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# **AORG351**

**Master`s Thesis in Administration and Organizational  
Science**

**Citizens' Trust in Political Institutions in Ghana: Do  
Legitimacy and Social Capital Matter?**

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## **DEDICATION**

*This thesis is dedicated  
to my unborn children  
with love.*

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## **ABSTRACT**

The study adopts cultural and institutional or performance-based theories to examine the impact of social capital and legitimacy variables on citizens' trust in their political institutions. The dependent variable was classified into central level institutions and local level institutions. The study included two cultural variables which are generalized trust and associationism based on Putnam's (1993) approach to social capital. Similarly, the study included three performance variables which are input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy, and output legitimacy based on Schmidt (2013) approach to legitimacy.

The thesis was based on a multivariate analysis, developing six regression models on a sample size of 2400 respondents from the Round 8 (2019) of the Afrobarometer datasets. The findings of the study suggest that despite high perceived levels of corruption among the central level institutions, citizens' trust in them are higher than local level institutions. Moreover, the results of the study revealed that on the aspect of social capital, both generalized trust and associationism had positive significant effects on the dependent variable. Additionally, on the aspect of legitimacy, both input legitimacy and output legitimacy variables had positive significant effects on the dependent variable, whereas the effect of throughput legitimacy variables were insignificant.

**Keywords:** Institutional trust, Social capital, Input legitimacy, Throughput legitimacy, and Output legitimacy.

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### **1.0 Background.**

What is trust? What defines trust? Why do we decide to trust and how do we measure it? Do we need trust? Trust is an invisible force that holds societies (Grimen, 2009). It is an anchor on which all societies and organizations hinge on. This makes the concept of trust to be an essential and integral component of every aspect of our society. A step further is to ask questions like ‘how do we trust?’ and what criteria determine the trustworthiness of another person or entity?’. Trust transcends an individual and it is expressed through relationships. That is, at least there should be two people involved in order to manifest trust – “trustor” and “trustee”. “Trustor” is the one who confers hopes, expectations or delegates responsibility to another. “Trustee” on the other hand, is an individual who is liable or accountable for a service or delegated task. Trust is coupled with consequences. It is not enough to hurriedly put your trust in someone, it has to be earned. Taking calculated steps and painstakingly verifying that an individual or entity is trustworthy before entrusting them can erase a series of unintended havocs. Trust can be acquired, which makes culture and society one of the important determinants of trust. A negative experience will serve as a deterrent for someone to trust again even if they encounter different people within different contexts. There is a general perception that those who trust are interdependent and collaborative. However, it is possible to find collegiality among people who do not trust each other.

### **1.1 Importance of studying institutional trust.**

Various studies on institutional trust showcases the diverse scopes that either do or do not depict how it emerges. The level of trust that citizens have in institutions can literally help in interpreting how effective they are or not (Askvik 2007; Bouckaert et al., 2003; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Van de Walle and Bouckaert, 2003; Askvik and Jamil, 2013). Trust is ubiquitous and influences the efficiency of the political arena, personal well-being, societal, educational, and economic advancements (Almedom, 2005; Portes, 1998; Realo et al., 2008; Uslander,

2002). As stated by Kim (2005) that when citizens display a high trust in political institutions, it leads to good governance and effectual execution of policies. There is the promotion of democratic unification in modern democracies because of high trust, whereas in authoritarian regimes, it mirrors the extent to which power is held (Wong et al., 2011, Baniamin, 2019). When there is poor governance, the citizens will have a low trust in the political institutions. As a result of distrust, “flexibility and discretion become severely constrained” and “it hinders informal relationships and lead to an excessive dependence on rules, formal procedures, regulations and legalisms” (Ruscio, 1996: 463).

Fukuyama (1995) asserts that the level of economic advancement in most countries can be attributed to their corresponding degrees of institutional trust. The reason is that when there is trust in the system, financial transactions are conducted freely and without doubts (Rusco, 1996). However, it is straightforward to point out the path that leads to institutional trust, with evidence from previous studies associating social trust with political, economic, and social status (Rothstein and Eek, 2009). All things considered, trust can aid in market activities (Granovetter. 1985), which will likely result in booming economic conditions in the country and as well help improve existing political institutions (Lee. 2012). Moreover, the degree of trust necessarily may not be the cause of institutional performance but instead its effects (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Rothstein, 1998, 2002; Lee, 2012). A study conducted by Kumlin and Rothstein (2005), in Sweden shows that there is low trust amongst the citizens that relate with need-testing welfare institutions than citizens who exclusively relate with non-need testing welfare institutions. The reason for the debate is that the citizens see need-testing institutions as bias and murky because of the means of determining qualification for the service. With this supporting data, trust can also be a factor for good institutional performance, that is, trust influences institutional performance and vice versa.

## **1.2 Rationale of the Studies.**

In developing countries like Ghana, the provision of public services like road construction, health care delivery, and education has predominantly been managed by the public institutions in the country. Higher trust in political institutions means that citizens have the assurance of a productive performance from these institutions. Previous studies depict that

the level of institutional trust in a country is dependent on an array of governance factors (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Grönlund and Setälä, 2012; Armah-Attoh et al., 2007, cited in Baniamin, 2019). When institutional heads abuse power and authority, fail to implement policies and deliver services shambolically, skepticism arises amongst the citizens (Askvik and Bak, 2005). The various definitions of institutional trust circle around these themes. Miller and Listhaug (1990: 358) explained institutional trust as the “evaluation of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in accordance with normative expectations held by the public”. Also, Giddens (1996: 34) described trust as “confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events”. Corrupt and undemocratic political atmosphere leads to low trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). And when institutions underperform, the citizens consequentially have low trust in them (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011).

Inferring from this streamline of logic, corrupt officials, unsatisfied democratic practices, and poor performance from political institutions in Ghana will result in low level of institutional trust. Pande (2010) stated that the quality of service that an institution provides to the citizens serves as the basis for their trust in that institution. At first glance, it would be plausible to assume that performance is the controlling factor in determining citizens trust in political institutions. The Human Development Index (HDI) of Ghana is 0.611 which places the nation in the medium level of Human Development Index. That is positioning the country at 138 out of 189 countries and territories. Between 1990 and 2019, there has been a significant increase of the country’s Human Development Index percent by 31.4 percent, that is, from 0.465 to 0.611 (Human Development Report, 2020). This feat can be attributed to the performance of the political institutions over the years. With respect to the performance-based theory, it is likely to assume that when the citizens are satisfied with the performance of the political institutions, it will also trigger the citizens to have higher levels of trust in their political institutions.

Despite the instrumental role that performance play in assessing citizens trust in political institutions, however, there are other elements that contribute to citizens trust in political institutions (Fitzgerald & Wolak, 2016: 132). Citizens’ evaluation of performance from political institutions are not always adequate (Van de Walle, Roosbroek & Bouckaert, 2008: 49). There are a lot of insufficiencies that emerge when researching into performance and trust, because it is not forthright to ascertain an institution’s accurate performance (*Ibid*).

Trust levels are somewhat affected by cultural elements (Hofstede 1980 cited in Bouckaert & Van de Walle 2003: 334). And it is necessary to explicate citizens' trust in political institutions within a wide societal scope than only on performance statistics (Vande Walle, Roosbroek & Bouckaert 2008: 51). Citizens' trust in political institutions can be viewed through the lens of cultural which are social capital and socio-demographic variables (Christensen & Laegreid 2005: 494).

Socio-demographic variables like gender, educational level, economic condition and employment status shape out communal settings and the values acquired from our social orientations determine how citizens interact with the political institutions in the country. The differences in socio-demographics result in either citizens will have a positive or negative behavior towards their political institutions. Likewise, citizens experience with political institutions will determine whether they will have high trust or low trust.

Barber (1983) defined trust as a bundle of “socially learned and socially confirmed expectations that people have of each other, of the organizations and institutions in which they live, and of the natural and moral social orders that set the fundamental understandings for their lives” (cited in Paxton, 2007: 48). Different individual traits or the socio-demographic variables become essential in determining citizens trust in political institutions (Paxton 2007: 48). The relevance of inquiring into the connection between socio-demographic variables and trust in political institutions can help in estimating patterns of trust in the remote future (Christensen & Laegreid 2005: 494).

Trust has been widely acclaimed to be a quintessential element for growing a modern democracy, attaining quality governance, and establishing strong social capital. The selected studies below showcase how trust has been studied as a dependent variable in Ghana. Addai *et al.*, (2013) ‘An explorative study of Religion and Trust in Ghana’, their study was based on individual-level data from 2008 Afrobarometer survey to examine the relationship between religion (religious affiliation and religious importance) and trust (interpersonal and institutional) amongst Ghanaians. Also, Asante (2014) in his study ‘Dynamics and trends in social trust in Ghana’, examined the problem of lack of social trust (or interpersonal trust) in Africa and delves into the challenges of low social trust despite political and economic advancements in the country. Moreover, Sulemana (2014) in his work ‘An empirical examination of the determinants of trust in Ghana’, relied on 2012 Afrobarometer survey to examine how trust affects political, social, and economic aspects of Ghana. Lastly, Boateng

(2017) in his study on ‘Institutional trust and performance: A study of the police in Ghana’, he endeavored to examine if performance theory is adequate to determine residents’ trust in their police. I would like to contribute to the pool of knowledge on trust studies in Ghana by focusing on the impact of performance indicators such as input, throughput and output legitimacy and cultural variables like social capital and socio-demographic variables.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

Based on the rationale of the study, the research questions to be explored are as follows.

- Do socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, economic condition, educational level, and employment status and social capital variables such as generalized trust and associationism influence citizens’ trust in political institutions?
- On performance theory, do input legitimacy variable like democratic satisfaction, throughput legitimacy variables like transparency and corruption and output legitimacy variable like performance influence citizens’ trust in political institutions?

### **1.4 Organization of the Thesis**

This study is divided into seven different chapters. Chapter one is the introduction of the thesis. It sets out the pace for the entire project but providing information on the background, importance of studying trust, rationale of the study and the research questions that the study endeavors to answer. Chapter two discusses the theoretical approach to the study and how the variables used in the study are operationalized. Chapter three explains the methodological approach and research design used in the study. Chapter four opens discussions on Ghana and the socio-political development with reference to governance and trust. Chapter five is the data analysis aspect of the study involving descriptive statistics and percentile distribution of the dependent variable and all the independent variables used in the study. Chapter six opens discussions on multivariate analysis using OLS regression to identify causality between the variables, and finally chapter seven is a concluding remark of the study.

## CHAPTER TWO

### CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the theoretical framework of trust used in this study. Accordingly, the dependent variable for the study is Institutional trust. Independent variables are divided into five broad categories, these are input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy, output legitimacy, social capital, and socio-demographic factors. The variable of concern under input legitimacy is democratic satisfaction. With regards to throughput legitimacy, the variables that will be studied are corruption and transparency. Also, the output legitimacy variables are institutional performance and policy performance (Askvik and Jamil, 2010). Moreover, on social capital the focus is on generalized trust and associationism based on Putnam (1993). Lastly, on socio-demographic factors, the study will analyze variables like age, gender, educational level, economic condition, and employment status of the respondents. Two aspects of trust will be considered, that is, the institutional or performance-based theory and the cultural-based theory. The institutional or performance-based theory will be the support for input, throughput, and output legitimacy. And cultural-based theory will be the anchor for social capital and socio-demographic variables.

#### 2.1 Theoretical Framework

##### 2.1.1 The Concept of Trust

The idea of trust is a multifaceted concept which has several definitions and implications in the discipline of social science (Jamil & Askvik 2015, p.158). An extensively cited definition of trust is from Mayer et al. (1995: 715), where trust is defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustier, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party”. Trust was originally linked to moral virtues (Jamil & Askvik 2016, p. 648). The criteria of trustworthiness of people were based on their honesty, integrity, and conscientiousness (*ibid*). Also, Newton (2001) defines trust as the “actor’s belief that, at worst, others will not knowingly or unwillingly do you harm, and at best, will act in his

interest” (p. 202). Trust is often enhanced among people when they encounter positive interactions (Jamil & Askvik 2016, p. 648).

Therefore, this notion creates the occasion to explain trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intention or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 395). Citizens trust in institutions fundamentally beckons that they have an unflinching conviction that the institutions will work effectively and efficiently to improve the way of living in the country. For this to happen, the institutions must prove to be dependable, neutral, predictable, helpful, and compassionate which will create a premise for positive expectations from the citizens. Exceptional and fair delivery of services instill legitimacy of the institutions and generates trust among the citizens.

### **2.1.2 Dependent Variable – Institutional Trust**

The focus of the study is on institutional trust (that is, citizens’ trust in political institutions). The notion is that people by default will have trust in institutions (Sztompka, 1999: 41– 45). These institutions have laid down rules, regulations, and rational actors whose actions may warrant trust or distrust from the people. The political institutions that the study will explore includes the President, Members of Parliament, Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive and the Local Government Council. The Afrobarometer survey’s assumption is that the Ghanaian citizens who were selected for the exercise had a fair knowledge of the composition and the structures of the political institutions under study. When citizens affirm that they trust a particular institution, is an indication that they deem such an institution as credible (Askvik, Jamil et al. 2011). That is, based on personal experience, together with information gathered from the media and the people. All put together creates a cognitive image of the various institutions and how the citizens perceive them as trustworthy or unreliable.

Moreover, different factions in the country will have varying perceptions of the institutions. The perceived trust of an institution is a cumulated trust from all groups in the country. A minority group may not trust a certain institution and that does not entirely mean that a particular institution is untrustworthy. For a fair representation of the situation on the ground,



a statistically depiction of each institution will provide the basis for categorizing various institutions as credible or unreliable.

As a dependent variable, institutional trust is operationalized using the Afrobarometer survey question “*How much trust do you have in the following or have you not heard enough about them to say?*” the President, Members of Parliament, Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive and Local Government Council. Answers ranging from ‘Not at all’ (1), ‘Just a little’ (2), ‘Somewhat’ (3), and ‘A lot’ (4). The political institutions are divided into central (President and Members of Parliament) and local (Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive and Local Government Council) institutions in the analysis. The different dimensions of trust will be explored to assess the level of citizens’ trust in their political institutions. The output legitimacy variable which is performance of the various political institutions will help define strategic trust and the extent to which the perceived level of performance from the political institutions affects the citizens trust.

### **2.1.3 Dimensions of Trust**

Trust can be categorized into two aspects, that is, strategic against moralistic trust, and particularized against generalized trust (Gleave et al., 2012). Strategic and moralistic trust chiefly pertains to the means by which people trust. Strategic trust is based on risk (Misztal 1996: 18; Seligman, 1997: 63). And at the same time in strategic trust, the parties involved know the abilities and limits of each other. For instance, when X trusts Y to drill a well in his house and Y also trusts X to pay for after drilling the well, then that cooperation can be termed as strategic trust. In the same vein, X will not trust Y to prescribe a medicine to his child likewise Y will not trust X to gift him loads of money when he has not performed any task that is beneficial to X. As Dasgupta (1988: 53) states that “the problem of trust would... not arise if we were all hopelessly moral, always doing what we said we would do in the circumstances in which we said we would do it”. On the other hand, moralistic trust is the broader view on humanity as opposed to individual encounters or perceptions that a person or group of people are trustworthy (Hardin 2000: 174). Moralistic trust is having the conviction that people are by default trustworthy and therefore one will trust people the way one would want others to trust oneself.

The second aspect of trust that is particularized trust and generalized trust pertains to trust based on social relations. Particularized trust can be defined as trusting specific people like family members, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. This kind of trust is based on previous information or past actions, as Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) refer to it as knowledge-based trust. Offe (1999) put it as “trust in persons results from past experience with concrete persons”. Likewise, Hardin (2010: 10) claims that “my trust of you be grounded in expectations that are particular to you, not merely in generalized expectations”. In other words, particular trust is built in people we have close relations or share particular social ties as a result of an experience and the knowing that they will deliver as they have previously done (Gleave et al., 2012). A typical example is “I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you” (Putnam et al., 1993: 169). On the other hand, generalized trust is trust in other members of the society (Gleave et al., 2012). This form of trust is demonstrated by trusting established state institutions and corporations like the political system, health delivery system and commerce. For instance, generalized trust is having the assurance that when you board an airplane, the pilot is well trained and qualified to take you safely to your destination. Also, having the confidence that the doctor will prescribe the right drug and dosage for the recovery of your ailment.

## **2.2 Theoretical Underpinnings**

According to Freitag and Traunmüller (2009), trust can be derived from “either personal predispositions and concrete experiences of trustworthiness in social interaction or on the other side, experience and evaluation of a situation and performance” (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009 cited in Landmark, 2016: 19). Institutional trust can be explained using cultural theory and institutional or performance-based theory (Lühiste, 2006). The baseline of the two theories is that trust is ingrained in experience (Mishler & Rose, 2001). Studying trust in Ghana, it is practical to recognize the impact of cultural heritage, and customs will have on the citizens in trusting their public and political institutions (Jamil and Askvik, 2016).

Personal predisposition refers to an individual’s nature as well as learned habits from societal interactions. According to Eric Uslaner (1999), an individual’s trust in society is based on confidence, idealism, and a broader perspective on life and not necessarily one’s experiences.

Hence, one bad experience will not be enough to alter a person's trust template (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009). On the contrary, according to Putnam (2000) individual's experience will determine how they interact with strangers. When a person is a member of a trusting social network, it is easier for them to trust strangers, but a negative experience will make them very cautious when they are to interact with people outside of their social network. Trust between citizens and political institutions are entirely asymmetric (Landmark, 2016). The trustier which represents citizens know of the trustee which represents the political institutions but not otherwise.

The lifetime learning model suggests an interplay of institutional and cultural theories with regards to early-life socialization and adult learning (Mishler & Rose, 2001). According to the model, cultural theory will anticipate that the trust that people acquire from an early stage in life will be converted into trust in political institutions when they become of stage. Adulthood encounters and experiences will either confirm the views that one held about institutions when they were younger, or they might be altered by recent developments or actions. An instance where both cultural and institutional trust concatenate is in advanced democracies. The trust judgements and impressions on political institutions amongst citizens from advanced democracies usually remain the same throughout their lifetime (Mishler & Rose, 2001).

Ghana maybe referred to as the beacon of democracy in Africa after experiencing three successful changes of governments in the fourth republic with seven consecutive successful democratic elections on the African continent, but still cannot be classified as an advanced democracy. During every election year the citizens are anxious and dreadful that conflicts might breakout in case the losing party do not concede defeat. Unlike advanced democracies like the Scandinavian countries, New Zealand, Australia, and many others have elections are run without fear or recourse. Therefore, citizens' view of political institutions is bound to change overtime. It is mostly complicated to predict the outcomes of institutional and cultural theories in instances where political trust fluctuates over time.

At this point, explaining performance-based theory and cultural theory in citizens' trust in political institutions will be dependent on which of the two factors contributes largely to institutional trust, whether experiences individuals acquire early-stage or later-stage in life (Mishler & Rose, 2001). When we expect that people will be more analytical and evaluative of past and present institutional performances then we can credit the explanation of citizens'

trust in political institutions to later-stage life experiences and performance-based theory. Nevertheless, an enigma might result when we track a mix of early-stage and later-stage experiences contributing to citizens' trust in political institutions. Askvik (2010), posits that it will take a meaningful amount of time for people to change their orientation of life and values. Therefore, a new governmental system will depict tremendous performance-based trust than a culturally based trust.

### **2.2.1 Independent Variables**

## **2.3 Cultural Theories**

Unlike institutional theories, cultural theories of trust eliminate all political elements in the concept of trust among individuals and public institutions. It is seen as the external factors that influence trust in public institutions (Mishler and Rose, 2001). The external factors can be categorized into two groups. One group is personal factors like experience and childhood background which is at the individual level. The other group is non-personal factors like ethnicity, social class, and party choice, which are at the structural, that is, society or national level (Lühiste, 2006). The reason for this classification is that generally if the citizens trust each other, we can suppose that they will have trust in the government and the public institutions. In the article, "*Who trusts? The origins of social trust in seven societies*" Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton (2003), discussed six cultural theories of trust. They are personality theory and the theory of success and well-being at the individual level. The remaining theories which are attributed to the societal level are voluntary organization theory, social networks theory, community theory and societal theory (*Ibid*).

## **2.4 The Individual Level**

Personality theory states that social trust is basically what we learn from childhood. Individual traits such as tolerance, patience, humility, and perseverance are features that influence social trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Although it is assumed that these traits are gained in early years of life, it is possible that individuals' level of trust can change when they get access to new information and deeper knowledge of the wider society (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Also, authoritarian cultures are prone to influence an individual's social

orientation within a political system. These values can be transmitted to relatives at home and friends or colleagues at school and turn into a noticeable parent-child affair or teacher-student affair (Ma and Yang, 2014, Jamil and Askvik, 2016). The effect is that there will be a wide power distance between the authorities and the ordinary citizens turning them into laudatory and uncritical people. Thus, it will lead to high level of loyalty in the government which will result in increased trust.

Further, the second theory at the individual level is success and wellbeing which asserts that scarcity of resources will scare individuals from taking risks because of the fear of losing everything. Wealthy people on the other hand, will be eager to take risks because in case there is a breach of trust, they will relatively lose less (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Moreover, the wealthy grows to become wealthier whereas the poor unfortunately stays poor. Evidence from research in Western countries through the World Value Survey and the American General Social Surveys back this claim (Almedom, 2005; Portes, 1998; Realo et al., 2008; Uslaner, 2002). People who had smooth upbringing and had almost everything at their disposable grow to be more trusting. However, the people who grew up in run-down neighborhoods and had to battle with crime, abuse and lack also grow up with scars and tend to trust less (*ibid*).

#### **2.4.1 Socio-demographic factors**

Personality theory and theory of success and well-being can be used as a lens to explain how socio-demographic factors can influence institutional trust. Due to the focus of the study, cultural variables like ethnicity, language, and religion were excluded from socio-demographic variables. According to Kuenzi (2008), socio-demographic variables like age, gender, economic condition, educational level, and employment status have been proved to have effects on institutional trust. Moreover, education and age are important because of the influence that experience has on trust. European studies conducted on education and trust affirms that the higher the education of an individual, the more trusting that person will be (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005, Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). The opposite can also be plausible since higher education makes people assertive and critical of the way the government is managing state affairs. Educated people have more access to information and

exposed to governance scenarios in other countries which may make them critical of how the state of affairs is managed in their own countries.

Therefore, the more information and knowledge that people have about the political system will either make them trust the institution when that institution performs as expected or not trust them when they are involved in corruption and favoritism. From the success and well-being theory which basically states that a person's level of financial freedom determines their level of trust, that is, the more income they have, the more trusting they will be (Delhey and Newton, 2003). As such, it becomes easier to connect a hypothetical line between education, occupation, and individual's economic prosperity because it is possible for one to lead to the other (Christensen and Lægheid, 2005, Lühiste, 2006).

The study plans to test the personality theory by measuring the effects of age, education, and standard of living over a period. However, little attention has been given to it from previous studies conducted by Delhey and Newton (2003) and Mishler and Rose (2001) who both concluded that adult experiences had a strong influence on trust rather than childhood social orientations. A study conducted by Hutchison and Johnson (2011), showed that socio-demographic features had a minimal effect on trust in public institutions because the greater contributing factor was attributed to the performance of the government and not necessarily the individual characteristics of the citizens. Possibility could be that since most of the studies on institutional trust were conducted in European or Western countries, the reality could be different in an African context. However, previous studies suggest a positive association between age and education and trust in public institutions (Herrerros and Criado, 2008, Paxton, 2007). In Kadri Lühiste's (2006) studies, there was an inverse relationship between education and institutional trust and finally institutional trust levels among females were higher than males (Lühiste, 2006).

The socio-demographic variables selected for the study are age, gender, economic condition, educational level, and employment status. Age and gender values in the survey data are clear and direct. The age of the respondents ranged from 18 years to 98 years. The value for measuring education was a question about the respondent's educational level ranging from 0 to 9. Economic condition was measured by the individual's present living conditions. This is a subjective question and the response ranges from bad (1) to very good (5). Employment status was measured whether the respondent was Not employed (1), employed part time (2) and employed full time (3).

## ***Age***

Trust, according to the personality theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003) trust is gain from childhood and early social orientations which means that the older the people get and the experiences they acquire along the way will influence their trust levels.

*H2.1: Old age may influence institutional trust.*

## ***Gender***

Evidence from previously conducted cultural theories studies suggest that trust amongst males and females are unpredictable. Notwithstanding Lühiste's (2006) studies that showed that trust amongst females were higher than males. Therefore, I presume that gender may either influence institutional trust or not influence.

*H2.2: Institutional trust amongst females is expected to be low than males.*

## ***Education***

Previous studies have shown that education influences trust (Lühiste, 2006, Christensen and Lægreid, 2005, Herreros and Criado, 2008). That is, as people increase in knowledge and can access and process information, it becomes easier for them to either trust public institutions when they are delivering services as expected or have distrust when they act otherwise (Mbatudde, 2013: 37). Since the establishment of Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) in Ghana since 1996, it is expected that most Ghanaians have access to at least basic school education and therefore could make them very critical and likely to affect their trust in the political institutions in the country. Undoubtedly, the citizens with no education or very low education may not be aware of the reality in the political system and are bound to be misled and also base their judgements on hearsays.

*H2.3 Educated people tend to be more critical about political institutions and therefore may distrust them.*

## ***Economic Condition***

From the success and well-being theory, when people enjoy high standards of living, they tend to trust more whereas when people are experiencing low standards of living, they tend to

trust less. Askvik (2008), studies showed the significant effect of living conditions of citizens on institutional trust.

*H2.4: Citizens with better economic conditions of living will have higher institutional trust.*

### ***Employment Status***

According to the success and wellbeing theory, the scarcity of resources makes people scared of taking risks because they know they might lose everything (Delhey and Newton, 2003). When people are unemployed the resources at their disposable are usually scarce and that would not incite them to take risks. According to Rousseau et al. (1998), a person's ability to take risks means that they have high trust. Moreover, people with low education are unemployed more and therefore are less well-off compared to people with higher education. Hence, it will be expected that high levels of unemployment amongst citizens will lead to low trust in political institutions.

*H2.5: High rate of unemployment amongst citizens will generate low institutional trust.*

## **2.5 The Societal Level**

The societal level of cultural theories focuses on interpersonal relationship, shared norms, understanding and cooperation among people. The theories identified by Delhey and Newton (2003), which are voluntary organization theory, social networks theory, and community theory will be used as basis for explanation. These theories can also be linked to social capital. The societal level proposes that trust is a result of culture, that is, people are born into it, and also practice it (Delhey and Newton, 2003).

The voluntary organization theory posits that a society that is made of many compacted and lasting voluntary groups will surely possess higher trust in the society (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Voluntary groups create an avenue for people to learn the importance of virtues like empathy, tolerance, humility, and the essence of working together to achieve a common goal (*Ibid*). However, there are scholars who object the theory, Marc Hooghe (2003), suggests that “there is no indication whatsoever that interaction with other group members would automatically lead to the development of a more socially oriented value pattern, to a rise in trust levels, or to abandoning prejudices” (p. 92).



Next, is social networks theory which unlike the voluntary organization theory gain a lot of acceptance from other scholars. The theory posits that the usual daily communication among peers, relatives and teammates forms social trust, for example by being a member of a book club or a soccer team (Delhey and Newton, 2003). It is important to note that there is an intersection between the social network theory and the voluntary organization theory. But the social network theory is broader and has received more acceptance from critics than the voluntary organization theory. The voluntary organization theory concerns with freely engaging in activities that will result in a collective gain.

Lastly, community theory deals with aspects of the society, for instance, the size, security of the members of the community and accessibility to social amenities (Delhey and Newton, 2003). It has been observed that social trust is higher in communities with smaller populations like small towns than communities with larger population like cities. Nonetheless, the community theory will not be used in the study.

### **2.5.1 Social Capital**

Social capital is the second independent variable for the study, and it will be supported by voluntary organization theory, social networks theory, and community theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Trust facilitates social capital, and the focus will be on the respondent's involvement in community-based organizations and religious activities and its effects on institutional trust. Social capital has been bounded by many criticisms since its introduction into social science in the late twentieth century. Common phrases associated with its definitions are trust, collective gains, and the essence of social networks. A definition from James Coleman suggests "*people's ability to work together in groups*" (Fukuyama, 2002, p. 23). Robert Putnam also puts it as "*features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit*" (Putnam, 1995, p.2). It has been recognized that social capital enhances liberal democracy and economic advancement (Fukuyama, 2001). Social capital emanates from religious beliefs, customs, and societal norms (*Ibid*).

Existence of social organization and establishment of social networks help in attaining common objectives. The success of social networks depends on trust among its members.

Robert Putnam (2000), in his book “*Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*”, discussed the concepts of *bonding* and *bridging* which pertains to social capital. Bonding refers to close relationship among socially identical groups like relatives, peers, and members within the same geographical location. It is easier to establish strong social networks among members of these groups because they share common interest and identities. These groups also offer their members the assurance of security and harmony (Putnam, 2000). Bridging on the other hand, refers to relationships between socially heterogeneous groups like council members (*Ibid*). Socially heterogeneous groups are characterized by people who have different ages, level of income and diverse viewpoints on life. Bridging thrives on the level of trust between groups. Higher level of bridging will mean that there is high trust among heterogeneous groups which foster the creation of institutions that sustains democracy (Putnam, 2000).

The concept of “radius of trust” refers to the groups of people who share the same customs and values (Fukuyama, 2001). When the social capital of a group is extensively positive, their radius of trust can transcend the group to affect non-group members. Sometimes, not all internal members of a larger group might be affected by the group’s radius of trust (*Ibid*). Freely participating in activities and joining groups in the society is one of the media through which people can extend their radius of trust and attain higher degrees of in-group and out-group trusts.

Not much recognition is given to voluntary organization theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003) and has received numerous critics as to whether it should be considered as a factor that contributes to social capital and trust as a whole. According to Sulemana *et al.*, (2015), with their study conducted in Ghana using the Afrobarometer survey reveals that there is low trust among Ghanaians and also the men have low trust in relatives, neighbors and friends than the women.

Moreover, there was no support for community theory in Delhey and Newton’s (2003) study. However, there is support for community theory when Putnam (2000), clarifies that social trust is significant in provincial or local towns. It is a commonplace to find volunteer works, community development activities and readily assistance to foreigners or outsiders in rural or small towns than in cities or urban centers. The population in small towns are relatively small compared to cities and because of congeniality amongst people who live in small towns, crime rates are relatively less as compared to people who live in urban centers (Putnam).

A generally trusting society can persuade people to participate in voluntary group activities and not necessarily because of an individual's membership in a voluntary group will make the person more trusting.

Newton (2001) proposes that high degrees of social capital is necessary for fostering an efficient political system, nonetheless, a strong social capital do not necessarily translate into a strong political capital. According to his assertion, there must be a degree of generalized, social trust which can bring about political trust in the society and also in political institutions. Cultural theories of institutional trust have been tested in several studies (Newton and Norris, 2000, Lühiste, 2006).

The social capital variable was operationalized by *generalized trust* and *associationism* and these variables were used by Landmark (2016) to measure institutional trust. The following questions pertain to generalized trust: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people. The answers were 'most people can be trusted' (1) and 'must be careful' (0). Also, 'could you tell me for each of the statements below whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much, or not all? Answers were 'people of another religion' (1) and 'people of another nationality' (2). Lastly, "to what extent do you agree with the following statements". Answers were 'people like you are accepted in Ghana for who you are' (1) and 'people who share your ethnic, racial, or religious background have a say in the direction of the country' (2).

*Hypothesis: Higher general trust amongst citizens will lead to positive evaluation of institutional performance*

On associationism as used by Putnam (2000) to measure social capital was used in the study by asking this question; 'here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. {If Yes, read}: Was this often, several times or once or twice? {If no, read}: Would you do this if you had the chance? Attended a community meeting (A), Got together with others to raise an issue (B) and Participated in a demonstration or protest march (C). Answers {Yes}: often (4), several times (3), once or twice (2), {No}: would if had the chance (1) and would never do this (0).

*Hypothesis: High associationism in groups will generate higher institutional trust.*

## **2.6 Institutional or Performance-based Theory**

States and political institutions exist to protect lives and safeguard the social and economic advancement of its citizens (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011, Landmark, 2016). The legitimacy and trustworthiness of political institutions are dependent of their ability to deliver these duties. The baseline for performance-based theory of trust is that the ability of political institutions to be able to perform their duties and match-up with the expectations from the citizens will determine whether the people will have high trust or low trust in their political institutions. When a government efficiently use available resources to provide adequate public services, the citizens will have a high trust in that government and its political institutions, however, when the government misappropriate resources and performs below the expectations of the citizens, people will have a low trust in the government and its political institutions (Jamil et al., 2013, Van de Walle and Six, 2014).

According to Mishler and Rose (2001), performance-based theory of trust is manifested as an effect or a by-product of the performance of institutions. It is what the people witness as to whether promises have been delivered and expectations have been met that form the basis of their trust in the political institutions. Unlike cultural theory where social orientation of society pre-informs people how to perceive the political climate in the country, this is a calculative form of trust. In a politically unstable environment, trust in political institutions is low because democratic governments can be interrupted by military invasions or interferences. In Ghana between 1966 to 1996 several military coups interfered with democratic governance because in all instances of the military coups, the soldiers argued that the government and political institutions were failing the country and not performing up to expectation.

When this is prevalent in a country, the citizens lose trust in political institutions because they sense that the political institutions exist to serve their selfish needs and not to serve the citizens. Ghana in its fourth republic since 1996, has enjoyed quite a stable political climate over the years and has successfully, changed power peacefully between different political parties during national elections. According to Mishler and Rose (2001) for a new political administration to gain the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the people, that government should invest in providing quality and affordable healthcare delivery, education, and roads.

A new democracy is prone to encounter difficulties in transforming its political and economic structures. At the transitioning period, levels of performance are likely to be low and citizens

might have low degrees of trust in the political institutions because they do not level-up. Lühiste (2006) remarks that citizens might show little support to the political administration when they do not trust the political institutions executing the new democratic ethics. The legitimacy of the government and political institutions can be threatened when the citizens are unsatisfied with democracy, there is high levels of corruption, and the performances are shambling (*Ibid*). According to Mishler and Rose (2001) performance-based theory is divided into political and economic dimensions. The political dimension pertains to how governments and political institutions uphold the principles of democracy. That is, the respect for rule of law, freedom of expression and association, respect for equality and all persons, accountability, transparency, and regular and free elections. The economic dimension deals with the enablement of governments and political institutions to fulfil economic expectations to the citizens like facilitating credit access options for producers, reducing tariffs, reducing currency inflation to foster international trade, and forming strong partnership with international organizations like International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to undertake projects that will lead to development of the country and prosperity of the citizens. This ideology is widely recognized in advanced democracies but has not been sufficiently tested in new democracies (*Ibid*).

One of the studies that supports the performance-based theory is Newton and Norris (2000) paper on “*Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture or Performance?*”. They concluded in the paper that performance-based trust in governments and political institutions is dependent on performance and meeting expectations. High performance of governments and political institutions lead to high trust while poor performance leads to low trust. They added that the reason why performance was a strong factor in shaping trust is that performance outcomes of governments and political institutions indiscriminately affect the citizens irrespective of age, gender, economic condition, educational level, or employment status.

### 2.6.1 Input, Output and Throughput Legitimacy

The variables used under the performance-based theory in the study are divided into input, throughput, and output legitimacy. The first person to use these concepts from the systems theory was Fritz Scharpf (1970; 1997; 1999) who divided democratic legitimation into input and output. He evaluated input legitimacy in relation to the European Union's receptiveness and impartiality to the interest of the people by because of the participation of the citizens. Further, output legitimacy was evaluated in relation to the efficiency and success of the policies of the European Union. Schmidt (2013) in her paper '*Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output, and Throughput*,' introduced the third dimension of legitimacy as 'throughput' legitimacy. Throughput legitimacy is evaluated in relation to efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the European Union's administration through impartiality and inclusiveness to dialogue and deliberation with the people.

The purpose of the paper was "to show the quality of governance processes, and not only the effectiveness of the outcomes and participation of the citizenry, is an important criterion for the evaluation of a polity's overall democratic legitimacy" (Schmidt, 2013: 3). Abraham Lincoln's famous definition for democracy as government *by* the people (political participation), *of* the people (citizen representation) and *for* the people (governing effectiveness). Linking the three forms of legitimacy to Abraham Lincoln's definition of democracy, 'output' is *for* the people, 'input' is *by* (and *of*) the people and 'throughput' is with the people (*Ibid*). As the concepts of input and output are loaned from systems theories, also, they are present in the work of David Easton (1965). He defined input in relation to the political sphere as the needs and assistance from the citizens and output as the choices and activities of the government, deserting what transpire in the political arena.

According to Scharpf (1999: 7-21), input legitimacy is seen as the performing element that results in laws and conventions as established by the 'majoritarian' institutions of electoral representation. Output legitimacy on the other hand, deals with the ability of the law and regulations to provide solutions and has a spectrum of institutional agencies to assure it. Throughput legitimacy focuses on what goes on between the blanks of political input and policy output which often times have been overlooked by scholars. Institutional throughput envelops the accountability and transparency of political administrations. In sum, output legitimacy expects policies to work efficiently at the same time representing citizens' attitudes and standards. Input legitimacy is determined by citizens' requests and tensions on

institutions intentionally through their representative politics. Throughput legitimacy needs institutional administration that operates with competence, accountability, transparency, and impartiality.

For the current study, input legitimacy, output legitimacy, and throughput legitimacy were used to assess citizens' trust in political institutions using the performance-based theory as our theoretical lens. The variable under input legitimacy is democratic satisfaction. The variables under output legitimacy are policy and institutional performance and variables under throughput legitimacy are corruption and transparency.

### **2.6.2. Input Legitimacy**

The variable under input legitimacy is democratic satisfaction. Diamond and Morlino (2004) defined democracy as a system of government with four important principles. First principle is democracy as an avenue for competing for political power. Second principle is the active role of the citizens in public life. Third principle is safeguarding human rights of all citizens in the country. Finally, is the respect for rule of law. In democracy everything is under the authority of law and not individuals or leaders. The law ensures the safeguarding of human rights so that no one is discriminated against, preserves order, and controls the power of governments and political institutions.

An extensive survey research on citizens satisfaction of democracy has primarily been generated at the individual-level using socio-demographic variables (Gibson, Duch, and Tedin, 1992; Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Lagos, 1997, 2001; Morlino and Montero, 1995; Diamond, 1999: 192). Anderson and Guillory (1997: 69) stated that “a country’s political context has rarely been incorporated explicitly into explanations of system support or satisfaction with democracy and political institutions. In fact, much of the research on the determinants of system support in Western democracies is notably institution-free because it has focused exclusively on the level of individuals”. Wells and Kriekhaus (2006) conducted a multi-level analysis to determine whether national context influence democratic satisfaction. Their results were in support of Anderson and Guillory’s attempt to incorporate national-level variables into the analysis of democratic satisfaction. They concluded that institutional structure is highly important to democratic satisfaction but other factors like

policy performance, corruption and political history were not relevant in determining democratic satisfaction. They acknowledged that the results of their study were not surprising. The variable with the highest effect on democratic satisfaction was representation and that any political institution that increase citizens representation in government will lead to citizens satisfaction with democracy.

Nevertheless, according to the focus of the study attention is geared towards the individual level on citizens' perception on satisfaction with democracy to determine its effect on institutional trust in political institutions. Askvik (2008) study on institutional trust in post-apartheid South Africa revealed that citizens perception of the political structure has a significant effect on their satisfaction with democracy in the country both at the national and individual levels. The variable contributed about 46 percent of variation in citizens' trust in political institutions.

This variable will be operationalized by the question 'Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ghana? Answers: Ghana is not a democracy (1), not at all satisfied (2), not very satisfied (3), fairly satisfied (4), and very satisfied (5). It is expected to be seen that when all the four principles of democracy as identified by Diamond (2006) are existing and well-functioning in the country, the citizens will express high satisfaction with democracy and their trust in political institutions will be high whereas when they express low satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country their trust in political institutions will be low.

*Hypothesis: High satisfaction of citizens with democracy will lead to high trust in political institutions.*



### 2.6.3 Throughput Legitimacy

The variables under throughput legitimacy are corruption and transparency.

#### Corruption

According to Gerring and Thacker (2004: 300)

The term ‘corruption’ is notoriously difficult to define. The term overlaps with a wide field of neighboring concepts such as bribery, campaign finance abuse, clientelism, cronyism, fraud, embezzlement, extortion, graft, kickbacks, machine politics, misappropriation, misconduct, nepotism, patronage, pork, rent-seeking, scandal, side payments, special interest politics, theft and venality. Indeed, corruption is frequently employed as a generic label for any sort of failure on the part of politics or politicians. If corruption means different things to different people, or different things in different places, we are faced with a recalcitrant subject matter, one that resists the kind of system cross-national scrutiny that has emerged in recent years and that we attempt here.

We define corruption generally as an act that subverts the public good for private or particularistic gain.

Corruption as noted by Philip (1997: 29) ‘is rooted in the sense of a thing being changed from its naturally sound condition, into something unsound, impure, debased, infected, tainted, adulterated, depraved, perverted, et cetera’.

The corruption variable used in the study was operationalized by asking the question; ‘how many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or have you not heard enough about them to say? Answers: The President and Officials in his office (A), Members of Parliament (B), Local Government Council (C), Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive (D). From the discussion above on the extent of corruption in Ghana, it is expected that when there is less corruption amongst the political institutions, they will gain legitimacy as well as the citizens trust in them will increase.

*Hypothesis: Less institutional corruption will increase citizens’ trust in political institutions.*

## Transparency

A way of examining citizens' trust in political institutions on the basis of transparency is to consider the tools for citizens' access to information. These can be divided into two aspects: proactive and demand-driven (Fox, 2007). Proactive dissemination deals with information that the government provides the public concerning its actions and achievements. Demand-driven access deals with institutional responsibility to be responsive to the people's demands for any sort of information or documents which are not readily or easily accessible.

Institutions can vary from freely reachable and handy to giving out information, to strictly and confidential with access to information. The notion of transparency can also be understood through the direction of the channel of information (*Ibid*). Whether upwards transparency which has to do with information from the people to the political institutions or downwards transparency which information from the political institutions to the citizens. But the focus of the study is on downwards transparency to examine whether the citizens can free access their political institutions and the effects it has on their level of trust in these institutions.

There are two phases of transparency: clear and opaque (Fox, 2007). Opaque transparency refers to circulating of information that is inconsistent and incredulous about the nature and structure of institutions in terms of choices, activities, and outcomes. This term refers to information that tends to mislead the public and create a bad image about the institutions. Clear transparency on the other hand, involves both the openness to information and systems that manifest credible information about the performance of institutions.

Transparency is used in this study as previously been used in other studies (Landmark, 2016), to measure institutional trust among citizens. The aim for selecting the transparency variable in the study is to examine whether citizens are able to determine the truth or falsehood of information that they receive concerning their political institutions and to a large extent how that affect their perception of these institutions. The variable was operationalized in the study by asking the survey question; *'Please tell me how often, in this country, you think people from each of the following groups spread information that they know is false? Government Officials (A), Politicians and political parties (B), News media and journalists (C), Social media users (D), Activists and interest groups (E). Answer alternatives are; Never (0), Rarely (1), Sometimes (2), Often (3).*

*Hypothesis: Citizens will have high trust in political institutions when they deem information, they receive from them as credible.*

## **2.6.4 Output Legitimacy**

The variable under output legitimacy is policy performance.

### ***Performance***

Several scholars and even politicians describe lack of trust in governments and political institutions to be because of poor performance. This slightly explains the need for restructuring leadership in the government for instance, Copernicus in Belgium, reinventing government in the USA and la Relève in Canada. The association between performance and trust has not been studied widely as compared to the effects of party choice or the media. Bouckaert & Van de Walle (2001: 20) identified that:

The performance approach to trust in government has two main parts: the first one deals with macro-performance (unemployment, economic growth, inflation...) (Brown and Coulter 1983; Kuechler 1991; Miller and Lishaug 1991; Anderson 1995; Kornberg and Clarke 1994; Zussman 1997; Newton and Norris 1999), while the other deals with micro-performance, that is, government service delivery (Noren 2000; Rose and Pettersen 2000; Hoogland DeHoog and others 1990; Kobi 1998; Glaser and Hildreth 1999).

Askvik (2008) study on institutional trust in South Africa using survey data from Afrobarometer shows significant effect of policy performance on citizens' trust in political institutions. Moreover, Citrin and Green (1986) study on "*Presidential leadership and the resurgence of trust in Government*" depicts that the performance of the president is important in shaping citizens trust in the government and the political institutions. The President is often referred to as the 'first gentleman of the land' this in essence portrays the President as the commander-in-chief or head of the government and when he is admirable and his actions are approved, and also meet the expectations of the citizens, they develop immense trust for the government and the various political institutions (*Ibid*).

The performance variable for the study was operationalized by two variables, that is, performance by the various political institutions on one hand, and general performance on the other hand, as used by Landmark (2016) to measure effects of performance on institutional trust. On performance by various political institutions, the survey question was *‘Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over last 12 months, or have you not heard enough about them to say?’* Answers: President Nana Akuffo Addo (A), Your Member of Parliament (B), Your Local Government Councilor (C), Your Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive (C1\_GHA). Scale ranging from ‘not at all’ (1), ‘just a little’ (2), ‘somewhat’ (3), and ‘a lot’ (4).


On policy performance variable, the survey asked; *‘How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, have you not heard enough to say?’* Answers; Managing the economy (A), Improving the living standards of the poor (B), Creating jobs (C), Keeping prices stable (D), Narrowing gaps between rich and poor (E), Reducing crime (F), Improving basic health services (G), Addressing educational needs (H), Providing water and sanitation services (I), Fighting corruption in government (J), Maintaining roads and bridges (K), Providing a reliable supply of electricity (L), Preventing or resolving violent conflict (M), Addressing the needs of young people (N), Protecting rights and promoting opportunities for disabled people (O). Scale ranging from ‘very badly’ (1), ‘fairly bad’ (2), ‘fairly well’ (3), and ‘very well’ (4).

*Hypothesis: Institutional trust in governments and political institutions will increase when they perform according to citizens’ expectations. Hence, higher performance is expected to generate higher institutional trust.*

## 2.7 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework shows the five groups of independent variables with their respective components and the dependent variable.

**Figure 2. 1 Showing analytical framework**



*Summary of the application of all the independent variables*

**Table 2. 1 Summary of the application of all the independent variables**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Meaning/Characteristics/Components</b>	<b>Hypothesis</b>	<b>How it measured</b>
<b>Socio-demographic Variables</b>	Gender	Institutional trust amongst females is expected to be low than males.	Gender is explanatory
	Age	Old age may influence institutional trust.	Youngest 18 years - Oldest 98 years
	Economic condition	Citizens with better economic conditions of living will have higher institutional trust.	Very bad (1), Fairly bad (2), Neither good nor bad (3), Fairly good (4), Very good (5)
	Educational level	Educated people tend to be more critical about political institutions and therefore may distrust them.	No formal schooling (0), Primary education (1), Secondary education (2), Tertiary education (3)
	Employment status	Institutional trust amongst unemployed citizens tends to be higher than employed citizens	Not employed (1), Yes part-time (2), Yes full-time (3)
<b>Social Capital</b>	Generalized trust	High general trust amongst citizens will generate institutional performance	Answers range from Not at all (1) to Completely (5)
	Associationism	High associationism in groups will influence higher institutional trust.	Answers range from No, would never do this (0) to Yes, often (4)
<b>Input Legitimacy</b>	Democratic Satisfaction	Higher satisfaction of citizens with democracy will generate higher trust in political institutions.	Answers vary from Ghana is not democratic (1) to Very satisfied (5)
<b>Throughput Legitimacy</b>	Corruption	Less institutional corruption will increase citizens' trust.	Answers range from None (1) to All of them (4)

	Transparency	Citizens will have high trust in political institutions when they deem information, they receive from them as credible.	Answers vary from Never (0) to Often (3)
<b>Output Legitimacy</b>	Institutional performance	Higher institutional trust in governments and political institutions will increase when they perform according to citizens' expectations. Hence higher performance is expected to generate higher institutional trust.	Answers vary from Strongly disapprove (1) to Strongly approve (4)
	Policy performance		Answers vary from Very badly (1) to Very well (4)

*Source: Researcher's synthesis*

## **2.8 Summary of Chapter**

This chapter has aimed at discussing the relevant theories in relation to the subject matter of the study and how they would be operationalized throughout the study. Two main theories were used as the driving force of the study; cultural theory and institutional or performance-based theory. The cultural theory states that individuals gain trust in political institutions as a result of their social orientation and experiences in life, while the performance-based theory is of the view that individuals' trust in political institutions is determined by institutional performance vis-à-vis their expectations. Based on previous studies, the variables selected for the study under the cultural theory are social capital and socio-demographic variables. Also, the variables selected under the institutional/performance-based theory were input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy and output legitimacy variables. The research design and methodology of the study will be discussed in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

#### 3.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion on the research design and methodology of the study. A quantitative research design was used and the quality of the research focusing on reliability and validity of data are discussed in this chapter.

#### 3.1 Research Designs

There are three research design methods for undertaking a research in social science. These are quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods (Creswell, 2014). The qualitative research design is often an inductive approach, and it is used for exploring the meaning that individuals or groups give to a social phenomenon (*Ibid*). Quantitative research method on the other hand is often a deductive approach and involves the use of numbers and statistical methods to derive numerical measurements of a particular aspect of a phenomenon (King *et al.* 1994: 3). Lastly, mixed method is usually a combination of qualitative and quantitative research designs (Creswell, 2014: 4). The method of inquiry selected for the study is a quantitative approach involving both central and local (that is, President, Members of Parliament, Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executives and Local Government Councils) political institutions in Ghana.

##### 3.1.1 Choice for Quantitative Research Approach

Hetherington (1998) states that measuring trust implies comprehending people's opinions and expectations and this is best done through statistical strategies like surveys. There are several studies that have used quantitative research design to study institutional trust. Sulemana and Issifu (2015) used the data from 2012 Afrobarometer survey to apply the four sets of variables that Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) identified as important determinants of trust to the context of Ghana and to study the dimensions of trust in six public institutions, namely, the President, Parliament, Electoral Commission, Police, Army, and the courts of law. Also, Godefroidt, Langer and Meuleman (2017) used data from both rounds 5 (2012) and 6 (2015) of the Afrobarometer to study the impact of institutional and cultural factors on political trust



in developing political trust in a developing country like Ghana. Jamil and Askvik (2015) used a nation-wide door-to-door questionnaire surveys to explore the level of citizens' trust in public and political institutions in Bangladesh and Nepal.

The purpose of this study is to explore the variables that determine institutional trust. And as a descriptive study, the quantitative research design will enable the study to predict the association between the dependent and independent variables. According to Cohen *et al.* (2013), quantitative research design uses standard methods and analysis to ascertain the extent to which a certain scientific outcome conforms or does not conform to a particular phenomenon. Moreover, quantitative design will help the study to reach larger sample size and make it possible to draw generalizations from the Ghanaian population. As such the study will be able to interpret the perceptions of trust of citizens towards their political institutions. In addition, the participants were randomly selected which helps the research to avoid errors like personal biasness and little control over the results of the study. Further, it is possible to duplicate results in a quantitative research. Also, performing a quantitative research and as well as resorting to a secondary data source is time saving and cost effective. However, one of the downsides of this approach used in the study is that sometimes due to the delicateness and sensitivity of certain topics, randomization in quantitative research might not produce relevant results. Another issue is that quantitative research does not offer the opportunity to review responses of the respondents in the study. Therefore, the feedback from participants whether clear or ambiguous were treated to stand on its own. These reasons justify the study's choice for using quantitative research to draw the degree of citizens' trust in their political institutions.

## 3.2 Research Methodology

### 3.2.1 Source of Data Collection

The study uses secondary data from Round 8 (2019) of the Afrobarometer survey datasets. This round of data was selected because that was the latest survey data that had been released by Afrobarometer and because the study's aim is on citizens' perceptions towards political institutions, current data will portray a clear picture of what is happening on the grounds. Afrobarometer offers open access to their datasets by the public so the data for the analysis was downloaded from their website<sup>1</sup>.

#### *Sampling Principles and Weighting*

Data from Afrobarometer are designed to produce a sample that is a representative random sample of all voting age population in each country<sup>2</sup>. The aim is to allow every adult individual an equal opportunity to participate in the survey interviews. This is done using cross-sectional techniques at every stage of sampling. The minimum age of respondents are usually 18 years old. As a routine procedure, citizens living in regularized environments like hospitals, prisons, nursing homes and students confined in boarding houses or dormitories, or people under curfews are excluded from the sample or population.

#### *Sample Size and design*

Afrobarometer usually includes either 1,200 or 2,400 participants but in the case of the Round 8 data for Ghana, the participants selected were 2,400. With this size, the margin of error decreases to +/-2.0 percent at 95 percent confidence level. The sample design is a "clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample" (Afrobarometer, 2020). It means that all levels of demographic and geographic stages in the country are captured, from towns to regions, provinces, or states. The reason is for an all-inclusive and representative data collection.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://afrobarometer.org/data/ghana-round-8-data-2019>

<sup>2</sup> <https://afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles>

### 3.2.3 Respondents Profile<sup>3</sup>

**Table 3. 1** Respondents' Profile: Socio-demographic distribution of respondents

Socio-demographic Variables		Frequency	%	
Gender	Reference from Data	Male	1197	49.9
		Female	1203	50.1
	Reference from National Population	Male	15.5 million	49.1
		Female	16 million	50.9
Age	Reference from Data	18-30	915	40.8
		31-40	557	23.2
		41-50	380	15.9
		51-60	255	10.6
		60+	293	9.5
		Average age 38		
	Least -Highest age (18-98)			
	Reference from National Population	Below 15 years	11.6 million	37.44
		15-24	5.8 million	18.64
		25-54	10.6 million	34.27
Median age 21.4 years (21 years for males and 21.9 years for females)				
Economic Condition	Reference from Data	Bad	1375	57
		Neither Good nor Bad	1326	6
		Good	893	37
	Reference from National Population	Dependency rate		67.4
		Urban migration		57
Educational level	Reference from Data	No Formal education	426	18
		Primary	552	23
		Secondary	1253	52
		Tertiary	169	7
	Reference from National Population	Primary	35,432	
		Secondary	404,856	64.6
Tertiary		49600		
Employment Status	Unemployed	1088	45	
	Yes, Part time	265	11	
	Yes, Full time	1047	44	
N	Reference from Data	2400		
	Reference from National Population	31,072,940		

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/ghana-demographics/>

The profile of respondents selected for the study from Afrobarometer is quite synonymous to the overall demographics of the population of Ghana. The criteria for selection are from socio-demographic variables like gender, age, living condition, employment status, and educational level of 2400 respondents. On gender, there were 1197 males representing 49.9% and 1203 females denoting 50.1%, in essence, the females were 6 more than the males. According to World Population Review (2021), the total population of Ghanaians living in the country as of 2021 is 31.5 million (31,531,996) people with 2.15% growth rate and ranked as the 47<sup>th</sup> most populous country in the world. The rise in population is attributed to the high fertility rate of 3.89 births per woman together with the country's measures to reduce mortality rate amongst its citizens. The gender dichotomy of the population as it stands now is 16 million (16,090,599) males and 15.5 million (15,536,866) females both denoting 50.9% and 49.1% respectively. Even though, from our data the number of females were 6 more than the males, it does not overwrite the fact that when two people are randomly chosen in Ghana, there will be a probability that one will be a male and the other a female.

On age distribution, the least age of the respondents was 18 years, the highest was 98 years with the average age been 38 years. The majority of the respondents were between the age range of 18-30 years with a frequency of 915 denoting 40.8%, followed by respondents within the age range of 31-40 years with the total number of 557 representing 23.2%, next was the respondents between the age range of 41-50 years with a frequency of 380 denoting 15.9%, then the age range of respondents between 51-60 were in total 296 denoting 10.6% and lastly respondents who more than 60 years had a frequency of 255 representing 9.5% of the total population. Statistics of age distribution of the Ghanaian population from World Population Review (2021), shows that the majority of Ghanaians are below the age 15 years representing 37.44% of the population and depicts that the country has a growing and youth population. The second largest group of citizens are between the age range of 25-54 years denoting 34.27%, followed by citizens between the age group of 15-24 years denoting 18.64% and the minority of the citizens are the group of citizens whose ages are more than 65 years, and they represent 4.44% of the total population. The total median age is 21.4 years; 21 years for males and 21.9 years for females. The median age is lower in the national population than the age for the respondents used in the data for the study because Afrobarometer selected respondents who were 18 year and above whereas the national population included citizens who 18 years or below.

The living conditions of the respondents were divided into three categories. The total number 1375 as the majority of respondents denoting 57% who said that their living condition was bad followed by 893 respondents denoting 37% also said that their living condition was good and the remaining 132 respondents denoting 6% said that their living condition was neither good nor bad. The total dependency ratio in Ghana is 67.4%, the majority is within the youth dependency which is 62.2% and is less amongst elderly dependency ratio which is 5.3%. The rate of dependency explains the fact that there is high rise in urban migration in the country. The urban population of the country is 57% constantly rising at the rate 3.34% annually (World Population Review, 2021). Living conditions of the citizens concatenated with their employment status, educational level, age, and the political economy. Unlike Europeans societies, Ghana and most developing countries have citizens who start life at a later stage in life. The average Ghanaian will own a house or buy a car at the age of 35-40 years, whereas in other developed countries due to effective and efficient structures that have been instituted, a citizen at the age of 18 can take loan to buy an apartment or car to start life with. But most Ghanaians live in houses with their spouses, children, parents, and other relations. At the family level, they are already competing for the limited amenities they share at home and then this lifestyle is transfer to the society. The World Population Review (2021) identified Accra (the Capital city of Ghana) and Kumasi (the second largest city) as the two most populous cities with highest rates of rural-urban migration. Both cities accommodate 1,963,264 and 1,468,609 people, respectively. The dominant factor of poor living condition is poverty which results in the inability to provide basic living essentials like food, clothing, shelter and medical needs.

On the level of education, most of the respondents with a total number of 1253 ( 53%) had Secondary education, followed by 552 respondents (23%) who had Primary education, next, 426 of the respondents denoting 18 percent had no formal education and the remaining 169 respondents denoting 7 percent had Tertiary education. The educational system in Ghana is divided into three categories: primary education, secondary education and tertiary education. The duration for primary education is 12 years, secondary education is 3 years and tertiary education is usually 3 or 4 years depending on the student's area of study. The primary mode of communication in the Ghanaian educational system is English language. The statistics of the respondents show that the majority have secondary level education, and this is reflective of the national population statistics. According to Statista<sup>4</sup> (2020), as of 2019 a total of

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.statista.com/search/?q=Ghana&qKat=search>

404,856 students denoting 64.6 percent were enrolled in secondary schools. In 2017, the government launched its free Senior High School (SHS) policy to enable Ghanaians' access to free tuition at the secondary education level. The number of unenrolled children in primary schools are 35,432 and the number of students at the tertiary level are 49600 (*Ibid*). Since 2010, Ghana has made impressive progress in giving more school-going age citizens access to education.

On employment status, most of the respondents were unemployed with a total number of 1088 (45%), followed by 1047 respondents denoting 44 percent are employed full time and the remaining 265 denoting 11 percent are engaged in a part time employment. According to Statista (2021), in 2020 the unemployment rate in Ghana is more than the worldwide unemployment rate. However, the unemployment rate from 2010 to 2020 has decreased from 5.9 to 5.4 percent. Amongst the employed citizens, the majority of them are engaged in services denoting 49 percent, followed by 29 percent who are engaged in agriculture and the remaining 22 percent are engaged in industry (*Ibid*).

### **3.2.4 Data Analysis and Interpretation**

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for running the univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses of the variables. The analysis involved descriptive statistics for both dependent and independent variables in the form of frequencies, mean, standard deviation and percentile distributions. The study also includes a multiple regression analysis to ascertain the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable which is citizens' trust in political institutions.

### **3.3 Quality of Research**

Yin (2003), pinpoints four quality tests used in quantitative study, which are, construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (p. 35). Validity primarily highlights the credibility and authenticity of the data and how the research problem can be addressed by the research design. Reliability check is necessary for proving that an accurate

and dependable approach was used in carrying out the research and hence the findings of the studies can be replicated by a different researcher (*Ibid*).

Data from Afrobarometer can be trusted because of its long operation and experience. It has been in operation since 1999 and has had eight (8) successive rounds of survey covering 37 African countries. It is a non-partisan research institution which undertakes surveys on citizens attitudes towards democracy, governance, the economy, and the society at large. The institution has notable African political researchers such as E. Gyimah-Boadi as the chairman of the board, and Dr. Michael Bratton and Dr. Robert Mattes as part of the co-founders (Afrobarometer,2020). Afrobarometer is a topnotch rank in providing high-quality data on perceptions of Africans.

The co-founders of Afrobarometer discussed in their book, *Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform*, the necessity to design and develop a research strategy that is adequate and essential in capturing data and portraying the African story as it is supposed to be and not necessarily superimposed research strategies that have been used in the Western world and other parts of the worlds on the African continent. After survey has been conducted, it undergoes rigorous checks. These checks help in threshing out wrong answers in order to avoid producing compromised data.

### **3.3.1 Construct Validity**

According to Yin (2014) construct validity is concerned with creating the right operational measures for the concepts that are being studied. My dependent variable, trust in political institutions, has been operationalized through the question “*How much do you trust each of the following, or have you not heard enough about them to say? {The President, Parliament, Local Government Council, and Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executives}*”. This is a standard question Afrobarometer asks and is like other databases such as the World Values Survey and Asian Barometer. This is a standardized question and hence characterized by robustness.

The independent variables however are a bit more complicated. The variables selected are based on cultural and institutional dimensions of institutional trust. On cultural perspective of institutional trust, the variables are social capital, and socio-demographic variables. Espinal,

Hartlyn and Morgan (2006); Sulemana and Issifu (2015); Jamil and Askvik (2015); Landmark (2016); Baniamin, Jamil and Askvik (2020), in their studies used variables like social capital and civic engagement to explore citizens' trust in public institutions. To measure socio-demographic variables, the study asked questions regarding age, gender, living conditions, level of education and employment status of the respondents. To measure social capital, the study asked questions regarding generalized trust and associationism based on Putnam's concept of trust. The questions regarding generalized trust were to ascertain whether the respondents did trust people from either their kindred or people outside their kindred like neighbors; Whether people can be easily trusted or not. On associationism, the study endeavored to measure the strength of the social networks of the respondents by asking questions like whether they attend a community meeting or not and whether they join others to raise an issue or not. As well as that of the variables under the performance-based approach as already stated in theoretical chapter of this study. In sum, the independent variables used in the study have all been tested and serve as an accurate measure for institutional trust.

### **3.3.2 Internal Validity**

Internal validity refers to “establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Yin, 2014:46). In this study, trust is a dependent variable and as such it is hypothesized by several factors discussed before. These are also the variables that have been used by others (Landmark, 2016; Mahmud, 2017). In this respect, combination of these variables has been used to explain citizens' trust in political institutions. Kim (2005b) demonstrated that social capital in the form of associationism has a negative effect on institutional trust. Nonetheless, researchers like Inglehart, (1990); Putnam, (1994); Fukuyama, (1995); Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) stated that higher associationism lead to higher trust in the government. Landmark (2016) identified socio-demographic variable like age to have a positive effect on trust in political institutions. Also, Christensen and Laegreid (2005) found a variable like level of education to have a positive effect on institutional trust. This study includes independent variables that have been causally attributable to measuring trust in institutions by several previous researchers, hence, the current study is expected to have high internal validity.



### **3.3.3 External Validity**

This validity ensures the extent to which the study can be generalized (Yin, 2003, p. 37). Quantitative analysis gives the advantage to generalize to the larger population. The sample size for the study is 2400 and it qualifies for large N studies and is well suitable for generalization. Afrobarometer uses a random sampling approach and there is proportional representation of data from different geographical locations. Also, quantitative analysis helps in hypothesis testing and verification of theories. The current study is a cross-sectional study, but majority of the previous studies on institutional trust were longitudinal (Christensen and Laegreid, 2005; Wang, 2006; Jamil and Askvik, 2015). Nevertheless, results of this study could be generalized to the larger population due to the representative nature of the sample size.

### **3.3.4 Reliability**

Reliability of a study is about how the findings of the study can be replicated by someone else other than the original researcher by following the methods used in the previous study (Gibbert et al, 2008). According to Van Thiel (2014), the two components of a research necessary for reliability is accuracy and consistency. Accuracy means that the appropriate tools were used for data collection and consistency ensures that the same methodology will produce the similar results by different researchers. The variables used in the study have an appreciable amount of consistency as they have been used in previous studies (Christensen and Laegreid, 2005; Espinal, Hartlyn, and Morgan, 2006; Jamil and Askvik, 2015; Sulemana and Issifu, 2015; Freitag and Ackermann, 2016; Landmark, 2016). Hence, these variables have been used, tested, and validated in different waves of surveys.

Moreover, Afrobarometer goes to great lengths to make sure that their data is reliable, and this is proved by their thorough process in developing the questionnaires, their data collection methods and training of their fieldworkers. For the survey itself to be reliable we need to know that the respondents would answer the questions the same way tomorrow as they do today (Midtbø, 2007). Their answers cannot be random and uncertain, and this can be avoided with clear questions and alternatives. The respondents need to understand fully what they are being asked and be sure of their answers. To assure this the questionnaires are developed through a process of careful testing with focus groups evaluating the core concepts and topics of the survey like democracy, corruption, and government. The questions are also

made as precise as possible to avoid many “do not know” answers. I therefore regard the data presented by Afrobarometer as reliable.

### **3.4 Ethical Considerations**

A commitment to observe ethical considerations in a research is as an important principle and process like data collection, analysis, and accurate interpretation of results. Afrobarometer is a credible organization that produces valid results and datasets. As a commitment to ensure ethical considerations, their interviewers are trained to that task. The participants selected voluntarily give their consent to partake in the exercise and are 18 years and above.

Interviewers sign forms of anonymity so that identities of respondents are never disclosed.

This is done by coding names of respondents as numbers making it impossible to track their whereabouts (Afrobarometer, 2020). Since this study is a secondary data analysis, there is little control I have over the data rather than to use it for purpose of the current study.

Further, all documentary sources are well cited to avoid misinterpreting them as my original ideas.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### A DESCRIPTIVE CHAPTER ON POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN GHANA

#### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter opens a detailed discussion on both the central level and local level political institutions used in the study.

#### 4.1 Ghana in Perspective

Ghana gained its independence from the British on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1957. Prior to the 1957 independence, Ghana was called Gold Coast because the first Europeans who arrived at the shores of the country found so much gold in rivers Ankobra and the Volta and they called the place Mina, which means Mine. This name was later changed to Gold Coast by the British colonizers who took over from the Portuguese. The first political party to be formed in Ghana (formerly known as Gold Coast) was the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947, which had a slogan of “self-government within the shortest possible time”<sup>5</sup>. Kwame Nkrumah, who was a secretary of UGCC, left the party and formed a new political party called Convention People’s Party (CPP) who had a vision to seek for self-governance now and not in the shortest possible time. The CPP were radical and embarked on non-violent protests, strikes and noncompliance with the British authorities. The founder, Kwame Nkrumah, was incarcerated for one year during this period. He was elected to parliament during the 1951 Gold Coast’s general election and was released from prison to assume the office of leader of government business<sup>6</sup>. He became the Prime Minister of Gold Coast in 1952 and help improve infrastructure and also create numerous jobs for the people. After a long struggle for self-reliance, at the midnight of 6<sup>th</sup> March 1957 Ghana gained independence and the territories were merged to form one sovereign country. Kwame Nkrumah became the first President of Ghana.

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<https://web.archive.org/web/20101215170543/http://ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/history/>

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<https://web.archive.org/web/20101215170543/http://ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/history/>

The republic of Ghana is a country in West Africa. It is the second populous country in West Africa after Nigeria with a population of over 31 million people and shares borders with Burkina Faso on the north, Togo in the east, the Ivory Coast in the west and the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean in the south. Ghana has an area size of about 238,535 km<sup>2</sup> (92,099 sq mi)<sup>7</sup>. The country currently has sixteen regions which are subdivided into 260 local districts assemblies. It is a multinational country comprise of different ethnic groups and religions<sup>8</sup>. About 71.2 percent of the population are Christian, 17.6 percent are Muslim, and 5.2 percent are traditional faith believers<sup>9</sup>. Ghana practices a multi-party system that is dominated by two political parties, which are; the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). It is a unitary constitutional democracy led by a president who performs the dual function of head of state and head of the government. The economic progress and advancement in democratic political system have widened Ghana's influence in Africa.

## **4.2 Political Institutions in Ghana**

The focus of the study is on four political institutions, which are: The President, Members of Parliament, Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executives and Local Government Council. This section contains discussions on all of the four political institutions in Ghana.

### **4.2.1 The President**

The President of the Republic of Ghana is elected through a presidential election which is organized every four years and acts as the head of state and head of government. The President equally performs the duty of the commander-in-chief of the Ghana Armed Forces. Since independence, Ghana has had only male presidents and they are elected using the two-round system. On December 7, the current President by name His Excellency (H.E.) Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo from the New Patriotic Party (NPP) was reelected into office. He

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<sup>7</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghana#cite\\_note-warriorking-10](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghana#cite_note-warriorking-10)

<sup>8</sup> [https://web.archive.org/web/20180424110616/http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/pop\\_stats.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20180424110616/http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/pop_stats.html)

<sup>9</sup> [https://web.archive.org/web/20180712212518/http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/2010p hc/National\\_Analytical\\_Report.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20180712212518/http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/2010p hc/National_Analytical_Report.pdf)

won the 2020 presidential election with a margin of 4.23 percent against Ex-President John Dramani Mahama, the flagbearer for National Democratic Congress (NDC) and fourteen other candidates from different political parties. The sitting President was sworn into office on 7<sup>th</sup> January 2021 for his last term for a period of four years.

### ***Eligibility for Presidency***

According to Chapter 8, Article 62 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, anyone who desires to occupy the seat of the President of Ghana must fulfill the following conditions:

- The person must be a citizen of Ghana by birth.
- The person must not be less than forty years.
- The person must be eligible to be elected as a Member of Parliament, except that the disqualifications stated in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of clause (2) of article 94 of the 1992 Constitution shall be maintained<sup>10</sup>.

Presidential aspirants must file a nomination form from the Electoral Commission (EC) and must be signed by a minimum of two registers voters in each district, together with the name of a potential vice president as the running mate. The Constitution grants the President a maximum of two terms, with each term lasting for four years. In instances like the death of the President, or resignation from office, impeachment, or life-threatening illness, the vice president will by default resume the duties of the president for the balance of the term. If the vice president resumes office before half of the president's tenure lapses, he or she is only permitted to run for one term in the next presidential elections. Lastly, in the absence of both the president and vice president, the Speaker of Parliament will fill in the gap as the acting president, and new presidential elections must be arranged latest by three months.

### **4.2.2 Duties of the President**

Chapter 8 of the 1992 Constitution captures the roles and powers of the President. The three mandatory duties of the President under the Constitution are: to defend the Constitution, exert executive authority and to ensure the conservation and security of Ghana. In addition, the

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<sup>10</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judiciary\\_of\\_Ghana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judiciary_of_Ghana)

President is given the power to; declare war, issue amnesties, exercise the authority as head of the executive arm of government, act as the commander-in-chief of the military, organize referenda, when necessary, issue medals of honor of serviced to the country, and proclaim a state of emergency suspending all laws.

### **Overview of Presidents of Ghana (1960-2021)**

Table 4.1 (in the appendix) displays the list of all the people who have led Ghana whether as head of state, head of government or presidents. The first elections were held in 1960 which gave Ghana its first president, Kwame Nkrumah. The country under the Nkrumah government introduced a one-party system. On 24<sup>th</sup> February 1966, Joseph Ankrah led a military coup under the flagbearer ship of National Liberation Council (NLC) against the democratic Convention People's Party (CPP) led by Kwame Nkrumah. This coup collapsed the democratic government and forced Ghana into a second republic. A symbolic feature of the second republic is that there were no elections held for the leaders of the country during that era.

After 3 years and 39 days of the National Liberation Council (NLC) been in government, it was overthrown by Akwasi Afrifa on 2<sup>nd</sup> April who was a right-hand man to Joseph Ankrah. The reason for the coup and apparently that is the prime reason for all the coups was that incumbent government misappropriate state resources and also do not perform to the expectations of the citizens. After 1 year and 126 days, National Liberation Council led by Akwasi Afrifa then, handed over to civilian government on 7<sup>th</sup> August 1970 to Nii Amaa Ollenu. Nii Amaa Ollenu was independent (had no political party) and he was the third head of state in the second republic. He led the country for 24 days as the shortest time in office in the history of the country and handed over to Edward Akuffo-Addo. Edward Akuffo-Addo was a lawyer and founding member of the first political party in the struggle for independence for the country, which was United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and father of Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, a president in the fourth republic of Ghana. On 31<sup>st</sup> August 1970, Edward Akuffo-Addo assumed the office as the head of state of the nation as an independent for the next 1 year and 134 days. The economy was crushing and sinking and on 13<sup>th</sup> January 1972, Ignatius Acheampong led the second military coup on the ticket of Supreme Military Council (SMC). He was in office for the next 6 years and 174 days and

was overthrown through a military coup by his then right-hand man Fred Akuffo on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1978.

On 4<sup>th</sup> June 1979, a junior military officer called Jerry John Rawlings led a military coup on the ticket of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) against Fred Akuffo's Supreme Military Council (SMC) government, which ushered the country into the third republic. After 112 days, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) made provisions for the taking over by a democratic government. Presidential elections were organized and Hilla Limann won on the ticket of People's National Party (PNP) on 24<sup>th</sup> September 1979. After been in office for 2 years and 98 days, Jerry John Rawlings overthrew the Limann government on 31<sup>st</sup> December 1981 on the ticket of Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). This action collapsed the third republic. Jerry John Rawlings was disappointed with the heightening of corruption in the Limann democratic government, and he knew the nation was heading in the wrong direction and needed to act very fast to save matters. The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) stayed in office the next 11 years and 7 days before the country was ushered into its fourth and current republic.

Jerry John Rawlings stepped down from military rule which led to the creation of the 1992 constitution which guides the fourth republic of the country. The Constitution makes provisions for periodic elections of every four years which allows a candidate to stay in power for a maximum of eight years. Jerry John Rawlings contested in the 1992 elections on the ticket of National Democratic Congress (NDC), where he won and became the first president of the fourth republic on 7<sup>th</sup> January 1993 and served two full terms of eight years. Another symbolic feature about the fourth republic is that all the Presidents who act as head of state and head of government all gain their legitimacy through a multiparty contested election. John Agyekum Kufour contested and won in the 2000 elections on the ticket of New Patriotic Party (NPP), where he served two full terms. The National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) are two most dominant parties in the fourth republic and has been alternating power. John Evans Atta-Mills won the 2008 elections on the ticket of National Democratic Congress. Unfortunately, his tenure was marked by ill health, and he lost his life after 3 years and 199 days of been in office. He was the first president to die without serving his full term in office. His Vice, John Dramani Mahama, assumed office to complete the four-year term. On 2012, John Dramani Mahama won the elections on the ticket of National Democratic Congress (NDC), which also marked his first term as President in office. The results of the elections were contested in court because the New Patriotic Party

alleged that the results were rigged and according to their projections, they were the ones to have won the elections. They lost the case in court after months of deliberations. In the 2016 elections, John Dramani Mahama lost to Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo of the NPP. This was the first time that an incumbent government lost an election which could have led to its second term. The Mahama administration lost the elections because of the numerous corruption cases that his government were involved in. Moreover, during his tenure the country was struck with many economic crises, unemployment rate increased, electricity power shortages increased, and many investors left the country. Nana Akufo-Addo also won the 2020 elections which mark his final term in office.

### **4.2.3 Members of Parliament**

#### *History of Parliamentary system in Ghana*<sup>11</sup>

As early as 1850, during the Gold Coast era, the country had its own Legislative Council purposely to admonish the British Governor in making laws in the form of ordinances. The Legislative Council was reformed in 1916 which comprised of nine new members, six of which were Africans. The first elections for the Legislative Council happened in 1925 under the Guggisberg Constitution. The power of governor did not change under the new provision. A new constitution was introduced in 1946 which permitted a person outside the Legislative Council to become its president. This system remained till 1951 when Sir Emmanuel Charles Quist was elected as its first Speaker. In the same year, election based on universal suffrage was introduced in the country. Nkrumah led Convention People's Party (CPP) won the elections in that year against United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) led by J.B. Danquah.

In addition, Convention People's Party won 71 out of 104 seats in the Legislative Assembly elections organized in 1954 and 1956. The Legislative Assembly was renamed as National Assembly when the country gained independence in 1957 and changed its name from Gold Coast to Ghana. Ghana officially became a republic on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1960 after the approval of the republican constitution. A five-year term of office for National Assembly members was introduced after the approval of the citizens through a plebiscite. Interestingly, through threats and harsh clauses, CPP advocated for a one-party system which was approved in a

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<sup>11</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament\\_of\\_Ghana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_Ghana)



referendum in 1964. As such only CPP candidates were permitted to contest for the National Assembly Election held in 1965. A military coup was staged in 1966 which overthrew the Nkrumah's CPP and dissolved the National Assembly.

In 1969, the country was back under a civilian rule and the elections held in that year resulted in Kofi Abrefa Busia emerged as the winner of 105 seats out of 140 seats under the ticket of Progress Party (PP). He became Prime Minister on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1969, but everything was disrupted by the 1972 military coup.

The country returned to a civilian rule in 1979 which marked the third republic. Hilla Limann won 71 out of the 104 seats on 18<sup>th</sup> June 1979. However, this republic like the previous republics was short lived after a military coup in 1981 that dissolved the democratic government and halted all political party activities.

### ***Parliament of the Fourth Republic***

A new constitution was approved in 1992 through a referendum which marked the end of an 11-year military rule by the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) after the dissolution of the third republic. Controversies emerged after the Presidential elections in November which led to other political parties excluding themselves from the December parliamentary elections. Hence, the National Democratic Congress won 189 out of the 200 parliamentary seats. When all the political parties actively competed in the 1996 parliamentary elections, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) won 133 out of the 200 seats making them the majority in parliament for the second time. There was a baton change in the 2000 elections. John Agyekum Kufuor contested on the ticket of NPP and won against the new presidential candidate of the NDC, John Atta Mills at the run-off stage. Elections in Ghana entered into the run-off stage when after the first round no political party was able to accrue fifty percent plus one vote of the total casted ballots. Out of the 200 parliamentary seats, NPP won 100, NDC also won 92 and the remaining 8 seats were won by independent candidates. During the Kufuor's administration, the number of parliamentary seats were increased from 200 to 230. NPP won 128 seats, NDC won 94 whereas two other political parties which were the People's National Convention (PNC) won 4 seats and Convention People's Party (CPP) won 3 seats, during the 2004 parliamentary elections. In 2012 during

the Atta Mills administration the number of parliamentary seats were increased from 230 to 275 and like the presidential term of office, parliamentarians also spend a term of four years.

### ***Leadership Structure at the Parliament***

#### *Speaker*

The speaker of Parliament oversees the proceedings of the parliament and strict adherence to constitutional rules and regulations at the parliament. The party with the highest number of parliamentary seats are regarded as the majority in parliament. The majority lead the consultation and a speaker is chosen for the house. The constitution requires that the speaker should not be a member of parliament at the time of his or her ascension to the seat but must renounce their parliamentary seat if they are currently serving as a Member of Parliament. Nevertheless, the candidate should be eligible for the position of a member of parliament before can be selected as the Speaker. The speaker is supported by first deputy and second deputy speakers who are selected from different political parties in the house.

#### *First Deputy Speaker*

He or she manages affairs in the absence of the Speaker.

#### *Second Deputy Speaker*

He or she manages affairs in the absence of the Speaker and first deputy speaker.

#### *Majority Leader*

He or she is selected from the party with the highest number of seats in the parliament and is supported by a deputy majority leader and a majority chief whip.

#### *Minority leader*

He or she is selected from the party with the second highest number of seats and its equally supported by a deputy minority leader and a minority chief whip.

#### **4.2.4 Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executives**

##### **History of Districts in Ghana<sup>12</sup>**

There are 260 districts in Ghana, and these are referred to as second-level administrative subdivisions in the country. In the year 1988 and 1989, measures were put in place to enhance economic, social and political progress by decentralizing government through restructuring districts in the country. The then 10 regions of Ghana were categorized into 110 different districts where local district handled affairs related to local administration. This number increased to 138 districts with the addition of 28 districts in 2006 (Ayee, 2012). In 2012, a major reformation took place and on 28<sup>th</sup> June 2012 the total number of districts were increased to 216 districts. There are three types of districts in Ghana, which are ordinary districts, municipalities, and metropolises (*Ibid*). Ordinary Districts are the smallest with a total number of not less than seventy-five thousand people. Municipalities are bigger than ordinary districts with a population of not less than ninety-five thousand people. And finally, metropolises are the biggest with a minimum population of two hundred thousand people.

##### ***Governance and Administration<sup>13</sup>***

###### *District Assemblies*

Districts are under the mandates of District Assemblies which are set up by the Minister of Local Government, and functions as the apex of political authority in each district that they represent. They are made up of the District Chief Executive, who is an appointee of the president, one representative from every electoral area within the district through elections, the member(s) of parliament whose constituencies are within the District Assembly, and finally, less than thirty percent of the total number of people at the Assembly are selected by the President in deliberation with the local authorities.

###### *District Chief Executive*

The President appoints the District Chief Executive (DCE) who acts as a delegate from the central government. The District Chief Executive steers the day-to-day activities of the District Assembly.

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<sup>12</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Districts\\_of\\_Ghana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Districts_of_Ghana)

<sup>13</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Districts\\_of\\_Ghana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Districts_of_Ghana)

### *Executive Committee*

This committee comprises of the District Chief Executive as the chairperson and other sub-committees who are responsible for administering the District Assembly.

### *Presiding Member*

A presiding member is selected from every District Assembly who coordinates and supervises meetings at the District Assembly.

### *Functions of District Assemblies*

The function of the District Assemblies is to promote local economic advancement. The Local Government Act of 2016<sup>14</sup> assign District Assemblies to perform duties such as:

- Drawing plans and programs for efficient organization of resources that will lead to the advancement of the District Assembly.
- Provide scholarships to students to attain the level of education that can improve the district in sectors like healthy care by producing more health workers and in the education by producing more teachers.
- Formulate policies that will lead to infrastructural developments in the district.
- Taking away legislative hindrances by making courts accessible to the members of the district.
- Ensuring peace and security in the district by liaising with national and local security agencies.
- Overseeing and improving human settlements at the district levels.

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<sup>14</sup> <http://lgs.gov.gh/index.php/2017/01/25/local-governance-act-of-2016-act-936/>

#### **4.2.5 Local Government Council**

The Local Government Council is a state-owned institution that was formed by the Local Government Service Act, 2003 (Act 656) which has recently been substituted by the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936)<sup>15</sup>. The mandate of the service is to ensure that the local government system in the country function effectively. The council fulfils this duty by undertaking the following measures:

- Assisting the Metropolitan, Municipal, District Assemblies (MMDAs) with technical support
- Assisting the MMDAs with organizational and job analysis.
- Building structures and processes for MMDAs.
- Assisting MMDAs in other means to ensure that they execute their activities productively.

#### **4.3 Summary of the chapter**

This chapter was designated for depicting a detailed description of the four political institutions understudy and the premise for their legitimacy under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

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<sup>15</sup> <http://lgs.gov.gh/index.php/about-us/>

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DATA ANALYSIS

#### 5.0 Introduction

The chapter presents a descriptive statistics and percentile distribution of the dependent variable (citizens' trust in political institutions in Ghana) and the independent variables.

#### 5.1 Descriptive Findings of Dependent Variable: Trust in Political Institutions in Ghana

The study operationalized citizens' trust in political institutions by creating a trust index of citizens' trust in their President, Members of Parliament, Local Government Council and Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief Executive. The descriptive statistics includes all the values for each measure as well as the combined average for citizens' trust in political institutions. The trust index is divided into low trust and high trust. Low trust includes citizens' response between "not at all" to "just a little" trust in political institutions, whereas high trust consists of respondents' answers between "somewhat" to "a lot" of trust in political institutions. But for the study to be concise and precise only figures for high trust, and mean are presented in Table 5.1.

**Table 5. 1** Descriptive Statistics and Percentile Distribution for trust in Political Institutions.

<b>Political Institutions</b>	<b>Percentile Distribution (High Trust = Somewhat + A lot of trust)</b>	<b>Mean</b>
President	61%	2.76
Parliament/National Assembly	46%	2.31
Local Government Council	41%	2.29
Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive	38%	2.14
<b>Trust Index</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>2.38</b>
<b>Valid N</b>	<b>2400</b>	

Note 1: **Q: How much do you trust each of the following, or have you not heard enough about them to say?** 1)The President 2) Parliament/National Assembly 3) Local Government Council 4) Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive

Note 2: The percentages are rounded up.

Note 3: *Minimum value (1) and Maximum value (4)*

Note 4: *Low Trust = Not at all (1) and Just a little (2)*

Note 5: *High Trust = Somewhat (3) and A lot (4)*

Table 5.1 depicts the descriptive statistics of trust index amongst the various political institutions with the average value of the overall trust index as **2.38** denoted by **32 percent** of high trust from the respondents. The political institutions with mean values below 2.38 signify that the citizens have low trust in those institutions, whereas institutions with higher mean values than 2.38 are seen as citizens displaying high trust in those institutions. The table shows that the President, attracts more trust than the Parliament/National Assembly, Local Government Council, and Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive. This result reflects on the phenomenon of ‘Big Man Rule’ explained by Goran Hyden (2013), in his book “African Politics in Contemporary Perspectives”, where he described the political culture in Africa has been a personalistic rule. He describes the relationship of the source of power of the leaders over the people to thrive on personal reciprocities or clientelism.

Amongst the four political institutions, the President had the highest level of trust with an average trust value of **2.76** denoting **61 percent** of high trust. One of the reasons for the high trust in the President than the other institutions is because of the charismatic nature of African heads of states inclusive of Ghana. Also, the President is seen as the father of the land and the face of the government in power. So, for the citizens to vote for a particular political party, they believe that the President will ensure that their welfare and needs are always met. The respondents have less than 50 percent trust in the other institutions because unlike the President, they do not have a human face and are rather recognized as formal institutions who are paid with tax-payers money to perform their duties. This is evident in the following results: **46 percent** of the respondents have high trust in the Parliament/National Assembly with an average of **2.31**. Followed by **41 percent** and **38 percent** in both Local Government Council and Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief Executive, with a respective average trust value of **2.29** and **2.14**.

## 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables

### 5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics for Input Legitimacy variables

**Table 5. 2 Showing the descriptive statistics for input Legitimacy Variable.**

Input Legitimacy	Categories	Percentages (%)
Democratic satisfaction	Not at all satisfied	3
	Unsatisfied	32
	Fairly satisfied	39
	Very satisfied	26
	Mean value	2.76
<b>N</b>	<b>2400</b>	

*Note 1 Q: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ghana? Are you: Scale; Very satisfied (4), Fairly satisfied (3), Not very satisfied (2), Not at all satisfied (1).*

#### **Democratic Satisfaction.**

The descriptive statistics in Table 5.2 depicts a mean value of 2.76 which is seen as most of the citizens are fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in the country denoted by 39 percent. Followed by 32 percent who are unsatisfied. However, 26 percent of the respondents say that they are very satisfied with the way democracy works. One of the reasons for this answer might be the respondent is demonstrating party loyalty. In Ghana, every activity is viewed through the lens of partisan affiliations. And this creates a hollow effect on the party members. They consider every action of the government as right in spite of how obvious the error might be they will still stand their grounds to defend the image of their political party. Lastly, 3 percent of the respondents say that the country is not a democracy.

The citizens are gradually giving up on the government and the political institutions because they only give promises and never fulfill them when they are elected to power. Prior to the present fourth republic of Ghana, the previous democracies were disrupted by military interventions because the actions of elected representatives were driven by self-interests and difficulty in delaying gratification by approving policies that were detrimental to the growth and development of the country for years to come (McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah (1994)).



An example is giving license to foreigners to practice small scale mining also known as ‘galamsey’ in the Ghanaian parlance. These foreign investors use machines and chemicals that make the soil infertile and also dig underground holes that make the land prone to natural disasters like earthquakes. This is one of the hottest debating issues in the country and the government can only do little to resolve the situation because it has been alleged that they have taken lumps of money in the form of bribery from these investors, and hence cannot properly regulate their activities. It is a commonplace in Ghana now that the citizens jokingly or sometimes seriously suggest that the country go under military rule because the government and the political institutions keep disappointing them. In other words, people complain that democracy is not functioning the way it should have.

### 5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics for Throughput Legitimacy

The variables under throughput legitimacy are corruption and transparency.

#### Corruption

**Table 5. 3:** Showing the descriptive statistics for Corruption.

Corruption Variable	Mean	Percentile distribution of categories (%)				
		None	Some of them	Most of them	All of them	Total
Members of Parliament	2.41	5	59	25	11	100
Office of the Presidency	2.35	9	59	21	11	100
Your Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive	2.34	6	63	22	9	100
Local Government Council	2.25	9	66	18	7	100
Overall	2.34					
<b>N</b>	<b>2400</b>					

*Note 1: Q: “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or have you not heard enough about them to say? [Answers; The President and Officials in his office (A),*

*Members of Parliament (B), Local Government Councilors (C), Your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief Executive (D)].*

*Note 2: Scale; (None {1}, Some of them {2}, Most of them {3}, All of them {4})*

*Note 3: Minimum value (1) and Maximum value (4).*

The first throughput legitimacy variable to be discussed is the level of corruption amongst political institutions. The corruption indicator was on perceived corruption amongst various institution. An additive index was created by taking the average of mean values of the variables. The overall index mean for corruption is **2.34** which suggests that institutions with mean values higher than this value are very corrupt, whereas institutions with mean values lower than 2.34 means that they are less corrupt.

The most corrupt political institution was the Members of the Parliament with a mean score of 2.41. About 59 percent of the respondents think that some of them are corrupt, 25 percent also think that most of them are corrupt, followed by 11 percent who think that all the Members of Parliament are corrupt, and the remaining 5 percent think that none of them are corrupt. One of the reasons for attributing high levels of corruption with Members of Parliament is because in Ghana, Members of Parliament are assigned ministerial positions. And often issues relating to embezzlement of state funds and resource are linked to the ministers, who at the same time are Members of Parliament. Constant bashing of Members of Parliament on radio shows and television programs create an impression on the citizens. Therefore, it becomes easier to point fingers at the Members of Parliament and the office of the Presidency when one talks about corruption in Ghana.

The office of the Presidency was rated as the second most corrupt political institution with a mean value of 2.35. Most of the respondents denoting 59 percent expressed that some of the people at the office of the Presidency are corrupt. Further, 21 percent of the respondents expressed that most of them are corrupt followed by 11 percent who claimed that all of them are corrupt. Lastly, 9 percent of the respondents claimed that none at the office of the Presidency is corrupt.

The local level institutions were rated as less corrupt compared to the central level institutions. The reason is that anytime the issue of corruption comes up in a discourse, people want a face to associate it with or someone to blame for the deeds. Thus, the more formalized and less political an institution is, the less corrupt it appears to be. Moreover, these local offices stand near to people and people communicate with these institutions on a regular basis. These make these institutions more transparent and open. Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive had an average value of 2.34. Most of the respondents

representing 63 percent said that some of them are corrupt, 22 percent also said that most of them are corrupt, followed by 9 percent who said that all of them are corrupt and lastly, 6 percent said that none of them are corrupt. The mean value for Local Government Council was 2.25 which is perceived as the least corrupt political institution. Most of the respondents denoting 66 percent expressed that some of them are corrupt, followed by 18 percent who expressed that most of them are corrupt, next, 9 percent expressed that none of them are corrupt, and lastly, 7 percent expressed that all of them are corrupt.

## Transparency

**Table 5. 4:** showing descriptive statistics for transparency.

Transparency variable	Mean	Percentile distribution of categories (%)				Total
		Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	
Politicians and Political parties	3.08	5	10	58	27	100
Social media users	3.04	3	8	70	19	100
Government officials	2.86	8	15	60	17	100
News media and journalists	2.84	6	16	66	12	100
Activists and interest groups	2.83	6	15	69	10	100
Index	2.93					
<b>N</b>	<b>2400</b>					

*Note 1: Q: 'Please tell me how often, in this country, you think people from each of the following groups spread information that they know is false? Government Officials (A), Politicians and political parties (B), News media and journalists (C), Social media users (D), Activists and interest groups (E).*

*Note 2: Scale; Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4).*

*Note 3: Minimum value (1) and Maximum value (4).*

The second throughput legitimacy variable to be discussed is transparency. The mean for the transparency index is **2.93** which suggests that groups with mean values higher than this are perceived as spreading false news that they know to be false, whereas the groups with a mean value less than 2.93 are perceived as spreading less fake news. Most of the people suggests

that politicians and political parties are the group of people who often spread false news in the country with a mean value of **3.08**. Out of which 58 percent of the respondents indicated that they sometimes spread false news, followed by 27 percent who also stated that they often spread false news, next, 10 percent expressed that they rarely spread false news and lastly, 5 percent expressed that they rarely spread false news. This is because they are the group that represent the face of the government and are frequently invited on talk shows for discussions. When politicians or members of an incumbent political party are invited to either television or radio program, in order to make their government popular they mostly say impressive things about their government even when they know it is impossible for them to accomplish the things they say. Whereas, when politicians or members of political parties who are in opposition are equally invited on these platforms, for the sake of propaganda and also to make the government of the day unpopular among the citizens, they sometimes say wrong allegations against the government and the political institutions to discredit them.

The second group perceived as spreading false news is social media users with a mean value of **3.04**. Most of the respondents representing 70 percent indicated that social media users sometimes spread false news, followed by 19 percent who think that they often spread false news, next, 8 percent stated that social media users rarely spread false news, and lastly, 3 percent of the respondents claimed that social media users never spread false news. Some of the examples of social media platforms for disseminating information about the government and political institutions are Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Tiktok, and many others. The president and most of the politicians have verified accounts on these platforms where they share their views on issues. Apparently, this is the most commonly used medium of information dissemination amongst the youth in Ghana. A lot of people share fake news on these platforms, sometimes it is either they hack into the profile of these public figures to post fake stories, or they would rather impersonate these people. The remaining groups are perceived as spreading less false news to the public.

The third group ranked to spread false news are government officials with a mean value of 2.86. Out of which 60 percent of the respondents expressed that they sometimes spread false news, 17 percent expressed that government officials often spread false news, followed by 15 percent who stated that government official rarely spread false news, and the remaining 8 percent claimed that government officials never spread false news.

The fourth group ranked to spread false news is the news media and journalist with a mean value of 2.84. Most of the respondents denoting 66 percent declared that sometimes news media and journalists spread false news, followed by 16 percent who declared that they rarely

spread false news, next, 12 percent expressed that they often spread false news, and lastly, 6 percent disclosed that news media and journalists never spread false news. The reason for the low mean score is that the citizens deem the news media and journalists as professionals who are apolitical and hence act neutral, therefore, they trust them to deliver credible information at all times.

The last group which are perceived as the least group to spread false information about the government and political institutions are activists and interest groups with a mean value of **2.83**. About 69 percent of the respondents indicated that activists and interest groups sometimes spread false news, further, 15 percent expressed that they rarely spread false news, followed by 10 percent who stated that they often spread false news, and the remaining stated that they never spread false news. The reason why they are rated as the lowest in this category is because activists and interest groups in Ghana are very dormant and very little is heard of them on the daily basis.

### **5.2.3. Descriptive Statistics of Output Legitimacy**

#### **Performance**

The only output legitimacy variable in the study is performance. The performance variable was used in the study to ascertain how the performance of political institutions in Ghana can affect the level of trust that citizens' place in these political institutions. The performance indicator was made of two variables, the perception of the performance of the various political institutions and policy performance of the government.

## Institutional Performance

**Table 5. 5:** showing descriptive statistics for institutional performance. Only Strongly Agree + Agree are presented.

Output Legitimacy	Strongly Agree + Agree (%)	Mean
<i>Institutional Performance Variable</i>		
President	64	2.70
Local Government Council	42	2.30
Members of Parliament	38	2.22
Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive	34	2.18
<b><i>Institutional performance overall index (Disapprove-Approve)</i></b>		<b>2.35</b>
<b><i>N</i></b>	<b>2400</b>	

*Note 1: Q; Do you approve or disapprove the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past year, or have you not heard enough about them to say? (President (A), Members of Parliament (B), Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive (C), Local Government (D)).*

*Note 2: Scale; Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Neither Agree nor Disagree (3), Agree (4), Strongly Agree (5)*

*Note 3: Agree column in Table 5.5 is a composite of "Agree" and "Strongly Agree" responses*

*Note 4: Minimum value (1) and Maximum value (5).*

The mean value of the overall performance index of the various political institutions was **2.35**. This suggests that the citizens disapprove of the performance of institutions which have mean values less than 2.35 but approve of institutions which have higher mean values. From Table 5.5, only the President has a mean higher than the mean of the overall index.

Among the political institutions, most of the respondents representing **64 percent** approved of the performance of the office of the Presidency indicated by a mean value of **2.70**, Followed by **42 percent** of the respondents who approved of the performance of the Local Government Councilor indicated with an average value of **2.30** and then **38 percent** of respondents approved of the performance of the Members of Parliament which was denoted by a mean value of **2.22**. The political institution that the citizens highly disapproved of their performance was the Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive represented by **34 percent** of the respondents with a mean value of **2.18**. The reason is that Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executives are the least popular political institution in Ghana, even though they are the closest to the citizens in terms of proximity. But they get little attention on social media, radio, or television either for good or bad deeds Therefore, most of the citizens hardly ever know what they represent or do.

## Policy Performance

Policy performance denotes how well the government has addressed some core issues of governance. These are presented in the following table.

**Table 5. 6: Showing descriptive statistics for Policy Performance. Only Strongly Agree + Agree are presented**

<b>Output Legitimacy</b>	<b>Strongly agree + Agree (%)</b>	<b>Mean</b>
<i>Policy Performance Variable</i>		
<i>Performing well (above 50%)</i>		
Addressing Educational needs	74	2.91
Providing reliable electric supply	69	2.77
Protecting rights and promotion of opportunities for disabled people	67	2.63
Improving Basic Health Services	64	2.59
Preventing or resolving violent community conflict	61	2.56
Providing Water and Sanitation Services	58	2.50
Managing the Economy	56	2.41
Addressing needs of young people	51	2.33
<i>Performing poorly (below 50%)</i>		
Reducing Crime	47	2.26
Creating Jobs	47	2.25
Improving living standards of the Poor	44	2.21
Fighting Corruption	45	2.20
Maintaining roads and bridges	41	2.12
Keeping Prices stable	33	2.01
Narrowing Income gaps	34	2.00
<b><i>Policy performance index (Poor-Better)</i></b>		<b>2.38</b>

Note 1: Q; How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or have you not heard enough to say?

Note 2: Answers; Handling managing the economy (A), Handling improving living standards of the poor (B), Handling creating jobs (C), Handling keeping prices stable (D), Handling narrowing income gaps (E), Handling reducing crime (F), Handling improving basic health services (G), Handling addressing educational needs (H), Handling providing water and sanitation services (I), Handling fighting corruption (J), Handling maintaining roads and bridges (K), Handling providing reliable electric supply (L), Handling preventing election violence (M), Handling preventing or resolving violent community conflict (N), Handling addressing needs of young people (O), Handling protecting rights, promoting opportunities for disabled (P)

Note 3: Scale; Very badly (1), Fairly badly (2), Fairly well (3), Very well (4)

Note 4: Agree column in Table 5.5 is a composite of "Agree" and "Strongly Agree" responses

Note 5: Minimum value (1) and Maximum value (4)

The overall mean value for policy performance is 2.38 and the assessment of the government's policy performance were categorized into two groups. Policies with more than 50 percent approval of the respondents were termed as performing well, while policies scoring less than 50 percent were termed as performing poorly. The highest score of the government on policy performance was on education. A total of 74 percent of the respondents affirmed that the government had done a great job with the state of education in the country. This is as a result of the implementation of the Free Senior High School policy in 2017. Poverty is one of the major reasons why school going-age children drop out from schools in Ghana and the government implementing this policy has helped reduce the rate of student dropouts and also lessen the financial burdens on parents to provide their children with secondary cycle education. This acceptance from the citizens was marked by a mean value of 2.91. Followed by an approval for providing reliable electric supply with a mean value of **2.77** represented by **69 percent** of the respondents. The major source of electricity in Ghana is hydroelectric power from the Aburi dam. In recent times the country has been experiencing series of power shortages which has led to the collapse of some companies and also scare away investors. This ordeal is popularly known as 'dumsor' in the Ghanaian parlance. The current government has put measures in place to ameliorate the situation. One of the pragmatic steps is to schedule power outages on a timetable for the citizens to prepare themselves ahead of time and also other measures including finding other sources of electricity supply. Even though the problem still persists in the country, the citizens appreciate the efforts of the government in resolving the power crisis.

Next, **67 percent** of the respondents agree that the government did well by protecting rights and promotion of opportunities for disabled people with a mean value of **2.63**, about **64 percent** of the respondents indicated that the government performed well in improving health services with a mean of **2.59**. The current government has made efforts to improve the health system in the country. Notable amongst them is the commissioning of 307 ambulances to be distributed to the 275 constituencies in fulfilment of its 2016 election campaign<sup>16</sup>. On the issue of preventing or resolving violent community conflict, **61 percent** stated that the government did well denoted by a mean value of **2.56**. Further, **58 percent** appreciated the government's efforts in providing water and sanitation services represented by a mean value of **2.50** followed by **56 percent** who approved of the way the government was managing the economy with a mean of **2.41**. Consequently, **51 percent** of the respondents acknowledged

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<sup>16</sup> <https://www.moh.gov.gh/president-akufo-addo-commissions-307-ambulances/>



that the government did well in addressing the needs of the youth with a mean score of **2.33**. The respondents assessed the government as performing poorly in handling the remaining matters which was denoted by scores less than 50 percent. With regards to reducing crime and creating jobs about 47 percent of the respondents agreed that the government did well with respective averages of **2.26** and **2.25**. The rising levels of unemployment rate in the country has led the people to indulge in dubious means to earn a living. Ritual killings are on the rise because people desire ‘get rich quick’ schemes and also series of reported armed robbery cases are all on the rise. Even though the world might regard Ghana to be a peaceful nation, it is often times unsafe to walk or drive in the night because you might either get robbed or killed in the process. Since this present government took over, there has been a number of unresolved killings involving journalists, Members of Parliament and civilians<sup>17</sup>. Also, in terms of improving living standards of the poor, **44 percent** of the respondents agreed that the government performed well with a mean value of **2.21**. On the issue of fighting corruption 45 percent of the respondents approved of the government’s performance denoted by a mean value of **2.20**. This current Akufo-Addo government is known for its popular campaign against corrupt practices in the public spaces. Meanwhile, after being elected to office, the government has been coupled with a number of fuliginous deals which have attracted public criticisms. Next, **41 percent** of the respondents acknowledged the government’s efforts in maintaining roads and bridges represented by a mean value of **2.12**. Road networks in the country are bad which leads to pressure on the few good roads causing traffic jams in the urban centers. Followed by **33 percent** of the respondents who were pleased with established measures at keeping prices stable and 34 percent of the respondents expressed that they were pleased with how the government is narrowing income gaps with respective means of **2.01** and **2.00**.

Indexes were created for both institutional performance and policy performance which are presented below;

**Table 5. 7** *Summary of the Descriptive Statistics for indexes of Output Legitimacy*

<b>Output Legitimacy</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>S.D.</b>
<i>Performance Variable</i>		
Institutional performance index (Disapprove-Approve)	<b>2.35</b>	0.721
Policy performance index (Poor-Better)	<b>2.38</b>	0.720

<sup>17</sup> <https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-06-18-the-journalist-who-was-shot-in-cold-blood/>

## 5.2.4 Descriptive Statistics for Social Capital

The variables under social capital are generalized trust and associationism which are used to measure the degree of citizens' trust in their political institutions.

### Generalized trust

**Table 5. 8** Descriptive statistics for Generalized trust

Generalized Trust	No (%)	Mean
Most people can be trusted	91	0.09

*Note 1: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people? Answers; most people can be trusted (1) and must be very careful (2).*

**Table 5. 9:** Descriptive statistics for Generalized trust

Generalized Trust	Mean	Percentile distribution of categories (%)				Total
		Not at all	Not very much	Sometimes	Completely	
Trust people from different religion	2.76	17	17	39	27	100
Trust people from different nationality	2.43	26	21	36	17	100

*Note 2: Could you tell me for each of the questions below whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all? Answers; people of another religion (1) and people of another nationality (2).*

*Scale; Not at all (1), Not very much (2), Sometimes (3), Completely (4).*

**Table 5. 10:** Descriptive statistics for Generalized trust

Generalized Trust	Yes (%)	Mean
People like you are accepted for who they are	83	3.97
People like you have a say in the country	76	3.82

*Note 3: To what extent do you agree with the following statements: People like you are accepted in Ghana for who you are (1) and People who share your ethnic, racial, or religious background have a say in the direction of the country.*

*Scale; Strongly disagree (1), Disagree (2), Neither disagree nor agree (3), Agree (4), Strongly Agree (5).*

The first social capital variable for the study is generalized trust as used by Landmark (2016) to measure the effect of social capital on institutional trust. From Table 5.8, when the survey asked about whether most people can be trusted, **91 percent** of the respondents unanimously said that most people cannot be trusted which was denoted by the mean score of **0.09**.

From Table 5.9, the majority represented by 39 percent sometimes trust people from different religion which is denoted by the average value of 2.76. Followed by 27 percent who completely trust people from different religion, next, both 17 percent of the respondents do not trust very much and do not trust at all people from different religion. Moreover, the majority represented by 36 percent indicated that they sometimes trust people from different nationality denoted by a mean value of 2.43. Also, 26 percent expressed that they do not trust people from different nationality at all, next, 21 percent do not very much trust people from different nationality, and the remaining 17 percent completely trust people from different nationality.

From Table 5.10, most of the respondents denoting 83 percent expressed that they agree that people like them are accepted for who they are and this was represented by the mean value of 3.97. Furthermore, 76 percent indicated that they have a say in the country with mean value of 3.82. This is representative of the country since Ghana is seen as a peaceful and tolerable country. Freedom House (2021) ranked Ghana at 82 out of 100 as a free country. Out of the 82 marks, the country scored 35 out of 50 for political rights and 42 out of 50 for civil liberties.

## Associationism

**Table 5. 11;** Show the descriptive statistics for Associationism.

Associationism	Yes (%)	Mean
Attend a community meeting	50	2.83
Join others to raise an issue	44	2.63
Attend a demonstration or protest march	15	1.65

*Note 1: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year.*

*Note 2: Scale: {If Yes, read}: Was it often (5), several times (4), once or twice (3)? {If No, read}: would if I had the chance (2) and would never do this (1)*

*Note 3: Attended a community meeting (A), Got together with others to raise an issue (B), Participated in a demonstration or protest march (C).*

The second social capital variable used in the study is associationism as used by Putnam (2000). The descriptive analysis in Table 5.11 shows that 50 percent of the respondents stated that they attend a community meeting once or twice which was indicated by a mean value of **2.83**. Similarly, 44 percent of the respondents expressed that they would join others to raise an issue once or twice as this was denoted by a mean value of **2.63**. Lastly, 15 percent of the respondents expressed that they would attend a demonstration or protest march if they had the chance, and this was indicated by the mean value of **1.65**.

## CHAPTER SIX

### MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS

#### 6.0 Introduction

In this chapter multivariate analysis are carried out through regression analyses (OLS) to determine causality between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable – citizens’ trust in political institutions. The study generated six (6) models; the first five (5) models were based on five independent variables and the last model is a cumulative structure of all the independent variables. . Results are presented in the table below.

#### 6.1 All Independent Variables Affecting Citizens’ Trust in Political institutions

The strongest model is model 6 which includes all the independent variables in one regression model. The model explains **34 percent** of the variation in citizens’ trust in political institution with an adjusted R squared of 0.341.

#### 6.2 Social Capital

In Table 6.1, the model 1 consists of generalized trust and associationism which are the social capital variables used in the study. Both generalized trust and associationism were found to be significant with respective standardized beta coefficients,  $\beta$ , values of **0.253 (p>0.001)** and **0.077 (p>0.001)**. This result suggests that when citizens generally trust people within or outside of their circle of influence and the more active citizens are in attending community meetings, the more trust they will have in their political institutions. Therefore, Putnam’s (1994) understanding of social capital on the premise of social networking through participating in voluntary organization in order to enhance trust finds support from the result of the analysis. The adjusted R squared of the model is 0.0365, i.e., and the model explains only **3.7 percent** of the total variation of citizens’ trust in political institutions. Moreover, analysis in ‘Model 6’ shows that both generalized trust and associationism have significant effect on citizens’ trust in political institutions.

To answer the research question ‘*does social capital variables have an effect on citizens’ trust in political institutions?*’, the findings from both ‘Model 1’ and ‘Model 6’ regression

analysis provide proofs that generalized trust and associationism have a significant effect on citizens trust in political institutions. The study expected that high generalized trust amongst citizens will lead to positive evaluation of political institutions. The standardized beta coefficients for generalized trust in ‘Model 6’ has a value of **0.169 (p>0.001)** which decreases when compared to its coefficient in ‘Model 1’. However, generalized trust is the strongest social capital variable which influences institutional trust in both models. The descriptive statistics indicate that most of the citizens expressed that people cannot be trusted. The positive coefficient of the generalized trust value in both Models 1 and 6 suggest that when generalized trust increases in the societies trust in institutions will equally increase. This finding is consistent with the results from Landmark (2016) studies on institutional trust. Jamil and Askvik (2015) study showed an inverse result where generalized trust had no effect on institutional trust.

Furthermore, associationism has a standardized beta coefficient of **0.086 (p>0.001)** in Model 6, which increases when compared to Model 1. The study predicted that high associationism in groups will generate higher institutional trust. Associationism has a positive coefficient which means that when there is an increase in social networks and voluntary activities amongst citizens, the level of trust in political institutions also increases. The descriptive statistics on associationism show that the citizens are willing to attend a community meeting or join others to raise an issue once or twice in a year. Therefore, the findings show that getting people to work in groups or engage in communal activities is one of the ways to increase institutional trust amongst citizens. The result is consistent with the findings from Jamil and Askvik (2015) and Mahmud (2017) studies which showed a significant effect of civic membership on institutional trust.

### **6.3 Input Legitimacy**

In Table 6.1, the ‘Model 2’ contains the regression analysis for democratic satisfaction as the variable for input legitimacy. Democratic satisfaction had a positive significant effect on citizens’ trust in political institutions with a standardized beta coefficient,  $\beta$ , value of **0.215 (p>0.001)**. This finding supports the hypothesis that the more satisfied the citizens are with the way democracy works in the country, their trust in political institutions will be increased. The adjusted R squared of the model is 0.0589 and it explains about **5.9 percent** of the total variation of citizens’ trust in political institutions. To answer the research question “*does*

*input legitimacy variable like democratic satisfaction have an effect on citizens' trust in political institutions?"* The standardized beta coefficient for democratic satisfaction in 'Model 6' of the same table is **0.081 (p>0.001)** which reduces when compared to 'Model 2'. Nonetheless, its effects in both models show a significant positive effect on the dependent variable, i.e., institutional trust. The study forecasted that high satisfaction of citizens with the way democracy works will lead to high trust in political institutions in the country. The descriptive statistics shows that the citizens are fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in the country. A positive beta coefficient suggests that when there is an improvement in the way democracy works in the form of free and fair elections, effective checks and balances on the various arms of government and the rights and freedoms of the people are fully enforced, the citizens' trust in political institutions will increase. Askvik (2008) study on institutional trust in South Africa reveals that citizens' satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country has a significant positive effect on institutional trust. Contrastingly, Landmark (2016) study on institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania reveals that democratic satisfaction has no effect on institutional trust.

Abdulai (2009) conducted a study on the 'political context study-Ghana'. He sought to delve into the degree of democratic unification in Ghana and to determine the salient economic and political actors that gradually built Ghana's elementary democratic processes. He noted that Ghana has made moderate but compelling advancement in democratic governance. Looking forward, in a region notable for political instability, conflicts and abuse of human rights, Ghana is outstanding in a positive way and can be seen as a reference point in democratic growth in Africa.

First, since the commencement of the fourth republic of Ghana in 1992, there has been eight successful Presidential and Parliamentary elections with three peaceful changes of government between the two dominant political parties, that is New Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC), and this is seen as an important milestone in the context of sub-Saharan Africa to practice free and fair elections for over 29 years. A country with a population of over 29 million people, Ghana is frequently ranked in the top three countries in Africa for freedom of speech and the press, with a vibrant broadcast media and radio is the widely used media for conveying information (World Bank 2018b).

Second, the enactment of the 1992 constitution included the protection and preservation of human rights and the establishment of checks and balances for institutions like Commission

for Human Rights and Administration Justice (CHRAJ) which has improved the respect for human rights and freedoms of all citizens. The Freedom House (2020) rates Ghana as free with an overall score of 82 (35 out of 40 for political rights and 47 out of 60 for civil rights).

Third, the democratic progress in Ghana is demonstrated in the complete change in the political environment, to allow non-state actors like civil society groups and the private sector to be active in and freely share their opinions on the growth and administration of the country by the government and the political institutions.

#### **6.4 Throughput Legitimacy**

In Table 6.1, 'Model 3' contains corruption and transparency variables represent throughput legitimacy used in the study. Both corruption and transparency had negative significant effects on citizens' trust in political institutions with respective beta coefficients,  $\beta$ , values of **-0.364 (p>0.001)** and **-0.114 (p>0.001)**. These findings support the hypotheses that when there is less corruption amongst the various political institutions, the citizens will increase their trust in them. Moreover, when citizens do not believe in false news propagated by political institutions, their (citizens') trust in the political institutions will be high. The model has an adjusted R squared of 0.0832 and it explains about **8.3 percent** of the total variation in citizens' trust in political institutions. A step forward into the analysis in the 'Model 6' helped in answering the research question "does throughput legitimacy variables like corruption and transparency influence citizens' trust in political institutions?"

There is a variance in the regression analysis in Model 3 and Model 6. Both corruption and transparency variables had significant effect on the dependent variable in Model 3 but when additional explanatory variables were added in Model 6, both variables showed an insignificant effect on the dependent variable. The study expected that less corruption amongst political institutions will increase citizens' trust. The descriptive statistics depicts that the respondents deem most of the political institutions to be corrupt. Further, the study anticipated that the citizens would increase the level of trust they have in political institutions when they deem information, they hear from them to be credible. The descriptive statistics reveals that sometimes the information they receive from these institutions are sometimes false. The regression results for throughput legitimacy variables like corruption and



transparency when combined with other explanatory variables show no effect on the dependent variable, institutional trust.

Corruption exists in all the sectors of the Ghanaian government. Political corruption still lingers around the various institutions in Ghana despite legal and institutional structures to curb it, through media coverage and government anticorruption initiatives (Freedom House 2018). Previous governments have been promulgated to be involved in corrupt practices. An example is the maiden Mahama-government before the current Akufo-Addo-government, which faced a lot of backlashes of corrupt practices amongst government appointees and the office of the presidency. These hullabalos led to downfall of the Mahama-government during the 2016 national elections. The frequent occurrences of corrupt activities amongst governments and political institutions like buying of votes during elections, misappropriation of government funds, politically motivated dismissals weaken the legitimacy of democratic institutions among the citizens (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). An independent institution like Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) exonerated Ex-President Mahama from claims of bribery and corruption when he accepted a car from a construction company from Burkina Faso tendering for a money-making contract in Ghana. The company won the contract, and the president refuted any acclaimed corrupt connections to the contract and stated that the car was received as a present and was added to the government's fleet of cars. Even though, CHRAJ vindicated him of bribery, he was culpable of breaching government rules (Business Day 2016; GAN Integrity, 2018). During the first year of the Akufo-Addo-government in 2017, the Youth Employment Agency (YEA) disclosed that an internal audit found payroll fraud of about GHc 50 million equivalent to US\$11.1 million. Yet, the year ended without the government setting up any committee of enquiry or holding anyone accountable for corrupt practices. Governments and political institutions in Ghana wobble in corrupt activities are mainly because of limited monitoring. They are incited to rob the state and its people to either enrich themselves or to solve family burdens (Brierley, 2017).

Ghana's attempt to curb corruption was perceived during the first National Integrity Conference set up by the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) in 1998 (Boateng, 2018). The idea was to advocate for a strong ethics for a society of integrity. In October 2011 at the second integrity meeting, a national anti-corruption plan was devised. In July 2014, the Parliament agreed, and the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) was passed. This action was in tune with the United Nations Convention Against

Corruption (UNCAC) that dictated “coordinated anti-corruption policies” for Ghana and other member countries. The policy was underway by 2015 with tools that assisted members in rendering accountability under the NACAP. Between 2015 and 2016 only two reports were made on the country’s performance. Afterwards nothing was ever said about the NACAP.

The current Akufo-Addo-government has introduced the Office of the Special Prosecutor which has revived Ghana’s efforts in fighting corruption among governments and political institutions. Ghana’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) has moved from 81 in 2017 to 43 out of 180 countries in 2020 (Transparency International 2020). The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is an index that ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived degrees of public sector corruption according to experts and workers. It uses a scale of 0-100, where scoring zero (0) means that the country is highly corrupt, and a hundred (100) score means that the country is very clean. Ghana making a score of 43 making a score of 75 means that the country has made progress in tackling corruption. According to Worldwide Governance Indicator, Ghana’s control of corruption has moved from 49 percentile in 2017 to 54 percentiles in 2019. According to Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), Ghana’s score for public perception of anti-corruption indicator increased from 54.0 percent in 2010 to 58.6 percent in 2019 when a positive change of 4.6 percent. Also, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance in 2017 ranked Ghana as 8 out of the 54 countries with a score of 65.0 in overall governance.

## **6.5 Output Legitimacy**

In Table 6.1 The fourth model analyzes two dimensions of performance variables as the output legitimacy variable in the study. Both institutional performance and policy performance have positive significant effect on citizens’ trust in political institutions with respective beta coefficients,  $\beta$ , values of **0.376 (p>0.001)** and **0.371 (p>0.001)**. The results back the two hypotheses that when various political institutions perform to the expectations of the citizens their trust in the political institutions will be increased. In addition, when the citizens approve of how the government handles matters their trust will be high in political institutions. The adjusted R squared of the model is 0.258. Among all the independent

variables, performance variable explained institutional trust the most with its model explaining about **26 percent** of the total variation in citizens trust in political institutions.

The regression analysis for output legitimacy in Models 4 and 6 provide an answer for the fifth research question “*Does output legitimacy variable like performance have an effect on citizens’ trust in political institutions?*” The performance variable was divided into institutional performance and general performance. The beta coefficient for general performance and institutional performance is **0.290 (p>0.001)** in Model 6, which reduces when other explanatory variables are added to the regression analysis as compared to its coefficient value in Model 4. But despite this, output legitimacy variables explain the most and generate higher institutional trust. The study anticipated that when general performance of the government and the institutions increase, the citizens will increase their trust in their political institutions. The descriptive statistics shows that some of the citizens rate the performance of the government in handling matters as fairly bad and also, some of the citizens disapprove of the performance of the various political institutions. The beta coefficient suggests that policy performance of the government and the performance of the various institutions have a positive significant effect on citizens trust in their political institutions. Which means when government performs well in certain areas, such as to improve the economy, and the various political institutions deliver to the expectations of the citizens, the trust of the people is increased in their political institutions. In general, it can be concluded that output variables, i.e., performance variables matter most in generating citizens’ trust in political institutions more than input, throughput and social capital variables. This can be compared to policy performance in Singapore, China, Vietnam where despite poor democratic legitimacy, the performance variables provide high legitimacy and positive evaluation of governance. On the other hand, India being the largest democracy suffer from output democracy, i.e., governance failing to respond to the needs and aspiration of citizens. The findings resonate with Fukuyama (2013: 4) who defined governance as “A government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not”.

The current Akufo Addo government has achieved more in four years than any preceding government. Various notable policies and programs comprising of the Free Senior High School initiative, which is the first of its kind in the country. Another implement policy is One District, One Factory (1D1F), this initiative was implemented by the current government to reduce the country’s dependency on imports. The initiative has led to the creation of 232

projects and 72 companies, which are into the production and processing of raw materials into finished goods. Further, another plausible policy implemented by this government is Nation Builders Corps (NABCO). This initiative is targeted at reducing graduate unemployment by solving social problems in sectors such as public health delivery service, education, agriculture, technology, revenue creation and mobilization, and finally in governance. Apparently, the current government took over from weak and a debt-drowned economy. All other things been equal, it will need some time to stabilize the economy. The country is still coupled with issues of electricity supply, illegal ‘galamsey’ mining in areas like Atiwa, where these activities are destroying the water bodies. Ghana has recently been ranked as the second most peaceful country in Africa by the Global Peace Index (2021) report by the institute for Economics and Peace. However, the government is only starting to resolve the many challenges facing the country which it promised in their campaign manifesto. The public health service delivery in the country needs to be improved and the government must pay the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) debts to enable to enable poor citizens access free medical care. Moreover, road networks need to be improved to reduce traffic congestions in the urban areas.

## **6.6 Socio-demographic Variables**

In Table 6.1, the ‘Model 5’ consists of all the socio-demographic variables used in the study. Out of the five socio-demographic variables, age, educational level, and economic condition show a significant effect on citizens’ trust in political institutions whereas gender and employment status variables do not have any effect on the dependent variable. However, there are some variations in the regression results between variables like age, educational level, and economic condition. The standardized beta coefficient,  $\beta$ , values for age (**0.003,  $p > 0.001$** ), and economic condition (**0.183,  $p > 0.001$** ) have positive effect on citizens’ trust in political institutions and support the hypotheses. The findings suggest that citizens’ age, that is, the older a person get the more trust they have in political institutions. Moreover, as the citizens economic conditions increase the more trust they will have in their political institutions. Nonetheless, the standardized beta coefficient,  $\beta$ , value for educational level (**-0.024,  $p > 0.001$** ) has a negative effect on citizens’ trust in political institutions. This suggests that when a citizen attains higher levels of education, their trust in political institutions in the country decreases. This result asserts the hypothesis that higher levels of education will lead

to low levels of trust. The model has an adjusted R squared of 0.0978 and explains about **9.8 percent** of the total variation of citizens' trust in political institutions.

Furthermore, 'Model 6' shows that age, educational level and economic condition have a significant effect on the dependent variable. The standardized beta coefficient for age is **0.002 (p>0.01)** which is reduction in the standardized beta coefficient in the 'Model 5'. The study expected that age might have an effect on institutional trust and the results find support for this claim based on the personality theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003). The majority of the respondents were between the ages of 18 years and 30 years denoting 41 percent of total respondents. There are previous studies which found socio-demographic variable like age to have a significant effect on citizens trust in institutions (Rose, 1999; Christensen and Laegreid, 2005; Paxton, 2007; Herreros and Criado, 2008). On the contrary, there are other studies which suggests that governmental actions have random effects on the citizens irrespective of age (Newton and Norris, 2000; Landmark, 2016).

The standardized beta coefficient for educational level is **-0.017 (p>0.01)**, which has an increased coefficient in 'Model 6' than in 'Model 5'. This suggests that educational level has a stronger effect on institutional trust when combined with other variables in 'Model 6'. The study hypothesized that educational level would have an inverse effect on institutional trust and the results of the study support this assertion. That is, the higher education people attain make them more critical of the government and public institutions which generate less trust in these institutions. Most (52%) of the respondents had secondary level education and this representational of the country as a result of the free Senior High School (SHS) policy which was implemented by the government in 2017. Findings from other studies support the claim that education has an effect on institutional trust (Lühiste, 2006, Christensen and Læg Reid, 2005, Herreros and Criado, 2008). However, there are other studies which show that socio-demographic variable like educational level have no effect on institutional trust (Espinal, Hartlyn and Kelly, 2006; Landmark, 2016; Mahmud, 2017).

The third socio-demographic variable that had a significant effect on institutional trust in 'Model 6' was economic condition with an increased standardized beta coefficient value of **0.063 (p>0.001)**. It shows the strongest effect amongst all the socio-demographic variables and also suggests that its effect is robust when it is combined with other variables in 'Model 6'. Most (57 percent) of the total respondents indicated that their living condition is bad. According to the success and wellbeing theory, the study expected that level of economic

condition will influence trust in political institutions. As such, the results of the study find support to this claim. On the contrary previous studies found that economic condition of citizens has no effect on institutional trust (Landmark, 2016).

The remaining socio-demographic variables which are gender and employment status have no significant effect on institutional trust in both 'Model 5' and 'Model 6'. The reason is that for employment status, the success and wellbeing theory posits that lack and insufficiency of resources will make people take less risks which is correspondent to low trust (Rousseau et al. 1998). The study expected that high rate of unemployment amongst citizens will lead low levels of trust in their political institutions because unemployment rate in Ghana had increased from 4.16 in 2018 to 4.51 in 2020 (Statista, 2020). However, the descriptive statistics shows that the majority of 55 percent of the citizens are engaged in either full time or part time employment. As such, the findings indicate that employment status of citizens have no effect on their trust in political institutions. Also, previous studies show that the gender of citizens have no effect on institutional trust because policies of governments and political institutions have random consequent on the people irrespective of their gender (Newton and Norris, 2000; Espinal, Hartlyn and Kelly, 2006; Askvik, Jamil and Dhakal, 2011; Landmark, 2016; Mahmud, 2017).

The results for socio-demographic variables answers the research question that '*does socio-demographic variables have effect on citizens' trust in political institutions?*'. The findings depict that the effects of age, educational level and economic conditions have significant effect on citizens' trust in political institutions, but gender and employment do not have any effect on the dependent variable.

## **6.7 Summary of the chapter**

The chapter presents a multivariate analysis involving the dependent variable and the explanatory variables. The OLS regression table produced 6 different models. The model with the strongest effect was 'Model 6' which explains 34 percent of citizens trust in their political institutions. Legitimacy variables all put together showed a higher effect on the dependent variable than the social capital variables.

**Regression Analysis for the independent variable and all explanatory variables**

Table 6. 1 Regression Table

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<b>Social Capital</b>						
Generalized trust	0.253***					0.169***
Associationism	0.077***					0.086***
<b>Input legitimacy</b>						
Democratic satisfaction		0.215***				0.081***
<b>Throughput Legitimacy</b>						
Corruption			-0.364***			-0.157
Transparency			-0.114***			-0.042
<b>Output Legitimacy</b>						
General performance				0.371***		0.290***
Institutional performance				0.376***		0.290***
<b>Socio-demographic Variables</b>						
Age (ref; young)					0.003***	0.002**
Gender (ref; male)					-0.007	0.001
Educational level					-0.024***	-0.017**
Economic condition					0.183***	0.063***
Employment status					-0.009	0.003
_cons	0.675***	0.841***	2.151***	-0.345***	1.021***	-0.637***
<i>N</i>	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.0373	0.0593	0.0841	0.259	0.0999	0.345
$\Delta R^2$	0.0365	0.0589	0.0832	0.258	0.0978	0.341

*t* statistics in parentheses

\**p*<0.05, \*\**p*<0.01, \*\*\**p*<0.001

All coefficients are standardized

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSION

#### 7.0 Introduction

The chapter begins with a brief overview of the results, theory and methodology underpinnings of the study. The thesis was based on asking three questions: a) what was the research issue and research questions, b) what did the study do to address these in terms of choice of theory and methodology, and c) what did the study find, i.e., were the research issue and research questions fully addressed? Also, discussions are made on the relevance and general implication of the study.

#### 7.1 Research Issue, and Question

The focus of the study was to identify how trust is emerged in political institutions in Ghana. And a string of questions was asked at the introductory chapter about how trust manifests. A controlling definition of trust for the study was based on Newton's (2001) definition of trust which presupposes that trust is revealed through the vulnerability of one of the parties involved. That is, when the trustor trusts the trustee that at worst, the latter will do the former no harm. This fundamental understanding of trust was transferred to the context of political institutions and how trust is developed between these institutions and the citizens.

The research was guided by two main questions, which are;

- Do socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, economic condition, educational level, and employment status and social capital variables such as generalized trust and associationism influence citizens' trust in political institutions?
- On performance theory, do input legitimacy variable like democratic satisfaction, throughput legitimacy variables like transparency and corruption and output legitimacy variable like performance influence citizens' trust in political institutions?



## 7.2 Theory and Methodology

Hence, research questions were raised based on existing theories of trust. Cultural and institutional or performance-based theories of trust were used as the guiding lens for the study. Under the cultural theory, the study applied the six auxiliary cultural theories from Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton (2003), which were personality theory, the theory of success and well-being, community theory, voluntary organization theory, social networks theory and societal theory. Socio-demographics and social capital were the variables of interest that were identified from these theories for the study. Even though socio-demographic variables were classified under cultural theories, the study excluded cultural variables like ethnicity, language, and religion, which were used in previous studies like that of Landmark (2016). However, the current study wanted to identify the effect of socio-demographic variables like *age, gender, economic condition, educational level, and employment status* on citizens' trust in their political institutions. On social capital, the focus of the study was on how trust is developed amongst people who share common values and norms as well as those who do not necessarily belong to the same community or share common values. Putnam (2001) discussions on social capital was used as the guiding force for the study and the two variables identified under this were *generalized trust and associationism*. The concept of generalized trust was used in the study to ascertain how trust is developed amongst heterogenous groups which mirrors the relationship between the two entities under study, i.e., political institutions and citizens. Associationism, on the other hand, was used to determine how trust is developed amongst people who share similar customs and values and how that trust affects their trust in political institutions.

The second guiding theory for the study was institutional or performance-based theory. According to Schmidt (2013), three legitimacy variables were identified from this theory. The variables are input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy in the context of our study is defined as the political institutions' receptiveness and impartiality to the interest of the people. The variable of interest under input legitimacy was *democratic satisfaction*. Furthermore, throughput legitimacy is evaluated on the basis of efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the political institutions. The variables of interest identified under throughput legitimacy are *corruption* and *transparency*. Last but not least, output legitimacy is evaluated in relation to the efficiency and success of the political institutions. The output legitimacy variable for the study was *performance (institutional performance and policy performance)*.

The present study used quantitative research design. Most of the studies on trust use quantitative research methods because it enabled the study to reach larger sample size and made it possible to draw generalizations from a given population. The study used secondary data from Round 8 (2019) of the Afrobarometer survey datasets. This round of data was selected because that was the latest survey data that had been released by Afrobarometer and also because the study's aim is on citizens perceptions towards political institutions, current data will portray a clear picture of what is happening on the grounds. The total number of participants selected for the study were 2400. The unit of analysis was classified into two groups, that is, central level political institutions which comprised of the President, and the Members of Parliament, on one hand, and local level political institutions which consisted of Local Government Council, and Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executives on the other hand. The analysis of the data involved descriptive statistics for both dependent and independent variables in the form of frequencies, mean, and percentile distributions. The study also included a multivariate regression analysis to ascertain the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable which is citizens' trust in political institutions.

### **7.3 Succinct Description of Key Findings of the Study**

The multivariate analysis produced six different regression models, the 'Model 6' which included all the explanatory variables proved to be the strongest model, explaining about 34 percent of the total variation in citizens' trust in their political institutions in Ghana. Out of the five socio-demographic variables, age, educational level and economic condition variables were the only variables that had a significant effect on citizens' trust in political institutions in Ghana. Moreover, under social capital, the results showed that both generalized trust and associationism influenced citizens' trust in political institutions.

On the performance-based variables, only one factor was associated with input legitimacy in the study, which was democratic satisfaction. The result of the study revealed that the level of satisfaction with how democracy works in the country influences citizens' trust in political institutions in Ghana. Further, two factors were selected under throughput legitimacy which were corruption and transparency. The findings demonstrated that these factors do not have

an effect on citizens' trust in political institutions in Ghana. Last but not least, policy performance and institutional performance were associated with output legitimacy has a positive significant effect on the dependent variable. The results showed that how institutions performed and how well the government handles affairs of the state have an influence on citizens' trust in political institutions in Ghana.

To sum up, results from the multivariate regression analysis proved that there are evidences that both social capital and legitimacy variables matter in determining citizens' trust in their political institutions.

#### **7.4 Research Implications and Future Research**

Trust amongst central level institutions like the President and Members of Parliament were higher than trust levels amongst local level institutions like Local Government Council, and Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive. This means that the central level institutions have a major role in shaping citizens trust in public institutions. The reason is that trust is essential for all levels of developing in the country including good governance.

Because the findings show that corruption amongst central level institutions are higher than local level institutions. Hence, central level institutions most importantly, should endeavor to perform to the expectations of the citizens and this will automatically increase citizens' trust in local level institutions as well.

The present study used secondary data source for the analysis which I would recommend that future trust studies can deploy mixed methods of data inquiry by including interviews. Also, trust studies in the context of Africa lack longitudinal studies. The present study used a cross-sectional data which sometimes do not give the clear narrative because trust is built through time and a time series study will help in identifying and predicting trends of trust among political institutions.

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## APPENDIX 1: SURVEY QUESTIONS

### Institutional Trust

41. How much do you trust each of the following, or have you not heard enough about them to say? {Read out options}					
	Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	Do not know
A. The President	0	1	2	3	9
B. Parliament	0	1	2	3	9
D. Your Local Government Council	0	1	2	3	9
D1-GHA. Your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief Executive	0	1	2	3	9

### Socio-demographic Variables

#### *Age*

<b>1. How old are you?</b> [Interviewer: Don't know = 999] [Interviewer: If respondent is aged less than 18, select “Respondent is under 18 years old” and use the tablet to select another respondent of the same gender from this household. If there are no other respondents of the correct gender in this household, continue to the next household in the direction of the walk pattern.]				
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#### *Economic Condition*

4. In general, how would you describe: {Read out options}						
	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know
B. Your own present living conditions?	5	4	3	2	1	9

*Educational level*

97. What is the highest level of education you have completed? {Code from answer do not read options}	
No formal	0
Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling	1
Some primary schooling	2
Primary school completed	3
Some secondary school/high school completed	4
Secondary school	5
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. diploma or degree from polytechnic or college	6
Some university	7
University completed	8
Post-graduate	9
Do not know (do not read)	99

Gender

101. Respondent's gender	
Male	1
Female	2

Employment Status

95. Do you have a job that pays cash income {if yes, ask} Is it full time or part time? {If no, ask} Are you currently looking for a job?	
No (Not looking)	0
No (Looking)	1
Yes, part time	2
Yes, full time	3
Do not know	99



## Social Capital

### Generalized Trust

83. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?	
Most people can be trusted	1
Must be very careful	0
Do not know (Do not read)	9

83B-GCP. Could you tell me for each of the statements below whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all? {Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion}					
	Not at all	Not very much	Somewhat	Completely	Do not know
1. People of another religion	1	2	3	4	9
2. People of another nationality	1	2	3	4	9

83C-GCP. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: {Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion}						
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Do not know
1. People like you are accepted in Ghana for who you are	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. People who share your ethnic, racial, or religious background have a say in the direction of the country	1	2	3	4	5	9

### Associationism

11. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. {If Yes, read}: Was this often several times, or once or twice? {If No, read}: would you do this if you had the chance?

	Yes			No		Do not Know
	Often	Several times	Once or twice	Would if had the chance	Would never do this	
A. Attended a community meeting	4	3	2	1	0	9
B. Got together with others to raise an issue	4	3	2	1	0	9
C. Participated in a demonstration or protest march	4	3	2	1	0	9

### Input Legitimacy

#### Democratic Satisfaction

37. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ghana? Are you	
Very satisfied?	4
Fairly satisfied?	3
Not very satisfied?	2
Not at all satisfied?	1
Ghana is not a democracy (Do not read)	0
Do not know	9

## Throughput Legitimacy

### Corruption

42. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or have you not heard enough about them to say? (Read out options)					
	None	Some of them	Most of them	All of them	Do not know
A. The President and Officials in his office	0	1	2	3	9
B. Members of Parliament	0	1	2	3	9
D. Local Government Council	0	1	2	3	9
D1-GHA. Your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief Executive	0	1	2	3	9

### Transparency

57. Please tell me how often, in this country, you think people from each of each of the following groups spread information that they know is false?					
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Do not know
A. Government Officials	0	1	2	3	9
B. Politicians and political parties	0	1	2	3	9
C. News media and Journalists	0	1	2	3	9
D. Social media users	0	1	2	3	9
E. Activists and interest groups	0	1	2	3	9

## Output Legitimacy

Performance

### Policy Performance

50. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or have you not heard enough to say?					
	Very badly	Fairly badly	Fairly well	Very well	Do not know
A. Managing the economy	1	2	3	4	9
B. Improving the living standards of the poor	1	2	3	4	9
C. Creating jobs	1	2	3	4	9
D. Keeping prices stable	1	2	3	4	9
E. Narrowing gaps between rich and poor	1	2	3	4	9
F. Reducing crime	1	2	3	4	9
G. Improving basic health services	1	2	3	4	9
H. Addressing educational needs	1	2	3	4	9
I. Providing water and sanitation services	1	2	3	4	9
J. Fighting corruption in government	1	2	3	4	9
K. Maintaining roads and bridges	1	2	3	4	9
L. Providing a reliable supply of electricity	1	2	3	4	9
M. Preventing or resolving violent conflict	1	2	3	4	9
N. Addressing the needs of young people	1	2	3	4	9
O. Protecting rights and promoting opportunities for disabled people	1	2	3	4	9

### Institutional Performance

51. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performance their jobs over the past 12 months, or have you not heard enough about them to say?					
	Strongly disapprove	Disapprove	Approve	Strongly approve	Do not know
A. President Nana Akuffo Addo	1	2	3	4	9
B. Your Member of Parliament	1	2	3	4	9
C. Your Local Government Councilor	1	2	3	4	9
C1-GHA. Your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief Executive	1	2	3	4	9

## APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

### DEPENDENT VARIABLE

#### *Institutional Trust*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
President	2400	1	4	1.76	1.151
Members of Parliament	2400	1	4	1.31	1.059
Local Government Council	2400	1	4	1.29	0.978
Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive	2400	1	4	1.14	1.045

### INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

#### Socio-demographics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age	2400	18	98	38.69	15.313
Gender	2400	1	2	1.5	0.5
Economic condition	2400	1	5	2.55	1.395
Educational level	2400	1	4	2.49	0.864
Employment status	2400	1	3	1.98	0.943
Valid N (listwise)	2400				

## Social Capital

### *Generalized Trust*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Most people can be trusted	2400	1	2	0.09	0.285
Trust people from different religion	2400	1	4	2.76	1.023
Trust people from different nationality	2400	1	4	2.43	1.051
People like you are accepted for who they are	2400	1	5	3.97	1.058
People like you have a say in the country	2400	1	5	3.82	1.196
Valid N (listwise)	2400				

### *Associationism*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Attend a community meeting	2400	1	5	1.83	1.417
Join others to raise an issue	2400	1	5	1.63	1.384
Attend a demonstration or protest march	2400	1	5	0.65	1.133
Valid N (listwise)	2400				

## Input Legitimacy

### Democratic Satisfaction

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Satisfaction with democracy	2400	1	5	2.76	1.040
Valid N (listwise)	2400				

## Throughput Legitimacy

### *Corruption*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Office of the Presidency	2400	1	4	1.35	0.791
Members of Parliament	2400	1	4	1.41	0.748
Local Government Council	2400	1	4	1.25	0.713
Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive	2400	1	4	1.34	0.730

### *Transparency*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Government officials	2400	1	4	1.86	0.783
Politicians and Political parties	2400	1	4	2.08	0.741
News media and journalists	2400	1	4	1.84	0.711
Social media users	2400	1	4	2.04	0.627
Activists and interest groups	2400	1	4	1.83	0.686
Valid N (listwise)	2400				

## Output Legitimacy

### *Institutional Performance*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
President	2400	1	4	2.70	0.974
Members of Parliament	2400	1	4	2.22	0.917
Local Government Council	2400	1	4	2.30	0.914
Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executive	2400	1	4	2.18	0.838

### *Policy Performance*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Addressing educational needs	2400	1	4	2.91	0.958
Providing reliable electric supply	2400	1	4	2.77	0.998
Protecting rights and promotion opportunities for disabled people	2400	1	4	2.63	0.894
Improving Basic Health Services	2400	1	4	2.59	0.920
Preventing or resolving violent community conflict	2400	1	4	2.56	0.915
Providing Water and Sanitation Services	2400	1	4	2.50	0.948
Managing the Economy	2400	1	4	2.41	0.981
Addressing needs of young people	2400	1	4	2.33	0.952
Reducing Crime	2400	1	4	2.26	0.994
Creating Jobs	2400	1	4	2.25	0.955
Improving living standards of the Poor	2400	1	4	2.21	0.959
Fighting Corruption	2400	1	4	2.20	1.006
Maintaining roads and bridges	2400	1	4	2.12	0.987
Keeping Prices stable	2400	1	4	2.01	0.935
Narrowing Income gaps	2400	1	4	2.00	0.936
Valid N (likewise)	2400				



### APPENDIX 3: PAST PRESIDENTS AND HEADS OF STATE IN GHANA

Number	Name	(Birth-Death)	Election	Term of Office			Political Party
				Took Office	Left Office	Time in Office	
Presidents of the First Republic of Ghana							
1	Kwame Nkrumah	1909-1972	1960	1st July 1960	24th February 1966	5 years, 236 days	Convention People's Party
Presidents as Head of State (Second Republic: 1966-1972)							
1	Joseph Ankrah	1915-1992	-	24th February 1966	2nd April 1969	3 years, 39 days	National Liberation Council
2	Akwasi Afrifa	1936-1979	-	2nd April 1969	7th August 1970	1 year, 126 days	National Liberation Council
3	Nii Amaa Ollenu	1906-1986	-	7th August 1970	31st August 1970	24 days	Independent
4	Edward Akuffo-Addo	1906-1979	-	31st August 1970	13th January 1972	1 year, 134 days	Independent
5	Ignatius Acheampong	1931-1979	-	13th January 1972	5th July 1978	6 years, 174 days	Supreme Military Council
6	Fred Akuffo	1937-1979	-	5th July 1978	4th June 1979	334 days	Supreme Military Council
Presidents as Head of State (Third Republic: 1979-1981)							

	1 Jerry John Rawlings	1947-2020	-	4th June 1979	24th September 1979	112 days	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
	2 Hilla Limann	1934-1998	1979	24th September 1979	31st December 1981	2 years 98 days	People's National Party
	3 Jerry John Rawlings	1947-2020	-	31st December 1981	7th January 1993	11 years, 7 days	Provisional National Defense Council
Presidents of the Republic of Ghana (Fourth Republic since 1993)							
	1 Jerry John Rawlings	1947-2020	1992, 1996	7th January 1993	6th January 2001	8 years	National Democratic Congress
	2 John Agyekum Kufuor	1938-	2000, 2004	7th January 2001	6th January 2009	8 years	New Patriotic Party
	3 John Atta Mills	1944-2012	2008	7th January 2009	24th July 2012	3 years, 199 days	National Democratic Congress
	4 John Dramani Mahama	1958-	2012	24th July 2012	6th January 2017	4 years, 166 days	National Democratic Congress
	5 Nana Akufo-Addo	1944-	2016, 2020	7th January 2017	Incumbent	4 years, 114 days	New Patriotic Party