Statsvennlighet i Norges Høyesterett. En flernivåanalyse av saksegenskapers påvirkning på dommernes vota i sivilsaker mellom staten og private parter, 1963 - 2014
Type
Master thesisNot peer reviewed

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Date
2015-11-20Author
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This thesis examines the influence of case characteristics on
the behavior of Norwegian Supreme Court justices when the
state appears as a party in civil cases. Acting as the highest
court of appeal, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in all
areas of law, and hears cases that raise matters of principle
beyond the actual case itself, where the law is unclear.
Statistically, the Supreme Court decides cases in favor of
the state more often than private party litigants. This fact
has led to debate within the legal community, over whether
or not the court is placing greater emphasis on the state's
interests than what follows from the legal doctrine. While
research on Norwegian Supreme Court justices has
produced important insights about the effects of individual
justice characteristics, little is known about how aspects of
the actual cases affects judicial behavior. Here, I investigate
variables connected to case categories and importance,
results from lower courts, the character of the different
parties and their legal counsel.
Using a multilevel model that control the effects of these
case characteristics against panel effects connected to the
collegial nature of the court, and also includes the individual
characteristics of the justices, all 834 cases with 4170
justice votes between 1963 and 2014 are analyzed. Firstly,
the results show that the history of the case matters: In
cases where the state party won in both the District Courts
and the Courts of Appeal, the justices are more probable to
vote in favor of that party. This effect is not evident for
private parties with the same case history. Secondly, the
Ministry of Finance is identified as a uniquely strong plaintiff.
Differently from other actors, an appeal from the Ministry of
Finance increases the probability of the justices to vote in
favor of the state. Additionally, the analysis confirms the
existence of panel effects and individual effects on the
Supreme Court: In panels where justices with former
employment with the Legislation Department make up the
majority, all justices are more likely to vote in favor of the
state. Individual justices with former employment with the
Legislation Department or the Office of the Director of
Public Prosecutions, interim justices and former lower court
justices are more likely to vote for the state party. Former
law professors and the chief justices are more likely to vote
in favor of the private party.
Although a growing field of research, the Norwegian
Supreme Court is still severely understudied.
Publisher
The University of BergenCollections
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