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dc.contributor.authorSivertsen, Sveinung Sundfør
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-15T12:31:15Z
dc.date.available2019-11-15T12:31:15Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.PublishedSivertsen SSS. On the Practical Impossibility of Being Both Well-Informed and Impartial. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics. 2019;12(1):52-72eng
dc.identifier.issn1876-9098
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/21003
dc.description.abstractAdam Smith argued that the ideal moral judge is both well-informedand impartial. As non-ideal moral agents, we tend only to be truly well-informed about those with whom we frequently interact. These are also those with whom we tend to have the closest affective bonds. Hence, those who are well-informed, like our friends, tend to make for partial judges, while those who are impartial, like strangers, tend to make for ill-informed ones. Combining these two traits in one person seems far from straightforward. Still, if becoming well-informed is, as Smith also claims, a matter of imaginative perspective-taking with the “person principally concerned” (TMS, I.i.1.4, 13), it might be possible to become well-informed without the emotional entanglement that comes from any actual proximity to those we judge. Against this intuition,I use Construal Level Theory to show that the tension between being well-informed and impartial is likely to persist even if we take any actual proximity out of the equation. I end by discussing some implications of this, and suggest that we should consider revising the ideal to accommodate them.en_US
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherErasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics (EJPE)eng
dc.subjectAdam Smitheng
dc.subjectimpartialeng
dc.subjectwell-informedeng
dc.subjectconventionalismeng
dc.subjectConstrual Level Theoryeng
dc.subjectproximityeng
dc.subjectbiaseng
dc.subjectperspective-takingeng
dc.titleOn the Practical Impossibility of Being Both Well-Informed and Impartialeng
dc.typePeer reviewed
dc.typeJournal article
dc.date.updated2019-10-09T14:50:55Z
dc.description.versionpublishedVersion
dc.rights.holderCopyright the authoreng
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v12i1.377
dc.identifier.cristin1735652
dc.source.journalErasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics


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