necessary to undertake a rescoring of some of the individual items later on.

The instructions for the scale were as follows:

“A series of statements is listed below. What is your opinion of each of these statements? Put a circle round the answer you think most suitable.”

The patriotism scale, or the NP scale as we shall call it, was worked out during the summer of 1952. No systematic pretesting was undertaken. Originally we had no intention of working with more than one nationalism index, namely the NI scale. However, during the preparatory work with this scale we became more and more doubtful as to how far national idealization in Norwegian conditions gives an adequate expression of nationalism. The NP scale was constructed just before data collection in the autumn of 1952 in order to remedy the weaknesses of the NI scale.

We shall here discuss one particular aspect of the NP scale only. A crucial problem is whether certain items in the NP scale can by their content be said to indicate certain attitudes towards foreign affairs. If this is the case possible correlation between the NP and the IR scales would show exclusively that both register the same phenomenon.

Item no. 1 does to a certain extent exclude a positive association between patriotism and an intropunitive attitude towards foreign affairs, but on the whole, the content of the items in the NP scale can hardly be said to indicate any specific ways of reacting towards international conflicts. The NP scale is primarily concerned with values and ideological matters. On this level, however, we can say that item no. 8 excludes a positive association between patriotism and a general pacific orientation, and the same can be said indirectly to be the case with items 6 and 9. Items nos. 3 and 7 both reflect the use of force by others than one's own nation: the former, the use of force against one's own government, and the latter, the use of force by a world

government. Both these items can be said to exclude a possible association between patriotism and a general power orientation. All in all we can say that the NP scale, as far as its content is concerned, does not indicate a definite orientation towards foreign affairs, but rather excludes certain orientations, in particular a general pacifist, power-oriented and intropunitive orientation.

B. *Results*

Below will be given a detailed account of the statistical properties of the NP scale. We shall analyse the score distribution on the scale, examine the discriminatory power of the various items, and the reliability and differentiating ability of the scale. Next we shall calculate the correlation between the NP and the NI scales and the correlation between each of these scales and our measures of various international reaction patterns. Finally we shall examine the relationship between the NP scale and different dimensions on the Blacky Pictures.

Statistical Properties of the NP Scale

A total of 159 of our total sample of 167 subjects answered all the items on the NP scale. For this sample we calculated the mean, the standard deviation, the hypothetical score distribution given a normal distribution, and by means of the Chi square test, the agreement between the hypothetical and observed distributions.

The result of the latter test shows that the score distributions on the NP scale are symmetrical and satisfy the demands for normal distribution ($P = .70$). The mean of the distribution is $M = 27.43$, the standard deviation, $\sigma = 4.62$, and the total range of scores goes from 16 to 40.

Item Analysis of the NP Scale

Since we had no pretest results for the NP scale we decided to undertake a systematic item analysis.

Table V,1 gives a survey of the results of this analysis. As well as calculating the differences between the mean values on each single item for the highest and lowest quartile on the scale as a whole, we calculated the standard error of the differences, and thereby obtained an approximate expression of the connection of the individual items with the scale as a whole, expressed in terms of *CR* and *p* values.

The highest and lowest quartiles both contained 40 subjects. The

Table V,1. *Item Analysis of the NP Scale*

No.	Item	M_{Q_1}	M_{Q_2}	M_{Q_3}	M_{Q_4}	CR	p
1	(Duties to own country)	4.38	4.03	4.23	4.00	1.88	.06
2	(Open frontiers)	3.90	2.98	2.77	2.05	8.11	.001
3	(Removing government)	3.28	2.70	2.62	1.85	5.59	.001
4	(Give up independence)	4.50	4.05	3.00	2.20	10.50	.001
5	(Loyalty to king and government)	4.60	4.48	4.26	4.10	2.94	.01
6	(Human beings equally important)	2.03	1.70	1.62	1.25	4.76	.001
7	(Establishing a world government)	2.73	2.15	1.92	1.55	5.62	.001
8	(Justifying the taking of life)	4.50	4.20	3.56	3.15	5.84	.001
9	(Loyalty to humanity)	3.43	2.55	2.05	1.47	9.51	.001

range in the highest quartile goes from 31 to 40, and in the lowest from 16 to 25.

The average item score for all the subjects is 3.05. Considering the fact that each item has a quintuple gradation this implies that the scale as a whole is comparatively balanced where the favouring of response to the individual items is concerned.

The item analysis indicates that all items are positively correlated with the scale as a whole. The greatest association occurs in items nos. 2, 4 and 9, the least in items nos. 1 and 5. It is of interest to note that items nos. 2, 4 and 9 reflect different "loyalty dimensions". Item no. 4 pertains to the relationship between national and supra-national loyalty, and items nos. 2 and 9, the relationship between national and more universal human loyalty. The comparatively low association in items nos. 1 and 5 can possibly be ascribed in some degree to a skewed response distribution. Over half of the sample strongly agree with these two statements. If we take the social status of our subjects into account it is understandable that considerable homogeneity should exist in connection with attitudes towards "duties towards one's own country" and "loyalty towards the King and government". It is likely that these two items would prove to be more discriminating and more highly associated with the scale as a whole when used with other subjects. Since they both nevertheless achieve a significance below the 10 % level, we did not find it necessary to reorganize the scale.

Reliability and Differentiating Ability of the NP Scale

In order to obtain an exact measure of the reliability of the NP scale we computed its statistical reliability using Hoyt's formula based on analysis of variance technique. Before this was done we calculated

the hypothetical scores as with the R scales for subjects with one item left open. This was the case with 4 subjects.¹

Table V,2 gives a survey of the sum of squares and variance for items, persons, total and residual respectively on the NP scale. By using Hoyt's formula we get $r_{tt} = .54$, and a standard error of measurement, $\sigma_e = 3.13$.

Table V,2. *Analysis of Variance of the NP Scale*

Source	df.	Sum of Square	Variance
Total	1466-4	2978.85	2.04
Item.....	8	1183.23	147.90
Person	162	385.74	2.38
Residual	1294-4	1409.88	1.09

In evaluating the reliability coefficient it is important to notice that the NP scale consists of nine items only and that two of these elicit responses predominantly in the direction of high score values. All in all the reliability coefficient indicates that the scale covers a rather heterogeneous attitude universe, but that it is capable of differentiating between the subjects. This is apparent when we examine the relationship between person and residual variance. Here we get $F = 2.18$, which means that the scale is capable of differentiating between individuals with a significance considerably below the 1 % level ($F_{.01} = 1.32$).

The hypothetical reliability when the scale is lengthened to 40 items gives $r_{tt} = .84$. Compared with the R and E scales therefore, the potentiality of the NP scale is quite good. Certainly the scale possesses sources of error, but these are not so prevalent as to make the use of the scale statistically unwarranted.

Intercorrelation Between the N Scales

In contrast to our treatment of the NP scale we did not analyse the statistical properties of the NI scale thoroughly. In all 165 subjects proved to have given complete responses on the NI scale. The score distributions were relatively symmetrical here too; the mean of the distribution being $M = 1.02$, the range of scores from -0.56 to 2.75 , and the standard deviation, $\sigma = 0.69$.

¹ In the analysis of variance the degrees of freedom for total and residual were therefore reduced by this number.

r = .07

The correlation between the NP and the NI scale based on 157 subjects gives $r = .07$. This correlation does not achieve any statistical significance. Our data therefore indicates that no correlations exists between national idealization and patriotism. On the whole this supports our earlier theoretical considerations concerning Norwegian conditions.

Correlation Between the N Scales and the IR Scale

The lack of correlation between the NP and the NI scales can be interpreted as suggesting that nationalism is an extremely complex social phenomenon, and that the scales accentuate different aspects of this phenomenon. We shall analyse below the correlation between the N scales and the IR scale, limiting ourselves as before to the secondary categories and the two primary E and i categories of the IR scale.

See also

Table V,3 gives a survey of our results.

Table V,3. *Correlation (r) Between the N Scales and Different Categories of the IR Scale*

Categories of the IR Scale	NP Scale ($N = 154$)		NI Scale ($N = 160$)	
	r	p	r	p
<i>Ex</i>25	.01	.22	.01
<i>In</i>	-.41	.001	-.04	—
<i>Im</i>10	—	-.21	.01
<i>E-D</i>16	.05	-.16	.05
<i>E</i> ..	.29	.001	.00	—
<i>i</i> ...	-.33	.001	.06	—

The table shows that statistically significant correlations exist between the IR scale and both the NI and the NP scales. Both national idealization and patriotism seem to be correlated with a preference for certain national ways of reacting in international conflict situations.

As regards the NP scale we find greatest correlation with the *In* category and with the i and E categories on the IR scale. The NI scale, however, shows greatest correlation with the Ex and Im categories.

Both N scales show a positive correlation with the *Ex* category, but there is a striking difference all the same. While the NP scale is

positively correlated with the *E* category, the NI scale seems primarily to be correlated with the *e* category. We have a hint of this in the NP scale's positive and the NI scale's negative correlation with the *E-D* category.

Our data indicate therefore that national idealization is correlated with a somewhat different international attitudinal dimension than patriotism. Strong national idealization seems primarily to accompany tendencies towards putting the responsibility for solving international conflict situations on others; weak national idealization to accompany tendencies towards excusing and explaining away such situations.

We mentioned above that patriotism under Norwegian conditions will probably give a more relevant indication of nationalism than national idealization. We also stated that patriotism as we operationally defined the term points towards an ideology which to a certain extent is incompatible with tendencies towards putting blame on one's own nation. The fact that we find high negative correlation between the NP scale and the *In* category of the IR scale is therefore not especially noteworthy. The significant positive and negative correlations of the NP scale with the *E* and *i* categories respectively are of much greater interest. Our data indicate that strong patriotism goes with a preference for aggressive national ways of reacting, weak patriotism with a preference for one's own nation taking the initiative in trying to solve situations where national interests are threatened. None of these correlations can, we think, be directly derived from our definition of patriotism.

Correlation Between the NP Scale and Conflict Scores on the Blacky Pictures

We have stated that patriotism and aggressive international attitudes have been considered by some psychologists to have exactly the same psychodynamic basis; others do not indicate a common dynamic core, but stress strongly that patriotism is connected with infantile experience of one's parents' power and strength, and with displaced aggressive and libidinous impulses. The importance of oedipal and phallic conflicts has been particularly stressed. Still others completely reject depth psychological explanations in favour of theories of social learning and imitation.

In order to examine the relationship between patriotism and psychodynamic conflicts we calculated the association between the NP scale and the various dimensions on the Blacky test. The dimen-

sion reflecting phallic impulses is of particular interest. It appears, however, that subjects scored as conflict-free in relation to "phallic initiative" fail throughout to achieve a lower score on the NP scale than subjects who were scored as conflict-charged. Nor do we find any statistically significant association in connection with any of the other Blacky dimensions. This is also the case as regards the correlation between the NP scale and "number of conflict scores" on the Blacky test. Here we get $r = -.08$. The coefficient builds on data from 63 subjects and does not achieve any statistical significance.

We have no data for comparing the relationship between patriotism and more special oedipal conflicts. Blum, however, in his investigation of 119 men, found no correlation ($r = .08$) between "castration anxiety" and "oedipal intensity" (13, p. 93). The lack of significant correlations between these two factors indicates that we cannot exclude the possibility of a certain connection between patriotism and "oedipal intensity".

Our data gives no basis for concluding that patriotism is independent of deep lying personality layers. But our results suggest that patriotism and aggressive international attitudes do not always have a similar psychodynamic anchorage.

C. *Summary and Conclusion*

The aim of our study was to examine how far a relationship exists between nationalism and reaction patterns towards foreign affairs.

Nationalism can be defined in various ways. We have concentrated on nationalism in the sense of national idealization and of patriotism.

We constructed two separate scales for registering these two aspects of nationalism: for patriotism, a series of nine statements on which the subjects were to express their opinions; and for national idealization, a series of 20 national traits which the subjects were to assess as to their value, and as to the degree to which their own nation possessed such a trait.

Our statistical analysis includes an examination of the score distribution of the scales, their mutual correlation and their correlation with the scale for registering international reaction patterns. In addition we undertook a systematic item analysis of the patriotism scale, calculated the scale's reliability and differentiating ability, and its correlation with various dimensions on our Norwegian revision of the Blacky Pictures.

Our empirical results give support to the following statements:

A significant correlation exists between nationalism and reaction patterns towards foreign affairs. This is the case for nationalism both in the sense of national idealization, and patriotism. The two phenomena seem, however, to imply different reaction patterns towards international situations. The higher the national idealization present, the greater on the whole seems to be the tendency to expect others to solve international conflicts; and on the other hand, the higher the patriotism present, the greater on the whole seems to be the tendency to prefer aggressive national ways of reacting in international conflict situations.

No significant correlation exists between patriotism and national idealization. We are inclined to regard this as the expression of the fact that nationalism is an extremely complex social phenomenon. We are not capable of deciding how far this is particularly characteristic of Norwegian conditions. Finally we wish to stress that our index on national idealization gives no possibility of distinguishing between national satisfaction and national glorification.

No significant correlation exists between patriotism and psychodynamic conflicts. Patriotism thus seems to be capable of explaining independently certain individual differences in relation to aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs. Here too we wish to stress that our measure of psychodynamic conflicts solely include data on conflicts pertinent to some early psychosexual impulse patterns. We undertook no analysis of the connection with specific oedipal conflicts, nor with tendencies towards parental idealization. On the other hand our data tentatively indicate that neither phallic, nor oral or anal conflicts are significantly associated with patriotism.

CHAPTER 11

The Knowledge Hypothesis: A Preliminary Analysis

The Knowledge Hypothesis contends that a person's knowledge of international relations will affect his attitudes towards foreign affairs. We should therefore expect to find a positive correlation between international knowledge and preference for certain national ways of reacting in international conflict situations.

According to what has previously been said we should expect to find an increased tendency towards non-aggressive national ways of reacting the more international knowledge a person possesses. We should also mention that knowledge and hostility have been assumed by some psychologists to be uncorrelated, and by others to be curvilinearly correlated; i. e. extremely little knowledge has been assumed to be linked with less aggressive tendencies than moderate knowledge.

Below we shall describe an investigation with the aim of throwing light on how far there is a connection between international knowledge and international reaction patterns.

A. *Procedure*

In registering international knowledge we made use of the second part of the NI scale. As we have stated, this part consists of a series of 20 traits on each of which the subject states to what degree he considers Norway to possess such a national trait in relation to most other nations. Each judgement is made in relation to a quintuple gradation.

For the measurement of international knowledge we compared

the judgements of the individual subjects with parallel judgements by a panel of experts. We noted the difference (in intervals) between the subjects' judgements on each trait and the average judgement of the panel and finally summarized the subjects' deviant scores.

"General education", for example, was assigned by the experts to Norway to a somewhat greater degree than to most nations. If this trait was assigned by one of the subjects to Norway to a considerably greater degree than or to the same degree as most nations, we would have a deviant score of one (one interval); if the trait was assigned to Norway to a somewhat lesser degree or to a considerably lesser degree than most nations, we would have deviant scores of 2 and 3 respectively.

This procedure presupposes that the experts are in agreement on the whole, and that their judgements cover factual conditions. In other words we took it for granted that the experts had a comparatively structured and detailed perception of "most nations" and that their judgements were realistic.

Three Norwegian political scientists formed the experts' panel, and those judgements where all or two of three were in agreement were used as criteria-points.¹ It turned out that there was never more than one who disagreed with the others concerning a trait, and except for one case the deviation was never more than one interval. At the outset we regarded considerable agreement among the experts to be a pre-condition for the application of the method.

In adding the individual subject's deviant scores for the different traits we obtained a total score indicating the degree to which the subject deviated from the experts' judgements. The lower a person's total score, and the more his judgements were in agreement with the experts', the more international knowledge we would ascribe to him.

This scale procedure, resulting in what we will call the IK scale, cannot be expected to give very reliable results. Doubts can be raised as to whether the different traits are of equal importance, whether the experts were competent to give "true" judgements, or whether "correct" evaluations of Norway in relation to other nations concerning a number of national traits give a valid measure of international knowledge.

Compared with the methods previously introduced the IK scale

¹ The experts' judgements were collected in 1956, several years after the collection of the rest of our data. The members of the panel were Chr. Bay, Research Fellow of the University of Oslo, Magister K. Dahl Jacobsen, and Magister N. Vetti.

is more indirect and is constructed more haphazardly. Its indirect character is not necessarily its weakest aspect. An open general knowledge test of other countries' specific political, geographical and economic conditions would easily over-emphasize detailed formal international knowledge to the detriment of a broader ability to understand and evaluate international relations. On the other hand it may be maintained that the Knowledge Hypothesis does point to the influence of formal knowledge. Our examination of the hypothesis is consequently based upon a somewhat inadequate method. We nevertheless present this material, mainly because some interesting trends may be discerned.

B. Results

First we shall describe some of the statistical properties of the IK scale.

Of our total sample of 167 subjects four had failed to give responses on all items. Of these, one did not state his opinions on any of the traits, and three ignored one of the traits. In the latter cases we decided that the subjects could keep their total scores if their mean deviant scores per trait were under 0.5, and if between 0.5 and 1.5, we decided to add one point to their total scores. 167

The range of the total scores on the IK scale goes from 2 to 23. The mean of the score distribution is $M = 12.52$, and the standard deviation, $\sigma = 4.54$. The score distribution is comparatively symmetrical and satisfies the demands for normal distribution ($P = .25$). We undertook no item analysis of the scale, nor an exact reliability analysis.

To investigate the relationship between international knowledge and international reaction patterns we worked out the correlation between the IK scale and the IR scale's secondary categories and the primary *E* and *i* categories.

Table VI,1 records the result of these correlations. The IK scale shows the highest correlation with the *E-D* and *E* categories of the IR scale. It is of interest that we find highest correlation between our measurement of deficient international knowledge and tendencies towards threat oriented and aggressive international ways of reacting respectively. It is also interesting to find the suggestion of a positive correlation between international knowledge and tendencies to put responsibility on one's own nation. None of the correlation coefficients achieves any statistical significance, however.

Table VI,1. *Correlation (r) Between IK Scale and Different Categories of the IR Scale ($N = 161$)*

	<i>Ex</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Im</i>	<i>E-D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>r</i>09	-.08	-.03	.11	.11	-.05
<i>p</i>27	.32	—	.15	.16	—

The lack of statistically significant correlation between the IK scale and the *E* category of the IR scale apparently weakens the validity of the Knowledge Hypothesis. A possible explanation is that we are not faced with a linear, but a curvilinear correlation. As we have stated, it has been strongly asserted that knowledge does not always stand in direct relation to enmity.

In order to get a rough expression of the connection between the IK scale and the *E* category of the IR scale we calculated the mean *E* score for the different score intervals on the IK scale. Fig. VI,1 illustrates this association in the form of a graph.

The graph shows a clear curvilinear tendency. High and low scores




Fig. VI,1. *Mean Scores on the E Category of the IR Scale for Different Score Intervals on the IK Scale ($N = 161$)*

on the IK scale seem to be associated with low mean E scores. Little international knowledge seems in other words to be generally more often linked with non-aggressive international reaction patterns than moderate international knowledge.

A calculation of the correlation ratio (*eta*) on the basis of the raw score distribution, gives $\eta = .35$. If we start out with this correlation ratio (uncorrected), we find that the difference between η and the Pearson r is 4.42 times its standard error, which indicates that the regression is curvilinear ($p < .001$)¹. Such a procedure is not very reliable, however, and probably gives too large a difference. If Pearson's correction is used (on the correlation ratio) we get a much more conservative indication of non-linearity. In this case the CR is reduced to 0.29, and the regression does not indicate any significant deviation from linearity. The considerable difference in result is due to the relatively great number of intervals in the first case. The latter procedure probably makes too great demands on curvilinearity, but is undoubtedly more correct. This conclusion is supported by the use of analyses of variance technique.

In other words, our empirical data show no statistically significant curvilinearity, but nevertheless have tendencies in this direction.

C. Summary and Conclusion

The aim of our investigation was to clarify how far a connection exists between international knowledge and reaction patterns towards international conflict situations.

In order to obtain a measure of international knowledge we calculated the disagreement between the subjects' judgements of Norway in relation to most other nations where different national traits were concerned, and parallel judgements by a panel of experts. We made use of the judgements of this panel as a criterion of knowledge, and assumed that a person's level of international knowledge was higher, the higher the agreement present with this criterion.

Our statistical analysis limited itself to a calculation of the corre-

¹ CR is calculated here according to the formula $\frac{\eta^2 - r^2}{2 \sqrt{\frac{\eta^2 - r^2}{N}}}$ where N stands

for the number of subjects, r^2 for the square of the product-moment correlation and η^2 for the square of the correlation ratio (cf. 60, p. 348).

lation between our index on international knowledge and different international attitudes.

Empirical data show no significant correlation between international knowledge and reaction patterns towards international conflict situations.

The measure of international knowledge applied has obvious shortcomings. Thus our results give little basis for dis-confirming the Knowledge Hypothesis. Our discovery of a certain non-significant tendency towards negative correlation between international knowledge (as we have registered this phenomenon) and preference for threat-oriented and aggressive national ways of reacting is of interest, as is also a certain non-significant tendency towards a curvilinear correlation between knowledge and aggressive international attitudes. Continued investigations with more heterogeneous samples of subjects and with more thorough methods of registering international knowledge are highly desirable; this in spite of the fact that our results actually do support the conclusion of an earlier empirical investigation (cf. p. 68) in this area.

CHAPTER 12

The Channelization Hypothesis: A Preliminary Analysis

The Channelization Hypothesis contends that various psychological conditions are of decisive importance for the degree to which deeper personality layers will influence a person's attitudes towards foreign affairs. We have previously discussed three such conditions: nationalism, international knowledge, and manifest reaction tendencies in everyday situations.

In what follows we shall take as our point of departure our previous demonstration of a positive correlation between psychodynamic conflicts and aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs. We shall consider this correlation as supporting the fact that latent, character-conditioned aggression has a tendency to become displaced on to the sphere of foreign affairs, and investigate the degrees to which such displacement is related to nationalism (patriotism), international knowledge, and aggressive everyday ways of reacting.

Next we shall start out with our earlier demonstration of a positive correlation between aggressive everyday and international reaction patterns, and investigate the degree to which this correlation is related to psychodynamic conflicts (latent aggression), nationalism (patriotism), and international knowledge respectively.

The latter proposition perhaps falls outside what should strictly be described as the Channelization Hypothesis. However, it can at any rate be said to complement it, since it often seems to be assumed that a lack of displacement of aggression implies an independent and rational stand in foreign affairs. In our opinion a lack of displacement will provide a basis for increased generalization of aggression unless tendencies in this direction are counterbalanced by other psychological conditions.

next!

A. Procedure

We have already described our method of registering psychodynamic conflicts, patriotism, international knowledge and aggressive reaction tendencies towards everyday and international conflict situations. We refer here to our shortened revision of the Blacky Pictures, the NP scale, the IK scale, and the *E* category of the ER and IR scales.

To obtain a survey of the effect of various factors on tendencies towards generalization and displacement of aggression, we proceeded in the following manner: first we examined the score distribution on the factor whose effect we wished to study, and isolated the approximately highest, middle, and lowest third of the distribution. On the basis of this delimitation we undertook a division of the subjects into three sub-samples and calculated the trend towards generalization (or displacement) in each of the sub-samples. Finally we compared the sub-samples and examined the differences among them.

B. Results

There follows a statistical analysis of the connection of various factors with tendencies towards displacement of aggression, after which we shall present a parallel analysis of the connection of various factors with tendencies towards generalization of aggression. In both cases the analyses will be based on a comparison of fairly small groups since our total sample included a comparatively small number of subjects. On the whole the results will serve rather as a basis for elaborating hypotheses than providing material for final conclusions.

Displacement of Aggression in Relation to Nationalism

For our total sample we found a significant positive correlation between "number of conflict scores" on the Blacky test and the *E* category of the IR scale ($r = .33$). We have interpreted this as indicating that there is a connection between latent aggression and aggressive international reaction patterns.

To investigate the degree to which nationalism (patriotism) influences the connection between these two factors, we isolated the subjects who had answered both the IR scale and the Blacky Pictures, and divided the sample approximately into three groups according to the individual scores on the NP scale. We delimited three sub-

samples: those who had achieved a score in the highest, middle and lowest third of the score distribution on the NP scale. We then calculated for each sub-sample the correlation between "number of conflict scores" on the Blacky test and the *E* category of the IR scale.

Table VII,1. *Correlation (r) Between the *E* Category of the IR Scale and Conflict Scores on the Blacky Test in Samples with Different Scores on the NP Scale*

Score Intervals on NP Scale	N	r	p
19 – 26 (Least nationalistic)	20	.18	.45
27 – 29 (Moderately nationalistic)	21	.26	.26
30 – 38 (Most nationalistic)	21	.56	.01

Table VII,1 presents the correlation coefficients in these three cases, showing that there are respectively highest and lowest correlations in the sub-sample with the highest and lowest scores on the NP scale. A comparison between the samples with the highest and lowest scores shows a difference between correlations of .38. Because of the small samples, however, the difference does not achieve statistical significance ($p = .18$).¹ In spite of this fact our data suggest that displacement tendencies might be associated with the degree of nationalism in the sense of patriotism. The correlation only achieves a satisfactory statistical significance in the sub-sample with the highest scores on the NP scale ($p = .007$).² In other words a certain degree of nationalism seems to be a prerequisite for the displacement of aggression on to the international sphere. Our data thus tend to support Durbin and Bowlby's view of nationalism as a channelizing factor (cf. p. 65).

Displacement of Aggression in Relation to Everyday Aggression

To investigate the degree to which manifest aggressive reaction tendencies in everyday situations influence the connection between latent aggression and aggressive international reaction patterns, we proceeded in the same way as above and undertook a triple division of the total sample according to the scores of the individual subjects on the *E* category of the ER scale.

¹ If a one-tail criterion is applied, the difference obtains an approximate statistical significance ($p < .10$).

² In testing the significance of an obtained correlation in subsamples where N is less than 30, the r to z transformation has consistently been used.

Table VII,2 surveys the correlation coefficients in these three instances.

Table VII,2. *Correlation (r) between the E Category of the IR Scale and Conflict Scores on the Blacky Test in Samples with Different Scores on the E Category of the ER Scale*

Score Intervals on the ER Scale	N	r	p
0 – 10 (Least aggressive).....	23	.32	.14
12 – 22 (Moderately aggressive)	23	.43	.04
24 – 45 (Most aggressive)	20	.22	.36

The table shows highest correlation in the sub-sample with medium scores on the ER scale, and lowest correlation in the sub-sample with the highest scores. Only in the sub-sample with medium scores does the correlation achieve statistical significance ($p < .05$).

In spite of the fact that the difference between correlations in the sub-samples does not achieve statistical significance it is interesting to note that high scores on the ER scale's *E* category are associated with a comparatively smaller displacement tendency than low and medium scores. This is exactly what we might expect from the point of view of the "drainage theory": that aggressive tendencies in everyday situations function as a draining of latent aggression, so that less remains for international situations. An argument against such a view is the higher correlation in the sub-sample with medium scores than in the sub-sample with the lowest scores on the ER scale's *E* category. This does not necessarily mean that the "drainage theory" is untenable, but that it must be complemented by other considerations. A view which is apposite in the present connection is that inhibitions of everyday aggression — if sufficiently strong — may be transferred or generalized to affect aggressive international tendencies. If this were the case we should in fact expect greatest displacement to occur when more moderate inhibition of aggression is present. In those cases where we are dealing with a generalized inhibition of aggression we should further expect, from a depth psychological point of view, a comparatively greater tendency towards hypochondria and somatization. No examination was undertaken on this point. Some support for such a view is found in the fact that the frequency of certain heart and circulatory diseases (and also of certain mental diseases) was considerably reduced in Norway during the occupation period from 1940—45, compared with pre- and post-war periods (151a).

An intense positive sanctioning and encouragement of aggressive social attitudes may possibly under certain circumstances be positively stimulating and "health bringing" for strongly affect inhibited persons. Here we are faced with an extremely interesting hypothesis which invites further exploration.¹

Displacement of Aggression in Relation to International Knowledge

In investigating the effect of international knowledge on the connection between latent aggression and international attitudes we proceeded in the same way as above, dividing the total sample into three sub-samples according to the individual subjects' scores on the IK scale.

Table VII,3 surveys the correlation coefficients in this case.

Table VII,3. *Correlation (r) Between the E Category of the IR Scale and Conflict Scores on the Blacky Test in Samples with Different Scores on the IK Scale*

Score Intervals on IK Scale	<i>N</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>
14 – 21 (Least knowledge)	24	.26	.22
11 – 13 (Moderate knowledge)	15	.39	.15
4 – 10 (Most knowledge)	26	.37	.06

The table shows that there is comparatively little difference between the sub-samples. The highest correlation turns out to be in the sub-sample with medium scores on the IK scale, the lowest correlation in the sub-sample with the highest scores. The fact that we find the least displacement of aggression to occur in the sub-sample characterized by least international knowledge is in accordance with a point of view previously referred to, that the influence of latent personality layers presupposes an orientation towards international relations (cf. p. 71).

¹ An observation relevant in the present context is that aggressive persons by and large seem to be in a much better state of physical health than people of similar age taken from the general population. E.g. in an American investigation of paranoid patients, nearly all diagnosed as dementia praecox, paranoid type, it was found that the manifestation of arteriosclerosis, including cerebral arteriosclerosis, was less frequent than in the general population (6a). Since the paranoid is a personality type who continually acts out his hostilities, the data indirectly support the hypothesis that repressed hostility often is a causal factor of hypertension and somatization.

The very slight trend which exists in the direction of a lower displacement tendency in the case of most as compared to moderate knowledge, or the mere fact that here we do not find a corresponding higher displacement tendency in the case of most knowledge, fits in with the viewpoint that international knowledge may contribute in keeping character-conditioned aggression under control (cf. p. 69).

The differences found between the three sub-samples are much too small to verify these hypotheses. The differences achieve no statistical significance and the reason for the above comments is therefore mainly to indicate some lines for future research on more heterogeneous samples of subjects.

Generalization of Aggression in Relation to Latent Aggression

As we have previously stated we found a significant positive correlation ($r = .42$) between the *E* categories of the ER and IR scales. We interpreted this as indicating that a generalization of aggressive reaction tendencies takes place from everyday to international situations.

In order to investigate the degree to which latent aggression (psychodynamic conflicts) affects tendencies towards the generalization of aggression, we delineated the subjects who had given complete responses on both the ER and IR scales, and divided the sample into approximately three groups according to the individuals' "number of conflict scores" on the Blacky test.

Table VII,4 surveys the correlation between the *E* categories in the sub-samples with 2 or less, 3, and 4 conflict scores on the Blacky test. The table shows that the highest and lowest correlations occur in the sub-sample having the lowest and highest "number of conflict scores" respectively on the Blacky test.

Table VII,4. *Correlation (r) Between the *E* Categories of the IR and ER Scales in Samples with Different Scores on the Blacky Test*

Score Intervals on the Blacky Test	N	r	p
0 - 2 (Least conflict charged)	23	.69	.001
3 (Moderately conflict charged)	14	.56	.04
4 (Most conflict charged)	29	.29	.13

While the correlation in the sub-sample with most conflict scores achieves a very limited statistical significance ($p = .13$), the correlation in the sub-sample with least conflict scores shows a significance

well below the 1 % level ($p \approx .001$). The difference between correlations in these two samples is .40 and statistically significant at the 6 % level.¹ The frequency of conflicts in connection with basic impulse patterns thus seems to be approximately significantly associated with a lack of generalization of aggression. The less the amount of latent aggression the greater the generalization tendency which seems to be present.²

Our empirical material thus supports the view we previously put forward, that lack of repression of aggression does not necessarily lead to attitudes towards foreign affairs independent of personality factors, but to an increased generalization, unless tendencies in this direction are counteracted by other factors.

Generalization of Aggression in Relation to Nationalism

We proceeded in the same fashion as above in investigating the degree to which nationalism (patriotism) affects the correlation between aggressive everyday and international reaction patterns, by making a triple division of the total sample according to the individual scores on the NP scale.

Table VII,5 shows the correlation between the *E* categories in the three sub-samples.

The table shows that the highest and lowest correlations occur in the sub-sample with the highest and lowest scores respectively

Table VII,5. *Correlation (r) Between the *E* Categories of the IR and ER Scale in Samples with Different Scores on the NP Scale*

Score Intervals on NP Scale	<i>N</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>
16 – 25 (Least nationalistic)	50	.23	.11
26 – 29 (Moderately nationalistic)	56	.55	.001
30 – 40 (Most nationalistic)	47	.62	.001

¹ If a one-tail criterion is used the difference reaches a statistical significance at the 3 % level.

² In concluding our empirical investigation of the Generalization Hypothesis it was pointed out that the hypothesis cannot explain why aggressive reactions do not show highest generalization despite the fact that this reaction type seems to be more consistent than others in both everyday and international situations. It is not inconceivable that this discrepancy might be abolished were we to concentrate on subjects who were unburdened by latent aggression. We have touched upon the same question in another footnote (cf. p. 145).

on the NP scale. The difference between correlations in these two sub-samples is .39 and statistically significant below the 5 % level ($p = .02$). We may therefore conclude that the score values on the NP scale are significantly associated with a tendency towards generalization of aggression. The more the patriotism present, the greater appears to be the tendency towards generalization.

Our data indicate on the whole that nationalism (patriotism) co-varies with tendencies towards displacement as well as towards generalization; in other words, it probably facilitates the influence of various personality factors on international attitudes.

Generalization of Aggression in Relation to International Knowledge

In examining the degree to which international knowledge affects the connection between aggressive everyday and international reaction patterns we proceeded in the same manner as above, dividing the total sample according to the individuals' scores on the IK scale.

Table VII,6. *Correlation (r) Between the E Categories of the IR and ER Scales in Samples with Different Scores on the IK Scale*

Score Intervals on the IK Scale	N	r	p
15 – 23 (Least knowledge)	56	.46	.001
11 – 14 (Moderate knowledge)	45	.30	.05
2 – 10 (Most knowledge)	59	.43	.001

Table VII,6 surveys the correlation between the E categories of the ER and IR scales in the three sub-samples. The table shows highest correlation in the sub-sample with the highest scores on the IK scale, and least correlation in the sub-sample with medium scores. The difference between correlations in these two samples is .16, but it achieves no statistical significance ($p = .36$).

Our data give no basis for any definite conclusion, but there is a certain tendency for the greatest generalization to occur in the case of most and least international knowledge. In the two latter sub-samples only we find correlation coefficients obtaining a statistical significance below the 1% level. However, the difference between correlations in these two samples and the sample with moderate scores on the IK scale does not achieve statistical significance ($p = .33$).

In spite of the obvious shortcomings of the IK scale it nevertheless may be worth while to venture some speculations concerning our

results: the relatively higher correlation coefficient in the sub-sample with the lowest scores on the IK scale (those with most knowledge), than in the sub-sample with medium scores, is in accordance with the aforementioned hypothesis: that the effect of personal values (*in casu* such values as are reflected in everyday reaction patterns) on a person's attitudes towards foreign affairs will be the greater, the greater the international knowledge present (cf. p. 75). The same hypothesis is, however, weakened by our findings of a relatively higher correlation coefficient in the sub-sample with the highest scores on the IK scale, than in the sub-sample with the medium scores. The latter relationship supports the hypothesis that little international knowledge implies small ability to differentiate between everyday and international situations, and that tendencies towards generalization are greater the less a person differentiates between different situations.

On the whole our data do not weaken the hypothesis that a curvilinear correlation exists between international knowledge and tendencies towards generalization. Furthermore, a comparison between Table VII,3 and VII,6 suggests an inverse relationship between the influence of international knowledge on tendencies towards generalization and displacement respectively. Among the subjects characterized by least knowledge, the correlation between the R scales ("generalization") is somewhat higher than the correlation between the Blacky test and the IR scale ("displacement"), while the opposite is true in the rest of the sample. Here again interesting prospects open up for later empirical research on more heterogeneous samples of subjects based upon a more adequate method for registering international knowledge.

C. *Summary and Conclusion*

The intention of our investigation was the clarification of the influence of various psychological factors on tendencies towards generalization and displacement of aggression. We have previously shown that both these psychological mechanisms seem to have a certain validity as regards the explanation of aggressive reaction patterns towards foreign affairs.

By *generalization* we refer to the fact that a person reacts similarly to everyday and international situations, in other words, that a person's preference with regard to his nation's ways of reacting in international conflict situations are connected with his own reaction patterns in everyday conflict situations. The greater the correlation present in this area, the greater the generalization.

For the registration of ways of reacting to everyday and international situations we made use of two parallel attitude scales, the ER and IR scales. In the present investigation we concentrated entirely on the generalization of aggressive ways of reacting, that is, on the *E* categories of these two scales.

By *displacement* we refer to the fact that reaction tendencies which are repressed in relation to certain objects or situations find an outlet towards other objects or in other situations. In the present thesis we have concentrated exclusively on displacement of latent reaction tendencies on to international matters. We have said that greater displacement occurs the higher the correlation between a person's way of reacting to international conflict situations and his latent tendencies. In this chapter we have dealt with displacement of aggression only. To register the latter factor we made use of a shortened version of Blum's Blacky Pictures, and presumed that the frequency of conflicts in connection with basic psychosexual impulse patterns gives an approximate measure of the degree of latent aggression present.

As well as investigating how far latent aggression (or psychodynamic conflicts) influence tendencies towards generalization of aggression, and how far aggressive ways of reacting in everyday situations influence tendencies towards displacement of aggression, we concentrated on the influence of nationalism in the sense of patriotism and international knowledge respectively. For registering these last two factors we made use of two scales called the NP and IK scales.

The results of our investigation give support to the following statements:

A certain degree of nationalism (patriotism) is generally a necessary precondition for the displacement of aggression towards foreign affairs. In spite of the fact that our data do not give any conclusive evidence, on the whole there seems to be a closer connection between latent aggression and aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs the more a person identifies himself with his own nation. Nationalism therefore seems to represent a mediating factor of importance for the degree to which latent personality layers are likely to colour a person's international attitudes.

There is no direct (linear) connection between aggressive ways of reacting in everyday situations and tendencies towards the displacement of aggression. Our data give no basis for concluding that tendencies towards aggressive ways of reacting to everyday situations represent a mediating factor of importance for the degree to which latent personality

layers are likely to colour a person's attitudes towards foreign affairs; they nevertheless indicate hypothetically that extremely strong as well as extremely weak tendencies towards everyday aggression are associated with less pronounced displacement than moderate everyday aggression.

There is no direct (linear) connection between international knowledge and tendencies towards the displacement of latent aggression. Due to the inadequacy of our research instrument this statement must be considered with great cautiousness. As a hypothesis for later studies we may propose that displacement of aggression increases with increased knowledge up to a certain point, after which it decreases or remains approximately constant.

There exists an inverse connection between latent aggression (psychodynamic conflicts) and generalization of everyday aggressive reaction patterns. Our data indicate that there is a closer connection between aggressive ways of reacting to everyday and international conflict situations the more basic psychosexual impulse patterns are conflict-free and assimilated. Latent aggression seems to represent a mediating factor of importance for the degree to which everyday reaction patterns are likely to colour a person's attitudes towards foreign affairs.

A direct connection exists between nationalism (patriotism) and generalization of everyday aggressive reaction patterns. Our data indicate that there is a closer connection between aggressive reaction patterns towards everyday and international conflict situations the more a person is characterized by patriotic attitudes. Nationalism in the sense of patriotism therefore seems to represent a mediating factor of importance for the degree to which everyday aggression is likely to colour a person's attitudes towards foreign affairs.

No direct (linear) connection exists between international knowledge and generalization of everyday aggressive reaction patterns. Here too we wish to stress the shortcomings of our measurement of international knowledge. As a hypothesis for further investigations we wish to point to the possibility that extremely great as well as extremely little international knowledge may be associated with greater generalization than moderate international knowledge.

We can summarize the above conclusions by stressing that the following three factors at least should be considered in attempting a psychological explanation of aggressive reaction patterns towards foreign affairs: 1) tendencies towards everyday aggressive ways of reacting, 2) scope of latent aggression or degree of psychodynamic conflicts; and 3) degree of nationalism or patriotism.

CHAPTER 13

Final Considerations

In earlier chapters we presented results from a number of individual investigations. We demonstrated that attitudes towards foreign affairs seem to be correlated with nationalism, with psychodynamic conflicts, and with manifest reactions in everyday conflict situations. On the other hand, we found no correlation worth mentioning with regard to personal insecurity and international knowledge.

The demonstration of a connection between international reaction patterns and individual psychological characteristics does not imply that such characteristics are sufficient to explain attitudes towards foreign affairs. Statistically significant correlations with certain psychological factors do not exclude the possibility of significant correlations with such sociological factors as social status, group belongingness, and social class membership.¹

This latter point is exemplified by the finding in an American investigation of a connection between hostile outgroup attitudes and status mobility (cf. p. 54). In fact, this finding suggests that non-psychological factors as characteristics of the social structure can be important determinants of outgroup attitudes. In addition to vertical mobility, such characteristics as social heterogeneity, rapid social changes (*anomie*), and communication barriers have been stressed in this connection.

A number of studies have attempted to clarify the relationship

¹ We are here faced with different levels of analysis. A psychological explanation may eventually be related to a sociological (an institutional or group dynamic) one, and *vice versa*. By this we do not mean that sociological laws will always have to be "reduced" to psychological ones, but that theories on different levels of analysis may eventually be brought into explicit *congruence* with each other (cf. 84, p. 24).

between group membership and attitudes towards foreign affairs. One of the most comprehensive is Droba's study based on an analysis of American students (cf. 82, p. 175). Droba finds no correlation between aggressive international attitudes and parents' level of education, profession and economic status; but he does find a positive correlation with the subjects' age, sex, field of study, and religious affiliation. Younger students appeared to be more war-minded than older ones, men more so than women, Catholics and Lutherans more so than adherents of other faiths, students of the natural sciences more so than students of the social sciences, and students whose fathers were born in the United States more so than students whose fathers were born abroad.

A connection between religious affiliation and international attitudes is also demonstrated in the investigation by Grace to which we have previously referred (cf. p. 24). On the whole Grace finds a considerable similarity between Republicans, Protestants and Roman Catholics on the one hand, and between veterans, non-religious persons and Progressives on the other. The difference between Republicans and Progressives is the most striking. Grace's comparative analysis of everyday and international reaction patterns in these two sub-groups attract our attention. He writes:

"The Republicans . . . seem to direct their hostilities towards themselves in the everyday and professional fields, but direct them toward others in the international field . . . The Progressive group . . . is very auto-hostile in international situations, and very seldom auto-hostile in everyday situations . . . The Democrats do not seem to be a homogeneous group." (53, p. 37-38)¹

We have previously referred to an investigation into the relationship between the attitudes of young people and of their parents to war and international problems (cf. p. 87). A few empirical investigations into this special area are to be found. In an investigation of more than 1,000 young people it was shown that a statistically significant correlation existed between the attitudes of parents and children to war ($r = .44$). Another interesting aspect of this investigation is that the correlation between parents' (mothers' and fathers') international attitudes was on the whole exactly the same as the correlation between children and parents, and that the correlation between siblings was only insignificantly lower. Furthermore, this correlation

¹ If Grace had worked exclusively with Republicans and Progressives the "drainage theory" would undoubtedly have been given considerable support!

between parents' and children's international attitudes does not seem to depend at all on the age of the children, but does seem to depend to a high degree on the socio-economic status of the parents. The highest correlation occurred consistently in those cases where the parents had the lowest professional status (*112*, p. 1006).

The point of departure for our investigations was the study of the tenability of various views concerning the relationship between attitudes towards foreign affairs and individual psychological factors. Our reason for omitting the inclusion of a more detailed analysis of our subjects' group belongingness and similar sociological phenomena, is not that we consider such factors of no importance but that we wanted to undertake a psychological study exclusively.

The more difficult it might have proved to find psychological correlates with attitudes towards foreign affairs, the more inclined we would have been to assume that such attitudes represent a fairly isolated and superficial aspect of the individual personality. As a matter of fact we hoped, through an overall evaluation of the results of our different investigations, to reach a rough estimate of the degree to which variations in attitudes towards foreign affairs can be explained by personality factors.

At this point it ought to be stressed that a demonstrable connection with certain individual psychological factors does not necessarily indicate a causal connection. Where nationalism (patriotism) and ways of reacting to everyday conflict situations are concerned, it is reasonable to assume that actual group membership (social norms) will be of importance. There is thus a theoretical possibility that a possible correlation between these factors and attitudes towards foreign affairs will express an attitude syndrome which is anchored not so much in the individual personality core as in the individual's group memberships. When we used the expression "can be explained by personality factors" above, we were not referring to a strictly causal explanation. Two or more attitudes may be mutually conditioned by each other. In any case a partial change of a syndrome component would be extremely difficult, and a purely symptomatological influence hardly effective.

Aggressive versus Destructive Attitudes towards Foreign Affairs

It is a matter for discussion whether one should strive to change or eliminate aggressive international reaction patterns, and whether such tendencies always represent the opposite of a constructive

orientation. After all, aggressive attitudes represent an active orientation towards the environment. In individual situations spontaneous anger may possibly clear the way for a constructive solution of problems which would not have been realized by an apathetic initial reaction.

There are several investigations to day which indicate that persons with overt aggressive tendencies are often more sociable and have greater cooperative ability than others with no or weak overt aggressive tendencies. Lois Murphy's demonstration of positive correspondence between the ability to sympathize and aggressive tendencies in children is almost classic (114). In another investigation by Zander, also using children as subjects, it was concluded that "Aggression seems to be a normal, healthy form of adjustment rather than a manifestation of maladjustment, or a form of abnormal behavior" (156). In support of this view Zander cites the following empirical observations:

1. Aggression . . . accompanied fewer neurotic mannerisms than did other forms of behavior and thus, it is assumed, accompanied lowered bodily tension — a more healthy state than high tension.
2. The subjects who are superior (i.e. better adjusted) on various personality tests used Aggression more frequently than the inferior subjects.
3. Aggression was more closely related to Attention in the patterns of behavior . . . (during frustration) . . . than any other type of behavior. It may be assumed that Attention to the task is a healthy form of adjustment.
4. The friendliest subjects were the most Aggressive." (156, p. 31).

The above observations do not mean that Zander excludes aggression as "a manifestation of maladjustment, or a form of abnormal behavior": "Aggression may be considered normal in the present instance because it is justified by the frustration that the subjects have been forced to experience. Obviously, Aggression would not have been a normal response if the only contact that occurred between the writer and subject had been a brief smile." A tendency to react aggressively to insignificant blockings is, according to Zander, a sign of low tolerance of frustration and is not associated with genuine aggressive ways of reacting in situations involving real frustrations.

Himmelweit touches on much the same point of view, when after summarizing the results of various empirical investigations concerning reactions to frustration, she writes: "These findings suggest that a person who feels secure enough to 'let off steam' by voicing his feelings about the situation is the one who at the same time will deal with it in a constructive manner." (66, p. 178).

From this point of view aggressive tendencies will not always represent a contradiction to constructive tendencies. Instead of talking of aggressive attitudes in general the question becomes how far these aggressive tendencies act as a blockage to a constructive orientation. The inclination towards aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs will no longer come to the fore, but rather the degree to which such attitudes become dominating in relation to taking responsibility oneself for solving existing conflict situations. We shall only be able to talk of destructive reaction patterns in foreign affairs to the extent that this constructive element is lacking.¹

Our scale concerning international attitudes, the IR scale, may indirectly provide a measure of the degree of destructive orientation present among our subjects. As such a measure we may consider the relative dominance of aggressive tendencies in relation to self-imposed problem-solving tendencies.

This implies that the relationship between the *E* and *i* categories of the IR scale is considered more relevant than the *E* category alone. The way the IR scale is constructed means that these two categories are in principle relatively independent, since they refer to different forms and directions of reactions. The correlation between them in the sample as a whole ($N = 162$) is $-.64$. In other words these two categories show a considerable negative correlation, but this correlation is not so high as to preclude the construction of a composite measure.

To provide such a measure we subtracted the individual subject's *i* score from his *E* score on the IR scale and added a constant ($C = 100$) to the difference to avoid negative score values. In this way we obtain scores with a total range from 47 to 131 for the sample as a whole, with a mean, $M = 76.72$, and a standard deviation, $\sigma = 16.10$. The distribution of scores is comparatively symmetrical, but with a certain skewness in the direction of the low scores.

In what follows we shall describe an analysis aiming at clarifying the degree to which a destructive orientation in foreign affairs can be "explained" by individual psychological factors.

Personality Characteristics and Destructive International Attitudes

In earlier chapters we presented our instruments for registering nationalism, psychodynamic conflicts, everyday reactions to frustra-

¹ At this point we wish to re-emphasize our earlier distinction between affect-releasing and affect-inhibited aggression (cf. p. 71), and between adequate and inadequate aggressive tension discharge (cf. p. 44).

tions, personal insecurity and international knowledge. We now want to consider to what extent each of these personality characteristics are related to destructive international attitudes.

Table VIII,1 gives a total survey of the correlations found between the $E-i+C$ measure on the IR scale and the Blacky test (number of conflict scores), the EE, NP, IK and ER scales. In regard to the latter scale we have concentrated exclusively on the E and i categories.

Table VIII,1. *Correlation (r) Between Destructive International Tendencies ($E-i+C$ on the IR Scale) and Different Individual Psychological Factors*

Measurements	N	r	p
E category, ER scale	161	.46	.001
i category, ER scale	161	-.44	.001
Blacky test	66	.38	.003
NP scale	154	.35	.001
IK scale	161	.13	.098
EE scale	157	.10	.214

The table suggests — as we should expect from preceding findings — that destructive tendencies in foreign affairs are positively correlated with nationalism, psychodynamic conflicts, and aggressive everyday reaction tendencies; and negatively correlated with tendencies towards taking responsibility oneself for solving everyday conflicts. On the other hand we still find no significant correlation with personal insecurity and international knowledge.¹ It is of some interest to note that all correlations are higher than the corresponding correlations with the E and i categories of the IR scale alone. (Cf. table I,14; III,9; IV,5; V,3; and VI,1).

To obtain an overall expression of the degree to which individual psychological factors are capable of explaining destructive international attitudes, we concentrated exclusively on the factors above, which had been shown to be statistically significantly correlated with the $E-i+C$ measure on the IR scale. We only included those subjects for whom we had complete data on all these factors, 61 subjects in all, and calculated all the intercorrelations.

¹ The last statement is not quite true if we apply a one-tail criterion of statistical significance. In that case we do find a small negative correlation between international knowledge and destructive international tendencies, statistically significant just below the 5 % level.

Table VIII,2. *Intercorrelation (r) Between Destructive International Tendencies ($E-i+C$ on the IR Scale) and Different Individual Psychological Factors ($N = 61$)*

Measurements	ER- E	ER- i	NP	Blacky	IR ($E-i+C$)
ER- E	-	-.73	.12	.07	.46
ER- i		-	-.13	-.21	-.37
NP			-	-.08	.36
Blacky				-	.36

Table VIII,2 gives a survey of these correlations. We have already pointed out that no noticeable correlation seems to exist between the "number of conflict scores" on the Blacky test, and the NP scale and the E category of the ER scale respectively. On the other hand we have not previously attempted to throw light on the relationship between the two latter scales. We shall only be able to assert that these three measures indicate mutually independent factors if it turns out that no noticeable correlation occurs here either.

The table shows that there is a very limited correlation between the NP scale and the E and i categories of the ER scale. Consequently, our data indicate that no significant correlations exist between patriotism and everyday reaction patterns.¹

Furthermore, the table shows that, apart from the correlation between the E and i categories of the ER scale, all the correlations presented are lower than the correlations involving the $E-i+C$ measure on the IR scale. The former correlation is nevertheless so high ($r = -.73$) that we considered it sufficient to concentrate on one of these two categories. In calculating the multiple correlation between the above-mentioned factors and our index on destructive international attitudes we have thus omitted the i category, partly because it correlates with the IR scale lower than the E category, and partly because it shows an approximately significant correlation with the Blacky test.

The multiple correlation between the $E-i+C$ measure on the IR scale and the NP scale, the E category of the ER scale, and the

¹ This conclusion is further supported by the fact that we find no statistically significant correlation between the NP scale and the different secondary categories and the E and i categories of the ER scale for all those subjects who answered the two scales. In this case the sample consists of 158 subjects.

“number of conflict scores” on the Blacky test, give $r_{1.234} = .66$.¹ If we list the factors as follows

IR —($E-i+C$)	1
ER— E	2
Blacky	3
NP	4

we get successively these partial correlation coefficients:

$$\begin{aligned} r_{1.2} &= .46 \\ r_{1.23} &= .56 \\ r_{1.234} &= .66 \end{aligned}$$

By means of the Chi square technique it is possible to demonstrate that the multiple correlation achieves a statistical significance far below the 1 % level ($p < .0005$).² The correlation indicates that the three factors with which we are dealing are together capable of explaining a considerable part (c. 40 %) of the variance. Our data therefore support the assertion *that destructive tendencies in foreign affairs do not represent any isolated aspect of the individual personality, but are linked with other dynamic and cognitive aspects.*

The multiple correlation coefficient found gives no basis for drawing general conclusions about the exact contribution of individual psychological factors. None of our various instruments is free of errors of measurement. They all build on a number of untested assumptions. We especially wish to point to the possible effect of the fact that some of the scales were administered on the same day; consequently a halo effect may have been introduced. Nevertheless we think this qualification is not likely to make our conclusion unjustifiable.

Prospects for Further Research

As we have previously stated, our investigations were planned with the aim of throwing light upon different hypotheses concerning the relationship between personality and international attitudes. Since

¹ The multiple correlation was calculated by K. Lauritzen, a statistician at the Computation Centre, Central Institute for Industrial Research, Oslo.

² A multiple correlation of .66 is not very high from a statistical point of view, but compared with usual “criterion correlations” in psychological and sociological research, it is of considerable magnitude. The external validity of most intelligence tests is somewhat lower. Here we would like to mention that in selecting pilots for the American Air Force during the last world war a test battery of as many as 18 tests with a total composite validity of only + .60 was used.

these hypotheses have been assumed to have general validity, it should also be possible to demonstrate their tenability in our particular case. Our empirical results support the Generalization Hypothesis, the Latency Hypothesis, and the Nationalism Hypothesis. We have no basis for concluding that these hypotheses are tenable under all circumstances. On the contrary, our data indicate that their tenability is limited: that the tenability of the Generalization Hypothesis, for instance, is dependent on the amount of latent aggression present; that of the Latency Hypothesis on the occurrence of a particular national identification, and so on. Nor do these conditions of dependency necessarily need to be general. It is highly likely that they are dependent on even more basic conditions: on the level of education and intelligence, on interest in foreign policy and international questions, on the level of international knowledge, etc. In our investigation we have not, it is true, been able to demonstrate any clear-cut dependency on this latter factor. This need not mean that the factor is without importance in a wider context.¹ The same may be true in the case of the Insecurity Hypothesis in spite of the fact that it is not supported by our empirical material either.

On the whole it is reasonable to assume that the relationships obtained in our studies are also to be found for other samples of subjects given that the subjects possess a high level of general education.

We wish to stress strongly that only *on the whole* must this be presumed to be the case. We found, for instance, a positive correlation between psychodynamic conflicts and aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs. It is not inconceivable that psychodynamic conflicts in another sample may have a completely different effect. Thus a curvilinear correlation between anti-semitic attitudes and neurotic tendencies has been demonstrated in an investigation by Eysenck and Crown (35, p. 60). They also find tendencies towards a similar curvilinear correlation between neurotic tendencies and militaristic attitudes. Both strong pro-militarists and strong anti-militarists appeared to be less emotionally stable than persons with less extreme attitudes. It would thus not be surprising to find, for instance, a negative correlation between psychodynamic conflicts and aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs among conscientious objectors.

Our investigation is particularly deficient on one point especially. We have absolutely no definite data on the relationship between certain reaction patterns towards international conflict situations and

¹ Cf. footnote on page 237.

willingness to participate in and actively work for a particular policy in foreign affairs. Here we are dealing with questions which touch on the political involvement or apathy of the individual subject.

In spite of a number of uncertainties the results of our investigations indicate that destructive international attitudes have a considerable connection with personality characteristics. Efforts with the purpose of reducing such attitudes can (and probably *must*) take several different directions. It does not seem possible to construct any simple directives which are valid under all circumstances. We think our investigations make their most significant contribution on this very point.

The encouragement of non-aggressive behaviour in everyday situations would seem to be capable of furthering non-aggressive attitudes on foreign affairs under certain circumstances, while in other circumstances it would seem to have the opposite effect. A decisive factor in this connection seems to be the amount of psychodynamic conflicts present, or — genetically speaking — the amount of latent aggression being produced by the extinction of aggressive responses. If much latent aggression exists, it would seem that aggressive ways of reacting in everyday situations may to a certain extent counteract the development of aggressive attitudes towards foreign affairs.

It would seem that all forms of mental health programmes with the aim of preventing or treating psychological conflicts and neurotic personality disorders, would be able to reduce tendencies towards destructive attitudes towards international matters. Child-rearing would seem to represent an important factor. In this connection the attitude of the parents and of those in authority to children's expression of their primary needs and aggressive tendencies is of particular relevance. The affective qualities of such attitudes often seem to be far more penetrating than their cognitive aspects.

This is the conclusion arrived at by Frenkel-Brunswik in her investigation of the relationship between child-rearing and personality formation:

“Somewhat surprisingly . . . certain frequently emphasized details of procedure seem to be relatively unrelated . . . to the development of an authoritarian vs. a liberal personality structure. Among these comparatively irrelevant factors seems to be the circumstances of nursing, such as breast feeding vs. bottle feeding, and time of weaning, and those of toilet training, such as the age at which it began . . . What seems to count most is the establishment of an intelligible, non-ego-destructive type of discipline.” (42, p. 236).

In a wider context this means that the expectations one may entertain regarding the effect of formal training and education of parents are fairly limited. At any rate we are here faced with central problems for research involving considerable practical and theoretical implications.

Work in the field of mental hygiene is hardly sufficient, however. We have mentioned the importance of ways of reacting in everyday situations. A lack of repressed aggression does not seem to guarantee non-aggressive attitudes to foreign affairs. Perhaps efforts to counteract certain forms of nationalism are just as important as efforts in the field of mental health. One condition for the displacement of latent aggression and the generalization of everyday ways of reacting over to the level of foreign affairs seems to be the existence of a particular national identification and patriotism. Where the development of nationalism is concerned, school instruction, films, the press and radio all probably occupy a prominent position. The desirability of preventing all national identification can, however, be strongly disputed. The form taken by such national identification seems to be of the greatest significance, whether it is based on a superior loyalty to and glorification of national symbols and institutions, or based on a feeling of inter-human solidarity and an awareness of the significant role played by national units in shaping the future of humanity.

Our knowledge of the causes of destructive attitudes towards foreign affairs is still incomplete and fragmentary. A number of factors seem to interfere with each other to a decisive degree. In spite of the fact that a number of psychological points of view all seem to have a certain validity, there is considerable scope for new theoretical speculation and a strong need for further systematic conceptual clarification combined with experimental investigations. Such investigations can produce conclusive evidence concerning causal relationships. As stated previously, the effect of personality factors may sometimes be overruled and their effect most clearly revealed in connection with external social changes. Thus personality-oriented hypotheses may give rise to predictions about attitudinal changes. Empirical testing of such predictions by experimental methods represents an important area for future research, which may finally give rise to the development of an inclusive theory concerning the *interaction processes* taking place between various environmental and personality factors in shaping individuals' international attitudes.

Seen in relation to the enormous significance international events

and questions of foreign policy have in our day for the existence of both individuals and nations, it is hard to understand why more systematic research in this field is not under way. One explanation is perhaps that many researchers decline to take up problems in this complex and many-sided area, since their contribution would of necessity be considered exceedingly limited, and would in addition often be exposed to methodological and ideological criticism. Our investigations have concentrated on reaction patterns on behalf of one's own nation in situations where national interests are threatened by other nations. A more intimate understanding of the basis for various reaction patterns in this area only touches on one aspect of the conditions forming the background to international events. The relationship between public opinion and leadership in foreign affairs is of tremendous importance, as is also the possibility of modifying public opinion, and conditions of national strength and economic resources. One particular question which calls for attention is how far the connection between attitudes towards foreign affairs and individual psychological factors remains the same, independent of national structure and historic background. We touched on this earlier in connection with our discussion of the Nationalism Hypothesis, when we pointed out that national idealization probably has a different psychological significance according to whether the nation is a small country or a military power.

We are still practically speaking without data on this problem, mainly because comparative investigations in different countries have so far been little developed. Much can be said in favour of continued studies of the psychological basis of attitudes towards foreign affairs being initiated as international research projects.

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A P P E N D I X I

INVENTORIES FOR REGISTERING
WAYS OF REACTING TO EVERYDAY AND
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS
(THE R SCALES)

INSTRUCTIONS

In what follows you will be presented with a series of everyday situations. You are to state what you would do in these imagined situations. Here is an example:
 "One night when you go into your bedroom, you bang your foot hard against the leg of the bed."

There are great differences between the ways in which people react to such a situation. Some reply that they would be annoyed with the leg of the bed, others that they would blame themselves for not having been careful enough, others that they would feel like sawing off the leg or kicking the bed again as punishment. Many possible replies can be given.

In this booklet you will be presented with 40 different situations. After each situation six different reactions are listed. Some of these will be used more frequently than others of course, but they are all common reactions. You will be asked to state in which of the listed ways you would probably react. You are to give two replies for each situation: in which of the ways mentioned you consider it most possible, and next most possible that you would react. You are not to write your replies in the booklet, but on a separate answer sheet. Put a circle round the letters on the sheet which stand for the alternative responses which you think cover best your likely reactions to each situation.

Here is an example:

100. most likely a b (c) d e f
 next most likely a b c (d) e f

In this case (situation 100) the alternative response "c" would be the reaction which you considered most likely, and "d" the one you considered next most likely.

There is no time limit, but it is important to work rapidly. Sometimes you will probably feel uncertain as to what you should answer. In that case, don't stop, but choose the alternative which first strikes you as the most likely. Avoid reflections concerning your responses and try to work as continuously as possible.

Don't say what you ought to do, but what you in fact would do in each situation.

1. One morning when you enter a schoolroom one of the pupils throws a rotten orange at your head.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
 - a) Wonder whether I had ever done him an injustice.
 - b) Take it calmly.
 - c) Get angry and give the pupil a good thrashing.
 - d) Fetch water and a cloth and wipe the mess off.
 - e) Insist that the pupil wipe the bits of orange off and clean up the mess he has made.
 - f) Think: there's nothing to be done about it, children will be children after all.

2. You are in a hurry and are just going to jump on your bus when the conductor slams the door in your face.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Take it calmly, wait for the next one.
 - Swear rudely at the conductor.
 - Be irritated with myself for not getting there earlier.
 - Consider it understandable; the bus can't wait for everybody.
 - Run after the bus and knock on the window.
 - Make sure of getting there earlier another time.
3. You are sitting in a restaurant and when the waiter comes to serve you he spills sauce on your clothes.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Ask for the sauce to be washed off, claim compensation.
 - Lose my temper, tell the waiter to be more careful another time.
 - Treat what happened as an unfortunate accident that could happen to anybody.
 - Be sorry for the waiter, try to help him.
 - Be patient, these things usually can be settled amicably.
 - Feel that to a large extent it was my fault, should have been more careful.
4. Just as you are going to sign an important letter your pen drips and makes a large ink blot on the letter.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Feel there is nothing much I can do about it, take it calmly.
 - Regret what has happened, nobody was to blame.
 - Swear at the pen, get irritated.
 - Feel sorry, offer to rewrite the letter myself.
 - Have the pen looked at, claim compensation if new.
 - Be annoyed with myself for not having been more careful.
5. You have bought tickets and arranged to go to the cinema with a friend, but he arrives a good while after the film has begun and you are not allowed in.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Get angry, abuse him for his unpunctuality.
 - Forgive him, these things can happen to the best of people.
 - Demand an explanation, make him pay for both tickets.
 - Blame myself for having made an arrangement with such an unreliable fellow.
 - Try to buy tickets for a later showing.
 - Take it calmly.
6. One evening when you are at the pictures you discover that you have sat on a piece of chewing gum.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Swear at the mess and at the person who put it there.
 - Get annoyed with myself for not having noticed it when I sat down.
 - Stay seated, take it calmly.
 - Feel disgust, try to forget it.
 - Get annoyed and report it to the manager.
 - Feel sorry, try to get the chewing gum off.

7. A friend of yours contradicts you no matter what you say.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Be patient, try not to react to it.
 - Get angry, answer in the same way when he says anything, or avoid talking to him.
 - Wonder whether I have irritated him in any way.
 - Have to excuse it, we can all feel perverse from time to time.
 - Rebuke him, ask him why he does it.
 - Find out what's behind it all.
8. One day when you are standing on the outer platform of the tram an elderly drunk man pushes you violently and threatens to throw you off.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Get annoyed, tell him to try.
 - Rebuke him, demand an explanation.
 - Ask whether he has a grudge against me, offer him my place.
 - Blame myself for having perhaps stood in his way.
 - Be patient, there's nothing to be done.
 - Move, make excuses for him, drunk people don't know what they are saying or doing.
9. While dressing one morning you drop your watch on the floor and it breaks.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Feel there is nothing to be done, these things happen.
 - Get the watch inspected to see if there was anything wrong with it, claim compensation.
 - Tell myself that I shall be more careful another time.
 - Swear at the clock because it didn't stand up to being knocked.
 - Be annoyed with myself for my carelessness.
 - Excuse the mishap, try to forget it.
10. You discover that some of your best friends have formed a secret club without including you.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Try to find out what I have done since they want to keep me out.
 - Be angry with my friends, tell them to go to hell.
 - Be annoyed, demand an explanation.
 - Be disappointed and dissatisfied with myself.
 - Forgive my friends, it's their own business to decide who they want to have with them.
 - Take it calmly, these things usually work out in time.
11. You are out one evening walking along a private road when you are suddenly attacked by an aggressive dog which rips your coat.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Get the dog off, find its owner and claim compensation.
 - Try to kick the dog and knock it down.
 - Take it easy, try to calm the dog until its owner comes and controls it.
 - Get away, no one's to blame.
 - Try to get away, decide to be more observant another time.
 - Apologise to the owner for having gone along his private road.

12. You are all dressed up and on your way to a big party when a car splashes you with mud from top to toe.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Take the number of the car, claim compensation.
 - Blame myself for having gone too near the road.
 - Be upset, it doesn't matter who's to blame.
 - Take it calmly, these things happen now and again.
 - Get angry and curse the driver's carelessness and inconsiderateness.
 - Try to stop the car and get it to drive me home so that I can change my clothes.
13. You have reserved a table at a restaurant and invited a friend to come with you. When you arrive, you are told by the head waiter that he has forgotten your reservation and has no table available.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Feel sorry at having caused the head waiter such embarrassment, order a table for another day.
 - Wait and see if a table becomes free.
 - Be irritated with myself for having ordered a table at such a restaurant.
 - See the manager, demand that a new table be procured.
 - Forgive the head waiter, it is human to forget.
 - Get angry and rebuke the head waiter for his forgetfulness.
14. Some 14-year-old boys are playing ball outside your window. Suddenly one of them throws the ball through the window and smashes it.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Demand that they pay for a new window pane and find another place to play.
 - Get furious, run after them and rebuke them.
 - Take it easy, wait and see.
 - Blame myself for not having chased the boys away earlier.
 - Consider it just an accident, remember my own childhood.
 - Give them back their ball and tell them how to get to the nearest playground.
15. A friend of yours has mislaid some very valuable books which you lent him.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Demand that he replaces them completely.
 - Be patient, ask him to look for them once more.
 - Blame myself for having lent books to such an unreliable person.
 - Forget the whole thing, it probably wasn't his fault.
 - Try to buy the missing book again.
 - Get furious, break off our friendship, in any case not lend him any more books.

16. You have just finished varnishing the floor when one of your parents comes in and walks straight on to the new varnish.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Be annoyed with myself for not making it known that the floor was newly varnished.
 - Fetch the varnish and brush and varnish over the footprints.
 - Get angry, ask the culprit to keep awake another time.
 - Get annoyed, ask the offender to varnish it over.
 - Take it calmly, these things look bad to begin with, but disappear when the varnish dries.
 - Call it just an accident, with no one to blame.
17. A ten-year old child related to you has stolen 50 kroner from your wallet.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Demand the money back from the child's parents.
 - Think: one has to forget such things, after all he's only a child.
 - Find out whether the child is given pocket money, suggest to his parents that they give him more.
 - Blame myself for not having looked after my wallet better.
 - Take it calmly, the child is sure to have second thoughts and give it back to me.
 - Get angry, give the child a strong rebuke.
18. An acquaintance of yours has revealed things which you had confided to him in strict secrecy.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Rebuke him, take revenge, never confide in him again.
 - Blame myself for having confided in him.
 - Demand an apology and an explanation.
 - Make certain of being more careful whom I confide in another time.
 - Make excuses for my friend, he couldn't have understood that it was told him in confidence.
 - Take it calmly, these things happen.
19. A four-year old child which is sitting on your lap suddenly wets on you.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Take it calmly, it dries quickly.
 - Give the child back to his mother, ask her to wash my clothes.
 - Forget it, the child is innocent.
 - Buy rubber pants and give them to the child.
 - Get annoyed and angry, rebuke the youngster.
 - Be annoyed with myself for not having paid more attention.

20. The postman where you live has lost an irreplaceable parcel which was addressed to you.

In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?

- a) Decide to send valuable parcels by registered mail another time.
 - b) Complain to the postal authorities and demand compensation.
 - c) Be patient, hope that it will turn up.
 - d) Get in a rage, perhaps see to it that the postman gets the sack.
 - e) Reflect that these things will always happen, everyone can make a mistake.
 - f) Reproach myself for not having seen to it that the parcel was sent in the correct way.
21. A friend absent-mindedly puts a lighted cigarette on your table and burns a large hole in the cloth and on the tabletop.

In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?

- a) Reproach him, tell him to look what he is doing another time.
 - b) Ask him to compensate for the damage or see that it is repaired.
 - c) Be annoyed with myself for not having paid more attention.
 - d) Be sorry for my friend, offer to fix it myself.
 - e) Say it was just an accident, such things can happen to anybody.
 - f) Take it calmly.
22. You have booked an important and urgent long distance telephone call, but the operator does not ring you back. When you get in touch with her again she says she is afraid she has forgotten to put it through.

In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?

- a) Get furious at such forgetfulness, rebuke the operator.
 - b) Demand that the call be put through at once.
 - c) Take it calmly, book the call again.
 - d) Be annoyed with myself for not having told her the first time how important the call was.
 - e) Offer to pay her more, ask for a quicker way of getting through.
 - f) Excuse the operator, she is probably very busy.
23. You are sitting writing letters, and a small child knocks over your ink-well so that you get ink on the table and on your clothes.

In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?

- a) Be patient, wipe it up and continue with my letter writing.
- b) Be irritated with myself for not having paid more attention to what the child was doing.
- c) Get angry, rebuke the child severely.
- d) Consider it just an accident, it wasn't the child's fault.
- e) Get the child to fetch cold water, claim compensation from the child's parents.
- f) Wipe it up myself, decide to be more careful another time.

24. Some of your friends tease you on account of your appearance.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Get annoyed, tease them back or try to avoid them.
 - Think they were childish, one has to forgive and forget such things.
 - Ask my friends why they teased me, ask for an explanation.
 - Feel despairing and upset about my appearance.
 - Take it calmly, ignore it altogether.
 - Try to find out the reason for the teasing, whether I have irritated them in some way.
25. As you are going down a flight of icy steps you slip and fall and hurt your back.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Get angry, swear at the person who should have sanded the steps.
 - Curse my own carelessness.
 - There's nothing to be done, try to forget it.
 - Get hold of something to scatter on the steps so that others are not hurt.
 - Take it calmly, these things are painful to begin with but soon pass.
 - Tell the person who is responsible for the steps, demand compensation.
26. You come across some small boys opening the air valves on your bicycle.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Take it calmly.
 - Ask them to stop, get them to pump the tyres up again.
 - Chat to the boys, you have to excuse such pranks.
 - Get angry, rebuke them and chase them away.
 - Pump the tyres up again myself.
 - Be annoyed with myself for having left the bicycle.
27. One day when you are in a grocer's shop one of the assistants suddenly pours syrup down you.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Demand to have it wiped off, and claim compensation for the cleaning.
 - Be annoyed with myself for not having been more careful.
 - Be annoyed, avoid that shop afterwards.
 - Feel embarrassed for the assistant, accidents can happen to everybody.
 - Try to buy cleaning fluid and repair the damage myself.
 - Take it calmly, that kind of mark always comes off.
28. A friend of yours won't tell you something you want to know, and gives as his reason that he can't trust you.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- Try to convince him that he can trust me.
 - Be annoyed and feel injured, drop him as my close friend.
 - Wonder why he has been given such an impression.
 - Be disappointed, get him to show what grounds he has for saying that.
 - Excuse my friend, forget it, it's sensible to be careful.
 - Take it calmly, sooner or later he will realize he has made a mistake.

29. You don't have much time to spare and have to catch a long distance train. After much difficulty you manage to order a taxi which promises to come at once. You wait and wait, but the taxi doesn't appear until it is far too late to catch your train.

In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?

- a) Swear at the driver, phone the company and complain.
 - b) Send the taxi back and wait for the next train.
 - c) Feel vexed, try to remember what happened in the future.
 - d) Be annoyed with myself for not having started earlier.
 - e) Ask the driver why he is late, demand compensation.
 - f) Try to forget it, the driver probably did his best.
30. One day during the winter you are walking along in town when there is a sudden fall of snow from a roof on to your head.

In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?

- a) Reproach myself for not having noticed the danger and stepped off the pavement.
- b) Demand compensation, ask the owner of the building to fence off the danger area.
- c) Consider it just an accident, these things happen, unfortunately.
- d) Get angry and swear at the owner of the building for having neglected his duty.
- e) Take it calmly, brush off the snow.
- f) Try to get hold of something with which to fence off the pavement, so that others need not have the same thing happen to them.

31. A close friend accuses you of being obviously a miser and self-centred.

In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?

- a) Take it to heart, try to find out how much truth there is in it.
 - b) Feel injured, demand further explanation as to why he thinks that.
 - c) Feel annoyed and disappointed with my friend.
 - d) Not bother about it.
 - e) Try to convince my friend that his accusations are unjust.
 - f) Take the whole thing calmly, his impression will probably alter in time.
32. You discover that your 12-year-old brother has stolen a packet of cigarettes from you.

In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?

- a) Offer him cigarettes, say that he doesn't have to steal.
- b) Forget it, it's only natural to experiment at that age.
- c) Call it nothing to make a fuss about, those kinds of boyish pranks cure themselves.
- d) Blame myself for not having looked after my cigarettes better.
- e) Demand the cigarettes back again or demand that he pay for them.
- f) Get angry, rebuke him.

33. You haven't much time and have to give an important and urgent telephone message. You are waiting outside a telephone kiosk which is being used by a particularly garrulous elderly lady, who looks as if she is never going to finish. *In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?*
- Keep calm, wait.
 - Ask the lady how long she is going on.
 - Try to find another telephone.
 - Reproach myself for my dependence on the telephone.
 - Get annoyed, try to disturb her as much as possible.
 - Take it calmly, she may have just as important things to say as I have.
34. A stranger sitting beside you in the train rudely asks you to get up and give up your seat to an acquaintance of his who has not found one. *In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?*
- Be annoyed, take no notice, ask him to give up his own seat.
 - Ask why. Demand a seat in exchange.
 - Take it calmly, hope they will find seats somewhere else.
 - Reproach myself for having sat beside such an uncouth person.
 - Offer him my place and try to find another myself.
 - Be embarrassed and move — one finds impolite people everywhere.
35. You fall and hurt yourself badly. Some of your friends who are standing nearby laugh heartily and tell you it's good for you. *In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?*
- Blame myself for my carelessness.
 - Be embarrassed, try to forget it.
 - Get angry and bawl them out.
 - Take it calmly, try to laugh too.
 - Demand a reason for their laughter.
 - Find out why it should be good for me.
36. You are phoning from a telephone kiosk at the railway station when a stranger suddenly flings open the door and asks you to "beat it" and leave the telephone to him. *In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?*
- Take it calmly and try to pacify him.
 - Wonder whether I may have kept the telephone too long.
 - Excuse the man, we are all quick-tempered at times.
 - Ask him to explain why he is in such a hurry.
 - Cut my conversation short, offer him the telephone.
 - Get angry, tell him to shut up and "beat it" himself.
37. Just as you are about to run and dive into the water you slip on a piece of soap, fall, and knock yourself hard against the diving board. *In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?*
- Take it calmly, it hurts to begin with, but soon passes.
 - Be annoyed with myself for not having looked where I was going.
 - Get rid of the piece of soap so as to prevent further accidents.
 - Feel there is nothing to be done about it, it's easy to forget a piece of soap.
 - Find out who owns the soap and ask them to remove it immediately.
 - Curse the person who put the soap there.

38. Some of your friends shut you in a dark room against your will.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- a) Sit down and keep calm.
 - b) Demand to be let out.
 - c) Get furious, smash the door; the others will have to take the blame.
 - d) Blame myself for not having been more careful.
 - e) Feel annoyed, try to find a possibility of getting out.
 - f) Think: how childish; one has to excuse such behaviour.
39. Some friends accuse you for no reason of having stolen money from them.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- a) Get angry, defend myself to the last, perhaps drop them as friends.
 - b) Feel sorry, convince them they have made a mistake.
 - c) Wonder whether I have given them any cause for the accusation.
 - d) Not care about the accusation, these things are put right in time.
 - e) Get annoyed, demand proof of the accusation.
 - f) Excuse my friends, it is human to make mistakes.
40. One day when entering a store in the centre of town you accidentally tread on an unknown gentleman's foot, and before you have time to look round, he cracks you over the head with his walking stick.
In which of the following ways would you be likely to react?
- a) Demand an explanation.
 - b) Beg his pardon and explain that I did not do it on purpose.
 - c) Get furious and shove him.
 - d) Be vexed, blame myself for having been the cause of the fuss.
 - e) Feel there is nothing to do about it; I must have startled him terribly.
 - f) Take it calmly, such things can usually be settled amicably.

ANSWER SHEET

Give two responses for each situation. Put a circle round *one* of the letters after *most likely* and a circle round *one* of the letters after *next most likely*.

- | | | | |
|------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| 1. most likely | a b c d e f | 21. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 2. most likely | a b c d e f | 22. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 3. most likely | a b c d e f | 23. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 4. most likely | a b c d e f | 24. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 5. most likely | a b c d e f | 25. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 6. most likely | a b c d e f | 26. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 7. most likely | a b c d e f | 27. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 8. most likely | a b c d e f | 28. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 9. most likely | a b c d e f | 29. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 10. most likely | a b c d e f | 30. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 11. most likely | a b c d e f | 31. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 12. most likely | a b c d e f | 32. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 13. most likely | a b c d e f | 33. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 14. most likely | a b c d e f | 34. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 15. most likely | a b c d e f | 35. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 16. most likely | a b c d e f | 36. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 17. most likely | a b c d e f | 37. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 18. most likely | a b c d e f | 38. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 19. most likely | a b c d e f | 39. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |
| 20. most likely | a b c d e f | 40. most likely | a b c d e f |
| next most likely | a b c d e f | next most likely | a b c d e f |

INSTRUCTIONS

In what follows you will be presented with a series of international situations. You are to state what should be done in these imagined situations. After each situation are listed six alternative reactions. You are asked to give two answers for each situation: in which of the ways listed you would most prefer and next most prefer Norway to react. Your answers are not to be written in this booklet, but on a special answer sheet. Put a circle round the letters on the sheet which stand for those alternative responses to each individual situation which you think best cover the reactions you prefer. Here is an example:

100. most prefer a (b) c d e f
 next most prefer a b (c) d e f

In this case (situation 100) the alternative response "b" would stand for the reaction amongst those listed which you would most prefer, and "c" for your second preference.

There is no time limit, but it is important to work rapidly. Sometimes you will probably feel uncertain as to what you should answer. In that case don't stop, but choose the alternative which first strikes you as best. Avoid reflections concerning your responses and try to work as continuously as possible.

Don't say what you think Norway would actually do, but what we ought to do in the following situations.

1. India demands that all Norwegian missionaries leave the country immediately.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
 - a) Demand a satisfactory explanation, turn the matter over to the United Nations.
 - b) Introduce restrictions on Indians who wish to live in Norway.
 - c) Blame the activities of Norwegian missions which have made the Indian action necessary.
 - d) Offer to withdraw the missionaries at once.
 - e) Take it calmly, these matters can be settled amicably.
 - f) Decide that there is nothing to be done about it; the Indians must naturally decide on matters affecting their own country.

2. The United States demands that Norwegian shipping stop all freight transport to Communist China.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
 - a) Blame the Norwegian shipowners who have been carrying on such traffic.
 - b) Demand an explanation, if necessary send the matter to an international forum.
 - c) Refuse to agree to the demand, ask the United States to attend to her own affairs and not meddle in ours.
 - d) Take the whole thing calmly, the matter is bound to be settled after a while.
 - e) Start investigations to find out what would best serve Norwegian interests.
 - f) Feel that we were in a difficult situation, with nobody to blame.

3. Russian nationals who have lived in Norway for some time tell Russian newspapers that they have been submitted to unpleasant cross-examination by the Norwegian police, and that the attitude of the Norwegian people has on the whole been unfriendly.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Take it calmly, wait and see.
- b) Offer to investigate the complaints and put matters right.
- c) Answer in the same vein, protest.
- d) Demand more exact information.
- e) Blame the Norwegian people and the behaviour of the police.
- f) Do nothing about it, unfriendly people can be found in any country.

4. Leading politicians in Germany demand that the Norwegian occupation force return home immediately.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Offer to consider recalling the brigade.
- b) Tell the Germans we will not put up with taking orders from them.
- c) Blame ourselves for not having recalled the brigade earlier.
- d) Take it calmly, wait and see.
- e) Protest, turn the case over to a forum of the Western allies.
- f) Do nothing about it, no one can be blamed for wanting to be master in his own country.

5. Finland has decided that Norwegian tourists shall not be permitted to visit the country.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Do the same in return, bar Finnish tourists from Norway.
- b) Do nothing about it, all nations have the right to close their frontiers.
- c) Take it calmly, it should be possible to settle such a question amicably.
- d) Demand an explanation immediately.
- e) Investigate the reason, suggest discussions.
- f) Get irritated at the Norwegian tourists who have given cause for the Finnish decision.

6. The United States demands to control Norwegian air and naval bases.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Offer to negotiate.
- b) Reject the demand immediately, reproach the United States for its imperialistic tendencies.
- c) Protest, turn the matter over to an international forum.
- d) Reproach ourselves for having made such a demand possible.
- e) Take it calmly, wait and see.
- f) Not reproach anyone; the United States' motives must be good.

7. A spokesman for an Indonesian delegation on a visit to Norway maintains that the delegation has been given bad treatment by Norwegian ships and hotels.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Ask the Indonesians to stay home if they are not satisfied with Norwegian conditions.
- b) Blame Norwegian tourist organizations for discrimination.
- c) Do nothing; unfriendly people can be found in all countries.
- d) Wait and see, hope that the Indonesians' impressions of Norwegian conditions will improve in time.
- e) Offer to help the Indonesians to see the best we have.
- f) Ask the Indonesians for a more detailed explanation.

8. A Norwegian legation in French North Africa has been blown up after Norway voted against taking up the question of the country's independence at the United Nations' General Assembly.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Blame ourselves for our attitude at the General Assembly.
- b) Demand compensation, and an investigation of the matter.
- c) Demand that those responsible be punished, threaten to break off diplomatic relations with the country if a similar incident occurs again.
- d) Take it calmly, leave the matter to the authorities in North Africa for the time being.
- e) Build a new legation; one has to allow for such happenings in North Africa.
- f) Revise our attitude towards colonial peoples, offer our support in future.

9. The United States threatens to cut off all economic and military aid to Norway if Norway does not immediately put a stop to all trade relations with the Soviet Union.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Demand an explanation, turn over the case to an international organization.
- b) Investigate the consequences, offer to negotiate.
- c) Blame ourselves for having made such a request possible.
- d) Assert our independence, accuse the United States of dictatorial tendencies.
- e) Do nothing; the United States is no worse than other great powers.
- f) Wait and see, don't do anything rash.

10. Czechoslovakia has begun an extensive propaganda campaign against Norway over several short wave radio stations.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Get the United Nations or some other international organization to take the matter up.
- b) Do nothing; all large nations carry on radio propaganda.
- c) Start jamming, or do the same thing.
- d) Take it calmly, wait and see.
- e) Wonder whether there is anything in the Czechoslovakian propaganda.
- f) Invite Czechoslovakian broadcasters to Norway to get to know the country.

11. A Norwegian citizen has been arrested and imprisoned in Germany for no reason.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Demand compensation on behalf of the man.
 - Wait and see, avoid rash action.
 - Suggest that the case be investigated by representatives of both countries.
 - Wonder what the Norwegian could have done to cause the German police to interfere.
 - Take it calmly, any nation's police can make mistakes.
 - Demand to have him returned, undertake reprisals.
12. Some Eskimos have accused Norwegian hunters of undermining the basis of their existence by excessive hunting of seals and other arctic animals.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Offer to investigate the matter, offer compensation.
 - Protest, Norwegian hunters also have the right to their existence.
 - Blame ourselves for having given cause for such a protest.
 - Turn the matter over to the International Court of Justice, maintain that the hunting takes place in international territory.
 - Not blame anyone, hunting conditions have probably been bad for all concerned.
 - Take it calmly, these matters can be settled amicably.
13. Norwegian citizens are refused entry visas to the United States.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Do nothing about it; each nation has the right to decide who it wants.
 - Refuse permission to American citizens to visit Norway.
 - Wait and see, there are plenty of other places to go to.
 - Demand a statement as to why the United States refuses entry visas to Norwegian citizens.
 - Blame the Norwegian police who issue passports to all kinds of people.
 - Take the initiative in getting information as to how the matter is handled by the American authorities.
14. The Nazi party has begun to make itself felt again politically in the Norwegian zone of occupation in Germany.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Do nothing about it; wait and see.
 - Not get mixed up in it; the Germans must be allowed to have whatever parties they want.
 - Protest, appeal to the Bonn government.
 - Forbid the Nazi party to hold public meetings, reproach the Germans who are again allowing themselves to be attracted by this party.
 - Offer the German authorities help in reforming social conditions in the occupation zone.
 - Blame ourselves for not having taken strong action sooner.

15. Russia demands that the price of bread corn exported to Norway be doubled.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Stop these imports or multiply the prices of goods we export to the Soviet Union.
 - Demand other goods from the Soviet Union correspondingly reduced in price.
 - Be irritated with ourselves for having entered into trade treaties with the Soviet Union.
 - Do nothing; the Soviet Union has the right to decide what prices it wants.
 - Offer the Soviet Union more Norwegian goods, propose discussions.
 - Wait and see, and do nothing rash.
16. The NATO authorities in Paris have reproached Norway for maintaining too high a standard of living and for not investing large enough sums in military preparations.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Ask the authorities to stop meddling in Norwegian affairs.
 - Invite observers to Norway to investigate the matter.
 - Reproach ourselves for not having invested more in military preparations.
 - Take the complaints calmly, wait and see.
 - Do nothing about it, the authorities must know what is necessary.
 - Demand reasons and concrete proof.
17. Swedish shrimp fishers keep fishing far into Norwegian waters, driving out Norwegian fishermen.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Blame ourselves for not having sufficient patrol ships to prevent such fishing.
 - Try to get the Swedish fishermen punished, threaten them with being shot at.
 - Do nothing, the Swedish fishermen probably didn't realise they were fishing in Norwegian waters.
 - Demand compensation, protest.
 - Take it calmly, the matter is bound to settle itself after a time.
 - Take the initiative in getting the matter discussed with the Swedish authorities, offer to mark the boundary better.
18. American tourists in Norway write in American newspapers that Norwegian citizens generally behave in an unfriendly fashion and that the Norwegian police are often tactless.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Be irritated at the behaviour of the Norwegian public and police who have given such an impression.
 - Do nothing about it; it is not easy for foreigners to understand the Norwegian temperament.
 - The Americans are doubtless to blame themselves; ask them to behave more tactfully when they come to this country.
 - Investigate the matter, start a campaign for better service.
 - Take it calmly, such things are soon forgotten.
 - Demand more exact information.

19. Czechoslovakia has asked all Norwegian citizens to leave the country.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Break off all relations with Czechoslovakia and make a similar demand here.
 - Demand the reason, send the case to the United Nations.
 - Offer to see to it that all Norwegian citizens come home.
 - Wonder what Norwegians have done in Czechoslovakia since they have been asked to leave.
 - Do nothing about it: the Czechoslovakians have the right to make decisions in their own country.
 - Reflect that these things always turn out all right if only one shows enough patience.
20. The Soviet Union demands the use of ice-free harbours in North Norway.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Mobilise, send military units to defend the north.
 - Demand a further explanation, send the case to an international organization.
 - Find out why the Soviet Union wants to use the harbours, offer to discuss the matter.
 - Take it calmly, wait and see.
 - Not blame anyone; all nations should have the opportunity of leasing fuelling berths in Norwegian harbours.
 - Blame ourselves for not having allowed the Soviet Union to do this earlier.
21. The United Nations has charged Norway with not taking enough refugees from Central Europe.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Offer to investigate the matter, if necessary try to rectify it.
 - Tell the United Nations that it is our own business; point to the small amount other countries have done for the refugees.
 - Take the whole thing calmly, avoid hasty action.
 - Demand more detailed reasons and further discussion.
 - Blame ourselves for having given grounds for such a charge.
 - Feel that it is important to think of the refugees, but that Norway has limited resources.
22. A Norwegian tanker has been sunk by Viet-Minh forces off French Indo-China.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- Do nothing about it; one has to expect such things in time of war.
 - Blame ourselves for not having armed our merchant vessels sailing in such waters.
 - Demand compensation; bring the case before an international forum.
 - See to it that the Viet-Minh forces are severely punished.
 - Support the building of a new ship.
 - Feel that nothing can be done about it as long as the war lasts; wait and see.

23. Norwegian citizens residing in Russia are not allowed freedom of travel.
How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Prevent Russian citizens in Norway from moving about freely.
- b) Do nothing, the Russians have the right to decide in their own country.
- c) Protest, demand an explanation.
- d) Blame ourselves for having provoked the Russian travel restrictions.
- e) Try to arrange talks with the Russian authorities.
- f) Do nothing hasty, wait and see.

24. The United States demands the right to carry out air manoeuvres over Norwegian territory.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Tell the United States that we will not be dictated to by them.
- b) Turn the matter over to the North Atlantic Council.
- c) Do nothing about it; the United States has the right to demand this.
- d) Offer to discuss the matter with the U. S.
- e) Wait and see; avoid taking hasty action.
- f) Blame ourselves for having given occasion for such a demand.

25. Sweden threatens to stop all imports of fertilisers from Norway. Fertilisers are our most important export to Sweden.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Take it calmly, wait and see.
- b) Try to develop an export market somewhere else.
- c) Threaten Sweden with reprisals, by stopping imports of goods which Sweden wishes to sell us.
- d) Demand an explanation.
- e) Blame ourselves for not having found more stable customers for our fertilizer exports.
- f) Do nothing about it; Sweden must decide herself where she wants to get her fertilizers from.

26. A Russian radio station starts jamming Norwegian wave-lengths used for broadcasting to Norwegians abroad.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Take the matter calmly; wait and see.
- b) Protest and retaliate on Russian broadcasts in Norwegian.
- c) Change the wavelength.
- d) Demand an explanation and bring the matter before an international forum.
- e) Wonder what reasons the Russians might have for disturbing these broadcasts.
- f) Do nothing; such things can be due to pure accident.

27. The United States demands that the rental charges for American films be increased by 200 %.
- How would you prefer Norway to react?*
- Protest, stop importing American films.
 - Do nothing about it; all prices have risen and the United States has the right to decide itself what prices it wants to charge.
 - Let the matter rest, wait and see.
 - Accept the demand; reduce our income by abolishing duty on American films.
 - Blame ourselves for having become so dependent on American films.
 - Demand a further explanation, try to contact other countries importing American films.
28. The Chinese Communist government has confiscated the property of Norwegian missionaries and categorically refused Norway any kind of compensation.
- How would you prefer Norway to react?*
- Break off all relations with Communist China, undertake reprisals.
 - Demand compensation, send the matter to the United Nations.
 - Do nothing about it; the Chinese are masters in their own country.
 - Let the matter rest until China's international status is clarified.
 - Blame the Norwegian missionaries for having incurred the ill-will of the Chinese.
 - Offer China aid on a non-missionary basis.
29. Canada has started intense radio propaganda against Norway.
- How would you prefer Norway to react?*
- Invite Canadian radio broadcasters to come to Norway to get to know the country.
 - Do the same thing against Canada.
 - Do nothing, all large nations carry on radio propaganda.
 - Send the matter to the United Nations or some other international forum.
 - Take it calmly, wait and see.
 - Wonder whether we have irritated the Canadians in some way since they have started this propaganda.
30. German war toys are being exported to Norway again and sold extensively all over the country.
- How would you prefer Norway to react?*
- Demand that such trade be stopped; blame the Germans for producing such toys again.
 - Do nothing about it; German toys are of a high standard and Germany has to export.
 - Take it calmly, wait and see.
 - Blame ourselves for not providing ourselves with good Norwegian toys.
 - Demand a very high import duty on German toys.
 - Try to increase the production of Norwegian toys.

31. The Norwegian standard of living has been seriously threatened by England's reduction of the prices she is willing to pay for Norwegian paper and pulp.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- a) Blame ourselves for having linked our export trade so one-sidedly with England.
 - b) Do nothing about it; England has the right to decide how much she wants to give for her imports.
 - c) Take the matter calmly, wait and see how other export countries will react.
 - d) Demand an explanation; bring the matter before an international organization.
 - e) Try to develop export markets elsewhere.
 - f) Undertake reprisals, reduce the prices we are willing to pay for English exports.
32. Russia protests against the removal of Russian war graves in North Norway.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- a) Try to persuade the Russians that it is necessary to move them; initiate discussions.
 - b) Continue moving them; tell the Russians that the graves in Norway are none of their business.
 - c) Blame ourselves for having started moving the graves without first having discussed the matter thoroughly with the Soviet authorities.
 - d) Take it calmly; it should be possible to come to an agreement about such a matter.
 - e) Demand that the Soviet authorities pay for the upkeep of the graves if they insist that they remain spread about in many different places.
 - f) Do nothing we might be blamed for later; the case can be understood both from the Norwegian and the Russian point of view.
33. English trawlers have repeatedly violated Norwegian fishing boundaries and fished in Norwegian waters.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- a) Confiscate the trawlers and punish their captains severely.
 - b) Develop a warning system which would make it possible for the English trawlers to be informed when they cross the fishing boundary.
 - c) Demand compensation; refer the case to the Hague International Court.
 - d) Do nothing about it; the English trawlers couldn't have realized that they had crossed the boundary.
 - e) Blame ourselves because we don't have an efficient patrol system.
 - f) Take the matter calmly.

34. The Soviet Union asks Norwegian ships to refrain from transporting military material to Chiang Kai-shek's government on Formosa.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- a) Remember that the Soviet demand is understandable, but Norwegian interests must be respected.
 - b) Try to find out what Norway's best interests are.
 - c) Take the matter calmly; it is bound to be settled when China's international status is clarified.
 - d) Refuse to meet to the request, ask the Soviet authorities to mind their own business and to stop sending us requests of this kind.
 - e) Demand a further explanation.
 - f) Blame the Norwegian shipowners who have been carrying on this traffic.
35. Spain has decided that Norwegian diplomats are to be allowed very limited freedom of movement.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- a) Do nothing hasty; wait and see.
 - b) Try to institute discussions with the Spanish authorities.
 - c) Blame ourselves for having been unfriendly towards Spain.
 - d) Protest, demand an explanation, seek the support of other nations.
 - e) Do nothing, the Spaniards must decide for themselves in their own country.
 - f) Institute the same restrictions for Spanish diplomats in Norway.
36. Switzerland has started intense propaganda within the continent of Europe against Norway as a tourist country.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- a) Answer in the same coin, start propaganda against Switzerland.
 - b) Do nothing about it; Switzerland has more to offer tourists than we have.
 - c) Blame ourselves for having neglected our tourist propaganda with the result that the Swiss arguments cannot be rejected.
 - d) Take the initiative in getting the matter discussed with the Swiss authorities.
 - e) Protest, send the case to an international forum.
 - f) Take it calmly; other things matter more than propaganda in competition for the tourist trade.
37. Western Germany has instituted very strict trade restrictions against Norway on the basis of our trading activities with Eastern Germany.
How would you prefer Norway to react?
- a) Investigate the matter; try to find out what will best serve Norwegian interests.
 - b) Institute the same trade restrictions against Western Germany.
 - c) Demand an explanation; get the matter discussed in an international organization.
 - d) Take it calmly; wait and see.
 - e) Blame ourselves for our trade with Eastern Germany.
 - f) Do nothing about it; no one can prevent Western Germany from instituting what trade restrictions she wants.

38. British military planes have been observed at a great height over several towns in North Norway.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Protest, demand an explanation.
 - b) Take it calmly; wait and see.
 - c) Try to chase them away; if necessary shoot them down.
 - d) Do nothing about it; it was most likely due to a mistake in navigation.
 - e) Blame ourselves for our inefficient warning system.
 - f) Take the initiative in getting the matter investigated in cooperation with the British authorities.
39. Egypt refuses to allow Norwegian ships to call at Egyptian ports because the ships are being used to transport weapons and military material to Israel.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Try to take reprisals; stop calling at Egyptian ports.
- b) Blame ourselves for having carried on contraband activities.
- c) Demand proof, send the matter to the United Nations.
- d) Take it calmly; these always turn out all right in time.
- e) Do nothing about it; Egypt can decide herself what ships she will permit to call at her ports.
- f) Allow Egypt to inspect the Norwegian ships which call at Egyptian ports.

40. A Norwegian diplomat has been wrongfully arrested and accused of spying in Iran.

How would you prefer Norway to react?

- a) Blame ourselves for having sent diplomats to the country when conditions are so uncertain.
- b) Demand that the diplomat be handed over; take reprisals.
- c) Take it calmly; the police of any nation can make mistakes.
- d) Demand compensation; try to get Iran to put the matter right.
- e) Wait and see, hope the matter will be cleared up after a while.
- f) Offer to help Iran to investigate the case.

ANSWER SHEET

Give two responses for each situation. Put a circle round *one* of the letters after *most prefer*, and a circle round *one* of the letters after *next most prefer*.

- | | | | |
|------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| 1. most prefer | a b c d e f | 21. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 2. most prefer | a b c d e f | 22. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 3. most prefer | a b c d e f | 23. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 4. most prefer | a b c d e f | 24. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 5. most prefer | a b c d e f | 25. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 6. most prefer | a b c d e f | 26. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 7. most prefer | a b c d e f | 27. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 8. most prefer | a b c d e f | 28. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 9. most prefer | a b c d e f | 29. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 10. most prefer | a b c d e f | 30. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 11. most prefer | a b c d e f | 31. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 12. most prefer | a b c d e f | 32. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 13. most prefer | a b c d e f | 33. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 14. most prefer | a b c d e f | 34. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 15. most prefer | a b c d e f | 35. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 16. most prefer | a b c d e f | 36. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 17. most prefer | a b c d e f | 37. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 18. most prefer | a b c d e f | 38. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 19. most prefer | a b c d e f | 39. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |
| 20. most prefer | a b c d e f | 40. most prefer | a b c d e f |
| next most prefer | a b c d e f | next most prefer | a b c d e f |

A P P E N D I X I I

INVENTORIES FOR REGISTERING
EXPECTATIONS CONCERNING PERSONAL
AND NATIONAL MATTERS
(THE E SCALES)

INSTRUCTIONS

In this questionnaire you will be asked a series of questions about personal matters. After the majority of the questions seven different alternative responses are listed. You are to put a circle round the number below the alternative you consider most suitable.

There is no time limit, but it is important that you work as rapidly as you can. Sometimes you may feel uncertain as to what you should reply. In that case don't stop, but choose the alternative that corresponds to the very first thing that comes into your head. Avoid any thorough investigation of your responses, and try to give the most spontaneous and direct responses possible.

1. How do you think your personal life will turn out during the next few years?

exception- ally well	very well	fairly well	not parti- cularly well	fairly badly	very badly	exception- ally badly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2. You go to a doctor and you are told that it will be necessary to have your appendix out. How great do you think the possibilities are of your dying as a result of the operation?

<i>Give your answer in % :</i>

3. If you were taking a train to Trondheim, at 1 p. m. tomorrow from the East Station in Oslo travelling without any luggage, when would you try to be at the station if you had no seat reservation?

<i>Give your answer in number of minutes before 1 o'clock :</i>

4. Do you ever keep an account of your income and expenditure?

practi- cally never	very seldom	fairly seldom	from time to time	fairly often	very often	practi- cally always
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

5. If you were to give a 15 minute talk on the radio on a subject which interested you, how far in advance would you be most likely to start preparing for it?

<i>Give your answer in number of days :</i>

6. Do you ever consider that you might become disabled or unemployed at any time in the future?

never	very seldom	fairly seldom	from time to time	fairly often	very often	exceptionally often
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7. Very many people die of cancer in our society. Do you ever think that you might suffer the same fate?

never	very seldom	fairly seldom	from time to time	fairly often	very often	exceptionally often
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

8. If you were to train as a military pilot, how great do you think the chances would be of your being killed or seriously hurt during your training?

<i>Give your answer in % :</i>

9. When you plan for the future do you normally take unexpected events into account which could affect and ruin your plans?

never	very seldom	fairly seldom	from time to time	fairly often	very often	practically always
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

10. When you use a lift do you ever think that by accident you might be trapped between two floors or that the lift might crash?

never	very seldom	fairly seldom	from time to time	fairly often	very often	avoid lifts
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

11. How far in advance do you generally prefer to plan various activities in detail?

<i>Give your answer in length of time :</i>

12. If a new war were to break out, how would you look on the possibility of your surviving it?

practically certain	highly probable	fairly probable	not very probable	fairly improbable	highly improbable	practically unthinkable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

INSTRUCTIONS

In this questionnaire you will be asked a series of questions about national and international matters. After the majority of the questions seven different alternative responses are listed. You are to put a circle round the number below the alternative you think is most appropriate.

There is no time limit, but it is important that you work as rapidly as you can. Sometimes you may feel uncertain as to what you should reply. In that case don't stop, but choose the alternative that corresponds to the very first thing that comes into your head. Avoid any thorough investigation of your responses, and try to give the most spontaneous and direct responses possible.

1. How do you think Norway has reason to look forward to the future, as compared with other nations?

with exceptional optimism	with much optimism	with some optimism	without much optimism	with some pessimism	with much pessimism	with exceptional pessimism
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2. How far in advance do you think the Norwegian Government ought to make detailed plans for the expansion and development of Norway's resources?

Give your answer in length of time :

3. Has the thought ever struck you that the whole of Norway might be destroyed by a natural catastrophe?

exceptionally often	very often	fairly often	now and then	fairly seldom	very seldom	never
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

4. Economic crises can completely destroy a nation's prosperity. How do you regard the possibility of a serious economic crisis striking Norway in the near future?

practically unavoidable	very likely	fairly likely	not particularly likely	fairly unlikely	very unlikely	practically unthinkable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

5. If Norway were to do away with military defence, how great do you think the possibilities would be of Norway being attacked by another nation?

practically unavoi- dable	very likely	fairly likely	not par- ticularly likely	fairly unlikely	very unlikely	practi- cally unthink- able
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

6. How do you look upon Norway's future as a nation? Do you think Norway will exist as a nation 100 years from now?

practi- cally certain	very likely	fairly likely	not par- ticularly likely	fairly unlikely	very unlikely	practi- cally unthink- able
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7. How long do you think foreigners ought to live in Norway before they can become Norwegian citizens?

<i>Give your answer in length of time :</i>

8. Do you think Norway takes sufficient measures on the whole against possible saboteurs and spies, or do you think Norway goes too far on the whole with such measures?

com- pletely insuffi- cient	very insuffi- cient	some- what insuffi- cient	suffi- cient	some- what too far	much too far	defini- tely too far
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

9. Do you think there will be another world war in our lifetime? If you were to guess, what would you consider to be a reasonable length of time from now?

never	in 30 years or more	in about 20 years	in about 10 years	in about 5 years	in about 3 years	in about 1 year
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

10. Do you consider it likely that Norway could stay neutral or avoid becoming a theatre of war if a new world war were to break out?

quite certain	very likely	fairly likely	not particularly likely	fairly unlikely	very unlikely	practically unthinkable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

11. If Norway were to be drawn into a new world war, how do you think it would affect Norway compared with the last time?

definitely better	much better	a little better	as before	a little worse	much worse	complete destruction; terribly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

12. How do you look upon the possibility of Norway being able to recover as a nation after a new war?

quite certain	very likely	fairly likely	not particularly likely	fairly unlikely	very unlikely	practically unthinkable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7