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# **Trust in public institutions**

A comparative study of Botswana and Tanzania

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***Abstract***

This thesis concerns institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania and seeks to test several variables' importance in determining individuals' trust. African countries have historically been somewhat neglected in trust research and these two countries have therefore been chosen as the cases of my study. Based on the cultural theories and institutional theories of trust I have selected socio-demographic factors, social capital, transparency, democratic satisfaction and policy performance as my independent variables. The analysis is based on survey data from Afrobarometer conducted in 2012. The findings in this thesis suggest that the cultural theories do little in explaining institutional trust as the socio-demographic and social capital variables do rather poorly. Institutional theories on the other hand do very well in explaining variations in trust in public institutions. The most determining variable in terms of individuals trust in public institutions seems to be the general policy performance of the government and individuals' approval of the President's performance.

***Key words:*** Institutional Trust, Botswana, Tanzania, Social Capital, Democracy

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## **Chapter One: Introduction**

### ***1.1 Introduction***

What is trust? What defines trust? Why do we decide to trust and how do we measure it? Do we need trust? Trust can be seen as the glue that holds our society together, a foundation and a lubricant (Grimen, 2009). It is a control factor that evaluates the job of the trustee and in this sense we also need distrust as a morally correct reaction to actions we find critique worthy (ibid.). Blind and naïve trust can have fatal consequences and some hesitation is therefore good before deciding to trust someone. We need to minimize the risk of entering a relation with someone. How do we do this? How do we know if we can trust someone? General trust can be learned and it is crucial that we do as we in many situations in life need to rely on others and their skills and expertise to handle unforeseen issues, like for instance with medical treatment. General trust or distrust will in many ways stem from experience and the culture of trust in society. Negative experience will naturally lead to a more precautionous attitude in the future. It is believed that those who trust are more tolerant, cooperate better, are more creative and willing to take risks as well as generally being more satisfied. With that said, we do find cooperation between people who do not trust each other and this is also to some degree necessary. Yes, we do need trust, both between individuals as well as between individuals and institutions and professionals. We need to cooperate with one another and trust is a natural part of this. Institutional trust is also a necessary component for individuals to trust each other. If the members and actors in the institutions adopt the accepted and expected values and norms the institutions will become trustworthy and in turn this will have positive repercussions for society as a whole. Confucius (551-479 B.C.) once said that there were three elements necessary in order to rule a state: weapons, food and trust. In trying times the last factor to be given up should be trust because without trust the system will collapse (Grimen, 2009) and participation and cooperation will decline.

In this thesis the weight will be on institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania. The field of trust is without a doubt extensive and it can be studied within various contexts, disciplines and subgenres. Within political science and public administration however, it seems only right to study citizens trust in public institutions and how and why this trust occurs. Numerous contributions have been made in order to find some answers to these questions concerning why individuals choose to trust institutions. However, rather few of them on the African continent and this is where I wish to contribute. Hopefully, by the end of this thesis, I will be able to give some answers as to which factors lead to individuals' trust in the public



institutions, and if any of the theories that have commonly been used to explain trust in Western and Asian countries can be applied to an African context as well.

The quality and moral trustworthiness of an institution should be evaluated through four key values: fairness, solidarity, keeping promises and veracity (Grimen, 2009). When actors do not embrace these values we do not know what motivates them in their work and it will consequently be harder, if not impossible to trust both them and the institutions (ibid.). Institutional trust indicates the public's support for the political system and we can identify several levels of support. The most general level refers to the feeling of national identity and citizenship. The second level is concerned around the support for, and agreement about the main principles in the political regime. The third level focuses on the evaluation of and support for governmental performance while the fourth level is concerned about the actual institutions of the system, like courts of law, the parliament and the police force. A final level can be accounted to support in the actors of the institutions (Askvik, 2007). I will include these levels of support in different ways throughout the thesis. As my dependent variable is trust in public institutions the latter two levels will be visible in relation to this. The second and third level of support becomes clearer when studying policy performance and satisfaction with democracy which are two of my independent variables, which I hope can help explain why individuals trust institutions. In addition, I have chosen socio-demographic factors, transparency and social capital as independent variables. I find that these variables cover a wide specter of areas in society and I hope that they therefore will explain large parts of the variations in institutional trust. These are also variables that have been included in previous research on the field and have been found to be rather explanatory for institutional trust.

Trust can seem somewhat abstract and broad, at the same time it is a very common and familiar concept. But do we ever reflect over why we trust others or why we do not? Studying trust requires us to consider these questions carefully. A good theory of trust should include components of how, when and why trust occurs, develops and crumbles (Grimen, 2009). As of today no theory is successful in doing this, combining several theories is therefore necessary. In my attempt to explain how and why individuals in Botswana and Tanzania choose to trust or not trust the public institutions in their country, I will rely on institutional theories as well as cultural theories. These two theories have vastly different approaches to explaining why trust occurs. While the former bases itself on individuals' evaluation of the performance of institutions, the latter is based on individual and social factors such as upbringing, personality and societal conditions unrelated to the public institutions. In newer regimes it is believed to be

common that popular support from the public will consist of a combination of these two as presented in William Mishler and Richard Rose's (2001) lifetime learning model. After a regime has undergone change people may still rely on the fundamental political attitudes they acquired under the old regime as well as pre-adult socialization. Influence from the performance of the new government will cause their original beliefs and values to be questioned and updated (Askvik, 2010). The longer the new regime has been in place the more important institutional performance seems to become (ibid.). Botswana and Tanzania both have relatively new regimes, though Botswana has had a stable multi-party democracy since independence (Kryzanek, 2009, Worldbank, 2016), while Tanzania just recently converted from Nyerere's socialist one-party regime to a multi-party democracy (Morrissey, 1995). We might therefore be able to see signs of these transformations in people's trust patterns. As both countries are still in the phase of establishing full-functioning liberal democracies it is likely that we will see traces of both early-life and later-life experiences in the determination of trust as these are likely to coincide in newer democracies. If any of the two theories will gain more support and be of greater importance in determining trust will therefore be interesting to see. The fact that these two countries do not have full liberal-democracies yet and have a history of autocracy, lack of freedom and reduced civil rights might also cause levels of institutional trust to be unnaturally high due to loyalty and political fear. Determinant factors of trust may in this case be hard to discover and we might find some paradoxes in the correlations between institutional trust and the independent variables. I will therefore have a critical view of the results I get, and try to give logical explanations for the occurrences. In some cases I must acknowledge that there can be multiple reasons for why respondents answer the way they do, which in turn will cause the paradoxical correlations.

## ***1.2 Research Problem***

The wide-ranging field of trust can be studied in numerous ways and contexts and as outlined above I have chosen to study the determinant factors for institutional trust in two African countries. Based on this I have developed the following research problem:

*What determines how and why people trust public institutions in Botswana and Tanzania?  
Are levels of institutional trust higher in Botswana, a relatively successful (in socio-economic development terms) country, than in Tanzania, a less successful country?*

### **1.3 Relevance of the study**

“Trust is the core of social capital and one of the key resources for the development of modern societies” (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009:1537). Why then is this vital factor in society not studied further in developing countries in general and African countries in particular? Afrobarometer<sup>1</sup> is a database that provides quantitative data on several social, political and financial issues in Africa, but there are only a limited number of studies where these findings have been used in relation to trust studies. Afrobarometer too, produces a large number of papers and articles based on the findings in their surveys, but as far as I am concerned only a few of them are focused on trust and what factors lead to institutional trust. I think it is astonishing that there has not been conducted more research on trust in the African countries, I therefore find it both interesting and relevant to study this further and that is why I have chosen institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania as the topic for my research. The reason for choosing these two countries is their differences in economic performance and cultural compositions, but also similarities in their geographical placement and historical factors.

Studying trust as a vital part of social capital first became common in the 1980’s and 1990’s and is therefore a relatively new research field in social science (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). Trust is an absolute necessary factor in order to cooperate with other members of society, both the ones we know personally and strangers, in financial, political or social situations (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). These connections and networks are crucial in order to achieve personal and societal goals, which will again be crucial in order to achieve development. In order for public institutions and the government to gain legitimacy and successfully implement public policies they are dependent on a trusting and supporting population (Jamil and Askvik, 2015). Previous research finds that political institutions, civic engagement and income equality are necessary conditions for developing trust (Gleave et al., 2012). But where do these relations of trust occur and why? The theories are many and the findings point in many directions and it is necessary to explore these questions within this field further (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). It is for this reason exactly I believe it is important to contribute, at least to some degree, to this research field by studying the occurrence of trust in the context of two developing countries. As trust has been so widely acknowledged as an important factor in developing a modern democracy, achieving good governance and building social capital there have been a large number of studies on this field, but these studies have to a large extent focused on countries that are included in the World Values Surveys or European Values Surveys. These mostly cover

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<sup>1</sup> Afrobarometer: *A Pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions and related issues in 36 African countries* (www.afrobarometer.org).

developed countries in Europe and North America, whilst only a few number of African, Asian and South American countries are represented. Nevertheless, Steinar Askvik's (2007, 2008, 2010), Ann Kryzaneck (2009) and Dag Ingvar Jacobsen's (1999) have studied trust within institutions in South Africa, Botswana and Tanzania respectively. They have however had a slight different approach than I have chosen. I will review the findings from these in the following. In addition to this many of the theories developed around the concept of trust have been developed from studies in Western countries with a higher development status and far more established and stable democracies. These theories may therefore not be applicable to less developed countries which are still struggling to establish strong institutions and a functioning government. Findings from post-communist countries or newly established democracies show somewhat different patterns of trust than in more established, western democracies. A further testing of the most common theories of trust might therefore be necessary.

#### ***1.4 Objectives of the study***

The overall objective of this thesis is to study institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania and what factors influence this form of trust. Some specific objectives can be included in this:

- Compare levels of institutional trust in the two countries
- Examine which of my independent variables explains the variations in institutional trust the best
- Test the main theories of trust in an African context
- Analyze the findings in regard to development levels in the two countries

#### ***1.5 Significance of the study***

Trust in public institutions is a vital factor for a functioning democracy and a stable society and is therefore needed in order to achieve development. It is also interesting to see which factors determines trust, and only by knowing this will we have a chance to increase levels of institutional trust. Causality however, is a big issue when studying trust and we therefore need to be aware of whether different societal factors like social capital or satisfaction with the democracy leads to trust or the other way around. The importance of trust has been studied to great lengths in Western and some Asian countries over the last few decades, while most African countries have been neglected from this research. This is the main reason for the case-selection in this study. As institutional trust has not been extensively studied in an African

context, it is both interesting and much needed to test the theories of trust also here. Are there any significantly different factors determining trust here than in developed countries? Are there any cultural differences between the two countries that determine trust? The hope is that this master thesis can be a small contribution to the study of institutional trust in Africa.

### ***1.6 Organization of the thesis***

This thesis will be divided into six chapters; this introduction chapter has included an introduction to the field of trust and my motivation for doing this research and the relevance of the topic as well as objectives for and significance of the study and naturally the research problem. I will in the following section move on to a theoretical discussion of institutional trust, explaining my dependent variable and a theoretical discussion of various factors explaining institutional trust, leading to my independent variables. This chapter will naturally also include the main theories I will use when discussing my findings, and last the analytical framework displaying my variables. The third chapter of this thesis is the methodological framework I have used for completing my research, including a review of the quantitative comparative method, the reasoning for my case selection and an evaluation of the reliability and validity of the study. The remaining chapters will be devoted to the presentation of my findings and analyzing and discussing these. Lastly, I will round off with some concluding remarks where I will try to give an answer to my research problem and place this thesis in the context and field of trust.

## **Chapter Two: Theoretical and Analytical Framework**

### ***2.1 Introduction***

This second chapter consists mainly of two parts; first, a theoretical discussion of institutional trust which is my dependent variable and second, a theoretical discussion of the various factors explaining institutional trust. On the basis of this discussion I have chosen socio-demographic factors, social capital, transparency, satisfaction with democracy and policy performance as my independent variables. As we will see in the discussion all these variables can help explain institutional trust and they have also been grounded in different theories of trust. The theories that I have chosen to rely on are institutional or performance-based theory and cultural theories including both individual traits and societal conditions. I will round off the chapter by talking briefly about Afrobarometer and the datasets I am using, and last I will present the analytical model of the variables for my study.

### ***2.2 The field of Trust***

Ever since the times of philosophers John Locke and Thomas Hobbes the field of trust has been a present feature in discussions surrounding the society we live in (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009). Georg Simmel (1992:393-394) later stated that trust was “*one of the most important synthetic forces within society*”. The current debate on trust stems from the increased research on social capital and is a rather recent development within social science (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009). Over the last few decades we have seen an extensive growth in the literature concerning trust and it has become an important part of studying economic growth, development, good governance and civic engagement as well as social capital (Jamil and Askvik, 2015). Social capital in particular is directly connected to and impossible to achieve without trust. Social capital can refer to social organization and can generate coordinate actions (Putnam et al., 1993). This social cooperation is largely built on trust and reciprocity as this is the basis for collective group action (Rotberg, 1999). In order to take part in voluntary activities one needs to know that the efforts put in will be reciprocated in terms of certain benefits to taking part in these activities. These benefits will usually come in the form of societal goods and security in the fact that one is part of a larger whole.

The complexity and discussions surrounding the concept of trust naturally make the definitions many, but one way of defining it is as: “*a belief that others, at worst, will not knowingly or willingly do you harm, and at best, will act in your interests*” (Newton, 2001:3). Trust can be seen as a coping mechanism for individuals to handle the complex and uncertain

social organization (Gleave et al., 2012). This way they can either trust others to perform a certain job and be responsible for the outcome or they will cooperate with those with mutual interests in order to reach a common goal. Others again relate trust to social intelligence, morality or shared expectations, meaning that people who share an understanding of the world are more likely to trust each other (Gleave et al., 2012).

Despite the disagreements on how to define the concept of trust it is widely agreed upon its importance for a civilized social and political society as well as high levels of trust is a prerequisite for a functioning democracy (Newton, 2001). The civil society and social capital that is needed in order to sustain democracy is only achieved through a large number of social networks which have to be based on trust in order to function. Trust is a good indicator of social capital, but is not necessarily sufficient. In addition to this there also needs to be a degree of trust between the civil society and politicians and government officials for civic engagement to occur (ibid.).

### *2.2.1 Dimensions of Trust*

We can divide trust into four types within two dimensions: strategic versus moralistic trust, and particularized versus generalized trust (Gleave et al., 2012). The first dimension explains *how* we trust. For instance, that we trust someone with a specific profession to do the job they are trained to do, we trust X to do Y. This is called strategic trust. Moralistic trust, on the other hand, is not context-specific. This means that we simply trust another person (ibid.). The second dimension refers to *whom* we trust. Simply put, particularized trust means trust in the people you have a personal relation with, such as family and friends. The social trust that occurs in a local community, neighborhoods, amongst friends and family will be referred to as particularized trust. This is based on trust in people, not because what they say they will do, but because their previous actions give you a reason to believe that they will act in a way that will benefit you in the future and it will in turn also benefit them to help you or act in your interest. For both parties the options and consequences of not entering this relationship are unwanted (Putnam et al., 1993). Often, these are people you have a personal relation with (Gleave et al., 2012). *“I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you”* (Putnam et al., 1993:169). Particularized trust has, by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994), been referred to as knowledge-based trust. When this trust is transferred to the larger community, like governments, public institutions, the health care system and education system we have no personal relation to the people in charge and this is what we call a generalized type of trust (Gleave et al., 2012). This is trust in strangers or anonymous others we know nothing about

(Gleave et al., 2012). “*Generalized trust is the belief that most people can be trusted. Particularized trust is faith only in your own kind*” (Uslaner, 2000:573). The generation of generalized trust from particularized trust is where it gets difficult and this is especially a problem in developing countries. As noted above this is mainly because people tend not to trust people outside their own ethnic group or local community which again will cause levels of social trust to be low as people in general do not trust each other. Robert Putnam (2000) introduces the concepts of bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital refers to networks within homogenous groups. This would be relations with family, friends and neighbors. These types of networks are valuable when it comes to working for collective needs, as people in these groups are likely to have the same interests. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, means networks between heterogeneous groups. Meaning ties that are slightly more distant, like those with workmates and acquaintances. These networks can benefit from linking social capital by establishing ties with those outside one’s immediate group of contacts. These concepts can also be referred to as thick and thin trust (Freitag and Traummüller, 2009).

Another reason that generalized trust may be low in certain developing countries is that the government and public institutions have not delivered the way it should and have not provided for its citizens. High levels of corruption is also likely to lead to distrust as this proves that government officials are more concerned with their private good, rather than the one of the public. This may cause a distrusting environment so that people will not just develop low trust or even distrust towards the government, public officials or others within their vertical trust relation, but also other people with whom they have a horizontal relation. Horizontal relations in the networks of trust mean that the members of the group are of equal status, race, class, ethnicity etc. Vertical trust networks will then consist of asymmetrical relations in a hierarchical system where some might be more dependent on the network than others (Putnam et al., 1993). Political and internal violence causing instability in a state, is another factor that contribute to low trust. The causation here is however, a little unclear as it can just as well be low levels of trust causing the conflict (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). This is a rather complex relation. Hutchison and Johnson (2011) provides two state-level factors, political capacity and internal conflict, that needs to be accounted for in future studies of cross-national differences in trust levels (ibid.).

### *2.2.2 Political Trust*

While social trust refers to the general trust in society, political trust is related to the political world and whether or not individuals trust politicians as well as political and public



institutions (Newton, 2001). Individual trust is a very common concept in society and in social science. Institutional trust however is slightly more abstract and debated. How does this trust in institutions differ from trust in other people? The rules, norms and procedures in society are in large part implemented and structured by institutions. Therefore, it is expected that officials like policemen, doctors, lawyers and civil servants will put into practice the rules and norms and official roles they are given (Jamil and Askvik, 2015). Individuals evaluate their trust in public institutions based on actions from and interactions with these members (ibid.). Institutional trust is achieved when the rules, norms and procedures are followed by the officials. The opposite actions will lead to the absence of trust as well as stating that the institutions are not functioning. This will in turn cause a decrease in legitimacy and a weak relationship between the state and the society (ibid.).

Political trust is strongly related to political capital, and just like social trust and social capital it is essential for a functioning democracy (Newton, 2001). While social and cultural trust refers to a more generalized form of trust in the social spheres, political trust can be seen as an evaluation of the political world (ibid.). According to the performance-based theory it is a measure of how well the public thinks political and public institutions are performing. Kadri Lühiste (2006:478) defines it as: “*confidence that political institutions will not misuse their power.*” Low trust tells us that something is wrong, either the institutions are performing poorly or the expectations are too high (ibid.). Distrust from the public, on the other hand, will require the government to actively do something that violates with the general opinion of what is right and wrong, for instance corruption. Too high trust though is also not ideal as this can cause naivety and an uncritical attitude amongst the citizens. Trust can also be a consequence of naivety and an uncritical attitude. If political trust is based on factors in the cultural theories, trust might be unnaturally high as individuals will trust public institutions for no other reason than that they are trusting people.

Levels of political trust and legitimacy can be measured by looking at political interest, civic engagement, voter turn-out, tax payment, participation, political tolerance and confidence in the President, Parliament and other public institutions (Newton, 2001). How responsive the government is to the citizens and to what degree they act according to preferences is another way of measuring trust and legitimacy (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). An individual’s idea or experience of how the government is performing is often shaped through media and other information channels. It is therefore important that the perception individuals have is as close to correct as possible. A transparent political system is therefore vital so that any unlawful and unfaithful public officials or politicians will be uncovered. Political trust is essential for stable and functioning political institutions as well as for the democracy in whole. Public institutions

as well as the officials, both elected politicians and administrators, working there are dependent on trust, legitimacy and support from the public in order to complete their tasks. A democracy is also dependent on active citizens who want to take part in the political world. However, if they do not regard the institutions as trustworthy this will likely not happen (Jamil and Askvik, 2016). In addition, it will also make more sense to individuals to follow rules and regulations if they trust the institutions (ibid.).

In spite of the importance of trust in a democracy there is a belief that a certain level of distrust is needed in order to guarantee control (Van De Walle and Six, 2014). Too much trust will lead to naivety amongst citizens (ibid.). The value of low trust and distrust in a society is important to consider in a study of trust (ibid.). Many see trust and distrust as opposite ends of the same axis. Steven Van de Walle and Frederique Six (2014) along with Lewicki et al. (1998) however, treat them as two separate ideas which can both be present simultaneously. The absence of trust is rather low trust than distrust, and the absence of distrust does not necessarily generate trust, but gives us low levels of distrust. According to Möllering's definition of trust it is based on routine, reflexivity and reason (Van De Walle and Six, 2014). If individual's trust in government and public institutions is based on routine, it will cause them to be passive. Individuals are the ones who should keep the government in check and some degree of criticism is therefore productive. Van de Walle and Six (2014) also see distrust as not purely negative, but rather a factor that can be constructive and rational and lead to control, whilst too much trust can be seen as naïve and uncritical and lead to the absence of control (ibid.).

Democratic progress can often develop from distrust (ibid.). Both trust and distrust requires an active opinion from the individual, while low trust or low distrust is more or less based on ignorance and indifference. Trust is based on the expectation that a government official or public institution will perform the task they are assigned to do. Distrust, on the other hand, relies on an expectation that the official or institution will fail to complete its tasks and act contrary to shared values and norms (ibid.). When treated as two separate concepts the two can, as mentioned, coexist, meaning that one can trust certain aspects within a relationship, but distrust others (ibid.). The presence of control does not necessarily imply active distrust, but it can help produce and build trust (ibid.). When studying trust in a society it is therefore important to study both trust and distrust as well as control as separate concepts. We must avoid drawing conclusions stating that low trust in a society means distrust (ibid.). If trust and distrust in public institutions are based on performance, change in trust patterns and regaining trust is a relatively easy matter, at least on paper. Institutions can turn to one of two methods, they can either improve their performance or they can lower the public's expectations. These approaches will

lead to fast change in the institutions and trust can be regained in only a few years. If trust and distrust are culturally bound however, change is somewhat harder to achieve and may take decades. To explore this further, we need to dig deeper into institutionalism.

### 2.2.3 Empirical examples

Dag Ingvar Jacobsen's (1999) article: "*Trust in Political-Administrative Relations: The Case of Local Authorities in Norway and Tanzania*" examines the differences in trust in a well-developed, functioning democracy and a newly established democracy. The study was conducted in the context that administrative development is equally important as the political development in achieving and sustaining a developed and modern society (Jacobsen, 1999). Both these aspects are included in the concept of good governance, though the labor division between these two is a bit unclear. In a functioning democratic system politicians come and go as they are elected only for a certain period of time, but the administration stays. It is vital that there is a trusting relation between these two. If politicians exploit their positions to their own benefit (corruption), administrators may distrust the political system. In addition, if the politicians act incompetent, due to how the system is designed, administrators may distrust the politicians (Jacobsen, 1999). The findings in this study indicates that there is indeed a difference in trust between the countries with Norwegian administrators expressing greater trust in their politicians and political institutions than the Tanzanian administrators do (ibid.). One variable that seems to influence the trust-levels positively is education and degree of professionalism. This is probably the most interesting finding in relation to my own study. I however, will study the general public's trust in the public institutions which means both administrators and politicians. Nevertheless, the indication that the more education one has the more faith one has in the political system can possibly be applied to the general public. This shows that an education contributes to a better understanding and more knowledge about the system of politics and administration (ibid.). The paper concludes that national factors, such as culture, political traditions, economic prosperity and social capital, are more important for a functioning administration than trust (ibid.).

In a working paper from Afrobarometer Mattes et al. (2002) review the results from an Afrobarometer survey from 2001 on national public opinion in Tanzania. This paper considers how citizens feel about the transition from a socialist one-party state with command economy to a multi-party democracy with market-based economy. In order for this to be successful individuals need to first of all understand what this type of regime contains as well as approve

of the policies that are being implemented. Secondly, they must take an active part in the democracy which includes being critical towards the government. The survey shows definite support for economic and political reform, but there are also clear signs of the legacies from the previous regime. In addition, we also see that Tanzanians are rather uncritical in regard to their political system which can work as a hindrance for democracy to function ideally. In general, the public opinion in Tanzania differentiates itself from several other African countries (Mattes et al., 2002). The authors of this paper present three paradoxes as a result of this. First, they are very dissatisfied with the national economy, but at the same time they are very supportive of an economic reform. Secondly, they express great interest in politics and are active in various political events like campaigns and rallies. Individual and spontaneous participation however is not so common. Third, Tanzanians perceive corruption levels to be high at the same time as they show great trust in government (ibid.). One reason for this inconsistency in opinions could be that individuals are simply not critical enough and they employ a certain habit when it comes to how they feel about the government and the political system. These habits stem partly from the old, socialist regime, but also from the new political and economic regime. The distance between “normal” people and politicians in government is also quite big which may cause individuals to have more respect and loyalty towards them instead of the critical attitude they should have. Another reason for the paradoxes may be that the top-down rule in the country has been rather kind and well-meaning so even if the institutions do not succeed in all their work they still receive some support from the public (Mattes et al., 2002). This can indicate that trust in Tanzania is determined by both cultural and institutional factors from the life-time learning model that Mishler and Rose (2001) present us to.

Judged by this we can expect levels of institutional trust in Tanzania to be rather high even though there is not necessarily an objective reason for this. An uncritical attitude and a belief that they, as citizens, must obey and support any government and President will give high levels of trust. In addition, this uncritical attitude may also work as a hindrance for an objective evaluation of the government’s performance. This may cause results for both my dependent variable as well as some of the independent variables to be unnaturally high, giving me a somewhat wrong picture of reality.

Marc Hutchison and Kristin Johnson (2011) have studied the relation between political capacity and institutional trust in 16 different African countries. They rely on the relative political capacity (RPC) model, which refers to whether governments are able to obtain the needed levels of resources given their economic capabilities. It accounts for variations in

income due to economic development as well as it reflects how effective a government's resource extraction is considering its natural resources and economic endowment (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). RPC is regarded as a valid measurement of how well public institutions perform in a number of important areas and could therefore also be seen in relation to institutional trust, hence the institutional theory discussed below. Hutchison and Johnson (2011) hypothesize that countries with high political capacity will also have high trust in the public institutions. If the government is efficient it must mean that the institutions are performing as they should and if individuals base their trust on performance, high efficiency will increase trust (ibid.). In their analysis they find that a state's political capacity does have a positive effect on institutional trust across all the countries in the study. Increasing the government's efficiency will therefore help in generating more trust (ibid.). The RPC in Botswana was 0.63 in 2005 while it was 1.77 in Tanzania the same year. Given that a higher number indicates better political capacity we might expect that individuals have more faith in institutions in Tanzania than in Botswana. As opposed to in the previous example, this indicates that trust in Tanzania would be high based on valid and legitimate reasons.

#### *2.2.4 Institutionalism*

Douglass North (1981) defines institutions as "*mechanisms or structures designed to govern the behavior of individuals*" and their performance should be reflected when measuring political trust. Rosemary C. R. Taylor and Peter A. Hall (1996) simply states institutions as: "*the rules of the game*". Institutions form individual's behavior providing the strategic information as well as the routines and systems that shape their preferences in more cultural terms. These aspects are so deeply embedded in individuals and in society that the resistance to change is large. An institution will gain support from the people by contributing to solving collective action problems (Hall and Taylor, 1996). This way they will likely also gain more trust. Individuals' behavior is influenced mainly through two approaches, the calculus approach or the cultural approach. The calculus approach relies on strategic and instrumental thinking and behavior from individuals (ibid.). The cultural approach on the other hand, focuses less on individuals as utility maximizers and more on the satisfactory outcome. Although individuals will always have some sense of rationality and purpose, they use known patterns and routines to reach their decision (ibid.). Historical institutionalism includes aspects of both these theories, while rational choice institutionalism naturally focuses on the calculus approach and sociological institutionalism is centered around the cultural approach (ibid.).

These two approaches can be related to the different theories of institutional trust; cultural theory and institutional theory. Cultural theory states that trust in public institutions is based on personality characteristics and socialization. Institutional theory claims that institutional trust is generated when institutions perform in the preferred way according to the individual's preferences. Change in the institutions in order to gain more support is naturally also related to these factors. If institutional trust is based on cultural factors, aspects of national and societal culture as well as up-bringing and socialization needs to be changed. This will be a long and complex process and can take decades or generations. If institutional trust is performance-based however increasing trust is a much simpler process, or at least in theory. In this case the variable that needs change is performance. In order for levels of institutional trust to increase institutional performance needs to change so that it fits better with people's preferences (Hall and Taylor, 1996). The strength of the rational choice view is its explanation of why institutions continue to exist. It is claimed that this is because the institution succeeds in delivering the benefits individuals want (ibid.) and will therefore also gain more trust. Both historical and sociological institutionalism rely on an inductive approach to the question of how institutions emerge, but this theory comes to short when explaining change and persistence (ibid.).

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1989) offer a valid contribution to institutional change in their book "*Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*". They view institutions as a source of order and stability, but state that even though institutions encode experiences into standard procedures of action, professional and practical rules and identities they do not necessarily reflect intelligence (March and Olsen, 1989). Nor does it automatically mean that institutions that do not adapt precisely and immediately will fail (ibid.). Their main point is that most attempts to reform political institutions are unsuccessful in terms of achieving what was intended. However, these processes do make change possible and it makes talking about the justifications and mechanisms of change useful (ibid.). It is quite obvious that institutions and the rules and norms within them cannot last forever; they will not always be applicable to society. Through time it will become necessary to diverge from the rules and slowly adjust to the changes in the surrounding society. These much needed adjustment periods can be long and exhausting and often the conflicting and inefficient solutions survive. In some cases, the institutions will rather try to change the society they are a part of than adapt to it (ibid.). The historical approach to institutions claim that this theory is particularly efficient based on that history changes quickly and inevitably towards an outcome greatly influenced by the environment. This assumes that regardless of the process or the time path of history the

outcomes will result in an equilibrium between institutions and the society they are a part of (March and Olsen, 1989). This, of course, will not always be the case as this would require a perfectly stable environment and instant adaption from institutions. There is likely to always be a certain degree of mismatch between the rate at which the environment changes and the institutions adapt (ibid.).

#### *2.2.5 Dependent Variable – Institutional Trust*

The former discussion has proved the importance of trust in a society as well as it is a crucial part of studying institutions, democracy, social capital and civil society. In addition, studying trust and its origins is vital for the generation of these factors in society. We must know what variables generates trust so that increased trust can be achieved. Trust is without a doubt an essentially contested concept and there are a number of definitions as well as several synonyms. I chose to rely on Newton's (2001) definition: "*a belief that others, at worst, will not knowingly or willingly do you harm, and at best, will act in your interest*", which I believe can be transferred to institutional trust. There are many schools of thought regarding what leads to trust both among individuals and towards the government. It is natural to believe that our trust in government will rely on records of how they have performed in the past. High political trust will usually be a sign of an efficient, effective and democratic government, while low trust can be a result of government's failure to deliver public services (Van De Walle and Six, 2014). There is also reason to believe that social and cultural factors will play in on how individuals trust government and also amongst each other. The specific theories of trust will be reviewed below. The belief that a certain level of distrust is needed in order to guarantee control and that too much trust will lead to naivety amongst citizens can be interesting in African terms as political fear, loyalty and little experience with a full liberal democracy can result in high levels of trust. The control factor will in this case be absent.

This is the main reason that institutional trust was chosen as my dependent variable as this is a factor in society that needs to be explained further. Although there have been a number of studies within the field of trust they lack focus on the African countries. This is something that needs attention and I have therefore chosen Botswana and Tanzania as the cases for comparison in my study. I want to find out how trust in public institutions differs in these two countries and what factors influences trust in either negative or positive ways.

In my study I will focus on institutional trust as I want to study citizen's trust towards the public institutions. This will be operationalized through the question in the Afrobarometer

survey concerning the respondent's trust in a number of public institutions. I could have chosen to combine this with other ways of measuring individuals' trust in the government. For instance, by looking at in what degree people are willing to pay taxes as this would show to what degree people are willing to transfer their own earnings to the state. We can also look at the willingness to report crimes to the police as this could indicate to what extent people have faith in the police and investigation system. I have however, chosen to only focus on the institutional trust question. This has been converted into a trust index in my analysis and is merged together of the respondents' answers to the question: *How much trust do you have in the following?* the President, the parliament, the national/independent electoral commission, the Botswana or Tanzania revenue authority, the local government council, the ruling party, the opposition political parties, the police, the army, courts of law and in Tanzania also the prevention and combating of corruption bureau. The reason for merging these into one variable is that it will be easier to operate within the analyses and simpler to read, but I have included the descriptive statistics for each individual institution.

One problem that follows the merging of trust levels in regard to these various institutions is that there will be no division between the representational institutions, like the President and the Parliament, and the implementation institutions, like the police and court of law. According to Rothstein and Stolle (2008) the theoretical difference between this is that for the representational institutions the main task is to be partisan. The political parties and the President in power are supposed to implement the political ideologies of their party, individuals who support these ideologies will therefore likely have more trust in these institutions than individuals with opposing meanings (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Trust in the legal and administrative branches of the government however are believed to be more equally spread amongst the population. This is because civil servants, judges and police treat people evenly and impartially, or at least they should. Another reason is that these institutions identify and punish those who live outside the law, generally those who cannot be trusted (ibid.). The latter category is consequently thought to have a stronger correlation with general trust levels than the former category. As all the institutions will be merged in this case we might therefore not see a particularly strong correlation between generalized trust and institutional trust.

In terms of how and whom respondents trust we need to see how the independent variables effect trust levels. Strategic trust can be defined from looking at policy performance and how the government's performance will affect people's trust. Moralistic trust can be related to the general trust in public institutions, which in turn is connected to generalized trust and if individuals feel that people in general can be trusted. Particularized trust on the other hand, will



be of greater interest in regard to the independent variable concerning social capital. As this is trust only in people that you know it might be interesting to see if respondents who are part of a trusting social environment will have greater trust in the public institutions.

*H<sub>1</sub>: In general, institutional trust may be higher in Botswana than in Tanzania*

Botswana is one of the most successful countries in Africa and has had great economic progress over the last few decades. Their annual growth rate is of over 7 percent (if we exclude the negative growth in 2009 (-7.7 percent)) (Worldbank, 2016) and the national poverty rates have dropped from 47 percent in 1993 to 19 percent in 2015 (UNDP, 2015). This is in part due to functioning institutions and political programs as well as low corruption rates. According to the performance-based theory of trust we have reason to believe that this will generate a trusting population as the theory states that the respondents who report that they are happy with the performance of the government will also show more trust. The societal theory, which states that the success of a country will have a positive effect on trust, also gives ground for this hypothesis. On the other hand, Botswana is still battling high poverty rates which can be a sign that the economic progress has not benefited the general population. As the theory of success and well-being is positively related to trust this may cause institutional trust to not be that high after all. Tanzania however, has not achieved the same levels of development as Botswana, in spite of their average annual economic growth of around 6 percent between 2006 and 2012 (Worldbank, 2016). The government is still struggling in many areas, like with high corruption levels and high poverty rates. As 43 percent of the population is living in extreme poverty<sup>2</sup> (Millenium Development Goals Indicators, 2015) and 28 percent below the national poverty lines (Worldbank, 2016), it is likely that we will see lower levels of trust here. Since neither the economic success of the country nor of the individuals is particularly high, institutional trust may be lower in Tanzania than in Botswana. However, previous findings show that Tanzania has rather high levels of institutional trust, which could be due to loyalty, political fear and unawareness of ones rights and how a liberal-democracy is supposed to function. In addition, the relative political capacity seems to be better in Tanzania than in Botswana, which could lead to higher levels of trust (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011).

It is also believed that trust is easier achieved in homogenous countries than in heterogeneous countries, I therefore have yet another reason to expect that levels of trust is likely to be higher in Botswana. The findings and theories point in somewhat opposite

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<sup>2</sup> extreme poverty is defined as living for under \$ 1.25 (PPP) per day

directions, but I chose to rely on the theories and I therefore expect levels of institutional trust to be higher in Botswana than in Tanzania.

### 2.3 Theories of Institutional Trust

Where, how and why trust occurs are questions that have triggered a debate amongst scholars in the field of trust in the recent decades (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009). Generally speaking, we can say that trust stems from either personal predispositions and concrete experiences of trustworthiness in social interaction or on the other side, experience and evaluation of a situation and performance (ibid.). This can be divided into two main theories; institutional or performance-based theory and cultural theories (Lühiste, 2006). The common factor for these theories is that trust is something that is grounded in some form of experience (Mishler and Rose, 2001). When this experience is acquired, which experiences are most relevant and how long the lessons of trust are likely to last, however, are points where the two theories differ (ibid.). In terms of trust in developing countries it is important to acknowledge what effect culture and traditional norms and values will have on peoples trust in public institutions, public office holders and civil servants (Jamil and Askvik, 2016). These two theories and their determinant factors are displayed in figure 2.1 below.

Figure 2.1: Mishler and Rose's (2001:34) competing theories of the origins of institutional trust combined with Newton and Delhey's (2003) theories of cultural trust

	<b>Cultural and/or Exogenous Theories</b>	<b>Institutional and/or Endogenous Theories</b>
<b>Micro-Level</b>	<u>Individual socialization</u> - personality theory - theory of success and well-being	Individual evaluations of performance
<b>Macro-Level</b>	<u>National culture</u> - voluntary organization - social networks theory - community theory - societal theory	Government performance

Personal predispositions mean qualities that are either innate or acquired early in life and this can result in generalized trust. Experience of trustworthiness builds on an evaluation of the social environment one is a part of and results in particularized trust. The particularized form of trust has strong ties to rational choice theory as individuals in this case would need information on the trustee in order to make a decision on whether or not to trust him or her. Getting this information implies that there is already a relationship and an interaction with past experiences to draw from (Mishler and Rose, 2001). The relationship will in most cases be mutual and in both party's interest to maintain, meaning that trustworthy behavior is encouraged. As most people are part of bigger social networks this trustworthy behavior and trusting relationship can have repercussions to other members of the network. This particularized form of trust naturally only applies to people you know. The rational choice theory approach cannot be used in trusting strangers as we know nothing about them. In these cases Eric Uslaner (1999) amongst others turn to the personal predispositions one has for trusting people in general. Trust in this case will be based on optimism, worldview and outlook on life and not so much on experiences. Negative experiences will therefore not change one's trust-patterns (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009). But if you are a constant victim of betrayed trust would not your outlook on life and optimism change? How can you continue to trust people if no one ever reciprocates the trust? Robert Putnam (Putnam, 2000) states that also trust in strangers is based on experience. If you are a part of a trusting social network and in general have positive experiences surrounding trust you will likely also trust strangers, but negative experiences will result in the opposite. Others again rely on a top-down, state-centered approach in explaining trust. In this view, trust is seen as something that is derived from institutions and organizations that encourage trustworthy behavior. It is related to generalized trust as it is based on whether there is a general degree of trust amongst individuals in a society (Delhey and Newton, 2003).

How then does trust in public institutions fit into this explanation of trust? On the one side, individuals do not have any personal relation to any of the public institutions and the two do not interact as closely as two individuals would, but on the other side, they are not strangers either. The individual has past experience and the institution's performance to draw from so it is natural that this is the basis of the trust, but yet it is not particularized trust. Some however, argue that a positive attitude will result in trust in government even though we do have the information we need to make an informed decision unlike when we choose to trust a stranger. The trust relationship between an individual and a public institution is largely asymmetric. The trustier knows the trustee, but not the other way around. Both parties are also dependent of the

trusting relation, but in different ways; the trustees in order to get the wanted and needed good and services, and the trustee in order to stay in power.

In relation to how and why trust occurs comes the question of causality between social and political trust. This is a constant debate in the field. Does a strong social capital and trust amongst citizens generate trust to public institutions or do reliable and trustworthy institutions generate trust to the public? And do people take part in their local community and voluntary groups because they are naturally trusting or do they become more trusting because of this membership? Do people have more success in life because they are trusting or do they trust because of their success? Two important implications about cause and effect can be made here (Delhey and Newton, 2003). First, we need to look at the correlations between trust as a dependent variable and several independent variables. Only if there is a correlation between two of the variables we need to try to find the cause and effect. Secondly, there is no one way to determine the direction of the effect. We need to study each correlation separately in regard to what variables we are looking at (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Common sense is a good tool here. If there is a correlation, what cause-effect direction makes the most sense? Developing countries will often display low levels of trust in public institutions due to poor performance and bad governance. The correlation between governance factors and trust gives support to the performance-based theory stating that people will trust public institutions based on how they perform. If low institutional performance however, generates low trust this will also affect the factors in the cultural theory of trust, which states that trust is something that we obtain from several societal factors like socialization, upbringing and social networks.

The cultural approach states that people will be naturally trusting (or distrusting) and if this is the case it can lead to more efficiency in market transactions. This will in turn generate more efficient economic outcomes and better functioning institutions as trust might provide some sort of lubricant for interaction between parties (Lee, 2013). On the other hand, if public institutions are free and fair and well-functioning and they perform according to people's needs and expectations this will lead to trust from the citizens. The fact that people will have greater trust towards the government might also lead to more trust between people. Trust is in this case a consequence, not a cause of good performance (ibid.). We still lack further knowledge on what variables determines trust and this continues to be of great interest to scientists.

William Mishler and Richard Rose (2001) present a lifetime learning model to trust where institutional and cultural theories can be seen in relation to one another when looking at both early-life socialization and adult learning. The model states that the cultural theory expects

that social trust acquired when young through youthful and pre-political experiences will later be transferred to trust in institutions. Adult experiences will either support or challenge the opinions developed as young causing trust preferences to change or stay the same. In established democracies with well-functioning and stable institutions the initial opinions are likely to be confirmed causing the trust relationship between individuals and public institutions to stay the same over time (Mishler and Rose, 2001). A situation like this will cause cultural and institutional expectation for trust to coincide. This however is not likely to happen in newer democracies where the political and economic institutions have undergone major changes in recent times, like for instance in Botswana and Tanzania. In cases where political trust is likely to be unstable over time we might find that cultural and institutional theories clash in their predictions. From this perspective the discussion between the cultural and institutional theories boils down to an empirical debate over what is most important of early-life or later-life experiences (ibid.). If we assume that individuals will distinguish clearly between past regimes and institutional practices and those of today, we have reason to believe that the later-life experiences and present institutional performance will explain more of political trust than cultural factors will. However, in a transitioning phase traces of both early-life and later-life experiences can be found, which may cause some paradoxes in the results. According to Askvik (2010) it will take time before people abandon their previous beliefs and perceptions, hence the cultural theories of change. Stronger signs of performance-based trust and weaker support for culturally based trust will become more apparent the longer the new regime has been in place (Askvik, 2010).

### *2.3.1 Independent Variables*

In sociological theory determinants of trust can be divided into four categories; civil society, institutional quality, culture and values, and demographic homogeneity (Gleave et al., 2012:212). Active participation in civil society will teach individuals the signs and rules used to judge the trustworthiness of others. They will learn from past experiences and develop expectations for how others will behave and act (ibid.). Institutional quality refers to in which degree the government succeeds in providing for its citizens and express trustworthy behavior. Low levels of trust on the other hand is generated from the opposite conditions (corruption and unfair or partial regimes). The culture and values determinant claim that high trust can be a result of an optimistic outlook, strong moral attitudes, and egalitarian values. Demographic homogeneity's relation with trust means that it is more likely that people who share some basic characteristics are more likely to trust each other. Hence, trust will be harder to achieve amongst

people across different ethnic groups, religions, and classes (ibid.). Culture and values and demographic homogeneity naturally fall under the cultural theories. Civil society is also in large part within cultural theories, though could also be linked to institutional theory as it relies on the trustworthiness of others. Institutional quality is of course part of institutional theory. Based on the two main theories of institutional trust I have developed the following categories of independent variables. Socio-demographic factors and social capital are linked to cultural theories of trust, while transparency, democratic satisfaction and policy performance are linked to institutional theories. The specific theories and the independent variables will be outlined further in below.

## **2.4 Cultural Theories**

The cultural theories of trust differ from the institutional theories mainly because they discard all political factors in the trust relationship between individuals and public institutions. It is in many ways closely related to generalized trust. It is exogenous in nature as trust in public institutions is caused by factors unrelated to the institutions (Mishler and Rose, 2001). We can divide this into trust that stems from individual factors like experience and upbringing and trust from societal and national factors (Lühiste, 2006). If people generally trust others they are believed to also trust the government and public institutions. Cultural theories of trust can be divided into macro and micro distinctions. The macro distinction emphasizes the standardizing trends of national traditions and makes little room for variations in trust among individuals within societies. The micro distinction on the other hand, focuses on the differences in socialization experiences as a reason for variation in political trust both within and between societies (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Some might even argue that institutional trust in this perspective is just another aspect of social trust (Lühiste, 2006). If political trust is a result of social norms and patterns, change in institutional trust in order to generate increased trust will, as mentioned above, be a long process. When political trust is path dependent it can take decades or generations before a trusting relationship between citizens and institutions can be developed (Mishler and Rose, 2001).

Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton (2003) defines six culturally based theories of trust in their article "*Who trusts? The origins of social trust in seven societies*". Two of these theories are within the individual approach at the micro level of trust, whilst the other four are within the societal approach at the macro level. The individual approach can be divided into personality theory and the theory of success and well-being. The societal approach consists of voluntary organization theory, social networks theory, community theory and societal theory

(Delhey and Newton, 2003). Even though these theories have not gained the most support in previous studies, I have decided to include them as a contrast to the institutional theory, in an attempt to explain the variables that are not directly connected to the institutions.

#### *2.4.1 The Individual Approach*

Personality theory argues that social trust is something that we learn as children and is a part of our upbringing. This trust is also influenced by personality characteristics such as optimism and a belief that people can live peacefully together by co-operating for the benefit of all (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Even though acquired early in life the trusting or distrusting relationship can change to some degree throughout life due to more experience. The lessons you learn early on are either confirmed or confronted as you get older, in addition it is likely that you develop a more critical and nuanced evaluation of the political system and its performance which can change your trusting preferences (Mishler and Rose, 2001). In authoritarian cultures these values will likely impact one's socialization. The authoritarian values in society will be transferred to relations in homes, at school and in religious settings and become visible in the parent-children relationships as well as in the teacher-student relationships (Ma and Yang, 2014, Jamil and Askvik, 2016). This will result in a great power distance between authorities and "normal" people causing them to be less critical and accept, respect and support all kinds of rule. High degrees of loyalty towards the government will likely lead to more trust.

The second theory within the individual approach is associated with success and well-being and states that the less you have the less likely you will be to take risks because you cannot afford to lose the little that you have. Richer people will lose comparatively less if their trust is betrayed and is therefore much more willing to take risks (Delhey and Newton, 2003). This again leads to the fact that the rich become richer and the poor will stay poor. In studies mostly conducted in Western countries using the World Value Surveys and the American General Social Surveys these theories have often been supported. Those who have mostly positive experiences throughout life come off as more trusting than the ones having to battle crime, violence, divorce, discrimination, unemployment and social excursion (ibid.). Roger Mayer's (1995) specific and critical definition of trust can be related to this: *"the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustier, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party"*. Vulnerability indicates that there is something of

importance that can be lost, which again means taking risks. Trust is the willingness to take risks, not taking risks itself (Mayer et al., 1995). The willingness to take this risk can be linked to people's success in life.

#### *2.4.1.1 Socio-demographic factors*

Personality theory and the theory of success and well-being leads to the socio-demographic category of independent variables. This includes age, gender, economic prosperity, education and tribe. There is a slight disagreement amongst scholars about whether socio-demographic factors have anything to say in terms of who and how people trust, I do however choose to include them as I see them as rather relevant. As mentioned above ethnicity may be a factor in determining particularized trust at the cost of generalized trust. This can be seen in regard to social capital discussed further down, but I chose to study if there is any difference in trust between ethnic groups and if this has a positive or negative effect on institutional trust. We might for instance find that groups that have been discriminated or suppressed by the government in the past is likely to show lower levels of political trust (Gleave et al., 2012). It is natural to believe that experience will affect how and who people trust, which makes education and age to be relevant factors. Studies conducted in Europe show that the more education people have the more trusting they will be (Christensen and Læg Reid, 2005, Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). This can imply that knowledge and experience about society, government and political system leads to more trust. However, it is important to note that this experience can also lead to less trust due to negative experiences or knowledge, like corruption and failures in government. This is for instance the finding in Lühiste's (2006) study. According to the theory of success and well-being the more success you have financially and professionally the more you trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003). There is a natural connection between education, occupation and your economic prosperity as one is likely to lead to the other. We have also seen that there can be certain differences in institutional trust between genders, therefore this can be interesting to study further (Christensen and Læg Reid, 2005, Lühiste, 2006). Societal theory (explained further down) also states that low ethnic diversity and economic prosperity as well as equal rights are important in order to generate trust. This theory might border to both social capital variables and performance-based theory, but as these are individual factors I choose to include it here.

Success in society in general can lead to success and well-being for individuals and we can see that both these theories also gain support. Societal conditions are strongest related to trust and we can see a correlation between the development of the countries in the study and



their levels of trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003). This is a natural and expected connection as higher levels of development is most likely a proof that the government and public institutions are performing their tasks as expected and providing for its citizens which will lead to a more trusting population. However, a recurring problem in developing countries, and also in Botswana and Tanzania, is that the government does not manage to have the economic growth benefit the population. Therefore, large parts of the population will stay poor, even though there is great progress for the country as a whole.

Subjective measures of success and well-being (satisfaction with life and living standards) are more important than objective ones (income, occupation, living standard). One explanation for this can be that the subjective measures will most likely be in comparison to what one used to have and what others have, whilst the objective measures will compare to general standards of living and income etc. in the country. Steinar Askvik (2008) studies this in the context of South Africa post-apartheid and seeks to see if living standards has any effect on institutional trust. He does indeed find a strong correlation between how standards of living have changed over the past 12 months and trust in public institutions (Askvik, 2008).

The personality theory is hard to test and the best way to test it using my variables is to see if there is any effect from the variables that change over time, like age, education and living standards. It does however not receive a lot of support in Delhey's and Newton's (2003) study which agrees with Mishler and Rose's opinion that adult experiences are more important for trust than early-life socialization. It is also hard to believe that a positive outlook on life and belief that people will cooperate peacefully for the benefit of all is solely based on personality. One will likely only employ this view after positive experiences. Hutchison and Johnson (2011) note that demographic characteristics have little influence on political trust which may suggest that citizens trust in government is largely based on its performance and less on individual factors. Many studies on the field of trust however have been conducted with data from the World Value Surveys where most African countries are not represented, with the consequence being few studies on trust in an African context. The results from many previous studies might therefore differ from European or Western countries to African countries. Nevertheless, other studies (Herrerros and Criado, 2008, Paxton, 2007) show that there is a positive link between socio-demographic factors, such as age and education, and trust whilst social networks and discrimination may be seen as a hindering for trust to develop (Gleave et al., 2012). Other studies however, show the exact opposite results. Socio-demographic factors have little or nothing to say, while social networks seem to be of significant importance (Delhey and Newton, 2003). This is also the finding in Ishtiaq Jamil and Steinar Askvik's (2015) study on citizens

trust in political and public institutions in Nepal and Bangladesh were membership in different societal groups has a positive effect on institutional trust.

Kadri Lühiste (2006) includes a few control variables in his study, these being partisan support and ethnicity as well as some socio-demographic factors. Individuals supporting the party in power show greater signs of trust than ones that support opposing parties (ibid.). The study also shows that ethnic minorities have less trust in government and education is negatively correlated to trust, while men show less trust than women (Lühiste, 2006).

The values for survey questions<sup>3</sup> regarding age and gender are self-explanatory, while the one for education will consist of the question regarding respondent's education level ranging from 0 to 9. In the analysis these levels will be combined into fewer groups: those with no formal schooling, those who have attended or completed primary school, attended or completed secondary school and attended or completed a university degree. Economic prosperity will consist of the question regarding the respondent's living conditions as I see this as a valid measure for their financial stand. The answers here ranges from very bad (1) to very good (5). In the analysis these will be combined into either good or bad. I must note that the answer respondents give to this question is a subjective measure. The values for the question on tribe are given only in order to separate them. As there is a large number of ethnic groups I will focus mainly on the three largest ones. In the regression analysis I have created dummy variables from these three and therefore not included tribe as a whole as this would be too extensive.

*H<sub>2.1</sub>: Age may only have a little effect on institutional trust*

According to the personality theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003) trust is something that you take with you from your up-bringing and early socialization therefore how you trust will not change much as you get older and the effect of this variable will therefore be small if not insignificant. In addition, it is believed that the performance and functioning of public institutions will affect people randomly, independent of age for instance.

*H<sub>2.2</sub>: I do not expect gender to have any significant effect on institutional trust*

Lühiste (2006) have found that men are less trusting than women, but other studies have not found any evidence for any effect from gender on institutional trust. The various cultural theories also suggest that trust would appear randomly amongst men and women. Therefore, I expect no effect from gender on institutional trust.

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<sup>3</sup> All the survey questions I have used in this study are shown in Appendix 1

*H<sub>2.3</sub>: Education may have a negative effect on institutional trust*

In general, the effect of socio-demographic variables, including education, is quite small, but some studies (Lühiste, 2006, Christensen and Læg Reid, 2005, Herreros and Criado, 2008) find that education has an effect. The positive correlations however are mostly found in Western societies. Lühiste (2006) on the other hand, finds a negative effect from education on institutional trust in his study. The more education you have the more critically you think and you will likely also have more knowledge about the political system, democracy and you own rights. Therefore, a higher educated person will easier recognize when the government does not perform and will not deserve to be trusted. The loyalty and blind trust might therefore not be as apparent amongst those with higher education.

*H<sub>2.4</sub>: Economic prosperity may be positively related to trust as success and well-being can lead to a more trusting attitude*

The theory of success and well-being tells us that people who have more success in life will trust a lot easier. Living standards, as a measure of financial stand, can work as a measure for success. Based on this it is natural to believe that those with higher economic prosperity and better living conditions will trust slightly more. Previous findings (Askvik, 2008) have also shown an effect from this variable on institutional trust as better living standards is a sign of success in society in general which again can be said to be a consequence of high performance by the government.

*H<sub>2.5</sub>: Tribe will likely have a positive effect on trust*

In Tanzania there are a large number of ethnic groups, meaning that none will be particularly large or dominating. If, in addition to this they are all treated fairly by the government this will likely affect institutional trust levels positively. In Botswana the Tswana is the dominating tribe, while there are a few other smaller ethnic groups. This asymmetry in society could cause conflicts which in turn could affect trust negatively, but if the conflicts are between the groups and not with the government it may not affect trust levels.

#### *2.4.2 The Societal Approach*

At the macro-level of the cultural theory I have placed those of Delhey and Newton's sub-theories that can be related to national culture; social networks theory, community theory, voluntary organization theory and state-centered theory. All these theories can be related to

social capital and the main idea is that civic associationism and generalized trust will lead to more cooperation between individuals, both within and across ethnic groups. It is believed that this in turn will make the government more democratic and efficient (Jamil and Askvik, 2016). The societal approach builds on the thought that trust is something we gain from a trusting culture that individuals participate in, contribute to, or benefit from (Delhey and Newton, 2003).

The “top-down”, state-centered theory considers societal factors such as satisfaction with democratic institutions like the welfare and legal systems, political and economic prosperity as well as access to these goods for the population. In addition, level of political freedom, social conflicts and public safety are important factors. The greater the success of the country and equality between the population the more trusting the people will be (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Both social and institutional trust levels are found to be higher in countries with low levels of social division, measured by income equality and ethnic homogeneity (Knack and Keefer, 1997). This theory is naturally also connected to institutional theory and can be used to explain the effect of some of the variables categorized under institutional and performance-based theory.

The voluntary organization theory is closely related to social capital and states that a society built up of many and varied voluntary organizations and associations will likely have higher levels of social trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003). By participating in voluntary organizations in your community you learn the patterns of trust, reciprocity, cooperation, empathy for others, and you understand the importance of working together for the common interest and common good (Delhey and Newton, 2003). This theory has however, received some criticism due to little evidence theoretically and empirically. Marc Hooghe (2003), amongst others, claims that *“there is no indication whatsoever that interaction with other group members would automatically lead to the development of a more socially oriented value pattern, to a rise in trust levels, or to abandoning prejudices”*.

One theory that gains greater support is the one of social networks. This claims that it is the everyday social interactions with friends, family and colleagues that shapes and generates social trust. This also includes smaller groups and networks formed out of mutual interest or benefit for its members, for instance car pools, book clubs or local action groups (Delhey and Newton, 2003). The social networks theory though, can in certain aspects be related to the voluntary organization theory as the social networks of cooperation is largely based on voluntarism and mutual benefits. In addition, both these theories are vital in regard to social capital, but the social networks theory might have a broader range and is therefore the one that has gained greater acceptance.

The final theory in this group is community theory which focuses on the characteristics of a society, like the size of the city or town, satisfaction with the community and safety, rather than the networks between the people in it (Delhey and Newton, 2003). It is often found that social trust is higher in smaller towns and suburbs than larger cities. This theory has a “bottom-up” approach and is concentrated around the community separately from the country or state as a whole. This theory will however not be included specifically in this study.

#### 2.4.2.1 Social Capital<sup>4</sup>

The four theories within the societal approach are the basis for my second category of independent variables: social capital. General trust indicators will be of importance as well as the respondent’s participation in community and voluntary groups as well as religious groups. Also particularized trust will be included with questions regarding trust in relatives, neighbors and others they know. Generalized versus particularized trust could indicate whether people’s “radius’ of trust” are wide or narrow. In Tanzania, where there is a large number of ethnic groups, high particularized trust and low generalized trust would mean that an individual’s radius of trust would not be very large. In Botswana on the other hand, the ethnic groups are fewer and larger, therefore the radius’ of trust might be bigger and the difference between generalized and particularized trust might not be so big and this can effectively mean that there is higher level of general trust. Low trust between ethnic groups, although not necessarily distrust, can still cause conflicts in society. And of most importance in this context: how does this effect institutional trust?

Social capital has been a concept of large debate in social science since it again became a part of the social scientist terminology in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Most definitions, nevertheless, include trust, cooperative benefits and the value of social networks. James Coleman defines the concept quite narrowly by saying that social capital refers to: “*people’s ability to work together in groups*” (Fukuyama, 2002:23). I however prefer Robert Putnam’s definition: “*features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit*” (Putnam, 1995:2). It has also become widely acknowledged that social capital is essential for both a stable liberal democracy and economic development (Fukuyama, 2001) and since trust is vital for social capital to occur I find it interesting to include this variables within this category in my study. Social capital stems from

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<sup>4</sup> Parts of this section is taken from my AORG 323 research field paper of spring 2015

religion, traditions, shared historical experiences and cultural norms (Fukuyama, 2001). It can therefore be natural to believe that in societies with low ethnic diversity, like Botswana, social capital will be stronger and trust between people will be greater because people share religion, traditions and cultures. In Tanzania however, ethnic diversity is high and therefore we might see lower degrees of trust and social capital.

Achieving mutual goals requires social networks and social organization. These networks rely on trust between individuals. In relation to this Robert Putnam (2000) introduces us to two concepts, bonding and bridging, within social capital in his book *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. Bonding social capital refers to networks within socially homogenous groups. This would be relations with family, friends and neighbors. These types of networks are valuable when it comes to working for collective needs, as people in these groups are likely to have the same interests and for this reason the connections are believed to come rather naturally. It is also valuable as it seeks to bring together oppressed and marginalized groups to work for their collective needs and these type of relations can also provide safety to its members as it will protect them from external threats (Putnam, 2000). A way of avoiding these threats will be to build networks of trust between them. This is where the concept of bridging becomes helpful. Bridging social capital means networks between socially heterogeneous groups, ties that are slightly more distant, like those with workmates and acquaintances (ibid.). These networks can benefit from linking social capital by establishing ties with those outside one's immediate group of contacts. In this way they can exchange ideas, information and innovation as well as coming to agreements regarding their diverse interests. Bridging is undoubtedly more challenging than bonding since it relies on trust between groups. Successful bridging relies on the degree of trust. If the degree of trust is high the "radius of trust" will expand, but if trust is not apparent the wide variety of heterogeneous groups is likely to be a hinder for democracy as bridging can help create an inclusive institutional structure which is democratic in nature. As this is not possible when only bonding takes place, bridging is absolutely essential in establishing the institutions we need for a functioning democracy (Putnam, 2000).

The "radius of trust" refers to the circle of people for whom the shared norms and values apply (Fukuyama, 2001). The radius of trust can expand to apply to people outside the group if the social capital of the group produces positive externalities. In other cases the radius of trust may not even include all members of the group, this is often true for larger organizations where mutual norms, values and rules may only apply to a specific group within the group, for instance the leadership (Fukuyama, 2001). In less developed and traditional societies, the radius of trust is usually small as social cooperation, or informal institutions, are based on traditional values,

norms and ethnicities. There is usually little trust between groups and the externalities are often negative. Taking part in voluntary organization and various community groups can be a way of expanding one's radius of trust and achieve higher levels of both particularized and generalized trust in society.

In Delhey and Newton's (Delhey and Newton, 2003) study however, voluntary organization theory does not receive a lot of praise, which is in tone with the debate around whether this is positively related to trust and a strong social capital or not. Numbers from previous Afrobarometer surveys conducted in several African countries show that 74 percent of the respondents say that they take part in at least one voluntary organization (Kryzanek, 2009:2). Even by world standards these numbers are high. Interpersonal trust however, receives relatively low scores, with almost 80 percent claiming that others generally cannot be trusted (ibid.). As trust is seen as a necessary factor in voluntary organization this is a rather contradicting finding. It is hard to imagine people working together for a common goal without trusting each other.

Ann Pawlik Kryzanek (2009) has studied political participation within a social trust framework in the new democracies of South Africa and Botswana. These countries are chosen because they are the two most successful sub-Saharan African countries with functioning institutions and economic progress. The distinguishing factor is that Botswana is a homogenous country with few ethnic groups, whilst South Africa is a lot more diverse. This is also the main difference between the two countries in my study, but I have chosen one rather unsuccessful country along with the successful one. Kryzanek's focus is on whether social trust leads to political participation and bridging between ethnic groups. She uses data from the Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 2003. Though her focus is slightly different than mine I find it interesting to look into her findings. African countries have a long tradition for cooperation, but results from 18 countries surveyed by Afrobarometer show that in spite of this voluntary participation, trust between people is very low (ibid.).

One of the factors Kryzanek studies is whether there is a relation between bonding and bridging and if trust is easier established in a homogenous society versus a heterogeneous society. She finds that respondents in Botswana who express bonding social trust also express bridging social trust (ibid.). In the more ethnically diverse South Africa, on the other hand, she has found levels of both bonding and bridging trust to be lower. Higher levels of bonding social trust also seem to be a hindering for political participation in South Africa. Bridging social trust has a rather insignificant effect on political participation. In Botswana however, the high levels of both bridging and bonding social trust are positively correlated with political participation.

Respondents who report higher general trust in others are more likely to be politically active and those who are a part of a society with higher levels of bridging social trust are more likely to have faith in others (Kryzanek, 2009). These findings support the theories of social trust that state that widespread generalized trust is harder to achieve in heterogeneous countries than in homogenous countries. Both bonding and bridging social trust levels are higher in homogenous countries and political participation is therefore also more common here (ibid.).

As political participation is necessary for democracy studies of trust will also contribute to theories about which societies are more likely to succeed in democratic terms. Robert Putnam (1993) states that democratic participation will be more of a struggle in ethnically diverse countries and the findings in Kryzanek's study show that democracy will easier succeed in a cohesive society (Kryzanek, 2009). Kryzanek highlights one aspect of studying homogenous societies. This is the fact that it may be hard to distinguish between bonding and bridging trust as these might go hand in hand. When the majority of the population is of the same ethnic group, that one's neighbor as well as a stranger in a different city is of the same kind, respondents may have difficulties separating the trust relation to these people (Putnam et al., 1993).

Also community theory does quite poorly in Delhey and Newton's (2003) study. In spite of their rejection, community theory does gain support from others. Robert Putnam (2000) dismiss the rejection of the community theory by saying that social trust is greater in smaller towns. Volunteerism, community projects, help and assistance to strangers and those in need is much more common in smaller towns than larger cities. At the same time crime rates are way lower in the smaller cities (Putnam, 2000). The characteristics of voluntary organization theory seem decent enough, but it is hard to believe that these factors alone will generate trust. It might rather be the other way around, that a general level of trust in society will lead to more volunteering citizens. Newton and Norris (2000) draws particular emphasis to the voluntary association and cooperation aspect of the social trust theories. This thought can be dated back to the works of Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill who saw the importance of a functioning social society in order for a democracy to work ideally (Newton and Norris, 2000). The main point of this theory is that individuals' life experience, education, participation in community and involvement in voluntary organizations will generate social trust and an understanding of the importance of cooperation which in turn can lead to strong, effective and successful social and political organizations and institutions (Newton and Norris, 2000).

It is important to note that five out of the six countries in Delhey and Newton's study are well developed European countries (maybe with the exception of Hungary and Slovenia)



and the only non-European country is South-Korea, which is also a highly developed country. Their findings may therefore not necessarily be applicable to developing countries in Africa. Not just because of their level of development, but culturally they are also quite different.

The spill-over effect from social trust to political trust has been argued to only be true for established democracies in the West where we clearly see that countries with high social trust also have high political trust. In new democracies and liberal regimes there does not seem to be any correlation between social and political trust, some cases even show a negative correlation (Lühiste, 2006). As I am going to study two relatively new democracies this last note will be of great relevance to me. Botswana though, has a slightly more functioning democracy than Tanzania so I might be able to see some differences in how the two types of trust influence each other. It is also stated that a high level of social capital is a prerequisite for an effective political system which in turn can generate political capital, but a strong social capital will not necessarily lead to strong political capital (Newton, 2001). This theory states that a certain level of generalized, social trust in society is needed in order to generate political trust, but others again claim that a well-functioning government that acts according to expectations will cause a trickle-down effect of trust (ibid.). This is where the question of causality is particularly evident. If low social trust and social capital will not generate any political trust or political capital, and a low functioning government will lead to low trust or even distrust towards the government and also in society in general we find ourselves in a vicious circle it is hard to come out of. This low institutional trust can also act as a hindrance for social cooperation and the development of social capital (Lühiste, 2006). It is hard to imagine that levels of social trust are high, based on the fact that there is an actual reason to trust people, at the same time as levels of political trust is low, or the other way around for that matter.

Pippa Norris and Kenneth Newton (2000) as well as Kadri Lühiste (2006) have all tested the cultural theories in their studies. Norris and Newton have used data from the World Values Surveys for 17 trilateral democracies and tested both theories on an individual as well as a national level. Lühiste (2006) have tested the theories on an individual level in the Baltic countries; Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. He finds that in general trust in political institutions is quite low with an average trust rate being 20 percent. On an individual level Norris and Newton (2000) have found little evidence supporting the cultural theory and the correlation between social and political trust is rather weak. In addition, their findings support those of Delhey and Newton (2003) saying that there is little proof that membership in voluntary

organizations lead to more trusting individuals (Newton and Norris, 2000). One small exception is association with church. Membership in religious organizations might therefore be more important for people's trust in public institutions than membership in other voluntary or community organizations. Lühiste (2006) does however also find evidence that social trust is positively correlated with institutional trust and an increase in social trust will also increase institutional trust. Norris and Newton (2000) only find this correlation on a national level. Here social trust seems to have quite an influence on institutional trust. High levels of social trust have a positive effect on political trust, but this relationship is not mediated by social capital as membership in voluntary organizations for instance is not positively correlated with trust in institutions. At the same time low levels of social trust and social capital is not likely to generate any political trust (Lühiste, 2006). In Lühiste's study the explanatory power of the performance-based model explains 15 percent of the variance in institutional trust and is therefore naturally higher than of the cultural model which only explains 11 percent of the variance (ibid.). The best explanatory power is achieved when we combine the two models. This way we can explain 20 percent of the variance in institutional trust (ibid.).

On the basis of his findings; that there is a strong correlation between social and political trust, Lühiste (2006:493) suggests that new democracies need to strengthen the social trust by *“supporting open and inclusive voluntary organizations and enacting policies that tackle economic inequality”*. This idea contradicts with the findings of social trust theories where we saw that the voluntary organization theory gained little support. Although in this specific context voluntary organizations might be seen in a broader perspective and fall under the concept of social capital and social networks. In order to increase the public's support in government there needs to be more transparency and openness (Lühiste, 2006). As a final point Lühiste (2006) notes that this study does not take into consideration how individuals' evaluation of governmental performance is connected to their expectations and this is an important question for future research (ibid.).

The social capital variable will consist of three questions. The first question asks about the respondent's membership in religious groups and voluntary or community groups. The answers here range from “not a member” (0) or “inactive member” (1) to “active member” (2) and “official leader” (3). The question regarding general trust simply asks if people in general can be trusted (1) or one must be very careful (0). The last question refers to particularized trust and to what degree the respondent trusts his or her neighbors, relatives or other people they know. The answers here range from not at all (0) to a lot (3).

The various studies I have reviewed show slightly different results and several of the cultural theories receive both support and dismissal. I have

*H<sub>3</sub>: Social capital and social trust levels may be higher in Botswana than in Tanzania due to less ethnic diversity, this in turn will affect political trust slightly positive*

According to the social networks theory the building of social networks is vital for achieving trust and building social capital. This will in turn have a positive effect on institutional trust. Although the voluntary organization theory has not gained a lot of support it can be included in the social networks theory and therefore membership in religious or community groups will help in achieving this and will therefore have a positive effect on trust. Social networks and a trusting community is believed to be easier established in a more homogenous society which is in tone with Fukuyama's radius of trust theory and Putnam's bridging and bonding. In the heterogeneous country, Tanzania, particularized trust might be high, but generalized trust levels may be low as a result of the ethnic diversity. In Botswana on the other hand, there are larger and fewer ethnic groups which can result in radius' of trust to be bigger and both particularized and generalized trust to be high. This has also been the case in previous studies, where we see that countries with high ethnic diversity have lower general trust-levels. According to the cultural theory this can have a positive spillover effect on political trust, but previous studies have shown that this is not always the case. Especially in new democracies we can see that there is not always a positive correlation between the two. I do however believe that the institutional trust will be slightly more positively affected by social trust in Botswana than in Tanzania.

### **2.5 Institutional theory**

The main responsibilities of the state and its public institutions are to ensure domestic order and provide the basic material well-being for its citizens as well as protecting its territorial integrity and citizens from internal and external threats (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). The state's legitimacy and trustworthiness relies on whether or not and to what degree it is able to perform these tasks (ibid.). The concepts of political trust and legitimacy are closely related, though legitimacy is more covering for the system of government and politics as a whole whereas trust mostly refers to the politicians and government of the day (ibid.). The performance-based or institutional theory of trust is based on that citizens trust in the state is decided by how well the public institutions perform according to their expectations (ibid.). In

relation to public administration there is reason to believe that a government's efficient, effective and democratic performance leads to high trust amongst the public, whilst low trust is a result of government's failure to deliver public services (Van De Walle and Six, 2014). Citizen's trust in institutions and government can be seen as a measure of how well they perform (Jamil et al., 2013).

Institutional theories is politically endogenous in nature as it sees political trust as a consequence, not a cause, of how the institutions are performing (Mishler and Rose, 2001). The foundation for this theory of institutional trust is quite simply that individuals' trust in public institutions relies on how well the institutions perform according to their expectations and what has been promised (Lühiste, 2006). It is a very rationally based form of trust, but cultural and social influence in early life and upbringing can however shape individual's trust through political socialization and influence from older generations and their trust in institutions. A requirement for this though is as mentioned a continuity and stability in the political regime in the country. Nevertheless, in newer democracies where the change from an undemocratic government to a democratic one is quite recent we might not find this factor to be as apparent (Mishler and Rose, 2001). The political regime and culture people have grown up with is likely not the same as today, therefore it is natural to believe that individuals will base their trust on the actual performance of the institutions today rather than the system itself as this has proven not to be so stable and fair over time.

A new democracy is likely to undergo challenges in its beginning phase due to transitioning's in the political and economic systems as well as little experience with democratic governing (Mishler and Rose, 2001). In this situation performance will likely be low and in some areas also failing. This will, according to the performance-based theory cause low levels of trust (ibid.). An absence of trust in the public institutions that are supposed to implement new democratic principles can also mean low support for the new regime principles (Lühiste, 2006). The consequence of low trust can be less effective functioning of the institutions as well as dissatisfaction with the regime and its performance, institutions and principles. At worst it can challenge regime legitimacy (ibid.). In order for the institutions to gain increased trust they need to perform in several key areas in society, like economic growth and improved healthcare and education systems as well as making sure this benefits all. In addition they need to refrain from activities that are generally perceived as negative, like for instance corruption (Mishler and Rose, 2001). This process of improvement only needs to take a few months or years, which will cause levels of trust to increase rather quickly as opposed to if trust is culturally bound, where change is a slow process stretching over decades and generations (ibid.).

The performance-based theory has both a political and an economic aspect. The political aspect of the performance-based theory refers to how the government performs in terms of fair treatment of citizens, protecting civil liberties and assuring human rights as well as a transparent and effective administration (Mishler and Rose, 2001). If individuals evaluate the institutional performance in these areas to be good they will show greater trust. The economic aspect of the performance-based theory is based on the government's ability to meet economic expectations from the public, both in regard to their personal economy and the national economy (Lühiste, 2006). Satisfying performance in this area will increase trust in government, but here the subjective measures are more important than the objective ones (Lühiste, 2006). This theory has gained support in advanced democracies and post-communist countries, but has yet to be tested further in new democracies (ibid.).

Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris (2000) also rely on this theory in their paper on "*Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture or Performance?*". When institutions perform well and according to citizens needs and expectations they will likely gain trust and support, while poor performance and ineffectiveness will generate low trust or even distrust. In their view this theory dismisses all personal, social and cultural factors for generating trust and is solely based on the thought that individuals trust politicians and public institutions on the background of their performances (Newton and Norris, 2000). This is because political performance, whether good or bad, affects the public randomly, independent of age, education, occupation, gender and religion (ibid.).

Newton and Norris (2000) list three implications for the performance-based theory. First, if the samples are of a relevant size and represent the general public, the research procedures are reliable, and the survey questions are reasonable the results from the surveys are likely to be a good measure of how well the government is performing (ibid.). Second, it suggests that if the public show little trust in institutions the politicians can either lower the public's expectations, by for instance promising less, or improve the effectiveness by delivering more (ibid.). The third implication is that there is a somewhat indirect relationship between political and social trust. This can be explained by the fact that trust is a determinant for social capital and a strong social capital can help strengthen political institutions which in turn will improve governmental performance and they will gain greater trust from the public (Newton and Norris, 2000). The connection between trust on the different levels can also be explained by the fact that like we base our trust in the political system on their performance we also base our trust in other people on how they have behaved and acted in the past (ibid.). This does then mean that there is in many ways a social factor to the performance-based theory after all as

social factors like background, education and age can seem to have an influence on your trust. This is connected to the cultural theory.

The performance-based theory is a systemic model consisting of both a micro and a macro perspective. The macro distinction of the performance-based theory emphasizes the collective performance of the institutions, like economic growth, effectiveness of government and little corruption (Mishler and Rose, 2001). The micro distinction on the other hand, considers the individual's personal preferences and experiences in relation to performance. How they personally have been affected by trust plays a greater role than how the institutions are performing in general (Mishler and Rose, 2001). The model does not predict any relationship between social trust and trust in public institutions on the individual level, but rather at the collective level.

The main factor determining trust in institutions on the individual level is governmental performance which supports the performance-based theory and dismisses the cultural theory (ibid.). In Lühiste's (2006) study we can also see that the performance-based theory is confirmed as the levels of trust correlate with individuals' perception of corruption, protection of human rights and how they experience the general performance (ibid.). The economic aspect of performance also seems to matter as individuals who perceive economic conditions to be good have higher trust in government (ibid.). This is based on individuals' expectations and experience of the economic performance of the government and can be seen in relation to the theory of success and well-being and societal theory. As opposed to cultural theories institutional theories gains support in all studies, on both individual and national level. These studies are for most part conducted in developed countries which means that I should maybe expect somewhat different results in my own study.

### *2.5.1 Transparency*

The first category of independent variables within institutional theories will be regarding the transparency and openness in Botswana and Tanzania. An important part of making democracy work is that citizens have a certain degree of insight in political processes as they are the ones to keep the government in check. If there is openness around the activities and processes in government, it will be harder for government officials to misuse their power in for example corruption or rent seeking activities. The media functions as an information source for the people. The problem though is when it is not free, but rather controlled by the government so that only the positive stories come out. One reason that access to media is chosen

as an indicator is that people get their information about the government's performance through media and this should contribute to shaping their trust in public institutions (Hetherington, 1998). One might think that respondents with access to internet, television, newspapers or radio have a different opinion about the government than respondents without this access. This can be in either a positive or negative direction, depending on the information that comes out.

According to Hutchison and Johnson (2011) the most recurring finding in the studies on political trust is that citizens trust in government is affected positively when the police force, legal system and public bureaucracy act in honesty and are corruption-free. People's perception of corruption in public institutions therefore makes a natural contribution to this variable.

The transparency variable will be indicated by how often the respondent's get news from different mediums and how they perceive corruption. The question regarding their media access asks how often they get news from either radio, television, newspapers or internet and the answers ranges from never (0) to every day (5). The respondents are also asked if they believe that members of several public institutions are involved in corruption. The answers range from none of them (0) to all of them (3). Here I have created an index based on the various institutions in the question: The President and officials in his office, members of parliament, government officials, local government councilors, the police, tax officials and judges and magistrates. The index is created by adding all the variables and their values together before dividing them on the number of institutions, seven.

#### *H<sub>4</sub>: High levels of perceived corruption may lead to low political trust*

The performance-based theory gives reason to believe that respondents who perceive corruption in public institutions to be high also report low trust towards the government. This is natural as corruption is not in line with how individuals would expect public institutions to use their resources. Also, individuals with access to radio, television, internet and newspapers are likely to have less trust in government if the media will inform about corruption and unfaithful public officials. This obviously requires the media to be free and report neutrally and objectively about incidents of corruption.

#### *2.5.2 Democratic Satisfaction*

According to Larry Diamond (2004) democracy includes four key elements: a political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections, active participation from the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life, protection of human rights

for all citizens, and the rule of law, which would apply equally to all citizens. In the survey the respondents are asked which characteristics they find most desirable and Diamond's first point is one factor that is favored by the respondents in both countries. Low levels of corruption are also desired. In Botswana respondents also state that basic needs and job opportunities are important, whilst Tanzanians want freedom of assembly and a free media. What I will focus on for this variable is how satisfied the respondents are with the functioning of democracy and if these principles are taken care of in their country and if they at all regard it as a democracy. I will also add their opinion on the governments problem solving abilities. How does people's satisfaction with the democracy affect trust in public institutions?

Askvik (2008) included democratic satisfaction in his study on institutional trust in post-apartheid South Africa. Using survey data from the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) he found that how individuals perceive the political system in their country and how satisfied they are with the democracy has a strong positive effect on trust in public institutions on a local, provincial and national level (Askvik, 2008). Individuals' opinion about the political system in general is therefore an important variable in determining people's trust. In the study it explains for 46 percent of the variation in institutional trust. The same effect is found in Tom Christensen and Per Læg Reid's (2005) research on trust in government in Norway. In this case satisfaction with democracy has the strongest effect of a number of political, demographic and experiential variables.

This variable will be operationalized through two questions. The first one simply asks how satisfied the respondent is with the democratic functioning in their country. The answers here ranges from "Botswana/Tanzania is not a democracy" (0) and "not at all satisfied" (1) to "very satisfied" (4). The second question asks how likely the respondent thinks it is that the government will solve a given problem within the next five years. The answers range from "not likely" (0) to "very likely" (3). If this variable effects trust levels in any way it can be explained by people's strategic form of trust, they trust people or institutions based on the tasks that they are set to do. If public institutions fail, trust is likely also to be lower. This form of trust can be true also for my next variable.

*H<sub>5</sub>: A positive opinion about democracy may lead to higher political trust*

Respondents who are positive to the democratic functioning of their country and have faith in the government's problem solving abilities are likely to also express greater trust. This is based on the thought that a positive attitude towards the political system should mean that you are satisfied with the performance which according to institutional theory may lead to more



trust. If you have faith in the government's problem-solving abilities, it also suggests that you are satisfied with their performance which again may result in increased trust.

### *2.5.3 Policy Performance*

The category of independent variables that is most directly related to institutional theory is policy performance. Providing the basic needs within healthcare, education, living standards, jobs, electricity, water and sanitation and several other areas is the prime job of the government. How well the government performs in these areas can be a deciding factor for trust generation in the public. This is related to the democracy variable mentioned above, but is more concerned around the performance part rather than the system itself. The respondents are to rate the government's handling of a number of matters, both nationally and locally, from managing the economy, to battling crime and providing a reliable supply of electricity. In addition, the President, the Parliament and the elected local government councilors performance will be included.

The analysis in Askvik's (2008) study on institutional trust in South-Africa in 2006, based on the HSRC survey and the Afrobarometer survey, shows that policy performance has a somewhat effect on how much individuals trust the public institutions. The Afrobarometer analysis shows that only a few of the policy areas have a significant effect on trust in the President and provincial and local governments. The relatively weak explanatory power of the model tells us that policy performance variables only explain 24 percent of the variation in trust in the President, and 15 and 12 percent of the variations in trust in provincial and local governments. The HSRC analysis show a few more significant effects from policy performance variables on trust in national, provincial and local governments, but they are rather weak. The explanatory power of this model is 15, 12 and 11 percent, respectively (Askvik, 2008).

In their study *"Presidential leadership and the resurgence of trust in Government"* Jack Citrin and Donald Philip Green (1986) find that especially the President's performance is important in determining people's trust in government and public institutions. They also note that the President's personal characteristics and charisma plays a role in gaining people's trust. This is explained by the fact that the President is the face of the government and he is the one being portrayed in the media and therefore seen by the public as the main actor (Citrin and Green, 1986). It is also likely that it is easier for people to relate their trust to a specific person rather than to an institution, if the government performs well this success will benefit the President in form of more trust because people associates this success with good leadership. If the government fails to perform, on the other hand, this will be associated with bad leadership

and trust in public institutions will decline. It is natural to believe that signs of low faith in the government in these areas will generate low trust, but is that the case for these two countries?

This variable will consist of two performance indexes, one national and one local, and approval of the President's, the Parliament's and the local governance councilor's performance. The national performance index is merged from how the respondents evaluate how the government is handling the economy, improving living standards for the poor, creating jobs, keeping prices down, narrowing the gap between rich and poor, reducing crime, improving basic health services, addressing educational needs, providing water and sanitation services, ensuring food for everyone, fighting corruption in government, resolving violent crimes between communities, combating HIV/AIDS, maintaining roads and bridging, providing a reliable supply of electricity and empowering women. In Tanzania two additional factors are included; reducing transport accidents such as roads and marines, and managing natural disasters such as flooding and droughts. The local index is merged from the responses on how local governments are maintaining roads, local market places, health standards, keeping the community clean and managing the use of land. Just as the corruption index these indexes have been created by adding the values for all variables and dividing them on the amount of performance-areas, 16/18 and five. The answers to both these questions range from "very badly" (1) to "very well" (4). In the analyses they will for most part be combined into either badly or well. The answers to the questions concerning approval of the President's, the Parliament's and the local governance councilor's performance range from "strongly disapprove" (1) to "strongly approve" (4). In the analysis this will mostly be combined to approve or disapprove.

*H<sub>6</sub>: Respondents expressing higher faith in policy performance may also show greater degree of trust in public institutions*

The basis of the performance-based theory is that if individuals are satisfied with the job the government is doing and feel that they are delivering the required goods and services, individuals will have greater trust in them. We therefore have good reason to believe that those respondents who feel that the government is delivering in the areas that they find important and relevant will also show more trust. I also believe that the respondents in Botswana will show higher levels of faith in policy performance as the country's government has managed to deliver in many areas which has led to their higher development status.

## **2.6 Data**


The datasets I will rely on for my study is provided by Afrobarometer which is a world leading survey-research project. It measures African men and women's attitude towards democracy, economy, governance, civil society and other issues (Afrobarometer, 2016). They collect and publish high quality, reliable quantitative data available to the public. They have conducted a total of 145 surveys in 6 rounds from 1999 to 2015. 36 of the 54 African countries have been surveyed, resulting in the fact that 84 percent of the population in Africa is represented (*ibid.*). Their methods of data collection consist of face-to-face interviews from a standard questionnaire with a randomly selected sample of 1200 to 2400 respondents in each country. A sample size of 1200 respondents allows inferences to the national adult population with a margin error of +/- 2,8 percent with a confidence level of 95 percent, whilst a sample size of 2400 gives us a margin of error of +/- 2,0 percent at a 95 percent confidence level (Afrobarometer, 2016).

They use a national probability sampling method which seeks to give every adult an equal and known chance to be selected for an interview. This method also tries to ensure that people living in geographical areas with a higher population have a proportionally greater chance of being chosen (*ibid.*). Afrobarometer's national partners are responsible for training their interviewers so that they are familiar with the survey methods. Groups of four interviewers travel to the sample area to conduct the interviews under the control of one field supervisor which ensures that the quality of the data that is collected is valid and reliable. Interviews only proceed after the consent of the respondent and the information they give is treated with absolute confidence. After the data is collected it is verified and checked for any incomplete, improperly formatted or inaccurate records by the national partners as well as the core partner data managers and the Afrobarometer data manager. The data is published online along with summaries of the results. In addition, Afrobarometer hold public dissemination events to present the results (*ibid.*). The topics of the questionnaires span over many areas of society and include politics, democracy, governance, economics, poverty, social capital, public services, gender equality and tolerance (*ibid.*). I will use the datasets from round 5, conducted in 2012, for Botswana and Tanzania as the data from round 6 (2015) has not yet been published. The datasets for Botswana has a total of 1200 respondents, whilst the one of Tanzania has 2400 respondents. Given the large sample sizes in both countries and the fact that all social groups and all geographical areas are represented makes this data well suited to generalize from.

## 2.7 Analytical Model

In the model below I have displayed the five different categories of independent variables in my study and the dependent variable, trust in public institutions. Under each category of independent variables, I have listed the different factors included in that variable.

Figure 2.2: Analytical Framework



## **2.8 Summary**

This rather extensive chapter has reviewed the theoretical implications for studying trust in general and institutional trust specifically and the many variables that generates institutional trust. There are mainly two theories we can rely on here. The cultural theory states that trust, both social and political, is something that we take with us from our up-bringing and socialization in addition to it being part of our personality. The institutional theory on the other hand states that trust in institutions is something that is based on their performance. If they act according to individuals' preferences they will gain trust, if not people will either show low trust or even distrust. The different theories in addition to previous studies of trust lead to two categories of independent variables, socio-demographic factors and social capital, within the cultural theory and three categories of independent variables, transparency, democratic satisfaction and policy performance, within institutional theory. The datasets used in this study are collected from Afrobarometer and how I have decided to analyze this data will be presented in the following chapter covering my methodological framework.

## **Chapter Three: Methodological Framework**

### ***3.1 Introduction***

My methodological framework chapter starts with the research approach and design for the study before I discuss why I have chosen a quantitative comparative research method. Next, I explain why I have chosen Botswana and Tanzania as my cases and why these two countries make for a good comparison. I will then turn to how I will go through with the data analyses, including the benefits of descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis in SPSS. As this study is based on data collected by others, a secondary analysis, it has been fundamental to evaluate the quality of the data. I do this by considering Afrobarometer as a source and their methods of data collection, before I look at the reliability and validity of both the data and my own analyses. Finally, I will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of my study as well as ethical aspects I have considered while doing the research.

### ***3.2 Research Approach and Design***

A research approach is a plan for the research, from the first thoughts on the topic to a detailed plan on how one should go through with the data collection, analysis and interpretations. There are three main aspects of a research approach, these are the research problem, the research design and the research methods. The approach to the study is in large part shaped by the nature of the research problem and the issues it undertakes (Creswell, 2014). My research problem concerning trust in public institutions in Botswana and Tanzania lays the ground for a quantitative approach and method. I could also have chosen to rely on a qualitative method or combined the two, but a quantitative method using large samples gives me the opportunity to see the bigger picture and generalize to the larger population. I will however, combine the statistical method with the comparative method. As theories of political trust have been the basis of the hypotheses for my study the research has a deductive approach, meaning that I will test if these theories are valid for patterns of political trust in Botswana and Tanzania.

### ***3.3 Quantitative Comparative Study***

For my research I chose to rely on quantitative data as this is the favorable method when we want to look at larger populations and contribute to statistical generalizations (Grønmo, 2004). We can also see from previous studies that this has been the preferred method of choice by other scientists when studying trust in different societies. The World Values and European

Values surveys have been frequently used for this purpose. The data that I have used however are publicly available datasets and questionnaires from Afrobarometer. In a statistical research the data collected are supposed to reflect that of the population so that it will be possible to generalize the findings to the larger whole. In addition, the samples must be big enough to generalize from. Where the descriptive statistics only gives me the average answer to certain questions and how many respondents have higher education or low living standards, the inferential statistics gives me the opportunity to see the different variables in relation to one another. The correlation analysis shows me if there is any link between the dependent variable and one of the independent variables, while the regression analysis shows me exactly how big effect the different groups of independent variables have on the dependent variable. I will explain the details of these two types of statistical analysis below. The point of looking at the effect of certain independent variables is to see which types or groups of variables explain the variations in trust the best. Statistical analysis also gives me the opportunity to test my hypotheses for the study as well as theories surrounding the field of trust. In order to make sense of the numbers and figures coming out of the analyses, this needs to be related to the real world in order to find logical and valid explanations for the results I get, especially if the results are contradicting to the hypotheses and theories.

Collecting the amount of data needed for a large N study like this is quite time consuming, therefore it is relatively normal to do a secondary analysis like this where you rely on data collected by others. The fact that I have not collected the data myself means that I have had no impact on this process or the selection of respondents. This required me to be extra critical towards Afrobarometer and their methods of data collection. This is discussed further below. One weakness in statistical analysis is that once the data is collected it is not possible to go back and ask any further questions in order to clarify certain issues. It also gave me less flexibility than if I had chosen a qualitative research approach.

Since I chose to study the levels of political trust in both Tanzania and Botswana I combined the statistical study with a comparative study. In many ways all forms of scientific studies are based on comparison as we need to see effects and occurrences in relation to others in order to make some sense of them. We compare the effect of different independent variables and we need to compare the effect in one case with another. There are a few important components to, and good reasons for doing a comparative study. The first is that the cases are carefully selected based on certain qualities that they have as well as the dependent variable we want to study (Moses and Knutsen, 2012). The respondents within my two cases however, have been randomly selected. The important factor here is to recognize why it is important to

compare these exact cases. Why I have chosen Botswana and Tanzania is further discussed below. Another positive component of the comparative method is that it allowed me to see the causal relationships found in the statistical analysis in relation to their natural environment and the actual situation in either Botswana or Tanzania. This can strengthen the results from the correlations and regression models (Moses and Knutsen, 2012). When I see the effect one of my independent variables has on trust for either of the two countries I need to compare it to the effect of this variable in the other country as well as the effect of other independent variables in order to make sense of it. This way it is easier to determine which variables has the strongest effect on trust in Tanzania and Botswana. One important precondition for a comparative study is that the data collected are equivalent, meaning that the respondents must have been asked the same questions and understood the questions in a similar way (Grønmo, 2004). The questionnaires in this research are the same for every country and every respondent, though there may be variations due to local differences when it comes to language, ethnicities and political organization. The limitations or negative sides of a comparative method are that only a limited number of cases can be studied at the same time and there can only be a limited number of variables. This means that we do not get the complete picture as there are others variables and countries we could have included in the research. Generalization should therefore only count for Botswana and Tanzania.

### ***3.4 Why Tanzania and Botswana?***

In my thesis I wanted to compare one relatively successful country, in terms of socio-economic development in Africa, to a country that has had more difficulties with its economic and political progress to see if there were any clear differences in the patterns of trust that can distinguish success from failure. In addition to this, I also wanted one heterogeneous country with a high number of ethnic groups and one homogenous country where the ethnic diversity is low. Botswana and Tanzania seemed to fit these criteria's very well.

#### ***3.4.1 Botswana***

Botswana has long been known for its economic and political success and it is the highest ranked Sub-Saharan African country on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2015). The country gained independence in 1966 and has since gone from being one of the poorest countries on the continent to one of the most successful ones. This has been achieved with a peaceful and stable multi-party democracy, the oldest in Africa, a market-driven economic



growth and smart financial policies as well as low levels of corruption. The development of a good institutional structure has also been relevant (Iimi, 2006). Their main industries are diamonds, cattle and tourism (Kryzanek, 2009) with the mining industry accounting for 40 percent of GDP (Iimi, 2006). A big fear associated with rich natural resources is the Dutch disease or a resource curse, meaning that a rise in this sector will cause a decline in other sectors and the inflow of more foreign currency will diminish the price competitiveness of other goods. Several African countries have experienced this, but Botswana has been able to avoid it (Iimi, 2006). The political institutions in Botswana have gained legitimacy through fair and free elections and oppositional representation in parliament. Voter turnout in the country is also rather high (Kryzanek, 2009). Another major factor that has contributed to the success is the fact that, as opposed to a large number of other African countries, they have been able to avoid a coup d'état. In addition, the country has a well-functioning education and healthcare system, where ninety percent of the kids are enrolled in primary schools and eighty percent of the rural population has access to health care (ibid.). Yet, approximately one out of three people in Botswana are HIV positive and they are struggling with socio-economic inequality. Although GDP per capita is relatively high there are high levels of poverty and unemployment both in the cities and in the rural areas (Globalis, 2014). This shows that the economic growth of the country has not benefited the majority of the population. There have also been indications that President Ian Khama has become more autocratic in his leadership in addition to economic growth slowing down (The Economist, 2014, Worldbank, 2016).

Botswana is one of the top ranked African countries on the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators with a 72.34 percentile rank (Worldbank, 2016). Meaning that Botswana has relatively good governance indicated by voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence and terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. This number coincides with the number presented by the Ibrahim-index (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015), a 74.2 percentile rank. The Mo Ibrahim foundation uses slightly different indicators for measuring governance and these are: safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development. About 2.2 million people live in Botswana and almost 80 percent of them are part of the Tswana people. This makes it a largely homogeneous country (CIA, 2016).

### *3.4.2 Tanzania*

Tanzania, on the other hand, has not experienced the same success since gaining independence in 1961. Their first president Julius Nyerere implemented an independent,

socialist-oriented development strategy. Initially this was a success, but it did not manage to stand against external shocks and internal restrictions and weaknesses throughout the 1970's (Morrissey, 1995). The problematic economic situation forced Tanzania to join numerous other developing countries in implementing the structural adjustment programs introduced by the World Bank. This also involved structural adjustment loans, requiring an economic adjustment including tax reforms, trade liberalizations, privatization and reducing government intervention (ibid.). In order for these programs to be successful there needs to be an administrative and institutional capacity in the country as well as political commitment. In the case of Tanzania, this has been partly achieved and there was a commitment from the government. All in all, structural adjustment programs have been successful and the country has experienced steady economic growth and development over the past decades (Muganda, 2004), but as with most African countries this growth has not benefitted the many and they are still battling high levels of corruption and ineffective bureaucracy. As a result, it is still amongst the poorest and least developed countries on the Human Development Index as it struggles financially, politically and in developmental terms. Nevertheless, as opposed to the majority of other less developed Sub-Saharan African countries it is a relatively peaceful country.

Agriculture accounts for 80 percent of the labor force and 85 percent of the country's exports (CIA, 2016). The financial sector, however has expanded in the previous years due to the establishment of foreign-owned banks (ibid.). On the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators Tanzania scores quite poorly, receiving only a 40,2 percentile rank (Worldbank, 2016). On the Ibrahim-index, however, it scores slightly better with a 56,7 percentile rank. There has recently been found large gas-resources in Tanzania which gives hope for a fast growth in income, more jobs and better social goods (Norad, 2015). The government now faces the challenge to meet the expectations from the people and building a proper institutional framework to handle this. There is great potential to make this situation the turning point for development in Tanzania, but it can also make matters worse. Strong institutions can be seen as a factor for generating trust; does the people of Tanzania have faith in the government in order to have everyone benefit from the natural resources?

Another major factor that differentiates Tanzania from Botswana, and one of the main reasons these two countries are chosen, is that Tanzania has a highly heterogeneous population. The population of approximately 50 million people is a mix of about 130 different ethnic groups with Sukuma being the largest, representing around 16 percent of the population. There are also a large number of ethnic languages in addition to the official languages English and Swahili (CIA, 2016). The religious divide in the country is quite equally spread amongst Christians,

Muslims and traditional religions with approximately one third representing each religion (Globalis, 2014).

It is often believed that the larger the ethnic diversity the lower the trust is, because people tend not to expand their trust-radius to outside what is familiar to them. Is this also the case in Tanzania? And will Botswana's therefore be more trusting? Does economic progress and political success foster trusting citizens and will trust-levels therefore be higher in Botswana than Tanzania? Is the low development a reason for low trust or is low trust the reason that institutions are not functioning? Do low levels of trust lead to low levels of social capital? How does trust vary in a homogenous society versus a heterogenous society? The Scandinavian countries together with Japan are examples of homogenous countries with high levels of social and political trust. Is it so that homogenous countries in terms of ethnicity foster more trust than heterogeneous countries?

*Table 3.1: Statistics over Botswana and Tanzania*

	<b>Botswana</b>	<b>Tanzania</b>
<b>Surface Area (km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	581, 730	947, 300
<b>Population</b>	2, 219, 937	51, 822, 621
<b>GDP</b>	\$ 30.8 (PPP)	\$ 82.2 (PPP)
<b>GDP per capita</b>	\$ 15, 247 (PPP)	\$ 1, 718 (PPP)
<b>Extreme Poverty</b>	13.4 %	43.5 %
<b>National Poverty Line</b>	19.3 %	28.2 %
<b>HDI index/rank</b>	0.698/106	0.521/151
<b>Good Governance</b>	72.34 %	40.2 %
<b>Adult Literacy</b>	86.7 %	67.8 %
<b>Child Mortality</b>	36.3	36.4
<b>Fertility Rate</b>	2.4	4.9
<b>Life Expectancy</b>	64.5	65

Sources: (Worldbank, 2016, UNDP, 2015)

### 3.4.3 Respondent's Profile

Based on the frequencies from the Afrobarometer surveys I have developed the following profile of the respondents. Living standards as a measure of economic prosperity does not match what is stated above and the general knowledge that Botswana is more developed than Tanzania. The reason for this however could be that it is a subjective measure. The biggest tribe in Tanzania is Sukuma and around 16 percent of the population is known to be of this tribe. Their representation in this survey is therefore good. In Botswana almost 80 percent of the population is of the Tswana tribe. In this survey however they only represent 47 percent. The education level of the respondents is according to the general standards in the two countries as Botswana has a slightly better education system than Tanzania.

Table: 3.2: Respondent's Profile

	<b>BOTSWANA</b>	<b>TANZANIA</b>
<b>Gender</b>		
<i>Male</i>	600 (50 %)	1203 (50.1 %)
<i>Female</i>	600 (50 %)	1197 (49.9 %)
<b>Age</b>		
<i>Min. – Max.</i>	18 – 92	18 – 99
<i>Average</i>	38	38
<b>Living Conditions</b>		
<i>Bad</i>	989 (82.4 %)	1 569 (65.4 %)
<i>Neither Good or Bad</i>	208 (17.3 %)	642 (26.8 %)
<i>Good</i>	-	184 (7.7 %)
<b>Tribe</b>	Tswana 46.8 %	Sukuma 13.8 %
<b>Education</b>		
<i>No Formal/Informal Only</i>	148 (12.4 %)	210 (8.8 %)
<i>Primary Complete</i>	264 (22.1%)	1 698 (70.8 %)
<i>Secondary Complete</i>	566 (47.1 %)	405 (16.9 %)
<i>Post-Secondary</i>	75 (6.2 %)	54 (2.3 %)
<i>University Complete</i>	147 (12.3 %)	32 (1.3 %)
<b>N</b>	1200	2400

### **3.5 Data Analysis**

After the data is collected, which in my case was a job done by Afrobarometer and I therefore only needed to get hold of the datasets, it was time to analyze it. The goal, in both qualitative and quantitative studies, is to uncover general patterns and relations or possible differences between the cases. We inspect the data in order to discover useful information and finding possible conclusions (Yin, 2014). The main focus and also the great challenge will be to find an answer to the research problem. As mentioned I used a deductive approach to my analysis and therefore rely on a theoretical proposition – strategy in order to reach my conclusions, this is typically used in case-studies. By using this strategy, I followed the theoretical propositions that my study is built on. The theoretical framework was the basis for my research problem, the literature reviewed and the hypotheses of my study and I have analyzed and discussed my findings in relation to the background for my study. The theoretical framework helped me reach conclusions and test the theories I have reviewed. Is the performance-based theory valid in Botswana and Tanzania? Does social trust have a positive effect on political trust? What role do socio-demographic variables play?

In order to analyze statistical data, we need to rely on a statistical program. In my case I have used SPSS. This allowed me to do everything from the very simple analyses like a univariate analysis to a multiple regression analysis. To get an overview of the values in the different variables I started by running a univariate analysis of all my variables, both dependent and independent. These descriptive statistics gave me answers about the average response for each question, the standard deviation and the significance level. I also looked at the frequencies of each value for some of my variables. This tells me how often each value occurs in my sample and in a large sample like this it should be a representable pattern for the general population. The interesting thing by looking at the descriptive statistics is that the typical value and average for each variable will either be according to your expectations or deviate from them and this is likely to answers some questions about the situation in these countries, but it will possibly also generate more questions about why this is the case. This way the analyzing process is already beginning. A natural next step was a correlation analysis. This told me whether there is a connection between the dependent variable, trust in public institutions, and one of the independent variables. I also got answers to whether these correlations are significant or not. For this step I could also have chosen to use cross-tabulations to look at the connection between each of the values in the dependent variable and each of the values for the independent variables, one at a time, but I found it to extensive and not quite as interesting as the correlation analyses. The final and most important step of my analysis was an OLS regression analyses. This showed me the direction and strength of the correlation and the effect is also adjusted for

the effect of the other independent variables in the group. The significance value and t-value in the regression models tells me if the effect is generalizable to the general population. These final analyses helped me answer my research problem and find out if my hypotheses are correct or not.

### *3.5.1 Correlation analysis*

A correlation analysis focuses on the strength of the relation between the dependent variable and one of the independent variables (Midtbø, 2007). If there is a positive correlation it means that a lot of one factor leads to a lot of another factor, if there is a negative correlation a lot of one thing leads to less of another thing (Midtbø, 2007). Whether these correlations are random or valid and if they can be generalized to outside this specific research depends on the statistical significance (ibid.). Testing the significance means also testing if the hypotheses are correct or not. We have two different types of hypotheses-testing; a two-tailed (symmetrical) test and a one-tailed (asymmetrical) test. As there is no clear indication in my theories or previous studies on the field whether there is a positive or negative correlation between trust in public institutions and my independent variables I find it most sensible to rely on a two-tailed test. This might though be a rather safe assumption. The next important step in a correlation analysis is deciding on a test statistic. In a correlation analysis we mostly rely on significance values, often referred to as the p-value, whilst in the regression analysis we have several other measures for deciding if the effect is significant or not. This decides to what degree we are willing to reject the null hypothesis; the higher the significance level is the harder it will be to reject the null hypothesis. The correlation analysis can cause us to make one of two mistakes in generalizing to the larger population. An error of first kind, a rejection error, is to falsely reject a correct null hypothesis and an error of second kind, an acceptance error, is to not reject the null hypothesis when it is in fact wrong (ibid.). The first type of mistake is generally seen as worse than the other as this will cause us to state that there is a correlation when it in fact is not. To avoid this, the significance level will be set quite low, usually to 1, 5 or 10 percent (ibid.). The significance level I have chosen to use is 5 percent, meaning that I am willing to accept up to a five percent chance of claiming that there is a correlation when this can be caused by random effects. When running the correlation analysis in SPSS it will sometimes decide this for you, meaning that in some cases the significance level will be higher or lower than 5 percent.

### *3.5.2 Regression analysis*

When we want to study the direction of a correlation and a more exact effect of each variable we need to turn to a regression analysis. This distinguishes between the variable that is being explained, the dependent variable, and the ones explaining, the independent variables (Midtbø, 2007). The regression analysis is what gave the most precise and complete picture as it gave me the opportunity to connect all my independent variables or the different groups of independent variables to my dependent one. This has naturally been the main focus of my study. I found the explanatory power of the models by looking at the adjusted R square, as all the models have more than one independent variable. The number tells how much of the variations in the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables and is adjusted for how many independent variables are included in the model. This number is based on Pearson R, which is a measure of the correlation between metric variables, which again is based on the covariance. The number will be between 0 and 1 (0-100%) and the closer it is to 1 the more does the independent variables explain.

Testing of the hypotheses in a regression analysis is a lot like in a correlation analysis, but instead of looking at the correlation itself we want to see if the independent variable affects the dependent one (Midtbø, 2007). The constant tells the level of the dependent variable when there is no effect from the independent variables. The effect from these variables is shown by the slope coefficients. The higher the coefficient, the bigger is the effect. This effect will be either positive or negative. When we have more than one independent variable in a model the slope coefficients will also be affected by the correlation between the independent variables and the other independent variables effect on the dependent variable. When adding more independent variables to a model the original coefficients will not change value if there is no correlation between the original independent variables and the newly added one and if the new independent variable does not have an effect on Y. Both these criteria's have to be achieved for there to be no effect (ibid.).

In order to prove or reject the null hypotheses I need to know whether the estimated slope coefficient can be regarded as significant or random. There are several ways to find the significance of a regression model. One way is to look at the standard error. The general rule is that the estimate must be double the standard error to be significantly different than 0. It is more common however to look at the t-value. If the coefficient is high and the standard error small the t-value will be high. The higher the t-value is the more likely it is that the effect is real and the null hypothesis is wrong (ibid.). In order to reject the null hypothesis, the t-value needs to be higher than the critical value. With a significance level of 5 percent my t-value in a two-tailed test will be  $\pm 1.96$ . This means that if the t-value is higher than 1.96 the null hypothesis

will be rejected and there is only a 5 percent chance that this is a false rejection. Nevertheless, I choose to pay attention to the p-value as well, as the last form of test statistic. This tells me how likely it will be to get a result in my sample if the null hypothesis is correct. The rules for the significance level and value in the correlation analysis apply in a regression analysis too. The lower the p-value is the less reason we have to accept the null hypothesis. If the p-value is lower than my chosen significance level the null hypothesis will be rejected. My significance level of 0.05 means that I am willing to accept up to a 5 percent chance that the effect is caused randomly. The t-value and p-value are in many ways related and if the p-value is lower than the significance level the t-value has to be over the critical value.

One point that is important to note when it comes to a regression analysis is that it requires the variables to be metric. This means that the values in the datasets need to be meaningful in themselves, either values that are ranged in a particular order or values that simply are numbers, like age. The values that are on a nominal or ordinal level, where the values are given just to separate the answers, need to be recoded into dummy-variables.

### ***3.6 Quality of the Research***

Whether the data can illuminate the research question or not depends on the quality of the data, which again depends on a number of factors. The quality of the material cannot be generalized as it depends on whether it is relevant or not in order to answer the research problem (Grønmo, 2004). It is therefore possible that the data has both high and low quality, depending on what it is used for. There are several ways of reviewing the quality of the data, making sure that the data collection process has been reasonable and the research as a whole is justified in terms of purpose and completion. I have relied on two overall criteria's in order to review the quality of my data and my study. These are validity and reliability. In general, the validity tells how valid the data is and how well my research design contributes to answering my research problem. If the collection of data gave me relevant information according to the intentions with the research the validity is high (ibid.). Validity can be broken into construct validity, internal validity and external validity. Reliability indicates if the research methods, data and results are trustworthy. If the research is repeated with the same results there is high reliability (Yin, 2014). If the collected data has high validity the reliability must also be high, but even though it is reliable it is not necessary valid. Reliability is a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for validity (Grønmo, 2004).



I consider Afrobarometer to be a serious organization which collects and distributes both valid and reliable data, but since the data I have used is collected by others and based on questionnaires developed by others there is reason to be extra critical. The original motivation for collecting this information might also differ from mine which is an extra factor to be aware of. My evaluation of Afrobarometer as a valid and reliable source is based on their 17 year-long history in providing statistics on societal, political and cultural issues on the African continent and their strong scientific team. Some of the leading scientists within African political research, Dr. Michael Bratton and Dr. Robert Mattes, are among the co-founders (Afrobarometer, 2016). Afrobarometer is really the only organization that collects and distributes this type of large-scale data about the public opinion on important topics within society in Sub-Saharan Africa. In their book, *Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform*, Bratton and Mattes along with Dr. E. Gyimah-Boadi discuss the validity and reliability of Afrobarometer's methods and why the type of research that they do has not been conducted so much in the past. Their main argument is that a research technology and questionnaires developed in industrial societies may lead to largely misleading results when conducted in typical rural areas in Africa (Bratton et al., 2004). One way of solving this is by using focus groups to discuss the core concepts of the questionnaires, with participants from several African countries. Another point is to make the questions as concrete as possible in order to eliminate any "non-attitude" responses just because the questions are too vague and the respondent has not reflected too much on the matter. Most respondents will have an opinion on the different topics in the survey and the goal is to capture these opinions and not let them end up in the "other"-category (ibid.).

One important concern they mention surrounding the validity and reliability of the research is whether or not the respondents answer true to their opinion or if they are influenced by the leaders of their country. It is therefore vital that the fieldworker gives thorough information about the purpose of the survey as well as emphasizing that Afrobarometer is a politically independent and non-governmental organization. Opinion surveys like this are not a common feature in African societies and it is therefore natural that respondent have some hesitations when it comes to participating. As most media channels are controlled by the government the opinion that the public have of political matters is largely shaped to be what the government wants it to be. To avoid this Afrobarometer surveys are only conducted in politically liberalized countries where citizens enjoy at least some degree of free speech and where the mass media is pluralized (ibid.). As far as possible, the fieldwork was not conducted during elections. After the surveys are completed they undergo numerous internal tests. These tests have revealed little threat to the possibility of false answers or fake ignorance ending up in the "don't know" category. The refusal to take part in the survey is also relatively low, around

5 percent, with many respondents being very positive to take part as this hopefully means that their voice will be heard. The number of “don’t know” responses is also fairly low. The last, but maybe the most important point is to measure political fear and cross-reference these answers with the respondents’ answers to a number of other questions. Some correlation has been found between those who say one must be very careful expressing political opinion and those expressing loyalty to the winning party and performance of the government. However, these respondents do not show signs of any self-censorship in regard to any other questions about public opinion, for instance trust in public institutions (Bratton et al., 2004). The thorough and systematic work done by Afrobarometer in conducting the surveys gives me faith that these are reliable and valid data and that they are relevant and appropriate for my research as a number of questions contribute to understand the correlation between my dependent variable and independent variables.

### *3.6.1 Construct Validity*

According to Yin (2014) construct validity is concerned with creating the right operational measures for the concepts that are being studied. My dependent variable, trust in public institutions, has been operationalized through the question of how the respondents range their trust in several public institutions. The dependent variable is therefore quite simple to cover. The independent variables however are a bit more complicated. The first category, socio-demographic factors, includes basic questions concerning age, gender, education and tribe as well as living conditions which is to refer economic prosperity. In order to measure social capital, I have chosen to focus on in what degree respondents take part in any organization and to what degree they trust the people around them, either friends, family, neighbors or strangers. General trust in society and associationism are good measures for social capital and is why I am relying on these questions for this variable. My third category of independent variables, transparency, is covered by one question about the respondent’s use of media sources whilst the other asks to what degree they believe that several public institutions are involved in corruption. In order for these indicators to be valid for my research they need to be seen in relation to one another. Is there any difference in how corruption I perceived from the ones with great access to media to the ones with little access? And how does this affect their trust? My fourth category of independent variables, democratic satisfaction is operationalized by the direct questions asking respondents to rate their satisfactions with the democracy and faith in problem solving. The last category, policy performance, consists of questions regarding the respondents’ evaluation of the national and local government’s policy performance as well as

approval of the President's, the parliament's and local government council's performance. The questions in relation to my variables have also been used and tested in previous research by other scientists (Jamil and Askvik, 2015, Delhey and Newton, 2003, Lühiste, 2006) and should therefore be valid operational measures in relation to my research problem.

In order to improve the construct validity of my study I could have used multiple sources of data and for instance combined my dataset with fieldwork or in depth interviews. This way I could have seen if the results coincide.

### *3.6.2 Internal Validity*

Internal validity refers to *“establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships”* (Yin, 2014:46). In causal studies we need to be particularly aware of the internal validity and avoid concluding that X causes Y when it is actually Z that causes Y (Yin, 2014). Since I have relied on SPSS to run my analyses I have gotten a decent amount of help. In the correlation analysis I saw if there was at all a correlation between trust in public institutions and any of my independent variables, but it did not tell me anything about which variable effects which. If the correlation is valid depends on the statistical significance. This is vital to pay attention to so that I do not draw any false conclusions. It is better to conclude that there is no correlation when there in fact is, than to state that there is a correlation when there is not. In order to distinguish between which variables that are explaining and which variable is being explained I ran a regression analysis. This showed me the strength of the relation between the variables. To test if the relation between the variables are valid in a regression analysis I need to look at the significance value and the t-value.

### *3.6.3 External Validity*

External validity tells me whether the results from the study can be generalized to other situations at other times (Yin, 2014). The goal of a quantitative study is to do exactly that: generalize to the larger population. In order for this to be possible the samples need to represent the population and they need to be of significant size. The samples in my study are 1200 for Botswana and 2400 for Tanzania. This qualifies for large N studies and are therefore well suited to generalize from. As mentioned, Afrobarometer's methods for selecting their respondents are based on random sampling giving every adult an equal chance to be chosen to participate. Geographical areas and tribes are represented respectively to their size in the population. The

sample for Tanzania has a slightly lower error margin than the one of Botswana, but both samples have a confidence level of 95 percent. Quantitative studies also give us great opportunities for testing hypotheses and theories.

#### *3.6.4 Reliability*

Reliability tells us about the conformity between different collections of data about the same phenomenon based on the same research design; how reliable is the data (Grønmo, 2004). If a researcher were to repeat my research he or she should come to the same findings and conclusions as I did. Reliability is mostly concerned with the data and as I have not collected this myself I need to be well aware of the methods used by Afrobarometer. As mentioned, Afrobarometer goes to great lengths in order to make sure that their data is reliable and this is proved by their thorough process in developing the questionnaires, their data collection methods and training of their fieldworkers. In order for the survey itself to be reliable we need to know that the respondents would answer the questions the same way tomorrow as they do today (Midtbø, 2007). Their answers cannot be random and uncertain and this can be avoided with clear questions and alternatives. The respondents need to understand fully what they are being asked and be sure of their answers. To assure this the questionnaires are developed through a process of careful testing with focus groups evaluating the core concepts and topics of the survey like democracy, corruption and government. The questions are also made as precise as possible to avoid a large number of “don’t know” answers. One factor that is relevant for my study is the respondents political fear. Do they answer what they think the government wants them to answer? Do they express higher levels of trust in public institutions out of loyalty? According to testing done by the organization itself there is no correlation between expression of political fear and trust in public institutions (Bratton et al., 2004). I therefore regard the data presented by Afrobarometer as reliable.

My research design and how I have conducted my analyses in SPSS have been systematically explained throughout this paper. I have clarified which questions in the survey that have been used in creating my variables as well as how these have been used in the correlation and regression analyses. Creation of index variables and dummy coding’s have also been explained. The data-collection and SPSS analyses should, based on this, be fairly straightforward for others to repeat with the same results and I therefore regard my analyses to be reliable.

### **3.7 Strengths and Weaknesses to my Study**

There are both strengths and weaknesses to my study and the method I have chosen. One of the weaknesses is that I have not collected the data myself, but rather downloaded the datasets from Afrobarometer. The reason for this is that I would have had no chance to collect this amount of data in my appointed time-frame and therefore could not have done a large N study. This secondary analysis method requires an extra critical attitude towards Afrobarometer, their methods and the data, and the thorough examination of these, outlined above, shows that this is a serious organization collecting and presenting data using valid and reliable methods. They also go to great lengths in order to safety-proof both input and output in the surveys. In regard to the outcome of the research I therefore do not think that this method is of disadvantage. In terms of taking part in the entire research process, on the other hand, it might show signs of choosing a slightly simpler path in order to reach my goal. However, this study would not have been possible without secondary analysis. In addition, I regard the analysis part as the most important part and the data collection as more of a starting point. Another negative side to doing a quantitative study is that it only gives you an overall and in some cases slightly shallow perspective of the situation as opposed to a qualitative study where you dig a little deeper in order to get more in-depth information from people. In addition, I have never been to either of the countries which of course is a weakness that may be most visible in the analyses section. The fact that I have no first-hand experience with these societies and have to rely on documents in order to make sense of the findings in SPSS could cause me to make misinterpretations. A qualitative study nevertheless is harder to generalize from as the sample sizes are often relatively small and when comparing a great societal issue like trust in two countries it is absolutely preferred to rely on quantitative data and methods. Looking at other, similar studies of trust, both institutional and social, we also see that the absolute majority is based solely on quantitative data.

The quantitative comparative method gives me the opportunity to look at large scale data and hopefully be able to make generalizations to the population. This way I can also test theories and hypotheses and compare my findings with previous research. As mentioned, statistical analysis also lets me see the correlations between the different variables as well as the effect the independent variable has on the dependent variable. This way we can see which exact factors are important for generating trust. Comparing two countries also gives me the opportunity to test theories between nations and cultures to find what determines trust in different areas. I have chosen a somewhat wide variety of independent variables which gives me a better image of whether social or institutional factors are deciding of individuals' trust in public institutions. This gives the analyses a broader range and allows me to see things from

different perspectives and test competing theories. The fact that other, highly acclaimed scientists have relied on the quantitative method in their research also proves that this is absolutely a valid and reliable method for conducting this type of study.

### **3.8 Ethical Considerations**

In any research that is conducted it is of high priority to make sure that all ethical principles are considered. Afrobarometer is a serious organization conducting serious research and producing valid results and datasets. Their interviewers are well trained and informed about general ethical principles when conducting research. All respondents are over the age of 18 and have under informed consent agreed to participate. They are therefore well informed about the purpose of the study and how the information they give will be handled further. Interviewers must also sign agreements stating that they will not under any circumstances discuss the identity of the respondents or the contents of the interview to anyone outside the project. No respondent should risk taking any harm from participating in the survey. When the data is collected the respondents are coded and from there on they are mere numbers in a scheme and there is no possibility of identifying them (Afrobarometer, 2016). There is little I can do in terms of wrongdoing in regard to the respondents, but I do have a responsibility to handle the data in a respectful way and in line with the purpose of the data collection. In relation to the documentary sources that I have used I have made sure to cite the authors and respect their work by not passing of any of their research as my own. In addition, I have ensured that my conclusions and further recommendations are not misrepresentative and incorrect based on my findings.

### **3.9 Summary**

The methodological framework of a research should give a detailed presentation and discussion of how one has planned and followed through with the data collection and analyses as well as an evaluation of the quality of the data. I found the quantitative comparative method to be best suited in order to answer my research question as well as it giving me the opportunity to generalize my findings. The analyses have been completed in SPSS and the findings from the descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analyses will be presented in the next chapter. The secondary analysis approach is justified with the time frame I am working with and Afrobarometer's thorough methods of data-collection as well as their valid and reliable data. The chapter was completed with a reflection around the strengths and weaknesses of my study and the ethical considerations.

## **Chapter Four: Empirical Findings**

### ***4.1 Introduction***

This chapter presents the results of my analyses in SPSS. I start by presenting the findings from the descriptive statistics, both the frequencies table and the descriptive statistics table for trust in public institutions and then the same for all the independent variables. I then turn to the correlation analysis. I will present all the correlations in one table before I discuss the findings for each group of independent variables. Last are my regression models. These too are presented in one table consisting of six models, one for each group of independent variables in addition to the last one where all independent variables are included. The complete tables for the descriptive statistics as well as the correlation and regression analysis can be found in appendix two, three and four. I will discuss the findings in the regression models for each group of independent variables separately before I round off with a brief discussion of all the independent variables' effect on institutional trust. A further analysis and discussion of my findings follows in the next chapter.

### ***4.2 Descriptive Statistics***

#### ***4.2.1 Dependent variable: Trust in public institutions***

When I look at the frequencies and descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, trust in public institutions, the first thing I notice is that the number of valid answers is remarkably lower for Botswana than Tanzania. In Botswana only 69 percent of the response is valid, whilst the number for Tanzania is 88 percent. The numbers from Tanzania might therefore be more valid for generalization as it is a much larger sample. Of more relevance we should turn to the actual numbers for trust. The trust index is, as mentioned above, computed from the values for trust in the various public institutions. The values presented here is therefore the total number of answers for each value as well as the combined average for trust in public institutions. In order to simplify a little, I have divided the trust index in two with the lower half representing low trust and the upper half representing high trust. Low trust consists of the values from “not at all” (0) to in between “just a little” and “somewhat” (1.49), while high trust then naturally reaches from in between “just a little” (1.5) to “a lot” (3).

For Botswana 39 percent of the respondents express low trust while 30 percent express high trust. Since such a large percentage of the answers in Botswana are invalid we need to also look at the valid percentages which is 57 for low trust and 43 percent for high trust. The fact that the majority of the population expresses low trust is surprising and that there seems to be

lower trust in Botswana than in Tanzania is even more surprising. For Tanzania we see that 65 percent show high trust while 24 percent express low trust. In this case the valid percent's do not deviate as far from this with 73 percent in the high trust category and 27 percent in the low trust category.

Table 4.1: Trust in Public Institutions in Botswana and Tanzania (percent distribution)

	FREQUENCIES		PERCENT		VALID PERCENT	
	Botswana	Tanzania	Botswana	Tanzania	Botswana	Tanzania
<b>Low Trust</b>	468	576	39	24	57	27
<b>High Trust</b>	360	1 545	30	65	43	73
<b>Missing</b>	372	279	31	12		
<b>N</b>	1200	2400	1200	2400	828	2121

How much trust do you have in the following, or haven't you heard enough to say?

a) The President; b) Parliament; c) the National Electoral Commission; d) the Tanzanian/Botswana revenue authority; e) your Local Government Council; f) the Ruling Party; g) Opposition Political Parties; h) the Police; i) the Army; j) Courts of Law; K-TAN) the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB): Not at all (0); Just a little (1); Somewhat (2); a lot (3)

For both countries the larger percentage clusters around the middle of the index. The average response for Botswana is 1.5, which is right in the middle of the scale. This means that most respondents in Botswana answer that they trust the public institutions just a little or somewhat. In Tanzania the average institutional trust is slightly higher with 1.9. Respondents in Tanzania therefore seem to have somewhat trust in the public institutions.

Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for trust in Public Institutions in Botswana and Tanzania

	MEAN/S.D.	
	Botswana	Tanzania
<b>Trust Index</b>	1.5/0.7	1.9/0.6
<b>Valid N</b>	828	2121



It is quite interesting that trust in public institutions is significantly higher in Tanzania than in Botswana and that the majority of the respondent's in Botswana express low trust while a large majority of respondents in Tanzania are trusting of public institutions. The average however, is only slightly higher in Tanzania than in Botswana. These findings contradict with my first hypothesis, why is it so that institutional trust is significantly higher in Tanzania than in Botswana? I will attempt to answer this question in my discussion of these findings in my analysis chapter.

#### *4.2.2 Independent Variables*

The descriptive statistics and frequencies for the independent variables might be somewhat surprising. According to the respondents living conditions are better in Tanzania than in Botswana which is contradicting to the general development level and poverty rates. Education levels and access to media are however more as expected. Faith in problem solving is higher in Tanzania, which is strange as their level of development may show signs of little action from the government. On the other hand, Botswana's are more satisfied with the policy performance. However, the most surprising is that both generalized and particularized trust levels are so low in Botswana, while only generalized trust is low in Tanzania.

##### *4.2.2.1 Socio-demographic variables*

###### *Living conditions*

The average for living conditions in Botswana is 1.6, meaning that most people state that they have somewhere between very bad and fairly bad living conditions. As we see, the highest answer in Botswana is 3 (neither good or bad) which means that none of the respondents in Botswana has answered that their living conditions are fairly or very good. The frequencies (in appendix 2) tells me that 82 percent of the respondents consider their living conditions to be bad, while 17 percent think they are neither good or bad. In Tanzania the average living standard is 2.1, slightly better than fairly bad. The frequencies show that 65 percent of the respondents answer that their living conditions are bad, while only 8 percent say that their living conditions are good. It should be noted once again that this is a subjective measure by the respondents, but it is however unexpected that such a large majority of the respondents in Botswana say that their living conditions are bad as this country is considered the most successful country in sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables

	<b>MEAN/S.D.</b>	
	<b>Botswana</b>	<b>Tanzania</b>
<b>Socio-Demographic Variables</b>		
Age	38.5/17.1	38.3/14.1
Living Conditions	1.6/0.8	2.1/1
Tribe	147.2/6.1	748.5/4.9
Education	4.1/2.2	3/1.3
Gender	0.5/0.5	0.5/0.5
<b>Social Capital</b>		
Member In Religious Group	0.8/1	1.2/1
Member in Com./Vol. Group	0.3/0.8	1/1.1
General Trust	0.1/0.3	0.1/0.3
Trust Relatives	1.7/1.1	2.6/0.6
Trust Neighbors	1.2/1	2.2/0.8
Trust Others You Know	1/0.9	1.7/0.9
<b>Transparency</b>		
Listen to Radio	2.7/1.5	2.9/1.5
Watch TV	2.4/1.7	1.3/1.6
Read Newspaper	1.9/1.5	0.9/1.3
Use Internet	0.7/1.4	0.3/0.8
Corruption Index	1.1/0.5	1.3/0.5
<b>Democratic Satisfaction</b>		
Satisfaction w/Democracy	2.9/0.9	2.9/0.8
Faith In Problem Solving	1.6/1	2.5/0.7
<b>Policy Performance</b>		
Performance Index	2.7/0.4	2.2/0.5
Local Performance Index	2.5/0.6	2.2/0.7
President's Performance	3.1/0.9	2.9/0.9
MP's Performance	2.4/0.9	2.7/0.9
LGC's Performance	2.5/0.9	2.8/0.9

### *Education*

In terms of education the average in Tanzania is 3, completed primary school with 58 percent of the respondents answering that they have only completed primary school. In Botswana the average is 4, some secondary school with 30 percent of the respondents saying that they have completed secondary school and 16 percent have some secondary education. These frequencies are also displayed in appendix 2.

### *Age*

In Botswana the respondents are between 18 and 92 years old with the average age being just above 38 years. This is the same average as in Tanzania, but here the oldest respondent 99 years old.

### *Tribe*

The average tribe does not tell much, but the frequencies (appendix 2) shows that the dominating tribe in Tanzania is Sukuma with almost 14 percent. It is believed that this group makes up around 16 percent of the population, so this result is quite representative (World Culture Encyclopedia, 2016). Ha is the second largest with 5 percent and Chaga is the third largest with 4.5 percent. In Botswana the largest ethnic group is the Tswana people, this group however is made up of several smaller groups. In the survey these groups are mentioned separately and not Tswana as a whole. 47 percent of the respondents say that they are members of one of the Tswana groups. Amongst these are Bangwato with 12 percent and Bakgatla with 9 percent which respectively are the second and third largest groups in the survey. The second largest ethnic group in Botswana is Kalanga. In this survey however it is the largest as 16 percent of the respondents state they belong to this group. Since 79 percent of the population is said to belong to the Tswana and 11 percent to Kalanga (CIA, 2016) this survey might not represent the ethnicities in the country correctly.

#### *4.2.2.2 Social Capital*

Based on memberships in community groups or religious groups social capital seems to be higher in Tanzania than in Botswana. In terms of membership in religious groups the average (ranging from 0 to 3) in Tanzania is 1.2, slightly over inactive member, while for Botswana it is 0.8, close to inactive member, but leaning more towards not a member. For community or voluntary groups, the numbers are even lower, the average membership in Botswana is 0.3, meaning most people are not members, while in Tanzania the average is 1, inactive member.

The frequency table in appendix 2 shows that 45 percent in Tanzania say that they are an active member in a community or voluntary group and 35 percent are active in a religious group. Respectively 42 and 51 percent are not members. In Botswana however only 29 percent are active in a community or voluntary group while 59 percent are not members. Only 12 percent say that they are a member of a religious group and 82 percent say they are not members. In general, this means that associationism is quite a bit higher in Tanzania than in Botswana. Why is this the case and how does it affect institutional trust?

Looking at the general trust indicator we see that the average in both countries is 0.1, meaning that the majority of the respondent's state that one must be very careful when dealing with others. General trust is therefore very low in both Tanzania and Botswana. In Tanzania particularized trust is somewhat higher than in Botswana. In terms of trust in relatives the average 2.6 for Tanzania shows that most respondents have somewhat or a lot of trust in them, while in Botswana the average is only 1.7, meaning that respondents here are slightly more careful when dealing with relatives. Trust in neighbors is naturally a little bit lower, the average is 2.2 for Tanzania and 1.2 for Botswana, meaning that people in Tanzania have somewhat trust in their neighbors while in Botswana people only trust their neighbors a little. Trust in other people you know is even lower with the average in Tanzania being 1.7 and 1 in Botswana. Respondents in Tanzania have close to somewhat trust in others, while in Botswana they have just a little trust in others. Particularized trust levels in Tanzania show that most people generally trust people somewhat, but naturally they have more trust in the people they know well. In Botswana people seem to be more careful as most answers cluster around just a little trust, but here too people display most trust in those they know the best. The social capital variables show that both associationism and particularized trust is higher in Tanzania than Botswana while generalized trust is the same. If these variables can be seen as good measures for social capital, social capital is slightly stronger in Tanzania. Theories of social capital state that social trust and associationism can be harder to achieve in an ethnically diverse country, therefore this result is rather surprising. As we saw above institutional trust is also higher in Tanzania, can this be explained by the fact that social capital is stronger here than in Botswana and are the cultural theories of trust therefore valid?

#### *4.2.2.3 Transparency*

The transparency variable is divided in two; how often respondents get news from different mediums and perceived corruption. The media variables tell us that most people get news from the radio a few times a week as the average is 2.7 for Botswana and 2.9 for Tanzania

(on a scale from 0, never, to 4, every day). Watching television is more common in Botswana where the average person gets news from a television between a few times a month and a few times a week. In Tanzania on the other hand, where the average is only 1.4, people get news from a television less than a few times a month. Reading newspapers is even rarer as the average is 1.9, a few times a month, in Botswana and 0.9, less than once a month, in Tanzania. Use of internet has the lowest average, 0.7 for Botswana and 0.3 for Tanzania. This means that very few people use internet at all and most people never use it or use it less than once a month. Based on this we can see that people in general pay more attention to news in Botswana than in Tanzania, but it can also be explained by less access to the different media channels in Tanzania. If the media is reporting negative cases related to public institutions this is believed to have a negative effect on institutional trust, but if they are reporting positive circumstances institutional trust is likely to increase.

The corruption index has an average of 1.3 for Tanzania and 1.1 for Botswana. This means that most respondents believe that some or most public institutions are involved in corruption. Transparency International's corruption index gives Botswana a score of 63 on a scale from 0 to 100 where 100 means very clean (Transparency International, 2015), corruption is therefore quite low in Botswana. Tanzania on the other hand only gets a score of 30 meaning that corruption is generally quite high here. The fact that the average perception is so similar is therefore surprising. As corruption is viewed as a negative factor in institutions this could have a negative effect on trust according to the performance-based theory.

#### *4.2.2.4 Democratic Satisfaction*

Satisfaction with the democratic functioning receives an average score of 2.9 for both countries, which means that people generally are fairly satisfied. When it comes to how much faith the respondents have in the government's problem solving abilities we see that the average for Botswana is 1.6 and 2.5 for Tanzania. This means that people in Botswana do not have too much faith that the government will solve certain issues within the next five years. In Tanzania however most people seem to believe that it is likely that problems will be solved within reasonable time. This generally high satisfaction with the democracy in the two countries will according to the institutional theory of trust result in higher trust in the public institutions. But is there actual reason to be so satisfied with the democracy or should people be more critical?

#### *4.2.2.5 Policy Performance*

The performance index for Botswana has an average of 2.7 meaning that most respondents rate the government's handling of several policy matters as either fairly well or fairly bad. The highest frequencies however are closer to 3, either right over or right below, which means that people generally think the policy performance is fairly good. In terms of local performance, the average is slightly lower, 2.5, but here as well most respondent's answers cluster around "fairly well". For Tanzania the numbers are a little lower, 2.2, for both the performance index and local performance index. This means that more respondents are leaning towards "fairly bad". In both countries respondents seem to approve of the President's performance with the Tanzanians having a slightly lower average, 2.9 towards 3.1 in Botswana. The members of Parliament receive a somewhat lower average in both countries, 2.7 in Tanzania and 2.4 in Botswana. The elected local Government Councilors receive slightly more approval, 2.5 in Botswana and 2.8 in Tanzania. We see then that people are generally more satisfied with the policy performance in Botswana than in Tanzania, which is somewhat strange as Tanzanians were generally more satisfied with the democracy. In addition, Tanzanians also display more trust in public institutions. The link between performance and trust may therefore not be so strong in the case of Tanzania. It might also be surprising that the averages are so similar when levels of development are quite different in the two countries.

#### *4.3 Correlation Analysis*

In the correlation analysis I will get an indication of whether there is any link between the dependent variable, institutional trust, and the independent variables. Only the significant variables are included and, as expected, we see that quite a few are correlated with institutional trust. As mentioned, the causality does not become clear here, we can therefore not be sure that the independent variables have any effect on trust. It could just as well be the other way around.

The first thing to notice when looking at the correlation analysis is that almost all variables related to institutional theory are correlated with institutional trust, while rather few, at least for Botswana, of the ones related to cultural theories have a correlation with trust. The variables related to institutional theory generally also have stronger correlations than those connected to cultural theories. Some variables are, as expected, negatively correlated with institutional trust, like corruption.

Table 4.4: Correlation analysis, dependent variable: Institutional Trust

	BOTSWANA	TANZANIA
<b>Socio-Demographic Variables</b>		
Age	.142**	.115**
Living Conditions	-	.114**
Tribe	-	.112**
Education	-.158**	-.149**
Gender	-	-
<b>Social Capital</b>		
Member in Religious Group	-	-.067**
Member in Community/ Voluntary Group	-	-
General Trust	-	-
Trust Neighbors	.259**	.114**
Trust Relatives	.201**	.176**
Trust Others You Know	.210**	.165**
<b>Transparency</b>		
Listen to Radio	-	-.106**
Watch Television	-	-.143**
Read Newspaper	-.124**	-.112**
Use Internet	-.102**	-.069**
Corruption Index	-.303**	-.394**
<b>Democratic Satisfaction</b>		
Satisfaction With Democracy	.377**	.302**
Faith In Problem Solving	.268**	.059**
<b>Policy Performance</b>		
Performance Index	.416**	.421**
Local Performance Index	.277**	.248**
Approval Of President	.422**	.456**
Approval Of Members Of Parliament	.319**	.304**
Approval Of Local Government Council	.257**	.311**

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)

#### 4.3.1 Trust and socio-demographic variables

##### *Age*

The correlations between the trust index and the socio-demographic variables show that age has a slight positive correlation with trust for both Botswana (0.142\*\*) and Tanzania (0.115\*\*). This could mean that the older you get the more trust you will have in public institutions. Both these correlations are valid as the significance value is 0.00 and the significance level is 0.05. The positive correlations between age and institutional trust tells us that more experience could affect trust positively. This may indicate support for the thought that later-life experiences are more important than early-life experiences in Mishler and Rose's (2001) lifetime learning model.

##### *Living Conditions*

In Tanzania living conditions are positively and significantly correlated with trust (0.114\*\*). Which can mean that people with better living conditions are likely to trust more. The correlation for Botswana is not significant. The positive correlation between living conditions and institutional trust in Tanzania could support the theory of success and well-being.

##### *Tribe*

There is also a small, significant correlation, between tribe and trust in Tanzania (0.112\*\*). In Botswana this correlation is insignificant. In the correlation analysis, as opposed to the regression analysis, tribe is treated as one, collective variable with all tribes. We will therefore see the effect of ethnicity and not the affiliation with a specific tribe. The correlation between tribe and institutional trust in Tanzania can be a sign that there is a positive relation between the various ethnic groups and the public institutions and that individuals are treated fairly by the government.

##### *Education*

Education is negatively and significantly correlated with trust in both countries (-0.158\*\* in Botswana and -0.149\*\*), which could mean that the more education you have the less you trust. As opposed to the positive correlation between age and institutional trust it seems as if the experience one gets from education has a negative effect on institutional trust which may seem rather contradicting. It is therefore natural to believe that what one learns in school has a negative effect on institutional trust, while what you learn and experience outside school, as



you get older will have a positive effect. As age and education naturally are correlated this might become clearer in the regression analysis.

### *Gender*

Gender is insignificantly correlated with institutional trust in both countries. These findings give mixed support to some of the cultural theories. It does however support the institutional theory stating that the institutional performance affects people randomly.

### *4.3.2 Trust and Social Capital*

The correlations between trust and the social capital variables shows that for Tanzania there is a negative, but significant, correlation between membership in religious groups and institutional trust (-0.67<sup>\*\*</sup>). For Botswana there is no correlation between these variables. Membership in voluntary or community groups is insignificantly correlated with institutional trust in both countries. General trust also has an insignificant correlation with trust in public institutions in both countries. The particularized trust variables on the other hand have significant correlations in both Botswana and Tanzania. Trust in relatives (0.201<sup>\*\*</sup> and 0.176<sup>\*\*</sup>), neighbors (0.259<sup>\*\*</sup> and 0.114<sup>\*\*</sup>) and other people you know (0.210<sup>\*\*</sup> and 0.165<sup>\*\*</sup>) are however stronger correlated in Botswana than in Tanzania. This correlation analysis displays mostly weak correlation and with several of them also being insignificant it can tell us that social capital variables does not have a great impact on trust in public institutions and the spill-over effect is not as big as one maybe had hoped. These findings fail to give any significant support to the voluntary organization theory. Particularized trust does nevertheless have somewhat of a correlation with institutional trust, although not too strong. With the social capital variables however, we need to be extra cautious about the causality. In this case it could just as well be institutional trust and reasons for high institutional trust that leads to associationism and particularized trust as the other way around. The direction of the correlations between institutional trust and particularized trust and associationism will become clearer in the regression models below.

### *4.3.3 Trust and Transparency*

All the correlations between trust in public institutions and media access and perception of corruption in both Tanzania and Botswana are negative. In Botswana however listening to radio and watching television have insignificant correlations with institutional trust. The

corruption index is strongly correlated with trust (-0.303\*\* for Botswana and -0.394\*\* for Tanzania) which means that if a respondent expresses high levels of trust he or she is likely to also express low levels of perceived corruption and if a respondent believes that corruption rates are high they will likely express less trust in public institutions. This is as expected and in line with institutional theory of trust, saying that individuals will base their trust on how the institutions perform and as corruption is unaccepted behavior it will affect trust negatively. The correlation between media access and institutional trust are not as strong. The fact they are all negative is nevertheless quite interesting. This could mean that the mediums are reporting negative stories about incidents in relation to any of the public institutions. Stories that will cause the public to have less trust in public institutions, for instance about corruption in government. From this correlation analysis it seems as if perceived corruption has quite a lot to say in terms of peoples trust in public institutions, while how much they access media does not play the same role.

#### *4.3.4 Trust and Democratic Satisfaction*

In both countries there are positive and significant correlations between institutional trust and both “satisfaction with the democracy” and “faith in the government’s problem solving abilities”. The correlations are however strongest between trust and satisfaction with democracy (0.377\*\* for Botswana and 0.302\*\* for Tanzania). For Botswana the correlation between trust and faith in problem solving is also quite strong (0.268\*\*), while this correlation is rather weak (0.059\*\*) for Tanzania. This means that how well the democracy is functioning, in the eyes of the respondents, plays a significant role in how much they trust public institutions, while faith in problem solving does not seem to matter as much. Again, and not unexpected, institutional theory gains support, but here too the question of causality is important to remember. A well-functioning democracy could just as well be a result of high institutional trust as high institutional trust is a result of well-functioning democratic institutions. Further answers to the strength and direction of these effects will be given in the regression analysis.

#### *4.3.5 Trust and Policy Performance*

All variables in the policy performance category correlate quite strongly with trust in public institutions for both countries and they are all significant. The strongest correlation, in both Tanzania and Botswana, is between trust in public institutions and approval of the President’s performance (0.456\*\* and 0.422\*\* respectively) as well as the national performance

index (0.421\*\* and 0.416\*\*). In Tanzania the local performance index correlates the least with trust in public institutions (0.248\*\*), although this too is rather strong. In Botswana approval of the local government council correlates the least (0.257\*\*). Overall this could mean that if respondents regard the governments performance in a number of key areas as good and they approve of the President's, members of Parliament and the local government councilor's performance they will also trust more. The findings are according to the performance-based theory and therefore expected. The strong correlation between approval of the President's performance and institutional trust may however be somewhat surprising, although this is also the finding in Citrin and Green's (1986) study. This could prove that the President's performance is reflected in peoples trust in public institutions in general.

The findings in the correlation analysis are in large part as expected, both in terms of strength and direction, and most independent variables have an effect on institutional trust. The performance and institutionally related variables in the last three categories have the strongest effect which supports institutional and performance-based theory. National policy performance as well as approval of the President's performance have the strongest correlation with institutional trust. In addition, the corruption index is strongly, negatively correlated with trust in public institutions. Cultural and early-life experience does not seem to matter as much, yet many of the variables are correlated with institutional trust.

#### ***4.4 Regression analysis***

The regression analysis will hopefully give some answers to the direction and causalities in the correlations found above. It will also tell which category of independent variables explains the most of the variations in institutional trust. Many of the correlations above are confirmed, some with stronger and others with weaker effects. Those variables that were negatively correlated, still have a negative effect on institutional trust. Cultural theories of trust seem to still receive a little support, while institutional theory appears to get quite a lot support.

Table 4.5: Regression Analysis, dependent variable: Institutional Trust (Beta coefficients)

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4		MODEL 5		MODEL 6	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
<b>Socio-Demographics</b>												
<i>Age</i>	.100**	.123***										
<i>Living Conditions</i>	.131**	.145**										
<i>Tribe 1</i>	-.070**	.176**										.092**
<i>Tribe 2</i>	-	.059**										
<i>Tribe 3</i>	-	-.095**										
<i>Education</i>	-.140**	-.110**										
<b>Social Capital</b>												
<i>Member in Religious Group</i>			-	-.121**								
<i>Member in Com./Vol. Group</i>			-	.112**								
<i>Trust Relatives</i>			.169**	.055**								
<i>Trust Others You Know</i>			.086**	.100**								.123**
<b>Transparency</b>												
<i>Listen to Radio</i>			.089**	-.054**								
<i>Watch TV</i>			-	-.066**								
<i>Read Newspapers</i>			-.094**	-								
<i>Corruption Index</i>			-.209**	-.378**								-.218**
<b>Democratic Satisfaction</b>												
<i>Satisfaction w/Democracy</i>			.231**	.193**								.154**
<i>Faith In Problem Solving</i>			.179**	.050**								
<b>Policy Performance</b>												
<i>Performance Index</i>			.397**	.298**							.419**	.222**
<i>Approval of President</i>			.280**	.249**							.258**	.203**
<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>	.045	.090	.048	.034	.105	.164	.101	.040	.263	.390	.379	

\*\* . Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level

#### 4.4.1 Socio-demographic variables (model 1)

I start by looking at the explanatory power for model 1 for the socio-demographic variables. In a model with a multiple number of independent variables I need to look at the adjusted R square. This number is adjusted for the number of independent variables and will therefore be more accurate than just R square. In Botswana the socio-demographic model explains 4.5 percent of the variations in trust, while in Tanzania this category of independent variables explains 9 percent of the variation.

The coefficients are however the most interesting and the slope coefficients tell how much change, either positive or negative, there will be in the dependent variable if the independent variable changes with one unit. When we operate with a multiple number of independent variables, like here, we will not only see what effect each of the independent variables has on the dependent variable, but also the correlation between the independent variables and the other independent variables effect on the dependent variable. None of the slope coefficients in this regression model are particularly high, meaning that the socio-demographic variables do not have very big effects on trust in public institutions.

Age has a small positive effect on trust (0.100\*\* in Botswana and 0.123\*\* in Tanzania) which means that for both countries people seem to be more trusting the older they get. Living conditions has a slightly bigger effect on trust in both countries (0.131\*\* in Botswana and 0.145\*\* in Tanzania). Even though this is not very substantial it still gives some support to the theory of success and well-being. As mentioned, I have only included the three most dominating tribes in the regression analysis and we see that in Botswana being part of the Kalanga people will likely result in less trust in public institutions (-0.070\*\*). Since this in reality is the second largest ethnic group in Botswana and significantly smaller than the Tswana group the negative effect could be explained by discrimination or inferiority. In Tanzania however the tribe variables have a more significant effect. Members of the largest ethnic group, Sukuma, seem to be rather trusting of the public institutions (0.176\*\*), while being part of the Ha group has a slightly lower effect (0.059\*\*), but still positive. The third largest ethnic group, Chaga, do not seem to be very trusting as this effect is negative (-0.095\*\*). Education on the other hand has a slight negative effect on institutional trust (-0.140\*\* in Botswana and -0.110\*\* in Tanzania). This means that the higher education you have the less you trust. Gender does not have any significant effect on institutional trust.

The significant variables in this model can be generalized to the larger population, meaning that the effects seen here are likely to be true also outside this sample. As the significance level is 0.05 there is however a 5 percent chance that the effects are not real.

Similar to the correlation analysis we see that the socio-demographic variables have a minimal effect on institutional trust. This is as expected and means that several of the cultural theories, like the theory of success and well-being, only receive limited support. Previous findings state that ethnic background may have an effect on institutional trust, according to how the respective group has been treated by the government in the past and we do see signs of that here. The Kalanga people in Botswana and the Chaga people in Tanzania seem to be less trusting of the public institutions which may indicate poor treatment from the government in the past or the present. I will get back to this in the analysis.

#### *4.4.2 Social Capital (model 2)*

The explanatory power of the social capital model is not very big in either of the two countries. 4.8 percent of the variations in trust can be explained by social capital in Botswana, while only 3.4 percent of the variations in institutional trust can be explained by this category of independent variables in Tanzania.

The regression table tells us that none of the coefficients for social capital are particularly high. Associationism only has an effect in Tanzania where membership in religious groups has the strongest effect (-0.121<sup>\*\*</sup>) of all the social capital variables on trust in public institutions. This effect however is negative, meaning that the more active you are in a religious group the less trust you will have in public institutions. Membership in community or voluntary groups on the other hand has a small positive effect on institutional trust (0.112<sup>\*\*</sup>). The theory of voluntary organization therefore gains some support, but does not seem to be valid for religious groups. Why is this the case?

In Botswana trust in relatives (0.169<sup>\*\*</sup>) and trust in other people you know (0.086<sup>\*\*</sup>) are the only variables with any significant effect on institutional trust, but they do not have a very big effect. In Tanzania these variables have slightly smaller effects (0.055<sup>\*\*</sup> and 0.100<sup>\*\*</sup> respectively), but still positive. General trust and trust in neighbors have insignificant effects in both countries.

These findings give some support to some of the cultural theories, like the voluntary organization theory, as membership in voluntary and community groups has a small effect. However, membership in religious groups has a negative effect on institutional trust. We also see some spill-over effect from particularized trust to institutional trust, since trust in relatives and trusting other people you know will lead to more trust in public institutions. However, none of the effects in this model are particularly strong and the explanatory power is not very high,

consequently we cannot give too much support to the spill-over effect from social capital and social trust to institutional trust.

#### *4.4.3 Transparency (model 3)*

The explanatory power of the regression model for the category of transparency variables shows that for Botswana media access and perceived corruption explain 10.5 percent of the variations in institutional trust and in Tanzania they explain 16.4 percent. The somewhat high numbers for adjusted R square gives this model a relatively high explanatory power.

In Botswana listening to radio has a slight positive effect on trust in public institutions (0.089\*\*), while reading newspapers has a slight negative effect on trust (0.094\*\*). Using the internet and watching television have insignificant effects. Listening to radio will therefore lead to slightly more trust while reading newspapers will lead to slightly less trust. In Tanzania listening to radio (-0.054\*\*) and watching television (-0.066\*\*) have small, but significant negative effects, while using the internet and reading newspapers have insignificant effects. Listening to the radio and watching television will therefore lead to slightly lower trust in public institutions in Tanzania. The mediums with a negative impact on institutional trust can be believed to report on negative behavior or poor performance from institutions.

The variable that does have quite an effect on institutional trust is the corruption index. In Botswana trust in public institutions will decrease (-0.209\*\*) if respondents perceive corruption in the institutions. In Tanzania the effect (-0.378\*\*) is a little stronger and perceived corruption will lead to lower trust in public institutions. This confirms the negative relation between these two variables that was found in the correlation analysis, and also institutional theories claiming that unaccepted and unlawful behavior in government will lead to less trust in public institutions. We see that the effect from the corruption index is bigger in the regression model than in the correlation analysis, while the effect from the media variables are smaller. This indicates a correlation between these variables and that media usage will cause perception of corruption to influence institutional trust more.

#### *4.4.4 Democratic Satisfaction (model 4)*

The explanatory power of these variables for Botswana is quite good as this model explains 10.1 percent of the variations in trust in public institutions. In Tanzania however, only 4 percent of the variation in institutional trust can be explained by people's satisfaction with democracy.

The coefficients table shows us that in both countries both satisfaction with democracy and faith in problem solving has a somewhat strong positive effect on trust in public institutions. Satisfaction with democracy in Botswana has the strongest effect (0.231<sup>\*\*</sup>), while this variable is slightly weaker in Tanzania (0.193<sup>\*\*</sup>). Faith in the government's problem solving abilities has a somewhat smaller, but still significant effect in Botswana (0.179<sup>\*\*</sup>), in Tanzania the effect from this variable is rather small (0.050<sup>\*\*</sup>). As neither of these coefficients are vastly different from the coefficients in the correlation analysis it is not likely that these two variables correlate too much with each other. The effects are rather significant and proves that institutional performance is important in order to generating trust. Again we find evidence that supports the institutional theory.

#### *4.4.5 Policy Performance (model 5)*

The model summary for the regression analysis with trust and policy performance shows that the explanatory power is quite high and it seems that policy performance is important in deciding people's trust in public institutions. In Tanzania 26.3 percent of the variations in institutional trust can be explained by what the respondents think of the government's performance in several areas. In Botswana, the policy performance variables can explain 30.5 percent of the variations in institutional trust.

In both countries the performance index and approval of the President's performance are the only significant variables and they seem to have quite an effect on institutional trust. In Botswana, the coefficient for the performance index (0.397<sup>\*\*</sup>) shows that trust in public institutions will increase rather much if people are satisfied with the performance of the government. In Tanzania, the effect (0.298<sup>\*\*</sup>) is slightly lower, but still strong. Approval of the President has a slightly less effect on institutional trust in both countries, though higher in Botswana (0.280<sup>\*\*</sup>) than in Tanzania (0.249<sup>\*\*</sup>). The remaining variables have insignificant effects on institutional trust.

It is surprising that only two of the policy performance variables have any significant effect on trust in public institutions when all these variables had a significant correlation with institutional trust in the correlation analysis. It is however not so surprising that national policy performance and approval of the President's performance are the ones to have significant effects. The fact that these two factors alone explain so much of the variations in institutional trust absolutely prove that how individuals perceive the performance of the government in several key areas is important in determining trust. People will in large part base their trust on



past experience and performance. These findings absolutely coincide with the institutional and performance-based theory in addition to previous findings.

#### *4.4.6 All Independent Variables (model 6)*

In order to find out which independent variable explains the most we need to combine all the independent variables in one regression model. The adjusted R square shows us that the explanatory power in both cases is quite good. In Botswana, all the independent variables together explain 39 percent of the variations in institutional trust, while they in Tanzania explain 38 percent of the variation.

The model shows us that only a few of the independent variables have coefficients that show a significant effect. For Tanzania the Sukuma tribe, trust in others that you know, perceived corruption, satisfaction with democracy, policy performance and approval of the President's performance are the only significant variables. Being part of the Sukuma tribe continues to have a positive effect on institutional trust (0.092\*\*), yet not as big as when seen only in relation to the socio-demographic variables. This means that its correlation with the other variables decreases its effects. Trust in other people you know has a slightly bigger effect (0.123\*\*) in this model than in the model for only social capital variables. Some types of particularized trust can therefore be said to have a positive spill-over effect on institutional trust. The corruption index has a smaller effect (-0.218\*\*) on institutional trust than before, but still significant. Satisfaction with democracy also has less effect (0.154\*\*) than in the previous model. The performance index has the greatest effect (0.222\*\*) yet this is slightly lower than in relation to only policy performance variables. Also the effect of the approval of the President's performance remains quite high (0.203\*\*). As policy performance and perceived corruption are the variables with the greatest effect it can be said that positive and negative performance are the most determining factors in terms of institutional trust which gives support to the institutional and performance-based theory.

For Botswana even fewer coefficients for the independent variables are significant. The performance index has a slightly higher effect (0.419\*\*) now than in the previous model and the coefficient tells us that this effect is rather substantial. Approval of the President's performance is also important for the generation of trust (0.258\*\*), this is only marginally lower than in the previous model. None of the other coefficients have any significant effect on institutional trust. The most surprising factor in this model however is that perceived corruption does not have any effect. In Tanzania this variable is almost as important as policy performance, why then is this not significant in Botswana?

Not surprisingly, this model has the most explanatory power. However, there is more of a spread in the origin of institutional trust in Tanzania compared to Botswana where only performance variables influences trust in public institutions. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that we find stronger evidence for the performance-based and institutional theory of trust than cultural theories. Socio-demographic variables were not expected to have a big effect, but I had thought that social capital would have a bigger effect as well as levels of social capital all together to be stronger in Botswana than in Tanzania. Social networks theory might be said to gain somewhat support due to a small effect from particularized trust. If we see ethnicities as part of personality theory this also gains some support. Although the effect from performance variables is great, not all of them have an effect. Faith in problem solving, for instance, does not matter in the bigger picture. It might be strange that past performance of the government is so important while faith in their future performance is insignificant.

#### **4.5 Summary**

I have in this chapter presented my findings from the descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis completed in SPSS. The findings have in some cases been rather surprising and contradicting to my hypotheses. I found that most of the socio-demographic factors and the social capital variables were insignificantly correlated with trust. In the regression models there were more significant correlations, but rather weak ones. Being part of the largest tribe in Tanzania, Sukuma, seems to be positive for generating trust while the Chaga people are likely to express lower trust in public institutions. Most surprising however was that social capital had such little effect on institutional trust and that membership in religious groups in Tanzania and trusting relatives being negatively correlated with institutional trust. Institutional theories of trust seem to gain more support as the vast majority of the independent variables in the three remaining categories have rather strong correlations with institutional trust. As expected media access and perceived corruption is negatively correlated. These findings were confirmed in the regression models, although media access was not as strongly correlated. Perceived corruption has a strong negative effect on institutional trust, while satisfaction with democracy and policy performance have strong positive effects on institutional trust. When looking at the last regression model I find that in Botswana national policy performance and approval of the President's performance are the only variables with significant effects and quite strong effects too. In Tanzania, a few more variables, in addition to national policy performance and approval of the President, explain the variation in institutional trust. Perceived corruption has a negative effect while being part of the Sukuma

people, trusting other people you know and satisfaction with democracy have small positive effects.

All in all, we can say that the institutional and performance-based theory gains more support than the cultural theories. When seen in relation to the lifetime learning model these findings agree with previous findings stating that later-life experiences are of greater importance in order to generate institutional trust than early-life experiences. I will in the following chapter analyze these findings further and attempt to understand and explain why some variables have a greater effect than others and why some are negative while others are positive.

## **Chapter Five: Analysis**

### ***5.1 Introduction***

Analyzing my findings may be seen as the core of my thesis. This is where I try to answer my research question and draw the bigger lines in order to generalize. I will also conclude with whether institutional or cultural theories can be seen as valid in explaining trust in public institutions in Botswana and Tanzania. I have organized this chapter a lot like the previous one with separate discussions for each category of independent variables or in this case each hypothesis. I will start with the first hypothesis regarding the dependent variable, institutional trust before I move on to discussing the effect of the different categories of independent variables. In this, I will include both the descriptive statistics, the correlation analysis and the regression model for that specific category of independent variables as well as how these variables behave in the last regression model including all independent variables.

### ***5.2 Institutional Trust***

My first hypothesis was that levels of trust in public institutions would be higher in Botswana than in Tanzania due to their higher development level and stronger achievements from the government in a number of key areas. In addition, I predicted that the low ethnic diversity in Botswana would cause social trust and social capital to be high which again would have some positive effect on trust in public institutions. This was based on the performance-based (Mishler and Rose, 2001) and societal theories (Delhey and Newton, 2003) that stated that the success of a country and good performance by the government would lead to more trust from the public. The theories pointed in opposite directions than the findings in this case and I chose to rely on the theories when forming my hypothesis. What I found seemed to correspond more with previous findings than with the theories. Average trust in public institutions in Tanzania is somewhat higher than in Botswana and the majority of the respondents in Tanzania have faith in public institutions. In Botswana on the other hand, the majority has low trust in public institutions. Why is this the case and can it be explained by any of the independent variables? The average for the performance index shows us that respondents in Botswana believe the government here performs better than the respondents in Tanzania believe of their government. This also has a rather strong effect on institutional trust. It is strange however that how individuals evaluate their government's performance plays such a significant role while their faith in the government's ability to solve certain issues in the future is insignificant.

In addition to being the only coefficients that were valid for Botswana, the general policy performance and the President's performance have rather strong effects on trust in public institutions. As the performance-based theory predicts (Mishler and Rose, 2001) there is a strong correlation between trust and how well people believe the government performs. Why then are levels of trust not higher in Botswana when the respondents believe that the government performs fairly well? The President and the government's performance alone explain for almost 40 percent of the variations in trust in Botswana and none of the other variables explain anything. Therefore, several other factors in society must explain for the remaining 60 percent when controlled for these independent variables. What are these factors?

Understandably, the corruption index has a strong negative effect on trust in public institutions as this contradicts with people's expectations of how the government should perform. Perceived corruption in Botswana is fairly low, which coincides with their actual low corruption levels, and as this is the case trust levels will not suffer as much. In the regression analysis for all the variables however we saw that the effect of the corruption index was insignificant in the bigger picture. Levels of education however are somewhat higher in Botswana than in Tanzania and this too has a negative effect on trust, some of the explanation could lie here, but it is insignificant in the final regression model. Satisfaction with democracy and faith in the government's problem solving abilities does also have fairly strong effects on trust in public institutions and the average levels for these variables are quite high. Over 70 percent are satisfied with the functioning of the democracy in Botswana while the faith in problem solving is a bit more reserved. The insignificant effect from these variables on trust in public institutions, however, tells us that even though people are generally satisfied with democracy it does not matter for how they trust. Respondents in Tanzania are even more satisfied with democracy and this does have a positive effect on trust. Levels of generalized trust in both countries are very low, while levels of particularized trust are also fairly low in Botswana. In Tanzania on the other hand particularized trust is quite high. In comparison to the institutional trust levels this is rather surprising. How come people generally trust the public institutions, but they do not trust each other or in some cases even people that they know? In many ways institutional trust is more related to particularized trust than generalized trust as you have some sort of knowledge about the specific institution. It is in large part also related to strategic trust as this refers to trusting someone to do the job they are trained to do. In many ways it is therefore natural that institutional trust will be more similar to particularized trust than generalized trust.

The fact that political trust in Botswana is low might not be as big a surprise as the fact that trust in public institutions in Tanzania is so high. What is the reason for this high trust when the country is doing rather poorly development-wise? It could be a sign of loyalty towards the government and the President. People could be victims of President Jakaya Kikwete's<sup>5</sup> charismatic appearance and focus less on his actual achievements. An uncritical attitude towards the public institutions can also cause high trust. These findings corresponds with those of Mattes et al. (2002) and the paradoxes in the public opinion they present. Also my findings can therefore be said to be determined both by cultural, early-life factors and institutional, later-life factors. The political landscape of Tanzania has been influenced greatly by Julius Nyerere's one-party system which came to an end first in 1992. Although Tanzanians have enjoyed a multi-party system for a while now this is not a full-worthy liberal democracy. It could therefore be that individuals are somewhat naïve and believing that what they have is as good as it gets. We also see that higher education leads to lower trust, which means that the more knowledge one gets and the more trained one is in critical thinking will cause one to trust less. Since only a small minority has exceeded a primary school level the low education levels could be a reason for the high trust, which is also the hypothesis for my education variable.

More of the independent variables in the final regression have significant effects on trust causing the picture to be slightly more nuanced for Tanzania than Botswana, but they explain less of the variations in trust. The relatively low trust in Botswana could be caused by higher expectations from the people due to the countries previous success. It could also be that the democratic success in Botswana is not as great as it seems or that it is slowly coming to an end. Trust in the President is amongst the most trusted institutions.

### ***5.3 Socio-demographic variables***

My first category of independent variables had the general hypothesis that the socio-demographic variables would have a limited effect on trust in public institutions. As the performance of the government affects people randomly, trust in public institutions will also be randomly distributed amongst the population, regardless of age, gender, education, living standards and tribe (Newton and Norris, 2000). According to the personality theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003) trust can also be based on individual personality characteristics that will be evenly spread amongst all ages and tribes, genders, different living standards and levels of education. The socio-demographic factors have however been proved to have different effects

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<sup>5</sup> Kikwete resigned in November 2015, but since he was the President when the survey was conducted his performance will be used in the analysis.

on institutional trust in the past, I therefore developed individual hypotheses for each of the variables. I predicted that age would not have much effect on institutional trust. The results show that there was a small correlation in the correlation analysis and also a small, positive effect in the first regression model and absent in the final model. In a complex world there will always be a number of factors influencing each other and this again will affect the influence on a third factor. Looking at several variables will therefore give us a more complete picture. Age is naturally connected to several other variables and will therefore correlate with these in the different regression models. The more variables that are added to the model the less effect age seems to have. The idea that governmental performance affects people randomly independent of for instance age (Newton and Norris, 2000) receives support in the final model. In general, age has had mixed effects in previous studies, but Herreros and Criado (2008) as well as Paxton (2007) also find that age has a positive effect on institutional trust.

The second hypothesis within the category of socio-demographic variables anticipated that gender would have no effect on institutional trust. This turned out to be correct as we see that in none of the models does gender have any correlation with or effect on institutional trust. The insignificance of gender in this context again confirms the idea that institutional performance affects people randomly.

Education was believed to have a slight negative effect and we see that this is the case as it is negatively correlated in both countries and we see in the first regression model that education does have a slight negative effect on trust. It does however not have any effect in the final model including all the variables. The effect in the first model states that the higher education people have the less they trust. This can be explained by the fact that people get more experience with the political system as well as the different institutions and they learn more about it, which can cause them to become more critical as they know about the flaws and weaknesses of it. These are factors though that should also have been explained by age. The fact that education has a negative effect while age has a positive effect could mean that those with an education have developed a more critical mindset and they know more about what they should expect from the government and from a democracy in addition to what rights they have. These findings correspond with what Lühiste (2006) finds in his research on institutional trust in the Baltic states.

The theory of success and well-being was the basis for the hypothesis regarding economic prosperity's effect on trust. It was believed that those with better living conditions

had greater trust in institutions. Making sure that the economic growth in the country benefits all is one area where the government in Botswana has received some criticism and this is also the opinion of the people as 53 percent say that the government is doing a bad job at narrowing gaps between rich and poor. In Tanzania, 86 percent feel the same way. Living standards, which here represent economic prosperity, can be considered as a sign of how the government is doing in this area. We remember from the descriptive statistics that respondents reported worse living conditions in Botswana than in Tanzania. Again it must be noted that this is a subjective measure and people would normally evaluate their living conditions in comparison to what others have in addition to their own expectations. In Botswana, where the development is generally more successful than in Tanzania it could be the case that respondents rate their living conditions as worse even though they are actually better. Therefore, objectively living conditions are not necessarily worse in Botswana than in Tanzania. In Botswana 74 percent of the respondents answers that the government is doing a good job at improving living standards for the poor. In Tanzania however 81 percent says that the government is doing a bad job in this field. These numbers are not quite in line with how they rate their living standards. Living conditions has a stronger correlation with trust in Tanzania than in Botswana, and this is the case in the regression analysis as well. In both countries living standards has a small positive effect on trust. The theory of success and well-being states that people who have less will also trust less as they have relatively more to lose (Delhey and Newton, 2003). The fact that living standards has a positive effect on trust means that this theory gains some support. That people trust more the better their living conditions are can also be a result of their approval of the performance by the government. Since the majority of the respondents in Botswana are satisfied with the government's job at improving living standards for the poor the positive correlation between living standards and trust in public institutions can be a result of approval of performance. Therefore, this effect can also give grounds to the performance-based theory. In Tanzania however we must credit this effect to the theory of success and well-being.

My final hypothesis in the socio-demographic category suggested that tribe would have a positive effect on institutional trust. This was because the tribes included in the regression analysis were the three largest ones in each country. Smaller tribes might be discriminated and neglected by the government and could therefore have less trust in institutions, while the more dominating tribes avoid this. We saw that in Tanzania this was to some degree the case as the two largest groups, Sukuma and Ha, had a positive effect on institutional trust, while the third largest group, Chagga, was negatively correlated. The size difference between the second and third largest group however is not very big (4.9 percent and 4.5 percent). In spite of the great



ethnic diversity in the country it seems that most groups are linked by a common language, Swahili, and a shared national identity. In addition to this one major uniting factor is credited to the Tanzanian socialism created under Julius Nyerere's (World Culture Encyclopedia, 2016). This socialism was largely based on the idea of familyhood and mutual cooperation which in turn had a positive effect on ethnic groups and cooperation between them. The financial benefits from this politics were rather unsuccessful however. It does not seem like any groups are discriminated or neglected by the government. Why then does the Chagga tribe have a negative effect on institutional trust? When seen in relation to all the independent variables, however, Chagga and Ha are insignificantly related to trust, while Sukuma still has a positive effect.

In Botswana the Kalanga tribe had a negative effect on institutional trust, while the others were insignificant. In the model and in the survey Kalanga is the largest ethnic group, but in reality this is the second largest group with only around 11 percent of the population. In the past the Kalanga tribe as well as a few smaller tribes have been treated as lesser or minors by the Tswana people. This has caused a rivalry between the different ethnic groups and the Kalanga people have since the 1990's been fighting for recognition as an ethnic tribe as well as their minority rights (World Culture Encyclopedia, 2016). The domination of the Tswana people has also caused their customs, culture and language to predominate society, naturally causing other groups to feel neglected and discriminated. The government on the other hand claims to have a non-ethnic profile and the ethnic minorities are represented in official administration and bureaucracy (ibid.). Yet, it is easy to understand that being part of the minority will have negative effects on institutional trust. The situation has in many ways improved the last few decades, but the fact that trust amongst the minority is still low can be explained by cultural theories and path-dependency. Trust seems to be culturally bound in this case and will therefore be substantially more difficult to change, both in regard to how institutions should generate increased trust and how and why individuals will choose to trust institutions.

The many ethnic groups in Tanzania will result in none of them being too dominant. Therefore, the relation between them will be peaceful and cooperative, while in Botswana there is one very dominating group and some rather small ones which lead to an asymmetrical relation between the groups causing tensions. Though the oppression is not by the government it seems to have a negative impact on the trust relation between the Kalanga people and public institutions. This confirms previous findings and theories stating that discriminated groups will be less trusting (Gleave et al., 2012, Lühiste, 2006). On the other side, being part of the dominating tribe does not necessarily have a positive effect as we see that the Tswana tribe has an insignificant effect on institutional trust.

Most of the socio-demographic variables have low or insignificant effects on institutional trust. Together with the low explanatory power of the model this confirms the general hypothesis that socio-demographic factors would have a limited effect on trust in public institutions. This again confirms the part of the performance-based theory that states that how the government performs affects the population randomly. This is proven further when we see the socio-demographic variables in relation to the other independent variables where only the Sukuma tribe in Tanzania has any significant effect on trust in public institutions. The effects of the tribe variables in the first model confirm parts of the cultural theory stating that trust is something that is derived from personality, up-bringing and socialization.

#### ***5.4 Social Capital***

A strong social capital with a high degree of general trust is believed to have a positive spill-over effect on political trust. But as this has proven to not always be the case in newer democracies my hypothesis was slightly reserved in terms of this effect although I did predict a small effect. There were however good reasons to believe that social trust would be higher in Botswana than in Tanzania. We see that the effect of the social capital variables is not quite as expected. For both countries levels of generalized trust is very low and it does not seem to be any difference between the homogenous and the heterogeneous society. According to social networks theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003) generalized trust would be high in the homogenous country, Botswana, and low in the heterogeneous country, Tanzania, as it is believed that one easier trusts someone of their own kind. The fact that the levels are as good as equal is therefore much unexpected.

The levels of particularized trust are higher in Tanzania than in Botswana, which is quite surprising and also contradicting to the social networks theory. As noted in the hypothesis I had expected it to be the other way around. The societal theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003) also supports this thought as it is based on the belief that societal factors such as welfare systems, legal systems, political and economic prosperity and equal access to these goods for the population will lead to more trust. In many ways it is a lot like the theory of success and well-being for the country as a whole. As Botswana is definitively the more successful country of the two both social and political trusts should be higher here, but also this theory fails in this case. What are the reasons for this low social trust in Botswana? We remember that also the political trust was quite low in Botswana and lower than in Tanzania. Is there a correlation here or is it just a coincidence?

There is a correlation between the particularized trust variables and institutional trust, with the coefficients being a little higher in Botswana than in Tanzania, but the effect in the regression is rather small with only “trust in neighbors” and “trust in others you know” being significant. Levels of particularized trust are rather low, but they do have a positive effect on political trust, so if levels of particularized trust would be higher levels of political trust would be higher too. Surprisingly, general trust is weakly correlated in both countries and in the regression model we find that the effect is insignificant in both countries. As emphasized by Rothstein and Stolle (2008) the spill-over effect from general trust to institutional trust may vary between the political institutions and the legal and administrative institutions. One explanation for the insignificant effect from generalized trust to institutional trust could therefore be that all these institutions are merged in my study. The issues between the few ethnic groups in Botswana, discussed above could also be a contributing factor in the low social trust, both particularized and generalized, though as the vast majority of the population is of the same tribe both these forms of trust will in most cases not expand to outside the ethnic group.

The fact that membership in religious groups has a negative effect on political trust in Tanzania also contradicts with the hypothesis. What is the reason for this when membership in community or voluntary groups has an equally positive effect on trust in public institutions? Should religious groups be considered separate from other types of voluntary groups? Do the opinions and solutions from the government contradict with what is being professed in churches, mosques and within traditional religions? In Botswana the majority of the respondents are not members in any form of religious or community groups and this does not play any significant role in their political trust. These findings both reject and support the voluntary organization theory, as membership in community or voluntary groups has a positive effect, but membership in religious groups has a negative effect in Tanzania. The majority of the respondents however, are not members in any of these kind of groups.

People will likely join or form community and voluntary groups in order to achieve something collectively. They will be working together for a mutual benefit in their own community such as neighborhood watch or local action groups. To take part in a religious group, on the other hand, is only for personal benefit. Some of the reason for these group’s divertive effect on political trust could be explained by this. The social networks theory overlaps slightly with the voluntary organization theory and states that interaction with friends, family and colleagues will generate social trust. Low membership in both religious and voluntary and community groups could therefore also be a reason for the low social trust levels. As mentioned

before, there is a question of causality here. Whether membership leads to social trust or social trust leads to more members in community groups is unknown.

When seen in relation to the other independent variables we see that for Tanzania trust in others that you know still has a positive effect on trust in public institutions and this is stronger when seen together with all the independent variables instead of simply with social capital variables. For Botswana none of the social capital variables have any significant effect on institutional trust in the bigger picture. Why are social capital variables in general more correlated with institutional trust in Tanzania than in Botswana? In light of these findings we can say that the voluntary organization theory and social networks theory gains minimal support. For most part these findings support other recent findings that claim that the spill-over effect from social to political trust will likely be harder to achieve in newer democracies, like those of Tanzania and Botswana, than in well established, western democracies. Social trust however does not seem to be very high in either countries, so it is not so much a problem that the social trust has a positive effect on political trust, but rather that neither types of trust is very high.

The more nuanced picture the regression for Tanzania paints gives a slight credit to the social theories of trust by acknowledging that some of the social capital variables have an effect on trust. The variables that are significant have rather weak effects however. I find it most surprising that general trust has insignificant correlations and effects in all the analyses. Why is it so that people do not seem to trust people in general, but have a relatively high trust in the public institutions? As we have seen the cultural theories have gained little support, therefore institutional trust must in large part be based on performance. If individuals base their trust in institutions on the basis of performance it is more likely that they will also base their trust in others on the basis of previous experience. If their trust has been betrayed in the past they will likely be more careful before trusting people in the future. In relation to particularized trust this trust or distrust is assigned to each individual, but in terms of generalized trust it will be based on previous experience with strangers. If one stranger has betrayed your trust in the past you will likely be less trusting when interacting with the next stranger.

### ***5.5 Transparency***

The hypothesis regarding transparency was that high levels of perceived corruption would have a negative effect on trust and so would media access given a free media that is able to report on unlawfulness within public institutions. According to institutional theory

individuals are believed to show signs of less trust or distrust if institutions and the actors within the institutions do not act in line with shared norms, values and rules. In large part this hypothesis turned out to be correct as I found strong negative correlations between perceived corruption and media habits and trust in public institutions. These correlations are further established in the regression analysis where the effects are still strong, though a little weaker for the media variables and a little stronger for the corruption index.

The descriptive statistics shows us that most respondents believe that there is some degree of corruption within public institutions which is a pretty good assumption. Levels of corruption in Botswana have historically been amongst the lowest on the African continent. According to Transparency International's corruption index their scores have been right above 60 (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 is very clean) the last few years and dropping to 63 in 2015 (Transparency International, 2015). For a country who claims to have zero tolerance for corruption however this is not too impressive, but quite good in African terms. Tanzania on the other hand has only scored a little over 30 the last few years and dropping to 30 in 2015 (Transparency International, 2015). This means that for both countries corruption has actually worsened slightly over the last few years. Respondents then do right in believing that there is a degree of corruption in their countries although those of Tanzania should be more critical than they are. The fact that the perceived corruption will lower their trust is as expected and in line with the performance-based theory. If for instance members of Parliament, the President or the Police are involved in corruption, rent-seeking activities and bribing others to get their way they are not performing according to the public's expectations which will obviously influence their trust. When seen in relation to all the other independent variables the corruption index continues to have a negative effect in Tanzania, though not as strong, but in Botswana however it is insignificant. The fact that it does not seem to matter much in the bigger picture in Botswana is very surprising. The performance variables in general seem to influence trust quite a bit and since perceived corruption has a strong negative effect on institutional trust in the first model it is natural to believe that this would still be the case in the final model. In addition, it is often thought that negative incidents weigh heavier than positive incidents, meaning that individuals will focus on the negative things, like corruption, but also low performance and misuse of resources rather than the positive things. Therefore, I would have expected perceived corruption to also be evident in Botswana when seen together with the other variables. The case of Tanzania nevertheless is as expected according to my hypothesis and institutional theory in both models.

Freedom House's *Freedom of Press Index* shows that in Tanzania the freedom of the press has become slightly better over the last couple decades. In 1993 they received a total score of 60 on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is free and 100 is not free. Since then their score has been slightly over and under 50 and in 2015 it was 54. This means that the press is only partly free to report what they want. The fact that people will trust less the more they watch television or listen to radio in Tanzania can be caused by the media reporting on unlawfulness in the public institutions even though they are not completely free. The reason for the insignificant effect from internet and newspaper access could be that very few people get news from these mediums in their daily life. Reports from Freedom House show that there are some laws meant to prevent critical journalism like for instance the Statistics Act and even though it is not common that journalists are being convicted for unlawfulness the fear of prosecution causes a high degree of self-censorship. In addition to this the government tend not to support the critical mediums by for instance refusing to advertise through them and as private firms want to stay on good terms with the government they will often follow in the same paths. This results in an unfortunate financial situation for the critical mediums due to lose of income (Freedomhouse, 2015).

The total scores for Botswana are slightly better, but has worsened since the beginning of the 90's. In 1993 their score was 19, which is very good in African terms. After then however they have been stuck around 40 and in 2015 their score was 44 (Freedomhouse, 2015). This also equals out to be partly free, though better than Tanzania. In Botswana freedom of speech and expression is secured through clauses in the constitution, which for most part is respected by the government also when this is practiced by the media. On the other side there are a number of rules and laws meant to ensure national security, public order and public morality which can be used to limit freedom of the press (Freedomhouse, 2015). This can force the media to avoid reporting on the negative news. One of the major problems in Botswana, however is not that information does not get out to the people, but rather that the journalists do not have access to the information in the first place. This is a sign of low transparency and openness from the government. There are also reports saying that the government at times will censor and restrict stories they do not agree with. Self-censorship is also in some degree evident in Botswana due to fear of punishments. The state-owned newspaper the Daily News is free and the only newspaper accessible in rural areas (ibid.), and as most people read newspapers weakly or at least several times a month it is natural to believe that they read this one. As it is state-owned one might think that censorship and restrictions on what to publish would be more common here, but since reading the newspaper has a negative influence on institutional trust this might not be the case.

It seems then that in both Botswana and Tanzania media will report somewhat freely and as people for most part end up trusting less the more news they get from different media channels it must mean that negative information on public institutions is being reported. This could be in terms of corruption, but it can also be on the government not performing as they should and as expected by the public. The low effect from the media variables can be explained by the fact that certain restrictions and fear of punishments can cause the media to not being able to report on all the negative actions of the public institutions which again can be an explanation for why the effect on trust is not stronger. The generally negative effect can also be a sign that whatever positive stories that are being reported do not make up for the negative ones. In relation to all the other independent variables in the final regression model media habits no longer have any effect meaning that these variables are not so relevant in the bigger picture.

Overall it can be stated that only in Tanzania does negative performance have a negative effect on trust in public institutions while this is the case in Botswana only when seen isolated from other categories of variables. The performance-based theory therefore gains some support, but it might be that negative performance does not have as big effect on trust as positive performance does.

### ***5.6 Democratic Satisfaction***

The performance-based theory was the basis for a hypothesis stating that satisfaction with the democratic functioning of the country would lead to higher trust and as we saw in the previous chapter this turned out to be a correct assumption. The descriptive statistics for Tanzania showed us that the vast majority of the respondents were satisfied with the democracy and they find it likely that the government will solve several societal issues within the next five years. In Botswana, respondents are also mostly satisfied, although there is a slightly smaller majority than in Tanzania and just over 50 percent believe that the government will solve certain issues within the next five years. It is surprising that people in Tanzania are more satisfied as this country has performed worse in terms of development in the past. This trend is noticeable also when looking at levels of institutional trust and there should therefore naturally be a correlation between the two. Instead we find a rather weak link between institutional trust and faith in problem solving.

Faith in problem solving can be regarded as strategic trust, that individuals trust the various institutions to solve certain issues within some main societal areas like for instance improving health care or education systems. Institutional trust on the other hand can, as

mentioned, be seen as particularized trust in the sense that we in many ways know the institutions or officials within the institutions. These types of trust both refer to the context-specific versions of trust regarding how and whom we trust. It would therefore be expected that they had a stronger correlation. Why are they not stronger correlated?

The main task of the government is to provide for its citizens and ensure their rights, how and if they at all perform in these areas should affect how people trust in a larger degree. Tanzanians are generally very pleased with the government's problem solving skills something that according to the performance-based theory should lead to greater trust in institutions. The finding that this is not the case dismisses the institutional theory in this specific point. In Botswana however the effect of this variable is stronger as well as satisfaction with democracy having even stronger effects on institutional trust in both countries.

Satisfaction with democracy can be seen as a general satisfaction with and faith in the political system as opposed to trust in the specific institutions. The result that satisfaction with democracy as the generalized form of institutional trust has a strong effect on the more particularized form of trust in public institutions is therefore not so surprising. Overall satisfaction with democracy does nevertheless seem to be less important for trust in public institutions in Tanzania than in Botswana. This is also explained by the weaker explanatory power by the model for Tanzania. However, satisfaction with democracy does have a positive effect on institutional trust also in the final model, meaning that it does play a contributing role in explaining trust. All in all, the performance-based theory gains support due to the strong effect that these two variables have on trust in public institutions, with the small exception of faith in problem solving in Tanzania. If people are satisfied with the political system, they will also trust the public institutions in that system. In his study on institutional trust in South Africa Askvik (2008) finds that satisfaction with democracy is very important in the determination of peoples trust in institutions. It is therefore somewhat surprising that the explanatory power of these variables in my study is significantly lower than in his study.

In relation to the other independent variables the effect from satisfaction with democracy becomes a little weaker in Tanzania while faith in problem solving is insignificant. In Botswana both variables are insignificant.

### ***5.7 Policy Performance***

The hypothesis for the policy performance variable was naturally based on the performance-based theory and the hypothesis is in large part correct. The performance of national government and approval of the President's performance have strong correlations with



trust in both countries and the effect for these variables in the regression analysis is even stronger. The insignificance of the remaining variables in the regression model shows that when all the policy performance variables are seen together the effect that the government's and the President's performance has on trust "washes out" the effect of the other variables. The strong effect from policy performance variables can be seen in several other studies as well, like for instance those of Askvik (2008), Lühiste (2006) and Hutchison and Johnson (2011) referred to in the theoretical framework above. The descriptive statistics shows that people are generally fairly satisfied with the performance of the President, the members of Parliament and the local government council. In Botswana they are also quite satisfied with the general policy performance while people in Tanzania are not as pleased in this area. As the samples in these surveys are rather large it can be believed that these numbers paint a reasonably good picture of how well the government actually performs, although this is a subjective measure from the respondents according to their expectations.

The fact that the government in Botswana receives higher praises from their people can be explained by their success in several important policy areas, like health care and education systems (Worldbank, 2016), through the years. It is nevertheless strange that the numbers were turned around in the previous section where Tanzanians had great faith in the problem solving skills of the government, while Botswanas did not have that much faith. The main difference here is that one variable is based on evaluations of past performance, while the other is faith in future performance. There seems to be a slight change in both countries at the moment, with the economic growth in Botswana slowing down while Tanzania is experiencing higher economic growth than ever (Worldbank, 2016). This could be an explaining factor. The overall success in terms of development can also cause the people of Botswana to expect more of the government than the people of Tanzania. Therefore, the government also has more to lose if they do not succeed, which in turn will affect trust negatively.

In the regression model with the effect of all the independent variables on trust in public institutions we see that in Botswana the government's and the President's performance are the only variables that have significant effects and they have quite strong effects too. In Tanzania these are the variables with the strongest effect, but a few other variables also contribute in explaining institutional trust.

We see that the local government's performance has an insignificant effect on institutional trust in both countries, while national policy performance is the most important factor in determining people's trust in public institutions, at least in comparison to my

independent variables. This confirms the foundation of the performance-based theory further as it seems that how the government performs is the most determining factor for peoples trust. But why is the performance of the national government so much more important than the performance of the local government? As mentioned, there are two aspects to the performance-based theory, the political and the economic (Mishler and Rose, 2001, Lühiste, 2006). Both aspects are represented in the national performance index with for instance empowering women, fighting corruption and reducing crimes representing political aspects and reducing the gap between rich and poor and creating jobs are part of the economic aspects. In the local performance index mainly political aspects are represented. The matters mentioned in the national performance index can be seen as more relevant in terms of development and improvements in the country, both nationally and locally. One explanation could thus be that individuals feel that national government is more important than local government and that they are to a stronger degree responsible for the really important issues in society. In addition, the majority of the public institutions in the trust index are national level institutions, it might therefore not be so strange that local performance is not correlated with trust in national institutions.

Why does the President's performance have such a positive effect on trust while members of parliament's performance are insignificant? The respondents in Botswana state that they approve of President Ian Khama's work, but they only have a little trust in him. The respondents in Tanzania are a bit more consistent in their answers with somewhat trust and a slight approval of President Jakaya Kikwete. Their performance however is important in terms of how people trust public institutions in general. Is there something about their leadership and charisma that causes this effect or have they achieved on levels which justifies approval? Is it also that the Presidents get credit for achievements from institutions in general because they give people a name and a face for people to rely on? Citrin and Green (1986) have found this to be true in their studies. Personal characteristics and charisma are especially important in this matter and these are factors that have been visible amongst leaders in several African countries since independence. This was the case also for President Kikwete. He was a very popular president in his ten-year period much due to his charismatic character, but also because of his achievements in improvement of infrastructure and foreign policy. He also improved economic conditions for individuals and women in particular and contributed to economic growth. However, Kikwete and his government were also involved in numerous corruption scandals as well as failing to protect journalists criticizing political leaders and reporting on failure from the government (Daily Monitor, 2015). The high trust in and approval of President Kikwete is

thus well reasoned and it seems to be the case also here that he might stand as a representative of the public institutions in general.

Botswana has long been known for its democratic, peaceful and stable society. It has a well-functioning multiparty system that has existed long, but over the past few years this has started to crack. A negative development that is being ascribed to President Khama's more and more autocratic leadership. In his re-election in 2014 his party, Botswana Democratic Party, received significantly less support than before and there are clear signs of stress in the political system (Mail & Guardian Africa, 2015). Yet approval of President Khama's performance is high, though trust is slightly lower. As this variable has a strong, positive effect on institutional trust we can believe that also in Botswana people view their President as the leader for, and face of the public institutions.

These presidential characteristics correspond with the mentioning above that it seems as the two countries are undergoing some changes. While Tanzania seems to be heading in the right direction in many key areas, both politically and economically, Botswana is going through somewhat of a rough patch. In the case of Botswana, it will hopefully turn out to be exactly that, a rough patch, and thus not be a permanent shift. The newly elected president in Tanzania, John Magufuli, on the other hand must continue the good work to assure continued high trust from the public.

As we saw above trust levels are higher in Tanzania than in Botswana. The strange factor is that approval of governmental performance and presidential performance is relatively high in Botswana and this has a strong positive effect on trust in public institutions, but trust levels are rather low. The adjusted R square of the final model shows that policy performance explains almost 40 percent of the variations in trust in public institutions. This is a very satisfactory result, but it also means that there are other factors in society that I have not considered in my study that have negative effects on trust. Again, this shows how complex it is to explain the origins of trust. Nevertheless, the performance-based theory of trust gains a lot of support in this category as do previous findings that the President's performance and charisma play a significant role.

## **5.8 Summary**

What are the origins of institutional trust? And how can we explain that different variables have different effects in Botswana and Tanzania? These are questions I have tried to answer in this analysis chapter. The first hypothesis regarding the general institutional trust

levels in the two countries turned out not to be valid as respondents in Tanzania expressed greater trust in public institutions than the respondents in Botswana did. The reasons for this could be lower expectations from the public, naivety or that they simply do not know better after years of poor government under Nyerere and a one-party democracy. The different hypotheses within the socio-demographic category showed mixed belief in the effect of these variables. Age and gender turned out to be insignificant, as expected, while education had a small negative effect, also as predicted. Living standards as a measure for economic prosperity turned out to have a small positive effect which was also in line with the hypothesis and the theory of success and well-being. Tribe was probably the most interesting variable in this category and the strong effects, both negative and positive, were reasoned in the specific groups relation to the government. The Kalanga tribe in Botswana have long been discriminated and oppressed by the Tswana tribe which is likely to explain their low institutional trust. The generally low support for the socio-demographic variables as well as low explanatory power of the model proves that cultural theories help little in explaining why people choose to trust public institutions.

The social capital variables do not give much support to the cultural theories either. In the first model however, there is a small effect from most of the variables in Tanzania, but only a few significant ones in Botswana. The spill-over effect from social trust and social capital can therefore only be said to be slightly true in these countries.

The transparency variables were expected to have a negative effect on trust based on that corruption is seen as a negative factor in society and will therefore lead to lower trust amongst the people. Levels of perceived corruption are not too high in either country, but this does have a rather strong negative effect on institutional trust. The media variables had for most part negative influence on institutional trust as well, but not as strong. The partly free media in both countries gives reason to believe that some negative stories are being reported which is likely to lead to the decrease in trust.

Satisfaction with democracy and faith in problem solving were, based on the core of institutional theory, believed to have positive effects on institutional trust which turned out to be a relatively correct assumption. The strong effect from satisfaction with democracy can be explained by the thought that if people are generally satisfied with the system they will likely also trust the functioning of the institutions within this system. Faith in problem solving should by this logic have been stronger related with institutional trust as this refers to why individuals trust and whom they trust. Institutional theory does nevertheless gain support given that the variables all do have a positive effect on institutional trust. The significant effect from the satisfaction with democracy variable in the final regression model also proves this.

The policy performance variables were not unexpectedly the variables with the strongest correlations in both models. However, national policy performance and the President's performance were the only significant variables, these were also significant in the final regression model. This is naturally explained by the performance-based theory as people will trust more the better they evaluate the government's performance to be. The importance of the President can be ascribed to his role as the head of government and many will probably see him as a leader for the various institutions, although this is not necessarily the case in practice.

All in all, national policy performance and approval of the President's performance seems to be the most important variables in determining people's trust in public institutions which in turn gives support to performance-based and institutional theory as well as previous findings (Askvik, 2008, Lühiste, 2006, Mishler and Rose, 2001). Cultural theories on the other hand does not get a lot of support, though there are some small spill-over effects from social trust to institutional trust. Associationism and particularized trust have minimal effects and so does tribe and education. Also these results correlate with the theories and hypotheses.

In the following chapter I will try to gather the main points of this analysis in order to reach a conclusion for this study. A summary of the thesis will be necessary before I can list the paradoxes and implications of my study and finally answer my research problem. As institutional trust in an African context is without a doubt a field that deserves to be studied further I will round of with some suggestions for future research.

## **Chapter Six: Concluding Remarks**

I started this thesis by asking the questions *What is trust? What defines trust? Why do we decide to trust and how do we measure it? Do we need trust?* Maybe of more importance in this context *how does trust occur?* I have for most part treated trust as expectations as opposed to ways of conduct. I relied on Newton's (2001) definition of trust stating it as "*a belief that others, at worst, will not knowingly or willingly do you harm, and at best, will act in your interest*". This will also include a vulnerability factor, meaning that individuals place themselves in a somewhat critical position by relying on others to handle certain matters on their behalf. The decision to trust someone can be based on mutual interests and the want and need to cooperate in order to reach a common goal or simply making others responsible for the outcome alone. In complex and unknown situations individuals need to trust and rely on others in order to cope. It was established early on in this thesis that we need trust. We need to be able to trust the people around us as well as the institutions we interact with on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. Trust is vital for social cooperation, the generation of social capital, a stable democracy and functioning institutions. It is believed that people who share expectations, values and beliefs are more likely to trust each other. If the common codes of conduct are practiced by the institutions, they will likely gain increased trust from the public. In addition, this could lead to more trust amongst individuals.

The importance of trust is highly recognized and widely studied and discussed, but in the large pile of research on the field there are surprisingly few studies concerning African countries. As the presence of trust is regarded as vital for establishing modern, well-functioning democracies it is strange that it is not studied further in these newly established democracies in Africa. Based on this I chose to study institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania. The reason for choosing these two countries was that the former is seen as a rare African success in terms of development. It has had a stable multi-party democracy since independence in 1966 with a steady economic growth. However, it has struggled a bit when it comes to making sure that the growth will benefit the many. In addition, it has recently been claimed that President Ian Khama is rather autocratic in his leadership. Nevertheless, Botswana is the highest ranked sub-Saharan African country on the Human Development Index. The latter has been known to struggle slightly more in terms of development and good governance. Since independence in 1961 Julius Nyerere ruled the country for decades as a socialist, one-party state. The implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs was partly successful and has helped the country to economic

growth, but this has not benefited the majority of the population and development is still suffering. In addition, corruption levels are high and the country scores rather poorly on good governance indexes. An additional difference between the countries is the ethnic compositions. Botswana is a homogenous country with one dominating ethnic group, the Tswana tribe, and a few smaller ones. Tanzania on the other hand is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world with around 130 different ethnic groups.

My research problem asked which factors determined institutional trust in the two countries and if there were any differences, either in trust levels alone or determining variables of trust in public institutions. In order to be able to answer this I started off with a theoretical discussion of the concept of institutional trust as my dependent variable. This led me to a further discussion of the various factors and elements that can cause a trusting relationship between individuals and public institutions. Two main theories were presented here as the ones I would rely on when explaining my findings in the analysis. Cultural theories consist of six sub-theories; personality theory, the theory of success and well-being, community theory, voluntary organization theory, societal theory and social networks theory. These theories have gained mixed support in the past, but were included as a contrast to the institutional theory in an attempt to explain those variables that were not directly connected to the institutions. Institutional or performance-based theory logically states that trust in institutions is based on their performance and if this is in accordance with the public's expectations. Based on this I developed two categories of independent variables within the cultural theories; socio-demographic factors and social capital, and three categories of independent variables within institutional theory; transparency, democratic satisfaction and policy performance.

The absolute majority of studies on trust are done using statistical data and I therefore chose to rely on quantitative method as well. Statistics gave me the possibility to generalize my findings to the larger population and it tells me about the situation concerning institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania as a whole as opposed to looking at a very isolated case like when using qualitative methods. Comparing two countries gave the study more depth as I got to test the theories in different national contexts. The time-consuming process of collecting statistical data required me to rely on a secondary analysis using data from Afrobarometer's 2012 survey. I thoroughly evaluated their methods as well as the data collected and regarded it as both valid and reliable. The validity and reliability of my study was also evaluated and found to be fairly good. In addition to these strengths to using the quantitative comparative method there are absolutely some weaknesses. The main one being that I have never been to either of the two countries which can cause me to make misinterpretations about different situations. Combining

the quantitative method with qualitative elements like for instance fieldwork would absolutely have strengthened the thesis. Observations and in depth interviews would have added some flesh to the bone and a more accurate interpretation of reality. I do however think that I have been able to capture a good image of the situation due to the thorough data collection methods done by Afrobarometer catching the diversities in society and a reflected understanding of key areas in the two countries.

In the process of analyzing my data I relied on descriptive statistics as well as correlation and regression analysis done in SPSS. The findings gave me some surprises judging by my hypotheses. First and foremost, levels of institutional trust were higher in Tanzania than in Botswana. I had expected it to be the other way around. The explanation for this could be loyalty towards the government or simply that they are not aware of what good governance entails after years of bad governance. The situation in Tanzania has however improved somewhat over the last few years and this is likely to increase trust. At the same time the development curve in Botswana is flattening out which could cause institutional trust to decrease. One could also think that President Khama's autocratic style would decrease trust, but trust in the President is fairly high in Botswana. Wong and Hsiao (2011) has studied the effect from several institutional and cultural variables on institutional trust in six Asian countries; China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. In a few of the countries some of the cultural variables have an effect. Traditionalism and authoritarianism, for instance, have weak, but positive correlations with institutional trust. Although these two variables are not included in my study they could be thought to lead to high trust in public institutions in general and the President in particular. Authoritarianism is believed to lead to loyalty towards the government and political fear will cause one to express higher trust than intended (Jamil and Askvik, 2016).

As the trust index consists of administration and public officials in addition to the elected politicians I must also consider their trustworthiness. Jamil et al. (2013) find, in their study on institutional trust in Nepal and Bangladesh, that prompt and efficient as well as friendly and helpful public officials generate more trust in both countries (Jamil et al., 2013). In addition, predictable and reliable civil servants are positively correlated with institutional trust in Nepal (ibid.). It could therefore be that the administration and bureaucracy in Tanzania is more efficient since trust is generally higher here. The descriptive statistics for trust in the public institutions separately (in appendix 2) show that there is no clear distinction between trust in the representational institutions and the legal and administrative institutions.

Based on previous findings I did not have too high hopes for the socio-demographic variables. I expected an insignificant effect from gender and age which turned out to be correct,



which is also in line with previous findings and theoretical expectations that institutional performance will affect people randomly. In Wong and Hsiao's (2011) study age and gender also have insignificant effects on trust in public institutions. Personality, up-bringing and societal and community features will also affect people regardless of age and gender. The slight negative effects of education were also expected, though this effect was not very strong. As the absolute majority in both countries has completed primary school it is likely that it is secondary school and higher education that causes the effect. Learning about the political system and political and social rights as well as developing a more critical mindset could be the cause effect. Also this was the case in Wong and Hsiao's (2011) study, where education is found to have a slight negative effect on institutional trust in China, while insignificant in the other countries (Wong and Hsiao, 2011). China is known for its authoritarian regime and as people seem to trust less the more education they have could be a sign of a more critical attitude towards the government. The same explanation can be valid in the two countries in my study.

Living standards was expected to have a positive effect as the theory of success and well-being states that those who have more have relatively less to loose and will therefore be more willing to trust others, including public institutions. This theory gained some support as the effect was weakly positive. The descriptive statistics for this variable was surprising as living standards seemed to be better in Tanzania than in Botswana. This is strange considering Botswana's higher development status. Some of the explanation however can lie in the fact that this is a subjective measure.

Tribe was believed to be positively related to institutional trust. The effects from the three largest tribes in the two countries were both negative and positive. Due to discrimination and oppression in the past the Kalanga tribe in Botswana seems to trust less. The two largest tribes in Tanzania, Sukuma and Ha, are very trusting of the public institutions, while the Chaga tribe is less trusting. The overall effects of the socio-demographic variables were as expected minimal. The explanation for the limited effect could be the irrelevance of social and demographic elements in regard to how institutions perform, both negatively and positively.

I did expect there to be a spill-over effect from the social capital variables to institutional trust and this was to some degree true, though very limited. The theory of voluntary organization gained some support due to the findings in Tanzania. It was however baffling that membership in voluntary or community groups had a positive effect on institutional trust while membership in religious groups had a negative effect. General trust levels in both countries seem to be very low and this has no impact on institutional trust. Theories and previous findings state that if people generally trust other people and take an active part in their community this

will build social networks and a more trusting culture will develop. In Tanzania this seems to be the case as most variables have some effect, though membership in religious groups are negatively correlated. In Botswana on the other hand only two of the particularized trust variables have a positive effect on institutional trust. Social capital does, for most part, have a positive impact on institutional trust, but it cannot be said to be a determining factor.

The remaining groups of independent variables were all connected to institutional theory, and the thought that trust in institutions would be based on their performance. Generally speaking, these variables had a significantly bigger effect on institutional trust than the previous variables. Involvement with corruption is viewed as negative behavior and it contradicts with values and norms in society, it was therefore as expected that perceived corruption had a negative effect on institutional trust. In Jamil et al.'s (2013) study in Bangladesh and Nepal they too find that corruption has a negative effect on institutional trust in Bangladesh, but not in Nepal.

In what degree people get news from different mediums is not of great significance, but in Botswana listening to radio has a positive effect while reading newspapers has a negative effect. It is therefore likely to believe that different stories or different perspectives of the stories are being reported in these two mediums. In Tanzania both listening to radio and watching television has a negative effect, meaning that they are likely reporting stories that put the public institutions in a bad light. Individuals will mainly receive information about what is going on in government through the media and this will naturally influence their trust, but we see that it does not have a great effect.

We also find an expected correlation between how satisfied respondents are with democracy and how much they trust public institutions. This can be explained by the thought that if people are satisfied with the political system and agree with the values and norms expressed through that system they will trust more. As the core of the performance-based theory claims, the actual performance of the institutions will be determining for how much trust they receive from the public. This is also the case in Tanzania and Botswana. Approval of the President's performance is also very important. In both countries it seems as the performance in various key areas is quite good, however better in Botswana than in Tanzania. Respondents also approve of their President. This has also been the case in previous findings. The President is the face of the government and its institutions, the work done by the institutions may therefore reflect on his leadership and this again will either increase or decrease trust. Wong and Hsiao's (2011) also find that both economic and political performance has a strong positive effect on institutional trust. Similar to the findings in a number of other studies (Mishler and Rose, 2001,

Askvik, 2008, Lühiste, 2006), it can be said that the institutional theory gains vastly more support than the cultural theory.

This summary leads me to the answer of my research problem. Although the socio-demographic and social capital variables do have some effect on institutional trust in both countries, it is without doubt that those variables directly related to the institutions and their performance that explain for the most variations in trust in public institutions. The institutional theory of how and why trust occurs therefore gains the most support and we can say that this theory is valid in these two African countries. Mishler and Rose's (2001) lifetime learning model distinguishes between early-life socialization and later-life experiences and cultural and social variables and institutional and performance-based variables are seen in relation to one another. They claim though that the combination of these variables in the determination of individuals' trust will likely not happen in newer democracies and it seems as this is the case in Botswana and Tanzania. However, there are signs that the people in Tanzania still inhabit some of the legacies from Nyerere's presidential era. In an unstable political situation with varied performance trust will likely also change rapidly if determined by performance, if, on the other hand, the cultural and social variables play the bigger role trust will not be affected by the unstableness in government. In this case it will be unlikely or rather impossible that these variables all influence institutional trust. In well-established and stable democracies early-life socialization, pre-political experiences and social trust will often coincide with adult experiences of both the social and political world. This is likely to cause both cultural, social and institutional variables to influence peoples trust patterns, but in newer democracies individuals will rely on one type of variables, or early-life or later-life experiences. In Botswana and Tanzania, it seems as though people, as expected, will rely on the latter. The main difference between the two countries is that slightly more of the variables can be given credit for institutional trust in Tanzania than in Botswana. Apart from this, both countries display the same trends in terms of institutional trust. As national policy performance is the absolute most important factor in gaining trust from the public this is the key area to focus on in terms of continued trust and increased trust in the future.

A few paradoxes can be found in this thesis. The first one is that respondents are more satisfied with the policy performance in Botswana and this has a positive effect on institutional trust, but trust levels are lower here than in Tanzania. A second paradox is that more people approve of the President in Botswana than in Tanzania, but less people trust him. Third, faith in future problem solving is much stronger in Tanzania, but satisfaction with previous performance is weak. Why would people trust the government to solve issues when they do not

approve of the work they have done in the past? In addition, I also find it strange that people in Botswana show greater trust in public institutions than in relatives, neighbors and other people they know.

Grimen (2009) required that a good theory of trust would help answer the question how and why trust occurs, develops and crumbles. The combination of institutional and cultural theories does a satisfying job at this. In terms of how and why trust occurs, positive and fulfilling performance by the government is of most importance. Trust in institutions in both countries is quite high, people are also satisfied with the performance of the institutions and they approve of their President. When trust is performance-based, increasing and developing trust will as mentioned require better institutional performance which in theory is simple as opposed to culturally based trust. The challenging element with performance-based trust however is that institutional trust can crumble just as easy as it can occur and develop. Continued high performance and avoidance of negative conduct is therefore important for continued trust from the public. The fact that trust already is high and satisfaction with policy performance, the President and the democracy as a whole is good are positive signs in regard to development and government. As noted several times, trust is vital for a well-functioning democracy with stable institutions and the findings in this thesis paints a positive picture of the situation for both countries. Even though there is still a long way to go in terms of a stable government and development the fact that the public is generally positive to the work done by the public institutions is a very good start and this will also make it easier to solve issues and achieve goals in the future.

I hope that I with this thesis have contributed somewhat to an increased focus on the African countries within trust research as well as determining some of the factors that lead to trust in public institutions. I have tested the two main theories of trust in two African countries and the results I got were not much different than those found in studies in Western and Asian countries. Based on this study I can say that it seems as if performance and institutional factors are the main variables determining institutional trust also in African countries. However, this is a relatively small study and if there are at all any major differences between how trust occurs in developed and newly established democracies would be interesting to study further. A larger comparative study of several African as well as European countries could therefore be of great interest. Even though the explanatory power of my model is satisfying there are other factors in society that I have not included that could possibly contribute to explaining the variations in institutional trust. Relying on different independent variables is yet another path one could take

when studying institutional trust. There is absolutely a potential for improvement in regard to the method I have used and in terms of further studies on institutional trust in an African context it would absolutely be beneficial to combine the quantitative method with qualitative methods. As mentioned this is a weakness to my own study. A greater depth in the analysis could have been given by including fieldwork and having some real-life experiences to draw from. Another interesting perspective for a study on institutional trust would be a time study in order to compare levels of trust over a certain period of time and see if the determinant variables of trust has changed through different development phases and under different governments and Presidents as this is seemingly an important variable. I sincerely wish that institutional trust and its determining factors will be studied further in a wider African context.

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## Appendix 1: Survey Questions

### *Institutional Trust*

<b>59. How much trust do you have in each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?</b>					
	Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	Don't Know
a. The President	0	1	2	3	9
b. The Parliament	0	1	2	3	9
c. The Independent Electoral Commission	0	1	2	3	9
d. The Botswana/Tanzania Revenue Services	0	1	2	3	9
e. Your Local Government Councilor	0	1	2	3	9
f. The Ruling Party	0	1	2	3	9
g. Opposition Political Parties	0	1	2	3	9
h. The Police	0	1	2	3	9
i. The Army	0	1	2	3	9
j. Courts of Law	0	1	2	3	9
K – TAN The Prevention and Combatting of Corruption Bureau (PCCB)	0	1	2	3	9

### *Socio-demographics*

<b>1. How old are you?</b> [Interviewer: enter three-digit number. Don't know=999] [If respondent is aged less than 18, stop interview and use cards to randomly draw another respondent from the same household]			
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<i>Let's discuss economic conditions.</i>						
<b>3. In general, how would you describe:</b>						
	Very Good	Fairly Good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly Bad	Very Bad	Don't know
<b>b. Your own living conditions?</b>	5	4	3	2	1	9

<i>Let's go back to talking about you</i>			
<b>84. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?</b> [Do not read options. Code from response] Tanzania			
Mnyakyusa	740	Mmeru	751
Mchaga	741	Mkurya	752
Mhaya	742	Migogo	753
Mngoni	743	Mluguru	754
Mikwere	744	Mfipa	755
Mpare	745	Mmanyema	756
Mhehe	746	Mnyiramba	757
Mmakonde	747	Mnyaturu	758
Mnyamwezi	748	Tanzanian only or "doesn't think of self in those terms"	9990

Msukuma	749	Refused to answer	9998
Mmasai	750	Don't know	9999
		Other (specify):	Post code

<i>Let's go back to talking about you</i>			
<b>84. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?</b> [Do not read options. Code from response] Botswana			
Mokgatla	140	Mokhurutshe	154
Mokwena	141	Mmirwa	155
Mongwato	142	Mongologa	156
Mongwaketse	143	Modamara	157
Motlokwa	144	Mombukushu	158
Moherero	145	Molete	159
Morolong	146	Motswapong	160
Mosarwa	147	Motlharo	161
Mokalaka/Mokalanga	148	Motlhaping	162
Mosubeya	149	Mokgothu	163
Motawana	150	Motswana only or "doesn't think of self in those terms"	9990
Mokgalagadi	151	Refused to answer	9998
Moyeyi/Moyei	152	Don't know	9999
Mohurutshe	153	Other (specify):	Post code

<b>97. What is the highest level of education you have completed?</b> [Code from answer. Do not read options]	
No formal schooling	0
Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling)	1
Some primary schooling	2
Primary school completed	3
Some secondary school/high school	4
Secondary school/high school completed	5
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. diploma or degree from polytechnic or college	6
Some university	7
University completed	8
Post-graduate	9
Don't know (do not read)	99

<b>101. Respondent's gender</b>	
Male	1
Female	2

**Social Capital**

*Let's turn to you role in your community*

**25. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member.**

	Official leader	Active member	Inactive member	Not a member	Don't know
a. A religious group that meets outside of regular worship services	3	2	1	0	9
b. some other voluntary or community group	3	2	1	0	9

*Let's turn to your views on your fellow citizens*

**87. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?**

Most people can be trusted	1
Must be very careful	0
Don't know	9

**88. How much do you trust the following types of people?**

	Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	Don't know
a. Your relatives	0	1	2	3	9
b. your neighbors	0	1	2	3	9
c. other people you know	0	1	2	3	9

**Transparency**

**13. How often do you get news from the following sources?**

	Every day	A few times a week	A few times a month	Less than once a month	Never	Don't know
a. Radio	4	3	2	1	0	9
b. Television	4	3	2	1	0	9
c. Newspapers	4	3	2	1	0	9
d. Internet	4	3	2	1	0	9

**60. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?**

	None	Some of them	Most of them	All of them	Don't know
a. the President and Officials in his Office	0	1	2	3	9
b. Members of Parliament	0	1	2	3	9
c. Government Officials	0	1	2	3	9
d. Local government councilors	0	1	2	3	9
e. Police	0	1	2	3	9
f. Tax officials, like Botswana Unified Revenue Services or Local government tax collectors	0	1	2	3	9
g. Judges and Magistrates	0	1	2	3	9

**Satisfaction with Democracy**

<b>43. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way the democracy works in Botswana?</b>	
<b>Are you:</b> [Read out options. Only one option to be chosen. Read the question in the language of the interview, but always read “democracy” in English. Translate “democracy” into local language only if respondent does not understand English term.]	
Very satisfied	4
Fairly satisfied	3
Not very satisfied	2
Not at all satisfied	1
Botswana/Tanzania is not a democracy	0
Don't know	9

<b>64. Taking the problem that you mentioned first, how likely do you think it is that the government will solve this problem within the next five years?</b>	
Very likely	3
Somewhat likely	2
Not very likely	1
Not at all likely	0
Not applicable	7
Don't know	9

**Policy Performance**

<b>65. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?</b>					
	Very badly	Fairly badly	Fairly well	Very well	Don't know
a. Managing the economy	1	2	3	4	9
b. Improving living standards for the poor	1	2	3	4	9
c. Creating jobs	1	2	3	4	9
d. Keeping prices down	1	2	3	4	9
e. Narrowing gaps between rich and poor	1	2	3	4	9
f. Reducing crime	1	2	3	4	9
g. Improving basic health services	1	2	3	4	9
h. Addressing educational needs	1	2	3	4	9
i. Providing water and sanitation services	1	2	3	4	9
j. Ensuring everyone has enough to eat	1	2	3	4	9
k. Fighting corruption in government	1	2	3	4	9
l. Resolving violent conflict between communities	1	2	3	4	9
m. Combatting HIV/AIDS	1	2	3	4	9
n. Maintaining roads and bridges	1	2	3	4	9
o. Providing a reliable supply of electricity	1	2	3	4	9
p. Empowering women	1	2	3	4	9
Q – TAN Reducing transport accidents such as road and marine	1	2	3	4	9
R – TAN Managing natural disasters such as flooding, draughts etc.	1	2	3	4	9

<b>66. What about local government? I do not mean the national government. I mean your municipal or local government council. How well or badly would you say your local government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?</b>					
	Very badly	Fairly badly	Fairly well	Very well	Don't know
a. Maintaining local roads	1	2	3	4	9
b. Maintaining local market places	1	2	3	4	9
c. Maintaining health standards, for example in restaurants and food stalls	1	2	3	4	9
d. Keeping our community clean, for example, by refuse removed	1	2	3	4	9
e. Managing the use of land	1	2	3	4	9

<b>71. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?</b>					
	Strongly Disapprove	Disapprove	Approve	Strongly Approve	Don't know
a. The President	1	2	3	4	9
b. Your Member of Parliament	1	2	3	4	9
c. Your elected local government councilor	1	2	3	4	9



## Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics

### *Dependent variable*

#### Descriptive statistics

	N		Min.		Max.		Mean		Std. Deviation	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
Trust President	1160	2387	.00	.00	3.00	3.00	1.822	2.075	1.1292	.9821
Trust Parliament	1143	2382	.00	.00	3.00	3.00	1.35	2.128	1.0252	.9224
Trust national electoral commission	1088	2279	.00	.00	3.00	3.00	1.626	1.806	1.1009	1.0012
Trust revenue authority	930	2218	.00	.00	3.00	3.00	1.501	1.599	1.0834	.9342
Trust local gov. council	1159	2381	.00	.00	3.00	3.00	1.25	1.846	1.0225	.9160
Trust the ruling party	1180	2390	.00	.00	3.00	3.00	1.454	1.833	1.1367	1.0486
Trust opposition parties	1156	2382	.00	-1.00	3.00	3.00	.884	1.588	.9575	.9762
Trust the police	1188	2392	.00	.00	3.00	3.00	1.542	1.691	1.1132	1.0142
Trust the army	1152	2384	.00	.00	3.00	3.00	1.877	2.31	1.1118	.857
Trust courts of law	1091	2382	.00	.00	3.00	3.00	1.835	2.008	1.1146	.8811
Trust the PCCB*		2233		.00		3.00		1.698		.9819
Valid N (listwise)	828	2121								

#### Frequencies: Trust Index

	Frequencies		Percent		Valid Percent		Cumulative percent	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
<b>0.00-0.49</b>	30	34	2.5	1.4	3.6	1.6	3.6	1.6
<b>0.50-0.99</b>	148	122	12.3	5.1	17.9	5.7	21.5	7.4
<b>1.00-1.49</b>	290	420	24.2	17.5	35.1	19.8	56.5	27.2
<b>1.50-1.99</b>	139	509	11.6	21.2	16.8	24.0	73.4	51.2
<b>2.00-2.49</b>	110	727	9.1	30.3	13.2	34.3	86.6	85.5
<b>2.50-3.00</b>	111	309	9.3	12.9	13.4	14.5	100.0	100.0
<b>Total</b>	828	2121	69.0	88.4	100.0	100.0		
<b>Missing</b>	372	279	31.0	11.6				
<b>Total</b>	1200	2400	100.0	100.0				

**Frequencies: Tribe**

	Frequencies		Percent		Valid Percent		Cumulative Percent	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
<b>Tribe 1</b>	191	332	15.9	13.8	15.9	13.8	61.6	36.9
<b>Tribe 2</b>	147	118	12.2	4.9	12.2	4.9	29.4	59.6
<b>Tribe 3</b>	113	108	9.4	4.5	9.4	4.5	9.4	6.8

*Tribe 1 = Botswana = Kalanga; Tanzania = Sukuma*

*Tribe 2 = Botswana = Bangwato; Tanzania = Ha*

*Tribe 3 = Botswana = Bakgala; Tanzania = Chaga*

**Frequencies: Education**

	Frequencies		Percent		Valid Percent		Cumulative Percent	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
<b>No formal schooling</b>	138	189	11.5	7.9	11.5	7.9	11.5	7.9
<b>Informal schooling only</b>	10	21	.9	.9	.9	.9	12.4	8.8
<b>Some primary school</b>	136	316	11.4	13.2	11.4	13.2	23.7	21.9
<b>Primary school completed</b>	128	1382	10.7	57.6	10.7	57.6	34.4	79.5
<b>Some secondary school</b>	202	210	16.8	8.8	16.8	8.8	51.3	88.3
<b>Secondary school complete</b>	364	195	30.3	8.1	30.3	8.1	81.6	96.4
<b>Post- secondary qualifications</b>	75	54	6.2	2.3	6.2	2.3	87.8	98.7
<b>Some university</b>	45	13	3.8	.6	3.8	.6	91.6	99.2
<b>University completed</b>	96	15	8.0	.6	8.0	.6	99.5	99.9
<b>Post-graduate</b>	6	4	.5	.1	.5	.1	100.0	100.0
<b>Total</b>	1200	2400	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

**Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis**

*Socio-demographic variables*

Trust Index	Age		Living Conditions		Tribe		Education		Gender	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
<b>Pearson Correlation</b>	.142**	.115**	.059	.114**	-.002	.112**	-.158**	-.149**	.079**	-.027
<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	.000	.000	.089	.000	.946	.000	.000	.000	.024	.214
<b>N</b>	828	2117	827	2117	747	1148	828	2121	828	2121

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)

*Social Capital*

Trust Index	Member in religious group		Member in community/ voluntary group		General trust		Trust neighbors		Trust Relatives		Trust others you know	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
<b>Pearson Correlation</b>	.010	-.067**	.061	.018	.040	.031	.259**	.114**	.201**	.176**	.210**	.165**
<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	.767	.002	.078	.398	.248	.149	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
<b>N</b>	828	2121	828	2112	828	2119	828	2121	827	2121	827	2121

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)

*Transparency*

Trust Index	Listening to Radio		Watch Television		Reading Newspaper		Use Internet		Corruption Index	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
<b>Pearson Correlation</b>	.060	-.106**	-.044	-.143**	-.124**	-.112**	-.102**	-.069**	-.303**	-.394**
<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	.083	.000	.211	.000	.000	.000	.003	.002	.000	.000
<b>N</b>	828	2121	828	2121	828	2118	825	2081	569	1929

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)

*Satisfaction with Democracy*

Trust Index	Satisfaction with Democracy		Faith in Problem Solving	
	Botswana	Tanzania	Botswana	Tanzania
<b>Pearson Correlation</b>	.377**	.302**	.268**	.059**
<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	.000	.000	.000	.007
<b>N</b>	824	2099	782	2097

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)

*Policy Performance*

Trust Index	Performance Index		Local Performance Index		Approval of President		Approval of MP		Approval of LGC	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
<b>Pearson Correlation</b>	.416**	.421**	.277**	.248**	.422**	.456**	.319**	.304**	.257**	.311**
<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
<b>N</b>	677	2121	706	2045	805	2108	783	2107	787	2108

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)

**Appendix 4: Regression Analysis**

*Trust and socio-demographic variables*

Model	R		R <sup>2</sup>		Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		Std. Error of the Estimate	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
1	.231 <sup>a</sup>	.304 <sup>a</sup>	.053	.093	.045	.090	.69039	.57250

Model	Unstandardized coefficients				Standardized coefficients		t		Sig.	
	B		Std. Error		Beta		Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.				
Constant	1.322	1.599	.127	.060			10.375	26.582	.000	.000
Age	.004	.005	.002	.001	.100	.123	2.389	5.620	.017	.000
Living conditions	.118	.092	.033	.013	.131	.145	3.607	6.920	.000	.000
Tribe 1	-.134	.305	.068	.036	-.070	.176	-1.986	8.377	.047	.000
Tribe 2	-.033	.160	.075	.057	-.016	.059	-.446	2.800	.656	.005
Tribe 3	-.110	-.271	.087	-.060	-.044	-.095	-1.257	-4.529	.209	.000
Education	-.047	-.050	.014	.010	-.140	-.110	-3.319	-5.079	.001	.000
Gender	.102	-.035	.049	.026	.072	-.029	2.101	-1.363	.036	.173

*Tribe 1 = Botswana = Kalanga; Tanzania = Sukuma*

*Tribe 2 = Botswana = Bangwato; Tanzania = Ha*

*Tribe 3 = Botswana = Bakgalta; Tanzania = Chaga*

*Trust and Social Capital*

Model	R		R <sup>2</sup>		Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		Std. Error of the Estimate	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
1	.234 <sup>a</sup>	.191 <sup>a</sup>	.055	.036	.048	.034	.68881	.58955

Model	Unstandardized coefficients				Standardized coefficients		t		Sig.	
	B		Std. Error		Beta					
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
<b>Constant</b>	1.297	1.614	.041	.055			31.792	29.390	.000	.000
<b>Member in religious group</b>	.018	-.145	.053	.029	.012	-.121	.339	-4.967	.735	.000
<b>Member in com./vol. group</b>	.115	.136	.069	.030	.057	.112	1.666	4.593	.096	.000
<b>General trust</b>	-.067	.047	.081	.040	-.030	.025	-.831	1.157	.406	.248
<b>Trust relatives</b>	.240	.136	.058	.056	.169	.055	4.127	2.409	.000	.016
<b>Trust neighbors</b>	.021	.068	.066	.041	.014	.043	.322	1.656	.747	.098
<b>Trust others you know</b>	.138	.123	.067	.030	.086	.100	2.071	4.030	.039	.000

*Trust and Transparency*

Model	R		R <sup>2</sup>		Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		Std. Error of the Estimate	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
1	.336 <sup>a</sup>	.405 <sup>a</sup>	.113	.164	.105	.162	.68040	.54533

Model	Unstandardized coefficients				Standardized coefficients		t		Sig.	
	B		Std. Error		Beta					
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
Constant	1.975	2.500	.094	.042			20.996	58.999	.000	.000
Listen to Radio	.045	-.023	.021	.010	.089	-.054	2.093	-2.374	.037	.018
Watch TV	-.010	-.024	.020	.010	-.024	-.066	-.513	-2.362	.608	.018
Read Newspaper	-.046	-.006	.022	.012	-.094	-.014	-2.081	-.502	.038	.616
Use Internet	-.041	.010	.021	.016	-.088	.014	-1.959	.611	.051	.541
Corruption Index	-.405	-.442	.056	.025	-.290	-.378	-7.254	-17.668	.000	.000

*Trust and Satisfaction with Democracy*

Model	R		R <sup>2</sup>		Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		Std. Error of the Estimate	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
1	.322 <sup>a</sup>	.202a	.104	.041	.101	.040	.66758	.58215

Model	Unstandardized coefficients				Standardized coefficients		t		Sig.	
	B		Std. Error		Beta					
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
Constant	1.091	1.560	.049	.048			22.423	32.498	.000	.000
Satisfaction w/democracy	.356	.267	.054	.030	.231	.193	6.633	8.960	.000	.000
Faith in problem solving	.257	.106	.050	.045	.179	.050	5.142	2.339	.000	.019

*Trust and Policy Performance*

Model	R		R <sup>2</sup>		Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		Std. Error of the Estimate	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
1	.576 <sup>a</sup>	.518 <sup>a</sup>	.332	.268	.305	.263	.64858	.55670

Model	Unstandardized coefficients				Standardized coefficients		t		Sig.	
	B		Std. Error		Beta		Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.				
Constant	.465	1.324	.175	.037			2.664	35.437	.009	.000
Performance Index	.856	.549	.213	.090	.397	.298	4.024	6.075	.000	.000
Local performance index	-.050	.100	.186	.084	-.028	.058	-.271	1.186	.787	.236
Approve of President	.578	.334	.167	.051	.280	.249	3.463	6.556	.001	.000
Approve of MP	.185	.014	.150	.058	.117	.011	1.233	.235	.220	.814
Approve of local gov. council	-.016	.100	.151	.059	-.010	.077	-.108	1.683	.914	.093

*Trust and all independent variables*

Model	R		R <sup>2</sup>		Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		Std. Error of the Estimate	
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
1	.747 <sup>a</sup>	.636 <sup>a</sup>	.559	.405	.390	.379	.62967	.50729



Model	Unstandardized coefficients				Standardized coefficients		t		Sig.	
	B		Std. Error		Beta					
	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.	Bots.	Tanz.
<b>Constant</b>	.294	1.680	.588	.185			.499	9.070	.619	.000
<b>Age</b>	.000	3.472E-5	.007	.002	.008	.001	.062	.021	.951	.983
<b>Living conditions</b>	-.004	-.004	.104	.024	-.005	-.006	-.043	-.163	.966	.871
<b>Tribe 1</b>	-.371	.176	.243	.066	-.143	.092	-1.53	2.656	.131	.008
<b>Tribe 2</b>	.114	.012	.263	.129	.045	.003	.433	.093	.666	.926
<b>Tribe 3</b>	-.095	-.064	.276	.109	-.034	-.020	-.342	-.589	.733	.556
<b>Education</b>	-.029	-.024	.059	.018	-.060	-.049	-.483	-1.35	.631	.178
<b>Gender</b>	.326	-.007	.177	.045	.201	-.005	1.84	-.154	.070	.878
<b>Radio access</b>	-.052	-.023	.059	.017	-.095	-.049	-.884	-1.35	.380	.178
<b>TV access</b>	.003	-.024	.050	.017	.006	-.061	.059	-1.43	.953	.153
<b>N.P. access</b>	-.002	.013	.063	.020	-.004	.027	-.033	.635	.973	.526
<b>Internet access</b>	-.087	.015	.056	.029	-.165	.019	-1.55	.532	.125	.595
<b>Corruption Index</b>	-.009	-.275	.157	.046	-.007	-.218	-.059	-5.996	.953	.000
<b>Satisfaction w/democracy</b>	.052	.227	.092	.050	.060	.154	.563	4.583	.575	.000
<b>Faith in problem solving</b>	.165	.099	.087	.087	.196	.038	1.901	1.143	.062	.253
<b>Performance Index</b>	.888	.406	.269	.094	.419	.222	3.296	4.299	.002	.000
<b>Local performance index</b>	-.213	.094	.253	.085	-.117	.055	-.841	1.104	.403	.270
<b>Approve of President</b>	.555	.269	.234	.052	.258	.203	2.373	5.162	.021	.000
<b>Approve of MP</b>	.183	.011	.210	.056	.110	.009	.869	.196	.388	.844
<b>Approve of LGC</b>	-.169	.023	.205	.058	-.098	.018	-.822	.402	.414	.688

<b>Member in religious group</b>	-.143	-.063	.169	.049	-.082	-.049	-.844	-1.286	.402	.199
<b>Member in com./vol. group</b>	.049	.088	.256	.051	.019	.065	.194	1.712	.847	.087
<b>General trust</b>	.146	.064	.334	.067	.043	.032	.437	.955	.664	.340
<b>Trust relatives</b>	.149	-.019	.180	.088	.093	-.008	.828	-.212	.410	.833
<b>Trust neighbors</b>	.133	-.113	.183	.066	.080	-.070	.726	-1.702	.470	.089
<b>Trust others you know</b>	.093	.162	.206	.052	.050	.123	.451	3.103	.653	.002