The Phenomenology of Intuition

dc.contributor.author	Koksvik, Ole
dc.date.accessioned	2017-08-08T13:12:22Z
dc.date.available	2017-08-08T13:12:22Z
dc.date.issued	2017-01
dc.Published	Koksvik O. The Phenomenology of Intuition. Philosophy Compass. 2017;12(1):e12387	eng
dc.identifier.issn	1747-9991
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1956/16251
dc.description.abstract	When a person has an intuition, it seems to her that things are certain ways; to many it seems that torturing the innocent for fun is wrong, for example. When a person has an intuition, there is also something particular it is like to be her: intuitions have a characteristic phenomenal character. This article asks how the phenomenal character of intuition is related to two core core questions in the philosophy of intuition, namely: Is intuition a source of justification and knowledge? and What are intuitions?	en_US
dc.language.iso	eng	eng
dc.publisher	Wiley	eng
dc.rights	Attribution CC BY-NC-ND	eng
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	eng
dc.title	The Phenomenology of Intuition	eng
dc.type	Peer reviewed
dc.type	Journal article
dc.date.updated	2017-05-09T12:30:37Z
dc.description.version	publishedVersion
dc.rights.holder	Copyright 2017 The Author(s)	eng
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12387
dc.identifier.cristin	1427948
dc.source.journal	Philosophy Compass

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