

The territorial architecture of government

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Abstract

This article sets the stage for a special issue that examines the interplay between subnational and supranational governance. It begins by discussing how the territorial architecture of government has become more multilevel as national governments have shifted authority both downwards to subnational governments and upwards to international and supranational institutions. Next, we argue that this multilevel structure emanates from a tension between the drive to reap the functional benefits of scale diversity in a globalizing economy and the pressures arising from collective self-rule. We build on the research in this special issue to highlight some tangible effects of this tension for policy, politics, and polity. Subnational and supranational governance are conventionally perceived as separate phenomena with distinct consequences, and yet they are intimately connected in a fluid territorial architecture of multilevel governance.

1 | INTRODUCTION

This special issue showcases recent research that transcends methodological nationalism, the notion that the national state is the natural political form in the modern world and the default basis for comparison. The four articles in this issue examine how the simultaneous dispersion of authority to subnational governments and to international and supranational institutions has affected policy outcomes (policy), political competition (politics), and the architecture of

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governance (polity) in contemporary Western societies. We begin by describing how the territorial architecture of government has become multilevel since WWII. We then propose that multilevel governance is a response to a tension between two forces in a globalizing economy: the drive to exploit the functional benefits of governance at diverse territorial scale and the pressures arising from the desire for self-governance. This tension is expressed in a variety of ways, and in the remainder of the introduction, we highlight some tangible effects for policy, politics, and polity. We conclude that subnational and supranational governance are intimately connected.

2 | A CHANGING TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

The past seven decades have seen an unprecedented transformation in the territorial structure of government. No level of government has escaped major reform, but the extent of change appears to be greater as one moves from the local to the global. Local government has a history that stretches to the beginnings of civilization, and today every country has some form of village or town council that handles local public goods such as refuse disposal or road maintenance. In most countries, both the responsibilities and territorial scale of local governments have grown in response to urbanization and the knowledge economy (Ladner et al., 2016; Ladner & Keuffer, 2021; Page, 1991; Resnick, 2021; Sellers et al., 2020).

Regional governance is more contested and more variable across time and space. The past seven decades have seen an unprecedented growth in regional authority which has affected democracies worldwide (Eaton et al., 2010; Hooghe & Marks, 2016; Marks et al., 2008). The European continent has been at the cutting edge. Since the 1960s, new tiers of subnational government have been set up in 25 European countries, 15 of which have regional elections (Schakel, 2018, p. 687). Around 47% of the EU population lives in regions endowed with primary legislative powers (Tatham, 2018, p. 679). Substantial self-rule has been extended to several territorial communities, including the Azores, the Basque country, Catalonia, Corsica, Flanders, Scotland, South-Tirol, and Wales. Metropolitan tiers have been created or strengthened in France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK, as well as in Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey (OECD, 2014, 2015).¹ Regional authority in Europe now reaches into agriculture and fisheries (Carter & Smith, 2008), education (Dupuy, 2020; Kleider et al., 2018), immigration (Adam & Hepburn, 2019; Tatham, 2020), health (Costa-Font & Greer, 2013; Piccoli, 2020), and welfare (Kleider, 2018; Vampa, 2016).

As regional self-government has grown, it has sometimes spilled into the national arena, taking the form of *shared rule*, co-decision making for the country as a whole (Hooghe & Marks, 2016, pp. 34–37). Shared rule is characteristic of federal states, and it can also be found in some regionalized states, such as Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Bolivia. Many asymmetrical arrangements in more centralized states give regions a form of bilateral shared rule over national policy in the region itself as in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the UK, Portugal's Madeira and Azores, the Åland islands in Finland, Jeju in South Korea, the two autonomous regions in Nicaragua, or Aceh and Papua in Indonesia. In Europe, regional shared rule has spilled up to the European Union (EU) (Tatham, 2011). Decentralization has also been conducive to greater Europeanization among regional actors. For example, interest groups in more authoritative regions tend to target European decision making more intently than those in less authoritative regions (López & Tatham, 2018). On occasion, regional governance can alter

European outcomes, as when in 2016 the parliament of Wallonia blocked the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) until it received concessions on dispute settlement and agricultural tariffs (Tatham, 2018, pp. 680–683).

The rise of regional governance has been matched by deepening international governance. The restructuring of authority has been most transformative in Europe. The EU is, at once, international and domestic, federal and confederal, supranational and intergovernmental. It encompasses 448 million people in a multilevel polity that transforms nationals into European citizens, and its authoritative competences touch virtually every public policy. A comparative measure that assesses an international organization's portfolio finds that the EU is the only international organization covering the entire range of 25 policies (Hooghe et al., 2019b, pp. 63–64). The EU's supranational institutions, including the European Court of Justice, the Commission, and the Central Bank, have been empowered in a sequence of reforms. In addition, the EU's Parliament has metamorphosed from a nominated consultative assembly into a directly elected transnational parliament with extensive law-making powers. EU laws have direct effect and supremacy over national and subnational legal orders.

The supranational empowerment of the EU is exceptional in depth and breadth, but it is part of a larger trend of world regionalization (Börzel & Risse, 2016; Lenz et al., 2019; Rocabert et al., 2019). Some 33 regional international organizations (RIOs) have been empowered over the past 25 years (Hooghe et al., 2019b). One remarkable development is the growing delegation of authority by national states to independent non-state bodies: RIO secretariats, courts or arbitration panels, assemblies, and, occasionally, bodies of independent experts. The Measure of International Authority (MIA) finds that 25 of 33 RIOs have gained authority since 1995, and just two have lost authority. The average increase in delegated powers is equivalent to setting up an independent court that can make binding decisions or granting an IO secretariat agenda-setting powers on policy and the budget. Twenty-four RIOs broadened their policy portfolios, and just four saw their portfolio contract. On average, a RIO widened its policy portfolio from 10 to 13 policies.

In recent years, the rise of international authority has entered a domestic political debate in which populist nationalists campaign to constrain supranational organizations, limit trade, and stop migration (De Vries et al., 2021; De Wilde et al., 2019; Mutz, 2018). If they succeed, we may witness a second transformation away from transnationalism toward a fragmented, “my nation first” global disorder dominated by states and their regional groupings. The liberal international order survived the first Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it now faces a double threat: a second Cold War, this time between the United States and China, and populist nationalism within the West itself (Hooghe et al., 2019a).

Central governments have played a pivotal role in orchestrating, mediating, and sometimes resisting the territorial transformation of governance. They are both actors and witnesses; sometimes taking a leading role in reform and at other times a reactive one (Harbers et al., 2021, pp. 1–5; Jensen et al., 2014, pp. 1237–1243). Alongside the vertical territorial re-organization of authority, many governments have decentered authority horizontally to non-majoritarian institutions (Thatcher & Sweet, 2002). These included reforms to increase central bank autonomy (Garriga, 2016), privatization (Schmitt, 2014), agencification (Jordana et al., 2018; Verhoest, 2018), and judicial review (Stone Sweet, 2017; Stone Sweet & Mathews, 2019), many of which insulated decision making from democratic pressures (Peters, 2016, 2018).

Subnational and supranational governance are conventionally perceived as separate phenomena with distinct consequences. Our point of departure is that they are elements of an interconnected system of multilevel governance encompassing authority from the village to the

globe (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, 2020; Ostrom et al., 1999). However, the idea that subnational and supranational governance are two aspects of a single phenomenon raises some fundamental puzzles. How do these subsystems interact? In what ways do they combine to produce a triptych of polity, policy, and political outcomes? The interplay of supranational and subnational governance is a core puzzle in the study of multilevel governance and the concern of this special issue.

3 | SCALE, COMMUNITY, AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE

We begin by considering the possibility that multilevel governance has an overarching logic: the tension between the functional benefits of scale diversity and the pressures arising from collective identity. Each of these factors has a rich literature, and while each has its proponents, we believe that they are most accurate in combination.

The functionalist premise is that the scale at which a public good is most efficiently provided depends on the costs and benefits of centralization for the public good in question. The classic statement is Wallace Oates' decentralization theorem (1972) that conceives a trade-off between scale economies and extra-regional externalities, which pull government up to the national level, and territorial heterogeneity of preferences, which pulls government down to the local level. While fiscal federalists conceive this trade-off as domestic (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 2005), there is no need to limit it within states. International relations scholars adopt a functionalist logic when they explain international institutions as instruments for reducing the transaction costs of cooperation among states (Keohane, 1984).

Few scholars tie these insights into a single theory that applies both within and among states. An exception is Alberto Alesina, who in *The Size of Nations* (1997, 2003) co-authored with Enrico Spolaore, models how economic globalization makes small jurisdictions economically viable, thereby tilting the trade-off between size and heterogeneity toward the latter. Alesina and Spolaore conceptualize heterogeneity in terms of policy preferences: what matters for jurisdictional design in *The Size of Nations* is the policies that are delivered to an individual in relation to the taxes they must pay (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003, p. 18). The more heterogeneous a country, the greater the disparity between the policies that a government provides and the preferences of individual citizens.

However, providing individuals with the policies they want is not the same as giving them the authority to collectively determine those policies. Self-rule is the independent exercise of authority. A shortcoming of the functionalist theory of governance is that it takes for granted its most problematic feature—the *Who Question*: *Who* gets to exercise governance; which groups are given the right to make laws? A territorial group may demand self-rule even if the central government tailors public goods to their preferences. Analysis of policy preferences, no matter how sophisticated, cannot explain why some groups demand the right to exercise authority over their own laws.

The premise of a community logic is that preferences over governance are shaped by collective identity as well as by policy preferences. Governance in this approach is an expression of sociality among participants. The root of the modern concept of community is Aristotle's *koinonia*, literally translated as “sharing in common” (Liddell & Scott, 1940). Communities facilitate the provision of public goods because they nurture social networks, repeated interaction, and long time-horizons that diminish free riding. In Elinor Ostrom's (1990, p. 88) words,

the capacity for providing public goods is enhanced where “Individuals have shared a past and expect to share a future.”

An extensive literature examines the effect of community on jurisdictional design within states and among states. Within states, peripheral groups are most liable to demand self-rule. Geographical isolation, linguistic distinctiveness, and a history of independence can lead members of a group to see themselves as a people entitled to self-rule. The geo-historical bases for such identities are especially strong in Europe and Asia (Shair-Rosenfield et al., 2021). Among states, international organizations that can tap into some similar culture, religion, geographical location, political or legal institutions are most likely to sustain general-purpose government (Hooghe et al., 2019a, 2019b).

However, the implication of community for governance is double-edged. Norms that facilitate governance within communities can constrain governance among them. While a sense of shared community can diminish free riding, it can also divide the world into “us” and “them,” “insiders” and “outsiders.” Hence, communities are settings of *parochial altruism*, combining empathy to those within the group and antipathy to those beyond (Bernhard et al., 2006).

Such feelings are socially constructed and politically contested (Keating, 2021). What shared norms are necessary for the collective provision of public goods? To what extent does sociality depend on speaking the same language, adhering to the same religion, or living in spatial proximity? A key finding here is that where conceptions of community are exclusive, multilevel governance is contentious because it shares rule among, as well as within, peoples.

Hence, a jurisdictional design that reflects community may stand in tension to a design on functionalist principles (Hooghe & Marks, 2020; Kleider, 2020). From a functionalist perspective, the optimal design is to bundle policies in a limited number of exponentially spaced tiers reflecting spatial externalities and economies of scale (Hooghe & Marks, 2016). From a community perspective, the structure of multilevel governance will reflect the pattern of collective identities and the political struggle over whether they are conceived as inclusive or exclusive of overarching governance.

4 | THIS ISSUE

The effects of scale and community on jurisdictional design, and the effects of multilevel governance on policy, politics, and polity inform the contributions to this special issue.

Several contributions tackle the relative strength of functionality and community for the territorial architecture of government. In the first comparative survey of its kind, Tatham and Bauer (2021) probe regional elite preferences over government authority across regions, national states, and the EU in 18 policy domains. Using data from a survey conducted in 12 countries and 68 regions, the authors find that the jurisdictional preferences of directly elected regional politicians and top regional civil servants are shaped both by functional and community factors.

Functional pressures are expressed in the preference of elites in larger regions for greater authority over their own region. Elites in smaller regions are not averse to the idea but are considerably less intent. So the sheer population size of a region affects preferences over regional empowerment. Identity, tapped by measures of territorial attachment, is also a powerful influence. A feeling of attachment to their region leads elites to want more decentralization and to disempower their parent state. This is a general pattern: Place attachment produces a desire to strengthen the corresponding tier of government and weaken those at adjacent levels. Elites

who are attached to Europe wish to empower the EU and reduce national competences, while those who are attached to the nation wish to empower the state and diminish both regional and EU competences.

Tatham and Bauer find the same effect when they assess identity using regional indicators, such as whether a region has the status of a minority nation (Brigevich, 2018). Hence, both individual and aggregate data confirm the effect of identity for preferences over self-government. These results are robust to potentially confounding influences, including the current allocation of authority, attitudes regarding the EU, its member states, and subsidiarity, as well as individual economic and social characteristics.

The interplay between functional and identitarian variables is picked up by Jurado and León (2021) who investigate whether globalization among states triggers jurisdictional reform within them. Using data from 78 countries from 1970 to 2010, the authors investigate the jurisdictional effect of globalization, which they conceptualize as economic interdependence and measure with the KOF index for trade and financial openness. Globalization, they find, spurs decentralization and is mediated by communal identity. This has a functionalist basis: decentralized governments can respond more effectively to asymmetric shocks arising from globalization.² Communal identity, mobilized through regionalist parties, amplifies the effect of globalization on decentralization. Where regionalist parties are strong, the effect of globalization is twice as strong as in a country without regionalist parties. In short, globalization makes smaller polities more viable.

Jurado and León draw on the idea that an international trade regime opens the door to larger markets. When a region trades beyond national borders, membership of the national state may even become a liability under national protectionism (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003; Jolly, 2015; Marks & Hooghe, 2000). Hence, this can be expected to intensify secessionist pressures. This finding is consistent with Tatham and Bauer, who conclude that regional elites in minority nations are most strongly in favor of strengthening regional government. Since minority nationalism and regional party success are highly correlated (Masseti & Schakel, 2016), both studies suggest that regional identity provides fertile ground for decentralization.

In sum, functional pressures triggered by jurisdictional size (Tatham & Bauer, 2021) and by globalization (Jurado & León, 2021) are important influences on the territorial architecture of government. And these functional pressures exist alongside, and sometimes in tension with, community effects arising from territorial identity (Jurado & León, 2021; Tatham & Bauer, 2021).

A second theme of the special issue concerns the effects of dispersion of authority on policymaking, politics, and the polity (Tatham & Mbaye, 2018). On the policy dimension, Peters (2021) investigates how decentralization and globalization affect the citizen-policy link. Looking at social policy, Peters analyzes the relationship between citizen preferences and public spending for 23 democracies between 2002 and 2012. She finds that decentralization and globalization influence central government responsiveness in contrasting ways. The gap between what citizens want from social policy and what central governments provide in spending grows smaller in more decentralized countries, and this effect is significant both cross-sectionally and temporally. Importantly, this appears driven chiefly by a region's shared rule. The effect of shared rule is three times as large as that of self-rule. In contrast, globalization has the opposite effect. Countries that are less exposed to globalization are more responsive than more globalized countries. The upshot is that both decentralization and globalization affect policymaking beyond their own territorial scale, but in countervailing ways.

On the politics dimension, Schakel (2021) highlights how regional and European electoral politics are intertwined. Comparing European election results for 209 regions in 11 EU member states since 1979, the author finds strong evidence of prospective voting in European elections in which voters send a signal about their regional government. They do so by rewarding political parties that are in government at the regional level, especially when these parties are in opposition at the national level. This effect is magnified in regions with extensive regional authority, such as Flanders, Catalonia, or Scotland, and when regional elections precede European elections. This article complements research that shows how European electoral outcomes have trickle-down effects for national elections, and it therefore seems reasonable to argue that regions affect national elections both directly (Dinas & Foos, 2017; Spoon & Jones West, 2015) and indirectly via European elections (Dinas & Riera, 2018; Schakel, 2021).

On the polity dimension, Tatham and Bauer (2021) examine whether regional elite preferences on the attribution of competences are shaped by the existing distribution of authority. Controlling for confounding factors, they show that elites in authoritative regions favor further shifts of authority away from the national state and toward the EU. In other words, dispersion of authority appears to strengthen preferences for greater dispersion of authority (Brancati, 2006; Tatham & Bauer, 2021).

5 | DIFFERENTIAL ARCHITECTURES: SELF-RULE AND SHARED RULE

Regional authority can be unpacked into self-rule—the authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region—and shared rule—the authority exercised by a regional government in the country as a whole (or simply at a higher scale). Self-rule and shared rule usually correlate highly (Hooghe et al., 2016) and yet they have contrasting consequences. For example, self-rule appears to produce regional disparities, while shared rule appears to have no such effect (Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose, 2013, p. 397). Within the European context, regions with self-rule have several distinctive effects, including a greater likelihood of having an office in Brussels and of it being well-staffed; a greater likelihood of membership in a trans-regional association at the EU level; or a lesser likelihood of using consultative instruments domestically on EU affairs. In each case, shared rule does precisely the opposite (Donas & Beyers, 2013, p. 540; Huwylar et al., 2018, p. 767; Tatham & Thau, 2014, p. 265).

Several contributions in this special issue explore the distinct effects of self-rule and shared rule. Tatham and Bauer (2021) show how self-rule induces regional elites to want to shift central government competences to the EU, whereas shared rule does not. Jurado and León (2021) reveal how both dimensions are affected by economic globalization, but that self-rule is boosted to a greater extent than shared rule. This echoes findings regarding the differential effect of EU candidacy and length of membership on self-rule and shared rule (Chacha, 2020; Gómez Díaz & Gómez Díaz, 2020). The contribution by Peters (2021) underlines that both self-rule and shared rule strengthen the opinion-policy link at the national level, but shared rule does so to a much greater extent than self-rule. Self-rule, by providing citizens with directly elected representatives whose policy portfolio is growing, supplies an additional platform—an alternative territorial arena—for interest aggregation and articulation. Shared rule, however, furnishes an institutionalized channel through which citizens (or their representatives) can co-determine national policy. If self-rule can function as an echo-chamber amplifying citizen preferences over national policy, shared rule institutes a direct lever over central affairs. Perhaps it should not surprise us,

then, that the effect of shared rule on responsiveness “is triple the size” of that for self-rule (Peters, 2021).

6 | THE ARCHITECTURE OF COMPROMISE: BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND INTERDEPENDENCE

It is undeniable that many changes in the structure of authority are triggered by a desire for self-government, whether symbolic or substantial. This is true at the subnational level. The Catalan and Scottish cases illustrate this dramatically, and numerous reforms in unitary countries reflect the same process in less spectacular fashion (Saarts, 2020; Sijstermans & Brown Swan, 2021; Trinn & Schulte, 2020). The same logic operates at the national level too. Brexit reveals the potency of narratives about “taking back control” despite the cost to scale benefits (Menon & Wager, 2020). Meanwhile, the member states of the European Economic Area/European Free Trade Association (EEA/EFTA) have struck a different sort of compromise between national sovereignty and scale benefits by relinquishing political influence in the EU in return for access to the EU single market (Egeberg & Trondal, 1999; Fossum & Graver, 2018; Panara, 2021). Hence, demands for decentralized governance and differentiation express themselves at multiple levels.

This desire for self-government has to navigate the reality of interdependence among globalized democracies. This recognition has provided the cornerstone for European integration as well as other supranational ventures (Hooghe et al., 2017; Lundgren et al., 2018). Similarly, it has framed secessionist debates at the subnational level in terms of the seceding entity’s relationship with existing supranational structures such as the EU (Chamon & Van der Loo, 2014; Loughlin, 2021; Muro & Vlaskamp, 2016).

The result is a tension, and occasional struggle, between a desire for autonomy and an acknowledgement of interdependence. This tension is manifest at the subnational level where greater self-rule (i.e. autonomy or self-government) has been tempered by stronger shared rule (i.e. interdependence or co-government). Similarly, at the national level, sovereignty movements have developed in tandem with the creation and empowerment of international organizations and supranational governance.

Nothing provokes this tension between autonomy and interdependence more than globalization.³ Trade and financial openness have created transnational interdependencies which provide some economic actors with options to elude government regulation. As economic interdependence has perforated national borders, the capacity of governments to regulate globalization depends increasingly on their willingness to coordinate across subnational, national, and supranational levels. But here their desire for autonomy may interfere with their functional need for coordination. The upshot is a territorial governance architecture that is both more fluid and patchier in its capacity to project authoritative control.

The magnitude of interdependence resulting from globalization becomes starkly visible in times of crises. The financial crisis of 2008 originated from the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers in the United States before spreading across the Northern globe. The Covid-19 pandemic purportedly started through a bat-pangolin-human transmission erupting at the Huanan seafood market in the city of Wuhan (Hubei Province, China) before sending half of the world population in lockdown. As globalization deepens interdependence, it upsets established patterns and routines and provides new constraints and opportunities for different groups of actors. While globalization multiplies opportunities for some economic agents (especially, corporate actors and mobile capital), it imposes costs on

people and sectors that are less mobile. And it generates huge governance challenges for territorially bounded public authorities. It is hence not surprising to observe that globalization interferes with citizen-government relations and contributes to the erosion of the opinion-policy link, a foundation of modern democracy (Peters, 2021).

Analyses that seek to understand the interplay between autonomy and interdependence need to acknowledge that these tensions are—by essence—multilevel. And this should be reflected in their approach. Globalization, for example, has differentiated effects across territorial scales. In addition, it can have both direct and indirect effects on outcomes. We illustrate this in Figure 1, which summarizes the combined results of the studies by Peters (2021) and by Jurado and León (2021). Figure 1 shows that globalization *directly* erodes central government responsiveness (Peters, 2021) but that it *indirectly* reinforces it through its positive effect on regional authority (Jurado & León, 2021). By provoking increases in regional authority, globalization seems to generate a response to its own shortcomings. It remains an open question as to whether globalization induces regional authority (as an endogenous development) or whether regional authority stems from governments' active efforts to mitigate the negative fallout of globalization (as a purposeful riposte). Either way, the fact that globalization directly erodes responsiveness, but indirectly enhances it by strengthening regional authority is indicative of how the confluence of autonomy and interdependence pressures play out differently across territorial scales in both forthright and roundabout ways.

We view these complementary findings as a further illustration of the countervailing pressures generated by globalization on, not only the architecture of government (i.e. the polity dimension), but also on political and policy outcomes. Globalization is one of the ultimate embodiments of interdependence. Naturally, it constrains national governments in ways that erode responsiveness toward their own citizens (see also: Ezrow & Hellwig, 2014). But it also provides opportunities for greater regional authority (see also: Alesina et al., 2000, p. 1293) which, in turn, seems to somewhat redress the responsiveness deficit it generated in the first




FIGURE 1 Globalization, regional authority, and responsiveness.

Note: Visualization of the combined results presented by Peters (2021) and by Jurado and León (2021).

RAI = Regional Authority Index; KOF = Index of Globalization; G = Globalization. Signs represent the direction and approximate strength of the relationship. Solid lines represent findings by Peters (2021). Dashed lines represent findings by Jurado and León (2021). Jurado and León's findings concern Economic Globalization and various subdimensions thereof

instance (see Figure 1). Globalization's varied effects elegantly illustrate the ongoing compromises between autonomy and interdependence and how these play out at various territorial scales across the policy-politics-polity triptych.

7 | CONCLUSION

The twin trends of regionalization and internationalization against the backdrop of globalization provide the focus for this special issue, and each contribution problematizes how these interact to shape political outcomes. The research presented here reveals that the balance between autonomy and interdependence, and between self-rule and shared rule, has no given answer. Arbitrations between subnational, national, and supranational governance are crucial as they decisively shape policies, politics, and polities. In sum, as our societies have become increasingly multilevel so should our analyses.

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DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Figures on regional tiers and metropolitan governance are from RAI v.3 (Shair-Rosenfield et al., 2021).

² Jurado and León's research throws up an interesting puzzle for future research. While functionality and community emerge as the most powerful drivers for variation in decentralization, they find evidence that territorial inequality may act as a brake on decentralization, and they conjecture that this may be due to political pressures to alleviate potential disruptive effects of globalization through tax equalization.

³ We here understand globalization as a threefold process that: (a) erodes national boundaries, (b) integrates economies, technologies, governance and cultures, and (c) creates relations of mutual interdependence (see Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008).

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