

“ We strongly condemn...”:
Norwegian governments’ Foreign Policy
Statements as Political Tool or Moral Stance?

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Abstract

In international relations “shaming-policy” is one of the most common and popular “tools” for achieving change in state behavior, concerning human rights and international law. Public exposure leads to pressure, which leads to change in behavior. In the international community, Norway has established itself as a small power with huge impact on peace related work. By examining 344 official press releases, from 1995-2017, issued by the Norwegian Government, have I tried to identify the main driving forces behind condemnation. The thesis is based on theories that claims that international politics is a struggle for power and status. States act in the international society, either based on moral or national interests, which represent the liberal international view and the realistic view.

This thesis seeks to reveal to what degree the Norwegian government use condemnation as a political tool or a morality statement, and to what degree such patters are similar or different across Norwegian governments. The main findings in this study is first and foremost that the Norwegian government do not keep track of what they condemn. The findings also suggest that Norway does not exclusively condemn based on moral, but are guided by it. If there is a risk by choosing to condemn, that might threaten national interests, then there is a tendency that moral and ethics has to go at the expense of national interests. Therefore, the conclusion is that Norway use condemnation as a morality statement, but almost equally as a political tool.

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1.Introduction

On 21st April 2019 bombs were used to attack churches and hotels in Sri Lanka. According to officials, more than 250 people were killed. Only a few hours after the news reports about the attack, the Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg condemned the attack on Twitter:

“I strongly condemn the senseless and horrible attacks on churches and hotels in #SriLanka this Easter morning. My thoughts are with the victims and their families”.

– Erna Solberg, Norwegian Prime minister

When atrocities take place states and non-governmental organizations (NGO) tend to respond in terms of words where they express their support and compassion with the victims and their dependents, and shame the violators or the act committed. Public exposure, or “naming and shaming”, is a common and popular strategy to enforce international law, promote norms and especially human rights. News media, international organizations and non-governmental organizations expose the violator, a state or a non-state actor, and urge reform(Hafner-Burton 2008, 689). Many studies have been done on the effect of shaming on perpetrators, However, while mainly focusing on human rights, the specific act of condemning has been neglected (Krain 2012, Brysk 1993, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Risse and Sikkink 1999, Franklin 2008, Murdie and Bhasin 2011, Murdie and Davis 2012, Bob 2005, Hafner-Burton 2008). Hence, within the field of shaming policy and international relations, I seek to contribute with a broader perspective on the use of shaming and condemnation. By looking at one country over time and thereby trying to identify what drivers lie behind the condemnation? What mechanisms or underlying conditions will cause an actor to condemn another international actor?

Being a field of uncharted territory, it is constructive to focus on one case to create a deeper understanding of the condemnation-process. I will in this paper look at Norwegian use of condemnation in the realm of international politics.

Looking back at Norwegian foreign policy the last 20 years one policy area which stands out is the one concerning activism and extensive peace commitment (Skånland 2009, 321; Carvalho and Neumann 2015). Norway’s emergence as a peacemaker and security exporting state has been a significant element within the international landscape of conflict management in recent years and has influenced states to redirect their Foreign policy in a similar direction. The Norwegian case is interesting to investigate because it is a special and different case. Because Norway has the Nobel peace prize, because Norway is a small state and because it has gained relatively high status in the international community. I will examine how Norway uses condemnation, and try to understand the motivation behind condemnation; Is it based on moral grounds or is it used more strategically as a political tool to gain higher international status?


“We have a self-image as a peaceful nation. (...) The government’s eagerness to participate militarily in international conflicts stands in contrast to the building up of peace as a Norwegian brand” (Skånland 2009, 42). Because Norway consider itself as a ‘peace nation’, it is an interesting case to investigate. Norway has the Nobel peace prize, they are recognized as a small state and has gained relatively high status in the international community.

A quick search through the most dominant newspapers in Norway show that condemnation is a frequent phenomenon. A complementary search on Google for “Norway strongly condemn” on April 30th 2019 revealed 913 000 hits. From 1995-2017 the Norwegian foreign ministry condemned 344 times through official press releases. Figure 1 and Figure 2 below illustrates the Norwegian media coverage of terrorism, compared to the coverage of condemnation and condemned cases. The number are obtained from.



Figure 1 Coverage of condemnations compared to terrorism

Source: Retriever/A-tekst.



Figur 2 Articles covering condemnation in general

Source: Retriver/A-tekst.

The international community is all about the struggle to promote its country's national interests and increase its own status. In Hans J. Morgenthau's words: "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power". When talking about international relations it is natural to talk about national interest and status seeking. National interests refer to a state's national interests, both domestic and foreign. Status can be considered a national interest (Carvalho and Neumann 2015, 22). It is said that the term national interests are as old as the study of international politics (Leira 2015, 71). In international relations theory states might be referred to as powers, and one operates with labels such as small, middle and great power. Norway is considered a relatively small power (Whitfeldt 2007, 52; de Carvalho and Neumann 2015), but if you do an overall assessment it can be counted as a middle power, or in William Wohlforts words: "A small middle power" (Wohlforth 2015, 147). Power is relative, which in this context mean that what each state considers as "having" power is based on their subjective opinion. Power will differ; i.e. military or diplomatic power.

A small power seeking status typically diverge from and take other forms than that of great powers. Small powers is said to suffer from status insecurity to an extent that established great powers do not, which leaves an extra pressure to succeed in the status game (de Carvalho and Neumann 2015). There are different ways in which states can act in this status game. To better cope with the complex setting of foreign policy and international relations, I will focus on a small, but important and slightly forgotten part of how states react to events and actions within the field of international relations.

The main preordinations of states are to avoid invasion, annihilation, and economic collapse, but for most states, these negative interests will not restrict the state's other wishes and interests. There will be a wide range of potential goals and values that states can pursue in a variety of policy arenas. "Interests are not just out there waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction" (Finnemore 1996, 2). Domestic politics can play a large role in defining a nation's goals and interests, but as is indicated by Finnemore, interests are to a large extent formulated on the basis of interaction on a supranational level, rather than at the local level conditions cannot explain many of the interests articulated and policy choices made. State interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate. National interests are often not the result of external threats or demands by domestic groups, but rather shaped by internationally shared norms and values (Finnemore 1996, 2).

In the realm of international politics each nation must find a niche which is their comparative advantage. In economic terms it means this means having the ability to carry out a particular economic activity more efficiently than others. In political terms, it means to find something that can give an advantage, but in this case the "product" are policy or politics. Norway has several comparative advantages which promote the state's ability to engage in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes. First and foremost, Norway has the *resources*, both in terms of richness, but also the lack of fear to invest on a more long term basis. Secondly, there is the *perceived lack of interests* and *track record*. Historically, Norway does not have a colonial past, which could have undermined and interfered in the process of peace making. More recently, Norway has won the reputation as "the helpful fixer". The fact that Norway is not a member of the European Union (EU) can also be regarded as an advantage in some cases, because Norway is not obligated to fulfill the responsibilities of EU membership. And maybe the most apparent fact, Norway can engage discreetly with armed actors who may be proscribed by the EU as terrorists. In international relations Norway is also considered to be patient and a consensus builder. Finally, their strategic position geographically and their relationship with the United States is considered to be of great benefits (Whitfield 2007, 50-52). These "advantages" provide a comparative advantage and a broad international legitimacy (Tørres 2007, 31).

Status seeking and national interest, as I will argue for in this thesis, are all important aspects of foreign policies and state behavior in the international community. Choices states make in the

international realm are grounded in the interest of improving their international standing and gaining recognition. Studies on status seeking and international standing often focus on big states and great powers, but if we see status as a hierarchy, it is important to focus not just on the highest-ranking powers, but also those at lower levels, like Norway (Finnemore 1996, 2).

This leads to my research question:

(1) To what degree is condemnation used as either a political tool or a morality statement? (2) And to what degree are such patterns similar or different across Norwegian governments between 1995 and 2017?

1.1 Scope

The scope of this thesis will deal with the soft-power dimension of Norwegian foreign policy, more specifically condemnation. In earlier research there has been done a lot of research on hard power (Finnemore 1996, 2; Friman 2015), but more focus is needed on soft power (Finnemore 1996, 3; Friman 2015). Therefore, this thesis is concerned with condemnation (soft power), as opposed to sanctions or military invasion (hard power). Condemnation is a type of public diplomacy, which Joseph Nye (2009) mention as one of many official instruments when it comes to soft power.

A thorough explanation of the term "condemnation" follows in the literature review, but summarized, this thesis looks at condemnation as *to express strong disgust to an action or incident*. For a statement to be considered as a condemnation, the word "condemn" or condemnation must be explicitly used. This thesis cannot say anything about actions and incident that are not condemned, because the data that I have had access to only show who, what and where actions has been condemned in the period being analyzed.

I will only look at condemnations given by the Norwegian government's representatives which has something to do regarding foreign policy issues. Therefore, in this thesis I will not look at what other party leaders say, or other representatives of the Norwegian government for that matter. I will focus on official press releases issued by representatives from the Prime Minister's

Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹. Concerning the time dimension, I will look at condemnations issued by Norway in foreign policy matters during the period 1995-2017. The data set I will use as basis for my data collection for the analysis is made by Professor Tor Midtbø² and the start date for the data collection is January 1, 1995 and ends June 1, 2017. The data go back to 1995, because that was how far the readable data went and the data collection ended in 2017. For practical reasons and for the sake of the way the data collection has been done I will also have cut-off points on June 1, 2017 to avoid errors. In addition, in parts of the analysis I will remove 1995 and 2017 to avoid errors in the analysis. Because it doesn't exist any kind of database over Norwegian condemnations, I have to create the data set from scratch.

I chose to look at official press releases. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all condemnations are given officially in this way, but also now also on Social media. Condemnations can also occur orally, but for the sake of the scope of the thesis, I have chosen to focus on the channel that is officially used and which is valid throughout the whole period. Politics is not performed in a vacuum and how politics are implemented and how politicians behave is influenced by a number of factors. I do not see condemnations coming verbally or through other channels. In this thesis, it will be focused on uncovering and mapping tendencies, rather than attempting to draw conclusions and generalize.

1.2 Why study soft-power and condemnation?

When a condemnation has been given from a Norwegian official it often finds its way to the news media, and it reaches out to all kinds of people in our community, and not just politicians and scholars in the field of international relations. Therefore, this is a phenomenon that should be explored more because it is something we are exposed to in our everyday life. An important distinction to make is the difference between hard power and soft power. In earlier research focus has been placed in a larger degree on hard-power as opposed to soft-power (Biersteker 2015, Busby and Greenhill 2015, Evers 2017, Brzoska 2015). Power is one's ability to affect the behavior of others to get what one wants and there is basically three different ways to do

¹ Information from the Ministry of Foreign affairs provides validity. Due to sensitive information this cannot be attached.

² Received this on request.

this. Either by payment and coercion, which is called hard power, or by persuasion, which is called soft power (Nye 2009, 162; Friman 2015, 13-14). The type of shaming that is called condemnation, is first and foremost a soft-power can also be referred to as a type of rhetoric (Tjalve and Williams, 38). Rhetoric, in the vision of realism, is “either the concern of naïve idealists who attribute undue power onto words, or its significance is purely instrumental: rhetoric, however subtle or sophisticated, is more than the rationalization or masking of grand strategy determined by more fundamental interests” (Tjalve and Williams 2015, 38). Joseph Nye (2009) established the term smart power to counter the misperceptions that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy. He argues that it would be beneficial to combine the tools of both hard and soft power, and to use only one will usually prove inadequate (Wilson 2008). Condemnation is a type of public diplomacy, which Joseph Nye mentions as one of many official instruments when it comes to soft power (Nye 2009, 160).

There are some studies that investigate naming and shaming of human rights in international politics. Some studies examine and demonstrate the effectiveness of shaming policy on perpetrators (Brysk 1993, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Risse and Sikkink 1999, Krain 2012), others argue that there is a conditional effectiveness (Franklin 2008, Murdie and Bhasin 2011, Murdie and Davis 2012), and some argue that there are either none, little or negative effect (Bob 2005, Hafner-Burton 2008).

Still, there is a lack of research when it comes to the perspective of those who condemn/ naming and shaming by governments (Franklin 2015, 53). As I have tried to argue, more focus needs to be placed on soft-power and that's what I intend to do in this thesis. This thesis is concerned with condemnation (soft power), as opposed to sanctions and military intervention (hard power). What I am adding to all of this is more empirical research with another perspective on the use of shaming policy. I will investigate a country, through time and different governments. In Norwegian context, there has never been done any similar studies on the Norwegian use of shaming policy, and especially not condemnations.

1.3 Overview and how to answer the research question?

To answer the research question, I will use a combination of qualitative and quantitative method. Norwegian use of condemnation will be explained by analyzing and mapping who

condemns, what is condemned when it is condemned and whether one condemns alone or with others. I will go through every single official press release which contain condemnations. Based on this I will create a final product for further analysis that constitutes a data set of Norwegian condemnations given between 1995 and 2017.

The next two chapters will contain the thesis's literature review. Chapter 2 deals with the concept of condemnation, while Chapter 3 deals with theories of the relationship between national interests and morals, and small state status seeking. Chapter 2 and 3 will lay the foundation for the analysis and discussion in chapter 5 and conclusion in chapter 6. Data and method are explained thoroughly in chapter 4. Then chapter 5 follows, with a presentation of the results and discussion. In Chapter 6 I will finish up with some concluding remarks.

2. Politics of shame: Condemnations

“I strongly condemn”, “Never again” and “not on my watch” are typical phrases used by political leaders when an atrocity occurs (Krain 2012, 574). Condemnations and these type of rhetoric is considered as a weak response, and it is implemented in order not to seem paralyzed. There is no official list of different options in the real world. In diplomacy, however, some customs or codes when it comes to rhetoric have been established throughout the years. These codes are used mutually between countries and can say something about the perceived severity of the event. The same applies to physical measures, such as sanctions of various kinds or armed invasion, where one can move up or down on a ladder, based on the severity of the situation. Conceptualizing condemnation and shaming is difficult, because as H. Richard Friman (2015) state is that it is difficult to pin down what exactly the concept means. The concept in its purest sense, according to the dictionary, means to express strong opposition to an act or in religious context, to judge someone to eternal punishment.

In this chapter, I will go through the existing literature on condemnation that is relevant in this thesis. First in chapter 2.1 I will clarify how the term condemnation is understood in this thesis. In 2.2 I will go through studies done on politics of leverage and what role condemnation has had and in what situations condemnation is used.

2.1 The concept: Naming and Shaming

In this section I will go through the psychological aspects of the concept, then I will go into what conditions must be appropriate for naming and shaming policy to have some effect or impact. This section will include scholars from three of the field's formative theoretical traditions, mainly liberalism, constructivism and realism. In international politics and international theories (IR), as in other political theory, one can look at the world through different lenses. The two main theories are liberalism (idealism) and realism, and in-between we have constructivism (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). Can condemnations be conceptualized as merely a political tool and as means to an end, a tool to achieve something else? Or is it solely rooted in moral and ethics, and therefore a pure statement of morality and a way to express what is considered right and wrong? This section will include scholars from three of the field's formative theoretical traditions, mainly liberalism, constructivism and realism.

2.1.1 The psychology of condemnations

“We condemn, or we like to believe we condemn, on behalf of some larger moral principle” (Lamb 2003, 932).

Why do we bother to shame someone or something? Judging, shaming, denunciation and condemnation, are all words connected to shaming policy. Shaming is one among many different mechanisms of social influence that include “shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning, or dissonance derived from actions inconsistent with role and identity” (Johnston 2001, 499). Shaming and condemnation can be interpreted on two levels, individual level and state level, or micro and macro. Individual level describes the basic, core mechanisms behind condemnation, while state level tries to adapt these to an international level.

Constructivist literature have identified three mechanisms that can explain how shaming works. Lebovic and Voeten (2006) uses the term “social conformity”. The first mechanism is that shaming functions to discipline actors to follow the community norms. Second, shame may function as an individual's internal sanction where exposure can trigger feelings of guilt, anxiety and embarrassment. The third mechanism, identified by Lebovic and Voeten (2006) is that shaming may influence the actor's reputation (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 868). Reputation

may have different conceptions; the constructivists claim that reputation are not purely instrumental and how different actors regard one another has value as a goal in itself. While liberalists see reputation as a function of past behavior, meaning that how actors act in the future is based on their past (Busby and Greenhill, 109).

The concept of naming and shaming can be traced back to 1800s and can, in the most basic way, be described as: “the publication of the identity of a person or group that is culpable in some anti-social act in order to shame them into remorse”. Mainly, it is all about exposure and public humiliation and to generate remorse on the part of the offender (Friman 2015, 4). According to Mark Peters (2013), shaming is used as something that describes the public criticism of everything in the world that make us feel bad (Mark Peters 2013; Friman 2015, 3). His more serious view on the concept is that naming and shaming is often used to point out legitimately horrible behavior and actions (Mark Peters 2013). Hafner-Burton (2008) defines it almost in the same way and refer to shaming and as “public exposure of illegitimate goals and behavior. Busby and Greenhill (2015) support this definition and narrowly define shaming as public exposure (Busby and Greenhill 2015, 107).

On an individual level, Wertheimer (1998) claim that abstaining from judgement is not an option for human beings in general, it’s in our nature (Lamb 2003; Wertheimer 1998). Only agents can be condemned, for only agents can, in a strict sense, be punished. Sharon Lamb (2003) states that: “All condemning is a response to and aimed at something judged to be wrong” and he argues that condemnation is final and decisive, and the last word before action. Condemnation serves a social function, communicating to society that the condemned act is not acceptable. Wertheimer (1998) categorize condemnations into three categories, directive, attitudinal, and expressive. While directive condemnations mean to sentence some agent to suffer a punishment, the directive condemning is motivated by a hostile attitude that may exist where one lacks the will or power to punish. The attitudinal condemning may be more linguistic driven, it does not give direct punishments, but rather express and justify the hostile condemnatory attitude, which motivate directive condemning. In the way this thesis will be concerned with the attitudinal condemning. Still, the three categories are interlinked, and as Wertheimer puts it: “All condemning is a response to and aimed at something judged to be wrong, evil” (Wertheimer 1998, 491)

Public exposure and condemnation has a long history in international politics (Friman 2015, 5). Lebovic and Voeten(2006) claims, and refers to Krasner(1999), that governments may talk the talk when it comes to human rights and moral wrongdoings, but they do not “walk the walk” to inflict political damage on forging opponents, not to induce them to treat their citizens according to some universally accepted standard. In other words, condemnation can also be assaultive because we just want to see the agent suffer (Lamb 2003, 932). Public exposure of suffering can offer a form of deterrence to possible violators, and can give an expression of a boundary, and clarify that these acts will not be tolerated by the community (Nye 2009, 162). “Processes such as shaming and denunciations are not aimed at producing changing minds with logic, but on changing minds by isolating or embarrassing the target (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 14; Friman 2015,17). To condemn something and the concept of condemnation binds people in a society, domestic or international, together in a joint interpretation when a boundary has been crossed (Lamb 2003, 932).

William F. Schulz (2015) emphasizes the power and usefulness of public exposure as a means to change illegitimate behavior of the target state. In this sense, condemnation is the ‘means’ to change the targeted actor’s behavior. Schulz(2015) points out that shaming is insufficient for improving human rights in itself (Wertheimer 1998, 491). In the extension of this, Lebovic and Voeten (2006) has found through their examination of voting in UNCHR, that countries with “better rights records” would increase the sincerity of the shaming enterprise. If you as a country has ha good reputation regarding human rights, the contribution to shaming will carry more weight. As Schulz (2015) stated it is not enough in itself just to shame, it helps to have a good reputation.

Mark T. Nancen (2015) pointed out that naming and shaming as a strategy are a significant risk for both the named and the “namer”. Too much naming will lead to consequences such as less cooperation and conflict (Nance 2015, 126). Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) argue that the global institutionalization of human rights standards had created an institutional context that exerts independent social pressure on governments when they signed or ratified the treaties. Conceptualization of the phenomenon that is condemnation has two sides, first there is the definition of the concept. Second, is the conditions which must be present for shaming and condemnation to have an impact.

2.1.2 Conditions

Scholars have tried to map down the conditions necessary for shaming to have an effect in the international society. Hedley Bull ([1977] 2002, 13) notes that in any society, in order for rules to be effective, they need to be enforced and to be seen as legitimate and an international society of states “exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 2002; Lebovic and Voeten 2006; Friman 2015, 9; Risse and Sikink 1999). Legitimacy of rulers refer to the: “extent that members of the society accept them as valid or embrace the values implied or presupposed by the rules. (Friman 2015, 10). Human rights violators can be shamed because, as members of an international society, they share common understandings, references, and standards (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 869; Risse and Sikink 1999).

Busby and Greenhill (2015) argue that strength and weakness are relative, in the same way as power is relative. Some states and actors are in an absolute sense stronger than others, but most are strong or weak relative to each other. According to them weaker actors can pursue a variety of strategies to attempt to offset the myriad capabilities-related advantages possessed by more powerful counterparts. However, the strategic use of norms can be particularly attractive tools for weaker actors, because stronger actors’ traditional material capabilities offer them no special advantages or strong defenses against the tactical use of norms. They define weak actors as those who possess limited material wealth or military power relative to their targets (Busby and Greenhill, 107). Weaker actors often use the power of norms to enlist allies, shame, or intimidate opponents to get what they want. The strategic use of rhetoric by advocates is one strategy by which weak actors are able to exercise influence and induce states to embrace new policy commitments inspired by norms (Busby and Greenhill, 108). “Moreover, one would also assume that mechanisms of persuasion, naming and shaming are particularly effective with regard to stable democratic regimes given that respect for human right constitutes an institutionalized logic of appropriateness in such systems” (Risse, Ropp and Sikink 2013, 17).

Regarding human rights and human rights violations, Keck and Sikink (1999) suggest countries that “aspire to belong to a normative community of nations” that are “actively trying to raise their status” will prove most vulnerable to these socializing pressures” (Busby and Greenhill 2015, 111). Judith van Erp (2008) as an extension of that argument argues that: “while there are important ideational aspects to naming and shaming, the target also must experience

material consequences for having broken the agreement to begin with”, and for that actor to believe that there is a possibility to suffer any consequences the actor needs to believe as Risse and Ropp (2013) said: “[...] actually believe in the social validity of the norm”. The keyword is reputation and: “The more states and other actors care about their social reputation and thus want to be members of the international community in ‘good standing’, the more vulnerable they are to external naming and shaming, and thus to social mechanisms relying on the logics of arguing and appropriateness” (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Friman 2015, 20). The target for shaming needs to have the desire to be an acceptable member of a social group or a community, is defining characteristic of social vulnerability (Friman 2015, 21).

2.2 Different types of shaming

Previous section dealt with the concept of shaming and condemnation in general, in this section I will introduce existing literature on the field, by dividing into three categories, the first one being shaming and human rights, then shaming beyond human rights, and lastly shaming combination with hard power. In 2.3.1 I will present “naming and shaming” and human rights, this is where the field is most developed and where shaming-policy has been used the most. In 2.3.2 I will go beyond human rights, and look at research done on “naming and shaming” in other areas. Then, in 2.3.3 I will look more closely at what Nye (2009) and Wilson (2008) called smart power, where hard power and soft power are combined, often sanctions.

2.2.1 “Naming and Shaming” and Human rights

“The most commonly used weapon in the arsenal of human rights proponents is shaming the violating government through public criticism” James C. Franklin (2008).

Since the 1970s there has been an increase in the activity on the topic of human rights (Franklin 2008, 187). The most developed research field regarding shaming policy is the one concerning human rights and human rights violations. One of the most recognized work is the study done by Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in their book *Activists Beyond Borders* (1998). They note that the transnational abolitionist movement against slavery is one of many historical precursors to the modern-day mobilization in human rights campaign. They emphasize how these activist groups engage in the “mobilization of shame”, by using public exposure of noncompliance with human rights norms to mobilize support from other actors against the offending government, pressuring them to abandon their policies of violation (Schulz 2015). H.

Richard Friman (2015) and Ann Marie Clark (2013), refer to Alfred Zimmern's classical work *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* as offering one of the earliest reference to the "mobilization of shame" (Friman 2015, 5).

Kathrin Kinzelbach and Julian Lehman(1998) says that shaming can work as a megaphone to build up pressure from "above" and "below," and can be one of many mechanisms of human rights change. Research on the effectiveness of shaming mostly focuses on shaming by human rights NGOs or international organizations. Public exposure can lead to the targeted governments or actors to feel ashamed or at least cognizant about their standing in the international community (Schulz 2015). Kinzelbach and Lehman (1998) finds that shaming is most effective when domestic actors coordinate and cooperate with international actors, such as humanitarian organization or the UN. This is because international actors can "activate" state actors into joining the shaming or even employing other instruments of human rights diplomacy(Keck and Sikkink 1998).

James C. Franklin (2008) argues that naming and shaming countries for their violations on human rights is more effective on countries "with greater ties to the outside world," as they have "more to lose". While Matthew Krain (2012) argue that naming should force perpetrators to reduce the severity of these ongoing atrocities to shift the spotlight, save their reputation, reframe their identity, maintain international legitimacy and domestic viability, and ease pressure placed on them by states or international organizations (Krain 2012, 574). Gruffydd-Jones (2019) studies how the strategic use of international human rights pressure works in Authoritarian states. His study demonstrates that authoritarian regimes may be able to manipulate international human rights diplomacy to help them retain the support of their population while at the same time suppressing their human rights (Gruffydd-Jones 2019, 579).

2.2.2 "Naming and shaming" beyond human rights

Naming and shaming can move beyond human rights and has proven to be an effective tool in different sectors. The key phrase here is: "Damage to reputation" (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 868). "Damage to the reputations of states that ate publicly condemned can also spillover into markets" (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 686). What they mean by this quote is that damage to reputation can cause domestic legislature to change the incentives for investment, like granting

the most favored nation. Farber (2002) argues that investors infer from human rights protections that a government is willing to forego short-term power advantages in exchange for long-term benefits and hence that a rights-observant poses a smaller expropriation threat than a government known for violating the rights of its subject. Simmons (2000) shows in a study of international monetary affairs that competitive market forces punish states that renege on public legal commitments.

Virginia Haufler(2015) discusses naming and shaming as a mechanism used against corporations, and how the adoption of this strategy is linked to the reputational vulnerability of different firms. Even though this is about corporations it may have some transferable value to state behavior. “The vulnerability of corporations to naming and shaming strategies by activists will only increase in future years”. The vulnerability of companies to naming and shaming hinges on the degree to which their reputation – their name or brand – is important to their ability to sell to consumers or commercial buyers (Haufler 2015,199).

2.2.3 Naming, shaming and sanctions

Shaming might not always be enough alone, and needs to be followed by further sanctions (some actors might perceive shaming as sanction enough³). “State and non-state actors turning to combinations of public identification and condemnation of normative noncompliance and threats and implementation of material sanction to try to influence target behavior have become a prominent dimension of international politics” (Friman s 201). International actors have potentially three policy instruments: the public identification of non-compliant behavior(signaling), public condemnation of such behavior(shaming) and material sanction (Friman 2015, 203). “Naming” refers to the public identification of actors, and “stigmatization” to the public condemnation of their noncompliant behavior (Friman 2015, 207). Thomas Biersteker (2015) Stigmatization can have one of two purposes: first, to embarrass the target into changing its behavior; or second, if the target is deemed highly unlikely to change, to isolate the target to the fullest extent possible (Biersteker 2015, 167).

The consequences of naming, stigmatizing, or shaming may be more than merely psychological. There is fair amount of evidence from our targeted sanctions research to indicate

³ See chap xx on shame as sanction

that being aimed at, stigmatized, and sometimes being shamed has some significant material consequences, not only in the cases of individuals whose assets are frozen but also in regimes that have greater difficulty achieving their goals.

By combining hard-power and soft-power

2.3 Summary

In this chapter I have laid the theoretical foundation for understanding the phenomenon and concept that is condemnation.

First I went through the basic psychology behind condemnation, then I presented different scholars view on what conditions that had to be present for shaming and condemnation to work successfully.

Then I gave an overview over different types of shaming, focusing on the field on human rights because this is the most developed part of the field that is shaming policy. But I also presented the research that has been done beyond human rights, how it can be used to affect corporations and how they behave.

Finally, I went into smart power and the combination of shaming and mainly sanctions.

3. National interests, morality and status seeking in international politics

The previous chapter presented the concept of condemnation, as well as how it is used and has been used, and how it works in combination with sanctions. But what is the connection between national interests, morality, condemnation and status seeking - and why is this interesting in the Norwegian case? Before I can address the question on how Norway uses condemnation, I must address the key factors that drives the foreign policy in general. What makes states act as they do when it comes to foreign relations? Status seeking and national interests is maybe two of the

most important parts of foreign policies and international relations, because all states care how they are being seen by “the others”, namely other states and all states are bottom line selfish (Franklin 2015, 33).

This chapter will be structured as follows, in section 3.1 I will go through the Norwegian foreign policy history and how Norway ended up as “a peace nation”. In section 3.2, I will focus on national interest theories and then look at the relationship between national interests and morals in section 3.3. In section 3.4, I will go into what is called small state status seeking. The chapter ends with a summary and establishing the hypotheses of the thesis.

3.1 The Peace Nation

Ever since the 1990s, Norway has played an active role in peace work in conflicts around the world (Skånland 2010, 34; Leira 2012, 22; Lange et. al 2009, 8). The tradition is related to Norway being assigned the work of handing out the Nobel Peace Prize, and that Norway have had two the Peace Prize winners Fridtjof Nansen in 1922 and Christian L. Lange. The two peace prize awards can be used to justify a peace tradition (Lange. Et. al. 2009,16; Skånland 2010, 36). Skånland (2010) looks at how Norway has ended up in this situation and how the term peace has become such a natural part of Norwegian foreign policy (Skånland 2010, 34). In this section I will show how and why Norway has gained (or given) the status as a peace nation. It provides the basis for explaining the use of political tools such as condemnation. Former prime minister Kjell Magne Bondevik contributed largely to establishing peace as one of the most important and central characteristics of Norway and Norwegian foreign policy. By drawing lines between the Norwegian Christian cultural heritage, Fritjof Nansen and the historical humanitarian heritage. He introduced the concept that “Norway is a peace nation” during his New Year Address on January 1st, 2000:

Norway must be a nation of charity and solidarity. Let us follow in the footsteps of Fridtjof Nansen through faithful efforts for refugees and suffering people in other countries (...) Norway must be a peace nation – an actor for conflict resolution and peace creating efforts. (...) I wish that our capital will appear as an international peace city. If we are remembered as a peace nation, Norwegians have reason to be proud. (Bondevik 2000, Skånland 2010)

Norway's way towards this hallmark can be traced back to the moment of September 13th, 1993, in front of the White House, when Yasser Arafat and Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shook hands can be considered the start of Norway's path to becoming a peace nation. Nevertheless, in several historical studies one can find that Norway has had a tradition of peace ever since 1890, so "Peace" as a concept in Norway has deep roots (Skånland 2010, 36). Skånland (2010) points to the period 1993-2003 as the period when the peace nation concept was really established and consolidated. Furthermore, the peace portfolio grew with issues such as efforts in the Middle East, Guatemala, Cyprus, Haiti, Mali, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Guatemala. In addition to other peace-promoting work in Europe and Eurasia through the OSCE (Skånland 2010, 37).

The Norwegian peace tradition can be said to be traced back to the establishment of an independent state in 1905 (Leira 2015, 22-23). Some might argue that it moves even further back in time (Lange et. al. 2009, 14). Main elements of this tradition have been central to Norwegian foreign policy debate throughout much of the twentieth century, and have been important parts of Norwegian foreign policy self-understanding. But the very notion of Norway as a particularly peace-minded nation seems primarily to belong to the post-Cold War period (Lange et. al. 2009, 12-13). The Norwegian approach ("the Norwegian model") was eventually established as a concept that explained how Norway could succeed as they apparently did in the peace work (Skånland 2010, s 39; Lange et. al 2009, 11). The model consisted of 4 points, or columns, that reflects what I presented as Norway's comparative advantages:

- (1) Small-state benefits and lack of colonial history, great-power interests and the power to push other actors.
- (2) The close cooperation between Norwegian authorities, NGOs and academic institutions, so that the authorities could benefit from the flexibility, experience and contacts of non-state actors in the conflict areas.
- (3) Close contact and trust of between the political parties.
- (4) The fact that the Norwegian model has a long-term perspective, combined with assistance and financial support for reconstruction (Skånland 2010, 39).

Norway is considered to be state without special interests, and could achieve more than states with strong self-interests. It has led to a special commitment to acting as a broker and assistant (Lange et. al. 2009, 14). Norway's willingness to participate actively in binding international

cooperation during the interwar period marks another turning point in Norwegian politics. Primarily the Western-oriented organizations that emerged may have contributed to limiting Norwegian freedom of action in international issues. This applied, for example, to the question of colonial development, where Norway took greater account of its western allies than would otherwise have been the case (Skånland 2009, Tørres 2007; Whitfeld 2007).

The Cold war and the end of it made a lot of changes to the international community and the framework for international politics (Skånland 2009, 2010; Wilson 2008; Slaughter 1995; de Carvalho and Neumann 2015). Norwegian foreign policy after the Cold War has been characterized by a stronger self-image and a higher level of ambition than before. Changing governments have emphasized that Norway is not only a small state, but also a country with rich resources and a historical tradition that offers significant opportunities for international influence. This period can be considered as a turning point for Norwegian foreign policy, where one saw a change in rhetoric and politics, and Norwegian governments have since then regarded Norway as a nation of peace and underlined Norway's opportunities and duty to play a global role (Lange et. al. 2009, 9). At the same time, a continuity with the foundations of economic and security policy interests as well as of ideological preferences and fundamental notions of the dynamics of the international system were observed (Lange et. al. 2009, 7).

The message has been given a slightly different design through different governments, and all governments have not been as clear in their speech. However, as of Kjell Magne Bondevik's first government, this self-understanding has been quite unambiguous. Jens Stoltenberg's second government, led by Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, has formulated the new policy with great systematics, and with considerable intellectual power. In a lecture at the Nobel Peace Center in April 2006, Støre reviewed the Norwegian effort to promote a world less marked by war and conflict. Støre then stated that the government would increase efforts to make the UN a tool for a more peaceful and fair development, and that Norway should strengthen its efforts for human rights, peace and reconciliation in conflict areas. In addition, Norway should occupy a leading position in the fight for a better global environment (Skånland 2010).

However, in other contexts, Støre has emphasized that these global commitments do not imply that the Government of Stoltenberg will ignore clear Norwegian self-interests. He has emphasized that both clear elements of self-interest in the global engagement lie, and that these measures cannot be borne by Norwegian interests in the near areas. According to Støre and

other similar statements to judge, central Norwegian politicians also see no contradiction between idealism and real-political assessments. Idealism is a real political necessity (Skånland 2010,10).

The meaning of peace promotion thus seemed to change. An instrumentalist self-interest perspective began to gain ground, and the engagement became increasingly related to Norwegian interests unrelated to peace (Skånland 2010, 40). There is a thought that self-interest and altruism go well together (Lange 2009, 20). Where aid and peace work are initially focused on altruism, solidarity, charity and the moral duty to help are combined with motivation based on self-interest. This explanation can be exemplified by a quote from former State Secretary Jan Egeland from 1995 "A trump card is Norway's success as peace mediator in several international conflicts. We can exchange information on the international market if we are perceived as interesting. Our status is for example the middle east enables us to meet on a higher level and in more comprehensive talks. They are interested in our assessments. This way we can get more information back that is important to Norway" (Skånland 2010).

The Norwegian media focus and the discourse that dominated much of the 2000s show a perception of the Norwegian peacekeeping policy which is exclusively positive and successful. This largely contributed to the Norwegian approach being unique and well-functioning (p. 41). According to Skånland (2010), this notion received much criticism, among other things for having lost focus on national interests. Some of the criticisms were that self-interest and altruism cannot work together, they are incompatible. While the other part concerned, the practice was not related to the concepts of peace nation and humanitarian great power. An illustrative example is the Iraq war in 2003, where Norway as a peace nation should have broken with the United States, and taken an anti-war standpoint. The recognition Norway received through its efforts in the Middle East, and elsewhere, built up a perception of Norway as a nation of peace. Nevertheless, one can see that real politics and idealism with different accounts give radical different perceptions of foreign policy and the motivation behind (Skånland 2010, 42).

Norway has a comparative advantage in a broad legitimacy internationally and not least in several countries in the south. Such legitimacy is related to history and lack of past as colonial power that has allowed few to question our international engagement and whether our interests are related to self-interest or altruism and solidarity and not self-interest (Tørres 2007, 31). The

engagement was considered as ‘Norway’s best foreign policy niche product’ (Larsen, 2002), and said to give Norway status and ‘considerable political capital’ (Matlary, 1999, Skånland 40).

Foreign policy must safeguard the interests that are not easily changed over time, although the definition of national interests will vary with changes in the political dominance and leadership. Foreign policy also reflects notions of values and moral obligations, which may be as lasting as the consideration of material interests (Lange, Pharo and Østerud 2009, 25). There is considerable continuity in Norwegian foreign policy with regard to binding international cooperation, attempts at mediation and other peace-promoting measures (Lange, Pharo and Østerud 2009, 26).

3.2 National interests in foreign policy

“In its simplest form, the national interest is the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment” (Nuchterlein 1976, 247).

National interests are an important feature both in domestic policy, but not least in foreign policy. The concept of national interests is as old as the study of international relations (Nyhamar 2007, 72; Nuchterlein 1976, Glanville 2005). According to Tore Nyhamar (2007), it can be regarded as an objective concept without clear content. Much of international politics is about defining rather than defending national interests. Neorealists and neoliberalists make parsimonious assumptions about what all states want. States are assumed to be some combination of power, security and wealth. Interests are not just out there waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction (Finnemore 1996, 1).

Interests can be understood in several ways and Nyhamar (2007) mentions two, the first is to map the population's wishes and how it ranks the different conceivable outcomes. The modern, subjective concept of interest understands interests as preferences over outcomes. Then the player chooses the outcome that gives the highest benefit. The notion of national interests, on the other hand, is not based directly on what the population wants, but says that the interests have an element of objectivity: "Realism is the key concept of interest as an objective category

which is universally valid, but does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all” – Morgenthau (Nyhamar 2007, 72). The national interest is one of the favorite concepts in political realism because it is close to the concept of national security. Nevertheless, they embrace more than national security.

The concept of interest can be narrowed down to what Oppenheim (1987) called “welfare goals”. Agent A, e.g. a person, a group or a nation, has interest in doing action x. In the context of this thesis, if a nation does x this action will promote A’s material advantage and preference of whatever kind. “Interest” refer to not only economic goods, but also to material advantage in a broader sense, such as security – personal, social, or national (Oppenheim 1987, 370). “Foreign policy x is in the national interest of state A, means that the policy is in the self-interest of A; that is, that it helps to protect nation A’s security, and that it promotes the interests of some other country or some cause only as far as consistent with A’s own national interest” (Oppenheim 1987, 371). Treating the state as an actor is done for analytical purpose, and the state must be viewed as the dominant actor in international politics (Oppenheim 1987, 371; Beer and Hariman 1996, 3).

George Kennan formulated that: "The interests of the national community which the State must promote, is basically the state's military security, the autonomy of the state's political life and welfare of the citizens (Nyhamar 2007, 72). Realism is the belief that international relations is mainly about the interaction of independent states acting as self-sufficient powers in their own interest (Friman 2015). National interest is presumed to be obvious and uncontested. The question is what is the correct strategy to achieve it. International anarchy is the argument that whereas within states a government with sovereign power enforces some degree of law and order, the international system is characterized by anarchy and violence. Among nations there is no rule of law; only power matters (Kinszelbach and Lehman 2015). Military power matters most and balance of power is the best hope for peace, since governments will be less prone to war if their power is balanced by the power of rivals (Mearsheimer 2014). Peace was thus essential as part of Norway’s core identity and self-image, and tradition and continuity were discursively constructed (Skånland 2010, 41).

Leira (2012) on the other hand state that there are clear distinctions in foreign policy regarding basic philosophy, but they do not coincide with the differences we find in domestic policy. Liberalism and conservatism (realism), which can go relatively well together domestically, is

in a contradiction in foreign policy (Leira 2012). In realistic foreign policy philosophy, there is a fundamental distinction between domestic and foreign policy, where peaceful development is possible within state boundaries, it is considered unlikely that the world at large can become a fundamentally better place. The key players in this perspective are the states, which exist in a self-help system and are primarily concerned with survival. Thus, domestic governance is perceived as at best secondary; a state is a state is a state, and sovereignty is the state's main characteristic (Leira 2012).

Liberal foreign policy philosophy has, for its part, been developed in response to real-life thinking and practice (cf. Taylor 1957), and is even more heterogeneous than realistic philosophy. Unlike realism, liberalism sees domestic politics and foreign policy as differential degrees, not essentially different. Thus, development towards a better world is both possible and probable. Liberalism also operates with many different actors, where realism views states as the central units. Liberal theorists are concerned with individuals, both as trading agents and as moral subjects, and they believe that popular control of foreign policy will guide it in a peaceful direction. Where realism sees recurring conflict and a system where someone loses when others win, liberalism sees basic common interests and opportunities for everyone to improve their position (Leira 2012).

This brief comparison should show clearly that a consistent liberal conservative foreign policy is difficult to formulate at a philosophical-theoretical level; It is not easy to combine development optimism with developmental pessimism, to highlight both state sovereignty and human rights / democracy or to emphasize self-reliance and relative gains while promoting cooperation and absolute gains. However, the political process, with its compromises and mixed motives, makes concrete policies different from clear philosophical grounds (Leira 2012). This leads to the next section which is about the relationship/connection between national interests and morality, which is particularly important regarding the Norwegian case. Because moral and ethics are one of the main drivers of peace and reconciliation.

3.3 National interests and morality

“One can compromise on the national interest, but one cannot compromise on principles”
Morgenthau 1949

Some might say that realism is politics as it is while liberalism is an example of politics idealized (Nolt 2016). The emergence of realism is to criticize idealists who “focused much of their attention on understanding the cause of war to find a remedy for its existence”. Idealists argued that every state prefers to live in coexistence and peace as well as to cooperate with others to pursue their common interests. For realists, such a view is no more than a wishful thinking (Manan 2017, 177).

3.2.1 Theoretical framework for understanding the relationship national interests and moral

Luke Glanville (2005) had a good way of describing what “National Interests” really mean: “National interest has been used not only to explain state behavior, but to justify, recommend and admonish behavior”, or said in other words interests constitute some kind of justification or explanation for acting (Glanville 2005, 33; Tjalve and Williams 2015, 42). Meaning that states might use it to argue and justify actions and choices they make, and this is where one finds the relationship between morality and national interests. If states argue that they did what they did because it was in the interest of their nation it is hard for other actors in the international community to argue against it.

Jannika Brostrom (2016) tries to establish a framework for understanding morality and national interests in foreign policy, based on review of three classic scientists within realism. She argues that for analytical purposes, morality can be linked to the concept of power, rather than being explicit or just normative (Brostrom 2016, ;Rosato 2003, 586). Brostrom (2016) claims that the variability of morality makes defining it difficult, but she view morality as those acts perceived by agents to be right or good. International relations scholars interested in morality have recently turned their attention to the way in which early classical realists understood the national interest (Kilder). The role of morality in classical realist conceptions of the national interests (Brostrom 2016, 1624).

Neoclassical realists and the English school contributions that have dealt with this issue tend to emphasize the inherent rationality of normative theorizing as the most appropriate space for morality. They propose that, since state interests fall within the domain of rational choice, the more abstract and subjective concept of morality belongs in a separate sphere. Here, two problems emerge: First, many have come to confuse morality with norms, and second, how

does this help us understand state behavior? Their proposal comes short by explaining why states do as they do regarding foreign policy (Brostrom 2016, 1624-1625). She is concerned with the effects of actions claimed to be moral, not in using moral properties as prescriptions for policy. She argues that there is possible to treat morality as instrumental. This argument can be traced back to the work on the relationship between morality and power by Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan (Brostrom 2016, 38; Tjalve and Williams 2015, 41).

Niebuhr and Morgenthau share the same view about the objective content of the national interest. But while Morgenthau saw national interest in a purely realistic manner and as a normative, Niebuhr rejected this notion and argued that it was not an either or question (Glanville 2005, 34; Brostrom 2006; Kennan 1985, Manan 2017, Tjalve and Williams 2015).

Based on the work done by these three scholars, Brostrom (2016) identify three factors that might be useful in assessing state foreign policy choices. These three factors can be seen as the logical outgrowth of key themes focused upon by all three classical realists. This can be called a 'moral realist' framework. This framework incorporates expectations of reciprocity in state-state cooperation, the importance of rational choice and the outcomes of moral action(s.1625).

Constructivists generally understand morality as part of a political community's normative agenda, linked to identity and ideas. Given this, norms and interests are mutually constituted, and hence also inter-subjective. Contrary, various liberal thinkers characterize moral forces effectively as ends in themselves. Thus, they require a deontological methodology to explain policy learning and epistemic community building. The English school, meanwhile, remains split on the issue. English school thinkers have generally prioritized a normative approach to determine where morality fits in world politics (Brostrom 2016, 1626). Hedley Bull referred in the *anarchical society* to the causal force of norms as factors that create the laws and institutions of international society and that functions as fluid evolutionary variable guiding state behavior. Bull came to see norms as simpler forces with no inherent motivational properties, which only assisted in the maintenance of anarchical order. Thus, norms were a product of anarchy, not independent variable that could be employed in causal analysis (Bull 1977, Brostrom 2016, 1626).

This is where morality, constituted primarily by ideas, has been major point of difference between realism and the solidarist perspectives emanating from the English school. Because claims that derive from assumptions about morals, ethics and ideas are not always grounded in power and interests, the realist typically dismisses them as lacking explanatory utility. This is an overly simplistic view of the way realists have attempted to conceptualize such factors (Brostrom 2016, 1626).

Reflexivists have viewed causality as a matter of construction. In the latter view, any effect A has on B was already comprehended within the cause of A, because A had within it the power to produce B, then B would be in A (Rosato 2003; Brostrom 2016, 1626). To side-step this, reflexivists scholars contend that it is feasible to argue for morality as part of the conditions to create society. Grounded in the principles of atomism, reflexivists argue that morality cannot be inferred as part of the society of states without first establishing the conditions under which it might operate. Such arguments are flawed. They are based on the error of stating that a situation exists alongside the ideal conditions or circumstances under which it should exist (Brostrom 2016, 1626). In contrast, the central claim of classical realism relative to morality is that it exists whether the individual is conscious of it or not. But even neoclassical realists have recently begun to categorize morality normatively, viewing it separately from interests (and yet nonetheless as a factor that shapes them). Hence the ideas, beliefs and perceptions of states not only matter; they actually intervene in the domestic and international settings in which states articulate their foreign policy (Brostrom 2016, 1627).

According to the classical realists, Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan, morality did not produce causal chains of events whereby A causes B, and B causes C. Instead they argue that it could be understood through causal sequences. This is based on the idea that all reality can be observed as sequences of cause and effect (Brostrom 2016; Waltz 1988). Here, morality is considered as an interlinking event that attaches to the same variable (self-interest), rather than being part of a transformative chain where multiple variables are responsible for the overall result. At the same time, they also understood that the placement of moral considerations into a separate analytical space to those of interests might not adequately capture how the two can interact. According to Brostrom, therefore, Morgenthau was careful to include morality as a motivational force associated with the qualitative components of national power. He said that "a foreign policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign policy inspired by universal moral principles" (Brostrom 2016, 1627).

The common position between both classical and neoclassical realists here is that material forces shape both morality and interests. This is embodied in the argument advanced by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, which is that ideas tend to change when material conditions do (Brostrom 2016, 1628). Although norms help determine how individual form coalitions at the domestic level, they cannot themselves have a determining influence on foreign policy outcomes. The process is a transformative one in which social order is not exclusively determined by material or normative forces.

Classical realists thus argued that the relationship between interests(A) and morality(B) could only be understood by examining the moral and material outcomes that flowed from A. In contrast, rationalists merely state that A (interest) is not B (morality). This represents both the main methodological and theoretical problem with the rationalist thesis. In arguing for the independent power of morality to explain how states ought to shape their foreign policy, rationalists must first argue for the existence of empirical facts in order to justify the use of cause-and-effect analysis (s.1628).

Niebuhr saw Judeo-Christian ethics as a way to moderate the pursuit of national interests privately felt that the highest expression of morality for rational beings “mutual love” – or acts of giving and receiving between parties of equal worth – Niebuhr recognized that this level of mutuality was unattainable in an international system composed of states with unequal material capabilities. This distinction also informed his views on the separation between individual and social morality, in which personal morality could not be identified within the selfishness of the group. A rational ethic seeks to bring the needs of others into equal consideration with those of the self (Brostrom 2016, 1628). Kennan saw the role of morality different than Niebuhr. For him morality in diplomacy and foreign policy was tied to the nations interests. He also argued that agents mattered in foreign policy decision-making because leaders tended to seek outcomes that they had filtered through the prism of their own moral choice. Morgenthau, meanwhile, was closer to Kennan than Nieburh in his skepticism about a leader’s ability to advocate a moral foreign policy divorced from his or her own ethical values.

Morgenthau emphasized the consequences of power on morality. He saw little room for a moral code operating above and outside the nation-state. He argued that morality was always a second-order factor in shaping foreign policy choices. He was criticized for advocating an

immoral or amoral foreign policy and for highlighting that moral factors are always at risk of being overruled in situations of necessity, with morality sacrificed for the preservation of the state (Brostrom 2016, 1628). Morgenthau and Niebuhr agreed on the importance of reciprocity in foreign policy given the constraints of what we understand today as strategic interdependence. Democracy is good because it is moral, and it is moral because it is good (Brostrom 2016, 1630). There are three factors that might be useful in assessing state foreign policy choices. These are reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes.

3.2.2 Reciprocity

“Sacred values are sacred because they reflect our ideas of the moral worth of individuals and the importance of certain relationships. Feelings about our worth as individuals are about what we can and should expect from other people are grounded not only in social practices but in individual development within the culture” (Lamb 2003, 933). Mutual respect and trust ensure that conflict of interests is resolved amicably (Rosato 2003, 586).

Classical realists saw it as the factor that connected morality to interests. Morgenthau and Niebuhr pointed out that foreign policy is often constructed upon expectations of reciprocity at either the bilateral or multilateral levels of diplomacy. For these scholars, understanding the notion of reciprocity begins with consideration of the other (Shultz 2015, 33), that are tied to the basic classical realist assumption of individuals being both rational and social. Sartre said in 1966 that: “all of a sudden I am conscious of myself... in that I have foundation outside myself. I am for myself only as I am a pure reference to the Other”. The only way we truly know that we exist is because we are seen by someone else, the Other as Sartre referred to (Shultz 2015, 33). This has a transfer value to how the international community works and, as mentioned, is one of the most important conditions for condemnations to work.

Human nature is primarily defined by the will to use self-interest as the key motivator for action. Yet, this struggle for power does not occur in isolation. Individuals are still motivated by the desire to advance their own interests first, but in tying morality to the means involved in the will to power, there is limited room for progress through human rationality. Niebuhr saw morality as being connected to a broadening of the national interest that included an appreciation for the interests of other nations (Brostrom 2016, 1632). He also asserts that neither utopian idealism nor realist moral cynicism accurately reflects human nature (Glanville 2005, 34). A nation’s moral commitment to foreign aid, for example, brings with it economic

advantages that are primarily to the national interest. This means that both moral and material considerations that inform these two sets of foreign policy goals are explicitly linked; separating them for methodological convenience is incorrect (Brostrom 2016, 1632). Niebuhr once stated that: ‘An individual may sacrifice his own interests, either without hope of reward or in the hope of an ultimate compensation. But how is an individual, who is responsible for the interest of his group, to justify the sacrifice of interests other than his own?’⁴.

Reciprocity in this instance only requires that individuals develop a certain standard of behavior that they would then have applied to themselves. In the realm of international relations, this does not imply consent: it only implies the rational capacity of states to seek common ground on what course of action might be of mutual benefit. When expectations of reciprocity are combined with the classical realist circumstances – it is possible that states can gain more if they adopt reciprocity as part of a moral foreign policy approach (Brostrom 2016, 1632). According to both Niebuhr and Morgenthau, giving aid is a political act, deriving from the national interest (Brostrom 2016, 1633).

3.2.3 Rational Choice

Brostrom (2016) moves further to the notion that morality is contingent on the effects of reasoned action informs the second key assumption of a moral realist approach, or rephrased, rational choice. Rational and rational choice denotes behavior that is appropriate to achieve a specified goal in a given situation. “Given any goal an agent might adopt, it is in principle possible to ascertain whether or not a certain course of action is rational with respect to that goal” (Oppenheim 1987, 371).

Niebuhr argued that a consideration of mutual interests in foreign policy reflected the surest conception of morality in state decision-making, but that the necessity of self-interest and the limits of human rationality prevent morality from being universally realized. Political actors have a distinct moral obligation to act rationally that goes well beyond their own simple moral duty; to act: in accordance with the rules of political art. In other words, they should act in accordance with national interests. In the context of foreign policy and shaming policy, the act of condemning might be as Oppenheim said: “too difficult or too costly or too painful to

⁴ This refers to what I said earlier regarding justification of what is right and wrong.

perform that act” (Oppenheim 1987, 372). The act might not be rational for the state to implement. Foreign policy must first be defined in strategic or economic terms: a policy determined solely by moral principles is “a policy of national suicide”, because it makes the transformation of the international society the primary goal over the fulfilment of the national interest (Brostrom 2016, 1633). According to Oppenheim (1987), national security is a practically unavoidable foreign policy goal. “The borderline between feasible alternatives, on one hand, and either practically ineligible or practically unavoidable courses of action, on the other, is fluid and depends on the concrete situation, including the actor’s basic preferences. It is not always possible to decide at what point the opportunity costs become so high or the risks so great as to render a contemplated course of action practically impossible or necessary” (Oppenheim 1987, 372).

Morgenthau argued that universal moral principles do exist, but correctly pointed out that these cannot be applied to the behavior of states as a form of abstract universalism. Because expectations of reciprocity are not universally realized by all states at all time, they cannot be viewed causally and they independently drive state behavior (Brostrom 2016,1633). To achieve a goal, one have to make decisions that might have conflicting moral point of view, moral in the perspective of Western liberal democracy (Oppenheim 1987, 373). Glanville (2005) argue that for Morgenthau, the national interest is both logically deductive and normative. Morgenthau and Niebuhr agreed that material capabilities such as the exercise of military power, are ineffective when unsupported by a strong moral and political base. Nuebuhr and Morgenthau do also agree in recognizing that states are responsible to their constituency and that concern for their welfare must influence policy formation, and therefore “individual morality may be judged willingness of the individual to sacrifice their own self-interest to that of their neighbor” (Glanville 2005, 34). George Kennan’s views on morality help establish the limits of reciprocity (Glanville 2005; Brostrom 2016, 1634). The benefits achieved from engaging in moral action are therefore often long term rather than transient. It also the case that the expected returns from this cost – benefit calculation may not always be provided by the recipient and this can be described as indirect reciprocity, where second-order factors such as prestige can enhance the function of a state’s recourses. Oppenheim (1987) does state that he does not agree that it must always be rational to be moral: “The choice of a course of action meeting all the criteria of rationality may be considered immoral”.

This is particularly visible in the creation of alliance networks, where individual states realize that they can stand to benefit by trading off asymmetrical wants for more lasting security. Thus, when expectations of reciprocity are included in the rational choices of states they can bring coherence to domestic debates and assist elites to sift good policy decisions from bad ones. Consistency and coherency in foreign policy reduce the risk of miscalculation and increase the likelihood of obtaining a greater material gain (Brostrom 2016, 1635).

3.2.4 Moral and material outcomes

It is insufficient, however, for a moral realist framework to only describe the expectations of actors and the means in which they operate. Any useful framework for foreign policy analysis must take into consideration the outcomes (Brostrom 2016, 1635). The potential for both moral and material outcomes that stem from policy choices. There is a hierarchy of moral decisions a state can make, and any evaluation of moral consequences is inevitable the result of the lesser of two policy evils. For example, Meghan Shannon et. al (2015) explore what drives states in the international community to react to coups. Their theory differentiates between normative concerns, such as protection of democracy, and material interests, for example ensuring continued access to oil supplies. Because actions that is a threat to “Western values”⁵ in terms of democracy. To achieve a goal one might have make decisions that might have conflicting moral points of view, morality in the perspective of Western liberal democracy(Shannon 2015, 363).

Morality characterized by the results of foreign policy was preferred over an “ethic of conviction” because it properly accounts for the effect certain policy choices have on the others and counters again the type of moralizing they cautioned would lead to negative consequences for the national interest. In this way, this theme draws together the previous factors of reciprocity and rational choice in that a state’s expectation of achieving benefits in return for choosing a moral course of action is premised on what result such a policy is likely to produce in the first place (Brostrom 2016,1635).

It’s not always necessary for a state to be concerned with both its own position in the international system and with the position of others. A moral realist approach would thus

⁵ See Oppenheim 1987.

anticipate that when states choose foreign policies that are both moral and instrumental, they can sometimes stand to gain more than if they had acted out of altruism alone, or conversely from a desire to engender relative gains (Glanville 2005, 37). In the case of weak actors, for instance, the prospect of state failure can create further insecurities. Spillover effects of poverty, instability and political violence thus create both moral desires to ameliorate them, as well as strategic and economic interests in promoting stability (Brostrom 2016, 1635).

The emphasis on reciprocity, rational choice and policy outcomes fills an important gap in identifying how the classical realists theorized the role of morality through its connections to rational calculations of the national interest and expectations of moral benefits. Given that moral realism avoids universal conceptions of values determined by right and wrong, and accommodates the possibility of relative gains, it remains firmly embedded within the realist tradition (Brostrom 2016, 1635). A focus on reciprocity at the elite level, rational choice as the process of decision making and moral and material outcomes may well offer some assistance when looking for a way to explain why states sometimes seem to behave “morally”, while at other times they do not (Brostrom 2016, 1636).

“Given that the national interest is the only valuation standard practically available to statesmen, acting accordingly is to be characterized as rational, but right or wrong” (Oppenheim 1987, 378). Sometimes it might be rational to sacrifice “principles of common humanity” for the benefit of national interest in case of conflict (Oppenheim 1987, 382; Walt 1988, 616).

States exist and act together in the international community and they do all participate in the construction of their social environment and the shaping of its values and norms. Stripped down, ‘states choose whether or not to pursue moral goals or respect ethical constraints’. The classical realists are doing the right thing when stating that the absence of international government and self-interest (national interest) may have an impact on and constrain state choices. Still, one cannot deny reality and the importance of moral and ethics in political processes. Neither, anarchy or egoism requires an amoral foreign policy (Glanville 2005, 37).

3.4 International game of power: Small state status seeking

“It is of particular importance for the smaller states, when they see the need to engage in the strife of other states, to do so steadfastly and decisively. For them, honor and prestige are even more important for the greater powers”

– Ole Jacob Broch [1864](Leira 2015, 22)

How states behave and act in the international realm is grounded in the interest of getting a higher international standing and a good reputation⁶. Studies done on status seeking and international standing often focus on big states, but if we see status as a hierarchy, then it is important to focus not just on the highest-ranking powers, but also those at lower levels, like Norway. Usually, status seeking for small powers has different meanings for small powers than for great powers. Small powers suffer from status insecurity to an extent that established great powers do not, which makes the status game more important to them (Carvalho and Neumann 2015, 1-2).

Status is a key driver in the politics of small states in the everyday life of international society (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 1). For realism, the fundamental view is that state behave as they do to achieve power and recognition. The struggle for power arises just because human beings want things (Waltz 1988) and smaller states will usually align themselves to maximize their own security and freedom (Krasner 1992, 39). Norway, which is considered a small state and a small power in the international game of power, have had a different approach. Since the early 1990s, ‘Norway’ has been built up as an international brand name, as a particularly peace loving country, that eager to donate resources and with specific tasks in world politics. The branding takes place through the ‘engagement policy’ – the work for conflict resolution, peace, democracy, and human rights – around the world. The image of Norway as a moral and humanitarian great power has become a new national symbol in line with other symbols shaping Norwegians’ national identity (Skånland 2010, 44; Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 872).

Small states achieve status through making themselves useful to greater powers. Small power status is about being noticed or seen. Small states seek to be noticed and acknowledged by great powers by taking, an admittedly small part of, responsibility for matters of international peace and security. When a small state seeks status, the goal is not to be recognized as a great power, but to be acknowledged as a good power. Based on Hobbesian theories states strive to be feared,

⁶ As mentioned in last chapter.

for glory and for gain. Glory meaning something rather similar to status. Symptomatically, International relation scholars have paid close attention to the role of fear and gain, but rather less status. As State Secretary Jan Egeland once expressed:

“The Oslo Agreement, the Guatemala Agreements, and our efforts in South Africa, our efforts on Balkan, show that little Norway may play a role that the super powers cannot in a range of different situations, and we have played such a role the last four–five years, clearer than any other small nation, ever, I think, in world history” (Skånland 2010, 38).

Neumann and de Carvalho (2015) define status as the condition of filling a place in a social hierarchy. There has been an assumption in the field of International relations that status seeking was a concern more prevalent to great powers than to small states. Status may also be defined as: “Status is often employed to refer to standing. Standing refers to an actor’s position in a social hierarchy, and consequently what rights, respect and patterns of deference from others they should expect. It is in this sense of rank that we can speak of status as an uni-dimensional metric: e.g. an action increased Norway’s status, Norway has high status” (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 4).

In the literature one can identify several terms which overlap with status, Thomas Hobbes referred to glory, Max Weber talked about prestige, while Emile Durkheim used pride. Glory indicate religious language, and plays up aesthetics. The concept of prestige is perhaps more linked to specific situations and things than is that of status, although the two remain very close. Pride is usually used about individuals and minorities. Honor is used with reference to other individuals, typically aristocrats and soldiers or women in patriarchal societies, but it can also be used as national honor. Another term that overlaps status is ‘rank’, but this is often used about highly formalized hierarchies, and not informal hierarchies such as the one that exists between states (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 7).


Status seeking on the other hand refers to acts undertaken to maintain or better one’s placement. In case of nation states there exists a potential tension between an individual seeking status and the status of the state (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 7). Neumann and de Carvalho (2015) refers to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Carl von Ossietzky in 1935 and the Nobel prize in literature to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1970. They were rewarded for their work against the situation in their respective countries, Germany and the Soviet Union respectively. By giving status to the individuals, one also saw that this served as criticism and status-attenuating

for Germany and Soviet (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 5). This was in many ways the case when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Liu Xiaobo in 2010, the Chinese regime critic.

As stated earlier in this chapter, Norway rarely problematizes the idea to seek status for around a century after gaining state sovereignty in 1905. Things began to change when Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre launched the initiative to discuss Norwegian national interests in 2007, before this it was unusual to hear any discussions concerning this topic (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 6). In the Norwegian case status and power are two different things and the idea that Norway has interests and powers remains hotly contested. Emilé Durkheim once said that: “As long as there are states, so there will be national pride, and nothing can be warranted. But societies can have their pride, not in being the greatest or the wealthiest, but in being the most just, the best organized and in possessing the best moral constitution”. The issues singled out by Durkheim, namely justness, order and morality have become staples of Norwegian political debate, about status and otherwise (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 6).

Small states try to minimize the costs of conducting foreign policy by initiating more joint actions and by targeting multiple actors (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 8). Neo-realists, expect small states of similar size to pursue similar foreign policy. “In that sense, or focus on the status seeking of small states addresses one of the central concerns of neoclassical realism namely to explain how: ‘systemic pressure and incentives may shape the broad contours and general direction of foreign policy without being strong enough to determine the specific details of state behavior’ ” (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 9). Great powers have greater access to resources as well as moral authority. Small states, by contrast, have been understood as the opposite of great powers, having fewer recourses and less moral authority. Small states look for arenas where status may be achieved peacefully (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 12). Understanding status as an important driver of policy allows us to work beyond the distinction between values and interests (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 15).

Figur 3 A two-stage model of state behaviour



Source: (Moravcsik 1997, 545)

Figure 3 explain the different levels and different stages of state behavior. The state has both liberal features and realist features, which has an effect of the choices they make. Liberal factors indicate idealism and moral, while realist indicate strategic in accordance with national interests.

3.5 New government, New foreign policy direction?

In advance of the 2013 election, Halvard Leira (2012) try to predict the direction the possible blue-blue government will steer foreign policy. Since the Norwegian Progress Party had never been in government and that the Conservatives had not been in the lead on foreign policy issues a since the Cold War, laid a foundation for envisaging a foreign policy with a new direction. As I mentioned in section 3.1, since the Cold War, there has been a clear consensus in Norwegian foreign policy. *Foreign policy, is usually* divided between liberal and conservative(*realism*) thinking, which Leira (2012) when trying to predict the new direction of the Norwegian foreign policy divides into philosophical, strategic and tactical levels. This section will present Halvard Leiras argument.

3.5.1 Strategy

Whereas the philosophical level is about worldview, the strategic level is about overall political assessments and choices, such as alliance participation, membership in organizations and choice of priority areas. Realistic strategy is typically shaped by the philosophical emphasis of uncertainty and relative gains. In this perspective, alliances exist only until the common enemy is defeated, and international organizations are perceived as arenas for the strong states.

In liberalism, the belief in is the meaning of cooperation. Alliances can thus gain a self-weight which means that they live on even after playing out their original role, and international organizations can be independent actors. Overall, there are four traditional liberal strategies. The first variant is concerned with how democracies are more peaceful, at least in between, than other states. The second variant highlights the peacemaking characteristics of free trade and the idea of the state as passive in international politics. The third variant envisages development towards a world state, but has, in a more moderate form, emphasizing organizational building and development of international law. And finally, a fourth variant has been concerned with the trade-off between rich and poor states, and advocated redistribution at the "global level" (Leira 2012).

It is worth noting that it is quite possible to imagine that the conflicting foreign policy philosophies can lead to similar strategies. Assistance can serve as an example. Many liberal (but not pure free-trade liberals) believe that aid is an appropriate strategy to achieve a better world. On the other hand, realists can well defend aid from a neo-colonial logic; Assistance can be effective for establishing patron-client relationships and promoting own country's business sector (Leira 2012).

3.5.2 Tactics

Foreign policy tactics deal with the tactical level of concrete politics, and here the realism of its own success in naming and daily language connotations is plagued - real politics is a word of honor, and all state leaders want to follow a realistic policy, regardless of philosophical fundamentals. "Realism" therefore often ends up as an empty rhetorical grip, which does not mean anything else than that one feels that one has found the right balance between means and goals. For example, one can argue as a liberalist that aid leads to a better world, but also think

that aid should be provided smarter and with better value for money, and call this realism. To claim that it is good real politics for small states to work for a better-organized world falls into the same category, such a statement is an expression of the belief that one has found the best means to achieve the liberal goal of world peace (Leira 2012).

3.5.3 The direction of the Norwegian foreign policy

Liberal conservative foreign policy is a hybrid policy with some conservative and some liberal elements. Leira argues that Norway's foreign policy is strongly rooted in liberalism, but with elements of realistic elements. The arena of foreign policy has embraced international solidarity thinking, and Norwegian foreign policy has been characterized by the belief that Norway can play a role internationally, but also a belief that the realization of Norwegian self-interest does not contradict the overall liberal project. Thus, philosophically speaking, Norwegian foreign policy has been predominantly national-liberal, but if we go to the strategic level, we find that real-political elements have been and are clearly present (Leira 2012).

3.6 Hypotheses

Chapters 2 and 3 constitute the theoretical framework for this thesis. In chapter 2 I laid the foundation for the concept and phenomenon which this thesis studies, in chapter 3 I go through the ground theories in order to explain what drives foreign policy and the use of shaming policy and condemnations. Based on the problem presented in chapter 1, I will now present the hypotheses and the connection they have to the theory. Based on the theory I have created four different hypotheses which I will discuss later during the presentation of the results and analysis in chapter 5.

The first thing I expect to find is that there is continuity in Norwegian foreign policy and the use of condemnation. Halvard Leira (2012) argue that a shift in government could potentially indicate a change in foreign policy from the liberal tradition Norway has been accustomed to a more liberal conservative foreign policy. But he shows that this is not necessarily the case because in Norwegian politics there is a consensus as to what are Norwegian interests and when it comes to liberal values. Historically, there has been great agreement between the parties that

Norwegian foreign policy should have a liberal foundation with realistic elements. Political parties are considered as one of the main drivers behind foreign policy in most parliamentary democracies (Joly and Dandoy 2016, 1). Although some parties in conjunction with elections alerts altered directions, but elections are rarely won on foreign policy, even if they can be lost on it. It is therefore not given that a possible blue-blue government will prioritize reforming foreign policy. The author predicts that at a potential governmental change we will probably have a policy that, in good Norwegian tradition, is national-liberal in its basic philosophy and incorporates certain real-political strategies, but which slightly changes the mix ratio compared to the current government (Leira 2012, 389).

Even Lange, Helge Pharo and Øyvind Østerud (2009) claims that there is considerable continuity in Norwegian foreign policy regarding international cooperation and peace-promoting measures (Lange, Pharo and Østerud 2009, 26). A change in government cannot change the status we have in terms of size. In addition, many will argue that the difference between right and left in politics is not great in Norwegian politics. The first hypothesis therefore reads as follows:

1. There is continuity in the Norwegian use of condemnation.

The second expectation I have is based on the status Norway has received as a nation of peace. Morality and ethics are principles Norwegian politicians and the Norwegian people appreciate and cherish (Skånland). As former Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre said during a presentation in 2006: “Norway is a nation that wishes for peace, and Norwegians wishes for peace for themselves and for others”. Therefore, hypothesis sounds like:

2. Norway is a nation of peace that acts solely based on morality and ethics.

Expectation number three are based on the expectations in hypothesis number two, but is a kind of contradiction. As a peace nation, morality and ethics will be highly valued and a focus area. But based on statements such as the one from Jonas Gahr Støre where he says that: “peace

promotion and other peace related work should have focus, but it should not go beyond the work of promoting Norwegian interests”. As a small state, one must find a niche to gain the status of the international community. Norway has been given the status of a peace nation, and as President Barack Obama said in 2011: "Norway punches above its weight" (Skånland 2010, 56). Which means that Norway has reached an international status higher than other states of the same size, and has thus become a small state with much to say (especially issues concerning peace building and promotion). However, the theory show that there is a conflict of interest between promoting national interests and promoting morality. Norway has many national interests, but one of them is to get high international standing (status). Are we cautious about condemning some countries / actors not to stir up anyone who is crucial to our national interests, typical cases that may be relevant are our relationship with China and Saudi Arabia. China and Saudi Arabia are known to commit grave human rights violations (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 886) Hypothesis number three therefore go as follows:

3. Norway uses morality and peace to promote self-interest, which is to gain status.

The fourth and final hypothesis goes deeper into the actual process of condemning something or someone, and about the choice of cases one may condemn. The previous hypothesis was more general and concerned the moral principle that may have to give way in different situations. This latest hypothesis, on the other hand, is based on the existence of a kind of selection bias when it comes to who and what we condemn. “Weak actors can be expected to launch shaming campaigns only against apparently vulnerable targets, because resources are limited and need to be employed strategically” (Busby and Greenhill 2015, 116).

Halvard Leira (2012) discusses foreign policy on three different levels, where the strategic and tactical level are two of them. The selection of cases to condemn or where to abstain from condemnation are largely a question of where can we do this and still maintain our international relations. Norway must assess the strategic and tactical outcomes against what would be morally and ethically right. In the literature, selection bias is often used in combination with

case selection (Geddes 1990). Do we condemn where we are involved in the peace process, or are we involved where there is something to condemn? Do we choose cases to involve us where the risk of success is great? For Norway to succeed as a ‘Peace nation’, it almost goes without saying that they must succeed in peace building and peace reconciliation. Do Norway therefore condemn to a greater extent where they are involved? Or are they involved where things happen?

*4. There exist a **Selection bias** when it comes to where, what and who we choose to condemn.*

3.7 Summary

The second chapter of the literature review deals with theories surrounding national interests and status, and how this is combined with morality and ethics. In addition, I have given an insight into Norwegian foreign policy history, and in what way this has characterized Norwegian politics and rhetoric. And how this has led Norway to gain the status as a “peace nation”. The literature shows a tendency towards continuation and consensus throughout out the history of Norwegian foreign policy, effective deployment of relevant strategies in the pursuit of strategic and political goals.

4. Data and method

This study is explorative in its research design, because the study of Norwegian press releases with focus on condemnation has not been done before. The method has features from both qualitative and quantitative method. I analyze a relatively large number of press releases, but

also go in depth on each of them. The sample is therefore too small to be able to call it a pure quantitative analysis, but it is also too large to call it a pure qualitative method (Gerring 2012). The method I use to answer the research question is therefore a mixed method, which I choose to call comparative quantitative-qualitative content analysis. Content analysis can be defined as: "analysis of the manifest and latent content of a body of communicated material through classification, tabulation, and evaluation of its key symbols and themes to ascertain its meaning and probable effect." (Krippendorff 2004, 14). When it comes to analyzing qualitative data in text form, one faces a challenge associated with making sense out of the data in a way that holds onto the richness of the content (King and Brooks 2017, 1). As stated earlier, this thesis attempts to answer the question: how Norway uses condemnations in international politics, and I will try to find out whether it is used as a political instrument or as an expression of morality. I conducted an exploratory study based on information gathered from news articles and official press releases from the Norwegian government.

In this chapter, in 4.1, I will present the method which I have used to analyze the press releases. Furthermore, in chapter 4.2 I will go through the method in practice and my approach collecting the data. In 4.3 follows a thorough reviewing of the coding of the data. The method chapter ends with a summary of this chapter.

4.1 Discourse analysis

In international relations and inter-governmental relations there exists a joint discourse (Farrelly 2010, 99). Any analysis of discourse will always be incomplete as stated by Michael Farrelly (2010): "Discourse structures and enables much of our social and political practice. But because it is part of the open system that is our social and political world we can never completely or fully organize it".

Discourse analysis has two main analytical focuses, namely genre and style. Genres are the forms of action that language takes when one is speaking or writing, while style is the way of being that speaking or writing embodies. Press releases count as a genre because of its recognizable form that authors follow to let it fit in with what is expected of it and for it to do its job. Style, on the other hand, could be either arrogant, humble or reticent in the language (Horton 2017). One might see both as expressions of authority as well as the implication that government must be seen to explain its actions.

4.2 Data collection

In this section I will do a thorough description on how I sampled my data and created my data set. First I had to find out what kind of data that existed, then I had to find out what kind of data I needed and then I had to find a way to collect it.

4.2.1 Mapping existing data

This research area is a field with a lot of undiscovered land, therefore it was necessary to have an exploratory design. The first step along the way was to map out what existed of data and information about Norwegian governments usage of shaming policy and condemnation. Based on this information I could move further and find out how the use of condemnation could be measured. Since there is no data set on condemnations, I have had to do the data collection by going in depth and build up the data set from scratch. I started from a data set from Tor Midtbø about all press releases from the Norwegian government⁷. Then I ran the dataset in the analysis program R to extract the press releases containing condemnations. I did further screening by retrieving those who contained condemnation and who came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The Prime Minister's Office. This I did base on information from the Communications Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Frode Overland Andersen. Due to sensitive information, I am not allowed to attach the e-mail correspondence with Frode Overland Andersen. If desired, a quotation list can be provided on request.

First I made a big search in some of Norway's largest online newspapers to see what existed on the topic. Since I study the use of condemnation in foreign policy, it was therefore natural to look to those who are responsible for Norway's foreign policy, the Royal Norwegian Foreign Ministry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA]). Through an e-mail correspondence with the communication manager in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and he could confirm that there is no database of what Norway has condemned and not. I also learned that the condemnation is mainly issued by prime minister or foreign minister, but that this is not a written rule. He could also inform that there is an established procedure when it is to be given a condemnation, where a recommendation is sent from the department where then political leadership decides. Disagreements are published through press releases, but to a greater extent also or only on social

⁷ The self-developed dataset will be provided on request.

media from 2009/2010. The frequency of condemnation will depend on what is happening in the world and will also to a large extent be influenced by the media requesting a statement, which according to Overland's opinion can be an explanation for a possible increase: "We pronounce ourselves to a much greater extent today than before". The question is received in the communication unit and sent to the department for recommendation. Thereafter, a recommendation is sent to the political leadership for a decision on a possible statement and a possible condemnation.

4.2.2 What data is suitable for answering the research question and how to collect it?

Based on the information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I saw it as natural to focus on statements made by the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as these are considered the official and valid communication channels for Norwegian foreign policy and international communication. In addition, I chose to look at official press releases downloaded from regjeringen.no. The confirmation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs helps to strengthen the validity of the assignment, both regarding who gives the statements and in what format. The information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was useful regarding where and when the scope of the study should be limited.

In addition to the contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was also in contact with the UN association and Arne Øi, and the Professor of rhetoric's at the University of Bergen, Jens Kjeldsen. The United Nations Association: In the diplomacy between the countries, however, some "codes" have been established for language use that many countries thus use mutually, and which say something about the severity. The same applies to physical measures, where we can talk about a kind of conflict-ladder where you can move up or down. Much of the diplomatic customs was established the following years after the UN was founded in 1945.

Since there was no available dataset containing what Norway has condemned in foreign policy, I had to do the data collection myself and build up the data set from scratch, based on Tor Midtbø's data set on press releases from the Norwegian government in the period 1995-2017. I have chosen to focus on the period 1995 to 2017, because there are no readable data further back in time. I chose to quit at the end of 2017 because a cut-off point was needed, and the data

collection started before 2018 was over. Analysis of press releases and news articles is method many have used before me in social research, but not exactly with the same approach as myself (Amer 2017, van Dijk(SOURCE)). The approach I have had to the data collection is unorthodox / untraditional, where the road has been created along the way. As far as I know, no similar studies have been done with the same design before. An important note is that press releases are told to be told, they are therefore attempted to be as accurate and clear as possible so that the content cannot be misinterpreted. This is perhaps particularly important when it comes from public holdings and deals with a sensitive topic. Politics and political conflict often occur in the written and spoken word (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Grimmer and Stewart (2013) and Grimmer (2009) argue that text analysis is an important and effective tool for understanding politics and political rhetoric.


The data collection was carried out together with the analysis and was structured in 4 parts. This was done because the content and data were unknown and I did not know exactly what to look for. I therefore had no overview of which variables would be relevant. Part 1 of the analysis was a review of the entire dataset where I used R to extract the press release that came from the Prime Minister's office and the Foreign Ministry. When these were retrieved, I sorted the data once more, by extracting the press releases, from these players, which contained "condemnation". By looking for "condemn" I will also include those press releases that contained "condemn", "condemnation" and "condemned". For it to be considered a condemnation statement, the word must be used. At the same time, this reading gave me an overview of the content and what to look for.

Part 2 of the analysis consisted of delving into each individual press release and mapping the content and sorting out the press releases that were not relevant. These were, for example, the press releases containing condemnation, but which were not a condemnation given by Norway (Norway as the sender). I went into the data with the assumption that it would be a change in Norway's use of condemnation over such a large time span. Over such a large period, the world has changed greatly and this must be case for policy as well. In addition, in Norway during this period, we have had several different government assemblies, where the entire political spectrum is represented, which can also give an assumption that the policy has also changed.

While part 2 was about sorting out the press releases superfluous, while in part 3 of the analysis I went through all the press releases again, but this time I made more detailed notes. As I went

through the press releases, they were chronologically treated in an Excel sheet and in a matrix for each government made in Word. The condemnations have been dealt with according to the following relevant variables: date, actor, type of event, where, when and who. I wrote a log of all thoughts I made along the way, as well as other things that appeared. This helped me later in the interpretation of the data where I could look back at the thoughts I had along the way and what assessments were made at the various stages of the analysis. I made an array for each of the governments, Brundtland, Bondevik 1, Stoltenberg 1, Bondevik 2, Stoltenberg 2 and Solberg. In the matrices, I noted down who gave the condemnation, when (date), where did the incident that was condemned take place, against whom and what kind of event is being discussed. I took note of what was in the press releases and the first thing that struck me. More thorough categorization and conceptualization were planned to be done in the next series because it would be too time-consuming to do while reading through. Had this next step in mind so I noted the details that were needed.

Figur 4 Total number of press releases from the Norwegian Government 1995-2017



In part 4 of the analysis, I went through the matrices I made in part 3 and then I encoded these into the Excel table. Through parts 1, 2 and 3 I have collected information so that in part 4 I could build on the data set for Tor Midtbø. The data set I started with consisted of 83404 press releases from the entire Norwegian government (Figur 3). After the first screening, down to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister's office, the data set consisted of 14069

press releases, of which 381 contained condemnations. After the review, I ended up with 344 press releases, which are the basis for the analysis.

4.3 Variables and categorization

First and foremost, it is important to operationalize the concept that is condemnation, how it is understood and used in the dataset. In line with the conceptualization done in chapter 2.1 there are 6 criteria that must be fulfilled for a statement to be considered as an official condemnation:

1. The word “condemn” must be used explicitly.
2. In some cases are used in the press release, but it's just a repayment of the "original" condemnation. A reference to "the condemnation.
3. It must come from either The Ministry of Foreign Affairs or The Prime Minister’s office.
(Ref. Frode Overland, communication manager in Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
4. The statement must come through as an official press release to be considered as a condemnation.
5. It must be clear that the condemnation is given by Norway. Example: “Norway condemns”, “Norway strongly condemn” or “I condemn on behalf of Norway/the Norwegian government.
6. It is not a condemnation given by Norway if the press release just refers to some other country’s statement or encouragement.

Examples of press releases that will *not* be defined and considered. These are just a random selection of examples to illustrate those different types of press releases that is not considered as “a condemnation” and thereby not included in the 344 press releases that make up this thesis sample.

Press release number 28.03.2014:

"Action against another twelve people threatening Ukraine's sovereignty".

"(...) EU action is part of the international condemnation of Russia's actions and Norwegian endorsement of the last list-listing contributes to strengthening the common reaction to Russian violations of international law".

Press release number 17.07.12:

"Continued violence in Syria must get consequences.

It is expected that the UN Security Council will vote this week on a resolution condemning the abuses in Syria and requiring compliance with Kofi Annan's six-point peace plan.

Press release number 21.12.16:

"Foreign Minister Børge Brende signs the condolence protocol.

[...] Press release where Foreign Minister Brende condemns the attack here (link) ".

The distinction between the various events/act and thus, the conceptualization was difficult as some of the events may overlap. One example could be the attack on a school in Nigeria in February(26th) 2014, where the incident can be categorized as either a terrorist attack and/or a violation of human rights. As for this incident, it is coded as terrorism because the word "terrorist attack" is used in the press release and not human rights. Due to the limited scope of the assignment, I had to decide based on words and concepts used in the press releases. Where there was doubt, or was unclear what was specifically condemned, I went deeper into each of the cases to assess which of the concepts the incident ended up.

The world is complex and to measure what I want to measure it is necessary to operationalize the concepts. In this thesis, it is not necessary to enter the level of detail in each individual event, as this thesis will attempt to uncover trends and the broad lines of the use of the phenomenon. In this section I will explain the basic definitions that I take as a starting point, at the same time I will discuss in what ways they are problematic.

4.3.1 Operationalization of variables

Based on the analysis of the press releases, several read-throughs and contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I identified the variables which was of relevance for further analysis. In the

following section I will go into detail on how I coded these variables and the decisions I had to make to do it as proper as possible.

In the work of categorizing the variables, I have only slightly broadened to other sources, precisely because one of the tasks' limitations is that I do not go deep into every single event that is being condemned. In this way, I also have no basis for deciding / categorizing the incident. Therefore, I have chosen to base the categorization on what is explicitly written in the press release. In this way, I get categorized based on what is the Norwegian authorities' view of the incident. In the section that follows, I will still try to explain the concepts sufficiently so that you get some understanding of what it is. I will address this in the end in further research.

Due to limited resources and limited time, I had to make the coding of the variables on my own. By encoding everything on my own, a challenge arises with the inter coder reliability. Ideally, I should have one or more to control the coding. With just one person coding the variables, there is no inter coder reliability and the results may not be reliable and thus a result of bias (Nolt 2016). Therefore, I must account for that there might be errors done in the coding process, even though I did the coding 3 times to try to avoid it. I also tried to handle this by discussing the steps and questions that arose with my student colleagues, together with the members of the research group, and with my supervisor.

The variables I identified throughout the analysis are: The act, who gave the condemnation, regions, country, together/alone (and if together with who/whom), and peace reconciliation relationship. The table on the next page shows an overview of the variables that describe the one who has condemned an action. Table xx shows the variables that describes the act being condemned. Chapters 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 operationalize and describe the variables in detail.

4.3.2 Descriptive background variables

In order to answer the part of the issue about whether there is continuity in the Norwegian use of condemnation, it is necessary to identify who condemns and which government and party affiliation. In the construction of the data set, I have therefore included these background variables that describe characteristics of those who condemn.

Position tells which minister has condemned.

Name tells the name of the minister who has condemned.

Party tells the party affiliations of the minister who has condemned.

Government tells which government the minister belongs to and which government has power when condemnation is given.

Table 1 Act

Variable:	Description:
Position	Prime Minister
	Minister of Foreign Affairs
	State secretary
	Others
Name	Kjell Magne Bondevik
	Jens Stoltenberg
	Erna Solberg
Party	Labour Party
	The Conservatives
	Christian People´s Party
Government	Brundtland 3
	Bondevik 1
	Stoltenberg 1
	Bondevik 2
	Stoltenberg 2
	Solberg

There are no problems related to the coding of these variables. These are truths that cannot be added to one's own interpretation and perception. However, for the next section and variables describing the action, a number of definition and interpretation problems arise.

4.3.3 Variables that describe the condemned act

To better understand the variables that describe the condemned act one must divide the different variables into different analysis levels. Figure 3 illustrate how this relationship between the variables and the different levels. As the figure below show I have divided into 5 different levels. What is being condemned is an act, performed by an actor or actors, in a region, in a country – against a target. I have also included the variable *relationship*, which is parallel to the other variables because the relationship might be with the actor(s), the region, the country or the target or victim.




Figure 5 Analysis level

As mentioned earlier, due to limited capacity, I have chosen to take the starting point the words that are explicitly used in the press release when I categorize the variables. The weakness of this approach is that there are various people who have written and sent the press release. This can have an influence on which words are used and which conceptualization is applicable. However, this is something I will consider in the analysis by looking at similarities and differences.

Table 2 Describing the variables

Variable:	Description/Categories:
Act	Terrorism
	Human rights violations
	Illegal/mass destruction weapons
	Armed conflict
	Hostage situation
	Suicide attack
	Oral statements
	Violation of international law
	Murder/Assassination
	Coup/ Coup attempts
	Military attack
Target	Governmental actors
	Non-governmental actors
Region	America
	Asia-Pacific
	Eurasia
	Europe
	Middle East and North Africa(Mena)
	Sub-Saharan Africa
Relationship	Yes
	No
Victim	Humanitarian organizations
	Civilians
	The UN
	Others

When it comes to the variables that describe the action that is being condemned, there are several that are important.

The most important variable describing the action is the one that specifically describes the action. The Act thus refers to what action has been performed and which has been condemned by Norway. This variable I have, based on the content and the explicit use of words in the press releases, divided into 12 categories. Frode Overland Andersen(MFA) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me that when the press release and condemnation formulated it is done based on the internationally accepted definition of the term, but that in practical diplomacy must be used a language that is understood and do not create further complicating matters. The definitions are therefore based on the “internationally accepted definition” of the act combined with other relevant sources when it is appropriate.

In this thesis, "internationally accepted" will be considered as the definitions used by the UN. The UN with its 193 member states is an organization with high legitimacy in the international community, and thus this will be the basis for saying that their broad definitions of the different actions condemned are "internationally accepted". The reasons I choose to include this explanation/definition is to give an idea and a basic understanding of what it is and what type of actions the dataset contain. A deeper and more thorough conceptualization will be a good element for further research, where one can go into each case and conceptualize Table 3 follows a short description of the variable and the definitions of the different acts identified in the data.

Table 3 Variable description

Act:	Description:
Terrorism	“Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; it also flourishes in contexts of regional conflict and foreign occupation; and it profits from weak State capacity to maintain law and order” (United Nations n.d, terrorism).

Human right violations	“Human rights violations occur when any state or non-state actor breaches any of the terms of the international Human Rights Law and basic Human Rights. Human rights apply to everything from economic, social and cultural rights, to civil and political rights” (United Nations n.d, human rights).
Illegal/mass destruction weapons	“Use of weapons considered illegal by the international community because it could possibly harm and kill millions of people. Such as nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, cluster weapons, bio-weapons” (United Nations n.d, weapons of mass destruction).
Armed conflict	“A political conflict in which armed combat involves the armed forces of at least one state (or one or more armed factions seeking to gain control of all or part of the state). Armed conflicts within states are political conflicts involving citizens fighting for internal change” (United Nations, n.d., Armed conflict).
Hostage situation	“The act of seizing or holding a person as security for the fulfilment of a condition” (United Nations n.d., International Convention against the taking of hostages).
Suicide attack	“A suicide attack is any violent attack in which the attacker accepts their own death as a direct result of the method used to harm, damage or destroy the target” (United Nations 2018, Suicide attacks).
Oral Statement	“When a head of state, military leader or other prominent persons make an oral or written statement. Often to provoke and create a reaction”.
Violation of international law	“A state violates international law when it commits an internationally wrongful act. A state is bound to act in accordance to international treaties it signed” (United Nations n.d., Uphold International Law).
Assassination	“Murder by sudden or secret attack often for political reasons” (Meriam-Webster n.d., assassination).
Coup/Coup attempts	“A coup is a quick, unconstitutional takeover of a state, usually by a small group of people who only replace the top political leaders” (United Nations n.d., democracy)
Military attack	“An international law principle defined as the use of military force across borders, or the sending of armed groups across borders to

	commit armed attacks, which justifies the use of collective self-defense”(United Nations n.d, chapter VII; Quimbee n.d. Armed Attack).
Other	Unspecified.

The *target* variable shows who the condemnation is aimed at. In other words, the one who has performed the action that has been condemned.

Some areas in the world is more turbulent than others, so it will be interesting to identify the regions that most often get incidents condemned. The variable *region* refers to the area where the atrocity has happened. I have chosen to categorize the regions in the dataset based on Freedom House's division(Kilde). The only change I make is to divide the America region, based on V-Dem (Varieties of democracy)(Kilde). When I tagged the regions, I wanted to have a rough distribution and not to detailed, because what is important is to describe the main lines. Based on some assumptions I expected that most of the condemnation would be directed at the MENA area. Therefore, I decided that it was not necessary to further divide regions like America further.

The next variable is *relationship*. This variable refers to if there is a relationship between the actor who condemn, in this case Norway, and the country where an act is being condemned. According to the Norwegian government's internet page these are the countries where Norway has had an active role concerning the peace and reconciliation process:

- Afghanistan
- South-Sudan
- Colombia
- Guatemala
- Nepal
- Myanmar
- Israel/Palestine/Gaza
- Philippines
- Somalia
- Sri Lanka

Another interesting thing to look at when it comes to actions being condemned is who is hit by the atrocities. Therefore, the last variable is *victim*, which refer to those who are harmed by the act. In the dataset, I have chosen to categorize this variable as either humanitarian organizations, civilians, UN or others. I believe it is natural to separate the UN from other types of humanitarian organizations because they have a distinctive legitimacy in the international community.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter I have explained the method and the data that this thesis will use to answer the question of whether condemnation is used as a political instrument or as an expression of morality and whether it has and is a continuity in the Norwegian authorities' use of this.

First, I had to map out what existed of data in the area. Since there was no database with an overview of all Norwegian condemnations, I had to build a database on my own. Based on information at the Foreign Ministry, it gave the choice of studying press releases legitimacy.

The categorization of actions and condemnation provides a basis for uncovering trends in who, what and where actions are taking place and who condemns. The coding leads to a data set of all the condemnations given by the Norwegian government through official press releases from 1 January 1995 to 23 May 2017.

The content analysis results in a data set consisting of 344 press releases, each representing one condemnation sent out by the Norwegian government.

5. Analysis of condemnations given by the Norwegian government

Does Norway use condemnation as a means of promoting national interests, or do they condemn solely because of morality, and what they consider to be morally wrong and how has the use evolved from 1995 to 2017. The research question is two-pieced and therefore I choose to

structure this chapter based on these divisions. Part 1 and the research question is about finding out whether we use condemnation as a political instrument or a morality statement whereas part 2 is about to determine whether this is a trend through the Norwegian governments from 1995 to 2017. The variables in the analysis will be used to answer both part 1 and 2, but analyzed with different perspectives. The analysis in this chapter is done on the self-developed data set.

To determine whether the use of condemnation can be categorized as being either a political instrument or moral statement, I must show who is condemned, what is condemned, where an act or violation is condemned and how it is condemned. This analysis can help to uncover trends based on what Norway have condemned through the scope of the thesis, but can say little about what we have not condemned because the dataset only consists of actions that we have condemned.

The chapter will be structured as follows. First, in section 5.1 I want to analyze the structure of the press releases and how they are distributed over time through different governments (1995-2017). Second, in section 5.2 I will present the descriptive statistics and results that will help me determine whether Norway uses condemnation as a political tool or (and) as a morality statement. Finally, in section 5.3 I will discuss the findings all together before going into the conclusion in chapter 6.

5.1 Press releases

5.1.1 Structure

To analyze the structure of the press releases I will use these questions as a guide:

- Who is the target?
- How is the press release written?
- When was the press release issued?
- Is the language appropriate?

The total number of press releases is 344 and they mainly written to be read by the press, but are available to everyone. When it comes to actions that are condemned, the target group is both national and international. The press release I have studied is written in Norwegian, but it is also available in other language versions. All are written in English, while some in other

languages are Arabic. All the press releases analyzed in this thesis are available at regjeringen.no.

Press release number 187 22nd November 2011:

"Syria on the agenda in the UN"

http://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/prm_syria_dagsorden_fn_arabisk.pdf

There is a distinct diplomatic and standardized language in the press releases, which are largely in the entire period from 1995-2017 shows signs of "cut and paste". This is consistent with Farelly (2010) which claims that releases have a distinct pattern and a structure. In figure 4 I present a screenshot which give an impression of how the press release visually look.

Regjeringen.no

Tema Dokument Aktuelt Departement Regjering

Du er her: Forsiden · Aktuelt · Terrorangrep i Jerusalem

Terrorangrep i Jerusalem

Pressemelding | Dato: 18.11.2014

- Jeg fordømmer på det sterkeste dagens terrorangrep mot en synagoge i Jerusalem, sier utenriksminister Børge Brende.

- Jeg fordømmer på det sterkeste dagens terrorangrep mot en synagoge i Jerusalem, sier utenriksminister Børge Brende.

Tirsdag 18. november angrep to terrorister en synagoge i Har Nof i Vest-Jerusalem under morgenbønnen. Det meldes om at minst fire israelere er drept, og flere andre skadet. De antatte gjerningsmennene ble skutt og drept. Forrige uke ble to andre israelere, en sivil og en militær, drept i knivangrep på Vestbredden og i Tel Aviv.

- Min dypeste medfølelse går til de etterlatte og de sårede, sier Brende. Det er hjerteskjærende at mennesker i fredelig bønn blir angrepet og drept på denne måten.

Angrepet tilspisser den allerede svært spente situasjonen i Jerusalem, der det den siste tiden har vært flere alvorlige hendelser, inkludert angrep på både moskeer og synagoger.

- Jeg oppfordrer alle parter til å gjøre sitt ytterste for å dempe konfliktnivået og avverge voldsbruk, sier utenriksministeren.

Utenriksminister Brende hadde i dag tidlig en samtale med Israels utenriksminister Avigdor Lieberman hvor han uttrykte sin medfølelse.

Figure 6a The visual appearance of the press releases, in Norwegian (screenshot): Terrorism in Jerusalem. From regjeringen.no

Regjeringen.no

Tema Dokument Aktuelt Departement Regjering

Du er her: Forsiden · Historisk arkiv

HISTORISK ARKIV

Publisert under: Regjeringen Bondevik II
Utgiver: Statsministerens kontor

Statsministeren fordømmer bombeaksjonene i Egypt

Pressemelding | Dato: 11.10.2004
| Nr: 171-04

-Vi reagerer med sorg og fordømmelse på nyheten om bombeaksjonene på Sinai-halvøya, sier statsminister Kjell Magne Bondevik i en kommentar til eksplosjonene som rammet ulike turistmål på Sinaihalvøya torsdag 7. oktober. (09.10.04)

Pressemelding
Nr.: 171/2004
Dato: 9. oktober 2004

Statsministeren fordømmer bombeaksjonene i Egypt

-Vi reagerer med sorg og fordømmelse på nyheten om bombeaksjonene på Sinai-halvøya, sier statsminister Kjell Magne Bondevik i en kommentar til eksplosjonene som rammet ulike turistmål på Sinaihalvøya torsdag kveld.

Ifølge foreløpige tall er det rundt 30 omkomne og over 100 skadde. Det er også flere personer som fremdeles er savnet. Rødehavskysten er et populært reisemål for blant andre israelske turister.

- Våre tanker går til ofrene og deres pårørende, sier statsministeren. - Vi vet ennå ikke hvem som står bak disse aksjonene, men nok en gang er det uskyldige som må lide for ekstremistiske gruppers verk. Terrorister må ikke få sette dagsordenen med slike avskyelig angrep på uskyldige mennesker, sier Bondevik.

Figure 6b The visual appearance of the press releases, in Norwegian (screenshot): The Prime Minister condemns bomb attack in Egypt. From regjeringen.no

In some cases, the press release is designed so that they have an introduction with a quote from the actual press release and with the press release's most important content. Figure 4a and 4b are selected randomly, but on the condition that they have different layout. The press release is structured with a headline that in most cases contains who condemns, what is condemned and where what has been condemned has taken place (Figure 4b). Figure 4a is an example of an exception to this "rule", where the title only tells which event and where. The length of the press release is generally the same, with about 120–350 words. The screenshots in figure 4a have 187 words, while 4b have 178 words.

It varies between "strongly condemns", "condemns sharply" and "X condemns Y".

5.1.2 The distribution of condemnations

Moving on from the structure of the press releases to the distribution of them. One of the most interesting findings I have made through this analysis is then to uncover the distinct increase in the number of condemnations in the 2010s, compared to the 1990s. The total number of press releases, which equals condemnations ended at 344. 26 of them issued by the Prime Minister's office, while the Foreign Ministry accounted for the main share with 318 condemnations. As can be seen in figure 8 and figure 9, there has been a general trend that there is an increase in the number of condemnations. The Figures are presented in real numbers, and are not calculated based on years in government. Potentially, there can be many reasons and explanations to the increase, but that's difficult to ascertain. Whether it is issued a condemnation or does not, depend on whether something happens that should be condemned. Former press officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented that the increase could be because the media demanded a statement to a greater extent now, compared to earlier.




Figure 8 Condemnations by year. Made from self-developed dataset.

In 2011, there was a peak with a total of 41 condemnations over one year. In a supplementary media search made in Retriever, I found that only Aftenposten, one of Norway's largest newspapers have written about condemnations regularly all the way up to 2011. I 2011 one can see a clear increase around 22nd July and Utøya. The media search also shows that there was no clear increase around September 11, 2011. This media search also gives support to Frode Overland Andersens, at that time communication manager (now former) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assumed that the increase in the number of condemnations issued by the Norwegian authorities may be due to increased demand for a statement and an increase in media focus.




Figure 9 Based on numbers from dataset

Figure 10 below shows an overview of the distribution of condemnations distributed among the 7 different governments Norway has had in the period 1995-2017. One thing I would like to

point out is that there was not given a single condemnation by Torbjørn Jagland's government in 1997.




Figure 10 Condemnations issued partitioned by government.

In the period 1995 to 2017, Norway has had 7 different governments, and thus 7 different governmental assemblies. The table below shows government, the Prime Minister's party affiliation and the government's party composition. In the literature, little is written about Norwegian parties and the parties' foreign policy. Especially in terms of condemnation and peace commitment. The literature, on the other hand, shows that there has been a consensus in Norwegian foreign policy in general. Where it may indicate that the focus has been on Norway and what place you have in the international community.

If there was a connection between party affiliation and government composition then there would not be such a big difference between Stoltenberg 1 and Stoltenberg 2, and Bondevik 1 and Bondevik 2. Regarding Solberg, there is no direct comparison from several years back, but that There is such a small difference between Stoltenberg 2 and Solberg, which are two governments that consist of completely different parties showing that there is nothing to indicate that party affiliation and government composition have any significant significance.

Tabel 4 Government, ministers and party affiliation

Government	Prime Minister's party affiliation	Party affiliation
Gro Harlem Brundtland 3	Labour Party	Labour Party
Thorbjørn Jagland 1	Labour Party	Labour Party
Kjell Magne Bondevik 1	Christian People´s Party	Christian People's Party, Liberal and Centre Party
Jens Stoltenberg 1	Labour Party	Labour Party
Kjell Magne Bondevik 2	Christian People´s Party	Christian People's Party, Liberal and Centre Party
Jens Stoltenberg 2	Labour Party	Labor Party, Centre Party and Socialist Left Party
Erna Solberg	The Conservative Party	Conservative party, Progress Party and Liberal, 2018 - Christian People's Party

Based on what I have shown in this chapter, it may indicate that there is a consensus in Norwegian foreign policy, and that the increase is due to factors other than a new government. In terms of how to assess whether something has been done for reasons in line with realpolitik or liberal concerns, an assessment must be made of what actions can be considered morally to condemn or necessary for national interests. Table 5, on the next page, show the distribution of acts that are condemned by each government compared with eachother. What's interesting about this table is the change in condemnations against terrorism and human rights violations (Stoltenberg 2 versus Solberg).

Table 5 Distribution of condemned act on government

Act/Government	Brundtland 3	Jagland 1	Bondevik 1	Stoltenberg 1	Bondevik 2	Stoltenberg 2	Solberg
Human rights violations	3	0	1	4	2	63	10
Terrorism	0	0	1	2	29	37	56
Violation on international law	0	0	1	1	0	16	11
Attack	0	0	1	0	1	12	1
Illegal weapon	0	0	2	0	0	10	6
Assassination	0	0	1	0	4	10	3
Conflict	1	0	0	0	3	9	7
Suicide attack	0	0	0	0	4	4	4
Hostage situation	0	0	0	0	3	1	3
Bomb attack	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Oral statement	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Coup/ coup attempt	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

5.2 A political or a morality statement?

Now that I have presented the structure of the press releases and the general distribution of the given condemnations. To move further, I have looked at who, what and where the condemnations has been given. In this section I will go through this, and present the results which is relevant for answering the research question. As mentioned earlier the research question is structured into 2 parts, where part 1 concerns the question if condemnation is used as a political tool and/or a statement of morality. And part 2 is concerned with the trends and patterns in the Norwegian government usage of it throughout the 22 years which makes up the timespan examined in this thesis, whether it is a political tool, a moral statement or both.

5.2.1 Who?

In this section I will present the analysis results concerning the three “who’s” in this thesis, namely the object of condemnation (who has been condemned), the victim of the condemned act and the one’s who has given the condemnation. It is made evident in almost every press release, in this dataset, who has been affected by the atrocities. Well wishes and condolences are often given and at the same time the importance of finding the guilty is emphasized. Again,

Norway's humanitarian and moral / ethical side shines through. The wrongdoers are often referred to as "the guilty":

"(...) The guilty must be found and held accountable".

In cases where "they" meaning the violators are named or specified, it looks like this:

Press release number 1, July 12th 1995:

"We strongly condemn that the Bosnian Serbs' forces have taken Srebrenica with power[...]"

Press release number 4, September 3rd 1996:

"[...] condemns the recent Iraqi actions in Northern Iraq .."

There is another tendency in the press releases, that the condemnations are directed at the act that was committed. Either the act or the victims are addressed in the press release. This may be explained by the fact that Norway wants to avoid offending anyone, and therefore focuses on the safe cases where there is less controversy. The less controversial statements may be those where Norway does not condemn alone. Such as:

Press release number 190, December 3rd 2011:

"A number of states, including the EU, Norway and representatives of the Arab League, condemned the violence of Syrian authorities and demanded that abusers be held accountable."

Press release 5 is an example of a press release that focuses on the action and not on those who perform the action

Press release number 5, February 14th 1998:

"The Norwegian government strongly condemns the death sentence against Salman Rushdie [...]"

To summarize, it is very rare for those who have performed the work to be mentioned. It may mean that one gives a condemnation before the guilty parties are identified, but it can also have the effect of not making them want to name them. By naming someone, one explicitly or directly target someone. This is something that can have greater consequences than condemning the action itself and not the actor. It may seem that a condemnation is a simple matter, but far from it. Although it is one of the least costly options of action a state has, it can still have major repercussions.

In the period 1995-2017, there are a total of 26 actors who have given condemnation on behalf of the Norwegian government. The table below shows the distribution (all who have condemned):

Table 6 Condemnations issued by minister

Minister	Number of condemnations
FM Børge Brende	101
FM Jonas Gahr Støre	101
FM Jan Petersen	34
FM Espen Barth Eide	27
Norway*	15
PM Jens Stoltenberg	12
PM Kjell Magne Bondevik	11
SS Gry Larsen	8
FM Knut Vollebæk	5
SS Raymond Johansen	4
Eirik Solheim	4
PM Erna Solberg	3
Other**	19

PM= Prime Minister, FM=Foreign Minister, SS= State secretary

* It is not specified who is the sender.

** Together from the entire period 1995-2017, mainly state secretaries, merged because it is less important for the analysis.

The two former Foreign Ministers Jonas Gahr Støre (Labour party) and Børge Brende (Conservative), stands out when it comes to the number of condemnations given. It is a huge coincidence that they have the same number of condemnations, namely 101. Together the two previous Foreign Ministers (excluding Ine S. Eriksen who is not included in the dataset) have 202 condemnations and thus account for well over half of the condemnations, respectively 58.7%. Børge Brende and Jonas Gahr Støre are in a class of their own regarding the number of condemnations. Number 3 on the list is Jan Petersen with 34 condemnations.

By comparing the 5 prime ministers we have had in the period, there is a big difference, although the number of condemnations is low that compared to the foreign ministers, it is almost

insignificant. The ministers who have condemned, and their party affiliation is not relevant in this analysis because in the period 1995-2017 the Labor Party has had the most years in power, and had most people in positions that can condemn on behalf of Norway. Thus, it is not a sufficient basis for comparison.

In the analysis of Bondevik 2 I saw that the period was heavily influenced by the Israel-Palestine conflict, which made a great impact on the number of condemnations. The total number of Israel / Palestine conflict is 60 condemnations⁸, and of those the Bondevik 2 government issued 40. Which means that over 60% of the press releases concerning this conflict are issued by one single government. What's interesting about the condemnations regarding this conflict is that they often target both sides of the conflict in one single press release, and that's one of the main reasons why I analyzed it as one unit.

One of the variables in the dataset relates to whether we stand for condemnation alone, or whether we do it in cooperation with other states or organizations. It turns out in the analysis that it only appears that 11.94% of the condemnations are with others, this percentage is so small that it is not considered important in this analysis. More people may be with others, but my dataset does not provide a basis for confirming or denying this.

5.2.2. What?

What is the object of condemnation? When it comes to what is being condemned, there is quite a distinct difference between the top two and the rest. The actions that mostly are condemned are terrorist acts and human rights violations. In a third place one finds violations of international law. Regarding the remaining actions that have been condemned, they can be divided into two categories, where group 2 is 18-29 condemnations, while group 3 are those who have been condemned 1-12 times. Where suicide attack stands out as the only action with 12 condemnations.

⁸ See table 10, page 73.

Table 7 Number of occurrence of the acts

Act	Number of incidents
Terrorism	125
Violation on Human rights	83
Violation on international law*	29
Attack	21
Armed conflict	20
Illegal weapon	18
Assacination	18
Suicide attack	12
Hostage	7
Coup/coup attempt	4
Oral statement	2
Other	5

*The killings of humanitarian workers are considered a violation of international law.

In the previous section, I illustrated the general distribution of who is condemned and who is condemned. Here again I show who condemns, but also the distribution of what they condemn. Former Foreign Ministers Jonas Gahr Støre and Børge Brende, who represent the Labor Party and the Conservative Party respectively, are the ones who clearly stand out as when it comes to the number of condemnations. It was a surprise that they stand with the same number of condemnations. Støre was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2005-2012 (7 years), while Brende was from 2013-2017 (4 years). From this one sees that Brende gave more frequent condemnations as he reached the same number as Støre, but in less time. If one goes in and looks at the distribution of the 101 condemnations each of them has given, then one sees that there is a rather large variation in what they condemn and how many times they have done it (Figure 11, below).




Figure 11 Condemnations given by Jonas Gahr Støre (2005-2012) and Børge Brende(2013-2017).

The foreign ministers are the ones who condemn the most to compare with other ministerial posts. There are no theories on this, but the fact that the Foreign Minister deals with foreign affairs is natural. Could be that the Prime Minister as head of state relate a little more careful in such matters. Condemnation is a relatively sensitive issue, and it is quick to step on someone's toes. During the Solberg government, it is only Brende who condemns, while under all the others there are several (except Brundtland 3).

Tabell 8 Condemnations from Norwegian foreign ministers

Jonas Gahr Støre

Human rights violations	38
Terrorism	25
Attack	8
Armed conflict	6
Illegal weapon	4

Børge Brende

Terrorism	55
Violation on international law	11
Human rights violations	9
Armed conflict	6

Jan Petersen

Terrorism	20
Suicide attack	4
Armed conflict	3
Assassination	3

Espen Barth Eide

Human rights violations	9
Violations on international law	8
Terrorism	4
Illegal weapon	4

5.2.3 Where?

The last variable I have analyzed in the data set is place, that is, where do most things happen that are condemned? This variable is divided into two, region and country (Analysis levels). The analysis shows a marked concentration with thought where actions are condemned. I have combined the Freedom house and V-them to get regions that fit this study program. MENA is the region that differs quite strongly from the others with 171 condemnations aimed at actions in this area. Then, the condemnations are evenly distributed between Asia, Africa and Europe.

Table 9 Regions and number of condemnations

Region	Number of condemnations
MENA	171
Asia	67
Africa	52

Europe	47
Noth-America	2
Oseania	1
South-America	1
Other	3

Otherwise, this case will mean that there is no place the incident has occurred. It is not possible to identify in the press release. It is not a region but, for example, a global event / action / event: Press release number 112, 19th December 2008:

“Norway was 18th December among 66 countries who endorses a post about the rights of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender people. In the post, the countries condemn homosexual abuse because of their sexual orientation and ask states to review their laws to ensure that gay practices are not criminalized”.

In a total of 66 countries, incidents have been condemned. The table below shows the total distribution of condemnations and how many countries have received that number. The countries that have received the most incidents are those who are at the bottom of the table. The countries that have received the most condemnation is Israel / Palestine with 60 condemnations, then Syria with 29 condemnations.

Tabell 10 Countries and number of condemnations

Country	Number of condemnations	Country	Number of condemnations
Israel/Palestina	60	Kongo	2
Syria	29	Mali	2
Sudan	26	Thailand	2
Iraq	20	United States	2
Iran	19	Uganda	2
Pakistan	18	United Kingdom	2

Afghanistan	15	Algeria	1
Egypt	14	Baharain	1
Libya	9	Belgia	1
Russia	9	Bosnia	1
Turkey	9	Bulgaria	1
Sri Lanka	8	Fiji	1
Ukraine	8	Georgia	1
Belarus	6	Honduras	1
Yemen	6	India	1
North Korea	6	Indonesia	1
France	5	Jordan	1
Nigeria	5	Cambodia	1
Libanon	4	Kina	1
Zimbabwe	4	Kuwait	1
Annet	3	Madagascar	1
Bali	3	Maldives	1
Burma	3	Marokko	1
Filippinene	3	MENA	1
Kenya	3	Saudi Arabia	1
Kosovo	3	Sierra Leone	1
Somalia	3	Sør-Korea	1
Tunisia	3	Timor	1
Bangladesh	2	Tyskland	1
Elfenbenkysten	2		

Perhaps most notable with China and Saudi Arabia has only been condemned once each during the period 1995-2017, when, according to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, numbers of human rights violations have been committed (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 866). The one condemnation we do have given to China doesn't even concern human rights violations:

Press release number 3, July 29th 1996:

“Norway condemns the Chinese nuclear test”.

Another remark about that condemnation and condemning China in general, it was given back in 1996. At the time of writing, it is 23 years since Norway condemned something that had to do with China.

The one condemnation directed at Saudi Arabia does concern a violation on human rights:

Press release number 215, 11 January 2013:

“Norway condemns execution in Saudi Arabia”.

In addition to this which is mainly about Saudi Arabia, there is two other press releases where they are mentioned, but not targeted:

Press release number 161, 16 March 2011:

“Norway condemn the use of violence in Bahrain.

*[...] On Tuesday, Bahrain introduced a state of emergency. Monday, the military and police came from the Cooperation Council for the Arab states in the Gulf (especially **Saudi Arabia** and **Dei unified Arab emirates**) to Bahrain following the request of Bahrain government”.*

Press release number 186, 14 November 2011:

“Norway condemn the attack on missions in Syria.

*[...] Norway condemns the attacks on missions to France, Qatar, **Saudi Arabia** and Turkey, which took place in Damascus and other Syrian cities last Saturday.*

The tone or wording in these press releases can be interpreted to be positive and supportive towards Saudi Arabia.

In those cases where Iran is involved, there is a consistent use of "Norway condemns ..." and not the focus on person such as. Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. The total number, from 1995-2017, of condemnations against Iran is 19.

Tabell 11 Government and number of condemnation directed at Iran

Government	Number
-------------------	---------------

Brundtland 3	2/4
Bondevik 1	1/8
Stoltenberg 1	0/7
Bondevik 2	1/47
Stoltenberg 2	13/172
Solberg	0/106

Of these countries, some countries we have or have had special ties with when it comes to peace work and as hypothesis 4 says, then I have an assumption that there is a selection bias when we choose places we condemn actions. Of all the condemnations, 110 are, that is, 32% of the condemnations are aimed at places where we have a “peace-connection”, meaning that we have been or are involved in the peace building and reconciliation processes.

Table 12 Countries where Norway are or have been involved in peace building processes

Country	Number of condemnations
Israel/Palestine	60
South-Sudan/Sudan	26
Afghanistan	15
Sri Lanka	8
Philippine	3
Somalia	3
Colombia	0
Guatemala	0
Nepal	0
Total	110

5.3 Discussion

While presenting my findings, I have discussed some of the findings. In this chapter, I will conduct a more thorough discussion and link the findings with the theories of reciprocity, rational choice and morality and material costs. One of the biggest challenges in answering the

problem in this thesis is that it is difficult to distinguish between the actual reason for condemning something and the reasoning used. After the analysis, I am left with the impression that with the data I have had available it is difficult to be able to draw any conclusions, and confirm or dispel the hypotheses. What I can say about it that there has been and is continuity in the Norwegian use of condemnation in the period 1995-2017.

There is continuity in Norwegian use of condemnation. The increase that has been affected by factors other than government members. Yes, there is a growing trend 'to condemn', but my findings indicate that this is not due to changes in Norwegian foreign policy (despite various regimes). Leira (2012) tried before the 2013 election to predict that it would be a change when for the first time you were right in a leader's position in foreign policy. When it comes to actions we condemn, it is terror, human rights violations and violations of international law that stand out. Norway strongly condemns terrorism (125), human rights violations (83) and violations of international law (29). In the literature, there is little about shaming policy and terrorism. I have no support in my results to say if there is an increase in the number of actions that should be condemned, but this is something that will be interesting to look at further. Looking at the increase in the number of condemnations so it seems rather that there is something in the Overland Andersen (MFA) said that the increase may be because the media are more and pray statement now, compared with before.

Regarding the term 'smart power', established by Joseph Nye (2009), encounters the misperceptions that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy. He argues that it would be smart to combine the tools of both hard and soft power, and to use only one will usually prove inadequate (Wilson 2008). I do not find support for this theory in this analysis, because there are very few cases where Norway alone sanctions other players based on the analysis done on the press releases, this is related to what Neumann and Carvalho (2015) say about Norway being a small state, and therefore focusing on peace as their comparative advantage.

In the Norwegian use of condemnation, I find support for the view of Niebuhr and reject the view of Morgenthau. Niebuhr claims that the relationship between National Interests and moral is not normative, while Morgenthau saw national interest in a purely realistic manner and as a normative, Niebuhr rejected this notion and argued that it was not an either-or question (Glanville 2005:34, Brostrom 2016, Kennan, Manan, Tjalve and Williams 2015). Jannika

Brostroms (2016) framework for understanding morality and national interests in foreign policy argues morality can be linked to the concept of power, rather than being explicit or just normative.

As I argue in chapter 3, constructivists understand morality as part of a political community's normative agenda, linked to identity and ideas. Given this, norms and interests are mutually constituted, and hence also inter-subjective (Brostrom 2016, 1626). On the contrary, various liberal thinkers characterize moral forces effectively as ends in themselves. This is not the case with Norway. If Norway were to act according to moral, they should have been out there condemning every single act that was a violation to international law, human rights or an act of terror. My analysis show that it is not the case.

Based on Brostroms (2016) framework and the concept of rational choice it would be rational for Norway to act solely based on moral and ethics, because those are the values necessary to promote peace. Act based on rationality regarding national interests, but in the Norwegian case national interests are both peace and status. Peace and moral actions give Norway higher status, which is of the nation's interests. But to act solely on the basis on moral principles could possibly ruin for other important interests... "Juggling concerns: liberal ideals and conservative practices? A conflict arises between Norway's national interest to gain status by being acknowledged as a good power (Neumann and de Carvalho 2015) and other national interests, such as trade with oil and fish. Even though peace is their most important advantage and feature of foreign policy, it's not the only one.

Difficult to find a distinction between actions made regarding morality, and action done regarding national interests. As mentioned earlier, one can say that one does something about something other than what is the real reason. The finding that is most apparent when it comes to the type of act (being condemned) that is relevant for answering the research question is that the condemnations and developments in press releases per year have approximately the same curve(increase).

To act based on morality and ethics is challenging. This hypothesis can be denied because it is felt that Norway has not condemned more than one violation of human rights in China, and one in Saudi Arabia. The condemnation where China is targeted looks like this:

Press release number 3, July 29th , 1996

“Norway condemns the Chinese nuclear test.

Norway deplores the Chinese nuclear test which was carried out on Monday night and regret that China thus not taken into account international opinion on this issue, said Foreign Minister Bjorn Tore Godal”.

While the one against Saudi-Arabia:

Press release number 215, 11th January 2013

“Norway condemns execution in Saudi Arabia

- I am appalled by the execution of the Sri Lankan woman Rizana Nafeek in Saudi Arabia. Norway condemns the execution, which is also a violation of the Children's Convention because the woman was a minor when the crime was committed, says Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide”.

Based on the analysis done on the press releases it's difficult to explain why this is the case. But as Morgenthau argued:” Indeed, a foreign policy derived from national interest is morally superior to a foreign policy inspired by universal moral principles”. Morality is viewed as an interlinking event linked to "self-interest" rather than being part of a transformative chain where several variables are due for the overall end result (Brostrom 2016, 1627). With the Norwegian case, this is evident. Morality is linked to self-interest and is not about being an absolute. For Norway, it is a challenge that it is a small state, because as Nancen (2015) points out, shaming is a significant risk for both the named, and the namer. So, what may seem like a simple reaction can have big consequences.

Based on the theory of the Norwegian status quest in the international community combined with the findings in the analysis, I do find that Norway uses morality and peace to promote its own national interests, ie status. In cases where the national interest is threatened, however, it seems morality must give way to those interests. It turns out, through the analysis, that separating morals from interests is difficult, as Brostrom (2016) claims. The realistic approach is unsatisfactory. Norway often shows a concern over the condemnations. There is an expression of an escalation of the conflict in the exposed area.

Another obvious sign that we are focusing on morality and humanitarianism is that we very rarely mention any names of the violator. Can also be a sign that you do not know, but also that we do not want to focus on them and give them recognition. By not naming, we give focus to

those who are affected and rather to the action itself as something that should not occur. 'Not naming' could possibly be another type of shaming, by not giving the violator the attention they possibly were after. The act this might concern the most are terrorism.

Finally, : *“No country, not matter how powerful, can afford to take on the role of a global policeman”* (Oppenheim 1987, 383). By ignoring the fact that being a "global policeman" would mean more than condemning or not, one could draw parallels to the fact that no state can afford to risk doing something that might threaten its own national interests.

6. Conclusion

By doing an explorative study where I in the examination of 344 press releases, combine xx from both qualitative and quantitative research method, I have tried to answer the research question:

(1) To what degree is condemnation used as either a political tool or a morality statement? (2) And to what degree are such patterns similar or different across Norwegian governments between 1995 and 2017?

In this thesis last chapter I will summarize my findings (6.1), connect the treads from the theory to the findings (6.2), then I will with a critical view on my method make some proposals for further research(6.3). To finish up, in 6.3 I will make some concluding remarks about what I like to call “The peace nation paradox”.

6.1. Summary of findings

One of the most interesting discoveries I've made through this task / study is that Norwegian authorities do not have an overview of who, what and where they have condemned, other than a complex database of press releases.

The second found I consider most exciting is that we have not condemned a single violation of human rights in China, and only one in Saudi Arabia.

Hypothesis **number 1** suggested that there is continuity in the Norwegian governments use of condemnation in international politics. This hypothesis refers to part 2 of the research question. My analysis can confirm this, both in the structure of the press releases, but also who, what and where we condemn. The increase in the number of condemnation does not seem to have anything to do with government composition, but rather other external factors such as media and digitization.

Hypothesis **number 2** assumed that Norway, as a peace nation, acts solely based on morality and ethics. Based on my analysis I cannot confirm this hypothesis, what I can say is that we do act morally, but there are tendencies that indicate when something threatens certain national interests, it happens at the expense of moral and ethics.

Hypothesis number 3 went further by addressing how we use moral as a political tool, an assumed that Norway uses morality and peace to promote national interest/ self-interest. This hypothesis can in some way be confirmed, but not definitely. This is still only an assumption and from the analysis I have identified a tendency, but no truth. It is dangerous to conclude on these matters, because there are so many aspects and factors that I as a researcher may not be aware of, that may be confidential information, or things might not be what it seems. What I can say is that if we were not using morality as means to get higher standing in the world or other ends, then we should have condemned much more, especially violations on human rights (China and Saudi-Arabia).

The last hypothesis, number 4 were concerned about the possible selection bias at hand when we choose who, what and where we condemn. My analysis indicates that there might be some bias present in the process of condemning something or someone. This builds on what I suggested as an explanation regarding hypothesis number 3: We do not give out a condemnation only because we believe that something is morally wrong, we take into account whether our action and statements can potentially be detrimental to our reputation and international reputation. I can say this because there are many examples of actions and violations that one knows are wrong, but we have not stated. Norway seems to act to a large degree based on moral and ethics, but based on this analysis I have found support to claim that that's not always the case.

To summarize, I have found that there is a consensus in the Norwegian use of condemnations.

1/3 of the condemnations are directed at places where we have a “peace-connection”. Foreign ministers condemn the most, compared to prime ministers, state secretary and others. Based on the information I have gotten out of press releases it looks like we mostly condemn on our own, with only 11% of the press releases indicating that we shame together with someone or somebody.

6.2 Perspective and ethical considerations

With this thesis and this approach, I have opened a new branch in this field of research concerning shaming policy, condemnations, national interest, moral and international relations. With this approach, it is necessary to make some difficult choices. This thesis and study has provided many interesting findings which would be interesting to explore further. Information and confirmation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided validity to the research design. When measuring Norwegian use of condemnation, it will look at press releases with condemnations given by Norway. Confirmation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on who gives the condemnation. The data set spans over a long period and over various governmental combinations, which means that I can more generalize for Norwegian foreign policy. Good basis for uncovering trends, but not conclude.

By analyzing manually there are might be human errors. To cope with this problem, one could have had several coders, because due to limited resources that was not an option. The information obtained from press releases is limited, so there is a weakness in the analysis. But for further research it may be an idea to try to map out all actions and events that can and should be condemned. I would be interesting to compare the cases Norway has condemn with the ones they have not. In that way, it would be easier to find patterns regarding hypothesis number 4. Would it, for example matter where Norway have an embassy or not? To get an even deeper and better understanding of what lies behind the process of issuing and condemnation, could be done by interviewing people in the government. It would also be interesting to compare condemnations issued in press releases and those issued in Social Media.

Finally, shaming policy and condemnation are relatively sensitive issue. It’s important with good research ethics are important to those who are directly and indirectly subject to the work, and those who can be affected by the research and findings (Saunders et al. 2016). Throughout

the research process, I have been aware of research ethics and challenges that may arise. One big problem is that due to sensitive information I am not allowed to attach the e-mail correspondence with Frode Overland Andersen. If desired, a quotation list can be provided on request.

6.4” The Peace Nation Paradox”




Figure 12 The Peace Nation Paradox

In Norway's case one can see tendencies that morality is central to foreign policy, but that it is also considered instrumental. National interests are as we have seen a complex term. I have tried to identify one of Norway's national interests in foreign policy, which is as for so many other states to gain increased status. Increased status brings with it several benefits, which in turn can help promote and strengthen other national interests.

Figure 12 illustrate the relationship between Norwegian national interests, status seeking and peace promotion. Efforts in peace reconciliation processes and issue condemnations can be viewed as” means to an end”, where the end and goal is to promote the national interest of increase international standing and to be recognized as a peace nation. In the Norwegian case this is a complicated matter, and a “Peace nation paradox”. If by any means, I should be able to conclude it is that it's not about consistency as opposed to absoluteness, one cannot say that it is either / or traded from morality. The political world does not take place in a vacuum, and thus there are too many considerations to make. As Morgenthau said:” Universal moral principles, such as justice and equality could only guide political activities to the extent that they have been

given concrete content and have been related to political situations by society” (Morgenthau 1952, 34

“A point of concurrence must be found, therefore, between the moral mandates to protect the interests of constitutes and to sacrifice the interest of the state those of the wider community”. (Glanville 2005, 34).

Do we see a double standard, where Norway in Lebovic and Voetens (2016) words “Selling morality”? Norway uses moral and promote peace, because they think it’s the right thing to do and a good thing, but they use it to gain status. And as I address in the discussion, when there is a possibility that national interests might be threatened, moral has to go at the expense of national interests. Norway uses moral as both means and ends. Moral and efforts regarding peace building and conciliation works as both means to get higher international standing and status, which is one of many national interests

Bottom line, it seems like Norway wants to make the world a better place. The increased status give Norway more power and credibility in peace negotiation, but it also gives Norway a better position to promote other national interests. Ideally, peace commitment should be based on values and made independent of Norwegian interests (Skånland 2009, 334). Former state secretary Kjetil Skogrand suggests that related work is difficult, but contributes positively. If there is a risk by choosing to condemn, that might threaten national interests, then there is a tendency that moral and ethics has to go at the expense of national interests. Therefore, the conclusion is that Norway use condemnation as a morality statement, but almost equally as a political tool., but "It is far between the spectacular successes, but we cannot ignore the fact that the conditions in the relevant areas had been far worse without Norwegian efforts” (Skånland 2009, 340).

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