Med én fot innenfor: hvordan norske interesseaktører jobber i Brussel

Abstract

Denne masteroppgaven er et hypotesegenererende casestudium, foretatt innenfor et hovedsaklig uutforsket område. Oppgavens hovedmål er å forklare hvorfor interesseaktører i EU-systemet velger ulike lobbystrategier når de forsøker å påvirke politikken som føres i unionen. Oppgavens andre målsetting er å øke vår kunnskap om hvordan ikke-statlige norske interesser representeres i EU-systemet, et felt det er gjort lite forskning innenfor. Selv om det er gjort mye forskning på lobbyisme i EU, finnes det få studier som tar for seg interesseaktørers valg av lobbystrategi, eller hvilke mekanismer som påvirker dette valget. Dette studiet tar for seg seks norske interesseaktører med permanent representasjon i Brussel, som studeres i detalj med den hensikt å avdekke hva som ligger til grunn for deres valg av lobbystrategi. Datamaterialet er samlet inn ved hjelp av ekspertintervju, og inkluderer også seks ansatte i Kommisjonen og to representanter i Europaparlamentet. Oppgavens hovedfunn er at valg av lobbystrategi påvirkes av tilgang til EU-institusjonene, interesseaktørenes interne beslutningsprosedyrer, deres motivasjon for å være representert i Brussel, samt deres ressurser. Basert på disse funnene genereres åtte hypoteser, som forhåpentligvis vil bli testet inngående i fremtidige studier.

This master's thesis is a hypothesis-generating case study, conducted in a largely unexplored sub-universe of units. First and foremost, it seeks to explain why interest actors choose different strategies while attempting to influence European Union policy outcomes. The second goal of the thesis is to provide insight and knowledge about private Norwegian interest representation in the European Union, a field in which there has been done little previous research. Although there has been carried out a great deal of research on lobbyism in the European Union, the interest actors' choice of strategy is largely uncharted territory. I argue that there has not been done enough research addressing which strategies interest actors in the European arena pursue in order to gain influence in the policy making process, or what mechanisms and factors that affect these choices. This lack of understanding of why interest actors behave differently to reach their goals of influencing EU-institutions constitutes a gap in our knowledge regarding lobbyism in the European Union. This study examines six Norwegian interest actors that are permanently represented in Brussels. The data used in this thesis is collected through expert interviews with six Norwegian interest actors, two Members of the European Parliament and six Commission officials. Since Norwegian interest actors are the subjects of investigation, this thesis gives valuable insight into how Norwegian private interests are represented in Brussels, coming from a country that is affected by EU-law, but is not represented in the institutions of the Europeans Union. The five different strategies that constitute the variance in this study's dependent variable, and the explanatory variables, are a result of a careful and lengthy dialogue between the relevant academic literature and my own empirical observations from the field. The central findings of this thesis is that access, internal decision-making procedures, motivation and resources are determinants for the strategies chosen by the Norwegian interest actors examined in this study. Based on these findings, I conclude this thesis by putting forward eight hypotheses, which will hopefully be tested extensively in future studies.