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**Trust in Public Institutions in Zanzibar:
Mapping the Influence of Identity and Performance Factors**

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Dedication

I dedicate this work to my father and my mother, who sent me to school. No doubt you will be pleased with my achievement,

and

to my wife, FARHAT, and my children; MUNDHIR, ISSA, and IRFAN. This thesis is a valid excuse of my absence during the time you needed me most. *Nawapenda sana!*

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Acronyms

ASP	Afro Shirazi Party
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party)
CUF	the Civic United Front
GNU	Government of National Unity
HoR	House of Representatives
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OCGSZ	Office of the Chief Government Statistician Zanzibar
PCCB	Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
SMZ	Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar (the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar)
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SUZA	the State University of Zanzibar
TRA	Tanzania Revenue Authority
TVZ	Television Zanzibar
UDSM	University of Dar es Salaam
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
ZAECA	Zanzibar Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Authority
ZEC	Zanzibar Electoral Commission
ZNP	Zanzibar Nationalist Party
ZPPP	Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party
ZRB	Zanzibar Revenue Board

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Abstract

What explains trust in public institutions in Zanzibar? The study's main objective was to examine the significance of identity and perceptions of performance in explaining citizens' political trust in Zanzibar. Using a mixed method approach, the study utilised the strength of each method to interrogate, clarify, and compare findings to derive meaningful interpretations of the data. The Afrobarometer round 6 survey data from Tanzania, the main quantitative data source of the study, was supplemented by qualitative data from 8 focus group discussions with ordinary citizens, 10 in-depth interview with key informants, documentary review, and researcher's direct field observation to make powerful analysis.

The study employed two dominant theories of trust, namely, the identity theory, and the institutional theory of trust in guiding the analysis and interpretation of findings. An interactive conceptual framework, which depicts multiple interaction effects between variables, was developed to engage identity and performance theories as complementary to each other in understanding trust in public institutions.

The study findings reveal that perceptions of institutional performance, especially political performance and satisfaction with social service delivery, have the most strongest and pervasive effect on citizens' trust attitudes, while party affiliation and historical legacies among were also found to have powerful influences on citizens trust in their government. The three together- perceptions of performance, party affiliation, and historical legacy- have the most interactive and trust eroding effect on political trust in Zanzibar.

Key words: political trust, social capital, institutional performance, identity, corruption, Zanzibar,

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1 Introduction

This research work examines the significance of identity and performance in explaining popular trust in public institutions in Zanzibar. The study is a contribution to a body of scientific literature on institutional trust. This chapter introduces the study's background, the case study, the rationale of the study, the scope of the study, and the guiding research questions.

1.1 Background to the study

Trust 'makes democracy work', a famous statement by Putnam (1993) has been amplified by a vast literature on trust that have produced new evidences showing the significance of trust in effective functioning of democracy. This refers to the extent to which public governments enjoys legitimacy to continue to rule a society in a democratic way. The puzzle lies with the African regimes characterized by various forms of authoritarianism, single party legacies, deep rooted corruption, weak institutions, poverty, ethnic, and religious divisions (Chikwanha: 2005). Do the African regimes of this nature lack people's trust? Definitely not. What then explains the trust patterns present in these countries? In emerging democracies, identity and institutional theories have been argued to offer an explanatory alternative of regime support instead of Putnam's social capital theory.

Zanzibar shares some common features like most of African countries although is also different on a number of characteristics. Of importance to note is the central place of identity in Zanzibar's social and political history. Also Zanzibar, a multi-ethnic society, is highly politicized. The incumbent regime has been in power for 52 years since the popular 1964 revolution. Could identity be the explaining factor for the continued support of the government in power?

1.2 A Brief Description of the Case

Zanzibar comprises of two major islands of Unguja and Pemba with their surrounding archipelago and is part of the United Republic of Tanzania. It is located about 35km from the coast of Mainland Tanzania with a total land area of 2,232 square kilometers. The island of Unguja, where the capital city is located, occupies 63% of the total area, whereas Pemba, a

predominantly rural region makes up the remaining 37%. According to the 2012 Census (URT, 2013), Zanzibar had a population of 1,303,569 projected to be around 1,411,722 by 2015 (URT, 2015), of which 68.8% live in Unguja and 31.2% in Pemba. About 53.7% of the population lives in rural and 46.3% in urban areas. The number of eligible voters (18 years or above), a target population of this study, is around 720,491 people.

Zanzibar had been under a long period of colonial rule under the Arab administration from 1780s until the eve of the revolution in 1963. Although from 1890 Zanzibar became a British Protectorate, the Sultan (Arab ruler) continued as the symbolic head of state (Bakari, 2001:47). Having been a famous commercial center for centuries, and later the main slave trading market in East Africa during the slave trade era, the islands accommodated immigrants and traders from various places such as Asia, Arab Middle East, and African mainland (Lofchie, 1963). There is no current statistics of ethnic and racial composition of Zanzibar community, the last being that of 1948 Census shown in Table 1 below¹. The Arab colonial government made the racial categories more pronounced and antagonistic with discrimination in land ownership, employment, and access to civil rights across racial lines. The Arab minority were on top, followed by Asians and Shirazi (the indigenous) in the middle, and Africans of Mainland origin at the bottom of the pyramid (Lofchie, 1965). Since this study also examines identity, this historical development of ethnic relations is very important to understand.

Table 1: Ethnic Composition of Zanzibar in 1948

Ethnic category	Unguja		Pemba		Zanzibar	
	Number	Percentage				
Shirazi	81,150	54.3	67,330	58.8	148,480	56.2
Africans	37,502	25.1	13,878	12.1	51,380	19.5
Arabs	13,977	9.3	30,585	26.7	44,560	16.9
Asians	13,107	8.8	2,104	1.8	15,211	5.8
Comorians	2,764	1.8	503	0.4	3,267	1.1
Goans	598	0.4	83	0.07	681	0.3
Europeans	256	0.2	40	0.03	296	0.1
Others	221	0.2	66	0.05	287	0.1
Total	149,575	100.0	114,587	100.0	264,162	100.0

Source: Adopted from Bakari, M. (2001) *The Democratisation Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition*, p.64.

¹ The table is used to give a rough picture of the three politically significant racial groups in the isles. The racial composition of the present population, however, has changed drastically and there is no up to date statistics. The 1964 bloodshed revolution wiped out a large number of the Arab population (Sheriff, 2001:314), while forced inter-marriage policy of the revolutionary government made the racial boundaries closely interwoven.

The nationalist struggles for independence was characterized by fierce competition among political parties that were roughly divided along racial lines of three politically active ethnic groups- Arabs, Shirazi and Africans (Lofchie, 1965). The independence on 10 December 1963 was granted to the coalition government between the 'Zanzibar Nationalist Party' and 'Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party' (ZNP-ZPPP) supported mainly by the Shirazi and Arabs, respectively, at the expense of the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP), which drew its support from Africans of Mainland origin and some sections of Shirazi people. The ASP staged a successful revolution on 12 January 1964 and institutionalized an authoritarian one party regime which shaped the racial relations just opposite to that of the colonial period by privileging Africans over Arabs (Mamdani, 2005). Following the Union with Tanganyika on April 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania, ASP later merged with Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977, which ruled the country under a single party system until the re-introduction of multi party system in 1992. In Zanzibar, the post-revolutionary political development witnessed the killings, expulsion, and discrimination of Arab Zanzibaris and uneven regional development where Pemba became marginalized politically and economically (Bakari, 2001; Sheriff, 2001).

Since the re-introduction of multiparty politics, Zanzibar has endured series of violent political conflicts which culminated in various short lived peace accords between the ruling party (CCM) and the main opposition party, the Civic United Front-CUF (see, Anglin, 2010). The latest peace accord between the two parties known as *Maridhiano* (reconciliation) in 2010 resulted into the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) following a referendum. On the one hand, it has been argued that the GNU has managed to create a peaceful political environment and relatively harmonious political relations (Matheson, 2012; Nassor & Jose, 2014), whereas others suggest that the modality of its formation and scope is flawed as the deep seated polarity problem remains unresolved (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012:214). Indeed, analysis of Zanzibaris political behavior is very much contested among scholars. With all these political dynamics, it is extremely important to examine the factors influencing trust attitudes in Zanzibar with a particular focus on nuanced aspects of identity and performance.

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem

Scholarly research on political trust in Tanzania tends to treat Zanzibar within the Union framework, hence overlooking the peculiarities within Zanzibar's political dynamics that deserve an independent analysis. Having its own autonomous government², Zanzibar presents an interesting case that differs on a number of characteristics from Mainland Tanzania. Interestingly, Zanzibaris' assessment of the Union government is reported to be very critical and they depict high level of political awareness compared to Mainlanders (Chaligha, et al., 2002). For example, recent findings have also depicted that awareness was high in Zanzibar on the issue of taxation and the Union question compared to Mainland Tanzania (Aiko, 2013; Manda, 2013), though there is no comprehensive study examining Zanzibar's popular trust patterns in particular. Therefore, this leaves the question 'what explains these political trust attitudes within Zanzibar' almost unanswered.

Nearly 52 years since Zanzibar's independence and the revolution, with a completely different political environment, the interpretation of the political behavior of Zanzibaris is still highly contested among scholars. Some political analysts describe identity politics shaped by a distinct political history of Zanzibar as a key explanation. They view political attitudes as influenced by the legacy of the past and antagonism that emanates from this background, which is further fueled by continuing politicization and polarization of identities in terms of race, political affiliation, and regionalism (Killian, 2008; Maliyamkono, 2000; Mapuri, 2006). These scholars claim that the present party support reflect the pre-independence patterns where CUF, the main opposition party, represent the ZNP-ZPP influence with strong support in Pemba, whereas CCM represents the ASP influence and the black African revolution influential in Unguja. Others view the present political developments as a result of post-revolutionary socio-economic policies of ASP and CCM, with nothing or little to do with ethnic identities (Bakari, 2001, 2011; Matheson, 2012; Sheriff, 2001). This group of scholars contends that the political support and social classes in Zanzibar cut across all ethnic categories, and thus they point to issues of governance, representation, livelihood conditions of people, and distribution of resources in terms of social services as factors of concern. Such issues of economic marginalization,

² the Revolutionary government of Zanzibar (SMZ) has all the three arms of government- Executive, Legislature (House of Representative), and the Court (except court of Appeal) and enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over non-union matters, which include education (bar higher education), health, land, energy, infrastructure, agriculture, civil service, finance, tourism and natural resources, employment, and sports, among others. These are critical aspects for a daily livelihood of an ordinary Zanzibari.

discrimination, and low performance in terms of high rate of unemployment, poverty, poor infrastructure and household services are cited as important in understanding people's political attitudes in the islands.

Given the history of a contested identity politics in Zanzibar, this study contributes to wider discussions on political attitudes by examining citizens' trust in public institutions to determine the significance of identities and perceptions of institutional performance.

1.4 Research Questions

1.4.1 Central Research Question

How significant are identities and perceptions of performance on individuals' trust in public institutions in Zanzibar?

1.4.2 Specific Questions

1. What influence do social and political identities have on individuals' political trust in Zanzibar?
2. Do perceptions of government performance influence citizens' trust in public institutions in Zanzibar?
3. What are the most important factors in explaining patterns of popular trust in public institutions in Zanzibar?

1.5 Scope of the Study

The study examines the roles of identities and perceptions of performance in shaping citizens' trust in public institutions in Zanzibar. Basically, the study focuses on individual level political attitudes in explaining institutional trust. Several other studies have used individual level characteristics in explaining institutional trust with great effectiveness (see Robinson, 2009; Rose & Mishler, 2010). Mishler and Rose (2001) rather argued that institutional trust can be best explained at an individual level factors. Thus in this study, the measure of assessment are the perceptions of ordinary citizens about public institutions, policies, and leaders and the influence of their social, political and demographic attributes. Only citizens above 18 years of age participated in the study. The study was conducted with a primary focus of central government institutions and only looked briefly on how people rate the local

governments. According to Hutchison and Johnson (2011:739), individuals' trust in government is largely associated with state-level factors more than the local level and individual level characteristics. One notable limitation of focusing on state-level factors is that government services and the quality of its institutions may vary within a country and so are peoples' experiences and their perceptions (Sacks and Levi, 2010:2326). For instance, this could be so in relation to rural-urban discrepancies on various aspects of country's development. However, the possibility of studying the impact of local level government depends on the structure and development of the local government in particular country. In the case of Zanzibar, the government is highly centralized in terms of service provision and probably due to its small population size the impact of the central government is quite visible (see Bakari, 2011).

In assessing government performance, on the one hand, the study focus on citizens' satisfaction with the conduct of public institutions and leaders, and the achievements of public policies in economic, political and social service delivery sectors. On the other hand, the study's investigation of identity is inclusive and encompasses a wide range of variables, namely, personal demographic attributes (age, gender, and education), social group similarities (rural-urban location, occupation, race, and region), and common political attributes (party association, historical legacy, and national identity).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2 Introduction

This chapter reviews both theoretical and empirical academic literature on the topic of trust in public institutions with a particular focus on the African context. The chapter first defines the concept of trust, its various dimensions, and its significance for the effective functioning of the state. Next, it offers a critique of the inapplicability of 'social capital' theory in explaining trust in the case study context, and then presents the identity and performance perspectives of trust, which have been preferred to guide the study. The variables posed by the proposed theories are then elaborated in line with the hypotheses to depict a conceptual framework of the study. Finally, the conclusion revisits major arguments of the review and show the contribution the study makes in the academic literature.

2.1 Defining Trust: Conceptual Clarifications

Throughout academic literature, trust is defined from specific disciplinary standpoints. For economists, trust is related to economic transactions; psychologists place trust on individuals' background and their dispositions; whereas sociologists focus on the social factors and relationships among people (Askvik & Bak, 2005:5). Despite these diverse approaches to the study of trust, there is a general interdisciplinary agreement on the essential elements of trust and trustworthiness as embracing concepts of "risk, positive expectations, reliance, suspension of watchfulness and granting of discretionary powers" (Askvik & Bak, 2005:5-10). In this sense, the truster is said to build 'positive expectations' on the possibility of the trustee to do the 'right thing', by suspending 'suspicious watchfulness' and giving the necessary 'discretionary powers' to the trustee to act. Consequently, the truster relies on the 'future contingent action' of the trustee to bring about the desired outcome, and hence 'trusting' implies making a decision to take 'risk' and become 'vulnerable' in case the trustee decide to act contrary to the expectations.

This understanding brings us to a classical debate about 'what constitutes the object of trust? Basically, it is widely accepted that the primary target of trust are 'persons' or individuals to whom we can engage in face-to-face commitments (Sztompka, 1999:40; Warren, 1999:348). The argument, however, arises regarding the possibility of trust in other social entities such as institutions or organizations. Can we trust an institution? On the one hand, Hardin (1999:38)

argues that trust requires sufficient knowledge of the other person's interest and motivation, and hence trusting an organization cannot be justified by claims of analogy of individuals constituting those organizations. His argument is that modern institutions are complex and thus, an individual cannot possess sufficient knowledge of the big number of office holders within these institutions. Thus, he claims that trust in institutions such as the government can at best be described as "a relationship of inductive expectation" rather than "relationship of trust or distrust" (Hardin, 1999:39).

On the other hand, Sztompka (1999:41) strongly suggest that trust in institutions is possible and maintains that "behind all other social objects, however complex, there also stand people, and it is the people whom we ultimately endow with trust". He cites an example of an individual who trusts a flight company and decides to fly with them for instance, the individual trusts "their pilots, the cabin crew, the ground personnel, technicians, controllers, supervisors, and so forth" without necessarily knowing them in person (Sztompka, 1999:41). Similarly, Warren (1999:349) holds that it make sense to trust an institution, because even with large scale institutions 'their functions are specified by law' that creates incentive structures guiding officials "to act in accordance with the shared expectations of law, thus reducing the risks of trust". Additionally, Levi (1998:80) analytically distinguishes the concept of trust and trustworthiness arguing that "only persons can trust or be trusting, but trustworthiness can attach to either individuals or institutions". This study adopts this later conception and treats institutional trust as an extension of interpersonal generalized trust.

Reflecting on the above debate, one may note that the concept of 'trust' has puzzled researchers a great deal and efforts to define and clarify the concept has only successfully revealed it as complex, multifaceted, ambiguous and contested (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005:487-488). There is neither a single definition of trust, nor a dominant theory of explaining it. In most cases, researchers give it an operational definition relevant to the focus of a study. This study is not an exception; it primarily focuses on two forms of interpersonal trust, namely; 'generalized' and 'particularized' trust. Uslaner (2000, cited in Gleave et al., 2010:211) defines generalized trust as "the belief that most people can be trusted", and particularized trust as "faith only in your own kind". In this sense, when you trust an individual you know on the basis of familiarity or because of similarities in certain group characteristics, then trust is particularized to that specific individual, whereas when you trust

someone not because of similarity in group characteristics or when you trust a stranger you know nothing about, trust becomes generalized to a larger society.

Institutional trust or sometimes referred to as 'political trust', on the one hand, is regarded as a form of generalized trust because, generally, an individual cannot be said to be familiar with, a big number of individuals who constitute the public offices. Therefore, when one evaluates the government on the basis of its functional expectations, the form of trust is generalized across those individuals with diverse background characteristics who occupy the government institutions. On the other hand, a person's judgment may be influenced by what the institutions and office bearers represent in terms of one's own background and similarities in group characteristics. Therefore, it has been argued that both generalized and particularized forms of trust may co-exist when examining institutional trust (Bahry, et al., 2005, cited in Zerfu, et al., 2008). This implies that the presence of diverse identities in a society is not a problem as both forms of trust can be infused into the overall trust in a society, but what rather problematic is the existence of tensioned relationships on the basis of identity which discourage generalized in favour of particularized trust. On this note, Zerfu, et al., (2008:155) argue that tensioned relationships "may create an environment marred by suspicion among individuals, which in turn may reduce generalized trust levels.

Finally this study engages another important facet of the trust debate about the paradoxical relationship between trust and democratic governance. It is argued that trust is very important for institutional legitimacy, and at the same time, a 'healthy distrust' is desirable for democracy, without even knowing the extent of scepticism needed (Christensen and Læg Reid, 2005:504; 2003:7). This implies that both trust and distrust play crucial roles for the effective functioning of a democracy. Does the absence of trust imply distrust? In clarifying these concepts, Van de Walle and Six (2013) hold that trust and distrust are two distinct concepts and should not be treated as "polar opposite of a continuum". In their critique of prevalent research studies which see trust as positive and desired, and distrust as negative and destructive, and that distrust is the absence of trust, they correctly argue that both trust and distrust may be present at the same time in a society. They contend that while trust refers to "confident positive expectations regarding another's conduct", distrust entails "confident negative expectations regarding another's conduct", and thus distrust is "an attitude in itself" and not a mere absence of trust (Van de Walle and Six, 2013). This study reflects on this understanding in examining trust in public institutions in Zanzibar.

2.2 Significance of Trust

Trust, it is argued, is a key element for the smooth and effective functioning of the state. It is said to enhance regime's legitimacy and popular acceptance of its policies (Jamil and Askvik, 2013:153). Legitimacy is defined as "the belief that the institutions, especially the enforcement institutions, of the state are appropriate and that their decisions ought to be obeyed regardless of whether one agrees with those decisions" (Mattes, and Richmond, 2015:19). In this sense, when citizens support the government they become willing to abide to and support regime's policies and decisions such as tax payment and obedience of the law without coercion. Similarly, trust reduces the possibility of conflicts and friction by encouraging smooth and harmonious relationship with the government and within the society at large (Rothstein and Stolle, 2002).

Economically, trust acts as a catalyst for country's economic development by promoting investment efficiency (Knack and Keefer, 1997 cited in Zerfu, et al., 2008). When confrontation is reduced and government enjoys large support, peace prevails and provides a ground for economic stability. It facilitates smooth and less costly transaction by reducing the suspiciousness and the need for 'strict means of enforcement' (Zak and Knack, 2001, cited in Zerfu, et al., 2008:153).

Finally, trust is claimed to be an important ingredient for the flourishing of modern democratic governance, economy, social and political development, and stability. Putnam (1993:167) considers 'interpersonal trust' as essential element of what he referred to as 'social capital', which he defines as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions". Hence trust strengthen the social fabric of a society by improving cooperation among citizens and promote participation in community affairs. Similarly, Van de Walle and Six (2013, cited in Askvik & Jamil, 2013:460), asserts that "high levels of public trust are regarded as evidence that the government performs effectively, efficiently and democratically", and low levels of trust signifying the contrary.

2.3 Social Capital and Institutional Performance in African Context: A Critique

The sociological trust theory developed by Putnam in his breakthrough work '*Making Democracy Work*' (1993) expounded the concept of *social capital* to refer to trust at societal level. Putnam aimed to explain 'why do some democratic governments succeed and others

fail', and his examination of regional government reforms in Italy revealed that in some regions, where trust relations were deeply rooted at societal level, the regional government reforms were successful, whereas in some regions the governments were less effective because those societies were characterized by a culture of distrust as public life was organized hierarchically, corruption was widespread, disobedience of laws was common, political participation was determined by private greed, and the common citizens disengaged in public affairs (Putnam, 1993:115).

The social capital theory has been heavily challenged since then by number of scholars. According to Rothstein (2004:2-6), the theory suffers conceptual and empirical critiques. On the conceptual level, it fails to clarify the distinction between "organizations that produce social trust and those that produce the opposite". He further argues that "many voluntary organizations and networks are actually built to instil mistrust of other people in general, and of members of other organizations in particular". One may think of criminal organizations and gangs, which instil fear and suspicion among people as what Levi (1996, cited in Rothstein, 2004:3) termed "antisocial capital". The empirical critique holds that "it has not been possible to prove any correlation on the individual level between involvement in voluntary associations and high social trust". Similarly, Tarrow (1996:395-396) questioned whether "the causal link between the political culture of association and the practice of democracy" really a straightforward one. He then claims that policy performance may be positive even in non-democratic states, something that contradicts the assumptions of social capital theory.

In as much as the social capital theory has its own strengths, it does not board well with realities of the third world countries. In most developing countries the civic and associational life is not well developed, and yet levels of institutional trust has been reported to be variably high and these countries are characterized by a problematic state, the economy of affection, the ethnic factor, and big man rule (see, Hyden, 2013; Young, 2012). According to Hyden (2001:161) the conception of the 'social capital' in Africa as formed by social networks of trust, voluntary organization, and collective actions of a civic nature is both biased and misleading. He argues that social trust is not absent in Africa, but is formed based on reasons of 'class solidarity', common values and communal ties. In his analysis of social capital among rural and urban farmers, entrepreneurs, and women groups in Tanzania, Hyden (2001:162) observed a loss of confidence to engage in collective actions in solving common

public problems such as health, education and infrastructure, which require political strategy and mobilization. This is because people were suspicious towards government due to the inherited political legacy of colonial period and highly centralized post-independence rule.

2.4 Theoretical framework: Identity and Performance Approaches

Scholars researching on trust in Africa have insisted taking into consideration the fact that the African context offers a differentiated social reality from that of the Western countries. In comparative analysis, Zanzibar shares features that resemble contemporary and historical political development as that of most African states (see, Hyden, 2103; Young, 2012). However, the nature of interplay of politics and racial identities in Zanzibar makes it characteristically different from some African states. In Zanzibar, it is race in particular defined in terms of differences in colour- rather than ethnicity, which is more inclusive of other attributes like religion, culture, and language. In this case, therefore, identity and performance theories are very much applicable in understanding popular trust in the government. These two major theoretical perspectives identified for this study focus on explaining the sources of institutional trust also referred to as political trust. That is, they attempt to answer the question how trust in public and political institutions is created and maintained.

On the one hand, the identity based perspective views trust in institutions as a product of 'common group identity'. Identity may be defined as "any social category in which an individual is eligible to be a member" (Chandra, 2006:400). This perspective assumes, according to Askvik (2008:519-520) that "one tends to trust members of one's own group and distrust members of other groups". Askvik (2008:521) holds that in this approach "trust in public institutions and the government appears as an extension of trust in representatives of one's own particular identity group, be this a political party, a religious movement, or people of similar cultural or ethnic background". For instance, supporters of the opposition political party may tend to express low trust in the government as they see it reflecting the ruling party's identity. In this sense, trust based on identity reflects particularized trust and as the strength of identity support increases, the level of generalized trust decreases. Hyden (2013:187) maintains that Africans, like anyone else, "have multiple identities and how they see themselves depends on whom they address". This pragmatic identities is what Bratton, et. al., (2005) categorized as self-ascribed identities, which include race, partisanship, regional, and national identification, among others. Given the poor performing economies in Africa,

and yet incumbent governments are re-elected and public opinion surveys consistently report relatively high level of institutional trust, the identity approach claims to offer a better explanation of the scenario.

On the other hand, as much as identity is key in explaining trust in emerging democracies, the capacity of political institutions to deliver on both economic and political fronts is equally significant (Chikwanha, 2005:214). This approach holds that people judge their governments based on perception of pragmatic improvement in their socio-economic welfare. Therefore, in this approach political trust is defined as "an individuals' confidence in government institutions based on their perceptions of their performance" (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011:738). The institutional performance approach emphasizes the role of citizens' evaluation of output of public and political institutions as a source of political trust. It assumes that citizens will trust public institutions "insofar as they are satisfied with public policies and services" (Askvik, 2008:522). This is basically an institutional theory which assumes that institutions do matter. It is a political science based approach to the study of trust which basically argue that the "social capital does not exist independently of politics or government in the realm of civil society. Instead, government policies and political institutions create, channel and influence the amount and type of social capital" (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002:7). Accordingly, "the capacity of citizens to develop cooperative ties and establish social trust is in this account heavily influenced by (the effects of) government institutions and policies" (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002:7). Disqualifying ideological and identity consideration, Mishler and Rose (1997:420) maintain that "in the short term, popular trust in government may be inherited.., in the longer term, however, trust must be earned; it must be performance based". Similarly, Rose and Mishler (2010:24) assert that "trust or distrust in political institutions is primarily determined by the political and economic performance of new democracies". On similar note, Hutchison and Johnson (2001:738) argue that "African political attitudes are primarily influenced by observations of government performance rather than commitment to abstract ideals".

The relevance and explanatory strengths of the two theories is supported in various trust studies conducted in Africa. For instance, in summarizing the research findings on voting behaviour from a number of African countries, Bratton (2013) concluded that African voters are motivated by social identity, but they also consider partisan loyalty and especially economic performance." Similarly, Askvik (2008; 2010) found both identity and performance

having influence on citizens' trust in South Africa, and suggested that the respective theories should be seen as complementing each other. This study is moulded on similar theoretical lines in the context of Zanzibar. However, methodologically, this study differs from that of Askvik, which was primarily quantitative, in that it employs a mixed method approach by adding qualitative data from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to the empirical survey data from Afrobarometer round 6 in Tanzania. Next, I delineate and discuss the 'identity' and 'performance' variables from the proposed theories in connection to the dependent variable-institutional trust'.

2.5 Variables of the Study

A variable is "an empirical property that can take on two or more values" (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996:55). Since social science deals with human behavior, it is better to define a variable as "a characteristic or attribute of an individual or an organization that can be measured or observed and that varies among the people or organization being studied" (Creswell, 2009:49-50). Hence, variable can be concepts such as 'race', which can be attributed to two or more values, say African and Arab, or can be abstract concepts such as 'trust' seen as low, high, moderate and so forth. In scientific research, variables are derived from a theoretical or conceptual framework and can be formulated as hypotheses to provide tentative answer to the research question posed (Creswell, 2009:51). There are various types of variables, however, in this study two types are most important namely, dependent and independent variables. Independent variables are those that are assumed to cause or influence outcomes, while dependent variables are the outcomes or results themselves of the independent variable (Creswell, 2009:50). Simply put, independent variable is the 'assumed cause' and dependent variable is its 'assumed effect'.

2.5.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of this study is institutional trust, also referred to as political trust or trust in government. Institutions could be defined as "mechanisms or structures designed to govern the behaviour of individuals" (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011:739). This also includes the individuals and leaders who occupy the structures. Trust in institutions refers to a person's positive beliefs and expectations that the institutions and "its members in general will act in a competent and reliable way in order to fulfil its objectives and obligations" (Askvik, 2010:26). In this study this variable was measured based on individual's overall ranking of

the government institutions and leaders. Respondents were presented with a list of institutions and leaders and asked to express the degree to which they trust the selected institutions and leaders with a more general question "how much do you trust each of the following". Respondents were asked to choose from a Likert scale responses to determine their level of trust.

2.5.2 Independent Variables

The Study employs two main independent variables: *identity and performance*. According to Creswell (2009:105), a researcher may relate one or more independent variables to a dependent variable in order to measure which among contending explanatory factors best explains the dependent variable. The two independent variables are further defined and operationalized below.

2.5.2.1 Identity Variables

The study employed three categories of identities: the first is the *individual's demographic attributes*, which include *age, sex, and education*. The second category encompasses self-ascribed *social group identities* namely; *ethnicity/race, rural-urban location, region, and occupation*. The third category involves *common political identities* in terms of *party affiliation, historical legacy, and national identity*. Other identities such as language and religion were not included in this study since Zanzibaris are homogeneously Swahili speakers, and about 96 percent are Muslims predominantly of Sunni denomination (Bakari, 2011).

2.5.2.1.1 Individual's Demographic Attributes

The first group of identity variables are the individual's demographic characteristics, specifically age, sex and education. Several empirical studies have focused on understanding how these demographic identities shape individuals' economic, social and political attitudes such as perception of democracy, likelihood of voting, party affiliation, political participation, evaluation of the economy, and policy preferences. To begin with, *age* has been analyzed as constituting different 'generational identities' in terms of youth and non-youth age group. The definition of youth is very much contested and has been defined for various purposes. In this study 'youth' included people aged 18 to 39 years, while non youth are those aged 40 years or above. The minimum age limit for this study was the legal voting age of 18

years like other researches on political attitudes. It is argued that although the African context is characterized by different socioeconomic and political conditions such as high rate of unemployment, poor service delivery, fragile electoral process, and weak party competition, youth political attitudes are not different from other parts of the world (Resnick and Casale, 2014; 2011). In their study of 19 Sub-Saharan African countries, Resnick and Casale (2014; 2011) repeatedly observed that youth, being the most affected age group with unemployment and poverty, are more likely to express pessimistic attitudes and less confidence in the democratic process compared to old people. On the other hand, Mattes and Richmond (2015) found no difference between youth and old people in South Africa on a range of political attitudes. This study posed a rather positive hypothesis considering age as influential on trust, where *young people would be less likely to express trust in the government than older ones*.

Another demographic identity that influences individual's political attitude is **gender**. The social roles and socio-economic conditions that a particular gender group faces are said to influence differences in attitudes and preferences. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, Gottlieb et al., (2015) observed that in context where women are socially and economically vulnerable and dependent, they express different policy preferences such as priority for improved access of clean water and their political participation and representation becomes more limited compared to men. Moreover, public opinion survey findings from Uganda in 2005 revealed gender differences in several political attitudes, where men were more likely than women to prefer democracy, to support multiparty, to reject single party system, to be affiliated to a political party, and to oppose the removal of a presidential term limits (Afrobarometer, 2005). Thus, this study hypothesized that *men are much likely to be critical of the government and thus less likely to express trust compared to women, as men have more access to information, and participate more in political process*.

Finally, there are varied findings on the relationship between **education** and institutional trust. In most industrial countries education has been found to increase political participation and hence one's political trust, while the relationship is negative in most of African countries where in most cases an increase in education has been found to decrease one's likelihood of trusting the government (Croke et al., 2015:15). Educated individual possess greater knowledge about the functioning of the government and have more access to information and thus more likely to be troubled by poor performance characterizing most developing democracies in terms of poor economy, prevalence of poverty and corruption, electoral

mismanagement, and other forms of authoritarian practices. Croke et al., (2015:3) suggest that regime type is more important in explaining the effect of education on individual political attitudes, where they found in Zimbabwe that educated people deliberately chose to disengage from the political sphere as they become pessimistic of meaningful contestation in the electoral authoritarian regime. Interestingly, they found that education increases support for democracy and support for opposition party, while decreases support for incumbent and reduces perception of government performance. The study also hypothesises that *the highly educated individuals are more likely to be critical of the government and likely to express low trust than the less educated ones.*

Overall, the individual demographic attributes of *age, sex, and education* have the most interactive effect between each other and with several other factors in shaping trust attitudes. For instance, Resnick and Casale (2014; 2011) observed that government economic performance and political affiliation are key influences alongside individual's age group, where youth are less enticed to vote and participate in politics compared to older ones. In Uganda, the Afrobarometer surveys (2005) reported that gender and education are equally significant in explaining Ugandans political views, where girls were lagging behind boys in terms of access to education. Furthermore, Gottlieb et al., (2015) found that the socioeconomic conditions affecting particular gender group marked out meaningful differences among men and women in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this study therefore, the individual demographic identities are considered to have influence on individual's inclination to a specific trust attitude together with other factors, but not as direct causes.

2.5.2.1.2 Social Group Identities

In this second category of identity constructs, four group variables were examined namely; *ethnicity/race, rural-urban location, region, and occupation*. The concept *ethnicity* is the most inclusive of social identities and has traditionally been defined to embrace groups unified by commonness of colour, language, culture, history, territory, and religion, whereas the concept of 'race' is a subset of ethnicity and it refers to identification based on individual's skin colour (the two concepts are used interchangeably in this study). However, there is no consensus on the defining attributes of ethnicity, while some treat it as a fixed cultural property that defines an individual; others consider it as an outcome of social relations (Hyden, 2013:207). However, it is widely accepted that ethnicity is a reality in Africa, and that ethnic divisions is a challenge to projects of national integration throughout the region.

Another disagreement in scholarly literature concerns the use of ethnicity as a causal factor to explain an outcome such as voting behaviour, political conflicts, and trust in government. Chandra (2006) suggest that in explaining an outcome one should relate it to a particular subset of ethnic identity rather than ethnicity in general, or rather use ethnicity in conjunction with other factors. In this sense, Chandra argues that "either ethnicity does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked" such as violence and patronage. In a study of ethnic conflict for example, Ellingsen (2000:234-235) observed the effect of other variable in explaining the influence of ethnicity such as when political and economic allocation of resources becomes highly divisive and discriminative on ethnic lines, then ethnic identity becomes hostile and the only organizing force, except when national identity prevails. Others strongly suggest a need to go beyond ethnicity in explaining political and economic outcomes. For instance, in examining conflicts in Africa, Hyden (2013) holds that ethnic cleavages are losing their explanatory significance in the changing context of African countries. Similarly, Zerfu (2008) argues that ethnicity in itself may not significantly affect trust, but rather the interaction between ethnicity and ethnic nepotism can. Also, Keefer (2010:9) argue that ethnic clustering of political support should not be directly interpreted as collective action of co-ethnics, instead, it "is likely to be a byproduct of other features of the political environment", such as absence of information, instilled fear, or coercion.

On the other hand, there are considerable empirical literature which claims strong influence of ethnicity on individual political attitudes and behaviour. For instance, Norris and Mattes (2003:2) observed from a study of 12 sub-Saharan countries that ethnicity based on race and language was the strong predictor of party support mostly in countries where a society is divided by many languages such as Nigeria, South Africa and Namibia, while playing less significant role in linguistically unified societies such as Botswana, Lesotho and Tanzania. Moreover, Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) found that although most Kenyans preferred to define themselves with national rather than ethnic terms, their actions reflected ethnic lines in electoral choices and mistrust among ethnic groups. Likewise, Bratton et al., (2011) observed that ethnicity could explain why incumbents are re-elected despite poor performance of African economies, though they caution against single factor explanation as they also found economic considerations uppermost important. This study therefore, does not dismiss the possibility of influence based on race or ethnicity; *instead it assumes positive relationship* in order to examine its explanatory significance.

Other social categories such as *rural-urban location* and *region* have been recognized as influential in explaining patterns of popular attitudes towards the government. The large gap of access to information, economic conditions, and difference in social service delivery are factors cited to influence an opinion gap between rural and urban inhabitants. There is a mixture of findings regarding opinion differences of *rural and urban* residents depending on a context. Bleck and Michelitch (2015) found in Mali that rural residents were less enticed to identify themselves with the state compared to urbanites due to unmet needs for public services and infrastructure, basic needs insecurity, and physical insecurity. On the contrary, Harding (2010) argues that most governments in Africa pursue policies that benefit rural majority as electoral incentives due to large rural population and hence leaving urban residents dissatisfied. Others suggest that rural areas remain critically poor and less developed in terms of social services, yet rural dwellers are more likely to support incumbent government due to information gap (Young, 2009). Interestingly, the rural-urban opinion differences are much connected to performance indicators, although it is treated as identity category. In this study, therefore, it is expected that rural-urban differences amount to variation on individual's trust attitudes in government institutions. In particular, I expected *rural dwellers to be more likely to show higher trust in government than their urban counterparts due to glaring disparity in access to information.*

The *regional aspect* of identity is both linked to ethnic geography and performance criteria, both of which are commonly associated with variations in political attitudes (Harding, 2010). Bakari (2011) found that in Zanzibar recruitment into public sector was discriminative on the basis of region, and political party support, where by regional origin and support for opposition could be a factor for non-recruitment or dismissal from job. However, this variable has not been widely employed in empirical research on trust across Africa, and hence this study will make a valuable contribution in this regard. The study thus assumes that *regional identity may have significant influence on individual's trust level.*

Finally, individual's *occupation*, in terms of whether working in government, private, or self-employed, or unemployed, has a positive effect on trust level. Given the restricted freedom of expression in most developing countries, it is likely that those employed in public sector or in formal organizations have more positive evaluation of the government compared to those in informal occupations and private sectors. This could be partly linked to what Bayart (2009:188) referred to as 'the politics of the belly' implied in his quote of a Cameroonian

saying "the mouth which eats does not speak", which reflects the compromise made by the employed educated elites and those working in the formal organizations of the state. It also reflects the legacy of single party authoritarianism profound in most African countries. As observed above by Bakari (2011), recruitment into the public sector in Zanzibar was discriminatory based on political party support and regional origin, thus the study hypothesized that *those working in the government sector and formal organizations of the state are more likely to express higher trust level compared to those working in the private sector, NGOs, and self-employed.*

2.5.2.1.3 Common Political Identities

The third category of identity encompasses three variables, namely; **party affiliation, historical legacy, and national identity.** *Party affiliation* refers to the extent to which individuals identify themselves with a particular party. According to Young (2009), party preferences in Africa supersedes consideration of individual's credentials, where if a party is a contender then anyone running on the party label have a chance of winning. In his study of determinants of support for president in sub-Saharan Africa, Young (2009:14) examined ethnicity and partisanship influence and concluded that it was party attachments rather than ethnicity that assured African presidents most reliable support base. I therefore assume that party association has significant influence on individual's trust in government, where by *supporters of ruling party are more likely to express higher trust while expecting lower trust among opposition supporters.*

The second political identity is *historical legacy*, also sometimes referred to as ideological identity. I use the term historical legacy simply to denote the socio-political history handed down from one generation to another. These are beliefs, practices, events of influence, and ideologies of a particular time in history that reemerge and endure or used to shape the present. Essentially, historical legacy can have both positive or negative effect to the current generation depending on the type of history and the belief of a community. Most African countries have had a dark past political history under colonialism which ended in some areas by major events in history including resistance, military coups, revolutions, and regime changes towards independence. The post independence era also brought in its own history under the project of 'national building' which in most cases resulted to various forms of authoritarian regimes and practices that lasted for several decades before the transition to democracy towards the end of twentieth century. Zanzibar has gone through similar history

with its own distinct experiences. In particular, its political history of the Arab colonial rule, the struggles for independence, the independence regime of 1963, the revolution in 1964, and the post revolutionary one-party-state that lasted for three decades until the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992.

Several studies have considered the influences of the past legacies in shaping present citizens' trust attitudes in public institutions. Mbatudde (2013) in her examination of institutional trust in Uganda found events such as the 'movement system' and the turbulent history of war left an enduring legacy to affect political trust attitudes of many Ugandans in various ways. Chikwanha (2005:214) examined two types of influences from the historical legacies, namely; the '*ideological trust*' which he defines as trust originating "in the promises made by the liberating regimes"; and '*experiential trust*' as "a reflection of the governance the citizens have actually experienced under these regimes and their successors". Chikwanha's (2005) reflected on the failure of the new political leadership to deliver on both economic and political fronts and the extent of citizens support to these regimes. In this study, the *ideological* and *experiential* trust are merged together in what I called *historical legacies*. In a similar model, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (SMZ³) has survived since the 1964 Zanzibar revolution initially under Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) and later its successor Chama Cha Mapinduzi⁴ (CCM). Both the ruling party and the government not only maintained the historical identity, but have used past historical influences to mobilize political support of its citizens. The question is, to what extent the government and leaders identity, and historical trajectories experienced by people have influenced trust in governing institutions in Zanzibar. In other words, do people of Zanzibar identify themselves with particular historical perspective and align their support to that effect. The study assumes that historical legacy is strongly linked to citizens trust attitudes in Zanzibar. In particular, the study hypothesize that *attachment to historical legacies of pre-independence incline an individual to trust the government more, while identification with post revolutionary legacies erodes institutional trust*.

³ The current government of Zanzibar even under the structure of Government of National Unity still maintains its identity as a liberating regime. Its Official title in swahili , Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar, translated as the revolutionary Government of Zanzibar is derived from the history of the Zanzibar revolution of 12 January 1964.

⁴ The official swahili title Chama Cha Mapinduzi can be translated as 'the Revolutionary party'.

The third political identity is attachments to one's *national identity* also referred to as geographical nationalism, which is identification based on country's territorial boundaries. This is the most inclusive political identity at a country level by which people of one country are unified with a vision of national interest, rather than appealing for within country divisions, and by which a territorial community regards themselves in relation to others. Several factors are said to influence a sense of national identification including linguistic homogeneity and absence of dominant ethnic group. In a study that covered 16 sub-Saharan African countries, Robinson (2009) found Tanzania to be a singled out example with highest level of national identification due to reasons such as the widespread use of Kiswahili as a second language and in schools, equitable regional distribution of national resources in early post-independence period, and due to the political leadership role of first president, Julius Nyerere. The study also found that ethnicity was positively related to national identification in ethnically heterogeneous societies compared to societies with dominant ethnic group, while finding no relationship between performance indicators such as improvement in provision of social service with national identification (Robinson, 2009:24). This study therefore, expected that *national identification would co-exist with other group identities, and that individuals who identify themselves based on national identity would prioritize performance criteria rather than their ethnic and political identities in their expression of trust.*

2.5.2.2 Institutional Performance

Institutional performance is the study's second major independent variable beside identity. Performance refers to achievements of the state institutions in areas related the economy, politics, and social service delivery. As noted above, in this study I examined performance based on *citizens perceptions* of how well or bad the government has done in key functional areas. In relation to *economic achievements* the study examined individuals' satisfaction with the *economic conditions* both at individual and country levels, which include *perception of employment conditions, poverty, tax payment, price control, and the distribution of national resources*. Moreover, assessment of *political performance* focused on *satisfaction with democracy and elections, perception of corruption, and perception of political stability*. Further, in analyzing *satisfaction with social service delivery*, citizens' perceptions in five key services were examined, namely, *education, healthcare, road (infrastructure), access to water, and electricity*. Finally, assessment of specific public institutions, such as such as the

office of the president, the police, tax department, corruption bureau, and local government, and their overall job performance on specific functional aspects were examined.

There is a considerable empirical literature examining government performance evaluations across Africa, but space does not permit to comprehensively discuss supportive evidences for each aspect. This study will highlight main arguments and empirical country examples to examine its influence on trust in public institutions. In the framework of this study, examination of interactive effects of variables is key in understanding the influence of various factors on citizens' trust attitudes. Several studies have reported that judgments of government performance co-exist with identity attachments in an individual's decision to trust although with primacy of one over the other factor. Bratton and Kimenyi found (2008) found ethnicity and performance evaluation as determinants of voting behaviour among Kenyans, while Young's (2009) examination of seven other sub-Saharan countries dismisses ethnicity and instead found party affiliation and approval of job performance as predictors of support for presidents. On the other hand, there is considerable literature suggesting the primacy of performance evaluation over all other criteria. Logan (2008) for instance, examined trust gap between incumbent and opposition parties in 18 sub-Saharan countries using both structural country level and individual level factors and found performance evaluation having the greater explanatory power in explaining trust gap on party support. Specifically, Logan noted that strong performance in *managing the economy*, and *provision of social services* amount to increase in trust to both ruling and opposition parties, while negative perceptions of corruption affect more the incumbent party.

Moreover, a mixture of findings on the effect of various performance indicators has been reported in several contexts. *Economic problems* were ranked highest of all priorities in 2013 from 34 African countries, with unemployment topping the list (38%), followed by poverty (23%), and management of the economy (13%), among others (Dome, 2015). Young (2009) found modest evidence of considerations of individual's economic wellbeing, strong evidence for job approval, while no evidence for perception of national economy. This suggests that in economic terms individuals judge performance of the government and its institutions on the basis of improvement in their own life rather than the growth in national economy, of which they normally lack cognitive capacity to detect. In 2013 public opinion survey findings from 34 African countries revealed an overall widespread discontent with *economic conditions*, based on measures such as performance in job creation, narrowing the gap between rich and

poor, and improving the living standards, despite growth in national economy (Hofmeyr, 2013). The study therefore hypothesized that *the more positively citizens evaluate government economic performance, especially in sectors related to individual wellbeing, the more highly they will express trust in the government.*

Furthermore, government's political performance in terms of **improvement in democracy** is closely evaluated by citizens in forming their political trust attitudes. Africa has had a recent past of various forms of authoritarianism including single party rule, military regime, and presidential dictatorship, and in some contexts these features are either present or its legacies instills fear in citizens political choices and behaviour. It is argued that against this background that the opening up of political space in Africa makes citizens crave for greater political freedom, civil rights, and competition, and thus granting overwhelming support for democracy and rejection of all forms of autocratic rule (Armah-Attoh, et al., 2007; Logan, 2008:20-21). I therefore expected that *improvement in ensuring free and fair political game will positively impact on trust level, while poor democratic performance such as unfair electoral process will hamper trust negatively.*

Likewise, citizens' perception and experiences of **corruption** as they keep track of the functioning of the government and institutions has huge influence on trust attitudes. Transparency International (2017) defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain," and classifies it into petty, grand, and political corruption. I employ these three categories as defined by the Transparency International (2017), where grand corruption "consists of acts committed at a high level of government that distort policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good"; whereas, petty corruption "refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low-and mid-level public officials in their interactions with the ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments, and other agencies"; and political corruption as "a manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth." They also noted that corruption is destructive to social, political, and economic progresses and has corrive effect on citizens' trust and legitimacy of the governing institutions.

Perception of corruption has been found to have strong influence on citizens trust attitudes in various studies. Armah-Attoh, et al., (2007:20) conducted a comprehensive examination of the effect of perception of corruption on institutional trust covering three rounds of public opinion surveys from 1999 to 2005 in up to 18 countries, and the study revealed that corruption is the strongest factor with negative influence on institutional trust and confidence in electoral process. They also argue that people perceive all forms of corruption as wrong and it affect citizens as they form disillusioned attitudes with democracy and tax payment. Contrary to the assumption of theoretical literature, which suggests strong influence of corruption on tax payment in a sense that widespread perception of corruption creates disobedience in tax payment, D'Arcy (2011:18) observed that in Africa corruption among tax officials did not affect willingness to pay tax, and thus although it erodes regime's legitimacy, it may not affect specific institution. In as much as the relationship between corruption and tax payment or democracy is important in understanding reciprocal effect of performance and institutional trust, this study does not examine corruption in relation to tax payment, instead it specifically focuses on trust in government as its dependent variable. In this direction, Cho and Kirwin (2007) found that corruption produce mistrust in a 'vicious circle' of relationship, where people who lack confidence in corrupt institution try to get service by offering bribe, hence resulting in circular corruption-mistrust relationship. Therefore, I expect *an increase in experience and perception of corruption to influence trust negatively.*

In addition, the level of citizens' satisfaction with ***social service delivery*** has a significant impact on their overall trust level. Africa is less developed in terms of social service infrastructure and citizens' demand in this sector constitute a major priority on government policy priorities in areas of health, education, roads, and home-based services like water and electricity. There are of course country differences in terms of which social service is prioritized among these, but the difference is not significant (Dome, 2015:8). A recent Afrobarometer public opinion used categories of 'public services' which constitutes water supply, infrastructure (roads), and electricity; and 'social service', to include health, education, and housing (see, Dome, 2015). The findings revealed that health service is a top priority (23%), followed by water supply (21%), infrastructure and education (both at 19%), and electricity (13%). Although satisfaction with service varies from one service to another and within-country contexts with a mixture of positive and negative evaluations, it is widely accepted that negative evaluation of government's service delivery erodes institutional trust.

This study therefore hypothesize that *the more positively the citizens evaluate social service delivery the more positively they will express trust in government.*

2.6 Description of the Conceptual Framework


The conceptual framework employed in this study depicts a multiple interaction effect between the two independent variables (identity and performance), and their relationship with the dependent variable (institutional trust) as depicted in figure 1 below. First, the causal direction of *identity* variables are in twofold, (a): *identity* as a direct cause of *institutional trust*, a case may be where regardless of manifest performance indicators respondents persist on their way of expressing trust citing identity as a main factor, and (b): *identity* as influencing the way one evaluates the government *performance*, and hence his/her overall *trust* level. The former scenario describes a blind confidence or complete mistrust based on identity considerations, while the later depicts an adjusted positive relationship of one's identity, in line with the expected evaluation based on one's identity, and hence the expected level of trust coincides with individual's identity on various considerations. Specific identities that are powerful and likely to skew an individual's perception of government performance regardless of the tangible achievements on the ground include ethnicity and party affiliation.

Second, the causal direction of *institutional performance* is as well two-folded. First, *institutional performance* as primarily a direct cause of *trust*. In this sense, *institutional performance* becomes a pragmatic criterion alone of judging the government; and second, *institutional performance* as a factor for *identity* formation and consequently the expression of negative or positive *trust*. That is, the functioning of the government in terms of implementation of policy programs may be a factor reinforcing formation of identities. For instance, as noted above, government performance may influence differences in attitudes based on gender, age group, education, region, ethnic group and so forth. That influence of policy *performance* on *identity* could, on the one hand, favourably create a large stock of trust in two scenarios, first: by means of negative policies such as discriminative policies designed and implemented in favour of a dominant ethnic group or region so that the government may enjoy block legitimacy based on such identity, which is a worst-case scenario. Second, *identities* may favourably express confidence in government influenced by positive policies promoting welfare of a particular group such as policies addressing women marginalization and improving their political participation. On the other hand, such influence may be negative, where poor performance of the government across several public policies

aggravates marginalization of group identities, and consequently causing low trust. The rationale of *performance's* influence on *identity* and hence *trust* is that the primary cause is attributed to public policy performance rather than identity attachments.

Finally, the dependent variable, *institutional trust*, has a reciprocal effect with *performance* variables. This idea is informed by the significance of trust in public institutions as noted above, where *institutional performance* is seen to affect *trust* level, and as a result, respective *trust* level creates either favourable or unfavourable conditions for the effective functioning of *institutions* relative to legitimacy base it has been able to create. A good example here would be the performance of tax collection institutions, where its effective functioning in terms of not being linked to corruption, mismanagement, and the government capacity to allocate tax revenues back to social services becomes a critical factor for building tax payers' trust base, and ultimately creating a smooth tax collection exercise next time around due to the legitimacy it enjoys.

Figure 1: The Conceptual Framework of the Study



Source: Author's synthesis of reviewed literature

2.7 Summary of Major Hypotheses

The study poses three major hypotheses in relation to the theory and research questions as follows:

- Hypothesis 1: *Age, sex, and education influence how an individual is inclined to assess government performance and consequently his/her overall political trust, but are not direct causes of trust in themselves.*
- Hypothesis 2: *Social and political identities may strongly influence one's political trust, or influence significantly one's judgment of government performance, and his/her overall political trust.*
- Hypothesis 3: *The more positively the citizens assess the performance of government institutions and leaders the more highly they will express political trust.*

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter surveyed various understanding of the concept of trust from theoretical and empirical literature. The study focused on generalized as well as particularized forms of trust, and as noted above, the two forms co-exist. If trust is based on identity, particularized trust would be higher, whereas if performance evaluation was more powerful, generalized trust would be stronger. The chapter strongly argued that social capital theory fails to explain the African trust hurdle because the norms and networks of civic engagement are poorly developed in African context. On the contrary, identity and institutional performance theories informed the analysis of the study. The identity and institutional performance theories largely reinforce each others as depicted in the study's conceptual framework, where it was noted that causal relationship could be direct or indirect with multiple interaction effect among variables. This review limited itself on a comparative analysis of trust findings in African settings similar to that of Zanzibar. Therefore, the study makes significant contribution by adding new insights on the significance of identity and institutional performance theories of trust, with Zanzibar as a case study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3 Introduction

The focus of the present chapter is to describe the study's methodology. It begins by describing the research design and specific research strategies adopted for the study. It also clarifies the analytical focus of the study by pointing out the unit of analysis. Then, the research methods employed for data collection are explained in detail as well as showing how sampling was done and the sample size. Moreover, the chapter depicts how data analysis and interpretation of findings was carried out as well as explaining how the study observed considerations for validity, reliability, and research ethics. Finally, the conclusion sums up the main points defining the research methodology of the study.

3.1 Research Design

Research design are “plans and the procedures for research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis” (Creswell, 2009:3). A good research design should allow flexibility, revision, and adaptability at various stages of the research process given that consistency and scientific procedures are maintained (see, Layder, 1998; King, et al., 1994:12). The researcher is the architect of the study and his/her world view, preferences, and experiences, together with the nature of the problem, influence the choice of research strategy (Creswell, 2009: 3-20).


In this study I used a mixed methods design to examine the significance of identity and perceptions of performance in explaining political trust in Zanzibar. More specifically, the study employed a 'concurrent triangulation design' (see, Figure 2). In this approach the researcher "collects quantitative and qualitative data concurrently and then compares the two databases to determine if there is convergence, differences, or some combination" (Creswell, 2009:213). The mixing usually occurs during the analysis and discussion of findings as it enables researcher to compare 'side-by-side' by bringing "quantitative statistical results followed by qualitative quotes that support or disconfirm the quantitative results". In this study, the available quantitative data from Afrobarometer, was supplemented by focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, documentary review, and direct observation method. The analysis was done and findings compared and presented concurrently to cross validate results, confirm or disconfirm findings, or to corroborate conclusions with more evidences.

A mixed methods strategy was preferred because it gives the researcher an advantage to triangulate qualitative and quantitative data sources, to utilize the advantages of their rich methods, and minimize limitations of each. The quantitative approach is more widely used in trust studies because it is more rigorous and can process a bulky amount of data and easily establish causality and generalizability. The approach also strengthens the claim for objectivity as evidences are gathered from a large sample with standard questions. For example, one may examine party affiliation documented by respondents in relation to their expression of trust to see whether party identification influences trust patterns. The quantitative approach though is limited as it does not give in-depth account and clarifications of answers from respondents.

The qualitative approach, on the other hand, facilitates in-depth investigation of cases and contexts and enables the collection of insights, interpretation, and clarification of information from the respondents themselves. It is also a flexible approach that allows follow up questions and enables a researcher to obtain detailed and nuanced description of phenomenon, experiences, and information required. Using the same example supplied above, the qualitative approach allows the researcher to get the respondents voices, insights, and possible reasoning regarding the meaning of party labels and its influence on trust level. Thus the researcher is able to crosscheck whether other factors have more influence from respondents' perspectives. The qualitative approach is commonly criticized for involving greater researcher's subjectivity with potential researcher's bias, and for lacking criteria of generalizability of its findings to other cases.

In the context of Zanzibar's multi-ethnic society and given the contested interpretations of its identity politics, a single approach would have offered a misleading picture, and thus, engaging both approaches has supplemented each other's weaknesses. More specifically, the study was designed for a single case of Zanzibar. The justification of using a single case is that Zanzibar can be considered as either a critical case or an extreme/unique case (see, Yin, 2009:47). It is critical case because, as noted earlier, Zanzibar is a multi-ethnic society, a perfect case to test an identity theory of trust. It is also an extreme, because it differs in many respects from Tanzania Mainland and all East African countries due to the history of politicization of identity, divisive politics, and persistent political conflicts (Bakari, 2011). In this sense, documenting and analyzing this case has been a valuable contribution to trust studies to further test the relevance of identity and performance theories.

Figure 2: Concurrent Triangulation Design



Source: Creswell, (2009).

3.2 Unit of Analysis

Unit of analysis is "the most elementary part of the phenomenon to be studied" (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996:53). This study focuses on an individual as the main unit of analysis. This is because the individual is the basic element from which data is gathered; and individual's perceptions and social attributes become the measure of political trust. Several studies have used individuals' perceptions and their social attributes in measuring political trust (see, Christensen and Læg Reid, 2003; Mbatudde, 2013). However, aside from an individual, one can also use other constructs such as rural-urban location, region, or identity constructs as units of analysis to which findings are generalized. Thus, potentially the study may be regarded as a "single case (embedded) design" (see Yin, 2009:46). This means that the study focuses on a single case, but with multiple units of analysis as findings are also generalized to group of people with similar identity.

3.3 Methods of Data Collection, Sampling and Sample Size

In a mixed method research design, the researcher chooses various methods and tools of data collection from both qualitative and quantitative approach. These include among others, surveys, questionnaires, observation, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and documentary analysis (see Creswell, 2009). The selection of any of these tools must be appropriate for a particular type of data source. For example, secondary data can be collected using documentary review, whereas survey is useful for primary data. This study makes use of multiple methods of data gathering to improve the richness of information and the validity of findings. Yin (2009:114-124) holds that although collecting evidence from multiple sources is expensive compared to single sources, it strongly allows for the triangulation of

data sources as well as methodological triangulation by developing 'converging lines of inquiry' and enhancing research validity. The following methods have been employed in collecting data from primary and secondary data sources, namely; survey (Afrobarometer survey round 6 in Tanzania), in-depth interviews, focus group discussion, documentary review, and observation. Next, I elaborate sampling methods, procedures, and sample size for the survey, focus group and in-depth interview. Sampling refers to the techniques and procedures used in obtaining units of the study, while sample size is the number of elements or units selected from the population for the study.

3.3.1 Afrobarometer Survey, Round 6, Tanzania

Afrobarometer is a non-partisan African-based research network that conducts public opinion surveys on trust, governance, democracy, economic conditions, and related topics across more than 30 countries in Africa through face-to-face interviews in local languages. In Tanzania the latest data available was from the 6th round conducted between 26th August and 19th October, 2014. The country's sample was based on the 2012 National Population and Housing Census, where a sample size of 2,386 adults of 18 years or older was drawn for the whole of Tanzania, with a margin of error of +/-2 at a 95% confidence level. The survey used a nationally representative, random, clustered, stratified, multistage area probability sampling design. Since this study focus on Zanzibar in particular, I took the data for the five (5) regions of Zanzibar from the main dataset. The sample size for Zanzibar was 240. The sample characteristics from the survey fulfilled the criteria for this study.

3.3.2 In-depth Interviews

According to Yin (2009:106), "interviews are one of the most important sources of case study information". In the form of 'guided conversation' interview allows fluidity of inquiry. The 'key informants' may provide critical opinions and insights that may guide the researcher to access "corroboratory or contrary sources of evidence" for further inquiry (Yin 2009:107). One of the limitations of this method is that it requires a lengthy period of time with the possibility of an interview to be conducted in more than one sitting. Key informants for this study involved academicians, civil society activists, and journalists, who have extensive knowledge and experience with Zanzibar society and politics. The interview method was used to obtain expert opinion, which was useful in clarifying, explaining, and interpreting Zanzibaris' political attitudes and patterns of institutional trust. In-depth interview was administered to a total of 10 key informants, namely; 6 prominent academicians, 2 veteran

journalists, and 2 civil society activists (see Table 2). The researcher used a snowball sampling technique in selecting the sample units by starting with his own contacts from University of Dar es Salaam, and then got the rest of key informants by asking them to recommend other targets. The interview was administered using a prepared interview guide to guide the conversation (see Appendix 1), but also the researcher as able to ask follow-up question when necessary.

Table 2: Profiles of Key Informants for In-depth Interview

Number of Respondents	Gender	Profile
2	Males	-Professor of political science, University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) -Lecturer of Political science and Public Administration, (UDSM)
1	Female	Professor of political science, Mkwawa University College of Education
1	Male	Emeritus history Professor (i.e. retired)
1	Male	Lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy, Open University of Tanzania
1	Male	Lecturer in Development Studies, State University of Zanzibar (SUZA)
1	Male	Independent veteran journalist, and media Consultant
1	Male	Former Managing Editor of Zanzibar's 'Cooperation of Government Newspapers'
1	Male	Civil society activist from Zanzibar Youth Forum (ZYF)
1	Male	Civil society activist, Zanzibar NGO Cluster (ZANGOC), an umbrella organization
Total = 10		

Source: Field work July - Sept 2015

3.3.3 Focus Group Discussion

Focus group discussion is a form of interview and a method of primary data collection involving a group of six to ten participants led by a group moderator (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009:150). According to Bloor, et al., (2001:19-21) in composing a focus group the researcher should consider participants' characteristics relevant to the topic to accommodate sufficient diversity of opinion for a meaningful discussion. Sample should carefully be selected so that the group composition may not inhibit fruitful discussion. Therefore, a certain possible level of group homogeneity must be maintained and yet ensure diversity and productive discussion. Since this study involved several cross-cutting measurements of identity variables such as age, sex, education, race, and political affiliation, it is therefore unrealistic to conduct a completely homogeneous group discussion for each identity aspect. For example, one and the same person can be categorized as male, youth, Arab, educated, and

opposition supporter. It is also an impossible task and unrealistic to conduct so many focus group discussion due to time and resource constraints.

The study used stratified purposive sampling to prioritize some cross-cutting considerations to ensure diversity of opinion, adhere to possible homogeneity and encourage free expression of opinion. One limitation that was imposed by the responsible authority issuing the research permit in Zanzibar was that the study should not use 'special groups' based on specific party support. Thus, the researcher was required to select participants with varied party support into each group although initially the study intended to have separate discussion with different party supporters to avoid conflictual views. Thus the researcher flexibly used the following criteria for sampling. The first criterion was developed to capture the geographical representation of the two *regions*⁵ of Unguja and Pemba, where four (4) focus groups were conducted in each region. The second is the *rural-urban* representation due to the glaring differences in development between these locations, that is, for each region two groups were conducted in urban and two in rural area. The third factor was gender whereby in each sub-location (rural-urban), female participants formed separate group from male participants. The rest two criteria were used to select participants into the groups, where the fourth criterion was *age*. In each group half of respondents were between 18 to 39 years and the other half aged 40 years or above. The fifth and last criterion was *party affiliation*, among the four youth participants two were opposition affiliated and two were affiliated to the ruling party, and the same for old participants. Those individuals' not affiliated to any political party, were added to each group when available, but without exceeding 10 participants per group. The study conducted a total of 8 focus groups involving 71 participants (see Table 3). Initial recruitment of focus group participants were done through a short screening form to determine eligibility criteria as for sampling as outlined above. Selected participants were then informed about their inclusion in the groups, the venue and time.

In this study, focus group interview was designed to solicit opinions directly from ordinary citizens about the topic. Data from this qualitative method provided useful information on how people feel about various issues posed through topics for discussion that allowed free expression of variety of viewpoints. The researcher acted as a moderator of the discussion, and 2 qualified research assistant with Advanced school education were recruited and trained

⁵ Here *region* refers to the two main islands, not the government administrative structure

to act as assistant moderators, one in Pemba and another in Unguja. Focus group discussion was organized in two stages, first, before the start of each focus group participants were asked to fill in a short 'pre-group questionnaire' designed to record participants' demographic data, and self-ascribed identity, and assigned identification number, which were useful in the analysis of data. Each participant mentioned the assigned identification number before contributing to the discussion. Then, the second phase involved guided deliberations on topics put forward to them by a moderator (see, topic guide fo focus groups, Appendix 2). The discussions were audio-recorded for transcription purpose after consent was sought from discussant prior the discussion.

Table 3: Profiles of Focus Groups

Region	Name of Shehia	Location	No.of participants& Gender	Age category of participants	Party Affiliation
PEMBA	CHOKOCHO	Rural	9 Males	6 - (youth) 3 - (old)	3 - CCM 3 - CUF 3 - Not affiliated
	KANGAGANI	Rural	9 Females	4 - (youth) 5 -(old)	5 - CCM 4 - CUF
	UTAANI	Urban	8 Males	5 - (youth) 3 -(old)	4 - CCM 2 - CUF 1 - CHADEMA 1 - ACT WAZALENDO
	UWELENI	Urban	9 Females	5 - (youth) 4 -(old)	3 - CCM 4 - CUF 2 - Not affiliated
UNGUJA	KIBENI	Rural	9 Females	6 - (youth) 3 -(old)	4 - CCM 5 - CUF
	POTOA	Rural	8 Males	3 - (youth) 5 -(old)	4 - CCM 4 - CUF
	JANG'OMBE	Urban	10 Females	7 - (youth) 3 -(old)	3 - CCM 3 - CUF 4 - Not affiliated
	KIDONGO CHEKUNDU	Urban	9 Males	4 - (youth) 5 -(old)	4 - CCM 4 - CUF 1 - CHADEMA
Total	8 Groups		Total= 71		

Source: Field data July-September 2015

3.3.4 Direct Observation

In a case study design that focuses on current issues, the researcher's role in making observations of the proceedings around the study setting is very significant. Direct observation method is a source of primary data that allows the researcher to observe the context, behaviours, conditions, and events relevant to the study. It provides additional

information about case characteristics of the topic under study that could otherwise not be obtained away from the natural setting (Bloor, et al., 2001:110). This method offers the opportunity for researchers to obtain information direct from the case and its surroundings. This method was used throughout the field work to seek more information about the study context. Also, the method was useful in observing the economic, political and security conditions, the actual services and infrastructures during the field work. The research observed some of the proposed ways of increasing the reliability of this method such as the use of photographic evidences of some physical observable phenomena of interest after seeking prior consent in certain situations (Bloor et al., 2001:110-111).

3.3.5 Documentary Review

Documentary information was another important source of secondary data that was widely accessed during the field work. This study sought information from formal studies available on the internet, and library. Also, official reports such as national demographic and household surveys, and key information from useful websites were consulted. The researcher is aware that these sources may report information potentially biased from the authors' viewpoints or the intended audiences, and hence information was cross-checked with other sources of information for verification.

3.4 Data Analysis

Data analysis involves "preparing the data for analysis, conducting different analyses..., representing the data, and making an interpretation of larger meaning of the data" (Creswell, 2009:183). Data analysis relates both to the procedures chosen and the theoretical view of the research and hence is connected to various stages of the research process to ensure validity and reliability of the conclusion (Creswell 2009:218-219). In this research both quantitative and qualitative techniques of data analysis were employed. Data from Afrobarometer surveys are already processed into an SPSS file; hence statistical measures of Chi-square and correlations were utilized to determine relationship between variables and to test the significance of variation. Also, data from interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, translated, and grouped into thematic categories to simplify the use of content analysis technique. Similar procedures were utilized in the analysis of focus group discussions. Data were manually allocated with index codes (labels) and placed into thematic categories relevant to analytical themes to make them easily manageable for interpretation. Data

interpretation was done by examining each hypothesis in relation to thematic categories to see whether the responses confirm or refute it. Speech statement from participants were quoted and supplied as evidence in support of propositions.

3.5 Validity and Reliability of the Study

Validity and reliability relate to the overall quality of the study. According to Yin (2009:40), four criteria can be used to measure the quality of the study in social science inquiries. These are: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability. These are very important considerations especially for a case study design in order to enhance its overall credibility.

3.5.1 Validity of the Study

Validity criteria aim to ensure that the methods, and procedures used validly and accurately measured or investigated the topic. Discussed below are three validity measures recommended for a research study to take into consideration to enhance its overall acceptability.

3.5.1.1 Construct Validity

Construct validity is about developing sufficient operational measures in terms of clarity of concepts and objective judgment criteria in making sense out of data (Creswell, 2009:41). This serves to reduce researcher's bias although subjective judgment cannot be completely overruled in qualitative research. This study has clarified concepts used and cited a number of scholars that have applied similar concepts in their studies. Multiple sources of evidence outlined above constitute another strategy that have been used to enhance construct validity of the study. The researcher established a chain of evidence linking various aspects of the research by following the stipulated procedures of the study.

3.5.1.2 Internal Validity

Yin (2009:42-43) argues that internal validity "is mainly a concern for explanatory case studies, when an investigator is trying to explain how and why event x led to event y". This also relates to a problem of making inferences. Yin further argues that in order to ensure a 'causal relationship' between independent and dependent variables, a researcher needs to consider alternative rival explanations so that the 'third factor' effect does not render the claimed relationship spurious. This study adheres to these recommendations by examining

both identity and institutional performance factors in explaining political trust. The researcher also looked for possible explanatory frameworks such as the 'social capital' theory, but could not fit in the context. The qualitative approach was thus used to provoke opinions from key informants regarding other possible causal factors of institutional trust.

3.5.1.3 External Validity

External validity concerns the possibility of generalizing the findings "beyond the immediate case study" (Yin, 2009:43). Concerns of generalizability are often raised to criticize qualitative case study design, particularly 'a single case'. This study enjoys both the formal generalization advantage derived from quantitative approach and the 'analytical generalization' of qualitative methods because it used mixed method approach. According to Yin (2009:43), formal generalization "relies on statistical generalization" where "a sample is intended to generalize to a larger universe", whereas case studies offer 'analytical generalization' whereby "an investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory" not on other cases.

3.5.2 Reliability of the Study

Reliability is about consistency and repeatability of the research process, that is, if the same tests, procedures, and conditions are repeatedly applied by other researchers, the similar findings will be derived. Yin (2009: 45) argues that "the goal of reliability is to minimize errors and biases in a study" by documenting clearly all the methods and procedures used from the initial research process to its conclusion. In this study the author kept records in a well organized manner including researchers notes from interviews, observation, and documentary analysis and other forms of proof collected from the field to increase reliability. Also, the researcher has ensured that proper citation of actual sources consulted are supplied. The limitation of these strategies is that the information at the disposal of the researcher may not be kept long after the completion of the research project, except few crucial attachments. In this final report I have supplied some important attachments including tools of data collections, and research clearance letter.

3.6 Ethical Consideration

Ethical issues are important consideration for the credibility of the research study in various stages. In studies involving human participants, a researcher is supposed to protect and "develop trust with them; promote the integrity of the research; guard against misconduct and

impropriety that might reflect on their organizations or institutions" (Creswell, 2009:87). This research adhered to ethical considerations from the initial intentions of the research, data collection, data analysis and interpretation, and finally the same was ensured during writing and submission.

The study taken into consideration the initial ethical issues related to the formulation of the research problem and its purpose, which is clearly identified in this paper. The study secured the legal research clearance for data collection from relevant authority (see Appendix 3). The researcher asked for an informed consent from respondents, introduced himself and his assistants and the aim of the research properly, and avoided influencing respondents' opinion. Also, considerations on data analysis such as following the professional and scientific procedures of research analysis and interpretation, as well as issue of concern for scientific writing of the final report will be taken into account.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has put forward the methodological procedures of doing research on political trust. It used a mixed method approach and in particular a case study design. Data were collected using five main tools from both secondary and primary data sources, namely, quantitative survey, in-depth interviews, focus group discussion, direct observations and documentary analysis. Data analysis plans were proposed and criteria of quality of the study were described in line with research ethics. The study has largely tried to supplement the weaknesses of using single design in doing research to enrich the validity and reliability of its findings.

CHAPTER FOUR

INSTITUTIONAL TRUST: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

4 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses findings on the dependent variable of the study. The main objective of this chapter is to examine the status of citizens trust in public institutions. This provides a springboard to explore the roles of identity and institutional performance as the two major independent variables of the study in the following two chapters. The findings and discussions presented here and in the subsequent sections are derived from various sources of data and the researcher's personal reflections on the findings. The quantitative data are derived from the Afrobarometer Survey Round 6 in Tanzania, which are then triangulated with qualitative evidences in discussing the topics so as to clarify, confirm, disconfirm, or corroborate the findings of the survey by providing further evidences. The qualitative data include primary data from 8 focus group discussions conducted between July and September 2015. Also, the analysis is enriched further with findings from ten in-depth interviews conducted in the same period, and direct field-observation, as well as documentary review.

4.1 The State of Institutional Trust in Zanzibar


As explained in previous chapters, in this study trust was measured in terms of people's expressions of confidence levels and feelings of satisfaction with public institutions. These perceptions are judgments of how well public institutions met its functional obligations towards its citizens and the relationship people have towards them. Higher trust level is regarded as a political capital for the smooth functioning of the state institutions, whereas lower levels of trust inhibit institutional performance as institutions lack support base for its policies and decisions (Jamil and Askvik, 2013:153). The study assumed similar analytical framework on the impact of trust and institutional performance. Below I present and discuss findings that give an overview of trust in public institutions in Zanzibar.

4.1.1 Citizens Confidence in Various Public Institutions

It is argued that trust is not constant throughout a number of public institutions, and therefore, although one can speak of trust in government or public institutions in a general sense, it is also important to understand how people judge specific institutions, such as the police, the courts of law, and the parliament. In the Afrobarometer survey, respondents were presented with a list of public institutions and were asked to indicate their trust levels for each. The

response categories included 'Not at all', 'Just a little', 'Somewhat', and 'A lot'. For purposes of simplification of analysis throughout the study, I grouped the first two responses- 'not at all' and 'Just little'- as 'low trust', and the remaining two responses, that is, 'somewhat' and 'a lot', as high trust. The results of their ranking is depicted in below.

Figure 3: Trust in Various Public Institutions in Zanzibar



Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

At this level, it suffices to make some general observations of ranking for each institution and the trust level it is attributed to before explaining the causes of that score in the subsequent sections. Figure 3 above shows that amongst the surveyed institutions relevant to this study, trust was highest in the president (67%), followed by the army (58%). The disapproval score of trust as 'just a little' or 'not at all' was highest in the opposition political parties (59%) followed by the tax department (57%), the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the police both at 55 percent, the courts of law (54%), and the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau - PCCB (53%). Data also reveals that some institutions received moderate trust scores such as the parliament (50%), the ruling party and local government both at 52 percent trust level against 48 percent of disapproval score.

4.1.2 Overall Citizens Trust in Public Institutions in Zanzibar

Having observed trust score in specific institutions, it is imperative to derive an overall picture of trust in public institutions in Zanzibar. In the Afrobarometer survey round 6 there

was no general question included asking people of their overall trust ranking. What I present here is a calculated cumulative score of trust across the surveyed institutions presented above. This cumulative trust scores offer an overall picture of trust levels and could help explain the amount of legitimacy the government or public institutions collectively enjoy from its citizens. Table 4 below shows the overall trust level scores for public institutions in Zanzibar.

Table 4: Overall Trust in Public Institutions in Zanzibar

Response	Number of responses	% of Responses
Not at all	50	21
Just little	72	30
somewhat	61	25
A lot	57	24
N=240	240	100%

If we take the data (Table 4) and apply the 'hight trust vs low trust' cotegorization proposed above for easy interpretation of the findings, then the data can be interpreted to indicate that 51 percent of respondents had low trust compared to 49 percent who showed high. This implies that the government and public institutions in general command a relatively moderate trust from its citizen. This trust results should merit a concern from the government and public institutions in general because it means public institutions and its policies lack support from half of the population.

The study investigated further the trust levels depicted above by analysing respondents' opinions about the country's direction. In the survey, participants were asked of their opinion whether they thought the country was going in a right or wrong direction. Their responses were cross-tabulated with the overall institutional trust variable. As shown in Table 5 below, the findings revealed that an overwhelming majority (78%) were of the opinion that the country was going in a wrong direction. Nevertheless, desite having evaluated the direction of the country negatively, 43% among them still expressed high trust.

Table 5: Relationship Between trust and Perceptions of the Country Direction

	Going the Right direct	Going the wrong direction
High trust%	73	43
Low trust%	27	57
Total%	100	100
N=239	n=52	n=187

Question: *Some people might think the country is going in the wrong direction. Others may feel it is going in the right direction. So let me ask YOU about the overall direction of the country: Would you say that the country is going in the wrong direction or going in the right direction?*

The observed difference is statistically significant and visibly shows the need to further scrutinize the findings on trust scores to determine the factors that affect citizens' trust in Zanzibar. This is because, the fact that trust in government and public institutions in general is half divided as noted above does not concur with the fact that 78 percent of the same respondents (187 out of 240) felt the country was going in the wrong direction. One would have expected that perceptions of country's direction would relatively correspond to the assessment of trust in government. That is, given the overwhelming negative feeling of the country direction, one would expect to observe a higher disapproval level. Since that was not the case in the findings presented, it implies that the understanding of trust attitudes in Zanzibar is a complex phenomenon, there is a need to examine multiple possible factors responsible in explaining the observed trust levels, as this study assumed.

Opinions from the well-informed key informants obtained through in-depth interviews also reiterate this puzzle. A political scientist from the University of Dar es Salaam claimed that *'Zanzibar's citizens trust towards their government is dwindling'*. Similar conclusions were reached by all key informants of in-depth interviews based on their analysis of Zanzibar's socio-economic and political context. Their impression, however, does not match with the trust perceptions expressed by citizens' themselves in the Afrobarometer survey. Indeed, citizens opinions from focus group discussions collected by the researcher roughly confirm the Afrobarometer survey findings that trust was relatively moderate among participants, prompting further inquiry into it to understand responsible factors.

4.2 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I examined the state of trust in public institutions in Zanzibar. Trust levels were measured separately for each institution to determine the highest and lowest ranking among the listed public institutions. The findings show that trust varied throughout specific public institutions, implying that trust in each institution is affected by specific factors perceived by individuals. It was important to note such observed differences of trust scores in specific institutions so as to explore and link factors affecting such attributed score in the subsequent sections. Moreover, the results show that the overall trust level depicts that citizens' disapproval and approval perceptions were of relatively equal measure. This signify the need to be concerned for public institutions because such is not a healthy state of trust in public institutions as it could have an impact on the amount of legitimacy the government is afforded in executing its duties. Finally, findings on perceptions of the country's direction presented a perplexing results that show the need for further examination of factors affecting institutional trust. That is the subject of subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER FIVE

DOES IDENTITIES MATTER FOR POLITICAL TRUST?

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

5 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses findings on the influence of identity (one of the two major independent variables) on citizens' trust. Having examined the status of institutional trust in Zanzibar, I now present and discuss findings on identity variables in an attempt to explain the observed patterns of trust in Zanzibar. Again this chapter make use of both quantitative data from Afrobarometer Survey, and qualitative data from focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, field observation, and documentary review.

5.1 The Place of Identity in Trust Attitudes Among Zanzibaris

In this study, *identity* is one set of independent variables, which is further divided into demographic attributes (age, sex, education), social identities (location, occupation, ethnicity, and region), and common political identities (party association, national identity, and historical legacy). In the following sections I examine each of these variables in the light of findings from both quantitative and qualitative data sources to determine their effect on citizens' political trust.

5.1.1 Demographic Identities

5.1.1.1 Age

As shown above, age was categorized into two major groups: the youth which included respondents aged 18 to 39 years, and the elderly which comprised participants aged 40 years or above. Age was not the main criteria of sample selection in the Afrobarometer Survey Round 6, but it appeared that these age groups were relatively well represented in the data. The findings in Table 6 below reveal that Trust was moderate at an average of 50 percent throughout youth and older population. The observed difference was not statistically significant, that is, trust attitudes were not influenced by respondents' age group.

Table 6: Relationship Between age and Institutional Trust

	Age between 18 - 39 years	Age 40 years or above
High trust%	49	50
Low trust%	51	50
Total %	100	100
N=240	n=130	n=110

Data from qualitative focus group discussions and in-depth interview disconfirm the above findings. In the focus discussions, there were strong opinions among the youth group that the youth are less trusting compared to their older counterparts because they are less tied to the history and politics of the past. They are also less likely to have *strong* connections to political parties, because the majority of them have little interest in politics as their main concern is lack of employment and economic progress. The youth are economically disadvantaged compared to their old counterparts. On the contrary, the old generation in the group were not entirely trustful, but showed high propensity to be entangled in the past memories which influence their trust attitudes. In the groups it was observed that while most of youth detached themselves from identity based descriptions, as will be seen in the next sections, they prioritized performance considerations in forging their trust attitudes. As discussed from Kidongo Chekundu makes his point clear about the influence of age on trust, he held that *"most of us from young ages and some people up to fifty years, we didn't witness the revolution or the colonial rule. For most of us we care about a responsible government, not our political ideologies"*.

From the analysis of those very familiar with Zanzibar's politics among scholars, and those who work closely with the society in Zanzibar including prominent journalists and civil society activists, who were key informants in my in-depth interview, it is clearly that age is an influential factor in trust attitudes among Zanzibaris. All of the 10 key informants agreed that youth are increasingly becoming detached from the politics of the past, while the old generation are prone to be influenced to the politics of race, and party attachments. A key informant, a prominent history scholar, noted this in his discussion, he observed, *"it seems the young people are coming out now and say they are tired of the history, tired of this politics and they are beginning now to behave differently. The old generation is much more inclined to identity and history attitudes. The old generation, people of more than 50 years, and even among the politicians, they are very worried. And many of the youth don't go to political*

party meetings." Another key informant suggested that senior citizens and those who directly benefit from the government even among the youth are more likely to express higher trust.

It suffice to conclude therefore that age has influence on trust attitudes among Zanzibaris despite the observed statistical findings presented above. Thus the study hypothesis that youth are more likely to express less trust than the older population is affirmed. As I move on to examine other variables in subsequent sections such as ethnicity, historical legacy, and party affiliation, the influence of age would be more clarified by words from participants own words as young people vehemently reject association to identity while some section of the old population would identify themselves with it, hence affecting the trust attitudes differently.

5.1.1.2 Gender

Men and women are said to hold different trust attitudes towards public institutions. This study also hypothesized that gender identity shapes individual's trust perceptions. The survey used gender as one of its sampling criteria, hence male and female respondents were equally represented (120 each). The findings shown in Figure 4 below also confirm that gender was positively related to individual's trust level and the observed difference was statistically significant. It was found that women showed more trust (57%) compared to men (43%).




Figure 4: Relationship Between Gender and Institutional Trust

Findings from focus group discussions support the above findings. However, women raised some dissenting issues of gender concerns in relation to government performances in areas of

security and employment, though for some, their political judgments remained indeferent. Some of the issues affecting women that were widely discussed in focus groups included sexual bribery in employment sectors, sexual abuse in the community such as rape where those who commit crimes go unpunished, poverty and low income especially for widows, and poor social services such as shortage of clean water. Nertheless, some women still were not influenced by their evaluation. A female discussant from Kibeni was clearly very disturbed by the rampant corruption in the country, but when asked who is responsible for it, she replied, *"no one! It just destroys us completely. Who should we blame? We don't know who can fight it. All we need is to thank God! That's it"*. It can be argued as observed in the literatre review that women's limited political participation, and due to their gender roles in Zanzibar society, means that they likely to have limited political knowledge and limited access to political information. Thus, they are less likely to be influenced by their disatisfactions of policy issues, and some may fail to link their sufferings with issues of governance and administration. In contrast, their male counterpart are more exposed to political processess as this could highly increase their access to political information. Men are also bread winners for their families, hence the as they face extreme economic hardships they become likely to be disatisfied with the government.

5.1.1.3 Education

Contrary to the hypothesis of the study, the findings show that education has no relationship to individual's trust in public institutions as shown in Table 7 below. The 'less educated' category consisted of those with informal education and all levels of formal education below secondary school (including those who did not complete secondary school), while the 'highly educated' category comprised those who completed secondary school, post secondary school, and higher levels of education. The findings show that although there is a bit of variations in terms of expression of trust between the less educated and highly educated people, where by the less educated expressed a little higher trust (51%) compared to trust level among highly educated group (45%). The difference is however statistically not significant. This could probably be attributed to the nature of the sample, high literacy rate in Zanzibar, and high political awareness of citizens stimulated by the small size nature of the polity and its political culture, as explained below.

Table 7: Relationship Between Education and Institutional Trust

	Highly educated	Less educated
High trust%	45	51
Low trust%	55	49
Total %	100	100
N=240	n=69	n=171

To start with, education was not a crucial sample criteria for the Afrobarometer survey and this could have influenced the results, where the variable was not meaningfully represented. Coincidentally, the 'less educated group appeared to be overrepresented, where among the 240 respondents interviewed, 171 (71%) could be categorised as 'less educated' based on the study's categorization, whereas only 69 (29%) were highly educated.

Another explanation could be that the impact of individuals' education level in understanding common political issues is less influential due to the high literacy rate in Zanzibar society. According Zanzibar Household Budget Survey report 2014/15, among adult population in Zanzibar (15 years and above), literacy rate was 84 percent (where by rural area is 76 and urban 92), while percentage of adults with no education was 16, majority of whom (23%) were in rural locations compared to (8%) urban areas (URT, 2016a). The literacy⁶ rate in Zanzibar is considerably high compared to Mainland Tanzania. Therefore, high literacy rate in Zanzibar could be an important factor in explaining why level of education was not observed to have a significant impact on trust attitudes, because large percent of the population have the basic literacy skills required to access political information.

Moreover, field data from qualitative focus group discussion do not differ much from the findings presented above, although opinions from indepth interviews seem to suggest education as an important factor in Zanzibaris' trust attitudes. In the focus group discussions participants of different education levels showed high awareness in their assessment of several issues at an individual level and the country at large. Non of the discussants considered level of education as necessary in relation to trust attitudes. In their opinions, every citizen of Zanzibar was very much aware of the politics and the differences in

⁶ Note: Zanzibar Household Budget Survey 2014/15 used a new test of asking individuals to read from a card as a literacy test.

expression of trust could be attributed to other factors of identity and performance rather than education.

Furthermore, almost all key informants observed that Zanzibar being a small polity with a small population size, communication of political information spread quickly and reached almost every corner in a short period of time. A key informant from University of Dar es Salaam observed that Zanzibar's small size and intensity of political competition were two key factors for high political awareness, he noted, "*since the early days of what we call "the era of politics" that refers to the period during the struggle for independence. Given its **small size**, it was very easy to disseminate information. So even during the early days of the struggle for independence the level of political awareness in Zanzibar was very high. Whether you live in urban or rural areas you could be easily reached by those who were propagating politics those days. And **the intensity of competition** then, it was a deeply divided society in terms of politics, it has continued to be divided so politically to date, not socially.*

In addition to that, another key informant, a prominent journalist, noted that political activism was at the peak in Zanzibar society because of strong feelings of Zanzibari nationalism that propelled high level of political participation, and in particular the '*vibaraza*' tradition has become a source of political awareness for a wider population. He noted, "*in Zanzibar's culture there's something we call '**gossip centers**', or *vibaraza*⁷ or *vijiwe*. Actually these are like learning centers where people would have coffee and *visheti* and dates, but at the same time they talk of issues such as Afghanistan, issues of Asia, African continent, and football. So through these conversations people learn a lot, and therefore, their political awareness becomes very high through these *vibaraza*."*

Finally, the issue of political competition was widely elaborated by key informants. They argued that high political awareness was influenced by issues such as the suppression of political space and negative impacts of post revolutionary policies and practices and during one party rule. These, together with the 'Union question' make Zanzibaris politically active in terms of complaints, defending their identity, and a sense of the need for change of political

⁷ *Vibaraza* or *vijiwe* is a swahili slang meaning meeting places for informal/casual talks. The topics in those gatherings could be about society, politics, or sports, and involve different age groups. *Vibaraza* are very common in Zanzibar organized especially during evenings.

system. Therefore, it is quite understandable that the impact of individual's level of education on their trust attitudes is not so much pronounced.

5.1.2 Social Group Identinties

5.1.2.1 Ethnicity and Race

Zanzibar is a heterogeneous racial community representing varieties of ethnic groups from Mainland Tanzania and some peculiar local ethnic categories. As mentioned earlier, the study regrouped the ethnic categories into three politically significant ethnic groups namely, the Africans, the Shirazis, and the Arabs. It is important to note that in the Afrobarometer survey, ethnic identity was not a criteria in sample selection. However, placed into the above-mentioned categories the sample from the survey depicted meaningful representation of ethnic identity, where among 240 respondents, 40 identified themselves as Africans, 89 were Shirazis, 10 were Arabs, 2 from other ethnic groups, and 99 described themselves by national identity rather than their ethnic attachments.

Table 8: Relationship Between Ethnicity and Institutional Trust

	Africans	Shirazi	Arabs	Others	National Identity
High trust%	60	50	36	100	45
Low trust%	40	50	64	.0	5
Total %	100	100	100	100	100
N=240	n=40	n=89	n=10	n=2	n=99

The findings above (Table 8) reveal that 60 percent of the Africans showed high trust, whereas Shirazis depicted moderate trust (50%), while Arabs had the lowest trust level (36%). It is interesting to note that about 41 percent (99) of respondents perefere national identification than their ethnici attachments. However, overall, the observed difference is statistically not significant, and thus there is no relationship between ethnicity of respondents and their trust level.

The above findings are confirmed by qualitative evidences from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. There was a vehement rejection of ethnicity as a factor for explaining trust in government. This doesn't mean that ethnic or racial identity was absent, but rather it was not considered a significant factor in explaining citizens' political attitudes. That was the dominant view from focus groups regardless of participants' age group, gender, or party

affiliation, while few (less than five percent) still thought ethnicity was influential. The first thing, discussants took time to clarify was that despite the political propagation about racial conflict in Zanzibar, the social realities is one of harmonious cooperation, understanding and peaceful co-existence among various ethnic or racial categories. One discussant from Utaani stressed on the role of Islamic religion in ensuring that recognition of identities served identification purpose only, he stated, *"we know each other by tribes, ethnic groups, or origin for purpose of identification only. We have buried all those ethnic hatred in the distant past. You don't hesitate to mention your tribe, but only for purpose of knowing each other and our historical roots. These are the teachings of our religion and we live by them."* Another participant from Chokocho explained the misconception others have about Zanzibar society being ethnically conflictual, he critically observed...

"you may hear a lot of people say nonsense about Zanzibaris being ethnically or regionally hostile and divided. Socially there is no such a thing, we are very united and we live in peace and cooperation. Our marriages have crossed the ethnic borders, a Pemban married to a Tanganyikan, a Makunduchi in marriage with a Pemban. Myself, a Pemban, I got my daughter married to a Makunduchi and some people say we are hostile. No! we don't have segregation of humans against other humans based on our social differences".

Another discussant in the same group was in agreement,

"I agree, we have all sorts of ethnic people in our areas. We have Makonde, Haya, Nyakyusa, and Yao from Mainland. We also have Indians, Arabs, Shirazis and Hadimu. Intermarriage have immersed our differences. Unguja and Pemba does not symbolise human differences and we are not hostile for this. We are all Zanzibaris regardless".

Asked of their opinion whether peoples' identification with ethnicity or race is influencing their trust perceptions of the government, large majority of discussants disqualified ethnicity in their political attitudes. A discussant from Utaani clarified what he thought was important consideration in relation to trust in government, he explained, *"in forming my opinion on trust I look at performance of the government. Even if my party takes over the government, I will judge it based on performance. Ethnicity has no place in this for us as well"*. Another one added, *"I agree, even if we are governed by a foreign white man, an Arab, or a Makonde, what matters is performance"*.

Moreover, through direct observation method I found that Zanzibaris were not sensitive with their ethnic attachments. In most cases when local Zanzibaris were asked for purposes of inclusion in the focus group discussion, most respondents were not able to figure out which

ethnic group they belong from many titles they hear about their own descriptions. Most of them ended describing themselves with national identity as Zanzibaris. There were even those who mentioned religion as their ethnic description because they did not understand the meaning of such descriptions of their identity. And for those who able to mention a specific ethnic group, they wondered about two or more options they could use describe themselves, for example, people of Pemba had to choose between *Shirazi*, *Hadimu*, or *Swahili*. The question on ethnicity made most people laugh before they attempt to describe themselves, and even ask the interviewer which one was suitable from many titles they hear are talked about. However, the Arabs and the Africans (Mainland origin) were likely to express their ethnic description easily.

Furthermore, 9 out of 10 key informants essentially echoed the view that the ethnic relations in Zanzibar are harmonious, except when politics are injected into it. I wanted to know their opinions whether they see racial relations in Zanzibar as harmonious, suspicious, or conflictual. Five of the key informants described the racial relations as harmonious, four others thought they were suspicious, and only one informant considered them as conflictual. Nevertheless, those who considered racial relations as suspicious, reasoned that they do so when politics comes into play. The respondent who considered social relations as conflictual cited after election stalemate in Zanzibar as an evidence, she argued, *"I think it is still conflictual. The ongoing stalemate regarding the refuted 2015 elections is one indicator of the conflictual relations that exist. I think this is a reflection of deep-underlying sentiments based on racial and ethnic relations in Zanzibar society"*⁸.

However, there is no valid evidence to support the argument that racial relations in Zanzibar are conflictual, because in every sense the political stand-off in Zanzibar after elections can not be summed up as racial or ethnic clashes. Instead, it can be granted that racial relations are harmonious at societal level, but due to history the racial sentiments *'are used deliberately when they suit politics of the day to drum political support'* and thus become suspicious, as one informant from University of Dar es Salaam observed. Another key informant, a veteran journalist, put it this way, *"if you leave aside politics, social relations of people of Zanzibar have been extremely good. But politics especially this multiparty politics is affecting it. They are made to look suspicious. Now politicians bring in ethnicity, religion,*

⁸ This interview was conducted later (after the October 2015 election) to supplement the study, while most others were done between July and September, 2015.

race and considerations of peoples' origins. But Zanzibar is cosmopolitan, it used to be referred as 'the land of religious tolerance'." One of the prevailing feelings of suspicion among ethnic groups particularly those of Tanzania Mainland origin versus the the native Shirazi, is "the question of who is more Zanzibari than the other", noted a key informant from the State University of Zanzibar. In Zanzibar, the racial politics is propagated in broad day light by the ruling party and the government in power (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Racial Poster Displayed by Ruling-party-supporters at the National Revolutionary Day Celebrations, January 12, 2016



Source: Zanzibar Yetu (2016)

Note: Captioned subject in swahili "*Machotara HIZBU Zanibar ni nchi ya Waafrika*", can be translated as "Mixed race HIZBU⁹ Zanzibar is a country of blacks (Africans)"

The question for further analysis is, has politicization of race in Zanzibar been able to antagonize people on ethnic lines and influence their political support to that effect? To examine this, I refer to opinions from a key informant from University of Dar es Salaam who

⁹ HIZBU is a name of the party during pre-revolution politics, an Arabic word by origin which means 'party' . The full name of the party was 'HIZBU ALWATANI which meant 'the nationalist party'. It is hereby used to describe Arab attachments claimed to be dominating the support of the HIZBU party. The message is thus intended to those mixed race people of Arab origin in Zanzibar.

makes this claim about politicization of race in Zanzibar, he holds, *"those are more or less like stereotypes, ... and otherwise it's like self-deception that these people are bad, but the way you relate to them it doesn't depict that these people are bad. ...[only] when it comes to public employment, or giving some rights to people, then there is some kind of discrimination.* This implies that the politicization of race did not attain the intended effect. Another key informant explained that such strategies are not as effective anymore, he noted, *"more recently because of the deteriorated economic conditions 50 years after the revolution, some of the younger people of all races begin to realize that the problem is not the race, the problem is the government and the economy, and therefore there has been a lot of coming together of people on common interest... But you will find that even now the political and racial arguments are constantly used, not always to the same effect as it would have had 50 years ago."*

Therefore, from the above findings it is clear that citizens perceptions of trust is not strongly influenced by their ethnic attachments. Both, the survey findings and qualitative data from focus groups and in-depth interviews have confirmed this. Hence, the study did not find any strong evidence to show that ethnicity matters for trust, hence the hypothesis of the study is rejected.

5.1.2.2 Rural-Urban Location

The findings reveal a positive relationship between respondent's location and trust level, where trust was lower among urban residents (42%) compared to their rural counterparts (57%), as seen in Figure 6 below.




Figure 6: Relationship Between Rural-Urban Location and Citizens' Trust Attitudes

Exposure to news media was found to be closely affecting the rural-urban gap. When respondents were asked how often they get news from the following sources, the findings revealed that radio was the most accessible media both in rural and urban settings, whereby about 82% had access to radio everyday, few times a week, or a few times a month in rural areas, while the percentage was slightly higher in urban areas (87%). Television was the second most accessible source of news, but the findings show a significant discrepancy of access, where in rural areas only 49% had access compared to 81% among urban population. It should be noted that in Zanzibar the only television channel is government owned because of a limited media freedom, while private radio stations have started to broadcast albeit with severe government interference. Further, the findings reveal a big gap of access to information through other media, where by majority in rural settings (68%) never had access to newspapers or accessed it less than once a month, in contrast to urban respondents (45%). Indeed, access to internet is much limited in both locations, but much more in rural areas (94%) than in urban settings (79%), while about 98% of the rural population did not have access to social media, compared to 80% who did not have access to social media among urban residents. In brief the findings shows the rural dwellers are more constricted in the access to news throughout all sources of media though in some others both areas have extremely limited access, while urban residence are the more exposed to information.

Indeed, other factors such as big gap in terms of income poverty contribute to their incapacity to purchase or access media sources, which seem to be luxurious needs for their livelihood, while high illiteracy rate in rural areas also hinder their access to information. Income poverty and illiteracy rate are reported to be higher and worse in rural areas compared to urban areas as shown in the Zanzibar Household Budget Survey 2014/15 (URT, 2016a). Among the 30.4% of Zanzibar population who can not afford their basic needs, majority are from rural areas (40.2%) compared to urban settings (17.9%), while extreme poverty defined as inability to meet daily needs for food, the most affected area is rural (15.7%) in contrast to urban areas (4.5%). This means the large rural population are unable to be informed through media sources. Meanwhile, the difference in illiteracy is higher in rural (23.9) compared to urban areas (7.7%) from a total population of 16.3% illiterate people who could not even read. The two factors, namely, extreme poverty and high illiteracy rate exacerbate the

information gap which was found to be the key factor in rural urban differences in trust attitudes.

In summary, on this aspect, there was no qualitative data to supplement the analysis, and thus I rely on the above findings to make the conclusion. As shown above, the findings support the study's hypothesis that rural-urban-location is positively associated with differences in trust attitudes. The findings reveal that rural citizens are more likely to express higher trust in public institutions compared to their urban counterparts. Indeed, information gap in terms of access to news media between rural and urban location was found to be the key factor for the observed trust attitudes despite rural areas having lowest progress in various sectors. Further, high percentage of income poverty and high illiteracy rate handicapped rural dwellers critically in the access to information.

5.1.2.3 Region

The literature revealed that in Zanzibar, regions are very much said to form part of people's identity. This study also assumed a positive relationship between regional identity and trust attitudes based on general assumption that people from Pemba, where the opposition party has an overwhelming support, would likely express lower trust levels compared to those from Unguja, where the ruling party draws its major support. Other factors considered as influencing the scenario is the apparent differences in social and economic development between the two islands where Pemba is by far disadvantaged compared to Unguja. However, the survey findings reveal an opposite direction of trust attitudes against the assumptions of this study. The findings show no relationship between regional identity and institutional trust levels. Nevertheless, though statistically not significant, the findings posed a puzzling scenario in this case, whereby Pembans showed much support of the government (53%) compared to Ungujans (48%) as seen in Figure 7 below. This is in every sense contrary to the existing socio-economic and political realities between the two regions.




Figure 7: Relationship Between Region and Institutional Trust

A deeper analysis from qualitative data sources disconfirm the survey findings and suggest that *regional identity* has significant influence in Zanzibaris political attitudes. Before I present the qualitative evidences, first I examine some intricate aspects of the statistical data from the Afrobarometer survey presented above and from secondary sources. To start with, this puzzle could be explained by the nature of the sample having interactive effect with another variable, namely; the (rural-urban) location of respondents. As shown in previous findings, rural-urban location of respondent has positive effect on trust attitudes, where rural dwellers have shown higher trust levels compared to urban residents. This attribute is likely to have influenced the twist of results contrary to the hypothesis of this study. Admittedly, rural and urban locations were equally represented in the sample, by drawing 120 respondents from each locations. However, Pemba being categorized as predominantly rural, and about 75 percent of Pemba's respondents were drawn from rural settings. This is in sharp contrast with Unguja whereby about 59 percent of respondents were drawn from urban areas. As seen in Table 9 below among 120 urban respondents 87% were from Unguja and only 13% were from Pemba. Granted that this might reflect the countours of the sample population in terms of sample selection considerations, I however think that in this case it has also significantly affected and skewed the findings.

Table 9: Distribution of Respondents between Regions and Rural-Urban locations

	Urban	Rural
Unguja%	87	60
Pemba%	13	40
Toal%	100	100


N=240	n=176	n=64
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Source: Derived from the Afrobarometer Survey Round 6 Tanzania dataset (Zanzibar regions)

Furthermore, an important clarification needs to be made regarding the influence of regional identity to trust attitudes. That is, the regional identity was observed to have strong interactive effect with performance considerations, hence supporting the conceptual framework used for analysis in this study. By that I mean that participants from focus groups discussions and in-depth interviews vehemently rejected regionalism as a 'stand alone' identity of respective people. Instead, their opinions suggest that regional identity, which is so pronounced in Zanzibar, was created, shaped, perpetuated, and reinforced by institutional performance factors. This argument could be supported by glaring differences of economic conditions, and political representations in the country's governance between the people of the two main regions. For instance, if official statistics is worth to go by, the Zanzibar Household Budget Survey 2014/15 report a striking disparity of economic conditions between the two regions, cut in half. Consider for example, the two crucial measures of income poverty, that is, the basic needs poverty and the food poverty¹⁰. Among the two regions, Pemba is the most affected economically and by far, where the percentages of basic needs poverty ranges from 47.7% to 69.0% compared to Unguja's 14.6% to 26.3% (Figure 8). This means using a basic needs poverty line scale, Pemba is poorer by 21.4% to 42.7% compared to Unguja. Indeed, by percentages of food poverty, also referred to as extreme poverty, a large population of Pemba (15.7% to 32.6%) languishes into extreme poverty in comparison to Unguja (3.5% to 7.2%). This means Pembans are extremely poorer by 8.5% to 24.5% (Figure 9). It is worth presenting the figures in pictorial format below.

Figure 8: Percentage of Basic Needs Poor Population by District, HBS, 2014/15


¹⁰ The Zanzibar HBS 2014/15 report describe basic needs poverty (also referred to as poverty) as the absolute minimum resources (amount of income) required to satisfy needs in terms of consumption of goods. The food poverty (referred to as extreme poverty) is defined as where the household total spending on all items is less than they need to spend to meet their needs for food (see URT, 2016b).



Source: URT, (2016b)

In the focus group discussion it was widely observed that there were major concerns of economic conditions and the feeling the the government discriminated Pemba in its economic policies and political governance. For example, a discussant from Utaani noted, *"economic conditions are bad for everyone, but most specifically in Pemba. Our government does not encourage industrial and company investment in Pemba. These things need water supply, electricity, roads, and manpower, and we have all that, but all investments are made in Unguja, why aren't they considering us?"*

Figure 9: Percentage of Food (extreme) Poor Population by District, HBS, 2014/15



Source: URT, (2016b)

Thus, regionalism is an indisputable fact in Zanzibar's politics, but it is not based on feelings of social divisions and conflicts, rather it is a sort of identity formed out of common

experiences and a sense of discrimination. A key informant, a prominent political scientist from University of Dar es Salaam, offers some clarification on this, he argued,

*For the regional divide of course there are **historical factors and economic factors**, and above all the **most important are political factors**. For the historical factors, is that even during the colonial time there was a difference, Pemba for example was treated like purely a rural area for production of cloves while Unguja was the center of government and colonial administration. So, most important services were available in Unguja, not even throughout Zanzibar, but just Zanzibar town. The other areas in Zanzibar, the north and south, were as poor as those in Pemba or may be even some areas in Pemba were better off than some of the areas in Unguja. At that time over 70% of the national wealth was being produced in Pemba, but those who benefited from it were based Unguja. That has continued even after independence, Unguja has been the center of everything and Pemba has been a periphery. So, that in itself created a sense of marginalization. Moreover, if you look at the composition of the government of 1963 it was at least reflecting the fair regional representation, but the post-revolutionary government has always displayed that marginalization of Pemba.*

He continued;

*"But it's not a matter of identity [per se], it's just a matter of mobilization and political experience. It doesn't suggest any identity that I am supporting this party because I am from Pemba, it's not a question of identity per se. That's why if you analyze the current political trend there is also a very strong support for the opposition particularly if you are talking of let's say Urban West region and Northern region [in Unguja], the support for the opposition has grown very strong. For example, people of North Zanzibar have been for a long time very strong supporters of the opposition not because of identity [by and of itself], but it's because of political experience, the kind of persecution they have undergone, and the kind of socialization of course. When you experience a particular event or phenomenon over a period of time it create a sort of identity. It may not be a strong identity, but for example, the way people from Pemba were persecuted after the revolution, that in a way created a sort of identity among people in Pemba based on a sense of discrimination. Thus, **a sense of discrimination creates a sense of identity**, it may not be strong as it is depicted, but we cannot ignore completely."*

The point was more elaborated by participants in focus group discussions, accepting the feeling of regional identity and its influence, but giving performance reasons for its existence. For example, a discussant from Potoa clarified that the regional identity is not really a social division that affect social cooperation, but rather a politicized phenomenon used by politicians for their own interests, he holds, *"I think this regionalism is exaggerated. Politicians try to antagonize people for their own political interests. Political posters are being displayed and hatred speeches are preached to make people believe that it's real. But, it has no place in our society and no one truly feels that way about a Pemban or an Unguja fellow citizen"*. Another discussant from Kangagani admitted regional identity is real, but explained the reason behind it from her own personal experience as a teacher, she observed

critically, *"let's speak the truth! The real reason for regional divide (Pemban and Unguja identity) is discrimination by the government. We in Pemba are left behind in everything. We are told because we did not participate in the revolution. I will give you an example, for us teachers in Zanzibar we have BAMIZA (Baraza la Mitihani Zanzibar¹¹). Look at its composition, all sixteen or eighteen members are from Unguja. Another thing, when there is selection for teachers to go for marking national exams almost all of them come from Unguja. They makes us feel miserable and discriminated against. Hence, the Pemban identity becomes stronger among ourselves"*.

Indeed, some arguments may sound ridiculous, but it might be useful present the so as to clarify that the regional identity in Zanzibar is real and its people are identified using all sorts of common aspects of identity including linguistics idiosyncrasies, as this discussant from Jang'ombe potrays it when talking about descrimination in employment, she observed, "in employment when they want to know whether you are from Pemba, they test your pronunciation with a word 'Mkate' [bread], if you pronounce it 'Nkate' then they know you are from Pemba. You wont get that post".

Therefore, from the above analysis, I submit that regional identity influences trust attitudes in Zanzibar, whereby among the two main regions (islands) of Zanzibar, people from Pemba are less likely to express support in government institutions compared to their Unguja¹² counterparts.

5.1.2.4 Occupation

The data reveals out of 220 respondents who had some form of employment, majority (167) were self-employed, followed by government sector employee (34), private sector (14), and NGOs (5). When occupation was cross-tabulated with trust level, the findings revealed a positive relationship as seen in Figure 10 below. Trust was highest among those employed by the government (74%), and among those unemployed which are herein marked as not applicatble (60%), while disapproval score was highest among those working in NGO's (80%), followed by those employed in private sectors (57%), and self employed (55%). The observed difference was statistically significant, and hence, supporting the study's hypothesis that in Zanzibar, people employed in government institutions are more likely to show high

¹¹ Zanzibar Examination Council

¹² Note: Unguja island is sometimes referred to as 'Zanzibar' in some official circles, but legally Zanzibar refers to both Unguja and Pemba and the surrounding archipelago under its jurisdiction.

trust in the government compared to those working in non-governmental organizations, private sector, and those that are self-employed.




Figure 10: Relationship between Occupation and Institutional trust

Opinions from qualitative focus group discussions and in-depth interviews corroborate the above quantitative findings. Employment in government sectors was widely perceived to be discriminatory based on party affiliation and regionalism, where opposition supporters and people from Pemba claimed to be left out. That means high percent of those working in the government are sympathetic with the government and likely to evaluate the government positively and to trust it. A discussant from Utaani lamented about recruitment practices based on partylines, he noted, *"to tell you the truth, this government employs by looking at your political affiliation even for these important posts of medical doctors, someone has to be a staunch supporter of the ruling party. Even if you are less educated you will be employed as a doctor! They sacked so many competent doctors for political reasons and we all know that."*

Similar sentiments were echoed by participants mentioning the feeling that certain sections of the society benefit more by filling most of government employment posts, hence they are the loyal source of government support. A discussant from Chokocho observed, *"certain sections of this society enjoy more benefits from the government not because of their ethnicity, but for political reasons. For example, people from Makunduchi fill most of employment posts from the government. Other sections are discriminated against also because of political reasons."* (quoted in full elsewhere in this study). Indeed, several key informants from in-depth interviews concurred that politicization of public service and state

apparatuses in terms on party lines is very high in Zanzibar. Assessing the GNU in particular, a key respondent from University of Dar es Salaam noted, *"the government has been exclusive in favour of CCM supporters and Unguja at the expense of CUF supporters and Pemba. GNU is inclusive at the top (political leaders), but remains exclusive at the middle and bottom ranks of governance structure."* Others who are employed, but not supporters of the ruling party have to 'keep their mouth shut' and express sympathy to the government for their own survival.

5.1.3 Common Political Identities

5.1.3.1 Political Party Affiliation

Party rivalries is is very much said to be at the heart of Zanzibar politics. The main assumption of the study was that party association positively affects institutional trust, and that supporters of opposition parties would likely express less trust to the government unlike those who are affiliated with the ruling party. The data shows that 113 respondents described themselves as feeling close to the ruling party (CCM), 81 close to the main opposition party (CUF), and 6 close to other opposition parties, while 40 respondents did not feel close to any political party. When their descriptions of party association was correlated to their institutional trust, the findings as seen Table 10 below shows a positive relationship and hence affirms the hypothesis of the study. On the one hand, trust was observed to be higher among ruling party supporters (65%), compared to those who felt close to opposition political parties (33%). Interestingly, those not affiliated to any political party (referred to as 'not applicable') showed higher disapproval level (60%).

Table 10: Relationship Between Party Affiliation and Institutional Trust

	Ruling party	Opposition parties	Not applicable
High trust%	65	33	40
Low trust%	36	67	60
Total %	100	100	100
N=240	n=113	n=87	n=40

Question: *Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that?*

When interrogated further about if presidential elections would have been held the next day which party's candidate would they vote for, respondents remained loyal to their parties' allegiance. About 109 out of 113 CCM affiliated respondents continued their faith in their

party, only 3 of them suggested they would vote for opposition parties, and 1 would not vote. Also, among 87 of those feeling close to opposition parties, only 2 said they would vote for CCM, while 85 of them maintained their loyalty to the opposition parties. This is an interesting observation regarding the strength of party support, which confirms further the above findings by displaying continued faith in their respective parties regardless of other factors.

Findings from qualitative data sources such as focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were extensively elaborate on this topic, and strongly supported the quantitative findings presented above. In the focus group discussions I wanted to know participants view of their perceptions about several issues connected to party support, such as the strength of political party support in Zanzibar, relationship between race and party attachments, relationship between party followers, and the influence of partisanship on citizens' trust attitudes in government institutions. There was high awareness among participants that party attachments were very strong than all types of identity. This was made clear by a respondent from Utaani group who started refuting the role of ethnicity in trust attitudes among people in Zanzibar, he ended his clarification on this note, *"but, as for party affiliations that is a serious business in our communities. An opposition supporter will not change even if employed by the government. 'a co-wife is never happy about sharing a husband"*. Generally, expression of strong party connection was made openly among supporters of the ruling party, while discussants affiliated with opposition parties claimed to be driven more by performance considerations, though also acknowledging that strong party attachments exist. An old discussant affiliated with the ruling party from Kidongo Chekundu said he has no shame to his party's support, he claimed, *"to this political support I always say, 'whatever the heart cherish is its medicine'. Whatever you do to an individual he will not change. I, Kijogoo, love CCM, whatever you do to me I won't change, even if you kill me. I will love CCM until death do us apart"*.

About their perceptions of political parties and relationships between its followers, discussants portrayed that party rivalries was at a conflictual stage where discrimination, social exclusion, violence, and even death have been the consequences in some cases. On the one hand, supporters and sympathizers of the opposition parties claimed that opposition parties were established for good democratic intentions to widen citizens' choice, but there were misconceptions about their roles. They argued that the opposition supporters are

segregated and discriminated against most because the ruling party construe them as trouble makers, which they say, is not true. On the other hand, some of the ruling party's supporters held negative opinions about the opposition parties. This was demonstrated by an old CCM affiliated discussant from Kidongo Chekundu who was explaining to the group his opinions of the origin of opposition parties, he claimed, *"one has to understand these opposition parties. They were not established for purpose of democracy. Each of these opposition parties has a history. Their origin is hatred. They were not formed especially to offer genuine democratic challenges and to stimulate development. No! Their founders have their past history either from party rivalries before the Zanzibar revolution, or they were in the government and they had misunderstanding and decided to form their own parties for vengeance. They emerged from hostilities"*. Others added,

"in this country, if the offender is in ruling party and the victim is in oppositions parties, the case will neither be heard nor processed. There is stigma" [Discussant from Kangagani]

"Even in our society when your neighbour knows you are from this or that party they will segregate you, especially when election politics draws closer. Even those with authorities in our streets, like our street representatives escapes certain houses just because they support opposition, particularly when there is something beneficial. It's hatred all over". [Kidongo Chekundu]

However, participants insisted that ethnicity does not influence party support. One discussant observed critically, *"it is also not true that political support is related to one's ethnic group influenced by history. There are Arabs who are even closely related by family ties to the former Arab colonial family, but today they are leaders of the ruling party. ethnicity is crosscutting in political support not confined in particular party"*. Also in this regard, majority of key informants from in-depth interviews concurred that ethnicity or race have extremely weak relationship to party affiliation.

In summary, party attachments are extremely pronounced in Zanzibar's politics; **you either belong to this or that political party, non-partisanship is simply hypocrisy**; that is a prevailing feeling among Zanzibaris. I noted this from since the first day of administering pre-group questionnaires for selection of participants in focus group discussions. It should indeed be noted that everything circles in to the two dominant political parties, namely, CCM and CUF, and those who claim affiliation to other political parties are simply 'beating around the bush' or branded as 'selfish money mongers'. The expression from this key informant from University of Dar es Salaam is not very far from the truth, though a little strong a statement, he stated, *"I can say that the level of political maturity and participation is very*

high in Zanzibar. **The level of political party support is unprecedented and sometimes infectious.** While people can be followers of political parties, in Zanzibar the attachment to a political party is very strong. However, this partisanship seems to have waned a bit after witnessing some bigwigs crossing over to the adversary party." Other key informants echoed similar opinions and observed that party affiliation sometimes are stronger than Zanzibar national identity or even stronger than religious influences, as one key informant from University of Dar es Salaam put it,

*"Yes it is extremely strong. Those who are in power in Zanzibar, their main preoccupation is solidarity within group (internal solidarity). So whatever it takes so as to hold the group together they will do it. You can say that **political affiliation is so strong to the extent that even religion or religious beliefs are undermined.** The 2001 killings of demonstrators is a testimony of the strength of political affiliation, people are ready to kill people belonging to the same religion because of political reasons. It is also **stronger than the national identity of Zanzibar.** There was an attempt for example to bridge the gap in favor of promoting Zanzibar's national identity as was evidenced by the 10th Constitutional amendment in 2010, then you could see how they behaved in the constitutional assembly. Zanzibar members were split or divided across the middle, it's not that those who opposed the Warioba draft were opposed to greater autonomy for Zanzibar, not at all. All Zanzibaris, regardless of their political affiliation would actually like greater Zanzibar autonomy, **but political survival is also very important.** That's why because of political survival of a particular faction then when it comes to those things that would have an impact for the political survival as a group, as a special group, a privileged group in Zanzibar's politics, then all other things can fall apart."*

The only matter that needs further clarification are the factors influencing party support itself, that is, should it be considered a 'stand alone' identity, or an identity shaped by other factors? The observed dynamic pattern of political support in Zanzibar community as argued above suggests that party affiliation is interactive with other variables as depicted in the theoretical framework of the study. Majority of key informants held that the claims of ethnic or racial influence on party support are utterly unfounded. They nevertheless granted that policy performance and history, especially post-revolutionary history, has strongly shaped political party support. A key informant from University of Dar es Salaam argues that for historical reasons in terms of political experiences *"the kind of persecution they have undergone,.... When you experience a particular event or phenomenon over a period of time it create a sort of identity"*. A veteran journalist described in details such experiences in history including gross violations of human rights describing in full details and names a long list people who went missing and their graves nowhere to be found. He insisted that this pushes people to *"want change either for the better or for the worse"*. He also noted that even when changes start to appear, there emerge some political leaders who he described them as being

"controlled by the legacy of the past", who bring the history into political agenda of the day. Another key informant, a retired academician, considered the changes of political party support map from before independence, and post revolutionary policies, and the current patterns of party support, he concluded that performance criteria were the reason behind. For example, he argued that the Afro-Shirazi (ASP) party, which later merged with Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) from Tanganyika to form CCM, earned about 42% of the votes from Pemba during elections before independence, but that support has diminished to 15% and is declining due to citizens' disatisfactions with the performance of the revolutionary government.

5.1.3.2 Historical legacy

The prominent role of history in the politics of Zanzibar is one aspect that is peculiar in contrast to Tanzania Mainland and some other East African countries. In this sense, it is understandable that the standardized questionnaire used in the Afrobarometer survey throughout Tanzania did not capture this delicate issue. Therefore, I rely on data from qualitative sources to examine the influence of historical legacy on trust attitudes in Zanzibar. Findings from focus group discussions reveal that historical legacy is imprinted in most people's political attitudes even if they do not openly admit. Youth and opposition supporters seemed to play down the influence of history on their attitudes and passionately proposed the consideration of performance indicators, although acknowledging that history is still being propagated in political platforms. A young discussant from Utaani echoed this view, he noted, *"the historical legacy of the government no longer influences the present. It is true there were those who were sympathetic with the overthrown government by the revolution, but time has passed enough and now government performance is the uppermost criteria of judgment"*. Also, others in the same group refuted the argument about the influence of the racial history, which is connected to the pre-independence history, arguing that race is not an important factor for political support.

However, there was some recognition of the influence of a distant historical legacy among older generation and ruling party supporters, and some proudly described themselves with it. A participant from Kidongo Chekundu argued this way, *"you cannot disregard history. History is everything of who we are. History is transferred from one generation to another. There are few who no longer care or don't bother about history, but most of us are shaped by it. We get stories from our parents and grandparents, and they influence our attitudes"*.

Another old discussant from the same group made clear that history was the reason for his continued support in the ruling party, he said, *"listen to me youngman! I am a revolutionist. I don't hide this fact and God knows this truth inside me, and I won't change. President Karume warned us there will come the so called educated people who will bring misery and suffering to us and they won't care about our history. That's why I tell you, I am CCM to death"*. Similarly, a young woman discussant and ruling party supporter from Uweleni argued that she is proud of the government and revolution for they symbolise liberation, she stated, *"we hear that our parents were tortured, chained, and humiliated by Arab colonialists. If an Arab ruler wants to see how a person dies, one would be ordered to climb a coconut tree and shot down to death. If her majesty wanted to see how a women deliver a child, then a local pregnant woman would be brought and brutally operated on her stomach to remove a child and lead to the death of the mother. The revolution came to remove these inhuman treatments"*.

Having provided some initial reactions of discussants, I noted that historical legacies were shaping people's trust attitudes in multiple ways, as much as there were disagreement about validity of various history accounts. The question was then, which history? One type of history, in favour of and propagated by the government and the ruling party, was the historical legacy of colonialism, pre-independence racial politics, and the revolution itself (see Figure 11 below). As noted in the literature review, trust based on this type of history is called *'ideological trust'*, in which the government leaders and institutions are portrayed as liberators or freedom fighters and the hopes they represent. However, this version was highly contested among discussants in the focus group discussions. On the one hand, some discussant particularly the youth and those associated with the opposition parties argued that it was a fabricated history used by the ruling party to intimidate and antagonize people on racial lines to win political support. On the other hand, a small margin of participants especially those affiliated with the ruling party thought it was real and something they care about (see quotes above). Arguably, this history still influences some sections of Zanzibar society although is increasingly losing ground. When this historical legacy is positively received by citizens, it reinforces trust to the government institutions as the custodian of the revolution.

The second version was the history of the post revolutionary government and during one party rule, which essentially works against the government in power. Several issues were

referred to including the history of the unconsulted Union with Tanganyika in 1964, and in particular the political persecution that people undergone under post revolutionary regime for political reasons, as one participant explained, "*as for me, I have never heard of what the other lady has said about torture during colonialism, but I remember when the independence government was overthrown, I was still in standard two, I realized of the revolution when my father was taken away from home. I was terrified.*" In most cases old people affiliated to the opposition held this view, and few young generation referred to it. The third version, which is a predominant concern among youth and mixed other discussants, was the recent history during the twenty five years of multiparty elections that included issues of gross human rights violations, political persecution, economic stagnation, regional discrimination, and in particular, the 2001 killings of demonstrators. Both the second and the third versions of historical legacies could be described as *experiential trust*, which in this case have had negative impact on citizens' trust in public institutions and hence enhanced disapproval level.

Opinions from indepth interviews made some clarification about the strength of influence of the above mentioned historical legacies in citizens trust attitudes in Zanzibar. First, there was wide recognition that historical legacy was an important factor in Zanzibar politics, although majority of key respondents were of the opinion that the prominence of historical legacies of distant past, that is, colonialism, pre-independence, and revolutions was increasingly diminishing. Asked specifically about their opinion whether the government's and ruling party's attachment to the history of revolution, as liberators, was still lingering on people's minds, they were in agreement, but majority thought the feeling is dying out. Below are the views of two key respondents, both of them prominent academicians, they observed,

*"That kind of idea seems to be still there particularly among the old people, those who would identify themselves with the system. There are people who still believe that these are the liberators and they are the ones who are deserving to be in power. That is why you have those kind of statements like "we cannot surrender power simply through a ballot paper", meaning that Zanzibar's independence was achieved through revolution, therefore it has to be safeguarded by whatever means including using coercion to safeguard the so called "holy revolution". But also may be even among the young people, some of them through socialization might also buy that idea. **But increasingly that idea is dying out as an outcome of education.** So the more people are becoming educated they distance themselves from that legacy. They realize that this is the party that brought independence, but that doesn't mean that it should continue to rule forever. (Key respondent from University of Dar es Salaam)*

"Well, I think that is the ideology of the ruling party, ruling elite. That is what they use and it does have an effect among some sections of the population. They are easily persuaded that if this government falls the

*Arabs will come back, the Sultan will come back, and the situation will get worse. But it is difficult to argue that the situation before the revolution was worse as it is now in many parts. In Zanzibar that ideology is used by the ruling elite to remain in power. **But the support is shrinking particularly because of the younger people born after the revolution, who feel that that politics now is gone, it's no longer.** There has been a considerable amount of shift. So that ideology, like in the rest of Africa, people say yes you performed your role to bring independence, but you have to deliver the fruits."*

Asked if the ideology is no longer appealing how could the ruling party cling to power for such a long time even after four periods of multiparty elections against the background of poor socio-economic development, six out of ten key respondents thought the ruling party held on to power through undemocratic means and election fraud, one of them put it like this, "if it was because of that ideology that it came in power, they would not have needed to steal in every election, and that is admitted now even by those members of that party who have now crossed-over and are now saying that they were stealing." In this case, the influence of ideological based trust is becoming increasingly weak.

Figure 11: Ideological Poster Displayed by Ruling-party-supporters at the National Revolutionary Day Celebrations, January 12, 2016



Source: Zanzibar Daima (2016)

Note: Captioned subject in swahili "*Machotara Vibaraka wa Usultani Watupishe na Mapinduzi Yetu*", can be translated as "Mixed race Puppets of the Sultanate should leave us with our Revolution"

Regarding the historical legacies of intermediate and recent history which is the basis for *experiential trust*, most key informants suggested that it has been gaining wider support. There were some detailed description of post revolutionary policies and undemocratic practices, both from intermediate past and recent events, that have impacted negatively the image of the government institutions. A key respondent, a prominent journalist, after a lengthy explanation of events and comparative history, he had this to say when asked of the influence of the historical legacy,

"I do agree about history, and this history is the history of human rights violations. I wish there would be a rule of law, and then reconciliation of those people, for instance, those whose families went missing, or people whose properties had been confiscated, they would be given at least compensation, or create truth commission like in South Africa. Then the situation would have been good."

He continued;

"Leaders who came to power after the revolution instead of leading they became rulers. That's why you find in Kenya KANU only remains the title, Obote's UPC party has gone, Nkrumah's party has disappeared, UNIP of Zambia was finished, Banda's party is getting only 10.5 to 11 percents of the seats, and there is even a big crack in the African National Congress of South Africa. Now that is because people have been disappointed by leaders who fought for independence. For example Robert Mugabe fought for freedom from colonialism, but now he has become an emperor, his wife has powers like a Queen. And you see what happens in Zimbabwe, those in power wants to hold on."

Another key informant from the State University of Zanzibar echoed similar view, he noted,

"liberation parties have failed to deliver. That's why when multiparty politics was reintroduced most of them lost power, but it's because they have nothing new. If they say conditions are better, people are not blind, they know that in some sectors the situation is worse than even before independence. They have failed because of their history of corruption, misuse of power, poor management of the economy, and so forth."

To conclude, historical legacy has been found to be in use both as a base for *ideological trust* and is also a source of *experiential trust*. Thus, the hypothesis of the study is strongly supported by the evidences supplied. The study found out that historical legacy as a source of ideological trust is only influential in some limited sections of the society, and is increasingly becoming less compelling among large majority of the population especially the young generation. Instead, the post-revolutionary historical legacy based on experiential trust has the uppermost trust eroding influence on trust attitudes.

5.1.3.3 National Identity

Identification with the national identity in Zanzibar has two expressions; the first one which is more strong is identification as Zanzibaris because Zanzibar has an autonomous government which runs its own non-union matters. But Zanzibaris also have another national identity, being part of the United Republic of Tanzania, they are Tanzanians as well. Both, identification with Tanzanian and Zanzibaris National identity co-exist, as described by a discussant in the focus group from Chokocho when he noted,

"I want to be identified as a Zanzibari, but this is not possible without being a Tanzanian. So inside our country I am a Zanzibari, but outside our country we are all Tanzanians. To me non-national identification are not important".

Another discussant from Utaani preferred Zanzibari national identity over a Tanzanian one, he opined,

"For me the Zanzibar national identity is so important. I don't think it's right to call someone a Tanzanian, because Tanzania is a Union of two countries. There must be first a Zanzibari and a Tanganyikan, everyone should be known by their original nationality".

Moreover, by direct observation method during the research fieldwork, in particular when administering pre-group questionnaires for selection of focus groups participants, I noted that high percentage of respondents recognized themselves by national identity rather than their ethnic or racial attachments. As noted above, some mentioned religion (*muslim*) in reply to a question of ethnic affiliation. Others, were not sure of the ethnic titles they should choose among many to describe themselves, for example, among the local Zanzibaris from Shehia of Kibeni, they would wonder between identifying themselves as *Shirazi*, *Hadimu*, *Swahili*, or *Tumbatu*, they were more certain when they say they were Zanzibaris.

Nevertheless, in the Afrobarometer survey, the reference was more of *Tanzanian national identity* rather than the *Zanzibari national identity*. So, I generally examined their description with national identity regardless of which particular reference was made. The study assumed that, given the cosmopolitan nature of Zanzibar society, national identity would co-exist with individuals identification with other social group identities such as ethnicity. I also expected that those who identified themselves with national identity were likely to express less trust in public institutions and would prefer more performance evaluation than their attachments to group identities.

The findings on the variable of national identity was briefly presented above when discussing ethnicity. It was shown that about 99 respondents described themselves with national identity rather than their ethnic attachments. Also the findings showed that out of 99 respondents who described themselves on national identity, 54 (55%) indicated high disapproval of public institutions. The survey investigated the national identity further against ethnicity by posing a question to participants about whether they felt closer to either their ethnic or national identities. This question was important to ensure that participants are presented with a choice of preference between the two identities and measure their description against their respective trust levels. Surprisingly, the identification with *only national identity* increased from 99 respondents to 104 out of 240, and 18 others said they feel equally national and their ethnic affiliation. This means that at times citizens would mention their ethnic identity, but given more choice, they would change their identity or attribute to both set of identities.

However, among 104 respondents who said they feel *only national identity*, 61 (59%) showed high trust. Together, with those who feel *equally national and ethnic identity* (122 respondents in total), 67 of them (55%) expressed higher trust. When I cross-examined the findings of those who described themselves with national identity (99 respondents) with those who felt much more closer to national identity rather than ethnic attachments (122 respondents), there was a puzzling scenario. As shown above, the former expressed higher disapproval level while the later expressed higher trust level.

Furthermore, the findings showed there was no relationship between identification with national identity and individual's trust. Data from qualitative findings were also not enough to make a significant analysis of the effect of national identity on trust. There was wide recognition among focus group discussants and key informants from in-depth interviews about the prominence of national identity in Zanzibar, especially the Zanzibari nationalism. Yet, no much discussion was made about the direction of its influence on institutional trust. In most cases, participants would refer to it being so strong, but also in some cases they offered examples where national identity was undermined by party preferences, through discussions on its effect on trust level was not very clear. From the above observation, I conclude that I was not able to significantly test the influence of national identity, and in particular, the direction of influence on trust attitudes. That is, I could not determine whether identification with national identity would incline individuals' to more or less political trust.

5.2 Discussion

In this chapter I examined the significance of identity variables on citizens' trust in public institutions. The findings revealed that among the identity variables examined in this chapter, political identities in terms of *partisanship* and *historical legacies* had the strongest effect on citizens' political trust in Zanzibar. Other variables which were positively associated with institutional trust include *age* and *gender*, *location*, *region*, and *occupation*. However, the study found no evidence on the influence of *education*, *ethnicity*, and *national identity on trust attitudes*. I discuss these findings below more elaborately.

In relation to the influence of *partisanship* on citizen's trust attitudes in Zanzibar, the study's hypothesis was strongly confirmed by both quantitative and qualitative sources of data. As shown in Table 10, the findings show that *support for opposition parties decrease trust in the government while affiliation to the ruling party boost support*. It was observed that in Zanzibar partisan attachments is extremely pronounced, unprecedented and sometimes conflictual leading to discrimination based on party lines, social exclusion, violence and even death. It is known for example that in Pemba after the 2001 killings of opposition demonstrators, social exclusion was practiced widely among supporters of two main political parties, whereby CUF supporters boycotted attending social events of the ruling party followers such as funeral, or wedding, or even buying commodities from such people. It was noted that partisanship was so strong that in some occasions it undermined national identity or even religion. Partisanship was found to have the most interactive effect with other factors such as government performance and history, which is consistent with the theoretical framework of the study about the interactive nature of identity and performance variable. However, there no evidence was found to relate party attachments to ethnicity.

The above findings are consistent with several studies that have examined party affiliation to trust attitudes. For example, in a study of voting behavior in Africa, Young (2009) found that that party labels supersedes other considerations in determining voting behavior, it is what gives presidents their most strongest support base..

On the effect of *historical legacies* on trust attitudes, both historical legacies based on ideology and experiential historical legacies were observed. However, the findings show that the ideological historical legacy in terms of the government and leaders' identity as liberators

and freedom fighters is increasingly losing its appeal, although it is still being used. It was widely perceived that the Revolutionary government is haunted by peoples' political experiences of the past under the regime that has been under the same party and maintained the same identity since the revolution of 1964. The government was both associated with a history of negative practices such as violation of human rights and championing discrimination, and policy failures in terms of economic stagnation and prevalence of corruption.

The above findings are consistent with the proposition of identity theory and are strongly supported by empirical evidences from similar context. For instance, Chikwanha (2005:214) argued that in African context ideological identity is linked to the support most African governments receive as icons of liberation struggles, especially where ruling parties have been in power since independence like in Tanzania, thus the legitimacy of incumbents partly hang on this ideological trust basis. He argues that "without this mechanism, the institutional decay in most Africa's countries implies that the governments would have degenerated into the worst-case scenarios, like Somalia, and to an extent, Zimbabwe" (Chikwanha, 2005:226). Nevertheless, there is wide agreement that the ideological influence of historical legacies in support of the ruling regime is declining. For example Mishler and Rose (1997:420) found in their studies of post-communist regimes that inherited trust may be appealing for a short time, but in a longer periods governments must deliver to satisfy its citizens. Similarly, Jeffrey and Lewis (2011) observed the decreasing impact of ideological identity in current politics in African context, they however observed that parties still make appeals of their respective ideological heritages, citing Ghana's NDC and NPP as an example (see Chikwanha, 2005). More importantly, Dimitrova-Grajzl (2010) in a study of the impact of historical legacy of the post-socialist countries found that the socialist legacy was significant in explaining trust among youth, and specifically found to affect trust negatively.

Regarding the *demographic attributes*, the results reveal that **age** and **gender** were significant in explaining citizens trust attitudes. The quantitative findings (Table 6) revealed that *age* was not related to trust, but findings from qualitative sources disconfirmed the results and suggested that generational identities were important in explaining institutional trust in Zanzibar, whereby *youth were the more likely to express less trust compared to their old counterparts*. It was also found that youth were the least likely to be attached to history and identity politics of the past, instead they preferred pragmatic judgment of the government

based on performance criteria as they were the most disadvantaged group. Their main concern was improvement in economic conditions such as getting employment and increasing their income. In Zanzibar, similar findings were reported by Galteland (2010) who found that, given the prevalence of poverty and low level of development, the youth were mostly dissatisfied and politically disengaged as they reject to be identified with past divisions of identity politics compared to the old people who were more allegiant to the historical polarization. Mbatudde (2013) also found in Uganda that old people showed more trust to the government due to their experience with past wars and insecurity, and their perception that the about the role of the new government in stabilizing the country.

Also, evidences show that *gender* was influential in shaping individuals inclination to specific trust attitudes (Figure 4), *whereby women were more likely to express much trust compared to men*, hence supporting the hypothesis of the study. Through focus groups it was learned that though women were more economically disadvantaged and evidence revealed that they are faced with multiple challenges such as poor home based social services, their trust level were still high compared to women. The study found that women's limited access to political information due to their gender roles was the key explaining factor for their trust attitudes. Whereas men were more exposed to political information such as through what a key informant called 'gossip centers', of which women cannot attend. Men are also more inclined to have less trust because they are the bread-winners for their families and hence are facing the economic hardships on daily basis.

Indeed, among the *social group-identities* examined in this study, *location, region, and occupation* revealed positive influence on individual's trust attitudes. To begin with, *location* of respondent in terms of being resident of rural or urban locations was found to important factor in trust expressions, whereby rural residents were more trusting than their urban counterparts (Figure 6). The findings show that a glaring gap in access to information through news media sources was the key factor in explaining the rural-urban divergence of trust attitudes, while huge disparity in economic conditions and illiteracy rate further handicapped rural residents' capacity to access information through news media. In particular, it was noted that media freedom is highly limited in Zanzibar compared to Mainland Tanzania. On a similar note, Makulilo (2015), observed that media situation in Zanzibar is worse, whereby the only available local television (TVZ) is government owned, as well as the main radio station and newspapers, while the small private radio stations that exist are under the

influence of ruling party politicians. In this scenario, the influence of such traditional media is limited, while the social media that offers an alternative platform for urban dwellers, is almost nonexistent in rural settings. The findings are in line with the observation made by O'Gorman (2012) that despite the rural neglect the ruling party loyalty among rural population in Tanzania is unchallenged, "their support is based on ideological factors - an inherent loyalty or nostalgia for a party that helped to bring independence to the country, which has maintained peace, and which historically supported farmers". Also, Harding (2010) found higher support of the incumbent government among that rural residents in Sub-Saharan Africa, though different from this study, he found pro-rural policies to be the explaining factor.

Regarding *regional identity*, the findings from the quantitative survey revealed no relationship between region and institutional trust (Figure 7). However, it was noted that the survey sample could have skewed the results due to the influence of rural urban factor as respondents from Pemba were dominantly from rural areas (Table 9). Indeed, strong evidences from documentary review, direct citizens' opinions from focus groups, and in-depth interviews disconfirmed the survey findings. Instead, regional identity was found to be significant in explaining citizens trust in line with the hypothesis of the study, whereby people from Pemba were less likely to express support in government institutions compared to their Unguja counterparts. Moreover, the results suggested that regional identity had strong interactive effect with historical legacies and performance variables where by solidarity based on regionalism was exacerbated by feeling of economic discrimination, lack of regional representation in the country's governance, and common political experiences of marginalization particularly at the expense of Pemba (see also, Matheson, 2012; Bakari, 2001; 2011).

Furthermore, both quantitative and qualitative data revealed that *occupation* in terms of being employed by government or working in the private sectors, was related to trust, where by those employed by the government were expressed higher trust compared to those working in private sectors, NGOs, and self-employed (Figure 10). Qualitative sources revealed that employment in government was discriminative based on party lines and regions as politicization of public service was very high, hence suggesting the likelihood that those employed in government to be sympathetic and trusting servants. The findings are supported

by Robinson (2009) who also found in 16 African countries that formally employed individuals are more likely to identify with the state.

Finally, the study did not find evidence in support of the influence of *education*, *ethnicity*, and *national identity* variable in explaining political trust in Zanzibar. For *education*, it was noted that the sample did not represent the education variable enough to draw meaningful conclusions. Also, another factor suggested to have undermined the noticeable influence of education was the high literacy rate in Zanzibar where large percent of citizens have the basic skills required to access political information, and indeed the 'gossip centers' culture of Zanzibar contributed to high level of political awareness. Moreover, there was no enough qualitative to supplement survey data. This could probably be something surprising, but Mbatudde (2013) also did not find differences based on education in the evaluation of government performance and trust.

Regarding ethnicity, the existence of heterogeneous ethnic/racial group backs up the findings of this study which showed that ethnicity was not related to trust (Table 8). Also, it was found that socially there was no dominant ethnic group, and political support, for instance, crosscut ethnic boundaries. Similarly, Moss & Tronvoll (2015) argue that Zanzibar residents have strongly been identifying themselves with their national identity as Zanzibaris rather than on ethnic lines. This was noted clearly in the survey findings whereby when respondents were asked about their ethnic affiliation, they preferred identification with national identity. The argument of ethnic diversity is also consistent with observation made by Letki (2008) in a study of English neighbourhood that diverse ethnicity have no effect on trust, while dominant ethnic group has. Robinson (2009) observed similar effect of ethnic diversity in 16 African countries, whereby ethnic diversity was positively related to identification with national identity. Several other studies in Africa have also found that ethnic cleavages are losing their explanatory significance (see Hyden, 2013; Keefer, 2010).

Also, the study was not able to examine *national identity* thoroughly as the survey findings provided some confusing results, and qualitative data were lacking on this aspect. However, some scholars such as Moss and Tronvoll (2015), and Jjuuko and Muriuki (2010), observed that identification with national identity was so strong in Zanzibar, as also confirmed with results from the Afrobarometer survey. Others suggested that Uamsho group claims had the potential of obtaining unprecedented influence in Zanzibar politics due to its economic

nationalist claims (Nassor & Jose, 2014:263). It is important that future research should examine this important aspect, because other studies elsewhere have found identity based on nationalism significant in explaining trust (see Askvik, 2008; Godefroidt, et. al., 2015). Also, Robinson (2009) found that national identity was vital for democracy.

5.3 Concluding Remarks

In the light of findings and discussion in this chapter, it can be concluded that identity matters for political trust. The mapping of identity variables revealed various levels of strength of influence and interactions of identity variables to trust attitudes and performance considerations. The findings depicted political identities such as *party affinities* and *history* as the most significant variable in explaining political trust, while a number of other identity variables such as *age, gender, region, location, and occupation* were also positively correlated to trust. A more interesting finding of the chapter was the strong interactive influence of performance factors in explaining identity and hence political trust. Indeed, this key finding is consistent with the theoretical framework of the study, and this is why in the next chapter I examine the impact of performance consideration on citizens' political trust.

CHAPTER SIX

THE EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE ON POLITICAL TRUST: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

6 Introduction

In this chapter I analyze the impact of perceptions of institutional performance on trust attitudes among Zanzibaris. The chapter presents findings and analysis from quantitative and qualitative data sources of the study followed by discussion of findings at the end. Again the quantitative data presented in this chapter are from the Afrobarometer survey round 6 Tanzania data-set, and in particular for the five regions in Zanzibar. The qualitative evidences were collected during fieldwork from focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, direct field observation, and documentary analysis. Data from the above mentioned sources are triangulated to ensure meaningful analysis.

6.1 Perceptions of Institutional Performance

As explained earlier in the study, perceptions of institutional performance is inclusive of evaluation of office holders, institutions, and the impact executed public policies and programs. As a second major variable of the study, institutional performance is examined in terms of citizens perceptions of output of public policies in areas of economic and political achievements, as well as social services delivery. In the following sections each key area is elaborated further and examined in the light of the findings.

6.1.1 Satisfaction with Economic Performance

I examined two general aspects in relation to *satisfaction with the economy* namely; *perceptions of national economy* and *perceptions of individual's living conditions*. The study hypothesized that *the more positively citizens evaluate government economic performance, especially in sectors related to individual economic wellbeing, the more positively they would express trust in the government*.

In relation to *satisfaction with national economy*, participants were generally asked to describe the country's present economic condition. As shown in Table 11 below, a total of 186 respondents (78%) said the country's economy was very/fairly bad, while 32 (13%) said it was neither good nor bad, and only 22 (9%) thought the economy was fairly good. When perceptions of satisfaction with national economy was compared with trust attitudes, the findings show no significant relationship between them. It can be observed that even among those who said the country's economy was very/fairly bad, their trust perception were very much divided.

Table 11: Relationship Between Perceptions of Country's Economic Condition and Trust Attitudes

	Very/Fairly bad	Neither good nor bad	Very/Fairly good
High trust%	47	53	64
Low trust%	53	47	36
Total %	100	100	100
N=240	n=186	n=32	n=22

Question: *In general, how would you describe the present economic condition of this country?*

Similarly, perceptions of individual's economic wellbeing were negatively inclined, whereby 123 respondents (51%) were of the opinion that their living conditions were very/fairly bad, while 54 (23%) thought it was neither good nor bad, and 63 (26%) said it was fairly/very good. Again, as shown in Table 12 below, the study did not find evidence of relationship between perceptions of *satisfaction with individual's living condition* and institutional trust.

Table 12: Relationship Between Perception of Individual's Living Condition and Trust

	Very/Fairly bad	Neither good nor bad	Very/Fairly good
High trust%	48	57	46
Low trust%	52	43	54
Total %	100	100	100
N=240	n=123	n=54	n=63

Question: *In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?*

Further questions were posed to check participants perceptions in evaluating their economic conditions. When respondents were asked about how they assessed their living conditions compared to other Tanzanians, about 50 percent said it was worse or much worse, 37 percent said it was the same, and only 13 percent said it was better. Similar findings surfaced when asked of their opinions regarding the country's economic condition compared to twelve months ago, where 52 percent said it was worse or much worse, where as 41 percent said it was the same, and only 6 percent felt it was better. Again, respondents held a despair opinion when asked about their perceptions of the prospects of the country's economy in the next twelve months, whereby 35 percent said it would be worse or much worse, and 56 percent did not envisage any change. All these findings reiterate the fact that participants evaluated the economy, both at national level and individual level with discontentment. Nonetheless, their trust attitudes were not very much influenced by their economic evaluations.

Data from qualitative focus group discussions and in-depth interviews shed light on the above findings and help to explain the observed relationships. In the focus groups discussions, participants considered both the national economy as well as individual's economic conditions, but were very much focused in assessing the later rather than the former because they were critical of the national economy as they see little improvement in their own lives.

"We are told that our national economy is growing, but our own conditions are worsening. If the economy is growing how do we know? If we are not benefitting from the growth, we pay for everything from education to health care". [A discussant from Kangagani]

"Our economic conditions especially at individual level is tight. The prices for goods and services are so high. What our government does is to increase salaries for those working in public sector. How can an ordinary citizens who is unemployed afford his life?" [A discussant from Potoa]

But, even those employed by the government at lower levels had the same opinion, as expressed by a discussant from Utaani:

"Personally, I am a government employee - a teacher. I am a bachelor degree holder. My monthly income [salary] is three hundred and fifty thousand shillings. This income hardly is enough for a week or so, only for basic needs such as food and medical treatment. I exclude other important things like clothing because we, poor people, buy clothes only once a year. Our economy is in a mess and inflation is killing us".-Utaani

Age, gender and political affiliation was not observed to be significant in terms of participants' opinions in assessing the economy. However, some old people mostly affiliated with the ruling party made reference to a distant past when the country's economy was in deep crisis to argue that the national economy had changed for the better, but some admitted that their individual economic conditions have little improvement.

"Looking back where we came from I think we are now better off. Our conditions were so bad, back then we could not afford to buy building materials, roads were not passable, there was no electricity, and no water supply. Anyone of my age [57 years] can see the changes, people now are getting education and they make progress. However, I agree that we still face high rate of unemployment, but this is a problem all over the world." [An elderly male discussant from Chokocho]

A contrary view of the comparison of the past and present was repeatedly raised in two other group discussions:

"The past is gone, our economic conditions were not so bad. In the past you go to a local forest and you get ripe bananas, mangoes, pineapples, and plenty of forest fruits to eat. Our children went to school free, we didn't buy books, chinks, uniforms, these were all provided for free, and they were even given porridge and bread for breakfast. But today, you need to buy all these for your small kid, and pay more money as if you are preparing wedding gifts for a bride" [A discussant from Utaani, and similar view was expressed in Kangagani]

A large majority of opinions from focus group discussions evaluated the government negatively in the management of economy and were in despair about the future prospects under the same regime. Some of the issues raised included poor circulation of money, low income, high rate of unemployment, closure of industries, foreign citizens occupying local jobs, inflation, double taxation, unaffordable payments in social services, unexplored national resources for the advantage of Zanzibar people, Zanzibar's inability to access foreign aid and loans due to the Union, economic classes, and the general poverty level.

"We work tirelessly even when we are sick, but we do not get any tangible income except huge accumulation of debts. We do not get anything. When we sleep we ask God to keep us alive so that we can pay back the debts. For a small business for example, you pay taxes to ZRB [Zanzibar Revenue Board], you also pay to TRA [Tanzania Revenue Authority], and you pay taxes to the Local Municipal. How can you prosper?" [lamented a female participant from uweleni]

"Zanzibar in the past, we had small scale industries which provided employment to many people. We had copra processing industry, shoe-making industries, Soda industry, cigarette manufacturing, and oil manufacturing industries. They are no more, they have been either privatized and not producing anymore or closed down." [A discussant from Utaani]

"Our economic conditions are extremely poor and prospect for change can come only if there will be a change of government. But if this same government continues, there will be no changes and the economy will fall down even more". [A discussant from Uweleni]

"Our economy will not change for the better until Zanzibar becomes a sovereign state. Currently we can not ask for foreign aid and loans, until the Union government do so and we do not get our share. Our country is so small, a little amount of foreign aid and loans will suffice to fight poverty and unemployment." [A discussant from Chokocho]

A key informant, an academician from the University of Dar es Salaam, puts the issue of the nature of the political system and Zanzibar's autonomy in relation to the Union at the core for the prospect of Zanzibar's economy:

"Actually in my view Zanzibar economy has been deteriorating, and if you look at the GDP and per capital income of Mainland and that of Zanzibar, the Mainland is higher than that of Zanzibar. That was different, in the past Zanzibar used to have a higher per capital income because of its small population up to 1980s or may be early 1990s. The prospects for improving living standards are brighter in Mainland compared to Zanzibar. And I don't see the possibility of Zanzibar improving its economic wellbeing unless there is a major sort of restructuring of the Zanzibar's political system including of course streamlining the issue of Zanzibar's autonomy to manage its own economy. Because in so many respects the Zanzibar's economy is so different from that of Mainland. Economy is not essentially a Union matter but the way it is managed in practice it's like a union matter in terms of policies."

Others suggested that the government's handling of the economy has created classes and reflects discriminatory policies based on regions:

"There are things inside the government and outside it. Those who work within the government benefit from it such as by receiving salaries and health insurance. Such people will tell you the prospect of the country is good. But, about 99 percent of us, the ordinary citizens, we are hurting so much. We live like devils, our life is so hard." [A discussant from Chokocho]

"Economic conditions are bad for everyone, but most specifically in Pemba. Our government does not encourage industrial and company investment in Pemba. These things need water supply, electricity, roads, and manpower, and we have all that. But all investments are made in Unguja, why aren't they considering us?" [A discussant from Utaani]

But why do citizens of Zanzibar assess the economy negatively by an overwhelming majority, nevertheless their trust attitudes are equally divided as was observed in the survey findings and during focus group discussions. There are possibly multiple interaction effects of variables that will be further explored, but some key informant tried to explain this perplexed perceptions on two grounds; first, these people are driven by faith in God as the

Grantor of their economic needs, and second, because most Zanzibari families supplement their economic needs from remittances they receive from their family members abroad,

"So they feel that their poverty is part of their fate and God's providence on them. And the Sheikhs¹³ do not help us on this. In the mosques they talk about rich only, and that if you were 'made to be' poor then God loves you, or is a test from God. In the end of their speeches they ask for offerings and donations for the poor. They don't talk about poverty as something politically catalysed or connected to leadership and governance." [An activist from civil society organizations]

"In our country, Zanzibar, what is helping the situation not to get worse is that its people have embraced religious faith. But another crucial reason is you fellow Zanzibaris, our relatives, in foreign countries. Zanzibar diaspora are all over the world, and are supporting their families, relatives and friends back home economically." [Another activist from civil society organizations]

This was noted in the group discussions as many participants attributed thanks to God for their conditions regardless, while fiercely offering negative evaluation of the government's management of the economy. Others, failed to link economic problems such as unemployment with the issue of governance, as one discussant who offered critical comments about employment situation in the country, but when quizzed on how that affected her trust in the government, she said, *"I trust the government very much, because it can not solve all of our problems. We have to employ ourselves. The one to be blamed are the citizens themselves not the government"*. [A discussant from Kibeni]

6.1.2 Political Performance

In this section, I examine three aspects in relation to *political performance* namely; *satisfaction with democracy and elections*, *perception of corruption*, and *perception of political stability*.

6.1.2.1 Satisfaction with Democracy and elections

This variable was examined in two separate concepts namely, *democracy and elections*, the former is inclusive of the latter, but for a common understanding of ordinary citizens the latter is a clear manifestation and a true test of the former. Hence it was important to examine both separately, but they are treated as one variable in this study.

In relation to *satisfaction with democracy*, the study hypothesized that *improvement in democracy impacts positively on citizens' trust level, while poor democratic performance*

¹³ Muslim leaders and clerics

influence trust negatively. First of all, before discussing perceptions of citizens' satisfaction with democracy, I present some interesting preliminary information that depicts their awareness and judgment of democracy in the country. The findings reveal an overwhelming support for democratic rule whereby 85 percent said democracy was preferable, only 10 percent preferred non-democratic government, and 4 percent said a type of government doesn't matter. Parallel to wide acceptance of democracy, participants vehemently rejected authoritarian forms of government such as one-party rule (83%), military government (96%), and one-man rule (95%).

Moreover, given Tanzania is a multiparty democracy, participants were asked of their opinions about the desirability of multiple political parties to assess if they either see the presence of many political parties as divisive or needed to ensure voters' choice. About 68 percent agreed with a statement that many parties are important in ensuring voters' choice, compared to 32 percent who said multiple political parties are divisive. Furthermore, when asked to assess the extent of democracy in the country, majority of respondents said Tanzania was a democracy with minor problems (58%), followed by those who said it was a full democracy (19%) or a democracy with major problems (18%), while some were of the opinion that it was not a democracy at all (4%).

Finally, participants were asked to express their level of satisfaction with how democracy works in the country. Table 13 below shows relationship between satisfaction with democracy and trust levels. The findings show that majority of respondents, about 186 out of 238 (78%) were very/fairly satisfied with the exercise of democracy in the country, while 52 (22%) were not at all/not very satisfied. The observed difference is statistically significant and therefore there is a relationship between satisfaction of democracy and trust attitudes. Trust was observed to be higher among those who were fairly/very satisfied with the exercise of democracy (54%) compared to those who were not at all/not very satisfied (33%).

Table 13: Relationship Between Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust Attitudes

	Not at all/Not very satisfied	Fairly/Very Satisfied
High trust	33	54
Low trust	67	46
Total %	100	100
N=238	n=52	n=186

Question: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Tanzania? Are you: (i) Very satisfied, (ii) Fairly satisfied, (iii) Not very satisfied, (iv) Not at all satisfied, (v) Tanzania is a democracy [Do not read], (vii) Don't know [Do not read]

With regard to citizens' *perception of elections*, I examined the overall satisfaction with the exercise of elections and electoral processes in general. In multiparty democratic system, elections is an important tool for regime change and holding office holders responsible to their voters. Hence, the electoral process must abide to the principles of freeness and fairness to ensure genuine party competition, informed voters choice, and finally put in place a popular choice of government. In this sense elections empowers citizens with a mechanism to hold leaders accountable. The study assumed that *the more citizens are satisfied with the conduct of elections the more likely they would express trust in the government that came to power through it*. When respondents were asked of their opinions regarding freeness and fairness of the last election (2010), their responses correlate positively with their trust attitudes. As seen in Table 14 below, in excess of 64 percent among those who said the election was not free and fair, and those who thought it was free but with minor/major problems showed lower trust, while trust was higher among those satisfied with election as completely free and fair (78%). The observed difference is statistically significant, hence confirming the hypothesis of the study.

Table 14: Relationship Between Perceptions of Elections and Political Trust

	Completely free and fair	Free and fair, but with minor problems	Free and fair, with major problems	Not free and fair
High trust%	78	35	34	36
Low trust%	22	65	66	64
Total %	100	100	100	100
N=231	n=72	n=110	n=38	n=11

Question: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in 2010. Was it: (i) Completely free and fair, (ii) Free and fair, but with minor problems, (iii) Free and fair, with major problems, (iv) Not free and fair, (v) Do not understand question [Do not read], (vi) Don't know [Do not read].

Nevertheless, the data reveal that respondents held a dispair opinion about the role of elections as a tool in ensuring genuine voters' choices and for disciplining office holders. When asked how well do elections ensure Members of Parliament reflect the views of the voters, 67 percent said 'not very well', and 27 percent said 'not at all', that is, a total of 94

percent had negative opinion. Similarly, when asked how well do elections enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want, they had similar negative perception (94%).

Qualitative findings from focus group discussions, and in-depth interviews corroborate the findings presented above. As to be expected, due to its small geographical size that facilitates greater social cohesion, and the historical struggles for power within Zanzibar and in relation to the Union, the Zanzibar community is politically very active. Focus groups were dominated with animated discussions of various issues related to the practice of democracy and elections in the country. As the groups were equally represented with participants affiliated to the two major political parties in Zanzibar, opinions were equally divided in some topics where arguments and counter arguments were presented regarding some aspects of democracy and elections. However, the general feeling was that democracy in Zanzibar is in crisis. A key informant from the State University of Zanzibar explained the crisis of legitimacy marring the regime in Zanzibar, he observed,

"Democracy is not an isolated phenomenon, it's a process. Among other things, understanding how the government comes to power is very important in assessing the practice of democracy. Government that attain power through undemocratic ways do not turnout to be custodians of democracy. In Zanzibar, that is the situation, all multiparty elections since 1995 have installed governments which lacked legitimacy due to rigged elections. Such governments would create state organs, laws, and institutions that can guarantee their survival through similar means because they do not depend coming to power through democratic means. Otherwise, to consolidate democracy is to commit suicide".

A comment from a discussant in Kangagani group highlighted the feeling that coming to power through undemocratic means dwindles citizens trust, as she explained, *"you can not say you trust a government that come to power through illegal means by rigging election results and announce themselves winners while everybody knows the ruling party had lost"*. However, given the specific nature of the government in place, a Government of National Unity, which joined the major political parties in its top political leadership structures, participants expressed satisfaction with *'Muafaka'* [*peace accord*] that put it in place although admitting that the future was not so bright:

"When Muafaka came, it resolved a lot of disputes and smoothened relationships. We hope we can continue this way. However, we do not ask this to happen and God forbid, but with what is happening now the future looks obscure. Hatred politics may return after this election" [A discussant from Uweleni]

Another elderly discussant affiliated to the ruling party from Chokocho group commented on the improvement of democracy, peace and cooperation brought by the formation of GNU government and he compared the situation with the past, *"if you know where we come from, you know we are much better today. We had one party for long time, and later when multiparty was introduced, people were very hostile to each other, they couldn't sit like this to talk to each other"*.

Experiences of elections has been accompanied with political instability and violence in Zanzibar since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. Situations have been worse in periods towards elections, during elections, and after elections leading to killings in worst case, and forcing some people to flee the country. The three peace accords agreed between the ruling party (CCM) and the main opposition party (CUF) are evidence of divisive and hostile politics in the isles as aftermath of repetitive elections. Thus, participants were understandably disturbed about the situation, hence they expressed dissatisfaction with the Zanzibar Election Committee (ZEC) for its role in elections fraud and were equally critical of the role the security organs including police and the special government forces,

"We accept election results for the sake of peace and stability of our country, but not because the electoral commission conducted the election with freedom and fairness. Otherwise this country would have plunged into endless chaos long time ago". [A discussant from Chokocho]

"During voting days we vote peacefully in most areas, but when it comes to results the powerful ruling party which owns military weapons always becomes the winner. I don't think there is democracy, what we have is humiliation, and we don't trust elections in our country". [A discussant from Kangagani]

"When elections get close there is a lot of harassment done by armed forces. Particularly the opposition supporters are beaten awkwardly. Multiparty democracy in our country is not fully functioning and not satisfactory". [A discussant from Kidongo Chekundu]

"the security organs and special forces in Zanzibar are used only in one period, elections period. The forces would be spread all over places, you will even fail to find a place to pee" [A discussant from Potoa]

In Zanzibar there is also a feeling that most of what happens are conspired between the government of Zanzibar and the Union government. Hence, the prospect for genuine democracy in Zanzibar hinges up on political development in the Mainland Tanzania, as a political scientist from University of Dar es Salaam noted, *"the state of democracy will very much depend on the developments in the Mainland. If we are going to have sort of political change in the Mainland, then that will also contribute to change in Zanzibar. But so long as*

CCM is so dominant then I don't expect any significant political changes in terms of political relations in Zanzibar."

To sum up, all key informants had extremely negative evaluation of democracy and elections in Zanzibar. They pinpointed excessive use of force against civilians, breach of freedoms, unbalanced playing field where bottom-up structures from Sheha level work against opposition parties and its supporters. One key informant from civil society organizations branded Zanzibar's democracy as *'hypocrisy'* (implying politics of lies and propaganda). Another key informant from civil society organizations added, *"we don't have democracy, we have domocracy"* (implying a rule based on too much talking). It all became worse because the ruling party in Zanzibar is *"a state party, that is, the party and government are inseparable"*, explained a key informant from State University of Zanzibar. All key informants concurred that democracy and elections have significant influence on citizens' trust in Zanzibar's polity. Thus, a political scientist from University of Dar es Salaam observed that *"legitimacy of government will come about if rule of law, transparency, accountability, and democracy will be allowed to take roots in Zanzibar"*.

6.1.2.2 Perception of corruption

Perception of corruption was another variable examined in relation to political trust. The study hypothesized that *citizens' perceptions of increase in corruption would influence their trust negatively, while positive performance in combating corruption would increase citizens' trust*. First of all, respondents were presented with a list of specific institutions and asked their perception of how many people they thought were involved in corruption in those institutions. Indeed, the results show a relationship between assessment of corruption in specific institutions and trust attitudes towards each of them. On the one hand, those who said 'none of them' and those who 'don't know' consistently expressed higher trust in those institutions. On the other hand, those of the opinion that 'some of them', or 'most/all of them' were involved in corruption showed lower trust levels.

Analysing further the scale of responses, the findings reveal that perceptions of excessive corruption in terms of being said 'most/all' people were involved in corruption, was highest in the Police (50%), followed by Judges and Magistrates (30%), and Members of Parliament (25%). Also, perception of corruption ranked by a response that only 'some of the officials' were involved in corruption was higher in tax officials (53%), followed by government

officials (52%), and local government councillors (52%). In contrast, the office of the president and officials of PCCB were found to be the least corrupt institutions. These results relates positively to the trust levels in specific institutions presented in chapter four. Those institutions perceived to have all or most or some of its officials involved in corruption were also shown to have been attributed higher disapproval level such as the police, the courts, and the tax department, while the office of the president was revealed to be the least corrupt also had the highest trust level. This implies that perception of of increase in corruption has negative effects on trust attitudes among citizens.

Similarly, the findings show a statistically significant relationship between overall perceptions of corruption and trust when respondents were asked of their perceptions of the level of corruption in the country over the past year. As shown in Table 15 below, an astonishing majority of respondents (91%) indicated that the level of corruption had increased a lot/somewhat, and disapproval was higher within this group. Likewise, those who thought corruption had decreased or stayed the same expressed 100 percent support to the government. However, the margin of difference within group leaves some doubt about the strength of influence perception of corruption has on individual trust attitudes. As illustrated among those who thought corruption had increased alot/somewhat (218 out of 227), their negative evaluation did not strongly skew their trust levels to that extent, they remained relatively equally divided.

Table 15: Relationship Between Perception of Corruption and Trust

	Increased a lot	Increased somewhat	Stayed the same	Decreased somewhat
High trust%	45	47	100	100
Low trust%	55	53	.0	.0
Total %	100	100	100	100
N=227	n=154	n=64	n=3	n=6

Question: *In your opinion, over the past year, has the level of corruption in this country increased, decreased, or stayed the same?*

Qualitative data from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews are in line with the above findings. Opinions from focus group discussions were dominated by perceptions of rampant corruption in Zanzibar. Participants showed a wide understanding of the meaning of corruption and its various types, forms and manifestations. They talked about corruption at higher levels of the government (grand corruption), lower levels (petty corruption) and policy

levels (political corruption). They also discussed corruption in monetary terms (bribery), fraud, misuse of office, and other forms of malpractices. Indeed, participants showed awareness of the negative effects of corruption in their lives. Some of these understanding can be appreciated from their own words presented below. It is important to note that there was no even a single positive evaluation of government efforts to the fight corruption, and opinions did not differ by participants' age, sex, education, or political affiliation. The general feeling was that corruption was deeply rooted in Zanzibar, as expressed by a discussant from Potoa:

"In my opinion, bribery has now become legal. You don't get anything if you don't give something. Bribery is no longer an enemy of justice, instead it has become something that makes someone progressive, and the easiest ways to get your needs, rights, and justice."

Another participant was similarly pessimistic about the possibility of a corruption-free Zanzibar, she expressed herself this way:

"Corruption has deeper roots in our country. Even in our political parties when you want to contest for position you must bribe. In our country corruption is practiced top-down, and hence it will be there to stay"
[A participant from Kibeni]

Crosschecking participants opinions about their reference of open bribery incidents within CCM party referendum for candidacy nomination, the researcher through documentary review confirmed that about 20 politicians including bigwig politicians were accused by the Zanzibar Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Authority (ZAECA, 2015).

Institutions that were constantly blamed for corruption included the police, the courts of laws, and the local councils. A discussant from Potoa group observed; *"the police is leading in corruption and the courts follow suit. Look at police job posts, people are buying it at around eight hundred thousand shillings. Consequently, when you 'purchase' it you will want to recoup your money through that position"*. Another participant added, *"in this country if you want employment, all your credentials are put aside. They will need to know where you come from, which party do you support, who do you know, and if everything ticks well they will want to know how much bribe you can give. The police, the courts, and the district councils are all in deep corruption"* (from Potoa). Constant references were made about nepotism, sexual bribery, bribery in employment and in social services. Participants shared personal experiences of corruptions and some common stories of corrupt practices such as corruption

during elections, which the researcher confirmed to have been reported by the Zanzibar Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Authority- ZAECA (see, ZAECA 2015).

Elaborating on consequences of corruption, participants argued that corruption puts the security of their lives at stake, makes injustices a prevailing norm, and is an obstacle to progress. Participants also blamed corruption practices for a flow of illegal drugs into the country which kill the youths, the labour force of the nation:

"I tell you we are no longer safe. Corruption cost people their lives in hospitals. Corruption let crimes go unpunished and as a consequence it hunt down victims. One day, in a 'daladala' [local public transport] a police officer was telling people to make sure when they catch thieves they cut their leg heels or stab them at the back with a sharp-end weapon before they submit them to the police so as to make sure they are not able to stand again. Because even if you send them to the police they will be let free due to corruption". [A discussant from Potoa]

"It hurts so much when institutions that supposed to serve justice becomes champions of corruption and malpractices. Corruption in the state apparatus such as the courts, and the police, is more distractive than in social services". [A discussant from Utaani]

"This country will not progress when leaders embezzle money for their private accumulation. Such amount of money could have been used to give loans to higher education students, and to improve agriculture and social service facilities such as in health sector." [A discussant from Uweleni]

However, there was a general feeling among participants in focus groups and some key informants of in-depth interviews that grand corruption was not so common in Zanzibar, *"I have not heard of any big scandals of embezzlement of public funds in Zanzibar. We hear this from Tanzania Mainland such as corruption scandals involving former prime minister of Tanzania, Hon. Edward Lowasa, and Hon. Anna Tibaijuka. That type of corruption is not common in Zanzibar"*, claimed a discussant from Chokocho. On the contrary, others argued that grand corruption was there and it seriously destroys the country, it is only not visible because of a system of 'protecting each other':

"I know that even the highest paid individuals here in Zanzibar do not exceed four million Tanzanian shillings per month. How could four million translate into several houses in a short time, each costing over hundred millions? We know for example, the second vice president of Zanzibar, Hon. Seif Ali Iddi, was questioned in the House of Representative for his embezzlement of public funds in the purchase of government ship from Japan. Using government money he bought an extra ship for his own. But nothing was done, they are protecting each other". [A participant from Kidongo Chekundu]

"In the past our parents worked in civil service for their life time and managed to own a bicycle. But today, within one year of employment they have three houses and luxurious cars. How much is the salary?!". [Questioned a discussant from Jang'ombe]

Similar sentiments were echoed by several key informants from civil society, and journalists based in Zanzibar. Their views are summed up by this veteran Journalist:

"The state of corruption in Zanzibar is serious than how it is reported. To the extent that those who get into power becomes filthy rich in few days. In fact the easiest way to get rich in Zanzibar is to be a leader in any of government institutions. Now the people of Zanzibar are acquainted to it, and they feel its part of life"

The above views were corroborated by majority opinions of key informants through in-depth interviews. All key informants concurred that corruption is at the peak in Zanzibar, but is made less visible due to a weak accountability and governance system in Zanzibar, as one prominent political scientist from University of Dar es Salaam opined, *"in Zanzibar the level of corruption is very high, and part of the reason is that leaders can do whatever they want because of the system of accountability. There is a tendency of protecting each other. That's why there are so many scandals in Zanzibar including scandals relating to poor land management, there is a lot of corruption. And because of partisan politics, you can hardly deal with these problems."* Another academician from the State University of Zanzibar added, *"because corruption is a major obstacle to democracy and the rule of law, it tend to thrive in a non-democratic state. Even if you are corrupt, provided that you played your part in maintaining the status quo, then you will survive."* And an independent veteran journalist claimed that the situation is worse because *"apart from the apparent lack of transparency, the media which is supposed to be a public watchdog, has not taken the issue of corruption seriously in Zanzibar"*.

6.1.2.3 Perception of Political Stability

In examining *perceptions of political stability*, I rely on qualitative data from focus groups, in-depth interviews, and direct observation method. The Afrobarometer survey did not have a specific question asking respondents about their general perceptions of political stability, instead there were questions regarding experiences of crimes in the community and personal experiences of electoral violence. However, since the issue of Political stability is a

pronounced feature of Zanzibar politics, it is important to examine its influence on trust attitudes.

Security is of utmost importance for human life; it is crucial for economic development, governance, and social progress. Although I examine political stability in particular, participants also discussed security conditions in society in general. This topic was introduced to investigate citizens' perceptions of peace and security in Zanzibar, and in particular their assessment of *political stability* or *political instability* for the past five years under the Government of National Unity. I also wanted to know how much these perceptions impact on their trust in government institutions. The assumption was that *if people were satisfied with the security situation they would trust the government more, but on the contrary, if a sense of insecurity prevails then they would trust the government less.*

Findings from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews confirm the hypothesis of the study. *A sense of peace and security, in this case political stability, aroused a feeling of satisfaction and praise for the government institutions, while a sense of insecurity or political instability instilled fear and loss of trust.* The importance of the Government of National Unity (GNU) was mostly acknowledged for its role in bringing peace and stability in the country. It had promised to bury the four decades' history of political instability since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy. A remark from a discussant from Uweleni focus group made this very clear, *"what helped to stop the breach of peace was the establishment of this GNU. For a while now, we have lived without violence, killings, and unjust acts committed against us. So, now when we hear that the government wants to abolish GNU, we start to fear"*. Another discussant from Chokocho had a similar opinion, he remarked, *"in a cosmopolitan community like ours, the role of top political leaders in maintaining political stability and democratic practices is very crucial. They need to avoid hatred confrontations that will lead to clashes between party supporters. This is why we commend the Muafaka in the GNU. We have been living in peace and understanding in this period"*

The first three years under the GNU were very much commended as the most peaceful period since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Zanzibar. A key informant from the State University of Zanzibar, an author who in his previous writing evaluated the GNU as a

democratic consensus¹⁴, now has changed his mind, *"If I was writing the paper now, I would have different opinion. We wrote that in 2011/2012 and we looked into evidences on the ground, there were every indicators in support of our conclusions. But, it's now clear that that was just a temporary measure which we experienced after the reconciliation, 2010, 2011, and 2012. But from then onward the situation has gone back to 'normal'- the country is not stable and there is no future- the trend of political confrontation, and politics of hostility have re-emerged"*. Another key informant added about the GNU, *"the structure has remained constitutionally, which is not very stable in any case, but the spirit of GNU has dissappeared. And I think that is the problem when old politics comes in despite the structure that it was supposed to bring."*

A sense of insecurity, clear signs of violence, and political intimidation were evident towards the preparation for the national elections and this was observed during the research fieldwork.

Hence discussants accused the security organs as perpetrators of violence:

"at the community level security is not a big problem. But my worries is when there is political conflicts, the security apparatus does not seem to be working impartially. They are pro-ruling party and oppressing the opposition parties always". [A discussant from Chokocho]

"Sabotage is being perpetrated during election periods. Those who are supposed to protect us [the police] are the ones who rob us in our homes." [A discussant from Utaani]

"The army has done very well, but the police and government special forces have abandoned their responsibilities to citizens and instead they are operating on partisan lines. Our country is not safe from the conduct of the police." [A discussant from Utaani]

The politicization of security organs in Zanzibar is said to be very high and is costing the peace and stability in the islands. Even at societal level, discussants were mobilizing for mob justice as a recourse should they encounter crimes due to perceptions of corrupt and politicized security organs. A key informant referred to the ongoing torture and persecution of civilians mostly targetted to political opposition during daytime and in public places by a group of masked and armed militia believed to be part of the government special forces, he observed, *"these people who now appear as Ninjas (Janjaweed forces) who wear masks. If they are members of official government forces, why should they be wearing Ninja? How come in the past we didn't have that? That is increasing insecurity, and I have heard people say 'I don't think I can stay here during this election', because they are afraid of the*

¹⁴ Nassor, A. and Jose, J. (2014), 'Power-Sharing in Zanzibar: From Zero-Sum Politics to Democratic Consensus?', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40:2, 247-265.

violence. I mean, a member of the House of Representatives has been recorded [in a confidential meeting] telling people to 'beat up the opposition people, but not to kill them, otherwise beat them until they look like 'chandarua'[mosquito net]. Now, that kind of language." The researcher personally observed the deteriorating security situation and the outrageous persecution of civilians by a gang of masked militia (Figure 12), which the government claimed not to be aware of. Their acts were instilling fear among citizens as one discussant from Kibeni expressed it, "do not be suprised, even here we can suddenly be ambushed and attacked for nothing at all. They can catch one or two of us and beat them severely. No security. There are those Ninjaz and the government says it doesn't recognize them" [A discussant from Kibeni].

Figure 12: Masked Armed-gang Beating Civilians in Unguja using Government Vehicles



Source: Field Observation July-September 2015

Generally, the security situation towards the October 2015 elections was volatile and unstable and the acts of these militia groups could have triggered outright violent conflict. A key

informant, a political analyst, assessed the situation, he argued *"the fundamental issues have not been resolved, the possibility of deterioration of political relations is still there particularly when it comes to managing the elections. We have not experienced any peaceful transfer of power from one political party to another. The other thing that has not been resolved is the issue of the Union that also seems to be dividing the followers of the two main parties. So I think these two key issues are highly divisive in Zanzibar's politics and they can lead to violence any time. It is only that when violence erupts in Zanzibar, the likelihood is that it can be contained by the Union government."* Such is what happened after the October 2015 election which was annulled by the government in power, and a re-run of election was conducted on March 2016 of which the main opposition party (CUF) boycotted, claiming it had won the October elections, and that its annulment was unconstitutional. Zanzibar was consequently put under a tight military control by the Union government. Since then, Zanzibar political situation has remained tense with frequent incidences of violence.

6.1.3 Satisfaction with Social Service Delivery

In the Afrobarometer survey, participants were asked to mention three most important problems facing the country that the government should address. Social services came up as the top three priorities; health (159), education (104), and water supply (55). Other problems included unemployment (46), wages, income and salaries (45), corruption (39), management of the economy (38), infrastructure (27), and electricity (23) among others. Likewise, when respondents were asked to specify priority sectors for additional investment should the government decide to increase its spending, the findings show that health (198), education (171), and infrastructure (35) emerged as top three priorities. This shows the prominence of social services for citizens' day-to-day wellbeing.

The study hypothesized that *the more positively the citizens evaluate social service delivery the more they would express high level of trust in public institutions.* The findings in Table 16 below show that 183 respondents out of 231 (79%) perceived the government as doing very/fairly badly in addressing the problems, while 48 (21%) were of the opinion that the problems were addressed very/fairly well. Indeed, the results show a positive relationship between perception of performance in social service delivery and citizens' trust attitudes. Trust was lower among those who evaluated the government negatively (45%), while positive assessment resulted into higher trust (58%).

Table 16: Relationship Between Satisfaction with Social Service Provision and Trust

	Very/Fairly badly	Very/Fairly well
High trust%	45	58
Low trust%	55	42
Total %	100	100
N=231	n=183	n=48

Question: *Thinking of the problem you mentioned first, in your opinion, how well or badly would you say the current government is handling this problem, or haven't you heard enough to say?*

Probed further about the identified problems, participants were asked whether there was any other political party that could do a better job in solving the problems. In this regard participants remained loyal to their party affiliations whereby 149 respondents said 'no', and 81 said 'yes'. This roughly represents the political affiliation of the sample with a very slight variation arguably from those who earlier reported not to be affiliated with any political party (see part affiliation in Table 10 above). Similarly, when asked specifically which one between ruling and opposition political parties is most able to address improving basic health services, similar patterns of responses was observed. About 144 respondents still had faith in the ruling party, while 82 thought the opposition parties would do a better job.

In addition, when asked whether they would support or oppose if the government decided to make people pay more taxes or user fees in order to increase spending on public health care, majority of respondents (58%) said they would strongly/somewhat oppose it, compared to those who would support the decision (40%), while few (2%) said they would neither support nor oppose. The within group percentages indeed show that trust was lower among those who were opposed to the decision, whereas support was higher among those who supported the decision. Again, the observed difference was statistically significant, supporting the study's hypothesis about the influence of performance in social services delivery on trust attitudes. Besides, the observed opposition against the increase of taxation can be interpreted as citizens resistance as they do not see how their taxes are re-invested in improving social service delivery.

The above findings are supported by qualitative findings from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. There were mixed opinions among focus group participants and key informants with regard to satisfaction with social service delivery. However, most participants acknowledged that social services in terms of health care, education, clean water,

roads, and electricity were the most important things that matter in their lives, and thus its improvement would definitely boost their trust to the government in power. A discussant from Kangagani made it clear, *"when social services are good, I am happy with my life, I can't complain much about other things, but when they are bad, I am trusting the government less and less."*

In most cases participants offered positive views on *road infrastructure* improvement both in Unguja and Pemba. A discussant from Utaani probably made an overstatement in commending government efforts, he noted *"regarding road infrastructure, Pemba is now like Europe to a large extent. All main roads have been constructed and most of them very recently. Even interior roads at various places are now passable"*. Nevertheless, there were still some critical comments about road qualities where participants pointed out that most of them were very thin and slippery, something that causes frequent road accidents. Also participants were able to mention some important roads near their localities which were still in very bad shapes including Chambani and Chaani roads in Pemba and Unguja, respectively. For instance, a discussant from Kangagani commented, *"others say we have good roads! Have you visited Chambani? a pregnant women would deliver in the car, will not reach hospital due to the road situation. Still we have problems. Even these new roads they are very thin to pass two cars and are very slippery. That's why we hear road accidents everyday"*.

The rest of social services, such as health care, clean water, education, and electricity, despite some moderate positive remarks, were assessed in a highly negative tone. To begin with, official statistics show that 100 percent of Zanzibar households are within 5 kilometers of a primary health care facility (URT, 2016a). Nevertheless, participants in focus group discussions noted that the delivery of health care service was the worst of all services. They did not argue on the proximity of healthcare facilities, but rather the access and quality of the services was the major problems. Participants discussed about problems of poor and irresponsible healthcare services coupled with corruption, and unfulfilled healthcare policy promises such as free healthcare for pregnant women. These two comments from Utaani clarify the point of poor healthcare:

"On health service in my view, we are very poor and backward. We have some few hospital buildings but the services are extremely poor, no doctors and no medicine. Sometimes you have only one doctor attending so many patients and is not available most of the time. I have witnessed a child who was sent to the hospital crying with lots of pain and stayed long hours until his death without being attended by a doctor".

Another discussant in the same group echoed similar sentiments, he noted,

"At our place for instance, we only have one doctor who can perform a surgery procedure, he is famously known by the name 'Dr. Salum operation'. If he is not around, patient will stay three months no one else among the available staff can perform operation. In fact, no serious medical treatment is available, how could we say we have medical service?"

Clean water service was also discussed widely with dissatisfaction. Most participants acknowledged the presence of some sort of improvement in water infrastructure from central water authority, but still in most areas clean water was not available. When a moderator asked discussants how many times a week they get water from government pipelines, their answers varied, where in some cases they said once a week, others once a month, and to the extreme participants from Jang'ombe replied *"once a year"*, and another discussant added, *"I have never seen it recently, I even forgot if we have water pipelines in our homes. Maybe the rain water, but not water from ZAWA [Zanzibar Water Authority]"*, and another explained further *"until election times, like this time since yesterday we have started getting it because election is nearby."* Alarming, Jang'ombe lies at the heart of the Zanzibar city, and clearly their neighbours, Kidongo Chekundu, have similar problems with clean water services as one discussant pointed out, *"we don't get water in our area until the water pipes get rusty, when water comes first the rusty water comes out for long. The whole week and sometimes a month we get it once. Always there is un-ending rationing distribution of water, and this is in town area. It's a shame"*. In the rural area it wasn't much different, as a discussant from Potoa observed, *"it's one thing to have them present, and quite another to ensure their accessibility, effectiveness and sustainable use. For example, in our village we rely on a drilled well constructed by our MP, and thanks to him, but our neighbouring village had a problem with water pipelines, it took a year or so to fix the problem. So, these are the challenges"*.

The Zanzibar Household Survey 2014/15 report that only about 38% of the population has water access within home, of which rural households have less access (23.9%) compared to urban households (56.5%). However, the survey shows that about 96.9% of Zanzibar population have access to water within 1 kilometer distance (URT, 2016a). Though these statistics show some relative improvement, the situation seems worse in terms of actual availability of clean water as questioned by discussants above. Similarly, a key informant from the University of Dar es Salaam observed that water services have deteriorated even in

town areas, but noted some improvement in infrastructures such as roads, he argued, *"Zanzibar is not a big country, so I wouldn't expect people living in urban areas for example in Zanzibar town that they don't have access to clean water. In the past, even during colonial time, or even during 1980s and 1990s, there was no serious shortage of water. There is some improvement in areas of infrastructures such as road infrastructures where most areas can be easily accessed. But, generally I think the services are very poor"*.

Other services such as *education* and *electricity* supply were associated with unaffordable costs for many poor people, and for education, in particular, the quality was put into critical scrutiny,

"These services have been brought closer. For example the government has been able to bring the main electricity line close to our houses. However, most people still can't afford to pay the associated fees for the services. Water, electricity, health, and education, non of them is free of charge. Many people cannot afford their daily food, how could they afford to pay for these expenses". [A discussant from Chokocho]

The supply of electricity in Zanzibar is still far from covering even half of the population. Only 44.2% of the households have electricity supply, and expected the rural areas is less connected to electricity (20.3%) than the urban households (75.5%). The unaffordable costs could indeed be the reason for this situation.

Many key informants were more concerned with the quality aspect of education as they analysed education policy and assessed the performance of primary and secondary education. Large numbers of pupils in a single classroom was mentioned as a sign of a rotten education system:

"Today if you go to some of those primary schools it is very sad, a 100 children in one classroom, no tables, no desks to sit on. This is what I saw when I went for get my registration card. Children are sitting on the ground, and the ground was full of holes. It was not even a straight floor. But then I am told that two teachers in a class teaching at the same time, one stands behind there to maintain discipline." [A 'retired' key informant]

Generally, poor social services were complained by participants of all age groups and of different party support. It was clear that lack of improvement in social services delivery had deeply negative effect of citizens trust to the government. The situation becomes worse when they feel that other sections of the society are getting better treatment from the government, as this discussant from Jang'ombe made it clear, *"we urge the government to also consider us living in this area. We are also human beings, we are not wild animals. They shouldn't just*

think about Mazizini and Chukwani where owners of big and luxurious cars stay. We in Jang'ombe are also humans". Such an emotional statement must truly have an eroding effect on one's trust to the government. Hence, the views presented above confirms the positive influence of good performance in social services delivery over citizens trust in government, and bad performance on the contrary dwindles trust.

6.2 Overall Policy Performance of the Central Government

In addition to the findings on institutional performance presented above, the Afrobarometer survey, also examined *citizens' perceptions* of the performance of central government based on how well or badly it was handling some key functional responsibilities. These were; (a) Managing the economy, (b) Improving living standards of the poor, (c) Creating jobs, (d) Keeping prices down, (e) Narrowing income gaps, (f) Reducing crime, (g) Improving basic health services, (h) Addressing educational needs, (i) Providing water and sanitation services, (j) Ensuring everyone has enough to eat, (k) Fighting corruption, (l) Maintaining roads and bridges, and (m) Providing reliable electric supply.

The findings show that throughout the above responsibilities, the central government was evaluated vehemently negative. Above 92 percent were of the opinion that the government did very/fairly badly in handling the following functions: narrowing income gaps, ensuring enough to eat, fighting corruption, managing the economy, improving living standards, keeping prices down, and creating jobs. Also, above 87 percent of respondents thought the government did very/fairly badly in handling; improving basic health services, educational needs, and provision of water and sanitation; while handling maintaining roads and reliable supply of electricity was evaluated negatively at 77 and 65 percents, respectively. However, some modest perceptions of positive performance was notable in the provision of reliable electricity (35%), followed by maintenance of road and bridges (23%), and reduction of crime (21%).

In analysing the overall performance throughout the above-mentioned functions, the findings reveal a positive relationship between perception of job performance and trust attitudes. As shown in Table 17 below, the findings show that trust was higher (88%) among those who said the government did "very/fairly well", while those who said the government did "very/fairly badly" showed higher disapproval level (53%). The variation is statistically significant, though in analytical terms the limited strength of influence of institutional or

policy performance on trust attitudes as depicted in various findings above suggest that in Zanzibar institutional trust is a phenomenon of composite influence of several factors . For example, as shown in Table 17, below, the fact that an overwhelming majority of respondents (224 out of 240) thought that overall the government performed very/fairly badly in the above mentioned functions, nevertheless trust attitudes within the same group was almost equally divided is evidence in support of this argument.

Table 17: Relationship Between Overall Central Government Performance and Trust

	Very/Fairly well	Very/Fairly bad
High trust%	88	47
Low trust%	12	53
Total %	100	100
N=240	n=16	n=224

Question: Now let's speak about the performance of the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?

To examine the strength of influence further, participants were asked to say if the opposition political parties presented a viable alternative in governing the country. There was positive perceptions of the opposition political parties as viable alternatives, whereby 53 percent agreed, and 45 percent disagreed. However, when asked specifically to say which between the ruling and opposition political parties would do a better job in handling fighting corruption, controlling prices, and creating job, their responses show a great deal of relationship to their party affiliation consistently throughout the three problems mentioned above. For instance, about 103 out of 113 CCM supporters maintained their faith in ruling party in handling fighting corruption despite having assessed its performance highly negatively on how it has handled corruption. Likewise, majority of the opposition supporters opted for the opposition parties as the more capable of addressing the problems, whereby for example, 62 of 81 CUF supporters thought the opposition could do a better job. There was a small variation in this regard for those who were not affiliated with any party, most of whom supported the ruling party (21 out of 40), and some of them (13) opted for opposition political

parties. The inter-party faith was very minimal, where only 4 out of 113 CCM supporters thought the opposition could do better, and 14 out of 81 respondents affiliated to CUF showed faith with the ruling party. Quite similar figures were observed when asked in relation to the handling of the other two functions, namely; controlling prices and creating jobs.

Data from qualitative focus group discussions and in-depth interview support the findings that considerations of performance are significant in explaining trust attitudes in Zanzibar. Majority of discussant in focus group discussions, about 90 percent, suggested that performance factors were key in forging their trust attitudes, while at the same time vehemently rejecting the idea that identities were of major influence in Zanzibar politics. A respondent from Uweleni focus group, when asked to comment if party support makes supporters blind in judging the government, she replied, *"I dont think so! If the government can improve people's economic conditions and control prices, we cannot lose trust. In my view, it's not about party support, it's about how the government treats its vitizens"*. Another discussant from Utaani put his argument this way, *"trust is a pillar for peace and stability. It's not that in our society we don't have trust, we do. In Pemba for example you can sleep outside your house safely, but if you go to the Mainland Tanzania and sleep outside the house they will cut your legs. **But, trust in government is a different thing, the government has to perform to fulfil people's needs and abide to the rule of law, then it will gain their trust."*** [Emphasis is mine]

There were constant mentions of performance examples which in discussants opinions were strongly shaping people's trust in government. One recent issue which in their opinion has strongly eroded trust among citizens was the handling of Uamsho¹⁵ leaders' case. A discussant from Kangagani gives this example to elaborate her argument, she opined, *"for instance, this issue of imprisoning our sheikhs, has infuriated many, both suppoters of CCM and opposition. So its about how the government conducts its affairs not identity. This issue has even made people change their party affiliation"*. Also, many other discussants pointed at discriminatory practices and policies executed by the revolutionary government against some

¹⁵ Uamsho (Association for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation) became actively engaged in politics during constitutional review process, mobilizing support based on Zanzibari nationalism calling for separation from the Union. Uamsho leaders were ultimately detained accused of terrorism charges.

sections of the society and in favor of others as another performance factor eroding trust. For instance, a discussant from Chokocho provided his personal experience to illustrate his point,

"Certain sections of this society enjoy more benefits from the government not because of their ethnicity, but for political reasons. For example, people from Makunduchi fill most of employment posts from the government. Other sections are discriminated against again because of political reasons. Myself, I have been a victim. I had applied for a post to join the Police. I passed the interview and was selected to go to Moshi, in Tanzania Mainland for training. As we were boarding the ship to Dar es Salaam, an officer known as 'Franco Ali Mweupe' pointed at me and said that I was a Pemban and that I am not fit for the position. I was removed immediately from the ship. That was it, just because I am from Pemba".

Another discussant feels discriminatory practices responsible for the decline of trust,

"In Zanzibar hatred is ingrained in politics. Politics of discrimination, absence of justice, and prejudice. The government treat its people based on where they are from, and which party they belong. Trust in government fades away due to this, nothing less nothing more". [A discussant from Kibeni]

Other performance issues cited include a thorny agenda of Zanzibar's autonomy in the Union and its associated discontentments. In highlighting where the government could improve to bolster its citizens' trust in its institutions, discussants stressed variety of issues which showed that individuals' are shaped by specific preferences. Some highlighted *economic issues* such as double taxation, price control in food items, addressing employment problem, and narrowing income gap. Others thought *political performance* was more important and highlighted issues such as ensuring freedom of speech, political stability, championing Zanzibar's autonomy, fighting corruption, enhancing media freedom, transparency and accountability, and ensuring justice. There were indeed those who singled out *provision of free or affordable social services* as most important.

It should be noted that in the framework of this study, performance considerations include both positive and negative performance perceptions. On the one hand, it embraces positive achievements, positive policies, and positive practices affecting the society which reinforce citizens' trust. On the other hand, it also include negative practices, ineffective delivery, and negative policies which are corrosive to citizens' trust attitudes. Therefore, as shown in various findings above, performance considerations are significant in enhancing or destroying citizens' trust in government institutions.

6.3 Overall Performance of Local Government Councils

The study also examined citizens' perception of performance of local government in handling the following key responsibilities; (a) Maintaining local roads, (b) Maintaining local market places, (c) Making audit findings of the council known to the people, (d) Handling complaints about local government councilors or officials, (e) Guaranteeing that local government revenues are used for public services and not diverted for private gain, and (f) Managing conflicts over land. The findings reveal that the local councils were negatively evaluated throughout the six aspects mentioned above at above 82 percent in each, except in managing conflicts over land (73%).

However, when perceptions of performance of local government was cross-tabulated with trust level, the findings show no relationship between the two variables. It should be noted that in this case, the trust score used was specifically for the local government council where people were asked how much do they trust their local government council as an institution. Again, there were overwhelming negative evaluations of local government performance in executing its responsibilities, whereby 207 out of 233 respondents (89%) said it performed very/fairly badly. Nonetheless, as seen in Table 18 below, trust in local council was equally divided even among those who had evaluated it negatively, though trust was higher among those who said the local government did very/fairly well. This could be attributed to particularised trust attitudes where individuals tends to trust others who are familiar with. The proximity of local government and their day-to-day interactions with citizens' enhance trust among the population despite their poor performance.

Table 18: Relationship Between Overall Local Government Performance and Trust

	Very/Fairly well	Very/Fairly bad
High trust%	73	50
Low trust%	27	50
Total %	100	100
N=233	n=26	n=207

Question: *What about local government? I do not mean the national government. I mean your municipal or local government council. How well or badly would you say your local government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?*

Findings from qualitative focus groups and in-depth interviews also show that local government councils were evaluated negatively. In Zanzibar, the administrative structures at the lower echelon have lesser autonomy from the central government (Bakari, 2011), and are closely interwoven in terms of implementation at local level. Participants claimed that the

local government councils were highly politicized, lacks transparency, unaccountable, and irresponsible of popular demands. A discussant from Potoa suggested that delays in solving problems related to social services like water are most of the times due to inefficiency of the local government councils, he opined, *"sometimes it's the Municipal councils which are irresponsible. They collect revenues from citizens but they fail to address a simple problem for over a long period of time. The least they could do is to report it to higher authorities on time if they can't handle it"*.

At the lowest level local administration in Zanzibar is exercised through the Sheha who is the head of Shehia administration. Shehia is equivalent to village government in the Mainland's local administration structure. Sheha is appointed by the Regional Commissioner in consultation with the District Commissioner and currently all of them are members of the ruling party. They are part of the local administration although officially they are part of the central government structure at lower level (see Table 19). Participants in focus group discussions were more familiar with Shehas than the district councils or town councils. Most of them knew very little about the local government councils proper. To them, Sheha, deputy sheha, and their councils were a reference points for local government councils. Generally, they held negative evaluation of the roles of Shehas claiming that they operate on biased basis, motivated by ruling party orders, and they are obstacles to citizens access of their political rights and social justices.

Table 19: Sub-National Administrative Structures in Zanzibar

	Unguja	Pemba	Total
Regions	3	2	5
Districts	7	4	10
District Councils	6	4	9
Municipal Council	1	0	1
Town Councils	0	3	3
Shehia	258	131	389

Source: Field data, July-September 2015.

6.4 Discussion

Perceptions of overall central government performance was positively correlated to trust attitudes, whereby positive evaluation resulted into higher trust level while negative evaluation resulted into lower trust levels (see Table 17). Indeed, focus groups findings showed a mixture of considerations of the performance factors, where some participants prioritized economic performance, others political performance, while others thought performance on social service delivery was important. Overall, the findings show that political performance in terms of *perceptions of corruption, and satisfaction with democracy and elections*, and performance in *social service delivery* had somewhat the strongest impact on citizens trust attitudes. Another important performance area is the *perceptions of political stability*, though I could not examine this using quantitative data. Hence, performance considerations were significant in explaining trust attitudes among Zanzibaris. However, the study did not find strong evidences to link *satisfaction with the national economy* and *satisfaction with individual's economic conditions* with trust level.

Several studies support the performance perspective although with prominence of one factor over the other. For instance, Rose and Mishler (2010) suggested that in new democracies, trust or distrust in political institutions was based on *political* and *economic* performance. Similarly, Hutchison and Johnson (2011) also found that positive evaluation of government performance strongly reinforces institutional trust. Similar to this study, Mishler & Rose, (2001) observed that institutional performance was the key to citizens' trust in political institutions, and were strongly in favour of political performance in terms of fighting corruption and improving democracy, as well as responding to public priorities. Findings from Ghana also corroborate the superiority of institutional performance factors (Godefroidt, et. al., 2015).

In relation to *satisfaction with democracy and elections*, findings revealed that majority of respondents were generally satisfied with exercise of democracy, and their trust reflected their satisfaction, while dissatisfaction with elections yielded lower trust among majority of respondents (see Table 13 and Table 14 above). Indeed, results showed despair among respondents (94%) on the role of elections in ensuring voters choice, disciplining office holders, and especially removing leader from office. Thus, the study's hypotheses both for *democracy* and *elections* variable were supported. Findings from qualitative data sources

further elaborated that coming to power through undemocratic means dwindles citizens trust. The findings revealed that despite the violations of democracy and unfairness of elections in Zanzibar, experiences of electoral violence and persistent political conflict meant that people accepted the outcome of elections for the sake of peace and stability, which partly explain the observed trust attitudes. The prominent of political factors is backed up by empirical research. For example, Haagensen (2016) found democracy and corruption as strongly and negatively affecting institutional trust in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Moreover, *citizens' perceptions of corruption* was positively correlated to their trust attitudes, hence supporting the hypothesis of the study. The findings revealed that majority of respondents perceived public institutions as corrupt and their institutional trust was similarly lower (as shown in Table 15 above). However, although citizens held high perceptions of increase in corruption in the country (91%), that was not equally reflected in their trust level. Interestingly, the findings on perceptions of corruption was found to be consistent with trust in specific institutions, whereby those institutions perceived to be corrupt, such as the police and the courts, scored the lowest, while the least corrupt institutions such as the office of the president was attributed higher trust. Indeed, qualitative findings from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions corroborated the quantitative results. Corruption was perceived to be a threat to security and people's lives as crime went unpunished and embezzlement of public funds left people with poor health care. It was further noted that corruption was flourishing in a non-democratic environment due to weak accountability system, and more so because the media has not seriously exposed it. Other trust studies have revealed similar observation, for instance, Cho and Kirwin (2007) found that corruption was important in explaining trust in Sub-Saharan Africa, whereby corruption corrodes trust, and mistrust increase corruption, hence forming a vicious cycle (see also Haagensen, 2016). Also, Armah-Attoh (2007) found corruption as 'the major' obstacle to popular trust in public institutions.

The findings revealed that satisfaction with social services delivery positively correlated with trust, where the positive performance in social services yielded higher trust and perception of negative performance resulted into lower trust level (see table Table 16 above). Findings from focus group discussions found that, among the five examined services in this study, health performed the worst, followed by clean water services, education, and electricity, while the government was evaluated relatively positive in improving road infrastructures. In most cases participants were concerned about access and quality of services, rather than

presence of infrastructure. However, consistent with the conceptual framework of the study, participant's evaluation of social service delivery was found to be influenced by party attachments as respondents remained loyal when asked whether another political party would have done a better job.

Further, in examining *perceptions of political stability*, I relied on qualitative evidences and the findings supported the hypothesis of the study. Although this was not statistically measure, citizens opinions from focus group showed high dissatisfaction with the security situation. They in particular attributed blame at the security organs of the state for perpetrating violence as they were perceived to be highly politicized. However, participants seemed to recognize that the role of GNU in maintaining stability compared to their past four decades' experiences of political conflicts.

Indeed, findings on citizens' *perception of the economy* was not strongly related to their trust attitudes (see Table 11 and Table 12 above). Findings from focus group discussion revealed that citizens prefer to evaluate their individual's economic conditions in rather than the national economy, and they expressed high discontentment for not seeing improvement in their own lives. Among issues of concern for individual economic conditions included triple taxation from organs of union government, Zanzibar central government, and local government structures, regional economic discrimination, high unemployment, price inflation, low income, and general poverty situation. Nevertheless their negative evaluation did not affect their trust level significantly, hence the study' hypothesis was rejected. Qualitative evidences suggested that Zanzibaris' religious faith and majority of population's dependence on remittances from their Diaspora relatives were important in explaining their divided trust attitudes.

Finally, the findings revealed that perception of performance in local government was not significant in explaining trust in local councils, where the trust was observed to be equally divided (50%) despite an overwhelming majority (89%) evaluating it negatively (see Table 18 above).

6.5 Concluding Remarks

The results in this chapter showed varied citizens' attitudes relating to performance consideration. The findings show that political performance in terms of satisfaction with

democracy and elections and perceptions of corruption, as well as satisfaction with social service delivery, had the strongest effect on citizens' trust attitudes. Also, perceptions of political stability have an impact on political trust. However, the findings revealed that economic considerations and evaluation of local government performance was not strongly related to expression of trust. Further, the findings show that performance evaluation is also influenced by some identity attachments such as political party affiliation. Generally, performance consideration was found to be increasingly prominent in citizens' expression of political trust.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, IMPLICATION OF FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS

7 Introduction

In this chapter I present a summary of the entire study on institutional trust in Zanzibar. The chapter begins with an overview of the study in terms of the study problem and methodology used. It then provides concluding analysis of the two major independent variables, having examined them separately in the previous two chapters. Further, a summary of key findings is provided and the study's theoretical framework revisited in the light of the findings. Finally, the chapter culminates with some remarks on the limitations of the study, its contribution to trust studies, and suggestion for further research.

7.1 An Overview of the Study

What explains political trust in Zanzibar? To be more specific, let me put it this way, *how significant are identities and perceptions of performance on individuals' trust in public institutions in Zanzibar?* With this as the central research question, the study's main objective was to examine the significance of identity and performance variables in explaining citizens' trust attitudes in Zanzibar. The need to examine this question arose due to a research

gap in trust literature that has often overlooked the peculiarities of Zanzibar as a polity. Trust surveys and empirical studies have often examined Zanzibar within the Tanzania Union framework, hence making such a big confusion even with regard to the *referent* the observed trust could be attributed to because of the dual reference posed by the Union and Zanzibar governments structures. Above all, such analysis neglect the local political dynamics and historical trajectories within Zanzibar. Hence, given the contested scholarly interpretations of identities, history, and politics in Zanzibar (see for instance, Killian, 2008; Maliyamkono, 2000; Bakari, 2001, 2011; Matheson, 2012; Sheriff, 2001), it was imperative that an independent analysis of trust attitudes of Zanzibaris be made. The study's mapping of the influence of identity and performance factors aimed to address this research gap.

Towards that end, the study employed a mixed method approach to examine the influence of identity and performance on citizens trust. The approach was particularly important in this analysis as it helped to cross-check meanings, interrogate facts, compare findings, and clarify some interpretations made from the data. The study utilized rich and up to date sources of data including; (i) Afrobarometer Survey round 6 in Tanzania, the most recent survey conducted between August and October 2014, and its data-set was officially released for public consumption in November 2015, (ii) qualitative field data from 8 focus group discussions with ordinary citizens, (iii) 10 in-depth interviews with key informants, (iv) documentary review, and (v) direct field observation.

In the light of the study problem, I particularly adopted the identity and institutional performance theories of trust that have been so commonly applied in trust studies in African context. The central research question was further broken into the following three specific questions to guide the analysis;

1. What influence do social and political identities have on individuals' political trust in Zanzibar?
2. Do perceptions of government performance influence citizens' trust in public institutions in Zanzibar?
3. What are the most important factors in explaining patterns of popular trust in public institutions in Zanzibar?

After a thorough review of both identity and performance theories of trust, with institutional trust as the dependent variable, the study derived two major set of independent variables. First; the identity variables, which consisted of 10 variables such as demographic attributes

(*age, sex, and education*), social group identities (*ethnicity, location, region, and occupation*), and common political identities (*party affiliation, historical legacy, and national identity*), and, second; the performance variables, which included 5 aspects, namely, economic performance (*perception of national and individual's economic conditions*), political performance (*satisfaction with democracy and elections, perceptions of corruption, and perceptions of political stability*), and performance in *social service delivery* (health care, clean water, electricity supply, and road infrastructure). Based on the categorization of variables mentioned above, and informed by empirical trust studies, the following major hypothesis were formulated and tested by further observation;

Hypothesis 1: *Age, sex, and education may influence how an individual is inclined to assess government performance and consequently his/her overall political trust.*

Hypothesis 2: *Social and political identities may strongly influence one's political trust, or influence significantly one's judgment of government performance, and his/her overall political trust.*

Hypothesis 3: *The more positively the citizens assess the performance of government institutions and leaders, the more highly they will express political trust.*

The above hypotheses were broken down further for each specific variable as presented in the summary of key findings below. The major hypotheses were carefully formulated to reflect the interactive nature of variables as depicted in the conceptual framework of the study (see Figure 1). With a huge number of variables to examine, the study utilized the advantage of qualitative data to tap into citizen's own explanations, and feelings, and experts' opinions regarding the problem to arrive at meaningful conclusions.

7.2 Summary of Key Findings

Below, I briefly present the key results for each of the specific research questions. The first two questions were directly related to the findings of specific variables, while the third was meant to provide critical concluding reflections of the findings on the two major independent variables in order to determine the one with the most strongest explanatory significance.

1. What influence do social and political identities have on individuals' political trust in Zanzibar?

The study added demographic variables in line with the social and political identities. As noted earlier, a total of 10 variables fall under the identity factors. They study's major

findings on identity was that common political identities in terms of *party affiliation* and *historical legacies* (particularly the post revolutionary legacies) were the two most important identity constructs in explaining trust in the government. Other variables found to have significant relationship to trust include demographic attributes of age and gender, as well as social group identities such as region, location, and occupation. However, the study found no evidence in support of the ethnic influence on political trust. It was also at the surprise of the researcher that education was not seen to be associated with citizens' trust contrary to the findings in most African settings. Further, the study could not establish the relationship between national identity and trust due to lack of enough data for meaningful analysis.

Moreover, the results on identity variables depicted multiple interaction effects between identity variables themselves, and in relations to performance factors. This is consistent with theoretical framework of the study. It was further observed from the findings that, some of the identity variables such as historical legacies (especially the ideological legacies) are increasingly losing their influence on trust attitude. Therefore, an important remark from the findings is that identities matter for political trust in Zanzibar, and this means a certain level of particularized trust exist.

2. Do perceptions of government performance influence citizens' trust in public institutions in Zanzibar?

The study analyzed several aspects of performance variables including economic performance, political performance, and social service delivery. It also tried to examine overall central government and local government performance. The findings show that political performance (in terms of *perceptions of corruption, satisfaction with democracy and elections*), as well as *performance in social service delivery* had the strongest impact on citizens trust attitudes. The findings also reveal that *perceptions of political stability* influenced trust significant, while no evidence was found on the influence of *economic performance*, both at the national economy and individuals' living conditions on trust. Similarly, the study found evaluation of performance of local government councils did not have strong influence on trust.

Moreover, the fact that citizens evaluated public institutions extremely negative, as shown from both quantitative as well as qualitative data sources, regardless of their identity attachment means government performance is closely scrutinized by citizens. However, the

perplexing findings showing that despite highly negative evaluation, citizens trust expression was not so much skewed to that effect, signify that other factors come into play. In general, the findings show that the *overall central government performance* was correlated to trust attitudes, whereby positive evaluation resulted into higher trust level and negative evaluation resulted into lower trust levels.

Further, the findings suggest the prominence of performance consideration over identity factors, which signifies the presence and increasing levels of institutional generalized trust which is important for economic development, democratic stability, and cooperation (see Rothstein & Stolle, 2002).

In conclusion, in this section I have addressed the three major hypotheses mentioned in line with the two specific research questions above. The summary of results for all the specific variables are listed in Table 20 below. Next, I address the last research question.

Table 20: Summary of Results for specific hypotheses

Independent variables	Specific Hypotheses	Results
Age	<i>Youth were the more likely to express less trust compared to their old counterparts</i>	Partly supported
Gender	<i>Men are much likely to be critical of the government and thus less likely to express trust compared to women</i>	Supported
Education	<i>The more educated individuals become, the more likely to express low trust in the government compared to the less educated ones</i>	Not supported
Location	<i>Rural dwellers are more likely to show higher trust in government than their urban counterparts</i>	Supported
Occupation	<i>Those working in the government sector and formal organizations of the state are more likely to express higher trust level compared to those working in the private sector, NGOs, and self-employed</i>	Supported
Region	<i>Regional identity may have significant influence on individual's trust level, whereby people from Pemba are less likely to express support in government institutions compared to their Unguja counterparts</i>	Partly supported
Ethnicity	<i>Ethnicity is positively related to expression of trust, whereby people of Arab origin are less likely to express trust compared to Africans of Mainland origin</i>	Not supported
Party affiliation	<i>Supporters of ruling party are more likely to express higher trust while expecting lower trust among opposition supporters.</i>	Strongly supported
Historical legacies	<i>Attachment to historical legacies of pre-independence incline an individual to trust the government more, while identification with post revolutionary legacies erodes institutional trust.</i>	Strongly supported
National Identity	<i>Identification with national identity is likely to decrease trust in government as it is likely to prioritize performance criteria rather than similarities in group identities in expression of trust.</i>	-
Satisfaction with economic conditions	<i>The more positively citizens evaluate government economic performance, especially in sectors related to individual economic wellbeing, the more positively they would express trust in the government.</i>	Not supported
Satisfaction with democracy and elections	<i>- Improvement in democracy impacts trust positively, while poor democratic performance influence trust negatively. - The more citizens are satisfied with the conduct of elections the more likely they will express trust in the government that came to power through it.</i>	-Strongly supported -Strongly supported
Perceptions of Corruption	<i>Citizens' perceptions of increase in corruption will likely influence their trust negatively, while positive performance in combating corruption would increase trust.</i>	Strongly supported
Perceptions of political stability	<i>The more people are satisfied with the security situation, the more they would trust the government more, but a sense of insecurity affects institutional trust negatively</i>	Supported
Satisfaction with social service delivery	<i>The more positively the citizens evaluate social service delivery the more they would express high level of trust in public institutions.</i>	Strongly supported
Local Government performance	<i>Expected that evaluation of performance of local councils would be key explanation to trust attributed to it</i>	Not supported

3. What are the most important factors in explaining patterns of popular trust in public institutions in Zanzibar?

This final research question was meant to provide an overall analysis of the strengths of influence between identity and performance. The question was also posed consistently with the conceptual framework of the study in order to examine if there was merit in treating the two theories of identity and institutional performance as complementary rather than rival approaches in understanding institutional trust in Zanzibar. When participants in focus group discussions were asked to rank which one between identity and performance had the most strong influence on their trust attitudes, there was majority support for performance factors. They raised issues in relation to several aspects of performance, such as democracy and election, justice system and rule of law, issues of corruption and mismanagement of resources and office, and economic factors. But there were also acknowledgment about the effect of identity among people particularly political party affiliation and historical legacies.

Similar question was posed during interviews with key respondents. Again, opinions of performance considerations received major support. However, and this is most importantly, 9 out of 10 key informants thought trust attitudes in Zanzibar cannot be explained by a single factor and proposed a mixture of identity and performance factors, at the same time highlighting the increasing effect of performance factors. A key informant from the University of Dar es Salaam explained his view on this, he argued,

"Now here we have to make a difference in the expression of trust. For example if you are talking of electoral behavior, it is very much guided by identity (by party affiliation) not performance, may be government performance is secondary. So its different I would say. But if you are talking of trust broadly I think I would take into account both because Zanzibar is a highly politicized society and you wouldn't say they take into account performance rather than identity (identity not in terms of racial identity but identity in terms of political affiliation)"

Another key informant held similar opinion, he observed,

I think it is becoming complex now because the political affiliation and historical factors that sort of combine. That is being pushed as part of the propaganda. But the people now are beginning to look at their own conditions and are behaving differently contrary to what the political elite wants to them to behave. So the fact is that they don't see the improvement in their lives, and that is changing their political attitudes.

The above findings are indeed consistent with the conceptual framework of the study. The study conclude that none of the individual's identities or performance criteria alone could be

said to have a solitary influence on individual's judgments. Similar argument is advanced by Bratton (2011) who hold that researcher need to be cautious with single-factor explanations.

However, it is important to stress that the findings have shown high hopes that in Zanzibar, performance factors are increasingly gaining prominence. Even the Afrobarometer survey results show that when respondents were asked to explain what was the difference between the opposition and the ruling party, most of respondents thought that 'the honesty or integrity of party leaders' (40%), and 'their economic and development policies' (37%), while only 3 percent and 2 percent mentioned religion of party leaders and ethnicity of party leaders, respectively. Similarly, the findings also show that identities citizens were not made blind by their identities such as party affiliation. For example, when participants were asked if it was important to obey the government in power no matter who one has voted for, or whether it was necessary to obey the government only if one had voted for it, an overwhelming majority of respondents (97%) supported the statement that it was necessary to obey the government regardless of who one has voted for.

7.3 Revisiting the Theoretical Framework in the light of key findings

The study employed the identity and performance approaches with great effectiveness to understand citizens' trust attitudes in Zanzibar. Both theories proved relevant in explaining institutional trust in Zanzibar. On the one hand, the identity theory, which claim that people's identities are key consideration in their expression of trust was useful in explaining trust among Zanzibaris as party affinities and historical legacies were found to have strong significance. Other identities such as regional identity, rural-urban location, and occupation as well as demographic attributes of age and gender were similarly important, although identities such as ethnicity, education, and national identity were not relevant in understanding political trust in Zanzibar. This shows that the identity theory was partly able to explain why some Zanzibaris express political trust the way they do, and in turn suggest the presence of some levels of particularized institutional trust.

On the other hand, the institutional performance perspective, which views political trust as the outcome of the institutional performance (or non performance) in terms of policy output, and the conduct of political leadership, was also strongly applicable. The findings revealed that people's perceptions and satisfaction with political performance in terms of satisfaction with democracy and elections, perceptions of corruption, and perceptions of political

stability, as well as satisfaction with the provision of social services were key in explaining institutional trust in Zanzibar. This implies also that generalized institutional trust is present in Zanzibar, and its co-existence with particularized trust boards well with the theoretical design of this study.

A very critical theoretical implication derived from the findings of the study is the powerful evidences for the interactions between identity and performance factors. Consistent with the study's conceptual framework emanating from the theoretical and empirical literature, identity and performance factors, and so the theories themselves, were found to influence each other significantly in explaining trust patterns in Zanzibar. For example, evidences from the findings revealed that regional identity, political affiliation, and identification with historical legacies (the post-revolutionary legacy in particular), were strongly shaped, influenced, and defined by performance factors such as discriminatory policies, violations of democratic rights, volatile politics, and policy failures in terms of poor social service delivery and worsening individual's economic conditions. Similarly, citizens' evaluation of performance were relatively influenced by some identity factors such as political affiliation and historical legacies. Hence the findings provide further support for the study's framework of analysis. Similar observation is made by Askvik (2008) who found both identity and performance factors significant, and recommended that the two theories "should be seen as complementing each other in understanding trust in the post-apartheid government of South Africa" (see also Askvik, 2010). The study's conceptual framework is further supported by Cho and Kirwin, (2007) who even found circular and vicious relationship between experience of corruption and trust, whereby citizens experience with corruption lowers trust, and lower levels of trust are likely to increase experience of corruption. The consideration of multiple interaction effect consideration serve the purpose of avoiding the third factor effect, by trying to uncover what Elster (2007) termed the 'causal chain' of a possible outcome. For instance, as Keefer (2010) pointed out, if ethnicity is exploited by politicians to exacerbate fear due to voters imperfect information, then the true cause could not be attributed to ethnicity, but rather the absence of information, or other features of the political environment.

Another significant implication of the findings is that, increasingly the identity attachments are losing their explanatory significance, hence performance judgments becoming much stronger in citizens' trust attitudes. Similar findings was observed by Askvik (2008) who noted that the significance of racial identities was in decline in South Africa as apartheid

memories were fading. For Zanzibar, this implies that increasingly particularized trust is being replaced by generalized institutional trust, which is important for the flourishing of democratic institutions and economic development (see Rothstein and Stolle, 2002).

7.4 Limitation of the Study

The Afrobarometer data was collected using a standardized questionnaire for the whole of Tanzania. There was no tailored questionnaire for Zanzibar. This puts some limitations on the data in some respects. First, given the presence of two government structures, the Union government on the one hand and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (SMZ) on the other, it is not clear which of the two government is being assessed and attributed with the observed trust level. This is what I called the problem of *double referents*. As noted above, the government of Zanzibar is a fully functioning government with its own autonomous central and local government executive structures, the judiciary, and the House of representative (HoR). In fact, it is the SMZ which is responsible for the welfare of its people and day-to-day administration in Zanzibar, including provision of social services, management of the economy, and ensuring democratic rule and respect of the rule of law. In this regard therefore, when citizens of Zanzibar assess the performance of central government and ultimately express trust based on that, do they assess the Union government or that of Zanzibar?¹⁶

In connection to the above limitation, most of the assessed institutions referred in the survey were either limited to Mainland Tanzania in terms of jurisdiction, or had double reference, that is, similar institutions exist in Zanzibar and in Mainland autonomously and thus increasing the ambiguity of which one is being referred to. An example of an institution whose functions do not extend to Zanzibar is the PCCB, and its substitute is the Zanzibar Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Authority. Other institutions have limited authority only in relations to Union matters, these include TRA and NEC while alternative institutions with similar mandates for Zanzibar such as ZRB, and ZEC, were not included in the survey¹⁷. Also, an example of an institution that has double referents is the office of the president,

¹⁶ There is an indication that the government of the United Republic was the *referent* of the assessment in the Afrobarometer Round 6 standardized questionnaire in Tanzania. For example, in question 68(B) respondents were asked to assess the job performance of the former president of the United republic, president Jakaya Kikwete, though it was not clear in all other questions.

¹⁷ The Zanzibar's autonomous legislative body known as the House of Representatives is another institution which deserved to be examined parallel with the parliament of the United Republic.

hence when citizens assess the office of the president it is not clear whether the *referent* is the president of Zanzibar or that of the United Republic.

Perhaps it is also important to note that some variables could not be examined thoroughly due to lack of data from the survey. For example, the influence of *historical identities* (legacies), and *perceptions of political instability* lacked quantitative evidences from the Afrobarometer survey. This is again due to the use of standardized questionnaire throughout Tanzania instead of tailored questionnaire for Zanzibar. The intricate nature of identity is a peculiar feature of Zanzibar's politics, and the influence of such aspects are more pronounced. A tailored questionnaire for Zanzibar could improve the survey data in the future.

Having pointed out the above limitations, however, the rational of this study is still intact. The study excluded the data of 5 regions of Zanzibar from the Tanzania data set. It was able to examine citizens' expression of trust in the lights of identity and institutional performance theories, that is, explaining how Zanzibaris' trust attitudes are formed by examining identity and performance factors. Indeed, having supplemented the survey data with qualitative evidences from focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, documentary review, and direct observation, the findings revealed great consistency and similarities from both qualitative and quantitative sources. In particular, the qualitative data provided deeper insights from rich sources to allow the study to confirm, disconfirm, or corroborate the quantitative findings with more evidences.

Another limitation was probably the timing of the study's data sources. On the one hand, the Afrobarometer survey data was collected between August and October 2014, when the Government of National Unity (GNU) was in place and the political relations were relatively very good. This could have a positive influence on the results against a background of decades of restrained political relations, conflicts and instabilities the isles has experienced. On the other hand, the qualitative data were collected between July and September 2015 closer to the October 2015 national elections, where there were clear signs that the GNU was falling apart. Probably, the political relations had started to be suspicious and somehow affected the findings. It was later noted that the October elections proved to be a turning point for the return of political conflicts in the isles as it was annulled, and a re-run of elections in March 2016 was boycotted by the main opposition party (CUF). The political standoff is yet to be resolved.

7.5 Contribution of the study and Suggestion for further research

As pointed earlier, the study made some important contributions to the existing literature on trust research in African settings, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. First, the study attempted to fill the research gap in trust literature, which has overlooked Zanzibar's peculiarities from other countries¹⁸. The study has argued that treating Zanzibar within the Union framework is not only misleading, but is also an intellectual disregard of a rich case that is characteristically different from many of the Sub-Saharan countries because of its intricate, and volatile politics and historical trajectories that bring claims of identities into play. This study is probably one of the first of its kind to address trust in particular, but also supplement other existing studies on general political attitudes.

The study also provides empirical evidences from a case study of Zanzibar to inform and enhance the explanatory strength of the identity and performance theories of trust. Flyvbjerg (2006) calls this 'theoretical generalization' role of a case study research. Similarly, Yin (2003:10) referred to this contribution as 'analytical generalization' whereby the case study goal is "to expand and generalize theories". More importantly, the study's findings show that the two theories are complementary to each other for a better understanding of trust rather than being considered as competing or rival models of trust.

Indeed, the study informs public policy by outlining important factors in building institutional trust. For a country like Zanzibar that has gone through decades of one party system where people's experience with suppression of freedom, the delivery of political goods is more important than in other places of different context. This was evident in the findings as political identities and political performance were found to be most important in citizens' institutional trust. Thus, by ruttig out practices which are corrosive to political trust such as corruption, and improve democracy, as well as improve delivery of social service, the government will improve its popular legitimacy and increase citizens' voluntary compliance with the state (see also, Armah-Attoh, 2007). Also, by encouraging the growth of national identity (as other studies argued) will help mitigate the negative effects of historical legacies and party affiliation.

¹⁸ The scholarly neglect of Zanzibar and analysis of Tanzania as a single unit of analysis is also noted by Killian (2008), who argue that such analysis "tends to ignore variations between the two partner states."

Since this study was basically mapping the influence or significance of several identity and performance factors, understandably it could not rigorously examine in expansive detail the causal relationship for each of the variables. Thus, deeper analyses to test the causal relationship and strength of some few variables found to be significant from this study, is one area for future research. Also, for variables that could not have been examined thoroughly such as national identity need to be explained. With high level identification with national identity in Zanzibar, national identity is likely to have strong influence. As evidences cited from several studies above, Robinson (2009; 2011; 2016) consistently found to relate significantly to institutional trust in Malawi and Zambia. Another suggestion is for the Afrobarometer, they should consider examining Zanzibar in a separate survey, because although it is not a sovereign state in terms of the conduct of foreign affairs and Union matters, arguably it enjoys an internal sovereignty over non-union matters, most of which are the central concern for trust research.

7.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter presented a summary of the study on trust in public institutions in Zanzibar using identity and performance theories of trust. The chapter made a recap of key findings and its linkages to the study's research questions and theoretical framework. Also, the study's limitations were pointed out and its contribution to trust research highlighted. In summary, the study found identity as well as performance factors to be strongly associated with citizens' trust in Zanzibar. Another major finding of the study is the evidence that identity and performance theories are complementary to each other in explaining institutional trust. Further, the study found that performance consideration are increasingly become the most dominant criteria of judging public institutions and even identities are very much influenced by government performance. Also, the prominence of performance considerations and their strong influence on identity means that increasingly Zanzibaris are getting detached from negative historical influences. This provide hope for Zanzibar as identity factors, especially those that are considered divisive, such as ethnicity, were not found to be significant in citizens' trust attitudes. It implies that generalized institutional trust is in increase in Zanzibar, which is a positive phenomenon for national development and national integration. Therefore, in brief the study suggest that performance is the right button the government should press in order to enhance citizens' trust in public institutions and ultimately strengthen its legitimacy and public acceptance of its policies and programs.

8 Bibliography

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Data set

Afrobarometer Data, Tanzania, Round 6, (2015), available at <http://www.afrobarometer.org>

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: In-depth Interview Guide for Key Informants

1. Recent Afrobarometer opinion surveys have shown that Zanzibaris show high awareness of political issues. What is your view on trust situation in Zanzibar?
2. What is your view about racial and ethnic relations among citizens in Zanzibar? Would you say harmonious, suspicious, or conflictual? Why?
3. Party affiliation is said to have strong influence in forming political attitudes in Zanzibar. How strong is it compared to national/geographic identification as Zanzibaris or as Tanzanians? **Is there any link between ethnic identity and party support in Zanzibar?**
4. What is the nature and cause of regional divide in Zanzibar between Pemba and Unguja? How does regionalism influence trust in public institutions in Zanzibar?
5. In your opinion, has the Revolutionary government of Zanzibar represented a particular racial/political group at the expense of others or is it an inclusive government? What is your view before and after the formation of GNU?
6. It is argued that most ruling parties in Africa have achieved great support from what they had done as liberators and freedom fighters. What is your opinion of the revolutionary government of Zanzibar having governed 51 years since the popular revolution? Is this history still lingering in people's minds?
7. Do you think there is political instability in Zanzibar? If Yes, what are the triggers of the conflict? And how does the instability impact on citizens' trust in their government? **What is your view on general peace and security in Zanzibar?**
8. The period under the GNU (2010-2015) is said to be the most peaceful term in multiparty era. How do you assess the achievement of the GNU in building citizens' political trust?
9. What is your opinion regarding the conduct of democracy and elections in Zanzibar and how has it strengthened or destroyed the trust and legitimacy of the government?
10. What is your perception of corruption and governance in Zanzibar?
11. How do you generally view the economic situation of Zanzibar?, the livelihood of an ordinary Zanzibari in comparison to Mainland and other regions, and the prospects of the Zanzibar national economy.
12. How do you rate the government of Zanzibar in terms of social service provision? How does that situation impact on citizens' trust in government?
13. Overall, what would you say is the most important factor that influence citizens' trust in government in Zanzibar? Is it identity (ethnic, political, regional, history) or government performance (economy, democracy, security, corruption, social service)? or both? Why?

Appendix 2: Focus Group Topic Guide for Political Trust

Country Direction

1. What is your view regarding the overall country direction?
 - (a) Do you think the country is in the right or wrong direction?
 - (b) What is your view of the future prospect of the country?

Economy

2. Let's talk about the economy, how well the government manages the economy?
 - (a) The national economy, and your own individual living/economic conditions
 - (b) Your assessment of economic conditions for the past 5 years
 - (c) Prospect of the economy in the next 5 years

Security

3. What is your view of the security situation in the country?
 - (a) Do you think the country is in peace and political stability
 - (b) How well do you think the current government has done in managing security situation?
 - (c) What has been the role of National security forces in maintaining peace and stability
 - (d) Do you have experience of political violence for the past 10 years?

Democracy and Elections

4. What democracy mean to you?
 - (a) What is your assessment of multiparty democracy in the country
 - (b) What is your assessment of democracy for the past 10 years
 - (c) Are you satisfied with the exercise of democracy in the country
 - (d) In your opinion, is there anything restricting the exercise of democracy?
5. To what extent the 2010 elections reflected voters' genuine choice?
 - (a) Right to vote and be voted
 - (b) Was it free and fair?
 - (c) To what extent elections improve legitimacy of elected leaders?

Corruption

6. What does corruption means to you? What is your opinion about corruption in Zanzibar?
 - (a) How is corruption compared to 5 years ago?
 - (b) Do you think corruption has any effect/impact in your life?
 - (c) What effect corruption has to the country at large?
 - (d) Has the government done enough in fighting corruption
 - (e) To what extent newsmedia, courts of laws, and the government have played their roles in the fighting against corruption

Social Service Delivery

7. Let's talk about social services; water, electricity, education, road infrastructure, and health care provision. The government is responsible for providing social services to its citizens:

- (a) How well has it done the job?
- (b) What are the priority problems you face in your residency area.
- (c) What is your view about the status of the services you have mentioned in different parts of the country

Identity

8. There are so many social and political identities one could identify with such as race, a region where you live, nationality, occupation, ethnicity, party affiliation, and ideology.

- (a) Which of these you feel likely to identify yourself with and why?
- (b) Which one do you think most people in your area like to associate with and why?
- (c) Do you think the history of the government and leaders as liberators influence your trust attitudes to the government?
- (d) To what extent history influences your political attitudes

Trust in Government

9. What does trust in government mean to you?

- a) Overall, how do you rate your trust in the government?
- b) What motivates you to trust the government the way you do?
- c) What makes citizens lose trust in the government?
- d) What can government do to gain the trust of its citizens?

Arising issues and any other Comments

10. If you have any information that you need to share, or a question to ask me, you are welcome to do so.

This marks the end of our group discussion. We appreciate your participation, contribution, and opinions on the topics.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Appendix 3: Research Clearance permit

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF ZANZIBAR

SECRETARY
ZANZIBAR RESEARCH COMMITTEE
P. O Box 239
Tel: 2230806
FAX: 2233788



RESEARCH/FILMING PERMIT

(This Permit is only Applicable in Zanzibar for a duration specified)

SECTION

Name: KHAMIS ISSA ALI
Date and Place of Birth: 30/10/1981 ZNZ
Nationality: TANZANIAN
Passport Number: AB 197622
Date and Place of Issue: ZANZIBAR
Date of arrival in Zanzibar: 11/06/2015
Duration of stay: TWO MONTHS
Research Tittles: "TRUST IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN ZANZIBAR: ASSESSING THE ROLES OF IDENTITY AND PERFORMANCE"

Full address of Sponsor:

This is to endorse that I have received and duly considered applicant's request I am satisfied with the descriptions outlined above.

Name of the authorizing officer: ABDUL R. ABEID

Signature and seal:

Institution:

Office of Chief Government Statistician

Address:

P. O Box 2321
Zanzibar.

Date:

15/07/2015