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dc.contributor.authorHjortland, Ole Thomassen
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-26T11:48:09Z
dc.date.available2020-06-26T11:48:09Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationHjortland OT. Disagreement about logic. Inquiry. 2019eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1956/23047
dc.description.abstractWhat do we disagree about when we disagree about logic? On the face of it, classical and nonclassical logicians disagree about the laws of logic and the nature of logical properties. Yet, sometimes the parties are accused of talking past each other. The worry is that if the parties to the dispute do not mean the same thing with ‘if’, ‘or’, and ‘not’, they fail to have genuine disagreement about the laws in question. After the work of Quine, this objection against genuine disagreement about logic has been called the meaning-variance thesis. We argue that the meaning-variance thesis can be endorsed without blocking genuine disagreement. In fact, even the type of revisionism and nonapriorism championed by Quine turns out to be compatible with meaning-variance.eng
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherTaylor & Franciseng
dc.titleDisagreement about logiceng
dc.typeJournal articleeng
dc.date.updated2020-01-24T12:50:24Z
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Groupeng
dc.type.versionacceptedVersioneng
bora.peerreviewedPeer reviewedeng
dc.type.documentJournal article
dc.identifier.cristinID1732111
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/0020174X.2019.1651084eng
dc.source.issn0020-174Xeng
dc.source.issn1502-3923eng
dc.relation.journalInquiry (Oslo)
dc.rights.termsUnder embargo until: 2021-02-08


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