# MUSIC THERAPY, TRUST AND CHILD WELFARE

In a Norwegian context

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Abstract

This thesis theoretically explores the concept of trust in music therapy with adolescents in a Norwegian child welfare context. By reviewing literature describing the Norwegian music therapy practice in child welfare and music therapy with adolescents in general, exploring different perspectives on trust and relating these to an interdisciplinary framework of trust, suggestions are made concerning how trust is built in the music therapy context.

Music therapy can be used as a different setting in which the adolescents can create knowledge structures containing experiences of trust associated with adults and peers related to child welfare. The supportive nature of musical objects and the multifaceted role of the music therapist can enable new ways of relating which open up for trust. By listening to the adolescent's voice and emphasizing their participation in determining the institutional structures of the music therapy sessions, they can use shared goals and values as a resource that enables trust. Repeated collaborative interaction in music therapy can build trust relations that move towards affect- and identification-based trust. People from the adolescent's network can be invited to participate in the music therapy, giving opportunities to re-negotiate poor trust relations and challenge relational power structures.

1.0 - INTRODUCTION

How is trust built in music therapy with adolescents in a child welfare context? Many children and adolescents placed in child welfare have experienced some form of neglect and have difficult emotions and feelings attached to this (Kayed et al., 2015), and some have experienced traumatic events which leave them at risk of developing traumatized reactions (Webb, 2005). It seems that positive experiences of trust may not have been the most prominent during the early years of these young individuals' lives, and it might be understandable that some have difficulties trusting as they continue their lives. But, what is "trust?" Is it something we can give, take, create and destroy? Is it something inherently individual, something we adopt, create and share socially and through culture? What is the relevance of trust in music therapy? The aim of this thesis is to elucidate and explore these points, and explore the role of trust with respect to music therapy in child welfare, as well as the value a deeper understanding of this has.

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of my master thesis is to explore the role of an interdisciplinary understanding of trust in relation to a sociocultural, culture-centered and community-oriented approach to music therapy within a Norwegian child welfare context. By reviewing select literature on music therapy in child welfare as well as on trust in music therapy with adolescents, how trust is built and the possible influence it has in music therapy in the context will be considered. I will then describe the main components of trust and elaborate on an integrative theoretical framework of trust that includes the notion of adaptive rationality. The ideas described will be used to explore the role of trust in music therapy in child welfare. Finally, the implications a deeper understanding of trust might have for music therapy with adolescents will be considered. Research questions will be presented in section 1.4.

1.2 Background

In accordance with what Wenger (1998) has written about social communities, my understanding is that we, throughout our lives, learn, find meaning and develop our identities in relation to the social and natural world we navigate and participate in, which in turn shapes how we interpret and act in the world. We are not "isolated individuals", but are deeply interconnected with other individuals, groups, institutions and larger social systems, which we both influence and are influenced by. Interactions with others allow us to both shape the

situations we interact in and develop ourselves based on the experiences. This of course, involves trust as well, as I argue that trust is an essential component of relationships and fundamental to interpersonal interaction.

In Norwegian literature on music therapy and child welfare, a lot of focus recently has been aimed at the notion of participation (see for example Stige, 2005; Strandbu, 2011; Krüger & Stige, 2013, 2015; Stensæth, Krüger & Fuglestad, 2016). For example, Krüger, Strandbu & Stige (2014) found participation in music therapy to be helpful in becoming part of a community, as well as helping the child transition from child welfare institutions into participation in society. Personally, I have had the opportunity to work in a music therapy setting with adolescents in child welfare over the past three years, and developed an appreciation for participation in music therapy and how it can be valuable. However, one thing I started contemplating a while back is how trust plays into such participation, and in music therapy in general. One of my initial thoughts was whether it is different to trust someone "through music" compared to verbally. Are there some properties within music therapy activities that allow for trust to be developed differently, and if so what implications can this have in situations outside the music therapy? While there are mentions of trust in the literature regarding music therapy and adolescents / child welfare, it seems to be usually only mentioned in passing or dealt with implicitly, its role is not actually expanded upon very much. A common statement is that music therapy and the relations that develop within can be used to "build trust", and that once trust has been established, many opportunities arise. But how does this build-up happen, and why? Scwhartz (2008) understands trust as the fundamental way very young children create meaning out of awareness, and explains that repeated experiences are necessary in which perceptual input is connected to responses from the child and finally mapped out as a way to structure the world. But how can we understand trust with older children and teenagers, such as in initial interactions in music therapy sessions? It seems reasonable that some degree of trust is necessary in order to allow for participation at all, and that trust must come from somewhere. In order to understand this, I use a broad, interdisciplinary theoretical framework of trust in an attempt to illuminate the role trust plays with respect to music therapy with adolescents in child welfare.

1.3 Norwegian context of music therapy

The Norwegian context of music therapy is commonly considered to have been founded by Even Ruud, who among other things helped establish the first music therapy education in Norway in 1978, theoretically developed a *humanistic perspective* of music therapy (Ruud,

2010), and critically inquired about the values and epistemological and ontological elements of music therapy (Ruud, 1998). He was considerate of the relationship and interplay between individual and community with respect to both health and the goals of music therapy. Stige (2002) described a *culture-centred perspective* on music therapy, which involves an interest and exploration in how individuals and communities are dependent upon and interact with each other, as well as the importance of culture as a resource for action. From this perspective, human interdependence is understood as a basis for autonomy, where participation in social communities such as society leads to the development of individuals' different capacities. Rolvsjord (2010), with a similar critical approach as Ruud and Stige, developed *resource-oriented music therapy*, which is highly collaborative and focuses on user-involvement. This perspective emphasises client strength and resources rather than being overly focused on curing a pathology and the reduction of symptoms, and is linked to other theoretical fields such as positive psychology, the philosophy of empowerment and salutogenesis (Rolvsjord, 2016). A third perspective that incorporates the thoughts and ideas described above, is the broad perspective of *community music therapy* (Ansdell & Stige, 2016). Ansdell and Stige (ibid.) characterize community music therapy as a movement rather than a model or approach, emphasizing social and community dimensions. Rather than just "adding community" to music therapy, the movement aims to rethink music therapy in terms ecological and sociocultural ideas, attempting to reconnect the individual music therapy with broader social and musical opportunities (ibid.).

Generally, in Norway music therapy in child welfare has been relatively scarce (Krüger & Stige, 2013), although it is growing. Krüger describes the practice describes the practice in Bergen, Norway, stating that the sessions usually occur on a weekly basis, both in individual and group formats (ibid.). Activities emphasize resources and opportunities for participation, in line with the perspectives described above. Through participation in musical activities, the adolescents are supported through learning to play instruments, meet peers and have opportunities to be in dialogue with adults. Music therapy can also involve participating in the performance of concerts or shows, where they can convey music or lyrics to an audience. This creates opportunities for identity development, new social experiences and new possible courses of action. The music also allows for a bridge to be built between their specific child welfare environment and the local society surrounding it, for example through a performance. The adolescents can receive guidance on how to use and participate in public cultural programs outside of the child welfare system, and musical activities can thus be related to school, recreational activities and every-day life. Skills and abilities that the adolescents have learned

in the music therapy context, can potentially be applied to new situations - one might wonder then, if the same type of transferability is true with *experiences of trust* in music therapy. Further, workers at the teenagers' child welfare institutions can be invited to participate at music therapy workshops with the adolescents as well, giving teenagers opportunities for positive experiences with adults. This new way of relating to one another might provide opportunities to develop new *relational schema*, where trust can be built through a new musical framing of the situation in which new courses of action are possible (schemata will be explained further in section 3.2). If the relationships between adolescent-adult in the institutions is strained, posing a challenge to trust and communication, music therapy can potentially provide fresh arenas for the adolescents and adults to develop healthier relationships and trust towards one another.

A human rights perspective is relevant to the practice of music therapy with children and adolescents (Curtis & Vaillancourt, 2012). The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has been ratified in Norway, which involves an obligation to uphold the rights and values the convention is built upon (Krüger, Bolstad & Stige, 2016). In terms of participation, article 9 recognize the child's right to participate and let their voices be heard in decisions regarding them and their parents, while article 31 describes their right to opportunities where they can freely participate in cultural life and arts, where the state has an obligation to encourage the provision of such opportunities (United Nations, 2009). Article 3 of the CRC places a primary emphasis on considering "the best interests of the child" in all actions concerning children (ibid.). This is a somewhat vague concept, but I argue that it is essential that the child's own voice is of vital importance in determining what these best interests are. I claim that in order for the child's voice to be heard, *trust* is fundamental. As adults working with children, we need to trust that they can make choices and decisions in their own lives, and that they possess an indispensable source of knowledge in terms of their own needs. However, children also need to be able to trust the adults around them, so that they feel safe and secure in actually voicing their thoughts, feelings and interests. This involves balancing out the power structure between children, adults and the systems around them, so that they do not become controlled passive actors, but active participants in their lives with strengths and resources they can utilize. I argue that music therapy can provide an arena where such a focus can be placed, and trust can be built. Similarly, Follesø (2006) posits that it is insufficient to simply amass general and theoretically informed knowledge regarding children, but that youths have to be asked about their experiences and thoughts, and that their competencies and experiences need to be trusted. Krüger and Stige (2015) state that there is a need to produce more research that can help professionals develop strategies which can structure and facilitate capacities related to listening

to each individual child in order to let their voices be heard. My hope is that this thesis on trust and music therapy in child welfare can be a contribution towards this.

1.4 Method

This thesis is theoretical, using a literature-based investigation similar to what Stige (2006) used when exploring the notion of participation. As Stige notes, the approach relates to both what Bruscia (2005) described as "integration," which is an integrative approach to theory building which is based on several existing theories, and philosophical inquiry described by Aigen (2005). According to Aigen, philosophical inquiry involves four procedures. These are (1) clarifying terms, (2) exposing and evaluating underlying assumptions, (3) relating ideas as systematic theory, and (4) using arguments as primary means of inquiry. In chapter 2, music therapy with adolescents and child welfare will be investigated, in order to uncover assumptions about trust. In chapter 3, trust as an interdisciplinary concept will be investigated, first exploring different types of trust from a psychological, sociological and economic perspective. These ideas will then be bridged together using the notion of adaptive rationality in a broad integrative theoretical framework developed by Rompf (2014). The different literature and ideas will be compared and related to each other, in order to deepen my understanding of the role trust has with respect to music therapy in child welfare. As this aims to explore the Norwegian context of music therapy in child welfare, the literature I use will predominantly be concerning the Norwegian context. Regardless, the literature I use is the main data of this thesis, and the main method is the critical reflection around and comparison of the literature.

When doing research, it is important (many argue necessary) for the researcher to describe their epistemological perspective (Murphy & Wheeler, 2016). This concerns what assumptions and understanding one has about knowledge, a "theory of knowledge." Each epistemology is based on its own set of assumptions with respect to the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the research subject(s) (ibid.). The theoretical perspectives, methodology and methods of research studies reflect these assumptions. In research, by sharing one's epistemological perspective explicitly, it allows the reader to understand findings more deeply, and be more informed if critically challenging the findings and the processes involved in getting to them. With this in mind, the three philosophical orientations of social constructionism, critical theory and hermeneutics will be put forward that help inform my understanding.

Social constructionism is similar to the perspective of constructivism, which understands meaningful human reality as constructed by individuals through both their interpretations and interactions with other individuals and the world (Alvesson & Sköldberg,

2009). A principle difference is that social constructionism considers interpretations and meaningful reality not as something purely produced through an individual mind, but as inter-subjectively co-constructed by individuals with a shared sociohistorical language and context (Crotty, 1998; Murphy & Wheeler, 2016). The subjective and transactional elements of interpersonal relations allow meaning and reality to manifest. From this perspective, "interaction" is a fundamental element in understanding both social and natural phenomena. People interact dialogically through language, and both communicate and transact meanings (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). The "self" is considered socially constructed, and both emerges in and is shaped by social interactions and relationships with others. The importance of culture is emphasized, because it molds us and influences the way we interpret and feel (Crotty, 1998), which affects how we interact and leads to us to "communicate culture" with others. This relates to the concept of *socialization* (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), which is the process of internalizing socially shared knowledge (i.e, culture), such as social norms and values, as well as individual identity development. As such, constructivist epistemologies are useful for exploring meanings and meaning-making processes (Murphy & Wheeler, 2016), I believe they are relevant for the topic of trust.

Critical theory, sometimes referred to as critical hermeneutics, is characterized as an interpretive approach, and also has a focus on critically disputing concrete social realities (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). It goes against assumptions that the conditions in society are inevitable and natural, and instead postulates that asymmetries of power and special interests strongly influence historically created societal conditions, and that it is possible to bring radical change to these conditions (ibid., p. 144). A dialectic view of society is maintained, and any social phenomenon must always be considered with respect to its historical context. In relation to child welfare, I find this an important perspective as the power structures between children and adults can sometimes be very asymmetric, which can lead to children not being able to voice their needs, thoughts and feelings. There is also a "risk" that workers within the child welfare system unnecessarily assume an "expert role", where they have a disproportionate amount of power compared to the adolescents they interact with. Additionally, there is a conceivable risk that adults may hold more power in choosing when to end a relationship, and that the adolescents are passively sent around through the child welfare system according to the needs of the system and the adults' themselves.

Scwhandt (2001) describes hermeneutics as the "art, theory and philosophy of interpreting the meaning of an object" (p. 155). In research, the hermeneutic epistemology is related to what Heidegger (1927/1996) called *hermeneutic phenomenology* and the

philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer (1976/2008). According to Heidegger and Gadamer, individuals are always situated in both a specific and historic context, which influence how we perceive, understand and experience the world (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). The interpretive nature of the research process has to be acknowledged when trying to describe structures and important phenomena in human experience, as the researcher will inevitably be informed by their own preconceptions, prejudices and worldview (ibid.). In other words, the subjectivity of the researcher will influence how phenomena are understood in the research process.

With this in mind, these are the research questions for the thesis:

1. How has trust been understood in music therapy with adolescents?
2. How can trust as a mental phenomenon broadly be understood?
3. How can interpersonal trust be built in music therapy in Norwegian child welfare?

2.0 - MUSIC THERAPY WITH ADOLESCENTS

In this chapter, I will begin with presenting a few pieces of literature that mention and generally deal with trust in music therapy. I will make initial notes of what seems to be important to the build-up of trust, and consider the rationale behind emphasizing trust in work with adolescents. Subsequently, I will present literature that focuses on music therapy specifically in a Norwegian child welfare context, again making some initial assumptions concerning the role of trust as I understand it in the literature and exploring a few different approaches to music therapy work in a Norwegian child welfare context, such as individual and group sessions.

2.1 Music Therapy and Trust

McFerran (2010) highlights the importance of trust with respect to different aspects of music therapy. She explains that during an initial meeting with the music therapist, teenagers have a need to determine whether the therapist is trustworthy, and so tend to "hold back" and mask themselves until proof is provided. McFerran argues that the only way the music therapist can meet this demand without any prior interaction history, is to offer a "clear sense of purpose, and a willingness to get things done." (2010, p. 51). In order to do this, she argues, the music therapist needs to offer a "real" presentation of their self that is consistent and authentic.

McFerran (ibid.) suggests that music therapists have "three primary ways of being with the adolescent client", associated with different theoretical orientations. These are to "stay calm" (psychodynamic orientation), "go with it" (humanistic orientation) and "stay one step ahead" (behavioural orientation). Again, the important point is to be authentic and consistent, and as long as the music therapist is clear and respectful of the adolescent, it doesn't matter which stance is adopted. Importantly, she notes that if the music therapist is consistent, but flexible, *trust* will build more quickly. A hypothesis that can be gleamed is that being consistent and clear leads to a greater sense of predictability, which might indicate trustworthiness.

McFerran (ibid.) describes the use of songs in music therapy, and explains that they can represent deeply personal aspects of the teenager. She argues that through the use of songs, adolescents might share information and feelings they haven't shared elsewhere, "masked" or contextualized by the music in order to make their communication tolerable. If this sharing of *personal aspects* is consciously intentional on the part of the teenager, this might be a way for them to "test the waters" for trustworthiness, informed by the music therapists' response. If the adolescent is not fully aware that they have shared a vulnerable part of themselves through the song, then it seems important that the music therapist acknowledges this and sensitively

supports them in order to avoid violating the trusting act the adolescent has offered, even if it was done without conscious intent. McFerran explains that through offering to truly listen to and accept the music of the adolescent, trust can be established and defensive barriers reduced.

McFerran posits that teenagers very quickly make a judgment of whether they trust an available adult, and so adults should feel able to ask directive questions. She explains that adolescents should be trusted to make decisions and refuse to discuss a topic if they feel uncomfortable, though keeping in mind that persistent questioning in response to resistance can lead to a negative relational outcome (ibid.). In other words, adolescents should be trusted to have control over their own choices, and the music therapist shouldn't be scared of being (sensitively) direct and honest. This can be related to Epstein (2007) and his thoughts concerning child-parent relationships, who argues that children should be offered more trust as they develop their identity on their path to becoming an adult, and that the emotional connection between child and caregivers can suffer a fundamental breakdown if the child's ability to make decisions in their own lives aren't acknowledged. He argues that the adolescent-parent bond should be strong and accepting rather than controlling. Exerting such control on their lives can be understood as a *distrust* towards the teenagers, where they are not entrusted to make choices in their own lives. This seems to indicate that a notion of *power* is relevant to building trust and developing relationships, also in the context of music therapy.

Though not specifically geared towards adolescents, Kenny (1989), focusing on musical improvisation with clients, claims that the "merging of the therapist's and the client's aesthetic fields in the musical space results in trust" (p. 74). She explains that this establishes the "field of play", a relational space consisting of musical experimentation, imitation, communication and modelling, as experienced through musical improvisation. It seems then that shared musical experiences can be used to frame an interaction in such a way that trust can be built through a dialogue of one's musical identities.

When working with adolescents with severe disorders related to affect and contact regulation, which can be relevant in the context of child welfare, using a particular musical object can be valuable in managing to build a therapeutic relationship (Smetana, 2017). Smetana analysed three cases in order to understand how music can be used in a therapeutic dyad as a "third element". The findings indicate that the key factors are that there are typical characteristics inherent in the musical objects, that they can contain a variety of meaning and that they are important to the adolescent. They provide a sense of security, and can function as a foundation that development of exploration, contact regulation, mentalization and symbolization can build upon. In fact, the musical objects can become the foundation for the

music therapy sessions themselves (ibid.). This can be related to Ruud's (2013) study of how people use music in their everyday life to improve their health and well-being. One of the findings were that music can potentially function as a safe and positive "self object", and is something that the individual can trust and interact with that supplies the strength to work through challenges. These two studies seem to indicate that the musical objects can provide something safe and consistent to hold on to, and that they can help an individual deal with challenging situations, such as going to therapy or tolerating social interactions.

From a community music therapy perspective, Stige and Aarø (2012) found that music is useful providing adolescents with individual and social support, and facilitating the voice of the child (see also Krüger, 2012). Music (understood in a broad sense) can be used as a flexible and multifaceted resource in order to facilitate various forms of participation. Participation is here understood as more than simply "the action of taking part in something." Stige (2006) presented the following definition of participation:

> "Participation is a process of *communal experience and mutual recognition*, where individuals *collaborate* in a socially and culturally organized structure (a community)*, create goods* indigenous to this structure, *develop relationships* to the activities, artefacts, agents, arenas, and agendas involved, and *negotiate on values* that may reproduce or transform the community" (Stige, 2006, p. 134, emphasis in original).

Stige explains that the collaboration in music therapy usually involves some means of music-making contextualized by complementing activities. Examples of created goods can be musical products or psychological insights, which help develop relationships and contribute to the value negotiations. It doesn't seem farfetched to consider that trust can also be part of created goods, which might nestle into psychological insights (new positive experiences regarding trusting others), or be observable in the musical products. We might also consider how the negotiations of values in the context affect trust, in that shared values (which we can also call social norms) regarding what is deemed appropriate and wanted in the setting can influence the actors' disposition to trust one another in interactions. If an openness to share creative ideas is considered a value in the setting, that might prompt an individual to feel secure in voicing their thoughts as they trust that the other participants will be accepting and respectful, potentially based on the community's internalization of the value alone. Stige's mention of mutual recognition and cooperation in his definition of participation also involves a notion of both power and empowerment, which implies that these are concepts that should also be considered when thinking of trust.

2.2 Music Therapy in Norwegian Child Welfare

In a Norwegian context, Krüger (2012) explored the themes of children's rights and music in his doctoral thesis interviewing 15 adolescents living under institutional care; the following four findings were uncovered:

1) Related to their life and upbringing in the child protection institution, many adolescents have experienced serious challenges. Examples are moving, unstable social relations, poor quality communication with adults, and stereotyping by others.

2) Music can be valuable in how they organize and make meaning of situations in their everyday life, and a resource that helps adolescents process feelings, thoughts and social participation experiences.

3) Music, in a community music therapy workshop setting, can be a resource that helps structuring participation.

4) Music can be used to help create communities where people can meet and use music as a communicative means to share important messages with others, while also giving opportunities to dispute established positions of power.

The first finding seems to indicate a lack of trust between the adolescents and the adults around them, where, perhaps in part due to power differences, proper communication has been difficult to establish and so opportunities to build trust have been limited. Further, due to being moved around a lot without much say of their own, trust in the child welfare system as a whole might have been negatively affected, which might influence how they judge new people they encounter, especially if we take into account McFerran's (2010) point that adolescents are very quick to judge whether an adult is trustworthy or not. We might consider that if a new adult is associated with a system in which the adolescent lacks trust, that does not bode well for the development of their specific trust relationship.

The second and third findings in Krüger's study indicate that music in itself can be something the adolescents can trust, similar to the ideas of Smetana (2017) and Ruud (2013). Perhaps by having such a trusting relationship with a musical object or setting, a social situation can be framed in such a way where interaction with others in whom trust is less certain is made easier. The musical structuring of a situation and the "rules" that that provides can provide some clear courses of action for the adolescents (e.g. "we are going to play music together, only rule is play as fast as you can"), which if nothing else might allow them to trust the specific situation's musical rules, and then potentially through shared social and musical experience lead to trust being built between participants. The fourth finding can be taken to indicate that

this is the case, as the musical dimension provides a foundation upon which a community can develop, and can be trusted to convey meaningful messages to others. This can be related to the creation of shared values in a community (Stige, 2006) mentioned previously, which in themselves might be a source of trust participants can depend on. By starting with some sort of trust in the music, relationships and new values can be created and negotiated that build upon, support and develop this initial trust.

Mandal and Bergset (2016) describe experiences from using music therapy as an integrated part of aftercare measures for children and adolescents living in foster care. A rationale for their work is based on that many adolescents who live in foster care experience having a fragmented network around them, and that it is important for people who work with the adolescents to try to find ways to connect these different parts of their lives. Theoretically, it is informed by Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological perspective his understanding of human development. He defines development as "[…] a lasting change in the way in which a person perceives and deals with his environment." (p. 3). This emphasizes the importance of the context(s) the individual is situated in, and the interaction between individual and their environments. As Mandal and Bergset argue, when understanding development like this, it becomes important to be build knowledge about what contexts the individual is a part of. In Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological model, the environment surrounding the individual is conceived of as a set of different context systems or "nested structures". The first and innermost is the *microsystem*, which is the immediate setting the developing individual is situated in. This includes situations where the individual has face-to-face interactions with others, such as in the home, classroom, and friend groups. Second is the *mesosystem*, which is the relationships between the individual's different microsystems, such as between the home and school. In other words, the mesosystem concerns the interactions between the different microsystems (Mandal & Bergset, 2016). Third is the *exosystem*: this system involves other people and places which the individual does not usually interact with directly, but where the social processes that occur influence their microsystem. This can for example involve the status of the caregivers' workplaces, or school administration. Finally, fourth is the *macrosystem* which contains the most remote set of people to the individual, but which still has strong influence; governments, cultural values, laws etc. Bronfenbrenner (1979) posits that the individual's development occurs through mutually influential interactions between the individual and the different systems they are a part of.

Mandal and Bergset (2016) focus on the mesosystem, explaining that since the adolescents' often experience a fragmented network of microsystems, this means that there

might be a lack of contact between their individual microsystems. The authors argue that the music therapist can potentially assume the role of a *mesoagent*, which means that they are part of several of the microsystems of the adolescent and can work towards strengthening the connection between the different microsystems, such as biological/foster family and school. In their case illustration, the authors describe an experience where the adolescent was part of a concert performance, which her biological family, foster family different groups of friends, teachers and child welfare case worker were present for. Many of them met for the first time, and the situation gave opportunities for the different microsystems to build bridges and bonds between them, creating more coherency in the adolescent's network. In addition, the people in the different microsystems might have experienced a new side of the adolescent's identity which they have not encountered in the context they usually frequent together.

Describing how a music therapist can work as a meso-agent for an adolescent in foster care, Mandal and Bergset (2016) mention that music can be used as a unique medium for communication, which mirrors the findings in Krüger's (2012) study. They describe that music can be used to help the youths regulate their feelings, and help them experience stability and safety. Here too it seems that music as an object or setting can be used as something the adolescent can trust and find support in. The authors suggest song-writing as a useful activity as well, where the songs can be used as containers for difficult experiences and feelings, which they can use in order to potentially build relationships; for example, if past experiences with a biological parent have been challenging, using a song can be a softer and more comfortable way to communicate this with the parent, which might give opportunities to repair broken bridges and build trust in other relationships. In this way, music created in one microsystem can be used as a resource in another. This example indicates that there might be a fairly strong trust relation between the adolescent and music therapist in that the former feels comfortable in sharing difficult thoughts and working together to place them into a song. It also points to a trust in the song itself to be used as a means to confront someone important to the adolescent with a difficult topic.

Mandal and Bergset (2016) do also note that music therapy might not be the correct choice for all adolescents, stating that it is important for the professional to try to meet the adolescent in one of their fields of interest and use this as a foundation to build a relationship. This emphasizes the importance of listening to the child's voice, and respecting their needs, opinions and motivations. I argue that this is important for the building of trust as well, making sure that the adolescent plays a main role in the relationship with the music therapist. As Mandal and Bergset argue, "one size never fits all", and some adolescents might specifically *not* want

different parts of their microsystems to interact with each other. By attempting to "force" something on the adolescent, be that a certain activity or facilitating unwanted interaction between micro-systems, it seems likely that trust between the adolescent and music therapist will become more difficult. In other words, a collaborative approach between the adolescent and music therapist seems more favourable in terms of building trust.

Strandbu et al. (2016) describe "music theatre" as a setting that can be used when working with adolescents in child welfare, empirically informed by interviews with teenagers that have participated as well as observations made from rehearsals and performances over the course of 15 years. This music therapy work in a music theatre setting has a focus on identity development, recreational activities and working towards opportunities of further participation in other contexts.

The conducted interviews indicate that several of the adolescents have struggled with being heard and understood by adults, and that they have been confused or not properly consulted about decisions regarding them, contrary to what the CRC described as part of the children's rights. Strandbu et al. (ibid.) also relate their work to article 8 of the CRC, which is the child's right to identity. The authors explain that the teenage years are especially challenging in terms of identity development, where questions regarding family, important others and thoughts about one's own future are actualized. Teenagers within the child welfare system may have difficulties answering all these questions. This is illustrated in a study of 400 adolescents in Norwegian child welfare institutions by Kayed et al. (2015), where workers in the child welfare institutions describe that 55% of the adolescents in the study have struggled to make friends outside of the institutions due to frequently being moved around the system, which has also led to 21% of the adolescents facing difficulty in terms of attachment.

As mentioned above, several of the teenagers find it challenging to be understood and taken seriously by the adults and system around them. To "take someone seriously" can be defined as considering the other's arguments, thoughts and opinions as assertions that have to be looked further into (Skjervheim, 1996). Relating to this definition, Strandbu (2011) defines participation as "involvement in and communication and interaction with children, where the goal is to achieve an understanding of the child's experiences, expressions and opinions" (p. 81, my translation). In other words, there is an interpretive aspect to realizing a child's right to participate, in that individuals in the child's environment need to be determined and motivated with respect to understanding the child's perspective (Strandbu, 2011; Strandbu et al., 2016). This involves trusting the child as competent and knowledgeable in terms of their own lives, and places a demand on the people around the child to both act and be trustworthy, so that they

are someone the child can open up to. Realizing children's right to participation also involves helping them to express themselves so that they are taken seriously (Strandbu et al., 2016). The authors argue that a music theatre context can be a place where such opportunities for development and understanding can be made available and worked on.

The music theatre form in itself involves all types of theatre that have music as a foundational element, such as musicals, cabarets, opera, dance-dramas etc. (ibid.). Theoretically, as a child welfare measure it is informed by Boal's (1979) method of forum theatre and Freire's (1970/2005) "Pedagogy of the Oppressed." The latter is a theory that involves a notion that dialogue and communication, using language and arts as means, can be valuable in developing equitable relationships characterized by respect (Strandbu et al., 2016). Powerlessness and suppressive life situations can, through dialogue, be transformed into constructive protest and opposition. In the music theatre used by Strandbu et al. (ibid.), the life experiences of the adolescents are used as a starting point to create different scenes, lyrics and performances, partly as an attempt to highlight and challenge established asymmetrical power structures. An attempt is made to help bridge the gap between people who for different reasons struggle to communicate with each other, using music and arts as a means to foster communication and understanding, which can potentially establish healthier relationships and build trust.

Strandbu et al. (2016) note that the most important inspiration they have taken from Freire and Boal are that the music theatre participants are equal actors, engaged in a collaborative work-process spanning over a longer course of time. It is important to facilitate dialogue both between the participants and to actors in other relevant communities, such as child welfare institutions. Participation in the music theatre involves continued interaction between adolescents, peers and adults who meet, talk and do something together, with a mutual goal of collaboratively creating something. There are planned weekly rehearsals, as well as occasional excursions, concerts and revues. Both musical and personal goals are worked on, for example by musical practice or practicing speaking your mind, as well as experience speaking in larger groups and cooperating with other teenagers to solve concrete tasks. The adolescents assume different roles and are given different responsibilities (which can change over time), based on collaborative and dialogical interactions (Krüger & Strandbu, 2015), where the expression of ones needs and opinions is considered a shared value in the collective. As the music theatre has lasted for a long period of time, there are both participants who have only recently joined while others have been there for years. The authors explain that some of the adolescents with more experience and time in the group sometimes assume a "mentor role" for

the newer participants, and that former participants often visit in order to meet people they have made friendships with through participation in the group. The group can be thought of as a place of security of comfort, where the participants take care of each other and structure the context in a way where the actors can gain experiences of trust and the effects of trustworthiness. The resultant friendships can be a resource for the individuals even after participation in the music theatre has ended.

Strandbu et al. (2016) break down the work-process of the music theatre into four phases, which are not strictly start-stop sequential but can overlap. They are not driven by predetermined rules and procedures; importantly, their progression and content is defined in collaboration with the participating adolescents (Krüger & Strandbu, 2015).

First is the *planning phase*. This involves mapping out needs and figuring out practical solutions and possibilities, such as which resources (people, places and material) are available. This phase also involves finding out which adolescents are participating and how the musical activities are carried out.

Next is the *preparing phase*. Here the adults and the adolescents get to know each other and work on establishing relationships and trust. Concretely, this occurs by visiting the adolescent's homes or recreational settings. The needs of each adolescent are mapped out, and the actors discuss how these needs can be met through participation in a music theatre. Strandbu et al. (2016) emphasize the importance of explaining the context and goals of the music theatre, providing some predictability about the setting which the adolescents can consider before actually entering into the group. Once the adolescents come together, different activities are used so the actors can start getting to know each other. Examples are association games, role-play and improvisation theatre. Activities focus on exploring different topics they are concerned with, and voicing individual and collective experiences. The adolescents' individual experiences are used as a means to participate, both shaping future activities and creating bonds between the actors.

Third is the *work phase*. Ideas that sprung out of the previous phase are developed, and transformed into musical objects such as scripts and lyrics. This occurs with the help of a professional writer, who prepares drafts based on the teenagers earlier input. These drafts are then reviewed by the teenagers, who for example comment on whether the texts accurately describe what they meant. While these texts are collaboratively worked on, the participants also work on music that can fit the texts, do band rehearsals and prepare for the performance (the participants switch between being on stage and in the audience). The importance of the audience's role in supporting and helping the performer feel secure on stage is emphasized,

giving them a chance to build some experience being on stage in a safe environment. Individuals from the adolescent's other microsystems also come by rehearsals occasionally, such as friends and family. Strandbu et al. (2016) state that helping the teenagers feel comfortable on stage and developing a sense of ownership of the musical product is crucial in making a performance that is credible and touching to the audience.

A subset of the previous phase is the *realization phase*. This is about focusing on the environment, local community and society at large. Here, the performance is actually held for an external audience. invited audience members are not random, as the audience and their response and feedback are an essential part. This is often geared towards friends, family, and people within the child welfare system, both to create a safe setting for the performance and sharing new parts of their identity, while also communicating important messages and experiences. The performance can be seen as a way for the adolescents to invite other actors into a dialogue.

Last is the *evaluation phase,* which takes place after the performance has been given. The group participants give feedback on the work process and the performance, voicing what has worked well and what could use improvement. These evaluations can occur both through individual conversations and group discussions. Feedback from friends, family and child welfare workers are also important, creating a dialogue between the participants and audience. And important point here is that the music theatre's leader takes care to make sure the feedback is both constructive and supportive to development.

3.0 - DEFINING TRUST

A vast amount of research has been done on trust, and a plethora of different definitions exist. The definitions are usually very specific to the research subject at hand, which often leads to challenges comparing findings across different studies. Due to this, I have chosen to rely on the ideas developed in a broad interdisciplinary framework of trust (Rompf, 2014), which attempts to bridge the vast amount of different perspectives and ideas from psychological, sociological and rational choice approaches. The reason for this will hopefully become clear throughout chapter 3. First, I will present the *objective structure of trust*, which are elements that most trust researchers agree upon. Following that I will describe the more contentious *subjective experience of trust,* which trust research seems to have struggled to collectively define. Subsequently, Rompf's solution will be presented, involving a notion of adaptive rationality and dual-processing modes.

3.1 The objective structure of trust

A trusting act requires *actors* as constituents of an interpersonal trust relation. Note, while trust is commonly meant to mean something between to individual actors, it can also refer to a relation between a person and other groups, collectives, social institutions etc. In a trust relation, the individual and purposeful actors are the primary *subjects of trust* (Rompf, 2014), here referred to as *trustors*. The primary *objects of trust* are other actors, organizations, groups or institutions, referred to as *trustees* in the following.

Rompf (ibid.) notes that while cases of interpersonal trust between two actors don't necessarily directly explain how trust works on a larger scale, such relations of dyadic trust make up the micro social building-blocks which constitute a larger system of trust. In order to understand other social phenomena, such as social integration at large, it is necessary to sufficiently comprehend dyadic trust relations (ibid). This is because if we conceive of trust as a mental phenomenon, its only level of emergence is from the individual micro-level. Due to this, the concept of trust will in the following focus on these building blocks, and thus be limited to trust relations between two individual actors. Trust in groups, collective actors, and in the economic and political system as a whole, are classified as "system trust" in order to differentiate such types of trust from the concept of interpersonal trust (ibid; p. 32). System trust isn't irrelevant, as such trust can be the starting point for certain types of interpersonal trust, but this will be explored further in section 3.3.

The *trust relation* refers to the special relation between trustor and trustee. A trust relation is always made up of a three-part relation manifested as "A trusts B with respect to X" (Hardin, 2002, p. 9). Here, A and B refer to trustor and trustee respectively, while item X refers to the *content of the trust relation*. Trustor, trustee and the content of the trust relation are the main elements of interpersonal trust relations. In terms of music therapy, this can for example be that the adolescent trusts the music therapist specifically with regards to teaching them how to play guitar.

Defining the Basic Trust Problem

As a prerequisite for a trust relation, the trustor has to be confronted with a certain decision-making problem when deciding *whether to trust*. Rompf (2014) presents two different sets of actions the trustor can decide to choose from when dealing with a *basic trust problem.* The first set's actions leave the trustor vulnerable to the trustee's response. Control over resources or events are transferred to the trustee, whose future actions will decide outcomes of loss or gain for the trustor. The trustor cannot precisely predict the trustee's actions or rely on the external enforcement to negate the risk. The second set of actions eliminates potential losses, vulnerability and risk altogether, as a transfer of control is not made and there is no opportunity for the trustee to decide the outcome. An adolescent could for instance choose to share something difficult and personal with the music therapist (thus leaving them vulnerable to the music therapist's response, but potentially being supported and cared for if a trustworthy response is given), or they could choose not to and not risk anything, but eliminate all possibilities of gain too.

When a trustor chooses an action from the first set, we can say that A trusts B, which is referred to as a *trusting act*. This trusting act establishes the trust relation. If the trustor chooses an action from the second set, we can say that A *distrusts* B, and the observed action is distrust. Assuming that A chooses to trust B with respect to X, then all actions B can take which do not harm A and serve to achieve the potential gain and utility increase for A, are part of the content of the trust relation X. B is considered *trustworthy* when they fulfil A's trust by choosing such actions.

Lewis and Weigert (1985) define the behavioural content of trust as choosing a risky course of action through which one can see trust demonstrated. Since the trustor has to transfer control over select resources or events to the trustee while not being able to know for sure what the final outcome will yield, Luhmann (2000, p. 27) interprets the choice of a trusting act as a "risky investment". However, do we always *choose* to trust? A behavioural approach considers

an observable trusting act as the trustor's rational choice among actions, based on sufficient expectations of a trustworthy response (Coleman, 1990). However, Mayer et al. (1995) maintain that there is a fundamental difference between trust and trusting behaviours, in that having a willingness to assume a risk is not the same as actually assuming that risk. Therefore, trust is often conceived of by authors as a psychological state (Kramer, 1999) or a mental phenomenon (Lahno, 2002), and intrinsically connected to subjective affect and knowledge. Thus, choosing to perform a trusting act only displays some observable outcome, while when actually trusting someone, the trustor accepts the trust problem's inherent vulnerability (Rompf, 2014). Rompf offers an understanding of trust as a two-step process, in which trust begins with the subjective definition of the situation (interpretation), which both leads to and prepares for the eventual choice of an action in the trust problem. This will be expanded upon later.

Social Uncertainty

A trust problem involves some degree of *social uncertainty* (Kramer, 2006). If we assume that a trustor has *perfect knowledge* of all of the trustee's motivations, intentions and preferences, then the trustor can perfectly predict if the trustee will respond with a trustworthy action. Trust would be unnecessary in such a deterministic context, although we would still be able to observe trusting acts. If the trustor has *zero information* there is no opportunity for trust, and the choice of a trusting act would be left to blind chance. This means that as a concept, trust refers to a situation in between these two extremes, where there is neither a state of perfect knowledge or of complete ignorance (Simmel, 1992).

A trust problem always has a degree of asymmetric and imperfect information in a trust problem, then. Asymmetric in the sense that while the trustor might not have perfect knowledge of the trustee's characteristics, this knowledge is available to the trustee. Imperfect meaning that the trustor typically knows *something* about the trustee that can be used in the trust problem. As the information is not perfect, we can say that a trustworthy response can only be predicted with some probability – such a "subjective assessment of the probability of an event" can be referred to as an *expectation* (Rompf, 2014, p. 37), and we will adopt that understanding of expectation in this thesis.

Social uncertainty stems from both the imperfect information concerning the trustee, and the fact that the trustor has no control over the outcome once trust has been chosen. Social uncertainty results from being dependent upon the decisions of other actors, and can be avoided in a trust problem by choosing to distrust. Social uncertainty can never be avoided when a trusting act has been chosen by a trustor, which means it is inherently a part of a basic trust

problem (Rompf, 2014). This is in line with what many researchers have defined as one of the objective core elements of trust problems – the cocktail of potential opportunistic actions with imperfect information and social uncertainty (Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 2000; Hardin, 2001; Kramer, 2006). When a trustor chooses to trust, the social uncertainty is bypassed or "ignored", in a way that seems beyond the expectations that could come from reasoning and experience on their own (Lewis & Weigert, 1985).

Vulnerability

Since trust will always include a transfer of control of resources from the trustor to the trustee, there will always be an objective vulnerability on the part of the trustor (Deutsch, 1960). If there is no vulnerability present, then the outcome is irrelevant trustor and trust is unnecessary (Mishra, 1996). Conversely, Heimer (2001) found that vulnerability increases along with the stakes in an interaction. We can also speak of an *individual subjective experience of vulnerability* (Rompf, 2014). This aspect encompasses a qualitative element of individual subjective experience, manifested as an internal response to the incentive structure. Trust can be considered as a psychological state which is made up of the "intention to accept vulnerability", given favourable expectations of the behaviour or intentions of another actor (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). This means the trustor is conscious of the vulnerability inherent in a relevant trust problem, but opts to go for the risky choice of a trusting act.

3.2 The subjective experience of trust

Most theorists agree upon the fact that trust can be considered as a fundamentally psychological state, regardless of what other features are essential (Kramer, 1999). However, theorists have offered many suggestions for the characteristics of this psychological state of mind (Bigley & Pearce, 1998). Cognitive conceptualizations of trust tend to focus on the trustor as a rational actor aiming for the achievement of maximum utility when faced with a trust problem – key elements are what expectations, beliefs and intentions the trustor uses. This perspective views the trust phenomenon as something completely cognitive, where the trustor utilizes existing knowledge in order to form an unemotional expectation which leads to a corresponding rational choice to trust or distrust (Luhmann, 1988; Rousseau et al., 1998). When viewing trust as situated in the category of knowledge, Hardin (2001) notes that in instances where the trustor's rational choice in the interaction was incorrect, that simply results in a need for the existing knowledge of the trustor to be updated.

Viewing trust from a psychological perspective, McAllister (1995) found that a unique basis for trust can be formed through the emotional bonds between two individuals, while Jones and George (1998) found that moods and emotions can influence the subjective experience of trust, and that they can indicate the quality and presence of trust in a relationship. Burke and Stets (1999) argue that trust can create a sense of commitment, confidence and security, as well as induce attachment to the trustee.

It seems that there are processes that work interrelatedly through affective, cognitive as well as behavioural aspects with respect to trust. Rompf (2014) notes that such a proposed dimensionality of the trust construct is similar to that of attitude research, which has explored and explained attitudes through the three dimensions of cognition, affect and behaviour (Breckler, 1984; Chaiken & Stangor, 1987). Lewis and Weigert (1985) offer an explanation as to why trust research varies so greatly in how it perceives the subjective experience of trust, by saying that the distinct manifestations of the affective, cognitive and behavioural dimensions need not necessarily be equally present at all times. Some trust relations might be influenced more greatly by one of the dimensions; intimate relationships might be more affective in nature, while more foreign situations may be more influenced by the cognitive dimension. Rompf (2014) explains that while this may be the case, all three of the dimensions are present at all times in the experience of trust; be that through the knowledge structures and corresponding expectations which are part of the cognitive dimension, moods, feelings and emotions which constitute the affective dimension, or the behavioural intention to act on trust. He also adds that the normatively and culturally structured environment is referenced implicitly, and that all of these elements merge to become a unique experience of trust.

Expectations

The trustor will utilize the knowledge they have available to create a group of assumptions, beliefs or expectations considering the probability that the trustee's future actions will be beneficial to the trustor's interest, or at least that the outcome won't be harmful (Robinson, 1996). Many authors have placed an emphasis on the trustor's positive expectations concerning the outcome of a trusting act (Deutsch, 1958; Rotter, 1967; Coleman, 1990; Hardin, 1993; Robinson, 1996; Gambetta, 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998; Kramer, 1999). Rompf (2014) labels and summarizes these expectations, beliefs and assumptions as the trustor's *expectation of trustworthiness*. Gambetta (1988) explains that the trustor requires their expectation of trustworthiness to exceed a subjective threshold value in order to perform a trusting act,

dependent upon both individual dispositions and situational circumstances. In other words, an expectation that surpasses the subjective threshold will be considered a favourable expectation.

The Danish philosopher and theologist Løgstrup (1956) considers us humans to be born with a natural trust in our surroundings, and thus that we initially have a generally favourable expectation of trustworthiness. He bases this assumption upon a belief that people are deeply dependent upon one another due to a mutual influence on each other's lives. He argues that as we grow older, we learn to adjust our expectations and trust accordingly based on experience, but that children have not necessarily had the same opportunities for such an adjustment. He further elaborates that if children are met with breaches of trust and a rejection of their own trustworthiness early in their lives, this can be of major consequence for the child, and greatly impact their expectation of trustworthiness and willingness to trust as they grow older (ibid). We can elaborate by connecting this to Rotter's (1967) definition of interpersonal trust, which considers trust a favourable expectation concerning the reliability of another actor's promise, oral/written statement or word. Rotter offers a distinction between expectations that are *specific* and *generalized.* While the specific expectations are comprised of experiences and an interaction history with a specific individual, the generalized expectations are more abstract and consist of more generally similar experiences in a larger range of situations with different actors. In any given situation, Rotter argues that we use both our specific and generalized expectations when faced with interpreting the interaction partner. We could hypothesize that since our social networks very early in our lives might be limited in size, dramatic or traumatic interactions with important specific individuals might have far-reaching implications for our generalized expectations as we grow older, in line with Løgstrup's thoughts. This carries implications if we consider our expectations to provide some sort of general theory regarding what we can expect in terms of trustworthiness. If our expectations tell us *not* to trust on a general level, we could be in danger of never involving ourselves socially and might risk social isolation.

Four major trustee characteristics have been described which relate to positive expectations of trustworthiness: benevolence, competence, integrity and predictability (Mayer et al., 1995; McKnight et al., 1998). These characteristics are assumed to notably influence both the perceived trustworthiness and resulting level of interpersonal trust, and are considered to be "antecedents of trust" (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 727). *Benevolence* is understood as how much the trustee cares about the trustor's welfare, and involves a trustee's personal orientation towards the trustor. *Competence* refers to the skills or ability the trustee has that actually make fulfilling the content of the trust relation possible. Rompf (2014, p. 44) illustrates this by saying

that while A trusts B with regard to X, that might not be the case with Y, because an expectation of competence is specific to an activity or context. *Integrity* refers to how consistent the trustee's actions have been in the past. This relates to how honest, truthful and open the trustee has been, and whether or not what they say matches what they do (Hosmer, 1995). Finally, *predictability* concerns the trustors evaluation of the trustee's personality, and an assessment of whether they act predictably or not. In other words, can the trustor predict that the trustee will behave and act consistently enough to warrant a trusting action? Taken together, these four characteristics can explain a large part of perceived trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995).

Rompf (2014, p. 46) presents five micro- and macro-sources of trust-related knowledge based on several theoretical accounts:

(1) *Specific expectations* – Includes knowledge of the characteristics of the specific trustee, as well as information concerning the particular and unique trust problem

(2) *Dyadic embeddedness* of the trust relation – Knowledge that concerns experience taken from reciprocal, repeated interactions between the specific actors

(3) *Network embeddedness* of the trustor and trustee – Entails knowledge about the relevant social mechanisms of learning, control and reputation

(4) *Institutional embeddedness* – This consists of knowledge tied to internalization of social roles, cultural practices, norms related to trust on one hand, and knowledge of various safeguards the institution might have, such as regulations, contracts or guarantees

(5) *Generalized expectations* – The individual disposition to trust, as well as aspects like moral principles, values and stereotypes.

Basically, the trustor has a broad range of tools at their disposal which are utilized when establishing expectations in a trust problem. Trust is defined by cognitive accounts as the intention and willingness to be vulnerable, given sufficiently favourable expectations of trustworthiness when met with social uncertainty (Mayer et al. 1995, McKnight et al. 1998, Rousseau et al. 1998, Rompf, 2014).

Risk and ambiguity

Risk and ambiguity seem to be very similar concepts, as they both refer to the subjective perception of an objective uncertainty. But there is a difference: faced with a situation carrying a risk, the decision maker is able to subjectively *precisely* predict the probability that events will occur (Rompf, 2014). The actor has a certain expectancy of risk in the situation, and we can understand risk as "the perceived probability of loss which originates from the choice of an uncertain event" (ibid., page 48). While the actual occurrence of a risk-related event in a given

situation might be uncertain, the actor has an *unambiguous expectation* of it. If I walk around with my eyes closed, I can expect that I might bump into something with an exact subjective likelihood, though it doesn't necessarily need to occur – my expectation of risk is unambiguous.

When confronted with ambiguity on the other hand, attaching any precise probabilities to events is impossible. Our expectations are imprecise, and we don't have enough information or knowledge available to utilize in order to sharpen them. Situations of ambiguity refer to imprecise expectations concerning uncertain events, as opposed to situations of risk which contain certain expectations (ibid.).

As previously noted, Lewis and Weigert (1985) explained a trusting action as a bypassing of social uncertainty, seemingly exceeding whatever expectations come solely from reasoning and experience. An interesting solution to this is Möllering's (2001) concept of *suspension*. According to Möllering, suspension removes situational ambiguity by making available knowledge temporarily certain, allowing the actor to define expectations as either favourable or unfavourable in order to transform ambiguity into a manageable risk. Similarly, Luhmann (2000, p. 30) argues that when trusting, external uncertainty is replaced by an internal certainty through "overdrawing information." These notions seem to add a somewhat irrational element to a cognitive conceptualization of trust, through which trustors can surpass their rational expectations (Rompf, 2014). When thinking about why the trustor would go through such a process of suspending ambiguity, we might infer that it is to both protect the self from the ambiguous social uncertainty, as well as give opportunities to move forward and perform actions when dealing with unfamiliar situations.

Normative dimension of trust

A common characteristic of the normative dimension of trust is that the trustee's compliance to values, moral principles and other social norms forms the basis of their motivation for trustworthiness (Hardin, 2003). The normative dimension helps us understand the importance of where the trust relations are situated, meaning their embeddedness in social systems, the social norms within these systems, as well as the societal values in general (Rompf, 2014). The normative dimension of trust implies that there is a connection between the individual, institution and culture, and that we must consider trust both from an individual and collective perspective, as it is thoroughly imbued in both (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Ripperger (1998) explains that in order to protect trust and trustworthiness within a social system, behaviour needs to be regulated by the social establishment of internal mechanisms which promote the

internalization of social norms and moral values, unless mechanisms of external enforcement (such as contracts) can be used.

Rule-based trust is based on a shared understanding of appropriate behaviour according to the relevant system of rules (Kramer, 1999). This understanding assumes that both actors in a trust relation each have an established value system and an implicit understanding of the cultural practices and socially shared norms (Rompf, 2014). Rule-based trust is group specific, and depends on how the social system structures the normative rules. For rule-based trust to be relevant, the actors need to be socialized into the same social system and have internalized the same set of social norms. As Lewis and Weigert (1985) summarize: "In groups for which trust exists as a social reality, interpersonal trust comes naturally and is not reducible to individual psychology" (p. 976). The rules, roles and routines of the institutional framework in which the trust relation is situated can give enough reason for choosing a trusting act, because they give meaning to action by representing socially shared expectations for the individuals within the collective (Rompf, 2014).

The affective dimension – emotions and feelings

Many researchers point out the importance of an affective dimension as well (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Rempel et al., 1985; McAllister, 1995; Jones & George, 1998; Schul, 2008; Lount, 2010). The consensus seems to be that both cognitive and affective dimensions are necessary for understanding trust, as trust can both be thought of and felt.

We can make a theoretical distinction between moods and emotions when understanding the affective dimension. Emotions are tied to particular affective reactions one has to a specific event. Emotions tend to be clear, intense and short-lived (Rompf, 2014). Moods on the other hand are less clear-cut, not quite as intense and generally last longer, and the specific cause for its emergence not usually immediately apparent (ibid). Both moods and emotions tell us how we feel about the situations we find ourselves in, which also includes our interactions with others.

Our affective states can be a source of information we utilize heuristically when making decisions, defined by Schwarz and Clore (1983) as the "feeling-as-information" paradigm. Put simply, a complex decision problem can be solved by considering "how we feel about it", where the answer guides our decision-making. Rompf notes that affective states have a *direct* influence on individual's judgments when they let their feelings inform decision-making, and an indirect influence when they change the individuals processing strategies, and so influence "what comes to mind." (Rompf, 2014, p. 57).

Jones and George (1998) found that by experiencing either positive or negative emotions, the trustor can be influenced in whether they deem the trustee trustworthy or not. In other words, their emotions can inform their interpretation and judgment of the other actor. This can be connected to cognitive appraisal theory, which basically refers to how people make sense of events through a personal interpretation and "appraisal" of the situation utilizing relevant available knowledge (Yap & Tong, 2009). Cognitive appraisal theory suggests that emotions are the outcome of a series of cognitive processes which are activated if the individual recognizes the current situation as being relevant to personal wellbeing (Rompf, 2014, p. 58). Maier (2009) notes the importance of the interpretation of a given trust problem, and argues that a plethora of different emotional reactions can emerge simply from the initial interpretation – emotions can be activated through a cognitive appraisal of the situation's *meaning*. Maier adds that the particular context where the trust problem is embedded can determine the arousal of any specific emotion. The perceived status of the trust relation, the trustor's knowledge of the trustee, and the particular set of expectations associated with the situation are reflected in the trustor's emotional reaction.

Moods and emotions can also influence "what comes to mind", which impacts how we interpret and form expectations of a situation. One might suppose that being in a happy mood makes you more inclined to trust and vice-versa with negative states. This has been shown empirically, and induced emotions can influence trust even when they are unrelated to the trustee (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). For example, the recognition of faces has been found to trigger automatic emotional responses (Phelps, 2006) which are consequential for evaluations of trustworthiness (Winston et al., 2002).

Bless and Fiedler (2006) found that positive moods make us more likely to rely on existing knowledge structures (a top-down processing style), while negative moods push us to rely on external information (a bottom-up processing style). Forgas and East (2008) demonstrated that negative moods can increase an individual's scepticism, reduce their likelihood to interpret interpersonal communication as being truthful, and *improve* their ability to accurately detect actual deception. Research has also found that positive moods might result in less trust, as individuals with a top-down processing strategy are more likely to recognize situational cues that indicate distrust (Lount 2010). Interestingly, if individuals are made aware of their affective state and its origin, its influence on judgments and decision-making is neutralized (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005, Lount 2010). Summarized, both emotions or moods are important when thinking of the subjective perception of trust, as they can directly or indirectly influence the judgments and decisions we make in a trust problem.

According to Lewis and Weigert (1985), strong affective bonds between actors can develop into being the predominant part of the trust in mature trust relations. It can be described as a state of positive affect associated with feelings of emotional security and confidence, where the trustor does not even consider that the trustee will breach trust (McAllister, 1995; Lahno, 2001, 2002; Rompf, 2014). An affective state of trust can be imagined like a perceptive filter that immediately impacts the preferences and beliefs of the trustor (Lahno 2001). To understand this, we can use the idea of *relational schemata,* which Baldwin (1992) relates to how we process social information. Relational schemata are an explanation for how people frame their social relations, based on the idea that individuals develop cognitive structures through social interactions which represent "regularities in patterns of interpersonal relatedness" (ibid., page 461). They can be both *general* or *specific* to a relation. These schemata also contain typical affective responses, which can be automatically triggered in the form of associated moods and emotions if the relational schemata between two particular actors is developed through repeated interactions (Andersen & Chen, 2002). Basically, the more developed and mature the trust relation and its associated relational schemata is, the more likely trust is dominated by affective elements. The authors found that in some cases, developed specific relational schemata can be applied to actors and contexts even where the specific significant other is *not present*. If a new person is eliciting interpersonal cues which match the specific relational schemata (the way they listen, meet one's gaze, habits, attitudes, gestures etc.), that can contribute to the specific relational schemata being deemed as applicable in the situation by the trustor, as well as activating the associated relational self (ibid., page 623).

Essentially, affective states are an important dimension of the subjective experience of trust. They inform the trustor of the status and nature of initial and ongoing trust relations in specific situations (Rompf, 2014). When trusting, a trustor chooses to perform the trusting act either because their expectations are sufficiently favourable and stable, or their corresponding affective state make the choice to trust "feel right". Emotions and current mood can influence whether the trustor interprets the trustee as trustworthy, but also be directly activated through the trustors cognitive appraisals in a particular trust problem. The degree to which the trust relation is developed and matured can influence whether the choice of a trusting act is rooted more in affective or cognitive elements. Essentially, both feelings and rational thinking are fundamentally important in trust relations.

3.3 System trust and institutional trust

System trust concerns social systems or abstract institutions as *objects of trust* (Rompf, 2014). It manifests and is made sustainable through the ongoing and confirmatory experience of the system's functioning, illustrated for example through the stability of monetary systems. System trust is maintained by the individual participants' trust in the functioning of the system as a whole (Luhmann, 1979). It relates to an institution's global features which both structure and control interaction in social settings, such as its main goals, structure, legitimacy, operation and sanctioning potential (Rompf, 2014). System trust has implications for the system's functioning and stability, and a lack of system trust leads to the social system's deterioration and decline (Lewis & Weigert, 1985).

Institutions can function as a basis for the formation of expectations in a trust problem, by providing relevant rules and social norms. Rompf (2014) describes institutional trust as the "manifestation of system trust in a particular interaction" (p. 68). Luhmann (1979) argues that system trust is dependent upon the individuals' assumption that other participants in the social system also equally trust in it, and can be thought of as "trust in trust". High levels of system trust can be described as ones' expectation that the social system provides effective regulation and structure to the other participants through institutional rules, norms and procedures, and sanctioning measures. Institutional trust can emerge if this perception of system trust is sufficient (ibid). High levels of system trust can be thought of as providing a sense of security and stability to the individual as they interact within the social system. Rompf (2014) summarizes the distinction between institutional and system trust by explaining that institutional trust refers to the trustor's specific interpretation of the institutional rules in relation to the trustee's action, while system trust refers to assumptions about whether the rules are generally valid, applicable and enforced.

Over time, as interactions and experiences structured by institutional trust within the social system comply with our assumptions and expectations, system trust is strengthened. This illustrates how larger systems of trust are made up of building blocks constituting of dyadic trust relations. Using the medical system as an example, Giddens (1990) argues that specific, interpersonal trust relations with medical professionals plays a large role in developing trust in the system as a whole. An assumption that can be made here is that the same is true for specific interpersonal trust relations with music therapists or other child welfare workers in shaping trust in the child welfare system. All these dyadic trust relations form the building blocks of system trust for a relevant institution, and provide generalized expectations for trust relations between actors who are otherwise anonymous to one another – such as initial doctor-patient meetings.

Trust relations are embedded into a social context, and both individuals and social systems influence the framework of interaction in which trust occurs, which means that trust cannot be understood as exclusively belonging to either (Luhmann, 1979, p. 6)

3.4 Objective structure to subjective experience

As illustrated above, trust is complex and multifaceted. In order to properly understand it, there is a need to examine the concept from several disciplinary approaches. I will now briefly outline the main points taken from the psychological, sociological and economic approaches. The claims from these different approaches might seem to initially be conflicting.

3.4.1 Psychological development – learning theories

Can trust be learned? When a trustor faces a trust problem, the information they have available shapes their expectation of trustworthiness. The trustor interprets and uses this *stored knowledge* together with both affectual information and any immediate situational impressions to form expectations of trustworthiness (Rompf, 2014). Generalized expectations are created, or "learned", from a large number of past experiences, which the trustor uses to inform their immediate impressions of a trustee when there is no specific knowledge available. Expectations of trustworthiness are informed by actual interaction history between the actors, where they have had the opportunity to build a relationship and learn about each other. Individuals can learn social rules, norms and roles, which they can also use to inform the choice of a trusting act. Essentially, the psychology of trust is constructed through experience (Hardin, 1993).

When understanding how the structure of knowledge is determined and organized, we can use the concept of "schema" (Rumelhart, 1980). Schemata are mental representations of the world that let us recognize what we already know, and we use them as interpretive schemes of reality to abstract the typical from specific experiences as well as to understand context. They function as theories about reality, and guide us when making new experiences (Baldwin, 1992). The totality of the schemata in a given moment construct the internal model we have of any given situation (Rumelhart, 1980). Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984) defined identity as a collection of self-related schemata, while Fiske (1993) defined stereotypes as socially shared schemata that include the prominent traits of a social category. Schematic knowledge can be "updated" if we encounter experiences that contradict them, but as long as experiences or *situational cues* do not deviate too far from the available knowledge, people can use a process

of "familiarization" to accommodate for unfamiliar events by discerning their "distance" to internalized schemata (Möllering, 2006b)

When schemata indicate that a situation is familiar and known, this allows for routine behaviour which relates directly to the interpretation process (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973). Routine is interrupted if a situation appears problematic if stored knowledge cannot be used to define it properly, which leads to relevant knowledge being brought into consciousness in order to rationally attempt to understand the situation. If routine is left uninterrupted, we interpret automatically (ibid.). From this we can infer that perhaps trust-related knowledge could also potentially be applied routinely when in familiar contexts with well-known individuals.

We can understand the concepts of learning, familiarization and routine as important dimensions of socialization (Rompf, 2014). Through socialization, individuals learn and internalize society's basic rules, norms and values, and develop schemata concerning what is typical and irregular, usually from significant others in their lives. Simultaneously, the individual learns and generalizes a multitude of socially shared schemata through experience, which they use to add meaning to typical situations, action sequences, actions, roles, routines and technical skills (Rompf, 2014, p. 84). This socially shared knowledge influences an individual's perception, interpretation, planning and action (D'Andrade, 1995). Schematic knowledge of typical situations, or *frames*, make the main goals of a given situation clear, and allow the social definition of a situation to be reciprocal between actors (Lindenberg, 1992).

This relates to trust as it is rooted in specific information, for example about the trustee, dyadic/network embeddedness, the normative culture surrounding the trust relation (rules, norms, roles, values) and generalized expectations. As this suggests the possibility of trust becoming routine and habitual behaviour, the processes of both socialization and learning can be considered important in terms of conditions for interpersonal trust.

Basic trust and attachment theory

Erikson (1950) described the idea of *basic trust* being formed in infants and children, which involves the creation of a "basic sense of faith in the self and the world" (p. 80). According to Erikson, the formation of basic trust occurs within the first two years of life, is preconscious, and involves a vague sense of safety and consistency regarding the relationship between the child and its caregiver(s). It is rooted in the child's experience of the environment as secure and capable of providing general satisfaction of its needs. It relates strongly to the caregivers' availability, reliability and predictability in response to the child, and is primarily an emotional concept. It is part of the child's identity development, influences social interaction, and provides

a general orientation of perceiving others as being trustworthy or not. A criticism here is that it portrays the child as a passive actor, and many argue that the child is an equal participant during this development (Warming, 2013).

Bowlby (1969) similarly describes the early affective bonds children have with their parents as fundamentally important, and emphasizes their impact for adult life. His research spurred the development of *attachment theory*, which studies and explains how attachments are formed and influence relationships throughout the course of life. Primary questions are how and why children make emotional attachments to their caregivers, and if/how this influences how relationships are developed and maintained throughout life. These attachment bonds are grounded in the infant's need for safety and protection. This early feeling of faith and security in a caregiver's reliability and responsiveness comes with the creation of one of the first relational schemata the child develops (with their caregiver(s)). If a child has a secure attachment with their caregivers and basic trust, this reflects an inner sense of security in the child in which everything in the environment appears typical and expected; thus, we can understand basic trust as related to a routine, taken-for-grantedness of reality.

Individual dispositions and traits

Several authors argue the idea that learned trust-related knowledge can transform into stable individual dispositions and personality traits (Erikson, 1968; Rotter, 1980; Hardin, 1993, 2002). Building on this, theories which focus on differences in trusting behaviour in an inter-individual sense have been proposed, jointly called theories of dispositional trust (Kramer, 1999). These theories have a central assumption that aspects within people make them more or less likely to trust others. Rotter (1980), in a social learning perspective, describes trust in terms of a generalized expectation of other people's trustworthiness, meaning that an individual develops a general expectation through their prior experiences involving trust. This generalized trust functions as a reference for the individual when trusting unfamiliar others, and its influence increases the more novel the situation is to the trustor. If the situation is familiar, the generalized expectations can be replaced by specific ones depending on how developed the trustor-trustee relationship is (ibid.).

Hardin (1993) describes a similar perspective, arguing that early-life experiences like and neglect can deeply impact the individual's capacity to trust, represented by a "general optimism about the trustworthiness of others" (p. 508). This is especially consequential for low-trust types, as they cannot gain any utility from trust as they avoid trusting interactions, which also diminishes the possibility to learn and update their general expectations of trustworthiness

through positive trust experiences. Empirical studies exploring the difference between low- and high-trust types find that the latter are more likely to notice trust-related information and correctly judge another's trustworthiness (Yamagishi et al., 1999), are able to adjust faster in situations that show signs of untrustworthiness (Yamagishi, 2001), and are more trustworthy and honest in terms of their behaviour and more positively viewed by others (Rotter, 1980). However, Gill et al. (2005) found that individual dispositions to trust can only be used to predict trusting intentions in situations where the trust-related information concerning a trustee is ambiguous. If the situational cues clearly point to the trustworthiness of a trustee, these become the basis for judging their trustworthiness rather than the individual dispositions and traits of the trustee. While internal factors like traits and dispositions seem relevant in interpersonal trust, their effect in a given situation may be limited when considering external factors.

Dynamic Models of trust development

Researchers have also focused on how trust develops and changes in relationships over time (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995, Jones & George, 1998; Lewicki et al. 2006). Through a series of repeated interactions in an ongoing relationship, multiple trust relations are developed and specific trust-related knowledge generated. There is a focus on how expectations, intentions and affect regarding the other evolve as the relationship progresses, and an assumption that the trust relations become reciprocal. Lewicki et al. (1998) claim that relationships have a "bandwidth" and "richness." The relationship bandwidth concerns which specific contexts of interpersonal relating the interpersonal trust is relevant to, where the bandwidth will be broader if trust is experienced across several contexts and very narrow if the interpersonal trust is only valid with regard to one specific context. The relationship richness concerns how detailed knowledge is across the bandwidth, meaning how much information the individuals know about each other in relation to the various contexts.

From this perspective, trust is generally considered to be low at first and building up over time through experience (Lewicki et al., 2006). The increase in trust is typically fuelled by interactions that are mutually satisfying (Rempel et al., 1985) If the outcomes of a trust interaction is successful, this is associated with positive emotions and moods, making the experience of trust favourable and warranting a continued relationship and building of trust (Jones & George, 1998. Essentially, trust creates more trust.

Lewicki and Bunker (1995) proposed that trust evolves through the stages of *calculus-based trust, knowledge-based trust* and *identification-based trust.* When considering the choice of a trusting act in calculus-based trust, the trustor calculates the gains and losses the trustee

will have if they choose to be untrustworthy, and uses this as a guide. In knowledge-based trust, the actors have gotten to know each other and stabilized their expectations through repeated interaction. Rather than focusing on assessing the consequences of specific actions like in calculus-based trust, the trustor focuses on the trustee's qualities and characteristics (Lewicki et al., 2006). Jones and George (1998) classified these first two stages of trust as conditional trust, which they argue is adequate to enable most social interactions. The last stage of identification-based trust springs out of a mature relationship where the actors have developed a mutual identification with each other accompanied by strong affect. The actors have developed shared values and common goals, and move towards being motivated by maximizing joint outcomes rather than self-interest (Lewicki et al., 2006). Trustworthiness is unquestioned, as the actors have learned through joint experiences to be confident in the other's values (Jones & George, 1998). Jones and George (ibid.) consider this stage as unconditional trust, where uncertainty is completely removed and mutual attachment is increased. The other's motivation is now attributed to intrinsic motives as well as an established shared social identity (Rempel et al. 1985). This stage is an example of real "blind" trust, where trustworthiness is taken for granted.

These models of trust development help us understand how specific relational schemata, favourable expectations, affect and attachment are developed, which are important sources of trust-related knowledge. They also illustrate how trust moves from calculating subjective perception of trust towards a state of affect and security.

3.4.2 Sociological perspectives – functions of trust

Sociological approaches to trust focus more on trust as a relational concept, and places the socially embedded trust problem in a broader institutional and cultural context (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). This approach explains how trust-related knowledge is socially predefined, as it is internalized through socialization that occurs in a context with a specific social stock of knowledge. This approach also explores how social institutions influence and shape the way trustors solve a trust problem, for example through the use of trust-related knowledge such as the institution's social roles or norms. This trust-related knowledge can lead to trust problems being solved through what is considered "appropriate" in the situation.,

This perspective considers trust an element in a fundamentally social human reality, and relates trust to the social context it is embedded in. The relational features of trust are emphasized. Trust is conceived of as an element of multiple actors in the form of dyads and groups rather than isolated individuals (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Trust can be understood as

having mainly a sociological function, since it is unnecessary unless in social relations. The need for trust stems from the complexity of the social world individuals interact in (Luhmann, 1979), and so trust can be understood as a means for the individual to reduce social uncertainty and be able to act. The importance of trust in social interactions will lead to it commonly being institutionally protected, to make sure that rule-based trust is valid and applicable for the individual, and that system trust can be maintained. Sociological approaches demonstrate another way trust can emerge unconditionally, through actors' routine application of institutional rules which stem out of situational normality and structural assurance (Rompf, 2014).

Another important focus for sociological approaches is how trust works in regard to the social systems is originates and is sustained in. It promotes socializing, participation with others and enriches networks of interpersonal ties as well as encouraging tolerance and acceptance of strangers (Sztompka, 1999). Fundamentally, trust is considered as a primary element of successful social integration and the maintenance of social order (Luhmann, 1988; Giddens, 1990).

Social embeddedness

The strategies trustor's employ to solve a trust problem is influenced by the social embeddedness of the trust relation, through the availability of resources and the costs of action, and activates relevant cultural schemata such as norms (Heimer, 2001). The relationships between the trustor and trustee, trusting parties and other actors in a social system, actors and the relevant social system itself are all part of the social embeddedness (Rompf, 2014). Individuals are regarded as embedded in networks of personal relationships, which means that actions always occur in a social context. Trust and trustworthiness are influenced by mechanisms of learning and control (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Control involves opportunities for reward and punishment in response to a trustee's actions, while learning entails opportunities for the trustor to get information about the trustee, either through past interaction, from third parties through reputation or through the surrounding institutional structures. We can differentiate social embeddedness into dyadic, network and institutional embeddedness (Rompf, 2014).

Dyadic embeddedness involves the repeated interactions between two individuals. It refers to a situation where the trustor and trustee already have a history of interaction, or where it is likely they will interact again in the future. There is a dimension of power to these trust relationships, and only a certain amount of power asymmetry can be endured before inevitably

leading to distrust (Farrell, 2004). In continuing relationships with developed emotional attachments where resources have been invested by both actors, power is less likely to be very asymmetrical, and the relationship is valuable to both. If there is a power difference, the actor with less interest in continuing the relationship possesses more power, since they have less incentive to be trustworthy and to be considerate of the other's interests. On the other hand, since the actor with less power knows the other has no incentive to be trustworthy, neither do they, and such big power differences are likely to result in a mutual distrust (ibid.).

Dyadic embeddedness involves the opportunity for learning about the other's dispositions, motives and intentions, which can be used in order to form and stabilize specific expectations. Repeated interactions have the potential to increase the relationship bandwidth and richness, as well as promoting mutual attachment and shared relational schemata being developed. It can also lead to trust becoming routine action (Endress, 2002).

Network embeddedness involves third parties in relation to both the trustor and trustee. These third parties can be a source of information or means of sanctioning, and allow for reputation mechanisms to be relevant; reputation is important as a source of trust knowledge, as well as social capital for the actors (Coleman, 1988). Third parties use reputation to inform trustors of a trustee with respects to trustworthiness, and can regulate the trustee's behaviour by rewarding or punishing them based on reputation-information within the network (Rompf, 2014). Consequently, failing trust is costlier for the trustee, while the trustor has the option to damage reputation or seek out alternative trustees in the network as a response to untrustworthiness, effectively increasing the trustor's power.

Institutional embeddedness refers to the cultural-normative setting that surround a trust relation. These institutions are a source of trust-related knowledge and structure action (ibid.). Institutions are here understood as socially shared expectations involving sanctions in regard to an obligatory and pre-established rule (Esser, 2000). Examples of institutions are social norms, which are associated to either external or internal negative sanctions. Institutions can create a familiar foundation for trust, as well as structurally protecting trust between unfamiliar individuals. They reduce complexity by giving socially shared information about typical behaviour and action in a social setting. Social roles, for example, enable trust through the expectations that are associated with specific social roles, rather than on any specific information concerning trustee characteristics (Kramer, 1999). As long as the trustor sufficiently perceives and accepts both the trustee's competency and intention to fulfil the expectations of the role, the trustor can decide on a trusting act based on the knowledge of the normative expectations tied to the role (Buskens & Raub, 2008). Note that whether an

institution is effective in encouraging trusting actions depends on the trustors conviction that the institution itself is effective.

Taken together, social embeddedness reduces the risk of trust due to learning and control opportunities. They also reduce uncertainty by providing familiar foundations in the form of institutions, which both actors use to establish a socially shared definition of the situation.

3.4.3 Economics of trust – rational choice theory

Lastly, we have the economic paradigm, or rational choice approach, which focuses on developing a formal specification and causal explanation of trust. Here, trust is considered as a rational decision actors make, based on evaluations of payoff versus risk in order to determine the best way to solve the trust problem, informed by the information, preferences and constraints they are dealing with. While economic models of trust seem very clear and precise, they do not sufficiently explain why trust sometimes can occur irrationally.

The economic approach to trust has been researched extensively (Möllering, 2006a), and connects trust to rational choice theory (Gambetta, 1988; Coleman, 1990; Hardin, 2002). It allows for a very clear formal representation of complex aspects of trust, and emphasizes the aspect of logic behind choices (Kramer, 1999). The basic idea is that actors are rational and utility maximizing, who systematically contemplate whether to perform a trusting act, bounded and guided by their goals, preferences and incentives.

Rational choice theory (RCT) is based on the methodological individualism principle, which holds that any social phenomena must be explained and analysed from an individual perspective (Coleman, 1990; Rompf, 2014). An example is that social norms can be explained as objectively shaping the constraints individuals meet when defining a situation, rather than with respect to compliance with third parties (Rompf, 2014). Further, RCT explanations construct a model of the situation through an abstraction of the essential aspects of a problem, and attempt to establish a causal relationship between the variables. The actions of an individual are assumed to be understandable and intentional, with clear, stable preferences that motivate behaviour, and in order to understand a social process we have to explain it through the rational actions made by individuals (Coleman, 1990).

Two elements are characteristic to the rational choice approach to interpersonal trust. The first is the trustor's trust-related knowledge, which is expressed through their expectations, and the second is the trustee's concrete incentives to fulfil the trust content and be trustworthy (Hardin, 1993). Expectations are important in the sense that while the preferences and intentions

of the trustee are never completely known, the trustor can base an estimate of trustworthiness on their various sources of trust-related knowledge. The general idea is that trustees either rationally uphold or breach trust depending on the costs and benefits associated with either choice (Rompf, 2014).

When considering costs and benefits, relevant elements are social embeddedness (which can provide incentives), trustee characteristics, as well as potential bias through individual disposition and generalized expectations of trust (ibid.). The rational choice perspective describes trust decisions as deliberate and laden with effort, where the trustor carefully considers any relevant incentives the trustee might draw motivation from, in an effort to avoid an outcome of opportunism and exploitation (Möllering, 2006a).

3.5 Interpersonal trust - an integrative framework

Based on all that's been said so far in this chapter, trust needs to be considered from multiple perspectives. I will utilize the interdisciplinary perspective developed by Rompf in order to try to properly integrate all the different aspects of trust. Basically, the subjective experience of trust seems to be the primary reason for why definitions of trust in the literature seems to be confusingly incompatible (Shapiro, 1987). When defining the concept, different authors focus on different phenomenological aspects as well as different sources of trust-related knowledge, which leads to theoretical formulations and empirical results being incomparable (McKnight & Chervany, 1996). Rompf proposes two elements as the missing link which prevents the integration of the different theoretical approaches. The first is interpretation, which is the subjective definition of the situation, and the second is the actor's individual adaptive rationality. The issue stems from that researchers are unclear about what role interpretation plays in trust problems, and that the rational adaptability of the individual is a fundamental dimension of the trust concept. Rompf (2014, p. 378) argues that the idea of dynamic, flexible and adaptive degree of rationality constitutes the common ground which makes room for both rational and non-rational accounts of trust.

In order to properly explain adaptive rationality, Rompf (ibid.) focuses on the process of both interpretation and the subjective definition of a situation, where information processing states function dynamically and adaptively based on the current needs given by the situation as well as trust-related knowledge which is activated based on context. In exploring the concept of adaptive rationality and trust, he uses the Model of Frame Selection (MFS), which conceptualizes trust as the outcome after a process in which frame, script and action are selected. Rompf pairs the different steps of selection with adaptive degrees of rationality at each

selection, starting with the step of interpretation (selection of frame and script), leading to the eventual choice (selection of action). The MFS can functionally relate the determinants of information processing, the mode-selections determine to what degree rationality is involved in interpretation and choice. This is guided by the trustor's natural evaluations of motivation and opportunity, and informed by the available situational cues which warrant the use of existing trust-related knowledge structures.

3.5.1 Adaptive rationality

In order to properly understand how human rationality can be variable and adaptive, Rompf (2014) utilizes the theoretical *dual-process* paradigm, based on a principal assumption that people process information through two different underlying cognitive systems (Kahneman 2003, Evans 2008). Basically, individuals can use both cognitive systems and their associated information-processing strategies flexibly. Explained generally, humans use two different routes or "modes" when processing information which are defined as (1) the "heuristic" automatic mode, whose activation is contingent on whether the situation allows for the application of readily available simple rules and associations, and (2) the "elaborate" rational mode, which requires that the actor has both sufficient levels of motivation and that cognitive capacities are available (Rompf, 2014, p. 166). Smith and DeCoster (2000) describe the automatic mode as a fast, "rough" approach that humans use to effortlessly and efficiently arrive at adequately good answers, and the elaborate mode as a slower approach that involves hard thinking and reasoning to solve a problem, resulting in mental operations that require effort. Illustrating the activation of the automatic mode, they refer to instances where people use rules like "experts are always right" or "the majority is always correct" (ibid., p. 119). If such rules are assessed as sufficient to define the situation, the actor does not need to engage in the elaborate mode, and heuristically relies on rules when engaging in the situation. Smith and DeCoster (2000) claim that the automatic processing mode is what humans use by default, and that they will use it unless circumstances contain something out of the ordinary.

There is considerable agreement on which characteristics define and distinguish the two information-processing modes (Kahneman, 2003). When processing in the automatic mode, authors agree that it is almost effortless, and that its activation does not enter into the individual's focus of attention. This means that such automatic cognitive processing is not intentional or controlled actively by the individual, as the actor relies on simple rules and heuristics when interpreting and subjectively defining the situation, as well as when making a choice (Rompf, 2014). These rules and heuristics are guided by situational cues that are

available, as well as through the actor's routine application of learned schemata, scripts and routines.

To understand how these modes work, it is necessary to briefly explain how we create and store memories. Neuropsychological and psychological evidence indicates that humans have evolved and developed two memory systems, due to the need for both slow and fast learning (Sherry & Schachter, 1987). The slow-learning memory system is used to form stable and general representations of the environment's "typical properties", based on experience from many trials (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). We can call these representations *schematic knowledge structures*, or simply *schemata.* Learning in this first memory system occurs as each stimulus is processed, "and involves small, incremental alterations of representations in ways that facilitate repetition of the same processing" (ibid, p. 170). Basically, the schemata we have stored in this system are "updated" when experience in new situations warrant it – we learn which stimuli fit with the representation we have, and develop it over time. These stored schemata are utilized pre-consciously to both process and interpret new stimuli, by filling in incomplete information and categorizing situational cues in the environment (ibid.).

The fast-learning memory system is able to quickly construct new schemata that can connect the different pieces of information about the various aspects of an experience or an object in its context (Wiles & Humphreys, 1993). It involves conscious and explicit recollections of stored knowledge. The fast-learning system is more concerned with irregularities in a situation, stimulus that are unpredicted/unexpected, while the slow-learning system is geared towards regularities and "learns" what is typical and expected (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). It lets us react when we encounter new information in a new situation, when stored knowledge structures cannot adequately be applied.

Smith and DeCoster (2000) argue that the automatic mode is involved with the slow-learning memory system and draws information from it in order to form general expectations based on typical properties of the environment. The automatic (associative) processing mode works by "performing a pattern completion function" (ibid, p. 113), which essentially means that the situation is "scanned" for salient cues that fit the stored schemata, and if associative retrieval of knowledge is possible and there is a sufficient match, the pattern is "completed" which allows for the schemata to be applied successfully in the situation.

The automatic mode then, can be described as "fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and often emotionally charged" (Kahneman, 2003, p. 1451). They are also closely tied to habits, and as a result are difficult to control or modify (ibid.), since associated schemata require repeated experience in order to change. When answers are gotten through the automatic mode

they seem to just "pop into the head" and become part of the stimulus information in the setting, rather than being considered as something the perceiver has evaluated or interpreted on their own (Rompf, 2014, p. 170). Such associative retrieval of knowledge through the automatic mode can greatly influence the judgments and decisions we make, as they have the potential to "colour" how we perceive a situation without us being consciously aware.

The rational mode of information processing is characterized as being conscious, paying select attention to mental content and situational stimuli in the environment (Rompf, 2014). It involves an elaborate, explicit and controlled reasoning process, limited in the amount of information it can handle simultaneously, and is guided by the individual's motivations and goals. It allows us to have cognitive control when processing information, through the use of mechanisms like logical thought, abstraction, planning, inference and decision making (Stanovich, 2004).

The rational mode is related to both memory systems. Schemata stored in the slow memory system can be consciously accessed and rationally compared to knowledge of previous experiences, which can be used to make judgments and decisions in the situation. The fast memory system can be used to rationally connect situational cues together and create a new schema "on the spot" (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). An individual can rationally use available situational information about a trustee to generate specific expectations of trustworthiness, by asking questions like "does he look trustworthy?" or "what incentive does she have to give a trustworthy response?" etc. While the rational mode might be able to give more accurate answers, the caveat is that it is much slower and costly relative to the automatic mode.

Kahneman (2003) found that while judgments and decisions are normally intuitive, they can be modified or overridden by the rational mode. If the situational cues and information that are being processed sufficiently match stored schemata, the automatic mode will activate. The rational mode only activates if the situation warrants its intervention to correct or support the automatic mode's operations (Rompf, 2014).

Such a dual-process approach demonstrates "the notion of human bounded rationality as adaptive, highly flexible, and responsive to situational constraints" (Rompf, 2014, p.173). Connecting this together with trust, this can be used to understand suspension of doubt, use of unconditional or conditional trusting strategies, how institutional trust emerges, and make room for accounts of trust as rational choice. As Rompf (2014) puts it: "these aspects can essentially be answered in terms of the preferential activation of distinct cognitive systems, their information processing state, and the degree of rationality involved in interpretation and the choice of a trusting act" (p. 173).

Determinants

When considering determinants of information processing, researchers have put forward a large number of variables that could be relevant (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). However, most dual-processing models agree that (1) opportunity, and (2) motivation are crucial determinants in the selection of the automatic or rational mode (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Researchers also emphasize (3) the accessibility and applicability of stored knowledge, as well as how well the stored knowledge matches situational cues, and finally (4) effort-accuracy trade-offs, which involves the efforts and cognitive costs of different processing strategies; this factor is crucial in regard to which decision strategies are employed and what degree of rationality is involved (Payne et al. 1993; Rompf, 2014).

(1) ***Opportunity*** involves the cognitive resources of an actor, and how these are limited and constrained by situational and individual aspects. Whether a sufficient amount of attentional resources or processing time is available helps determine if the actor has the opportunity to use the rational mode. Considering the situational dimension of opportunity, if the actor finds themselves a situation where a quick behavioural response is necessary, they may not have the actual opportunity to utilize the kind of reasoning and reflection the rational mode provides, despite the fact that they might otherwise have desired to do so (Fazio, 1990).

The cognitive capacity and ability of the actor describe the individual-intrinsic dimension of opportunity (Kruglanski & Thompson 1999). *Cognitive capacity* refers to how much of a "cognitive load" the actor experiences in the situation, and the amount of attentional resources they have available (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 2002). *Ability* refers to general cognitive skills, as well as to what degree actors perceive themselves as effective at processing information. Situations where the actor is simultaneously engaging with several different tasks increases the cognitive load, which limit the amount of cognitive resources available (Rompf, 2014). The accessibility and availability of cognitive resources jointly determine the individual-intrinsic opportunity.

(2) ***Motivation*** concerns the motivation to actually utilize a controlled mode of information processing. The situational dimension of motivation has subjective and objective aspects; it refers to how the actor subjectively perceives the importance of a task, and the responsibility they have for an outcome (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). The objective structure of the situation and the stakes involved (what can be gained or lost) are also important in determining situational motivation (Payne et al. 1993). If the actor encounters novel cues in the

situation or is startled and surprised, this can also increase their situational motivation to use more elaborate information processing (Rompf, 2014).

Individual-intrinsic factors of motivation are *need for cognition* (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), *faith in intuition* (Epstein et a. 1996) and *accuracy-motivation* (Petty & Cacioppo 1986). These factors are relatively stable personality traits, and influence our general tendency to engage in either the rational or automatic mode. Individuals with high levels of faith in their intuition tend to use affect to inform most of their decisions, resulting in quick and spontaneous decisions, while people who generally prefer to deliberate usually make slower and more elaborate decisions based on cognition (Schunk & Betsch, 2006).

Goals and expectations influence motivation. When a desired outcome or goal suggests that systematic reasoning should be used, or when a systematic analysis is promoted by expectations, this can lead to processing in the rational mode (Fiske, 1993; Bargh et al., 2001; Molden & Higgins, 2005). If situational goals do not require accurate decisions they can lessen the need to undergo controlled reasoning and promote the use of the automatic mode.

(3**)** *Accessibility and Applicability*: Accessibility concerns how accessible particular knowledge is, how much effort is required to bring it to mind. It depends on the characteristics of the cognitive mechanisms that produce particular thoughts as well as those of the situational stimuli that elicit it (Kahneman, 2003). Higgins (1996) defined accessibility as the activation potential of available knowledge; the more accessible any particular information is, the more likely it is employed to categorize stimulus information. While accessible knowledge always has some potential to be activated, it exists in a somewhat dormant state until activated. This means that the most accessible knowledge in a given moment shape interpretation, the subjective definition of the situation, and decision-making. The *temporary accessibility* of stored knowledge can be increased through situational cues in the environment that promote its activation; this means that the knowledge comes to mind more easily, and are used when processing information. *Chronic accessibility of knowledge* means whether knowledge is accessible on more of a general basis and can be used independently of context (Schwarz, 2009).

The applicability of stored knowledge concerns whether it can be applied to understand the information that is perceived (Higgins, 1996). If stored knowledge cannot help us master a situation the situation is likely to appear problematic and warrant an elaborate and systematic analysis in order to properly understand the situation and consider how to approach/deal with it. The higher the *match* between stored knowledge and situational features, the more likely it

is to be activated to understand the situation. If stored knowledge is both highly accessible and matches the situational features, that promotes the activation of the automatic processing mode.

(4) ***Effort-accuracy Trade-offs***: The different processing modes and decision strategies are assumed to involve different amounts of mental effort (Rompf, 2014). This results in a trade-off evaluation between the expected necessary effort and the amount of accuracy involved in using the different decision strategies. Rational decision strategies require a tremendous amount of cognitive resources in order to systematically retrieve knowledge from memory, compare alternatives and scrutinize situational cues, but can provide a high level of accuracy (Payne et al., 1993). Heuristic automatic strategies are usually less accurate, but incur far less cognitive costs, while random choices are the least costly and accurate.

Summarizing, both opportunity and motivation are necessary in order to select the rational mode (Chaiken, 1980; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). If either of the conditions are missing, the use of the rational mode is either not feasible or required. The higher the costs of a decision strategy, the higher the accuracy and vice versa. Individuals try to balance out the cognitive costs needed in order to sufficiently satisfy their motivational concerns in a situation (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). The accessibility and applicability of knowledge is also an important determinant. In the automatic mode, individuals process information by relying on the stored knowledge that is most accessible; however, in order for the automatic mode to be activated there also needs to be a sufficient match between stored knowledge and situational cues. If there is a mismatch, motivation to use the rational system increases as long as conditions of opportunity and motivation are met (Fiske et al., 1999).

In terms of interpersonal trust, dual-processing models are valuable as adaptive rationality is demonstrated to be an essential feature of human interaction, which can be taken to mean that it's fundamental as a dimension of trust itself (Rompf, 2014). It can be presumed to be involved in every decision of a trusting act as well as part of every solution to a trust problem (ibid.). Adaptive rationality allows us to understand and explain the different types of trust which seem conflicting, such as calculus-based vs. affect-based trust. However, the actual link between cognition and action has not been formally established in the models of dual-processing, meaning we cannot discern the actual rules of selection related to the definition of the situation, scripts and actions (Mayerl, 2010). Also, while dual-processing models include the importance of context, they don't incorporate the fact that there is always a *socially pre-structured* environment from which perception and choice draw information from. Symbolically structured and socially defined situations are important to action in general and for interpersonal trust to be established in particular (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Jones & George,

1998). In order to properly understand the social phenomenon of interpersonal trust, the objective social definition of the situation needs to be included as an important variable as well, while still accounting for the importance of adaptive rationality in regard to interpretation and choice (Rompf, 2014).

3.5.2 Model of Frame Selection

The starting point of this model is the idea of a definition and framing of a situation, explaining how an individual defines a situation as a fundamental condition for which actions they have available and are willing to perform (Kroneberg, 2006). It builds upon the Thomas theorem: "if [humans] define a situation as real, it is real in their consequences." (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572). Action is grounded the subjective beliefs of an actor, and these actions become part of a social reality, despite their possible lack of objective truth. It includes the idea that actors use mental schemata in order to reduce a situation's complexity through categorizing its situational cues into a meaningful whole, abstracting from some cues as being irrelevant (Kroneberg, 2006, p. 4). The mental schemata contain situationally relevant knowledge structures which in the case of interpersonal trust could include specific and generalized expectations, social norms, expectations tied to a role, relational schemata tied to a significant other etc. (Rompf, 2014). An actor's perspective of a particular situation is structured by the totality of activated mental schemata. As a given situation can be interpreted by an individual in many different ways, the term *frame selection* refers to the process of activating a specific frame (Kroneberg, 2006).

Mental schemata can be separated into two classes: *frames* and *scripts* (Rompf, 2014). Frames are mental models of typical situations, referring to socially shared interpretive schemes. These help us understand what kind of situation we find ourselves in, and are usually learned and internalized during socialization in a social or cultural context (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). A subjective definition of a situation through the activation of a frame defines the relevant main goals, and certain "programs of behaviour" are activated. These are the frame's associated *scripts*, containing knowledge of typical sequences of action in typical situations, and involve different kinds of behaviour, values, routines and affective states (Rompf, 2014). Because scripts will always be tied specifically to certain situations, the activation of a script happens after a situation has been defined and *framed*, i.e. a process of frame selection has taken place. The process through which scripts are selected is referred to as *script selection* (Kroneberg, 2006).

Through the activation of frames and scripts, the set of available meaningful sequences of action are limited, simplifying our interpretation process of a situation. Since frames belong

to stored associative knowledge structures and the slow-learning memory system, they are tied to certain situational objects that indicate and signal the appropriateness of a frame in a particular situation (Kroneberg, 2006; Rompf, 2014). Since situational objects contain a socially constructed meaning they are susceptible to change, i.e. through negotiations of meaning (Wimmer, 2002). Frames can be activated in many different ways, such as through conversation or the manners of how an individual is acting. An example is the hospital frame which can contain situational objects such as uniforms and behaviours. Frame and script selection typically follows a "logic of appropriateness" (March & Olsen, 1989), meaning that actors are primarily motivated with decoding situations they find themselves in most accurately and appropriately (Rompf, 2014).

After the frame and script selection, the actor is in a position to consider what course of action to take; this leads to an *action selection* (Kroneberg, 2006). The action selection is what rational choice theories usually focus on, which only considers what an individual actually overtly does in a situation, and not necessarily how they reached that decision (ibid.). By taking into account the selections of frames and scripts, the MFS accounts for the importance of the subjective definition of the situation. Since the activation of frames and scripts narrow down the possible courses of actions in a situation due to forming the preferences and influencing expectancy-formation, the actual choice of action is shaped significantly by the prior processes of interpretation and activation of mental schemata.

All three selections can occur with varying degrees of rationality, meaning in both the automatic or rational modes. Automatic mode selections spring out of the temporary accessibility of mental models (Rompf, 2014). Referring back to Smith and DeCoster's (2000) description of the automatic mode as pattern-completion, the automatic mode is used if a pattern can be "completed" without any irregularities and stored knowledge can be routinely executed.

The *activation weights* of schemata is based on how well particular schemata match a situation and how accessible they are in relation to situational cues and their activation of associative knowledge (ibid.). If we encounter situational cues we can understand intuitively, we will interpret the situation using the most accessible frame, activating the most accessible script, and executing the most accessible course of action, as determined through the selected frame and script (ibid, p. 201). This automatic mode selection-sequence occurs without any deliberate effort or conscious thought.

Automatic mode selections

What are the determinants that influence the activation weight of schemata? An automatic mode frame selection is completely determined by the actor's immediate experience of a *match* between the frames and the given situation. The match of a frame is a function of (1) the mental accessibility of the frame, (2) the presence of situational objects which are significant to the frame and (3) how strong the *associative link* is between the frame and objects (Kroneberg, 2006).

The mental accessibility of the frame can be understood as its *chronic accessibility* (Rompf, 2014), referring to an actor's general disposition to understand situations in a particular manner; it relates directly to socialization, learning and experience, and is generally fairly stable. Present situational objects function as heuristic cues, used to determine both the appropriateness and validity of the frame – it allows the model to include objective-situational variance and show the influence of context on activation weights (ibid.). The associative link refers to how strongly the situational cues are tied to a specific frame and carry symbolic meaning of the situation to the actor, describing the associative strength between a situational object and frame.

If a frame is selected automatically, the frame that best matches the current situation is selected. A general inference that can be made from this is that the more familiar the situation is, the higher the match and activation weights will be (Rompf, 2014). A complete match between frame and situation means that the situational cues can easily be understood by using available knowledge. A low match indicates that the actor is confronted with an unfamiliar situation, which cannot be mastered by the application of routine knowledge. In unfamiliar situations, the frame has a low chronic accessibility and/or the associative strength between the frame and situational cues is weak. This means situational cues cannot be properly decoded even if they are objectively present (ibid.). If a situation is filled with ambiguity where situational cues cannot unambiguously indicate a specific meaning, then the match is low even if chronic accessibility is high and there is a strong associative link between the frames and situational objects.

The activation weight of *scripts* is also dependant on several related elements (Kroneberg, 2006). The chronic accessibility of the script represents the strength of its mental anchoring, such as to what degree certain norms are internalized or the actor is used to particular routines. A highly internalized norm can easily be retrieved as a script which can guide action, as it is chronically accessible to the individual.

The temporary accessibility of a script has two sources which situationally influence the script activation (Rompf, 2014). It is dependent upon the associative strength between the

already selected frame and script – once the situation has been framed in a particular manner, that definition will result in certain knowledge structures becoming either more or less accessible. It's also influenced by the presence of situational objects, which can indicate certain actions as more appropriate.

Lastly, the match between the activated frame and the script. As the accessibility of a script implies, depending on the kind of situation certain actions are more or less expected (Kroneberg 2006). One can then make the assumption that the activation of a script is completely dependent upon how the frame was selected, as the frame defined what kind of situation the actor is in. The clearer the definition of the situation through a script, the more likely a script related to the frame will be activated. If a situation is very familiar to an individual, they are more certain about their interpretation of the situation being valid, leading to them being more confident about the relevant possible courses of action in the situation.

Summarized, automatic mode script selections depend on the experienced match, which involves how the frame was defined in regard to the amount of ambiguity. The script also needs to be associated with a certain frame which indicates its appropriateness, and the script needs to be chronically accessible in the memory of the actor.

The action selection in the automatic mode happens in a situation which has already been defined according to a frame and where a script has been subsequently activated. For an automatic action to be possible, the selected script needs to sufficiently regulate the course of action. While scripts contain information and knowledge about what actions are considered typical and which behaviours are expected in well-known situations, they tend to be open to interpretation and are not necessarily detailed enough to allow for an unambiguous selection of *one* specific action from a set of possible alternatives (Rompf, 2014). This means that the activation weight is dependent on how strictly the script regulates action. Rompf illustrates this by comparing the relatively open "restaurant" script (what type of behaviour is expected in a restaurant) to the rule-based social norm "do not lie", which is a script that highly regulates action (ibid., p. 204). A second aspect that determines the activation weight of an action is the script's overall activation level; if there is uncertainty in the actor's mind concerning a scripts appropriateness, then it is unlikely that they will respond with an automatic behaviour based on routine. This will be the case even if action is highly regulated by the script, as the actor is not sure whether the script should be applied to the current situation. In other words, in order for an action to be selected routinely, the situation must have an unambiguous subjective definition while the action is also highly regulated by a script.

Rational mode selection of frame, script and action

The logic that informs the selection rules of schemata in the rational mode is not quite the same as in the automatic mode. Selections in the rational mode are characterized by comparison, evaluation, effort and a deliberative reasoning processes (Rompf, 2014). However, as selections are motivated by the actor's intent to appropriately identify the correct alternatives given the circumstances of the situation, selections in this mode do also follow a "logic of appropriateness." Selections in the rational mode resemble choices as defined in rational choice theory (Coleman, 1990); from this perspective, behaviour and choice are viewed as purposive action rooted in subjectively rational considerations, and involves an understanding of actors' primary motivations and purposes for making a choice as being grounded in a maximization of utility (Kroneberg, 2006).

When considering whether a frame is appropriate or not, the actor is mainly concerned with determining whether or not they are acceptable given the situation – actors attempt to systematically analyse the situation as well as identify the objectively matching frame through a process of reasoning (Kroneberg, 2006). Actors form expectations about whether a frame is appropriate, an *appropriateness belief*, which corresponds closely to the match of the activated frame described in the automatic mode. The difference is that the match is both experienced and perceived as an expectation, rather than a routine, unconscious definition of the situation (ibid.). An important note is that all the elements which can determine a match in the automatic mode have the potential to become problematic when selecting a frame in the rational mode, and thus be scrutinized and undergo an elaborate reasoning process in order to determine their appropriateness (Rompf, 2014). To rationally select a frame, actors consciously evaluate how the situational cues fit available knowledge structures, and as a result consider (1) the importance of relevant situational objects present in the environment, (2) their significance in regard to a specific frame, and (3) how appropriate the particular interpretation is, given the situation. The utility attached to the different possible frames is derived from the utility the actor gains from forming an appropriate perspective of the world, and this is why a rational utility-maximizing actor might be motivated to properly frame a situation (ibid.).

The appropriateness belief of a frame becomes a decisive factor for an actor when rationally defining a situation, as it is indicative of the subjective expected utility in a situation. Continuing to scripts then, how does an actor determine which behaviour is the most appropriate after they have defined the situation they find themselves in? Construction of the appropriateness belief of a script is similar to the corresponding factor for frames: the actor considers whether situational cues are available which are significant for a particular script, and

also whether a script is appropriate given the selected frame. The subjective expected utility plays a role here as well, as a correctly selected script (which thus is appropriate) will yield the best options for behaviour and action in the situation.

Finally, actually selecting an action in the rational mode involves the available alternatives of behaviour and action being consciously and elaborately evaluated in regard to costs, expectations and benefits (Rompf, 2014). Taken together, it becomes apparent that the actual selection of actions becomes structured by the preceding selections of frame and script, and this is true both for automatic and rational selections. Specific knowledge structures are activated by the frame and script in the form of primary goals, values, affective states and sequences of action and the like, which directly influence expectations and utility. After activating, frames and scripts limit the alternative choices that can be considered, which means that they help determine the preferences and individual goal structure of the individual (ibid., p. 206).

The selection rules outlined in the MFS causally connects interpretation and choice in both the automatic and rational mode. It utilizes the valuable insights the dual-processing paradigm provides, while also incorporating the framework of rational choice theory. The model can be used to help explain how we can sometimes see unconditional normative routine in human action, contradicting standard rational choice theory (Rompf, 2014). We can both understand and explain unconditional norm compliance through automatic activation of schemata and the routine execution of scripts. Conversely, if something interrupts our initial interpretation of the situation, or if actions are not sufficiently regulated by scrips, the rational mode is activated where actors perform operations in order to maximize utility. The model can be used to explain how culture shapes preferences (Fehr & Hoff, 2011), and point to the significance of a socialized stock of cultural knowledge concerning typical situations and typical programs of behaviour in relation to individual interpretation and choice (Rompf, 2014). Selections that resemble pure rational choice can be understood as a case where either no intuitive frames are accessible, the situation is interpreted as unfamiliar and important, or when there is sufficient motivation on the part of the actor to override automatic categorizations of information.

3.5.3 Definition - trust and adaptive rationality

If we consider the different forms of trust put forward in the literature, such as calculus-based, affect-based and conditional trust, rule-based and institution-based trust, the primary difference between them is the amount of involved rationality (Rompf, 2014). This means that adaptive

rationality is a major component of the trust concept, and that adaptive rationality, individual processing states and their underlying mechanisms are necessary in order to understand trust. By incorporating this perspective, we can understand cases of conditional forms of trust, in which the trustor deals with the trust problem subjectively and contemplates what decision to make, and unconditional forms of trust, where the trustor trusts without doubt or any conscious elaboration (ibid.). We can also explain the interplay between the different types of trust, such as the how social norms and roles work together with trust built in a dyad relationship over time. As such, Rompf's definition of trust, which I will also use, is as follows:

"[Trust is] *an actor's definition of the situation that involves the activation of mental schemata sufficient for the generation of a favorable expectation of trustworthiness and the subsequent conditional or unconditional choice of a trusting act."* – Rompf (2014, p. 380).

While it is a very general definition, it combines both the psychological and sociological dimensions of trust with the behavioural dimension of choice and action (ibid.) It does not actually demand a specific processing state or directly specify the content of trust-related knowledge. But as Rompf notes, it is impossible to specify a closed set containing "all-encompassing types of trust" (ibid., p. 380). The definition does however allow for us to causally trace the choice of a trusting act back to both rational and automatic means of processing. This can for example be a rational assessment of trustee characteristics or a consideration of effort versus value, or the automatic routine use of trust-related knowledge such as relational schemata, norms and roles. Unconditional cases of trust can be understood as building on the person's specific learning history and socialization, and occurs already at the level of mode selection (ibid.). Expectations of trustworthiness are only rationally accessed in conditional trust – here, the specific situation decides whether trust-related knowledge is relevant, and if that knowledge makes the generation and formation of expectations possible.

4.0 DISCUSSION

4.1 The adolescent's definition of the situation

Let's begin by tying this framework of trust to the adolescent's lives. As previously mentioned, many children within child welfare have experienced challenging experiences and relationships with adults and with the child welfare system (Kayed et al., 2015). Using our understanding of trust and adaptive rationality, we can see how such previous experiences can become stored knowledge and schemata for the adolescents through processes of socialization and learning (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Rumelhart, 1980; Rompf, 2014). This influences how they interpret and act in future situations that are assessed as being sufficiently similar, forming general expectations of trustworthiness (Rotter, 1980; Baldwin, 1992).

If we consider that an adolescent has had mostly negative interactions with adults throughout their lives, this can lead to them subjectively defining situations with *all* adults in a way where trust is unlikely to occur. After framing the situation, the most appropriate script is likely to be selected, based on the match between stored knowledge and available situational cues (Kroneberg, 2006). In our current example, if nothing indicates that there is something out of the ordinary with the situation (follows a pattern of previous negative interactions with adults), then the most appropriate scripts are probably going to contain action sets that make trust unlikely. In an extreme case, a script's contained actions might not involve any opportunity to trust at all, as they have already been ruled out by the selection of the script (Kroneberg, 2006). One way to create opportunities for trust then, is by providing situational cues and experiences which signal that trust is a *possibility*.

McFerran (2010) noted that since adolescents are quick to judge whether an adult is trustworthy (indicative of an automatic selection frame and script), it is important for the music therapist to be *clear, consistent and authentic* in order to initially appear trustworthy. This is also reflected in comments from adolescents participating in a music therapy workshop, where available adults represented stability, continuity and a break from life in child welfare institutions (Krüger et al., 2014). We can interpret this as a means to reduce social uncertainty for the adolescent, and signalling trustworthy characteristics. As previously argued, benevolence, competence, integrity and predictability are important to perceived trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995), and emphasizing these might prevent adolescents from automatically defining a situation as distrustful. McFerran's (2010) point of being authentic and consistent can be connected to predictability, since the adolescent can more easily perceive and asses the music therapist's personality and characteristics if they act in a clear and authentic

manner, and so be able to more accurately predict future behaviour. This can potentially strengthen the perceived integrity of the music therapist, which can be used to create expectations of future trustworthiness. McFerran (ibid.) also mentions the importance of genuinely listening to the adolescent, which we can relate to Skjervheim's (1996) definition of "being taken seriously" and to giving importance to the child's voice (Krüger & Stige, 2015). If the music therapist is successful in genuinely listening to the adolescent, this can build up their perceived benevolence (how much the trustee cares about the trustor's welfare), as the adolescent feels that the music therapist is acknowledging their point of view and trying to understand them. A suggestion here is that one can start small where stakes aren't too high, such as with simple getting-to-know-each-other activities (Strandbu et al., 2016). Starting with small and less demanding experiences of successful trust can potentially later develop into more mature, meaningful trust relations (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Activities can also be an opportunity for the music therapist to demonstrate their competence, that they for example can be trusted to competently lead/support a group discussion or teach a musical instrument.

4.2 Music therapy and roles

We can also consider the impact of the different roles of the music therapist. Krüger (2012) noted that when interviewing adolescents that he had previously worked with in a music workshop, it was commented on how he used a different "language" in his research role, that he spoke differently and more formally to the adolescent than usual. When Krüger asked how he should speak, the adolescent answered that he should "just be himself" (ibid., p. 54). This emphasizes McFerran's (2010) point of presenting oneself as clear, authentic and consistent; by appearing or behaving different, it can be argued that some degree of social uncertainty entered into the situation. In Krüger's example, this was quickly resolved as their already-established trust relationship made it possible to comment on and discuss the discrepancy.

Because music therapists can be symbolic of many different roles, this might provide different opportunities. The music therapist can for example be perceived as a health professional, musician, teacher, mentor, adult, coach, friend etc. Since different roles contain different meanings, certain roles might appear more trustworthy than others (Rompf, 2014). While interaction with someone who the adolescent associates with the role of "child welfare worker" can be unfavourable to trust opportunities due to negative past experiences, interactions with a "musician role" might represent something new, potentially preventing an automatic distrusting interpretation and judging of the situation. The adolescent might associate the musician role with certain values that are in line with their musical and recreational interests,

possibly motivating them to be open to trust (Hardin, 2003). By opening up for interactions, communication and dialogue can occur, in which meanings and opinions can be shared and the actors can get better acquainted. This can provide opportunities to reduce social distance (Hoffman et al., 2008) develop shared mental schemata and specific expectations of trustworthiness.

Recall the music therapist's role as a potential "mesoagent" (Mandal & Bergset, 2016). For this to be possible, a trusting relationship needs to be established between the adolescent and music therapist, providing the adolescent with a sense of confidence and security (Burke & Stets, 1999). This relationship can be used to improve the overall connectedness between the adolescent's different networks; being situated in several of the different systems surrounding the adolescent, the music therapist *themselves* might be considered as a situational cue the adolescent can draw confidence from, which can promote interactions of trust with others. The presence of the music therapist in the situation can lead to the selection of trust-promoting frames, scripts and actions in interactions with others in the situation, opening up for communication and dialogue which can establish or re-negotiate relationships both between the adolescent and different parts of their network, and between the different parts themselves.

The music therapy workshop with peers can also provide adolescents with a different "atmosphere" than usual, where they feel more relaxed and able to be themselves (Krüger et al., 2014). The adolescents are allowed to feel sad without having to explain why; instead of being probed with questions about how they feel and pushed to do something in order to feel better, the adolescents can just be accepted *as they are*, countering the common normative pressure to always be happy and strive for perfection. This involves treating the adolescents as equals characterized by trust and acceptance. They can be trusted to bring up things if they want to, indicating that they are being taken seriously and maintaining a power balance between the adults and adolescents in the setting. This leads to the development of schemata and scripts related to a notion that it is "okay to be who you are", based on experiences that let you trust that who you are is *good enough* and *valuable* in social interactions.

4.3 Musical activities, objects and trust

The importance of musical objects as a source of trust has already been hinted at. Mandal and Bergset (2016) mentioned that music can be useful in emotion-regulation, and that written songs can be used as containers for difficult experiences and feelings. The song-writing activity can be interpreted as a setting where norms and values make sharing and expressing thoughts easier, because we encounter music in our everyday lives that commonly contain stories or

descriptions, meaning that we are used to them carrying such information. It feels *appropriate* and ordinary to write song lyrics related to stories and experiences, because it is so typical in musical culture (Ruud, 1997). This doesn't mean that is necessarily *easy* to write songs. But such norms and values inherent in songs and song-writing can be a starting point for developing a relationship with the music therapist, assuming that the adolescent is motivated and interested in actually writing a song.

If repeated experiences of song-writing with the music therapist are successful, this leads to the development of new schemata related to the belief that songs are appropriate for expressing and regulating thoughts and feelings, and the development of specific relational schemata with the music therapist that favour expectations of trustworthiness. This is because through repeated interaction the actors can get to know one another and create specific knowledge structures containing information about the others' trustworthiness (Endress, 2002). This also relates to Kenny's (1989) "field of play", in which shared musical experiences can result in trust; the musical framing of the situation can make different actions and means of communication available (Rompf, 2014), and create a setting where a dialogue between the actors' musical identities can build trust.

The musical objects, which can also be instruments, can be used as something the adolescent can trust and use as support in interactions with others. They can symbolize something familiar in the situation, which can be used to reduce social uncertainty (Rompf, 2014). For example, by orientating the music therapy session around a guitar, the adolescent and music therapist interact specifically around the *guitar* as a topic. This provides a predictability in the content of the social interaction and trust relation, where meanings can be negotiated and explored, rooted in the guitar. For instance, the dyad can discuss how they *each* find the instrument important and interesting to them, as equal individuals who both invest personal resources in the relationship rather than a one-way therapist-client interaction where the therapist "knows" why the instrument should be important to the adolescent and tries to explain the meaning in the adolescent's relationship with the guitar. The instrument can be used as a setting where the actors' values and personalities can meet in dialogue and constitute the beginnings of a relational bond. As the sessions develop, the actors might start playing together and explore the dynamics of their particular relationship and musicalities. As such, their dyadic embeddedness situated around the guitar can be used to form and stabilize specific expectations regarding each other and promote the development of relational schemata and mutual attachment (Endress, 2002). The "guitar" in the above example can just as well be replaced with specific songs, or even non-musical interests.

4.4 Trust in redefining power structures

Concrete musical objects and settings can contain meaning which the adolescents can use as a resource in several ways (Ruud, 2013; Strandbu et al., 2016; Smetana, 2017). The musical objects or setting and their meaning can be shared and conveyed to others, such as in the performance of the music theatre (Strandbu et al., 2016), and be used to bridge networks, build relationships and develop identities challenge power structures. In the example of the music theatre, the adults and adolescents come together to create a collaboratively defined collective, in which the institutional structures are developed together. This means that the adolescents have power and can use their voice in dialogue with the other participants to help shape the setting to their needs and interests by collectively determining the goals, rules and social norms of the group. As these developed schemata of the music theatre are shared by participants, these institutional structures can be relied on when choosing to trust in the music theatre (Luhmann, 1979; Lindenberg, 1992). The participants can reach agreements on what is needed in order to reach the group's goals, and help motivate each other to act according to the agreements, which helps maintain the validity of the institutional structures and make institutional trust feasible. As the group and its structures (the schemata) become more familiar and known to the participants, trust has the potential to be routinely executed (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973). In other words, the participants have developed shared frames and scripts by socializing in the same setting, which involve shared values and goals. This can lead to the situation being defined as one where knowledge structures involving trust are easily accessible, and therefore are likely to be used to categorize situational cues in the setting (Higgins, 1996). This works mutually alongside the relational trust the participants can build towards one another through group interactions (Rompf, 2014). As the relationships develop through repeated interactions over time, the participants can move towards more affect- and identification-based trust (Lewicki et al. 2006).

Music therapy can also include actors from other parts of the adolescents' social network, such as relatives, friends and child welfare workers. As described earlier, these are actors that adolescents in child welfare sometimes experience difficult relationships with (Krüger 2012; Kayed et al. 2015). By inviting them to participate in the musical context, interactions between the actors can be framed differently than usual, rooted in the schemata related to the music therapy setting. This allows for strong trust relationships to increase their relationship bandwidth and richness (Lewicki et al., 1998), while strained relationships between actors can have a chance to be re-negotiated in a setting with new situational components that can potentially foster trust. If verbal communication has been challenging, a communication

through musical elements can allow for interests and experiences to be shared in a new light, potentially developing deeper understanding between the actors and laying the groundwork for trust to be built, as the actors can gain more knowledge about each other. If interactions are successful in the context of music therapy, this can help create new expectations of trustworthiness in regard to the other actors, which can be utilized to develop the relationship between the actors in different contexts (Rompf, 2014).

Similar to the generalized expectation proposed earlier where "all adults in the child welfare systems are untrustworthy based on previous experience", we can assume that an opposite expectation can be true as well. if the music therapy is part of a child welfare measure, we can consider that it can help build trust in the child welfare system. Positive experiences of trust in the music therapy setting has the potential to give the adolescents new stored knowledge regarding adults in the child welfare system. This can start with the music therapist, and extend to other adults which can be invited to take part in the music therapy in some manner, e.g. as equal participants or audience members. In the example of the music theatre, the presence of child welfare workers and other adults in the audience can symbolize a willingness to listen to and acknowledge the adolescent's voice, and an attempt to understand their life experiences. These might be sides of the adults which the adolescents have not subjectively experienced before, and can be indicative of their trustworthiness; "They *do* actually make an effort to understand me, they've come to listen to me and my performance!". Power can be shifted, where the adolescents are in the spotlight and share important messages to the child welfare workers. If the adults then follow-up on the adolescents expressed thoughts and feelings, engage in dialogue and take their perspective seriously, this can be used as a starting point to develop positive, respectful trust relations with new opportunities for relating.

4.5 Implications of understanding trust

Developing insights into how trust concretely can be built and relied on as a resource can help determine how to best use music therapy with the specific adolescent, and increase the likelihood of achieving goals. As trust can lead to openness, the adolescents might feel more comfortable sharing their voice, promoting dialogue. A deeper understanding of how musical objects can be a resource for trust can be useful for the adolescents outside of the music therapy sessions. Understanding trust can also promote opportunities to trust relationships with significant others' in the adolescents lives. It seems necessary however, for further research to actually ask adolescents about trust, and include them in defining the values of trust, since

general theorising can only go so far (Follesø, 2006) and, as I have argued, it is important for the child's voice to be heard.

I need to emphasize that trust does not *equal* participation in music therapy. Music therapy isn't always interesting or necessary for the adolescent, and the aim of music therapy should not be to build trust in order to *keep the adolescents in therapy for an indefinite amount of time*. It is important to help them realize their own strengths and resources and be able to navigate their own lives with confidence. And so, it is important for the music therapist to *trust the adolescents*, in that they know best when to leave therapy, for whatever reason. If a strong, trusting relationship has been developed then hopefully it will be possible to speak more openly to one another about such topics.

5.0 CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored trust in music therapy in child welfare, and presented a broad theoretical framework of trust as a means to do this. I have argued that trust can be built and used as a resource in many different ways, with implications to both the music therapy itself and the adolescents lives outside of music therapy. To conclude, I'll begin by revisiting the research questions and see how these can be answered based on the insights above.

1) *How has trust been understood in music therapy with adolescents?*

The music therapy literature presented has considered trust as a necessary component of music therapy, but has not necessarily explained how trust is concretely built. The importance of a trust relationship with the music therapist has been related to opening up possibilities for activities and interaction. Musical activities have been considered as a unique setting to build trust and interact with one another. It has also been argued that musical objects in themselves can provide a basis for trust, which the adolescents can use as a resource in social interactions and in dealing with difficult experiences.

The literature suggests that a clear, consistent and authentic presentation of the music therapist is conducive to building trust. It can give the impression of predictability and that the adolescents are taken seriously and genuinely listening to, promoting expectations of trustworthiness.

2) *How can trust as a mental phenomenon broadly be understood?*

Trust as a mental phenomenon can broadly be understood as multidisciplinary, with psychological, sociological and economic dimensions. By focusing on understanding the influence of interpretation and considering adaptive rationality a fundamental dimension of the trust concept, different types of trust from the research traditions can be understood and causally explained. In order to do this, the following definition of trust was used:

*"Trust is an actor's definition of the situation that involves the activation of mental schemata sufficient for the generation of a favorable expectation of trustworthiness and the subsequent conditional or unconditional choice of a trusting act." (*Rompf, 2014, p. 380)

Mental schemata are knowledge structures that contain past experiences of socialization and learning, which help the actor interpret, define and act in a situation. These can be applied

automatically if the situational cues match the stored knowledge, but may need to be considered rationally if the situation is unfamiliar and contains something the actor isn't used to.

3) *How can trust be built in music therapy in Norwegian child welfare?*

One way trust can be built in music therapy in child welfare through repeated collaborative interactions in a musical setting, where the actors are considered as equals and their voice and perspectives are respected and participation promoted. It is important that the music therapist is clear, consistent and authentic, as it provides adolescents with a sense of predictability that can be used as a starting point for a trust relation. Music therapy can provide situational cues relevant to knowledge structures associated with trust, such as by focusing on a shared interest in musical objects or providing unambiguous courses of action such as practicing instruments, reducing social uncertainty. In groups, trust can be built by the participants collaboratively deciding the institutional structure of the group, creating shared schemata related to group goals, values, roles and social norms. Institutional trust can be used as a starting point to develop trusting relational schema based on repeated interactions and shared interests, potentially leading to affect and identification-based trust. By inviting people from other parts of the adolescents' networks to take part in the music therapy, the musical setting can function as a new arena for the development of the trust relations between them. The context can influence how the actors interpret the social interaction, and help prevent automatic distrustful interpretations and judgments. By opening up for communication and dialogue, power-structures can be disputed, and create new trust opportunities with adults the adolescents have previously tended to distrust.

Study limitations

This thesis has only focused on a limited part of specific theoretical perspectives to music therapy with adolescents, meaning the findings are relatively specific and thus its validity in other approaches is unclear. Further, the selected literature and how it has been interpreted can be considered to have been influenced by my preunderstanding, meaning that other authors exploring the topic might reach different conclusions. My decision to use a broad, universal framework of the mental phenomena of trust can also be criticized, as I could have opted to define it more specifically following disciplinary borders which might have made it easier to understand specific points. Nevertheless, my hope is that by using such a definition the findings can provide unique insights and be comparable with findings in other trust research.

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