The Implementation of Civil Service Reforms in Tanzania, 1991-2000

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Master of Philosophy in Public Administration

Emmanuel C. Lukumai

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CSD	Civil Service Department
CSR	Civil Service Reform
CSRP	Civil Service Reform Program
DANIDA	Department of International Cooperation (Denmark)
DFID	Department for International Development
DPMN	Development Policy Management Forum
ESAMI	Eastern and Southern Management Institute
GoT	Government of Tanzania
IDM	Institute of Development Management
IFM	Institute of Finance Management
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MBS	Minimum Basic Salary
MDAs	Ministries, Departments, Agencies
MLW	Minimum Living Wage
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
NPM	New Public Management
NPR	National Performance Review
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPRAS	Open Performance Review System
PSM	Public Service Management
PSRP	Public Sector Reform Program
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
TA	Technical Assistance
TGS	Tanzania Government Scale
TRA	Tanzania Revenue Authority
UNDP	United Nation Development Program
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
WB	World Bank

DEDICATION

For my family and parents, who offered me unconditional love and enthusiasm throughout my course of this master's degree.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ABSTRACT

The present thesis deals with civil service reforms implemented in Tanzania in between 1991-2000. It aims at assessing whether the reforms achieved the intended objectives of *"smaller, affordable, well compensated, efficient and effective performing civil service"* (Caulfield, 2004: 233). To this end, the discussion starts by explaining the overall move for reform globally and then narrows its scope and deals with assessing the factors that led to achievement or failure of the process in the Tanzanian context. Drawing from the implementation theory of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), independent variables are considered to influence the dependent variables (reform measures) and lead to success or failure. Independent variables discussed are standard and objectives, resources, Inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities, characteristics of implementing agencies, disposition of implementers, and economic, social and political conditions. The reform measures selected and assessed are remuneration, recruitment, retrenchment, capacity building, and government expenditure.

In order to contextualize the research issue, I explained the history of reforms in Tanzanian since independence in 1961 and as well, the composition of the civil service.

The research presents data collected from the field using a qualitative (case study) approach which was gathered through written documents and some interview that was possible accessed. The data collected draws a complex picture. It indicates that some reform measures were successful (e.g. retrenchment) whiles others (e.g. remuneration, government expenditure and capacity building) were unsuccessful. Recruitment was more of a paradox as success in recruiting the right candidates was frustrated by high turnover of competent workers due to poor remuneration which cannot motivate skilled worker to remain in government employment.

A number of factors that impeded the achievement of the process have been identified including limited resources, poor communication of the reform objective, weak political support of reforms by the government that was in power before the 1995 election, and lack of local ownership in reform. In this general assessment, the reform was unsuccessful and the discussion concludes with suggestion of what should future reformers should strive to do for successful reform in the future.

CHAPTER ONE

1.0   Introduction

"In the past two decades there has been an unprecedented wave of reform as the traditional model of public administration has come under attack" (Minongue, 2001: 20). *"This wave of reforms came in the name of New Public Management (NPM) and dominated thinking about public sector reform by practitioners and academics alike.* As noted*, some hailed it as new paradigm. However there are different interpretations of what that common response consists of, but there is a general agreement that key components of NPM include the deregulation of line management; Civil Service Reform and Privatization"* (Polidano, 2001: 44*).* As presented*, "advocates and critics alike often accept the assumption that the New Public Management is universal. The universality assumption is encouraged by the undoubted fact that NPM catch-phrases feature prominently in the vocabulary of civil service reform all around the world"* (ibid: 44)

In most developing countries, civil service reforms in the past two decades were often related to Structural Adjustment Program (SAPs) introduced by international organizations (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) as a means to redress the deteriorated economic circumstances (Corkery & Land, 1997). As addressed by Mutahaba & Kiragu, *"the impetus for that first wave of Public Sector Reform (PSR) in Africa, as was the case in other developing countries, emerged from the macroeconomic and fiscal reforms that were embedded in structural adjustment programs (SAPs) sponsored by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Public Service Reform/Civil Service Reform then sought to make Government lean and affordable through cost reduction and containment measures, rationalizing the state machinery, divesting non-core government operations, retrenching redundant staff, removing ghost[1] workers from the payroll, freezing employment and adopting measures to control the wage bill and other personnel-based expenditure"*(Mutahaba & Kiragu, 2002: 52).

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[1] "Ghost employees" refers to presence of names Government payroll when such employees either do not exist or should already have been removed from the payroll

Tanzania is one of the countries that embarked upon the Civil Service Reform program in 1991 with the aim of improving the performance of government activities through improved efficiency and effectiveness of the civil servant workforce. As Therkildsen (2000) documented in his article, *"poor performance, inefficiency and corruption in the public sector contributed to pressure for reform in Tanzania as they did elsewhere in Africa"* (Therkildsen, 2000: 61). He further emphasized that, *"those pressures have grown with introduction of multipartyism in 1995 following 30 years of one-party rule"* (ibid). The donors of the reform program were World Bank (WB) and United Nation Development Program (UNDP) (NORAD, 1995). However, most civil service reforms in recent years have been associated with economic reform efforts organized by the World Bank (Rafiqur, 2001).

1.1   Historical background

Civil service reforms started to prevail in the1980s in advanced capitalist democracies as a response to the realization of poor performance of civil service evidenced in expanded government size, over expenditure in wage bills, unaccountability of civil servants etc. The poor performance problems called for reform strategies. However, the strategies for dealing with this problem varied between nations considerably in scope, orientation, and accomplishments (Lane, 1997). Following its global spread, Civil Service Reforms (CSR) were increasingly being adopted in several African countries and in most cases was closely linked to structural adjustment efforts.

The main concern of civil service reform programs administered in various countries through entrusted bodies related to civil service was to deal with its weaknesses and inefficiencies to make it function more effectively in a dynamic environment. The weaknesses and inefficiency of civil service always resulted in too much public expenditure (Corkery and Land, 1997). In practice, this led to the need for the governments to implement this type of reform in an attempt to reduce the cost of the civil service, e.g. by reducing its size. In Tanzania, the responsibility of civil service reform was entrusted to the President Office, Civil Service Department and the program was supported by several donors.

However, most of civil service reforms that are undertaken in developing countries including Tanzania are usually the results/outcomes of pressure and guidance from international organizations namely World Bank and IMF and sometimes from industrialized countries as one of the conditions to get their financial support (World Bank, 2002). Civil service reforms in developing countries are driven by Donors' countries/Multilateral Institutions and not like the reforms made in developed countries like in the UK under Thatcher regime, the USA i.e. National Performance Review (NPR) under Al Gore commission (named Sand in Oyster) and that of New Zealand which were home grown though they all aimed at improving civil service performance. The reforms made to the above mentioned developed nations were financed from their national treasuries while those made in developing countries had dependency on donor's financial and advisory support.

Apart from being used as a tool for curbing government spending through personnel and wage cuts; Civil Service Reforms were also used as a tool for creating a skilled and efficient government workforce. Cost containment was an important aspect of civil service reform but there were also other equally important aspects. An efficient and motivated civil service was critical for governance, production and distribution of public goods and services, formulation and implementation of economic policy, and management of public expenditure. *"The broader aim of civil service reform was therefore, the creation of a government workforce of the size and with the skills, incentives, ethos, and accountability needed to provide quality public services and carry out functions assigned to the state"* (Schiavo, 1996: 1).

In some countries, civil service reforms contributed to microeconomic stability through supporting downsizing programs that reduced the size and cost of civil service to an affordable and sustainable level. Reducing the size of the civil service is often a prerequisite for ensuring that governments can sustain and finance a smaller and better-paid civil service over time (Lienert, 1998).

Although civil service reforms have been applied and implemented in different countries, the reforms tend to became complex, mixed up with various institutional challenges that required time to sort out (Rafiqur, 2001). Civil service reforms are difficult to implement since they often involve rearranging difficult human configurations and changing human behavior (Olsen and Peters, 1996). Current civil service reforms usually are incorporated within administrative reforms that intend to rearrange and make the state and government leaner and have a strategic role through strengthening institutions and processes to perform core state functions.

1.2   Problem statement

The drive towards civil service reforms in most developing countries in recent years has been commonly employed to resuscitate the efficiency and effectiveness of civil service performance and hopefully government's economic ills, such as chronic budget deficits. Furthermore, the need for civil service reforms is claimed to be accelerated by overstaffing of government offices, underpayment of civil servants, unskilled workers, inefficiency of the work force, unaccountability and an eroded ethical behavior. During the post-independence period, the Tanzanian public sector experienced a big growth and expansion of the civil service sector that made it unable to meet the public wage bills. According to the World Bank review, the civil service of Tanzania expanded twice as much as government revenue and hence necessitate the squeezing of public finance which caused the fall in salaries (Caulfield, 2004). The result of this vicious circle in Tanzanian civil service contributed to another bad outcome when qualified and professional employees decided to leave public sector employment and seek career elsewhere they can be well paid. This also resulted in competent and ambitious graduates regarding employment in the public sector as a second best alternative. Civil servants were demoralized by their income which was very low in comparison to those in the private sector. However, those professionals who decided to remain working for the government, or didn't get employment elsewhere, were forced to seek ways and means to earn their living outside the work place. This resulted in prolonged absence from work as they conducted their other business during working hours (NORAD, 1995)

Another problem that was associated with the expansion of Tanzanian civil service was the level of competent civil servants. In the NORAD final report of 1995, the increase and expansion of civil service size led to employment of people without the necessary educational background (NORAD, 1995). According to that report, *"principles of merit-based recruitment and promotion was played down and elements of nepotism crept into the system"* (NORAD, 1995: 11). In an attempt to rebuild much needed capacity resources, the government of Tanzania launched the civil service reform in 1991 with the objective of achieving the *"smaller, affordable, well compensated, efficient and effective performing civil service"* (Caulfield, 2004: 233). Civil service reform in Tanzania was the result of "*serious problems of overstaffing, low pay and under resourcing of basic services and crowding out of operational spending which resulted in the decline of real wage levels and the quality of government, collapse in services and a growth in maladministration and corruption"* (Clarke & Wood, 2001: 71). The implemented civil service reform program had various aspects contained in it namely the creation of autonomous executive Agencies in some ministries, improving local governments, retrenchment (rightsizing), pay reform, capacity building[2], recruitment process, and wage cost cut.

In the implementation of the program according to Janice Caulfield, there was a reduction of 27% of civil servants in 1992-2000 (i.e. from 355,000 personnel to 260,000) and improvement of salaries to the upper echelons (Caulfield, 2004).

The implemented civil service reform in Tanzania, like in other developing countries, was a part of the Structural Adjustment Program directed and supported by the international organizations in 1991 (NORAD, 1995). Therefore, the purpose of this research is to examine whether its implementation as discussed by various authors has delivered and proved to be the right approach towards improving effectiveness and efficiency of civil service performance in Tanzanian context.

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[2] The term "capacity building" used here to mean
- development of leadership skills and *capacity* needed to manage change; and
- develop *capacity* to ensure that the Government will in future effectively
  Manage its role and functions.

1.3 Objectives of the study and research question

Following the global trend of initiating civil service reforms in different countries that started in the UK, the USA, New Zealand and in developing countries, the objectives of my research were to examine how CSR strategies have been dealt with in Tanzania in order to achieve the program aspiration as follows:

1. To asses whether the objectives of CSR of smaller, affordable, well compensated, efficient and effective performing civil service were achieved
2. Asses the impediments of the program and how they were dealt with
3. Examine the impact of the CSR to civil servants

Research questions

In view of the global trends with respect to civil service reforms in various countries and the reservations expressed about their outcome in terms of performance, it has become necessary to find out how the civil service reforms was implemented in Tanzania. The research therefore sought to answer the following questions,

- Has the CSR delivered in terms of its expectations?
- What has Civil Service Reform done to improve civil service performance?
- How was the implementation of the CSR program carried out in Tanzania

1.4   Variables

In this research report, I identified both dependent and independent variables. According to Nachmias (1996), the variables move us from conceptual stage to the empirical stage and usually explain causal effect relationships; as documented, it is the empirical property (Nachmias, 1996). The use of variables explains the expected changes to the dependent variables as a result of the change in the independent variable. The independent variable by Nachmias is the presumed cause of changes to the values of dependent variable in quantity or quality. The expectation in my research is that, the

following independent variable resulted in a change of the dependent variables that lead to better civil service performance or otherwise.

1.4.1 Dependent variable

Generally, civil service reform implementations have carried out numerous reform initiatives. However, for the purpose of my study, I am interested only in measuring the few dependent reform components mentioned below.

Reform Implementation measures the following aspects: employee remuneration, degree of merit-based recruitment, type of structure, capacity building, level of government expenditure (Rafiq, 2001).

1.4.2 Independent variables

According to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) successful implementation of any policy reform will depend on: clear standards and objectives, sufficient resources, accuracy of inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities, characteristics of implementing agencies, economic, social and political conditions and finally the disposition of implementers.

1.5 Research hypotheses

This part of the thesis is intended to set the base of my prediction in which I tried to establish the relationships on how the formulated independent variable might result in changes to dependent variable, and ultimately, to provide the answers for my research question

- Clear standards and objectives of reform components to implementers set direction for successful implementation
- Availability of sufficient resources facilitate successful implementation on the reform components
- Clear and unambiguously communicated policy standards and objectives makes implementation easier
- Sufficient numbers of qualified implementers result in successful implementation

- Committed political leaders with good economic conditions likely result in successful implementation
- If expected reform results are positive to the mindsets of implementers and stakeholders, resistance will be minimal and likely to succeed

1.6   Scope of the study

I conducted this research at the President's Office, department of Public Service Management- (PSM) formally known as civil service department which is responsible civil servants in the country. Due to shortage of time, my research focused only on some selected components of the program to assess improvement. These are **remuneration/salaries, recruitment and promotion, retrenchment, capacity building and government expenditure (i.e. wage cost cut).**

This research covers only the first phase reform of the second generation that was implemented in the period 1991-2000 before it was replaced by the second phase reform known as Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP) in 2000 (refer figure 3.2).

1.7   Significance of the study

Apart from being the obligatory requirement to partial fulfillment for the award of master's degree to the researcher, the research report will add to existing literatures. For this reason it can be referred and make the base for further research on the same topic. Also, this research report maybe useful to new researchers who intend to re-search similar reforms in the Tanzanian civil service department, where the research was conducted.

1.8   Analytical framework.

For purpose of analysis/discussion, the following framework has been developed.

Figure 1.8 Outline of analytical framework

Independent variables

• Standards and objectives
• Resources
• Inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities
• Characteristics of implementing agencies
• Economic, social and political conditions
• Disposition of implementers

Dependent variables

Reform Implementation
• Level employee remuneration
• Degree of merit-based recruitment
• Retrenchment/rightsizing
• Capacity building
• Level of government expenditure

1.9   Organization of the Study

The first chapter of this thesis has given an introduction, the historical background, the purpose statement, objectives of the study, research questions, variables, research hypotheses, scope of the study, significance of the study, and the analytical framework. The second chapter covers the background of reform wave (i.e. literature review), theoretical perspective, methods and data collection, and limitation of the study. The third chapter discusses the reforms in the Tanzanian context. Chapter four is the presentation of dependent variables. Chapter five is the presentation of data on the independent variable and analysis. Chapter six is the conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0   Literature review, theoretical perspectives, and methodology

2.1   Introduction

This chapter gives an account of civil service reform trends globally. It describes various efforts made by countries in reforming their civil service and the factors that stimulated the need for such action. It describes challenges encountered in the implementation of reforms in various countries as pointed out by various authors. The chapter also presents theory used in this study in regard to implementation studies. The implementation theory of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) is discussed. As well, the chapter describes the methods used in this study. It discusses the methods used in the data collection and the difficulties encountered in the whole process of gathering the required information.

2.2   Literature review

2.2.1   Reform

Civil Service Reforms implemented in developed, developing and countries in transition were considered as a part of the wider public sector reform agenda (Peters L, 1999). However, it often confronted resistance as it was seen as a tool for curbing government spending through personnel and wage cuts. It is true that, personnel and wage cuts were primary components of reform goal with ultimate aim of achieving the creation of a skilled and efficient government workforce (Schiavo, 1996)

Reforming the civil service for government performance carefully examined the government's performance by distinguishing among three types of reform i.e. civil service, administrative, and governance. Civil service reform mainly concentrated on strengthening the administrative capacity of the government to perform its core activities and as well to serve the social economic needs of the public. Administrative reform dealt with addressing the rationalization of the structures in governments, such as coordination and improvements of service delivery. The governance reform concerned improvements in legal and policy framework such as improving accountability and transparency in

governments (Schultz, 2003). However, a brief review of the global trends in reforming public administration in different countries over the last 25 years revealed different approaches adopted in reforming the civil service stemming from deeply rooted and diverging concepts of the role of the state, as well as the emergence of new demands from the civil society. Nonetheless, key findings from reforms converge on the importance of a sound, highly performing public service.

Civil Service/Public Service Reforms which have taken place in the last two decades are part of a global phenomena that has touched all parts of the world- developed, developing and countries in transition (Olowu, 2002)

In African countries, Civil Service Reform programs were often related to Structural Adjustment Programs introduced to address deteriorating economic situations. With these programs like other reforms in developed countries, the main concern was to reduce government expenditures. In implementing such reforms, governments attempted to reduce the costs of civil service by trying to reduce the size of the government. The responsibility of reforms was mainly entrusted to the ministry that deals with public services in respective countries. (Corkery & Land, 1997)

Initially, cost reductions in civil service were generally translated into retrenchment measures for governments to reduce its size with the hope that the resulting savings could be used to increase the salaries of those expected to remain in service and as well to attract and retain sufficient numbers of able people to providing better capacity for discharging core functions such as policy analysis (Cokery & Land, 1997). The neo-liberal ideology prevailing in early 1980s in many developed nations was in support of this approach. It postulated a changed and sometimes diminished role for the public sector and a greater reliance on the private sector. It challenged state involvement in economic activity.

The experience learned from the developed countries was that, the emphasis shifted from public administration to public management with the belief that private sector

management techniques were also needed in public sector if governments were to deliver better. Management practices used in private sector were considered to be equally appropriate to management of public affairs and were seen likely to lead to a more effective public service (Corkery & Land, 1997)

However as pointed out earlier, experience in various countries revealed obstacles to Civil Service Reform. Reforms usually faced problems emanating from the following aspects:

- *"Support for the reform programs remains narrow and difficult to sustain at all levels, (i.e. those of political leaders, the public at large, and bureaucrats) for two reasons: First, the reforms are still stigmatized by the pain of such first wave structural reform measures as retrenchment, employment freeze, cost sharing, etc. Second, to the extent that the reform entails the change, there are large constituencies who perceive threat and resist change.*

- *Weak capacity and resource constraints often hinder implementation of plans and programs for improvement and expansion of services. Furthermore, in a vicious circle, poor budgeting and financial management practices exacerbated the problems of capacity and resources constraints, and vice versa.*

- *There are no effective incentives for performance. Generally, pay remains low for public servants in the countries. At the same time, pay reform is not readily feasible in the short to medium term because of the limited wage bill that can be afforded under budgetary constraints"* (Mutahaba & Kiragu, 2002, 68).

According to United Kingdom records of 1997 after the implementation of CSR in the UK, about 80% of civil service was well paid according to their performance in the so-called Performance Related Pay. The same had been happening in New Zealand and in the USA under the Gore plan (Rafiq, 2001). In Uganda reports showed the improvement of salaries as the result of reforms after an improvement in average salaries by 75% (Clarke & Wood, 2001). The experience from the above discussion can be used to prove the changes brought about by civil service reform in the respective countries.

The evidence of CSR that lead to a lean government can be evidenced by reforms made in UK under the Thatcher regime were she was successful in reducing the size of the government employees by 33% (Duggett, 2002). The number of people employed by the government in Britain reached the peak of around 732,000 by the time the Thatcher government came to power in 1979 and was reduced to 533,350 by 1994 (British Government, 2004). Although one of the main aims of reforms is cutting down the wage bills, the evidence of this becomes a paradox. In the UK, the overall government spending increased because of compensations to retrenches and contracting of companies to do some jobs that were done by those retrenched (McCourt, 1998). However, through reform they manage to remove nepotism and corruption and as well, remove *"cumbersome central personnel and solving the problem of mistrust"* (McCourt, 1998: 184). New Zealand serves as an exception. Through downsizing they managed to reduce employees from 72,000 in 1986/87 to 60,000 employees in 1987/88 (McCourt, 1998). New Zealand was successful and avoided *"large increases in the public sector wage bill, and the government has been running a surplus in both cash and accruals bases"* (World Bank, 2003: 3).

The merit-based recruitment and promotion is evidenced in the Organization of Economic Cooperation Development member countries where after reforms, they emphasised promotion based on individual performance and not depending on seniority. They further insisted on merit-based recruitment *"in which initial entry to civil service is determined by independent testing, a relevant university degree, or academic credentials"* (World Bank, 2004: 8). Having a person promoted according to good performance and people employed based on good academic credential guarantee the government to have good performance (Rafiq, 2001*). As well, "experience in the developed countries suggests that attempts to improve performance are unlikely to be successful unless incentives are created for departments and the individuals involved in managing public services*" (Clarke & Wood, 2001:79)

2.3   Theoretical perspective

In this study, I used the implementation theory (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975) to form the base of the analysis. This section discusses this theory in regards to implementation studies.

2.3.1   Implementation theory

This section discusses the factors (independent variable) that may engineer changes in the dependent variable. It is considered that, if these variables are fully met in any policy being implemented, there will be an expectation for successful implementation (i.e. the independent variable is expected to result in change to dependent in an intended way)

According to the implementation theory by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), policy usually originates from top-down; where the top (policy initiator) gives directives to the subordinates (implementers) to meet the objectives and standards of the policy. They further argue that, the success of any policy implementation depends on the following factors:

- The amount of change involved
- The extent to which there is goal consensus among participants in the implementation process.

The implementation theory (Van Meter and Van Horn (1975)) explains six variables in their model that are crucial to the implementation process in addition to the previously mentioned factors of goal consensus and amount of change. These variables (from their model) are policy standards and objectives; resources; inter-organization communication and enforcement activity; the characteristics of implementing agencies; economic, social, and political conditions and finally the disposition of implementers.

2.3.1.1   Policy standards and objectives

The policy standards and objectives in their argument elaborate the overall goals of the policy decision to provide concrete and more specific standards for assessment of what is being pursued

Under policy standards and objectives, emphasis is on the need to establish the performance indicators against which the ongoing performance will be measured. It is obvious that something cannot be judged successful or failed if no measurement criteria established. "*The performance indicator assesses the extent to which the standard policy's standards and objectives are realized*" (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 464); usually they elaborate the overall objective or goal of the policy decision under consideration. Standards and objectives are considered to be self-evidenced and easily measured in some cases, especially for those which have numerical value. Measurement of objectives which involve quality, for instance satisfaction, is considered difficult to measure. However in implementation studies, there is a need for goals and objectives to be identified and measured since "*implementation cannot succeed of fail without a goal against which to judge it to*" (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 464).

The standards and objectives against which performance can be measured is thought to be reflected in the statement of policy makers and in documents related to the program such as program regulations and guidelines which spells out the direction of policy implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975).

2.3.1.2 Policy resources

The policy resource variable explains the need for adequate funds and other incentives to facilitate the administration of implementation process.

In policy implementation studies, the provision and availability of enough resources is among the things that need to be considered well in advance before the implementation starts in order to achieve the stated objectives and standards. The availability of implementation resources assures the facilitation in the administration of standards and objectives. The resources include financial resources or other materials incentives that can stimulate, motivate, encourage or facilitate effective implementation. Although economic resources are usually scarce, the availability of sufficient resources still remains vital. For instance, one of the implementation studies made in federal governments "*suggested that the limited supply of federal incentives was a major*

contributor to the failure of local government to develop new towns" (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 465)

2.3.1.3   Inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities

The inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities stress the importance of communicating policy standards and objectives, so they are understood with sufficient clarity and consistency so that if the need arises, a superior can use enforcement mechanisms to increase the likelihood of implementation by subordinates (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975).

Under this, the discussion is on the extent to which the program standards and objectives are understood by the individual who are assigned the task of implementation. It is emphasized that the effective implementation of any program is determined by the way responsible implementers have understood the program standards and objectives.

Successful implementation is therefore expected to be achieved when the standards and objectives are clearly communicated to implementers with sufficient clarity to eradicate ambiguity. There is potential for distortion in the transmission of information from the top down or in lateral communication. Its meaning may be distorted unintentionally or sometimes intentionally. Information originating from different sources, targeting the same program, should be uniform regardless of source. Inconsistency of information and conflicts in interpretation of standards and objectives in the same program over time places the implementers in a difficult position to carry out the intention of the policy. *"Therefore, the prospects of effective implementation will be enhanced by the clarity with which the standards and objectives are stated and by the accuracy and consistency with which they are communicated"* (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; 466).

To secure achievements in the pursuit of implementation standards and objectives, institutional mechanism and procedures must be in place to allow higher authority figures to influence implementers to increase the likelihood of acting in accordance with the stated standards and objectives. It is thought that, since superiors have institutional

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mechanism powers like recruitment and selection, assigning and relocation, advancement and promotion and ultimately dismissal they can use such mechanism to influence subordinates achieve the desired standard and objectives. Additionally, superiors have financial power from budgetary allocation. Through budgetary allocation, superiors can either increase or reduce rewards to motivate field officers relative to satisfactory performance.

2.3.1.4 The characteristics of Implementing Agencies

Characteristics of implementing agencies refer to the importance of the competence and size of agency's staff involved in the implementation process: the agency's political resources (e.g. support among legislator and executives): the degree of open vertical and horizontal communication between implementers; and finally vitality of the organization.

This section describes the characteristics needed in policy implementers that as suggested in the Van Meter & Van Horn model (1975). The authors have identified specific characteristics of the administrative agencies that must be in possession in order to affect their policy performance successfully. The characteristics include:

- *"The competence and size of any agency's staff*
- *The degree of hierarchical control of subunit decisions and processes within the implementing agencies*
- *An agency's political resources (e.g. support among legislators and executives)*
- *The vitality of an organization*
- *The degree of open communication (i.e. networks of communication with free horizontal and vertical communication, and a relatively high degree of freedom in communications with persons outside the organization) within an organization*
- *The agency's formal and informal linkages with the policymaking or policy enforcing body"* (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 471)

2.3.1.5 Economic, social, and political conditions

Economic, social and political condition variables emphasize the importance of sufficient economic resource to be accessible to implementers for successful implementation. They also emphasize the need to know the nature of public opinion and whether elites favour or oppose the implementation of the policy as well as the extent to which private interest groups are mobilised to support the policy.

Under this heading is the lesson drawn from experience that, there was the global focus and attention to the impact of economic, social, and political conditions on public policies. There was the global impetus in identifying the influence of these environmental variables on policy output.

Van Meter & Van Horn (1975) suggest the need to ask questions regarding the economic, social, and political environment that affects the jurisdiction or the organization within which implementation takes place. These questions are:

- *"Are the economic resources available within the implementing jurisdiction (or organization) sufficient to support successful implementation?*
- *To what extent (and how) will prevailing economic and social conditions be affected by the implementation of the policy in question?*
- *What is the nature of public opinion; how salient is the related policy issue?*
- *Do elites favor or oppose implementation of the policy?*
- *What is the partisan character of the implementing jurisdiction (or organization); is there partisan opposition or support of the policy?*
- *To what extent are private interest groups mobilized in support or opposition to the policy?"* (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975: 472)

2.3.1.6 The disposition of implementers

The disposition of implementers variable stresses the cognition (comprehension, understanding) of policy objectives and standards by implementers and their direction (i.e. accept, neutral, reject). According to (Hill and Hupe, 2002:46), *"implementers may*

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fails to execute policies faithfully because they reject the goals contained in them, and will struggle to achieve standards and objectives of accepted policy"

This section intends to discuss the importance of implementers' perception with regard to the policy they are to put in action. For successful implementation, three elements that are necessary for appropriate disposition are:

> -*"their cognition (comprehension, understanding) of the policy;*
> -*the direction of their response toward it (acceptance, neutrality, or rejection), and*
> -*the intensity of implementers response"* (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975:472)

The above elements can affect the ability and willingness of the implementers for carrying out the policy. Van Meter & Van Horn (1975), further explain that, the implementers understanding of the general intent as well as the specific standards and objectives of the policy is important to remove ambiguity and frustration from implementing officials. The implementer's awareness of standards and objectives should make them more compliant to the set target.

The implementer's disposition toward the standards and objectives is crucial "*because sometimes the implementers fail to execute policies faithfully because they reject the goals contained in them. Conversely, widespread acceptance of the policy standards and objectives, on the other part of those responsible for administering it, will enhance greatly the potential for successful execution. There is also a belief that, shared attitude will make implementation easier"* (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 473).

Rejection of policy implementation as explained by Van Meter & Van Horn (1975), is usually caused by the perception of implementers that the policy goals "*offend implementer's personal value system, extra organizational loyalties, sense of self-interest, or existing and preferred relationships"* (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 473). In summarizing this, Van Meter & Van Horn (1975: 473) point out that rejection *"arises*

from the fact that human groups find it difficult to carry out effectively acts for which they have no underlying beliefs".

It was also thought that the intensity of the implementer's disposition may affect the performance of the policy. According to Van Meter & Van Horn (1975: 473), "*those holding intense negative preference may be led to outright and open defiance of the programs objectives".*

2.4   Research methodology

In this study, I used qualitative methods in an attempt to describe and analyse the implementation process of civil service reform in Tanzania. Creswell (2003) point out that qualitative researchers are concerned primarily with (1) process (2) meaning-how people make sense of their lives and experience (3) the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis (4) it involves field work (5) it is descriptive in that the researcher is interested in process, (6) qualitative research is inductive (Creswell, 2003). In conducting my research, I went to Tanzania for data collection and this enabled me to personally experience, the place and individuals (Creswell; 2003). By using a qualitative approach, researchers benefit from the emergent character of the qualitative approach. This enabled me to change and refine the research questions as I learned what to ask and to whom. *The data collection process changed as doors open and closed for data collection"* (Creswell, 2003: 181).

I decided to use case design strategy (one of the qualitative approach strategies) in conducting this study because I was interested in knowing _why_ civil service reforms have been selected and practised as the best way or means to resuscitate the performance of the government activities by embarking in civil service reforms as well as to know _how_ the implementation process of this program in Tanzania had gone so far. I also needed to explore the extent of the _result_ of this process (Yin, 2003). The use of a case study design provided me an opportunity to relate facts and concepts, reality and hypothesis (Wieviorka, 1992: 160).

Civil service reform is a contemporary phenomenon. *"A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates contemporary phenomena within its real life context";* (Yin: 2003: 13) Therefore, the case design strategy was chosen for the present research. According to Creswell, the use of a case study can enable the researcher to explore a program in depth regardless of a shortage of time for conducting the research. *"The case(s) are bounded by time and activity, and the researcher will collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time"* (Creswell, 2003; 15).

In conducting the present case study, I used numerous sources of both primary and secondary data. The use of various sources of primary and secondary data enabled me to overcome the weaknesses that are inherent in using one source. The weakness of one source of evidence was compensated from the other sources (Yin, 2003). Additionally, by using various sources of evidence (i.e. data triangulation) to measure the same phenomenon (i.e. the implementation of CSR in Tanzania) enabled me to overcome the potential problems of construct validity. Case studies that use multiple source of evidence in data collection is usually rated highly in terms of overall quality compared to those relied on single source of evidence (Yin, 2003).

2.5 Sources of data

This section gives an account of the various sources used to collect evidence that gave answers to the pre-set guiding questionnaires in relation to the implemented civil service reform in Tanzania. Techniques used in collection of information included written documents and interviews.

2.5.1 Written documents

Various documents were used in collecting the information needed. In this regard, the relevant information from published documents, historical documents, annual government reports, quarterly government reports, periodicals, and the internet was used as means of gathering the required data. By making the field visit to the case study site, I obtained access to documentary evidence related to CSR. These documents were kept in

the library of the Civil Service Department where I spent most of the time going through the following

- The implementation status report 1993-1999 and other annual and quarterly reports prepared by the government
- Civil Service Reform in Tanzania National Symposium proceedings that contained various presented articles
- Administrative documents-proposals, progress reports, and other internal records
- Newspaper clippings and other articles appearing in the mass media or in community newsletters

My presence at the field site afforded me the opportunity to go through various documents prepared by people who played important role in the civil service reform committee at different capacities as chairman, member of reform team, or reform technical advisors.

Apart from the above-mentioned government documents, I also used other documents prepared by outside observers like local academicians occupied with matters of public administration, public officials outside the civil service reform team, independent consultancy reports and as well documents prepared by donors of the program like World Bank and IMF. The use of these written documents by people outside the civil service department/government was of great importance as their information may have included those concealed in the government reports. As Kjaer (2001: 64) points out, "*it would be inadequate to solely rely on government publications, since government officials would arguably have an interest in making CSR appear successful*".

The written documents described the reasons for adopting the reforms, participants, history for the need of reforms, and target to be achieved. The use of annual reports informed me about the implementation of the program, its successes and failures.

2.5.2   Interviews

Interviews were among the techniques used to collect the required information. However due to the shortage of time allocated to conduct this research, and a delay in getting access to the field site, I only interviewed a few respondents from the human resource office, planning, and one of the members in reform secretariat. Fortunately the information collected through written documents provides the strength of this research since it contained the information presented by those intended to be included in the interviews but not reached. As such, they were exhaustive as they included the information required by the pre-set questionnaires (see the interview guide in appendix II).

Relying on information I collected through interview as mentioned above and written documents this research gathered concrete relevant information for the present research.

For the analysis process, I employed a pattern-matching strategy to analyze the evidence collected in the field from various sources mentioned above. This type of data analysis will enabled me to explain the phenomenon and to stipulate a set of causal links of the issue under research (Yin, 2003).

2.5   Limitations of the study

In doing this research, I faced obstacles in my efforts to collect the data that answered the interview guide questionnaires (see appendix II). I encountered problems such as time limitation, lack of access to the organization, and a lack of cooperation from the expected respondents.

Time limitations. In collecting this research data, I had only two months that were allocated for data collection. This period became too short to collect information as some expected respondents traveled outside the country and did not return during before I left the site to return to Norway. As a result, I was unable to interview them. Time was the main obstacle in making appointments to meet senior officers who had knowledge about the reforms. Most of the time I was in the field officials who could have contributed

relevant information through interviews were busy doing other duties outside the office and sometimes attending a Parliamentary session that was taking place at that time.

Access to the organization. Although I submitted my application for access to the organization, I was to collect my data shortly after arriving Tanzania I faced the problem of getting access immediately because the Director of Administration was attending the Parliamentary session and therefore was out of office. Although somebody was acting on his behalf, he was unable to give me access. Therefore, I was only granted access after three weeks considerably reducing my period of data collection from eight weeks to almost five.

Cooperation from expected respondents. During the data collection, I faced the problem of meeting respondents who were not ready to give me information when I intended to interview them. Their argument was that, all the information was available from the administration office that has power to release the information. The person who was acting on behalf of the Director of Administration was among the ones who had information but left the country before I was able to access it. Another limitation I faced was lacks of availability of top officials because of general elections were to be held at the end of October 2005. Due to the difficulty faced meeting and interviewing some respondents, the researcher relied mostly on the documentary evidence like reports, journals, cuttings of newspapers, and those few respondents who were interviewed to obtain data for the present study. Fortunately the information collected from written documents as mentioned above was sufficient for the reason that, it included the views of those top officials whom I aimed to interview. Such documents included the views that were made through various presentations, interviews by journalists, and other previous researchers who got an opportunity to meet them physically.

This chapter started by reviewing the literature that discussed implementation of civil/public service reform in various countries. These literatures were consulted to gain a general overview of reforms being implemented globally. It further discussed theoretical aspects (implementation theory) used in the analysis of this study. The remaining part of

this chapter dealt with the discussion of methodological aspects. Various methods used in data collection were discussed and limitations were highlighted.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0   Reforms in Tanzania context

3.1   Introduction

This chapter presents a brief description of the civil service composition of Tanzania and discusses the reform history in the Tanzanian Civil Service. It gives an account of the various measures taken in the country to bring changes expected to improve efficiency of the civil service. The chapter also discusses the reasons that led to the respective reforms.

3.2   The Tanzanian Civil Service

The Tanzanian Civil Service/Public Service includes all full-time, non-military personnel working in the Government (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005a). As documented in the NORAD report, "*the overall structure of the civil service comprise ministries and independent departments, national institutions financed by Government grants channeled through their parent ministries, parastatal organizations, regional administration and local government in the form of urban and district councils*" (NORAD, 1995: 5)**.** However, *"the concept of civil service as used in the civil service reform program encompasses employees in ministries, independent departments, regional administration and local government. Employees of National Institutions are not included although they are funded by the government"* (NORAD, 1995: 7). Various functions/services provided by civil servants can best be categorized according to the body (i.e. ministry, department, regional administration, or local government) within which they are employed. According to 1993 statistics (the time of CSRP implementation) there were 20 Ministries charged with responsibilities in the fields of order, defense, foreign affairs, agriculture, industry and trade, social services and human resources, information and infrastructure. The 11 independent departments were charged with specific tasks e.g. the Exchequer and Audit Department, the Civil Service Commission, Local Government Service Commission and Teachers Service Commission. The 20 regions are trusted with regional administration and are responsible for development planning, primary and adult education, curative and preventive health services, urban and rural water supply,

surveying and mapping, forest management, commerce and industry promotion services, co-operative development, community development and town planning. A number of ministries also have offices decentralized at the local level. The prime minister's office is responsible for regional administration and local government. The ministry of finance is responsible for revenue and expenditure management except for the development budget which is under the planning commission. Together the Prime Minister's office, the Ministry of Finance, the Planning Commission and the Civil Service Department have the overall planning, coordination and monitoring function of the government (NORAD, 1995)

Figure 3.1 is the break down (in percentage) of civil/public service employment as of 1992/93 statistics.

Figure 3.1 Employments in Civil Service 1992/93

Employment in Civil Service 1992/93

Ministries, Departments, 34.80%

Regions, 8.60%

Local governments, 56.60%

Below (table 3.1) are job classification/service the civil service offers and their size (as of 1992/93).

Table 3.1 Size of the Civil Service

	1988/89	1992/1993	1993/94	1994/95
Ministries and indep. departments		123,405	123,845	129,098
Regional administration		30,529	27,435	25,608
SUB TOTAL		153,934	151,280	154,706
Local government		200,678		174,349
TOTAL CIVIL SERVICE	299,138	354,612	N.A	329,055

Source: CSD

Basing on 1993 statistics, Tanzania had a population of 27,791,600 (CIA, 1993) meaning that the Civil Service provided employment to approximately 1.3% of the total population. On aspect of gender, the civil service has been considered the largest employer of women given that 32% of all civil service employees were women. Most of those women (i.e. 81%) were found in the lower salaries scales (i.e. GS. 2 and below) (NORAD, 1995). The reason behind low salaries for women was due to lower formal qualifications and that they were disadvantaged when competing for promotion (NORAD, 1995).

The table below provides the functional distribution and growth trend of civil service as documented in some years.

Table 3.2 Number of employees in different sections

Sector	FY 71	FY 75	FY 81	FY 85	FY 88	FY 92	FY 93
Education	11145	23131	32735	93318	95551	101042	126410
Health	6300	12400	13000	17036	30193	32650	37705
Others	72300	103072	102488	104745	135062	165446	190497
Total	89745	138603	148223	215099	260806	299138	354612

Source: CSD

3.3 Background of reform in Tanzania

Reform is an intentional need to institute changes that bring better conditions relative to the existing situation. Various Civil Service Reforms adopted in Tanzania were instituted for the purpose of bringing change to the Civil Service to make it better in delivering goods and services to the public.

Usually the need for reform arises when part of the system or the whole of the system fails to function to expected standards and therefore call for modification or even an overhaul of the whole system. Since the parts which make up the system are usually interconnected and interdependent, the failure of one part to meet the required standard directly affects the functioning of the other interdependent part and ultimately the whole system (Ntukamanzina, 1998). Since 1961, the Tanzanian Public Service (or Civil Service) underwent numerous reforms at different times in the country's post-independence history.

Early post-independence public service reform efforts occurred in three different eras. The first reform era, between 1962 and 1970, was driven by the realities of independence and sovereignty. There was a need to replace the previously extractive function of the colonial state with economic and social development functions of the independent state to face up to the raised expectations of the people. These new and expanded functions called for an entirely new cadre of public service personnel with the requisite education and skills and in adequate numbers (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005b).

The second reform era was the decentralization that took place from 1972 to 1984. This was followed by the third reform era or the structural adjustment (categorized into first and second generation reform) that began in 1987 and lasted for roughly a decade. Both of these latter era reforms were required in the public service in order for it to respond to the corresponding new social-economic and political environment (ibid).

The outcome of the earliest era reforms was the assemblage of a functional public service which partly due to its own rapid expansion, and partly due to high expectation of

Tanzanians for social-economic development and the prevailing governance philosophy – where all progress were thought to emanate from government, comes to a crisis at the beginning of early 1980s. Following the crisis in those early reform efforts, the need for reform was then followed by the current more far reaching public service reform program, which in itself is divided into two major parts namely first generation reform and second generation reform (ibid).

The Tanzanian public services experienced rapid expansion during the first two decades following independence until the growth was checked by economic crisis resulting from the mismatch of resources and pay, and the informal compensation systems that arose in the wake of sharp fall in real pay, brought many of public services to dysfunction. The legacy of that collapse provided the backdrop for the present public service reforms. The first generation reform (under third era) known as a structural adjustment program was then adopted. This program emphasized the wage bill containment. This reform was termed as first generation reform program (ibid).

The third era reform (i.e. first generation) was thought to be successful in what it set out to achieve but then there was a need for something to restore a well performing government. It was therefore followed by the second generation reform program (i.e. civil service reform-CSRP) which continued to stress on pay reform, but also put emphasis on restructuring the government and linking to other control system of the government. The second generation reforms (i.e. CSR 1991-2000 & PSRP 2000+) featured specific performance improvement schemes, drawing in various methods of the New Public Management reform experience in OECD countries. The current reform program (CSRP) is an example of this approach.

Figure 3.2 Time series of civil/public service reform in Tanzania, 1962-2000+

First Era 1962-1970	Second Era 1972-1984	Third Era 1987-2000+
Structural Africanization/ Localisation	Decentralisation	Adjustment Programme (SAP)

First generation 1987-1990

Second generation 1991-2000+

CSR- Phase I 1991-2000

CSR- Phase II 2000+ named-PSRP

3.4 First era reform

Following the country's independence in 1961, Tanzania had very few indigenous graduates to place in civil service positions. For that reason, expatriates dominated senior positions and especially local Asians occupied many middle level technical position. Very few Africans had made it to the officer level in the civil service prior to independence. Identifying that, first era reforms therefore focused on public service policies that put an emphasis on localization (or Africanization). Most of the government and donors' efforts was aimed at building indigenous capacity through the creation of public service training institutions, the training of key staff overseas, and the establishment of local universities. At the same time, the rigid class structure of the colonial public service was abolished and cadres were introduced to provide a career structure for staff advancement and training. Pay scales were adjusted to remove colonial anomalies. A Public Service Ministry was created to implement training and localization policies. This was first era reform (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005b).

During the first and the second decade of independence, graduates entering the public service were well paid and assured of a car loan and accesses to government housing.

Unskilled workers were paid better than a subsistence wage. While the pay scales earned by first era of civil servants were considered to be influenced by living standards of the departed colonial administrators, there was no doubt that the pay structures in place then were sufficient to recruit, retain and motivate the best brains in the country for public service. In the first era reform, the government recognized the importance of pay and made an effort to make it proportional to what was happening elsewhere in other economies. These reforms were also concerned with equity and efficiency. The aim of the government at that time was to integrate pay scales across the public sector so that they could be a guide to the private sector that could facilitate interchange of staff between central government and private sector.

From the discussion in the above paragraphs, in the past 40 years following the country's independence, Tanzania has experienced a chain of reforms aimed at bringing better conditions. Some of those reforms were initiated by foreign donors and others by the government of Tanzania itself. Mostly, these reforms resulted from economic crisis that the country faced in the first half of the 1970s hence the need for reducing government expenditure by reducing public services and staff retrenchment in 1976 and 1985. Due to the deterioration in the real value of salaries in those years, civil servants had to find supplementary income outside of work. That condition made them to use more of the working time to secure income elsewhere.

3.5   Previous reforms reports

Although civil service reform (CSR) was officially launched in 1991 and its practical implementation started in 1993, there were other reforms that the country tried to implement for the same purpose of improving the efficiency of civil service in the provision of goods and services. The drive toward the civil service reform of 1991-2000 was in response to the public expenditure crisis which was revealed in 1989 World Bank report. However, before Civil Service Reform of 1991, Tanzania underwent various reforms which were thought to be the evolutionary stage to the civil service reform. Those reforms as noted by Mtafitikolo (1998) were

- *"The Adu Commission in 1961: this resulted in quick Africanization of the service immediately after the independence of mainland Tanzania (until at least the early 70s).* (First era reform)

- *The Mamuya report and McKinsey Report: early 1970s. These resulted in the decentralization processes of the mid 1970s, under the auspices of Act # 27 of 1972 known as the Decentralization of Government Administration (interim Provision) Act.* (Second era reform)

- *The Kisumo Report (1983) on Government restructuring to reduce costs and improve efficiency. Major recommendations, some implemented, proposed downsizing government, merging some ministries, reducing embassies and enhancement of self help schemes in social service provision.* (Third era reform)

- *The Nsekela (salaries Review) commission: 1985-87: this introduced new nomenclature in grading and classifying civil servants as well as proposing new salary/compensations scales. The nomenclature and many of proposals were adopted for use until the mid 1990s when active policies on Pay Reform began to take place"* (Mtatifikolo, 1998: 63). (Third era reform)

The Civil Service Reform (i.e. second generation reform) in Tanzania (i.e. 1991-2000) came after the implementation of structural adjustment program that were being adopted in various countries. The Structural Adjustment Program adopted in Tanzania at that time contained programs for the rationalization of the public enterprises, through closure and privatization. However, in the implementation of Structural Adjustment Program, the government and the donors came to realize that they would have to incorporate a governance component. To fill that gap the country and the donor (World Bank) initiated the Civil Service Reform Program in early 1990s.

3.6 Objectives of civil service reform (1991-2000)

The Civil Service Reform in Tanzania which was launched in 1991 and started operation in 1993, with the support of UNDP *"aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness of government activities. The Civil Service Reform consisted of UNDP assistance focusing on capacity building, the World Bank funds for retrenchment and redeployment, pay*

reform and organization and efficiency reviews, and technical assistance from ODA for
personnel control and management audit. All these reforms were integrated into an
action plan for Civil Service reform in May 1994" (NORAD, 1995: 13)

Before the implementation started the government came up with formulated objective of
Civil Service Reform to be achieved. These objectives were grouped into two different
levels: overall goals (development objectives) and more specific short term results
(immediate objectives).

3.6.1 Development objectives

The development objectives to be achieved were stated by the government as:

> *"A smaller, affordable, well compensated, efficient and effectively*
> *performing civil service working to implement redefined policies and*
> *strategies for national economic development and delivery of public*
> *services"* (NORAD,1995: 13)

In order to achieve the objective of this Civil Service Reform program the government
made efforts toward reorganization, increasing the skills of government staff and
developing a management culture.

3.6.2 Immediate objectives

The immediate objectives to be achieved as mentioned in the Consultative Group paper
corresponds to six functional components. These immediate objectives are:

- *"Redefinition of the role of the Government and organizational and efficiency*
  review of all Ministries with a view to reorganize the Ministries according to new
  roles and functions

- *Payments increased (pay reform) based on performance and function by*
  monetization of allowances, revised salaries compensation rates, and revised
  income tax policy.

- *Improved personnel control, information and registration systems for the civil service to be implemented including the improvement of appointment and confirmation procedures, job descriptions and diversified employment conditions.*

- *Enhanced skill levels and capacity of work in the civil service, including specialized management training for women, and the strengthening of the government training institution.*

- *Implementation of the government decision to retrench 50,000 civil servants while maintaining human face i.e. ensuring a minimum of concern for the individual retrenches' welfare and supporting redeployment in other areas.*

- *Strengthened capacity and functions at local government level to meet the needs of the decentralization process"* (NORAD, 1995: 14).

3.6.2.1 Organization and efficiency review

Organization and efficiency review was planned for each ministry as a means of evaluating the means and modalities of the organization of each ministry and department, given its redefined roles and functions in the reformed public sector.

- Also under organization and review was the recommendation on how the recruitment should be handled in order to hire with competent employee to enhance the efficiency in public service delivery. It was suggested that presidential appointment be reduced drastically to include the appointment of principal secretaries only. The rest of appointments should be left to be carried on by the new public service commission which should be constitutionally protected in contrast to the present civil service commission. The existing civil service commission at that time couldn't perform its function properly. In instead, *"a merit based recruitment and transparent promotion practice was highly recommended" (*NORAD, 1995: 15).

3.6.2.2 Pay reform

Under the pay reform the government was to improve wages in order to improve minimum living cost of many employees. Following the poor economic performance of the country in 1970s and 1980s the real pay level of employees' salaries was eroded to the extent that the value of 1990 salary was equated to 25% of the salary level of 1972. The government finds itself paying the salaries that cannot meet the living cost of many employees. Still the paying system at that time suffered from the lack of transparency and equity especially to lower echelon that needed additional income due to low salaries they were paid.

To get rid of that, *"the government introduced the pay reform component aiming at consolidating the allowances into basic salaries, enhancement of basic salary levels, and developing appropriate remuneration system as a response to the two fundamental problems in the existing system"* (NORAD, 1995: 18)

3.6.2.3 Personnel management and control (recruitment)

The Tanzanian government faced human resource problems in all of its ministries and departments. The government's size was too large for its economic position and inefficient due to uncontrolled growth in public sector employment, insufficient application of employment rules and regulation and higher level appointments which ignored the rules and guidelines that govern employment in the civil service. It was also characterized by poor record keeping of employees particulars including those concerning with payments.

The government faced many problems as a result of low level competence in its civil servants. The government had insufficient technical resources and staff without the technical skills essential for detailed reporting and analysis. Through reforms, the government aimed at concrete measures to attain better information including the establishment of more effective personnel information system. In line with the

establishment of information systems the government aimed to initiate other *"short-term activities related to upgrading the professional qualifications of the civil servants, as it has been established among other things that over 50% of civil servants only have primary school qualifications"* (NORAD, 1995: 20). *"The specific activities designed and planned to meet these challenges included a review and improvement of recruitment policy as the whole which would comprise the formulation of minimum standards for entry into the civil service. In addition, job description for all employee and staff performance assessments based on agreed standards was planned to start by 1994/95"* (ibid)

3.6.2.4 Capacity building

The capacity building considered in the reform program mostly included provisions for training individuals who were to implement the reform and those employed to execute various government activities to equip them with skills and techniques necessary for their assignments (Teskey & Hooper, 1999). Following the 1998 civil servant census, it was identified that 44% of civil servants were assigned duties for which they had inadequate skills. The Civil Service Action Plan emphasized the importance and need for training as the core of capacity building. Under the CSRP long term plans regarding the improvement of staff, training was among things to be developed. The need for building training organization was a priority as well as the reviewing of existing training Institutions.

Along with the need for building the capacity of employees through training, gender sensitivity was also a priority. As the stating point, a special study of women in management in the civil service was carried out in 1992. Since the Civil Service Department is the one responsible for all civil servants it was the main recipient of technical assistance related to capacity building from different donors and made allocations to various ministries and departments according to needs identified by the government.

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Although it was not clearly stated what the term capacity building meant in Civil Service Reform Program, it appeared the term was equated to training with a small provision for re-tooling office equipment, computers etc. Training at the beginning was concentrated on a few key groups responsible in implementation of the reform program. This technical group was known as Technical Task Group (TTG). The training they attended covered aspects of the reform process such as reorganization and restructuring (e.g. planning and budgeting using performance targets) (Teskey & Hooper, 1999).

3.6.2.5 Retrenchment

Retrenchment was among the most Civil Service Reform components. However as documented, retrenchment in Tanzania government was initiated before the introduction of Civil Service Reform Program of 1991 and efforts were already made to freeze recruitment prior to the program.

According to the World Bank directives in relation to the Civil Service Reform Program, retrenchment was an inevitable step to be taken because the more persons employed in the public service the more difficult would be to create balance in budget. Retrenchment was therefore the main condition for getting World Bank credit. For World Bank consideration, retrenchment will release funds for pay reform. It was considered that, after retrenchment, the government will be in position to rationalize the pay structure to improve motivation and performance. As well, the monetizations of in-kind benefits were to be established.

The retrenchment process was planned to remove 50,000 employees from the public sector employment following the functional review and manning level analysis which were completed in 1991/92. Retrenchment focused on poor performers, volunteers from central and local government, ghost workers and retrenchment of surplus employees identified by local government manning level (NORAD, 1995)

3.6.2.6 Local government

During the period of Civil Service Reform implementation, the focus of the government was on restructuring of the overall machinery of the government, regaining control over the payroll and the size of the establishment, recapturing the control of costs and retrenching surplus staff.

Due to the limited positive results on the quality of services delivery in the period of implementation, the program was re-launched in 2000 as the Public Service Reform Program (PSRP), with the stated objective "*to enable the public service to deliver efficiently and effectively the government's economic and social programs on a continuous and sustainable basis*" (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002:1). The PSRP is considerably broader in scope than CSRP, and represents a substantial increase in reform efforts. The CSRP was implemented from 1993 to 1999. In June 2000, the Civil Service Department (CSD) commenced the implementation of the new phase of the Public Service Reform Program (PSRP) (ibid).

With the recognition of the problems in the Civil Service, the Tanzanian government with the support of UNDP conducted studies to determine the optimal size of the Civil Service needed (NORAD, 1995: vii)

This chapter discussed the history of reforms implemented in Tanzania. It began by defining the composition of civil/public service to give the reader an overview picture of civil service which the reforms were created to address. It further discussed the various reform efforts attempted/implemented (since independence to 2000). The following chapter (chapter four) is the presentation of data on the dependent variables (the ones selected for the purpose of this research) contained in the civil service reform implemented in between 1991-1999. Such reform is the main discussion of this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0   Presentation of empirical data of dependent variables

4.1   Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present empirical data on the dependent variables collected during field work from the President's Office Civil-Service Department. The data presented in this chapter, and empirical independent data presented in Chapter Five (Part One) aim to prepare the environment for analysis of selected aspects (i.e. in chapter Five-Part Two) that were strategic components encompassed in the Civil Service Reform and thought to be the engine for the civil service performance or efficient and effective civil service. These strategic components are retrenchment, remuneration, recruitment, government expenditure, and capacity building. In this regards, each component (i.e. in Chapter Five-Part Two) is analyzed according to the status of its implementation against the expected objectives.

4.2   Program Objective

The fundamental Government objective in launching Civil Service Reform Program i.e. Phase I of second generation in third era (refer figure 3.2) was to attain efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public goods and services. In order to achieve the above fundamental objective the government decided:

- *"To reduce and control the size of public sector employees in order to remain with the small size with required merit and who can be competitively compensated.*

- *To enhance public service employee pay at the levels that meets the minimum household living requirements*

- *To improve the quality, capacity, productivity and performance of civil servants through strengthening the systems and procedures for personnel recruitment, deployment, grading and promotion, training and discipline*

- *To reduce government expenditure in the re-current budget and improve savings after Retrenchment"* (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c:5).

4.3   Program implementation

4.3.1   Retrenchment

Retrenchment was considered to be the first Civil Service Reform strategy to be implemented. According to guiding Principles on Civil Service Reform, Retrenchment could contribute directly to macroeconomic stability through reduction of size and cost of Civil Service to an affordable and sustainable level.

The implementation of CSR by retrenchment was considered the most important strategy of the reforms to create a small sized government structure. It was expected that, retrenchment should release funds to improve salaries and make the small government affordable. Dealing with overstaffing of government employees relative to the government GDP (i.e. basing on government sources of income), retrenchment was considered the foremost strategy to start with in reform components as big sized government was thought the source of government vicious circle and poor performance.

> *"The persistence of low civil service pay is due to a large number of employees compared to the current levels of budgetary resources available for wages and salaries"(*Kiragu, 1998: 135)

According to the suggestion by the World Bank, the large number of the public sector employees was the major obstacle to creating a balance in the Tanzania budget. Following the functional review and the manning level analysis conducted, the first Phase of retrenchment was to remove 50,000 civil service employees from government employment. Retrenchment was to include those poor performers, ghost workers and volunteers redundant through encouraged early retirement. The retrenchment process started in 1993 and included the reduction of the 2,212 poor performers (i.e. those spotted by heads of departments as having low attendance in job with no specific reasons and prolonged sickness) by January 1994. It also included retrenching the employees who voluntarily agreed to be retrenched and as well, the removal of those employees considered ghost workers[3] in the government payroll. It also included those who were recently employed. By fall of 1994 a total of 47,000 civil servants were retrenched from public service employment. However, the criteria of retrenching recently employed civil

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[3] Ghost Workers defined in pp 1

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servants (i.e. basing on principal of last in first out) brought the adverse effect to the government need of creating well qualified workforce as most of recently employed were qualified professionals. Noticing that, the government recruited again later.

Table 4.1 Extent of Retrenchment 1993-1999

Date	Number of retrenchees		Total number of retrenchment	Total cost of retrenchment in TShs.	Saving in salaries in TShs.	Source of retrenchment fund
	Bona fide	Ghost				
1993-1995	32,400	14,600	47,000	16,187,891,828 (16,187,891.83 USD)	4,116,225,179	URT
1996-1999	29,720	5,600	35,320			Donors
Total	62,120	20,200	82,320			

Source CSRP (Vision, Strategy and Action Plan 1996-1999)

The result of the whole retrenchment process was the reduction of the civil service work force from 355,000 in 1993 to 270,000 in 1997. The employment in the civil service was successfully reduced by approximately 50,000 employees or 18.5% of the total and by the end of the reform program in 1999, a total of 80,000 government employees were removed from the government payroll, comprising 60,000 bona fide redundancies[4] and about 20,000 ghost workers who were deleted from the payroll (Ntukamanzina, 1998).

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[4] A "bona fide redundancy" occurs when a person's position is no longer required. It involves both voluntary and compulsory redundancy. The main feature of a bona fide redundancy is that the company no longer requires you to perform the task you used to perform, and your position will not be filled by someone else.

Table 4.2 Total government employment, 1971-1997(selected years)

Sector	FY 71	FY75	FY 81	FY 85	FY 88	FY 93	FY 94	FY 96	Dec 97
Total	138,603	148,223	215,099	260,806	299,138	354,612	315,963	285,624	270,629

Source: CSD

Rightsizing also involved the rationalization of the organization and senior management structure of ministries. The number of ministerial divisions has been reduced by 25% (Ntukamanzina, 1998).

4.3.2   Remunerations

On implementation of reform program (i.e. recruitment), the government intended to improve the salaries for civil servant to make the minimum civil servant earner be in a position to meet his/her basic requirements and minimize the gap between government employees and the private sectors employee who were highly paid. This difference in salaries between the public and private sector salaries made most qualified government employees leave the public sector employment for the private sector where they were better paid. The remuneration of civil servants was discouraging qualified people to join the government sector employment and also were discouraging qualified employed professionals to remain in government employment once he/she get private sector option. Below is comparison of the remunerating professionals having the same qualification saving in different sectors (i.e. public vs. private sector)

Table 4.3 Sector comparison of Gross Remuneration (Tshs/Months) 1996

Organization	Civil Service	Private
Chief executive	444,085	1,136,225
Head of department	272,878	680,534
Internal Auditor	97,650	555,564
Doctor	168,353	404,400
Ps to Chief Executive	51,635	299,487
Engineer	115,875	902,940
Legal Officer	85,705	646,080
Accountant	97,455	316,905
Economist	77,965	684,680
Personnel Officer	77,965	496,420
Purchasing/Supplies Officer	102,055	316,500
Assistant Engineer	69,000	656,320
Research Personnel	77,965	-
Teachers	108,105	109,365
Technician	69,000	195,856
Nurse	51,010	163,329
Computer Analyst	115,875	424,296
Secretary	51,010	176,950
Registry Assistant	51,010	147,000
Driver	43,500	86,475
Watchman	43,000	74,354

Source: Coopers and Lybrand/GoT Civil Service Reform Program, Sector

Comparative Compensation Survey, November 1996

Real wages in the civil service and for the entire government employment sector were drastically eroded. This was caused, to a large measure, by a general decline in economic performance of the country which led to a decline in the generated government revenue (Rugumyamheto, 1998).

"The poor economic performance of Tanzania in the 1970s and 1980s eroded the salary levels. It was estimated that in 1990, the real direct wage and salary level for public employee was only 25 per cent of the level of 1972. In 1990s the government was then paying salaries that do not correspond to the minimum living costs of many employees" (NORAD, 1995:18)

Figure 4.1 Index of real average pay in the Tanzanian civil service, 1969- 2000

Index of Real Average Pay in the Tanzania Civil Service, 1969 - 2000

Source: Valentine, 2002, p. 4. Based on data provided by Civil Service Department and Valentine, 1999.

Following the pay reform, the primary aim was:

- To rationalize the civil service salary and grading structure, to make it more transparent, equitable and efficient,
- To enhance civil service pay in order to motivate and retain highly qualified staff.

The outcomes of the pay reform resulted to 75% increase in average civil service real salaries between 1992 and 1997. In nominal terms, average civil service salaries increased from Tsh.12, 000 in 1992 to 54,000 in 1997.

According to Kiragu, (1998: 161),

> *"The goal for civil service pay can only be fulfilled in the long run if, solution is found for the many serious economic constraints likely to be encountered in the short and medium term. The long term goals will be to raise the minimum basic salary (MBS) of the civil servants to the minimum living wage (MLW), and to raise the salaries and other compensation benefits of its top civil servants to the levels consistent with the feasibility to recruit and retain the best qualified candidates in civil service"*

The efficiency and effectiveness of the government employees was low as a result of low salaries that made them cut back their productivity or hours of work. The pay reform was therefore vital for the rehabilitation of government, particularly in terms of realizing improvements in capacity and delivery of public goods and services. It was thought that, delaying in releasing and achieving objectives of pay reform can be the biggest constraints since this adversely affect the morale of the civil servants in delivery of public goods and services. As quoted from motivation theory, "*a man is an economic animal who is motivated by material rewards. His effort will depend on the level of compensation: therefore, employers should pay their employees in accordance to level of effort"* (Mutahaba, 2005: 1). The same has been learnt by Kiragu (1998) who identified the existence of vicious circle in the wage and service delivery. He pointed that people who get low pay tend to perform poorly.

Although the salaries were said to increase by 75% in 1997, the amount was still very small to meet the minimum living wage. On realizing this, the government continued to look for ways to improve the public servants remuneration. In its effort to achieve this, the President's Office, Public Service Management, tried to improve public servants pay

by instituting the Medium Term Pay Policy and the Public Service Terminal Benefit Act No. 2 of 1999.

According to a message from the Minister of State, President Office, Public Service Management, the following changes have been effected in order to improve public servants remuneration from 1996/97-2004/2005.

- *"The minimum wage has been raised from Tshs. 17,000 to Tshs 60,000 per month, an increase of 242.9 per cent.*
- *Salaries have risen by an average of more than 300 per cent from Tshs. 31,200 per month to Tshs. 132,483 per month"* (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005b).

Much of the above mentioned success came after the start of second phase reform program (PSRP) in year 2000 although the move was initiated in the first phase reform program (CSR) in 1991. In real practical experience, the pay reform in the second generation reform efforts (Civil Service Reform 1991-1999) failed to achieve pay reform objectives of achieving minimum living wage due to economic constraints (i.e. financial power). It is obvious that, the pace of attaining the pay reform objectives depended on the growth of the country economy. The government financial resource was a major constraint due to budgetary constrains and inadequacy in revenue collection. However the good prospects for success in pay reform was realized under the new reform program under the name Public Service Reform Program (PSRP) that was launched in at the turn of millennium in the year 2000.

In fact, the launch of the above reform program (PSRP) on 20th June 2000 was in response to inadequacies experienced in the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) that was implemented from 1993-1999.

Table 4.4 The salary structure for civil servants before and after civil service reform (amount in Tshs per month.)

Salary Scale	1992(before reform)	1999/2000 (after reform)
TGS 1	6545	49570
TGS 3	9610	71020
TGS 4	9770	78000
TGS 6	13525	94500
TGS7	13780	104400
TGS 9	17730	133600
TGS 10	18140	151800
Special scale TGS 20 and above	30325	694250

Source: Salary Circular Number 3 of 1993 and salary Circular No.1 of 2001.

According to the World Bank survey focusing on African countries observed that,

"as government compensation falls, both in absolute terms and to relative alternative remunerative activities, civil servants adjust to the new situation"
(Kiragu, 1998, 130)

In 1996 the proposed minimum living wage (MLW) in Tanzania was estimated to be Tshs. 69,000 per month, which was 56 percent higher than the practical government minimum basic salary (MBS). Records show that, nearly 92 percent of all government employees were paid the monthly salary below Tshs. 65,000. In comparison to the neighboring countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, Tanzania civil servants were paid the lowest wage which is about 31 percent to 94 percent below the average of those countries. (Kiragu, 1998)

4.3.3 Recruitment

The objective of this reform program strategy was to make sure the employment of government employees abide to the laid down recruitment procedures and that, selection and placement of vacant position is done according to merits so that, tradition employment system which were being used is eliminated. In implementing this strategy the government **"***aimed at creating meritocracy in the Tanzanian Civil Service***"** (Rugumyamheto, 1998: 82). Previously before the implementation of civil service reform, employment in civil service was characterized by nepotism and patronage system. The traditional recruitment system resulted into *"overstaffing and low salaries which had adverse consequences including poor staff morale and decline in work effort, difficulty in recruiting and retaining technical and professional staff"* (Lienet, 1998:1).

This area of concern gave attention on the procedures and practices used in employment of Civil Service, ranging from recruitment and appointment into the Civil Service, promotion and career advancement.

According to NORAD report (1995: 10)

> *"Large number of Civil Servants has been employed without the necessary education background"*

Civil Service Reform imposed conditions for the recruitment in civil service to be competitive whereby people will be selected based on competence and ability to perform the assignment to which they are going to be recruited. The reforms therefore clearly stated the need for job openings and vacant positions to be advertised in the labor market so that those who meet the required qualifications can get opportunity to apply. Those short listed based on their evidence of qualification were interviewed and selected upon rating score done by civil service commission. All these procedures of advertising for job openings, interview and selection needed to be conducted transparently. This procedure which was expected to equip the government with competent staff was also expected to be extended to the appointments of people to fill higher position within the civil service. Although the government had the special agency (The Civil Service Commission) entrusted with the human resource of the government it was once neglected. However,

following the implementation of the Civil Service Reform, this independent and autonomous body was strengthened in its capacity and authority in order to function effectively in recruiting and selecting right applicants for civil service employment. It was expected that the government will then be equipped with people basing on technical qualification, and personal attribute. This resulted in improved employment standards and procedures. Through that, the government prepared guidelines for drawing up job description for ministries and independent departments, launched a civil service job evaluation exercise in 1997 and as well prepared the draft design of Open Performance Appraisal System (OPRAS) (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999b).

The traditional way to recruit and which made the government not to get appropriate and merit based selection was the recruitment and selection made through a central allocation of schools or Universities outputs into various job positions.

"The traditional way of promotion and appointment into the civil service employment for higher positions were made informally and personal familiarity of individuals which resulted in unsuitable people in most positions" (Rugumyamheto, 1998: 85). It reached a point where a candidate for a vacant post was identified and well known even before the job was advertised, in the end, vacancy advertisement was only done to justify legality that the procedures in employment was followed.

According to Rugumyamheto;

> "*Promotion is now made on job openings which are created out of a need for expanded services or when a position falls vacant. That means promotion of its own sake is discouraged. However, even these promotions will be based on an individual's performance and will have to be impartially administered, fairly and Transparent*" (Rugumyamheto, 1998: 86)

Although recruitment for first appointment in the government is made by the Civil Service Commission (the entrusted body), usually, after advertisement of the job vacancies, conduct interviews in collaboration with the Department/Ministry in which the vacancies are to be filled. This kind of recruitment is only for university graduates and above.

For employees who fall in the cadre of assistant (i.e. those with qualification below undergraduate) recruitment is usually done by respective ministry in collaboration with the respective department under the same ministry that need vacancies filled. However all these recruitments are done after the approval of President Office-Civil Service Department in order to control the country manning level so that the crisis of overstaffing experienced in 1980s won't re-occur.

Following the reform "*each head of a ministry or head of the government department in collaboration with the civil service commission is responsible for the recruitment, promotion, development, transfer and dismissal of all employees in his/her ministry/department*" (Rugumyamheto, 1998: 86). This has been done to give room to heads of Ministries/Department who know their subordinates better basing on day to day supervision to decide who deserves promotion when the job opening arises. Previously promotion was done by Civil service Department mainly basing on duration of tenure.

> The new "*system intends to abolish the concept of a common cadre whereby parent ministries become responsible for the career advancement of individuals who they do not supervise on a day to day basis*" (Rugumyamheto, 1998: 86).

Civil Service Reform as well created a room for secondment and clearly stated some kind of secondment to be allowed to civil servants from one employer to another to allow skill exchange of individual. According to one of the civil service magazine, civil servants can now apply for the new job in the private sector if the position provides higher salary and for that reason the civil servant can apply for secondment (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999d).

In order to equip the government with personnel with skills required and make civil service meritocracy, the government allowed recruitment of a foreigner to fill the vacant that failed to get local people while efforts to send local people to such training are done. However, according to Civil Service guidelines, the foreigner will be employed on contract basis that won't exceed three years. Employment of foreigners basing on

contract basis aim to equip government with rare professional skills and give chance to local people who may come out with such qualification to fill in later. However, the employment of the foreigner will be done after the approval of Chief Principal Secretary (ibid).

4.3.4 Government expenditure

According to documentation in Kisumo report of 1983, the government trial to restructure and reduce its size for the sake of reducing its costs and improve efficiency started years back where some of ministries were merged and some embassies reduced (Mtatifikolo, 1998).

In 1992, the government of the United Republic of Tanzania embarked on a transformation of its public service which was described to be highly overstaffed.

> *"The period spanning 1960s to mid 1980s was characterized by rapid growth in public sector employment and personnel cost. The mid-1970s to mid-1980s were characterized by rapid decline in public service pay and collapse of the systems for personnel management and control. The 1990s has been a decade of efforts to manage and control personnel costs"* (Lister & Betley, 1999: 1)

Civil Service Reform mainly focused on the size of Civil Service in terms of the number of employees. The reason was the government realization to have the size of the Civil Service which it cannot sustain and make it improve efficiency (NORAD: 1995)

In implementation of civil service reform, one of the objectives was to get government expenditure cut down. This was to be achieved after retrenchment and rightsizing processes were completed. The assumption behind this strategy implementation was that, the government would generate savings resulting in removal of some employees from the government payroll and reduction of government ministries.

*"At the beginning of the civil service reform program the government was primarily responding to a public expenditure crisis which was reveled in the 1989 report of the World Bank. Consequently, the initial thrust of the reform agenda focused mainly on cost-containment hence the retrenchment in terms of numbers and functions of the civil service" (*Ntukanzina: 1998:57)

The rapid growth in public sector personnel costs from 1960s to 1980s was reflected in increased number of employees that were underpinned by the following factors

- First, the expansion was driven by the felt need to recruit staff to support growth in basic social services, especially education and health (the benefit expected after independence)

- Second, the government undertook the role of employer of last resort for increasing number of school leavers in that period.

In its efforts to respond to wage bill control, the government was advised by World Bank to restore that condition by retrenchment. According to Ntukamanzina, *in 1994/95 the wage bill expenditures exceeded the budget by 40 percent, but in 1996/1997 the wage bill out-turn was only 2 percent over the budget* (Ntukanzina, 1998: 55)

The implementation of civil service reforms in the 1990s caused the decline of government personnel size with the intention of lowering government expenditure in wage bills. The reforms have also involved rationalization of roles, functions, structures through a redefinition of the role of government accompanied by hiving off, privatization, contracting out and decentralizing the local government, and pursuit of operational efficiencies.

Table 4.5 GDP Growth and the government wage bill, FY 1997- FY 1999/2000

Fiscal Year	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)*	4.0	4.7	4.9
Government Wages as % of GDP**	5.0	4.3	3.9
Government Wage bill in Monetary (Tshs. Millions)*	218,842.2	220,478.0	-
Memo item: GDP Deflator (%) ***	10	6.4	5.0

Source: * http://www.ic.keio.ac.jp/jjwbgsp/pdf/reports/2001/2001_5Tanzania.pdf 08.02.2006
         ** OECD/AFDB, 2002
         *** GOT/Ministry of Finance

The Government expenditure in wage bill in 1970s and 1980s was so high that the government was unable to meet its cost. As a solution, the government was advised to reduce the size of its government employees which blotted in 1980 if it needs to cut down its expenditure.

In an attempt to know real government expenditure being incurred in wages to its employees as the initial start to deal with this problem, the government conducted the National Pay Day exercise supervised by the ministry of Finance. This was done on 28th February 1994 with its primary objective of confirming the number of valid employees and detecting ghost workers registered in government payroll.

> *According to one of the respondent, on 28th February 1994 every government employee was to appear in person before the cashier bringing with him/her the employee Identity card in order to collect his/her salary.*

Through national pay day exercise, the government managed to identify 13,360 cases of ghost workers who were paid salaries from the government payroll collected by some people in a fraudulent way hence causing an increase to the government expenditure. The government employees continued to receive their salaries in cash from the cashiers of their Ministries/Departments from 1994 to 2004 when it was again changed for employee to collect their salaries through their bank accounts. However, cash payment of salaries was difficult to administer effectively. In a number of occasions the cash was in fact lost.

Furthermore, with cash payments, cases of fraud with scattered payroll increased. Cash payment of government employee salaries in the period 1994-2004 aimed to get rid of ghost workers.

The next objective following that exercise was to build the personnel database by capturing key data on employees for entry into the payroll database. However, there were doubts in creating the employee payroll database due to low capacity in computer skills and suspicion to some computer staffs that had a stake in continued existence of ghost workers to deliberately frustrate the data collection exercise (Sawe, 2001).

"Although the government was trying to cut out government expenditure through civil service reform, the special payroll audit which involved a small sample of ministries and authority in late 1996, the controller and auditor general uncovered 1,666 instances of dubious payments amounting to Tshs. 295,849,657" (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999b: 10)

Based on the audit report, the main categories involved were:
- Fuel allowance paid without proper authority: 30%
- Voucher payment of salaries: 23%
- Allowance paid beyond entitlement: 13%
- Unpaid salaries not remitted to bank: 7%
- Employees with more than one check number: 7%
- Payment to terminated employees: 6%
- Payment of salaries without budgetary provision: 5%
- Overpayment of salaries: 3%
- Salaries made to other than bona fide payees: 2%
- Incorrect manual adjustments of salaries 2%

Source: New Utumishi (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999b).

Firm wage bill freeze was the potent instrument for the control of personnel cost which the government undertook. However it was not the easily applied instrument. The

government 1996/1997 wage bill freezes illustrated the problem and difficulties with the exercise of this option.

The compensation allowances outside the salary payroll were the common feature of personnel costs in government expenditure. These allowances were paid on an ad-hoc basis and without transparency. This resulted in substantial proportions of total personnel costs and was not reflected in the budget wage bill. The government in its efforts to solve this problem consolidated 36 non-salary allowances into the basic salary in the financial year 1995/96. In addition, common practice used by the government to deal with wage cost was improving control and management of personnel cost by strengthening payroll checks and control. This practice entailed the following range of interventions:

- **Scrutiny of payroll amendments before entry on the payroll**: this practice was introduced in 1995. Before then, changes to the payroll were handled between the accountants in ministries and data entry clerks at the government computer departments:

- **Proper documentation of all payroll amendments**: this was introduced in 1995 and was an important internal control measure:

- **Decentralizing responsibility for verification and approval of payroll amendments to specific officers in MDAs**: this responsibility in 1997 was given to personnel officers and internal Audit staff. The objective included:

  o *"Making controlling (accounting) officers clearly responsible for changes in payrolls;*

  o *Easing the identification of discrepancies between payroll numbers and the monthly wage bill through returned salaries;*

  o *Enabling both controlling officers and ministry of finance staff to carry out variance analyses on the personnel expenditure budget, and take corrective action; and*

  o *Facilitating controlling officers to report objectively on all expenditures budgeted and incurred under their vote"* (Lister & Betley, 1999: 15)

- **Stabilizing effective institutional arrangements**: this entailed specifying the institutional focal points for enforcing and monitoring compliance with the laid

down policies, procedures and controls. This led to the formation of Management Information System Unit and a Payroll Control Unit at the Civil Service Department in 1995

- **Documenting the existing systems procedures and controls**: this system ensured that details of systems procedures and controls were clarified and understood for implementation by relevant staff. The documentation also facilitated training on the system. With the documentation, it was feasible to establish a mechanism to undertake the regular checks on compliance with personnel and payroll administration procedures and controls. It was for this purpose that a personnel and payroll procedures manual was prepared for the government in 1997 (Lister & Betley, 1999).

4.3.5   Capacity Building

Capacity building was among the aim of civil service reform to improve the institutional capacity through provision of training to its civil servants. It was among the government objectives to improve the skill and knowledge to its employees in order to improve their capacity in carrying out and administering the reform process, delivery of goods and services as well as interpreting various government policies. However, in the first phase of reform (CSRP) this received very little attention from the government.

According to principle secretary civil service department,

> *"The capacity building to government employees in the first phase of civil service reform received a very little attention; however we came to realize that, we can only achieve successful implementation on reform objectives through equipping employees with skills and knowledge in administering their duties"* (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001).

Following the recognition in importance of training to government employees that was lacking in the first phase of reform, the government made efforts by setting various training programs to be attended by civil servants in accordance with training needs so that the second phase of reform would not suffer from that. The deficiency noted in capacity building drove the development of training policy which provided the direction

for all capacity building initiatives in the public service, and expedite the development of leadership skills and capacity needed to manage change.

It is clear that, at commencement of the CSRP, the capacity of government employees was rather diminished, especially with regards to competent employees who could implement reforms objectives and other government activities. In the second half of 1990s, while the government was implementing far reaching reforms, there were systematic efforts to build capacity and that, workshop on management of training 26 Training officers from all ministries was conducted in February 1996. Senior civil service department officers were trained in time management and report writing facilitated by the British Council and ESAMI, and 295 ministerial staff trained in reform interventions and change management, examination of government structures, changing the roles and functions of government, performance management, issues in staffing levels, training needs analysis, performance budgeting, human resource planning and control, records management and registry procedures. The above training was targeted to middle range (professional staff) and operational staff. The government recognized the need to re-invest in its civil servants through training and education. Before in-service training of key government officers through sponsorship for post-graduate studies and executive development courses, the government employees capacity was low that resulted the injection of needed expertise through contract recruitment of personnel with critical skills for which government salary level were too low while service of that skill was required (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c).

Capacity building also involved a gender sub-component introduced in the reform program. In equipping the civil servants with gender issue in reform, 302 public servants (76 women and 216 men) from central and local government have received gender training. This positively changed attitudes towards gender in the civil service reform program (ibid)

In efforts to find a solution for dealing with capacity building, various local training institutions were consulted by the government to set various short time courses for the

purpose of improving the skills and knowledge to employees who were sent to attend training. The institutions assigned were, (a) The University of Dar-es-Salaam, (b) Eastern and Southern Management Institute (ESAMI), (c) the former Institute of Development Management (IDM) now Mzumbe University, and (d) Institute of Finance Management (IFM)

This chapter concentrated on presenting the dependent variable based on information collected during the field visit. As mentioned earlier in the methods of data collection section (in chapter two), the data presented was collected mainly from the written document and interviews. The presented data is analyzed in the following chapter (chapter five).

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 Presentation of data on independent variables and analysis

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part one gives the empirical status of independent variables that provide the base for analysis of Civil Service Reform (CSR) implemented between 1991 and 2000. Part two makes a general analysis of how the selected measures (reform components) were dealt with, the extent of success/failure and the reason for such outcome.

Part one

5.2 Empirical status of independent variables

5.2.1 Policy standard and objective

This variable emphasizes the need to set the standards and objectives that will be the target in implementation and form the basis for judgment of success or failure. In implementation of CSR, the directional slogan stated that the government intended to achieve a *"smaller, affordable, well compensated, efficient and effective performing civil service"* (Caulfield, 2004: 233). To achieve this, the government set Development and Immediate Objective it was striving to implement (that specified in 3.6.1 and 3.6.2).

In Downsizing the government at the initial stage followed the study and analysis that was in the report of Functional Review and Manning Levels of 1991/92 targeted at retrenching 50,000 employees who were considered excess in the civil service (NORAD, 1995).

In Remuneration the government target was to improve the Minimum Living Wage (MLW). The government was also to consolidate all payments. The general aim was to have a civil service that was better compensated. However, the time to fulfill the achievement, and the expected minimum living wage was never mentioned. It is obvious, the objectives and targets concerning downsizing and remuneration were concrete and specific, and thus were in line with the conditions mentioned in 2.3.1.

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5.2.2   Resources

The state of available resources in implementation of civil service reform in Tanzania was less convincing to be sufficient. It is obvious that, resources were needed to finance the reform process to achieve the set objectives such as retrenchment compensation, Training of reform managers and better pay and incentives to implementers. Notably, there was need to generate sufficient funds to pay all civil servants better as one of aims documented in civil service reform. The Tanzania civil service reform experienced the difficulty of insufficient resources. According to evidence collected from one of the report; "*successive governments had created unrealistic expectations given the prevailing budgetary constraints and inadequate revenue collection*" (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c: 15). They further explained that, "*there was imbalance in budget allocation between debt services, personnel expenditures, other charges and development expenditure and managers had insufficient flexibility and autonomy to maximize result from the available resource*" (ibid). They pointed that;

- *"Corruption reduced resources and*
- *Communities and civil society were not effectively tapped to supplement Government resources".* (ibid)

Resources intended to be used to facilitate implementation of the reform program were to come from both the donors and the local sources of the government. The areas of the reform that were financed by donors were somehow better than the areas that were financed using internally generated funds due to the low capacity of the government to tap funds from those internal sources. However, donor funds were not always reliable due to the donors tendency to halt the release of the funds when they are not satisfied with the political conditions or the way the funds were being used (Kjaer, 2001). In order to improve the internal resource collection the government in 1997 created a semi autonomous agency, Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) to collect the revenue on behalf of the government.   The Tanzania Revenue Authority Act of 1995 established the authority as a semi-autonomous agency of the Government, under the general supervision of the Minister for Finance.

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The major functions of the Authority as learned from (http://www.tanzania.go.tz/tra.html : 26, October, 2005) were to: -

- Assess, collect and account for all central government revenue
- Administer effectively and efficiently all the revenue laws of the central government
- Advise the government on all matters related to fiscal policy
- Promote voluntary tax compliance
- Improve the quality of services to the taxpayers
- Counteract fraud and other forms of tax evasion
- Produce trade statistics and publications

Before the creation of TRA the government revenue collection was done by the ministry of finance that proved to be inefficient following very low government revenue collection for the reasons mentioned above. However TRA is an agency under the ministry of finance but with full autonomy working on private sector management techniques that is usually emphasized in new public management. The collapse of finance collection that contributed to the difficulty in implementation of reform before the establishment of TRA was evidenced by the statement made by the principal secretary Civil Service Department who pointed that, while implementing the reforms, they faced many constraints and the key problem was the lack of adequate resources to carry out the reform they were undertaking (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005b).

5.2.3 Inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities

As pointed out in the theoretical part, successful implementation also depends on the way reform objectives are disseminated from top to bottom and lateral communication to all responsible in implementation. It is emphasised that all information be precise and consistent to remove ambiguity in pursuing a common goal. In relation to this, the government of Tanzania made efforts in the following ways:

- *"The use of electronic media to capture and disseminate aspects of the program;*
- *The wider distribution of regular publications (including a news letter) on the program implementation;*

- *Workshops, Seminars and conferences for the stakeholders, especially the political leaders; and*

- *Regular and timely distribution of comprehensive program progress reports to the key stakeholders (especially senior government officers and local representatives of the CSRP donors)"* (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c: 12).

5.2.4   The characteristics of implementing agencies

The characteristics of implementing agencies in relation to reforms were discouraging. No preparation of implementers was made especially in equipping implementers with techniques to undertake this program at early days of implementation. However, although they later tried to send some officials to attend some training abroad to learn what other counties did in reforming their civil service, the number was small. The evidence documented shows that, it is the principal secretary from Civil Service Department who only got the opportunity to attend and learn what other countries did and also to attend short courses abroad. He attended two weeks studies in Japan in 1996, two weeks studies course in public service reforms in New Zealand in 1997, and 10 days studies in USA in 1998 (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999b). Generally there was a need to increase the number of personnel and training programs, study tours to successful countries and technical assistance to the implementing team. While the theory insists on political resource (i.e. support among legislator and executives), the actual situation was the opposite. As noted by Kjaer (2001), political support on reform got impetus after 1995 election when a new government took office. During previous administration, political support on reform was weak. It was also noted that, middle level bureaucrats didn't support reform because the pay reform was not in their favour. With the removal of allowances (due to consolidation of income) this group lost between a quarter and a third of their basic monthly income (ibid).

The model insists on the importance of open communication. As documented on the report (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c) various means of communication were used in dissemination of reform program process to various stakeholders as mentioned earlier (those mentioned in 5.2.3)

However, although the above means of communication were identified, some stakeholders were still not well informed of the reform process. As noted by Kjaer (2001: 86) *"most regional or district officers knew only about retrenchment"*.

5.2.5 Economic, social, and political conditions

Under this variable, the Tanzanian economic condition did not favour reforms due to the fact that the country was suffering from low economic performance. The country depended mostly on aid support from donors in various aspects including financing for civil service reform. It is also noted that, the country was still dependant on aid that amounted to 14% of GDP in 1997 (Therkildsen, Ole (2000a)). The poor performance of Tanzania economy was the result of dependence on agricultural exports that yielded very little compared to industrial export of processed goods. According to Kjaer (2001), the Tanzania economy is characterized by a huge informal sector that is hard to tax or indeed to measure as part of official GDP. She further emphases that, the Tanzania economy is characterized by the stagnation of the Industrial sector since 1970s.

It was also noted that, the reform in Tanzania failed to get support from political elites compared to their neighboring country Uganda. Ole Therkildsen (2000a) observes only "fragile political support" for the reforms, and the government acknowledges that *"there have been no clear benefits of reforms to political leaders, especially because there are no short term improvements in delivery of public services as result of changes"* (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c: 15). As Kjaer (2001:184) noted, the earlier governments (the one in power before 1995 election) "*did not seem to perceive civil service reform as particularly important and the push for initiation primarily came from external actors"*.

It was also argued that, public opinion about the reform was not well documented and there was no evidence whether the reform faced the support or resistance from the public (Kjaer, 2001). The important interest group that was supposed to be involved in reform process i.e. the trade union had never been involved in the Civil service reform program, and this led to differences between the government and that organ. The difference is evidenced by minimum wage salary that the trade union usually proposes basing on cost

of living and their proposal never converges with the minimum salary the government provides.

5.2.6 The Disposition of implementers

This variable is concerned with how the implementers perceived the reform and whether intended outcome was in-conformity with existing expectations. As the theory suggested the comprehension and understanding of the policy by implementers was needed so as to provide the direction of response by implementers on whether to accept, or reject the process. In implementation of the reform program, the status of this variable showed the disparity of implementers of which one group of implementers was committed in implementation and another group not fully committed. Implementers of the group from the line ministries are the ones who were less committed due to low income that were compensated from the government payroll in comparison to those fellow implementers in Civil Service Department who were paid from the Word Bank payroll (Kjaer, 2001). Kjaer, (2001:208) identified that, *"resistance typically tended to be stronger than support seems not to have dominated the Tanzania case of civil service reform"*

According to Kjaer (2001), resistance from the line ministries that were to implement parts of reform were identified. This resistance was associated with the way reforms goals/objectives were perceived as some implementers were not well informed on what was to be done as well as what would follow next. Resistance was also seen among public employees who were still tied to the party patronage system or who for some other reason were interested in status quo (Kjaer, 2001).

Part two

5.3   General analysis

Generally, according to the civil service reform program report 1999 (i.e. implementation status report) the reform faced serious problems and challenges. The CSRP faced low political support in early stages of implementation until 1995 when the government that supported the reform came in power. The reform got little support from the political bureaucrats because it was perceived to have no clear benefits to political leaders;

especially there were no short-term improvements in delivery of public services as a result of changes (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c).

According to DPMN Bulletin, there was no hope for civil service reform being effectively introduced and sustained unless, to begin with, there was an assertion of political will by government (Wamara: xx). Low political commitment on reform process was contributed by the fact that, the reform was not internally grown therefore lacked internal ownership (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c)

The reform also faced resistance from implementers mostly from the line ministries. The reason for resistance was the way the implementers were remunerated which showed discrimination in compensation. There were two groups of implementers i.e. those who were paid by the word bank and those who were paid by the government. These differences in sources of remuneration caused the difference in commitment to reform because those implementers who were remunerated by World Bank were paid better than those remunerated by government (Kjaer, 2001). The group that enjoyed remuneration from World Bank was the chairman of civil service reform program and his staff and the group that was remunerated by the government were the principal secretary in the civil service department and staff in line ministries (ibid). It is obvious that, the differences that rose in compensation of implementers doing the same work, and who have the same qualification is one of the evidence of poor coordination in the reform process. Poor coordination was also evidenced in the perception of reform by implementers especially among those from the government that perceived the reform to be of little importance and benefit (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c) while those from World bank thought it would have made improvement in civil service performance. In addition, CSRP objectives were not known to all those expected to implement. Apart from central ministries (Civil Service Department, Ministry of Finance, as well as Planning Commission) some implementers from line ministries were said to have no knowledge of reform program. According to Kjaer (2001: 207) "*lack of knowledge within sector ministries even at permanent secretary level or among ministers was considered surprising*". Although the resistance was identified in the reform process, it also lacked enforcement mechanism to make those implementing the reform become conversant with

reform objective and ensure achievement of the goals. According to The public Sector Reform Program report (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c), Public service managers (including permanent secretaries) were not held accountable for performance. According to the implementation theory, the success of the policy depends on the proper coordination of policy objectives and goals and the need for enforcement mechanism by superiors to make subordinates comply.

According to principle secretary civil service department (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005b), the civil service reform faced some constraints. He pointed out that, the reform suffered from the slow pace of change in the mindset and behavior of both public servants and the Tanzania public towards quality public service delivery. He further argued that, the expectation was the public servants to quickly change their mindset and behavior towards work and become customer focused to deliver quality public services within agreed time (ibid). He admitted that, although changes have already started to appear, there was still a degree of delay in decision making in some areas. Doing so is denying the citizens their right to timely and quality public service (ibid). It is obvious that, lack of support to reform was due to difficulty of political leaders, executives in ministries to adjust by changing inbuilt traditional values which to them was considered and accepted as the right way in executing daily activities. Therefore there was need to infuse the new values to the mindsets of those responsible in implementation of reforms before the implementation process could start. CSRP is directly related to the New Public Management concepts that are western management ways applied in managing public sectors using principles almost similar to those used in managing private sector. Issues like recruitment and retrenchment which was among the component in CSRP were to be implemented against the traditional means in which every university graduate and even secondary school leavers were getting direct job posting. Promotion was done following seniority, and salaries depended on both seniority and education. According to Therkildsen (2000), there are allegedly cases of support of reform and cooperation between top officials from sector ministries on some reform issues. However training that was conducted to those involved in reform was among the struggles to change the

mindsets of implementers by infusing them with values attached in reform program to make them the good agents of change.

Another constraint that the principal secretary pointed out was lack of adequate resources to speed up the reform that was undertaken as fast as they would wish. Transformation of that magnitude reform required a huge amount of resources, and given the country's inadequate resources and competing demands for them from many other sectors, it was difficult to get enough resources for the program. He has however acknowledged the role that donors played in the overall implementation process (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005b). As addressed by the NORAD (1995, 57), *"the Tanzanian economy cannot sustain its own government, and will not be able to do so in the immediate future. The CSRP as well as other reform interventions in the public sector will have to be financed with international assistance for a good while yet"*.

The reform suffered from the lack of operational leadership (outside of CSD) and commitment to, and participation in, the program across the government (Teskey & Hooper, 1999)

5.4   Specific reform components analysis

5.4.1   Retrenchment component

Civil Service Reform (retrenchment) is practically considered successfully achieved following the retrenchment of 62,120 bona fide employees in first phase (i.e. 1992/93 to 1997/98) and other 20,200 ghost workers from the Government Payroll. The initial objective/target was to remove 50,000 employees following the studies made in relation to manning level completed in 1991/92 (NORAD, 1995).

According to the NORAD report, the implementation of retrenchment process on reform during the early reform phase (1993-1995) was carried out slowly because of insufficient resources provided by the government. The implementation of this component was also

delayed because of lack of funds that were expected from donors. According to Kjaer, (2001), most of the donors excluding Denmark had once suspended their support due to rampant tax exemptions something that delayed the retrenchment process. The government financed the compensation of early 36,000 employees who were laid off between 1993 and beginning of 1995 which cost amounted to US$ 35 Millions (which equals to 972 US$ per employee) (Kjaer, 2001). Financial support from some donors (i.e. UK-DFID, Switzerland, European Union, Netherlands and DANIDA) was withheld because of low trust to the political leadership of that time which seemed not to support civil service reforms. However, in 1995 after the election of the new government, this component got the support of donors because of the commitment of the new government to civil service reform and therefore drew trust from donors. It was said that after the new government came into power in 1995, the donors were ready to support the reform and they immediately released US $ 97.9 millions in support of retrenchment process (Kjae, 2001). This component during previous regime that was in office before 1995 suffered from financial resource constraints resulted from poor country economy and donors halt to their support due to low political trust to the government that was in power as earlier mentioned. From a theoretical point of view, policy implementation will achieve success when resources are sufficiently available. The success achieved in this reform component was also contributed by coordination of the reform objective to all stake holders who had the role to play in implementation stage. The involved stakeholders were the civil service department (main actor), ministry of finance, all ministries and the departments under them. The ministries and departments under them were required to list all underperformers (i.e. those with critical absenteeism, late comers, and also propose the areas that were overstaffed) and forward the names to civil service department for verification and later forwarded to the ministry of finance to update the payroll system. However there were shortcomings in implementation due to low capacity of administrative staffs in various ministries to identify the people to be retrenched of which qualified people were sometimes included. According to the implementation theory, the characteristics of the implementing agency in terms of competence and size is a necessary condition for successful implementation

It was also noted that, the introduction of the so called multi-party political system in the country in 1992 also led the reform process to get little support and commitment from political leaders of the ruling party. The threat of changing political situation from single party to multiparty crowded the reform process. It was obvious that the reform component like retrenchment was painful and opposition parties could have taken advantage against the ruling party (Mutahaba & Kiragu, 2002). According to Salvatore (1996), retrenchment can offset opposition from those whose jobs are threatened. Had the reform process been home grown, retrenchment component would probably have been hesitated by the ruling party or would have not been acted upon, but instead, the government of the ruling political party using internally generated funds acted on this component and finance early retrenchment that impressed donors who actually financed the later part of retrenchment process after 1995. According to (Wescott, 1999:7) *"donors should avoid taking the lead in diagnosing problems and devising reform strategies".* Leading the reform strategies is likely to undermine ownership and commitment from the political, administrative leadership and the rank and file of the civil service (Wescott, 1999).

Retrenchment is usually financially costly in short term and is also politically costly but when it is necessary it should not be approached as an end in itself or merely as reaction to fiscal problems without careful planning and respect for the law of unintended consequences (Mutahaba & Kiragu, 2002)

5.4.2   Remuneration component

Until the termination of the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) in 1999 when it was replaced by the second phase reform (i.e. PSRP in 2000), the remunerations/pay reform component was slightly successful basing on Index of 1970 (see figure 4.1& table 4.4). As the figure portrays, real average pay in 1992 was equal to 45% of 1970 pay and 85% below the level of 1974 and after the implementation of first reform phase in 1999 the real average pay was equal to 80% of 1970 pay and 50% below the level of 1974. However, this component became a paradox as it had been suffering from the lack of the precisely stated target /standards (i.e. amount in Tshs to be achieved as MLW). As the implementation theory suggest, specific standards and objective are important since it

establish the criteria for assessing the achievement of the policy. Although it was stated to strive for improved remuneration through improved salaries to meet the Minimum Living Wage (MLW) as the pay reform objective, it was ambiguous since no precisely stated minimum living wage that can offset continuously deteriorated economic condition accompanied by continued devaluation of Tanzania currency. However, since the initiation of the reform program in 1991, once in 1995 the government came up with the objective to achieve the minimum wage of TShs 60,000 which practically was impossible to implement due to financial resource constraints. As the implementation theory suggests the availability of sufficient resources is the necessary condition for the successful implementation of the policy. Due to financial resource constraints, the stated minimum wage set in 1995 was not met and that, half of government employees were receiving the wage between 40,000 to 45,000. Failure in achieving the objective of the intended minimum salary that can meet the Minimum Living Wage, the component was brought forward to the second phase program (PSRP) for further implementation. Lack of coordination between the government and trade unions was also another weakness noted in pay reform were difference in proposing the minimum living wage (MLW) was evidenced. From theoretical point of view, the communication with various stakeholders is very important as that can attract and mobilize the interest group to support implementation of the policy. Although this union showed interest in participating in the reform process in a letter to the CSD, they were not invited to participated (NORAD, 1995). The Trade union was suggesting the minimum wage of US$ 200 (approximately TShs 111,640) in the same year of 1995 (Kjaer, 2001). This component unlike the retrenchment, suffered from the lack of financial resources of which its source was to depend mainly from internally generated sources of income which had few sources characterized by low functioning to generate enough funds compared to successful retrenchment which was financed by the government at early stage and donors support after 1995. Although retrenchment was expected to generate funds that could be used to improve salaries to those who would remain in government employment, the generated amount was used to compensate those who were laid offs due to donors halt in releasing funds (Kjaer, 2001). The component also lacked good coordination of various important stakeholders in order to stand with one common objective and standard to be achieved. It

was important for the civil service department as the main actor on behalf of the government (employer) to establish a dialogue with the ministry of finance to identify all the sources of government revenues and establish effective ways of taping them in order to secure revenue collection. In addition to identifying the revenue source, there was need to clearly spell out the enforcement mechanism to those responsible for revenue collection in order to enforce them to abide by procedures, regulation and the laws that govern revenue collection. The government couldn't collect revenue to its apex due to rampant corruption that made most of the revenue collected lost without reaching the government (i.e. ministry of finance). According to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), firm enforcement mechanism is important in influencing compliance in any policy. However, in identifying the weakness in revenue collection the government in 1995 established the agency in the ministry of finance (i.e. Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA)) which was entrusted with the duty of government revenue collection.

In addition to the above stakeholders, there was the need for the two mentioned actors to involve the third actor the Trade unions which most of the time (almost every year) came up with a proposed Minimum Living Wage identified by its specialist based on a survey of consumer price index[5]. Although in years after 1993 there was increment in employee salaries, that increment did not aim to meet the Minimum Living Wage but to adjust to inflation. However, in 1996 the government expressed the need to achieve the Minimum Living Wage of TShs 69,000 per month (which its value was equal to TShs 52,000 in 1969 according to price index) without specifying the time frame for achieving the objective. It was noted that, by that time 92 percent of all government employees were paid the monthly salary below Tshs. 65,000 (Kiragu, 1998). It is clear that, the CSRP recognized the need to improve incentives for civil servants through pay reform but it failed to adequately address the incentives structure within which the reform were to take place. Until 1997 when the decision was taken to close the CSRP by 1999, incentive/salary for professional and managerial staff whose support is critical to the success of reform was inadequate. In some cases, CSRP policies on the abolition of

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[5] An index of prices used to measure the change in the cost of basic goods and services in comparison with a fixed base period. Also called **cost-of-living index**

various allowances and non-cash benefits meant that managers actually become worse off following pay reforms. As the theory advocates, sufficient size of qualified staff and sufficient resources are of paramount importance for smooth and successive policy implementation. Low pay remains the single most serious problem constraining the effective operation of civil service (Teskey & Hooper, 1999). As (Kjaer, 2001:127) "*pointed out, the limited government revenue base and the need to maintain an appropriate recurrent expenditure balance constrained pay reform efforts*"

5.4.3 Recruitment component

In implementation of this component the objective was to develop and institute personnel policies that reflect equal opportunities in recruitment, appointment, promotion and staff development. It also involved reinstating policies, systems and practices that ensures the quality of civil service employees especially transparent and promotion policies (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999b)

The recruitment component after introduction of reform process is reported to have improved judging by the way government started to recruit employees. This was achieved through improving and strengthening of the system and procedures for personnel recruitment, grading and promotions (ibid). It also resulted in the strengthening and empowerment of civil service commission which was entrusted the duty to recruit on behalf of the government. Civil Service Commission is the branch under the Civil Service Department with specific functions of dealing with establishment issues in the government such as recruitment, promotion, demotion, and dismissal of civil servants that after introduction of reform process was equipped with employees with skills and knowledge on establishment matters. The empowerment and making use of this commission made the government to recruit and be equipped with the right personnel. As the theory points out, the characteristics of implementing agency in competence and size is of paramount importance for policy success. However with all efforts of getting the right professional based on merits they possess, the government has been suffering from the turnover of those professionals due to the low salaries they are paid compared to salaries provided by private sector (see table 4.3). Most professionals used the

government employment opportunities as the starting point while they sought employment from the private sector. Other professionals used the government employment as the vehicle to advanced studies before they switch off to private sector to get better salaries. It is easier to advance to higher studies under government employment than in the private sector. It is easy to get scholarships while in government employment as many scholarships are forwarded to the government by various sponsors and government employees are informed to apply for those who meet conditions specified in that scholarships. These scholarships cannot be accessed by private sector employees. On top of that, once employees become successful to secure the scholarship they continue to be paid their salaries for the whole duration they attend their studies. Apart from scholarships accessed to studies abroad, ministries also provide training opportunities to local universities and also to foreign universities financed by ministries. Compared to government employment, private employers provide good salaries but provide nothing in relation to higher training (except short courses specific to enhance employees doing better) like undergraduate or master's programs. Even when an employee secure scholarship somewhere in his/her own effort, no study leave can be provided and instead the employee have to terminate employment that result to termination of his/her salary. In order to ensure that the qualified people remain in government employment, there is a need for government to improve its sources of revenue and be in a position to pay salaries equivalent to those provided by private sector. From theoretical point of view, financial resources are important and usually facilitate successive reform outcome.

Through strengthening of Civil Service Commission, the government is nowadays getting merit based employees as a result of abiding to recruitment procedures and recruitment process that is conducted by competent staff. Job opening is now transparent and usually communicated to the public through advertisement in newspapers and sometimes in radio to attract applicants. In areas like libraries and work places, the cuttings of the papers are put in notice boards for information dissemination. All these success is the result of availability of financial resources to advertise vacancies as well as in preparing committee that conducts interviews and those who evaluate the results. There is also disciplinary action for those who will conduct interview without obeying the procedures

or noticed to involve in corruption in relation to the whole process at any stage. Disciplinary action might be severe that can involves the cancellation of the result if irregularities in conducting interviews noticed. As the theory suggest, the enforcement mechanism are important and usually increase the likelihood of implementation to subordinates. Apart from enforcement mechanism coming in force, the success was also contributed by type of people involved in the whole process where by specialist in human resources/personnel issues in the civil service department administer the whole process and usually involves other professional specialist (those with knowledge similar to the one to be filled) from any ministry/departments to attend recruitment interview for the purpose of advice. It also includes officials from ministry/department where the vacant is available. Those officials are human resource specialists and technical official with the same knowledge that need to be filled. It is obvious that, since all government employees are employed through the civil service commission, there have been good coordination between the top officials and subordinates (establishment office) in all ministries/departments and between the ministries/departments with the civil service commission when the need for new employees arise in ministries/departments. The theory suggest for inter-organizational communication and enforcement mechanism for the successful policy implementation so that every implementer can act in conformity with standards and objectives.

5.4.4 Government expenditure component

The objective of this reform component was to reduce government employees who were considered excess in order to provide savings for better salaries to those who will remain in the public service employment. The result of this component was successful in one part and paradox in another part. By the end of CSRP in 1999, the government managed to reduce 62,000 bona fide (target was to remove 50,000) excess employees in government payroll and 20,200 ghost workers. Although the government saved the 82,200 employee's salaries removed from the payroll, civil servants still got low salaries without improvement. The achievement of this component in early days of program implementation that fell in between 1993-1995 was facilitated by the internal source of funds that financed the compensation of 36,000 employees at a cost of US$35 millions.

The component (retrenchment) was later financed by donors who provided a range of technical assistance to the program including short-term resident technical advisers. However by far the most significant support in monetary terms was the donors support to the retrenchment program. Over the period 1995-1998 donors contributed over US$90 million to pay redundancy compensation for retrenched civil servants (Teskey & Hooper, 1999). The objective behind this measure was to cut down the government expenditures that were incurred by having the excess employees in the government payroll. Apart from cutting down government wage bill expenditure through retrenchment, the wage bill was also checked by the use of pay day that uncovered wage bill expenditure of 20,000 ghost employee. The success in achieving the above results was contributed by clear objectives of the government need to cutting down the government wage bill something that was communicated to all Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). MDAs were required to identify the people who were included in the retrenchment list following the guidelines provided by the Civil Service Departments. In addition to that, on 28th February 1994 the government conducted a pay day that successfully uncovered wage bill incurred through ghost workers. Salaries of those who failed to turn out physically were submitted to the ministry of finance with the names. Through retrenchment, the government managed to cut down the government wage bill cost Tshs 1,621,831,226 by retrenching 10,292 employees in 1993 and in 1994 the saving was Tshs 2,333,818,399 by retrenching 22,395 employees and as well in 1995 the wage bill cut was Tshs 156,575,564 (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999c). Following the retrenchment process the government realized the wage bill expenditure falling down from wage bill that exceeded the budget by 40% in 1994/1995 to wage bill that exceeded the budget by 2% in 1996/1997 (Ntukanzina, 1998).

It is obvious that, the well established coordination between CSD, Ministry of Finance and MDAs was the contributing factor to success in this reform measure. As well the availability of financial resource used to finance the retrenchment process was another contributing factor in cutting down the number of employees that resulted to saving of salaries of those removed in the government payroll. According to implementation

theory, the availability of resource and inter-organization communication are important variables for successful policy implementation.

5.4.5   Capacity building component

The objective of this component states the need to develop a training policy which provides direction for all capacity building initiatives in the public service. As such, the need for training was important to expedite the development of leadership skills and capacity needed to manage change. The policy was to be approved by the cabinet by mid of 1996 but instead until December 1999 the policy document was still in draft. The targeted stakeholders needed to attend various training for development of leadership's skills to effectively administer and achieve reform objectives were to come from public service and political leaders. A program in management of change was conducted at UK civil service College which was attended by the CSD Directors, Assistant Directors and Director of Administration and Personnel (DAPs) from other ministries. Also training of top leaders in strategic leadership and change management was conducted for permanent secretaries (PSs) and two ministers. Although the above effort was made, the positive impact in first phase reform was at minimum due the delay of such training which was caused by the low weight put in this component at the start of CSRP. As noted by Teskey & Hooper (1999:3), *"a broader capacity building strategy was not developed under the CSRP"*. Low weight put on such component was contributed by financial constraint in internal sources of revenue needed to provide for such training. As the theory suggest, sufficient availability of resources is a necessary condition for policy implementation. However, as noted, *"Since inception of the CSRP capacity building activities were undertaken on an ad hoc basis, without an overall strategic perspective; And inadequate resources were allocated to support capacity building initiatives"*. (Ibid) This was evidenced by the reality that, the above mentioned training was financed by donors. According to the United Republic of Tanzania report (1999c), UNDP supported review of government training capacity building needs and training policy and NORAD funded short-term Technical Assistance (TA) performance, leadership and management development program. However, although the contribution of the above efforts was not realized in the first phase reform, it is said to have assisted significantly in managing

change and the development of the second phase of the public service reform program. They contributed towards having some senior managers in MDs equipped with leadership's skills and who are result oriented. According to implementation theory, the characteristic of implementing agency in terms of competence and size is very important for successful implementation of the policy. Hence by recognizing the importance of having the sufficient number of competent people in reform process, the new government that took power in 1995 in collaboration with stakeholders showed positive response on this measure evidenced by the support among legislator and executives that led to the approval of capacity building policy by the cabinet in mid of 1996. The implementation of this policy was expected to bring positive changes to the characteristics of implementing agency which in return would result in the achievement of capacity building component objectives. Such objectives were:

- *"To enhance capability of top civil service management in the management of change*

- *To improve or enhance the technical skills of civil servants who will be retained in the service*

- *To build the capacity of institutions through retooling with modern administrative technology"* (Ntukamanzina, 1998: 52).

It is obvious that, in the early stages of CSRP implementation, the status of this component (i.e. characteristics of implementing agencies) was less convincing and was the contributing factor to the low pace and success of the reform program. According to NORAD report (1995), at early stages of implementation neither the CSD nor the individual ministries had required capacity and many of public institutions had no orientation of what was to be done. As suggested by implementation theory, attribute of implementing agencies and personnel in terms of educational qualification and the size of agencies staff are very important for successful policy implementation.

This chapter started by presenting information on the state of independent variables collected during the field visit. It was then followed by analysis of the finding starting

with general analysis and then specific data analysis. The following last chapter (chapter six) is the conclusion of this study.

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 Conclusion

This chapter provides the summary of this research findings presented and analyzed on the basis of implementation theory. It as well draws the conclusion of the researcher based on tested variables of the study.

As earlier introduced in the first chapter of this thesis, the CSRP was attempting to address the fundamental structural weakness in the civil service, which prevents it from effectively delivering services to the public. However, after this study made the relationship between the implemented CSRP and real improvement in service delivery to the Tanzania public was not adequately demonstrated. This is evidenced in the design of new PSRP. It is obvious that, until the termination of civil service reform program in 1999 full reform objectives summarized in the slogan of achieving *smaller, affordable, well compensated, efficient and effective performing civil service* was not fully met in totality. This is due to various reasons that were discussed in chapter five. The amount of change intended upon the implementation of CSRP covered a lot of things and could be one of the factors which made it not fully successful. According to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) the success of policy will also depend on the amount of change involved. However, although the objective was not fully met, each reform component had it own strength and weaknesses in implementation stage that made the achievements in those components to differ. The evidence of achievements or failure of the components was its continuation or termination. The achieved component was terminated and unsuccessful component(s) was/were brought forward to the second phase reform program (Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP)) launched in 2000 to replace the first phase reform (Civil Service Reform Program). Bringing forward of such unsuccessful component(s) (i.e. 1991-1999 reform component) was efforts to fulfilment of stated objectives to those component whose targets was/were not achieved.

Retrenchment was done to remove excess employees and provide better salaries for those who would remain in the service. As addressed by Kayed, Fayyad and Assaf (1999) on

their report, overstaffing and low salaries have adverse consequences, including poor staff morale and decline in work effort as well as difficulty in recruitment of technical and professional staff (Kayed, Fayyad and Assaf, 1999). However, Pay reform in Tanzania couldn't be achieved mainly due to the poor economic performance especially in tax collection that had too much loop holes that resulted in loss of public funds. As well, Poor performance of the previously state owned enterprises caused the government giving them subsidies instead of those enterprises providing revenue to the government in form of taxes also contributed to that worse economy. All these made the government to have very limited financial resources generated internally to provide better salaries. This situation sometimes caused donor's agencies to make salary top-ups; provide incentive allowances and other benefits to civil servants (Teskey & Hooper, 1999). Therefore it is clear that, the implementation of this component till the closure of CSRP was not successful and for that reason it was brought forward to the second phase reform (PSRP) for further implementation. It was therefore noted that*," low pay remains the single most serious problem constraining the effective operation of the civil service"* (Teskey & Hooper, 1999: 9). On a wider level, the institutional incentives within civil service did not support reform. There were no consistent method of setting targets for ministries and departments, measuring performance against these targets, rewarding success or disciplining failure. Without accountability for results, there was little incentive for ministries to seek to improve performance. The public finance and budgeting system which was outside the scope of CSRP provided further disincentives for reform. There was little incentive for ministries to shed staff in the interest of efficiency (Teskey & Hooper, 1999). On the other hand as learned a small number of dedicated civil servants within civil service department have provided excellent strategic leadership and technical implementation support to the CSRP (ibid). They added that, the reform program has since inception been heavily depending on external support. Following the discussion in the previous chapter, it is obvious CSRP suffered from low base of resources generated from internal sources that was very important in successful implementation of reform objectives. The insufficient financial resource was among the hurdles spelt out by the principle secretary - Civil Service Department.

As stated in chapter four, the recruitment process after reform got a positive direction of which the recruitment administered by the strengthened civil service commission started recruiting the right people with right skills and professions in the civil service employment. However, the civil service was suffering from professional's turnover due to low remuneration. "*For that reasons there was the need for the systematic monitoring of public/private salaries differentials for jobs that require the same skills and experience, reducing and eventually eliminating wage gaps for comparable jobs*" (Lienert, 1998)*.*

In this study analysis, another obstacle noted was the weakness in bureaucrats/political support of reform. Weakness in support as explained in the analysis part was due to various reasons as documented in previous chapter (refer 5.2.5 & 5.2.6). There was the need to ensure that, civil servants like those in the line ministry were in support of the reform. Lack of support (bureaucrats) led to delays and in extreme cases to the blockage of reform process. As addressed by Corkey (1995, 2), *"the success of reform programs require that civil servants are actively involved and support them"* (Corkey, 1995). The same weakness was noted by the Chairman of civil service reform who insisted for all ministries and departments to seriously take over reforms. He urged for each permanent secretary and his/her management team to be on top of reforms (Ntukamanzina, 1998). Apart from bureaucratic backing there was need for reforms to get full political support. Support of reform from political leadership was very important for successful implementation. Compared to Uganda, the CSR implemented in Tanzania lacked political support until in 1995 when the new government came to power (Kjaer, 2001). The need for political support was also learned by Corkery (1995, 2) who pointed *"the need for explicit political support for reform measures over an extended period".* He further emphasizes that*, "This provides the necessary conviction that the reform will be sustained over time"* (ibid). Support to reform by political leaders gives optimism to reform success. Citing the UK experience, Corkery (1995, 2) insisted that, *"Mrs. Thatcher's long spell as prime minister in the United kingdom during the 1980s provides an obvious example of a strong commitment to sweeping reforms which permitted changes to be made in organizational structures and behavior which were previously*

considered unattainable". As such, lack of political support during the previous government (i.e. the government in power before 1995 election) was due to the fact that, CSRP was viewed as an external program initiated by donors hence lack local ownership. As Clarke and Wood, (2001) identified, CSRP has been donor-driven. For purpose of gaining political support, the need for reform was supposed to be felt and initiated by local people and the role of donors was to respond to that need. Corkery (1995: 1) clarifies that, *"civil service reform must be 'owned' by the national's authorities if it is to be successful. External agencies such as the World Bank has a role to play but this must be a supportive and advisory role akin to specialist consultants which governments in industrialized countries have used to develop their own reform programs"*.

Apart from the above mentioned (bureaucratic/political support) requirement for successive reform, there was the need to have qualified personnel who could put CSRP plans in action in an effective way. This was to be achieved by providing people well in advance and in a sufficient number before the start of the program. It was obvious that, at the start of the reform program there were no sufficient local people who could manage change and as well the training for that purpose came late under the support of donors whose funds were always not guaranteed for sustainability. It was learned that, *"political commitment must be buttressed by the existence of an implementing agency with sufficient prestige and authority as well as the necessary intellectual and technical capacity, to formulate and execute the reform program"* (Corkey, 1995: 3).

Another hurdle for successful implementation of CSRP seems to be emanating from the multiple defined goals of reform. It is obvious CSRP covered wide ranging activities that were implemented jointly. It is clear that, *"Comprehensive set of reform have to limit ones ambitions to a more restrained, incremental program of change. This is relevant to industrialized as well as developing countries"* (Polidano, 2001: 3). Before the start of the program there was the need for planning of appropriate sequencing of actions with a clearly identified means and timing (This is known as critical path). Such sequencing should consider realism and reflect the political and institutional environment in the country (Corkery, 1995).

Another condition needed for effective reform was the improved communication mechanism for all parts that were to implement part of the reform. Although it was reported CSRP to have been well established in communication using various means, some of the people who were to implement parts of reform were also reported not aware of what the reform constituted. Apart from weak communication, was poor coordination of which other organs that were very important like trade unions were not included nor consulted although they asked to be incorporated in some reform component; as suggested there is *"the need for effective communication with all the actors and stake holders who have interests in the process of civil service reform and with all the ministries and agencies which can contribute to the identification of issues and the development of programs of reform"* (Corkery, 1995: 3).

Advice for successful reform.

It is obvious that, for successful reform there must be political commitment. First and foremost the commitment and determination should come from key central management like the president who is essential in moving forward the reform that will bring the functioning civil service. In addition to that is the support and backing of reform by bureaucrats from the level of rank and file who are undertaking the reform which can be achieved by providing them with incentives after mutual understanding of the need and importance of making reforms. As well, bureaucrats responsible in implementation process should be equipped with training that aimed to manage change. Objectives and goals of reform is essential be known and understood by implementers since this will derive personal commitment rather than depending on imposing penalty to them in order to enforce commitment to implementing agencies. The evidence from successful reforms like that of United Kingdom under prime minister Margaret Thatcher is the proof of need for support and backing from Top political leadership together with bureaucrats from the lower level involved in reform as the result of shared consensus about what needs to be done to make successful reforms.

Another important aspect to make successful reform is reform being internally identified and become home grown. Most of reform that end up in failure lack important political

support since most of them were identified by outsiders like donors as conditionality while providing assistance to poor countries. Lack of resources in poor countries became the entry point to donor's initiation of reforms that are not home grown and therefore lacking political and bureaucratic commitment of implementing countries and usually ends up in vain. Countries implementing the reform should strive to become the initiator of reform process and donors avoid becoming owners of reform and instead (donors) remained only with the role of supporting and advising on reform that are homegrown like it was done in industrialized countries that develop their own reform..

Another advice to reformers is that, the reform should start with pay reform that will provide material incentives to implementers and influence commitment and influence qualified professionals who can manage change to remain in civil service. It is important that, on top of clear accepted goals of reforms by implementers, incentives in terms of better remuneration be provided. Implementation of Tanzania reforms at lower pace is the evidence of poor commitments by reformers resulting from poor salaries to encourage them meets reform targets. It is therefore important for countries to strive to improve their economic conditions in order to allow better remuneration to reformers and make them committed in implementation process. The evidence for this is the success of United Kingdom reform under Thatcher regime and that of USA under Al Gore commission.

Civil society involvement in reform process is also important as they can give advice especially in areas that needs professional advice. Involvement of society like Trade unions in areas like determination of salaries is important because they stands for rights of employees and this will remove contradiction in goals that need to be achieved under pay reform. Civil society involvement is important in reform process and countries should strive to do so.

Another important aspect in reform that countries should do to ensue successful reform process is effective communication and coordination of reform activities. This should start from initiation of reform objectives and maintained during implementation process

to termination to all who are stakeholders of the reform that includes those undertaking reform process and those affected by reform outcome.

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Appendix I

Tanzania Macroeconomic performance indicators 1986-1996 (Only small selected section)

Indicator	1986-1989	1989-1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Inflation	31	31.6	22	25	33	29.8	21
Exchange Rate(average) TShs/$	86.8	207.6	335	479.87	523.4	558.2	590.48

Source: Bank of Tanzania

Questionnaires: Interview guide for top management at the civil service department

1. When did you start reforms
2. How did it come about? Was it the need of the government or directives from International organization? If International organization WHO are they.
3. What were techniques/approaches employed.
4. Are the objectives met
5. What are the obstacles/ impediments faced in carrying out the program
6. What are the weaknesses of the program
7. Do you think this reforms was the only way to resuscitate the performance of civil service

    ❏ YES

    ❏ NO

    If NO what was the alternative

    ----

8. Is there any success in implementing the program by improving the salaries, reducing the number of employees, and cut expenditure?
10. What do you think was the cause of overstaffing and unqualified employees?
11. What was the size of employees before and after the reform and what was the planned size to be achieved
11. Who financed the CSR program
12. Did they provide sufficient fund to carry out the whole program.
13. Was the program successful. If YES in what aspects. If NO what are the reasons
14. What is your recommendation regarding the program importance

Questionnaire to human resource/establishment office of the civil service department

1. What is the number of employees before and after reforms
2. Did the employees before reforms have necessary & required qualifications

3. What factors caused the employment of unqualified people before the reforms

4. Is there improvement in recruitment after reforms? If YES, How? If NO Why?

5. Is there any guidance/procedures laid down in recruitment process.

6. Is there any enforcement mechanism (disciplinary action for violation of procedure and nepotism?

7. Was there any motivational techniques used to attract most qualified applicants. If YES What are they

8. Is there any employee turnover. If YES what might be the reason

9. How many employees were retrenched

10. What was the criterion used to retrench the employee

11. Was this Process supported by Elites

12. What happened to the position left by the retrenched

13. Was there any Ghost workers. If Yes How many.

14. Was there permanent sick employees. If Yes How many

15. What was the wage bill before and after reforms

16. Is there any wage bill cut off after reforms   YES   NO if yes By what percent

17. Is there any motivation introduced after reforms   YES NO if Yes what are they

18. How was the employees Development (training &promotion) before/after reforms

19. Do employees get opportunity to attend training to enhance their skills

20. How are employees promoted? And how long does it take to get promotion

21. What is your recommendation regarding the program

Accounts/Salaries Department
1. What is total wage bill in 1991, 1992……… 2000
2. What is total wage bill in 1985, 1986,…….., 1990