dc.contributor.author | Mathisen, Ruben Berge | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-12-21T13:07:03Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-12-21T13:07:03Z | |
dc.date.created | 2023-10-09T15:47:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0007-1234 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3108619 | |
dc.description.abstract | Recent studies suggest that public policy in established democracies mainly caters to the interests of the rich and ignores the average citizen when their preferences diverge. I argue that high-income taxation has become a clear illustration of this pattern, and I test the proposition on a least likely case: Norway. I asked Norwegians to design their preferred tax rate structure and matched their answers with registry data on what people at different incomes actually pay in tax. I find that within the top 1 per cent, tax rates are far below (by as much as 23 percentage points) where citizens want them to be. A follow-up survey showed that this divergence is entirely driven by capital incomes being taxed too low. My results suggest that even in a reasonably egalitarian society like Norway, the rich get away with paying considerably less in tax than what people deem fair. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | en_US |
dc.rights | Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | Taxing the 1 per cent: Public Opinion vs Public Policy | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | Copyright 2023 The Author(s) | en_US |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 2 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S000712342300039X | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 2183015 | |
dc.source.journal | British Journal of Political Science | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | British Journal of Political Science. 2023 | en_US |