

# **UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN**

Department of Administration and Organization Theory

# **AORG 351**

# **Master's Thesis in Public Administration**

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IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES AT LOCAL LEVEL IN UGANDA. A CASE STUDY OF NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL ADVISORY SERVICES (NAADS) IN MUKONO DISTRICT LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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#### **Abbreviations**

NAADS National Agricultural Advisory Services

UBOS Uganda Bureau of Statistics
GDP Gross Domestic product

DANIDA Danish International Development Agency

EU European Union

EC European Commission

MFPED Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development
MAAIF Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries

NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
CAO Chief Administrative Officer

CFO Chief Finance Officer

DPMO District production and Marketing Officer

DNC District NAADS Coordinator
DAO District Agricultural Officer
DVO District Veterinary Officer
DFO District Fisheries Officer

UPDF: Uganda people's Defense Forces
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization

FGDs Focus Group Discussions

FGs Farmer Groups

SAPs Structural Adjustment Programs
OWC Operation Wealth Creation

PFA Prosperity For All

PPP Public Private Partnership

LEAP Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty Program

IGG Inspector General of Government

OAG Office of Auditor General

CIID Criminal Intelligence and Investigations Directorate

PAC Parliamentary Accountability Committee

PMA Plan for Modernization of Agriculture

IMF International Monetary Fund SAPs Structural Adjustment Programs

GOU Government of Uganda

DSC District Service Commission
OPM Office of the Prime minister
RDC Resident District Commissioner
DISO District Internal Security Officer

VFF Village Farmer For a
PFF Parish Farmer For a

DENIVA Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations

# **Dedication**

This research work is dedicated to my family, more so to my uncle, Mr. Kisaaliita Paddy Valerian for starting my academic journey. It is also dedicated greatly to my brother Mr. Masembe Mohammed for the immense support and advice during my academic journey and finally to my wife, Edith Nalugwa for the great support, endurance and courage to give birth to our first child, Idris Ssewanyana Bwogi, while I was away finishing this academic milestone.

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#### **Abstract**

The Government of Uganda's NAADS policy is the main overarching policy in the agricultural sector in the country. With implementation of NAADS in all 111 districts in the country, the government sought to increase accessibility of farmers to extension services in order to boost agricultural productivity in the country and eventually improve farmers' livelihood. NAADS is implemented in phases, with first phase starting in 2001 to 2007 but later extended to 2010 and phase two commenced from 2010 to 2015. This study focused on NAADS phase two because it was the most recent one and offered me easy accessibility to relevant empirical data for the study

The study based on data collected from Mukono District local government to assess the challenges that affected NAADS implementation in the district. This study used qualitative research approach. Therefore, data collection methods such as interviews, FGDs, observation and documents were used to collect relevant empirical evidence for the study. To study the research problem, I sought guidance and theoretical explanations from mainly two theories: Winter's integrated implementation theory and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory.

Both theories proposed relevant explanatory factors that affect the policy implementation process and its results. These explanatory variables include: policy standard and objectives, policy resources from Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory and organizational and inter-organizational relations, political and socio-economic conditions and target-group behaviors from Winter's integrated implementation theory. The theoretical elements from both theories were merged and analyzed in the study in order to show their account on policy implementation specifically NAADS implementation at the local level. Based on the data gathered, the study realized various challenges that greatly affected the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district. Some of the challenges highlighted in the study include: political interference in the NAADS implementation process, ambiguity of policy standard and objectives to various policy actors, insufficient financial and human resources, delayed disbursement of policy funds to the district, corruption by policy implementers, lack of budget control by local governments, poor organizational and inter-organizational relations, opposition of the reform from technical personnel, farmers, among others. The study analyzed the findings extensively in the subsequent chapters of the study and the findings purposely contribute to theory building of the two theories mainly used in the study.

#### **CHAPTER ONE**

#### 1.0 Introduction

In this study, I examine the implementation process of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) at the local government level in Uganda. Taking Mukono district as the area of study, I intended to analyze the challenges encountered in the implementation of NAADS. I anchor my analysis in the grassroots local governments because that is where the actual implementation of the NAADS takes place. NAADS is a government of Uganda extension policy implemented in all the district local governments in the country. It was introduced in 2001 through an Act of parliament, known as the NAADS Act 2001. In particular, the study focused on the second phase which was the most recent. This phase commenced from 2010 to 2015. The second phase was opted for because it afforded me easy accessibility to empirical data. Therefore, the study draws on the empirical data which I collected from Mukono district local government in Uganda between June and August 2015 to analyze the research problem. This chapter consists of: the background of the study, statement of the problem, significance of the study, research objectives, and research questions of the study. It also comprises of the significance of the study, scope of the study, theoretical framework, methodology of the study, and composition of the thesis, as elaborated below.

#### 1.1 Background of the study

During late 1980's and early 1990's, the World Bank and IMF introduced sweeping reforms in most developing countries. In Uganda, these reforms included liberalization of trade in agricultural inputs, services and output, privatization of state owned enterprises that supported production and marketing and downsizing the number of civil servants who had hitherto provided extension services, among others. (Bahiigwa, Rigby, & Woodhouse, 2005). These reforms aimed at changing the status quo, where the agricultural sector in Uganda was dominated by state parastatals<sup>1</sup>. The parastatals subsidized the sector from farm inputs supply to marketing of the agricultural commodities. However, with the economic struggles of the 1980's, the country could not maintain the status quo, hence, the need to introduce structural adjustment programs (SAPs). In debates regarding the influence of SAPs like liberalization, privatization, de-regulation, decentralization, Uganda was often seen as an

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Parastatals refer to corporations or companies owned wholly of partially by the government.

African show case<sup>2</sup> for the beneficial effects of SAPs (Bahiigwa et al., 2005). Conversely, in response to Bahiigwa et al (2005), other authors drew more pessimistic conclusions on implementation of those reforms, remarkably, structural weaknesses in the Uganda's economy still existed and the agricultural sector response to reforms was weak (see Belshaw, Lawrence & Hubbard, 1999 as cited in Bahiigwa et al., 2005; Betz, 2009; Joughin & Kjær, 2010; Kjær & Joughin, 2012). These reforms had both positive and negative consequences. For instance, the positive consequences included a reduction in the gross government expenditure on service delivery operations, development of the private sector in the agriculture sub-sector of the economy. However, the negative consequences seem to outweigh the positive ones. Some of the notable negative effects of the reforms included income inequality and increases in the proportion of the very poor; the collapse of public extension, credit and marketing services (Semana, 1999, 2004) and fall in agricultural productivity (MAAIF, 2012; Okoboi, Kuteesa, & Barungi, 2013). The purpose of this study is not to revisit that debate about the effects, merits and demerits of SAPs, but to assess the implementation process of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) in the country, with the view to explore the challenges that hinder its effective implementation specifically in Mukono district local government.

To overcome the impending problems in the Agricultural sector, the government of Uganda, with the support from World Bank and other donors, restructured the country's Agricultural extension system. In 2001, Uganda embarked on a fundamental reform of its agricultural extension services. For that matter, NAADS was drafted as a paradigm-changing policy-shift, a radical move away from a conventional, top-down government-led extension service system to a partially privatized, demand-led extension policy in which farmers were supposed to define their own requirements for advice (Okoboi et al., 2013: 3). Although, NAADS was conceived as an ambitious long-term program that might take 25 years to succeed, it has been suspended twice, significantly changed, and finally turned on its head, to re-emerge as a government extension service once again (ibid). NAADS has been implemented in phases: the first phase started in 2001-2007. However it stretched to 2010 and phase two commenced from 2010 to 2015. This study focused on the second phase of NAADS implementation because it was the recent one, and thus, it afforded me easy accessibility to pragmatic evidence about NAADS implementation in the district. Additionally, record keeping in most local governments in Uganda was and is still a challenge because it is not considered a

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> African show case meaning exemplary case of well implemented SAPs in the continent.

priority, and thus, it is always allocated little funding (see Onzima, 2013). Therefore, accessibility to some data is a problem. Such reasons necessitated my option for the latest phase because data was still in one piece and easily accessible unlike the earlier phase. NAADS implementation has been reviewed several times and various studies conclude that its implementation has been ineffective (see Joughin & Kjær, 2010). However, some of those studies devoted little effort to studying NAADS implementation at a local government level. Due to the distinctive nature of local governments in Uganda, each with its own unique characteristics, it calls for an independent analysis of each unit. Thus, such rationale prompted me to study NAADS implementation in Mukono district local government.

In 1997 the Ugandan government launched the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) as a strategic framework to eradicate poverty through agricultural development (Betz, 2009: 1). PMA comprised of seven components, each of which addresses a particular objective of the plan. The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) is one of the seven components and is responsible for broad range of activities, including the provision of advisory services to farmers, expansion of farmer institutions, and raising the productivity of Ugandan farmers (ibid). NAADS implementation has been extensively funded compared to other reforms in the sector. The first phase (2001-2010) costed US \$108 million and the budget was vastly increased in the second phase (2010- 2015), costing US\$ 666 million (Benin, Nkonya, Okecho, Randriamamonjy, Kato, Lubade, et al., 2011). Despite the attention and resources devoted to the NAADS implementation, recent analysis show that majority of staple food crops production was decreasing (see Betz, 2009), and farmers accessibility to agricultural technology was low and generally there was limited public information on the impact of the program (Okoboi et al., 2013). NAADS was designed to be implemented under public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement, where, the government would contract out extension services provision to private agencies. (Benin, Nkonya, Okecho, Randriamamonjy, Kato, Lubadde, et al., 2011). The approach was assumed to be an efficient means of delivering services to only those farmers who would demand the service, hence creating a demand-driven extension system that would minimize costs (ibid). Moreover, under the PPP extension system, it was envisaged that the central government would initially shoulder a greater share of the cost of extension services provision and later gradually shift the cost to the local governments and farmers through their organizations in order to make extension services demand driven by the private sector (Nahdy, 2004). However, little success was registered in that endeavor and the overall output of the policy which targeted increased

agricultural productivity in the country was not forthcoming (MAAIF, 2012). Hence the need to explore the underlying factors that hinder effective NAADS implementation in the country, particularly in this study the focus was put on Mukono district local government.

#### 1.2 Problem statement

By any measure, Uganda is an agricultural country. Despite the declining contribution of agriculture to overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP) now estimated at 15%, the agricultural sector remains the main source of livelihood to 80% of Uganda's population (UBOS, 2014). The agricultural sector accounts for 48% of exports, provides a large proportion of the raw materials for industry (UBOS, 2008 as cited in Joughin & Kjær, 2010 p. 64). The bulk of Uganda's exports are agricultural commodities and much of the industrial activity is in agro-processing. Growth of agriculture is therefore critical to the growth of the overall economy and poverty reduction in Uganda (MAAIF, 2012). Various research studies conducted for instance the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study for Uganda by World Bank in 2006 and its recent update in 2012 confirm the country's substantial potential to expand production of food and to become a regional exporter of food staples (Okoboi, 2010). However, despite the fact that rapid growth in agriculture is important for Uganda, it remains dismal averaging 3 per cent over the past 5 years (MAAIF, 2012). Therefore, to revamp the agricultural sector such that it reclaims its position as the bedrock of Uganda's economy, the Government of Uganda (GOU) introduced various interventions. The most essential of all the interventions has been NAADS. It is the single most important and well financed reform in the agricultural sector in Uganda, although various studies have concluded that its implementation has been characterized by inefficiencies (Benin, Nkonya, Okecho, Randriamamonjy, Kato, Lubade, et al., 2011; Joughin & Kjær, 2010)

Policy implementation in most developing countries including Uganda is marred with inefficiencies which result into policy implementation failures. Matt Andrews posits that most of the reforms introduced in developing countries fail because they do not fit to specific countries' contexts and hence reformers especially multi-national donor agencies and countries have not been paying attention to it (Andrews, 2013). Hence, such reforms end up as 'square pegs in round-hole governments' (ibid: 1). Several reasons explaining policy failures have been put forward by different studies. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) point out: ambiguity in the policy standards and objectives, limited supply of resources to support policy implementation, un-coordinated organizational relations, among others as factors that

may hinder effective implementation of a policy. On the other hand, Grindle and Thomas (1991) expressed that the characteristics of the policy determine its implementability. Thus, the policy is likely to face opposition at any stage in its life cycle especially from public or bureaucrats if it infringes on their rights. Other authors see implementation as a process which involves several actors, each with their selfish interests and thus conflict of ideas is likely to sabotage the implementation process (Hill & Hupe, 2009). Additionally, Lane asserts that: "there is persistent myth or perhaps naive assumption that politicians make policy and public servants implement it rationally as if implementation was something utterly simple and automatic", (Lane 1993: 93; cited in Turner & Hulme, 1997: 75). Reforms are likely to be supported and opposed by different stakeholder groups, both within government, and outside. Coalitions of support are required for the design and successful implementation of reform (Poulton & Kanyinga, 2014). Therefore, with the above reasons in perspective, this study set out to specifically analyze NAADS implementation process and the challenges it encountered in Mukono district

Agricultural extension is the primary mechanism that developing countries' governments use to assist farmers in expanding their ability to adopt and implement new methods and to relay information concerning new technologies (Betz, 2009: 2). Throughout Africa extension programs have the reputation of being largely ineffective, adding very little to the productivity of farmers (Dejene 1989; Gautam 2000 as cited in Betz, 2009: 2). Such policy ineffectiveness is no exception in Uganda as evidenced by the Ugandan government's suspension of NAADS in September 2007 on the grounds of implementation failures (ibid). NAADS is implemented through the local government structure. It received its funding from the World Bank, Danida, the European Commission(EC) and the Government of Uganda, (Rwakakamba, Lukwago, & Walugembe, 2014). It is implemented by Local Governments with technical backup, and monitoring from NAADS secretariat under Ministry of Agriculture. According to various authors, NAADS faced a number of antagonistic opposition emanating mainly from the political organizations, and other interest groups, (Joughin & Kjær, 2010). Joughin and Kjær, stressed that the president intervenes directly in NAADS program and in the wider rural development agenda, for example in 2007, he suspended the NAADS program and all activities, even salaries were put on hold, citing inefficiency in its implementation, (Joughin & Kjær, 2010: 70). Although several studies have been conducted on NAADS (See Betz, 2009; Nahdy, 2004; Okoboi et al., 2013), trying to assess the magnitude of the problems, majority of the studies were limited by their scope because they focused their research at central level and their views were implicit in explaining the challenges of NAADS implementation in local governments. Therefore, this study sought to dig deeper to the grassroots, in local governments where actual implementation of the NAADS policy takes place in order to understand the problem from a local level perspective.

# 1.3 Objective of the study

The main objective of this study was to analyze the implementation process of the NAADS policy in Uganda, anchoring my analysis in Mukono district local government. The specific objectives included the following:

- To explore how the NAADS design affect its own implementation. I intended to assess
  how the policy design or policy standards and objectives influence and facilitate the
  achievement of the policy output.
- To identify the policy actors involved, and their roles in NAADS implementation process at the local government level in Uganda. NAADS implementation encompasses several interested parties with distinct interests. Therefore, the study sought to find out how all these interests were catered for in order to realize NAADS output in Mukono district.

#### 1.4 Research Questions

The central research question of the study is: What are the challenges that affected NAADS implementation in Mukono district local government? The specific research questions below helped me to narrow down the study such that relevant empirical evidence is gathered in order to enable the study answer the research questions:

- i. How is NAADS reform perceived by different policy actors involved in its implementation in Mukono district? Are NAADS objectives clear to implementers?
- ii. What are the resources needed for effective NAADS implementation in the district?
- iii. What is the nature of organizational and inter-organizational relationship in place and how does it affect NAADS implementation?
- iv. How do political and socio-economic conditions affect NAADS implementation?
- v. How do the behaviors of the policy target group affect its implementation? Is there any opposition of NAADS implementation by farmers?

## 1.5 Significance of the study

Agriculture being the engine of Uganda's economy, several reforms were introduced in the sector, with NAADS being the most influential one. Since its introduction in 2001, various studies have been conducted on its implementation but majority of the studies mainly focused on the impact of the reform (see Benin, Nkonya, Okecho, Randriamamonjy, Kato, Lubade, et al., 2011; Okoboi, 2010). They concentrated on the impact of the policy especially on farmers' livelihood in relation to country's development. However, this study focused on analysis of the NAADS output basing on the stated policy objectives at the same time considering bottom-up concerns like behaviors of front-line workers and target group during implementation. Additionally, the study investigated the challenges involved in NAADS implementation process at the local level unlike the earlier studies. Furthermore, NAADS being the most funded Agricultural reform in the country, and government's major intervention towards Agricultural transformation, it calls for a comprehensive study into its implementation especially at the local level.

Additionally, majority of the studies as indicated above focused on the general outlook or assessment of the policy performance in the whole country (see Benin, Nkonya, Okecho, Randriamamonjy, Kato, Lubade, et al., 2011; Betz, 2009; Kjær & Joughin, 2012). Little effort has been taken in terms of research on NAADS implementation at the local level where actual implementation takes place. Therefore, based on the above background, I was motivated to carry out an empirical study about policy implementation, particularly NAADS, at the local government level in order to add more ideas, knowledge and experiences to policy implementation discourse in Uganda.

The study reflects the kind of challenges local governments face during implementation of policies. Furthermore, the study will be significant to policy actors especially at the local government level because it identifies factors that may hinder achievement of policy output. This explorative study may hopefully inspire other scholars to conduct similar studies in order to enrich literature on policy implementation at local level in Uganda.

#### 1.6 Scope of the study

I conducted this study from Mukono District local government. The study focused on Agricultural policy commonly known as National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), particularly phase II which started from 2010-2015. The study targeted NAADS actors who were involved in its direct implementation in the district so as to provide a rich array of data which was necessary to answer the central research question. The aim was to explore the challenges that hindered successful NAADS implementation in the district. In the study, successful NAADS implementation is reflected by attainment of NAADS output as it was envisaged in the policy objectives which included: increased agricultural productivity, capacity building of farmers, creation of farmer groups, and promotion of private financing of extension services.

#### 1.7 Theoretical framework.

The study examined the implementation process of NAADS at the local level. NAADS implementation process at the local government level comprised of various policy actors with different interest. The policy actors included: Agricultural technical personnel, local politicians, farmers, private sector. Therefore, to study all those different policy actors, the study sought the guidance of theories with elements that explain the implementation process of such nature. The theories I used in the study mainly included: Winter's integrated implementation theory, and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory. The above theories developed various factors that affect or determine policy implementation. But not all the factors pointed out by those theories were applicable in the study. I used only those theoretical elements which were relevant to my case. These included: Policy standard and objectives, policy resources, derived from Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory, and organizational and inter- organizational relations, target group behavior, political and socio-economic conditions from Winter's integrated implementation theory. The theoretical underpinnings of the study and the variables are elaborated in detail in the next chapter.

# 1.8 Methodology of the study

This study applied a qualitative research methodology. Qualitative research is an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem (Creswell, 2014: 4). In other words the researcher is an important part of the research where, the researcher becomes an active learner who can tell the story from the participants' view other than as an expert who passes judgment (Creswell, 2014: 18). Qualitative methodology enabled me to gather multiple forms of data through methods such as: interviews, observation, documents, and focus group discussions. This approach provided

comprehensive evidence for the study hence creating depth in empirical data gathered and attaining validity of the study's findings. Furthermore, the methodology enabled me to be a key instrument of the data collection thus putting me in the position to understand the problem from the participant's view point and experience the NAADS implementation process from its natural setting. I collected primary data through in-depth interviews, focused group discussions, and observation. Secondary data was contributed by document reviews. I also adopted case study strategy in the study. Case study strategy helped me to derive richer, more contextualized, and more authentic interpretation of the phenomenon of interest than most other research methods by virtue of its ability to capture a rich array of contextual data", (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.93). Overall, the methodology helped me to collect rich and contextualized data that formed the basis of analysis of NAADS implementation in the district.

#### 1.9 Composition of Thesis

This thesis is organized into eight chapters. The first chapter consists of an introduction to the study, background to the study, statement of the problem, study objectives, research questions, and significance of the study. It also includes the theoretical framework, research methodology and organization of the thesis. Chapter Two comprises of literature on implementation studies; implementation debate, theoretical underpinnings of the study, comparison and relevance of theories to the study, and the variables. The chapter also describes the dependent and independent variables of the study, the linkage between variables, their operationalization and analytical framework. The third chapter discusses the research approach used, research strategy, area of the study and its rationale, selection of respondents and sample size for the study. It also includes data collection method; data analysis, limitations of the study, and addresses issues of validity, generalization and reliability. Chapter Four covers an Overview of NAADS in Uganda. This chapter elaborates NAADS structure, its legal framework. Chapter Five presents findings and discussions on the dependent variable which is state of NAADS implementation reflected by various indicators including: increased agricultural productivity, creation of farmer groups, capacity building of farmers, and promotion of private financing of NAADS activities. The sixth chapter presents findings and discussions on three independent variables which include: policy standard and objectives, policy resources, organizational and inter-organizational relations. Chapter seven entails findings and discussions on independent variables: political and socio-economic

conditions, and target group behaviors. Chapter eight involves summary of key findings, theoretical implications of the findings and conclusion.

#### **CHAPTER TWO**

#### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

#### 2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, I review the relevant literature to my study. I also elaborate the theoretical underpinnings used to study the challenges that affected NAADS implementation at the local level in Uganda. I mainly use two theories in the study, that is: Winter's integrated implementation theory and Van Meter and Van Horn implementation theory. In addition, other theoretical elements from several implementation theories such as: Lipsky's street-level bureaucracy, Grindle and Thomas's interactive theory were also used in order to augment the study. I used the two main theories in the study because they presented relevant theoretical underpinnings for the study as elaborated in detail below. In this chapter I also provide a summary discussion of the topic of policy implementation.

# 2.1 Concept of policy implementation

Implementation research has come to mean many things. When the concept of policy implementation was first introduced several decades ago, it was an attempt to problematize the public administration research reflex to separate politics and administration (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973 as cited in Hjern & Hull, 1982: 106). However, along the years, various authors refined the subject. Thus, implementation can be described as follows: Policy implementation can be referred to as what develops between the establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government to do something, or to stop doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action (L. J. O'Toole, 2000:266). Therefore, government's attempt to do something and its inaction influences actions in the real world, and thus constitute policy implementation. On the other hand, Dye simply offers a concise definition referring to policy implementation as 'anything government chooses to do or not to do'(Dye, 1972: 2 cited in Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009: 4). Dye's description entirely makes public policy a government business in all aspects. Other authors refer to policy implementation stage of the policy cycle as where the policy decisions are translated into action (Howlett et al., 2009:160). In reference to the policy cycle, during policy formulation phase, policy framers come up with the most appropriate decisions on how to solve the problem on the table, and consequently, action taken to enforce the agreed decisions constitute policy implementation.

Mazmanian and Sabatier, whose definition is regarded as the most influential definition of implementation, described it as:

"Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objectives to be pursued, and in a variety of ways, 'structures' the implementation process" (Hill & Hupe, 2009: 7; P. Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; P. A. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

Mazmanian and Sabatier's definition encompassed crucial aspects of policy implementation because it highlights the architects of the decision, the problem to be solved, the procedure to be followed and enforcement of the decision. However, their definition excluded the input of grassroots implementers of policies. In order for policy decisions to be effected, Howlett et al (2009) argue that various factors must be in place: funds must be adequately provided, requisite personnel assigned and, rules of procedure developed and followed. Moreover, desired policy actors are also essential for any implementation to succeed. Furthermore, some scholars emphasize the role of non-governmental actors (Ginsburg 1992; Johansson & Borell, 1999 cited in Howlett et al., 2009), while others accentuate the behaviors of street-level bureaucrats as essential if successful policy implementation is to be attained (Lipsky 1980). In the same regard, Van Meter and Van Horn view policy implementation to involve those actions by public and private individuals or groups that are focused on the realization of objectives set forward in prior policy decisions (1975: 447). Their analysis of policy implementation is a typical top-down perspective where emphasis is placed on the policy goal attainment. In addition, Pressman and Wildavsky referred to implementation as a "process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them" (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxiii). Pressman and Wildavsky, along with Van Meter and Van Horn, therefore view policy implementation as action taken to achieve stated objectives of a policy. Unlike the bottom-up theorists who view implementation as a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place overtime, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depend (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a: 4 as cited in Hill & Hupe, 2009: 7).

Policy implementation often relies on civil servants and administrative officers to establish and manage the necessary actions. It involves different bureaucratic agencies at national, state or provincial, and at local levels of government, each with its own interests, ambitions, and

value that affect the implementation process and shape its outcome, (see Bardach, 1977; Elmore, 1978 as cited in Howlett et al., 2009). For that reason, since implementation is an interaction of different players with competing interests, it is sometimes referred to as a game. A good example is Eugene Bardach's (1977) The implementation Game, which placed more emphasis on the aspects of conflict in implementation. Bardach saw implementation as a continuation of the political game between different actors from the policy adoption stage to its implementation, all determined to fulfil their interests (Winter, 2006: 152). Therefore, with ambition by every policy actor to fulfil their interest, implementation becomes a game which in some instances might be riddled by conflicts because different actors harbor competing interests and thus, failure of having a consensus is likely. Moreover, Grindle and Thomas argued that policies during their implementation, attract various reactions, depending on their characteristics, and the reaction mainly arise from the public and bureaucratic arenas (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). However, other authors suggest that implementation should be regarded as part of the study of organizational behavior or management (Hill & Hupe, 2009: 20). There is a tendency by organizations implementing policies to follow their organizational values, norms and goals instead of those goals structured in the policy document. Therefore, in order to study implementation carefully, organizational behaviors have to be considered profoundly. Besides organizations, the Implementation course is shaped by the disposition of implementers. Although, other actors come in as implementation begins for example: the public, political actors, non-governmental organizations, interest groups who are part of the policy subsystem.

Most of the features of policy implementation explained in various definitions above are reminiscent of policy implementation process at local government level in Uganda. Therefore, the study deemed it fit to analyze the implementation process in order to find out the challenges that affected the successful implementation of the NAADS policy in Mukono district.

# 2.2 The Implementation Discourse

One of the major controversies among implementation analysts has been whether implementation should be studied from the top-down as a control problem (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981) or from the bottom-up, by focusing first on actors most proximate to the problems to be solved by policies (Hull & Hjern, 1987; cited in Winter, 2012: 257). This kind of argument among different theorists led to the emergence of the Top-down- Bottom up

debate. The debate was heavily influenced by the question of how to separate implementation from the policy formulation (Hill & Hupe, 2009:44). But that was only a part of a wider problem about how to identify the features of a very complex process occurring across time and space, and involving multiple actors (ibid). Therefore, various authors developed views explaining their understanding of the implementation process, hence leading to the categorization of top-down and bottom-up approaches. In the following paragraph, the study elaborates on views of top-down and bottom-up perspectives, how distinct they are and their contribution to the study.

## 2.2.1 Top-down perspective of policy implementation

Classical top-down authors include: Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (Goggin, 1990). They are celebrated as the 'founding fathers' of implementation studies. Their implementation idea is defined in terms of a relationship to policy as laid down in official documents, in which they visualize policies to contain both goal and means of achieving them (Hill & Hupe, 2009; Howlett et al., 2009:45). The top-down perspective is concerned with two essential issues: political intent and administrative action. This perspective assumes that policies are made by senior politicians and carried out by lower-level officials as contained in the policy documents (Kipo, 2011).

The traditional approach of implementation is characterized by a top-down perspective which concentrates on policy outputs and investigates the extent to which the intended objectives have been achieved over time (Knill & Tosun, 2012: 152). The top-down perspective analyzes the policy multitude of actors who interact at the operational level of a particular policy issue (P. A. Sabatier, 1986: 22) unlike the bottom-up theories which usually stress the strong inter-linkages between the stages of policy formulation, implementation and formulation (ibid). The logic of the top-down perspective is also well illustrated by the four-step model suggested by Sabatier & Mazmanian (1980). The four-step model first addresses the extent to which acts of implementing officials and target groups were consistent with the objectives and procedures outlined in the public policy (Knill & Tosun, 2012: 154). Next, they focus on the extent to which the objectives were attained over time. Thirdly, they evaluate the principal factors affecting policy outcomes. Finally, they suggest analyzing whether and how the policy was reformulated on the basis of experience (ibid). Furthermore, in the top-down approach it is assumed that decision makers provide implementers with clear goals and direction on how policy implementation should be carried out (Howlett et al., 2009;

Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). The degree of goal attainment serves as an indicator of implementation success, and effective policy implementation corresponds to a match between policy objectives and outcomes. On the other hand, various critics of the top-down model express that it takes policy outputs as the starting point of analysis and disregards actions taken earlier in the process, especially during policy drafting (Winter, 2012). Furthermore, Herbert Simon (1946), through his bounded rationality notion points out that decision makers have neither the possibility nor the capacity to review all the goals, all alternatives or all potential consequences of various alternatives (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness, & Røvik, 2007: 10). And since most government interventions emerge from a bargaining process, the result is often vague or unclear, and sometimes, even contradictory goals and direction are generated (ibid). Another major critic of the top-down perspective is its focus on politicians and policy managers who play a peripheral role during the daily implementation of the policy compared to the front-line workers and the policy target group (Howlett et al., 2009; Winter, 2012). Regardless of the criticisms, top-down approach's view of measuring policy output and outcome basing on stated objectives is essential and it profoundly guided my study. However, it is imperative to note that due to the short comings of the top-down perspective of policy implementation as briefly discussed above, it led to the rise of the other approach, the bottomup perspective.

#### 2.2.2 Bottom-up Perspective of Policy Implementation

The bottom-up theorists include: Michael Lipsky who constructs the street-level bureaucracy theory. Lipsky proposes that the choices, judgements of street-level bureaucrats, the procedures they set up, and the strategies they formulate to manage uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out (Lipsky, 1980: xii). Street level bureaucrats make important discretionary decisions in their direct contact with the citizens, who tend to define public policies not as crafted in statutes but as delivered to them by street level bureaucrats (Winter, 2012: 260). Street-level bureaucratic factors concerning the policy understanding, knowledge, attitudes, and values of street level bureaucrats are key influences on their behaviors (see Meyers and Vorsanger 2003: 248-9 as cited in May & Winter, 2009: 455). For instance street-level bureaucratic factors like technical competence or levels of education influence front-line workers' knowledge of the policy objectives hence, shaping their attitude towards implementation. In addition, Lipsky argues that street level bureaucrats are autonomous in policy making and sometimes often do not share perspectives

and preferences of their superiors (Lipsky, 1980:16). The discretion and actions of street-level officials is sometimes determined by the uncertain working environment they find themselves in and the limited resources at their disposal. Therefore the choices they make, in some instances become the policies they implement. Lipsky also emphasized that street-level bureaucrats face uncertainty about what personal resources are necessary for their jobs (Hill & Hupe, 2009:52). In addition, front-line workers find that work situations and outcomes are unpredictable, and they face great pressures of inadequate time in relation to limitless needs (ibid). Therefore, they find ways on how to steer through such uncertainties and make choices about the use of scarce resources under pressure, and eventually, such modalities become practicalities of policy implementation. Whereas Lipsky's contribution was important for understanding implementation, the theory needs more specifications of the casual mechanisms that can explain variation in coping behaviors and their consequences (Winter, 2002 cited in Winter, 2012: 260). Lipsky's street level bureaucrat theory also assumed that lower level bureaucrats while implementing policies face similar working conditions and make them all apply similar behavior across all public sectors. Neither does the theory envisage that street level bureaucrats' attitudes have a bearing on their behaviors. Furthermore, the theory also neglected the roles of target groups of public policies during implementation. For example policies that especially affect the public, can be subjected to public scrutiny, hence the public has a stake and role during their implementation. Therefore, in instances where the policies infringe on public interests, such policies are likely to face public opposition and thus, they might be reverted to the agenda stage to be changed, (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). Generally, the bottom-up perspectives neglected the influence that policy framers have on the policy, their zeal to achieve the stated objectives and the kind of control they wield over lower level bureaucrats or subordinates.

Nevertheless, bottom-up perspectives like Lipsky's, unlike the top-down views, are credited for the acknowledgement of the significance of lower level bureaucrats who actually carry out day to day implementation of policies. Secondly, the bottom-up approach identifies the many policy actors that affect or are concerned with the problem in question and map out relations between them. Therefore, it creates consensus among various players involved in finding the solution to the problem, and analysis of various policies that affect the same problem can be done whether initially intended or un-intended (Winter, 2012). Despite all the arguments for and against both perspectives, top-down and bottom-up approaches were useful in drawing increased attention to their importance in explaining the implementation process.

Consequently, authors like Hull and Hjern (1987), Winter (1990) worked towards synthesizing both top-down and bottom-up models because both perspectives offered valuable insights in explaining policy implementation.

# 2.2.3 Synthesis of top-down and bottom-up perspectives

As mentioned above, both top-down and bottom-up views ignited the implementation discourse. However their unfruitful ventures in opposing and ignoring the contribution of the implementation reality explained by the other perspective could not take the implementation discourse a mile farther. Hence the need to merge or synthesize the best features of both perspectives resulting into the emergence of hybrid theories (Winter, 2006: 154).

Authors such as Elmore (1985) recommend using both forward mapping which is essentially a top-down analysis and back-ward mapping for policy analysis because each tends to offer valuable insights for policy makers (Winter, 2006: 154). He suggests that policy framers need to consider and take advantage of the policy instruments and resources at their disposal as well as the incentive structure of the target group and street level bureaucrats' ability to effect the problematic situation of the target group (ibid). For that reason, for policy implementation to be effective, there is need to utilize the organizational structure and resources put forward by the policy as well as effectively use the abilities of front-line workers who are in direct contact with the policy target population.

Winter (1990;1994; 2003a) through his integrated implementation theory also incorporated a number of the most fruitful theoretical elements from various pieces of implementation research regardless of their origin into a single model (Winter, 2012). Thus, Winter raised very important factors that explain the implementation process. He linked formulation with actual execution of the policy because some time factors hindering effective implementation might be associated with policy formulation or design. For that reason, this study borrowed a leaf from Winter's integrated theory which merged ideas from both perspectives in order to benefit from its strength, and thus Winter's theory was used in the study, augmented by Van Meter and Van Horn' implementation theory.

## 2.3 Theoretical Underpinnings of the study

I applied Winter's integrated implementation theory and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory to guide and provide theoretical foundation for the study. I merged aspects in both theories to help the study explain implementation process at the local level in Uganda's context. Winter's integrated implementation theory, and Van Meter and Van Horn's theory developed relevant factors that affect policy implementation which are practical in the local government setting in Uganda. The intention of using two theories was to take advantage of the strength of each theory and both theories to supplement each other especially where one has deficiencies. The justification for my choice of both theories is that, Winter's integrated theory has the ability to link policy formulation to the implementation process. This element is essential because some other implementation theorists neglected the interconnection between the two stages of the policy cycle. Yet, actually policy implementation is a continuation of policy formulation. Therefore, to study implementation critically some aspects in policy formulation have to be considered. Winter also managed to merge most essential elements of both top-down and bottom-up perspectives. His integrated implementation theory resonates well with the NAADS implementation process at a local government level in Uganda where different interests are at stake. Also, Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory overtly emphasize goal attainment as prescribed in the policy statute. Besides, both theories have been used in implementation studies similar to my study (see Eshun, 2015; Kipo, 2011; Ryan, 1996), therefore, their theoretical elements have been tested by several similar studies and proved to account to valid data. Thus, such factors justify the choice of both theories to guide my study.

# 2.3.1 Winter's Integrated Implementation theory

Winter developed the integrated theory in order to take implementation research a step farther away from the squabbles of both top-down and bottom-up perspectives. Unlike previous attempts, the purpose in his theory was not to make true synthesis between top-down and bottom up perspectives, but rather to integrate a number of most fruitful theoretical elements from various views on implementation research regardless of their origin into a joint model (Winter, 2006: 155). The theory focuses on implementation behaviors (outputs) and outcomes in relation to official policy objectives. Winter conceptualizes the connection between policy formulation and implementation. Unlike the top-down theorists who placed emphasis on attainment of policy goals as prescribed by policy architects in the policy documents, and

'bottom-uppers' who also concentrated on the importance, behaviors of policy target group and front-line workers or street level bureaucrats as Lipsky prefer to call them. Winter's integrated theory creates linkage between policy formulation (design) and implementation process in determining policy implementation results. The theory suggests a linkage between policy performance or output and outcome, as felt by policy beneficiaries (Kipo, 2011: 17). Winter's integrated theory suggests factors which affect implementation results. The first set of factors includes the policy formulation process and the policy design. The next set of factors focus on how the implementation process affects the results. Among the factors include: organizational and inter-organizational behaviors, the behaviors of street level bureaucrats, target group behaviors and political and socio-economic conditions.

In regard to the impact of policy formulation process or policy design on implementation results, Winter's theory suggests that roots of implementation problems can be often found in the policy formulation process. The theory suggested conditions in the formulation process that may compromise implementation results. These include conflicts and lack of attention among the policy architects, choice of policy instruments to ensure achievement of policy objectives. The theory theorizes that conflicts in the policy formulation process can create a policy marked with ambiguous policy objectives as well as lack of connection between goals and means of achieving them in the policy design (Winter, 2012). Therefore, ambiguity in the policy objectives and failure to select right policy instruments may result into implementation failures.

Furthermore, Winter points out the effect of organizational and inter-organizational behaviors on implementation results. The focus here is placed on the inter-organizational implementation setting, agreement on basic organizational decisions, cooperation among institutions, compatibility of policy goals, organizational interests and resource dependency among participating organizations (Winter, 2012). Accordingly, NAADS implementation involves government and non-government agencies including farmer institutions, private sector, central government and local governments' agencies. These organizations join forces and work towards attainment of NAADS output. Therefore, the study used the variable of organizational and inter-organizational behaviors, to explain the relationship and behaviors of organizations involved in NAADS implementation and how their networking or relationship affected the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district.

Street level bureaucrats' behavior is another factor essential for policy implementation as pointed out by Winter's integrated theory. The insights of Lipsky about the importance street level bureaucrats in policy implementation are embedded in Winter's integrated implementation theory. Street level bureaucrats exercise important discretionary decisions in their direct contact with the public while executing their duties. Lipsky argues that the decisions they make amidst many demands and limited resources, result into coping behaviors which are the policies they implement (Lipsky, 1980). Lipsky's theory emphasizes more the importance of front-line workers' actions and behaviors than policy managers and their policy goals. Therefore, analysis of the roles, attitudes, reactions and behaviors of street level bureaucrats is essential in studying implementation process of a particular policy because behaviors of street level bureaucrats have the capacity to distort policy implementation.

Another variable is target group behaviors. Winter's integrated theory advocates for analysis of target group behaviors because their behaviors in the form of opposition towards the policy may result into its failure. Conversely, support for the policy by the target group may facilitate its successful implementation. In this connection, target groups of public policies may include citizens and organizations. The policy target groups play an integral role in policy implementation. Their actions not only effect the policy, but also affect the performance of street level bureaucrats through positive or negative actions in co-producing public services and regulations (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 134-136; cited in Winter, 2006: 156). Therefore; under this variable, the study analyzed the perception, expectations and roles of farmers in NAADS implementation, with the view of finding out farmers' awareness of the policy and whether they harbor any opposition towards it.

Lastly, Winter's integrated theory advances the element of socio-economic conditions. Favorable socio-economic and political conditions facilitate successful policy implementation by creating an enabling environment for a policy to thrive. These environmental factors determine implementability of a policy and also provide measures whether a policy was implemented successfully or unsuccessfully by assessing whether there is change in the political, socio-economic conditions of target group (Winter, 2012). According to Van Meter and Van Horn, although the impact of socio-economic and political conditions on implementation of policy decisions has received little attention, political and socio-economic conditions may have a profound effect on the performance of implementing agencies (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). For instance, for effective NAADS implementation to be attained,

political will and support of local politicians is essential. The local politicians are mandated to mobilize their communities to engage in NAADS implementation. Therefore, socio-cohesion between local government workers, local politicians and farmers is crucial for effective NAADS implementation to be attained.

# 2.3.2 Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation Theory

Van Meter and Van Horn's point of departure in elaboration of their theoretical framework starts with policy its self, where goals and objectives are established to guide implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975:458). They hypothesize that decision makers provide implementers with clear goals, objectives, and direction on how policy implementation should be carried out (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:189). Furthermore, they argue that for policy implementation to be successful, it depends on the factors below:

- i. The amount of change involved
- ii. The extent to which there is goal consensus among participants in the implementation process.

In their analysis they inferred that reforms with a small degree of change from the original policy, can be easily implemented and vice versa. In the case of NAADS policy, there was a big shift from the original agricultural extension approach where extension services were mainly a government business but, NAADS introduced radical changes which brought the private sector on board in extension service delivery. NAADS promoted private sector delivery of extension services and farmers were required to contribute to the cost of extension service delivery unlike before. Therefore, the big shift away from the original extension service delivery system to a NAADS approach could undermine the achievement of the NAADS output due to opposition from various policy actors like farmers who opposed the new changes. For that reason, the study sought to assess the perception of various policy actors about NAADS implementation to ascertain whether the policy objectives were clear or unclear to them.

Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory also proposes goal consensus among policy implementers. They projected that failure to have consensus among the policy actors, creates rift and lack of cooperation, which in return may negatively affect realization of policy objectives (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 458). Winter as well, advocates for consensus among policy implementers in the organizations and between organizations. He cautions that

conflict during policy formulation process may trickle down to implementation process and hinder achievement of the policy output. Conflicts at the formulation may be political or technical and thus, they are likely to negatively affect selection of policy instruments like resources which are essential for successful policy implementation. Van Meter and Van Horn's theory describes six variables which shape and influence policy implementation, together with the above mentioned factors of goal consensus and amount of change involved. The variables include the following: policy standard and objectives; policy resources; interorganization communication and enforcement activity; the characteristics of implementing agencies; economic, social, and political conditions and finally the disposition of implementers.

Van Meter and Van Horn view policy standards and objectives as the cornerstone of implementation process. The policy goals and objectives provide the basis on which to measure the implementation results (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Thus, policy goals and objectives ought to be clear to all policy players especially implementers in order to realize the policy output. Ambiguity of the policy standards and objectives creates inconsistencies and confusions on the part of implementers during execution of the policy activities. Unclear policy standards and objectives affect attainment of a common agenda and perception of the objectives by the implementers hence leaving policy implementation at the mercy of individual discretion. It is at the stage of designing policy objectives that standards, procedures and instruments are set to support policy implementation. However, ambiguity of the objectives might affect the selection of correct operational measures and resources to facilitate effective policy implementation.

Another variable proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory is the policy resources. They emphasize that policy resources must be made available to facilitate implementers to achieve policy targets (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Among the resources highlighted by their theory include funds and incentives that help to support execution of policy activities. In the case of NAADS implementation, funds and human resource in the form of agricultural extension workers are essential in ensuring effective NAADS implementation. Therefore, this variable was essential in assessing the availability, accessibility and management of NAADS resources in Mukono district and how such resources affected the state of NAADS implementation in the district.

Inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities also affect policy implementation according to Van Meter and Van Horn. Under this variable, emphasis is put on the need for effective communication within and among organizations, clarity of policy standards and objectives as well as accuracy in their communication to implementers such that a desired common goal is achieved. Likewise, Winter's integrated theory also advocate for cooperation and harmony among organizations involved in implementation such that issues of organizational conflicts and clashes are lessened. In addition, Van Meter and Van Horn advocate for enforcement of the policy activities by the policy managers using institutional mechanisms and procedures like powers to recruit, promote, and dismiss. Also, using budgetary controls in order to reign on their subordinates, such that performance of policy activates is enhanced and geared towards attainment of the stated policy objectives.

Another factor proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn that affect policy implementation is characteristics of the implementing agency. In this regard, they refer to the capacity of the agency involved in implementation of a particular policy. Some of the features that enable implementing agencies to effectively execute the policy activities include the competence and size of its staff, the hierarchical control over its sub-units, the political backing and will, openness in communication with other institutions. However, arguments under this variable replicate elements in other variables developed by the same theory such as interorganizational communication and enforcement activities, political and socio-economic variables.

Political and socio-economic conditions. These environmental factors in the organization's jurisdiction also influence policy implementation. Political will and support of policy activities enforced by the implementing organization contribute to the success and realization of policy objectives. In relation to my study where there is a multi-party dispensation in local governments in Uganda. It requires consensus and support of the politicians in the local government council such that they rally behind the policy implementation. In addition, socio-economic factors like education levels, social status of participants also need to be considered in policy implementation.

Finally, their theory advances the variable of the disposition of implementers. This variable develops similar arguments such as those of street-level bureaucrats' behaviors advanced by Lipsky and Winter's integrated theory. The emphasis is put on the front-line workers' perception, discretion towards the policy standards and objectives. Their capacity to

comprehend and competently implement the policy objectives determines the implementation results.

#### 2.4 Comparison of both theories

Although there are marked differences between Winter's integrated theory and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory, there are some similarities and agreement on some arguments which are worth noting in this study. Both theories emphasize the influence of policy design on implementation results. By policy design, they referred to the structured policy goals and objectives. The goals and objectives act as a lens to implementers through which the policy purpose is realized. Both theories advocated for measurement of implementation results basing on the stated policy goals and objectives. However, Winter's integrated theory goes an extra mile to link policy formulation process to implementation result. He cautions that activities in the policy formulation stage might have a trickle-down effect on the implementation process. For instance, conflicts among policy managers or policy architects at formulation stage might affect the implementation results. For example, selection of policy instruments has profound impact on the policy output, whereby failure to select correct instruments like resources might hinder attainment of the policy goal. And finally they call for commitment of policy proponents if effective implementation is to be realized (Winter, 2012).

Winter's integrated implementation theory as well as Van Meter and Van Horn's acknowledge the importance of good relations in the organization and between organizations involved in the implementation process. Winter (1990), cautioned about organizational and interorganizational conflicts, during policy implementation. Hence, he advises the need to foster good organizational relations if successful implementation is to be achieved (Winter, 2012). Similarly, Van Meter and Van Horn call for communication, networking in the organization and among organizations such that there is accuracy and consistency in communication of policy standards and objectives down to implementers. On the contrary, inaccurate information from different sources might be disseminated to implementers creating inconsistencies and contradictions in the way implementers perceive the policy standards and objectives, hence negatively affecting implementers' ability to implement the policy effectively and attain stated policy goals. Both theories acknowledge the importance of analyzing the street-level bureaucrats' behaviors. Although, Van Meter and Van Horn advance concerns of street-level bureaucrats through the variable of disposition of implementers.

However, both theories emphasize that, street-level bureaucrats' perception, behaviors and knowledge of policy standards and objectives are essential in determining the direction of the policy.

Both theories acknowledge the impact of political, social and economic conditions on implementation results. These environmental factors must be favorable for the policy to thrive. For example, Van Meter and Van Horn emphasize that support of the policy from the civil society, elite groups and other interest groups is essential for effective policy implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). In relation to my study, effective NAADS implementation is affected if social and political groups opposed its implementation for example such groups include; the civil society, farmer groups and political parties, because such interest groups hold high stake in NAADS implementation. Thus, NAADS implementers ought to cooperate, build rapport with such interest groups if NAADS implementation is to be successful

However, Winter's integrated theory did not explicitly emphasize the importance of policy resources in facilitating effective policy implementation. Conversely, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) advocated for availability of funds and incentives to implementers such that they can effectively execute the policy activities. Another distinct characteristic of the two theories is: Winter acknowledged the need to consider the importance of target-group behaviors (Winter, 2012). Effective implementation can be measured basing on the changes in behaviors of the policy target group. Thus, support for the policy by target group, ensures their compliance to the policy activities and cooperation with implementing officials hence, easing the attainment of the policy output. On the contrary, Van Meter and Van Horn because of their top-down perception, they did not recognize the need to consider the behaviors of the policy target group during implementation, and their theory mainly focused on fulfilment of the objective as prescribed by the policy architects. On that note, the study used the two theories to gain from their comprehensive insights and strengths and also to complement each other where one has shortages.

## 2.5 Relevance of the theories to the study

Winter's integrated theory incorporated implementation variables which are prominent in both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' perspectives (Ryan, 1996). The integrated theory calls for measurement of implementation results with stated policy objectives as laid down in policy

documents, which is a typical top-down concern. In addition, it also considers 'bottom-up' concerns such as the behaviors, decisions and interests of implementers (Winter, 2006, 2012). Accordingly, NAADS implementation is associated with similar conditions where policy architects aim at achievement of the policy goal by emphasizing enrolment of all farmers in the farmer groups such that they are empowered to demand for extension services, and increase agricultural productivity. At the same time, bottom-up concerns like farmers (target group) interests, behaviors are considered, and those of the street-level bureaucrats and their organizations. Therefore, since Winter's integrated theory took into consideration concerns of various policy players like; policy architects, street-level bureaucrats, target group, it helped to analyze how those distinct interests were catered for during NAADS implementation in order to ensure realization of the policy goal.

Winter's theory also cautions about the impact of policy formulation on implementation results. Whereas Mazmanian and Sabatier viewed policy formulation as a process requiring the development of rational causal linkages between program design and outcomes, Winter constructed a set of hypotheses on policy-formulation based on competing models of policymaking (Ryan, 1996: 744). Winter's first assumption was concerned with the degree of conflict during the policy-formulation phase. The theory hypothesizes that a high degree of conflict during the formulation phase might negatively affect the implementation process and eventually the policy output. This was evident in the research on NAADS implementation, where various authors about NAADS policy implementation cited conflicts at the formulation stage and such conflicts eventually trickled down to the implementation process causing policy woes (see Joughin & Kjær, 2010). There were conflicts between politicians on one side and donors, MAAIF technical experts on another side. Therefore, these conflicts mainly stemmed from the policy formulation processes where actors failed to concretize the policy purpose. Hence, due to such gaps in the policy design or formulation, the politicians ceased the opportunity and veered off the policy from its initial goal of demand-led, private-sector based extension services provision back to its roots of government-led extension service delivery (ibid: 61). Such alterations of the policy goal by the government was heavily opposed by the donors and failure by government to heed to donor concerns, the development partners drastically reduced their funding of NAADS implementation, consequently resulting into woes in the execution of policy activities.

Winter's integrated theory posits that policy formulation process influences the development of other factors: Organizational and inter-organizational behavior is influenced by, and influences the actions of 'street-level' bureaucrats (Winter, 2012). These relationships also exist between target groups and street-level bureaucrats. Likewise, Van Meter and Van Horn's theory posits six variables as mentioned earlier which shape the linkage between policy and performance. Both theories raise similar important factors that affect policy implementation like policy design or policy standard and objectives, organizational and inter-organizational relations, socio-economic conditions. Therefore, the study merged relevant ideas from both theories in a bid to explain the policy implementation process at local government level. Additionally, both theories have been used in similar policy implementation studies (see Eshun, 2015; Kipo, 2011) thus, their theoretical elements have been tested by several studies and proved valid in explaining the policy implementation process. However, I relied more heavily on Winter's integrated theory for theoretical underpinnings of the study because of its ability to synthesize ideas from both top-down and bottom up perspectives. Though, it has weaknesses like failure to explicitly acknowledge the significance of policy resources during the implementation process. Therefore, such gaps were bridged by Van Meter and Van Horn's theory as well as theoretical elements from other implementation theories like the interactive theory from Grindle and Thomas and Lipsky's street level bureaucracy. The variables below were derived from both theories in order to help the study to explain NAADS implementation process with the view to find out the challenges affecting its successful implementation in Mukono district local government. The variables include: Policy standard and objectives, policy resources from Van Meter and Van Horn's theory and, Organizational and interorganizational relations, target group behaviors, political and socio-economic conditions from winter's integrated theory. The factors above were used in the study because they were found to be relevant in explaining the implementation process at the local level.

#### 2.6 Dependent variable and its operationalization

The study's main research question focused on analyzing the challenges that affected NAADS implementation in Mukono district local government. Therefore, the state of NAADS implementation was used as the dependent variable in the study. Some implementation studies measure implementation results basing on policy output and outcomes (Ryan, 1996). However, in this study, the focus was put on measuring policy output to reflect the state of NAADS implementation. I measured the state of NAADS implementation basing on the achievement of policy objectives as prescribed in the policy documents in the district.

Therefore, failure to achieve the stated NAADS objectives reflected unsuccessful policy implementation in the district. NAADS objectives mainly focused on attainment of increased agricultural production, creation of farmer groups, capacity building of farmers and promotion of private financing of extension services. Thus, the above NAADS objectives acted as indicators of effective NAADS implementation and were operationalized as follows.

# 2.6.1 Increased agricultural output

This is one the major indicators of effective NAADS implementation. The policy aimed at increasing farmers' accessibility to agricultural extension services in order to boost agricultural production. The government of Uganda assumed that through increased agricultural output, it would promote food security, nutrition and market oriented farming in the long run. Over 80% of Mukono district is agricultural, characterized by low acreage subsistence production (Ntambirweki-Karugonjo & Barungi, 2012: 5). The crops mainly produced include: coffee, beans, banana, maize and vegetables. One of the reasons for low production cited by several authors include: limited farmers' accessibility to agricultural knowledge (Betz, 2009; Mwaura, 2014; Nabbumba & Bahiigwa, 2003). Shortage of household food production has exposed farmers to severe food insecurity and high prices of food. In Uganda, only 12% of households are significant net sellers of food, with 66% being net food buyers and relying on market for more than 25% of the value of the food they consume (Benson, Mugarura, & Wanda, 2008). Therefore, NAADS focused on changing the status quo by improving accessibility of farmers to agricultural extension services such that increased agricultural output is realized. The study analyzed attainment of such milestone by assessing the agricultural productivity levels in the district for the past five years.

# 2.6.2 Creation of farmer groups

NAADS policy and other development agencies have used farmer organizations as a major avenue for information dissemination intended to spur agricultural productivity since 2001 (Mwaura, 2014). Although the farmer groups approach attracted attention, little is known on how successful the approach is in addressing the country's agricultural transformation. Queries still linger on how to enhance farmer groups' membership, cohesiveness, mandate, resource availability, integrity and members' managerial capacity (ibid). Under this variable, it was imperative to understand the requirements for enrolment into farmer groups, roles of farmer groups in NAADS implementation. According to the NAADS guidelines, all farmers

above 18 years old were targeted to enroll in farmer groups (MAAIF, 2010). By enrolling in groups, farmers are supported through provision of extension services, technological inputs and other development capacities to achieve increased agricultural production. Considering that for farmers to access resources and gain capacity support from the National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAADS) they must be in groups. Key drivers for membership to farmer groups included sensitization of farmers on the benefits of groups by the agricultural technical staff, mobilization of farmers by local politicians, accessibility to extension service and social-economic conditions in the area. Thus, the study looked at the number of farmer groups created in the district for the past 5 years of NAADS implementation, and analyzed the trend in order to determine whether the number was increasing or reducing. I also analyzed the influence of groups on easing accessibility to extension services, farmer groups' roles and contribution to agricultural output.

# 2.6.3 Capacity building of farmers

Farmers' capacity building is a responsibility of agricultural extension workers. This is carried out from farmers' localities. Farmers' trainings intended to empower them in order to demand for extension services. In addition, the training in agricultural skills aimed at improving their capacity to manage agricultural enterprises, application of modern technologies and farming practices. After creation of farmer groups, technical experts at district and sub-county were tasked to carry out farmer groups training. The training session were carried out from the farmers' locality in order to save farmers from incurring transport cost. Therefore, local governments were mandated to facilitate their technical experts to move to farming communities and train the groups' members. However, for such trainings to be conducted, it depended on the availability of policy resources like finances and availability of technical staff. Therefore, the study assessed how NAADS objective of capacity building of farmers was achieved by analyzing the number of capacity building sessions planned and conducted and their impact on farmers' output. The study also analyzed farmers' ability to demand for extension services, their capacity to manage agricultural enterprises and the technical officer's response to farmers' needs.

# 2.6.4 Private financing of NAADS activities

NAADS also aimed at promoting private financing and delivery of extension services. The policy was initially planned to be implemented under public-private partnership (PPP)

arrangement where private organizations would be contracted by government to provide extension services to farmers (Nahdy, 2004) . Under the PPP arrangement, private organizations, using their own staff and resources would be contracted by local governments to carry out extension services in their areas of jurisdiction, and then later government would pay them for their services. Eventually, government would gradually withdraw its funding and let private sector and farmers carry on. However, the strategy did not work as planned because government lacked sufficient resources to pay the private organizations in time. The government instead hired individual extension service providers which it co-opted as its own staff. Financial markets in developing countries and particularly the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) region are largely underdeveloped, lacking in depth, highly inefficient, concentrated in the urban areas and dominated by a few, and are often foreign-owned commercial banks (Mpuga, 2004: 2). In particular, credit, savings and insurance markets in the rural areas in Uganda are generally non-existent, and of those that do, many work imperfectly (ibid). Many private credit institutions in the country considered agriculture risky and unprofitable venture and were hesitant to invest in the sector. Moreover, accessibility of the population to financial institutions was still low, with only 22% of the total population of 34.6 million people in the country had bank accounts (UBOS, 2014). Specifically, over 85% of people in rural areas where agriculture is the main source of livelihood had no bank accounts or access to credit institutions (ibid). Therefore, NAADS sought to link farmers with credit institutions through sensitization of farmers on credit and its management. Therefore, the study analyzed accessibility of farmers to credit facilities in the district, the number of ventures supported by private financial institutions, farmers' knowledge on credit management and farmers' demand for credit.

#### 2.7 Independent Variables and their operationalization

The independent variables are those variables that cause change in the dependent variable (Creswell, 2014). The independent variables for the study were derived from two theories that informed the study. These included winter's integrated theory and Van Meter and Van Horn's implantation theory. The explanatory variables included: a) policy standards and objectives, b) policy resources, c) organizational and inter-organizational relations, d) target-group behaviors, e) political and socio-economic conditions. I discussed the independent variables and operationalized them in the study as follows.

#### 2.7.1 Policy standard and objectives

Clear policy standards and objectives provide the basis for understanding the overall goals of policy decisions (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). This is so because an elaborate legislative document provides concrete and specific standards for assessing program performance or output (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975:464, cited in Mruma, 2005:33). The study of implementation requires that goals and objectives be identified and measured since implementation cannot succeed or fail without goals against which to judge it (Pressman & Wildavisky 1973: xiv as cited in Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 464) Under this variable, the study posed questions like: what happens if policy standards and objectives are unclear? Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) posit that clear objectives provide performance indicators for implementers on which to measure implementation results. In case of ambiguity in the policy standard and objectives, inconsistencies are likely to emerge, hence compromising implementer's ability to follow up on the policy goal. For example, NAADS policy set out to promote private financing of agricultural extension services. However, during the policy design, the policy architects fell short on that objective because few or no policy instruments were put in place for its realization. For example, no incentives were put in place to attract the private sector to finance agricultural activities. Additionally, achievement of such an objective also depended on efforts of the private sector which had an insignificant role during NAADS formulation; therefore, their views were not embedded in the policy and could not actively participate in NAADS implementation.

Furthermore, clear policy standards and objectives are measurable and easily communicated to implementers. But, if policy objectives are unclear, inconsistencies in their dissemination down to implementers emerge especially in implementation processes like NAADS' where several organizations are involved. For that reason, under this variable, I assessed and compared the respondents' knowledge of the policy objectives and whether they were clear to them. NAADS implementation involves a combination of policy actors including: farmers, local government workers, MAAIF experts, politicians, NGOs and private sector. For the policy to be effectively implemented the policy actors mentioned above ought to clearly understand its objectives and work towards achieving them. Some studies done before about NAADS implementation point out ambiguities in NAADS objectives and asserted that goal posts of NAADS changed often depending on the political situation in the country (Joughin & Kjær, 2010). Other government commissioned studies claim that NAADS has clear and attainable objectives and envisaged progress in its implementation (see MAAIF, 2012).

However, a recent study by FAO concluded otherwise and portrayed ineffectiveness in implementation of NAADS due to ambiguities in policy objectives, and also continued difficulty by farmers to access agricultural extension services, resulting into low agricultural output (FAO, 2013). Therefore, it was prudent for the study to analyze the perception of various policy implementers on NAADS objectives in the view to answer the main research question: What are the challenges that affected NAADS implementation in Mukono district? Under this variable, the study hypothesized that: *unclear policy standards and objectives may hinder attainment of policy output hence affecting the state of NAADS implementation Mukono district*.

# 2.7.2 Policy Resources

For a policy to be successful, resources are essential in influencing its effective implementation. Policy resources may include funds or other incentives that might encourage or influence effective implementation of the reform (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). However, Grindle and Thomas go an extra mile and categorize policy resources into: Political, financial, managerial, and technical resources (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). Various policies call for different types of resources, but reformers must know which are needed and where they will be available (ibid). Principally, decision makers ought to assess the availability of resources for policy implementation and consider how they might be mobilized. Effective NAADS implementation certainly calls for availability of resources like financial and human resources. Under this variable, the study hypothesized that: insufficient policy resources may negatively affect the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district. It is evident that policy resources are often scarce in most developing countries, yet resources are so essential if a policy is to thrive (ibid). Grindle and Thomas (1990) argue that resources are occasionally used to counter opposing forces of the reform. For example, in some instances policies are opposed because of ignorance by the target group about the policy terms or objectives. Therefore, in such a case, financial resources and technical human resources are required to sensitize the target groups about the policy. Otherwise, if such resources are insufficient, the policy might face stiff opposition from several groups who feel it infringes on their interests, hence causing its failure. Additionally, implementations of several policies depend on the capabilities of the technical experts. In relation to my case, NAADS policy is labour intensive and hence requires availability of skilled extension workers to conduct policy activities such as capacity building and field visits. Therefore, absence of such resources may hinder successful NAADS implementation. I categorized and operationalized policy resources as follows:

# a) Financial resources

Financial resources for NAADS implementation in the country were mobilized both within and outside government. Policy resources in recent times have not been a major problem in Africa, because external partners and donors have been willing to fund those initiatives in which they share a common agenda (Andrews, 2013; Grindle & Thomas, 1991). Correspondingly, NAADS funding was mainly through long-term multilateral and bilateral credit financing, including grants and loans. Out of the \$108 million earmarked for NAADS phase one (from 2001-2010), 80% was provided by multilateral and bilateral development partners while the central government contributed 8% and the rest was from local governments (Rwakakamba et al., 2014). In NAADS phase two, from 2010-2015, which was the focus of the study, the Ugandan government contributed 75% of the total NAADS national budget while its development partners contributed 25% (ibid). With regard to NAADS budgets at the local level, local governments entirely depended on the central government for funding. For Mukono district in particular, 90% of its NAADS budget was funded by the central government. Therefore, with regard to NAADS financial resources, the district was not self-reliant and depended heavily on the central government transfers to finance its NAADS budget. Accordingly, different NAADS implementation documents reviewed, cited shortage of financial resources as one of the encumbrances to effective execution of the policy activities (Benin, Nkonya, Okecho, Randriamamonjy, Kato, Lubade, et al., 2011).

However, the issue of meager resources is a common phenomenon in most of developing nations where budget resources are always tight (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). But the problems always stem from management of such tight budgets. Therefore, the study sought to analyze mobilization, availability, accessibility, and management of the NAADS finances because failure by the policy managers to effectively utilize the available financial resources consequently resulted into failure in achievement of NAADS objectives and policy output. For agricultural extension staff to effectively conduct their activities with farmers and train them on key NAADS activities like modern farming practices and group dynamics, they needed to be facilitated financially, through provision of easy transport means and allowances, such that they could respond to farmers' demands and needs easily and swiftly.

Therefore, the study assumed that limited financial resources affect extension workers' capability to conduct their field duties and also de-motivate them. According to data obtained by the study, it was realized that agricultural extension staff were poorly remunerated and some turned their back on NAADS implementation. Consequently, the poor remuneration of the technical staffs, greatly affected implementation of the policy activities like training of farmers hence negatively affected agricultural productivity in the long run. According to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), there is a correlation between policy standards and objectives and other implementation determinants such as policy resources. They assumed that during establishment of policy standards and objectives, policy managers equip implementers with means of achieving such objectives. Therefore, in situations where ambiguous policy objectives are designed, coupled with limited funding, policy implementation is likely to be drastically affected. For example, Cecilia Eshun, in her study about Implementation of Social Protection Programs in Ghana, she found out that scarcity of financial resources and delay in disbursement of funds to the poor, affected effective implementation of the LEAP program in Ghana (Eshun, 2015). Therefore; in the case of my study, I analyzed the availability, accessibility of funds to enable implementers effectively execute the policy activities in the district.

# b) Human Resources

Human resource is another type of policy resources needed for effective policy implementation. NAADS implementation requires availability of well-trained agricultural extension workers who conduct daily implementation activities of the program. Lipsky (1980), referred to front-line staff involved in policy implementation as street-level bureaucrats. The Agricultural extension workers are charged with front-line duties such as mobilization of farmers to form farmer groups, training of farmers on group dynamics, among others. The study did not only assess the availability, competencies of the extension workers, but also analyzed their behaviors, perceptions, and discretions as far as implementation of NAADS was concerned. Thus, the study theorized that, scarcity of competent technical workers and opposition of NAADS by the street-level bureaucrats may hinder the achievement of the policy output.

Street-level bureaucrats are referred to as public service workers who interact with citizens in the course of their jobs and have significant discretion in the implementation of their work (Lipsky, 1980: 3). Street level bureaucrats inform of extension workers are central in implementation of NAADS policy. Its implementation is heavily reliant on highly skilled agricultural extension workers who train and give guidance to farmers. Therefore, the study analyzed whether the district was able to attract and retain skilled and competent agricultural technical staff. I also assessed their technical competence by analyzing the education levels of the agricultural staff, whether they were proportionate to the kind of duties assigned to them. Because their knowledge and ability to understand the policy standards and objectives influenced how other participants in the NAADS program perceived and implemented the policy activities. For a policy to be implemented effectively, implementation theorists like: Winter (1990), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Grindle and Thomas (1991), and Lipsky (1980) advocate for consideration of behaviors of street level bureaucrats. The actions of front-line workers in the communities where they operate may dictate the direction of the policy and its implementation because of their direct contact with the public. The outcomes of some reforms is largely determined by how bureaucratic agencies, public officials and administrative routines respond to the changes (Grindle & Thomas, 1991: 138). Thus, if the reform infringes on bureaucratic interests, then bureaucrats are likely to oppose the policy implementation. For instance during NAADS implementation in the year 2014, retrenchment of NAADS extension staff was carried out which resulted into mass bureaucratic opposition and some boycotted their duties hence affecting the policy implementation. Although, Grindle and Thomas, postulate that public opposition towards the reform is more influential than bureaucratic opposition because it threatens the existence of a political regime. However, they also acknowledge the influence of bureaucrats on policy implementation and corroborate that in cases where bureaucrats team up with other interested parties like civil society, they can mount opposition towards the reform (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). Hence, the assumption that the capacity and behaviors of street-level bureaucrats may affect NAADS implementation.

#### 2.7.3 Organizational and Inter-organizational relations

Winter's integrated theory is concerned with the response of organizations to programs and inter-organizational relationships (Ryan, 1996). The degree of conflict in the organization and between organizations is assumed to be one of the hindrances of effective policy implementation. Conflict normally arises due to competition of organizational interests against program objectives (ibid). In respect to my study, NAADS is implemented through a multi-organizational framework involving various organizational actors like politicians,

farmers, public servants, private sector, all with their distinct interests. Lower local governments known as sub-counties, district local-government, MAAIF, farmers' organizations all have to work in tandem in order achieve the desired NAADS objectives. Another ingredient of Organizational and inter-organizational behaviors is resource dependency among participating institutions (Winter, 2012). In case of an implementation process which involves a chain of sequential relations where one organization depends on the output of another for its input and contribution to policy implementation, the complexity of a joint action is likely to occur (ibid: 260). This is typical of NAADS implementation process where the Ministry of Agriculture depend on information and activities of district local governments, and also districts depend on information from sub-county local governments for their output. Yet sub-counties also depend on farmer groups' activities for action. Accordingly, in terms of policy finances, those organizations depend on each. Funds are released by MAAIF to the districts and later to the sub-counties where activities involving farmers are implemented. Thus, existence of organizational and inter-organizational conflict under NAADS's implementation framework may hinder its effective implementation.

Effective implementation requires that policy standards and objectives be understood by those individuals responsible for their achievement (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975:466). Successful implementation often requires that institutional mechanisms and procedures are in place, whereby higher authorities (superiors) may increase the likelihood that implementers (subordinates) will act in a manner consistent with policy's standards and objectives (ibid). Organization and Inter-organizational operations in the local government setting in Uganda is driven by a mixture of hierarchy, rules and regulations as well as networking. There exists a chain of command with MAAIF at the apex and farmer groups at the base. Additionally, during implementation, organizations play by the rules and regulations that govern their operations. A good example is the Local Government Act 1997, NAADS Act 2001. Moreover, NAADS implementation guidelines (2010) demand that organizations should network and operate interdependently during implementation of the policy. Policy architects at the center charged with policy formulation were mandated to ensure that implementers in district local governments clearly understood the policy goals and objectives. Eventually, local government actors would be in a position to sensitize their counterparts in lower local governments-the sub-counties and the farmers. There is a possibility of alteration of information from top managers to implementers because of the existence of several policy actors and organizations involved in NAADS implementation. Information originating from

different sources targeting the same program ought to be the same regardless of the source. Contradictions in interpretation of the standards and objectives of the policy send a wrong signal to implementers hence creating inefficiencies in the policy implementation process. In this regard, the study looked at the organizational mechanism in place to enable sensitization of program standards and objectives to implementers. Van Meter & Van Horn, argued that effective implementation of a reform is determined by the way implementers have understood the program standards and objectives (1975:466). Therefore, effective implementation is expected to be attained when the standards and objectives are unequivocally communicated to implementers with sufficient clarity to exterminate ambiguity (ibid).

To ensure attainment of the policy standards and objectives in the case of NAADS in Uganda, institutional mechanisms were put in place. The higher authorities in the form of policy managers were empowered with administrative authority to influence implementation in accordance with policy standards and objectives. This included the powers to recruit, promote, dismiss and budget control. Such enforcement means intended to reign in on their subordinates such that the policy objectives are met. Under this variable, the study analyzed organizations' capacity to implement the policy. In addition also the study assessed the communication mechanisms in place to influence networking among organizations. Furthermore, I analyzed the existing hierarchy and how it enables organizational players to take action and to understand the roles of each institution. I also assessed organization's ability to pool resources together such that NAADS activities are implemented effectively and also assessed their levels of trust to develop partnerships such that organizations can supplement each other, for example in areas of capacity building. Therefore, under this variable the study hypothesized that: organizational and inter-organizational relations may affect the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district.

#### 2.7.4 Political and socio-economic conditions

Both Winter's integrated theory and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory advocate for consideration of these environmental variables. They call for assessment of the political and socio-economic environment in which the policy is implemented. At the same time, socio-economic conditions are essential because they influence the response of target group to program initiatives (Ryan, 1996). Therefore, under this variable, the study asked questions like: what is the political situation in the implementing jurisdiction (or organization); is there political will to support NAADS implementation?

Political conditions are important in introducing and sustaining a reform, particularly policies that generate a public reaction (Grindle & Thomas, 1991:143). There has to be the required political will and commitment for a policy to be implemented successfully. Winter argued that political conflicts during policy formulation might affect the implementation process (Ryan, 1996). In Uganda, politicians play an integral part in policy implementation (see Joughin & Kjær, 2010). At the local government level, politicians are mandated by law to allocate resources, approve plans, budgets and mobilization of the target group towards government programs. Therefore, political will, support and commitment towards a policy and its implementation process are essential. It is the role of policy managers to mobilize political support for a reform. On the other hand, Grindle & Thomas caution that the political support for a reform sometimes is determined by the public reaction (ibid). In the case of public opposition towards a policy, it is likely to influence the political action, either to halt the policy or alter its course. In the case of NAADS policy, Local political support is essential in mobilization of farmers to participate in the farmer groups in their localities. However, more often than not, policy implementation in Uganda is hampered by political interference (Joughin & Kjær, 2010). What causes political interference, opposition towards the reform implementation? This can be attributed to ambiguity of policy objectives and insufficient knowledge of the policy objectives by the politicians (ibid). Hence, such reasons affirm the stance that for a policy to be effectively implemented, the policy standard and objectives must be clear to all policy actors (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). On the other hand, as mentioned above, political support or opposition is influenced by the public reaction towards a reform. In a certain study by Joughin and Kjær (2010) about the politics of agricultural reforms in Uganda, they mentioned political interference as one of the hindrances of effective NAADS implementation. Politicians are directly involved in policy implementation at the local government level. For instance, under the law in Uganda, politicians at the local government level are mandated with power to approve budgets, development plans, policies for their areas of their jurisdiction (Local government Act 2007). The NAADS guidelines, emphasize political representation on NAADS implementation and monitoring committees at all levels, and in some instances collision of bureaucrats and politicians during execution of policy activities has been widely reported as one of the bottlenecks for effective NAADS implementation (see Joughin & Kjær, 2010). Therefore, the study assessed the political roles, politician's perception of the NAADS and relationship with other policy actors involved in the policy implementation.

Social and economic factors may influence NAADS implementation. NAADS implementation approach calls for social cohesion among farmers since they are required to come together and form farmer groups. Under this group format, it requires them to work together, share ideas, knowledge and skills. However, leadership conflicts among farmer groups has been reported in several technical reports as a hindrance to farmer groups sustainability (MAAIF, 2012). Yet the groups are crucial in implementation of program activities and achievement of NAADS objectives such as farmers' training and increased agricultural output. Also, under social factors, farmers' education levels also may determine how they perceive and implement the NAADS policy. Farmers with some level of education were likely to comprehend the program objectives easily and indulge in most policy activities than their counterparts the un-educated farmers. Therefore such social factors were assessed during operationalization of this variable. Economically, the farmer groups which are a core unit of NAADS thrive on members' savings in the form of membership fees and subscription fees. Thus, farmers ought to be economically sound and willing to sustain their groups economically. Moreover, the socio-economic status of the area in terms of infrastructure like roads also influenced implementation of NAADS activities. Infrastructural facilities like community roads facilitate movements of technical experts in the target farming areas. Therefore areas with impassable or poor road networks were likely not to be reached easily by extension workers, consequently jeopardizing ability by such areas to effectively engage in NAADS activities. Thus, the study hypothesized that: Unfavorable political and socioeconomic conditions may affect the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district.

# 2.7.5 Target-group behaviors

Target group behavior is one of the measures of policy success or failure. Top-down and bottom-up perspectives differ in their interpretation of whether these changes should be judged according to program objectives, or by the expectations of target groups (Ryan, 1996: 749). In NAADS implementation, farmers constituted the policy target group. They played an integral part, not only on the effects of the policy but also in affecting the behaviors of street level bureaucrats through farmers' positive or negative reaction towards policy activities. NAADS depend heavily on farmers' efforts in order to achieve its policy output. Farmers had to demand for extension services, capacity building from technical staff, mobilization of their fellow farmers to participate in groups and co-funding the policy activities. Therefore, most of the activities which determined the success of NAADS implementation depended on farmers'

will, commitment, support and perception of the policy. In case of farmers' opposition towards the policy, the implementation process is greatly affected. Therefore, the study assessed farmers' perception of the NAADS objectives, their roles during implementation and relation with agricultural technocrats.

Grindle and Thomas' interactive theory hypothesize that reforms with characteristics that infringe on public or societal interests are likely to be opposed by the public (Grindle & Thomas, 1991:135). The public exerts pressure on the political leadership and thus, due to such pressure, a policy may be altered or reverted to the agenda stage (ibid: 138). Therefore, policies that generate public opposition carry high stakes for the regime and incumbent political elites. In reference to NAADS, it has experienced public opposition especially from farmers who oppose its group approach. This study assessed the roles of farmers in NAADS implementation, their expectation of the reform, perception, and behaviors towards its implementation. Thus, under this variable, I constructed the hypothesis that: *opposition of NAADS by target group-group (or farmers) may negatively affect its effective implementation.* 

Figure 1. Showing the analytical framework of the study

# Policy standard & objectives State of NAADS Implementation **Policy Resources** (Successful or Unsuccessful) > financial resources human resources **Indicators:** Organizational and Inter-Increased agricultural output organizational behaviors Farmer groups creation Political, and socio-economic Capacity building of farmers conditions Promotion of private financing Target group behaviors of NAADS activities

**Dependent variable** 


# Source, (researcher's own initiative)

**Independent Variables** 

The illustration above depicts the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables. Therefore the study used the variables derived from both theories and assessed or measured them to explain their influence on NAADS implementation.

Based on Winter and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theories, they developed the above mentioned factors in the analytical framework which influence the degree of policy implementation. They might not be the only factors that influence the implementation process of a particular policy but the implementation variables they suggested are integral in determining the attainment of a policy output as evidenced in previous studies which have used the same theories (see Eshun, 2015; Kipo, 2011). Therefore, in implementation process where such explanatory variables like policy standard and objectives are explicit and understandable to all policy players involved in its implementation, it makes the policy tight fit and stable since there will be less antagonistic forces during its implementation because the concerns of several interest parties are harmonized. As depicted in the figure below

Figure 2 summarizing impact of explanatory variables on policy implementation



However in instances where there are conflicts in the policy design process or during formulation, it is likely to affect all other factors because such conflicts are likely to trickle down to implementing agencies, hence affecting the organizational and inter-organizational relations of agencies involved in implementation. Such conflicts would also affect selection of policy instruments like resources hence creating instability in the policy implementation. Therefore, the variables derived from both theories helped to inform the study and to gather relevant empirical evidence essential to answer the study's research questions

#### **CHAPTER THREE**

#### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 3.0 Introduction

The purpose of this methodological chapter is to discuss how data was collected. This chapter focuses on the area of study, research approach, research strategy, sample size, methods of data collection, data analysis and discusses the quality of the study. This chapter also highlights some of the challenges I encountered during field work, the ethical issues I took into consideration before and during collection of data from respondents

# 3.1 Research Approach

I used qualitative research approach in attempt to analyze the implementation of NAADS policy in Uganda, particularly Mukono district local government. By using qualitative method, the intention was: (1) to explore and understand the meaning policy actors attach to a social or human problem, (2) analyze the process of policy implementation (3) to experience the problem from the source, where the researcher is a primary instrument in data collection such that I can tell the story from the participant's view point rather than as an expert who passes judgement, (4) to analyze the problem thoroughly by conducting in-depth interviews with people directly involved in the implementation of NAADS and thus analyze data inductively hence, aiming at theory building. In this study, I used emerging questions and procedures, data was collected in participant's setting, analyzed inductively building from particulars to general themes, and making interpretation of the meaning of data, as various authors recommend (see Creswell, 2014). This approach enabled me to carryout data triangulation by gathering multiple forms of data through data collection methods such as: interviews, observations, documents, focus group discussions. This enabled me to gather comprehensive evidence hence ensuring depth in data collected, and reducing data biasness or reliance on one source of data, hence ensuring validity for the study. Additionally, qualitative design has been used several times by similar studies. Therefore the approach has been tested several times and proved to be effective and facilitate collection of in-depth and relevant data for the study

#### 3.1.1 Research Strategy


A case study was opted for as the research strategy for the study. Yin describes it as the logic of sequence that connects the empirical data to study's initial research questions and ultimately, to its conclusion (Yin, 2009:26). The strategy helped me to explore the process of NAADS implementation, by using a great array of data collection methods. NAADS being a contemporary phenomenon in Uganda, it was prudent to use a case study strategy in order to understand it in depth. Therefore, NAADS implementation in Mukono district local government is referred to as the case in this study. Why NAADS implementation? It was opted for because it is the most influential and heavily funded policy implemented at the local government level in the country. Furthermore, It is also the policy whose implementation affects the livelihood of majority (80%) of the population in the district (Mukono, 2015a). Therefore, to study NAADS implementation in the district, I sought the services of case study research strategy because of its ability to employ several data collection methods such that indepth data is collected to inform the study and also answer the main research question. As Bhattacherjee elaborates that case study research helps to derive richer, more contextualized, and more authentic interpretation of the phenomenon of interest than most other research methods by virtue of its ability to capture a rich array of contextual data, (Bhattacherjee, 2012:93). In this regard, by using various data sources enabled me to overcome the weaknesses associated with using one source, (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Yin, 2009). Thus data collected from various sources complemented each other hence achieving data triangulation and increasing validity for the study's findings.

#### 3.2. Area of study

The area of study or unit of analysis may refer to a person, group of people, objects, organization(s), technologies, countries, that is the target of the investigation (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Yin, 2009:30). Mukono District local government was the focus of study in this study. The district lies in the Central region of Uganda, sharing borders with the District of Buikwe in the East, Kayunga along river Sezibwa in the North, Luwero in the North West, Kampala and Wakiso in South West, Tanzania, and Lake Victoria in the South with the Islands of Buvuma District. The District Headquarters is in Mukono municipality, central Division, situated along Kampala-Jinja road (21kms East of Kampala City). Mukono District has a total area of 2,986.47kms², 40% of which is water -- comprising lakes, rivers, wetlands and swamps. The district lies on a high plateau 1000-1300m above sea level (Mukono, 2015a:

22). The district has a population of 596,804 people of which 80% are farmers, hence, they earn their livelihood from agriculture (UBOS, 2014). The main agricultural crops produced include: maize, banana, beans, vegetables, coffee and cocoa. Comprehensive statistics about agricultural production in the district is scanty because of poor record keeping in the production department and limited funding allocated to the department of records. However, data obtained from the department from their recent survey report on production showed that in the year 2014, only 56,821 tons of the main crops mentioned above were produced in the district. The study was conducted from Mukono district local government and one would ask why? I selected the district as my area of study because it is one of the six districts in which NAADS implementation initially started in the year 2001. Mukono district represented the central region during the preliminary implementation of the policy in the country, although, the program was later rolled out to all the districts in the country in 2005. Therefore, the actors involved in the reform implementation in the district had immense experience in the NAADS implementation; hence, their insights provided enriched data for the study.

Figure 3 showing the map and Location of Mukono District on the Map of Uganda



# Source: Mukono district development plan 2010-2015

The two maps above show the area of study, the first map represents Mukono district local government and its 13 lower local governments commonly known as sub-counties which later increased to 15 namely: Mukono central division, Goma division, Nakisunga , Ntenjeru , Mpata , Mpunge, Koome island , Nama , Kyampisi , Nabbaale , Kimenyedde , Kasawo, Nagojje, Seeta Namuganga, and Ntunda sub-counties. The second one is the map of Uganda showing the locality of Mukono district shown by the arrow sign.

# **3.3 Selection of Respondents**

Purposive sampling was employed to achieve the desired respondents relevant to the study. The study targeted respondents who were responsible for implementation of NAADS in the district, as well as beneficiaries of the policy. The group of policy actors selected included:

the agricultural technical officials in Mukono district charged with implementation of NAADS, local politicians in the district and farmers who are the policy target-group. Also technical officers from MAAIF were interviewed to expound more on the policy performance and the study to benefit from their technical point of view as policy architects. Therefore, insights of those respondents, together with documentary evidence helped the study to explore its main objective of finding out the challenges that affected NAADS implementation in the district. The technical personnel selected were mainly from the production department at the district charged with the mandate of NAADS implementation. Thus, they were well conversant with the topic under study and their expertise and knowledge provided enriched qualitative data that helped me to find answers for the research questions. Local politicians in the district were also selected because they were crucial in NAADS implementation. The politicians were tasked with various roles like mobilization of the farmers to participate in NAADS implementation. They were also mandated by law to carry out budget allocation and approval of plans and budgets in their areas of their jurisdiction. Therefore, their insights were essential to the study and also provided a different perspective from that of technical workers. Farmers also helped the study to analyze NAADS implementation from the policy beneficiary's point of view. Thus their expectations of the policy, understanding and perception of the policy objectives contributed to the enriched data gathered in the quest to answer the research questions.

Purposive sampling is a non-probability method of selecting a sample based on selecting respondents because they are uniquely qualified to provide needed information (Sarquah, 2008: 28-29). Therefore, technical staff, local political leaders, and farmers were purposively sampled to provide primary data for the study through interviews and focus group discussions. Those respondents were opted for because of their knowledge and experience in implementation of NAADS policy. The district technical staff, local politicians and farmers are the main stakeholders concerned with NAADS implementation at the local level. Thus, their insights and experiences helped the study to achieve the main research objective and in position to answer the research questions, as Creswell rightly asserts that, "the idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select participants that will best help the researcher to understand the problem and the research questions" (Creswell 2013: 189). Therefore, 15 agricultural technical officers were sampled to provide interview data, although 14 interviews were realized because the last one did not find time to have interview session with me. Also two political leaders at the district were interviewed to elaborate on their roles in NAADS

implementation. Four farmer groups composed of five farmers each were also interviewed through focus group discussions.

Table 1 showing Sample size of the study

No	Category/ Agencies	Representatives	Sample	Type of data
			size	
1	Central government	MAAIF	2	In-depth
	agencies	Director of NAADS		interviews
2	Local Government	Mukono District technical staff:	12	In-depth
		CAO,CFO, DPMO, DAO, DVO, District		interviews
		Planner, Agricultural Extension Officers		Documents
		Political Leaders		In-depth
		District chairperson, Secretary for	2	interviews
		production, and agriculture.		
3	Farmars Crouns	Farmers in the district. Four FGDs	20	Focus group
3	Farmers Groups	consisting of 5 farmers conducted	20	Focus group discussions
	Total		36	

Source: Researcher's field notes

# 3.4 Data collection methods

To gather the empirical evidence for the study, I employed various data collection methods. Both primary and secondary data were collected. Primary data was gathered mainly by using In-depth interviews, Focused group discussions, observation and secondary data comprised of document reviews. The use of multiple sources of evidence enabled me to address a broader range of historical and behavioral issues about implementation of NAADS. The several data collection methods used enabled me to gather rich array of information obtained from different actors involved in NAADS implementation. Therefore, the application of several data collection methods helped the study to capitalize on the advantages of all of them and they augmented each other. For example data from FGDs with farmers was clarified and substantiated on by technical officers through the interview sessions I held with them. Also document review helped to clarify some of the issues mentioned in interviews like actual

names of areas, technical terms mentioned in interviews hence enabling the study to gather accurate data.

#### 3.4.1 Interviews

It is one of the most important sources of case study information, and key in collection of primary data for the study (Yin, 2009: 107). In-depth interviews were conducted with respondents using open-ended questions in order to let respondents air out their insights about the problem under study. In total, 14 interviews were conducted with agricultural technical staff and 2 with local politicians. In those interview sessions, respondents expressed their views, experiences about NAADS implementation in the district. Bureaucrats from MAAIF were also included to expound more on the policy aspects. The interviews were a very useful tool since NAADS implementation was still on-going, and thus, the participants selected had firsthand information about the policy and their rich experience about its implementation helped to inform the study. By use of open-ended questions, respondents were not limited in their discussions; therefore, they were able to present their perspectives about NAADS implementation.

Interviews were conducted from participant's places of work especially in the afternoon when they had finished much of their daily duties. They lasted averagely for about 45 minutes per interview. Therefore, respondents had ample time to provide me with the relevant data for the study. All respondents were asked similar questions in order to get their insights concerning NAADS implementation and assess the variations in their perception of the policy. For instance the study probed all respondents on their understanding of the policy objectives. The intention was to explore whether there was ambiguity in the policy objectives which might have affected NAADS implementation. A rich array of interview data was collected for example data concerning roles of various respondents in NAADS implementation, their perception, expectations of NAADS policy. With the use of open-ended questions, respondents were at liberty to express their ideas and knowledge concerning the research problem. Thus, Interviews provided most of the primary data, supplemented by data from FGDs, observation and secondary data from documents. This made it possible to answer research questions and provided depth in evidence gathered contributing to validity of the study's findings.

#### 3.4.2 Focus group discussions

A focus group is a planned series of discussions intended to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening, non-judgmental way (Krueger & Casey, 2009: 2). Focus group participants in my study were farmers. They were selected because they had certain characteristics in common and were conversant with the research problem (ibid). Experienced farmers from various farmer groups in the district who were conversant with NAADS implementation were selected to provide their perspectives on NAADS implementation. The study considered farmers who had been involved in NAADS implementation for at least five years and above. This was because, those farmers had extensive understanding of the policy and thus, their enriched knowledge benefited the study by providing a different view point from that of technical officers and political actors. Krueger and Casey advise researchers to conduct more than one focused group discussion with different participants such that the researcher can identify trends and perceptions (2009: 2). Four focus group discussions were conducted consisting of five farmers per group and both males and females were represented. They were selected purposively basing on their experience in NAADS implementation and also considering gender aspects.

The focus group discussions helped me to tap into farmers', attitudes, behaviors and perceptions towards NAADS implementation. Open-ended questions were used to attain respondents' views on issues like their knowledge of the policy objectives, accessibility to agricultural extension services, roles of farmers in NAADS implementation, resources essential for NAADS implementation. During focus group discussions, I employed the services of a research assistant who helped me to record farmers' responses. Before starting group discussions, I instructed the research assistant on the topic under study and the kind of data required. Through FGDs, I was able to acquire farmers' perception and insights on NAADS implementation, their roles during implementation and reaction on how the reform was implemented. The study hypothesized that: opposition of NAADS by farmers may affect the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district. Farmers constituted the target-group of the policy, thus their views were helpful in understanding their perception, reactions, attitudes and behavior towards the policy and the way it was being implemented in the district. FGDs data was essential for the study because it was the most appropriate method to gather data from the target-group considering the time of data collection. Same questions were asked to all the different four FGD members in order to identify trends and patterns across groups and how their opinions relate to the research problem. Data from FGDs was clarified and corroborated by technical officials in the production departments through the interview sessions I held with them.

#### 3.4.3 Observation

Observation was another data collection tool used. This mainly involved observing the civil servants' behaviors, activities response towards clients, attitude towards their duties. I participated in 5 production department meetings that took place during my research period at the district, and in these meeting I observed behaviors of civil servants in relation to time management, reporting mechanism used, inter-personal relations. The technical staffs' behaviors are key ingredients that determine their general performance and ultimately policy implementation. Since agricultural extension officers are major actors of NAADS implementation, I observed how long they take to respond to farmers demand for agricultural services. NAADS aimed at easing accessibility to agricultural knowledge and extension services in order to spur agricultural productivity. Thus, timely response to farmers' demands and provision of relevant knowledge and skill is essential to achieve the policy output. I was also able to observe the inter-organizational communication mechanism in place to ensure effective NAADS implementation. I was able to observe activities in the field, the different challenges that extension staff encountered while conducting their duties, and also observed their attitudes, morale, towards implementation of policy activities. Creswell (2014) asserts that a qualitative observation is when the researcher takes field notes on the behavior and activities of individuals at the research site. Observation was mainly conducted during various meetings like departmental meetings, field visits with farmers and also observed how technical officials conducted their daily business at the station. An observation protocol was used which included guiding aspects (open-ended questions) which were followed during observation. Although Yin (2009, p.108) cautions that sometimes individuals behave differently from usual when they are being watched. But nevertheless, the method enabled me to decode events as they unfolded.

#### 3.4.4 Documentation

Secondary, data was collected through document reviews. In case studies, documents are important to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources, (Yin, 2009: 103). Administrative documents like NAADS progress reports, statutes like NAADS Act 2001, Local Government Act 1997, NAADS implementation guidelines 2010-2015 were relied on

to provide more empirical data for the study. Other documents also included District development plan 2010-2015, NAADS audit reports, budgets, minutes of meetings were reviewed to reflect on the progress, achievements and challenges encountered in NAADS implementation. Document helped me to verify the correct spellings and titles or names of organizations that were mentioned in the interviews, and also provided specific details to supplement evidence from other sources. Documents helped in provision of numerical data, for instance data concerning agricultural production of main crops in the district, financial resources released to the district from the central government, data concerning technical capacity and number of technical personnel involved in NAADS implementation. Therefore, such data that was handy in giving a true picture of the state of NAADS implementation in the district

Table 2 showing the type of data gathered using various data collection methods

No	Data collection Method/tool	Type of information
1	Interviews	- Knowledge of policy objectives by technical personnel,
		and politicians
		-Type of resources necessary for NAADS implementation
		- Political conditions
2	FGD	- Farmers' perception of NAADS
		- Roles of farmers in NAADS Implementation
		-Farmers expectations
3	Observation	- Behaviors of technical personnel at place of work and in
		field,
		- Time frame for response to farmers needs
4	Documents	-Numerical figures like agricultural productivity levels,
		financial resources released quarterly
		- Administrative data like Annual Implementation, evaluation
		and audit reports, budgets, and work plans
		-Newspapers articles, Internet

Source: researcher's field notes

#### 3.5 Data analysis and interpretation

Data analysis is where the researcher continually reflects on collected data, moving deeper to understanding and representing the data, and deriving an interpretation of the larger meaning of the data (Creswell 2003: 190 cited in Karyeija, 2010: 103). In a scientific study it is appropriate to convert large quantities of data into condensed forms, facilitating easy interpretation and understanding by other readers (ibid). The intention here was to make sense out of the text data recorded at the research site. Therefore, after data collection, I edited, coded, and analyzed findings. Some of the codes were pre-determined while others developed during data analysis. I sorted data into various categories, each category was hand coded under different themes and different study areas based on the independent variables presented as: policy standard and objectives, policy resources, organizational and inter-organizational relations, political and socio-economic conditions and target group behaviors. The intention in this case was to generate themes or categories which appear as the study's findings. A relationship between data and variables was established by interpreting statements, and document evidence. Results were presented through narrative text, quotes from respondents and logical reasoning. The research questions were answered by analyzing data from the various sources. Data collected from the field was presented through descriptions and analysis. I used content analysis in make meaning out of the various data collected. Direct quotations were used to represent some of the views of respondents. Furthermore, narratives were used to make meaning of some of the data. Tables and figures are presented in the work to make an illustrative view of some data for a better understanding of some of the findings.

# 3.6 Issues of Validity, Generalization and Reliability

# 3.6.1 Validity

Validity means checking the accuracy of the study's findings (Creswell, 2014: 201). The accuracy of the study findings can be determined from the viewpoint of the researcher, the participants, or the reader's perspective (ibid). To ensure validity for the study, I triangulated different data sources of evidence by examining information from the sources and using it to build coherent justification for the themes. In-depth data was collected from interviews with agricultural technical workers in the district and MAAIF and also local politicians and farmers expressed their views about NAADS implementation in the district through interviews and FGDs respectively. Together with documentary evidence, I was able to gather

enriched data for the study which helped me to answer the research questions. Collecting data from various sources of information and also obtaining the evidence from various players involved in NAADS implementation at the local level enabled the study to get views from different perspectives hence reducing data biasness and it ensured validity for the study findings. Being a local government employee myself though not from the agricultural field but from the administrative ranks it makes me one of the implementers of the policy. Therefore, one might say that my interpretation of findings is shaped by my background. However, my experience about the phenomenon under study was beneficial to the study because I analyzed the research problem from the participant's or implementer's view point and I had an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. As Creswell (2014) augmented that the more experience that a researcher has with participants in their settings, the more accurate or valid will be the findings. Moreover, insights of various NAADS actors or implementers in the district like agricultural technical officers, local politicians and farmers were presented and analyzed, to provide the study with various views about NAADS implementation in the district thus ensuring validity of the study.

The study also used two theories (Winter's integrated theory and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory) which have been used by several studies of implementation (see Eshun, 2015; Kipo, 2011). These theories developed variables and concepts which have been tested several times by various studies and proved to be valid. Thus, in order to ensure accuracy of my findings, the concepts and variables derived from both theories were explained and operationalized explicitly to the study's respondents and hence, they were in position to provide reliable and credible data for the study.

#### 3.6.2 Generalization

Several researchers especially those who use qualitative approach and case study strategy more often than not carry out analytical generalization for their studies (Onzima, 2013; Yin, 2009). Others who conduct multiple cases try to generalize their research by comparing data from different cases and hence generalize the findings to represent a bigger section of the area of study (Onzima 2010). My study was mainly a single case study. Several authors caution on the weaknesses of case study especially single cases as far as generalization is concerned. Therefore, I cannot authoritatively state that the findings for my study from Mukono district can be generalized to portray the NAADS implementation picture for the whole country.

Nevertheless, this study was explorative and thus its findings can be used as starting point to trigger more research on the topic in the country. Additionally, my study also focused on analytical rather than statistical generalization. Therefore evidence from the study aimed at building and adding to theoretical elements presented by the two theories used in the study. The study contributes to the theoretical argument by merging ideas from both Winter's integrated implementation theory and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory to explain policy implementation at the local level in Uganda.

## 3.6.3 Reliability.

The objective of reliability is to be sure that, if a later investigator followed the same procedure as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the same case study all over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions (Yin, 2009: 45). To achieve reliability, I developed a clear case study protocol and data base. The protocol contained the interview guide and observational forms. I documented steps taken in the field work, and report preparations. In addition, I also documented the respondents who provided the primary data for the study. Therefore, any other researcher can follow the same steps and be in position to get the same findings, hence achieving reliability for the study. I also carried out a careful coding process in order to exterminate inconsistencies in data. This was done by regularly checking and comparing data with the codes.

# 3.7 Challenges of the study

The limited time allocated for data collection could not enable me to carry out more interviews for the study. The two months provided for data collection as well as holiday were limited and thus hindered me from engaging in many other research activities. For example I wanted more engagements with the farmers through field visits such that I experience more of their perspective of the NAADS implementation in the district. However, I was able to gather enough comprehensive data relevant for the study.

Due to the NGO culture that has deeply penetrated people's mind, where they expect meeting allowance whenever they are called upon. Also, during FGDs with farmers, they expected some kind of meeting allowance from me. But I explicitly explained to them the purpose of the study as it was purely academic and being a student, I could not afford to offer them the allowances. Well and good, they understood my position and thus focus group discussions with them moved on well.

#### 3.8 Ethical Considerations

Researchers need to protect their research participants; develop a trust with them; promote the integrity of research; guard against misconduct and impropriety that might affect their organizations or institutions; and cope with new challenging problems (Israel & Hay, 2006 as cited in Creswell, 2014: 92). In this regard, permission was sought from relevant institutions in order to conduct the research. Various study concepts were explained explicitly to the respondents therefore, they were acquainted with study's purpose hence respondents were in position to provide relevant information for the study. In addition, the principle of confidentiality was also exercised.

#### 3.9 Conclusion

The study intended to find out the challenges that affected effective NAADS implementation in Uganda, particularly Mukono district. With the guidance of both Winter's integrated theory and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory, empirical evidence was gathered in order to add to theoretical explanation of public policy implementation at the local level particularly in Uganda's context. As analyzed above, the study adopted a qualitative study and case study strategy which facilitated usage of multiple sources of evidence. Thus, data gathered as analyzed in the subsequent chapter helped to answer the study's main question

#### **CHAPTER FOUR**

# OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL ADVISORY SERVICES IN UGANDA

#### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a general overview of NAADS policy in the country. It depicts the institutional structure involved in NAADS implementation. It also expounds on the legal framework in which NAADS is embedded. The data presented in this chapter and next chapter provides insights on NAADS implementation in the country hence creating foundation for analysis on aspects that I found out during data collection in Mukono district

#### 4.1 NAADS Overview.

The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) is the Government of Uganda's (GOU) program spearheading the reform process of agricultural extension provision. NAADS aimed at developing a demand-driven, client-oriented, agricultural service delivery system to farmers (Nahdy, 2004). This program was grounded in the government's overarching policies of agricultural modernization, poverty eradication, decentralization, privatization, and community participation in decision-making. NAADS implementation started in 2001 after the enactment of NAADS Act 2001 by the Ugandan parliament. NAADS was initiated in 2001 in 24 sub-counties within six districts, (Benin, Nkonya, Okecho, Randriamamonjy, Kato, Lubade, et al., 2011). Mukono district, the area of study in this research was one of the pioneer districts in which NAADS implementation started. NAADS was implemented under a public private partnership arrangement in which the NAADS secretariat worked with technical staff at the district, sub-county level, and farmer groups to contract and supervise private professional firms to provide specialized agricultural advisory services according to farmers' priority enterprises and needs (ibid, p.250). NAADS was implemented in phases; phase one (2001-2008, however postponed to 2010), phase two (2010-2015). The focus in this study was phase two because it was the latest one and afforded me easy accessibility to the relevant empirical data needed to answer the study's main question: What are the challenges affecting NAADS implementation in Mukono district? NAADS was implemented according to the institutional framework as defined in the NAADS Act 2001. The organizations involved included: farmer organizations, local governments, MAAIF, MFPED, private sector, (ibid).

# 4.2 The NAADS Act 2001 as a legal implementation guideline

The Act was enacted in 2001 by the Parliament of Uganda to guide NAADS implementation. The Act created NAADS implementation structure in conformity with existing local government structure. The Act created the NAADS Secretariat under MAAIF mandated to coordinate NAADS implementation in the country. The Act further created farmers' structures from national to village level, that is: National farmers' forum, District farmers' forum, subcounty farmers' forum, parish farmers' forum and village farmers' forum. These farmers' forums were tasked by the act to consider and approve proposed annual work plans and budgets at their respective levels of jurisdiction, to monitor the overall implementation of the NAADS program at the respective levels, to advise implementers on suitable strategies of implementation of the objectives of the Act. A policy statute constitutes the fundamental policy decisions being implemented, it also indicates the problem(s) being addressed and stipulates the objective(s) to be pursued (P. Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980:544). A policy statute also has the capacity to structure the entire implementation process through its selection of the implementing institutions (ibid). In that regard, NAADS Act 2001 created the implementation structure and objectives of the NAADS as will be expounded on later.

# 4.3 Policy Actors involved in NAADS implementation.

Policies engage different actors, although technical actors are always at the forefront of implementation. Once the direction and goals of a policy are officially decided, the nature and type of actors involved begin to expand beyond the small subset of actors making policy decisions to encompass the policy universe of interested actors (Howlett et al., 2009: 160). NAADS was implemented following a decentralized structure, where by different parties right from the village level up to the district level are involved in the implementation process. During NAADS implementation, central government agencies were mandated to carryout monitoring and evaluation of the policy activities, and also to conduct capacity building of local government NAADS implementers. The end results of the policy rotated around farmers because final implementation and realization of policy output depended on farmers' efforts and their groups' commitment towards the policy. The farmer groups were represented in farmer forum at sub-county, district, and national levels. The Forums were the major points for interaction between farmers and government institutions. The NAADS Act of 2001 worked as the guideline to all NAADS implementers. Thus, it designated roles to various players at different levels of implementation, and empowered MAAIF to make regulations or

administrative rules required to ensure effective implementation of the policy (NAADS, 2001).

#### **4.4 NAADS implementation Structure**

NAADS was implemented under both the local government structure and NAADS structure established by the NAADS Act and other relevant laws. NAADS implementation followed a bottom-up approach where farmers identified their needs in which they required capacity building. Those needs were prioritized and integrated in the local government plans and budgets. Then later, technical personnel prepared extension services to farmers depending on the farmers' identified demands or needs. NAADS Act 2001 created the organizational structure including the Board, secretariat and Farmers forum at the center.

# 4.4.1 The NAADS Board.

The board was appointed by the ministry of Agriculture consisting of 15 members, 9 of them farmers and the rest technical officials representing different agencies. The board was mandated to carry out the functions below:

- To formulate policies of the organization
- To support and supervise the implementation of NAADS objective and functions of the organization
- To advise and give guidance on program, policy and strategy issues
- To set targets and approve work plans and budgets for the organization
- To facilitate, supervise and support the secretariat in carrying out its functions
- To appoint and discipline members of staff of the secretariat
- To perform any other functions relating to the above as the minister of agriculture may direct.

#### **4.4.2** The Secretariat

The secretariat referred to the technical wing of the organization headed by the executive director who was appointed by the minister of Agriculture on the recommendation of the NAADS Board. The executive director and his or her subordinate staff were responsible for the day-to-day operations of the NAADS secretariat, management of funds, property,

administration, organization and control of the staff and the general affairs of the organization.

#### 4.4.3 National Farmers forum

The NAADS Act 2001 established a national farmers' forum comprised of chairperson of the District Farmers fora, two members from the district elected by the district farmer fora, and invited stake holders as identified by the minister. The functions of the national farmers' forum included:

- To participate in monitoring and evaluation of the progress of advisory services
- To participate in review of local government plans for agricultural development
- To provide feedback at different levels
- To identify and nominate the farmers representatives on the board.

# 4.4.4 The district farmers' forum

This was established in each district and linked to the National farmers' forum and the secretariat. The district farmers' forum comprised of the secretary for production at the district, chairperson of every sub-county farmers forum in the district, the district NAADS coordinator. Its functions included the following:

- To consider and approve proposed annual work plans and budgets at the district level for the implementation of NAADS in their areas.
- To advise the district on suitable strategies of implementation of the objects of the Act
- To monitor the overall implementation of the NAADS program in the District.

# 4.4.5 The Sub-county farmers' forum

This was created at the sub-county level and comprise of two members of the executive committee of every farmers group in a sub-county, the secretary of production at the sub-county and the sub-county NAADS coordinator who played the secretarial duties. The functions of the sub-county farmer forum included:

• To consider and approve proposed annual work plans and budgets at the sub-county level for the implementation of NAADS in their areas


- To advise the sub-county on suitable strategies of implementation of NAADS in their areas
- To monitor the overall implementation of NAADS program in the sub-county
- Identify among themselves members to form a sub-county procurement committee which awards contract for NAADS services and goods for farmer groups.

During review of the documents, I found out that these forums comprised of farmers and technical personnel working together to steer implementation of the NAADS. However, there was a lacuna in the law because farmers who sat on these committees were not required by law to have a certain level of education, yet they were working with technical personnel with advanced education levels, hence creating disparities in the level of interaction and debate among committee members. This explains the mistrust expressed some times by committee members because some felt inferior to their counterparts.

# 4.5 NAADS Implementation structure in Mukono District

NAADS implementation in the district is premised under the production department. This is the department concerned with agricultural activities. The department is headed by the District production officer, and under him there are senior technical officers at the district level, and also junior officers or Agricultural extension officers in lower local governments (sub-counties). NAADS implementation in the district followed the structure below.

Figure 4 showing NAADS Implementation Organizational Structure in the District



Source: Researcher's field notes

The figure above shows how NAADS was implemented in Mukono district. During the implementation process, farmers identified their priority enterprises and needs in which they needed advisory services from local governments. The farmers' needs passed through different stages, ranked and prioritized until they reached at the district local government level. At district level, the most needed services were incorporated in the district plan and budget, and later sent to the Ministry of Agriculture and Finance for funding. Subsequently, with funding secured from the central government, the production department at both the district and sub-county level provided the agricultural advisory services to farmers. Recently in 2014, the president added the army as another agency involved in NAADS implementation, through the so called operation wealth creation (OWC). The OWC component focused at mass procurement and supply of free farm inputs to farmers. This was the president's idea smuggled into NAADS implementation because initially it was not part of NAADS activities. It just changed names because it was introduced in 2006 during the presidential campaigns.

Then, the president named it Prosperity For All (PFA) and was regarded by many authors as a political campaign strategy aimed at fetching votes for the ruling regime (see Joughin & Kjær, 2010). After winning the elections, then the president later blamed the technical staff at districts for failure of PFA alleging that technical experts were corrupt. He vowed to sack most of the extension officers and replace them with the army which he referred to as a competent and disciplined force. Eventually in 2014, he managed to achieve his target by sacking extension officers and replaced them with the army personnel with no skills, knowledge and experience in agricultural activities (Ogenga-Latigo, 2015). The army spearheaded the OWC implementation. However, the army's involvement in the NAADS implementation structure had no linkage with other implementing partners. The army's purpose focused solely on implement the presidential directive of supply of free handouts to farmers in the form of seeds. The OWC sub-program greatly reduced NAADS budget of agricultural extension service delivery to farmers, consequently affecting training of farmers in agricultural practices. Therefore, this created the information and skills gap among farmers; hence, it negatively affected the state of NAADS implementation in the district.

#### 4.6 Conclusion

The above chapter portrayed NAADS overview in the country. The information therein created foundation for the subsequent chapters as it presented the NAADS implementation structure at the center and at the local government level. The chapter also presented the NAADS Act 2001 which is the legal document that guided NAADS implementation and specified the policy objectives and functions of various policy players.

#### **CHAPTER FIVE**

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS ON THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents analysis of the dependent variable of the study. The study set out to assess the challenges that affected effective NAADS implementation in Mukono district local government. In that regard, the state of the NAADS implementation formed the dependent variable of the study. The state of the NAADS implementation was measured in the study basing on the attainment of the policy output as prescribed by NAADS objectives. Accordingly, many implementation theorists adduced that goal achievement has been the dominating standard and dependent variable for implementation research since the 1970's (see Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975) Therefore, NAADS implementation was operationalized in the study through the following indicators:

- Agricultural Productivity
- Creation of Farmer groups
- Capacity building trainings
- Promotion of private financing of extension services

Therefore, this chapter sets out to present findings, discussion and analysis of the above indicators of the dependent variable.

# **5.1 Agricultural Productivity**

NAADS sought to improve farmers' accessibility to extension services in order to boost agricultural productivity. To increase agricultural productivity, government devised means which included: provision of information and training on profitable enterprises, technologies and farming practices that met local farm production. Such measures were expected to lead to increased adoption and marketed output. Also later through supply of free farm inputs like fertilizers, improved seeds to farmers, government intended to enable farmers to boost agricultural production. Through document reviews, the study retrieved information about agricultural production of major crops in the district. Although there were other crops, the ones represented in the table below were the major ones planted by 85% of the district farmers population in the district (Mukono, 2015b).

Table 3. Showing Mukono District Agricultural production of major crops from

Crop	Annual output per year in tons				
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Maize	12,345	11,169	13,969	10,554	10,040
Beans	20,098	17,687	17,633	16,990	16,311
Banana	6,312	4,227	4,122	4,090	3,998
Vegetables	2,101	1,763	1,698	1,509	1,354
Coffee	25,654	24,920	23,675	25,909	22,663
Cocoa	3,667	3,395	3,221	2,887	2,455

Source: Mukono district production report 2014

From data presented in table 3 above, it is evident that agricultural production of some of the major crops in the district was dwindling annually. The technical personnel in the district were tasked to explain the above trends. Nine respondents out of the 14 agricultural technical workers interviewed attributed the decrease in agricultural production in the district to limited farmers' accessibility to agricultural information from the technical personnel. It is through knowledge transfer from agricultural extension workers to farmers that farmers' concerns were dealt with and measures devised to address the challenges which hindered farmers from achieving high crop yields. As one technical officer reported:

"There has been decline in the agricultural production of the major crops in the district primarily because of lack of adequate information by farmers. It is through the technical guidance that farmers are trained on modern farming practices and effective management of farming enterprises such that they are able to increase agricultural output. During NAADS phase one, farmers in their particular groups used to be trained twice a season (3 months) but now the agricultural technical experts and financial resources are limited and groups are trained once in 6 months and even farm visits of different farmers are no longer carried out".

The above argument by the technical personnel was augmented by data from the focus group discussions I held with farmers. 15 out of the 20 farmers in FGDs reported that they had not seen a technical personnel visit their farms despite several pleas calling for technical guidance on how to prevent pests and diseases from attacking their maize farms. Although NAADS aimed at easing farmers' accessibility to agricultural extension services, realization of such objective was hampered by shortage of technical staff to enforce it.

Another reason for the low production in the district was due to the practice of subsistence farming by majority of the farmers. Subsistence farming aims at production of agricultural products mainly for home consumption. Despite the NAADS implementation which involved encouraging farmers to be market oriented while implementing their agricultural activities, 80% of the farmers in the district still produced for subsistence purposes or home consumption. Subsistence production meant that farmers relied on their human bodies and energy for labour, small acreages were under production and almost there was no usage of machines like tractors which would have helped in opening up vast fields such that large acreage would be put under production in order to attain increased agricultural production. One of the government owned newspaper called New Vision, quoted Professor William Kyamuhangire of Makerere University faculty of food science and Technology blaming the low agricultural output in the country on subsistence farming. He said that: "Subsistence farming is dominating farming, for instance, you will find in most rural areas homes with a goat, a hen, a dog and a small garden". (as cited in; Watuwa, 2012: 15). It would be more productive, according to Kyamuhangire, if farmers focused say on cows or goats or vegetables than attempting all of them on a small garden (ibid). Under subsistence farming where farmers produced mainly for home consumption, there was less motivation for them to increase production.

Through NAADS, the central government provided free farm inputs like improved seeds, fertilizers, and livestock to farmers as an incentive to boost agricultural production. However, increase in agricultural output was not realized instead production dwindled every year as reflected in table 3 above. During interviews with the agricultural technical personnel and farmers, it was realized that some of those inputs provided to farmers were misused by the farmers themselves. As one of the farmers during focus group interviews asserted that:

"Many of our colleagues who receive farm inputs from government like bean seeds, they eat them instead of planting them and later complain to the authorities that the seeds were of poor quality and they did not germinate. This is due to the fact that some farmers receive those farm inputs as a result of influence of other people in higher authority like politicians, hence they receive them when they are unprepared, thus ending up misusing the initiative".

According to documents reviewed, the study found out that farmers who received the free farm inputs under NAADS were assessed and vetted by agricultural technical workers, whether they had the capacity to implement the planned initiatives before they were provided with those farm inputs. But basing on data received from interviews with technical staff and focus group discussions with farmers, I found out that the procedures for selection of beneficiaries were sometimes flouted due to external influence especially from politicians. Consequently, some unprepared farmers were selected to receive those farm inputs. Such unprepared farmers had less commitment towards the attainment of the common goal of increased agricultural output. Under the initiative of providing free farm inputs to farmers, there was another intention apart from boosting farm yields, was to multiply seeds and revolve them among farmers in the village. Every farmer who received free seeds from government was mandated to return the quantity he or she received, such that other fellow farmers in the village also benefit in order to boost production. Unfortunately, basing on reviewed NAADS documents, farmers defaulted on their obligation to return the seeds they got in order to revolve it to others (Mukono, 2014a, 2015b).

Low agricultural productivity had detrimental effects on economic welfare of rural populations and food security measured in terms of caloric intake (Ssewanyana & Okidi, 2009 as cited in Mruma, 2005). High prevalence and incidence of poverty had been observed in the country (UBOS and ILRI, 2007), with the main contributory factor being low agricultural productivity. Insufficiency in household food production exposed farmers to severe food insecurity and high prices of food. In Uganda, only 12% of households were significant net sellers of food, with 66% being net food buyers and relied on market for more than 25% of the value of the food they consumed (Benson et al.., 2008 as cited in Mwaura, 2014: 918). This implied that increased agricultural production remains an important intervention in addressing welfare and economic development in Uganda. However, basing on empirical evidence gathered, NAADS output of increased agricultural productivity was yet to be realized.

# **5.2** Creation of farmer groups

Farmer groups are those groups that share common interest and come together to share experiences in farming (DENIVA, 2005a, as cited in Adong, Mwaura, & Okoboi, 2013: 37). Farmer groups were used as means of reaching smallholder farmers by the government, the private sector and the development partners to improve agriculture productivity and food security. Overall, farmer groups were important avenues through which farmers accessed market and credit information as well as other important agricultural information like new

agricultural technologies. Farmer groups also formed important avenues for mobilization of farmers around a common objective especially in delivery of services and formulation of policies that supported agriculture development.

The concept of farmer groups in Uganda was the main component of agricultural extension service delivery in the country. The Ugandan government published guidelines on group formation among farmers (MAAIF, 2010: 445) According to the guidelines, all farmers of 18 years and above in all villages in the country were targeted to be enrolled in farmers groups. Through enrolment of farmers in groups, they were supported by easing their accessibility to extension services, technological inputs and other development capacities to achieve increased agricultural production. The use of groups approach in extension service delivery was viewed as more decentralized and demand driven, hence it was expected to facilitate farmers to achieve higher agricultural output. Considering the fact that, for farmers to access resources and gain capacity support from the NAADS, they were supposed to be in groups (MAAIF, 2010). Basing on the data retrieved from policy documents, Mukono District had 1609 farmer groups with a population of 27,311 farmers (Mukono, 2015b).

Table 4 showing number of Farmer groups and their population per sub-county

Sub County	Number of farmer	Number of farmers		Total
	groups	M	F	
Goma	197	1908	1932	3840
Kasawo	112	794	812	1606
Kimenyedde	103	619	823	1442
Koome	84	189	289	478
Kyampisi	120	386	502	888
Mpatta	128	255	633	888
Mpunge	56	499	341	840
Nabbale	67	753	567	1320
Nagojje	101	667	882	1549
Nakisunga	168	2397	2979	5376
Nama	95	303	479	782
Ntenjeru	136	793	799	1592
Ntunda	54	641	531	1172
Mukono Division	78	525	1013	1538
Seeta Namuganga	110	1638	2362	4000
Total	1609	12367	14944	27311

Source: Mukono District NAADS Implementation and Evaluation Report 2015.

The table above shows number of farmer groups and their population per sub-county or lower local government in the district. Data obtained from the production department, indicated that 80% of the district population were farmers (Mukono, 2015a). The production department at the district had a target of achieving enrolment of 50% of farmers in groups. However those involved in farmer groups as indicated in the table above only totaled to 27,311 farmers. Thus, it indicated that less than 10% of farmers were group members. The technical personnel in the district considered farmers' negative attitude towards group approach to be one of the reasons for existence of few farmer groups in the district, as one agricultural extension officer elaborated:

"Many farmer groups were formed especially during NAADS phase one implementation but almost 60% of those groups have collapsed due to farmers' negative attitude towards the group approach and ignorance about the group dynamics. Although we have tried to sensitize farmers about the importance of farmer groups, many of them still harbor negative attitude towards them. The group approach has not sunk deeply into them since majority are used to solo management of their farming ventures"

Another technical officer explained that, the small number of farmer groups in the district was as a result of farmers' ignorance of the NAADS' objectives and added on that some farmers harbored ambitious objectives which were not catered for in the policy, as elaborated below:

"Initially many farmers joined groups in anticipation that they were going to receive financial assistance from government inform of interest free credit. So, when such farmers' expectation was not recognized, many pulled out of groups hence reducing farmer groups' population enormously and it affected NAADS expansion".

Therefore, formation of farmer groups and developing their capacities to demand for agricultural extension services as one of the indicators of effective NAADS implementation was not yet successfully realized. Although NAADS program is a public investment intervention, farmers had to decide whether to participate in the program or not. When a farmer decided to participate, he or she had to do so through membership of a NAADS participating farmer group. Then, together with members of the group as well as with members of other NAADS participating groups in the sub-county they requested for specific technologies and advisory services associated with their prioritized enterprises. The roles to sensitize and mobilize farmers to form farmer groups were bestowed upon agricultural technical workers helped by their counterparts the local politicians with the mobilization

roles. However, the technical personnel faced an enormous challenge because they were few compared to the population of farmers in the district and the area of operation. Despite the group approach being embraced in developing countries to address a plethora of rural development challenges (Loevinsohn, Mugarura, & Nkusi, 1994), queries still linger on how to enhance farmer groups' membership, cohesiveness, mandate, resources availability, integrity and members' managerial capacity (Adong et al., 2013). Nevertheless, well conceptualized and supported groups like in the case of tea small holders in Kenya where they collectively owned factories, dictated on market prices and were able to employ experts and set agenda for research (Mwaura et al.., 2010 as cited in Mwaura, 2014: 918). However basing on the evidence gathered, farmer groups formation, cohesiveness and sustainability in Mukono district was still below targeted output.

During assessment of the effectiveness of farmer groups as viable institutions for farmer empowerment. District NAADS evaluation reports pointed out that farmer institutional development component under NAADS program had been underfunded for the past five years. Procurement of farm inputs had been continuously allocated the largest chunk of the NAADS budget, receiving 40% of total budget, followed by management and coordination 30%, farmer institutional development at 16% and other activities 14% (Mukono, 2015a). Over the years, NAADS funding focused more on farm inputs procurement, farming technology development, monitoring and evaluation compared to farmer institution development component through which farmers were trained on relevance of farmer groups and agricultural skills. Such trends explain the low participation of farmers in groups in the district. In addition, stringent requirements also limited farmers from joining farmer groups. During focus group interviews, 17 farmers out of 20 interviewed across the four focus groups reported that some farmers failed to join groups because they could not afford to pay group dues like membership, subscription fees among others. Therefore, such requirements discouraged many farmers from joining the farmer groups hence limiting the achievement of NAADS objective of creation of farmer groups and empowerment. Although the group entry or formation requirements could have hindered farmer enrolment into the groups, there is a tendency for people not to value skills obtained through capacity building provided by the government because those services are given for free. However, there is a degree of responsibility and seriousness when individuals partially contribute to the cause.

# 5.3 Capacity building of farmers

Empowerment of farmers was implemented through various field trainings conducted by extension staff in communities. During review of NAADS implementation documents in the district, I found out that the field visits were initiated by the farmer groups by inviting technical staff to train them in a particular area where they need technical capacity building. As reflected above there were 1609 registered farmer groups in the district, averagely every sub-county had more than 100 farmer groups. All these groups required training on farming ventures, skills and other NAADS activities. However, there was insufficient staff to serve the overwhelming demand for agricultural advisory services from farmers. As farmers expressed during focus group discussions. One chairperson of a farmer group stated that:

"It is now 6 months since we wrote to the technical staff at the sub-county to come and train us on banana bacterial wilt disease affecting our crops in the area but we haven't received any response. By 2009, we used to have four extension staff at the sub-county, at least they could try to respond to our problems but now we have only one extension staff at the sub-county who is so overloaded and can't serve all farmer groups and farmers in the sub-county".

The study hypothesized that: *insufficient policy resource like inadequate skilled labor may negatively affect the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district.* The study found out that in the year 2014 government conducted restructuring of extension staff in local governments. The reduction of extension officers in local governments was a nation-wide process. It was a presidential directive which ordered all the funds meant for salaries and facilitation of extension officers to be channeled towards procurement of agricultural inputs such as improved seeds to be supplied freely to farmers. However, the decision had a negative impact on NAADS implementation because it drastically reduced funding for delivery of agricultural advisory services to farmers. Consequently, farmers lacked the sufficient knowledge and skills to effectively plant the hybrid seed varieties supplied to them by government, which affected the agricultural production in the district.

During interviews with technical staff, they informed me that it was very costly to deliver extension services to farmers since they were widely dispersed in remote areas in the district where transport was difficult due to existence of a poor road network in the rural areas. One technical officer expressed that:

"It is as if government expects us to serve the communities while incurring the cost of extension service delivery from our pockets. Government facilitation towards extension services is very little and always delayed, in addition to all these hurdles, now they have even reduced the number of agricultural extension officers and consequently the NAADS implementation is negatively affected".

Therefore, empowerment of farmers through field trainings was not effectively implemented hence compromising NAADS effective implementation. Furthermore, during interviews with the agricultural technical workers and farmers, both highlighted that farmers' attendance of agricultural training had drastically reduced. Majority of farmers were only interested to benefit from the free farm inputs supplied by government and ignored trainings which would equip them with various agricultural skills and build their capacities to improve on their farm outputs. Furthermore, as expressed in the NAADS implementation reports reviewed, most of the farmers initially expected the reform to offer interest free credit such that they would get funds to invest in their farming ventures (Mukono, 2015a). However, that was not the case and out of frustration, some farmers abandoned groups and others limited their participation in the groups and agricultural trainings which were meant to equip them with farming skills.

# 5.4 Promotion of private financing and delivery of extension services.

NAADS was meant to be implemented through a public-private partnership arrangement in which advisory services were to be provided by contracted professional service providers (Nahdy, 2004). The ideal was to contract private organizations with their own technical staff to provide agricultural advisory services, but due to financial constraints, the Government instead contracted individuals which it co-opted as its technical personnel. The contracted agricultural technical individuals were very few and could not adequately serve the farmers, as one of the respondents stated that:

"Every sub-county was allocated four extension officers and later reduced to one staff to serve a population of averagely 30,000 farmers. This brought a heavy work load on the extension staff and could not serve farmers adequately".

NAADS also intended to promote private financing of extension services, however, agriculture in Uganda is largely self-financed, regarded as un lucrative business, by most private financial institutions (Khandker & Koolwal, 2014). Hence, explaining the limited investment in agriculture due to the high risks and cost involved in delivery of extension

services. Although, agriculture makes up 35% of the country's GDP, and the agricultural sector employs 73% of the active labour force, compared to service sector's 23% and industry 4% (Khandker & Koolwal, 2014; Nuwagaba, 2012: 109). Virtually all rural households are in farming, about 80% of which are smallholder farmers, as well as nearly half of households in urban areas where farming has grown rapidly in recent years due to concerns about food adequacy (See; Khandker & Koolwal, 2014; Mukwaya, Bamutaze, Mugarura, & Benson, 2011). However, because of limited access and perceived risks of agricultural loans, agriculture receives only about 9% of total commercial bank credit annually, of which crop production receives about 3% and crop finance or trade in agricultural output receives the rest (Khandker & Koolwal, 2014; Mpuga, 2004). In the past and still currently, most rural households relied on informal sources<sup>3</sup> for their borrowing needs (Khandker & Koolwal, 2014). Therefore, attraction of private financing for extension service delivery was still a challenge. Furthermore Anderson and Feder, in the World Bank report titled Agricultural Extension: Good intentions and hard realities, they posited that:

"In countries with large number of farmers working relatively small plots (as it is common in most developing countries) the potential clients of extension services living in geographically dispersed communities. Underdeveloped transport links add to the cost and difficulty of reaching these farmers. High rates of illiteracy and limited connection to the electronic mass media rule out reaching these clients through means that do not require face-face interaction (written materials, radio, television and internet). Thus the number of clients who need to be covered by extension services is large and the cost of reaching them is high" (Anderson & Feder, 2004, p.45). Thus, the private sector is less attracted to the agricultural sector because of its high risky nature.

As indicated before during analysis of political and socio-economic conditions, the study looked at the social economic conditions in the district including infrastructure like community roads that facilitated extension workers' outreaches to farmers. But, during review of the district development plan report (2010-2015), I found out that 70% of the community roads in the district were in poor state. These roads are vital in movement of people and goods to the markets. Therefore, the poor road network in the district made it difficult for extension staff to reach farmers easily hence, it negatively affected delivery of agricultural advisory

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Informal Sources included un-regulated financial means, like borrowing from friends, neighbours.

services and technology to farmers. Thus, hindering NAADS goal attainment, yet Meter and Horn 1975 emphasize goal achievement as the ideal for implementation studies.

Table 5 Summary of major findings on the dependent variable (Effective NAADS implementation)

Indicator of Dependent variable	Findings
Productivity	Low agricultural productivity
Creation of Farmer groups	Only 1609 farmer groups created
	Only 10% of farmers were involved in farmer groups
	Leadership conflict in groups affected their sustainability
Capacity building of farmers	Limited number of trainings conducted due to existence of
	insufficient technical staff in the district
Private Financing of NAADS activities	Low coverage of credit institutions in rural areas
	Farming considered highly risky venture by private
	finance institutions
	Low demand for credit by farmers
	Limited knowledge by farmers about private financing
	alternatives

Source: Researcher's field notes

### **5.5 Conclusion**

From the above analysis of data on the dependent variable and the summary of findings presented in the table above. It reflected dismal and negative performance in realization of NAADS objectives. As elaborated above, agricultural production of the main crops in the district decreased annually, farmer groups were associated with a lot of problems like leadership conflicts and also existence of limited technical staff affected the creation of more groups since farmers lacked training on group dynamics. Also limited penetration of private financing institutions in the rural areas due to lack of incentives and infrastructure in rural areas to attract private financial institution led to limited funding of agricultural activities. Therefore basing on the data gathered and analyzed, NAADS output was yet to be realized hence data indicated that the policy was still unsuccessfully implemented in Mukono district.

# **CHAPTER SIX**

# PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

#### 6.0 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyzes empirical evidence on three independent variables: policy standard and objectives, policy resources, organizational and inter-organizational relations. Data presented in this chapter endeavors to answer the research questions including: How policy standard and objectives were perceived by the NAADS implementers in the district and how it affected NAADS implementation? And whether NAADS objectives were clear or ambiguous to implementers? Secondly, data on policy resources aimed at answering research questions including: what is the nature of resources needed and how they affected NAADS implementation in the district? Lastly, how organizational and inter-organizational relations affected effective NAADS implementation. Data from interviews with technical staff, local politicians, focus group discussions with farmers and document reviews provided the basis for the analysis.

# 6.1 Policy standards and Objectives: Are NAADS objectives clear or ambiguous?

Clear policy standards and objectives provide the basis for understanding the overall goals of the policy decisions. This is so because an elaborate legislative document provides concrete and specific standards for assessing program performance or output (Long & Franklin, 2004; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1980, 1981; P. A. Sabatier, 1986; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). The study of implementation requires that goals and objectives be identified and measured since implementation cannot succeed or fail without goal against which to judge it (Pressman & Wildavisky 1973: xiv; cited in Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 464). NAADS' overall goal aimed at easing farmers' accessibility to extension services in order to boost agricultural productivity. This mission ought to be clear to all policy actors in the policy cycle. To this end, the intention during the study was to assess the clarity or ambiguity of the policy objectives to implementers and how it affected their capacity to implement the policy successfully; also focus was put on the degree of conflict or consensus over NAADS goals and objectives. The study theorized that conflicts over policy goals and objectives might negatively affect policy implementation. Both theories applied in the study advocate for participation of subordinates or implementers in formulation of policy goals and objectives if

consensus among policy players and clarity of the objectives to implementers were to be attained. The question about clarity and knowledge of the policy objectives was posed to all respondents including district technical staff, local politicians and farmers to analyze their knowledge of the NAADS objectives. According to agricultural technical personnel interviewed, they stressed that NAADS objectives were inconsistent, ambiguous and often altered by politicians depending on the political conditions in the country. The political conditions referred to here were substantiated below in the insights of a particular technical officer in the district. The respondent, when asked why the objectives were unclear, he responded:

"The politicians determine the direction of NAADS, whenever the country moves towards presidential and general elections, NAADS tend to be used as a political tool to garner political support for the ruling government. NAADS initially intended to promote accessibility of farmers to extension services through a public-private partnership, in which government would contract service providers to provide agricultural advisory services to farmers but politicians particularly the president instead diverted some of the funds for that component to the procurement of free handouts in the form of farm in-puts like hybrid seed varieties, fertilizers because they are tangible. The intention is to use the free handouts to lure voters since majority of the population (80%) are farmers. Currently, because of the upcoming presidential elections next year 2016, a big percentage of NAADS funds (75%) are diverted towards politically orchestrated sub-program called operation wealth creation (OWC)<sup>4</sup> placed under NAADS where the army is carrying out mass procurement of seeds and supplying them to farmers regardless of their capacity to manage such inputs".

The above argument by technical personnel in the district was augmented by the fact that the president often changed NAADS goals and targets at his own will. In 2005, the president initiated a sub-program called Prosperity for All (PFA) and included it in the NAADS activities. It was one of the main focus of the president's manifesto in 2006 presidential elections (Joughin & Kjær, 2010). It aimed at increasing household income through agriculture by carrying out mass procurement and distribution of free agricultural in-puts like seeds to farmers using NAADS funds (ibid). However, before its impact was realized, the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Operation wealth creation is a sub-program placed under NAADS in which the army procure seeds and supply to farmers. After retrenchment of most extension officers, Funds which were meant for extension services were channelled towards OWC as directed by the president.

president disbanded it and suspended the whole NAADS implementation in 2007 including halting salaries for NAADS technical personnel citing irregularities in its implementation. However, 12 technical staff out of the 14 interviewed viewed PFA as a political campaign strategy which used NAADS resources and structures to garner political support for the ruling government during 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections and after its target was achieved of retaining ruling regime into power, it had to be disbanded. Later on, in 2014 the president once again brought up another change in NAADS by introducing another subprogram called operation wealth creation (OWC); it was similar to PFA but just changed names. This however came with dire consequences in which, government laid off most extension workers and replaced them with army personnel (Okoed, 2014). OWC was also implemented under NAADS, and the funds which used to cater for salaries of sacked agricultural extension workers were channeled to procurement and distribution of free handouts to farmers inform of improved seed varieties supplied by the army this time round. Basing on data gathered, there were disagreement and conflicts between agricultural technical experts and politicians over NAADS goals and objectives and general direction of the policy implementation. In that regard, the inconsistency and deviation from initially stated NAADS goals hampered the capacity of technical personnel to effectively execute the policy activities and attainment of its output. Politicians and policy makers prioritized mere distribution of agricultural in-puts over and above NAADS policy standards and objectives such as: development of farmers' capacity to manage agricultural enterprises, easy accessibility to extension services, farmer groups' creation, and promotion of private financing of agricultural activities. According to Theodore Lowi (1972b), it is difficult to detach politics from policies (Gustavsson, 1980). However, the duality of politics and policies should not compromise policy implementation and attainment of intended objectives. Neither, public money should be spent on selfish political interests to stabilize power and ensure regime longevity. Hence the need for professionalized management and leadership in the public sector (Raffel, 2009). The approach of government giving farmers free handouts inform of farm inputs is neither feasible nor sustainable. It is too costly for government and it inculcated a dependency syndrome among farmers in the country.

During focus group discussions with farmers, I found out that 16 farmers out of the 20 interviewed regarded NAADS as a tool or mechanism for acquiring free agricultural inputs from government, not as a policy which aimed at promoting farmers' accessibility to

agricultural extension services in order to increase agricultural output. As one farmer when asked to list the NAADS objectives, he responded that:

"Mister Researcher, I only know of one purpose of NAADS to us farmers. NAADS was brought by the government to supply to us improved varieties of seeds because our local seeds were not giving us good yields and were prone to pests and diseases"

Furthermore, during focus group discussions, farmers were provided with papers and requested to write all the NAADS objectives they knew. Sixteen farmers (80%) out of the 20 farmers in the focus groups were not conversant with all the NAADS objectives. They could not mention more than one of the seven NAADS objectives. Of all the categories of respondents I interviewed, farmers were less knowledgeable of the NAADS objectives, yet they were the policy target group. Several reasons were given for farmers ignorance of the NAADS objectives, key among them included: limited staff to mobilize and train farmers about the policy and its goals, also insufficient funding allocated to capacity build trainings was another hindering factor. Farmers' lack of knowledge of most policy objectives resulted into their dismal participation and limited collaboration with agricultural technical experts during execution of the policy activities hence, it affected farmers' capacity to optimally play their roles in NAADS implementation like group creation and sustainability.

The principal-agent theorists believed that implementation problems result from the differences between policy objectives and their actual implementation (Knill & Tosun, 2012). Furthermore, Knill and Tosun argued that, "the problem that initiated the policy making process can only be solved effectively if the adopted policy is properly put into practice" (Knill & Tosun, 2012: 148). Therefore the inconsistencies in NAADS objectives affected implementers' ability to effectively implement it and realize its output like increased agricultural output, creation of farmer groups, capacity building.

Under this variable of policy standard and objectives, the study had hypothesized that: unclear policy standard and objectives may hinder attainment of policy output hence negatively affecting the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district. Farmers are crucial policy actors in NAADS implementation, since most of the implementation activities rotated around them, for example group formation, demand for extension services, co-funding towards program activities, among others. Their understanding of the policy objectives was critical and determined its implementability. However during focus group discussions with them, it was evident that they were not fully aware of NAADS objectives. As indicated above 80% of the

20 farmers I interacted with in the focus group discussions lacked adequate information on their roles in implementation of the policy. The onus to disseminate information and train farmers was on technical personnel in the district assisted by their counterparts the politicians with mobilization roles. However, even the local politicians were uncertain about the policy objectives, as various NAADS implementation reports reviewed, reported the lack of sufficient knowledge of NAADS policy by local politicians which affected implementation of NAADS in their areas (Mukono, 2015b). Such argument was augmented by a response from one politician who asserted that:

"NAADS phase one hardly involved us politicians, and that is why we fought tooth and nail<sup>5</sup> to be included in this second phase, although phase two has now been implemented for the past four years, we have not yet comprehended it thoroughly, that is why sometimes we have conflicts with the agricultural technical staff because majority of us do not know our roles and the policy objectives. But we are optimistic that as time goes on we shall come on board and understand NAADS objectives and our roles as well. Unfortunately time is against us because our term of office is only five years and now we are left with only one year to complete it, unless we are voted back in office by the electorate that is when we shall be able to digest the program well".

During review of NAADS records at the district, limited understanding of the NAADS' modus operandi<sup>6</sup> by politicians and farmers was cited as one of the challenges hindering effective implementation of the policy. However, sometimes ambiguity in the policy standard and objectives may be fostered deliberately by policy makers in order to ensure a positive response on the part of implementers at other levels of the organization or policy delivery system (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Hitherto, the study of implementation necessitate that goals and objectives are identified, measured, since implementation cannot thrive without goals and objectives on which to judge it (Pressman & wildavisky, 1973: xiv; cited in Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 464).

Apart from ambiguity of the NAADS goals and objectives to farmers and politicians, the study also found out that farmers, local politicians and front-line workers were less involved in the program design or formulation of policy standards and objectives. As one extension officer responded:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Tooth and nail; politicians fought so hard to be included in the next phase.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> modus operandi referring to methods of operation of the program.

"During NAADS formulation we were not consulted to provide our input and ideas which concerned the local farmers. The policy was designed by MAAIF technocrats and donors without local input hence some of the policy goals and performance indicators are not compatible with practicalities on ground. However, with policy implementation we are the main drivers of NAADS implementation and sometimes it is difficult to implement policies you have no attachment to. Even when we identify issues which need to be sorted out for the policy to be implemented successfully, such ideas are ignored by our superiors at the center hence affecting our morale and commitment to effectively implement the policy".

The lack of commitment by technical staff towards NAADS implementation was observed during the research period. This was indicated by their slow reply to NAADS demands, evasion of NAADS meeting, arriving late at the duty station among others. Therefore, the exclusion of local staff and other partners like farmers, local politicians in NAADS formulation affected NAADS goal consensus yet according to Van meter and van Horn (1975) and Winter (1990) goal consensus and harmony among policy actors is essential for effective policy implementation. According to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 459), participation of implementers in policy formulation lead to higher staff morale, increases their commitment towards the policy and leads to greater clarity of the policy standards and objectives, thereby facilitating successful implementation. However I cannot conclude that participation of implementers in policy formulation necessarily solves all problems associated with the policy standard and objectives, and that it ensures successful implementation. This is because successful implementation is determined by a combination of other factors as elaborated farther in the study.

#### 6.2 NAADS Resources.

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) theorized that policies make available resources for their administration and implementation. The resources may include funds or other incentives in the program that might encourage and facilitate effective implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 465). On the other hand, Grindle and Thomas categorized policy resources into political and bureaucratic resources. They further sub-categorize bureaucratic resources into: financial, managerial and technical resources (Grindle & Thomas, 1991: 146-149). Every reform does not always call for all those, but reformers must know which resources are needed and where they will be available. This requires the capacity to assess their availability

and consider how they can be expanded or mobilized (Grindle & Thomas, 1991: 143). The study assessed the availability, mobilization and accessibility to relevant policy resources like financial and human resources, and how policy resources affected the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district local government.

#### **6.2.1 Financial resources**

The financial resources for NAADS in the district were mainly provided by the central government. According to NAADS budget documents reviewed at the district, they indicated that every financial year (from 2010 to 2015), the central government contributed 90% of the annual district NAADS budget, and the district only contributed 10%. The funds from the central government were released on quarterly basis following planned activities. The study theorized that, insufficient policy resources may negatively affect the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district. However, several authors like: Grindle & Thomas (1991) claimed that lack of policy resources like finances has never been a problem to developing countries. Grindle and Thomas argue that, despite the apparent poverty associated with most governments in developing countries, acquiring financial resources to sustain the implementation of a policy reform may be moderately easy (Grindle & Thomas, 1991: 147). They based their assertion on the availability and willingness of donors to support such reforms in which they share common interest. Accordingly, the national NAADS budget was financed by both the GOU and development partners including World Bank, European Union. But local governments depended on financial releases from MFPED for their NAADS implementation budgets.

Table 6 showing NAADS budget for Mukono District for 2010-2015

TE/N/		2010/2011	2011/2012	2012/2013	2013/2014	2014/2015
F/Y						
AMOUNT	UGX	2,210,894,000	1,876,453,231	1,708,548,390	1,522,066,475	1,420,240,678
	US\$	565,078	507,150	461,770	414,505	383,849

Source: Mukono district development plan 2010-2015

It is evident from the above table that each new financial year government kept on reducing the NAADS budget for the district. When agricultural technical staffs were asked why funding was reducing annually, one respondent stressed that: "NAADS funds are reducing each year because majority of donors have stopped funding of the program because it deviated away from its original goal of provision of extension services to farmers using contracted extension workers and adopted a politically orchestrated goal of mass procurement and supply free handouts in the form of agricultural inputs like seeds, fertilizers to farmers, hence reducing the funds allocated to the primary objective of provision of extension services".

The above insight by the NAADS technical personnel was augmented by the facts retrieved from the program documents where it was indicated that, development partners contributed 80% of the total US \$108m of NAADS phase one (2001-2010) budget, but their contribution reduced to less than 25% of NAADS second phase (2010-2015) budget of US \$ 665.5m (Muwanga, 2015; Okoboi et al., 2013; Rwakakamba et al., 2014). Also several studies about NAADS implementation conducted in the past indicated a rift or disagreement between donors and government of Uganda concerning NAADS goal and direction of policy implementation (see Joughin & Kjær, 2010). Not only NAADS funds allocated by central government to the district reduced, but they were released late by the ministry of finance. This was a common theme in all responses from the 14 agricultural technical staff interviewed, as one extension staff reported that:

"Delay in disbursements of funds to the district is considered as one of the bottlenecks of the NAADS implementation. Farming in Uganda depends on raining seasons; however, government consistently delays to release NAADS implementation funds to the district including funds for procurement of planting materials. The late release of funds greatly affects farmers' ability to plant the crops in time hence, impacting negatively on the targeted agricultural output".

Although budgetary resources are always tight and meagre, however, problems of poor financial management, poor prioritization and planning were cited by different NAADS implementation and audit reports. During review of financial documents and audit reports for the program, it was evident that budget provisions were not strictly followed and diversion of funds from one vote<sup>7</sup> to another was common (Mukono, 2015a). As elaborated by one agricultural extension officer:

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> vote meaning planned or budgeted activity in the annual district budget

"There is poor financial management of NAADS resources by our superiors. For us the extension officers, we are hardly facilitated to do our work of training farmers on agricultural skills. We occasionally use our meagre salaries to facilitate our movements in the field, yet funds are put in the budgets for our transport facilitation, however it is normally diverted by budget controllers to other activities. Therefore, we hardly reach most of the farmers in the community. Consequently, such conditions cannot enable us to attain the policy targets"

## a) Corruption in NAADS implementation

Furthermore, misappropriation of funds by technical personnel in district was one of the impediments cited in the program reports. For example earlier in financial year 2009-2010, the Ugandan president halted transfer of funds from central government to Mukono district due to allegation of embezzlement of funds by the then District Chief Administrative Officer (Parliament, 2009). Furthermore, budget flaws, diversion of funds, un-accounted expenditures were highlighted in district audit reports as one of the challenges facing NAADS implementation in the district (Mukono, 2014b). Therefore, such mal-practices in the financial management of the policy's financial recourses which occurred every financial year unabated affected implementation of various NAADS activities and also hindered the achievement of policy objectives.

NAADS implementation guidelines also created problematic procurement process which catalyzed corruption by different implementation actors. The desire by policy architects to fully involve communities or farmers in NAADS implementation, a community procurement approach was created which was very different from the traditional procurement mechanism used by local governments where procurement was purely a technical prerequisite. However, NAADS implementation guidelines established a community procurement system which constituted farmers as members of the procurement committee. The committee included 5 members, of which one was agricultural technical officer and the rest farmers (MAAIF, 2010). The incongruity observed was that, NAADS implementation guidelines vested the powers to confirm supply and delivery of agricultural inputs in the hands of farmers not the agricultural technical personnel who would ascertain quality and quantity, as reflected here in NAADS guidelines, "the supplier will deliver the inputs directly to the beneficiaries in the farmer groups in the Village Farmer Forum (VFF) and submit demand documents to the village procurement committee. The village procurement committee will then submit the

demand documents to the Senior Assistant Secretary or accounting officer for payment. Payment should be made directly to the supplier" (MAAIF, 2010:8). Such a gap or unprecedented provision in the NAADS implementation guidelines acted as a catalyst for financial malpractices in NAADS implementation process, and hence affected the attainment of policy objectives. One agricultural extension officer elaborated that:

"Quack suppliers and farmers connive to fleece government resources, since the policy implementation guidelines vested the powers to confirm and approve that supply was made in the hands of farmers not the technical experts. There has been tendencies of conspiracy where farmers and suppliers agree not procure the required materials such that they swindle the funds, since the only requirement by accounting officers to effect payment is submission of demand documents by village procurement committee to accounting officer with signature of the farmer approving that he or she received the farm inputs or the consignment. Therefore, many payments have been made yet procurement was not done due to connivance between farmers and suppliers since the guidelines excluded technical workers who would have received the consignments on behalf of farmers".

However, based on the evidence from program reports reviewed, in some cases farmers and suppliers were arrested for embezzlement of governments funds, although the prosecution process was muddled by a lot of controversies, delays and political interference in the judiciary system hence culprits ended up freed because in most cases they claimed that there were supporters of the ruling government and due to the patronage nature of political system in most developing countries, including Uganda (see; Hyden, 2006; Karyeija, 2010), the culprits easily found safe haven. Unfortunately, program resources were wasted hence hindering effective NAADS implementation.

# b) Budget Control

One of the hallmarks of NAADS policy was to enable farmers' participation in decision making process on matters that affect them. The budget making process at the local government level is one of the major avenues through which citizens participate in decision making process and demand for accountability. During interviews with technical personnel at the district, I asked them about community participation in decision making, demand for accountability, and ownership of projects. One of the technical officers in the production department stressed that:

"It is required by law to involve citizens in planning, budgeting and implementation of government programs. The district budget conference is one of the main forums where different stake holders make their contribution to draft budget proposals prepared by the district budget committee before they are presented to the district council for approval. But this process does not start from the district level, it starts from villages, where community members identify their needs, they are later prioritized at the sub-county level before they are sent to the district. However, community members and local government's ability to allocate, reallocate more resources to their own priorities is limited. The central government largely determines the priorities that local governments should focus on. This is mainly through the indicative planning figures<sup>8</sup> the central government gives to local governments at every beginning of the budget making process. Furthermore, districts receive funds from the central government in form of conditional and unconditional grants, but the conditional grants make up 90% of the district total budget. These conditional grants, to which NAADS fund is part, come to the district with fixed amount for specified activities in areas the central government regard as priorities. Therefore, this leaves community members and local governments generally with little control over their budgets largely because most of local governments in Uganda, Mukono in particular heavily depend on central government financially"

Therefore, there were contradictions in financial management, where policies call for local participation, control of their budgetary process as prescribed in local government regulations (see; Devas & Grant, 2003; Francis & James, 2003; NAADS, 2001). Yet practically, the central government still wielded great control over local governments' budgets. Consequently, a great deal of NAADS activities identified by actors in the district could not be dealt with because they were not considered priority by central government. Hence, lack of financial independence by local governments affected NAADS implementation in the district. Additionally, local governments would be reprimanded by central government by reducing their subsequent budget allocations if they diverted away from the national priority program areas, yet actually every local government has its own unique circumstances (see; Ntambirweki-Karugonjo & Barungi, 2012). Thus, the lack of budget control by the district leadership affected their ability to solve the most placing agricultural issues in their area of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> indicative planning figures refers to budgetary figures sent from central government to local governments and other agencies stipulating amounts allocated to various activities in their budgets within which to operate.

jurisdiction and always the district technocrats had to seek for authority from the central government on areas to invest in.

# c) NAADS Co-funding Approach

Under NAADS implementation guidelines; farmers, sub-county local governments and district local governments were mandated to co-fund their NAADS budget that is 10% of the total NAADS budget in the particular local government. For example at the lower local government or sub-county, farmers were required to contribute 3% and the Sub-county council 7% of the total NAADS budget at the sub-county level, and also the district had to co-fund 10% of its total budget. However, from documents reviewed, farmers, sub-counties and even the district hardly fulfilled their obligation (Mukono, 2014b). As reflected by data in the table below

Table 7, Showing NAADS Co-funding performance of F/Y 2014/2015

Stakeholder	Annual co- funding budget		Amount paid		Amount not paid	
District	UGX	7,402,000		0	7,402,	000
	US \$	2,001		0	US \$	2001
Sub-counties	UGX	43,425,000	UGX	9,792,000	UGX	33,633,000
	US \$	11,736	US \$	2646	US \$	9,090
Farmers	UGX	29,250,000	UGX	2,613,750	UGX	26,636,250
	US \$	7,905	US\$	706	US \$ 7	7,199
Total	UGX	80,077,000	UGX	12,405,750	UGX	67,671,250
	US \$	21,642	US\$	3,353	US\$	18,290

Source: Mukono district development plan 2010-2015

As mirrored in the table above, those various stakeholders defaulted on their obligation of cofunding NAADS budget in that particular financial year as reflected in the last column in the table. Thus, leading to budget shortfalls and suspension of implementation of some NAADS activities.

Although development partners are always willing to provide finances for reforms in developing countries especially those reforms in which they share a common agenda

(Andrews, 2013; Grindle & Thomas, 1991). In most instances development partners demand for local contribution such that there is local ownership of the programs. Failure by local authorities to co-fund those programs, development partners in most instances may reduce their funding or halt completely the funding of such programs. Even the central government in Uganda demanded that local governments and farmers co-fund development programs such as NAADS. Failure to co-fund, the central government also enforced the same punitive measures as donors, most especially reducing the NAADS budget for the particular district local government. This was evidenced in the district NAADS financial documents where funds from the central government reduced every financial year as indicated in table 6 above, partly because of defaulting on co-funding obligation by the district. Therefore, such tendencies affected effective NAADS implementation in the district because many activities remained un-executed.

#### 6.2.2 Human resources

Under this variable; the study analyzed the availability, recruitment of human resources, roles of the bureaucrats, competences and their behaviors towards NAADS implementation. Winter's integrated theory incorporated 'bottom-up' element of the crucial role played by the street level bureaucrats in implementation process. Lipsky (1980) emphasized that bureaucrats shape policy outcomes by interpreting rules and allocating scarce resources. Through their day-to-day routines and decisions, they produce public policies as citizens experience it (ibid). In the case of NAADS implementation, street level bureaucrats in the form of extension workers were charged with daily implementation of NAADS activities. They interacted with farmers on daily basis through capacity building workshops. The extension workers defined how NAADS was perceived by farmers and their levels of engagement in its activities. Together with farmer groups, extension workers vetted and determined the beneficiaries of farm in-puts.

# i. Roles of bureaucrats in NAADS implementation

The Agricultural extension workers were the engine of NAADS implementation. They carried out the daily implementation of the reform and interaction with farmers through various roles mainly including:

- Mobilization and sensitization of farmers about NAADS policy
- Capacity building and provision of agricultural knowledge to farmers
- Registration and training of all farmer groups on agricultural skills in the district
- Facilitated election of farmers leadership at all levels
- Drew up plans for program activities
- Mobilized, managed, and controlled policy resources
- Facilitated and guided the selection of policy beneficiaries in-case of farm inputs
- Program monitoring, reporting, evaluation and accountability.
- Coordination with other agencies and interest parties

NAADS policy implementation is labour intensive which required a lot of skilled human force commonly known as agricultural extension officers. The policy initial idea was to contract private organizations to provide extension services to farmers, however due to the scarcity of resources; government instead hired agricultural experts which it co-opted as its own staff. The irony was, only a few technical extension workers were recruited that is: a between two to four agricultural extension staff per sub-county, yet each sub-county required at least 6 extension workers minimum. However in the year 2014 they were reduced to one extension officer per sub-county, serving a community of over 30,000 farmers. Documents from the district indicated that 44% of the posts in the production departments at the district charged with NAADS implementation were vacant, and over 70% positions were vacant in lower local governments in the district (Mukono, 2015a). This situation of limited staff worsened after the presidential directive in the year 2014 which dismissed most of the agricultural extension workers such that funds that catered for their salaries were diverted to procurement and supply of free farm inputs to farmers. This left many technical posts in the district and its lower local governments vacant as evidenced above, hence negatively affecting NAADS implementation in the district.

Table 8, Showing Mukono district production department staffing levels

S/N	Post	Required posts	Total Posts Filled	No_ of Vacant Posts	% of Filled posts	% of Vacant Posts
01	District production officer	1	1	0	100	0
02	District NAADS Coordinator	1	1	0	100	0
03	Principle Agriculture officer	-	-	-	-	-
04	Principle Veterinary Officer	-	-	-	-	-
05	Principle Entomology Officer	1	1	0	100	0
06	Principle Fisheries Officer	1	1	0	100	0
07	Principle Commercial Officer	1	1	0	100	0
08	Senior Agriculture Officer	1	1	0	100	0
09	Senior Agriculture Engineer	1	-		-	-
10	Senior Veterinary Officer	1	1	0	100	0
11	Senior Entomology Officer	1	-	-	-	-
12	Senior Fisheries Officer	1	-	-	-	-
13	Senior Commercial Officer	1	-	-	-	-
14	Animal Husbandry Officer	1	1	0	100	0
15	Laboratory Technician	1	1	0	100	0
16	Animal Production Officer	1	-	-	-	-
17	Vermin Control Officer	1	-	-	-	-
18	Fisheries Officer	1	1	0	100	0

Source: Mukono District Development Plan 2010-2015

Table 9, showing staffing levels at lower local governments/ sub-county level

S/N	Post	Required posts	Total Filled posts	No_ Vacant posts	% Filled posts	% Vacant posts
01	Sub-county NAADS Coordinator	15	-	-	-	-
02	Agriculture Officer	15	15	0	100	0
03	Veterinary Officer	15	4	11	26	74
04	Fisheries Officer	15	-	-	-	-
05	Assistant Agriculture officer	15	4	11	26	74
06	Entomological Assistant	15	-	-	-	-
07	Animal Husbandry Officer	15	-	-	-	-
08	Assistant Fisheries Officer	15	5	10	30	70
09	Agricultural Advisory Service Provider- Crops	15	-	-	-	-
10	Agricultural Advisory Service Providers - Animals	15	-	-	-	-

Source: Mukono District Development Plan 2010-2015

The study hypothesized that: existence of insufficient policy resources like human labour may negatively affect the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district. According to the statistics above, the production department both at district headquarters and in lower local governments, charged with NAADS implementation duties was not fully staffed, especially in sub-counties where actual implementation of the reform was done. Therefore, the few available staff faced heavy work load and were unable to cater for all farmers' demands, hence creating loopholes in NAADS implementation. When asked why some of the posts were vacant, head of production department replied that:

"In fact we are far better off than so many districts, but the staffing gap is as a result of limited financial resources, the district has a tight budget and cannot afford salaries of all required staff and their benefits".

During interviews with 14 agricultural technical staff involved in implementation of the reform, they expressed dissatisfaction towards the NAADS implementation. Out of 14 technical personnel interviewed, 12 expressed opposition towards the reform citing issues of understaffing, poor remuneration. As one agricultural extension officer stressed that:

"The heavy work load imposed on us without increasing our wages and benefits has caused extension workers' resentment towards implementation of NAADS because work which would have been done by 6 agricultural extension workers is performed by one personnel. The shortage of technical labour in the district worsened after the termination of contracts of many extension workers due to a presidential directive. Therefore, many NAADS activities have stalled because of the inadequate staff".

The president's argument in this case, he wanted to increase funds allocated to procurement of farm inputs supplied to farmers freely such that production boost could be realized. However the option had dire consequences because increase in production could not be realized without technical assistance of agricultural extension workers. Although, NAADS implementation had lasted 14 years, every year new farmers came on board and they required agricultural knowledge, training from the technical experts. However, reduction of the technical personnel disenfranchised farmers from most of the agricultural extension services like farming skills training hence contributing to agricultural production decline in the district as reflected in table three above. For the past five years, the district registered decrease in production of major crops. During the focus group discussions farmers stressed that:

"Although we have been getting free farm inputs from government but that is not enough, because an increase in agricultural production depends on a number of factors of which provision of agricultural information by technical staff to farmers is essential. However many of us planted the crops following our traditional methods, yet the seeds we got from government were hybrid and thus we needed the training first on how to plant them. But due to scarcity of technical staff in our locality and lack of funds to hire the private extension workers, we lacked the skills and information to enable us achieve high crop yields"

Therefore, the idea of reducing technical staff involved in NAADS implementation did not auger well with technical staff in government agencies especially local governments because they knew the multitude of tasks awaited the few who remained. Although, Uganda is governed under a decentralization system, practically elements of a unitary system of governance and militarism still existed. Thus, the president's controversial decision of replacing agricultural extension workers with military personnel who had no prior experience in agriculture was implemented regardless of opposition from technical personnel and civil society (Ogenga-Latigo, 2015). Staffing and capacity issues including retrenchment of

NAADS staff without clear plans and a budget to recruit other extension staff for the local governments affected negatively implementation of the policy activities. Additionally, 85% of NAADS budget was spent at the center to procure free handouts to farmers inform of strategic farm inputs (ibid). Key functions like technical advice for farmers, disease control were less funded. The sudden retrenchment of the professional extension workers served as a demotivation factor to district agricultural technical personnel, who had a commitment to serve the sector. Even the few professionals who remained were not optimistic of their future.

# ii. Agricultural Staff technical competence

The study assessed the technical competence of NAADS staff in terms of their educational levels. The intention was to assess whether their education background corresponded with their technical roles and how it affected effective NAADS implementation. Therefore, I found out that 90% of employees involved in NAADS implementation were university graduates and the rest 10% had diplomas from Agricultural technical intuitions. The district attracted highly qualified agricultural staff partly because of its close proximity to the capital. Mukono district is located 21 km away from the capital Kampala (Mukono, 2015a). Moreover, it is one of the rapidly growing towns in Uganda although it is still largely rural. Thus, due to its strategic location, it was easy to attract the technical staff in the district and its lower local governments. Recruitment of these technical staff was regarded as relatively transparent because it was conducted by an independent district organ called District Service Commission (DSC) mandated by the Local Government Act, 1997 to recruit on behalf of the district. However the independence of the above commission is also debatable because, the powers to nominate its members were vested in the hands of the district executive committee composed of largely politicians. Therefore instances of influence peddling by politicians in the business of district service commission were common in the district and the country at large. However, regardless of such allegations, the district was able to recruit competent and highly skilled technical staff. Though, during interviews with technical staff, all the 14 agricultural technical staff complained of meagre salaries which could not enable them to have a decent living. As one of the staff posted that:

"We are some of the less paid civil servants in the country, our pay is not commensurate with the heavy workload on our table, the government last increased our salaries more than a decade ago but due to scarcity of jobs in the country that is why we are trapped in these low paying jobs. On top of that we are not facilitated to do our jobs, the

government no longer provides transport facilitation to us, and therefore, in most instances we use our resources to do deliver public services. That is why there is lack of morale among staff hence less motivated to perform".

I observed poor time management and lack of motivation among staff especially at the production department charged with implementation of NAADS in the district. Normal arrival time to station as prescribed in public service standing orders and public code of conduct was 8.00am. However, I observed that 75% of technical personnel in the production department arrived late at their duty station between 9.00am and 10.30am. The poor time management practice by public officials in the long run affected the achievement of organizational targets. Another kind of de-motivation among agricultural technical staff was reflected by their slow reply to farmers' calls for extension services and also evasion of departmental meetings. It was through the departmental meetings that NAADS activities were assessed and solutions devised to counter the implementation challenges, however as indicated above technical staff had a tendency of shunning such meetings. I observed majority of technical staff attended program meeting where they expected heavy allowances especially meetings organized by NAADS secretariat, MAAIF, NGOs or international agencies.

Furthermore, other managerial means like promotions, rewards, which would have motivated the technical staff to perform their duties were not implemented. During review of human resource documents and interviews with technical staff, I found out that promotions rarely occurred in the production department. Many workers were stagnated in their current positions regardless of whether they had further training in their fields or not. More than 70% of the staff had remained in the same positions for the past 15 years (Mukono, 2014b). The ideal would have been that staff at the district would be able to rise through ranks and move to the center at MAAIF, but that was not the case since MAAIF also recruited its own staff and it was rare to promote local government staff to senior positions in MAAIF. Thus, such instances and related poor working conditions were disincentive factors for optimal staff performance of NAADS activities

Additionally, I assessed the reaction of the technocrats towards NAADS implementation. Grindle and Thomas in their interactive theory of implementation called for analysis of policy characteristics by policy managers such that they determine where the reform is likely to attract opposition, either in the public arena or bureaucratic arena (Grindle & Thomas, 1991).

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 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 9}$  Public service standing orders refer to human resource document that guides public officials

Although they emphasized that public reaction was more crucial to the government than bureaucratic reaction, because the stakes are high for government in case of public opposition towards the reform than bureaucratic opposition. Nevertheless, they recognized that: "in some cases, alliances between factions or individuals in the bureaucracy and external interests can result in piecemeal sabotage of the intent of the policy makers" (Grindle 1980; as cited in Grindle & Thomas, 1991: 140). Moreover, lack of capacity within the administrative apparatus can lead to implementation failure (ibid p.140:141). Furthermore, Lipsky explicitly recognized the role of street level bureaucrats as an influential hand in policy implementation because their decisions define policies and how the public conceive such policies (Lipsky, 1980, 2010). All the 14 technical staff interviewed expressed dismay about the direction of NAADS. They felt the policy was hijacked by politicians and directed it towards their selfish agenda. All the fourteen technical staff interviewed opposed the decision taken by cabinet which reduced the number of extension staff and diverted those resources into supply of free farm inputs to farmers. The technical experts shared a common idea with development partners who suspended funding of some NAADS activities because of that same political decision to divert funds into giving out free handouts to farmers inform of farm inputs (see Muwanga, 2015).

Although discreetly, the technical staff also opposed to the involvement of the army (UPDF) in NAADS implementation. They felt there was no reorganization of roles between agricultural technical personnel and army personnel, and also there was no level of command and supervisory structure. The idea of army's entry in NAADS implementation was considered odd because there was no such precedent before in Uganda. And in more clear sense, the army personnel lacked expertise in agricultural activities. However, bureaucratic opposition did not deter the presidential directive from taking effect, hence they grudgingly worked side by side with the army in an uncoordinated style and such conditions led to ineffectiveness in NAADS implementation.

# **6.3** Organizational and Inter-organizational relations

Effective implementation require that program standards and objectives are well understood by policy implementers (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). It is through inter-organizational relations that program standard and objectives are disseminated to implementers. Data collected under this variable sought to answer how organizational and inter-organizational relations affected NAADS implementation? Due to several organizations involved in NAADS

implementation, cooperation among them was essential for mutual understanding and execution of policy activities like capacity building. Various authors credit the success of implementation on the cooperation of organizational actors, (Knill & Tosun, 2012: 153; Weible, Heikkila, Deleon, & Sabatier, 2012). Hence, the need for uniformity in dissemination of the program objectives down to implementers, because any inconsistencies would lead to distortion in the policy implementation strategy. Several studies of implementation of regulatory and social service programs demonstrated that one of the principal obstacles of implementation was the difficulty of obtaining coordinated action with in any given agency among numerous semi-autonomous agencies involved in most implementation efforts (P. Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980: 546). NAADS implementation involved a vertical organizational mechanism, where guidelines were formulated by Ministry of Agriculture and disseminated down to implementers (or local governments) and farmers. However, as reflected above during discussion on policy standard and objectives, NAADS objectives were regularly altered by politicians depending on the political situation in the country. Moreover, new organizations came on board without streamlining operational mechanisms, formal hierarchy and reporting mechanism. For example, recently in 2014 through a presidential directive, the army was brought on board to involve in implementation of the reform. Respondents interviewed were puzzled with the role of the army in implementation of NAADS. Thus, various publications in the country called on the executive to revisit the decision of Army's involvement in NAADS implementation (See, Okoed, 2014).

In Uganda, there was no such precedence of army's involvement in civil service or agriculture per se. There was a great fear of the army by the masses because of the past brutal military regimes in the country. Secondly, the army worked with orders and commands unlike civil servants who follow pre-defined procedures and guidelines. Therefore there was lack of cooperation among implementers, and as a result, it created animosity in NAADS implementation, and some of the technical staff retracted back on their duties because they feared confrontation with army personnel. I noticed the disconnect in organizational relations, where in some instances agencies usurped powers and roles of others as explained in the case of the army's takeover of roles of technical staff. This created confusion in implementation of the reform. Farmers were most affected because they were left in the dark and they did not know who was in charge and where to report to in case of any irregularity in NAADS implementation. During interviews with farmers, 12 out of the 20 farmers I interacted with in the focus group discussions, complained about the fake seeds supplied to them by the army.

Whereby the seeds failed to germinate, but they were hesitant to raise the issue farther because they feared the wrath of the army. Therefore the reporting mechanism in NAADS no longer worked as it was envisaged by policy framers. Berman (1978) suggested that, implementation occurs at two levels; the macro level comprising of central actors and micro level consisting of local actors (cited in Knill & Tosun, 2012: 155). And thus both actors at the center and local level have to work in tandem to achieve the desired target. But during assessment of the organizational and inter-organizational relations in the district, mutual cooperation between macro and micro implementers was still yet to be realized. One technical respondent expressed that:

"There is an ambiguous organizational structure in NAADS implementation with different pattern of authority making technocratic work complicated. The initial hierarchy pattern used to be a vertical one with MAAIF at the pinnacle, followed by district local governments, lower local governments and farmer organizations at the base, but now it is no longer significant. Various government agencies have come on board each with its own interest, with unclear inter-organizational setting hence disorganizing the reporting mechanism. For instance now as district staff we report to various authorities like: office of the president, MAAIF, MFPED, OPM, RDC, DISO, secretary for production, Operation wealth creation coordinator, without clear and streamlined inter-organizational framework. As the district, we at the center of NAADS implementation and thus all the above organizations tend to direct their agenda to us to implement, consequently making implementation complex"

Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) argued that the complexity of joint actions is the key hindrance to successful implementation. By this, they meant the number of decision points. They indicated that as the number of such points required for implementation increased, the chance for action declines(L. O'Toole, Peters, & Pierre, 2012: 297). Although various authors like O'Toole (2011) contested Pressman and Wildavsky argument by stressing that implementation is affected by the types of interdependency of organizations involved not simply the number of units or decisions (L. O'Toole et al., 2012: 297). However, I observed existence of ineffective patterns of organizational relations in NAADS implementation in the district where various organizational actors worked independently and sometimes led to duplication of program activities, yet cooperation among them would streamline their activities and achievement of NAADS output.

### 6.3.1 Organizational enforcement of activities

In terms of Organizational relations, enforcement activities are important, and one of those provided in NAADS organizational structure is capacity building. The Ministry of Agriculture and its NAADS secretariat were mandated to provide technical assistance to district local governments, (NAADS, 2001). During interactions with technical staff at the district, they expressed that capacity building to subordinate organizational members were meant to be executed through: quarterly review meetings, national trainings, Short courses sponsored by the district, national long courses sponsored by the ministry. However they expressed that such activities were rarely implemented due to various reasons including limited budget allocated to such activities. From documents reviewed at Mukono district, every year, they planned to conduct 8 capacity building sessions with lower local governments staff (Mukono, 2015a). Although it was inadequate, realization of such target was not achieved for instances in 2014, only 4 training sessions were held with lower local government staff. Therefore, such constraints limited information flow among implementers consequently affecting effective NAADS implementation in the district.

policy managers in organizations have wide varieties of sanctions both positive and negative which they would use to influence implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). These include: budget controls, recruitment, promotion, demotion and dismissal mechanisms. In Mukono District, technical appraisal of NAADS extension officials were conducted annually to assess whether the technical personnel met the targets agreed upon in the work plans. However, according to the documents reviewed, rarely did district authorities discontinue non performing staff because of the high cost involved in dismissal of such staff. Such costs would include: court fees if such matter extended up to court, settling all retirement benefits at once. Therefore in most cases, the district continued with the ineffective staff hence affecting effective NAADS implementation.

Table 10 showing Summary of findings on the above discussed independent variables

Independent Variable	Findings
Policy standard and objectives	<ul> <li>Policy actors understand NAADS objectives differently</li> </ul>
	■ Farmers and politicians were not conversant with policy
	objectives
	<ul> <li>Sudden changes of policy objectives due to political demands</li> </ul>
Policy resources	Limited policy resources
77	<ul> <li>Delayed release of policy resources by central government to</li> </ul>
Financial resource	district local government
	<ul> <li>Financial misappropriation</li> </ul>
	■ Limited commitment by district local government to co-fund
	NAADS activities
Human resources	<ul> <li>District was able to attract competent technical officers however,</li> </ul>
	they were poorly facilitated
	Retrenchment of agricultural technical staff and replacing them
	with unskilled army officials on agricultural development
	<ul> <li>Limited capacity building for NAADS implementing staff</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Lack of motivation for technical staff due to limited promotion</li> </ul>
	avenues (majority had spent 15 years without promotion)
Organizational and inter-organizational	Un clear organizational hierarchy
behaviors/ relations	Inadequate capacity building for organizational staff
	Inability by organizations to enforce policies

**Source: Researcher's field notes** 

In a nutshell, as evidenced from the data analyzed above. Effective NAADS implementation in the district was hindered with a number of challenges as evidenced in the findings column in the table above. Most of the challenges highlighted are common in implementation processes at the local level especially in developing countries (see Eshun, 2015; Kipo, 2011; Lukumai, 2006). However, NAADS being a labour intensive policy in which the services of agricultural technical experts were so essential and act as foundation on which majority of the policy activities are enforced. Therefore, the retrenchment or laying off of most of the agricultural extension workers due to a presidential directive was precarious and detrimental to effective NAADS implementation in the district.

#### **CHAPTER SEVEN**

# PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

#### 7.0 Introduction

This chapter continues with discussion and analysis of data gathered on independent variables specifically, target group behaviors and political, social and economic conditions. This chapter sought out to answer: How target-group behaviors, political and socio-economic conditions affected NAADS implementation? Data gathered to answer such questions is presented and analyzed as follows.

### 7.1 Political factors

The existence of pluralist political system in the country requires cooperation among different interest groups for effective NAADS implementation to be achieved. This study hypothesized that: *Unfavorable political, social and economic conditions may affect effective NAADS implementation in Mukono district.* Political factors are important in introducing and sustaining a policy (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). Under the political, social and economic variable, the study aimed at finding out how these environmental factors affected the state of NAADS implementation in the district? Therefore, the study analyzed the political will or support towards NAADS implementation, roles played by the politicians in NAADS implementation. Although, politicians had a less significant role during implementation of the first phase of NAADS that spanned from 2001 to 2010 (Kjær & Joughin, 2012). NAADS phase two (2010-2015) fully brought politicians on board after their outcry about exclusion in NAADS phase one implementation (ibid). NAADS phase two allocated politicians direct involvement in NAADS implementation especially through planning, monitoring, evaluation and mobilization roles.

The study found out that Politicians were represented at every committee involved in NAADS implementation right from the village farmer forum<sup>10</sup> (VFF) up to the national level. Due to the patronage nature of most of African countries' politics (Hyden, 2006), politics at times defined the success or failure of policy implementation. Political interference in NAADS implementation had been experienced way before in 2006. This was evidenced by the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> village farmer forum refers to committee of farmer groups in the village

inclusion of contentious 'prosperity for all'<sup>11</sup> (PFA) and 'Operation Wealth Creation'<sup>12</sup> (OWC) programs in NAADS implementation in 2005 and 2014 respectively. Both PFA and OWC had the same motives but just changed names and period of implementation. Both aimed at eradicating poverty and facilitating growth of household incomes through agriculture. This was to be achieved through provision of free handouts to farmers in the form of farm inputs such as seed varieties to farmers in order to boost agricultural production. These 'off the cuff'<sup>13</sup> political decisions were considered as election campaign strategies for the ruling regime during presidential elections (Kjær & Joughin, 2012). Furthermore, political interference continued to unfold as evidenced by the temporary suspension of NAADS implementation in 2007 by the president (ibid). During interviews with technical workers, all the agricultural technical officers interviewed (14 respondents) expressed that political interference was an obstacle to effective NAADS implementation in the district. As One technical officer responded that:

"There is noticeable interference by politicians in NAADS implementation. They influence selection of beneficiaries of farm inputs and the delivery of agricultural advisory services, the politicians want their supporters to benefit first, they put pressure on us and tend to influence the kind of decisions we make. Because local politicians are our immediate supervisors, in most cases they influence us to make choices which favor their own interests. Contrary to that politicians have the powers to threaten our job security"

During interviews with local politicians in the district especially those on the opposition side, they admitted that political interference in NAADS implementation was visible. One politician revealed that:

"The political interference stem from the head of state to local politicians. Since majority of our electorate are farmers (80% of the population are farmers). NAADS is used as a political tool by the ruling party. It is a rewarding mechanism in which politicians give back to their supporters. The president has on several times directed that NAADS should benefit ruling party supporters first. So those messages from the head of state are not taken for granted and are re-echoed at local level by local politicians.

Prosperity For All; sub program under NAADS aimed at uplifting people livelihood through agriculture.

Operation wealth Creation; similar with PFA except OWC was introduced 2013 and implemented by the army off the cuff; I referred to unprepared political decisions.

Such circumstances sabotage the implementation process hence negatively affecting effective NAADS implementation".

Various authors about Uganda's agricultural extension policy appealed for de-politicization of the policy by the government if effective implementation was to be achieved (AfranaaKwapong & Nkonya, 2015; Kjær & Joughin, 2012; Ogenga-Latigo, 2015). Accordingly, farmers also complained about the direct political involvement in NAADS implementation. Out of the 20 farmers I interviewed in the four focus group discussions, 14 farmers representing 70% agreed that there was much political interference in NAADS activities, the remaining 6 farmers expressed that there was less political interference and none said that there was no political interference. One chairperson of a farmer group expressed his disappointment about political interference in NAADS implementation as reported below:

"Politicians are the biggest problem to NAADS implementation. They cause the inequitable distribution of farm in-puts to farmers. Because they are involved in all planning and budget committees of NAADS, they tend influence distribution of more resources to places where they have great support regardless of those areas' capacity to utilize the resources allocated to them. Hence, marginalizing other areas where such political actors have less support. Such behaviors go on unchallenged because the technical personnel cannot oppose the politician for fear of conflict with politicians who may cause insecurity to their jobs".

Another farmer, a secretary in one of the farmer groups involved in the focus group discussion also supplemented the above assertion by denoting that:

"Actually, there is conflict of interest involved. Politicians control the contracts committees which award tenders for supply of NAADS inputs; in most cases they award themselves these contracts through disguised companies. Therefore, such malpractices compromise the quality of supplies like seeds and eventually the farmers' output. For example last year, when NAADS wanted a supplier to supply one million banana plantlets to farmers in our community, the contract was awarded to the Subcounty chairperson yet there were other competent suppliers in the area, eventually substandard products were supplied to farmers and this affected the banana production output in the area. As a result, such acts continue unchecked because politicians wield so much power and influence in policy implementation".

As earlier noted, various NAADS implementation reports, evaluation reports and articles reviewed cited political interference in NAADS implementation as one of its impediments (see Joughin & Kjær, 2010; Mukono, 2014b, 2015b; Muwanga, 2015). Policy targets change often depending on the discretion of ruling regime. During NAADS phase one, donors contributed majority of the policy funds, over 75% of NAADS national budget and thus, devotion to laid down policy objectives was strictly emphasized, but during implementation of NAADS Phase two, the GOU contributed the big chunk of the policy funds (75%) and thus influence of the political actors at center increased and defined the policy direction. The policy was implemented on the whims of politicians in the ruling regime and adherence to policy standards and objectives as laid down in the policy statute was minimal.

#### 7.2 Socio-economic conditions

The study analyzed the socio-economic conditions of the policy target group and their community. The intention was to find out how these environmental conditions influenced NAADS implementation. As explained earlier in the theoretical chapter, policy target group with different socio-economic background needs different implementation strategies to promote policy implementation. The study took into consideration socio-economic factor such as: educational background of farmers, infrastructure development in the area, social status of farmers, in attempt to find out how these aspects affected the state of NAADS implementation in terms of: Increased agricultural productivity, farmer groups creation, training and their access to private financing.

#### 7.2.1 Education background of target group

The study assessed social economic factors like education background of farmers to ascertain whether it had impact on their involvement in NAADS activities like farmer groups, demand for extension services, ability to understand policy objectives and ability to comprehend agricultural skills from technical experts.

Table 11. Showing Education level of Farmers interviewed in FGDs

Education	Never attended	Primary level	Secondary level	Tertiary and	Total
level	school			university level	
Number of	11	6	3	0	20
farmers					
Percentage	55%	30%	15%	0%	100

Source: Researcher's field notes

The table above depicts education level of farmers who were interviewed in the focus groups. The study assessed 20 farmers, but majority 55% had never attended school and hence they lacked the reading and writing skills. The studies found out that majority of the respondents (80%) were not cognizant with NAADS objectives because they lacked the cognitive capacity to understand them. Although, on several occasions farmers were trained by extension workers on NAADS modalities, the un-educated farmers particularly found difficulties in understanding the policy objectives well as compared to their counterparts who had some level of education. In that regard, the un-educated farmers lagged behind their compatriots as far as implementation and involvement in the policy activities was concerned. The educational imbalance in farmer groups brewed conflicts and lack of trust in farmer groups because the un-educated ones felt that their counterparts, those with some level of education were taking advantage of them. When asked about the cause of group conflicts, 65% of farmers interviewed in FGDs responded that it was as a result of lack of trust among members due to educational gap, where by the un-educated members felt as peripherals as regards to policy implementation. The remarks by farmers were augmented by agricultural technical experts who also acknowledged that:

"We find it so easy dealing with farmers who have some level of education because most of the NAADS activities involve documentation or paper-work for-example entering contractual agreements between farmers and local government. The educated farmers easily understand the terms of agreements and targets to be achieved unlike the un-educated ones".

Therefore, such social factors led to technical personnel's biasness towards farmers with some level of education hence exclusion of the uneducated farmers from some NAADS activities. Such scenarios compromised achievement of NAADS objectives which aimed at provision of extension services to all farmers, hence, it negatively affected the state of NAADS implementation.

The economic standards of farmers also determined creation of farmer groups and their sustainability. All the 20 farmers interviewed across the four farmer groups involved in FGDs, reported that their groups sustainability depended on farmers contributions and savings like membership fee, subscription fees. They expressed that they maintain strict rules concerning adherence to group rules like members paying groups dues. In addition, all the four farmer groups' constitutions I reviewed constituted penalties of expulsion from the

groups if a farmer, on three reminders, failed to fulfil those group requirements. Farmers expressed that such funds enabled them to co-fund NAADS activities which was an obligation if the group was to benefit in NAADS. Such funds also helped them to facilitate technical personnel inform of transport allowance such that their group members get the needed capacity building training from agricultural experts. Therefore, farmers who had no capacity and will to raise such funds had no access to group, hence exclusion from the reform activities. Such conditions constrained NAADS motives and targets of increasing agricultural production because not all farmers were able to meet such conditions.

Socio-economic conditions in the communities like levels of infrastructure development such as community roads influenced farmers' accessibility to extension services. Data gathered from the district development plan 2010-2015 showed that 75% of the community access roads were in poor conditions (Mukono, 2015a). These community roads facilitated the movement of people and goods. Therefore, places where roads were in poor conditions could not easily be reached by extension workers. As one farmer stated that:

"All our community roads and those linking us to the other areas are impassable especially during the rainy season. And many of technical experts do not want to come to our area during the rainy season. Yet this is the period when we most want them to come and visit our gardens and give us more agricultural knowledge and skills practically from the gardens. For-example last year August-October 2014 it rained heavily in our area and unfortunately, in the same period we were attacked by a banana wilt, we invited technical experts to come to our rescue but they could not reach us because of the bad roads. Therefore we used our traditional mitigation methods but they were less effective in countering the spread of the banana wilt, as a result, the wilt affected our plants and the banana production in the area during that season was extremely low".

During interviews with technical experts, they also noted that socio-economic factors of some farming communities such as community roads affected implementation of their activities. Out of the 14 technical personnel interviewed, 12 of them (86%) expressed that conditions of community roads affected their ability to deliver extension services to farmers, and they considered such aspects before selecting area where to carry out training of farmers. They explained that many farming communities were so distant from their duty stations and such areas were characterized by poor roads, which made the cost of transport so expensive, hence

hindering their movements in those particular areas. Thus, in addition to poor facilitation of extension officers, they were not in position to reach some places where farmers needed them hence affecting farmers' capacities in those areas to fully engage in NAADS implementation process.

# 7.3 Target-group behaviors

Grindle and Thomas theorized that: "the performance of some reforms is largely determined by the public reaction towards such changes that the reform introduces" (Grindle & Thomas, 1991: 135). Therefore, public opposition towards a reform may negatively affect its implementation. Accordingly, Winter's integrated implementation theory also emphasized the importance of assessing the behaviors of target group of public policies that is, citizens or firms. The target-group play an integral role, not only on the effects of the policy but also in affecting the behaviors of street level bureaucrats through citizen's positive or negative action towards policy implementation (Winter, 2012: 261). In the theoretical analysis, the study hypothesized that: Opposition of NAADS policy by the target group (or farmers) may negatively affect the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district. NAADS policy is distinct from other policies which are largely implemented by the bureaucrats. For NAADS to achieve effective implementation, it required full devotion, cooperation and participation of farmers, contrary, policy failure would be inevitable. During focus group interviews with farmers, all the 20 farmers responded that farmers were not involved during NAADS formulation. However, during implementation their input was essential and determined success or failure of the reform. Therefore, the study assessed the roles of target group (farmers) in NAADS implementation; it also analyzed relationship between farmers and technical personnel and farmers' expectations from NAADS implementation. Because a cordial relationship between the farmers and agricultural technical personnel ion the district would ensure effective NAADS implementation

#### 7.3.1 Roles of farmers

NAADS policy mainly targeted farmers through measures like, promotion of farmers' accessibility to extension services, building their capacity to manage farming enterprises, improvement of agricultural productivity and promotion of private financing of agricultural activities as elaborated earlier. To achieve such objectives, full participation of farmers in

NAADS activities was essential. During documents review and interviews with agricultural technical experts at the district, farmers' roles below were identified:

- Formation of farmer groups at village level
- Mobilization of fellow farmers to participate in farmer groups
- Nomination and election groups leaders, and at various levels
- Identification of gaps where farmers need training
- Demand for extension services from contracted service providers
- Co-fund NAADS activities according to planned budgets
- Ensure that seed beneficiaries return back what they got such that it is revolved to other farmers
- Identification of potential beneficiaries for farm inputs (MAAIF, 2010).

During focus group interviews, farmers were individually asked about their roles in NAADS implementation. Farmers had mixed understanding of their roles during NAADS implementation. Out of the total 20 farmers interviewed in FGDs, 12 farmers representing 60% were less conversant with most of their roles. The rest 8 farmers (40%) had some basic information about their roles in NAADS implementation. Majority of farmers were less aware of their roles because they only attached value on the policy benefits they received during its implementation and hence they cared less about other activities. During interactions with farmers in focus group discussions, I realized that the group format was benefitting a few especially group leaders who took advantage of the rest of the farmers in the groups. Moreover, when I probed further, I realized that 55% of the farmers interviewed opposed some of the core values of the NAADS policy such as the farmer groups approach. As one farmer responded:

"I participate in the farmer group activities because I want to benefit from the NAADS resources like the seeds, fertilizers, and other farm inputs that government gives to farmers freely otherwise, if it was not for those benefits I would not get involved in the group format because for me I prefer working on my own".

A certain farmer group chairperson also added on that:

"The farmer group approach is failing because farmers have competing interests but they are forced by the policy to work together because if you are not in the group, NAADS does not cater for you. These groups are governed by constitutions but a few farmers endeavor to read the rules and abide by them, therefore, in most instances we have failed to find consensus over issues in the group. Sometimes, such differences culminate into personal conflicts with each other hence leading to poor farmers' relations in the community. At times cliques develop within a group and in other instances some groups tend to be dominated by a few knowledgeable farmers. Hence affecting groups performance and implementation of NAADS activities"

Leadership wrangles within farmer groups were some of the challenges reported in NAADS implementation reports (Mukono, 2015a). Therefore, such group conflicts limited farmer groups' ability to demand for extension services, co-fund NAADs activities, increase agricultural productivity, and achievement of all other NAADS objectives. Additionally such target group behaviors also affected the relationship between farmers and technical experts. Extension officers, through their discretion, preferred training groups where group conflicts like leadership wrangles were inexistent. The technical personnel further explained that such conflicts affected mobilization of group members to indulge in NAADS activities consequently; it negatively affected the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district.

# 7.3.2 Farmers' expectations of NAADS

The target group behaviors towards a policy can be determined by their expectations from the policy. Data from focus group discussions held with farmers show that all the 20 farmers interviewed expected NAADS to provide financial assistance in terms of interest free credit to them such that they invest in their preferred ventures. As one farmer reported that:

"I joined NAADS implementation through my group at the village expecting that government through NAADS was going to provide us with financial assistance such that we invest and diversify our income. Unfortunately, they don't give us cash instead they procure for us farm in-puts like seeds for planting. Worse still, they even ask for our contribution through NAADS co-funding requirement which was imposed on us. This was not my expectation because I can get seeds for planting on my own, but we need funds without interest from government such that we invest in our private ventures and diversify our income".

This shows that farmers were not consulted during the policy formulation to incorporate their ideas in the NAADS policy. However during implementation, their input and effort were

essential if effective NAADS implementation was to be attained. On the other hand, such farmers' expectations like provision of interest free credit to farmers by government were tried before and failed because of non-repayment tendencies by the citizens (see Namutebi, 2010; Nathan, Banga, & Mukungu, 2004). Although, most farmers expected financial assistance through NAADS, government could not repeat such mistakes. During interviews with agricultural technical personnel at the district, they confirmed the farmers' expectations of an interest free credit from government. As one extension officer responded.

"Even though NAADS has been implemented for the last 14 years (2001-2015), farmers up to now still expect that soon government will provide to them financial assistance in the form of interest free loans. Despite our assurances that NAADS does not involve provision of credit to farmers, some farmers keep on asking us when their demand will be fulfilled by government. Consequently, out of frustration because their expectations are not fulfilled, they withdraw from farmer groups and other NAADS activities"

Therefore, the farmers' dismal participation in NAADS activities can be explained by their negative attitude towards the policy because of government refusal to notice their expectations.

## 7.3.3 Farmers' opposition towards NAADS implementation

According to focus group discussions held with farmers, they did not oppose the reform in its entirety but only a few elements of the reform like the group approach and co-funding requirements. Out of the 20 farmers interviewed in the focus groups, 18 farmers representing 90% opposed the co-funding obligation imposed on them by NAADS. Farmers in Uganda got used to the free handouts from government thus, the mentality of dependency on government developed day by day resulting into opposition to reforms that called for their contributions. Yet, individuals tend to be negligent and less committed to programs which they do not contribute to. When farmers were asked why they were opposed to NAADS co-funding requirement, they cited the high level of poverty in their communities as the major hindrance for them to meet the co-funding obligations. They also pointed out the problem of corruption among civil servants as a deterrent factor. Due to the corrupt tendencies of many civil servants in the country including NAADS officials (Muwanga, 2015). Sixteen farmers representing 80% of the farmers interviewed during focus group interviews believed that the funds they contributed towards NAADS activities were misused by the technical personnel hence justifying their opposition towards co-funding of NAADS. Though, the existence of

corruption in public service in Uganda especially in local governments was evident and needed urgent solution (see Onzima, 2013), for NAADS to succeed, it needed farmers' full commitment and participation in the NAADS activities. In addition, transparency, accountability and adherence to NAADS objectives by all actors involved in its implementation. Target group behavior is the final measure of whether a program has been successful, although 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' perspectives differ in their interpretation of whether these changes should be judged according to program objectives, or by the expectations of target groups.

Grindle & Thomas highlight that societal opposition towards a reform is critical and could threaten the existence of a regime (1991:131). With regard to NAADS implementation, farmers' opposition of the policy was visible. This is because NAADS changed the status quo of extension services delivery to farmers. The farmers in Uganda were used to government-led extension service delivery where all the cost of extension services was incurred by the government. However, NAADS introduced cost sharing mechanism where farmers were required to co-fund to the NAADS budget in their areas of jurisdiction. Additionally the policy instability also bemused the farmers as one farmer reported that:

"Farmers are skeptical of NAADS implementation because the policy purpose is often altered. NAADS has parallel strategies. Various sub-programs have been introduced by the government like PFA, OWC. So there is duplication of activities which leads to wastage of resources. It also demoralizes the farmers because we do not know which of all those sub-components under NAADS we should focus on".

Therefore, such negative attitude of the farmers against NAADS explain the small number of farmers involved in farmer groups as reflected in table four. The farmers' opposition towards the policy, in some instances instigated political response as evidenced by a presidential directive which halted the reform in 2007 (Joughin & Kjær, 2010). Therefore, such indictors reflected a problem in the implementation of the policy.

Table 12. Summary of finding of independent variables: Political, social and economic conditions and Target group behaviors

Independent variable	Findings
Political, social and economic conditions	<ul> <li>Political interference in technical workers' activities</li> <li>Political favoritism during distribution of NAADS farm inputs to farmers</li> <li>Distrust in farmer groups due to education disparity among farmers</li> <li>Leadership conflicts in groups affected farmer groups activities</li> <li>Exclusion from farmer groups due to financial constraints of some farmers</li> <li>Poor community infrastructures like roads affected mobility technical personnel to farming communities</li> </ul>
Target group behaviors	<ul> <li>Farmers' opposition towards the NAADS group approach affected group activities and effective NAADS implementation</li> <li>Farmers were not consulted on NAADS policy during its formulation hence, it created less ownership of the program by farmers</li> <li>Farmer groups conflict affected NAADS activities</li> <li>Difference between farmers expectations and NAADS stated objective dissuaded farmers from participation in the program activities</li> </ul>

Source: Researchers' field notes

#### **CHAPTER EIGHT**

## SUMMARY, IMPLICATION OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

#### 8.0 Introduction

This is the final chapter of the study. It basically summarizes the major findings of the study basing on the four independent variables and how they influenced or impacted on the dependent variable. The chapter also depicts the implication of the study on the policy implementation discourse especially at the local level in Uganda and also includes the general conclusion of the study.

## 8.1 Summary of main findings

This is mainly based on the analysis of the independent variables of the study and their effect on the dependent variable. The study set out to answer the main research question: what are the challenges affecting NAADS implementation in Mukono district? Therefore, based on data gathered from Mukono district local government as discussed in the previous chapter, the findings can be summarized as follows

## 8.1.0 Ambiguity of Policy standard and objectives

In this variable the emphasis was placed on the extent to which the policy standards and objectives were realized. The study analyzed the clarity and ambiguity of the objectives to the policy actors or implementers. NAADS implementation encompass many actors including public employees, politicians, farmers, therefore, objectives ought to be clear to all actors for implementation to succeed. However, I realized there was lack of knowledge of NAADS objectives by some essential policy actors for example farmers and politicians. Out of the 20 farmers interviewed during focus groups, 16 farmers (80%) were not conversant with all the NAADS objectives. They could not mention more than one objective and thus, they only regarded NAADS as a mechanism in which they obtained free handouts in the form of free farm inputs from government. Therefore, farmers' ignorance about most of the NAADS objectives affected their participation in most NAADS activities like farmer groups training, hence hindering achievement of policy objectives. According to Van Meter and Van Horn, the policy standard and objectives elaborate on the overall goals of the policy decision (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). They move beyond the generalities of the legislative document to provide concrete and more specific standards for assessing program performance (ibid: 464).

Some of the major problems identified about the NAADS objectives were their inconsistencies. The technical personnel who were the major implementers of the policy reported that the policy objectives were often altered by the politicians in order to suit their selfish political interests. This was evidenced by the diversion of NAADS' main goal from extension service delivery to supply of free farm inputs to farmers. Therefore, such frequent modifications perplexed so many actors involved in implementation and hindered achievement of set targets.

Additionally, the policy standard and objectives were ambiguous. For example the objective of increasing agricultural productivity. The policy architects assumed that by increasing farmers' accessibility to agricultural knowledge, technology, and later supply of free farm inputs to farmers would have a positive impact on agricultural production. However, increase of agricultural production is determined by a combination of factors including access to credit, acreage under production, levels of mechanization, labour among others (Bahiigwa et al., 2005; Khandker & Koolwal, 2014). Therefore, NAADS design neglected some of those other influential factors hence resulting into failure to achieve the desired objective. Such problems in NAADS design substantiates Winter's assumption that problems in the policy design may trickle down to implementation. Van Meter and Van Horn also share the same sentiments and emphasize clarity of policy standard and objectives if successful implementation is to be achieved.

I found out that some of NAADS objectives merely focused on quantity than quality. For example increased agricultural production focused on only enabling farmers to boost production neglecting the quality of produces. Little effort was placed on post-harvest handling which would be essential in ensuring quality of agricultural products produced that would command good market for farmers' produces. Government merely encouraged farmers and private sector to add value on agricultural products but it did not thoroughly promote the idea whereby no incentives were established and also little funds in NAADS budget were allocated to such activities. The government also failed to attract the private sector to invest in agricultural activities. The private sector in Uganda considered agricultural investment as a risky venture where recovery of their investment was uncertain. Therefore, there was limited access to agricultural credit by farmers hence affecting agricultural investments.

## 8.1.1 Insufficient policy resources

The study found out that the central government was the major source of funding for NAADS implementation in the district. Central government contributed 90% of the district NAADS budget. These funds were transferred on quarterly basis following the approved annual budgets. But as noted earlier, central government transfers to finance district NAADS budget reduced every financial year as reflected in table six. Consequently, the decline in NAADS budget negatively affected the capacity of extension staff to conduct their activities like capacity building training of farmers.

## 8.1.2 Nonpayment of co-fund obligation by local governments

The study also noted non-compliance of some organs on their co-funding obligations. As prescribed in the NAADS act 2001, and NAADS implementation guidelines 2010, both farmers and local governments were mandated to co-fund NAADS budget but I found out that both parties defaulted on their obligations. Such acts on non-compliance created persistent budget deficits hence; it hindered implementation of planned NAADS activities. Subsequently, it affected realization of NAADS targets and output. Co-funding aimed to instill sense of local ownership of the program and commitment to its implementation. However the ideal was not realized with both entities citing various hindrances. For instance, the farmers cited the high poverty levels could not enable them to fulfill their obligation.

## 8.1.3 The dependency syndrome

Furthermore, the study realized that there was increased growth of dependency syndrome by the farmers on government. The Ugandan community in recent times had become used to free handouts from government. This was perpetuated by politicians especially during election period. The politicians started a culture of giving out free goods and amenities to the people. For instance, the idea of mass procurement and supply of free seed varieties to farmers was not originally in NAADS objectives, but because of selfish political interest and regime survival, the president and his ruling NRM government, smuggled it into NAADS activities. Therefore, such conditions made the public complacent and reluctant to contribute towards development programs anticipating always to be receiving free handouts from government, yet politicians only used it as a political gimmick to lure their votes. On the other hand local government officials stressed that the small local revenue sources in the district could not

enable them to fulfill their co-fund obligations on all programs implemented in the district. Therefore such tendencies contributed to challenges that affected NAADS implementation in the district.

# 8.1.4 Corruption

Poor management of NAADs finances was noted as one of the challenges that affected NAADS implementation. Financial flaws were cited in Auditor general reports where instances like un accounted expenditures, diversion of funds were evident (Muwanga, 2015). Issues of corruption were rampant in the district where technical officers sometimes connived with politicians and misused public finances (Muwanga, 2015). Although there were anticorruption agencies in the country like IGG, OAG, Ant-corruption court, CIID, PAC and others. Corruption in public organizations like local governments was still rampant in the country (see Onzima, 2013). Corruption was not only practiced by public servants but the society at large. For instance in some situations, farmers also connived with suppliers and swindled public finances through sham procurements of farm inputs like seeds. Such syndicated financial mal-practice was a loophole created by the NAADS implementation guidelines which authorized suppliers to supply directly to farmers, and farmers to approve receipt of the consignment. Thus, quack farmers claimed receipt of farm inputs yet in actual sense procurement was not done. Such magnitude of corruption in the district was reported in various program audit reports (Mukono, 2014b).

Although financial audits were conducted every quarter in all lower local governments in the district and the district headquarters itself to ensure value for money. The corruption problem was still evident. The district has an internal audit department mandated by the Local Government Act 1997 to audit all local government transactions on a quarterly basis. In addition to internal auditors, also external audits were conducted by the office of Auditor general (OAG) at every end of financial year. However during interface with the internal department officials in the district, they decried about the limited funding allocated to the department. The department every financial year received less than 3% of the total district budget (Mukono, 2015a). In addition also the delay to release the funds constrained the department to conduct timely financial audits. Furthermore, the internal department at the district only had three auditors tasked to audit the district itself and its 15 lower local governments every quarter. The auditors were overwhelmed with heavy workload although they were able to fulfill their obligation but they could not do thorough audits which would

include field visits to ascertain procurements claimed to have been carried out by technical workers and farmers. Thus some loopholes existed and continued unchecked hence affecting effective NAADS implementation in the district.

As regards to human resources, the study analyzed, availability, recruitment, retention, and support rendered to street-level bureaucrats and their attitude or behavior towards NAADS implementation. The study found out that the district was able to attract competent technical personnel in particular, agricultural extension officers. I realized that this was due to its central location and close proximity to the capital. However during interviews with the agricultural technical staff in the production department charged with NAADS implementation. They complained about poor salaries paid to them compared to the heavy workload on their table. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) advocated for mobilization of funds and incentives if effective policy implementation is to be attained. Therefore, scarcity of incentives like pay rise to extension workers such that they earn a decent salary proportionate to their work load discouraged them and lowered their commitment towards implementation of the program activities.

The human resource situation was worsened when the government reduced the number of extension staff in local governments. The retrenchment of Agricultural extension officers in 2014 drastically reduced the number of agricultural extension workers. It affected farmers' access to agricultural advisory service which was one of the primary program activities. During discussions with farmers through the focus group discussions, they expressed their disappointment in the program implementation. Farmers depended heavily on government extension workers for agricultural knowledge and skills since majority of farmers had no financial capacity to hire private extension workers. Therefore the reduction of the number of extension workers to one staff per sub-county, limited farmers' access to technical knowledge. Consequently, it also affected the levels of agricultural production because some farmers were not able to receive guidance from technical personnel on how to apply various methods of farming and post-harvest handling.

In addition other incentives like rewarding, promotions were not executed to motivate technical personnel. During review of human resource management documents such endeavors were rarely carried out and I was reliably informed by 65% of the technical personnel interviewed in production department that they had served in their current positions for the last 15 years. Thus, many officials had remained in their positions for many years with

no hope of being promoted. Such defects in human resource management demoralized the agricultural technical personnel in the district; as a result, their devotion towards implementation of NAADS activities gradually dwindled.

## 8.1.5 Opposition of the policy by technical workers

The study also assessed the reaction, attitude of technical workers towards NAADS implementation. Although they were mandated and obliged by law to follow and implement directives from their superiors, technical discontentment was evident among agricultural technical employees involved in NAADS implementation. Though, their disgruntlement was expressed inaudibly because of fear of the consequences including loss of jobs. Technical opposition was observed through, evasion of some NAADS meetings by agricultural technical workers and slow response to farmers' problems. Furthermore, the technical workers although not openly, opposed the entry of the army and inclusion operation wealth creation component in NAADS implementation. The agricultural technical personnel's opposition towards army involvement in NAADS was because the army had no prior experience and training in agricultural activities. Also difference in the work ethics of both organs, where by the army worked following orders and commands unlike civil servants who followed organizational principles and set procedures. In addition, there was deep-rooted fear of the army by the local people. This was as because of the past brutal armies and regimes in the history of the country. Therefore such unfavorable working environment characterized by fear and discontentment affected coordination between army personnel and civil servants involved in NAADS implementation.

## 8.1.6 Political interference and conflicts with technical personnel.

The direct involvement of politicians in NAADS implementation brought more harm than good. Political interference, influence peddling was cited widely in most of the policy implementation reports as one of the challenges that affected effective NAADS implementation in the district (Mukono, 2014a). Politicians were involved in planning, mobilization, resource allocation, monitoring and evaluation of NAADS activities. And, they were composed on several committees of NAADS implementation. Therefore, they used their powers to influence the implementation process to favor their political interests for example in certain instances politicians determined beneficiaries in the program, hence disenfranchising the genuine beneficiaries from the services. Such acts by political players contributed to the inefficiencies marred in NAADS implementation.

#### 8.1.7 Poor organizational and Inter-organizational Relations

The study also aimed to find out the organizational and inter-organizational relationship that existed among organizations involved in NAADS implementation. As earlier mentioned, NAADS implementation involved a vertical organizational approach where MAAIF was the overseer and then district and its lower local governments carried out grassroots implementation. Basing on NAADS implementation guidelines 2010, the organizations involved in the implementation of the policy activities had to network in order to ensure progress. Organizations were supposed to review implementation on a quarterly basis. However, the technical personnel at MAAIF and Mukono district illustrated that even though it was the best practice, but such arrangement could not be achieved because of limited resources and thus they could only manage such meeting once in a year. It is through the inter-organizational meetings that challenges the policy implementation encountered were identified and solutions devised in order to ensure effective implementation. Thus failure to have such arrangements as it was found out during the study, it affected NAADS implementation in the district. Under the NAADS act 2001, MAAIF was mandated to coordinate, supervise and conduct capacity building for local governments on NAADS implementation. During interview with director of planning at MAAIF he noted that his ministry (MAAIF) lacked manpower to monitor and supervise all the 112 districts in the country. Hence he admitted that the technical capacity gap at the ministry created loopholes in the NAADS implementation, since the ministry could not effectively follow-up on the activities in the districts

Another flaw identified by the study was the ineffective organizational enforcement mechanism. During the study I discovered that the district could not enforce sanctions against its staff. During review of documents, I found out that staff appraisals were carried out once a year to determine whether agreed targets were met. But hardly did the district authority penalize ineffective staff especially through dismissal. The head of production department at the district reported that such punitive measures like dismissal of ineffective staff were costly for the organization to enforce since in most instances such cases ended up in court involving hefty compensations. Therefore, the district got stuck with some inefficient staff hence compromising NAADS implementation. Therefore such weaknesses of organizational enforcement mechanism observed during data collection validates Van Meter and Van Horn (1975)'s views where they cautioned about policy implementation failures due to inability by

policy managers in the organizations to reign over their subordinates to ensure attainment of policy objectives as prescribed in policy documents is attained.

I also noted lack of cooperation among organizations involved at grassroots implementation. For instance, there was poor working relationship between the district technical workers and army personnel who were implementing the newly created Operation Wealth Creation component implemented under NAADS structure. As elaborated earlier, the technical experts opposed the introduction of the army in NAADS implementation because the military personnel had no experience in agricultural activities. However army involvement in NAADS implementation was a presidential directive hence its effectiveness but the technical resentment continued towards it continued and some agricultural technical workers withdrew from the program implementation. But the army could not fill up the gap of agricultural extension workers because they lacked the knowledge and experience hence causing disruptions of effective NAADS implementation.

Table 13 showing Summary of findings that show effect of independent variables on dependent variable

Independent variables	endent variables Indicators of the Dependent Variable: NAADS Implementation				
	Increased agricultural productivity	Farmer groups creation	Training or capacity building of farmers	Promotion of private financing of NAADS activities	
Policy standard and objectives	- Objectives biased on increasing productivity and neglected quality of the products which would have fetched in high prices for farmers - Farmers were not consulted or involved in policy formulation yet they are key stakeholders in increasing productivity	Less emphasis devoted on Farmer institutional development which was primary in sensitizing farmers about FG creation	- Diversion of emphasis from farmer training to mass procurement of free handouts like seeds supplied to farmers reduced efforts devoted to training	- Gap in linking farmers to private financial institutions	
Policy resources	-Late release of NAADS funds affected planting season and output -corruption by public officials affected attainment of program activities - Default of co-funding of NAADS budget by LGs and farmers affected implementation of some activities	-Limited funds only 16% allocated FID activities which involve sensitization of farmers on FGs -Inadequate extension staff to promote FGs creation	- Diversion of resources from extension services delivery to non- sustainable plans of supplying free handouts to farmers	- No incentives to attract private sector funding of NAADS activities - Agriculture considered risky venture by private financial institutions - Corruption in government organs discouraged private sector funding of NAADS activities	
Organizational and Inter- organizational relations	- Competing interests of several organizations involved in NAADS implementation affected realization of a common goal - Weaknesses by organizations to enforce institutional activities	- Lack of organizational incentives towards staff to motivate them to carry out their activities like sensitization of farmers on group formation	- Limited capacity (financial and human) by organizations to conduct capacity building trainings for farmers in the district	- Limited coordination between public organs and private financial institutions	
Political and socio- economic conditions	- Political interference in bureaucratic activities affected achievement targeted production output	Inadequate mobilization     of farmers by local     politicians towards FGs     creation     Education disparities     among farmers affect FGs     sustainability	- Leadership conflicts in FGs affect groups' capacity to demand for capacity building training - Poor socio-economic infrastructure like community roads affected mobility of extension workers	-The remoteness of farming communities and lack of infrastructures like power, internet discouraged penetration of private institutions	


Target group behaviors	- Farmers misused the	-Farmers' opposition	- Lack of interest in FGs	- Farmers were less
	free handouts given to	towards group approach	activities by farmers due	knowledgeable about
	them inform of seeds	hindered creation of more	to non-realization of their	private financing
	hence affecting	groups	expectations.	modalities
	attainment of increased		-60% of farmers	
	agricultural output		interviewed during FGDs	
			did not know their roles	
			like demanding for	
			agricultural training	
			through their FGs	

Sources: Researcher's field notes

## 8.2 Theoretical implication and relevance to the study

The study used Winter's integrated theory and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation to provide theoretical explanations for the study. The theories advanced explanatory variables as analyzed above. The summary of findings in the figure below reflects the challenges NAADS faced which resulted into unsuccessful policy implementation in the district.

Figure 5. Showing effect of findings on NAADS implementation



Source: Researcher's field notes

The figure above depicts findings of the study and their effect on the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district local government. The challenges identified by the study created instabilities during the implementation process, hence making the policy loose fit, and unable to attain its output, hence making implementation unsuccessful.

According to the data presented and analyzed in the study, both theories (winter's integrated implementation theory, and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory) were essential and augmented each other in the study, hence enabling it to answer its research questions. Both implementation theories developed some similar essential variables like the importance of policy design or stated policy objectives in determining the implementation results. Both theories explicitly emphasized the need to set clear policy standards and objectives if effective implementation is to be achieved. They advocated for measurement of implementation results basing on the stated policy objectives. Conversely, data analyzed indicated that NAADS stated objectives were not adhered to and were often altered by the political players at the center especially the president hence, such scenarios created inconsistencies in the policy standard and objectives making realization of policy output unachievable. Therefore, data collected validates both theories' assertion that ambiguity of the policy objectives affects negatively policy implementation.

The study realized that existence of insufficient policy resources especially financial and human resources was one of the major causes of ineffective NAADS implementation in the district. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) implementation theory overtly emphasized mobilization of resources and provision of incentives to implementers if effective implementation was to be achieved. However, basing on the data gathered and analyzed above, the study realized that the district had insufficient agricultural technical officers to enable it effectively execute the policy activities.

However, Winter's integrated theory's was relied on more for theoretical explanations of the study. The theory developed relevant factors which were relevant in explaining the implementation process involving a multitude of players like the NAADS policy. Its ability to combine both elements of top-down and bottom-up perspectives was informative to the study. Winter advanced variables like organizational and inter-organizational relations, target-group behaviors, political and socio-economic conditions which helped in explaining NAADS implementation at local government level.

The variable of organizational and inter-organizational relations helped the study to elaborate on how different organizations involved in NAADS implementation collaborated. Winter's integrated theory cautioned that organizational and inter-organizational conflict may affect effective implementation. This was evidenced in the study where there was no clear coordination and effective communication mechanism between the staff at the production

department and army personnel implementing OWC. This was as a result of army involvement in NAADS implementation despite its inexperience in agricultural activities. There was also no clear organizational hierarchy and it was difficult to establish which organization reported to the other. This also confused the farmers and during FGDs they expressed that they did not know where to report their concerns whether to the army personnel or the district technical staff. Thus, such conflicts and poor organizational and interorganizational relationship negatively affected the state of NAADS implementation in the district.

The variable of target-group behavior was also essential in informing the study about the roles, perception, expectations and behaviors of farmers towards NAADS implementation. In this scenario, the study was able to find out that farmers opposed the farmer group approach and most of them preferred working independently. I was also able to find out through FGDs that most farmers joined the farmer groups because they expected that government was going to provide them interest free credit through NAADS, yet such objective was farfetched and out of NAADS scope. Therefore, such factors confirmed that farmers were not consulted during NAADS formulation and also I realized that majority (80%) were not conversant with its objectives. Hence, NAADS output like increased agricultural productivity was not attained because farmers' participation in policy activities was marginal and they lacked full knowledge of NAADS intention.

Winter's integrated theory also developed the political and socio-economic conditions as determinants of implementation. These environmental factors were relevant in explaining the political and socio-economic circumstances in the district. The study hypothesized that: negative or unfavorable political and socio-economic conditions may affect the state of NAADS implementation in Mukono district. This was validated in the study whereby, due to the pluralist political system in Uganda. Various political parties had competing interests as elaborated in the findings. The ruling regime in the country diverted the policy from its primary purpose of provision of agricultural extension services to supply of free handouts in the form of seed varieties to farmers. Majority of policy resources were diverted towards that target because it was politically rewarding inform of attracting political support and votes for the ruling regime. Hence other NAADS activities like training of farmers on farming skills were marginalized, consequently affecting effective NAADS implementation.

#### 8.3 Conclusion

According to data analyzed in the study, it reflected that the policy design or policy standards and objectives had a great bearing on the NAADS implementation process. Most of the NAADS challenges analyzed in the study originated from the policy design or policy standards and objectives. The empirical evidence gathered reflected that the policy standards and objectives were not clear, not only to farmers but also the politicians who were the supervisors of the policy implementers. As noted earlier, NAADS was mainly drafted by the donors mainly World Bank and agricultural experts in the Ministry of Agriculture (MAAIF). Therefore, views of other policy actors were not sufficiently considered during the policy designing and therefore, policy actors like farmers and politicians were less knowledgeable of the policy standard and objectives. The limited knowledge of the NAADS objectives by politicians forced them to directly interfere in NAADS implementation by driving it away from its original purpose of promoting and providing farmers with extension services to a politically motivated goal of providing free farm inputs such as seeds to farmers. Such unsustainable politically motivated agenda did not only drain the policy funds, but it also drastically affected implementation of other NAADS activities such as capacity building of farmers and technical personnel at lower levels, since majority of funds were committed to procurement and supply of free handout to farmers.

Therefore, the lack of consensus among the policy players resulted into conflicts especially between politicians at the center and donors (see Joughin & Kjær, 2010). The donors reacted drastically by reducing their funding from 75% to less than 25% (ibid). Although the government tried to bridge the gap by increasing its funding of the policy implementation to 75% (Rwakakamba et al., 2014), still the funds were insufficient to enable effective NAADS implementation. Therefore, Local governments, Mukono district in particular faced budget cuts as reflected in table six which negatively affected the state of NAADS implementation. Therefore, such findings in the study validates both Winter's integrated theory and Van Meter and Van Horn's implementation theory because both theories advocate for setting up clear policy objectives which can help to streamline procedures, standards and resources for implementation. Winter's theory farther advocates for involvement of all concerned policy actors in the policy formulation process which could improve their understanding of the goals and objectives, hence reducing issues of conflicts among policy players. With clear policy standards and objectives, coupled with harmony or consensus among the policy actors, it would lead to selection of correct policy instruments like resources. But, disarray among

policy actors as elaborated in the study led to challenges of NAADS implementation such as failure to select right policy instruments to support NAADS implementation.

The study also realized that policy formulation was not inclusive, as all the 20 farmers interviewed in FGDs reported that they were not consulted during the policy formulation. This explains the divide in farmers' expectations and the policy objectives. It also accounts to the limited knowledge of the policy objectives by the farmers and politicians because they played a peripheral role during policy formulation. Therefore, some pertinent issues which mostly affected the farmers were not included in the policy. For example accessibility to affordable or low interest credit by farmers was one of the issues that farmers wanted to be sorted by NAADS. But unfortunately, such objective was not included in the NAADS scope. Inaccessibility to affordable credit by farmers explains the low levels of mechanization of agriculture in Mukono district and the country in general, and also the large practice of subsistence farming by majority farmers in the district and the country, representing 80% (UBOS, 2014). Furthermore, failure by the policy to address issues of irrigation in the country contributed to low agricultural productivity in the country. In Mukono district, farming heavily depended on rain and thus, farmers planted crops basing on raining seasons, which only occurred twice a year. Therefore, with the existence of harsh conditions characterized by global warming, droughts, farmers were helpless and they could not attain increased agricultural productivity due to their dependency on nature for farming. Therefore, some of these pertinent issues which affect NAADS implementation call for more investment in the agriculture sector and further research on practicalities on the ground if effective NAADS implementation in Mukono district and the country in general is to be attained

This study contributed on the policy implementation discourse at the local level in Uganda, particularly the NAADS policy. The study realized that local government's dependency on central government financially, the insufficient technical capacity in the form of human labour, political interference, un-coordinated organizational and inter-organizational relations, opposition of farmers towards the reform, and the unfavorable socio-economic factors in the organizational jurisdiction were some of the outstanding challenges that negatively affected the state of NAADS implementation in the district. And if such challenges are addressed, NAADS and other related policies can be successfully implemented. The study was an explorative research, based on a single case and thus its findings mainly build and augment both theories applied in the study. In addition, the study can act as an eye opener for more research on policy implementation at the local level.

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# **Appendix 1: Recommendation letter from Research Area**

TELEPHONE: 0414669803

IN ANY CORRESPONDENCE ON
THIS SUBJECT, PLEASE QUOTE
EDU/MKN/309/03

Our Ref:

Your Ref:
August 21, 2015



OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER MUKONO DISTRICT P.O. BOX 110, MUKONO

THE HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANISATION THEORY

**UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN** 

This is to certify that **Bwogi Moses** carried out research on **implementation of Agriculture policy reform in Uganda. A case study of Mukono District** for a period of two months (June 4 - August 19, 2015).

The researcher displayed good research skills and had good inter-personal relation with organization's staff. The researcher is expected to avail a copy the research results to the department after completion of the research. The research will not only benefit the department but the entire district.

I wish you success in your endeavors strative officer

Jonathan Hosea Mukose

For. CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

**MUKONO DISTRICT** 

# **Appendix 2: Farmer Groups Members Who Attended FGDs**

	FOCUSED GROVP DISCUSSION					
	BASIIMA DEVELOPMENT GROUP – LUGAMBA 108 / 2013					
NO.	NAME	SEX	TITLE	CONTACT	SIGNATURE	
1.	BILINOO MAZIANO	w	chief notes ev	0751375985	Allinis.	
2.	Kiwanuha Jereph	M	Member	0751417214	121	
3.	NAKATISE DITAH	F	member	0 15549 1117	ARLY 30	
4.	MANGalita		Nakalety			
5.	NAKAMAABI JUSIM	F	Member	0788648974	fulls	
6.	MARUCALU ICOTINA	F	CIPERSON	0750762650	NHEstida	
7.	Twesiage Loy	F	MEMBER	0773841163	withan	
8.	Nabantema	7	MEMBLER	075427829	p T	
9.	Tondo Lydia	E	member		ludia	
10.	Naboline mary	F	member	0753517160	J	

#### **Appendix 3: Interview Guide**

## Variable: target group beneficiaries, Policy standards and objectives

(Awareness/knowledge, perception, roles of farmers in NAADS implementation)

- 1. What is NAADS to you?
- 2. What are the main objectives of NAADS?
- 3. How are farmers engaged in NAADS?
- 4. What is the role of Farmers in NAADS implementation?
- 5. What do you expect from NAADS as a farmer?
- 6. What services do you receive from agricultural extension officers?
- 7. What do you think about the NAADS implementation so far?
- 8. How have you benefitted from the implementation of the reform?
- 9. Does the reform face opposition from farmers or other actors?
- 10. What kind of opposition? How does it affect NAADS implementation?
- 11. What are other challenges involved in implementation of the reform?
- 12. How do you go about these challenges?
- 13. What needs to be done to improve NAADS implementation?

## **Variable: Policy Resources**

- 1. What are resources needed for effective implementation of the reform?
- 2. How is mobilization of policy resources carried out?
- 3. Are resources available and accessible to NAADS implementers?
- 4. How is recruitment of agricultural extension service providers conducted?
- 5. How are bureaucrats supported and facilitated during implementation of the reform?

#### Variable: Organizational and Inter-organizational relations

- 1. What are the organizations involved in NAADS implementation?
- 2. What is the communication mechanism in place for NAADS implementing agencies?
- 3. Who monitors or supervises the reform activities?
- 4. How is capacity building of officials involved in NAADS implementation carried out?

## Variable: street-level bureaucrat conditions, policy standards and objectives

- 1. What do you consider NAADS to entail?
- 2. What are the main objectives of NAADS?
- 3. How is the reform implemented and when did it start?
- 4. What are the policy actors involved in NAADS implementation?
- 5. What is the role of the technical staff in NAADS implementation?
- 6. What is the role of other policy actors involved in NAADS implementation?
- 7. How do farmers demand for Agricultural extension services

- 8. What is the linkage between technical staff and farmers during implementation of the reform?
- 9. What are the staffing levels of public officials involved in NAADS implementation?
- 10. How are private extension staff involved in NAADS implementation?
- 11. Does the policy face any kind of opposition, if YES, explain?

What other challenges affect NAADS implementation

## Variable: Political and socio-economic conditions

- 1. What is NAADS according to you?
- 2. What are the objectives of the reform?
- 3. What is the role of political leaders in implementation of the reform?
- 4. Do political leaders support the NAADS implementation, if yes how?
- 5. If no, why the opposition?
- 6. What are resources necessary for policy implementation?
- 7. What are challenges involved in NAADS implementation?