

Institutional Logics, Organizational Action, and Change in Zambian Public Accountability Organizations



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Abstract

Public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa have been perceived as schizophrenic and guided by incompatible ideas deriving from their local norms, colonial histories, and development paradigms, which is thought to constrain action and impede organizational change. This study analyzes these tensions using an institutional logics perspective in three case studies at public accountability organizations in Zambia: the Office of Auditor General, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the ombudsman office. Institutional logics are understood as the different sets of values, principles, practices, and social structures that can guide organizational and individual behavior. This study shows how alternative logics were introduced in the organizations, and it examines the relationships between the different logics and how they affect organizational action. The study also presents a case of change in one of the organizations, which came through a process of institutional entrepreneurship and the organization's engagement with a well-established international professional community.

The analyses and findings from this study, which are based on qualitative data that primarily come from interviews and documentary sources, contribute to theories and literature on institutional logics and development. It develops a typology of logics useful for research on public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it demonstrates how different types of relationships can exist between these logics, in which some relationships are complimentary and can facilitate organizational action, while others are competitive and can hinder organizational action. The study also contributes to our understanding of the materiality of logics by showing how a move between office buildings was a material expression and enabling condition for the enactment of a logic. Finally, the study contributes to theories on institutional entrepreneurship and change and engages in ongoing discussions about the paradox of embedded agency, as it shows how an institutional entrepreneur was drawn toward certain courses of action through her history of social positioning across organizations, which she then applied in her current leadership position where she drove a process of organizational change. By using theoretical perspectives normally found in research on organizations in the Global North, this study moves the literature further toward theorizing the contexts of public organizations in the Global South, while it also leads to a better understanding of organizational behavior more broadly.

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Chapter One: Introduction

There are a variety of ideas about how public organizations in the developing world (hereafter, *the Global South*) should work. These different ideas are related to the appropriate roles and forms of public organizations in their communities, the ways in which civil servants should behave and be evaluated, and the basic values and norms organizational actors should follow while carrying out their work. These different ideas often offer competing frameworks for organizational and individual behavior, and they can come from a variety of sources, such as donor and development communities, professional associations, the political elites, civil service cadres, and not least from the traditional and primordial social structures that have existed long before the formal modes of government that exist today (Ekeh, 1975; Hydén, 2012, 2013b). The result of the competing ideas and frameworks within organizations is that the organizations can often act in “schizophrenic” ways (Masunungure, 2004, p. 68), as these underlying norms, values, and practices can shift, leading to situations in which civil servants are not sure how to act since the appropriate courses of action can change depending on what is happening and which actors are involved at a given point in time (Hydén, 2013b).

These arguments can also be considered regarding public organizations in Zambia, which have had their own cultural heritages, historical trajectories, and administrative systems that have developed over time. As administrative reforms and other development projects have been introduced in Zambia in recent decades, their impact can be limited by the different sets of organizing principles, values, practices, and social structures that are guiding Zambian public organizations. This can lead to limited change in the ways that these organizations deliver goods and services, the transparency of their financial systems, and their interaction with members of the public. These limitations of reform and development, according to Andrews (2013), come from “stubborn contextual constraints” (p. 36) of conflicting norms, values, and practices within the organizations, which form “rule-like logics” (p. 47) that shape how organizational actors behave and limit opportunities for change (pp. 49-52).

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this study is to contribute to our understanding of how these multiple ideas interact within public organizations in Zambia and to what effect. It further develops our understandings of how they can co-exist in relationship to one another within an organizational context, and how those different types of arrangements can constrain change and development processes in some ways or how they can also enable them in other ways (Waldorff, Reay, & Goodrick, 2013). Theory on institutional logics will be useful in this regard, as institutional logics are understood as the sets of values, principles, and practices about how a social world should work and the social structures that constitute it. These institutional logics “operate, often implicitly, as practical guides for action” (Jones, Boxenbaum, & Anthony, 2013, p. 52), as they shape the way organizational actors understand their world, what they value as important, and how they plan to act.

In order to do this, this study develops a typology of institutional logics useful for research in Sub-Saharan Africa, which it uses to understand the contexts of Zambian public accountability organizations. It also builds on and develops theory about how those logics interact with one another within the organizational contexts as the actors within them enact the different logics. According to this theoretical perspective, this can lead to different mixes of multiple institutional logics within a single organization, which can impact action in various ways. This analysis leads to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics and relationships that exist between institutional logics and how those dynamics impact the way these public organizations and their members interact with the public, political leaders, and with each other. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, this study provides an understanding of how change can occur within these organizations, which it does through the case narrative of one of the organizations that has changed in significant ways as a result of institutional entrepreneurship and its engagement with the professional community. In these ways, this study contributes both to research on institutional logics as well as to development research, and it allows the analyses of this study to focus on “the micro-foundations of action” at the organizational level, which has often been overlooked within the institutional logics literature (Waldorff et al., 2013).

An Empirical Focus on Public Accountability Organizations

Some of the most significant entities in the development sphere are public accountability organizations. These are organizations that have multiple objectives, since they are seen to be the guardians of public resources, watchdogs over powerful government officials who might abuse their office and infringe on the rights of the public, and as safeguards for ensuring that donor funds are not misused by the receiving governments. Though the term “accountability” tends to be “chameleon-like” and ambiguous (Dubnick & Justice, 2004; Posner & Schwartz, 2011), one can argue that public accountability organizations exist to uphold normative moral standards of behavior by creating a social relationship and system through which individuals and/or collectives must render an account of their behavior (Dubnick & Justice, 2004). These types of organizations can be national and local audit offices, human rights institutions, ombudsman offices, or anti-corruption agencies, for example, since each of these types of organizations are thought to call public officials and public organizations to an account for their behavior and the ways in which they use public resources.

Accountability organizations often sit on the threshold between traditional public organizations that are part of centralized public service commissions and autonomous organizations, since they are semi-autonomous and have special protections spelled out for them within state laws and constitutions. These organizations might be located under state legislatures or given a status similar to that of high courts to help ensure their autonomy and their ability to be impartial in their work of holding government officials accountable. However, in many cases within the Global South, these institutions are often more connected to the executive branch of government than their counterparts in the Global North. Public accountability organizations in the Global South are likely to operate in unpredictable and inhospitable environments that have competing interests and multiple institutional logics, and each of these different logics likely espouse conflicting sets of principles and ideas about how these organizations should go about their work of holding public officials accountable.

Public accountability organizations in the Global South have a special task of protecting public as well as donor resources, and they are often seen as a check against governments and public officials who might abuse their authority and infringe on the human rights of the public or misappropriate or misuse public resources. Therefore, public accountability organizations have begun receiving significant attention from donors and attracting funds for capacity-building and development projects (Hydén, 2013b; OECD, 2008, 2013), as the very idea of accountability has risen to iconic status within the international community (Dubnick & Justice, 2004). Because of their international status and their mandates, public accountability organizations are in the public eye more than other organizations, and this is especially the case when media coverage and sensational news stories come out in which these organizations have uncovered cases of corruption, embezzlement, or abuse of power.

The Three Cases

The three empirical cases in this study are based on public accountability organizations in Zambia, in which there have been dynamic relationships between different institutional logics. The first case explains how changes among institutional logics have taken place within the Office of Auditor General Zambia. This case illustrates how change can occur in the relationships between institutional logics as well as how some relationships between the different logics can be complementary, with one logic facilitating the enactment of another logic. The second case focuses on the institutional logics within the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission, an organization that has been at the center of political power struggles over several decades. The commission has gone through a number of reforms in the laws that are meant to empower and protect it and changes in its organizational structure. Yet, it can be argued that the Anti-Corruption Commission has experienced very little change among the institutional logics that guide it, particularly as it relates to the issue of political independence. The third case looks at the Zambian ombudsman's office, which has recently begun processes of reform and organizational restructuring. These processes have introduced alternative institutional logics into the organization, and

there are ongoing power struggles over which institutional logics will become more influential in guiding the organization and which ones will lose their influence.

These three cases, taken together, use the institutional logics perspective as a lens to understand organizational context, and to examine ways in which these contexts can constrain or enable action and also how those contexts can be changed through agentic and structural processes. In that way, the cases demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of the institutional logics perspective and the typology that is introduced in Chapter Two. In addition, the cases lead to a richer and more detailed understanding of these processes within public accountability organizations, which are receiving a greater degree of interest and scrutiny in recent years. The institutional logics perspective provides a more nuanced look at how the independence and autonomy of these organizations is understood and practiced from within the different logics and how the micro-level enactments of the different logics impact action within these organizations. These cases also provide an actor-centric look at political power and show the important role of political support and political will for the independent operations of these organizations, a claim often made in academic and technical literature on accountability in development.

Research Questions

The study addresses three research questions to achieve its purpose of contributing to our understanding of the relationships between multiple institutional logics in public accountability organizations in Zambia:

1. What types of institutional logics provide sets of organizing principles, practices, and social structures that constitute the contexts of public accountability organizations in Zambia?
2. How do these institutional logics relate to one another within the three organizational contexts, and how does that affect organizational action?
3. How does change within these contexts occur?

The first question is answered, in part, by drawing on extant theory and data to develop a typology of institutional logics, which is presented in Chapter Two. The

typology was developed and further refined through the incoming empirical data as the research project was carried out in Zambia (Layder, 1998). The second research question uses the typology of logics to understand and explain the dynamics of how the different institutional logics relate to one another in the contexts of the three public accountability organizations in Zambia and the social impacts of the institutional logics and the relationships between them. Finally, the third research question also uses the typology as it draws from the analytic narratives of the cases to explain how change in the contexts can occur, and it does so paying close attention to the simultaneous interactions between structure and agency – not privileging either in their potential roles in change processes.

Theoretical Contributions and Relevance of the Study

By using an institutional logics perspective to understand the different organizing principles, practices, and structures that guide Zambian public accountability organizations, this study links to a vibrant and growing stream of research that has been used in a number of contexts (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017). The institutional logics perspective was first introduced by Friedland and Alford (1991) “as part of their attempt to emphasize the importance of social context” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 373). This perspective locates organizational and individual behavior within contexts that both regularize behavior as well as provide opportunities for change (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). These contexts are interinstitutional, since they are comprised of multiple logics, which at times can lead to problems when actors are confronted with contradictory courses of action based on different logics.

Research on development often discusses the institutional context of public organizations in the Global South and the diverging interests and competing frameworks that govern them (Ekeh, 1975; Evans, 2004; Hydén, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Masunungu, 2004). This can be seen as a mismatch between development reforms, which are often global in character, and the organizational context, which is necessarily local in character. Bergh (2012) argued that “decoupling is endemic” in the application of these reforms because they are “modelled on an external culture

whose elements may be inconsistent with local practices and requirements and cannot simply be imported wholesale as a fully functioning system” (p. 315). This runs parallel to Askvik’s (1993) contention that, “established Western management techniques may to a large extent contradict the traditional values systems of the developing countries, and hence they may frequently have consequences contrary to their intended purposes” (p. 162). These arguments point to what Evans (2004) has referred to as “institutional monocropping” and the wrongheaded presumption that the conditions of states in the Global South will improve if they simply follow the same path towards development as states from the Global North.

A recent book by Matt Andrews (2013), *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development*, examines these issues further from within institutional theory. It contributes to the field of development research by considering how dominant institutional logics that guide behavior in the governments of the Global South have a significant influence on the outcomes of reforms and development initiatives. The book argues that reform and development initiatives in the Global South often fail because they do not take local contexts into account and that these reforms are often only implemented in symbolic ways as signals to donors. As a result, governments in the Global South usually only change on the surface – not in the ways they actually function. Andrews’s book takes a novel approach to development research because of its use of new institutional theory as its underlying perspective for understanding problems and successes in development. Andrews (2013) described this approach as one that “draws from broader work in new institutional theory, applying ideas about institutional logics, isomorphism, institutional entrepreneurship, and decoupling. Such ideas... have yet to be applied prominently in the development domain”. (p. 3). This unique approach, according to some reviewers, “crosses boundaries” (Klitgaard, 2013, p. 408) and “offers a different—and refreshing—theoretical perspective” while also “offering novel ways to think about some of the most pressing policy issues” (de Renzio, 2013, p. 463).

Amidst all the praise, Christopher Pollitt (2013), in his review, also offered a critique of the book. He noted that “the theorization of context” needed to be more

extensively elaborated, and that future works could contribute toward that end.

According to Pollitt,

One small criticism of the book is that the theorization of context could have been taken a little further. Andrews assembles some promising components (normative and cultural-cognitive mechanisms, etc.) but does not push too far down the road of synthesizing them into a systematic approach. It may be that scholars from a number of sub-fields are now converging on ‘context’ as worthy of more focused attention... and that subsequent editions of Andrews’ book will be able to link up with those wider concerns (p. 585).

It should be noted that Andrews’s (2013) book did not avoid discussing “context”, as it sees it as important for development workers to take into account the contexts for which they are designing reform programs. For example, the book argued that reform designers commonly “overlook important aspects of context”, which “leads to cases of reforms not fitting into the targeted setting – because the setting is either not ripe for change or does not accommodate the change imposed on it” (Ibid, pp. 35-36), and it pointed to multiple cases of failed development efforts (and some successes), discussing them generally in terms of their institutional logics. However, the book did not provide a typology of institutional logics that could be used for conducting research in development contexts, nor did it use a single extant typology throughout it to examine the different cases. Instead, it applied a variety of typologies or dyads of competing logics throughout the book, such as the “anti-corruption logic” and “logic of corruption” to look at reforms in Malawi (Ibid, p. 54), and the “soft budget constraint logic” and “hard budget constraint logic” to look at budget reforms in Argentina (Ibid, p. 52).

If Andrews’s (2013b) book had provided a typology of logics and used it across the different cases it discussed, this would have potentially contributed further toward the theorization of context. Then, that typology could again be used in later research for systematically comparing empirical cases to a set of institutional logics that one would expect to find in governments and government organizations throughout the Global South (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 378; Layder, 1998). This would have “facilitate[ed] comparison to other studies” within the Global South and to further

elaboration of the theory (Reay & Jones, 2016, p. 443). The use of typologies allows research to “convey a more dynamic understanding of logics, in which actors can move between logics depending on the time and organizational issues” and “how actors drawing on different logics work together in the same organization” (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 64; see also Reay & Jones, 2016, p. 442).

In fairness, however, the task of developing a typology of logics lies outside the general premise of *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development* and its unique contributions to both theory and practice. The book moves development research forward in two significant ways. It does so first by discussing how reforms fail when reform designers do not take context into account and providing a framework that enables one to consider established and dominant logics that come into conflict with alternative logics introduced through reform projects. The book also contributed to development research by presenting a practical method for development in the South, which Andrews (2013) calls Problem Driven Iterative Adaption (PDIA). In the PDIA approach, reforms should be driven by local actors who perceive problems they want to address, they muddle through and try to resolve those problems, and then they adapt their responses by learning from their mistakes and improving upon them in their next iteration. Andrews demonstrated the application of the PDIA approach with empirical evidence within the second half of his book.

Conclusion

This study on public accountability organizations in Zambia contributes to the work of Andrews and others in development research by focusing on “the theorization of context”, to use Pollitt’s (2013, p. 585) words. It develops and presents a typology of logics that can be used in research on public accountability organizations in Zambia and more generally on public organizations within Sub-Saharan Africa. By applying the typology to the three empirical cases, it allows the study to examine more fine-grained processes of change and ways in which organizations and organization members navigated and enacted the different institutional logics within their organizational contexts. This advances the use of institutional logics as a theoretical perspective within development research as well as advancing this perspective more

broadly, as the institutional logics perspective has recently been criticized for being too narrow in its focus on organizations in the Global North and “organizations that in one way or another are associated with the market” (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 71). Therefore, by applying this perspective on public accountability organizations in Zambia, it extends the theoretical perspective to new contexts and advances our understanding of organizational behavior more generally.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Approach

This chapter provides a conceptual framework or a “clustering” of theoretical concepts (Layder, 1998, p. 159) for understanding the contexts of public accountability organizations in Zambia, how these contexts impact organizational action, and how they can change. The theoretical concepts presented in this chapter have helped to orient the research process, to depict and explain the different organizational phenomena under question, and ultimately to develop and elaborate theory. In the end, this contributes to a deeper theorization of the contexts of the public accountability organizations (Pollitt, 2013) and to a better understanding of the processes of reform and development in Zambia and throughout the region. This chapter, broadly titled, *Theoretical Approach*, first reviews the literature that has been helpful in this regard and that was foundational in this study’s contributions. Then, it presents the new typology of institutional logics that is used in the three case studies of Zambian public accountability organizations. Finally, it presents a set of behavioral concepts (Layder, 1998) and mechanisms (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) that explain how actors within the organizations enact the different logics found in the typology and how they are involved in changing their organizational contexts.

Institutional Logics: A Perspective within Institutional Theory

The institutional logics perspective is a stream of research located within a broader theory addressing organizational behavior, *institutional theory* (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008). The central quest of institutional theory, according to Johansen and Waldorff (2017), “has always been to understand organizational action as a social construct, bound by more than economic reasoning and rational strategic goals” (p. 52). According to this theory, organizations are also influenced by societal values and norms that may shift or be ambiguous, and organizations often act in non-rational ways (Ibid, p. 53). The history of institutional theory began with studies of organizations by Philip Selznick (1949, 1957) that located organizations within their broader environment (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) and the different sets of societal values that influenced them. These studies emphasized “the non-rational

dimensions of organizational behavior”, noting that organizations often have lives of their own apart from the intentions of the rational actors within them (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 53).

In the late 1970s and 1980s, institutional theory continued with its emphasis on the non-rational choices of organizational actors. However, it would then begin to focus on those choices and actions through a macro-level perspective, looking at how institutionalized myths and rules lead to isomorphism among the formal structures of organizations on a global scale (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). According to a seminal article by Meyer and Rowan (1977), organizations ceremonially adopt institutionalized rules and formal structures in order to attain legitimacy, but those organizations often decouple the formal structures and rules from their day-to-day operations. This allowed the technical core of an organization to continue operating in informal ways while the visible elements of the organization, such as its structures and formal policies, would conform to the institutionalized myths of their environment.

The notion of isomorphism would become a hallmark of institutional theory moving forward, as other researchers also used macro-level perspectives to explain how organizations were becoming more similar. For example, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that isomorphism occurs within organizational fields through coercive, normative, and mimetic mechanisms, leading, “in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture, and output” among organizations (p. 147). This stream of institutional theory eventually became known as “the new institutionalism” after DiMaggio and Powell (1991) coined the phrase to capture it as a “reaction to the behavioral revolution” (p. 2) and “a rejection of rationality as an explanation for organizational structure” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 100). An overarching characteristic of the new institutionalism was its emphasis on societal structures and culture as sources of organizational similarity, and as such, it became increasingly criticized for being too abstract and ignorant about issues of change, dissimilarity among organizations, and the effects of human agency.

It was in the midst of these criticisms that researchers began developing a new stream of institutional research that would later come to be called the institutional

logics perspective (Thornton et al., 2012). This was a response to the new institutionalism's focus on the socializing effects of institutions at the expense of a focus on human agency. In a 1991 essay, Friedland and Alford (1991) sought to bring the two foci together. They introduced their work as a path toward "understand[ing] individual and organizational behavior" by "locating it in a societal context", which could accommodate both the "utilitarian individual" and the "power-oriented organization" (Ibid, p. 232). According to this perspective, each institution in society has a central logic: "a set of material practices and symbolic constructions – which constitutes its organizational principles and which is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate" (Ibid, p. 248). This perspective shifted the focus of analysis away from isomorphism and towards the ways in which actors can draw on different institutional logics that provide meaning, motive, and identity and also how those actors can manipulate and elaborate on those different logics for their own advantage and to change social relations in society (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 101).

Friedland and Alford (1991) listed several institutions and their corresponding logics. The essay mentions, for example, the "central institutions of Western societies – capitalism, family, bureaucratic state, democracy, and Christianity" (Ibid, p. 249), and it also mentions other logics such as "the institutional logic of kinship" (p. 259) and of love (pp. 249-250). Notably, the burgeoning community of institutional logics researchers, which have mostly come from business schools (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 71), adopted and elaborated upon the five logics related to Western societies: capitalism, family, bureaucratic state, democracy, and Christianity (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012), and the variants of these five logics are often found in the literature today. However, the institutional logics of love and of kinship that were discussed by Friedland and Alford (1991) have not been further explored or elaborated in detail with the exception of Friedland's more recent works on the institutional logic of love (Friedland, 2013; Friedland, Mohr, Roose, & Gardinali, 2014).

Central to the institutional logics perspective is the notion of "embedded agency", which assumes "that the interests, identities, values, and assumptions of individuals and organizations are embedded within prevailing institutional logics.

Decisions and outcomes are a result of the interplay between individual agency and institutional structure” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 103). This notion of embedded agency distinguishes the institutional logics perspective from the two perspectives mentioned previously, and it attempts to find a middle ground between their two extremes: the rational choice extreme, in which actors are autonomous and make rational choices based primarily on their interests, and the macro structuralist extreme, in which “mindless” human action is guided by scripts and norms that are “taken for granted” (Hatch & Zilber, 2012, p. 95). This middle ground provided by the institutional logics perspective leaves room for agentive action, as actors elaborate, combine, or manipulate the “potentially contradictory” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 232) logics that exist in relationship to one another within “inter-institutional” contexts (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 104).

Institutional Logics and Development Administration

The recent book by Andrews (2013) was the first to use the institutional logics perspective to study development administration and reforms within the Global South, building on the notions of embedded agency and inter-institutional contexts discussed above. Andrews (2013) argued that development and reform initiatives often fail to meet their objectives in the South because reform designers do not understand how the institutional contexts of those societies limit and undermine the contents of their reforms. Andrews’s study uses the institutional logics perspective as a way of understanding the contexts of these public administrations and their stubbornness to change. To do that, “[i]t introduces the idea of ‘inter-institutional’ contexts in which multiple institutional logics interact to shape the potential for change” (Ibid, p. 36). According to Andrews (2013), the administrative contexts into which reforms are introduced are comprised of multiple institutional logics that affect the outcomes of those programs. Some logics can be more dominant than others, having long been embedded within society and making it more difficult for change to occur. There may also be alternative logics that compete against those dominant logics. A significant change would occur, according to Andrews (2013), if there was a “logic shift” through

which the previously dominant logic weakened and the competing alternative logic became stronger (p. 51).

This view of institutional logics, as a way of understanding and explaining social context, places Andrews's (2013) perspective squarely within the field of institutional logics research. As Thornton and Ocasio (2008) argued, this is a core aspect of the theory: to understand individual and organizational behavior by locating it within its societal and institutional context, and to understand how the inter-institutional system guides behavior and shapes action, while it also provides opportunities for change through individual and collective agency. Thornton and Ocasio (2008) contend that institutional logics provide the social categorizations, classifications, and shared identities that shape organizational and individual action, yet organizations and individuals can also change institutional contexts occurs through entrepreneurial action as competing logics become more influential within an organizational context through various means (Ibid, pp. 115-117).

As a way to illustrate the view of institutional contexts as interactions between multiple logics, Andrews (2013) presented a case of anti-corruption reforms in Malawi. The context in Malawi was already dominated by the values and norms of "unchallenged patrimonialism" and "corruption... that deemed it appropriate and expected to provide for one's kin – and extended kin – from the resources gained from office" (Ibid, p. 46). Furthermore, the constitution of Malawi at that time gave unchecked power to the president, which "formalized the informal authority granted him" (Ibid, 46). According to Andrews (2013), it was those values, norms, and laws that comprised an "anti-corruption logic", which "shaped how agents understood their world, what they deemed appropriate, what they were willing to enforce, and how they planned to do so" (p. 47). The logic of corruption was dominant within the Malawi context, but at the same time, there was also a competing logic of anti-corruption, which was based on the values of democracy, transparency, and strong control of corruption. These values were reflected within Malawi society through various means, such as popular music, NGO activities, and formal regulations of the civil service against corrupt behavior. However, according to Andrews (2013), their influence was limited, because the logic of corruption had become dominant in the society and

ingrained in the behavior of individuals and because the authoritarian rule of the president was unquestionable (p. 49).

Even after a string of dramatic political events occurred and reforms were enacted in the 1990s, the logic of corruption continued to remain dominant in Malawi. A new president was elected through multi-party elections in 1994, a new anti-corruption law was passed in 1995, and an Anti-Corruption Bureau was established to control corruption. Yet, these did not lead to a shift in the dominant logic, and this became evident when a major scandal erupted in 2000 and the newly elected president was implicated among other officials in the theft of millions of US dollars. As it turned out, the new Anti-Corruption Bureau that had been established was being perpetually underfunded and not given adequate power and autonomy. Plus, the new anti-corruption laws were simply being ignored, and the president's authoritarian power continued to go unchecked. Therefore, the logic of corruption continued to remain dominant in Malawi society and prevented the alternative logic of anti-corruption from becoming legitimate in the eyes of locals and government officials.

Types and Institutional Logics: Extant Literature

Research on institutional logics often use typologies of logics as a systematic way of viewing the inter-institutional system. This helps order data collection and theorizing since the ideal types serve as stable points that “facilitate systematic comparison of empirical variation” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 378). Typologies are classifications based on ideal types with exaggerated features that may be found in empirical reality. Typologies of institutional logics are comprised of what could be considered the typical features that are internally consistent within those logics, which Johansen and Waldorff (2017) “call the ‘vertical relationships’ internal to the institutional logics and their more detailed compositions” (p. 60). According to Layder (1998), developing and using typologies in social research “is a very useful means by which the theoretical imagination is fired” and “has the advantage of ordering one’s observations and analyses” by asking how phenomena are similar or different from others (p. 73).

Studies on institutional logics can derive their ideal types of logics in different ways depending on their area of focus, their research questions, and their methodological approach for answering them. Reay and Jones (2016) elaborated on some of the different approaches that have been used in extant research. They noted that some studies use inductive approaches to develop their ideal types, and that these studies are grounded in empirical data coming from interviews, texts, and observations. The data are then categorized and developed into a set of different institutional logics that exist in relationship to one another in a particular social context. In these studies, “researchers must immerse themselves in the data, examining and categorizing text segments to reveal the underlying meanings and thus identify patterns of behaviors and beliefs” (Ibid, p. 449). Other studies, according to Reay and Jones (2016), begin with “the established literature” to develop a typology of logics (p. 447). Thus, “they privilege theory and prior research” and they use a set of ideal types to avoid getting bogged down in the empirical data and to interpret meaning within the organizational or social contexts they are studying (Ibid, p. 447). Finally, Reay and Jones also noted that studies of institutional logics likely involve a combination of different techniques and “cycle between inductive and deductive approaches” (Ibid, p. 442). Thus, it is important not to limit oneself strictly to inductive or deductive approaches when conducting institutional logics research, as this would limit theoretical development (Layder, 1998).

The following subsections present typologies from extant research that are useful for understanding organizational and societal contexts. They give an idea of how typologies are developed and used in research, and as will also be seen, they contribute toward the development of the typology created in this study on accountability organizations in Zambia. The first subsection presents a study of different logics in Bolivian microfinance agencies, which, even though it is not focused on public organizations, it is still a useful example of types of institutional logics used in development research in the Global South. The next subsection presents a typology that was used for research on public organizations in Austria, which in spite of its geographical location far from Zambia, still contributes to this study, especially as it relates to the vertical relationships internal to the logics one might expect to find

in public organizations. The final subsection presents a typology of administrative models in Africa from Goran Hydén (2012). Although Hyden's types are not explicitly called institutional logics, they are comprised of similar categories and vertical relationships inherent in institutional logics, and, more significantly, they contribute insight into the conflicting values, norms, and practices likely to be found within public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa. For that reason, they have contributed to the typology of institutional logics in this study of public accountability organizations in Zambia.

Development and Banking Logics in Bolivian Micro-Finance

Battilana and Dorado (2010) contributed one of the few works of research that uses an institutional logics perspective in the Global South. Their study is focused on two microfinance organizations in Bolivia and the different strategies those organizations employed to manage the tensions between their fiduciary responsibilities as banks and their social responsibility to help the poor. Their study contributes to the way we can understand hybrid organizations, particularly in the newly emerging field of microfinance. It showed how different institutional logics offered competing goals, management principles, and ways of viewing loan recipients. The authors identified two competing logics through an inductive approach, which were a development logic that focused the attention of organization members on helping the poor and vulnerable, and a banking logic that focused organization members on making enough profits to support the organization and meet obligations to investors and depositors. Battilana and Dorado (2010) found that in order for these new types of organizations to work, they would need to develop a hybrid logic combining the development and banking logics in a sustainable way.

The development logic (see typology in Appendix A) was focused on "Development and poverty alleviation", while the banking logic was focused on "Deriving a rent and profit" (Ibid, 1423). The logics also shaped the way organization members viewed the recipients of the microloans. According to the development logic, they saw the "target population" as "Clients and beneficiaries... seen as more or less deserving of support", while according to the banking logic, organization

members saw them as “customers... more or less risky sources of income” (Ibid, 1423). These logics were also seen in the management principles and practices within the organization. According to the development logic, the management principles were “Maximizing the impact of donor funds on development and poverty alleviation”, while the principles of the banking logic were “Maximizing profit while fulfilling fiduciary obligations not only to investors but also depositories” (Ibid, 1423).

The two microfinance organizations used different strategies to create the hybrid microfinance organizations and balance between the two competing logics. The first set of strategies was related to employment processes: hiring a mix of employees with different job experiences in banking and social work or hiring young employees with little or no work experience to be trained on the job. The second set of strategies was related to the socialization of the employees, which took place through training programs, performance-based incentives, and evaluations for promotions within the organization. The authors contend that these strategies helped foster a common organizational identity based on both logics, which was critical to sustaining the hybrid organizations. The study contributes to the way we understand the creation of hybrid organizations and the organizational actors’ strategies in the midst of these new arrangements. It also contributed one of the few studies in the Global South that used an institutional logics perspective. It explained how these organizational contexts had innate tensions resulting from the different values and practices of a development logic that is based on empowering the disempowered and a banking logic based on market principles.

Administrative Logics in the Austrian Civil Service

One study from the Global North by Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a, 2006b) focused on the Austrian civil service and used a typology of two competing logics – a legalistic-bureaucratic logic and a managerial logic (see typology in Appendix B), which they consider “globally available constructs” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, p. 1002). The legalistic-bureaucratic logic, is part of a tradition of European-style professional bureaucracy “characterized by a strong emphasis on processes, rules, and... impartiality toward sovereign and citizen...

drawing on distinctive bodies of knowledge... but especially tied to the legal profession itself” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, pp. 1002-1003). The managerial logic is based on market principles, which are seen by some as a way to make government organizations more responsive and to serve their citizens more efficiently and effectively. This form of managerialism has often been promoted under a program of New Public Management (NPM) and can even be seen as part of “a global wave of administrative reforms” within the public sector (Christensen & Læg Reid, 2011, p. 1).

Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a) looked at “identity work” among civil servants and executives and contended that their identities “change with the logics that shape them” (p. 1001). Under this view, identity is flexible and contingent, and as such it is socially constructed “from the productive power of discourse” (Maguire, Phillips, & Hardy, 2001, p. 304). This construction of identity, according to Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a) “is thus the micro-level enactment of social structure” or a translation of global categories on the local level (p. 1001). In order to link civil servants with identities and logics, Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a, 2006b) studied the vocabularies used by civil service executives, which linked them with certain identities and the logics that sponsor those identities in a similar way to Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) who contended that “institutional vocabularies... are the primary means by which institutional logics are articulated and manipulated” (p. 43) and “that the respective vocabularies would contain different role identities” (p. 44). Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b) argued that, “at the level of the discursive field... the vocabularies and accounts used give evidence of the prevalence of the different logics and manifest the specific local versions or translations of the global trends” (p. 100).

Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a/b) contributed two significant findings from their studies. First, they found that, within the civil service in Austria, there are local translations of global trends, as “actors pick elements of a logic, thus giving the global concept a local flavor” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b, p. 112). Second, they found that there were only minor changes within the civil service related to these logics. So, even though the authors found a blend of logics and identities that formed what they called a “hybrid”, they found that actors only identified with the managerial logic and

its values to a small extent and only “on an instrumental level, which does not necessarily entail a new governance mode” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, p. 1013). Thus, they found that the legalistic-bureaucratic logic continued to be the dominant institutional logic within the Austrian civil service and the main source of “belief systems... goals and values” that guided the civil servants’ actions and provided their frames of reference in spite of global trends toward managerialism and reform in human resource policies and civil service laws (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b, p. 99). Finally, the typology from the Austrian study contributes to the current study on accountability organizations in Zambia by demonstrating categories that can be applied in public organizations. For example, it demonstrated how employment status can be based on the different institutional logics, and it also presents categories for analyzing where organization members focus their attention, the values that guide their actions, and the systems of control and authority within the organization.

Models of Administration in Africa

A third typology that contributes to this study (Appendix C) comes from work by Goran Hydén (2012, 2013a, 2013b), who has spent much of his life’s work theorizing about and studying the contexts of government administrations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although Hyden’s studies do not approach these phenomena from an institutional logics perspective, they do look at the competing interests and competing “models of administration” within African contexts (Hydén, 2012). Hydén (2013b) noted the importance of considering the historical development of administrative legacies and “the conflicts that exist between norms that are indigenous to African societies, those that were introduced by the colonial powers, and the contemporary reform agenda with its inspiration from New Public Management” (p. 922). Therefore, most states in Sub-Saharan Africa have relied on transplanted administrative systems, which have been shaped by colonial regimes and, more recently, by development programs of Northern donors.

Hydén (2012) contends that the problems with reform and development programs in the Global South come from tensions between these three models, in which civil servants are pulled in three competing directions based on their

relationships with different actors. The first model, patrimonialism, is based on a system of social interaction that flows from a personal form of rule or leadership, through which powerful leaders grant favors to people in exchange for their loyalty and fealty. Although patrimonialism is commonly associated with African governments because of its barefaced prevalence there, it is also found in social relations all over the world wherever there are patron-client relationships (Jackall, 2010). The colonial model is based on the rule of law and a hierarchical division of labor, which was based roughly on administrative systems in Europe. It arose in Europe as a response to, and a replacement of patrimonial rule with its fiefdoms, patronage, and fealty. This model of administration was later transplanted to Africa in the 20th Century when most African administrations were directed by foreign powers in an effort to control and extract from their colonies (Hydén, 2012, 2013a, 2013b).

The third model, New Public Management, can be considered a more recent phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa. It too is a transplant, but instead of coming from colonial powers, it comes from donor organizations and initiatives and through consulting firms. It is based on principles of the market and business trends, it tends to take flatter and more team-based approaches for organizing, and it has a flexible and open career system. The New Public Management model emphasizes measurable results, which lend themselves to donor goals and objectives and the more short-term nature of donor-driven projects. Therefore, donor organizations and consultancies often push African client governments to adopt elements of the New Public Management model through reform and development programs and with the enticements of donor funding (Ibid).

Hydén (2013b) noted that these three models of administration are combined in public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and he used the term, “triangular hold” to describe the tensions and the effects that the three models have on African civil servants (Hydén, 2012, p. 606). The tensions between the models produce “a hybrid administrative reality where norms shift and it is difficult to know which one is decisive where and when” (Hyden, 2013b, p. 930). There are similarities between Hyden’s typology of three models and the Meyer and Hammerschmid’s typology based on the Austrian civil service. Hyden’s typology and, in particular, the first type

of patrimonialism, compliments the legalistic-bureaucratic logic and managerial logic from the Austrian study by providing additional concepts that account for local organizing principles, practices, and structures that have been institutionalized over time.

Hydén (2013a) also discussed another concept that he called the economy of affection, which is based on communal relationships and revolves around three core principles: “whom you know is more important than what you know, sharing personal wealth is more rewarding than investing in economic ventures, and a helping hand today generates a return tomorrow” (p. 74). Though it is called an “economy”, it is not based on capital, but rather an “informal political economy” (Ibid, p. 74) in which actors “share expectations about what is appropriate behavior: that is, reciprocity in all exchanges, even if this does not mean giving back exactly what one received, or responding within a specified time” (Ibid, p. 87). While Lemarchand (1989) critiqued the economy of affection, arguing it was too broad and difficult to falsify theoretically, other researchers, such as Masunungure (2004) have used it to conceptualize tendencies within African civil service that run counter to professionalism and create tensions within organization. Masununguru used the metaphor of “schizophrenia” to describe the African public official who must constantly balance the demands of the economy of affection and the formal public service.

These concepts from Hydén (2012, 2013a, 2013b) offer a valuable perspective from development research to the typology of logics from Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b) and other concepts from the Global North. They offer elements of an institutional logic that can reflect the long-standing norms, values, and social structures of the local society in the Sub-Saharan region and within Zambia. These informal norms and social structures may stand in conflict or be subversive of the more formalized norms and structures of a state bureaucracy (Friedland & Alford, 1991, pp. 258-259). The following section describes the development of a new typology for understanding the context of public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa. It takes into account the contributions from Hyden and other studies on administrations in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as literature on institutional logics, public organizations, and the professions.

Developing a Typology of Logics for Studies in Zambia and Sub-Saharan Africa

The typology used in this study and presented in this section was derived primarily from extant literature in conjunction with data collection in Zambia. It is based on typologies that were presented in the previous sections as well as other concepts, models, and insights from other literature in the fields of development (e.g., Andrews, 2013; Cooke, 2001, 2004; Ekeh, 1975; Grindle, 1997; Gustavson, 2014; Hydén, 2012, 2013b; Masunungure, 2004; Thomas, 1996, 1999), institutional logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, 2006b; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Thornton, 2004; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012; Waldorff et al., 2013), and organization theory (e.g., Freidson, 2001; Mintzberg, 1989). The extant literature was selected to determine what ideal typical institutional logics may be at play when it comes to development work and administrative reform in Zambia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The development of the typology began with extant literature, but it has also been iterative, moving between the previous conceptualizations and observational and interview data that were collected from the field in the three public accountability organizations in Zambia. This process of iteration comes from a view of theory as “adaptive”, following the adaptive theory approach by Derek Layder (1998). Layder’s approach views theory metaphorically as a “scaffold” that pre-exists data collection and is a durable construction (Ibid, p. 150). Yet, just as a construction scaffold can adapt and be reconfigured to fit different locations, so can theoretical constructs be reflexively adapted to understand new empirical data. The “raw materials” (Ibid, pp. 163-166) of adaptive theory come from four types of sources (see following table): general theory (e.g., institutional logics as societal level structures guiding action), substantive theory (e.g., more focused research on development, professions, public organizations, typologies of logics), extant data (previous findings from research on Zambian public organizations), and emergent research data (i.e., data collected in this study of public accountability organizations in Zambia).

Sources of adaptive theory

<i>Theoretical</i>	General Theory
	Substantive Theory
<i>Empirical</i>	Extant Data
	Emergent Research Data

(Layder, 1998, p. 163)

To Layder, the dual approach of using theory and data in “dialectical interplay” is that “prior concepts and theory both shape and inform the analysis of data which emanates from the ongoing research at the same time that the emergent data itself shapes and moulds the existing theoretical materials” (Ibid, p. 166). Through the use of theory and data in dialectal interplay, Layder attempts to find a middle ground between inductive studies that are grounded in empirical observations that lead to new theory and deductive studies that begin with theory, which is in turn tested through empirical observations. To Layder, the adaptive approach can include elements of both deductive and inductive procedures, echoing the position by Reay and Jones (2016, p. 442) mentioned previously, about how researchers often cycle between inductive and deductive procedures, and that the resulting typology contributes new theory and insight into the empirical area of interest (Layder, 1998, p. 171).

Therefore, when field work for this research project in Zambia began in 2014, there were already some preliminary concepts and types that could be used for organizing and understanding the data. These were derived, generally, from the two types of civil service logics from Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b) and the models of administration in Sub-Saharan Africa from Hydén (2012, 2013b) and his concept of *the economy of affection* (Hydén, 2013a). This provided an initial scaffolding of theory, presenting three preliminary types of logics that might be found in the three organizations: a kinship or patrimonial logic, a bureaucratic logic, and a managerial logic. This preliminary theoretical scaffold is presented in Appendix D as a rough working typology for early fieldwork, with footnotes corresponding texts from which the different concepts were derived. This rough typology was developed prior to the

first trip to Zambia in 2014, with the intention of developing it further after conducting the first observations and interviews in Zambia at the Office of Auditor General. It is included in Appendix D as a way of showing the iterative process, particularly early on in the process of developing theory adaptively (Layder, 1998).

While collecting data through interviews, observations, and extant documentary and academic literature sources, it was possible to re-evaluate the preliminary typology. It became evident that some of the practices or values espoused within the public accountability organizations went beyond typical norms and practices of efficiency and public service found in the new public management or managerialism logic (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b). For example, interview respondents discussed outreach and service to members of the public, particularly those who were poor and marginalized and who would normally have no access to systems of governance or democratic accountability, which went beyond the patterns of practices and principles of the managerialism logic and the other types from the preliminary typology. A return to the literature then led to the theoretical concept of “development management”, which is a well-established discourse within international development and reform in the Global South (Cooke, 2001). Within the development management discourse are normative notions about how public organizations in the South empower the poor and the disadvantaged and how modern managerial practices and techniques can help move developing societies towards modernization (Brinkerhoff & Coston, 1999; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2010). These notions seemed to be a better representation of the typical features likely to be found within public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa and Zambia than managerialism alone. Therefore, instead of the more general types of managerialism or new public management, a more contextually relevant and specific type, the development management logic, was developed further and used in the three case studies.

Another issue that became evident was that professionalism would need to somehow be addressed and analyzed. Interview respondents spoke in terms of professionalization processes and practices and the organizational effects those processes were having in their organization. Furthermore, extant data and literature on public organizations in Zambia also mentioned the effects of the “erosion of

professionalism” in the early days of the Zambian civil service (Mulikita, 2002, p. 2) and the compounding effects of that erosion of professional values and skills that are still being felt in the civil service today (Mpaisha, 2004). In that way, professionalism can be seen as having been divorced from the bureaucracy in the Zambian context. In addition, there was also a basis in the development literature on the analytical value of considering professionalism when studying development in the Global South (Hildebrand & Grindle, 1997) and public accountability organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa (Gustavson, 2014). Therefore, it seemed reasonable that a fourth logic should be developed based on “professionalism” as its core organizing principles. This was a departure from the typology from Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b), which implied that professionalism is an innate characteristic of the bureaucracy. That may have been the case in Austria, but in Zambia where bureaucracy had existed for many years devoid of professionalism, this did not seem to be the case. Furthermore, literature on the professions (Freidson, 2001) and organizations (Mintzberg, 1979, 1989) have also made an analytical distinction between bureaucracy and professionalism as a way of understanding professional organizations and their members, texts which would come to inform the development of the fourth logic in this typology, the professionalism logic.

The iterative processes between substantive and general theories as well as emergent and extant data resulted in a new typology of four institutional logics, which can be used for analyzing public organizations in Zambia and across the region. In that way, this process follows Layder’s (1998) approach to developing a typology:

The development of this typology subsequently becomes the centrepiece of the adaptive theory, which then feeds into the data collection... So that while the typology itself is shaped and modified by the extant theoretical materials and the incoming research data, the unfolding adaptive theory (the typology and related concepts) simultaneously shapes, modifies and orders the data and the extant materials...The typology that begins to shape up in this way becomes an addition and partly autonomous theoretical product (new theory) as well as providing new theoretical insights into the substantive area of [research] (Ibid, p. 171, parentheses in original).

After the typology had been substantially revised and developed during early fieldwork at the Office of Auditor General, it was used to compare to the data being collected in all three cases, which was also a useful means of assessing its validity since the types needed to fit the incoming data and have a capacity to explain social reality (Layder, 1998, pp. 85-97, in particular pp. 85-86, 91-92). The typology and the four ideal types are presented below, and descriptions of the specific dimensions and elements that make up the “‘vertical relationships’ internal to the institutional logics” (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 60) are presented in detail in subsequent sections.

Kinship Logic

The first ideal type, kinship logic, is inspired by the original conception from Friedland and Alford (1991), in which an informal logic based on gift-giving and mutual obligations between individuals is used to “subvert the logic of other institutions” (p. 258). The formulation of the kinship logic in this study also draws extensively from Goran Hyden’s work on the economy of affection, and as such, it is based on a communitarian and relational approach to life in Sub-Saharan Africa. This way of life is “primordial”, according to Ekeh (1975), Hydén (2013a), and Masunungure (2004), in that it predates colonialism and is often divided along ancient kinship lines, and through which, actors “share expectations about what is appropriate behavior: that is, reciprocity in all exchanges” (Hydén, 2013a, p. 87). Roberts’s (1976) history of Zambia discussed these types of reciprocal exchanges in ancient tribal relations in Zambia, that it “was one of the most important means of circulating scarce commodities such as salt, iron-work, or foreign cloth” at that time (p. 81). These types of informal exchanges also ensured the loyalty of tribe members to their chiefs by rewarding loyal tribe members with the material and cultural resources necessary for their existence.

Masunungure (2004) contended that one of the central problems facing African public administration today is the tension that exists between this informal and primordial way of getting things done and the more abstract civic professionalism within government administrations. This is because within the kinship logic there is no distinction between private and state resources. Thus, state resources may be

distributed as favors in exchange for fealty, and patrimonialism is practiced and tolerated under a kinship logic. Patrimonialism is a system of social interaction in which powerful leaders grant favors to people in exchange for their loyalty, and it flows from a personal form of rule or leadership. Weber (1978, as cited in Hydén, 2013a) noted, “the patrimonial office lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the ‘private’ and the ‘official’ sphere” and is there to serve the ruler and the official – not civil society (p. 98). Patrimonialism is commonly associated with African governments because of its barefaced prevalence there, but it is also found in social relations wherever there are patron-client relationships (Jackall, 2010).

The kinship logic has its own basis of rationality in the sense that it “presupposes personal interdependence” between members across all levels of society (Hydén, 2013a, p. 86). As Friedland and Alford (1991) described this interdependence, “Through gifts, the lower status persons take possession of powerful persons whose substance they have penetrated with their own... Individuals make use of the institutional logic of kinship to penetrate the state definitions of needs and social categories” (p. 259). In this way it can subvert the professional and bureaucratic logics and their ways of determining what is appropriate and the ways in which they serve the public, and it can be used to get things done outside of those logics. This can be commonly seen in practices such as payouts or bribes, the hiring or promoting of civil servants based on tribal affiliation, or the granting other types of benefits based on interpersonal relationships or exchanges of favors as opposed to being based on formal operating procedures.

Bureaucratic Logic

The second ideal type, bureaucratic logic, is based on the hierarchical division of labor in a standardized and stable work environment. If a public organization is run according to a bureaucratic logic, the career system would be fixed and closed with promotions based on seniority, and public services would be delivered in a regulated fashion, without the requirements of bribes or payouts. Bureaucratic organizing principles arose over time in Europe as a response to patrimonial rule with its fiefdoms, patronage, and fealty (Hydén, 2013a) and as a means of standardizing

industrial labor (Freidson, 2001). An organization guided by a bureaucratic logic would be “characterized by a strong emphasis on processes, rules, and... impartiality” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, pp. 1002-1003). This can be seen as “traditional bureaucracy” with “rigid rule orientation and a programming of all activities” rather than a more “modern” and professional bureaucracy (Askvik, 1993, p. 158) as was reflected in the typology for Austrian public organizations by Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b).

As Hydén (2012, 2013a, 2013b) noted in his typology of administrative models, bureaucracy is a product of transplantation from Europe in the 20th century, when much of Africa was colonized by European powers who set up administrative systems for collecting taxes, organizing industry, and controlling the native populations. Many Africans have understandably looked upon this set of ideas with skepticism. However, bureaucratic ideas, practices, and structures still can be seen on the continent, at least on the surface, in public organizations today (Ibid).

Development Management Logic

The third ideal type, development management logic, is based on private sector approaches to development processes. It has much in common with the managerial trends in public organizations of the Global North, such as managerialism and the new public management, but it is centered around development and the empowerment of the poor and disempowered members of society in the Global South. Development management is a value-laden term and is contested in research literature (Bawole, Hossain, Ghalib, Rees, & Mamman, 2016). In its logically pure form, development management assumes the claim that governments in the Global South “have yet to achieve modernity, which is why they are deemed to need ‘development’” in the first place (Cooke, 2004, p. 604). It also assumes the claim that management is a neutral technocratic instrument rather than an instrument of political power. Much as Thomas (1996, 1999) argued in his pioneering work on development management, this study takes the concept of development management at “face value” (Cooke, 2001, p. 13) for the purpose of developing an ideal type that can be used for making comparisons with the empirical data. As such, the statement by Thomas (1999) holds true:

“Development management will often remain the ideal rather than a description of what actually takes place” since what takes place in reality is “more ambiguous, with value-based conflicts, contestation over the definition of development itself, and power struggles” (p. 17).

In a development management logic, the mission of the organization is centered around the empowerment of society and its marginalized groups. According to Brinkerhoff and Coston (1999), “development management takes a normative stance on empowerment and supporting groups, particularly the poor and marginalized, to take an active role in determining and fulfilling their own needs” (p. 350). This, again, makes the development management logic distinct from managerialism more generally because of its normative emphasis on promoting societal empowerment and good governance for the citizenry, particularly for the disempowered and vulnerable. This normative distinction is kept intact for this typology even as recent research from a critical management perspective has debated whether or not development management is “simply another colonizing discourse... governed by an institutionalized managerial logic” and used as a form of oppression (Gulrajani, 2010, p. 140).

The development management logic’s values and practices are centered on “results” – bringing measurable results for all members of society with efficiency and effectiveness, and in particular, those who are poor and disenfranchised. It approaches organizing with flatter and more team-based approaches, and it has a flexible and open career system. The principles and practices found in the development management are more recent arrivals to Africa, according to Hydén (2013b, p. 923). These types of ideas lend themselves to donor goals and objectives and the more short-term nature of donor-driven projects. Therefore, donor organizations and consultancies tend to promote elements of development management as part of reform and development initiatives in the Global South.

Professionalism Logic

Finally, it is useful to consider a fourth ideal type, the professionalism logic, in order to gain a better understanding of public organizations in Zambia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Some development researchers (Grindle & Hilderbrand, 1995;

Gustavson, 2014) have been calling for greater attention to the role of professionals and professionalism in development processes. They contend that professional identity, ethics, and skill sets can have a positive impact on reform and development efforts in the region. Particularly in a country like Zambia, which saw a steep decline in professionalism during the early days of independence and Zambianization of the civil service (Mulikita, 2002) due to the severe lack of education among Zambian nationals. This indicates a context in which the professionalism logic was either nonexistent or at least not very influential and a bureaucracy that was virtually bereft of professionalism.

Within the professionalism logic, special emphasis is placed on education and training within an occupational specialty, and a professional ethic is assumed to eclipse other motivations when it comes to doing one's specialized job or delivering a professional service. For example, a professional accountant is assumed to not cheat when producing financial data, even when there is an opportunity for financial gain by doing so. Thus, it is thought to add an additional layer of accountability to members of public organizations in the Global South, which would help ensure more effective delivery of public service.

According to Freidson (2001), a professionalism logic would be characterized by control and coordination from within the profession by fellow professionals, as opposed to by organizational executives and management. Within this logic, occupational roles are to be stable and fixed, offering freedom to professionals to assume those same roles across different organizations within the same professional field. Formal and abstract knowledge are hallmarks of the professionalism logic, and this specialized knowledge is a key source for a sense of occupational identification and pride common among professionals (Freidson, 2001; Lamont & Molnár, 2002). The profession sets standards for labor market entry with particular training and credentials being required to enter the labor market. A typical career line within a professionalism logic would be horizontal, with the ability to easily move across firms – thus a professional's allegiance lies more with the profession than with the employer.

Dimensions of Institutional Logics

When studying logics, it is useful to specify the sets of dimensions that comprise them, as it enables researchers to analyze how “actors handle different logics across identified characteristics” (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 61). According to Campbell (2004), there are three considerations for specifying these types of institutional dimensions: theoretical perspective, local salience, and the levels to be studied (pp. 37-38). The first consideration is the analyst’s theoretical perspective, which broadly organizes a range of dimensions to be examined. In this study, it is the combination of institutional and development theories that have informed the specification of dimensions to be studied. In an institutional logics perspective, each institutional logic is a typification that can be broken down into multiple dimensions such as values, practices, and principles. Development theories, among other contributions, explain how informal local administrative systems may deviate from or even undermine formalized administrative systems or perspectives of the Global North.

The second consideration for specifying institutional dimensions is salience. Instead of researchers imposing their own categories on the phenomena they observe, they should allow room for input from relevant stakeholders about what is important within their own social worlds, which in this research project are the practitioners of development in Zambia and organization members in each of the cases. Beyond ensuring that the research will be useful to practitioners, it also ensures the research can adequately reflect empirical reality. “In other words, when selecting the dimensions of institutions that we think are important, we should try to ensure they are salient for the people who actually live in them” (Campbell, 2004, p. 38). Through research trips to Lusaka and in the early interviews, part of the objective was to assess the salience of the dimensions described in the typology of logics. For example, interview respondents were often eager to talk about how employment practices affect the ways they view and do their work, noting how it seems unfair if individuals are hired or promoted based on family connections or length of service instead of performance or academic qualifications. They were less eager to talk about models of governance, sources of legitimacy, or economic systems as categorized within some

typologies of logics (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b; Thornton et al., 2012). This process of refining the typology with data coming from interviews also helped increase its “ability to render accurately and adequately the lived experiences of those studied” and to ensure the theory can “‘fit’ the data and be relevant to the people involved” (Layder, 1998, pp. 85-86).

The third consideration for specifying dimensions of a study relates to levels of analysis – be they global, societal, field, organizational, or individual levels (Campbell, 2004). Different levels of analysis influence which dimensions are relevant and the types of theoretical insights that will be developed as a result of the research. This study is focused on the organizational level, looking at the dynamics of institutional logics in three public accountability organizations in Zambia. Therefore, the dimensions in the typology are more focused on practices, principles, and structures that would be experienced within organizations than within broader societal groups. For example, employment practices are more relevant to a study on public organizations than to a study of rural villages or ethnic groups.

Specifying the Dimensions in the Typology

The typology used in this study is a reflection of these processes of narrowing the focus, as described above, according to the three considerations and by specifying the different dimensions of each ideal type. It has been developed in an iterative way, going back and forth between extant theoretical concepts within the institutional logics and development literature and interviews with organization members. This process narrowed down the dimensions from broad and expansive theoretical categories to the dimensions that are relevant to stakeholders of development and administration at the organizational level in the Sub-Saharan African context of Zambia. For example, it specifies elements related to employment practices, evaluation criteria, and control systems, which were particularly relevant to interview respondents, and it also specifies elements related to organizational forms, values, and operational mode, which are relevant to theory on institutional logics at the organizational level. Finally, it specifies elements related to education, accountability, and authority within the organizations, which are relevant to development in the Global South since they relate

to developing the capacity of the workforce, ensuring accountability, and the delivery of services to members of society. The typology and its dimensions are illustrated in a table on the following page.

Collective identity

The first dimension in the typology is collective identity, which is central in the way organization members experience different institutional logics. As organizational actors identify with different institutionalized groups, they experience a common shared status and connection with other group members and are thus “more likely to... abide by its norms and prescriptions” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 111, citing March and Olsen, 1989). Rao, Monin, and Durand (2003) argued that the link between the institutional logic and the behavior of individuals is bound up in their social identity, “the self-image derived by actors when they categorize themselves as members of a collectivity or occupants of a role” (p. 797). This is a phenomenon characterized by the oft-quoted questions about how humans take reasoned action (March & Olsen, 1989, 2010): What kind of situation is this? What kind of person am I? What does a person like me do in a situation like this? In that way, decisions and behaviors of organizational actors link to the institutional logics and their respective categories and criteria of boundaries between who is in-group and who is out-group (Lamont & Molnár, 2002).

Within the kinship logic, collective identity is rooted in primordial and informal affiliations, such as tribes or ethnic groups. According to Ekeh (1975), tribalism, which only became prominent after colonialism, “arises where there is a conflict... regarding the proportionate share of [state] resources” (p. 109). Within the bureaucratic logic, collective identity is rooted in affiliation with the centralized state bureaucracy, and organization members see themselves as servants of the state who carry out their relegated duties. Within the development management logic, identity is rooted in the shared mission of the organization to serve society. Within the professionalism logic, identity is rooted with organization members’ professional community.

Institutional Logics in Zambian Public Accountability Organizations

<i>Dimensions</i>	<i>Kinship Logic</i>	<i>Bureaucratic Logic</i>	<i>Development Management Logic</i>	<i>Professionalism Logic</i>
Collective Identity	Affiliation with tribal and ethnic groups	Affiliation with the bureaucracy	Affiliation with shared mission of the organization to serve society	Affiliation with the professional community
Staff Orientation	Orientated toward kin, community, and patriarch	Internal orientation within bureaucratic organization	External orientation toward public	Oriented toward professional field
Core Values	Relationships: reciprocity, serving one's own needs and those of family and tribe with loyalty	Rules: Following rules and correct procedures in a stable environment	Results: Achieving measurable results, efficiency, effectiveness for society, especially the disempowered	Reliability: Being skilled in and following professional norms, standards, and methods; maintaining professional work ethic, autonomy
Preferred Org. Structure	Patriarchal structure	Centralized hierarchical structure	Fragmented structure, team & project based	Decentralized hierarchical structure
Operational Mode	"Personal fiefdoms" with no separation between private and public resources	Mechanistic and geared to rules and routines	Organic, strategic, and flexible to meet the needs of the public	Pigeonholing processes: diagnosis and application of program; discretionary judgement
System of control	Informal control based on expectations of reciprocity and/or fear	Rule-based, with strict formal control by centralized authority structure	Managerial control based on performance measurement	Professional autonomy, guided by norms and standards
Source of Authority	Informal authority	Rational-Legal authority	Managerial authority	Professional authority
Evaluation criteria	Elevating status with community; showing and sharing personal wealth	Following proper procedures; providing stable, consistent service	Achieving performance goals and targets	Delivering professionally sound and reliable work by following professional standards and methods
Employment Practices	Entry to employment and promotions based on personal favor and connections	Entry to employment through centralized system. Promotions based on seniority	Entry to employment and promotions based on ability to bring results and performance	Entry to employment and promotions based on professional certifications and knowledge acquisition

Staff orientation

Staff orientation relates to how and where the members of the Zambian public accountability organizations focus their efforts and their attention (Hydén, 2012, p. 606) and defines the issues and realms that are important for organization members' consideration (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, 2006b; Thornton et al., 2012). Within the kinship logic, organization members focus on members of their informal networks, which could be dominant patrimonial leaders, and members of their immediate and extended families or tribes (Hydén, 2013b). Within the bureaucratic logic, the orientation turns inward to the bureaucratic organization itself in a form of "departmental patriotism" (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b). Within the development management logic, staff orientation is external toward the public, as it relates to the outputs and outcomes of public service delivery and good governance discourses (Brinkerhoff & Coston, 1999). Within the professionalism logic, the orientation is toward the professional field itself. The loyalty of professionals is not beholden in service to clients, customers, or managers. Instead it is beholden to its own "professional priesthood" and "transcendent value", and "it has the right to serve it independently when the practical demands of patrons and clients stifle it" (Freidson, 2001, p. 123).

Core values

The third characteristic, core values, describes foundational principals for each of the four institutional logics. Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b) discussed these as "central values", while Hydén (2012) discussed them as "service rationale" (p. 606). These core values, as they are considered in this study, describe the underlying motivations for action by the organization members. In the kinship logic, the core values relate to relationships. "Whom you know is more important than what you know", and sharing one's wealth with extended family and offering help are the best ways to prepare for an uncertain future (Hydén, 2013a, p. 74). This assumes there is no distinction between public and private goods, and that "state resources thus become fair game for ethnic groups and extended family to build their own bases of support and legitimacy, through patronage, or sometimes, outright graft" (Dia, 1991, p. 11). In

the bureaucratic logic, the core values are “based on a comprehensive and rigid rule-orientation and a programming of all activities” (Askvik, 1993, p. 158). Decision-making is centralized and roles are rationalized in a “definite and stable” division of labor (Freidson, 2001, p. 50). Organization members follow the rules and procedures that have been prescribed, and by following them, they ensure that policy is implemented in a stable and consistent manner. In the development management logic, the core values relate to results. Organization members should work efficiently and effectively in order to bring results to society with efficiency and effectiveness, especially to the vulnerable and disempowered. In the professionalism logic, the core values relate to the reliability and repeatability of professional standards. Organization members follow professional standards by using their abstract knowledge and methods and by working according to a professional ethic that remains consistent from one organization to the next.

Preferred organizational structure

Each of the four institutional logics presumes a different structure for organizing activity. Hydén (2012) discussed this dimension as “organizational structure” while Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b) discussed this as each logic’s “model of governance”. For example, the kinship logic would guide the organization toward a patriarchal structure, operating at the discretion of the so-called “big man” of the organization (Hydén, 2013a, 2013b) – the leader whose whims, strategies, and goals are obsessed over by organization members (Jackall, 2010). According to the bureaucratic logic, the preferred organizational structure is a centralized hierarchy, in which relative status and authority scales up through the organization, ending ultimately with its top leadership and the state. This includes a dominant technostructure, such as cadres of quality control analysts, schedulers, accountants, and researchers, whose role is to standardize the work processes of the organization (Mintzberg, 1989). According to the development management logic, the preferred organizational structure is fragmented, where work is organized around projects, teams, and other ad-hoc bases. Authority is thus more diffuse throughout the managerial echelons. In the professionalism logic, the preferred organizational

structure is a decentralized hierarchy, in which the organization is led by a member of the profession (Freidson, 2001) and “hires duly trained specialists – for the operating core – then gives them considerable control over their own work” (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 175). In this case, standardization in the organization does not arise from cadres of technocrats, as with the bureaucratic logic, rather standardization of work arises from the common skills and training of the professionals within the organization.

Operational mode

Each of the four institutional logics would guide the Zambian public accountability organizations toward distinct modes of operation (Hydén, 2012, 2013b). According to the kinship logic, Zambian public accountability organizations would run as the personal fiefdom of the organizational official, as they “are engaged in a search for personal power and privilege and little else” (Montgomery, 1987, p. 913). According to this image of African civil service, bureaucrats would not be particularly interested in development, reforms, or other social programs. Instead they would try to alleviate their own financial hardships and those of their relatives by engaging in graft or providing service to those who pay a little extra money, for example. Within a bureaucratic logic, the organizational mode is mechanistic and “rationalized into simple tasks” that require minimal in-house training (Mintzberg, 1989). Within a development management logic, the espoused operational mode is flexible, shifting modalities in order to meet changing demands from society. This mode could be called “organic” (Hydén, 2013b, p. 930), because it does not rely on standardized activities but adapts to its environment (Mintzberg, 1989, pp. 103-104). In the professionalism logic, the mode of operation is based on pigeonholing processes. In pigeonholing, professionals encounter various contingencies, which call for a variety of standard programs to be executed. The role of the professional is to “‘diagnose’ the client’s need in terms of one of the contingencies, which indicates which standard program to apply, and to apply, or execute, that program” (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 177).

System of control

Each of the four ideal types of institutional logics would entail a different system of controlling members of the Zambian organizations. In the kinship logic, the system of control is informal and face-to-face, in which an exchange of favors happens directly between individuals, away from abstract civil institutions, written contracts, rules, or laws. The norms of reciprocity as well as fear of informal punishment or ostracization ensure that favors would be returned in due time (Hydén, 2013a). In the bureaucratic logic, accountability is based on strict rules and controls within the hierarchical system, with a chasm between employees and their superiors regarding work freedom and relative power (Meyer, Egger-Peitler, Höllerer, & Hammerschmid, 2014). Within the development management logic, the system of control lies in management's use of tools such as performance appraisals, strategic planning, and employee reviews to motivate employees with rewards or sanctions. In the professionalism logic, the system of control lies within the professional community itself – through relationships with fellow professionals, which according to Romzek, LeRoux, Johnston, Kempf, and Piatak (2014), “can supersede dynamics and incentives associated with bureaucratic, political, or legal accountability” (p. 5). Additionally, professional associations may have the formal power to enforce rules or sanctions on their members.

Source of authority

The dimension, source of authority, relates to the right to exercise power over organization members. Power is a topic of interest in development literature, as it relates to “big man rule” and patrimonialism, and it is of interest in organizational literature as it relates to organizational operation and change. According to the kinship logic, the “formal authority of the office is emptied in favor of that of the informal, invisible one” (Masunungure, 2004, p. 81). Therefore, workers do not always recognize the formal authority of their superiors, unless that authority is reinforced via informal relations such as tribe or quasi-political affiliation. In the bureaucratic logic, authority is based on rationality and legitimacy. According to Freidson (2001), “when rational-legal authority organizes work, formal written rules establish the duties of

each position, occupation, or job as well as their relationships... establishing clear lines of authority leading up to the ultimate executive officer” (p. 49). In contrast to the kinship logic, within the bureaucratic logic, office holders empty themselves of their own interests in favor of the interests of the state and its bureaucracy. In the development management logic, authority is vested in management to hold workers to account for their performance. Managers exercise their authority through rewards and sanctions in accordance with the measurement of worker performance. Within the professionalism logic, authority is vested in the professionals themselves, which is based on the transcendent value of the discipline (Freidson, 2001) and is exercised through rewards or sanctions by a professional association or network.

Evaluation criteria

The characteristic, evaluation criteria, describes how organization members measure success. Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b) discussed this as an element in their typology of logics, as it drew a dividing line between the legalistic-bureaucratic logic in which organization members are evaluated by rule following and the managerial logic in which they are evaluated by bringing results. Rao et al. (2003) also considered evaluation criteria an important link to logics in organizational life and noted, “a system of incentives that rewards actors for conformity to a given logic and penalizes actors for violations of behavior” (p, 797). Within the kinship logic, the measure of success is based on gaining status in the community (Dia, 1991; Masunungure, 2004). In this way, African public servants can be expected to share the resources of the state with family and community, which in turn elevates their status and legitimacy within their community and builds support for whatever the future may hold. Within the bureaucratic logic, organizational work is evaluated according to rule-following and the use of proper inputs: following the correct procedures that are clearly spelled out for all employees. Within the development management logic, organizational work is evaluated according to outputs: delivering results based on organizational and individual goals. Within the professional logic, the criteria for evaluating organization members are based on delivering professionally sound work, which follows repeatable standards and methods.

Employment practices

Employment practices are particularly salient in the literatures on development and on organizations as well as in the contexts of public organizations (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Hydén, 2012, 2013b; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b). Interview respondents were also particularly keen to discuss employment processes since they had a major impact on their lives and the lives of the other organization members. There were often comparisons of one's own career path with those of others, and it seemed organizational members tried to make sense of the organization and management through their decisions related to employment practices, which included the hiring of new employees and especially the promotions of existing ones.

Each of the four ideal logics contains different practices and processes for entering into the workforce of the organization and for being promoted within it. According to the kinship logic, employment is based on relationships. For example, if someone is seeking employment in an organization, he or she may use community or familial connections to attain a position or may seek this position through an exchange of favors. The organizational position would then make that person indebted to the individuals who secured that position as a favor. According to the bureaucratic logic, entry to employment happens through a centralized and bureaucratic system such as civil service commission, which would apply rules and procedures to ensure that the hiring process is fair and equal, without respect to family or other informal connections. Promotions would then be based on seniority, with the employee having the longest tenure being first up for open positions. Within the development management logic, entry to employment and promotions are based on one's ability to achieve the results required in a given position. Within the professionalism logic, entry to employment and promotions are based on professional training and certifications, such as lawyers passing the bar or doctors being licensed through national medical associations.

Relationships among Institutional Logics: Agency and Change

The previous sections focused on how institutional logics are social structures that "shape individual preferences and organizational interests" (Friedland & Alford,

1991, p. 232) and how they are conceptualized as ideal types that have internally consistent vertical relationships between the different elements that comprise them (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017). Those vertical relationships within the different logics are “modular” and “nearly decomposable”, according to Thornton et al. (2012, p. 60), which means an institutional context might be consistent with different elements from multiple logics at the same time. This brings the discussion back to one of the central arguments of Friedland and Alford (1991), that society’s “institutions are potentially contradictory and hence make multiple logics available to individuals and organizations. Individuals and organizations transform the institutional relations of society by exploiting these contradictions” (p. 232).

To examine these processes, analyses then focus on the horizontal relationships between different logics in addition to the vertical relationships between the different elements within each logic. It is by focusing on the horizontal relationships between multiple logics, according to Johansen and Waldorff (2017, p. 63), that the institutional logics perspective provides the capacity to explain processes of change and human agency. Through this perspective, “the analyses of organizations become more nuanced, since they capture how actors drawing on different logics work together in the same organization” (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 64) and how the elements from different logics are available to be combined, which Friedland and Alford (1991) have argued has the potential to transform social relations.

Contexts as Competing Logics

Most research on institutional logics, such as the studies by Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a, 2006b) and Battilana and Dorado (2010), have theorized institutional contexts as being conflictual and comprised of institutional logics that exist in competitive types of relationships with each other. Analysis in these studies focuses on whether or not an alternative logic replaced a formerly dominant logic or formed some type of hybrid logic (see also Andrews, 2013, p. 51). One of the main contributions of these studies, “has been to explicate how organizations find themselves in paradoxical situations where irreconcilable logics force them to choose and/or develop practices related to one logic or the other” (Johansen & Waldorff,

2017, p. 63). This brings the issue of agency to the foreground, as these contexts are seen as changing as a result of social interactions over time.

In one such study of competing logics, Reay and Hinings (2005) examined ways in which an alternative institutional logic was promulgated within the context of healthcare in Alberta, Canada. The institutional context had previously been characterized by a logic of medical professionalism, in which the quality of service was controlled by the physicians and the doctor-patient relationship was central to care practices. Then, through a series of reforms and new laws that were proposed by the government, a new competitive logic of business-like healthcare was promulgated into this context. According to the new logic, the quality of service would be determined by market forces and the relationships between patients would then be seen as consumer transactions.

A significant contribution from the study by Reay and Hinings (2005) was showing how an alternative logic was promulgated into an institutional context, which then, as a result of social negotiations, either culminated in a rejection of the alternative logic, the acceptance of it, or in an uneasy truce between the two competing logics. The study examined these processes in a chronological narrative, which allowed analyses to follow the processes of promulgating alternative logics and the social negotiations occurring over time. This began with a period of relative stability, in which the medical-professionalism logic was dominant and went largely unquestioned. It followed with a period of promulgating the change, in which the business-like healthcare logic was introduced through a series of structural and policy changes. The narrative continued with a period of resistance, acquiescence or acceptance of the change by the key actors, during which time the key actors were involved in social negotiations over whether or not to accept or reject the proposed changes. The narrative ended with an uneasy truce, in which some actors accepted the changes and other actors rejected them but reluctantly acquiesced.

The study by Reay and Hinings (2005) demonstrated how alternative logics were promulgated through “purposeful actions” and how actors within the context reacted for or against those promulgations (Ibid, p. 375). The institutional context was described in the study “as a battlefield, where campaigns are waged using all available

sources of power. Actors who resist imposed change respond based on their ability to do so, and may essentially give up the battle, but not the long-term fight” (Ibid, p. 375). In that way, the study by Reay and Hinings was clearly focused on competing relationships between logics, in which strengthening one logic implied the relative weakening of the other logic within the context of healthcare provision in Alberta.

Constellations of Logics

More recently, some studies of institutional logics have begun to move away from the battlefield metaphor and have started to focus on how relationships between logics can be complimentary as well as being competitive. In this way, institutional contexts can be seen metaphorically as “constellations of logics” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Waldorff et al., 2013). Goodrick and Reay (2011) first used this astronomical metaphor to describe ways that different societal logics combine, since “constellation means a configuration or position of “stars” [or potentially other elements] in regard to one another (p. 399). By seeing organizations as comprised of a constellations of logics or a “mix of multiple logics” (Reay & Jones, 2016, p. 448), this acknowledges that there are multiple logics at play within the organizational context, each with varying degrees of dominance or influence and with differing effects on how work is done. This makes it possible to consider how some logics are more dominant than others, how some may compliment or compete with one another, and how these constellations can shift at times, leading to new constellations of logics. This contributes to a more useful understanding of the contexts of the public organizations in Zambia and the Global South that are often comprised of multiple logics, and as will be shown, these relationships can be competitive and they can also be complimentary.

Waldorff et al. (2013) took these notions of competing and complimentary logics and constellations of logics further with their study of healthcare policies and practices in Canada and Denmark. They discussed how different types of relationships between logics can either constrain or enable action. According to their analysis, action within organizations could be impacted in various ways depending on the constellation of logics guiding them, and in particular, through the ways that the

different logics relate to one another in the field. The study categorized how the different types of arrangements of institutional logics in a constellation affected action, and it showed how the different constellations affected the design and implementation of healthcare policies and changed the way work was done and structured.

For example, according to Waldorff et al. (2013), action can be constrained by the ongoing presence of a dominant influential logic within the constellation. Similar to findings in other studies on institutional logics, they discussed how, when there is a large number of actors within a social context who hold the values and beliefs of a particular institutional logic, “change is constrained because only alternatives that respect the principles underlying the logic are possible” (Ibid, p. 121). In those situations, alternative values and courses of action are not readily recognized by the actors, as they seem inappropriate, irrelevant, or even impossible. Action can be enabled, however, through other types of relationships between logics. For example, if there is a competitive logic that is viable and can be strengthened to become more influential within the constellation of logics, this can open up new alternatives for action according to the competitive logic. Relationships between competitive logics can also be segmented when actors who are guided by different logics are separated from one another either geographically or by organizational division. This allows them to act according to the values and principles of their competitive logics in their own space without a conflict occurring between their actions and the actions of others. Finally, action can also be enabled through facilitative logics, in which the actions based on one logic strengthens or reinforces another logic (Ibid, pp. 121-124).

How Contexts Change

In addition to explaining how individuals and organizations manage institutional contexts comprised of multiple logics, extant literature also provides concepts and mechanisms that can explain how change can occur within these contexts. The constellations of institutional logics that guide organizational action are either reproduced or are changed by the individuals and organizations that are embedded within them (Thornton et al., 2012). It is useful to look at these processes through a critical realist perspective (Archer, 1995, 2010; Porpora, 2013), which

indicates that at a given point of time, the constellations of institutional logics pre-exist the actions of agents, who in turn recreate or alter the constellations of logics through their actions. Thus, human agency is central when it comes to these processes of change and reproduction. According to Thornton and Ocasio (2008), these social contexts can be altered through “three mechanisms of change”: “institutional entrepreneurship”, “structural overlap”, and “rupture[s]” of unique and transformative events (pp. 115-117; see also Thornton et al., 2012). These three concepts are described in more detail below as well as an additional concept of decoupling, and they are central in the analyses of the three cases in this study and provide a conceptual framework for explaining change processes.

Institutional entrepreneurship

A central concept for understanding change among institutional logics, according to Thornton and Ocasio (2008), is institutional entrepreneurship. This is a process that revolves around resource-rich actors who “create new and modify old institutions” (Ibid, p. 115). Institutional entrepreneurship has been defined as:

[T]he ‘activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones’ (citing Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004, p. 657); while institutional entrepreneurs are those actors to whom the responsibility for new or changed institutions is attributed (Hardy & Maguire, 2008, p. 198).

Institutional entrepreneurship is often understood as a bricolage process in which institutional entrepreneurs import cultural symbols and practices from one institutional logic and combine them with another institutional logic, which leads to change in the constellation of logics (Højgaard Christiansen & Lounsbury, 2013; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Institutional entrepreneurs bring about these changes through rhetorical strategies in which institutional vocabularies are used to affirm a new institutional logic, by positioning the institutionalization project in terms of existing categories and schema, and by drawing upon the discourses available in other logics (Hardy & Maguire, 2008).

Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum (2009) contend that institutional entrepreneurs are the central actors involved in driving divergent change, even if those changes fail to materialize. Entrepreneurs drive divergent change as they engage in activities that dislodge principles of the formerly dominant institutional logics and enable the principles of alternative logics. To do this, institutional entrepreneurs create and cast a compelling vision for change, they motivate organization members to follow that vision, and they mobilize resources and allies necessary for implementing the changes. Battilana et al. (2009) also noted the importance of social location in these processes. This is because institutional entrepreneurship is only theoretically possible if agents are capable of breaking from the norms, values, and rules of the institutional logics in which they are embedded while also having the resources and authority to make divergent change happen.

It is on that point in which theory on institutional entrepreneurship is often criticized for “taking agency to far” (Cardinale, 2018, p. 132), and being a convenient *deus ex machina* explanation for change (Delmestri, 2006). As Andrews (2013) argued, it is “questionable” that “a ‘supermuscular’ entrepreneur” can reflexively “break with dominant institutional logics and institutionalize alternative rules, practices, or logics” (p. 94) because of the paradox of embedded agency. For that reason, Andrews argued that “multi-agent leadership fosters change, not solitary leaders” (p. 96). This emphasizes the importance of considering the implications of structural effects on agency, that the institutional logics dominant within an organizational context will likely have a hand in shaping the motivations, values, and aspirations of the actors embedded within them.

Structural overlap

It is along those lines of structural effects on agency, that Thornton and Ocasio (2008) argue for another core mechanism of change among institutional logics. They argue that change among logics can happen through “structural overlaps”, which occur when one organizational structure and the roles within it crosses boundaries with another organizational structure (p. 116). This could happen through organizational partnerships, mergers, collaborations, or other means of interorganizational relations.

Through these means, structural overlaps can create “contradictions in organizations and organizational fields, creating entrepreneurial opportunities for institutional change”, which reduce the “constraints and embeddedness of actors and enables central actors to become institutional entrepreneurs” since they come into contact with new and conflicting logics and ideas (Ibid, p. 116).

Thornton and Ocasio’s (2008) concept of structural overlap returns the theoretical discussions to the conditioning effects of structure on organizational actors and how structure shapes organizational and individual behavior. Within institutional theory, this has been seen as processes of “diffusion”, in which “organizational strategies and structures” are reproduced via isomorphic processes and pressures from organizational fields (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 157). Alternatively, this has also been seen as more negotiated processes of “translation” of organizational ideas and of imitating the identities, values, and standards associated with particular institutionalized groups (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). In these ways, social structures are seen as enabling change by opening up a limited set of possible courses of action by orienting organizations and individuals toward certain possibilities and away from others (Cardinale, 2018).

Decoupling

In spite of these institutional pressures to adopt procedures and structures from the external environment, organizations often only implement them ceremonially and decouple them away from their core operations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Decoupling is a theoretical concept that has long been used in institutional theory to explain the “gap between policy and practice”, which “includes policies adopted purely as ceremonial window dressing or implemented, evaluated, and monitored so weakly that they do little to alter daily work routines” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 7). Therefore, decoupling can explain why some change does not occur, and in particular, it can explain why change may occur on the surface, while in reality, the organizational context remains the same.

Significant historical events

Thornton and Ocasio (2008) argued for one final mechanism of change among institutional logics, that change can happen through dramatic historical events that bring “changes in cultural schemas, shifts of resources, and the emergence of new sources of power” (p. 116). It is because these events are able to dislocate the way societies interpret the meanings of their cultural and social symbols and structures, which in turn can lead to new interpretations that transform societal relations. Sewell (1996) has called these “historical events”, but he noted that they are more than mere occurrences in a particular point in time. They begin with ruptures to the status quo that cascade to other ruptures that eventually transform social structures and practices. This happens in clusters of intense bursts – something Sewell (1996) described as the “lumpiness” of historical temporality (p. 843). According to Thornton and Ocasio (2008), these types of dramatic events can “erode the dominance of the incumbent logic” (p. 116), which presents an opportunity for change to occur, or they can actually “reinforce” the dominant logic (Ibid, p. 116), which can then present a barrier to change as actors continue to enact the incumbent logic in the face of instability and uncertainty.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the theoretical approach and conceptual framework of this study, which uses the institutional logics perspective for understanding administrative contexts in the Global South. It presented the institutional logics perspective as a unique approach to research and placed it within its own historical research context within broader institutional theory. It demonstrated the ambition of the institutional logics perspective to find middle ground between approaches that emphasize the rational choices of actors and approaches that emphasize the structural primacy of institutions. It presented a conceptual framework to show how institutional logics comprise organizational contexts that shape the behavior of individuals and organizations as well as how those individuals and organizations also have a hand in shaping their organizational contexts through human action.

The chapter also presented a review of relevant literature that applies the institutional logics perspective in a variety of cases as well as other research from the fields of development and organization theory, which together contribute to the development of this study's typology. The typology, which was constructed iteratively between extant literature and incoming research data, provides a way of categorizing organizational and individual behavior within the organizations in this study. The following chapter will present the methodological approach used for analyzing organizational behavior and change within the three public accountability organizations in Zambia.

Chapter Three: **Methodological Approach**

This chapter presents the strategies, methods, and sources of data used to answer the study's three research questions and to contribute to our understanding of the relationships between multiple institutional logics, how they change, and how they impact action. The study's three research questions are:

1. What types of institutional logics provide sets of organizing principles, practices, and social structures that constitute the contexts of public accountability organizations in Zambia?
2. How do these institutional logics relate to one another within the three organizational contexts, and how does that affect organizational action?
3. How does change within these contexts occur?

Addressing these research questions implies dealing with socially complex phenomena since theory on institutional logics assumes there will be multiple logics at play within organizations, that the actions of organization members are shaped by more than one logic at a given time, and that these logics can come from a variety of sources. Institutional logics research is also deeply contextual, as it focuses on how different logics are “translated by members for their time and place” as well as how “the patterns and interplay among symbols, beliefs, norms, and practices” construct a constellation of logics that can guide organizational and individual actions (Reay & Jones, 2016, p. 441). This also assumes that individual and organizational actions are both constrained and enabled through embedded agency. This notion of embedded agency is seen as a paradox within institutional theory (Lok & Willmott, in press), and it implies that human action is shaped and influenced through institutional logics within an organizational context, while at the same time, those logics are enacted and constituted through human action. Therefore, the study's research methods should adequately address the issues of social structure as well as human agency as they relate to institutional logics and change.

This chapter describes how the study uses multiple cases and qualitative methods to answer the research questions. It describes the case study approach, why

this approach is suitable for this study, and how the cases and the data address the research questions. It goes on to describe the analytic strategies used to answer the questions and to further develop theories on institutional logics and development as well as describing the data sources and data collection in detail and why they were chosen to answer the research questions. Finally, this chapter address the quality of this study on the basis four key areas: internal validity, external validity, construct validity, and reliability (Yin, 2014).

Case Study Design

This study uses three different cases to address the research questions and to develop theory on institutional logics within public organizations in Zambia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The three cases are three public accountability organizations in Zambia: the Office of Auditor General, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the ombudsman office. Each of the three cases is comprised of dynamic institutional contexts with multiple institutional logics that exist in relationship to one another with varying effects. These are complex settings in which “the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident”, which Yin (2014, p. 16) contends is a reason for conducting case studies, since they provide the ability to go in depth to examine phenomena while also considering contextual implications and processes over time. This allows, for example, the research to focus on agentic action and change processes, while at the same time considering the structural and contextual implications that can enable or constrain those actions – *i.e.*, the paradox of embedded agency.

Case studies such as the three in this study are also suitable for answering “‘how’ and ‘why’ questions”, according to Yin (2014, p. 10), because of the space they allow to examine processes as they unfolded, “rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (Ibid, p. 10). This is particularly useful as each of the three cases examine processes that unfolded over time and are presented in chronological order, following the approach from Reay and Hinings (2005) that was presented in Chapter Two. This was useful for examining the processes through which alternative logics were promulgated within the contexts, how actors responded to those alternatives, and how

change may have occurred as a result, while at the same time considering that the agency of the actors was being shaped by the different institutional logics that were dominant within the context.

Each of the three cases in this study are focused on public organizations involved in safeguarding public resources and the rights of Zambian citizens and residents. Even though they have different mandates and institutional arrangements, they are all semi-autonomous, falling in-between centralized public organizations and autonomous entities. As public accountability organizations, they have recently begun receiving increasing attention and funding from the international donor and development communities (Hydén, 2013b), which can have their own ideas and agendas about how these organizations should be run. The political environment in which the three organizations operate can, at times, be hostile because of these organizations' roles in holding government officials accountable for their actions. Therefore, there are often political power struggles taking place within and around these organizations (Kuris, 2015) that are related to which institutional logics will guide them. Finally, each of the three accountability organizations has recently gone through, or is currently going through, processes of reform or development. These processes can also introduce or strengthen alternative institutional logics, leading to greater complexity in institutional environments.

Therefore, the three cases can be seen as “exemplary” cases, in the sense that they represent what could be considered typical or illustrative of public accountability organizations in Zambia and the region, in which multiple logics interact and guide social behavior (Ragin, 1992, p. 2). The three cases provide rich empirical settings for analyses of the enactment of institutional logics within these types of organizations, the types of relationships that exist between the institutional logics and their impacts, and the way change can take place among them. In that way, the three cases “come wrapped in theories”, as contended by Walton (1992), because they “embody causal processes operating in microcosm” that lead to generalizable findings based upon those theories (p. 122). Thus, the multiple cases in this study are not used as statistical samples of a broader population of cases, but rather as a means of analytic

generalization and theoretical development at a higher conceptual level than the empirical cases themselves (Yin, 2014, pp. 21, 41, 68).

The cases were used to develop theory through processes of explanation building, refining theoretical explanations about how the different logics relate to one another in an organizational context and about how those contexts can change. In this way, the study contributes by refining and developing theory on institutional logics. According to Yin (2014), “explanation building occurs in a narrative form” to answer “how and ‘why’ something happened” (p. 147). The case narratives in this study are “analytical” (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 1998, p. 10), as they are based on the theoretical principles guiding the study, and in that way, they are “tightly constrained” and “disciplined” by the theory and do not get bogged down in empirical details not relevant to the theory (Ibid, p. 16). They consider both structural and agentive explanations about change processes, which offer rival explanations about why change takes place (Bates et al., 1998; Yin, 2014).

The three case narratives are each presented in chronological order, placing the organizations within their historical context and capturing the dynamic processes that surrounded the introduction of alternative logics within the context. The cases begin with a brief history of the organization in Zambia and an overview of the general type of the organization on an international level, which provides the broader context of which the organization is a part. It then follows with a description of a period of stability within the organization in which different logics had been enacted within the organization to varying degrees and with various effects. Then, the cases go on to describe dramatic events or “ruptures” that happened within and around the organization that had the protentional to durably transform the organization’s previous structures and practices (Sewell, 1996, p. 843). These were the moments in which alternative logics were introduced or strengthened within the organization, which could then lead to change. These processes of strengthening or introducing alternative logics are referred to in the cases as “promulgating” the logics, following Reay and Hinings (2005). Then, each case follows with discussions and analyses of the effects of those promulgations of alternative logics and the current relationships among the logics within the organizations.

Theory in this research project is seen as being adaptive, according to the adaptive research approach proposed by Layder (1998). In that way, prior theoretical concepts impose order on the incoming empirical data being collected, while at the same time, the analyses of empirical data feeds back into the elaboration of a conceptual framework. Extant theoretical materials or emerging theory from the data can then be added to the initial conceptual framework, providing it with more explanatory power in light of the incoming data. For example, this can be seen in the initial typology in the study, as shown in Appendix D. The initial typology imposed order on the data being collected in the earliest phase of the field research in 2014. However, after field research began, it became evident that a broader typology could hold more explanatory power, so the model was adjusted to accommodate the incoming empirical data. Another example is found in the change mechanisms that Thornton and Ocasio (2008) had elaborated, such as “institutional entrepreneurship” and “structural overlap”, which could explain some of the processes within the organizations. However, with more incoming empirical data, it became clear that additional concepts, such as decoupling, might offer additional explanatory power. From Layder’s (1998) perspective then, “the interview data themselves fed back into the elaboration of the model and provided clues about the social processes that underpinned it, clues that could not be gleaned from, or suggested by, the initial model itself” (p. 153).

As a result of these reflexive feedback loops within the research process, the additional concepts were added to explain these social processes. For example, as described in Chapter Two, the professionalism and development management logics were added because they provided relevant categories and criteria for understanding the lived experiences of organization members and different types of organizational practices. Also, adding behavioral concepts (Layder, 1998), such as “decoupling” (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and the “translation of organizational ideas” (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017, Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996), were helpful for explaining the actions of organization members as they navigated their complex organizational contexts and enacted different institutional logics. These reflexive adaptations of theoretical models and concepts

began to take shape and lead to what Layder (1998) calls “the newly emergent adaptive theory”, which can then “act as an ordering device, suggesting or imposing interpretive schemas and conceptual frames on incoming data in a manner similar to the extant theory” (p. 170). In essence, the iteration between incoming data and theory, elaborated and developed the conceptual framework and typological model, which could then be used to explain the empirical phenomena of the three cases.

Qualitative Methods, Data Sources, and Analytic Strategies

In this study, the four ideal types of institutional logics, the kinship, bureaucratic, development-management, and professionalism logics, were used to make comparisons with the incoming empirical data from the three Zambian public accountability organizations. Since these institutional logics are “contextual and translated by members for their time and place”, the methods used to study them had to be able to capture the cultural and symbolic meanings the actors draw on and the practices and social structures they embody (Reay and Jones, 2016, p. 441). Reay and Jones (2016) argue that qualitative methods “hold great promise for studying institutional logics” (p. 441), an argument they expand upon further in the following statement:

Logics, which are revealed through language, practices, and manifested in symbols and materials, are naturally suited to qualitative data and methods that demand immersion in the phenomenon. When studying logics, researchers must ground their insights and abstractions to the context through quotes, observations, and thick description (Ibid, p. 442).

As a way of providing these quotes, observations, and descriptions, the three case studies captured data coming from interviews with organization members and other key stakeholders, from observations of work environments and practices, and from documentary sources.

The main source of data came from semi-structured interviews, since they allowed actors within the three organizations to characterize their life experiences, their shared systems of meanings, their sense of identification, and their ways of viewing social reality. As interview respondents described their organizations, the

work they do, how they relate to each other and their environments, and the unspoken rules of the organization, they provided rich descriptions of elements that were consistent with the different institutional logics. Therefore, evidence of the different institutional logics comes from the narratives and vocabularies used by interview respondents, since “at the level of the discursive field... the vocabularies and accounts used give evidence of the prevalence of the different logics and manifest the specific local versions or translations of the global trends” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b, pp. 100; see also Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996).

In addition to providing evidence for the existence of the different institutional logics, interview respondents also provided evidence for how the logics may have changed over time. They did this, again, by providing descriptions of their organization, their work practices, and the unspoken rules of the organization from within different time periods. For example, in the Office of Auditor General, interview respondents and extant literature pointed to significant changes that happened in 2003. So, it was possible to ask the interview respondents who had worked in the organization during that time about those changes and about how their organization, their work practices, and the formal and informal rules of the organization were before that time period and how they were after it. By describing ways that the organization previously operated and comparing them to the ways it operates now, it was possible to compare those empirical variations with the typology of logics and consider ways in which there had been changes within the constellations of logics guiding the organization. This then made it possible to pose further questions about how and why those changes may have taken place.

Interview data are particularly well suited to address issues of how social structures constrain and enable change and how human agency interacts with those structures. As Rathbun (2008) argued, “interviewing... is often the best-suited method for gathering data on those characteristics of the social world that differentiate it from the natural world: human beings’ effort to intentionally transform their environment on the basis of cognition, reflection, and learning” (p. 8). Interviews are also useful for capturing the motivations, preferences, desires, and beliefs among organization members and other key stakeholders and why they may act in certain ways, which are

aspects consistent with the different institutional logics. Furthermore, interviews also provide useful insights about structural processes and causes as well. According to Rathbun (2008), “Interviewing can help establish whether a political actor felt under pressure from forces beyond his or her control, and what those forces were, particularly when there are multiple independent variables in the theoretical mix” (p. 8). In that way, conducting interviews with key organization members was useful for explaining the structural forces important within these organizational contexts as well as the motivations and preferences of the individuals involved in change processes.

Other sources of qualitative data were the observations of meetings, work environments, and work processes, which also helped illuminate the social reality in the three organizations as well as to corroborate the interview data (Yin, 2014). In addition to these observations, photographs of the physical spaces within one of the organizations were used as a way to record the physical instantiations of the institutional logics, the ways in which the unseen aspects of the institutional logics are “transmuted into the observable objects” (Friedland, 2013, p. 37). Furthermore, documents such as internal organizational communications, employee guides, annual reports, newsletters, and strategic plans have also added to the picture of the espoused norms and values that have been circulating with the organizations.

Using the different qualitative data sources listed above, the study has developed sets of analytic narratives that describe the different systems of meanings, practices and structures in use within the organizations that can then be compared to the four ideal types of logics. Following Goodrick and Reay (2011), who examined the constellations of logics related to the practices of pharmacists, this study examines the constellations of logics related to practices in the three Zambian public accountability organizations as well as meaning systems and structural elements. The similarity and consistency between the analytic narrative and the ideal type reflects the relative influence of the logic within the constellation. Dissimilarity and inconsistency between the analytic narrative and the ideal type reflects the relative weakness of the logic within the constellation. These similarities and dissimilarities are represented and explained in the empirical chapters through thick descriptions with quotes from

interview respondents and document sources as well as notations from observations and photographic evidence.

Data Collection

The interview data for this study were collected on three research trips to Lusaka, Zambia. The first trip was for two weeks in November 2014, and the second was for ten days in September and October of 2015, in which members of the Office of Auditor General and other major stakeholders related to the Office of Auditor General were interviewed. The third research trip was in April and May of 2016 and lasted three weeks, which also expanded the study to include the two additional cases: the Anti-Corruption Commission and the ombudsman office. Interview respondents were selected from each of the three organizations based on their positions, expertise, and knowledge of the organization. Interview respondents were added until a useful analytic narrative of the cases could be developed to address the theories on institutional logics, interrelationships between the logics, and change.

All of the interview respondents were offered anonymity for their protection since some of the information they provided deals directly with acts of corruption by individuals who exercise political and organizational power. Therefore, the interviews remain confidential, since revealing the identities of interview respondents could possibly lead to their harm or other forms of recrimination against them. The few exceptions to this anonymity are some of the high-ranking officials who freely volunteered to speak on the record as indicated in the tables below. For example, the Auditor General offered to speak without the protection of anonymity because the legal framework of the Zambian constitution protects her from recrimination. Furthermore, revealing the identity of these central actors who had given permission to do so strengthens the validity and reliability of the study, since the responses from these actors are particularly well-suited to address issues of change, the political contestations surrounding these changes, and the challenges or pressures they may have experienced along the way (Rathbun, 2008).

Tables representing the interview data are presented in the tables below:

Interview respondents: Office of Auditor General

Auditor General Anna Chifungula	1
Deputies Auditor General	2
Department Directors	5
Managers/principal auditors/auditors/other officers	10
Former Vice President/Current Leader of Opposition Party, Nevers Mumba	1
Members of Parliament, also sitting on the Public Accounts Committee	3
Executive Director of Transparency International Zambia	1
Local expert on programs at Auditor's Office from Norwegian Embassy	1
Norwegian Ambassador to Zambia	1
Total respondents related to OAGZ	25

Interview respondents: Anti-Corruption Commission

Commissioner Steven Moyo (1 of the 5 commissioners in 2016)	1
Department Directors	3
Chief, Senior, and other Officers	22
Executive Director Transparency International Zambia	1
Total respondents related to Anti-Corruption Commission	27

Interview respondents: The Zambian ombudsman organization

The Zambian Ombudsman: Public Protector Caroline Sokoni	1
Executive Administrator	1
Investigators	2
Administrative officers and other officers	3
Executive Officer from Danish Ombudsman Office	1
Total respondents related the Zambian ombudsman organization	8

The interviews were transcribed and entered into a research database, and segments of the interviews were coded for later retrieval and analysis. As interview respondents described their organization, the work they do, how they relate to each

other and to their environment, and the unspoken rules of the organization, they provided descriptions that were consistent with the different institutional logics. As they described their experiences, their frustrations, and their hopes for the organization, it denoted the salient systems of meanings associated with the organization. These systems of meanings comprise the intangible aspects of the institutional logics, such as values and sense of identity, as opposed to the more tangible aspects of the institutional logics, such as sources of control and authority or employment practices. However, both aspects are important for understanding the institutional logics in the three organizations. As Zilber (2008) noted, “meaning and the material are intertwined, constituting each other. Meanings are encoded in structures and practices, while structures and practices express and affect those meanings” (p. 152). In spite of their mutual constitution, is still useful to separate meaning and the material for analyses, particularly to see how one might affect the other.

It was important that the interviews were not rigidly structured, but instead allowed respondents the conversational space to describe the meanings, practices, and rules that were salient to them – not attempting to force emerging data into preexisting ideas or types (Campbell, 2004). This process guided the development of the typology toward a direction that makes the types more characteristic of what the social worlds of these organizations are like rather than forcing the concepts and types from literature focused on the Global North onto organizations within Zambia (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017). These interviews, particularly those of well-informed or expert respondents also indicated the histories of the organizations and how the constellation of logics may have changed over time or how they were maintained. Respondents who had been connected to the organization for a long period of time were asked to describe the organization now as compared to the way it was at an earlier time period. They gave an account of those changes and marked the major milestones along the way, which were useful in describing and discussing processes of change among the institutional logics guiding organizational and individual action.

In addition to the semi-structured interviews, observations were also important sources of data. Observations were made about how organization members interacted

with each other and the public, how they did their work, and even how their physical workspaces were designed and configured. These observations were useful in corroborating and adding to interview respondents' descriptions of the work practices of the organization – the ways that meaningful work and related tasks are done. More significantly, they made it possible to examine the materiality of the institutional logics and how material structures constitute the logics and can enable change. It was also possible to take photographs of the different work locations for the organizations. These images recorded physical aspects of institutional logics that are the transmutations of the ideational – their discursive renewals of commitment (Friedland, 2013) and the expressions and affectations of their meanings. In one case, these photographs were especially useful for later analysis and are included in Chapter Seven, which is based on the Zambian ombudsman office.

The three trips to Lusaka between 2014 and 2016 also provided an opportunity to collect documentary evidence from the three organizations. Documents such as strategic plans, restructuring plans, and other internal communications described espoused values and norms and help provide a fuller picture of the institutional logics in the organizations. It was often a challenge to retrieve these documents since organization members did not usually have digital copies of them, and they did not know where to access printed versions. Sometimes, it was not clear whether they wanted to give access to the files or not, which could have been because they were afraid of doing so without permission from their organizational superiors.

In addition to forming an analytic narrative of the three organizations, the combination of these multiple sources of data provided a “convergence of evidence” that helped ensure that events, descriptions, and narratives were “rendered accurately” (Yin, 2014, pp. 121-122). In this way, documentary evidence, as well as evidence from other interview respondents could confirm and clarify statements from other interview respondents. When interview respondents had contradictory interpretations, the multiple interviews and sources could reflect “multiple realities”, which are reflected in the case narratives within the three empirical chapters (Ibid, p. 122).

Presenting Data and Analysis in the Three Organizations

In November of 2017, a fourth and final research trip to Lusaka was made and lasted two weeks. The purpose of this trip was not to collect data, but rather to present preliminary research findings to stakeholders from the three organizations for them to review and to give their feedback. Those who attended the review meetings were among the study's interview respondents, as well as additional members of the organizations who were in a position to respond to the research findings. Participants were also given an opportunity to review preliminary case reports that were provided to the office and specific to their organization. Each review meeting lasted approximately one hour, in which the first 20-30 minutes was a research presentation of the typology of logics, applying the typology within the organization, analyses of the how the logics were seen in the organization and their impacts on organizational action, and what change among those logics had taken place within the organization, if any. The last 30-40 minutes of the meeting was an opportunity for feedback from those attending the presentation.

The participants seemed eager to discuss the case reports and their own experiences within their organization. They offered useful feedback in the form of corrections about dates, organizational processes, and historical events. There was some confusion and discussion in one of the presentation meetings about what the word "institutional" means in "institutional logics", thinking that an institutional logic actually meant the single governing logic for the entire organization. This confusion is understandable because these three organizations are often called "institutions" in popular discourse (i.e., an "audit institution", or an "ombudsman institution"). Overall, the feedback received in the review meetings validated research findings and the adequacy of the typology of logics to reflect their lived experiences, as respondents indicated that they could see them as a valid representation of the different practices and meanings systems they encountered within their organizations. Furthermore, participants also noted that the narratives from the case reports gave an accurate historical representation of their organizations, and if any of the details diverged, they provided correct information.

After each review meeting, there was also ample time for informal conversations with individuals from the organization to get their feedback on the research presentation on-on-one or in smaller groups. This was done on purpose, just in case some participants may have felt intimidated to speak up during the presentation meetings. The informal feedback after the review meetings converged with the formal feedback in the meetings, though it was more relaxed and expressive. One exception was in the Anti-Corruption Commission in which the informal feedback after the meeting went deeper into issues of the agency's lack of independence and how the political leaders were undermining its autonomy and independence on a regular basis, which participants did not discuss during the meeting. This was understandable, in their politicized context, that organizational members would not want to speak freely about powerful political leaders in a negative way and that they would feel freer to do so informally after the presentation meeting was over.

In addition to the final review trip to the three organizations in Zambia, a trip was also made to the headquarters of the Office of Auditor General Norway, in Oslo, to present the findings about the Office of Auditor General Zambia to a Norwegian advisor who has significant experience and knowledge about the Office of Auditor General Zambia. This was because of the long-standing relationship between the two organizations, through which this advisor had served in a long-term secondment from the Norwegian audit office to the Zambian audit office. He had lived in Zambia and worked at the Office of Auditor General Zambia as an advisor for more than five years, working alongside the Zambian auditors in a capacity-building role. The Norwegian advisor was also able to provide useful feedback on the case study presentation as well as validate its findings from his unique perspective as someone from outside the Office of Auditor General Zambia and who also had extensive knowledge and experience from within the organization as a long-term advisor.

The trips to Zambia and to Oslo to present preliminary findings were a means of validating the study and refining some historical details based on the feedback of actors who had first-hand experience working in the organizations or working closely with them. Issues of research quality are explored further in the following section, using the four tests of research quality proposed by Yin (2014).

Assessing Research Quality

It is important to consider the quality of research to ensure that the case study findings are valid and reliable and are therefore able to contribute to the development of theory on institutional logics in development contexts. The following sections discuss four measures for assessing research quality and how they relate to the three cases in this study (Yin, 2014). As much as these four measures are “tests” to determine the quality of the study’s design, they were also ongoing guides for the research processes as they unfolded in the field, during analyses, and in writing the case study reports (Yin, 2014, pp. 45-46).

Construct Validity

Establishing construct validity is a foundational aspect of ensuring research quality in case studies, because the concepts being used in the study should accurately reflect social reality. Layder (1998) has called this “the concept-indicator problem”, as a way to characterize the difficulty of social science research to have a “firm... grasp of the connections between theoretical ideas (concepts, frameworks, typologies) and the empirical materials (data, information) they represent” (p. 79, parentheses in original). One way in which this study has attempted to make these connections was the presentations of research in the three organizations in Lusaka in 2017. These review meetings allowed interview respondents and other organization members to read and to hear presentations of the preliminary case study reports on their organizations. Through reading the reports and hearing the oral presentations, they had the opportunity to review the case and reflect on the concepts being used in the study, such as the typology of logics, and to give their feedback on them. “Such review is more than a professional courtesy”, according to Yin (2014); it is “a way of corroborating the essential findings and evidence presented in a case report” (p. 199).

The review meetings helped ensure the “subjective adequacy” of the different concepts used in the study, that they are relevant, understood, and that they “adequately reflect the lived experiences of those studied... Moreover, concepts must be recognizable, make sense and be understandable to those who are the subjects of the study” (Layder, 1998, p. 86). The presentation participants had the opportunity to

reflect on the typology and the analyses of the cases, and they responded that it made sense to them and the work they do in their environment. They also made corrections related to historical and biographical facts, and “the corrections made through this process... enhance[d] the accuracy of the case study” (Yin, 2014, p. 199). Their feedback on the concepts used in the study, the overall narratives of the cases, and the correction of some factual errors, have helped produce stronger subjective adequacy and construct validity.

The review meetings helped to mitigate some of the potential weakness in the case design related to the short length of stay in Zambia (4 trips that lasted between 10 days and 3 weeks for each trip) and the cultural differences between the American researcher based in Norway and the research participants, who were Zambian for the most part. However, as Layder warned, the concept-indicator problem is not fully addressed by ensuring subjective adequacy alone. This is because “social reality is not simply composed of actors’ meanings and subjective understandings, but there exist systemic (or structural) factors which exert considerable influence on the nature of people’s lived experiences” (Ibid, pp. 86-87, parentheses in original). This is particularly relevant on studies of institutional logics in which individual and organizational behavior is being shaped by institutional logics while at the same time those embedded actors are enacting or changing those institutional logics.

To ensure the validity of structural aspects of the theoretical concepts requires that these concepts be “locked into a chain of reasoning related to a wider body of theory” (Ibid, p. 91). This has “to do with the analyst’s (researcher’s) efforts to locate the empirical phenomenon in a wider, more generalized and abstract context of ideas” (Ibid, p. 91, parentheses in original). In this study, this was accomplished by tying into institutional theory and the institutional logics perspective, which is abstract, generalized and able to provide the concepts that can adequately explain and analyze social reality. This study uses constructs that had been previously developed in extant literature, and it builds upon those constructs. These constructs were discussed when describing the theoretical approach in Chapter Two and are primarily the four types of logics, but also include theoretical mechanisms for change such as institutional entrepreneurship, structural overlap, and historical events. Drawing on well-

established literature helps ensure construct validity, while at the same time, it contributes empirical findings and theoretical elaboration back to those research fields.

As these constructs were compared with incoming data from the field, they were able to provide a picture of how actors were enacting the logics within the organizations, the relationships between logics, and how they may have changed over time. The sources of data involved in establishing these conclusions provided a triangulation of semi-structured interviews, observations, documents, and physical artifacts (e.g., the physical locations of the three organization's headquarters). While the interviews were the main source of data, observations, documentation, and artifacts were also useful for drawing conclusions and corroborating the interview data. This triangulation of data also helped ensure construct validity through developing converging lines of inquiry, in which facts of the case were supported by multiple sources of evidence.

Internal Validity

Internal validity, which deals with causal arguments, mainly relates to the case of the Office of Auditor General Zambia, since it explains how change can take place among institutional logics. One way that this case explains change is by looking at the agentive actions of an "institutional entrepreneur" in introducing alternative logics into the organization and driving divergent change, using explanation building to draw its conclusions based on prior theoretical propositions about how these agents can drive divergent institutional change. However, Yin (2014) warned that this approach is "fraught with dangers" because it can be easy for the researchers to lose focus and drift towards other "topics of interest" and because "unwanted selective bias may creep into the process, leading to an explanation that glosses over some key data" (p. 150). The solution from Yin is to continually be reminded of the purpose of the study, to consider alternative plausible explanations, and to use a case study protocol and database.

The interview data from the study were entered into a digital research database and transcribed for later retrieval, and the purpose of the study was continuously revisited throughout the research process, which helped maintain focus. In addition,

the theoretical concepts of change presented in the previous chapter provided a set of alternative explanations that are implicit within the paradox of embedded agency, namely that reflexive human agents drive change or that social structure constrains or enables change (Cardinale, 2018). One of the “possible alternative explanation[s]” (Yin, 2014, p. 150) is that entrepreneurial agents drive divergent change within the organization leading to a new constellation of logics. The rival explanation, based on institutional theories of diffusion or translation, is that embeddedness within an organizational field determines organizational arrangements. Thus, change through “structural overlap” with other organizations (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) is considered alongside “institutional entrepreneurship” (Hardy & Maguire, 2008) as rival explanations for change within the constellations of institutional logics. The interesting result in the case of the Auditor General’s Office is that “structural overlap” and “institutional entrepreneurship” worked together to bring about changes in the constellation of logics guiding the organizations. Therefore, the two explanations can be subsumed into a more general framework for understanding processes of change (Bates et al., 1998, pp. 17-18).

External Validity

To determine whether the findings of a case study are generalizable beyond the study itself requires a discussion of external validity. According to Yin (2014), external validity in case study research is often fundamentally different from that of survey research. In survey research, statistical generalizations are made based on a sampling unit that represents a larger population. Statistical researchers follow methodological procedures to ensure their sample of respondents can adequately represent the larger population onto which they want to extrapolate their findings. In case study research, on the other hand, analytical generalizations are made based on theory that exists “at a conceptual level higher than that of the specific case” (Ibid, p. 41). In that way, case study researchers “go beyond the setting for the specific case” (Ibid, p. 40) by generalizing from empirical findings to broader theory, rather than from sampling units to broader populations.

This case study generalizes its findings to broader theory on institutional logics. It builds a relevant typology for public organizations in the Global South, more specifically Sub-Saharan African and Zambia. It also generalizes its findings about the relationships between logics and how different types of relationships impact action in different ways. Finally, the case of Auditor General presents mechanisms of change within a constellation of logics. The typology can be applied to cases in Zambia and the Sub-Saharan region, and the findings related to how logics interrelate and change could be used on cases using an institutional logics perspective regardless of whether it is focused on the Global North or South.

One limitation to the generalizability of the study is its typology. The typology is applicable to other public organizations within Zambia, as the four types are not dependent on the organization being a public accountability organization. Arguably, the typology could also be used in public organizations throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, since the concepts and characteristics that comprise the kinship logics are drawn primarily from empirical research and theoretical literature on the Sub-Saharan context (Dia, 1991; Ekeh, 1975; Hydén, 2013a, 2013b; Masunungure, 2004; Montgomery, 1987; Posner, 2005). However, the typology would likely prove less useful in other parts of the Global South, for example Latin America and South Asia which have different colonial and societal histories.

Reliability

Reliability is related to repeatability of the case study's procedures. As Yin (2014) argued, "The general way of approaching the reliability problem is to make as many steps as operational as possible and to conduct research as if someone were looking over your shoulder" (p. 49). As noted earlier, this study relies on a research database that catalogued interview data, and even though the interview data is secure and anonymous, the database provides a way, at least hypothetically, that the case study could be repeated by another researcher. Furthermore, a field research protocol is provided in Appendix E that documents data collection in Lusaka and contains brief summaries of the study's purpose, theoretical concepts used, interview themes and

topics, as well as information for contact persons who facilitated the field interviews for the study, which is also a means of repeating the study.

One significant limitation regarding the study's repeatability is that the interviews are anonymous. Therefore, it is not possible to reveal the identities of interview respondents, aside from the respondents who volunteered to reveal their identities, because doing so would put them in potentially dangerous situations. However, if another researcher was to go back to the three organizational settings and use the listed contact people to set up field interviews, then they could conduct new semi-structured interviews using the same theoretical conceptualizations, and they could reach similar conclusions.

Conclusion

The research design and methodology described in this chapter have provided a strategy for understanding the organizational contexts of the three cases and to answer the study's research questions. The qualitative data sources have made it possible to demonstrate how different institutional logics are consistent with the empirical cases, the types of relationships that exist between the different logics, and how those relationships can change. These approaches have also allowed the study to examine the complex relationships between structure and agency within the cases and to describe how actors were shaped by the logics, while at the same time they were constituting them, and it allows the study to compare the analytic narratives derived from the cases with theoretical concepts such as institutional entrepreneurship, structural overlap, and decoupling. The following section presents a brief history of the social and governance structures in modern-day Zambia, which provides a contextual background for the three empirical cases that follow, and it also provides discussions about how the four institutional logics were enacted during the different historical periods.

Chapter Four:

A Brief History of Zambia's Social and Governance Structures

In order to understand the state of affairs in Zambia today, it is important to consider its historical context. This chapter will attempt, albeit briefly and modestly, to follow the history of the land and its people from its early inhabitants to today, giving special attention to its social structures and systems of governance. Roberts (1976) noted the methodological difficulty of studying the prior history of a geographical area that would only come to be established millennia later, which is why he described it as “a study of history *in* Zambia, rather than a history *of* Zambia” (Ibid, p. xi, emphasis added). Texts such as Roberts (1976) and Wills (1985) provide a background history of the land and its people before the arrival of Europeans, while other texts about the colonial period and modern-day Zambia also contribute to this chapter's brief survey of Zambia's history and its social structures (Bratton, Dulani, & Nkomo, 2017; Cheeseman, 2006, 2017; Posner, 2005; Tordoff & Molteno, 1974; Wills, 1985).

The following sections will present a brief survey of the history in Zambia and relate it to the four institutional logics that were presented in Chapter Two. For example, it will show how the social relations and societal structures in the early historical periods were the development and enactment of the kinship logic, and it will show how the British Colonial administration's use of bureaucracies as a system of extraction was an enactment of the bureaucratic logic. Indeed, these two logics, the bureaucratic and kinship logics have existed in relationship to one another in this region going back beyond 100 years. By relating these historical periods to the four types of institutional logics, it then becomes possible to trace the development or the introduction of these logics within Zambian society and also provides a better understanding of the three accountability organizations in this study.

From Nomadic Bushmen to a Tonga Diaspora: Prehistory-1600s

The earliest human activity within the borders of modern-day Zambia can only be established in archeological evidence, mainly in the form of tools that were made of stone over 200,000 years ago (Roberts, 1976). The early bushmen who used these

tools were nomadic scavengers and hunters who would later be misplaced by Bantu tribes that migrated from Western Africa in the 4th century AD, bringing iron tools and more modern agricultural practices with them (Wills, 1985, p. 14). This time period came to be called “the bantu explosion” (Roberts, 1976, p. 27) and led to more stable settlements and the exchange of commodities between the groups of settlers. In the 12th century AD, the Tonga people arrived in the region, as part of what is called the Tonga diaspora (Roberts, 1976). Based on evidence found in Tonga burial sites, the Tonga people introduced the idea of social stratification based on wealth and status, as some of the human remains found in the burial sites were much more richly adorned than other remains (Ibid, pp. 54-55).



Maps of Modern-Day Zambia (www.cia.gov)

By the 16th century AD, the region had become inhabited mostly by small-scale farmers, whom today’s Zambians could consider their hereditary ancestors (Roberts, 1976). To the Northeast and central parts of Zambia were the Bemba peoples of the “Luangwa tradition”, who occupied the woodlands. To the South were the Tonga people who were herdsmen and cotton spinners. To the west were the Lozi farmers who are thought to have inhabited that area for centuries. In addition to these larger people groups were other smaller clans. Everyone in Zambia at that time belonged to clans, which were named after natural phenomena such as animals. These clans defined their own customs for marriage, family, and social relationships, and these customs helped provide social boundaries. In the period leading up to the 1700s,

political relations and social organization were based primarily on familial relations, and power within the clans and people groups was diffuse among their members.

The Rise of the Chieftains: 1700-1860

The period from the 1700s marked the rise of the chieftains, and by the 1800s, nearly everyone in the area was governed by a chief. The nature and extent of a chief's authority varied across the region. Some chiefs were the head men of the village, and others were paramount chiefs or "senior ruler" among all other chiefs in the tribe (Roberts, 1976, p. 80). Chiefs were responsible for making sure people followed local customs and laws. Most importantly, they made sure their people were kept safe from enemy tribes or other forms of calamity. All of the chiefs required their subjects to pay tribute to them in some form or another, either in goods or services. While this made the chiefs wealthier than others in the tribe, much was required of them in return (Swidler, 2009). They met the needs of visitors, maintained a supply of food in case of famine, and took care of people in the tribe who were unable to take care of themselves. Indeed, upon payment of a tribute, "a chief commonly made some payment in return: such 'reciprocal' exchange was one of the most important means of circulating scarce commodities such as salt, iron-work, or foreign cloth" (Roberts, 1976 p. 81). These types of reciprocal exchanges are hallmarks of traditional systems that developed across Sub-Saharan Africa and in Zambia, and they were important for sharing scarce resources across the tribe, providing a common good, and taking care of those in need (Hydén, 2013a).

The time periods from the early civilizations to the rise of the chieftains can be understood as being mainly consistent with the kinship logic, as social relations were informal and based on reciprocal exchanges to meet the needs of tribe members. Power relations can be seen as based on patriarchal structures and other informal ties such as religion and kinship. Shared sense of identity at this time would have been based on clan or tribe membership, and it would have been reinforced through each clan's unique customs, taboos, and family structures, which would have defined boundaries between in-group and out-group members.

British Domination and African Resistance: 1860-1964

The British first began arriving to the area as Christian missionaries during the 19th Century. David Livingstone was among the first and often wrote romantically about the region and his missional quest for “the heart of Africa”. Later, other missionaries from Britain were inspired by his writings, and thereafter, “[a] welter of denominations, each bent upon capturing souls for a Christ of its particular persuasion” followed him there (Rotberg, 1965, p. 8). At that time, the region was actually of little interest to the British Empire, who were “quite content to see northern ‘Zambezia’ pass into the hands of Portugal” (Hughes, 1963, as cited by Cheeseman, 2017, p. 100). The British government only became involved after Cecil Rhodes, the mining magnate and colonial statesman, sought to attain a royal charter from the British after he had begun receiving mining concessions from among the local tribes. Territorialization of the region followed, sometimes by threat of force and by 1900, Rhodes and the British South African Company had established company rule in the land that would come to be called Northern Rhodesia.

Northern Rhodesia would be a British territory under the administration of the British South Africa Company until 1924. According to Cheeseman (2006), the British South Africa Company “was concerned with profits rather than effective government and so little was done to develop an effective structure of government” which “necessitated the construction of a system of indirect rule, in which the Company relied upon a ‘small body of white civil servants’ to preside over a tier of co-opted ‘native authorities’” (pp. 100-101). This led Cheeseman to note that the “system of Administration developed in Zambia was... limited” (Ibid, p. 100), as the British South Africa Company only had “fewer than fifty administrators” in Northern Rhodesia at that time (Posner, 2005, p. 27). Thus, local chiefs were co-opted as tax collectors and arbiters of conflicts among native populations.

In 1924, the status of Northern Rhodesia moved from being a territory under the control of the British South Africa Company to becoming a protectorate under the British Empire, which brought the territory under the British Secretary of State for the Colonies. The colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia followed the same pattern as the British South Africa Company, as it organized much of its administration via

tribes and chiefs (Posner, 2005; Roberts, 1976). One difference however, is that the colonial administration vested more power in the chiefs through the Native Authorities programs that gave the chiefs more control over resources such as treasury funds, lands, agricultural resources, and judicial powers. This provided the chiefs with more means for compelling the allegiance and fealty of the members of their tribes and kingdoms. Thus, as tribe members invested in their relationships with the chiefs, the chiefs would reciprocate with loans, land, and favorable court rulings. In this way, colonial rule further strengthened the power and influence of chiefs by investing in them resources and power from the colonial state (Posner, 2005).

These descriptions of the colonial administration from Cheeseman (2006), Posner (2005), and Roberts (1976) can be seen as the enactment of two institutional logics: the kinship logic and the bureaucratic logic. The colonial office sought to achieve their purposes through the informal practices of the kinship logic, enabling them to control and extract from the native population via existing kinship and tribal relations. As the chiefs already had informal authority within their tribes and were already practicing the methods through which they received tributes and reciprocated to circulate commodities and goods, the colonial authorities used those systems for their own benefit. This strengthened the roles of the chiefs by layering the formal authority structures of the Native Authorities programs over the informal authority that the chiefs already exercised. Thus, there was a facilitative relationship between the bureaucratic and kinship logics as the formal authority vested by the colonial administration strengthened and facilitated the informal authority and patriarchal position of the chiefs. This precipitated Zambian independence with the development of an African elite who would later lead the nationalist struggle in what would eventually be called a “fairly peaceful and evolutionary, albeit hasty, transition to political independence in which Britain eventually co-operated with the nationalist movement” (Tordoff & Molteno, 1974, p. 11).

The First Republic of Zambia: 1964-1972

After years of struggle by the native populations, the former colony of Northern Rhodesia became independent from the United Kingdom on the 24th of October, 1964,

and it would be called the Republic of Zambia. A new constitution was drafted, and Kenneth Kaunda, a former freedom fighter and national hero would become Zambia's first president. As with the populations of other former British colonies, Zambians then "found themselves straddled with a hybrid and disconnected system in which formal institutions transplanted from the outside had been superimposed upon indigenous informal institutions reflecting the cultures and traditions of these societies" (Hydén, 2013b, p. 925). Zambia had inherited the Westminster model of government and its administrative systems, which had been composed primarily of British settlers and based on serving colonial interests.

The systems of bureaucracy Zambia inherited were designed to maintain law and order and to extract resources from the colony to the colonial power at minimal cost (Mulikita, 2002). The Zambian government then set out "to adapt the English model of local government to the post-independence situation" (Tordoff & Young, 1994, p. 285). The early days of "Zambianization" of the civil service faced significant challenges with a steady exodus of European bureaucrats and an influx of undereducated Zambians entering the civil service (Mpaisha, 2004). To exacerbate these problems, Kaunda began using government jobs as way to reward those who had been faithful to his political party and the struggle for independence, placing party loyalty over administrative ability (Cheeseman, 2006).

Levels of education during the First Republic of Zambia were extremely low. At the time of independence in 1964, there were "only 109 indigenous people with university degrees and 1,200 indigenous people with secondary school certificates out of a population of 2 million" (Mpaisha, 2004, p. 191). Even after the Zambian government established the University of Zambia in 1965, enrolment of new students only stood at 312 students, and it would still take years for them to finish their studies and earn university degrees. This meant that while the need to fill the Zambian civil service with qualified officers was overwhelming, the pool of available candidates was woefully inadequate. Mpaisha noted, "The civil service was so desperate for staff, a basic secondary school qualification being all the was required for employment. In some cases, students were withdrawn from schools to take up a career in the civil service" (Ibid, 193). As a result of these problems with recruitment, "The image of the

whole civil service suffered” (Ibid, p. 193). These situations led to what Mulikita (2002) described as an erosion of professionalism within the Zambian public administration.

The Zambian government’s establishment of its new civil service in many ways was an enactment of the bureaucratic logic, as it adopted the bureaucratic systems it had inherited from the British. It had many of the same characteristics, structures, and duties associated within the various bureaucratic roles, and many of the former European occupants of those roles remained for a time. However, Kaunda and his party also used the civil service as a way of reciprocating benefits to faithful followers and freedom fighters, which was also the enactment of the kinship logic, with its emphasis on reciprocal exchanges, personalization of public resources, and employment based on personal favors.

The Second Republic of Zambia: 1972-1991

By the early 1970s, internal factions within Kaunda’s UNIP political party had developed around ethnic and tribal lines, and as a result, some UNIP members left the party and formed a new breakaway party, the United Progressive Party (UPP), which had widespread support from the dominant Bemba population. This presented an existential threat to UNIP and to President Kaunda’s hold on power. In February of 1972, President Kaunda declared Zambia would become a one-party state. He appointed a commission to determine how to move forward, which toured the country to hear from citizens and seemed more “an empty gesture to give the mere appearance of consultation” than a means of actually allowing “all who wished [to] have a voice in the eventual outcome” of Zambia’s democratic system (Pettman, 1974, pp. 239, 236). The commission culminated in a resolution that passed through Parliament on the 8th of December, 1972 and made UNIP the single party in Zambian politics and gave President Kaunda complete domination of the party and the government (Ibid, p. 240).

The problem of unqualified civil servants within the Zambian administration became worse as Zambia expanded the civil service, as there was an “accelerated promotion of individuals already in the civil service”, and as a result, junior officers of “relatively poor quality were... shifted upwards in the bureaucracy” (Mpaisha, 2004,

p. 194). This meant the new university graduates from the University of Zambia and the newly established Copperbelt University had to be placed in junior positions under senior-level bureaucrats with lower education and qualifications than their juniors (Ibid).

New professional organizations were beginning to be established in Zambia at this time. For example, the Zambian Parliament established the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) in 1973 with its passage of the Law Association of Zambia Act (1973). Then, less than ten years later, in 1982, Parliament established another professional organization, the Zambian Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA) with the passage of the Accountants Act (1982). The Accountants Act mandated that ZICA would be the professional organization in Zambia to “assist in the education and training of persons practising or intending to practise the profession of accountancy; (b) conduct professional examinations in accountancy; (c) maintain and improve the professional standards of accountants” (*Accountants Act of Zambia*, 1982, section 5).

The development of new professional organizations and university systems were the enactment of the professionalism logic within Zambia, which is based on professional training and standards within the professional disciplines. The bureaucratic and kinship logics continued to be influential within the Zambian administration at that time, as the spoils system and personal favors were still ways in which jobs were given, and benefits were extended to those who were in the government’s favor. Cheeseman (2006) characterized the public administration in Zambia in the 2nd Republic as a “faltering bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (p. 42), arguing that the UNIP party and the bureaucracy were fused together as a means of providing political patronage. Patronage from the Kaunda government flowed down to senior-level bureaucrats, who enjoyed the benefits from the state-controlled economy and were able to enrich themselves and other members of the “aspirational ‘middle class’” (Ibid, p. 52). However, these benefits were “not extended vertically into the locality in a way that connected the Zambian ‘public’ to the centre” (Ibid, p. 52), which resulted in a growing discontentment among many ordinary Zambians. Their discontentment was intensified when the Zambian economy collapsed in the late 1970s and 1980s and structural adjustment programs led to crippling food shortages. There was a popular

uprising among the public, the labor unions, and the church, which would eventually be followed by a reinstatement of multi-party elections and the dawning of the Third Republic of Zambia.

The Third Republic of Zambia: 1991-Present

The Third Republic of Zambia began in 1991 with the amendment of the Constitution allowing multi-party elections. A new president would be elected for the first time in Zambia's 30 years, Frederick Chiluba, and his new political party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), also won a majority of seats in Parliament. They began liberalizing the economy and launched a series of major public service reforms beginning in 1993, with the Public Service Restructuring Program (PSRP) which was supposed to "make the Zambian Public Service leaner..., to improve Human Resource Management through Performance related incentives..., and to decentralize and devolve administrative power away from Central Ministries" (Mulikita, 2002, p. 4).

The civil service reforms that began in 1993 were the enactment of the development management logic, with its emphasis on service delivery, performance evaluations, and decentralization. In the midst of these reforms, however, corruption also increased at an alarming rate in Zambia. Chiluba, along with other members of his administration, would be investigated and charged for crimes related to the theft of public resources and corruption. It was in this point of Zambia's history that corruption became institutionalized in society and in the government to a degree that the country had never experienced before (Momba, 2007; Rotberg, 2017).

Chiluba tried to amend the constitution to allow him a third term, but that failed, and he had to step down in 2002. Several presidents have succeeded Chiluba in the Third Republic of Zambia, beginning with Levy Mwanawasa, who died early in his second term in office, in 2008. Mwanawasa's Vice President, Rupiah Banda, then replaced him and won a by-election allowing him to serve the remainder of Mwanawasa's term until 2011. Michael Sata, won the 2011 elections along with his new populist party, the Patriotic Front. Sata also died in office, in 2014, and his Vice President, Guy Scott served until by-elections were held. Edgar Lungu won the by-

elections and remains president today after winning the most recent elections in 2016. However, that election process was seen as “significantly flawed” by the Carter Center (2016, p. 1), due to incidents of violence, abuse of public office, and harassment of the media. More recently, the Lungu government has incarcerated the main opposition leader, invoked a “state of threatened emergency” in the country (Cheeseman, 2017), and suspended opposition members of parliament for missing the President’s State of the Union address. These heavy-handed tactics harken back to Kaunda’s time as authoritarian president when Zambia was governed under a state of emergency until he lost power in 1991 (Cotterill, 2017).

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the history in Zambia and to indicate the rise of the four different logics within its society. It describes the development of the kinship logic within the contexts of the tribes and the relationships between tribe members. It also describes how, with the arrival of the British, a more formal bureaucratic logic was introduced alongside the kinship logic, as the British created the colony of Northern Rhodesia. Finally, the chapter described the introduction of the professionalism and development-management logics in more recent years, as professional organizations were established beginning in the 1970s and as the new government of Frederick Chiluba began launching administrative reforms in the 1990s. Notably, the three organizations that are the focal points for this study began at different times in Zambia’s history, which is indicated in the timeline on the following page.

A Graphical Timeline of History in Zambia

Ca. 200,000 BC	<p>Stone-age period: Nomadic peoples inhabit river basins.</p>	<p>1964: Transition of the State Audit from Northern Rhodesia to Zambia and the creation of the Zambian Audit Office.</p>
Ca. 400 AD - Late 1600s	<p>Influx of familial clans: Migration of Bantu and Tonga tribes bringing clan-based systems of governance and social organization based on familial relations.</p>	<p>Being the process of “Zambianization” in the civil service.</p> <p>1972: Appointment of the Chona Commission for public hearings on how to move forward as one-party state</p>
Ca 1700 - 1890	<p>The rise of the chieftaincy: Patriarchal system of paramount chiefs and lower chiefs responsible for the security and common good of tribe members.</p> <p>Tributes systems distributed needed and scarce commodities</p>	<p>1972 - 1991</p> <p>The Second Republic: Transition to a one-party system</p> <p>1974: establishment of the Zambian ombudsman office</p> <p>1982: establishment of the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission</p> <p>Drop in copper prices led to economic crisis</p> <p>Kaunda allowed multi-party elections, ending one-party rule</p>
1890 - 1964	<p>British Domination and African resistance: 1891-1924, administered by British South Africa Company</p> <p>1924, administered by British Colonial Office, making “Northern Rhodesia” a colony</p> <p>1953, Rhodesia became federated with Nyasaland (less British influence)</p>	<p>1991 - 2017</p> <p>The Third Republic: A transition to multi-party system.</p> <p>1991-2001: Frederick Chiluba Presidency</p> <p>Dramatic increase in corruption</p> <p>2002-2008: Levy Mwanawasa presidency (died in office 2008) <i>Creation of the Task Force against Corruption</i> <i>Former President Chiluba charged for public theft</i></p>
1964 - 1972	<p>The First Republic: New independence constitution, creating a new state, The Republic of Zambia</p> <p>1964: Kenneth Kaunda elected as Zambia’s first president</p>	<p>2008-2011: Rupiah Banda Presidency</p> <p>2011-2014: Michael Sata Presidency (died in office 2014)</p> <p>2014-2017: Edgar Lungu presidency</p>

Chapter Five: Professionalizing the Office of Auditor General Zambia

This chapter examines processes of change among institutional logics within the Office of Auditor General Zambia, using the concepts of institutional entrepreneurship and structural overlap to explain how these processes unfolded over time. It presents a narrative showing how a new Auditor General promulgated the professionalism and development management logics within the organization at a critical juncture in Zambia's history, the resistance she encountered, and how her unique social position informed and enabled the change processes to continue in spite of that resistance. It also discusses how the audit office's engagement with the international professional community lowered barriers to change and how these relationships provided ready-made standards, methods, and a shared sense of professional identity from which members of the Zambian audit office could draw, which also played a critical role in change processes.

The chapter's narrative is presented in chronological order, which allows it to present an impression of the context of the organization before the change processes began and after, showing how the relationships between logics also changed. This demonstrates how changes among institutional logics can actually take place within public accountability organizations in the Global South, as processes of development and reform. The case narrative places moments in which alternative logics were promulgated within the organization in their historical contexts, leading to the appointment of the new Auditor General in 2003, as well as the Office of Auditor General's increasing engagement with the international professional community, and it shows how members of the organization enacted the promulgated institutional logics within their context as local translations and adaptations of logics from the societal level. In describing these processes, the chapter draws from the concepts of embedded agency (Andrews, 2013; Battilana et al., 2009; Cardinale, 2018) and the imitation and translation of ideas (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017) to explain how organization leaders and members promulgated and enacted the institutional logics within the organization.

The remainder of the chapter begins with a section that describes the rise and the prominence of auditing and national audit offices around the world, particularly since the 1980s when auditing became a prominent tool of “public accountability and stakeholder dialogue” (Power, 2003, p. 200). Indeed, some have even argued that this was the time when traditional society became an *audit society*, which changed the way work was done in order to make it measurable and auditable (Power, 1997). The section also describes the rise of an international professional community of state auditors, which is responsible for developing and spreading professional audit standards around the world and promoting international cooperation between state audit offices. These descriptions place the case of the Anti-Corruption Commission within its international context and provide a background for the change processes that are described later in the chapter.

Supreme Audit Institutions and “The Audit Explosion”

The Office of Auditor General Zambia is the public accountability organization responsible for auditing the government’s institutions. This type of organization is known more generally as a Supreme Audit Institution (SAI). The main function of a SAI is to make sure government accounts are correct and that the government is managing public funds appropriately. SAIs perform this function primarily through auditing the government’s revenue and its spending (Stapenhurst & Titsworth, 2001). However, “in recent years more and more SAIs have started to review the performance of public administration” in addition to reviewing budgets and spending (Noussi, 2012, p. 32). Because of SAIs’ core functions in overseeing government resources, these types of organizations are thought to play a role in curbing fraud and abuse and in increasing overall government accountability in their handling of public resources (Stapenhurst & Titsworth, 2001).

Nearly all states in the world have a SAI, which can be based on one of three models: *the court model*, *the board-system model*, and *the Westminster model*. The court model is run by a collegial court of judges, who typically hold their positions until retirement. These audit courts have judicial jurisdiction to impose penalties and are, therefore, not dependent on legislatures for following up their audits. The board-

system model is similar to the court model in that they have a “collegial approach to deciding important issues but have no judicial function” and must rely on legislatures or other bodies for following up their reports (Noussi, 2012, p. 35). The Westminster model, also called the audit office model, typically has a single head called an Auditor General. The authority that Auditors General have can vary widely from state to state, but they typically report to legislators who then follow-up on recommendations made within the audit reports. Therefore, audit offices do not prosecute or take action against individuals or organizations, but they work closely with investigative bodies and the Parliamentary committees that do take these types of actions (Hoque & Thiagarajah, 2015).

Globally, since the 1980s, there has been what is popularly called “the audit explosion”, characterized by “an increase in the quality and quantity of formal monitoring systems” of state resources and programs (Power, 2003, p. 185). Auditing can be seen as a tool for both “blaming” and for “learning” since it is used to “identify and punish recalcitrant individual and organizational behavior” as well as to “support values of learning, development, and evolutionary improvement in organizational management systems” (Ibid, p. 196). Since audits are used as a tool for identifying the misuse of resources as well as for improvement of organizational management systems, the international donor community has devoted increasing attention to programs that build institutional capacity in supreme audit institutions in the Global South (Hydén, 2013b, p. 928; Stapenhurst & Titsworth, 2001).

Alongside the “audit explosion” described by Power (2003, p. 185), the international arena has also seen the rise of an umbrella organization that supports the work of its member SAIs, the International Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). INTOSAI, which was first established in 1953, is now comprised of 194 member SAIs from around the world and considers itself to be “an autonomous, independent, and non-political organization” (INTOSAI, 2017, p. 2). The work of INTOSAI is centered around four strategic goals: providing and maintaining international audit standards; building audit capacity in SAIs; encouraging SAI cooperation, collaboration, and knowledge exchange; and being a “model international organization” that other organizations around the world would want to

emulate (INTOSAI, 2017, p. 11). INTOSAI also works through smaller, regional branch organizations around the world. For example, the African Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAI) serves as the umbrella for SAIs in states across the continent, and the African Organizations for Supreme Audit Institutions in English Speaking Countries (AFROSAI-E) focuses on translating international standards and norms from INTOSAI for the African SAIs that work within their own unique governance contexts, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa.

One of the significant contributions of INTOSAI is the development and propagation of professional audit standards, which are called the International Standards for Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs). According to INTOSAI, these ISSAIs are the foundational principles for the proper functioning of Supreme Audit Institutions, and they are the “authoritative international standards on public sector auditing” (“What are ISSAIs?,” n.d.). There are over 40 ISSAIs, each containing multiple guidelines related to SAIs. Gustavson (2014), in her study of SAIs in Sub-Saharan Africa, summarized the salient aspects of the ISSAIs into what she called the three pillars of a Supreme Audit Institution: the independence of the SAI, the standardized work procedures used by auditors, and competence in relation to appropriate levels of education and qualifications (p. 104).

SAIs from around the world gather on a regular basis for INTOSAI congressional gatherings, workgroup meetings, and various symposia geared toward training and capacity building. SAIs, such as Zambia’s, who are members of AFROSAI-E also meet on a regular basis as they hold training programs specifically related to capacity building within the Sub-Saharan African context. These training programs focus on such topics as audits tools and methods, managing relationships between SAIs and Parliamentary committees, and the public relations functions of audit offices. In addition to these regional gatherings, it is also a common practice for the different SAIs in the regions to cooperate with one another by auditing each other’s work practices and conducting joint audits to share knowledge and expertise across the different national audit offices (Gustavson, 2014).

The History of State Audit in Zambia

The history of state auditing in Zambia goes back to the colonial period. As with most other Sub-Saharan states, Zambia inherited its current audit model from the former colonial government (McKie & van de Walle, 2010), a model it has largely retained up to the present time. When the British South Africa Company administered the territory between 1891 and 1924, audits were conducted by the British High Commission in Cape Town and were then submitted to the Secretary of State in London. Later, between 1924 and 1963, when the territory officially became part of a self-governing British protectorate, the audits were carried out by the office of Colonial Audit Services and submitted to the local governor who responded to the reports and thereafter submitted them to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London (Simwanza, 2003). It was not until 1954 that Northern Rhodesia created its own localized audit agency, the Audit Department of Northern Rhodesia, which had its own Auditor General.

By the time of Zambian independence in 1964, a traditional and legal foundation of the Office of Auditor General had already been established. It was a foundation based on the Westminster system of auditing, in which an auditor general and his (and later, her) accounting staff prepared written reports about the financial accounts of the government and treasuries that were then presented to select Parliamentary committees for review and follow-up, if necessary. The newly drafted constitution of the fledgling state of Zambia would again call for an Auditor General, whom the President would appoint and whom should be ratified by parliament. The constitution also called for the creation of an audit office with support staff to help fulfill the responsibilities of the appointed Auditor General, which is called the Office of Auditor General or, alternatively, the National Audit Office. After independence, the former colonial staff remained in place within the National Audit Office, as well as the former British Auditor, John Bourne, who then became the first Auditor General of Zambia. During this time, the Office of Auditor General operated as a part of the Ministry of Finance. This arrangement, according to Mwambwa (1998), came as “a result of the uncertainties following the changes in the political scenario” (p. 18).

Early Growth, Stability, and Low Capacity in the Office of Auditor General

In the midst of the uncertainties in the new state of Zambia, the Office of Auditor General slowly began hiring Zambian nationals to join its audit cadre. This was part of the overall process of Zambianization, which saw the replacement of European officers with Zambian nationals. As this process occurred at the Office of Auditor General Zambia, the challenges discussed in the previous chapter also apply, namely that the newly hired Zambian nationals had not received high levels of education due to the inequalities of the colonial system. It would, therefore, require several years of educational development to have the capacity to recruit Zambian staff with higher education to work in the audit office.

The British Auditor, John Bourne, continued to serve as the Auditor General of Zambia until 1972, when a Zambian national would replace him. The first Zambian Auditor General was Stubbs Nundwe, who held the position from 1972 to 1992. During Nundwe's tenure, the Audit Act of 1980 was passed into law, which further codified the security of tenure of the Auditor General and the powers of the office to have access to financial records for auditing purposes. Then, in 1992, the third Auditor General was appointed, Frederick Siame, who served until 2003. It was during these years, wrote Mwambwa (1998), that "the SAI ha[d] evolved from a small audit institution with a small work force of expatriates to a... work force of 150 audit staff, and... an autonomous office within the public service" (p. 18). Frederick Siame served until 2003, when he was replaced by the fourth Auditor General of Zambia, Anna Chifungula, who would retire in 2015. Currently, at the time of writing, there is still an "acting Auditor General", Ronald Mwambwa, who is expected to hold the temporary position until the president appoints a formal replacement.

Up until the early 2000s, there were significant challenges related to the capabilities of the audit staff, and the quality of the audit reports was considered low according to interview respondents and to outside observers (Norad, 2007). By 2003, a four-year backlog of audit reports had been built up, and the quality of those reports was considered insufficient for holding government agencies accountable for the misuse or misappropriation of resources. Therefore, the Office of Auditor General was not able to play its role in the punishment of "recalcitrant... behavior" or in the

“support... of learning, development, and evolutionary improvement” (Power, 2003, p. 196) within the government of Zambia. This was illustrated by a case study report by Norad, which noted,

Historically, the OAG faced several constraints in performing its duties: ...independence compromised because supported by civil servants and public officers, inadequate financial resources; inadequate human resource capacity and skills; undeveloped internal systems... These constraints resulted in some key failings including lack of professionalism and fiduciary duty; limited scope of audits; and inconclusive and untimely reporting” (Norad, 2007, p. 56).

Commensurate with the Norad (2007) report, interview respondents also described an overall lack of professionalism in the office during this time period. They noted that auditors lacked the skills and motivation to perform their duties and that most of them were underqualified to do the type of work they were assigned to do. They lacked education and training in current accounting and auditing techniques, and the result was seen in the low quality and lack of timeliness in their work, for example the four-year backlog of audit reports.

In the ways interview respondents described this time period, the formal aspects of the organization were consistent with the bureaucratic logic. The agency was part of the centralized state bureaucracy, and they were internally oriented, which served to isolate them from external pressures. Some interview respondents noted that they were actually secretive in the ways they interacted with society, and they did not consider it important to communicate with the public about the contents of their audit reports at that time. An advisor from the Norwegian foreign ministry described it this way:

Previously you had an organizational culture where they considered everything [confidential, saying:] “No, no, this is confidential, this is secretive” - not knowing the constitution gives them the right to hold audit papers and preparations confidential until it is released. So, when it is released, they should give as much information as possible to the stakeholders, and now that has started happening. So, part of the cultural shift has been shifting from the bureaucracy, which is inward, to outward looking.

During this time, the Office of Auditor General went about its business without a strategy to engage the public and without informing members of the public about the nature of the work of the office or the findings of their audit reports. One officer described his own personal experience with the organization, that before working for the audit office, he had actually never even heard of it. To him, this exemplified the insular approach the agency was taking at that time. He said:

I was quite active in my studies both within the university and outside, but I can confirm to you that I didn't even know that there was such as an office - even at the time I graduated, I didn't know about this office. So, this is one litmus test I have used - if I didn't know, myself a scholar, how many more people didn't know about this - especially the taxpayers?

The Office of Auditor General was operating in the shadows of the Zambian government and the public, with little regard for the external environment, and this arrangement seemed appropriate to organization members at that time. This was characteristic of the bureaucratic logic, with its internal orientation of organization members toward the bureaucratic organization.

The core values and organizational structure of the audit office were also consistent with the bureaucratic logic in the sense that it was a formal and centralized hierarchy with an emphasis on following established procedures. It was based on following rules and directives, and those at the top of the hierarchy were treated with unquestioned respect. One interview respondent described this way of operating in the following:

It was a very small office. It was highly formalized, and the relationships were the formal type - hierarchical... it was a very formal arrangement. You've got the boss, junior, and what not. Even in the relationships, it was just around those lines. It was: "He's your boss, and that's it!"

One of the Deputy Auditor Generals, who had worked for many years within the organization, described it as a "very, very closed office" and that it was difficult to work through the hierarchy at that time:

Very few people knew what was going on in this place, and even working here when we joined, it was very difficult for you to go to your superior and say

anything. The culture was totally different because you felt like, I don't know how to describe it, but people just kept to themselves... That was the culture, but now it's completely different because people are open with each other. A lot of people come here [to my office], and we chat and things like that. Yes, now it's very, very different.

These types of interactions and hierarchical structures were consistent with the bureaucratic logic, and some respondents also argued that this tended to slow down the auditing and reporting processes leading to the delays in their reports.

The Auditor General described the situation when she first arrived to the office in 2003 and the work delays that were common during that time:

They were so set in their ways of working, according to them. The report had to go to the auditor general, and the auditor general could take up to 3 or 4 months to look at it. After that, then they would write to auditees. They had strange time lags that were there.

The time lags in the Office of Auditor General were, in some ways, reminiscent of the days during the colonial era, in which the reports had to move between the colonial territory, Cape Town, and the seat of the distant imperial power in London. Because of the multiple levels in the hierarchy that needed to be worked through and the overall lack of capacity, those processes were slow, and the office was not able to submit the yearly audit report by December 31st each year, as they were mandated by law to do. Add that to the fact that they had fallen far behind in the production of their audit reports, and this made it difficult, if not impossible, to hold individuals and agencies within the government to account for the misuse or misappropriation of funds.

Most of the auditors joining the organization were actually recruited into the audit office right after finishing secondary school without ever attending university. This was a centralized process in which new officers were inducted into the civil service in a cohort with others from across the entire civil service in Zambia. In this way, the organization was enacting employment practices consistent with the bureaucratic logic. One of the auditors who had been employed in the office for many years reflected on his own entry into employment with the following statement:

[W]hen we came, we went through what is called an induction course. So, at the induction course, we were told what is expected of us, because the Office of the Auditor General falls under the public service... which means we have to adhere to the rules, terms, and conditions of service in the public service. So, we underwent that training for a period of 6 days... Then after training, we were posted in the field and we were called clerk officers.

The newly appointed cohort of new clerk officers was then sent to study in a basic program that led to a diploma in state auditing. After they completed the course successfully, they would then be called “assistant auditors” within the organization. To this limited extent, there was some form of professionalism in the office because officers did undergo specialized training in state auditing before they could officially be promoted from clerk officers to assistant auditors. However, this was a rudimentary level of professional training compared to that which is required in the professional field of auditing, in which the content and complexity of audits continually evolves and advanced methods are required to conduct audits (Hoque & Thiagarajah, 2015, pp. 14-16).

Promotions within the ranks of auditors at that time were based primarily on seniority, rather than on academic qualifications or work performance. Another one of the officers who had been employed in the organization many years described his own experience with promotions in the following way:

In the past, they looked at seniority very much. But now I see that going. You see, like me, I’ve been principal auditor for 10 years or so, but you find someone who just became principal auditor today, you would think we were on the same level. But in the past, they used to take it [seniority] very seriously. You find that some people who are even junior to me, like my boss who came in after me as principal auditor, but he has a master’s degree so they promoted him above me. He’s also doing his PhD, so they promoted him. But in the past, I should have been the one to go first.

This interview response shows the contrast between the old employment practices and the new employment practices, and it highlights the previous emphasis on seniority as the main criteria for promotions during that time.

The descriptions from the interview respondents above and from documents about the organization at this time are mainly consistent with the bureaucratic logic. There had been a formal structure with a steep vertical hierarchy within the organization. Entry into the workforce was centralized through the Public Service Commission, as was the case with other public organizations in Zambia, and promotions were based on length of tenure rather than merit or professional qualifications. There was rudimentary training leading to diplomas in state auditing, but this was not enough to keep up with changing trends in government finance as well as the global movement toward performance audits as a way of measuring the value for money of government programs (Hoque & Thiagarajah, 2015).

While those descriptions described the formal ways in which the organization operated, interview respondents also described ways in which there was an informal mode of operation in the organization. Workers often did not work full days – showing up late and leaving early. One respondent described the way people viewed their work at that time as, “just waiting for your salary at the end of the month... I go to work, and at the end of the month, I get my salary.” The notion that workers were responsible for producing tangible outputs and actually working the hours for which they were paid did not seem salient to many at that time. This way of viewing work is consistent with a kinship logic, in which there is no separation between the private sphere and the public sphere (Hydén, 2013a; Masunungure, 2004). So, according to the mode of operation of the kinship logic, the organization was there to meet the personal needs of its management and staff – serving as the “personal fiefdoms” of civil servants (Montgomery, 1987). The consequences to this mode of operation were low levels of service to the public at the expense of state resources.

Furthermore, there was also the impression that the Office of Auditor General had formerly been compromised by undue influence from political leaders at that time. The Auditor General herself said in an interview, that “the institution seemed to have been very politicized, because at that time, even the auditor general that was there, the poor man, was getting instructions sometimes from politicians. That made his job very difficult”. Hatchard (2014) likewise noted similar problems related to undue political influence of the Auditor General during the Chiluba administration:

[T]he Auditor General failed properly to exercise his duties or alternatively chose not to exercise the duties required of him probably because of the intimidatory nature of Chungu [who was the Director General of the Zambian Security Services at that time] and the unwillingness of the Auditor General to challenge him and thus the president (p. 72).

These situations during the Chiluba administration, in which the former Auditor General was seen as acting at the behest of the President and the Director General of the Zambian Security Services, are consistent with the kinship logic, in which there was informal control through fear of reprisals or expectations of reciprocal exchanges.

It was in the midst of these challenges, in 1996, that the Norwegian Foreign Ministry began funding a development project at the Office of Auditor General Zambia, called the Restructuring and Institutional Development Project (RIDP). The purpose of the project was to “to build the capacity of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG Zambia) to ‘conduct independent, timely and cost effective audits in order to ensure optimal utilisation of resources’” (Norad, 2008, p. 113, parentheses in original). According to a representative from the Norwegian Embassy, the Norwegian government started the project at “the time when the thrust for proper management of corruption activities came into the fore” at an international level, and they saw the Office of Auditor General as “a very important institution, but [realized] it was playing ‘second fiddle’ in the background, and it was not coming out as important as it should be”. So, in light of international developments related to accountability and the control of corruption, the Norwegian government saw the Office of Auditor General as an increasingly important organization and a central part in an overall strategy for improving governance in Zambia.

The interview respondent then went on to describe the Norwegian involvement at this time in the following:

So, from 1996 till 2001, that was called RIDP-I. Much of what happened there was trying to identify the proper building blocks to make a supreme audit institution, and realigning this in its proper sequence. It was purely the basics of restructuring.

At that time, the Norwegian development project at the Office of Auditor General was

focused on evaluating what needed to be done to modernize and build capacity within the organization, as well as offering technical training to members of the audit staff. These processes were consistent with the values of the professionalism logic, particularly as it related to training Zambian auditors in the skills and methods of the professional field of auditing.

Instability, Transition, and the Promulgation of Alternative Logics

Meanwhile, problems and scandals were beginning to surface within the government of Zambia and throughout the country. The benefits from liberalization reforms that were promised by President Chiluba, who served from 1991-2001, were not being realized, and there was additional uncertainty after Chiluba had reached the limit of serving two terms as president (Ng'oma, 2008). There were rumors of rampant corruption in the government, high levels of inflation, and rising unemployment as some of the nation's copper mines began closing (Ibid). At this time in Zambia's history, there was a crucial role to be played by an Office of Auditor General that would be capable of holding the government to account for the way it was using public resources. However, at this time, the agency was still not equipped to handle the scope of audits required for this responsibility, nor was it prepared to communicate the findings of their audits with the public.

In the final years of the Chiluba presidency, the public and the media had begun calling for greater accountability of government officials who were suspected of committing fraud or the theft of public funds. The independent Zambian newspaper, *The Post*, had begun running news stories alleging corruption at the highest offices of government. The most notable news story was called *Chiluba is a Thief*, which sent shockwaves through Zambian society because it dared to speak negatively about a sitting president in such a frank manner, which up until then had been unheard of. The newspaper editor and the reporter of the article were both charged with libel for calling President Chiluba a thief. During their trial, however, they produced additional evidence of corruption as a part of their defense when they called government witnesses to testify and subpoenaed bank documents related to corruption. The evidence pointed to Chiluba and to his inner circle of advisors, and the court case

“became popularly referred to as the ‘Chiluba is a Thief’ trial” (Ryder, 2011, p. 1) after the infamous title of the newspaper article. During this time, the public and the donor community started to become interested in corruption and transparency, and they wanted the Zambian government to hold individuals accountable for acts of corruption and to recover public resources that had been stolen (Norad, 2011; Ryder, 2011).

In the wake of these events, Levy Mwanawasa was elected president in the 2001 presidential elections. He entered office in January 2002, replacing Chiluba, who was unable to have the constitution amended to allow for a third term as president. After taking office, Mwanawasa began talking about the need to “root out corruption” in Zambia as pressure from the public continued to increase (Ryder, 2011; Taylor, 2006). Mwanawasa called the Zambian Parliament into a special session later that year, where he “made a landmark speech” requesting parliament lift Chiluba’s immunity so that criminal investigations could begin (Ryder, 2011, p. 2). Parliament voted unanimously to lift Chiluba’s immunity as a shock to many in the region and to Chiluba himself, since up until that time, there had been a longstanding policy of not investigating or prosecuting former rulers in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ng’oma, 2008). The investigations against Chiluba and other government officials were carried by the Task Force on Corruption, which was established by Mwanawasa that same year. Chiluba would eventually be charged with 168 counts of theft of government resources and later found guilty of stealing \$46,000,000 (Ryder, 2011, p. 6). In the midst of these events, The Mwanawasa administration also began strengthening accountability organizations such as the Office of Auditor General.

The events surrounding the National Assembly’s stripping of Chiluba’s immunity and the Task Force’s investigations into his alleged corruption were a dramatic break with the status quo, and they sent shock waves throughout Zambia and the region. This was an unfolding of historical events that had the potential to “dislocate, rearticulate, and transform the interpretation and meaning of cultural symbols and social and economic structures” and an ability to “reinforce or erode the dominance of the incumbent logic[s]” in Zambia (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 116). This was a critical moment in which changes to social structures in Zambia seemed

possible and when principles and practices from alternative institutional logics, such as the development management logic and professionalism logic, could be promulgated within the organizational context. According to Sewell (1996), “historical events” such as these begin with ruptures to the status quo that cascade outward and lead to other ruptures, which can eventually lead to significant and sustainable change in institutional structures.

The following sections present a narrative account of how alternative logics were promulgated in the Office of Auditor General Zambia, leading to change within the organizational context. This account begins in 2003, which was a year in which major events began happening within the organization that strengthened the alternative institutional logics. This was also the year that interview respondents and donors believe that the organization “made a leap forward” in its capacity-building process and its development as a public accountability organization (Norad, 2011, p. 37). This section will consider two key processes through which the alternative logics were promulgated and how organization members responded. The first process began in May 2003, with the appointment of a new Auditor General. She would lead an organizational change process within the Office of Auditor General, promulgating principles and practices consistent with the professionalism and development management logics. A second process is related to the first, when the Office of Auditor General Zambia became actively involved in international partnerships and networks with other Supreme Audit Institutions. These engagements began with a partnership with the Office of Auditor General Norway in 2003, as part of the Norwegian development program already underway (Office of the Auditor General Zambia, 2010, p. 5). Later, the office extended these relationships toward other Supreme Audit Institutions through its involvement with the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) and the African Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions in English-Speaking Countries (AFROSAI-E).

These two processes are explained using theoretical concepts from the literature on institutional theory. The first concept is “institutional entrepreneurship”, which is a process through which organizational actors drive divergent institutional change, breaking away from institutionalized norms and structures leading to new norms and

structures. Here, the focus is placed on the newly appointed auditor general who acted as an institutional entrepreneur and led a professionalization process in the office. The second process is the Office of Auditor General's engagement with the international professional community as seen through the theoretical concept of "structural overlap" in which the boundaries of organizational structures overlap, providing opportunities for the exchange of new ideas and lowering the constraints and embeddedness of actors (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Theoretical concepts about the "imitation and translation" of organizational ideas through the professional fields (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017) are also used to explain fine-grained processes through which the changes took place within the organization.

Appointment of a New Auditor General, an Institutional Entrepreneur

Just a few months after the investigation into Frederick Chiluba began and after President Mwanawasa's call to "root out corruption" in Zambia, the president appointed a new Auditor General to lead the National Audit Office, Anna Chifungula. She began leading the office in May 2003 as Acting Auditor General before being formally confirmed as Auditor General three months later, in July. As Auditor General, she came to play a central role in promulgating the professionalism and development management logics within the office. Her role and her actions contributed to changes in the way the organization employs and promotes members of its audit staff as well as the values, norms, and practices that are central in the organization today.

The analytic narrative in this section presents the Auditor General as an institutional entrepreneur for two reasons related to theoretical perspectives and salience to interview respondents (Campbell, 2004, p. 37). First, the literature on institutions and institutional logics has laid a theoretical foundation for studies of institutional entrepreneurship, which describes the processes of actors who drive divergent structural change within an institutionalized environment. Second, this reflects the experiences and descriptions of interview respondents, as they described her being the key actor in many of the changes in the organization. In that way, presenting the narrative account as processes of institutional entrepreneurship is an

attempt to reflect the perspectives of the interview respondents as they experienced and understood these processes as well as being based in established theory.

As discussed previously, institutional entrepreneurship is understood as the “activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones” (Hardy & Maguire, 2008, p. 198). This concept within institutional theory explains how change can take place within institutions and the role that central actors play in these processes. According to Battilana et al. (2009), the concept of institutional entrepreneurship “reintroduce[es] actors’ agency to institutional analysis”, a notion which had been overlooked in much of the new-institutional theory literature (p. 66). As the narrative is presented in this section, it will describe and analyze how the Auditor General acted as an institutional entrepreneur to bring change to the organization and promulgate alternative institutional logics. It will provide an account of how she mobilized and leveraged resources from the state (Hardy & Maguire, 2008), as well as from international donors, to promulgate elements of the professionalism and development management logics. It will also provide an analysis of different factors and strategies that enabled the processes of institutional entrepreneurship within the audit office.

Enabling factors of institutional entrepreneurship

Contextual and social factors are important aspects to consider, as they are thought to enable the process of institutional entrepreneurship. According to Battilana et al. (2009), this because of the “paradox of embedded agency” (p. 72; see also Andrews, 2013, p. 94), which poses the “question of how organizations or individuals whose beliefs and actions are determined by existing institutions can break with these very same institutions and innovate” (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 72). One contextual factor in the case of the Office of Auditor General is the organization’s previous engagement in a capacity building project with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. This project had already begun to highlight structural weaknesses and a lack of professionalism in the office through its evaluations of audit methodologies, internal organizational systems, and human resource capacities (Norad, 2007, p. 57). These

evaluations contributed to a state of “internal contradiction” and “unstable tension” (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 75) between the condition of the office at that time and that of a proper functioning professional audit office to conduct timely audits and hold the government accountable for its use of funds. According to Battilana et al. (2009), these tensions would help lower the barriers to change, making it easier for organization members to question the status quo and diverge from the way things were being done in the organization up until that time.

When the Auditor General was appointed to lead the organization in 2003, the audit office had previously concluded the first phase of the development project funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in 2001. Upon her appointment, the Norwegians were again willing to sign on to another phase of the project, this time with expanded funding from the Dutch government and expanded technical support and training from the Office of Auditor General Norway. According to Chifungula, signing the memorandum of understanding with the Norwegians was one of the first things she did as acting Auditor General, as she travelled to Norway before being formally confirmed in her position later that year.

In addition to the ongoing development project with the Norwegians, another important factor was related to the social position of the new Auditor General. Institutional entrepreneurship is only theoretically possible if agents are capable of breaking from the norms, values, and rules of the dominant institutional logics guiding their organizational context while still having the resources to initiate change process. The Auditor General was in a unique position to drive divergent change and introduce alternative logics within the organization based on her social position. She was coming from the Ministry of Finance where she had been the Acting Secretary of the Treasury and had also been the Controller of Internal Audits in the Ministry, where she played a role in uncovering corruption in the Chiluba administration and had also been involved in a professionalization process within the ministry. Therefore, when she arrived in the Office of Auditor General, she was able to draw upon her cache of social capital and experiences from her previous roles.

Chifungula had served in various positions within the Ministry of Finance. She was Controller of Internal Audits from 1997-2002 and later appointed Acting

Secretary of the Treasury from 2002-2003. While working in internal audits at the Ministry of Finance, she had played a pivotal role in uncovering evidence of corruption by Chiluba's inner circle, evidence which would later be used by the special Task Force on Corruption set up to investigate and prosecute these cases (Chifungula, n.d.). It was her work in uncovering and presenting this evidence about illicit financial transactions that first brought her to the attention of President Mwanawasa. According to Nevers Mumba, who was Vice President during that time, it was Chifungula's bold character that eventually led to her appointment as Auditor General. He went on to say,

I think, without any exaggeration, we set a tone in the fight against corruption that up until today is unmatched. And so, it was arising from that vision of zero tolerance to corruption, which was our theme, zero tolerance to corruption, that we ended up with an auditor general that the President felt was strong enough to handle that office. Obviously, the Auditor General has to be ratified by Parliament, but at that time we were very comfortable in the House because we had the majority in Parliament. It made our job easier to have her ratified.

Former Vice President Mumba continued by describing Chifungula as "a no-nonsense auditor general, because she doesn't fear anyone". Which according to Mumba, was what the government needed to deal with corruption at that time.

When Chifungula arrived at the Office of Auditor General, she was not already embedded within the institutional context of that office, and she could come in with a new perspective and envision and initiate change within the Office of Auditor General. She could also draw upon a cache of social capital, as President Mwanawasa and his cabinet gave her considerable freedom to make changes within the Office of Auditor General. She began the change process by working with the President's Cabinet Office to restructure the office, drawing on significant support from the Norwegian and Dutch development partners (Norad, 2007, p. 46; 2011, p. 37). As the Auditor General said during her interview for this case study, "When I came in, I just came in running!" because, according to her, there was much work that needed to be done in the organization to bring it up to professional standards.

Furthermore, Chifungula's experiences in her previous social position as Controller of Internal Audits, oriented her toward certain courses of action that were consistent with the professionalism logic (Cardinale, 2018). She would use the same types of training and certification programs that had been used in the Ministry of Finance for the auditors to become certified chartered accountants. It was also helpful that she had formal authority in her new social position as Auditor General to lead the organization and launch a "professionalization project" (Hardy & Maguire, 2008, p. 208), bringing it to an international professional level. One way she did that was by changing the recruiting and promotion policy in the office as part of the organizational restructuring process. Previously, auditors were recruited straight out of secondary school and apprenticed within the organization. After 2003, auditors were to be recruited already holding university degrees or professional certifications such as from the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA) or the Zambian Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA). Existing auditors on staff, none of whom had these accounting certifications, were given seven years to upgrade their qualifications to those levels. If they failed to upgrade their qualifications, they would have no chance of being promoted within the organization and could even face demotion. In this way, the Auditor General implemented changes in employment and promotion practices that were the enactment of the professionalism logic and based on professional training and the achievement of certifications.

As a result of these changes in employment practices, some officers who had been with the organization for decades were still working in junior-level positions while newer recruits have surpassed them. These auditors, for various reasons, have either not upgraded their qualifications or are doing so at a slower pace than their colleagues. One of the Auditors who was left behind by his colleagues was asked how he felt about the changes in promotion policies:

Interviewer: How do you feel about that?

Auditor: Personally, I think it encourages people to read [*i.e.*, to prepare for exams]. It's OK.

Interviewer: Even if you are missing out?

Auditor: Yes, because a lot of people used to be under me. Some of them are high up there. Some of them are in the same level. Most of my colleagues are directors - those who went ahead and did what they were supposed to do. But for me, I relaxed... That is the difference between the old way and now. But in the old times we even had directors who didn't have the papers [professional certifications]. That's why she [the Auditor General] decided to push them aside.

Some officers nearing the retirement age of 59 have decided it is not worth it to upgrade their certifications. They have essentially made the decision that staying where they are and not being promoted is a better alternative than investing the time to upgrade their qualifications. The following interview segment typifies this rationale:

Auditor: Alright. I'm not an accountant, and my highest qualification is an advanced diploma, and in terms of how it has affected me, I'm aware that I won't be promoted beyond this point. Otherwise, how else is it affected me? I don't think it has.

Interviewer: What if you want to be promoted?

Auditor: I would have to move to another office [within the civil service] or upgrade myself... But for me that's not really an option. I'm only a few years to retirement.

These interview responses note that not all organization members have been able, or have even had the desire, to upgrade their professional certifications. Because of that, they have not been promoted within the organization because there has been a change from employment processes that were consistent with a bureaucratic logic to the new employment processes consistent with the professionalism logic.

Removing institutional defenders

One of the critical decisions the new Auditor General made after she arrived was removing "institutional defenders", those officers who were against changes in the employment practices and had "benefit[ed] from the status quo" (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 78). As the Auditor General said in her interview, "We got rid of 30 of them. We had to write them letters of retrenchment, because they were almost 'dead wood'

anyway.” By terminating this “dead wood”, or the existing employees who were defending the bureaucratic logic’s employment practices based on seniority and resisting the move toward more professionalism, she eliminated much of the resistance within the office to change. This made the process of professionalizing the office go smoother and move at a more rapid pace.

However, according to some interview respondents, the removal of the institutional defenders was both “good and bad”. They believe that the Auditor General “pushed out” too many people, and that “some people who could have helped and had knowledge of audits – they may have been pushed out because they didn’t follow what she [the Auditor General] wanted”. Not everyone was happy with the way the Auditor General was changing the way the office operated, but according to Chifungula, “luckily, I had so much good will because it was a new government, and I had so much good will from the secretary of the cabinet”. Therefore, she was able to drive through many of these changes, even being able to terminate public officers, with very little resistance at that time, because of her social position within the organization and within the government.

Rhetorical strategies of an institutional entrepreneur

The Auditor General created and communicated a new vision for divergent change within the organization, which is an important part of the process of institutional entrepreneurship, according to Battilana et al. (2009). This is necessary for driving such divergent change processes, as it can “make explicit the failing of the existing organization” and “expose problems with current institutionalized practices” (Ibid, p. 79). As one of the Deputy Auditor General’s described it,

The current auditor general came here in 2003. Now when she came in 2003..., she had her own vision. Her own vision was that she wanted a professional office, which was comprised of qualified people for what we were doing. So, we started the restructuring program which was helped by RIDP [the Norwegian and Dutch development project]... The main issue was capacity building, and so a number of us, at least those who wanted to study, enrolled in ACCA [Association of Certified Chartered Accountants]... At the time when

the Auditor General arrived, there wasn't a single chartered accountant in this office. She was the only one when she came ¹, but today I can tell you we are now over 100. So, the transformation has been quite tremendous. And we've continued with that process because almost every semester we are getting one or two or three who are qualified. So, even in terms of recognition within the region, because of that, we are now being recognized as one of the audit institutions which is quite professionalized.

The Auditor General's vision entailed the need for new employment practices that were consistent with the professionalism logic, that employees should be trained and skilled in the standards and methods of the professional field and required to hold the appropriate professional certifications for the work that they were doing.

While the Auditor General's vision was consistent with the professionalism logic, in other ways it was also consistent with the development management logic, by its focus on the empowerment of society and its marginalized groups (Brinkerhoff & Coston, 1999, p. 350). When she arrived, she cast a vision that diverged from the former way of working in the organization, being insular and merely just showing up for a paycheck. The new vision was in line with the development management logic to watch over taxpayers' money to ensure it was used for the development of the country. She described the recurring pep talk she gave to the new auditors joining the office, in which she would try to inspire them, telling them:

This is a calling. You are here to make sure public resources are managed properly and they reach the intended purpose. That is to follow every kwacha that is spent, wherever it is spent!

The Auditor General used a religious term, "calling", to describe the work they were doing in the audit office. A development management logic is, at its core, an idealistic and moral concept based on taking "a normative stance on empowerment and supporting groups, particularly the poor and marginalized, to take an active role in determining and fulfilling their own needs" (Brinkerhoff & Coston, 1999, p. 350; Thomas, 1999). Taking the development management logic and its normative

¹ Some documentation notes that there were actually 2 chartered accountants in the office at that time, including the Auditor General and one other organization member (OAGZ Project Document, 2010).

assertions to their ultimate end would call for an almost missionary zeal in fulfilling its mission of empowering the disempowered, giving voice to the voiceless, and protecting the poor from those who would abuse their authority and power against them. Thus, it would not be much of an exaggeration to use the religious term, “calling”, to describe their work.

This vision was repeated among organization members, and it can still be heard being repeated today. It contributes to organization members’ shared sense of identity through their affiliation with the organization’s vision of serving the needs of society and its vulnerable members. As one auditor put it, there is now more “emphasis on... the goals and mission of the organization... So, what are you going to do to make sure that mission is achieved? ...The only way is for us to work together... trying to contribute to the achievement of the mission of the institution.” And, he went on to describe the heart of the mission in the following statement:

That’s the mission of the institution. It is society that is supposed to benefit – the community and the common person. The moment the common person in society does not benefit, that means the mission of the institution is not achieved. Hence, we have a motto which says, ‘We follow the kwacha wherever it goes.’

An important part of institutional entrepreneurship is “the use of discourse” to “convince different constituencies embedded in the existing institutions of the need for the change and mobilize them behind it” (Battilana et al., 2009, pp. 81-82). Discursive statements, such as the motto to “follow every kwacha that is spent” and that the job is actually “a calling”, are more than simple sentences or phrases. They form an “elementary unit of discourse” (Foucault, 2002, p. 90) or a “sign” that circulates within the organization to help the members make sense of their roles and the rules they follow and what acts they should carry out (Ibid, pp. 97-98). They help create a “collective intentionality” among organizational members, in which “the crucial element... is a sense of doing (wanting, believing, etc.) something together, and the individual intentionality that each person has is derived from the collective intentionality they share” (Searle, 1995, p. 24, parentheses in original). These statements that came from the Auditor General and were circulated through the

organization contributed toward a shared identity that is based on the mission of the organization to serve the public, and they are the enactment of the development management logic.

The Auditor General also used storytelling as another rhetorical strategy and a way to mobilize people around her vision for the organization. By doing so, she connected the organization to its missional goals and communicated a need for major change to be able to hold the government to account for its misuse of public resources. One of the stories she told in her interview is an example of this rhetorical strategy:

I remember our auditors going to a very remote place, where there was a bridge that was supposed to be done there. Four million US dollars had been paid, and an engineer had signed that the work had been done. He certified the work. So, when our officers went there with all these certificates of work, to go and see the place, they just found a wide river. There was a heap of sand somewhere beside the river, but where was the bridge that you certified was done? It wasn't there, so we asked the Permanent Secretary, and he said, "No, no, the bridge was built." So, I took him along. I said, "Look. Let us go there." And we went there together with the Public Accounts Committee, and he was so shocked [and said:] "But they said the bridge was here!" [And I said:] "Well, as you can see we used the canoes to cross." But four million dollars was spent. Because of the [four-year] time lag, when we were going there, they said the bridge had been constructed four years ago, but when we got there, there was nothing.

The Auditor General's story about the abandoned bridge and the canoes connects the former way the organization had operated and its failures to hold the government accountable with a need for change. It expressed the need to change, to become more skilled and capable of "following every kwacha" and ensuring public funds are used for their intended purposes.

The Auditor General also used rhetorical strategies to motivate employees, which was especially crucial in her first years within the organization. She described the ways in which she motivated them, that she would talk one-on-one with them, identifying with them and "providing compelling reasons to support the new vision"

(Battilana et al., 2009, p. 80) and rewarding those who supported it (Hardy & Maguire, 2008, p. 207). She described this process in the following statement:

They were not difficult to motivate - just talking to them, you know, giving them a vision of the future, how I wanted this office to be in the next five years. I showed them, look, though you are like this now, but give me two or three years, and we should maybe be able to get our autonomy and remunerate you properly. Also, there is the training, most of them were so interested in the training function, and of course auditing is moving around, so most of them would complain, "I have this problem or that problem". So, I would send them to some courses outside the country, just to make sure they interacted with other people and developed that interest in the office.

Interview respondents described the marked change in how the new Auditor General talked with them on a personal level, remarking that it was a departure from the way previous Auditor Generals had interacted with them. Communication with the organization had become more collegial and less rigid.

At the same time, the hierarchal structure of the organization was also becoming less centralized and easier to work through. This was a result of the restructuring process that began in the organization after the Auditor General was appointed. These changes made the organization flatter, with fewer positions in the hierarchy and more departments focused on distinct tasks. Organization members noted that the organization was still hierarchical, but that it had become less centralized and more collegial, and that they now had more autonomy to do their work than they previously had. As one auditor said,

The hierarchy is still there, but there is more horizontal interaction. There is more interaction, like between myself and fellow principal auditors, and directorate to directorate. There is more consultation. You can call on various [areas of] expertise from various directorates. So, if we are editing and are stuck on something, we can call on someone, if it is something to do with fraud, we can call on someone from specialized audits.

The new organization structure also enables professionals to use their skills with relative autonomy in an organizational arrangement that is consistent with a

professionalism logic. This structure places less emphasis on a technocracy that would set work standards and devise ways of ensuring workers adhere to them (Mintzberg, 1989), as would be consistent with a bureaucratic logic. In the case of a professional organization like the OAGZ, there is a standardization of work, but this standardization does not come from a technocratic structure or management. Rather it comes from the professional training and education the auditors share (Freidson, 2001). This allows the organization to be more collegial and collaborative, with more autonomy and more interaction between the professionals, even from different divisions or departments.

The auditors in the office spoke often about their professional training and how it was important to their work and their legitimacy as auditors. Their training and certification comes from a variety of sources, with most being chartered accountants, either through the Zambian Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA) or the more internationally established Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA). Auditors also have bachelors or even master's degrees in accounting, which solidifies their sense of shared identity. Lamont and Molnár (2002) see this creation of shared identity as interactive work across social boundaries. Through it, individuals "differentiate themselves from others by drawing on criteria of community and a sense of shared belonging within their subgroup" while at the same time, "this internal identification process must be recognized by outsiders for an objectified collective identity to emerge" (Ibid, p. 170). This is especially true in the professions, which "originally emerged as a demarcation problem... between 'special' and ordinary occupations" (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 177, see also Freidson, 2001).

From that perspective, one's sense of identity is forged through a dialectic process of both internal and external definition. It is in the interplay of seeing the meaning of "us" according to "them", and vice versa, that individuals get a sense of whom they are. Education is one way in which group demarcation happens, "by drawing a line between insiders and outsiders" (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 178). Education is an indispensable aspect of professionalism, because it is the "primary source of the status of its members and their personal, public, and official identities" (Freidson, 2001, p. 84). It also leads professionals like the Zambian auditors to a

deeper “commitment to the occupation as a life career and to a shared identity, a feeling of community or solidarity among all those who have passed through it” (Ibid, p. 84). Interview respondents often related their sense of shared identity with their professional education, and also in their participation within an international community of state audit professionals. This engagement with the international community of professional state auditors had an impact on the way they saw themselves and the way they did their work, which is described in more detail in the following section.

Engagement with an International Professional Community

While the new Auditor General was acting as an institutional entrepreneur, the Office of Auditor General was also becoming increasingly engaged with the international community of state audit professionals. These engagements were another means through which alternative logics were promulgated within the office. This has happened primarily through two main avenues of international engagement with the professional community. The first avenue has been through a twinning partnership between the Office of Auditor General Zambia and the Office of Auditor General Norway, which is a development partnership “meant to facilitate hands-on skills transfer for auditors” (OAGZ, 2016, p. 10). The second avenue has been through the Zambian audit office’s involvement with regional and international professional organizations, the International Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) and the African Organization for English-Speaking Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAI-E).

The Norwegian and Zambian audit offices began having regular exchanges between them in 2003, after the second phase of the RIDP development project had begun (Office of the Auditor General Zambia, 2010, p. 5). This type of “twinning” partnership between the Zambian and Norwegian SAIs is a capacity-building process through which “fellow professionals from similar organizations in the North” engage in a “variety of person-to-person relationships” with their counterparts from organizations in the South (Askvik, 1999, p. 403). In a twinning partnership such as this, there is a focus on the face-to-face relationships between like-minded

professionals from both organizations in addition to the more traditional development methods of providing resources and technical assistance. A recent report on the twinning partnership between the Zambian and Norwegian audit offices noted the types of exercises that were being carried out between the two organizations, such as “joint audits” in which Zambian and Norwegian auditors conducted audits together as a learning process and other activities through which they could have an “exchange of experiences” and ways to share knowledge between them (Riksrevisionen, 2013, p. 8).

According to interview respondents, the partnership has been a benefit to the Zambian office, not least because of the material resources and training it has provided them. They described ways in which it increased their confidence to conduct audits, especially the more modern types of audits such as performance audits or environmental audits, and that it helped them to “think outside the box” and imagine new ways of doing their work, as described by one of the interview respondents. This happened as Zambian auditors began conducting performance audits alongside the more seasoned and experienced Norwegian auditors, and in doing so, they were able to build their professional skills and their confidence to eventually conduct these audits without help from their Norwegian counterparts. This collaborative working relationship also modelled to the Zambian auditors the professional values and collective identity that are consistent with the professionalism logic.

Interview respondents also noted the importance of working alongside other auditors from within the same region, through AFROSAI-E. They mentioned how cultural similarities made it easier for them to work with their close regional neighbors than to work with those from other parts of the world. As one of the informants said, “there is a shared sense of identity, especially with our close neighbors in Southern Africa.” He went on to mention that, for example, “Nigeria is different and [their office is] structured differently, so there is not much common ground. Also, culturally they are just different.” So, even within the continent of Africa, cultural boundaries between Northern African and Southern Africa can have an effect on their professional engagement with one another, making the collaboration between close neighbors even more important. Another interview respondent also described his relationships with auditors from the Sub-Saharan African region through AFROSAI-E, noting he felt

“more or less on the same level” with them and able to talk about similar problems they may encounter in their work. Thus, in addition to the close cooperation with the Norwegian audit office, there was also an element of camaraderie and common exchange that they experienced with Southern African auditors through their collaboration with AFROSAI-E.

Thornton and Ocasio (2008) discussed the importance of these types of interorganizational relationships, as they can lead to change among institutional logics. They called these types of relationships between organizations “structural overlaps” (Ibid, 116) since they are arrangements through which one organizational boundary overlaps another organizational boundary, which can provide access to alternative ideas and institutional logics. This type of relationship exists between the Office of Auditor General Zambia and its regional and international counterparts, and it reduces the barriers to change as it “increases the awareness of and experiences with contradictions in logics, which lowers constraints and embeddedness of actors” (Ibid, p. 116). The interactions that took place between the Office of Auditor General and its international and regional counterparts provided access to new ideas about how to perform audits and act as professional auditors. In this way the Zambian auditors were “local interpreters and translators” of the institutional logics, which they “‘performed into being’ in [their] particular organizational context” through processes of imitation and translation (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017, p. 121).

The imitation and translation of professional ideas

As auditors from the Office of Auditor General interacted with their professional peers, they engaged in a process of imitation, which is “a basic social mechanism tying people together” according to Wedlin and Sahlin (2017, p. 107). This process of imitation was based on their perceived shared identity as professional auditors. In the process, they imitated the values, principles and practices of the professional community, translating them into their own organizational environment. This brings the imitation process back full circle, as the Zambian auditors started becoming more like the other members of the community in the process. In that way,

the imitation process is dialectical: “perceived identity shapes imitation” while “imitation shapes identity” (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017, p. 107).

These processes of imitation and translation took place within the interstices of the overlapped social structures of the Zambian audit office and its counterparts from around the world. As Zambian auditors met with auditors from other contexts, they were able to discuss similar stories about their work, discuss best practices, and exchange ideas; and through that process to develop their shared sense of identity as professional state auditors and translate the international audit standards within their own local context. In this way, the ideas, standards, and values of the professionalism logic “became quasi-objects, transgressing the barriers of local time and entering translocal paths, becoming disembedded... becoming reembedded, materialized into actions, and – when judged successful – becoming institutions” (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, pp. 22-23).

Auditors from the Office of Auditor General Zambia share a sense of professional identity with state auditors from around the world, and this is consistent with the professionalism logic. This shared professional identity became evident in the course of conducting interviews in the office, as respondents discussed the ways in which they saw their roles within the office and their camaraderie with other auditors. One auditor described the sense of shared identity in the following statement:

I can give an example of a recent [training session] from AFROSAI and IDI. They even invited people from the South African SAI, and you feel more or less on the same level. And since you are learning together, you are asking questions, and together you see your friends where they are also lacking. It makes you feel you are on the same level, and you feel a friendly feeling, even when you meet them in another meeting, you go back to that same person and say “Hey you remember we met in that place for this and that, and we were looking at this assignment.” That’s my feeling.

This interview response denotes the personal connection, even at an emotional level, that the Zambian auditors experienced with other members of the professional community.

Even in the midst of imitation and camaraderie, there is still a desire for members of the Office of Auditor General to distinguish themselves from other audit institutions through competition within the professional community. This is done through a ranking system within AFROSAI-E in which the audit agencies are ranked according to how well they have implemented audit standards and practices. There is a strong desire among many of the organization members to stand out from the rest of the field by being ranked higher than other audit offices. Those processes of imitation and competition would not be possible without the structural overlap of AFROSAI-E and INTOSAI, which provides access to the auditors, organization leaders, and other prominent actors in the field with whom the circulation of ideas and identity construction depends. One of the Deputy Auditor Generals described it in this way:

The thing is, with our active involvement with AFROSAI-E and INTOSAI, this has helped us to try to be up there with the best. Because with AFROSAI-E, we have these gradings, which we aim for, so that we improve, you know, to the next level. We want to be at the highest level but there are certain criteria we need to meet to reach that level.

The auditors talked about the pride they have as members of the professional community and particularly as members of their own office, which has made strong progress in moving from a poor performing SAI to leader in the region. One of the partners from the Norwegian embassy remarked on this change in the auditors' sense of pride. He noted that it started from the top of the organization, with the Auditor General, and it worked its way down through the organization. She is "competitive as a leader" and "wants to showcase the work [the office] is doing... and apart from that competitive leadership, there is a professional pride, where the staff want to stand out and prove their professionalism. They are not shy to stand up and say, 'We are able to do this!'" This was echoed in a later interview with a Zambian auditor who said, "you find that because of the sense of belonging to a professional body... it will make you want to prove yourself". The more the members of the Office of Auditor General strived to prove themselves, the more they came to identify with and imitate their counterparts from AFROSAI and INTOSAI, becoming more like them and reflecting their values and beliefs.

Training workshops are a key way in which the Zambian auditors engage with the international professional community, which can take place within AFROSAI-E and INTOSAI and through the twinning partnership with the Office of Auditor General Norway. This is where the Zambian auditors meet other auditors from the region as well as auditors and trainers from partnering institutions from the Global North. Freidson (2001) noted that training brings a shared “sense of community, or solidarity” to professionals, which “is strengthened by the common problems they confront in the course of their work, and both together encourage an inclination to form societies or associations in which they can come together” (Ibid, p. 101). The training workshops give the auditors the opportunity to get together “to talk shop, trade war stories, and share new knowledge and techniques” (Ibid, p. 101). This shoptalk was indicated in previous interview segments in which Zambia auditor described the “friendly feelings” he felt as he discussed common problems and audit approaches with auditors from other audit offices.

The professional identity of the auditors is a central way they experience the professionalism logic (Rao et al., 2003). As auditors in the office identify with the professional community through AFROSAI-E, INTOSAI, and their partnership with the Office of Auditor General Norway, this affects more than just the way they view themselves and their roles in the office. Yet it is because of the way they see themselves as professional auditors that they choose to act in accordance with the professionalism logic (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). This affects the way they view education and training, modes of operation, systems of authority and power, and the employment and promotions processes. These principles, which make up the professionalism logic, can be seen as flowing from their identity as professional auditors. This harkens back to the three questions about human action that were mentioned previously. When individuals want to take reasoned action, they can ask themselves questions about their role and identity (March & Olsen, 1989, 2010): What kind of a situation is this? What kind of a person am I? What does a person like me do in a situation like this? As auditors ask themselves the questions about who they are and what they should do, this focuses their attention to the professional field and the standards within it.

International standards for supreme audit institutions

As the Office of Auditor General engaged with the professional community of state auditors, they translated the ideas, standards, and practices of that community. According to Wedlin and Sahlin (2017), this happens as “these institutional ideas travel”, and that “in the continued translation process, actors become carriers as they narrate and move institutional elements and ideas between contexts, but also link them to practice” (p 120). The ideas then “become embedded in local practice”, which is “how logics get embedded in and enacted through local practices and day-to-day activities” (Ibid, p. 120). In that way, the Zambian auditors are the local interpreters and enactors of the institutional logics. Different aspects of those logics became local translations within their own organizational context, as they were adopted, adapted, and adjusted to fit local practices.

For example, when one of the principal auditors responsible for the office’s standards and policies was interviewed and asked about how the office decides which auditing standards to implement, he replied,

Basically, the number one consideration is just to say, ‘What is AFROSAI saying?’ And sometimes you can use that to supplement what you are already using... You might find there is a new standard that’s come up which is very good and can assist you in what you are already using.

The auditor’s statement demonstrates how it works when encountering the issue of which standards to implement in the office. In these cases, the chief consideration and the focus of their attention is the professional community of AFROSAI-E and INTOSAI.

Another auditor gave a more specific example of this process of translating international standards in the local Zambian context:

I’ll give you an example of our audit manual that we are currently using. We adopted that from AFROSAI-E, the regularity audit manual. It was an AFROSAI-E idea, which we customized to meet our local arrangement. What usually happens is when you go to those trainings, once the training is done, you write a report to the Auditor General, in this case, with recommendations, which she can either take it or drop it... Those recommendations are taken back

to the standards committee, of which the Auditor General, she's chairperson...

Once it's approved, it's adopted as the office policy.

When it comes to the standards for auditing, the professional community is where members of the organization look for guidance, which is the enactment of the professionalism logic. Then, as described in the interview segments above, those standards are deliberated upon and translated into the local context. This is another situation in which structural overlap is important for promulgating alternative logics since it has lowered the barriers for organization members to adopt and adapt the elements of the professionalism logic within the Office of Auditor General Zambia.

The implementation of these audit standards is regularly evaluated by teams of auditors coming from AFROSAI-E. Every two years, the Office of Auditor General is visited by a team of auditors as part of what AFROSAI-E calls a "Quality Assurance Support Visit". The main objective of these support visits is to assess the way the Zambian audit office is implementing international standards and how they can improve the quality of their audit work. The analyses within the Quality Assurance Support Visits are based on the principles from INTOSAI, which are used as benchmarks to evaluate the Office of Auditor General. Based on these evaluations, the quality assurance report makes recommendations for the audit office to follow in order to improve their work. A recent example of these evaluations comes from a quality assurance report prepared by an AFROSAI-E team composed of auditors from Uganda, South Africa, and Sweden. According to their report, "The main objective of the support visit was to assist the SAI of Zambia to determine whether audits comply with international standards and to make recommendations on how the quality of audits could be improved" (Ogentho, Motala, Nordstrand, Öståker, & Gjerde, 2012, p. 1).

The AFROSAI-E quality assurance report used various international audit standards from INTOSAI to assess the performance of the Zambian office. For example, they evaluated the way the Zambian office used their new manual based on ISSAI 40, which stipulates "the SAI should establish procedures and policies that give reasonable assurance that it will carry out audits where the SAI is competent and has the capabilities, including time and resources to do so" (Ibid, p. 29). The evaluation

team found, “The SAI staff has not been adequately trained in the requirements of the ISSAIs and use of the AFROSAI-E manual” (Ibid, p. 30). They further recommended the Office of Auditor General should engage more with the AFROSAI-E community for training and conduct knowledge-sharing exercises internally within the audit office in order to foster more learning across its different departments (Ibid, p. 30).

One of the Zambian auditors discussed this process of working with the AFROSAI-E support team in this way:

In terms of the improvement that we have [made], like in our reports, through the AFROSAI-E, when they come to quality check our reports, there are certain recommendations that are made. And through these recommendations, we see that this recommendation is worth taking forward. They are helping us to improve our [audit reporting], I think.

This response indicates how Zambian auditors accept and welcome the evaluation teams from AFROSAI-E, because they believe it improves the way they do their work and the quality of their audits. These evaluations are the enactment of the system of control and criteria for evaluation from the professionalism logic, which come from the professional community and are based upon its norms and standards.

The professional standards from INTOSAI and AFROSAI have impacted the way the auditors do their work. One example comes from the way they select on which cases they are going to conduct the audit. Previously, there was not a clearly distinguished set of programs and solutions in which the auditors could categorize the types of situations they encountered. This led to confusion about how to go about the audit process and resulted in inefficient and ineffective work routines. One auditor described the changes in the following:

Initially, we didn’t have the documented manual guidelines... You would do the audit, and [the supervisor] approves it, and that’s it. And then you go and get a lot of data there. But now you follow the standardized way in which you collect data. You have some working papers on the knowledge of the entity of the organization. You have the working papers on the risk assessment of the organization. And you have standardized working papers on some of the tests you will do.

These standards, which set the guidelines for how auditors select cases and perform audits, made their way into the organization through processes of structural overlap with AFROSAI-E, which has also provided legitimacy for these changes. For example, as one auditor said, “There are certain ideas where if it is labeled an AFROSAI-E thing, people take it more seriously”.

These professional standards have enabled the auditors to work through a process called *pigeonholing*. Mintzberg (1989) contends that pigeonholing is “how the professional organization functions at the operating level” through standard programs that the professionals are ready to use and apply in a standardized set of contingent situations (p. 176). The role of the professional, according to Mintzberg (1989), is to “‘diagnose’ the client’s need in terms of one of the contingencies, which indicates which standard program to apply, and to apply, or execute that program” (p. 177). Interview respondents described these pigeonholing processes, with their standardized programs and methods, as central and meaningful parts of their work roles. One respondent described it as it relates to explaining to audited organizations the reasons why they were chosen for audit:

So, there is a model, which we use on how to select clients to be audited. So, we use the risk-based method. That’s the one that is used by the office as of now. So, it is no longer a matter of guessing, but we use certain permutations to ensure that, OK, even when one asked, “But why did you pick this institution as opposed to the other one?” I would have the evidence actually, I would be very proud to tell them, “I picked this institution because of ‘ABCD’ using this risk-based method”

These standardized models the auditors use indicate which organizations should be audited, based on the risk that the organization will misuse or mismanage public resources. The model will then determine the type of audit to be conducted and the methods that should be used to conduct the audit. Furthermore, by standardizing the audit process, this allows the reports of the Office of Auditor General Zambia to be evaluated by the other audit offices from AFROSAI-E and INTOSAI and for knowledge-sharing practices among the offices, since they are all using the same processes for their audit work (Gustavson, 2014).

In another interview response, an organization member described how the organization uses the international standards now and compares this to the way the organization operated in the past.

The issue of the standards is just to do one thing - improve the quality of our output, improve the quality of that process we are undertaking... Now, [with] standards: we are coming from a background whereby you were recruited as an auditor, and we simply said, 'We took you through the induction, go and audit and use your intuition because you have a fair understanding of what it is.' But now we are coming from that background to a situation whereby we tell you, 'In auditing these are the principles that you follow, and this is how you audit this area.' Why the use of standards? If I go and audit *Client A*, and I came up with a result using the standards, even after I have left the institution, and you went and audited the same client on the same phenomena, using the same methodology, you should be able to come up with the same kind of results. It is meant to increase the aspect of objectivity, the aspect of confidence, so that the work we finally churn out is of high standards. So, basically, the issue of standards, especially as far as auditing standards are concerned, is to improve the quality of our work.

While this response indicates how little the audit office once used the audit standards in the past, it also gives an indication of the centrality of audit standards today and how they are seen as important parts of the work they do.

Several of the interview respondents discussed one professional standard in particular, which is ISSAI 12. ISSAI 12 is considered one of the fundamental "prerequisites for the functioning of supreme audit institutions", which is "constructed around the fundamental expectation of Supreme Audit Institutions making a difference to the lives of citizens" (INTOSAI, 2013). ISSAI 12 entails many aspects of a supreme audit institution and how it should engage with the public, and it specifies that SAIs should be:

Carrying out audits to ensure that government and public sector entities are held accountable for their stewardship over, and use of, public resources... Enabling those charged with public sector governance to discharge their responsibilities

in responding to audit findings and recommendations and taking appropriate corrective action... Reporting on audit results and thereby enabling the public to hold government and public sector entities accountable... Communicating effectively with stakeholders... to support beneficial change in the public sector... Striving for service excellence and quality... Capacity building through promoting learning and knowledge sharing (INTOSAI, 2013).

The Office of Auditor General has translated ISSAI 12 and localized it into the organizational context in a number of ways. One way has been by changing the format of their yearly Auditor General Report, making it more user friendly with executive summaries and a glossary. These simple steps have made the reports more approachable for the public to read to instead of them being overly technical and only approachable to accountants. This has enabled the audit office to communicate more “effectively with stakeholders” (INTOSAI, 2013). They also work with a local NGO, the Policy Monitoring and Research Center (PMRC), who produce and publish simplified reports based on the report of the Auditor General for the general public to access.

In addition to the simplified information about the reports that is printed and placed online, the audit office also discusses the reports on the radio, which provides a way for those who are not able to read to be able to listen to presentations about the audit findings. Until recently, this had only been done in English and on the national radio station, ZNBC, which is only available around the capital city, Lusaka, and along the major rail lines in the rest of the country. More recently, a new outreach initiative has begun in which groups of auditors take tours across the nether regions of Zambia to discuss audit findings on local radio stations using the local language, making the reports available to more members of the public.

These simplified reports on the local radio programs around Zambia are particularly interesting to consider, because while the Office of Auditor General is following professional standards as specified in ISSAI 12, by “Reporting on audit results and thereby enabling the public to hold government and public sector entities accountable” and empowering even the poor members of public to hold their government accountable (INTOSAI, 2013), they are also enacting values and the

orientation of the development management logic. They are putting their focus beyond the organization and on the disempowered members of society and enabling them to hold their government accountable in measurable ways. It no longer keeps its data secret and looks out for itself with a departmental patriotism characteristic of the bureaucratic logic. Now, it generates and delivers its reports with various stakeholders in mind. It makes them simple enough for an average citizen to have an understanding of the way the government uses taxpayer money. So, in addition to having an orientation toward the professional community, the audit office also has an external orientation toward society, especially the poor and vulnerable. The public outreaches from the Office of Auditor General are an example of how two different logics, the professionalism logic and the development management logic, can co-exist in complementary ways in which “strengthening one logic serves to strengthen another logic” (Waldorff et al., 2013, p. 123).



Officers from Office of Auditor General Zambia at the local radio station, Oblate Liseli Radio, in the Western Province, preparing to talk about audit reports on live radio (Photo courtesy of Ellen Chikale, Office of Auditor General Zambia)



Officers from Office of Auditor General Zambia talking about audit reports on a local radio program at Sun FM, in the Copperbelt Province (Photos courtesy of Ellen Chikale, Office of Auditor General Zambia)

Change and Facilitative Relationships among Logics

The sections above described ways in which the development management logic and the professionalism logic were promulgated within the Office of Auditor General Zambia, which led to changes within the organization. Leading up to this period of transition, the bureaucratic logic was dominant, as evidenced through the interview and documentary data. There had been a formal structure with a steep vertical hierarchy within the organization, which made it difficult for organization members to communicate with their superiors. Entry into the workforce at that time was centralized through the Public Service Commission, and promotions were based on length of tenure rather than merit or professional qualifications. There was a general lack of professionalism among the staff at that time with low educational qualifications and low motivation. The training in state audit that did take place at that time was considered too basic and not at a high enough level to keep up with changing trends in government finance and the global move toward performance audits (Hoque & Thiagarajah, 2015).

Also, to a limited extent, the case evidence described ways in which the organization had operated in informal ways that were consistent with the kinship logic. The former Auditor General was seen to have been compromised by undue influence from the Chiluba administration and his security services (Hatchard, 2014, p. 72), and workers did not seem to take their jobs seriously, seeing them as personal fiefdoms to meet their own needs. This contributed to the lack of professionalism in the office and the low level of output resulting in the backlog of audit reports and in the organization's overall inability to hold the government accountable in its use of public resources.

The organization's move toward the professionalism and development management logics began to take place in 2003, the year it "made a leap forward" in capacity building processes (Norad, 2011, p. 37). This happened after the new Auditor General was appointed and the Zambian audit office began regularly engaging with the international professional community. This case views these change processes as occurring through the institutional entrepreneurship of the new Auditor General and through structural overlaps with an international professional community and as evidenced by the changes in employment practices, the adoption of professional standards, the way the auditors do their work, and the way the organization has shifted its focus to the public.

Many of the changes within the organization are consistent with the professionalism logic. This logic is evident in the audit office's emphasis on training and certification in professional standards and methods for public auditing and delivering professionally sound work in an ethical manner. Its system of control comes from the professional community, who regularly evaluate the organization in its compliance with standards. Entry into employment at the Office of Auditor General and promotions are based primarily on academic and professional achievements, particularly within the field of accounting. The evaluation criteria of the office is based on the professional standards coming from INTOSAI, and the evaluations of the audit office are carried out by other professional auditors from the Sub-Saharan region as well as from around the world.

The audit office's move toward professionalism has affected the way the auditors conduct audits and do their work, which according to them, has improved the quality of their work. Now, instead of conducting audits by using their "intuition", which were the words one of the auditors used to describe the way audits used to be done, they now use audit manuals and guidelines that were adapted to their own context. The training of auditors has given them more skills in their audit work and more confidence to conduct audits and report their findings to Parliament. The Zambian officers now see themselves as professionals and emulate the standards and norms that come from the professional community. This also enables their work to be evaluated by other audit offices in the region and subject to the "soft regulations" of the professional community (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017, pp. 115-116).

Some of the changes within the Office of Auditor General Zambia are also consistent with the development management logic. This is seen most evidently in the office's shift of focus toward the Zambian public, particularly those who are poor and vulnerable, and it is echoed in their stated goal "to enhance accountability in the collection and utilization of public resources in order to contribute to sustainable development" (OAGZ, 2015, p. 20). The way the Office of Auditor General Zambia reports the audit findings and discusses those within the media have made the audit data more visible throughout Zambia and more useful for holding the government accountable.

This leads to a discussion about facilitative relationships between logics. When the relationship between institutional logics is facilitative, "strengthening one logic serves to strengthen another logic" (Waldorff et al., 2013, p. 123). A facilitative relationship between the development management logic and the professionalism logic can be seen in the office's implementation of the ISSAI 12 standard from INTOSAI. This principle is embedded within the professional audit community of INTOSAI as one of its fundamental "prerequisites for the functioning of supreme audit institutions" (INTOSAI, 2013) . However, ISSAI 12 is also comprised of values inherent within the development management logic, such as serving society and empowering the disempowered. According to ISSAI 12, it is based on INTOSAI's "fundamental expectation of Supreme Audit Institutions making a difference to the lives of citizens"

and of carrying out audits “to ensure that government and public sector entities are held accountable for their stewardship over, and use of, public resources” and also communicating the reports in ways that enable the public “to hold government and public sector entities accountable” (Ibid). With professional guidelines such as those, the auditors at the Office of Auditor General were simultaneously pursuing the values and principles of a development management logic while also meeting the obligations of the professional community via soft regulations. Thus, it can be seen as a facilitative relationship, since strengthening the professionalism logic also serves to strengthen the development management logic.

In some ways, the bureaucratic logic is still evident within the Office of Auditor General. One way this is seen is in how the organization is tied to the centralized hierarchical system within the overarching state bureaucracy. This arrangement entails restrictions and obligations for the organization that a fully autonomous organization would not have. One example is that some of the executive managers are unable to implement the managerial tools for measuring performance objectives that they want to use due to state employment regulations. One of the Department heads described this dilemma in the following:

[T]he biggest challenge is that we have to work through overall government. We are still part of the government. So, if there are changes we would want to propagate, we are basically told by the state, ‘Hey hold up, that’s not the policy of the government.’ We cannot fully implement the performance management system at the individual level because it’s not being done elsewhere. And that’s the idea I’m trying to push now, that performance must be managed at the individual level. So, we might not be able to succeed because now we are still part of the government.

This response expresses the frustration that is sometimes experienced by organizational managers when they try to work within an environment characterized by the formal hierarchical structures and rule-oriented modes of operation consistent with the bureaucratic logic.

Another example that has been discussed by development partners is the audit office’s lack of independence (Norad, 2007, p. 56). This lack of independence from

the executive government and Public Service Commission makes it difficult to allow professional independence so auditors can do their work without the prospect of political interference. One of the long-time auditors from the organization described this arrangement in the following:

OK, legislatively, yes, you can say the auditor general's office is independent and so on, but financially it is being controlled by the client [i.e., the Government]. And when you talk about the Auditor General herself, yes, she is independent and appointed by the president and ratified by parliament, but what about the staff? We belong to the Public Service Commission. So, the Auditor General is presiding over public servants. And even the emoluments, they are determined by the public service management commission. They are all civil servants, so in terms of motivation, they may try to do much, but looking at what they get and the work that they do, there is a mismatch.

The lack of independence of the auditors was an issue that came up often in interviews, and this also a prominent point in the INTOSAI standards. INTOSAI declarations dictate that the audit office should be autonomous from the executive government, which include control over the SAI budget.

The kinship logic is not clearly evident in the Office of Auditor General Zambia. Interview respondents did describe it in what they saw as some informal hiring practices that had happened and were based on personal connections rather than qualifications. Admittedly, this was also something they said they “could not prove”, but something they just had a gut instinct about. The lack of evidence indicating the kinship logic at the Office of Auditor General could also be because the very nature of the kinship logic is informal and less obvious than the other logics and therefore harder to detect.

Conclusion

This chapter examined how alternative logics were promulgated within the Office of Auditor General after a new Auditor General was appointed to lead the office and auditors from the Zambian audit office began to engage regularly with the international professional community. This was explained through the theoretical

concepts of institutional entrepreneurship and structural overlap (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). This led to change within the organization as its practices and organizational principles became more consistent with the professionalism and development management logics. The chapter also showed how dramatic historical events are important in the processes of change, as these events happened during a critical time in Zambia's history. The events surrounding the election of a new president, Levy Mwanawasa, who would become a champion for accountability reforms (Taylor, 2006) and the stripping of Chiluba's immunity opened a window of opportunity for the alternative logics to be promulgated and enacted within the Office of Auditor General.

One of the critical processes through which alternative logics were introduced came through the appointment of a new Auditor General, who acted as an institutional entrepreneur within the organization. The case presents a narrative of an institutional entrepreneur whose social position provided her with ideas about the professionalization process as well as giving her access to organizational resources and formal authority. This helps explain why the paradox of embedded agency was not an obstacle to change among the institutional logics, since her previous social position within the ministry of finance guided her toward the courses of agentive action she took within the Office of Auditor General, which her new social position as Auditor General gave her the formal authority to execute.

This case also demonstrated the importance of the professional community in promulgating alternative logics. It showed the fine-grained processes of imitation and translation in the process of institutionalizing ideas, practices, and meanings systems from other organizations into the Office of Auditor General (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). As auditors identified with the professional community, they began imitating other members of the community. The standards and norms were translated into the Zambian context and gave a sense of legitimacy to what they were doing and the changes they were making.

Although the Office of auditor General Zambia has made considerable progress in its outputs and has changed the way it operates, the future of the organization is not entirely clear. The Auditor General who was a central figure in all the changes described in the previous sections, retired from her position in December, 2015, after

reaching the age of mandatory requirement in Zambia. As of 2017, the Deputy Auditor General of Audits is still acting as Auditor General since the president has not formally appointed a new Auditor General, and it is not clear who that person will be. Only time will tell whether the changes in institutional logics described in the previous sections will continue to be developed and sustained. There is a sense of concern in the office now as they await the formal appointment of the next Auditor General. The external environment is now also less hospitable for the Office of Auditor General. The government has less political will to fight corruption and ensure financial transparency. They are less supportive in the recruitment of auditors and less vocal in support of the work of the office. Even public opinion has begun to change. Many Zambians now see the former President Frederick Chiluba as a misunderstood figure, even the victim of “a British-led witch-hunt” (Ryder, 2011). This is especially true since the death of Chiluba in 2011.

Furthermore, there are still problems related to how the PAC and Parliament use the auditor general’s reports, since little corrective action is ever taken by Parliament against those who have abused, misused, or misappropriated public funds (Chikale, 2014). Every year, the Auditor General’s report highlights many of the same issues, but “its recommendations are largely ignored” by Parliament (Chêne, 2014, p. 8). This is a result of the lack of political will of government since the Office of Auditor General continues to play its role in this process with Parliament, yet its committees are lagging behind. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2006, as cited in Hoque and Thiagarajah, 2015) also noted this problem that exists in many countries in the South, and they argued, “Parliaments must have not only the tools but also the political will to oversee the government” (p. 6). Without political will from Parliament to act on the Auditor General’s reports, the Office of Auditor General will not be as effective as it could be in its role of ensuring public accountability in Zambia, regardless of its professional expertise.

Chapter Six:

Power Struggles at the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission

This chapter examines the relationships among institutional logics within the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), and it discusses ways in which alternative institutional logics were promulgated within organization and the effects this has had. The passage of three new Anti-Corruption Acts promulgated the professional autonomy consistent with the system of control of the professionalism logic as well as the internationally accepted standards and norms for how anti-corruption agencies should operate. In addition, organizational restructuring processes promulgated a development management logic, which is seen in a new emphasis on engaging the public and the introduction of annual performance evaluations. These promulgated logics contradict the incumbent bureaucratic and kinship logics that have long been influential in guiding the organization.

In addition to discussing how the logics were promulgated, the chapter also discusses how elements of the different logics interrelate with one another in different ways. In some ways, multiple competing logics can be seen as co-existing in the organization yet segmented away from one another in ways that enable organizational action. In other ways, there have been competitive relationships between the logics with ongoing power struggles around them. This chapter focuses specifically on a few elements of the institutional logics in the typology: staff orientation, system of control and system of authority, evaluation criteria, and employment processes. It focuses on the dynamic relationships between the different logics, how some were able to co-exist through segmentation in different organizational departments, as well as how some logics have existed competitively with the incumbent logics that remain influential in the organization.

Similar to the previous chapter on the Office of Auditor General Zambia, the remainder of this chapter begins with a section describing the rise of anti-corruption agencies in the international arena, which places the case of the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission within its international context. It then continues with a brief history of the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission and some descriptions of the institutional logics that were influential in the early years of the organization. Then,

the chapter will discuss how alternative logics have been promulgated at the Anti-Corruption Commission with some explanations of how that may have affected the organization as well as some discussions reflecting on the different types of relationships that exist among the different logics and how they impact action.

Anti-corruption Agencies Emerging on the World Scene

Anti-corruption agencies are a relatively new type of public organization on the global scene that only “proliferated worldwide in the 1990s and early 2000s” (Kuris, 2015, p. 126). These specialized agencies are thought to play a role in ensuring accountability and curbing abuse of power through the investigation of corruption and by working with the public to increase collective action against it. Singapore established the first anti-corruption agency in 1952, followed by Malaysia in 1967, and Hong Kong in 1974. Following from Asia, anti-corruption agencies began to be established on the African continent in the 1970s, with Tanzania establishing the first anti-corruption agency in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1974 (Chêne, 2009, p. 6), followed by Zambia in 1980. Anti-corruption agencies are now becoming increasingly common throughout Africa, Asia, Europe and beyond, with France establishing its anti-corruption agency in 1993, Argentina in 1999, and Latvia in 2002 (de Sousa, 2010, p. 6).

Anti-corruption agencies around the world are organized and operate differently, depending on their national contexts and legal frameworks. Therefore, they have “not converged in form and function”, according to Kuris (2015, p. 127). Anti-corruption agencies can be classified into three basic models, according to their mandates and functions. The first is *the law enforcement model*, which investigates and prosecutes cases of corruption. The second is *the preventative model*, which monitors ethics and promotes systemic reforms aimed at curbing corruption before it happens. The third is *the multi-purpose model*, which combines these preventive and investigative functions (OECD, 2013, p. 26). Hatchard (2014) has argued that the multi-purpose model has often been mimicked by states in Africa “without taking into account” which arrangement would actually fit best into their individual contexts (pp. 178-180).

Kuris (2015) argues that anti-corruption agencies can be broken down further into two main categories. They can either be *guard dog agencies* or *watchdog agencies*. Guard dog agencies have strong legal mandates to prosecute cases of corruption in the court systems of their respective countries. In other words, they have “strong teeth”, to follow along with Kuris’s metaphor (Ibid, p. 127). Watchdog agencies, on the other hand, do not have strong prosecutorial power and are therefore considered “toothless” (Ibid, p. 127). Kuris (2015) argued that the relative strength of legal mandates can actually lead to counterintuitive results, since guard dog anti-corruption agencies with the “strong teeth” of prosecutorial power can actually be less effective, “especially in countries rife with entrenched corruption and impunity” (p. 127). Even though these guard dog agencies have more legal and prosecutorial power to go after those suspected of corrupt practices, they are also bound by more legal and regulatory restrictions, require more resources, face unrealistic expectations from the public and from donors, and encounter greater risks of political interference due to their legal power. The weaker watchdog agencies, on the other hand, can operate more flexibly since they are not bound by the same legal constraints of “high evidentiary standards, due process requirements, and tight disclosure rules”, and their weaker legal provisions also make them less threatening to powerful officials who may be engaged in corruption (Ibid, p. 132). Therefore, those officials are less likely to interfere with weaker anti-corruption agencies that do not pose a threat.

In spite of the diverging forms and mandates of anti-corruption agencies, there have been some attempts from international and regional associations to coordinate these agencies and the work they do. In Europe, the European Partners Against Corruption (EPAC) was established to facilitate knowledge exchange, cooperation on investigations, and to “develop common strategies and high professional standards” among European agencies (EPAC, 2017). On the African continent, the African Anti-Corruption Authorities Association was established to bring African anti-corruption agencies together across the continent (Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities in Africa, 2014), while the Southern African Development Community Anti-Corruption Committee has a narrower focus on member states within the Southern African Development Community. Internationally, the United Nations launched the

International Association of Anti-Corruption Agencies (IAACA) in 2006 to help the agencies adhere to principles from the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and in 2012, various stakeholders gathered for an international summit “to discuss a set of ‘Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies’ and to promote and strengthen the independence and effectiveness of ACAs” (*Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies*, 2012).

Chief among the principals for anti-corruption agencies is that they have sufficient “independence... to enable [them] to carry out... their functions effectively and free from any undue influence” (*United Nations Convention against Corruption*, 2003, p. 10). The principle of independence is generally agreed upon within the international community of donors, academics, and practitioners coalescing around anti-corruption work (Hatchard, 2014; Kuris, 2015; OECD, 2008, 2013; Quah, 2015), as the OECD (2013) has argued, “The independence of a specialised anti-corruption institution is considered to be a fundamental requirement for the proper and effective exercise of its functions”, and in addition, “[t]his consensus is reflected in all major international legal instruments” (p. 27). In principle, independent anti-corruption agencies should be able to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption against even the most powerful officials in their countries, since they would be able to investigate and prosecute without any undue influence. In reality, however, these agencies often find themselves in more complicated situations in which they must navigate hostile political environments and contend regularly with the influence of powerful actors (de Sousa, 2010; Kuris, 2015). Therefore, it is not surprising that “there is widespread skepticism regarding the effectiveness of ACAs” (Schütte, 2015, p. 2).

The History of Zambia’s Anti-Corruption Agency

The Anti-Corruption Commission is the public agency “mandated to lead the fight against corruption in Zambia” (Chêne, 2014, p. 6). It was established by the Corrupt Practices Act No. 14 of 1980, becoming an operational agency two years later, in 1982. At that time, Zambia was a one-party state under the authoritarian control of its president, Kenneth Kaunda. Chikulo (2000) noted that corruption in Zambia was actually not as prevalent at that time as it is today, and that it mostly “involved lower

level public servants, seeking to supplement their meagre salaries” (p. 163). However, Chikulo also added that “it was not only restricted to this group. Such cases were also reported among senior public servants and political officials” (Ibid. 163). It was in the midst of these corruption cases that the Kaunda government and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) drafted and enacted the Corrupt Practices Act of 1980, which established the Anti-Corruption Commission of Zambia in state law.

President Kaunda’s personal motivation to create an anti-corruption agency can be interpreted in two different ways. One way to interpret it is through a lens of “Kaundaist humanism”, which was rooted in Christianity and Zambian tradition and espoused “the high value of man” as a central tenet (Venter & Olivier, 1993, p. 26). According to that perspective, Kaunda led a fight against corruption because he was personally aggrieved by the sin of public theft and the harm it caused to the Zambian people (Chikulo, 2000, p. 175; see also Phiri, 2008). Another way to interpret Kaunda’s move to establish the Anti-Corruption Commission is through a lens of political oppression, in that it was to create a tool to punish political enemies and potential political challengers (McLoughlin & Weerdesteijn, 2016). Szeftel (1998) noted that during that time, the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission was seen to have “been used to harass political opponents”, which left a general sense of suspicion among opposition leaders (p. 228). Even today, whispers of this legacy remain, as the Anti-Corruption Commission continues to be seen by some as a tool of the sitting government to harass and punish members of the opposition, which as Baniamin and Jamil (2017) noted, “sends a clear message about the dire consequences of opposing the government” (p. 396) and solidifies a sitting government’s control over politics.

Regardless of Kaunda’s personal motivations, the Corrupt Practices Act 14 of 1980 established the Anti-Corruption Commission with a strong and far-reaching legal mandate and prosecutorial power. Therefore, it had “strong teeth” to continue with Kuris’s (2015) metaphor, and it was established as a multi-purpose anti-corruption agency, since it should simultaneously prevent and investigate corruption. According to the Corrupt Practices Act of 1980, the Anti-Corruption Commission was to be the central agency in Zambia to “investigate and prosecute incidents of corruption...; prevent incidents of corruption... by examining the practices and procedures of both

private and public agencies and advising them on systematic reforms...; and carrying out public education campaigns on the evils of corruption” (Corrupt Practices Act no. 14 of 1980, as cited by Mbaio, 2011, p. 270). This broad mandate was inspired by the so-called “three-pronged approach” used by Hong Kong’s anti-corruption agency (Rotberg, 2017), which is the approach used by most African anti-corruption agencies today (Hatchard, 2014).

In spite of the Anti-Corruption Commission’s broad mandate, it initially only focused on the investigative and prosecutorial functions, opting not to focus on corruption prevention activities or on educating the public about corruption and how to prevent it. This was ostensibly due to resource constraints and the small size of the organization in its early years. At its inception, there were only 20 officers, recruited from the ranks of the Zambian police and military, which provided a quick way to get the agency up and running with a team of experienced investigators.

Early Growth and Stability in the Anti-Corruption Commission

During the early years of the Anti-Corruption Commission, the organization grew steadily as it began recruiting additional officers to expand its capacity for investigations and prosecutions. At that time, the organization was developing a reputation within Zambia and throughout the region as being strong and effective in its work of controlling corruption (Rotberg, 2017). Interview respondents who had served for decades within the organization also described it as working effectively at that time, and they noted that Kaunda spoke out publicly against corruption and often dealt swiftly with cases of corruption in the government. One of the interview respondents described the organization during these years in the following statement:

In the Second Republic [*i.e.*, during the Kaunda presidency], it was very effective because it was lean. It was extremely effective and lean. We had a lot of political support. And also, Kaunda was always talking against corruption. He didn’t like corruption. So, most of the speeches you can see he didn’t like corruption. Bear in mind also, it was not a liberalized economy, so most of the entities were either government or parastatal. So, there was

corruption, of course, I'm not saying there was not corruption, but it was dealt with firmly.

Rotberg (2017) echoed this sentiment describing ways Kaunda worked through the Anti-Corruption Commission to arrest several government representatives who were suspected of corruption, noting that even “several cabinet members were removed from their positions” (p. 170). At the time, the Zambian public perceived the organization as hard-working and that it was an organization to be feared (Ibid).

There was an attitude of following orders within the agency, which worked its way down through the hierarchy. Steven Moyo, one of the current Anti-Corruption Commissioners, described the operational mode of the organization at the time as, “commandist”, meaning that it was formally organized in a steep vertical hierarchy, and in which junior officers followed their senior officers’ orders, often without question or critical reflection. This type of blind rule following is consistent with a bureaucratic logic, with a centralized hierarchical system and rational-legal authority, scaling its way up to the top of the hierarchy. Freidson (2001) described this rational-legal authority of the bureaucratic logic, in the following:

When rational-legal authority organizes work, formal, written rules establish the duties of each position, occupation, or job as well as their relationships.

The organization of positions is pyramidal, establishing clear lines of authority leading up to the ultimate executive officer (p. 49).

In the case of the Anti-Corruption Commission, those lines of authority traced their way up from officers, to the Director of Operations, the Commissioner, and ultimately to the President. There were strict ways in which officers should address the leadership. According to Moyo’s account, officers from the Anti-Corruption Commission did not challenge the opinions of their leader. Instead, they simply followed the rules and directives that were given to them without question. This allowed the organization to run smoothly, but it also left little room for internal debate and checks on authority.

In its early years, the Anti-Corruption Commission’s “institutional position was within the Office of the President” (Szeftel, 1998, p. 228). Its hiring and promotional processes were handled centrally through the Public Service Management Division,

promotions were based on seniority and loyalty, and authority and control were centralized at the executive. In that way it was organized according to the bureaucratic logic, with its centralized hierarchical system and rigid structures of authority and control. This organizational structure and the strict rule following by the officers in the Anti-Corruption Commission might have come naturally to them, since they had previously served in the military and the national police force. As Moyo noted, “When the ACC was created, it was hived off of the police force and was still called a police force. So, the first recruits were all seen as regimented officers to enforce the law, specific to corruption.” Furthermore, the organization did not engage often with the public at that time. Interview respondents described it as being internally focused and “rather secretive”, and that they did not talk to members of the public or even receive complaints from them at that time. This internal orientation is also consistent with the bureaucratic logic since it is internally focused on the bureaucracy and not concerned with the external environment.

Being an arm of Kenneth Kaunda’s executive government gave the Anti-Corruption Commission political legitimacy, power, and legal authority to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption that included a genuine threat of force to back it up. Yet, since the authority and control of the Anti-Corruption Commission were squarely in the hands of the president and the ruling party, this also restricted the agency as well. As Hatchard (1985) argued, it limited the Anti-Corruption Commission’s access to the political elites:

[The Anti-Corruption Act of 1980] denies the Commission access to the defense forces, to the security services, and to the secret or confidential deliberations of the Central Committee of U.N.I.P. or the Cabinet, or any of their sub-committees. This restriction regarding top party and government officials means that critical areas of power are not within the jurisdiction of the Commission, and this may seriously weaken its attempt to eliminate corruption (493).

With this arrangement, if the Anti-Corruption Commission wanted to pursue high-level officials that were suspected of corruption, it would have to go through the President first. This left the agency in a precarious situation if it ever wanted to

investigate individuals who were close to the President. Therefore, the organization and its investigators lacked professional autonomy to pursue cases based on evidential criteria alone and remained under the control of the central bureaucracy.

An additional element of control from the executive branch of the government was that the Anti-Corruption Commission had to receive clearance from Director of Public Prosecutions in order to prosecute a case in the courts. This again curtailed the operational autonomy of the organization and provided an opportunity for the executive branch to interfere with investigations into corruption (Coldham, 1995; Rotberg, 2017). These arrangements assured that, although the Anti-Corruption Commission operated with strong legal powers during its early days, it was not its own power. Instead it was the power of the president who was standing behind it and directing it where he wanted it to go – for better or for worse. It could be used to control corruption within the government, and it could also be used to control and harass political opponents of the president, undermining the very purpose of the organization and burdening it with undue influence from the President’s office.

This historical account, drawn primarily from interview data and extant literature leads to an analysis that, during the early days of the Anti-Corruption Commission during Kaunda’s rule, the way the organization operated was mostly consistent with the bureaucratic logic. This can be seen in the strict and centralized hierarchical structure and the following of orders, sometimes blindly, up the chain of command. The agency was mechanistic in the sense that it was based on strictly following the rules and directives issued from the top of hierarchy, echoing the conceptualization of Mintzberg (1979): “the Machine Bureaucracy is a structure with an obsession, namely control” (p. 319). It can also be argued that the Anti-Corruption Commission was used as a tool of repression or fear to control the opposition, which is consistent with a kinship logic. There was little evidence of the professionalism logic since there was no autonomy or authority coming from the fledgling professional community during that time. Likewise, there was little evidence of a development management logic and its public service orientation, fragmented structures, and performance measurements. In many ways, the Anti-Corruption Commission at this

time could be seen as a blunt instrument of the government, and particularly of President Kaunda.

Instability, Transition, and the Promulgation of Alternative Logics

The political situation in Zambia changed dramatically in 1991, when it became “the first Anglophone African country to undergo a peaceful transition from one-party rule to a competitive multiparty system” (Bratton et al., 2017, p. 2). After the landmark elections, a new president, Frederick Chiluba, was elected to defeat Kenneth Kaunda who had served as Zambia’s president for 27 years. Chiluba was initially seen as a reformer and called “Mr. Clean” by members of the public (Chikulo, 2000, p. 178). He promised to bring in a new era of transparency to government in Zambia, as he pledged to “conduct our business openly... with accountability to the people, as embodied in our democratic ideals” (Taylor, 2006, pp. 285-286). Chiluba also promised to liberalize the economy, privatize state-owned enterprises, and implement public sector reforms aimed at making government more efficient and effective. These promises were lauded by the donor community, who financially supported Zambia’s moves toward neo-liberal economic reforms and civil service reforms (Rotberg, 2017), as they hailed Zambia “a success story on the international scene” (Momba, 2007, p. 116).

However, Chiluba’s electoral pledges to govern with transparency and accountability to the public soon “proved hollow, as Chiluba and his inner circle began engaging in rampant corruption...the unbridled use of state resources for his own private benefit” (Taylor, 2006, p. 286). Many consider that it was during “Frederick Chiluba’s government when corruption became entrenched in the fabric of the country” (Momba, 2007, p. 115) and “flourished to a degree that Zambia had never before experienced” (Rotberg, 2017, p. 171). During this time, the work of the Anti-Corruption Commission was routinely frustrated by the government (Mwiinga, 1994). Rotberg (2017) noted, “Cases of the kind that formerly had moved smoothly from the ACC to the courts were blocked, usually on presidential orders. With the withdrawal of executive and therefore political backing, the ACC became more and more powerless” (p. 171). In the second year of Chiluba’s presidency, he began looking for

ways to minimize the Anti-Corruption Commission, either by merging it with the police force or dissolving it entirely (Szeftel, 1998, p. 228; see also Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2005). These developments were leading to a critical juncture for the Anti-Corruption Commission, as its future role or even its very existence as a public accountability organization in Zambia was uncertain.

President Chiluba's threats to dissolve the Anti-Corruption Commission came at a time in which the international community was becoming increasingly interested in the work of anti-corruption agencies (OECD, 2008). In the early 1990s, international donors, governments, and civil society organizations had begun putting pressure on Chiluba and his government to control corruption and to strengthen the role and legal power of the Anti-Corruption Commission (Chikulo, 2000). As Szeftel (1998) argued, the organization's "survival owed much to strong support by Britain's ODA [Office of Development Assistance] and political conditionality" (p. 228), as they began applying pressure for anti-corruption reforms. It was in the process of adopting these reforms that alternative logics were promulgated at the Anti-Corruption Commission, which could potentially change the way the organization was operating, giving it more operational autonomy and more focus on serving the public. The passage of new laws that provided the framework for the operation of the Anti-Corruption Commission and two new organizational restructuring programs that altered the structures of the organization and introduced new management tools promulgated alternative logics in the Anti-Corruption Commission.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss how these events promulgated alternative logics that led to some changes within the constellation of logics guiding the organization. It will also discuss limitations to those changes using the theoretical concept of decoupling, which describes situations in which a state like Zambia may adopt anti-corruption policies or laws but fail to implement them fully (Bromley & Powell, 2012). In these cases, the introduction of alternative logics through new laws or restructuring the organization can be seen as an example of what Andrews (2013) called "reforms as signals", when he wrote:

[M]any reforms are introduced as short-term signals that ensure developing countries attain and retain external support and legitimacy... Such reforms are

prone to having limited success, however. They may produce new forms (like laws) in the short term, but these typically have poor functionality.

Governments look better after reform but often are not better (p. 2-3 parentheses in original).

This also alludes to Campbell's (2004) argument that "sometimes events, such as the passage of a new law, can end up having surprisingly little effect" (p. 47). This is because they may be designed "more to legitimize or obscure organizational practices than to achieve real substantive change in how an organization operates" (Ibid, p. 43), and their implementation can also be watered down throughout the implementation process thereby further reducing their effectiveness.

The Introduction of Three New Legal Frameworks

In 1994, international donors and civil society organizations began pressuring the Chiluba government to curb corruption and implement new policies aimed at improving government accountability, which included changes to the legal framework of the Anti-Corruption Commission, making it more independent and "autonomous from the political executive" (Chikulo, 2000, p. 178). The donor community then placed conditionality on their aid disbursements, which meant that, if the Chiluba government wanted to continue receiving monetary aid, it would have to comply with the demands to give the Anti-Corruption Commission more independence (Chikulo, 2000; Szeftel, 1998). As one of the Anti-Commission officers who worked for the organization during that time noted,

So, there were a lot of calls for the institution to become independent... there was an outcry in the country, and the NGOs were a part of that outcry, including the donors - our external partners. So, that's how the law was changed.

In the wake of the public outcry and increasing pressure from donors, the Chiluba government eventually relented and began drafting a new Anti-Corruption Commission bill that would later be enacted in 1996. This was actually the first of three times that the anti-corruption laws would be changed in Zambia. After the changes in 1996, they were later changed again in 2010 and in 2012, and as the

following sections will demonstrate, each time these laws were changed, they promulgated elements of alternative logics in the organization.

Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 1996

In 1996, the Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 1996 was passed in Parliament. The new act granted the Anti-Corruption Commission more independence in its investigations of corruption, and it provided for the creation of a board of commissioners who would oversee the Anti-Corruption Commission instead of it being “under the control and supervision of the President” as it previously had been (Szeftel, 1998, p. 228, see also Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2005). The new act also allowed the agency to handle its own employment processes, disengaging its officers from the executive branch (Chikulo, 2000; Musonda, 2011). In this ironic turn of events, it seemed that even though Chiluba had wanted to marginalize or dissolve the Anti-Corruption Commission, he actually ended up signing into law a new act that called for more autonomy and strength for the Anti-Corruption Commission.

The passage of the new Anti-Corruption Commission Act signaled to the international community that the organization would have more independence, in line with the international standards and principles for anti-corruption agencies, and that it would begin addressing the rampant corruption that was taking place within the country. However, in reality, Chiluba still managed to weaken the commission, which he did by simply ignoring it (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2005, p. 80). He did not appoint a new board of commissioners to lead the organization as the 1996 law had required, and he also held back the financial resources that it needed to operate (Ibid). In spite of the Anti-Corruption Commission’s new-found independence, its funding still had to flow through the Ministry of Finance, and this arrangement gave the executive a tool for controlling the agency’s capacity to conduct investigations, which required significant financial and human resources. As Mwenda (2007) argued:

[T]he Commission was under the Chiluba regime perpetually underfunded, as it was often denied operational funds... Although under the ACC act, the Commission is self-accounting, the Ministry of finance handles its financial affairs. The executive always drastically reduces its proposed budget and even

the little money allocated in the budget is not released in full (Mwenda, 2007, p. 75).

Thus, while the new act had promulgated values of the professionalism logic, bringing it into line with the international norms and standards for anti-corruption agencies, decentralizing its hierarchical structure, and providing professional autonomy; and while it promulgated the bureaucratic logic by strengthening the legal authority of the agency, this was not experienced in reality. It was decoupled from the way the organization actually operated and only seen visibly through the law that was on the books.

This decoupling was to the benefit of the president and those around him at that time. The government would be able to attain external legitimacy from the international and donor communities by enacting the stronger law, but they would still be able to avoid the scrutiny and unwanted attention from a strengthened and independent anti-corruption agency by failing to implement the law fully. This type of situation was discussed by Bromley and Powell (2012) who argued, “decoupling is more common when it serves the interests of powerful leaders..., in which networks of top managers and organizations become skilled at symbolic manipulation” (p. 11). Chiluba and his administration were able to manipulate the public and donor community by symbolically implementing the new law on paper, but in reality, they were able to continue abusing their offices for their own benefit.

Organization members who were in the Anti-Corruption Commission during this time described it as a difficult working environment, in which President Chiluba “had a lot of negative influence on the organization... and officers were really not that motivated”. One of the organization members reflected on this time in the organization’s history through the following comment:

Under Chiluba, there was no political will to fight corruption. Even the funding for the commission, it was literally zero. So, in terms of operations, we were affected. There were no high-profile cases. So, even the pace at which we were disposing of cases was very slow - those which we could attend to because of limited funding.

Another organization member reflected on the organization under the Chiluba administration with the following comment:

There was no money in the institution. There was no money for anything.

There was no money. So, the morale wasn't good. To fight corruption, you need support. Big corruption will involve big people, and you need that political support.

According to interview respondents and extant literature, it appears that, even though the donor community had been successful in pressuring the Chiluba regime to strengthen the Anti-Corruption Commission through a stronger legal framework that had the appearance of independence and autonomy, the new law actually had very little effect. The new legal framework formally provided more autonomy and independence for the organization, but the executive government and the President still found ways of controlling the agency and slowing down its investigations. This led Chikulo (2000) to write about the organization of that time, "in spite of the amendments designed to strengthen the ACC... analysis of the relevant legislation reveals that the Commission, to all intents and purposes, still remains executive-based" (p. 179).

The situation for the Anti-Corruption Commission did begin improve under the next presidential administration that began in 2002, when Levy Mwanawasa was elected president. Mwanawasa's ant-corruption efforts are generally considered to have been robust and sincere. As Rotberg (2017) argued, "Levy Mwanawasa... was genuinely determined to eliminate corrupt behavior" in Zambia (p. 172). President Mwanawasa appointed a board of commissioners to oversee the anti-corruption commission, and he increased its funding. He also called for Parliament to strip prosecutorial immunity from the former President, Frederick Chiluba, which they did, so that a criminal case could be brought against him. Mwanawasa then established the Task Force on Corruption, of which the Anti-Corruption Commission was a part, to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption against Chiluba and other members of government.

Some interview respondents described the years during the Mwanawasa government as the best years for the Anti-Corruption Commission. As one of the long-time organization members said,

Mwanawasa, each time he had an opportunity, he spoke against corruption and he referred to the institution. Financially, the financial support to the institution increased. At that time the ACC appeared to be dead, but it came to be alive again, and it commanded respect.

Interview respondents believed Mwanawasa demonstrated a strong political will to fight corruption, particularly since he even allowed the Task Force on Corruption to bring cases forward against members of his own government. A 2011 Norad report, noted that, “[o]ver 30 government officials (including three ministers and seven permanent secretaries) were removed from their posts over 2005-08”, which was during Mwanawasa’s administration (Norad, 2011, p. 15, footnote 26, parentheses in original).

However, interview respondents also discussed negative aspects associated with the Mwanawasa years, particularly as they related to the Task Force on Corruption that he established. To them, it made the Anti-Corruption Commission look bad, because it seemed that all of a sudden, there were cases of grand corruption going before the courts. People began wondering why the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) had not been doing this previously. As one of the respondents said,

But the negative issues that came up was that these same officers from ACC are now in a public domain, they are in court, they are prosecuting a former president. What is lacking at the institution itself, and why weren’t they doing this before? ... Why did it take [the Director of the Task Force] to become so proactive? But what about the ACC as an institution? Are they able to do this on their own? That opened up this institution to exposure, it opened up this institution to such thinking like that.

There was a common perception at that time that the Anti-Corruption Commission was not up to the task of investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption against Chiluba and his alleged co-conspirators. As Ryder (2011) noted, “the ACC’s low standing” and the perception that the “ACC did not have the internal capacity for such

an undertaking” led Mwanawasa to the conclusion that “the ACC simply did not seem up to the task” (p. 2). “[H]e needed a crack team to hit the ground running and capitalize on the momentum he had created” (Ibid, p. 2). However, that team would not be coming from the Anti-Corruption Commission. It would instead come from Mwanawasa’s new Task Force on Corruption.

The Mwanawasa administration did not last long, however. Nor did the Task Force he had established. Mwanawasa died while in office in 2008, and his Vice President, Rupiah Banda, served out the rest of his term. Banda’s actions while in office are seen by many as undermining anticorruption work rather than supporting it (Hatchard, 2014; Mbao, 2011; Ndulo, 2014). During Banda’s presidency, Frederick Chiluba was acquitted on all charges of public theft and corruption. The appeal by the Task Force on Corruption against the acquittal was withdrawn by the new Director of Public Prosecutions, and when the head of the Task Force publicly disagreed with the decision, he was removed from his position by President Banda. The case against Chiluba that had been built over the years was eventually dropped in 2009. Finally, in what can be considered a dramatic step backward, President Banda formally disbanded the Task Force on Corruption.

Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2010: a brief interlude

The Anti-Corruption Commission law was changed a second time in 2010, when the Banda government introduced a new act, which was to ostensibly, “bring the law into conformity with the provisions of the regional and international conventions to which Zambia is a State party” (*The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2010*, the introduction section). The new act brought the agency closer to international norms and standards in some ways since it toughened penalties for corruption. However, it also curbed the powers and level of independence of the Anti-Corruption Commission in two key ways (Mbao, 2011). First, it gave the President the authority to remove the Director General, removing the Parliamentary check that was put in place in the 1996 Act. Second, it removed the abuse of authority clause that criminalized abuse of office (Mbao, 2011, p. 270), which is seen as “an important tool for prosecuting high-level corruption in Zambia” (Lungu, 2017, p. 289). This is because it criminalizes public

officials' abuse of their position for personal gain or even "maintains a standard of living above that which is commensurate with his present or past official emoluments" or "is in control or possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his present or past official emoluments" (*The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 1996*, section 37). The removal of this clause took away a key tool for investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption since it can be difficult to trace financial transactions to their original source.

Again, the Zambian government was sending a signal to the international community that it was dealing with corruption and coming into line with the international standards for anti-corruption work. Yet, as Ndulo (2014) argued, the 2010 act moved the Anti-Corruption Commission backward in terms of its autonomy, as it "clearly ensures that the removal of the Director General is completely controlled by the executive" (Ndulo, 2014, p. 20). With these legal changes, the Commission seemed to be back under the control of the executive again, in both formal and informal ways. Not only could the president continue to work behind the scenes to apply pressure to the Director General of the Anti-Corruption Commission, he could even remove him or her by a presidential fiat.

Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2012

In March of 2012, shortly after the election of a new president, Michael Sata, his Minister of Justice presented a bill in Parliament that would change the anti-corruption laws for the third time, just two years after Banda's administration had changed them. President Sata's Minister of Justice noted that the changes to the laws would "domesticate the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, the Southern African Development Community Protocol Against Corruption, and other regional and international instruments on corruption to which Zambia is a party" (*Parliamentary Debates - Wednesday, 7th of March, 2012, 2012*). The new bill was enacted in Parliament on the 12th of April, 2012 to become the Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2012, which is the current legal framework at the time of writing this case study.

The changes to the Anti-Corruption Commission Act would, once again, formally provide for broader legal powers and more independence for the agency. The abuse of authority clause and the Parliamentary check on the president's power to remove the Director General were now put back in the law. This meant the agency would again have the legal provisions to investigate and prosecute public office holders who abused their positions to enrich themselves or their family members and that the President would no longer have the legal ability to fire the Director General on his own accord. However, Hatchard (2014) contended the 2012 act still did not go far enough in several ways, and he described some of the law's provisions as "alarmingly weak" (p. 194). It still would essentially allow "the President to hand pick an appointee and have the (normally) cooperative legislature rubber-stamp the appointment, without the need for even an enhanced majority" (Ibid, p. 194, parentheses in original). The new law simply said the Director General should be "appointed by the President, subject to the ratification by the National Assembly, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine" (Section 9, line 2 of the ACC Act, 2012). Hatchard (2014) went on to argue, that with provisions like these, "it is the very people who the ZACC is likely to investigate who control the appointment of the Director General" (p. 194). This opened the door, once again, for the informal control of the Director General and the organization, which is consistent with the kinship logic and based on expectations of reciprocity and fear of repercussions.

The introduction of the new laws was conceivably meant to strengthen the independence of the Anti-Corruption commission, giving it more autonomy to be able to operate independently of the executive branch and giving it more power to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption. While this was aimed at strengthening the rational-legal authority of the agency, which is the source of authority of the bureaucratic logic, it also introduced more autonomy for the organization, which is based on the international standards and norms of the professional field and consistent with the professionalism logic's system of control. It would provide autonomy and discretion to anti-corruption officers to work without undue influence from politicians.

However, when interview respondents from the Anti-Corruption Commission discussed the independence and autonomy of the organization, they often expressed

their concerns about its lack of autonomy. They consider this to be a major obstacle standing in the way of their work, and that this has become more of a problem in recent years. Instead of the organization being run as an autonomous and independent commission, it is seen by many as receiving directives from the executive and “there to persecute the people that are on the opposing side”. As one of the respondents said,

You see when you talk about autonomy, I think this autonomy is just “autonomy” in inverted commas. Of course, in the past, you would actually accept that ‘Oh, OK, 90% of the things we do here, we are really autonomous,’ but this time you see that the directives that happen there in the political environment are actually taken into this institution, and they are taken to be implemented. This was not the case in the past.

The interview respondents expressed their increasing concern about interference from powerful political actors, that it limits the cases they can investigate and prosecute, and this is primarily based on who is seated in government at the time. Investigators are told which cases they should follow and which ones they should leave alone, and according to interview respondents, these directives ultimately come down “from the office of the president”. This political interference from the president’s office affects their work since they do not have real autonomy to select the cases they will pursue, only the ones that will not negatively affect the government in power.

When interview respondents were asked to talk about political interference in the organization, they seemed uncomfortable discussing it since it was not something they usually spoke freely about. As one of the officers said:

Well, as much as we try to deny it, especially to the outside and sometimes even to ourselves within here, it’s something that we can’t run away from, something we are able to see happening. Again, I will speak from my position. There were a number of times when you had to communicate something, but then before you get any kind of directions, you censor yourself and say, ‘No this will not sit well with those people’. So, that gives you an indication. And there are obviously even times when directions come down that say ‘Don’t go this way. Go that way’. I think that’s one we can’t run away from. There’s a lot of cases that could have gone differently had the person involved been on

the other side of the fence, politically speaking. So, usually, you can see that, as much as they try to not make it look so obvious, it's something that we can't run away from. It's there.

According to these respondents, the Anti-Corruption Commission cannot run away from the fact that political interference is there, and that it limits the work they do and that it also diminishes the public's faith in them to control corruption.

The officers who were interviewed seemed understandably fearful when discussing political interference. They were afraid of the personal repercussions they might receive for speaking out about it. For example, during the interviews, some of the respondents spoke up and wanted to make sure the interview recording equipment would be kept secure so that it would not end up in the hands of the government. They also wanted to make sure their identities would be kept anonymous and protected in case study reports. One of the officers described the reasons for their fear, saying,

[T]he environment we are operating in now is more political than independent. You risk being fired. You risk being reprimanded. You risk being demoted. You risk being all sorts of things. So, officers are operating in some kind of fear in this environment.

Anti-Corruption Commission officers believe they have good reasons to be afraid, given the current political climate of the country. There have even been a number of Directors General who have recently left the office under suspicious circumstances in recent years, which has also heightened the sense of anxiety among organization members.

In essence, officers at the Anti-Corruption Commission are afraid of losing their jobs for doing their jobs properly – for investigating cases of corruption among public servants and politicians. This subverts the rule of law in Zambia and is contrary to the rational-legal authority put in place within the organization. The organization members' fear is consistent with the system of control and authority of the kinship logic, which is informal and based on expectations of reciprocation and fear of reprisals. This exists even though the Anti-Commission Act provides for the autonomy of the organization, for security of tenure for the Director General, and protections for officers. As one of the interview respondents said, “the law is on our

side since the legal framework gives us autonomy and security of tenure for the DG. Maybe we are just scared of our own shadows.”

When interview respondents were asked for more details about how political interference happens within the organization, they often pointed their finger at the Director General’s office (often times literally, they gestured toward the office of the Director General, which was located down the hall from the conference room where the interviews took place.) They described different situations in which Director Generals did not support organizational officers who were investigating politically connected people. If they went to search a politician’s office, for example, that politician could just place a phone call to the Director General, who would then tell the investigators that they needed to come back to headquarters to clear up some technical details before moving forward. Those investigations would then get bogged down and end up not being finished. This left the officers feeling embarrassed and demotivated. Respondents also discussed times in which a Director General had actually been seen removing critical files from the office “to ensure that no action was to be taken” against well-connected or powerful “politicians and ministers”.

According to interview respondents, the autonomy of the Anti-Corruption Commission is just “on the books” or “in inverted commas”, and they believe the president still has the power to direct the organization through the Director General he had placed in that position. Thus, the source of control still ultimately lies with the office of the President through fear of recrimination and through informal means of exerting influence and pressure. In this way, the informal control and authority of the kinship logic undermines and subverts the rational-legal authority of the bureaucratic logic and the professional autonomy of the professionalism logic. The independence and autonomy that are consistent with the professionalism logic and the strong rational-legal authority consistent with the bureaucratic logic, though promulgated through the passage of stronger laws in line with international standards, are decoupled from the way the organization is actually being controlled. This form of control is particularly obvious and nefarious when it really counts, when the Anti-Corruption Commission is investigating powerful political operatives who are suspected of corruption.

Restructuring Processes

Another way in which alternative logics were promulgated within the Anti-Corruption Commission was through organizational restructuring processes. The Anti-Corruption Commission went through two different restructuring processes in 2005 and 2012, each of which promulgated elements of the development management logic. Organizational restructuring is a process of “streamlining and rationalizing the structures and operations” of public organizations in Zambia (Mate, 2006, p. 30). The restructuring process is done by determining the appropriate staff levels and organization structures to meet the organization’s mission and goals and adapting the structure of the organization to be able to meet those goals. Since the launch of Zambia’s Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), all public organizations are supposed to be restructured after going through a managerial audit and strategic planning process to determine the organization’s mission and objectives and how the organization can achieve them. The overall goal of PSRP is to “improve government capacity... for social and economic development... to enhance ministerial capacities to effectively manage public expenditure and meet fiscal stabilization objectives, and to make the public service efficient and responsive to the needs of the country’s population” (Government of the Republic of Zambia Public Service Reform Programme, 1993, as cited by Mate, 2006).

Increase of outreach and corruption prevention activities

One of the major emphases of the restructuring processes at the Anti-Corruption Commission was related to public outreach and corruption prevention. This was a significant change since, for the first twenty years of the organization’s existence, it had mainly only been focused on investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption even though it had a broad legal mandate based on the Hong Kong model’s three-pronged approach. To that end, the first restructuring plan in 2005 called for the creation of a new department called, *Corruption Prevention and Community Education*. The creation of the new department signaled a renewed focus for the Anti-Corruption Commission: “that the focus of the ACC was to move from investigation and prosecutions to corruption prevention” (Doig et al., 2005, p. 81), enabling it fulfill

its original mandate as a multi-purpose anti-corruption agency simultaneously investigating cases of corruption and working with the community to prevent it (OECD, 2008, 2013).

The second restructuring process, which occurred in 2012, sought to sharpen the organization's focus on the public even further. It split the Corruption Prevention and Community Education Department into two separate departments. The first department, *Corruption Prevention*, was set up "to create effective mechanisms for prevention of corruption in order to significantly reduce corrupt practices" (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2012, p. 26). It was to do this by developing and overseeing Integrity Committees in government organizations, through which those organizations are supposed to self-monitor and thereby "reduce corruption at service delivery level" (Norad, 2011, p. 32). Corruption Prevention would also be the department to conduct monitoring evaluation exercises using survey data to diagnose which public organizations were at high risk for corruption and required intervention strategies (Ibid, p. 25). The second department that was created in the restructuring process, *Community Education*, was set up to "create public awareness and obtain public support for preventing and combatting corruption" (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2012, p. 14). Its sole focus was to communicate with the public in order to gain their trust and support in the fight against corruption.

Since these new departments were developed, the Anti-Corruption Commission has increased its activities related to both community outreach and integrity committees. It increased the number of Integrity Committees from 22 in 2011 (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2011, p. 9) to 46 Integrity Committees in 2015 (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2015, p. 9). It also increased its number of community outreaches by giving more lectures and talks about corruption and other types of outreach activities within Zambian communities. This increase is evidenced by organizational measures for public lectures and other presentations Community Education officers gave, which is tracked in the Anti-Corruption Commission's annual reports. For example, the annual report from 2006 showed that community education officers gave 33 lectures and talks to 2,750 participants (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2006, p. 46), while the annual report for 2015 showed that community

education officers gave 150 lectures and talks to 14,673 participants (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2015, pp. 40-41). That is a significant increase in public outreaches over a nine-year period of time, and it also indicates changes that are consistent with the development management logic and its staff orientation that is externally focused on the public.

The chart that follows below shows a steady yearly increase of reported public outreaches as measured by the Anti-Corruption Commission, which demonstrates an increase in the importance of public engagement with the organization.

Public Outreaches from the Anti-Corruption Commission by Year

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Number of public outreaches made across Zambia:	33	91	110	58	128	78	126	161	151	150
Number of people who were present during outreaches:	2,750	5,765	5,700	5,433	7,229	4,828	15,354	16,889	14,473	14,673

Chart based on available data from annual reports between 2006 and 2015.

By creating a new department focused on community education, the restructuring processes promulgated a staff orientation consistent with the development management logic, one that is focused on empowering the public to become more aware and engaged in anti-corruption efforts in Zambia. This also allowed the development management logic to increase its relative influence within the organizational context by segmenting it within the one department, Community Education. One of the organization members described the department and the segmentation within the organization by saying:

There’s a department called Community Education, and those are the ones I think who have the public at heart. Everything they do, they have to think of the public- “We have to get this to the public”. They have a different perspective... The Investigations Department on the other hand, they don’t keep the public in mind. I doubt it. I think, for them, it’s just an issue of the organization. “The organization wants this done. We need to investigate this and give them

information on what transpired in this matter.’ And that’s it. So, it depends on which department is involved.

When it comes to the staff orientation of the Anti-Corruption Commission, it can be understood as mainly oriented in two directions, internally to the bureaucratic organization itself and externally toward the public. The two logics can co-exist in this way because of segmenting between logics, which “allows competitive relationships to coexist by partitioning work consistent with different logics among actors or organizations” (Waldorff et al., 2013, p. 123).

The new Community Education Department was set up to educate the public about corruption as well as to communicate with the public through its public relations division. It is the very nature of the department to interface with the public and is not involved in investigating or prosecuting cases of corruption. The Investigations Department, on the other hand, is focused on conducting investigations, which are by their nature, secretive and covert. The two departments exist in separate parts of the headquarters building in Lusaka, and the officers within them can work on their projects without significant interaction with one another. This spatial separation provides a way to keep the two logics segmented away from one another in day-to-day work. The Community Education Department would be able to focus on the public while the Investigations Department could focus internally on the bureaucracy, abiding by the rules and routines and secrecy inherent in their work.



Theatre troupe performing during an Anti-Corruption Day event. Photo and text found in the 2014 Annual Report by the Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia (2014, p. 38).



Children listening to a presentation at an Anti-Corruption public rally at Chiyeke Market in Chavuma District. Photo and text found in the 2014 Annual Report by the Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia (2014, p. 39).



A group of men listening to an anti-corruption talk at Chief Nkweto's Palace in Chinsali District. Photo and text found in the 2012 Annual Report by the Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia (2012, p. 20).



Group of women and children listening to an anti-corruption presentation at Chief Katyetye's Palace in Isoka District. Photo and text found in the 2012 Annual Report by the Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia (2012, p. 21).

Introduction of performance appraisals

Another change that came through the restructuring process was the introduction of annual performance appraisals. According to Zambia's Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), after restructuring takes place within a government agency, the restructured organization is then conditionally required to conduct annual performance appraisals of its officers (Kanchebele, 2013; Manning & Agere, 2002). The Anti-Corruption Commission's key donor, DFID, had also been pushing for performance appraisals and the importance of "holding staff to account for their performance against agreed standards of professionalism for the ACC work and leading by example" (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2005, p. 5).

According to the Anti-Corruption Commission's 2006 annual report, performance appraisals were first introduced within the organization in 2006, one year after the first restructuring process was completed (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2006, p. 12). Annual performance appraisals are the yearly systematic evaluation processes, in which supervisors assess the performance of their direct reports based on previously agreed upon objectives as well as how those objectives contribute to overall organizational goals and objectives. The central element of the performance appraisals is a yearly interview, in which a supervisor meets together

with his or her direct reports to discuss their performance. One of the interview respondents described the interviews like this, “You sit with the supervisor. Then you go through the form that you have filled in about why you were not able to fulfill certain targets and the reasons you have put there.” The supervisor will then make recommendations based on the evaluation. These might be to reward good performance with promotions and pay increases, for example, or to help improve an officer’s job performance with training programs, all based on the evaluation and interview processes.

The introduction of annual performance appraisals promulgated elements of the development management logic at the Anti-Corruption Commission, particularly as it relates to evaluation and employment processes for organization members. This appraisal process would presumably give more control and authority to management within the organization for evaluating organization members based on their job performance. Members of management would then have the tools and authority to call for promotions, training programs, or corrective actions based on the evaluations of employees. This also emphasized the strategic operational mode of the organization, which was focused on how it could effectively work toward its mission to prevent and combat corruption for good governance and sustainable development.

However, officers within the Anti-Corruption Commission said that performance appraisals are not taken seriously within the organization or that they are not even being done at all in some cases. When they are being done, they were described simply as “an academic exercise,” or something that just had to be done, even though respondents said there was no point in doing them within their organization. To clarify this point, one of the respondents said,

What I mean by ‘academic exercise’ is, figuratively speaking, there is nothing that comes out of them that the commission benefits from. So, it’s just one of those things we just do for the sake of doing it. So, people would just say [to their supervisor], “Write down whatever you want to put there because I’ve been doing this for the past few years, and nothing comes of it!” ... it becomes something you do just for the sake of doing it.

These performance appraisals can be seen as a type organizational ceremony performed for the sake of making it look legitimate, yet doing very little to change the daily routines of the organization (Bromley & Powell, 2012).

Some officers said that they had actually quit doing the appraisals years earlier after a government spending freeze prevented officers from receiving salary increases. One respondent noted that after that point, the “supervisor would not even ask about the appraisal for that coming year” because it was just understood that they would not do it. He went on to say, “that’s why, me, I haven’t done those appraisals... nobody has done appraisals. I think in the last three years no one has, because they have no motivation to do the appraisals.” This situation has gotten worse over the years, as funding for the organization has decreased. Therefore, without the incentives of pay increases, the policy of performance appraisals is seen as a meaningless act of ceremony, both by managers and their direct reports.

A University of Zambia researcher, Njekwa Mate (2006), also found gaps between the Zambian performance appraisal policy and its implementation in public organizations. His research showed that, across the civil service, performance appraisals are largely symbolic, rather than being used as tools to monitor and improve performance of public servants. Mate (2006) noted that “the majority of civil servants interviewed (i.e., 58.5 percent) argued that the administration of the performance appraisal system in the civil service today was just a matter of routine and served very little purpose” (p. v, parentheses in original; see also pp. 48-60). Mate’s research, along with the current case on the Anti-Corruption Commission, illustrates how processes of decoupling can affect the implementation of performance appraisals. They are decoupled from the core operations of the organization, which rewards officers for stable and consistent service in the organization rather than for performance.

The issue of annual performance evaluations also relates to employment processes at the Anti-Corruption Commission, which continue to be consistent with the bureaucratic logic in spite of the development management logic being promulgated through the restructuring processes. Promotions are based on seniority and do not take into account evaluations from the annual performance appraisals.

Interview respondents were eager to talk about the way promotions took place within the organization. As one of the respondents described it,

I would say unfortunately it only has to do with seniority, how long a person has been in this institution. So, whether you performed better than a certain person who has been here longer than you, you will still never get a position... rarely is performance or qualification looked at.

Another organization member described it by saying, "In reality, promotions are based on how long you've stayed. I know people who have been longer than me, and they have been promoted sometimes regardless of whether or not they have performed."

It troubles some of the officers that promotions are not being based on job performance. One of the respondents described the situation in the following:

What I have noticed is that promotions are based more on the years of service - long service is a very big advantage for a promotion - not really your output or performance. It's about who has worked with us longest: let's reward him with this position. So, people don't really care how good you are at what you do.

This seemed to affect the morale of the officers, and it has been exacerbated by a situation in the organization in which there are very few vacancies for promotions. The way respondents see it, the few promotions that are actually given, are given to those who have been at the organization longest, regardless of their performance.

Decoupling, Segmentation, and Relationships among Logics

The sections above described how the passage of news laws and organizational restructuring processes promulgated the development management and professionalism logics within the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission. These promulgations in some ways led to changes in ways the organization operated and interacted with society. These changes came as organization members enacted elements of the development management logic and its orientation toward the public, as evidenced by outreach activities throughout Zambia. However, in other ways, particularly related to the autonomy and independence of the organization and the way that evaluations were carried out, they were only enacted on a surface level within the organization.

The passage of the new laws can be seen as signals sent to the international community that the Zambian government was taking action against corruption. They codified the international standards for anti-corruption agencies into Zambian law with language that provided the agency more legal independence and autonomy to conduct anti-corruption work without undue influence from political actors. The passage of the new laws promulgated the professionalism logic, since it espoused the standards and norms commonly accepted within that professional community, and because it formally provided more autonomy and independence for the organization to do its work without undue influence, which is consistent with the professionalism logic. The new laws also promulgated the bureaucratic logic by formally strengthening the rational-legal authority of the organization, giving it more legal strength to prosecute cases of corruption.

However, in spite of the promulgations of the professional and bureaucratic logics, the ultimate system of control and authority within the organization continues to remain consistent with the kinship logic. The executive branch of government and those who are politically connected are able to use informal means of control. For example, interview respondents stated that the President can expect the Director General, whom he appointed to that position, to reciprocate for this by steering investigations away from himself and those close to him. In that way, the actual operation of the Anti-Corruption Commission is decoupled from the formal laws that provide independence for the organization and for its leader, the Director General. According to this perspective on decoupling, the laws were “adopted purely as ceremonial window dressing or implemented... so weakly that they do little to alter daily work routines” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 7). As a result of these laws being implemented only ceremonially, officers within the Anti-Corruption Commission regularly operate in fear of losing their jobs or being punished in other ways if they expose corruption among powerful politicians and those closely connected to the President.

In that way, there continues to be a facilitative relationship between the kinship and bureaucratic logics, since in some ways the laws and structures that are rational and legal can be subverted and used as weapons to instill fear and informal control of

the Anti-Corruption Commission and its members. For example, the law requires the Director of Public Prosecution to approve cases before they can go to the courts. This gives the President and the executive branch of government yet another lever to exercise control and undue influence in the organization, as was attested by interview respondents. Likewise, even though the organization is now situated outside of the president's office and is "self-accounting" with control of its own budget, it still comes under the ministry of finance, which is part of the executive (Mwenda, 2007, p. 75). The Ministry of Finance regularly cuts its budget and fails to release the total amount of its budgeted funds, which prevents the officers from doing their work (Ibid). Interview respondents believe these arrangements have allowed politicians to subvert the legal system and to control the organization through fear and intimidation, practices which are consistent with the kinship logic.

The organizational restructuring processes promulgated the development management logic in two main ways. The first was that it provided for more external focus on the public through education programs. This was made possible through segmenting the development management logic and the bureaucratic logic in different departments. Segmenting is seen as a way to enable action, according to Waldorff et al. (2013), since it allows competitive relationships to coexist by partitioning the types of work consistent with different logics in different departments. The external orientation of the development management logic was segmented within the Community Education department, which has the staff resources and the responsibility for developing collective action against corruption in Zambia and communicating with the public about the cases the organization is investigating. The Investigations Department, on the other hand, continues to have an internal orientation. It is focused internally on the bureaucracy and operating under secrecy, which is arguably a necessary requirement for doing their work as investigators. Even though there could be competition between the bureaucratic logic's internal orientation, in which organization members would be focused on the needs of the bureaucracy and disregarding the needs of the public, and the external orientation of the development management logic, these can coexist by being separated within two distinct organizational departments.

Through that segmentation, the organization can satisfy demands of both logics. The constraints of the bureaucratic logic, with its internal orientation within the bureaucratic organization was able to continue unabated. While, at the same time, the organization could also focus on the public through the Community Education department, both in its education programs such as lectures, talks, and workshops in the community. Indeed, the number and types of programs have expanded with outreaches in the traditional communities, larger public rallies, and creative presentations through dramas and music (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2014, 2015). The staff members from the two departments are able to do their very different types of work without preventing each other from satisfying the demands of the different logics guiding their work.

Restructuring also paved the way for performance evaluations, which are a requirement at all public organizations in Zambia that have been through the restructuring process. The performance evaluations, at first glance, were implemented within the office in 2006. However, interview respondents said that the performance evaluations were either not taking place at all or were merely done in a symbolic way. Therefore, performance evaluations in the Anti-Corruption Commission are another example of decoupling. As a result of the decoupling and the symbolic implementation of the performance evaluations, the bureaucratic logic remained influential in the way employees were evaluated and how promotions took place within the organization. Many organization members complained that promotions are not based on the evaluation or measurement of an employee's performance on the job, rather they continue to be based on seniority instead.

This can be seen as two different types of decoupling, according to Bromley and Powell (2012). In the situations the interview respondents described, in which the performance appraisals were not being done at all, this can be seen as "policy-practice decoupling" in which policies are not fully implemented as an act of "symbolic adoption" (Ibid, p. 15). In the cases the interview respondents described in which the performance appraisals were done, but only as an academic exercise that did not lead to any benefits to the organization or the officers, that can be seen as "means-ends decoupling". In means-ends decoupling, policies or practices are implemented "that

have an opaque relationship to outcomes”, or what can be called “symbolic implementation” (Ibid, p. 15).

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at how the introduction of new laws and restructuring processes promulgated alternative logics at the Anti-Corruption Commission. These promulgations led to “limited change” within the organization, in which “visible elements of alternative logics are introduced ‘on top of’ less visible norms” (Andrews, 2013, p. 51). This is interpreted using theoretical ideas around the concept of “decoupling” in which “structural elements are only loosely linked to each other and to activities, rules are often violated..., and evaluation and inspection systems are subverted or rendered so vague as to provide little coordination” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 343). In some ways, the organization has changed to become more focused on the public, which is consistent with the development management logic. This remains competitive with the bureaucratic logic and its internal orientation, but the two logics can co-exist as they are segmented between two organizational departments.

The situation for the Anti-Corruption Commission is strained and conflicted in many ways. There are influential and competing logics that prevent them from fulfilling their role in controlling corruption in Zambian society. Consistent with the kinship logic, they do not have true autonomy and independence from the undue influence of powerful political actors. This is in conflict with the autonomy of the professionalism logic that was promulgated through a number of laws passed in the Zambian Parliament. The organization has, however, been able to engage the public through training programs and other outreach activities, which is consistent with the development management logic and its staff orientation focused on meeting the needs of the public. This can be seen as a result of segmenting the logics based on organizational departments, which allows the Investigations Department to work in secrecy and away from the public eye, while the Community Education Department can work closely with members of the public.

The political situation in Zambia seems to be becoming more opaque and oppressive in recent years (Bratton et al., 2017), which will likely make matters more

challenging for the Anti-Corruption Commission and its work of prosecuting and preventing corruption, especially as it relates to powerful political actors. One of the officers in the organization had the following to say about this situation and the level of political will to fight corruption in the country:

The political will? Ah, it disappeared a long time ago. It's not there. The support to the institution, financially, it's not there. We have vacancies we cannot recruit for, because there is no funding... Right now, like in my department, there is nothing! It's completely lacking in terms of finances. Officers just come to sit, play on the internet, knock off and go home. So, there is a problem somewhere.

The situation seems hopeless to many members of the Anti-Corruption Commission, as well as members of the public who are observing it. The political power seems overwhelmingly strong in its ability to interfere with the operations of the agency, and the Anti-Corruption Commission's legal autonomy seems largely symbolic and vaporous. Perhaps as Kuris (2015) argued, an anti-corruption agency with broad legal powers like in Zambia faces greater risks of interference and politicization precisely because of its power and mandate. This is especially the case where corruption runs rampant, as it does in Zambia. Kuris contended that the government will likely "pressure them to act as attack dogs against opposition politicians" or that they "may respond by stripping its powers, removing its leadership, challenging it in court, reducing its funding, or curtailing its independence (Ibid, p. 130). In light of all of this, the situation for the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission remains tenuous.

Chapter Seven: Becoming an Ombudsman Office for the Zambian People?

This chapter examines the relationships between institutional logics within the ombudsman office of Zambia, and it argues that the office is now entering a period of potential change as alternative logics are being promulgated in the organization. The outcomes of these processes are still uncertain, however, as there are ongoing contests for power and negotiations over which logics will be influential in guiding the organization. The ways the ombudsman office had been operating was in many ways consistent with the bureaucratic and kinship logics, and there is now a contestation between those established logics and two alternative logics – the development management logic and the professionalism logic.

This chapter brings the focus of analyses “close to the action” on the organizational “battlefields”, where “political contestations” and “power struggles” over competing logics are currently taking place (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, pp. 117-119). These power struggles revolved around three key events in the recent history of the organization: a process of strategic planning and drafting a plan for restructuring the organization, a move into a new office building, and the drafting of new ombudsman legislation. The three events promulgated the professionalism and development logics within the organization. However, the case narrative in this chapter does not end in period of “relative stability” in which a new constellation of logics guides the organization (Reay & Hinings, 2005, p. 364). There are still ongoing power struggles, and it is yet to be determined whether actors will accept or resist the proposed changes and how that will look (Ibid, p. 369). Therefore, the present time period within the organization can be seen as a “transition period where multiple competing logics exist and a resolution is required” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 376). The narrative that unfolds below describes “power plays involving agents” (Andrews, 2013, p. 50) who have different interests and are vying for different future outcomes for the organization. There are the “institutional entrepreneurs” who are driving divergent change in the organization, and there are also “institutional defenders’ who benefit from the status quo” and actively work to retain it (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 78).

The following sections begin with an overview of the work of ombudsman offices and the recent development and growth of these unique types of organizations on a global scale, which places the case within its international context. It continues with an overview of the history of the ombudsman office in Zambia, the background of which is necessary for understanding the power struggles that exist in the organization today. Then the chapter continues with a description of the institutional logics that were dominant in the office during the period of stability from 1974 – 2014, followed by a narrative account of how alternative logics were introduced by a team of institutional entrepreneurs and a discussion about how these logics currently co-exist in a tense and combative battlefield within the organization (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 377). Finally, the chapter presents some alternative arrangements that could come about in the ombudsman office over time, depending on how the actors involved will respond to proposed changes.

Ombudsman Offices and “Ombudsmania”

The organization that is the subject of this chapter is Zambia’s ombudsman office². As an ombudsman office, its core function is to investigate cases of maladministration and abuse of authority by the state bureaucracy. Ombudsman offices do not typically have prosecutorial power or issue enforceable directives. Instead, they make recommendations to address cases of maladministration or unfair conduct and often use “‘soft powers’ of persuasion and cooperation” to bring about resolutions between accuser and accused (Reif, 2011, p. 270). Therefore, an ombudsman can be seen as a “mediator” or “facilitator” who “brings indirect pressure to bear on the public agencies, so that they take appropriate corrective or remedial measures” (Abedin, 2011, p. 900). Donald Rowat colorfully illustrated how an ombudsman can deal with the broad issue of maladministration case by case, when he wrote, “It may be true, as critics say, that the office is not very well equipped for hunting lions. But it can certainly swat a lot of flies” (Rowat, 1984, p. 211). An

² Zambia’s national ombudsman office was originally called *the Commission for Investigations* from 1974 until 2016. Then in 2016, it was reestablished in Zambian law as a new organizational entity with a new name, *the Office of the Public Protector*. Throughout this paper, the organization will be referred to as “the Zambian ombudsman office” or simply “the ombudsman office” to avoid confusion, unless otherwise noted.

ombudsman office typically deals with many of the day-to-day issues that can arise in the process of public service delivery, in which the public is not served in the manner it should. Taking corrective measures to address these types of cases, as well as addressing the systemic problems that may cause them, is thought to lead to better public administration and public service delivery.

The history of ombudsman offices traces back to Scandinavia, as the first official ombudsman's office was established in Sweden in 1809. However, the concept goes further back to 1711, when a Chancellor Justice was appointed by the Swedish King to consider people's complaints against royal officials. Sweden was actually the only country with an ombudsman for over 100 years. It was only in the first half of the 20th century that ombudsman offices began to spread throughout the rest of Scandinavia, then later making their way to British Commonwealth countries and beyond in the 1960s and 1970s (Reif, 2011). Tanzania was the first state to establish an ombudsman's office in Commonwealth Africa in 1966, followed by Mauritius in 1969. Zambia established the third ombudsman's office in Commonwealth Africa in 1974, called *The Commission for Investigations*, which was immediately followed by Nigeria in 1975. This spread of ombudsman organizations from Scandinavia to the rest of the world has been "of such enormous magnitude on a global scale" that it has been labeled "ombudsmania... an ombudsman explosion... ombudsman tidal wave, or ombudsman tsunami" (Abedin, 2011, pp. 898-899). The four early adopters in Commonwealth Africa initially chose organizational names other than ombudsman to communicate what the purpose of the organizations was to be. "The principal reason for this", according to Ayeni (1997), "was the need to give the institution an identity that people in the countries concerned could easily associate with" (p. 549). However, beginning in the 1980s, these newly established ombudsman offices on the African continent did begin to refer to the word "ombudsman" in the names of their offices. This only happened after the ombudsman concept began to become popularized in 1978, with the establishment of the International Ombudsman Institute (IOI), which serves as an umbrella organization for ombudsman offices around the world. "With this, the title 'Ombudsman' became a basis for some

professional fraternity, and African offices did not want to be excluded” (Ayeni, 1997, p. 550).

As the adoption of ombudsman offices has proliferated around the world, so has the diversity of structures, approaches, and unique features found within these offices. They take various forms and have a variety of legal mandates. The structures and mandates of public ombudsman offices can be broadly classified according to two main types. The first type is a *classical ombudsman institution*, in which the ombudsman is appointed by the legislature or parliament and reports directly to them. The second type is an *executive ombudsman institution*, in which the executive branch of government appoints the ombudsman, who then, in turn, reports directly to the executive. Recently, many new and existing ombudsman offices have also begun placing an increased emphasis on the protection of human rights, moving beyond their narrow focus on maladministration. These ombudsman offices are seeking to expand their legal mandates to become human rights organizations, or so-called *human rights ombudsman institutions*, as well as to have strengthened “powers like the right to inspect closed facilities, to bring abstract or concrete review actions before constitutional courts, to participate in administrative court proceedings, or to prosecute or recommend the prosecution of public officials” (Reif, 2011, p. 275).

From its establishment in 1974 up until a newly amended constitution was passed in 2016, the ombudsman in Zambia was an executive ombudsman institution. It reported to the office of the President, and its investigative work was narrowly focused on administrative matters reported by complainants. It has now begun a transition to become an entirely new organizational entity with a new name, *the Office of Public Protector*, and it will now be a legislative ombudsman and have an expanded mandate to protect human rights in Zambia. The details of the history of the organization will follow below as well as descriptions of the patterns of institutional logics that were consistent with the operation of the organization at that time.

The History of Zambia’s Ombudsman Office

To trace the history of Zambia’s ombudsman institution, it is instructive to follow the course of Zambia’s constitution and its political system. The first

constitution for the newly independent Republic of Zambia was adopted in 1964, based on the Westminster model inherited from the British during the colonial era. The 1964 constitution allowed for a multi-party democracy, which was initially dominated by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) with its leader, President Kenneth Kaunda. This time period, known as the First Republic of Zambia, lasted from 1964 until 1972, two years before the establishment of the ombudsman institution. During much of this time, the economic situation of indigenous Zambians began to improve dramatically. Their “annual earnings... rose by 97 percent. The manufacturing sector doubled its output, and the number of people employed rose by 40 percent” (McLoughlin & Weerdesteijn, 2016, p. 128). It seemed the future for Zambia and for Zambians was promising.

UNIP and President Kaunda had initially enjoyed unchallenged hegemony within the electorate, because the only other opposition party, the African National Congress (ANC), had only been able to secure a small minority stake in the government. It seemed that UNIP’s dominance would be able to last indefinitely, since Kaunda went to great lengths to appease the diverse ethno-linguistic factions by balancing their representation within the government. However, a “general political malaise” began to develop in Zambia in the late 60s and early 70s (Chikulo, 1988, p. 37). Trouble had also begun to arise within the ranks of UNIP, as ethno-linguistic factions grew dissatisfied with the power balancing arrangements in government, and some factions began to break away to form splinter parties in opposition to UNIP. In response to these challenges, Kaunda declared Zambia a one-party participatory democracy in 1972, and he assigned his vice president, Mainza Chona, to lead a commission to devise a strategy for moving the country toward becoming a one-party state. Among the provisions that gave more power to UNIP and its president, the Chona Commission also called for the establishment of an ombudsman office in Zambia.

The ombudsman office would be established two years later, in 1974, early in the Second Republic of Zambia, the period in Zambia’s history that lasted from 1972 to 1991. During that time, the only officially recognized political party in Zambia was UNIP, and its leader, President Kenneth Kaunda held the power of the government.

The new ombudsman office was established as an executive ombudsman institution, and as such, it was answerable directly to the President. The ombudsman³, who led the organization, was “appointed by the President in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission” (Phiri, 1986, p. 235). It can be argued that the establishment of the ombudsman office in Zambia actually served as a form of political control and a way to quiet potential opposition groups by providing legitimacy to the government and giving the appearance of transparency and accountability. Alluding to this argument, Martin (1977) cited deliberations in the Zambian National Assembly about the establishment of the ombudsman office and how the government “felt that this would be viewed as an ‘independent and impartial’ institution... ‘of tremendous value to the administration’, since it would not only check excesses and provide an outlet for public resentment against them, but also protect the administration (p. 244). The current ombudsman in Zambia also expressed a similar opinion of the establishment of the institution during her 2016 interview for this research project:

Dr. Kaunda was right again. I think he was a very clever man. He was a clever strategist. He didn’t have any opposition party. It was a one-party state. So, somebody sold him the idea of the ombudsman and said “Look you can have an ombudsman institution that can report on the public service delivery system, so that would be sort of like a pseudo opposition for you”.

As with most of the policy instruments implemented by Kaunda and his political party, UNIP, the reasons behind their implementation are open to interpretation. He may have been motivated by his “humanist philosophy” and “inclusive ideas” or by a desire for “maintaining [his] position of power” (McLoughlin & Weerdesteijn, 2016, p. 128). Regardless of the motivation, however, the ombudsman office was seen as a welcome addition to the administrative system in Zambia, especially in light of the precarious condition of the courts at that time.

As Martin (1977) noted, Zambia had “a fairly standard Westminster export-model constitution. Typically the courts were envisaged as the major institution of

³ To avoid confusion, this paper uses the generic term, “ombudsman” to signify an executive official who would hold the position “Investigator General” from 1974 – 2016 and “Public Protector” from 2016 onward. These titles were given to the appointed official who leads the effort to redress maladministration in Zambia, which in general terms is the nation’s ombudsman.

control... [for] the enforcement of the provisions of the constitution concerning fundamental rights” (p. 241). However, the courts in Zambia were actually not useful avenues for citizens as a means of redress in the face of maladministration or abuses of government. The courts in Zambia, as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the public. There were also additional challenges because “cultural, geographical, procedural, and financial factors severely limit[ed] the access of the mass of the people to the superior courts where, generally speaking, rights against the state can be enforced” (Martin, 1977, p. 242). The court system at that time lacked the capacity to handle cases of maladministration, and to compound these problems, “Kaunda gradually replaced all High Court judges who made decisions against the government, until the judiciary was stacked with judges known to favour the government”, which further eroded the judicial system’s ability to protect the rights of ordinary Zambians (McLoughlin & Weerdesteijn, 2016, p. 130). For these reasons, Martin (1977) argued that the new ombudsman office had actually come at a fortuitous time in the nation’s history, since it would have had the potential to ensure better government services to the people.

The economic situation of the country began to change in the 1970s and 1980s, and with those changes, the rising levels of prosperity in Zambia again receded, and Zambians began losing confidence in Kaunda. The price of copper dropped, leading to the closure of copper mines and increasing rates of unemployment. A public outcry for political change and a return to multi-party democracy began to rise. To his credit, Kenneth Kaunda conceded and allowed multi-party elections to take place in 1991, and Frederick Chiluba was elected President. To facilitate the move to multiparty democracy, the constitution was amended in 1991 and then again in 1996. Likewise, the legal framework for the ombudsman office was also amended, with Parliament passing the Commission for Investigations Acts of 1991 and 1996. However, as Ayeni (1997) argued, these changes were limited to “necessary amendments to reconcile the ombudsman to the new constitutional dispensation”, and there were still not “many substantive changes... made in the character and functioning of the institution”, as it remained an “essentially executive based institution, a situation all those concerned agree should not continue” (p. 554).

In spite of dramatic changes to Zambia's political situation, the ombudsman office changed very little from the time of its initial establishment in 1974 up until 2014, at which point significant changes and reforms would be introduced in the organization for the first time. The section below describes the initial period of stability in the ombudsman office from 1974 to 2014 as well as discussing the institutional logics that were consistent with its practices and structures at that time. This will be followed by subsequent sections that describe the current period of transition within the organization in which alternative logics are currently being promulgated within the office. Those sections also present details about the political contestations and power plays between actors that are likely to have an effect on the future constellation of logics within the ombudsman office, which can, in turn, shape the way the organization and its members do their work in the coming years.

Stability and Low Capacity in the Ombudsman Office

As noted previously, the Zambian ombudsman office operated in much the same way during its first 40 years of existence. During this time, it faced limitations of various kinds that affected its ability to consistently address cases of maladministration in Zambia. A recent report about the ombudsman office, which was funded by Danish and Swedish development agencies, noted that the ombudsman office had “persistently low case resolution” due to “a number of challenges, including financial constraints and inadequate human resource” (Chewe-Chanda, 2009, p. 19). Another problem, according to data from the report, was that there was a lack of professional autonomy because of the institution's legal framework as an executive ombudsman, since it answered to the president and had its budget set by the Ministry of Finance. The report also emphasized a number of what it called “claw-back provisions” in the law that allowed the executive government to interfere with the work of the ombudsman office (Chewe-Chanda, 2009, pp. 13, 29, 33). One example of a claw-back provision was the fact that on one hand, the legal framework gave the ombudsman office “unrestricted powers to act, even where other bodies or institutions have been restricted from doing so”, while on the other hand, the commission would not be able to act in certain situations “unless it is specifically permitted by the

president to do so” (Ibid, p. 13). Legal provisions like those stifled the autonomy of the organization by giving it “wide-ranging powers” with one part of the law, while taking them away with another part of the law (Ibid, p. 13).

The legal framework also ensured the ombudsman office remained tied to the centralized hierarchical system of government. This system is consistent with the bureaucratic logic, in which organizations are structured in centralized bureaucratic hierarchies with strict accountability up the chain of command. This arrangement caused the ombudsman to rely on the executive branch for all of its resources, whether it was recruiting staff, paying their salaries, or budgeting for the investigative work related to cases of maladministration. As Chewe-Chanda (2009) noted, “The commission is funded through the Ministry of Finance and National Planning which considers the budget prepared by the commission, determines, the allocation, with the approval of Parliament, and transfers funds monthly”, which leaves the ombudsman vulnerable to interference via its finances (p. 19). One of the interview respondents from the ombudsman office described how this kind of political interference happened in the following statement:

The commission reports to the President, and when he doesn’t want to pursue a case, they don’t. Most of the investigations we do are expensive. They [the executive branch of the Government] delay funding the monthly disbursements, which slows us down.

It is ironic that while the office’s centralized hierarchical system was based on the law, it could still be used by the President to interfere with ongoing investigations whenever he wanted, which runs contrary to the general understanding of how an ombudsman office should operate.

The ombudsman office was established as an executive ombudsman institution, linked to the President of Zambia and his government. This linkage with the executive branch reduced the autonomy of the ombudsman office and made it essentially “an arm of the executive” according to Abedin (2011, p. 919). The Zambian President retained power over the investigations and deliberations of the Commission, and he could intervene at any time. He could even terminate an investigation if he did not want the office to continue looking into it (Chewe-Chanda, 2009, p. 27; *The*

Commission for Investigations Act, 1996, section 21). This, in particular, was a challenge for the ombudsman office because it meant that it lacked independence from the very offices it was also responsible for investigating. This led to a tenuous situation in which organization members were not sure how to proceed with cases that were related to the executive. An example of this is when the ombudsman's investigators, who are civil servants, had to investigate the ministry directly in charge of their resources, the Ministry of Finance. As one of the officers said, "With complaints against the Government or the Ministry of Finance, if we start pushing them, we will be scared and think, 'How will this affect our funding?'"

As illustrated above, the centralized hierarchical system, which is consistent with the bureaucratic logic, at times actually hindered the operations of the office. Yet, during the time in which Zambia was a one-party state, perhaps the best and only reasonable type of arrangement was for the ombudsman to be located under the president. In that way, the office would have been able to benefit from the strength of the presidency. Furthermore, if the ombudsman office did not operate as an arm of the executive, it would not have had the legitimacy to act as a mediator or facilitator. This type of legitimacy would have been meaningful and also practically useful if the ombudsman also enjoyed "the confidence of the political leadership" to back up his or her recommendations (Martin, 1977, p. 245). This also would have allowed the ombudsman to turn to the office of the President as the final arbiter in unresolved cases with the belief that the President would listen favorably. This may have been the case in the early days of the office during the First Republic, but the ombudsman office began to grow increasingly marginalized after the democratic system in Zambia changed in 1991 at the start of the Third Republic.

The organizational system of the ombudsman office was formally established in the laws of Zambia, but it did not allow the investigators to work independently, and it precluded any real autonomy for their investigative work related to maladministration by the government. This lack of autonomy in the organization is consistent with the bureaucratic logic's system of control and source of authority. The ombudsman office was controlled by the centralized power structure of the state bureaucracy. The source of authority was also bureaucratic in the sense that it was rational and legal, as it was

based on a legal framework established in Zambian law and its constitution. Furthermore, the officers in the organization also saw themselves as civil servants affiliated with the centralized state bureaucracy, which is also consistent with the staff orientation of the bureaucratic logic. This was evidenced in field interviews, when respondents often discussed their status as civil servants, particularly how being under the authority and control of the executive branch of government was a threat to their ability to conduct investigations without undue influence.

However, the bureaucratic system of control and source of authority in the organization were also subverted by a kinship logic, in which informal control occurred through intimidation and fear of recrimination. When discussing political interference with the work of the ombudsman office, respondents from the organization said they had reason to be afraid. As one of the officers said, “We are scared because we are just civil servants. So, we are afraid of losing our jobs”. This meant that the investigators could actually be punished for doing their jobs properly and not acting to please the desires of government officials and protecting their privileged positions. In this way, the systems of authority and control of the kinship logic, which are based on informal authority structures and expectations of reciprocity or fear, were being facilitated by the authority and control of the bureaucratic logic, which is based on a rational-legal authority with strict control by a centralized structure. This enabled powerful government officials to abuse their formal power within the state bureaucracy to intimidate members of the ombudsman office and to keep them from investigating cases of maladministration that would have negatively affected them in some way.

In development literature these types of arrangements are sometimes referred to as “neo-patrimonial” (Hydén, 2013a; Therkildsen, 2010), in which the ancient and informal patrimonial power structures of African society continue to guide behavior in spite of, as well as through, modern forms of government. According to Hydén (2013a), this is actually just a new form of patrimonialism: “Patrimonialism in Africa after independence is new in that it is backed by the resources of the modern state” (p. 99). Thus, political leaders could exert informal control based on fear or intimidation using the formal and legal bureaucratic structures and power arrangements that were at

their disposal. This layering of patrimonial control over bureaucratic structures happens all over the world, but it seems especially prevalent in Africa according to Hyden (Ibid). An aptly descriptive reference to this form of subverted bureaucracy comes from Jackall (2010) in his work on American corporations:

The kind of bureaucracy that developed... was a hybrid; it incorporated many structural features of the pure form of bureaucracy but it also resembled patrimonial bureaucracy... There, personal loyalty was the norm... one survives and flourishes by currying favor with powerful officials up the line who stand close to the ruler. It is a system marked by patronage and by intrigues and conspiracies among various factions to gain the favor of the ruler and the perquisites that accompany his good grace (p. 11)... the subordinate must symbolically reinforce at every turn his own subordination and his willing acceptance of the obligations of fealty. In return, he can hope for those perquisites that are in his boss's gift (p. 20)... and acceptance of the gift implicitly involves a reaffirmation and strengthening of fealty (p. 23).

The systems of authority and control of the ombudsman office were overlapping and dual in nature. Its formal source of authority and system of control were based on the constitution of Zambia and the Commission for Investigations Act, which are consistent with the bureaucratic logic. Yet, at the same time, those legal provisions provided the opportunity for the President, members of his government, and the political and bureaucratic elites to abuse the ombudsman office in ways that are consistent with the kinship logic. In that way, this was an example of facilitative relationships between logics, as the enactment of the systems of control and authority consistent with the bureaucratic logic based on laws and regulations, also facilitated forms of informal control that are consistent with the kinship logic and based on fear of reprisals and expectations of reciprocity.

Interview respondents described ways in which they dealt with the fear of reprisals from powerful or politically connected officials. They talked about the possibility of losing their jobs as well as losing the sparse funding for the organization if they investigated those individuals. As one of the respondents said, "Sometimes it is quite scary. We take those cases to the Investigator General [the ombudsman], but

she's not a person who is easily scared. We are lucky that way." In that way, officers were sometimes able to manage their fears by delivering a case up to the ombudsman, who would then handle it. However, not all officers were convinced that the ombudsman was able to stand up against the patriarchal power structures. As another officer said, "The Investigator General [the ombudsman] was appointed by the President, and she doesn't want to bite the hand that feeds her. So, if the President doesn't want a case pursued, they will find a way of slowing it down."

The potential for collusion between the executive and the ombudsman was exacerbated by the fact that all investigations and proceedings had to be done *in camera*, or in private quarters, according to the law (*The Commission for Investigations Act*, 1996, section 16). Therefore, it was only the President who was privy to the details of some investigations and reports from the ombudsman office, and cases of maladministration could even be closed without any reasons given to complainants (Ibid, sections 20 and 10.3). With the proceedings done in camera, there was virtually no public accountability for the work of the ombudsman, which made it easy to abuse the formal authority the President had over the organization.

As organization members have navigated their way through this complex environment, they have had to continually focus their attention on both formal and informal power structures, the state bureaucracy and the patriarchy, in order to protect their jobs and their livelihoods. This is consistent with the staff orientation of both the kinship and bureaucratic logics. However, the place where members of the ombudsman office have not been focusing much of their attention is on members of the Zambian public. Most of the cases the office has been handling have come from complaints by civil servants, and only a limited number of cases have actually come from the general public (Commission for Investigations, 2006, p. 9; Martin, 1977). It was for this reason that, after a fact-finding trip to Zambia by the Danish Ombudsman Office in 2009 (Commission for Investigations, 2009, p. 14), the Danish office decided not to pursue development cooperation with the Zambian ombudsman office. A lead officer from the International Section of the Danish ombudsman office discussed their reason for not cooperating in the following:

As a result of the fact-finding trip [to Zambia], the Danish ombudsman institution came to realize that the *Zambian* ombudsman office was not a *de-facto* ombudsman. That's because the *Zambian* ombudsman was mostly just dealing with complaints from members of the civil service, related to their pay and benefits. It wasn't dealing with complaints from the public. This was an entirely different focus than the Danish Ombudsman... the delegation didn't feel that the cooperation would be effective.

Instead of the *Zambian* ombudsman office being focused on members of the public, as a "*de-facto* ombudsman" would, it was mostly just dealing with cases brought forward from other civil servants. This is also consistent with the staff orientation of the bureaucratic logic, as it is characterized by an internal orientation and focus on the bureaucracy.

There were several potential factors contributing to *Zambian* ombudsman office's bureaucratic orientation and lack of public orientation. One factor was that the ombudsman office did not have regular public awareness campaigns, which would have let members of the public know about the office and the work it did. Another factor was related to the building in which the ombudsman office had been located. As Chewe-Chanda (2009) noted,

"The commission is not accessible to the general public because it has only one office in Lusaka, hidden in the former Bank of Zambia building, which is difficult to locate, even for Lusaka residents. This contributes to the fact that there is little appreciation among the general public of the commission's role and mandate" (p. 26).

Staying in the building that interview respondents affectionately called "*the Old Bank of Zambia Building*" had been a factor in keeping the ombudsman office internally focused on the bureaucracy rather than on the general public. Most members of the public did not even know the organization existed, much less where it was located.

Being housed in the *Old Bank of Zambia Building* also enabled the organization to operate in a mode consistent with the kinship logic. Its physical location and space allowed some organization members to use their positions as personal fiefdoms, not separating private and public resources (Hydén, 2013a;

Therkildsen, 2010). One way in which organization members could use the office for their own personal benefit was that it enabled them to shirk their responsibilities and engage in their own personal affairs during office time. One interview respondent described it in the following:

I could just walk out of my office and there were a lot of shops! I could buy my groceries and clothes... I think sometimes it was to the detriment to the institution because I'm supposed to be there, but then I would go across and just buy a shirt for my son. So instead of me working, I'm stealing office time.

This was, in part, possible because there were so many hidden exits from the office. As the ombudsman said, "In the old building, we had three outlets. There were even the fire escape stairs, which people could regularly use... When you went into your office, that's it. You didn't know what was actually happening [in the building]."

Another way the kinship logic's mode of operation was seen was through members of the ombudsman office collecting cash "tips" from members of the public to help them get faster access to the passport services in an adjacent office within the building. As a respondent described it,

Some people... were actually getting money from members of the public for speeding up the passport application process... Members of the public would come and give "tips" to the workers [from the ombudsman institution], who would then go and find the passport office workers and split the tip money with them, and then the passport application process would move faster.

These activities demonstrated how some organization members were guided by the core values of a kinship logic – reciprocal informal exchanges to get things done and meet needs, which came at the expense of following proper procedures in the office, delivering unbiased service to the public, or of following professional methods and standards in ombudsman work. This was a tragic irony in the ombudsman institution, as members of the very organization tasked with redressing cases of maladministration had actually been perpetrating cases of maladministration themselves.

In that way, being housed in the Old Bank of Zambia building was a "material expression" of the kinship logic (Jones et al., 2013). The values and principles of the kinship logic were "transmuted into observable objects – nested and interlocked –

which are the means by which practices are anchored, affected, and oriented” (Friedland, 2013, p. 37). The ombudsman’s own words encapsulate best what the building was like and the transmutation of the kinship logic. She called the building itself a case of “maladministration” and described it in the following statements:

So that building, it was dark, sort of like a prison atmosphere. The stairs were very narrow and dark. And the outside of the building, it just looks sort of like a prison building, the way you would imagine a prison. And then, secondly, there were a lot of other departments, about three or four other departments in that building... There would be a lot of queues and a lot of people. The room as you enter the building, that’s where all these people would be. There’s no ventilation, apart from the door. So, it’s just, the air is just dense. I don’t know what I can say. So, at the end, the people would have no access to toilet facilities. They would have to go look for a public toilet somewhere. You would have people begging you to use the toilets. The departments would lock their toilets, because they would think their toilets are not going to be properly used. Now can you imagine putting an ombudsman in such a building? I’m saying: Can you imagine putting an ombudsman in such a building? Because what is the work of an ombudsman? It’s to resolve maladministration! And we were sitting with this maladministration. I think it killed me just to be in that building.

The Old Bank of Zambia building expressed maladministration, as it was a barrier to the delivery of public services in a humane way. It was also the transmutation, and a condition for, the enactment of the kinship and bureaucratic logics. It was the physical place employees in the ombudsman office could be paid cash “tips” by people who did not want to wait for service in the passport office and who were willing and able to pay a little extra for it. It was also the physical place from which they could slip away to take care of their personal business. Finally, the building also expressed a disregard for serving members of the public, since it was hidden away with other public organizations and was not designed, built, or maintained in a way that made it easy and secure for members of the public to access it and to lodge complaints of maladministration. Images from the Old Bank of Zambia Building follow below:



Above: The building's broken elevator, still unrepaired after more than a decade, making it impossible for wheelchair bound citizens to access the office of the ombudsman.

Left: One of the fire escapes that employees used to walk out of the office to go shopping or conduct personal business.



Above: The crowds outside of the Old Bank of Zambia Building, making it difficult for people to access the office and complain in anonymity.

Left: A waiting room at the passport office, where some members of the public paid so-called "tips" to employees of the ombudsman office to help speed up the process of applying for a passport. The "tip" money would be split between the employee from the ombudsman office and the employee from the passport office who sped up the process.



Above: The stores and shopping center right across from the Old Bank of Zambia Building at which the employees from ombudsman office would shop during office hours.

Left: The entryway into the ombudsman office in the old building. The ombudsman described it as dark and narrow, and that it was uninviting to visitors.

(Photos taken by the author in May 2016.)

In addition, the ways that employment processes were handled in the office also had an impact on the way that work was done. Employment was handled entirely through the centralized Public Services Commission. Most of the officers working in the organization were transferred from other government ministries or agencies, and promotions were based on time spent within the public service and were also handled through the Public Service Commission. One of the officers noted that, technically, promotions “can happen based on academic upgrades, but there have not been so many promotions”. The Zambian ombudsman office actually had only two investigators in the office for the entire country with a population of over 16 million people. Because of this shortage of investigators, they had developed a system of co-opting officers from the administration division to help with investigations. This was problematic, according to respondents, but it was the only way the ombudsman office could manage to move forward through the numerous complaints that came through their office each year.

These administrative officers were neither college-educated nor trained in investigation techniques. They were given instructions about how to carry the cases forward, and they reported regularly to the two official investigators and the ombudsman. One investigator described the ways in which they would simplify the entire investigations process into simple steps for the co-opted investigators to follow:

You analyze everything, when the complaint comes, it gets screened, and you formulate an investigations strategy and then put it on paper, and then you pass these files to the co-opted staff. They will just transplant what is written, they will pursue it because everything will be done for them. It was a matter of simplifying the work for them to make it easier for them. On their own, they could not understand the nature of the complaint or the mandate of the institution and its jurisdiction. We also tried to formulate an investigation strategy for them, because strategies differ from one complaint to another. So, it was prudent to do that for them, because when you gave it to them it was easier for them to follow.

Due to shortages of staff and operational resources, co-opting non-skilled workers to do investigation work may have been the best way to handle the hundreds of complaints coming into the office each year, but still the results were not adequate. The backlogs of investigations were long and the quality of the work was low since those doing it were not equipped or capable of using professional methods and standards or using professional judgment and discretion. The investigators who oversee the work of the co-opted investigators described working with some of them as “hav[ing] to teach somebody like at kindergarten” and that “they didn’t fully understand the role of the investigator”. The co-opted administrative workers were also not happy with the situation because they were not being paid the same amount as the college-educated investigators. One of the organization members who was co-opted for the investigation work described his feelings about the arrangement in the following statement:

I will talk about myself. I’m good at writing and understanding, and because of that, they said I could assist with investigations. But I did voice up and said, “I may be good at writing reports and analyzing things, but this is not my job. I’m

not being paid for this. How am I going to fit into this? You are not paying me anything”... what management did was to take people from other sections like administration, even the typing pool staff. You know someone who is a typist, you take him and push and give him instructions... I think that also created inefficiencies in the system. In any case, like me, there was no motivation for me... But I said since you cannot promote me, and you cannot pay me an allowance for doing this, I'm quitting. So, that's how I left it. But it was after I did it for almost five years. And I can say I was one of the best! I could really, you know, analyze issues.

The co-optation of typists and clerical workers to help with investigations was a stopgap measure to try to attend to the complaints that came in to the office, but it is not a sustainable solution. However, this practice has gone on for many years within the office. The current Investigator General found this co-optation system in place and operational when she arrived in the organization in 2004 and has continued the practice. The plans are to phase out the co-opting system when the ombudsman office receives more resources and a larger staff establishment for carrying out its investigations, which they hope will happen in the near future since the organization is going through organizational, structural, and legal reform processes.

The following section describes the change and reform processes that are currently unfolding within the ombudsman office. It focuses on a period of instability and transition within the office, during which alternative logics have been promulgated within the organization, which can lead to changes in the way the organization operates.

Instability, Transition, and the Promulgation of Alternative Logics

Research about changes among institutional logics often includes studies that focus on periods of transition and instability, which are marked by conflicts between competing logics and require a resolution to bring about a new period of stability and a new constellation of logics (Reay & Hinings, 2005). In these accounts, “multiple institutional logics are portrayed as battling with each other for supremacy”, and there can be “a potentially long period of time of competing logics where different actors

continue to hold different logics and where there is no winner” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 376). This section describes such a period of transition or instability within the ombudsman institution, in which there has been a “battlefield mentality” and a “tension between co-existing logics” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 102). This period of instability is actually the current state within the ombudsman office since there has not been a resolution in which alternative logics have been institutionalized. More time is needed to determine what the eventual outcome will be, but this section provides a close-up view of the battles and power plays that will ultimately shape the future constellation of logics within the ombudsman institution.

After the long period of stability in the ombudsman office, which lasted from 1974 until 2014, a transition period started to take place within the organization. This transition began after a series of cascading events within the political system that changed the political environment in which the ombudsman office was operating. In a surprise victory, Michael Sata, a populist running on the opposition ticket, was elected president in September 2011. Among other populist agendas, he promised to revive the process of drafting a new constitution and to deliver a “people-driven constitution”. Sata, whose nickname was King Cobra because of his harsh use of rhetoric, used the sly campaign slogan, *Don't kubeba!* “Don't kubeba” means “‘don't tell' in Bemba... meaning implicitly ‘you are free to accept gifts from other parties, just don't tell them you will vote for us’” (Tobolka, 2013, p. 27). The presidential incumbent, Rupiah Banda, and his party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), had expected to easily win the election. However, they were surprised to find out that the majority of people had actually voted for the opposition candidate and simply *didn't kubeba*. Therefore, Sata narrowly won the 2011 presidential election, and his populist political party, the Patriotic Front (PF), also won the majority of seats in Parliament. This paved the way for a season of change in the politics and administration of the country as well as for the ombudsman office.

President Sata and his administration took a different tone with the once overlooked ombudsman office. According to interview respondents, President Sata was more likely to actually follow the recommendations of the ombudsman to redress cases of maladministration, which the previous President, Rupiah Banda, did not do.

Furthermore, right after taking office, President Sata and his government appointed a technical committee to begin planning for and drafting an amended constitution for Zambia. This new constitutional amendment had the potential to make space for a re-imagined ombudsman office in Zambia, one that had more professional autonomy, a more independent organizational structure, and a stronger, better equipped and more professional staff to conduct investigations into complaints of maladministration. It seemed as if a new trajectory would be possible for the ombudsman office in Zambia, but it was still too soon to tell.

Michael Sata was not to be president for long, however. He became ill in his second year in office and was not able to fulfill his duties as president, only appearing in public infrequently. He remained in office as president until he died in October 2014, just three years after taking office. A week before his death, in spite of a “lack of consensus building from various stakeholders” and the reservations of critics who “accused the government of stalling the process”, a draft version of the amended constitution was presented to the public (Ndiho, 2014). Among other changes to the governance system in Zambia, the draft constitution had new language related to the ombudsman. Now, the ombudsman would have a new title, Public Protector, instead of being called the Investigator General, as he or had previously been called, and he or she would have broader legal powers to investigate and take action to redress cases of maladministration.

Some critics and government watchdogs were still concerned that the draft constitution was merely a symbolic gesture and would never be implemented. In addition, the draft for the amended constitution only provided a broad outline for the work of the ombudsman. For example, it did not give any details about the structure or independence of the ombudsman office. Those details that would comprise a legal framework for the ombudsman office would still need to be developed in a later bill, which would then be presented and voted on by Parliament in order to enact it into law.

This scenario presented a window of opportunity for the ombudsman to initiate changes within the ombudsman office that she had been requesting from previous government administrations, particularly that it should become an independent human

rights ombudsman. There was now also a possibility for the office to have more autonomy built into the structure with less authority and control held by the executive branch, and it might no longer fall under the centralized hierarchical structure of the Public Service Management Division. This would give the office more autonomy to conduct investigations against powerful and well-connected government officials, which would make its systems of control more consistent with the professionalism logic. This would also be an opportunity to emphasize serving the poor and needy, thus having an external orientation on the public, rather than an internal orientation on the central state bureaucracy. In that way, the operations and the focus of attention of the organization could become more consistent with the development management logic as well.

In order to bring about these changes, the ombudsman and her team would have to move quickly. They would need to lobby the government for more autonomy for the office to operate as a public accountability organization. They would also need to develop a strategic plan in order for restructuring to take place, which would enable them to increase the number of staff and to ensure a higher level of professional qualifications for organization members. Finally, they would need to work with the Ministry of Justice to draft a new legal framework for the office to operate autonomously and to shift its orientation towards the public, rather than the internal bureaucracy of the state. As the ombudsman and her team worked to bring about these changes, they encountered resistance from within the ombudsman office as well as from members of the executive branch of government. The following sections describe these different activities, how they promulgated the development management and professionalism logics within the office, and the power struggles around these processes.

Drafting the strategic and restructuring plans

The year 2014 was an important time period in these processes, because that is when the ombudsman and a small team of officers from the ombudsman office began drafting strategic plans as well as plans to restructure the office. The ombudsman had been requesting the government to allow her office to be restructured since 2005,

because it was the only way she would be able to expand and to hire more employees. Yet, as previously noted, she had encountered resistance from the two previous presidents, Banda and Mwanawasa. She had formally put her requests for restructuring before the government within the ombudsman office's annual reports, both in 2005 and 2008 (Commission for Investigations, 2005, p. 31; 2008, pp. 26-27), while later reports remained silent about the issue. She also wrote directly to the president, requesting that he help her to initiate a restructuring process for the organization.

The ombudsman described her appeals to the President and to the Government in the following statement:

I had written to the president, I had said to the president 'we need to be restructured' and I had also written to the minister of justice. In fact, the minister of justice set up a commission to enquire on legal institutions in Zambia because of us - because we agitated so much. So, he eventually set up this commission that is chaired by Justice Choba. It's currently having sittings right now because we agitated so much and said "We need to be restructured. We need to be changed. We are not operating the way we should operating."

The Government gave a positive response to the ombudsman in 2014, and the process for restructuring was then able to move forward.

In order to create a restructuring plan, it was necessary to first create a strategic plan on which the restructuring would be based (Mate, 2006). Both of these plans were developed in conjunction with the Cabinet Office. Notably, this was the first strategic plan to be implemented by the ombudsman office in its 40 years of existence. There had been previous attempts that were abandoned early, but according to one of the interview respondents, there had been "no deliberate effort to use [the strategic plans] as a guide" before. This new strategic plan was viewed differently than the previous plans had been, and organization members consider it a major accomplishment for the ombudsman office.

The stated aim of the 2014-2017 strategic plan was "Clarifying the organization's future direction, common vision and purpose" (Commission for Investigations, 2014, p. 8), and it emphasized the need to increase the skills and

qualifications of organization members. It also emphasized the need to implement “Provincial Sittings” (Ibid, pp. 20-21) in which members of the ombudsman office would travel to remote provinces of the country to hear complaints from citizens who would not be able to travel the distance to the capital city, Lusaka. By drafting a strategic plan that emphasized the provincial sittings that can “provide relief to complainants” of maladministration in the rural parts of Zambia (Ibid, p. 20), this was promulgating the development management logic, with its emphasis on serving the needs of the disempowered members of society. By drafting a plan that described how it would engage with the Cabinet Office to “recruit suitably qualified candidates” (Ibid, p. 8) as well as to implement “programmes for skills enhancement” (Ibid, p. 21), this was promulgating the professionalism logic, with its emphasis on professional qualifications, methods, and standards. Finally, the strategic plan culminated with a set of “structural implications” (Ibid, p. 36), which led to the formulation of the restructuring plan and the restructuring into three specific organizational divisions for Investigations, Administration, and Information Services and increasing the number of officers within the organization structure.

With the strategic plan written, the ombudsman office was then allowed to draft a restructuring plan. They drafted a plan to decentralize the office out into the provinces of the country in phases, so complainants outside of Lusaka would be able to access to the office more easily, which is consistent with the values and organizational structure of the development management logic. It also set the salary scales for new positions in the office at a level that required higher education and professional qualifications for candidates. Therefore, college degrees would become necessary for investigations officers, information technology officers, and public relations officers, while accounting officers would be able to qualify with either a college degree or professional certifications such as from the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA) or from the Zambian Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA). These changes in employment practices were consistent with the professionalism logic.

There were institutional defenders in the office who resisted these changes because they were worried about losing their jobs or being left behind. As Battilana et

al. (2009) argued, institutional defenders are more likely to rise up to defend the status quo and resist changes if the changes threaten their social position or organizational privileges. The restructuring process meant that some employees could lose their social position in the organization through demotion, and it also meant that some of them hoping for a promotion as the organization grew would not be eligible without upgrading their academic qualifications. As one of the officers involved in the restructuring processes noted:

Of course, there were some people afraid. Even now some people are afraid for the simple reason that the restructuring comes with issues to do with qualifications. You need to have higher qualifications for some positions. So, they could be in one position, maybe previously they were only supposed to have a diploma but after restructuring they have to have a first degree in a particular field. So, there was a lot of anxiety. People were afraid. People were eyeing for certain positions, even the few we recruited for. Priority was first for members of staff who served, but certain people could not get the positions. They applied but they didn't have the minimum qualifications. They had experience, but of course we couldn't bend the rules because we had a standard that we needed to adhere to, lest we become perpetrators of maladministration by practicing favoritism as well... Even now, there is that level of anxiety, but people have been assured they will still have a job, but it might be at a lower level simply because of qualifications. You can't force someone to go and upgrade themselves.

The newly created positions required a bachelor's degree, which was not easily attained. As one of the officers remarked, "You know a first degree [i.e., a bachelor's degree] in Africa is a major achievement, because education is not readily available." Therefore, some employees in the organization grew frustrated and even afraid of what their future might look like in the ombudsman institution. Some of these institutional defenders took matters into their own hands to try to circumvent the process.

Some organization members resisted the restructuring process through acts of sabotage. Their hope was that if they could keep the restructuring process from

happening, or at least slow it down, their jobs would be secured. One of the officers in the organization who worked on the restructuring team described it like this:

When we were restructuring, it brought insecurity because if you look at the background of the institution, it had less qualified people.... So now it was a challenge with our less qualified employees, our fellow workers. They were sabotaging the process, where you do some documentation to seek approval, they would not deliver the mail - they would hide files... They were afraid that they would lose their jobs. So, they would hide files, tear documentation. When an approval came from cabinet office, if I'm not tracing it, if it lands in the registry, they will tear it and say it never arrived. So, we had to devise a strategy where I would ensure that the supervisor of the registry came on board. When the letters were typed, I would go with him, get the vehicle, we would drive to the organizations where we are doing the deliveries and sit with that document. Then I would be in touch on Facebook and Outlook with the relevant organizations with the responsible officers to say, 'when you are sending a response, send a copy, so that in case it gets lost, we can start from somewhere'.

These acts of sabotage were not successful in keeping the restructuring plans from moving forward. By April and May 2016, when the interviews for this case study were carried out, the organization had already hired five new officers with higher levels of education and professional certification: two investigators, one public relations officer, one information technology officer, and one accountant.

Moving to a New Office Building

During this time of transition, the ombudsman again requested to move the institution into a new office building, a request that had been routinely denied under previous administrations. Moving to the new building would mean that complainants coming to the ombudsman office would not have to worry about being recognized by the crowds of people around the Old Bank of Zambia Building, and the new building would also be more open and user friendly. Rather than being on an upper floor in the old building with broken elevators, the offices in the new building would all be on the

lower level and wheelchair accessible. There would also be a large and open waiting room and reception area that would make it more comfortable for complainants coming to office. The layout, design, and fresh appearance of the building were all characteristics of a development management logic with its emphasis on serving members of the public and meeting their needs.

Surprisingly, some of the employees were resisting the move from the Old Bank of Zambia Building to the new office building. Even though the new building was more spacious, bright, and made it easier for complainants to seek redress in anonymity, the new building also meant that they would not be able to avail themselves to organizational privileges (Battilana et al., 2009) they could get in the old building. As one of the officers noted: “Some people didn’t want to move to the new office because they were actually getting money from members of the public for speeding up the passport application process.” These cash payments from passport applicants would have added to their meager salaries. Organization members were also able to easily leave the office to take care of their personal business. These informal privileges would not be readily available in the new office building because it was situated away from the central shopping districts of the city and away from the passport office. The new building into which the ombudsman office moved stands in stark contrast to the old, and images of it follow below:



Exterior of the new office building is inviting, with clear and readable signage.



There is an open reception area in the front of the building.



There is an open and spacious waiting area across from receptionist.



Interior courtyard of the ombudsman office building, as seen from the lobby.



Interior courtyard of the ombudsman office building, as seen from the rear of the building, which was once a hotel before being converted to an office.

The ombudsman office moved from the Old Bank of Zambia Building to the new building pictured above in October 2015, and employees were still getting used to the idea of being in the new facility at the time of field interviews in May 2016. Some organization members expressed a positive opinion about being there, while others were still ambiguous about it. The new building is a material expression of the development management logic. It signifies the ombudsman office is becoming externally focused on the public, by making itself more accessible and user friendly, and in this way, the building acts as “an important extension of” and “a necessary condition for” the enactment of the development management logic within the organization (Jones et al., 2013, p. 52). The new building provided a means through which members of the ombudsman office could engage with members of the public to redress their cases of maladministration, and it also articulated the symbolic gesture that the organization has entered a turning point and is becoming more focused on members of the public. The new building has made it safer, easier, and even more comfortable for people to visit the ombudsman office face-to-face and to lodge their complaints. In these ways, it is a physical and visible enactment of the unseen elements of the development management logic, or as Friedland (2013) characterized it, it is a transmutation of the unobservable substance of a logic into an observable object (p. 37).

Writing New Legislation

Beginning in January 2016 and for a period of four months, a team of officers from the ombudsman office worked with drafters from the Ministry of Justice to craft the new Public Protector Bill, which would later be voted on in Parliament to then become the Public Protector Act. The Public Protector Act (2016) would provide the legal framework for the ombudsman office in Zambia. Drafting this legislation was important for the ombudsman office because it would have the potential to give the office more autonomy by making it a parliamentary ombudsman that would answer to parliament and would receive its operational funds and other resources through the legislature, rather than through the executive branch and its centralized hierarchical structure. This could alleviate the precarious situation of the ombudsman office, in which it was investigating cases of maladministration that involved the very same branch of government that had control over the financial and human resources for the office.

The new Public Protector Bill was completed in April 2016 and approved by Parliament who assented it into law as the Public Protector Act in June 2016. Many of the provisions that the ombudsman wanted in the act were included, but there were some instances in which the team from the ombudsman office had met with resistance from the drafters from the Ministry of Justice. In many ways, the act does provide the ombudsman office with autonomy from the executive branch, especially as it relates to funding. For example, it states: “The funds of the Office of the Public Protector shall consist of such monies as may be appropriated to the Office of the Public Protector by Parliament for the purposes of the Public Protector” (*The Public Protector Act*, 2016, section 31). The new act also stipulates that officers will be employed through the Parliamentary Services Commission, rather than through the Public Service Commission as before. It states: “The Parliamentary Service Commission shall, on the recommendation of the Public Protector, appoint a Chief Administrator, officers and other staff to assist the Public Protector in the performance of the Public Protector’s functions” (*The Public Protector Act*, 2016, section 9). As the new law stipulated greater financial autonomy for the ombudsman office, this had the potential to alleviate a problem that interview respondents were complaining about in which

organization members sometimes had to investigate complaints lodged against the very officials who controlled the budgets of the ombudsman office and the salaries of its employees. In this way, the new Public Protector Act also promulgated values and a system of control that are consistent with the professionalism logic, which is based on professional autonomy.

The new legislation also officially makes Zambia's ombudsman office a human rights ombudsman institution, which was another important objective for the ombudsman and members of her staff. They wanted to ensure that the new act included language related to human rights, which it does, as it articulates, "the function of the Public Protector [*i.e.*, the ombudsman]... to investigate any complaint of human rights arising from maladministration or any conduct which the Public Protector has reasonable grounds to believe may be connected with, or conducive to, maladministration" (*The Public Protector Act*, 2016, section 6). The ombudsman reflected on this and she noted,

[W]e have actually had to work very, very hard in the bill to have clauses included that include our human rights mandate. Yes, we investigate maladministration, but maladministration is a breach of people's rights when they are trying to access the public service delivery system... And also, there was this provision we put in about the vulnerable. I really wanted it to come out that that's who we are here for. Of course, we have mentioned the disabled, we've mentioned children, we've mentioned women. For me, that's great. That provision for me is like the heart of the act. We haven't had these people. I think civil servants have been over-represented as complainants in the system, and the really vulnerable have been totally under-represented. And they don't even know.

The new act gives the ombudsman status as a human rights institution, and it articulates that it is focused on the citizenry – not only the civil servants of Zambia, which is consistent with the development management logic. It even includes the more vulnerable in Zambian society as especially relevant to the mandate, that the ombudsman should "provide added protection to vulnerable persons, including children, women and persons with disabilities, where a State institution engages in or

is about to engage in a maladministration which is a significant and substantial infringement of their rights” (*The Public Protector Act, 2016*, section 35). This language promulgated values of the development management logic, to achieve results for society – especially those who are disempowered.

These provisions also bring the mission of the Zambian ombudsman institution in line with current trends, values, and norms of the broader professional community of ombudsmen. Internationally, ombudsman offices are moving toward a new expanded model of ombudsman work, which places greater emphasis on human rights as opposed to focusing exclusively on maladministration alone (Reif, 2011). For example, the largest professional community of ombudsmen, the International Ombudsman Institute (IOI), has recently begun emphasizing the expanded role of ombudsmen offices in protecting human rights, which it sees in grand terms as the “evolution of ombudsmanship” (Field, 2016; Simbiri-Jaoko, 2016). In addition, the regional African professional community, The African Ombudsman and Mediators Association (AOMA), is similarly moving toward the evolution of ombudsmanship, as espoused in one of their core values, which declares “the ombudsman’s fundamental commitment to human rights and human dignity, and to serving humanity with respect and compassion” (African Ombudsman and Mediators Association, n.d.). In this way, the new bill is also consistent with the values of the professionalism logic, as it is complying with norms and standards set by the professional community of ombudsmen.

However, some members of the ombudsman office complained that the provisions in the act are articulated clearly enough and that they do not provide full autonomy for the office. They complained that during the processes of deliberation about the new law, the drafters from the Ministry of Justice pushed to bring the ombudsman office under the Ministry of Justice and the Judiciary, by allowing those institutions to have the authority to write the rules and regulations for carrying out investigations. This can be seen as an attempt to “claw back” (Chewe-Chanda, 2009) independence and autonomy from the ombudsman. The ombudsman office even appealed to members of Parliament for support in the matter. However, the language that drafters from the Justice Department wanted included in the act remained, in

which the Minister of Justice would be the one “make regulations for the better carrying out of the provisions of this Act” (*The Public Protector Act*, 2016, section 43). This provision makes the ombudsman office dependent upon the Ministry of Justice to make the specific rules and regulations for how its investigations are to be carried out. This worried some interview respondents, because they believed that this limits the ombudsman office’s level of professional autonomy and that it can potentially lead to undue influence from politicians or government ministers since they will be the ones to determine how investigations take place.

However, even though there are limitations in new the legislation, the ombudsman has said she is mostly pleased with the new law. She noted,

I think what we have now is, I would say almost 90% [of what we want] with this bill in its current form, because we have the administrative autonomy and we are recognized as a human rights institution, and we have been given the right to decentralize right out to the districts. And we can have hearings in the public, which is a big plus, because we like the idea of naming and shaming these government officials. I think that’s going to be a powerful tool in our work.

The Public Protector Act of 2016 helped set the stage for potential change within the Zambian ombudsman institution. It articulated and promulgated elements of the development management and professionalism logics, which could then either be accepted by actors within the organization and the Government or they could be resisted. As noted previously, the Zambian ombudsman office has now entered a stage of potential change, and it is too soon to tell what the long-term outcome will be. Thus, the organization can still be seen as a “battlefield” in which competing logics are “battling with each other for supremacy” without a resolution (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 376). In light of this, the following section discusses the dynamic relationships between the institutional logics as well as potential outcomes of the recent promulgations of logics.

Uncertain Outcomes of Recent Processes

The sections above described a transition period within the Zambian ombudsman office, as it began moving toward potential change among the institutional logics guiding it with the promulgation of the professionalism and development management logics. Leading up to this transition period, the context of the ombudsman office had been mainly consistent with a bureaucratic logic and a kinship logic. Evidence of the bureaucratic logic could be seen in the ombudsman office's internal focus on the central bureaucracy as well as in its bureaucratic systems of control and hierarchical structures. This could also be seen in its centralized employment system that was based on seniority and through which employees had been transferred into the organization from other public organizations and departments.

Evidence of the kinship logic is seen in the institution's patrimonial authority structures that overlaid the bureaucratic structures as well as in the organization members' descriptions of their fears of reprisal for challenging those systems of authority and power. The kinship logic could also be seen in the ways some organization members had been using their social positions within the organization as personal fiefdoms for their own benefit and how they used informal exchanges of gifts, favors, and cash as a means of getting things done. That is not to say that all organization members "were satisfied with the status quo", however (Reay & Hinings, 2005, p. 364). Some organization members believed that the systems, structures, and practices needed to be changed, and they actively worked to change them. It was only recently that their efforts began to gain momentum.

To use the battlefield metaphor, the kinship and bureaucratic logics are still at war with alternative logics, which are the professionalism and development management logics. The three sets of activities that were described in previous sections, drafting the new strategic and restructuring plans, moving to the new office building, and writing the new legislation, can all be seen as part of a turning point in the process of change among institutional logics, or what Reay and Hinings (2005) called "promulgating the change" (p. 367). They promulgated the professionalism logic with its emphasis on educational qualifications, autonomy, and on following the

norms and standards of the professional field. They also promulgated the development management logic with its emphasis on serving the needs of society, particularly the most vulnerable. These alternative logics are now available for the actors involved to either “acquiesce and accept” or to “resist”, which would lead to either change or a prolonged state of battle (Reay & Hinings, 2005, p. 369).

Elements of a professionalism logic were promulgated through the restructuring plan and the new ombudsman office legislation. This is seen in the push for greater autonomy for the institution within the new law, which would give it financial independence from the centralized state bureaucracy. Thus, the system of control would be based on professional autonomy and guided by international norms and standards for ombudsman work. The investigators and the ombudsman would then have authority as professionals to do what needs to be done to bring redress to cases of maladministration, and they would not have to worry about how the cases might be in conflict with the interests of members of the executive branch and central bureaucracy. What remains to be seen however is how Parliament might exercise authority over the ombudsman institution, since the new constitution and the new legislation now deem it a parliamentary institution. The new legislation also declares the ombudsman office is a human rights institution, which is also in line with professional standards and norms. Finally, the restructuring plan also promulgated the professionalism logic within the office, as it set the salary scale for its new recruits at levels that require higher education and professional qualifications, thus making employment processes more consistent with the professionalism logic as well.

Another alternative logic that was promulgated during the transition period was the development management logic. This was evidenced in the organization’s move to the new building, the development of the strategic plan, and the drafting of the new Public Protector Act. Moving the office into the new building may seem insignificant in ordinary circumstances, but it had been a major obstacle for the organization, and the move had immense symbolic value. It signified that the ombudsman office was there to meet the needs of the public and to make it as easy as possible for them to access the institution to complain about cases of maladministration. This move materially articulated the mission of the organization to serve the needs of society and

reflected a new external orientation of the organization on the public, which are consistent with the development management logic. Along the same lines, the strategic plan set out to build “a common shared sense of purpose” for the ombudsman office “to be the lead governance institution dedicated to eliminating bureaucratic injustice and maladministration in the public and private sector for the benefit of all persons in the country” (Commission for Investigations, 2014, p. 19). The strategic plan also, by its very existence, was an enactment of the operational mode of the development management logic, which is about operating in ways that are strategic in order to meet the needs of the public.

Some elements of the professionalism and development management logics lend themselves to cooperative relationships with one another at the ombudsman office. There is a facilitative relationship between the development management logic’s focus on service to the poor and vulnerable and with the value of the professionalism logic to follow the norms of the professional field, which within ombudsmanship is the “commitment to human rights and human dignity” (African Ombudsman and Mediators Association, n.d.). Therefore, at the same time the ombudsman and her team worked to ensure that the new legislation reflected professional norms for ombudsman institutions, their actions also led to legislation that reflected the values of the development management logic, which is to empower the disempowered. In that way, the provisions in the law about how the ombudsman office should “investigate any complaint of human rights arising from... maladministration” and “provide added protection to vulnerable persons, including children, women and persons with disabilities” (*The Public Protector Act, 2016*, section 35) dually satisfies demands of both the professionalism logic and the development management logic. The enactment of elements of one logic entails the enactment of elements of the other logic.

Conflicts between the professionalism logic and bureaucratic logic can be seen in the struggles between institutional defenders and institutional entrepreneurs within the organization. The team members working on the restructuring plan for the organization were acting as institutional entrepreneurs to move the organization towards employment practices consistent with the professionalism logic. Some

employees who felt they would lose out from the new employment practices acted as institutional defenders by working to sabotage the restructuring process by hiding or tearing up documentation in the hopes of derailing the proposed changes.

These battles and power plays are still unfolding in the ombudsman institution, and it is not possible to say what will happen in the future. It is possible, however, to speculate, based on theory, what could happen depending on how future events unfold. One possible scenario is that the professionalism and development management logics will become more influential within the ombudsman institution. For that to happen, the key actors would need to eventually acquiesce and accept the promulgated logics of professionalism and development management (Reay & Hinings, 2005, p. 369). The change mechanisms that were described in Chapter Two could play a role within this scenario. For example, if the Zambian ombudsman office increased its level of interaction with the professional community, *i.e.*, through *structural overlap*, this would have the potential for the “circulation of ideas” (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008) to have an impact on the ombudsman office and its members. More specifically, if they engaged with the African Ombudsman Mediators’ Association (AOMA) and the International Ombudsman Institute (IOI) for knowledge exchange programs, they could be impacted by the imitation of shared identities with the professional community and the translation of professional ideas and standards for ombudsmanship into the Zambian ombudsman institution.

Furthermore, if the ombudsman herself were to take a decisive role as an institutional entrepreneur by rewarding those who go along with the professionalizing processes within the organization and by punishing those who oppose them, this could incentivize more organization members to go along with those processes (Hardy & Maguire, 2008, pp. 206-209). This could be done in a similar way to the institutional entrepreneurship process in the Office of Auditor General Zambia, in which many of the institutional defenders were actually removed from the organization in a retrenchment process (as described previously in Chapter Five). They were either retired early or transferred to another public organization. However, a gentler approach might be taken by rewarding those who go along with the changes with trips to international conferences and workshops hosted by the professional community as

well as by continually supporting and providing educational opportunities to those who want to upgrade their qualifications. This would require increased funding for these types of activities, which could potentially come from new partnerships with the international community.

Finally, the ombudsman and her allies could be prepared to act decisively as dramatic events continue to unfold in Zambia. If they are able to continue to push for changes in the midst of the transition to a new constitution and new legal framework for the ombudsman institution, they can continue promulgating the professionalism and development management logics, thus enabling the organization to emphasize professional training and standards, a service orientation and focus on the disempowered, and to continue pushing for autonomy. Some tools available to them would be the news media who could draw attention to the work of the ombudsman office as well as the international professional community, who can lobby the government on their behalf. Likewise, several members of Parliament seem keen to support the organization, and they could act as a buffer between the ombudsman and the executive branch of government during these tenuous transition processes.

Another possibility is that there could be a long, extended period of instability, in which the power struggles between the actors and unresolved conflicts between the logics continue. The president and executive branch could continue to interfere with, or be indifferent to, the work of the ombudsman, or they could at least make it more difficult for the ombudsman office to operate. For example, the rules for conducting investigations and administrative proceedings still need to be written and signed by the Minister of Justice, who is part of the executive branch, and this presents an opportunity for the executive branch and the President to interfere in these processes. Furthermore, the members of the ombudsman office who are institutional defenders of the status quo could continue to undermine change processes or they could continue shirking organizational responsibility if they are not prevented from doing so or are even ultimately removed from their positions.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how events at the Zambian ombudsman office promulgated change among institutional logics in the organization. Because these events are recent in the organization's history, the case narrative is able to provide a close-up view of how the three different processes have promulgated the professionalism and development management logics as well as the ensuing power struggles around them. It showed how drafting the organization's strategic and restructuring plans promulgated employment practices consistent with the professionalism logic as well as an external orientation consistent with the development management logic. It also showed how the organization's move to a new office building was a physical expression and an enabling condition for the enactment of the development management logic's external orientation. Finally, it showed how the process of writing new ombudsman legislation that gives the office more operational autonomy has promulgated the values and systems of control of the professionalism logic. This also showed how the new law's language about human rights could satisfy the demands of both the professionalism logic and the development management logic. In describing the ways in which the development management and professionalism logics were promulgated within the organization, the chapter also described the recent and ongoing power struggles that unfolded as a result of the proposed changes. Some of these changes have been met by resistance from institutional defenders within the organization who have actively worked to maintain the status quo by sabotaging reform efforts.

The Zambian ombudsman office has now been re-launched as "the Office of Public Protector". It has a new name, a new organizational structure, new legal framework, and a new office building. Significant changes in the constellation of logics that guide the organization are not guaranteed, however. It could remain operating in much the same way as it has been, with interference from the Government and with very little motivation or concern from employees in the office. Alternatively, it could become more professionalized and also have a stronger emphasis on serving the needs of the public. It is still too soon to tell if the promulgated logics will be enacted in a sustainable way and become institutionalized within the organization.

However, as discussed in the previous section, if the office were to interact more with the professional community and if the ombudsman and her team continue to drive the changes and to seize the windows of opportunity as they open in Zambia, this could lead to sustainable change among the logics guiding the office. If the office were to enact these elements of the professionalism and development management logics that are related to meeting the needs of the public and becoming a human rights ombudsman institution, then it would begin to become an ombudsman for the Zambian people rather than one for the bureaucracy.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

This study contributes to theory and research literature on institutional logics as well as research on development within the Global South. It does so in several ways, as it contextualizes theory on institutional logics within new organizational contexts and a new geographical area, public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, an area which received scant attention in previous studies of institutional logics (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017). Thus, it extends the application of this perspective further into new areas and fields. It also contributes to a better understanding of the contexts of public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically in Zambia, and in that way it leads to a further theorization of context, as called for by Pollitt (2013, p. 585). The following sections argue in greater detail about the specific contributions to research on institutional logics and development, as well as empirical contributions related to the practice of development in the region.

Theoretical Contributions

The first way this study contributes to research on institutional logics and on development is by constructing and applying a new typology of logics useful for studying public organizations in Zambia and within the Sub-Saharan African region. The new typology fills a gap in the literature, since institutional researchers have not focused their research in the Sub-Saharan region or throughout the Global South more broadly (Andrews, 2013, p. 3; Johansen & Waldorff, 2017). Therefore, this study helps move institutional logics research beyond its narrow focus on organizations in the Global North, and it demonstrates the perspective's usefulness in the context of public organizations in the South, and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. By extending institutional logics research into this area, this study also responds to recent calls by Johansen and Waldorff (2017) "for a broader engagement with the world" (p. 69), and to move beyond "a rather rationalistic view of organizations and organizational actors... by tending also to the informal organization, the chaos and the 'muddling through'... and power struggles" (pp. 70-71).

One way this study tends to the informal organization is by calling attention to the kinship logic, which goes beyond the formal organizational roles, rules, and procedures. It reflects what Friedland and Alford (1991) considered within their original conception, that the kinship logic is subversive of the more formal logics, and in that way, it transcends the bureaucratic office. It was through the informal kinship logic that individuals could assert themselves and “penetrate state definitions of needs and social categories” (Ibid, p. 259). By empirically demonstrating the way this worked in the Zambian public accountability organizations, this study and its new typology are “bringing” the kinship logic “back in” to the institutional logics perspective (Ibid, p. 232).

The informal aspects of the kinship logic were especially relevant at the Anti-Corruption Commission. There, organizational actors regularly had to manage both their informal and formal identities in dealing with how they handled investigations of their own tribe members. This came out as they discussed what they called the “problem with issues of tribalism” in Zambia. It was in those situations that an informal identity based on ethnicity or tribe became a factor in the choices that organizational actors made (Ekeh, 1975, p. 109). As one interview respondent aptly put it:

We are investigators, yes, but at the same time, we are human and we have lives out there. For some people, it’s hard to draw the line, “Where do I place my loyalties? Is it with the institution? With my family? My friends?” Because either way the backlash is there. Family - it will be there. Institution - it will be there.

This quote highlights the informal dimensions of organizational life in Zambia, which goes beyond the hierarchy, rules, regulations, and codes of ethics. The organization members have to continually make choices about where they will place their loyalties and consider the type of backlash that will come as a result. There will be consequences regardless of the choice they make, but they must continually consider which consequences they can live with.

Relationships among Institutional Logics

Using an institutional logics perspective in this context broadens our understanding of how multiple sets of organizing principles, practices, and ideas co-exist and guide action in public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is a vibrant focus of inquiry in the development literature (Andrews, 2013; Evans, 2004; Hydén, 2012, 2013b; Jamil, Askvik, & Hossain, 2013). The institutional logics perspective provides a theoretical lens for examining these dynamic relationships, and the typology provides categorizations for ordering them in a systematic manner. Through this theoretical lens, one can see how an organization and its members manage the conflicting values and practices consistent with multiple institutional logics in various ways. For example, practices consistent with different institutional logics can be segmented from one another, through which the activities of one organizational unit can be consistent with one institutional logic while the activities in another unit are consistent with another logic. Segmentation of logics can alleviate the tensions and competition that can exist between the different value systems, practices, or foci of attention. This was evident in the case at the Anti-Corruption Commission, as the Investigations Department was guided by principles of the bureaucratic logic, with its internal orientation and attention on following the rules and procedures for investigations and doing so in secrecy. Meanwhile, the Community Education Department had a different orientation that was consistent with the development management logic, which was focused on members of the public, educating them about corruption and how to prevent it. The two organizational units were able to work in different ways and have different foci because their work was segmented away from one another in the organization.

Another way the different logics can coexist and enable action is when they are complimentary to another and exist within facilitative relationships. Because of the logics' complementarity, pursuing the goals or following the norms and values inherent in one logic facilitates the enactment of another logic. An example of this is found in the case at the Office of Auditor General. The office and the officers see themselves as professionals and as members in good standing in the professional audit communities of INTOSAI and AFROSAI-E. As such, they follow the professional

norms, standards, and methods prescribed by INTOSAI and AFROSAI-E. One such standard is ISSAI 12, which states that audit offices should regularly engage with the public and empower them to hold their governments accountable. As the Office of Auditor General follows and implements that standard into their own context, they are simultaneously following professional standards, which is the enactment of the professionalism logic, while they are also orienting themselves and their work toward empowering the public, which is the enactment of the development management logic. This is seen most evidently in the ways the audit office engages the public through the media and, in particular, in their trips to rural areas to explain audit reports in local languages. They are simultaneously enacting the professionalism and development management logics through their involvement in these types of activities.

Of particular note is also how these different logics can be facilitative of one another in ways that are subversive to formal organizational modes. One example of this is the way that the hierarchical organizational system consistent with the bureaucratic logic can facilitate patrimonial and informal forms of control by powerful or well-connected individuals, which is consistent with the kinship logic. This can be seen in situations in which officers from these organizations were intimidated or felt afraid to do their work of holding officials accountable because those above them in the government hierarchy could abuse the formal system to punish them. For example, they could cause them to be fired or removed from their positions, prevent them from being promoted, or they could cut funding to the organization. In these types of situations, the formal power of the central bureaucracy is abused to punish organization members for doing their jobs to hold civil servants, ministers, and other political leaders accountable.

This perspective also aids in our understanding of how these different logics exist in competitive relationships, which implies that one logic's win is another logic's loss, and that increases in the influence of one logic corresponds with the decrease of another logic (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). This is seen, for example, in relationships between the kinship logic and development management logic. As organization members saw their position in the organization as a personal fiefdom and a way to extract money from members of the public, or "tips", as they called them, it precluded

delivery of service to the poor and vulnerable as espoused by the values of the development management logic. This can be seen empirically in the ombudsman office, when they were located in the Old Bank of Zambia building together with the passport office and some of the officers were taking bribes to help speed up passport application processes. While this informal expediting service might have made the lives of some people, particularly those with money, easier by allowing them to get their passports faster, it would have conversely make the lives of the poor more difficult as their passport applications would move further down the queue below the applications of those who paid the extra cash to speed up the process. In those situations, the enactment of the kinship logic and its mode of operation prevents the enactment of the development management logic and its operational mode to meet the needs of the public, especially those who are poor or vulnerable.

In addition to exploring how relationships between logics can be competitive or complementary and how different logics can be segmented away from one another or facilitative of one other, this study also explores another type of relationship in which policies consistent with a logic are decoupled away from organizational practices. The case of the Anti-Corruption Commission provides an illustration of policy-practice decoupling, in which policies consistent with the development management logic and the professionalism logic were adopted symbolically to attain legitimacy, but the policies were de-coupled away from the core operation of the organization (i.e., how the organization “really works”). This was seen, for example, in the adoption of the international standards that were supposed to give the organization more independence and autonomy through the enactment of formal laws, which on the surface was consistent with the professionalism logic. However, in reality, the organization was not actually operating independently of the president or those close to him.

The case of Office of Auditor General Zambia illustrates how means and ends can be decoupled, leading to implemented policies while “scant evidence exists to show that these activities are linked to organizational effectiveness or outcomes” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 14). In that case, the Office of Auditor General had implemented a host of professional reforms, standards, and norms, and they had begun producing detailed annual audits showing how government agencies had misused

public resources. The quality and quantity of the reports coming from the Auditor General's office have increased. Yet, very little action is ever taken on these reports by Parliament or the Executive, and hence, there has been very little change in the way the government handles public resources. So, in spite of the changes within the Audit Office, there continues to be public theft and irresponsible spending within the Government of Zambia. Thus, there is a decoupled relationship between the means of holding government accountable through audit reports and the ends of responsible handing of resources by the government.

The Materiality of Logics

This study contributes to our understanding of the materiality of institutional logics as physical expressions of the values of the logics. In a recent article on institutional logics and materiality, Jones et al. (2013) argued, that while the roles of meanings systems and practices have dominated the research agenda on institutional logics in the past two decades, the roles of material objects "have been peripheral" (p. 53). To Jones and her coauthors, material objects need more emphasis in institutional logics research because they are "important extensions of" and the "necessary condition for" the enactment of institutional logics since material objects "not only anchor established practices and structures and institutionalize new ones, but are also vehicles enabling ideas and symbols to travel across time and space" (Ibid, pp. 52, 55). Material objects are the transmutations of the invisible ideas and symbolic meanings, according to Friedland (2013), and they "are the means by which practices are anchored, affected, and oriented" within organizations (p. 37).

The ombudsman office's move from the Old Bank of Zambia Building to the new office building illustrates how physical objects, which in this case are the office buildings, can be important extensions of, and necessary conditions for, the enactment of the institutional logics. When the office was located in the Old Bank of Zambia Building, it was an extension of and condition for the kinship and bureaucratic logics. It was located within a building with other government agencies, away from the public eye. The ombudsman herself called the building "maladministration" and noted how it was not geared toward effective and efficient service delivery to the public. The

elevators did not work and it was located in an area that did not provide anonymity to complainants. Furthermore, it anchored the practice of accepting bribes from the public to speed up passport application processes. This practice was made possible because of the ombudsman office's location in the Old Bank of Zambia Building along with the passport office. This changed when the ombudsman office moved to the new location. The new location was open and spacious and geared toward public service, and in that way, it expressed the values of the development management logic. It was also an enabling condition for changing the practices within the organization away from taking bribes and using the office as a personal fiefdom toward public service delivery. In these ways, the move to the new building was the material enactment of the development management logic within the ombudsman office.

Change, Structure, and Agency

Finally, this study has contributed to theory about how change can occur in the relationships among institutional logics, which ties in to theoretical arguments about structure and agency. The analytic narrative from the case of the Office of Auditor General Zambia offers a unique perspective on the roles of institutional entrepreneurship and structural overlaps within these change processes. Many of the changes that took place within the Office of Auditor General revolved around a central figure who acted as an institutional entrepreneur, Auditor General Anna Chifungula. At the same time, however, structural elements were also important to consider in the change processes within the organization.

Andrews (2013, 2016) provided a critique of institutional entrepreneurship and the overreliance on "solitary heroic leaders" or "champions" in institutional reform and development initiatives in the Global South. His critique hinges on the paradox of embedded agency that was discussed previously: If actors are embedded in the institutionalized rules of the game, how can they imagine any alternatives? This is especially the case with resource-rich actors at the center of social networks. They would likely benefit most from the existing institutional arrangements and would not be particularly motivated to deviate from it. The answer, according to Andrews (2013, 2016), is to go beyond solitary heroic leaders and towards an understanding of the role

of multi-agent leadership in change processes. In this way, actors on the periphery who are less embedded in the principles of the incumbent institutional logics can imagine new alternatives, and they can work with the central actors who have the resources to enact change to make it happen. Andrews (2013) contended, “multi-agent leadership fosters change, not solitary leaders. It is unlikely that institutional reforms will progress far where such multi-agent leadership is not in place” (p. 96).

While it is true that the Auditor General did not act entirely in isolation as an institutional entrepreneur, she did play a central role from within her unique social position, more specifically, her “current position and history of positioning” (Cardinale, 2018, p. 141). Her previous position within the Ministry of Finance provided her with “self-evident” courses of action based on the professionalism logic (Ibid, p. 142), i.e., the importance of providing professional training to auditors, requiring them to become certified, and basing new employment processes on the acquirement of professional qualifications. Therefore, her previous social position oriented her towards those courses of action by providing her with “flexible schemes” (Ibid, p. 141) based on professionalism, which she could then transpose and apply through agentive action after she had acquired her new social position to lead the audit office. According to Cardinale (2018), “Agency is needed... to narrow down possible courses of action to one”, and this process of selecting a course of action is based on one’s previous experiences and history of social positions rather than being solely based on one’s current social position alone (p. 141).

This perspective provides an alternative to that of Andrews (2013), which is that multi-agent leadership is required for change, since the Auditor General was actually able to play dual roles deriving from her historical and current positioning. She was a resource-rich central actor because of her current role as Auditor General and her social capital from the President and Cabinet, but it was her former roles within the Ministry of Finance that provided her with a set of schemes to apply in the audit office to bring change in accordance with the professionalism logic. In essence, her actions “reflect[ed] a generative process through which actors tackle the present by activating the flexible schemes acquired during the past” (Cardinale, 2018, p. 141),

and they provide a unique empirical example of a central actor who is simultaneously able to imagine new alternatives and drive divergent institutional change.

Another alternative explanation for the changes within in the Office of Auditor General Zambia would be to see those changes as processes of diffusion or the translation of ideas coming from the organization's structural overlap with the professional community of state auditors. The social boundaries of the Office of Auditor General intersected with the boundaries of the professional community through cooperation with INTOSAI, AFROSAI-E, as well as the Office of Auditor General Norway. This provided the opportunity for the Zambian auditors, as well as the Auditor General, to interact with audit professionals from different organizational contexts, providing a bridge to exchange ideas about how audits should take place and how professional auditors should act, and in so doing, it lowered the barriers to change. In that way, change can be seen as either deriving from normative pressures from the professional community towards isomorphic mimicry (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), or as processes of translation (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017) of the norms, practices, and standards from the international professional communities of INTOSAI and AFROSAI-E. This explanation would support the bold assertion of Scott (2008) that transnational communities of professionals have become "the most influential contemporary crafters of institutions... and currently claim supremacy in today's secularized and rationalized world" (p. 223).

Rather than seeing only one of the alternatives as the explanation for change in the Office of Auditor General, this study sees change as coming from within the interactions of institutional entrepreneurship and structural overlap. The ideas and practices coming from the relationships with the professional community provided material and ideational resources for the professionalizing processes that were being driven by the Auditor General. As the Auditor General acted as an institutional entrepreneur, removing institutional defenders and rewarding those who went along with the project, the professional community of auditors was there with a useful set of standards and methods that could be translated into the Zambian audit context, leading to change within the organization. Therefore, the changes in the Auditor General's Office can be understood as coming from the agentic actions of an institutional

entrepreneur who was preconditioned toward certain courses of action (Cardinale, 2018) and through structural processes coming from the overlaps with the professional organizations. Furthermore, from a practitioner perspective, this provides a case for looking at how a strong and established professional community can lower barriers to change as well as the importance of entrepreneurial leadership to drive change processes within organizations.

Empirical Contributions

In addition to the theoretical contributions above, this study also contributes empirically to research on public administration in Zambia in several ways. One way is by providing a historical context of the three organizations from the case studies. It provides this context in light of social developments within Zambia, the Sub-Saharan African region, and internationally within the fields or sectors in which the three organizations are a part. For example, very little has been written about the ombudsman office in its more than forty years of existence. A search of literature reveals two academic studies focused on the Zambian ombudsman office, and both are by legal scholars rather than social scientists (Chewe-Chanda, 2009; Martin, 1977), and as such, they are focused on the legal framework of the organization more than on its social or political environment. In addition, there was a legal bulletin written by a former senior legal officer who worked at the ombudsman office at that time, which is also focused on the legal framework for the organization (Phiri, 1986). Literature searches found no articles or books that focus on the organization from a social science perspective, though a few texts do mention the organization in passing (Chikulo, 2000) or in relation to similar organizations in the region (Ayeeni, 1997). This is perhaps because so few people have been aware of the existence of the organization since it had always maintained a low profile, at least until recently.

Therefore, this study contributes empirical analysis and data that can be useful in future studies of the Zambian ombudsman office (Layder, 1998, pp. 162-171). It is conceivable that in the near future, new studies will be conducted because, with the recent changes to the legal framework and organizational structure for the Zambian ombudsman's office, the organization could become more prominent in its role with

accountability and governance processes in Zambia. This provides a setting in which studies of the ombudsman's office would have a renewed sense of relevance and value across the academic disciplines. More academic studies focused on the Zambian ombudsman would be a welcome development, and as more studies are conducted, the chapter on the ombudsman office from this study will be useful by presenting a contextualized history and social and political analyses of the organization.

The study on the Office of Auditor General Zambia finds itself in good company with recent research by Maria Gustavson (2014) who studied "how African public auditors perceive and handle international public audit standards in relation to their own context" (p. 21). Her study, which was focused on the SAIs in Botswana and Namibia, as well as AFROSAI-E, found that professional norms and social legitimacy within the professional community were key factors in the ways that African public auditors approached international standards. In her study, the auditors considered those international standards as legitimate, and therefore, they saw it as appropriate for them to take the standards and implement them within their own local contexts. In that way, her study offers an alternative perspective to development research, which "argue[s] that Western administrative structures and practices lack legitimacy in African countries" (Ibid, p. 170). This case study on the Office of Auditor General Zambia supports Gustavson's analysis that public auditors in Africa view the ISSAIs and other international standards as legitimate and appropriate for their own contexts, and it contributes more empirical analyses and theoretical perspectives to studies of SAIs in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Therefore, the case study on the Office of Auditor General responds to Gustavson's (2014) call for "widening the theoretical perspectives of African public officials to regard them also as professionals... contribut[ing] to a more nuanced understanding of African public administrations than what is provided by the existing literature" (p. 180). The professionalism logic from this study's typology provided an ideal type that helped consider how interview respondents were guided by shared identity, values, standards, and norms from their professional community. By seeing this professionalism logic in relation to the other three logics, this provides a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics within the organizations as organization

members drew on multiple institutional logics. It also provided a systematic way of understanding how auditors enact the professionalism logic through their interactions with the professional community via processes of imitation and translation of professional ideas and identities (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017).

Finally, the case study of change in the Office of Auditor General Zambia can contribute to the knowledge and the work of development practitioners and audit professionals in the South. It demonstrates how the audit office's engagement with the professional community of state auditors lowered barriers to change and provided sets of ready-made tools, methods, and practices that the Zambian auditors could apply in their own context. It also gives an example of how twinning can be used as a process of development when professionals from the North and the South partner together to exchange ideas and practices. Moving forward, the literature on twinning can be useful, which began as a dialogue between Jones and Blunt (1999), Askvik (1999), and Proctor (2000), and has now seen somewhat of a renaissance in more recent years (Bontenbal & Lindert, 2011; Bontenbal, 2013; Van Ewijk et al., 2015). These works could serve as guides for practitioners engaged in twinning, and they could also be built upon and expanded in future case studies of partnerships between professional organizations from the Global North and South.

The case study on the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission contributes to empirical research on anti-corruption agencies (de Sousa, 2010; Kuris, 2015). It places the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission within the existing frameworks or models for anti-corruption agencies by identifying it first as a "multi-purpose model" agency that combines preventative and investigative functions (OECD, 2013) and secondly as a "guard dog" agency with the "strong teeth" of prosecutorial power (Kuris, 2015, p. 127). This case has also provided an empirical example of Kuris's (2015) counterintuitive assertion, that strong anti-corruption agencies are likely to face more political interference in countries with high levels of corruption, like in Zambia. In that way, the Anti-Corruption Commission case illustrates the importance of political will "from the top" of the Government, which Hatchard (2014, p. 14) has argued is vital for the work of anti-corruption agencies (see also de Sousa, 2010; Kuris, 2015). It has done this by demonstrating how members of the Zambian

government interfered with the agency, making it less effective than it could have been if it were given more autonomy and backed up with strong political will. Finally, the case has shown how, in spite of multiple reform efforts, the mix of institutional logics guiding the organization has remained relatively stable. In this way, the new laws can be seen as signals sent to the international community that Zambia is getting tough on corruption. However, the formal laws and reforms have been decoupled away from the ways the organization actually works since it continues to be controlled by the executive branch in spite of laws providing it with operational autonomy.

As with the other cases, the case study at the Anti-Corruption Commission also offers a contextualized history of the organization, as it relates to Zambian society and government and the international community. It shows how the agency has followed the popular Hong Kong Model of having three foci on investigation, prevention, and education, but how it also only focused on investigations for its first decade or more as an agency and how it attempted to shift its focus in recent years. It places the agency within the Zambian context, in which the presidency is strong and corruption is prevalent, and it describes the types of challenges those situations pose to the work of an anti-corruption agency.

Final Thoughts

In the ways described above, this study contributes to literature on institutional logics and development, and it provides a rich theorization of context of the three organizations, as was urged by Pollitt (2013) in his review of the seminal book by Andrews (2013). The study first presented a typology of institutional logics that provides a systematic way of looking at different sets of organizing principles, practices, and social structures that can constitute the contexts of public accountability organizations in Zambia. It has also led to a better understanding of how these institutional logics relate to one another within these organizational contexts and how those relationships can constrain or enable organizational action. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it has shown how these organizational contexts can change in sustainable ways, as demonstrated through the case at the Office of Auditor General. This type of research is particularly relevant for public accountability organizations, as

they are often the scenes of political power struggles related to the different values, systems of control, and modes of operation consistent with different institutional logics.

This research is especially relevant in Zambia today, as the current situation for public accountability organizations in the country is becoming increasingly tenuous, with a number of observers noting a “convergence of troubling trends” in the country (Bratton et al., 2017, p. 1). A recent report from Afrobarometer warned that “Zambia has arrived at a crossroads” (Ibid, p. 1) and that “[t]he country faces a choice of futures between democratic deepening and authoritarian backsliding” (Ibid, p. 15). As an example, the most recent presidential elections in 2016 were marred by “incidents of violence... harassment of private media, the abuse of public office by government ministers, and the application of the Public Order Act in ways that appeared to disadvantage the main opposition party” (Carter Center, 2016, p. 1). The incumbent President won the election, but this was overshadowed by acts of oppression and voting irregularities, according to the Carter Center (2016, p. 2). In the months following the election, the leader of the opposition party was arrested and incarcerated on charges of treason and forty-eight members of his party were suspended from Parliament, which further silenced the President’s critics. Finally, the President invoked a state of threatened emergency, allowing him “to restrict movement of assembly, implement a curfew, curtail parliament, ban publications, order detention without trial, and search any property without a search warrant” (Cheeseman, 2017). If these trends continue, the country could once again return to more authoritarian forms of government, as it had in previous years, and the rights of members of the public will be limited.

In light of these events, a robust set of capable and independent public accountability organizations could help protect the public and act as a bulwark against powerful officials who might abuse their office, misappropriate public resources, or infringe on people’s human rights. Even while the analyses in this study have demonstrated the difficulties public accountability organizations face and how political interference and intimidation can subvert their professional and legal autonomy, it still indicates a path forward. It demonstrates how alternative logics can be promulgated

within these organizational environments through reform processes and the important role that institutional entrepreneurs play in organizational change, as they imagine new alternatives and drive divergent change. It also demonstrates the supporting role that professional communities can play in these development and reform processes, as they provide sources of alternative logics for the organizations and organization members to draw from as guides for action.

As more studies on public accountability organizations in this region are carried out, it will contribute to a better understanding of the ways these types of organizations operate and how alternative logics can be promulgated and enacted within them and how they interact with incumbent logics. This study's typology and conceptual framework will be useful in this future research, as they can be applied to different organizational contexts and expanded upon in studies on public organizations within the region. This will lead to a richer theorization of context of public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa and to a better understanding of organizational behavior more broadly.

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Appendix A

Comparison of Banking and Development Logics

	<i>Banking Logic</i>	<i>Development Logic</i>
Goals	Deriving a rent or profit	Development and poverty Alleviation
Target population	Clients are customers and seen as more or less risky sources of income	Clients are beneficiaries and seen as more or less "deserving" of support
Management principles	Maximizing profit while fulfilling fiduciary obligations not only to investors but also depositors	Maximizing the impact of donor funds on development and poverty alleviation

(Battilana & Dorado, 2010, p. 1423)

Appendix B

Institutional logics in the Austrian public sector

	<i>Legalistic-Bureaucratic logic</i>	<i>Managerial Logic</i>
Rationality and legitimacy	Bureaucratic, legal, and professional rationality. Logic of appropriateness. Procedural legitimacy.	Economic rationality (formal means-end rational action). Logic of consequentiality. Legitimacy by results.
Mission	State as policy maker with superior position in society serving public interest and citizens.	Public organizations as provider of services achieving specific objectives and serving clients/customers
Central values	Legality, correctness, neutrality, equity, objectivity, loyalty, security, secrecy. Continuity, and stability	Performance, effectiveness, and efficiency. Prudence. Change, flexibility, adoption.
Evaluation criteria and focus of attention	Rules, inputs, responsibilities, duties, and rights. Internal orientation.	Fixed/single goals, results (outputs, outcomes) External orientation
Model of governance	Bureaucratic governance based on laws, rules, and directives, with strict accountability towards the sovereign and tight and multiple controls of correctness. Hierarchical, centralized, and united system.	Contractual governance based on objectives, results, performance measurements and management tools within a competitive environment. Decentralized and fragmented system with managerial autonomy
Employment status	Sectoral closure, lifetime tenure to guarantee neutrality. Closed recruitment and career patterns based on seniority.	Sectoral openness based on private sector employment laws. Flexible and open career patterns based on performance

(Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b)

Appendix C

Competing Models of Administration in Africa

	<i>Patrimonialism</i>	<i>Colonial</i>	<i>New Public Management</i>
Organizational Objective	Power Maintenance	Law and Order	Development
Service Rationale	Ruler	Rule	Result
Organizational Structure	Patriarchal	Hierarchical	Team-Based
Operational Mode	Discretionary	Mechanistic	Organic
Staff Orientation	Upward	Inward	Outward
Career System	Favoritist	Fixed and Closed	Flexible and Open
Handling of Wrongs	Blaming Others	Reward and Sanctions	Learning Lesson

Hydén (2012, p. 606; 2013b, p. 930)

Appendix D

An Early and Preliminary Typology of Institutional Logics

	<i>Kindship/Affective/Patrimonial Logic</i>	<i>Legalistic-Bureaucratic logic</i> ⁴	<i>Managerial Logic</i> ⁵
Rationality and legitimacy	The “Economy of Affection”, “microrational”, embedded in social network, and comprised of unwritten rules. ⁶ Logic of reciprocity. Legitimacy by relationship, power. ⁷	Bureaucratic, legal, and professional rationality. Logic of appropriateness. Procedural legitimacy.	Economic rationality (formal means-end rational action). Logic of consequentiality. Legitimacy by results.
Mission	Power maintenance State as redistributive mechanism, from state coffers to local community groups (buying political support?) Provide a common good. ⁸	State as policy maker with superior position in society serving public interest and citizens.	Public organizations as provider of services achieving specific objectives and serving clients/customers
Central values	Reciprocation, ⁹ Mutual obligation ¹⁰ , Respect and deference to leaders ¹¹ . Status. “A helping hand today generates a return tomorrow”. ¹²	Legality, correctness, neutrality, equity, objectivity, loyalty, security, secrecy. Continuity, and stability	Performance, effectiveness, and efficiency. Prudence. Change, flexibility, adoption.
Evaluation criteria and focus of attention	Ruler ¹³ and Duties to provide for one’s own group. The “management of relations rather than rules”. ¹⁴	Rules, inputs, responsibilities, duties, and rights.	Fixed/single goals, results (outputs, outcomes)
Model of governance	Upward orientation (to leaders) ¹⁵ Informal and personalized governance ¹⁶ , in which rules are dependent on human agency (particularly with the leader) and based on concrete tangible results for local interests. Patriarchal (leader-dependent) based on loyalty and fiefdoms, ¹⁷ subversive. ¹⁸	Internal orientation. Bureaucratic governance based on laws, rules, and directives, with strict accountability towards the sovereign and tight and multiple controls of correctness. Hierarchical, centralized, and united system.	External orientation Contractual governance based on objectives, results, performance measurements and management tools within a competitive environment. Decentralized and fragmented system with managerial autonomy
Employment status	Favoritist, based on “who you know” Discretionary hiring practices rather than merit-based. ¹⁹	Sectoral closure, lifetime tenure. Closed recruitment and career patterns based on seniority.	Sectoral openness based on private sector employment laws. Flexible and open career patterns based on performance

4 Meyer and Hammerschmid (1996 a/b).

5 Meyer and Hammerschmid (1996 a/b).

6 Hyden (2013b), p. 923

7 Hyden (2013a)

8 Hyden (2013a)

9 Hyden (2013b)

10 Friedland and Alford (1991), p. 259

11 Andrews (2013), p. 46

12 Hyden (2013a), pp. 74, 87

13 Hyden (2013b)

14 Hyden (2013a), p. 95

15 Hyden (2013b)

16 Friedland and Alford (1991), p. 258

17 Hyden (2013b), p. 927

18 Friedland and Alford (1991), p. 259

19 Hyden (2013b)

Appendix E

Field Research Protocol

<i>Initial purpose of the study</i>	Contextualize Public Accountability Organizations in Zambia. Develop a typology of logics for understanding these organizations and understanding processes of change within them.
<i>Core theoretical concepts</i>	<p><i>Institutional logics</i> – sets of socially constructed organizing principles and practices (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008)</p> <p><i>Institutional entrepreneurship</i> – actors who leverage resources and drive change in the organization or field (Hardy and Maguire, 2008)</p> <p><i>Structural overlap</i> – boundary spanning between the organization with other organizations or social groups (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008)</p> <p><i>Historical events</i> – dramatic events that shift cultural views and power bases (Sewell, 1996; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008)</p> <p><i>Competing logics</i> – the presence of competing logics as an “antecedent” to change (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008)</p> <p><i>Translation of organizational ideas</i> – institutional ideas move across time and space (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996) and they are adapted by actors to fit local contexts (Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008)</p>
<i>First trip to the field</i>	1st – 16th of November 2014
<i>Organizational contact</i>	The Office of Auditor General Zambia Stand No. 7951 Haile Selassie avenue, Long Acres, Lusaka Louis Mwansa – Director of Planning and Information Directorate +260 211 252 772
<i>Goals</i>	To use and build upon the preliminary typology Determine if changes did actually occur in OAGZ, as espoused by Norwegian development partners and evaluation reports. If changes did happen, then look for possible explanations as to why. “Soak and Poke” – make observations, have informal conversations about the organization and its environment.
<i>Themes to be covered in semi-structured interviews (not used as an “interview guide”, but as reminders of topics to be covered)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing a rapport with respondents and understanding their place within and their level of knowledge of the organization: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Length of time working in organization, position, how they were recruited, career path, educational and occupational background. - Getting a sense of the way the organization works: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Find out what it’s like to work in the organization and how things “get done”. o Get descriptions of process of working through the organizational structure (types of hierarchy – steep, rigid, flat?). o How to get ahead (be promoted) in the organization. o How organization members interact with others inside and outside the organizations (e.g., political actors, members of the public, central bureaucracy, international partners). o Get an idea of the image of an ideal officer in the organization and what happens when members do not live up to those expectations. o Find out about evaluation processes within the organizations – particularly related to employees. o Find out about authority structures – who determines what work is to be done and how it is to be done.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Find out the challenges and frustrations of working in the organization. - Getting a sense of changes in the organization: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Ask long-time organizational members to describe the way the office operated when they first arrived and compare it to now. Try to get details about timeframes of changes ○ Ask for their opinions about how and why changes took place – who the key actors were, what some of the obstacles to change may have been. <p><i>N.B. Also check with interview respondents about documentary data, particularly if they referred to documents in interviews</i></p>
Second trip to the field	22nd of September – 8th of October 2015
<i>Organizational contacts</i>	<p>The Office of Auditor General Zambia Stand No. 7951 Haile Selassie avenue, Long Acres, Lusaka Louis Mwansa – Director of Planning and Information Directorate +260 211 252 772</p> <p>Local researcher and contact person for members of Parliament and Public Accounts Committee (Contacted through Njekwa Mate – Lecturer at University of Zambia - +260 965 134 617) Peter Soko +260 977 890 825</p> <p>Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (Political Party) secretariat@mmdzambia.org (after an internal split in the MMD party in 2016, with a “Mutati faction” and “Mumba faction”, the MMD website and email are not working. However, individual contact information can be requested from the author. For reasons of individual security, it is not included here.)</p> <p>Transparency International Zambia Stand no 3880, Kwacha Road, Olympia Park, Lusaka Goodwell Lungu – Director +260 211 293 649</p>
<i>Goals</i>	Get a broader point of view by including interviews with external actors from the Zambian Parliament and Public Accounts Committee, Norwegian embassy, Transparency International Zambia, and former Vice President of Zambia
<i>Themes to be covered in semi-structured interviews</i>	<p>Continuing with themes from the first trip to the field, and in addition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Getting a sense of what external actors think about the organization – how it is to work with it, whether they have seen changes along the same lines as organization members. ○ Get the political perspective. ○ Get an up close historical perspective from the former Vice President of Zambia, particularly related to the appointment of the Auditor General ○ Begin looking for additional cases to study

<i>Third trip to the field</i>	23rd of April – 14th of May, 2016
<i>Organizational contacts</i>	<p>The Office of Auditor General Zambia Stand No. 7951 Haile Selassie avenue, Long Acres, Lusaka Sally Ross – Director of Planning and Information Directorate (currently holds this position, as of April 2017) +260 211 252772</p> <p>Transparency International Zambia Stand No. 3880, Kwacha Road, Olympia Park, Lusaka Goodwell Lungu – Director +260 211 293 649</p> <p>The Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission Anti-Corruption House. Chachacha Road, Southend, 50486 Lusaka, Zambia Christopher Chibanku – Corporate Affairs Manager +260 966 548 867 Timothy Moono – Public Relations Manager tmoono@acc.gov.zm</p> <p>The Office of Public Protector (the ombudsman office) Stand No. 4623, Mwaiwena Road, Lusaka (in Rhodes Park area, behind Taj Pamodzi) Victor Siulanda – Investigations officer ksiulanda@gmail.com +260 211 228 330</p>
<i>Goals</i>	<p>Add two additional case studies at the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission and the ombudsman office. Look at similar processes and concepts within these cases.</p> <p>In addition, secure as many documentary data sources as possible since this will likely be the last trip for data collection.</p>
<i>Presentation of Research</i>	8th – 23rd of November, 2017
<i>Organizational contacts</i>	Same as listed above
<i>Goals</i>	Determine the accuracy and validity of case narratives and concepts. Get feedback from written case reports and presentations of research, get corrections from participants when necessary.

Institutional Logics in Zambian Public Accountability Organizations

<i>Dimensions</i>	<i>Kinship Logic</i>	<i>Bureaucratic Logic</i>	<i>Development Management Logic</i>	<i>Professionalism Logic</i>
Collective Identity	Affiliation with tribal and ethnic groups	Affiliation with the bureaucracy	Affiliation with shared mission of the organization to serve society	Affiliation with the professional community
Staff Orientation	Orientated toward kin, community, and patriarch	Internal orientation within bureaucratic organization	External orientation toward public	Oriented toward professional field
Core Values	Relationships: reciprocity, serving one's own needs and those of family and tribe with loyalty	Rules: Following rules and correct procedures in a stable environment	Results: Achieving measurable results, efficiency, effectiveness for society, especially the disempowered	Reliability: Being skilled in and following professional norms, standards, and methods; maintaining professional work ethic, autonomy
Preferred Org. Structure	Patriarchal structure	Centralized hierarchical structure	Fragmented structure, team & project based	Decentralized hierarchical structure
Operational Mode	"Personal fiefdoms" with no separation between private and public resources	Mechanistic and geared to rules and routines	Organic, strategic, and flexible to meet the needs of the public	Pigeonholing processes: diagnosis and application of program; discretionary judgement
System of control	Informal control based on expectations of reciprocity and/or fear	Rule-based, with strict formal control by centralized authority structure	Managerial control based on performance measurement	Professional autonomy, guided by norms and standards
Source of Authority	Informal authority	Rational-Legal authority	Managerial authority	Professional authority
Evaluation criteria	Elevating status with community; showing and sharing personal wealth	Following proper procedures; providing stable, consistent service	Achieving performance goals and targets	Delivering professionally sound and reliable work by following professional standards and methods
Employment Practices	Entry to employment and promotions based on personal favor and connections	Entry to employment through centralized system. Promotions based on seniority	Entry to employment and promotions based on ability to bring results and performance	Entry to employment and promotions based on professional certifications and knowledge acquisition



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