

# Motives in Development Policy, whose are they really?

-A study of the administration's role in Norwegian development policy

**By**

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## Abstract

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Engaging in a study of the administration's role in Norwegian development policy, this thesis explores the *microfoundations* of development assistance in relation to the concept of motives in development policy.

In this thesis, the common practise of attributing the motives that lie behind development policies to a “collective actor” – *the state* – is found to be dubious and misguided. Exploring the history of Norway as a donor provides the possibility for commenting on some of the stated motives; however, it also becomes apparent through the historical review that there is more to the issue of aid motivation than what is represented by the stated guiding motives. Attempting to establish a better conception of the holder of motives behind development policy, the administration's role is identified as an interesting point of departure. Establishing the role of the administration in the formation of development policy is believed to provide the possibility for scrutinising the concept of *the state* as a singular and unitary actor.

Performing the analysis based on empirical material generated by a distributed survey and follow-up interviews, the administration is indicated to be a sizable actor in the field of development policy. The scope and volume along with the complex issues making up the policy field, are found to tilt the advantage in favour of the administration. However, although the administration is characterised as being resourceful and central, the political authorities are found to be decisive in drawing up the broad lines and the general structure framing the manoeuvrability of the administration. Thus, the *macro-policies* are found to be the domain of the politicians while the bureaucrats enjoy considerable latitude on the more specific *micro-level*. Relating the findings of the analysis to the overarching issue of motives in development policy, the concept of the holder of these motives as a “collective actor” seems satisfactory only on the most abstract level. On a more detailed *micro-level* the exploration of the administration's role in development policy have provided insight into aspects concerning the *microfoundation* of development assistance and thus established the domestic origin of national policies in the field of development policy.

## ***Acknowledgements***

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Although the name on this thesis' front page is mine, and with it all responsibility for its contents,<sup>1</sup> the accomplishment is not mine alone and numerous people are due thanks.

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<sup>1</sup> Some of the data used in the analysis are from the Leadership survey 2000, conducted by Statistics Norway (SSB) and made available to me through NSD. Neither SSB nor NSD are responsible for the analysis performed or for any conclusions drawn on the basis of these data.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

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AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
DnA	Labour party (Det norske Arbeiderparti)
DUH	Ministry of development assistance (Departement for Utviklingshjelp)
EU	European Union
FrP	Progressive party (Fremskrittspartiet)
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KrF	Christian People's Party (Kristelig Folkeparti)
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NMS	Norwegian Missionary Society (Norsk Misjonssamband)
NNP	Net National Product
NOK	Norwegian Currency Unit (Norske Kroner)
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for International Development
NORFUND	Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries
NOS	Norwegian Official Statistics (Norges Offisielle Statistikk)
NSD	Norwegian Social Science Data Services (Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste AS)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OPEC	Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries
SSB	Statistics Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyrå)
UD	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utenriksdepartementet)
UK	United Kingdom



UN	United Nations
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USA	United States of America
US	United States
WB	World Bank
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WW	World War

# 1 – Introduction

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What power-resources are vested in the bureaucracy? What guides the behavioural pattern of the bureaucrats? In which ways do bureaucrats prioritise their work? What level of latitude are the bureaucrats granted in their work? What constraints are imposed on the bureaucracy to keep it under political and popular control? These questions are answered in the analysis of this thesis where focus is placed on the administration's role in Norwegian development policy and the implications this role is characterised as having for the concept of donor motivation.

*The principle reason for donors to provide aid should be the needs of the recipients: the greater the need and the greater the ability of the donor to provide it, the stronger the case for aid. However, the needs of recipients do not constitute the total case for aid (Riddell 1996).*

As implied by Robert Riddell in this quote, there is more to development assistance than what meets the eye. Regarding the initiation and continuation of programmes of international development assistance, it is common to emphasize the importance of the donor's *motivations* that lie behind the provision of aid (Stokke 1995, 1996; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003; Tvedt 2003). Considering development policy as being rooted in specific motives held by a donor simultaneously presupposes that the donor constitutes an entity capable of holding such motives. However, considering the *state* as the donor of development assistance gives rise to the dubious common practise of attributing motives to this "collective actor". According to Robert D. Putnam "[...] the unitary-actor assumption is often radically misleading" (Putnam 1988: 433). Dismantling the concept of the state as a unitary actor along the lines of Putnam seems fruitful for the study of national policies of development assistance (see section 4.1).

Considering foreign policies as originating in the domestic arena, within the interest-spheres of multiple actors and groups, the policy-line adopted and implemented by the *state* is in this thesis suggested to constitute the result of various domestic actors trying to make their respective priorities influential on the national level. Accordingly, I regard motivations behind development aid, as ascribed to the state, as being phenomena of "macrobehaviour" which are generated on the basis of the various domestic groups' "micromotives" (Schelling 1978). Thus, I argue that the concept of motives in development policy is provided more

transparency when regarded as reflecting the preferences of these various domestic groups relative to their respective strength. Providing insight into this large and complex matter, I regard the state as constituting an arena within which domestic actors operate. This arena is here considered to comprise of a complex web of formal and informal channels for policy influence determining the ability of the various actors in their pursuit for influencing national policies. Some of these actors occupy decisive positions, while others are more peripheral to the policy process. This thesis thus approaches these matters via an analysis of the role of the administration in Norwegian development policy, and approaches this topic informed by a broad framework of rival theories. Structuring the study around these alternative theoretical models of the nature and behaviour of the bureaucracy (the Weberian, Niskanenian, and principal-agent perspectives, respectively), I develop the capability to identify the focal elements for exploration of this specific case. The application of these theories also allows for an assessment of the different theories' applicability to the case; in other words, *which theoretical model most accurately and usefully allows us to effectively conceptualize and explain the Norwegian bureaucracy engaged in development policy?* It is the elaboration of these rival theoretical perspectives and the evaluation of their relative strengths and weaknesses for explaining my case that also constitutes a central objective of this thesis.

I argue that the case chosen for this study provides a particularly effective means for illustrating the theoretical models and approaching my central research questions. The role of the bureaucratic apparatus is believed to be essential and forceful within all policy areas (Jacobsen 1997; Peters 2001; Christensen et al. 2002), even to an extent where its forcefulness borders democratic obstruction (Beetham 1996: 96-102, 1999: 6-13). However, the role of the administration may be characterised as being particularly forceful within the area of *development policy*. Development policy is distinguished from other fields of national policy by the fact that the policies adopted are implemented in distant places and are designated for other people than those having input on the processes prior to their adoption (Tvedt 2003:187-197). The complex nature of issues related to development assistance due to the special characteristics of these policies further suggests that a high level of expertise is needed in order for the policies to be well targeted and adjusted; this profound need for expertise is argued to *enhance the policy impact of the administration* even further vis-à-vis the political authorities in the field of development policy (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003:177-181; Tvedt 2003: 189-190). Hence, I suggest that directing the focus of the analysis

towards the role held by the administration in development policy is a well attuned strategy for providing insight into this thesis' research question:

*- What are the microfoundations of development policy, namely, who holds these motivations, what are these motivations, and how do we explain them? Furthermore, what constraints do these actors face from other actors within the state? In a word, what underlies the Norwegian foreign development policy formulation process, and to what degree do plural actors within the Norwegian state work more or less in tandem with each other?*

### **1.1.1 Why Motives - Why Bureaucracy**

The focus of the thesis stem originally from an interest for development assistance as a phenomenon in itself. Having studied different aspects of development policies in various contexts, I have continued to be puzzled by what these policies represent to the donor. Why are they initiated and why are they continued? Exploring development policy within the context of international relations theory provides insight; however, employing a study of this phenomenon with a more in-dept focus on the national political actors in a domestic context is more attractive to me. Thus, engaging in development policy research I am interested in exploring the link between the policy preferences of different domestically based groups and the national policies as adopted at the national level.

Due to the complexity and mere volume of the topic chosen I select to focus on only one actor on the domestic level; reducing the scope of the analysis makes it conceivable in a practical sense. However, focusing on only one domestic actor leaves several other important actors unattended and the total picture of domestic groups' interests in the field somewhat incomplete. Despite the obvious limitations encountered when choosing to focus on only one domestic actor, I still regard an analysis of the bureaucracy's role in development policy as highly fruitful in attaining better knowledge of the interconnectedness between the national and international politics.

### **1.1.2 The Approach of the Study**

I have chosen to employ the approach of a case-study to this research project. Based on the assumption that the administration's role in development policy is one of importance and that

establishing this role will assist in grasping issues related to motives in development assistance, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD - Utenriksdepartementet) is identified to be the unit of analysis in this thesis. Establishing the role of the UD in matters related to development policy will provide insight into the administration's role in the field and provide the possibility for commenting on aspects of actorness<sup>2</sup> related to development policy motives. However, the UD is the largest ministry of the Norwegian central administration and the field of policy it is engaged in is wide-ranging. The focus in the analysis is therefore further narrowed by focusing on the departments and sections of the ministry engaged in policies of long term bi- and multi-lateral development assistance (for an argument see section 4.3).

As already mentioned, the approach towards the analysis of the case studied is approached through the application of a broad theoretical framework. This framework is based both in the traditions of sociology of organisation and of political economy (chapter 5). A broad framework which includes the work of such different theorists as Weber and Niskanen, along with a more general principal-agent approach, provides a broad-based possibility for identifying the critical elements of the administration. Structuring the analysis according to the critical elements of bureaucracy, identified through the theoretical review, allows for an empirical analysis well grounded within a *range* of alternative and rival models, all of which are universally identified as constituting the theoretical backbone of the analysis of modern bureaucracy. Each of the three theories considered holds different conceptions and generates different predictions concerning the role of the administration within state structures, and each in turn provides a set of ready-made conceptions, paradigms, and variables which I utilize throughout this thesis. The empirical findings presented in this thesis therefore possess value not only in and of themselves (for understanding the complexities and patterns in the administration of Norwegian development policy), but are also utilized extensively for the purpose of *illustrating and evaluating a broad range of classic theoretical perspectives* which frame the entire analysis.

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<sup>2</sup> The concept of actorness is here employed as a term signifying an entity's capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors (Vogler 2002). However, contrary to the conventional manner, the term is here employed on the domestic level and regards the capacity of various national groups. Thus, it signifies which entities and/or groups that actively and deliberately may influence development policies on the domestic arena.

The three theories employed for the study are all identified to hold the administration as a potentially powerful actor. While Weber argues that the rational characteristics of the bureaucracy are the elements making it forceful, the two theories representing the political economy approach emphasize the skewed distribution of information in their explanations of the power-potential of the bureaucracy. Weber sees the rational character of the administration as an element guiding its conduct. This rationality is by Weber said to spur efficiency, an element that is believed to cause the bureaucratisation of society if no external control is imposed. The political economy approach also regards rationality as an element guiding the conduct of the administration, but rationality within the political economy approach signifies own-utility of the individual bureaucrat, which is maximised through exploiting the power of the administration (facilitated by the skewed distribution of information). Lastly, the critical element within all the three theories is the element of constraints. While the assumptions made within the theories concerning these elements are widely different, the element of *control* is critical to the internal logic of all the theories employed for the study.

The empirical data on which the analysis of this thesis is based are original, generated specifically for the purpose of this study. This became a necessity since no prior study has generated data on the administration for development policy in Norway. In the fall of 2004 (August/September) I conducted a survey within the selected sections and departments of the UD, and this survey generated a dataset that constitutes the major source of empirical material.<sup>3</sup> In addition to the data generated by the distributed survey, follow-up interviews have been conducted with a smaller sample of bureaucrats working within the UD in November 2004. These sources constitute the main body of empirical data employed for the analysis. In addition to these original data, some secondary sources such as articles and public documents are employed for improved insight into certain elements.

The analysis of these departments and sections of the ministry according to the approach laid out above, will provide insight into the power-potential of the administration, the conduct and behaviour of the bureaucrats as a group, and the constraints imposed on the administration by other actors in the development policy field. Performing this analysis will provide the

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
<sup>3</sup> The data are available from NSD upon application; the questionnaire of the survey is included in the appendices (in Norwegian).

opportunity for assessing the administration’s role and will allow for the generation of inferences regarding the holders of motives in Norwegian development policy.

**1.1.3 The analytical structure**

The role of the administration in the field of development policy is explored as the dependent variable in the analysis of this study. This variable is operationalised in various manners via the theoretical framework of this thesis (see above, chapter 5). The theoretically based identification of operationalised variables (independent) employed in the study is further developed into researchable indicators in the methodological chapter (chapter 4). The overall scheme of the analysis is illustrated in Figure 1.1 (for a detailed outline developing this model see chapter 4).

**Figure 1.1: A guide to the analytical structure of the thesis**



**1.2 The Main findings**

As an introduction to the main body of text and to the arguments of this thesis, this section presents the main findings as they have been established through the empirical and theoretical exploration of the topic of this thesis. The thesis holds as its major objective to analyse and establish the role of the administration in the field of Norwegian development policy and

through this approach to dissect the state and its policy process in order to comment on the concept of actorness as related to motives in development policy.

My analysis finds the technical character and the knowledge intensity of the policy field to favour the administration vis-à-vis other actors – the competence and power resources possessed by the bureaucrats collectively suggests that the power potential of the administration far exceeds that of any other actors in development policy. At the same time, based upon my survey data, I find that although the position of the administration is favourable, the extent to which the power resources of the administration can be exploited so as to serve the administration itself is inconclusive. Employing certain variables as indicators for the level of homogeneity (see figure 1.1), and thus the ability of the administration to serve itself as an interest group, the survey data provide an unclear picture. These uncertainties related to the administration's ability for coordinating its actions reveal that the level of homogeneity may be seen as a limiting element in terms of bureaucratic power in the field. However, this same element of homogeneity in the studied departments and sections of the administration is found to be different when considering the answers provided by the interviewed bureaucrats. When asked questions concerning the degree of homogeneity of the organisation, the respondents placed an emphasis on the strong culture and unity. Pointing to elements such as the trainee programme and the common career paths within the UD, their information draws a picture of a more homogenous organisation with a larger potential for collective action. Thus, related to the issue of homogeneity the surveyed sections and departments of the UD are argued to hold the potential for acting as a unified group towards a common purpose.

Based on the theoretically identified notion of bureaucrats' *utility*, the thesis explores the interests of the surveyed and interviewed bureaucrats. Contrary to what was expected on the basis of the theoretical notions employed as the springboard for my analysis, I find that the bureaucrats are highly *professionally focused* in their work, and are *not* found to be motivated by their own utility as conceptualized in more narrow (usually monetary) terms. Overall, the bureaucrats are suggested to hold a profound interest in their work *for its own intrinsic value*, rather than viewing their professional activities as *instrumental for the pursuit of their own more narrow self-interests*. Thus, one result generated by my research is that a more broadly defined, encompassing conception of utility is more useful for understanding and explaining



the behaviour of bureaucrats than the more narrow, materialistic conception of personal utility that is commonly encountered in economic models of bureaucratic behaviour.

Having established the power-resources and the potential for extorting this as present within the structures of the administration in Norwegian development policy, it is imperative to establish the level of latitude enjoyed by the administration in the policy field. My analysis finds that the administration enjoys considerable leeway in its work. The political authorities are found to structure the *macro-level* of the policies, while much of the more precise contents of the various policies are found to be trusted with the administration. However, there are many different actors that influence these policies and function to put constraints on the autonomy of the administration, and thus the role held by the administration is indicated to be far from autonomous. Nonetheless, despite the various constraints imposed by various actors, and the framework provided for the policy field by the political authorities, the administration is depicted as an actor with substantial capabilities for influencing the various policies of development assistance.

The identification of the administration as a decisive actor in Norwegian development policy is ultimately provided as an attempt to answer the question posed at the outset of this introduction. The analysis performed in this thesis is not intended to provide a fully satisfactory answer to this question; however, it is believed to provide insights and inferences into important issues. The concept of the unitary actor as the holder of motives in development assistance seems to be false based on the role identified as being held by the administration. This seems to be especially true when an account of donor motivation is provided based on specific policies (*micro-level*). The role established for the administration signifies that not all these motives may be the motives of *Norway*, even if Norway is understood as a term representing the central political authorities. The concept of the unitary actor seems adequate only on the most abstract level, and even then the concept is found to reflect poorly the complexity of the processes that run prior to the adaptation of policies to the national level. In a word, although the thesis provides no final answer to the research question, it does direct the focus for the pursuit for an answer to the domestic arena.

In terms of the theoretical objective of the thesis, testing the applicability of the theories to the case of Norwegian development policy, one of the theories seems more applicable than the others. Exploring the elements of the administration commonly identified as important for the

three theories all three theories are found to hold elements of truth. However, it became apparent through the analysis that the rigidity of the assumptions of Weber's theory and that of Niskanen makes them ill-equipped to fully grasp the structures of the Norwegian development policy administration. Also the assumptions of the principal-agent approach are occasionally found to apply badly to the empirical case, however, this theory is more generally formulated and more flexible than the other two. Though the match is not perfect, the principal-agent theory can with some minor amendments be made a powerful theoretical tool, incorporation the elements central to understanding the administration's role in Norwegian development policy.

### **1.2.1 The structure of the thesis**

This entire thesis is laid out over seven chapters. Following this introductory *Chapter 1*, the concept of motives in development assistance is presented. The presentation of motives in *Chapter 2* reviews the concept of motives as this topic is commonly treated in development research literature. The presentation offered deals with motives that can be said to be of paramount importance to the donor; however, the categories provided are wide and can therefore be said to be exhaustive in terms of donor motives. Towards the end of the presentation, the concept of actorhood related to these motives is put forward as being problematic. The notion of motives as it is presented is characterised as presupposing a unitary actor being the holder of these motives. However, the notion of a unitary actor is identified as being dubious based on general knowledge of the policy processes in a democracy.

*Chapter 3* moves on to relate the topic of motives to the context of Norwegian development policy. Presenting the development of Norway as a donor, chapter 3 indicates how the concept of motives can be utilised in practical terms for disclosing what lies behind precise policies. The review of the vast history of the Norway as a donor provides support to the conception established concerning the dubious notion of the unitary actor. Although the concept of these policies being Norway's is accepted for the review, it is made evident that the national policies of international development are influenced by various actors, both national and international.

Having recapitulated the history of Norway as a donor country and contextualised the case chosen, *Chapter 4* develops the approach of the study by outlining the scheme of the empirical analysis. Following the conceptualisation and consideration of the research approach, the chapter presents the empirical data generated for the purpose and constituting the basis for the analysis of the thesis. *Chapter 5* presents the designated theoretical framework of the thesis. Providing the structure for the analysis of the administration's role within the development policy field in Norway, the various theories are identified to hold some common denominators for the approach, and these form the basis for the analytical scheme by providing the structure for the exploration of the administration in Norwegian development policy.

The analysis of the administration's role in development policy in Norway is conducted in *Chapter 6*. This chapter presents the central analytical material for the thesis and implements the strategy adopted in the earlier methodological outline. The analysis is divided into three subsections, each dealing with an element identified as important when reviewing the theory. Having performed the analysis of the administration in the context of Norwegian development policy, *Chapter 7* summarises the findings and draws a set of conclusions regarding the research questions posed throughout the thesis. First the chapter deals with the empirical analysis performed, before the findings of the analysis are related back to the larger issue of motives in development assistance and the holder of these.

## 2 – Motives as a Concept in Development Policy

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Motives in development policies differ from country to country, within each country over time and between policies. The presentation I offer here is concerned with the motivations behind development assistance as the topic is generally treated in the scholarly literature. Providing this account, the motives presented can be characterised as being of paramount importance to donors. This is not to say that motivation for providing aid is singular; it most certainly is not. Motivation behind aid is complex and involves many variables; this is recognised in the presentation that seeks to provide a thorough introduction into the concepts.

Programmes of development assistance might be based on a range of motives. However, in the literature it is common to provide an account of motives divided into three or four larger categories (Stokke 1984: 9-18, 1996:20-29; Hellebø 1998; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003:7-17). This division, distinguishing between only a few categories of motives is of course a rough account, but will serve as a good baseline for the further exploration into donor motives. The three categories of donor motivation that I will apply in this chapter of my thesis are:

- Strategic-, security- and/or commercial self-interest of the donor.
- Moral imperative and altruistic motives; the need of the recipient.
- Common interests related to global challenges (environment, refugees etc.)

Looking closer at donor motivation it is important to realise that official motivation is not the full case. Motives are a sensitive issue and most donors will seek to project a good image of themselves. However, in most instances motives are mixed and so donors tend to over-emphasize the *altruistic* motives while toning down the *egoistic* (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003:17), this means that when the real motives behind a policy is sought official publications and statements of the donor should not be the only source of information, looking at the implemented policy-line may provide more and complementing insight.

The subsequent presentation is structured in three parts, which each deal with one set of motives. Each part will provide the reader with a thorough introduction to the specific

category of motives. The presentation follows the chronology of the motives as presented above.

## **2.1 Self-Interest of the Donor**

The motives included in this category are diverse, but nonetheless are all rooted in the self-interest of the donor. These motives are seldom put forward and articulated by the donor as being vital to the programme of development assistance, but still they have been identified to be of the utmost importance to certain donors at certain points in time (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003:7-24). This category of self-oriented motives can be divided into two distinct sub-categories, *economic/ commercial* motives and *strategic/security* motives. Between these two sub-categories of motives the first, *economic/commercial*, is the most widespread. The basic reason for this is that donors, irrespective of size, have economic interests at some level. The other category referred to as *strategic/security* is also widespread, but these interests are closer associated with donors of scale, and normally believed to be more peripheral to middle-sized and small-sized real term donors (Stokke 1996:17). The two sub-sections look at these two categories in turn.

### **2.1.1 Economic/Commercial Self-Interest**

Development policies are not the primary policies promoting the economic interests of the donor countries, other policies more explicitly related to trade and commerce serve this function. However, this does not bar donors of aid to choose cooperation partners and development strategies partly based on their own economic/commercial interests. Economic interests of the donor in development policies take on different forms. The most common and direct form in international development policies today is the phenomenon of tied aid. *Formal* tied aid is usually where the provision of aid is dependent upon the recipient procurement of goods from the donor. In practical terms this implies that aid is provided in the form of goods and services from the donor country, securing contracts exclusively for companies in the donor country. Tied aid can also be more *informal* in that a donor can direct aid towards projects, goods or countries in which its own industry have a strong standing (Alesina and Dollar 1998; Lloyd, Tim, et al. 1999). Whatever form, tied aid is designed for preserving the commercial interests of the donor and of large corporations based in donor countries (aid is trade/export), while promoting development in the recipient country. The consequences of tied aid vis-à-vis untied aid are hard to estimate since the initial tying might generate future

derivative consequences. This is especially so if the project initially financed with tied aid favours equipment manufactured in the donor country (e.g. infrastructure), or if maintenance of the externally financed system requires tools, spare parts or expertise from the donor country. However difficult, some estimates suggest that the tying of aid reduces the real value of the aid with up to thirty percent (Jepma 1991, Jepma in Stokke 1996). Tied aid is generally believed to reduce the real value of aid and to undermine the recipient countries' ability for self-determination. Though the concept is debated in international fora and many donors have reduced the share of aid that is tied, tied aid continues to be a common phenomenon (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen 2003:15).

Tied aid is possibly the most common and most clear-cut example of commercial interests manifested in aid policy, but it is far from the only one. Development aid might occasionally be motivated by the desire to open or (re-)build markets for export, or in order to secure imports. Historically this has happened in large scale world-wide with many countries involved. These motives for development assistance are usually not outspoken, the typical would rather be to emphasize the great effect the strategy chosen might have in and for the recipient country itself. Though these elements of a donor-recipient relation are often played down, studies of trade flows indicate that there might be a link between aggregated trade- and aid-flows, however the problem of causality and succession remains to be solved (Lloyd, Tim, et al. 1999).

### **2.1.2 Strategic/ Security Self-Interest**

As already stated, motives rooted in strategic and security self-interest are most relevant when dealing with aid from large and powerful states. Policies of development assistance are not the primary policies employed to promote these issues; this is commonly done within the wider field of foreign policy. Still, development assistance has been identified as used in the extension of these policies and thus can be said to be motivated by the same consideration. In relation to the other means in foreign policy that can be considered to be the "stick", development policies and aid might be considered the "carrot", this implies that the two fields of policy complement each other in pursuit of the same goal. One further feature that suggests these motives being relevant for aid, is that large industrial countries are known to administrate and distribute large parts of their development assistance in accordance with national security priorities (Stokke 1996; Alesina and Dollar 1998; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003).

## **2.2 Altruistic Motives: The Need of the Recipient**

The basis for altruistic motives and arguments for providing aid is the general notion that the rich have an obligation to help the poor; this applies domestically and is also used internationally. This way of thought is to be found in all major world religions from Islam to Christianity, it is also traced in socialist ideology and in certain other philanthropic systems of thought. The argument can also be turned the other way around, arguing that the poor are entitled to share more of the world's resources. This is the principle that all human beings have the right to development, a principle widely supported in Vienna at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights. Though more implicit, this same principle can also be said to be included in the UN Charter on Human Rights. The socio-economic rights included in the charter obligate, at least morally, the industrial countries to promote development for the poor (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003:12).

This form of motivation reflects well on the donor and is usually outspoken, however rallying on support for development policy domestically these motives are often promoted alongside arguments for long-term positive economic consequences for the donor. This connection between development aid and positive economic consequences for the donor is usually referred to as *interdependence*. What this entails is that global economical development is contingent on development in the south, thus facilitating development in the south by providing aid will in the long run reflect on the donor in terms of positive economical trends. This dual motivation where aid is based on the moral obligation of the donor and on the recognition of the processes of interdependency is in recent debates referred to as *human internationalism*. Olav Stokke, a renowned scholar in the field of development research, has characterised human internationalism as being:

*[A]n acceptance of the principle that citizens of industrial nations have moral obligations towards people and events beyond their borders; this, in turn has bearing on the duties of governments. [...] [W]ithin the North-South relations, human internationalism implies, in particular, a responsiveness to the needs of the South as regards social and economic development, but it does not stop at that point: civil and political human rights are also considered to be universal. [...] Within human internationalism, such ethical obligations are combined with what is considered to be in the best long-term interest of the Northern countries concerned (Stokke 1996:23).*

Stokke argues that this dual nature of human internationalism has contributed largely to the shaping of development policies and the mobilising of support for these in a diverse group of donor countries.

On the most general level one might say that the altruistically rooted motives for development assistance presented in this subsection are more intimately connected to multilateral- than to bilateral foreign aid. The common argument is that multilateral development assistance to a large extent is detached from national interest than what is the case for bilateral aid. Thus, the amount of aid channelled through international organisations (e.g. UN) can be said to provide some indicator for the motive behind aid (Hellebø 1998; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003:22). However, this is only a rough indicator, and it would be an error to classify bilateral aid *a priori* as rooted in selfish motives.

### **2.3 Common Interests Related to Global Challenges**

Issues regarded as constituting common global challenges have slowly emerged forming a third category of motives for providing development assistance. The motives originate in the recognition of certain issues as being profoundly global, this implies that the solution to them must also be sought by global measures. The foremost example is the global environmental challenges. These issues were drawn to everyone's attention by the report issued in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) - the Brundtland Commission. The Commission's report "Our common future" (WCED 1987) linked the environmental challenges to development aid. Putting focus on the need for *sustainable development* globally in order for the environmental challenges to be overcome, the report argued that development aid should be increased in order for the poor countries to be able to meet these challenges satisfactorily. The increase in aid volume was seen as a prerequisite for enabling the developing countries to meet these challenges without neglecting their primary objective of development. The later *Earth Summit* held in Rio de Janeiro (1992), reinforced the points made by the Brundtland commission, and together these formed an international consensus on the need for applying environmental elements to development policies (Kothari and Minogue 2002). Linking the environmental challenges to the development agenda, the international consensus that was formed in the late eighties and the early nineties had wide reaching consequences both in applied policy and in scholarly work in the field of development (Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003:193).



Environmental motives are possibly the most high-profile motives within this category, however there are also other motives of some magnitude. Development aid in recent years has been used as a means to slow down immigration to European countries from the Middle East and Africa. This is not a common and widespread practice, but some donors (e.g. EU countries) have been known to provide third countries with development aid as a reward for taking in refugees who were denied entrance into the donor country (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003:16). Also the desire to halt various types of trafficking (e.g. drugs) has been a known motive for providing development assistance, though this is of minor importance when seen relative to the total amount of aid.

The category of motives for development aid treated in this section can be seen as dealing with issues related to the formerly mentioned phenomenon of *inter-dependency*. By this is meant that these elements function as motives for providing aid because of their global nature. These issues are local in origin, but hold a potential for having global consequences. Thus, these issues represent challenges to the donors, challenges that can only be met through a strategy for development in the recipient countries based on a principle of sustainability. Though environmental problems are of a somewhat different nature than the two other examples of immigration and trafficking, they are all intrinsically linked to the greater issue of poverty, and are local in origin and global in reach (Smith 1992; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003:314).


In the literature in the field, immigration and trafficking is occasionally sorted under the former heading of *national security* motives, however, I see these issues as more closely associated with the category of common global challenges, and so I choose to place these under the heading of this subsection, although both cases can be argued. The relation between these issues and poverty is the focal point, and the relation that makes these issues constitute a motivational basis for development aid.

## **2.5 Summary of Motives**

The presentation offered here is provided on the basis of the conventional manner for treating motives in development policy as identified in scholarly literature. Offering the three categories of motives separately is done solely an orderly presentation; the structure applies poorly to empirical examples. Empirically, the three categories are believed to be intertwined and inseparable and difficult to untangle. In addition these motives are seen as varying from

issue to issue, and over time within the policy-line of the donor. To structure this complexity it might be intuitively better to think of the various motives as interceptive continuums (Figure 2.1). This figure places the various motives in a trade-off relation along two continuums. Depending on the level of aggregation chosen for the account one may make an assessment of the motives of a donor on a general or on a more precise level by employing this simple model.

**Figure 2.1 Motives in development assistance**



(Dengbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003:17)

Considering development policy as being rooted in specific motives such as those presented above simultaneously presupposes that the donor constitutes an entity capable of holding such motives. However, considering the *state* as the donor of development assistance gives rise to the dubious common practise of attributing motives to this “collective actor”.

In general, when dealing with the state as an entity, the central political institutions may be identified as the *state*. These are indeed the rightful holders of legitimate political power in a democracy,<sup>4</sup> however, knowing that the national policies within a democracy originates within a domestic arena comprised of various actors each pursuing influence over policy, indicates that an understanding of the processes that lies prior to the adaptation and implementation of policy is needed in order to fully grasp the concept of motives. This notion, concerning the holder of motives in development policy, will be further considered in a later chapter developing the approach for this study. For the present it should simply be noted that the concept of the state as a singular and unitary actor is here recognised to be of a dubious nature that should be further explored.

<sup>4</sup> The vast majority of development assistance is provided by states, and the majority of states engaged in international development assistance as donors are democracies.

From the issue of motives in development policy in general, I will in the next section move on to deal with donor motives and development policy in the case of Norway, offering the reader a thorough introduction to the Norwegian history as a donor the next section provides a more vivid and in-depth account of the concept of motives in development policies.

### 3 – Norway: The Donor

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Norway has a longstanding tradition as donor of development assistance. The initial steps were taken within the framework of the UN in the late 1940s and in a joint Scandinavian hospital project in the early years of the Korean War. As early as in 1952 the Norwegian Government funded its first project of bilateral aid in the Indian province Kerala. However, when the Norway engaged in development aid after the Second World War, they had two strong and distinct national movements to draw upon for knowledge in the field.

In the fifties, as the Norwegian Government was initiating its first project, various national Christian organisations already had a long standing tradition of missionary and aid. The Christian missionary movement was established in Norway with the forming of Norwegian Missionary Society (NMS) in 1842 and has since remained strong. This strong tradition of Christian missionary was by no means weakened by the aftermath of WWII. When the Norwegian Government engaged in its project in Kerala it did so by allocating 10 million NOK to the project, the same year twice that amount was privately raised and channelled through the Christian missionary organisations (Simensen 2003:29). This strong stand of the Christian organisations and their broad based, hands-on knowledge of the development field made them natural collaborators for the inexperienced Norwegian Government from the very beginning.

In addition to the Christian missionary tradition, the Norwegian state could also draw upon the humanitarian tradition, also this strongly represented in Norway. This tradition was rooted in the thoughts and ideas from the enlightenment era and represented in modern form in the relief-work done by organisations like the Red Cross during the second half of the nineteenth century, and more profoundly during the First World War. Between the two great wars of the twentieth century these same ideas became manifested in the founding of the League of Nations. The League of Nations emerged as a response to the devastating war and the need for international dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts. As a humanitarian organisation, working with relief-operations and with refugees, the organisation focused on peace and human dignity. Representing these ideas internationally within the framework of the League of Nations and also nationally in Norway was Fridtjof Nansen. Still a national hero in Norway

after his great expeditions, his tireless efforts for humanity and his important international work was widely supported and had great appeal both popularly and within the Norwegian Government. His work, and the tradition and ideas it rested upon, was the other non-religious tradition from which the Norwegian Government could derive knowledge and inspiration when turning aid donor.

The two traditions are distinct, but the values and ideas supported by the two are to a large extent unifiable. This has been evident from the very beginning within Norwegian development assistance.

### ***3.1 The First Steps as a Donor***

Norway launched its first bilateral programme of development assistance in India in 1952. Inexperienced and with modest resources the Norwegian Government identified a project that was thematically and geographically limited, a fishery project in the region of Kerala. The concentration of effort to one particular region and to one particular sector was done for the sole purpose of engaging in an achievable project. This was necessary in order to generate popular support for development assistance at home, and in order to make the limited resources count and be visible. At this point in time bilateral aid was still in its infancy. Only the former colonial powers and the USA had bilateral aid programmes when Norway launched the Kerala-project, this made Norway the first small industrial nation to bring about country-to-country aid relations and side-track the larger multilateral project within the framework of the UN (Galtung 1974; Simensen 2003:49-55).<sup>5</sup> The choice of India, and specifically the region of Kerala, was made for various reasons. The choice of country must be seen in light of the US activities in India at the time and the trans-Atlantic orientation in Norwegian foreign policy after WWII. The choice of this particular project was less political and based more on an evaluation of the various possibilities presented to Norway by the Indian authorities and an assessment of the Norwegian capabilities and expertise in the different fields.

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<sup>5</sup> The Norwegian Kerala project was, as it was outlined in 1952, an agreement between India, UN and Norway, and was heavily affected by the traditions for development assistance that were present within the UN at the time. However, the agreement was still bilateral of nature (Simensen 2003:49-55).

In an historic account of the political debate among Norwegian politicians leading up to the initiation of the project various motives and goals have been revealed for why Norway ended up launching the project. The continuation of the traditions of the formerly presented movements was one element to this equation, but far from the whole truth. The reorientation of Norwegian foreign policy, from a pre-war neutral line to a militarised western-oriented line, called for a balancing element. In the eyes of many, development assistance offered this softer counter-balance to the increased militaristic profile of Norwegian foreign policy (Ibid., 42-43). Development assistance was also argued to be the logical extension of the defence build-up since it was seen as an element for securing peace. This argument was widely contested but still put forward. The western-oriented foreign policy profile adopted by the Norway came with some obligations. The American fight against communism was at this time initiated and well undertaken, a fight which rhetoric also reached the Norwegian debate. The promotion of democracy and market-economy was seen as the best means for keeping communism at bay in threatened areas, democracy was in time seen as contingent on improved economic performance, and hence development assistance was linked to the ongoing fight on communism. However, among the initial arguments for entering into development assistance also other arguments than those presented this far, regarding national security issues, were central. National economic motives were also present in the argument that the development assistance would help establish future export markets for Norway and other western industrialised nations. Though, it might seem like the overwhelming majority of motives for the initial programme in India was self-centred, also other motive and arguments were in play.

As mentioned above, but not elaborated on, much of the reason for the early Norwegian initiative in development assistance is to be found in the Christian and humanitarian traditions of missionary and relief-work, which have had a strong standing in Norway. Along the line of ideas represented within these traditions the argument that the west had a moral obligation to help the underdeveloped nations develop was put forward, this argument was further expanded by pointing to the role of the west in putting the underdeveloped nations in their unfortunate position in the first place. This period in Norwegian politics was also marked by the dominating position of the Labour party (DnA), this dominating position also lead to the employment of arguments rooted in international solidarity, a concept closely related to socialist thought.

Arguments promoting development assistance because of the good effect this could have on the international profile of Norway were also put forward in the debate, a debate that all-in-all centred around arguments for the positive effect development assistance would have for Norway, and that only to a minor extent was occupied with the effect the programmes would have in the recipient country.

### ***3.2 Development of Development Programmes***

As indicated in the former section the initial introduction of Norwegian bilateral programmes for aid was done to a large extent based on self-centred considerations, and only secondary as a project for developing the recipient country. Of course the relative success of the project would (at least partially) determine the success of the policy. Though, the account this far has been of Norway's initial steps as a donor of development assistance and only in relation to the first decade from the launching of the project in India. The Norwegian development assistance grew after this, both in fiscal size and geographical scope. In this section I will give an account of the expansion of the Norwegian development programmes, and the general development of Norway as a donor country up until the present.

#### **3.2.1 The Establishment and Development of a Donor**

Throughout the fifties the general conception in international development assistance was that developing countries were incapable of receiving large transfers of monetary funds, technical assistance was seen as the best (and only) way to facilitate development in the recipient countries (Simensen 2003:79). This trend started to change towards the end of the fifties, the new choice of how to distribute the funds became a central and often posed question.

The question of how to proceed with the development assistance also found centre stage in the Norwegian policy debate. In this time period the World Bank (WB) was established as an institution providing grants and loans to developing countries. The WB was viewed by the developing countries as being overly focused on economic performance, and they therefore argued that an institution with similar functions should be based within the framework of the UN and have a softer approach.<sup>6</sup> Norway was throughout this period in accordance with the

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<sup>6</sup> The first call for this was in 1952, but received no support. Throughout the fifties this remained a request of the developing countries, but was never widely supported by the industrial west. In 1957 a "light version" was set up

developing countries, trying to portray an image of being on the developing countries' side. However, siding with the developing countries in these matters provided Norway with a predicament. The USA favoured a strong position of the WB in international development assistance. Norway, being closely associated with and dependent on the USA, had to prioritise between popularity in the developing countries and in the USA. In an historic account Jarle Simensen has noted that there was a large gap between Norway's expressed policy and their actual doing in these matters, implying that Norway expressed political support for the point of view of the developing countries, but acted as supporter of the US position (Simensen 2003:90-97). This tendency is also possible to trace elsewhere in Norwegian policies. In the early 1960s the developing countries joined force and called for a conference to be held within the UN concerning issues of trade and development. Unified in "the group of 77" the developing countries organised for the first time in a front with common demands. Earlier, before the conference, Norway had in the UN proclaimed wide reaching support for the developing countries, but when the demands of the UNCTAD were formulated the same gap between word and action was revealed on the part of Norway. The Norwegian reluctance came about due to national commercial interests, especially in relations to measures aimed at regulating international shipping. The Norwegian commercial fleet was in the early sixties the fourth largest in the world, and vital to the Norwegian capabilities for generating badly needed foreign currency. The importance of free competition in this industry was great, something that made this consideration top priority of the Norwegian Government. Where considerations for the developing countries came in conflict with national economic interests, Norway deviated from their expressed policy-line and pursued the latter. In order to understand these priorities one must understand the situation of the Norwegian Government.

Norway was at this time still recovering from the war, but it should be kept in mind that Norway even before the war was a poor and backward country.<sup>7</sup> The Marshall-plan provided Norway with needed resources for reconstruction and modernisation, but the Norwegian economy continued to be weak and in need of foreign investments. While the first bilateral project in Kerala was launched, and the general development policy-line was adopted in order

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within the UN, but this structure was unsatisfactory to the developing countries. The shift in numerical power of the developing countries in the UN as a consequence of the decolonisation, lead to the establishing of the UNCDF. But without support from the industrialised nations the fund was left without the means necessary in order to play the vital role it was designated (Simensen 2003:79-97).

<sup>7</sup> Norway was in relation to the Marshall-plan from 1948 characterised as an "underdeveloped country". This was done partially due to political persuasion from the Norwegian minister of trade seeking downgrading in order to gain an advantage in the allocation of resources. However, it also mirrored the basic truth, that Norway was a poor country in need of outside assistance in order to handle the immense challenges.



to gain international recognition for Norway, most policies had to take Norwegian economical interests into account. Furthermore, Norway had a dual relationship with the WB-system, on the one hand it contributed with funds to the organisation, on the other it received large loans for own development.<sup>8</sup> Norway used the contributions as a means for being eligible for receiving WB loans. This was the Norwegian situation when the developing countries continued to push for a UN based fund with a softer profile, thus Norway was faced with a dilemma. This dilemma ultimately led to Norwegian support for a US initiated compromise with the set-up of an additional fund within the WB-group. The International Development Association (IDA) was set up in 1960 for the purpose of providing long-term loans more in line with the demands of the development countries. Norway came to favour the IDA along with a few other institutions (e.g. UNDP, WFP) for the disbursement of multilateral development assistance throughout the sixties, but was due to self-interest incapable of lending more real support to the developing countries.

The sixties are also to be considered the decade in which the policy-field of development assistance became institutionalised in Norway. The first Norwegian bilateral aid-programme in Kerala was set up outside the state institutions, only administrated by an ad hoc organisation. In 1962 the first real institution for administrating the policy-field was set up, but its structure left many issues unresolved. This again led to a restructuring of the organisation in 1968, something that resulted in the Norwegian Agency for International development (NORAD). NORAD has later gone through numerous reforms and changes, but is still today a central institution within the field of development policy.

### **3.2.2 The Seventies**

The first years of the seventies continued the trend of the late sixties (Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003). Norway continued to favour multilateral channels for the disbursement of development funds (60% in 1970) and the total budget for development assistance grew steadily, aiming to reach the common international goal of 1% of net national product (NNP) of annual transfers sometime in the first half of the seventies (Stokke 1984).<sup>9</sup> One of the initial arguments for choosing Kerala in India as a first project of Norwegian

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<sup>8</sup> In the time period between 1954 and 1963 Norway received six WB loans with a combined total of 145 million dollars; in the same time period the annual Norwegian contribution to the WB was somewhat over 1 million dollars.

<sup>9</sup> This goal, initially proclaimed more or less randomly in 1960, had been heavily debated. In Norway some suggested a commitment to increase the budget each year towards the ultimate goal, while others again saw such a commitment as total nonsense (Simensen 2003:124).

development aid had been the need for concentrating Norwegian transfers in order to make visible the difference the Norwegian effort could have. Employing the same logic led in the late 1960s to the selection of a particular group of countries for co-operation. Choosing these countries Norway sought to concentrate its efforts of development assistance on a small group of recipient countries in a fairly concentrated region. The need for geographical concentration was identified in order for the inexperienced donor to accumulate valid knowledge across the borders. The choice in the sixties fell on a small group of six countries, two of the countries represented the continuation of existing programmes (India and Pakistan), while the four others were new partners in co-operation (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia).<sup>10</sup> In essence this is a group of countries that has largely remained central beneficiaries of Norwegian development assistance up until today. The general principle of concentrating development assistance is also a feature that remains intact within Norwegian policy, though the scope of the Norwegian policies in this field have grown and is today of a different nature than what it started out to be in the fifties and sixties. In general Norwegian development assistance can be said to have gone through its formative decade in the sixties, while the seventies, in essence, continued on the path already indicated (Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003). This observation may be extended as to include international development assistance as such. The positions of the international institutions became clearer towards the end of the sixties, in many respects the WB won its hegemony in the sixties establishing what can be termed a international *regime* for development assistance.<sup>11</sup> This regime of the WB became clear in the course of the seventies (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003).

Though the seventies started out by a continuation of the trends in development policies from the late sixties, the new decade also brought about changes. In the first half of the seventies the Norwegian trend of added emphasis on the bilateral programmes became obvious, while the multilateral channels for development assistance had been in favour throughout the sixties, the early seventies tipped the balance in favour of bilateral aid (Simensen 2003; Stokke 1984). In addition to being a factual occurrence, a restatement of distribution goals was issued by the

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<sup>10</sup> Additional countries have been included and co-operation with some countries has also been terminated since the first selection of programme countries for long-time co-operation.

<sup>11</sup> *Regime* is here employed meaning a system of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making mechanisms within a limited field of policy on the international arena (My translation Østerrud, Goldmann, Pedersen 1997).

Cabinet proclaiming a reorientation with more emphasis on bilateral programmes.<sup>12</sup> The bilateral aid was also provided with a new-found focus on poverty (Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003; Simensen 2003; Stokke 1984). The general principle as established in the seventies targeted the poor segments of the population within poor and underdeveloped countries. This was an early focus on pro-poor policies that since has been fundamental within Norwegian development assistance.

Internationally the seventies also brought about clear changes, pro-poor policies were launched by the WB based on a belief that targeting the poor was a prerequisite for economic growth, this strategy was followed up and pursued by other international organisations (e.g. UNDP). However, the greatest changes came about as results of the first post-WWII economical crisis. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) successful cartelisation of the world oil market, and the shocks this caused in the whole world economy, reshaped the market perception in the west. The fear of producer-cartels like the OPEC was further heightened by the real shortage of raw materials. These tendencies in the international markets in the first part of the 1970's changed the relative position of the developing countries vis-à-vis the west. Suddenly the western dependency on imports of raw material made these countries feel the vulnerability of their economies (Grilli 1994; Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003). The immediate changes this caused in relation to development policy, were an improved status of the developing countries vis-à-vis the west in international fora. However, this situation was temporary, and though issues of importance were put under discussion and had real consequences, the second half of the seventies brought about a weakening of the economical position of the developing countries. This weakened position was brought about by the high oil prices and at the same time a continued fall in prices on raw materials which was the most important exports of most developing countries. Combined, these trends lead to large deficits in the developing countries balance of payment, forcing them deeper into debt (largely to the IMF and the WB) (Cameron 1997:395).

In relation to Norway and the Norwegian programmes of development assistance the time of the oil-crisis also mark a watershed in various respects. The oil-crises hit the world economy at the same time as Norway started to profit from its offshore oil adventure in the North Sea.

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<sup>12</sup> In an official document from the Norwegian government (St. melding nr. 29,1971-1972) the goal of a 50-50 distribution between bilateral and multilateral channels is explicitly mentioned.

This made the shock to the national economy somewhat softer since increased earnings went along with the high oil prices. The increased earnings of Norway soon became manifested in a radical growth in the budgets for development assistance. The increase in the Norwegian budget went along with a general increase in most donor countries' budgets. However, these increases could not alone counter the trends of the international economy in the second half of the seventies.

**Table 3.1: Norwegian development assistance 1970-1979 (Figures contains administrative expenses)**

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
<b>NOK Millions</b>	274	307	436	524	773	985	1225	1612	1911	2222
<b>% of GNP</b>	0.34	0.34	0.44	0.47	0.58	0.66	0.72	0.84	0.90	0.93

(Source: NOS Statistical Yearbook, SSB)

The situation for the developing countries was intolerable, and the downward spiral-effect the international crisis had placed on their national economies became an issue within international fora and was widely debated. In the course of the seventies the desperate situation of the developing countries was recognised internationally, the expected effect of the development policies did not occur and the positive buzz surrounding development assistance in the sixties was replaced by a less optimistic tone. Within the fora of the UN the developing countries started to push for a reorientation and a restructuring of the world economy, a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The claims were not new, but the international climate secured more sympathy for the cause. Norway had been, as presented above, reluctant to support special protective provisions for the developing countries in trade. However, when the issue was raised again more forcefully in the mid-seventies the Norwegian position was more in line with the claims of the developing countries. From the Norwegian Cabinet statements of solidarity were issued and Parliament gave its support. Throughout the debate in the UN, Norway supported the claims of the developing countries, moving far away from its earlier support of a liberal-economic world system. Though, toward the end of the seventies when the Norwegian contribution was to be specified, Norway once more displayed a gap between expressed and executed policy. The negotiations both with regards to shipping, textiles and agriculture came to a stall. Norwegian commercial interests were once more the top priority. The programme of a New International Economic Order was shut down without results in 1979, and the developing countries entered the eighties in a sad status of dismay.

### 3.2.3 The Eighties

After the shut down of the negotiations for the NIEO, the perception of the developing countries' lack of development was changing. The optimism in the industrial countries for the development project in the south was fading, and focus in development policies was starting to change world wide. This was also the case in Norway where the constantly increasing budget for development assistance was given more popular attention. The inefficiency of development assistance was internationally portrayed as resulting from the structural chaos within the various recipient countries, and calls were starting to be made for a more stringent scheme for the disbursement of aid (Stokke 1996; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003).

The early eighties were marked by the continued crisis of the developing countries, the oil-prices had remained high since the start of the seventies, but a new shock led to yet another increase in prices in the early eighties. The high oil-prices directly led to higher interest rates on loans from the international institutions,<sup>13</sup> giving already struggling economies their final blow. Mexico was the first developing country not able to fulfil its economic obligations, but many other countries struggled likewise and followed close.

Within the World Bank, McNamara was replaced as president by Clausen in 1981, a change that resulted in a new policy-line of the bank. The new policy-line adopted by the bank, soon put the bank in a leading position in formulating international economic theory. The new-liberalistic theory as formulated by the bank won further appeal internationally with the election of Margaret Thatcher as UK Prime Minister and Ronald Reagan as US President. In essence the bank called for restructuring of the recipient countries' domestic economies, the lack of development in the seventies and the indebted situation of most developing countries in the early eighties was explained largely by bad domestic policies on part of the recipient. The measures suggested to alter this trend was a roll-back of the state in terms of administration, radical devaluation of the currencies and budgetary cut-backs. The ultimate goal was to reshape the developing countries' economies, making them market based and competitive. The World Bank started to work closer together with the IMF, providing loans conditional on economic reform.

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<sup>13</sup> The interest rate on loans increased as a response to the crisis, but also the budgetary policy of the large industrial countries (e.g. USA) affected the level of the interest rates in the same manner.

In Norway the debate in the early eighties was somewhat broader based, the World Bank's one-sided focus on internal factors as the reason for the desperate situation, was contested and the situation in the development countries was explained by both internal and external factors. The Nordic countries joined together in criticising the World Bank for, what they saw as, being ideologically motivated policies for rolling back the state (Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003). The criticism of the neo-liberalistic approach of the World Bank by the Nordic countries, however, did not manifest itself in actual policy. In the case of Norway, many of these issues were handled by the administration. The focus of Norway was primarily on the bi-lateral programmes, while the transfers of funds to the multi-lateral institutions (about 50% of ODA) were continued without political debate. This profile led to confusion, Norway pursued different policies bi-laterally and multi-laterally: transferring funds to be allocated according to stringent economical conditionalities by the World Bank, while pursuing a softer and more social profile when co-operating bi-laterally. In 1983 a ministry was set up for administering development assistance (DUH), after reviewing Norwegian development policy-line the DUH suggested that Norway should not pursue the line of the WB, the Ministry of Finance advised the Government to do just that. The result was Norwegian policy-alignment with the World Bank and the IMF, Norwegian assistance was not to be provided before structural adjustments set by the IMF was agreed upon by the recipient country (Ibid.).

In the second half of the eighties the critics of the policy-line of the WB/IMF became more prominent, the debate in Norway gave much attention to arguments put forward by African state-leaders. Among these the most profound was the argument that the WB/IMF policies were badly adjusted to meet individual needs of the different countries, and that the WB/IMF delegations sat aside local authorities administering projects without local participation. African countries were reluctant to accept and implement the structural plan of the WB/IMF, but the hegemonic condition in development assistance led to the situation where most funds (bi- and multi-lateral) were made conditional upon IMF/WB criteria of economic reform, it was a "take it or leave it"-situation where most recipients were forced into taking the offered funds and the economical reform-packages that came along with these (Stokke 1996; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003; Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003)

In 1986 the World Bank President for five years, Clausen, stepped down leaving his position to Conable, also this time the change of President meant a change in policy-line. The criticism of the IMF/WB's policy-line was in 1986 and onwards commonplace, the fact that no real progress was made in terms of development despite introducing the economic reforms, made the criticism more forceful and it needed to be taken into account. In Norway Gro Harlem Brundtland resumed office in May 1986 heading her second labour Cabinet, the following year her Cabinet issued an "additional report" revising some policies in the development policy field.<sup>14</sup> The central issue in the report was the debt crisis of the south, and the following discussion was concerned with radical means for remediation such as a re-launch of the NIEO, and even a Marshall-plan for the south. Internationally these measures were of course unrealistic, this was also recognised in Norway, but focus placed on these issues in the Norwegian public and political debate indicates the radical shift that occurred within Norway (and in the Nordic countries as such) in the mid-eighties. Norway, along with the other Nordic countries, continued to push for radical measures within the IMF/WB. One of these measures was debt-release an issue that was far too radical to be implemented internationally, but that spurred debate concerning other feasible measures. One initiative the Nordic countries made that was adopted within the World Bank was the transfer of loans from the IBRD to the IDA, this provided the debtor with better conditions and therefore better possibilities for making payment. Other measures were also made in order to improve the loaning conditions, but none of these became as widely used as first intended (Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003). Towards the end of the eighties and in the beginning of the nineties the IMF/WB issued reports adapting a new policy-orientation.<sup>15</sup> In many respects this change of policy-line has been seen as a response to, and a realisation of, the malfunctioning policy-orientation sustained by the IMF/WB throughout the eighties (Stokke 1996; Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003).

The issues pushed for within the international institutions were also formative in a re-orientation of Norwegian bi-lateral programmes of development assistance. From the issuing of the "additional report" in 1987, Norway adopted a policy-line including more emphasis on human resources and on social, political and administrative reforms in the recipient countries. Much of the inspiration for the reorientation, both in Norway and elsewhere was derived from

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<sup>14</sup> "Tilleggsmelding" 1987. A report considered additional to the report issued earlier (1984) by the conservative government under Prime Minister Willoch.

<sup>15</sup> World Bank reports: *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* 1989 and the *World Development Report* 1990.

the UN organisations, which throughout the eighties functioned as the centre for the ideological opposition to the World Bank and the IMF. This reorientation of Norwegian policy also became evident in the new tendency of including NGOs in development assistance work. From the mid-eighties and onwards, national NGOs became increasingly involved in carrying out projects on behalf of the Norwegian Government, the general aim was to target civil society to a larger extent believing that these NGOs were more capable of this than a government agency (Tvedt 1993; see also Tvedt and Børkved 1992 and Tvedt 1998).

Although some improvements were made during the eighties, the overall lack of success of the development-policies adopted by most donors in the eighties left the developing countries in much the same situation at the end of the decade as they had been in at the beginning. Exceptions from this general pattern exist and the foremost among these are the countries of south-east Asia (e.g. Taiwan, Korea) which during the eighties experienced a boom in their economies with a constant high growth, little of this can however be ascribed development assistance. This was the exception, the majority of countries classified as developing countries at the beginning of the decade remained within the same category at the end. Furthermore, the situation in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, was in some cases even worse than what it had been at the start of the decade. This overall trend of the decade is the reason for the eighties being referred to as “the lost decade” in terms of development.

### **3.2.4 The Nineties**

The early nineties involved the introduction of a new set of conditionalities into development policy. The obvious failure of the development regime of the eighties where too much emphasis had been placed on economic reform, had led to a longstanding wish to also include administrative and political reforms into the reform-packages. The inclusion of these elements became possible with the events in Eastern-Europe in the late eighties and early nineties. As mentioned earlier, the downfall of the Eastern-block, and with it the ideological rivalry of the Cold War, paved the way for the inclusion of more politicised issues into development policy. The inclusion of features such as democratic principles and human rights,<sup>16</sup> now believed to be vital for development,<sup>17</sup> created a positive attitude towards development in the new decade

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<sup>16</sup> Human rights had been included into development policies before but than the emphasis had mostly been on *economic rights*, the inclusion also of *civil and political rights* was the new element.

<sup>17</sup> Though communism still had some strongholds (e.g. China), it no longer functioned as a ideological counterpart to democracy in the way it had done throughout the Cold War.



(Stokke 1995, 1996; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). However, it soon became evident that the countries formerly within the political sphere of the Soviet Union, commonly referred to as “the transition economies”, needed increased attention from the west. Crisis on the Balkan along with general economic instability in Eastern-Europe drew away much of the attention which had earlier been exclusively held by the developing countries. The increase in the number of recipient countries occurred at a time when aid fatigue due to lack of development, and a general world wide economic recession, caused many of the large donors to make cuts in their development assistance budgets, the combined effect was an even harder competition for funds (Stokke 1995, 1996:50-58; Liland and Alsaker Kjerland 2003).

Through the eighties, the World Bank along with the IMF had manifested themselves as important institutions in international development assistance, and the shift in policy that occurred within these institutions in the late eighties further placed them at the centre stage. The World Bank had, from its origin, a principle of not interfering in the domestic policies of the recipient countries. This principle was partially sat aside when the bank issued the 1989 report *Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth* (World Bank 1989), widely criticising the internal policies of the various developing countries, identifying them as a major factor for the lack of development. Soon after the release of the report changes in bank policies became apparent. In the early nineties the second generation of conditionality, promoting internal political and administrative reform were adopted, however due to continued controversy within member fora, the IDA was chosen as the arena for implementing these conditionalities. Political conditionalities, promoting adherence to human rights and democratic principles, were seen as fundamental to development. Political reform, both administrative and regime-wise, was aimed at empowering the poor and raising their standard of living immediately, these pro-poor measures promoting social stability were seen as a precondition for all forms of improvements in terms of development (Stokke 1996; Wilson et al. 2001). *Good governance* became the term employed, the term is somewhat vague, but covers broad aspects such as: transparency in state affairs, rule of law, adherence to democratic principles and human rights.<sup>18</sup> With these additional features implemented into the World Bank’s policies the profile of the Bank was changing once more, the previously

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<sup>18</sup> The concept of *Good Governance* is intuitive on a general level, but is treated somewhat differently by different scholars. Common for all are the features mentioned above, but no precise definition is provided in order to construct a line of demarcation between “good” and “bad” governance (for further readings see Clapp, Alfreðsson and Sano 2002) .

dominating policy of structural reshaping of the developing countries' economies was increasingly being taken care of by the authorities in the recipient countries, this allowed the World Bank to put focus and redirect funds towards different aspects of development, thus the World Bank was turning into a fully-fledged development institution. This development within the Bank was continuous throughout the nineties, but was stepped up when Wolfensohn took office as bank president in 1995. Though many were enthusiastic, the regime of political conditionalities also received widespread criticism, for instance for being a means for the donors of aid to legitimise their withdrawal from (cut backs in) development co-operation (Smith and Light 2001), nonetheless the approach was during the early nineties adopted by most donors of development assistance (Stokke 1995, 1996; Angell 1997).

For the case of Norway, budgets were also reduced in the early nineties, in addition to this trend the first years of the decade also involved a partial reorientation in development policy where new elements were introduced. On a general level immediate crisis and efforts to create and maintain peace were given more attention, but also within the standing bi-lateral development programmes new elements such as women's rights, more emphasis on environmental issues and emphasis on education were included (Stokke 1996; Liland and Alsaker Kjerland 2003). This more *holistic* approach, where development was seen as a complex process resting upon multiple sectors, resulted in practical terms in a broader based Norwegian development policy both in terms of geographical scope and programme engagement in each recipient country. Complementing this broader based policy-line in terms of implementation the earlier mentioned inclusion of NGOs was continued and increased throughout the nineties, becoming an integral part in carrying out Norwegian development policy (Tvedt 1993, 1998).

This broadening of the scope of Norwegian development policy was introduced in spite of the continued preservation of the longstanding principle of concentrating aid geographically for efficiency reasons, and lead to controversy between the administration and the political leadership (Liland and Alsaker Kjerland 2003: 205). At the same time Norway launched the principle of *recipient responsibility*, which implied that the donor country was to be less engaged in the various projects leaving the selection, planning and execution of programmes up to the recipient countries. More emphasis was, from the Norwegian side, placed on aid efficiency something that made Norway favour cross-country co-ordination of development assistance. The World Bank became the institution favoured by Norway for this donor co-

ordination. The Norwegian belief in the World Bank as a development policy institution *per se* was further manifested when the Minister of International Development replaced the Minister of Finance as the Norwegian governor to the bank in 1998, this change came on request from the foreign ministry and indicates the Norwegian perception of the changes in World Bank policies during the nineties.

The Norwegian efforts towards a larger degree of co-ordination among donors also came to expression regionally with the forming of a well co-ordinated position of the Scandinavian countries within various organisations. The events in the east had downplayed the geopolitical tension in the region allowing for a higher degree of policy co-operation and co-ordination, this offered a possibility for a well orchestrated position for like-minded countries in international fora. Scandinavian credibility based on their persistent efforts in development policy from the early post-war years, and the fact that the coalition jointly contributed with a large portion of the funds of various international organs, made the co-operation highly successful resulting in partial support for the Scandinavian progressive policy-position both within the World Bank and the UN. The Scandinavian co-operation, though successful, became less significant with the inclusion of Finland and Sweden into the European Union (EU) in 1995. The EU administrates a large donor programme on behalf of its members, making Finland and Sweden pre-occupied with EU policies in the field, Norway withdrew its membership-application based on a popular referendum and remained outside the European project of co-operation (EU). However, despite the diminishing significance of the Scandinavian co-operation, co-operation among likeminded within other fora blossomed in the mid- and late nineties (e.g. the Utstein-group).<sup>19</sup>

At the beginning of the nineties Norwegian development assistance was still aiming for a 50-50 distribution between bi- and multi-lateral assistance, however, the bi-lateral projects continued to receive a growing portion of the total budget. At the same time funds directed towards the international organisations were to an increasing degree specified in order to secure that Norwegian priorities were served, this phenomenon is commonly referred to as

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<sup>19</sup> Utstein-group: a group of like-minded formed in 1999 deriving its name from its first meeting at a Norwegian monastery.

multi-bilateral development assistance.<sup>20</sup> These trends circumscribed the portion of multi-lateral assistance, a trend that continued throughout the nineties.

**Table 3.2: Composition of Norwegian development assistance 1990-2000**

	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Bilateral	56,5%	56,5%	59,2%	57,0%	56,6%	60,7%
Multilateral	37,1%	36,3%	27,1%	27,9%	28,0%	26,0%
Multibi	6,4%	7,2%	13,7%	15,1%	15,4%	13,3%

Source: Norad (Bilateral assistance includes costs of administration)

The international trends of decreasing budgets for development assistance, made Norway adopt a policy promoting trade. In order to make the developing countries capable of trading internationally, generating national income, the painful economic reforms of the eighties were upheld as a necessary evil. The Labour Administration had in the second half of the eighties resumed internal discussions concerning issues of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). These thoughts were effectively abandoned in the early nineties and rather than seeking international systemic change, the Norwegian strategy sought to adapt the economies of the developing countries to the existing international market system. Implementing political conditionalities in its development policies, Norway came to favour a line of policy that best can be termed “moderate market liberalism”, where emphasis was placed on both market and state along the traditions of the Nordic model (Tvedt 2003: Liland and Alsaker Kjerland 2003). Though promoting trade as a means for bringing the development process in the south back on track, Norway once again displayed an inability to follow up proclaimed policies in its actual policy-line, this became evident when the country continued to protect domestic production using tariff barriers, quotas for import and other means for trade regulation. Some measures were made to spur exports from developing countries (e.g. flower exports from Uganda) and to direct Norwegian foreign investments towards developing countries (e.g. the establishing of NORFUND), but these were of minor importance leaving Norway within the general economical pattern of the west.

As mentioned above a new element, forcefully introduced into Norwegian development assistance in the nineties, was the effort to promote peace and stability world wide. Norway

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<sup>20</sup> Development activities financed by one or more countries but implemented by an international organisation or agency (NORAD 2004).

became highly profiled as a peace-promoting country<sup>21</sup> and was constantly involved in peace talks and negotiations between conflicting parties.<sup>22</sup> This was the most prominent feature typifying the Norwegian international profile in the nineties and it fitted well together with the more general aspects of Norwegian development policies promoting democracy and human rights. The rationale for why Norway, a peripheral small country, could acquire such a high profile on the international scene is possible to establish when looking at the structural conditions in the early nineties. For one, the geo-political international climate allowed for Norway to take this active role where considerations for the east-west rivalry had earlier prohibited it. Further, the economical problems hitting many western economies in the early nineties did not affect the oil-economy of Norway to any significant extent, allowing Norway to continue to allocate funds to these issues (see Figure 3.2).<sup>23</sup> Norway did also in this period adopt an image of being highly neutral and “peace-loving”, referring to the country’s lack of a colonial past and its absence of strategic interests further enhanced this profile of Norway as “the good Samaritan”. I will not dwell on the issue of motives for these policies here, they have been said to be many and to include a combination both of motives rooted in self-interest and in altruism. What should be said however is that these features came to define the international profile of Norway throughout the nineteen nineties.

At the end of the nineties the prospects for development assistance seemed lighter, and were surrounded by a much more positive attitude than what it had been at the start of the decade. This trend is evident in the continuation of policies that marked the transition into the new millennium, rather than the discontinuity that had earlier been experienced when moving into new decades. Through the work done in development policy during the nineties the world community was able to agree on the path onwards, towards development in the south. In the following section I will turn to the development in the latest four years, providing the reader with an understanding of today’s programmes in Norwegian development assistance.

### **3.2.5 Development Policy Today**

Unlike the former transition between decades, the transition from the nineties into the new millennium did not represent an abrupt break in international development strategies, nor in

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<sup>21</sup> At least this was the profile promoted domestically.

<sup>22</sup> E.g. Palestine-Israel, Guatemala and Sri-Lanka

<sup>23</sup> Norway did have a reduction in the development budget in the early nineties, but this was a passing trend and the budgets continued to increase steadily during the decade (OECD statistics).

the Norwegian approach to development. Rather, the transition was marked by continuity. The nineties was the decade where issues of development were put under scrutiny in international fora, and discussed both by donors and recipients of development assistance in order to reach a better understanding of the complex processes. These debates were undertaken with topical specificity and ranged from the UN-conference on education in Jomtien 1990,<sup>24</sup> to the 1996 UN-conference on food security in Rome.<sup>25</sup> Common for these conferences is that they shed light upon issues considered as being related to the process of development and ultimately formed the basis for the declaration of September 2000, where the UN-General assembly unanimously voted for an adaptation of the Millennium goals for development. In relation to content the Millennium goals did not represent many new elements. However, the UN formulation represents a quantification of the goals making them measurable in order for the international community to take action towards meeting explicitly formulated targets.

#### **UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG):<sup>26</sup>**

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality, improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

In the early nineties calls were made for an organisational reform of the UN which was losing ground as the primary international organisation in development assistance. Reform was undertaken in the course of the nineties, and the UN was during the decade able to restore its position on the international scene (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). The declaration of the MDG in 2000 within the framework of the organisation, and the later support for these goals by other international organisations such as the World Bank and the

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<sup>24</sup> The World Conference on Education for All: Meeting Basic Learning Needs, Jomtien, Thailand, 5-9 March 1990.

<sup>25</sup> The World Food Summit, Rome, Italy, 13-17 November 1996.

<sup>26</sup> For a more thorough introduction to the MDG see UN web-pages.

IMF, further confirmed the restored position of the UN. Based upon the UN conferences during the nineties the MDG have formed the platform of consensus on which international development assistance rests in the new decade.

Norway, being a member of the UN, also committed its work in development assistance to the eight goals for the new millennium, and continues to do so (St.meld. nr. 35, 2003-2004). In practical terms the manifestation of the eight goals did not represent a sudden shift in Norwegian policy orientation. Resting upon UN declarations, the goals were for the most part well served and in line with Norwegian policy before the formal formulation was passed before the General Assembly. The issue of poverty reduction was placed on the international and on the Norwegian national development agenda ever more forcefully throughout the nineties. The focus on this issue was continued, both internationally and in the case of Norway, into the new decade, something that is evident in the top-priority this issue is given within the MDG (see list above). The principle of partnership, where the recipient country is responsible for the execution of the various projects continued to be stressed by the Norwegian Government, the argument for the choice of this approach continued to be the same, pointing to the synergy-effects this form of project management had. Also donor co-ordination is a principle from the nineties that was carried into the new decade and further developed. The strategies of donor co-operation in various forms (e.g. basket-, multibifunding) have been promoted by Norway since the early nineties, and continue to be promoted and employed both by Norway and also by an increasing group of aid-donors. The Norwegian development strategy continues to focus on Africa (an aim for 42 pros. of total bilateral aid in St. meld. nr. 35, 2003-2004), and also on those countries that lag behind the schedule for reaching the MDG within the set timeframe.<sup>27</sup>

As seen in the former section, the conception of development as a complex and multiple process led Norway to engage in development work in many sectors. Although the situation changed somewhat during the nineties, the focus in Norwegian development policy continued to be broad also in the later part of the decade. In the newly issued Government report to the Parliament (St. meld. Nr. 35, 2003-2004), the Norwegian Government proposes a further narrowing of focus in development policy. The report suggests a continuation of the above mentioned geographical concentration and goes on to suggest this principle complimented by

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<sup>27</sup> Most MDG are formulated with a point of departure in 1990, and seek to accomplish the goal within 2015. However, some of the goals also have a different time horizon.

focus on a smaller number of sectors within each recipient country. This form of concentration is argued to benefit both the recipient and the donor country in that it contributes to reduce the administrative burden and expenses related to project management. In the same report issued by the Government it is suggested that total spending for development policies should be increased, this is suggested due to the commitment made to the MDG and the obvious need for increased funds in order to reach these goals.

This suggested budgetary increase, signifying a substantial increase relative to the budget for 2004 (1.6 Billion NOK), has later been proposed by the Government and approved by Parliament for the budgetary year 2005. These mechanisms allowing for a substantial increase in the budget to be passed before Parliament without much controversy and the overall peculiar situation and climate for development policy debate in Norway will be addressed in the following section.

### **3.2.6 Political and Popular Consensus**

As seen in the preceding sections Norwegian development assistance is largely inter-twined with that of the international community. The trends within the international community of donors have widely been adopted, though the adoption has also left room for national priorities. However, one element that is striking when reviewing the Norwegian history in development assistance is the level of national consensus on which these policies are built. Even though the area of development policy has been subject to controversies concerning aim and focus, the field is generally stripped of political controversy and debate. In the OECD, DAC Peer Review report issued in 1999 the field of Norwegian development policy is characterised as being:

*[b]ased on a broad national consensus, underpinned by the churches, a strong NGO community and an ongoing development education effort [...]. This consensus is reflected in a "grand coalition" in Parliament, assembled around an agreement on the scale and purposes of Norwegian development assistance, and reaching across the major part of the political spectrum (there is some minority dissent) (OECD 1999).*


The newly issued DAC Peer Review report for Norway follows up the picture drawn in 1999 by indicating that “[...] there is a strong national consensus in Norway regarding development co operation, both with respect to funding levels and the priority given to the MDGs, and little disagreement in Parliament regarding the global role Norway is playing [...]” it further goes



on to draw the conclusion that the “[...] public support for development aid [in Norway] is intact [...]” (OECD 2004).

These quotes illustrate that the domestic climate for development policy in Norway. The Parliament in Norway is commonly marked by consensus in issues regarding development policy, some debate is heard in terms of budgetary priorities, however, these are usually of minor importance and have little impact on the final passing of the budget. This was also the case this autumn when the budget proposal was passed through Parliament. Some debate was held, however, this largely dealt with some minor issues concerning priorities between different budgetary posts. The Progress party (Frp) was in this debate, as usual, the only party disagreeing in the more fundamental issues concerning development policy as such. This political climate characterised by consensus is reflected in statistics on the general public's attitudes towards development assistance.

**Figure 3.1: Popular support for development assistance in Norway (percent) (1972-2001)**



(Source: Statistics Norway 2002)


The broad based consensus encompassing both the Government, the political parties in the Parliament and various NGOs and which is backed up by the public opinion, contribute in making issues of development policy uncontroversial. The public debate concerning these issues is and has been largely confined to issues of budget size (Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003:20-21) leaving policy-priorities within the policy area generally untouched. This situation, where the policy-priorities within the field are left untouched by the party politics, is by the scholar Terje Tvedt argued to be a result of the profound character of a "national project" held by the Norwegian development assistance. Tvedt argues that the

status of a "national project" along with some structural features in the field of development policy (e.g. wide ranging scope, geographic distance), have contributed in providing the administration in the field with a relatively large degree of autonomy, both in relation to political authorities and society at large (Tvedt 2003:187-197).

### 3.3 Summary

As seen in this section development policy is constantly changing, from the early post-war years this policy field has changed radically, both in terms of fiscal size, geographical scope and structural arrangement. What started out in the fifties as a profoundly national project has, through a process of both national and international institutionalisation, become a policy-field where international collaboration with other donors is more the rule than the exception. This tendency of a more co-ordinated international donor community has resulted in a broader based international consensus concerning the long-term objectives of development policy, and concerning the means for reaching these objectives. The large international institutions have been setting the agenda in the field of development policy for decades, but their capacity in terms of "normative power" have increased continuously, reaching a preliminary high point with the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000. These international trends have greatly affected the development of Norwegian development policy.

**Figure 3.2: Norwegian ODA as percentage of GNP/GNI**



(Source: Statistics Norway/Norad)<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Some of the decline in the mid-nineties is related to a new methodology for assessing GNI, at this point the allocations for development assistance were starting to be contrasted with GNI rather than with GNP (OECD 2004).

Norwegian development policy started out as a small scale project but the early commitment showed intent for the future. Looking at the Norwegian engagement in development policy it has been possible to recognise different motives behind initiatives, these motives are mixed and many and continue to be present in various manners within the policy field. Although the motives are identified as being many, a striking feature within this field of policy is the absence of political debate concerning different priorities. Reviewing the history of Norway as a donor the most heated debate seems to be concerned with budget size, and then rather concerning radical increases than drastic reductions (Engelsen Ruud and Alsaker Kjerland 2003: 20-21). The political consensus surrounding issues in this field is, as mentioned earlier, striking since the field is politically complex and concerns issues that should be made subject to political and public debates.

Having reviewed the history of Norway as a donor, and having provided some insight into the complexity of the policy field, I will in the next section develop the research approach of this thesis towards the objective of this thesis related to the microfoundation of Norwegian development policy.

## 4 – Structuring the Approach

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*- What are the microfoundations of development policy, namely, who holds these motivations, what are these motivations, and how do we explain them? Furthermore, what constraints do these actors face from other actors within the state? In a word, what underlies the Norwegian foreign development policy formulation process, and to what degree do plural actors within the Norwegian state work more or less in tandem with each other?*

Providing answers adequately contributing in gaining insight into the complex matter presented in this research question, the approach taken is one exploring the role of the administration in Norwegian development assistance. Making the administration the studied entity also allow testing of the rival theoretical models employed as the framework for the approach (see chapter 5). This chapter will outline how the concept presented as the issue of the thesis is developed and operationalised into a precise and measurable concept for inquiry, how data are generated and how the analysis will be structured and conducted.

### **4.1 Considering the Concept of the State**

As was indicated earlier, the concept of the state as a singular and unitary actor is a dubious notion. In terms of political power and policy influence, much of the literature explores the notion of the state itself. These scholarly discussions concerning topics such as power resources-, legitimacy-, autonomy- and cohesion of the state are wide-ranging and end up with different conceptions being held concerning the concept of the *state*.

Concerning the essence of the state as an entity there is a voluminous body of literature to draw upon. Given the nature of the topic, this literature ranges all the way back to ancient antiquity and the works of Plato and Aristotle (Held 1996:13-33). In its modern form the topic of the state has been treated by numerous scholars in various ways. One of the classic definitions of the modern state is offered by Weber in a seminal study on the topic. Defining the state, Weber identifies the foundation on which a state is made as being different from other organisational entities. Formulating his definition, Weber pays particular attention to the state's ability to hold a monopoly of legitimate violence within a predefined territory (Weber

1966:156). However, a definition of the state dealing only with the basis of its powers provides little insight into the precise *functioning* of the state as an entity. Establishing the *manner in which the state functions as the holder of the motives in development policy* presuppose a clarified concept of the internal power distribution and the functioning of the state.

Recognising that various groups within the state hold the capacity for influencing the policy processes, Weber writes extensively on the internal functioning and the relative power of these various domestic actors (Weber 1964; Beetham 1985, 1996:96-102; Held 1996). Also Karl Marx, another scholar central to studies of the state, deals extensively with the topic of various domestic actors' ability for influencing the policies of the state (Elster 1985:398-408; Held 1996: 121-124). Although Marx's notion of the state can be termed *functional*, while Weber is *structural* in his orientation, they both identify the state as an entity encapsulating domestic struggles for power, thus recognising the internal complexity of the state.

Adam Przeworski argues that the uneasy co-existence of the state and the market has resulted in a multi-disciplinary research area focusing basically on the same problems. Although being widely different in thematic contents and ambition, Przeworski sees these differing issues as stemming from three basic theoretical positions. (1) States respond to preferences of citizens, (2) states pursue goals of their own, and (3) States act in the interests of those who own productive wealth (Przeworski 1990: 2). These three theoretical positions structure the entire presentation offered by Przeworski, where he presents theoretical discussions concerning *the rule of the people, the rule of the state* and *the rule of capital*. The discussion provided on these three conceptions of the state draws on the work of different scholars in the field and provides deep-rooted and thorough accounts of the different conceptions of the internal functioning of the state. Structuring the concept of the state and disclosing its composition, the conceptions of Adam Przeworski assists me in formulating my research questions, generating hypothesis, and identifying my approach in the pursuit for insight into the theme of this thesis.

The three conceptions of the state explored theoretically in the work of Przeworski consider the functioning and the purpose of the state differently. While the first discussion deals with the state as a medium for popular societal control, assuming that the political representatives function as perfect agents of the people, the second conception assigns a considerable role to

be played by the administrators of the state (i.e. politicians and civil servants), assuming that these are not simply perfect agents of the public but hold personal ambitions to pursue their own utility. The third discussion dealing with the power of capital, takes its departure within Marxist thinking, exploring theoretically the implications of the constraints placed on the state by capital and the privately owned means of production. While all these perspectives of the state presented by Przeworski are interesting and potentially fruitful, I find the second concept particularly applicable for my thesis. Exploring the *rule of the state* provides the possibility of dismantling the notion of the singular and unitary state in an effort for attaining a better understanding of the *microfoundations* of Norwegian development assistance.

The rule of the state, or what is sometimes termed the *autonomy* of the state, signifies the intentions and efforts of the state administrators (i.e. politicians and bureaucrats) to pursue their own-utility utilising the positions they have been entrusted (Ibid.,30-41). Przeworski discuss this concept within many contexts, one of which is the structures of a democratic system (Ibid.,57-64). The autonomy of the state is relative and presupposes certain factors both in terms of administrators' capabilities and in terms of constraints put on these capabilities. Elaborating on state autonomy under democracy, Przeworski suggests that an analysis of the possibilities and effects of this phenomenon should be undertaken by structuring the various domestic groups and institution and determining how these interact in terms of strategic positioning. Furthermore, he recognises the need for an account of the institutional limitations imposed on the freedom of these groups to pursue their goals. The groups identified as being crucial for the domestic arena are voters, parties, elected politicians, and bureaucrats.

Approaching the issue of motives in development policy, I recognise the theoretical suggestions made by Przeworski and build my approach accordingly. Through the theoretical suggestions made it has been possible to single out domestic actors believed to hold influence over the policies adopted nationally. Thus, the notion of the state as a singular and unitary actor, earlier characterised as being somewhat dubious, is dismantled in order for an analysis to be performed. The domestic groups presented above as being crucial in identifying the consequences of state autonomy are accepted within my approach; however, in my approach the scheme towards the study is narrowed even further. The groups presented as critical above can be identified as being rooted in two distinct spheres of the state, the representative sphere (political) and the administrative sphere. The voters, parties and elected politicians function in

relation to the representative channel. The voters choose between political parties and candidates at elections, a process that ultimately leads to the elected politicians taking office. Thus these three groups are all vital components to the electoral process and the representative system of democracy. In contrast the bureaucracy represent an entity qualitatively different from these other groups in that it serves no function in the election for office and hold no representative legitimacy. The lack of popular accountability in the administration is a feature that makes the issue of this group's power and policy influence vis-à-vis the other groups more controversial related to democratic ideals (Beetham 1996: 96-102, 1999: 6-13). Where the other groups have been found to hold legitimacy based on the electoral process and through that process are found to be held accountable according to democratic principles, no such mechanism holds the bureaucracy responsible for its actions.<sup>29</sup> Because of this central and potentially controversial position held by the administration, I chose to make this my unit of analysis in this thesis.

Establishing the role held by the administration in the field of development policy in Norway is believed to yield insight into the *microfoundations* and *concept of actorness* related to motives in development policies, simultaneously the empirical analysis of the role of the administration in Norwegian development policy is believed to provide empirical insight into a field of research (*rule of the state*) that is characterised by a wide gap between theory and available data (Przeworski 1990:63).

## **4.2 The Approach to the Case**

Many issues for research within the social sciences are based upon concepts that can not be measured directly through precise indicators. These concepts, such as the *administration's role* in development assistance, must be explored by identifying adequate indicators that provide insight into the concept. This exercise of moving from a concept to a measurable entity for inquiry constitutes a critical point in studies in the social sciences in that it raises the issue of accuracy in moving from the theoretical concept to the empirical indicator(s).

The linkage established between the general concept of inquiry and the precise variables chosen as indicators for this concept is generally assessed in terms of *validity*, identified by Carmines and Zeller to be "...the presence of non-random error, for such error prevents

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<sup>29</sup> Mechanisms for bureaucratic control will be addressed in later subsequently.

indicators from representing what they are intended to: the theoretical concepts” (Carmines and Zeller 1979:15). Thus, the level of validity is the extent to which the general concept studied (e.g. role of the administration in development policy) is well represented and measured by the variables identified and employed for this cause (Przeworski and Teune 1970:102; Shively 1990:52; Hellevik 1999:52-53).

In the next chapter, the theoretical approach of the study is presented. The three theories included in the approach present the topic of the administration differently, and thus, provide different assessments of the role played by the administration within the structures of the state. However, it is made evident that the three theories at the same time recognise much the same features to be determinant for administration’s role. Exploring the role of the administration in Norwegian development policy, I provide an analysis based on these common features of the theories in order to get at vital aspects of the administration. These features, functioning as my points of departure, are commonly identified as important by all the theories included in the approach; yet, the different theories end up drawing quite different conclusions concerning the administration’s role within the state structures. Pursuing insight into the administration’s role based on these various theoretical elements, I will analyse three vital aspects of the administration; (1) *the power-potential of the administration*, (2) *the conduct of the bureaucrats* and (3) *shed light on the role of the administration vis-à-vis other actors in the field of development policy*.

Keeping in mind that the process of moving from a concept of inquiry to precise and measurable variables is central for determining the validity of the study, the following three sub-sections present the above mentioned concepts for inquiry separately, specifying the respective approaches taken, in order to gain insight into these elements through the analysis.

## **4.2 Structure of the Analysis**

In the first section of the analysis focus is directed towards the *resourcefulness* and the *power-potential* of the administration *vis-à-vis the political authorities* and in terms of the *administration’s capabilities* as a common actor in general. The resourcefulness of the administration is an element that is seen as a prerequisite for the respective roles designated for the administration by each of the theories employed in the approach. Thus, analysing this feature of Norwegian development assistance provides insight into an important element related to the total assessment of the administration’s role in the policy field.



Pursuing insight into the concept of resourcefulness, both competence and homogeneity are identified as determining elements (Jacobsen 1997:105-152; Christensen, Lægreid and Zuna 2001: 5; Peters 2001: 234-237). Exploring these concepts some critical variables identified in the literature as being well adjusted indicators include: *Educational background; career paths; tenure;* along with *political party affiliation*. These are employed as variables providing insight into these first elements of the analysis (Young 1991: 33-36; Blais, Blake and Dion 1991:205-211; Peters 1991, 2001; Jacobsen 1997: 105-139).

The second part of the analysis deals with the behaviour and conduct of the bureaucrats, the second elements identified as common for the theories. However, though this is an element identified as common, the concept is quite differently treated within the theories. On this account there is a basic divide between the structural tradition of sociology, represented by Weber, and the behavioural approach of political economy, represented by principal-agent theory and the theory of Niskanen. This basic divide provides no role to be played by the individual bureaucrat within Weber's approach, while a decisive role is played by the bureaucrats within the political economy approach. This division in tradition is more thoroughly explained in the theoretical chapter; here, the second section of the analysis is primarily concerned with the notion of bureaucratic behaviour as put forward within the theories of political economy.

I Explore the bureaucrats' own perception of their role as administrators, based on theoretical notions as put forward in the theories, will yield both insights into the empirical case studied in terms of bureaucratic behaviour and conduct, and at the same time provide the possibility of scrutinising elements of the theoretical approaches chosen for the case. The baseline of the approach to the analysis on this point is the utility-function as presented in the theory. Exploring the studied sections and departments on this account the ambition is to clarify the bureaucrats own perception of their role as administrators, and to sort out whether the theoretical notion concerning the bureaucrats attitudes towards the presented set of variables is accurate or not.

The final part of the analysis is devoted to the context within which the bureaucracy in the field of development policy functions. The bureaucratic apparatus does not function in a vacuum. Within the development policy field many other entities have and seek influence, as touched upon in the previous chapter: domestic NGOs aim at affecting policies, and possibly

even more importantly the bureaucracy is closely supervised by the political authorities (Peters 1991:318-324; Jacobsen 1997:153-210). Thus, the third part of the analysis focuses on the environment within which the administration operates, establishing and assessing the various constraints and limitations placed on the bureaucratic power. I will provide a picture of the external constraints placed on the power-potential of the administration, in order to grasp the full picture of how the administration has the possibility of acting in its environment vis-à-vis other more or less forceful actors within the policy field. The analysis of the concept of control over bureaucracy will be based on the bureaucracy's contact with the various other actors in the field, the guidelines provided to the bureaucracy by the political leadership and on the bureaucrats' perception of this topic of control vs. autonomy. These indicators are chosen in order to generate a full picture of the interaction between actors within the field of Norwegian development policy with the administration at its midst.

All in all, the analysis will provide an assessment of the administrations role in development policy, according to bureaucratic resources, bureaucratic conduct and the constraints and limitations imposed on the bureaucratic autonomy. First, the obvious objective will be an assessment of the bureaucratic role in Norwegian development assistance. Secondly, the manner in which the analysis is structured permits a theoretical objective to be met by providing the possibility of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the various theories applied for the Norwegian context. Finally, the analysis allows the scrutinising of the overarching theme concerning the concept of motives in development policy and the holder of these.

### ***4.3 Sampling Procedure and Data Collection***

The latest reform of the Norwegian administration of development assistance has resulted in a more profound centralisation of development policy within the sphere of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both the transfer of the state-to-state programmes from NORAD to the UD and the responsibility for the embassies engaged in efforts for development, placed within the UD, indicate this. However, the role of the embassies is simultaneously being made more autonomous in an effort to make development policy more adaptable to local conditions in each recipient country. Thus there is a tendency for centralising the more major elements of development policy within the ministry and at the same time providing more adaptability in the implementation of the country specific strategies.

Exploring the administrations role in Norwegian development policy I will focus on the long-term aspects of development assistance, both bi- and multilateral. This focus is chosen because these aspects of development assistance are most likely to be kept under close supervision of the political authorities and other actors. Contrary to elements of development policy closely related to humanitarian aid or efforts of a more ad hoc nature, long-term development policy can be made subject to a carefully adopted policy-line designated by the politicians. I will further focus on the administration of these policy-elements within the ministry. The focus on the more central elements of the administration situated within the ministry is done based on a notion that these are the administrative elements best kept under control by the political authorities, and thus if these departments and sections are found to have great latitude in their administration of policies, there is reason to believe that also other branches of the administration, assumed to be less controllable for the political authorities, operate at least as autonomous. However, this is an assumption that will remain unanswered in this study; the findings here will be confined to comment on the present case of the administration within the UD.

The precise selection of departments and sections within the UD will be outlined in the subsequent section presenting the sampling procedure and the sample composition. The research strategy employed comprises of two complementing elements for generating data on the subject: a survey and additional follow-up interviews with a selection of the survey respondents. A presentation of this strategy is also put forward in the following sections.

#### **4.3.1 Questionnaire**

The questionnaire for this survey is made up largely by questions taken from a previously conducted survey, the Leadership Survey 2000. However, some of the questions are also self-formulated.<sup>30</sup> The approach chosen, drawing upon the work of other scholars, was intended to benefit my thesis in different ways. Firstly, the quality of the questions derived from the Leadership Survey 2000 was believed to surpass my capacity for formulating research questions. The concept of reliability is characterised by Carmines and Zeller as “...the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials” (Carmines and Zeller 1979:13). Thus, the element of reliability relates to the accuracy of the procedures employed for gathering the desired data, basing the questionnaire of the survey largely on questions from the Leadership Survey 2000, and was therefore thought to

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<sup>30</sup> Questions: 1-11(bar 8e), 14-43 (Leadership survey 2000). 8e, 13,14,44,45 (self composed).

benefit the aspects related to reliability of the generated data. Secondly, the close affiliation between my survey and that of the Leadership Survey was believed to provide a profound possibility for comparison between the two data-sets.<sup>31</sup> The self-formulated questions of the survey were added to the questionnaire in order to generate data on some variables particularly relevant for the problem at hand.<sup>32</sup>

The structure of the questionnaire reflects the three-fold division presented above as the structure of the analysis (section 4.2), each of these three sections of the questionnaire is believed to contain variables that adequately measure the central elements identified, on the basis of the theory, as vital concepts for understanding the functioning of the administration within the structures of the state.

### **4.3.2 Survey Sample**

The administration in the field of development assistance within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not very clear-cut and hardly any sections or departments deal solely with the area of development policy.<sup>33</sup> The organisation of the ministry, with two ministers and numerous departments, leaves almost all sections and departments involved within the larger field of foreign policy (e.g. the UN-section surveyed deals with development issues, but also all other issues related to the UN). Thus, sampling sections only engaged in development policy became impossible. Through a close dialogue with the administration within the Ministry, and based on advice from them, a selection of sections and departments was done and arrangements for the distribution of a survey were made. However, it should be pointed out that the nature of the ministry's organisation and my lacking capacity for sampling bureaucrats individually,<sup>34</sup> have resulted in a survey sample that represents the sections and departments of the ministry with the highest density of bureaucrats working with issues of development policy. Thus, one problem with the sample is that it includes bureaucrats that do not work with these issues and leaves out bureaucrats that do. Nevertheless, the sample

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<sup>31</sup> After gaining access to the data set of the Leadership Survey 2000 (after the distribution of my survey), it became evident that the measures taken for making these data anonymous had led to the recoding of some of the more vital variables, making a comparison between the data sets impossible.

<sup>32</sup> Questionnaire for the survey is included in the appendix of the thesis.

<sup>33</sup> The reform within the development policy area rearranged the spheres of competence for each division and section within the field, however, it was an earlier reform (1997) that abolished the organisational form where two distinct "ministries" co-existed within the organisation of the MFA (Liland and Alsaker Kjerland 2003).

<sup>34</sup> Due to my recourses, a formal instruction from Norwegian Social Science Data Services and the MFA's possibilities in accommodating my requests, individual sampling was made impossible.

represents bureaucrats working with issues of long-term multi- and bilateral development assistance within the most central parts of the administration in the field, the UD.

The questionnaire was distributed to the bureaucrats working within the following departments and sections:<sup>35</sup>

- The Regional Department
- The Department for International Development Policy
- The UN-section within the Department for Global Affairs

The above mentioned sections and departments comprise of a total of 96 employees.<sup>36</sup> In the correspondence with the Ministry before distributing the survey it was agreed that the survey would be distributed to all the employees within the selected sections and departments irrespective of each individual's precise work (the nature of which was unattainable) This approach left each individual bureaucrat with the responsibility of self-selection in case they felt incapable of answering the questionnaire of the survey. In the course of the data collection period I had some responses indicating that self-selection was taking place and that some bureaucrats found themselves incapable of responding to the survey.<sup>37</sup> However, it stands unclear how many of the potential 96 respondents who felt this, and so an assessment of the final survey return relative to any other figure for potential respondents is impossible, this forces me to assume that all 96 bureaucrats were potential respondents, making this my figure for *gross sample*.

I first contacted the ministry by snail-mail dispatched 1 June 2004.<sup>38</sup> Simultaneously, I dispatched a letter of approval for conducting the survey to the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). After not getting any response from the ministry I once again contacted them, this time by e-mail, 23 June 2004 and the response I then received was indecisive but with a promise that a final decision would soon be made. On 15 July a final approval for

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<sup>35</sup> The survey was also distributed to some sections within NORAD; however, it soon became evident that the reorganisation of the development policy field left many unable to answer the questionnaire. With only 2 out of the believed potential of 135 returning the survey, NORAD was cut from the survey sample.

<sup>36</sup> This figure is derived from the electronic phonebook of the MFA, no official number of bureaucrats has been provided by the ministry upon request.

<sup>37</sup> This feedback was provided to me by my contacts in the ministry.

<sup>38</sup> Formal correspondence with the MFA is included in the appendix to the thesis.

conducting the project was received from the UD,<sup>39</sup> and by then I had also received final approval for conducting the survey from NSD,<sup>40</sup> something that made me ready for distribution. However, due to August being a turbulent month in the ministry I was advised by my contact to push back the date set for distribution. The survey was first distributed within the above mentioned departments and sections of the UD on the 25 of August 2004. During the data-collecting phase three reminders were distributed to the respondents in an attempt to improve response rates. When I terminated the data-collection, 31 September 2004, 26 respondents had returned adequately filled out questionnaires.

### 4.3.3 Data Generated by the Survey

The response rate of the study turned out low. However, due to factors mentioned in the former section, it is difficult to assess what real percentage the final survey-returns represent relative to the *gross sample*. In strict terms  $100/96 * 26$ , or 27.1% is the response rate of the survey. This low response rate relates to the issue of validity in that it exposes the data to a *nonresponse bias*. Nonresponse bias is a problem that occurs in most surveys as it stem from the fact that there are usually differences between the gross- and net sample. According to Fox and Tracy (1986), "...when these differences are related to criterion measures, the results may be misleading or even erroneous" (Ibid.,9). Though the low response rate limits the general validity and prevents me from conducting statistical analysis due to the difficulty in constructing confidence intervals, I find the response rate sufficient in order to make some broader based remarks and to draw some general conclusions on the sample as a whole. Providing general observations based on the data, not depending on the precise values of the various variables, curbs some of the issues concerning the representativeness of my sample vis-à-vis the entire population.<sup>41</sup> However, the issue of representativeness and thus validity of the generated data remains a weakness with the study.<sup>42</sup>

In general it can be said that the composition of the sample resembles the entire population in proportions (Figure 4.1) and there is a sound age distribution among the respondents in the sample. However, these points do not necessarily transfer to other aspects in the relation between the *net-* and the *gross sample*, and although there exists nothing that indicates that the respondents included in the sample are atypical and non-representative for the larger

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<sup>39</sup> The approval from the MFA is included in the appendix.


<sup>40</sup> The approval from NSD is included in the appendix.

<sup>41</sup> Bureaucrats working with issues related to bi- and/or multilateral development assistance within the MFA.

<sup>42</sup> The survey data have been submitted to and are available from NSD upon application.

population, inference should be carefully conducted. However, making these pre-considerations concerning the data, some general remarks concerning the issue at hand should be possible to make based on the original data-set generated by the survey.

**Figure 4.1: Composition of sample and population (High-, middle- and low-ranking bureaucrats)**



**4.3.4 Interviews**

Even though the initial scheme for the study entailed follow-up interviews with some of the surveyed bureaucrats, this became even more important due to the fairly low response rate spurred by the survey. The survey was followed up by conducting interviews with some of the surveyed bureaucrats. The primary objective was to validate the findings of the survey by providing the interviewed bureaucrats with an opportunity to talk more freely about their work situation and their role as administrators of development policy. It also gave me the opportunity to go more in-depth into the topic of political control.

It should be mentioned that the criticism of qualitative interviews as the basis for scientific work is wide ranging (Ryen 2002:131-139). However, I will argue that although the approach has some clear limitations (e.g. in terms of generalisation), the research method does offer complementing qualities to those of the survey, something that should make these well functioning when employed within the same study (Ibid.; Miles and Huberman 1994: 40-48).

A requirement necessary in order to conduct the interviews and in order to provide the respondents with the possibility of talking freely concerning potentially controversial topics, was that the interviewed bureaucrats were granted anonymity. This anonymity does of course reduce the weight of the quotes as arguments; however, the answers provided to me are still well adjusted in order to provide deeper insight into the dynamics of the ministry. The guide

structuring the interviews is included in the appendix, however, this does not provide a full account of the interviews that were conducted as the approach taken was one involving *semi-structured* interviews (Ryen 2002: 97-114).

The interview objects were chosen from among those who had responded to the survey according to some simple criteria for selection, *rank* and *section of employment*. Initially I intended to interview six bureaucrats, a number that provided the possibility for two interviews within each unit within which the survey had been distributed. Unfortunately, only five interviews were possible to schedule and conduct within the set time-frame.

In the analysis the insight provided through the interviews is commented on, in general terms, where they thematically fit in with the general argument. In addition the interviews function to highlight certain topics, and in doing this they are presented as direct quotations.<sup>43</sup> However, the most important findings of the interviews are not included in direct form in the analysis, namely the confirmation I was pursuing through the interviews concerning the validity of the survey data. In general, I will characterise the findings of the survey as being highly corresponding to those of the interviews.

The sections above have outlined the major sources for data utilised in the following analysis. However, it needs to be pointed out that also some other sources of information will be consulted. In relation to the interaction between the various state institutions there is a need for accessing information not held by the bureaucrats, and thus unattainable through the survey and interviews. For this purpose the occasional usage of public records, articles and press releases will be employed. The usage of these sources will be well documented in the text.

#### **4.4 Summarising the Study Approach**

This methodological chapter has outlined the approach taken towards the study of the administration's role in development policy. The approach was first structured according to the important features identified in the theoretical chapter. Basing the analysis on this threefold notion each of these concepts was then outlined so as to constitute measurable

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<sup>43</sup> The quotations inserted into the text are in English while the interviews were conducted in Norwegian. The Norwegian quotes have thus been translated; the original versions are included in footnotes.



entities that could be made subject to empirical exploration. Further, the unit of analysis was considered and a choice concerning which elements of the administration are to be studied was made. Some general remarks concerning the means for generating the needed empirical data were made, before the generated data were presented and assessed. It has been recognised that the data generated by the survey hold some imperfections, and that these need to be taken into consideration, however, drawing on the additional sources for research data and making the analysis more general is argued to provide the possibility for employing the data for my intended purpose, viz., analysing the administration's role in Norwegian development policy.

In this chapter the methodological approach towards the subject of this thesis has been developed, next chapter goes on to present the theoretical approach around which the analysis will be structured.

## 5 – Theory: Administration and Administrators

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Approaching the selected case of this thesis, this chapter will introduce theory representing different approaches towards the study of bureaucracy. David Beetham argues in his book on bureaucracy that this subject has been researched within various academic disciplines, and that these different approaches have given the term “bureaucracy” a variety of different connotations (Beetham 1996:1-5).

Beetham does not claim this list to be exhaustive, but argues that that these are some of the meanings assigned to the word bureaucracy.

- Rule by officials – its original meaning, where the autonomy and strength of the bureaucrats makes them *de facto* rulers of the state (technocracy).
- A system of professional administrators – the bureaucratic ideal, where professionalism and efficiency are the virtue.
- Organisational inefficiency – the inescapable reputation of bureaucracy, rigidity, inflexibility and red-tape.
- Public administration – bureaucracy as something distinctly public.
- A non-market institution – bureaucracy as constituting something distinct due to its removal from the market.
- Undemocratic organisation – bureaucracy as an alien organisation in the midst of democracy.

Bureaucracy constitutes a multi-disciplinary field of research studied within sociology, economics and political science. Depending on the academic discipline and theoretical orientation, the approach taken towards the study of bureaucracy may take different forms. Taking my departure in the writings of Beetham (Beetham 1996) I will present two very distinct theoretical approaches towards the study of bureaucracy. The dual theoretical scheme, using sociology of organisation and political economy,<sup>44</sup> is a conscious choice aimed at providing the thesis with a well-balanced theoretical approach for the following case-analysis.

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<sup>44</sup> In his book Beetham also introduces public administration and comparative government as important theoretical fields within which bureaucracy have been studied (Beetham 1996:3-6). Conscious about the great

This scheme for the theoretical approach prohibits us from applying a formal definition of the concept of bureaucracy since each theoretical tradition treats the concept differently, and consequently defines the phenomenon differently; however I find this to be of minor importance due to the case oriented nature of my study.

## **5.1 Sociology of Organisation/ Weberian Tradition**

Taking its departure in the writings of Weber, this school is to be considered the most classic in the study of modern bureaucracy. Weber was among the first to recognise the vast amount of power the bureaucracy could acquire; and also one of the first to conduct detailed studies into the topic of modern bureaucracy. Writing in Germany at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century much of his work must be seen in the light of his contemporary world. At that time Germany still remained under monarchic rule dominated by a privileged upper-class.<sup>45</sup> Though the regime remained closed, the state-administration had gone through some degree of modernization, and was already at that time recruiting based on merit rather than social position.<sup>46</sup> Weber's comments on modern bureaucracy were largely based on his familiarity with this German system, and on his knowledge of the British administration and political system (Albrow 1970:50-53; Kamenka 1989: 76-84).

Looking at the work of Weber, I am primarily interested in the issue of political control over bureaucracy. In Weber's writings this is a well-developed theme with many considerations that can be fruitful in the later analysis; however a thorough account of the sociological basis for these considerations is necessary for a good display of the Weberian approach.

### **5.1.1 Organisation**

According to Weber, the presence of a leader and usually also an administrative staff is the defining characteristic of an organisation, furthermore all organisations are by definition hierarchical,<sup>47</sup> where the existence of a distinct set of rules governing behaviour is intrinsic to

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value of these traditions, I choose to pursue the two traditions I find to be the most relevant in my approach to the study of the selected case.

<sup>45</sup> Germany was up until WW 1 a union of states largely dominated by the province of Prussia (Palmer and Colton 1995).

<sup>46</sup> Social stand and merit at that time often went together, since education was primarily for the privileged class (Beetham 1985).

<sup>47</sup> Weber uses the term *Verband* to describe such different entities as the state, the political party, the church, the sect and the firm. *Organization* is the obvious translation though *Verband* had a particular connotation for

the concept of an organisation. The rules of an organisation for governing member's behaviour was by Weber termed the *administrative order* (*Verwaltungsordnung*). The administrators of an organisation will have a dual relationship with these rules; on the one hand the administrators are themselves subject to the rules, and on the other the administrators have the responsibility of supervising other members' adherence to the same rules. Accordingly, the most significant aspect of an organisation's *administrative order* is that it determines who is placed where in the organisation's hierarchy; thus the administration and authority was by Weber regarded as intimately linked (Albrow 1970:38). The concept of *administrative order* was by Weber regarded as being universal and valid for all organisations irrespective of their size, form or purpose. What constituted difference between different organisations was, according to Weber, their foundation for their claim to legitimacy. Weber argued that an organisation's claim to legitimacy can take on different forms, and that the form chosen will have great implications for the features of the organisation.

*[A]ccording to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally (Weber 1966:324).*

Hence, Weber argued that it is useful to classify the types of authority according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each; according to Weber there are fundamentally three distinct sources of legitimate authority:

- Rational grounds -resting on the legality of a set of normative rules, and the adherence to those elevated to authority according to these rules (legal authority).
- Traditional grounds -resting on an established belief in the existing order and the authority of the leaders due to longstanding traditions (traditional authority).
- Charismatic grounds -resting on the loyalty to one particular individual and adherence to the normative order sanctioned by him (charismatic authority).

(Weber 1966:328)

Identifying these three distinct grounds for the claim to legitimate authority empirically was viewed by Weber as difficult since he recognised that most organisations will claim legitimacy based on a mixture of the elements mentioned above. However, Weber identified

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Weber, signifying an ordering of social relationships where the maintenance was left up to certain individuals (Albrow 1970:38).

examples where he found that the three grounds for authority were presented in their purest empirical form. Following Weber I present these as follows. (1) Legal authority is best represented in the modern bureaucracy, where the administrative conduct was carefully executed according to defined rational rules and law. The rational rules for administrative conduct also clearly defined a hierarchical structure within the organisation, leaving no confusion concerning field of competence and authority. (2) Traditional authority is best exemplified by patrimonial rule. The legitimacy of the rulers will in such a regime stem from longstanding traditions, sanctioned by history. The rules and laws of the society are closely associated with the ruler(s), and his administrative staff is normally based on relations of personal loyalty. (3) Charismatic authority is found, according to Weber, in organisations centred around one particular person claiming authority based on his extraordinary qualities. These qualities may take on numerous forms, but are generally recognised as qualities unattainable for ordinary people. In most instances the charismatic leader defines the rules of the group, and the “quality” of the charisma is solemnly judged through the eyes of the followers (Weber 1966:359).

### **5.1.2 Bureaucracy**

Bureaucracy was by Weber recognised as an organisation deriving its authority from its legal-rational basis. Though Weber never defines the term *bureaucracy* in a general sense (Albrow 1970:40), he constructed a model where he outlined the features of a rational administrative organisation, and specified that this model represented modernity and a final break with the historical and patrimonial forms of administration. The model for bureaucracy was formulated in a ten-feature list laying down the rules for rational bureaucracy:

1. They [bureaucrats] are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations.
2. They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
3. Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense.
4. Each office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free selection.
5. Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination or guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are *appointed*, not elected.
6. They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to pensions. Only under certain circumstances does the employing authority, especially in private organizations, have a right to terminate the appointment, but the official is always free to resign. The salary scale is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy; but in addition to this criterion, the responsibility of the position and the requirements of the incumbent's social status may be taken into account.
7. The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent.
8. It constitutes a career. There is a system of "promotion" according to seniority or to achievement, or both. Promotion is dependent on the judgement of superiors.
9. The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position.
10. He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.

(Weber 1966:333-334)

These ten features of bureaucracy are by Weber regarded as the features that clearly distinguish modern bureaucracy from historical forms of administration, specifying its legal-rational structure. Weber viewed this legal-rational mode of bureaucracy as the most efficient way of organizing an administration. He argued that although this model represents an ideal-type of bureaucracy, efficiency will be improved the closer a bureaucratic organisation can approximate his model. Intrinsic to this model is his notion of the bureaucrat. Weber pictured a bureaucrat guided by his professional training and his rational application of rules, the contour of this bureaucrat can easily be extracted from the above mentioned ten feature list.<sup>48</sup> Though the notion of the rational bureaucrat must be understood as an ideal-type, Weber can be said to show great belief in the professionalism of bureaucrats and bureaucracies.

These ten defining characteristics represent a definition of modern bureaucracy that can be said to be inclusive, rather than exclusive, in that they allow us to operate with degrees of bureaucratisation and not strictly with a clear set of criteria for what is and what is not included in the category *bureaucracy*. One of the benefits with this type of approach is that

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<sup>48</sup> Just about every feature on the list contains information concerning the bureaucrat and his role within the bureaucracy.

the definition assists us in identifying bureaucratic aspects within a given organisation; placing them on a continuum. Identifying bureaucratic aspects within different forms of organisations was also Weber's aim when formulating his ten-feature list.

### 5.1.3 Rationalisation of Society

As mentioned, Weber wrote at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, witnessing the ever intensifying effect of modernisation in Germany. Organisation based on the principles of rationalization and standardization had greatly contributed to the increased capabilities of the German (Prussian) army, and rendered it great success in the late nineteenth century. At the same time Weber recognised that the German bureaucracy was well functioning and efficient due to these same processes of rationalization. Industrial production was also influenced and improved by this trend.<sup>49</sup> Based on these observations of the efficiency of rational organisation, Weber predicted a rationalisation (bureaucratisation) of society. Though Weber regarded the rationalization of society to be a feature of modernity, he also recognised the ambivalent nature of this process. It should be pointed out that he saw a total rationalisation of society, rid of any human factor, as an extreme consequence and as a danger; though this was not his foremost concern with this process.

As stated above, Weber regarded the rational character of bureaucracy as being the feature that made it supremely efficient as an administrative instrument; however Weber recognised that bureaucracy had an inherent tendency to exceed its instrumental function, and to intrude into the political sphere. The power of bureaucracy lay, as Weber saw it, in the competence of the rational bureaucrat, and this competence was a product of both the technical skills derived from professional training (e.g. law, economics), and of the information and knowledge acquired in the course of duty. This accumulation of power based on asymmetrical information was to some extent necessary for a properly functioning bureaucracy; nevertheless Weber recognised the need to prevent this from reaching a point where bureaucracy controlled the policies and the entire organisation it was supposed to serve.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Taylorism and other findings from studies of efficiency in industry were at this time still regarded as the ideal. (Taylor had published his book: *The Principles of Scientific Management* in 1911.

<sup>50</sup> In the following section of this chapter, the section on political economy, we shall see that Weber's views correspond largely with what is termed principal-agent approach towards the study of bureaucracy.

By identifying this bureaucratic tendency he put focus on a question still puzzling students of bureaucracy: if any, where is the divide between politics and administration?

#### 5.1.4 Political Control

Exploring the above mentioned question, Weber wrote extensively on the topic of how to control and limit the power of bureaucracy and its tendency for exceeding its sphere of competence. He formulated technical suggestions for how to reduce the bureaucratic capability for accumulating power and thus limit its ability for affecting policy (Albrow 1970:47-48; Beetham 1985:95-102; Etzioni-Halevy 1985:32-35). The most fundamental suggestion he made was that for parliamentary democracy. Though Weber was no agitator for empowering the masses by introducing universal suffrage, he ended up arguing for parliamentary democracy as the best means for controlling bureaucracy. Weber held the institutional structure of Germany accountable for the ill conducted policies that had caused so much damage to the country in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. He argued that weak political institutions, particularly the parliament, failed to provide the country with good policies and able politicians; thus the political leadership was given a role of mere dilettantes to bureaucracy. Looking at the British system he concluded that its parliament functioned as a breeding ground for politicians, as the system fostered politicians capable of handling the bureaucratic administration and containing it in the sphere of administration. Weber came to favour better politicians and saw strong constructive parliaments as a permanent way for securing their supply.

*Forms of constitutions are for me technical means like any other machinery. I'd be just as happy to take the side of the monarch against parliament, if only he were a politician or showed signs of becoming one (Weber 1954, in Beetham 1985:102).*

This quote should not be understood literally since the whole reason for Weber's opposition to the *Kaiser* was aimed at the system, and not at the person. The feature of parliament that appealed so profoundly to Weber was its ability to ensure continuity in political leadership. Weber admired the rationality and efficiency of bureaucracy, but feared a fully-fledged bureaucratic take-over of politics. Martin Albrow argues that Weber regarded the parliamentary democracy, and the *able politicians'* ability of controlling bureaucracy as somewhat of a compromise and a middle-way between bureaucratic tyranny and mass irrationality (Albrow 1970:49; See also Beetham 1985:96-101; Held 1996:168).



### **5.1.5 Critique of the Approach**

However groundbreaking, Weber has been widely criticised for numerous reasons. In the subsequent section, I will present some of the aspects of this diverse critique most relevant for the issue of this thesis.

Firstly, the ideal type model of bureaucracy has been criticised for only taking into account aspects that fitted Weber's notion of rational bureaucracy, putting aside contradictory features of bureaucracy; this one-sidedness of the model makes it ill-suited for use as a conceptual tool. This approach of a one-sided account of bureaucratic organisation also exposes Weber to the criticism of naivety. If Weber regards bureaucracy as being constituted solely by formal relations, he fails to recognise the vital other side that makes bureaucracies tick, namely the informal and unpronounced norms, values, relations, etc.

Secondly, the link between rationality and efficiency that stands so fundamental in the work of Weber has been put under scrutiny. It has been argued that Weber fails to recognise the ambivalent feature of strict rationality as he sees it applied in modern bureaucracy (Albrow 1970:55; Etzioni-Halevy 1985:36-37; Beetham 1996:13). While Weber argues that efficiency is the directly causal result of rationalised procedures, critics have argued that less favourable consequences might also occur. The more rigorously the principals of bureaucratic organisation are applied, the more obvious this becomes: adherence to rules and hierarchy may foster inflexibility and red tape and impersonality may produce indifference and insensitivity. Thus, the connection between rationality and efficiency seems to be more dubious than what Weber suggested; inefficiency may also be a consequence of strict adherence to rules and procedures in the administration.

Finally, it should be noted that Weber has been criticised for playing into the hand of totalitarianism. The reasoning behind this criticism has been that Weber leaves no room for ethical considerations for the bureaucrat, as the only place for ethics is with the politicians. Consequently, Weber allows the bureaucrat to perform their duty stripped of all considerations for consequences, only following the orders of superiors. However, the blame for totalitarian regimes can hardly be assigned to Weber, since he emphasizes that his model is an ideal type. Though Weber can be criticised for assigning normative weight to his model,

he does this only related to the aspect of bureaucratic efficiency (Weber 1966:329-341; Etzioni-Halevy 1985:39-40; Beetham 1996:11-15).

Next, I turn to the second theoretical approach chosen for this thesis. Although representing a fundamentally different angle of approach, it will become obvious that some aspects of this theory are quite harmonious with aspects of the one just presented.

## **5.2 Political Economy**

*If Weberians are impressed by the efficiency of bureaucracy in comparison with traditional systems of administration, political economists are equally impressed by their inefficiency in comparison to hierarchies which operates within the market (Beetham 1996:25-26).*

The quote above sums up much of the foundation for the discrepancies between the sociological approach and the approach taken within the political economy tradition. But though the former tends to be enthusiastic when dealing with the efficiency of bureaucracy, and the latter somewhat disillusioned looking at its inefficiency, the two traditions are concerned with much of the same issues.

As seen in the former section, Weber started out with a notion of bureaucracy as the organisation best displaying a clear-cut legal-rational claim to legitimacy, and via the ten-feature list he presented his ideal-type bureaucrat. Nonetheless, although Weber had the conception of bureaucracy as rationalised machinery, and of the bureaucrat as the incarnation of the bureaucratic virtue, he ended up writing on the topic of how to control the bureaucratic apparatus. Though the approach within the political economy tradition is somewhat different, the issue at hand is much the same. As a defining element the approach focuses on the financing of the bureaucracy, and is fundamentally interested in the economic operation of the administration. With a somewhat more sceptical approach to the intentions of the bureaucrat, this tradition is also preoccupied with providing the best solution for bureaucratic efficiency and political control.

### **5.2.1 Foundation**

Political economy, in its neo-classical form at least, locates bureaucracy at the hierarchical side of the basic divide between hierarchy and market. Hierarchy and market represent two fundamentally different concepts for social coordination: while the market is based on the

“free” competition for allocating resources among individuals with equal status, hierarchy allocates resources in a clearly specified structure of authority where individual status is by definition unequal. Further, the hierarchical category is subdivided into hierarchies that function within markets (firms), and those that function outside of markets (bureaucracies).

Following this, one can say that the definition of bureaucracy provided by political economy is exclusive, rather than inclusive as I characterised the sociological definition to be. William Niskanen offers this definition of bureaucracy in his book on the subject (Niskanen 1971:15):

1. The owners and employees of those organisations do not appropriate any part of the difference between revenues and costs as a personal income.
2. Some part of the recurring revenues of the organisation derive from other than the sale of output at a per-unit rate.

The first characteristic of the definition provides us with a notion of bureaucracy that excludes corporate businesses, partnerships and other profit-seeking organisations, however elements of these organisations may be included (e.g. staff units providing research), Niskanen suggests that the more difficult it is to identify a component’s contribution to corporate profits, the more likely it is that this unit will behave like a bureau (Niskanen 1971:16). Included by the first characteristic are all non-profit organisations, such as government agencies and enterprises, most educational institutions and the many ideal organisations. The second characteristic includes all non-profit organisations that receive a recurring grant. This means most of the organisations included by the first characteristic. Some government enterprises and private non-profit organisations that are financed solely by sale of output are excluded by this (e.g. public power supplier).

Being interested in the economic operation of bureaucracy, political economy is especially concerned with the efficiency of the bureaucratic organisation. This analysis of efficiency stems from two basic assumptions:

First: The key to efficiency lies in the incentives and sanctions of the competitive market; it is the removal of the bureaucracy from this competitive environment that makes the organisation fundamentally different from other forms of similar organisational features.

Second: People are only brought to work for the goal of an organisation by means of incentives and sanctions which align the individual's interests with the interests of the organisation. In the absence of such incentives or sanctions, individuals will shirk or in other ways serve themselves. This is a potential dilemma in all hierarchical organisations, but actualised in bureaucracy (Beetham 1996:28).

The scepticism within political economy towards the cost efficiency of bureaucracy has been manifested in various theories on the issue. The ones I will deal with here follow along the line of Weber in questioning how bureaucracy can be kept under political control.

### 5.2.2 Principal-Agent Theory

This theory describes the relation between a principal and an agent in general terms, but is highly applicable to the specific relation between the political leaders and the bureaucrats.<sup>51</sup> Principal-agent theory originates in formal economic theory, and although formal modelling is beyond the scope of this thesis, I will highlight and clarify our verbal presentation of the theory with the introduction of a basic formal model.<sup>52</sup>

In essence the theory focuses on the transfer of power that goes along with delegating a task to an expert. The theory argues that an expert hired to perform a task on behalf of a principal may, if the control-mechanisms are not good enough, end up serving his own preferences, *shirking*. The reason for this is that the agent usually is the expert in the field, and thus the relation is asymmetrical in terms of information and expertise. Furthermore, and what is the central point in relation to my thesis, *the agent might have a different agenda than its principal*, thus the principal's ability to control the agent is the issue of interest.

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<sup>51</sup> There exists a variety of principal-agent models with differing level of specification and differing level of formality. The model employed here is a general one, employed as a descriptive model for the relation between politicians and administrators.

<sup>52</sup> Before presenting the formal model of a principal-agent relation some assumptions of the relation must be stated. 1. The agent is drawn from a large population of similar agents. 2. The agent is willing to perform the task on behalf of the principal as long as his net utility from performing the task is at least as large as he can get from his next best opportunity; this is referred to as the agent's *reservation level of utility*. 3. A hired agent must decide whether to work hard or not on a particular job; all other things equal, the agent will prefer not to work hard on the job. 4. The effort of the agent determines the value of the relation for the principal; the principal must gain from the relation in order to maintain it.

The basic relation between politicians and bureaucrats as formulated in this theory resembles the views earlier expressed by Weber on the same topic. Though Weber never elaborated on the reasons for why bureaucracy had this perceived tendency for exceeding its intended instrumental function, and though he never formulates a formal model, he pointed to the asymmetrical relation between politicians and bureaucrats in terms of information as a prerequisite for this inherent tendency of bureaucracy.<sup>53</sup> After identifying the tendency for power accumulation as natural to bureaucracy, Weber followed up by writing extensively on how to restrain bureaucratic power. In doing this he focused on the topic that has later become the essence of principal-agent theory. Thus I will argue that even though these theories represent two distinct schools in the study of bureaucracy, and even though much of their basic approach continue to be different in many respect, Weber came close to formulating the key concept of principal-agent theory.

The developed principal-agent theory deals with the same issue that was mentioned earlier in this section as the second basic assumption in the study of bureaucratic efficiency. In general principal-agent theory comprises two types of information distribution in the relation between the principal and the agent (Hagen 1990:6; Kreps 1990: 577-585; Kiewet and McCubbins 1991:22-25; Laffont 2003).<sup>54</sup>

*Hidden action* is a characteristic of the distribution of information that results in the problem of *moral hazard*. The agent is hired by the principal because he possesses some sort of expertise needed by the principal. Because of the difference in competence related to the issue/task, the principal will have no means for assessing the action taken by the agent on her behalf; thus the principal can not decide if the action taken by the agent is optimal in order to reach some predetermined objective. The initial power-structure has been reversed.

*Hidden information* is the term provided for the relation producing the problem of *adverse selection*. The agent represents the expert and is hired because of special competence or information. The information held by the agent is impossible for the principal to obtain because it is inaccessible or too expensive. This means that the agent is able to assess the resources needed for the job while the principal is left to trust the assessment of the agent; the

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<sup>53</sup> See section on sociology of organization and Weber.

<sup>54</sup> It should be noted that the manner of dealing with these information distributions differ quite markedly between authors in the field, thus, terms utilised for describing these distributions differ. Comprising my approach I employ the terms based on Kiewet and McCubbins 1991.

agent may choose to exaggerate the estimate she communicates to the principal in order to gain more from the relation. Likewise the agent may hide information from the principal concerning the continued need of her services; if she is successful in this strategy she can continue her employment despite the fact that there is no need for her anymore (a formal presentation of the principal-agent relation is provided in the boxed text below).<sup>55</sup>

### The formal model

We set the agents reservation level of utility to be 9 (no assigned meaning). The agent derives utility from his level of pay ( $w$ ), and from the effort he puts into the job ( $a$ ). The effort the agent put into the job can be “high” ( $a=5$ ) or “low” ( $a=0$ ). The agent’s overall (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility from  $w$  and  $a$  is given by:

$$U(w, a) = \sqrt{w} - a$$

If the agent works hard the job he performs will have a value of \$270 to the principal, however if the agent does not work hard the performed task will only be worth \$70 to the principal.

In order for the agent to take the job the pay must be minimum \$81 since  $\sqrt{81} = 9$  and the agent’s reservation level of utility is set at 9 for this example. If the pay is \$81 this will cause the agent to put in a low work effort, since his utility according to the expression above is conditional upon wage and effort, and since this level of pay only allows low level of effort in order for the utility to equal the agent’s reservation level of utility. However, if the agent works with low effort the performed task is only worth \$70 to the principal; thus the agent represents a net loss to the principal.

In order for the principal to be able to persuade the agent to work with high effort, making the arrangement worthwhile for both parties, he must offer a wage stimulating high effort. The wage must be high enough for  $\sqrt{w} - 5 \geq 9$ , or  $\sqrt{w} \geq 14$ , or  $w \geq \$196$ . Since the principal values the job done with high effort at \$270, this relation is worthwhile for both the principal and for the agent. However, the wage in itself does not stimulate high effort. If the pay is static at the level set above (\$196) in an attempt to make the relation worthwhile for both parties, the agent will (following assumption 3 above) work with a low effort. This is so because this maximizes the agent’s utility:

$$\sqrt{196} - 5 < \sqrt{196} - 0$$

Since the assumption states that the agent will prefer not to work hard on the job the measures structuring the relation between the principal and the agent must secure that high effort is rewarded with due wages and that low effort is less favourable than high to the agent. All types of measures taken by the principal towards controlling the agent are designed for aligning the goals of the agent with those of the principal (Kreps 1990: 577-585).

### **5.2.2.1 Prevention of Shirking**

The principal can initiate measures to limit or prevent the agent from shirking (deviate from the principal’s wishes). These are termed (1) contract design, (2) screening and selection

<sup>55</sup> Formal modelling along the lines of the example is beyond the scope of this thesis. The examples are included in order to provide the reader an introduction to the formal aspects of these theories originating within the discipline of economics.

mechanisms, (3) monitoring and reporting requirements and (4) institutional checks (Kreps 1990: 586-593; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991:27-34).

- (1) The problems associated with shirking can not be hindered by a contractual design, however the contractual design can create an environment where the incentives are structured in a manner that align the preferences of the agent with those of the principal. Furthermore, the contract design should, as far as possible, specify the precise tasks and goals of the agent; shirking would then be easier to detect.
- (2) The process of screening and selection starts before the agent is hired. Gaining as much information as possible about the candidates is required in order to hire the right man for the job.
- (3) While the two former measures for the prevention of shirking are initiated in the hiring phase of the relation, the two remaining are processes that run parallel to the agent's execution of the job. Monitoring and reporting are two ways of controlling what the agent is doing. However, one should not glorify the principal's ability to do this. Firstly, monitoring is time-consuming and costly and contributes to reduce the value of hiring the agent in the first place. Secondly, the principal's ability to assess the quality of the agent's work that is reported back to the principal, is conditional on the principal's familiarity with this type of work and the agent's capabilities. Monitoring and reporting relates to the contractual design and the specification of the tasks and goals, this is so because the principal usually have no other means for valuing the work done by the agent. The magnitude of the agent's work will also be decisive; the greater and more complex the job is, the harder it is to control by the principal through these measures.
- (4) Institutional checks are mechanisms that secure the decisions of an agent by giving another agent the ability to block or veto a decision. An example may be the checks integrated in the political system. The separation of power between the three branches of government, legislative, executive and judicial as first described by Montesquieu and Lock (Held 1996:82-89), secures that no single institution can act unconstitutionally and oppose the *will of the people* (most strictly implemented in USA and in countries with judicial-review).

Continuing along the lines of the example of principal-agent relation presented above, the following example introduces a formal approach to contract design.

### Contract design

We assume that the agent is a salesman representing the principal to a potential client. There are three possible outcomes of this scenario: 1. the client places no order with the principal, 2. the client places an order worth (gross) \$100 or 3. the client places an order worth (gross) \$400. The effort of the agent affects the odds (P) for each of these outcomes.

High(5):	Low(0):	Result:
.1	.6	0
.3	.3	\$100
.6	.1	\$400

The size of the sale is observable and the wage of the agent can be made contingent upon this variable. Further, we assume that the principal is risk neutral, the agent is risk averse and that the utility function presented in the previous section continues to be valid for this example.

If the agent had been risk neutral the contractual design could secure an outcome of the relation where the principal would be as well off as he would have been if he could write a contract contingent on the actual effort level of the agent; however that is not the case here.

In this case when the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse, the most cost-efficient arrangement is one where the agent's wage is certain. This is so because if there is any risk associated with the wage the agent will value it at less than its expected value. But, being risk neutral, the principal values the cost of the wages at their expected value. However, if we provide the agent with a predetermined wage, the agent would have no incentive to put in a high effort level on the job. Thus, when doing the contractual design we must sacrifice some of the efficiency that is gained in putting all risk on the principal in order to establish an economic incentive for the agent to put in a high effort.

Suppose the agent is paid:  $\$ \chi_0^2$  for no sale,  $\$ \chi_1^2$  for the small sale, and  $\$ \chi_2^2$  for the large sale. The agent's utility function, expressed for each case, would then be  $\chi_i - a$ , for  $\chi = 0,1,2$ .

This contract provides the agent with three choices:

(A) Refuse the contract and get the reservation utility 9, (B) Take the contract and put in a low level of effort, for an expected utility of:  $(.6)\chi_0 + (.3)\chi_1 + (.1)\chi_2$ , (C) Take the contract and put in a high level of effort, for an expected utility of:  $(.1)\chi_0 + (.3)\chi_1 + (.6)\chi_2$ .

Writing the best possible contract for the principal, the contract will be subject to the constraints that the agent will take the contract and that he puts in a high level of effort. In mathematical terms:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Minimize} & \quad (.1)\chi_0^2 + (.3)\chi_1^2 + (.6)\chi_2^2 \\ \text{Subject to} & \quad (.1)\chi_0 + (.3)\chi_1 + (.6)\chi_2 - 5 \geq 9 \\ \text{And} & \quad (.1)\chi_0 + (.3)\chi_1 + (.6)\chi_2 - 5 \geq (.6)\chi_0 + (.3)\chi_1 + (.1)\chi_2 \end{aligned}$$

Sale:	Wage:
\$0	$5.42857^2 = \$29.46$
\$100	$14^2 = \$196$
\$400	$15.42857^2 = \$238.0407$

Solving this constrained optimization problem we get that the best contractual design is one where:

The expected wage bill for an agent putting in a high level of effort is therefore:

$$(.1)(29.46) + (.3)(196) + (.6)(238.0407) = \$204.56$$

Total result of the relation for the principal will in this case be:

$$270 - 204.56 = \$65.44$$

In the previous example we saw that the principal had to pay the agent  $w \geq \$196$  in order for him to take the job and put in a high level of effort. However, a predetermined wage at this level would cause the agent to maximize his utility putting in a low level of effort. In comparison the additional \$8.56 provides the principal with a measure to better control the outcome of the relation.



As seen, the theory considers the relation between the principal and the agent as asymmetrical in nature. The resourcefulness of the agent stems from the identified problems termed *hidden action* and *hidden information*. Furthermore, it assumes the basic interest of the principal and the agent to be conflicting. However, as shown, it is possible to limit the manoeuvrability of the agent and thus his ability to shirk. But though the agent can be controlled through the application of various measures and his possibility to shirk can be reduced, he still remains strong and resourceful.

### **5.2.3 The Budget-Maximising Bureaucrat**

The political economy approach is dominated by theories with a basic concept resembling principle-agent theories. One of the most profound in its analysis of bureaucracy, and also one of the most criticised, is that of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat developed by William A. Niskanen.

Niskanen views the public sector bureaucracy as a non-profit monopoly supplier financed wholly or in part from a periodic grant. His basic interest in the study of public sector bureaucracy is to look into their effect on the efficiency in resource allocation and to compare this to the market based situation of firms.

Niskanen identifies the personal preferences of the bureaucrat as a central element of his theory. However he argues that this does not necessarily imply a cynical interpretation of the personal motives of bureaucrats. He recognises the notion of the ethical bureaucrat motivated by serving the public interest, but argues that the budget-maximizing strategy is placed on the agenda the minute one bureaucrat (or agency in the budgetary competition) serves his personal interest or a different perception of the public interest. By this argument Niskanen suggests that the structure of government corrupts the minds of well intending bureaucrats (Niskanen 1971:39).

*The beginning of wisdom is the recognition that bureaucrats are people who are, at least, not entirely motivated by the general welfare or the interest of the state* (Niskanen 1971:36).

Drawing on the economist's theory of the firm and on the earlier work by Downs (Downs 1967), Niskanen argues that bureaucrats are maximizing their own utility. While Downs in his theory operated with a diversified set of variables for the bureaucrat to maximize, Niskanen

argues that all variables in a bureaucrat's utility function are a positive monotonic function of the total budget of the bureau; thus he argues that all variables sought maximized by a bureaucrat are maximized by maximizing the budget of the agency. Niskanen only identifies two variables in the bureaucrats utility function that are not positively associated with a growth in the budget size, namely the ease of managing- and ease of making change in the bureau (Niskanen 1973:22).

Niskanen further suggests that bureaucracies, being removed from a competitive market, have fundamental problems in aligning employee's interests with those of the organisation. He argues that employees in market based firms have a great incentive to try to achieve the best possible result for the firm (in terms of profits); since this maximizes their utility. At the same time, he claims that no such mechanism exists in the public sector and that this creates a *treadmill phenomenon*, stimulating bureaucrats to push for increasing budgets since this is the only way in which they can maximize their own utility.<sup>56</sup>

In maximizing the budget the bureaucrats stand opposite to its sponsor. Niskanen describes the relationship between the sponsor and the agency as a bilateral monopoly, by this he refers to the two-way dependency between the parties; the agency's dependency of the sponsor as their sole financier, and the sponsor's dependency of the agency as their only provider of a particular service.<sup>57</sup> According to Niskanen the sponsor may be the executive, the legislator or any sub-committee of the legislator. The Treasurer functions as an intermediary between the sponsor and the agencies, allocating funds and conducting fiscal control. The bilateral monopoly relation is one of exchange. In contrast to the exchange in a market where units of output are offered at a price, the exchange in a bilateral monopoly is total output in exchange for a budget. The result in terms of size of expected total output vs. size of allocated budget is decided by the relative bargaining strength of the two sides. Niskanen, along with others, suggests that the struggle between the agency and the sponsor is easily won by the agency due to an asymmetrical power-relation between the two (Downs 1967:144-157; Niskanen 1971:24-30; Wildavsky 1964:74-84). This supremacy of the bureaucracy is heavily dependent on what in an earlier section was referred to on a general level as: *hidden action and hidden information*. These problems are further enhanced in the special case of governmental


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<sup>56</sup> This claim relates to the second assumption of organizational efficiency formulated above

<sup>57</sup> Niskanen holds this to be the *ideal* relation between the agency and the sponsor, however he recognises that numerous of other hybrids of this relation exist.

efficiency due to special conditions. The assessment of efficiency in an agency is a difficult exercise, much of what is being produced is difficult or impossible to quantify.<sup>58</sup> Niskanen argues that the sponsor is passive due to a lack of capabilities for obtaining information of what minimum cost a given level of service output will have; the sponsor only knows the budget it is prepared to pay for a given quantity of services. The passive sponsor paves the way for the bureaucrat to maximize the agency's budget. The budget-maximizing strategy of bureaucrats is, by Niskanen, assumed to lead to overproduction of services and added inefficiency, with growth in government spending being the final result (Figure 5.1).

**Figure 5.1: Equilibrium output of a bureau** <sup>59</sup>



<sup>58</sup> Health services cure deceases, but they also prevent them; the one is more quantifiable than the other.

<sup>59</sup> Figure 5.1 represent the equilibrium output level of a bureau for representative demand and cost conditions. The figure is generated based on the functions for the equilibrium presented in the text box on the next page. The areas V1 and V2 in the figure represent respectively the lower and upper demand conditions as expressed in the equilibrium functions included in the boxed text below (Niskanen 1971:46-47).

### The formal model for the budget-maximizing bureaucrat

The basic model is a one-period model of a “pure”, single-service bureau which is a competitive purchaser of factors. At this stage Niskanen expressed the model with the bureau as a monopoly supplier, but the sponsor was not presented as exercising its potential power as the single buyer of the service, either for lack of incentive or opportunity.

The total potential budget available to the bureau during the budget period is represented by the following budget output function:

$$B = aQ - bQ^2, \quad 0 \leq Q < \frac{a}{2b} \quad (5,1)$$

The minimum total cost during the budget period, given the competitive purchase of factors, is represented by the following cost-output function:

$$TC = cQ + dQ^2, \quad 0 \leq Q \quad (5,2)$$

The constraint that the budget must be equal or greater than the minimum total cost is represented as follows:

$$B \geq TC \quad (5,3)$$

These two functions and the budget constraint constitute the complete model of the elementary bureau.

For these demand and cost conditions, the first task is to find the maximum level of budget that the sponsor will approve and the expected output of services that will be supplied by the bureau at the approved budget level. With full consideration for the probable reduction made by the sponsor's review process, the bureaucrat will submit a budget-output proposal which maximizes the expected approved budget subject to the constraint that the approved budget must be sufficient to cover the costs of the output expected by the sponsor at that budget level.

The equilibrium level of the expected output of services at the approved budget level, for these conditions, is determined as follows:

Maximization of B (first derivative [5,1] equals zero) leads to an upper level of  $Q = \left[ \frac{a}{2b} \right]$ .

The constraint (5,3) that B must be equal to or greater than TC leads to a lower level (equality of [5,1] and [5,2]) of  $Q = \left[ \frac{a-c}{b+d} \right]$ . These two levels of Q are equal where  $a = \left[ \frac{2bc}{b-d} \right]$ . For an elementary bureau which buys factors in a competitive market the equilibrium level of Q is where:

$$Q[ \quad (5,4)$$
$$= \frac{a-c}{b+d} \text{ for } a < \frac{2bc}{b-d}$$
$$= \frac{a}{2b} \text{ for } a \geq \frac{2bc}{b-d}$$

(Niskanen 1971:45-52)

Thus, the central hypothesis of Niskanen's theory is that ranking bureaucrats attempt to maximise their budget, because it is in their interest to do so, and that the strategies they adopt contribute substantially to the growth of the state (Niskanen 1971; 1973; Jackson 1982:131).

Beetham suggests that the model of Niskanen can be employed in the following two different ways (Beetham 1996).

### ***5.2.3.1 Formal model with Strong Assumptions***

Budgets are the sole component in the bureaucrats' utility function; consequently budget maximising is the only objective being pursued and all strategies of the bureaucracy are geared toward this goal. The budget sponsor is completely passive.

The formal interpretation of the model hardly seems plausible; the assumptions are too rigid and disregard empirical evidence. Firstly, it is presumed that all action taken by the bureaucrats are aimed at benefiting the bureaucrat personally, this assumption of personal utility is very basic in rational-choice theory and is one that have been stated above; none the less it remains questionable that this is the only consideration of a bureaucrat. Secondly, it is questionable if bureaucrats even gain from growth in the budget; as long as this stands unproven and without any empirical evidence, it stands questionable if this can be the only component in a bureaucrat's utility function. Finally, the formal interpretation assumes that the legislative branch is powerless in dealing with the bureaucracy, this is also an assumption that seems implausible. The legislator is of course weakly staffed relative to the bureaucracy, however, tendencies towards increased staffing and division into technical committees have made the legislator better equipped for controlling the bureaucracy, these features may suggest that the legislator (sponsor) is better equipped with means for controlling the administration than what is assumed by Niskanen.

### ***5.2.3.2 Informal Model with Weaker Assumptions***

Bureaucrats are presumed to want larger budgets, not necessarily to try to maximise them. The strategies of the bureaucracy are mainly, but not solely, targeted at budget increase. In dealing with the sponsor the bureaucracy only has a relative advantage, based on asymmetric information (Beetham 1996).

Even though the basis of the assumptions made in the informal interpretation are also questionable and make the informal model subject to much the same criticism as the more formal form, the less rigid approach still seems more flexible and applicable. This interpretation sees the bureaucrats occupied with increasing the budget; not necessarily maximising it. Furthermore, this interpretation regards budget increases as the main occupation; but the bureaucrats are not restricted to only this one goal. In describing the relation between the sponsor and the bureaucrat the power distribution seem more realistic, granting power to the legislator. What makes this interpretation more realistic is the softer approach it takes: it is less rigorous in its assumptions, and thus it has a greater chance of identifying some nuances of bureaucracy.

#### **5.2.4 Criticism of the Approach**

The most basic criticism is that we will never know the inside of the bureaucrats' heads, thus we will never know their precise strategies. I state this because when attempting to test the model of Niskanen I can not test the strategies of the bureaucrat; I test the relative success of a presumed strategy. If bureaucrats have the strategy as presumed but are unsuccessful I will conclude that they never had it; an accurate operational hypothesis for the issue at hand is difficult to obtain.<sup>60</sup> Testing the model of Niskanen I am exposed to drawing the wrong conclusions due to the problem of excluding other possible relations; results I would interpret as confirming the model may also be consistent with other models of utility-maximizing organisational behaviour and difficult to only ascribe to Niskanen's theory (Peters 1991:304). However, if I find that bureaucrats for most of the time are unsuccessful in their strategy of budget maximizing, this result is interesting as well, since Niskanen's theory assumes that bureaucracy is usually successful in deceiving its sponsor for increases in the budget (Peters 1991).

##### ***5.2.4.1 Bureaucrats' Incentives***

As stated above, it is questionable whether bureaucrats do gain from a growth in the budget. A typical example of a personal gain would be an increase in salary. However, studies on this subject show an insignificant correlation between the variables budget growth and salary level. The main reason for this is the formal and rigid system of pay common in governmental organisations (Young 1991:37-38; Peters 2001:106-110). Though the size of an agency's

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<sup>60</sup> Of course this depends on expectations but it borders the impossible.

budget and the level of salaries it offers correspond poorly, it might be possible to identify other personal benefits that are better correlated with growth in budget size. Since studies show that the salary level of a department remains largely unchanged in spite of an increased budget, it should be reasonable to expect increased expenses relating either to (1) new employees, (2) an increased volume in the output of the services (without increased demand), or (3) a general increase in per unit cost (as mentioned above inefficiency and/or overproduction).

All three possibilities may translate into potential benefits for the bureaucrats and thus function as incentives for the bureaucrats to push for maximization of the budget.

Firstly, a growth in the organisation in the form of new employees will increase the possibility for advancement since growth is likely to create new positions on every level, and new co-workers also improve job-security for those already employed. Furthermore, the growth of the organisation may also heighten the prestige of the top ranking bureaucrat since they now will be ranking in a bigger organisation. In addition to the better chances for advancement, the growth of the organisation with new employees might also result in a lower workload and more leisure for the employees since the organisation now would be better staffed (if “production level” remains the same). This relates to the third point and results in inefficiency (Young 1991:33-54; Beetham 1996:44-17). Secondly, the scope of services and the efficiency with which they are provided can be expected to reflect on the prestige of the organisation: the better and more efficient the organisation is perceived to be the, more prestigious it is to be employed in (Niskanen 1971:38). Thus overproduction of services may be a result the bureaucrat aims in order to heighten their prestige.<sup>61</sup> Lastly, it is perceivable that there is an increase in the budget without any of the two factors already mentioned occurring. If that is the case and the agency has more funds without any particular increase in expenses, this may translate into a benefit for the bureaucrat in the sense that the running of the organisation is done with better economic leeway. If the budget spent on the maintenance of the organisation exceeds a given level it contributes to inefficiency in budgetary allocations. This is the issue earlier presented as a formal model and illustrated in figure 5.1. Niskanen referred to this particular situation as maximization of the discretionary budget, by this he meant a

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<sup>61</sup> This said it should be pointed out that efficiency in governmental organizations is difficult to assess. Niskanen argues in his book that the frequency of contact between the organization and the general public is decisive for the reputation of a given governmental organization. Niskanen suggest that the postal-service’s somewhat poor reputation is due to their high frequency of contact with the public, and that despite this reputation it outperforms most other governmental agencies in terms of efficiency (Niskanen 1973:15).

maximization of the budgetary portion that exceeds the cost of the expected output. Niskanen argued that this type of budget maximization could easily be translated into benefits for the bureaucrats since part of the budget allocated to the agency remained unused within the agency (see figure 5.1 for a formal presentation).

The benefits mentioned above can all be viewed as reasons for bureaucracy to push towards an increase of the budget. However, when Niskanen developed his model of the budget-maximising bureaucrat he assumed that it was the top ranking bureaucrats that would gain personally, and that it was these that possessed the ability to increase the budget allocations of the department/agency. The above mentioned benefits are to a larger extent beneficial to lower ranking bureaucrats, and the personal gain of the top-officials is expected to be more limited (Peters 1991:346, 2001:13).

#### ***5.2.4.2 Context***

In addition to that above it should be mentioned that the model was established by Niskanen based on his knowledge of the US bureaucracy, and in the US a career bureaucrat normally remains within one department throughout her entire career, as opposed to the norm in most western-European states, where a career in state bureaucracy unfolds within the whole state apparatus (Peters 1991:315; Page 1997:80-86; for an empirical example (Belgium) see Page and Wright 1999:126-127). This general career pattern suggests that there is a bigger incentive to push for growth in the department budget in America than what is the case in most western-European countries. This is assumed because it seems more likely (assuming the model of Niskanen is correct) that a gain in budget size would benefit those bureaucrats that remained within the organisation for a longer duration of time. In addition to the differences in career paths, there are other elements that may suggest that the model is profoundly American. Peters argues that the environment created by the much decentralized agencies and the likewise decentralized legislative sponsor (committees) creates a system with great possibility for fostering the budget-maximizing strategy among bureaucrats, more so than the parliamentary systems common in western-Europe. The decentralized system as currently in place in the US facilitates the budget-maximizing strategy due to its decentralized structure, where the agencies escape sponsor scrutiny and enjoy autonomy to a level where they may practise budget-maximization (Peters 1991:307). Further, Peters points to the dubious notion of the “bureau chief” in Niskanen’s model, and argues that Niskanen fails to specify whether this refers to a career bureaucrat or a short term appointee. If the latter is the



focus of the analysis, the possibility of testing the theory in different contexts would fade. It is possible to extend the criticism of Niskanen's use of the term *bureaucrat* even beyond this point made by Peters. In his book Niskanen fail to distinguish in term between high-ranking officials (the focus of his analysis) and the lower-ranking officials, disregarding the necessity of a clear-cut definition on this point the applicability of Niskanen's model become tainted. However, though the main focus of Niskanen's model can be said to be the higher ranking officials with budgetary responsibilities, it may also be argued that a budget-maximising strategy of the high ranking officials needs compliance from the lower- and middle ranking officials as well. It has been argued that the maximizing-strategy, originally adopted by the higher ranking officials, must be present within the entire agency or bureau in order for it to be a success (Niskanen 1971:38-41; Blais and Dion 1991:5).

#### ***5.2.4.3 Constraints by State Institutions***

In his theory Niskanen considers the power-relation between the sponsor and the agency to be the deciding factor for the bureaucrats' ability to exercise budget-maximizing. It can be argued that Niskanen underscores the ability of the elected officials in the legislative and in the executive to control bureaucracy. There are different approaches taken towards controlling bureaucracy: politically appointing the top officials,<sup>62</sup> monitoring bureaucratic conduct, specialisation by politicians in certain fields of policy, etc. All these measures may contribute to bring into balance the relation between politicians and bureaucrats. Even though the relation remains skewed due to asymmetrical distribution of information and expertise, the power seems better distributed than what Niskanen suggests.

In addition to constraints imposed on bureaucracy by the elected branches of government, it is important to realise that bureaucracy also limits its own success. Bureaucracy is no monolithic construction and the various departments and agencies compete for the resources of the state; this competition will undeniably limit the ability of a department or agency to increase its budget. If all bureaucratic departments seek to increase their budgets they will necessarily be competitors; this is so because the resources of the state are scarce and what one gets the others cannot have. This said, it should be added that this competition for funding is not a zero-sum game in strict terms. In addition to the competitive environment among the line

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<sup>62</sup> Though Niskanen suggests that these soon become bureaucrats and representatives of the bureau they are heading (Niskanen 1973:11).

departments and the “spenders” of the state, there is competition between the “spenders” on the one side and the “provider” of the funding, the Treasurer or its equivalent central ministry, on the other. While most departments wish to increase their budgets, the interests of the department of finance run opposite. The Treasurer will attempt to counter the trend of increased spending among the “spenders” of the state, if the growth of the budget is controlled, expected and minimal then it is perceived a job well done by the Treasurer (Peters 1991: 318-319).

#### ***5.2.4.4 External Constraints***

This far the focus has been on the limitation placed on the budget-maximising bureaucrats by the various state institutions, and it has been questioned if these limitations might be more profound than what Niskanen portrayed them to be. However, when dealing with the power of bureaucracy one should keep in mind that also other actors, outside the state, limits the autonomy of the bureaucracy.

Bureaucracy is of central interest because of its vital role within the state apparatus. This central position leads external interest groups to direct their effort for affecting policy towards bureaucracy. The limitation on bureaucratic autonomy imposed by this strategy of civil society interest groups is conditional on the bureaucratic structure and the culture for cooperation. These features will vary from case to case. However, it is raised above questioning that these factors also have some effect on the latitude with which the bureaucracy operates (Peters 2001: 185-210).

Bureaucracy is a complex apparatus and, as seen, the various constraints placed upon its powers are many. However simplistic and unrealistic in its formal interpretation, the model suggested by Niskanen seems to be reasonable if applied in a moderate manner along with a clarification of its limitations.<sup>63</sup> Thus, it should not be dismissed as failing to capture the essence of bureaucracy, but employed along with modifications in order to improve its performance in the analysis of bureaucracy and of bureaucratic behaviour.

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<sup>63</sup> In testing the validity of Niskanen’s model in Europe Peters look at both structural characteristics (most of these included above), individual characteristics and the sponsor (touched upon above).

### **5.3 Concluding Remarks**

The theoretical chapter have provided a presentation of two central traditions in the study of bureaucracy, sociology of organisation and political economy. Although they have been identified to differ greatly in their views on bureaucratic efficiency, they can be seen as much more in line regarding their focus of analysis.

Sociology of organisation follows, as presented here, closely the line of Weber, arguing that rationality is the quality of bureaucracy that makes it both attractive, and at the same time dangerous. By this is meant that the sociological tradition holds great faith in the bureaucratic apparatus and in the rational bureaucrat, but recognises the ambivalent nature of bureaucratic power. This recognition of the potential danger posed by bureaucracy has resulted in a focus upon how bureaucracy can be contained within the administrative sphere. The political economy approach towards the study of bureaucracy is primarily interested in the fiscal performance of the bureau. The basic assumption is within this theoretical tradition that bureaucrats are, like other people, seeking to maximize their own utility. This basic notion implies that bureaucrats and bureaucracies as such are viewed as entities that need to be controlled in order to serve their designated purpose. Political economy therefore ends up with much the same focus as sociology of organisation, on the mechanisms for how to control bureaucracy.

Identifying the two traditions and the three presented theories as basically dealing with the same issues makes it possible to structure one common approach towards the analysis of the case chosen for this study. Basing the approach towards the analysis of the administration's role in Norwegian development policy on the theoretical approaches, I identify three elements commonly viewed as defining for the administration's role within all three theories, these are:

1. The power-potential held by the administration
2. The attitudes and conduct of the bureaucrats themselves.
3. The constraints placed on bureaucracy by state institutions and other public actors.

These three elements are the features that will be explored in order to gain insight into the administrations' role within the policy-field of development assistance in Norway. Identified as being the crucial features of bureaucracy within the widely different theories explored in

this chapter, these elements of bureaucracy are thought to represent a well adjusted point of departure when I in the next chapter applies this approach to the empirical material, analysing the role of the administration within the context of development policy in Norway.

## 6 – Analysis: Assessing the Bureaucratic Role

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The theoretical presentation provided in the former chapter gave a thorough account of rivalling theories commonly believed to be widely different in their most fundamental elements. However, though different in many vital aspects, the two theoretical traditions represented also display some clear elements of similarity. For this analysis, I choose to make these similarities my point of departure. The scheme I employ is that developed in this thesis chapter four, structured around the theoretically identified focal point:

1. The power-potential held by the administration
2. The attitudes and conduct of the bureaucrats themselves.
3. The constraints placed on bureaucracy by state institutions and other public actors.

These three basic observations will serve as my point of departure when I now turn towards the analysis of my case, that of the role played by the administration in the field of Norwegian development policy.

### 6.1 Structure of the analysis

The first section of this analysis focus is directed towards the *resourcefulness* and the *power-potential* of the administration *vis-à-vis* the *political authorities* and in terms of the *administration's capabilities* as a common actor in general. Analysing these features of the administration in Norwegian development assistance provides insight into an important element related to the total assessment of the administration's role in the policy field.

The second part of the analysis deals with the behaviour and conduct of the bureaucrats, the second elements identified as common for the theories. Although this is an element identified as common for the different theoretical approaches the topic is differently treated within the theories. On this account I explore the bureaucrats' own perception of their role as administrators, based on theoretical notions as put forward in the theories.

The third part of the analysis is devoted to the context within which the bureaucracy in the field of development policy functions. Within the development policy field many other

entities have and seek influence. The relation between the administration and some of the most central actors on the policy arena is explored in this section. Establishing and evaluating the various constraints and limitations placed on the bureaucratic power. I will provide a picture of the external constraints placed on the power-potential of the administration, in order to grasp the full picture of how the administration has the possibility of acting in its environment vis-à-vis other more or less forceful actors within the policy field.

The last section of the analysis is devoted to theory. In this final section the focus is redirected away from the empirical case and over to the different rivaling theories. An objective with this analysis is to assess the applicability of the various theories to the chosen case, this assessment is performed in section 6.5.2 after a summary and conclusion concerning the administration's role is reached the previous section 6.5.1.

## **6.2 Composition and Capabilities of the Bureaucracy**

Assessing the capabilities of the surveyed departments I commence by reviewing some general features concerning organisational composition and formal competence. These two elements are believed to be interconnected in that the one is contingent upon the other signifying that in order for the administration to be characterised as powerful, both features must be present. The general assumption is that *the more homogenous the organisation the larger the capacity of the organisation in serving the interests of the people employed in it* (Jacobsen 1997). Exploring these features of the departments at hand I employ results generated by the first section of the questionnaire concerning education, career path and political affiliation. In presenting the findings I will, where possible, also draw upon the responses provided by selected bureaucrats in the follow-up interviews conducted after the conclusion of the survey.

In terms of the theoretical notions the powerful position ascribed to the administration within all theories are seen as stemming from its technical skills and its access to information (asymmetrical distribution), thus, it will be commonly expected based on the theoretical notions of all three theories that the analysis reveals an administration in the field of Norwegian development policy that is characterised as possessing a considerable power-potential.

## 6.2.1 Education

Starting with the educational aspect it is evident that a high level of education is common for most employees in the three departments. Although the findings of the survey should be carefully employed as being valid for the entire case it seems safe to state this as plausible since the findings are so overwhelmingly one-sided (6.1). These findings are not surprising, and they correspond largely with the findings of other studies of Norwegian civil service (Christensen, Læg Reid and Zuna 2001), and illustrate the need for competence as a prerequisite for getting the job done in a knowledge intensive policy field. The survey results illustrate that a common factor for the bureaucrats is post-secondary education, most commonly on the undergraduate or the graduate level.

**Table 6.1: Educational level within the departments**

Level of education	Frequency	Percent
University/college I (1-2 years)	1	3,85
University/college II (3-4 years)	8	30,77
University/college III (5-6 years)	16	61,53
PhD (>7 years)	1	3,85
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>100,00</b>

However, as a group characteristic, a common educational level is not very decisive; what is more interesting is the subject areas within which the education is held (Mintzberg 1979, 1983; Torgersen 1994). The limited response-rate does not allow a detailed investigation into the educational background of the bureaucrats based on the survey results; however, the figures generated by the survey do suggest that a majority of the employees in the departments hold academic degrees from within the disciplines of administration, economics, social science and law, something that further indicates some degree of homogeneity (6.2).

**Table 6.2: Highest completed level of education/discipline (Cross tabulation)**

		Uni./coll. I (1-2 years)	Uni./coll. II (3-4 years)	Uni./coll. III (5-6 years)	PhD (>7 years)	Total
<b>Discipline</b>	Administration, economics, social science, and law	1	6	14	1	22
	Other	0	2	2	0	4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>26</b>

Turning to secondary literature in the field it might seem like the formerly mentioned educational group is somewhat overrepresented within the sampled group of my survey. In a study conducted in relation to the research project "Power and Democracy" Christensen, Læg Reid and Zuna (2001) have identified the above mentioned group to make up 46% of the work force of the entire UD (Ibid.,34). Even though it is likely that differences in educational composition exist between the various departments within the ministry, it seems unlikely that these are as profound as the differences between my survey and the one conducted for the above mentioned research project indicates. Assuming that the educational composition of the departments I have surveyed is in line with that documented for the whole of the ministry by Christensen, Læg Reid and Zuna, it offers a picture of these departments as somewhat heterogeneous in terms of education. Decomposing the 46% made up by ministry employees with an educational background from within the disciplines of administration, economics, social science and law, all of these disciplines are well represented, securing a pluralistic educational basis for the departments.

The conducted interviews indicate much the same as what is reflected in the survey findings and in the general assumption that the surveyed departments are largely in line with the larger organisation in terms of educational composition. The interviewed bureaucrats were chosen so as to represent all of the surveyed departments; this allowed me to ask for their assessment of educational composition for the department they were employed in. Asked to give this assessment, the interviewed civil servants generally stressed that post-secondary education, particularly at a post-graduate level was the norm. In terms of discipline they were more unsure but all five said that the majority of their colleagues were trained within the social sciences and economy. Thus, the interviewed bureaucrats were more in line with the findings of my survey than the findings of the study of the entire UD, this might indicate a somewhat differently composed workforce within the surveyed departments than what is the case for the larger organisation of the entire ministry. However, the interviewed bureaucrats also stressed that the workforce within the surveyed departments was multi-disciplinary and not very homogeneous in terms of education.

On the basis of these findings there is *no evidence supporting a very homogeneous educational pattern among civil servants* working within the surveyed department, nor within the whole of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Though there is evidence indicating a predominant position within the surveyed departments for the social sciences and economy.



The only consistent common denominator in terms of education is that most employees seem to have some sort of post-secondary education, this however is not very surprising knowing that merit is the key qualifier for a position in the state administration in Norway.

### **6.2.2 Career path**

A second general element that should be considered is the continuity vs. discontinuity in the work force in the studied departments. A general assumption within studies of administration is that the *higher the level of continuity the more likely the bureaucrats within these departments perceive them self as comprising a distinctive group*. In the survey three questions deal with different aspects of the career patterns of the respondents.

Firstly, this issue is addressed by asking the number of years the respondents have held their current positions. From the figures generated by asking this question it is evident that the surveyed departments are going through a process of reform. The majority of the respondents have answered that they have held the current position for less than one year, a figure reflecting the administrative reshaping undertaken within the area of development policy in the course of the last year.<sup>64</sup> In addition to the somewhat unusual circumstances within the ministry related to the administrative reform, it should be added that most of the respondents surveyed are occupying positions that involve mandatory service at the Norwegian embassies, and thus a position will under normal circumstances be held only for about three years before the bureaucrat is reassigned to a position abroad, there are of course exceptions to this general pattern.

In order to make further sense of the variable measuring tenure in current position, it should be regarded in relation to the variable indicating former work-place. This variable should provide more insight into the issue of continuity since the administrative reform within these departments has relocated people within the administration of development policy, and since the normal pattern is one market by volatility. Asked if they held another position in the organisation before the one they currently hold, fourteen said that they did, twelve came from a position at another work place, but out of these eleven had held position within the state administration before. Out of these eleven only two had the majority of their work experience outside the public sector.

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<sup>64</sup> This internal relocation of personnel within the administration for development assistance has been explored in an earlier chapter.

In addition to the survey data representing former work-place for the respondents, career path within the surveyed sections and departments should also be commented based on the uniform manner of recruitment still dominant in the ministry. Though the current and previous reforms affecting the organisation of the UD along with some element of direct recruitment have provided the ministry with some personnel not fitting the general profile, the common manner for recruitment to the ministry is through the specialised trainee-program (Christensen et al. 2002:73). The highly prestigious programme recruits 15-25 trainees annually and paves the way for a career within the UD. The survey does not hold any information on how the bureaucrats have been recruited; however, the interviewed bureaucrats portrayed the trainee-program as being the manner in which the majority of the employees within the departments have been recruited. Further the interviewed bureaucrats also said that most employees within the UD remain within the organisation for their entire career, more so than what is the case for civil servants within other ministries and agencies in the central state administration. As put by one of the respondents when asked to describe the general career pattern within the ministry: "[The] usual [pattern] in the UD is one-sided, one enters at the bottom and resign at the age of 67."<sup>65</sup> This system of recruitment offers a profound mechanism of socialising the new employees into the organisational culture of the ministry, a culture that has been described as powerful and conservative in studies on the subject (Neumann 2001:135-147; Fonn and Presttun 2004) and in the recent public debate in the major Norwegian daily newspapers following the Tsunami-crisis in Eastern-Asia (Hanssen 2005; Larsen 2005; Steiro 2005; Ystad 2005).

Some of the internal mobility documented for the surveyed departments is likely to stem from the ongoing restructuring within the development policy field. This ongoing reform creates an impression of more job volatility within the surveyed departments than what would be the case under normal circumstances. However, the normal circumstances are also likely to display a higher level of job mobility within the UD compared to other ministries due to the obligatory service abroad common for most of the employees within the UD. Though there is evidence within the survey-data indicating that each position is only held for a smaller period of time, the interviews and the survey-data further indicate that the general pattern of careers within the departments is one market by continuity. The common career for a bureaucrat within the surveyed departments is one confined to the UD for the entire stretch of their work

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<sup>65</sup> Quote in text is my translation of the Norwegian: "[det] vanlige I UD er en ensidig praksis, man kommer inn i bunn og går av i 67 års alderen".


active life. This career pattern suggests that most bureaucrats identify strongly with the organisation of the ministry; an element that points towards a high level of homogeneity in the surveyed departments.

**6.2.3 Political Attitudes**

Political attitude is the final feature of the departments I would like to explore on the basis of my survey response before I turn to the theoretically based analysis. Political affiliation of the bureaucrats is a feature that can provide insight into the mindset of the bureaucrats as a group, providing information on the basic set of values held by the bureaucrats (Blais, Blake and Dion 1991:205-231). The general assumption is that *if there is a tendency towards homogeneity in this matter it is reasonable to expect a certain bias in the bureaucrats' priorities.*

Figure 6.1 illustrates the composition of the departments in question in relation to political attitudes. The respondents were asked what party they voted for at the last parliamentary election. Compared to the leadership survey conducted in 2000, the figures generated by my survey deviate only to a small extent. Political party affiliation of bureaucrats working within the area of development policy seems to be in line with the larger population of bureaucrats working within the state administration as such.<sup>66</sup>

**Figure 6.1: Political party affiliation (percentage)**



<sup>66</sup> The Leadership survey was conducted in 2000 surveying the senior officials within the state administration. The population for my survey has been all bureaucrats, whatever level of rank within the departments in question. However, I find it reasonable to expect no discrepancy between the ranks in relation to political party preference.

The close resemblance in distribution between the respondents to the two surveys related to this issue may be interpreted as providing support to the validity of my survey sample. There is a bias towards leftist political orientation among the bureaucrats, a finding that suggests certain attitudes being more profound than others. However, it should be added that although this is a clear tendency, and most bureaucrats express a leftist orientation, there is also a large proportion of the bureaucrats that do not fit within this profile. Based on these findings there is little evidence suggesting homogeneity within the bureaucratic departments in terms of political affiliation. Though there is a general pattern suggesting a leftist bias, the figures also show that this is only a general pattern and do not overshadow the diversity that is present.

#### **6.2.4 Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity**

Attempting to establish some understanding of the surveyed departments' ability as a joint group, I have in this section focused on general features believed to be linked to this aspect.

- Education
- Career path
- Party affiliation.

Overall, the three indicators chosen for shedding light on the composition of the surveyed departments assessing whether these are occupied by a homogenous or a heterogeneous group of bureaucrats, and thus provide insight into their abilities as a group, have proved to be ambiguous. Some aspects of the findings suggests that the surveyed group of bureaucrats is homogenous and may act as an self-serving interest group; however other aspects are more suggestive of a more diverse group less capable of acting together. Overall, the indicators chosen point towards homogeneity, however, the overall picture indicates that this homogeneity is only moderate in force

The bureaucrats' capabilities and strategies for acting on behalf of themselves will be further explored in the following parts of the thesis.

#### **6.2.5 Summary**

The basic argument of both theoretical approaches is that the bureaucracy prevails over the politicians due to their capabilities rooted in technical skills and accumulation of information. The technical skills of the bureaucrats, operationalised as the general level of education, is to

be characterised as high on grounds of the findings in the section above and according to other studies of bureaucracy (Christensen, Lægreid and Zuna 2001). This is not to say that the politicians are poorly educated, however the collective technical skills of the bureaucrats along with the level of work specification and continuity provides that these are capable of being more intimately acquainted with the vast area of development policy than the politicians are (Peters 2001:236-237). The surveyed departments are made up of ninety-six bureaucrats all assumed to be working with specific topics related to development policy (UD Phonebook). Relative to the three politicians working with the field of development policy within the ministry (Minister, Deputy-Minister and Political Advisor) and the foreign-policy committee made up by fifteen members of parliament,<sup>67</sup> the expertise and competence in the field is obviously skewed towards the administration rather than towards the politicians.

Development policy is a knowledge-intensive field; this became evident when reviewing the geographic scope, topical diversity and financial complexity of the Norwegian policies in the field (chapter 3). The complex structure of this field of policy and the fact that the implementation of policies occurs in distanced places further strengthens the role of the bureaucrats relative to that of the politicians (Tvedt 2003:188). Working closely with precise issues of development policy over time enables the individual bureaucrat to attain a level of knowledge superior to that possible for the politicians to hold. In the process of formulating or implementing policy this asymmetrical distribution of information can be employed by the bureaucrats so as to affect the policy-priorities in their desired manner.

Regarding the capabilities of the administration the surveyed departments have been identified to be *powerful vis-à-vis the political authorities in terms of technical skills and topical information*. Thus, the notion of the two theoretical approaches concerning the powerful bureaucratic apparatus having the means for affecting policy seems to be correct for the empirical case chosen for this study. The skewed distribution of information and skills, and the rational procedures with which these capabilities were applied was the factors identified by Weber to be the decisive for the strength of bureaucracy vis-à-vis the political authorities. Within the political economy approach the skills and level of information was also considered pre-conditions for the capabilities of bureaucracy. The power-potential identified

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<sup>67</sup> The parliamentary foreign policy committee deals with all issues of foreign policy, among which one is development policy. Normally the committee comprise of fifteen members, but this number may be extended to twenty-eight when treating certain matters.

as held by the departments surveyed here can, in terms of principle-agent theory, be termed the hidden information problem. This problem of hidden information is also the foundation of the bureaucratic power-potential as identified by Niskanen.

However powerful, as became evident in the former section the ability of the bureaucrats as a group is questionable. *Though some level of homogeneity was disclosed, the surveyed departments also displayed signs of having a limited ability related to this same issue.* What this implies is that the technical power held by each individual bureaucrat may remain unorganised, limiting the bureaucracy as a whole to exploit the full power-potential within.

The capacity of bureaucracy vis-à-vis the politicians that has been revealed was expected and correspond largely with the findings of other studies and with general literature on the topic (Christensen, Lægreid and Zuna 2001:66-71; Peters 2001:234). Being the administrative branch of government in the field of development policy these capabilities are necessary, it is not before the power-potential of the administration develops into an administrative intrusion into the sphere of the politicians that the issue becomes controversial. This is a notion that will be explored further in the subsequent section.

### **6.3 Bureaucratic Conduct and Behaviour**

In the preceding section the power-potential of bureaucracy in the field of development policy was established as decisive. This power-potential was expected, and is believed to be common within state administration due to the need of administrative capabilities. *Though there is a need for an able state administration in modern society these necessary capabilities of the administration may also provide a democratic problem, in that the administration takes over parts of the sphere normally believed to be the domain of the politicians* (Beetham 1996: 96-102, 1999: 6-13). If realised, this would eventually cause what Weber termed the bureaucratisation of society (or at least of the policy area in question).

This section explores the attitudes and conduct of the bureaucrats on the basis of the survey findings, taking its departure from the account provided by the theory. As will be remembered from the theoretical chapter, the Weberian approach provides little room for the behaviour of the bureaucrats. Being structurally oriented in his approach, Weber argues that the inherent tendency of bureaucracy of exceeding its domain and intrude into politics stem from the

rational character of the administration,<sup>68</sup> and that the irrational structure of politics will cause it to succumb to the efficiency of the bureaucratic apparatus. This structural approach leaves no room for the bureaucrat as an actor; the only determining factor for the extent of the natural process of bureaucratisation in Weber's theory is to what extent the measures taken for controlling the bureaucracy are efficient. This is an issue I will return to later in the analysis.

The issue of political control over the administration also occupies a crucial point in the political economy approach. However, this approach also sees the power of bureaucracy only as potential, conditional upon the strategies of the bureaucrats and the availability of these in terms of the level of control imposed on the administration in a given policy area. The issue of control will be addressed in the next section, now I turn to the issue pointed to as crucial by the political economy approach, namely that of bureaucratic behaviour.

### **6.3.1 The Political Economy Approach: Bureaucrat's Utility**

As will be remembered from the theoretical chapter the political economy approach has traditionally been occupied with the study of bureaucratic efficiency. In studying bureaucratic efficiency two basic assumptions have formed the foundation on which the analyses have been grounded.

First: -The key to efficiency lies in the incentives and sanctions of the competitive market; it is the removal of the bureaucracy from this competitive environment that makes the organisation fundamentally different from other forms of similar organisational features.

Second: -People are only brought to work for the goal of an organisation by means of incentives and sanctions which align the individual interest with the interests of the organisation. In absence of such incentives or sanctions, individuals will shirk or in other ways serve themselves. This is a potential dilemma in all hierarchical organisations, but actualised in bureaucracy (Beetham, 1996:28).

The two theoretical approaches representing political economy both deal with these issues. The general principal-agent approach argues that the principal and the agent inherently have

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<sup>68</sup> Referring to the rational character of bureaucracy Weber implies the high level of technical skills as well as the hierarchical organisation (see section on Weber).

conflicting interests that leads the agent to shirk if the incentives are not structured in a manner which aligns the interests of the agent with those of the principal. The budget-maximizing approach of Niskanen does not argue that the interest of the bureaucrat and the politician are necessarily conflicting, Niskanen argues that the bureaucrats' utility function is comprised of variables that are positively associated with increases in the total budget, thus he argues that the major strategy of the bureaucrats is to maximise their own utility by maximizing their department's budget.<sup>69</sup>

The principal-agent approach presents two types of information distribution that steers the relationship between the principal and the agent. These issues have been presented in the theory in somewhat general terms, however, they point to elements central to the understanding of the mechanisms deciding the bureaucrats' (agents') actions. Dependent upon which type of information asymmetry is present the problems of *moral hazard* and/or *adverse selection* occur. Even though both these distributions of information can be said to be present within the larger field of development policy, the type of distribution referred to as *hidden information* was above identified as being the most profound in the relation between the politicians and the bureaucrats in the field of development policy studied here.

In basic scheme, the situation described by Niskanen resembles a situation where the problem, termed hidden information within principal-agent theory, is present. Niskanen argues that because of their intimate knowledge in the policy field, the bureaucrats are capable of assessing the need for resources, however when communicating their budgetary request they increase their assessment so as to receive more funds than necessary from the politicians, that at the same time are incapable of knowing the cost of the bureaucratic output.<sup>70</sup> The exaggeration of the bureaucratic need for funds is by Niskanen said to be a result of the utility-function of the bureaucrats, a utility-function in which the variables included are positively associated with an increase in the budget.<sup>71</sup> Thus, Niskanen argues that the bureaucrats serve themselves by maximizing their department's budget.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Employing the theory of Niskanen I focus on the interpretation of the informal model with weak assumptions, this in order to make the theory more flexible and applicable for the analysis.

<sup>70</sup> As will be remembered from the theoretical chapter the principals only know the maximum of what they are willing to pay for the service provided.

<sup>71</sup> Niskanen assumes that only two variables are negatively associated with a budget increase, but these are minor compared to the benefits, thus the rational action is to maximize the budget (Niskanen 1973:22).

<sup>72</sup> Niskanen developed his theory arguing that the strategy of budget-maximisation was one held by the senior bureaucrats, however, the term 'bureaucrat' is unclear in his writings (Peters 1991:305). Employing his theory for this study is done on the recognition of the strategy adopted by the senior bureaucrats is largely dependent



Employing these theories for the purpose of analysing the behavioural patterns of the bureaucrats included in my case, I focus on the elements of the theories that deal with the attitudes of the bureaucrats. Arguing that the bureaucrats are utility-maximising both theories suggest certain variables that are sought maximised by the bureaucrats. Being general in its approach, the principal-agent theory only suggest some basic elements that are included in the bureaucrats utility-function, Niskanen develops a more specified theory presenting specific variables for the utility-function of the bureaucrats.

Arguing that most variables in the bureaucrat's utility-function are positively associated with an increase in department budget, Niskanen suggest these variables to be: *salary, reputation, power, patronage, output, enhanced job security and increased opportunity for promotion*. These variables can also be characterised as being consistent with the more general principal-agent approach though this approach may be characterised as less rigid in specifying the precise variables.

### **6.3.2 Survey Findings**


Exploring the survey-data trying to establish the behavioural pattern of the bureaucrats makes the attitudes of the bureaucrats the central issue. Not reviewing the actual work as conducted within the departments, the manner in which I can reach insight into the behavioural pattern of the bureaucrats in the field of development policy is by assuming that their values and attitudes form the basis on which they act. Taking my departure in the variables presented above I will explore whether these really are the variables expressed by the bureaucrats to be decisive upon their conduct, or if there are other variables yet to be disclosed that are essential to understanding how bureaucrats act within the field of development policy.

In the survey the respondents were presented with a list stating certain elements that by some may be held as important aspects of a job. Elements which included the above mentioned variables presented in the theory as guiding the bureaucrats' behaviour on the job. Being presented with this list the respondents were asked to indicate which of these elements they perceived as important to them (Figure 6.2).

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upon the compliance between the strategy of the senior- and the ranking officials. As put by Blais and Dion "Niskanen asserts that the tenure of senior bureaucrats depends critically on the behaviour of their employees. The latter may choose to be more or less cooperative and efficient [...]. In return for that collaboration, the [senior]bureaucrats will defend their interests. As their interest also lies in a larger budget [...]"(Blais and Dion 1991:5). Thus, the budget-maximising strategy is one that, according to Niskanen, should be possible to trace within the entire bureaucratic organisation of the studied case (see also Niskanen 1971:40).

**Figure 6.2: Important elements in a work situation**<sup>73</sup>



From the figure above it seems obvious that the issue of *salary* is less important in the case for this study than what it is presented to be in the theoretical approach. Both the principal-agent approach and the scheme presented by Niskanen, holds this to be the foremost indicator of own utility. However, in the data only 26.9% of the respondents list this as important to them, indicating that the importance of this variable is overstated in the theory, and that a salary is less important to the bureaucrats than what would be expected based on the theoretical approach.

The two following variables are both viewed as important by the respondents. *Possibility of initiative* and *responsibility* can be argued to hold some element of the *power*, a variable found by Niskanen to be central in the utility-function of the bureaucrats. As far as these two are regarded as indicators of *power* this is a variable on which the theory and the empiric material seem to correspond, however the variables identified to be important to the bureaucrats also reflect other elements besides that of *power*. Possibility of initiative and responsibility can be argued to express the professional integrity of the bureaucrats, bureaucrats finding these aspects important due to their central role as experts in policy field. Though some elements of *power* are represented in these two variables, and though they are indicated to be important by the bureaucrats, the extent to which bureaucrats are seeking power remains unclear.

<sup>73</sup> It seems timely to make the reader remember some of the critique presented in relations to Niskanen in chapter 5; “we will never know the inside of the bureaucrats head”, this is true and so these data are the respondents expressed preferences. However, providing an account of attitudes based on the expressed preferences may be criticised for issues related to issues considered in this thesis’ chapter 4 (see section 4.2).

The following variable, *prestige*, was by 38.5% of the respondents indicated to be an important element. This figure indicates that this is a variable of some importance to the bureaucrats, and thus the empirical findings correspond to some extent with the theoretical approach which also argues this to be important to the bureaucrats.

The issue of *job security* is pronounced to be somewhat less important than the former variable, but also this can be characterised as being somewhat important based on the findings of the data. In the theory of Niskanen and in the principal-agent approach this is an element found to be important. Although, some of the respondents find this element to be important, most do not. Niskanen argues that budgetary increases supply job security in different ways, such as increase in number of positions and reduced danger of cut-backs. The linkage between budgetary-growth and *job security*, in the form of organisational growth, also links job security and increased opportunity for promotion which is the last variable presented by Niskanen in the bureaucrats' utility function. These issues also relates to the principal-agent approach arguing that agents seek to invest the absolute minimum necessary in his/her work. Niskanen argues that organisational growth can facilitate "on-the-work-leisure" for the bureaucrats, since better staffing provides more people to perform a task. The variables *leisure at work* and *long vacation* can be said to measure the importance of these elements. Looking at the figures (7.7% and 15.4%) it becomes obvious that this is a variable assigned more importance in the theory than by the bureaucrats in my sample. Also the variable where the respondents are asked to indicate if they find that *good work hours* are important to them can be seen as being linked to leisure. However, it is difficult to assess how the respondents interpret *good work hours*. However, the number of bureaucrats that assign importance to this variable is limited (23.1%).

The variables of the empirical data that have been addressed this far have all been possible to trace within the theoretical approach of political economy, thus they can all be characterised as being linked to the utility function of the bureaucrats as presented in the theory. However, the bureaucrats that have returned the survey have also indicated that they assign importance to other variables, variables that are difficultly associated with the utility function of the theoretical approach.

The first of the variables that is detached from the former variables and from the theory is that of *interest*. The vast majority of the respondents state that their interest in their work is highly

important (88.5%). Both the *interest-variable* and the *adjusted to ability- variable* (42.3%) can be seen as expressing the specialisation of the work force in the departments. Being highly educated holders of competence the two variables can be characterised as expressing the importance, as perceived by these bureaucrats, of working with issues related to their specialisation.

The last of the variables indicated by the bureaucrats to be of some importance is that of *loyalty to superiors*, both administratively and political, only 7.7 percent finds this to be an important aspect of their work. Although, this variable is not included in the theory an absence of this is necessary for the bureaucrats to shirk from the line designated by political leadership. However, the lack of loyalty to administrative leaders as well limits the possibility of the bureaucrats to work together as a group, pushing in one direction, this lack of internal administrative loyalty runs counter to the theoretical approach of Niskanen, where internal cohesion is a prerequisite for the success of the budget-maximising strategy

### **6.3.3 Discussion: Considerations Regarding the Utility-Function**

As seen in the presentation above of the survey findings there is reason to question the grounds on which the political economy approach is built. In explaining the behaviour of the bureaucrats both theories from within this tradition assumes that the bureaucrats are utility-maximizing and suggest certain variables sought maximised by the bureaucrats. The maximisation of these variables is by the two theories presented as ultimately leading to different strategies, however as seen in the presentation of the variables included in the bureaucrats utility function there is reason to question whether the bureaucrats really do seek to maximise these specified variables.

Many of the variables put forward in the theory as variables the bureaucrats seek to maximize were indicated to be somewhat important to the bureaucrats in my sample. Variables such as *salary, prestige, power, job security* and *on the job leisure*, were all found to be represented in the empirical data. Still, these variables identified by the theory to be the most important to the utility-maximising bureaucrat, were only indicated to be important by a relatively low percentage of the respondents, suggesting that the importance of these variables to the bureaucrats is somewhat overstated in the theory.

In addition to the relatively low percentage of respondents finding the variables presented above important, other variables, not identified as important by the theory, appeared in the data-set as vital to most of the respondents. These variables, *responsibility*, *possibility of initiative*, *interesting work* and to a little less extent *adjusted to my abilities*, can be regarded as representing priorities of a different nature than the ones formerly mentioned. The formerly mentioned variables, those included in the utility function of the bureaucrats as presented in the theory, can be characterised as a "pure" manifestation of self-interest (Downs 1967:84). The latter group of variables, indicated by the respondents to be the more important group, can be argued to be reflecting the respondents' integrity as professionals. Being professionals in a policy field with a clear need for expertise, one of the more important elements for the bureaucrats seems to be the possibility offered to them for making use of the expertise they possess.

Both the bureaucratic behaviour presented in the principal-agent theory and in the theory of the budget-maximising bureaucrat, rested on the assumption of a utility-maximising bureaucrat. While the principal-agent theory is more adaptable and only suggested some vague concepts of what the utility function of the bureaucrat contained, the budget-maximising theory was more specific in formulating the precise contents of the utility function. In the preceding I have been able to establish, on the basis of the survey-data, supplemented by other studies in the field, that the variables found to be important by the bureaucrats comprise of more than what the theory specified, and that the variables regarded in the theory to be of vital interest to the bureaucrat only seem peripheral to the bureaucrats included in my case.

On this basis the rationale that bureaucrats seek to maximise their departments budget because their utility function comprise of variables that are all positively associated with budgetary increase seems misplaced for the case at hand. The utility function of the bureaucrats within the surveyed departments appears to be more diverse than the one presented within the two theoretical approaches, this added diversity in preferences among the bureaucrats draws into question whether the budget-maximizing strategy is the best strategy for reaching their goal.

### **6.3.4 Other Objectives of Bureaucrats**

The analysis performed in the section above follows strictly the scheme of the theories from the political economy approach. However, also other elements of the survey can be closer scrutinised in order to gain insight into the attitudes and preferences of the bureaucrats in the surveyed departments.

The notion I seek to explore here is that concerning the preferences of the bureaucrats for big government. The general assumption concerning this aspect is that bureaucrats are, provided that the budget-maximisation strategy is their adopted strategy, pro-big government since this is consistent with their own preference for budget increase (Blais, Blake and Dion 1991: 205-230). Within the survey data three variables will provide insight into this aspect.

First, the variable of political affiliation should be explored. As stated above there is a general pattern among the bureaucrats of a political preference for the leftist parties. These parties are associated with public expenditure and a focus on the public sector. Thus, a bias in the voting pattern of the bureaucrats towards the left would be consistent with their maximising strategy (Ibid.). However, the voting decision involves many other aspects, and the budget-maximising strategy may not be confirmed or disconfirmed by the observation of this leftist bias. It should also be stressed here that the leftist bias in voting behaviour only depicts the general pattern, and that a considerable proportion of the bureaucrats in the surveyed departments do not fit this pattern.

Secondly, the variable indicating attitudes towards privatisation should be considered. This variable indicates more directly whether the bureaucrats are pro-big- or pro-small government. The figures indicate favouritism among the respondents for a continued large public sector in Norway, however, this picture is not one-sided and a large portion also considers privatisation to be a desired development. Overall, the variable provides indecisive evidence in relation to the strategy of the bureaucrats as based upon their individual preferences.

Finally, the third variable that will be considered here is that concerning the attitudes of the bureaucrats towards development assistance. Asked if Norway should increase the budget for development to meet the continued challenge of world poverty, a large percentage of the

bureaucrats said that they were in favour of this (69.2%). Though this fits neatly with what would be expected provided that the bureaucrats are pursuing budget-maximisation, it should be remembered that development policy is well rooted in Norwegian popular opinion and that these findings correspond largely with the earlier mentioned high legitimacy of development policy in the wider population. Whether the bureaucrats within the surveyed departments on this account are budget-maximisers, or if they simply adhere to the same pattern as the general public, is impossible to assess.

Some elements of the above suggest that the attitudes of the bureaucrats correspond largely with that expected on the basis of the theory of the budget-maximising strategy; however, other findings suggest the opposite. Overall, the variables considered here provide inconclusive evidence in terms of assessing the bureaucrats' attitudes and in turn their strategy.

### **6.3.5 Summary**

Firstly, the feature that was put in focus was that of the utility function of the bureaucrat. By comparing the findings of the survey with the postulated utility function as proposed by the theories within the political economy approach, it became evident that the priorities as put forward by the bureaucrats in the surveyed departments did not correspond fully with the theory. The variables presented by the theory as most vital to the bureaucrats proved only to be of secondary importance to the respondents included in my sample, other variables reflecting other values and priorities proved to be the more profound. On this basis the conclusion that the utility function of the bureaucrats, if such a construct exists, comprise of some of the same but also other variables than those presented in the theory was reached. The picture drawn on the basis of the empirical data is one where the priorities of the bureaucrats are more diverse than what they are presented to be within the theory. Establishing this somewhat different set of variables vital to the bureaucrats, the question was raised whether the budget-maximising strategy really was the better strategy for utility-maximisation, as Niskanen argues it is.

Secondly, the wider concept of the entire budget-maximising strategy was put under scrutiny by employing some other findings of the survey. Three variables concerning 1-political affiliation, 2-attitude towards privatisation and 3-attitudes towards increases in development budget, were hypothesised to provide knowledge concerning the validity of the general

scheme of Niskanen's theory *the budget-maximising bureaucrat*. Generally, these variables did not yield results that enable any absolute conclusion on these matters. Much of the findings adapt nicely with what would be expected given the budget-maximising strategy of the bureaucrats, however the picture is far from one-sided and evidence for the opposite is also present. All and all the evidence is inconclusive.

With these findings concerning the element of the attitudes and conduct of the bureaucrats, I move on to deal with the element of constraints placed on bureaucratic autonomy found to be essential within both theoretical approaches.

## **6.4 Constraints Placed on the Bureaucracy**

As identified in the theoretical presentation, and as presented and referred to in the former section, the theoretical approaches chosen for this thesis both identifies two central elements for assessing the role of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis the political authorities. In the preceding section the first of these elements, that concerning the conduct and behaviour of the bureaucrats, was put under scrutiny. This section moves on to deal with the second element identified to be vital in assessing the role of the bureaucracy, namely the *constraints placed on bureaucracy by state institutions and other public actors*.

### **6.4.1 Theoretical Approach**

In the previous section, the capacity of the bureaucracy - a prerequisite for bureaucratic power - was found to be present within the structures of the development policy area in Norway. However, the mere presence of this power-potential is not sufficient for assessing the role of the administration. The power held by bureaucracy is determined by certain factors. One of these factors, that of bureaucratic conduct, has already been explored; however, other factors are seen as important for determining the role held by bureaucracy as well. Even though the theoretical approaches chosen for this analysis perceive the role of the administration differently, both view the various *constraints placed on bureaucracy* as being a major determining factor on the bureaucracy's ability of transforming the identified power-potential into actual power.

Writing at the dawn of the twentieth century, with only scarce and underdeveloped examples of modern bureaucracy to draw upon for examples, Weber came to support democracy as the



ultimate restraint that could present a counter-weight to the efficiency of bureaucracy, a feature of bureaucracy Weber assessed would cause the bureaucratisation of society. The issue of establishing a democracy with a strong Parliament as a "breeding ground" for able politicians, as suggested by Weber (Beetham 1985:97), seems to be an outdated suggestion for the majority of the donors of development assistance. Today, democracy and parliamentary institutions are present within all members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and yet the issue of political control over bureaucracy withstands. The mere establishment of a Parliament seems inadequate, and represents no final solution and panacea in the struggle for securing democratic control over the administration. However, though inadequate in precise form, the notion of Weber's argument that bureaucracy can be restrained by the politicians and the political institutions and through this control be made accountable, indicates that Weber holds great belief in the ability of the democratic institutions vis-à-vis the administration. Thus, Weber is to be considered as belonging to the side of a continuum holding great belief in the possibilities of controlling the forceful administration.<sup>74</sup>

*For Weber, leadership recruited and developed in Parliament provided the only means of controlling the administration. This was the only viable form that democracy could take under modern conditions (Beetham 1985:100).*

Dealing first and foremost with the issue of bureaucratic efficiency, the theory of Niskanen is largely uninterested in the notion of controlling bureaucracy in its present form. Identifying the power of bureaucracy as great and the sponsor as inherently weak, Niskanen regards the structure of government as fundamentally flawed and in need of revision. The assumptions put forward in the theory concerning the weak and incapable sponsor and the uncontrollable bureaucracy were already examined in the theoretical chapter. The absence of the means for controlling the bureaucracy is a basic assumption on which the theory of the budget-maximising bureaucrat rests, and thus Niskanen acquires the position at the opposite side of the continuum from Weber, who holds no faith in the possibility of controlling bureaucratic conduct within the present structures of government.


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<sup>74</sup> Although I find Weber to hold great belief in politicians' possibilities for controlling bureaucracy it should be pointed out that this is a debated element of Weber's work. I argue that the tendency found inherent in the nature of bureaucracy, found to cause the bureaucratisation of society, was a tendency Weber identified and not a inevitability. Through the measures suggested (i.e. Parliament) Weber saw a real possibility for countering this tendency and thus imposing political control over bureaucracy (Etzioni-Halevy 1985:33-35; Beetham 1996:55, 60-63).

[T]he theory [...] assumes a passive sponsor which knows the budget it is prepared to grant for a given level of services but does not have the incentives or the opportunity to obtain information on the minimum budget necessary to supply this service (Niskanen 1971:30).

Principal-agent theory deals with the issue somewhat differently, suggesting measures for countering the problems of *adverse selection* and *moral hazard* that stem from the skewed relation that exists between the principal and the agent. As pointed to in the former section of the analysis, not all elements of the theoretical approach bear relevance for the issue at hand. In the former section the major problem in the relation between the political authorities and the administration was identified to be best represented with the theoretical scenario of the *hidden information problem*. Countering the problems of *shirking* that stem from this type of skewed relation, various measures can be undertaken. The principal-agent approach offers general suggestions, such as monitoring and contract design. However, the approach also points out that these measures offer no final resolution in terms of controlling bureaucracy. The power of bureaucracy based on the skewed distribution of information is inherent and largely unchangeable; however, the ability of bureaucracy of acting autonomous can be limited by employing certain measures of control. Assuming this position, the principal-agent approach acquires the middle-ground on the above mentioned continuum flanked by Weber on one extreme and Niskanen on the other (Fig. 6.3).

**Figure 6.3: Belief in control of the bureaucracy**<sup>75</sup>



In the following analysis I will assess the constraints and limitations placed on the autonomy of the bureaucracy by various actors. In dealing with this issue I am first and foremost interested in the more precise issue of political control over bureaucracy, although other factors limiting the autonomy and thus the power of bureaucracy will also be considered. I

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<sup>75</sup> Placing the Weberian and the Niskanian theories at the two extremes of this continuum might be considered to overemphasise their theoretical claims. Doing this I presuppose the presence of the 'strong Parliament' and the 'positive politics' as put by Weber (Beetham 1985:96-116) and the strong assumptions in interpreting the theory of Niskanen (see sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2). I am however aware of the different perceptions that are held concerning these aspects, both in regards to the ambivalent attitudes of Weber towards the bureaucracy (Beetham 1985, see also section 5.1.4) and the question as to how literal the interpretation of Niskanen's claims should be (Blais and Dion 1991, see also sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2). Likewise, it should be mentioned that placing of the principal-agent model at the middle is thought contingent on the specified model applied.

will start with the findings of the survey and the interviews on the different aspects of control. After establishing the level and force by which the administration is kept under control by the various actors, I will return to the theoretical notion assessing where on the above mentioned continuum the case of Norwegian development policy is most accurately placed.

## **6.4.2 Forms of Political Control**

The administration is set to serve the elected politicians; in my case the selected departments function as vital elements in the administration serving the Minister of International Development. It has been established in the former section that the administration in the field is resourceful and potentially powerful. How then is the development policy administration kept under control by the political authorities?

### ***6.4.2.1 Interaction and control within the ministry***

All but one of the respondents say that they had particularly intensive contact with the political leaders within the ministry when working on what each regard as their most important issue in the past year. The number of occasions of this contact is highly variable and ranges from one up to more than thirty, though the median value for this variable is 8.<sup>76</sup> Though it seems like there is a tendency that more contact with the political leaders is held by the more senior bureaucrats, and though this seems like a probable pattern of contact, the pattern of contact also seem to vary according to issue and thematic field. This notion that contact between political leaders and bureaucrats vary according to field and subject was further supported by the conducted interviews. Though most interview objects (IO) made clear that the formal hierarchy formed the general communication structure within the ministry, they also made clear that the intensity of contact between the political level and the bureaucrats increased when dealing with matters found to be particularly important by the politicians. One tendency in contact pattern, according to one of the interviewed bureaucrats, was a particular intensity in contact when dealing with issues related to Africa (being the foremost region of interest of the Minister).

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<sup>76</sup> I employ the measure of median rather than any other measure of the central tendency due to the wide ranging spectre on which the respondents have reported. The median provides an intuitive measure allowing the reader to assess the general distribution on the variable (for a discussion see Bohrnstedt and Knoke 1994:47).

**Table 6.3: General or precise guidelines**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
General	15	57,7
Precise	9	34,6
Both	1	3,8
No answer	1	3,8
<b>Total</b>	26	100,0

In terms of contact the respondents were asked whether the guidelines for their work were provided in precise form or if these were more generally formulated (table 6.3). The general picture divides the respondents into two groups one being somewhat larger than the other. The larger group of bureaucrats, representing the majority of the respondents, answer that the guidelines provided for them by the political leaders were general in form. The smaller group (34.6%) of the respondents characterise the guidelines given to them in their work as being precise in formulation. Regarding the composition of the two respective groups, no single pattern is detectable when regarding seniority. The respondents were also asked to indicate whether they received these guidelines orally, in writing or in both of these forms. The majority states that both forms of communication was used (57.7%), while only a smaller percentage was given guidelines only in one form or the other (table 6.4).

**Table 6.4: Written or oral- , general or precise guidelines (Cross tabulation)**

		<b>General or precise guidelines</b>				
		General	Precise	Both	No answer	Total
<b>Written or oral guidelines</b>	Written	3	3	0	0	6
	Oral	2	1	0	0	3
	Both	10	5	1	0	16
	No answer	0	0	0	1	1
	<b>Total</b>	15	9	1	1	26

From the interviews it became clear that the vast majority of communication and guidelines from the political level to the bureaucrats is, in fact, conducted in a very general manner. All of the five IOs found the common trend of communication to be one where the political leadership communicates a general position on a matter providing a framework, the precise shaping of policy is left up to the bureaucracy. As one of the interviewed bureaucrats explained, a general strategy is planned by the Minister annually; this "business strategy"

draws up the course and general priorities of the government. The annual strategy clarifies the Cabinet's position on controversial issues and communicates to the administration how the basic priorities within the various policies should be made.

As mentioned above, the type of guidelines provided is also determined by the political leaders' perception of the issue. As some of the interviewed bureaucrats expressed, "[political] attention is largely centred on issues put in focus by media attention or by international trends in development policy".<sup>77</sup> The handling of the more general and less controversial elements of the policy field is left up to the administration. This trend of shifting focus in policy according to media focus was found somewhat frustrating by some of the interviewed bureaucrats. Working within a field of policy heavily dependent upon continuity in order to be successful, the bureaucrats found the frequent shifts in the politicians' focus, characterised as "topic of the week" by one of the respondents, to be counter productive in relations to their primary objective of development.<sup>78</sup> As put by another bureaucrat:

*When the Minister has been abroad meeting with someone, she returns with new ideas and new issues for us to focus on. If these are communicated to us [the administration] without a precise follow up [in writing], cases that seem irrelevant are "forgotten". This is quite common.<sup>79</sup>*

Both the survey and the interviews indicate a pattern of contact between the political leaders and the administration that in general can be characterised as being somewhat scarce. In relations to guidelines provided for the work of the bureaucrats by the politicians, these seem to be largely in a general form. However, the interviewed bureaucrats express that the current Minister is far more involved on most levels than what is typical for the "traditional" Minister of International Development in Norway, this is especially true for the policies related to the continent of Africa.

Describing their work, the interviewed bureaucrats state that most activities of the administration are conducted within a framework provided by the politicians, and this

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<sup>77</sup> Quote in text is my translation of the Norwegian: "[Politisk] oppmerksomhet blir i stor grad satt på tema som er fokusert på i media eller som er en del av de internasjonale trendene i utviklingspolitikk".

<sup>78</sup> For a discussion of the interaction between politicians and bureaucrats within the structures of state administration as such see Christensen and Læg Reid's discussion based on the Leadership survey 2000 (Christensen and Læg Reid 2002).

<sup>79</sup> The interviews were conducted in Norwegian. The quote in the text is my translation of the following: "Når ministeren har vært utenlands i møte med noen, kommer hun tilbake hit med nye ideer og nye tema som hun ønsker iverksatt. Hvis disse nye tiltakene blir formidlet til oss [administrasjonen] uten oppfølging og spesifisering [skriftlig], "glemmes" saker som oppfattes å ingen relevans ha. Dette er forholdsvis vanlig".

framework draws up the political stand on the most principal issues leaving the task of formulating the precise content of the policy to the administration. Though much of the policy formulation is left to the administration, the interviewed bureaucrats stress that they experience little controversy in relation to what is suggested by the administration and what is adopted by the politicians as the official policy-line.

The moderate level of contact between the politicians and the bureaucrats identified above corresponds to the trend discovered by Christensen, Lægreid and Zuna in their study of professions in the Norwegian state administration (Christensen, Lægreid and Zuna 2001:84-92). In terms of contact between the bureaucratic- and the political level of the various departments and agencies, their study has yielded results indicating a decline in the bureaucratic-political interaction over time (1976-1996). Explaining this decline the study suggests the growing problems of mere capacity in the political leadership, a problem that in the former section have been identified as profound also for the political authorities within the context of development policy (Christensen et al. 2002:128-129).

#### ***6.4.2.2 Parliamentary control***

In a strict constitutional sense the Parliament holds no power over each individual bureaucrat, the principle of the responsible Minister to whom the bureaucrats answer, is the code of conduct in state affairs (Christensen et al. 2002: 129-132; see also St. meld. Nr. 11, 2000-2001). However, via more informal means of contact and through the budgetary process the Parliament may play some role in exercising control over the administration.

The foremost element of parliamentary power is exercised through the budgetary process. Funding the entire administration, Parliament is able to prioritise among the various budgetary posts and thus guide the work of the administration. However, as seen in a former section the capabilities of the Members of Parliament are limited. Both the various party groups and the standing committees dealing with the subject of development are modestly staffed and largely pre-occupied with other policy areas. The interviewed bureaucrats drew a picture of a Parliament largely incapable of comprehending a complex and multiple policy area; almost all of the interviewed bureaucrats found Parliament to be incapable and largely uninterested in debating issues of development. "[T]here is too little of that [debate], there are some that are passionate, some that do it out of obligation, but the majority just assumes that it

[development policy] is alright."<sup>80</sup> Further, the general impression of the bureaucrats was that the changes done to the development budget when passed through Parliament were ill advised, lacking substance, and that these relatively small changes to a large extent were made in order for Parliament to put its mark on the budget for development policy.

The picture that is drawn by the bureaucrats of the role of Parliament is reflected when reviewing the recent debates concerning the budget for 2005. Both in the general parliamentary debate concerning the budget and in the debate held when the Standing Committee on Foreign Policy presented its budgetary proposal for the UD for 2005 to Parliament (Parliament's home pages), real controversies were absent.<sup>81</sup> The Progressive party (FrP) is the only party in Parliament that remains fundamentally unsupportive of the budget for development assistance. Other than the remarks by this party, the debate was a mixture of appraisal of the budget and some minor remarks concerning alternative priorities. The budget was finally passed through by a comfortable margin.<sup>82</sup>

Even though the budgetary process can be characterised as the foremost means for parliamentary control over the administration, other features of a more informal character can also be explored in pursuit of disclosing the level of parliamentary control exercised over bureaucracy.

Turning to the survey for insight into the patterns of contact between the administration and Parliament it becomes evident that this is not a very important aspect of political control. As mentioned in a former section development policy lies within Parliament under the competence sphere of the standing committee on foreign affairs, therefore it should be expected that the control of Parliament on the policy area is exercised by this committee. However, only one respondent state that there was contact between her and the committee in relations to the work on the issue regarded as the most important case in the past year. None of the respondents said that they themselves initiated contact with the committee. Looking at the list of cases submitted by the committee for Parliament in its former session, 2003-2004, the overwhelming majority was concerned with other aspects of foreign policy, only two out

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<sup>80</sup> Translated version of the Norwegian quote: "alt for lite av det, det er noen ildsjeler, noen som kanskje gjør det av plikt, mens de fleste tenker at det sikkert er bra."

<sup>81</sup> Finansdebatten 25 November 2004.

<sup>82</sup> The impression provided through the empirical data is also reflected in the literature. Writing on the subject, Bjørn Erik Rasch notes the general pattern of Parliament activity to be modest relative to the size of the whole budget (Rasch 1993 111-140)

of a total of 13 cases dealt directly with issues of development policy (Parliament's home pages).

Although the standing committee of foreign affairs is the parliamentary committee under which development policy formally belongs, the control over bureaucracy is also exercised by the Standing Committee of Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs. This committee does not deal with the precise issues of policy, but rather with the manner in which the policies are implemented and how the general work of the bureaucracy is conducted. Still, the pattern that became evident when looking at the relation between bureaucracy and the committee on foreign affairs is continued in relation to this committee as well. Only one respondent to the survey stated that this committee had some influence in the precise case she was working on, the rest of the respondents found the committee to be insignificant. Turning to the case-index for the issues dealt with within the Committee of Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs the same pattern as for the former committee becomes evident, the issue of development policy is completely peripheral within the wide-ranging case list of the committee. Only one of the total of thirty-two cases deal directly with issues of development policy.<sup>83</sup>

Thus, the overall picture of Parliament is one characterised by *passiveness* vis-à-vis the administration. The passiveness is evident both in relation to budgetary matters where only small amounts are moved around, and than only for the sake of demonstrating authority, and in terms of the more informal element of contact which has proven to be all but absent. Thus the overall impression is that Parliament plays only a minor role in exercising direct control over the administration in the field of development policy.

#### ***6.4.2.3 The office of the Auditor General***

Besides the roles played by Parliament in controlling the bureaucracy directly, Parliament also has at its disposal the Office of the Auditor General (Christensen and Egeberg 1997:28-30; Christensen et al. 2002:75-77). This office is the supreme audit institution and the supervisory body of the Norwegian Parliament established as an agency independent of the Cabinet, and of other sections of the public administration. Acting on behalf of Parliament, the Office of the Auditor General functions as the Parliament's "watch dog", controlling the Cabinet's and the administration's conduct and procedures. The Office of the Auditor General performs a

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<sup>83</sup> See Bleiklie, Læg Reid and Wik 2003 for a discussion of the role of the Parliament and the standing Committee of Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs.



series of functions on behalf of Parliament, *financial audit, corporate control and performance audit*, all of which are important in securing a proper conduct in state affairs. Most relevant for the case of development assistance is the first and last function of the office of the Auditor General.

The general procedure is one where the Office of the Auditor General samples some programmes or budgetary posts for closer scrutiny. Performing the audit the Office of the Auditor General will, if any discrepancies are found, allow the ministry to respond to the finding.<sup>84</sup> Based on the original audit and the response provided by the ministry, the Office of the Auditor General will provide Parliament with a recommendation. Based on the recommendation Parliament (The Standing Committee) will in turn discuss the issue and then confront the Cabinet and the Minister.

The findings of the survey indicate that the political control placed on the administration by Parliament via the Office of the Auditor General, is more decisive than any other form of Parliamentary control with the administration. 46.2% of the respondents of the survey state that the Office of the Auditor General played some role in relation to the most important issue worked at last year. The role of the Office of the Auditor General is also one held to be decisive by the bureaucrats that were interviewed. The IOs expressed that the possibility of auditory control by the Office of the Auditor General resulted in a stricter adherence to formal procedures within the ministry and that it becomes important to avoid negative comments from the Office of the Auditor General. One of the respondents stated that:

*After the Office of the Auditor General published their sceptical remarks concerning the development assistance provided for Mozambique it became a political necessity to take action [...] this was an important reason for some of the measures within the current process of reform of the administration.*<sup>85</sup>

Though the direct effect of the audit in terms of better procedures for fiscal control in development policy is important, other more far reaching consequences seem even more significant. A better adherence to the administrative procedures with adequate documentation and reporting secures transparency in the administration of development policy; transparency

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<sup>84</sup> Though the ministry is the entity in question here it should be noted that the Office of the Auditor General also audit agencies and publicly own companies (Christensen and Egeberg 1997).

<sup>85</sup> The quote in the text is my translation of the statement: "Etter at Riksrevisjonen rapporterte om mangelfulle rutiner i arbeidet med utviklingshjelp til Mosambik ble det en tvingende nødvendig for politisk ledelse å foreta seg noe [...] dette var en viktig årsak som lå til grunn for prioriteringer gjort i den pågående reformen".

in the administration further promotes the future ability for political control, both from within the Cabinet and from Parliament.

The role played by the Office of the Auditor General seems to be one that matters. The interviewed bureaucrats state that the constant presence of the auditing authority does affect their adherence to the rules and laws specified for the administrative work. The threat of a programme-review secures due procedure, something that further promotes the ability of the political authority to assess the programmes of a more transparent administration. It can be stated that *Parliament's ability of controlling the administration of development policy is most potent when exercised indirectly through the Office of the Auditor General.*

### **6.4.3 Forms of Popular Control**

As mentioned in an earlier chapter the state institutions do not function within a vacuum. For interest groups and other organisations that seek to influence policies, the administration becomes a focal point, and the field of development policy is no exception. As presented in the earlier presentation of Norwegian development policy the policy area in Norway characterised by being highly inclusive to Norwegian based NGOs. The scenario of an open state structure, inclusive to interest groups and organisations, is not unique to the area of development policy, the co-operative state has a longstanding tradition in Norway. However, the level to which the state and the organisations have been and are intertwined reach new and unheard of proportions within the sector of development policy in Norway (Tvedt 1995, 2003:79). As state contracted organisations, the NGOs are to a large extent serving as policy implementers on behalf of the administration (see chapter 2). Thus, it is already established that NGOs have great possibility of affecting the policies they administer on behalf of the Cabinet; however, this is not the element I am concerned with here. Surveying and interviewing bureaucrats in the UD I am interested in disclosing the role of the NGOs vis-à-vis the central administration: can the NGOs be characterised as an element limiting the autonomy of the administration?

In the survey, the respondents were asked if they had been contacted by organisations and institutions external to the state apparatus: 61.5% said they had, while only 30.8% said they had not. These figures in themselves are not overwhelming, but they far exceed the levels of contact within the ministry and between committees in Parliament and the administration,

thus revealing a frequent contact pattern between external organisations and the administration. Looking closer at which organisations make up this contact, the spectre seems wide and diverse. Municipal- and regional administration is mentioned along with private and public companies, labour unions and organisations for employers, organisations from within the culture sector, universities, churches, police and defence; however, the most frequent contact is indicated to be present between the administration and the media and various organisations.<sup>86</sup>

Most of the above mentioned contact between the administrations and various organisations has been of minor importance and is on average only mentioned by one or two respondents. However, the contact between the administration, the media and NGOs seems to be somewhat more persistent and frequent. While 30.8% of the respondents state that they have been contacted by the media in relation to their most important issue last year, as many as 73.1% indicate that they were contacted by NGOs.<sup>87</sup> On a general basis 76.9% of the respondents indicate that they have had monthly contact, or more frequent contact, with ideal organisations in the course of the last year.

The respondents were further asked what importance these organisations had for the final result on the particular matter. Some of the respondents indicated that some of the organisations that less frequently contacted the administration (e.g. labour unions) did actually have a great impact on the final result of specific cases. However, this is not surprising since the topical diversity within development policy is great, making it natural that specific organisations (e.g. labour unions) have greater input into the process of formulating policies closely related to topics being central to the core activities of the organisation (e.g. employment contracts). Besides these more scattered patterns of organisational influence over policy, it stands clear from the survey that ideal organisations are perceived as being in a particular position for influencing policies. 57.7% of the respondents found ideal organisations to have some influence over the outcome of the issue they had been working with.

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<sup>86</sup> Some of these organisations can not be included in what would normally be considered civil society, however, they are included due to the formulation of the question in the questionnaire, and because they may provide insight into the patterns of contact between the central administration and organisations and institutions that do not have a more formalised pattern of interaction.

<sup>87</sup> There is a consistency error in the survey return on this point. 61.5% states that they have been contacted by organisation or institution outside the state apparatus, while 73.1% indicates that they have been contacted by an ideal organisation (errors that could have occurred in the data registration have here been ruled out).

In the conducted interviews it was expressed by the participating bureaucrats that the capabilities of the Norwegian based NGOs were seen as particularly potent in relation to their ability of directing focus towards certain issues. However, though these organisations have these agenda-setting capacities, these capacities provide influence only in relations to certain issues and policies. The interviewed bureaucrats stress that the final result of this form of influence is of minor importance relative to the vast area of development policy, both in terms of influencing the policies and in terms of redirecting funding.


Thus, the NGOs can be characterised as exercising some influence (read control) over the policy field and thus circumscribe the autonomy of the bureaucracy. However, the influence over policy and consequently the control held by these organisations over the administration is limited and noteworthy only to a certain extent.

#### **6.4.4 The Influence of International Organisations and other Donors**

This far in the analysis the focus has been placed on policy formation within the national arena. However, Norway does not operate a development policy solely founded in Norwegian policy-preferences and initiatives. Development assistance is a "western-project" that has constantly gone through changes, in the earlier presentation of development policy the roles of international organisations were identified as being important in determining the course chosen for the Norwegian policy-line (See sections 3.2.3-3.2.4). This section aims at disclosing how these international elements are seen by the bureaucrats to be formative elements for the policy-line adopted by Norway.

The respondents of the survey were asked to indicate how important they found international organisations and other countries to be in determining the outcome of the matter they indicated to be their most important issue last year. 50% of the respondents indicate that international organisations and other countries do affect the outcome of specific matters, while, only 30.8% state that these have a "large" or "somewhat large" impact on the matter. When compared with the findings of the Leadership survey 2000, it becomes evident that the findings of the two surveys correspond to a large extent, though the category "small influence" differ some (table 6.4).

**Figure 6.4: Impact of international organisations and other countries**



Although these two samples display some of the same characteristics there is reason to believe that they do this for different reasons. Norwegian development policy is, as indicated in an earlier section, predominantly influenced by the larger international institutions such as the World Bank and the UN. These institutions set to a large extent the standard for international development cooperation (e.g. UN Millennium goals). The Leadership survey, deriving its survey sample from the state administration in general, is likely to refer to European organisations on this variable. Provided that most international influence over Norwegian policies are invoked by the EU through the EEC agreement making Norway subject to Community law, there is reason to believe that the answers provided by the respondents to this survey largely refers to influence invoked by the EU. Thus, Norwegian policy in general is significantly influenced by international organisations. Although it seem plausible to assume that development policy is influenced by different international organisations than what is the case for most domestic policies.<sup>88</sup>

Turning again to the interviews for more qualitatively based insight, it stands clear that bureaucrats do recognise the larger international organisations as major sources of influence on the Norwegian policy-line. All of the interviewed bureaucrats refers to "international trends in development" when trying to explain the shifting focus in Norwegian development policy. They also point to the consensus that is prominent in international development policy today, where much of the policies that are adopted nationally are agreed upon by the various donors of aid within the framework of an international organisation. These international talks

<sup>88</sup> For a study of the consequences of European integration on the central administration in Norway (Nordic states) see Læg Reid, Steinthorsson and Thorhallsson 2002.

run continuously and strongly affect the process leading towards the formulation of Norwegian policy. As stated by one of the interviewed bureaucrats:

*The intensity in the international cooperation provides that the politicians can not be involved unless there is raised an issue on which one does not have the foundation for promoting Norwegian policy, that happens rarely.<sup>89</sup>*

This quote states what most of the interviewed bureaucrats expressed, namely that many of the innovative sides in development policy are driven forward within international fora on a day to day basis, and that Norwegian policy needs to be adaptable to these international trends. The trend of international coordination of development policy has been increasing throughout the nineties and continues to be a central point in international development assistance, and this causes international trends of development to be ever more influential on Norwegian policies in the field. However, this trend of increased levels of international development coordination has also resulted in an international policy-dialogue. The interviewed bureaucrats emphasize that Norway does take a leading role within this international process, especially under the leadership of the current Minister of International Development Hilde Frafjord Johnsen (Christian People's Party - KrF).

The findings of this section indicate that Norwegian development policy functions within an international context and must be seen in relation to this. The international donor community has been closely integrated, both in dialogue and in policy coordination, a process of integration that has also affected Norwegian development policy. However, the international arena is also one where the individual donor countries are active in presenting their policies and where they try to shape and mould the adopted international approach on various issues. This role is one actively played by Norway, a role that has provided Norway with decisive input on the process of creating a common international development agenda. The symbiotic relation between the international fora and the domestic arena can be summed up by the words of one of the interviewed bureaucrats:

*[It is...] difficult to say whether the changes [in development policy] are the results of issues of domestic policies and development within Norway, or if they are the results of a larger international agenda and discussion.<sup>90</sup>*

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<sup>89</sup> The quote is my translation of the Norwegian statement: "Intensiteten i det internasjonale samarbeidet gjør at politikerne ikke kan være involvert. Med mindre det kommer opp en sak man ikke føler man har grunnlag for å fremme norsk politikk på, det er sjeldent."

### 6.4.5 Summary

In this section focus has been placed on the constraints imposed on the administrations by the various actors in the field of development policy, both nationally and internationally. Control over the bureaucracy was the second point identified to be of common vital interest to the theoretical approaches chosen for the study. In the analysis I have assessed the level of political and popular control imposed on the administration by various domestic actors, I have also looked at the element of influence of international organisations in the development policy field, assessing whether international trends and actors also have an influence over Norwegian policy.

The first element of control scrutinised was that held by the political authorities within the ministry. It has been shown in the analysis that the political authorities, the Minister and the Deputy Minister are capable of directing the work of the bureaucrats. However, the general level of contact between the common bureaucrat and the political leadership was identified as somewhat scarce through the findings of the survey. The interviews revealed that through various general and more precise guidelines, both formal and informal, a framework within which the administration may operate is provided. This general framework clarifies controversies and principal questions but leaves much of the detailed structuring of policies to the administration. The analysis also revealed that some issues were more closely followed up by the political authorities, while other areas were to a larger extent left to the administration. The areas to which the politicians paid special attention were usually those focused on by the media or those debated in international fora. The analysis further revealed that the person occupying the ministerial post for development to a large extent decides the level of political involvement at the different levels of the administration. The current Minister, recognised to be thematically well informed and respected, displayed a more *pro-active role* than what was termed “the usual situation” by the respondents, this providing a larger degree of political involvement than prior occupants of the position have shown. All in all it seems like the political authorities are capable of controlling the major issues and the more general structures of Norwegian development policy (*Macro-level*). However, this general control held by the leadership within the ministry leaves great latitude within which the administration may conduct business at their own discretion.

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<sup>90</sup> The quote is my translation of the Norwegian statement: "Vanskelig å si om endringene er et resultat av innenrikspolitiske saker eller utvikling i Norge, eller om det er et resultat av en større internasjonal agenda og diskusjon."

Secondly, I moved on to study Parliament's role in controlling the administration. As the legislative branch of government, Parliament does possess a critical role, especially in the current Norwegian situation of a minority coalition Cabinet. *However, the survey findings grant little evidence supporting a decisive role of Parliament.* Most surveyed bureaucrats found Parliament to be all but absent in shaping development policy. The picture presented by the findings of the survey was further underlined by the interviewed bureaucrats. Their common remark concerning Parliament was that it was largely accepting the field of development policy to be a policy-neutral field rid of controversy. The powers of Parliament related to the budget, generally believed to be the most potent feature of Parliament in guiding the work of the administration, was considered by the interviewed bureaucrats to be exercised in a manner making it insignificant. Most changes imposed on the budget for development policy within Parliament were, by the IOs, seen as ill advised and lacking real substance. Generally these changes were seen by the bureaucrats as constituting the need of Parliament for putting its mark on the final outline of the budget.

Parliamentary consensus in the development policy field was also found when turning to the debate preceding the passing of the budget for 2005. The budgetary spending for 2005 constitutes a substantial increase in the development policy budget, but, the level of increase was not debated, and what was debated were certain priorities within the budget of only minor importance relative to the scope of the entire budget.<sup>91</sup> The level of activity within Parliament in the field of development policy was further assessed by turning to the lists of cases submitted by the committees to Parliament in its former session. These lists, that of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Standing Committee of Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, indicates that for both these committees their activities related to the field of development policy is most peripheral relative to their core issues.

Summarising the role held by Parliament in terms of controlling the work of the administration the above presented review indicates that the role is all but absent. The most important means held by Parliament for exercising such control is not employed effectively, a feature of Parliamentary work that largely seems to be a product of the general notion that no real controversies exists within the field of development policy.

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<sup>91</sup> The Progressive party did floor some more fundamental issues in the debate that were less compatible with the Parliamentary consensus made up by the other parties.



Thirdly, I turned to an element that may be said to provide Parliament with a somewhat more flattering track-record in terms of keeping an eye on the state administration, namely the Office of the Auditor General. Although the capabilities of the legislator in terms of exercising direct control over the administration was found to be all but absent. Parliament was found to be in possession of some means for indirect control over the bureaucracy. *The Office of the Auditor General*, the supervisory body of Parliament, exercises extensive control over all public affairs including the field of development policy. Through the findings of the survey the Office of the Auditor General was established as a quite decisive institution in the work of the respondents. The interviews revealed that it was largely through making the bureaucrats within the field of development policy adhere to due process and procedures that the Office of the Auditor General was influential. This affect held by the Auditor General over the UD was found to result in a more orderly administrative conduct, facilitating transparency in the affairs related to development policy.

Fourthly, the issue of popular control through influence was raised as an issue limiting the autonomy of the bureaucracy. The survey evidence indicated close relations between external organisations and the administrative departments and sections surveyed. This pattern is consistent with the Norwegian tradition of allowing civil society input into the policy-making process, and is not surprising. However, the level of contact between the ideal organisations and the administration indicated a relation somewhat out of the ordinary. Earlier in the thesis the close entanglement between Norwegian development assistance and the state provided development assistance was described, thus a frequent pattern of contact come as no surprise either. However, the influence that goes with this pattern of contact is described by the respondents of the survey to be decisive. This is further emphasised by the interviewed bureaucrats who stress the spotty influence these ideal organisations are capable of attaining, although the same bureaucrats also accentuate that relative to the scope of the entire field of Norwegian development policy the influence of these organisations are of minor importance.

Finally, the section of control drew attention to the element of influence on national development assistance policies held by international organisations and other donor countries. The survey indicated some element of influence by international organisations and other donors; however, the level to which this was found important by the respondents can best be termed moderate. Turning to the response provided by the interviewed bureaucrats the role held by international factors becomes clearer. Almost all of the interviewed bureaucrats found

the international dialogue related to development issues to be guiding for the national policy-line adopted by Norway. However, the direction of influence was not found to be exclusively one-sided. In addition to influence from the international fora on national policies, the relation was also one granting Norwegian influence over the international dialogue. A role found to be particularly strong with the current Minister of International Development.

In sum, the administration is restrained from operating autonomously within the field of development policy. Political authorities, national public institutions, ideal organisations and international organisations and other countries have all been identified as circumscribing the autonomy of the administration in the field of development policy. However, *although the limitation on the surveyed departments' autonomy is substantial, the latitude within which the administration operates remains substantial, providing the administration with the possibility of shaping the precise content of most policies within the field of development policy in Norway.*

## **6.5 Discussion: Evaluating the Theories in Light of the Findings**

In the course of this analysis, the focus has been placed on three distinct, yet inter-related, elements: (1) composition and capacity of the bureaucracy, (2) bureaucratic conduct and behaviour and (3) the constraints placed on bureaucracy. These three elements were through the theoretical chapter found to be important for understanding the functioning of bureaucracy, and have been employed here in order to pursue insight into the two objectives of the analysis. Firstly, the analysis has explored the role of the administration in the field of development policy in Norway. Secondly, the exploration of the administration's role has made possible an assessment of the various theoretical approaches employed for the case.

This section concludes the analysis by first summarising the empirical findings of the analysis before moving on to consider the applicability of the different theories to the case of development policy in Norway.

### **6.5.1 Overview of the Empirical Findings**

Firstly, the analysis has established the surveyed departments and sections of the UD as being highly competent, comprised of highly educated and specialised bureaucrats, a feature that is further underlined by the uniformity of the sections due to the ministry's manner of recruiting

bureaucrats through their special trainee-program and the general pattern indicating that most bureaucrats remain within the UD for their entire career. However, although these departments were characterised as highly competent and potentially forceful, the level to which the surveyed departments could be termed homogeneous and thus be able to function as an "interest group" on behalf of its own was drawn into question. Thus, the empirical findings of the analysis correspond with the notion put forward in the theory concerning the power-potential of bureaucracy. However, the extent to which this power-potential found present within the surveyed departments could be extracted in a manner making the bureaucracy forceful vis-à-vis other actors in development policy remains unclear.

Secondly, the analysis turned its focus to the element of bureaucratic conduct and behaviour. Related to this issue the two theoretical traditions, the Weberian and that of political economy, indicate quite different elements as decisive. The Weberian tradition is structural and leave no room for the bureaucrat as an actor - the bureaucrat acts solely based on rationality and plays no subjective part. The political economy approach does include a role to be played by the bureaucrats, and specify a set of indicators for gaining insight into the bureaucrats' behaviour and conduct.

Pursuing the notion of political-economy, the second section of the analysis provided insight into the priorities of the surveyed bureaucrats (variables in a utility-function in the terminology of economics), priorities that were found to correspond only to a small extent to what was specified by the theory. Overall the expressed conduct and values of the surveyed bureaucrats were characterised by being less self-oriented than what was specified in the theoretical notion of Niskanen and in the more general principal-agent approach, especially in strict monetary terms. The variables expressed by the surveyed bureaucrats to be the most important to them had a wider scope than those presented in Niskanen's theory. This wider scope of variables was characterised as reflecting the bureaucrats' professional role, rather than their self-centred struggle for economic gain as Niskanen argues. The utility function of the bureaucrat, if such a construct exists, was portrayed as comprising of a wider set of variables than those identified by Niskanen. This mismatch between the theoretical model and the empirical findings drew into question whether the budget-maximising strategy really is the better strategy for the bureaucrats in pursuit of utility-maximisation, as Niskanen argues it is.

Although central elements of the two theories representing the political economy approach were drawn into question by the empirical findings related to the utility-function of the surveyed bureaucrats, the latter findings concerning the correspondence between some aspects in the bureaucrats' attitudes and the more general notion of the budget-maximising strategy provided some support for Niskanen's notion. However, though some elements of correspondence between the bureaucrats preferences on certain matters and what would be expected from a budget-maximising point of view were found, these elements were not overwhelming and may further be said to represent some general preferences among bureaucrats rather than a clear strategy for budget-maximisation as suggested by Niskanen. On these grounds the evidence pointing in the direction of a budget-maximising strategy seems less than convincing.

Finally, the analysis turned towards the third element put under scrutiny, namely that related to the constraints placed on bureaucracy by the many other actors in the field of development policy. This third section of the analysis explored the roles both the political establishment and civil society vis-à-vis the administration. The constraints placed on bureaucratic autonomy were found to be many and imposed by many actors in the field, still, the administration was found to enjoy considerable latitude in their work. The pattern that was depicted was one where the general framework for development policy was structured by the many actors in the field of development policy, the political authorities, civil society organisations and international organisations and other donors of development assistance. The more precise formulation of the policy-content of this framework was described as created differently within different subsections of the policy-area, according to certain factors. These factors were identified as: the particular interests of the political leaders within the ministry, the focus on certain topics generated by international trends in development policy and the media focus placed on certain issues either by the media themselves or by nationally based NGOs. Thus, there are many factors and actors that limit the autonomy of the administration in the field of development policy. However, the administration still enjoys great latitude within the field, a level of latitude that can be characterised as vary according to the relative presents of the limiting factors mentioned above.

Thus, the overall picture is one making the administration out as holder of a vital role in Norwegian development policy. Highly competent bureaucrats occupy decisive positions for formulating the precise contents of development policy (*Micro-level*). The national political

authorities prioritise the major and general structures of the policy (*Macro-level*), and occasionally and randomly the more precise contents. The administration constitutes the continuous competence in the field and is trusted to administrate the policy area in accordance with the designated framework, a responsibility that is well taken care of by an administration that comprise of bureaucrats largely interested in serving the policy-area as professionals.

## **6.5.2 Theoretical Applicability**

Summing up the theoretical suggestions made within the different theoretical approaches in light of the empirical findings it is obvious that the various approaches hold elements that fit well within the explored structures of the case, but at the same time elements that do not fit are also obvious. The subsequent sections offer individual explorations of each theory relative to their applicability for the chosen case.

### **6.5.2.1 Weberian Approach /Sociology of Organisation**

The Weberian approach rightly specifies the administration as being competent. Merit based recruitment and a general high level of formal competence identified for the empirical case aligns well with Weber's notion of the rational administration. Unlike the political-economy approach, Weber assigns no role to the individual bureaucrat in his theory, holding the tendency of bureaucratic intrusion into the sphere of the politicians to be an inherent tendency based on the superior efficiency of the rational bureaucracy. Thus, Weber assigns all explanatory force for the extent of this intrusion to the ability of the political authorities for controlling the administration, confining it to the administrative sphere.

Weber's calls for a strong Parliament may seem anachronistic within the current Norwegian context. However, the calls are not for a strong Parliament *per se*, but for Parliament as a means for breeding able politicians. Weber assigns great faith in the ability of able politicians to control the administration. The role of the able and active politician described by Weber was found to fit well with the role held by the current Minister of International Development. However, the ability of the Minister, along with the rest of the political authorities within the ministry, for controlling the administration was found to be forceful mostly on a general level. The mere scope and volume of the policies limits the politician's ability for getting engaged in all aspects of the policies, something that makes the recommendations of Weber seem less than adequate.

The absence of a genuine political debate concerning issues of development policy within Parliament also indicates that the situation is somewhat different than what is specified by Weber. Weber assigns great faith in the democratic institutions, not as ends but as means for an end. However, modern society has become an even more complex construction than what Weber foresaw, and other measures are needed in order to adequately control the administration. These measures, evident in the empirical case in the form of the Office of the Auditor General, are absent in the theory of Weber, an absence that indicates the lacking level of complexity on this account of the theory.

Overall, there seems to be a too great belief by Weber in the able politician's capability of confining the bureaucracy to the administrative sphere. Even though the current Minister of International Development personifies the *able politician*, in Weberian terms, it is obvious that this is insufficient for controlling the forceful administration. Thus, it seems safe to characterise Weber as holding too much faith in the possibility for political control over bureaucracy, and at the same time neglecting other important organisational and institutional mechanisms for exercising control.

### **6.5.2.2 Principal-Agent Theory**

The Principal-Agent approach constitutes the first of two theories comprising the political economy approach towards the study of bureaucracy employed for this study. The principal-agent approach specifies a skewed distribution of information as the structure creating the asymmetrical power-relation between a principal (politician) and an agent (bureaucrat), indicating two different types of distributions with the potential of creating two distinct problems in the relation. For the case at hand the skewed distribution established was characterised as being that of *hidden information*, resulting in the heightening of the bureaucrats' stand in the relation between the politicians and the bureaucracy. Identifying the power-structures in the empirical case as being in correspondence with those specified in the theory, the strategy of the bureaucrats was necessary to establish.

Exploring the strategy of the bureaucrats, the theoretical assumption that bureaucrats (agents) seek to exploit their power so as to maximise certain variables associated with own utility was put under scrutiny. The principal-agent approach is, as presented here, quite general in form and does not specify very carefully what the bureaucrats seek to maximise of own utility. However, the goals of the principal and the agent were said to be conflicting and some

suggestions for what variables the agent sought to maximised were put forward, such as job security, leisure and pay (see theoretical chapter). Exploring the empirical case, the variables found important by the bureaucrats correspond poorly with those assigned most importance in the theory. However, rather than dismissing the entire theoretical approach the concept of utility should be expended so as to include own-utility in the form expressed by the surveyed bureaucrats. Being professionals interested in the issues of development policy, the importance expressed for a wider set of variables can be regarded as own-utility in a more intellectual and professional sense, relating to the challenges and responsibility they may meet through their job. However, the notion that the goals of the principal and the agent are naturally conflicting is not given support through this study. Thus, the notion of utility-maximisation as put forward in the principal-agent theory is dismissed in its current form and should be amended. Even so, the general framework of the principal-agent theory seems functional if some adjustments concerning the variables suggested as the bureaucrats' maximand are done. Rather than keeping the suggested set of variables the bureaucrats' utility should be thought of as a more wide-ranging concept including variables along the lines of those indicated in the analysis.<sup>92</sup>

In terms of controlling the bureaucracy, the principal-agent approach suggests various measures. The approach is quite general, formulating only wider concepts for control. However, among these wider concepts, various measures adapt nicely to the scenario found within the field of Norwegian development policy. Also, the level to which the theory suggests these measures to be efficient corresponds with the empirical findings. The principal-agent approach suggests that although these various means for control can be employed, they do not represent a panacea in terms of political control over the bureaucracy. The suggested measures (e.g. monitoring) are put forward as efficient to a certain level, a theoretical concept that match the findings of the empirical case. All in all, the adaptability and flexibility of this general approach makes it well adjusted for describing the development policy field in Norway.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> For an applied principal-agent model see Hubert (2000).

<sup>93</sup> No similar application of the principal-agent theory or the theory of Niskanen have performed in the context of Norwegian development policy. However, there has been conducted some studies based on these theories within the wider area of Norwegian bureaucracy. Hagen have earlier conducted a study of county hospital financing based within principal-agent theory, however, this study applies the theory differently and in more technical terms than what is done in this study, resulting in a lack of possibilities for drawing experiences between the two (Hagen 1997).

### 6.5.2.3 Niskanen's Theory: the Budget-Maximising Bureaucrat

Niskanen's theoretical approach takes the form of a more specified model than the former, but is in its basic scheme structured on the grounds of a principal-agent approach. In terms of the postulations made concerning budgetary growth, the theory of Niskanen seems plausible for the area of development policy. In addition the role of the sponsor as put forward by Niskanen seems reasonable given the complexity of the policy field.<sup>94</sup>

Exploring the empirical data, it has become evident that the power-potential of the administration, as specified in Niskanen's approach, is present. As documented in the analysis and as summarised above, the administration is resourceful vis-à-vis the political authorities. The administration has further been found to be somewhat homogeneous, a feature that also fits well with Niskanen's notion concerning the common strategy of the bureaucrats both senior- and junior-staff.<sup>95</sup>

However, the empirical support for Niskanen's model became scarce when his basic argument - that bureaucrats maximise budgets because it is in their interest to do so – was put under scrutiny. Niskanen specifies a utility-function for the bureaucrats and argues that most variables in this utility-function are positively associated with budgetary increase. The empirical data explored in the analysis granted little support for this argument. Niskanen's utility-function was found to be too limited, something that draws the entire model of the budget-maximising bureaucrat into question as a theoretical model for this case. Though some additional findings were more supportive of the entire notion of the budget-maximising bureaucrat, the findings related to the vital argument concerning the utility-function of the bureaucrats made the model less plausible.

The last critical element specified by Niskanen and explored empirically in this thesis was that of the passive *sponsor*. Niskanen finds the *sponsor* to be inherently weak and bureaucracy to operate in very autonomous ways because of this. Exploring the role of what Niskanen terms the sponsor, Parliament was found to fit well into the notion of Niskanen. However,

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<sup>94</sup> While this study have only focused on some aspects of Niskanen's theory, Blais and Dion edited a widely based study of various aspects of the theory. That study provide detailed insight into the functioning of the theory (Blais and Dion 1991). More recently Casas-Pardon and Puchades-Navarro (Casas-Pardon and Puchades-Navarro 2001) have provided a critical account of Niskanen's model (see also Breton 1975; Conybeare 1984; .

<sup>95</sup> Contrary to Peters' suggestion that the model is profoundly American due to common patterns of careers being different in America and Europe (see section 5.2.4.2), the empirical analysis has shown that the careers within the MFA do unfold, largely, within one ministry.



according to Niskanen the sponsor may also comprise of other central political institutions, this is something that provides a different picture of a more active sponsor more involved in the work of the administration and less compatible with the notion of the passive sponsor central to the theory of the budget-maximising bureaucrat. In addition to the notion of the passive sponsor being inaccurate, Niskanen's theory fail to see that also other features external to the state institutions have limiting effects on the manoeuvrability of the administration. The constraints placed on the development administration's autonomy by national NGO's and international organisations further indicates that the administration is more restricted in conducting the policy area of development policy than what would be expected provided Niskanen's notion of the budget-maximising bureaucrat.

All in all, the theory of Niskanen seems to rightfully identify a troublesome relation between the politicians and the bureaucrats based on a skewed distribution of information and competence. However, the assumptions made regarding the *consequences* of this relation have proven to be false for my case. The fundamental argument concerning the one-sided aim of bureaucrats for budget-maximisation and the role indicated to be held by the *sponsor* in the theory appears to be false in light of the empirical findings.<sup>96</sup> Thus, this theory has proven to be a poor instrument for gaining insight into the structures of Norwegian development policy.

In sum, the adaptability and the lack of specificity in the principal-agent approach has been argued to make this theory more applicable to the case chosen than the more rigid and specified approaches of Weber and Niskanen. The general structures within the principal-agent approach have proved to be highly compatible with the case while the other approaches specify elements that simply do not fit. These features of the three theories seem to make the principal-agent approach the approach best applicable to the structures of Norwegian development policy.<sup>97</sup> I proceed in the next chapter to draw some lessons and inferences from these findings.

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<sup>96</sup> Though a full falsification of the theory is beyond the scope here where the primary objective have been to assess applicability, it seems safe to say that the formal model of Niskanen interpreted with strong assumptions as put forward in section 5.2.3.1 is overly simplistic and false.

<sup>97</sup> Providing this account of the principal-agent model I assign all attention to the general structure of the theory according to the elements explored in the analysis. The assumptions laid out in the theoretical chapter are not considered (see section 5.2.2). Thus, the preference assigned to the principal-agent theory in terms of applicability to the chosen case is only a limited one.

## 7 – Conclusions: Actors and Motives in Development Policy

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Directing its focus towards the administration of development policy in Norway, this study has been undertaken in an effort to explore aspects related to actorness and the domestic foundations of national development policies. Motives in development policy are, as presented in chapter two, generally treated in the existing literature as belonging to a singular and unitary actor, namely the donor of development assistance – “the *state*”. However, I argued that by considering “the *state*” as constituting the donor of development assistance, one gives rise to the dubious practise of *attributing motives* to this “collective actor.” As I was sceptical of and dissatisfied with this conceptualization concerning the holder of motives, the analysis was performed in order to glean some insight into the complexities related to the policy process of development assistance. In this vein, I generated the following research questions.

*- What are the microfoundations of development policy, namely, who holds these motivations, what are these motivations, and how do we explain them? Furthermore, what constraints do these actors face from other actors within the state? In a word, what underlies the Norwegian foreign development policy formulation process, and to what degree do plural actors within the Norwegian state work more or less in tandem with each other?*

Although I offer no final resolution concerning the issues explored, some aspects of these questions have been successfully answered via my research methods and findings. This chapter will provide a discussion of some conclusions drawn on the basis of the findings of the analysis. First, sections two and three deal with the approach of the study and the expectations held based on this approach. Secondly, focus is directed towards the topic of the analysis, the role of the administration in the field of development policy in Norway. Thirdly, the concept of motives in development policy is considered, based on the empirical findings of the analysis. Finally, some remarks are made concerning aspects for further exploration.

### **7.1 Framework and Approach**

The approach to the analysis performed in this thesis has been broadly based on a framework of rival theories. Structuring the study around these alternative theoretical models of the

nature and behaviour of the bureaucracy (the Weberian, Niskanenian, and principal-agent perspectives), has provided the possibility to identify the focal elements for exploration of the specific case, and simultaneously the application of these theories has allowed for an assessment of the different theories' applicability to the case. That is to say, *which theoretical model most accurately and usefully allows us to effectively conceptualize and explain the Norwegian bureaucracy, as engaged in development policy?*

The analysis performed in the previous chapter was structured according to the elements identified as critical within the three theories, and thus the basic arrangement of the analysis was provided with subdivisions according to the following three elements:

1. The power-potential held by the administration
2. The attitudes and conduct of the bureaucrats themselves.
3. The constraints placed on bureaucracy by state institutions and other public actors.

## **7.2 What Theory led us to Expect**

On theoretical grounds, a resourceful bureaucracy staffed with competent bureaucrats was expected; however, the expectations regarding the *manner* in which this resourcefulness became manifest within the state varied widely across the theoretical paradigms. While Weber's approach depicts the administration as being the resourceful and well oiled administrative machinery of the state controllable by the politicians (if able), the political economy approach was more concerned with the "utility" of the bureaucrats and the manner in which their efforts for maximising this affected the role of the entire administration within the state. Unlike the belief in the ability for the politicians for controlling the administration, expressed by Weber, the two theories comprising the political economy approach were more sceptical in terms of the politicians' ability on this point.

Assessing the role of the administration within the field of development policy, based solely on the various theoretical approaches, provides three different conceptions. First, Weber assigned faith in the politicians' role for controlling the administration and only a minor role to be played by the administration itself; other than strictly administrative. Secondly, the principal-agent approach depicts a role for the administration that is substantially

circumscribed by various limitations imposed by the politicians for controlling the administration; however, these limitations imposed on the bureaucracy are seen as efficient only to a certain extent, leaving the administration with a decisive and powerful role to play. Lastly, Niskanen's theory depicts the administration as extremely powerful vis-à-vis the politicians, whom he finds to be overly passive. Barely controlled in its conduct, the administration is seen by Niskanen as highly successful in maximising own utility by constantly pushing for increasing budgets.

Thus, the three theoretical approaches each provide quite different assumptions and expectations concerning the bureaucracy's role in development policy. Relating these three scenarios above to the overarching theme of motives in development assistance, it can be said that each of the roles assigned to the administration offers quite different implications for the topic. Motives are generally considered to be held by the *state*, a very general and unspecific entity that earlier in the thesis was suggested to be best understood as the central state institutions (i.e. legislator, executive). However, the aim in this thesis has been to deconstruct and dismantle the notion of the *state* as an actor so as to gain better insight into the foundation of development policy, and through that to provide a more nuanced picture of the concept of actorness in relation to motives in development policy.

The Weberian notion of the administration is one depicting it as powerful, but contained within the administrative sphere by *able politicians*, and thus the role offered to the administration is of minor political importance. Identifying the role of the administration in the empirical case of development policy in Norway to resemble this image provided by Weber would yield little evidence that national development policies in Norway are decided and prioritised by any entity other than a singular and unitary actor. If this Weberian ideal is found to be present, little can be said in terms of the concept of motives, other than that they seem well represented when presented as being held by the *state* (i.e. political authorities). However, identifying the administration as holding an important role within the field of development policy, along the lines of the role suggested by Niskanen or even that presented within the principal-agent approach, will provide a picture of the administration as an actor of vital importance within the policy field. Identifying such a role to be held by the administration provides the possibility for scrutinising the common concept of the "collective actor" as the holder of motives in development policy.

Establishing that not all priorities within Norwegian development policy originate within the central political institution, and thus that these institutions do not control all aspects of the policies and the policy priorities that are made within the field, the notion that these central political institutions are the sole holders of motives in development assistance may be characterised as too simplistic and even false. If such a pattern is found to be present within the field of development policy in Norway, it seems more satisfactory to regard motives for specific policies as intimately linked to the *various preferences of actors* on the domestic political arena. This implies that the notion of the state as a *singular and unitary actor* should be abandoned, and that a more complex conception, linking the national policies for international development more intimately with the domestic policy arena, should be adopted. The extent to which the administration is found to be forceful within the policy field will thus decide to what extent the concept of motives as commonly presented should be regarded as phenomena of “macrobehaviour”, generated on the basis of the various domestic groups’ “micromotives”.

Thus, the role of the administration is explored as the key element. Deciding the role played by the administration provides the possibility for scrutinising the concept of actorness in relation to development policy, and will be decisive for the findings of this study.

### **7.3 What has been learned?**

This section deals with the findings of the empirical analysis. I address the questions that were explored empirically, comment on the related theoretical issues, and relate these findings to the issue of *actorness* concerning motives in development assistance.

#### **7.3.2 The Administration’s Role**

The analysis of the thesis set out to answer questions such as: What power-resources are vested in the bureaucracy? What guides the behavioural pattern of the bureaucrats? In which ways do bureaucrats prioritise their work? What level of latitude are the bureaucrats granted in their work? What constraints are imposed on the bureaucracy to keep it under political and popular control? These questions are believed to provide insight into the administration’s role, and thus provide valuable insight into aspects related to the *microfoundation* of Norwegian development policy.

In accordance with what was assumed based on the different theoretical notions, the administration in the field of development policy has been identified as resourceful and competent. In terms of power-resources the surveyed sections and departments within the UD were found to comprise of bureaucrats with a high level of competence (operationalised as education), and in addition the career path of the bureaucrats in the UD was found to be one commonly confined within the ministry for the entire career. This continuity in the work force of the ministry along with the high level of competence was found to indicate a profound forcefulness on behalf of the bureaucrats vis-à-vis the political authorities. This is not to say that the politicians are considered to be incompetent; however, relative to the collective ability of the administration, even distinguished politicians such as the current Minister of International Development seem unresourceful. Even so, the capabilities of the administration was argued to be contingent on the group's ability to act unified, and so the level of homogeneity of the surveyed sections and departments was characterised as a determinant for their collective capabilities. Related to this element, the data from the survey proved somewhat ambiguous. While some of the variables considered were found to indicate homogeneity, others pointed in the opposite direction. On this point the qualitative interviews with a selection of the survey respondents were very illuminating and served as a valuable complement to the larger survey. When asked to characterise the UD, all interviewees pointed to a strong culture and a high level of homogeneity in the ministry's organisation, and in doing so they particularly emphasised the effect the trainee-programme had on the homogeneity and culture of the UD in general. All in all, the combined surveyed sections and departments were characterised to hold capabilities for acting as a common group serving a collective purpose.

In total, the first section of the empirical analysis provided a picture of an administration that is capable and well positioned in terms of influencing the adaptation and prioritisation of policies in development assistance. Identifying the administration as a resourceful apparatus, the conduct and collective behaviour of the administration became a critical element to be explored. The point of departure was taken within the structures of Niskanen's theory of the *Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat*. This theory presents a utility-function that is suggested to be maximised by bureaucrats. Exploring this concept of utility, drawing upon the finding of the survey, there emerges a different conception of bureaucrat's utility. Relative to what was expected, given the theory of Niskanen, the answers provided by the survey respondents span wider. The focus of Niskanen's concept of utility is placed on variables that he assumes are

associated with increases in agency budgets. I, by contrast, find that the bureaucrats are highly *professionally focused* in their work, and are *not* found to be motivated by their own utility *as conceptualised by Niskanen*. Overall, the bureaucrats are suggested to hold a profound interest in their work *for its own intrinsic value*, rather than viewing their professional activities as *instrumental for the pursuit of their own more narrow self-interests*. Thus, one suggestion that can be made based on the conducted empirical analysis is that a more broadly defined, encompassing conception of *utility* is more useful for understanding and explaining the behaviour of bureaucrats than the narrower, materialistic conception of personal utility that is commonly encountered in economic models of bureaucratic behaviour.

Having established the collective capabilities of the administration and the bureaucrat's individual attitudes and conduct, the last section of the analysis was provided in order to contextualise the administration within the domestic policy arena. It should be remembered that though focus in this analysis has been directed towards the administration, the intention of this thesis was also to consider the domestic arena as such, and the relations that are present between different actors in the field of development policy. Through the exploration in chapter three, of Norway as a donor country, it was indicated that the relations between the various actors impose constraints and provide possibilities in terms of policy options. The final section of the analysis places a focus on these elements with the administration at the centre.

The many limitations identified as being imposed by other actors displayed that the administration is less than autonomous within the policy field. Through the analysis, relations between various actors of the policy area have been considered and they have all been characterised as impacting the relative autonomy of the administration. However, while the role of NGOs and the media have been found to be potentially important related to different issues, the continuous presence of the institutions of the political system provides a picture of these as most important in imposing constraints on the administration. The ability of the political authorities in controlling the administration is of course not surprising – they *should* be able to in a democracy. Still, even though these institutions are characterised as being the most forceful, they are not found to control every detail of the administrations work. The wide-ranging policy-field of development was found to be best understood as being divided into two levels, one general where funds are allocated to the various larger budgetary posts and where the more general priorities are made, and the other more precise structuring the

particular contents of specific policies. It became evident through the analysis that the more general framework and the major budgetary allocations for development policies are structured and prioritised between political authorities, though the administration holds an important and influential preparatory position, given the guidelines provided by international trends (see sections 3.2.2-3.2.6 and 6.4.4). Performing the macro allocations and prioritising the budget on the various budgetary posts, is a conceivable task for the political authorities, and although Parliament on this account has been found to be involved only to a lesser extent, this *macro-level* of development policy seems to be profoundly political. However, development policy encompass more than macro-allocations.

As indicated above, the more general level of the policies is structured by the politicians, on the recommendations of the bureaucrats and in accordance with the international trends in development assistance. The more precise contents of the various policies are to a larger extent run by the administration. The aspects of this level of policy that are run primarily by the administration are particularly those aspects of the policies that are in continuous need for follow-up, have a profoundly technical character or simply are out of the politicians' focus. On this more precise level the mere scope of the policies seems to make it impossible for the politicians to be fully involved, leaving various aspects of these policies to the discretion of the administration. However, certain topics and policies may be in the politicians focus, either because of particular political interest (e.g. the current Minister's interest in Africa or particular focus due to peace negotiations)<sup>98</sup> or due to special media attention or attention drawn to an issue by a national NGO, such special circumstances necessitates more intimate involvement of the politicians on this *micro-level*, temporarily squeezing the role of the administration.

Overall, the conclusion concerning the administration's role in Norwegian development policy is that it is a decisive and sizable actor, highly influential in the shaping of Norwegian development policy. The politicians are involved, but due to the incapability of these to be everywhere present in a complex and diverse field of policy, they are restrained from dealing with much more than the larger framework and the more general aspects of policy. These structures in the policy area provide the administration with a favourable position, where its competence and forcefulness can be exploited so as to put a profound mark on the various

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<sup>98</sup> Peace negotiation was discussed in chapter three, "Norway: the donor", and identified to be an area within which Norway has been particularly active since the early nineties (section 3.2.4).



national policies of development. Thus, I will argue that the role of the administration as established through this thesis analysis is vital in reaching a better understanding of the *microfoundation* of development policy. This point is elaborated on in a subsequent section. However, it should be stressed that though the role identified of the administration in development policy was identifying as forceful and vital, the point made above concerning the *professionalism* of the bureaucrats in the surveyed departments and sections, provides a picture of the bureaucrats exploiting the influential position largely in an effort for creating well adjusted policies for spurring development. Thus, the lack of supervision is not found to create discrepancies within the policies of development.

### **7.3.2.1 Theoretical applicability**

Providing the analysis of the administration based on the theoretical framework of the thesis has also allowed a second, theoretical objective to be met. It will be remembered that a question was posed in the introduction concerning the rival theories' applicability to the selected case: *-which theoretical model most accurately and usefully allows us to effectively conceptualize and explain the Norwegian bureaucracy engaged in development policy?*

Answering this question, assessing the theoretical notions of the administration's role based on their respective applicability to the selected case, it has been indicated that all theories have elements bearing truth (see section 6.5.2).<sup>99</sup> As recognised above, the power-potential of the administration is commonly identified within all theories and is also disclosed as present for the empirical case. The resourcefulness of the administration vis-à-vis the other actors in the field of development policy is not surprising, in that it underlines the power-potential generally perceived as being vested in the structures of bureaucracy.

Related to the concept of *bureaucratic conduct* and *behaviour* the theories were found to be highly different; however, an assessment of applicability proved difficult due to the very different assumptions forming the basis on which the theories were built. While Weber's approach simply assumed that the rationality of bureaucracy steered the conduct of the bureaucrats, the role delegated to the bureaucrats within the political economy approach was one more open for scrutiny. The notions presented within the political economy approach

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<sup>99</sup> It should be noted that the application of the theories towards analysing the empirical case has been selective and thus the comments offered are based on the notions of the theories dealing with the features of bureaucracy dealt with here. The account should be seen relative to the analysis and not as a fully fledged account of the theories and their applicability.

concerning the bureaucrats' wishes for utility-maximisation was granted little support in the analysis. Niskanen's conception was dismissed on these grounds, while the principle-agent approach was found to be more applicable, although some elements such as that concerning the utility-function of the bureaucrats were found to be in need for revision. As indicated earlier, a widening of the concept of bureaucrats' utility seem to make the notion of *utility* more applicable.

As will be remembered, the three theories presented and employed for purpose of the analysis ascribe different faith to the concept of control over the bureaucracy. While Weber, though aware of the inherent nature of bureaucracy for exceeding its administrative sphere, holds great faith in the ability of able politicians to control the power-resources of bureaucracy, Niskanen finds the *sponsor* to be inherently weak and bureaucracy to operate in very autonomous ways. Principal-agent theory places itself in the midst of a continuum running between the previous two perceptions, seeing various means relatively effective in countering the structures providing bureaucracy with great potential powers. At the same time, these measures suggested by the principal-agent theory are stressed as being efficient only to a certain point and provide no final resolution to a problem that is inherent in the structures of government.

Weber's theory seems too one-sided in terms of its applicability to the more complex structures of the modern state administration. Though the current Minister fits the ideal-type politician, the common politician within Parliament does not. The passive Parliament in development issues suggests that controlling the administration can not be trusted entirely to the politicians – their capabilities and competence simply will not do. The recognition of the politicians' inability for controlling the administration has resulted in other checks of an administrative nature being established, checks which do not fit within the theory of Weber. However, they are exactly what the principal-agent theory specified in terms of monitoring the administrative conduct. The findings further indicated that the work of the administration generally is kept within certain boundaries provided by a policy framework designated by the political level and by the specified rules and laws for administrative conduct enforced by the monitoring functions of the Office of the Auditor General. These elements fit well with the principal-agent notion of *contract design* and *monitoring and reporting*, and provide an image of the political authorities as involved and active. Thus, even though the role of the Parliament fits well with the notion of the passive sponsor provided by Niskanen, according to Niskanen

the sponsor may also include other political institutions such as the Cabinet, this is something that provides a different picture of a more active sponsor more involved in the work of the administration and less compatible with the notion of the passive sponsor central to the theory of the budget-maximising bureaucrat. In addition to the notion of the passive sponsor being inaccurate, Niskanen's theory fail to see that also other features external to the state institutions also have a limiting effect on the manoeuvrability of the administration, this is an observation along the lines of the critique offered in chapter 5. The constrains placed on the development administration's autonomy by national NGOs and international organisations further indicates that the administration is more restricted in conducting the policy area of development policy than what Niskanen indicates in his theory of bureaucracy. Simultaneously, the Weberian notion of the well controlled bureaucracy seems to be inaccurate as well. It appears very clearly that although the administration is kept under general control by the various institutions and organisations, it continues to enjoy substantial latitude in the precise shaping of specific policies within the general framework designated.

Thus, both the notions of Weber and those of Niskanen regard one of the two sides – either the politicians or the bureaucrats – as being as too forceful, and therefore the more balanced notions of the principal-agent approach seem more applicable to the specific scenario of development policy administration in Norway. Table 7.1 below offers a summary of the theoretical suggestions relative to the findings of the empirical analysis.

**Table 7.1: Summary of theories and the empirical case**

	<b>Sociology of organisation</b>	<b>Political economy</b>		<b>Empirical case</b>
	<b>Weber</b>	<b>Principal-Agent</b>	<b>Niskanen</b>	
<b>Bureaucratic capabilities</b>	-Bureaucracy is conceived as being a powerful force. Based in strict adherence to rationality, the bureaucracy is superior in capacity to all other actors.	- Bureaucracy (agent) is seen as forceful due to a asymmetrical distribution of information in the relation between the politicians and the bureaucracy	-Bureaucracy as forceful based on asymmetrical information related to service cost and budgetary size	-Bureaucracy found to be forceful based on formal education and intimate knowledge of the policy field. Bureaucracy is further found to represent continuity in the policy field
<b>Bureaucratic behaviour and conduct</b>	-No individual role ascribed to the bureaucrats; Bureaucracy with an inherent tendency for exceeding the administrative sphere	-Utility-maximisers seek to maximise utility while putting in the least amount of effort; the precise utility-function is not specified but indicated to be related to monetary variables	-Budget-maximisers. In pursuing this objective they seek to maximise a precise utility-function	-Pursue a wide concept of utility associated with their roles as professionals and experts in the field; Characterised as holding a profound interest in the issues related to development
<b>Bureaucratic autonomy</b>	-Best kept in place by able politicians capable of taming the administration (strong Parliament)	-Successful in pursuing their agenda, however, the autonomy is circumscribed by various measures taken by the politicians (prevention of shirking)	-Usually successful in their pursuit for maximising the budget due to a weak sponsor (political authorities)	-Granted considerable latitude in administrating policies. However, the autonomy is confined within a general framework designated by the politicians

### 7.3.3 Motives in Development Policy

The former sections summed up the findings related to the empirical analysis of the administration's role in Norwegian development policy, and concluded that the administration is a decisive actor in the field and occupied a position that is vital for gaining insight into the domestic foundation of development policy. This section utilises the insights identified in the former section in order to comment on the concept of motives in development policy. Having reviewed the common conception regarding the holder of motives in development policy (Chapter 2) the unitary actor assumption was found to be dubious and short of real substance. Accordingly, the concept of motives in development policy as presented in chapter 2 was at the outset of this thesis characterised as a phenomenon of “macrobehaviour” generated on the basis of the various domestic groups’ “micromotives”.

As identified in chapter two, motives are often provided as labels based on judgements concerning aspects of policy. The motives behind policies for development were presented as being comprised of three basic groups:

- Strategic-, security- and/or commercial self-interest of the donor.
- Moral imperative and altruistic motives; the need of the recipient.
- Common interests related to global challenges (environment, refugees etc.)

Although the presentation treated these motives as separate categories, that separation was recognised as being made for the sake of the presentation, manifested in actual policies in which these motives were said to be entangled. The motives were presented as constituting two intercepting continuums within which policies and initiatives in development policy could be placed according to motivation (Figure 2.1).

The common practise of attempting to infer the content of *motives* which lie behind policy on the basis of the *content* of these same policies has led me to question who the holders of these motives really are. Commonly, the reference to the singular and unitary actor refers to the state, further identified as the central decision-making actors (i.e. executives, legislators) who rightly are responsible for the various policies. However, the motives behind development policy are, as said, provided as labels to a donor, and are based on a judgement concerning aspects of the policies that were actually implemented. Thus the administration as a sizable

actor in the field of development policy is identified as being highly influential concerning the precise policy-content.

The presentation of motives in development policy provided in chapter two of this thesis dealt primarily with motives on an abstract level, or what has been termed the *macro-level* in development policy, namely the most major allocations and the general structures related to the various programmes for development assistance. These elements have been established as being profoundly determined by the political level. However, the process of continuous internationalisation in the area of development policy has to an increasingly higher degree linked the national priorities within development assistance to the international trends and priorities within the international donor community (see sections 3.2.3-3.2.5 and 6.4.4). Thus, even though I conclude that the administrative role in determining the most general priorities in development policy is limited, these aspects of development policy are not fully grasped only by focusing on the national political authorities and their preferences alone. Determining motives by reviewing the major structures of Norwegian development policy, the implications of the interconnectedness between the international and the national policies of development assistance must also be taken into consideration. Even so, on this abstract level the notion that motives are held by the political authorities and referred to these as if they were a unitary and singular actor seems for the most part adequate, especially when considering in the light of the broad based political consensus established as surrounding these policies in Norway (see section 3.2.6).

However, as also stated in the chapter presenting the concept of motives in development policy, the level of aggregation chosen for the account may vary and an assessment of the motives of a donor may also be made on a more precise level than what is done above. Assessing motives in development policy on a less aggregated level than the macro-level implies reviewing more precise policies and policy papers and assessing the donor's motives behind a specific policy. This less aggregated level of development policies, the *micro-level*, has in the analysis been characterised as being highly affected by the choices and priorities of the administration. Thus, the vital position identified for the administration within the policy-field indicates that policies of development, adopted at the national level, may originate and be structured elsewhere than within the political institutions. Consequently, since this micro-level in development policy in Norway is to be regarded as a level within which the administration is highly influential, *the motives that are found to lie behind policies on this*

*level can not fully be understood as reflecting the motivation of the political authorities. Thus, when reviewing national development policies for the sake of assessing motives that may lie behind these, there is a need to take into account the influence exercised by the various domestic actors specifying the precise contents of policy, among which the administration is found to be decisive.*

Subsequently, in the pursuit of assessing who the holders of motives in development policy are, I argue that there is a need for differentiating the concept of actorness according to level of abstraction. Dealing with motives behind development policy on the most abstract level, the notion of actorness seems for the most part satisfactory when reference is given to a collective actor (Norway). However, also on this level other factors, such as the international constraints imposed on national policies in the development policy field, should be taken into consideration. On a lower level of abstraction, dealing with motives related to more specified policies, the concept of the state as a unitary actor is identified as misleading. At this level of abstraction, both the concept of actorness and motives should be moved away from a macro-sphere and placed within the context of domestic politics. Providing such a differentiation allows for a better understanding of the domestic origin of these aspects of foreign policy.

However, having established the role of the administration as decisive, represents only one piece of the puzzle, and I proceed to suggest possibilities for further exploration in order to grasp the totality of the foundations and the domestic origins of national policies of development assistance.

#### **7.4 The path onwards**

Having provided an analysis of the bureaucratic role in Norwegian development policy in an effort for studying the microfoundations of these policies, it is evident that the strategy has its limits. Throughout the analysis, I have identified a range of political and administrative actors that have been found to be more or less influential. Common to all of these other actors is that they have all appeared in the periphery of this thesis focus, and so insights into their important roles have been missing. One group of such actors identified as important throughout the analysis is what has been termed the *political authorities* or actors within the *central political institutions*. Considering this actor as the unified holder of motives as presented in chapter 2, or considering the Minister as only motivated by these three *macro motives*, seems as

simplistic and dubious as the notion of the state as an “collective actor” motivating the initiating of the entire thesis. As mentioned both in the introduction and in the conclusion of the thesis, the strategy chosen for the study generating insight into the administration’s role in development policy constitutes only one piece of the total puzzle.

Accordingly, I will argue that the path onwards, gaining more insight into the foundations of Norwegian development policy should be to explore the entity referred to in the thesis simply as *political authorities* and *central political institutions*. Simply put, the concept “political authorities” is rooted in ignorance of the entity’s internal functioning. However, it may be possible to utilize the assumptions and findings in this thesis – concerning the administration and the administrators and their important role in development policy – and redirect them towards the political institution and politicians: micromotives determine their macrobehaviour. (Of course, the scheme of the analytical approach would have to be adapted carefully and altered in order to fit within the new context.) The knowledge gained from this study of the administration may also prove useful for a future study of the *politician’s* competence, their behaviour, their preferences and the constraints they encounter when exercising the power of their position. Consider the following, excerpted from a recent news report in the major Norwegian daily newspaper, *Aftenposten*:

*The Minister of International Development Frafjord Johnson was launched as Norway’s official candidate to the vacant top position in a letter from Prime Minister Kjell Mangne Bondevik to the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. [...] - Jan Petersen will now utilize the foreign services in the most efficient manner, to rally support for our candidate for the UNDP-position, Bondevik said to VG yesterday. [...] Frafjord Johnsen has, according to Aftenposten’s sources, also her self presented her candidacy and received positive feedback from several countries. Right now she is attending international meetings in Paris, and will also there have the possibility to rally support for the top position (Harboe in Aftenposten 02.03.2005).<sup>100</sup>*

As I have indicated throughout the analysis presented in this thesis, the Minister of International Development assistance holds a decisive position, influencing Norwegian development assistance in most areas and on various levels. The capabilities vested in the Ministerial position are of course limited and considerably circumscribed by other actors; nonetheless, the assumption that this position is the single most powerful position within

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<sup>100</sup> The quote in the text is my translation of: ”Utviklingsminister Frafjord Johnsen ble lansert som Norges offisielle kandidat til den ledige toppjobben i et brev fra statsminister Kjell Mangne Bondevik til FNs generalsekretær Kofi Annan. [...] – Jan Petersen vil nå bruke utenriksstjenesten på den mest effektive måten for å opparbeide støtte til vår kandidat til UNDP-jobben, sa Bondevik til VG i går. [...] Også Frafjord Johnson selv har etter det Aftenposten erfarer luftet sitt kandidatur, og fått positive tilbakemeldinger fra flere land. Nå er hun på internasjonale møter i Paris, og kan også der søke støtte til lederjobben.” (Harbo, Aftenposten 01.03.2005)



Norwegian development assistance seems plausible. *What then, guides the behaviour and choices of the Minister?* Drawing on the newly gained insight into the field it seems safe to characterise the administration as one guiding element for the action taken and the choices made by the Minister. Simultaneously the actors established in the thesis' analysis as influential, such as the media, NGOs and international organisations may be assumed to be actors which the Minister takes account of before acting. However, even though the presence of these organisations and institutions offers some insight into the context within which the action of the Minister is taken, they explain only partially the foundation of the choices made. In addition to the variables contextualising the decisions of the Minister it might be hypothesised that the Minister has a personal stake, or some sort of own-utility associated with the policies of international development; the recently declared candidacy launched for the top position of the UNDP (see quote above) can be argued to suggest this.

However, this is not an attempt to engage in speculation concerning the current Ministers' person and personal ambitions (conception of own-utility); rather, it is simply a matter of directing the focus of future research towards the entity referred to in this thesis as the *central political authorities*. Although the field of development policy has been characterised as surrounded by political consensus, I suggest that gaining insight into the microfoundations of development policy (along the lines of the survey conducted here concerning the domestic origins of national development policy in Norway) within the *central political sphere* could yield yet additional findings which are critical for a more complete understanding of the policy process. As argued repeatedly in this thesis, the decision-making process is complicated, with multiple actors, varied motivations, and overlapping jurisdictions and realms of authority. I am hopeful that the methodology and findings presented in this thesis can provide a springboard for a more elaborate, complementary examination of other political actors in the policy process, a process within which the actors' "macromotives" cannot be fully understood without a careful study of their "microfoundations."

## Appendix A: Questionnaire (available only in Norwegian)

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Før du går i gang med å besvare spørsmålene vil jeg igjen takke deg for din deltakelse i undersøkelsen. Jeg vil også benytte anledningen til igjen å forsikre deg om at svarene du her gir vil bli behandlet konfidensielt, og vil utelukkende bli presentert sammen med svar gitt av andre respondenter. Personvernombudet ved Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste (NSD) påser at personvernet blir ivaretatt i gjennomføringen av undersøkelsen.

Den markerte rubrikken etter spørsmålene er hvor jeg ønsker at du skal angi ditt svar. Hvis spørsmålet ber deg angi det alternativet som passer best for deg ber jeg deg markere dette med symbolet ' X ', i de tilfeller hvor du blir bedt om å angi et verbalt svar ber jeg deg gjøre dette i den markerte rubrikk etter det aktuelle spørsmålet. Når du skal angi ditt svar i den markerte rubrikken "klikker" du med musen i den aktuelle rubrikken og skriver ditt svar direkte inn, for å gå videre til neste spørsmål "klikker" du på neste spørsmåls markerte svarrubrikk. Du kan også manøvrere i skjemaet ved hjelp av piltastene (høyre piltast for ned/ venstre for opp).

Når du har fullført spørreskjemaet ønsker jeg at du returnerer det pr. mail til meg. Det beste viset å gjøre dette på er å først lagre arket som et Excel-dokument på din pc, før du sender meg en e-post hvor du vedhefter dokumentet. Adressen jeg vil du skal returnere skjemaet til er: [geir.teigland@student.uib.no](mailto:geir.teigland@student.uib.no)

### **I- Helt innledningsvis trenger jeg å stille deg noen spørsmål om blant annet alder, utdanning og yrke.**

- 1) Når er du født? (Fødselsår)
- 2) Hva er nivået på din høyeste fullførte utdanning? (Her menes normert tid)

(Ett kryss mulig)

0-Ingen utdanning

1-Barneskolenivå (1-6 år)

2-Ungdomskolenivå (7-9 år)

3-Videregående skole - nivå I (ett år etter obligatorisk grunnskole)

4-Videregående skole – nivå II (2-3år etter obligatorisk grunnskole)

5-Universitets- og høyskolenivå I (1-2 år)

(dvs. grunnfag eller tilsvarende)

6-Universitets- og høyskolenivå II (3-4 år)

(dvs. cand. mag. grad, lærerhøyskole eller tilsvarende)

7-Universitets- og høyskolenivå III (5-6 år)

(dvs. hovedfag, embetsstudie eller tilsvarende)

8-Forskernivå (over 7 år på universitet eller høyskole)

(dvs. doktorgrad eller tilsvarende)

9-Uoppgitt utdanning

3) Innen hvilket fagfelt? (Ett kryss mulig)

- 1-Allment fagfelt
- 2-Humanoria og estetikk
- 3-Undervisning
- 4-Administrasjon, økonomi, samfunnsvitenskap og jus
- 5-Industri, håndverk, naturvitenskap og teknikk
- 6-Samferdsel
- 7-Helsevesen
- 8-Jordbruk, skogbruk og fiske
- 9-Tjenesteyting og forsvar

4) Hvilken yrkestittel har du i ditt hovedyrke? (Tittel)

5) I hvor mange år har du hatt den stillingen du har nå? (Antall år)

6) Tiltrådte du din nåværende stilling etter å ha hatt en annen stilling på nåværende arbeidsplass, eller kom du fra en annen arbeidsplass?

(Ett kryss mulig)

- 1-Hadde annen stilling på nåværende arbeidsplass
- 2-Kom fra en annen arbeidsplass

7) Vi er også interessert i overganger mellom ulike samfunnssektorer. Har du arbeidet i ett år eller mer innenfor noen av disse sektorene

Hvor mange år har du arbeidet full tid innenfor...

(Full tid= minimum 30 timer per uke) Antall år

- 1-Politikk?
- 2-Forvaltning?
- 3-Næringsliv?
- 4-Organisasjoner?
- 5-Kultur?
- 6-Massemedier?
- 7-Forskning/ høyere utdanning?
- 8-Politi og justisvesen?
- 9-Forsvaret?
- 10-Kirken?

## II - Oppfatninger og holdninger

8) Nå er vi ute etter dine synspunkter på noen samfunnsspørsmål. Den tematiske variasjonen er stor, og vi er klar over at enkelte påstander kan virke noe forenklete. Jeg håper likevel du vil si din mening.

Er du helt enig, delvis enig, delvis uenig eller helt uenig i disse utsagnene.

(Ett kryss pr. linje)

1.	2.	3.	4.
Helt Enig	Delvis enig	Delvis uenig	Helt uenig

- a) I Norge bør man vektlegge mer privatisering og en mindre offentlig sektor.
- b) Den statlige innflytelsen over privat næringsdrift bør reduseres.
- c) Vi bør satse på et samfunn der kristne verdier spiller en større rolle enn i dag.
- d) Vi bør regulere omfanget av innvandring etter behov i arbeidsmarkedet. e)  
Forskjellene mellom den rike og den fattige del av jordens befolkning øker.  
Norge bør øke sine bistandsbudsjetter for å bidra til å motvirke denne trend.

9) Vil du oppgi hvilket parti eller hvilken liste du stemte på ved siste Stortingsvalg?

(Ett kryss er mulig)

- 1. Rød valgallianse (RV)
- 2. Norges kommunistiske parti (NKP)
- 3. Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV)
- 4. Det norske Arbeiderparti (DNA)
- 5. Venstre (V)
- 6. Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF)
- 7. Senterpartiet (SP)
- 8. Høyre (H)
- 9. Fremskrittspartiet (Frp)
- 10. Annet parti
- 11. Stemte ikke

10) Er du medlem av et politisk parti?

(Ett kryss er mulig)

- 1. ja → spm. 11

2. Nei→spm.12

11) Vil du oppgi hvilket parti?

(Ett kryss er mulig)

1. Rød valgallianse (RV)
2. Norges kommunistiske parti (NKP)
3. Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV)
4. Det norske Arbeiderparti (DNA)
5. Venstre (V)
6. Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF)
7. Senterpartiet (SP)
8. Høyre (H)
9. Fremskrittspartiet (Fr.p)
10. Annet parti

12) Her er noen sider ved arbeidet som noen mener er spesielt viktige.  
Vær snill å fortelle meg hvilke du mener er viktige.

(Flere kryss er mulig)

- a) Bra betalt
- b) Ikke for mye stress
- c) Trygg arbeidsplass
- d) Et arbeide som respekteres av folk i sin alminnelighet
- e) Arbeidstid som passer for meg
- f) Mulighet for å ta initiativ
- g) Lang ferie
- h) Ansvarsfullt
- i) Interessant
- j) Tilpasset mine evner
- k) Lojalitet til mine overordnede (politiske/administrative)
- l) Lojalitet til en spesiell politisk linje
- m) Annet

13) Hva var grunnen for at du begynte i etaten/ institusjonen du nå arbeider i?

(Flere kryss er mulig)

- a) Falt naturlig p.g.a. fars/mors yrke
- b) Kjente noen som arbeidet der.
- c) Siker arbeidsplass i staten
- d) Arbeidet passer godt for utdanningen
- e) Lønnen var god.
- f) Arbeidet virket interessant.
- g) Det var vanskelig å få annet arbeid
- h) Mulighet for videre utdanning.
- i) Mulighet for barnehage/ daghjemsplass.

- j) Arbeidet var samfunnsnyttig.
- k) Ville ikke arbeide i privat virksomhet.
- l) Fleksible arbeidsordninger i staten.
- m) Ble oppfordret til å søke.
- n) Annet

### **III – Saksorienterte kontakter og generelle kontakter**

Spørsmålene i denne delen av undersøkelsen omhandler kontakter du har hatt i forbindelse med større saker.

14) Hvilken sak var den viktigste du arbeidet med i 2003 eller inneværende år? (Angi sak)

15) Hadde du særlig intensiv kontakt med politisk ledelse i eget departement under arbeidet med denne saken?

(Ett kryss er mulig)

- 1. Ja
- 2. Nei → spm. 18

16) Omtrent hvor mange ganger hadde du slik kontakt i løpet av det siste året? (Angi antall)

17) Var det hovedsakelig du selv eller politisk ledelse som tok initiativ til disse kontaktene?

(Ett kryss er mulig)

- 1. IO selv
- 2. Politisk ledelse

18) Ble det gitt styringssignaler fra den politiske ledelsen i denne saken?

(Ett kryss er mulig)

- 1. Ja
- 2. Nei → spm. 21

19) Var det i hovedsak generelle styringssignaler eller var det presise styringssignaler i den konkrete saken?

(Ett kryss er mulig)

- 1. Generelle styringssignaler
- 2. Presise styringssignaler i den konkrete saken

20) Var styringssignalene skriftlige eller muntlige?

(Ett kryss mulig)

- 1. Skriftlige

- 2. Muntlige
- 3. Begge deler

21) Skapte denne saken spenninger i tillitsforholdet mellom politisk ledelse og embetsverket i ditt departement?

(Ett kryss mulig)

- 1. Ja
- 2. Nei

22) Fikk du henvendelser fra politisk ledelse i andre departementer (enn det din arbeidsplass sorterer under) under arbeidet med saken?

(Ett kryss mulig)

- 1. Ja
- 2. Nei → Spm. 24

23) Omtrent hvor mange slike henvendelser fikk du? (Angi antall)

24) Tok du selv kontakt med politisk ledelse i andre departementer under arbeidet med saken?

(Ett kryss mulig)

- 1. Ja
- 2. Nei → Spm. 26

25) Omtrent hvor mange ganger tok du slik kontakt? (Angi antall)

26) Fikk du henvendelser fra embetsverket i andre departementer under arbeidet med saken?

(Ett kryss mulig)

- 1. Ja
- 2. Nei → Spm. 28

27) Omtrent hvor mange slike henvendelser fikk du? (Angi antall)

28) Tok du selv kontakt med embetsverket i andre departementer under arbeidet med saken?

(Ett kryss mulig)

- 1. Ja
- 2. Nei → Spm. 30

29) Omtrent hvor mange ganger tok du slik kontakt? (Angi antall)

30) Fikk du henvendelser fra en eller flere av følgende politiske instanser under arbeidet med saken?

1. Ja    2. Nei

- 1. a) Partigrupper på Stortinget tilhørende regjeringen?  
    b) Omtrent hvor mange ganger?                      Antall...
- 2. a) Partigrupper på Stortinget i opposisjon?

- b) Omtrent hvor mange ganger?                      Antall...
3. a) Fagkomiteen i Stortinget?  
b) Omtrent hvor mange ganger?                      Antall...
4. a) Partiorganer utenfor Stortinget i Regjeringens parti eller partier?  
b) Omtrent hvor mange ganger?                      Antall...
5. a) Partiorganer utenfor Stortinget i opposisjonspartiene?  
b) Omtrent hvor mange ganger?                      Antall...

31) Tok du selv kontakt med en eller flere av følgende politiske instanser under arbeidet med saken?

1. Ja    2. Nei

1. a) Partigrupper på Stortinget tilhørende regjeringen?  
b) Omtrent hvor mange ganger?                      Antall...
2. a) Partigrupper på Stortinget i opposisjon?  
b) Omtrent hvor mange ganger?                      Antall...
3. a) Fagkomiteen i Stortinget?  
b) Omtrent hvor mange ganger?                      Antall...
4. a) Partiorganer utenfor Stortinget i Regjeringens parti eller partier?  
b) Omtrent hvor mange ganger?                      Antall...
5. a) Partiorganer utenfor Stortinget i opposisjonspartiene?  
b) Omtrent hvor mange ganger?                      Antall...

32) Hvilken form var kontakten med Stortinget?

(Kryss av for det som passer, flere kryss er mulig)

- a) Møte i fagkomiteen  
b) Møte i departementet  
c) Per brev eller telefon

33) Stortinget har i økende grad lagt vekt på sin kontrollfunksjon overfor regjering og forvaltning. Hadde dette betydning for forløpet og utfallet av denne aktuelle saken?

(Ett kryss mulig)

1. Ja  
2. Nei

34) Hvilken betydning hadde følgende kontrollinstanser?

Hadde de stor betydning, en viss betydning, liten betydning eller ingen betydning i det hele tatt?

(Ett kryss pr. linje)

1.    2.    3.    4.  
stor    viss    liten    ingen



- a) Riksrevisjonen
- b) Stortingets kontroll- og konstitusjonskomité

35) Tok noen av følgende underliggende etater eller institusjoner selv direkte kontakt med Stortinget under behandlingen av denne saken?

(Flere kryss er mulig)

1. Ja

2. Nei

- a) Direktorat(er)
- b) Forvaltningsbedrift(er)
- c) Statlig(e) selskaper eller foretak

36) Fikk du henvendelser fra organisasjoner og institusjoner utenfor Storting og departementene i denne saken?

(Ett kryss mulig)

1. Ja

2. Nei → Spm. 39

37) Fra hvilke organisasjoner eller institusjoner fikk du henvendelser?

(Kryss av for det som passer, flere kryss er mulig)

- a) Private bedrifter og finansinstitusjoner
- b) Statlige bedrifter og finansinstitusjoner
- c) Arbeidstaker- og yrkesorganisasjoner
- d) Nærings-, bransje- og arbeidsgiverorganisasjoner
- e) Fylkes- eller kommunepolitikere
- f) Fylkesadministrasjonen i ett eller flere fylker
- g) Kommunaladministrasjonen i en eller flere kommuner
- h) Frivillige eller ideelle organisasjoner
- i) Universiteter, høyskoler og forskningsinstitutter
- j) Kirken
- k) Organisasjoner eller institusjoner innenfor kultursektoren
- l) Politi- og justisvesen
- m) Forsvaret
- n) Media

38) I hvilken form var kontakten med disse organisasjonene eller institusjonene?

(Kryss av for det som passer, flere kryss er mulig)

- a) Over telefon
- b) Brev
- c) Møte i departementet
- d) Møte med organisasjoner utenfor departementet.

39) Benyttet noen av disse organisasjonene eller institusjonene profesjonelle lobbyister for å fremme sine synspunkter i saken overfor deg?

(Profesjonelle lobbyister er der hvor en tredjeperson, mot betaling, søker å påvirke en sak i betalers ønskede retning. Tredjeperson står ikke i noe fast og varig arbeidsforhold til betaler.)

(Kun ett kryss mulig)

- 1. Ja
- 2. Nei

40) Hvor stor innflytelse synes du hver enkelt av de følgende aktører eller instanser hadde i utfallet av saken?

Hadde de meget stor innflytelse, nokså stor innflytelse, liten innflytelse eller ingen innflytelse i det hele tatt?

(Ett kryss pr. linje.)

1.	2.	3.	4.
Stor	nokså stor	liten	ingen

- a) Politisk ledelse i ditt eget departement
- b) Administrativ ledelse i ditt eget departement
- c) Politisk ledelse i andre departement
- d) Embetsverket i andre departementer
- e) Underliggende etater og institusjoner
- f) Fagkomiteen i Stortinget
- g) Private bedrifter og finansinstitusjoner
- h) Arbeidstaker- og yrkesorganisasjoner
- i) Nærings-, bransje- og arbeidsgiverorganisasjoner
- j) Profesjonelle lobbyister
- k) Kommunale eller fylkeskommunale instanser
- l) Frivillige eller ideelle organisasjoner
- m) Andre land, EU, Internasjonale organisasjoner

41) Er du blitt forsøkt påvirket via profesjonelle lobbyister i andre saker?

(Kun ett kryss mulig)

- 1. Ja
- 2. Nei

42) Hva er din holdning til følgende påstander om profesjonelle lobbyister?

(Profesjonelle lobbyister er der hvor en tredjeperson, mot betaling, søker å påvirke en sak i betalers ønskede retning. Tredjepersonen står ikke i noe fast og varig arbeidsforhold til betaler.)

Er du helt enig, delvis enig, delvis uenig eller helt uenig i at... 1. 2. 3. 4.

(Ett kryss pr. linje)

Helt Delvis Delvis Helt  
enig enig uenig uenig

- a) Profesjonelle lobbyister fører til at viktige saker blir grundigere belyst
- b) Det er ønskelig at profesjonell lobbyisme synliggjøres, slik at myndigheter og allmennhet får vite hvem som kjøper slike tjenester for hvilke beløp i ulike saker?
- c) Det er betenkelig om virksomheter som fullfinansieres over offentlige budsjetter kjøper tjenester fra profesjonelle lobbyister?

43) Vi er også opptatt av mer generelle kontaktmønstre, og spør derfor om hvor ofte du, gjennom din stilling, i løpet av 2003 eller inneværende år, har hatt kontakt med disse gruppene.

Har du hatt kontakt ukentlig eller oftere, månedlig, sjeldnere eller aldri med...

1. 2. 3. 4.

(Ett kryss pr linje)

Ukentlig Månedlig Sjeldnere Aldri  
eller  
oftere

- b) politisk ledelse i andre departement?
- c) administrativ ledelse i andre departement?
- d) representant for politiske partier?
- e) representant fra fagkomiteen på Stortinget?
- f) ledere i underliggende direktorater, tilsyn og andre offentlige forvaltningsorganer?
- g) representanter i private bedrifter og finansinstitusjoner?
- h) representanter i offentlige bedrifter og finansinstitusjoner?
- i) representanter for arbeidstaker- og yrkesorganisasjoner?
- j) representanter for nærings-, bransje- og arbeidsgiverorganisasjoner?
- k) Representanter for frivillige eller ideelle organisasjoner?

44) Hva er din mening om de påstander framsatt nedenunder?

Er du helt enig, delvis enig, delvis uenig eller helt uenig i at...

	1.	2.	3.	4.
(Ett kryss pr. linje)	Helt Enig	Delvis enig	Delvis uenig	Helt uenig
a) norsk bistandspolitikk styres utelukkende fra politisk hold.				
b) bistandspolitikk styres fra politisk hold, men forvaltningen spiller også en rolle i dens presise utforming.				
c) de generelle rammer for norsk bistandspolitikk avgjøres på politisk nivå, mens forvaltningen utformer det presise innholdet.				
d)forvaltningen er den sentrale aktør i utformingen av norsk bistandspolitikk.				

45) Som oppfølging til denne undersøkelsen kan det bli aktuelt for meg å gjennomføre intervju med noen av respondentene,

Jeg ber deg krysse av i rubrikken nedenunder hvis du samtykker til at du kan bli kontaktet for et slikt intervju.

Jeg samtykker

TAKK FOR AT DU TOK DEG TID TIL Å BESVARE SPØRRESKJEMAET

## Appendix B: Interview guide

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### Bakgrunn:

- Din utdanning og ditt syn på avdelingssammensetning i forhold til utdanning.
- Din tidligere stillinger/yrkeserfaring (spesifiser)

### Identitet:

- tilhørighet til/ lojalitet overfor arbeidsplassen, andre ansatte i avdelingen/ innen det samme politiske området, del av en større enhet, en kollektiv størrelse?
- Hvordan har den nylig gjennomførte reformen påvirket dette?
- Hvordan oppfatter du forholdet mellom administrasjonen og den politisk ledelse i departementet i forhold til dette, oppfattes politisk ledelse som del av UD, eller som noe distinkt (oss/dem)?

### Arbeidsoppgaver:

- du oppgir i ditt svar på spørreskjemaet [sak oppgitt] om å være den viktigste sak du arbeidet med i forrige år, vil du fortelle litt om hvordan arbeidet med denne saken artet seg.
  - Hvordan ble retningslinjene lagt fra politisk hold?
  - Hvem holdt initiativet?
  - Vil du si arbeidet var preget av tett samarbeid?
  - Vil du si resultatet slik det framstår i dag er et produkt av politiske prioriteringer eller administrasjonens prioriteringer?
  - I arbeidet med en sak (for eksempel ovennevnte) oppfatter du deg selv som uavhengig fagperson, eller som bundet av din rolle som del av administrasjonen. Føler du en motsetning mellom disse to elementer?

### Politisk kontroll:

- I arbeidet med [omtalt sak] sier du at du hadde/hadde ikke særlig intensiv kontakt politisk ledelse. I prosjekt av denne art skulle man anta at politisk ledelse var særlig/ikke særlig involvert, var de/var de ikke det? Har du normalt hyppig kontakt med politisk ledelse?
- Du indikerer også i spørreskjemaet at du oppfatter forholdet mellom administrasjon og politisk ledelse [karakterisering hentet fra spørreskjema]. Vil du utdype dine meninger omkring denne betraktning?
- Hvorledes opplever du Riksrevisjonens tilstedeværelse i ditt daglige arbeid?
- Hvordan opplever du debatten på området slik den generelt utspiller seg i Stortinget?

## Appendix C: Project approval from NSD

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Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS  
NORWEGIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA SERVICES



Hans Holmboes gate 22  
N-5007 Bergen  
Norway  
Tel: +47/ 55 58 21 17  
Fax: +47/ 55 58 96 50  
nsd@nsd.uib.no  
www.nsd.uib.no  
Org.nr. 985 321 884

Geir Teigland  
Stormsgate 2  
5006 BERGEN

Vår dato: 04.06.2004

Vår ref: 200400647 SM /RH

Deres dato:

Deres ref:

### KVITTERING FRA PERSONVERNOMBUDET

Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 01.06.2004. Meldingen gjelder prosjektet:

11117 *The bureaucratic role in the making of development policy*

Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS er utpekt som personvernombud av Universitetet i Bergen, jf. personopplysningsforskriften § 7-12. Ordningen innebærer at meldeplikten til Datatilsynet er erstattet av meldeplikt til personvernombudet.

#### Personvernombudets vurdering

Etter gjennomgang av meldeskjema og dokumentasjon finner personvernombudet at behandlingen av personopplysningene vil være regulert av § 7-27 i personopplysningsforskriften. Dette betyr at behandlingen av personopplysningene vil være unntatt fra konsesjonsplikt etter personopplysningsloven § 33 første ledd, men underlagt meldeplikt etter personopplysningsloven § 31 første ledd, jf. personopplysningsforskriften § 7-20.

Unntak fra konsesjonsplikten etter § 7-27 gjelder bare dersom vilkårene i punktene a) – c) alle er oppfylt:

- a) førstegangskontakt opprettes på grunnlag av offentlig tilgjengelige registre eller gjennom en faglig ansvarlig person ved virksomheten der respondenten er registrert,
- b) respondenten, eller dennes verge dersom vedkommende er umyndig, har samtykket i alle deler av undersøkelsen,
- c) prosjektet skal avsluttes på et tidspunkt som er fastsatt før prosjektet settes i gang,
- d) det innsamlede materialet anonymiseres eller slettes ved prosjektavslutning,
- e) prosjektet ikke gjør bruk av elektronisk sammenstilling av personregistre.

Personvernombudets vurdering forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres slik det er beskrevet i vedlegget.

Behandlingen av personopplysninger kan settes i gang.

*Avdelingskontorer / District Offices:*

OSLO: NSD, Universitetet i Oslo, Postboks 1055 Blindern, 0316 Oslo. Tel: +47/ 22 85 52 11. nsd@uio.no  
TRONDHEIM: NSD, Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, 7491 Trondheim. Tel: +47/ 73 59 19 07. kyre.svarvg@svt.ntnu.no  
TROMSØ: NSD, SVF, Universitetet i Tromsø, 9037 Tromsø. Tel: +47/ 77 64 43 36. nsd@uaa@svt.uib.no

# Prosjektbeskrivelse

**Behandlingsansvarlig:**

Michael Alvarez

Institutt for sammenliknende politikk  
Universitetet i Bergen

Christiesgt.15

5007 BERGEN

**Daglig ansvar/prosjektleder:**

Geir Teigland

Institutt for sammenliknende politikk  
Universitetet i Bergen

Christiesgt.15

5007 BERGEN

11117 The bureaucratic role in the making of development policy

**FORMÅL**

Formålet med prosjektet er å belyse byråkratiets rolle i utformingen av norsk bistandspolitikk.

**UTVALG-TREKKING-FØRSTEGANGSKONTAKT**

Utvalget består av ansatte i Norad og Utenriksdepartementet som arbeider med utviklingspolitiske spørsmål. Førstegangskontakt opprettes av administrasjonen i henholdsvis Norad og Utenriksdepartementet som videreformidler informasjonsskriv og spørreskjema til aktuelle ansatte på vegne av prosjektleder (jf. pkt. a).

**INFORMASJON OG SAMTYKKE**

Det gis skriftlig informasjon. Retur av spørreskjema anses som samtykke. Det innhentes skriftlig samtykke til deltakelse i evt. oppfølgingsintervju gjennom avkrysning i spørreskjema (jf. pkt. b). Personvernombudet for forskning finner skrevet tilfredsstillende.

**DATAINNSAMLING**

Opplysninger samles inn gjennom spørreskjema per e-post, evt. med oppfølgingsintervju.

Det innhentes opplysninger om fødselsdato, utdanning, yrkestittel, arbeid, oppfatninger og holdninger til samfunnsproblemer, politisk preferanse, relasjon mellom byråkrati og politiske institusjoner. Opplysningene vil indirekte kunne identifisere enkeltpersoner.

Det kan bli aktuelt med oppfølgingsintervju for å utdype allerede nevnte tema. Dersom intervju skal omfatte nye tema, ber Personvernombudet prosjektleder ettersende intervjuguide som avtalt på telefon 03.06.2004.

Det samles inn og registreres sensitive personopplysninger, jf. personopplysningsloven § 2 8 a).

**REGISTRERING OG OPPBEVARING**

Opplysninger registreres på isolert pc. Evt. intervju tas opp på lydbånd og transkriberes til isolert pc. Direkte personidentifiserende opplysninger erstattes med et referansenummer som viser til en navneliste. Listen oppbevares atskilt fra det øvrige materialet.

Datamaterialet anonymiseres ved prosjektslutt ved at verken direkte eller indirekte personopplysninger fremgår. Prosjektslutt er satt til 31.12.2004 (jf. pkt c og d).

Det gjøres ikke bruk av elektronisk sammenstilling av personregistre (jf. pkt e).

### **Ny melding**

Det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de punktene som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering.

Selv om det ikke skjer endringer i behandlingsopplegget, skal det gis ny melding tre år etter at forrige melding ble gitt dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår.

Ny melding skal skje skriftlig til personvernombudet.

### **Offentlig register**


Personvernombudet har lagt ut meldingen i et offentlig register, [www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/register/](http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/register/)

### **Ny kontakt**

Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 31.12.2004, rette en henvendelse angående arkivering av data benyttet i prosjektet.

Vennlig hilsen

  
Vigdis Kvalheim

  
Siv Midthassel

Kontaktperson: Siv Midthassel tlf: 55588334

Vedlegg: Personvernombudets vurdering

Kopi: Behandlingsansvarlig Michael Alvarez



## Appendix D: Survey approval

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DET KGL. UTENRIKSDEPARTEMENT, OSLO

Prioritet: Dato: 15.07.2004

Ref. Off. loven:

Deres ref.: Vår ref.:

Saksbehandler: Hammelbo/Bjelke

Ansvarlig enhet: Administrativ avdeling

Departementet har behandlet Deres forespørsel om distribusjon av spørreskjema.

Prosjektet vurderes som seriøst og av potensiell interesse for departementet. Det forutsettes at deltakelse i undersøkelsen ikke krever mye tid av den enkelte. Undersøkelsen er meldt til Personalvernombudet for forskning ved Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste (NSD) og gjennomføres under påsyn av denne instans og i henhold til norsk lov.

Departementet forutsetter at det får tilgang til resultatene av undersøkelsen. Resultatene av undersøkelsen bes oversendt de avdelinger som inngår i spørreundersøkelsen, samt en kopi til UD's administrative avdeling.

På bagrunn av ovennevnte gis student Geir Teigland tillatelse til distribusjon av spørreskjemaet forutsatt at avdelingsledere i berørte avdelinger (Utviklingspolitisk avdeling, Regionalavdelingen og NORAD) gir sitt samtykke.

Departementet ønsker deg lykke til med hovedfagsprosjektet.

Mvh

Andreas Gaarder  
Avdelingsdirektør

CC:

Direktør Tove Strand, NORAD

Ekspedisjonssjef Vegard Ellefsen, UD - Regionalavdelingen

Ekspedisjonssjef Nils Haugstvedt, UD - Utviklingspolitisk avdeling

## Appendix E: Interview approval

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DET KGL. UTENRIKSDEPARTEMENT, OSLO

Prioritet: Dato: 11.11.2004

Ref. Off. loven:

Deres ref.: Vår ref.:

Saksbehandler: Bjelke Gunnar Marius

Ansvarlig enhet: Personalseksjonen

Departementet viser til forespørsel om dybdeintervju i e-post av 9 nov.

Departementet takker for orientering knyttet til gjennomført spørreundersøkelse og gir med bakgrunn i forespørsel student Geir Teigland tillatelse til å foreta dybdeintervjuer med utvalgte tjenestemenn, slik beskrevet i e-post fra Teigland av 9. november. Tillatelsen for å gjennomføre slike intervjuer forutsetter at avdelingsledere i berørte avdelinger (Utviklingspolitisk avdeling, Regionalavdeling og NORAD) gir sitt samtykke.

Med vennlig hilsen,

Petter Ølberg  
Avdelingsdirektør

CC:

Direktør Tove Strand, NORAD

Ekspedisjonssjef Vegard Ellefsen, UD - Regionalavdelingen

Ekspedisjonssjef Nils Haugstvedt, UD - Utviklingspolitisk avdeling

## Appendix F: Initial letter to the ministry

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Geir Teigland  
Daniel Hansensgt. 3  
5008 Bergen  
geir.teigland@student.uib.no.

Bergen 01.06.2004

Utenriksdepartementet  
Postboks 8114 Dep  
0032 Oslo

### Forespørsel om distribusjon av spørreskjema

I tilknytning til mitt hovedfagsprosjekt ved Institutt for Sammenliknende politikk, Universitetet i Bergen, ønsker jeg tillatelse til å distribuere et spørreskjema til ansatte i UD som til daglig arbeider med utviklingspolitiske spørsmål (altså i et utvalg av UD's avdelinger). Hovedfagsprosjektet mitt omhandler forvaltningens rolle i norsk utviklingspolitikk, utvalgte avdelinger i UD og NORAD utgjør sammen mitt valgte case (jf. Vedlegg 1).

Spørreskjemaet som jeg ønsker å distribuere består av et utvalg spørsmål hentet fra lederskapsundersøkelsen 2000, en undersøkelse gjennomført bl.a. i sentraladministrasjonen i tilknytning til Makt- og demokratiutredningen 1998-2003. Forespørselen gjelder distribusjon pr. mail, hvor skjemaet vedlegges som et Microsoft-Excel regneark. Spørreskjemaet besvares elektronisk i Excel og returneres avsender pr. mail. Estimert tid for besvarelsen er 5-10 min (jf. Vedlegg 2).

For å være i stand til å foreta analysen i oppgaven slik jeg ønsker er tilgang til de data denne undersøkelsen vil generere vital, jeg håper således på en positiv respons.

Vennlig hilsen

Geir Teigland

Vedlegg 1: Oppgavebeskrivelse  
Vedlegg 2: Spørreskjema i tekstformat

CC: 1. amanuensis Michael Alvarez, UiB - Institutt for Sammenliknende Politikk

## Appendix G: Letter for approval of the follow-up interviews

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Geir Teigland  
Stormsgt. 2,  
5006 Bergen.  
geir.teigland@student.uib.no.

Avdelingsdirektør Andreas Gaarder, UD - Administrasjonsavdelingen

I henhold til tidligere godkjenning fra dere (se nedenunder) har jeg i løpet av de foregående månedene gjennomført en spørreundersøkelse i utvalgte avdelinger av UD's organisasjon; denne undersøkelsen er nå gjennomført og avsluttet.

Som nevnt i tidligere korrespondanse med UD, kunne det bli aktuelt å følge opp spørreundersøkelsen med noen mer dyptgående intervjuer med utvalgte respondenter. Gjennom spørreundersøkelsen har en del av respondentene samtykket til å bli kontaktet for slike intervju, intervju jeg ønsker å gjennomføre i løpet av november. Den direkte kontakten allerede etablert mellom respondenten og meg gir at intervjuene ikke vil påføre UD noen form for administrasjon, da jeg selv har mulighet for å kontakte de aktuelle intervjuobjektene med forespørsel.

Jeg forestiller meg at intervjuene vil ha en varighet av ca. 20-25 min. Jeg er innforstått med at dette gir seg utslag i tapt arbeidstid og ønsker derfor å innhente samtykke fra administrasjonen før jeg går til det skritt å kontakte de aktuelle intervjuobjektene.

Med vennlig hilsen

Geir Teigland  
Stud. Polit.  
Institutt for Sammenliknende politikk  
Universitetet i Bergen

CC: 1. Amanuensis Michael Alvarez, UiB - Institutt for Sammenliknende politikk

## Appendix H: Contact letter for the survey distribution

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Geir Teigland  
Stormsgt. 2,  
5006 Bergen.  
geir.teigland@student.uib.no.

Til mottaker av denne e-post melding

I mitt hovedfagsprosjekt ved Institutt for Sammenliknende politikk (ISP), Universitetet i Bergen (UiB), har jeg satt fokus på byråkratiets rolle i utformingen av norsk bistandspolitikk, i den sammenheng kontakter jeg deg med et ønske om at du svarer på det vedlagte spørreskjemaet. Undersøkelsen baserer seg på frivillighet og du kan således avstå fra å besvare undersøkelsen uten videre følger. Allikevel håper jeg at du tar deg tid til å svare på spørreskjemaet (ca. 10 min) da en god svarprosent vil være altavgjørende for kvaliteten av datamaterialet og således for gjennomførbarheten av min hovedfagsoppgave.

Spørreskjemaet omhandler i stor utstrekning politisk kontroll, men også spørsmål om holdninger og ulike bakgrunnsspørsmål er inkludert i skjemaet. Alle data som samles inn vil bli behandlet konfidensielt og publisert i anonymisert form. Prosjektet er meldt til Personverneombudet for forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS (NSD), og gjennomføres i tråd med gjeldende regelverk for personvern i forskning. Ved prosjektslutt vil data bli utlevert til NSD i anonymisert form.

Ansvarlig for prosjektet er Geir Teigland i påsyn av veileder Michael Alvarez (ISP). Eventuelle spørsmål angående prosjektet bes rettet til Geir Teigland.

På forhånd takk!

Vennlig hilsen

Geir Teigland  
Stud. Polit.  
Institutt for Sammenliknende politikk  
Universitetet i Bergen

CC: 1. amanuensis Michael Alvarez, UiB - Institutt for Sammenliknende Politikk

## Appendix I: First reminder of the survey

---

Geir Teigland  
Stormsgt. 2,  
5006 Bergen.  
geir.teigland@student.uib.no.

Til mottaker av denne e-post melding

For vel en uke siden ble du forespurt om å delta som respondent på en undersøkelse som omhandler byråkratiets rolle i utformingen av norsk bistandspolitikk, undersøkelsen inngår som ledd i mitt hovedfagsprosjekt ved Institutt for Sammenliknende politikk (ISP), Universitetet i Bergen (UiB). Jeg kontakter deg nå med en ny forespørsel om å delta i samme undersøkelse (hvis du allerede har svart på undersøkelsen ber jeg deg se bort fra denne forespørsel).

Undersøkelsen baserer seg på frivillighet og du kan således avstå fra å besvare undersøkelsen uten videre følger. Allikevel håper jeg at du tar deg tid til å svare på spørreskjemaet (ca. 10 min) da du som respondent ikke kan erstattes i utvalget og da en god svarprosent vil være avgjørende for gjennomførbarheten av min hovedfagsoppgave.

Alle data som samles inn vil bli behandlet konfidensielt og publisert i anonymisert form. Prosjektet er meldt til Personverneombudet for forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS (NSD), og gjennomføres i tråd med gjeldende regelverk for personvern i forskning. Ved prosjektslutt vil data overleveres NSD i anonymisert form.

Ansvarlig for prosjektet er Geir Teigland i påsyn av veileder Michael Alvarez (ISP). Eventuelle spørsmål angående prosjektet bes rettet til Geir Teigland.

På forhånd takk!

Vennlig hilsen

Geir Teigland  
Stud. Polit.  
Institutt for Sammenliknende politikk  
Universitetet i Bergen

## Appendix J: Second reminder of the survey

---

Geir Teigland  
Stormsgt. 2,  
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Til mottaker av denne e-post melding

For vel tre uker siden ble du forespurt om å delta som respondent på en undersøkelse som omhandler byråkratiets rolle i utformingen av norsk bistandspolitikk, undersøkelsen inngår som ledd i mitt hovedfagsprosjekt ved Institutt for Sammenliknende politikk (ISP), Universitetet i Bergen (UiB). Jeg har en gang tidligere sendt rundt en påminnelse og ønsker med denne e-post å gi de av dere som enda ikke har svart en siste sjanse til å svare (hvis du allerede har svart på undersøkelsen ber jeg deg se bort fra denne forespørsel).

Jeg har fra ulikt hold mottatt tilbakemelding på at spørreskjemaet er for nærgående og at det ikke i tilstrekkelig grad ivaretar respondentens personvern. Skjemaet vil bli anonymisert ved undersøkelses slutt, jeg er allikevel enig i at noen av spørsmålene har vist seg å være unødvendig detaljert og jeg har derfor valgt å justere noen av spørsmålene noe i den versjonen av spørreskjemaet som her er vedlagt.<sup>101</sup> Videre har jeg også fått respons på at e-post ikke oppfattes som beste kommunikasjonsmidlet mellom dere og meg, jeg har derfor fått aksept for at dere kan oversende en papirversjon av skjemaet direkte til meg via post hvis det er ønskelig (jf. adresse over).

Undersøkelsen baserer seg på frivillighet og du kan således avstå fra å besvare undersøkelsen uten videre følger. Allikevel håper jeg at du tar deg tid til å svare på spørreskjemaet (ca. 10 min) da du som respondent ikke kan erstattes i utvalget og siden en god svarprosent vil være altavgjørende for gjennomførbarheten av min hovedfagsoppgave.

Alle data som samles inn vil bli behandlet konfidensielt og publisert i anonymisert form. Prosjektet er meldt til Personverneombudet for forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS (NSD), og gjennomføres i tråd med gjeldende regelverk for personvern i forskning. Ved prosjektslutt vil data overleveres NSD i anonymisert form.

Ansvarlig for prosjektet er Geir Teigland i påsyn av veileder Michael Alvarez (ISP). Eventuelle spørsmål angående prosjektet bes rettet til Geir Teigland.

På forhånd takk!

Vennlig hilsen

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<sup>101</sup> Denne form for koding var planlagt gjort i etterkant av undersøkelsen. Alle svar på skjemaet som er gitt før disse forandringene vil naturligvis også bli omkodet etter samme mønster.

## Appendix K: Contact letter for the follow-up interviews

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### Oppfølgingsintervju

For en tid tilbake deltok du i en spørreundersøkelse som inngår som del av mitt hovedfagsprosjekt ved Institutt for Sammenliknende politikk, Universitetet i Bergen. I spørreskjemaet for denne undersøkelsen svarte du bekreftende på at du var åpen for å bli kontaktet for et eventuelt oppfølgingsintervju, det er i denne anledning jeg nå kontakter deg direkte.

Forespørselen gjelder et intervju av en varighet på ca 20 minutter, hvor temaet vil være ulike sider ved ditt arbeid og ditt inntrykk av den politiske kontrollen over administrasjonens arbeid. Som tilfellet var for spørreundersøkelsen vil også dette intervjuet være anonymt.

Som tilreisende til Oslo er det er poeng for meg at intervjuobjektene har mulighet for å stille til intervju i løpet av samme uke. Intervjuet er tenkt gjennomført i uke 48, 22/11 til 26/11. Jeg vil kontakte hver og en nærmere for å avtale nøyaktig tidspunkt når jeg har mottatt tilbakemelding fra de aktuelle. Jeg ønsker at du gir meg en tilbakemelding på om du har mulighet for å stille til intervju, og at du indikerer hvilken dag som kan passe for deg.

På forhånd takk!

Med vennlig hilsen

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