

**Legacy and survival:  
Civil society under dictatorship and the survival of post-  
authoritarian democracies**



UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN  
*Faculty of Social Sciences*

Håkon Jørgen Tranvåg

---

Master thesis  
Department of Comparative Politics

Spring 2016

## **Abstract**

Why do some democracies fail while others survive? Much research has shown that a vibrant and strong civil society is important for democratic performance and survival. At the same time, the legacy of certain traits and features of the past authoritarian regime can exert a significant effect on the survival of the emerging democracy. Yet, little or no literature has sought to combine the aspects of legacy and civil society in the way it is done here. Rather than focusing on its manifestation in democracies, I investigate how *previous* activation of civil society – defined as key forms of collective action such as protests, strikes, and riots – under authoritarian rule affects the survival of a subsequent democratic regime. This is done by performing an event history analysis of all post-authoritarian democracies between 1946 and 2008.

The most significant finding is that of protest behaviour, where results indicate that this form of peaceful civil society activation under dictatorship increases the survival of the post-transitional democracy. This is in line with previous research both on the role of protests as a factor of democratisation of autocracies, and as an essential feature of well-functioning democracies. Results regarding other forms of activation are mixed and less conclusive.

Combined with our knowledge of institutional and economic factors that are pre-requisites for stable democracy, this expanded understanding of the non-contemporaneous relationship between civil society activation and democratic stability can render us capable of predicting successful democracies rather than merely explaining them. If the scientific standard is indeed the ideal, this should undoubtedly be of ultimately interest.

## **Acknowledgements**

First of all, I am indebted to my supervisor Michael Alvarez, whose encouragement from day one has been a source of inspiration. His guidance, patience, and availability, for which I am extremely grateful, has been indispensable to this project.

I am much obliged to Andrea Castagnola for all her help and advice in developing the methods for the thesis. I would also like to thank the *Challenges and Transformations in Advanced Democracies* and the *Democracy and Development* research groups at the Department of Comparative Politics for allowing me to present early versions of the thesis, and giving me insightful feedback and criticism. For his comments and technical assistance throughout the process, I am grateful to Troy Saghaug Broderstad. I thank Ingri Løkholm Ramberg for her careful and thorough corrections to the final draft.

Lastly, thank you Selma, for your support, encouragement, comments and corrections, and for reminding me when needed that there is a world outside Stata as well.

Remaining errors are my responsibility alone.

Bergen, May 2016

Håkon Jørgen Tranvåg

## Table of contents

ABSTRACT	I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	II
TABLE OF CONTENTS	III
LIST OF FIGURES	V
LIST OF TABLES	V
<b>1 INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<hr/>	
1.1 CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS	3
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS	5
<b>2 THEORETICAL REVIEW</b>	<b>7</b>
<hr/>	
2.1 EXPANDED TIME HORIZON – EXPANDED PERSPECTIVES	7
2.2 A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE	11
2.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL	14
2.4 CIVIL SOCIETY	16
2.4.1 A NOTE ON SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY – OVERLAPS AND DIFFERENCES	18
2.5 CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY	20
2.5.1 WHY CIVIL SOCIETY IS GOOD FOR DEMOCRACY	20
2.5.2 “SINGING MUSSOLINI’S TUNES” – WHY CIVIL SOCIETY IS BAD FOR DEMOCRACY	22
2.6 CAN CIVIL SOCIETY EXIST IN NON-DEMOCRATIC STATES?	27
2.7 CONCEPTUALISING CIVIL SOCIETY AND POSING HYPOTHESES	30
2.8 SUMMARY	36
<b>3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH: WHAT MAKES DEMOCRACIES SURVIVE?</b>	<b>37</b>
<hr/>	
3.1 THE LEGACY: FEATURES OF THE PAST AUTHORITARIAN REGIME	37
3.2 THE PRESENT: FEATURES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REGIME	41
3.3 SUMMARY	47
<b>4 METHODOLOGY</b>	<b>48</b>
<hr/>	
4.1 THE QUANTITATIVE METHOD	48
4.2 EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS	50
4.2.1 KEY FEATURES OF EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS	50
4.2.2 THE MATHEMATICS OF EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS	53
4.3 DEFENDING THE USE OF EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS	55
4.3.1 ADDING TIME TO THE EQUATION	55
4.3.2 CENSORING	56
4.4 CONTINUOUS AND DISCRETE TIME MODELS	58
4.5 SPECIFYING A MODEL	59
4.5.1 THE COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL	59
4.5.2 THE ARGUMENTS FOR CHOOSING A COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL	61
4.5.3 INTERPRETATION OF COX REGRESSIONS	61
4.5.4 OTHER POSSIBLE CHOICES OF MODELS	62
4.6 SUMMARY	63

<b>5 THE DATA AND THE VARIABLES</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>5.1 THE DATA SET: WHO'S IN AND WHO'S OUT</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>5.2 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>5.2.1 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF DEMOCRACY</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>5.3 THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>5.3.1 CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVATION</b>	<b>67</b>
5.3.1.1 The problem of legacy	68
5.3.1.2 Capturing the legacy of civil society	69
<b>5.3.2 THE PAST AUTHORITARIAN REGIME CONTROLS</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>5.3.3 THE PRESENT DEMOCRATIC REGIME CONTROLS</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>5.4 SUMMARY</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>6.1 THE RESULTS</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>6.2 MODEL ROBUSTNESS AND DIAGNOSTICS</b>	<b>82</b>
<b>6.3 COMPARISONS</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>6.4 DISCUSSION</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>6.5 SUMMARY</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>7 CONCLUSION</b>	<b>97</b>
<b>7.1 ENDOGENEITY</b>	<b>98</b>
<b>7.2 VALIDITY</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>7.3 FINAL REMARKS</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>8 LITERATURE</b>	<b>101</b>
<b>9 APPENDIX</b>	<b>A</b>

## List of figures

Figure 4.1 Right censored observations .....	57
Figure 9.1 Baseline hazard .....	A
Figure 9.2 Goodness of fit .....	A
Figure 9.3 Schoenfeld residuals test, <i>Strikes</i> .....	B
Figure 9.4 Schoenfeld residuals test, <i>Elections</i> .....	B
Figure 9.5 Test for proportional hazards assumption, <i>GDP Growth</i> .....	C
Figure 9.6 Test for proportional hazards assumption, <i>Presidential-Mixed</i> .....	C
Figure 9.7 Comparison of Kaplan-Meier and Cox survivor function, <i>GDP Growth</i> .....	D
Figure 9.8 Comparison of Kaplan-Meier and Cox survivor function, <i>Presidential-Mixed</i> .....	D

## List of tables

Table 3.1 Summary of hypotheses .....	47
Table 5.1 Overview of the data set .....	65
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics .....	75
Table 6.2 Authoritarian regime controls .....	76
Table 6.3 Civil society activation and democratic regime controls .....	79
Table 6.4 The full models .....	81
Table 6.5 Comparisons across coding .....	85
Table 6.6 Summary of hypotheses and findings .....	96

## 1 Introduction

In 1948, Costa Rican president Rafael Ángel Calderón refused to resign in face of electoral defeat. The result was a brief civil war, where the opposition, led by social democrat José Figueres, subsequently ousted the president. Having deposed Calderón, Figueres then handed power over to the actual winner of the 1948 election, the conservative Otilio Ulate Blanco. His government accepted and implemented a new constitution, extended democratic rights, and dissolved the army (Fukuyama 2014, Valenzuela 1992). Since the dramatic year of 1948, Costa Rica has been an exceptionally successful democracy: given its location in notoriously unstable Latin America (Fukuyama calls Costa Rica “[a] good example of a country escaping the Latin American *birth defect*” (2014, 270, italics mine)), its low level of economic development before democratisation, and its tumultuous history of both democracy and dictatorship, the country has overcome worse odds than most. Today, it is prosperous, egalitarian, and the region’s longest living democracy (Fukuyama 2014).

Further south in the hemisphere, in Brazil, democracy was also established in the late 1940s. The democratisation of Costa Rica and Brazil were both part of the larger picture that Samuel Huntington (1991) would later label the Second wave of democratisation. But unlike Costa Rica, democracy in Brazil was short-lived: not two decades later, in 1964, the military overthrew the government in a coup (Huntington 1991). It would be another two decades before a civilian government would again rule the country (Agüero 1992).

Why *do* some democracies survive while others do not? The question is in no way new: since the time of Aristotle, the topic of political regime survival has been one of the most fundamental in social and political science. In modern times, the research has focused mostly on structural or elite-actor perspectives. In particular, economic explanations have received the larger part of the attention (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000, Boix and Stokes 2003, Lipset 1959). The less structuralist and more agent-driven explanations have in turn tended to focus on elites (O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013, Fukuyama 2014, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a).<sup>1</sup>

Though these perspectives have proven to be important, the literature risks suffering from a “proelite bias” (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 547). A complete explanation of the survival of democracy necessitates a consideration of the mobilisation “from below,” and the role of ordinary citizens.

---

<sup>1</sup> Fukuyama, for example, credits much of Costa Rica’s success to the fact that “the Costa Rican elite made good political choices in 1948,” while in infamously unstable Argentina, the “elite made some very bad [choices]” (2014, 280).

Active and participatory citizens are central to the life of any well-functioning democracy. From constituting a part of a democratic culture (Almond and Verba 1965), to increasing trust among citizens (Putnam 1994), a substantive amount of literature deems the activation of citizens through civil society as essential for the survival of democracy (Diamond 1999, Edwards 2004, Kaviraj 2001). Popular mobilisation from below can also be important for democratisation in the first place (Wood 2000).

Yet, the role of ordinary citizens and popular mobilisation in democracies is not always assessed for the better. Some see an active civil society as a threat against democratic survival (Berman 1997b). If the activation of the people out-paces the institutional capabilities of a given democracy, democracy may very well collapse (Berman 1997a, Huntington 1968). Civil society is not *in itself* good for democracy – what matters is its political and moral content (Chambers and Kopstein 2001).

My approach to the question is not one of civil society under *democracy*: rather, I look at countries that have made a transition from dictatorship to democracy, and focus on the *legacy* of civil society activation under the previous dictatorship. As will be discussed later, I define civil society as *key forms of collective action such as protests, strikes, and riots*. Can the legacy of such activation under dictatorship have an effect on post-transitional democratic stability? Hence, in this thesis – paraphrasing Putnam (1994, 185) – I therefore ask:

*Is the legacy of civil society activation under dictatorship key for making emergent democracies last?*

To answer this, I apply the statistical method *event history analysis* to all countries that have made a transition from dictatorship to democracy in the period 1946 – 2008. I create several variables designed to capture the “legacy” of civil society under authoritarian rule in order to investigate whether they have an explanatory effect on the survival of the subsequent democracy.

I find that democracies that have a legacy of high levels of protest activity are less likely to experience backsliding to authoritarianism. A legacy of low levels of riots under dictatorships also reduces the likelihood of democratic collapse, while high levels of riots *increase* the likelihood of such collapse. Other factors, such as the legacy of strikes and the broader measure of the participatory environment of civil society organisations are not found to have an effect.

I want to begin by making a few clarifications. For this thesis, I am not concerned with a technical definition of “consolidation.” The conceptual meaning of consolidation is both



foggy and disputed.<sup>2</sup> Instead, I am merely concerned with the year-to-year survival of a democracy. I rely on Przeworski et al., who find no empirical support for the idea that a democracy is ever consolidated, and “so conclude that ‘consolidation’ is an empty term” (1996, 50). Further, the term “stability” will be used interchangeably with “survival” here; stable democracies survive, and those who survive are stable.

I would also like to underline that, as I will repeat throughout the thesis, the topic in question here is *not* democratisation, or what causes authoritarian regimes to collapse. Rustow (1970, 346) is arguably right in stating that “[t]he factors that keep democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence: explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis.” There is nonetheless a close relationship in the literature between these two factors,<sup>3</sup> and much of the literature in this thesis will inevitably touch upon both the matter of democratisation and authoritarian regime survival and failure as well. Still, the dependent variable in question here is democratic survival and democratic survival only.

### **1.1 Contribution of the thesis**

The consequence of authoritarian legacy for new democracies is a topic which has been extensively investigated. Much of this literature, some of which will be discussed further in chapter three, concerns the legacy of various institutional features of dictatorship: regimes that have allowed authoritarian elections become more stable democracies (Miller 2015); the type of authoritarian leadership, be it personalist, party-state, or military, also affect the survival of the future democracy (Geddes 1999, Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014, Svobik 2015). Likewise, the nature of the transition itself to democracy is a form of legacy that can affect democratic survival (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014b, Huntington 1991, Weyland 2012).

Secondly, the importance of a robust civil society for democracy has been widely examined. Civil society is seen to be fundamental for democracy by enhancing its performance (Diamond 1999, Kaviraj 2001, Warren 2011); it is a platform through which citizens can facilitate their participation in politics (Edwards 2004); and it serves to limit the powers of the state (Diamond 1999). It can also be important to push liberalisation of authoritarian regimes to full democratisation, and to consolidate the new democracy (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013, Cohen and Arato 1995).

The correlation between democracy and strong civil societies is remarkable (Warren 2011, Howard 2003), and the relationship between civil society and democracy in post-

---

<sup>2</sup> See Linz and Stepan (1996), Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela (1992), O'Donnell (1996), Schedler (1998).

<sup>3</sup> Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), for example, argue that these processes are more or less the same.

authoritarian states has received considerable attention (Uhlin 2009, Bernhard and Karakoc 2007). Yet these studies, though acknowledging that post-authoritarian democracies have a different civil society activation than well-established democracies, only observe this legacy *indirectly*, by comparing the civil society in democracies with an authoritarian past to those with no such past. Many of them also focus largely on associations and voluntarism.

The two core theoretical elements of this thesis, legacy and civil society, are thus neither original nor new. Yet, to my knowledge, little, if any, research on post-authoritarian democracies have sought to combine these elements in the way it is done here. The underlying logic of this thesis' research question builds on what I argue constitute two solid assumptions derived from the literature on democracy and dictatorship: (I) that features of the preceding dictatorship are known to have a lasting effect – a *legacy* – on the post-transitional democracy; and (II) that a vibrant and robust civil society is necessary (though not sufficient) to sustain democracy. If this indeed is the case, then *dictatorships with high levels of civil society activation are expected to become more robust democracies than those with lower levels of such activation*.

Another reason for taking this approach to civil society and democracy is the reciprocal nature of social capital, as developed by Putnam (1994). Social capital increases when it's used, and therefore, dictatorships in which there are high levels of civil society activation can be expected to become *democracies* with higher levels civil society activation compared to the democracies which succeed dictatorships with little or such activation. In this picture, social capital is almost like an asset that is being invested under dictatorship, only to produce returns later under democracy.<sup>4</sup>

This investigation of the social sphere under dictatorship and its legacy for subsequent democratic stability is important. Along with research on the institutional legacies of the past dictatorship, the democratisation process itself, and the economic and social factors that mark stable democracies, it helps develop a more complete understanding of what produces successful democracies.

I am aware of the methodological ramifications and potential problems of this approach to the question. Legacy, like democracy, is an abstract concept that cannot be observed directly. But for democracy, we can observe whether certain rules, deemed necessary and sufficient, for judging a country as democratic are respected: are there free and fair elections? Do the incumbents leave office, or do they cling on to power, in face of electoral defeat? With legacy,

---

<sup>4</sup> The relationship between social capital and civil society is convoluted, and the concepts are often used interchangeably. This will be discussed later, in chapter two.

however, there are no such rules that to observe. To quantify the legacy of civil society activation is at best tricky. A second problem is precisely that of civil society itself – for, though the literature on the topic is immense, consensus about its actual meaning and how to measure it empirically is scarce.

A related problem, perhaps more dire here, is that civil society will necessarily behave differently under dictatorship than under democracy; we cannot expect civil society activation to take the same form under dictatorship as under democracy. This is a result of the very nature of the various political regimes. For these reasons, I will operate with a broad definition of civil society in this thesis, which is more concerned with the collective actions of ordinary citizens independently of the state, than with associations and voluntary membership. All of these issues will be discussed more extensively later in the thesis.

## **1.2 Outline of the thesis**

In chapter two, I present the larger, theoretical framework of the thesis. First, I briefly discuss path dependency. Though I do not argue that the processes under investigation here *are* path dependent, the concept can nonetheless provide a valuable understanding of why legacy is so important for a regime. I then move to develop the theoretical argument of the thesis. The purpose is not to present one or several theories for falsification, but rather to develop an understanding of how and why participation of ordinary citizens is essential for a democracy. I do this by drawing on three well-known theoretical elements: political culture, social capital, and civil society. The chapter then concludes by first conceptualising civil society clearly, before producing the main hypotheses.

Chapter three discusses much of the previous literature and research on the topic of democratic survival. In this chapter, I divide the literature into two categories that are central here: the literature dealing with the legacy of the authoritarian past, and the literature concerned with the present democratic regime. This chapter generates several supporting hypotheses for the control variables that will be included in the analyses.

The fourth chapter deals with the methodology of the thesis. First, I discuss the advantages of a quantitative approach to the research question, before I proceed to explain event history analysis in detail. I also discuss more explicitly the model specifications of the Cox proportional hazards model, which is the type of event history analysis that will be used here. A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this model finalises the chapter.

In chapter five, I present the structure of the data set, and the operationalisation of the dependent and the independent variables. Specifically, the major question is how to best capture

the legacy of civil society activation. I therefore discuss various coding of civil society legacy, which will be classified into three categories, named the Year-based, the Average-based, and the Transition-based variables.<sup>5</sup> I argue that the Year-based coding of the variables has several advantages over the other, making it the more apt choice.

In chapter six, I conduct the event history analysis. I develop a series of models before reaching the final two models, which are then committed to several tests to verify that certain modelling and estimation assumptions hold. After these tests, I compare the final model to models using the other, abovementioned coding of the civil society legacy variables. In the last part of the chapter, I discuss the findings in light of the theoretical framework.

The final chapter, chapter seven, summarises the thesis. The most important findings will be repeated, before I discuss potential problems of endogeneity and internal validity. A final section presenting suggestions for further research on the topic concludes the chapter.

---

<sup>5</sup> The Year-based variables count the number of years in which an event of interest occurred, while the Average-based variables assign an average of the total number of events. The Transition-based variables are identical to the former, but only concerned with the last three years of the authoritarian regime.

## **2 Theoretical review**

In this chapter, I will develop the theoretical framework for the thesis. The purpose is not to present a single theory for falsification. Rather, my objective is to develop the idea of why active, participant citizens are essential for a stable democracy. This theory-building is constructed mainly via three central frameworks: that of a civic – or democratic – political culture, social capital, and civil society. It is this latter component, civil society, which will occupy the better part of the chapter. The idea of a democratic political culture is mainly developed through the work of Almond and Verba (1965), while the part on social capital is presented in the work of Putnam (1994).

A central topic regarding civil society is whether it can exist in a meaningful way under dictatorship. Though civil society is often linked to democracy, I argue that it can, albeit it will necessarily manifest itself in different forms.

Before developing these three central pieces, however, I explain the logic behind *path dependency*. The purpose here is not to argue that the processes investigated in the thesis are path dependent. The idea is rather to build up an argument for why the *legacy* of civil society activation can be important to understand democratic stability and survival, which is the central premise for the thesis.

In the last part of the chapter, I try to conceptualise civil society clearly, in order to produce several hypotheses regarding its effect on democratic survival. A final section summarises the chapter.

### **2.1 Expanded time horizon – expanded perspectives**

Charles Tilly (1995, 365) remarked that much of recent research on democratisation makes the process seem “almost instantaneous.” Similarly, Fukuyama (2011) poses the critique of many general theories of development that they “fail to push the story back far enough historically,” and are instead “seeking to abstract a single causal factor out of a much more complex historical reality” (Fukuyama 2011, 24). This same critique can be applied to much research on democratic stability. The factors that determine a new democracy’s future survival do not all originate from the moments of its conception. What happened in the past authoritarian regime can exert a strong effect on a democracy’s economic performance. Therefore, a new democracy’s level of civil society activation is not spontaneously determined at the moment of transition – it can be the result of a long, continuous development.

The logic of path dependent processes is highly relevant here, because rather than merely investigating the civil society activation of post-authoritarian democracies, the scope of

the thesis is expanded to look at the *legacy* of civil society activation in the past authoritarian regime and its effects on the subsequent democracy. This is *not* to say that the thesis argues that the relationship between civil society and democracy is path dependent.

Path dependency is a process which involves elements of agency and action, but what is central is that “once a path is taken, then it can become ‘locked in,’ as all the relevant actors adjust their strategies to accommodate the prevailing pattern” (Thelen 1999, 385). A decision made at a given point in time will constrain future available options, and as time goes by, it becomes more difficult to reverse course (Hansen 2002, Mahoney 2001, Pierson 2004). However, path dependency is not simply a proposition that “history matters” and that “what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” (Sewell 1996, quoted in Pierson (2004, 20)). At the starting point of the analysis, one must be able to point to several viable options, and the early, contingent events must have been central in establishing the chosen policy. Further, “we must specify the conditions in which we would expect path-dependent systems to reproduce their form and ‘lock-in’ to occur” (Greener 2005, 68).

There is also a socialising effect at play in path dependent processes. Through shared historical experiences and a conscious perception of history, a group of people will come to share a common expectation of the future (David 1994). In this manner, members are socialised into certain patterns and types of behaviour, which may reinforce long-term stability. For institutional or organisational developments that follow path dependent patterns, “social patterns flow into unique historical channels, from which it is more difficult to generalize” (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 226). Pierson (2003, 196) states that

Once established, specific patterns of political mobilization, the institutional ‘rules of the game,’ and even citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world will often generate self-reinforcing dynamics.

In other words, path dependent processes are processes where countries, institutions, actors, or organisations may all fall into patterns of behaviour, either willingly or unwillingly. This will lead them into a trajectory that subsequently “lock in” future choices and behaviours. There is no Sartrean radical freedom where every unit at every point in time can actively choose whichever direction they like. “Once certain choices are made, they constrain future possibilities” – making any range of available alternatives a “function of institutional capabilities that were put in place in at [sic] some earlier period” (Krasner 1988, 67).

Path dependency has historically been associated with the study of economics and technology development, and has gradually been extended to the study of institutions (North

1990, Arthur 1994). Over the last decades, it has gained leverage in the study of historical, political and social phenomena as well (Collier and Collier 2002, Mahoney 2001, Pierson 2004, 2000). Pierson (2004, 40) argues that four central areas of political life make path dependency a useful tool in social research: “collective action, institutional development, the exercise of authority, and social interpretation.” The example of collective action is especially relevant here.<sup>6</sup>

Mobilisation of individuals into groups and organisations is obviously necessary for collective action, which in turn will be central for any major political action. As Olson (1971) demonstrates, any collective action group is likely to suffer from the problem of free-riding. This is because goods stemming from political action will be public goods, and the consumption of public goods are difficult to limit only to those who participated actively (Pierson 2004). But achieving political goals requires collective action, and intra-group coordination is therefore vital. Once individuals have organised into collective action groups, *future* collective action can be facilitated by changing the balance of resources, and creating new expectations among individual members and thus new incentives to participate. Once they have overcome the often high start-up costs, these positive feedback loops can ensure substantial stability over long stretches of time (Pierson 2004).

Robert Dahl (1971) argues in *Polyarchy* that some specific patterns in the longer historical development of political rights are more likely to create stable democracies than others. In his view, increasing political competition between already established actors before expanding inclusiveness (i.e. expanding political rights beyond the elites), will strengthen stability in the subsequent democracy. *Ceteris paribus*, this would be more important than other explanatory variables, and to do it in the reverse order would bring about less stable democracies (Dahl 1971). Similarly, Barrington Moore (1966) claims that the pattern in alliances formed between the crown, the peasantry, and the aristocracy was central to whether democracy would eventually develop or not. Though these are not argued to be path dependent processes, the research takes a longer, historical view of what creates and what maintains stable democracy. To merely look at the lines of development from the point of democratisation and onwards risks losing sight of the fact that important historical developments may precede the event in question.

That certain countries follow certain common historical evolutionary developments may in turn mean that other intervening variables are the actual root of this common development.

---

<sup>6</sup> See Pierson (2004, 34-41) for further discussion.

The historical sequence of development is perhaps “more a facilitating or intervening variable than a primary one” (Dix 1994, 102).<sup>7</sup> This does not mean that history is irrelevant, but rather that it is not deterministic. To study and analyse the historical sequence leading up to the point of democratisation may be a fecund undertaking to enhance our understanding of democratic stability.

In this vein, Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring (2013) argue that path dependency cannot explain the long-term stability of Latin American political regimes. They find that the region’s most democratic countries today have also had the strongest democratic history since the beginning of the twentieth century. However, this cannot be path dependent due to several radical shifts and turns in the countries’ trajectories throughout the century. Path dependency, they argue, is too deterministic and linear in its understanding of history (Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013).

Instead, the authors present the concept “regime legacy” to explain the long-term consistency – with detours and divergences – that have marked Latin American regimes. This concept is “a less-bounded, less-deterministic version of path dependence, with less emphasis on the improbability of profound shifts in path and greater emphasis on the probability of recovering an early democratic trajectory” (Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013, 393).

Though this is no doubt a useful concept, I will argue that their depiction of path dependency over-emphasises and exaggerates its determinism. It is, however, not my purpose to engage in a conceptual debate here. The point of this section is simply to show that in order to understand a phenomenon fully, it is central to examine the long-term causes and effects of actions. This can help shed light on the often slow-moving processes of changing preferences and actions, which in turn can increase our understanding of gradually changing structures or transitions, such as the process of democratisation. Some processes simply take a long time to unfold (Pierson 2004, 2003), and “[h]istory rarely creates situations where the influence of important independent variables can be analysed in anything resembling isolation” (Berman 1998, 395). Democratic survival is not something that begins with democratisation. And the civil society which is so important for a healthy democracy does not arise spontaneously with democratisation; its seeds may have been planted well before its flowering.

Why is this relevant here? As will be seen in section 2.2 concerning Almond and Verba (1965) and their discussion of political cultures, this could potentially mean that a democratic culture, or even just democratic elements within authoritarian countries, can reinforce

---

<sup>7</sup> One is also at risk of embroiling oneself into a “turtles all the way down”-argument when trying to find the “proper” historical starting point for a developmental analysis. See Fukuyama (2011, 22-25).



themselves over time. This makes it relevant to investigate the long-term effects of civil society in a dictatorship for a subsequent democracy. Similarly, as will be seen in the discussion in section 2.3, social capital is important for “a dense civil society” (Fukuyama 2001, 11). Central to the concept of social capital is the idea that the interaction between individuals increases social capital over time – its use creates more of it. This logic of reciprocity has some elements of path dependency in it, which can help explain why groups with high levels of social capital, or countries with active civil societies, can expect more of it in the future. Governments will have a hard time creating social capital (Fukuyama 2001), which is why it necessary to take a wider temporal approach to the question, as the social roots of stable democracy may be traced *antecedent* to democratisation. This is the underlying idea of the larger argument of this thesis.

With this first premise for the thesis in place, i.e. that the processes that effects democratic stability and survival may emerge *before* democratisation itself takes place, I move to the second part of this chapter, namely the much larger theoretical framework of citizen activation through civil society, and why it is important for democracy.

## **2.2 A democratic political culture**

In this section, I explore the idea that certain cultural features among a state’s citizens are necessary to sustain certain political forms. The logic of the argument is simple: the attitudes and norms of the citizens together make up a political culture, and a given political culture is necessary to uphold a given political system. This means that democratic stability is increased if citizens of a country exhibit a particular set of attitudes and behaviours. However, this is not a dichotomy: democratic aspects and traits may be found among citizens of authoritarian regimes as well. This is central to the thesis, since I try to trace the *legacy* of citizen action under dictatorships.

The idea that political culture and political stability are interconnected is not new. Dating back to Plato, the notion of political culture has been central to much political science research (Almond 1989). In more modern times it is Alexis de Tocqueville who brought the idea of political culture to the centre of attention in social science. In his locus classicus *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville (2003) shows how American democracy in the 1830s, the most radical and inclusive democracy of its time, was sustained by active citizens coming together, forming associations and participating on a voluntary basis. An individualist democracy like the American one could easily fall prey to authoritarian rule because of its decentralised and atomistic political and civil society. However, precisely because of the participatory spirit of the American people, civil society instead served as “a check on the centrifugal forces of

democratic equality” (Putnam and Goss 2002, 13). Since Tocqueville, American democracy has often been regarded as unique in its dependency on citizen action and voluntary participation (Wuthnow 2002, Almond and Verba 1965).

Almond and Verba (1965, 366), in their classic book *The Civic Culture*, underline this exact point:

the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process – upon the political culture. Unless a political culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances of the success of that system are slim.

Almond and Verba present three main, ideal types of political culture. The first is *parochial political culture*, found mainly (in 1965 terminology) in “African tribal societies.” Here, there are no distinct political roles: social, religious and political roles are mixed together, and members “expect nothing from the political system” (Almond and Verba 1965, 17). Members of these societies do not see the political system as a distinct system, and they are not active participants, nor do they engage in any input or output process (Almond and Verba 1965). The second type of culture is the *subject political culture*. Here, the subjects are aware of and oriented toward a distinct political system, but mostly to the output processes of this system. They are not active participants and do not engage in the input process of the system, if there even is one (Almond and Verba 1965).

The third type is the *participant political culture*. Here, members are aware of the political system, its structures and input and output processes. They are engaged and active, participating in the system. This does not mean that they must support any given system; they may be hostile to the political system in which they live. A participant political culture simply implies that citizens are aware of their role in the system, how the system works, and that they participate in it (Almond and Verba 1965).

Though similar, this does not mean that Almond and Verba take a rational-activist approach to the democratic citizen. They criticise this model for two reasons. First, they argue that the traits postulated by the model are not present, even with citizens of democracies. Citizens “are not well informed, not deeply involved, not particularly active; and the process by which they come to their voting decisions is anything but a process of rational calculation” (1965, 338). The rationalist-activist model of democracy presents a set of unrealistic expectations from the citizens. Secondly, and more importantly here, if *all* citizens were to act according to this model, stable democracy would be impossible. Too much participation will destabilise the system, and “[o]nly when combined in some sense with its opposites of passivity,

trust, and deference to authority and competence was a viable, stable democracy possible” (Almond 1989, 16). They instead propose the *civic culture* as central to uphold and nourish a democratic political system.

No doubt, the citizen of a democratic political system must be something more than just a mere subject. The democratic citizen is expected to be a member of associations, to partake in government affairs, and to have his preferences and concerns expressed through participation. This means the citizen must be active in the political input process, participate in political activities, and be aware of how decisions are made. He must be self-confident, believe in his ability, indeed duty, to participate in the political process, and must support the rights and duties of his fellow citizens to participate (Almond and Verba 1965).<sup>8</sup>

This is important because any democratic system requires some control over the elites governing the society. However, citizens cannot become *too* active in the governing process as this will impede any effective policy making (Almond and Verba 1965). This tension between what Almond and Verba call power and responsiveness is more balanced in a civic culture. The citizen must let elites rule, yet at the same time show their preferences and hold the elites accountable: “Thus the democratic citizen is called on to pursue contradictory goals; he must be active, yet passive; involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet differential” (Almond and Verba 1965, 343-344). Almond and Verba point to a gap between citizens’ *belief* in the importance of participation and their *actual* participation. A citizen in civic culture is not active all the time, but he is more exposed to politics, and therefore “he is not the active citizen: he is the potentially active citizen” (Almond and Verba 1965, 347).

The citizen of the civic culture is not like the member of the subject political culture, but nor is he his anti-thesis; he is not a fully rational-activist citizen; but nor is he his anti-thesis. The democratic citizen must be a mix of all these: many of the components of the rationalist-activist model are important to the civic culture, but “they are only *part* of that culture” (Almond and Verba 1965, 339). The democratic culture is a “balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values” (Almond and Verba 1965, 30). Surveying five western democracies, Almond and Verba (1965) thus find that the most stable democracies are those with the largest share of such citizens.

The democratic *citizen* is not apathetic, but at the same time she must not be overly engaged in political affairs (Norris 2011). These different political cultures do not replace one

---

<sup>8</sup> In a similar vein, the traits and characters of the authoritarian person has also been attempted described. Though controversial, see Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950).

another, but rather merge into the civic culture, and no individual fully qualifies as a “democratic” citizen. Any individual will exhibit characteristics of each “personality”, but democratic citizens will exhibit more of the values and norms associated with democracy. Similarly, and of central importance to this thesis, *no political system consists of only one political culture*, and no political culture will consist solely of citizens of parochial values, of subject values, or of democratic values. Elements of a democratic culture can be found among citizens of authoritarian regimes as well, yet the active and participant citizens will be more frequent in (stable) democracies.

### **2.3 Social capital**

Drawing heavily on Tocqueville, as well as Almond and Verba, is Robert D. Putnam and the theory of social capital. The concept is not Putnam’s invention, but it is perhaps to his credit that the concept has experienced a revival in modern political science, launching an avalanche of literature. In a landmark study of local governments in southern and northern Italy, Putnam argues that the variance in institutional performance of democratic local governments can be explained by the degree to which the citizens exhibit “social capital” (Putnam 1994).

Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (1994, 167), and, like both Tocqueville (2003) and Almond and Verba (1965), he argues that membership in associations is good for democracy. What he calls the “civic community” is essential for the performance of democratic institutions. A civic community is comprised of high levels of trust and solidarity among individuals, high levels of participation in politics, high levels of associational membership, and political equality among all citizens. The more social capital a community has, the easier voluntary cooperation will be (Putnam 1994).

According to Putnam, how well the ideal of civic community is fulfilled explains good governance better than any other explanatory variable. This is because participation is necessary to sustain democracy, and high levels of social capital lower the cost of collective action, making people more active. “This favorable effect is due to the fact that social capital, by definition, includes all those behavioural dispositions that help to reduce transaction costs (...) and to overcome the undersupply of public goods that result from the propensity to be a free rider” (Offe and Fuchs 2002, 189). Norris (2011, 136) summarises the connection between social capital and democracy as “dense community networks [that] foster interpersonal trust and civic engagement and, ultimately, such culture underpin democratic government. People who are closely tied together are more likely to join forces and build social movements,

facilitating the expression of collective preferences in democratic polities.” As is clear, the argument is similar to that of Almond and Verba (Lipset and Lakin 2004).

A second reason why social capital is good for democratic performance is that membership in associations works as a training ground where individuals can acquire leadership experience and skills necessary for participation in democratic processes. From Tocqueville, the point has been made regarding the uniqueness of American associations, which have been regarded as cross-class in their structure and form. This has meant that these “American associations served as schools for democratic citizenship, providing an unusually large number of citizens with chances for active participation and democratic leverage” (Skocpol 2002, 105). This is also referred to as “the human capital hypothesis” (Lipset and Lakin 2004, 94).

A third way in which social capital affects democratic stability is through what Lipset and Lakin (2004, 95) call “the mediation thesis.” Through membership in associations, individual preferences are brought into an already established system, which helps moderate and channel preferences. Thus, high levels of participation are institutionalised and brought into a political platform. This helps institutional performance because it is “likely to unburden state and local governments,” and thus “social capital helps to make democracy work” (Offe and Fuchs 2002, 189-190).

In sum, social capital is good for democracy because (I) it increases trust among citizens, which strengthens horizontal organisation and lowers costs of collective action; (II) by increasing membership in associations citizens acquire valuable training and experience in politics and leadership; and finally (III) it mediates and channels individual preferences and opinions into established political channels, thus enhancing stability.

Finally, and of utmost importance for this thesis, social capital is *reciprocal*, in that the “use” of it will increase it over time.<sup>9</sup> The total “holding” of social capital in a country or culture can be expanded. The levels of social capital in a dictatorship facilitate collective citizen action, which in turn can produce increased levels of social capital that will become a valuable asset when democracy, for one reason or another, has been established. Social capital, and the way citizens act under dictatorship is therefore linked to the survival of a subsequent democracy.

Putnam’s findings have been criticized. His focus on the importance of associational membership for the development of trust is argued to be overstated (Wollebaek and Selle 2003). Perhaps more fundamentally, the theory of social capital and democracy is argued to have an unclear causal connection, and that it is circular in its argumentation (Lipset and Lakin 2004).

---

<sup>9</sup> The term social *capital* itself insinuates that it is an asset that can be invested, resulting in increased returns over time.

Some of this might be due to the fact that, as Fukuyama (2001, 7) states, “many of [the definitions] refer to manifestations of social capital rather than to social capital itself.”

Nor is it certain, given that social capital has an influence on democracy, that it is a positive one. Networks and levels of trust among individuals will also mean that some are excluded from these networks. It is therefore not given that everyone will benefit from the development of social capital, and instead it might reinforce benefits for those already advantaged. Networks between friends and family will necessarily exclude some people, while reinforcing capital between others (Putnam and Goss 2002, Howard 2003).

Explaining the difference between social capital and civil society, Howard (2003, 42) remarks that social capital, contrary to civil society, also includes “the networks and activities of the KKK, the Mafia, or other malevolent and anti-democratic organizations.”<sup>10</sup> This point is emphasised by Putnam himself, who acknowledges that “the [Ku Klux] Klan – and its counterparts in other countries – remind us that social capital is not automatically conducive to democratic governance” (Putnam and Goss 2002, 9).

However, one of the four components of civic community as defined by Putnam is political equality. This means that citizens of a civic community must be political equals, have the same rights, and be “bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation” (Putnam 1994, 88). To the degree a community is organised along such lines, it can be said to be more “civic”. The Mafia will necessarily represent a vertical political structure, the opposite of the horizontal structure advocated by Putnam, and the Ku Klux Klan, needless to say, does not represent any movement for political equality among citizens. To the degree that such organisations are present in a civic community, they will lower the “civicness” of the community rather than increase it.

## **2.4 Civil society**

Civil society is an immense subject. What I will *not* do here is to cover all its conceptual history, variations, and theoretical debates. Scholars of civil society often make a distinction between three traditions stemming from the Scottish enlightenment, the French enlightenment, and the German tradition (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001b). In more modern terminology, there are the “liberal,” the “radical” or the “conservative” positions (Khilnani 2001). In short, many of the arguments developed below will follow the liberal tradition of John Locke where civil society is seen as an autonomous domain opposed to and serving to balance the powers of the state.

---

<sup>10</sup> Section 2.4.1 will develop this difference further.

This is contrary to the radical view, where civil society is seen as yet another domain for the bourgeois state to exercise its control (Edwards 2004). However, the definitions here will also depart from this liberal view in that I will separate it from economic society, which is more in line with the above-mentioned radical view.<sup>11</sup>

There is, then, no single definition of civil society. According to Kolankiewicz (1992, 142) it “has come to mean in popular discourse all forms of free associations, unmediated and untrammelled, the antithesis of the totalising state.” It has been described as “a complex welter of intermediate institutions, including businesses, voluntary associations, educational institutions, clubs, unions, media, charities, and churches,” (Fukuyama 1995, 4). It is “the sphere of uncoerced human association between the individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the market” (Edwards 2011b, 4). According to Cohen and Arato (1995, 74), all definitions “include, almost always unsystematically, some combination of networks of legal protection, voluntary associations, and forms of independent public expression.”

As Edwards (2004, 3) points out, however, “[a]n idea that means everything probably means nothing.” Diamond (1999, 222) similarly argues that “civil society is not some mere residual category, synonymous with ‘society’ or with everything that is not the state or the formal political system.” It is separated from the parochial society, where organisations and groups are concerned with private ends; civil society is concerned with public ends. It is also separated from the state, and though many civil society groups will naturally seek to influence politics, they are not concerned with controlling it. As a public space of action outside the grasp of the state, it is protected by law (Howard 2003, Kolankiewicz 1992, Bernhard 1993, Diamond 1999).<sup>12</sup> Civil society is, in other words, “an intermediary phenomenon, standing between the private sphere and the state,” (Diamond 1999, 221). Likewise, Bermeo (2003, 7) describes it as “shorthand for the networks of formal and informal associations that mediate between individual actors and the state.” Bunce (2003, 214) concurs that civil society exists “between the family and the state.”

Civil society is also separated from political and economic society where elites and institutions seek power and profit. Members of civil society groups on the other hand, are there to express genuine concerns and promote interests (Kolankiewicz 1992, Diamond 1999). They “have neither power nor profit as their objective or rationale” (Howard 2003, 35). This echoes

---

<sup>11</sup> For an overview of the larger, conceptual and theoretical debates, see Edwards (2011c), Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001a), and Taylor (1990).

<sup>12</sup> Not all agree that it must be protected by law. See for example Cornell, Møller, Skaaning, and Lindberg (2016).

Putnam's description of citizens in civic community, who, though they "are not required to be altruists," pursue "self-interest defined in the context of broader public needs, (...) [a] self-interest that is alive to the interests of others" (Putnam 1994, 88). There are, however, no absolute lines separating these three spheres. A political group in civil society may seek to change policies in their favour, they may collaborate with political parties, and they may also be dependent on popular support from ordinary citizens (Howard 2003, Diamond 1999).

Howard also separates civil society and (some forms of) social movements. He argues that "civil society does not refer to simply any form of mobilization, but to membership and participation in a formally organised group, club or association. This leads to the necessary differentiation between civil society and social movements" (2003, 39). His emphasis on formally organised groups, however, is not shared in the definitions of neither Bermeo (2003) nor Diamond (1999), while Cohen and Arato (1995, 492) on their hand, suggest that "social movements constitute the dynamic element in processes that might realize the positive potential of modern civil societies." This is also supported by the definition given by Edwards (2011b) and Edwards (2004).

Further, civil society, according to Diamond, represents plurality, and – vital for democracy – it "*does not seek to represent the complete set of interests* of a person or a community" (Diamond 1999, 223, italics in original). It is fundamentally anti-totalitarian, because it does not aim to control every aspect of their members' lives, nor is it a system which claims to hold an ultimate truth, like a totalitarian system (Gellner 1994, Diamond 1999).

One of the few things that seems to be shared in all these definitions, then, is the fact that civil society occupies a space between the private sphere of the family, and the state. Though the lines are not definite, it is social, not political or economic, and it consists of ordinary citizens who are participating in collective actions in various forms to promote their interests, not elites seeking power.

#### **2.4.1 A note on social capital and civil society – overlaps and differences**

The concepts civil society and social capital are often used interchangeably (Howard 2003). Though they are quite similar, one difference between the two concepts is that social capital encompasses private networks between family members and close friends. Such networks are not part of civil society, since they do not belong to the public realm (Howard 2003, Diamond 1999). Secondly, where social capital concerns the norms and trust among individuals, civil society is generally more directed toward the actions and behaviour of members in institutionalised organisations (Howard 2003). This is not a clear dichotomy, however, since,



as Bernhard and Karakoc remark, “Putnam moves beyond the attitudinal dimension to include political *behaviour*. (...) Putnam's innovation has been the observation that it is not just what citizens believe, but how they act that creates social conditions conducive to democracy” (2007, 539-540, italics mine). In his description of the civic community, Putnam (1994) quite clearly emphasizes the importance of participation and behaviour as central for democracy, *in addition* to the attitudinal factors such as norms and trust between individuals. Howard (2003) is correct, on the other hand, in remarking that these behaviours and actions need not be institutionalised in order to count as social capital.

Finally, as briefly mentioned above, according to some, “malevolent and anti-democratic” organisations, such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Mafia are not part of civil society (Howard 2003, 42). Memberships in such organisations do, however, count as social capital. This does not mean that all groups in civil society must be pro-democracy or benign, in which case the civil society argument for democracy would have been circular (Chambers 2002). Groups can pose a threat to stable democracy while still belonging to the realm of civil society, but they must accept the rule of law, and cannot be set on the destruction of other groups and organisations, like the Ku Klux Klan is (Howard 2003).

This is not supported by everyone. Bermeo (2003, 7) states that the networks in civil society “may function for good or evil.” Not as specific as Howard’s statement, Bermeo’s definition opens up for the possibility that groups like the Ku Klux Klan, who surely function for evil rather than good, can still be part of civil society. “A pro-democratic civil society,” Bermeo (2000, 238) says, “is one in which groups promoting intolerance are outnumbered and overpowered by groups of others sorts. In antidemocratic civil societies, groups promoting intolerance become hegemonic.” In and of itself, “civil society [is] an a-moral order” (Gellner 1994, 137). To install in civil society “a moral dimension is not only to misrepresent its historical role in the regulation of social and political life, but also to deprive it of its capacity to express, and thereby paradoxically to contain, the aspirations for power influence, and control over truth which are defining features of politics” (Jenkins 2001, 267-268). As will be discussed in section 2.5.2, civil society groups can serve to destabilise democracy.

Social capital can thus be seen as a broader, more encompassing concept than civil society (Howard 2003). But the two concepts have clear overlaps, and it is perhaps no wonder that they are often used interchangeably in the literature.<sup>13</sup> The connection between them is clear: Social capital can be seen as bridging the gap between a civic culture and civil society.

---

<sup>13</sup> An anecdotal evidence for this: in Putnam (2002), the authors suggest to “*see also* Social Capital” when looking up civil society in the index.

Underlying any political culture is social capital (Norris 2011), and it explains how citizens with democratic attitudes and values come together to form associations.

The central point is not whether the associations in themselves have political purposes or not. What matters is that people come together in horizontal structures, learn from each other and develop interpersonal trust (Diamond 1999). This, in turn, increases costs of defection from any collective purpose, while it decreases costs of collective action, which in turn leads to a strengthened civil society (Fukuyama 2014, Putnam 1994). Thus, political culture, social capital and civil society all link up: “A thriving civil society depends on a people’s habits, customs, and ethics – attributes that can be shaped only indirectly through conscious political action and must otherwise be nourished through an increased awareness and respect for culture” (Fukuyama 1995, 5). High levels of social capital ease collective action, which in turn makes a more rigorous civil society. A healthy civil society, in turn, is an essential part of a strong, democratic culture, because it is dependent on active citizens. But it is rather a circular relationship than a linear one: By participating in civil society, social capital is increased. Civil society “is understood, in the social capital approach, as the breeding ground for social trust” (Rothstein 2002, 295). But is civil society *ipso facto* necessarily good for democracy?

## **2.5 Civil society and democracy**

As was mentioned in the introduction, there are opposing views in the literature for whether civil society is good or bad for democracy. In the following sections, I will therefore summarise these two opposing positions on civil society.

### **2.5.1 Why civil society is good for democracy**

As mentioned above, I will not embark on any expedition to trace the history or the various conceptual meanings of civil society. For this section, it can be mentioned again that most of the arguments presented for why civil society is good for democracy, as the reader will probably recognize, can be associated with the liberal understanding of civil society – as a sphere of influence opposed to the state.

Diamond (1999), clearly in line with this Lockean liberal tradition, argues that a strong civil society can serve a function of checks and balances against the state. It prevents the state from gaining too much power over society, blocking any potential abuse of power by the state, and thereby consolidating democracy. Especially in a democracy which have recently transited from dictatorship, this may be of vital importance.

Civil society groups can also play a part in educating citizens in the democratic game. They can be an arena for gaining experience and increasing political competence. This will also mean that participation will increase: Almond (1989) argues that citizens who have more faith in their own political competence are more likely to be active. Civil society makes democracy more robust by boosting participation, which is necessary both to create and to maintain a healthy democracy (Diamond 1999, Edwards 2004, Cohen and Arato 1995).

One of the fundamental parts of democracy is the right for every citizen to express their preferences (Dahl 1971). In contrast to the minimalist Schumpeterian-type democracy (Schumpeter 1950), O'Donnell states that it is not just during elections that citizens should express their preferences – this must be done *between* elections as well (O'Donnell 2010). Civil society offers a whole set of possibilities – supplementary to institutionalised elections – through non-party channels for citizens to do precisely this (Warren 2011, Diamond 1999, Edwards 2004). A strong civil society will be central in developing a stage for public debate, which in turn is essential for sharing ideas, norms and values. It can serve as a training ground for potential future political leaders, and it helps distribute information to empower their members and provide alternative perspectives necessary in a healthy democracy.<sup>14</sup> Thus, it can be an arena for democratisation of citizens, and for building democratic institutions (Diamond 1999, Chambers 2002, Cohen and Arato 1995). This is central for democracy, because

(...) without competing visions of the good society, public spheres in which they can be developed and solidified, and associations that create an infrastructure for collective action between the individual and the state, no democratic progress would be possible (Edwards 2011a, 480-481).

Similarly, active civil society groups can also help monitoring elections and arrange debates – in short, to build a platform where democracy can be played out. All this will mean that a healthy civil society is good for mediating conflict and channelling conflicting views in society into peaceful expressions (Diamond 1999). A healthy democracy is dependent on a diverse, critical debate, with broad representation of minorities and groups, and a civil society that reflects this will help strengthen democracy (Chambers 2002).

Civil society can also smoothen the working of the state by simply relieving it from some of its (minor) responsibilities, thus also lowering expectations for what the state should and can do. It can also do this by helping to implement larger reforms that need wider popular support (Diamond 1999). Whether the state is ineffective, unresponsive or even repressive, “The slogan for a revival of civil society is to rally forces in society to correct these

---

<sup>14</sup> Note that this argument is identical to the “human capital hypothesis” in section 2.3 on social capital.

shortcomings” (Kaviraj 2001, 318).

It is not only when democratic institutions are finally in place that civil society can be central to consolidate democracy. When transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy slowly begin to move forward, civil society can play a role in completing the democratisation. Such transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule will often be controlled by the incumbents. If there is little or no pressure from below, i.e. from ordinary people, such transitional processes can be imperfect, as argued by O'Donnell and Schmitter (2013, 63-64):

in such cases the pressure for moving beyond liberalization is lower and (...) the form of democracy which may eventually be achieved will tend to contain more oligarchic elements, more “islands” of institutionalized inequality in participation and accountability, than is the case when regime incumbents are faced with a resurrected civil society coalesced into a highly mobilized *pueblo*.

An active and mobilised civil society can play a vital role both in bringing about proper democratic change, and in consolidating the new democracy “from below” when post-transitional political institutions are still weak (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013, Cohen and Arato 1995), or it can proceed to dismantle any “authoritarian enclaves” on the local level left over from the authoritarian past (Diamond 1999).

All in all, a rigorous civil society will help enhancing the legitimacy of the state; to increase support for its democratic institutions; to develop attitudes, norms, and behaviour among citizens that is needed for these political institutions to function properly; and to balance and decentralise the power of these institutions (Diamond 1999, Warren 2011, Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001a, Taylor 1990).

### **2.5.2 “Singing Mussolini’s tunes” – Why civil society is bad for democracy**

There is, however, another side to the story. As Berman (1997a, 565) argues, “There is no intrinsic reason why civil society activity should bolster an existing political system.” A vibrant civil society does not in itself serve to segment democracy, it is argued. Instead, it can give deprived individuals forums where they can come together, mobilise, and act. Clubs, associations, and churches can just as easily promote anti-democratic ideas. If associations, rather than bridging already established cleavages in society, as Skocpol (2002) argued the traditional American associations have done,<sup>15</sup> instead are organised *along* these cleavages, civil society can serve to further fragment society. This will evidently not support democratic stability (Berman 1997a, Chambers 2002).

---

<sup>15</sup> See section 2.3.

The failure of the German inter-war democracy has been seen by several scholars as a testing ground for theories of democratic stability and collapse (Berman 1997b, Hagtvet 1980). A strong and vibrant civil society served not to strengthen democracy, it is argued, but to bring about its collapse. The political system of the Weimar Republic was not capable of adapting to the new mass politics of its era. Instead, dissatisfied citizens turned to private clubs and associations, who in turn could be infiltrated by the growing Nazi movement. In addition, the associations served not as training ground for democrats, but for those who would later become high ranking officials in the NSDAP (Berman 1997b). The flourishing civil society in Germany helped bring down democracy, not strengthen it.<sup>16</sup>

The point that the critics of civil society are making is simple: one must look not only at whether people participate or not in, but also at the values and morale that is underlying the associations (Chambers and Kopstein 2001, Kubik 2000). The clubs and associations during the Weimar republic were infiltrated by Nazi ideology and were subsequently used to segment Hitler's total power in the 1930s (Berman 1997b), and "[t]he very chorale groups that Robert Putnam claims sustain democratic life in Italy were in the previous regime singing Mussolini's tunes" (Mosher 2002, 208).<sup>17</sup>

Huntington argues that the difference between states lies not in their form of governance, but rather in their level of political institutionalisation, i.e. the *capacity* of the state (Huntington 1968). The reason why popular mobilisation in civil society cannot create stability is that these groups will not necessarily have a sense of community: they will seek particularistic goals and reinforce cleavages. To create "civic" politics, and prevent praetorian politics, solid political institutions must be in place. Good institutions in complex societies must therefore "give new meaning to common purpose and create new linkages between the particular interests of individuals and groups" (Huntington 1968, 10). Thus the civicness of a society, and hence its stability, is a result of its institutionalisation (Huntington 1968, Berman 1997a). "[C]ommunity involves not just any 'coming together,' but rather a regularized, stable, and sustained coming together. The coming together must, in short, be institutionalized" (Huntington 1968, 10).

As a society grows increasingly complex and mobilises more people to participate in politics, it is absolutely central for this polity that it at the same time manages to create institutions that can absorb these new levels and ways of participation. Political institutions are

---

<sup>16</sup> Note the similarity in this argument to the radical view of civil society mentioned in section 2.4: in the Weimar republic, civil society became an extended arm of the Nazi apparatus, one through which it could more easily dismantle democracy.

<sup>17</sup> The argument is about civil society, and yet, strictly speaking, the example used concerns Putnam and social capital. Again, this is testimony of how similar these two concepts are treated in the literature.

key to structure participation. The gap between the mobilisation of a society and the capacities of its political institutions is what determines its level of instability (Huntington 1968). If the institutions cannot keep up with the development of participation, there will be instability: “Political stability (...) depends upon the ratio of institutionalization to participation” (Huntington 1968, 79).

Recall Almond and Verba’s (1965) description of the parochial political culture in section 2.2, where there is little involvement from the individual members, as there is no distinct political society in which they can participate. In contrast, in the participant political culture, individuals are aware of opportunities for political action and act accordingly. However, to avoid causing instability, these participant attitudes must be balanced by attitudes of passivity as well (Almond and Verba 1965). Likewise, Huntington argues that the modern polity differs from the “traditional polity” (without referring to any geographical location) in “the scope of the political consciousness and political involvement of its population” (1968, 89).

Both Almond and Verba and Huntington agree that there are differences in attitudes and consciousness between traditional and modern societies, and that this results in different levels of participation. To ensure stability, however, they differ in that Huntington seeks institutional solutions, while Almond and Verba seek attitudinal and cultural solutions. Another difference is that Almond and Verba seek to explain *democratic* stability, while Huntington is occupied with stability in general, and argues that “[c]onstitutional democracies and communist dictatorships are both participant polities” (Huntington 1968, 89).

Thus, a civic community, or a vibrant civil society, cannot in itself create stability, according to Huntington – the key is the institutional arrangements than can channel the rising levels of participation, to give them a more universal, public sphere of interest. If institutions cannot do this, an active civil society can create instability, as elaborated by Berman (1997a, 569-570):

If a country’s political institutions are capable of channeling [sic] and redressing grievances, then associationism will probably buttress political stability and democracy by placing its resources and beneficial effects in the service of the status quo. (...) [I]f, on the other hand, political institutions are weak and/or the existing political regime is perceived to be ineffectual and illegitimate, the civil society activity may become an alternative to politics for dissatisfied citizens, increasingly absorbing their energies and satisfying their basic needs. In such situations, associationism will probably undermine political stability and have negative consequences for democracy by deepening cleavages, furthering dissatisfaction and providing rich soil for oppositional movements.

The fear of un-institutionalised citizen participation has also troubled the so-called mass society theorists. Mass society is “a set of conditions under which democratic institutions are vulnerable to totalitarianism” (Kornhauser 1959, 16). Here, there are few intermediate groups, and the

individual has a low sense of integration in society (Halebsky 1976). The problem of mass society for democratic stability is that there are no intermediate organisations between the elites and non-elites. Thus, the elites, without any institutional relation to the rest of society, are highly sensitive to mass movements, while non-elites are “directly available for mobilization by mass-oriented elites” (Kornhauser 1959, 115).

Echoing Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that “[d]espotism, suspicious by its very nature, views the separation of men as the best guarantee of its own permanence and usually does all it can to keep them in isolation” (Tocqueville 2003, 591), Hannah Arendt (1951) notes that the isolated man is the “mass man.” And the mass man – individuals who are without group belonging but who, nonetheless, are active and participant – will potentially form a mobilised, totalitarian movement, unless there are intermediate organisations. A highly atomised society of isolated individuals is fertile ground for potential totalitarian movements (Arendt 1951, Kornhauser 1959).

To increase stability of liberal democracy and avoid any totalitarian backlashes, Kornhauser (1959, 230-231) argues that “A plurality of independent and limited-function groups” are necessary, because they “[provide] social bases of free and open competition for leadership, widespread participation in the selection of leaders, restraint in the application of pressures on leaders, and self-government in wide areas of social life.” The similarities here to the definitions of civil society should be clear: civil society organisations are limited in their function, they are egalitarian, and will include a substantial proportion of their members in the day-to-day conduct of the organisation. And, as mentioned, participation in associations and organisations mediates opinions and actions.

A problem for both Kornhauser (1959) and Arendt (1951) is that their descriptions of interwar Germany as a highly atomised society seem not to hold under closer scrutiny. Politics in the Weimar Republic did not represent a “breakdown of the class system” as Arendt (1951, 306) argues. To the contrary, the Weimar Republic had a flourishing civil society and associational life. Reflecting the insights of Huntington (1968), both Berman (1997b) and Hagtvet (1980) show how it was the weakness of Weimar political institutions that brought down the Republic: “The instability and the ultimate doom of the Republic was essentially due to liberalism’s failure to keep the loyalty of its primary groups and incorporate its clientele into the fabric of 20th century industrial society” (Hagtvet 1980, 95). Thus, civil society could only serve to cement these cleavages:

Weimar’s paralysis was not caused by a withering away of intermediary bonds, but by their increasing tenacity. Far from becoming available to manipulating élites because of loosened ties, the

German population remained firmly anchored in their cohesive social blocs which interacted strongly with the political system (Hagtvet 1980, 95).

Berman (1997b, 411) concur that “Under these circumstances, associational life served not to integrate citizens into the political system, (...) but rather to divide them further or mobilize them outside and often against the existing political regime.”

What should by now be clear, is that a vibrant civil society is not in itself any guarantee for democracy. The composition of the associations and ideology of its members must be taken into account, as well as the political and institutional landscape in which they operate. A civil society dominated by free riders and antidemocratic tendencies is likely to contribute to democratic instability, as the case of the Weimar Republic shows (Kubik 2000). Yet this critique need not be as devastating for civil society theory as it may first appear.

Berman is arguably right when stating that the role of civil society “depends heavily on the political context” (1997a, 569). The strong and vigorous civil society in the weak political institutional context of the Weimar Republic served to “[continue] to draw public interest and involvement away from parties and politics, further sapping their strength and significance” according to Berman (1997b, 425). Hagtvet, however, seems open to the possibility that it was due to the *weakness* of civil society that the institutional problems became fatal for the Republic: “This intra-organizational ‘weakening’ could conceivably be taken to support the notion that the organizations had become ‘empty shells’, run by faceless bureaucrats, unable to provide any meaning or gratification to the individual” (Hagtvet 1980, 98).

Further, as Bermeo (2003) demonstrates, the strong and vibrant civil society of the Weimar Republic was not the causal reason for its democratic collapse. In line with the arguments of Huntington (1968), Bermeo, like Berman (1997b), points to the institutional weakness of the Republic as the root of the problem. However, *unlike* Berman, Bermeo argues that the collapse was not the fault of ordinary citizens through their civil society participation. Instead, Bermeo claims that the elites of the Weimar Republic deliberately chose the anti-democratic way. A weak civil society could not have prevented the Republic’s fall, nor was its strong civil society the fault of its collapse (Bermeo 2003). Had the elites been dedicated to democracy and had the Weimar political institutions been stronger, the robust civil society might just as well have stabilised democracy. Similarly, Howard (2003), noting that high levels of organisational membership in interwar Germany may have facilitated the rise of the Nazi regime, argues that this case does not reversely mean that *low* levels of civil society activation will be *good* for democratic stability (Howard 2003).



These previous two sections have served to show two things: although civil society is not a sufficient condition for democracy, it is important for any democratic system, because it may increase its institutional performance and balance the powers of the state. Secondly, the debate on whether civil society may be bad for democracy is a bit more complicated. Though one cannot completely ignore the political and social content of civil society associations, the oft-used case of the Weimar Republic as an example of civil society's potential negative effect on democratic survival, may be inconclusive. This merely serves to illustrate what has already been stated: a vibrant civil society is not sufficient in itself for stable democracy, but stable democracies will to a strong degree be reliant on it.

## **2.6 Can civil society exist in non-democratic states?**

From the definitions given of civil society in section 2.5, and the discussion of its influence on democratic success or failure, one thing seems clear: ideally, civil society will exist partly or completely separated from the powers of the state. It is an arena for organising collective action over which the state does not have (much) authority. Since a key element of democracy is that all citizens must be able to “formulate” and “signify” their preferences (Dahl 1971, 2), it is evident that any democracy *must* allow civil society groups to exist. No democratic government, by definition, can be in complete control over the collective actions and preferences of its citizens. This begs a question central to this thesis: can there be civil society in *authoritarian* regimes? This is the question I will explore in the present section.

For there to be any purpose in talking of a civil society in a given state, there must also be a reserved, separated domain for politics. Though many of the theorists discussed in section 2.4 separate civil society from political society, there is nonetheless an unavoidable interaction between civil and political society, as several of them have noted (Howard 2003, Diamond 1999). For civil society groups to be able to form, articulate and promote preferences and interests of their members, there needs to be a clearly defined political space. “That is, it presupposes a conception of politics that embodies a common sense of its purposes, a sense of what it is that individuals and groups are *competing for*, of why they have associated and agreed to compete and disagree” (Khilnani 2001, 26, italics in original). This means there must be territorial and constitutional limits for politics, with a given set of practices for how to compete on the political arena (Khilnani 2001).

This will immediately draw from the reader's memory the classifications by Almond and Verba (1965) of different political cultures. The parochial political culture has “no specialized political roles.” Instead, “these roles are not separated from their religious and social

orientations.” Thus, its members “[expect] nothing from the political system” (Almond and Verba 1965, 17). In the subject political culture and the participant political culture, however, members do perceive the political system as distinct from other parts of society, though their orientations to the input and output aspects of the system, and their role as participants in it will vary (Almond and Verba 1965).

These are ideal types of political cultures, and as mentioned, no country will consist of solely one type. But what is central here is that authoritarian regimes, like democratic ones, will consist of a mixture of political cultures where the political system can be defined as distinct from other parts of society. Thus, an important pre-condition for a meaningful understanding of civil society is in place in authoritarian regimes.

Though there clearly is a correlation between democracy and level of civil society (Warren 2011, Howard 2003), it is a mistake to directly connect the existence of civil society to any particular political regime: “(...) a necessary association between civil society and a specific political form – for example, liberal democracy – cannot be assumed. It may well be that a viable liberal democratic political order is not possible in the absence of a civil society; but, as the East Asian cases make clear, civil societies can live without liberal democracy” (Khilnani 2001, 25). As remarked by several theorists above, extreme individualism can be harmful to democracy (Tocqueville 2003, Kornhauser 1959). Since individualism is so central in liberal political theory, the relationship between civil society and liberal theory is “in fact a profoundly unstable relation” (Khilnani 2001, 28).

At the extreme end of the political spectrum, totalitarian states have historically been devoted to crushing all forms of civil society: “The Leninist state set about deliberately to destroy all possible competitors to its power, from the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy down through the innumerable farms, small businesses, unions, churches, newspapers, voluntary associations, and the like, to the family itself” (Fukuyama 1995, 54-55). Howard (2003) finds that totalitarian states have significantly lower levels of civil society than do authoritarian states, and that this has a lasting impact. As a result, the post-totalitarian democracies of Eastern Europe still have significantly lower levels of civil society than other democracies (Bernhard and Karakoc 2007, Howard 2003).

A healthy democracy depends on a thriving civil society; totalitarianism depends on destroying it. But complete political control of a society as in the totalitarian cases is rare. In regimes that are milder in their form of repression, i.e. authoritarian ones, civil society can, if not thrive, still exist. This is not to say all authoritarian regimes will accept civil societies. As described by O'Donnell and Schmitter (2013), an authoritarian regime will *try* to destroy any

autonomous political space: “By physical repression, ideological manipulation, and selective encouragement, they [authoritarian rulers] manage to orient most of their subjects toward the pursuit of exclusively private goals” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013, 55). This echoes the mass theorists like Kornhauser and Arendt, where being able to atomise societies is key for complete state control. This description of how authoritarian regimes deliberately seek to demobilise its population and to reorient their subjects' interests toward “exclusively private goals”, is in clear contrast to what Tocqueville called “self-interest properly understood,” where citizens in the United States promote a self-interest that benefits all society, not just themselves privately. This “enlightened” self-interest strengthens American democracy, according to Tocqueville (2003, 609-613), and it is also precisely this type of self-interest that authoritarian regimes seek to destroy by atomizing society.

If the dictatorship does not succeed in destroying the autonomous space demanded by civil society, “repression can have the effect of shifting the locus of political activity to non-party arenas by effectively proscribing traditional political-part activity” (Oxhorn 1995, 7). When repression is existent but not total, it can serve to alter the focus of civil society activity onto other arenas, rather than destroying it.

O'Donnell and Schmitter (2013) find an inverted U-shaped curve of mobilisation, where there are low levels of mobilisation during an authoritarian rule, high levels when a democratic transition is under way, followed by demobilisation after the transition. But precisely because demobilisation of citizens is so important for authoritarian rulers, it leaves demobilised democracies vulnerable: “it is hard to see how one can speak of a transition to democracy rather than a return to cycles of democracy and dictatorship” (Cohen and Arato 1995, 56). Instead, as already argued in section 2.5.1, the mobilisation of civil society is central both for the transition, and for consolidating of the subsequent democracy (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, Diamond 1999).

Oxhorn shows that after the 1973 military coup in Chile, popular organisations involving hundreds of thousands of people developed in the poor suburbs of Santiago alone. These organisations were “characterized by their participatory and democratic qualities” (1995, 287). His case study of civil society during Pinochet's dictatorship concludes that it is possible that “not only will civil society be resurrected under an authoritarian regime, it may even undergo a process of democratization” (Oxhorn 1995, 33). Thus, relatively strong, democratic civil societies can develop and endure even under non-democratic regimes, and can play a central role both in the democratisation of the country, and in the consolidation of the new democratic regime (Oxhorn 1995, O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013, Ekiert and Kubik 1998).

Totalitarian regimes will set out to annihilate civil society; authoritarian regimes may or may not co-exist with an active civil society, while democracies will both encourage and be dependent on a strong civil society. This does not mean that “more state” equals lower levels of civil society while “less state” equals higher levels of civil society. The relationship between civil society and the political system of a given country is more complex, and is not a simple zero-sum game. Strong, democratic states can actively help and create strong civil societies, while weaker states can reduce the potential strength of a civil society. There is a constant interaction between the state and civil society, but this interaction does not necessarily mean conflict between the two (Worms 2002, Howard 2003).

Recall Huntington’s (1968) argument that it is not so much the way in which laws are passed, i.e. whether they are democratic or not, that differentiates states, but to what degree they are capable of implementing these laws. Similarly, both weak authoritarian states and weak democratic states will have low capabilities in their interaction with civil society. Strong democratic states can have a significant impact on civil society, while still remaining a democracy. Civil society groups in both democracies and dictatorships are connected, whether they like it or not, to the state (Worms 2002, Zubaida 2001).

All this means that a strong, vibrant civil society need not be an exclusive trademark of democracy. Though the correlation between high democratic performance and strong civil society is indeed remarkably strong (Howard 2003, Warren 2011), democratic civil societies can find room to exist under authoritarian rule. While it is a necessary part of any well-functioning democracy, the fact that civil society also can exist in authoritarian regimes, is evidence that it is not a *sufficient* factor for democracy (Bernhard 1993). Further, it is also meaningful to talk of civil society under authoritarianism, but, as will be discussed further in the next section, it will necessarily take different forms under different types of regimes.

## **2.7 Conceptualising civil society and posing hypotheses**

As the discussion in section 2.5 made clear, there is little agreement on what civil society actually means. In order for me to propose concrete hypotheses to investigate the relationship between civil society and democracy, it is first necessary to conceptualise it clearly.

Many of the quantitative approaches to civil society, political culture, or social capital, either make use of the World Value Survey or country-specific surveys designed for their present research (Bernhard and Karakoc 2007, Booth and Richard 1998, Uhlin 2009, Letki and Evans 2005, Selle and Strømsnes 1998, Inglehart 1988). Others use measures counting the number of civil associations and volunteering in a country (Hart and Dekker 1999, Wollebaek

and Selle 2003). The advantage of such approaches is that they can capture both attitudes and behaviour of individuals in a much more satisfactory way, and it undoubtedly would have allowed me to link up the research more closely with the concepts of both Almond and Verba (1965), Putnam (1994), and the more general concept of civil society.

However, given the design of my research project, such surveys would have significantly reduced its scope in time and space. The World Value Survey, for example, consists at present of six waves, the first conducted in 1981-1984, in just ten countries. Even today, with more countries included, the survey includes mostly high-development countries (Bernhard and Karakoc 2007). Because my concern is civil society activation under dictatorship, surveys that measure people's attitudes are scarce. This renders it difficult for me to directly follow research that investigate political culture in the manner of, for example, Inglehart (1988), who uses the Euro-barometer, or to examine social capital by using a national survey, like Wollebaek and Selle (2003) do.

Nonetheless, as the theoretical discussions above has shown, these concepts do not only entail certain attitudes and norms among citizens that are beneficial for democracy – they also include *behaviour*. I therefore choose a different approach. In this thesis, the term “civil” in “civil society” will simply denote a “location rather than approbation” (Bermeo 2003, 7). Civil society is the sphere between the individual and the state, a platform for collective citizen action, independent of the state. The most central forms of collective action undertaken by ordinary citizens to express their common preferences – popular mobilisation “from below” – fall within the civil society definition here. It is a loose definition, but an important reason for doing this is that I in this way can hope to capture the collective action behaviour that is important for democracy, both from the political culture, social capital, and the civil society perspectives. The term “civil society” thus serves as an umbrella term for all these forms of behaviour. Hence, it is also the term I will most commonly refer to throughout the rest of the thesis.

Another reason for doing this is that it is unreasonable to impose the same expectations for what citizen action should look like under democracy and under dictatorship. If the definition of civil society requires, as some argued in section 2.4, that it is protected by law, this imposes a serious problem on any civil society activation under dictatorship. Though there may be many free and independent associations in an authoritarian society, government control over such associations will unavoidably be stricter. Further, when the opportunity to vote, or to participate as a member of an association is blocked, spontaneous riots and protests may be the only way for the citizens to express themselves. The streets become the natural arena of collective action when the institutions are inaccessible (Hipsher 1996). Bernhard and Karakoc

(2007, 540), for example, use protest as one of “two behaviors associated with a robust civil society” – the other being participation in organisations. It is easier to ban political parties and organisations than it is to ban spontaneous street protests. My conceptualisation also places itself close to Edwards’ already quoted definition of civil society as “the sphere of uncoerced human association between the individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes” (Edwards 2011b, 4).

I first measure civil society through the civil society index from Coppedge et al. (2015). The variable measures the participatory environment and the independence of civil society organisation, and citizens’ involvement in these organisations. Further, three variables are from the Banks data set (Banks and Wilson 2015): *Riots*, *Protests*, and *Strikes*. All four variables are explained in detail in chapter five. By using the variables from the Banks data set as a supplement, which are more straightforward in their operationalisation, I can also capture more “imperfect” varieties of civil society activation. Further, from a practical viewpoint, the Banks data set has a much wider and more satisfactory data coverage than the World Value Service (Teorell 2010, Ulfelder 2005). This renders it possible to directly observe and count the number of incidents of interest *during the dictatorship itself*.

A second reason is that Bermeo (2003, 4), in her studies on collective citizen action and civil society in the breakdown of democracy, defines the most important forms of collective (political) action as “electoral behaviour, strikes, demonstrations, and acts of violence.” Engagements in collective action, says Bermeo (2003, 4), “are essential elements of democratic citizenship.” The right to express common objectives through both protests and strikes are key features of democracy. I rely on Bermeo, who uses the term “civil society” as “shorthand for the networks of formal and informal associations that mediate between individual actors and the state” (2003, 7). Riots, protests, and strikes, do obviously not cover all forms of collective action, but are generally seen to constitute the most central ones.<sup>18</sup>

Thirdly, taking this approach is that these forms of collective action – riots, strikes, and protests – can be seen as proxies for high levels of interpersonal trust. Any collective group faces problems of coordination and free-riding (Olson 1971). Traditionally, the common Hobbesian solution to this has been third-party enforcement, *coercion*. But as Putnam (1994) argues, this is not only expensive in the long run, it is also ineffective. High levels of

---

<sup>18</sup> Though undoubtedly a part of the economic sphere as well – which by some in section 2.4 was argued to be excluded from civil society – trade unions are often included in the concept (Bermeo 2003, Fukuyama 1995, Edwards 2004). Strikes are natural manifestations of trade unions, and I therefore include this variable as a measure of the civil society activation.

interpersonal trust in a group, however, could more effectively solve the problems of collective action. Given the logic of reciprocity of social capital, this could mean that these elements, if found during a dictatorship, could become a valuable asset after the transition to democracy.

I am aware of the potential problems of these choices. One can argue that riots, protests, and strikes do not fully capture civil society. These are quite drastic forms of expression, and could, especially in a dictatorship where voting in free and fair elections for a new government is not an option, be *ad hoc* expressions of general discontent rather than signs of civil society activation. The internal validity of the thesis may therefore be suffering by these choices, but I nonetheless deem it necessary for the reasons mentioned above, and accept the trade-off.

In conclusion, four variables are meant to measure the legacy of civil society: *Riots*, *Protests*, *Strikes*, and *Civil Society*. It has not been the purpose of the section here to discuss their coding and operationalisation – this is done extensively in chapter five. I have presented them briefly here because it has been necessary to clearly conceptualise civil society before I can produce any hypotheses. Now that this has been done, and the theoretical framework is in place, I turn to produce the main hypotheses of the thesis.

### **The robustness of civil society**

The variable for civil society robustness (Coppedge et al. 2015) is a fairly new one, and to my knowledge, only Cornell et al. (2016) have so far used it in relation to democratic stability and collapse. This is no drawback, however. Cornell et al.'s (2016) study is quite similar to this thesis in both motivation and design: performing a survival analysis of interwar democracies, the authors find that the strength of a democracy's civil society in this period significantly decreased its probability of collapse. The oft-mentioned case of interwar Germany as evidence of civil society's negative influence on democracy "might simply be exceptions from a more general pattern" (Cornell et al. 2016, 25).

Given the conclusions of Cornell et al. (2016) and the clear similarities in design with my present research, I take their findings at face-value and simply extend the logic: if a robust civil society is good for democratic survival, then dictatorships with more robust civil societies should be expected to become more stable democracies come transition. Therefore,

*H<sub>1</sub> – A legacy of strong civil society will decrease the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

## **Riots**

Violent resistance against dictatorship have in several instances been seen to topple authoritarian rule in favour of democratic regimes. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) point to several democratic transitions as a result of revolt and revolution in nineteenth century Europe, while Wood (2000) show how, more recently, the democratisation of El Salvador is a case of insurgency-lead transition to democracy. Admittedly, the variable used here – which will be presented in chapter five – does not necessarily capture *insurgency*. Instead, the riots captured here may simply be street protests turned violent because of harsh government reactions to them, or other types of minor riots. Nonetheless, the ability to mobilise, and if needed, to take violent action, can be a force of democratisation. I therefore hypothesise that the *legacy* of riots can also have a positive effect on the stability of democracy. Thus,

*H<sub>2a</sub> – A legacy of riots will decrease the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

However, riots can also exert a destabilising effect on a regime. Significant social upheaval and unrest may convince the political and military elite that to abandon democracy is safer (Bermeo 2003). Several Latin American post-authoritarian democracies, for example, bear witness that new-won rights may indeed be very fragile if the armed forces deem them “misused” by the people and decide to intervene in the name of “law and order” (O'Donnell 1988, Agüero 1992, Norris 2011). In addition to this, as will be discussed in section 3.1 on transitional violence, high levels of violence in wars, rebellions, and revolutions rarely lead to democracy, let alone *stable* democracy (Huntington 1991). Thus, as riots can be a bad influence for democratic stability, a post-authoritarian democracy with such a legacy can be hypothesised to become *less* stable. This leads me to produce a competing hypothesis,

*H<sub>2b</sub> – A legacy of riots will increase the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

## **Protests**

Dahl (1971, 2) states that the right for citizens to “signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action” is a fundamental and necessary condition for democracy. Likewise, Bermeo (2003) argues that collective action through demonstrations is one of the essential rights in a democracy. In this way, protest activity can be seen as a sign of a healthy democracy (Goldstone 2004). In several of the newly democratised states of eastern Europe, protest activity and political activity go hand in hand, and are complementary, not rivalling alternatives for political action (Kubik 1998). In addition to this, Teorell (2010) finds that dictatorships with higher levels of protest activity are more likely to



democratise. Protest action in both South Africa and Mexico was important in mounting the pressure necessary for the country's elite to accept reform and democratisation (Wood 2000, Trejo 2012). Thus, as peaceful protest activity can be central in the democratisation process itself *and* vital for a healthy democracy, it is reasonable to hypothesise that a *legacy* of such activity will exert a positive influence on democratic survival after the transition itself. Therefore,

*H<sub>3</sub> – A legacy of protests will decrease the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

### **Strikes**

Strikes are also a central form of collective political action (Bermeo 2003). They involve the coming together of ordinary citizens in peaceful settings to promote their common interests. The mobilisation of the working class and the work of organised labour have been central elements in the democratisation on several occasions (Wood 2000, Collier 1999, Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992). In South Africa for example, the organisation of black workers through a “wave of unprecedented strikes” substantially increased the pressure on the Apartheid government (Wood 2000, 4). Eventual reforms allowed the unions to organise further, becoming a power factor in South-African politics. When the economic sanctions on the country – largely imposed because of the government's harsh repression of protests and strikes – eventually burdened the economy to such a degree that the elites were forced to negotiate, these unions became central actors in the transition (Wood 2000).

The logic is similar to that of protests, discussed above: organised labour has been important in several occasions for the democratisation of authoritarian regimes, *and* it is a central right in every democracy – healthy democracies have strong labour rights and allow strikes. If the capacity to organise collectively has been demonstrated before, it might be a valuable ability for life in a democracy as well. For these reasons, a legacy of strike activity is hypothesised to exert a positive influence on democratic survival. Therefore,

*H<sub>4a</sub> – A legacy of strikes will decrease the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

There is a possible other effect as well, however. The underlying logic of this thesis is that high levels of civil society activation under dictatorship will consequently mean high levels under democracy. Therefore, a democracy with a strong legacy of strikes is expected to *have* more strikes as well. Similar to what was argued in the case of riots, high levels of strikes may bestow a challenging legacy for new democracies, because it may be part of a larger picture of social unrest in the new democracies, and this, in turn, can provoke the military to intervene under the

pretence of restoring law and order (O'Donnell 1988, Agüero 1992). Though there is little research on the topic, strikes may also impede economic growth in a country (Sharma 1989). This may pose a challenging legacy for an emergent democracy, and I therefore pose a competing hypothesis, the last of the main argument:

*H<sub>4b</sub> – A legacy of strikes will increase the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

## **2.8 Summary**

In this chapter, I have presented a larger, theoretical framework for understanding why the activation of ordinary citizens can be important for the survival and stability of democracies. I began the chapter by introducing the concept of path dependency. Though the processes here are not argued to *be* path dependent, the concept can nonetheless offer a valuable understanding of why the *legacy* of civil society activation is important for a democracy. The idea is that the ability of citizens to collectively mobilise in the promotion of common interest may be self-increasing over time. In this way, the activation of civil society and the capacity for collective action under dictatorship may become valuable assets in a later democracy.

The argument for why citizen activation is good for democracy was developed first through the ideas of a democratic political culture and social capital. The main focus of the chapter, however, was that of civil society. This was argued to be a tricky concept to specify, and for the purpose of this thesis, it was conceptualised in a rather broad way as a platform between the private sphere of the family and the public sphere of the state, where ordinary citizens can come together to express common interests through collective action. Such a platform is essential for democracy for several reasons. However, civil society is not uniquely a feature of democracy – authoritarian regimes may also have a vibrant civil society, though it will necessarily manifest itself in different manners than under democracy.

Now that the theoretical framework and main hypotheses are in place, I move to the next chapter, which will review previous literature and research on the question of democratic survival. This chapter will also identify key control variables for the thesis, and their respective hypotheses.

### **3 Previous research: What makes democracies survive?**

The purpose of the following chapter is to give a brief overview of the literature on democratic survival. There are few findings that enjoy unanimous support concerning the survival of democracies. What seems to be the most common feature of successful democracies is their level of economic development, or the ability to generate economic growth. There are no laws in political science, however, and these findings do not mean that economic development alone is sufficient for a democracy to survive.

Again, I remind the reader that the topic of the thesis is *not* what causes autocracies to democratise. Rustow (1970, 346), cited in the introduction, stated that “[t]he factors that keep democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence: explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis.” “Yet,” appends Huntington (1991, 270), “some [factors] may do so.” Consequently, the fields of democratisation and democratic stability are often closely intervened, and many, though not all of the findings presented here, will also touch upon democratisation.

I begin with the past: What aspects of the previous authoritarian regime may influence the survival of the subsequent democracy? A second part deals with the features of the emerging democratic regime. The third and final part summarises the chapter.

#### **3.1 The legacy: Features of the past authoritarian regime**

As Linz and Stepan (1996, 55) state, “the characteristics of the previous nondemocratic regime have profound implications” both for the available paths to democratisation and for the chances of democratic consolidation. It is therefore natural to begin at the very back: which features of the past authoritarian regime can affect a democracy’s chance for survival?

##### **Elections**

Having experience with autocratic elections seems to be a significant determinant of stable democracy. Though they may vary in their competitiveness, these elections are obviously not free or fair. While holding elections can be a risky strategy for the incumbent, it may serve as a tool for the regime to legitimise their rule (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Thus, autocracies that hold elections are, according to some, found to increase their survival (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, Geddes 1999). As a *legacy*, Miller states that “Stable democracy has never developed without an extended prior experience with autocratic or pre-independence elections,” and that “is the impact on democratic *survival* that stands out” (2015, 525, italics in original). Howard and Roessler (2006) use the electoral experience to separate

between open and closed authoritarian regimes, and argue that open regimes are more likely to become successful democracies. I therefore pose the following hypothesis:

*H<sub>5</sub> – A legacy of elections will decrease the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

### **A military past**

In his research on presidentialism and parliamentarism in democracies, Cheibub concludes that “what kills democracies is not presidentialism but rather their military legacy” (2007, 140).<sup>19</sup> Had it instead been parliamentary democracies that followed military rule, “the level of instability of parliamentary democracies would be much higher than what is actually observed” (Cheibub 2007, 147). In other words, the *military legacy* exerts a strong influence on a new democracy’s survival, according to Cheibub.

Geddes, in turn, finds that firstly, military dictatorships “contain the seeds of their own destruction” and “have more endogenous sources of instability than do personalist or single-party regimes,” and are therefore more fragile and short-lived (Geddes 1999, 131). Secondly, and more important here, military regimes are more likely not only to become democracies when collapsing, but also to become *stable* democracies. The fact that military regimes are observed more frequently in countries with higher levels of economic development than other authoritarian regime forms cannot alone explain this (Geddes 1999, Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014b).

This is, according to Geddes, because the military, contrary to the strong-man dictator or the ruling party, retains much of its autonomy and institutional power after the transition to democracy. It is thereby able to enforce any arrangements made during the transition that grant them amnesty, a trait that in itself is more common in transitions from military dictatorships to democracies than from other forms of dictatorships. For the military, therefore, a transition to democracy entails a lower risk than the one facing personalist dictators, who risk losing everything, even their lives (Geddes 1999).

Svolik (2015, 735), in turn, argues that a military past “raises the risk of coups but lowers the risk of incumbent takeovers.” This is simultaneously in agreement and at odds with Geddes’ findings: Svolik’s findings seem to suggest, as do those of Geddes, that the military remains an autonomous power factor after democratisation. Yet, the fact that these democracies survive at a higher rate than others, as Geddes argues, indicates that the military do not use its power to overthrow the new incumbents. According to Svolik, however, the risk of a coup increases with

---

<sup>19</sup> Presidentialism and parliamentarism will be discussed extensively below.

a military past – perhaps an indication that the military leaders do in fact use this power. The findings of Cheibub (2007) and Geddes (1999) also seem to be at odds: Geddes argues that democracies that follow military regimes are more stable than those who follow other types of authoritarian regimes, while Cheibub concludes that presidential democracies live shorter than parliamentary democracies precisely because they tend to be preceded by military dictatorships. There seems to be few consistent findings regarding the legacy of a military regime. I therefore pose two competing hypotheses:

*H<sub>6a</sub> – A military past will decrease the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

*H<sub>6b</sub> – A military past will increase the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

### **The length of the preceding dictatorship**

It was argued in section 2.6 that authoritarian rulers will be set on dismantling, or, to the extent possible, controlling civil society. Authoritarian regimes do not want their citizens to focus on politics, as this may pose a challenge to their power. Instead, the rulers will try “to orient most of their subjects toward the pursuit of exclusively private goals” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013, 55). One can expect long-lasting dictatorships to have more time and ability to do precisely this, while short-lived dictatorial regimes have not had the opportunity to effectively eradicate civil society. These democracies do not have the benefit of a strong civil society, and hence, one can hypothesise that democracies that are preceded by long periods of authoritarian rule, become less stable:

*H<sub>7a</sub> – Lengthier spells of previous dictatorial regimes will increase the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

On the other hand, long-lived authoritarian regimes can undoubtedly be seen as more stable than the more short-lived ones. Their long lives could be due to a sum of central traits that keep them stable: steady economic growth, high level of development, low levels of conflict, and well-developed institutions, all of which have been – and will be seen below – to positively affect *democratic* stability. Thus, if a dictatorship has survived for a long time, one can hypothesise that this indicates some preferable features that – given they are not lost in the transition to democracy – can cause the post-transitional democracy to also be stable. Therefore, a competing hypothesis is:

*H<sub>7b</sub> - Lengthier spells of previous dictatorial regimes will decrease the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

### **Past transitions and experience with democracy**

Huntington (1991) argues that previous experience with democracy is an advantage for democratic stability. For the regimes that stabilised after the Third wave of democratisation, there was, according to a “*second-try* pattern” (Huntington 1991, 42, italics in original). This argument seems to suggest a learning curve for democratic political actors, in that a country may learn from its previous mistakes that in one way or another caused the democracy to fail. Therefore, the second-try results in more stable democracy. Thus,

*H<sub>8a</sub> – Past democratic experience will decrease the likelihood of collapse.*

However, this argument, notes Przeworski et al., misses the fact that “if a country *had* a democratic regime (...) it is a veteran not only of democracy but of the *successful subversion* of democracy. Political learning, in other words, cuts both ways” (1996, 43, italics in original). They find that previous democratic experience *shortens* the life of the present democracy. Similarly, Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock (2001, 790), though they do not find any clear effect, are leery of the “learning” argument, since “multiple episodes of democracy may be indicative of inherent problems of instability.” Apart from Huntington’s statement and Przeworski et al.’s rejection of it, there seems to be little clear evidence for how past transitions affects the current survival of democracy (Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001, Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003, Gasiorowski and Power 1998, Miller 2015, Houle 2009). Nonetheless, the competing hypothesis becomes:

*H<sub>8b</sub> – Past democratic experience will increase the likelihood of collapse.*

### **Transitional violence**

A last form of legacy concerns not so much the type of regime itself as the *transition* from dictatorship to democracy. Non-violent resistance may be an efficient strategy even in dictatorships (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008), and forced, violent transition seem rarely to lead to democracy compared to non-violent, negotiated transitions (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014b). Huntington (1991, 207) states that “[t]hroughout history armed revolts have almost never produced democratic regimes,” and that “Governments produced by violence [rule] by violence.” This is not completely unrelated to the type of regime that precedes democracy: as mentioned, military regimes are more likely to negotiate their way out of power, thus lowering the risk of bloodshed and increasing the likelihood of democracy. Personalist dictators often have more to lose by giving up power, and may therefore resist, ultimately leading to more violence (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014b, Escriba-Folch 2013).

Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014b) themselves, however, warn that these results are inconclusive, and that it is important to remember that violence in a transition between dictatorship and democracy does not necessarily mean a struggle between pro- and anti-democratic forces. As Linz and Stepan (1996, 108) argue, “the terrorist struggle against a nondemocratic government may leave a difficult legacy for a new democracy, since the terrorists may pursue other goals than democratization and, therefore, not stop their actions when democracy has been achieved.” Similarly, speaking of the third wave of democratisation, Huntington states that “[e]stimating with even very rough accuracy the number of political deaths (...) is extraordinarily difficult.” Separating “violence that is part of democratization” from regular and routine violence, is extremely difficult, let alone impossible” (1991, 192).

Because of the difficulties in measurement and the inconclusive results that naturally follow, I refrain from posing clear hypotheses regarding this variable. I nonetheless include it as a control variable, since it is common in the literature, and because it is interesting to see whether it produces clear results, which so far are lacking.

### **3.2 The present: Features of the democratic regime**

In addition to the legacy of the authoritarian past which haunts the post-transitional democracy, what happens *after* democratisation is also naturally important. This is the second category of control variables, and will be discussed in the following section.

#### **Economic development and economic growth**

Though there is little agreement on Lipset’s (1959) modernisation hypothesis, i.e. that economic development *causes* democratisation,<sup>20</sup> there is substantially more agreement on the fact that economic development *sustain* democracy. This is perhaps most famously stated in Lipset’s (1959, 75) own assertion that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” The argument, Lipset claims, hails back to Aristotle: a political system in which the masses participate intelligently in politics and which is robust against demagoguery is only possible in wealthy societies where relatively few citizens live in poverty; Inequality and poverty, on the other hand, invites tyranny or oligarchy (Lipset 1959).

Thus, Przeworski and colleagues argue that democracies with lower levels of economic development are fragile, and significantly more likely to “die” than those with higher levels of development (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, Przeworski et al. 2000, 1996). In fact, they go as far as to state that “no democracy has ever been subverted, not during the period we studied nor

---

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Boix and Stokes (2003), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).

ever before nor after, regardless of everything else, in a country with a per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975: \$6,055” (Przeworski et al. 2000, 98). Similar findings are presented by Gasiorowski and Power (1998, 764), who state that “development-related socioeconomic factors have a strong, positive effect on the likelihood of consolidation.” Other than the fact that “higher GDP per capita reduces the probability that countries fall out of democracy,” Epstein et al. (2006, 564) find “few clues as to the factors that help prevent [democratic] backsliding.” They therefore conclude that “The key to consolidation of new democracies, it would appear, is a strong economy” (Epstein et al. 2006, 564). Aleman and Yang (2011, 1143) assert that “[t]he effect of income level is so decisive that it dominates all other variables.”

A similar variation of this argument is that it is not the level of economic development per se of a regime, but its economic *performance*, that lowers the likelihood of democratic collapse. In other words, a democratic regime’s ability to generate economic growth is what matters. Thus, “If they succeed in generating development, democracies can survive even in the poorest nations” (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 177).<sup>21</sup> The severe effect of economic crisis in the form of recession or hyperinflation on the survival for both old and young democracies is well-documented (Gasiorowski 1995, Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001, Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003, Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Just a single year of negative growth can markedly affect the survival of democratic regimes (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, Gasiorowski 1995).

Boix and Stokes (2003), though critical of Przeworski et al.’s (2000) rejection of Lipset’s modernisation hypothesis, concur that high levels of economic development and positive economic growth sustain democracy once established. Distinguishing between two types of democratic failures – incumbent takeover and coups – Svoblik (2015) notes that although “these two processes differ in both their dynamics and their determinants”, economic development and performance are the only factors that lower the risk of both. Similarly, Svoblik (2008), distinguishing between consolidated and non-consolidated democracies, finds that economic development can explain whether a democracy is at risk of failure or not, i.e. whether it is consolidated, but that *timing* of the collapse is “associated only with economic recessions.”

Both Olson (1963, 1982) and Huntington (1968) have famously argued that rapid growth can in fact destabilise a democracy. According to these arguments, quick growth can out-pace the institutions’ ability to keep up, untwining the social relations and bonds in a

---

<sup>21</sup> However, growth may very well be endogenous to democracy, and as such, not a causal reason for why it survives (Przeworski et al. 2000).



society, thereby destabilising it. There seem, however, to be little evidence of this, and according to Przeworski et al. (1996, 42), Huntington and Olson “could not have been more wrong.” Likewise, Boix (2011, 823) states that “adding income always makes democracy more stable.”<sup>22</sup>

Daron Acemoglu and colleagues argue that once one controls for country-fixed effects, there is in fact no empirical evidence in support for the notion that high levels of economic development lowers the likelihood of authoritarian reversals in democracies (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared 2008, 2009). And while Dahl (1971) by and large concurs that economic development and performance is vital for democratic survival, this is not an iron law: Argentina, for example, had the highest GDP per capita of any Latin-American country at the moment of democratic collapse. “Argentina,” states Dahl, “provided solid grounds for optimism,” yet its democracy failed nonetheless (1971, 134). The democracy in Costa Rica, on the other hand, survived economic recession and crisis, contrary to what the abovementioned findings would suggest (Dahl 1971, Seligson and Muller 1987). In fact, many of today’s western democracies were at lower levels of development at the moment of their democratisation than these findings “allow”, yet they have remained remarkably stable throughout their existence.<sup>23</sup> Thus, Dahl (1971, 135) concludes that

one thing seems clear: the differences in regimes cannot be explained by appealing to the usual explanatory factors – the level of socioeconomic development, urbanization, education, size of the middle class, per capita income, and so on. Although a full explanation would surely be very complex, one crucial factor does emerge with striking clarity: Argentinians appear never to have developed a strong belief in the legitimacy of the institutions of polyarchy.<sup>24</sup>

This latter point made by Dahl is essential, because it is in this vein Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013a, b) argue that neither level of economic development nor economic performance can explain the emergence and survival of democracies in Latin America. According to them, there are three key factors that explain the survival of democratic regimes in this region: normative preferences for democracy, the lack of actors with radical policy preferences, and a “favorable regional political context” (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013b, 134). In their own words, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013a, 5) “locate [their] theory between structural or long-term cultural approaches, on the one hand, and agency and contingent action approaches,

---

<sup>22</sup> See also Przeworski et al. (2000), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), and Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock (2001).

<sup>23</sup> Commenting on precisely this observation, Boix and Stokes (2003, 545) wonder why “a country [could] ‘buy’ democracy more cheaply—for a lower level of per capita income—in late-nineteenth-century England or Norway than in late-twentieth century Chile or Benin”

<sup>24</sup> Polyarchy is Dahl’s “real-life version” of the ideal-type democracy.

on the other.”

This approach emphasises the preferences and actions of various key *actors* in a society rather than broad structural factors.<sup>25</sup> Thus, “(...) with a normative democratic commitment on the part of powerful political players and a favourable international environment, democracy can survive in the face of daunting challenges” (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a, 5). Inversely, a democracy in favourable conditions may not survive if these same actors are “indifferent to liberal democracy’s intrinsic value” (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013b, 135). Although the constraints imposed by larger economic structures seem to weigh heavily on a democracy’s chances of success, there is nonetheless room for agency.

Though this latter section may somewhat moderate the argument of economic development and growth, none seem to argue that development and growth are *bad* for democracy. Therefore,

*H<sub>9</sub> – Higher GDP per capita will decrease the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

*H<sub>10</sub> – Positive economic growth will decrease the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

### **Ethnic fractionalisation**

Lijphart (1977) traces the argument concerning fractionalisation of society and its challenges to democratic stability back to Aristotle. According to this argument, “[s]ocial homogeneity and political consensus are regarded as prerequisites for, or factors strongly conducive to, stable democracy” (Lijphart 1977, 1). John Stuart Mill (2009, 344-345) in turn, fatalistically states that “Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government can not exist.”

Lijphart himself, however, states that it is merely “*difficult*, but (...) not at all *impossible* to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a plural society” (1977, 1, italics in original). The more recent, empirical literature on this matter also seems to be divided. Some find no significant effect of ethnic fractionalisation on democratic survival (Houle 2009, Cornell et al. 2016, Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003), while others find that it has a significant and negative, yet weak, effect on a democracy’s life span (Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001, Gasiorowski and Power 1998, Barro 1999). The hypothesis becomes

*H<sub>11</sub> – Higher ethnic fractionalisation will increase the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

---

<sup>25</sup> The authors identify these key actors to be “presidents and organization such as parties, unions, business associations, the military, and organized movements” (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a, 5).

## **The constitutional framework – Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism**

Juan Linz has famously promoted the advantages of parliamentarism over presidentialism for decades. Though the choice of a parliamentary system over a presidential system is in itself not enough to guarantee stable democracy, Linz argues that parliamentary systems are *ceteris paribus* more stable, and better at handling political crises than are presidential systems (Linz 1990a, b). This is because presidential systems depend on “the ability of their leaders to govern, to inspire trust, to respect the limits of their power, and to reach an adequate degree of consensus” (Linz 1990a, 69). Yet, while these qualities are “most needed in a presidential system, it is precisely there that they are most difficult to achieve” (Linz 1990a, 69). Przeworski et al. (2000, 131) concur with Linz, stating that “Presidential democracies are more likely to die than parliamentary democracies at any level of development,” while Svoboda (2015) finds that presidentialism increases the risk of incumbent takeovers, though not for coups.

According to Stepan and Skach, this superior survival of parliamentary democracies is based on several tendencies. Parliamentary democracies can more easily avoid, and, if necessary, remove, executives that “rule at the edge of the constitution,” while also providing governments with majorities necessary to “implement their programs,” and to “rule in a multiparty setting” (1993, 22). The ability of parliamentarism to handle multiparty political landscapes has also been underlined by Mainwaring (1993, 1990) who find that a democracy’s likelihood of survival is significantly reduced when presidentialism is combined with a fragmented party system. In this particular blend, a president risks facing a hostile legislature, and is consequently unable to implement policies. And while parliamentary systems “have institutionalized means of resolving this problem,” no such mechanisms exist for presidential systems, often leading presidents either to bypass congress or to seek extended powers through constitutional reforms (Mainwaring 1990, 168).

However, Power and Gasiorowski (1997), when applying the hypotheses to Third World countries, fail to find any support for Linz’s (1990a) “perils of presidentialism” or Mainwaring’s (1990) arguments on the combination of multiparty systems and presidentialism. The authors therefore “caution against premature acceptance of these arguments” (1997, 151). Likewise, neither Aleman and Yang (2011) or Cornell et al. (2016) find any effect of presidentialism on democratic survival. Hiroi and Omori (2009) argue that parliamentary systems do live longer than presidential systems, but only if they are uninterrupted: parliamentarism actually increases the likelihood of democratic breakdown in countries that have previously experienced such collapses. The authors suggest that the fixed terms of a presidency serves to stabilise the system, while the parliamentary system’s abovementioned

ability to discard unpopular or controversial governments “may actually underlie democratic instabilities that various parliamentary countries have experienced” (2009, 501). Thus, Hiroi and Omori also “[call] for caution” in drawing too definite conclusions regarding the institutional choices for democracies (2009, 501).

The important aspect in the findings of Hiroi and Omori (2009) is that the institutions’ effect on democratic survival is *indirect*: parliamentarism only increases survival if there is no history of previous democratic failures. The institutional arrangements “exert their influence through societies’ prior democratic records” (Hiroi and Omori 2009, 485). This emphasis on the history leading up to democracy is also a noteworthy insight offered by Cheibub (2007), who find that though presidential systems do indeed live shorter than parliamentary democracies, this is only due to the fact that these presidential democracies are more likely to have been preceded by military dictatorships. Cheibub concludes that there are no institutional arrangements that make presidential democracies *ceteris paribus* less stable than parliamentary democracies (Cheibub and Limongi 2002, Cheibub 2007). Instead, the real reason is what he calls the “military-presidential nexus”:

It is the combination of these two facts – that democracies that follow military dictatorships are more likely to become dictatorships and that presidential democracies are more likely to follow military dictatorships – that accounts for the higher overall regime instability for presidential democracies (Cheibub 2007, 22).

Presidential systems, in other words, simply tend to exist in countries where democracy “of any type” would be unstable (Cheibub 2007, 160).

There seems to be little agreement on this topic. Because the literature treats semi-presidential, or mixed, systems differently (See for example Cheibub (2007) and (Cornell et al. 2016)), I pose two similar hypotheses: the first concerning *pure* presidential systems, while the second conjoins these systems with mixed-systems, creating a non-parliamentary reference category:

*H<sub>12a</sub> – Pure presidentialism will increase the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

*H<sub>12b</sub> – Non-parliamentary systems will increase the likelihood of democratic collapse.*

### 3.3 Summary

In this chapter, I have given a brief overview of the most central literature on democratic survival. The purpose has been to identify the most relevant control variables and to generate hypotheses concerning their predicted effect on the stability of new democracies. They are separated into two main categories: those that concern the legacy of the authoritarian regime, and those that concern the features and characteristics of the new, present democracy. One of the few things that seemed to unambiguously increase democratic survival was the level of economic development and positive economic performance. There is little agreement on the effect and importance of several of these features, however.

All hypotheses are summarized in table 3.1 below. The operationalisation of all the variables will be discussed in chapter five, while the results are presented in the subsequent chapter six. First, however, I turn to the methodology underlining the thesis, and explain the methods that will be used.

**Table 3.1 Summary of hypotheses**

<b>Hypotheses</b>	
H <sub>1</sub>	A legacy of strong civil society will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>2a</sub>	A legacy of riots will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>2b</sub>	A legacy of riots will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>3</sub>	A legacy of protests will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>4a</sub>	A legacy of strikes will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>4b</sub>	A legacy of strikes will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>5</sub>	A legacy of elections will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>6a</sub>	A military past will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>6b</sub>	A military past will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>7a</sub>	Lengthier spells of previous dictatorial regimes will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>7b</sub>	Lengthier spells of previous dictatorial regimes will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>8a</sub>	Past democratic experience will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of collapse
H <sub>8b</sub>	Past democratic experience will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of collapse
H <sub>9</sub>	Higher GDP per capita will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>10</sub>	Positive economic growth will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>11</sub>	Higher ethnic fractionalisation will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>12a</sub>	Pure presidentialism will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse
H <sub>12b</sub>	Non-parliamentary systems will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse

## **4 Methodology**

The objective of the following chapter is to present and discuss the methodological choices underlying this thesis. I will begin by reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of a quantitative approach to the research question at hand, before explaining event history analysis, its key features, logic and benefits, and why it is the appropriate technique for this thesis. I then proceed to explain the Cox proportional hazards model, which, more specifically, is the type of event history model used here. Potential problems with this model and its alternatives will also be discussed, while a concluding section will summarize the arguments.

### **4.1 The quantitative method**

In its ideal form, the scientific enterprise follows a very simple and straightforward logic: there is a natural, external world independent of our perception of it, and the best, indeed only, way to gain knowledge about it is through experiments. This is reflected, among other places, in Richard Feynman's (1965, 156) characterisation of the search for new physical laws:

First we guess [the law]. Then we compute the consequences of the guess to see what would be implied if this law that we guessed is right. Then we compare the results of the computation to nature, with experiment or experience, compare it directly with observation, to see if it works. If it disagrees with experiment it is wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science.

There are, however, no equivalents to the physical laws in social science. Social science involves *agents*, actors capable of changing their mind and the course of action, making the processes under scrutiny in social science extremely complex (Elster 2007). Uncritical use of methods developed in the natural sciences for gaining knowledge of the external, physical world to the social sciences will thus potentially lead to grave errors due to the disparate objects of investigation in the two fields (Hayek 1975, Furlong and Marsh 2010).

Nevertheless, at the core of all social science is a desire to draw inferences. Simply to collect and systemise data is not enough – it must also attempt to “infer beyond the immediate data to something broader that is not directly observed” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 8). For social scientists too, experiment is the “gold standard for establishing causality” (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier 2008, 15). The experimental method's ability to isolate the cause-effect relationship and to compare findings is an obvious strength – and largely unachievable in social science. Experiments can often be expensive, complicated, and even unethical, in social research (Moses and Knutsen 2012). Over the last years, however, the use of experiments in social science has increased (Margetts and Stoker 2010).

For the problem addressed in this thesis, the ideal of controlled experiments is unattainable. Experiment may be the desired method for establishing causality, but the

statistical method can be both feasible and preferable. In its ability to generalise across a large number of cases, and to detect regularities and patterns in observations, it is so to speak a “second best” option (Moses and Knutsen 2012, King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Thus, statistical explanations are “inevitably guided by the first-best ideal of causal explanation,” and “in practice we may not be able to do any better” (Elster 2007, 27).

Quantitative research is of course not alone in trying to make inferential causal explanations (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier 2008). Though different in style and methods, both quantitative and qualitative research have at their core “the same underlying logic of inference” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 4).<sup>26</sup> To assume merely by default that quantitative research is superior to qualitative, is at best out-dated, and choosing a quantitative over a qualitative method is thus not a question of being “more scientific” (Moses and Knutsen 2012, King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, George and Bennett 2005). It is simply a question of which method is most appropriate to answer the research question at hand.

Concerning this present research question, a quantitative approach allows me to handle large amounts of data, for several countries over several years. There are a total of 1410 country-year observations in this data set; 68 countries; 97 democratic spells, and 41 democratic failures.<sup>27</sup> This amount of data could obviously not have been handled by in-depth case studies within the limits of a single thesis. Quantitative methods, on the other hand, allow the researcher to draw parsimonious inferences from large  $N$  data (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

There is a trade-off. Large- $N$  quantitative approaches risk losing a sense of the context of the phenomenon in question. As it was discussed in section 2.7, it is not given that one can reasonably expect civil society in one country in 1988 to be similar to civil society in another country in 1948. Concepts such as “democracy” and “civil society” do not travel untroubled across time and space – they risk “conceptual stretching” (George and Bennett 2005, Sartori 1970). Further, quantitative analysis is not adept at exploring the causal *mechanisms* that drive change, nor highly complex forms of interaction of variables. Complex processes thus risk being oversimplified (George and Bennett 2005). In-depth knowledge, the capacity to unravel multiple, complex mechanisms, and the ability to derive new hypotheses, is commonly associated with the qualitative case-study and small  $N$  approaches (George and Bennett 2005, Gerring 2012).

---

<sup>26</sup> King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) have been soundly criticised for their positivistic approach to social science. See Furlong and Marsh (2010) and Brady and Collier (2010) for an overview.

<sup>27</sup> These expressions, affiliated with event history analysis, will be explained in section 4.2.1.

## 4.2 Event history analysis

The method of event history analysis stems from the field of biostatistics. It goes under many names in many fields, the most common of which are perhaps survival analysis, duration analysis, or failure-time analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Some of its terminology, such as “survival”, “death”, and “failure”, may seem strange in the world of social science, but is a natural consequence of event history analysis’ medical past.

Although event history analysis has been increasing in popularity in the social sciences for the last decades or so, it is still scarcely used compared to other regression methods (Golub 2008). Event history analysis is focused on events that “connote change or represent a transition from one state to another” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 1). Such events “by definition (...) assumes a preceding time interval that represents its non-occurrence” (Yamaguchi 1991, 1). Thus, event history analysis is not only concerned with the question of *whether* an event will take place, but also with the question of *when* it will happen (Yamaguchi 1991, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, Mills 2011).

Event history analysis examines longitudinal data for a large set of observations, where the dependent variable measures how long a unit stays in one state before experiencing an event, i.e. a transition to another state (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Put differently, the dependent variable is the “conditional probability that an event occurs at a particular time interval (t)” (Mills 2011, 2).<sup>28</sup> The independent variables can be *fixed* (or *time-constant*), meaning that within a given spell, they do not change values over time, or *time-varying*, which means that they do change their values across time. A fixed variable can be place of birth, while age is a typical time-varying variable (Mills 2011, Golub 2008).

### 4.2.1 Key features of event history analysis

#### *Units at risk, event, spell, and other central expressions*

Only the units that are at *risk* of experiencing an event can be included in the analysis. This should be obvious: if one is studying the risk of divorce, it makes no sense to include individuals who are not married; only married couples can get divorced (Yamaguchi 1991). In my case, this means that only countries that have made a transition from dictatorship to democracy are at risk. Authoritarian countries are not at risk of democratic failure – they must first become democratic. If the event in question had been regime failure, non-democracies would also have

---

<sup>28</sup> In event history analysis, the dependent variable is in fact the same as the hazard rate (Mills 2011). For the research question at hand here, this is the likelihood that the democratic spell will end, or, quite simply, the likelihood of democratic breakdown. The hazard rate will be treated as a general term, and explained in detail later.



been included. Since, however, I am only concerned with democratic failure, only countries that have made a transition to democracy are at risk of experiencing the event.

The transition from the state of democracy to dictatorship is the *event*, or *failure*.<sup>29</sup> All post-authoritarian democracies which existed between 1946 and 2008 constitute the *risk set* in this analysis, and the period of time a country stays democratic is called a *spell*. The independent variables in event history models are assumed to affect how long a democracy will survive – the length of the spell – before (if at all) collapsing, i.e. experiencing the event.

#### *The hazard rate and the baseline hazard*

A key term in event history analysis is the hazard rate. As mentioned above, this is in fact the dependent variable in event history analysis. Technically speaking, the hazard rate is not a probability, since it can have values greater than one, though it is common to refer to it as if it is (Golub 2008). The hazard rate can thus be defined as “the probability that at any given point in time the event of interest will occur (...) given that it has not yet occurred” (Golub 2008, 531). It is, in other words, the risk that a unit “fails” or ends its spell, given that this has not yet happened. In this sense, failure “is conditional on ‘survival’: the event is conditional on its history” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 15). The hazard rate is therefore a *conditional* probability: it is the likelihood of failure *given* that it survived up to that point in time. In the words of this present research question, this will mean that the hazard rate is the probability a democracy has of experiencing the event of failure, i.e. breaking down, thereby returning to dictatorship. With the time unit of the analysis defined in years, the hazard rate is the probability of a democracy failing in year *y* given that it has survived up until that year *y*.

The hazard rate is a function consisting of two central components: the independent variables, and the baseline hazard. The independent variables are introduced according to one’s theoretical expectation of what will affect the survival of the dependent variable. They can, as mentioned earlier, be either time-varying or time-constant (Golub 2008, Mills 2011).

The baseline hazard, on the other hand, is defined as the “underlying effect the passage of time has on the hazard rate once all independent variables in a model are taken into account” (Golub 2008, 531). It is the “pure” effect time has on the hazard rate when the independent variables are equal to zero. A positive baseline hazard rate will mean that the probability of experiencing an event will increase, regardless of the independent variables. Conversely, a negative baseline hazard rate will lower the probability over time of experiencing an event (Golub 2008).

---

<sup>29</sup> This is also known as the “death” of a unit in event history analysis.

The baseline hazard can take an infinite variety of forms, and need not be merely linear (Golub 2008). If the researcher has strong empirical evidence and theoretical guidance for assuming a certain shape of the baseline hazard, a *parametric* event history model should be chosen. If one cannot assume the specific relationship between time and the hazard rate, *semi-* or *non-parametric* models must be chosen (Golub 2008, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).<sup>30</sup> A graphic representation of the baseline hazard is presented in figure 9.1 in the appendix.

#### *Structure of event history data*

As mentioned above, a country in my thesis enters the analysis when its political regime transits from autocracy to democracy. From this point on, the regime is at risk of failure. When, if it all, the country returns to dictatorship, it leaves the analysis. If it re-establishes democracy at a later point, it is again at risk of failure, and will subsequently re-enter the analysis. The period from entry to exit is known as the survival time, or the duration time, and cannot, logically enough, be negative (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Although defining the “starting-point” of a survival time may be difficult,<sup>31</sup> in my case, this is clear: a country enters the same year as it is first registered as democratic.

Some countries will enter in 1947, while others may enter in 1990. In “calendar time” their point-of-entry may vary, but event history analysis treats these no differently. In “clock time” the “starting point is generally treated as equivalent for all observations” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 8). Thus, the first year of any democratic regime, in any country, regardless of the actual “calendar year,” will be year zero.

If a country does not experience the event of failure before the end of the observation period in my data set (viz. 2008), it is known as a “right censored” observation (Yamaguchi 1991). Its ability to handle such right censored observation is a major advantage of event history analysis, and will be discussed in detail in section 4.3.2.

The recording of data on the survival period also provides event history analysis with the ability to be more dynamic in its modelling of the phenomena in question. Since it is not only information on the event itself that is recorded, but also the history leading up to the event, one can investigate not just *whether* an event happens, but also *when in time* it is more likely to happen (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 1997, Mills 2011).

---

<sup>30</sup> This will be elaborated in section 4.5.

<sup>31</sup> For example, exactly *when* do electoral campaigns start? (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

#### 4.2.2 The mathematics of event history analysis

Before turning to the model specifications for this thesis, I wish to explain some of the basic underlying concepts of event history analysis. I have already introduced the hazard rate. Here, I will explain it in mathematical terms, and its connection to two other central concepts: the *probability density function* and the *survival function*. I start with the latter two.

I will here assume that the probability distribution for a spell of democracy up until an event is perfectly continuous. The probability density function  $f(t)$  states the probability that an event  $T$  will happen at time  $t$ . Given that the time unit in this thesis is years,  $f(t)$  is the probability that a democracy will experience the event of failure in some specific year. *Lim* states the limit of a function, and is conditional on  $\Delta t$ , which denotes change in  $t$ . The *limit* as the  $\Delta t$  approaches zero is an instantaneous point in time. This gives the following statement of the *probability density function*:

$$f(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{P(t + \Delta t > T \geq t)}{\Delta t}$$

In words, this is the likelihood that the event of interest will occur in an instantaneous point in time – that moment between time  $t$  and  $\Delta t$ .

More frugally,  $f(t)$  for a democracy  $d$  can be described as:

$$f(t) = P(T_d = t)$$

To repeat, this states the probability that a democracy  $d$  will experience an event  $T$  at time  $t$ . In my case, this is the probability that at a given time, the democratic regime will collapse. The *cumulative distribution function*  $F(t)$ , in turn, states the probability that a democracy  $d$  will experience the event of failure at any point in time *before* time  $t$ . Hence:

$$F(t) = P(T_d < t)$$

The second concept here, the *survival function*, states the probability that an event  $T$  has *not* happened before time  $t$ , and thus that a democracy has survived up until, or past, time  $t$ . All democracies that have not yet failed at a given year of observation are in this sense survivors. At the origin time of the study,  $t = 0$  and  $S(0) = 1$ , which means that all the democracies in the study are currently surviving. As time passes, however, democracies will fail, which means that the survivor function is “a strictly decreasing function” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 13).<sup>32</sup> The survival function is expressed as

---

<sup>32</sup> If no units fail, the function is flat (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

$$S(t) = P(T \geq t)$$

Or, to demonstrate the connection to the cumulative distribution function more clearly:

$$S(t) = 1 - F(t) = P(T \geq t)$$

The relationship between the cumulative probability distribution and the survival function should be logical: if you know the probability of failure before time  $t$ , you also know the probability of surviving to and beyond time  $t$ . For example, if you know that the probability of a democracy failing before time  $t_{15}$  is 0.3, the probability that it will survive to and beyond time  $t_{15}$  is simply  $1 - 0.3 = 0.7$ .

Assuming that a democracy has survived up until time  $t$ , the probability that it will experience the event of failure in the next infinitesimal interval of time will now be

$$P(t \leq T \leq t + \tau | T \geq t)$$

The *hazard rate* is the third and last component. Remember its definition in section 4.2.1 above as “the probability that at any given point in time the event of interest will occur (...) given that it has not yet occurred” (Golub 2008, 531). It is simply the probability of an event happening at time  $t$ , given that the unit has survived up until that time  $t$  (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). This means two things: it is a *conditional* probability, and it consists of both the survival function and the probability density function. In other words, both the “survival” and “death” of a unit (Yamaguchi 1991, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The hazard rate can therefore be expressed as

$$h(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{P(t + \Delta t > T \geq t | T \geq t)}{\Delta t}$$

Or quite simply:

$$h(t) = \frac{f(t)}{S(t)}$$

It is more common to model the hazard rate  $h(t)$  than the probability density function  $f(t)$  or the survival function  $S(t)$ . The hazard rate gives more information, as it includes both the risk and the survival of a unit. By knowing the hazard rate only, it is also possible to employ *proportional hazards models*, such as the Cox model, which will be explained in detail later (Yamaguchi 1991).

### 4.3 Defending the use of event history analysis

In the following section, I will defend the choice of event history analysis for the purposes of this thesis. As mentioned earlier, the method allows me to investigate the transition between two states – democracy and dictatorship. Here, I will focus on two other advantages of the method: its dynamic modelling of time, and its ability to handle right censored observations.

#### 4.3.1 Adding time to the equation

There are two dynamics at play in determining the (potential) failure of democracy: the underlying stochastic processes, and the influence of independent variables. Event history analysis adds information by focusing not only on the event in question, but also on the time leading up to the event (Mills 2011). The dynamics of time are also captured by time-varying variables. These variables change their values as time passes, thereby changing their effect on the dependent variables. Traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is inferior at modelling these kinds of time-varying dynamics (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

To illustrate the difference between an event history analysis and a normal OLS regression, consider the following:

$$\lambda(t) = \exp(\beta'x(t))\lambda_0(t)$$

This is a different expression of what has been stated above:  $\lambda(t)$  is the probability that a democracy will fail at time  $t$  given that it has survived up until time  $t$ . This likelihood of failure is a function of independent variables whose parameters can vary over time,  $(\beta'x(t))$ , and the baseline hazard  $\lambda(t)$ , which, when the independent variables are zero, is denoted by  $\lambda_0$ .  $\lambda_0$  can incorporate the stochastic processes, thus integrating the duration dependence varying over time, hence  $\lambda_0(t)$ . All this simply means that the equation above can model duration dependence – time – in the explanation of democratic failure. In contrast, a standard OLS regression equation can be expressed as

$$Y = X\beta + e$$

where  $Y$  denotes the dependent variable, and is a function of the independent variables and their associated parameters  $X\beta$  as well as the error term  $e$ . These terms are assumed to follow a normal distribution in OLS regression (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004). The baseline hazard in event history analysis,  $\lambda_0(t)$ , however, is non-normal in distribution, which is reasonable when considering the risk for an event to occur, and it is allowed to vary with time.

This is a major strength for event history analysis techniques.<sup>33</sup> Further, the OLS regression equation does not include  $(t)$  as  $(\beta'x(t))$  in the equation above does. This makes it problematic for OLS regression to capture the underlying stochastic processes behind democratic survival, and again, risks losing some of the dynamics behind the processes under investigation.

#### 4.3.2 Censoring

A second advantage of event history analysis is its ability to handle censored observations. A censored observation occurs when a unit's full survival time is unobserved (Aalen, Borgan, and Gjessing 2008, 171). There are several types of censoring, the most common of which, in the case of event history analysis, is *right censored observations* (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999).<sup>34</sup> This occurs when the event of interest has not yet happened for the unit in question by the end of the study: we know when the unit enters the risk period, i.e. the start of the spell, but not when it fails (Mills 2011).

There are two reasons for why right censoring might occur. One is the design of the study, i.e. that when the study ends at time  $t_i$ , the event in question has not yet happened (for one reason or another) for some units (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999). The second possibility is when an event of no theoretical interest to the study occurs, and the unit leaves the study although it has not experienced the event of interest (Yamaguchi 1991). In regards to the present study here at hand, the observation period ends in 2008. Democracies that have not yet failed by this year are thus right censored. Secondly, a democracy may end because of foreign invasion, or because the state is dissolved, as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1993.


Right censoring is illustrated in figure 4.1 below. Unit A enters the study after the observation period begins, and experiences the event of interest before the observation period ends. In other words, we have full information about its survival time. Unit B on the other hand, leaves the study after experiencing an event that is not of theoretical interest for the study, like the abovementioned case of Czechoslovakia. Finally, unit C does not experience the event of interest before the observation period ends. At  $t_1$  the unit is still "surviving." This is a right censored observation.

---

<sup>33</sup> Exactly *how*  $\lambda_0(t)$  is assumed to vary over time is determined by theory. It can also be left unspecified (Warwick 1992a). This is the difference between parametric and non-parametric models, discussed in detail in section 4.5.

<sup>34</sup> See Yamaguchi (1991, 3-9) for an overview of other types of censoring.

**Figure 4.1 Right censored observations**



NOTE: X = Occurrence of event of interest

Z = occurrence of event not of interest

SOURCE: Yamaguchi (1991), Laastad (2013).

Linear regression models cannot account for the difference between unit A and unit C. Excluding the right censored observations is not an option: there might be systematic differences between the observations that experienced the event before termination of the study, and those who did not. We would then risk losing information about what makes some units survive while others fail, and this approach would create a serious selection bias (Petersen 1995, Hox 2010, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). Such selection bias can lead one to detect erroneous relationships and to draw false conclusions (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, Geddes 2003). A second option could be to create a dummy variable denoting whether the observation is censored or not. This, however, would completely ignore the amount of time a unit spends in one state before failure or censoring, which is exactly the effect event history analysis is designed to integrate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, Petersen 1995).

Instead of excluding these observations or assigning a dummy variable for censoring, event history analysis is capable of using information from the survival time  $S(t)$  for the censored observations to derive a likelihood of failure. We do not know the full survival time of the observation, nor do we know the probability density function  $f(t)$ . From  $S(t)$  it is nonetheless possible to derive a likelihood of failure after observation ends. Since this is not directly observed, but rather derived from  $S(t)$ , it is not an optimal solution (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). However, it is clearly preferable to excluding censored observations, which is

a cure “worse than the ill” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1416). The (incomplete) information we have about their survival time is thus retained rather than discarded.

#### 4.4 Continuous and discrete time models

There are two main categories of event history models: discrete-time models and continuous-time models. The difference between them concerns the dependent variable’s transition from one state to another. In discrete-time models, this transition can only happen at fixed moments in time, e.g. election day in a democracy (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, Allison 1982). Some events, however, do not happen at predetermined points in time such as election days, but can instead happen at any point during a time interval. If we are capable of measuring the moment of transition in finer time units, continuous-time models are needed (Mills 2011).

An example: In a parliamentary system, a government may lose elections only at certain, predetermined moments. Election Day is only each fourth year or so, and the time interval is therefore discrete. However, if one is interested in government *resignation*, this can happen at any point between elections. This is therefore a continuous time interval.

Continuous events are, however, often measured in discrete time: we may very well know exactly *when* something happens, but we are forced to order the events according to predetermined time intervals, say by year or month (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). We may know the day, hour, or even the minute, of a government’s resignation, but in a data set it may be coded according to the month in which it happened.<sup>35</sup> In other words, “the process itself is continuous in time. It just happens that our measures of it are not,” (Petersen 1995, 498). Such is the case of the data in this thesis. A democracy can fail any day, but in my data set, the time unit is *year*. It is, in other words, a continuous event recorded in discrete time.

A potential problem here is that of *tied data*. This means that two units experience the event at the exact same time (Allison 1982). In the real world, the likelihood of two democracies failing at the precise same point in time, though theoretically possible, is extremely low; the more precise the time unit, the less likely it is (Borucka 2014). In my data set, however, it is much more likely that they collapse in the same year. Such ties can potentially cause biased estimates of the parameters (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 2004). It is common to have ties in a data set, since no events are measured at their exact time.

However, this only becomes a problem if the number of ties is quite large (Mills 2011).

---

<sup>35</sup> Creating such time intervals is absolutely necessary. In theory, of course, the time unit could be infinitely small, down to a millisecond, but this would obviously create meaningless estimations. In a sense, all continuous data is measured in discrete time.



In my case, there are two reasons for why I nonetheless choose a continuous-time model. Firstly, the event in question – democratic collapse – is continuous in real life. There is no specific date during a year a democracy must fail, if it is to fail that year. It can happen at any point within the given time interval. Thus the process is continuous, though it is not measured as such, and “If a process is continuous in time, it is clearly preferable to use continuous-time methods” (Petersen 1995, 498). Secondly, tied data only becomes a problem for continuous models if the amount of such data is large (Yamaguchi 1991). When the number of ties is low, as is the case in my data set, there is little or no practical difference between discrete-time models and continuous-time models.

#### **4.5 Specifying a model**

Now that the advantages of event history analysis have been presented, I will proceed to discuss the model specifications. As discussed above, I will use a continuous-time model. There are three main categories of these: parametric models, semi-parametric models, and non-parametric models. In short, the difference between these models concerns the shape of the abovementioned baseline hazard. The baseline hazard, to repeat, is defined as the “underlying effect the passage of time has on the hazard rate once all independent variables in a model are taken into account” (Golub 2008, 531), i.e. the “pure” effect of time on the hazard rate. If there is strong theoretical evidence that allows the researcher to assume how the baseline hazard affects the hazard rate, then parametric models are preferred. If, however, one does not know the effect of time on the hazard rate, one should choose a semi-parametric or non-parametric model (Mills 2011, Golub 2008). The difference between semi-parametric and non-parametric models, in turn, concerns the covariates, or independent variables. Non-parametric models do not make any assumptions about how the independent variables affect survival, while semi-parametric models do so (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004).

##### **4.5.1 The Cox proportional hazards model**

The Cox proportional hazards model<sup>36</sup> is, as mentioned, a semi-parametric model. This means that the model, unlike parametric models, does not assume any function of the baseline hazard, i.e. the effect of time on the event, while it *does* assume specific effects of the independent variables on the event in question, unlike the non-parametric models.

I begin with some formal details. In a Cox PH model, the hazard rate for the  $i$ th individual at time  $t$  is modelled as

---

<sup>36</sup> From now on “the Cox PH model.”

$$h_i(t) = h_0(t)\exp(\beta'x)$$

where  $h_0(t)$  is the baseline hazard, while  $\beta'x$  represents the covariates and the regression coefficients (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

Contrary to *maximum likelihood models*, which require a specification of the baseline hazard function, the Cox PH model is a *partial likelihood model* (Mills 2011, Yamaguchi 1991). It is “partial” for the following reason: in order to estimate the partial likelihood function, a data set of size  $n$  is sorted by ordered failure time, meaning that duration times are ordered from shortest to longest:  $t_1 < t_2 < t_3 < \dots t_k$ . The intervals between these duration times do not contribute any information about the relationship between the hazard rate and the covariates. Remember, the Cox PH model is a semi-parametric model, meaning it does not assume a form of the baseline hazard. Therefore, it is possible that the baseline hazard could be zero in the intervals between the duration times (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Thus, it is the *order* of the events, not their *timing* that provide information used to estimate the partial likelihood function. In this way, some information is lost – we are left with only parts of all the possible information – hence the name *partial likelihood model*. Parametric models on the other hand, which do assume a form of the baseline hazard function, do not lose this information, and are thus considered as *maximal likelihood models* (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, Yamaguchi 1991, Allison 1984). The de facto loss of efficiency for the Cox PH model, however, is too low for this to be of major concern (Allison 1984).

An important assumption for the Cox PH model is, as the name itself indicates, the proportional hazard. This is central, and means that the log hazards for two subjects will be parallel to each other over time. The hazard for a unit is thus a “fixed proportion of the hazard for any other [unit]” (Mills 2011, 88). Further, this proportional hazard cannot change over time: a one-unit increase in a covariate is assumed to have the same effect on the hazard rate at time  $t_1$  as at time  $t_{25}$  (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999). In other words, the effects of a covariate are assumed to “[be] constant over time; the effect of an independent variable is to shift the hazard by a factor of proportionality, and the size of that factor remains the same irrespective of when it occurs” (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001, 973). Violations of this assumption can lead to biased estimates, erroneous standard errors, and false inferences (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). Is therefore of vital importance that tests are run to control for whether the assumption holds or not. These tests are explained and reported in detail in section 6.2. Though this assumption is quite strict, I will explain in the following section why the Cox model is nonetheless the preferred choice of model in this thesis.

#### 4.5.2 The arguments for choosing a Cox proportional hazards model

Many of the reasons for why the Cox PH model is the preferred model for the research question here at hand have already been mentioned. I will here briefly repeat and summarize these points.

First, the Cox PH model does not assume any form of the baseline hazard. Remember, the baseline hazard can take an infinite variety of forms; it is not simply a question of whether it decreases or increases over time – it can be U-shaped, exponential, constant, bell-shaped, etc. (Golub 2008). To assume a particular form can only be done based on strong theoretical evidence, and assuming the wrong form may lead to grave errors (Golub 2008, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Second, the Cox PH model is superior to parametric models for handling ties. As mentioned, such ties are often bound to happen because of the discrete measurements for continuous data. The problem of tied data also affects parametric models – and the Cox PH model is better at handling these ties (Golub 2008). Third and lastly, the Cox PH model is superior to other parametric models in handling the proportional hazards assumption. This assumption is central to the Cox model: the hazard ratio between two given individuals is assumed to be constant through the whole survival time (Golub 2008). This is, as mentioned, a strict assumption – but it is not unique to the Cox model. In fact, several of the parametric models, such as Weibull and Gompertz also assume a proportional hazard,<sup>37</sup> and the Cox model provides more convenient and simpler tools to detect violations of this assumption than do the other models (Golub 2008).

A last point, though this is not an argument in itself, is that the Cox PH model is extremely common in the literature. The model is by far the most widely used semi-parametric model, if not event history model, today (Mills 2011, Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Thus, the usage of the model places this project safely within the established practice.

#### 4.5.3 Interpretation of Cox regressions

To understand the results from a Cox PH model it is first necessary to make a distinction between the hazard *rate* and the hazard *ratio*. To repeat, the hazard rate is the risk for a unit of experiencing an event  $T$  at time  $t$  given that it has survived up until time  $t$ . The hazard ratio, on the other hand, estimates the ratio of the hazard rate in one group compared to the hazard rate of another. In other words, “the hazard ratio is the ratio of the hazard rate given a one unit increase in the covariate to the hazard rate without such an increase” (Mills 2011, 96). This

---

<sup>37</sup> Models “not part of the PH family,” such as log-logistic models, make similar assumptions, but regarding the log-odds instead (Golub 2008, 536-537). Thus, these do not evade the problem either.

means that the hazard ratio does not report an absolute probability; rather, it is a relative probability. It compares the hazards of units that do not experience an increase of the given independent variable to those that do.

The Stata software can report the hazard ratios of the Cox PH model as coefficients or as exponentiated coefficients. This is a difference in the way of reporting the results, and not in calculating them (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004). I let Stata exponentiate the coefficients for me, as these are less complicated to interpret. This means that if an independent variable generates a hazard ratio higher than 1, the independent variable increases the risk of experiencing the event. If an independent variable generates a hazard ratio lower than 1, on the other hand, the risk of experiencing failure decreases. For example, a hazard ratio of 2 doubles the risk of experiencing failure, while a hazard ratio of 0.70 reduces the risk by 30% ( $1-0.7$ ) in any given year  $y$ . If the hazard ratio is 1, the independent variable is not associated with any change in the hazard for a unit (Mills 2011).

An unusual feature of the Cox PH model is that it does not contain any intercept. The intercept is instead incorporated into the baseline hazard of the model, and it is strictly speaking not possible to identify it from the data (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004).

#### **4.5.4 Other possible choices of models**

The arguments for the Cox PH model have already been made, and I will not repeat them at length here. However, I would like to conclude this chapter with a short note on why a parametric model could or could not have been applied. In their studies of government durability, King, Alt, Burns, and Laver (1990), and Warwick (1992b) both use the exponential Gompertz distribution in their parametric model. Warwick and Easton (1992, 137) state that “the possibility of duration dependency is an inherently interesting issue, and it would be more appropriate to attempt to determine its precise nature than to exclude it from the analysis,” and compare several parametric models in their analysis. Strang (1991) also uses the Gompertz distribution in his study of decolonisation, and, more to the point here, Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon (2003) use a Weibull distribution in their parametric model of democratic survival and level conflict in the international system.

Though it may seem logical and perhaps even obvious that time has an effect on the likelihood of democratic collapse, I argue that it is problematic to assume a certain form of the baseline hazard. First of all, it is not so much the duration-dependency itself that is in focus here, as the relationship between independent variables and a certain outcome of interest. I concur with Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004, 47) that “most research questions in social

science should be chiefly concerned with getting the specific theoretical relationship ‘right’ and less concerned with the specific form of the duration dependency, which can be sensitive to the form of the posited model.”

Further, remember that the baseline hazard can take an infinite variety of forms. Simply assuming that time has an effect is not enough: it could be a constantly decreasing hazard, or an exponentially decreasing hazard; it could be U-shaped, or an inversed U-shaped distribution. The assumption that time affects the baseline hazard is thus not sufficient – it is also necessary to have a strong theoretical argument for precisely *how* the baseline hazard is distributed. In my opinion, the literature does not provide such evidence.

#### **4.6 Summary**

In this chapter, I have presented the methodological foundation and methods for the thesis. Event history analysis is capable not only of modelling the event of interest, but also the time leading up to the event. In an event history analysis model the hazard rate is the dependent variable. This is the conditional probability that an event  $T$  happens at time  $t$ , given that it has survived up until time  $t$ . For this thesis, this means the probability that a democracy will fail in year  $y$  given that it has survived up until that year  $y$ . The result is a more dynamic model, in which the stochastic processes as well as time-varying independent variables can be incorporated. Further, event history analysis is also capable of using right censored data. These are substantial advantages for the present purposes.

I also argued for the use of the Cox proportional hazards model. The advantage of this model is that, contrary to parametric models, it does not assume a form of the baseline hazard function. The inclusion of the baseline hazard is in itself a significant advantage over OLS regression models. Moreover, contrary to non-parametric models, the Cox PH model *does* assume a function of the independent variables, which there are strong theoretical reasons for doing here. Its ability to cope with the proportional hazards assumption and its superior handling of tied data are other advantages of the Cox PH model.

I have now laid out the theoretical framework, hypotheses, and methods of the thesis. Now, I continue to present the data set, its structure, and the operationalisation of the dependent and the independent variables, before finally turning to the analyses.

## **5 The data and the variables**

In the following chapter, I present the data set, the sample, and some specific issues and potential problems. I proceed to explain the operationalisation of both the dependent and independent variables, and discuss various other ways in which this could have been done. A particular problem is how to measure the legacy of civil society activation. I suggest three ways to code these variables, all of which will be discussed. A last section summarises the chapter.

### **5.1 The data set: Who's in and who's out**

As have already been mentioned, all countries that are included in this data set must have made a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy at some point after 1946. A few elaborations are in order, however. Firstly, countries that are democratic or authoritarian for the whole period are excluded by default: a transition must have taken place. Secondly, due to limitations in data, the transition must have taken place after 1946. If a country becomes democratic before in 1946, and collapses into dictatorship in 1950, it still does not enter the data set until this dictatorship in turn breaks down and a new democracy takes its place. It is important to keep in mind that the democratic spell *which succeeds* a dictatorship is my dependent variable. If the dictatorship does not collapse before 2008 (and there had not occurred a previous transition to democracy since 1946), the country is not included. Put simply, *a transition from dictatorship to democracy must be observed after 1946*.

I recognise that this design imposes some severe restrictions on data. Democratic spells that begin before 1946 are left out of the analysis entirely. However, any data set must have its limitations in time, and loss of information due to these limits is unavoidable. I could have used a data set that observes democracies earlier than 1946, but this in turn, would mean that I lack observations on my independent variables.

There is a specific point I would like to discuss in greater detail, namely that of the post-Soviet states. Much of the literature discussed in chapter two concerns civil society in post-Soviet states. These states are undoubtedly of theoretical interest here: they are all post-authoritarian states, some of which have made a transition to democracy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and some of these democracies have in turn survived while others have failed. However, following the logic explained above, only a few of these countries are included in the analysis. This is because these countries were not independent states before the termination of the Soviet Union. Therefore, there are no measures of their civil society activation during their authoritarian past, and technically, they have not made a transition from dictatorship to democracy during their time as independent states. Consequently, only the post-

Soviet countries that have been authoritarian as sovereign states for some period *after* the termination of the USSR and *then* made a transition to democracy are included. This problem is also relevant for the post-Yugoslavian countries.

**Table 5.1 Overview of the data set**

Nr of countries	Nr of spells of democracy	Shortest spell	Longest spell	Average length of spells	Failures	Right censored observations
68	97	1 year	60 years	23.3 years	41	59

## 5.2 The dependent variable

As mentioned in section 4.2.1, the dependent variable in this thesis is defined as the likelihood that a democratic spell will end, or quite simply the likelihood for democratic collapse. The time unit in which these spells are measured is years. This definition necessitates two demarcations: one to denote the beginning of the spell, and one to mark its termination. This is the “birth” and “death” of the democracy. The democracy is born when a regime transits from authoritarian rule to democratic rule, and dies when the reverse journey is conducted.

The measure for democracy is from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), and is a dichotomous classification of regimes as either democratic or authoritarian, first introduced by Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000). The version of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) used here has been provided with extended coverage. Here, democracies are simply “regimes in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections” (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, 69). More specifically, there are four requirements which must be met for a regime to be considered democratic: I) The chief executive is popularly elected, or “by a body that was itself popularly elected” (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, 69); II) The legislature too is chosen by popular election; III) There is more than one party competing; IV) There must be an alternation in power under the same rules that brought the incumbent to power in the first place (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). A country is coded as democratic from the year it meets these criteria.

### 5.2.1 Alternative measures of democracy

A democratic spell starts the same year a country’s regime fulfils the abovementioned criteria, and ends the same year it breaks one of them. The rules are necessary and sufficient to call a regime democratic; if one rule is broken it is no longer democratic. This is a minimalist description of democracy, in line with Schumpeter’s (1950, 269) definition of democracy as an

“(…) institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.”

A definition of democracy like this has its advantages and disadvantages.<sup>38</sup> O'Donnell (2010) for example, criticizes the Schumpeterian approach to democracy as being too minimalist and elitist. Schumpeter, O'Donnell claims, must either add a “vast array of dimensions” to complete his definition, which would render it “anything but minimalist,” or he has “failed to offer a typology that would differentiate full and diminished kinds of democracy” (2010, 15). In a similar vein, both Teorell (2010) and O'Donnell (2010) criticize Przeworski et al. (2000) for emphasizing contested elections in their definition without including any fundamental rights and freedoms that would ensure that the opposition actually has a de facto chance to win. Thus, many scholars argue that a range of other components must be included to capture what democracy truly is about (Paxton 2000, Dahl 1971, Coppedge et al. 2011, Munck and Verkuilen 2002, Schmitter and Karl 1991).

Further, the dichotomous nature of democracy employed by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2010) is itself contested. Perhaps the most famous rivals are the continuous indices of Freedom House and Polity IV (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Elkins (2000) argues that dichotomous measures are imprecise and insensitive to changes in the real processes behind democratisation, and that they often are unreliable; Bollen and Jackman (1989, 618) state that “Democracy is always a matter of degree,” and that treating democracy as a binary concept is outdated and unnecessary given recent advances in data collection and methodology.

Przeworski et al. (2000) are of course not alone in using dichotomous measures of democracy. Both Huntington (1991) and, more recently, Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013) to name a few, favour this line. I will not dive into this debate here. However, since this is a fundamental debate in much of the research on democratic regimes in contemporary political science, I will give a few remarks on why I have decided on a dichotomous measure.

Firstly, a dichotomous approach “provides a concreteness and transparency to the class of democracies” (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013, 1528). This point links up with the concern briefly expressed in section 2.7, namely that concepts such as democracy and civil society may not travel well in space and time. By using a minimalist and dichotomous conceptualisation of democracy, which is superior in clarity and precision to many other conceptualisations (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013, Munck and Verkuilen 2002), one is less vulnerable to this conceptual

---

<sup>38</sup> I will not discuss specific democracy indices up against each other. Rather, I seek to give a brief review of the debate of various measurements and conceptualisations of democracy. See Munck and Verkuilen (2002) for a thorough discussion of the most common democracy indices.



stretching (Collier and Levitsky 1997).

For my thesis, there is also a very practical reason for this choice: event history analysis demands a binary dependent variable. There is no “partial death” in the terms of event history analysis. Either a democracy survives or it dies. In this sense, I lean on Collier and Adcock who pragmatically search for common ground when they state that “decisions about gradations versus dichotomies are often built into the framing of research questions,” and that “how *scholars understand and operationalize a concept can and should depend on what they are going to do with it*” (1999, 539, 561, italics mine). Finally, a dichotomous classification is also more common in the literature on democratic transition, survival, and breakdown (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013). I thus seat myself in line with much of the previous research on this topic.

### **5.3 The independent variables**

#### **5.3.1 Civil society activation**

The first variable for civil society is from Coppedge et al. (2015). This variable is an index designed to measure the robustness of “core civil society” in a given country in a given year, and is composed of three indicators: repression of civil society organisations, the participatory environment of such organisations, and their entry and exit in time. It is coded for each country-year by assigned country experts, and ranges from 0-1, where 0 is least robust, and 1 it the most robust (Coppedge et al. 2015). For present purposes, I have re-scaled it to 0-100.

Three other variables measuring civil society activation are from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, commonly known as the Banks data set (Banks and Wilson 2015). The variable *Riots* counts the number of demonstrations that turn violent, or a clash of more than a 100 people that involves the use of physical force (Banks and Wilson 2015). *Protests* measures the number of anti-government demonstrations, defined as “Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature” (Banks and Wilson 2015, 11). The fact that I am interested in anti-government demonstrations in dictatorships need not mean that they are pro-democratic. Only including pro-democratic demonstrations would have severely biased my sample, for obvious reasons. The third and last variable, *Strikes*, counts the number of general strikes by industrial or service workers, involving more than 1000 people, aimed at government policies (Banks and Wilson 2015).

The use of the Banks data set can be problematic. Their source for recording the events in question is The New York Times (Banks and Wilson 2015). History is inherently biased, and

there is no guarantee that all relevant events have been recorded. As the countries included here were all authoritarian at the time of the occurrence the events, it is even more difficult to verify the information and to ensure that no relevant events were overlooked. In particular, one can imagine that smaller events have been overlooked, as they have not been reported in The New York Times. Both Teorell (2010) and Ulfelder (2005) worry about this bias in the Banks data set, while underlining “its extensive and systematic coverage” as an advantage (Ulfelder 2005, 321). Since it is easier to gain knowledge of events in more open autocracies than in closed ones, one risks potentially un-balanced measures from the various countries. I will address this problem by including several different ways of coding the variables, all of which will be discussed below.

### **5.3.1.1 The problem of legacy**

Now that the variables used to capture the activation of civil society in a country have been described, a new problem arises – namely how to capture the “legacy” of civil society activation which took place under the previous dictatorship. The dependent variable, i.e. the duration of a democratic spell, is measured from the point of democratisation. I seek to explain variations in the lengths of these spells with independent variables measured at a point in time much earlier than the occurrence of the dependent variable itself, namely during the authoritarian regime which preceded the democracy. In other words, the relationship between these independent “legacy” variables and the dependent variable is non-contemporaneous, i.e. they do not happen at the same time (Gujarati and Porter 2010).

A common procedure is to lag some, or all, independent variables. The cause and effect can, if lagged, not happen at the same time, since the cause has been “delayed”, so to say. Thus the results will more correctly reflect the true relationship (Mills 2011). For example, an increase in the monthly salary for a worker will not immediately result in increased spending. By lagging the independent variable *salary* however, its relationship to the dependent variable *spending* is better captured: the increase in a worker’s pay will not express itself in increased spending until the first pay-check arrives, a month or so later (Gujarati and Porter 2010).

However, lagged effects are not an option given the research design of this thesis. Lagging the independent variable *Riots* 10 years to separate it from the dependent variable will not make it accurate for units that experience authoritarian spells longer or shorter than 10 years. Each authoritarian spell is unique in length, and lagging the independent variable for a fixed  $n$  years will simply be inaccurate for all spells that are shorter or longer than  $n$ . There is no general duration for the authoritarian spells, thus there can be no general lag for all observations. More

importantly, the motivation here behind specifying past values of some key independent variables is *not* to capture the “lagged effect” as commonly understood in regression modelling; rather, the motivation is *theoretical*: I wish to capture the effect of the *legacy of the previous dictatorship* upon the duration of the subsequent democratic regime.

### 5.3.1.2 Capturing the legacy of civil society

I use the variable *Riots* as an example. The coding of the legacy variables follows a relatively simple and straightforward logic: for a country A, I count the number of years in which there were one or more riots during the authoritarian spell. I then create an average by dividing the sum of “riot-years” by the total length of the spell. This will create a 0-1 scale, as no country can have more years of riots than there are years in the spell. I rescale this to 0-10. This number is then assigned to each country-year of the democratic spell which succeeds the authoritarian regime in that same country. This is done for the variables *Riots*, *Protest*, *Strikes*, and *Elections*.

I recognize that objections may be raised as to whether it actually captures the *legacy* of civil society activation in a meaningful way. To try to accommodate for this, I have also coded the same variables in two other ways.<sup>39</sup> The first alternative creates an average of the number of incidents in total: the sum of riots during a dictatorship is divided by the years the dictatorship lasted. This average is assigned to each country-year of the following democracy. The second alternative follows this same logic, but *only in the final three years of the authoritarian regime*. A reason for doing this, is O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (2013) findings that there is often a higher degree of citizen activation during the *transition* to democracy than at other points in time. Thus, I count the number of riots in the last three years of the dictatorship and divide this sum by three.<sup>40</sup>

I argue, however, that the first approach has several advantages. Firstly, it accommodates the potential reporting problems in the Banks data set, which was discussed above. The data set relies, as mentioned, on the New York Times reports on events in any country in any year. Reliable information about these events are much harder to come by in closed authoritarian regimes, perhaps particularly during the Cold War. Information might be more accessible for Mexico than for Burma. Knowing that *at least one* protest occurred in each country moderates these potential reporting biases.

Secondly, this coding moderates any outliers. Short, intense authoritarian spells between two democratic spells might be marked by significant social upheaval and citizen action.

---

<sup>39</sup> The variable *Civil Society* does not come in these two alternative versions.

<sup>40</sup> If the spell itself is shorter than three years, I divide it by two or one.

Compared to the longer, more stable authoritarian spells, these values would have been problematic in terms of the regression analysis. This is avoided by counting the number of years rather than the number of incidents. Thirdly, the increase from, say, five to six strikes in a year might not be very meaningful in an analytical perspective. The difference between having *no* general strikes and having *at least one*, however, is much more consequential. Coding the variable in this manner reflects this. For these reasons, this set of variables will be the standard in the analysis, while the other two will serve as comparisons in section 6.2.

To summarise, I try to capture the legacy of civil society activation in the past authoritarian regime through three types of variables. (I) The Year-based variables, in which the total number of years where any incident of interest occurred is divided by the number of years the authoritarian spell lasted. (II) The Average-based variables, where the total number of *incidents* which occurred during the authoritarian spell is divided by the number of years this spell lasted. (III) The Transition-based variables, where the total number of incidents in the last three years of an authoritarian spell is divided by three.

### **5.3.2 The past authoritarian regime controls**

#### *Length of previous authoritarian regime*

The variable *Authoritarian spell* measures the length in years of the immediately preceding authoritarian spell. This is in fact the same variable as the dependent variable, from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). The length of the authoritarian spell in years is assigned to each country-year in the democratic spell for that same country.

#### *Previous authoritarian elections*

Data for the variable *Elections* is from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy data set, version 4.0. All national elections for the legislative or executive branch, or for constitutional assemblies, are included (Hyde and Marinov 2012). The *legacy* effect of these elections is captured in the same way as for the civil society variables explained above.

#### *Previous experience with democracy*

The variable *Transitions* counts the number of previous democratic failures a country has experienced. This will also capture a country's past experience with democratic rule: if there has been a democratic collapse, then there must obviously have been a previous democracy as well. The variable is from the Democracy and Dictatorship data set by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). If a country has experienced more than one democratic failure before 1946, the variable is coded as 1 at the beginning of the data set.

### *Violence during transition*

A third control variable for the legacy of the authoritarian past, *Violence*, measures the level of violence during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. This variable is from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014b), and is originally divided into four values: 0 for no deaths, 1 for 1-25 deaths, 2 for 26-1000 deaths, and 4 for more than 1000 deaths. I have for present purposes recoded this variable into a dummy, where 0 = less than 25 deaths, and 1 = more than 25 deaths.

### *Type of previous authoritarian regime*

Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014a) provide information on the type of authoritarian regime preceding democracy. The dummy variables *military*, *personal*, *monarchy* and *party* describe these various forms of authoritarian regimes. Because the dependent variable is a dichotomous democracy/non-democracy variable, there can be several transitions between various forms of authoritarian regimes before democratisation (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014b). The authoritarian regime type, either military, party, monarchy, or personal, in the last three years before democratisation becomes the institutional “legacy” variable for the new democracy.

There is only one country in my data set that has a legacy of monarchy: Nepal. Out of a total 1410 country-years this would have provided only 14 observations for monarchy as a regime legacy variable. As this is close to meaningless, I recode Nepal’s legacy as a *personal* dictatorship. The possible types of authoritarian regime legacy are thus three: *Personal*, *Military*, and *Party*. Including *Military* in the model means that *Personal* and *Party* are reference categories.

### *Alternative classifications: Totalitarian v. authoritarian regimes*

An alternative way to describe the various forms of authoritarian regime legacy could be to follow Juan Linz (2000) in separating between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. As described in section 2.6, in totalitarian states everything must be under state control, and they are set on destroying even the smallest sphere of independent and free organisation of citizens (Fukuyama 1995, Bernhard and Karakoc 2007). Linz (2000, 67) describes the characteristics of a totalitarian system as one consisting of “an ideology, a single mass party and other mobilising organizations, and concentrated power in an individual and his collaborators or a small group that is not accountable to any large constituency and cannot be dislodged from power by institutionalized, peaceful means.” Occurring separately, these elements constitute an authoritarian regime; combined, they incorporate the totalitarian state.

Following such a description, one would naturally expect that totalitarianism would have a more devastating effect on civil society than would authoritarianism. And indeed, both

Howard (2003) and Bernhard and Karakoc (2007) find that post-totalitarian democracies have weaker civil societies than post-authoritarian democracies. However, the reason why I do not follow this division is practical rather than theoretical: as Howard (2003) notes, with the exception of Nazi-Germany, all totalitarian and post-totalitarian states are connected to the former communist bloc. Given the particularities of my research design, discussed above in section 5.1, very few countries in my sample would fall into this category. Further, as Linz and Stepan (1996, 40-41) recognized, the scope of the totalitarian concept is limited not only in space, but also time: “By the early 1980s, the number of countries that were clearly totalitarian or were attempting to create such regimes had in fact been declining for some time. As many Soviet-type regimes began to change after Stalin’s death in 1953, they no longer conformed to the totalitarian model.” Thus, in 1991 many post-Soviet countries would not just have a totalitarian legacy, but also a “milder” authoritarian legacy. This would leave the variable *post-totalitarian* scarce in observations.

Lastly, the reason I include authoritarian legacies as controls is not because of their effect on civil society legacy: *democracy* is the dependent variable, not civil society. A military past is said to influence the likelihood of a post-authoritarian democratic collapse. The fact that totalitarian states interact differently with civil society is strictly speaking not of interest here.

### **5.3.3 The present democratic regime controls**

#### *Level of economic development*

A country’s level of economic development is measured by GDP per capita. The variable is from Gleditsch (2002). Named *ln GDP per capita*, the variable measures GDP per capita in US dollars in the current year in international prices. It has been logged, which is common in the literature as it makes it easier to interpret the results from the variable (Skog 2009). It has also been centred, as having 0 GDP, though theoretically possible, is not a substantial value for GDP (Leeuw and Meijer 2008). The variable *GDP Growth* denotes annual growth in GDP per capita. Data is from the World Bank (Group 2012). For purposes of interpretation, I have recoded it into a dummy variable, where 0 is negative or no growth, and 1 means positive growth.

#### *Ethnicity*

The variable *Ethnic* measures ethnic fractionalisation, and is provided by Fearon (2003). Based on an index of 822 ethnic groups in 160 countries that had at least 1 percent of a country’s population, Fearon’s index denotes the probability that two randomly drawn individuals will come from two different ethnic groups. The variable ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to

1 (perfectly heterogeneous). Following Collier and Hoeffler (2004) amongst others, I have rescaled the index to 0-100 to ease interpretation.

The ethnic fractionalisation index can be problematic. The concepts of ethnicity and ethnic diversity are widely used, particularly in the field of civil war studies, but they are slippery and unclear. Fearon's (2003) focus on ethno-linguistic differences is contested, and some argue that other indices, e.g. measuring polarisation of groups, or ethno-nationalism, are better (Reynal-Querol 2002, Cederman and Girardin 2007). For the present purposes as a control variable, its extensive coverage, and given its commonality in the literature, however, I decide on the variable from Fearon (2003).

#### *Democratic institutions*

The variable for democratic regime institutions is from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). As was seen in section 3.2 in the chapter on previous research, there is little consensus on the relationship between presidential and parliamentary systems, and democratic survival. Further, Cheibub (2007), amongst others, collapse mixed systems with parliamentary systems as these two have governments that are responsible to parliament. Others, such as Cornell et al. (2016), who in turn build their conceptualisation on Gerring and Thacker (2008), combine presidential and mixed systems into one category.

I have therefore created two dummy variables of this original measure. I first code the *Presidential* variable, where parliamentary and mixed systems are coded 0, and pure presidential systems are coded 1. I then create a second variable, where parliamentary systems alone are 0, while mixed and presidential systems are coded as 1. As will be seen in the next chapter, changing between these two variables does indeed affect the regression results.

### **5.4 Summary**

In this chapter, I have explained the structure of the data set, and the operationalisation of the dependent and the independent variables. The data set consists of all countries that have made a transition from dictatorship to democracy as sovereign states between 1946 and 2008, as coded by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). My main independent variables are from Coppedge et al. (2015) and Banks and Wilson (2015).

I have now presented the theoretical framework, hypotheses, the method and the variables. Next, I move to the analysis and the results themselves, all of which will be presented and discussed in the following chapter six.

## 6 Results and discussion

In the following chapter, I present the results of the Cox proportional hazards models. First, I explain the build-up of the various models, why I include or exclude the variables that I do, and what these models show. The first models I present will focus specifically upon the first of the two “categories” of control variables, namely those that are based on the *legacy* of the previous authoritarian regime (the other being those based on the *current* democratic regime). I then proceed, in models 3 and 4, to introduce the civil society legacy variables, *Civil Society*, *Riots*, *Protests*, and *Strikes*, first alone, then in combination with the authoritarian regime legacy controls. I then introduce the control variables for the post-transition democratic regime, in models 5 and 6. This leads up to the final two models, presented below in table 6.4. Before proceeding to the analysis, I run a series of robustness checks and tests on these two models.

Countries can experience recurring events, i.e. democratic failure several times during the time period under investigation. To accommodate for this, I follow Cornell et al. (2016), amongst others, and use robust standard errors clustered by country. Tied events are handled by using the Efron method (Mills 2011, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).<sup>41</sup> All observations are country-years.

The models report hazard ratios rather than coefficients. As I explained in section 4.4.4, the hazard ratio must be interpreted relative to 1. A hazard ratio of close to or exactly 1 indicates that the independent variable has little or no effect on the hazard rate for the dependent variable. If the hazard ratio is, for example, 1.10, this means that a one unit increase in the independent variable leads to a 10% increase in the hazard, i.e. a democracy’s likelihood of collapse. This is *relative* to a country that has not experienced a one-unit increase in that same independent variable, and does therefore not denote the absolute likelihood for failure. Conversely, a hazard ratio of 0.90 decreases the hazard by 10% relative to a country that has not experienced a one-unit decrease in that same independent variable.

Before proceeding to the results, I display descriptive statistics for all independent variables in table 6.1 below.

---

<sup>41</sup> See section 4.4 for a discussion of tied events.



**Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Civil Society	1381	35.294	23.754	2.3	92
Riots	1410	2.927	2.670	0	10
Protests	1410	2.554	2.681	0	10
Strikes	1410	1.204	2.269	0	10
<b>Authoritarian regime controls</b>					
Elections	1410	2.588	2.359	0	10
Military	1272	0.514	0.499	0	1
Authoritarian spell	1410	17.775	14.255	1	60
Transitions	1404	1.047	1.049	0	5
Violence	1101	0.205	0.404	0	1
<b>Democratic regime controls</b>					
ln GDP per capita	1321	1.66E-08	1.182	-2.694	2.537
GDP Growth	1310	0.766	0.423	0	1
Ethnic	1309	43.344	23.735	0.399	92.969
Presidential	1369	0.607	0.488	0	1
Presidential Mixed	1369	0.801	0.399	0	1

## 6.1 The results

### *The authoritarian regime controls*

Table 6.2 below presents two models showing the controls variables which measure past authoritarian regime characteristics. There are five such “previous authoritarian regime” control variables: experience with authoritarian elections (*Election*); the type of authoritarian regime (*Military*);<sup>42</sup> the length of the previous authoritarian spell, in years (*Authoritarian spell*); The number of previous democratic collapses for a country (*Transitions*), and a dummy variable for the level of violence during the transition from dictatorship to democracy (*Violence*), where 0 denotes less than 25 deaths, and 1 more than 25 deaths.

Model 1 presents all these five variables together. Only *Authoritarian spell* and *Transitions* are significant, both at a 5 percent level. *Authoritarian spell* has a hazard ratio of 0.969, indicating that for each additional year the previous authoritarian spell lasted, the hazard drops by about 3 per cent relative to a democracy without this increase in authoritarian spell duration. The hazard ratio for *Transitions* is 0.592, which means that for each additional democratic failure in a country’s past, the likelihood that this present democracy will collapse

<sup>42</sup> Personalist and one-party dictatorships serve as reference for *Military*.

is lowered by 40.8 per cent, again relative to a country with one fewer democratic failures in its pasts. By counting democratic collapses, the variable *Transition* also captures these previous democratic experiences.

Three of the independent variables do not show statistical significance: *Elections*, *Military*, and *Violence*. Of these three, *Violence* has the highest p-value, and is never significant under any combination of the variables that I run, including varieties that have been tried, but not displayed here. Changing the dichotomous coding discussed in section 5.3.2 does not produce any difference either. Considering this, and the fact that Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014b) warn that research on the effect of transitional violence on democratic survival is vague, while Huntington (1991, 192) states that estimating political deaths during democratisation is “extraordinarily difficult,” I decide to drop this variable. Model 2 therefore omits this variable, and we observe that again *Authoritarian spell* and *Transitions* are significant, this time at a 5 per cent and 10 percent level respectively. Both variables lower the hazard, and their hazard ratios display minimal changes from Model 1. *Election* and *Military*, the two variables that are non-significant here, also show consistent hazard ratios as compared to Model 1. Hence, I decide to keep these variables, as they are consistent and because they in later combinations do show significance, contrary to the *Violence* variable. These are thus the four authoritarian regime legacy variables that will be included further.

**Table 6.2 Authoritarian regime controls**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>
Election	0.859 (0.108)	0.923 (0.0864)
Military	1.850 (0.817)	1.840 (0.746)
Authoritarian spell	0.969** (0.0155)	0.962** (0.0171)
Transitions	0.592** (0.135)	0.597* (0.158)
Violence	0.740 (0.368)	
Observations	1,017	1,182
Wald chi2	11.32	11.35
Prob > chi2	0.0455	0.0229
Log pseudolikelihood	-127.13386	-147.19123
Robust standard errors in parentheses		
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

### *Civil society activation and democratic regime controls*

Table 6.3 displays models 3 to 6. Model 3 presents my four civil society activation variables alone: *Civil Society*, *Riots*, *Protests*, and *Strikes*. *Civil Society* is non-significant and has a close-to-neutral hazard ratio of 1.004. *Riots* is also non-significant, while both *Protests* and *Strikes* are significant: *Protests* has a hazard ratio of 0.861 and is significant at the 1 per cent level. *Strikes*, in turn, is significant at the 10 per cent level, with a hazard ratio of 1.075. Model 4 then introduces the authoritarian regime controls identified in Model 2. *Riots* is now significant at the 5 per cent level, with a hazard ratio of 1.272. This means that for each additional year with a riot during the dictatorship, the hazard for a subsequent democratic collapse increases by 27.2 per cent, compared to a country that did not see such an increase in its riot-legacy. *Protests* is significant at the 5 per cent level, with a hazard ratio of 0.773. Again, this means that an additional year of protests under dictatorship lowers the hazard for the subsequent democracy by 22.7 per cent.

*Strikes* is no longer significant, with a hazard ratio of 1.030. Of the control variables, *Election* is significant at the 5 per cent level, and lowers the hazard by 21.2 per cent. *Military* is significant, though at the 10 per cent level, and more than doubles the likelihood of democratic collapse. *Authoritarian spell* is non-significant, but with a hazard ratio of 0.981, it is consistent from models 1 and 2. Finally, *Transitions* remains significant at the 10 per cent level and for each additional democratic collapse in the past, the hazard drop by 39.5 per cent.

In models 5 and 6 the civil society activation variables are combined with a new set of control variables, namely those which measure characteristics of the present democratic regime: GDP per capita (*ln GDP per capita*), growth (*GDP Growth*), ethnic fractionalisation (*Ethnic*), and political institutions (*Presidential* and *Presidential-Mixed*). Models 5 and 6 are identical except for the coding of the political institution variable, *Presidential*. Here I have coded presidential system as 1, leaving parliamentary and mixed-systems as its reference category, while *Presidential-Mixed* groups mixed systems with presidential systems, leaving parliamentarism alone as its reference. The reason for testing both codings is twofold, as discussed in section 3.2: there is little agreement over the significance of this variable, and it is therefore interesting to see whether this minor change to the coding has any substantial effect on this matter. Further, some (see for example Cheibub (2007)) collapse mixed systems and parliamentary systems together as they both have governments that are responsible to the elected assembly. Others (see for example Cornell et al. (2016)) collapse mixed and presidential systems together, since these two have an independently elected president, which parliamentary systems do not.

The variable *Civil Society* is significant neither in Model 5 nor in Model 6, and again displays a close-to neutral hazard ratio of 1.002. *Riots*, *Protests*, and *Strikes* are all significant in both models, where particularly *Riots* and *Protests* are highly significant, at the 1 per cent level. All three appear to have consistent hazard ratios, where *Riots* and *Strikes* increase the hazard, while *Protests* lowers it.

GDP and growth are significant in both, the former at the 5 per cent level, the latter at the 1 per cent level. Both decrease the hazard, GDP per capita by approximately 30 and 32 per cent in the respective models, while growth lowers the hazard by around 70 per cent compared to a country with negative or no growth. *Presidential* and *Ethnic* are non-significant in Model 5, while in Model 6, *Presidential Mixed* is highly significant at the 1 per cent level and lowers the hazard by as much as 69.6 per cent. *Ethnic* is non-significant in this model too, and continues to display an almost neutral hazard ratio of 1.017, which would indicate a small 1.7 per cent increase in the hazard *had* it been significant.

What we therefore see thus far is the following: a legacy of having experienced several years of riots and strikes decrease the likelihood that the following post-authoritarian democracy will survive, compared to those democracies that do not have such a legacy. Further, a legacy of protests and experience with authoritarian elections increases the likelihood that the subsequent democracy will survive. Also, positive economic growth, high levels of economic development, and a non-parliamentary system significantly increases the likelihood that the democracy will survive, as was indeed expected.

**Table 6.3 Civil society activation and democratic regime controls**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 6</b>
Civil Society	1.004 (0.00547)	1.011 (0.00828)	1.002 (0.00763)	1.002 (0.00718)
Riots	1.084 (0.0682)	1.272** (0.134)	1.196*** (0.0720)	1.199*** (0.0712)
Protests	0.861*** (0.0404)	0.773** (0.0914)	0.858*** (0.0410)	0.841*** (0.0475)
Strikes	1.075* (0.0435)	1.030 (0.0520)	1.158* (0.0872)	1.152* (0.0849)
Elections		0.789** (0.0921)		
Military		2.183* (0.971)		
Authoritarian spell		0.981 (0.0203)		
Transitions		0.605* (0.176)		
ln GDP per capita			0.698** (0.121)	0.676** (0.104)
Growth			0.316*** (0.117)	0.287*** (0.0956)
Ethnic			1.013 (0.00971)	1.017 (0.0109)
Presidential			0.567 (0.232)	
Presidential – Mixed				0.304*** (0.122)
Observations	1,277	1,179	1,136	1,136
Wald chi2	21.00	21.98	45.24	67.25
Prob > chi2	0.0003	0.0050	0.0000	0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood	-165.32221	-141.48337	-124.74915	-121.85696

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*The final models*

I now proceed to construct the final models that will be used for interpretation. Models 7 and 8, which can be seen in table 6.4 below, include all the control variables that have now been identified, but exclude *Civil Society*. This variable has not been significant under any model specification, and consistently reports an almost neutral hazard ratio. Note again that the only difference between models 7 and 8 is the coding of the dummy variable for political institutions under democracy: *Presidential* has as its reference category parliamentarism *and* mixed-systems, while *Presidential-Mixed* leaves only parliamentarism as its reference. The theoretical difference between the two models is therefore minimal.

In the table below, observe firstly that of the control variables for the previous authoritarian regime, only *Elections* is significant, at the 5 per cent level. Judging by the

direction of the hazard ratios, however, the legacy control variables are consistent with the other models above, and indicate that having a legacy of military regime drastically increases the likelihood of democratic collapse relative to a personalist or one-party legacy; each additional year the previous authoritarian regime lasted slightly reduces this likelihood; and finally, for each previous democratic collapse the hazard for the new democracy decreases by just above 20 per cent. Again, this is what the hazard ratios indicate, but the variables are, as mentioned, non-significant, and interpretation is therefore dubious.

The models also show that both *Riots* and *Protests* remain highly significant. *Riots* displays a positive hazard ratio of 1.339 and 1.369 in models 7 and 8 respectively. *Protests* has hazard ratios of 0.763 and 0.750. This suggests (according to Model 8) that a country with one year more of protests under dictatorship lowers the hazard for the following democracy by 25 per cent. Again, this is *relative* to a country with one fewer year of protest. Likewise, having one more year of riot under dictatorship increases the hazard for the following democracy by 36.8 per cent. *Strikes* is non-significant in both models. The variable has a hazard ratio of 1.134 and 1.139 in the two models. *Had* the variables been significant, this could be interpreted as having one more year of strike activity under dictatorship would increase the hazard for the following democracy by about 13 per cent.

Further, GDP per capita is significant at a 5 per cent in both models, while growth is significant at a 1 per cent level in the two models. Increasing level of economic development, as measured by the level of GDP, greatly decreases the hazard for the democracy. Having positive economic growth under democracy lowers the hazard by as much as 70.2 per cent, according to Model 8, compared to having no or negative growth. This is very much according to theory, and consistent with earlier results. Indeed, that economic growth and high level of development would increase democratic survival seemed to be one of very few things on which most scholars on the field agreed.

The ethnic fractionalisation (*Ethnic*) of a democracy is not found to have any significant effect. The hazard ratio is also consistently low in all models where the variable is included. *Had* it been significant, given the low hazard ratio, it would indicate a mere 1.1 – 1.3 per cent increase in the hazard.

Finally, the variable *Presidential* is non-significant in Model 7, while *Presidential-Mixed* is significant at a 5 per cent level in Model 8, where parliamentary system is the reference category for this dummy variable. This means that having a presidential or a semi-presidential system during democracy lowers the hazard by 58.2 per cent compared to having a parliamentary system. The literature is divided on this matter, with many findings suggesting

that parliamentary systems shortened the life of democracies, or that there was no relationship at all. The findings here suggest that having a presidential or semi-presidential system greatly increases the lifespan of a democracy.

**Table 6.4 The full models**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>
Riots	1.339*** (0.125)	1.368*** (0.110)
Protests	0.763*** (0.0708)	0.750*** (0.0677)
Strikes	1.134 (0.0960)	1.139 (0.0911)
Elections	0.797** (0.0796)	0.795** (0.0776)
Military	1.797 (1.074)	1.691 (1.014)
Authoritarian spell	0.984 (0.0199)	0.988 (0.0200)
Transitions	0.781 (0.224)	0.775 (0.213)
ln GDP per capita	0.719** (0.113)	0.687** (0.109)
Growth	0.314*** (0.110)	0.298*** (0.0982)
Ethnic	1.011 (0.0105)	1.013 (0.0112)
Presidential	0.622 (0.284)	
Presidential – Mixed		0.418** (0.159)
Observations	1,102	1,102
Wald chi2	53.31	69.00
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood	-114.82449	-113.50034
Linktest _hat	0.000	0.000
Linktest _hatsq	0.061	0.113
Global test	0.1158	0.2402
Robust standard errors in parentheses		
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

## 6.2 Model robustness and diagnostics

In this following section, I explain a series of tests and controls I have applied to check the robustness of the models presented in the previous section. I focus on models 7 and 8 as these are my two final models, incorporating all relevant control variables. Hence, it is for these models only that I run the various tests.

The first test is the so-called link test. This test is designed to check whether the model is correctly specified, while also controlling, indirectly, for the proportional hazards assumption.<sup>43</sup> The linktest controls whether the coefficient of the squared linear predictor (denoted as *Linktest\_hatsq* in the models) is significant. If it is, and the linear predictor (*Linktest\_hat*) is non-significant, this would indicate a violation of this assumption, and that the model is wrongly specified (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004). Even though *linktest\_hat* is significant at 0.000, we observe that Model 7 fails to produce a non-significant squared linear predictor, as *linktest\_hatsq* has a value of 0.061. For Model 8, we see that *Linktest\_hatsq*, i.e. the squared linear predictor, is non-significant, while *Linktest\_hat* is significant. This verifies that Model 8 is correctly specified since the *squared* linear predictor does not prove to be a better fit than the ordinary linear predictor.

The second test is based on the Schoenfeld residuals. This is a more direct test of the proportional hazards assumption, and tests whether any of the variables have a non-linear slope over time, which would indicate a violation of the proportional hazards assumption (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The results for the models as a whole are reported by the *Global test* line in table 6.4. We observe that both models produce non-significant results, and that the models therefore pass the test. There is, however, some argument whether the Schoenfeld residuals test for the model as a whole is sufficient or not (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, Golub 2008). To be as thorough as possible, I run the test for each variable in both models separately. This test reveals that in Model 7 the variable *Strikes* has a significant p-value, while in Model 8, both *Strikes* and *Elections* have significant results, thereby indicating that these variables violate the proportional hazards assumption. As Model 7 has already failed to pass the Link test, I focus on Model 8 from now on.

The common solution to this problem is to interact the variables with some function of analysis time (since the result indicates that they have a different hazard at different points in time) and then include these interactions alongside the original variables in the model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). I therefore interacted *Strikes* and *Elections* with several

---

<sup>43</sup> See section 4.4.2 for a discussion of this assumption.



functions of time – to no avail: the p-values for the variables remained significant in the Schoenfeld residuals test. I then perform a graphic inspection of the results for the two variables, displayed in figures 9.3 and 9.4 in the appendix. This shows that their hazards, in fact, do not dramatically deviate from a linear line over time. The graphic evidence thus seems to suggest that the problem is less dramatic, though it does not acquit the variables. Nonetheless, I decide to leave the matter with that, though I am aware that the results are not optimal.

I also conduct a graphic investigation of the proportionality of the hazard for the two dummy variables that are significant in Model 8, *GDP Growth* and *Presidential-Mixed*.<sup>44</sup> This is reported in figures 9.5 and 9.6 in the appendix. As is seen in the results there, the lines are roughly parallel, which indicates that the relationship between the *observed* and the *predicted* hazard for *GDP Growth* and *Presidential-Mixed* respectively do not change over time and that the assumption therefore holds (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004). A second graphic test, seen in figures 9.7 and 9.8 in the appendix, compares the Kaplan-Meier curves to the Cox PH model. The Kaplan-Meier model is a non-parametric model which does not impose any assumptions on either the baseline hazard or the variables in the model.<sup>45</sup> The Cox PH model, on the other hand, does impose the abovementioned proportional hazards assumption. If the lines for the variables in question here are parallel, this will indicate that the assumption holds (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004). For *GDP Growth* we see that the lines are indeed parallel, while for *Presidential-Mixed* there is a divergence at about analysis time 5-10 – indicating a violation of the assumption – while the lines are parallel otherwise.

I finally test whether any of the variables require a different functional form. This is done by plotting the smoothed Martingale residuals of a variable against the log transformation of the same variables. If this second line proves to be a more linear fit, a transformed functional form should be considered (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The variable *ln GDP per capita* has, as mentioned, already been logged. By running the test on all the other variables independently, I conclude that no transformation of the remaining variables is necessary.

To summarise, Model 7 passed the global Schoenfeld residual test but *not* the linktest. For this reason, I dismissed it in favour of Model 8, which *did* pass these two tests. Though some variables individually proved problematic, because the model as a whole performed better than Model 7, I will employ Model 8 as my basis for interpretation for the rest of this chapter.

---

<sup>44</sup> This test can only be done with dummy variables.

<sup>45</sup> It is, in the words of Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez (2004, 183) “model agnostic.”

### 6.3 Comparisons

As I discussed in section 5.3.1.2, the coding of the civil society legacy variables may be considered problematic. Therefore, I have also coded two other versions of these same variables. I have named the alternative codings the Average-based and the Transition-based variables, and the details of their coding are discussed extensively in section 5.3.1.2. To repeat briefly here, the Average-based variables are an average of the number of incidents of interest *during the whole previous authoritarian spell*, meaning that the total number of e.g. strikes is divided by the total length, in years, of the dictatorship. The Transition-based variables in turn, follows the same logic, but only covering *the final three years of the preceding dictatorship*. For the Transition-based variables, *Protests* and *Riots* are strongly correlated (0.73) and I therefore run two models with each of these variables separately. There is no critical correlation for any of the Year-based and the Average-based variables, and models 8 and A therefore run the two variables together.

The purpose of the following comparison of the various models is to verify that the results in Model 8 are not due to any intrinsic scheme for coding the variables. We observe below that even when the coding scheme is changed, (some of) the results continue to hold, and though the p-values for the various variables vary, their hazard ratios are remarkably consistent. Table 6.5 below first reproduces the already-discussed Model 8 from above. Then, the table presents the Average-based model, Model A. The table then proceeds to the Transition-based models, where Model B includes *Riots* while Model C includes *Protests*.

Though the control variables have not been changed, I first take a moment to review their results. *In GDP per capita* shows consistent results except in Model C, where it is non-significant. Nonetheless, its hazard ratio is highly consistent across all the models, ranging from 0.631 at the lowest to 0.712. It is significant at a 1 per cent level in Model A, and at the 5 per cent level in models 8 and B. *GDP Growth* on the other hand, is consistently significant at the 1 per cent level across all the models. Its hazard ratio varies from 0.298 to 0.326, and quite clearly has a very strong effect on the survival of democracy.

*Presidential-Mixed* also displays a high level of consistency, with a hazard ratio ranging from 0.368 to 0.418. With the exception of Model C, where it is significant at a 1 per cent level, the variable is significant at a 5 per cent level. This reinforces the results from Model 8, which show quite clearly that having a presidential or semi-presidential system lowers the hazard of democratic collapse compared to a country with a parliamentary system.

Three of the authoritarian regime controls, *Military*, *Authoritarian spell*, and *Transitions*, are non-significant in all the models. Their hazard ratios, however, are notably

persistent, not only in models A – C, but also in the other models presented in this chapter. This indicates some consistency which compels one to wonder about a possible meaningful relationship between these independent variables and the dependent variable that is not captured here. Nonetheless, given that the variables are non-significant, I refrain from further discussion.

**Table 6.5 Comparisons across coding**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Model 8</b> Year based model	<b>A</b> Average based model	<b>B</b> Transition based w/Riots	<b>C</b> Transition based w/Protests
Riots	1.368*** (0.110)	1.463 (0.397)	0.845 (0.119)	
Protests	0.750*** (0.0677)	0.544** (0.155)		0.635 (0.183)
Strikes	1.139 (0.0911)	3.391*** (1.319)	2.091* (0.891)	2.493** (1.136)
Elections	0.795** (0.0776)	0.853 (0.332)	0.877 (0.398)	0.932 (0.312)
Military	1.691 (1.014)	1.979 (1.234)	2.308 (1.330)	1.804 (1.088)
Authoritarian spell	0.988 (0.0200)	0.989 (0.0225)	0.983 (0.0237)	0.989 (0.0214)
Transitions	0.775 (0.213)	0.794 (0.190)	0.800 (0.143)	0.867 (0.196)
ln GDP per capita	0.687** (0.109)	0.631*** (0.102)	0.653** (0.112)	0.712 (0.167)
GDP Growth	0.298*** (0.0982)	0.314*** (0.0951)	0.326*** (0.0931)	0.311*** (0.0878)
Ethnic	1.013 (0.0112)	1.016 (0.0102)	1.015 (0.0101)	1.014 (0.0102)
Presidential – Mixed	0.418** (0.159)	0.368** (0.153)	0.380** (0.149)	0.374*** (0.133)
Observations	1,102	1,102	1,102	1,102
Wald chi2	69.00	53.06	35.56	47.67
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood	-113.50034	-116.07159	-119.79043	-117.15395
Linktest _hat	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Linktest _hatsq	0.113	0.510	0.955	0.520
Global test	0.2402	0.1078	0.0687	0.0708

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The last authoritarian legacy control variable *Election*, has also changed its coding according to the Year-based and Transition-based rules described above. The variable shows consistent results with regards to the hazard ratio in all models, including those presented in tables 6.2-6.4 earlier in this chapter, but is only significant in Model 8, at a 5 per cent level.

Finally, we turn to consider the civil society legacy variables. *Riots* has been significant in all models so far, except Model 3. However, in Model A it loses this significance, and even further, in Model B it is not only non-significant; it has also reversed its hazard ratio, now at 0.845. This is the model where *Protests* is out of the equation due to correlation, and the variable changes its effect, from increasing the hazard to decreasing it. The variable seems to show some inconsistent results, which makes interpretation of the results difficult.

*Protests* shows a clear consistency in its hazard ratio over all the models and various coding of the variables. It loses its significance in Model C – the transition based model – however. It is noteworthy that while both *Protests* and *Riots* are significant in Model 8, neither is significant in models B and C, where they are treated separately. Although models B and C are coded differently than Model 8 and Model A, this could indicate that there is some interplay between the two.

A possible explanation of *Riots*' changing effect could be that there is a non-linear effect, meaning that low levels of riots have a different effect than high levels: the Transition-based version of *Riots* has a shorter observation period, and will naturally include fewer observations. To investigate this, I ran a version of Model 8, not reported here, where I include a *Riots squared* variable. Both variables are significant, and while the new *Riots squared* maintain the positive hazard ratio from the original, the initial *Riots* variable now has a negative hazard ratio. The relationship is in other words non-linear: a legacy of low levels of riots is good for democracy, while a legacy of high riot activity is negative for the subsequent democracy. This could in fact explain why the variable *Riots* showed inconsistent directions of its hazard ratio in the models in table 6.5.

Lastly, *Strikes* is consistently significant through models A-C, and displays a noteworthy increase in the hazard ratio in these models.

The point of this exercise has been to demonstrate consistency across models. As the various civil society legacy variables are coded in different ways, it is difficult to directly compare these results and interpret their exact meaning. Yet, though the level of significance varies according to the coding of the civil society legacy variables, the hazard ratios are nonetheless remarkably persistent across all these models. The exception is *Riots*, which changes its direction of the hazard ratio in Model B. Further, though all the models pass the

linktest explained in section 6.2, models B and C do *not* pass the global Schoenfeld residuals test. Caution is therefore warranted when drawing conclusions from these two models.<sup>46</sup>

## 6.4 Discussion

After having given a presentation and explanation of the results in the sections above, I now move on to provide a more substantial, theoretical discussion of what these results show. First, a brief summary of the argument so far is in order. I then proceed to interpret the significant findings from the chapter so far, in light of these arguments, before concluding.

Chapter two presented a larger, theoretical framework for why activation of citizens is good for democracy. The argument was mostly made through the literature on civil society, which was defined as an arena where ordinary citizens coming together outside the grasp of the state to exert their collective preferences through collective action. It was argued that such activity was good for democracy for a variety of reasons, all of which can be found in section 2.5.1. An active civil society can be seen as simultaneously a symptom of and a cause of high levels of social capital, which Putnam (1994) has famously argued is essential for democratic stability. Further, the activation of citizens through civil society is also connected to Almond and Verba's concept of the civic culture, which is a prerequisite for stable democracy. Here, the role of active, participant citizens is a central theme. Lastly, mobilisation "from below" was seen as essential to drive democratisation to its full potential once liberalisation of the authoritarian regime had begun: activation of civil society could thus avoid imperfect, elite-driven democratisation, and cement the new democratic rule.

Democracies with high levels of civil society activation were argued to be more stable. At its core, the logic of this thesis has therefore been simple: given that civil society is good for democratic survival, dictatorships with a legacy of high levels of civil society activation should be expected to become more stable democracies than dictatorships with low levels of such activation. Civil society's effects upon the collapse of the previous authoritarian regime and subsequent democratisation collapse have *not* been the subject of my investigation. Rather, I look at how a *legacy* of civil society activation under authoritarian rule can have a lasting effect on that dictatorship's eventual democratic successor. Thus, if a variable is found to have a

---

<sup>46</sup> As discussed extensively in section 4.4.3, the Cox PH model is a superior choice to fitting a parametric model to these data. However – notwithstanding that it may be a bad fit – I have for the sake of comparison here nonetheless done so. Results from both the Weibull model (which assumes a monotonic function of the baseline hazard) and the log-normal model (which does *not* assume a monotonic function of the baseline hazard) show similar results: *Protests*, *Elections*, *ln GDP per capita*, *GDP growth*, and *Presidential-Mixed* are significant and all lower the hazard. *Riots*, on the other hand, which is also significant, increases it. The other variables are non-significant, yet the directions of their hazard ratios in Model 8 are persistent in these two parametric models as well. Caution is due, however, when concluding from this.

significant effect, either positive or negative, on a democracy's survival, this does *not* mean that it simultaneously had an effect on democratisation or authoritarian regime collapse.

Apart from the civil society legacy hypotheses, I also presented a series of hypotheses concerning common control variables and key features of both the past authoritarian regime and the present democratic one. I will here focus the discussion on the findings that proved to be significant, while only briefly commenting on those that were found to be non-significant.

### *Civil Society*

The index on civil society robustness developed by Coppedge et al. (2015) measured people's involvement in civil society organisations, and was found to have a significant and positive effect upon democratic survival (Cornell et al. 2016). Based on this finding, and the larger theoretical evidence presented in chapter two, I hypothesised that the variable, when measured during dictatorships, could – via a legacy effect – exhibit a similar positive effect upon the survival of authoritarian democracies.

The findings were consistently non-significant. Further, the variable also displayed a slightly positive hazard ratio, signifying an increase in a democracy's likelihood of collapse, explicitly contrary to the expectation.<sup>47</sup> However, as the hazard ratio was persistently low and practically close to neutral, this could rather be interpreted as additional evidence of its non-significance. All in all, this renders me unable to confirm hypothesis H<sub>1</sub> that the legacy of civil society activation decreases the likelihood of subsequent democratic collapse.

### *Riots*

Armed resistance is perhaps not conventionally a part of civil society as such, but again I remind the reader of Bermeo's (2003, 7) notion that “the term ‘civil’ conveys location rather than approbation.” Violent behaviour is a key form of political mobilisation “from below”, and is a platform for collective action independent of the state. Hence, it is located within the realm of civil society in this thesis.

The effect of riots on both democratisation and democratic stability was theorised to be rather ambiguous. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 68) argue that “social disorder and, ultimately, revolution” was the driving force behind several democratic transitions in Europe in the nineteenth century. Wood (2000) in turn shows how popular mobilisation and riots were central factors in the democratisation of both El Salvador and South Africa in late twentieth century. Though Rustow's (1970) words that the factors that drive democratisation may not be

---

<sup>47</sup> By “positive”, I here mean a hazard ratio of more than 1. As 1 is neutral, a hazard ratio below this is negative, while a hazard ratio above 1 is positive.

the same that sustain democracy should be kept in mind here, it is not unreasonable to hypothesise that armed, organised citizen action against authoritarianism constitute a valuable trait for a subsequent democracy. As was discussed in section 3.1, on transitional violence, however, high levels of violence rarely lead to democratisation, let alone *stable* democracy. I therefore posed two competing hypotheses: H<sub>2a</sub> – that a legacy of riots would lower the risk of democratic failure, and H<sub>2b</sub> – that a legacy of riots would increase the risk of failure.

The results here show a clear, negative effect of the legacy of riots on democratic survival. The hazard, and thereby the likelihood of collapse, is increased by having a legacy of riot activation under dictatorship. Rioting undoubtedly is a form of collective action, and though the original operationalisation of the variable by Banks and Wilson (2015) does not juxtapose riot with *insurgency*, the result may indicate that the violence and instability caused by such activity leaves the post-authoritarian democracy worse off than it would otherwise be. H<sub>2a</sub> is therefore rejected, while H<sub>2b</sub> is supported. However, from the results from the model that included a squared *Riots* variable, it is also possible to conclude that a legacy of *few* riots lowers the risk of democratic collapse, while *many* riots increase it. Thus the legacy of riot activity is dual and complicated.

### *Protests*

Merely taking to the streets to protest is a much more inclusive and accessible form of collective action than rioting. Large scale riots, especially in the long run, require technology, equipment and coordination to a much larger extent than protest does. This is why violent resistance “has historically been limited to young, physically fit, ideologically indoctrinated or mercenary males” (Schock 2005, 40).<sup>48</sup> Protest has the potential to mobilise much larger segments of the population, and any violent repression against a peaceful protest could sway even more people against the government (Schock 2005, Teorell 2010). To engage in collective action in the form of protest, is also an essential form of participation under any healthy democracy, alongside voting (Bermeo 2003). Therefore, a country with a culture of peaceful mobilisation to promote collective interests may have a significant part of democratic life in place. I therefore posed the hypothesis H<sub>3</sub> – a legacy of protests will *decrease* the likelihood of democratic collapse.

The variable *Protests* was found to have a strong positive effect on democratic survival. It is highly statistically significant, and the results above in table 6.4 quite clearly indicate that

---

<sup>48</sup> As was seen in section 5.3.1, however, the coding of the *Riots* variable in Banks and Wilson (2015) does not necessarily imply such large-scale riots. It can merely be street protests turned violent due to clashes with the police or other government forces.

those dictatorships that have high levels of peaceful demonstrations become more stable democracies than those democracies that do not have such heritage. Popular mobilisation in the form of demonstrations and protests under authoritarian rule can be seen as a sign that its citizens are active and participatory, which is an important feature and a sign of a robust democratic culture. These results indicate that this spills over, so to say, to the subsequent democracy, and parallels Teorell (2010), who finds that protest behaviour in dictatorships increases the likelihood of democratisation to occur. Here, I find that *once democratisation has happened*, the legacy of this same protest activation also makes the subsequent democracy more stable and long-lasting. Thus, peaceful protests under dictatorship increase the prospects for democratisation *and* the stability of these same post-authoritarian democracies. H<sub>3</sub> is therefore supported.

### *Strikes*

Strike activity is the last activation of civil society under scrutiny here. Trade unions, though part of the economic sphere, are a key component in civil society (Fukuyama 1995, Edwards 2004, Bermeo 2003). It is therefore natural to view strikes as one form of expression of the activation of civil society. Organised labour and working-class mobilisation have been found to be an important factor in driving democratisation (Collier 1999, Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992, Wood 2000).<sup>49</sup> For this reason, and because labour rights are central rights in any democracy, I posed the hypothesis H<sub>4a</sub> - A legacy of strikes will *decrease* the likelihood of democratic collapse.

A second hypothesis was that a legacy of strike activity could increase the likelihood of collapse. Democracies with high levels of strikes could be more prone to slow or negative economic growth (Sharma 1989), which has been seen to greatly influence a democracy's survival. Strikes may also contribute to larger waves of social upheaval. O'Donnell (1988) shows how the period leading up to the 1966 military coup in Argentina was troubled by large-scale union strikes and social unrest. This ultimately led the military to bring down the democratic government in a coup. In Brazil too, the military would act against strike activity in the name of "law and order," though this time without actually staging a full-scale coup (Agüero 1992). Geddes (1999) argued that the military often remains a substantial power-factor after democratisation because it is allowed to keep much of its autonomy as part of the transitional "deal." Svobik (2015) found that both a military past and low or negative economic growth

---

<sup>49</sup> Labor unions are also included in the civil society variable by Coppedge et al. (2015).



increase the likelihood of a coup. Therefore, I also presented the hypothesis H<sub>4b</sub> – a legacy of strikes will *increase* the likelihood of democratic collapse.

Results in table 6.4 however, find no significant impact of strike activity under dictatorship for later democratic survival. The variable is in fact slightly significant when only controlling for features of the present democratic regime, but in the models that also control for other legacy effects of autocracy, the significance disappears. What's more, the variable consistently displays a *positive* hazard ratio, meaning that more strike activity would *increase* the likelihood of subsequent democratic collapse. The variable was only significant in the models that either coded it as the average of the total number of incidents during the previous authoritarian regime, or as an average of the transition period. Particularly the former model produced highly significant results, where the hazard ratios were more than doubled from the non-significant result in the Year-based model. A positive hazard ratio seems persistent.

Though perhaps surprising, these findings are in fact again consistent with those of Teorell (2010). To repeat, Teorell investigates how these forms of popular mobilisation affect democratisation, but the similarity is striking: there is little or no effect of strikes in Teorell's study, and that which does exist is negative for democratisation. These results parallel mine, where the legacy of strike activity under dictatorship is non-significant in the main model, while it is significant and lowers the life expectancy for the new democracy under various other coding. However, due to the non-significant finding in Model 8, both H<sub>4a</sub> that a legacy of strikes decreases the likelihood of democratic collapse and H<sub>4b</sub> that a legacy of strikes *increase* the likelihood are rejected.

One can, with caution, argue that a “strike-prone” culture might be a dangerous legacy for post-authoritarian democracies. To generate economic growth may be a question of life or death for these new regimes, and a culture of strikes may impede this. Further, many of these new democratic regimes live under the shadow of a still-powerful military. The social upheaval created by massive strikes may provide an excuse for the armed forces to intervene in the name of “law-and-order”, thus reversing the democratic progress that has been made.

### *Elections*

Miller (2015) argued that no stable democracy has emerged from dictatorship without some experience with regular authoritarian elections. As was mentioned in the discussion in chapter three, these elections will, by their very definition, not be free or fair. Nonetheless, the experience of casting votes in elections was found to exert a profound and positive influence, especially on the survival of new democratic regimes (Miller 2015). The findings presented

here seem to support this. A legacy of electoral experience under dictatorship has a significant and positive impact on post-authoritarian democratic survival. Hypothesis H<sub>5</sub> – that a legacy of authoritarian elections decreases the likelihood of democratic collapse – is thus confirmed.

I did not seek to differentiate between competitiveness and inclusiveness when controlling for electoral experience.<sup>50</sup> Rather, the experience with elections was instead seen as a measure for whether the authoritarian regime was closed or “open” i.e. electoral. Nor can the second element of Miller’s (2015) research, i.e. that electoral experience also increases the likelihood of *democratisation*, be answered by these results. The results here simply indicate that more open authoritarian regimes, i.e. those who allow for some forms of elections to be held, are more likely to become successful democracies, once a transition has occurred.

### *Economic development and growth*

A substantive body of literature, some of which was presented in chapter three, argued that a country’s level of economic development is essential for its chances of democratic survival. Though there is some debate on whether or not economic development *causes* democratisation (see for example Przeworski et al. (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Boix and Stokes (2003), Saghaug Broderstad (2015)) there seemed to be considerably more agreement on its positive effects on democratic survival. And although some suggested that high levels of economic development are not necessary nor sufficient to stabilise democracy (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a), little or no research seems to suggest that it is negative for survival. I therefore posed the hypothesis that higher levels of economic development would increase democratic survival. A similar hypothesis was that of economic growth. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Svobik (2008, 2015), amongst others, argued that positive economic performance, i.e. growth, will increase the survival of democracies, even at low levels of development. Thus, economic growth after transition was also hypothesised to significantly increase the survival of post-authoritarian democracies.

Both these hypotheses, H<sub>9</sub> and H<sub>10</sub>, are confirmed by the results here. Especially growth was highly significant across several models, with a low hazard ratio, which indicates that a change from negative or no growth to positive growth has a substantial and positive effect for the survival of a democratic regime. The level of economic development was also found to significantly decrease the likelihood of democratic failure, though this variable was occasionally slightly less significant than the results of the growth variable. All in all, however,

---

<sup>50</sup> See Dahl (1971).

there is little doubt that these results are in tune with the extensive amount of similar findings in the literature on the topic.

### *Presidentialism and parliamentarism*

Unlike the question of economic growth and development, the subject of presidentialism and parliamentarism is one of considerable discussion and disagreement. Juan Linz (1990a,1990b) has famously warned against the “perils of presidentialism” and promoted the “virtues of parliamentarism.” That presidential democracies are more risk-prone than parliamentary systems is supported by several others (Przeworski et al. 2000, Stepan and Skach 1993, Mainwaring 1990). Others, in turn, called for caution, and found little or no evidence in support for this (Power and Gasiorowski 1997, Aleman and Yang 2011, Hiroi and Omori 2009).

Cheibub (2007) accorded an important explanatory role to legacy, and argued that the tendency of presidential democracies to live shorter than parliamentary democracies was due to their military past, and that there is nothing about the institutional arrangements of presidentialism in itself that makes the system inherently less stable. From this ambiguous and undecided literature, I posed two connected hypotheses:  $H_{12a}$  - Pure presidentialism will *increase* the likelihood of democratic collapse, and  $H_{12b}$  - Non-parliamentary system will *increase* the likelihood of democratic collapse.

The result in Model 7 dismisses  $H_{12b}$ , as pure presidentialism alone does not have any significant impact on democratic survival. Though the direction of the hazard ratio indicates that having a presidential system does indeed decrease the likelihood that a democracy will collapse (relative to the reference category which groups mixed and parliamentary democracies together), the variable does not produce any significant values, and it is therefore dismissed. When the coding of this dummy variable is changed to also include mixed systems (with parliamentarism alone as the reference category), it becomes significant, but with the opposite effect than what is suggested by the hypothesis: we observe that parliamentarism in fact increases the likelihood of democratic collapse, meaning that having a presidential or mixed system clearly increase the democracy’s survival. This finding remains significant across various models. *Both*  $H_{12a}$  and  $H_{12b}$  are therefore dismissed.

A possible explanation for this somewhat unexpected result may be provided by Hiroi and Omori (2009). They find, as discussed in section 3.2, that parliamentarism actually increases the likelihood of democratic failure if there has been previous democratic breakdowns in a country. Another explanation could be that the fixed terms under presidentialism is a welcomed limitation to the executive power in the new democracy, a restraint that has been

notably lacking under dictatorship. If the fixed terms are respected, presidentialism can provide stability, a balance of power, and a long-desired rotation of the executive power. Nonetheless, the finding seems to be contrary to what much of the literature in section would suggest, and opposite of hypotheses H<sub>12a</sub> and H<sub>12b</sub>. The variable exhibits consistent hazard ratios, and is significant across models.

#### *The remaining control variables*

Several other hypotheses were also posed in connection to the other control variables that were included. These variables were identified through the literature, reviewed in chapter three. I will here deal shortly with the control variables that were found to be non-significant.

Democracies with a military past were argued by Geddes (1999) to be more stable and long-living than those with a legacy of a personalist or party dictatorship. Svobik (2015) however, found that post-military democracies had a higher risk of experiencing coups and hence a return to autocracy. I therefore posed two competing hypotheses about this relationship: H<sub>6a</sub> – that a military past *decreases* the likelihood of democratic collapse, and H<sub>6b</sub> – that having a military past *increases* the likelihood of collapse for a democracy. The variable *Military* produces persistently positive hazard ratios in all models, indicating that a military past increases the likelihood of collapse compared to having a legacy of a personalist or party dictatorship. Yet, the variable is not significant in any of the final models presented in tables 6.4 and 6.5. I can therefore not confirm either of the two hypotheses, and conclude that the institutional character of the authoritarian past does not influence the survival of the subsequent democratic regime.

As for the length of the preceding authoritarian dictatorship, *Authoritarian spell*, I produced two competing hypotheses. The first, H<sub>7a</sub> assumed that having a long-lasting dictatorship preceding the new democracy would increase this democracy's likelihood of collapse. This was because longer periods of authoritarian rule would provide the rulers with more time to "dismantle" any autonomous civil society and independently organised fora of collective action, as O'Donnell and Schmitter (2013) argued. Once democracy emerged, this would be a significant drawback.

The competing hypothesis H<sub>7b</sub> followed a more Huntingtonian reasoning. Long authoritarian spells can be seen as a sign of stability, while short spells are a sign of instability. If a regime manages to sustain its rule over long periods of time, this can be interpreted as a proxy for having well-developed institutions, positive economic performance and development,

and little internal conflict. These are all pre-requisites for stable democracy as well.<sup>51</sup> Thus, having these features in place before a transition (assuming they are not dismantled during the transition itself) would be an advantage for subsequent democratic stability.

The variable *Authoritarian spell* is significant in the first models, when only the autocratic legacy variables are considered. Once the civil society variables and the other control variables are introduced, however, the variable is no longer significant. Both hypotheses are therefore rejected: how long the preceding dictatorship lasted has no significant effect on the survival of the following democracy. The hazard ratio for this variable, however, is consistent and negative, which could indicate some support to hypothesis H<sub>7b</sub>, but the hypothesis must nonetheless be rejected.

Next, previous experience with democracy was expected to decrease the likelihood of democratic failure by those who argued that the “second-try” would be more likely to result in stable democracy (Huntington 1991). Conversely, previous democratic experiences would also mean previous democratic failures, and that forces in society had brought down democracy before, making it more likely that it could happen again (Przeworski et al. 1996). I therefore posed two competing hypotheses: H<sub>8a</sub> - Past democratic experience will *decrease* the likelihood of collapse, and H<sub>8b</sub> - Past democratic experience will *increase* the likelihood of collapse.

The variable *Transitions* is significant in the first models, but once various other control variables and civil society variables are introduced, its significance disappears. Thus, I do not find any support for either of the two hypotheses. Again, the persistency of the hazard ratio, which is negative in all models, can lend some support to the interpretation that there is a relationship not captured here. However, the non-finding presented here does fit with more recent empirical investigation on this question (Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001, Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003, Gasiorowski and Power 1998, Miller 2015, Houle 2009).

Finally, the ethnic fractionalisation of a country was hypothesised to increase the likelihood of democratic failure. It was argued by Mill (2009) that to sustain representative political institutions is difficult, if not impossible, in ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous societies. Some recent research on the survival of democracy has found some support for this (Barro 1999, Gasiorowski and Power 1998), while others find no such connection (Houle 2009, Cornell et al. 2016). Findings here align with the latter category. The variable *Ethnic* is not significant in any of the models. Though the hazard ratio does indicate an increase in the

---

<sup>51</sup> Remember, Huntington (1968) is not concerned with the *type* of government in a country. It is the *level* of government that separates successful states from non-successful ones.

likelihood of collapse, it is consistently non-significant, and hypothesis H<sub>11</sub> is therefore rejected: the ethnic fractionalisation of a democracy does not have an effect on its survival.

## 6.5 Summary

I have sought to answer and, if possible, explain a series of hypotheses in this section. Most of them have been answered through models 7 and 8, with the exception of H<sub>1</sub>, since the variable *Civil Society* was not included in these models. Table 6.6 summarises all hypotheses and findings. Briefly put, I find that having a legacy of peaceful street protests and of elections under the authoritarian regime is good for democratic survival. So is choosing presidential or semi-presidential institutions for the new democracy, and the level of economic development and performance. Having a legacy of high riot activity, however, does not bode well for the new democracy, as it increases the risk of failure for the new regime.

**Table 6.6 Summary of hypotheses and findings**

	Hypothesis	Status
H <sub>1</sub>	A legacy of strong civil society will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Rejected
H <sub>2a</sub>	A legacy of riots will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Rejected
H <sub>2b</sub>	A legacy of riots will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Supported
H <sub>3</sub>	A legacy of protests will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Supported
H <sub>4a</sub>	A legacy of strikes will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Rejected
H <sub>4b</sub>	A legacy of strikes will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Rejected
H <sub>5</sub>	A legacy of elections will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Supported
H <sub>6a</sub>	A military past will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Rejected
H <sub>6b</sub>	A military past will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Rejected
H <sub>7a</sub>	Lengthier spells of previous dictatorial regimes will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of	Rejected
H <sub>7b</sub>	democratic collapse Lengthier spells of previous dictatorial regimes will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Rejected
H <sub>8a</sub>	Past democratic experience will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of collapse	Rejected
H <sub>8b</sub>	Past democratic experience will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of collapse	Rejected
H <sub>9</sub>	Higher GDP per capita will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Supported
H <sub>10</sub>	Positive economic growth will <i>decrease</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Supported
H <sub>11</sub>	Higher ethnic fractionalisation will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Rejected
H <sub>12a</sub>	Pure presidentialism will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Rejected
H <sub>12b</sub>	Non-parliamentary systems will <i>increase</i> the likelihood of democratic collapse	Rejected

## 7 Conclusion

The research question of this thesis was motivated by two theoretical assumptions: that various characteristics of the past authoritarian regime can influence the survival of the subsequent democracy, and that activation of citizens through civil society is central for democratic stability and survival. To the degree that the legacy of civil society in post-authoritarian democracies has been investigated before, this has only been done *indirectly*, in that the activation of civil society in democracies with an authoritarian past has been compared to its activation in democracies with no such past. I have argued that one should rather, to the extent possible, observe such activation under dictatorship *directly* in order to investigate its influence on a subsequent democracy. Hence, I have conducted an event history analysis of all post-authoritarian democracies in the period 1946 – 2008.

The results regarding protest activity align very well with the previous research and expectations: protest is a key feature of a healthy democracy, and has been found to be a positive force for the democratisation of dictatorships. Here, I have found that such protest activation under authoritarian rule will also increase the survival of this following democracy. Thus, we can expect authoritarian countries in which there are high levels of peaceful protests and demonstrations to become more successful democracies in terms of survival. Peaceful activation of citizens, and a habit for collective action to promote interests and opinions, makes for a stable democracy.

A history of violence in the form of riots, however, decreases the survival of the democracy. Though the variable does not capture radical types of rioting in the form of insurgency, the results might not be surprising: the literature in chapter three did argue that violence rarely leads to democracy, let alone stable democracy. Here, I found that regardless of how democracy had been established, a tumultuous legacy of riots decreases the survival of the new democracy. However, some evidence may indicate that this only goes for high levels of riots; *low* levels may in fact increase survival. This again can be interpreted as signifying that the ability for (more or less) peaceful collective action is valuable for stabilising democracy. Having had a history of organising collectively to promote a cause is a beneficial mark to bring into the succeeding democratic life. Other hypotheses regarding the activation of citizens and legacies from the authoritarian past failed to be confirmed: a legacy of strikes did not have any effect, and the core civil society index-variable (*Civil Society*) was found non-significant. The legacy of civil society for emerging democracies is thus not univocal.

Nonetheless, I believe that the findings in this thesis open for a different approach to the question of *legacy*. The Banks data set (Banks and Wilson 2015) is extensive in its coverage of

citizen action, and offers possibilities for studying the non-contemporaneous relationship between citizen action and regimes. Likewise, the data set provided by Coppedge et al. (2015) contributes new, detailed data of civil society that to my knowledge has been rarely used so far, and which provides valuable data for the research on civil society and legacy. These are opportunities that may open some new ground in our understanding of what makes regimes endure. Nevertheless, caution is due drawing inferences from these results. Specifically, there are two concerns that merit discussion: that of endogeneity and that of internal validity.

### **7.1 Endogeneity**

It was briefly mentioned in section 2.3 that the relationship between social capital and democracy may be circular (Lipset and Lakin 2004). This potential problem is one of endogeneity, meaning that it is not the independent variable X that affects the dependent variable Y, but rather that the two variables are jointly dependent (Gujarati and Porter 2010). The problem of endogenous variables troubles much of social science research. Indeed, Przeworski goes as far as suggesting that everything might be endogenous, and that, “if it is, then identifying causes is hard, if not impossible” (Przeworski 2010, xv).

Though answers are not unanimous, much of the literature on both civil society and social capital has been forced to recognise this potential problem. (Letki and Evans 2005, Levi 1996, Brehm and Rahn 1997, Pollard 2014, Paxton 2002, Muller and Seligson 1994, Durlauf 1999, Adepoju and Oni 2012). Others, in turn, argue that formal policies and political institutions are not likely to *create* social capital (Fukuyama 2001, 1995). However, it need not be so much a question of deliberately creating social capital through public policies as the fact that political liberalisation can cause many side-effects, one of which may be increased social capital and a more vibrant civil society.

Strictly speaking, this thesis is not troubled by endogeneity, for one obvious reason: civil society activation is measured *before* democratisation takes place, and it is clearly impossible for a post-authoritarian democracy to exert a retrospective effect on the levels of civil society activation under the previous dictatorship. Hence, the relationship between the independent and the dependent variables must by definition be exogenous.

Even though the independent variables cannot be affected by the dependent variable, the type of authoritarian regime can still be a major influence upon the levels of civil society activation in a dictatorship. Dictatorship come in a variety of institutional forms. Some may allow or even encourage certain aspects of civil society, while others do not. How different



forms of dictatorship can determine levels of civil society activation is strictly speaking not an endogenous relationship, given the research question here at hand.

It is nonetheless important to recognise this as a potential problem for the present research question. This is because it might be that authoritarian regimes that are more open, and hence that allow civil society to exist, if not flourish, become more stable democracies. These regimes may become successful democracies not because of the activation of civil society, but because they *allow* civil society to be active. The real reason the post-transitional democracy survives, is its past as an open and liberalised dictatorship, of which a vibrant civil society was one of several legacies. This might very well be the true explanation here. Nonetheless, this is a problem that troubles much, if not all, of (quantitative) social science, and I can only take caution when drawing the final conclusions.

## 7.2 Validity

I would also like to discuss the validity of the thesis. By validity, I mean to what extent one can be sure that we are “measuring what we think we are measuring” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 25). More specifically, it is the *internal* validity that is the concern here: can we be certain that the results are actually true for the given sample in this thesis? Are the variables used actually capturing the concept in question (Gerring 2012, Midtbø 2007)?

The point has been raised several times throughout the thesis. The civil society index variable from Coppedge et al. (2015) was perhaps best suited for this research question, and the closest measure. It was found to be highly statistically non-significant, and with a close-to-neutral hazard ratio. Three less-than-perfect measures of civil society, *Riots*, *Protests*, and *Strikes*, were also used. It bodes well for the conclusion, I will argue, that the most robust finding, that of *Protests*, is also the variable that is most closely connected to civil society. Its effect is largely consistent with established findings on both democratisation and democratic performance. Nonetheless, protest activity, let alone strikes and riots, may very well be expressions of discontent rather than the activation of civil society, and one can argue that this does not allow me to conclude that the legacy of civil society during dictatorship is central for democratic survival.

Again, I am aware of these problems, and have, to the extent possible, sought to accommodate them. I have been clear throughout the thesis about the sources of the variables, and their operationalisation. My own coding of “legacy” is also extensively discussed in chapter five, and I have compared various codings of the variables as there is no inherent “right” way of doing this. This should, to the degree possible, maximise the validity of the findings.

### 7.3 Final remarks

Civil society and democracy are topics that have received, and continue to draw, significant attention from the research community. In this sense, it is difficult to suggest new and innovative questions that may further the research in the field. Nevertheless, I believe that the approach and findings of this thesis do provide some indications of fertile advances.

Methodologically, there are two ways to both verify and advance the findings here. The first concerns the method: I have used the continuous and semi-parametric Cox PH model. Other models, such as parametric ones, could be productive, or one could use a discrete-time event history method since the dependent variable after all is measured in discrete time. This is all discussed in chapter four, and though I argued that the Cox PH model is indeed the superior choice for this thesis, developing similar research designs which call for other, similar methods can nonetheless be a fruitful exercise.

The second aspect concerns the variables. To verify the findings using different measures and variables would clearly strengthen the thesis' conclusions. An alternative operationalisation of the democracy variable such as the one provided by Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013), is one option. Further, developing more sophisticated ways of quantifying "legacy" is essential if the approach taken here is to have any substantive impact. As I have mentioned throughout the thesis, this is difficult to do, and by no means do I claim that the approach taken here is the optimal one. To expand the time-period in order to cover more countries and transitions could also be advantageous. Huntington (1991), for example, argues that the forces driving the First and the Second waves of democratisation were different from those driving the Third wave. It could be that the legacy of civil society has had a different effect on democratic survival at various points in time.

As was discussed in chapter four, a disadvantage of quantitative research is the (necessary) loss of in-depth knowledge of the cases. A *qualitative* approach to the topic here could thus be very useful. Applying case-studies allows us to better understand the causal mechanisms behind the processes in question. Alongside the quantitative approach taken – which should be extended and developed further – a qualitative approach could help us to acquire a more complete understanding of how a country's legacy of civil society under dictatorship can affect its survival as democracy. Or, in a more general way, we can investigate the continuity of the social origins of regime stability in more satisfactory manners, which may help us not only to explain transitions to successful democracies, but also to predict them from the basis of current authoritarian regime characteristics. If indeed the social sciences strive after scientific standards, this undoubtedly should be the ultimate aim.

## 8 Literature

- Aalen, O. O., Borgan, Ø., and Gjessing, S. (2008): *Survival and event history analysis : a process point of view*. New York, NY: Springer.
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., and Yared, P. (2008): "Income and democracy." *American Economic Review* 98 (3):808-842.
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., and Yared, P. (2009): "Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 56 (8):1043-1058.
- Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2006): *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Adepoju, A.A., and Oni, O.A. (2012): "Investigating Endogeneity Effects of Social Capital on Household Welfare in Nigeria." *Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture* 51 (1):73-96.
- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., and Sanford, R. N. (1950): *The Authoritarian personality*. First ed. New York: Harper.
- Agüero, F. (1992): "The Military and the Limits of Democratization in South America." In *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G. A. and Valenzuela, J. S., 153-198. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Aleman, J., and Yang, D. D. (2011): "A Duration Analysis of Democratic Transitions and Authoritarian Backslides." *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (9):1123-1151.
- Allison, P. D. (1982): "Discrete-Time Methods for the Analysis of Event Histories." *Sociological Methodology* 13:61-98.
- Allison, P. D. (1984): *Event history analysis: regression for longitudinal event data*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications.
- Almond, G. A. (1989): "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept." In *The Civic Culture Revisited*, edited by Almond, G. A. and Verba, S., 1-36. London: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Almond, G. A., and Verba, S. (1965): *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.
- Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi, F., and Przeworski, A. (1996): "Classifying political regimes." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31 (2):3-36.
- Arendt, H. (1951): *The origins of totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
- Arthur, B. W. (1994): *Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Banks, A. S., and Wilson, K. A. (2015): *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*. Databanks, International. Jerusalem, Israel. <http://www.databanksinternational.com>
- Barro, R. J. (1999): "Determinants of democracy." *Journal of Political Economy* 107 (6):158-183.
- Berman, S. (1997a): "Civil society and political institutionalization." *American Behavioral Scientist* 40 (5):562-574.
- Berman, S. (1997b): "Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic." *World Politics* 49 (3):401-429.

- Berman, S. (1998): "Path dependency and political action - Reexamining responses to the depression." *Comparative Politics* 30 (4):379-400.
- Bermeo, N. (2000): "Civil Society after Democracy." In *Civil Society before Democracy. Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe*, edited by Bermeo, N. and Nord, P., 237-260. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC.
- Bermeo, N. (2003): *Ordinary people in extraordinary times : the citizenry and the breakdown of democracy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Bernhard, M. (1993): "Civil-Society and Democratic Transition in East-Central-Europe." *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (2):307-326.
- Bernhard, M., and Karakoc, E. (2007): "Civil society and the legacies of dictatorship." *World Politics* 59 (4):539-567.
- Bernhard, M., Nordstrom, T., and Reenock, C. (2001): "Economic performance, institutional intermediation, and democratic survival." *Journal of Politics* 63 (3):775-803.
- Bernhard, M., Reenock, C., and Nordstrom, T. (2003): "Economic performance and survival in new democracies - Is there a honeymoon effect?" *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (4):404-431.
- Boix, C. (2011): "Democracy, Development, and the International System." *American Political Science Review* 105 (4):809-828.
- Boix, C., Miller, M., and Rosato, S. (2013): "A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-2007." *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (12):1523-1554.
- Boix, C., and Stokes, S. C. (2003): "Endogenous democratization." *World Politics* 55 (4):517-549.
- Bollen, K. A., and Jackman, R. W. (1989): "Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies." *American Sociological Review* 54 (4):612-621.
- Booth, J. A., and Richard, P. B. (1998): "Civil society, political capital, and democratization in Central America." *Journal of Politics* 60 (3):780-800.
- Borucka, J. (2014): "Methods for handling tied events in the Cox proportional hazard model." *Studia Oeconomica Posnaniensia* 2 (2):91-106.
- Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Brady, H. E., and Collier, D. (2008): "Political Science Methodology." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, edited by Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Brady, H. E. and Collier, D., 3-31. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., and Jones, B. S. (1997): "Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (4):1414-1461.
- Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., and Jones, B. S. (2004): *Event history modeling : a guide for social scientists*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., and Zorn, C. J. W. (2001): "Duration models and proportional hazards in political science." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (4):972-988.
- Brady, H. E., and Collier, D. (2010): *Rethinking social inquiry : diverse tools, shared standards*. Second ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Brehm, J., and Rahn, W. (1997): "Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (3):999-1023.

- Bunce, V. (2003): "The Historical Origins of the East-West Divide." In *Civil Society before Democracy. Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe*, edited by Bermeo, N. and Nord, P., 209-236. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC.
- Cederman, L. E., and Girardin, L. (2007): "Beyond fractionalization: Mapping ethnicity onto nationalist insurgencies." *American Political Science Review* 101 (1):173-185.
- Chambers, S. (2002): "A Critical Theory of Civil Society." In *Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society*, edited by Chambers, S. and Kymlicka, W., 90-110. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Chambers, S., and Kopstein, J. (2001): "Bad civil society." *Political Theory* 29 (6):837-865.
- Cheibub, J. A. (2007): *Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., and Vreeland, J. R. (2010): "Democracy and dictatorship revisited." *Public Choice* 143 (1-2):67-101.
- Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F. (2002): "Democratic institutions and regime survival: Parliamentary and presidential democracies reconsidered." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:151-179.
- Cleves, M. A., Gould, W. W., and Gutierrez, R. G. (2004): *An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata*. College Station, Texas: Stata Press.
- Cohen, J. L., and Arato, A. (1995): *Civil society and political theory*. Third ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Collier, D., and Adcock, R. (1999): "Democracy and dichotomies: A pragmatic approach to choices about concepts." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:537-565.
- Collier, D., and Levitsky, S. (1997): "Democracy with adjectives - Conceptual innovation in comparative research." *World Politics* 49 (3):430-451.
- Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. (2004): "Greed and grievance in civil war." *Oxford Economic Papers-New Series* 56 (4):563-595.
- Collier, R. B. (1999): *Paths toward democracy : the working class and elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Collier, R. B., and Collier, D. (2002): *Shaping the political arena : critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, S., Hicken, A., Kroenig, M., Lindberg, S. I., McMann, K., Paxton, P., Semetko, H. A., Skaaning, S. E., Staton, J., and Teorell, J. (2011): "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach." *Perspectives on Politics* 9 (2):247-267.
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S. E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Staton, J., Zimmerman, B., Sigman, R., Andersson, F., Mechkova, V., and Miri, F. (2015): *V-Dem Codebook v5*. Project, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem).
- Cornell, A., Møller, J., Skaaning, S. E., and Lindberg, S. I. (2016), *The Varieties of Democracy Institute*.
- Dahl, R. (1971): *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

- David, P. A. (1994): "Why are institutions the 'Carriers of history'?: Path dependence and the evolution of conventions, organizations and institutions." *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics* 5 (2):205-220.
- Diamond, L. J. (1999): *Developing democracy : toward consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dix, R. H. (1994): "History and Democracy Revisited." *Comparative Politics* 27 (1):91-105.
- Durlauf, S. N. (1999): "The case "against" social capital." *Focus* 20 (3).
- Edwards, M. (2004): *Civil society*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Edwards, M. (2011a): "Conclusion: Civil society as a necessary and necessarily contested idea." In *The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society*, edited by Edwards, M., 480-491. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Edwards, M. (2011b): "Introduction: Civil society and the geometry of human relations." In *The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society*, edited by Edwards, M., 3-14. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Edwards, M. (2011c): *The Oxford handbook of civil society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ekiert, G., and Kubik, J. (1998): "Contentious politics in new democracies - East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-93." *World Politics* 50 (4):547-581.
- Elkins, Z. (2000): "Gradations of democracy? Empirical tests of alternative conceptualizations." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2):293-300.
- Elster, J. (2007): *Explaining social behavior : more nuts and bolts for the social sciences*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Epstein, D. L., Bates, R., Goldstone, J., Kristensen, I., and O'Halloran, S. (2006): "Democratic transitions." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3):551-569.
- Escriba-Folch, A. (2013): "Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946-2004." *Democratization* 20 (1):160-185.
- Fearon, J. D. (2003): "Ethnic and cultural diversity by country." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2):195-222.
- Feynman, R. P. (1965): *The character of physical law*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995): *Trust : the social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York: Free Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (2001): "Social capital, civil society and development." *Third World Quarterly* 22 (1):7-20.
- Fukuyama, F. (2011): *The origins of political order : from prehuman times to the French Revolution*. First ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Fukuyama, F. (2014): *Political order and political decay : from the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy*. First ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Furlong, P., and Marsh, D. (2010): "A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science." In *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, edited by Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillian.
- Gandhi, J., and Lust-Okar, E. (2009): "Elections Under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:403-422.
- Gandhi, J., and Przeworski, A. (2007): "Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats." *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (11):1279-1301.

- Gasiorowski, M. J. (1995): "Economic-Crisis and Political Regime Change - an Event History Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 89 (4):882-897.
- Gasiorowski, M. J., and Power, T. J. (1998): "The structural determinants of democratic consolidation - Evidence from the Third World." *Comparative Political Studies* 31 (6):740-771.
- Geddes, B. (1999): "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:115-144.
- Geddes, B., Frantz, E., and Wright, J. G. (2014): "Military Rule." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17:147-162.
- Geddes, B., Wright, J., and Frantz, E. (2014a): *Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions. Perspective on Politics.*
- Geddes, B., Wright, J., and Frantz, E. (2014b): "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set." *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (2):313-331.
- Geddes, Barbara. (2003): *Paradigms and sand castles : theory building and research design in comparative politics.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Gellner, E. (1994): *Conditions of liberty : civil society and its rivals.* First American ed. New York, N.Y.: Allen Lane/Penguin Press.
- George, A. L., and Bennett, A. (2005): *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Gerring, J. (2012): *Social science methodology : a unified framework.* Second ed. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gerring, J., and Thacker, S. C. (2008): *A centripetal theory of democratic governance.* Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gleditsch, K. S. (2002): "Expanded trade and GDP data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (5):712-724.
- Goldstone, J. A. (2004): "More social movements or fewer? Beyond political opportunity structures to relational fields." *Theory and Society* 33 (3-4):333-365.
- Golub, J. (2008): "Survival Analysis." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, edited by Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Brady, H. E. and Collier, D., 530-546. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Greener, I. (2005): "The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies." *Politics* 25 (I):62-72.
- Group, Word Bank, (2012): *World Development Indicators 2012.* World Bank Publications. <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.
- Gujarati, D. N., and Porter, D. C. (2010): *Essentials of econometrics.* Fourth ed. New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
- Haggard, S., and Kaufman, R. R. (1995): *The Political economy of democratic transitions.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Hagtvet, B. (1980): "The Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic: A Re-Examination." In *Who were the Fascists: social roots of European Fascism*, edited by Larsen, S. U., Hagtvet, B. and Myklebust, J. P., 66-117. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
- Halebsky, S. (1976): *Mass society and political conflict : toward a reconstruction of theory.* Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Hansen, R. (2002): "Globalization, embedded realism, and path dependence - The other immigrants to Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (3):259-283.
- Hart, J. de, and Dekker, P. (1999): "Civic engagement and volunteering in the Netherlands: a 'Putnamian' analysis." In *Social Capital and European Democracy*, edited by Deth, J. W. van, Maraffi, M., Newton, K. and Whiteley, P. F., 75-107. London; New York: Routledge.
- Hayek, F. A. V. (1975): "Pretence of Knowledge." *Swedish Journal of Economics* 77 (4):433-442.
- Hipsher, P. L. (1996): "Democratization and the decline of urban social movements in Chile and Spain." *Comparative Politics* 28 (3):273-297.
- Hiroi, T., and Omori, S. (2009): "Perils of parliamentarism? Political systems and the stability of democracy revisited." *Democratization* 16 (3):485-507.
- Hosmer, D. W., and Lemeshow, S. (1999): *Applied survival analysis : regression modeling of time to event data*. New York: Wiley.
- Houle, C. (2009): "Inequality and Democracy. Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization." *World Politics* 61 (4):589-622.
- Howard, M. M. (2003): *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Howard, M. M., and Roessler, P. G. (2006): "Liberalizing electoral outcomes in competitive authoritarian regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2):365-381.
- Hox, J. J. (2010): *Multilevel Analysis. Techniques and Applications*. New York and Hove: Routledge.
- Huntington, S. P. (1968): *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1991): *The third wave : democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Hyde, S. D., and Marinov, N. (2012): "Which Elections Can Be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20 (2):191-210.
- Inglehart, R. (1988): "The Renaissance of Political-Culture." *American Political Science Review* 82 (4):1203-1230.
- Jenkins, R. (2001): "Mistaking 'governance' for 'politics': foreign aid, democracy, and the construction of civil society." In *Civil Society. History and Possibilities*, edited by Kaviraj, S. and Khilnani, S., 250-268. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kadera, K. M., Crescenzi, M. J. C., and Shannon, M. L. (2003): "Democratic survival, peace, and war in the international system." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2):234-247.
- Kaviraj, S. (2001): "In search of civil society." In *Civil Society. History and Possibilities*, edited by Kaviraj, S. and Khilnani, S., 287-323. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaviraj, S., and Khilnani, S. (2001a): *Civil Society. History and Possibilities*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaviraj, S., and Khilnani, S. (2001b): "Introduction: Ideas of civil society." In *Civil Society. History and Possibilities*, edited by Kaviraj, S. and Khilnani, S., 1-8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



- Khilnani, S. (2001): "The development of civil society." In *Civil Society. History and Possibilities*, edited by Kaviraj, S. and Khilnani, S., 11-32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- King, G., Alt, J. E., Burns, N. E., and Laver, M. (1990): "A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (3):846-871.
- King, G., Keohane, R. O., and Verba, S. (1994): *Designing social inquiry : scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Kolankiewicz, G. (1992): "The Reconstruction of Citizenship: Reverse Incorporation in Eastern Europe." In *Constructing Capitalism. The Reemergence of Civil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist World*, edited by Poznanski, K. Z., 141-158. Oxford: Westview Press.
- Kornhauser, W. (1959): *The politics of mass society*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Krasner, S. D. (1988): "Sovereignty - an Institutional Perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (1):66-94.
- Kubik, J. (1998): "Institutionalization of Protest during Democratic Consolidation in Central Europe." In *Social Movements Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, edited by Meyer, D. S. and Tarrow, S. G., 131-152. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC.
- Kubik, J. (2000): "Between the State and Networks of "Cousins": The Role of Civil Society and Noncivil Associations in the Democratization of Poland." In *Civil Society Before Democratization. Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe*, edited by Bermeo, N. and Nord, P., 181-208. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC.
- Laastad, E. (2013): "Domestic terrorism and government duration - an event history analysis." Master thesis, Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen.
- Leeuw, J. de, and Meijer, E. (2008): *Handbook of Multilevel Analysis*. New York, NY: Springer.
- Letki, N., and Evans, G. (2005): "Endogenizing social trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe." *British Journal of Political Science* 35:515-529.
- Levi, M. (1996): "Social and unsocial capital: A review essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work." *Politics & Society* 24 (1):45-55.
- Lijphart, A. (1977): *Democracy in plural societies : a comparative exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Linz, J. J. (1990a): "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1):51-69.
- Linz, J. J. (1990b): "The Virtues of Parliamentarism." *Journal of Democracy* 1 (4):84-91.
- Linz, J. J. (2000): *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Linz, J. J., and Stepan, A. C. (1996): *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation : southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959): "Some Social Requisites of Democracy - Economic-Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53 (1):69-105.
- Lipset, S. M., and Lakin, J. M. (2004): *The democratic century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

- Mahoney, J. (2001): "Path-dependent explanations of regime change: Central America in comparative perspective." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (1):111-141.
- Mainwaring, S. (1990): "Presidentialism in Latin-America." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (1):157-179.
- Mainwaring, S. (1993): "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy - the Difficult Combination." *Comparative Political Studies* 26 (2):198-228.
- Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G. A., and Valenzuela, J. S. (1992): *Issues in democratic consolidation : the new South American democracies in comparative perspective*. Notre Dame, Ind.: Published for the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies by University of Notre Dame Press.
- Mainwaring, S., and Pérez-Liñán, A. S. (2013a): *Democracies and dictatorships in Latin America : emergence, survival, and fall*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, S., and Pérez-Liñán, A. S. (2013b): "Democratic Breakdown and Survival." *Journal of Democracy* 24 (2):123-137.
- Margetts, H., and Stoker, G. (2010): "The Experimental Method: Prospects for Laboratory and Field Studies." In *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, edited by Marsh, D. and Stoker, G., 308-324. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Midtbø, T. (2007): *Regresjonsanalyse for samfunnsvitere. Med eksempler i SPSS*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Mill, J. S. (2009): *Considerations on Representative Government*. Auckland, NZL: Floating Press.
- Miller, M. K. (2015): "Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development since 1815." *British Journal of Political Science* 45 (3):501-530.
- Mills, M. (2011): *Introducing survival and event history analysis*. Los Angeles, California ; London: Sage.
- Moore, B. (1966): *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy; lord and peasant in the making of the modern world*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Moses, J. W., and Knutsen, T. L. (2012): *Ways of knowing : competing methodologies in social and political research*. Second ed. Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mosher, M. A. (2002): "Conclusion: Are Civil Societies the Transmission Belts of Ethical Tradition?" In *Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society*, edited by Chambers, S. and Kymlicka, W., 207-230. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Muller, E. N., and Seligson, M. A. (1994): "Civic culture and democracy: The question of causal relationship." *The American Political Science Review* 88 (3).
- Munck, G. L., and Verkuilen, J. (2002): "Conceptualizing and measuring democracy - Evaluating alternative indices." *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (1):5-34.
- Norris, P. (2011): *Democratic deficit : critical citizens revisited*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- North, D. C. (1990): *Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Donnell, G. A. (1988): *Bureaucratic authoritarianism : Argentina, 1966-1973, in comparative perspective*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- O'Donnell, G. A. (1996): "Illusions About Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 7 (2):34-51.
- O'Donnell, G. A. (2010): *Democracy, agency, and the state : theory with comparative intent*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
- O'Donnell, G. A., and Schmitter, P. C. (2013): *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Offe, C., and Fuchs, S. (2002): "A Decline of Social Capital? The German Case." In *Democracies in Flux. The evolution of social capital in contemporary societies*, edited by Putnam, R. D, 189-243. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Olson, M. (1963): "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force." *Journal of Economic History* 23 (4):529-552.
- Olson, M. (1971): *The logic of collective action; public goods and the theory of groups*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Olson, M. (1982): *The rise and decline of nations : economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Oxhorn, P. (1995): *Organizing Civil Society. The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Paxton, P. (2000): "Women's suffrage in the measurement of democracy: Problems of operationalization." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35 (3):92-111.
- Paxton, P. (2002): "Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship." *American Sociological Review* 67 (2):254-277.
- Pérez-Liñán, A., and Mainwaring, S. (2013): "Regime Legacies and Levels of Democracy. Evidence from Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 45 (4):379-397.
- Petersen, T. (1995): "Analysis of Event History." In *Handbook of Statistical Modelling for the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, edited by Arminger, G., Clogg, C. C. and Sobel, M. E., 453-517. New York: Plenum Press.
- Pierson, P. (2000): "Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics." *American Political Science Review* 94 (2):251-267.
- Pierson, P. (2003): "Big, Slow-Moving, and... Invisible. Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics." In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by Mahoney, J. and Rueschemeyer, D., 177-207. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pierson, P. (2004): *Politics in time : history, institutions, and social analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Pollard, S. E. (2014): "The State and Civil Society in the Arab Middle East." Ph.d dissertation, Graduate College, Western Michigan University.
- Power, T. J., and Gasiorowski, M. J. (1997): "Institutional design and democratic consolidation in the Third World." *Comparative Political Studies* 30 (2):123-155.
- Przeworski, A. (2010): *Democracy and the limits of self-government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F. (1996): "What makes democracies endure?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (1):39-55.


- Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F. (2000): *Democracy and development : political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski, A., and Limongi, F. (1997): "Modernization - Theories and facts." *World Politics* 49 (2):155-183.
- Putnam, R. D. (1994): *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, R. D., ed. (2002): *Democracies in Flux. The evolution of social capital in contemporary societies*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Putnam, R. D., and Goss, K. (2002): "Introduction." In *Democracies in Flux. The evolution of social capital in contemporary societies*, edited by Putnam, R. D., 3-19. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reynal-Querol, M. (2002): "Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (1):29-54.
- Rothstein, B. (2002): "Social Capital in the Social Democratic State." In *Democracies in Flux. The evolution of social capital in contemporary societies*, edited by Putnam, R. D., 289-331. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rueschemeyer, D., Huber, E., and Stephens, J. D. (1992): *Capitalist development and democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rustow, D. A. (1970): "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics* 2 (3):337-363.
- Saghaug Broderstad, T. (2015): "A Meta-Analysis of Income and Democracy. Why we still have not reached consensus after 60 years of research." Master Thesis, Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen.
- Sartori, G. (1970): "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." *American Political Science Review* 64 (4):1033-1053.
- Schedler, A. (1998): "What is democratic consolidation?" *Journal of Democracy* 9 (2):91-107.
- Schmitter, P. C., and Karl, T. L. (1991): "What Democracy Is... and Is Not." *Journal of Democracy* Summer 1991:103-109.
- Schock, K. (2005): *Unarmed insurrections : people power movements in nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1950): *Capitalism, socialism, and democracy*. Third ed. New York: Harper.
- Seligson, M. A., and Muller, E. N. (1987): "Democratic Stability and Economic-Crisis - Costa-Rica, 1978-1983." *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (3):301-326.
- Selle, P., and Strømsnes, K. (1998): "Organized Environmentalists: Democracy as a Key Value?" *International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 9 (4).
- Sharma, Basu. (1989): "The Effect of Strikes on Economic Growth." *Atlantic Economic Journal* 1 (17):86-87.
- Skocpol, T. (2002): "United States: From Membership to Advocacy." In *Democracies in Flux. The evolution of social capital in contemporary societies*, edited by Putnam, R. D., 103-136. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Skog, O. J. (2009): *Å forklare sosiale fenomener. En regresjonsbasert tilnærming*. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk.

- Stepan, A., and Skach, C. (1993): "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation - Parliamentarianism Versus Presidentialism." *World Politics* 46 (1):1-22.
- Stephan, M. J., and Chenoweth, E. (2008): "Why civil resistance works - The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict." *International Security* 33 (1):7-44.
- Strang, D. (1991): "Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500-1987." *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (4):429-454.
- Svolik, M. W. (2008): "Authoritarian reversals and democratic consolidation." *American Political Science Review* 102 (2):153-168.
- Svolik, M. W. (2015): "Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation." *British Journal of Political Science* 45 (4):715-738.
- Taylor, C. (1990): "Modes of Civil Society." *Public Culture* 3 (1):95-118.
- Teorell, J. (2010): *Determinants of democratization : explaining regime change in the world, 1972-2006*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Thelen, K. (1999): "Historical institutionalism in comparative politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:369-404.
- Tilly, C. (1995): "Democracy is a Lake." In *The Social Construction of Democracy, 1870-1990*, edited by Andrews, G. R. and Chapman, H., 365-387. New York: New York University Press.
- Tocqueville, A. de. (2003): *Democracy in America and Two Essays on America*. Translated by Bevan, Gerald E. London: Penguin Classics.
- Trejo, Guillermo. (2012): *Popular movements in autocracies : religion, repression, and indigenous collective action in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Uhlin, A. (2009): "Which Characteristics of Civil Society Organizations Support What Aspects of Democracy? Evidence from Post-communist Latvia." *International Political Science Review* 30 (3):271-295.
- Ulfelder, J. (2005): "Contentious collective action and the breakdown of authoritarian regimes." *International Political Science Review* 26 (3):311-334.
- Valenzuela, J. S. (1992): "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and facilitating Conditions." In *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G. A. and Valenzuela, J. S., 57-104. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Warren, M. E. (2011): "Civil Society and Democracy." In *The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society*, edited by Edwards, M., 377-391. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Warwick, P. (1992a): "Economic-Trends and Government Survival in West European Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 86 (4):875-887.
- Warwick, P., and Easton, S. T. (1992): "The Cabinet Stability Controversy - New Perspectives on a Classic Problem." *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (1):122-146.
- Warwick, P. V. (1992b): "Rising Hazards - an Underlying Dynamic of Parliamentary Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (4):857-876.
- Weyland, K. (2012): "The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?" *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (4):917-934.

- Wollebaek, D., and Selle, P. (2003): "Participation and social capital formation: Norway in a comparative perspective." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 26 (1):67-91.
- Wood, E. J. (2000): *Forging democracy from below : insurgent transitions in South Africa and El Salvador*. Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Worms, J. P. (2002): "France: Old and New Civic and Social Ties in France." In *Democracies in Flux. The evolution of social capital in contemporary societies*, edited by Putnam, R. D., 137-188. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wuthnow, R. (2002): "The United States: Bridging the Privileged and the Marginalized?" In *Democracies in Flux: the evolution of social capital in contemporary societies*, edited by Putnam, R. D., 59-102. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yamaguchi, K. (1991): *Event history analysis*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.
- Zubaida, S. (2001): "Civil society, community, and democracy in the Middle East." In *Civil Society. History and Possibilities*, edited by Kaviraj, S. and Khilnani, S., 232-249. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


**9 Appendix**

**Figure 9.1** Baseline hazard



**Figure 9.2** Goodness of fit


The following figure graphs the goodness of fit for Model 8.




**Graphic investigation of proportional hazards assumption for Model 8.**

The following figures investigate graphically the results for the two variables that were found to have a significant p-value in the Schoenfeld residuals test for Model 8. Deviances from the horizontal line indicates violation of the proportional hazards assumption.

**Figure 9.3** Schoenfeld residuals test, *Strikes*




**Figure 9.4** Schoenfeld residuals test, *Elections*






The following graphs investigate the proportional hazards assumption for the two dummy variables that were significant in Model 8, *GDP Growth* and *Presidential-Mixed*. Parallel lines indicate that the proportional hazards assumption holds.

**Figure 9.5** Test for proportional hazards assumption, *GDP Growth*




**Figure 9.6** Test for proportional hazards assumption, *Presidential-Mixed*



Parallel lines for the observed and predicted values pairwise indicate that the assumption holds.

**Figure 9.7** Comparison of Kaplan-Meier and Cox survivor function, *GDP Growth*



**Figure 9.8** Comparison of Kaplan-Meier and Cox survivor function, *Presidential-Mixed*

