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dc.contributor.authorKvamme, Larseng
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-12T11:07:52Z
dc.date.available2008-11-12T11:07:52Z
dc.date.issued2008-05-20eng
dc.date.submitted2008-05-20eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/2965
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis I investigate numerically how three different scenarios of a Post-Kyoto agreement for the commitment period 2013-2017 affect the overall emission abatement, the cost of compliance and the price for emission permits in both the Kyoto (2008-2012) and the Post-Kyoto periods. The scenarios affect both periods through the banking rule; one of the compliance rules governing the emission trade mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol. In my results, banking reduces the overall cost of abatement and shifts abatement from the subsequent period to the present, when the Post-Kyoto emission targets are lower than in the present period. Due to over allocation of permits in the Kyoto period, so called hot air", it also causes a higher overall emissions, compared to a non-banking version of the same market, due to the possibility of bringing surplus permits from the Kyoto period into the next period. The numerical analysis in this thesis has been done using GAMS.en_US
dc.format.extent2202970 byteseng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfeng
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherThe University of Bergeneng
dc.subjectKyotoeng
dc.subjectBankingeng
dc.subjectEmission Tradeeng
dc.subjectEnvironmental Economicseng
dc.titleKyoto and Beyond: How the banking rule affects emission, cost and priceeng
dc.typeMaster thesisen_US
dc.rights.holderThe authoren_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright the author. All rights reserveden_US
dc.description.localcodeECON390
dc.description.localcodeMASV-SØK
dc.subject.nus734999eng
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210nob
fs.subjectcodeECON390


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