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dc.contributor.authorAbyaneh, Mohammad Reza Sohizadeheng
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-10T13:36:28Z
dc.date.available2012-10-10T13:36:28Z
dc.date.issued2011eng
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/6109
dc.description.abstractRecently, Alomair et al. proposed the first Un- Conditionally Secure mutual authentication protocol for lowcost RFID systems(UCS-RFID). The security of the UCSRFID relies on five dynamic secret keys which are updated at every protocol run using a fresh random number (nonce) secretly transmitted from a reader to tags. Our results show that, at the highest security level of the protocol (security parameter= 256), inferring a nonce is feasible with the probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping(observing) about 90 runs of the protocol. Finding a nonce enables a passive attacker to recover all five secret keys of the protocol. To do so, we propose a three-phase probabilistic approach in this paper. Our attack recovers the secret keys with a probability that increases by accessing more protocol runs. We also show that tracing a tag using this protocol is also possible even with less runs of the protocol.en_US
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.subjectRFIDeng
dc.subjectAuthentication Protocoleng
dc.subjectPassive Attackeng
dc.titlePassive Cryptanalysis of the UnConditionally Secure Authentication Protocol for RFID Systemsen_US
dc.typeJournal article
dc.description.versionDraften_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_6
dc.identifier.cristin1042436
dc.source.journalLecture Notes in Computer Science
dc.source.pagenumber92–103
dc.source.volume6829


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