

Development cooperation with Norwegian NGOs in Bolivia

*How the development cooperation is
affected by a stronger state*

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ABSTRACT

The Bolivian state evicted USAID and the Danish development organization IBIS for conspiracy against the state and political meddling in 2013, and introduced the same year a new law that involves more restrictions and regulation towards NGOs. Bolivia is not the first country to put restrictions and regulations on NGOs, and more countries introduce restrictions and regulations on NGOs. More than half of the world's states have implemented control on NGOs, and an increasing number of states have put restrictions and regulations on NGOs and civil society. The roles of NGOs as the mainstream development actor have also changed, and they are not as favored by donors as they once were.

This is a qualitative study that presents how three Norwegian NGOs and their Bolivian partner NGOs relate and adapts to the new regulations from the Bolivian state. The analysis is based on Nelson's six dimensions of organizational life, to get an understanding of how the Norwegian and Bolivian NGOs in this study relate to each other, their donors in Norway and the Bolivian state. The study also presents how the power relation is between the different actors and how the future development cooperation in the country looks like for the Norwegian NGOs operating in the country. This thesis will present why some NGOs are worried for the new restrictions and regulations from the Bolivian state, while others are not as worried, and how this can be seen in a wider context.

The study presents how the roles of NGOs have changed over time, both according to donors and policy makers, as well as towards the receiving states. By looking into how the Norwegian NGOs and their Bolivian partner NGOs relate to their partners in Bolivia, this study hopes to explain and present some of the realities NGOs are facing, related to donors and receiving state.

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	I
Acknowledgement.....	II
List of Figures	VIII
1 Introduction	1
1.1 NGOs role in development.....	1
1.2 The Bolivian state’s relation to NGOs	2
1.3 Research Question and structure	3
1.4 Structure of the thesis	4
2 NGOs and their roles in development	6
2.1 Introduction	6
2.2 The historical role of development discourse and development strategies	6
2.3 NGOs as development actors	9
2.4 The role NGOs have had over time	10
2.5 NGOs relation to the state	11
2.6 The power relationship between NGOs and their donors.....	13
2.7 Research On NGOs	14
2.8 The six dimensions of NGOs organizational life	14
2.9 Everyday practices as key to understand development NGOs	16
2.10 My analytical framework.....	17
2.11 Summary.....	19
3 Methodology	20
3.1 Introduction	20
3.2 Semi-structured interviews	20
3.3 Secondary data, reports and NGOs own documents	21
3.4 Presentation of Informants and NGOs.....	22
3.5 Research in another culture	25

3.5.1	Considerations to make when doing research in another culture.....	25
3.5.2	Working with different languages, different culture and an interpreter.....	25
3.5.3	Transcribing the interviews.....	26
3.5.4	My history in Bolivia.....	27
3.5.5	My status in the field.....	27
3.5.6	“Insider-outsider”.....	29
3.5.7	Location of the interviews.....	30
3.6	Coding the data.....	30
3.7	Ethics.....	31
3.7.1	Three main principles for conducting social science research.....	31
3.7.2	Relation to informants in the field.....	32
3.7.3	Securing the informants anonymity.....	33
3.7.4	Payment.....	33
3.8	Reliability and validity.....	33
3.9	Summary of the methods.....	35
4	The NGO-state relation in Bolivia over time.....	36
4.1	Introduction.....	36
4.2	A brief history of Bolivia until the revolution in 1952.....	36
4.3	Bolivia after the revolution in 1952 until 1982.....	37
4.4	Neoliberalism in Bolivia.....	38
4.4.1	NGOs in Bolivia during the neoliberal period.....	39
4.4.2	LPP – Law of popular population.....	39
4.4.3	Discontent before Morales was elected president.....	40
4.5	Bolivia after Evo Morales became president.....	41
4.6	The TIPNIS conflict.....	43
4.7	Reclaiming the power.....	44
4.8	The state-NGO relation over time.....	46

4.9	Law of Legal Entities No. 351 (<i>Ley de Otorgación de Personalidades Jurídicas</i>) ..	47
4.10	Summary.....	48
5	Norwegian NGOs operating in Bolivia.....	50
5.1	Introduction	50
5.2	NORAD Statistics and reports.....	50
5.3	Mission Alliance.....	52
5.4	SAIH.....	55
5.5	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)	57
5.6	Which dimensions that are important to the Norwegian NGOs in the development cooperation with Bolivian NGOs.....	59
5.7	Bolivian Partner NGOs of the Norwegian NGOs	62
5.7.1	How the Bolivian NGOs presented their development cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs.....	62
5.7.2	Values and mission.....	63
5.7.3	Human relationships within and among organizations	63
5.7.4	Political allegiances.....	64
5.7.5	Legal.....	65
5.7.6	Technical	66
5.7.7	Resources	67
5.8	Power relation between Norwegian NGOs and the Bolivian NGOs.....	68
5.9	Summary.....	70
6	The power relation between Norwegian NGOs, their donors and the Bolivian state	71
6.1	Introduction	71
6.2	The Bolivian state's approach to NGOs	71
6.3	Power relation between Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state.....	74
6.3.1	A stronger Bolivian state.....	74
6.3.2	Power relation between Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state	76
6.3.3	Cooperation between NGOs and the state through Nelson's six dimensions	78

6.4	Donors of the Norwegian NGOs	81
6.4.1	Government grants from NORAD	81
6.4.2	Private supporters, and earmarked projects from private donors	82
6.4.3	Student support.....	83
6.4.4	COOP	83
6.4.5	Other contributors and donors.....	83
6.5	Power relation between Norwegian NGOs and their donors	84
6.5.1	NORAD as a donor	84
6.5.2	Other donors	87
6.5.3	Wishes from donors or potential donors	88
6.5.4	How NGOs relate to donors in light of Nelson’s six dimensions	90
6.6	Summary.....	94
7	Future development cooperation in Bolivia, according to Norwegian NGOs and the Bolivian state’s politics	95
7.1	Introduction	95
7.2	Future development cooperation in Bolivia, according to Norwegian NGOs.....	95
7.2.1	Arguments to continue the development cooperation in Bolivia.....	95
7.2.2	NORAD funding	97
7.2.3	Weak value of the Norwegian currency	98
7.3	How a stronger Receiving state affects the development cooperation	99
7.4	Future development cooperation	100
7.5	Summary.....	101
8	Conclusion.....	102
8.1	The Bolivian State’s stand against NGOs	102
8.2	Findings from Bolivia related to a general trend worldwide.....	104
8.3	Norwegian NGOs’ relation to their donors	105
9	References	106

Appendix A 114
Appendix B 115
Appendix C 116
Appendix D 119
Appendix E..... 121
Appendix F 124
Appendix G 125

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Development theories within different approaches, figure from Potter, et. al. (2008)	7
Figure 2 Nelson’s six dimension of organizational life.	15
Figure 3 Analytical framework to understand the cooperation between NGOs, donors, and the Bolivian state.....	18
Figure 4 Overview of Norwegian and Bolivian informants.....	23
Figure 5 Historic development of NORAD funding through Norwegian NGOs to Bolivia. From NORAD ²	51
Figure 6 Distribution of NORAD funding through Norwegian NGOs to different sectors in Bolivia from 2000-20153	52
Figure 7 How Norwegian NGOs, Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state relates. Larger circles signify higher importance of the dimension for the NGOs. The thickness of the connecting lines signifies the number of NGOs that utilize the connection, with increasing thickness for increasing number of NGOs.	70
Figure 8 Overview of how Norwegian NGOs relate to their donors. The thickness of the connections signifies the importance of that connection to the respective donor. Thicker connections signify higher importance.	94

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 NGOS ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT

NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) have been active in many aspects of development since the 1980s, with service delivery, democracy building, conflict resolution, human rights work, policy analysis and research, and information providing. NGOs have been an important component in the neoliberal policy agenda, as well as having a dominant role within international development and humanitarian policy. This have led to a stronger empowerment of NGOs, from a local scale to a global scale (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, p. 666).

NGOs position as development actors has however changed. In the 1990s, and early 2000s, NGOs were seen as having a comparative advantage in organizational terms and in how they reached out to the most vulnerable people. NGOs are not regarded as positively as they once were, and the receiving state has gotten more attention from donor agencies (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, pp. 666-667). In 1997 the World Development Report stated that «... *state dominated development has failed, but so will stateless development. Development without an effective state is impossible*» (World Bank, 1997, p. 25, in Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, p. 667).

To understand the roles of the NGOs, Potter et.al. (2008) state the importance of understanding the role of the NGOs in the society, which values they represent, and how the NGOs are shaping the development. The values the NGOs represents are not value neutral, but are represented by some political or social groups, and they will affect their work (2008, p. 276). Nelson (2007) has made an approach to analyze the relationship between the donor states and the NGOs involved in the development process. He argues that to understand the role of NGOs, it is important to study the different dimensions of NGOs (Nelson, 2007, p. 91). He has made a model which includes six elements which he means involves everyday practice of the NGOs, and how they relate to donor state, receiving state and other participants. I have used this model, with some alterations, in my research to analyze how three Norwegian NGOs, Mission Alliance, SAIH (Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), operate in Bolivia. The three NGOs have different approaches, aims, values, and partners, and I will demonstrate how they and their partners in Bolivia operate in Bolivia in relation to Nelsons six dimension, and

how this approach can give a better understanding of the development cooperation with Norwegian NGOs, their donors, and the Bolivian state.

1.2 THE BOLIVIAN STATE'S RELATION TO NGOS

The background for my master thesis is the eviction of USAID and the Danish development NGO, IBIS in 2013 (IBIS, 2013; Gustafson, 2013). The reason for the evictions was “conspiracy against the state”. The Morales government has further threatened to evict foreign NGOs that do not cooperate with the state, or conspire against the state (Gustafson, 2013; BBC, 2013). The Bolivian government is stating a powerful message to foreign NGOs that they can risk being expelled from the country if they are criticizing the government or their politics (ProQuest, 2014). I wanted to look into how the Norwegian NGOs work in this context, and if their work could lead to eviction.

In August 2015, the Bolivian government, fronted by Vice President García Linera, threatened four national, research NGOs with expulsion or to be shut down, and accused them of lying about their research and research results (Rojas, 2015). The threats against four NGOs in 2015 and the eviction of IBIS in 2013 are related to the TIPNIS road project from 2011. This project involved a highway through the TIPNIS national park. The three indigenous groups living inside the park claimed the road project would destroy the biodiversity of life within the park, and started on a march to La Paz to protest against the highway. The march was blocked by campesinos (peasants), colonists and business groups, supporting the highway, and tension rose between the marchers and the supporters of the highway. The government sent the police to the area to calm the marchers and supporters, but on September 25, the police, by orders from someone in the government, brutally attacked the marchers, leaving many of the marchers wounded. The attack has been widely criticized nationally and internationally, leading to many protests against the Bolivian government. The government withdrew its proposal to the road, but the road project and the further development in Bolivia has been a tense topic since the police raid (Achtenberg, 2011). There has been a tense relationship between the Morales government and environmental NGOs since then, and the Bolivian state has taken a stronger position against foreign NGOs (Achtenberg, 2015). IBIS was evicted due to their public support of the marchers, and their critique of the Bolivian governments' handle of the conflict (France-Presse, 2013).

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND STRUCTURE

My research question is:

How are Norwegian NGOs affected by a stronger state in Bolivia, and how does this affect the donor-NGO- receiving state relation?

Sub research questions:

SRQ1: What characterize the NGO-state relation in Bolivia over time?

SRQ2: Which Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia, how do they work, and what is their mission?

SRQ3: How is the power relation between Norwegian NGOs, their donors and the Bolivian state?

SRQ4: How does the future development cooperation look like according to Norwegian NGOs and the Bolivian state's politics?

To understand why the Bolivian state has taken a stronger approach towards NGOs, it is important to understand how the relationship between NGOs in Bolivia and the Bolivian state has evolved over time. I have therefore used one of the sub research questions to look into that, and I will use the first analysis chapter to present how the NGO-state relation in Bolivia has changed over time.

The second sub research question is related to which Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia, their values, and which partners they have, and how their partners relate to the Bolivian state. To get an understanding of how the Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia, and how they and their partners are affected by a stronger state.

The third sub research question relates to the power relation between the Norwegian NGOs, their donors and the Bolivian state. To understand how the Norwegian NGOs and their partners are affected by a stronger state, and how this affect the cooperation and operation in the country.

In the fourth sub research question I will look how the future development cooperation looks like, and if it is affected by a stronger state. I will present how the Norwegian NGOs donors and the Bolivian state's approach towards NGOs affect the development cooperation. I will

present what considerations the Norwegian NGOs will take into consideration when they decide if they shall continue their development cooperation in Bolivia.

By having these four sub research questions, I get a chance to illustrate how the relation and cooperation between NGOs have evolved over time, which Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia, and how the power relation is between the different actors within the development process, as well as how the further development cooperation looks like. I get a chance to demonstrate different aspects of the main research question.

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

I have in total eight chapters. In the first chapter I will present the role of NGOs as development actors, the stronger approach the Bolivian state has against NGOs, as well as the research question and sub research questions. In the second chapter I will present my theoretical framework, focusing on former studies on NGOs and their roles in development, and how it has evolved over time. I will present former research on NGOs, and the power relation between NGOs, their donors and the receiving state, as well as other aspects related to the NGOs and development. In the third chapter I present how I produced and conducted the data, the methodology I have used to get information, which informants I have used, challenges with doing a fieldwork in another culture and how I have conducted this thesis. I have four analysis chapters, the chapters 4-7, where I will look more into the four sub research questions presented above. In the fourth chapter I will present a short version of the history of Bolivia, to get a wider understanding of the current events in Bolivia, as well as present how the Bolivian state's approach towards NGOs has changed over time, and the role NGOs have played in the development of the country, related to my first sub research question. This is mostly a context chapter, focusing on the history of Bolivia, to understand the changes there are in Bolivia today. In the fifth analysis chapter I will look more into the second sub research question, related to which Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia and how they work in light of the six dimensions of Nelson, and how they relate to their partners and the Bolivian state due to these dimensions. In the sixth chapter I will present the third sub research question, related to the power relation between the Bolivian state and Bolivian NGOs cooperating with Norwegian NGOs, as well as who the donors of the Norwegian NGOs are, and how the Norwegian NGOs relate to them. The chapter will present how the relation is between Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state, in light of the six dimensions of Nelson

(2007) to analyze why some NGOs are more concerned about a stronger state than others. The chapter will further present the power relation between the Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state, using Tvedt's (2009) power analysis. The chapter will also look into who the donors of the Norwegian NGOs are, and how they relate to their donors, and the power relation between them. In the seventh analytical chapter I will look into the fourth sub research question, and how the further development cooperation for Norwegian NGOs in Bolivia looks like. My main research question will be answered within the four analysis chapters. In the eighth chapter, the conclusion, I will present my findings, and how this can be seen in a wider context, in light of the theoretical framework for this thesis, as well as global trends.

Instead of using a traditional comparative analysis, I have studied how the different NGOs relate to their partners and the Bolivian state through different dimensions, to get a better understanding of how the role of NGOs in Bolivia, without presenting a definitive answer of how it is, but rather what is the case of the Norwegian NGOs operating in Bolivia. By taking this approach, I can study how NGOs are affected by a stronger state, and why they are affected, rather than comparing how the different Norwegian NGOs, their strategies and their partners work. I wanted to look at it from an overall point of view, rather than a comparative point.

2 NGOs AND THEIR ROLES IN DEVELOPMENT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will outline the theoretical framework of my thesis, starting by presenting the main trends within the development discourse, according to Potter, et.al. (2008), and how the development discourse has developed over time. It will further present the roles NGOs have as development actors, and present how the roles of NGOs have changed over time. Following that, the chapter will present the NGOs relation towards the receiving state (Bratton), and how the power relation is between NGOs and their donors (Hilhorst, Tvedt). It will further present the traditional research on NGOs and their roles in development (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah), and how Nelson argues that NGOs needs to be understood through different dimension of their work. I have used a combination of different models to develop an analytical framework of how I have understood the NGOs role in the development in Bolivia, and how their roles have changed. NGOs have been important actors within many areas of development, and it is impossible to outline all the different roles NGOs have had over time.

2.2 THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

To get an understanding of how NGOs have been development actors over the last decades, and how they have been seen by donors and development agencies, I will present the different paradigms and trends within development theory in the 20th century. There have been many different theories, thoughts, ideas and changing views in the thinking of development process, and what it is that constitutes development (Potter et.al., 2008, p. 79). Potter et.al. (2008) has classified the different trends within the development discourse, from a focus on economic growth in the classical- traditional approach, to alternative- and bottom-up development. In Figure 1, Potter et.al. (2008) has classified the development theories into different approaches, and set the approaches within a model to show if they are either normative or positive, economic oriented, or holistic oriented with focus on the social, political and moral dimension. Potter, et.al. (2008) state that development is highly political, and it is therefore many different ideas and thoughts that dominate the discourse, and hence different approaches

towards development strategies. Development theories are evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and the different ideas and approaches coexist at the same time without the eradication of older theories and approaches (Potter, et.al., 2008, pp. 79-83). By demonstrating the different approaches in the development discourse, I wish to demonstrate how the ideas and approaches develop over time, and how different ideas and actors are involved in the aid system. Later in this chapter I will demonstrate how the roles of NGOs as development actors have changed over time.




Figure 1 Development theories within different approaches, figure from Potter, et. al. (2008)

The classical-traditional approach is mostly based on economic theory, and it has generally dominated policy thinking at the global scale. The economic theories stress the importance of a liberal world trade as an essential path to growth and development. The theories have mainly been produced since 1945, but some of the theories date back to 1870. These theories

argue that fundamental dualism exists between the underdeveloped, traditional sector on one hand, and on the other hand the modern, developed and Western (Potter, et.al., 2008, pp.82-83).

The historical-empirical approach seeks to make a generalization about development by applying empirical observation throughout time. This approach has developed normative theories with some elements from the history. Especially the core-periphery theory represents this approach, when the basics of the theory is common for most developing countries, and then the further stages have been added by development planners (Potter, et.al., 2008, pp. 96-99).

The radical dependency approach criticizes the modernization theory from the classical-traditional approach, and holds up dependency theory as a voice from the developing countries. This approach further claims that there is a correlation between development and underdevelopment, and that the aid system generates more dependency and underdevelopment, rather than development (Potter, et.al., 2008, pp. 108-110). The dependency theories show a holistic view of how capitalism has made a chain of dependency relations, and how it coincides with colonialism and underdevelopment (Potter, et.al., 2008, p. 112).

The Alternative, bottom-up and participatory approach, criticizes the top-down approaches from the 1970s, and argues that development should come from below – or bottom-up. Walter Stöhr states that bottom-up development needs to be closely related to the socio-cultural, historical and institutional conditions in each territorial unit to help mobilize the indigenous natural and human resources (Potter, et.al., 2008, pp. 115-117). In this approach, sustainable development has a bigger role than in the other approaches, and more focus is set on how to target the poorest and most vulnerable groups. A way of securing that is to involve NGOs in the development process. The focus has moved from growth-oriented definitions towards more human-oriented frameworks, and there has been more focus on small-scale projects, than just national scale. It is also a lot more ideographic, acknowledging that there cannot be the same results or theories concerning all developing countries (Potter, et.al., 2008, pp.117-119).

There has also been a massive critique of development theories, known as anti-development, and alternatives to development. The essence in this discourse is that development is a Western construction where all the political, social and economic parameters are set by the West, and the ideal is to normalize and develop poor countries to be more like Western

countries (Potter,2008, p.18). Especially Escobar is a representative for this new approach, and argues that the idea of development is a Western construction, and that development often has led to “abnormalities”, such as more poverty and underdevelopment (Escobar, 1995, p. 212). This argument has also been used by the Morales government, which I will come back to later.

2.3 NGOs AS DEVELOPMENT ACTORS

NGOs have been an important part of the development planning, and are considered as important development actors by researchers and policymakers. Since the 1980s, there has been an immense growth in the number of NGOs working in developing countries with development practices the last decades (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, pp. 665-666). Exact numbers of how many NGOs that are working in developing countries are not available, but OECD statistics from 1987, estimated the total number of Northern NGOs involved in the aid system worldwide to be 2,450. In the 1990s, the number of NGOs receiving funding from donor states, directly and indirectly, was more than 50,000 (Tvedt, 2007, p. 26). NGOs have been held up as a local and global solution to promote the neoliberal economy policy, and the “non-governmental” had two mutually important functions. NGOs should take over some of the areas of the state, so the state could pull back, and private service deliveries could take over some fields of the countries development. The “non-governmental” sector could help build up the civil society in developing countries, and make the people aware of their rights and duties (Opoku-Mensah, 2007, p. 9).

Lewis & Opoku-Mensah claim NGOs are no longer regarded as positive as they once were. They state that it was argued in the 1990s and early 2000s that NGOs had a comparative advantage in how they reached out to the people who needed it the most, their ability to reduce poverty, work with local communities, and develop new and good solutions to development problems (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, pp. 667-669). Lewis and Opoku-Mensah (2006) further state that there seems to be a combination of different reasons why NGOs are no longer seen as the favored choice of development actors. A continuous search for new terms and approaches for the development sector, as well as a performance drop of NGOs during the 1990s, has led to a prioritizing of other development actors than NGOs. Donors have further argued the importance of bringing the state back in the development process, involving more support to national governments instead of NGOs. By bringing the

state back in the development process, the national governments can create a more consistent policy for strategies to generate economic growth and reduce poverty (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, pp. 666-667). In 1997, the World Development Report stated that «... *state dominated development has failed, but so will stateless development. Development without an effective state is impossible*» (World Bank, 1997, p. 25, in Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, p. 667). NGOs and the civil society do still have important roles within the development arena, but NGOs are no longer seen as the mainstream of development. NGOs no longer have the same influence in the development sector as they once had. For a long time, they were the favored choice of donors, but this have changed, according to Lewis & Opoku-Mensah (2006, p. 669).

2.4 THE ROLE NGOs HAVE HAD OVER TIME

In the late 1980s, it was common to see development NGOs as a group of third-sector organizations. The state was seen as the first sector, the market as the second sector, and development organizations as the third sector. This category included a diverse set of NGOs and institutions positioned between the state and the market (Tvedt, 2007, p. 28). In the 1990s NGOs were relabeled “civil society organizations” (CSOs). NGOs had not been able to accomplish what donors had hoped, but by changing their name, the same organizations could continue to receive support from the states (Tvedt, 2007, pp. 28-29). Development cooperation through NGOs has been an important part of most donor states’ foreign policy, and it has been an important development aid strategy. According to Tvedt (1998), many NGOs would have collapsed without financial support from the state (Tvedt, 1998, in Tvedt, 2007, p. 29).

Tvedt (2007) states that a number of donor states, especially the Scandinavians, began to directly fund “local NGOs” in the 1970 and 1980s. It was a policy strategy, which involved that “Northern NGOs” transferred funding to “Southern NGOs”, making them partners in development (Tvedt, 2007, p. 37). Tvedt (2009) and Tjønneland (2007) demonstrate how the relation between Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian donor state has evolved over time, demonstrating how there has been an increase in the number of NGOs receiving funding for their work in developing countries from the 1960s until the early 2000s, and how the Norwegian NGOs has been an increasingly more important development partner and actor within the Norwegian development aid, and state that half of the Norwegian development

assistant is channeled through Norwegian NGOs (Tjønneland, 2007, p. 278; Tvedt, 2009, p. 57). Tvedt (2009) further demonstrates how the role of Norwegian NGOs and funding through the Norwegian state has changed over time, to first involve 50 percent of other funding in 1962, to reduce this to 10 percent in 2001, involving 90 percent state funding for their work. He further demonstrates how different Norwegian official representatives promote NGOs and their roles in development, and the importance of the Norwegian NGOs work, and how the relation between the Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian state is closely linked together (Tvedt, 2009, pp. 63-81).

2.5 NGOs RELATION TO THE STATE

Bratton (1989) demonstrates how NGOs working in Africa have been held up as the preferable choice of development actors by international donor agencies, national governments and private firms for their capability to secure bottom-up development, reaching out to the most vulnerable as well as addressing the basic needs of the rural poor. Even though his research is based on African countries in the 1980s, his findings can be relevant to see how the relation between NGOs and the receiving state can develop in other countries as well. Bratton (1989) seeks to demonstrate how the favoring of NGOs by donor agencies could challenge the relation between the African states and the NGOs. African governments had not been able to reduce poverty or improve the rural living conditions, leading to a larger focus on NGOs as the favored development actor (Bratton, 1989, pp. 569-570). One of the questions he raises is who is responsible for the development with the increased number of NGOs working in African countries (Bratton, 1989, p. 572). Even though NGOs promised to contribute to the national development goals, it can be difficult for the government to get an overview of all the NGOs and their projects, and it would be too costly for the state to keep track of all the projects the different NGOs have (Bratton, 1989, p. 575). NGOs might promote political discontent with the national regime, and promote channels to express this opposition against the state, which can challenge the balance between the state and the civil society. The fact that they are both international actors can affect the relationship between the state and the NGOs. Governments will welcome NGOs as development actors within their country, as long as it does not involve a reduction in the flows of development capital channeled away from the receiving states to the NGOs (Bratton, 1989, pp. 572-573). NGOs and receiving states may differ in their methods of service delivery, but the differences seldom will lead not any

political impasse. NGOs can however argue that the state should do more to promote human rights or give more freedom to political and legal preconditions. The NGOs can also present the state in a negative light if they do not do so, which can give the state a more negative impression towards the NGOs working in their country. NGOs as a development actor within a country can give the government a challenge of how to balance central political control towards the autonomy of the civil society. NGOs can involve a variety of different actors, at both a national level, as well as an international level, considering neighbor countries and international donors. This can further affect how national governments see NGOs, and if they see NGOs as a threat to state security, (Bratton, 1989, pp. 575-580). States can control NGOs by introducing more controls, new laws and administrative and political pressure to secure that NGOs follow the national norms and standards. By introducing these types of regulation, the state is able to control and regulate the size of the NGO sector (Bratton, 1989, pp. 574-577). It is difficult to see how the states can hold NGOs accountable in different matters, but that states have the privilege to do something to them if they wish to. Even though African states and governments has taken drastic action towards individuals and leaders of human rights NGOs, African governments has seldom resorted to extreme measures such as dissolving NGOs (Bratton, 1989, pp. 577-580).

There seems however to be a change within this arena since Bratton wrote his article in 1989. According to *The Guardian*, half of the world's states have implemented control over NGOs, and more than 60 countries have passed or drafted laws that limit the activities of NGOs and civil society organizations. How the laws restrict the NGOs, differ from the different countries, but there seems to be a tendency that the NGOs activities and funding are controlled in a larger degree, as well as that the national government decides in a larger degree what is acceptable and not, and can chose to deny the NGOs' rights to operate. There seems to be many different and complex reasons why NGOs face more restrictions, but some main categories, according to monitor of civil society organizations, Tom Carothers. The first is related to a political shift against the West, where most domestic civil society organizations receives funding from the international NGOs. In the recent years, developing countries and former communist countries have however wished to distant themselves from Western concepts of human rights, values and concepts, and therefore chosen to push back against this. Another reason is that governments have woken up to a strong civil society which they cannot always control. The result, according to Tom Carothers, is that fewer NGOs dear to speak up

against the governments and states, afraid for the consequences it might involve (Sherwood, 2015).

2.6 THE POWER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGOs AND THEIR DONORS

It is often assumed that the power lies with the funding agency, in the relationship between NGOs and their donors. However, according to Hilhorst (2007), this might not always be the case, and the power relation between funding agency and NGOs is not predetermined. The NGOs and funding agencies agree upon a plan of financing, reporting and accountability, and where the power relation between the actors can evolve in different ways. NGOs are actively working on their relationship with donors and their repertoire to get more donors. This involves all from donors to support specific programs or projects, and donors with more formal contracts. Once the relation is established, NGOs and donors stay in touch through reports and occasional visits. Visits and reports, are means to strengthen the relationship between the funding agencies and the NGOs, where the NGOs can showcase what they have accomplished (Hilhorst, 2007, pp. 312-313).

Tvedt (2009) has researched the Norwegian development assistance channeled through Norwegian NGOs, and states that it is important to be aware that the actors within the process not necessarily are equally powerful or powerless. He demonstrates the power analysis of Foucault, which involves a repeal of the state's characteristic of power and distribution of power, and claims that power occurs and is reproduced locally or everywhere, «from an endless number of points» (Foucault, 1979, p. 94, in Tvedt, 2009, p. 35). “The power analysis must identify how the structures control and how the actors act» (Tvedt, 2009, p. 35). To understand how the actors' actions are structured, and how these actions structure other actors' actions, it is necessary to identify the language in public speeches, the money flow, as well as the control mechanisms between the state, organizations and research institutes. This involves that the structures can change over time, and that the actors change how the structures work (Tvedt, 2009, pp. 35-36). He further stresses the importance of seeing how international processes, as well as processes within the development processes in developing countries can affect the structure and actions of the partners involved (Tvedt, 2009, pp. 35-36).

2.7 RESEARCH ON NGOS

Lewis & Opoku-Mensah (2006) questions the little research there has been on NGOs, and asks rhetorically if «Can it therefore be possible that the more extensive and complex the NGO roles have grown, the less we actually know about them?» (2006, p. 670). They further state that there needs to be more research on NGOs, and wider than just «pros» and «cons» with NGOs. It is important to study different aspects of NGOs to grasp and capture the realities of current policy. And by studying it more, it can ultimately provide firmer ground for policy making (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, p. 671). NGOs have traditionally been studied with two approaches, the first as an object of their own rights, with a focus on their roles, their impact and the structure of their work during the last decades. The second has been work or studies on a bigger topic, where NGOs may have played a part in the development (Opoku-Mensah, 2007, p. 10). Opoku-Mensah (2007) further claims that the NGOs have *«usually been described as only in normative terms and rarely analyzed in terms of what NGOs have actually achieved, the ways they have functioned, and their level of influence within the development process»* (Humble, 1994; Robinson, 1998; Tvedt, 2002 in Opoku-Mensah, 2007, p.13). Lewis & Opoku-Mensah (2006) argue the importance of more research on NGOs and their roles as development actors. They argue the importance of *«locating NGO research more firmly within the structural context where the NGOs' activities take place»* (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, p. 674). To understand how NGOs work, it is important to look to all the aspects of the NGOs life, not just the organizational terms. This involves a larger focus on policy discussion, and how NGOs work within the different contexts, policies and practice in the development system (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, p. 674).

2.8 THE SIX DIMENSIONS OF NGOS ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE

Nelson (2007) argues that it is essential to understand the role of NGOs in development system. NGOs receiving funding from donors have more influence on the system than other NGOs. Within the donor state-NGO (DOSTANGO) approach, there are not necessarily an agreement on the values and policy between NGOs, donors and other actors. Nelson (2007) argues that NGOs are part of a system where the donor states and governments set the standard for which sectors, partners and regions receive funding, and how much and how often the partners have to report and evaluate their results. Organizations that have additional

fundings are not as dependent on public funding, as those that are solely dependent on this type of funding to conduct their work (Nelson, 2007, p. 91). To understand the different aspects of NGOs, Nelson (2007) has identified six dimensions of a NGOs organizational life, and states the importance of understanding NGOs as complex organizations with multiple dimensions. He argues that by looking more into the different dimensions of organizations life, it can give a better understanding of their roles in the development process. Nelson (2007) has identified six dimension, technical, resource, values, intellectual/ interpersonal, political allegiances, professional and contractual obligations, and put them into a model (Nelson, 2007, p. 94), see Figure 2.




Figure 2 Nelson's six dimension of organizational life.

The *technical* dimension refers to the organization's capacity to make something happen, its knowledge, expertise and exercise in the field, and its capacity of work. Technical skills are in this context whatever skills and organizational assets it employs, and varies between each organization. The *resource* dimension of an organization refers to money and other resources the organizations have and need, and what strategies the organization uses to secure them, either through state-donor funds, or through private and foundation funds. The third dimension is *mission and values*, demonstrating the different values or mission an organization have, and how these values and mission affect their work. All organization has some values they wish to promote. The fourth dimension is the *interpersonal relationships*,

which involves the movement of individuals in and among organizations, and the movements across the lines between state and non-governmental, and the exercise of personal charisma and leadership. The fifth dimension is *political life* of the NGOs. NGOs form allegiances with other organizations through informal networks or more structured federations. They may have political allegiances, get sponsored by some political parties, or associate themselves with social movements or a particular political direction, such as “green politics” or “left political”. Many NGOs have explicitly stated wishes or agendas for political or policy change, and carried out campaigns and advocacy to advance those agendas. The sixth agenda is the *legal* dimension, which includes that laws, contracts, regulations and formal agreements are followed (Nelson, 2007, pp. 94-95).

NGO’s organizational setup define the relation with donor state. The different dimensions will influence the choices in the decision-making process. The NGOs will try to connect with a donor state in one or more of their dimensions. When they have interacted with the aid system, they might change or strengthen the configurations for one of their dimensions. When NGOs interact with their donors, they can showcase their skillset, and make themselves more attractive for the donor (Nelson, 2007, pp. 96-97).

Nelson (2007) focuses on the different dimensions NGOs have to deal with in an everyday practice, and how they have to make adjustments to receive funds from larger donors such as the Worlds Bank or states. Rather than just focus on only the good parts of NGOs’ activities, Nelson shows how important it is to understand the different dimensions NGOs work within every day. By doing this type of dimension analysis, it shows the relation between donor state-NGO, and how the power-dimension between them is settled. In order to understand these types of relationships and transformations, he states that there is needed a systematic analytical framework that includes political, institutional and value-based aspects of NGOs and their roles (Nelson, 2007, pp. 98-110).

2.9 EVERYDAY PRACTICES AS KEY TO UNDERSTAND DEVELOPMENT NGOS

Hilhorst (2007) agrees to the importance of everyday practices to understand NGOs, and argues that instead of asking what NGOs are, it is a better approach to ask how NGO-ing is done. NGOs constitute multiple realities, and can be many things at the same time. Her approach involves following how NGOs define a situation, and how they act to realize

projects. By looking into the actors' motivations, ideas and activities, by looking into their past and present surroundings, social networks and histories, it is possible to reveal the art of NGO-ing. Practical knowledge, implicit interpretations and power processes are taking place within such organizations. NGOs are often political, and they often bring politics into development, both at a local and global level (Hilhorst, 2007, pp. 297-299). She further states that there is no single answer to what NGOs are, wants or does. NGOs present themselves differently to different actors, and that it therefore is more interesting to see how NGOs interact with these different actors, and how they act (Hilhorst, 2007, pp. 297-300).

NGOs are often presented in a specific way, and Hilhorst (2007) suggests that development NGOs are often presented as "Organizations that enhance development for poor and marginalized people" (2007, p. 305). NGOs do often compete about the same funds, and to get a head, they can accuse other NGOs for being fake-NGOs. Her claim is that identifying NGOs as fake is not a neutral occupation, but a political one (Hilhorst, 2007, p. 305). For the NGOs to legitimize that their work is important and good for the development of others, there are many things NGOs have to do to convince. According to Hilhorst (2007), the NGOs have to convince people that this development is needed, and that the intervention of the NGOs is indispensable and appropriate, and that the NGOs have no self-interests in the program, and that they are reliable and trustworthy enough to carry out the project. Without convincing within these areas, the NGOs have no chance of surviving and to uphold their reputation as an organization doing well for development (2007, pp.310-311).

2.10 MY ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

My aim with this master thesis is to get a better understanding of the roles of the NGOs in the development in Bolivia, both national NGOs that cooperates with foreign NGOs, and foreign NGOs working in Bolivia, and how they are affected by a stronger recipient state that takes more control over the development in the country. I have looked into how Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia, who they cooperate with and why, and how the cooperation between them is settled. I have also looked at the Norwegian NGOs' relations to their donors, and how the NGOs' relations are to the Bolivian state. To get a better understanding of the relation between the different actors, I have used a combination of Nelson (2007), Hilhorst (2007) and Tvedt (2009) to make an analytical framework (see Figure 3). I have used this framework to analyze how the NGOs relate to their donors, and their partners in Bolivia, as well as what

dimensions were held up as important when they cooperated with their partners in Bolivia and with their donors, as well as how the NGOs related to the Bolivian state. This model fails to capture all the aspects related to the NGOs' life, and only has a focus on the cooperation between Norwegian NGOs and Bolivian NGOs, and how these NGOs relate to their donors and the Bolivian state. The model does not demonstrate the cooperation with other NGOs, states, or actors, nor the power relation between the actors. It can on the other hand, as I will demonstrate in the analytical chapter, demonstrate how the different dimension are important for the power relation between NGOs and their donors and the state, which has been my aim for this thesis. In the analytical chapters it is presented how the NGOs relate to each other, the donor state, the receiving state and other donors. There are many models I could have used to illustrate the power relation in a better way, but since I have based my analysis on Nelson, I chose this model.




Figure 3 Analytical framework to understand the cooperation between NGOs, donors, and the Bolivian state

2.11 SUMMARY

In this chapter I have presented how the ideas have differed over time, as well as the roles of NGOs. I have demonstrated how NGOs have been held up as development actors on a general basis, as well as the arguments of researching different aspects of NGOs' involvement in development, and Nelsons approach to that. I have further presented different views on the power relation between NGOs and their donors, as well how NGOs relate to the receiving state, and how the relation towards them have historically been. In the end I have presented my theoretical framework for this thesis, and what aspects I have looked at. In the next chapter I will present how I conducted my data collection, methods I have used, and how I have secured the reliability and validity of this thesis.

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will present what methods I used to collect data, and present the informants. I will also present the challenges conducting fieldwork in another culture, and how I adapted to that. I have lived in Bolivia for four years, as well as visited the country several times, I will therefore present how my history in Bolivia has affected the research and my position during the fieldwork. In the end of the chapter I will present ethical principles it is important to be aware of during research, as well as a presentation of why and how I have secured the reliability and validity in this research.

3.2 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

To gain information from the informants, I used semi-structured interviews. With semi-structured interviews the researcher has an interview guide, but has the chance to change the questions, drop them, or ask about other issues that are more relevant to the research question. The questionnaires are unique for the different informants, and are more flexible than structured interviews, but have more structure than unstructured interviews (Dunn, 2010, p. 110). The NGOs have different types of work, different organizational structure and cooperation with other actors, and I had therefore different interview guides for the different NGOs. By using semi-structured interviews, I got the chance to evaluate during the interviews if there were things I wanted to hear more about, or if some of the questions already were answered.

The strength of interviewing is to fill the gaps in knowledge that other methods are unable to connect in the same extent, study motivations and behavior, collect diversity of meaning, opinion and experience (Dunn, 2010, p. 102). In the semi-structured interviews, the informants presented their NGOs opinions and experiences, and why they chose to work like that. I also got the chance to understand more about the different NGOs, how their relation to their donors is, as well as how they choose partners, how they relate to the state, and what challenges and opportunities they gain by doing so. Since all the NGOs have different plans, values and opinions, as well as different relation and cooperation with other NGOs and their donors/ the state, it was a good method to gain information I would not have gotten by only using other methods.

3.3 SECONDARY DATA, REPORTS AND NGOS OWN DOCUMENTS

As well as semi-structured interviews, I used official reports and evaluations from NORAD about the Norwegian NGOs' role in development cooperation in Bolivia, and a NORAD survey to look into the NORAD funding to Norwegian NGOs the last 15 years. Secondary data is information that has already been collected for another purpose but still available for others to use (White, 2010, p. 61). The most common source of secondary data is normally governmental, and there is an increasing availability of secondary data worldwide. There are non-governmental sources of secondary data as well, but they are often only available to the researcher if they pay a fee. It is important to be aware that secondary data was collected for another purpose, by someone else, and that the data may have been manipulated for a particular purpose, possibly political, and may therefore not be entirely trustworthy. Secondary data, collected for public use, tends to have a higher quality and be more thorough than data collected by the individual researcher (White, 2010, p. 62). By using secondary data, such as NORAD reports, I could study how NGOs have been represented as development actors, and if there had been some changes in their type of work. I also used NORAD's survey to find raw data to see what Norwegian NGOs get funding from NORAD, how much funding, and to what sectors in Bolivia. Even though I cannot control the secondary data, or find out how it was collected, I trust the information to be correct. I used most of the secondary data before the field work, to get a better understanding of which Norwegian NGOs were involved in the development cooperation in Bolivia, which sectors received funding, for how long the Norwegian NGOs had received funding, and how they had worked before compared to now. I used NORAD statistics to get an overview of which Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia, how the funding has changed the last years, and which sectors that received funding. I also used documents from the different NGOs and read about their strategies and partners on their webpages to get a better understanding of the NGOs, their values, how they work, and who they cooperate with and why before the interviews. By using different secondary data and the NGOs own documents, I could see the rhetoric related to NGOs and their work, both related to their donors and the hosting country. Together with semi-structured interviews, and secondary data I got a good understanding of different aspects of their work. I used a report on the Norwegian development cooperation through Norwegian NGOs operating in Bolivia from 2007, to get a better understanding of how the Norwegian NGOs worked before I had the interviews. For the analysis I have mostly used the semi-

structured interviews, as well as news articles about the more current events in Bolivia. The secondary data have been important for the data collection, but have not been given much space in the analysis.

3.4 PRESENTATION OF INFORMANTS AND NGOS

I looked at the three largest Norwegian NGOs that operate in Bolivia, and looked into what sectors they work in and what strategies they use. I wanted to have a variation of different NGOs, and it was therefore ideal that the three Norwegian NGOs have different approaches, strategies and missions for their work in Bolivia. The NGOs are: Mission Alliance, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and SAIH (Students and Academics International Assistance Fund). While Mission Alliance has a branch in Bolivia, *MANB*, NPA and SAIH cooperate with national NGOs. NPA had 6 partners during my fieldwork in Bolivia, while SAIH had 7 partners. I chose to have three of NPA's partners within this study, and three of SAIH's partners within this study. I wanted to get data about how the Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia, and how they cooperate with Bolivian NGOs, as well as their relation to donors in Norway, and how they or their partners relate to the Bolivian state. I further wanted to get a wider understanding of how the Bolivian NGOs were working, and learn more about the different aspects of their work. To get information about all these aspects, I decided to have one to two informants in each organization. Since I wanted to have information about different aspects of the NGOs work, it was ideal to have more than one informant, but to be able to conduct all the interviews, I could not have more than two or three informants in each NGO. If I would have two informants in each NGO, it would involve 18 informants in total, and since Mission Alliance has their own branch in Bolivia, with national employees, I wanted to have some Bolivian informants in *MANB* as well, to get a better understanding of their work. Since the Bolivian state has changed their rhetoric towards NGOs, I wanted to speak with a representative from the Bolivian government, to get a better understanding of how they relate to NGOs. Since there are many articles and documents regarding the Bolivian governments approach towards NGOs, I chose to only have one informant from the government, a Vice Minister, to go more in depth on how the Bolivian state's approach is towards NGOs. With three of the NGOs I only had one informant, due to last minute cancellations of the interviews. I did however get a good understanding of the work of these NGOs as well as the NGOs where I had two-three informants. I had 19 informants in total

(see Table 1). My goal was to have between 15-25 informants, to get a good understanding of the NGOs' work. There are many people I could have used, such as NORAD or Digni, which could have told me more about the cooperation between Norwegian NGOs and state funding. I did however get the information I needed from their webpage, and therefore kept my focus on Norwegian and Bolivian NGOs.

Table 1 List of informants

Informants	Number of informants
Mission Alliance	3
SAIH	2
NPA	2
Bolivian NGO 1	2
Bolivian NGO 2	2
Bolivian NGO 3	2
Bolivian NGO 4	1
Bolivian NGO 5	1
Bolivian NGO 6	1
Bolivian NGO 7	2
Bolivian Vice Minister	1
Total	19

In Figure 4, I have presented my 3 different informant groups and the number of informants in each group. To make it more difficult to reveal the identity of my informants, I have not written the number of the Bolivian NGOs that I have used in the figure.




Figure 4 Overview of Norwegian and Bolivian informants

I started contacting the NGOs in May 2015, to engage the interviews with each organization before I left for Bolivia in August. I presented my project draft, and my intension for the study, and asked if they wished to participate. The informants from the NGOs decided which persons within their organization were best representatives for me to interview, based on my

project draft and research question, and I therefore did not choose the informants myself. I managed to arrange two interviews with two representatives in SAIH in June, and SAIH further contacted their Bolivian partners, asking if any of them wanted to be a part of this study. All the NGOs SAIH cooperates with stated that I was more than welcome to meet them, and I chose three of these NGOs for this study.

Neither NPA nor Mission Alliance could meet me before I left for Bolivia, and I had the interviews with them when I had returned from Bolivia in November. During my stay in Bolivia, I did however have a Skype-interview with a person in charge of NPAs Bolivia program, and two interviews with Norwegian representatives from Mission Alliance working in Bolivia.

I had two informants in SAIH in Norway, two informants in NPA, one in Norway and one on a Skype interview to a NPA employee working in Latin America, one informant from Mission Alliance in Norway, and two Norwegian informants from Mission Alliance working in Bolivia. I had interviews with seven Bolivian NGOs, including MANB, and in total 11 informants from the different Bolivian NGOs. I chose Bolivian NGOs that worked with different groups of people, and NGOs with different size, to get a better understanding of how they work and opportunities and challenges they face. MANB has a wide range of work, were they work with communities to get more integrated local community projects. I therefore had interviews with representatives in MANB that had different areas of work and expertise in MANB to get a better understanding of how they work, how they cooperate with Mission Alliance in Norway and how they cooperate with the Bolivian state. SAIH cooperate with Bolivian NGOs that work towards education, civil rights and indigenous groups in Bolivia. NPA works mainly with peasant organizations, or social movements that work for peasant's rights and interests in Bolivia. Hence, by choosing different Norwegian NGOs, and different Bolivian NGOs, I got a better understanding of how the NGOs operates, and how they relate to the Bolivian state. To secure the anonymity of the informants, I will not write the names or positions of the informants or the NGOs. The Norwegian NGOs did not have a problem with being part of the study, but some of the informants in the Bolivian NGOs requested that I did not use their name or their NGO's name. I have therefore not written the names of the Bolivian NGOs participating in the study, and I will later refer to statements from the different Bolivian NGOs as "Informant, Bolivian NGO", and the number I have given their organization in Table 1.

Since I had two interviews with the informants in SAIH in June, and not in November, as with NPA or Mission Alliance, it could have affected the information I gained during the interviews. In August the Bolivian government presented a list of NGOs that risked being expelled or shut down, and a new list in September, with 38 additional NGOs (PamAm Post, 2015; Correo del Sur, 2015). The Norwegian Government proposed a decrease in aid channeled through Norwegian NGOs, which would involve 2/3 of the NGOs' funding from the state all over the world (Regjeringen.no, 2015). These aspects affected the interviews with NPA and Mission Alliances, and it could have resulted in other answers from SAIH if the interviews with them were conducted in November as well. I have kept this in mind when I did my analysis, but the different responses have given me a good insight in the NGOs' life, and their dependency towards public funding, as I will present more in chapter 6.

3.5 RESEARCH IN ANOTHER CULTURE

3.5.1 Considerations to make when doing research in another culture

Most of the interviews were in Bolivia, and during the fieldwork I had interviews in Spanish, Norwegian and English, and I had therefore three languages I had to take into consideration. I speak all the three languages fluently, and I had for the most parts not any problems understanding the informants during the interviews. There are however some considerations to make when having fieldwork in another culture, such as working with interpreter, understanding the meaning in the data, the power relations, my status as a researcher in the field, how to represent the informants from the other culture in the research, to mention some dilemmas (Smith, 2010, p. 157). I will in the next sections explain how I adapted to research in another culture.

3.5.2 Working with different languages, different culture and an interpreter

The interviews with the informants in the Norwegian NGOs went quite well, since the interviews were in Norwegian. I was however a bit more stressed for the interview I was having in Spanish, and I therefore brought an interpreter with me to the interviews. I wanted to be secure that I understood everything the informants said, so that there would be no misunderstandings, and that I understood the *meaning* of what was said, not just the words, and that I would not offend them in any way. Smith (2012) states that even though some writers suggest that it is ideal to speak the language of the participants of the research, most

researchers will at some time find it necessary or desirable to work with an interpreter (2012, p. 162). The interpreter helped me with the translation where that was necessary, but also to put the information in a local context. It is however important to be aware of the social relations between the interpreter, researcher and the research participants, as well as their relation to each to the research (Smith, 2010, p. 162). I used two friends as interpreters, both with long relationship to both Norway and Bolivia. The reason I chose them was due to their knowledge about both Norwegian and Bolivian culture. They helped me with the questionnaires, if some questions could be considered rude to ask, or if some questions needed clarification. The interpreter could therefore explain to me and the informants if there were some misunderstandings, etc. They would therefore translate to Norwegian if there were something that I did not understand, or help me show the meaning in what the informants had said. The interpretation is however much more than just transmitting meaning from one language to another. It is important to consider the interpreters' roles in the research, and not only see the interpreters as neutral actors (Smith, 2010, p. 163). By choosing to have friends as interpreters, I risked that the interpreters would have a bigger role in my research. The relationship between us could have affected the interview-situations. I did however want interpreters that spoke either Norwegian or English, that had no relation to the Bolivian or Norwegian NGOs, and that had good knowledge about both Norwegian and Bolivian context. Since I understood most of the things that were said during the interviews, I did not rely on the interpreters as much as I had expected, but I am very glad I had them with me during the interviews.

3.5.3 Transcribing the interviews

The interviews were recorded with permission from the informants, and were transcribed shortly after they were conducted. The recordings were erased after the interviews were transcribed, and I changed the names of the informants in the documents with numbers to anonymize the informants. I transcribed the interviews in Norwegian and English, but got help from my Bolivian Spanish teacher to transcribe the interviews in Spanish. The recordings and transcribed documents were deleted from my teacher's computer after they were sent to me. For the interviews in Spanish, I got help from my Spanish teacher to transcribe the interviews. I asked my informants if they would agree to be recorded, and if they were comfortable with the interviews being transcribed by a Bolivian. Only one of the Bolivian NGOs stated that they wished to not be recorded, the rest of the informants did not have a

problem with it. With the permission of the informants I therefore asked my Spanish teacher to transcribe them, and together we made an arrangement how it should be done.

3.5.4 My history in Bolivia

I have lived in total four years in Bolivia. I lived three years in Cochabamba as a child from 1995-1998 with my parents, and during that time my parents were missionaries for Norwegian Lutheran Mission (NLM). In 2012/2013 I once again lived in Bolivia, first as a student at *Universidad Mayor de San Andres* (UMSA) in the autumn 2012, and as a volunteer at an orphanage in Cochabamba in 2013. I have also travelled several times to Bolivia. When I studied at UMSA in 2012, my husband and I stayed at *Casa Alianza*, the guesthouse to MANB in La Paz. He was a volunteer at one of MANBs projects in El Alto, as a teacher. Since we lived at *Casa Alianza* for four months, I got to know their profile, employee's, their values and some of their projects. That was also part of the reason why I wanted to study the roles of NGOs in development, I wanted to get a wider understanding of how NGOs work, cooperate and organize their day; how they relate to donors in the home country and the state in the recipient country. I would also like to see the roles of NGOs in a wider context, not just for the work they do, but the role they have in the society. Since I have lived in Bolivia for four years, I speak Spanish fluently, and I know a lot about the Bolivian culture, and this has acted as a gate opener. During my fieldwork in La Paz I stayed at *Casa Alianza*. The reason for that was mostly practical and safety issues – I was staying in La Paz for four weeks, and it would be difficult to get a place to stay for that time. In Casa Alianza I could also conduct the interviews.

3.5.5 My status in the field

Since I speak Spanish, I could speak with the informants without any problems. I met most of the informants only once, but I tried my best to make them feel as comfortable as possible during the interviews, and I tried to get a status that would give me access to the information I needed. In Aase & Fossåsskaret (2014), Aase presents the different local statuses he got when he did fieldwork in Gorsî, Pakistan. He was put in many local statuses that would not give him any information, and he therefore chose to “break” with the expectations to the local statuses he got, until he was put in a local status where he could gain the information he needed (Aase & Fossåsskaret, 2014, pp. 71-79).

Since I only had the chance to meet my informants' one or two times during my fieldwork, I did not have the same possibility to change my status as many times as Aase did in Gorsî. I

was however able to identify what status the informants had put me in, and break with the expectations of the status if I was not pleased with it. Some of the informants saw me as an employee within the Norwegian NGO that they were cooperating with. Others though I came to evaluate their projects, and were a bit careful to say things that could be perceived as negative. To one of the NGOs I was a “*gringo*”, a white person wanting to get access to different aspects to their work, and they were a bit skeptical to share information with me. The NGO was willing to meet me, but the informants were a bit restricted with what they wanted to share with me, and skeptical to answer some of my questions. In the cases where my status was unclear, I used the beginning of the interview to state what my intentions were, and my history in Bolivia. I made it also clear that none of the informants’ name or names of their NGOs would be used in my master thesis, and that I was not in Bolivia to evaluate them or to write anything that could give them problems. The status *student* was not the best status in all the interviews, since the expectations to it was a bit unclear, and the informants were a bit unclear of what my intentions were. The status as *Researcher* gave me more authority, but could also make the informants more careful to what they told me, in fear it could give them problems later. I did explain to the informants what my intentions about the interview was, and I gave them a copy of the questionnaire if they were skeptical in the beginning. Most of the interviews started with some small talk, the informants wanted to know who I was, what my thesis was about, and my relation to their cooperation NGO in Norway. Taking time to get to know the informants before the interview started, I had the chance to be put in a status I preferred. I tried to get into a status that would give me the information I needed, as well as I did not overstep or make them uncomfortable.

During the interviews I experienced how the Bolivian NGOs relation to the Norwegian NGOs affected the interview situation. Many of the Bolivian NGOs stated that while many of their other donors came with requests and claims to their work, their cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs were different, where the Norwegian NGOs clearly stated that the Bolivian NGOs were the experts, and knew best. This had not been the case with all their partners, and my experience was that the trust between the Norwegian NGOs and the Bolivian NGOs gave me an advantage in the interviews, since the cooperation are dominated by trust and cooperation, where the different NGOs can contribute with different things. This type of trust takes long time to build, but the Norwegian NGOs have a long history in Bolivia, and has therefore been able to build the trust over time. Since the Norwegian NGOs vouched for me, it was easier to get the Bolivian informants to be comfortable talking to me.

3.5.6 “Insider-outsider”

Mullings (1999) states the challenges and opportunities by being an insider and an outsider in the field, and how it can be an advantage being both an insider and an outsider, and then debates around that issue. There are writers that argue that “insiders” have an advantage when they study groups where they belong since they are able to use their knowledge to get more intimate insight to their opinions. By contrast are “outsiders” argued that they are likely to have a greater objective point of view, since they are not part of the group they are studying (Mullings, 1999, pp. 337-340). Mullings (1999) is however criticizing this division, and states that things are not always this simple. She demonstrates how she during her fieldwork in Jamaica was both an insider and an outsider, both and neither (1999, pp. 348-349).

During my fieldwork, I experienced some of the same things Mullings (1999) describes, that it is not always that easy to make a distinction between an insider and an outsider; in many cases I could be both or neither. Since I had lived four months in the guesthouse of MANB, and since I lived there in a period of my fieldwork, I knew some of the people working in MANB, projects and organizational structure. Due to my “insider” status from when I lived there, I was able to get tips I could look more into, field conversations I would not have had if I had stayed in a hotel or somewhere else, and concerns and hopes they normally would not have expressed in interviews. Since I have lived in Bolivia for four years, which involved that I was partly an insider to the Bolivian society. On the other hand, it was clear that I was an “outsider”. With my blond hair and blue eyes, it was clear that even though I knew a lot about Bolivia, I was a “gringo” – white person.

I had no knowledge of the Bolivian NGOs before I met them, and saw their organization from an “outsiders” point of view. This was ideal in many cases, so my opinion would not be colored by former knowledge. In the case of MANB, I did know their work, but there had been two years since I stayed at *Casa Alianza*, and I was no longer a part of the organization. I was therefore both an insider and an outsider at the same time, as well as neither. I had not been involved in the organization or their projects during the time I lived there. During my fieldwork I was a Norwegian student looking into how MANB worked, and even though I knew some of the staff at MANB in Bolivia, and knew how they worked, I was an “outsider” looking into their project and organizational skills as an outsider, not an insider. I had never met any of my informants in MANB before the interviews. The fact that I however have a long history in Bolivia gave me access to some of the NGOs, and could be a good conversation starter in the interviews, and even though I was an “outsider” to their NGO, I

was more of an “insider” in Bolivia, which could change the way the Bolivian NGOs saw me. I was very aware of my history in Bolivia, and my relation to MANB during my fieldwork, and tried to not let this affect the data collection. Since I have a history in Bolivia, it affected the interviews in that way that I knew many of the historical events, and how it had affected Bolivians in a more personal way, and I could relate to many of the stories they told. I was focused on my status as researcher, and tried to not let my former history affect the data collection. I have tried to be aware of my status in the field all the time, before I went to Bolivia, during my fieldwork and after I came back home.

3.5.7 Location of the interviews

It is important to think about where to conduct the interviews, as it can decide how much the informants are willing to say. Ideally, the location and setting of the interview should be relatively neutral (Longhorst, 2010, p. 109). I had most of the interviews in the informants’ offices, both in Norway and in Bolivia. With the Bolivian NGOs I had the interviews in their offices or in *Casa Alianza*, the guesthouse to MANB in La Paz where I stayed. One of the interviews was held in a café. Most of the informants wanted to have the interviews in their offices, so that was where most of interviews were conducted. That was where they were most comfortable, and if there were some reports or other things I wanted to see they could show that to me there. I had no problems having the interviews in their offices, and my experience was that it was the ideal location for the interviews. That way the informants were comfortable, I could get access to reports and other materials. The interview in the café was affected by noise from other visitors at the café, and not the ideal location for an interview. I did get the answers I needed, but it was not as ideal considering noises.

3.6 CODING THE DATA

Coding of the data material is an important approach to get an overview of the data, and a way to simplify the content of the text. It involves finding keywords or codes that can describe or characterize a larger part of the text. The *codes* can explain the topic in that section, an actor or an event or a relation (Grønmo, 2004, pp. 246-247). I started therefore with making a list of the most relevant elements for my study, related to the research question. I read through the interviews, and made an overview of what the interviews were about. I made different codes, to get an overview of what the different sections in the interviews were about. Codes can be *descriptive*, *interpretative* or *explanatory*. With *descriptive codes*, it is an exact characteristic

of the content in the section. With *interpretative codes*, it is the researcher's interpretation or understanding of the content of the text. And with *explanatory coding* it is the researcher's explanation of the conditions that are explicitly described in the text (Grønmo, 2004, p. 247). I used all three types of coding, and organized the different types of codes by using different colors on the codes. After I had looked over the data many times, and had made different codes, I made some new categories. A *category* is a collection or a class of phenomenon with specific common characteristic (Grønmo, 2004, p. 248). When this was done, I organized my finding in categories, related to my research questions. I looked at differences between how the Norwegian NGOs had answered the questions related to donors, to see if there were any differences, as well as with the Bolivian NGOs. That way I could find patterns and similarities, as well as differences in and between the NGOs.

3.7 ETHICS

3.7.1 Three main principles for conducting social science research

There are three main principles the researcher has to take into consideration while conducting research. The first is that *social science is based on truth as a superior value*. It is an *ontological principle* in the sense that it is about the existence of certain social conditions, and that the information that is collected shall be true. The second principle is "*perceptions of the truth in social science are theoretical, methodological and contextually rooted*" (Grønmo, 2004, p. 17). This is an *epistemological principle*, since it relates to the development of knowledge about existing social conditions. The information the researcher collects about the social conditions that are being studied are not just dependent on the how these conditions "actually" are, but how these conditions are emerged and presented. This can be related to a point of view the researcher presents, taking the conditions into consideration. The truth is rooted in the fact that peoples' perception of reality is socially constructed. It involves that researchers have to explicitly present the truth, not just implicitly. The researcher has to account for the theoretical, methodological and contextual conditions for how the research was conducted. When the researcher presents the truth and explicitly presents the conditions for the truth, it is a premise for reevaluating the truth presented by the researcher. The third principle is *evaluations of truth in social science are built on rational and logical criteria* (Grønmo, 2004, pp. 17-18). That is a *methodological principle* related to how the process of evaluating knowledge about existing relations. It is important to have clear criteria for

knowledge about current circumstances when the truth as we know it is reevaluated. With this fundament, the results are based on a rational, logical, stable element, where the truth is *not* based on the majorities' opinions, or the researcher's personal point of view, or any other personal experiences, beliefs, faith or fantasy (Grønmo, 2004, pp. 17-18). I have tried to live up to these principles and not let my former experiences or personal opinions affect the research, but to base the research on methods that looks at the data from different points of view, and to be clear about my position as a researcher, both in Norway and in Bolivia.

3.7.2 Relation to informants in the field

It is important as a geographer to consider the values and norms in the area where the research take place, and to be aware of the ethical significance your actions have, and to take responsibility for those actions (Hay, 2010, p. 35). When doing cross-cultural research, it is important to be sensitive to the culture, and let the informants in that culture get an understanding of the research. In my research I had interviews with persons with a position in an NGO, either in Norway or Bolivia. I explained my research and why I conducted it, and my experience was that all the informants understood the terms of the study. Research can however never escape the power relations that are shaping the situations we research (Smith, 2010, p. 165). I contacted the Norwegian NGOs to participate in my study to begin with, and they then contacted the Bolivian NGOs they cooperate with, and even though the Bolivians agreed to meet me, it is not certain that they would prefer to be a part of the study, but felt obligated to say yes. In some of the interviews I experienced that some of the Bolivian informants were nervous of what I would write about them, and I tried to make it clear that I had no intentions of doing any harm to them or their NGO, or cause them any problems.

Hay (2010) asks four questions which are important to have in mind while doing research; "1) Is this just? 2) Am I doing harm? 3) Am I doing good? 4) Am I showing respect?" (2010, p. 38) These questions are related to the principles of ethical behavior as *justice*, the emphasis of distribution of benefits and burdens. The principle of *beneficence/ non-maleficence*, involves that our research shall maximize benefits and minimize physical, emotional, economic and environmental harms and discomfort. And *respect*, individuals shall be regarded as autonomous agents, and anyone of diminished autonomy should be protected. It is also important to consider different aspects of the informant's life, such as welfare, beliefs, heritage, rights, as well as any discomfort, trauma or transformation affected by organisms or environments that are involved in the research (Hay, 2010, p. 38). It is important to be aware

of these issues during research. The informants should not experience any harm or fault either during the research process, or after, and I have tried to prevent that as best I can.

3.7.3 Securing the informants anonymity

Before I started my fieldwork, I sent an application to Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), to evaluate my interview guides to the Norwegian informants, as well as how I planned to secure the anonymity of my informants in both Norway and Bolivia. NSD approved my application, and I have tried not to identify any of the different informants. I deleted the recordings from the interviews shortly after they were transcribed, and changed the names and organization of the informants and NGOs in the transcribed document. The transcribed interviews have been saved in a folder on my computer, and the computer has been locked by password when I have not used it, to not let any others than me get access to the documents.

3.7.4 Payment

Before I started my fieldwork I was recommended not to pay my informants. With the Norwegian informants in Norway, I simply thanked them for their time and sharing of information, but with the informants in Bolivia I brought a Norwegian chocolate. I wanted to show them that I valued their time, as well as I wanted to give them a little symbolic gift in return. The Norwegian chocolate was more of a gesture to them for telling me about their work and their organization, and was received with great enthusiasm.

3.8 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

The reliability shows how reliable the data material is. There are two types of reliability that is often used, stability and equivalence. *Stability* refers to the compliance between data about the same phenomenon that are collected with the same examine programs over different times. If the phenomenon that is studied is stable, and does not change during the time between the studies, the reliability is considered high since there is a wide compliance between the data collections on the different times (Grønmo, 2004, p. 222). *Equivalence* refers to the compliance between the data collection mutually independent data collections at the same time. Equivalence is based on the comparisons of data of the same examine programs, but from different persons. This way the reliability is an indication that the data collection is not affected by who conducts the data collection, i.e. that the data collection gives the same

results regardless of who conducts the data collection. It is mostly used in quantitative research to compare the answers to the respondents (Grønmo, 2004, p. 223). It is however challenging to evaluate reliability in qualitative studies. The examiner program and the data collection will be affected and dependent on *when* the study was conducted, and *who* conducted it. It has therefore been argued that the term *reliability* has little or nothing to do with qualitative studies. There have been presented alternatives, such as credibility or trustworthiness as an alternative to reliability. Reliability, or trustworthiness in qualitative research involves that the empirical findings that are presented are based on facts and that they do not underpin the researcher's subjective discretion or coincidences during the fieldwork, but it should be collected in a systematic way, in accordance with established requirements and procedures in the survey approach that were used. That way, the reliability of the empirical analytical framework will be strengthened (Grønmo, 2004, pp. 228-229).

In this study, I have used different methods, semi-structured interviews, reports written by independent agencies to evaluate the Norwegian NGOs' work in Bolivia, and secondary data from NORAD. I have used the NGOs' own overview of strategies and partners, and I have used different literature about NGOs and their roles in development, related to both cooperation with local NGOs, governments, donors and etc. I had therefore been able to get a good picture of how the cooperation between the Norwegian NGOs and the Bolivian NGOs were, before I started my fieldwork. My relation to Bolivia could have affected the data I got from the interviews. Since I have lived in Bolivia for four years, I got a foothold in the interviews other researchers without the same history and knowledge could have gotten. The data in qualitative data will be affected by the researcher that conducts the data collection. I have tried to be aware of my involvement in the process, and I will argue that the reliability is strengthened since I have used other data than just semi-structured interviews.

Since the interviews with the Norwegian NGOs happened in June and November, this affected the data collection, since there had been changes in proposed state budget and funding through Norwegian NGOs, and more restrictions and regulations on NGOs in Bolivia. This did however give me another insight in how the Norwegian NGOs related to the donor state in Norway, and how they saw the political process in Bolivia, and has therefore given me a better understanding of the NGOs role in the process.

Even though it was not the same study as former evaluations from the NGOs' work in Bolivia, I used the *stability* within reliability. I could evaluate it there were a correlation between what had been the case in 2007, and what was the case in 2015. I also used the

documents from the Norwegian NGOs and literature to compare with the results I got in the field. Since I have a different study than the evaluation report, the results were not equal in all the aspects, but for the most parts, the interviews gave much of the same answers as I had gotten from the other methods, but more in depth answers. That way the reliability of the study was, in my opinion, strengthened.

Validity is a measure for how relevant the data material is for the research question asked. Even though the reliability is strong and the researcher has good data, it does not necessarily indicate that the data is relevant for the study (Grønmo, 2004, p. 231). I used different methods to get an overview of the topic and to get information to answer my research question. I got good data, with high validity related to how NGOs relate to their donors and to the receiving state, as well as to how NGO connects with other actors in the process. In this study, I have looked into and interviewed ten NGOs in total, three Norwegian and seven Bolivian. I got an overview of how the NGOs work and relate to donors, partners and the receiving state, which my aim for this thesis was, and I consider the validity of that good.

I used different data to conduct this study, data with high reliability, such as NORAD statistics and reports on Norwegian development cooperation with Norwegian NGOs. Even though these data were with high reliability, they were not viable in answering my research question. I therefore used semi-structured interviews with representatives from the different NGOs to get a better insight into the questions I wanted answers to, and I did in that way get the answers I wanted and needed.

3.9 SUMMARY OF THE METHODS

In this chapter I have demonstrated how I have conducted the research, which methods I have used, and my role in the data collection. I have demonstrated how my different statuses have affected the conduction of data in the fieldwork, and the aims of research and ethical behavior in research. In the next chapter I will demonstrate how the power relation between the Bolivian state and NGOs has developed over time, and how history of Bolivia is an important factor to understand the social and political climate the country is facing, and how the history has affected the power relation between the state and the NGOs over time.

4 THE NGO-STATE RELATION IN BOLIVIA OVER TIME

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will discuss my first sub research question, “*What characterize the NGO-state relation in Bolivia over time?*”. To understand the significance of the first elected indigenous president in the history of Bolivia in 2005, and how NGOs have been held up as important development actors in Bolivia since the 1970s, I have begun with a short presentation of the history of Bolivia, to get an understanding of the political and social reality that has been and are facing Bolivians today. I will begin with briefly outlining the history from after the Spanish colonists came to Bolivia, to what Evo Morales has done since he became president in 2005 and until now. I will in short terms present the TIPNIS conflict, and how that marked a change in the role of NGOs’ work in Bolivia. I will also link the history of NGOs in Bolivia to the classification of roles of NGOs in development by Potter et.al. (2008), and how the TIPNIS conflict resulted in national and international support to indigenous groups, and how that has affected the Bolivian states approach to NGOs in Bolivia. I will also present how Bratton (1989) has demonstrated the relation between NGOs and the receiving state.

4.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF BOLIVIA UNTIL THE REVOLUTION IN 1952

The Spanish conquistadores came to “The New World” in 1535 when Bolivia was part of the Inca Empire. Due to the great silver mines in Potosi, the colonization was speeded up, and the Spanish drained the country of its silver resources. African slaves were sent to Potosi to take out the silver, making Potosi one of the world’s largest urban centers (Klein, 2003, pp. 26-31). The Spanish conquistadores controlled the region, and the indigenous people were forced to be integrated in the Spanish economy by paying royal taxes, and supply the Spanish with goods or labor to the market. Between 1545-1560 Potosi became the single largest source of silver in the world, which helped Spain becoming the dominant power in Europe (Klein, 2003, pp. 36-40). As well as forcing the indigenous to adapt to their economy and social control, the Spanish settlers introduced and forced the Catholic religion upon the indigenous, which was crucial in the formation of an independent center, and the Spanish settlers took more and more control over land resources from indigenous (Klein, 2003, pp. 42-49). The discontent towards the Spanish colonial system continued until 1808 when the region’s

independence movement rose, and in 1825 they got their independence from Spain, led by Sucre and Bolivar, and the new state was named after the revolution leader Simon Bolivar (Klein, 2003, pp. 91-93). The new country had a rough start, with an economic crisis, decline in the markets, and tension between them and the neighboring countries. The taxes from the colonial time had been dropped after the independence, but the Bolivian government had to reintroduce all the colonial taxes on all its indigenous inhabitants, which accounted for 60 percent of the government's income (Klein, 2003, pp. 100-105). The conditions for the indigenous people did not get any better even though Bolivia became independent from the Spain. From 1825 until the revolution in 1952 Bolivia had wars with Peru, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, were all the countries took a piece of the Bolivian territory, and the new republic had 188 state coups from 1825-1982 (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 36-37).

4.3 BOLIVIA AFTER THE REVOLUTION IN 1952 UNTIL 1982

Until the revolution in 1952, 92 per cent of all cultivated land in the country was owned by 6 per cent of the landowners (Klein, 2003, p. 210). In April 1952, a social revolution led by the *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (MNR), overthrew the government and Victor Paz Estenssoro, the candidate from MNR became president. Indigenous and illiterates were promised the right to vote, social and economic citizenship to all, nationalization of the mines and a drastic agricultural reform which allowed indigenous to own land, and it was no longer possible to ignore the demands from the indigenous people. Peasants and mineworkers supported MNR, but their expectation were far from met due to corruption and division in the MNR (Klein, 2003, pp.212-238; Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 48-49). The military overthrew the MNR government in 1964, introducing eighteen years of military rule. Between 1964 and 1982, *de facto* governments denied civil rights, such as free speech and assembly, and political rights to democratic elections. The US government supported the military government in Bolivia in fear that Bolivia would turn into a communist country (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 50). In the last years of the dictatorship, the economic crises worsened, both state-controlled mining and gas and oil production failed. The governments were increasingly corrupt, and pressure to end the military regime came from the student, labor and also segments of Bolivia's military (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 54).

Hernàn Siles Zuazo became president on 10. October 1982 representing the *Popular and Democratic Union* (PDU). The new government's aim was to resume the nationalist

economic and political project that began in 1952, but with another approach (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 54). The country had a large debt, uncontrolled government spending to support patronage and growing capital flight that they had no control over. By 1982, the foreign debt had grown to 3,8 billion US dollars, and in 1984-85 inflation raged as high as 20,000 per cent, one of the highest rates the world has ever seen. To handle the enormous debt, structural programs and privatizations were presented as a solution to the problem (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 55).

4.4 NEOLIBERALISM IN BOLIVIA

In the election in 1985, the winner was *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (MNR) under Victor Paz Estenssoro, the former leader from the early 1950s. The new government, introduced South America's second most radical neoliberal restructuring program called the *New Economic Policy* (NEP). It led to closing and privatizing of the state mines, allowing the currency to float against US dollar, privatizing state-owned enterprises and open the country to direct foreign investment and ended protectionist politics. Bolivia became a symbol of how neoliberalism could achieve macro-economic stabilization, and Bolivia was held up as a success story worldwide as the "The Bolivian Miracle", and a proof of how effective the neoliberal economy could be. But the success had a price for the people, and tens of thousands lost their jobs due to the privatization (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 61-71). The reform failed to eliminate patronage, corruption and inefficiency, and the aim of limiting the size of the state proved for the most parts impossible (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 74). To limit NEPs negative social impact, the World Bank finance introduced a Social Emergency Fund (*Fondo de Emergencia Social SEF*). The SEF supported hundreds of small projects, providing thousands of short-term jobs, sub-minimum-wage jobs in construction. An increasing number of these jobs were provided by NGOs. After four years the program was renamed *Social Investment Fund* (SIF). Even though the program failed to provide long-term jobs and job-growth, the World Bank regarded the project so successful that it has been integrated into other Structural Adjustment programs in Latin America and in Africa (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 73).

4.4.1 NGOs in Bolivia during the neoliberal period

NGOs became more active in Bolivia in the beginning of the 1970s, many funded by the Roman Catholic Church. Young professionals that had returned after exile in Europe during the military dictatorship utilized their contacts to secure funding for new NGOs that worked with education and communication projects. They coordinated with local levels of labor and peasant movements, and received during the 1980s more funding from international donor agencies. NGOs were seen as more honest, efficient, responsive and capable than governments, which led to an expansion of NGOs in the 1980s-1990s, and NGOs became the most important rural development agents in Bolivia, from about 100 at the beginning of 1980s to over 1,000 at the end of 1990s (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 77-78). NGOs were located in all of Bolivia's nine departments, but mostly located 3-4 hours' drive from the largest cities, which led to a concentration of NGOs in some areas, while more remote parts of the country stayed underserved (Duran, 1990; Kohl, 2003, in Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 78). The NGOs were at the beginning skeptical to the SEF programs, but were convinced when the SEF funding went through them. More than 80 percent of the participant organizations in SEF were NGOs. NGOs were criticized for their roles in the SEF programs, and critics accused NGOs for being tools to stabilize poverty and promoting neoliberal economy and politics (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 78). The NGOs responded that the programs helped them have programs in remote areas and help more people, but the critics did not change their statement that they were a part of the neoliberal project (Arellano-Lopez and Petras, 1994 in Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p.78). The NGOs were first funded by European NGOs, but there was also an increase in bilateral and multilateral funding from larger donor agencies, and in 1992 one-third of all the social spending were channeled through NGOs, making NGOs an important impact on the local life (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 78-79).

4.4.2 LPP – Law of popular population

Plan for All (*Plan de Todos*) was introduced by President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Goni) in 1993, involving “a market democracy, with a smaller, limited and formally democratic state” (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 84). President Sánchez de Lozada introduced a series of new social, economic and political reforms, and parts of the constitution were rewritten from 1952, making the Bolivian state a multicultural nation. It involved a more decentralized state, and the hope was that the new economic strategy would involve that wealth would trickle down to the poor (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 84-90). Law of Popular Participation (LPP) was a strategy for the government to decentralize the power, by turning a significant portion of the

national budget to the municipalities, involving more local control to the people, less corruption and abuse of national funding, as well as direct elections of governing councils in municipalities. In some areas it involved that the elites took control, while in other areas, larger grassroots organizations rose to power. Especially organizations with strong indigenous support could win several elections and promote an indigenous development agenda (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 93-95).

When the LPP was introduced, we had a real chance to be heard and work to promote our politics, a chance we had not had earlier (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 2).

Indigenous groups were also given more rights to control natural resources in their land area and to apply own norms in administrative functions, as long as it did not conflict with the Constitution (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 91). More organizations were empowered and were able to both strengthen the civil society and present an alternative development instead of a top-down approach from the state.

4.4.3 Discontent before Morales was elected president

President Sánchez de Lozada's plan to improve the economy in Bolivia was based on hopes and assumptions that did not go as planned, and the plan to get more jobs and higher economic growth failed (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 111-120). When the natural resources were privatized, it was also a question if Bolivia should sell gas to Chile. The suggestion rose a lot of anger in the Bolivian population, due to their tense relationship to Chile after they lost their coastline in The War of the Pacific in 1879-84, and the argument were presented as a threat to national jobs as well as national security, and an insult to the country' honor. (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 120). At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, the Bolivian people's discontent to the government and the neoliberal economy rose to new highs as Bolivia went from one economic and political crisis to another. Bolivia has South America's second largest gas resources, gas resources the neighboring countries wanted, and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank wanted the resources to stay private and not be nationalized. The Bolivian people demanded a "return of the state" and an end to the neoliberal economy, as well as to rebuild the state (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012, pp. 1-2). Indigenous movements joined together to claim a change of politics, and to secure the water and gas resources in the country. These groups were led by the indigenous leaders Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p. 154). The World Bank recommended development countries to privatize their natural resources, including water. In 1999, the Water

Law 2029 was set as a national standard, involving that the water would be privatized, forcing all water users to enter contracts with the concession holders. The contract gave the private enterprises the rights to control the city water system and all ground water, and the right to charge the use of water from pre-existing wells. The conflict escalated, leading to demonstrations and confrontations with the military police, known as the “water war”. The government gave after for the pressure, which gave the people confidence in themselves and a win against the neoliberalism, and it gave the grassroots organizations a boost to fight the neoliberalism (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 164-167).

To reduce the national deficit, Goni suggested to increase the taxes, a proposal leading to violent confrontations leaving 29 people dead and hundreds of people wounded, and to riots and looting all over Bolivia. Goni withdrew his proposal, but the opposition called for his resignation, and he did not get any more popular when he decided to sell gas to Mexico and the western United States, and that it would be distributed through a Chilean port. In August and September 2003, Bolivians demanded the resignation Goni, and a nationalization of the natural resources. The opposition against Goni and the government grew stronger, and on October 17, 2003 Goni fled to Miami, leaving Vice-President Carlos Mesa as president (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 173-175). Mesa stepped in as president, but he had the same problems Goni had dealt with. He tried to raise the taxes on hydrocarbons for foreign oil companies, resulting in foreign oil companies threatening to leave the country. The growing discontent in the Bolivian population to the neoliberalism politics threatened the multinational firms’ ability to operate in Bolivia, giving the country’s dependency on international capital, portended as an economic disaster. Mesa did not have much of a choice, and tried to resign in March 2005, but Congress did not except his resignation. After three months and weeks of strikes and roadblocks, the Congress acknowledged that social instability could not be maintained while Mesa were in office, accepting Mesa’s resignation, putting Mesa’s Vice President, Rodrigues, as head of a transitional government until new elections could be arranged. In December 2005 Evo Morales was elected President of Bolivia, and became the first indigenous president in the country (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 179-183).

4.5 BOLIVIA AFTER EVO MORALES BECAME PRESIDENT

Evo Morales, together with his political party Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), promised the Bolivian people a change from the neoliberal economy and politics, as well as to

govern the country in favor of the indigenous people. He promised a “process of change”, a change from the neoliberal economy, but also to rebuild the state and in a larger degree implement indigenous groups and peasants into political life. One of his first acts as president was to work towards nationalizing the country’s petroleum industry. With the nationalization, Bolivia increased its revenues allowing the government to invest in public work and project and social programs in effort to reduce the poverty in the country (BBC, 2016). When MAS and Morales took over the power in 2005, the country suffered from great inequality and poverty. More than 60 percent of the people lived in poverty, and 38 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty (Kepa, 2012, p. 123). The nationalization of the petroleum resources gave the government more economic opportunities to introduce social programs to reduce the poverty and inequality in the country (Molina, 2013, p. 166; Bebbington & Bebbington, 2012, pp. 27-28). President Morales and his government were able to reduce the national poverty by 25 percent, and extreme poverty dropped by 43 percent (BBC, 2016). Morales introduced a new constitution in January 2009, guaranteeing the participation and equality of all Bolivians in society. The constitution also recognizes the diversity of different modes of economic activity, and upholds the state ownership of key natural resources for the benefit of the people (Kepa, 2012, pp. 2-7). The Morales government made a new economic plan to reduce poverty, the National Development Plan (NDP) from 2006-2010, where it states that natural resources are nationalized, unless the constitution is changed. Since Morales and MAS took office in 2005, there has been an economical success, with healthy economic growth and budget surplus, as well as a reduction in the country’s inflation (Kepa, 2012, p. 124).

Many of the oil companies threatened to leave Bolivia and freeze their investments when the natural resources were nationalized, but the government were able to establish a deal with them, involving “selective nationalization”, of the hydrocarbon sector. That meant different levels of state involvement in these industries, including a cooperation between the Bolivian state and private companies with the exploration and exploitation of natural oil and gas resources in the field. That secured national interests, as well as private companies got a saying. The changes involved, in simple terms, more state control for the Bolivian state, and favorable prices for export of gas resources to Argentina and Brazil (Kepa, 2012, pp. 124-130). The road project through TIPNIS (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécore) has however resulted in critique of the Morales government’s point of view related to indigenous rights in Bolivia, as well as their economical politic to gain all Bolivians (Kepa, 2012, p. 137).

4.6 THE TIPNIS CONFLICT

TIPNIS (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure) is a national park, covering over 1,2 million hectares, and the home of three indigenous groups, Mojeño-Ignaciano, Yuracaré and Chimán. The indigenous groups living in the park received legal title to more than 80 percent of the territory in 2009. There are however large gas resources inside the park, which the country needs to continue the social programs and economic growth. Many other groups, countries and foreign oil companies were interested in accessing the resources inside the park as well (McNeish, 2013, p. 225). Despite the measures to guard the park, the Morales government decided to build a highway through the park on the 15th of August 2011. Indigenous groups objected to this highway, and leaders of the indigenous groups living inside the park went to La Paz to negotiate an alternative road. The government and the indigenous leaders could not agree on an alternative road through TIPNIS, resulting in the march with more than 2000 protesters, from Trinidad to La Paz. The marchers got support from 34 other indigenous groups that joined them in the march. After 40 days the march was blocked by campesinos (peasants) and supporters of the road, and the government sent more than 500 police to the area to “keep the peace”, and prevent confrontations between the groups. There were many efforts to dissolve the conflict, but the leaders of the march were resolute that there could be no solution to the conflict until they could come up with a good alternative road with the president (McNeish, 2013, pp. 226-229; Achtenberg, 2011). The foreign minister was sent to try to dissolve the conflict, without luck, but some of the indigenous women from the march forced him to see what the police line did to them, and this was presented in Bolivian newspapers as “abduction of the foreign minister” (McNeish, 2013, p. 221). The government then gave the police new orders from peacekeeping to forcing down the march. This led to the raid known as “La Chaparina”, a brutal attack where the police used tear gas, truncheons and dragged the bloodied, tied up protesters out to be sent away in busses (McNeish, 2013, pp. 221-222).

This event got national and international attention after the police raid. There were protests in the major cities of Bolivia, as well as road blocks all over the country. President Morales and his government’s popularity declined dramatically, and the protesters from the TIPNIS march were presented as heroes. After the tension had settled, two ministers withdraw themselves

from offices. The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), who funded much of the road, also withdrew its financial support from the project (McNeish, 2013, p. 228).

The TIPNIS protesters received both national and international support, and though they got international support as well, it seems to be the national support that forced the government to back down, and give the indigenous people of TIPNIS the win (McNeish, 2013; Achtenberg, 2011). The Morales government got massive critique for the raid against the indigenous groups, both nationally as well as international. One NGO that supported the TIPNIS protesters, and criticized the Bolivian government, was Danish IBIS, a development NGO working in Bolivia. Due to their critique of the Morales government they were evicted from Bolivia on February 20, 2013 (France-Presse, 2013).

4.7 RECLAIMING THE POWER

The process of change did also involve a change from Western alternatives to development and development involvement in Bolivia, and *Vivir Bien*, an indigenous concept concerning different aspects to a good life, and to live in harmony with humans and nature was introduced as an alternative to Western ideas of development (Gudynas, 2013, pp. 22-23). The critique President Morales and his government presents, has many similarities to the anti-development, stating that the concept of development is a Western construction, where the political, social and economic parameters are set by the West. One of the most significant spokesmen of this approach is Escobar, stating that these “ideals” of development fails, and rather produces more poverty and underdevelopment than development (Escobar, 1995, pp. 212-215). By presenting an alternative to the traditional development theories Morales has given an indirect statement that he does not want foreign donors and NGOs to come and define the “problems” in Bolivia, but rather let the Bolivian people define the premises of a good life themselves, with a concept from their own tradition and culture (Gudynas, 2011, pp. 441-445). The Bolivian state has also taken more control over the development in the country after Morales became president, and the Vice-Minister stated

It is important that the development cooperation gain the Bolivian people, and follows the national plan to reduce poverty, and that the foreign NGOs and donors that come to Bolivia follow the national laws, and let Bolivian authorities define the needs, and not them. There have been many cases where foreign NGOs and donors has come and

defined and solved problems that never really were problems (Informant, Bolivian Vice-Minister).

This statement signifies a change from who defines the development goals in the country, and how the power has changed. During the neoliberal era, the Bolivian state had little or no control over the development in the country, and the World Bank and IMF introduced structural programs to minimize the state, and NGOs, both Bolivian and foreign, were given more control over the development process in the country (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 77-79). With Morales as president, there has been a shift from the neoliberal economy, and the state has taken back more positions, as well as more power. Foucault (1979) demonstrates how to look beyond the traditional point of view, and acknowledge that power can occur and be reproduced anywhere (Foucault, 1979, in Tvedt 2009, p. 35). Tvedt (2009) further demonstrates how the structures control the actions of the different actors (2009, p. 35), which in the case of Bolivia demonstrates how the Bolivian state, with Evo Morales and MAS, has taken back much of the power they “lost” when the World Bank introduced structural programs, and gave NGOs an increasingly more important role in the development process in the country (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 55-73). By reclaiming state power, they also got more power over the development process in the country, how to define the problems, as well as the structures to control the actions of the different actors, such as NGOs. Mobilization against the neoliberalism gave the Bolivian people a victory, resulting in the election of Evo Morales and MAS in 2005, and more power to the people. NGOs have since the 1970s played an increasingly more important role within the Bolivian society. First as actors that could cooperate with local grassroots organizations and political parties, and in the 1980s they were seen as important rural development agents that could reach out to more vulnerable groups, resulting in funding from international donor agencies, which further involved an expansion of NGOs. The NGOs were also seen as a good partner to channel the SEF funding, and NGOs were involved in more of national development planning. NGOs have been an important development actor, and have arguably been more involved in the development in the country than the Bolivian state. With the LPP it involved more acknowledgement of the importance of grassroots organizations in the local communities and democracies (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 77-95; Arellano-Lopez and Petras, 1994, in Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p.78). The TIPNIS conflict have been a turning point in how the Bolivian state has introduced structures to limit foreign NGOs, from including *Vivir Bien* in the constitution as an alternative to Western

development ideals in 2009 (Gudynas, 2011, p. 444), to expelling the Danish IBIS for criticizing the government's actions in the TIPNIS conflict.

4.8 THE STATE-NGO RELATION OVER TIME

The relation between NGOs and the state in Bolivia has been affected by a weaker state, where the NGOs have filled the gap from the state during the neoliberal era. NGOs were favored by foreign donor agencies and were held up as a preferable choice of partner, unlike the Bolivian state, which was seen as less efficient, responsive and capable. That resulted in an increasing amount of NGOs working in Bolivia, national, foreign and international, receiving funding from foreign donor agencies (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 77-78). The Bolivian approach to development lies within a mix of the "Classical-traditional approach" and the "Alternative and bottom-up approach", in Potter, et.al. (2008)'s classification of different approaches to ensure development. While the state development and top-down approach failed in Bolivia, the state was forced to introduce structural programs, involving a neoliberal economy, an open market and the handing over of social programs to other actors, such as the NGOs. While the NGOs were seen as a more bottom-up approach, that could target vulnerable and poor groups, as well as empower people through participation (Potter, et.al., 2008, pp.82-83; Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 77-78; Potter, et.al., 2008, pp.117-119). Bratton (1989) demonstrates how this also have been the case in many African countries, where the states were seen as less capable to reduce poverty compared to the NGOs. He demonstrates how the African states had the chance to demonstrate their power and put restrictions on NGOs if they would, but which hardly happened (Bratton, 1989, p. 576). The Bolivian state had little possibilities to do the same, due to the structural programs introduced by the IMF and World Bank, but has demonstrated more power after Morales and MAS got to power (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 77-78; Kepa, 2012, p. 137). According to *The Guardian*, more and more countries introduce restrictions towards NGOs, either through laws or proposed laws (Sherwood, 2015). This has also been the case in Bolivia since 2013.

4.9 LAW OF LEGAL ENTITIES NO. 351 (*LEY DE OTORGACIÓN DE PERSONALIDADES JURÍDICAS*)

The Bolivian government introduced in 2013 a new law, Law of Legal Entities No. 351 (*Ley de Otorgación de Personalidades Jurídicas*), which involves that NGOs and foundations, must state “their contributions to economic and social development” and only carry out activities listed in their bylaws. If these criteria are not followed, the government can revoke the organization’s permit to operate (Vivanco, 2015). According to Human Rights Watch, the law has power to restrict and dissolve NGOs and foundations, and therefore violates the right of free associations. Human Rights Watch has therefore requested a court review of the constitutionality of the law, and presidential decree that grant the Bolivian government the broad power to dissolve NGOs and foundations (PamAm Post, 2015). The law demonstrates how the Bolivian state has taken action against foreign NGOs, but also national NGOs receiving funding from foreign NGOs. Informants at the Norwegian NGOs stated that they understand and expected a law that in a more extant way looks into the actions of foreign NGOs working in Bolivia. There were some different responses to the law, one informant stated that

I understand it this way that there is a stronger control of the civil society and sector, and that the Bolivian state wishes to have more control over the different stations, what they do, where they are receiving funding from, and what they do with the funding. It is a part of the political process in Bolivia, and we have experienced during the years that there has been a political shift. There has been a larger focus on national awareness, which we welcome. It is a good thing that the Bolivian people can be proud of themselves and their culture and their products. The state has another approach towards foreign actors in their country, and we understand that (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

Another informant in a Norwegian NGO stated that

As a representative from a Norwegian NGO I shall be very careful of how I comment, but we cannot accept that the government shuts down and threaten organizations because they say things the government dislikes. When that is said, we can support Bolivian NGOs that speak up to the Bolivian government, but we, as foreign NGOs, shall be very careful to do that (Informant, NPA, 1).

A Bolivian informant stated that

We have nothing to hide, all the activities we do are legit, but the tendency now is that NGOs that criticize the government gets in trouble, so more NGOs does not wish to speak up against the government, afraid it will give them problems, even though they have not done anything wrong (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 4).

Another Bolivian informant stated that

We are not a civil society organization, we have a good cooperation with the state and our partner organization in Norway, but we are more careful now than before. We do not think we can get in trouble for our funding, but it can happen (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 1).

A third Bolivian informant stated that

These NGOs [that are on the governments list] have hidden documents and their agenda to the government. They will not be shut down or expelled, but they need to understand that their actions will give them consequences (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 6).

As a general trend, the Norwegian NGOs stated that it is not good or ideal that the government has imposed restrictions on the civil society, and that they wish to control national NGOs in a more extent way. That they wish to get a better control over the foreign NGOs operating in Bolivia are on the contrary more understandable. The Bolivian NGOs on the other hand were more mixed in their answers, some feared more control from the state, while others supported the government's decision to introduce the law. The different NGOs felt more or less threatened dependent on their cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs and the Bolivian state, as I will present in the next chapter.

4.10 SUMMARY

In this chapter I have in short terms presented the Bolivian history, and how the relation between NGOs and the Bolivian state have been, as well as how the TIPNIS conflict can be seen as a turning point towards the Bolivian state's approach on NGOs, and how they in a very distinct way has demonstrated that they have power over the NGOs, both nationally and foreign. In the next chapter I will present more on how Norwegian NGOs operates in Bolivia, and how they cooperate with Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state. The Bolivian state has

taken back much of the control and power after Morales was elected President, and the government has taken more control over the development in the country, by nationalizing the natural resources and introducing more social programs. While national NGOs still has an important role within the Bolivian society, many through the LPP, there seems to be a shift in the Bolivian government's view on foreign NGOs operating in Bolivia. Lewis & Opoku-Mensah (2006) argues that NGOs are no longer regarded as positive as they were, and that donors have made a claim to bring the state back in the development process (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, pp. 665-667). This also seems to be the case for Bolivia, and specifically foreign NGOs are not regarded as positive by the Bolivian state. It is however not just the Bolivian state that has put restrictions and regulation on NGOs, and there are an increasing number of states that put restrictions and regulations on NGOs. As a change from the Western ideals and influence, and to control the civil society (Sherwood, 2015).

5 NORWEGIAN NGOS OPERATING IN BOLIVIA

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will look at the second sub research question, *Which Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia, how do they work, and what is their Mission?* I have focused on the three largest Norwegian NGOs that operate in Bolivia, how they work, who they cooperate with, what their mission in Bolivia is, and how they connect with Bolivian NGOs according to my analysis based on Nelsons six dimensions. In the beginning of the chapter I will present how the NORAD funding to Bolivia through Norwegian NGOs has developed over the last 15 years, which sectors that has been prioritized, and how the three Norwegian NGOs in this study worked inn 2007, according to an evaluation report ordered from NORAD. The chapter will further present how the Norwegian NGOs work now, and what they argue are important for the cooperation. I will demonstrate which dimensions that are important to the Norwegian NGOs when they choose partners, as well as what characterizes the relation between the Norwegian NGOs and their Bolivian partners, and how they relate to each other. I have looked into the three largest Norwegian NGOs receiving funding from NORAD for their work in Bolivia, Mission Alliance, SAIH and Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA).

5.2 NORAD STATISTICS AND REPORTS

NORAD statistics from 2000-2015 shows that 90 percent of all development assistance to Bolivia was channeled through Norwegian NGOs¹. As demonstrated in Figure 5, the funding increased notably from 2007 until 2009². This can be seen together with the increased interest of cooperation with Bolivia when Erik Solheim was development minister in Norway, who wanted more focus on cooperation in the country to support “social and political movements”, where Norwegian NGOs would play an essential role (Rorg.no, 2006).

¹ <https://www.norad.no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/?view=partner.json&cid=2&rid=84&fyr=2000&tyr=2015&locale=no>

² <https://www.norad.no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/?view=history.json&cid=2&rid=84&pgid=7&fyr=2000&tyr=2015&locale=no>




Figure 5 Historic development of NORAD funding through Norwegian NGOs to Bolivia. From NORAD²

The funding was used for four main areas, education, democracy and good governance, the health and social sector, and economic development and trade³, as presented in Figure 6.

I wanted Norwegian NGOs with a wide range of different projects, mission and approach towards the development cooperation in Bolivia, and chose Mission Alliance, SAIH and NPA. The different NGOs work within different areas and categories. An evaluation report ordered from NORAD from 2007, demonstrates the different approaches, mission and projects the different Norwegian NGOs had in Bolivia at the time. MANB had a large focus on integrated projects in local communities, and this was an important part of their development cooperation. The report demonstrates how this is a strategy to empower and strengthen local communities, and build local competence. SAIH mainly supported smaller NGOs and projects, especially indigenous groups to get access to education and training, and had chosen this strategy to empower and support local NGOs. NPA worked to strengthen indigenous organizations ability to participate and promote democracy, as well as the Bolivian NGOs to be participants in the North-South alliances', and how they can influence international politics. The report demonstrates how NPA cooperates with a wide range of civil society organizations and grassroots organizations (Braathen, et.al., 2007, pp. 17-20).

³ <https://www.norad.no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/?view=sector.json&cid=2&rid=84&pgid=7&fyr=2000&tyr=2015&locale=no>




Figure 6 Distribution of NORAD funding through Norwegian NGOs to different sectors in Bolivia from 2000-2015

5.3 MISSION ALLIANCE

Mission Alliance is the largest Norwegian NGO working in Bolivia, and have been working there since 1979. Mission Alliance's branch in Bolivia is called "*Mision Alianza de Noruega en Bolivia*", MANB. I will use Mission Alliance and MANB in between one another, since Mission Alliance is the headquarter in Norway, concerning donors in Norway, cooperation with other NGOs in Norway and so on, while MANB is the local branch in Bolivia, cooperating with local municipalities and local communities, as well as with the Bolivian state. MANB works to strengthen local communities by cooperating with local grassroots organizations, associations and municipalities, and works for these to mobilize to change their local communities. Local community development is one of Mission Alliance most important priorities in all the countries where they work, and is meant to empower and mobilize local forces to make a change in their environment. This is connected to the rest of what Mission Alliance does, and is important to the rest of their projects, since it builds networks that can form and run specific projects (Misjonsalliansen, a). In cooperation with the local

communities, MANB talks with the communities to settle what resources there are in the communities, what challenges there are, what they need, and what they hope for.

It is the target groups and local communities that define their needs and hopes, and prioritize them, and decides together with us [MANB] and the local municipalities how to arrange the projects and how to allocate the responsibility. They are the one to run and own the projects and it is therefore important that they get an ownership to the projects (Informant, MANB).

Their projects differ from place to place, as the local communities define their needs and wishes, and through cooperation with MANB work towards these. The projects can involve a variety of things, as health projects, water projects, micro credit, recreational activities for children and youth, to mention some (Misjonsalliansen, b). There are also five Norwegian representatives working for MANB in Bolivia. These either consult the national director of MANB in Bolivia, or work with bringing back information to the private supporters in Norway. The Norwegian representatives are not there to organize the work, but rather as advisers to the local board, and to bring information to the private supporters and donors in Norway. During my fieldwork there were approximately 70 employees in MANB, working in different areas of the organization. MANB has three main areas where they conduct their work (Informants, MANB).

Local communities and/ or municipalities send us an application to be a part of a project, where they arrange their priorities and wishes, and together with them, we make an arrangement and a plan for the projects. The cooperation between us, local municipalities and grassroots organizations is based on Bolivian laws and public structure. (...) We have a triangular structure, which involves that all parties shall contribute with something, but this plan is conducted differently for every project. We have to look at the resources in the communities and municipalities. The resources can be everything from workers, cultivation opportunities, and local capabilities and so on. In one area we have many school and health projects with the municipality, while in another there is more focus on cultivating more resistant potatoes and mandarins. Our aim is to build local competence, which we get to do in this process (Informant, MANB).

In the other interviews with informants from Mission Alliance and MANB, it was repeatedly stated the importance of working together with municipalities and local communities, as well

as to follow the national laws and regulations. Since it is the local communities that decides which projects, areas or sectors they wish support to, the projects and structure differs for each area. The informants did however state that they have a holistic approach towards the projects, involving a focus on integrated local programs. They stay in one area for several years, to build up competence together with the local communities and municipalities, and have different projects at the same time. How the different parts contribute differ from each project and area (Informants, MANB). Since MANB is a branch of Mission Alliance, they have a good cooperation with Mission Alliance in Norway. The cooperation goes from the board in Bolivia to Mission Alliance in Norway, and it is the board of MANB that decides what areas to work in and how to conduct their work, in cooperation with Mission Alliance in Norway.

Bolivia has had an impressive economic growth since Morales was elected president, and many people have a better daily life, but there are still great needs. Even though many countries in Latin America where we work is not considered LDC [Least-developed countries], there are still a large population living in poverty, and a large share of the world's poor live in these countries. We have a large focus on poverty reduction in our organization, we have a long history in South America, and we still see the need for development cooperation in this region and these countries even though some of them have had a better development the last years. It is however important that we adapt, which I think we do, and see that there might not be the same needs there were 10 years ago, but rather other needs where we can contribute in some way (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

The informants in MANB and Mission Alliance stated that they wish to continue the development cooperation in Bolivia, and argues that there are still needs, even though the country has had a positive economic development after Morales became president. The informants stated that it is important to have a good cooperation with the state and municipalities, and follow the wishes from them, rather than having their own projects. This way they can also build local competence and empower local communities (Informants, Mission Alliance and MANB).

5.4 SAIH

SAIH is a solidarity organization of students and academics in Norway. They have three main areas of work; development cooperation, North-South information, and political advocacy in Norway (SAIH, a). They have been working in Bolivia since 1979, where they are cooperating with seven local NGOs to strengthen education and training for indigenous people so they get to fulfill their rights, with eight projects in total. (SAIH, b). There is a variation in the local NGOs they support, from civil society organizations that works to educate youth about social and political participation, to NGOs working to secure the rights of indigenous groups in rural areas, to work on improving the indigenous education at a university level (SAIH, b). The different Bolivian NGOs have different approaches to strengthen indigenous people's rights in Bolivia. In the interviews, the informants from SAIH stated the importance of strengthening the education and training of different indigenous groups, and SAIH is supporting NGOs that works with different approaches related to this. They are cooperating with different NGOs, not just NGOs that aim for their target group, to help indigenous groups at different scales in the Bolivian society. Their partners work with different aspects, from educational training, to labor organizations for women, as well as training for youths (Informant, SAIH, 2).

We cooperate with national NGOs in the countries we work, that are part of our strategy; something we have decided is most sustainable in the long term. We wish to support local initiatives, and this partnership idea stands strong within SAIH. (...) There are however some challenges with this approach since we do not have a regional office in South America. There have been stricter reporting requirements the last years, which involves that we cannot support the small initiatives, since they don't have the capacity to follow up with these demands (Informant, SAIH, 1).

Another informant in SAIH stated that there are some aspects that are important to them when they choose partners.

We want partners that have some of the same values as we do, and that work for the same cause as we do, but there are of course differences within the hierarchy of values within our organization and other organizations, and that is fine. It is important that there is an understanding of our work and their work. We are a student and academics organization, our slogan is "Education for liberation", and we wish to work for the right to higher education, a critical civil society and to promote education in

developing countries. But there are of course adjustments to be made, and in Bolivia we support NGOs that work either with university students or NGOs that works with training of indigenous women in rural areas. All this is important, and are something we wish to support (Informant, SAIH, 2).

It is important for SAIH that they are not donors for the Bolivian NGOs, but partners.

Since we do not have a regional office in South America, we have an employee in Norway that travels 2-3 times a year to meet our partners in Bolivia, and talks to them about their work, what they have accomplished, challenges and goals. The NGOs are also invited to come to Norway to exchange experiences and tell about their work in Bolivia, and how the development in the country is going. Another important aspect of their partner relation is that SAIH does not wish, and has never intended, to find organizations that speak their cause, but rather work with organizations that work for a cause they wish to support (Informant, SAIH, 1).

We are careful to make demands to the NGOs that we are cooperating with, but when there is trust and a good cooperation between us, we can come with challenges to our partners within different forums. It is important that it does not happen before we have established a ground for discussion and disagreement, and that the challenges from us are not seen as demands, but as a suggestion or an aspect of reflection (Informant, SAIH, 2).

The Bolivian NGOs are choosing their own activities and politics without interference from SAIH in Norway. SAIH has had most of their partners in Bolivia over several years, some since before Morales became president.

We are, as mentioned before, an organization of student and academics, working to promote the right to take higher education, education on mother tongue, and support different indigenous and ethnical groups getting their rights. Much of our work in Bolivia is related to this. These things take time, even though Bolivia has gotten more rights for indigenous groups after Morales became president, the job is not done. This process takes time, and we therefore see it important to continue our work in Bolivia (Informant, SAIH, 2).

SAIH has partners that works within different sectors, and I therefore chose three of their different partners to get a better understanding of their cooperation in Bolivia.

5.5 NORWEGIAN PEOPLES AID (NPA)

Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) is a large Norwegian NGO with a wide aspect of different work areas. They have work within humanitarian disarmament, development cooperation, rescue and first aid, refugees and integration, they also have two youth organizations that work with sanitarily and solidarity (Norsk Folkehjelp, a). Since they have so many different branches, I have focused on their development work, their strategy and who they cooperate with in Bolivia. On their webpage they state that they have a political approach to development. They state that development is more than just economic growth, knowledge or the right technical solutions, and that it is important to see how resources are controlled and distributed. To work for a just world, NPA is working with oppressed groups to empower them, so that they can participate and influence governments and decision-makers (Norsk Folkehjelp, b). NPA works in Bolivia with the national indigenous peasant movements, and the cooperation is related to organizational development, with particular emphasis on leadership development and political education, as well as political influence in Bolivia. The cooperation is related towards development of the organizations, political training, leadership training and information about political processes within the country. Many of the leaders from the local organizations have been recruited and elected into offices, either locally, regionally or nationally, and it is therefore a great desire and need for political training and leadership training within the organizations, and to learn more about political influences and political processes. NPA were working with six Bolivian NGOs or social movements during my fieldwork, and three of these partners participated in this research. The NGOs and social movements NPA are supporting in Bolivia are important contributors and supporters to the political program of MAS and Evo Morales in Bolivia (Norsk Folkehjelp, c).

It is important to empower and support the oppressed or weak groups in society to get a more justified politic for all. In Bolivia that group has been indigenous peasants, and they first got a real voice after Morales was elected president in 2005. Indigenous people have gotten more rights after Morales became president, but there is still a long way to go (Informant, NPA, 1).

NPA have been working in Bolivia over two periods, first from 1983-1993, and then again since 2005 (Norsk Folkehjelp, c). Some of the NGOs and social movements NPA are cooperating with now, they also cooperated with in their first period in Bolivia, and they have

had a long cooperation with them (Informant, NPA, 1). In their webpage, NPA states that it is important to work with political questions, and in an interview, one of the informants at NPA elaborated this by saying:

To get a more just world, and for things to get better, it is necessary to be engaged in political questions and debates, not necessarily within a particular political party, but it is important to work with political questions and promote change (Informant, NPA, 1).

Some of our partner organizations, we have been working with since the 90s, and they have been politically engaged the whole time, and has since the beginning supported Morales and MAS to power. They have worked and mobilized to get a change from the neoliberal economy in Bolivia, and to grant more rights to peasants, indigenous and oppressed groups in society. With Morales as president, they have gotten a lot of influence in the politics in the country (Informant, NPA, 2).

The informants in NPA further stated that they have chosen partners in Bolivia due to their representation of oppressed and formerly weak groups in the Bolivian society, and that they work towards the rights of these groups. They also wished partners that were involved in changing the politics in the country, and that were loyal to the social movement. One of the informants further stated that:

Bolivia as a country does not need development assistance; they are more than able to introduce new rights and promote economic growth. It is however important to support the organizations so they can develop themselves as organizations. (...) It would be wrong to support these organizations so they could develop the agriculture sector. But by supporting them to develop themselves and educate leaders, be a voice of oppressed groups and marginalized groups rights, and be a critical voice is essential. Not to overthrow the government, but since a critical civil society is essential within a democracy (Informant, NPA, 1).

The informants from NPA stated that it is important to support organizations to be a voice within the political realm in the countries where they work. Rather than supporting the local organizations to develop the agricultural sector, it is better to promote change within the society where they are. One informant in NPA stated concern about only looking at economic growth as a factor for success within development, and stated that even though Bolivia has had a good economic growth the last years, there are other issues to consider as well.

To only look at economic growth as a factor is a dangerous and old-fashioned way of looking at the goals of development. It is important to support and develop good structures to uphold a critical and reflected civil society, where different groups from society can participate, not only the elite or well-educated. Bolivia has had a good economic growth since Morales became president, but that does not mean the job is done just yet (Informant, NPA, 1).

NPA, as well as Mission Alliance and SAIH state that the economic growth the country has had since Morales became president in 2005, is not a valid reason to pull out of Bolivia. They rather promote other ideals within development thinking to continue their work, and demonstrate different aspects, such as empowering local communities, working to promote and implement more rights to indigenous as well as develop organizations to become critical voices within the civil society in Bolivia.

5.6 WHICH DIMENSIONS THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO THE NORWEGIAN NGOS IN THE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH BOLIVIAN NGOS

The Norwegian NGOs operate much the same way as they did when the NORAD report was presented in 2007. During my fieldwork I used Nelson's (2007) model to see how the development cooperation between the Norwegian NGOs and the Bolivian NGOs were conducted, and how the Bolivian NGOs cooperated with the state or Bolivian authorities (departments or municipalities). To secure the anonymity of the Bolivian NGOs, I have presented how the cooperation between Norwegian NGOs and Bolivian NGOs is arranged, which dimension they highlight as important, and further how the Bolivian NGOs are cooperating with the Bolivian state. By doing this analysis I got a better understanding of the cooperation between the NGOs, but also the power relation between the state and the NGOs in a new form, as I shall present more on this in the next chapter.

As presented earlier, the Norwegian NGOs stated what was important for them when they choose partners. Mission Alliance stated the importance of having a triangulation structure of their projects, where local communities and municipalities contributed to the projects, and that the projects were conducted together with them. An informant at Mission Alliance stated that:

We are in principle an advisory authority in the process, and the local communities are the decision-making authority. But for the cooperation to work, we have made some conditions, so that it shall be a democratic management process, and there needs to be good documentation of the economy. And if these conditions are not met, we inform them that we will have to stop the project if the problems are not sorted out in a good way (Informant, Mission Alliance, 2).

Both SAIH and NPA have stated, as presented earlier, that it is important for them that their partners are representative, democratic organizations, and that they have a good handle of the funding documentation they receive through the Norwegian NGOs. As an informant in SAIH stated, there are many initiatives and smaller NGOs that they wish to support, but cannot support, since they are too small to handle the documentation required for receiving funding (Informant, SAIH, 1). NPA also stated the importance of choosing partners that has some of the same agenda as they do, and that they wish to support organizations that are working to improve the conditions for oppressed groups, and develop these organizations as organizations, and for them to be a voice for oppressed groups in society (Informant, NPA, 1). While the informants in the Norwegian NGOs state that their values and mission are important to them, they stated the importance of not letting this affect the development cooperation in a too distinct way.

We are clear on our profile, our identity and our values. MANB has two different types of work, we cooperate with local, evangelical churches in Bolivia, which stand clear within our profile, and support these churches on different aspects, but we don't have a direct evangelism in Bolivia. (...) On the other hand we have development cooperation with local communities and municipalities, and within that sector we work with everyone. As long as they represent the communities, there is no firm line. We do not try to hide our identity as a Christian organization, and as long as people are met with respect, they have no problem with us being a Christian organization. We have not had any problems related to our values or mission in Bolivia (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

An informant at SAIH stated that

We look for partners that have the same values as we have, and we think that is important. But it is also important that the Bolivian NGOs shall not be spokesmen for our values or ideals. In some cases, such as in Bolivia, it is more important to look at

what services they deliver, and what activities they have for their target group, and that they are important contributors somehow, not just that they work towards education. We see it as important to support organizations that can push politicians, and to have a reflected civil society (Informant, SAIH, 2).

Our values affect the development cooperation with the local communities and municipalities. We wish not only to have a technical cooperation, but also to be involved in all parts of society. To have a focus on the whole human, to involve women in the process, to make it easier for disabled people, to let all parts of the society be a part of and involved in the process. (...) We wish to have a focus on the whole human, we wish that everyone shall feel important, and not only to come to a community and give them access to water, and then leave. (...) These things take time, we don't want to push anything on the local communities that they don't want, but by staying in the local communities over time, we have a chance to make a difference in their lives (Informant, MANB).

The values of the Norwegian NGOs affect the development cooperation in that way that NPA and SAIH select partners with the same values and mission as they have, while Mission Alliance/ MANB wishes to promote other values in their development cooperation, but not in a direct way, and without making it a demand for the people involved in the process. An aspect that has been held up as essential among all the NGOs is the legal dimension, that their partners, either Bolivian NGOs, local communities or municipalities, follows the national laws, that they are registered as organizations, that they have a democratic structure, and that they can document their spending, and reports properly. The Norwegian NGOs stated that the values and mission of potential partners are an important factor when they choose partners, and that their aim is to have partners with some of the same values as they have. The Norwegian NGOs did however state that while their values are an important aspect of their organizations, they are not basing their cooperation on only this aspect. An informant at Mission Alliance stated that they chose to support local churches that have an evangelical structure, but when it comes to the development cooperation, they cooperate with all, as long as the legal structures are followed. An informant at MANB stated that by staying in the local communities for several years, they could gain respect and trust with the actors, and that they introduce other programs, more values-based projects. An informant at SAIH did also state that while values are important to them, they wish to cooperate with organizations that can make something happen and be an important voice for their members (Informant, SAIH, 2).

This aspect was also held up by NPA as an important aspect, and that they wished to have partners that worked towards the rights of oppressed groups, as well as those that are involved in political questions (Informant, NPA, 1). The most important dimension has been the legal dimension, followed by values and mission of their potential partners. While Mission Alliance stresses the importance of the resource dimension from their partners, SAIH stresses the importance of the partner organizations to make a difference for their members, which I have categorized within the technical dimension. NPA on the other hand highlights the importance of involvement in political questions, more civil society orientation, and how their partners shall work towards political questions and making it better for their target groups. I have put this within the political allegiances dimension.

5.7 BOLIVIAN PARTNER NGOS OF THE NORWEGIAN NGOS

5.7.1 How the Bolivian NGOs presented their development cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs

I will in short terms outline which dimensions the Bolivian partners of the Norwegian NGOs work through, and how they are related to the Norwegian NGOs through the different dimensions. Since I am not having a comparative analysis, I have presented the findings in a general presentation, and demonstrate how the different dimensions were promoted by the different partners.

While the Norwegian NGOs stressed the importance of having partners that dominated especially within the legal dimension, with the technical, political and resource dimension as other important dimensions, the Bolivian NGOs highlighted other aspects of the development cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs, and the Bolivian state. Since Mission Alliance and MANB is in principle the same organization, I have focused mostly on the responses from the partner organizations to SAIH and NPA in this section, but I will also present some of the responses from MANB. Below I have presented some of the statements regarded the cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs.

Our cooperation with [Norwegian NGO] is unique, not only do we share the same philosophy and values, but also the same line of work. Since they have the same type of work as we do, we feel connected to them, compared to our other partners (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 1).

Our cooperation with [Norwegian NGO] is very good, we have a good understanding of what is expected from the cooperation. They are also interested in seeing other parts of our work, and are genuinely interested in our work (Informant, Bolivia NGO, 6).

We have been working with this [Norwegian NGO] for many years, since the 90s, and we are very happy with the cooperation with them. We have a good contact with them during the year, with visits from [names informant in NPA]. They support our work and our involvement in “the process of change”, and they have been a great support all these years (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 2).

Our cooperation is first and foremost based on solidarity. They are not just donors that are interested in knowing what the money have been used for, but they are interested in our organization and our work, we are partners (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 4).

The Bolivian NGOs had cooperated with the Norwegian NGOs for a different amount of time, some for several years, others for a few years. Common for all of them was that they stated that they were very pleased with the cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs, and many of the informants stated that the Norwegian NGOs were more interested in their work. How the Bolivian NGOs work differs for each organization, but I will present some general findings, and how they relate to the Norwegian NGOs through this dimension, and how they cooperate with the Bolivian state within this dimension.

5.7.2 Values and mission

It was highlighted by many of the NGOs and social movements that the shared values and mission was important aspects of the cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs, and the acknowledgement that their values and mission were important for their partner in Norway as well. There is a difference in the values and mission of the different Norwegian NGOs, and this affects the cooperation. Some of the Bolivian NGOs stated that they had a good cooperation, and that the fact that they share the same values as their Norwegian partners, makes other parts of the cooperation easier (Informants, Bolivian NGOs, 4; 6; 7).

5.7.3 Human relationships within and among organizations

Our organization has a large cooperation with other Bolivian NGOs all over the country, and we encourages youth to get involved in organizational life and politics, claim their rights and take a part in the changes within Bolivia. With the help from [Norwegian NGO] we can reach more people (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 4).

We have a large network that works with the same things as we do, and many people within our organization has been elected to different offices, both locally, regionally and nationally. This gives us more opportunities to work for our agenda in a more extensive way (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 7).

As I will present more later in the text, many of the Bolivian NGOs had a cooperation with the public sector or the state through the technical dimension, but there were only two Bolivian NGOs that had cooperation with the public sector through interpersonal relationship. I will in the next chapter explain how this gave them more benefits compared to other NGOs.

5.7.4 Political allegiances

Morales is what Ghandi was for India, and Mandela was for South Africa. He is our symbol of freedom, and much more than just a president (Bolivian NGO, 6)

This was stated by one of the informants, representing how this Bolivian NGO sees President Morales. The informant stated that it is not possible to be neutral in the politics in Bolivia, and that they are large supporters of Morales and his “process of change”. Another informant stated that

We [indigenous people in Bolivia] have had 500 years without any rights, and with a lot of discrimination. We have had 20 years with military dictatorship, 20 years of neoliberalism, and only 10 years with Morales as president. We need more time with Morales and his “process of change”, and we will work towards that (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 2).

A third informant stated that

We have supported the Morales government for a long time, but we criticized the government’s involvement in the TIPNIS conflict. After that we that we have experienced more suspicion from the government related to our work. We have not done anything wrong, but since we ask questions the government does not like, we experience an increased control. It is clear that organizations that support the government and MAS get more advantages than organizations that are more critical, only look at the four NGOs that has been threaten by the Vice President (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 4).

Some of the NGOs had a clear link to the Morales government, and stated that have supported him since the 1990s. Especially three Bolivian social movement/ NGOs stated that they support Morales and his “process of change in Bolivia”, and that many of the campaigns they have fronted has been implemented within the new constitution from 2009 (Informants, Bolivian NGOs, 2; 6; 7). Another NGO stated that they on the contrary had criticized parts of the decisions from the government, and now experienced more controls and suspicion. The NGOs involved in the political dimension stated that it is an important aspect of their work, and stated that their partner NGO in Norway had a good understanding of their involvement in national politics (Informants, Bolivian NGOs, 2; 4; 6; 7).

5.7.5 Legal

The Norwegian NGOs stated that it is important that their partners are legal organizations, and that they have a democratic structure. During the fieldwork, this topic was quite relevant, as the Bolivian government had presented new regulations towards NGOs, from the Law of Legal Entities No. 351. The NGOs had different responses towards the law, and stated that

We have presented all the documentation the government requests, so we are not worried. But we fear that they will “lose” these documents, or find errors just to punish us if we do something they do not like. But we have nothing to hide, all our activities are legit (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 4).

We have a strictly professional relationship with the state, and we do not have any political agenda other than stating our opinion when we are asked. But maybe we can get in trouble due to our cooperation with [Norwegian NGO]. We do not think so, but we can never know (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 1).

We have not read too much about this law, we will do that, but why should it be a problem that the state has imposed more controls on NGOs? (Informants, Bolivian NGOs, 2).

The state only wishes to demonstrate that illegal activities will not be handled lightly. Many NGOs do as they please in Bolivia, and the four Bolivian NGOs that has received warning from the Vice President [*Milenio*, *Tierra Foundation*, *CEDIB* and *CEDLA*] have lied about their work and research, of course the government cannot tolerate that. It is a warning to other NGOs to not lie about their work (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 6).

All the NGOs stated that they had all the legal issues in order, but some stated that they were concerned about how the cooperation with foreign NGOs could affect their status, and if they could be forced to stop their funding from the Norwegian NGOs, while others did not see why the law was a problem. An informant at SAIH stated that

We don't have an office or are registered as an organization in Bolivia, so we cannot really be expelled. But our partners can be forced to cut the funding from us (Informant, SAIH, 2).

All the Bolivian NGOs stated that they had all their documents in order, and that they followed the guideline from the state. There was however a difference in their responses, and some of the NGOs stated that they were concerned that the government could increase the control upon them, while others did not see why they should be affected, or why it should be a big deal. The NGOs and social movements that had a cooperation with the Bolivian state, either through the "interpersonal" dimension or the "political" dimension did not see why they should experience any troubles related to the law, and stated that they did not understand the concern from other NGOs unless they had something to hide (Informants, Bolivian NGOs, 2; 6; 7).

5.7.6 Technical

It was through this dimension that most of the Bolivian NGOs related to the state. Many of the NGOs stated that they cooperated with the state, either through cooperation related to services the Bolivian NGOs performed for the state or services the NGOs arranged with the state. One informant stated that:

We cooperate with different departments within the state. We have been working with these issues for a long time, and we have had many projects with the state to optimizing the state's approach towards these issues. (...) I don't think the state has a problem with us cooperating with [Norwegian NGO], since their work is related to much of the same work as we do. Rather, I think it is strength that we cooperate with them, since it can involve more exchange of information between us (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 1).

We have been working with different departments within the state for several years, and we have a good arrangement. By cooperating with us can the state reach out to people in more rural areas, something both we and the state wishes (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 6)

Many of the other NGOs stated similar responses to their cooperation with the state, and stated that they did not have a political cooperation with the state, but rather through service delivery or technical cooperation. Most of the Bolivian NGOs that cooperated with the state cooperated with them through this dimension, and common for them all, was that they stated that they were satisfied with the cooperation. All the Norwegian NGOs cooperated with Bolivian NGOs that had cooperation through this dimension some way or another.

5.7.7 Resources

MANB cooperates with local communities and municipalities and all the partners bring something to the process, or resources to the projects. What these resources can be depends on the project, and if it is not clear what the different partners can contribute with, they decide it together and develop a plan with the different partners (Informant, MANB). Many of the Bolivian NGOs stated that they only had their Norwegian NGO as funders of their work (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 2; 6; 7), while others stated that they received funding from many different foreign NGOs and donor agencies (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 5). The NGOs that had a “technical” cooperation with the state stated that due to that cooperation, they received funding or “payment” from the state, depending on the cooperation (Bolivian NGOs, 1; 2; 5; 6; 7). One of the informants in SAIH stated that:

Many of our partners only receive funding from us, which makes them more vulnerable if we for some reason should not be able to support them anymore. We have a good cooperation with them in every way, but we don't like that they are so dependent on us (Informant, SAIH, 2).

This is also the dimension where the Norwegian and the Bolivian NGOs are connected, since the Bolivian NGOs receives funding from the Norwegian NGOs. The Bolivian NGOs have different means to receive funding as well, but some of them only receive funding from the Norwegian NGOs, which is not ideal, according to an informant at SAIH.

The Bolivian NGOs have different dimensions that they work through, and different dimensions that they relate to the state through. In the Figure 7, I have highlighted which dimensions that were held up as important for the development cooperation by the Norwegian NGOs, and what dimensions that were held up as important by the Bolivian NGOs.

5.8 POWER RELATION BETWEEN NORWEGIAN NGOS AND THE BOLIVIAN NGOS

While Mission Alliance is the only Norwegian NGO in my study operating directly in Bolivia through MANB, SAIH and NPA supports national NGOs, and can therefore be categorized as “donors”, even though it is important to them that they have a partnership with the national NGOs. There are however some elements that can be considered as power factors between the different actors. The first is that the Norwegian NGOs choose their partners, and has therefore the power to choose which partners they want, and wishes to support. How they choose their partners was presented in the previous chapter, and it was held up by SAIH and NPA that they want partners that have some of the same values as they have, as well as partners that has a democratic structure (Informants, SAIH and NPA). An informant in SAIH stated that:

There are some of our partners that there is a clear reason why we cooperate with them, but others are more random (Informant, SAIH, 2).

The Norwegian NGOs can choose which partners to have, and can choose partners that falls within the categorization of what they wish to support. An informant in SAIH stated, as presented earlier, that there are many smaller initiatives and NGOs that they wish to support, but that do not have the means to handle the funding, and the reports and documentation it involves (Informant, SAIH, 1).

Another issue that was presented, especially by an informant in SAIH, was related to the other partners of the Bolivian NGOs. As presented in the previous section, some of the Bolivian NGOs only had the Norwegian NGOs as partners, and received most of their funding through them. This made them more vulnerable if the funding from SAIH should for some reason stop (Informant, SAIH, 2).

While there are no plans for any of the Norwegian NGOs to cut Bolivia as a country of work, there are other matters to consider, and when the Bolivian NGOs are so dependent on the funding from the Norwegian NGOs to conduct their work, it can lead to more dependency from one of the actors, rather than a more equal power distribution. While some of the Bolivian NGOs that had various donors, stated that while they appreciated the cooperation with the Norwegian NGO partner, and it was an important contribution to their work, they were not so dependent on their funding that they would have to stop their programs without the support.

We like very much to work with [Norwegian NGO], but we are not solely dependent on their funding to do our work. It would affect us, but we would be able to adjust, rather than dissolve our projects (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 5).

A third power relation is that the Norwegian NGOs can make an evaluation if they wish to continue to work through the different partners, or if they choose to face them out and focus on other partners. There are probably other aspects as well to consider, but these are the ones I have focused on. How the Bolivian NGOs worked did not seem to be an important factor for the Norwegian NGOs, as long as they had worked towards the empowerment of oppressed groups (NPA) or had an important role within the work of the Bolivian society (SAIH). In Figure 7, I have tried to illustrate which dimensions that are important for the Norwegian NGOs when they choose their partners, and through which dimensions the Bolivian NGOs work. In the next chapter I will demonstrate how the different dimensions of the work of the Bolivian NGOs affect their cooperation with the state, and the power balance between them.

In Figure 7 below, the relationship between Norwegian NGOs, Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state is demonstrated. Larger circles signify higher importance of the dimension for the NGOs, and thicker connecting lines signify a larger number of NGOs utilizing this connection. As an example, it is important for Mission Alliance to operate legally in Bolivia, and it is therefore a link between the legal dimension of Norwegian NGOs to the Bolivian state. Many of the Bolivian NGOs state that they have a technical cooperation with the Bolivian state, and it is therefore a thick connection between the technical dimension of Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state.




Figure 7 How Norwegian NGOs, Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state relates. Larger circles signify higher importance of the dimension for the NGOs. The thickness of the connecting lines signifies the number of NGOs that utilize the connection, with increasing thickness for increasing number of NGOs.

5.9 SUMMARY

In this chapter I have presented an empirical presentation of the Norwegian NGOs working in Bolivia, and how they relate to the Bolivian NGOs, and I have demonstrated which dimensions that were highlighted during the interviews as important for the Norwegian NGOs when they chose their partners. I have also presented in short terms through which dimensions the Bolivian NGOs work, and demonstrated these differences between Norwegian NGOs and the Bolivian NGOs. While I have used this chapter to outline how the Norwegian NGOs operates in Bolivia, I will in the next chapter demonstrate how the power relation is between Norwegian NGOs and their donors, and the NGOs and the Bolivian state.

6 THE POWER RELATION BETWEEN NORWEGIAN NGOS, THEIR DONORS AND THE BOLIVIAN STATE

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented how Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia, how they relate to their partners, and through what dimensions the Bolivian NGOs relate and cooperate with the Bolivian state. This chapter will present the third sub research question; *How is the power relation between Norwegian NGOs, their donors and the Bolivian state* as well as the power relation between the Bolivian state and NGOs, both national and foreign. It will present how my findings show the power relation between the different actors. The chapter is divided into two parts, I will first present the Bolivian states new restrictions and regulations towards NGOs, and what the Bolivian NGOs in this study thinks to these changes. I will also attempt to demonstrate how the power relation is between the Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state. In the next section, I will present the donors of the Norwegian NGOs, and how the Norwegian NGOs relate to their donors.

6.2 THE BOLIVIAN STATE'S APPROACH TO NGOS

Unlike Bolivia's former presidents, Morales has another approach towards NGOs and development cooperation, and has repeatedly criticized the Western ideals of development (Gudynas, 2013, p. 23). A Vice-Minister in the Morales government stated that:

Foreign NGOs are welcome to work in Bolivia, if they present their plans and agendas to the state, and if they follow the guidelines from the state and promises to not meddle within the politics in the country. If they do not wish to do it the way the Bolivian government prefers, they are not welcome to work in the country (Bolivian Vice-Minister).

The Vice-Minister stated that the government has a much more "hands-on" approach to NGOs now than before, and stated that the reason was involvement in politics, and that they are fed up by foreign "experts" coming to their country and telling them how to do things.

There have been many incidences where foreign NGOs and donors have come with a done package, to solve a problem that has not really been a problem. They have been used to do as they please, and they show little respect towards the Bolivian state, history and people. If they want to help, that is OK, but then they have to change approach, not be the “experts”. If they don’t show respect, and work with us and with our guidelines, we will tell them that we don’t want their involvement (Bolivian Vice-Minister).

This statement, as well as statements from President Morales and Vice President García Linera demonstrates how the Bolivian state will no longer tolerate all involvement from the foreign NGOs and development agencies. In 2013, two foreign development actors, USAID and Danish IBIS, were evicted from Bolivia, accused of conspiracy against the state. President Morales stated that this should be seen as a warning to other foreign NGOs working in Bolivia to not meddle within the politics in the country (France-Presse, 2013). In August 2015, four national research NGOs were threatened to be expelled or shut down by Vice President García Linera, accused of lying about research and research results as an attempt to weaken the government (Rojas, 2015). In September 2015, the government presented an extended list of 38 NGOs and associations that they are looking more into, which had not been able to present sufficient information about their organization, funding or plan related to the Law of Legal Entities No. 351. The NGOs on this list were both national and foreign, and the last NGO on the list was MANB (Correo del Sur, 2015). Many of the organizations on the list claimed they had presented all the documents the law requires, but that the government claims that they never have seen these documents. The government has been accused of control of the civil society after the list was presented, and for prearranging the plan, due to the Vice Presidents stand towards NGOs (Correo del Sur, 2015).

The Law of Legal Entities No. 351 demonstrate the government’s stronger stand against NGOs, and to demonstrate how they are not just looking at foreign NGOs in Bolivia, but also the development cooperation Bolivian NGOs have with foreign donors, and how this affects their work. The four Bolivian research NGOs: *Milenio*, *Tierra Foundation*, *the Bolivian Center for Documentation and Information* (CEDIB), and *the Center for Labor Studies and Development* (CEDLA), were threatened by the Bolivian state to be shut down or expelled from Bolivia in August 2015 (Rojas, 2015). The reason was a report the NGOs had written about the Morales government’s involvement and extraction plans of oil and gas resources in national parks in Bolivia, similar to the TIPNIS conflict in 2011, when a motivation for

making the highway was the extraction of the oil and gas resources in the park. According to the government, the research NGOs presented subjective opinions in their research report and a hidden political statement, and that the critique of the government only was political rhetoric to weaken the government (Ruiz, 2015). The government threatened to shut down or expel the NGOs if they did not pull back their report. The four NGOs are well respected research NGOs that specializes in agriculture and indigenous people's rights, analysis of political economy as well as research related to these topics (Rojas, 2015). Vice President García Linera also criticized the NGOs for being funded of former neoliberal politicians from Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada's and Hernán Siles Suazo's governments, and that they were being used as tools for the former neoliberal ministers to provide controversial data about the Morales government's policy for the exploitation of natural resources (Ruiz, 2015). This is not the first time the government has criticized NGOs for their involvement in politics in Bolivia, and President Morales and the Vice President has accused NGOs and activist groups of serving an imperialist agenda (Ruiz, 2015). The threat to expel or shut down the four NGOs have however resulted in both national and international reactions to the Bolivian government, and there has been asked questions about national sovereignty, a threat to the democracy, and calls for a debate about the further plan to extract natural resources in Bolivia (Achtenberg, 2015). In an open letter to Vice President García Linera, 42 intellectuals from all over Latin America and elsewhere share their concern that the threats the government has stated upon the four NGOs are a "large setback for the democracy in Bolivia, as well as restrictions on civil society rights, freedom of speech and associations towards it" (Svampa, et.al., 2015). They further stated that the four NGOs affected were well respected intellectuals within the field, and presented a left and critical thinking, prepared concise reports and research on various topics of the territorial socio-Bolivian reality, within economic, environmental and other aspects. The only problem with their current report seemed to be the government's expectations regarding the progress on certain issues, or how the report could be uncomfortable for the ruling party (Svampa, et.al. 2015).

Vice President García Linera responded to this letter, stating that there was no reason to be concerned, that freedom of speech was not only a civil right in Bolivia, but also an important component for the strong democracy in Bolivia, which consists of all groups in society, where all inhabitants have an important voice. He claimed that the four NGOs lied about the research, and that their research never had occurred. He further stated that they are allowed to lie, but if they do, he is allowed to denounce their lies, and that he will not now or in the

future deny them their existence, function, ability to do research and be politically engaged, but stated that they have to be honest. The problem he had with the four NGOs was that they claimed to be “Non-governmental”, and that they falsified research, to give doubt to the government’s mission. The NGOs were funded by foreign donors, with a neoliberal viewpoint, interested in getting a foothold in Bolivian politics, which he and the Bolivian government would not tolerate. As a sovereign state, the government would not allow foreign donors, either government, companies or organizations, to define public politics in Bolivia, which would involve the state to be subjected to neocolonialism. In the case of the four NGOs, the problems were that they receive funding by foreign donors interested in meddling in the politics in Bolivia, and that they supposedly lied about their research, and used the research to weaken the socialist government with right party politics. It is because of that it has been important for him, both as a citizen and as a public server to speak up against this and any other damage against the revolutionary process in the country. He ended the letter with stating his regret that the four NGOs were used to demonstrate such authoritarian image about the state, when it is well known that Bolivia is one of the most democratic countries in the world (García Linera, 2015).

Some of the Bolivian NGOs were worried that they would get in trouble with the government due to their political engagement, and their funding from a foreign NGO, since García Linera presented funding from foreign NGOs and donor agencies as an issue in his letter. The list of the additional 38 NGOs was not presented until the end of my stay in Bolivia, and I was therefore not able to ask the NGOs further about their thoughts of the second list.

6.3 POWER RELATION BETWEEN BOLIVIAN NGOs AND THE BOLIVIAN STATE

6.3.1 A stronger Bolivian state

In a general trend, the Bolivian NGOs that supported the government state that they had little or no concern of how a strong state would affect their work, or their cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs. The informants rather stated that it was their aim that the state would take back some of their functions after the neoliberal period, and that they had worked towards that since the 1990s. Some of the informants stated that

We have mobilized for a stronger state for since the 1990s, why would we not like that we have stronger state? That has been our aim all along (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 7).

When Morales and MAS took back the state, and made it stronger, it gave us [Bolivians] more power, more rights and more influence within our own country (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 6)

It has been a good thing that the state has taken back much of the power, it is a victory for the Bolivian people. (...) After MAS and Morales were elected to office, there have been many changes, and many indigenous have been elected to office, which is a good thing for the democracy. There are however some challenges with it, involving that the best fit for some jobs are not elected, if they have studied at Harvard or Yale, but rather choosing indigenous without the right competence, to promote their own profile (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 1).

We welcomed a stronger state, we wanted it, but now it seems that the power has gone to their heads, and that they do not allow anyone to questions their authority or choices (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 4).

Many of the Bolivian NGOs stated that they preferred a stronger state, compared to the former neoliberal governments. Especially NGOs and social movements that supported Morales saw only positive outcomes with a stronger state. Some of the other NGOs stated that while there had been an improvement with Morales and MAS, there were some issues, such as persons that get chosen for positions without the sufficient education or training, but due to their indigenous background, rather than choosing people with the “right” education and knowledge, but not the “right” profile. Another NGO stated that the state had done a lot of good things the last years, but it was more difficult for NGOs that criticized the government, and that the government abused its power when threatening NGOs with forced shut down if they criticized the government, as Vice President García Linera did in August 2015 (García Linera, 2015).

Tvedt (2009) demonstrates how structures can evolve over time, and how actors can change how the structures work (Tvedt, 2009, p. 35). In the case of Bolivia, it can be argued that national discontent towards neoliberalism politics and economy led to protests, riots, and outcry for a new national discourse, which further led to the election of Morales and MAS (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012, p. 2). Seeing this within a power analysis, it can be argued that the actors (the Bolivian people) were discontent with the neoliberal state, and its influence in

their lives, and mobilized to change it, and by that changing the *structure* of the state. Tvedt (2009) argues that actors can change the structures over time (2009, p. 35), and in the case of Bolivia, that was what happened when the Bolivian people mobilized against the neoliberal politics and neoliberal government. When Morales and MAS got the power, they had the chance to change the *structures* that controls the *actors*, by introducing a new constitution, new laws and rights towards the actors, involving more rights to indigenous and Bolivians in general. During the neoliberal era, NGOs had more power, and were granted many advantages, either through cooperation with the programs initiated by the World Bank, or through the LPP, where local NGOs could be elected to office, and get a more extent control over the natural resources in their nearby areas (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 77-91). Not all of the Bolivian NGOs in my study had been operating since the 1980s-1990s, and stated that they had not experienced any negative restrictions from the state since Morales had been elected president. Instead, some of the NGOs and social movements had experienced a stronger position within the decision-making process in the country, as well as more acknowledgement of their work.

With Morales and MAS, we are finally heard, and our opinion is taken into consideration (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 2).

Many of our members are elected to office, and we have experienced a lot of changes after MAS and Morales were elected. (...) Formerly we have been active within local politics through LPP, but now we are elected to national office as well (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 7).

Other NGOs stated that they had developed a good cooperation with the state, and had due to their experienced and knowledge within the sector they work, been involved in formulation of new laws (Bolivian NGO, 1).

6.3.2 Power relation between Bolivian NGOs and the Bolivian state

While some NGOs stated that they had been formed in the 2000s, and therefore had not experienced much of a change before and after Morales was elected president, other NGOs stated that their position had changed in many aspects, and that they now had more influence and saying than before. NGOs and social movements that had a cooperation with the state or the Morales government through interpersonal relationships or political allegiances saw no reason why they should have a problem with the government, and stated that they did not see it as a challenge or problem that the state was stronger, but rather as a possibility, since

Morales was not just a president, but “the face of change in Bolivia”, and that he is more concerned with the well-being of the Bolivian people than former presidents (Bolivian NGO, 6). With the election of Morales and MAS, these organizations also got more power. An informant at NPA stated that

Our partners are important supporters to Morales and his “process of change”, and they have supported him since the beginning in the 90s. These are the people that got him elected, they have a lot of supporters, and I do not think they dare to force them to cut their funding and cooperation with us. These NGOs are too powerful, and our cooperation with them has lasted for many years, both this period, and in the 80s and 90s. (...) We have smaller partners as well, and these partners do not have the same type of power as the larger social movement organizations, and these partners could maybe get in trouble due to their cooperation with us, but since they support “the process”, I do not see it as likely (Informant, NPA, 1).

Seen in light of how the actors control the structures, as Tvedt (2009) presented, this can show how the social movements in Bolivia can control the Morales government. An informant from NPA indicated that by supporting Morales to victory, and through his presidency, the social movement organizations and NGOs that support him were empowered in the process, and he is dependent on their support to continue his presidency.

We saw a clear distinction within our partners after the TIPNIS conflict, some parts of the organizations supported the government in their actions, while others were furious. Until then, almost everyone within the organizations had supported Morales and MAS, but after that there was much more disagreement in how much they could support (Informant, NPA, 2).

We did not criticize the government publicly as an organization after the TIPNIS conflict, but we did not agree in their actions in the case. (...) In many ways the TIPNIS conflict has made a change in the government’s approach towards indigenous. Before that, they had a very indigenous friendly approach, but when they called the protesters from TIPNIS political enemies, it changed a lot of things, how people looked at the government, and how the government acted towards critics (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 1).

The TIPNIS conflict, as mentioned earlier, has been a changing point for the way the Bolivian state relates to NGOs. Many NGOs and social movements have been critical to the

government's involvement in the conflict, also the supporters of the Morales government. Even NGOs and social movements that had supported him since the beginning criticized the government's handle of the TIPNIS conflict. NGOs that had been officially critical to the government's involvement in the TIPNIS conflict stated that they experience sanctions from the state, and more inspections, the organizations that supported the government, and still does, stated that they criticized the government's actions, but continued to support them despite the conflict, and did not see why they should be affected negatively. While NGOs that had been critical to government, experienced more sanctions and inspections, NGOs and social movements that continued to support the government did not experience any negative reactions. NGOs that had been more critical stated that they were concerned that their development cooperation with the Norwegian NGO could give them trouble, even though they had presented all documents and followed all laws as required. NGOs and social movements that supported the government, stated that they have been working with their Norwegian partner for many years, and had a good dialog with them, even in the years they did not have a direct cooperation. None of them saw why the government should put restrictions on the cooperation with them.

While the stronger state has the power to control the actions of the actors, it can be seen as an example where the actors control the structure as well. Through the Law of Legal Entities No. 351 the state has the power to control the NGOs in a more extent way, by introducing more limits to their work. While the NGOs that have gained more power through the election of Morales and MAS did not fear the changes, the other NGOs without the same power and influence did.

6.3.3 Cooperation between NGOs and the state through Nelson's six dimensions

NGOs that had a "professional" or technical cooperation with the state, stated that they did not see why the Law of Legal Entities No. 351, should affect them. They stated, as presented earlier, that they had a professional cooperation with the state, and since they were not politically engaged, they did not think the cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs would affect their work. This view was also presented in other interviews with some of the other partners to SAIH and NPA. The informants in MANB stated that they have a permit from the state for their work, and that they work within the legal regulations the state has put on foreign NGOs working in the country. Bolivian NGOs that did not have a direct cooperation with the Bolivian state, or were not clear supporters of the MAS political party, stated that they were more concerned that the government had introduced the Law of Legal Entities No.

351, and feared that it would be easier to criminalize NGOs, especially NGOs that criticized the government, and pointed to the Vice Presidents threat to the four national NGOs that had been accused of hidden political work. The NGOs stated that The Law of Legal Entities No. 351 would make it easier for the state to find flaws with the NGOs, or to put sanctions on the NGOs if they had activities that they did not have planned and presented the plans for beforehand. Some of the NGOs thought the TIPNIS conflict was a trigger for the government to look more into NGOs, and to easier convict the NGOs that “have a hidden political agenda”. Hilhorst (2007) states how NGOs have a tendency to accuse each other for being “fakes” to secure funding. Her claim is that classifying NGOs as fakes is not a neutral occupation, but a political (Hilhorst, 2007, p. 305). My analysis is that it’s not the NGOs that accused each other of being fakes, but rather the Bolivian state, when Vice President García Linera accused the four national research NGOs for not being “non-governmental” when they received funding from foreign donors, and therefore could not be acknowledged as “non-governmental” or neutral in their critiques (García Linera, 2015).

By introducing the Law of Legal Entities No. 351 the state can easier control which national NGOs that receives foreign funding, and look more into them. As García Linera states in his letter to the 42 academics that were concerned about the state restrictions on NGOs, he stated that since the four NGOs received funding from foreign NGOs and governments, and got involved in politics, that was against the interest of the Plurinational state of Bolivia. He further claimed that the neoliberal project has destroyed rights, resources and social partnerships all over the world, and that this type of involvement is not welcomed in Bolivia (García Linera, 2015). NGOs receiving funding from so-called “neoliberal donors” could therefore risk trouble from the Bolivian state, and were accused of being “fakes” or “non-governmental”. Informants within almost all the Bolivian NGOs stated that organizations that support the government can get more advantages both socially and politically than organizations that are more critical to the government.

It is clear that NGOs that supports the government have privileges other NGOs do not have, it is just how it is (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 3).

I guess we get more advantages since we support the government, but that is how it has always been (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 6).

It is logical that NGOs that are critical are not on the good side of the government, and those NGOs that support the government gains from it (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 7).

The NGO that work towards civil society questions, and did not support the government, was concerned that they could be forced to end their cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs, while the others that had a technical cooperation with both their Norwegian partner NGO and the Bolivian state stated that it could happen, but they saw it is very unlikely. NGOs that tried to stay “apolitical” stated that they were concerned about the development in Bolivia if it involved that NGOs that were critical to the government would get more sanctions or restrictions.

Nelson (2007) states that NGOs will try to connect with donors or the state at least at one or more of the dimensions of their organizational work (Nelson, 2007, p. 95). NGOs that had many connections to the state were not worried, while NGOs with few connections were generally more worried. Especially the NGOs that had a political cooperation to the state, either through political allegiances or human relationships, did not see any problems with their cooperation with foreign NGOs.

While it is clear that the Bolivian state has a much stronger position and has more power now than earlier, it does not seem to threaten all the NGOs, especially the once supporting the government or those that connect with the state in more than one of the dimensions of their work. My analysis is that social movements and NGOs that have supported Morales for several years have gotten empowered in the process, and can be seen as *actors* that control the *structure* (the state). By introducing the Law of Legal Entities No. 351, the Bolivian state demonstrates its power over NGOs and how the *structure* can control the actions of the *actors*, especially actors that are critical to the government. NGOs that are critical of the government, and does not link to the state through more than one of the six dimensions, fears what the new law involves for their further work and cooperation with foreign NGOs. Neither the NGOs that had a “technical” cooperation with the state, nor the NGOs and social movements that cooperated with the state through the “interpersonal”, “political” nor “value-and mission” dimensions saw how or why the Law should affect their cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs. While NGOs with a “technical” connection to the state generally saw the law as more problematic, the NGOs and social movements with cooperation on other dimensions saw the problem with the law. Tvedt (2009) state that it is important to be aware that not all the actors within the development process are equally powerful or powerless (2009, p. 35). The larger social movements organizations that had supported Morales and MAS throughout the years, had gained more power in the process as well. This was however not the case for every organization or NGOs, even though they supported the government.

6.4 DONORS OF THE NORWEGIAN NGOS

6.4.1 Government grants from NORAD

The three Norwegian NGOs working in Bolivia receives funding from NORAD. NORAD is the largest donor to SAIH and NPA, while it is Mission Alliance's second largest donor (Informants, NPA, 1; SAIH, 2; Mission Alliance, 1). NORAD as a donor has clear guidelines, expectations and goals with funding Norwegian NGOs work in development countries. In NORADs webpage, it is stated that.

The aim of NORAD's cooperation with NGOs is to strengthen civil society in the South, as the driving force and changing agent for achieving national and international development goals. Added value is an important concept, and added value means that the cooperation between Norwegian organizations and partner organizations in the developing country will be a real partnership and cooperation and not just transferring of money (Norad, 2015a).

To receive funding from NORAD, there are a lot of demands the organizations need to fulfill, related to the technical and administrative capacity of the organizations, strategies for work in developing countries, an established relation with the civil society in the country where the project will be implemented, and expertise to carry out the projects, to mention some. The applicant organizations must also present a result framework that includes objectives, indicators, targets, baselines, as well as an ethical plan to mention some of the criteria, results both during and after the project have been implemented, and at least 10 percent of the finances to cover the expenditures, together with other demands (Norad, 2015b).

In the interviews with SAIH and NPA they stated that their program coordinators meet with representatives from NORAD occasionally to evaluate the projects, both individually as NGOs, as well as together with other NGOs (Informant, SAIH, 1; NPA, 1). Mission Alliance applies to NORAD funding through Digni, an umbrella organization for 20 mission organizations, and it is Digni that controls the results and projects, and has cooperation with NORAD (Digni). Digni applies on behalf of their member organizations, and distribute the funding to the member organizations. Mission Alliance has therefore not a direct contact with NORAD, but sends an application to Digni, which further apply to NORAD on their members' behalf (Digni). All the Norwegian NGOs stated that they have a good cooperation

with NORAD, and a good dialog, but NORAD differ from their other donors since they have much more demands towards the NGOs and the execution of the projects (Informants, NPA, 1; SAIH, 1; Mission Alliance, 1).

The elected government in Norway decides how the funding from NORAD is provided. The government decides on which countries, regions, programs and sectors to support, which is presented in the state budget every year (Norad, 2015c). In 2013, the Conservative party and the Progress party won the election, and became the new government in Norway. They had been clear on that if they were to win the election, they would reduce the number of countries that would get funding from NORAD, and the government would concentrate the support to mostly African countries, and the development assistance to Latin America would stop. The political spokesman for development and aid policy from the Conservative party, Peter Gitmark, stated in parliamentary meeting on October 25 that the Latin American countries would lose their funding if they were elected to office. There would be no reduction of the development budget, but rather a concentration (Håskoll-Haugen, 2013). The Norwegian NGOs who operate in Latin America cooperated together and made an allegiance to work towards continued governmental funding for their work in Latin America, and managed to make a framework agreement to continue development cooperation through Norwegian NGO to Latin America until 2017. After 2017 the NGOs have to reapply to get further funding for their work in the region. All the three Norwegian NGOs in this study plan to reapply NORAD for more funding for their work in Latin America after the deal they got in 2014 is terminated (Informants, NPA, 1; SAIH, 2; Mission Alliance, 1).

Since NORAD needs more documentation than the other donors, the NGOs have a more professional relationship with them. As stated during the interviews is it important that *all* the donors, private as well as government grants, get a good understanding of what work the NGOs do in Bolivia. How to document these results does however differ from the different donors.

6.4.2 Private supporters, and earmarked projects from private donors

Mission Alliance largest donor(s) are private persons that pay a monthly amount to the organization. The private supporters can choose to give the support to a specific country, or Mission Alliance will choose a country that needs more supporters. There are also churches, associations and choirs that support the work of Mission Alliance. They can either choose a project or a country in the project catalog that Mission Alliance distribute, or let Mission

Alliance decide where the money is most needed. There is also an overview at Mission Alliance's webpage of specific projects that it is possible to support (Misjonsalliansen, b). The private supporters stand for approximately 40 percent of their income, while approximately 35 percent comes from governmental grants from NORAD (Misjonsalliansen, c). The money from the private supporters goes to projects where the money is most needed. The supporters will get an overview over the different projects that Mission Alliance has, but no specifics of what the money they gave went to. When the money is "earmarked", either to a project, or a fund raising campaign from a choir or from a church, they will get a report stating how the project went, what were done and so on (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

6.4.3 Student support

SAIH receives much of its funding from student contribution every semester. More than 200,000 students in Norway supporting their work with either 20 or 40 NOK each semester, which results in more than 10 million NOK per year. The contribution to SAIH is voluntary, and even though it is not much for each individual, it is the largest donor next to NORAD (SAIH, c).

SAIH consists of 28 student democracies at different universities and university colleges in Norway, 3 interest organizations for students, 5 university boards, 7 union organizations for academics in Norway, and 11 local chapters (SAIH, d). These decide the candidates to run SAIH, which sectors and countries to prioritize, which political statements SAIH shall promote, and the different strategies for further work. Students and academics have a voice within these organizations, and can in that way promote their point of view (Informant, SAIH, 1).

6.4.4 COOP

Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) is a large organization, with many different types of work, both in Norway and other countries, and has many areas of work. There are many donors to an organization at this size, and I have therefore focused on the donors related to Bolivia. During interviews with NPA, COOP was held up as a large donor to the Bolivia program. According to an informant in NPA, COOP pays the equity to receive NORAD funding in Bolivia (Informant, NPA, 1).

6.4.5 Other contributors and donors

The Norwegian NGOs receives funding from other parts as well, but not directly towards their Bolivia program. SAIH and NPA has on several occasions earlier received funding through

“Operation Day-Work” (Operasjon Dagsverk, n.d.), but I have decided to focus on the different donors that contribute to their current work in Bolivia, rather than presenting former contributors and donors. Informants from NPA and Mission Alliance did also state that they have more fundraising and projects that it is possible to support, either a concrete project, or a country (Informant, NPA, 1; Mission Alliance, 1).

6.5 POWER RELATION BETWEEN NORWEGIAN NGOs AND THEIR DONORS

6.5.1 NORAD as a donor

Hilhorst (2007) argues how it is often assumed that the power between NGOs and their donors lies with the funding agency. She claims this may not always have been the case, and states that the donors might also be dependent on the NGO, and that the power relation differ between different donor agencies (Hilhorst, 2007, pp. 312-313). Tvedt (2007) demonstrates how Scandinavian donor states have channeled funding through NGOs, and how Norwegian NGOs have been an important partner of the Norwegian donor state since the 1960s (2007, pp. 37; 57). He further demonstrates how the state has stood for an increasingly large percentage of the Norwegian NGOs budget, and that this has led to a closer link between the Norwegian state and NGOs (Tvedt, 2009, pp. 63-81). Nelson (2007) argues that NGOs will connect to donors or receiving states with at least one of the six dimensions of their work (Nelson, 2007, pp. 96-97). I have used these different approaches to analyze how the NGOs relate to their donors, and the power relation between them.

We do not have a direct cooperation with NORAD, but we receive funding from NORAD through Digni. We experience it as a good cooperation, Digni has occasional meetings with NORAD, and we have meeting with Digni (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

I will say we have a very good cooperation with NORAD, a good dialog. (...) Our program coordinators meet with NORAD several times during the year, either only with our organization, or several organizations together. Last year [2014] we had a challenge, when the government signaled that they would not channel funding to Latin American countries anymore. Then we cooperated with many other NGOs working in Latin America, and managed to make a framework agreement for the next years, so we

have a framework agreement for our work in Latin America until 2017, and then we have to reapply (Informant, SAIH, 1).

We meet NORAD occasionally, we have a good cooperation. (...) It is strength that NORAD channels funding through Norwegian NGOs, we have been working in countries and with different issues for several years, and we have a good knowledge about it. (...) NORAD can never be an expert within all countries and parts of the development cooperation, it is important to trust other actors in the process that their knowledge is good and legit, and channel funding through them (Informant, NPA, 1).

Even though the NGOs have a good cooperation with NORAD, they are still dependent on the funding from NORAD to continue their work. In 2014, the new government planned to cut all financial aid to Latin America (Håskoll-Haugen, 2013), but the Norwegian NGOs working in Latin America managed to arrange a framework agreement involving continued funding for Norwegian NGOs in Latin America until 2017 (Informant, SAIH, 1).

It is not NORAD directly, but the political parties in government that decides the development course, and which countries and regions that get support (Norad, 2015c). With the Conservative party and the Progress party in government, there have been a lot of changes. The government has reduced the number of countries that get support, and Latin America is no longer a priority (Håskoll-Haugen, 2013). In the governments' Proposed State budget for 2016 they proposed to reduce the development aid channeled through Norwegian NGOs, not just in Latin America, but over the whole specter of Norwegian NGOs receiving funding through NORAD. The cut would in practice result in a reduction in 2/3 of all the funding channeled through Norwegian NGOs (Regjeringen.no, 2015). Two of the interviews with representatives from the Norwegian NGOs occurred days after this proposal, and they stated that

We experience what is presented as an enormous distrust, and we do not understand where it comes from. (...) If what is proposed is being passed, it will involve catastrophic results for the developing cooperation, not only for our work in Bolivia, but for all Norwegian NGOs work all over the world (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

If what is proposed happens, it will involve heavy cuts, it will involve cuts of many partners and in land programs. It is just sad that the government has proposed this. (...) By channeling funding through Norwegian NGOs, either it is our organization, Norwegian Church Aid or some other NGO, it has a value. It is cheaper than bilateral

aid, and it is more effective, since it is related to what people in the receiving countries and NGOs in the receiving countries wishes and needs. It is a solidarity, a cooperation between countries, it gives good results, and for less money. We experienced in 2013/2014 that the government did not wish to continue work in Latin America, which we managed to make a deal with them for some more years. But to cut 2/3 of all funding through Norwegian NGOs, it is just unbelievable (Informant, NPA, 1).

The proposed state budget would involve enormous changes from how the Norwegian state formerly had acknowledged Norwegian NGOs. Since the Norwegian NGOs working in Bolivia had NORAD as their largest or second largest donor, it would involve dramatic cuts in their work if the funding would stop.

If NORAD should stop funding us, it would involve reduction in employees and projects (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

We have a large share of funding through other parts than just NORAD, but if NORAD should choose to stop their funding through us, we would have to make an evaluation if we should or could continue our work in Bolivia. But if we should pull out, we would have used more of our own resources, to do it in a best way possible (Informant, SAIH, 2).

If we lose the funding from NORAD, we would have to stop our work in Bolivia. We hope that does not happen, but I am afraid that would be the result (Informant, NPA, 1).

Tvedt (1998) argues that many NGOs are dependent on state funding, which is also the case for the Norwegian NGOs operating in Bolivia. All the Norwegian NGOs stated that the funding from NORAD is essential if they are going to be able to continue their work in Bolivia in the same degree as now. Lewis & Opoku-Mensah (2006) argues that NGOs are not in the same position as they were before, and that donor agencies have made a claim to bring the state back in the development process (2006, p. 669). The argument from the government was that they had to use more of the aid budget to the increased expenses related to more refugees to Norway, but did not say why the largest cut was in the funding through Norwegian NGOs (Speed, et. al., 2015; Regjeringen.no, 2015). An informant stated

2/3 of the proposed cut is through the cut of Norwegian organizations, how can we not experience distrust? (Informant, NPA, 1).

In 2014 the Norwegian NGO managed to make a deal with the government, to continue to receive funding for their work in Latin America for four more years (Informant, SAIH; NPA; Mission Alliance). It demonstrates how the NGOs are not powerless in the process.

Feedback from our application to NORAD can be “You cannot receive funding for all that you have applied for, but you can receive 50 percent or 80% of the total number”, and that is fair. But they can also put constraints on the money, and that is more critical (Informant, NPA, 1).

The changes in the proposed state budget did not go through, and funding channeled through Norwegian NGOs was not cut. In the presentation of the new state budget, the different government parties and their support parties stated that they were content with the new state budget, and that they were content with the role the civil society got in the new budget (Speed, et.al., 2015). Tvedt (2009) states that the *structures* control the *actors* actions, and demonstrates how the *structures* change over time (2009, p. 35). In the Norwegian context, that has involved that Norwegian NGOs have gotten more power, and more influence, and a larger share of the development budget, as well as a that larger percentage of the funding of the NGOs have been through NORAD, and the equity has been reduced over the years (Tvedt, 2009, pp. 63-81). While the state as a structure can control how much the NGOs receive, as demonstrated in 2014 and 2015, the NGOs have other supporters as well, such as the support parties to the government, which can help them promote their case. Norwegian NGOs have an important role within the Norwegian development assistance, and are not powerless in the cooperation with NORAD, and they have many supporters (Tvedt, 2009, p. 71).

6.5.2 Other donors

During the interviews it became clear that there was a distinction between NORAD as a donor and the other donors the NGOs have. I have therefore looked into how the NGOs relate to their other donors. While the Norwegian NGOs stated that they have a professional relationship with NORAD, they uphold the importance of having a good cooperation with their other donors as well. Mission Alliance stated they have chosen to have Norwegian representatives in the countries where they operate, to inform the private supporters in Norway, and SAIH pointed out the importance of having employees that visits the different universities and university collages during the year, to inform them what they are supporting. NPA receives funding from COOP, and has cooperated with them since 2006.

We have chosen to have representatives to work in the countries where we operate to communicate to our supporters in Norway. We find it important to let our supporters know what the money have been used for (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

Even though it is not much each student support SAIH with every semester, it is important that the students get a good understanding of what SAIH is doing to continue to get support. Representatives from SAIH are trying to visit most of the universities and university collages during a year to tell what they do and the results of their work, but they have not enough time to visit them all over a year. As well as informing students, it is important to SAIH that the student knows what SAIH does, how they work, and why it is important to support higher education and civil society in development countries. (...) As well as coming to visits, we use a lot of time with representatives at the universities and the university boards. The universities and university boards are important parties deciding if they wish to support our work, and it is therefore important that they get a good insight to how we work (Informant, SAIH, 1).

We are very happy with our cooperation with COOP, we have the same ideals of development, and the same values, and the funding from COOP stands for the equity demand NORAD requires for receiving funding from them. Without the support from COOP we would most likely not be able to have development cooperation in Bolivia (Informant, NPA, 1).

In COOP Norway's webpage, they state that they wish to show sympathy to people that struggles with a difficult everyday life outside of Norway. The goal with their work is to help people to self-help, and shall promote a social and economic development in five respective countries (COOP Norge, n.d.).

6.5.3 Wishes from donors or potential donors

All the Norwegian NGOs stated that they experience some degree of wishes from potential donors to specific projects or areas to start work in.

There are often people who come to us that has been backpacking, visited a little place where they see a lot of poverty, and contacts us and say they wants us to start working there. (...) We are however clear on that it is not we here in Norway that shall define what projects to support, but the people living there. If we should decide, it would only

make matters worse. (...) As a general rule, we cannot receive money that puts restrictions on our work (Informant, NPA, 1).

There is a trend in what earmarked projects clubs and associations choose to collect money for. In theory a water project can be funded four or five times, and are very popular to support. Other projects, such as training and educational courses in rural areas are more difficult to get donors for, since it is not as specific as clean water (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

There have been cases where potential donors come to us and say “We want to build a school, it would be so awesome, and can we do it through your organization?” Most of them understand that we cannot have projects just for the donors to brag about, while others have more difficulties seeing that. The donors’ wishes cannot trump the needs in the field, and we cannot start a project if there is no need or wishes for it in the areas where we work. In some cases, that involves that the potential donors prefer to not support us (Informant, Mission Alliance, 3).

An informant in Mission Alliance stated that the earmarked projects can be a good motivation for the donor to collect money to a specific project and keep track with that. It is however Mission Alliance that states which projects it can be possible to support, and presents a new project catalog each year (Misjonsalliansen, b). All the NGOs are clear on that they cannot start a project just because a donor thinks it is a good idea, or if they promise to support the organization with money. The projects and needs must be defined by the local people and/or organizations in the receiving state. The NGOs state that it is good that donors have a personal involvement in the projects and in the organizations, but the concern shall be on what is needed, and not what is wanted from the donors. By having earmarked projects, the donors can support projects that have been chosen and asked for by local people and organizations in the receiving state.

Even though there are not so many demands from the private supporters, the student support and COOP, as there is with NORAD, the NGOs state that is important to give good feedback to what the money is going to, and what they have accomplished. COOP is supporting other projects in other countries than just the Bolivia program in NPA, and the informant at NPA stated that there is a good cooperation and dialog with COOP.

Related to a power understanding it is difficult to compare the many “smaller” donors, such as students and private supporters to funding agencies as NORAD. Nelson (2007) focuses on

how NGOs adapt to the different dimensions within an everyday practice, and how they adjust to receive funding from larger donors.

6.5.4 How NGOs relate to donors in light of Nelson's six dimensions

In my analysis, the NGOs connect to their different donors in different dimensions. The most distinct relation to NORAD is through the legal dimension, involving that the NGOs have a strictly professional cooperation with NORAD, with formal agreements, contractual obligations and a professional relationship. NORAD poses many demands to the Norwegian NGOs, related both their administrative and organizational capacities, as well as the plans for the projects, results, and implementation to mention some (Norad, 2015b).

We have been working with education in developing countries for several years, and we have a lot of experience and knowledge on how to conduct good cooperation within this sector, which we think our donors and partners will agree to (Informant, SAIH, 1)

We have been working in Bolivia for more than 30 years, and we have developed a good understanding of what works here, and how to reach out to people in a best possible way. To build the type of network as we have managed to do, take time (Informant, Mission Alliance, 2).

We have been working in Bolivia since the 80s, with a little pause between 1993-2005, and we know the country, history, culture and political climate, that give us many contacts, opportunities and our partners that trust us; essential aspects to conduct a good cooperation with good results (Informant, NPA, 1).

In the interviews, the NGOs argued that they have been working within different development sectors for a long period, such as civil society or education, and has a good capacity to make a difference in that way. Another important aspect of their work was that they have been working in Bolivia for many years, and they had made many contacts with different NGOs, and has a good cooperation with Bolivian NGOs. The informants further stated in the interviews that since they have been working for so long in Bolivia, and within these sectors, they were able to use their resources in a very efficient way, and argued that with their local knowledge, their network and technical capacity, would be able to get more results with less money than development aid channeled through other sectors. Their arguments fall under the categories of what I will classify as the resource dimension, and the interpersonal dimension,

pointing to their knowledge and contact in Bolivia, and how they can make a difference with less funding than other actors.

The legal dimension is the most apparent dimension that the NGOs relate to NORAD. NORAD is clear on the framework for channeling funding through Norwegian NGOs, and the NGOs are quite aware of what the funding from NORAD involves, and consequences if they do not meet the demands from NORAD. The NGOs did however also argue for some of the other dimensions as well. An informant at SAIH stated that

This government prioritizes to focus more on education this period, both at a ground level and at higher education; we are hoping that it can involve more cooperation with them, since they have a technical capacity within this sector (Informant, SAIH, 1).

This statement demonstrates how the NGOs can link their technical capacity towards priorities of the governments' development goal for the incoming period. Another aspect that was held up was the human and organizational relations that the Norwegian NGOs has developed over the years. The NGOs further stated that they have been working in Bolivia for a long time, knows the culture and country, and can therefore choose strategies together with national NGOs that would be the best approach in Bolivia.

Since we already have a network in Bolivia, we can ask our partners "What do you need?" and they can answer to that. To say it more dramatically, we can do more with 10,000 NOK than bilateral aid can do with 100,000 NOK, since we know the needs, what resources they possesses, and how to do it in a best possible way. Knowledge that is harder to get through bilateral aid (Informant, NPA, 1).

This statement demonstrates how the NGOs demonstrate their advantage related to resources and use of money, compared to other types of development cooperation, as well as that their type of development cooperation is "cheaper" and better than other actors.

We wish to empower the people, not just make a well for them, but show them and teach them how to make a well. We wish to share knowledge with the local people (Informant, Mission Alliance, 3).

By generating development aid through the NGOs, it was argued that it would give better results to share knowledge with locals and empower the people. The Norwegian NGOs could relate to NORAD not just in a legal matter, but also in a technical dimension, demonstrating what they can achieve, and how they could make something happen. Another dimension that

was promoted was the resource dimension, and how Norwegian NGOs could get better results with less funding, as well as empower local people and organizations in the process. The interpersonal dimension was presented as well, demonstrating how the Norwegian NGOs had a large network in Bolivia, and how they could reach people more effectively. Especially the technical and resource dimension were held up as reasons why development aid channeled through NGOs have a comparative advantage. This rhetoric has also many similarities to what NGOs were seen as during the 90s and early 2000s, when aid through NGOs were seen as a comparative advantage, by NGOs and donors (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006, p. 669).

For the NGOs other donors, there are other dimensions that might connect them. While it is difficult to present which dimensions their other donors prefer, I have based my analysis on how the NGOs reach out and interact with their other donors, based on their statements in the interviews. SAIH is an organization of students, for students. SAIH is also clear on the importance of supporting less fortunate students, and to promote higher education in developing countries. By being an organization of students and academics, working towards this aim, they touch both the technical dimension and the value-based dimension, showing the importance of education, and that SAIH can help. By visiting their members over the year they also present how the money is used, and why the student contributions can make a difference in their work. On the webpage of COOP, it is stated that they wish to participate in the good work NPA does towards empowering and helping people in developing countries, and that they chose NPA as partner due their common values and the good results of NPAs work (COOP Norge, n.d.). The link to the values- and resources dimension is in this case also quite clear, as well as the technical dimension and NPA's ability to gain good results within their work. In Bolivia, NPA is working with NGOs and social movements that are supporting the Morales government to get more rights for indigenous groups and peasants in Bolivia. In NPA's webpage and in interviews this was presented as an important step to promote a more just Bolivia, with more rights to more vulnerable groups, involving the political alliances dimension as an important aspect of their work (Norsk Folkehjelp, c). An informant at NPA stated that

We are committed to tell stories from the different countries, how the development cooperation is done, and why it is important to support this type of work, not just legitimize their results, but tell their donors why this type of work is important (Informant, NPA, 1).

Mission Alliance is a Christian organization, and stated that this is demonstrated in their values. They are working with both traditional development work in Bolivia, as well as local churches, and stated in the interviews that they have experienced little or none problems related to that.

We send information twice a year about our projects and the organizational work in Bolivia to our private supporters and other donors. We present our strategies, how we empower local communities and how we work. It is important that our donors in Norway get an understanding of the work and why we are cooperating with local communities and municipalities (Informant, Mission Alliance, 3).

To their donors they present the importance of following the legal regulations that it involves being a foreign NGO and guest in a country, and they touch in that way the legal dimension. They further present their values, the value dimension and how this affect their work, as well as how they can empower local communities within the technical and resource dimension, by making a change by using local resources in the different communities. In Figure 8, I have highlight which dimensions were held up as important when the NGOs connect to their donors. This model does not demonstrate how the Norwegian NGOs relate to the Bolivian NGOs, since I presented that in the previous chapter, nor does it capture the power relation between the Norwegian NGOs and their donors.




Figure 8 Overview of how Norwegian NGOs relate to their donors. The thickness of the connections signifies the importance of that connection to the respective donor. Thicker connections signify higher importance.

There is a correlation between which dimensions the NGOs use to promote their work and to connect with their donors. My analysis shows that the different NGOs relate to the donors through many of the same dimensions, both to NORAD and other donors, but with a slightly different rhetoric.

6.6 SUMMARY

This chapter has presented how the Bolivian state's approach towards NGOs has involved more restrictions and regulation in form of the Law of Legal Entities No. 351, and how this affects the Norwegian NGOs and their Bolivian partners operating in Bolivia. It has presented which donors the Norwegian NGOs have, and how they relate to their donors, and the power relation between them.

7 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN BOLIVIA, ACCORDING TO NORWEGIAN NGOS AND THE BOLIVIAN STATE'S POLITICS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will look into my fourth sub research question; *How does the future development cooperation look like according to Norwegian NGOs and the Bolivian state's (politics)?* The chapter will present the Norwegian NGOs arguments for further development cooperation in Bolivia, and which challenges they experience for the further development cooperation. It will present how the Bolivian state's politics affect the development cooperation,

7.2 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN BOLIVIA, ACCORDING TO NORWEGIAN NGOS

7.2.1 Arguments to continue the development cooperation in Bolivia

In this section, I will present the arguments of the Norwegian NGOs to continue the development cooperation in Bolivia, as well as challenges they have to take into consideration if they should continue their work there.

It is up to our board to decide which countries we shall work in, but we have no plans to stop the development cooperation in Bolivia, and there are not any indications that our board wishes that either (Informant, SAIH, 2).

We have been in Bolivia for more than 35 years, but we have no plans of pulling out at the moment (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

We would very much like to continue our work in Bolivia, absolutely, without doubt. There are however some considerations to make, if NORAD is cutting our funding, either next year or we do not get a new framework agreement, we will probably have to stop our cooperation in Bolivia (Informant, NPA, 1).

All the Norwegian NGOs stated that they wished to continue their development cooperation in Bolivia, and none of them had any plans of terminating their work in the country. The NGOs stated, as presented earlier, that even though there has been a good economic development in Bolivia after Morales became president, with more social programs, poverty reduction and more rights for indigenous groups, there is still need for development cooperation (Informant, NPA; SAIH; Mission Alliance; Kepa, 2012, p. 123). The NGOs had different arguments to continue the development cooperation, one of the NGOs stated that there is still a long way to go, and both them and their partners sees the need for further development cooperation, either to strengthen the organizations or to empower local communities. Several of the informants stated that even though Bolivia has experienced an impressive economic growth the last years, there is still the need for development cooperation (Informant, SAIH; NPA; Mission Alliance).

Bolivia as a country does not need any development assistant per se, they have proved that they are more than able to get economic growth on their own, as well as reduction of poverty and introduction of social programs. It is rather important to support a strong, independent and critical civil society, to continue the democracy in Bolivia. The democracy in Bolivia is still young and fragile, and to not fall back into old habits, it is important to continue to support the civil society (Informant, NPA, 2).

Another argument was that it is important to support local NGOs so they can develop themselves as organizations, and reach out in a more extent way to new groups, to train people at different levels, and to educate the people (Informant, SAIH; NPA; Mission Alliance).

That the Bolivian state does not wish involvement within its country's politics is understandable and logical, we understand that. We are guests here, and it is not in our place to criticize the government or the state for its politics. We therefore try to stay out of the public debate. (...) If we are asked, we can say our opinion, but if not, we shall not get involved (Informant, Mission Alliance, 3).

That the Bolivian state does not wish involvement in its politics from foreign NGOs is logical, especially consider its history. (...) It is however important that national NGOs can be critical without getting it leading to consequences (Informant, SAIH, 2).

A critical civil society is important, without a doubt, and that is what we wish to support. (...) The critique has to come from within (Informant, NPA, 1).

The NGOs stated that they understood that the Bolivian government did not want any involvement in the domestic politics from foreign NGOs, and Mission Alliance, as the only Norwegian NGO with offices in Bolivia, stated that they tried to not be involved in the country's politics. The Norwegian NGOs stated that it is a problem when Bolivian NGOs that are critical the governments' politics on some areas can risk sanctions, and in worst case be forced to be shut down, that only shows the importance of continued support to the civil society in Bolivia (Informant, NPA; Mission Alliance). The informants in the Norwegian NGOs stated that it was not in their place to have any opinions about the politics in Bolivia, but rather to support the civil society in Bolivia, so they could speak up.

7.2.2 NORAD funding

The Norwegian NGOs stated that even though they wish to work in Bolivia and with Bolivian partners, there are many aspects to consider. The three Norwegian NGOs stated that they are dependent on the NORAD funding to continue their work in Bolivia, and if the NORAD funding is cut, they will have to make an evaluation if they can continue their work.

If NORAD should pull its funding, it would affect our work in a dramatically way. We would have to stop projects and lay off employees, to mention some (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

Without the NORAD funding, we would probably not be able to continue our cooperation in Bolivia (Informant, NPA, 1).

All the NGOs have a framework agreement with NORAD until 2017, and have to reapply for further funding after that. The NGOs hoped to continue their work there for at least four years. Informants in NPA and Mission Alliance stated that

We have just filled in an application for our further development cooperation in Latin America, but since the government now has proposed to cut 2/3 off all development assistant through Norwegian NGOs, we are not sure if we will get it renewed (Informant, NPA, 1).

We hope to get it renewed, we have sent an application, but we are not sure at the moment if it will go through, due to the proposed changes (...) We have a large percentage of our funding from other donors than NORAD, but a cut from NORAD would involve many changes within their projects, structure and employees (Informant, Mission Alliance, 1).

We will apply NORAD for further funding from 2017, we hope it will go through, we have a good cooperation with NORAD, so we are not too worried (Informant, SAIH, 1).

The interviews with SAIH were in June, and the interviews with NPA and Mission Alliance were days after the proposed state budget to reduce the funding through Norwegian NGOs. The timing of the interviews would therefore have affected the interviews, but it demonstrates the difference within the relation to NORAD, and how the NGOs related to NORAD before and after the proposed state budget. While the informant in SAIH stated that they were not too worried, the informants from NPA and Mission Alliances were a bit restricted in their hopes. All the NGOs stated that they hope to get it renewed but stated that due to the Norwegian government's changes towards Latin America and channeling of funding through Norwegian NGOs, they did not know what the result would be. The Norwegian NGOs stated that if they should lose their NORAD funding, they would have to make an evaluation if they should continue in Bolivia, and if they should, it would involve a reduction in partners and projects. Both SAIH and Mission Alliance stated, as presented earlier, that if they lost their NORAD funding, they would rather use more of their own capital to phase out the projects and partners in a better way than just cut their projects, but stated that if that should be the case, they would have to make some adjustments then, and it was difficult to say at this point what they would do (Informant, SAIH, 2; Mission Alliance, 1).

7.2.3 Weak value of the Norwegian currency

Another issue related to their work, was the weak value of the Norwegian currency compared to the dollar. The Norwegian NGOs stated that even though they have supported their foreign partners with more money, there has been less money received by their partners due to the weak Norwegian currency. This has affected the Norwegian NGOs, and one of the NGOs stated that

If we should terminate one partner, it would not involve more money to the rest of our partners, due to the decrease on the Norwegian currency (Informant, SAIH, 2).

The decrease in the Norwegian currency has happened in a relative short period, which gives challenges to us when we transfer funding to the different branches, and it results in a less amount received. Together with the proposed changes in the state budget, it gives us an instability and insecurity to our work and future plans (Informant, Mission, Alliance, 1).

7.3 HOW A STRONGER RECEIVING STATE AFFECTS THE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The Bolivian state has made much more restrictions to NGOs, not only foreign NGOs and donor agencies, but also national NGOs. The Law of Legal Entities No. 351 states that all NGOs have to present a list of their programs and activities, which donors they receive funding from, their plans and structure, as well as that the NGOs cannot have activities that are not presented in the documents they present related to their work, and the state can revoke the NGOs permits if the organizations “fails to comply with [official] politics and rules”. The NGOs must further present who they receive funding from (Vivanco, 2015; Achtenberg, 2015). An informant in SAIH stated that

We are not registered as an NGO in Bolivia, so we cannot be evicted. But our partners might have to end their cooperation with us if the government does not approve it (Informant, SAIH, 2).

The law has gotten a lot of critique, especially from Human Rights Watch, which took Bolivia to court over the restrictions the law puts on NGOs. Human Rights Watch argues that the law gives the state power to dissolve and restrict the activities of NGOs without a judicial process, and thereby violates the right to free association (PamAm Post, 2015). Also 42 intellectuals has stated their concern in an open letter to the Vice President, stating that a critical civil society is essential to a living democracy (Svampa, et.al., 2015). While García Linera denied in his respond letter that he had any intentions to close, expel, or restrict the activities to Bolivian (opposed to foreign) NGOs, he claimed that the four national NGOs, *CEDLA*, *CEDIB*, *Tierra* and *Milenio*, fronted a geopolitical imperialism and could not be classified as “non-governmental” when they were funded by neoliberal interests and former neoliberal ministers of Bolivia (García Linera, 2015). According to Achtenberg (2015) has there been a tense relationship between the Morales government and pro-environmental NGOs since the TIPNIS conflict in 2011, when NGOs took a stand to support lowland indigenous against the government’s proposed highway. This involvement later resulted in the expulsion of Danish development organization IBIS for involvement and political interference (Achtenberg, 2015). This assumption was also confirmed by many of the Bolivian NGOs, which stated there had been a change in how the Bolivian government acted upon NGOs after the TIPNIS conflict (Bolivian NGOs, 1; 4).

While Vice President García Linera has been criticizing NGOs the most, and lately stated that NGOs are not as relevant anymore, Morales has assured that NGOs that wishes to help the government eradicate extreme poverty are welcome to stay, but NGOs that uses social and environmental movements to create opposition and conspiracy are not welcomed (Achtenberg, 2015). According to Vivanco (2015), the state can revoke the NGOs permits if the organizations “fails to comply with [official] politics and rules” (Vivanco, 2015), has resulted in a fear and self-censorship according to critics of the law (Achtenberg, 2015). This also seemed to be the case during the interviews with civil society NGOs, and they stated that they were concerned about the development in Bolivia if it no longer was allowed to criticize the government and its politics. A different informant stated that:

It is not a coincidence that we have experienced more sanctions and more inspections after we criticized the government. Even though all we do is legit, the government tries to pin us to something (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 4).

We will not engage in politics, we are afraid that it can result in negative consequences for our organization if we criticize the government (Informant, Bolivian NGO, 1).

NGOs that had a cooperation with the state related different services, either education, peasant movements and so on, were not as worried as civil society NGOs that they would get in trouble with the government for their work or from who they received funding, as presented earlier. Some of these informants stated a concern towards the changes, but did not dear to speak up, afraid it would give their organization trouble. NGOs that supported the government did not see why the government should make them cut with their partners. Most of the NGOs stated that their cooperation with a Norwegian NGO could force them to give up their funding, but not all of them saw it as likely.

7.4 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

While it is early to say how the future development cooperation with Norwegian NGOs will be in Bolivia, the Bolivian state’s politics involves more restrictions and regulations of NGOs, and Norwegian NGOs do not know if they will continue to receive funding from NORAD after 2017. It is however clear what the Bolivian state expects from the foreign NGOs working in the country. The Bolivian state has a stronger position, and stated that they wish development cooperation that works with the government to reduce the social issues in the

country, but not involvement in the politics within the country (Achtenberg, 2015). The Bolivian state has taken a stronger approach in the development discussion, and stated their wishes for the development cooperation, and that they are not interested in development cooperation if it is not on their terms (Achtenberg, 2015). Which priorities the Norwegian government has for the development cooperation also differ between the different governments, as it is the government and the parliament that decides what to have a focus on, which countries and regions to prioritize, and which issues and topics the Norwegian development aid shall support (Norad, 2015d).

We have experienced a change from a strong focus on Latin America during the periods of the Labor party and the Socialist Left Party, much promoted by the former development minister, Erik Solheim, to the Conservative and Prograssive party now in office that does not wish to continue development cooperation in Latin America. (...) We experience the different approaches the different governments have on development, as a different focus on which regions and which of the sectors that shall be prioritized (Informant, NPA, 1)

The Norwegian NGOs stated that the different agendas the government has, gives them more opportunities to prove their role in development. An informant at SAIH stated that:

Since this government has focus on education, and that is something we have a lot of expertise on, it gives us an opportunity to present our knowledge about the topic, and come with different suggestions (Informant, SAIH, 1).

7.5 SUMMARY

The future development cooperation is according to the Norwegian NGOs challenged at two levels, related to the insecurity if the Norwegian NGOs receive further funding from NORAD to continue their work in Latin America after 2017, and related to the Bolivian state, which has restricted NGOs, both national and foreign, through the Law of Legal Entities No. 351. The Norwegian NGOs and their partners wishes to continue the cooperation, but it is still too early to say how it will end, if the Bolivian NGOs will have to give up funding from their Norwegian partners, or if NORAD stops the funding to Latin America after 2017.

8 CONCLUSION

8.1 THE BOLIVIAN STATE'S STAND AGAINST NGOS

My research question is “*How are Norwegian NGOs affected by a stronger state in Bolivia, and how does this affect the donor-NGO- receiving-state relation?*”. In the four analytical chapters I have presented how the different sub research questions can answer the main research question. To understand how Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia, and which parts of their operation is important to them. I have used Nelsons analytical framework of six dimensions to see how they operate, cooperate with Bolivian NGOs, and how the Bolivian NGOs and the Norwegian NGOs relate to donors and the Bolivian state.

NGOs have been important actors in Bolivia since the 1970s, and were favored by donors and policy makers during the neoliberal period in Bolivia from 1985-2005 (Kohl & Farthing, 2006). When Morales won the election in 2005, the state took back much of the power, but local NGOs could still have an important voice within local democracies and the LPP law. President Morales has occasionally criticized the Western ideals of development, and promoted other ideals to a better life (Gudynas, 2011), but it was not until 2013 foreign NGOs experienced the strength of the state, when the Bolivian state evicted USAID and IBIS from Bolivia, accusing them of meddling in national politics, and for conspiracy against the state, and the Bolivian state threatened other foreign NGOs that they could end up the same way as USAID and IBIS (Gustafson, 2013; France-Presse, 2013; BBC, 2013). I therefore studied if Norwegian NGOs operating in Bolivia could be more or less vulnerable due to how they operated, and if some NGOs or some strategies are more “accepted” than others. By studying how the Norwegian NGOs operate in Bolivia and relate to their Bolivian partners, and further how the Bolivian NGO cooperated with the state, I got a better understanding of how the development cooperation is affected by a stronger state.

The Bolivian government introduced in 2013 the Law of Legal Entities No. 351, which involved more regulations towards NGOs, both national NGOs and foreign NGOs working in Bolivia. In August 2015, the Bolivian Vice President threatened four Bolivian NGOs with eviction or to be shut down, due to a report they had written about the government's extraction plans in Bolivian national parks. The Vice President stated that there would be more control of NGOs and their activities, and that national NGOs receiving funding from foreign donors would be looked more into (García Linera, 2015). In September 2015 the

government presented a new, extended list of 38 other NGOs they would look more into, where the last NGO was MANB, the Bolivian branch of Mission Alliance.

The Law of Legal Entities No. 351 is a good example of how a stronger Bolivian state can control the foreign as well as the national NGOs operating in Bolivia, and how the Bolivian state can demonstrate power over foreign as well as national NGOs. The law was presented in many of the interviews with the Bolivian NGOs, and some of the NGOs cooperating with the Norwegian NGOs were concerned if their cooperation with a foreign NGO could give them trouble, even though they have presented all the documents the law requires. There was however a general trend in my finding towards the concern from the different NGOs. NGOs that had a “technical” cooperation with the state, either through service delivery or technical cooperation somehow, stated that they were not too concerned, since they were not politically engaged. They stated that they could risk being forced to end their cooperation with the Norwegian NGO, but saw it as unlikely. NGOs that were politically engaged, and critical to some of the government’s politics, were more concerned, since how they worked could be similar to what the Vice President stated in his letter that the government would not accept, and since they received funding from foreign NGOs for their work (García Linera, 2015). These NGOs stated that they had presented all the documents the law requires, but that they were afraid the state would find errors just to sanction them. NGOs that cooperated with the state in the interpersonal or political dimensions saw no problems with the law, or how it could affect them in any negative way, and rather stated that since Morales and MAS had gotten into power, they had gotten more influence and saying in the national politics as well. NGOs and social movements that cooperated with the Bolivian state through several dimensions, especially through the “value and mission”, “interpersonal” and “political” dimension did not fear any consequences for the cooperation with the Norwegian NGOs. The more dimensions the NGOs connected with the state, the less worried they were. NPA was the only Norwegian NGO with a distinct political agenda, and stated that they saw it as important and necessary to be engaged in political questions. Their partners also received funding for being politically active, but none of these NGOs stated that they were concerned that they would get trouble with the government for their cooperation with NPA. There are different reasons for that. One of the reasons is that these NGOs and social movement organizations has supported Morales and MAS since the beginning in the 1990s. They are also large organizations with many members, and an informant in NPA did not think the Morales government would dare to force them to stop their development cooperation with NPA. A

third reason is that these organizations support the government and are not presenting a critique to the Bolivian state's new approach to development – they are rather supporting it. Bratton (1989) demonstrates how African states could have problems with NGOs promoting a political discontent with the national regime, and how this could affect the cooperation between them (1989, pp. 572-573). This seems to be the case in Bolivia as well. The NGOs that cooperated with the Bolivian state through the political and interpersonal dimension, and shared the same mission as the government, had no concern of how or why the cooperation with the Norwegian NGO would give them any problems. NGOs that were more critical on the other hand, stated more concern of the new regulations and restrictions, and how it would affect their cooperation with their Norwegian NGO partner.

8.2 FINDINGS FROM BOLIVIA RELATED TO A GENERAL TREND WORLDWIDE

These findings are not unique for Bolivia. Almost half of the world's states have implemented regulations on NGOs, and more than 60 countries have drafted or passed laws that restrict the actions of NGOs. It is especially NGOs and civil society organizations that are politically engaged that experience more restrictions. There are many reasons for that, but there is a general trend, involving a shift from political power away from the West, and involving more regulation of NGOs that receive funding for domestic civil society groups. The political shift many countries experience, involves a stronger state with less influence from Western ideals and influence, according to Tom Carothers. Another reason he presents is how the states cannot control the civil society, and by introducing laws and regulations, they still have a chance to control them (Sherwood, 2015). Bratton (1989) argued how states could put restrictions and regulations on NGOs, even though it was not common or normal at the time (1989, p. 580). There seems however to be a change from that, where receiving states have put more controls and regulations on NGOs for different reasons. Bolivia is no exception, and there seems to be a correlation with the historic development in Bolivia. After 20 years of neoliberalism, and little power to the people and the state, NGOs, both national and foreign, rose up as a good alternative to the state, and NGOs took over more of the development in the country (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, pp. 67-91). The Bolivian people mobilized to get a change from the neoliberal politics and economy, and wanted a stronger state with more rights to indigenous, and social programs (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012, pp. 1-4). The Bolivian state has taken back much power after Morales became president, and can therefore control the *actors*

(in this case NGOs) in a more effective way, demonstrated by the Law of Legal Entities No. 351, and how the state has threatened foreign NGOs with eviction. There are however some NGOs and social movements with a lot of control over the Morales government, which has been empowered in the process of a stronger state in Bolivia. These were the people who elected him, and have supported him during his presidency. If the government should put restrictions on their actions and agenda, this could give them more challenges.

8.3 NORWEGIAN NGOS' RELATION TO THEIR DONORS

In the proposed state budget for 2016, presented in October 2015, the Norwegian government presented a cut in development assistance, involving a cut of 2/3 of all foreign aid channeled through Norwegian NGOs (Regjeringen.no, 2015). This led to massive discussions in Norway, and informants from the Norwegian NGOs stated that they did not understand where this distrust came from. This can also be seen as a more global trend, and Lewis and Opoku-Mensah (2006) claim that NGOs are not as favored development actors as they once were (p. 666). Norwegian NGOs are however still important actors within the Norwegian development system, and Tvedt (2009) demonstrates how Norwegian NGOs have been an important part of the Norwegian foreign aid system, and how their roles and funding have increased from the 1960s until 2000 (2009, p. 79). Norwegian NGOs received a lot of support from other parties in the parliament, involving continued funding for the Norwegian NGOs work in developing countries (Speed, et. al., 2015). This demonstrates that even though NGOs on a global arena might have lost some of their position as policy actors, the Norwegian NGOs still has an important role within the Norwegian development assistance, even though the state proposed a change leading to changes away from NGOs.

The Bolivian government has stated that they do not wish involvement from foreign NGOs in their country, and the Norwegian government has stated that they do not wish to continue supporting Latin American countries. The Bolivian state and the Norwegian government has different arguments for why they do not wish to continue the cooperation and funding, but their conclusion is the same. The Norwegian NGOs are therefore facing challenges at both ends, from the donor state in Norway, and the receiving state in Bolivia. The future of Norwegian NGOs' development cooperation in Bolivia is therefore filled with many uncertainties.

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APPENDIX A

Forespørsel om deltakelse i Masteroppgave

Hei, mitt navn er Kristin Ekberg Vik, og jeg er en masterstudent i utviklingsgeografi ved Universitet i Bergen. Jeg planlegger å skrive masteroppgaven min om hvordan norske organisasjoner arbeider i Bolivia, og hvordan de samarbeider med lokale organisasjoner, institusjoner og styresmakter, samt hvordan de arbeider i Norge i forhold til å få støtte fra ulike givere og i forhold til Norad og norske styresmakter. Jeg håper deres organisasjon kan tenke dere å være med på studiet. Gjennom studiet håper jeg å få vist de mange ulike måtene organisasjoner arbeider på, og hvilken rolle de har i utvikling og utviklingssamarbeid. Ifølge tall fra Norad er dere en av de større norske organisasjonene som arbeider i Bolivia, og jeg håper dermed dere kan tenke dere å være med i studiet.

Jeg planlegger å ha en casestudie med tre norske organisasjoner, SAIH, Norsk Folkehjelp og Misjonsalliansen, og se mer på hvordan de arbeider i Bolivia, og hvordan de forholder seg til lokale organisasjoner i Bolivia, samt hvordan de forholder til staten i Bolivia og Norge, samt givere i Norge.

Foreløpig planlegger jeg å reise til Bolivia i august og september for å samle informasjon der, og håper det er mulig at jeg kan snakke med noen i deres organisasjon før den tid. Oppgaven vil ikke bli en evaluering av hvordan dere arbeider i Bolivia, men jeg ønsker å vise til de mange oppgavene og rollene ulike ikke-statlige organisasjoner har i utviklingssamarbeid, både i forhold til å samle støtte i Norge og være en representant for den norske stat i utviklingsland, men også hvordan dere arbeider i utviklingsland og hvilke sektorer dere der velger å støtte.

Om dere har flere spørsmål til oppgaven min kan dere kontakt veilederen min, Professor Arnt Fløysand, eller ringe meg eller sende meg en e-post.

Med vennlig hilsen

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Arnt Fløysand

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APPENDIX B

Consulta sobre participación en Tesis de Maestría

Hola, mi nombre es Kristin Ekberg Vik, soy estudiante de maestría en geografía en desarrollo en la Universidad de Bergen. Estoy planeando escribir mi tesis sobre como las organizaciones noruegas trabajan en Bolivia, y como las mismas trabajan en cooperación con organizaciones, instituciones y autoridades locales. Así también como trabajan en Noruega respecto al apoyo que reciben de distintos financiadores como Norad y las autoridades noruegas. Espero que su organización pueda considerar formar parte del estudio. A través del estudio espero aprender sobre las diferentes formas de trabajo de las organizaciones y cuales son los roles que tienen respecto al desarrollo y cooperación de desarrollo. Según las cifras de Norad ustedes son una de las mas grandes organizaciones que trabajan en Bolivia, por lo que yo espero que ustedes puedan considerar ser parte de mi estudio.

Estoy planeando tener estudios centrales de casos de tres organizaciones noruegas, SAIH, Norsk Folkehjelp y Mision Alianza, y ver cómo las mismas trabajan en Bolivia, además ver cómo se relacionan con las organizaciones locales en Bolivia, con el Estado en Bolivia y Noruega, y con los financiadores en Noruega.

Por el momento planeo viajar a Bolivia en agosto y septiembre para recolectar información en el país, y espero sea posible que sea posible hablar con alguien de su organización durante mi estadía. La tesis no será una evaluación sobre su trabajo en Bolivia, sino más bien deseo mostrar las diferentes responsabilidades y roles que las ONG's tienen en la cooperación de desarrollo, tanto en relación con la recolección de financiamiento en Noruega y como representantes para el Estado Noruega en los países en desarrollo. También deseo mostrar el trabajo que ustedes desempeñan en los países en desarrollo y qué sectores ustedes escogen para apoyar.

Si tienen más preguntas sobre mi tesis pueden contactar a mi tutor, Profesor Arnt Fløysand, o también pueden llamarme o mandarme un e-mail.

Saluda a ustedes atentamente,

Tutor

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Arnt Fløysand

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APPENDIX C

Intervjuguide Misjonsalliansen

1. Fortell du begynne med å fortelle litt om Misjonsalliansen?
2. Hvordan arbeider dere i utviklingsland? Hvorfor har dere valgt å gjøre det på denne måten?
3. Hvordan arbeider dere i Bolivia?
4. Hva er det som er gjennomgående i deres arbeid?
5. Har dere en felles strategi/ plan i alle landene der dere har arbeid, eller varierer det fra land til land?
6. Hvem/ hvilke organisasjoner samarbeider dere med, og hvorfor akkurat disse?
7. Hvilke fokusområder har dere i Bolivia?
8. Hvilke sektorer er det dere arbeider for/ med? Hvorfor akkurat disse?
9. Hvordan velger dere hvilke sektorer dere skal satse på?
10. Hvordan er samarbeidet med MANB i Bolivia?
11. Hva er utsendingenes rolle i Bolivia?
12. Mange bistandsorganisasjoner har valgt å ikke ha norske utsendinger, men heller satse på samarbeid med nasjonale organisasjoner. Hvorfor velger dere å fortsette med utsendinger?
13. Hvordan har dere arbeidet i Bolivia tidlige, i forhold til nå?
14. Hva er deres fremtidsplaner for Bolivia? Kommer dere til å fortsette arbeidet deres der fremover?
15. Hvordan er forholdet dere/ deres samarbeidsorganisasjon i Bolivias forhold til den bolivianske stat?
16. Hvordan er forholdet deres til den bolivianske staten? Har dere noe samarbeid med den (hvorfor- hvorfor ikke)?
17. Har dere hatt noen utfordringer med bolivianske myndigheter nå eller tidligere?
18. Morales har sagt han ønsker mindre innblanding av utenlandske NGOs, hvordan påvirker det dere?
19. Den siste dagen jeg var i La Paz havnet MANB på en liste myndighetene vil se mer på, kan du si noe om årsaken til det? Hva vil det si for deres arbeid fremover?

20. Tror du deres organisasjon kan risikere å bli kastet ut av Bolivia eller få problemer med å fortsette arbeidet deres fremover?
21. Bolivia har klart å redusere veldig mye av fattigdommen i landet etter Morales ble president, er det fortsatt nødvendig at utenlandske organisasjoner bidrar til utviklingen i landet?
22. Har deres organisasjoner engasjert dere i politiske spørsmål i Bolivia? Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke?
23. Dere får Norad støtte, varierer denne mye fra hvilke partier som er i regjering?
24. Hvordan er samarbeidet deres med Norad?
25. Regjeringen har nå foreslått i neste års statsbudsjett å kutte bistanden i det nye statsbudsjettet, spesielt gjennom norske organisasjoner. Hvordan vil det påvirke dere om dette blir vedtatt?
26. Har du noen forslag eller ide om hvorfor regjeringen har foreslått kutt gjennom norske organisasjoner?
27. Hvilke fordeler er det å gi bistand gjennom norske NGOs i stedet for bilateral bistand?
28. Det er jo regjeringen som bestemmer hvilke områder som det skal satses på i utviklingssamarbeid, med den rødgrønne regjeringen var det regnskog, og med høgrefrp regjeringen er det utdanning. Har disse målene noe å si for dere i forhold til støtte, eller hvilke prosjekter det er ønskelig at dere skal ha i utviklingsland?
29. Om Noradstøtten til dere blir redusert, hvordan vil det da påvirke deres prosjekter i Bolivia?
30. Hvilke andre givere har dere enn Noradstøtten?
31. Hvordan forholder dere dere til deres ulike givere?
32. Merker dere at givere i Norge kommer med noen konkrete ønsker eller krav til hva pengene de samler inn skal gå til på prosjektnivå?
33. Er ønsker fra givere forenelig med behovene i felt?
34. Hvordan syns deres organisasjon at utviklingssamarbeidet i Bolivia fungerer?
35. Hva er de langsiktige målene deres for Bolivia?
36. Dere er jo en trosbasert utviklingsorganisasjon. Hva vil det si i praksis for deres arbeid? Driver dere misjon i tillegg til utviklingsarbeid?
37. Har dere møtt noe kritikk/ motstand på at dere er en kristen organisasjon som også driver med utviklingssamarbeid (både i Norge, Bolivia og andre land for øvrig)?
38. Hvordan blir dere møtt i utviklingsland (som Bolivia) når dere har ordet "misjon" i navnet deres?

39. Hvordan er den kristne bakgrunnen/ verdiene deres med på å påvirke utviklingsprosjekter?
40. Hva er det dere ser på når dere skal velge prosjekter og samarbeidspartnere?
41. Hva er viktig for dere i samarbeidet med lokalsamfunn og lokale kommuner?
42. Noe annet du vil legge til?

APPENDIX D

Intervjuguide SAIH

1. Kan du fortell litt om hva arbeid dere gjøre (generelt) her i Norge?
2. Hvordan arbeider dere i utviklingsland? (Hvorfor har dere valgt å gjøre det på denne måten?)
3. Hva er det som er gjennomgående i deres arbeid?
4. Har dere en felles strategi/ plan i alle landene der dere har arbeid, eller varierer det fra land til land?
5. Hvordan arbeider dere i Bolivia?
6. Hvem/ hvilke organisasjoner samarbeider dere med, og hvorfor?
7. Hvorfor ønsker dere å støtte opp om akkurat disse organisasjonene og sektorene?
8. Er det en sammenheng i måten dere arbeider i Norge og i utviklingsland?
9. Hvilke utfordringer møter dere på generell basis i Bolivia?
10. Ifølge nettsidene dere samarbeider dere med lokale organisasjoner i mottakerlandene, men hvordan stiller de seg (og dere) til den Bolivianske staten?
11. Ifølge nettsidene dere samarbeider dere med 7 lokale organisasjoner i Bolivia, – hvorfor støtter dere akkurat disse organisasjonene?
12. Hvorfor har dere valgt å gjøre gi bistand det på denne måten?
13. Har deres organisasjon noen (felles) mål for både Norge og de landene dere arbeider i? Hvorfor har dere valgt akkurat disse målene?
14. Hvordan er samarbeidet med lokale organisasjoner organisert?
15. Hvordan velgere dere hvilke partnere dere skal ha?
16. Hvor lenge har dere hatt de ulike partnerne?
17. Hvordan arbeider dere/ samarbeider dere med Norad?
18. Hva ønsker dere å oppnå med samarbeidet med bolivianske organisasjoner?
19. Dere får støtte fra Norad, varierer denne mye fra hvilke partier som er i regjering?
20. Norad har jo også ulike verdier og mål for bistandsarbeid, og med den blå-regjeringen er utdanning viktig. Merker dere mye til dette når dere søker om støtte?
21. Hvordan er samarbeidet deres med den norske stat/ Norad? Er det spesielle krav til hva dere skal bruke pengene til?
22. Hvilke andre givere har dere?

23. Hvordan er forholdet deres til andre givere?
24. Merker dere noe til verdier og ønsker til givere som er med på å legge en føring for hvordan dere arbeider?
25. Når dere bestemmer dere for å gå inn i et utviklingsland og starte opp et arbeid der, hva er det da som avgjør hvilke sektorer og områder dere velger å gå inn i?
26. Hvordan syns du / deres organisasjon at utviklingssamarbeidet med Bolivia fungerer?
27. Hva er de langsiktige målene deres for Bolivia?
28. Hvordan velger dere samarbeidsorganisasjoner?
29. Hvilke faktorer er det som avgjør og er med på å bestemme hvilke samarbeidsorganisasjoner dere velger i Bolivia og ellers?
30. Kommer dere til å fortsette de samarbeidene? Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke?
31. Er det noen generelle utfordringer dere merker i Bolivia?
32. Hva er deres organisasjons fremtidsplaner for Bolivia?
33. Har deres organisasjon og de lokale organisasjonene dere samarbeider med ulike/ motstridende interesser?
34. Dere støtter opp om urbefolkningsgrupper for at de skal få mulighet til å ta utdanning og få oppfylt sine rettigheter, har dere merket en endring generelt på det feltet etter Morales ble president?
35. Hvordan tror du utviklingen i Bolivia vil ta form nå som Morales er president, og han har sagt at han ønsker en annen kurs for landet, og at det er de som skal definere landets utvikling?
36. Tror du deres organisasjon kan risikere å bli kastet ut av Bolivia?
37. Om dere skulle bli kastet ut av Bolivia, hvordan vil det påvirke dere og deres partnere?
38. Hvordan er forholdet dere/ deres samarbeidsorganisasjon i Bolivias forhold til den bolivianske stat?
39. Støtter dere noen organisasjoner som er kritiske til Morales regjeringen?
40. Hvordan er samarbeidet deres med den norske stat/ Norad (og andre store donorer)?
41. Når dere bestemmer dere for å gå inn i et utviklingsland og starte opp et arbeid der, hva er det da som avgjør hvilke sektorer og områder dere velger å gå inn i?
42. Noe annet du vil legge til?

APPENDIX E

Intervjuguide Norsk Folkehjelp

1. Kan du fortell litt om hva arbeid dere gjøre (generelt)?
2. Hvordan arbeider dere i utviklingsland? (Hvorfor har dere valgt å gjøre det på denne måten?)
3. Hva er det som er gjennomgående i deres arbeid?
4. Har dere en felles strategi/ plan i alle landene der dere har arbeid, eller varierer det fra land til land?
5. Hvordan arbeider dere i Bolivia?
6. Hvem/ hvilke organisasjoner samarbeider dere med, og hvorfor?
7. På nettsiden deres står det at dere har en politisk tilnærming i utviklingssamarbeidet, hva vil det si?
8. Hvorfor ønsker dere å støtte opp om sivilsamfunnsorganisasjoner i Bolivia?
9. Hvorfor startet dere opp arbeid i Bolivia igjen i 2005? (hvorfor pause i ti år?)
10. Hvilke fokusområder har dere i Bolivia?
11. Hvordan har dere arbeidet i Bolivia tidlige, i forhold til nå?
12. Hva er deres fremtidsplaner for Bolivia?
13. Har deres organisasjon og den lokale organisasjonen (e) dere samarbeider med ulike/ motstridende interesser?
14. Hva er det dere legger vekt på i samarbeidet?
15. Hva er deres ønsker og mål for samarbeidet med bolivianske organisasjoner?
16. Dere samarbeider med bondeorganisasjoner i Bolivia, hvorfor er det viktig å støtte opp om disse?
17. Organisasjonene dere støtter i Bolivia er også grasrotorganisasjon som støtter Morales, hvorfor støtter dere de da de er så pass aktive i den politiske debatten i Bolivia?
18. Dere samarbeider blant annet med ganske store organisasjon og sosiale bevegelser. Hvorfor akkurat disse?
19. Dere samarbeider med 7 organisasjoner i Bolivia, hvorfor har dere valgt å støtte akkurat disse 7?
20. Hvordan er forholdet dere/ deres samarbeidsorganisasjon i Bolivias forhold til den bolivianske stat?

21. Den Bolivianske staten har redusert fattigdommen betraktelig etter Morales ble president, er det fortsatt nødvendig eller viktig å gi bistand til Bolivia når de klarer så mye selv?
22. På hvilke måter kan utenlandske organisasjoner bidra til utviklingen i Bolivia på en best mulig måte?
23. Er bistand det beste for å skape utvikling i et land, eller er det av og til bedre å trekke seg ut og la landet selv ta ansvar for utviklingen?
24. Morales har lagt en annen kurs for landet, med mindre innblanding av utenlandske organisasjoner. Hvordan påvirker det deres samarbeid med bolivianske organisasjoner?
25. Tror du deres organisasjon kan risikere å bli kastet ut av Bolivia, eller bli tvunget til å avslutte samarbeidet dere har med organisasjonene der, siden den bolivianske stat ikke ønsker politisk innblanding?
26. Dere får Norad støtte, varierer denne mye etter hvilke partier som er i regjering?
27. Regjeringen har nå foreslått å kutte bistanden i det nye statsbudsjettet til bistand kanalisert gjennom norske ikke-statlige organisasjoner. Hvordan vil det påvirke deres arbeid i Sør-Amerika og Bolivia? Eventuelt hvordan vil det påvirke dere generelt som utviklingsaktør?
28. Vil regjeringens kutt i bistanden til neste års statsbudsjett påvirke dere og deres arbeid i Bolivia?
29. Hvilke fordeler er det å gi bistand gjennom norske ikke-statlige organisasjoner (NGOer) i forhold til bilateral bistand?
30. Hvordan samarbeider dere med Norad?
31. Hvilke andre givere har dere enn Norad?
32. Hvordan samarbeider dere med andre givere?
33. Hva er viktig i samarbeidet med de ulike giverne?
34. Merker dere at givere i Norge kommer med noen konkrete ønsker eller krav til hva pengene de samler inn skal gå til på prosjektnivå?
35. Er ønsker fra givere forenelig med behovene i mottakerland? Om ikke, hvordan forholder dere da til potensielle givere?
36. Det er jo regjeringen som bestemmer hvilke områder som det skal satses på i utviklingssamarbeid. Hvordan påvirker dette deres arbeid?
37. Når dere bestemmer dere for å gå inn i et utviklingsland og starte opp et arbeid der, hva er det da som avgjør hvilke sektorer og områder dere velger å gå inn i?

38. Hvordan syns du / deres organisasjon at utviklingssamarbeidet med Bolivia fungerer?
39. Hva er hovedtrekkene for det dere har oppnådd i Bolivia de siste ti årene?
40. Noe annet du vil legge til?

APPENDIX F

NGOs	Number of informants
SAIH	2
Mission Alliance	3
Norwegian Peoples Aid	2
Bolivian NGO 1	2
Bolivian NGO 2	2
Bolivian NGO 3	2
Bolivian NGO 4	1
Bolivian NGO 5	1
Bolivian NGO 6	1
Bolivian NGO 7	2
Bolivian Vice Minister	1
Total	19

APPENDIX G

Godkjenning fra NSD.



Arnt Fløysand
Institutt for geografi Universitetet i Bergen
Fosswinckelsgate 6
5020 BERGEN

Vår dato: 11.06.2015

Vår ref: 43706 / 3 / AMS

Deres dato:

Deres ref:

TILBAKEMELDING PÅ MELDING OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER

Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 09.06.2015. Meldingen gjelder prosjektet:

43706	<i>Norske NGOer tilpasser seg det politiserte klimaet til Morales-regjeringen i Bolivia</i>
Behandlingsansvarlig	<i>Universitetet i Bergen, ved institusjonens øverste leder</i>
Daglig ansvarlig	<i>Arnt Fløysand</i>
Student	<i>Kristin Ekberg Vik</i>

Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet, og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger vil være regulert av § 7-27 i personopplysningsforskriften. Personvernombudet tilrår at prosjektet gjennomføres.

Personvernombudets tilråding forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i meldeskjemaet, korrespondanse med ombudet, ombudets kommentarer samt personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av personopplysninger kan settes i gang.

Det gjøres oppmerksom på at det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de opplysninger som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering. Endringsmeldinger gis via et eget skjema, <http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/meldeplikt/skjema.html>. Det skal også gis melding etter tre år dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår. Meldinger skal skje skriftlig til ombudet.

Personvernombudet har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet i en offentlig database, <http://pvo.nsd.no/prosjekt>.

Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 14.06.2016, rette en henvendelse angående status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.

Vennlig hilsen

Katrine Utaaker Segadal

Anne-Mette Somby

Kontaktperson: Anne-Mette Somby tlf: 55 58 24 10

Dokumentet er elektronisk produsert og godkjent ved NSDs rutiner for elektronisk godkjenning.

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Vedlegg: Prosjektvurdering

Kopi: Kristin Ekberg Vik kristin.ekberg@student.uib.no



FORMÅL

Formålet er å undersøke hvordan norske NGOer arbeider i Bolivia, hvordan de tilpasser seg til det politiserte klimaet med Morales-regjeringen og hvordan de ser for seg at fremtidig utviklingssamarbeid i Bolivia skal foregå.

INFORMASJON OG SAMTYKKE

Ifølge prosjektmeldingen skal utvalget informeres muntlig om prosjektet og samtykke til deltakelse. For å tilfredsstille kravet om et informert samtykke etter loven, må utvalget informeres om følgende:

- hvilken institusjon som er ansvarlig
- prosjektets formål / problemstilling
- hvilke metoder som skal benyttes for datainnsamling
- hvilke typer opplysninger som samles inn
- at opplysningene behandles konfidensielt og hvem som vil ha tilgang
- at det er frivillig å delta og at man kan trekke seg når som helst uten begrunnelse
- dato for forventet prosjektslutt
- at data anonymiseres ved prosjektslutt
- hvorvidt enkeltpersoner vil kunne gjenkjennes i den ferdige oppgaven
- kontaktopplysninger til student og veileder.

SENSITIVE OPPLYSNINGER

Det tas høyde for at det kan behandles sensitive personopplysninger om etnisk bakgrunn eller politisk/filosofisk/religiøs oppfatning.

INFORMASJONSSIKKERHET

Personvernombudet legger til grunn at forsker etterfølger Universitetet i Bergen sine interne rutiner for datasikkerhet. Dersom personopplysninger skal sendes elektronisk eller lagres på privat pc/mobile enheter, bør opplysningene krypteres tilstrekkelig.

PUBLISERING

Det oppgis at personopplysninger skal publiseres. Personvernombudet legger til grunn at det foreligger eksplisitt samtykke fra den enkelte til dette. Vi anbefaler at deltakerne gis anledning til å lese igjennom egne opplysninger og godkjenne disse før publisering.

PROSJEKTSLUTT OG ANONYMISERING

Forventet prosjektslutt er 14.06.2016. Ifølge prosjektmeldingen skal innsamlede opplysninger da anonymiseres. Anonymisering innebærer å bearbeide datamaterialet slik at ingen enkeltpersoner kan gjenkjennes. Det gjøres ved å:

- slette direkte personopplysninger (som navn/koblingsnøkkel)
- slette/omskrive indirekte personopplysninger (identifiserende sammenstilling av bakgrunnsopplysninger som f.eks. bosted/arbeidssted, alder og kjønn)
- slette digitale lyd-/bilde- og videoopptak