Chapter 2. Same Rules, Higher Costs:

Women's Pathways to Candidacy in Zambia[1]

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Josephine Limata is a veteran politician who has competed in elections for nearly two decades. Her political biography is, in many respects, typical of any person — man or woman — who has run for office in Zambia. Limata needed to cultivate the support of local leaders in her community before winning her first election to represent Luampa constituency in the country's parliament in 2006. She then went on to compete in two more national elections, winning reelection in 2011 and losing in 2016. In each of those elections, as a widower and in the transport business, Limata had to use her own money to pay for her campaign costs because Zambian parties are usually too cash-strapped to support their candidates. And each time she ran for office she did so on a different party ticket, trying to increase her likelihood of winning by switching to the party she expected to win a majority in parliament as well as the presidency.

Yet, Limata's story also reflects the particular challenges that women in many countries must confront when competing in an electoral arena dominated by men. Simply being a woman, according to Limata, was an obstacle to securing a party's nomination for office: women who aspire to elected office face the type of scrutiny that men do not. As Limata explains in her own

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words, women who enter politics have to get used to being called *prostitutes*.[5] Because politics continues to be widely perceived as the realm of men in Zambia, the women who choose to run for office are perceived as challenging norms of what it means to be a "proper" woman who tends to her home and family. In this respect, the very act of seeking political power makes a woman suspect.

Understanding how women like Josephine Limata become candidates for elected office — despite facing social and political obstacles — is vital to charting progress toward women's inclusion in Africa's ongoing process of democratization. Relatively little research has been dedicated to specifically explaining how women in African countries enter politics, become party nominees, or campaign for office. While women politicians throughout the world make decisions in each of these areas within a broader social context that shapes gender relations, we do not know if the political choices made by African women are influenced by the same constraints identified in research that is based primarily on women's experiences in North America and Western Europe.

Women are commonly expected to have different experiences than men when running for office because social norms continue to produce gendered expectations about how men and women politicians should behave and will likely govern (Fox and Lawless 2011). The political institutions that determine how candidates compete for office can further influence women's access to the ballot (Krook 2010). In weakly institutionalized party systems, for example, the process of candidate selection often takes place behind closed doors, disadvantaging women who are not closely connected to party leaders, most of whom are men (Field and Siavelis 2008, Hinojosa

[5] Josefine Limate: It is a difficult job in parliament, sometimes we cry …… (p)eople can insult you – you are a prostitute …. (s)omeone said that if woman has never married, she's a prostitute, imagine at this age to be a prostitute!" Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 2016.

2012, Wang and Muriaas 2019.) These social and political factors not only affect how women perceive themselves as political actors; they also influence their strategies for getting elected.

To better understand the complexities that women face in becoming candidates for office, particularly in African countries, this chapter provides an empirical analysis of several hypotheses drawn from the existing literature. We examine these hypotheses through data from a unique survey carried out among candidates who competed in Zambia's 2016 national elections. Zambia, in several respects, can be considered a typical country case for the study of women candidates in developing countries where institutions can make it more difficult for women to win office. Women's representation in Zambia's parliament averaged 13% between 1997 and 2018, compared to an 18% average for the world as a whole in the same time period. In the 2011 and 2016 parliamentary elections, only one in six candidates were women (Wang and Muriaas 2019).

Zambia's lower than average representation of women can be explained, in part, by its electoral system. Members of parliament (MPs) are elected through first-past-the-post rules in single-member districts, which tend to be less inclusive than proportional representation systems (Rule and Zimmerman 1994, Norris 1997). Zambia has yet to adopt the reserved seats, candidate quotas, or political party quotas for women that have proven to increase women's legislative representation in other countries (Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010). Moreover, Zambia is characterized by weakly institutionalized parties that have inconsistently implemented formal procedures for candidate selection, which are known to work against women's candidacy as nominations are negotiated behind closed doors (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2019).

The Zambia candidate survey analyzed in this chapter contains responses from 215 men and women across the political life cycle, from their entry into politics to their campaigning during elections. To understand their initial entry into politics, men and women were asked about their

qualifications for office, their motivations for running for office, and their sources of encouragement. Candidates were asked, once they committed to a political career, about their strategies for joining parties and becoming a party nominee. They were then asked about their campaign experiences, including their strategies and costs.

The Zambia candidate survey provides a rare level of insight because the sample includes both failed and successful MP candidates.[6] Of the 215 MP candidates, 187 are men (119 successful and 68 failed) and 28 are women (22 successful and 6 failed). By collecting responses from both men and women, the survey allows us to assess where, how, and in which ways gender shapes how candidates' experiences. While the survey's percentage of women candidates (13%) is slightly lower than the percentage of women found in Zambia's parliament after the 2016 election (18%), this is reflective of the national average overtime (13%). The candidates sampled represent the main parties of Zambia, including the ruling Patriotic Front (PF), United Party for National Development (UPND), the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), and other smaller parties.

Candidates were sampled for the survey in two main ways. First, all successfully elected MPs were contacted to participate in the survey. Second, the losing MP candidates who placed second in their race in ten provincial capital districts were also included in the sample and invited to participate.[7] To add nuance to our understanding of the candidates' survey responses, we also conducted in-depth interviews with a cross-section of politicians concerning their experiences in party politics. These open-ended interviews covered the candidate's political biography with

[6] The surveys were conducted in person by Zambian enumerators using Qualtrics software on tablets between April and July 2017.
[7] The provincial capital districts (and provinces) are: Kabwe (Central); Ndola (Copperbelt); Chipata (Eastern); Mansa (Luapula); Lusaka (Lusaka); Chinsali (Muchinga); Solwezi (North-Western); Kasama (Northern); Choma (Southern); and Mongu (Western).

special focus on their choices regarding party affiliation and campaign strategy over time. The sample of interviewees includes three members of the current ruling party, PF; three from the former ruling party, the MMD; two from the main opposition party, the UPND; and one independent.

The survey's findings provide a nuanced portrait of women's experiences across their electoral trajectory. Concerning entry into politics, the survey reveals that the women who choose to enter politics in Zambia have many of the same qualifications as the men who enter (e.g., professional background), but are more likely to perceive themselves as being less qualified. On one key dimension of candidate quality, involvement in civic and community life, women actually have significantly *more* organizational relationships than men. And while women are driven to pursue higher office by the same motivations as men — both want to improve their communities and become leaders — women systematically report experiencing greater obstacles to their entry into politics, especially in terms of gender and family responsibilities.

In examining how women navigate party politics, the survey findings show that women largely pursue the same partisan strategies as men. Both tend to join the same set of parties (larger, national parties) and both tend to switch parties as they seek to maximize their chances of winning an election. Women also describe their engagement with the party nomination process in largely the same terms as men. Both women and men typically face competitive nomination processes in which they must vie with at least one other person to secure a nomination. Perhaps surprisingly, women appear to be as likely as men to use bribes to ensure their candidacy during the opaque nomination processes maintained by political parties.

Campaigning, the survey's third set of findings, is the area where women's experiences diverge most markedly from men's. While men and women equally stress the importance of many

common campaign activities, such as canvassing voters and distributing campaign posters, women are significantly less likely to emphasize giving public speeches and attending rallies. This is a critical, gendered difference to campaigning in a country like Zambia, where politicians are commonly expected to publicly appeal for votes. Our interviews with women candidates suggest that they may be less inclined to undertake such large-scale campaigning because of the increasing abuse and violence candidates face during competitive elections. The survey further reveals a gendered pattern in campaign spending: women appear to spend more than men. The fact that women spend more on their campaigns may reflect the need to offset their relative absence at large rallies and public events. For example, they may need to spend more on campaign advertising or gifts to voters because they are less likely to speak to them directly at mass events.

The remainder of this chapter reviews the findings the Zambian candidate survey in greater detail, pinpointing where women's political experiences may be similar to or different from men's. Given how little is known about women's experiences as candidates in African countries, the similarities we find between men and women may be as revealing as the differences. What clearly emerges from the candidate survey is that women generally seek to succeed in politics using the same strategies as men, but they must also overcome specific gendered obstacles that pose distinct challenges because they are women.

Women's Pathways to Political Office

Understanding how women run for political office — from seeking a party nomination to campaigning in an election — is vital to explaining why women are underrepresented in government in many parts of the world. One limitation to our understanding these dynamics in African countries stems from the fact that much of the relevant scholarship has skipped over the

candidacy selection stage to focus on actual election outcomes.[8] This oversight is likely due to the difficulty associated with studying an unidentified population, that is, who *might* run for office, particularly when candidate selection procedures are opaque and informal. But by focusing on the actual of election — by which time women have already been selected as candidates or not — much of the existing research fails to identify which factors are impeding women's access to political office. In addition, the few studies that have considered women's entry into politics have tended to focus on women's motivations rather than the procedures or processes by which women secure party nominations. This literature, drawn largely from the Global North, suggests that women are simply less likely than men to aspire to elected office (Fox and Lawless 2014, 2005), but such a generalization may be problematic for countries where nomination procedures are less transparent and institutionalized, as in many African countries. For women in these contexts, motivation may not be the most important factor keeping them out of elections.

Evidence from the United States suggests that a woman's decision to seek candidacy is heavily influenced by social encouragement and political recruitment, factors that can be highly gendered. Research focused on political socialization finds that women, especially younger women, are less likely to be encouraged to pursue a career in politics. For example, results from a survey of 4,000 randomly chosen high school and college students in the United States show that families encourage political ambition among girls at significantly lower rates than boys (Fox and Lawless 2014). Drawing from such findings in the United States, the importance of family support in a woman's decision to run for office is increasingly incorporated into political education for candidates. In Benin, for example, Johnson (forthcoming) shows that local non-governmental organizations are using training sessions for spouses to both change negative stereotypes

[8] Notable works that examine political recruitment and selection at the nomination stage include Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2019; Wang and Muriaas 2019; Ichino and Nathan 2016; Rahat 2007.

surrounding women's involvement in politics and teach them to be verbally encouraging with the hope that this will produce more women candidates.

Another common explanation for women's relative lack of interest in running for office is attributed to the nature of recruitment: they are both less likely to be recruited and less likely to respond positively when asked to run (Niven 1998, Sanbonmatsu 2010). In a survey of U.S. state legislators, Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013) show that over half of women legislators had not considered running for office until they were recruited by a party leader. Existing research suggests women may not run because they perceive themselves to be under-qualified, whereas men tend to have more generous self-perceptions. The irony is that surveys conducted in the U.S. also indicate that women politicians are just as qualified, if not more qualified, than men to run for office (Anzia and Berry 2011, Fulton 2012).

Beyond encouragement and recruitment, women's underrepresentation in public office may be the result of the obstacles women must navigate during the candidacy selection process within parties. There is consensus in the literature that women face considerably greater barriers than men during the candidate selection process. When party elites control candidate selection, their decisions are shaped by personal preferences and beliefs that are often highly gendered. Norris and Lovenduski (1995) and Niven (1998) find that the men in charge of candidate recruitment consistently prefer candidates who are members of their own in-groups and reflect stereotypically male characteristics.

More recent scholarship on women's representation from the Global South indicates that the bottleneck for women office-seekers is at the nomination stage, that is, in being selected as party candidates. Party leaders can exercise considerable discretion in candidate selection processes that often lack transparency and entail high personal financial costs for candidates

(Wang and Muriaas 2019). While some studies suggest that women fare better under candidate selection processes that are centralized (Kenny and Verge 2016), others find that decentralized decision-making through primaries is key to expanding candidate opportunities for women (Ichino and Nathan 2016). In either case, these considerations are only relevant as long as formal rules are effective. Most political parties in African countries do not hold formal primaries to select their candidates. Under such conditions, the gatekeepers within parties are as important as the actual rules for candidate selection (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2017, Wang and Muriaas 2019).

Once officially selected as a party candidate, women must deal with the reality of actual campaigning. Regardless of whether electoral success is based on identity or clientelistic voting, obstacles to effective campaigning may weigh more heavily on women. Candidates in many African countries, for example, find themselves having to finance both their own election campaign as well as their party's operations. These costs have grown exponentially over the last decade in many countries. In Ghana, candidates have nearly tripled their campaign expenditures (Lindberg 2003). But beyond financial disadvantages, women often receive differential treatment on the campaign trail. Research from the United States suggests women not only receive less media coverage than men (Yovonoo 2016), but their media coverage is also based on gender stereotypes (Kittilson 2008; Niven 2001). Research also suggests men tend to receive more positive coverage than women (Uscinski 2011; Ross 2013). Fortunately, as Coffie and Medie report in Chapter 6, such media bias can be addressed through proper training and journalistic commitment, but such advancements in coverage may remain limited to certain news outlets.

Of even greater concern than media bias is the electoral violence raised in Chapter 3. Women are more likely to experience violence than men, and this violence is fundamentally different from electoral violence experienced by men (Bardall 2010). Violence targeted at women

can take many forms, ranging from physical and sexual violence to psychological, economic, and symbolic violence (Krook 2017). Research from Nigeria suggests that the threat or reality of such violence prevents women are prevented from running for office (Safir and Alam 2015). Unlike the candidate selection processes discussed earlier, the campaign barriers noted here have been explored in greater depth in African contexts.

Drawing on insights from the literature reviewed above, we identify key hypotheses that lend themselves to empirical testing:

H1. Women are less likely than men to receive social encouragement to enter politics.

H2. Women face more obstacles than men in entering politics.

H3. Women are less likely than men to feel qualified to run for office.

H4. Women are less likely than men to be personally recruited to run for office.

H5. Women face more obstacles than men during the candidate selection process.

H6. Women campaign differently than men.

H7. Women have more funding problems than men during election campaigns.

These hypotheses are drawn largely from prior findings in the United States and European countries, and it remains unknown to what extent they can be generalized to women's experiences in African countries. We turn to this exercise in the following sections.

What Motivates Women to Run for Office?

We examine the hypotheses raised in the literature review through the Zambia candidate survey described in the introduction. We begin by examining candidate motivations for running for office. If women and men go on to express divergent political experiences related to hypotheses H1-H7, it may well be that these differences stem from the fact that they have distinct objectives

in pursuing elected office. As a first finding, our survey shows that women and men generally report having the same set of motivations. As shown in Table 1, when asked to choose between different motivations — e.g., improving their community versus improving the country — both women and men tend to opt for the former over the latter at similar rates: nearly 61% of women and 66% of men say they are primarily motivated to improve their community. And when asked if they entered politics to advance their professional careers or to become leaders, both emphasize leadership as the more important motivation at comparable rates: 89% of women and 93% of men. The one area where women vary from men is in emphasizing the importance of gender over ethnicity despite ethnicity's role in structuring politics in many African countries. Perhaps not surprisingly, 68% of men say that representing their ethnic group is more important than representing their gender, but only 28% of women make the same choice.[9]

[9] This difference is statistically significant (p=0.000, χ^2=12.94).

Table 1. Relative Importance of Motivations by Candidate Gender

	Men (%)	Women (%)
Improve community	66.31	60.71
Improve country	33.69	39.29
Represent ethnic group	68.25	28.00
Represent gender	31.76	72.00
Advance career	6.51	10.71
Become a leader	93.49	89.29

Despite similarities in motivation, the existing scholarship suggests that women may need additional or different sources of encouragement in order to seriously consider running for office. According to H1, women are likely to receive less social encouragement than men from their families or communities. The Zambia candidate survey, however, does not support H1. We find no appreciable gender difference in the sources of support that candidates receive to run for office. Women largely draw on the same sources as men. Figure 1 shows that 39% of women say that they were self-motivated to run for office, and 42% of men say the same. Similarly, 25% of women state that they received support from political leaders when considering a run for office, as do 29% of men. This latter finding is particularly surprising in light of the widely held notion that women in African societies are less likely to be politically engaged, thus reducing their opportunity to interact with political leaders. In Zambia, at least, an explicitly partisan and political pathway to office seems just as common among women candidates as men.

Figure 1. Sources of Candidate Encouragement by Gender



The political biography of Zambian MP Sylvia Masebo is consistent with these findings, but also underscores why varied sources of social encouragement may be necessary to offset other obstacles that women face when entering politics. Masebo, for example, enjoyed several advantages in building her political career because her own mother had also been actively involved in politics.[10] She thus had a personal sense that a political career was viable for her as well as enjoying family support. Nevertheless, as Masebo competed over the years to become the MP of Chongwe constituency and hold onto that seat, the social consequences often faced by women in politics became increasingly real for her. Not only did she find that community members would criticize women like her for violating conservative social norms (e.g., defying a women's proper

[10] Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 2017.

place), her own husband chose to divorce her during the 2016 election campaign due to stresses associated with her career. Masebo's experience in this respect is consistent with research suggesting that women do pay a personal cost for their political ambitions.

Do Women Perceive Higher Costs to Entering Politics?

Even when encouraged to run for office, women may be deterred by fears of a biased system that will impose higher costs on them as women candidates than it does on men. The Zambia candidate survey provides support for H2, revealing that women experience distinct obstacles to entering politics. In aggregate, women in the Zambia candidate survey report personally experiencing nearly three obstacles (2.79 obstacles on average) among a list of eight potential obstacles, while men reported experiencing only about two obstacles (1.87 obstacles on average). In other words, women candidates are confronting one more obstacle, on average, than men.[11] This suggests that potential women candidates would be correct in presuming that the pursuit of politics may be more challenging for them than for men.

We find further support for H2 in that, as might be expected, most women report feeling that their gender is an obstacle to entering politics, whereas most men do not (5% men vs. 82% women).[12] More specifically, we find that family can pose a barrier for women: they identify family responsibilities as an obstacle at a significantly higher rate than men (33% men vs. 57% women) [13] even with women being less likely to be married (96% men vs. 64% women).[14] The family obstacles faced by women are also reported in the Malawi and Benin cases explored in Chapter 4. This obstacle appears to work against even women who might have other important

[11] The difference of means based on two-tailed tests is statistically significant (p=0.005).
[12] This difference is statistically significant (p=0.000, χ^2=110.54).
[13] This difference is statistically significant (p=0.012, χ^2=6.37).
[14] This difference is statistically significant (p=0.000, χ^2=42.89).

advantages. Doreen Mwamba, for example, is the daughter of Zambia's first vice president, Simon Kapwepwe. Yet, despite having built an independent political career, she describes coming under considerable pressure to leave her preferred party, the United Party for National Development (UPND), because her husband's family had connections to a rival party.[15]

Table 2. Obstacles to Entering Politics by Candidate Gender

Obstacle	Men (%)	Women (%)	*p*
Gender	5.35	82.14	0.000
Family Responsibility	36.62	57.14	0.012
Money for Campaign	60.43	46.43	0.161
Entry into Political Party	31.02	35.71	0.618
Ethnicity	17.11	14.29	0.709
Religion	5.88	7.14	0.794
Rumors about You and Family	25.13	25.00	0.988
Witchcraft or Unseen Influence	9.63	10.71	0.856

Note: Figures indicate the percentage of candidates claiming the obstacle affected them. The *p* values are based on χ^2 tests.

The findings summarized in Table 2 further show that, in several respects, women face many of the same obstacles as men. Both typically report experiencing overtly political obstacles at similar rates, such as getting into a party (31% men vs. 36% women), and both complain of the

[15] Doreeen Mwamba is a political candidate for UPND and has been in the party since 2001 after parting with Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD). She ran for the Zambian parliament in the 2016 National Assembly election in Munali constituency (Electoral commission of Zambia 2016). She has run for office in previous elections: In 2001 she stood on an FDD ticket (Ndola), came second. (She says the reason she moved to FDD was that she was not endorsed by UPND). In 2006, she was approached by the UPND leadership to stand on a UPND ticket in the parliamentary elections (did not win). She also stod on a UPND ticket in 2011 (lost). Doreen is the daughter of Zambia's first vice president, Simon Kapwepwe. She is married to George Muma Mwamba. Mwamba is the majority shareholder (51%) and CEO of the construction company Lonerock, which specializes in large infrastructure projects (Lonerock 2013). In addition to domestic activity, the company operates and has partners in South Africa and Namibia. Her husband runs a transportation company. The couple is wealthy and they reside in a house off Ibex hill in a gated community. Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 2017.

challenges in financing a campaign (60% men vs. 46% women). Both also report at similar rates that social or communal obstacles have negatively affected their ability to enter politics, including ethnic identity (17% men vs. 14% women) and religious affiliation (6% men vs. 7% women). Surprisingly, even in areas where we would expect to find gender differences, are identified as barriers by both women and men at similar rates: rumors about them or their families (25% men vs. 25% women) and witchcraft (10% of men vs. 11% of women).

Are Women as Qualified as Men to Run for Office?

We find support for H3 in the Zambian candidate survey. In aggregate, almost as many women as men reported feeling that they were qualified when they first campaigned for office. Figure 2 shows that 86% of women state that they felt qualified or very qualified versus 93% of men. Nevertheless, we find support for H3 in that relatively more women perceive themselves as underqualified for politics. Women in the survey are more than twice as likely to report feeling that they were only somewhat qualified or not qualified at all when they first ran for office: nearly 15% of women versus only 7% of men.

Figure 2. Self-Perceived Qualifications for Office



Actual qualifications among the candidates surveyed offer a mixed picture as to the relative preparation of men and women candidates. While men and women in the survey are roughly the same age, women are less likely to be college educated (78% men vs. 57% of women) and relatively less likely to be represented in professions such as accounting, law, and education (38% men vs. 21% women). These differences are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3. Demographic Attributes by Candidate Gender

Attribute	Men	Women
Age (average)	46.69	46.30
College Educated (%)	77.72	57.14[16]
Married (%)	96.22	64.29[17]
Professional Experience (%)		
Business Owner	26.23	21.43
Professions—Accounting, Law	37.70	21.43[18]
Non-Governmental Organization	4.37	10.71
Civil Servant	16.39	25.00

The Zambian candidate survey does reveal one key difference between women and men's qualifications that is consistent with the existing literature on African women's activism. We find that women are more likely to be active members of their communities through their ties to civic and local organizations, an important attribute of viable candidates. Zambian parliamentarian Elizabeth Phiri, for example, first became well known in her Kanyama constituency for doing voluntary community work, earning her the nickname "Mama Key" among neighbors, before being elected.[19] Similarly, Josephine Limata, who was a member of Zambia's parliament from 2006 to 2016, notes that she was not able to successfully enter politics until she found enough support among community and civic leaders in her home constituency of Luampa. She notes that very few women run for office because (married women) cannot borrow money. In her experience, there are many women who would want to stand for office but they don't have the financial capacity and the adoption procedures favors men.[20]

[16] This difference is statistically significant (p=0.019, χ^2=5.49).
[17] This difference is statistically significant (p=0.000, χ^2=42.89).
[18] This difference is statistically significant (p=0.094, χ^2=2.81).
[19] Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 2017.
[20] Author interview, Lusaka January 2016

The data presented in Table 4 suggests that the experiences of Phiri and Limata generalize to other women candidates in Zambia. Table 4 shows the percentage of candidates who report being members of different types of civic and community organizations. Women participate at a higher rate in 11 of 16 organizational categories, and this difference is statistically significantly in 6 of those categories: community service, environment, human rights/social justice, religious, social welfare, and women. A simple additive index of organizational membership — in which we simply count up the types of organizational memberships for each candidate and divide them by the maximum of 16 — further confirms that, on average, Zambian women who run for office have a greater range of organizational ties than male candidates: 0.28 for women versus 0.20 for men.[21]

[21] The difference of means based on two-tailed tests is statistically significant (p=0.076).

Table 4. Gendered Differences in Organizational Memberships

Organization Type	Men (%)	Women (%)	*p*
Arts	5.98	14.29	0.110
Business/Industry	34.59	50.00	0.115
Community Service	29.35	62.96	0.001
Cultural/Heritage	16.85	10.71	0.410
Development	20.77	28.57	0.351
Education	16.85	10.71	0.410
Environment	12.50	25.00	0.077
Human Rights/Social Justice	20.65	49.29	0.029
Medical	7.10	7.14	0.994
Professional	29.89	39.29	0.317
Religious	36.76	71.43	0.001
Social Welfare	14.75	28.57	0.067
Sports	20.88	7.69	0.111
Trade Union	13.66	3.57	0.130
Women	6.56	71.43	0.000
Youth	30.05	32.14	0.823

Note: The *p* values are based on χ^2 tests.

Do Women Have Different Partisan Preferences from Men?

To understand how women pursue their office-seeking ambitions through parties, we examine whether women and men are choosing to affiliate with similar or different parties. In Zambia, we find that women and men join parties through a variety of pathways, but both largely state that they decided on their own which party they would seek to represent as a candidate: 61% of women and 71% of men claim that they made the decision independently.

Women and men demonstrate a shared preference for affiliating with larger parties in Zambia, perhaps because these affiliations are more likely to help them win a legislative seat at election time. There are, however, some gender differences in this respect. Although they tend to join the same parties when seeking to run for office, they do so at different rates. Figure 3 shows that a somewhat larger percentage of women than men have joined the country's ruling party, the Patriotic Front (PF): 61% of women versus 48% of men, suggesting either that women prefer affiliating with the dominant party or that the party is more open to women candidates. Another possibility may be due to PF's own history as a party. While the PF was an opposition party, it was closely linked to civil society, and many key civil society leaders moved into government when the PF won the presidency and expanded its share of parliamentary seats. Additionally, Figure 3 shows that relatively more men are members of the main opposition party, the United Party for National Development (UPND). Whereas 44% of men are members of UPND, only 29% of women are UPND members. Women candidates are slightly more likely than men to affiliate with Zambia's smaller parties like the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) and the Rainbow Party.

Figure 3. Candidate Party Affiliation by Gender



Here, we find evidence that contradicts the expectations of H4 regarding recruitment. We do not find that women are disadvantaged in partisan recruitment. Instead, we find that women may have an advantage over men in that more of them are directly recruited to join parties by party leaders themselves. Such recruitment discussions occurred for 18% of women, but only for 7% of men.[22] Otherwise, women and men are recruited to specific parties at comparable rates by other types of individuals, namely, party members (18% of women and 17% of men), traditional leaders such as chiefs and headmen (4% of women and 6% of men), and church leaders (4% of women and 1% of men).

[22] This difference is statistically significant (p=0.052, χ^2=3.78).

Both women and men have relatively low levels of party loyalty, however, and show no difference in their likelihood of changing their partisan affiliation. Over the past 15 years, Zambian politics has been increasingly marked by party defections, as candidates switch political allegiance from one party to another (Rakner and Svåsand 2004, Bwalya and Maharaj 2018). Once a ruling party loses power, its former members either seek to join the new ruling party, move to another opposition party, or form entirely new parties. Sylvia Masebo won her first parliamentary election as a candidate for the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 2001, when that party still held the presidency and a parliamentary majority. She then defected to become the PF candidate in her constituency in the run-up to the 2011 elections, so that she could be on the same party ticket as then President Michael Sata. And then Masebo switched parties again for the 2016 elections to run as the UPND parliamentary candidate. In this respect, Masebo's experience reflects the lack of gender difference we find in the candidate survey: 43% of women left another party to join their current one; 36% of men did the same. Among those who switched parties, most report leaving the MMD after it lost power: 75% of women and 70% of men.

Do Women Experience Party Nomination Processes Differently?

As in many countries across Africa, candidate selection remains an opaque process in Zambia. Even when there are stated procedures for how candidates are to be chosen by a party's local, provincial, and national committees, candidates claim that these procedures are often violated in practice. The contradictions created by formal and informal procedures also makes it more difficult to assess H5 on the obstacles faced during the candidate selection process.

In contrast to the broader literature suggesting that women face more obstacles during party nominations, some observers of Zambian politics claim that women receive preferential treatment

during the candidate selection process. This is consistent with the notion that national party leaders often clear the path to nomination for the candidates they favor. And because parties may seek to demonstrate that they are gender inclusive by ensuring that some women are listed on the ballot, the relatively small number of women involved in Zambian politics are sometimes criticized for allegedly receiving special treatment at the nomination stage.

Yet, our survey results challenge the notion that women are somehow being favored or merely appointed to their nominations. Women are just as likely as men to have to compete for their nominations. For example, although Elizabeth Phiri was recruited by PF party leaders to seek the candidacy for Kanyama constituency, she still had to vie against 17 other aspirants for the party's nomination. Indeed, nearly 79% of women and 74% of men had to compete against at least two other candidates for their party's nomination in a constituency, and 18% of both women and men had one other competitor. Moreover, men (8%) were actually more likely than women (4%) to face no competition at all. There is no clear evidence for H5 in this respect.

Some candidates may try to take advantage of the fact that the candidate selection process in Zambian parties is opaque — as candidates are vetted, ranked, and selected through closed-door committee meetings. To win over members of candidate selection committees, office-seekers may provide gifts or money in order to guarantee themselves a nomination. In other words, they can pay bribes to get on the party ticket. The Zambian candidate survey asked respondents how often this form of payment occurred for nominations. Note that respondents were not directly asked if they personally pay bribes for nominations, since they would be inclined to dissemble in admitting to behavior that is not technically allowed. Figure 4 shows, nevertheless, that women and men expect such payments to be quite common in the nomination process: 50% of women claim that candidates "always" or "very often" make such payments; 54% of men state the same. Importantly,

this similarity in responses across gender suggests that women are navigating the nomination process with the same expectations as men. Here, again, we do not find clear support for H5.

Figure 4. Paying for Nominations by Candidate Gender



Do Women Campaign in the Same Ways as Men?

While prior research suggests that women have gendered experiences when campaigning for office, the data from the Zambia candidate survey generally do not support the expectations of H6, namely, that women campaign differently than men. Instead, we find that women in Zambia generally undertake the same type of campaigns as men. As shown in Table 5, women and men have similar responses when asked what activities were important for their campaigns: meeting with party leaders and members; distributing posters and flyers; distributing food and gifts;

conducting media activities; and visiting businesses and social organizations. Across eight of nine campaign activities, there is no statistically significant difference between women and men.

Table 5 shows that the one activity where women and men do diverge is in giving public speeches and attending rallies. While both indicate that this is very or extremely important, the percentage of women who do so (79%) is significantly lower than the men (91%). We might speculate that the lower rate among women may be due to the increasingly violent nature of Zambian politics. Doreen Mwamba, the UPND candidate for Munali constituency in the 2016 elections, explains that the threat of violence made it increasingly difficult for her to make public appearances and hold rallies during her campaign. Not only did she encounter gendered insults on the campaign trail, but she herself became the victim of violence, having been beaten unconscious during a campaign rally.[23] Mwamba finds that in the 2016 elections violence increased to new levels, and at one point it became impossible to hold rallies: "I went door to door fighting for votes in Mulani…….(T)he PF vigliantes, were all over, to protect myself and my campaign team I had to hire an armed private security firm". Reflecting on why so few women in Zambia make it passed the nominantion stage, she argues that: "Men want to hold on to power, and especially, it is important not to cede power to women. Women that are not married are clearly allowed more space, they can attend meetings that last after 23 h which a husband may not tolerate. For married women, issues at home, linked to traditional expectations, interfere with the role as a politician".

[23] Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 2017. Mwamba became the victim of assault during a campaign rally where she was attempted raped and hit on head and beaten unconscious to die. She has an injury to her spine and her head. She wears a wig to hide scars in scull. Video clips depicting the violence that characterized the Munali parliamentary election ultimately led to the nullification of the election results in that constituency.

Table 6. Gendered Perceptions of Campaign Activity Importance

Activity Type	Men (%)	Women (%)	*p*
Door-knocking, canvassing	37.43	32.14	0.588
Calling voters on the phone	8.02	7.14	0.872
Public speeches and rallies	90.91	78.75	0.049
Connecting with voters using social media	27.03	28.57	0.864
Visiting businesses and social organizations	31.55	46.43	0.120
Meetings with party leaders, members, or groups	57.53	64.28	0.499
Distributing campaign posters and flyers	67.20	53.57	0.157
Distributing food, chitenge, or other gifts	47.03	39.29	0.444
Media activities (interviews and press releases)	48.92	50.00	0.915

Note: Figures indicate the percentage of respondents claiming the activity is very or extremely important. The *p* values are based on χ^2 tests.

Campaign funding is one area where women are thought to be at a distinct disadvantage. Competing in an election is a resource-intensive activity that requires large sums of money, particularly in countries where candidates are usually expected to pay for their own campaigns out of pocket. In most African countries, voters are simply too poor to be able to afford donating to parties or candidates, and most parties do not have resources to subsidize the campaigns of their candidates. As a result, candidates need to use their own money to pay for basic campaign costs like holding campaign rallies, transporting campaign staff, and printing campaign posters.

But the evidence for H7 is mixed. It is not entirely clear that Zambian women who run for office face greater funding problems. Earlier in Table 2 we presented survey results showing no statistically significant difference in the proportion of women and men identifying campaign funding as an obstacle to entering politics. However, as shown in Table 6, we find that Zambian women do spend more money to run their campaigns. Women are far more likely than men to report spending over 500,000 Zambian kwacha (over USD$60,000) during the 2016 general

elections: over 33% of women spent 500,000 kwacha or more on their campaigns, but only about 18% of men spent as much. At the other end of the scale, whereas over 26% of men reported spending 150,000 Zambian kwacha or less (USD$18,000 or less), fewer than 15% of women were at the lower end of the expenditure scale.

Table 6. Parliamentary Campaign Expenditures by Gender

Zambian Kwacha	Men (%)	Women (%)
More than 1,000,000	2.17	11.11
Between 500,000 and 1,000,000	16.30	22.22
Between 150,000 and 500,000	55.43	51.85
Between 50,000 and 150,000	17.93	11.11
Less than 50,000	8.15	3.70

To effectively compete for a parliamentary set in Zambia, candidates must be prepared to finance their campaigns through their own resources. Doreen Mwamba, for example, notes that she used earnings from her hotel and construction businesses to fund her parliamentary campaign. She notes that the party´s nomination committee will ask you how much money do you have and whether you can afford to stand as a candidate. She underlines that the financial challenges are more significant for women, arguing that: "Married women do not control their finances. Also, women feel a strong obligation to look after their families financially. Men have more space to serve"[24].

For her reelection in Zambia's 2016 elections, Josephine Limata estimated that she would have to spend about 800,000 Zambian kwacha (over USD$95,000) to pay for campaign staff, vehicles to transport them, food to feed her supporters at events, and t-shirts and cloth to hand out at rallies.

[24] Personal interview

One way that parties can help support the campaigns of their candidates is by helping to bring more attention to their constituencies. Party leaders often do so by traveling to select constituencies to appear alongside their candidates at campaign rallies and other election events, thereby signaling their personal endorsement of local candidates. In this context, women and men appear to receive the same amount of attention from their parties during campaigns. The survey asked candidates if their party's leaders visited their constituency during the campaign. Nearly as many women (89.29%) as men (93.51%) stated that they received at least one such visit during their campaigns.

Conclusion

Women in Zambia, as established in this chapter, experience different and higher costs when attempting to enter and compete in politics. The survey results, further supported by interviews with selected politicians, show that women have similar forms of encouragement and experiences with political recruitment as male candidates. Women feel equally qualified for office as men, and they are, in fact, more qualified on the basis of their civic activism. While women follow the same pathways as men toward party nominations, women note significant differences in barriers due to the additional burdens imposed by family responsibilities. Despite these barriers, women are neither competing for "hopeless" seats nor are they being merely appointed as nominees. Once selected as candidates, women do not necessarily campaign differently than men. However, women candidates do have higher campaign costs and less face time with constituents at public events and rallies.

The results from the Zambian candidate survey suggest that we need a more systematic assessment of the pathways women take into politics and the networks they use to support their

ambitions. To date, the study of women in politics has primarily focused on their ability to win elections. This is problematic because restricting our analysis to electoral returns limits our understanding of women's representation. It ignores the multiple steps that a candidate must take before the election, involving ambition, recruitment, selection, and campaigning. Scholars need to examine all the stages that a candidate must traverse toward political office if we are to understand why women's political representation remains so low in some countries but expands in others, particularly without the use of gender-based quotas.

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