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**INSTITUTIONALISING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
REFORMS IN THE GHANAIAN PUBLIC SERVICE:
ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE VERSUS LEADERSHIP?**

BY

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ABSTRACT

The dispensation of the New Public Management (NPM) over the last two decades has provided a surest way of restructuring the administrative systems of Ghana's Public Service through reforms. Ghana after adopting its maiden NPM reform in 1987, have remained focused on its bureaucratic reformative agenda. Since 1987, Ghana has witnessed several NPM reforms with some internationally adopted and others internally initiated. It is worth noting that, the NPM reform trajectories project performance management system and reform as an integral component of all these reform initiatives. The most recent Performance Management (PM) reform in the Ghanaian Public Service, is the New Performance Management Policy (NPMP).

And in this connection, the study examines the whole operationalisation of PM reforms, specifically the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service. In a narrow sense, it mainly explores and explains the impact and influence of leadership and administrative culture as contextual factors on the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in Ghana's Public Service. By using, the instrumental and institutional/cultural perspectives as well as the interplay of these perspectives (transformative approach), the study focuses on explaining failed and successful institutionalisation of the NPMP and ascertaining whether leadership, administrative culture or both matters in the institutionalisation process in the selected public organisations, that is the Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS), Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana (NMC), and the Youth Employment Agency (YEA). With regards to the research design and methodology, the study draws on qualitative data sourced from in-depth interviews (28 informants), documentation reviews and observations.

At the end of the study, the state of performance management was unravelled with NPMP identified as the current working PM reform in the public service. And OHCS and NMC were seen to have had quite a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP due to leadership efforts and cultural compatibility. The YEA on the other hand was seen to have had a false start to the implementation to the NPMP, and hence a policy deviation due to poor leadership style and commitment as well as cultural incompatibility. Also, the study concluded by arguing that both leadership and administrative culture matter in the institutionalisation of the NPMP and administrative reforms in general.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my family especially my Dad, Henry Patrick Gyimah and Mom, Lydia Afful. You have been my greatest inspiration. I am very grateful for your unwavering support right from day one. May the good Lord God richly bless you all!!!

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES & BOXES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACRS   *Annual Confidential Reporting System*

CEO   *Chief Executive Officer*

CSPIP   *Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme*

CSRP   *Civil Service Reform Programme*

CST   *Communication Service Tax*

ERP   *Economic Recovery Programme*

FOAT   *Functional Organizational Assessment Tool*

FWSC   *Fair Wages and Salaries Commission*

GIFMIS   *Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information System*

HR   *Human Resource*

IBM   *International Business Machines*

IPSM   *Internationalisation of Public Sector Management*

LI   *Legislative Instrument*

MDAs   *Ministries, Departments, and Agencies*

NDPC   *National Development Planning Commission*

NMC   *Nursing & Midwifery Council*

NPM   *New Public Management*

NPMP	*New Performance Management Policy*
NRCD	*National Redemption Council Decree*
PA	*Performance Appraisal*
PAS	*Performance Agreement System*
PAS	*Performance Appraisal System*
PES	*Performance Evaluation System*
PM	*Performance Management*
PMS	*Performance Management System*
PNDC	*Provisional National Defence Council*
PNDCL	*Provisional National Defence Council Law*
PSC	*Public Services Commission*
PUFMARP	*Public Financial Management Reform Programme*
OHCS	*Office of the Head of Civil Service*
YEA	*Youth Employment Agency*

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

The capacity of the modern state is largely contingent on the effectiveness and efficiency of her bureaucracy. Most developing states especially in Africa are failing by sheer virtue of the fact that their public service as an essential state machinery is failing to perform up to acceptable standards. The public sector in Africa especially in Ghana "has historically performed poorly and is generally perceived as an obstacle to development" (Stein, 1994 as cited in Owusu, 2006:2).

In this connection, performance management in the Ghana Public Service over the years has been one of the main concerns of the government of Ghana. Ghana in an attempt to revolutionise the public service to make it an efficient and effective instrument in carrying out its expected mandate since 1987 has introduced several NPM led performance reforms as an intervention mechanism to make the public service work. The Kufuor[1] led administration in May, 2005 created a ministry (Ministry of Public Sector Reforms) which was charged with the responsibility of implementing public sector reforms in Ghana (Owusu, 2006). This alludes to the fact that there has been an unending surge in Ghana for ways of creating a robust and sustainable public-sector reform strategy (World Bank, 2005 as cited by Owusu, 2006).

However, the outcomes and effects of these reforms have not been satisfactory vis-à-vis their reform objectives. Since the introduction of these reforms, the public service has continually been marred with low level of productivity, poor performance management and hence, failed reforms. So, the questions that scholars and practitioners over the years have attempted to address are: i. why the public sector has failed to perform despite all these reforms? iii. Are these reforms too ambitious given the existing public service or whether reforms depend on the compatibility between reform objectives and the contextual environment?

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[1] John Agyekum Kufuor is a Ghanaian politician who served as president of Ghana from 2001 to 2009.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

There is an increasing need for administrative re-engineering especially when administrative change is inadequate to keep an administrative system abreast of developments and in consequence, creating performance gaps, that is, when there is a significant disparity between what is being done and what ought to be done (Downs, 1967: 191). Scholars like Caiden (1968) are of the view that, administrative reform is the most effective panacea to the malfunctioning of the natural processes of administrative change. This is because reform initiatives aim at removing obstacles to change, or of improving on the results of change (Adei & Boachie-Danquah, 2003: 7).

There is an undeniable fact that, reforms in the Ghana Public Service have received a mixed record of successes and failures. One notable success of these reforms since its inception is the absolute downsizing of the entire public service. However, it is worth noting that most public service reforms have left a demoralised and unmotivated personnel largely incapable of performing basic functions (Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002 as cited by Owusu, 2006). Nana Kwasi Agyekum Dwamena, the head of the Ghana Civil Service emphasised in his presentation on "The Challenges and Opportunities of Civil Service Reform in Ghana" that, in spite of all reform initiatives in the service, the service is still beset with performance lapses and low morale among civil/public servants. He argued that, this ethos is partly as a result of the inability of reform initiatives to address system-wide problems in the civil service and the public service at large due to institutionalisation challenges such as contextual incompatibilities.

The mixed record of reform efforts in Ghana and in Africa at large suggests that performance in public organisations is a difficult and a multi-faceted task and thus, must encompass a wide array of strategies to change the rules of the game fundamentally (Owusu, 2006). Long term, high level commitment and extensive support by public servants, national leaders and the international community must be the main preconditions for this change (Stevens and Teggemann, 2004 cited by Owusu, 2006).

A number of studies have tried to offer explanations to the underlying causes of public sector reform failures and hence low productivity in Africa including Ghana. Several of these studies argue that most reforms are failing to enhance public servants' performance because of the absolute marginalisation and neglect of organisational contextual variables like organisational leadership, cultural norms as well as

institutional and structural environments in the reform formulation and implementation process.

1.2 Rationale of the Study

Performance management and New Public Management (NPM) reforms have had an ever-increasing influence in contemporary public management especially during the age of performance in the 2000s and has become the centrepiece of most recent public-sector reforms (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013). The main essence of performance management which constitute the key precept of NPM reforms is to reinforce accountability and enhance performance in the public services (Bouckaert and Peters 2002; Radnor and McGuire 2004; Ohemeng 2011; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013). However, Ghana over the years after the introduction of NPM inspired performance management reforms is still struggling to satisfy these basic objectives of performance management. The Ghanaian Public Service has witnessed several reforms since its inception in 1987 and the after-effects of these reforms have been unsatisfactory. Performance gaps still linger on the administrative contexts of the public service and thus sparking several debates among scholars on the essence and impact of NPM inspired reforms in Ghana.

This in effect serves as the point of departure for the research study. The main rationale for the study is to contribute to the understanding of the interplay and impact of NPM inspired performance management reforms and contextual factors in the Ghana Public Service. In spite of all the studies and discussions on the relation between NPM reforms, performance management and context, György (2004) still describes the subject as "a largely unexplored field". In this connection, it is of no doubt that the study contributes on the corpus of literatures on the subject as advised by King et al. (1994) on his discussion on the selection of a research topic. The study is of great theoretical relevance because it seeks to inquire and explain why there are performance gaps and hence, failed institutionalisation of NPM inspired performance management reforms. It explores the relationship between administrative reforms as a tool in the hands of government to bring changes in public service performance and administrative culture and leadership as contextual factors that harness the implementation and institutionalisation of these reforms. Most scholars like Ohemeng (2011) argue that the assimilation of reforms depend on context variables thus, reforms must be in direct

accord with context variables. The more the compatibility, the higher is the success rate. However, studies on the Ghana public sector reforms have been dominated by total focus on reforms and efficiency while institutional conditions and environment have received less attention, hence, marginalised.

1.3 Research Questions

The study seeks to offer explanations to the research problem by addressing the following questions:

i.   What is the state of performance management reform in Ghana's Public Service? To what extent has this been institutionalised in the various public institutions?

ii.   What explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform? Is it leadership or administrative culture that matters? Or a combination of both, that is, leadership and culture?

The first research question attempts to offer insights into the NPM inspired performance management reform initiatives in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy since the inception of NPM movement in 1987. It tries to explore the Ghanaian NPM inspired reform trajectory from its early dispensation to its present state. This unravels the instrumental nature of organisations with reforms as tools in the hands of government and leaders to bring changes in public servants' performance. The second part of the research question then seeks to examine and explore how performance management systems and reforms have been institutionalised with respect to the most recent reform in Ghana's Public Service. Here, institutionalisation is analysed by looking at how the PMS reform (NPMP) principles have been habituated by the various bureaucracies over time.

The second research question also attempts to explore and examine the contextual features of the Ghanaian bureaucracy like administrative culture and leadership and furthermore, examine the compatibility and relationship between these contextual features and reforms. Performance Management Reforms are inspired by NPM and are based on neutral, fair, and performance-oriented evaluations. To what extent have the reforms been contextualized in the Ghanaian context? It is assumed that the more the compatibility of the organisational context, the higher the success of reform initiatives.

1.4 Study Area

The study focuses on Ghana's bureaucracy, that is, the Public Services of Ghana. According to the Section 7 of the Public Service Commission Act: 1994, the Public Services of Ghana encompass all public services established by the Constitution and parliament as prescribed by law which include the Civil Service, the Judicial Service, the Audit Service etc. The Public Service Commission is in charge of the public service in Ghana and thus provides a supervisory oversight over all public service institutions. In light of this, the study focuses on three public institutions namely the Office of the Head of Civil Service, Youth Employment Agency and the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana that operate under the supervision of the Public Service Commission.[2] The rationale behind this choice is to examine the disparities of the nature and operationalisation of the performance management reform policy across these public organisations.

1.5 Scope of the Study

It is the explicit goal of NPM inspired reforms to enhance productivity in public servants; however, there seems to be some contextual resistibility at the implementation level and hence, leading to failed reforms. These contextual factors that militate against administrative reforms cut across factors like regime type, leadership, ideology, administrative culture, record of economic development, resource availability, and independence of action (Ohemeng 2006). This study however narrows its scope to the impact and influence of leadership and administrative culture as contextual factors on the implementation and institutionalisation of performance management reform policies in Ghana's Public Service. Reform institutionalisation analysis will also be narrowed down to the current PM reform in the Ghanaian Public Service.

In terms of research participation, the Public Service Commission was the first point of contact for the study. The office provided several insights into the state of performance management reforms in the service. The study was then narrowed down to the street-

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[2] Further discussions on the selected cases and the reasons behind my choice will be provided in chapter three.

level bureaucracies to measure the extent to which performance management has been entrenched in Ghana's Public Service.

1.6 Background to Public Sector Reforms in Ghana

Prior to the dispensation of public service administrative reforms in Ghana, the public service according to Nti (1978 as cited in Ayee, 2001: 2) was widely regarded as the "finest, most relevant and performance-oriented institution in Africa and also as "a moribund, paper pushing institution" across different periods. This assertion succinctly portrays the astounding and dire state of the public service during the pre-reforms era. The period of astounding performance and productivity where the public service of Ghana was widely regarded as the most constructive machinery of government spanned from the "period immediately before independence in 1957 to the mid-1970s" and was characterised by "well-trained" and competent civil servants who were satisfactorily "remunerated and resourced", "manageable" service size, and upheld the golden principle of political neutrality and anonymity (Ibid:2).

On the other hand, the period of administrative doom of the Ghanaian Public Service spanned from 1974 to early 1980s where Ghana was on an economic stagnation and decline (Ibid). The public/civil service during this period was largely characterised by several debilitating features like poor manpower planning, low staff morale with motivation-incentives problems, defective managerial competence, etc. which continually drag the service into its dire straits. (Ayee, 2001:4).

These among other reasons led to the takeover of power by Rawlings's PNDC[3] through a coup d'état in December 1981. Ghana's economical might and environment was not conducive enough to pursue the implementation of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and the Structural Adjustment Program that served as the only panaceas for our woes (Ibid). In conclusion, the Ghana Public Service after witnessing its maiden reform in 1987 has still remain on course with her public service restructuring exercise in order

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[3] **The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)** was the name of the Jerry Rawlings led Ghanaian government after he overthrown the People's National Party's elected government through a coup d'état on 31 December 1981

to make the service the main point of reference in Africa. The most notable ones include;

i.   *The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP);*

ii. *Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP)*

iii. *Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP);*

iv. *Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information System (GIFMIS);*

v.   *Functional Organizational Assessment Tool (FOAT)/District Development Facility;*

vi. *Health Sector Reforms.*

Although most of the undertaken reform initiatives may differ in content and scope, their implementation challenges enfolded around the same corroborating factors.

1.7 Organisation of the Thesis

The thesis is structurally organised into eight (8) chapters. ***The first and present chapter*** which happens to be the introduction offers introductory and background discussions of the study. It primarily discusses the research intent and theme of the study. It traces the socio-political phenomena (research problem) that might have influenced the intent of the research study as well as discussions on the main research questions, study area, scope and some public sector administrative reform background discussions.

The second chapter offers the theoretical and conceptual approach of the study. It also offers how these theoretical and conceptual underpinnings have analytically been operationalised into variables; hence the research variables of the study.

The third chapter discusses the research methodology and design of the study. It expounds on how the research was conducted and analysed.

The next three chapters discuss the findings and analysis of the study. It discusses the operationalisation of performance management reforms, its institutionalisation as well as the contextual factors that explain and account for the successful and failed institutionalisation of performance management reforms in the Ghanaian bureaucracy. Some of the findings in these chapters especially the chapter four are very descriptive and it draws on data from both documentation review and interviews.

The last chapter provides some theoretical and recap discussions, as well as concluding remarks. It also provides a summary of the research findings and the entire research.

CHAPTER TWO

UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS: THE CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL APPROACH

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews and discusses the theoretical concepts and perspectives underpinning the study, and also how they have been operationalised in the study. These theoretical precepts provide a broader premise for understanding how performance management reforms respond to organisational behaviour. On the basis of the theoretical discussions, a framework will be developed delineating both dependent and independent variables.

The study primarily draws on two main perspectives, that is, the instrumental and institutional/Cultural perspectives advanced by Christensen et al. (2007) in explaining and understanding administrative reforms in the public service of Ghana. Discussions in this chapter are mainly extant literature reviews on the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings and how they relate to the research study.

2.1 The Concept of Administrative Reforms and NPM

Administrative reform has been one of the managerial tools for reorganising the state and its public sector to realise its expectations of economy, efficiency, productivity, effectiveness and responsiveness. It is of no doubt that administrative reforms over the past decades have flourished in this regard (Caiden G. E., 1988). However, the conceptual discourse of administrative reforms and New Public Management (NPM) has been unending. Debate over the nature of reforms and NPM is as intense today as it has been over the last decades (McLaughlin, Osborne, & Ferlie, 2002: 7).

The concept of administrative reform hinges on the basic reform idea that man should not wait for changes to occur naturally but should rather expedite the process by artificial means, improvements in the world order (Caiden, 1968). The term "New Public Management (NPM)" is a label for recent administrative reforms first used by Hood (1991) (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 18). Christopher Hood's 1991 article 'A public management for all seasons?' remains the most cited exposition of the concept of NPM (McLaughlin, Osborne, & Ferlie, 2002: 38). New Public Management (NPM)

is a comprehensive neo-liberal ideology inspired global reform movement of which Hood (1991) describes as a doctrine, or at least a label for a set of administrative doctrines which he and others identified as 'new' (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; McLaughlin, Osborne, & Ferlie, 2002: 38). NPM "consists of deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organisations with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to run better (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000: 8).

The landscape of administrative reform is often complicated by discrepancies between the world of ideas and the world of practice, which may be loosely coupled (Brunsson 1989 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012: 2). This draws attention to the fact that there exists some amount of inconsistencies between how reforms are conceived and developed, and how they are put into practice. Often it proves more difficult to change how people and organisations act than what they think and believe (Christensen & Lægreid, 2012: 2). If one compares reform policy documents with reform decisions and with reform implementation and results, one tends to see different things (Pollitt 2001 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012: 2). In practice, sometimes there emerge somewhat disparities between reform objectives and the intended change.

Performance Management System (PMS): An Essential Element of NPM Reform

Performance management has had an ever-increasing influence in contemporary public management especially during the age of performance in the 2000s and has become the centrepiece most recent public-sector reforms (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013). The surge of performance management can be traced from the emergence of NPM in the 1980s within the public sector of most countries (Carroll and Dewar, 2002). This was in response to the poor governance and moribund public sectors that had characterised most countries especially developing countries during that period. The main essence of performance management was to reinforce accountability and enhance performance in the public services (Bouckaert and Peters 2002; Radnor and McGuire 2004; Ohemeng 2011; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013).

Performance management is still seen as an ambiguous concept despite the age of performance and its popularity in organisation and public management studies (Carrol, 2000 & Otley, 1999 cited by Ohemeng, 2009). This is as a result of the fact that performance management is mostly confused with performance measurement and other

forms of performance assessments such as performance appraisal, performance monitoring, and performance reporting (Bruijn, 2007, Halachmi, 2005, McAdam et al., 2005, Pollitt, 2006, Talbot, 2005 & Wholey, 1999 cited by Ohemeng, 2009). Mupazviriho (2003 cited by Ohemeng, 2009: 112) comments that "performance management extends beyond the concept of performance appraisal or performance-related pay of the 1980s, which only tries to address how a person should be rewarded after the completion of tasks over a given period".

This confusion has partially accounted to what Ohemeng and Owusu (2011 cited by Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013: 459) have discussed as "definitional quagmire", that is, difficult to define. Most scholars tend to describe rather than define (Halachmi, 2005, Heinrich, 2007, Radin, 2006, & Wholey, 1999 cited by Ohemeng, 2009). However, in the context of this study, Performance Management is defined as "the development and incorporation of performance measurement into an organisation's management and policy systems, and the subsequent use of the information generated for decision making by managers and the politicians to whom they are accountable" (Van Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan 2010; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013: 459). Performance Management is composed of four main immanent elements which include: "i. deciding what is the desired level of performance; ii. measuring performance; iii. reporting or communicating performance information; and iv. using performance information to compare actual performance to the agreed performance level" (Carroll & Dewar, 2002: 413). In this regard, Performance Management is seen as a feedback cycle of intentional behaviour because organisational goals and program decisions are been shaped by performance information which are relevant to managers and subordinates , and thus, may allude to significant changes that will eventually require the setting and measurement of new performance targets; and in effect, starting the whole Performance Management sequence over again (Van Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan 2010; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013: 459).

The Three Main Objectives of Performance Management System

Performance Management system is driven by three main objectives, that is, efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability (Ohemeng F., 2011; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013). The efficiency of any performance management system is mostly concerned with "value-for-money" and how costs are compared to outputs guided by the principle of rationality (McDavid and Hawthorn, 2006 cited by Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas,

2013). Effectiveness as an important objective of performance management system is also explained as the direct and indirect impacts and outcomes of public programs on the entire populace during and after implementation process (McDavid and Hawthorn, 2006 cited by Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013). Finally, accountability also as an objective, is literally referred to as "the mechanism that obliges agents, entrusted with public resources, to answer for their actions and decisions regarding these same resources to those who assigned them the responsibility" (Romzek & Dubnick 1987, Pollitt 2011 cited by Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013:460). It is also worth noting that, efficiency and effectiveness collectively provides greater understanding into organisation's service standards, successes, and failures, and hence, improved means of programmes and services delivery (Radnor & McGuire, 2004; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013).

In conclusion, as already discussed, performance management is the most essential element of NPM that drives administrative reforms in most developed and developing countries. Australia and New Zealand, who have experienced NPM peaks, had performance management (an essential element of NPM) as an integral part of their public management during each phase of reforms (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007).

2.1.1 Why do Some Reforms Fail?

The post implementation impact of administrative reforms has been mixed. Reform studies have shown mixed results for institutional reforms in development; many of these results are mixed (Andrews, 2013: 19). Reforms do not fail because, once implemented, they yield unsatisfactory outcomes; they fail because they never get past the implementation stage at all (Polidano, 2001: 346). They are blocked outright or put into effect only in tokenistic, half-hearted fashion (Ibid). In this section, I present reform arguments posited by scholars like Polidano C. (2001), Klitgaard (1997) and Karyeija (2010) on how some reforms fail and others do not.

Explanatory Factors: Leadership of Change (Approach-Based Viewpoint) by Polidano (2001)

Polidano (2001: 346) is of the notion that reform scholars tend to over emphasise on the content of reform (what sort of initiatives should be taken) at the expense of the reform approach (how to go about it) in their quest of explaining and suggesting ways to improve the prospects of reform. In light of this, Polidano advances an approach-

based perspective in explaining reform processes. He focuses on the approach to reform and not the content. His perspective is rooted in the assumption that "what matters most in improving the record of implementation are the strategic and tactical decisions taken in the course of putting the reforms into effect" (Ibid). Polidano expands his perspective from three viewpoints: the scope of reform, the role of aid donors, and the leadership of change. However, due to the research intent of the study, discussions will be narrowed down to the leadership of change viewpoint as advanced by Polidano (2001).

- *The Leadership of Change*

This is the last crucial issue discussed by Polidano and it pertains to the leadership of the reform. He presents that in two parts. The first part concerns the establishment of central structures of direction for reform that involve and co-ordinate the efforts of different agencies and ensure that they make reform a priority (Polidano, 2001: 352). The second part on the other hand concerns the structuring of the entire reform initiative itself so that it is aimed at the activities of departmental staff rather than central agency bureaucrats (Ibid).

With the establishment of an effective central coordination, scholars like Wilenski (1986) believe that reform will forever be kept on the back burner unless a dedicated unit is set up to drive it forward (Ibid). This implies that, "there must be a small core of people working full time on civil service reform. It needs no conspiracy theorist to see that reform may never get off the ground if it is added to the responsibilities of people who have many other things to do" (Ibid). With the second part of Polidano's argument, he projects that after the vertical divides between the various central agencies have been successfully bridged, reformers must then turn their attention to the horizontal divide between the centre and the street-level offices where most government business is transacted, and where change must ultimately make itself felt if reform efforts are to succeed (Polidano, 2001: 354).

Explanatory factors: Cultural Approach

Polidano's (2001) approach-based viewpoint especially with regards to the leadership of change discussion, mainly projects the structural rationalistic approach to reforms as the main explanatory factors for some failed reforms. Explanatory factors like culture are entirely overlooked by Polidano (2001). However, most reform scholars and studies like Klitgaard (1997) and Karyeija (2010) identify cultural variables as the most

convincing variables that account for some failed reform institutionalisation especially in developing countries. In the context of civil service in developing countries, reforms are mainly influenced by cultural variables such as power distance, ethnicity, political bias, affection, hierarchy, kinship, tribal networks, and the importance of leisure and celebration (Klitgaard 1997 cited by Karyeija 2010: 66). Karyeija (2010) argues that the failure of most public-sector reforms in developing countries is a result of the incompatibility between the reform and the host administrative culture. Reforms will not be accepted and eventually institutionalised as long as there is no cultural adjustment to enable them to take deep root (Ibid). Some of these cultural variables wrestle out and resist these reform goals and hence, failed reforms.

These particular lines of explanation constitute the main tenets of the study, that is, the effect of culture (administrative) and leadership on reforms, specifically performance management reforms.

2.2 The Theoretical Explanation to Administrative Reform and Culture

The study adopts the instrumental and institutional/cultural perspectives as well as the interplay of these perspectives (transformative approach) in explaining administrative reforms in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy. These new institutional theories provide a broad and yet relevant theoretical approach which explain the drivers of reform as a function of rationalistic human decisions in organisations as well as the factors that affect these decisions and reforms. The instrumental perspective presents a theoretical logic which underlies the concept of rational choice. Instrumentalists view reforms as administrative tools to expedite change in organisational through rational calculations (logic of consequentiality). Also, from a contextual point of view, instrumentalists also view culture as what has an organisation has. The institutional perspective on the other hand also provides a cultural contextual approach to the understanding of administrative reforms and how employees respond to reform policies. The institutionalists also believe organisational culture influences bureaucrats' actions and inactions and thus, reform frameworks must always be in sync the host administrative culture.

2.2.1 The Instrumental Perspective

The instrumental perspective conceptualises public organisations as agents of national development and thus make decisions on behalf of the society. In this sense, it suggests

that public actors' actions and inactions are guided by *instrumental rationality* in the achievement of organisational goals. Instrumental rationality entails members of an organisation assessing all available options or tools according to their consequences and in relation to the chosen goals making wilful choices between alternatives and achieving the effects desired through those choices (Christensen et al. 2007:20). The instrumental perspective hinges on the *logic of consequence* whose main point of departure begins with the 'idea of organisations as instruments are concerned with clarifying goals and means -ends conceptions of organisations and their members' (Ibid).

The instrumentalists argue that organisations are made up of formal organisational structures and thus, fulfilling tasks and achieving desired results require the design of formal structures. Formal organisational structure basically refers to a 'structure that consists of positions and rules for who shall or can do what and which defines how various tasks should be executed' (Ibid:21). Formal hierarchy, division of labour and routine are essential elements for any bureaucratic organisational form with a formal organisational structure. Hierarchy simply refers to superior and subordinate relations in an organisation. Division of labour also means that organisational tasks are horizontally tied to different units and positions in an organisation (Christensen et al. 2007). Routines also on the other hand refers to the 'rules and procedures for who shall carry out tasks and how they should be accomplished' (Ibid:24). In this sense, the standard organisational model is the departmental agency, embedded in a hierarchy of influence, responsibility, and control, and insulated from other influences (Olsen: 239).

The concept of instrumental rationality underscores action based on means-end rationality where the end always justifies the means. Actors always choose between alternatives and they are much concerned with achieving predetermined goals. According to Christensen et al, (2007:22), implementation of rational actions consists of four elements; i. Goal or problem; ii. Alternatives; iii. Consequences; iv. Decision-making rules. These elements are quite evident in bureaucrats' behaviour especially when operating under reforms. They make wilful decisions based on the consequences of their choices (What will I gain?).

In light of the discussions above, reforms and reorganisation efforts are based on explicit or implicit assumptions about formal organisations- how they are formed and changed, how decisions are made within and between them, and what effects they have

(Olsen, 1988). According to Christensen et al, (2007:130) performance management and administrative reforms conceived within the instrumental perspective are considered as structural-instrumental tools in the hands of political and administrative leaders. It is a control technique that: a) operates on clear and coherent goals serving as basis for performance measurement; b) measures results on specified indicators that are reported to the senior organisational officials, and performance measurement systems allow this through testing outcomes; c) results have consequences in terms of rewards and punishment to the individual employees (Ibid). This particular perspective to reform is very managerial. Political leaders deliberately design the administrative apparatus to make it more effective and efficient through reforms (Olsen, 1988). In such political systems, reform decisions are voluntary and reflect the goals and expectations of rational actors involved (Ibid).

Due to the rational choice logic underlying this particular perspective, Zey (1998 cited by Karyeija, 2010) outlines four main challenges that reformers (rational actors) face in the course of the implementation process. The first challenge is resource constraint (scarcity of resources). To Zey (1998 cited by Karyeija, 2010:56), the actor is constrained by the scarcity of resources; given that each actor possesses different resources and in different proportions, this constrains the actions taken. The second challenge is constraint of opportunity cost. Friedman and Hechter are of the notion that "these are costs associated with forgoing the most attractive course of action. An individual actor may choose the second most valuable end or goal in instances where resources are scarce" (Zey 1998 cited by Karyeija 2010:56; Karyeija 2010:56." The third challenge is associated with institutional norms constraint. "These norms may be societal, organisational or family centred. The actor can be constrained by these norms when choosing the best course of action" (Ibid). The last challenge is tied to information constraint. The quality of information available is the major constraint, more so than the quantity: 'the ability to control the source, amount, content, and accuracy of information has never been a stronger constraint on rational decision making' (Zey 1998: 3 cited by Karyeija: 56).

2.2.2 The Institutional/Cultural Perspective

The Institutional School of Thought contends that public organisations are marked by formal and informal norms which intend influence human action and dictates the 'rules

of the game' in organisations. By dint of this, Christensen et al. (2007) emphasise on why there is the need to draw a distinction between these two set of norms, formal and informal norms, due to their differing origins and modes of operation although they do influence each other. These set of norms form the building blocks of the organisational culture of the organisation.

The view of the cultural perspective is in tandem with the *logic of appropriateness* which constitutes the fundamental logic of action of organisations. According to the Culturalists, human action is based on legitimacy, that is, to what extent is one's action legitimate? Public servants' actions are tied to the organisational norms (informal or formal) that specify which action is fair, reasonable, expected, and acceptable in the organisational environment. According to Christensen et al. (2007:40), this logic tied to organisational culture means that 'when acting in public situations, one will not primarily act rationally according to careful deliberation of pro and contra arguments...but 'instead, one will engage in matching, whereby rules for action are deployed in order to link situations and identities. The logic of cultural appropriateness assumes that human behaviour and actions are influenced by these three fundamental questions: i. What type of situation is this? (recognition); ii. What is my identity? (identity); iii. What is the most appropriate action (for myself and my institution) for this situation (appropriate rules for action) (Christensen et al. 2007).

They further argue that the organisation's appropriate action is instigated by the 'normative and institutional foundation that may be highly divergent from that found in other organisations, depending on how an organisational culture has evolved and what its dominant informal norms and values are' (Ibid). Here, cultural and informal norms hinges on experience, that is, learning by experience. This implies that in public organisations, the experienced public servants will have more advantage over the less experienced ones. Christensen et al (2007) argue that these experienced members of organisations possess the 'institutional memory' of the organisation and thus try to cascade these norms into the new members.

The institutionalists in this sense view culture as an explanatory variable and thus possess some kind of explanatory power. They conceptualise culture as a prerequisite for the survival of organisations. This is done through 'pattern maintenance' to keep the organisation alive because according to them, organisations never or seldom die (Christensen et al. 2007). One general argument of the culturalists is that, an

organisational culture aims at creating a collective feeling and identity by integrating public servants into the organisation with 'integrative glue'. This presupposes that public organisations in their quest to realise collective goals must be devoid of 'cultural heterogeneity and tensions' (Ibid). Furthermore, culturalists conceive culture as a goal unto itself because organisational members' orientation and socialisation take place through the internalisation of informal norms and collective values (Ibid). This in effect creates some kind of loyalty in the organisation whereby members work under less supervision and become more satisfied with their job. However, it is worth noting that, organisational culture breads goal complexity because of the proliferation and differences between official and real organisational goals.

Change and stability are key elements in organisational settings (path dependency). Organisational norms and values are very difficult to alter once they are fully institutionalised. It is generally believed that 'new ideas and new ways of doing things may threaten the stability of the system' (Jamil, 2007:12). The course and outcome of processes of change is mostly influenced by the organisation's established cultural features (Christensen et al, 2007: 124).

Culture here is seen as a double-edged sword, such that, it helps create predictability and stability of actions on one hand, and also immunes organisations to change. Public servants may oppose reforms when they intend to change the stability of the host culture. This suggests that, reforms are likely to succeed and enhance performance when they are compatible with existing cultural norms.

2.2.3 The Transformative Approach: The Dynamic Interplay of Instrumentalism and Culturalism

Context is very crucial in understanding administrative reforms and decision making in many NPM countries. Thus, in order to better understand the role of context in reform and change, and reform and its effect in all situations, there is the need to examine both the instrumental and cultural approach in tandem in order to explain how their dynamic interplay accounts for the reform processes. Context literally refers to the circumstances, norms and values, environment, background or settings which affect, constrain, specify or clarify the meaning of an event (Christensen & Lægreid in Pollitt C., 2013:132). Contextual factors in administrative reforms represent the setting within which reforms are developed and implemented (Ibid).

Due to the contextual nature of administrative reform, there has been the growing need to blend different perspectives to understand the process of administrative reform across countries and policy areas and over time (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). By virtue of this, Christensen & Lægreid (2007:4) advance a broad **transformative approach** to public reforms which contend that "institutional dynamics of reforms can best be interpreted as a complex mixture of environmental pressure, polity features and historical institutional context". They further argue that these factors in turn "define how much leeway political leaders have in making choices about reforms – that is, they both further and hinder reforms, resulting in complex patterns of influence, learning and effects" (Ibid).

The first aspect of the transformative approach which is tied to the instrumental perspective emphasises that "different countries have different *constitutional features and political-administrative structures* and these factors go some way to explaining how they handle national problems and reform processes" (Weaver and Rockman 1993; Olsen and Peters 1996 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2007:6). This even transcends to the organisational level whereby different organisations also have different structural and administrative features and thus, shape how they handle reform processes.

The second aspect also tied to the cultural/institutional perspective emphasises that reforms are driven by *national historical-institutional context*. To Selznick, (1957 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012:8) cultural features of public organisations develop gradually in institutional processes, giving institutionalised organisations a distinct character or cultural soul.

The last aspect conceptualises the implementation of administrative reforms primarily as a reaction to *external pressure (environmental factors),* be it either institutional or technical (Meyer and Rowan 1977 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012). The institutional environment refers to the influence exerted by the prevailing, ideologically dominant doctrine diffused all over the world in the adoption of NPM reform (Czarniawska and Sevon 1996 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012). The technical environment on the other hand refers to the situation whereby reforms are seen as the optimal solution to widespread technical problems created by a lack of instrumental performance or by economic competition and market pressure (Self 2000 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012).

A transformative perspective emerges when we combine the above discussed internal and environmental reform features to explain why NPM may have different content, effects and implications in different countries (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999a cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 24). According to Christensen & Lægreid (2001: 24) external reform concepts and programmes are evidently filtered, interpreted and modified by a combination of the national political-administrative history, culture, traditions and style of governance which have developed in an evolutionary manner and the national polity features as seen in constitutional and structural factors. To them, these factors tend to constrain and create for purposeful choice, deliberate instrumental actions and intentional efforts undertaken by political and administrative leaders to launch NPM-reforms (Olsen, 1992; Olsen and Peters, 1996a cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 24).

The transformative approach denies the absolute power and control of leaders over reform process. The approach however acknowledges that leaders are assured a degree of manoeuvrability but their influence is constrained by the environmental factors, polity features and historical-institutional context (Ibid). To Christensen & Lægreid (2001: 25), "at one extreme, international environmental pressure to adopt NPM reforms may have profound effects on national systems if they are simultaneously furthered by the political-administrative leadership and are compatible with historical-cultural traditions" (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 25). At the other extreme, environmental pressure for reform may produce few changes and effects if political and administrative leaders consciously try to stop or avoid the reforms owing to their lack of compatibility between their values and norms and externally produced reforms (Røvik, 1996 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 25). According to Christensen & Lægreid, (2001: 25), in practice, political leaders can use certain elements of externally generated reforms or try to redefine ambiguous reform elements in a national context in order to match instrumental goals and national culture. Røvik (1998) and Sahlin-Andersson (1996) cited by (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 25) also add that in yet another scenario, political leaders might accept the reforms, leaving their implementation to administrative leaders and thus, allowing for adjustment and editing to fit institutional-cultural features.

Summing up with theoretical approaches....

The foregoing discussions present a very broad theoretical framework in explaining the concept of administrative reform. The instrumental/Cultural debate advances institutional logics that underscore the very essence of reform and its relationship with contextual elements like culture and leadership. The instrumentalists believe leaders use reforms to instigate change and bring out the best out of public servants in an instrumentally rational way. The Culturalists on the hand argues that organisations reflect dominant cultural values in society which is generally seen as appropriate and cannot be changed readily. These perspectives serve as a point of departure for understanding the role of context in reform from a **"transformative approach".** This approach contends that the dynamics of reform can be well understood by examining its contextual factors. As already outlined, the study focuses on the interplay of the leadership and cultural context in explaining the reform dynamics in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy. Any reform needs the appropriate soil to grow. The administrative context provides that soil to contextualise reforms and take deep root. If there is a mismatch between administrative context and reform objectives, then reforms may lack the necessary soil or foundation to institutionalise.

2.3 Operationalisation of Variables: Towards an analytical framework framework

By reflecting on the foregoing discussions of this chapter, the challenge is to operationalise the theoretical underpinnings of the study into clear cut variables, both dependent and independent for analysis.

2.3.1 Dependent Variable: implementation and institutionalisation of PM Reforms

The main dependent variable to be examined is the implementation and institutionalisation of Performance Management Reforms, specifically, the New Performance Management Policy (NPMP) developed and introduced by the Public Services Commission in the public service. This particular variable examines how well performance management system has been implemented and institutionalised in the public service. In effect, I pose the first research question as already mentioned in the preceding chapter. **"*What is the state of performance management reform in Ghana's***

Public Service? To what extent has this been institutionalised in the various public institutions?"

The main rationale is to first investigate and explore the performance management reform trajectory as well as the current reform in the service; and the extent to which it has been habituated through institutionalisation. This particular aspect of the study hinges on the concept of institutionalisation advanced greatly in Berger and Luckmann's (1967) work *"The Social Construction of Reality"*. Institutionalisation is identified as a process thorough which habits, norms and values are deeply rooted in organisations and become rules. People follow it and are afraid to break it, they feel comfortable with it and it gives them identity. Institutionalisation occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualised actions by types of actors (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 70).

Measuring the level of institutionalisation of the NPMP

The NPMP provides a very comprehensive overview of how performance management should be operationalised in the public service. And by measuring the institutionalisation level of the reform, I have teased out four key constructs from the entire reform policy framework[4] with bureaucrats' perceptions. These constructs happen to be the main highlights and summary of the NPMP. Bureaucrats are being asked to offer their thoughts on the extent to which the constructs have been well entrenched in their respective bureaucracies. Thus, the study draws on the thoughts and outlook of bureaucrats on how well these constructs have been implemented and habituated over time in their respective organisations. Table 2.0 presents the four teased out NPMP constructs or objectives and some questions that seek to measure the level of institutionalisation.

Table 2.0 The four teased out NPMP constructs and its measurement.

CONSTRUCT	MEASURING THE LEVEL OF INSTITUTIONALISATION
• **Construct A - Implementing Results-Oriented Management**	• *The NPMP seeks to implement performance/results-oriented management in meeting organizational goals. To what extent has this been institutionalised in the service?*

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[4] These constructs are comprehensively discussed in chapter four and five.

• **Construct B** - Introduction of Robust Performance Appraisal System	• *The NPMP seeks to introduce a more robust of Performance Appraisal System (PAS). How effective is the appraisal system in this institution? Has it influenced the performance of public servants?*
• **Construct C** - Transparency of performance targets	• *The NPMP also seeks to enhance transparency of performance targets – In a consultative manner between assessees and assessors. To what extent has this been institutionalised? Are you satisfied with the level of transparency?*
• **Construct D** – Ensuring an effective Reward and Sanction System.	• *One key objective of the NPMP is to ensure an effective Recognition, Incentive, reward, and sanction system linked to performance. To what extent has this been institutionalised? How often do bureaucrats get rewarded or sanctioned after an appraisal year?*

2.3.2 Independent Variables: Administrative Culture Vs. Leadership

The independent variable of the study happens to be the contextual factors that affect reforms stemming from the theoretical and conceptual perspectives which underscore the study. Thus, the independent variables of the study are administrative culture and leadership being adoptive or resistant to the reform process. By examining administrative culture and leadership as the independent variables of the study, again I pose the second research question as mentioned in the preceding chapter, that is: **"*What explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform? Is it leadership or administrative culture that matters? Or a combination of both, that is, leadership and culture?*"**

Administrative Culture as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable

Administrative culture as a critical element of organisational studies has been elaborated and discussed differently by different scholars, hence, there has not been any universally accepted definition. However, the working definition for this study is the "general characteristics of public officials, i.e., shared values, attitudes, and beliefs" (Henderson, 2005:41).

Measuring Administrative Culture

The concept of administrative culture is measured and analysed within the purview of the following cultural dimensions: **power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and political neutrality.** These dimensions are drawn from a commingle of ideas of Hofstedes' (2010) and other culture scholars like Jamil (2002) and Karyeija (2010). According to Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, (2010:31), dimensions of culture are the aspects of culture that can be measured relative to other cultures. Hofstede et al. (2013) advance four cultural dimensions: *power distance, collectivism versus individualism, femininity versus masculinity,* and *uncertainty avoidance.* However, the study adopts only two out of the four cultural dimensions. The main reason behind this choice is to really focus on the **structural institutional make-up** as well as its impact on administrative systems of the Ghanaian bureaucracy which cuts across issues like hierarchism and power, and the Public Service as a formal institution; hence power distance and uncertainty avoidance are deemed appropriate in that regard. Collectivism versus individualism, and femininity versus masculinity dimensions were not considered since they are more focused on relationship and gender than structural features. My third cultural dimension which happens to be political neutrality dimension can be traced from cultural studies by Jamil (2002) and Karyeija (2010). Karyeija in his study examines how political neutrality affects performance management in the Ugandan bureaucracy. In a nut shell, these three cultural dimensions were considered because they have indeed dominated most national level and/or cross-national studies across the globe.

The cultural dimensions and their indicators

Power Distance

Power distance is one of the main dimensions of national cultures. This dimension is based on Hofstede's ideas on power and authority relationships in organisations. Hofstede defines power distance as "the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010:61). There are two main forms of power distance in organisations; large power distance and small power distance. Large power distance is mainly hierarchic in nature where actions and inactions of subordinates are influenced by top-down superior commands in hierarchic

organisations (Jamil, 2002). Small power distance on the contrary is more egalitarian in nature and really characterised by total interdependence between boss and subordinates in a collegial atmosphere (Tayeb, 1988 as cited by Jamil, 2002).

Ghana as a West African country is seen to have a high or large power distance society according to Hofstede et al's (2010) Survey on 76 countries and regions. West African countries of which Ghana is part, scores 77 on the power distance index ranking 17-18 out of 76 based on IBM database plus extensions. In instances where a society has large power distance, then it follows that organisations may as well be considered to have large power distance tendencies (Karyeija K. G., 2010 : 70). Thus, by inference, it can be said that, there is a higher inclination of having a large power distance bureaucracy in Ghana. In analysing power distance in the Ghanaian Public Service, three main concepts of power distance have been identified to serve as the indicators for analysing power distance. They are: ***Hierarchism and Boss-Subordinate Relationship.***

- **Hierarchism**

One of the main indicators of power distance is hierarchism. Large power distance organisations are mostly characterised by tall hierarchies. In the large power distance organisations, superiors and subordinates consider each other as existentially unequal and mirrored in hierarchies (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010: 73). In such cases, power is highly centralised and wielded by a selected few (Ibid). Due to the highly centralised nature of power in large power distance organisations, subordinates constantly feed on the directives and instructions of their superiors in order to be able to work. Subordinates expect to be told what to do and they do, and they dare not question authority but to take orders (Munene et al 2000; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010: 73). In such organisations, hierarchism is an essential component for their survival. In implication, the moment the existing hierarchies break down, it is most likely to result into organisational failure. This is because the entire organisational setup is undergirded by hierarchism. There are always a large number of supervisory personnel, structured into tall hierarchies of people reporting to each other (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010: 73). This aspect of power distance even transcends to the salary system of the organisation. There is a wide gap between the salary earnings of superiors and subordinates in large power distance organisations (Ibid).

Hierarchism has been an essential part of the PMS especially in high power distance countries like Ghana and has constantly hindered the maximum impact and effectiveness of PMS in these countries. The PMS trends in Ghana have sought to accord so much power to superiors and thereby making subordinates more vulnerable. By dint of this, the Ghanaian bureaucracy has struggled with the issue of subjectivity which has constantly crippled the PMS process and its effect in the Ghanaian bureaucracy over the years. Until the introduction of NPMP in 2014, most junior bureaucrats regarded performance appraisal as an exploitation tool in the hands of leaders.

This particular situation is accentuated in Karyeija's (2010: 70) question that, "performance appraisal works on the premise that the rater and ratee can engage each other in conversation without fear, as peers, but how can this be achieved in a large power distance culture where both parties expect that only the superior gives instructions and commands?". He further posits that "in large power distance cultures, those in lower ranks are not expected to participate in the performance appraisal (Kirkbride and Westwood 1993) and thus the performance appraisal system does not fit with the culture because the subordinate may find it difficult to meet the rater and set his or her own goals in cooperation with the rater" (Ibid: 71).

- **Boss-Subordinate Relationship: Formalism vs. Informality**

Relationships between subordinates and superiors in a large power distance organisation is frequently loaded with emotions (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010: 73). The ideal boss in the subordinates' eyes, the one they feel most comfortable with and whom they respect most, is a benevolent autocrat or "good father" (Ibid). This alludes to the fact that personal relations mostly matter and thereby making formal rules and procedures redundant in large power distance organisations. In large power distance cultures when hierarchy is combined with informal relations, boss-subordinate interface is mostly tensed and unhealthy unlike in small power distance cultures. This has been because of the existentially unequal nature of large power distance organisations. Tensed large power distance cultures have never been compatible with PMS reforms. In relation to this, Mendonca and Kanungo (1994 cited by Karyeija, 2012: 71), puts forward that all critical activities in performance appraisal require the manager to function as a coach and mentor to his subordinates, but high-power distance

is 'certainly not compatible with this nature of a manager-subordinate relationship'. The only way the negative boss-subordinate relationship in large power distance organisations is managed is through sycophancy to smoothen the relationship (Karyeija 2012). Karyeija (2012: 71) posits that sycophancy is manifested in many ways such as flattery and by imitating the boss. Thus, it is intended to create an impression of a servile person and to win favour from the boss, and also thriving to impress the boss by diligently carrying out tasks meted out by the boss especially in the context of the performance appraisal (Ibid). Sycophancy in a nutshell, tends to foster personal relationship between bosses and subordinates in large power distance organisations and bosses in most organisations tend to utilise that to neutralise the negative implication of large power distance culture.

Hypothesis 1: *The existence of a large power distance culture and informal relations in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy may threaten proper institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service.*

Uncertainty Avoidance

Uncertainty avoidance denotes ways of handling uncertainty, which are part of and parcel of any human institution in any country (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010:191). The concept of uncertainty avoidance hinges on the assumption that the future is always uncertain, but we have to live with it (Ibid). In this sense, uncertainty avoidance is defined as the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010:191). To Hofstede et al. (2010: 191), this feeling is, among other manifestations, expressed through nervous stress and in a need for predictability: a need for written rules. From an organisational perspective, uncertainty avoidance reflects the degree to which people are likely to prefer structured or unstructured organisational situations (Islam, 2004:323). It also reflects the propensity to take risks and the attitude towards change and innovation (Ibid). Organisations can have either strong or weak uncertainty avoidance depending on the society in question (Jamil, 2002; Hoftstede et al, 2010). Organisations with strong uncertainty avoidance or low tolerance for ambiguity tend to have more formalised and centralised rules and regulations system with employees taking less risk by breaking rule and regulations (Jamil, 2002). In strong uncertainty avoidance cultures, leaders are continually engaged in rules, regulations and laws formulation in order to reduce stress and anxiety that come with uncertainty situations.

Here, they are very committed to avoiding unclear situations and hence creating an anxiety-free environment. In such situations, the future is always anticipated because of the existence of known standards that guide human actions and organisational processes.

The situation is different in weak uncertainty or high tolerance for ambiguity organisations. Here, organisations are characterised by low degree of formalisation and job definitions (Jamil, 2007: 89). For the purpose of measuring and analysing uncertainty avoidance in the Ghanaian Public Service, these concepts have been identified as the basis for analysis: ***Rule Orientation and Innovation.***

- **Rule Orientation**

Uncertainty Avoiding Organisations tend to reduce organisational anxiety caused by ambiguous or unclear situations through "rule orientation" – application of both written and unwritten rules (Hofstede et al. 2010). Hofstede et al. stresses that the need for rules in strong uncertainty avoidance cultures is very emotional (Ibid). People in such cultures have been programmed since early childhood to feel comfortable in structured environments (Ibid). In implication, administrative systems in uncertainty avoiding organisations are very rigid and room for manoeuvring is limited, and employees feel comfortable with that. Space makes them uncertain. In addition to this, Hofstede et al. (2010) furthermore add that the concept of rule orientation and uncertainty avoidance is closely tied to Power Distance. This is in the sense that, in high power distance organisations, the exercise of discretionary power by superiors replaces to some extent the need for internal rules (Ibid: 209). In situations, where the future is known due to the unavailability of explicit rules and regulations, superiors tend to dictate the "rules of the game".

However, critics from weak uncertainty avoidance organisations oppose vehemently to concept of rule following, that is, the emotional need for rules. They argue that the emotional need for laws and regulations in a strong uncertainty avoidance society can lead to rules or rule oriented behaviours that are purely ritual, inconsistent, or even dysfunctional (Ibid). In view of this, countries from weak uncertainty avoidance cultures rather exhibit an emotional horror of formal rules (Ibid: 210). People in such cultures believe the society or organisation can survive without the existence of formal rules. Thus, the application of rules must only be in case absolute necessity (Hofstede

et al. 2010: 209). They believe many problems can be solved without formal rules (Ibid).

According to Hofstede et al. (2010: 213), formal rules are very essential for implementation processes. They argue that "implementation of new processes demands a considerable sense of detail and punctuality" and this is made possible in high uncertainty avoiding cultures. In implication, the existence of formal rules especially in uncertainty avoiding organisations are very crucial for the survival of a reform or any policy. These rule culture backing the reform provides support for a successful implementation and institutionalisation. The rules stipulate what ought to be done at any given time and when well enforced, may lead to the desired change intended by the reform.

- **Innovation**

Innovation means new ways doing things and not appreciated highly in organisations characterised by strong uncertainty avoidance. Weak uncertainty avoidance organisations are mostly focused on ways to challenge the status quo through creativity and innovation unlike strong uncertainty avoidance organisations who are always showing a "need for precision and formalisation" (Hofstede et al. 2010). According to Hofstede et al., (2010: 211) ambiguity and chaos are sometimes praised as conditions for creativity. They believe in the application of one's expertise when faced with ambiguities on the floor of work (Ibid). In this regard, top managers are always in constant search of strategies to address organisational phenomena, and thus, it tends to challenge and stimulate the innovation and creativity prowess in them.

Again, in relation to appraisal reforms, high uncertainty avoidance bureaucracies may be characterised by bureaucrats unwillingness to accept organisational change (Mendonca and Kanungo, 1999 cited by Karyeija, 2012). Any reform that is bound to bring change to the organisational PMS in such cultures is seen as a threat because bureaucrats are not ready to relinquish their old way of handling their appraisal systems. So, whenever there is newly introduced reform, they become more anxious and become stressed about the future and mostly immune to change and hence creating appraisal reform deadlocks. In this regard, Karyeija (2012: 75) further elaborates "in cultures with strong uncertainty avoidance norms, emotions are displayed in the way that everything different is dangerous. People resist changes and worry about the future".

de Jager (2001) accentuates this change phenomenon in his argument that 'Most people are reluctant to leave the familiar terrain behind. We are all suspicious about the unfamiliar; we are naturally concerned about how we will get from the old to the new, especially if it involves learning something new and risking failure' (de Jager 2001:24).

However, with regards to implementation processes, Hofstede et al (2010) contend that innovation has more than one face. To them, it may be true weak uncertainty avoidance cultures are better at basic innovations but may be seen to be at disadvantaged in implementation, that is, developing these innovations into new products or services (Ibid: 213). Owing to this, it presupposes that strong uncertainty avoiding organisations have a greater tendency of having better implementations due to the availability of details and rules guiding the entire implementation process with weak uncertainty avoiding organisation having implementation challenges.

In connection to this mixed effect of uncertainty avoidance on the implementation of reforms, I present two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: *Uncertainty avoidance is associated with more rule following, less innovation, more resistance to change. Thus, higher uncertainty avoidance may impede successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service.*

Hypothesis 3: *More rule following may institute positive attitude to rule setting and its enforcement. Thus, higher uncertainty avoidance may foster a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service.*

Political Neutrality

Over the years, the role of politics has been marginalised in contemporary study of organisational culture where too much emphasis has solely been placed on organisations' internal context such as employee's work-related attitudes, organisation structure and management systems (Jamil, 2002). According to Jamil (2002), such an approach to the study of organisational culture may not offer greater insights into public organisational behaviour where politics is a critical element in shaping public administration and its relations to society. He argues that the fundamental characteristics of public administration is its relationship to politics and its position in a wider political system (Jamil, 2007:69). This dimension of culture specifically highlights on the incorporation of theories of politics into the study of organisational culture. This dimension seeks to look at the extent to which bureaucrats are politically

neutral or biased. According to Jamil (2002), relationship and attitudes of bureaucracies to politics are not the same and are determined by the context or society involved. Political neutrality refers to civil servants performing their jobs professionally and without biases towards politicians (Karyeija, 2010:78). Jamil (2007: 70) posits that the administration of public organisations is a neutral instrument which is concerned with translating into practice political decisions which are derived from other sources (Barker, 1966; Self, 1972 cited by Jamil, 2007: 70). The electoral system may bring in new political leaders but administrators remain unchanged through the system of career which is connected to the impersonal character of bureaucracy (Jamil, 2007: 70).

The study adopts *Classical Bureaucracy Vs. Partisan Bureaucracy* to serve as a benchmark for analysis with respect to political neutrality.

- **Classical Bureaucracy Vs. Partisan Bureaucracy**

Robert Putnam (1975 as cited Jamil, 2002:94) in his analysis of bureaucratic responsiveness in Britain, Germany and Italy identifies two forms of bureaucratic attitudes, that is, classical bureaucracy which is more procedure or rule oriented and political bureaucracy which is also more problem or programme oriented. The Classical bureaucracy is the kind which is more committed to upholding the principle of political neutrality in its administrative system. Classical bureaucracies are always neutral and loyal to all governments and regimes that come to power (Jamil, 2007). This situation is made possible through the system of Weberian bureaucracy (especially in the case of Europe) where administrators are arranged according to a hierarchy with vertical authority system, lifelong career, impersonality, and promotion on the basis of merit (Ibid: 70). Classical bureaucracies are always able to withstand any political upheaval which does not alter and destabilise the institutional structure and function of the entire bureaucracy. Jamil (2007: 71) stresses that classical bureaucracies believe in the assumption that "issues should be resolved through adhering to some objective and standard criteria of legality and technical practicality". Such bureaucracies believe in the universal application of rules devoid of any form of political considerations leading to favouritism. They see themselves as one people and the bureaucracy is not fragmented along political lines.

The political bureaucracy depicts the "opposite syndrome" (Ibid). The political bureaucracies consider the influence of partisan politics on policy as very legitimate

and thus, their everyday lives are characterised by bargaining and compromises rather than following rules and routines (Ibid). They see political influence as a part of their administrative systems. In this vein, bureaucrats' actions, especially those who got recruited by the help of an affiliated political party, must be in sync of with the values and dispositions of the affiliated political party. Such bureaucracies really run a highly politicised administrative system.

In relation to PM reforms, one key implication of this bureaucratic attitude along classical and political dimensions is the threat to objectivity and equity in the PMS process due to the inherent political fragmentation especially in political bureaucracies. The appraisal process of most PMS must always kick away subjectivity. Bureaucrats must always be objectively appraised based on the performance and accomplishment of their performance targets. Due to principle of equity and the universal application of rules that underpin classical bureaucracies, this aspect of appraisal is always upheld unlike political bureaucracies. The political bureaucracy is highly fragmented along political lines, and thus, threatens the issue of objectivity in the appraisal process. There are higher tendencies of favouring bureaucrats who belong to the appraiser's factional group and vice versa when the appraisee and the appraiser are not connected politically.

Hypothesis 4: *"the higher the degree of political neutrality in the Ghanaian Public Service, the less the bureaucracy becomes fragmented along political lines. Such a situation facilitates the objectivity, neutrality and equity element of the NPMP and hence, a better NPMP implementation and institutionalisation in the Ghanaian Public Service."*.

Leadership as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable

Leadership has largely been seen and assessed as a significant predictor of organisational success through strategy formulation (Acheampong, Odoom, & Tweneboah-Koduah, 1997: 338). This insinuates that organisational performance is shaped by the rational calculations of organisational leaders. Leaders in the upper echelons of an organisation influence organisational performance directly through their characteristics and behaviours and indirectly through the strategic choices they make (Ibid).

Leadership as a contextual variable of administrative reform is often seen as situationally contingent and thus, different situations demand different types or styles (Christensen et al. 2007: 113). According to Christensen et al. (2007), this particular

assertion has received several differing interpretations from different schools of thought. However, the most suitable interpretation for this study is that leadership is exercised in different contexts, and thus will vary in thinking and behaviour (Ibid: 114). In the implementation of reforms, conditions for leaders' actions vary due to the structural and cultural constraints (Ibid). leadership types and styles are mostly shaped by the structural and cultural features of the organisation. To Christensen et al. (2007: 114), some leaders will have a tighter framework of clear goals, organisational structures and position-instructions or leader contracts, but be given few cultural guidelines. Some leaders on the other hand will act according to historical traditions and norms, with few formal directives for their behaviour (Ibid).

Reform implementation such as the PM reform is heavily contingent on response of leaders towards the reform and as such, leaders respond differently towards reforms. Since leaders are often seen as rational actors, they mostly create a friendly atmosphere when they are faced with environmental incompatibilities. They try to make the environment conducive for a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the reform policy. Most of these externally or internationally adopted reforms are faced with some environmental especially cultural resistance, hence, most committed organisational leaders tend to manage the situation by adopting certain implementation techniques by way of establishing a friendly environmental receptiveness for the reform policy. Such implementation strategies include policy training, friendly negotiations, establishment of cordial relationships between key actors (superiors and subordinates), etc.

In contrast, highly institutionalised organisations with strong cultures, have higher tendencies of resisting reforms and change especially when reforms conflict with the existing cultures. Leaders in such organisations always feel reluctant to comply with reforms which tend to bring some cultural change. They either resist these reforms or manipulate the reforms to suit the existing cultures. Such organisations believe in incremental change which happens over time rather than radical change.

Hypothesis 5: *The right leadership strategy and commitment, and the ability of leaders to manage cultural incompatibility may foster a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service.*

In summary, Figure 2.0 presents a broad overview of the analytical framework of the study.

Figure 2.0 Analytical framework

2.4 Chapter Summary

It is generally hypothesised that the success or failure of administrative reforms is contingent on the degree of its compatibility with contextual factors like organisational culture. This chapter has sought to discuss all the relevant theories in relation to the subject matter of the study and how they would be operationalised throughout the study. Instrumentalism emphasises, the *logic of consequences (Instrumental rationality)* whereas the culturalism is tied to the *logic of appropriateness.* The chapter concluded with discussions on some literature review on the concept of administrative reform and culture, and some major studies similar to my study. The next chapter will primarily discuss the research design and methodology of the study. It is purely a qualitative study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter offers a detailed account of the research design and methodology of the study. A qualitative research design was used to explore and explain the extent to which organisational culture and leadership affects performance management administrative reforms in the Ghanaian public service.

3.1 Research Strategy

As already mentioned, the study employs a qualitative approach. It adopts a multiple case study research strategy (comparative) to investigate the research phenomenon.

Why Qualitative Research Design?

The underlying intent of the research study is to study the research phenomenon through the eyes of the people studied in their natural setting, and hence, a qualitative research design (Bryman, 2012). Performance management system as a social behaviour is very contextual and thus, it is best understood when organisational actors are engaged in face-to-face interaction to acquire up close information as well as observing them behave and function in their natural context. This means that we cannot understand the behaviour of members of a social group other than in terms of the specific environment in which they operate (Bryman, 2012: 401). By dint of that, the study employs a qualitative approach in order to explore and understand the meaning the respondents ascribe to the research phenomenon in their natural setting by engaging them to share their views and experiences and also observing them behave and function in their natural context. Moreover, data credibility is more enhanced when respondents are allowed to share their views, personal stories and experiences on the research phenomenon and thereby giving greater insights into the complex processes of the influence of context on performance management reforms in the public service.

Furthermore, the employment of case study research strategy grants me the leeway to retain the meaningful characteristics (Yin, 2003) of bureaucrats in the Ghanaian bureaucracy as compared to other qualitative research strategies such as grounded theory, narrative research, archival analysis etc. And also, by establishing a holistic

picture of the study, the qualitative case study grants me room to draw on a plethora of data from multiple sources.

Last but not least, considering the limited number of cases, participants, and variables of the study, qualitative design is seen as the most ideal method of inquiry to carry out the research the research study. Jamil et al. (2013: 907) stresses this in their argument that "if the research design includes few cases and few variables, researchers are more likely to adopt a qualitative method. This is more common in ethnographic or case studies adopted to understand administrative culture".

3.2 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis of a case study is "related to the fundamental problem of defining what the problem is" (Yin, 2003: 13). In other words, it refers to the case(s) of the study. A case can be a social system, a person, an event, and/or a process (Ibid). The unit of analysis (cases) for the study is the public service of Ghana focussing specifically on the Office of the Head of Civil Service, Nursing & Midwifery Council, and the Youth Employment Agency.

Brief Profile of the Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS)[5]

The OHCS is the HR regulatory body of the Civil Service of Ghana. It also serves as the seat of the head of Civil Service. The current Head of the Civil Service is Nana Kwesi Agyekum Dwamena and was appointed on the 1st of January, 2014. In general, the mission of the Civil Service, as stated in the Civil Service Law, 1993 PNDCL 327, "is to assist the Government in the formulation and implementation of government policies for the development of the country." The OHCS is tasked to "promote and ensure continuous renewal and professional development of the Human Resource of the Civil Service by ensuring that the MDAs are optimally structured, adequately staffed with the right skills mix to provide policy advice to Ghana's political leadership to facilitate good governance and accelerate national development."

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[5] Information Source: www.ohcs.gov.gh

Brief Profile of the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC)l[6]

The NMC is a statutory body and has its mandate rooted in the part III of the Health Professions Regulatory Bodies Act 2013 (Act 857). The Council had its name changed from Nurses and Midwives Council of Ghana as provided for in the NRCD 117 of 1972 and LI 683 of 1971 during the year 2013 to Nursing and Midwifery Council following the enactment of the Health Professions Regulatory Bodies Act, 2013 (Act 857). The Current Registrar of the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana is Mr. Felix Nyante and was appointed to the position of Registrar in August, 2014. The mission of the N&MC is to "secure in the public interest the highest standard of training and practice of Nursing and Midwifery".

Brief profile of the Youth Employment Agency (YEA)[7]

The YEAwas established under the Youth Employment Act 2015 (Act 887) to empower young people to contribute meaningfully to the socio-economic and sustainable development of the nation. Its objective is to support the youth between the ages of 15 to 35 years through skills training and internship modules to transit from a situation of unemployment to that of employment. According the Youth Employment Act, 2015, the head of the YEA who happens to be the Chief Executive Officer, shall be appointed by the President of Ghana. The Current Chief Executive Officer of the YEA is Mr. Justin Kodua Frimpong. The mandate of the YEA as established under the Youth Employment Act 2015 (Act 887) is to "oversee the development, coordination, supervision and facilitation of employment for the youth and related matters in Ghana." With regards to the funding of the agency, the sources of funds for the agency as stipulated in section 23 of ACT 887 include:

- 80% of the communication Service Tax (CST);
- 10% of District Assembly Common Fund subject to a formula approved by parliament;
- 5% of the Ghana Education Trust Fund subject to formula approved by parliament and;
- Donations, gifts and grants.

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[6] Information Source: www.nmcgh.org

[7] Information Source: www.yea.gov.gh

3.2.1 Why these Cases?

Purposive Sampling strategy was adopted in selecting the cases for my study. This is a non-probability form of sampling which aims at sampling cases and participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed (Bryman, 2012: 418). First and foremost, the main reason for the selection of these three different institutions was to access a wide set of participants across public institutions that are relatively different in terms of function and personnel. The idea was to procure a diversity of participants across different public institutions in terms of function and personnel by drawing some respondents from the Health Service (Nursing and Midwifery Council), the Civil Service (Office of the Head of Civil Service) and an agency tasked with specific grassroots responsibilities (Youth Employment Agency). At the end of the study, a wide set of data from these disparate institutions provided several insights into the reasons why some institutions respond differently to a "one size fits all" policy like the New Performance Management Policy. These three institutions operate under the supervision of the Public Service Commission. This implies that they all operate within the same performance management framework introduced by the commission and will thus also enhance better comparative analysis among these institutions.

Another goal of this study was to have a blend of respondents from both perceived good and poor performing institutions both in relation to the implementation of the PMS reforms and productivity. The selected organisations offer a blend of both perceived efficient and poor performing organisation. With my interaction with the Public Services Commission of Ghana (PSC), organisations such as the Office of the Head of Civil Service and the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana were identified as some of the good performing organisations in terms of the operationalisation and institutionalisation of the New Performance Management Policy (NPMP). The Youth Employment Agency on the other hand was considered for my study after a short pilot study I conducted to identify some perceived underperforming organisations in the eyes of the public. After the pilot study, the YEA was identified as one of the most perceived ineffective agencies in Ghana. The agency is tasked with the responsibility of employing both skilled and unskilled young men and women into the various public sectors in Ghana. As a result, a chunk of state monies is pumped into the agency for their activities each year, on the contrary, the aftermath effect of these efforts has been

disappointing thereby making the agency ineffective. Political factors continually, since its creation, hamper its activities and the entire functionality of the agency. Thus, out of curiosity, I found it interesting to include the YEA in my study to substantiate this finding by examining the PMS of the YEA and their response to the NPMP. The PSC moreover did identify them as one of the slow starters in the performance management policy implementation process.

Last but not least, convenience was also a factor in the selection of the cases of the study. It was quite easier to assess organisations like the N&MC, OHCS and the YEA as compared to the public service organisations. Due to the time constraint, I had to rely on some public servants for accessibility to their organisations. It was quite easier to do so with the N&MC, OHCS and the YEA.

3.3 Research Population, Participants & Selection Techniques

The study focused on the meaning participants ascribe to the research subject. It relied on their views and thoughts on the whole performance management system of the public service and the extent to which it has been entrenched in their organisations. Due to the partly exploratory intent of the study, it was quite imperative to seek the voice of the participants by sharing their views, personal stories and experiences. The target population comprised of all well-informed stakeholders in the various organisations whose views and experiences were deemed crucial for the study. Thus, study population focused on both principal officers and junior officers. The study saw to it that all levels of staff across all targeted organisations were substantially represented.

With regards to the selection of participants, I employed both purposive sampling (opportunistic sampling) and snowball sampling approach. With the snowball sampling, participants were able to propose other participants who have had the experience relevant to the research (Bryman, 2012: 424). The idea was to gather a wide array of rich information of greater significance to the purpose of the research, (Layder, 1998) from information-rich informants to enhance the validity of the study. In light of this, officers with specific information and experience about performance management were targeted and possibly sought further potential respondent referrals. The study in total had twenty-eight (28) respondents who were interviewed. Table 3.0 offers a distribution of the bureaucrats who participated in the study

Table 3.0. Participants Distribution

PUBLIC ORGANISATION	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	
Office of the Head of Civil Service	*Principal Director*	1
	Senior Administrative Officer	3
	Junior Administrative Officer	5
	TOTAL	**9**
Nursing & Midwifery Council	*Principal Director*	1
	Senior Administrative Officer	3
	Junior Administrative Officer	6
	TOTAL	**10**
Youth Employment Agency	*Principal Director*	1
	Senior Administrative Officer	2
	Junior Administrative Officer	6
	TOTAL	**9**
Public Services Commission of Ghana	*Chief Director*	1
Total Number of Participants	**28**	

3.4 Method of Data Collection

3.4.1 Qualitative Interview

Interview is one of the most important case study data collection tools (Yin, 2003). According to Yin (2003) case study interviews are seen to be guided conversations. With interviews, it is imperative for researchers to follow a personal line of enquiry as reflected by the case study protocol and also ask actual questions in an unbiased manner that satisfies the needs of the line of enquiry (Ibid:90).

The study adopted in-depth interviews as its main data collection tool. It drew on both open-ended and semi-structured face to face interview with guiding pre-set questions as an interview guide. This prevented me from drifting away from the line of enquiry. The open-ended nature of the interview allowed the respondents to propose insights

into certain questions which may serve as a basis for further insights through follow-up questions (Ibid). All the research interviews were conducted at the various premises of the various organisations (mostly participants' offices). The average span of the interviews for the low information-rich informants was approximately forty-five (45) and approximately One (1) hour for the high information-rich informants. Below are some of the questions asked as well as informants' responses during the interview engagements:

- **Interviewer... How do you see hierarchism and power distance in this organisation?**

Respondent... *Every institution has hierarchies of which you have to respect. This office has a top down approach system of governance here. But management also accommodates the bottom up approach through which those at bottom can make contributions. I will not say there is quite a big distance with regards to power. So, management of power is at the doorstep of every officer. At any given time, we are always welcome as long as we channel our issues through the appropriate process. I am an administrative officer and I have a deputy.*

- **Interviewer... How is the boss – subordinate relationship like?**

Respondent... *The boss – subordinate relationship is very cordial and we walk to them at any time.*

It is worth noting that the interview method of data collection came with its own challenges. One key challenge was that most of the interview sessions got interrupted by office personnel and visitors which made it difficult to for the interviewees to constantly maintain their concentration throughout the session. Nonetheless, I tried my best to constantly refresh their memories on the discussions whenever they seemed lost.

In addition, although the study is qualitative (Case Study) in nature, I had to employ a rating instrument as a field tactic to help validate and measure the extent to which some elements of the NPMP have been institutionalised[8]. The rating instrument had a measuring scale of 0 to 10, which in sum accumulated to a general score of 80. Scores

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[8] As part of the variations within Case Studies, case studies can be based on any mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence (Yin, 2003:15)

from 50 and above indicated a high level of institutionalisation whereas scores from 30 and below indicated a low level of institutionalisation with a score of 40 indicating an average level of institutionalisation.

3.4.2 Secondary Data

Yin (2003) really highlights on the essence of the use of secondary data in case studies, in that, it enhances the quality of the study by means of data triangulation. In addition to the usage of interviews as the main primary data source, the study also gathered data from other secondary sources inclusive of documents, and direct observation. Table 3.1 offers a general overview and summary of the tools of data collection employed for the study.

Table 3.1 Tools of data collection employed for data collection

Tools of data collection	What kind of data	From whom	Unit of analysis
In-depth interviews	- Bureaucrats' perceptions of the various variables of the study.	- Principal Directors - Senior Officers - Junior Officers	Public Service
Rating Instrument	- Bureaucrats' perception of the degree of institutionalisation of the PAS	- Principal Directors - Senior Officers - Junior Officers	Public Service
Observation	- Bureaucrats' behaviour; how they work and behave in relation to the variables of the study.	- Direct observation of bureaucrats	Public Service
Documentation	- Documents about the previous PMS and the NPMP.	- Public Service Commission - Selected Cases	Public Service

3.5 Data Analysis

Condensed Content Analysis was adopted for my data analysis to guard against being captivated by the richness of the data collected and thus preventing what Lofland describes as analytic interruptus (Bryman, 2012: 565). Content analysis provides a rigorous structure for analysing data by providing tighter definitions of the data coding process to distil the categories into themes (Kairuz, Crump & O'Brien, 2007: 372).

The study employed a four-step content analysis. The first step was the immersion of data. First and foremost, the qualitative data collected from interviews and other sources were transcribed into texts and furthermore organised into strands of data or meaning units. After the immersion of data, the next step was the reduction of the meaning units into simple words that is condensed meaning units. The condensed data were further abstracted into subthemes and higher logical levels that is themes. Finally, these subthemes and themes were analysed together to examine the thread of meanings that run through the entire data. Some of these content analyses are provided throughout the thesis for meaningful analytical discussions. An example of the condensed content analysis used for the study is provided below in table 3.2.

3.2 Condensed content analysis used for the study's data analysis

Meaning Unit	Code/Condensed Meaning Unit	Sub-theme	Theme
"This tool guides officers and I think that is a reflection of the objective you made mention of."	The effectiveness of the tool reflects this objective	Successful institutionalisation	**The institutionalisation of Construct A - Implementing performance/results-oriented management in meeting organisational goals.**
"In this office, I will say yes, it has significantly been institutionalised but, in the Civil service at large, No."	Significantly institutionalised in the OHCS		
"Yeah, I think that aspect is entrenched in a way. I can see the traits in the management style."	Traits quite evident in the management style of leaders		
"I think we are not there yet. And there is more room for improvement in that aspect."	More room for improvement.	Not fully institutionalised	

3.6 Quality of Research

Several scholars like, Yin (2003), Bryman (2012) and Creswell (2013) have expressed several criteria for judging the quality of any research design. However, the study adopts **Validity, Reliability, and Generalisation** as some criteria for assessing the checking the accuracy and credibility of my findings as posited by Creswell (2013) although they do overlap with Yin's (2003) validity tests.

3.6.1 Validity

Qualitative validity refers to the techniques and strategies the research employs in checking the accuracy of the findings (Creswell, 2013). In other words, it means

enhancing the integrity of the conclusions of a research study (Bryman, 2012). Validity is very much related to what Yin (2003) discusses as construct validity. In implication the validity of the research evaluates the degree to which the research phenomenon was rightfully addressed (Kirk and Miller, 1986). It seeks to establish the extent to which the study objectively achieves its research objectives. In relation to my study, this particular validity was established at the data collection phase of the study. To achieve this validity of the study, first and foremost, I saw to it that specific dimensions of organisational culture, leadership and administrative reform policies were clearly outlined and operationalised based on well researched concepts and were in sync with the main objectives of the study.

Furthermore, throughout the data collection phase, I again made sure that the selected measures in investigating the contextual effect and the institutionalisation of performance management systems reflected the actual study variables. In effect, all concepts and questions were clearly and succinctly explained to respondents to prevent any form of ambiguity. Respondents were engaged in a clear language of instruction (preferably English Language) for easy and smooth communication.

One of the main tactics that I employed to increase the construct validity of the study the use of multiple sources of evidence in a corroborative fashion. The main rationale behind this, was to establish converging lines of inquiry that is the process of triangulation. According to Yin (2003: 98) findings or conclusions of studies (especially case studies) are most likely to be more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information. With converging lines of inquiry and data triangulation, potential problems of construct validity are addressed (Ibid).

Additionally, the study employed the member checking (Creswell, 2013) technique, also known as informant feedback or respondent validation, to achieve the validity of the study. In view of that, I presented back the draft case study report to the key informants for review and data validation.

3.6.2 Reliability

The reliability of a study is about demonstrating the replicability of results of the study using the same research methodology (Yin, 2003). One of the main aims of this study is to build a premise for replicability. In other words, the study puts in place and develop correct measurements, instruments and procedures which will enable later investigators

to reproduce the same results or findings of the study by observing the study's laid down measures and procedures. According to Yin (2003:38), one prerequisite for achieving this validity is to document all procedures followed throughout the study. In view of this, an interview guide, and case study database (notes and documents) were developed in my quest to enrich the reliability of my study.[9] And this was observed at the data collection phase of the research.

Another strategy that was employed to achieve this validity is to maintain a chain of evidence. This also increases the reliability of the study. The maintenance of a chain of evidence refers to principle whereby external observers are able to follow the derivation of any evidence by tracing the steps in either direction (from conclusions back to research questions or vice versa) (Ibid:105). In view of this, all relevant documents and literature sources are well cited to help readers trace the authenticity of information and how they led to the research findings.

3.6.3 Generalisation (External Validity)

Generalisation basically refers to what Yin (2003) describes as the external validity. It is mostly about building a premise for generalisation (Yin, 2003). One of the main problems associated with case studies is the inability to make scientific generalisations beyond cases to wider populations (Ibid). Qualitative generalisation is mostly used in a limited way in qualitative research since the intent is not to generalise findings to individuals, sites, or places outside of those under study (Creswell, 2013: 192). This study seeks to resolve this problem by doing an analytical generalisation that is, generalising from empirical observations to theory rather than the population (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008:1468). The concern is to validate theories and to what extent theories were relevant to this study. In this connection, theories concerning administrative culture and leadership, and its influence on performance management systems will be generalised through analytical generalisation. This will be achieved by using multiple case study design and replication logic. This means, responses from the respondents from the selected organisations will be generalised to the theories underpinning the study and also may have some implications for other African

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[9] Interview guide and other documents provided in the appendices

countries. For example, the variables employed in this study can also be used by others to analyse the same problem issue.

3.7 Ethical Considerations

Adhering to strict ethical rubrics in research helps in trust development and enhances participants' cooperation. Ethical issues in research throw lots of challenges to most researchers especially when respondents feel their protection is not guaranteed. The study saw to it that ethical principles which include; avoidance of harm to participants, seeking informed consent, confidentiality, and personal integrity were strictly upheld in my study.

3.8 Chapter Summary

In an attempt to offer some 'ex-post' insight into the reason behind failed performance management reforms and low productivity in Ghana's Public Service, this chapter provides a detailed account of the research design and methodology of the study. The study employed a qualitative method of enquiry with a multiple case study as the main research strategy. With the Public Service as the Study's Unit of Analysis, the study drew several participants from the Office of the Head of Civil Service, Youth Employment Agency, and the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana who operate under the auspices of the Public Services Commission. Furthermore, multiple source of data collection was employed to enhance the validity of the study. The chapter also offered an in-depth account of the validity of the study as well the ethical principles upheld by the researcher.

The next chapter opens discussions on the findings of the study as I present findings on the state of performance management reform in Ghana's Public Service. (Part A of the first research question). It will be very descriptive as it presents the current performance management reform in the Ghanaian Public Service.

CHAPTER FOUR

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT REFORMS IN THE GHANAIAN BUREAUCRACY.

4.0 Introduction

This chapter opens discussions on the findings of this study. It begins discussions on the very nature and state of Performance Management Systems in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy, which in turn answers the first part of the first research question of the study; *what is the state of performance management reform in Ghana's Public Service?* The chapter provides a trajectory of results-oriented performance management reform attempts in Ghana's Public Service and also draw to the limelight the most recent performance management reform policy, that is New Performance Management Policy (NPMP) framework, rolled out in the Public Service by the Public Services Commission (PSC) in 2014. This chapter offers descriptive yet comprehensive discussions on the reform trajectories as well as broad overview, implementation and governance structure or framework of the policy. Who are the key actors involved? What are the roles of these actors? The chapter then wraps up with my critical reflections on the NPMP policy. Findings presented in this chapter are mainly sourced from interviews and some document reviews.

4.1 Trajectory of Results-Oriented Performance Management in Ghana's Public Service

Institutionalising a performance driven culture into Ghana's Public Service has since proven to be a difficult task despite several efforts through results-oriented reform initiatives. One of the attempts by reformers over the years has been the paradigm shift from a traditional performance management culture to a more rationalistic (results-oriented) way of performance management in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy.

Before the Public Service of Ghana first witnessed its maiden NPM – inspired administrative reform, that is, the CSRP, the service had its own performance management instrument, that is, the **Annual Confidential Reporting System (ACRS)** which was later reviewed in 1974. The main objective of this performance management instrument was to allow assessees the right to read and comment on their performance

appraisal reports (Ibid). This instrument was reviewed and improved under the CSRP in 1992 which led to the introduction of the **Performance Evaluation System (PES).** This system was primarily an interactive process between managers and members of staff. The main focus was on the category of Deputy Directors and equivalent grades and below (Ibid).

In spite of all these performance systems, the service was still beset with its moribund state giving rise to a radical paradigm shift from a traditional bureaucratic system to a more result-oriented management culture. Paradigm shift in this context is conceived as a transformative change from one way of thinking to another (Karjeija, 2010: 109). The first attempt in this regard was the introduction of the **Performance Agreement System (PAS)** in 1997. The system ran from1997 to 2008. The PAS which in some instances will be described as the old performance management system was quite ad-hoc in its implementation and had its own challenges. The system as a whole lacked a clear feedback system. This implies, this system was just only concerned with the rule driven bureaucratic way of doing things without paying attention to the individual/organisational output based on set targets either at the organisational or individual level. This system was very prescriptive in nature and it had a highly top down approach.

4.1.1. Challenges of the Old Performance Agreement System (PAS)

The old performance management system was plagued with several implementation challenges. First and foremost, the system lacked a clear defined, articulate and enforceable implementation framework (PSC, 2015). This particular challenge has been the main threat to the Ghanaian NPM movement. Most of these reforms or systems are normally presented without appropriate enforceable implementation framework. Policies with clear cut enforceable implementation framework creates what Berger and Luckmann (1967:51) describes as "reciprocal typification of habitual actions" where newly introduced policies become routine and persistent. In a broader spectrum, it creates the platform for a smooth implementation and institutionalisation process.

Another implementation challenge of the old performance management system was the low Executive commitment/involvement and support for the PMS in contrast to what pertains in other developed/developing countries (PSC, 2015). The executive support can be in a form of making all requisite resources be it, human, financial, or material

resources readily available for a successful implementation. By dint of this, it is quite easy to put in place proper monitoring measures for a successful policy implementation. The negative attitude of the executive in a way then trickles down and shape the attitude of bureaucrats especially the leadership of the bureaucracy.

Again, the non-linkage of the process to an enforceable Reward and Sanctions Mechanism partly accounted to the downfall of the old PMS system (Ibid). Performance management instruments with proper reward and sanctions mechanisms creates some sort of extrinsic motivation which tends to drive bureaucrats' attitude towards the instrument and the policy as a whole.

The entire policy framework became a failure because all these foregoing challenges among others daunted the very objective of the policy, that is the provision of an objective means of assessing performance in the public service. The adverse effects of these challenges on the performance management culture of public servants were very overwhelming and quite destructive. Firstly, according to the Public Service Commission of Ghana, these challenges created a non-responsive culture (PSC, 2015). There was absolute non-responsiveness or adherence to Staff Performance Appraisal System or Performance Agreement. This boils down to the weak implementation framework by the implementation body. Secondly, due to the implementation challenges, the old PMS system was beset with poor performance reporting system and non-compliance to timeliness/deadlines. This was as a result of lack of proper training and monitoring mechanisms. As already mentioned, the public servants in the first place did not understand the whole PMS policy. And again, it boils down to lack of proper training and hence creating this lacklustre attitude.

In response to these challenges and effects, the Public Services Commission saw it prudent to develop a new PMS policy framework (New Performance Management Policy) to realign the vision of creating a more effective and efficient public service. This new policy framework is what this study seeks to analyse and explore its operationalisation.

4.2 The New Performance Management Policy Framework (NPMP)

The New Performance Management Policy Framework, which was first piloted in 2011, was developed and introduced in 2014 by the Public Services Commission in collaboration with the Office of the Head of the Civil Service, the Australian Public

Commission and other key stakeholders to help institutionalise apt performance management culture in the public service. The Australian Public Service was very instrumental in the development of the policy. However, the engaged director at the PSC did emphasise that, their support was mainly in the form of the design of the tool, training and workshops.

The Policy is apparently still at the training phase of the implementation process with the Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS) spearheading the training at the Ministerial and Departmental level. Although there is no concrete statistics on the number of public service organisations using the policy, an engaged director at the OHCS did hint in one of my interviews that of about 243 public service organisations, only 85 have implemented it at their respective organisations.

4.2.1 Reasons for the Introduction of the NPMP

Firstly, the New Performance Management Policy Framework was mainly introduced as part of the government's quest to revamp the Public Service through NPM-inspired administrative reforms. The main rationale behind its introduction was to fill in the administrative gaps which came with the old performance management system and to introduce a "one-for-all" policy framework for the entire public service. The PSC director noted in our engagements that:

> *"...there were different ones, first of all, measuring different things but we wanted at least all public service organisations to use one for all. The public service commission as part of the public service reform, deemed it important to introduce a good performance management system in order to improve service delivery"* **(Chief Director, PSC).**

So, contrary to the old system, this policy seeks to institute quite a robust and a comprehensive performance management system from a holistic perspective. The NPMP hinges on the underlying assumption that, performance is an on-going process that takes place from the time an employee joins the organisation until they leave and should be used in time to support and develop people through their employment with the organisation (PSC, 2015: 7).

Secondly, this system was introduced to provide a comprehensive Performance Appraisal System (PAS) and methods on how individual and institutional performance should be measured. This system presents quite a different assessment approach where

performance is assessed both at the individual and institutional level unlike the old PMS system. The engaged director at the PSC in her explanations did underscore that the NPMP provides a more systematic, phasic way of measuring performance in the Public Service both at the individual and organisational level.

By correcting the implementation defects and deficits which characterised the old system, the NPMP aims at institutionalising better reward and sanction systems linked to performance as well as training and career development for the individual. This was really identified as one major kink of the old PMS which needed to be ironed out.

Also, most importantly, the NPMP was introduced to reduce subjectivity, which characterised the old system, to its minimum degree.

With a paradigm shift to a performance driven management, the new system emphasises on continuous feedback and employee development.

4.2.2 The Implementation Framework of the NPMP.

How does a policy get operationalised at the organisational level to achieve intended policy results? Who are the key bureaucratic actors and stakeholders involved in the implementation process? What are the roles of these actors as far as the implementation of the policy is concerned? This section primarily discusses the governance structure and the implementation framework of the NPMP. Here, I will try to discuss what Knill and Tosun (2012:148) describe as the "post-decisional politics" of the NPMP. The ultimate outcome of any policy can fall short of its' intended results or outcomes if the policy is insufficiently implemented (Ibid). The governance structure or implementation structure of the NPMP is very top-down in nature. This means that, it is the primary goal of the policy makers to implement the policy goals of the NPMP from the top bureaucratic divisions down to the street-level bureaucracies with little or no lower level bureaucrats' participation in decision making relative to the entire implementation of the policy. The main discussions of this section will focus on the roles of the various bureaucratic actors in the NPMP implementation chain. The study did identify a four-level implementation chain of the NPMP. The key bureaucratic actors making up this four-level implementation chain include: the main autonomous agencies, that is the Public Services Commission (PSC), the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) and the Fair Wages and Salaries Commission (FWSC);

the Governing Councils and Boards; the Heads of the Public Services, Chief Executives, and Chief Directors (Management); and the Street-level Bureaucrats.

The Role of Autonomous Agencies

The key autonomous bodies or agencies in charge of the overall design and implementation of the NPMP are the Public Service Commission (main policy designers and implementers), the National Development Planning Commission, and the Fair Wages and Salaries Commission.

The Public Services Commission

The PSC, per its Act is to promote a high level of integrity, accountability and competence in public service organisations in Ghana. And as already discussed in Chapter Five, the NPMP was developed by the PSC against the backdrop of this mandate through institutional administrative reforms. In this connection, it has this implicit implementation responsibility of developing guidelines, standards, regulations and procedures which provides an institutionalisation framework for the NPMP in the various public services (PSC, 2015).

Secondly, the PSC, as part of its regulatory duties, requires each public service organisation to provide annual performance report on all aspects of its Human Resource Management activities (Ibid). The essence of this is to create a post implementation feedback mechanism to help ascertain the state of organisational performance in the various public organisations.

The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) and the Fair Wages and Salaries Commission (FWSC)

Although instrumental in the overall implementation of the policy, these two organisations are more in charge of peripheral implementation roles as compared to the PSC. The core mandate of the NDPC is to "advise the President on development planning policy and strategy" per Article 82 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The FWSC, on the other hand, per its mission statement is to ensure that best practices in job grading, evaluation, performance management and research are employed in pay administration to ensure that pay in the Public services is linked to productivity and that high-calibre employees are attracted to and retained within the public service.

With regards to the implementation of the NPMP, the primary role of the NDPC and the FWSC is to provide indices or measures for incentives, rewards, increments, sanctions and productivity as the NPMP seeks to institute a more robust recognition/reward/sanction system in the Public Services of Ghana (PSC, 2015). The engaged director at the PSC noted that the FWSC is apparently working on the salary reward scheme of the NPMP and it has already been agreed in principle.

4.2.2.2 The Role of the Governing Councils and Boards

The Governing Councils and Boards are seen as one of the key implementers of this policy. As a major stakeholder in the implementation chain of the NPMP, the governing boards have the role of overseeing the general administration and evaluation of Performance Agreements signed with their CEOs (PSC, 2015). The various governing councils and boards as part of their core mandates serve as the primary performance evaluative agents of the organisation with the CEOs and perhaps, some top officials as their main subjects.

4.2.2.3 The Role of Management

Management in this context refers to the administrative leadership of the various public organisations. The leadership comprises of the Heads of the Public Services, Chief Executives and their Deputies, and Chief Directors and their Deputies. These bureaucratic actors are seen as one of the key implementation agents crucial for a successful implementation. The NPMP has management as one of its central actors at the organisational level. In view of that, management is responsible for the general administration and enforcement of the Performance Management System in their respective organisations (PSC, 2015). Management is in charge of the day to day administration of the organisation, thus, anything that feeds into the organisational output is an upshot of a nested sequence of leadership decisions and that is the theory behind the role of management.

4.2.2.4 The Role of "Street-level Bureaucrats"

Several scholars like Keiser and Soss (1998), and Langbien, (2000) have offered several developments on the concept of street-level bureaucracy[10]. Street-level bureaucrats in this context, unlike the traditional Lipskyan definition, refers to those practicing and typically, anonymous public servants at the very end of the public policy chain (Sevä & Jagers, 2013 :1060). In its simplest form, they are seen as the lower bureaucrats steering affairs at the lower units of the organisation.

As I have already mentioned, the implementation of the NPMP is presented in a top-down fashion where street-level bureaucrats are positioned at the very tail end of the implementation chain. These group of bureaucrats did not influence the design of the policy in any way, however, they are only regarded as mere implementation instruments to achieve the NPMP goals. The finding of the study indicates that some of these bureaucrats are not even aware of the existence of the NPMP (about 40%). All that they know of, is just the performance appraisal aspect of the policy as a general administrative practice implemented from the top management. For example, three out of the nine interviewees from the Office of the Head of Civil Service were just oblivious of the NPMP. One of these four bureaucrats opined when asked about the NPMP that:

"I don't really know about that policy so I cannot say anything about it".

This reflects in the fact that, street-level bureaucrats were just marginalised right from the design of the policy to its implementation. They had and still have no or little role to play in respect of decisions concerning the implementation of the NPMP.

4.2.3 The Key Features of the NPMP

Principles and Policy Statements/Guidelines

The New Performance Management Policy is theoretically conceptualised on four key principles, that is Accountability, Transparency, Equity and Ownership. These building constructs tends to guide the operationalisation of the whole performance management

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[10] The term and logic of "Street-level bureaucrats or bureaucracy" was first used by Michael Lipsky in describing public servants in "schools, police and welfare departments, lower courts, legal services offices, and other agencies whose workers interact with and have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the allocation of public sanctions (Lipsky, 1980: xi).

system. The Public Services Commission is very much determined to build up a more performance driven culture on these four principles. Box 4.0 offers a brief summary of the four key principles of the policy.

Box 4.0 The New Performance Management Policy Principles

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Policy Principles

Accountability: The principle of Accountability hinges on the basic premise that every individual, unit, department/ division must be accountable on a continuous basis to his/her superior, the public for their actions and inactions.

Transparency: By making the system very transparent, the new system generally agrees that, firstly, the setting and outcome of performance targets at both the individual and institutional level must be done and discussed in a very consultative manner between assessors and assesses.

Equity: Equity in this new system implies that the system should be devoid of any form of discrimination with respect to gender, ethnicity, geographical location, physical infirmity etc. Also, the principle of equity in the context of this policy seeks to establish a system where the frequency and use of assessment outcomes are the same for every individual or public service institution.

Ownership: The basic assumption of this principle is that the whole process and outcome of the assessment mechanism must be owned by all stakeholders as well as the assessors and assessees both at the individual and organisational level.

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Based on the foregoing principles, the policy is being operationalised and driven by eleven (11) explicit context-specific policy statements or guidelines. These statements provide some clear policy-specific objectives in the purview of what ought and needs to be done in the attainment of the ultimate policy goals. Box 4.1 succinctly presents the eleven undergirding NPMP's policy statements.

Box 4.0 The New Performance Management Policy Statements/Guidelines

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Policy Statements

Policy Statement 1: Performance Management shall be a management tool for meeting organisational goals.

Policy Statement 2: Performance Management shall be used to create a shared understanding of what is to be achieved and how it is achieved.

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Policy Statement 3: Performance Management shall be viewed both as an approach and a system for managing people and other organisational resources.

Policy Statement 4: Performance Management shall be used to promote the health and long-term growth of the institution.

Policy Statement 5: Competencies and measurement standards shall drive the performance management process to achieving desired results.

Policy Statement 6: Performance Management shall drive the process through clear, consistent, visible and active involvement of the governing bodies, senior executives and managers.

Policy Statement 7: Management and staff shall adopt effective and open communication systems at all levels for the successful promotion of the performance management process.

Policy Statement 8: Performance Measurements shall be linked to performance planning and assessment.

Policy Statement 9: Incentives, rewards, recognition and sanctions shall be linked to performance.

Policy Statement 10: Performance results and progress shall be openly shared and communicated with employees, customers, and stakeholders.

Policy Statement 11: Performance measurement results shall be used to effect continuous change and improvement.

The New Performance Management System of NPMP

Based on the underpinning policy principles of the NPMP, the performance management system depicts a six-stage cyclical process. The system is developed in a way that all phases of the performance process are directly interlinked creating a rational network mechanism for monitoring and assessing staff performance. These stages include: **Performance Planning:** *Development of performance plans and targets, identification of key metrics and their associated timelines, the mode of operation and attainment of these metrics;* **Performance Measurement:** *Setting agreed-upon performance goals, allocating and prioritising resources, informing managers to either confirm or change current policy or programme directions to meet the set goals, and report on the success in meeting those goals (PSC, 2015:10);* **Performance Monitoring:** *Development of proper monitoring mechanisms to help identify performance issues and take correct measures in dealing with those issues;* **Performance Evaluation:** *Undertaking a bi-annual level assessment both at the individual and organisational level;* **Annual Performance Reporting:** *Generating*

performance reports through a proper appraisal mechanism. This takes place at the institutional level; and **Performance Improvement Plans:** *Putting in place training systems and proper reward and sanction systems linked to performance.*

The system is developed in a way that all phases of the performance process are directly interlinked creating a rational network mechanism for monitoring and assessing staff performance. Figure 4.1 presents a visual summary of the performance management system of the NPMP.

Figure 4.1 The 6 phase Performance Management System Cycle of NPMP

(Source: PSC, 2015 NPMP Policy Document)

4.3 Critical Reflections

The NPMP with its results-oriented intent looks very comprehensive and promising. The policy formulators and implementers are very much optimistic with the post implementation effect of the policy on the performance of public servants. However, in spite of its robustness and optimism, I strongly opine that the policy has its own defects in content and in scope. The most interesting concern about the policy worth pointing out is the outlined policy statements. First, looking at these statements, they are just too many and hence some repetitions. For example, I think the policy statement 7 and 10 among others do overlap and a case of repetition. They both seem to underline the intention of enhancing communication among employees for an effective performance appraisal process.

Second, some of the statements and their explanations look very vague. They are not very clear especially as to how the policy seeks to achieve those statements. These

statements are supposed to drive the overall objective of the NPMP. Thus, I was expecting an in-depth operationalisation of these statements with their various implementation approach in order to prevent any form of misinterpretations at the organisational level.

That notwithstanding, for the purpose of a more constructive and critical analysis of the policy, four key constructs have been teased out from the policy statements and the entire NPMP as mentioned in chapter two. These four key constructs will serve as the key policy constructs or objectives and a framework within which the entire policy (NPMP) will be analysed vis a vis the bureaucrats' perception. These constructs have been outlined as follows;

- *Construct/Objective A -* Implementing Results-Oriented Management;
- *Construct/Objective B - Introduction of Robust Performance Appraisal System*
- *Construct/Objective C - Transparency of performance targets;*
- *Construct/Objective D – Ensuring an effective Reward and Sanction System.*

There will be further elaborations on the policy constructs in the next chapter.

4.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter addressed the first research question with discussions on the state and nature of performance management of the Ghanaian bureaucracy as well as its administrative restructuring in the age of NPM in Ghana. With a better outlook especially with PM reforms, the introduction and implementation of the NPMP seeks to provide a platform for a rational and scientific assessment of performance of public service employees which was very subjective, arbitrarily managed and sometimes flavoured with favouritism under the old PM system. It seeks to nullify the already existing supposition of performance management in the Ghana Public Service that "performance management is a one-time ad hoc mechanism". On the contrary, this policy seeks to advance a more rationalistic/mechanistic approach to performance management.

The next chapter will offer further insights into the state of performance management reforms in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy. It will present findings on the extent to which the NPMP has been institutionalised at the various bureaucracies. Discussions will be mainly about bureaucrats' perception on how the NPMP is fairing and the extent to which it has been institutionalised.

CHAPTER FIVE

INSTITUTIONALISING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT REFORMS: THE NEW PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT POLICY(NPMP) IN PRACTICE

5.0. Introduction

This chapter is a build-up on the preceding chapter as it surges deeper into the operationalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy. It seeks to also address the second part of the research question; ***To what extent has this (PM Reforms and the NPMP) been institutionalised in the various public institutions?*** As part of discussions, I will look at some implementation anomalies that characterised the old PMS and yet deferred to the current PMS dispensation creating an implementation and institutionalisation deadlock.

5.1 Institutionalising the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service

This chapter looks into the New Performance Management Policy (NPMP) from an institutionalisation view point with respect to the selected cases of the study. This pertains to the issue of "habitualisation" (habitual actions).

The study found some organisations who are really making some substantial headway with the policy as far as institutionalisation is concerned. However, there were still some traits of implementation lapses identified by the study. The state of the NPMP at the OHCS and the NMC was encouraging despite some few implementation lapses identified in the whole performance management system. The situation at the YEA was unsatisfactory especially with their response towards the new PMS and even PM as a whole. The subsequent sections will discretely discuss in detail the extent to which the NPMP has been institutionalised in the above-mentioned cases with particular reference to the key constructs of the NPMP outlined in the preceding chapter as the benchmark for analysis.

5.2 The Good Performers: The Case of the OHCS and the NMC

Performance Management System has been a great fool-proof administrative formula for instigating high level of result-oriented behavioural culture among employees at the

OHCS and the NMC of Ghana. The managements of the OHCS and the NMC are really striving to get PMS and the NPMP *fully* institutionalised since its adoption in 2014. Although there exist some contextual constraints, the entire managements of both organisations have tried to control the phenomenon and enhanced some degree of compatibility[11].

The OHCS

The Office of the Head of Civil Service was hit by a radical PMS alteration led by a revolutionary leader, the Head of the Civil Service, in 2014. According to engaged bureaucrats at the OHCS, this was the turning point of their PM fortunes and even up to date, the OHCS is projected as a key spearhead of the NPMP. The only engaged director the OHCS described this movement as below:

> *"In the Ghana civil service, it took the Head of Civil Service to say that 'we have ended it. This is where I want us to go'. I wouldn't say our performance management system was in a mess but it wasn't far from that either. Out of dissatisfaction, the current Head of Service had to embark on what I will say, a performance management revolution and hence the adoption of this new policy from PSC."* **(Principal Director, OHCS).**

From the findings of the study, the NPMP seems to take greater root in the administrative systems of the OHCS. Performance management or appraisal is not merely seen as administrative convention in the OHCS but as a key administrative component which drives organisational productivity. Having said that, the performance management "game" has not been all rosy in the OHSC. As a human organisation with a Ghanaian cultural setting, the NPMP has been beset with some implementation defects creating as a stalemate vis à vis the policy goals of the NPMP.

The NMC

Just like the case of the OHCS, it also took a revolutionary leader, that is the HR director, to revamp certain administrative systems especially with performance management at the NMC upon his appointment as the HR director. The NMC was marred with several administrative deficiencies with respect to performance management. The HR director noted this in my interaction with him:

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[11] Compatibility issues will be comprehensively discussed in the next chapter.

"Until my appointment as the HR director for the NMC, the NMC had several lapses in its administrative systems. One typical example is that, the organisational even had no basis for promotion of its employees which was just unacceptable" **(Principal Director, NMC).**

So, against this backdrop, the NMC invited the PSC after it had formally launched the NPMP for some enlightenment on the policy. The NPMP was then formally rolled out at the NMC in 2014 and ever since, the NMC has stayed committed to the policy. The NMC was faced with several initial implementation challenges as typical of any "one size fits all" externally adopted policy which needs some sort of assimilation with the existing host culture of the organisation. The main initial challenge faced by the NMC was that, the employees (mostly nurses) found it very difficult to comprehend the whole PAS aspect of the policy.

In order to ascertain the extent to which the NPMP has gained roots at the OHCS and the NMC, the teased-out four policy constructs/objectives outlined in the preceding chapter will serve as the analytical paradigm for institutionalisation discussions in the next sub sections. And, they will be discretely discussed in tandem with the bureaucrats' perceptions and at the same time as the main unit of measurement of the extent of the institutionalisation of the NPMP.

5.2.1 Construct A- Implementing results-oriented management

The first construct is rooted and underpinned by the first four policy statements of the NPMP (outlined in chapter four). Looking at the four policy statements of the NPMP and hence this construct, it presupposes that, the NPMP is meant to address all the managerial anomalies that characterised the old PMS system. This particular construct is highly managerial, and it hinges on the assumption that, organisational productivity reflects rational calculations through "hard-core" management practices. So, most importantly, the NPMP must be seen as one of the core management tools in driving the core mandate of the organisation, which will consequently promote the health and long-term growth of the public organisation. So, at the end of the day, the NPMP is expected to promote the professionalisation of the HR Management in the entire Public Service for improved management of staff (PSC, 2015: 18)

The OHCS

With regards to bureaucrats' opinions in respect to the degree of the institutionalisation success of this particular construct, although there were varying opinions, majority of the interviewees agreed to a substantial degree of the institutionalisation success of the construct A. Six out of eight respondents interviewed on the subject admitted that there is a great deal of institutionalisation. Bureaucrats agreed that, despite all the challenges that the organisation is facing with the implementation of the NPMP, they feel the leadership of the OHCS is really doing something right with their managerial approach in the organisation. One of the bureaucrats had this to say when asked on the subject of institutionalisation of construct A:

> *"Yeah, I think that aspect is entrenched in a way. I can see the traits in the management style. But I think they do have other management styles. It is not fixed. We kind of use the conceptual system, where we apply a particular line of management as and when it happens."* **(Junior Administrative Officer, OHCS).**

This particular respondent was full of praise for the entire management of the OHCS. The respondent was just impressed with the level of the management at OHCS and was quick to liken the performance of the entire management to what is happening in the private corporate world.

Despite the fact that most of the bureaucrats reacted positively to the extent of the institutionalisation of construct A, two of the respondents were adamant on the fact that, there is still more room for improvement in the OHCS and the whole public service at large. These persons felt that, although management is trying, they cannot match the competence of the elite Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers in the business corporate world. One of them opined that:

> *"I think we are not there yet. And there is more room for improvement in that aspect. You know something, the civil service will always remain the civil service. What is happening in the private sector is totally different here. Like I said, management needs to step up their game a bit."* **(Junior Administrative Officer, OHCS).**

In conclusion, I will emphasise that, considering the opinions and perceptions of the engaged bureaucrats (study respondents), there has been a significant degree of the institutionalisation of a result-oriented management at the OHCS and the future looks all bright as far as this construct is concerned and the NPMP as a whole.

The NMC

Since 2014 after the NMC first had its taste of the NPMP, there has been a massive turn around in the general response of bureaucrats to performance management systems in the Council. And I believe it is by virtue of the fact that the entire leadership has remained commitment to the laid down PM trajectory and considerations which triggered the adoption and implementation of the policy at the NMC. As already discussed in the preceding sections, one of the key policy goals mirrored in this construct is to sensitise the leadership or management of the various public organisations to organisational demands by implementing results-oriented management principles in meeting organisational goals. Nine bureaucrats were engaged in an in-depth interview on this particular subject with seven bureaucrats constituting a majority, admitting to a great deal of institutionalisation at the NMC. Most of the bureaucrats did acknowledge that, the entire leadership of the NMC is really one of a kind in the public service. Despite the negative public perceptions about public service organisations, the NMC of Ghana still has its integrity intact. I observed a very great working atmosphere and culture as well as the administrative structures at the NMC. So, even before my research engagements, I developed a preconceived thought that, the management of this particular organisation is really doing a great job per the public-sector standard in Ghana. My preconceived thought was later substantiated by the responses of my research participants as the research unfolded. With respect to the institutionalisation of this particular construct, the views of the majority are summed up in this admission by one of the bureaucrats:

> *"I have been here for four years and the management here have really made me appreciate them a lot. Their structures are really credible and it is not surprising that the council is really doing so well. We have our integrity intact and we are going by what is expected of us by the PSC. So, our ability to achieve our organisational goals is as a result of the commitment and efforts of management."* **(Senior Administrative Officer).**

These admissions lay clear credence to the fact that, the attempt by management to inculcate hard core management principles in their quest to professionalise HR management at NMC has duly been appreciated by its staff. Notwithstanding the above discussed consensus, two of the engaged bureaucrats were quite disappointed and pessimistic with the performance of management and the level of institutionalisation of this particular construct. I had one interesting revelation from one of the bureaucrats

who is an administrative staff at the HR unit which really caught me thinking throughout my research stint at the NMC. The bureaucrat hinted that, from where she is positioned unless something drastic is done, she sees the NMC very far from reaching the desired outcome of this particular provision of the policy. Although, it never corroborated with the views of the whopping majority, I still found her assertions very interesting. This is what she said:

> *"I don't think it has been institutionalised, maybe they are doing well with other administrative systems but with performance management, I think we have a long way to go. Sometimes, it is like they don't care especially with regards to appraisal. Maybe management don't know what is going on at the unit level. I think there is low commitment of management to administrative systems. I know of people who come to work and just sit on the internet all day. So, you see?"* **(Junior Administrative Officer, NMC).**

Thus, this presupposes that, irrespective of the rosy and optimistic picture painted by most of the bureaucrats, there somewhat exists some administrative deficiencies crippling productivity of which management may be oblivious of. However, the question is, to what extent can this assertion be validated? What may have influenced her claims? And even if her claims are true, what then might have caused the general positive response to the above discussed subject?

5.2.2 Construct B – Robust Performance Appraisal System (PAS)

This policy construct or objective happens to be one of the key reasons behind the development of the NPMP. Looking at the paradigm shift from the traditional old way of appraising bureaucrats' performance to the NPMP, the NPMP is to "ensure an objective and transparent scheme of assessment of performance" (PSC,2015: 2); and for this reason, the rationale for this particular construct. In implication, it is the objective of the NPMP to establish quite a robust performance appraisal system compared to the old PAS that had crippled productivity in the Public Service over the years. So, this PAS that comes with the NPMP is to create a clear direction for employees by ensuring that work is aligned with the strategic effort and direction for the Public Services (Ibid).

The OHCS

Based on the findings of the study, I can explicitly state that, the institutionalisation of a more robust PAS at the OHCS has been encouraging as a degree of success has been

chalked up by the office or the organisation. However, the institutionalisation progress of some elements of the PAS like post-appraisal actions (rewards & sanctions) still lags behind. Again, eight bureaucrats at the OHCS were engaged to find out the extent to which performance appraisal system has been institutionalised in the organisation. They all did admit that, PAS is one of such administrative systems that is least compromised in the organisation. And with my short research stint at the OHSC, I realised and observed that every official was thriving to work in order to achieve his or her work target(s) for the day. At times, I had to even forfeit some interview appointments due to the unavailability of officials as a result of bureaucrats trying to achieve their targets for the day and thus, making them busy for any engagement. So, this particular observation corroborated with what I gathered from my interviews that PAS is such an uncompromised administrative system in the OHCS. One of the engaged bureaucrats had this interesting claim to make on the degree of the institutionalisation of PAS at the OHCS:

> *"It has been very effective. It has informed us of our training needs and where to improve. That's something that the appraisal system has really worked on. After the assessments and your shortfalls are identified, you are given training to improve and that is one thing I like about the policy. When it comes to appraisals, there are no compromises. We go through all the appraisal stages and it has really influenced performance if not hundred percent, I will say about 80%."* **(Senior Administrative Officer, OHCS).**

A rating instrument was employed as a field tactic to help validate the positive reaction of my interviewees to the degree of institutionalisation. The rating instrument had a measuring scale of 0 to 10, which in sum accumulated to a general score of 80. I had a mean score of 58.7 out of 80 with the least recorded theoretical score being 40 out of 80 and the highest recorded theoretical score being 70 out of 80. Table 5.0 provide a distribution of the overall score as rated by the bureaucrats on the institutionalisation of the PAS whereas Table 5.1 provides a description of the rating instrument and how bureaucrats responded to it (mean rating).

Table 5.0 Distribution of the overall score as rated by the bureaucrats on Construct B

Rater	The Overall Score on the Degree of the institutionalisation of Construct B	
	OHCS	**NMC**
Bureaucrat 1	50 out of 80	21 out of 80

Bureaucrat 2	65 out of 80	66 out of 80
Bureaucrat 3	60 out of 80	47 out of 80
Bureaucrat 4	40 out of 80	56 out of 80
Bureaucrat 5	70 out of 80	61 out of 80
Bureaucrat 6	60 out of 80	57 out of 80
Bureaucrat 7	55 out of 80	57 out of 80
Bureaucrat 8	70 out of 80	46 out of 80

Source: Field notes

Table 5.1 vivid description of the rating instrument and how bureaucrats responded to it (average rating).

Phase of the PA Cycle	Key Tenets	Average Score by Respondents (0-10)		Degree of Institutionalisation
		OHCS	**NMC**	
Planning	Define roles and responsibilities	8.1	6.8	High Degree
	Communicate corporate vision and strategic plan	7.6	7.1	High Degree
	Set functional and individual objectives aligned to the vision	8.5	7.0	High Degree
	Identify competencies & requisite resources	6.0	6.4	High Degree
	Prepare personal work plan	7.2	7.0	High Degree
Progress Reviews	Monitor & evaluate performance against set objectives and targets.	7.5	6.9	High Degree
End of Year Review & Appraisal	Appraise individual, reflect upon past performance and provide evidence-based feedback	9.2	7.0	High Degree

Decision-making, Rewards & Sanctions	Reward excellent performance. Agree on sanctions where necessary	4.6	3.1	Low Degree
		Total – 58.7	Total – 51.3	

Source: Field notes

The NMC

Performance Appraisal Systems at the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana has been as practicable as possible. I must say that, there has been a great deal of institutionalisation of a more robust PAS in the NMC as well as its effectiveness. I only had one bureaucrat vehemently opposing to this claim which indicates that the degree of its effectiveness has been overwhelming. I had seven of the engaged bureaucrats expressing their extreme excitement towards how the PAS has taken roots at NMC and how it is moving the organisation forward. The post implementation era of the NPMP at the NMC has seen the organisation attaining certain organisational feats which have projected the NMC as one of the most effective and efficient public organisations in Ghana. One of the bureaucrats had this to say on the effectiveness of the PAS and its transformational power on bureaucrats' as well as organisational performance:

> *"As I mentioned, our performance collectively adds up to the entire organisational goal. We go through appraisal both at the institutional level and at the individual level. At the beginning of the year, we set out targets, peg it very high and we work towards it. We modify it during mid-year reviews. Stories from our organisational assessors indicate that we are one of the best institutions in Ghana of which some institutions have been recommended to take on our steps."* **(Senior Administrative Officer, NMC).**

According to the bureaucrats, performance appraisal at the NMC has been modelled on the systematic phasic approach to performance assessment that comes with the NPMP. All the seven bureaucrats agreed in principle that, the appraisal year opens with performance planning whereby all members of staff are required to set performance targets on either individual basis or unit basis. And these targets must be in sync with the overall organisational goal(s) for the year. There is a general mid-year programme, mostly in June, where these set targets are modified and reviewed. The bureaucrats

really emphasised progress review programs as one of the key tenets of the appraisal system. This is mirrored in a bureaucrat's assertion in the following:

> *"We go through the appraisal process every year. It is very effective. We always set targets for the whole year and perhaps review them during mid-year reviews. Progress review is one thing we don't joke with. It really informs us on the progress we are making in the attainment of our set targets. It has become part of our administrative systems"* **(Junior Administrative Officer, NMC).**

Annual appraisals, which follow the progress review phase, provide an evidence-based feedback to the organisation in relation to the set targets by its members. And again, the bureaucrats agreed to a very large extent to the degree of its effectiveness. They all did admit that, performance assessment at the end of the year since the implementation of the NPMP has become an inevitable administrative component that no one could ever think of avoiding.

However, the issue of aftermath decision after performance appraisal again popped up as the main missing component of the PAS. All but one of the seven bureaucrats who spoke well about the entire PAS expressed their disappointment with the aftermath decisions after performance appraisal. And, this is in relation to rewards and sanctions as a consequence for good and poor performance. These bureaucrats believe that, hard work must always be paid off by some form of recognition and vice versa. This recognition or sanction in turn serves as a motivational point of reference that drives employees' output which then feeds into the overall organisational output as advanced by Ryan & Deci (2000).

On the contrary, one official completely dismissed the whole positive impression created by her colleagues about the PAS system and the entire implementation of the NPMP at NMC. She really painted a very negative picture about performance appraisal at NMC and this is what said:

> *"Like I said, even though the policy has been implemented, but its effectiveness has been the problem. I must tell you that, we even hardly fill the appraisal forms. It is only when we are due for promotions. You see, it is different in the private sector. I don't even remember the last time I got appraised. The whole of last year, we didn't fill the appraisal form. I was even just asking my colleague that, we really have to fill the form."* **(Junior Administrative Officer, NMC).**

Not that withstanding, there was a general positive reaction to the degree of the institutionalisation and effectiveness of the PAS at NMC. And, my rating instrument again employed to validate the claims of the engaged bureaucrats. I had an average score of 51.3 out of 80 with the least recorded score being 21 out of 80 and the highest recorded score being 66 out of 80. The table 5.1 and 5.2 presented earlier provides more information in this regard.

5.2.3 Construct C- Transparency of performance targets

The next construct for analysis, that is Construct C, mirrors the second principle of the NPMP, transparency and to some extent the seventh policy statement as already discussed in the preceding section. The NPMP was introduced to kick away subjectivity that had crippled the performance appraisal in the public service. As a matter of fact, the only way PSC could do to reduce this canker to its minimal degree was to introduce some accountability checks in the whole PAS by insisting on a fluid communication flow and thus, making the entire PA process transparent right from the setting of targets at both the individual and institutional level to the discussion of assessment outcomes between assessors and assessees. So, this particular objective seeks to project the transparency and to some extent, accountability intent of the NPMP which starts right from the setting of performance targets. By virtue of that, all forms and formats for the assessment process should be easily available to all, clear and precise in terms of what has to be done (PSC 2015: 4).

The OHCS

With the degree of the institutionalisation of this particular construct, although it was a fairly mixed reaction, majority of the bureaucrats admitted to a great deal of institutionalisation. In terms of clarity and transparency of performance targets, five of the engaged bureaucrats expressed their satisfaction to the degree of its institutionalisation. They were content with how transparent the whole PAS has become as compared to the old PAS. Bureaucrats now feel that organisational performance, appraisal and productivity are shared responsibilities and thus, their role in setting and achieving organisational goals cannot be overlooked. The general transparency situation at the OHCS is summed up in this bureaucrat's assertion:

> *"Basically, at the end of the year, everybody has his or her job schedule and out of that, your targets are teased out. So, technically, that alone is kind of*

transparent because all schedules are prescribed by the organisational manual which the institution has and it let it suit the current situation within which an officer finds him or herself and based on that the assessor develops targets." **(Senior Administrative Officer, OHCS).**

On the other hand, I had bureaucrats referring to lack of transparency of performance targets as one of the key factors stymieing the progress of the policy. Although constituting a minority, three of the bureaucrats lamented on the less consultative nature of performance target setting in their units. And they feel that it is so wrong especially considering what the NPMP seeks to achieve in relation to transparency and accountability. One of such persons lamented in the following:

"With that aspect, I think there is a challenge because we are not able to go through everything with the appraisees and the appraisers. Most of the targets are brought to us and that is so wrong. I believe that, with the new system, everything regarding performance measurement and appraisal must be as transparent as possible. So why this?" **(Junior Administrative Officer, OHCS).**

Having put that across and considering the foregoing findings on the subject, it is of no doubt that, irrespective of the existing defects as raised by the three bureaucrats, the OHCS is still on course with the level of the institutionalisation of the Construct C and at least, there has been a significant degree of institutionalisation. However, let me add that, it does not look all that rosy for this particular construct. The OHCS need to pay attention to the issue of lack of transparency of performance targets as raised by the three bureaucrats. They need to identify and curb such cases if they are to carry the whole implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP to a successful end.

The NMC

Transparency of performance targets has not been a big issue at the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana under the dispensation of the NPMP. Performance Appraisal System like I did indicate in the preceding section has taken so much root at the NMC and members of the organisations now believe that, the ability of the organisation to realise its objective(s) of the year is hugely contingent on their collective involvement in the overall planning of performance targets especially at the lower level which then feeds into the overall objective(s) of the organisation. And, it all points to the transparency element or principle of the NPMP which gives employees the opportunity to see and analyse the entire appraisal process from an objective viewpoint

rather than mere subjective speculations. Over the years especially under the old PMS, the issue of transparency of PAS in the public service of which the NMC is of no exception became a huge topic of discussion when most of the bureaucrats complained on the way and manner in which their performance was measured and assessed.

Bureaucrats at the NMC now agree to a large extent that, the level of transparency of the PAS especially with regards to how their targets are teased out and appraised has been impressive. Most of the bureaucrats agreed to the fact that, performance targets and assessment outcomes have been as transparent as possible and discussions in that regard are always done in a consultative manner between subordinates (assessees) and bosses (assessors). In addition, communication flow has been so great and thereby fostering a very congenial environment for the realisation of their set targets as all information and logistics are made easily available to them. This is what one of the bureaucrats opined in our discussions on the transparency of performance targets:

> *"There is a great deal of transparency here. When we resume from new year, we meet and table out a communication plan which discusses about what we are going to do for the year, and what our focus is. Each and every time, the strategy becomes different. So, we come out with an objective of the year then we break them down to specifics. So, we sit down and dialogue out the overall objective and agree on the various individual targets in a general unit meeting. So, you see how open and transparent the exercise is?"* **(Senior Administrative Officer, NMC).**

This particular positive reaction to the transparency of performance targets as well as the entire PAS process was mirrored in the responses of all except one of the engaged bureaucrats. It is the very same bureaucrat who has been so critical of the whole operationalisation of the NPMP at the NMC. On this particular construct, this is how she sarcastically put her comments across:

> *"We hardly fill the performance appraisal form and let alone setting performance targets. Don't worry yourself my brother, it doesn't happen at all. We only fill out our forms when it is time for promotion. With that, we are always in a hurry to do that."* **(Junior Administrative Officer, NMC).**

5.2.4 Construct D - Reward, and sanction system

The Objective D constitutes what the policy defines as "Decision Making". One of main reasons for the introduction of the NPMP was to incorporate some rewards/incentives, sanction systems linked to performance. In this regard, the Policy Statement 9 of the

NPMP states that incentives, rewards, recognition and sanctions shall be linked to performance. Over the years, the PMS of the public service had no proper linkage of the PMS to any enforceable reward and sanction mechanisms as a form of extrinsic motivation to boost performance in the service. In response to this defect, the NPMP was introduced to help correct and provide a mechanism for rewarding high performance and managing unsatisfactory performance.

The OHCS & NMC

The institutionalisation of this particular provision of the policy has been very disappointing. Looking at the rating instrument described in table 5.2, it is very clear the OHCS & NMC are really struggling with the institutionalisation of reward and sanction systems. The issue of motivation is a major element of organisational theory. Human efforts are influenced by either intrinsic or extrinsic factors. So, with this as a backdrop, there was the need for extrinsic motivational systems in the NPMP to drive bureaucrats' performance.

The engaged bureaucrats at the OHCS expressed their utmost disappointment at the post-appraisal actions taken by management after every appraisal year. In fact, I had only one out of the eight engaged bureaucrats at the OHCS admitting to a great deal of institutionalisation of this particular construct. This is what the officer opined in our discussion on the subject:

> *"I would say to some extent. The current project that I was co-opted unto is to find ways and means to streamline performance linking it to rewards and that is what we are going to focus on. But in our small way, we have ways and means to recognise staff. 2016, I received a citation from the chief director in front of everyone for outstanding performance. And that is a way of motivation. And this year, there will be something like that so everyone is really working hard to sweep it up. Also, if there should be some form of foreign workshops, good performers are always rewarded with that. So, there is always that drive to perform well."* **(Senior Administrative Officer, OHCS).**

Looking at the above quoted assertion, it is quite easy to deduce that, the officer is a direct beneficiary of an award scheme that was instituted in 2016 and also part of the team that was sent to South Korea for training in 2018. The officer felt those acts of appreciation were motivating enough for him and to keep him going. But I think that is not what the NPMP seeks to achieve in respect to this particular objective. As already

discussed, one of the key principles of the NPMP is equity and thus, all good performers must be rewarded in the same measure and not a selected few. Actions for good performance and poor performance must be applicable to all manner of officials. In this regard, most of the engaged bureaucrats felt there is no need for performance appraisal if there are no immediate post appraisal consequences such as recognitions and sanctions.

Just like the OHCS, the employees at the NMC also believe that, the NPMP has been implemented just to make them work harder without any form of reward or recognition. In fact, I also had only one of my interviewees fairly agreeing on some amount of recognition linked to performance at the NMC. To this bureaucrat, he felt the fact that, the whole PAS is linked to promotion should be a reward in itself. As a unit head, he noted that, notes on good and bad performance are recorded on the appraisal form to inform the HR about how well members of staff are performing at the unit level. This in effect serves as a point of reference for promotional opportunities and also to inform the HR of the training needs of the employees' vis à vis their performance.

In spite of the positive picture painted by the aforementioned bureaucrats from the OHCS and NMC, the rest of the bureaucrats from these bureaucracies were just expressing their disappointments to the motivational schemes instituted at their respective organisations. On the issue of promotions and training linked to performance as a way of reward, they contended that, training and promotions are just part of their condition of service and thus, their bureaucracies do not treat them as a reward or sanction scheme to motivate them. The negative picture of reward and sanction system at the OHCS and NMC is summed up in this bureaucrat's assertion:

> *"I have not heard anybody being sanctioned for poor performance or rewarded for good performance. I don't think something is done after appraisal aside it being a requirement for promotion. Also, I don't think training here is even linked to our performance. It is just part of the organisation because at the beginning of every year, HR requests for our training needs "***(Junior Administrative Officer, NMC).**

One interesting observation I had with respect to this issue was an instance where an organisational driver had to express his aversion to the extent to which he is used in running several errands without any form of recognition or reward. I remember him passing a comment in his groans that:

"You guys just use me for unnecessary errands but you don't even appreciate my efforts"

However, looking at the level of productivity and the average ratings in table 5.1 with regards to this rewards and sanctions, it indicates that, bureaucrats at the OHCS and NMC are not motivated extrinsically in order to perform. It is quite surprising to see such a remarkable success of these bureaucracies in relation to productivity especially when the organisation lacks any form of reward or sanction system linked to performance to motivate employees. However, I can hypothetically attribute the reason for high performance without any proper form of extrinsic motivation to their general assumption that, "poor performance may jeopardise their promotional prospects".

5.2.5 Final Reflections

Considering the foregoing discussions on the degree of institutionalisation of the NPMP at the OHCS and the NMC, it is very obvious that performance management under the NPMP dispensation has been very promising and really seen as a thing of the future. The introduction of the NPMP has undoubtedly fine-tuned the perceptions of bureaucrats on performance management and the role they play in the overall attainment of the core mandate and mission of their respective organisations. Bureaucrats have now come to appreciate that, PMS as though behaviourally inclined, is also more of a mechanistic system to instigate high level of performance both at the institutional and individual level. In spite of the great success of the institutionalisation of the NPMP at both the OHCS and the NMC, there are two key highlights worth reflecting upon.

First and foremost, the above discussed findings suggest a very dire state of reward and sanction systems linked to performance in these organisations. I believe this is a key principle of the NPMP that the OHCS and the NMC should under no circumstance compromise on. Extrinsically motivated persons may produce desired outcomes either because of the reward at stake or the threat of punishment. With this kind of motivation, the individual's desire towards a particular action or work is driven by separable outcomes and not self-interests. Against this underlying logic behind the inculcation of construct D in the NPMP, bureaucrats in these bureaucracies will be more than willing to embark on any organisational related task with little or no interest in the assigned task and thus, enhancing productivity.

Secondly, the study found one bureaucrat out of the nine engaged bureaucrats at the NMC who really painted a very negative picture about the entire PMS and NPMP at the organisation. Her discussed revelations create a very negative impression about the organisation's attitude towards performance appraisal at the NMC. Although, she may be the only interviewee to have criticised the whole system, can it possibly be that she may represent just a section of the bureaucrats who are not just satisfied with the general state of performance management at the NMC or her reaction was more of a personal attack on her superiors or even the NMC as a whole. Having that said, I think the general impression created by the engaged bureaucrats reveals a great deal of institutionalisation of the NPMP at the NMC in spite of their own implementation challenges. Figure 5.0 provides a broad network analysis and summary of how the institutionalisation of the NPMP is coming along at the OHCS and the NMC with respect to the policy constructs.

Figure 5.0 Network analysis of the degree of the institutionalisation of NPMP at the OHCS and NMC

5.3 A Bad Performer? The Case of the Youth and Employment Agency (YEA)

Performance management at the YEA has been quite unsatisfactory as revealed by this study. In spite of the unsatisfactory state of performance management, the leadership

of the YEA is striving very hard to revamp its PMS leading to the creation of a unit at the HR department in charge of performance management and career development in 2018. This unit according to the unit leader, shall oversee the entire PMS in the office and ensure its operations is able to instil a routine performance monitoring and assessment culture necessary for one's career development at the YEA.YEA is perceived to be one of the highly politicised agencies in the public sector of Ghana. In this light, the political nature of the organisation has crippled several administrative systems including performance management and thereby, stagnating the functions and effectiveness of the organisation as well as its bureaucrats. As of October 2018, the agency could not lay claim to any performance report of the YEA in the past three years. And this is as a result of an inconsistent nature of performance assessment and management at the YEA as revealed by the Unit Head.

Unlike the case of the OHCS and the NMC of Ghana, the NPMP was just rolled out at the YEA in 2017, three years after its official launch by the PSC. According to the officer in charge of the PM, this late response of the YEA to the NPMP is as a result of their unawareness of the policy until late 2017. She added that, the agency was invited for their maiden training in May 2018 and was still managing the old appraisal instrument although not very effective. However, in spite of the deplorable state of performance appraisal and management at the YEA, the HR director did admit the essence of an effective performance appraisal system at the YEA, and thus, the agency was looking forward to an end of year performance appraisal of bureaucrats under this dispensation of the NPMP. He asserted that:

> *"The Head of Finance and Administration and myself at the beginning of this year agreed that, this year there will be an appraisal section for employees because as an employee you need to be appraised"* **(Principal Director, YEA).**

Despite this promising step by management, I found that little or no effort was done to push this decision to a complete realisation. After several engagements with the bureaucrats, I realised most of the bureaucrats were oblivious of this decision by management and no form of performance target has been agreed upon by these bureaucrats and their bosses. The question then is if there has not been any set performance target, how are bureaucrats going to be assessed? The performance appraisal cycle stipulates that, the appraisal process opens with a planning phase where

targets are set, however, the situation at the YEA looks quite different. So, can this be a false start to the NPMP? And can this false start also be as a result of lack of understanding of the NPMP and an incompatibility of the NPMP with the organisational culture, and thus creating a deviation?

5.3.1 False Start by the YEA: A Case of Policy Deviation?

The attempt of YEA to implement the NPMP resembles a false start and thus, a clear case of policy deviation. Policy deviation is a dimension of policy adaptation (Bakshi , Talaei-Khoei , Ray, & Solvoll , 2017). Policy deviation according to (Lewis 2010 cited by Bakshi, Talaei-Khoei, Ray, & Solvoll, 2017: 3) is an adaptation by relaxation which means monitoring consequences of non-conformance behaviour against the desired behaviour proposed by the policy to minimum incompliancy. Policies from a legal theory perspective are seen as a sense of duty because of the authority issuing the policy and it is not subject to any form of modification (Ibid). In this connection, any form of policy modification resulting to some level of incompliancy is a clear case of policy deviation.

In the case of YEA, the organisation attempts the whole policy implementation process by modifying and reducing the entire appraisal instrument to a two-page document. This is where the deviation starts from. The appraisal instrument that comes with the NPMP is quite comprehensive (a eleven-page document) with several additional notes to help guide the employee in the assessment exercise. In my engagement with the HR director, he did note that he is trying to reduce the content of the document since to him, it is very bulky and user unfriendly. He explained that in the following:

> *"One big challenge about this whole instrument is that, this is a very bulky document and we are trying to reduce it to something small which can easily be filled. Depending on your organisation and structures, you need to do it to favour what you do. So, we are trying to further reduce it to a maximum of two pages and then make sure that it is effective."* **(Principal Director, YEA).**

The decision to reduce the contents of the document is a deviation and a "false start" especially looking at what the PSC seeks to achieve with the instrument. From my viewpoint, the issue of bulkiness is not a good justification for reducing the document. Looking at the document itself and its content, its bulkiness is worthwhile. The

instrument is designed in such a way that, any lame person should be able to read and fill out the document without or with little difficulty.

Second, as I did indicate in the preceding section, the HR director informed me of their intention of having an end of year appraisal with the NPMP. However, after checking, it was revealed that the bureaucrats do not even have performance targets which will serve as a benchmark for their assessments. This also to me is a "false start". As already discussed, the PAS of the NPMP is a cycle which starts with a planning phase and ends with a decision-making phase. In implication, before any employee will be appraised, he or she must have gone through a planning stage where performance targets would be agreed on in a consultative manner and later reviewed at the progress review stage. So, this is a clear case of deviation from the provisions of the NPMP.

The main possible reason for this false start is perhaps the inability of leaders to manage the incompatibility of certain aspects of the NPMP and the host organisational culture. This is partly as a result of poor leadership styles and commitment towards a successful implementation. Mostly when reform implementers and leaders are faced with a case of cultural incompatibility, they tend to alter certain aspects of the policy at the organisational level and at the long run, distorts the overall objectives and intentions of the policy or reform. These anomalies do happen when policy implementers tend to take decisions based on convenience rather than adhering strictly to the demands of the policy. From my viewpoint, the entire policy right from the onset has been compromised and it presupposes that the leadership and officials in charge of the PMS although well abreast with the NPMP in theory, are trying to modify the policy due to some cultural and attitudinal incompatibilities. The performance management unit head did indicate that, the general attitude of the bureaucrats towards PMS has not been the best. According to her, bureaucrats think performance appraisal is just a waste of time. She furthermore adds that, there is the general mind-set that performance appraisal has always been flavoured with favouritism and subjectivity and thus, bureaucrats do not feel motivated to go through appraisal processes. With this perception in addition to some other attitudinal cultural norms, the implementers find it imperative to alter some content and structure to suit this organisational syndrome and thereby making it user friendly.

In this connection, as part of discussions in the next chapter, I will try to examine the extent to which the leadership and cultural characteristics of the YEA account and explain the false start and deviation.

5.3.2 Final Reflections

In spite of the far-reaching effort of the YEA to revamp its PMS, the implementation and institutionalisation attempt of the NPMP look very cosmetic and unpromising. Until the implementers accept the policy as it is and seek a better understanding of the policy, I do not see any possible radical positive change and impact on the entire bureaucracy since the policy itself has been compromised at the top level with some traits of incompliancy (policy deviation).

Having said that, it is worth noting that policy implementers at the YEA are highly optimistic of the success of the NPMP in enhancing productivity in the organisation. To them, the content of the NPMP is not entirely new to the organisation since it captures certain features of the old PMS. By dint of this, the assimilation of the policy into its existing administrative systems will be less challenging as compared to an entirely different policy. The PM Unit Leader (a key implementer) stressed on the fact that the NPMP is just an ad-on and an updated version of the old PMS. She further noted that the old PMS had some sort of appraisal but the NPMP has come to sanitise the entire the appraisal system and make it more transparent. She adds:

> *"The NPMP would not be entirely new to the already existing system here at the YEA. It will be just an ad-on to make things much easier. And it will help know the potential of every employee. Because, the employee now sets targets for him/herself and they are held responsible at the end of the day."* **(Senior Administrative Officer, Unit Head, YEA).**

This assertion also substantiates the claim that implementers are well abreast with the policy but makes a false start by attempting to appraise employees without transparently setting performance targets with employees.

5.4 Challenges with the Implementation/Institutionalisation of the NPMP

Against the backdrop of the foregoing discussions on the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP at the organisational level, it lays credence to the fact that, the implementation and institutionalisation process has not been so smooth. The

whole process has been beset with several challenges and they are very evident in the findings of the study.

First and foremost, one main challenge crippling the whole implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP is the issue of bulkiness of the PA instrument. As hinted in the preceding discussions, most of the organisational leaders are not so comfortable with the nature of the policy especially with regards to the appraisal instrument. Bureaucrats did acknowledge in principle that the instrument is very bulky. In consequence, the leadership of most of these public organisations are expressing some degree of reluctance in the adoption of the policy at the organisational level. These complaints of bulkiness of the appraisal instrument are not something the key policy formulators and implementers, that is the PSC, are oblivious of. My engagement with the director at the PSC revealed that, the PSC are very much aware of the bulkiness complaints, however, they do insist that the bulkiness of the document is on purpose and not to complicate the whole performance assessment process. She noted that in the following:

> *"The main challenge as I have mentioned is that some people think the policy and tool is bulky but we have explained to them that it is not bulky. What they see in there are just instructions. They are just unwilling to take out the instructions and put them as attachments.* **(Chief Director, PSC).**

Another key challenge stymieing the progress of implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP at the various public organisations is ineffective policy monitoring by the Public Service Commission. As already mentioned, it is only 85 out of 243 public organisations (constituting just 34.5%) that is said to have rolled out the policy at their respective organisations. This policy setback emanates from the fact that the policy lacks any form of command-and -control regulation by the PSC. According to Knill & Tosun (2012:23), authority-based policies like the NPMP must be guided by policy instruments whereby government hierarchically prescribes requirements that must be fulfilled by the regulatees, with failures to comply usually involving penalties. It is one of the missing elements of policy implementation that has got the NPMP stuck at the training phase after its introduction four years ago and thus a deadlock situation in the assimilation of the NPMP into the Ghanaian Bureaucracy. Although, the policy has been launched and rolled out by the PSC, it is poorly monitored by the PSC. The engaged director at the OHCS lamented bitterly on this particular subject as follows:

"I think somebody is not doing his or her work and I put the blame squarely at the doorstep of the Public Services Commission. Because, you issue something and they don't even monitor. They have 243 institutions and in fact, it is only 85 institutions that are implementing it. So, what happens to the rest? Every public service organisation is supposed to use it and the public service commission is supposed to also monitor." **(Principal Director, OHCS).**

Another key challenge worth pointing out is the failure of policy implementers to institute a more robust reward and sanction systems tied up with employees' performance, which seeks to be one of the key constructs of the policy. This is one of the key revelations of the study as almost all the engaged bureaucrats were quite disappointed with the situation at their respective organisations. Also, poor attitude towards PMS and the NPMP due to cultural incongruence were identified as the challenges crippling the full institutionalisation of the NPMP.

Looking at the outlined challenges in tandem with the previous challenges of the old PMS, it is worth concluding that, the implementation/institutionalisation of the NPMP has witnessed just an absolute deferment of the old PMS anomalies (as discussed in chapter four). For an effective comparative analysis of the anomalies of the two PMS systems, table 5.2 provides a comparative representation of the implementation challenges of the two systems.

Table 5.2 Comparative analysis of the implementation challenges of the Old PMS and the NPMP.

Old PMS	NPMP
• Lack of a clear enforceable implementation framework	• Lack of any form of command-and - control regulation by the PSC.
• Negative attitude towards PMS due to subjectivity	• Aversion towards PMS due to subjectivity history
• low Executive/Leadership commitment	• Poor leadership commitment at the institutional level
• Non-linkage of the process to an enforceable Reward and Sanctions Mechanism	• Lack of reward and sanction systems tied up with employees' performance

5.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter offered a comprehensive analysis of the operationalisation and institutionalisation of the NPMP at the street level bureaucracies. From the findings of

study, the OHCS and NMC are seen as organisations having a great deal of institutionalisation with the NPMP. However, the findings do suggest that it is not all rosy with the implementation and institutionalisation of the policy at these organisations. Both organisations despite their successes are still struggling with the construct D of the policy. The YEA on the hand is seen as "new babies" in terms of the implementation of the policy. The organisation in its quest to revamp its PMS decides to roll the NPMP out, however, its attempt to get the NPMP implemented is seen as a false start and thus, clear case of policy deviation. The chapter concludes with discussions on the implementation anomalies unearthed by the study. These anomalies are seen as a deferment of the old PMS anomalies.

The next chapter explains contextual effect of leadership and culture on the institutionalisation of PM reforms (NPMP) as it addresses the second research question: *What explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform? Is it leadership or contextual factors such as administrative culture that matters? Or a combination of both, that is, leadership and culture?*

CHAPTER SIX

CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT REFORMS: ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE VS. LEADERSHIP

6.0 Introduction

This chapter primarily addresses the second research question (*What explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform?)* as already mentioned in the preceding page. It attempts to explain the institutionalisation of the NPMP in the various organisations (selected cases of the study) in the Ghanaian Public Service. Here, I mainly discuss the contextual factors that account for the successful and failed implementation of the NPMP at the OHSC, NMC and YEA. The findings of the study show two things, that is, NPMP is institutionalised in OHCS and NMC but not in YEA. Why is it institutionalised in these two but not in the third one? It seems that, leadership is an important factor for the institutionalisation of NPMP in OHCS and NMC. Thus, NPMP is and as instrument depends on leadership for institutionalisation. But why has leadership not been able to instil NPMP in YEA? Is cultural incompatibility as well as leadership inability to manage the incompatibility the factors impeding institutionalisation?

The chapter presents two main arguments, that is, ***Administrative Culture as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable*** and ***Leadership as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable.*** These two variables constitute the internal context of the bureaucracies. The first part of the chapter will discuss Administrative Culture as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable. As part of discussions, I will first map out the Ghanaian Bureaucratic Culture with Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Political Neutrality as the main cultural dimensions and, then further analyse the effect of all the three cultural dimensions on institutionalisation of the NPMP. The second part will wind up discussions by looking at leadership as a contextual variable explaining why some organisations have performed better with the NPMP institutionalisation than others.

6.1 Administrative Culture as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable

6.1.1 Mapping the Ghanaian Bureaucratic Culture and its Contextual effect

This section and some subsequent sections discuss the general characteristics of the administrative culture of the Ghanaian Public Service and its contextual effect on the institutionalisation of the NPMP. It is one of the key objectives of the study to identify and examine the administrative culture of Ghana's Public Service and to draw the relationship between these cultural tendencies as a context to the NPMP. In order to be able to analyse the compatibility of the host culture and the PM reform, it will be prudent to first identify the features of the culture, and consequently becomes easier to analyse how they affect the institutionalisation of PM reforms. A total of twenty-five (25) bureaucrats from the selected cases of the study were interviewed on the issue of inherent administrative culture in the bureaucracy along the three cultural dimensions of the study.

6.2 Power Distance

In this section, I present findings from the study. In quest of examining the power distance as cultural dimension in the public service, the 25 study participants across the selected cases were quizzed on issue of power distance. The power distance interview questions enfolded around two main concepts of power distance and which happens to be the main indicators of analysis of the study with respect to power distance. These concepts include; ***Hierarchism and Boss-Subordinate Relationship.*** The study did reveal a very large power distance public service. All engaged bureaucrats admitted and accepted to some extent that, power is distributed unequally in their respective organisations. Thus, the subordinates see their organisational leadership as "colonial chiefs"[12] and their existence as only complementary to the work of their leaders.

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[12] A term borrowed from Gerald Karyeija (2010) in his doctoral dissertation "Performance appraisal in Uganda's civil service: Does administrative culture matter?

- **Hierarchism**

All the engaged bureaucrats admitted to a very hierarchical bureaucracy. And this presupposes that, superiors and subordinates consider each other as existentially unequal in terms of function and power. The study reveals a bureaucracy whereby power is highly reserved in the hands of a selected few (superiors). The bureaucrats believe that, power cannot be equally shared and thus, leaders must always feed subordinates with directives in order to function in their various work domains. Findings of the study suggest a very long chain of command in the various bureaucracies where personnel report to their immediate superiors in a very tall hierarchical system. However, the bureaucrats do have some sort of acceptance and respect for the established hierarchies and thus, they believe that hierarchism should be the best way of dividing up work in any formal organisation. The system is such that, you dare not resist authority and this aspect of culture traces its roots from the Ghanaian societal culture where the leader is always right. This is what one of the bureaucrats from the OHCS asserted with regards to hierarchism in the bureaucracy, specifically, OHCS and it projects the general hierarchical culture across all the three organisations:

> *"Every institution has hierarchies of which you have to respect. This office has a top down approach system of governance here. We have a very organised hierarchical structure here. Work always comes from the top and disseminates down to the subordinates. One of the key features of the public service is hierarchism."* **(Junior Administrative Officer, OHCS).**

- **Boss-Subordinate Relationship**

The bureaucrats responded and reacted differently to the issue of boss-subordinate relationship and thereby creating some sort of both intra and inter-organisational variations in bureaucrats' perceptions. First and foremost, the boss-subordinate relationship at the YEA totally differs from the situation at the OHCS and the NMC. Findings from both the OHCS and the NMC shows a very positive relationship between superiors and subordinates. Despite the fact that, these two organisations are horizontally hierarchic, this element of hierarchism is not so much reflected in the way they work and interact with each other. Bureaucrats in these organisations see themselves as one people irrespective of one's administrative status. I personally met the Head of Civil Service constantly engaging bureaucrats unofficially both on the corridors and in their various offices on work related issues and even other OHCS social

issues. Also, I remember suspending one of my interviews at the OHCS when my interviewee had to ready herself to join the team visiting a bereaved colleague, as way of OHCS sympathising with the bereaved colleague. All these observations corroborate with the fact that, the aforementioned organisations in spite of their large power distance have very great staff working relationships. Bureaucrats from these two organisations really paints a very rosy picture about how they relate with both their superiors and subordinates through sycophancy. To them, the doors of their superiors are always open and thus, there is never a tensed moment at the various offices. And, I did not observe otherwise either. I observed a very great working atmosphere. This cultural situation at the OHCS and NMC is reflected in the quote by a bureaucrat at the NMC below:

> *"Though we have a very respected hierarchical system, we have a very friendly working relationship here. I can easily walk to the registrar and talk to him on any work-related issue. And he can equally call me to work for him and communicate that to my immediate boss. This does not happen just here in my department and it is a general thing here."* **(Senior Administrative Officer, NMC).**

Findings from the YEA on the hand, shows a very typical large power distance organisation with quite a tensed or negative working relationship between superiors and subordinates. Although bureaucrats' responses were mixed, majority of the bureaucrats had a pessimistic outlook on the boss-subordinate relationship at the YEA. Only two out of the eight engaged bureaucrats agreed to a fairly positive working boss-subordinate relationship. Most of the bureaucrats on the other hand feel that the boss-subordinate relationship at the YEA is dependent on one's personal relationship (sycophancy) with the boss or the subordinate. Due to the hierarchical nature of the YEA, this very nature of the organisation transcends across every aspect of the organisation. Some bosses feel bossy and perhaps treat theirs subjects as mere subordinates. To these bureaucrats, accessibility of bosses is quite difficult and it requires some degree of personal relationship with a boss or a secretariat before one will be able to see a boss.

Figure 6.0 provides a network summary and analysis the power distance situation in the selected cases of the Ghanaian bureaucracy.

OHCS, NMC & YEA

Very hierarchical large power distance Organisations

YEA

Tensed boss – subordinate relationship

HIERACHISM

BOSS-SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP

POWER DISTANCE IN THE GHANAIAN BUREAUCRACY (OHCS,

OHCS & NMC

Positive boss – subordinate relationship

Figure 6.0 Network analysis and summary of power distance in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy

6.2.1 Power Distance and Performance Management

Performance management just like any other organisational subsystem in a bureaucracy is centrally controlled and regulated by the top leadership especially in high power distance organisations. Due to the disparate nature of power relations among the public-sector organisations in Ghana, the NPMP was developed to promote a very healthy human relation among workers and thereby making the entire PMS very transparent as mirrored in the third NPMP construct. As already discussed, transparency is one of the key principles of the NPMP to help avoid the abuse of power in performance management. But I ask, *"To what extent has this been achieved?" Has power distance become a hindrance to this?* In this section, I will explicate the extent to which the power distance culture affects performance management and ascertain whether it has spawned some level of resistance or receptivity to the NPMP leading to failed or successful institutionalisation respectively.

- **Hierarchism and the NPMP**

The NPMP really thrives on how hierarchies are structured in the bureaucracy. The study reveals long hierarchies in all the three cases of the study. All the bureaucrats believe that hierarchies are very essential for the survival and growth of their bureaucracies. In high power distance organisations, hierarchies help bring orderliness and help streamline the organisational chain of command. In such bureaucracies, subordinates draw on the expertise and experience of bosses in order to thrive in their various work domains. The NPMP is designed in such a way that, it relies on the internal

hierarchies in order to monitor and measure bureaucrats' performance as well as organisational productivity. The policy itself is designed to promote hierarchism. First and foremost, the NPMP is seen is a management tool for the organisational leadership as stated in the first policy statement. [13] It is a tool to help managers and superiors to effectively manage people (human resources) and other organisational resources. Secondly, the appraisal system sees to it that there is always an appraiser and an appraisee which is interpreted as a superior and a subordinate. In implication, it presupposes that without a hierarchical structure, individual performance cannot be measured and evaluated. Last but not least, it is one of the key objectives of the NPMP to involve the governing bodies, senior executives, and managers in the entire appraisal system to help monitor performance appraisal and prevent any form of subjectivity which may permeate through the appraisal process. The engaged director at the PSC explains:

> *"Like I told you, the PSC realised that the old PMS was not able to establish any link between the key stakeholders of the various organisations. So how then do we get the various boards and the top executives to monitor performance? This new performance policy aims to sensitise these top executives to performance management in the public service and we have tasked them to ensure the effectiveness of this policy and performance management in their organisations. They really have a very huge responsibility under their belts"* **(Chief Director, PSC).**

All the foregoing discussions alludes to the fact that, without a properly delineated organisational hierarchy and chain of command, the policy goals of the NPMP can be threatened. In this sense, the findings of the study reveal a very conducive and a compatible hierarchical environment necessary for the NPMP to thrive. All the three cases of the study, that is, the OHCS, NMC and YEA are well organised with very clear-cut hierarchies. The OHCS and the NMC are really thriving as far as the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP is concern and it worth noting that, the hierarchical structure has to some extent accounted for that. The YEA on the other hand may have its own implementation challenges, but with respective to the prospects that comes with hierarchism, the future looks bright. The bureaucrats believe and respect their hierarchical structures which is an inherent requirement for a

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[13] Refer to Box 4.1 The New Performance Management Policy Statements/Guidelines

successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP. This indicates that bureaucrats will not find it difficult showing deep loyalty towards the performance management and the NPMP once it is properly implemented.

- **Does Boss-Subordinate Relationship Matter?**

A healthy human working relation in an organisation is really essential for an enhanced organisational productivity and that is what the NPMP brings to the table. It is one of the main policy statements of the NPMP to promote the health and long-term growth of the institution. This statement enjoins managers and subordinates to work together to meet the vision and goals of the organisation through consistent capacity building of the employees to ensure the sustainability and longevity of the institution (PSC, 2015: 5). In consequence, it is the primary objective of the NPMP to bring superiors and subordinates together to collectively realise the mission and vision of the organisation. Hence, with respect to this policy statement of the NPMP, it can be said that boss-subordinate relationship really matters and is an essential prerequisite in order for the policy to thrive.

Another aspect of the NPMP which draws on the boss-subordinate working relationship has to do with the performance appraisal itself. As already discussed, the NPMP presents a very phasic appraisal process just to kick away subjectivity. At the planning stage, superiors are supposed to be set performance targets with their subordinates in a very consultative manner in order to enhance transparency. In this connection, it is of vital importance to have such a congenial working relationship among employees to make this policy provision happen.

As already discussed in the preceding chapter, the OHCS and the NMC are seen as high-power distance organisations with an inherent positive boss-subordinate working relationship. These two organisations again are projected as good performing organisations with respect to the operationalisation of the NPMP. Bureaucrats from these organisations believe the performance appraisal process has been very transparent devoid of any form of subjective manipulation and interpretation. To them, they now get the opportunity to sit down with their bosses to set performance targets for themselves without any imposition of targets from above. Thus, they believe this feat is as a result of the very positive relationship that exits between their superiors and them. One of the bureaucrats explains:

> *"My boss is a very open person and I really like how he handles work in this office. When it comes to appraisal, he makes sure you are okay with your targets. We all organise our targets together. At times, he disagrees with some of my targets claiming they are over ambitious. It is one thing that has really kept us going. I do not know what happens at the other departments but I believe the situation cuts across. We enjoy what we do here because we are one family and this has really enhanced a very objective performance appraisal."* (**Junior Administrative Officer, NMC**)

Against the backdrop of this, it is very evident that there is a substantial degree of compatibility between this particular cultural tendency and the NPMP and thus, it is not so surprising seeing the level of institutionalisation of the NPMP at the OHCS and the NMC. On the other hand, the findings of the study suggest that superiors and subordinates have quite a tensed working relationship. One's relationship is dependent on his or her personal relations with the boss and it is mostly professional. This is one cultural feature which serves as a big threat to performance management and the NPMP. How can one go through an objective performance appraisal process with an unhealthy working relationship with a boss? Despite the objectivity intent of the NPMP, most of the bureaucrats at the YEA do not see that coming. One of them explains this in the following:

> *"I do not see myself sitting down with my boss to set targets. In the first place, it is not even easy to see and talk to my boss. She is always busy. So, I believe it will be very difficult sitting down with my boss to set performance targets. Maybe she will know how to go about it."* (**Junior Administrative Officer, YEA**).

Does this account for the reason why the YEA was not able to set targets with their employees in spite of their annual performance appraisal intent? In organisations with tensed large power distance cultures, it will be quite difficult to realise a very objective performance appraisal process because the bosses feel juniors must always succumb to their personal preferences. Failure to succumb is liable to low appraisal score and hence, an underperformance. From the findings of the study, it can be deduced that the bosses feel threatened with how the NPMP seeks to bridge the power gap between bosses and subordinate which may even give rise to subordinates questioning their authority and decisions as far as performance appraisal is concern.

Summing up...

The findings from the YEA confirm the hypothesis that "*the existence of a large power distance culture and informal relations in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy may threaten proper institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service*". This is as a result of the tensed informal working relations between bosses and subordinates at the YEA and thereby, impeding a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP (Policy deviation). In contrast, the findings from the OHCS and NMC refutes this hypothesis. The findings suggest a very positive effect of large power distance on the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP. These organisations although very hierarchical (large power distance culture) have very healthy boss-subordinate informal relations through sycophantic approach. And in effect, their power distance culture has accounted for a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP.

6.3 Uncertainty Avoidance

By examining the uncertainty avoidance in the public service, again all the 25 study participants were engaged in an interview on issues relating to uncertainty avoidance. The interview questions mainly had issues pertaining to **Rule Orientation and Innovation** (Concepts of Uncertainty Avoidance) which happens to be the main indicators of uncertainty avoidance analysis of the study. Generally, the findings of the study suggest a very strong uncertainty avoiding bureaucracy with just some few variations among the selected organisations.

- **Rule Orientation**

Generally, all bureaucrats admitted to the fact that per the Ghanaian societal cultural orientation, no organisation will be able to survive without formal and informal rules and regulations even if they do not work. However, the YEA has quite an interesting rule orientation. Although the findings suggest a strong uncertainty avoiding organisation, the public servants feel that the organisation have not put in enough effort to get the organisational rules enforced. This in effect put them at risk in their everyday work life since the future is always uncertain just in weak uncertainty avoiding organisations. Some of the bureaucrats even admitted to a very low level of awareness of the organisation's code of ethics. However, while most of them showed some level of discontent with the general attitude towards rules at the YEA, others were quite

satisfied with the situation. The later feels that, inasmuch as the existence of rules is crucial for organisational survival, the rules must be more relaxed. A senior bureaucrat opined in the following:

> *"The general attitude towards rules here is not so encouraging. The rules are there but it is about the enforcement. The rules here have just been relaxed. I remember we are not supposed to be access YouTube and other social media websites with the office computers and internet but that has not been enforced. People still do it."*

The NMC and the OHCS shares some similarities with respect to rule orientation. Bureaucrats from both organisations admitted to a very strong emotional need for rules in their respective organisations. They believe rules, laws and regulations are very essential for their existence and thus, the absence of rules will be detrimental to their work. To them, their organisational rules are very strict and that may probably be the reason behind their organisational success especially with regards to policy implementation like the NPMP. To these bureaucrats, this emotional need for rules increases their urge to work hard as well as keeping them busy at all times.

- **Innovation**

As already discussed, the findings of the study suggest a very a strong rule orientation bureaucracy and hence strong uncertainty avoidance. Thus, as part of the uncertainty avoidance analysis, I seek to examine the extent to which creativity and innovation survives in such a strong uncertainty avoiding bureaucracy. Findings from the OHCS and NMC suggest that innovation to some extent is very much appreciated in their organisations especially with NMC which has innovation as one of its core values. Most of the interviewees from these organisations (5 out of 8 from the OHCS and 6 out of 9 from the NMC) admitted that despite the plethora of inherent strict rules, their management is also committed to giving them room to be innovative. However, the fact that these organisations allow for some innovation does not allow for absolute innovation. All forms of innovation must be in sync with the overall core values and mission of the organisation. Innovation and rule following are not seen as two mutually exclusive variables in these organisations. These bureaucracies believe that implementation of innovative ideas involve some level of detail and punctuality as typical of strong uncertainty avoiding organisations (Hofstede et al. 2010). A bureaucrat from the NMC describes this in a quote below:

"One of the values of our organisation is innovation as a way to motivate and encourage staff. Previously, people were not used to social media interactions. We were used to the traditional form of public relations like the newspapers and radio. Right now, public education in video is taking over. People want to see to remember. And now we put most of our public education activities in very short 2-3 minutes video form and circulate them on the social media forms. So, I can say we are always moving from one level to the other. And these developments are people innovative ideas of which the NMC duly recognise and appreciate. However, all innovations must be in line with the organisation's mission statement" **(Senior Administrative Officer, OHCS).**

In strong uncertainty avoiding organisations like the NMC and the OHCS, one's innovation is shaped by the inherent rules, ethics and hierarchical power. Also, innovation in high power distance organisations is mostly subject to superiors' approvals.

The YEA on the other hand depicts a very strong uncertainty avoiding culture with little tolerance for innovation. Most of the bureaucrats (6 out of 8) believe that innovation is not so much appreciated in the organisation. At the YEA, it is quite difficult to experiment new ideas since everything directly comes from the top. Job description is strictly top down and some feel that is the reason behind the failing Ghanaian bureaucracy as they believe it is an inherent canker in the Public Service of Ghana.

In a nut shell, although there were some variations in the indicators of uncertainty avoidance among the selected organisations, the entire findings as already mentioned suggest a very strong uncertainty avoiding bureaucracy. All these three organisations believe in the fact that, employees cannot thrive in an anxiety-ridden organisation where the future is always unknown. Hence, there must be rules to bring orderliness. Figure 6.2 provides a thematic summary and analysis of uncertainty avoidance in the selected cases of the Ghanaian bureaucracy.

6.3.1 Uncertainty Avoidance and Performance Management

The study presents a mixed implication of uncertainty avoidance on performance management and the NPMP as mirrored in the two uncertainty avoidance hypotheses:

"Uncertainty avoidance is associated with more rule following, less innovation, more resistance to change. Thus, higher uncertainty avoidance may impede successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service.";

YEA
Strong need for rules / Poor enforcement

NMC & OHCS
Innovation appreciated

RULE ORIENTATION

UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE IN THE GHANAIAN BUREAUCRACY (OHCS, YEA, AND NMC)

INNOVATION

OHCS & NMC
Strong need for rules / Strict enforcement

YEA
Less room for innovation

Figure 6.1 thematic analysis and summary of uncertainty avoidance in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy

and *"More rule following may institute positive attitude to rule setting and its enforcement. Thus, higher uncertainty avoidance may foster a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service."* As already discussed in chapter two, the first hypothesis suggests a negative (resistance to change by the PMS and the NPMP) implication of uncertainty avoidance on PMS and the NPMP. The second hypothesis whereas suggests a positive (availability of well enforced rules guiding implementation) implication of uncertainty avoidance and NPMP.

In this section and its subsequent subsections, I will discuss and analyse how the interplay of the NPMP and the uncertainty avoidance cultural tendencies of the organisations accounts for the state of the NPMP in the selected bureaucracies. As part of the discussions, I will as well focus on the compatibility issues pertaining to this interplay.

- **Rule Following, Uncertainty and the NPMP**

The comprehensive outlook of the NPMP helps reduce any form of uncertainty which may characterise performance management in the Public Service. Strong uncertainty avoiding organisations rely on details and precise instructions on how to carry out work in the organisation. With the comprehensive nature of the NPMP, anything pertaining to performance management and appraisal is clearly defined. This in itself is supposed to make performance measurement and assessment easier and to control any form of anxiety which may emerge out of appraisal ambiguities. All the NPMP policy guidelines and statements are very instructive and enjoins managers and subordinates

to take up responsibilities in meeting organisational goals. Furthermore, these instructive guidelines are supposed to instigate the desired policy outcomes when the implementation framework which comes with the NPMP is duly enforced. The implementation structure of the NPMP is very top-down and it requires greater commitment from the key stakeholders at the upper echelons of the organisation to ensure an effective implementation and institutionalisation process.

Hypothetically, the strong rule orientation tendency of the Ghanaian bureaucracy should be very receptive to the NPMP and its specifications. As the study reveals, bureaucrats from the OHCS and the NMC believe the existence of a rule following culture has accounted for the success with the NPMP. Inasmuch as the policy comes with its guidelines and implementation framework, these organisations do have their own implementation policies and statutes (both written and unwritten) that also guide the implementation and institutionalisation process at the organisational level. A director at NMC remarks:

> *"One key thing that is very essential for a successful implementation is that, there must be policies to guide the implementation. If you do not have the policies, it will be difficult to achieve the desired success. And that is one secret to our success here. We have implementation policies on almost every system and policy here. It is not only for performance appraisal."* **(Principal Director, NMC)**

Due to the strong need for rules for organisational compliance, the bureaucrats do have much respect for these statutes and become more inclined to comply with the performance appraisal procedures. A bureaucrat from the OHCS explains this in the following quote:

> *"We have rules that guide this performance appraisal. The current administration is very passionate about performance and performance appraisal. I can tell you that, you do not have any reason not to comply with these rules when it comes to appraisal. This is one of the main reasons why the policy is working".* **(Senior Administrative Officer, OHCS)**

In sum, it is very evident that in these two organisations, their strong uncertainty avoidance and rule enforcement cultural tendencies have provided an enabling environment for strict enforcement of the policy guidelines, the various implementation frameworks and policies and hence an effective policy implementation and institutionalisation.

Looking at the rule orientation situation at the YEA, although there is a strong emotional need for rules, the existing rules are hardly enforced. Employees tend to do whatever they feel appropriate with little or no consideration for aftermath consequences. This cultural phenomenon may have partly accounted for the policy deviation and false start to the NPMP. The policy itself has been compromised at the top level by the policy implementers at the YEA due to the fear of non-compliance. In this connection, the implementers find it prudent to compromise and relax the provisions of the NPMP to attract some level of compliance (compliance by convenience). A clear example of such situation can be traced to the intention of the HR department to give out appraisal forms to employees to fill and return them once they are done because they feel it will be difficult to sit an employee for about 20 minutes to discuss and appraise their performance. This in effect creates the impression that the organisation is not ready for the policy in the first place.

The foregoing discussion alludes to the fact that the rule following cultural environment does not look so conducive for the enforcement and institutionalisation of the NPMP at the YEA. Until there is an attempt to institute a strict rule enforcement culture, the effectiveness and development of the NPMP still continue to be under threat. However, such an attempt may not prove to be an elusive task due to the employee's strong desire for rules as well as an enforcement culture.

- **Innovation and Strategic Thinking**

One key management value that the NPMP upholds is innovation as a condition for organisational change in the Public Service. Hence, it is the ardent desire of the policy implementers to see public servants show a great level of innovation and strategic thinking in their line of work. By dint of this, the NPMP has innovation and strategic thinking as a competence[14] indicator to measure how employees achieve organisational results. The innovation and strategic thinking competence enjoin bureaucrats, in their quest to achieve their performance targets, to provide support for organisational change,

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[14] The appraisal instrument has a section described as competencies (core and non-core competencies). These competencies are supposed to serve as performance measurement standards to enhance performance and a learning climate conducive to continuous development. Check appendix for a full copy of the appraisal instrument.

to think broadly and demonstrate creativity as well as originality in thinking. One of the key NPMP implementers at the PSC explains:

> *"And we say the competencies are how you achieve results and these are general management signs that tells you that, when you do these things you should achieve results or it should help you achieve your targets... In relation to the core competencies, we always tell them to be innovative. For example, at times when you want to go somewhere and other officers also want to use the same vehicle for errands, you just have to put your schedules together and put yourself in one vehicle and see how you can achieve that task together.".*
> **(Chief Director, PSC)**

The findings of the study reveal that innovation is very much appreciated at the OHCS and the NMC despite some level of restrictions posed by organisational rules and regulations. Innovation and change are two mutually inclusive organisational elements. This implies that, innovation is an important prerequisite for change. An organisation which allows a substantial degree of innovation, sees change as its optimum goal. Thus, considering the implication of the innovation tendencies of the OHCS and NMC, first, the decision to reorganise their PMS with the introduction of the NPMP could be linked to their disposition to embrace change. It took forward minded and strategic thinkers at the OHCS and the NMC to embark on a performance management revolution at the OHCS and the NMC. Second, the NPMP then gained roots after its introduction due to the fairly receptiveness of the inherent innovation culture. Although the NPMP enjoins bureaucrats to exhibit some level innovation in their line of work, the policy itself and its content is tied to strategic thinking and innovation.

In spite of the degree of tolerance for innovation in these strong uncertainty - avoiding organisations, innovation and creativity are to some extent curtailed. This is because employees do not have that unlimited capacity to make judgements and to take decisions for themselves as they continually feed on the superiors' preferences and expertise. The ability to think broadly and demonstrate creativity requires a great deal of subordinate independence where one will be able to make independent rational calculations in carrying out organisational tasks. The bureaucrats from the OHCS and the NMC feel their level of innovation do not allow such a freedom and furthermore, all innovation attempts must be in sync with their organisational manual of work. Nonetheless, this missing element do not prove so worrisome for the organisations

because the bureaucrats are so much used to the strict rule following culture and hence has little impact on their performance and appraisal scores.

The YEA on the other hand do not have room for innovation at all as revealed by the study. In light of this, it presupposes that there is a lower tendency of bureaucrats to think broadly and get creative since the cultural environment do not encourage that. Bureaucrats at the YEA are solely dependent on their superiors for their organisational tasks and as well as suggestions on ways to carry out those tasks. In this regard, any attempt to bring the innovation tendencies out from these bureaucrats will prove to be a daunting one due to the incompatible innovation culture. This cultural phenomenon has moreover created an "it will not work" syndrome. This is because, any decision or policy which seeks to challenge and change the existing status quo is mostly met with some initial resistance. Most of the bureaucrats at the YEA feel change has gradually become a nearly unachievable element in the organisation. This particular phenomenon tames the innovation prospects that come with the NPMP. It can be said that the YEA seems to have NPMP implementation challenges due to:

- Their reluctance to embrace change in relation to their PMS; and
- Their intolerance of innovation as a means to change.

Summing up...

Considering the discussions above, the two hypotheses posited in relation to uncertainty avoidance have been confirmed by the findings of the study. The study confirms the first hypothesis in the sense that the YEA which was presented as a high uncertainty avoiding organisations with less room for innovation shows a greater tendency of resisting change. And such cultural phenomenon is revealed as incompatible with the NPMP and thus have impeded a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP as compared to the NMC and OHC that have quite a receptive uncertainty avoidance culture. In addition, the OHCS and NMC are regarded as strong uncertainty avoiding organisations with strong rule following tendencies. In this light, these organisations have a well enforced code of rules and details guiding the whole NPMP implementation process and hence, have accounted for a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP. The YEA seems struggling partly because of its weak rule enforcement culture. And that also confirms the second hypothesis.

6.4 Political Neutrality

In this section, I present findings on political neutrality as the third cultural dimension of the study. This dimension basically tries to examine bureaucrats' attitude towards politics and how their work intersects with partisan politics. By dint of that, the study looks into the extent to which bureaucrats are politically neutral as well as the politicisation of the selected bureaucracies. The study adopts ***Classical Bureaucracy Vs. Partisan Bureaucracy*** as the indicator to serve as a benchmark for analysis with respect to political neutrality.

- **Classical Bureaucracy Vs. Partisan Bureaucracy**

The findings of the study suggest a high level of political neutrality, thus classical bureaucracy at the NMC and the OHCS. All the engaged bureaucrats from these organisations agreed in principle that, their bureaucracies are politically neutral. In implication, the findings suggest that, bureaucrats are politically open-minded, and rule oriented and thus, ready to serve any government that captures political power. In classical bureaucracies like the OHCS and the NMC, bureaucrats' attitudes towards politics is inversely proportional, hence a clear distinction between partisan politics and bureaucratic activities. This is so because, these bureaucracies believe in the fact that, inasmuch as they work in the shadow of the executive arm of government, their activities are backed by law which makes them quite autonomous. In this connection, it is extremely difficult to see bureaucrats' actions and inactions being influenced by their political orientation. In spite of the fact the NMC and OHCS runs a purely classical bureaucracy where organisational work is distinguished from partisan politics, some of the bureaucrats did not rule out the fact that bureaucrats may have their political party preferences, however, they argue these preferences do not influence organisational work.

On the other hand, findings from the study present the YEA as a highly partisan bureaucracy. The bureaucrats were not reluctant to admit that the organisation is highly politicised and fragmented along partisan lines. Some believe this as a result has accounted for the stagnation of its growth. A bureaucrat explains this particular point in the following quote:

> *"If you know YEA for a while, it has not been politically neutral. It is this politics which has accounted for its downfall. Bureaucrats are always eager*

to know your political affiliation immediately you enter in here. You could see the political factions within the organisation. This does not even help work." **(Senior Administrative Officer, YEA).**

Furthermore, the entire leadership setup is determined and influenced by the ruling government which in turn threatens the political neutrality of the agency. The bureaucrats reveal that, the tenure of their leaders is tied to politics and thus, a change of government implies a change of leadership.

In sum, the study reveals that the YEA is really struggling to disassociate its functions from partisan politics. The YEA is being portrayed as a partisan bureaucracy with a high level of political interference. The OHCS and the NMC on the other hand is also being portrayed as a politically neutral classical bureaucracy. The findings of the study suggest that these variations are as a result of how these organisations were created especially with YEA. The YEA until recently used to operate from the Office of the Presidency of Ghana which happens to be a political office in the political landscape of Ghana and hence the politicisation of the YEA. Figure 6.2 provides a thematic summary and analysis of political neutrality in the selected cases of the Ghanaian bureaucracy.

YEA

Politically biased / Partisan Bureaucracy

CLASSICAL BUREAUCRACY VS. PARTISAN BUREAUCRACY

POLITICAL NEUTRALITY IN THE GHANAIAN BUREAUCRACY (OHCS, YEA, AND NMC)

OHCS & NMC

Politically neutral / Classical bureaucracy

Figure 6.2 network analysis and summary of political neutrality in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy

6.4.1 Political Neutrality and Performance Management

This sub section looks into how bureaucrats' responsiveness to politics affects performance management systems in the Ghanaian bureaucracy. The political aspects are very important for the success of appraisal reforms (Karyeija, 2010: 197). The main rationale behind the NPMP is to kick away subjectivity from performance management. In this sense, any form of manipulation which may stem out from bureaucrats' response to politics will rather undermine the objectivity element of the NPMP. In this light, the

study hypothesises that "*the higher the degree of political neutrality in the Ghanaian Public Service, the less the bureaucracy becomes fragmented along political lines. Such a situation facilitates the objectivity, neutrality and equity element of the NPMP and hence, a better NPMP implementation and institutionalisation in the Ghanaian Public Service.*"

- **Political Neutrality, Favouritism and Equity**

Equity is a key policy principle of the NPMP. As discussed in chapter four, it is one of the goals of the NPMP to foster equity considerations in the performance appraisal process. The policy stipulates that the PMS must not be discriminatory with respect to gender, politics, ethnicity, geographical location etc. (PSC, 2015). In other words, the PMS must eschew any form of discrimination and favouritism which may emanate from one's political identity in addition to other cultural identities. Favouritism is a pre-eminent organisational element which tends to cripple performance management systems in most public organisations. Favouritism sometimes becomes very pervasive in organisations when the internal human resource is fragmented into factions along political party lines. There is always the struggle between favouritism and equity. In a politically fragmented organisation, bureaucrats who belong to the same identifiable cliques tend to manipulate and alter things in the interest of their groups or cliques and thus, making it difficult for employees to develop on merit. In connection to performance management, this organisational syndrome creates some sort of non-responsiveness to staff performance appraisal system, and a breakdown in discipline and work ethic. The old PMS failed to thrive in the wider bureaucratic system because its modus operandi with respect to appraisal was very subjective and much beset with favouritism and other assessment manipulations influenced by factors like politics and ethnicity.

The study reveals that the YEA is really struggling trying to sieve out political considerations from its administrative systems. The YEA runs a very political or partisan bureaucracy, and that in itself is a threat to the objectivity and equity intent of the NPMP. From some of the revelations of the bureaucrats at the YEA, everything at the YEA has been politicised. The political factions are very conspicuous to the extent that everyone is keen to know your political identity once you join the bureaucracy. Against this backdrop, how then will the application of appraisal procedures and outcomes be the same for every individual within the bureaucracy? It is of no doubt

that these internal factions will lead to favouritism in the application of the performance management in the bureaucracy. A bureaucrat hints in the following:

> *"You cannot take politics out from the YEA like I said earlier. Everything is influenced by politics. Most of the bosses here have their own favourite persons and when it comes to some organisational benefits like training, they mostly consider these persons. I am 100% sure that will also be the case for performance appraisal. Because the last time we had appraisal, I observed favour being bestowed on the chosen ones."* **(Administrative Officer, YEA)**

In addition to the equity threat posed by this cultural tendency, the principle of accountability, transparency, and ownership are to a large extent threatened by the element of favouritism as a result of lack of political neutrality in the bureaucracy. First, bureaucrats will not feel very accountable for their appraisal scores if they feel the entire process was marred with favouritism and other politically induced appraisal irregularities. Second, transparency is threatened by favouritism as well when bureaucrats feel the mode of assessment was skewed to favour certain targeted groups at the detriment of others. In this connection, the bureaucrats will not own the process and outcome of the assessment mechanism which the NPMP seeks to achieve with its ownership intent.

The OHCS and NMC on the other hand are revealed as classical bureaucracies that uphold the principle of political neutrality. This is as a result of their system of Weberian bureaucracy where administrators are arranged according to a hierarchy with a vertical authority system, lifelong career, impersonality, and promotion on the basis of merit (Jamil, 2007: 70). Furthermore, such a stable system is not supposed to be disturbed by a change in government; the system continues despite political changes and upheavals (Ibid). Administration in these bureaucracies, is seen as a neutral instrument concerned with the translation of political decisions which are derived from other sources into practice (Barker, 1996; Self, 1972 cited by Jamil, 2007:70). In this sense, it makes it easy for such bureaucracies to stay committed to any public policy which is backed by law. The NMC and OHCS have been able to achieve a great deal of success by getting the NPMP institutionalised due to the nature of their stable bureaucratic system and their political neutrality unlike the YEA. The congenial cultural environment has made it more conducive for the NPMP to thrive. Bureaucrats do not consider the political source of the policy since they are expected to stay loyal to any government which comes to power. By dint of this, the NMC and the OHCS are

not segregated in any way along political lines and this is what has fostered a very smooth implementation and institutionalisation process. All appraisal procedures, processes, and outcomes are very free and fair as mirrored in the transparency principle of the NPMP.

Summing up...

The study reveals an incompatible coexistence between objectivity as a virtue of the NPMP and politicised organisations such as the YEA. The OHCS and NMC are seen to have a very receptive political neutrality culture to NPMP. This culture has really fostered a very objective performance appraisal process. The YEA is seen compromising on the aspects of the appraisal instrument which seeks to enhance an objective appraisal process. And this is partly because, the highly politically fragmented culture does not accommodate the objectivity, neutrality and equity element of the NPMP. This particular situation in effect confirms the fourth hypothesis that classical bureaucracies such as the OHCS and the NMC devoid of any form political induced organisational fragmentations tend to have a very successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP. And this is because such neutrality culture really facilitates the objectivity, neutrality and equity element of the NPMP and hence, a little or no NPMP implementation and institutionalisation challenges in the Ghanaian Public Service.

6.5 Final Reflections on Administrative Culture as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable

The findings clearly indicate that the NPMP is been nurtured on different administrative cultural environments across the various bureaucracies in the Public Service of Ghana. Some of these cultures have been very receptive while others are seen as threats to the NPMP. The study presents different cultural variations among the selected cases of the study. Thus, it presupposes that the outcome of the interplay of the host administrative cultures and the NPMP will differ across these organisations. In the same vein, bureaucracies with similar cultural tendencies are bound to elicit similar policy outcomes. When we consider the NMC and the OHC, the findings of the study reveal that these two organisations share lots of bureaucratic cultural traits in common. So, it is not surprising that, these two organisations are thriving together as far as the institutionalisation of the NPMP is concerned. Most of their cultural tendencies are

seemingly conducive and compatible with the policy goals of the NPMP. The YEA has entirely unique administrative cultural features which in itself serve as a threat to the provisions of the NPMP. Although, the YEA has not gone far with the NPMP, its false start can partly be traced to the incompatibility of the host culture and the NPMP. Hypothetically, a bureaucracy with the right and conducive cultural environment should be able to make a good start to a policy like the NPMP and hence a brighter institutionalisation prospect. With my engagements with the OHCS and NMC, none of them expressed a case of a false start or any deviation tied to cultural incompatibility at the early implementation phase of the NPMP and hence, their success. Table 6.1 presents a brief overview of the compatibility of the NPMP and the host administrative culture of the selected bureaucracies of the study.

Table 6.1 brief overview of the compatibility of the NPMP and the host administrative culture of the selected bureaucracies of the study.

Case	Cultural Features	The Compatibility of the NPMP and the Host Culture
OHCS	High Power Distance Strong Uncertainty Avoidance High Political Neutrality	✓
NMC	High Power Distance Strong Uncertainty Avoidance High Political Neutrality	✓
YEA	High Power Distance Strong Uncertainty Avoidance *(Poor rule enforcement)* Low Political Neutrality	✗

✗ - Represents a case of incompatibility.

✓ - Represents a case of compatibility

6.6 Leadership as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable

One interesting revelation of the study is that, all the three cases of the study in some instances do share some similar cultural features such as power distance and uncertainty avoidance; however, these features seems to have different effects on the institutionalisation process of the NPMP at the various organisations. This in implication connotes that culture do not always function in isolation, and thus,

organisational culture can be managed by instrumental actors, that is, organisational leaders to achieve the desired results. The findings of the study suggest high power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultures in all the three organisations, that is, the OHCS, NMC, and YEA. However, these cultural tendencies have had positive implications on the institutionalisation of the NPMP at both the OHCS and the NMC with a negative implication at the YEA and the difference is leadership. Most studies on administrative culture in developing countries have a negative connotation that, large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance contexts negatively affects administrative reforms. However, the case of OHCS and NMC also indicate that leaders can manage and utilise these cultural traits to instigate the desired change as purposed by the reform. By dint of this, the leadership of the OHCS and NMC combines and utilises the cultural traits of hierarchy, friendly relations between superior-subordinate, and subordinates' preference for rule following to neutralise the negative implications of large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultural tendencies in order to foster a successful institutionalisation of the NPMP. The NPMP looks unpromising at the YEA due to the inability of leaders to effectively utilise leadership strategies to neutralise the negative threats posed by large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultures.

In view of this, it can be said that the implementation anomalies and the lackadaisical attitude of the YEA towards the NPMP is as a result of managerial and leadership lapses. Until performance management is prioritised and received the requisite commitment by the governing leadership, the implementation of the NPMP will be forever be deadlocked. The OHCS and NMC of Ghana were identified as one of the best performing organisations with respect to the operationalisation of the NPMP, first by the PSC and later substantiated by the findings of the study. The success of the policy in the above-mentioned organisations are directly attributed the efforts and commitment of their organisational leaders. It took the efforts of revolutionary and visionary leaders at the OHCS and NMC to achieve such heights with the NPMP. And, in order to have a uniform diffused level of NPMP success in the Public Service, the leadership of the various organisations will have to rise up to make it happen starting from the apex implementing body, that is the PSC. This is how a director at the OHCS summed up the role of leadership in entire implementation and institutionalisation of the policy:

"I will say it is leadership, it is leadership, it is leadership. I will explain. For us as the Ghana civil service, it took somebody with that leadership quality to say that "we have ended it. This is where I want us to go." So, it takes a very good leader with all the capabilities because then in the public service if you are waiting for somebody to come and motivate you before you move, then it won't work. So, I will say again it is leadership. "(**Principal Director, OHCS**)

Considering the findings of the study, it is very evident that leadership really plays a significant role in the institutionalisation of NPMP and PMS in the Public Service. The institutionalisation process draws on the right leadership strategy and commitment for a successful institutionalisation. This confirms the fifth hypothesis that the right leadership strategy and commitment, and the ability of leaders to manage cultural incompatibility may foster a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service.

6.7 Conclusion and Chapter Summary

In conclusion, it worth noting that context really makes a difference when it comes to policy implementation and not just at the international level (IPSM) but also at the organisational level. Administrative culture and leadership are two key contextual elements that cannot be taken for granted in implementing and institutionalising administrative reforms. Both administrative culture and leadership matter in the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP and PM reforms. A cultural tendency such as political neutrality is difficult to be managed by leaders in developing countries unlike cultures like power distance and uncertainty avoidance. In effect, their implications on reforms are mostly inevitable and beyond leadership control.

This chapter primarily sought to examine the interplay and effect of contextual cultural variables on the operationalisation of the NPMP. Discussions in the chapter mainly explained the factors behind the NPMP institutionalisation situations at various selected bureaucracies. The findings suggest that the organisations (OHCS and NMC) with high political neutrality, high power distance and a strong uncertainty avoidance with a strict rule enforcement culture tend to perform better with the operationalisation of the NPMP as compared to the organisations (YEA) with low political neutrality, high power distance and a strong uncertainty avoidance but poor rule enforcement culture.

The next and final chapter wraps up with final theoretical discussions, summarises and concludes the whole thesis.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

7.0 Introduction

This particular chapter which happens to be the final chapter of the thesis wraps up and concludes the study. It primarily offers concluding remarks which cuts across theoretical discussions, summary of the research findings, recap of both theoretical framework and methodology, and the implication and limitation of the study.

7.1 Theoretical Discussions

This section elaborates on the theoretical discussions and implications relative to the key highlights of the research findings discussed in the preceding findings chapters. It captures discussions under the theoretical framework.

7.1.1 Discussion Under the Instrumental Perspective

The Instrumental School of Thought conceives public organisations as instruments for achieving certain goals seen as important in society (Christensen et al. 2007: 20). Such goals include the public-sector restructuring through NPM inspired administrative reforms in making the functions of the State and the broader society better. In one sense, these reforms in the lenses of instrumentalists are seen as tools in the hands of public organisational leaders for achieving such goals in the society. As discussed in chapter two, the arguments of the instrumental perspective hinges on the logic of instrumental rationality. This implies that the reform process entails rational assessment of available alternatives or tools according to their consequences and in relation to the chosen goals, making wilful choices between alternatives and achieving the effects desired through those choices (Ibid). In this view, the research study identified Performance Management Reforms as a rational restructuring tool to stimulate performance and productivity in the Public Sector of Ghana. The first research question of study, "*What is the state of performance management reform in Ghana's Public Service? To what extent has this been institutionalised in the various public institutions* sought to unravel

how the Public Service has rationally utilised performance management reforms to revamp its PMS to incite high performance in the service.

In consequence, as part of the findings of the study, the study established a clear trajectory of PM reforms from its distant historical past to the most reform policy, that is, the NPMP. The study reveals that the past PM reforms prior to the NPMP such as the ACRS (1974), PES (1992), and the PAS (1997) failed to achieve their intended goals and effects due to certain decision shortcomings caused by what Herbert Simons describes as "Bounded Rationality".[15] The Instrumental Perspective argues rational choices consist of four elements, that is: *Goal or problem identification, Identification, Expectations about consequences, and Decision-making rules* (Christensen et al. 2007). Against this logic, it is quite implicit that reformers' in designing reforms main point of departure is to identify an organisational goal or problem; assess possible alternatives based upon their consequences, and a choice is made accordingly (Ibid). If these rational calculations and actions are not properly handled considering decision constraints posed bounded rationality, decision consequences in a form of reforms tend to suffer at implementation and institutionalisation stage. In the case of Ghana as revealed by the study, it can be said that the previous PM reforms were beset with implementation shortcomings due to:

- the inability of reformers to anticipate future consequences;
- an adoption of "one size fits all" policies from the international community.

All these shortcomings are as a result of constraint posed by bounded rationality which caused reformers to go the easy way of reforming. For instance, the PES was introduced in 1992 under the CSRP (1987-1993). The CSRP was fundamentally a public-sector management improvement exercise which formed part of the core components of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which was donor funded by the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) of the United Kingdom and the World Bank (Ayee, 2001). This presupposes that the public service reformers adopted the PES and CSRP by way of restructuring the service the easy way and enjoying some donor

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[15] Herbert Simon's Bounded Rationality assumes that members of organisations and decision -makers have limited knowledge or cognitive capacity and will act on the basis of simplified models of the world (Christensen et al. 2007: 10)

funding without looking into the future ramifications as well as some possible contextual incompatibilities. Adei & Boachie-Danquah (2003: 13) assentuates this particular defect in their argument that the entire PES and CSRP was a failure because "the programme was crafted as a technical instrument by 'consultants' and mission experts and imposed top-down with little local participation and ownership".

It must be said that NPM inspired public service reforms which happens to be the most effective way of fixing the unending developmental challenges crippling the public sector has created an Internationalisation of Public Sector Management (IPSM) (Ohemeng, 2006: 247). This IPSM has led to a "one-size-fits-all" approach to administrative reforms (Ibid). However, several reform studies like (Ohemeng, 2006) reject this approach to reform. Ohemeng (2006: 248) argues that, "there is no "one best way" for changing the state... factors that may influence or enhance the successful implementation of administrative reforms in one country may not lead to a successful implementation of reforms in another." Ohemeng (2006) is in his study reveals that rational policy formulators must consider all contextual implications before adopting any reform into the circles of the administrative systems of the Public Service. He argues below:

> "the socio-economic and political environment, including a country's history, past development, system of governance, and relationship with the outside world (particularly, International Financial Institutions), the bureaucracy, and the culture in which the reforms are being implemented should all be of serious concern in determining the policies for reforms. In this sense, policies being transferred from one environment to another should be adapted to meet the environmental circumstances of the recipient country. In other words, such policies should be refined to accommodate a country's specific exigencies if they are to achieve their intended purposes."

7.1.2 Discussion Under the Institutional/Cultural Perspective

Administrative culture is the main study variable tied to the cultural perspective. The fundamental logic behind administrative culture and the cultural perspective is the logic of appropriateness. This means that, "when acting in public situations, one will not primarily act rationally according to careful deliberation of pro and contra arguments, or out of self-interest or assessments of possible consequences of actions; instead, one will engage in matching, whereby rules for action are deployed in order to link situations and identities." (Christensen et al. 2007: 40). This particular organisational

phenomenon plays a very crucial role in the adoption of any reform onto the administrative systems of public organisations as demonstrated throughout the study. Organisational reform and cultural studies indicate that organisational culture affects reforms in diverse ways. It can either be positive or negative depending on the compatibility of the cultural tendencies and the reform objectives. In highly institutionalised organisations, organisational actors first and foremost consider how their actions are acceptable within the organisation before considering how acceptable it is vis à vis reform provisions. According to Christensen et al. (2007: 40), organisational actors are constantly concerned with their "recognition" (which type of situation am I faced with as a public decision-maker?), their "identity" (which identity is most important for my institution and for me?), and the rules of the game (what are my institution and I expected to do in a situation like this?).

In this instance, the cultural norms dictate the "rules of the game" and thereby determining which aspect of the reform can fully be institutionalised and vice versa. Looking at the findings of the study, the YEA's operationalisation and start to the NPMP looks unpromising due to the cultural incongruence. Bureaucrats at the YEA are constantly engaged in what Christensen et al (2007: 40) describes as matching whereby rules for action are deployed in order to link situations and identities. The bureaucrats at the YEA through the existing organisational culture have been integrated into the organisation with an 'integrative glue' and thereby creating a collective feeling and identity. By dint of this, the organisation and its leadership are faced with no option than to deviate from the NPMP and modify the policy to suit its culture without trying to change their culture fundamentally.

The negative effect of culture is also well demonstrated in Karyeija, Gerald's (2010) study on the topic "Performance appraisal in Uganda's civil service: Does administrative culture?". Karyeija's findings demonstrated that "for the successful introduction of performance appraisals, culture matters because the performance appraisal is imposed from abroad and requires a compatible host administrative culture in order to take root" (Karjeija 2010: iv). He identified large power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance, high ethnicity and political neutrality as the main features of the Ugandan's bureaucracy. He further argued that "although the Ugandan government successfully introduced the appraisal reforms, the incompatibility between the values

embedded in the appraisal and the host administrative culture watered down the reform"
(Ibid).

7.1.3 Discussion Under the Transformative Approach

The study adopts a transformative approach in explaining why some reforms are watered down by contextual factors and hence addressing the second research question, *what explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform? Is it leadership or administrative culture that matters? Or a combination of both, that is, leadership and culture?* Christensen and Lægreid (1999a cited by Christensen and Lægreid, 2001: 24) as discussed in chapter two advances a transformative approach in explaining the interplay of reform process and context. To them, a transformative perspective emerges when we combine internal and environmental reform features to explain why NPM may have different content, effects and implications in different countries (Ibid). In this connection, the study primarily adopts leadership and organisational culture as the contextual variables in explaining the institutionalisation of the performance management in the Ghanaian Public Service. The implications of these two variables are tied to the dynamic interplay of instrumentalism and culturalism (transformative perspective). The findings of the study reveal that both leadership and organisational culture matter in the institutionalisation of the NPMP.

The function of leadership (traits and styles) is viewed differently by the instrumental and the institutional perspectives. From the instrumental perspective, structures surrounding a leader form their traits and they can use them deliberately as tools, almost irrespective of their own personal traits (Christensen et al., 2010: 110). Thus, in principle, it is irrelevant which qualities leaders have because formal norms steer behaviour, that is, what is decisive is the organisational framework (Ibid: 111). From a cultural perspective on the other hand, leadership trait is essential for how leaders exercise their roles. From this Selznick-inspired perspective, leadership traits become much more relevant...not only to promote historical norms and values, but also to be able to show, by example or in some other way, what the cultural norms and values are and to use them to garner support and aid social integration (Ibid).

The above discussed functions of leadership are very much mirrored in the findings of the study. The leadership at both the OHCS and NMC showed great levels of dexterity in the institutionalisation of the NPMP. Their astute leadership traits substantially

account for their NPMP successes as revealed by the study. What then accounts for this? Against the backdrop of the arguments posited by the instrumentalists, both the OHCS and the NMC have the institutional structures backed by law, and thus, these structures in turn serve as tools in the hands of their leaders to control the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP. The study reveals that the key policy implementers (leaders) at the OHCS and NMC drew on certain structural features to harness the entire operationalisation of the policy. Both the two organisations tapped on their financial backings and strengths to facilitate the entire implementation process. These organisations organised both in-house and external trainings on the NPMP to help bureaucrats understand the policy better. It is worth pointing out that these training programmes were organised as part of the organisations' training schemes (structural feature).

Also, against the backdrop of the arguments posited by the cultural perspective, leaders exhibited astute leadership traits by utilising and managing the organisational informal norms to achieve a great level of NPMP institutionalisation. This leadership argument posited by the culturalists, explains how the leaders at the OHCS and NMC managed to utilise large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultural tendencies to their advantage (compatibility) unlike the leadership at the YEA. Large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultures are mostly detrimental to reform implementation especially in developing countries and it was very evident in the case of the YEA.

7.2 Overview of the Study

The dispensation of the NPM over the last two decades has provided a surest way of restructuring the administrative systems of Ghana's Public Service through reforms. Ghana after adopting its maiden NPM reform in 1987, have remained focused on its bureaucratic reformative agenda. Since 1987, Ghana has witnessed several NPM reforms with some internationally adopted and others internally initiated. It is worth noting that, the NPM reform trajectories project performance management system and reform as an integral component of all these reform initiatives. The most recent performance management reform in the Ghanaian Public Service, is the NPMP.

And in this connection, the primary purpose of the study was to examine the whole operationalisation of the PM reforms, specifically the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public

Service. In a narrow sense, it mainly sought to explore and examine the impact and influence of leadership and administrative culture as contextual factors on the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in Ghana's Public Service. It focused on explaining failed and successful institutionalisation of the NPMP and ascertain whether leadership, administrative culture or both matters in the institutionalisation process in the selected public organisations, that is the OHCS, NMC, and YEA. In this light, the study sought to address this research phenomenon by posing two research questions: **"What is the state of performance management reform in Ghana's Public Service? To what extent has this been institutionalised in the various public institutions?"; "What explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform? Is it leadership or administrative culture that matters? Or a combination of both, that is, leadership and culture?"** In answering these questions, a qualitative research design was employed to gather, analyse and interpret data on the research phenomenon. The study adopted the instrumental and institutional/cultural perspectives as well as the interplay of these perspectives (transformative approach) in explaining administrative reforms in the Ghanaian Public Service.

At the end of the study, the state of performance management was unravelled with NPMP identified as the current working PM reform in the public service. And OHCS and NMC were seen to have had quite a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP due to leadership efforts and cultural compatibility. The YEA on the other hand was seen to have had a false start to the implementation to the NPMP, and hence a policy deviation due to poor leadership style and commitment as well as cultural incompatibility. Also, the study concluded by arguing that both leadership and administrative culture matter in the institutionalisation of the NPMP and administrative reforms in general.

7.2.1 Recap of the Theoretical Framework

The arguments of the study were built on New Institutional Theories, that is the Instrumental Perspective, Cultural/Institutional Perspective and the Transformative Perspective (dynamic interplay of the instrumental and cultural perspective). The instrumental perspective which hinges on the underlying logic of consequence argue that organisations and organisational actors are seen as instruments to address societal

challenges. To instrumentalists, leaders are seen as rational actors and thus, they wield the transformative power of instigating change in organisations through reforms. Hence, reforms are seen as tools in the hands to bring change in organisations and the society at large. The institutionalisation of PM reform as a consequence of rational decisions of leaders is seen as the dependent variable of the study.

The institutional/Cultural perspective is also tied to the logic of appropriateness and administrative culture as an independent variable of the study. To Culturalists, "people in public organisations act according to historical norms, values and what is seen as appropriate" (Christensen et al, 2007: 55). Furthermore, the study adopts a transformative approach in explaining the effect of context on reforms. In consequence, leadership is also identified as a contextual element which influences reform processes, hence an independent variable of the study. The transformative perspective argues that it is always prudent to merge and examine the interplay of environmental characteristics, polity features and historical-institutional factors in explaining reform process and context.

7.2.2 Recap of the Methodology

The study employed a qualitative research design with a multiple case study research strategy to investigate the research phenomenon. The main reason for this choice was to study the research phenomenon through the eyes of the people studied in their natural setting (Bryman, 2012). As a comparative multiple case study, the unit of analysis (cases) for the study was the Public Service of Ghana focussing specifically on the OHCS, NMC, and the YEA.

The study employed both purposive sampling (opportunistic sampling) and snowball sampling approach in identifying well-informed stakeholders, both principal officers and junior officers, in the various organisations for interview engagements. The essence of this was to ensure that all levels of staff across all targeted organisations were substantially represented. A total of twenty-eight (28) bureaucrats were interviewed in that regard. In addition to the usage of interviews as the main primary data source, the study also gathered data from other secondary sources inclusive of documents, and direct observation.

By way of data analysis, the study adopted a Condensed Content Analysis to guard against being captivated by the richness of the data collected (Bryman, 2012: 565).

Furthermore, the study adopts **Validity, Reliability, and Generalisation** as some criteria for assessing the quality of the research. Last but not least, the study saw to it that ethical principles which include; avoidance of harm to participants, seeking informed consent, confidentiality, and personal integrity were strictly upheld through the research process.

7.3 Summary of key Findings

In this section, I present a summary of the key findings of the study which enfold around the main research questions and hypotheses posed by the study by way of investigating the research phenomenon. In view of this, table 7.0 and 7.1 present a summary of the key research findings under the two research questions.

Table 7.0 Summary of the key research findings (Dependent Variable)

Research Question and Hypothesis	Theoretical Underpinning	Key Findings
What is the state of performance management reform in Ghana's Public Service?	Instrumental Perspective	**Trajectory of PM Reforms** • Annual Confidential Reporting System (ACRS) – This was the main PM instrument of the Ghanaian Public Service before Ghana's maiden NPM reform which was later reviewed in 1974. • Performance Evaluation System (PES) – The main PM instrument under the CSRP in 1992. It was primarily an interactive process between managers and members of staff. • Performance Agreement System (PAS) – This system marked the paradigm shift from a traditional bureaucratic system to a more result-oriented management culture and it ran from 1997 to 2008. The main challenge of this system was that it was quite ad-hoc in its implementation and lacked a clear feedback system. **The New Performance Management Policy (NPMP)** • The NPMP was first piloted in 2011, further developed and introduced in 2014 by the PSC in collaboration with the OHCS, the Australian Public Commission and other key stakeholders replace the old PAS. • The rationale behind its introduction was: to introduce a "one-for-all" policy framework for the entire public service; to provide a comprehensive robust PA system and methods on how performance should be measured; to institutionalise better reward and sanction systems linked to

		performance as well as training and career development; and to reduce subjectivity in the entire PMS.
		• Implementation Framework- The study did identify a four-level implementation chain of the NPMP. The key bureaucratic actors making up this four-level implementation chain include: the main autonomous agencies (PSC, NDPC, FWSC), the Governing Councils and Boards; the Heads of the Public Services, Chief Executives, and Chief Directors (Management); and the Street-level Bureaucrats.
		• The performance management system depicts a six-stage cyclical process, that is, performance planning, measurement, monitoring, evaluation, annual reporting and improvement plans.
To what extent has this (PM Reforms and the NPMP) been institutionalised in the various public institutions?	Instrumental Perspective	• From the findings of study, the OHCS and NMC are seen as organisations having a great deal of institutionalisation with the NPMP. However, the findings do suggest that it is not all rosy with the implementation and institutionalisation of the policy at these organisations. Both organisations despite their successes are still struggling with the construct D (reward and sanction system) of the policy
		• The YEA on the hand is seen as "new babies" in terms of the implementation of the policy. The organisation in its quest to revamp its PMS decides to roll the NPMP out, however, its attempt to get the NPMP implemented is seen as a false start and thus, clear case of policy deviation.

Table 7.1 Summary of the key research findings (Independent Variables)

Research Question	Theoretical Underpinning	Key Findings
What explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform? Is it leadership, culture or a combination of both, that is, leadership and culture that matter?	Transformative Perspective (Instrumental and Cultural Perspective)	• That study reveals that both administrative culture and leadership are two key contextual elements that cannot be taken for granted in implementing and institutionalising administrative reforms. Both administrative culture and leadership matter in the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP and PM reforms.
		Administrative Culture as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable
		• Power Distance- The findings from the YEA (having a tensed informal relations) confirms the hypothesis that the existence of a large power

	Cultural Perspective	distance culture and informal relations in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy may threaten proper institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service. In contrast, the findings from the OHCS and NMC (having a healthy informal relations) refutes this hypothesis. The findings suggest a very positive effect of large power distance on the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP. • Uncertainty Avoidance- The study confirms the first hypothesis that high uncertainty avoidance is associated with more rule following, less innovation, more resistance to change and thus, impede successful institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service (In the case of YEA). The study also confirms the second hypothesis that more rule following may institute positive attitude to rule setting and its enforcement. Thus, higher uncertainty avoidance may foster a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service (In the case of OHCS and NMC). The YEA seems struggling partly because of its weak rule enforcement culture. • Political Neutrality- The findings of the study confirms the fourth hypothesis that classical bureaucracies such as the OHCS and the NMC devoid of any form political induced organisational fragmentations unlike the YEA tend to have a very successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP
	Transformative Approach	**Leadership as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable** • The study confirms the fifth hypothesis that the right leadership strategy and commitment, and the ability of leaders to manage cultural incompatibility may foster a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service (In the case of OHCS and NMC).

7.4 Contribution of the Study

First and foremost, the findings of the study really add up to the extant literature on PM and NPM reforms, and Administrative Culture in Africa and the world at large. As already mentioned, the research area is a largely unexplored area both in the Ghanaian context as well as the international context especially within the sub-Saharan Africa. Most importantly, the findings of study contribute in filling in the gaps in the extant literature on public sector reforms in Ghana. Most reform studies in Ghana have only sought to address the scope and content of reforms with little interest of examining the

role and impact of contextual factors such as organisational culture and leadership. In this view, this study contributes by serving as a literature point of departure for NPM reforms and contextual studies in Ghana.

Also, another tremendous contribution of the study to extant literature worth pointing out is the finding of the study which discusses the effect of large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultures on NPM reform process. Most studies on administrative reform and culture in developing countries like Karyieja's (2010) study on the impact of culture on performance management reforms in the Ugandan Bureaucracy suggest a very negative impact of the above-mentioned cultural tendencies on the implementation of reforms. It is most often projected that large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultures are usually incompatible with reform initiatives and thus, water down these reforms. However, this study has illustrated otherwise; such cultural tendencies coupled with the right leadership and managerial strategies can result into a promising implementation and institutionalisation of the reform policy. And that is something new to the extant literature on reform and cultural studies in developing countries.

7.4.1 Implications for Further Studies

This study opens the way for further comprehensive assessment of the operationalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service. As of the time this study was conducted, the PSC was still creating the awareness and training organisational leaders on the NPMP with only a few organisations having rolled out the policy in their respective organisations. Thus, further studies will imply a wider scope, cases and research population. Further studies can also focus on the impact of other contextual variables such as record of resource availability, structural capacity, information constraint, independence of action (organisational sovereignty), etc.

7.5 Limitation of the Study

The main limitation of the study is the challenge posed by the unfriendly research environment in Ghana especially in the public service and the negative attitude towards research in the service. Access to key informants and data information in the public organisations was quite difficult, which at a point curtailed the progress of the research.

In addition, although I was given the greenlight to conduct my research at the OHCS, the office did not officially respond to my letter.

Second, another main limitation of study stems from the choice of cases for the study. YEA was included in the study to provide balance to the study in terms of perceived good and bad performing organisations relative the operationalisation of the NPMP. Nonetheless, considering the findings from the study, the balance seems unconvincing especially considering the fact that the policy was just almost a year old at the YEA as of the time the study was conducted. It thus, undermined the comparative intent of the research study.

Also, another limitation of study is in relation to the fact the cases and research population were not wide enough to warrant a statistical generalisation as typical of most case studies. However, this study makes its generalisation through analytical generalisation as discussed in chapter three. Responses from the respondents from the selected organisations are generalised to the theories underpinning the study and also may have some implications for other African countries. For example, this research can serve as point of departure for other similar studies and research analysis.

Last but not least, another limitation of the study is about the duration of the study. The time frame was short to delve more into the operationalisation process of the NPMP. I believe I would have unearthed more interesting findings if I had spent more time at the research field. The study lasted for only two months (from September 2018 to November 2018)

7.6 Final Remarks

The NPMP, I must say, looks very comprehensive and competent in bringing out the best out of public service organisations as it approaches performance management from a broader and scientific perspective. Although the policy looks very promising in scope, its implementation and institutionalisation is not an automated process. It needs the right working environment to thrive. For a brighter future of the policy, it will be highly essential to get all key missing elements fixed starting from the correction of implementation anomalies. Considering the challenges that have crippled the progress of the policy, it is of no doubt that the whole implementation of the policy requires a high degree of leadership commitment and an attitudinal change of bureaucrats (detachment from cultural norms) in order to thrive in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1- Interview Guide

NPM-INSPIRED ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

1. Please state the administrative reforms that you are aware of that have taken place in the service.

2. Why do you think these policies were introduced?

3. Which one of these do you think have come from the international arena?

4. Which one of these do you think have been a result of home grown solutions?

5. Who are the key actors involved in the initiation of these policies?

6. Who are the key actors involved in the implementation of these policies?

7. What are the main elements of the administrative reforms that you have witnessed?

8. What are the main constraints of these polices?

9. In your view what are the main successes of these reforms?

10. In your view, what are the main challenges of these reforms?

11. Are these reforms entrenched in the Ghanaian Public Service? If so, to what extent?

ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE

POWER DISTANCE

1.   How do you see hierarchism and power distance in this institution?

2.   Do you think hierarchism is a convenient way in dividing up work in this institution? If so to what extent?

3.   How is the boss – subordinate relationship like in this institution? Do bosses take care of their subordinates as if they were his own children (like the role of a chief)?

4.   How is the participation of subordinates in decision making in this institution like? In your opinion, do you think it's the best or there is more room for improvement?

5.   How wide is the salary range between bosses and subordinates?

POLITICAL NEUTRALITY

6. Do you think public servants are politically neutral? To what extent do you think the actions and inactions of public servants are politically motivated?

7. Do you see the interference of politicians in the business of public servants disturbing?

8. Most people think public servants should remain neutral in relation to political parties. To what extent do you agree with this perception?

9. Has there been any trait of conflict of political interests in this institution? To what extent has it affected the progress of this institution?

10. Do you think technical considerations must be given more weight than political factors in the public service as a whole?

UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE

11. How is the attitude of the employees towards the rules and ethics of this institution and the service at large like? (emotional need for rules)

12. Personally, do you feel it is better to follow known standards and procedures than experiment with new ideas?

13. How is decision making in this institution like? Is it based on rational thinking or common sense?

14. Do you agree to the claim that "more money is better than more leisure time"? To what extent do you agree or disagree?

15. How do you see the attitude of public servants towards innovation and invention as against implementation?

16. Is innovation really appreciated in the public service?

17. Do you think subordinates feel more comfortable working under close supervision?

FINAL DELIBERATIONS ON CULTURE

18. How does culture contribute to bureaucracy innovation, success, or failure?

19. How can culture be managed and or changed, in implementing NPM reforms?

20. Is this culture receptive or resistant to NPM reforms? And how?

THE NEW PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT POLICY FRAMEWORK OF GHANA

1. What do you think are the main reasons for implementing the new performance management policy? Do you think it has succeeded? Clarify.

2.   What are the key behaviour patterns, practices, values and cultural attributes responsible for the effective implementation of the performance management policy?

The New Performance Management Policy seeks to implement performance/results-oriented management in meeting organizational goals.

3.   Do you think this has fully been institutionalized in the service?

4.   Is the power distance in the institution a potential threat to this objective? How?

5.   Do you think strict rule following is the most effective way to help entrench this in the service?

Introduction of a Performance Appraisal System (PAS)

6.   How effective is the appraisal system in this institution?

7.   Has it influenced the performance of public servants in a way?

8.   Has the power distance in this institution really fostered a more effective PAS?

9.   Do you think political biasness is a threat to an effective PAS system?

10.   Do you think appraisers and appraisees feel threatened by the appraisal system? If so, then why?

The new performance management policy also seeks to enhance transparency of performance targets – In a consultative manner between the assesse and the assessor.

11.   To what extent has this been institutionalized?

12.   Is this aspect of the policy compatible with the power distance of the public service?

13.   Do you think there should be strict rules to help enforce this provision?

Recognition, Incentive, reward, and sanction system linked to performance.

14.   To what extent has this been institutionalized?

15.   Do you believe this system is in a way influenced by favouritism?

FINAL DISCUSSIONS

16.   Generally, do you think the Ghanaian administrative culture is compatible with the new Performance Management reform initiatives? Why?

17.   What do you think about the commitment of public servants to the performance management system? Whom do you think is most receptive to the performance management system? Which categories of public servants do you find resistant to the PM? Give reasons.

18.   Do you feel the new PMS policy has produced intended performance of the public service?

19.   Any suggestions on how to make the performance system effective?

Appendix 2 – Recommendation and Response Letters

UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN
Department of Administration and Organization Theory

The Director of Administration
Youth Employment Agency
Ridge-Accra

Bergen, 05.09.2018

LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

Dear Sir/Madam,

This is to introduce Jac Hage Gyimah (b.30.07.1990) who is a student of mine.
He is pursuing an MPhil degree in Public Administration (MPA) at the Department of Administration and
Organisation Theory, University of Bergen, Norway.

He is conducting the research under my supervision on the following topic: "Performance Management
Reforms for Better Performance in Ghana's Public Service: Is Administrative Culture a Hindrance?"

As an important part of this exercise, he has to interview various persons and collect relevant documents.
I hope you may assist him in the research. The information provided to him is for academic purposes only.

Any assistance given to him is highly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Ishtiaq Jamil
Director of MPA program

(Same letter to both the OHCS and NMC)

YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AGENCY
(YEA)

Republic Of Ghana

HEADQUARTERS

In case of reply, the number
and of letter should be quoted

P.O.Box CT 9120
Cantonment – Accra
Tel:0302 235 022 / 0302 235 023 / 0302 235 027
Website: www.yea.gov.gh

Our Ref: YEA/HQ /HR.GN. 208/18

03-08 20 18

Mr. Jac Hage Gyimah
University of Bergen
Norway

Dear Sir,

RE: LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

We acknowledge receipt of your letter on the above subject to conduct a research on Performance Management Reforms and Administrative Culture in the Youth Employment Agency for academic purpose, as a fulfilment for your M.Phil. studies.

This is to inform you that permission is duly granted to carry out the above-mentioned research project in our organization.

Sincerely,

DAVID ADAGBLENYA
DIR, HUMAN RESOURCES

In case of reply, the reference number and date of this letter should be quoted

Our Ref: N&MC/HR/18

September 14, 2018

PROFESSOR ISHTIAQ JAMIL
DIRECTOR OF MPA PROGRAM
UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN
DEPART. OF ADMIN. AND ORG. THEORY

Dear Sir,

RE: LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

We acknowledge receipt of your letter on the above subject.

We wish to inform you that the request of Jac Hage Gyimah to conduct interviews on the topic: Performance Management Reforms for Better Performance in Ghana's Public Service: Is Administrative Culture a Hindrance? Has been accepted.

We hope Jac Hage Gyimah will make use of this opportunity.

Yours faithfully,

Paul Mark Owooh (Mr.)
Head of Department, Human Resource Mgt

Cc: Jac Hage Gyimah

Our Ref: N&MC/HR/18

October 11, 2018

PROFESSOR ISHTIAQ JAMIL
DIRECTOR OF MPA PROGRAM
UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN
DEPART. OF ADMIN. AND ORG. THEORY

Dear Sir,

RE: LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

With reference to your letter on the above subject, we wish to state that Jac Hage Gyimah arrived at the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana on October 4, 2018 to conduct the interviews.

He conducted the interviews from October 4 – 11, 2018.   He interviewed ten (10) staff from the various departments of the Council.

We would be grateful if copies of his report is made available to the Council.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully,

Paul Mark Owooh (Mr.)
Head of Department, Human Resource Mgt

Cc: *Jac Hage Gyimah*

Appendix 3- NPMP Appraisal Form

PUBLIC SERVICES PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
(STAFF PERFORMANCE PLANNING, REVIEW AND APPRAISAL FORM)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 1 - A: Appraisee Personal Information

PERIOD OF REPORT	From (dd/mm/yyyy):	To: (dd/mm/yyyy):

Title: ☐ Mr.   ☐ Mrs.   ☐ Ms.   ☐ Other (Pls. specify): _____

Surname: _____   First Name: _____

Other Name(s):_____

Gender: ☐ Male   ☐ Female   Grade/Salary (p.a)--

Present Job Title/Position: _____

Department/ Division: _____

Date of Appointment to Present Grade (dd/mm/yyyy): _____

TRAINING RECEIVED DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR

Institution	Date (dd-mm-yyyy)	Programme
-------------------------------------		.-------------------
-------------------------------------		.-------------------
-------------------------------------		.-------------------
-------------------------------------		.-------------------

SECTION 1 - B: Appraiser Information

Title: ☐ Mr.   ☐ Mrs.   ☐ Ms.   ☐ Other (Pls. specify): _____

Surname: _____   First Name: _____

Other Name(s): _____

Position of Appraiser: _____

Guidance Notes

COMPLETION OF STAFF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT FORM

The Performance Management System is designed to evaluate how well you are doing in your present position in relation to results achieved within the period of appraisal to enable the organization to achieve its goals and objectives. The Performance Management System is also aimed at assisting you to improve upon your performance and ensure your career development.

The Performance Management System is an annual cycle involving four key phases. All members of Staff/Heads of Divisions, Departments/Units and Appraisers should read the Guidelines below before filling the Form

Employee Guidance Notes

- Phase One – Performance Planning

  Planning and setting of individual performance targets through work plans derived from the organisation's strategic plans and objectives set at the corporate, divisional, departmental and unit levels. The target setting process must be a top-down approach; preferably the first two weeks in January should serve as the period for setting of targets for the year.

- Phase Two – Progress Reviews

  Discussion and communication between appraiser and appraisee on progress of work, and adjustment of targets if necessary, through the provision of formal feedback.

- Phase Three – Review and Appraisal

  Evaluation of appraisee's performance at the end of the performance management period.

- Phase Four- Decision–Making

  Deciding on courses of action, i.e. recognition/reward, training plans, promotion prospects, career development plans and counselling and sanctions.

PERFORMANCE PLANNING

➢Performance Planning is the process of defining an employee's job and setting performance expectations for the annual review. It is important that you involve the appraisee and use his/her input in setting targets to ensure ownership by the appraisee. The process consists of three steps included on the appraisal form (all in Section 2)
: ▪ Key results areas
  ▪ Targets
  ▪ Resources required

For example, you will define the overall requirements of the job by identifying three to five key results areas.

Stage1 - Before the Meeting
Step 1: Appraiser and Appraisee identify key results areas
Step 2: Appraiser and Appraisee identify targets
Step 3: Appraiser and Appraisee should exchange notes

Stage 2 - During the Meeting
Step 1: Appraiser and Appraisee discuss and agree on key result areas identified for the appraisee
Step 2: Appraiser and Appraisee discuss and agree on targets
Step 3: Appraiser explains competencies as in Section 5
Step 4: Appraiser and Appraisee discuss key resources required for the attainment of targets

Stage 3 – After the Meeting
Step 1: Appraiser fills out the Performance Planning Form
Step 2: Appraiser and Appraisee sign the Performance Planning Form
Step 3: Appraiser gives a copy of the page to the appraisee and returns the original document to the HR.

PROGRESS REVIEW PROCESS

The Progress Review Meeting

The Progress review Stage of the performance appraisal cycle provides a formal mechanism by which appraisers and appraisee meet to review progress on targets. The appraiser will arrange a mid-year progress review meeting in July. At least a week's notice must be given to the appraisee specifying the date, time and place of the meeting. The review process should be as follows:

i. Appraiser and appraisee discuss progress of work in relation to targets set, one target after the other. If conclusions reached at the meeting necessitate changes or adjustments in targets, these modifications should be specified on the mid-year review form.
ii. Appraiser and appraisee discuss the extent to which competencies are being demonstrated; one competency after the other.
iii. Appraiser and appraisee agree on additions and deletions to targets and modifications where necessary.
iv. Appraiser records the changes if any and comments on the Mid-year Review Form.
v. Appraiser and appraisee sign the Mid-year Review Form.
vi. Appraiser and appraisee take copies and the original document sent to the HR.

.

THE END-OF-YEAR RAEVIEW AND APPRAISAL PROCESS

The End-of-Year Review and Appraisal Meeting

The End-of-Year Review and Appraisal Process shall span the period of December 1st to December 31st. The process is in three parts, namely before the interview, during the interview and after the interview

Stage 1 - Before the Meeting:

Step 1 – Appraiser should give at least one week notice to the Appraisee of the meeting.
Step 2 – Appraiser should write down on a separate sheet appraisee's performance in terms of targets achieved and targets not achieved with reasons.
Step 3 – Appraiser should write down appraisees performance in terms of competencies demonstrated and not demonstrated with reason(s).
Step 4 – The appraisee should review his/her performance and list the main achievements. Step
Step 5 – The appraisee should prepare for the discussion with the appraiser.

Stage 2 - During the Meeting:

Step 1 – The appraiser should welcome the appraisee and state the purpose for the meeting.
Step 2 – The appraiser should discuss the targets achieved one after the other.
Step 3 – The appraiser should discuss the targets not achieved one after the other
Step 4 – The appraiser should discuss the competencies demonstrated one after the other Step
Step5 – The appraiser should discuss the competences not demonstrated one after the other.
Step 6 – The appraiser should summarise his / her observations and communicate them to the appraisee

Stage 3 - After the Meeting
Step 1 – The appraiser fills the form within three working days.
Step 2 – The appraiser invites the appraisee to read, provide comments on the appraisal and sign the End-ofYear Form (section 7).

DECISION-MAKING

Performance Improvement or Enhancement plan is put in place by an autonomous body at the Human Resources Division to identify and list ways to enhance performance as well as any training/development or new challenges sought.The phase involves management ensuring that a plan of action is carried out such as coaching, counselling, salary increase, bonus and training programmes, which the employee will need during the next twelve months to continue growth, to develop new skills, and/or to improve various aspects of job performance.

SECTION 2: Performance Planning Form

To be agreed between the appraiser and the employee at the start of the annual appraisal cycle or when a new employee is engaged.

KEY RESULT AREAS (Not more than 5 - To be drawn from employees Job Description)	TARGETS (Results to be achieved, should be specific, measurable, realistic and time-framed)	RESOURCES REQUIRED

Key Competencies Required: (see Section 5)

APPRAISEE'S SIGNATURE

APPRAISER'S SIGNATURE

SECTION 3: Mid-Year Review Form

This is to be completed in July by the Appraiser and Appraisee

Progress has been discussed and Agreements have been reached as detailed below.

MID-YEAR REVIEW

NO.	TARGET	PROGRESS REVIEW	REMARKS

NO.	COMPETENCY	PROGRESS REVIEW	REMARKS

APPRAISEE'S SIGNATURE
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy)

APPRAISER'S SIGNATURE
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy)

This is to be completed in December by the Appraiser and Appraisee.
■ Please refer to **page 8** of the manual for guidance to the scoring.

END-OF-YEAR REVIEW FORM

NO.	TARGET	PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT	WEIGHT OF TARGET	SCORE	COMMENTS
			5		
			5		
			5		
			5		
			5		
			5		
			5		
			5		
			5		
			TOTAL (Q)	=	
			(A) AVERAGE (Q/n)	=	
			(M) = (A) × 0.6	=	

APPRAISEE'S SIGNATURE

APPRAISER'S SIGNATURE

DATE (dd/mm/yyyy)

DATE (dd/mm/yyyy)

- 136 -

Assessment of Core Competencies

Rating	Explanation

5 – **Exceptional, exceeds expectations:** Has consistently demonstrated this behavior competency and always encouraged others to do same. Four (4) or more examples can be evidenced to support this rating. **Exceptionally, exceeded e xpectations** on this behavioural competency requirement**.**

4. **Exceeds Expectations :** Has frequently demonstrated this behavior competency and sometimes encouraged others to do same. Three (3) or more examples can be evidenced to support this rating. **Exceeded expectations** on this behavioural competency requirement**.**

3. **Meets Expectations:** Has demonstrated this behavior competency and at least two (2) examples can be evidenced to support this rating. **Meets expectations** on this behavioural competency requirement**.**

2. **Below Expectation:** Has rarely demonstrated this behavior competency and two (2) or more examples can be evidenced to support this rating. Demonstration of requirements of this behavioural competency was **below expectation**

1. **Unacceptable:** Has not at all demonstrated this behavior competency and three (3) or more examples can be evidenced to support this rating. Demonstration of requirements of this behavioural competency was **unacceptable** and did not meet any expectations.

A/. CORE COMPETENCIES	(W) weight	(S) Score on Scale	W × S	COMMENTS
(i) Organisation and Management: ▪ Ability to plan, organise and manage work load. ▪ Ability to work systematically and maintain quality. ▪ Ability to manage others to achieve shared goals.	0.3 0.3 0.3	-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5-		Total......... .. Average...... ...
(ii) Innovation and Strategic Thinking ▪Support for organisational change ▪ Ability to think broadly and demonstrate creativity. ▪ Originality in thinking	0.3 0.3 0.3	-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5		Total......... .. Average...... ...
(iii) Leadership and Decision Making ▪ Ability to initiate action and provide direction to others ▪ Accept responsibility and decision-making. ▪ Ability to exercise good judgment	0.3 0.3 0.3	-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5		Total......... .. Average...... ...
(iv) Developing and Improving ▪Commitment to organization development ▪ Commitment to customer satisfaction ▪ Commitment to personnel development	0.3 0.3 0.3	-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5-		Total......... .. Average...... ...
(v) Communication (oral, written & electronic) ▪ Ability to communicate decisions clearly and fluently ▪ Ability to negotiate and manage conflict effectively. ▪ Ability to relate and network across different levels and departments	0.3 0.3 0.3	-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5-		Total......... .. Average...... ...
(vi) Job Knowledge and Technical Skills ▪ Demonstration of correct mental, physical and manual skills. ▪ Demonstration of cross-functional awareness. ▪ Building, applying and sharing of necessary expertise and technology.	0.3 0.3 0.3	-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5-		Total......... .. Average......
(vii) Supporting and Cooperating ▪ Ability to work effectively with teams, clients and staff. ▪ Ability to show support to others. ▪ Ability to adhere to organisation's principles, ethics and values.	0.3 0.3 0.3	-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5-		Total......... .. Average......
(viii) Maximising and maintaining Productivity ▪ Ability to motivate and inspire others. ▪Ability to accept challenges and execute them with confidence. ▪ Ability to manage pressure and setbacks effectively.	0.3 0.3 0.3	-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5-		Total......... .. Average......
(ix) Developing / Managing budgets and saving cost: ▪ Firm awareness of financial issues and accountabilities. ▪ Understanding of business processes and customer priorities. ▪ Executing result-based actions.	0.3 0.3 0.3	-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -1- -2- -3- -4- -5-		Total......... .. Average...

Average of ALL averages for CORE COMPETENCES (N) = _____

SECTION 5: Annual Appraisal   (Continuation)

B. NONE -CORE COMPETENCIES	(W) weight	(S) **Score on Scale**	W × S	COMMENTS
(xi) Ability to Develop Staff. ■ Able to develop others (subordinates) . ■ Able to provide guidance and support to staff for their development .	**0.1** **0.1**	**-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -** **1- -2- -3- -4- -5-**		Total……….. Average………
(xii) Commitment to Own Personal Development and Training ■ Eagerness for self development. ■ Inner drive to supplement training from organization.	**0.1** **0.1**	**-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-** **-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-**		Total……….. Average………
(xiii) Delivering Results and Ensuring Customer Satisfaction ■ Ensuring customer satisfaction . ■ Ensuring the delivery of quality service and products .	**0.1** **0.1**	**-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-** **-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-**		Total……….. Average………
(xiv) Following Instructions and Working Towards Organisational Goals: ■ Keeping to laid -down regulations and procedures. ■ Willingness to act on 'customer feedback' for customer satisfaction .	**0.1** **0.1**	**-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-** **-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-**		Total……….. Average………
(xv) Respect and Commitment ■ Respect for superiors, colleagues and customers. ■ Commitment to work and Organisational Development.	**0.1** **0.1**	**-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-** **-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-**		Total……….. Average………
(xvi) Ability to Work Effectively in a Team ■ Ability to function in a team. ■ Ability to work in a team.	**0.1** **0.1**	**-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-** **-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-**		Total……….. Average………

Average of ALL averages for NONE CORE COMPETENCES (O) = _____

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT **(M)**   = --
CORE COMPETENCIES ASSESSMENT **(N)**   = --
NON-CORE COMPETENCIES ASSESSMENT **(O)** =--

OVERALL TOTAL   =——————————————————————————
OVERALL ASSESSMENT/SCORE (Z) = T/5 X 100 = ——————————————————————%

OVERALL RATINGS AND DESCRIPTIONS

The table below provides explanations for overall rating and descriptions

5	Exceptional, exceeded expectations	Behavioural competencies and/or work performance consistently far exceeded expectations due to exceptionally high quality of work performed in all *essential* areas of responsibility, resulting in an overall quality of work that was superior; and either 1) included the completion of a major goal or project, or made an exceptional or unique contribution in support of unit, department, or organizational objectives. The employee truly stands out and clearly and consistently demonstrates exceptional accomplishments in terms of quality and quantity of work. His/her demonstration of competencies is easily recognized as truly exceptional by others.	*There are not less than four (4) particular cases that can be cited to support the rating.*
4	Exceeded Expectations	Demonstration of behavioural competencies and work performance consistently exceeded expectations in all essential areas of responsibility, and the quality of work overall was excellent. Achievements are regularly above expected level. Performance is sustained and uniformly high with thorough and on time results. Annual goals were met above expectation.	*There are not less than three (3) particular cases that can be cited to support the rating.*
3	Met all Expectations	Behavioural competencies and/or work performance consistently fully met expectations in all essential areas of responsibility, and the quality of work overall was very good. While minor deviations may occur, the overall level of performance meets all requirements. The worker has achieved all critical annual goals.	*Performance met the expected standards*
2	Below Expectation	Behavioural competencies and/or work performance did not consistently meet expectations – performance failed to meet expectations in one or more *essential* areas of responsibility, and two or more of the most critical goals were not met. The employee generally struggles to fully meet expectations.	Performance fell short of expected standards. *There are not less than two (2) particular cases that can be cited to*
1	Unacceptable	Behavioural competencies and/or work performance was consistently below expectations in most essential areas of responsibility, and/or reasonable progress toward critical goals was not made. Significant improvement is needed in three or more important areas. The employee is not meeting the job requirements. Performance must improve substantially within a reason able period of time if the individual is to remain in this position.	*Failed to meet performance standards. There are not less than three (3) particular cases that can be cited to support the rating.*

OVERALL RATING SCALE

Score	80% above	79-65 %	64-50%	49-41%	40% & below
Rating	5	4	3	2	1
Description	Exceptional, exceeded expectations	Exceeded Expectations	Met all Expectations	Below Expectation	Unacceptable

- 139 -

SECTION 6: Annual Appraisal	(Continuation)

Appraiser's Comments on Performance Plan Achievements

(Comment on Performance Plan achievements and additional contributions made)

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DATE (dd/mm/yyyy)

APPRAISER'S SIGNATURE

SECTION 7: Career Development

Training and Development - Comments and Plan

(To be completed by the Appraiser in discussion with the employee)

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- 140 -

SECTION 8: ASSESSEMENT DECISION

Assess the Appraisee's potential to perform the duties of the next grade, taking account of the assessment of performance in **Section 5** above.)

☐ **Outstanding** –should be promoted as soon as possible (promotion out-of-turn, study visits, commendations, salary increments and etc.)

☐ **Suitable for promotion** (encourage through mentoring, coaching, training and etc.)

☐ **Likely to be ready for promotion in 2 to 3 years** (encourage through mentoring, coaching, training and etc)

☐ **Not ready for promotion for at least 3years** (forfeit yearly increment, reassignment and etc.)

☐ **Unlikely to be promoted further:** (apply sanctions: demotion, dismissal, removal and etc)

SECTION 9: Appraisee's Comments

	DATE (dd/mm/yyyy)
APPRAISEE'S SIGNATURE	

SECTION 10: Head of Department's / Division's (HOD) Comments

	DATE (dd/mm/yyyy)
NAME AND HOD'S SIGNATURE	

- 141 -