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dc.contributor.authorØrstavik, Pål Moltubakkeng
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-14T15:16:44Z
dc.date.available2008-11-14T15:16:44Z
dc.date.issued2008-11-14eng
dc.date.submitted2007-11-20eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/3011
dc.description.abstractFrom a phenomenological point of view, 'meaning' is on the one hand something objective, irreal or ideal. On the other, meaning is something which is manifest in human action and expression. On a linguistic level, Husserl employs a distinction similar to Freges 'sense and reference' distinction. Contrary to Frege, Husserl also employ a theory of intentionality, which serves to anchor 'meaning' in the pre-predicative experiences of the world and its objects. Husserls transcendental turn, after Logical Investigations, is a turn towards the synthesis which always already are operative in the pre-predicative perceptual experience, and in which an anticipation towards cognition, knowledge and truth already are manifest. These serve as the basic foundation from which judging in general proceeds.en_US
dc.format.extent263420 byteseng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfeng
dc.language.isonobeng
dc.publisherThe University of Bergeneng
dc.titleMeningens Fenomenologi og Fenomenologiens Mening - et studie av Edmund Husserls fenomenologinob
dc.typeMaster thesis
dc.rights.holderCopyright the author. All rights reserved
dc.rights.holderThe authoreng
dc.description.degreeMaster i Filosofi
dc.description.localcodeMAHF-FILO
dc.description.localcodeFILO350
dc.subject.nus713505eng
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Humaniora: 000::Filosofiske fag: 160::Filosofi: 161
fs.subjectcodeFILO350


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