

Plato - A Voice for Peace

Political Accountability and Dramatic Staging

Gro Rørstadbotten

Avhandling for graden philosophiae doctor (ph.d.)
Universitetet i Bergen
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Abstract

With this dissertation I intend to give a contribution to the field *peace and peace-thematic*. The hypothesis of the dissertation is that it is possible to read the Platonic corpus as a body of critique where Plato in the last resort stands forth as a voice pro peace. I employ a method denoted as slow reading, and I read the dialogues systematic from the outset of their internal dramatic dating.

I present two main arguments. The first is that the *Republic* can be read as dramatic backdrop for the other dialogues. The readings of the *Republic* will show, on the one hand, how Socrates legitimizes the discipline of philosophy by contrasting it to sophistry; on the other hand, that by awakening the well-established two-city-topos Socrates paves the way for a profound critique of Athenian cultural and moral values. This, in turn, leads to a redefinition of the concepts *stasis* (faction) and *polemos* (war) which entails radical new thoughts that are not reducible to the contemporary war-waging politics. The second argument is related to the dialogues, which I denote as dramatic historical touchdowns. I relate to the theme *encountering youths* and highlights how Socrates, in conversations with young men intends to make them turn toward philosophy, which is an education and a path aiming toward freedom. Regarding the dialogues, I argue that the readers are invited to view how the past is recreated in the present, and to apprehend that this recreating is a dramatic and well-directed showing of how the past is responsible for the present conditions. In addition, I analyze the entrance of the Eleatic Stranger; he brings confusion at stage and through him, the Socratic practice of philosophy gradually fades away. The last text encountered is Socrates' apology where I—through a rhetorical reading—show that he presented a coherent defense both as a philosopher and as a citizen.

Overall, through the readings I intend to show that the Platonic corpus contains a critique of the values that led to the decay of Athens. Due to this critique and the dramatic staging of prominent personas not willing or able to change, the past was made responsible for the conditions of the present. By launching an alternative *politeia* and *paideia* that is not compatible to war-waging, and by showing the multiple and, thus individual, paths toward philosophy, Plato in the end stands forth as a powerful voice pro peace.

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¹ On this project, see: <<http://www.uib.no/fof/forskning/forskningsomraader-ved-fof/antik-kens-filosofi/poetry-and-philosophy>> (accessed 18.05.2018).

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Introduction: The Platonic literary-philosophical universe

This dissertation is a playful¹ experiment. The experimental feature is that I will read parts of the Platonic corpus consistently and strictly from their dramatic chronology,² and place the *Republic* and the *Laws* as dramatic backdrops for the other dialogues. I aim to give a contribution to the field “peace and war thematic;” an under-communicated field within Platonic scholarship. My hypothesis is:

It is possible to read the Platonic corpus as a body of critique where Plato, in the end, stands forth as a spokesperson for peace or as a powerful anti-war voice.

In this introduction, I will elaborate on the grounding premises for my dissertation. As I am first and foremost a reader, my point of departure will be to give some reflections on the method activated in my upcoming readings. Then I present my reflections on Plato the author before I turn to Socrates, the main character of the corpus. I will also give a brief survey of the inspirations and stepping-stones that have enlightened my project. Finally, I present the two main arguments for my hypothesis before I round off with a description of the progress of the dissertation.

1 How to read a dialogue—a sketch for a procedure

For all who are engaged in the works of Plato, the old phrase “standing on the shoulders of giants” is indeed true, due to the multitude of commentators and scholars who have committed themselves to the Platonic texts during two and a half millennia. However, some of the interpretative traditions developed I apprehend as entrapments.

¹ Regarding the “playful” feature, I refer to Sachs (2011, 4), who argues that “[p]hilosophy in Plato’s dialogues is always intertwined with play,” and points to Socrates who “explicitly says in the *Republic* (536c-537c) that this is the appropriate way to begin a philosophic education.” Sachs further argues, with reference to Jacob Klein, *A Commentary on Plato’s Meno* (University of North Carolina Press, 1965, 18), that “Plato called play and seriousness sisters.”

² By “dramatic chronology,” I mean the chronology worked out with reference to the hints and clues given *in* the dialogues themselves, as Nails (2002) has demonstrated. The concept “dramatic chronology” stands in stark contrast to what is denoted as “Platonic chronology,” which points to when the dialogues were composed by Plato. A profound criticism of the presumptions embedded here, and a comprehensive bibliography, are found in Howland (1991).

This entails that I take a few steps aside and leave behind “Developmentalism,”³ and the so-called “Platonism.”⁴ I stress that it is the interpretational premises embedded in these *isms* I distance myself from, not any specific readings. The only thing I can do is to read the texts, communicate with them, and take seriously the challenge posed by the radically different conception of politics, culture, and *paideia*.

There is written extensively on the topic of how to read a Platonic dialogue,⁵ on how to read Plato from a pedagogical perspective,⁶ on how the dialogues were read in antiquity and on early reception.⁷ However, although scholars now take the dramatic qualities of the dialogues into account when reading⁸ and even when they argue that the significance of drama is important for understanding the philosophical content of the dialogues,⁹ it is, according, to Arlene Saxonhouse (2009, 729), still questionable how and to which degree the “settings and personalities and events within the dialogues impinge on the interpretations.”¹⁰

I relate to this concern when I try to highlight the “activity of reading.” Reading viewed as a concrete activity or action is somewhat under-communicated, and the reader and the reader’s work are often ignored dimensions, with a few exceptions in

³ I find “Developmentalism” militant, and I find the notion of “early, middle, late dialogues” limiting. With regard to this, I will try to meet Griswold, Jr. (2002a, x), where he utters a hope that a “day may soon arrive when the ‘early, middle, late’ interpretative grid falls well into the background. A shift in that direction would quite obviously represent a very important change in our interpretation of Plato.”

⁴ Cf. Rasmussen (2008, 7), where he states: “When scholars have sought to extract from the dialogues a coherent philosophical system to call ‘Platonism,’ they have found so much to disagree about, for their readings of the texts have generated opposing interpretations. This disagreement has centered not only on claims of what Plato, the man, actually thought, [...] but also on efforts ‘to construct as good an argument as possible on the foundation that Plato lays’ toward a definitive statement of the Platonic philosophical position. In both enterprises scholars have had to confront the issue of hermeneutic methodology and to argue in defense of the way in which they use the dialogues to arrive at their account of Platonic thought.”

⁵ Just a few examples: Tigerstedt (1977), Howland (1991), Sløk (1992), Arieti (1995), Sallis (1996), Szlezák (1999), Tejera (1999), Griswold Jr. (2002b), Corlett (2005).

⁶ Cotton (2014), Clay (2000). On an ideal reading order from a pedagogical perspective, see: Bruell (1999), Altman (2010) and (2012).

⁷ Tarrant (2000), Charalabopoulos (2012).

⁸ See for example Gonzalez (1995b).

⁹ See for example Kahn (1996).

¹⁰ Saxonhouse maintains “that there has not yet been adequate attention to the narrative style of the dialogues, though there have been some forays in this direction by scholars such as Anne-Marie Bowery, Jill Frank, Ruby Blondell, and Dorrit Chon.” On reflections on the relationship between philosophy and literature, see also Cascardi (1989).

which scholars present themselves as readers. For example, Jacob Howland (1998a, 1) introduces himself as a “reflective reader,” Hayden Ausland (1997) conducts a “mimetic reading,” Saxonhouse (2009, 729) a “democratic reading,” Jill Gordon (1999) highlights a reader-response reading, and Claudia Baracchi (2002, 3) performs a “rigorously responsive reading.” Employing a method, I present as “close reading,”¹¹ or even “slow reading,” I do (necessarily) not differ very much from the ones mentioned regarding methodological strategy, and it is not my intention to launch a new way of reading. On the contrary, I simply want to highlight reading as a work in progress, and regarding the Platonic corpus, this progress is never-ending. I can give only a brief outlining of this immense subject, and in the present case, this means that I will take a step away from “a semantic concept of interpretation”¹² and move toward “a semiotic concept of reading.” In this moving away, I turn to Michael Riffaterre and his distinction between textual and poetic analysis.¹³ Through *textual analysis*, the intention is to explain the uniqueness of a text. This uniqueness exists and is identifiable on the textual surface through the textual structure, style, rhetorical means, narration, and construction. A textual analysis also implies an intertextual reading (I will return to his theme below). The *poetic analysis*, or in my terms, the *literary analysis*, aims toward understanding; the point of departure is to view the *text* as a limited code recorded in writing. It is important to underline that the “text” is a process of realization which is happening through reading. Behind the text, the author does not exist; behind the text, we find only other texts: inter-texts which bear witness to how the texts are part of a linguistic field consisting of quotes, genre, styles, and so on.¹⁴ The subject of the text is not a representation of an author; the condition of the text-

¹¹ “Close-reading” is originally associated with formalistic readings and especially within the tradition “new-criticism.” I use the term in a broader sense and include the concept of a “competent reader” as it was developed by Riffaterre (1983); the concept denotes a “semiotic reader”—and the work assigned to a “semiotic reader” is to decode through reading to actualize the text.

¹² I couple the “semantic concept of interpretation” to Ricoeur (1981), where “explanation” is related to textual analysis, and this analysis turns out to be not radically different even when done by very different actors; “understanding” is related to interpretation which turns out to be different from one interpreter to another.

¹³ Cf. note 11 above. Although Riffaterre presents a poetics designed for analyzing poetry and literature, I will try to use his core concepts, the division between *textual analysis* and *poetic analysis* of texts, with minor alterations.

¹⁴ Cf. Barthes (1977a and 1977b).

subject is different from that of the author-subject because these two dimensions are not connected. On the contrary, the text-subject is inscribed as a metaphor in a textual web.¹⁵ The text as a web creates an image which in turn, thematizes reading as an activity or action: The act of reading is for the reader to take a stand toward a vast code-specter *in* the texts. Against this background, it is obvious that if the *literary analysis* slides into an attempt to explain, the result will be generalizations and assumptions because, at that moment, the exclusive message of the text disappears; hence the reading is immediately controlled by mechanisms other than following textual traces. Because I take a literary reading to be a decoding of a textual web, it constitutes a process which establishes communication and/or contact between the text and the reader. That is to say, reading establishes a dialogue, which is *activated* through the reader's continuous alternation between textual rejection, resistance, and acceptance, and this process will gradually provide the reader with an understanding of the text, and finally (or hopefully) the reader will comprehend the message of the text. At this level, the reader can get in touch with the *literary aspects* and, regarding the dialogues, also the philosophical aspects of the texts. What is the *literary aspect* of the dialogues? Or, what is the *philosophical aspect* of the dialogues? These are the aspects actualized by the process of reading. Because these features are not explainable, I will in my readings concentrate on what the characters (including the narrators) *in* the dialogues are *doing*, and because of their actions, I will try to analyze the impact and the effect of their *words* and *deeds*. I aim to combine these two levels of analysis. Baracchi gives an inspirational reading along these lines. She also leaves a semantic interpretation behind and elaborates that her "present writing is oriented less by the program of interpretation and construction than by the task of response, of a *rigorously responsive reading*. So that the text may speak—if not purely according to itself, then out of itself, in the space of this encounter—in this possible space neither its own nor,

¹⁵ Cf. Barthes (1981). With regard to "textual mosaic" he states: "Any text is a new tissue of past citations. Bits of code, formulae, rhythmic models, fragments of social languages, etc., pass into the text and are redistributed within it, for there is always language before and around the text. Intertextuality, the condition of any text whatsoever, cannot, of course, be reduced to a problem of sources or influences; the intertext is a general field of anonymous formulae whose origin can scarcely ever be located; of unconscious or automatic quotations, given without quotation marks," p. 39.

strictly speaking, mine.”¹⁶ So, in addition to activating a close/slow-reading, I perform a reader-response reading, and I activate the concept of intertextuality.

1.1 Intertextuality

Marko Juvan (2008, 43-8) has demonstrated that it is both helpful and useful to distinguish between levels and degrees of intertextuality and suggests a distinction between “general intertextuality” and “specific intertextuality.” The “general intertextuality” denotes intertextuality as it is generally understood. The first to theorize intertextuality was Julia Kristeva,¹⁷ and according to her, it signifies a transposition of one or more systems of sign into another. This, Juvan (2008, 42) argues, “introduced a dynamic, transformative, sociohistorical and relational theory,” which allows the readers to vary “the syntagma for a text as a ‘mosaic of quotations’.” I take this textual mosaic as being close to general intertextuality. It can be exemplified by observing how one or several words make a crossing-point on textual surfaces, and it is on these surfaces, the crossing-points create dialogues between different texts.

We find multiple examples of such crossing-points throughout the dialogues; one is the phrases translated as “now we have stumbled across something.” In the *Republic*, Socrates and Glaucon “stumble across the origin of war;” in the *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus “stumble across the sophist;” in the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger and his interlocutors “stumble across the origin of legislation.” In these instances, the reader is led to believe that the interlocutors “stumble across something” by pure accident due to the development of the conversations; this is the impact of the phrase. However, the phrase also makes something happen in the text; each “stumbling” tells us that something important is about to take place. Thus, these textual crossing-points create an internal dialogue between texts in the corpus, and this

¹⁶ Baracchi (2002, 3).

¹⁷ In “La Révolution du langage poétique” (1974) translated into “Revolution in Poetic Language” (1986, 111), Julia Kristeva was the first to define (not coin) the term “intertextuality” as “the transposition of one (or several) sign-system(s) into another; but since this term has often been understood in the banal sense of ‘study of sources’, we prefer the term *transposition* because it specifies that the passage from one signifying system to another demands a new articulation of the thetic—of enunciative and denotative positionality.” On intertextuality as reading-strategy, see also Nightingale (1995, 1-12).

case—the stumbling—warns about a textual break, and hence it signals a textual turning-point. However, phrases or words may also create an external dialogue. One example is the *Sophist* and the Eleatic Stranger’s elaboration on “hunting tame animals” or humans. Through the phrase “hunting humans” the Eleatic Stranger creates a dialogue with both Xenophon¹⁸ and Isocrates.¹⁹ This external dialogue exhibits that “hunting humans” was a common metaphor used by authors in the late fifth century B.C.E. onwards to describe the activities of a new kind of sophists; thus, this phrase cannot be taken as a unique way of speaking in the *Sophist*.

This leads to Andrea Nightingale, who underlines the practical use of intertextuality. She argues that “Plato uses intertextuality as a vehicle for criticizing traditional genres of discourse and, what is more important, for introducing and defining a radically different discursive practice, which he calls philosophy” (1995, 5). Further, she suggests that “Plato’s use of intertextuality should be analyzed as species of parody” (ibid, 7) and that each dialogue can be viewed as a kind of “multi-generic hybrid” (ibid, 5). According to Juvan, this can be denoted as “specific intertextuality” which, in turn, relates to the terms “citation” or “citing.” Etymologically, “citation” points to the meaning of “calling upon,” or “evoking.” These terms apply “to the conventional marked introduction of an alien utterance into a text, its obvious presence and otherness” (Juvan 2008, 48). Alternatively, in Kristeva’s words, “any text is constructed of a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another” (1980, 66). Both general and specific intertextuality will mark my readings, but also, I will add yet another dimension to specific intertextuality—the concept of topos.

1.2 Topoi and audiences

I take topoi to be the headings under which arguments can be classified, or one can define topoi as “storehouses for arguments.”²⁰ As a rhetorical concept, a topos denotes the place where the orator finds specific types of arguments or patterns of argumentation (i.e., “commonplaces”), but the concept can also denote the arguments

¹⁸ Xenophon, *On Hunting*, chapter 13.

¹⁹ Isocrates, *Against the Sophists*, 19-20.

²⁰ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1991, 83).

themselves.²¹ Aristotle makes a distinction between “general topoi” versus “special topoi.”²² The general topoi can be used indiscriminately, and therefore they do not depend on any specific science or art. When I later will refer to the topos of peace, the poetic topos, and the moral topos, these topoi point toward arguments I suppose are well-known for the participants *in* the dialogues and the readers *of* the dialogues (both ancient and modern); thus, I understand these to be general topoi.²³ The special topoi belong to a particular science, a particular type of oratory, a particular genre, and so forth. When I refer to the topos of sophistry and the topos of philosophy, I understand them to be special topoi. Whereas the first is known and the latter unknown to most of the participants *in* the dialogues, with regard to the readers, the knowledge of both is relative.²⁴ However, when I refer to Socrates’ concealed topos—which is the topos of philosophy—I mean that Socrates does not always make known where he warrants his arguments; for some of his interlocutors, his arguments seem outlandish. This Socratic concealing has multiple consequences that I will try to expose throughout my readings. Lastly, I refer to the Socratic topos. This points to the instances where Socrates claims that he himself knows nothing and therefore is eager to learn from others. Also, I make a distinction between audiences. By the “universal audience,” I mean the readers, and by the “particular audience,” I refer to the participants partaking in the dialogues when such an audience is present.²⁵ This was an outlining of my principles for how I intend to read the dialogues; now I turn to their author.

²¹ Eide (1990, 115). In addition, Eide defines “topos” as being “the mathematical concept of a ‘geometrical locus’.” See also Eide (1996).

²² Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, 1, 2: 1358a.

²³ As the concept of “general topoi” and “special topoi” are central in my readings, I will—as my readings develop—refer to more than those listed here.

²⁴ This view, I think, is in accordance with Clay (2000), who argues that the richness of the dialogues is an invitation to a stepwise revealing where every intellectual level of maturity is gaining; it is a process that gradually leads to new depths in the texts. Clay isolates four layers: In layer 1, the focal point is the action, conversation, statements, humor, participants, etc. In layer 2, the focal point is the development of concepts; the readers start to ask questions of the text; working more in depth and trying to make out what is at stake. In layer 3, contextualization of the dialogues is the focal point; the dialogues are being valued and read comparatively; it is on this level the readers start to understand the elements that are presupposed in different ways in different texts, and further, the role these elements are given. In layer 4, the entirety or the whole philosophical picture starts to show.

²⁵ When defining the *audiences*, my outset is Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1991). According to them, a *universal audience* “consists of the whole of mankind, or at least of all normal, adult

2. Plato, the architect

By denoting Plato an architect, I view him in light of an old topos where transformative and restorative outlines were the main concern. Lisa Landrum (2010) has demonstrated that the term “architect” was coined during the second half of the fifth century and first brought into play and performance in 421 at the Great Dionysian festival in Athens through Aristophanes’ *Peace*. In this play, the chorus leader appointed the protagonist, Trygaeus, to act as the leader of the people, and he further begged him to architect a scheme to defeat War and rescue Peace. The same topos also postulates dramatic poets as the architects who managed to draw out the performative aspects of architecting. At first sight, this might look like a casual metaphor, but as Landrum points out, a closer look reveals that it “opens more profoundly onto an intricate web of mythic, ritual, and metaphoric associations that are as telling as they are troubling about the representative deeds and ethical dilemmas that architects perennially enact” (2010, 2). She underlines that these early architects are to be understood “less hierarchically as the master-builders, and more poetically and dramatically as agents of *archai*—as individuals who knowingly initiate, make and

persons” (p. 30); they further argue that “[p]hilosophers always claim to be addressing such an audience [...]” (p. 31). It is underlined that the agreement of the *universal audience* is the highest point reached—“not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker” (p. 31). The “speaker” referred to here is the orator; hence in the context of the *Republic*, the orator is identical to the narrator. When Perelman (1979) describes the *universal audience* as the “ideal audience” and states that “philosophical discourse considered traditionally as an appeal to reason would be characterized by its adaption to an ideal audience, this audience for Plato [...] I would call the universal audience” (p. 58). Hence, related to the context of the *Republic*, I understand the universal audience to be us; its readers. The internal audience—that is, the various interlocutors or the persons engaged in deliberation, and the men who listen to the diverse conversations/discussions—I call the *particular audience*. As the particular audience consists of men whose reactions are known to us and, in addition, have characteristics and convictions partly known to us—we are able to study them from the outset of their words and deeds as these are displayed in the dialogue. Long (1983, 108) argues that the speaker “creates a construct of a universal audience in order to persuade a particular one.” Contrary to Long, I argue that Socrates in the narrator’s voice is aiming at persuading the *universal audience* by showing how the *particular audience* is being persuaded through argumentation, and in accordance with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1991, 32), I find that argumentation “addressed to a universal audience must convince the reader that the reasons adduced are of a compelling character; that they are self-evident, and possesses an absolute and timeless validity independent of local or historical contingencies.” So, when Socrates, in the voice of the narrator, addresses the *universal audience* directly, the narrator’s comments and characteristics are in many instances biased, and in addition, the narrator often evaluates both the interlocutors and the content of the discussion; thus the impact of the narrator’s descriptions varies from person to person, from age to age, and from tradition to tradition.

make apparent *for others* auspicious beginnings, originating conditions and exemplary restorative schemes” (ibid, 3). However, Graham Pont argues (2005, with reference to Plato) that architecture also was perceived as “scientific building, that species of design and construction which is distinguished by having a *logos* or rationale” (ibid, 82). Hence through Landrum’s and Pont’s outlining of a development regarding the concept of the “architect,” I find a movement from the poetic and dramatic agent of *archai* to the scientific builder,²⁶ and from these reflections, I have chosen to view Plato as an architectural master builder. In accordance with this view, I lean on two assumptions.

First, I consider Plato to be the author that to the fullest extent mastered the *art of indication*.²⁷ In his texts, there remain many hints and clues with which readers can struggle. This does not mean that I am indicating what his intentions *in* each text might have been. Rather, I stress that it is the texts and their impact that are my occupation. This could perhaps be apprehended as a self-contradiction, so I will try to clarify right from the start. As a reader of my time, reading a Platonic dialogue gives the feeling of being thrown into a foreign territory where I am confronted with a foreign language and alien (often provocative) categories of thought. To paraphrase Thomas Pangle (1988a), these kinds of feelings are symptoms of liberation and it “is the first blaze on a trail that may lead us out of the cave of our contemporary culture to a vantage point from which we might begin freely to understand and judge the profound and hidden presuppositions of our age” (ibid, 375). As these texts were composed more than two millennia back, I am not interested in and surely not able to consider the intentions of the architect at the particular textual level. As a whole, I take the corpus to be a showing and presentation of what Pangle denotes as the “art of politics”—an “art whose business it is to care for souls” (ibid).

Secondly, the dialogues are composed as retrospective mimetic games. These games I take to be a part of the literary aspects of the dialogues. Within the corpus, we

²⁶ It is noteworthy that in *The Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle also includes “those that direct activities by thought” (1152b2) in the concept.

²⁷ Thein (2015, 222), argues that Plato is especially *the* grand master of the “hermeneutics of self-suspicion” which he, according to Thein, “translates into a very interesting if somehow military-like conception of self-knowledge as victory over oneself, a victory that presupposes an original disunity of human nature and its division into various parts with their own different goals and sets of value.”

can isolate five different literary categories: narrated dialogues with a frame story,²⁸ narrated dialogues with a prelude,²⁹ narrated dialogues without preludes and frame stories,³⁰ direct dialogues,³¹ and one monologue (or alleged reported speech).³² When reading the dialogues within the two first categories, the readers can identify the narrator. For example, when Socrates is set as narrator in *Protagoras* and *Republic*, he acts on two textual levels. On the first, he is a character taking part in the conversations on the same level as the other characters. On the second level, he acts as the narrator, and in that role, he represents a voice aiming directly toward the readers. In the *Republic*, the narrator addresses a universal audience; hence all readers are invited to partake in the unfolding drama. In the *Protagoras*, though, the narrator addresses an anonymous friend; hence the readers are reduced to eavesdroppers. When these two levels are considered, the reading opens new perspectives, as will be shown. These reflections lead me to Socrates, the main character within this textual universe.

3 Displaying the path toward philosophy—two Socratic practices

Regarding how Socrates is practicing philosophy, I have identified two main procedures which I call “Socrates’ two practices.” These will be points of return. I strongly stress that through this brief survey, I only touch the tip of the iceberg.

The earliest great teachers of ancient Greece were the poets.³³ People, in general, activated the poetic topos by warranting their opinions on the authority of the poets.³⁴

²⁸ *Parmenides* (450), *Symposium* (421/416), *Theaetetus* (399).

²⁹ *Protagoras* (432), *Euthydemus* (407), *Phaedo* (399).

³⁰ *Republic*, *Charmides* (429), *Lysis* (409).

³¹ *Laws*, *Alcibiades I* (432), *Alcibiades II* (432), *Timaeus* (429), *Critias* (429), *Laches* (424), *Cratylus* (422), *Cleitophon* (421/16), *Hippias Major* (421/16), *Hippias Minor* (421/16), *Phaedrus* (418/16), *Ion* (413), *Gorgias* (405), *Meno* (402), *Menexenus* (401/400), *Philebus* (?), *Euthyphron* (399), *Sophist* (399), *Statesman* (399), *Crito* (399).

³² *Apology* (399).

³³ Robb (1994, 159) states that “[...] Hellenes at all levels of society had heard Homer’s language and had absorbed it. [...] An older generation of scholars, led by figures such as Bruno Snell, Kurt von Fritz, Lionel Pearson, Eric Dodds, Werner Jaeger, and John Burnet, demonstrated in a series of brilliant studies that there is a continuity of vocabulary and concepts from Homer through the fifth-century dramatists in conceptualizing two important areas of human experience. In conceptualizing the interior mental life through a psychological vocabulary and in exhorting or praising correct behavior through an ethical vocabulary, there is no fundamental break from ‘Homer,’ or epical vocabulary and concepts, until we reach the fourth century, and above all Plato.”

³⁴ The critique aiming toward the poetic topos sets off right from the beginning in the *Republic*; how this works is exemplified through old Cephalus, to whom I return in Chapter II: *Prologue I. Father and son*, section 2.1: Cephalus and Socrates, pp. 65-80.

The next groups of teachers were the sophists³⁵ and the rhetoricians,³⁶ and it is safe to assume that it is these professions Socrates refers to when he, in the *Republic*, elaborates on *paideia*: “Education (*παιδείαν*) is not what the professions of certain men assert it to be. They presumably assert that they put into the soul knowledge that isn’t in it, as though they were putting sight into blind eyes” (518b8-c2). This brings out an image of the soul as a kind of *tabula rasa* upon which they could impress knowledge. From this it would follow that to teach is to inculcate, and to learn is to be inculcated; that the students are being indoctrinated and learn nothing but keep on repeating the doctrines of their inculcators. These procedures are incompatible with the Socratic practice.

As we learn from the *Meno* (402), to learn is to recollect, hence all knowledge is immanent.³⁷ However, the art of turning around (i.e., the art of dialectic, cf. *Republic* 518b8-d7) includes more than recollecting. Before the recollection, it is a matter of securing that the turn toward philosophy is done rightly in such a way that the soul is being enabled to “looking at what it ought to look at,” which is finding a way to release its thoughts and not being led by inculcated and false opinions.³⁸ In this regard, the art of turning around is coupled to Socrates’ practices, one conducted openly and the other secretly. The first—the demiurgic art—he relates to Daedalus,³⁹ his famous

³⁵ I return to the *paideia* of the sophists in chapter 7: *Setting the stage*, section 7.6: Protagoras, the teacher, pp. 267 ff.

³⁶ What is the difference between sophistry and rhetoric? In the *Gorgias*, Socrates admits that there is a distinct difference, and throughout *Gorgias* is consistently referred to as a rhetorician or an orator. However, because the two arts are close, Socrates argues that “sophists and orators tend to be mixed together as people who work in the same area and concern themselves with the same things. They don’t know what to do with themselves, and other people don’t know what to do about them” (465c7-9).

³⁷ It is not only mathematical knowledge; he also includes knowledge of virtues.

³⁸ Cf. Frede (1992). In accordance with Frede, I argue that the aim of Socrates’ praxis is to show that the one questioned leans on false authority, the authority of tradition, the authority of the many, or the authority of self-styled experts as Frede explains further: “But the point of this questioning is not just to expose the ignorance of so-called authorities. If somebody, having watched Socrates, drew the inference that he had been following the wrong authorities and needed to look for the right ones who would be in a position to tell him what to believe, he would draw the wrong inference. [...] For, at least on these questions which matter, it is crucial that one arrive at the right view by one’s own thought, rather than on the authority of somebody else, e.g., the questioner,” p. 217.

³⁹ On Daedalus, the demiurge, see McEwen (1993, 41-76). When summarizing Daedalus’ works, she highlights that “in Athens, at the beginning of his career, Daedalus made statues, in Crete he built the labyrinth and *choros*, and in Sicily, where the Greeks founded many colonial cities in the eighth and seventh century, Daedalus built a city.”

demiurgic ancestor on his father's side, a lineage he traces back to Zeus via Hephaestus.⁴⁰ The latter—the art of midwifery—he relates to his mother Phaenarete (“She who brings virtue to light”).⁴¹

3.1 The demiurge at work

When Socrates is conducting his practice openly in the city, he acts like a demiurge—a worker for the people. As the demiurge's labor in Aristophanes' *Peace*,⁴² Socrates' labor is also to restore and rebuild. Hermes was persuaded to act as the architect's co-worker to restore peace in the city; Socrates was chosen by the architect to act as a paternal co-worker to restore the souls *in* the city, consequently, the soul of the city. The linkage between Socrates and the demiurge is established by himself during his encounters with Hippias (*Hippias Maior*, 282a), Ion (*Ion*, 533a8 ff.), Meno (*Meno*, 97b-98a) and Euthyphro (*Euthyphro*, 11b-d) where Socrates conceitedly (and sometimes ironically) refers to his ancestor. Socrates even claims to be in possession of the same kinds of skills as Daedalus, although there is a concrete feature of these skills Socrates refers to. This capacity is displayed in the *Euthyphro* (399):

Socrates: [...] Now, if you will, do not hide things from me but tell me again from the beginning what piety is, whether being loved by the gods or having some other quality—but be keen to tell me what the pious and the impious are.

Euthyphro: But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have in mind, for whatever proposition we put forward goes around and refuses to stay put where we established it.

Socrates: Your statements, Euthyphro, seem to belong to my ancestor, Daedalus. If I were stating them and putting them forward, you would perhaps be making fun of me and say that because of my kinship with him my conclusions in discussion run away and will not stay where one puts them. As these propositions are yours, however, we need some other jest, for they will not stay put for you, as you say yourself.

Euthyphro: I think the same jest will do for our discussion, Socrates, for I am not the one who makes them go around and not remain in the same place; it is you who are the Daedalus, for as far as I am concerned they would remain as they were.

Socrates: It looks as if I was cleverer than Daedalus in using my skill (τέχνην), my friend, in so far as he could only cause to move the things he made himself, but I can make other people's move as well as my own. And the smartest part of my skill (τέχνης) is that I am clever (σοφός) without wanting to be, for I would

⁴⁰ Cf. *Alcibiades I*, 121a3-6.

⁴¹ Cf. *Theaetetus*, 149a1. Socrates also refers to his mother in *Alcibiades I*, 131e4-5.

⁴² On the demiurges' labor in Aristophanes' *Peace*, see Landrum (2010, 17-22).

rather have your statements to me remain unmoved than possess the wealth of Tantalys as well as the cleverness (σοφία)⁴³ of Daedalus. (*Euthyphro*, 11b1-e1).

Before this passage, Socrates has urged Euthyphro to work out a definition of “piety” so that Socrates can learn from an expert what piety is (cf. the Socratic topos), but it turns out that this is a difficult undertaking. At this point in the dialogue, Euthyphro’s suggestions have been refuted once, and Socrates demands that he start all over again. Euthyphro complains and says it is impossible because whatever the proposition, they “refuse to stay put.” This, Socrates claims, could be a statement put forth by Daedalus because Daedalus’ statues moved (they ran away), he needed to tie them down to have them stay put. This analogy, Daedalus’ statues versus Euthyphro’s arguments (propositions) and the common features of Socrates’ and Daedalus’ skills, point toward an ability to control movement and fixity.⁴⁴ But Daedalus was able only to set his own work in motion, whereas Socrates can move others as well. Also, it is the opinions of Euthyphro that Socrates now will try to move before he can tie down the true opinion, when and if it appears. However, in the case of Euthyphro, it apparently does not work:

Socrates: So the pious is once again what is dear to the gods.

Euthyphro: Most certainly.

Socrates: When you say this, will you be surprised if your arguments seem to move about instead of staying put? And will you accuse me of being Daedalus who makes them move, though you are yourself much more skillful (τεχνικώτερος) than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not realize that our argument has moved around and come again to the same place? (*Euthyphro*, 15b4-c3)

According to Socrates, Euthyphro is even more skillful than Daedalus because he can make the arguments move in circles repeatedly. This indicates that Euthyphro can

⁴³ On *epistēmē* and *sophia* in relation to Daedalus, see McEwen (1993, 125-28).

⁴⁴ This aspect is discussed in depth by McEwen (1993, 6). She elaborates: “In the case of Daedalus’ *xoana*, the chaining of cult statues brought the divine into the realm of human experience; for Plato, the bindings of true opinions with the chains of recollection [*anamnēsis*, cf. *Meno*, 97d-98a] brings the divine into the realm of human knowledge. Plato’s evocation of the animated cult statue reveals a detectable shift. In both cases the binding has as its purpose to bring the divine into the human sphere, but there is a shift, and the shift is a shift of emphasis from the primacy of motion to the primacy of fixity, from the primacy of experience to the primacy of the knowledge Plato calls *epistēmē*.”

present the opinions he possesses, but he is not able to go further.⁴⁵ Because there is nothing to tie down, Socrates cannot go any further. The result is that this self-appointed expert stays put while his arguments move in stable circles. When Socrates offers to start the investigation all over again, Euthyphro declines and runs off. The analogy between Socrates and Daedalus is made even clearer in the *Meno* after the incident with the slave boy:

Socrates: [...] Will he who has the right opinion always succeed, as long as his opinion is right?

Meno: That appears to be so of necessity, and it makes me wonder, Socrates, this being the case, why knowledge is prized far more highly than right opinion, and why they are different.

Socrates: Do you know why you wonder, or shall I tell you?

Meno: By all means, tell me.

Socrates: It is because you have paid no attention to the statues (*ἀγάλμασιν*) of Daedalus, but perhaps there are none in Thessaly.

Meno: What do you have in mind when you say this?

Socrates: That they too run away and escape if one does not tie them down but remain in place if tied down.

Meno: So what?

Socrates: To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like inquiring a runaway slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down, for his works are very beautiful. What am I thinking of when I say this? True opinions (*δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς*). For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man's mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno, my friend, is recollection (*ἀναμνησις*), as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down (*Meno*, 97c9-98a8).

Through this passage, it is confirmed that the daedalussian art of Socrates consists of setting false opinions in movement. While doing his procedure, Socrates notices these moving false opinions and refutes them. If the man encountered can understand and accept the refutation, he will move toward true opinion which Socrates will help him to tie down. When the true opinions are tied down, they become knowledge which remains in place. The turning of the soul is then completed, and the soul is looking where it ought to look. In the cases we witness throughout the dialogues, Socrates is

⁴⁵ I will argue that this feature (and problem) is equivalent to Glaucon. I return to this throughout chapter 5: *Founding cities making (ποιούμεν) guardians*.

hardly ever successful in his praxis; exceptions are young Hippocrates, whom we encounter in the *Protagoras*⁴⁶ and Polemarchus in the *Republic*.⁴⁷

When practicing his demiurgic craft, Socrates activates two proceedings or methods. The first is the elenchus.⁴⁸ Using the term, I lean on Hugh H. Benson (1989), who maintains that “the elenchus is concerned not merely to establish an inconsistency but to establish an inconsistency in the beliefs of the interlocutor” (ibid, 599). I also relate to his distinction between eristic and elenchus where “the latter is concerned with the truth while the former is not” (ibid).⁴⁹ The second procedure I designate as creating “an imaginary interlocutor.” It goes like this: What if someone asked us, what would we answer? I would probably say [...], what would you say? Both methods are frequently used throughout.

3.2 The midwife at work

In the *Theaetetus* (399), hence late in life, Socrates reveals his secret art of midwifery.⁵⁰ Socrates recognizes that Theaetetus is in agony and concludes that he is suffering from “the pains of labor;” Theaetetus’ pains are not due to him being barren, but due to pregnancy (149e6-7). At first, Theaetetus is not convinced about this, but Socrates assures him it is so; he knows this because he is the son of “a good hefty midwife,” and like his mother, he also practices the art of midwifery. He begs Theaetetus not to disclose this to the rest of the world because it is a secret and not known (λέληθα) to anyone (149a8), and further, “it is not one of the things you hear people say about me, because they don’t know” (149a10). Due to people’s ignorance, they say that Socrates is “a very odd person (ἀτοπώτατος, 149a10), always causing

⁴⁶ It is not clear if Socrates succeeded in his approach to Hippocrates, here the conclusion depends on how the last sentence in the *Protagoras* is interpreted or understood. I return to Hippocrates in Chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.1 Hippocrates’ dream on education, pp. 282 ff.

⁴⁷ I return to Polemarchus in Chapter 2: *Father and son*, section 2.2: Polemarchus and Socrates, pp. 80-90.

⁴⁸ The controversies connected to Socratic elenchus are long-lasting. This method is commonly understood as a pedagogical method employed by Socrates when he cross-examines his various interlocutors. The controversies evolve around the question of how elenchus should be defined. For a profound examination of this question, see Scott (2002).

⁴⁹ This distinction will be relevant for me when I read the Thrasymachus section of the *Republic* in chapter 3: *Prologue II: The tide is turning for Socrates*, pp. 91-134.

⁵⁰ For a more profound investigation of Socrates’ art of midwifery than I am doing here, see Burnyeat (1977).

people to get into difficulties.” Theaetetus has heard people talk this way, and Socrates does prefer that his secret behind the rumors continues to be a secret. At this point, Socrates offers to give the reasons for the secrecy.

The general facts about midwifery are that women practicing the art are past bearing and conceiving children. For this custom Artemis is responsible. Further, it is “the midwives who have the power to bring on the pains and [...] to relieve them; they do it by the use of simple drugs and by singing incantations. In difficult cases, too, they can bring about the birth; or, if they consider it advisable, they can promote a miscarriage” (149d10-e4). These general facts Theaetetus is well aware of, but he has never heard that the midwives also were the most cunning matchmakers; they have a thorough knowledge of which couples will produce the best offspring, and due to this knowledge, “reliable matchmaking is a matter for no one but the true midwife” (150a5-6). So, Socrates concludes, the art of the midwives is a highly important one, but not as important as his. The reason for this is that women do sometimes bring real children into the world and sometimes counterfeits which are hard to distinguish from the real ones, and “then the midwife’s greatest and noblest function would be to distinguish the true from the false offspring” (150b2-4). Although Socrates’ art of midwifery is in most respects similar to theirs, it differs and is more important because they attend to women while Socrates attends to men. Socrates attends to their souls when they are in labor, while the women attend to the bodies, and the most important thing about Socrates’ art is that he possesses the ability to “apply all possible tests ($\beta\alpha\sigma\alpha\nu\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\upsilon\nu$, 150c1) to the offspring of young men in order to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom—that is an error, or a fertile truth” (150c1-3). The word $\beta\alpha\sigma\alpha\nu\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\upsilon\nu$ translates “to test;” literally, the term means “to rub gold upon the touchstone.” In this context, it means “to try the genuineness of a thing, to put to the test and make proof of,” and “to examine closely” or “cross-question.”⁵¹ Through this special kind of testing, Socrates aims to deprive the young men of their nonsense, but some of them never quite believed that he was doing this in good faith.

This art also enables him to detect the ones pregnant: “At first some of them may give the impression of being ignorant and stupid,” he says, “but as time goes on and

⁵¹ Cf. Liddle and Scott.

our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make progress—a progress which is amazing both to other people and to themselves” (150d2-6). He stresses that it is clear that this progress “is not due to anything they have learned from me; it is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light” (150d6-8).

His guidance was at times not valued as such, and this “may be seen in the many cases where people who did not realize this fact took all the credit to themselves and thought that I was no good” (150d9-e2). This utterance adds yet another dimension to the Athenian gossip concerning Socrates’ unpopularity.⁵² In addition to the old rumors which denoted him a sophist, he was also confronted with blame coming from young men who failed or who left him too soon. In this regard, we can detect two sorts of youths: the ones leaving him permanently and the ones leaving but who change their minds and come back. The former left him sooner than they should, either of their own accord or through the influence of others. Socrates says that after they left “they have resorted to harmful company with the result that what remained within them has miscarried; while they have neglected the children I helped them to bring forth, and lost them because they set more value upon lies and phantoms than upon the truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant fools, both by themselves and by everybody else” (150e2-7). For the ones leaving but coming back, the outcome of their decision is uncertain. When they came back and once more were seeking Socrates’ company, they were “ready to move heaven and earth to get it” (151a1), Socrates states. However, “in some cases the divine sign (δαίμόνιον) that visits me forbids me to associate with them; in others, it permits me, and then they begin again to make progress” (151a3-4). This tells us there is a second chance, but due to his inner daimon, Socrates is forced to dispel some and allowed to accept others. However, there is also a third group—those who do not seem to be pregnant at all, and, when Socrates comes across them, he realizes that they do not need him at all. When this is the case, he gives them away to other wise and inspired persons; for example, he has given many to Prodicus (151b5). Socrates’ two practices are detectable, and I will use

⁵² Socrates elaborates on this in the *Apology* (399), which I return to in chapter 10: The *Apology*, section 10.6.1: The old accusations, pp. 362-66.

them as a tool throughout my readings to communicate what I think Socrates is doing and why. I will now turn to the inspirations and stepping-stones of my project.

4 Inspirations and stepping-stones

It is impossible to elaborate on all who have influenced, enlightened, and inspired my understanding of the Platonic dialogues. Hence I am bound to discriminate. Therefore, in this regard, I present the readings that are directly relevant for this project.

4.1 The dramatic chronology of the Platonic corpus

I highly value the readings given by Catherine Zuckert (2009), Howland (1998a), and Laurence Lampert (2010). They have—from different perspectives and intentions—paved the way regarding my undertaking to encounter the Platonic corpus from the outset of dramatic chronology. However, already in 1857, Eduard Munk suggested that the architect provided the dialogues with dramatic dates. According to Zuckert (2009, 17n30), Munk argued in accordance with present criticism that “attempts to date the dialogues on the basis of style or word choice involve inferences from highly questionable assumptions.”⁵³ Munk proposed a chronology which he argued was a *natural order* and suggested that the dialogues represent three periods in the development of Socrates’ philosophy.⁵⁴ Zuckert, who intended to expose the coherence of the dialogues by emphasizing the contradictory philosophical voices Plato uses, renews Munk’s thoughts. By reading the whole Platonic corpus, she argues that the dialogues cohere and reveal a comprehensive understanding of philosophy. Howland and Lampert are on the same track, but contrary to Zuckert, they do not consider the whole corpus.

4.1.1 Reading the whole corpus from the outset of the dramatic dates

Zuckert approaches an imperative question (if not *the* imperative question) in her project: Given the presence of different philosophers (Parmenides, Timaeus, the

⁵³ Zuckert further points out that “Plato was a consummate artist who was able to use many styles in depicting exchanges between different individual characters. Even if, as the stylometric studies show, there are six dialogues in which Plato uses similar phrases and constructions, Thesleff observes, the evidence that these dialogues were written ‘late is slight. Nor does it follow that Plato intended these conversations to be read as ‘late’ productions.” Cf. Thesleff (1982, 69-71). This is also in accordance with the views presented by Howland (1991, 189), in which he sets out “to awaken Plato scholarship from its dogmatic slumber.”

⁵⁴ For the schemata, see Appendix II: Eduard Munk, p. 396.

Athenian Stranger, the Eleatic Stranger, and Socrates) in the dialogues, how are we to locate Plato's philosophy, or, how are we to separate Plato's philosophy from the ones promoted by these characters? She suggests that Plato dramatized the insoluble problems which "make philosophy always a search for wisdom that will never culminate in certain knowledge" (ibid, 209). She argues that if the Platonic dialogues are ordered by their dramatic dates, then a coherent story about the development of Socratic philosophy comes to light, first in response to the various challenges posed by the pre-Socratic Athenian Stranger in the *Laws*, and then, subsequently, in response to the challenges of Plato's three other philosophic spokesmen: Parmenides, Timaeus, and the Eleatic Stranger. The methodological reading of the corpus is done by determining the internal dramatic chronology of Plato's portrayals of the life of Socrates, which Zuckert divides into five periods.⁵⁵

Zuckert claims that two benefits surface in this reading order. First, "it enables us to take account of the differences in Plato's presentation of Socrates that led most commentators to adopt the developmental thesis rather than maintain a unitarian reading of Socrates, much less of Plato, without claiming historical knowledge that we in fact lack about the times at which Plato wrote the individual dialogues." Second, and according to Zuckert the most important, "the dramatic chronology enables us to see the way in which Plato uses his other philosophical spokesmen, first to set up the problems, philosophical and political, that were bequeathed to Plato and his teacher by the pre-Socratics and then to indicate the limitations of the 'solutions' Socrates proposed, both cosmological and logical."⁵⁶ It is not difficult to agree with the elements Zuckert sets as the first benefit of this reading strategy. For me, the problem comes to light in the second benefit. I am especially ambivalent to the first part, denoted as the "pre-Socratic period," and I am not able to find my way around the arguments and justifications for dating the *Laws* to 460-450, and for claiming that the Athenian Stranger is a pre-Socratic philosopher.⁵⁷ I have the same sort of ambivalence toward the dating of the *Menexenus* (387-86). Also, I am troubled by the concept

⁵⁵ For the schemata, see Appendix IV: Catherine Zuckert, p. 397.

⁵⁶ The two quotes are from Zuckert (2009, 18-19).

⁵⁷ The arguments for the dating of the *Laws* is also set forth in Zuckert (2004).

“spokesmen of Plato,” which I associate with “mouthpiece interpretations,”⁵⁸ an interpretative tradition I distance my project from. Despite some (major) differences, Zuckert’s readings are important to me mainly because she has paved the way for new approaches.

4.1.2 Reading parts of the corpus from the outset of the dramatic dates

Howland suggests that the dialogues *Theaetetus*, *Euthyphro*, *Cratylus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo* stand together in dramatic time, in “the order in which they have been named, as memorials of Socrates’s last days.” He argues that, together, these eight dialogues form an octology constituting the largest single dramatic sequence of writings in the Platonic corpus. Thus, in “eight out of the thirty-five dialogues listed in the traditional canon of Thrasyllus, Plato concentrates upon the end of Socrates’ life.” This is, according to Howland, a remarkable fact which invites the readers to ask “whether the dialogues of the octology are also linked internally by common philosophical themes and issues.” He contends they are connected, and “The temporal contiguity of these dialogues is merely the surface of a deeper dramatic and thematic integrity.” The trial motif is the Ariadne thread in Howland’s readings, through which he finds that “the end of Socrates’ life furnishes the occasion for an extended philosophical exploration of the question ‘Who, or what, is Socrates?’” Plato, Howland argues, indicates an answer to this question in various other ways, and thus, “The issue of Socrates’ identity constitutes the unspoken center of all the dialogues of the octology.”⁵⁹ Howland’s readings of the octology have been enlightening and enriching for me. I highly value the way he implicitly activates intertextuality throughout the readings and the contextualization of the dialogues. I part from Howland when he sets the date of the *Cratylus* to 399,⁶⁰ and I move one step further regarding contextualization of the dialogues and will actively take the context (through the interlocutors) into consideration in my readings.

Lampert (2010, 1) sets out by claiming that “Plato spread his dialogues across the temporal span of Socrates’ life, setting some earlier, some later, inducing their

⁵⁸ I return to “mouthpiece theories” in chapter 9: *The Eleatic Stranger—a turning point*, p. 326.

⁵⁹ Howland (1998a), all quotes are from p. 2.

⁶⁰ I return to this in Appendix I: The chronology of the dialogues and their participants, pp. 384-95.

engaged reader to wonder: Does that span map a temporal development in Socrates' thought? Did Plato show Socrates *becoming* Socrates?" His answer to these questions is yes, whereupon he claims that the "dramatic dates Plato gave his dialogues invite his readers to follow a now little-used route into the true mansion of Socrates' thought." If the readers follow this route, they can accompany Socrates "as he breaks with the century-old tradition of philosophy, [...] learns the proper way to shelter and transmit that understanding in the face of the threats to philosophy that Plato made so prominent." Thus, the "plan of Plato's dialogues" is the "one turning point and vortex" (2010, 15)⁶¹ of "the history of philosophy—and of the history of political philosophy, philosophy's quasi-philosophical means of sheltering and advancing philosophy" (ibid, 1). The explicit aim of Lampert's book is "to show how Plato's chronological arrangement of his dialogues portrays the remarkable prodigy Socrates, having discovered all these things, learning to teach someone else how to judge them clearly for himself" (ibid, 9). Lampert is taking on this task, first by setting the dramatic date of the three dialogues, the *Protagoras* (432), the *Charmides* (429), and the *Republic* (429); then he performs a reading of these dialogues through which he treats them in detail.

I take one step aside from Lampert, especially regarding his dating of the *Republic* and his argument that the *Charmides* functions as a prologue to the *Republic*. The latter leads him to conclude that Socrates learned how to conduct a new public teaching from the conversations with Alcibiades and Critias, and further, that Socrates demonstrates this in the *Republic* by convincing Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Thrasymachus. These elements expose a major difference in our readings of this dialogue. I argue that the *Republic* is not equipped with a dramatic date,⁶² and I am not convinced that Socrates succeeds in turning these three men around.

4.2 Philosophy defined

In an extensive work on genres in the Platonic dialogues, Nightingale (1995)⁶³ has demonstrated that it is not controversial to claim that Plato, a few decades after the

⁶¹ Lampert is here quoting Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy*.

⁶² I will elaborate on this in chapter 1: *Preparing the stage*, section 1.1: Is the *Republic* equipped with a dramatic date? pp. 47-9.

⁶³ See especially chapter 1: "Plato, Isocrates, and the property of philosophy," pp. 13-59.

restoration of the democracy in 403, made it his project to define philosophy and make it a new discipline (or program) in which the philosopher contrasted the existing intellectuals. In an enlightening analysis, she pinpoints how “Plato appropriated the term ‘philosophy’ for a new and specialized discipline” which emerged as “an artificial construct that had to be invented and legitimized as a new and unique cultural practice” (ibid, 14). Through a discussion of the history of the word “philosophy”—φιλοσοφεῖν and its cognates—she shows that the term “was used to designate ‘intellectual cultivation’ in a broad and unspecific sense.”⁶⁴ Thus, before the fourth century, there “was no special subgroup of intellectuals who had appropriated the title of ‘*philosophoi*’” (ibid, 15).

I take this study to be a sophisticated developed argument, which I use as a stepping-stone for my dissertation in three ways. First, I view Nightingale’s study implicitly to give support to my view that the corpus is constructed through the lenses of a retrospective mimetic game. Secondly, her study demonstrates that one can view the whole corpus as an architectonic project; that is, as an effort undertaken to distinguish the philosopher and the discipline of philosophy from the author’s contemporary rivals, especially the sophists. Further, I am sympathetic to the positioning of both the philosopher and the discipline of philosophy in “relation to the social and political economy of fourth-century Athens” (ibid, 14). Thirdly, contextualization is important. As a necessary strategy for her comparative and intertextual analysis that aims to show how (and why) philosophy was “invented and legitimized as a new and unique cultural practice” (ibid), Nightingale contextualizes Plato, his texts, and his rivals in the fourth century. Based on the intertextual analysis of the defense-speeches of Isocrates’ *Antidosis* and Plato’s *Apology of Socrates*, she

⁶⁴ The argumentation for this is the following: “While Pericles’ famous “φιλοσοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας” suggests that virtually all Athenians were practicing ‘philosophy’ (Thucydides 2.40.1), the term is generally used to designate a smaller group of individuals, namely, people who have the time and the inclination to engage in intellectual pursuits as young men and adults. The narrowest application of the word in this period, in fact, is found in Gorgias’ *Encomium of Helen* (DK B11.13) in which those people who make a practice of verbal disputation (φιλοσόφων λόγων ἀμίλλας) are distinguished from both astronomers and rhetoricians. Perhaps the most important indication of the valence of this term in late fifth-century Athens, however, is its absence from the texts of Old Comedy. Although the fragments of Old Comedy as well as the plays of Aristophanes contain several attacks on intellectuals, they have nothing to say about ‘philosophers’.”

reaches the following conclusions: Isocrates' defense is constructed on the premise that the philosopher represents a great value for the city due to his intellectual property, and for that reason, he "firmly places himself and his philosophy within the social economy of Athens" (ibid, 59, cf. 43)—that is, Isocrates argues for an insider status for the philosopher. This is contrary to how Plato constructs the philosopher's defense. According to Nightingale, he argues "that the philosopher occupies a *disinterested* position" (ibid, 59)⁶⁵—that is, he argues for an outsider status for the philosopher; hence the philosopher is distinguished by his willingness to remain outside of the social economy of Athens. I will relate closely to Nightingale's perspective on the philosopher when I argue that the corpus contains a profound critique aimed toward politics and *paideia*, through which Plato—in my terms, the peace-waging architect—launches philosophy as a new and unique cultural practice. This leads me to the theme war versus peace within the scholarly tradition.

4.3 War and peace

Kurt A. Raaflaub (2011, 2) states that "experts on war in the ancient world are numerous, those on peace harder to find." However, he further argues that "the Greeks produced a rich discourse on the issue of peace," and compared to other ancient civilizations, the Greeks "were not unique, but exceptional" (ibid). Raaflaub (2009) and (2011) present a survey of the ancient peace discourses.⁶⁶ Through these surveys, he demonstrates that "the idea of peace" was an important part of performative arts such as "narrative and didactic epic, lyric poetry, tragedy, and comedy," and as these "were performed in public, at various occasions but always in front of audiences that represented important segments of the citizens body," the public was profoundly informed on the problem of war and peace. Intellectuals such as Thucydides, Plato, and other philosophers "primarily addressed readers or taught small groups of pupils [...]," but even so, "they interacted intensely with other intellectuals of all types." According to Raaflaub, this "explains why echoes not only of political, geographical,

⁶⁵ It should be underlined that this is a marginal summary of Nightingale's analysis, and she stresses that these definitions are "just a top of the iceberg" (p. 18) and further that "Plato's definition and defense of philosophy goes far beyond the arguments analyzed in this chapter" (p. 59).

⁶⁶ Raaflaub (2016) presents a groundbreaking comparative examination where the main topic is to answer why some ancient societies produced explicit concepts and theories of peace while others did not.

or medical theories but also of an intense discourse on peace pervade virtually all extant literature of the period.”⁶⁷ The period referred to is the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Some scholars have pointed out that “comments about the suffering caused by war and, correspondingly, a strong desire for peace pervades Greek literature.”⁶⁸ Despite the fact that scholars largely ignore the widespread peace discourse, Raaflaub emphasizes that he takes the existence of it for granted.

From this, it follows that with regard to secondary literature, the “bibliography on war in the ancient world is immense”⁶⁹ while there is less to be found on peace.⁷⁰ Henrik Syse (2010) highlights not the peace theme but the ethical aspects of war as he points out that there “has been so little secondary literature on Plato’s treatment of ethical aspects of warfare and indeed of his treatment of warfare as a whole.”⁷¹ He points out that the lack of attention to Plato’s discussions about war “is even more surprising in light of the fact that most of his dialogues are set during or shortly after the Peloponnesian War—with interruptions—from 431 to 404” (ibid, 104). Maybe these “surprising” aspects can be explained through Martin Ostwald’s authoritative voice when he—regarding Plato and Aristotle—argues as follows:

Neither of these philosophers ever articulated a coherent doctrine of war and peace, so that their views must be patched together from isolated statements, usually made incidentally and in contexts primarily concerned with other matters. Their vision of peace is not utopian but informed by the idea that peace exists in a society which, guided by law and trained by education, pursues excellence in the use of the goods it has, a society which knows that leisure is needed for the good life but also that this leisure is imperiled if men are not prepared at all times to defend it by military means.⁷²

I take this statement at face value, and from the same statement Raaflaub concludes that neither Plato nor Aristotle has very much to say on the subject of “war and

⁶⁷ Raaflaub (2009), all quotes above are from p. 228.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 227. According to Raaflaub, evidence for this has been collected by Zampaglione (1973), Spiegel (1990), and Raaflaub (2007).

⁶⁹ Raaflaub (2011, 27, note iv). For a solid bibliography on “war,” see Raaflaub and Rosenstein (1999).

⁷⁰ For substantial bibliographies on “peace,” see the chapters in Raaflaub (2007) and the bibliography in Raaflaub (2009). Also, see Wees (2001), and Zampaglione (1973).

⁷¹ In this regard, Syse (2010, 104n1) points to Craig (2001) and Baracchi (2002). Syse counts them as “some of the relatively few exceptions in treating war as much more than a passing and tangential topic within Plato’s philosophy.”

⁷² Ostwald (1996). Quoted in Raaflaub (2009, 233).

peace.”⁷³ According to him, the case is rather that they both considered war as deep-rooted in human society, and they both reflected on how to control it and assign it a responsible and meaningful function. Hence “both paid considerable attention to limiting the use of war and especially to securing the city’s internal peace through legislation and moral and intellectual education” (ibid). This conclusion serves as a second stepping-stone for me. For even if Plato did not write a text explicitly on the topic of war or peace as pointed out by Raaflaub (2009, 2011), Syse (2010), and Ostwald (1996), the dialogues are all mapped—in retrospective—within the era of the Peloponnesian War. Moreover, as this war was the single most significant feature of the political life in Athens, it can be argued that it is plausible to consider the Platonic corpus from the perspective of political critique. Also, when I, from the perspective of the dramatic chronology of the dialogues, follow Socrates and the discussions he and the various interlocutors are engaged in throughout the dramatic decades, it cannot be controversial to claim that the issues discussed are related to the political life in the city. Thus, I agree with Syse (2010, 104) that a reasonable assumption in this regard “is that the topic of war is rarely far away, even if the link is not always made explicit.”

As I see it, the general pattern is that scholars who highlight the aspect of war in Plato’s writings turn to the *Republic*, while those who highlight the aspect of peace turn to the *Laws*. For example, Leon Craig (2001) argues that war and spiritedness are central to the main argument of the *Republic*. Michael Kochin (1999) contends that Socrates’ three different accounts of war reflect and complete the central argument of the *Republic*.⁷⁴ Syse (2002) presents a more nuanced view when he considers the war-

⁷³ In continuance, Frank (2007, 444), argues that “[m]ost scholars agree with Aristotle’s claim that in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, Plato does not attend adequately to the city’s relations with its neighbors (*Pol.* 1265a20). Plato may ‘advocate the limits of desire,’ but he does not see pleonexia as a problem in interpolity relations, not, specifically, in the context of war.” However, when Frank asks if this is true, her answer is no. Her argument is as follows: “Plato’s political dialogues do focus most explicitly on the internal workings of the polis, on the analogy between city and soul, and on self-sufficiency as the normative aim of the city. But because the city, like the soul, is never as autonomous as it aspires to be, the city’s relation to itself, like the soul’s relation to itself, always also involves its relation to others” (ibid).

⁷⁴ The three accounts of war which Kochin (1999) identifies in the *Republic*, are first, wars for expansion (Book II); second, wars against cities riven by class conflict (Book IV); and third, the educative qualities of exposure to warfare itself (Book V), cf. Frank (2007, 465n27).

peace thematic. He argues that in the *Alcibiades* and the *Laches* we find that a rightful conduct of war is linked to the practice of virtue, and that the proper education of the warrior class in the *Republic* is a teaching of *ius in bello*—just war; while in the *Laws* we find that it is peace that presents the true aim for good laws. Mino Ianne (2016), on the other hand, turns mainly to the *Republic* when viewing the Platonic concept of peace as a fundamental human right. Mark Munn (2013) claims that mid-fourth century was a time in which Athens turned away from the Periclean vision of empire and toward the ideals of peace and wealth. On this background, he reads the *Laws* as a kind of inverted Pericleanism and argues that educated citizens are what secure peace. Regarding the war-waging imperialistic politics of Athens, Bruce Rosenstock (1994, 368) argues that “in the *Republic*, Plato turns his back on the political ideology that sustains his city.” I will return to these perspectives in due course. Now, it is time to present the main arguments for my dissertation.

5 Entering the Platonic literary-philosophic universe

I enter the Platonic corpus as a reader. When I am proposing to relate to but not read and analyze the whole Platonic corpus and designate it the “the Platonic literary-philosophic universe,” some scholars might dismiss such an undertaking right from the beginning; some may even see it as far-fetched. Ruby Blondell (2002) warns against such a reading and calls for cautiousness: “Despite their [i.e., the dialogues] common dramatic setting on the verge of Socrates’ death, these works share no formal links of a kind that invites us to view them as subordinate parts of one artistic whole” (ibid, 7).⁷⁵ She further argues that we “are not entitled to *assume* [...] that Plato’s oeuvre as a whole presents us with a coherent set of characters or ideas” (ibid, 6). I do not claim that the Platonic corpus presents us with a coherent set of characters or ideas. Nevertheless, to argue that the corpus *can* be read as a profound critique where the author, in the end, stands forth as a spokesperson for peace, it is necessary to relate to the whole corpus. As I elaborated on above, recent readings have presented a groundbreaking turn that allows new perspectives, and it is within this newly grounded

⁷⁵ Blondell (2002) admits that “any writer’s oeuvre in a sense creates and presents us with a complete authorial ‘world’” (p. 7), but “it is worth recalling, in this context, that as far as we can tell, all Plato’s dialogues have survived. But the picture of ‘Plato’s world’ that we recover from them will depend on how many of them—and which ones—are deemed authentic” (p. 7n16).

tradition that I will try to intervene. In accordance with my working hypothesis, I also suggest that it is through the profound critique aiming toward existing *politeia* that radical new views emerge. I argue that *politeia* as launched in the *Republic* and the *Laws* are incompatible with war-waging politics. Thus, they strongly suggest that new thoughts regarding *politeia* and education are that which will secure peace. With this claim I allude to Jill Frank (2007, 445) who argues that the *Republic* “models [...] a philosophy and politics that are irreducible to war and that provide an alternative to its motivating *pleonexia* by correcting the virtues taught by an education to, for, and by war.” This leads to Allan Bloom (1991b, 439-440n1) who states that the existing *politeia* in contemporary Athens can be “identified with the class of citizens who rule, for they impress their way on the city and are the source of the laws.” Pangle (1988a, 375) maintains that in Platonic terms *politeia* is identified with the soul of the city, and the business of the art of politics is to care for souls.⁷⁶ In these two opposed identifications, we also find implicit references to two different views on *paideia*, which on a general level denotes the shaping of character.⁷⁷ The conventional shaping of character is severely attacked throughout the whole corpus; thus, it is one of my main themes all through the dissertation. My last introductory encounter is to present the two main arguments for the hypothesis. The first concerns the *Republic* and the *Laws* as backdrops; the second concerns the dramatic chronology of the other dialogues.

5.1 Argument I: The *Republic* and the *Laws* as dramatic backdrops

When I claim that the *Republic* and the *Laws*⁷⁸ can be read as dramatic backdrops for the rest of the dialogues, my argument is two-fold. First, I will argue that these two dialogues constitute the corpus’ political-philosophic-thematic core. Overall, this core points toward an undertaking that promotes peace. In both dialogues, the new *politeias*

⁷⁶ The emerging of a new *politeia* and *paideia* will be the main theme of chapters 5: *Founding cities making* (ποιουόμεν) *guardians* and 6: *The demiurges of freedom*.

⁷⁷ Different aspects of *paideia* are broadly discussed. The works that have an impact on my understanding of the term is first and foremost the influential and ground-breaking work of Jaeger (1986), Havelock (1963), and Robb (1994).

⁷⁸ I will not perform a reading of the *Laws*. However, I will give a brief explanation of how the *Laws* functions as a backdrop in relation to the *Republic* and how I isolate the peace theme in this dialogue, see Appendix IV: *The Laws*, pp. 398-405.

displayed are aiming toward peace and prosperity. In the *Laws*, the aim is, through new laws and *paideia*, to make righteous citizens to prevent *stasis*. The *paideia* proposed in the *Republic* aims toward justice on both a collective and individual level. Further, by redefining the concept *stasis* and letting it include wars between Greek city-states, Socrates, in the *Republic*, launches a Pan-Hellenic peace-project which reduces war to defense. Following this re-definition, I suggest that the Peloponnesian War is denoted as *stasis*, while—in accordance with Guilia Sissa (2011)—the Persian War exemplifies a paradigmatic war due to the external threat that made the Greeks unite themselves. To secure peace, Socrates demands the rulers to be educated philosophers, a demand in accordance with the reflections on governing and partaking in politics as presented in the *Seventh Letter* (326a-b).

The second part of the backdrop argument relates especially to the *Republic*. On one level, the audiences partake in the two-city discussions throughout books II-VII where it all cumulates in the final surface of the “beautiful city” wherein people live in peace. On another level, the two-city construct can be viewed as a pedagogical tool which Socrates uses for trying to make Glaucon (and the readers) turn to philosophy. This pedagogical tool reflects Socrates’ two practices, and in addition, Socrates defines and elaborates on essential philosophical concepts in the *Republic*. These elements are noteworthy, and they are all points of return when reading the other dialogues. This is not to say that the *Republic* is the only key, but rather, that it is a backdrop for enlightening how Socrates sets forth and distinguishes philosophy from other disciplines.

5.2 Argument II: Historical touchdowns—the dialogues

The second argument for my hypothesis is tightly connected to the subtitle of my dissertation: *dramatic staging* and *political accountability*. Hence in this section, I will elaborate on these two concepts. The overall perspective is that the dramatic time span of the dialogues juxtaposes the time span of the era of the Peloponnesian War.⁷⁹ For me, this entails that the corpus is framed within the turbulent times of war—including *polemos* and *stasis* and the restoration of the Athenian democracy (403 ff.). Within this

⁷⁹ The time frame of the Peloponnesian War is 431-404, while the Peloponnesian War viewed as an era is usually framed within the time-span 450-380; cf. Strauss (1993, 221n1).

time span, the architect maps the chart and presents for the readers what I have chosen to call specific “historical touchdowns.” These historical touchdowns, I denote as “dramatic staging.” By viewing each dialogue as a dramatized historical touchdown, each dialogue represents a still frame. These still frames can be viewed as an invitation to study what happens when Socrates, the philosopher, encounters various historical personae who, one way or another, could have had or have had, an impact on Athenian culture, *paideia*, and politics. When these fictitious touchdowns are isolated and dated, they expose a coherent pattern. We first meet Socrates in the *Parmenides* (450) as a young man, and we bid him farewell in the *Phaedo* (399) when he has reached the age of seventy. However, this simultaneously reveals a parallel development. On the one hand, the readers can witness how the philosopher is practicing philosophy through his words and deeds.⁸⁰ This witnessing can be done without taking the historical context into consideration. It is sufficient to read the dialogues in the succession given by the dramatic chronology.⁸¹ On the other hand, the dramatic chronology creates an outline where it is possible to pinpoint quite definite and significant historical moments. When these components are considered, the readers become aware that the historical context is continuously creeping around backstage and the elements drawn onstage—being historical personae or cultural elements—preferably must have a bearing on the readings.⁸² When the historical context is considered and somehow integrated in a chronological reading, it is also possible to determine an approximate age of the participants and interlocutors. This aspect provides additional and enriching information when it comes to describing and determining the dramatic setting and place of each dialogue.⁸³ Also, we can expand our understanding of how some of the

⁸⁰ This view is in accordance with Zuckert (2009) and Lampert (2010).

⁸¹ As do Zuckert (2009), cf. p. 11 where she states that “I do not think the dramatic dates can do anything more than indicate the order and connections among the dialogues.”

⁸² Cf. Clay (2000).

⁸³ On the importance of establishing the “dramatic setting” and “place” of the dialogues, see especially: Hyland (1994) and (1995), and Gonzalez (2003).

characters change their attitude during a conversation with Socrates,⁸⁴ while we follow others from their youth onward.⁸⁵

I connect the theme *political accountability* to my suggestion that the dialogues propose a cultural/political critique. I take the conversations in the dialogues to be fictitious, but the concrete naming of the participants and the interlocutors gives the readers imperative clues regarding *whom* Socrates encounters on stage, and *how* he encounters them. It is also possible to deduce from the interlocutors' relative fragmented biographies what kinds of attitudes and convictions Socrates is confronting. According to Michael Frede (1992), for Socrates, it is generally a matter of questioning false authority, the authority of tradition, the authority of the many, or the authority of a self-styled expert. It is on this background I suggest that some features of the dialogues can be read as a profound critique of the Athenian political establishment. This critique especially hits the educators and their view on *paideia*, politicians, and/or military leaders. This leads me to believe that through dramatic staging the architect recreates the past in the present. From this perspective, the dialogues present a dramatized and well-directed performance of how various personae from the past are responsible for the degenerated conditions of the present.⁸⁶ Viewed from this perspective, contextualization of the dialogues becomes an element of necessity. Thus, Athens cultural history and all names and all clues given in the dialogues are important. I present my outlined chronology of the dialogues and their participants in Appendix I, pp. 384-95.

⁸⁴ Cf. Gordon (1999), see especially chapter 4: Character (pp. 93-116), where she shows this through a reading of the *Meno*.

⁸⁵ For example, Alcibiades, whom we first meet in the *Protagoras* (432) at the age of ±19 years, then in the *Alcibiades I* and *Alcibiades II* (432) where he is at the same age, and finally in the *Symposium* (416) at the age of 35 years. Another example is Phaedrus whom we meet in the *Protagoras* (432) at the age of ±12 years, in the *Phaedrus* (418/16) at the age of 26/28 years, and finally in the *Symposium* (416) at the age of 28 years. The question in this regard is to detect some kind of change or development in the character. Do Socrates' proceedings promote change? If not, why? This is the main theme in chapter 8: *Saving youths*.

⁸⁶ The view of "recreating the past in the present" is developed with inspiration from the concept "collective memory" as defined in Halbwachs (1992).

6 The progress of the dissertation

The dissertation is divided into two parts. The six first chapters are placed under the headline Part I: Dramatic backdrop—*Republic*. The four last chapters are placed under the headline Part II: Historical touch-downs—the dialogues.

6.1 Part I: Dramatic backdrop—the *Republic*

Regardless any tradition, there is, according to John Beversluis (2000), a long scholarly precedent for making a fairly sharp distinction between Book I and Books II-X. The result is that “most commentators spend little time on Book I and treat it as a mere preliminary” (ibid, 185). The reason is that in Books II-X “the Socratic elenchus is wholly absent, the dialogue form only nominally retained, and the interlocutors largely reduced to concurring listeners” (ibid) while Book I “reads like a typical early dialogue. [...] The discussion ends inconclusively. No acceptable definition is forthcoming, and it is partly for this reason that some commentators think Book I was originally an early dialogue or dialogue fragment (entitled *Thrasymachus* [...]) which Plato later used as an introduction” (ibid). By suggesting a new approach to this text, I deviate from this scholarly precedent. This alternative approach is related to the structure of the *Republic*. Traditionally, the readers use the book-divisions as their guidelines. However, if we instead focus on the conversations and read them in sequences, and in addition take into account that each conversation has impact on the next, then an alternative outcome is possible. Thus, I suggest the following structure: First, why Socrates and Glaucon decided to stay in Piraeus is displayed in the Prelude (327a1-328c5). After the Prelude Socrates encounters Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thracymachus, whereupon he is challenged by Glaucon and Adeimatus; I find these conversations tightly connected and therefore I view them together as the Prologue (331d10-369b4). Next, when Socrates encounters Glaucon and Adeimantus, he is engaged in five conversations with each of the brothers, respectively; of these I will read the three first. This gives the following progress of Part I: Dramatic backdrop—the *Republic*:

In Chapter 1: *Preparing the stage*, I first give reasons for my claim that the *Republic* has no dramatic date. Secondly, I aim to show how the participants, on the one hand, are related to Athenian politics, and on the other, how they are intertwined

and thus implicitly signify momentous instances that occurred both on the Athenian political stage and in the historical touchdowns during the time-span of the era of Peloponnesian War. Thirdly, through a close reading of the Prelude (327a1-328c5) I evaluate the arguments that made Socrates and Glaucon stay in Piraeus. Further, I find that the phrase “it is so resolved” is bracketing the sections 331d10-362d2. The impact of this bracketing is that I define these sections as the Prologue, which I have divided into three chapters.

In chapter 2: *Prologue I: Father and son* (331d10-336a10), my aim is two-fold. First, in the encounter between Socrates and Cephalus, we witness how the poetic topos is activated, and that old Cephalus warrants his argument here. During this conversation it is detectable that Socrates implicitly starts his criticism of the authoritative poetic topos—hence the critique of the poets is launched right from the beginning. This leads to my second aim. When Cephalus’ son, Polemarchus, interrupts, Socrates immediately starts his explicit attack on the poetic topos and in addition shows that the Athenian moral topos is embedded in the first. Through the proceedings Socrates employs in his encounter with Polemarchus, I suggest he makes him turn toward philosophy.

In Chapter 3: *The Prologue II. The tide is turning for Socrates* (336b1-354c5), the theme is Socrates’ encounter with Thrasymachus. In this section I deviate from the scholarly tradition, and therefore I read it in detail, closely and slowly. My aim is to show that the main subject in this section is not the philosopher’s refutation of the sophist’s arguments. Rather, I argue that when listening to the conversation between Socrates and Polemarchus, Thrasymachus (implicitly) observed that Socrates employed a concealed topos, but he did not quite understand the impact of his observations. Thus, the conversation between Thrasymachus and Socrates exhibits how the two parties warrant their arguments, respectively, in two incompatible special topoi, sophistry and philosophy. The consequence is that they create an unsolvable violent discourse. I will also point out that in this section the narrator is not a reliable witness, and regarding him, the challenge is to look behind his hostile rhetoric.

In Chapter 4: *The Prologue III. The tide is turning for Thrasymachus* (357a1-369b4), Glaucon and Adeimantus interrupt and lend their support to Thrasymachus.

They lay specific challenges before Socrates and demand him to answer. My aim here is twofold. First, I aim to show that the two brothers know—at least they know of—Socrates’ consealed topos. The premiss is that it is not sufficient for Socrates just to state that Thrasymachus was wrong; Socrates must find another way in order to persuade them and the particular audience. In their opinion Thrasymachus honestly and openly warranted his arguments on politics in the opinions of the many, that is the Athenian political culture, and methodologically in the topos of sophistry. With regard to justice his warrant was the Athenian moral topos. Secondly, I aim to show that due to the challenges laid down by Adeimantus and Glaucon, they take on different roles. Adeimantus stands forth as a leader and judge in a political assembly, while Glaucon intends to act as the devil’s advocate. When Socrates, reluctantly, accepts their premisses, he asks Adeimantus: “Is it resolved that we must carry this out?” (369b2). Now the substantial prologue is over. However, in the Interlude starting at 449a1 ff. (the beginning of Book V), the men gathered arrest Socrates arguing that he is robbing them of a whole section (εἶδος) of the argument, and state that he will not get away with it. Adeimantus even confirms what Thrasymachus earlier suspected: Socrates *is* warranting his arguments in a topos out of the ordinary. Therefore, the assembly now resolves that Socrates will not be released until he has told them the entire story on the matter. This is the second time I find a section bracketed with the phrase “it is resolved.” This second bracketing leads me to suggest that the conversations developing during sections 369b5-451b8 are set as preparations. These preparations contain a criticism of the Athenian conventions, and the core themes that were presented during the conversation between Socrates and Thrasymachus.

Hence, my aim in Chapter 5: *Founding cities making (ποιοῦμεν) guardians* (369b5-451b8) is to show how these sections are the preparatory stages that finally allow us to enter the realm of philosophy. Socrates is engaged in five conversations with each brother; and I will read relevant parts of the first three sequentially. The chapter ends with the Interlude starting at 449a1, hence G₃, Glaucon’s third conversation with Socrates, continues in chapter 6. In order to meet the challenges set forth by the brothers, Socrates awakes the well-known two-city-topos which is grounded in an old discussion where the aim was to superpose one city in war and one

in peace; when merged the new alternative would be freed from violent conflicts. From this perspective Socrates and Adeimantus create a thought-experiment which defines “the true city,” and because Glaucon declines to be a part of this, he and Socrates decide to investigate “the feverish city”—a city in which men live nowadays. Through a purging of the empirical feverish city that restricts its growth and removes most of its convention, and through a parallel expansion of the true city, they are on their way toward creating a paradigmatic just city. Through this process it gradually becomes obvious that Socrates’ opinions and arguments are warranted in a place unknown. After the arrest and after Adeimantus presents his new demand, Socrates starts explicitly to reveal his concealed topos. Through the readings in this chapter, I intend, on the one hand, to show the preparatory steps toward the final aim that is the “beautiful city.” On the other hand, I intend to show that the movement between the thought-experiment and the feverish city is used, by Socrates, as a pedagogical tool in order to make Glaucon (and the readers) turn toward philosophy. Thus, these preparatory stages, viewed from a pedagogical perspective, are to make us (both the men gathered and the readers) understand that we are on our way to philosophy.

In chapter 6: *The demiurges of freedom* we enter the realm of philosophy. Here we first encounter the three paradoxical waves. I will not discuss the controversial content regarding these, but rather consider the considerations following them as they are presented by Socrates. I argue that these are the final dismissal of the Athenian values, and the contrast between philosophy and sophistry is sharpened. In this chapter my aim is threefold. First, I will show that the exclusion of women is due to the art of eristic. When employing the art of dialectic we find that there is no reasonable argument for allowing such an exclusion. Secondly, during the three considerations following the second wave, Socrates’ proposals launch radical new thoughts on war and warfare. Thirdly, in order to make these new controversial thoughts even thinkable, he suggests that philosophers must be appointed rulers of the new-born regime. At this point my close readings end. In the summary of my readings of the *Republic*, I conclude that due to the showing of the long and hard road towards philosophy, and due to the exhibition of parts of the topos of philosophy, the *Republic* can be read as a backdrop for the other dialogues. This long road is simultaneously a path toward

peace and prosperity because the education proposed on an individual level leads to a *politeia* incompatible with war-waging politics.

6.2 Part II: Historical touchdowns—the dialogues

The ideal thing to do would have to been to perform a close-reading all of the dialogues, but for obvious reasons that is not doable. Therefore I have chosen to highlight the theme “encountering youths.” The dialogues I concentrate on are: the *Parmenides*, the *Protagoras*, the *Alcibiades I*, the *Charmides*, the *Sophist*, and the *Apology*. I start with the first historical touchdown, the *Parmenides* where the main action takes place in 450. From the Prologue, dated ± 382 , we learn that it all starts with a hunt for facts about Socrates. This hunt I take to be an invitation for the readers to follow Socrates throughout a period of fifty years, and it will be the guiding premise for my readings.

In Chapter 7: *Setting the stage*, my aim is twofold. First, by reading the Prologue of the *Parmenides*, I will highlight how Parmenides made Socrates turn toward philosophy. The proceedings employed by Parmenides in that regard are recognizable when Socrates later encounters youths. The dialectical procedure stands in stark contrast to the Protagorean method. This leads to my second aim which is to highlight the grounding premises of Protagoras’ *paideia*-program as it is launched in the *Protagoras*. In addition, both Parmenides and Protagoras were city-founders and legislators; hence I will briefly touch upon these features. Compared to the paradigmatic regime established in the *Republic*, Parmenides’ city and rule alludes to the best regime, while Protagoras’ alludes to a city in need for a purging.

In Chapter 8: *Saving youths*, my aim is threefold. First, I read the Prelude and the Hippocrates-section of the *Protagoras*. I intend to show that by preparing Hippocrates for meeting Protagoras, Socrates makes him turn toward philosophy. In addition, based on Socrates’ own upsetting experience and the detectable hints regarding him acting out of character (*atopos*), I suggest that we witness his final turning. Secondly, when we, maybe a few days later, witness the encounter between Socrates and Alcibiades; Socrates is back in character when he tries to tone down Alcibiades’ political ambitions. I suggest that he makes Alcibiades turn toward philosophy, but the effect is not long lasting because when left alone he returned quickly to his former habits. This

entails that Alcibiades belongs to the group of students leaving and coming back, and which Socrates at one point is forced to dismiss.⁸⁷ Thirdly, three years later, the day after his return from the campaign at Potidaea, Socrates meets the beautiful youth Charmides. However, it turns out that Charmides is barren and his beauty is shallow; hence he is not in need of Socrates' help and is dismissed at the outset.

In chapter 9: *The Eleatic Stranger: A turning point*, I have reached a new time; the year is 399 and the backdrop is preparations for Socrates' death. When encountering the Eleatic Stranger, I launch confusion as a theme. What is he, and how are we to understand him? I argue that in the *Sophist* he appears to be a sophist. The reasons for my argument are stated through three steps. First, I disclose how the prologue equips the reader with pointers relevant for deciding on the Stranger's identity. Secondly, I perform a close reading of the paradigm division which is presented as *the* method that will enable the Stranger and Theaetetus to hunt down the sophist. Thirdly, I will do a close reading of the upcoming three divisions in order to display how the proposed method is gradually abandoned. By paying attention to what the Stranger does, I suggest that due to discrepancies between deeds and arguments, he himself slowly but surely starts to look like a hunting sophist, and consequently Theaetetus starts to appear as the hunter's prey. The impact of this unhurried turnabout is that the hunting-method camouflages a hunting-metaphor which in turn conceals a threefold hunt. As the readers are hunting the Stranger; Theaetetus thinks he is hunting the hunter-sophist while the Stranger in a deceptive hunt is hunting Theaetetus. With the Eleatic Stranger's proceedings, the Socratic way of practicing philosophy starts to fade away.

In Chapter 10: *The Apology*, I address Socrates' defense speech. My point of departure is to give a brief sketch of the three types of civic discourse which after the *stasis* became three powerful *topoi* employed in forensic speeches. These are the *homonoiia*-*topos*, the *demos*-*topos* and the reconciliation-*topos*. I will inquire into how Socrates activates and makes use of them in his apology; during this investigation, it will come to light that his defense as a whole is structured around these *topoi*. Through

⁸⁷ Cf. Introduction, section: Displaying the path towards philosophy—Socrates' two practices, especially p. 25.

this literary and rhetorical reading, I do not intend to conclude whether Socrates was guilty or not; my aim is rather to show that he presented a coherent defense both as a philosopher and as a citizen. Socrates argues that he is a part of the city as a law-abiding citizen, but as a philosopher he defends his right for taking on an outsider status.

7 Conclusion

I round off with an overall summary where I conclude that through my readings I have showed that the corpus contains an implicit critique of the values that led to Athens decay. Due to this critique and the dramatic staging of prominent personas not willing or able to change, the past is made responsible for the conditions of the present. By launching an alternative *politeia* and *paideia* that is not compatible with war-waging, and by showing the multiple and, thus individual, paths toward philosophy, Plato in the end stands forth as a voice pro peace.

Part I

Dramatic backdrop – the *Republic*

Chapter 1: Preparing the stage

Before I start reading the *Republic*, I will prepare the stage through three steps. First, I argue that the *Republic* has no dramatic date. My no-specific-date argument has a two-fold impact. On the one hand, it is one of the main reasons for arguing that the *Republic* can be viewed as a dramatic backdrop, and on the other, it exhibits an alternative view on the ten participants: By holding Socrates up against them, this argument opens up a possibility for viewing the nine other characters present as representatives for three distinct generations, each symbolizing features that turn out to be imperative for the dramatic development. This leads to the second aim, which is to show—through a presentation of the participants—that they, on the one hand, are related to Athenian politics, and on the other, that they are intertwined and therefore implicitly signify momentous instances that occurred both on the Athenian political stage and in the historical touchdowns (i.e., the dialogues) during the time span of the era of the Peloponnesian War. The third aim is to evaluate the arguments that made Socrates and Glaucon stay in Piraeus. Through a slow reading of the Prelude (327a1-328c5), I will show that Socrates decided to stay not because he was persuaded but because Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Polemarchus so resolved.

1.1 Is the *Republic* equipped with a dramatic date?

The controversies related to this question are diverse and long lasting and the arguments pro or con any dates are multiple. Viewed together, these controversies mark a kind of status quo.¹ Recently, there seem to be three dates that stand out as main candidates: 429,² 421,³ and 411.⁴ The arguments in favor for 429 are grounded in the tradition that claims that the first celebration of the Thracian goddess Bendis took place this year (cf. Lampert 2010, 11). However, even if at the outset it seems a

¹ On the long-lasting controversies regarding dramatic dates of the *Republic*, see Nails (2002, 324-26).

² Lampert (2010, 11) bases his conclusion solely on Thrasymachus' statement that the goddess in question is the Thracian Bendis. With reference to Planeaux (2001), who sets the date of Bendis' entrance to Attica at 429, Lampert concludes that "the dramatic date of the *Republic*, then, is early June 429." Lampert elaborates on this conclusion at pp. 405-11.

³ Howland (2004b, xii) states that the approximate date of the *Republic* is 421-20.

⁴ Bloom (1991b, 440n3) argues that "[...] the supposed date of the action of this dialogue [is] probably around 411 B.C." Zuckert (2009, 9) supposes the same.

plausible argument, it sidelines because the *Republic* is the only dialogue in the corpus also to name its silent auditors (cf. Lampert, 2010, 249n14). This is a hint requiring consideration, and I will elaborate on this below when I evaluate 429 as a possible date. In her survey of the material used for deciding on the dates 421 and 411, Debra Nails concludes that both dates are equally supported, and that the dialogue takes place “throughout the Peloponnesian War” (ibid, 324-6). Her arguments and the intense controversies that result from trying to establish a dramatic date convinced me that there is no specific dramatic date at all—but the *Republic* juxtaposes the time frame of the Peloponnesian War. By making the no-specific-date argument the grounding premise when viewing the men gathered, it turns out that it is possible to indicate an approximate age-difference between them.⁵ This age-difference, in turn, exhibits that the men can be divided into three age groups as displayed in the following schemata:

Birth—Death	Participants of the <i>Republic</i>
(470-399)	Socrates
	Old men:
(†421-15)	Cephalus of Syracuse
(±500-≤420)	Charmantides of Paeania
	Middle-aged men:
(≤ 450-404)	Polemarchus of Thurii, son of Cephalus
(±445- >380)	Lysias of Thurii and Athens, son of Cephalus
(born in the 440s)	Euthydemus, son of Cephalus
(445-39 - 404)	Niceratus of Cyndantidae, son of Nicias
(born ±455)	Thrasymachus of Chalcedon
(≤452- >404)	Clitophon of Athens
	Young men:
(±432- >382)	Adeimantus of Collytus, son of Ariston
(≤429- >382)	Glaucon of Collytus, son of Ariston

On this background, I suggest that it is possible to disclose a coherent pattern or structure. By sorting the men according to their birth and death dates, the three distinct groups (or generations) appear: the old, the middle-aged, and the young men. When measured against Socrates, the old men are older than he is; the middle-aged are

⁵ For the dates of birth and death of the participants, I mainly follow Nails (2002). Throughout the survey of the gallery of persons present in the Platonic corpus, Nails points out several controversies regarding the dates of birth and death of a person. Thus, most dates are marked as “give or take a year or two,” “not before” or “not after.”

approximately twenty-five years younger than him, and the young men are about fifty years younger. What happens if the three most supported dramatic dates (429, 421, and 411) are viewed against the birth and death dates of the men present?

The first date, 429, turns out to be very problematic because this is roughly the same year Glaucón was born, and Adeimantus would be around three years old. The second date, 421, is equally problematic because Glaucón then would have been around eight years old and, Adeimantus eleven. Also, the two brothers Polemarchus and Lysias had not yet returned from Thurii—they arrived in Athens around 415. So, for obvious reasons, those dates do not work. When considering 411, I find that both Charmantides and Cephalus would have been dead for nearly ten years. There is, of course, a possibility that Cephalus is awakened from his death to do his part in the *Republic*. According to diplomatic Nails, it could be “a stroke of literary genius to have a dead man speak of dying conventions” (2002, 387).⁶ I could accept the silent Charmantides and the speaking Cephalus as anachronisms, but this would be an awkward option because, if accepted, I would be bound to accept similar arguments in other instances. This short survey gives the reasons for my no-specific-date argument, and on that background, it is plausible to claim that three generations are displayed. These generations and their representatives are of great significance regarding the dramatic development in the *Republic*. However, who are they?

1.2 The participants of the *Republic*: Three distinct generations

Cephalus (“Head”)⁷ of Syracuse and the silent Charmantides of Paeania represent the first generation. We do not have much information about the latter, but being a guest in the house of one of the wealthiest families in Piraeus, he was probably also a rich man. Paeania was a rural deme and, hence, it is relatively safe to assume that Charmantides accumulated his wealth from agricultural holdings (cf. Nails, 2002, 89). Cephalus arrived in Piraeus around 450. He established a flourishing shield factory, which in 404 had more than one hundred slaves operating at the plant (ibid, 84). He lived as a wealthy *metic* in Piraeus for thirty years. In this period, Athens found itself

⁶ Even if Nails’ suggestion might be likeable, I would like to place the architect’s stroke of genius on quite another level.

⁷ The translations of names are taken from Craig (2001).

at the peak of its might; it was prosperous and growing economically while culturally it developed fast in various areas. It was also in this period that the sophists emerged as a new kind of political counselor and teacher. Robert W. Wallace (2007, 215) states that they were an innovative social phenomenon and “never before had such teachers been seen, never such teaching.” Even if the sophistic education could have been available to the rich Cephalus, it is not likely that the eldest generation mingled with them. On the contrary, in his conversation with Socrates, it comes to light that Cephalus advocates a conventional way of speaking. He warrants the authority of his arguments in the poetic topos; hence regarding *paideia* the old patriarch represents tradition and its conventions wherein the main authorities were, in Leon C. Craig’s words, “renowned generals and martial poets” (2001, 3).⁸ This tradition and its conventions are later attacked and evaluated by Socrates and Adeimantus.⁹

The second generation is well presented. First, we meet Cephalus’ three sons Polemarchus (“War Ruler”) of Thurii, Lysias of Thurii/Athens, and Euthydemus. Also, Thrasymachus (“Bold Fighter”) of Chalcedon, Niceratus (“Victory”) of Cyndantidae, and Clitophon of Athens. The latter was a well-known figure in Athens due to his career as an oligarchic political leader and, according to Nails, “flip-flopping political affiliations” (2002, 102). After the Sicilian disaster in 413, the Committee of Public Safety was set down to prepare proposals for a renewed set of laws. Nails points out that Clitophon demanded that “the committee should also investigate the *patrios politeia*, the ancestral constitution” (2002, 102-03).¹⁰ This demand brings to light that Clitophon was a proponent of a return to the ancestral constitution, which again was a decisive step toward the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411.¹¹ Hence, his involvement in Athenian politics paved the way for the rule of the Four Hundred and the coup in Athens the same year. Within the oligarchy, he belonged to the moderates.

⁸ Cf. *Republic* 329b, 329e-331a.

⁹ This will be one of the main themes in chapter 5: *Founding cities making (ποιούομεν) guardians*, section 5.3: Socrates and Adeimatus on education and rearing, pp. 168-70.

¹⁰ Lampert (2010, 253) suggests that “old Cephalus stands at the beginning of the *Republic* for ancestral authority, but ancestral authority altered.”

¹¹ Cf. Aristotle: *Constitution of Athens* (29.3).

In the *Frogs* (405), Aristophanes pairs him with Theramenes,¹² which Nails (2002, 102-03) suggests was “a context suggesting similar histories of fickle loyalties, and the ability to land on their feet, regardless of change,” and further that the “reestablishment of the ancestral constitution was still his object in 404” when he served as an ambassador for Lysander.¹³ In the dialogue *Clitophon* (421-16), Socrates is under severe attack by Clitophon, an attack and criticism Socrates does not respond to in that particular context. Through Clitophon, there is in the *Republic* an implicit presence of the dark side of the political establishment in Athens: from Clitophon via Cleon¹⁴ to Theramenes who became one of the Thirty.

Besides being a well-known rhetorician, Thrasymachus from Chalcedon also acted as an ambassador of Chalcedon after the city had mounted an unsuccessful revolt against imperial Athens. As a diplomat, Thrasymachus traveled to Athens to negotiate and prevent harsh reprisals against his native city. This diplomatic meeting probably followed Alcibiades’ return to Athens in 407. According to Stephen A. White (1995, 308-09), Thrasymachus was “a consistent opponent of outside aggression and a champion of local autonomy,”¹⁵ and according to Jonathan J. Price (2007), he was also concerned about the Athenian *stasis*.¹⁶ Price further assumes that when Thucydides stated that “war changes men internally, transforming their minds and emotions to make them capable of things which they not only would avoid in times of peace and prosperity, but which would not even occur to them” (2007, 25), he was probably referring to some of Thrasymachus’ writings. If this assumption holds, it is acceptable to indicate that Thrasymachus represents a pro-peace voice. In the *Phaedrus* (418/16),

¹² Theramenes (≤440-404) was with the Four Hundred in 411. He partook at the naval battle of Arginusae in 406 and became a member of the Thirty. See Nails (2001, 284-87).

¹³ Cf. Aristotle: *Constitution of Athens* (34.3).

¹⁴ Cleon (†422) was an Athenian politician. “His first-known action was to attack Pericles in 431 and 430. In 427 he proposed the decree (rescinded next day) to execute all men of Mytilene after the suppression of its revolt. [...] In 425, after the Athenian victory at Pylos, he frustrated the Spartan peace proposals, and later accused the generals in charge of the siege of Sphacteria of incompetence. [...] He doubtless approved, if he cannot be shown to have originated, the measure now passed greatly increasing the tribute paid by the allied states, and he was certainly responsible, in 425 for an increase of the dicasts’ pay from two to three obols. In 423 he proposed the decree for the destruction of Scione and the execution of all its citizens” (*The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 1991, eds. N.G.L Hammond and H.H. Scullard. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, p. 251).

¹⁵ Quoted in Nails (2002, 289).

¹⁶ Thrasymachus DK 85, B1; cf. Price (2007, 25n35).

Socrates warns Phaedrus against Thrasymachus' particular rhetorical skills (267c6-d5).

Niceratus of Cyndantidae was the son of the famous military leader Nicias (±475-413) who, in turn, was an associate of Pericles. Due to the silver mine holdings of Niceratus' grandfather and father, the family was extremely rich. Nicias was very eager to make his son "a good man" and thus required him to "memorize both the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*" (Nails, 2002, 211). Aristotle links Thrasymachus and Niceratus to a rhapsode competition. Thrasymachus witnessed that Pratus won over Niceratus in the recitation, whereupon he allegedly stated, "Niceratus is like a Philoctetes beaten by Pratus."¹⁷ In the *Laches* (424), we learn that Nicias asked Socrates more than once to be engaged in Niceratus' education, but Socrates always suggested other teachers.¹⁸ Nails demonstrates that in Athens Niceratus was "praised for his wealth and had a good reputation being a just and humane man," and neither he nor his father "ever sought popular acclaim" (2002, 212). In 404, Niceratus was executed by the Thirty.

The last three men are the sons of old Cephalus: Polemarchus of Thurii, Lysias of Thurii/Athens, and Euthydemus. Of the latter, very little is known, of the two former a great deal more is known. Polemarchus was most likely the guardian of Lysias (and maybe Euthydemus) when the brothers went to Thurii as colonists around the 430s. This links them to the *paideia* initiated by Protagoras.¹⁹ They returned to Athens around 415. In *Phaedrus* (418-16), we learn that Polemarchus at some point turned toward philosophy (cf. 257b4-5).²⁰ Both he and his brother Lysias were house-owners in Piraeus, and Polemarchus was the legal owner of the house where the *Republic* unfolds. Nails (2002, 191) argues that Polemarchus and Lysias were "among the wealthiest people in Attica, sponsoring choral performances, paying war taxes, and ransoming citizen prisoners of war." In 404, the Thirty claimed that the *metics* were in

¹⁷ Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, 1413a. Aristotle further states that "the simile made by Thrasymachus when he saw Niceratus, who had been beaten by Pratus in a recitation competition, is still going about unkempt and unwashed." Cf. Nails (2002, 211).

¹⁸ Niceratus is not the only potential student declined by Socrates. I return to this theme in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.3: Charmides, pp. 306 ff.

¹⁹ I return to Protagoras' educational system in chapter 7: *Setting the stage*, section: 7.2 Protagoras, the teacher p. 267-78.

²⁰ I return to this Polemarchus' turning in chapter 2: *Father and son*, section 2.2: Polemarchus and Socrates, p. 80 ff.

opposition to the regime. Therefore, Polemarchus' and Lysias' properties were confiscated, and all the family's assets were seized. When the Thirty executed Polemarchus in 404, Lysias fled the country and lived in exile for a short period. However, he still managed to lend financial support to exiled democrats after the confiscation (cf. Nails, 2002, 190).²¹ According to Bloom (1991b, 441n7), Lysias played "an important role in the overthrow of the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy." He later turned out to be one of the most famous speechwriters in Athens. Andrew Wolpert (2002, 65-7) reports on an anecdote which tells that Lysias wrote a defense speech for Socrates' trial, but he declined to use it.²² One of Lysias' alleged speeches is a major theme discussed in the *Phaedrus*.²³

Viewed in light of the era of the Peloponnesian War, I take it that the second generation symbolizes maturity on different levels and the links between them are noteworthy. Polemarchus, Lysias, Euthydemus, and Niceratus represent very wealthy men. Polemarchus and Niceratus are heirs to their family's wealth, and they both were executed by the Thirty in 404. Lysias, Thrasymachus, and Clitophon were close friends. The two latter are both presented in Aristophanes' comedies: Thrasymachus in the *Banqueters* (427) and Clitophon in the *Frogs* (405) where he is paired with Theramenes. Clitophon and Theramenes are connected to the Four Hundred in 411 and later to the Thirty. Hence, there is both a direct and an indirect link to the Thirty present in the *Republic*.²⁴ Lastly, Thrasymachus and Niceratus are linked through a rhapsode competition. On this background, I suggest that this generation represents a

²¹ On the executions of Niceratus and Polemarchus, Lampert (2010, 244n16), reports: "According to Xenophon, Polemarchus was killed, beheaded, for his money in accord with a policy toward metics advocated by Critias. Niceratus was also killed, and Lysias barely escaped (*Lysias, Against Eratosthenes*, 4-23; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2. 3-39, 2. 4-19, 38)."

²² I return to this in chapter 10: *The Apology*, p. 360.

²³ de Vries (1969, 59), suggests that this speech could be a parody of Lysias' style due to the exaggerated use of eliminative ἄλλὰ. Howland (2004a) presents a very interesting hypothesis, and a thought-provoking reading regarding Lysias' presence in the *Republic*. Howland argues that "Socrates' conversation with Polemarchus is on one level a Platonic reply to *Against Eratosthenes* and that Plato's implicit criticisms of Lysias in the *Republic* harmonize with the picture of Lysias that he incribes explicitly in the *Phaedrus*," p. 179.

²⁴ In this regard, Frank (2007, 448) points out that "[b]y modeling interactions among political actors who do not resort to violence against the historical backdrop of an extremely violent war, the *Republic* depicts a different possible future while also arguing for the conditions necessary for such change."

time of turmoil. Regarding traditional *paideia* and its conventions, they take a position in between. On the one hand, they are in touch with old tradition through their fathers. This becomes known in the conversation between Polemarchus and Socrates, as we shall see later. On the other hand, they are educated by the new professional teachers; hence, they all witnessed how the old conventions fade away.

Plato's elder brothers Adeimantus ("Dauntless") and Glaucon ("Gleaming") represent the young men, thus the last generation. Of Adeimantus, little is known, of Glaucon a little bit more. We learn from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (III: 6) that Socrates saves young Glaucon from making a fool of himself before the Ecclesia. Glaucon had set out to deliver a speech aiming to preside over the city. However, Socrates makes him aware of his ignorance concerning the actual affairs of state and convinces him not to speak. We learn from *Alcibiades I* (432) that Socrates tried to do the same for Alcibiades.²⁵ We can infer from the frame story (± 400) in the *Symposium* (418-16) that Glaucon²⁶ had no contact at that point with Socrates. We learn from the *Apology* (399) that Adeimantus was present in court, but not Glaucon. Both brothers probably fought at Megara in 409 (cf. *Republic*, 368a3-4). After the outbreak of the war, the new professional teachers met competition from the philosophers, so regarding *paideia*, the two brothers could choose from whom they wanted to receive an education. There are several hints in the *Republic* that Adeimantus had studied philosophy. When it comes to the politically ambitious Glaucon, I take it that Socrates and Adeimantus try to make him turn toward philosophy throughout the dialogue.²⁷ Adeimantus stands forth as a reflected and thoughtful man. He is a sober admirer of Sparta, calm, and philosophically oriented. Glaucon, on the other hand, is described as

²⁵ I return to this in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.2: Alcibiades: A lion reared in the city, p. 295 ff.

²⁶ In the frame story (dramatic date ± 400), the conversation takes place between Apollodorus and an anonymous companion. Apollodorus agrees to retell what he told Glaucon two days earlier. Nails (2002, 315) argues that the "lack of any further specification of Glaucon by demotic or patronymic makes it almost certain that the reference is to Plato's brother."

²⁷ I make a distinction between the concepts "turn toward philosophy" and "turn into philosophy." The first entails a turning where the youths commit themselves to study and work (cf. Polemarchus whom I return to in chapter 2: *The Prologue I: Father and son*, section 2.2: Polemarchus and Socrates; Alcibiades whom I return to in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.2: Alcibiades: A lion reared in the city; Hippocrates whom I return to in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.1: Hippocrates' dream). The second entails the final turning that will happen after many years of studying. I return to this in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.1.1: The turning toward and into philosophy.

courageous in everything (cf. 357a), loving victory (cf. 368a, 548d), and unskilled in philosophy (cf. 533a). Maybe one can say with Kateri Carmola (2003, 41) that on one level the *Republic* is driven by a concern for youths who are politically ambitious and spirited in the philosophical, that is, youths like Glaucon. It is in the Prelude the three generations are gathering for the first time, so let us enter and see how it happened.

1.3 The Prelude (327a1-328c5)

“Yesterday I went down to Piraeus together with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess; and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing” (327a1-4). Through this famous and, much commented on, opening line, the readers are informed about the *time* (‘when’), *place* (‘where’) for the action, and the reason why Glaucon and Socrates went down to Piraeus in the first place. The narrator of the *Republic* addresses his narrative to a universal audience the day after the events took place; hence, the only thing to say regarding “when” is “yesterday.” Regarding “where” and “why,” it could be both rewarding and relevant to take a small detour.

1.3.1 Piraeus—the land beyond

The drama unfolds in Piraeus, which according to Eva Brann (2002, 117-28) means “the land beyond the river.”²⁸ In this land beyond the river, Socrates, Adeimantus, and Glaucon construct the “beautiful city.” Thus, if only for associative reasons, it is relevant to recall parts of Piraeus’ history. In the mid-fifth century, at the request of Pericles, the city was cut up by Hippodamus of Milet who, according to Aristotle (cf. *Politics*, 2.8.), was the first among non-politicians to speak on the subject of the best constitution; his new way (*tropos*) of town-planning was characterized by the orthogonal, ordered, rectangular, or regular plan (*Politics* 7.11). Aristotle further elaborates that Hippodamus “divided the land [of his ideal city] into three parts (zones)—sacred, public, and private” (*Politics*, 2.8), whereas, according to David Fleming, “the first was intended for the gods, the second for the warriors, and the third for the farmers” (2002, 17). These zones were grids of uniform blocks which made the Hippodamian project result in a vision of a city wherein the orthogonal plan made it

²⁸ Brann argues convincingly that the opening line of the *Republic* ought to be translated as follows: “I descended yesterday to the land beyond the river.” Cf. also Lampert (2010, 245).

good. However, how did this make a city good? On the one hand, according to Fleming, the straight streets were regular and symmetrical and thus provided a measure of social and aesthetic order; they offered residents easy internal communication; they appeared to support democracy because they made city life transparent and were linked to the equal apportionment of land, and finally, the idea of straightness has connotations of correctness (*orthos*) and truth (2002, 15). On the other hand, if we, like McEwen (1993, 83), think of city-founding in terms of weaving, “the intentions made manifest in orthogonal streets layout becomes quite precise.” At the core of the topos of weaving, we find the concept of “harmony” embedded. McEwen (1993, 83-4) explains that “[h]armonia, close fitting, can be a feature of the tightly woven cloth only [...] one cannot produce a ‘harmonious,’ tightly woven fabric if wrap and weft are not regularly spaced and are not at right angles to one another, perfectly orthogonal.”²⁹ She further maintains that as a port, Piraeus had a shifty population, and therefore it was a place where people continually came and went, and they were “not known for having a ‘harmonious’ or coherent urban fabric. The habitués of ports do not form closely knit communities.” Hence, before Hippodamus’ intervention, “everything about Piraeus lacked *harmonia*” (McEwen 1993, 84). Hippodamus’ enterprise took place a generation after Themistocles³⁰ founded the city, fortified it, and started the construction of the Long Walls. He had, in Thucydides’ words, “the audacity to suggest that the Athenians should attach themselves to the sea” (2.36.2). Themistocles, in short, laid the foundations of Athens’ sea power; made Athens a metropolis, a mother city; and the umbilical Long Walls “linked the “child”

²⁹ With reference to anthropologist Anette Weiner, “Why Cloth? Wealth, Gender, and Power in Oceania,” in *Cloth and Human Experience*, eds. A. Weiner and J. Schneider (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989, pp. 33-66), Rosenstock (1994, 363) reminds us that Hesiod advised women to “[w]eave closely; make good cloth, with many woof-threads in a short length of wrap,” and stresses that Hesiod’s advice is not only a metaphor for social relations, but also “a literal directive about the nature and complexity of [...] the social and cosmological order. In addition, he points to Onians (1951, 349-77), who has demonstrated that Hesiod’s words are echoed in many cultures—“they represent explicit imperatives for all manner of fastening and constructions that sustain the social and cosmological order.”

³⁰ With regard to “lack of harmony,” McEwen (1993, 156n19) also includes Piraeus; its climate, its topography, and its population. The “site where Themistocles built the Piraeus practically lacked just about everything,” it was practically “waterless, with steep, barren hills, it also had an unhealthy climate due to its proximity to the Halipedon Marsh” (*ibid*, 84).

to its mother and underscored the maternal connection” (McEwen 1993, 86).³¹ Compared with other Greek colonial foundations, Piraeus was exceptional. McEwen points out that “just as the parental relation between mother cities and their colonial foundations became reciprocal to become manifest in the rise of the *polis*, so did the roles of Athens and Piraeus become reversed, for by sustaining the city with imported goods the port became the nurturing mother of the city that had given it birth” (ibid).

After Hippodamus’ “cutting” was completed, Pericles welcomed rich foreigners to settle in Piraeus for economic reasons, and among these invited *metics* we find Cephalus. Thus, in the Periclean period, Piraeus was populated by foreigners, and it follows that they practiced strange and extravagant Great Mother cults. Among these, we find the Bendeia, the festival and celebration of the Thracian goddess Bendis.³² To conclude, with its design, Piraeus was an impressive and modern city. Furthermore, in Lampert’s words, it “was the seat of the Athenian navy, the basis [...] of both its empire and its democracy” (2010, 245-46n9). Piraeus was also the place where the war, the devastating *stasis*, and the rule of the Thirty found its end. The effort of the democrats in exile—the men of Piraeus—turned out to be a powerful *topos* regarding the restoration of the democracy.³³ It is in this splendid seaport the ten men of the *Republic* gathered in a house somewhere; Socrates arrived, metaphorically speaking, through his mother city’s umbilical cord. Viewed in light of these last events, Piraeus can be said to symbolize a new dawn.

1.3.2 Socrates’ prayers

Why did Socrates go down to Piraeus? He wanted to “offer up his prayers to the goddess.” The Athenians perceived the Thracian moon goddess Bendis³⁴ as the

³¹ On references to the “maternal connections,” see McEwen (1993, 156-57n22).

³² McEwen (1993, 156n20) refers to Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, vol. 3 (1956-87, 59-60), when claiming that “Piraeus in the *Republic* is a reflection both of Hades and of the cave with its shadow play: The empty freedom of the Piraeus, with its celebration of the chthonian divinity, becomes the empty freedom of Arete in Hades, and they both blend into the play of shadows in the cave.”

³³ I return to these events in chapter 10: *The Apology*, p. 353 ff.

³⁴ According to Planeaux (2001), two motives can be detected for the Athenians to import the Thracian goddess Bendis. 1) The political motive: During the early years of the Peloponnesian War, Athens possessed a considerable military force in Thrace, and this political situation provided compelling reasons for the importation of Bendis. This desire grew more intense after the revolt of Potidaea in 432. Thus, the Athenian statesmen had a political motive to have championed Bendis and thus granting a large group of Thracian *metics* in Piraeus a series of unique and unrivalled privileges

goddess Artemis, and according to Martin P. Nilsson (1961, 16), she was the most popular goddess throughout Greece. However, why did Socrates want to offer up his prayers to Artemis? Or, why is Artemis (through Bendis) called upon at the outset of the *Republic*? An answer to these questions calls for a speculative proposal, and my speculations lead me to Jean-Pierre Vernant (1992, 197-98) who demonstrates that the different places belonging to Artemis were in “the presence of boundaries, border zones, and frontiers where [...] the world and the cultivated exist side by side in opposition [...] but where they may also interpenetrate one with another.” Artemis was not a warrior goddess, nor a combatant, and therefore she was not called upon in what is considered normal conflicts. Vernant elaborates that she was called upon in what was viewed as “wars of total annihilation where the prize is no longer the victory of one city over another but the survival of an entire human community” (ibid, 246). She was invoked to guide (as *Hegemone*) and to save (as *Soteira*) and viewed as “a savior in critical situation, when a conflict threatens the city’s continued existence, at a time when it is threatened with total destruction” (ibid, 203). Vernant further argues that Artemis was “mobilized when too much violence was used during a military engagement, when warfare abandons the civilized codes through which rules of martial struggles are maintained and moves brutally into the realm of savagery” (ibid, 203). When the survival of a city was at stake, Artemis ...

... goes into action when one of the combatants violates the limits set either on the use of violence during battle or on the treatment of the defeated party afterward. In such excess and all-or-nothing stakes, war goes beyond the civilized boundaries within which the rules of military engagement are maintained and veers abruptly into savagery (ibid, 246).

(p. 179-80). 2) The healing motive: The outlet is the connection between Bendis (or Artemis Mounikhia) and the plague in Athens/Attica (431-29). Bendis “arrived in Piraeus with Deloptes, a Thracian hero who [...] also participated in the Festival of Bendis. We know two things about this Thracian hero: 1) His cult was related intimately with those of Bendis, and 2) he was portrayed in the iconography of Asclepius. These two observations [...] do offer a foundation from which conclusions can be made. If Bendis is to be considered a ‘Thracian Artemis’ [...] it is most plausible that Deloptes was a ‘Thracian Asclepius’ (p. 181).

According to ancient Greek historians, Artemis stood by Athens during the second Persian War (ibid, 248-49),³⁵ and she lent support when the democrats, under their leader Thrasybulus, fought the Thirty and their followers in Piraeus and ended the civil war in 403.³⁶ However, we do not hear that she intervened during the Peloponnesian War. Why? The following two examples of how the demands of Artemis were violated in this war may indicate a reason. Socrates was engaged in one of them as a soldier and, therefore, he had firsthand knowledge of this war's brutality.³⁷

First, during the siege of Potidaea, already at the beginning of the war, the Hellenes were reduced to cannibalism—the worst of pollution.³⁸ By this act, they crossed the borderline and stepped out of the cultivated into the realm of savagery. In the *Charmides* (429) we meet Socrates just as he and some others³⁹ returned from the camp at Potidaea after “a long absence” (153a2). The friends he meets are eager to

³⁵ Vernant gives two examples: First, according to Pausanias, some of the Persian commander Mardonios' soldiers “wanted to rejoin their leader at Thebes. ‘But by the will of Artemis, night fell when they were *en route*; they mistook the path and plunged into the mountain’. [...] The next morning, at daybreak, the hoplites of Megara were easily able to massacre the arches who no longer had any arrows. As a sign of gratitude, the Greeks had built a statue of Artemis Soteira.” Secondly, Artemis intervened at the Battle of Salamis. According to Plutarch, “the 16th day of Mounychion, the Athenians consider sacred to Artemis, because on that day the goddess shone as a full moon for the Greeks who were victorious at Salamis.” (*Mor.* 349f, quoted in ibid, 248). On this instance, Vernant comments, “It is this nocturnal illumination, this salvific light in the darkness, that is recalled in the flat cake ringed with small torches that was offered to Artemis on the 16th of Mounychion, the precise day on which the *ephebes* honored the goddess with a procession, a sacrifice, and a regatta.”

³⁶ This story is taken from Vernant (1993, 248). He states that, according to Xenophon, the weather had been fine until a sudden snowstorm that began during the night forced the Thirty to abandon their plans to besiege Phyle and to cut off the supply rout. “The gods are with us,” the democratic leader later announces. “During fair weather they provide a storm when we need it” (Xenophon, *Hell.* 2.4.14). Diodorus goes further in his description of this incident. According to him, during the snowfall, the soldiers of the Thirty were disturbed by noises whose origin they could not understand, and they thought that enemy troops were approaching. “The tumult called panic seized the camp, which had to be struck” (Diodorus, 14.32.3). The snow and the confusion are contrasted with the supernatural radiance that guides Thrasybulus' democrats, who march away from the roads so as not to be discovered. “They were making their way on a moonless night in bad weather when a flame appeared before them and led them flawlessly to Mounychia, where it left them. In this place, the altar of the goddess Phosphoros still stands.” From this light bearer came salvation for the democrats and for Athens.

³⁷ Socrates and Alcibiades were together on the Potidaea campaign from summer/fall of 432 to May of 429, nearly three years. What started as an invading army (Thucydides, 1.57 and 1.61) became a besieging army (Thucydides, 2.70), then a defeated army (Thucydides, 2.79) before its return. Cf. Nails (2002, 311).

³⁸ Thucydides, 2.70.1. Cf. Wolpert (2002, 216).

³⁹ Cf. *Charmides*, 153a1: “We got back the preceding evening from the camp at Potidaea [...]”

learn about the fighting which they have heard “was very heavy and many of our friends were killed” (153c1-2). Further, they want to know if Socrates took part in the battle (153c3). Socrates confirms that he did (153c3-4), but he is not willing to elaborate on details. Secondly, when the plague in Athens killed Pericles in 429, Cleon succeeded him as the leader of the people; both Thucydides⁴⁰ and Aristophanes⁴¹ portray Cleon as a warmonger and demagogue. In 428, he proposed a decree to execute all the men of Mytilene after the suppression of the city’s revolt against Athens. This proposal was accepted, but the next day, Diodotus set forth a protracted rebuttal arguing that the decree was “savage” (ὠμόν), hence it was rescinded. Nonetheless, approximately one thousand chief leaders and prominent men were executed.⁴² These examples show two instances where the warfare did go beyond the civilized boundaries regarding the rules of military engagement.⁴³ Thucydides judged parts of the campaign in Potidaea to be “savage” (ὠμόν) and the worst of pollution, and the Athenians themselves judged the decree of Cleon to be “savage” (ὠμόν). These two instances are examples of how the war transgressed and led the conflicting Greek parties into the realm of extreme violence. I take them to be a showing of how the Peloponnesian war caused violations of the demands set forth by the goddess, and as such, they may hint of an answer to why Socrates wanted to set up his prayers and, hence, try to mobilize Artemis.

Regarding borderlines and thresholds, there may be a third reason for Socrates’ prayers. We learn that it was Socrates and Glaucon who set out from Athens to Piraeus. In addition to marking the line between savage and civilized conduct in war,

⁴⁰ Thucydides was prosecuted for military incapacity and exiled by a decree proposed by Cleon. Of all the persons who appear in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Cleon is treated with the least impartiality, cf. Zagorin (2008, 80). Cf. also Thucydides, Book III. 36: “the most violent man at Athens;” Book IV.21: “a popular leader of the time and very powerful with the multitude;” Book V.16: “Cleon and Brasidas, who had been the two principal opponents of peace on either side—the latter from the success and honor which war gave him, the former because he thought that, if tranquility were restored, his crimes would be more open to detection and his slanders less credited.”

⁴¹ Cf. Aristophanes, chiefly *The Knights* (864-867): “You are like the fishers for eels; in still waters they catch nothing, but if they thoroughly stir up the slime, their fishing is good; in the same way it’s only in troublous times that you line your pockets;” and also *The Waps*, see especially 664-712.

⁴² It is irrelevant that many of the Mytilenians were speared in the end because the original decision was “savage” (ὠμόν) and eloquently defended, cf. Price (2007, 210n8).

⁴³ That the conventional laws of warfare broke down during the Peloponnesian War is confirmed by Lanni (2008), 486), and Ober (1994, 18).

Artemis was also the *Kourotrophos* (“child nurturer”) par excellence securing an upbringing on the threshold between the savage and the civilized life (cf. Vernant 1992, 198). Vernant argues that the goddess was “accompanying the young all along their route from embryo to maturity, in instituting the rites of passage that consecrate their leaving the margins and entering into civic space” (ibid, 200), and in her function as *Kourotrophos*, Artemis establishes “a definite line of demarcation between boys and girls, young and adults, beasts and men” (ibid). By establishing these borderlines, Artemis rules over the margins and thus “she takes charge of education of the young and assures their integration into civic community” (ibid, 201). By guiding the youths (both boys and girls) in their passing from the *other* to the *same* “she presides over this change of state, this leap, by which the young cease being young in order to become adults, but this time without entailing any confusion in status between young and adulthood or any effacement of the boundaries between them” (ibid, 202). If the goddess is taken as *Kourotrophos* Artemis, then Socrates’ prayers are an act hinting toward *paideia*, the upcoming conversations, and Socrates’ art of midwifery which also is related to Artemis. To summarize these suggestions, I propose that Socrates’ prayers can be interpreted as an act to awake the goddess and hence seek support from the saving *Soteira* and the guiding *Hegemone* in times of war, and from *Kourotrophos* regarding *paideia*. Next, we must observe what happened after Socrates finished his prayers after he had viewed the processions, and he and Glaucon started on their return to Athens.

1.3.3 Socrates and Glaucon decide to stay in Piraeus

Not long gone, Polemarchus’ slave got hold of them and asked them to stop. His master had ordered him to make them wait for him and his companions Adeimantus and Niceratus. When they catch up, Socrates and Glaucon are invited to stay. However, Socrates signals reluctance. As Polemarchus does not accept Socrates’ intention to return, the invitation turns out to be ambiguous. On the one hand, it could be read as a playful threat set forth by Polemarchus, “[...] do you see how many of us there are? [...] Well, then, either prove stronger than these men or stay here” (327c6-10). It is not obvious from Socrates’ response whether he appreciated this or not, “Isn’t there still one other possibility [...] our persuading (πείσωμεν) you that you must let us

go?” (327c11-12). It seems like Polemarchus has set his mind and will force Socrates to come along, “Could you really persuade if we don’t listen?” he asks. Glaucon now takes responsibility and proclaims that there is no way to persuade someone who is not attentive. This is an implicit advice addressed to Socrates: Do not start an argumentation now—it is doomed to fail. On the other hand, the invitation could be taken as a temptation set forth by Adeimantus, “Is it possible you don’t know that at sunset there will be a torch race on horseback for the goddess?” (328a1-2). Socrates suddenly seems to be impressed: “On horseback? [...] That is a novel. Will they hold torches and pass them to one another while racing the horses, or what do you mean?” (328a3-5). His awakening interest is noticed by Polemarchus, so he interrupts and follows up on Adeimantus’ temptation, “and, besides, they’ll put on an all-night festival that will be worth seeing” (328a6-7). After having set forth a promise (they will go and see it after dinner), and after yet another temptation (at his house they will be together and talk [διαλεξόμεθα, 328a9] with many of the young men), his final words are a demand, “So stay and do as I tell you” (328a9-b1).

This demand is powerful. It picks up on the initial playful threat, but now the threat has lost its playful value. At this point, Glaucon states, “It seems we must stay” (328b2). Socrates gives in and replies, “Well, if it is so resolved [...] that’s how we must act” (328b3). This phrase translates “ἀλλ’ εἰ δοκεῖ [...] οὕτω χρῆ ποιεῖν.” According to Bloom (1991b, 441n6), due to this phrase, the end of this section is “a dramatic prefiguration of the whole political problem, Socrates uses this word [i.e., δοκεῖ] as it was used in the political assembly to announce that the sovereign authority had passed a law or decree. It is the expression with which the laws begin, ‘It is resolved by [literally, ‘it seems to’] the Athenian people [...]’.”⁴⁴ If we now imagine the four men standing on a road somewhere in Piraeus discussing back and forth on the subject “what do we do now?” what is the impact of Socrates’ words? First, he indicates that he does not give in due to the threats and temptations, but due to Glaucon’s statement “it seems we must stay.” Isolated, Glaucon’s words seem like an imperative, that is, Glaucon signals that Polemarchus and Adeimantus have persuaded him. When he realized that there was no reason to argue anymore, he agreed to stay

⁴⁴ This point is also underlined by Howland (2004b, 36-7) and mentioned by Lampert (2010, 248).

and closed the subject. However, it is also possible to comprehend the statement as not being so conclusive. Toward Polemarchus and Adeimantus it can be taken as a confirmation that Glaucon—at least—wants to stay and has no urgency in returning to Athens. Toward Socrates, on the other hand, it can be taken as an invitation for Socrates to decide for himself. If the latter is the case, then Glaucon signals that, if it is to Socrates' liking, they will go to Polemarchus' house for food and talks and attend the spectacular torch show later that evening, but if Socrates wants an immediate return to the city—Glaucon will join him. In Socrates' response, nothing indicates that he has apprehended this two-fold suggestion. Instead, he alludes to the lawgivers as if Glaucon is the one forcing him to stay. By this defiance, Socrates signals that he concedes Glaucon to be the authority in this situation and thus, at this point, making Glaucon responsible for them staying at all. Second, if the impact of the formula is viewed in a broader perspective, Socrates' use of the phrase sets the tone for the upcoming events in the Prologue. From this viewpoint, Polemarchus, Adeimantus, and Glaucon are given specific roles and are to be perceived as the authorizing political assembly enacting laws. This entails that Socrates' role is to abide by the laws.

Now that I have argued that the *Republic* has no specific date and from that argument presented the men gathered as belonging to three distinct generations and evaluated the argument that made Socrates and Glaucon stay in Piraeus, I am prepared to start my reading of the Prologue. However, it is necessary first to present the grounding premise for how I understand this Prologue.

The phrase “if it is so resolved [...] that's how we must act” was uttered by Socrates at 328b3. However, when it occurs for the second time, its concluding form is transformed into a question. This happens when Socrates later asks Adeimantus: “Is it resolved that we must try to carry this out?” (369b2), and the situation is now altered. The question is posed after Socrates' conversation with Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus, and after Glaucon and Adeimantus have put forth their challenges and together with the whole gathering urge Socrates to answer as *they* see fit. At this point, all the men have situated themselves as a political assembly, and Adeimantus is appointed their leader. So, by posing the question and by once more alluding to the lawgivers and addressing Adeimantus directly, Socrates seeks verification from the

assembly to continue: Are you sure this is what you want? Socrates now sets Adeimantus as the authority and thus makes him responsible for the upcoming development. However, Socrates signals reluctance. It is almost as if he is afraid to open a sort of Pandora's box.

Because the first occurrence of the formula "it is so resolved" appears at 328b3 and the second at 369b2, it follows that this phrase bracketed sections 328c6-369b4; therefore, I have chosen to denote and read these sections as a Prologue. Subsequently, this bracketing has an imperative impact on how I understand the evolution of the dramatic development in the *Republic*, and it paves the way toward an alternative understanding of the upcoming sections. I have divided the substantial Prologue into three chapters, each of which reflects Socrates' encounter with representatives for each of the three distinct generations, respectively. I suggest that the proposed critique toward politics and *paideia* finds its grounding here.

Chapter 2: Prologue I: Father and son (328c6-336a10)

In this chapter, I aim to show mainly two things. First, I argue that through Socrates' encounter with the eldest generation we learn how the poetic topos is activated and how old Cephalus is using it. The impact is that Cephalus illustrates a character able to move only on a shallow surface and exemplify his lifelong experiences through poetic sayings and proverbs. Thus, he belongs to fading conventions. It is through Socrates' approach that an implicit critique of these conventions starts to surface.¹ This leads to my second aim. When Polemarchus interrupts and lends support to his father, Socrates immediately opens an explicit attack on the poetic topos and gradually shows that the Athenian moral topos is embedded here. He demonstrates that the moral topos is a poetic construct; hence, it represents false authority which Socrates, through his demiurgic art, helps Polemarchus to leave behind and makes him turn toward philosophy. Socrates does not expose his own topos; nevertheless, the readers recognize it through Socrates' practice. To reach my two-fold aim, I will first perform a slow reading of the Cephalus section (328c6-331d3)² and then of the Polemarchus section (331e1-336a10).

2.1 Cephalus and Socrates (328c6-331d3)

When Socrates and Glaucon arrived at Polemarchus' house, they met his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus in company with Thrasymachus, Clitophon, Niceratus, Charmantides, and Cephalus. Socrates had not seen old Cephalus for a long time and thought that he had aged. The narrator reports that the old man sat on a cushioned chair. He had a garland on his head for he had been sacrificing. In the courtyard, the chairs were arranged in a circle, and the guests sat down beside Cephalus. When seated, the stage is set.

¹ The core themes of the *Republic* are launched in the Cephalus section: themes such as justice, Eros, fear of death, wealth versus poverty, which Socrates approaches later, although through new perspectives. Thus, this section can somehow be read as a table of contents. Also, Blondell (2002, 203) notices that the themes discussed in Book I become subjects discussed later.

² For a survey of how Cephalus, the character, is apprehended in the scholarly tradition, see Beversluis (2000, 189-90).

From the sympathetic picture the narrator draws of old Cephalus, we—the universal audience—are led to apprehend Cephalus as a character whom Socrates appreciates, respects, and has met on previous occasions. When welcoming Socrates with hospitality and joy, Cephalus seems to confirm that these are shared sentiments; he even indicates that Socrates has been missed, “Socrates, you don’t come down (καταβαίνων) to us in the Piraeus very often, yet you ought to” (328c7). Cephalus’ first greeting is a paraphrase of the narrator’s opening lines (cf. 327a1-4), but, when uttered by Cephalus, these words give quite different allusions. Cephalus confirms that Socrates has arrived *down*; Socrates *is* down. Also, Cephalus’ confirmative greeting alludes to the prisoner of the cave who, when freed, is not “willing to go down” (καταβαίνειν, 519d5-6). However, because the philosopher is “better and more perfect educated and more able to participate in both lives,” he is obligated to go down (καταβατέον, 520c2). This implies that Socrates—as an educated philosopher—at this point was forced to go “into the common dwelling of the others and get habituated with them to seeing the dark things” (520b7-c4). Hence, this allusion also awakens a restoration theme related to war (cf. 521a), and simultaneously it foreshadows the cave allegory and the discussions that follow from there.

From the outset, there is one thing Cephalus would like Socrates to *know* (ἴσθι): “As the other pleasures, those connected to the body (τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναί) wither away in me, my yearning for conversation (τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι) and the pleasure (ἡδοναί) given by it increases (αὐξοῦνται)” (328c7-d1). Socrates responds neither to Cephalus’ testimonial on the loss of mobility nor his firm underlining of how the bodily desires have faded away proportionally with a growing desire for the pleasures given by conversations.³ Instead, he replies, “For my part, I am really delighted to discuss with men of age” (328d8-e1) because the men of high age have “traveled the road first” (328e2). Hence, Socrates is eager to *learn* (πυνθάνεσθαι, 328e2) from the old man “what sort of road it is, whether it is rough and hard or easy and smooth” (328e2-4). This word exchange could be taken just to be customary polite remarks, but I think

³ Socrates’ silence (or lack of response) is an established pattern of significance throughout the *Republic*. The silence is a pointing forward. It entails that when he does not respond, the theme will be picked up later and discussed with one of the other interlocutors and thus from a different perspective in a slightly altered context.

there is more to it. There is something hidden behind these courtesies which can be viewed as markers for upcoming conversations.

First, we notice that what Cephalus wants Socrates to *know*, is not the same as what Socrates wants to *learn*. Moreover, while Cephalus accentuates that he appreciates *conversations* (τοὺς λόγους), Socrates emphasizes that his interest is *discussions* (διαλεγόμενος). This difference will turn out to be significant, and further, even if Socrates addresses Cephalus directly, we bear in mind that the whole gathering is sitting in a circle, listening. Therefore, Socrates' reply also functions as an aide-mémoire to them because the difference between conversation and discussion, as indicated here, points toward the upcoming word exchange between Polemarchus and Socrates and, the opening section of Socrates' discussion with Thrasymachus, where this difference will be more deeply reflected.

Secondly, through Cephalus' statements, we get in touch with the vanishing conventions. That is the old or the traditional way of speaking and reflecting. Even if Socrates is the first to awake the poets (328e7), we shall see that Cephalus picks most of his arguments from a collection of anecdotes, proverbs, and poetry, or—more precisely—sentences created within a long-lasting poetic tradition. In other words, he warrants his opinions in a huge poetic sample-body that I already have named the poetic topos. By this warranting, Cephalus enables himself to generate distance toward his own words and deeds. Peter J. Euben (1990, 241) has demonstrated that the impact of this maneuver is that Cephalus is displacing the responsibility for his words, and thus is bouncing off criticism for his deeds. This foreshadows Glaucon's remark to Socrates when he points out that during his conversation with Thrasymachus a discrepancy between Socrates' deeds and words (cf. 357a5-b4) was detectable.⁴

⁴ I return to this in chapter 4: *Prologue III: The tide is turning for Thrasymachus*, p. 135. Regarding how *logos* (words, speech, thought) and *ergon* (fact, reality) were understood in fifth-century terms—as a disruption or irregularity between them, contrary to the standard *logos-ergon* opposition—I have adopted the views of Price (2007, 45-50). The standard categories of *logos/ergon* “were routinely paired in either a complementary or an antithetical relationship; context determined the author's intention. As complements, the two elements represented differing but positive constituents of human experience: word is joined to deed. [...] One example: Thucydides says of Phrynichus: ‘As he advised, so he acted’ (8.27.5). [...] When *logos* and *ergon* are antithetical, *logos* represents either misconception or deliberate falsehood, while *ergon* represents reality: language and belief are inexact, slippery and deceptive, reality is firm and knowable. ‘My parents loved me only in word, not in deed’, laments Admetus in Euripides’ *Alcestis* (399). [...] As antithesis, the

At the outset, Socrates signals friendliness toward Cephalus when he proclaims, “For my part, I am really delighted to discuss with men of age.” But how are we to understand the phrase “delight (χαίρω) in discussing (διαλεγόμενος)?” The meaning of the word χαίρω expands between two opposites where we, at one pole, find the meaning “to rejoice, be glad, be delighted,” and at the other the meaning “to dismiss from one’s mind, put away from one, renounce.”⁵ The term διαλεγόμενος belongs to the Socratic vocabulary and is usually understood as “practice of dialectics” or “to elicit conclusions by discussions.”⁶ Hence, the phrase “delight in discussion” stands forth as being notoriously ambiguous. Let us start with the term διαλεγόμενος. Regarding the meaning “practice of dialectic,” we know of Socrates’ ways from the dialogues, and we know that he employs his practices especially when encountering young men. For instance, in the *Protagoras* (432), we are told by the narrator that young Hippocrates and Socrates were engaged in a “dialectical conversation” (λόγου διελεγόμεθα, 314c4). The narrator there neither implied the content of this conversation nor what it was all about or what they discussed, but we are led to believe that it must have been something of great importance because they did not enter the house of Callias until they finished this dialogical conversation.⁷ In the Socrates-Cephalus context, we must look closer into the meaning “to elicit conclusions by discussions,” and I suggest that it is possible to isolate the feature I have already marked as Socrates’ concealed topos, but this is not to say that Socrates employs his secret art of midwifery. Cephalus is too old. Nevertheless, Socrates is given an excellent opportunity to reveal—for both the universal and the particular audience—the ethical values Cephalus’ conventions hold, conventions pointing toward the Greek

opposition is often found in political contexts. [...] These standard categories of the *logos/ergon* opposition collapse [...]” and one example is shown through the utterance of “Creon’s son in the *Antigone*, ‘Learning from others who speak well is an honorable thing.’ This is not empty moralizing but an expression of what was considered normal political process. Yet in parodic contrast, Thucydides writes that, during *stasis*, fair proposals are answered with ‘protective measures,’ i.e., an unreasonable and unfitting response, and an indication of the depth to which violence penetrates people’s thoughts and instinctive reactions during *stasis*. This strikingly unconventional relationship between *logos* and *ergon* is not a standard complementary or antithetical relationship but a *disjunction* between the two, illustrating how political procedures become dysfunctional in *stasis*.”

⁵ Cf. Liddell and Scott.

⁶ Cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 328d.

⁷ Cf. *Protagoras*, 314c3-8. See also chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.1.1: The turning toward and into *philosophy*, pp. 283-84.

moral topos (do good to your friends and harm your enemies) which we will learn is embedded in the poetic topos. How?

For example, when Socrates toward the end of this conversation deduces a concept of justice from Cephalus' statements, he infers that justice is "to say the truth and pay back to others what is due." It is not Cephalus who outlines this, but it will become known (through Socrates' conversation with Polemarchus) that this concept of justice relates to the moral topos. Thus, Socrates' implicit agenda in this context is to lift forth the moral topos and, further, show how it is passed down from one generation to another and given authority.⁸ If we now pick up the word *χαίρω* once again, I assume that Socrates is activating the whole register of its meanings. Then Socrates' "delight in discussing" can be taken to mean that he finds delight in eliciting conclusions by discussion and, when elicited, he aims to dismiss the wrong ones from the interlocutor's mind.⁹ In continuation of this, what about the relationship between Socrates words and deeds? At this point, the words-deeds opposition is antithetical¹⁰ because his words are ambiguous and therefore represent misconception or are obfuscating, his deed—to be engaged in a conversation—is, for now, firm.

Thirdly, Socrates wants to *learn* (*πυνθάνεσθαι*) from Cephalus about the road he has traveled, and as an old man he has almost traveled it to the end. By this request, Socrates implicitly refers to what I have called the Socratic topos (I want to learn because I do not know anything). The life-traveling theme is now awakened, and it will run throughout the whole *Republic* and culminate in the myth of Er. When Adeimantus later challenges Socrates, he states, regarding justice and injustice, that Socrates has spent his whole life considering nothing but this (367d8-e1). Thus, he urges Socrates to exhibit parts of his own life travel. In due course, Socrates grounds

⁸ According to Nagy (1990, 67-8), this tradition can be traced back to Solon. Nagy argues: "Assuming the stance of a lawgiver, Solon says in his poetry that he "wrote down" his *thesmoi* 'laws' after having adjusted "a *dikē* that is straight" for the noble and the base alike (F 36.18-20 W). However, besides this written law code, we must also keep in mind the poetic traditions attributed to Solon, and in these traditions the figure of Solon functions not only as lawgiver [...] but also as a personal exponent of *dikē* by virtue of his life as dramatized through his poetry. In one poem, for example, Solon prays to the Muses that they will give him wealth and fame (F 13.1-4 W), and that they should allow him to help his friends and hurt his enemies."

⁹ Cf. Introduction, section 3.1: The demiurge at work, pp. 20-23 above. Cf. also *Euthyphro* (11b1-e1).

¹⁰ Cf. p. 67n4 above.

this theme in a new *paideia*. So, to challenge the conventional *paideia*, Socrates needs to start by challenging the views held by Cephalus, and he needs to show how the traditional wisdom is warranted in the poetic topos. In this way the “old quarrel between poetry and philosophy” (607b5-6) is announced. The conversation between Cephalus and Socrates develops further through five subjects set forth by the latter: 1) The “threshold of old age.” 2) The opinion of the many. 3) Is the wealth inherited or earned? 4) What is the greatest good enjoyed from possessing great wealth? 5) What is justice? I will read these sections respectively.

2.1.1 The “threshold of old age” (328e4-329d6)

Socrates assumedly knows that to get Cephalus to display his views, the easiest way is to awake the poetic topos. Politely,¹¹ he establishes the tone and atmosphere when he wants to learn what Cephalus has “to report (ἐξαγγέλλεις)” about what “the poets call the ‘threshold of old age’” (ἐπι γήραος οὐδῶ, 328e6-7). Socrates’ specific request at this point has given way for several interpretations, and some of these are worth a closer look. First, this is usually taken to be a reference to Homer who later will be called “the most poetic and first of the tragic poets” (607a3) and to Hesiod who supposedly has “told the biggest lie about the biggest things” (377e7-8). Secondly, the scholarly tradition mainly holds that Socrates points to the last threshold of a human’s life, that is, the threshold of life and death.¹² Thirdly, however, Thomas M. Falkner (1995, 27) claims that “[f]ew formulas from the Homeric epics are as well-known and yet as unclear as those that describe ‘the threshold of old age.’” After presenting a limited survey of some of the occurrences of the phrase,¹³ Falkner concludes that “the

¹¹ I disagree with Zuckert (2009, 144), when she claims that Socrates in his initial responses to Cephalus behaves “rather rudely.” If any rudeness is detectable toward Cephalus, I think it may be in last section of the conversation when Socrates turns it into a discussion.

¹² Among Platonic commentators, it is—to my knowledge—precedence that the relevant issue here is the threshold between life and death.

¹³ Falkner (1995, 27-8) argues: “In the *Iliad* XXII, Priam pleads with Hector from the walls of Troy, describing the destruction Zeus will visit on him “on the threshold of old age” ([...] 60). In Book XXIV, he uses the same formula [...] when he begs Achilles to be mindful of his father who is old like him (487). In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus uses the formula when he asks Eumaeus about Laertes, whom he left behind twenty years ago “on the threshold of old age” (15.348). Penelope uses a similar phrase ([...] 23.212) in telling Odysseus how the gods begrudged them of the opportunity to enjoy their youth and arrive at old age together.” Adam, note on *Rep.* 328e, argues that the phrase ἐπι γήραος οὐδῶ occurs first in the *Iliad* XXII: 60 and XXIV: 487 where it denotes the natural limit of the life of man. The same meaning suits also *Odyssey* XV: 348 and XXIII: 212 and Hesiod, *Work and Days*, 331. Old

range of formulas used and the various contexts in which they appear suggest that they, and the metaphor they employ, were not original to Homer but were a ready resource in the formulary repertoire of heroic poetry,” and further, that any “precise meaning of the formulas is less certain” (ibid, 28). He suggests that Socrates’ use of the formula implies that he conceives Cephalus as having reached advanced old age; hence, it admits me to interpret the phrase in question as old age itself. Further, viewed in this context, I suggest that this Socratic reference points toward the threshold between prime- and old life. I also suggest that this is what Cephalus apprehends and intends to talk about. Let me elaborate on this.

Socrates wants to learn what Cephalus “has to report (ἐξαγγέλλεις)” about this threshold. The word ἐξαγγέλλεις (meaning: “tell out,” “proclaim,” “make known”) refers to ἐξάγγελος which denotes a messenger who brings out news from within, an informer, or one who betrays a secret. On stage, in tragedy, the term denoted a messenger who told what was going on in the house, or behind the scenes, as opposed to the ἄγγελος who told news from a distance.¹⁴ By using the word ἐξαγγέλλεις, Socrates first alludes to tragedy and Sophocles and hence anticipates Cephalus who will pick up on Sophocles a little bit later. Secondly, he alludes to Cephalus himself. Cephalus is encouraged by Socrates to be the bearer of news (ἐξάγγελος) from within, or what is hidden behind the scenes for the younger generations. That is to say, the concept of “old age” frames the period in life from the time a person steps down from the scenes of active everyday life until death. The person of old age can report only on what is happening on the outside of the active everyday life. Cephalus cannot report on what is behind the scenes regarding the threshold between life and death, for this specific report we must await the myth of Er. Compared to the young and the adult (middle aged) generations present in the gathering, the old ones (Cephalus and Charmantides) have taken a step back and are now living their lives *behind* the scenes. They can only observe how the men in their prime and the younger generations unfold

age is itself the threshold by which we leave the House of Life. We enter, as it were, by one door and pass out by another.

¹⁴ Cf. Adam’s note on *Rep.* 328e and, Liddle and Scott. It is also noteworthy that in the *Laws* (964e) it is the “young among the guardians” who serve as the ἐξάγγελος and “report everything in the city to the elders; the old men.”

on stage. I think this is what Socrates calls for. Related to thresholds, the “prime-old” threshold is somehow the “youth-adult” threshold in reverse. According to Falkner, it is permissible to view old age as a threshold because it “is in keeping with the significance of thresholds cross-culturally and their prominence in Greek culture” (ibid, 28).

Regarding news concerning the prime-old threshold, Socrates further wonders if this is “a hard time of life” (328e8). Even if Cephalus does not respond directly to Socrates’ question, he relates to the prime-old threshold when he tells what old people *do*: “Some of us who are about the same age often meet together and keep up the old proverb ‘like to like’” (329a1).¹⁵ By this utterance, he signposts that old people are perceived or they perceive themselves as being one homogeneous group—the old ones. Cephalus opposes this sort of conformity. He disagrees with those who make high age the main cause of their sorrows, with those who complain about having lost the pleasures of youth and love, and those who whine over “the abuse that old age receives from relatives, and in this key, they sing a refrain about all the evils old age has caused them” (329b1-2). To underline his disagreement, he refers to Sophocles, who once was asked, “Sophocles, how are you in sex? Can you still have intercourse with a woman? ‘Silence, man,’ he said. ‘Most joyfully did I escape it, as though I had run away from a sort of frenzied and savage master’” (329c1-5). Sophocles’ words “comes to pass in every day,” and as time went by Cephalus himself experienced the truth in these words. The peace and freedom of old age are to have been “rid of very many mad masters” (329d1). Cephalus does not present the forces of Eros in a positive manner; on the contrary, and according to Stanley Rosen (2005, 25), this “is the first of a number of negative remarks in the dialogue about *eros*, which concludes as they begin, namely, by identifying *eros* as a tyrant.” The consequence here is that both peace and freedom in old age are defined negatively, as freedom from something—or put in Howland’s words, as the release “from bondage to corporeal *eros*” (2004b, 59). Further, by renouncing *eros* from tragedy’s point of view and by the authority of Sophocles, Euben (1990, 242-43) proposes that Cephalus himself indicates that “he is

¹⁵ The old proverb is given the meaning “like to like” by Bloom (1991b, 441n13). Jowett says “old men flock together as they are birds of a feather.”

philosophically impotent and that he lives an impoverished and one-sided life.” Maybe this is underlined when Cephalus conducts a short reflection and concludes that it is “men’s characters (ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, 329d3-4)” which is decisive, for he who is “moderate (κόσμιος) and easily satisfied (εὐκόλοιοι) will measure (μετρίως) high age moderately painful (ἐπίπονον), but to him who is not, both age and youth alike turn out to be hard” (329d3-6). It is interesting to observe that Cephalus does not argue that men’s character is crucial regarding the way they endure the burdens of life in general, it is crucial regarding how they measure the painfulness of either youth or high age—he does not consider the period in-between—that is, the prime period of life.

At this point, the narrator intervenes and evaluates the conversation so far, “I was full of wonder at what he had said” (329d8), he says. By addressing his evaluation to the universal audience, a two-fold outcome is effectuated. Its impact is, on the one hand, an appeal for us to decide whether we agree with the narrator’s evaluation and, on the other, we also have to consider whether we believe that the narrator—indeed—was “full of wonder.” The following indicates the opposite because the narrator continues by stating that Socrates wanted Cephalus to “say still more,” so he “stirred him up” (329d8). The phrase “stirred him up” translates ἐκίνησεν, which is an expression belonging to the Socratic vocabulary: a technical term denoting “the stimulation of the intellect by interrogation.”¹⁶ This is a rare moment because the narrator now reveals Socrates’ strategy and, this creates anticipation in the reader. What will happen when Cephalus is stirred up? This point is noteworthy for yet another reason: It explicitly shows that Socrates uses different techniques when encountering different interlocutors. In this case, Socrates’ questions at first aim toward stimulating the old man’s intellect and, when stimulated, he gradually turns the conversation into a discussion. So, at this moment Socrates’ hidden agenda is partly revealed, and we understand that he has higher aims than a simple word exchange with an old man.

¹⁶ Cf. Adam’s note on *Rep.* 329d.

2.1.2 The opinion of the many (329d7-330a6)

Socrates now tells Cephalus that he suspects that “the many”¹⁷ are not convinced because they “believe rather that it is not due to character (τρόπον) that you bear old age so easily but due to possessing great substance; they say that for the rich there are many consolations” (329e2-4). By this entreaty, Socrates has introduced the opposition public (δημόσιος) versus private (ἴδιος), a theme that both Thrasymachus and Glaucon will bring forth and which will be discussed much later (cf. 505e ff.). Also, Socrates has touched upon the distinction “wealthy versus poor.” This theme turns out to be of importance when Adeimantus and Socrates later discuss corruption of men and claim that it is wealth or poverty that make men bad (cf. 421d). When Cephalus now agrees that “the many” will not be convinced by his arguments, and when he acknowledges that there are some truths in their opinion—though not “quite as much as they think” (329e6), this could be taken as criticism of “the many” from a wealthy *metic*’s point of view. However, this potential criticism turns out to be just an intermezzo, for Cephalus continues with a new reference. This time he brings forth Themistocles whose reputation Cephalus must have known very well. He thinks Themistocles was right in his answer to a Seriphian¹⁸ who was abusing him, “saying that he was illustrious not thanks to himself but thanks to the city; he answered him that if he himself had been a Seriphian he would not have made a name, nor would that man have made one had he been an Athenian” (330a2-5). Without elaborating, Cephalus argues that this argument still holds; he even thinks that the same answer could be given to poor individuals who are burdened by high age: “The decent man would not bear old age with poverty very easily, nor would the one who is not a decent sort ever be content with himself even if he were wealthy” (330a4-6). Compared with his earlier statements about the burdens

¹⁷ “the many” translate τοὺς πολλοὺς, and Bloom (1991b, 442n16), emphasizes: “Politically the expression is used in contrast to the one and the few. Ultimately, it reflects the theoretical problem of ‘the one and the many’. Every time it is used, it is meant to call up a cluster of meanings. [...] Here the temptation to translate it by ‘most people’ must be resisted, for such a translation would obscure the fact that Socrates is referring to a class of men, a politically relevant class. This passage presents one element in the definition of that class which is so important for political life. It is dominated by opinions which give too much weight to money. ‘The many’ have a distorted sense of the importance of the equipment necessary for a good life; they identify the condition of happiness with happiness itself.”

¹⁸ Serphios is a small island where the inhabitants were widely mocked because of their political insignificance.

of high age, we notice a clarification: earlier the key to carrying the burden of life in both youth and high age was the “character of men,” now the key is “the decent man (ἐπιεικής).” According to what Cephalus is stating now, it is hard for a morally reasonable old man to bear poverty and, the consolation for him is that the wealthy and morally unreasonable man will never be content with himself. From here on, this theme is a point of new returns.

2.1.3 Is Cephalus’ wealth inherited or earned? (330a7-330c9)

When Socrates poses his next question and asks whether Cephalus’ wealth, for the most part, is inherited or earned by him, he alters the wealth subject by turning it from being a consideration of wealth in general to a particular wealth. “What do you mean, earned, Socrates?” (330b1), Cephalus wonders. By this reply, a slightly irritated tone is detected, and this shows that Cephalus is not comfortable when he is the subject of discussion. Yet, he explains that as a money-maker he has not done as well as his grandfather but better than his father. Therefore, he is satisfied by leaving his sons a little more than he received (cf. 330b1-8). Maybe Socrates sensed this irritation because he continues by justifying why he asked that very question. It was because Cephalus did not seem overly fond of money, contrary to those who make money themselves:

Those who do make it are twice as attached to it as the others. For just as poets are fond of their poems and fathers of their children, so moneymakers too are serious about money as their own products; and they also are serious about it for the same reason other men are for its use. They are; therefore, hard even to be with because they are willing to praise nothing but wealth (330c2-8).

Socrates’ justification is interesting because of the analogy made between the poets and the moneymakers. The poets are attached to their products like fathers are to their children,¹⁹ and the moneymakers are attached to money the same way, and both are

¹⁹ According to Adam, note on *Rep.* 330c, the “present passage is through Aristotle (Et. Nic. IV: 2.1120b14, cf. ib. IX: 7. 1168a1-3) the source of the proverb about ‘parents and poets.’” In this I disagree; Sappho wrote about her “immortal daughters” more than a century earlier, thus the *Republic* cannot be the source of the proverb about “parents and poets.” Within the corpus, this theme also is touched upon in the *Phaedrus* where it is said: “[...] once been written down, every discourse roams about everywhere, reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those to who have no business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it always needs its father’s support; alone, it

twice as attached to their product as others. We will learn later that the poets and the moneymakers are defined as the two “classes” most dangerous. So, in his justification, Socrates, apparently quite accidentally, introduced another major upcoming topic. Before moving on, I must mention that Cephalus did agree with Socrates.

2.1.4 What is the greatest good of possessing wealth? (330d1-331b8)

Socrates now wants to know what Cephalus considers to be the greatest good he enjoys from his great wealth (330d1-3). At this point, it is Cephalus who emphasizes that he is not in agreement with “the many,” and further, he stresses that what he is about to say will not persuade them (330d4-5). He elaborates, “When a man comes near to the realization that he will be making an end, fear and care enter him for things which he gave no thought before” (330d5-7). It is the tales (μῦθοι) told about Hades that troubles him the most, especially the ones saying “that the one who has done unjust deeds (ἀδικήσαντα) here must pay the penalty there” (330d8-9). When younger, he did not bother to pay the stories any attention and jeered at them (καταγελῶμενοι), but now the same stories “make his soul twist and turn because he fears they might true” (330e1). Cephalus contemplates the causes of his anxieties. Is it “due to the debility of old age,” or is it because he can distinguish what is going to happen in Hades because at this point in life he is nearer to the events? Either way, he is ...

... now full of suspicion and terror, and he reckons up his accounts and considers whether he has done anything unjust to anyone. Now, the man who finds many unjust deeds in his life often even wakes from his sleep in a fright, as children do, and lives in anticipation of evil; to the man who is conscious in himself of no unjust deed, sweet and good hope is ever beside him (330e3-7).

At this point, Cephalus stands as a confirmation on Adeimantus’ forthcoming concern about what the stories told of Hades do to the souls of the children listening to them (cf. 365a4-7). Also, Cephalus also anticipates Socrates’ statement that what is inculcated in a child’s soul will stay there throughout life. In the case of Cephalus, it has resulted in terror. The only comfort he finds is in the words of the great poet

can neither defend itself nor come to its own support” (375e1-6). In the *Parmenides*, we learn that Zeno experienced this. Someone published an unauthorized copy of his book, so Zeno now travels to defend his writings (cf. *Parm.* 128d6-e1).

Pindar, who endorses that good hope is “a nurse of his old age” (331a1-2) and that “whoever lives out a just and holy life sweet hope accompanies” (331a4). Through these quotes, Cephalus reaches his conclusion, but he underlines that this does not go for any man, only for “the decent” (ἐπιεικεῖ, 331b1). He states that possession of money contributes a great deal to: a) not cheating or lying to any man against one’s will; and b) not departing for Hades frightened because one owes some sacrifices to a god or money to a human being. There are also many other uses, Cephalus says, without elaborating further. His concluding remark is that “still, one thing reckoned against another, I wouldn’t count this as the least thing, Socrates, for which wealth is very useful to an intelligent man” (ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, 331b6-8).

During this elaboration, Cephalus paves the way for problems and questions belonging to the core of the *Republic*. First, his reflections on the difference between the wealthy and the poor related to high age turned out to be a question of whether one is “easily satisfied” or not. As such, it could be taken as an appeal from Cephalus to the poor. The poor man must be content and accept the destiny he is given. Once again, we get a foreshadowing of the myth of Er, and it will turn out that Cephalus was wrong about the given destiny. According to Er, each individual chooses destiny. Further, the pleasure of wealth goes only for the “decent” or the morally reasonable man. The intelligent, wealthy man is the only one able to take the necessary precautions to secure his afterlife. The inference from this is that for Cephalus the main thing is to have the books balanced before departing to Hades. This is a conviction that can be traced to the “beggar priests” and the “diviners” which Adeimantus discards later (cf. 364b6-c1). Secondly, Cephalus gives the first allusion to the main subject of the *Republic*: justice (δική) and injustice (ἀδικία). However, while he has developed his understanding of these concepts from the poets, his understanding seems a little odd. He who does not render justice in deeds must render justice in punishment, for the tales of justice must be made balanced.²⁰ If at this point, Cephalus is taken literally, then he again foreshadows the myth of Er, but at the same time, this inference opens up and draws the attention in two directions. It is possible that when it comes to the concept of justice, Cephalus does not—or cannot—

²⁰ Cf. Adam’s note on *Rep.* 330d.

distinguish between δίκαιος which is justice sanctioned by divine law, and ὄσιος which is justice sanctioned by human law.²¹ Even if they are not synonymous, they are close. This we witness when, in the *Protagoras* (331a-e) and the *Euthyphro* (11c-12c), Socrates explores the connection between the two concepts, and even if both investigations are inconclusive, it is, according to Price (2007, 109n47), “nonetheless clear that he [i.e., Socrates] assumed an intimate connection if not complete identity between them.”

When continuing the conversation, Socrates does not pay any attention to this potential mix-up. Another possibility concerning Cephalus’ view of justice can be due to the fact that different poets say different things about the same subjects, a theme which will be highlighted and discussed by Polemarchus and Socrates later. Because it is poetry that teaches and stands as the authority for traditional wisdom, Cephalus also gives relevance to the critique of poetry which Adeimantus and Socrates will set forth. Regarding the definitions we are going to encounter throughout the *Republic*, a definition of justice and injustice derived from preoccupation with money makes Cephalus a dangerous man who cares most for material things (cf. Euben 1990, 242).²²

2.1.5 What is justice? (331c1-d10)

So far, Socrates has patiently been stimulating the intellect (ἐκίνοῦν) of Cephalus, but now his patient mode disappears and the word exchange turns into a discussion (διαλεγόμενος; cf. 328d8). As we remember, Cephalus appreciated conversations while Socrates’ liking was discussions. “What you say is very fine (παγκάλως),” Socrates first states. At this point, Bloom (1991b, 442-43n19) is helpful and explains that the word παγκάλως is “a crucial and ambiguous term in moral thought altogether.” Bloom maintains that it first and foremost means “fair or beautiful and expresses

²¹ Cf. Liddell and Scott. Price (2007, 109), gives an interesting example: In Thucydides (5.104) the Melians view themselves as ὄσιοι πρὸς οὐ δίκαιους which modern translators have rendered by using the same word for each; “just men fighting against unjust” (Crawley), or “we are righteous and you against whom we contend are unrighteous” (Jowett). On this, Price concludes that “the words are not of course synonymous, but they were close enough in common Greek understanding and frequently combined in speech.”

²² Cf. Euben (ibid) also emphasizes that in “the *Republic* each definition of justice is the issue of a life, which they, in turn, justify. Each definition is also an implicit claim for the superiority of that life, proposing that the traits of character embodied in it should be the most admired and powerful. In this sense, every concept of justice is a claim to rule and power, and injustice is a claim to more power or respect than is warranted.”

nobility when qualifying speech or deed.” In this particular context, however, the word points to “a subtlety in Socrates’ style, a subtlety based on a forgotten moral viewpoint.” As Socrates now starts to challenge Cephalus’ statements, I take it that the latter (and Polemarchus) recognizes this. The start of Cephalus’ withdrawal is when Socrates continues: “[...] but as to this very thing, justice (δικαιοσύνην), shall we so simply assert that it is the truth and giving back what a man has taken from another, or is to do these things sometimes just and sometimes unjust” (331c1-3) ? This question is a result of Socrates’ deducing a definition from Cephalus’ earlier arguments, and maybe he intended Cephalus to recognize the deduction. However, Cephalus does not. So, Socrates now ponders whether it is possible to acknowledge these things as being just on some occasions and unjust on others. To deepen his point, he presents a case, which is meant to exemplify an exception to Cephalus’ norm: Imagine that a man borrows a weapon from a friend who at the time of the borrowing is of sound mind, but the friend goes mad and then demands the weapon back. Would it be just to give the weapon back to a man in such a state, or would it be just to tell him the truth? Cephalus agrees that it would not be just to give him the weapon back. Hence, Socrates promptly concludes that “this isn’t the definition of justice” (331d2). Now Polemarchus interrupts and lends support to his father.

The definition is most certainly right, Polemarchus declares, “at least if Simonides should be believed at all” (331d4-5). This intervention gives Cephalus an opportunity to depart without being exposed and insulted, “Well, then, I hand down the argument to you, for its already time for me to look after the sacrifices” (331d6-7), whereupon Polemarchus asks, “Am I not the heir of what belongs to you?” The narrator reports what happened: “Certainly, Cephalus said and laughed” (γελάσας, 331d10). It is telling that when Socrates poses his conclusion and states that this was not the right definition of justice, Cephalus hands the argument over to his son and leaves—laughing scornfully. Why the mocking laughs?²³ Is it because Socrates starts

²³ Singh (2004) shows that “of the 53 instances of *gelan* (to laugh) in Plato’s entire corpus, 7 are in the *Republic*. Of the 36 appearances of *gelôs* (laughter), 9 are in the *Republic*. 1 of Plato’s 4 uses of *epigelaô* (laugh approvingly) is in the *Republic*. For every 12 times Plato employed the verb *katagelaô* (laugh, jeer at, deride), 1 of them was in his *Republic*. This great political dialogue also contains the only instances of *ekgelan* (burst out laughing), *prosgelan* (smile upon), *philogelôs* (prone to laughter), and *anakankazein* (laugh out) in Plato’s writings. The *absurd* and *comic* also occur disproportionately

to confuse him or is it because he feels insulted? Does the laughter conceal a sort of bitterness in that he understands that his wisdom is irrelevant?²⁴ Is the correct deed of Cephalus to withdraw when the younger generation enters the stage? I think it is possible to say yes to all these questions, but in view of the *Republic* as a whole, there is more to it than this. We have witnessed, or Socrates has shown us, how Cephalus advocates traditional wisdom. By doing so, Cephalus was not able to give an account of “the road he has traveled,” which was Socrates’ initial interest—that is, due to his way (τρόπος), Cephalus was neither able to give an account of his life nor to discuss the content of his views. So, with him, the old generation leaves the stage. However, the old tradition does not vanish quite yet because Polemarchus is not only the heir of his father’s wealth, he is also the heir of the argument. Hence, he sets out with reference to the famous poet Simonides and, by doing so, he is also warranting his argument in the poetic topos. Also, as I claim the *Republic* to be a critique of this tradition, it is simultaneously the old conventions that frame the *Republic* and the upcoming events. Nonetheless, when the eldest generation now leaves, the next is put on stage, and the first explicit confrontation with the established conventions can begin.

2.2 Polemarchus and Socrates (331e1-336a10)

When Socrates encounters Polemarchus, his sympathetic and patient attitude is gone. The change of atmosphere is noticeable when he confronts Polemarchus and demands, “Tell me, you, the heir of the argument. [...] What was it Simonides said about justice that you assert he said correctly?” (331e1-3). Socrates’ almost unfriendly approach to

often in the *Republic*: 34 out of 132 appearances of *geloios* (laughable, absurd) can be found there; 1 of 2 uses of *pangeloios* (entirely laughable); 7 out of 47 uses of *katagelastos* (ridiculous); the only appearance of *gelôtopoios* (jester); 3 out of 4 uses of *gelôtopoiein* (buffoon); 1 of 5 uses of *skômma* (a jest, joke); 1 of 4 uses of *ereschêlein* (mock); 1 of 2 uses of *tôthazein* (jeer) —and of 18 instances of words built on the base *kômôd-* (e.g., *kômôdos*, a comic), 5 appear in the *Republic*.” She argues that “one of the main reasons that there is so much laughter in the *Republic* is because there is so much absurdity within the discussions there.” Contrary to Singh, I think the laughing—in all its various utterances—has a much more profound meaning and thus the instances of laughing are significant pointers toward the laugher’s state of mind.

²⁴ Euben (1990, 242), suggests that both Cephalus and his wisdom are irrelevant, a fact that “is suggested by the separation of generations. While the old man attends to the religion of heart and home, his son, Polemarchus, is down in the Piraeus watching a new, more spectacular religion imported from Thrace.”

Polemarchus has an identifiable direction. It is the reference to Simonides and the poetic topos Socrates now starts to confront with polemical bravura. However, there is also something else going on. As I mentioned above, we learned from the *Phaedrus* (418-16) that Polemarchus at some point turned toward philosophy (cf. 257b4-5), and I suggest that it is Polemarchus' turning we now are about to witness. If this assumption holds, it is not Socrates' aim at this point to belittle Polemarchus but to make him understand that the arguments he is defending belong to a false authority.²⁵ The poetic topos exemplified by Simonides is also under attack in the *Protagoras*, but in that context, Socrates' agenda was a different one. In the confrontation with Protagoras, Socrates tried to display what the sophist *is*; now he tries to display the source of Polemarchus' convictions. So, what did Simonides say? "That it is just to give to each other what is owed. [...] In saying this, he said a fine thing (καλῶς λέγει), at least in my opinion" (331e4-5), is Polemarchus' response. Socrates now starts to activate his demiurgic art.

2.2.1 What did Simonides mean? (331e6-332c4)

In a slightly ironical tone, Socrates states that "[...] it certainly isn't easy to disbelieve Simonides. [...] He is a wise (σοφὸς) and divine (θεῖος) man" (331e6-7). Still, Socrates is not quite sure that he understands what Simonides meant by these words, so maybe Polemarchus can enlighten him?²⁶ Socrates picks up the "weapon-mad-man" example that Cephalus agreed upon just before he left and uses this to challenge Polemarchus: "For plainly he [i.e., Simonides] doesn't mean what we were just saying—giving back to any man whatsoever something he has deposited when, of unsound mind, he demands it. And yet, what he deposited is surely owed to him, isn't it?" (331e8-332a2). Like his father, Polemarchus agrees. By activating the Socratic topos (I do not know anything), Socrates has now made the distinction sound-unsound mind regarding the justice of always giving back what you owe. Therefore, when Polemarchus agrees that this distinction is noteworthy and, that it should be taken into consideration, Socrates' next move is to show Polemarchus that this must be wrong.

²⁵ Cf. Frede (1992), see also Introduction, p. 19n39 above.

²⁶ The request to be enlightened by his interlocutors is a common Socratic approach, which I denote as activating the Socratic topos (I do not know anything). This will be of vital importance when Thrasymachus takes the floor.

He states that Simonides “means something different from this sort of thing when he says that it is just to give back what is owed” (332a7-8). Polemarchus swears and acknowledges that “of course it’s different, by Zeus, [...] for he supposes that friends owe it to friends to do some good and nothing bad” (332a9-10). They have so far implicitly established that behind Simonides’s “meaning” we find the moral topos (do good to your friends and harm your enemies), which, in turn, shows that the poetic topos concealed the moral topos. By choice of words (“he supposes”) Polemarchus slightly alters the situation; he turns the discussion from being an investigation of what Simonides *meant*, to what Simonides *assumed*. By this, he exhibits that the phrase “to give back what is owed” is a sub-division of the moral topos, and he is simultaneously grasping Simonides’ assumption: You owe it to friends to do good to them. Socrates does not explicitly give Polemarchus credit for this exposure, but maybe his utterance “I understand (μανθάνω, 332a11)” and the fact that he leaves the “weapon-mad-man” example, could be taken as an indirect appreciation. It is probably so because when Socrates now gives Polemarchus two new problems to consider, he makes a turn. This problem-solving culminates when Socrates concludes that “[...] it seems that Simonides made a riddle, after the fashion of poets, when he said what the just *is*. For it looks as if he thought that it is just to give everyone what is fitting, and to this, he gave the name what is owed” (332c1-3). In this conclusion, Socrates points out *why* and *how* Simonides’s definition of justice cannot be right. Why, because it stands forth like a poetic riddle. How, because it seems that “what is fitting” means the same thing as “what is owed.” Polemarchus’ response is to launch a rhetorical question.

2.2.2 First method: Imaginary interlocutors (332c5-334b8)

When replying through the rhetorical question: “What else do you think?” (332c4), Polemarchus gives Socrates the opportunity to continue as he sees fit. Socrates grasps this invitation, and his first words are, “In the name of Zeus” (332c5). Why the swearing? The impression is that he has discovered something new, which Polemarchus also can discover with some guidance. Hence, Socrates chooses to employ a well-known procedure: he creates “an imaginary interlocutor.”²⁷ This method is employed in various ways throughout the dialogues, and in the case of

²⁷ Cf. Introduction, section 3.1: The demiurge at work, pp. 20-3.

Polemarchus, Socrates chooses to challenge him by urging him to visualize a conversation between Simonides and “someone.” He says, “[...] if someone were to ask him, Simonides, the art called medicine (τέχνη ἰατρικὴ) gives what that is owed and fitting to which things? What do you suppose he would answer us?” (332c5-8). Polemarchus finds the task easy and answers, “drugs, foods, and drinks to bodies” (332c9-10). The next question concerns the art of cooking (τέχνη μαγειρικὴ) which Polemarchus also finds unproblematic to answer, “Seasonings to meats” (332d1). By these two analogies, Socrates has introduced the use of special *topoi* related to specific arts, and these *topoi* and arts seems to be well known to Polemarchus—but this is not necessarily the case regarding the third analogy proposed: “All right. Now then, the art that gives what to which things would be called justice? (τέχνη δικαιοσύνη, 332d2-3).” Polemarchus now signals reluctance because his first response is to present a reservation, “If the answer has to be consistent with what preceded [...]” (332d4-5). What does this reservation mean? On the one hand, it could be that by “consistent with what preceded” Polemarchus refers to the two former analogies and thus, the special *topoi* and the arts related to them. However, he does not find that the “art of justice” fits. On the other hand, he may just refer to the moral *topos* because he finds it equivalent to his apprehension of the concept of justice. If this is the case, then it must be plausible to infer that it is not common to speak about an “art of justice” as Socrates does here. Hence, this is the first explicit hint suggesting that Socrates warrants his arguments and questions in a concealed *topos*, unknown to the particular audience at this point; but Socrates will start to reveal it later.²⁸ For now, it turns out that Polemarchus *is* referring to the moral *topos* when he concludes, “[...] the one that gives benefits and harms to friends and enemies” (332d4-6). The method “imaginary interlocutors” did not turn out effective, thus Socrates leaves it and turns once more to the question “what did Simonides mean?” He asks, “Does he mean that justice is doing good to friends and harm to enemies?” (332d7-8). Polemarchus answers that in his opinion this is the case. Even if the method did not result in a positive outcome on behalf of Polemarchus, they have now worked out a new definition of justice ascribed to Simonides. This definition is identical to the moral *topos*. It is obvious that Socrates

²⁸ This starts with Glaucon’s interruption at 357b4.

is not satisfied, because now he starts to employ another well-known procedure—the elenchus. By this method, he refutes the soundness of the definition and, hence, the moral topos altogether.

2.2.3 Second method: Elenchus (332d10-333e2)

Socrates sets out with two new analogies relevant for the definition ascribed to Simonides. In relation to the doctor and pilot analogies, Polemarchus answers satisfactorily. The problems become visible when the just man is introduced, “What about the just man, in what action and with respect to what work is he most able to help friends and harm enemies?” (332e3-4). Polemarchus’ answer is somewhat surprising when he states that in his opinion “it is in making war (προσπολεμεῖν) and being an ally in battle” (ξυμμαχεῖν, 332e5). However, my surprise turns into a lesson learned because I ought to have observed that Polemarchus’ earlier answers all turned out to be an advantage for Socrates. Now, Socrates can put forth daunting implications of the analogies: For the healthy people a doctor is useless, and for the people not at sea a pilot is useless, then it must follow that in time of peace the just man is useless. Polemarchus finds the last inference problematic. Therefore, Socrates makes him stress that justice is useful in peacetime (333a1) before he continues by presenting new analogies “farming—acquisition” and “shoemaking—acquisition.” The problem arises once more when justice is introduced, “What about justice then? For the use or acquisition of what would you say it is useful in peacetime?” (333a11-12). Polemarchus’ solution is “contracts (ξυμβόλαια, 333a13)” and he is quick to specify that it has to do with partnerships. Through further analogies and questions, they end up with the inference that when money is useless, justice is useful (cf. 333c12-d1). Polemarchus is obviously not happy with this conclusion, “I’m afraid this is the case” (333d2). It gets worse as they work their way from particular cases to general, and Socrates finally asks, “And with respect to everything else as well, is justice useless in the use of each and useful in its uselessness?” (333d11-12). “I’m afraid so,” Polemarchus states, whereupon Socrates quickly concludes, “Then justice, my friend, wouldn’t be anything very serious, it is useful for useless things” (333e1-2). This cannot stand, so Socrates tries to look at the whole problem from a different point of view. “Let’s look at it this way” (333e3), he says, and presents a new set of analogies

where the just man in the last resort is displayed as a robber. Now, Polemarchus seems surprised, but he is forced to acknowledge the inference is due to what the argument was indicating. Socrates concludes,

I'm afraid you learned this from Homer. For he admires Autolycus, Odysseus' grandfather on his mother's side, and says he surpassed all men in stealing and in swearing oaths. Justice, then, seems according to you and Homer and Simonides, to be a certain art of stealing, for the benefit, to be sure, of friends and the harm of enemies. Isn't that what you meant? (334a10-b5).

By this inference, Socrates is on his way to refute the moral topos, and instantaneously make Polemarchus understand that this topos represents a false authority. That Polemarchus disagrees with the conclusion is apparent when he responds "No, by Zeus" (334b6). The claim that according to Homer and Simonides "justice is a certain art of stealing" is an interpretation made by Socrates, and as such, it is bound to have a provocative effect toward the particular audience, therefore, at this point, I think Socrates is apprehended as a pure provocative polemic.²⁹ Next, Polemarchus signals confusion when stating "But I no longer know what I did mean" (334b6). This confusion indicates that he now finds himself in an aporetic state;³⁰ hence, the elenchus has so far been efficient. Nevertheless, Polemarchus is still certain that his opinion on justice relates to the saying "helping friends and harming enemies" (334b7-8). Socrates senses that Polemarchus is uncomfortable and takes on a new turn by asking what Polemarchus understands by friends.

2.2.4 A new turn (334c1-334e7)

"Do you mean by friends those who seem to be good to an individual, or those who are, even if they don't seem to be, and similarly with enemies?" (334c1-3). This is a tricky question. Some seem to be good toward others, but are actually bad, while some seem to be bad toward others, but are actually good. How are we to decide on this? Polemarchus' suggestion is reasonable, because he places the responsibility for judgment with the observer: "The men one believes to be good one loves, while those

²⁹ As this *topos* was the guiding moral principle in the Greek culture, Socrates' refutation of it implicitly set forth a severe critique. This is, of course, noticed by Thrasymachus who is present; hence this is one hint toward his outburst later.

³⁰ To bring his interlocutors to an aporetic state of mind is a part of Socrates' proceedings. Cf. chapter 8: *Saving youths*.

he considers bad one hates” (334c4-5). As Socrates points out, there is then, of course, always a possibility that our judgment is wrong, and those we think are the good ones are in fact the enemies, and those we think are the bad ones are in fact friends (334c10). After this contribution, Socrates alters the perspective. Now the viewing is placed with the ones misjudged. He says: “But nevertheless it’s still just for them to help the bad and harm the good? [...] Yet the good are just and such as not to do injustice?” (334c12-d3). Polemarchus does not notice the change in perspective and agrees. This agreement gives Socrates the opportunity to conclude: “Then, according to your argument, it’s just to treat badly men who have done nothing unjust?” (334d5-6). “Not at all,” Polemarchus replies, “for the argument seems to be bad” (334d7-8). He does not give any reason why the argument is bad, but Socrates accepts Polemarchus’ objection: “Then, after all [...] it’s just to harm the unjust and help the just” (334d9-10). Polemarchus is more satisfied with this than what they said previously. However, it does not look like Socrates is willing to give in, for he continues on the same track and tries to conclude yet once more: “Then for many [...] all human beings who make mistakes it will turn out to be just to harm friends, for their friends are bad; and just to help enemies, for they are good. So, we shall say the very opposite of what we asserted Simonides means” (334d12-e4). Yes, they have reached the opposite of what they asserted Simonides meant. However, they did not get there due to sound argumentation, but rather, due to Socrates’ little twist in perspective, and Polemarchus is not satisfied with this development. “It does really turn out that way,” he says. Nonetheless, Polemarchus is now determined to go on, because he figures that something went wrong right from the start. He therefore suggests that they should change what they set down at the beginning for “I’m afraid we didn’t set down the definition of friend and enemy correctly” (334e5-6). Socrates does not reject this suggestion, on the contrary, he gives him the opportunity to set things right and asks, “How did we do that?” (334e7).

2.2.5 A new start (334e8-335d11)

Polemarchus explains that the initial premise was wrong because they “set down that the man who seems good is a friend” (334e8); that was not sufficient. He wants to change it to “the man who *seems* to be, and *is*, good, is a friend [...] while the man

who seems good and is not, seems to be but is not a friend. And we'll take the same position about the enemy" (334e10-335a2). It now looks like Polemarchus has grasped the nuances in perspective, and to secure his premise, he demands that they include both "who seems to be" and "who is." However, this stand involves a profound problem. I would have expected that Socrates somehow demanded Polemarchus to clarify this, but instead he chooses to turn the argumentation in a new direction: "Then the good man, as it seems, will by this argument be a friend, and the good-for-nothing man an enemy?" (335a3-4). When Polemarchus answers confirmatively, Socrates continues by placing justice into Polemarchus' equation: "You order us to add something to what we said at first about the just" (335a6-7). Did Polemarchus *order* this? Was not Polemarchus' suggestion all about the difference between "friend" and "enemy" and, thus, a suggestion to specify these concepts in order to reach a conclusion? Because Polemarchus does not object, Socrates is once again given the opportunity to continue as he sees fit. "Then we said that it is just to do good to the friend and bad to the enemy, while now we are to say in addition that it is just to do good to the friend, if he is good, and harm to the enemy, if he is bad" (335a6-10). Even if this summary does not quite capture what they said in the start, Polemarchus states that "said in that way it would be fine in my opinion" (335b1). Socrates' next step is puzzling: "Is it, then [...] the part of a just man to harm any human being whatsoever?" (335b2-3). By this question, has he not left the distinction "friend" and "enemy" altogether? They have not discussed the possibility of "harming any human being whatsoever," so if this is meant to be a test, Socrates has activated his art of midwifery, and Polemarchus stands the challenge because he upholds the distinction and answers: "Certainly [...] bad men and enemies ought to be harmed" (335b4).

Polemarchus' answer makes Socrates alter the premises of the conversation, once more. He now starts a new elenchus from the outset of the consequences of harming someone. Through new analogies, they agree that harming both dogs and horses makes them worse with respect to their virtue, respectively. From these analogies, Socrates concludes in agreement with Polemarchus that the same must be asserted of human beings, "when they are harmed, they become worse with respect to human virtue" (335c1-2). Earlier, Socrates urged Polemarchus to make an inference concerning the

“art of justice” (332d2-3), but in this new move, which is grounded in the analogy dogs-horses-human virtue, he introduces justice as a human virtue: “But isn’t justice human virtue?” (335c4). By this altering, Socrates has left “justice as an art” behind and introduced the relationship between justice and virtue which will later become one of the core themes in the *Republic*.

After having posed this question and, by having Polemarchus accept that justice is a human virtue, the rest of the conversation develops on Socrates’ terms alone. Also, the narrative tempo is rapidly increasing due to short questions and answers—a turn which indicates that Socrates, the questioner, knows exactly where he is going. He carries on by first concluding that “human beings who have been harmed necessarily become more unjust” (335c6-7). Then he introduces two new analogies based on similarities: musicians cannot make men unmusical by music (335c9-10) and, men skilled in horsemanship are not able to make men incompetent riders by horsemanship (335c12). On this ground, he makes Polemarchus accept that good men are not able to make other men bad by virtue (335c14-d1). His next step is to introduce three new analogies based on opposites: “I suppose that cooling is not the work of heat, but of its opposite” (335d3-4), “Nor wetting the work of dryness but of its opposite” (335d6), “Nor is harming, in fact, the work of the good but of its opposite” (335d8). Then he makes Polemarchus agree that it is the just man who is good (335d10). This last settlement makes Socrates conclude: “Then it is not the work of the just man to harm either a friend or anyone else, Polemarchus, but of his opposite, the unjust man” (335d12-13). Whether Polemarchus is impressed or not is not easy to determine, but his reply to this conclusion could indicate that he is. “In my opinion, Socrates [...] what you say is entirely true” (335e1). With that consent, the only remaining issue for Socrates is to make clear that they now have shown that the moral topos does not hold. Hence, he will reveal the origin of this topos for Polemarchus and make Polemarchus conduct the final refutation.

2.2.6 Polemarchus becomes an ally in battle (335d12-336a10)

Socrates starts by recapitulating, “If someone asserts that it’s just to give what is owed to each man—and if he understands by this that harm is owed to enemies by the just man and help to friends—the man who said this is not wise” (335e2-5). This

“someone” is Simonides, the poet Socrates at the outset ironically called “wise and divine.” Socrates now gives us the reason for his ironic outburst: Simonides “wasn’t telling the truth” (335e5-6). From this, it follows that the difference between Socrates and Simonides is that the former tells the truth while the latter does not.³¹ “For,” as Socrates infers, “it has become apparent to us that it is never just to harm anyone” (335e6-7). If we now consider the particular audience, is this apparent? On what ground should the particular audience accept that Socrates is telling the truth while the poets are telling lies? To grasp the truth that Socrates is proclaiming to speak, where are they to look? These questions will be highly relevant when Thrasymachus interrupts, and later, when Glaucon is intervening after Socrates has had his encounter with Thrasymachus. However, at this point, no questions are asked, and Polemarchus accepts Socrates’ conclusion. Socrates then invites him to become his partner in battle against the poets who assert similar assumptions, “We shall do battle (μαχούμεθα) then as partners (κοινῆ), you and I [...] if someone asserts that Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus or any other wise and blessed man said it” (335e9-11). Polemarchus is more than happy to take on the task: “I, for one [...] am ready to be your partner in the battle” (335e12). This moment is imperative and noteworthy because Polemarchus becomes an ally in battle due to Socrates’ invitation. When Glaucon later offers to be an ally, he is self-appointed, and Socrates declines Glaucon’s proposal (cf. 474a-b). This happening is the main argument for Polemarchus’ turning, and at the same time, it questions whether Glaucon ever made his turning. I will return to this.

After this momentum, Socrates is ready to exhibit where the moral topos has its origin, “I suppose it belongs to Periander,³² or Perdiccas,³³ or Xerxes,³⁴ or Ismenias the

³¹ I take this to be pointing forward to 496a-e where Socrates explains the philosophic disposition to Adeimantus.

³² The tyrant Periander ruled in Corinth. Under his ruling, Corinth was wealthy and prosperous. He is claimed to be one of the seven sages of Greece, but as Adam points out, it is noticeable that he does not appear in the list of the seven wise men displayed in *Protagoras*, 343a.

³³ Through Perdiccas, we find, according to Adam (note on *Rep.* 336a), the allusion is to Perdiccas II, father of Archelaus (cf. *Gorgias*, 471b) who died late in 414 or early in 413 after proving himself “a fickle friend and foe” of the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War.

³⁴ Xerxes, the Persian king, is famed due to the Persian invasion of Greece and for being defeated by the Greeks at Salamis (480). The expedition of Xerxes against Greece is cited by Callicles (*Gorgias*, 483d) in connection with the theory “might is right.” Cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 336a.

Theban,³⁵ or some other rich (πλουσίου) man who has a high opinion of what he can do” (336a5-7). While Periander, Xerxes, and Perdiccas are taken as types of tyrants, this naming points toward the evaluation of regimes in Book VIII, and further, in Book IX, where it is stated that “no tyrants are wise” (cf. 587d). There, Ismenias represents a rich man with “high opinion of what he can do,” but the power of the tyrants is fancied and, thus, not real. They cannot even do the thing they want, as we shall learn later—especially throughout Book IV. As Socrates now indicates that rich tyrants launched the moral topos as a kind of political propaganda, this section also anticipates Socrates’ presentation of “the noble lie” (cf. 414b).

As they have exposed the moral topos, refuted it, and Polemarchus acknowledges that he had trusted a false authority and from there developed false opinions, Socrates prepares to elaborate on this theme, “All right, [...] since it has become apparent that neither justice nor the just is this, what else would one say they are?” (336a9-10). At this point, one would have expected that the discussion was put to an end and that the methodological proceedings “imaginary interlocutor” and “elenchus” should culminate in a “dialectical conversation,” or at least that Socrates would have made a comment on this.³⁶ Sadly enough, however, we are not allowed to hear how this could have developed because now the narrator takes over and reports on Thrasymachus. He had wanted for some time to interrupt, but the others present had restrained him because they wanted to hear how the argument developed. When Socrates paused and signaled a new elaboration, Thrasymachus could no longer keep quiet. The narrator tells that he “hunched up like a wild beast, he flung himself at us as if to tear us to pieces” (336a5-6). Both Polemarchus and Socrates got all in a flutter from fright.

³⁵ The Theban politician Ismenias is acknowledged to have pursued an anti-Spartan policy and for having harbored exiles fleeing Athens during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. In *Meno* 90a, he is portrayed as man who made much money in a short period of time.

³⁶ This is similar to what happened in Socrates’ encounter with Hippocrates in the *Protagoras*; see chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.1: Hippocrates’ dream, p. 282 ff. In this context, Socrates and Hippocrates worked their way toward a “dialectical conversation” through the proceedings of “an imaginary interlocutor” and “elenchus.” Here, the narrator points out by that they did not enter the house of Calicles before the dialectical conversation had come to an end, but the narrator does not reveal the content of this conversation.

Chapter 3: Prologue II. The tide is turning for Socrates (336b1-354c5)

The practices Socrates employed during his encounters with Cephalus and Polemarchus are the main reason for Thrasymachus' outrageous outburst. Thrasymachus witnessed how Cephalus, in the conventional way, warranted his arguments in the poetic topos, which Socrates implicitly criticized. He also witnessed how Cephalus—stranded when Socrates started to problematize the concept of justice—left the stage and handed the argument over to his son. He also observed that Socrates' open attack on the poetic topos resulted in a refutation of the Athenian moral topos, and he heard that Polemarchus was invited to become an ally in battle. My argument in this chapter is that Thrasymachus did not understand the depth of what he was observing. His flare-up signals a blind spot or lack of knowledge regarding Socrates' words and deeds. Therefore, his outburst is a momentous happening that constitutes a subtext in the *Republic*. This subtext lives its own life until it surfaces at 498d1-4 when Socrates declares that he and Thrasymachus have become friends and underlines that they were not enemies in the first place.

Traditionally, scholars have read the Thrasymachus section as an exemplification on Socratic refutation. For example, Zuckert (2009, 343) argues that “Thrasymachus concedes Socrates's superior argumentative skill,” while Lampert (2010, 257) states that “Socrates' treatment of Thrasymachus resembles his treatment of Protagoras and that Socrates succeeds in a way that he failed with Protagoras.” Rosen (2005, 38) indicates that “it is at least an open question whether Socrates can persuade Thrasymachus;” nevertheless, “Socrates begins his refutation of Thrasymachus by accusing him of self-contradiction” (ibid, 93). Also, he argues that “Thrasymachus' surrender is more likely due to shame than to persuasion” (ibid, 38). Regarding Thrasymachus, the character, he is often referred to as unsympathetic.¹ In this chapter, I will try to view the encounter between Thrasymachus and Socrates from an alternative perspective. At the outset, my approach to Thrasymachus is in accordance with Lampert (2010, 257) who states that in the *Republic* he “is not a singularity; he's

¹ Beversluis (2000, 221), states that “Thrasymachus is one of the most unsympathetically interlocutors in the early dialogues.” For a survey on the reception of Thrasymachus, see (ibid, 222).

a representative of the sophistic enlightenment founded by Protagoras, a radical, outspoken representant.”² Then it follows that this is an encounter between the topos of sophistry, exemplified through Thrasymachus, and the topos of philosophy, exemplified by Socrates’ use of a concealed topos. The first and foremost aim is to show that—as evidenced by his observations so far—Thrasymachus is not able to grasp exactly what Socrates is doing. Consequently, he interprets Socrates as being possessed with nonsense. What we are about to witness is two men relating to two incompatible topoi; hence, they develop a violent discourse. Their verbal combat comes to an end when Thrasymachus gives in and Socrates, after he apparently has refuted Thrasymachus, admits that the whole conversation went wrong from the start. Overall, I relate this to the theme “defining philosophy.” As a new specialized discipline, philosophy first emerged as an artificial construct, and then it had to be legitimized as a new and unique cultural practice (cf. Nightingale 1995, 14).³ Related to my backdrop argument, I suggest that from here on Socrates takes on the task of legitimizing philosophy, and he does so by implicitly contrasting it with sophistry. This entails that he does not expose his new topos through these sections.

3.1 Displayed and concealed topoi (336b1-c2)

According to Leo Strauss (1964, 77), it is safe to assume that Thrasymachus and Socrates were acquainted before the gathering in Piraeus. This acquaintance can contribute to explaining the irritation brewing in Thrasymachus and the reason why he sprang into the midst of the group, addressed Socrates, and shouted, “What is this nonsense that has possessed you for so long (ὕμᾱς πάλαι φλοαρία), Socrates?” (336b8-c1). The word πάλαι denotes two aspects of past time: first, “a long time ago” as in time goes by and secondly, “not long ago, just now.”⁴ Hence, through the use of πάλαι, Thrasymachus confirms that he has observed a change: “Long ago” Socrates behaved

² Was Thrasymachus a sophist? Beversluis (2000, 222) discusses this question and points out that commentators pro refer to 337d6-7 where Thrasymachus refuses to debate with Socrates unless he pays a fee; for a survey, see Beversluis, 222n3. The ground for commentators contra is that “Plato usually goes out of his way to identify sophists and never numbers Thrasymachus among them.” For a survey, see Beversluis, 222n4.

³ Cf. Introduction, section 4.2: Philosophy defined, pp. 29-31. See especially Nightingale (1995), pp. 1-12 and chapter 1: “Plato, Isocrates, and the property of philosophy,” pp. 13-59.

⁴ Cf. Liddle and Scott.

differently than he did “just now.” Does this imply that long ago Socrates was apprehended as a sophist, and therefore, Thrasymachus expects him to act accordingly?⁵ The word φλυαρία translates “nonsense” and is related to both words and deeds.⁶ I assume that Thrasymachus was educated or trained in the art of sophistry, a particular science or art, which, in turn, implies a special topos. If he couples Socrates to this art, then Thrasymachus’ outburst is not of a rude, polemic nature, but rather a demand for an explanation or, in turn, an implicit quest for Socrates’ topos. During the upcoming confrontation, we will detect confusion, a profound attentiveness, and a deep interest in getting Socrates to elaborate. Nonetheless, Socrates ignores it all. This creates an unstable ground. On the one hand, the universal audience knows Socrates’ new topos; we call it philosophy, and we explain Socrates’ deeds and words accordingly. On the other hand, Thrasymachus and the rest of the particular audience do not know it; at this point, none of them can perceive what Socrates is doing.⁷

Next, Thrasymachus addresses Socrates and Polemarchus: “And why do you act like fools making way for one another?” (336c1-2). Throughout that encounter, this is what Thrasymachus witnessed. From his perspective, a subject displayed is a sort of combat or *agon* where the aim is to win the argument.⁸ However, the philosopher aimed to guide Polemarchus and make him turn. When Socrates activated his new arts (demiurge and midwifery) and, employed his procedures (“creating an imaginary interlocutor” and “the elenchus”), Thrasymachus perceived them as fools making “ways for one another.” Thus, I again claim that he did not quite understand what he was observing. When Socrates later summarizes, he indicates that they were talking

⁵ That Socrates was apprehended as a sophist by some is confirmed by Aeschines who more than fifty years after the execution of Socrates (346/5) asked in the court of law, “Did you put to death Socrates the sophist, fellow citizens, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Critias, one of the Thirty who put down the democracy?” (1. 173); cf. Wolpert (2002, 63). In the *Apology*, Socrates finds it necessary to distance himself, explicitly, from the sophists and their teachings. This could indicate that his practices also were apprehended as sophistry among people in general. I return to this in chapter 10: *The Apologies*.

⁶ Cf. Liddle and Scott.

⁷ The exceptions are Adeimantus and Glaucon. The first knows it, and the latter at least knows of it.

⁸ Cf. the two brothers we learn to know in *Euthydemus* (≥407), and arguments set forth by Protagoras. I briefly return to these encounters in chapter 9: *The Eleatic Stranger: A turning point*, section 9.1: The prologue, pp. 300-31.

past one another, but I will argue that the differences and discords go much deeper. When two parties talk from dissimilar and incompatible topoi, the conversation can turn out to be violent—and a violent discourse is what develops over the next passages.

3.1.1 A violent discourse (336c2-337d9)

The incompatibility between their advocated topoi starts to be traceable through Thrasymachus' next address to Socrates: "If you truly want to know what the just is, don't only ask and gratify your love of honor (φιλοτιμοῦ) by refuting whatever someone answers—you know that it is easier to ask than to answer" (336c2-5). Here two things are noteworthy. First, he takes for granted that Socrates knows the eristic practice wherein it is easier to ask than to answer; and through the term φιλοτιμοῦ, which among other things, dispels "being ambitious in a bad sense,"⁹ he implies that Socrates was showing off by taking the easy part when he conversed with Cephalus and Polemarchus. Viewed in this light, his statement is a sort of defense for them both, who from his point of view, have fallen for Socrates' trickeries. Secondly, he dismisses the Socratic topos; he does not believe that Socrates enters discussions due to his longing for learning (cf. toward Cephalus Socrates wanted to know four things; toward Polemarchus he wanted to be enlightened). Thus, at this point, he implies that there is a discrepancy between Socrates' words and deeds. This is a serious accusation¹⁰ and leads to a challenge: "[...] answer yourself and say what you assert the just to be [...] tell me clearly and precisely what you mean, for I won't accept it if you say such inanities" (336c5-d5). This challenge exposes that Thrasymachus directly demands Socrates to clarify his topos. He puts forth a reasonable demand. It is obvious that the narrator is not in agreement, because he now reports how Socrates responded to the accusations. He was astounded when he heard him, and, looking at him, he was frightened (336d6-7). The narrator tells that Socrates' first impression was that Thrasymachus acted like "a wild beast." Then he adds, "I think that if I had not seen

⁹ Cf. Liddle and Scott.

¹⁰ I will return to this in chapter 4: *Prologue III: The tide is turning for Thrasymachus*, p. 135, where Glaucon at 357b4 confronts Socrates with the same accusation.

him before he saw me, I would have been speechless” (336d7-8).¹¹ Fortunately, Socrates laid eyes on Thrasymachus first and thus was able to answer him “with just a trace of tremor” (336e3). So, what did he manage to say? Before he elaborates, he makes an appeal to Thrasymachus, by pleading with him not to be hard on Polemarchus and himself. Socrates’ elaborative arguments are as follows:

- (1) “If we are making any mistake in the consideration of the arguments [...] know well that we’re making an unwilling mistake” (336e4-5).
- (2) “If we were searching for gold, we would never willingly make way for one another in the search and ruin our chances of finding it” (336e5-8).

Instead of exposing his concealed topos, Socrates first (cf. 1) alludes to the Socratic topos, pleading that because he and Polemarchus are not wise, they may have made some unwilling mistakes. This is not a convincing argument, but due to Socrates’ art of midwifery and his inner guiding daimon, maybe in this situation, he is obligated not to tell.¹² Secondly, (cf. 2) he activated his concealed topos by a double allusion. First, he alludes to the turning of Polemarchus and, then, to his art of midwifery.

At this point, we can remind ourselves about the distinctions concerning conversations which were indicated first in the Prelude and then at the beginning of the conversation between Socrates and Cephalus. I said then that it could be an aide-mémoire for the particular audience if they paid attention: In the Prelude, Polemarchus tempted Socrates with the possibility of partaking in a “conversation” (διαλεγόμενος).” Then the distinction between “conversations” (τοὺς λόγους) and “stimulating the intellect” (ἐκίνοον) was put forth through Socrates’ encounter with Cephalus. Finally, there was the “conversation” (διαλεγόμενος) that Socrates and Polemarchus were engaged in, versus “discussion or verbal combat” which is what Thrasymachus heard and saw. So, are we to think that Thrasymachus has been inattentive and not grasped the distinctions? Alternatively, could it be that he did not understand the distinctions because it was something new that he had never heard of? If the latter is plausible,

¹¹ Here the narrator alludes to an old proverb saying that if a wolf laid eyes on a man before the man laid his eyes on the wolf, the man goes mute, cf. Platon, *Staten* (2001, 400n19), and Lampert (2010, 259).

¹² According to Socrates’ art of midwifery, he sometimes is prohibited from speaking, Cf. *Theaetetus* 149e6-7 and, Introduction, section 3.2: The midwife at work, pp. 20-3. I will return to this silence in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.2.1: Alcibiades encountering Socrates, p. 296-97.

then Thrasymachus' rage can be taken as confusion. For the readers, who are acquainted with Socrates' ways of speaking throughout the other dialogues and who know how the *Republic* develops, Thrasymachus' request makes sense. However, this is not the case for the characters *in the Republic*.

The narrator now says that Thrasymachus listened before he “burst out laughing very scornfully (μάλα σαρδάνιον)” (337a3). This laughter¹³ I take to be a sign of Thrasymachus' pain caused by a desire to understand; his laughter also signals that he is resigned, and this is indirectly confirmed in his next outburst, “Heracles! Here is that habitual irony (εἰρωνεία) of Socrates. I knew it, and I predicted to these fellows that you wouldn't be willing to answer, that you would be ironic (εἰρωνεύσοιο) and do anything rather than answer if someone asked you something” (337a4-8). By his reference to Socrates' “habitual εἰρωνεία,”¹⁴ Thrasymachus pictures Socrates as soap—that is, when someone asks he slips away and turns the discussion in unpredictable directions. The only thing predictable is that this will happen. That he has experienced this previously, he validates by predicting exactly this outcome. Maybe Socrates recognizes and admits that Thrasymachus has a point, but he does not explicitly acknowledge it. Instead, he gives an ambiguous reply: “That's because you are wise, Thrasymachus” (337a9). These words could be interpreted as an ironic outburst, as many commentators have done, but there is yet another possibility. Socrates could refer to “wise,” meaning a man who has procreated.¹⁵ This kind of wise man has produced textual offspring or scientific discoveries,¹⁶ a description that fits

¹³ The phrase μάλα σαρδάνιον is used in accordance with Homer's use of it: a sinister smile that bodes pain to others; the context is Odysseus among the suitors (*Od. XX*: 301. Simonides also uses the phrase (Frg. 202 A Bergk.). Later, the phrase mostly denotes the forced smile that disguises the sufferer's own pain. Cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 337a. See also Singh (2004), cf. p. 79n23 above.

¹⁴ On εἰρωνεία, see Lane (2006, 49-51). Lane argues that “*eirōneia* and its cognates should nowhere in Plato be translated as ‘irony’ (defining ‘irony’ as saying something with the intent that the message is understood as conveying the opposite or an otherwise different meaning). [...] The assumption that Plato's application of *eirōneia* to Socrates licenses or underwrites discussions of ‘Socratic irony’—an assumption made by most such discussion—is correspondingly unsound. [...] The concept of ‘Socratic irony’ has no basis in Plato's use of *eirōneia* with respect to Socrates. That the occurrence of *eirōneia* in Plato gives not support to the edifice of ‘Socratic irony’ is, in brief, because the (purported) purpose of someone called *eirōn* is to *conceal* what is not said; the (purported) purpose of someone called an ironist is to *convey* what is not said (to at least one person), though not necessarily the person who is addressed in ironic tones.”

¹⁵ Cf. *Theaetetus* 150b ff.

¹⁶ Cf. *Theaetetus* 150c8-d2.

Thrasymachus. If the latter is conceivable, then Socrates actually signals respect toward him. Nevertheless, he does not tell Thrasymachus what he wants to know. Hence, at this point, he mirrors Cephalus, who did not tell him what he wanted to learn but what he wanted Socrates to know.

Socrates next move is to present an example, which is yet an act of concealment. The form it is presented in resembles the method “imaginary interlocutor,” but the example used has nothing to do with the theme discussed so far. Also, Thrasymachus is challenged to talk with himself. As this is an unusual application of the method, I take it to be a patronizing act. It goes like this:

[...] you knew quite well that if you asked someone how much twelve is and in asking told him beforehand, ‘See to it you don’t tell me, you human being, that it is two times six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three; I won’t accept such nonsense from you’—it was plain to you, I suppose, that no one would answer a man who asks in this way. And if he asked, “Thrasymachus, what do you mean?” Shall I answer none of those you mentioned before? Even if it happens to be one of these, shall I say something other than the truth, you surprising man? Or what do you mean?”—what would you say to him in response? (337a9-c1)

Socrates has now created an impression. We are to believe that when Thrasymachus takes on the role as questioner, he sets out by presenting some assumptions and implicitly forbids the answering party to state his mind (see also 337e1-3). At this moment, it is almost as if the universal audience can hear Thrasymachus’ pain. We can almost hear his resigned exhaling, and we can almost see his articulate body language when he states that “as if this case were similar to the other” (337c2). Socrates continues along the same lines, and the two start to look like two athletes trying verbally to wear each other down before even entering the arena.¹⁷ However, after a short word exchange, Thrasymachus sets forth a proposal, “What if I could show you another answer about justice besides all these and better than they are?” (337d1-2). This is the first reference to the content of the Polemarchus conversation, and it is difficult to decide whether he is serious when he presents this offer—through an implicit imitation of the Socratic topos (offering to teach Socrates). Furthermore, by

¹⁷ Cf. the two brothers in *Euthydemus* (≥407). As said above, I return to them briefly in chapter 9: *The Eleatic Stranger: A turning point*, section 9.1: The prologue, pp. 330-31.

alluding to the Athenian court, he—at this point—resembles its leader¹⁸ who, after the accused is found guilty, addresses the same question to the guilty one as Thrasymachus now addresses Socrates, “What punishment do you think you would deserve to suffer?” (337d2-3). Through these allusions, the trial theme is launched. At the outset, Socrates chooses the path of irony when he states that, as a man “who does not know,” a fitting punishment for him will be “to learn (μαθεῖν) from the man who knows” (337d5).¹⁹ Thrasymachus compliments Socrates for this reply but adds that in addition to learning he must also pay a fine in money (337d7-8). I take this to be an example of Thrasymachus answering irony with irony.

3.2 First interlude: On payment (337d10-338c1)

When Glaucon interrupts at this point, he states that regarding money Thrasymachus should not worry, because “we shall all contribute for Socrates” (337d11).²⁰ Glaucon’s words signal that Thrasymachus now is on his own. It is him against the others. Thrasymachus stresses this when he replies that “I certainly believe it, so that Socrates can get away with his usual trick; he’ll not answer himself, and when someone else has answered he gets hold of the argument and refutes it” (337e1-3). Glaucon and Thrasymachus have now given Socrates the ammunition he needed, and confidently he again leans on the Socratic topos and states, “It’s more fitting for you to speak, for you are the one who says he knows and can tell” (337e7-338a1). He concludes by ordering Thrasymachus to do as he says and to “gratify me by answering and don’t begrudge your teaching to Glaucon here and the others” (338a3-4).

The narrator now addresses the universal audience and reports that Glaucon and the others begged Thrasymachus to follow up on Socrates’ demand (cf. 338a5-6). The narrator continues by trying to belittle Thrasymachus when asserting that he “evidently desired to speak so that he could win a good reputation since he believed he had a very fine answer” (338a6-8). Thrasymachus insists on taking the role as the questioner and

¹⁸ Cf. Bloom (1991b, 400n20), and Adam note on *Rep.* 337d. See also the *Apology* 36a-e.

¹⁹ This reply alludes to the *Apology* when Socrates—after having been found guilty and after Meletus asked for the penalty of death—proposed a counter assessment and found it suitable to be fed in the Prytaneum (cf. 36b-d).

²⁰ This also alludes to the *Apology* when Socrates argues that he is not able to pay the fee required. However, he has friends who will guarantee the payment. The friends named are Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus (cf. 38b).

demands that Socrates shall be the one answering. On the one hand, Thrasymachus' utterances indicate that he neither accepts the Socratic topos nor that Socrates is atopos. On the other hand, Socrates is not willing to reveal his concealed topos. Therefore, this moment marks a status quo, so to be able to continue, one of them must give in. The narrator says that, finally, it was Thrasymachus who conceded. His submissive utterance is addressed to the particular audience, "Here is the wisdom of Socrates (Σωκράτους σοφία, 338b1-2); unwilling himself to teach, he goes around learning from others and does not even give thanks to them" (338b1-3). In response to this, Socrates stresses that it is true that he learns from others, but it is a lie that he does not make full payment—his payment is to praise (ἐπαινεῖν, 338b6). Socrates then allegedly plays the ball into Thrasymachus' hands: "How eagerly I do so when I think someone speaks well, you will well know as soon as you have answered; for I suppose you will speak well" (338b7-c1).

This short section (338a6-c1) is a sort of interlude within the interlude, and noteworthy for more than one reason. First, if taken literally, it seems like Socrates' attitude toward Thrasymachus is about to change; it is Thrasymachus who introduces the "wisdom of Socrates," but he does not have it quite right. It is right that Socrates learns from others, but it is not right that he does not pay. Socrates' payment is ἐπαινεῖν, to praise in the sense to approve, applaud, or commend, but not always—just in the cases where he thinks someone has spoken well. This praise Thrasymachus will receive because, when understood literally, Socrates assumes that Thrasymachus will do so. Secondly, if Socrates' statement is to be taken ironically, then at this point he indicates that Thrasymachus will be an easy match—hence he signals a hubristic attitude, which according to tradition will bring him down. Thirdly, the particular audience—through Glaucon—signals strong support for Socrates. If the narrator reports correctly, they apprehend Thrasymachus, at this point, as a scoundrel whom they expect Socrates will manage to take down.

Over the next three sections, this intense discourse continues: Thrasymachus tries to pinpoint what Socrates is doing, and for this reason, he continues by setting forth three allegations: 1) Socrates does not play by the rules, 2) Socrates is a sycophant, 3) Socrates needs a wet nurse. Socrates presents counterreplies to each indictment, but he

continues to conceal his topos. It looks like he tries to refute the indictments, but when it comes to Socrates, not everything is what it seems to be.

3.3 First indictment: Socrates does not play by the rules (338c2-339b8)

The point of departure is Thrasymachus' opinion of "the just" which he states, "is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger" (338c2-4). "I don't yet understand," Socrates responds, and continues in a rather polemical manner:

You say the just is the advantage of the stronger. Whatever do you mean by that, Thrasymachus? You surely don't assert such a thing as this: if Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are and beef is advantageous for his body, then this food is also advantageous and just for us who are weaker than he is (338c5-d2).

Does this analogy seem relevant to the claim set forth by Thrasymachus? I do not think so. I am even inclined to agree with Thrasymachus' next outburst, "You are disgusting (βδελυρὸς), Socrates, you take hold of the argument in the way you can work it the most harm (κακουργήσεις μάλιστα)" (338d3-4). The word κακουργήσεις usually denotes "knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectical reasoning."²¹ Hence, Thrasymachus points out that Socrates is not playing by the rules. Assumedly, he refers to the methodical rules set down regarding what is expected of the questioner and the answering part respectively, and further, he assumes that these rules are well-known to Socrates. However, Socrates does not admit breaking any rules. He does not even comment on it, nor does he acknowledge that the analogy is outlandish. Instead, he continues by urging Thrasymachus to say more clearly what he means (cf. 338d5-6)—and it seems reasonable to ask why Socrates is doing this. If Socrates did this unintentionally, we are bound to assume that the Socratic topos holds. If Socrates did this intentionally, then it is either a kind of testing or an arrogant way of once again trying to belittle Thrasymachus. Alternatively, it could be taken as a last attempt to convince Thrasymachus that the Socratic topos holds and make him accept that Socrates' truthful intention is to learn from the best of men. At this point, I think all three alternatives are reasonable, but I am also motivated to view Socrates' irrelevant analogy as bait thrown to Thrasymachus. However,

²¹ Adam, note on *Rep.* 338d; and the *Gorgias* 483a.

Thrasymachus does not take it. Instead he asks, “Do you mean to say you don’t know that some cities are ruled tyrannically, some democratically, and some aristocratically? And in each city, isn’t the ruling group master (ἄρχον)?” (338d7-10).²² Of course, Socrates knows this—he even admits that he knows, so Thrasymachus elaborates,

Each ruling group sets down laws for its own advantage; a democracy sets down democratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannical laws; and the others do the same. And they declare that what they have set down—their own advantage—is just for the ruled, and the man who departs from it they punish as a breaker of the law and a doer of unjust deeds. This, best of men, is what I mean: In every city the same thing is just, the advantage of the established ruling body. It surely is master; so, the man who reasons rightly concludes that everywhere justice is the same thing, the advantage of the stronger (338e1-339a4).

By directly addressing the particular audience, Thrasymachus launches his view²³ which holds that both law (νόμος) and justice (δικαίον) are identified as being the advantage of the stronger—that is, advantageous for the ruling group. When it comes to law and justice, it does not matter whether the regime is a democracy or a tyranny. Socrates understands this, he even claims that Thrasymachus forbade him earlier to say the same thing—that the just is the advantageous—but he is quick to stress that Thrasymachus now added, “for the stronger” (339a5-b2). This utterance makes me wonder if Thrasymachus’ next reply—“A small addition, perhaps” (339b3)—is to be taken as yet another ironical comment. He knows that Socrates’ remark is not to the point, and he also knows that the reason why he and Socrates have different views on justice is not due to this “small addition.” However, Thrasymachus does not know that these differences are to be identified on a much deeper level, but Socrates knows as well as the readers.²⁴ Socrates confirms this when he comments on the “small addition.” “It isn’t plain yet whether it’s a big one” (339b4), he says—in accordance

²² This question anticipates the discussion coming up during Book VIII.

²³ This view is also discussed in the *Laws* where the Athenian elaborates, “Do you understand, now, that some assert there are as many forms of laws as there are regimes, and that the forms of regimes spoken of by the many are those we have just enumerated? And do not suppose that this present disagreement is about something paltry; it concerns something very great. For once again we are involved in the dispute over the aim of the just and the unjust. They are claiming that laws ought not to look to war or to virtue as a whole, but ought to look to what is in the interest of the regime, to whatever will allow that regime to rule forever and avoid dissolution. They claim that the finest way to formulate the definition of justice that is according is this—that it is the interest of the stronger” (*Laws*, 714b-c).

²⁴ Cf. my argument that they are employing different and incompatible *topoi*.

with the Athenian Stranger who in the *Laws* calls the same thing not being “about something paltry; it concerns something very great.”²⁵ Socrates modifies his claim and states that “while I too agree that the just is something of advantage, you add to it and assert that it’s the advantage of the stronger, and I don’t know whether it’s so” (339b5-7). This discussion concerning the “addition” added to Thrasymachus’ definition also resembles the analogous discussion in which Polemarchus made an addition to his initial definition (cf. 334e10-335a2); it was at that point Socrates started to turn the tables until Polemarchus’ mind was changed. I think the same thing goes on here, but Thrasymachus is a different kind of opponent. So, by making Thrasymachus’ definition the point of departure, Socrates intends to reflect upon (σκεπτέον, 339b7) whether Thrasymachus’ proposal is true or not. However, true in relation to what?

3.3.1 Socrates’ first counterreply (339b9-339e8)

Is it true that the just is the same as the advantage of the stronger? When Socrates starts to consider this, he changes the perspective and begins his investigation from the view of the ruled, “Don’t you say though that it’s also just to obey the rulers?” (339b9-10). As Thrasymachus agrees, Socrates continues by looking into what the rulers *do*. They sometimes make mistakes; when setting down laws some are correct and thus advantageous for them, and some are incorrect and thus disadvantageous. Then, according to Thrasymachus’ argument, Socrates claims, “It’s just to do not only what is advantageous for the stronger but also the opposite, what is disadvantageous” (339d1-3). So far, Socrates has not answered the initial question. Instead, he has turned the attention toward the consequences of the ruler’s words and deeds. He has pointed out the discrepancy that due to the words—the laws—the consequences of their deeds—enacting the laws—might not be what they intended. In other words, one can assume that the rulers have their advantage in mind—but they sometimes err and enact laws that turn out to be a disadvantage to them. Therefore, as it is just for the ruled to obey all their laws, the just will consist in doing what is not advantageous for them. This inference is embedded in the concealed topos. So, by this reasoning, Socrates has confused Thrasymachus. Hence his reply is, “What do you mean?” (339d4). This

²⁵ Cf. p. 101n23 above.

question translates the phrase “τί λέγεις σύ” which is a favorite eristic formula;²⁶ thus he has now confirmed that he follows the rules of verbal combat—while Socrates does not. Maybe Socrates conceived this, because he now states that he and Thrasymachus must “consider (σκοπῶμεν) it better” (339d5). Nonetheless, he maintains that what he has argued is what Thrasymachus *meant*. Is this what Thrasymachus meant? Is this a reasonable interpretation of Thrasymachus’ arguments? I do not think so, and my suspicion is strengthened when Socrates goes on, “Wasn’t it agreed that the rulers, when they command the ruled to do something, sometimes completely mistake what is best for themselves, while it is just for the ruled to do whatever the rulers command? Weren’t these things agreed upon?” (339d5-9). Thrasymachus confirms his contemporary confusion when he answers, “I suppose so” (339d10). Socrates takes advantage of his confused state of mind and urges him, “Also suppose that you’re agreed that it is just to do what is disadvantageous for those who are the rulers and the stronger, when the rulers unwillingly command what is bad for themselves” (339e1-3) and further that Thrasymachus asserted that “it is just to do what they have commanded. In this case, most wise Thrasymachus, doesn’t it necessarily follow that it is just for the others to do the opposite of what you say for the weaker are commanded to do what doubtless is disadvantageous for the stronger?” (339e5-8). On this, Socrates is wrong; this is not what Thrasymachus asserted. However, we are not to know what Thrasymachus’ immediate response to this would have been because at this point Socrates’ ally Polemarchus and Thrasymachus’ friend Cleitophon interrupt.

3.4 Second interlude: Who said what? (340a1-c2)

This short interlude is of interest because it underlines a universal phenomenon nearly always present in discussions: Even if the audiences hear the same words, they do not hear the same message and start to discuss what actually has been said. At this point Polemarchus, the ally in the battle (cf. 335e12), is awakened, and he lends his support to Socrates, “Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, most clearly” (340 a1), whereupon Cleitophon

²⁶ Cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 339b. See also Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, 1174. The contrast between eristic (Thrasymachus’ “method”) and dialectic (Socrates’ “method”) will be made explicit later—at 454a8. Bloom (1991b, 458n14), points out that “eristic” means “contentiousness,” and entails that an argument is set forth for the sake of winning. Formally, this looks like “dialectic,” which is a friendly conversation. The main difference is that eristic is not carried out for the sake of truth, while dialectic is.

argues, “What need is there of a witness? Thrasymachus himself agreed that the rulers sometimes command what is bad for themselves and that it is just for the others to do these things” (340a3-7). Did Thrasymachus agree on this? Was not this Socrates’ inference after he required that Thrasymachus “also suppose” at 339e12? Or did Thrasymachus agree, but on different grounds, as Cleitophon tries to elaborate, “That’s because Thrasymachus set down that to do what the rulers bid is just” (340a5-7). Polemarchus does not consider this argument, but as Socrates’ ally, he is eager to show that Socrates is right. In addition to Cleitophon’s underlining, Polemarchus adds that it was also because Thrasymachus ...

... set down that the advantage of the stronger is just. Once he had set both of these principles down, he further agreed that sometimes the stronger order those who are weaker and are ruled to do what is to the disadvantage of the stronger; on the basis of these agreements, the advantage of the stronger would be no more just than the disadvantage (340a8-b5).

Cleitophon disagrees and tries once more to defend his friend, “But he said that the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger believes to be his advantage. This is what must be done by the weaker, and this is what he set down as the just” (340b6-8). Whether Polemarchus is annoyed or not is not easy to decide, but he concludes, “That’s not what was said” (340b9). The word exchange between Polemarchus and Cleitophon signals confusion and disagreement within the particular audience, but Socrates does not seem to be interested in solving it. He does not comment on it at all. Instead, he addresses Polemarchus with an ambiguous kind of comfort, “It doesn’t make any difference, Polemarchus; if Thrasymachus says it that way now, let’s accept it from him” (340c1-2). Implicitly, this ambiguity also contains a reassurance from Socrates: Regardless what Thrasymachus states now, let us accept it—he will eventually change his mind.

3.5 Second indictment: Socrates, the sycophant (340c3-341c4)

When they start again, Socrates picks up Cleitophon’s suggestion that “the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger believes to be his advantage.” By this deed, it looks like Socrates implicitly acknowledges Cleitophon’s suggestion. Hence, he gives Thrasymachus indirect support. In this manner, he also elegantly settles the score between Polemarchus and Cleitophon without explicitly uttering his opinion regarding

the disagreement that made them interrupt. The impact on the reader is irritation. Why does not Socrates state his opinion? Why does he choose to go on without addressing the particular audience? His next move could indicate that he at least tries to calm down the situation. He asks, “Now tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you wanted to say the just is, what seems to the stronger to be the advantage of the stronger, whether it is advantageous or not? Shall we assert that this is the way you mean it?” (340c3-6). On its surface, this question has a diplomatic ring to it. However, Thrasymachus, who now has had a short break and the opportunity to think, is determined when he answers and points out that Socrates is wrong, “Not in the least” he says, “do you suppose that I call a man who makes mistakes ‘stronger’ at the moment when he is making mistakes?” (340c7-8). Socrates admits that he supposed this to be what Thrasymachus meant, whereupon Thrasymachus replies, “That’s because you’re a sycophant²⁷ in arguments, Socrates” (340d3). He further explains that no ruler makes mistakes when he rules. Thus he cannot err. He supports this by an argument from the analogy of medical practitioners, calculators, and grammarians. He argues that his earlier concession was just a popular way of expressing the fact that rulers *seem* to err. Then he concludes,

[...] what follows is the most precise way: the ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, does not make mistakes; and not making mistakes, he sets down what is best for himself. And this must be done by the man who is ruled. So, I say the just is exactly what I have been saying from the beginning, to do the advantage of the stronger (340d8-341a5).

Socrates does not comment upon Thrasymachus’ clarifying explanation at all. Instead, he turns to the claim that he acts as a sycophant in arguments, “All right [...] so, in your opinion, I play the sycophant? [...] Do you suppose I ask as I asked because I am

²⁷ “[...] The sycophants were men who made accusations against Athenian citizens, acting, as it were, as public prosecutors. They were blackmailers; any charge they might make could cause difficulty and, at the least, would be expensive. They distorted the meaning of men’s acts and statements, and Socrates, accused of making the worse argument appear the better, could be compared to them, he was trying to cause trouble and make his interlocutors bad before the public. The sycophants were flatterers of the tyrant public opinion, since their charges usually had to do with alleged crimes against civil society, and since the juries were chosen by lot from the citizens body at large.” Bloom (1991b, 445n34).

plotting to do harm²⁸ to you in the argument?” (341a6-10). Thrasymachus stresses that he does not suppose anything; he knows this to be the case (341a11-b2). Could Socrates be *playing* the role of the sycophant? The claim seems to have struck a nerve in him since, for a moment, he forgets the argument and turns his attention solemnly to the sycophant accusation. Has Socrates been distorting the meaning of Thrasymachus’ acts and statements, and—both in arguments and through the voice of the narrator—tried to make Thrasymachus look bad before the universal audience? At this point, I am once more inclined to agree with Thrasymachus, not that Socrates is a sycophant, but he appears so due to his concealment. Thrasymachus continues, “It won’t profit you. You won’t get away with doing harm unnoticed, and failing to get away unnoticed, you won’t be able to overpower me in the argument” (341a11-b2). Socrates gives some credit to Thrasymachus on this point, saying, “nor would I even try, you blessed man (ὦ μακάριε, 341b3).” Socrates wants only to make sure “that the same sort of thing doesn’t happen to us again” (341b3-4). Hence, he wants Thrasymachus to make it clear whether he meant by the ruler and the stronger, the man who is such only in common parlance, or the man who is such in precise speech; whose advantage Thrasymachus claimed would be just for the weaker to serve because he is stronger (cf. 341b4-7). Thrasymachus now sees it fit to define “the ruler in the most precise sense” (341b8). Maybe it is due to Socrates’ somewhat vague way of giving credit to Thrasymachus regarding the sycophant claim that he now invites Socrates to “do harm to that and play the sycophant, if you can—I ask for no favors—but you won’t be able to” (341b8-c1). Socrates clearly wants to go on and asks if “you suppose me to be so mad as to try to shave a lion and play the sycophant with Thrasymachus?” (341c2-3). However, Thrasymachus does not suppose Socrates to be mad—just possessed with nonsense (cf. 336b8-c1). Thus, he concludes and claims that Socrates tried to play the sycophant and that he “was a nonentity at that too” (341c4).

3.5.1 Socrates’ second counterreply (341c5-342e12)

Socrates puts the sycophant-claim to an end by stating, “Enough of this” (341c5). By taking Thrasymachus’ definition of the ruler as his point of departure, he very

²⁸ The phrase “to do harm” translates *κακουργοῦντά*; a legal term which implies any sort of crime regarding malicious damage and fraud, cf. Bloom (1991b, 445n35).

carefully works his way toward an agreement by arguments from analogy: the doctor and the pilot (cf. 341c5-d5). The advantageous thing for both is their arts, respectively, and their arts aim to be as perfect as possible (341d12-13). Thrasymachus questions the last point, and again he asks, “What do you mean?” Socrates responds by using what seems to be the procedure of “creating an imagery interlocutor”—*seems to* because he now goes into a dialogue with himself:

[...] if you should ask me whether it's enough for a body to be a body or whether it needs something else, I would say: “By all means, it needs something else. And the art of medicine has now been discovered because a body is defective (*πονηρόν*), and it won't do for it to be like that. The art was devised for the purpose of providing what is advantageous for a body,” would I seem to you to speak correctly in saying that or not? (341e2-8).

Thrasymachus concludes that Socrates speaks correctly. Socrates further wants to know whether medicine or any other art, when it is defective, will need some supplementary virtue (*ἀρετῆς*, 342a3). Does an art need another art to consider what is advantageous for its defect, and is the art that considers this in need of another of the same kind, and so on endlessly? Socrates demands Thrasymachus to consider this in the precise sense and tell if he thinks it is so or otherwise. Thrasymachus' answer is, “That's the way it looks.” I take it that he agrees that there is no error present in any art and that an art is correct if it is what it is precisely and wholly. From this, it follows that he declines the art-of-art-of-art-suggestion. Socrates now states that medicine considers the advantage of the body, not of medicine (342c1-2). The same goes for horsemanship, which considers the advantage of the horses, not of the art itself (342c4). He concludes that no art considers its own advantage, only the advantage of that of which it is the art (342c5-6). Hence, Socrates has turned the tables and concludes, “[...] the arts (*τέχναι*) rule and are masters of that of which they are arts” (342c8-9).

The narrator informs the reader that Thrasymachus at this point conceded but with a great deal of resistance (cf. 342c10). After this information, Socrates continues, “Then, there is no kind of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) that considers or commands the advantage of the stronger, but rather of what is weaker and ruled by it” (342c11-d2). Again, the narrator reports that although Thrasymachus agreed to this, he tried to put

up a fight about it (342d3-4). This reluctant agreement gives way to Socrates' conclusion, "Then, isn't it the case that the doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, considers or commands not the doctor's advantage, but that of the sick man? For the doctor in the precise sense was agreed to be a ruler of bodies and not a moneymaker. Wasn't it so agreed?" (342d4-8). When he then transfers this logic to the ruler, it seems to be the last argument needed before he has refuted Thrasymachus:

Therefore, Thrasymachus, there isn't ever anyone who holds any position of rule, insofar as he is ruler, who considers or commands his own advantage rather than that of what is ruled and of which he himself is the craftsman, and it is looking to this and what is advantageous and fitting for it that he says everything he says and does everything he does (342e7-12).

What happened here? Did Socrates win this combat? In the best-case scenario, it is a step toward victory, but it is not a refutation, and I do not believe the narrator who informs us that it was evident to everyone that Thrasymachus went down (342e12). Even if this is evident to the particular audience, it is not evident to the universal audience. The thing Socrates managed was to turn the argument about the just in the opposite direction. From Socrates' final remark we recognize that, so far, Thrasymachus has been setting forth his argument on the grounds of experience and real life (or on the grounds of people in general) whereas Socrates gradually regarded them from what seems to be an idealistic point of view—what should be. By this recognition is the first seed of suspicion planted. Thrasymachus has already from his first outburst continued to argue that Socrates is concealing what he thinks, his *topos*, and from now on, I am beginning to side more and more with Thrasymachus.

3.6 Third indictment: Is Socrates in need of a wet nurse? (343a1-347a6)

By now, Socrates appears to be sure that he has convinced the particular audience, but Thrasymachus quickly breaks down his contentment by asking: "Tell me, Socrates, do you have a wet nurse?" (343a3-4). Socrates seems surprised by this new outburst, "Why this? Shouldn't you answer instead of asking such things?" Thrasymachus deepens, "Because you know she neglects your sniveling nose and doesn't give it the wiping you need" (343a7-9). Suggesting that Socrates has a "sniveling nose," he indicates that Socrates *is* sniffing and to "sniffle" is a common metaphor for

ignorance or stupidity. Thus, Thrasymachus implicitly suggests that Socrates needs help, and for the third time, he refers to the nonsense that possesses Socrates. Due to his sniveling nose and the wet nurse who ignores him, Socrates is not to blame for being unable to recognize the difference between sheep or shepherd (cf. 343b1), Thrasymachus states.

Socrates does not understand, so Thrasymachus goes into detail. He claims that Socrates is wrong on two matters, and his wrongdoings are due to what he supposes, and his suppositions, in turn, make him unaware of what justice and the just really *are*. Socrates now faces the same accusation from Thrasymachus that Socrates himself hinted toward in his conversation with Cephalus. Contrary to Socrates, though, Thrasymachus is not able to reveal exactly what he perceives as Socrates' false assumptions; he can only point out that there is something wrong. It is from this outset Thrasymachus now confronts Socrates. He chooses to present his arguments in the form of a speech, and not by answering Socrates' questions. This is a move in accordance with the sophistic way of teaching.²⁹ Hence, it is Thrasymachus, the inculcating teacher, who now stands forth. The arguments he presents are in accordance with "the many," which will be confirmed by Glaucon later.

First, Thrasymachus claims that Socrates is wrong because he supposes that shepherds or cowherds consider the good of their herds. The truth is that the only things that occupies them are their own and their masters' good. According to Thrasymachus, Socrates assumes that the same goes for the rulers in the cities. He assumes that those who truly rule (ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν, 343b5) think about the ruled differently from the way a man would with regard to sheep. Also, Socrates is far off about the just and justice, and the unjust and injustice. He is unaware that justice and the just are really the advantage of the man who is stronger and rules, and a personal harm to the man who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, and it rules the truly

²⁹ This claim I support by turning to the *Protagoras*. There Socrates and Protagoras more than once have a debate on whether to speak in brief through the style of questions and answers, or to speak in length. The latter signals an inculcating teacher—which is the mark of Protagoras. He states the following when Socrates urges him to partake in the former style of speaking: "Socrates, I've gotten into competitions in speeches with a lot of human beings by now, and if I had done what you're telling me to, that I should hold the conversation in the way the rival speaker told me to hold it, I would not have made a better appearance than anyone, and the name of Protagoras would not have come into prominence among the Greeks" (335a3-8).

simple (ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν, 343c6) and just. Those who are ruled do what is advantageous for him who is stronger, and they make the man they serve happy, but not themselves at all. This must be considered, most simple Socrates (ὦ εὐηθέστατε Ζώκρατες, 343d1-2), he says. He has now demonstrated that he does not accept the way Socrates turned the argument, that is, he does not accept that Socrates allowed justice to be advantageous. In this way, he confirms that he has not changed his mind regarding his initial statement. Further, by claiming that injustice rules “the truly simple,” and by addressing Socrates as “most simple,” he implicitly states that Socrates does not understand the reality of the world he is a part of. So, according to Thrasymachus, what Socrates really ought to consider is that the just man always and everywhere has less than the unjust man. For this claim, he gives four examples³⁰ and then argues that the unjust man’s situation is the opposite in all these respects. In this regard, he speaks of the man who is always able to get more (πλεονεκτεῖν, 344a1)³¹ in a big way. According to Thrasymachus, it is the unjust man we need to consider if we want to investigate private advantages. This will be learned most easily if we turn to the perfect injustice, which is tyranny (344a6).³² Thrasymachus describes the criminal deeds of the perfectly unjust man, who, instead of being accused of crimes gets to be called happy and blessed.³³ Why is it so? Those who blame injustice do so, not because they fear doing unjust deeds, but because they fear suffering them.³⁴ Socrates

³⁰ (1) In contracts, when the just man is a partner of the unjust man, you will always find that at the dissolution of the partnership the just man does not have more than the unjust man, but less. (2) In matters pertaining to the city, when there are taxes, the just man pays more on the basis of equal property, the unjust man less; and when there are distributions, the one makes no profit, the other much. (3) When each holds some ruling office, even if the just man suffers no other penalty, it is his lot to see his domestic affairs deteriorate from neglect, while he gets no advantage from the public store, thanks to his being just. (4) The just man incurs the ill will of his relatives and his acquaintances when he is unwilling to serve them against what is just.

³¹ Socrates will later argue that πλεονεκτεῖν is a cause to war; I return to this in chapter 5: *Founding cities making (ποιοῦμεν) guardians*, section 5.2: G1: Socrates, Glaucon, and the feverish city, p. 162 ff. The term πλεονεκτέω means *to have or claim more than one's due, to get or have too much, to be greedy, grasping, arrogant*, and also *to gain or have some advantage*, without any bad sense, cf. Liddle and Scott. See also Bloom (1991b, 445n37).

³² This claim will be confirmed by Socrates in Book VIII.

³³ This view will later be stated by Glaucon as a part of his challenge to Socrates. Cf. chapter 4: *The prologue III: The tide is turning for Thrasymachus*, section 4.1: Glaucon and Socrates, p. 136 ff.

³⁴ This line of argumentation will be reconstructed by Glaucon later, and he agrees with Thrasymachus’ claim that it is the common opinion because this is exactly what people in general experience.

has not taken this into his equation; hence, Thrasymachus' upcoming conclusion is bound to trigger Socrates: "So, Socrates, injustice, when it comes into being on a sufficient scale, is mightier, freer, and more masterful than justice, and, as I have said from the beginning, the just is the advantage of the stronger, and the unjust is what is profitable and advantageous for oneself" (344c4-9).³⁵

Socrates does not respond to Thrasymachus' speech, but the narrator informs us that when Thrasymachus had finished, he had in mind to leave³⁶ just like a bathman³⁷ after having "poured a great shower of speech into our ears all at once" (344d2-3). What is the narrator doing by comparing Thrasymachus with a vulgar bathman? Is it Thrasymachus' intention to leave that is vulgar, or is it a reference to Thrasymachus' speech? Or is he just being sarcastic as a pay-back for the wet-nurse suggestion? When the narrator states that Thrasymachus has "poured a great shower of speech into our ears all at once," he thereby addresses the universal audience with an appeal which takes the form of a complaint on behalf of the particular audience. This is the only example of such addressing. However, the narrator's comments on Thrasymachus have all along been leading and loaded. Hence, I think the narrator has been trying to force the universal audience to capture Thrasymachus as a dynamic and dangerous man.³⁸ The bathman analogy was the last straw. It is noteworthy that at this point the narrator's harsh tone will soon vanish. Another point worth noticing is that henceforth how Thrasymachus and Socrates address each other is changed.

Nobody wants Thrasymachus to leave, and when Socrates now pleads for clarification, he is referring to *us*. Thus, he makes the impression that the particular audience is homogenous. This is the second time he makes a hint that it is them against Thrasymachus. This is the outset when Socrates demands a new session of questions and answers. Socrates' next statement has deeper implications, "[...] do you suppose you are trying to determine a small matter and not a course of life by which each of us

³⁵ Glaucon will elaborate on this argument when he presents his challenge to Socrates, cf. 358e5-361d7.

³⁶ Threatening to leave is a ritual that signposts "I do not have more to say." Cf. the *Protagoras*, 335c, when Socrates threatens to leave and "everyone" begs him to stay.

³⁷ On the term "bathman," see Bloom (1991b, 445n39).

³⁸ Annas (1981, 35) argues that Plato "detested" Thrasymachus and "intends us to dislike and despise him," quoted in Beversluis (2000, 222).

would have the most profitable existence?” (344d8-e2). Socrates does not accept that a determination of what justice and injustice *are* can be done on the grounds of the experience of people (and Thrasymachus). He implies that justice is the foundation of happiness for all humans—and this foreshadows the core question which the main part of the *Republic* evolves around.

Thrasymachus’ response signals surprise, “What?” he asks. “Do I suppose it is otherwise?” (344e3) Now, if Thrasymachus was insulting Socrates by calling him ignorant and simple earlier, Socrates now pays back by stating that Thrasymachus seemed to suppose it was otherwise (344e4). If this is not the case, Socrates maintains with an appeal to the particular audience, then Thrasymachus has “no care for us and isn’t a bit concerned whether we shall live worse or better as a result of our ignorance of what you say you know” (344e4-6). By this, Socrates accuses Thrasymachus of not caring about how their lives will turn out, and further, that Thrasymachus is concealing his knowledge and intends to leave them in ignorance. This is an example of the mirroring-the-opponent strategy. Up to this point, it is Thrasymachus who has accused Socrates of not stating his opinions—that is, concealing the *topos* wherein he warrants his arguments. We have gradually become inclined to agree with that claim and be somehow sympathetic to Thrasymachus’ frustration. Socrates now continues by challenging Thrasymachus in the same way as he will be challenged by Glaucon and Adeimantus later.

Socrates presents his challenge in a rather interesting manner, which also turns out to be a challenge to the universal audience. First, we notice that he addresses Thrasymachus twice as “my good man (ὦγαθέ).” “But, my good man (ὦγαθέ, 344e6), make an effort to show it to us—it wouldn’t be a bad investment for you to do a good deed for so many as we are” (344e6-345a2). This is an appeal for Thrasymachus to make his knowledge known to the men gathered. Further, Socrates states that he is compelled to tell him that he is not persuaded, nor does he think that injustice is more profitable than justice, not even if one gives it free rein and does not hinder it from doing what it wants. Then comes the second addressing, “But, my good man (ὦγαθέ, 345a5), let there be an unjust man, and let him be able to do injustice, either by stealth or by fighting out in the open.” Socrates’ plea for an example Glaucon meets later

when he presents the myth of Gyges' ring. Regarding Thrasymachus, Socrates concludes before the example is even presented. "Nevertheless," he says, if such a man is to be found "he does not persuade me that this is more profitable than justice" (345a7). The two occurrences of ὠγαθέ we find here and the two incidences where Thrasymachus is addressed as "my good man" is Socrates' way of belittling him. First, he asks for the view Thrasymachus already has presented, a view that has been consistent. This gives the impression that Socrates has not listened at all, an impression that is not right. Alternatively, it gives the impression that Thrasymachus' view is not worth discussing because it is wrong. Secondly, he traps Thrasymachus by asking for an example and then concludes without giving him an opportunity to elaborate. In his final appeal, Socrates is a little bit more moderate when he says that "perhaps, someone else among us—and not only I—also has this sentiment" (345b2). When he repeats his challenge, he also changes the way he addresses Thrasymachus, "So, persuade us adequately, you blessed man (ὦ μακάριε, 345b2), so that we don't deliberate correctly in having a higher regard for justice than injustice" (345b2-3). The phrase ὦ μακάριε occurs ten times in the *Republic*,³⁹ and they are all related to Thrasymachus, one way or another. The four first occurrences are addressed directly to Thrasymachus, but later when Socrates addresses Glaucon and Adeimantus the same way, the themes discussed relates to Thrasymachus' views. This way the phrase functions as a pointer or marker for the universal audience with regard to how vital it is for Socrates to persuade Thrasymachus when it comes to justice and education.

Having received this challenge, Thrasymachus' pain and despair shine through his response, "And how shall I persuade you? If you're not persuaded by what I've just now said, what more shall I do for you? Shall I take the argument and give your soul a forced feeding (ἐνθῶ)" (345b4-6)? The reaction from Socrates on this proposition is: "By Zeus, don't you do it." The expression ἐνθῶ refers to a child being force-fed, and this theme is easily read as a metaphor for the inculcating teacher. As we shall learn later, these teachers and their ways of teachings destroy and break down the immanent

³⁹ 341b3; 345b2; 346a3; 354a8—These four occurrences are addressed to Thrasymachus; at 499a4 and 499e1 Socrates addresses Adeimantus; at 432d8; 535b5; 557d1; 589c7 Socrates addresses Glaucon.

knowledge already in the soul.⁴⁰ So, no wonder Socrates shudders at the prospect of having Thrasymachus as his (intellectual) nurse. Moreover, maybe this explains why Socrates continues to insist that he will be the questioner, and thus prevent Thrasymachus from presenting long speeches that he at this point considers dangerous for the souls of the men present.

3.6.1 Socrates' third counterreply (345a7-347a6)

As mentioned above, Socrates now changes his approach. The alteration is detectable both in the structure of his arguments and in his attitude toward Thrasymachus. He now urges Thrasymachus to stick to what he has said so far, and if he at any point has changed what he initially set down—he must be clear about it and not deceive the particular audience. Socrates' new rhetorical strategy is to present arguments of some length, containing assumptions from what he infers to be Thrasymachus' thoughts. In other words, Socrates creates a straw man. How does he do this? First, he underlines what seems to be a discrepancy in one of Thrasymachus' earlier arguments. He points out that Thrasymachus first defined the true doctor (*ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν*), but later thought it not necessary to keep a precise guard over the true shepherd (*ἀληθῶς ποιμένα*). From this, he infers that Thrasymachus *thinks* that the true shepherd has sale of the sheep—not what is best for the sheep—in mind (cf. 345c5-7). He concludes that this makes the shepherd look like a moneymaker (*χρηματιστήν*) and not a shepherd (*ποιμένα*). Socrates thereby refutes the whole argument and concludes that “the shepherd's art (*ποιμενικῆ*) cares for nothing but providing the best for what it has been set over” (345d2-3). However, Socrates has not refuted Thrasymachus' argument, but instead the assumption he inferred from it. Due to this, Socrates indicates his new turn: “It was thus that I came to think just now that it is necessary for us to agree [...]” (345d5-6). After having emphasized that he now speaks his *own* mind, Socrates proceeds by turning the attention toward the rules belonging to the various arts. He argues that it is necessary for them to agree “that every kind of rule, insofar as it is rule, considers what is best for nothing other than for what is ruled and cared for, both in political (*πολιτικῆ*) and private (*ιδιωτικῆ*) rule” (345d6-e1). He then poses an

⁴⁰ Cf. 518b8-c2. See also Introduction, section 3: Displaying the path toward philosophy—two Socratic practices, pp. 18-26.

imperative question: “Do you think that the rulers in the cities, those who truly rule, rule willingly?” (345e2-3). Through this question, Socrates starts to create a foundation grounded on perspectives which must be new for both Thrasymachus and the particular audience. Thrasymachus is convinced, due to his experience that the rulers in the cities rule willingly. However, in his reply, it seems that he does not notice Socrates’ precise phrase, “those who truly rules (τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, 345e3).” The choice of words anticipates the “true rules”—the philosopher kings—which we are going to learn about much later. Thus, this is the first explicit example of how Socrates employs his concealed topos and thereby begins to hint at the process of exposing the topos of philosophy. Socrates continues: “Don’t you notice that no one wishes to rule voluntarily, but they demand wages as though the benefit from ruling were not for them but for those who are ruled?” (345e5-7). The only way for his audiences to understand where he wants to go is to let Socrates continue and define “wage” and “benefit,” and in due course, he does so.

Socrates’ next move is to perform an elenchus, and now the narrator becomes very active. He comments on each of Thrasymachus’ answers. We learn that the agreement was reached after some resistance from Thrasymachus—but not what the resistance consisted of. Socrates presents a summary in which he states that the benefit, understood as getting wages, “is for each not a result of his own art” (346d1). More precisely, this means that the medical art produces health; the housebuilder’s art produces a house whereas the wage-earner’s art produces wages. The common feature of all arts is that “each accomplishes its own work and benefits that which it has been set over” (346d5-6). We now have a definition of wage and benefit, and we can understand Socrates when he asks, “If pay were not attached to it, would the craftsman derive benefit from the art?” (346d7-8). “It doesn’t look like it,” is the answer. The final agreement in this section is that when the craftsman works for nothing, he produces no benefit for himself. Thus, Socrates states that by now it is plain that no art or kind of rule provides for its own benefit. Is it plain? I do not think so. Through the elenchus, Socrates concentrated on the relation between arts and wages/benefits, and he did not explicitly discuss various “kind of rule.” So, what is he doing here? It looks like he makes an implicit inference and then states that what goes for the arts also goes

for any kind of rule. Is this true? This question is not going to be answered because Socrates goes on,

but, as we have been saying all along, it provides for and commands the one who is ruled, considering his advantage—that of the weaker—and not that of the stronger. It is for just this reason, my dear Thrasymachus, that I said a moment ago that no one willingly chooses to rule and get mixed up in straightening out other people's troubles; but he asks for wages, because the man who is to do anything fine by art never does what is best for himself nor does he command it, insofar as he is commanding by art, but rather what is best for the man who is ruled. It is for just this reason, as it seems, that there must be wages for those who are going to be willing to rule—either money, or honor, or a penalty if he should not rule (346e4-347a6).

At this point, I find it difficult to understand what Socrates means by penalty. Then I find it comforting that my lack of understanding not only goes for me, I find myself in company with both Glaucon and a learned scholar.⁴¹

3.7 Third interlude (347a7-348b7)

Glaucon interrupts and demands that Socrates elaborate because he does not understand that a penalty is a kind of wage (347a7-9). According to Socrates, Glaucon does not understand because he has not grasped the meaning of “the wages of the best men (τῶν βελίστων, 347a10) on account of which the most decent men (οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, 347b1) rule, when they are willing to rule.” By his elaboration, Socrates is again foreshadowing the philosopher-kings, and their attitude toward ruling, but how is Thrasymachus supposed to acknowledge this?⁴² That Glaucon has some knowledge of Socrates’ concealed topos, the readers start to suspect when he answers in the affirmative to Socrates’ next question: “don’t you know that love of honor (φιλότιμόν) and love of money (φιλάργυρον) are said to be, and are, reproaches (ὄνειδος, 347b2)?” That φιλότιμόν and φιλάργυρον are reproaches is a theme developed later in the *Republic*. However, that Glaucon at this point simply accepts that love for honor and money are disgraces is unexpected. This makes me more aware of him. This acceptance contradicts the common attitudes that existed in the strongly

⁴¹ Beversluis (2000, 236) states: “I am glad he [i.e., Glaucon] asked because I did not understand what penalty Socrates was talking about either.”

⁴² When the philosopher-kings are launched (in the third wave), we have entered the realm of philosophy.

competitive society of Athens. Thus, this little intermezzo can be understood as an implicit criticism of the values established by “the many,” and it looks like also Glaucon knows more than he is admitting. Perhaps Socrates reminds Glaucon of something he has forgotten; maybe Socrates simply appeals to Glaucon’s memory, so that he can recollect some earlier teachings.⁴³ Socrates now maintains that it is “For this reason the good (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ) aren’t willing to rule for the sake of money or honor” (347b5-6). So far, the men best fitted to rule are denoted as τῶν βελίστων and οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, and when the οἱ ἀγαθοὶ are ruling, they face a dilemma. If they openly demand wages for ruling, they fear being called hirelings. If they secretly take profit from their ruling, they fear to be called thieves. This fear is grounded in the fact that they are neither lovers of money nor lovers of honor. Hence, Socrates explains,

... necessity (ἀνάγκην, 347c1) and a penalty must be there in addition for them, if they are going to be willing to rule—it is likely that this is the source of its being held to be shameful to seek to rule and not to await necessity—and the greatest of penalties is being ruled by a worse man if one is not willing to rule oneself.

We have now learned that the greatest penalty is to be ruled by a man of substandard character. This leads to his next argument where Socrates foreshadows “the beautiful city.” He states that “it is likely that if a city of good men (πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, 347d1-2) came to be, there would be a fight over not ruling, just as there is now over ruling, and there it would become manifest that a true ruler really does not naturally consider his own advantage but rather that of the one who is ruled” (347d1-5). We notice here that he admits quietly, in passing, that in contemporary societies there are fights over ruling. Considering Thrasymachus’ position, how can he be expected to grasp the depth of Socrates’ counterclaims? Socrates talks to Glaucon about “the city of good men;” how is Thrasymachus supposed to consider this line of reasoning? Socrates confirms to Glaucon that Thrasymachus’ claim that fights over ruling are the case *now*; that is, those who want to rule *now* rule voluntarily. What is Thrasymachus to make of this distinction? We are beginning to understand the initial nonsense

⁴³ Glaucon’s forgetfulness and inattentiveness is a repeated theme throughout. When Glaucon sets forth his challenge to Socrates (cf. 357b3-362d2), he relates to the conventional opinion on justice and injustice. In this regard he revealed a remarkable memory concerning myths and a variety of details. However, when he later encounters conversations with Socrates, he needs several reminders—which all hint toward him being inattentive.

outburst, and how Socrates' arguments must seem contradictory to him. Socrates continues by presenting a conclusion for his reasoning: "Everyone who knows would choose to be benefited by another rather than to take the trouble of benefiting another" (347d5-7). Who is "everyone who knows?" How are we to understand "everyone?" On this subtle ground, Socrates concludes that "I can in no way agree with Thrasymachus that the just is the advantage of the stronger" (347d7-e2). Through his discussion with Glaucon, it becomes clear that Socrates has tried to refute Thrasymachus on the grounds that the latter cannot understand. Socrates needed his concealed topos in order to claim that Thrasymachus was refuted. There is yet another clue in this regard when Socrates addresses Glaucon and says, "This we shall consider again at another time" (347e2-3). That is, Socrates implies to Glaucon that the "city of good men," those "who truly rule," and their attitudes are themes for their consideration on another occasion.

The problem Socrates wants to consider next is Thrasymachus' assertion "that the life of the unjust man is stronger than that of the just man" (347e4-5). According to Socrates' opinion, this is "a far bigger thing" (347e4). Socrates now leaves the decision to Glaucon: "Which speech is truer in your opinion?" (347e6). At this point, it is noteworthy that Thrasymachus earlier had accused Socrates of not speaking his mind, and of not declaring his opinion. In this section, Socrates has twice stressed the importance of Thrasymachus speaking his mind. Simultaneously, Socrates starts to underline that what he states is his opinion, and when he probes Glaucon to choose, Socrates asks for Glaucon's opinion. Therefore, it is now evident that everyone speaks their mind from their respective topoi. Glaucon and Socrates have a topos in common while Thrasymachus stands on his own without quite understanding. This entails that it is the difference between sophistry and philosophy we are urged to grasp, but the distinctions are still obscured.

Glaucon chooses to support Socrates' opinion of "the life of the just man as more profitable" (347e4-5). He explicitly states that he is not persuaded by Thrasymachus' arguments, despite all the good things Thrasymachus has "listed [...] as belonging to

the life of the unjust man” (348a1-2).⁴⁴ Socrates is pleased with Glaucon’s support and asks if he wants them to persuade Thrasymachus “if we’re able to find a way, that what he says isn’t true?” (348a4-6).⁴⁵ This turns out to be the third time Socrates marks an explicit distance toward Thrasymachus by signaling “us” against “him.” I bear in mind that Thrasymachus is present and listening to this word exchange. This is bound to have an impact on him. I also notice that he does not interrupt with anger and violent outbursts anymore. Instead, he listens in silence to how Socrates and Glaucon make an alliance against him. He even remains silent when Socrates and Glaucon now start to discuss the strategy for crushing his arguments.

Socrates suggests two different strategies, and for the third time, he leaves it to Glaucon to decide. First, they could “speak at length against him, setting speech against speech (ἀντικατατείναντες, 348a7), telling how many good things belong to being just, and then he should speak in return, and *we* again, there’ll be need of counting the good things and measuring how many each of us has in each speech” (348a7-9). The disadvantage of this strategy is that “we’ll be in need of some sort of judges (δικαστῶν, 348b2) who will decide.” The second strategy is “coming to agreement with one another (ἀνομολογούμενοι, 348b3).” The advantage of this is that “we’ll ourselves be both judges (δικασταὶ) and pleaders (ρήτορες) at once” (348b4). The strategies suggested indicate that both Socrates and Glaucon acknowledge that Thrasymachus’ accusations toward Socrates are to be taken very seriously. It starts to look like Socrates takes the task before him to be like a trial, and both strategies suggested give association to the Athenian courtroom. The first, ἀντικατατείναντες, alludes—at a general level—to the lawsuits, where it was common for each party to deliver two speeches each and then the judges decided the outcome of the trial. For the readers, this is also an allusion toward the *Apology* and thus not a recommendable strategy for obvious reasons. The second, ἀνομολογούμενοι, seems to be more

⁴⁴ This statement will be central for both Glaucon and Adeimantus when they set forth their challenges to Socrates.

⁴⁵ Socrates’ urging to make Glaucon choose and his pleas for support pick up on the Prelude where Socrates chose to stay because “it was so resolved.” Hence, he now lifts forth Glaucon’s responsibility in that regard and sets him as the authority.

promising because now Socrates and Glaucon can act as both judges and rhetors.⁴⁶ This is also the strategy Glaucon prefers. Contrary to the first, the second gives Socrates the opportunity to advocate another kind of rhetoric which, according to Bloom (1991b, 446n43), in this case, gives him better chances to “triumph over his accuser and do away with his dependence on popular judgment.” That Socrates is not willing to choose his own strategy regarding his upcoming encounter with Thrasymachus and urges Glaucon to choose on his behalf, in addition to the strong allusion to the Athenian courtroom, signals that it is Thrasymachus who now is on trial. This impression will be confirmed later. At this point, Socrates starts to prepare, and he does so by making a quest for terminology.

3.8 A quest for terminology (348b8-d4)

Socrates’ quest for terminology is an important clue regarding the two incompatible *topoi*. When Socrates now turns to Thrasymachus, he once again underlines that Thrasymachus stands alone: “Answer *us* from the beginning” (348b8-9). Thematically, he is back on track when he wants to know if Thrasymachus still asserts “that perfect injustice is more profitable than justice when it is perfect” (348b9-10). Thrasymachus confirms and claims that he already has given his reasons for this. Socrates continues with a specific quest for terminology: “How do you speak about them in this respect? [...] Do you call justice virtue and injustice vice?” (348c2-6). Thrasymachus responds in an ironical tone: “That’s likely, you agreeable man” (ὦ ἡδίστε, 348c7). The irony is detectable through ὦ ἡδίστε, which indicates that Socrates is sweet, simple, and innocent.⁴⁷ When Thrasymachus adds “that injustice is profitable, and justice isn’t,” he is in accordance with Callicles’ view on virtue in the *Gorgias* (cf. 491e). This is yet another reminder on Thrasymachus’ position; he is in accord with the general view. Socrates now infers that Thrasymachus denotes justice to be vice. No, justice is not called vice, Thrasymachus corrects; it is called “very high-minded innocence (πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν, 348d1). This phrase can also be understood as “sublime simplicity” and, as such, Thrasymachus’ terminology resembles Thucydides’ when he is

⁴⁶ This discussion of strategies is similar to the one we find in the *Protagoras* after Socrates has threatened to leave and before the great encounter between Socrates and Protagoras. The difference is that in the *Protagoras* the discussion involves more than two parties; cf. 337a-338e.

⁴⁷ Cf. Liddle and Scott; and Adam, note on *Rep.*348c.

describing contemporary morality;⁴⁸ hence, the topos of war is awakened. This makes Socrates infer that Thrasymachus talks about injustice as corruption (κακήθειαν, 348d2). However, Thrasymachus does not. He rather calls it “good judgment” (εὐβουλίαν, 348d3).⁴⁹ Socrates does not comment upon injustice as “good judgment.” Instead, he stresses, again, that Thrasymachus must tell what his opinion is, this time on whether the unjust men are good (ἀγαθοί, 348d5) as well as prudent (φρόνιμοί, 348d4), while the just men are neither. Thrasymachus approves. His starting point was that injustice was good judgment, and when Socrates replies and wants Thrasymachus to confirm that the unjust men are good *as well as* prudent, Socrates speaks as though εὐβουλία and φρόνιμος are synonyms, or at least that they have the same meaning. Maybe this is also how Thrasymachus understood it, as he approved. Socrates now, elegantly, substitutes φρόνιμος with εὐβουλία and simultaneously transports the meaning of the latter into the first. Due to the asymmetries between the two concepts, Thrasymachus’ approval on this point will cause him big problems as the conversation develops. This asymmetry is present beneath the surface of this section from now on.

In his study on εὐβουλία, Paul Woodruff (2013) investigates different patterns and uses of the concept throughout different genres. He finds that on all views the result is the same: “A city governed by leaders with good judgment makes decisions that are best for the whole, and such a city is not likely to be torn apart by factual disputes” (ibid, 182). Hence, εὐβουλία generally denotes “management that is a) profitable for the manager, or b) beneficial for the home or the city” (ibid, 180), thus “‘good judgment’ is the virtue that helps us to deliberate well in the absence of knowledge” (ibid, 185). Although Socrates later⁵⁰ defines εὐβουλία as “a kind of knowledge,” Woodruff points out that the “tendency of ancient culture runs the other way: Good judgment is a virtue we are called upon to experience precisely in those cases in which we do not have complete knowledge” (ibid, 184). The definition

⁴⁸ Cf. Thucydides, III, 83; and Adam, note on *Rep.* 348d.

⁴⁹ Bloom (1991b) translates εὐβουλία as “good council” and φρόνιμος as “prudence.” Woodruff (2013, 185) uses “good judgment” for εὐβουλία throughout his essay but points out that “εὐβουλία is often rightly, translated “prudence,” meaning the ability to see where one’s own interests lie.” Thus, I chose to translate εὐβουλία as “good judgment” (following Woodruff) and φρόνιμος as “prudence” (following Bloom).

⁵⁰ Socrates will later define εὐβουλία as “as a kind of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) [...] for it’s surely not by lack of learning but by knowledge that men counsel well” (428b7-9).

Socrates sets forth contains a kind of knowledge which is “available only to the leaders of the Kallipolis, but it would not be available to anyone in Athens” (ibid, 183).⁵¹ The same goes for φρόνιμος; usually understood as “practical wisdom or prudence.”⁵² When Socrates later discusses the leadership of the Kallipolis, he asks Glaucon: “Who else will you compel to go to the guarding of the city than the men who are most prudent (φρονιμώτατοι, 521b8) in those things through which a city is best governed and who have no other honors and a better life than the political life?” (521b7-10). In the course of the *paideia* program launched for the philosophers, the virtues of the prudent (φρόνιμος) are cultivated by letting them study astronomy. Then “we are going to convert the prudence (φρόνιμον, 530c2) by nature in the soul from uselessness to usefulness” (530c1-3). Thus, when Thrasymachus, on the one hand, denotes the virtue of the just men as high-minded innocence and the virtue of the unjust men as good judgment and further understands the latter in accordance with tradition as a management that is profitable for the manager and/or beneficial for home and city, it turns out that his initial definition is in accordance with opinions held by “the many.” Socrates, on the other hand, suspects that Thrasymachus understood the concept of injustice as corruption, but when corrected and told that the virtue in question is good judgment, he starts to talk about prudence, which has quite another resonance.⁵³ Against this background, what are we to make of Socrates’ quest for terminology? Generally, when two persons are engaged in a debate, the clarifying of terminology intends to secure that the two are talking about the same issues. The case here seems to be the opposite: It becomes clear for the reader that Socrates and Thrasymachus are speaking of different matters, and this goes deeper than innocent misunderstandings, as Socrates later will define this discussion. Thus, a reasonable

⁵¹ Woodruff further points out that “Not even Socrates claims to have knowledge of the sort required. So, if good judgment is knowledge of this sort [...], we will have to be content with merely seeking it. We cannot use it, because there will be no true good judgment outside of the ideal state.” In Aristotle εὐβουλία “is a virtue of good judgment as carried out by people who are *phronimoi* (E.N. 6.9.). As a virtue of deliberation, which is a kind of seeking, *eubolia* is not a form of knowledge (episteme), according to Aristotle. It is, however, a form of correctness.

⁵² Cf. Liddle and Scott.

⁵³ By this deed, Socrates is acting in accordance with the philosophical tradition as well, because εὐβουλία “names a virtue which Plato and most other philosophers treat lightly or ignore” (Woodruff, 2013, 179).

inference so far is that Thrasymachus speaks of the virtue “good judgment” as it is commonly understood within the Athenian culture, and he seems to comprehend prudence as being practical wisdom. Hence, he collects his arguments and opinions from a topos recognizable for the particular audience. When it comes to Socrates, he is of an opinion which stands in contrast. Therefore, by now, it is safe to assume that his arguments are warranted in a topos concealed.

3. 9 Preparing the refutation I: Thrasymachus stands alone (348d4-349b1)

Thrasymachus responds by repeating Socrates’ earlier precision (at 348b9-10) and states that “those who can do injustice perfectly [...] are able to subjugate cities and tribes of men to themselves” (348d6-7). He then removes the possibility for Socrates to assume that he is speaking about “cutpurses” or thieves, who Thrasymachus considers not being “worth mentioning compared to those I was just talking about” (348d6-10). As to Thrasymachus’ last point, Socrates states that he is not unaware of what Thrasymachus wants to say on this (348e1), whereupon he bends the line of reasoning in a new direction. Socrates now wants to return to the point where Thrasymachus was putting “injustice in the camp of virtue and wisdom, and justice among their opposites” (348e2-3). This form of categorization creates a problem for Socrates, while Thrasymachus maintains that he “indeed set them down as such” (348e4).

By this confirmation, Socrates signals that he has something more solid to work on, but at the same time, it is “no longer easy to know what one should say” (348e5-6). Why is that? The problem turns out to be that if Thrasymachus—when he set down injustice as profitable—had simultaneously agreed that injustice was to be denoted as “viciousness (κακίαν) or shameful (αἰσχρὸν)” (348e7), then they “would have something to say” because this is claimed by “some others” who are “speaking according to customary usage,” Socrates claims. Hence, Socrates now points out that Thrasymachus’ view is not in accordance with the customary usage—an underlining that simply is not true. Therefore, it looks like Socrates is trying to make the impression that Thrasymachus does not relate to any topos at all; hence, we are supposed to believe that it is Thrasymachus who is atopus and further that his opinions are totally his own—or private. However, as the situation now stands, Socrates argues,

“Plainly you’ll say that injustice is fair (καλὸν) and mighty (ἰσχυρὸν), and, since you also dared to set it down in the camp of virtue and wisdom, you’ll set down to its account all the other things which we used to set down as belonging to the just” (348e9-349a2). By this outburst, Socrates argues that not only does Thrasymachus’ view contrast the customary view, but he is not in accordance with Socrates and Glaucon (cf. “we”) either. He now stands totally on his own. Thus, Thrasymachus’ response, “Your divination (μαντεύει, 349a3) is very true,” is ambiguous, and its impact is of importance. On the one hand, it can be taken as a compliment to Socrates—Thrasymachus is applauding Socrates’ abilities to see things clearly—but this interpretation is not likely. On the other hand, it can be taken as an outpouring, meaning that Socrates now has surpassed his “usual ironical habit” (cf. 337a4) by bending arguments and turning the discussion into the direction Socrates wanted. In this way, Thrasymachus’ earlier prediction is fulfilled, and this alternative makes more sense. “But nonetheless,” is Socrates response before he states that “one oughtn’t to hesitate to pursue the consideration of the argument as long as I understand you to say what you think. For, Thrasymachus, you seem really not to be joking now, but to be speaking the truth as it seems to you” (349a4-8). So, Socrates’ first step in preparing for the final refutation is to argue that Thrasymachus’ opinions find support nowhere—they are essentially of a private character. Then he sets down the premise for the refutation: for pursuing Thrasymachus’ argument, it is vital to understand what Thrasymachus thinks; at least he concludes that he is convinced that Thrasymachus speaks the truth, as it *seems* to him. “And what difference does it make to you [...] whether it seems so to me or not, and why don’t you refute the argument?” (349a9-10), Thrasymachus ponders. It makes no difference whether it seems so to Thrasymachus or not, Socrates states, but he does not respond to why he does not refute the argument.

3.10 Preparing the refutation II: One is what one resembles (349b1-350c11)

The ambiguous end of the section above creates the ground for the questioning in this section, and the opposition εὐβουλία (good judgment) versus φρόνιμος (prudence) is still present. As argued above, Thrasymachus does not apprehend the profound difference between the meanings of the concepts as Socrates does. The concepts are

not discussed further, but we notice that Socrates consequently uses his former substitution. Thrasymachus is now questioned about what the just man is willing to *do*, what he *deserves*, what he *claims to deserve*, and what he *wants*. By this, Socrates constructs a foundation which allows him to present the opposition like/unlike, and it is at this point we enter the discussion.

Socrates now proposes: “Let us say it, then, as follows, the just man does not get the better of what is like (ὁμοίου) but of what is unlike (ἀνομοίου), while the unjust man gets the better of like and unlike?” (349c11-d1). Thrasymachus approves and is also content with the next question: “is the unjust man both prudent (φρόνιμος) and good (ἀγαθος) while the just man is neither” (349d3-4)? At this point, Socrates infers that “the unjust man is also like the prudent and the good, while the just man is not like them” (349d6-7), and further, that both the just and unjust men are such as those whom they are alike. This seems to be exactly what Thrasymachus claimed earlier, and his agreement now becomes Socrates’ steppingstone for introducing one of his well-known analogies: “All right, Thrasymachus. Do you say that one man is musical and that another is unmusical” (349d10-11)? As Thrasymachus agrees to this, he has no problem also to acknowledge, and state, that “the musical man is prudent (φρόμινον) and the unmusical man thoughtless” (ἄφρονα, 349e4-5). They go through the same procedure regarding the medical man. Based on these analogies, Socrates can infer that in the things about which a man is prudent he is also good, and in things about which he is thoughtless he is bad. After this inference, the line of reasoning alters again. His line of questioning from here forward finds its basis in the opposition like/unlike: The ignorant man (ἀνεπιστήμων, 350a11) gets the better of both the man who knows and the man who does not; the man who knows is wise, and the wise man is good. This results in the inference “then the man who is both good and wise will not want to get the better of the like, but of the unlike and opposite” (350b7-8). However, Socrates again says, “The bad and unlearned will *want* to get the better of both the like and the opposite;” so, therefore, “does our unjust man get the better of both like and unlike.” Before Socrates goes on, Thrasymachus must admit that he had been claiming the latter. However, when Thrasymachus launched the idea of “the unjust man getting the better,” he was not talking of getting the better understood as knowledge. This

nuance is not taken into consideration when Socrates goes on and argues that according to the argument “the unjust man gets the better of both like and unlike” it follows that “the just man will not get the better of like but of unlike,” and then “the just man is like the wise and good, but the unjust man like the bad and unlearned.” Thrasymachus does not present any kind of counterclaim. Instead, he once again gives his approval: “I’m afraid so,” he says. Socrates does not stop but starts to wonder: “But we also agreed that each is such as the one he is like.” When Thrasymachus also agrees on this, he gives way for Socrates’ conclusion: “Then the just man has revealed himself to us as good and wise, and the unjust man unlearned and bad” (350c10-11).

Although Socrates reached a conclusion, there is a problem. As Adam⁵⁴ points out, there is a “pervading fallacy” in this section. In addition to what I have already pointed out, there is also a problem connected to the concepts “like” and “unlike.” They are “used absolutely, and each of them is equated with itself.”⁵⁵ The line of reasoning goes like this: a) the wise man is good; b) a man is good in that in which he is wise. The overall conclusion in this section is that one is what one resembles, and because Thrasymachus does not resemble Socrates and Glaucon, Socrates has managed once again to indicate that Thrasymachus stands alone.

3.11 Preparing the refutation III: Silencing Thrasymachus (350c12-352b5)

The narrator now reports that “Thrasymachus did not agree to all of this so easily as I tell it now, but he dragged his feet and resisted, and he produced a wonderful quantity of sweat, for it was summer” (350c12-d2). From this report, we learn that Thrasymachus’ body language signals resistance, but we are not told anything about his counterarguments or if he presented such at all. Instead, the narrator sees it fit to inform us that “I saw what I had not yet seen before—Thrasymachus blushing (ἐρυθριῶντα, 350d3).” This is an interesting piece of information. When Socrates engaged young Hippocrates in the *Protagoras*, the narrator also informed us that Hippocrates was blushing (312a2-4). In that context, Hippocrates’ blushing happened when he suddenly realized the consequences of his opinions, and in that instance, he promptly understood *why* they were wrong. Is there a parallel between the blushing of

⁵⁴ Adam, note on *Rep.* 350c.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

these two characters? If so, we can infer that Thrasymachus also gained a kind of sudden insight, which in turn indicates that we are led to believe that Socrates, at this point, has “tamed the wild animal.” However, the question is whether the “taming” actually happened, or if the situation now is that Thrasymachus has realized that his disagreement with Socrates will never be settled. If so, the situation is aporetic. This aporetic situation has some similarities to the one we find toward the end of the *Protagoras*. After bringing the discussion with Protagoras to an end, Socrates stated that in the current situation they have no alternative than to start their discussion all over again, a proposal Protagoras declined. When Thrasymachus now finds himself trapped, he has no other choice than to give in and leave, or to continue. Thrasymachus chooses the latter. As for the universal audience, we are convinced that something happened. That we are kept in the dark on this “something,” I think the narrator confirms in his next statement: “At all events, [...] we had come to complete agreement about justice being virtue and wisdom, and injustice both vice and lack of learning” (350d4-5). I do not have the impression that they “had come to a complete agreement,” on the contrary. When the discussion was interrupted by the narrator, the best-case scenario was that they maybe were on their way to an agreement. However, as things now have turned out, it is an illusion of a complete agreement which is the point of departure for the next step.

“All right, let that be settled for us (i.e., “complete agreement”); but we did say that injustice is mighty as well. Or don’t you remember, Thrasymachus?” (350d6-8), Socrates asks. Why this reminder? Is it supposed to be comforting? Comfort understood as “now that you have no support for your initial claim, we have at least given support to the assertion that injustice is mighty.” That is, they have both given some and lost some approval. Is this what it means? Thrasymachus’ reply can indicate something of the sort, “I remember,” he says. “But even what you’re saying now doesn’t satisfy me” (ἀρέσκει, 350d9). So, Thrasymachus now confirms that he is not satisfied. He wants to say something about this, but he is convinced that if he does, Socrates will argue that he is “making a public harangue” (350e2). Instead of just starting to speak, he proposes a choice. Socrates can either let Thrasymachus say as much as he wants, or he can keep on questioning. If Socrates chooses the latter,

Thrasymachus threatens to act like the old wives telling tales: He will just reply “all right” and nod or shake his head. Socrates obviously does not want Thrasymachus to speak, but through the questioning, he wants Thrasymachus not to say anything contrary to his own opinion. However, Socrates already has led us to believe that Thrasymachus’ opinions are of a private character, which means that he cannot contribute. In this way, Thrasymachus is trapped. Still, he promises to do as Socrates urges, emphasizing that it is just to satisfy him “since you won’t let me speak. What else do you want?” (350e7-8). “Nothing, by Zeus [...], but if that’s what you are going to do, go ahead and do it. And I’ll ask questions” (350e9-10). Socrates’ swearing at this point resembles the situation earlier when Thrasymachus acknowledged that he could not convince Socrates and, as a last desperate outburst, asked, “If you are not persuaded by now, what am I supposed to do? Shall I take the argument and give your soul a forced feeding?” (345b4-6). The difference between now and then is that Thrasymachus at this moment no longer has the ambition to persuade Socrates of anything, now he goes on just to satisfy Socrates.

Socrates indicates that he understands Thrasymachus’ state of mind (frustration), so he elaborates, “I ask what I asked a moment ago so that we can, in an orderly fashion, make a thorough consideration of the argument about the character of justice as compared to injustice” (350e12-351a2). Socrates has now introduced the subject for the last theme, to compare the characters of justice and injustice, and again he anticipates one core theme of the *Republic*. As he now implicitly starts to expose parts of his topos, this whole section serves to be yet a new aide-mémoire, this time for both the particular and the universal audiences. Even if Socrates at one point or another indicates that injustice is more powerful and mightier than justice, this is not the subject anymore.⁵⁶ Because now, when they have agreed that justice is both wisdom and virtue, Socrates believes “it will easily come to light that it is also mightier than injustice, since injustice is lack of learning—no one could still be ignorant of that” (351a34-5). However, according to Socrates, this is a simple and general consideration. Hence, he wants to go another way and asks, “Would you say that a city is unjust that tries to enslave other cities unjustly and has reduced them to slavery and

⁵⁶ This turning creates the problem Socrates addresses in his summary (354b1 ff.).

keeps many enslaved to itself?” (351b1-3). Thrasymachus holds on to his earlier distinction between the “perfect just” and the “perfect unjust” and replies that, of course, it is so, and “it’s this the best city will most do, the one that is most perfectly unjust” (351b4-5). Socrates underlines he is aware that this is still Thrasymachus’ opinion, but this is not the way he wants to go. He is more interested in a distinct aspect: “Will the city that becomes stronger than another have this power without justice, or is it necessary for it to have this power with justice?” (351b7-9). It seems like Thrasymachus’ interest in discussion is awakened again because he not only takes the comparison theme literally, he also marks that through the proposed theme the difference between him and Socrates also comes to light. If it is as Socrates claims—that justice is wisdom—the city will become stronger than another with justice, but if Thrasymachus is right, it will become stronger with injustice. It would have been interesting to see how a discussion on these terms would have turned out if Socrates had chosen to enter it, but he does not. Instead, he says, “I am full of wonder, Thrasymachus, because you not only nod and shake your head but also give very fine (καλῶς) answers” (351c4-5). In Socrates’ reply there is again a detectable ambiguity through the word καλῶς (cf. Bloom 1991b, 442-43n149). Either Thrasymachus does not recognize the ambiguous reply from Socrates, or he chooses to ignore it. I think he recognizes it because of his answer “It’s because I am gratifying (χαρίζομαι) you” (351c6). Socrates wants more of Thrasymachus’ gratifying; hence, he demands Thrasymachus to tell him if he believes “that either a city, or an army, or pirates, or robbers, or any other tribe which has some common unjust enterprise would be able to accomplish anything if its members acted unjustly to one another? [...] And what if they didn’t act unjustly? Wouldn’t they be more able to accomplish something?” (351c7-d2). Thrasymachus agrees, but this agreement does not have a sound grounding because of the difference in perspectives. Without knowing what Socrates is going to say on this subject later, it is not easy to establish quite clearly what he at this point understands by “injustice” and “unjust actions.” Nevertheless, there is a clear indication of a strong connection between the injustice in a city and an individual. However, it seems like Thrasymachus speaks of a city, armies, and so on as a unit, and argues that this unit will achieve the greatest advantages if it acts unjustly externally.

Internally, it looks like he demands and depends on loyalty; thus “acting unjustly to one another” will be understood as the disappearance of loyalty.

We remember that Thrasymachus earlier stated that the virtue of injustice was “good advice” (εὐβουλία) and that cities governed by leaders possessing εὐβουλία were able to decide what was best for the whole, and such cities were not likely to be torn apart by factional disputes (cf. Woodruff 2013, 182). Socrates now argues the opposite when he states, “For surely, Thrasymachus, it’s injustice that produces factions (στάσεις), hatreds, and quarrels among themselves, and justice (δικαιοσύνη)⁵⁷ that produces unanimity and friendship. Isn’t it so?” (351d4-6).⁵⁸ So, when Thrasymachus’ viewpoint is the city as a whole, and from that perspective, he implies how the city ought to act outwards, Socrates’ viewpoint is internal, on the level of individuals, and from this perspective, injustice produces factions and justice friendships. At this point, I think Thrasymachus gives in and resigns, “Let it be so, so as not to differ with you” (351d7). “And it’s good of you to do so, you best of men” (351d8), Socrates replies. After having introduced the origin of *stasis*, a tireless Socrates goes on, and Thrasymachus keeps his promise—he agrees to everything, and when given alternatives he chooses politely. From here on the discussion develops on Socrates’ terms only.

Socrates’ argument goes like this: When injustice comes into being (both among free men and slaves), it will cause them to hate each other and to form factions and thus make them unable to accomplish anything in common. This is because the work of injustice is to implant hatred. When injustice comes into being between two individuals, they will differ and hate and finally become enemies, and the just men will also suffer. However, what happens if injustice should come into being within one

⁵⁷ The question and conception of δικαιοσύνη will be discussed in depth in Book IV 433a-434e.

⁵⁸ From here onward, the results of Book IV are being foreshadowed more clearly. The notion that justice when present in the individual keeps the individual at peace with himself is discussed in depth in 441d. Further, in Book IV, Socrates first describes justice in the *polis*, and afterwards justice in the individual, using the larger aggregate to assist him to find it in the smaller. We can observe the same method here in Socrates’ description of injustice. In Books VIII and IX, we find views on varieties of injustice in states and individuals. According to Adam, note on *Rep.* 351e, “The present passage (351a-352a), in fact, contains the undeveloped germ of the whole method and doctrine of the *Republic* (with the exception of Books V-VII).”

man only, will it then lose its power, or will it remain undiminished? Socrates asks. “Let it remain undiminished” (351e9), Thrasymachus answers unengaged. That he, in his answer signals indifference, does not seem to bother Socrates at all, on the contrary. Through Thrasymachus’ last reply, Socrates argues that something new comes to light: When someone or something possesses such a power, no matter where the power comes into being (a city, a clan, an army, and so on), the power—according to its nature—first “makes that thing unable to accomplish anything together with itself due to faction and difference, and then it makes that thing an enemy both to itself and to everything opposite and to the just” (352a1-4). Further, when the power is in one man, the same thing happens. First the power “will make him unable to act, because he is at faction and is not of one mind with himself, and, second, an enemy both to himself and to just men” (352a7-9). From this, Socrates works his way toward a conclusion by first asking if the gods are just and then stating that “the unjust man will also be an enemy to the gods [...] and the just man a friend” (352b2-3). The impression of Thrasymachus’ reply on this conclusion is that he wants to object, but he chooses not to do so to the men gathered: “Feast yourself boldly on the argument [...] for I won’t oppose you, so as not to irritate these men here” (352b4-5).

3.12 Socrates’ alleged refutation (352b6-354b1)

“Come, then [...] fill out the rest of the banquet for me by answering just as you have been doing” (352b6-7), is the way Socrates marks his last turn. In this section, he allegedly refutes Thrasymachus’ initial definition on the ground he has prepared for some time during three steps. Does he, through his opening-line, confirm Thrasymachus’ last reply, which indicates that the men gathered are signaling impatience? Socrates, for his part, signals that the “rest of the banquet” is now coming up. He starts by presenting a survey of what they have been discussing so far. He settles that through the discussion it has come to light that the just man is wiser and better “and more able to accomplish something” (352b8); the unjust man is not. He admits that this is not the complete truth about the unjust men, for even they can accomplish “some common object with one another” (352c2). However, if they were completely unjust, “they could never have restrained themselves with one another” (352c3-4). This must mean that Thrasymachus and Socrates did not discuss the

“perfect unjust” thoroughly. Further, it must mean that what I took to be Thrasymachus’ concept of “loyalty,” Socrates now calls justice. Hence, he argues that “it is plain that there was a certain justice in them (i.e., the unjust men) which caused them at least not to do injustice to one another at the same time that they were seeking to do it to others” (352c4-5). Socrates further stresses that this is how he understands these things to be. They are not as Thrasymachus set them down. This is not quite a summary of what they have discussed, but more a summary of Socrates’ opinions on the subjects they have discussed. According to Socrates, they also proposed to consider whether the just man lived a better and happier life than the unjust man. On the basis of what they have said, it is Socrates’ opinion that the just man lives better. However, they must consider (σκεπτέον, 352d4) this question more thoroughly because this “argument is not about just any question, but about the way one should live” (352d6-7). “Consider (σκόπει, 352d8),” Thrasymachus replies.

As he starts his consideration, Socrates simultaneously starts the direct refutation of the view that injustice is more beneficial than justice. He does so by arguing that the life of the just man is better than that of the unjust. Socrates begins with a series of analogy arguments, but Thrasymachus does not quite understand the relevance of these arguments, so Socrates presents a few examples, for instance: Because we cannot see with anything else than our eyes, the work of the eyes is to see. The purpose of this line of questioning is to make Thrasymachus understand that “the work of each thing is what it alone can do” (353a10). Thrasymachus now confirms that he understands and that this is in accordance with his opinion. Socrates turns to virtue: “Does there seem to you also to be a virtue for each thing to which some work is assigned?” (353b2-3). He returns to the former examples; the virtue of the eyes is sight; the virtue of the ears is hearing. But could eyes do their proper work without their proper virtue? That is, with blindness (vice) instead of sight (virtue)? Does not the same go for ears? From these examples, Socrates turns to the soul. The work of the soul is living, and its virtue is justice. Deprived of its virtue, the soul will perform its work badly, while the virtuous soul will be able to do things like managing, ruling, and deliberating well. From these considerations, it follows that “the just soul and the just man will have a good life and the unjust man a bad one” (353e10-11). It seems like Thrasymachus is

still quite unengaged when he replies: “It looks like it [...] according to your argument.” Further, according to Socrates’ argumentation, it follows that “the man who lives well is blessed and happy, and the man who does not is the opposite” (354a). From the agreement on this, Socrates can present a two-step conclusion. First, he concludes that “the just man is happy” because “it is not profitable to be wretched; rather it is profitable to be happy.” The final conclusion is that “injustice is never more profitable than justice.”

Now that Socrates seemingly has refuted Thrasymachus and apparently has reached the preferable conclusion, he surely must be content; at least Thrasymachus seems to make that inference when saying: “Let that [...] be the fill of your banquet at the festival of Bendis, Socrates” (354a10-11). Nonetheless, Socrates turns out to be ambivalent. On the one hand, he is pleased because Thrasymachus has grown gentle and stopped being hard on him; on the other hand, however, he stresses that “I have not had a fine banquet, but it’s my own fault, not yours” (354a13-b1). Why is Socrates not content?

3.13 Socrates’ summary (354b1-354c5)

In his summary, Socrates compares the discussion with Thrasymachus with a meal consisting of several courses. Throughout the meal, he admits to having acted like a greedy glutton; gluttonous he ate ravenously without tasting and digesting course by course. What exactly went wrong? According to Socrates, it all went wrong right from the start. He admits that the major error was that he did not pay attention to the initial question “What is justice?” Instead, he started to consider whether it is vice and lack of learning, or wisdom and virtue. The next mistake was that he started to pursue another argument: Is injustice more profitable than justice? The result of the discussion, according to him, is that he “knows nothing.” By ending his summary with yet another reference to the Socratic topos, he also—in addition to reproaching himself and taking the blame—implicitly states that he learned nothing of substance from Thrasymachus and thereby implies that the same goes for the particular audience. They learned nothing either. This confession marks an imperative turning point in the text.

In the introduction to this chapter, I argued that the theme in the conversation between Thrasymachus and Socrates was discussed via two incompatible topoi. In my

reading, I have tried to show how this theme was displayed and that it marks a first step to distinguish between sophistry and philosophy. Also, I have suggested that during these sections, the narrator is not always reliable due to his tendentious language, some of his evaluations must be apprehended as exaggerations. These instances I take to be urgent requests to the readers for starting to take a stance themselves. Socrates admits an error, and from this, he concludes that he and Thrasymachus talked past one another. I have observed and claimed that the difference between the two parties goes much deeper, and in the next chapter we will learn that Glaucon and Adeimantus observed the same, and hence, will claim the same.

Chapter 4: Prologue III. The tide is turning for Thrasymachus (357a1-369b4)

The challenges Socrates now is forced to meet are essential to understand the dramatic development in the rest of the *Republic*. Therefore, my aim in this chapter is to lift them forward as Glaucon and Adeimantus present them, and thereby confirm that the narrator was not always reliable throughout the previous sections.

In the continuation of Socrates' concluding argument, the narrator informs us that Socrates now thought he was "freed from argument," but the three conversations so far turned out to be "only a prelude (προοίμιον)." For Glaucon, we are told, "is always most courageous (ἀνδρειότατος) in everything, and so now he didn't accept Thrasymachus' giving up" (357a2-4). The close reading in chapter 3 suggested several other reasons for Thrasymachus' "giving up" than the one given by the narrator now. He simply states that Thrasymachus gave up because he was refuted, while I have argued that Thrasymachus resigned due to the two incompatible *topoi* employed. I argued that Thrasymachus realized that any agreement would be impossible due to the difference in terms and perspective. I further suggest that my suspicion is confirmed by Glaucon when he asks: "Socrates, do you want to *seem to have* persuaded us or *truly to* persuade us that it is in every way better to be just than unjust?" (357a5-b2). At first, Glaucon's question seems surprising. It may seem surprising to the particular audience due to its polemic feature. If the men gathered have signaled a kind of boredom, as Thrasymachus indicated earlier, Glaucon has surely awakened them. This also goes for the universal audience, and the readers should at this point prepare to reconsider their inferences and start anew.

As Socrates confirms that he wants to persuade them (and us), Glaucon harshly replies: "Well, then you're not doing what you want" (357b4). This brief word exchange is imperative because Glaucon here points out that Socrates, through his conducts, has exposed a discrepancy between his words and deeds. To my knowledge, this is the only occurrence in the corpus where we find an explicit underlining of such a discrepancy addressed directly to Socrates. Glaucon acknowledges that what Socrates has been doing so far is not sufficient. He finds it necessary to give him a

profound challenge, through which Socrates gradually is forced to display the place or perspective he is speaking from. That is, Socrates needs to show the particular audience how and from where he warrants his arguments, and thereby exhibit a new kind of knowledge which in turn legitimizes the new discipline, philosophy. Glaucon strongly signals that the well-known Socratic topos (I do not know anything) will not do in this context. How does he force Socrates, the philosopher, to step up? He does so by setting forth a set of arguments that need to be answered. Thus, it is the conversation between Thrasymachus and Socrates that provoked Glaucon, and it is the conversation between Glaucon and Socrates that, in turn, will trigger Adeimantus. However, it is Thrasymachus' alleged fall that makes Glaucon take on the responsibility. Socrates is given two choices to consider. He can choose to decline and leave, or, he can stand up and accept the challenge. Socrates chooses the latter.

4.1 Glaucon and Socrates (357b3-362d2)

Glaucon sets out by performing a sort of test on Socrates, and by that particular testing, it seems like he aims to drive Socrates, the philosopher, out. He intends to “scope him out” as Socrates did toward Hippocrates in the *Protagoras*,¹ or he will stimulate his intellect like Socrates did toward Cephalus (cf. 329d8). His strategy is first to make Socrates agree upon the existence of three kinds of goods (εἶδος ἀγαθόν). By introducing the key term εἶδος, and by performing a test, he indicates for the first time that he knows of Socrates' concealed topos. He demands Socrates to place justice within the category he sees fit. Socrates plays along and states that justice “belongs in the finest kind, which the man who is going to be blessed should like both for itself and for what comes out of it” (358a1-3).

Did Glaucon foresee this answer? I suspect he did, because Socrates is now confronted with the same argument he himself stated to Cephalus (cf. 329e1): “Well, that’s not the opinion of the many (τοῖς πολλοῖς, 358a4),” Glaucon argues, before he paraphrases Thrasymachus and states that the opinion of the many, rather, “seems to belong to the form of drudgery, which should be practiced for the sake of wages and the reputation that comes from opinion (δόξαν), but all by itself, it should be fled from as something hard” (358a4-6). Regardless of whether the phrase “the many (τοῖς

¹ I return to this in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.1: Hippocrates' dream, p. 282 ff.

πολλοῖς)” is to be understood as “people in general” or “the political class,” Glaucon has, by his introduction to the challenge, managed to exhibit that Socrates and his opinion on justice is to be found outside, or at another place than, “the reputation that comes from opinion” existing among his fellow citizens. This entails that Socrates’ opinions do not find support in any well-known topos and hints again to the recognition of a concealed topos. Socrates admits that he knows that it is the general opinion and, he also acknowledges that it was this Thrasymachus put forth when he blamed justice and praised injustice. Socrates could also have admitted that this was the reason why they did not reach any real agreement, but instead, he indicates that they “talked past one another,” and this was the reason why they developed a violent discourse. When Socrates now concludes by yet another hint toward the Socratic topos, saying that it “seems I am a poor learner” (δυσμαθής, 358a9), his reluctant attitude has explicitly surfaced. Even if this can be taken as an implicit apology to Thrasymachus, Socrates signals that he is still unwilling to enter the realm where he and his arguments belong.

4.1.1 Introductory remarks to Glaucon’s challenge (358b1-e4)

Glaucon does not respond to Socrates’ admission, nor to his statement of being a poor learner. Instead, he presents an appeal: “Come, now [...] hear me too and see if you still have the same opinion” (δοκῆ, 358b2). This appeal could indicate that he is not yet sure if Socrates wants to walk the road Glaucon intends him to, hence, for his request to be heard he gives Socrates an opportunity to decide for himself. “For it looks to me,” he says, “as though Thrasymachus, like a snake, has been charmed more quickly than he should have been; yet to my way of thinking (νοῦν), there was still no proof about either” (358b2-4). What does this utterance mean? This is unreserved support for Thrasymachus. By stating these words, it becomes clear that Glaucon is familiar with Socrates’ modus operandi. According to Glaucon, Thrasymachus was not disarmed by sound arguments—on the contrary, there were no proofs. Instead, he argues that Thrasymachus was “charmed” (κληθηθῆναι)² too quickly. By comparing

² “Charmed” translates κληθηθῆναι (from κηλέω) which also means to *bewitch, enchant, beguile, fascinate*, esp. by music, cf. Liddle and Scott. On the vocabulary of magic in Plato, see Belfiore (1980).

Thrasymachus with a snake being hypnotized (or bewitched or enchanted),³ and by picturing Socrates as the hypnotizer, Glaucon confirms that he knows of the potential effects Socrates has on people, and he apparently also knows why. Thrasymachus' irritation, his confusion, and his feeling of powerlessness were due to Socrates' twisting and bending. This Glaucon wants the others gathered to understand. So, he presents a task for Socrates, and also, he makes it clear how he intends to act during the Socratic problem-solving. He desires (ἐπιθυμῶ) to hear what justice *is*, and “what power (δύναμιν) it has all alone by itself when it is in the soul—dismissing its wages and its consequences” (358b4-7). If Socrates gives his consent, Glaucon will first restore Thrasymachus' argument, and then tell what kind of thing the many or people in general say justice is and its origin. Secondly, he will claim that all those who practice justice do so unwillingly. Thirdly, he will show that it is fitting that they do so, for the life of the unjust man is, after all, far better than that of the just man, as people in general say.

He stresses that this is not at all *his own* opinion, but he is at loss because he has “been talked deaf by Thrasymachus and countless others, while the argument on behalf of justice—that it is better than injustice—I’ve yet to hear from anyone as I want it” (358c7-d3). Here, Glaucon confirms that he is at a crossroads. He is familiar with the general opinion—as Thrasymachus presented it—but he has never heard a satisfactory explanation on what justice *is*. Hence, he now wants to “hear it extolled all by itself,” and he supposes that it would be most likely to learn that from Socrates. To learn the nature of justice and injustice from Socrates, who assumedly will present it from a philosophical perspective, Glaucon will take the role of “devil’s advocate” and demands Socrates to act accordingly. He underlines the “reason why I’ll speak in vehement praise of the unjust life, and in speaking, I’ll point out to you how I want to hear you, in your turn, blame injustice and praise justice” (358c4-6).

³ In the *Protagoras*, people are charmed or enchanted by Protagoras; first there are the young men following Protagoras around, Protagoras “enchants (κεκηλημένοι) with his voice like Orpheus, and they follow the sound of his voice in a trance” (315b); then it is Socrates who, after listening to Protagoras, states that he “was entranced (κεκηλημένος, 328d) and just looked at him for a long time as if he was going to say more” (328d).

By this decision, Glaucon has insured himself that Socrates will reveal a new understanding of what justice *is*, and he expects this to be contrary to the view accepted by the many or people in general. In this way, Glaucon implicitly demands Socrates to reveal parts of his concealed topos. There is still a possibility that Socrates will decline, so Glaucon ends his proposal by addressing Socrates: “See if what I’m saying is what you want” (358d7). Socrates responds positively and seems content when stating: “[...] What would an intelligent (νοῦν) man enjoy talking and hearing about more again and again?” (358e1-2). Thus, Glaucon’s stage is set.

4.1.2 Glaucon’s three-fold challenge (358e5-361d7)

As Socrates accepted Glaucon’s suggestion, their respective roles are also clarified. Also, this agreement signals the start of dissolving the discrepancies between Socrates’ words and deeds. However, for Socrates to reveal his understanding of justice and injustice, we need to know what it is an alternative to. This knowledge Glaucon gives us when he elaborates on the three points he initially set forth in his proposal.

4.1.2.1 Genesis and being of justice according to people in general

According to Glaucon, the argument of people, in general, goes like this:

They say that doing injustice is naturally good, and suffering injustice bad, but that the bad in suffering injustice far exceeds the good in doing it;⁴ so that, when they do injustice to one another and suffer it and taste of both, it seems profitable—to those who are not able to escape the one and choose the other—to set down a compact among themselves neither to do injustice nor to suffer it (358e5-359a2).

The story tells that from this reasoning they began to set down their laws (νόμους) and conventional agreements or contracts (συνθήκας); then they continued by naming what the law commands lawful and just. This, Glaucon concludes, “is the genesis (γένεσίν) and being (οὐσίαν) of justice” (359a2-6). According to this elaboration, there seems to be a huge irregularity between the conventional opinions, where injustice is acknowledged as a “natural good” and the laws which are supposed to command the “lawful and just.” In this context, I am in accordance with Bloom (1991b), and think we ought to render the laws as the unwritten laws or conventional agreements

⁴ A similar theory is set forth by Callicles in the *Gorgias*, cf. 483a, 492c.

understood as “ancestral practice which governs a group of men” (ibid, 446n3).⁵ According to this logic, the laws (νόμους) become the opposite of what comes naturally. Thus, given this agreement on the laws, one cannot act badly toward fellow citizens if one acts within the limits of the law. This means, Glaucon continues, that justice is only “a mean between what is best—doing injustice without paying the penalty—and what is worst—suffering injustice without being able to avenge oneself. The just is in the middle (μέσση) between these two, cared for not because it is good but because it is honored due to a want of vigor in doing injustice” (359a6-b2).

In this context, it is likely that Cephalus’ opinion—pay back what one owes—was grounded in the laws; while Polemarchus’ understanding of justice—do good to your friends and bad to your enemies—was grounded in the general opinion which in turn points toward the moral topos. Thrasymachus’ argument was nuanced and grounded in both, as Glaucon shows.

4.1.2.2 No one acts voluntarily for the sake of the just

Glaucon’s second claim is that those who practice justice do not do so willingly, but from “incapacity to do injustice” (358b7-8). To give a reason for the claim, Glaucon presents a challenging question: What happens if both the just and unjust man are given license to do whatever they want? He asserts that the just will follow the same path as the unjust due to greed (πλεονεξίαν, 359c5) and contends that “this is what any nature (φύσις) naturally pursues as good, while it is law (νόμος) which by force perverts (βία παράγεται) it to honor (τιμῆν) equality” (359c5-7). Further, he asserts that the story of the ancestor of Gyges⁶ and his ring will be of help for us to perceive

⁵ Bloom underlines that “a law is not necessarily what is passed by an assembly.” This can also be an ancestral practice.

⁶ Bloom (1991b, 447n4) encourages the readers to compare Glaucon’s account of the Gyges story with Herodotus’ story on Gyges (*History*, I, 8-13). Such a comparison is done by Howland (2005). Contrary to the scholarly convention which holds that *logos* and *muthos* are fundamentally opposed, whereas the former being the medium of philosophy and the latter of poetry, Howland argues that *muthos*, in the broad sense of story or narrative, plays an indispensable philosophical role in the *Republic*. In particular, any account of the nature and power of justice and injustice must begin with powers of the soul that can come to light only through the telling and interpretation of stories. Howland argues that this is implicit in Glaucon’s Gygean tale, and when reading the earlier tale of Gyges in Herodotus in connection with Glaucon’s *muthos*, Howland concludes that the latter shows itself to be a story about storytelling and interpretation, knowledge of self and others, and the discovery of the roots of justice and injustice. Cf. Saxonhouse (2006, 57-82).

this. In Glaucon's story, there are two rings, so that the just and unjust man can have one each; in this way, they are both in possession of the same power as Gyges's ancestor and licensed to do whatever they want. "[...] no one," says Glaucon, "as it would seem, would be so adamant as to stick by justice and bring himself to keep away from what belongs to others and not lay hold of it [...]. And in so doing, one would act no differently from the other, but both would go the same way" (360b4-c5). I find it remarkable that when two men are given license to "do whatever they want," they will choose to steal (to take what he wanted from the market without fear), to rape (to go into houses and have intercourse with whomever he wanted), and to kill (to slay or release from bonds whomever he wanted), and to do other things as an equal to a god among humans. Nevertheless, Glaucon emphasizes that this is the case. When he further says that "all men suppose" injustice to be far more profitable privately than justice, then a reasonable inference will be that there are no just men—only a double standard ruled by fear. If, on the one hand, others knew that a man had a license to do whatever he wanted and obviously could get away with whatever he did, he would be considered most foolish if he did not lay his hands on what belonged to others. So, within this scenario, a potential just man acts unjustly due to fear of being called foolish in public. On the other hand, would those aware of it praise him and thus deceive each other due to fear of suffering injustice. In this way Thrasymachus' reasoning was correct, viewed from the perspective of the many.

4.1.2.3 *The life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just man*

So, how are we to make a judgment about the life of these two men who got this license? According to Glaucon, the only way to do this is to view them in opposition to each other. Only then will we be able to make a correct judgment. This viewing entails a new thought experiment, conducted as follows: "We shall take away nothing from the injustice of the unjust man nor from the justice of the just man, but we shall take each as perfect in his own pursuit" (360e4-7). In this experiment the unjust man is supposed to take on a mask and stand forth as being a well-skilled craftsman, a clever doctor or pilot who knows very well what is possible or impossible within his craft and, as such, is competent always to set himself right. He will perform his deeds in the approved manner and, if he is perfectly unjust, he will get away with it. The man

caught is not perfectly unjust; him we consider to be a common person (φαῦλον, 361a5).⁷ In this way, the extreme injustice will seem to be just when it is not. Therefore “the perfectly unjust man must be given the most perfect injustice, and nothing must be taken away; he must be allowed to do the greatest injustices while having provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice” (361a6-b1). This was the unjust man, so now we turn to the just man. The just man is “simple and noble” (361b6-7). He *is* good, and not one who wishes to *seem* to be good. I think it is noteworthy that regarding the just man and “what seems to be [...]” Glaucon refers explicitly to Aeschylus. By this reference, he also awakens the poetic topos, but there is a little twist when Glaucon paraphrases a quote from the *Seven Against Thebes*. In that play, the man described wishes to be “best” (ἄριστος, 592) while Glaucon says “does not wish to seem, but rather to be, good” (ἀγαθὸν, 361b7). The words “best (ἄριστος)” and “good (ἀγαθὸν)” have different connotations. I take it that the first gives associations toward the competitive culture of Athens, while the latter allows for assertion toward the upcoming discussions in the *Republic*. Although it is not this dissimilarity Glaucon seeks, the terms are stated and give food for thoughts as we follow Glaucon onward. He argues that it is “to seem” that must be taken away because, if he merely seems to be just, there would be no difference between him and the unjust man. Therefore, the just man “must be stripped of everything except justice, and his situation must be made the opposite of the first man’s” (361c3-5). He shall have “the greatest reputation for injustice, so that his justice may be put to the test (βεβασανισμένος, 361c6) to see if it is softened by a bad reputation and its consequences” (361c5-7). When Glaucon now demands that in this experiment justice should be tested, he picks up on the term βασανίζειν which alludes to the “gold-mining” theme. This further alludes to Polemarchus’ turning. By these allusions, Glaucon signals that he has been attentive and that he recognizes what Socrates has

⁷ φαῦλον translates “a common person,” in this context “one who does not get away.” Cf. Protagoras when he speaks of the many (people in general) who do not understand anything and therefore are obedient to the rulers: “Now, for a runaway not to succeed in running away but to be caught in the open is sheer folly from the start and inevitably makes men even more hostile than they were before, for on top of everything else they perceive him as a real rogue” (317b). Cf. also Adam, note on *Rep.* 361a, who points out the Spartan practice of punishing boys not for stealing, but for being caught.

been doing. Toward the universal audience, Glaucon is building trust and making us more attentive.

From Glaucon's arguments, it looks like the "perfectly just man" has been given the hardest life to live. He must live this life unchanged until death and seeming throughout his whole life to be unjust although he is just. So, only when both justice and injustice have reached the extreme, is it possible for us to judge and tell which one of the two is the happiest. Socrates' response to this speech is: "My, my, my dear Glaucon, how vigorously you polish up each of the two men—just like a statue (ἀνδριάντα)—for their judgment" (361d5-7). Glaucon replies that he has done his best. But he is not done yet. He must complete his speech by telling what kind of life awaits the two, and with two such extremes, he supposes this will be an easy task. Before he starts, he stresses for the third time that these are not his own words; he is only repeating the words from those who praise injustice over of justice. This statue or this image of a man that Glaucon has placed before us is somewhat frightening, and the image will not improve when he tells about his fate.

4.1.3 Glaucon's summary (361d8-362c7)

According to Glaucon, those who praise injustice will say that "the just man who has such a disposition will be whipped; he'll be racked; he'll be bound; he'll have both his eyes burned out, and at the end, when he has undergone every sort of evil, he'll be crucified and know that one shouldn't wish to be, but to seem to be, just" (361e3-362a3). If this is the fate of a good man, who *is* good and not only seems to be good, it is not a life anyone would choose willingly. Although we know that Glaucon's wording is short and apt, the future for the just and good man is horrific. Glaucon's summary of the benefits of being unjust is similar to Thrasymachus' earlier claims. He stated that the unjust gets to rule because he seems to be just; he "takes in marriage from whatever station he wants and gives in marriage to whomever he wants;" he can get into contracts and partnerships with whomever he wants, and "besides benefiting himself in all this, he gains because he has no qualms about doing injustice. So, then, when he enters contests, both private and public, he wins and gets the better (πλεονεκτεῖν, 362b7) of his enemies. In getting the better, he is wealthy and does good to friends and harm to enemies" (cf. 343d-e; 349b ff.). These benefits listed also allude

to Simonides (cf. 334b) where justice was masquerading injustice. However, here it is the opposite: injustice masquerading justice that is claimed to benefit friends and injure enemies.⁸ The unjust man also makes sacrifices and sets up votive offerings for the gods which are adequate and magnificent. The unjust man cares for the gods and those human beings he wants to care for far better than the just man because it is more appropriate for him to be dearer to the gods than is the just man. These last descriptions recall Cephalus' offerings and the reasons he gave for caring for the gods. Hence Glaucon's words here can be taken as an implicit (general) critique toward the outlooks he and his generation represent. Glaucon rounds off by concluding that this is what people in general hold, and therefore "with gods and with humans, a better life is provided for the unjust man than for the just man" (362c6-7).

During Glaucon's elaboration, Adeimantus paid attention and must have noticed that Socrates was prepared to comment on what had been stated, because the narrator addresses the universal audience and says, "When Glaucon had said this, I had it in mind to say something to it, but his brother Adeimantus" interrupted (362d1-3).

4.2 Adeimantus and Socrates (362d3-369b4)

"You surely don't believe, Socrates, that the argument has been adequately stated?" (362d3-4) Adeimantus asks and stresses that the things most needed to be said have not been said. Socrates does not seem to be surprised, and he wants Adeimantus to fill in the gaps Glaucon left open. "And yet," Socrates says, "what he [i.e., Glaucon] said was already enough to bring me to my knees and make it impossible to help out justice" (362d8-10). This is Socrates' third hint toward the Socratic topos, but while Glaucon earlier rejected Socrates' hinting with silence, Adeimantus bluntly rejects his rhetoric by calling Socrates' proclamation "nonsense" (362e1). Instead, he demands that Socrates listen to what he has to say: "We must also go through the arguments opposed to those of which he spoke, those that praise justice and blame injustice" (362e2-3). According to Adeimantus, Glaucon's intention will then be clearer. He sets out by presenting two clusters of arguments.

⁸ Cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 362b.

4.2.1 Cluster I: Arguments related to reputation (362e4-363e4)

The first cluster is related to good reputation, and Adeimantus' point of departure is the fathers and all those who have care for anyone, that is, the ones who in one way or another have to do with *paideia*. He asserts that they all urge that one must be just, though "they don't praise justice by itself but the good reputations that come from it" (363a2-3). When they exhort their charges to be just, they gain some benefits as a result. Adeimantus' first argument is in accordance with Thrasymachus and Glaucon: Ruling offices and marriages will come to the one who seems to be just. His second argument relates to general thoughts on practicing religion. Here he recalls Cephalus' statements, but in a somewhat ironical way: "by throwing in good reputation with the gods, they can tell of an inexhaustible store of goods that they say gods give to the holy" (363a6-8). This "inexhaustible store" Adeimantus exemplifies through the features of afterlife set forth by the poets. When they speak about what the gods give to the holy, the source for people, in general, is the poetical topos. The first ones presented are Hesiod and Homer who say pretty much the same things about what the gods make for the just. Secondly, it is Musaeus and his son⁹ who "give the just even headier goods than these from the gods" (363c3-4). Through their speeches, they make people believe that "the finest wage of virtue is an eternal drunk" (363d2-3). Thirdly, Adeimantus presents others who extend the wages from the gods yet further than these; "[...] they extol justice. In turn, they bury the unholy and unjust in mud¹⁰ in Hades and compel them to carry waters in a sieve; and they bring them into bad reputation while they are still alive" (363d5-e1). "Thus," Adeimantus concludes, "those penalties that Glaucon described as the lot of the just men who are reputed to be unjust, these people say are the lot of the unjust. However, they have nothing else to say. This then is the praise and blame attached to each" (363d8-e4). From Adeimantus' elaboration we learn that when justice and injustice are considered from

⁹ Bloom (1991b, 447n10) explains that by the son of Musaeus, Adeimantus may refer to "Eumolpus who, among other things, was reputed to have instituted the Eleusinian Mysteries, one of the central Athenian religious observances. His descendants were the Eleusinian priests. If it is indeed Eumolpus who is meant, Adeimantus is implicitly criticizing the official Athenian understanding of the future life."

¹⁰ Adam, note on *Rep.* 363d, says "something which they call mud" and explains that this mud is Orphic. The employment of the Danaid legend in Orphic teaching is illustrated in the *Gorgias* 493b; cf. also the *Phaedo* 69c and the *Republic* 533d.

the perspective of the afterlife, things are turned upside down. According to Glaucon, the just man is punished in the life here and now, but according to Adeimantus, the unjust man is punished in the afterlife. The conviction of how and where these punishments are received results in a discrepancy which is bound to create a double standard: In fear of the afterlife, the unjust man wants a reputation of being just; and in fear of being perceived as foolish and being punished, the just man cannot exist in the public sphere. In this light, Cephalus' definition of justice (to pay back what one owes) makes sense; this is not to say that Cephalus was an unjust man, but that he—due to fear of the afterlife—wanted to make sure that the books were balanced before he departed. So, if Glaucon sets forth a critique against the double standards in contemporary Athens, Adeimantus directs his against how some present a spurious depiction of the Orphic conception of the afterlife, the official understanding of the afterlife and Greek religion in general.¹¹

4.2.2 Cluster II: Arguments in speeches (363e5-365a3)

In his second cluster of arguments, Adeimantus wants Socrates to “consider still another form of speeches about justice and injustice, spoken in prose (ἰδίᾳ, 363e6) and by poets” (363e5-364a1). “Prose,” which translates ἰδίᾳ, has commonly been understood as writing in prose, but the reference is only to the representations of private persons (i.e., parents).¹² Bloom (1991b, 447n11) points out that “[t]he expression for prose is composed of words meaning “to speak privately” and could also mean what one says in private.” Words spoken in prose refers to representations of private persons, while words spoken by the poets (who also in a sense were the professional teachers of Greece) include public speeches written in verse and poetry addressed to men in large groups (cf. *ibid.*).¹³ By this distinction, Adeimantus

¹¹ Cf. Bloom (1991b, 447n10), and Adam, note on *Rep.* 363b and 363c. On the critique related to the Orphic conception of the afterlife, Adeimantus says that the “beggar priests” and “diviners” present “a babble of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, offspring of the Moon and the Muses, as they say, according to whose prescriptions they busy themselves about their sacrifices” (364e3-5).

¹² Cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 363e.

¹³ Bloom (1991b, 447n11) presents an appeal on this ground: “Prose has a naturalness and frankness connected with its private character, and this should provide a basis for reflection on Plato’s choice of prose for the presentation of his own thought.” This appeal is addressed by quite a few scholars; see, for example, Hyland (1968).

foreshadows the discussion developing at 366e ff., and which is discussed from an alternative perspective at 606c ff.¹⁴

When it comes to speeches about justice and injustice, the speeches in prose and those by the poets are spoken with one tongue. They all “chant that moderation (σωφροσύνη, 364a2) and justice (δικαιοσύνη, 364a2) are fair, but hard and full of drudgery, while intemperance (ἀκολασία, 364a3) and injustice (ἀδικία, 364a3) are sweet and easy to acquire, and shameful (αἰσχρόν, 364a5) only by opinion and law” (364a1-5). In accordance with Thrasymachus, Adeimantus states that both in public and in private they say that the unjust is, for the most part, more profitable than the just. They are even “ready and willing to call happy and to honor bad men who have wealth or some other power, and to dishonor and overlook those who happen in some way to be weak or poor, although they agree that the latter are better than the former” (364a5-b2). Although this argument is not directly transferable to Cephalus’ statement that the pleasure of wealth goes only for the “decent” or the morally reasonable man, Adeimantus’ argument here can be viewed as a second criticism toward the attitude of the elder generation.

“The most wonderful (θαυμασιώτατοι, 364b3) of all these speeches are those they give about gods and virtue” (364b2-4), Adeimantus ironically claims. He relates these speeches to “beggar priests” and “diviners.” They claim that the gods themselves are sometimes kind to the wicked; they proclaim that the gods sometimes allocate misfortune and a bad life to many good men, and an opposite fate to opposite men. They wander “to the doors of the rich man and persuade him that the gods have provided them with a power based on sacrifices and incantations” (364b6-c1). If then, the rich man himself, or his ancestors, once has committed some injustice, they promise to heal the deed with pleasures and feasts. Even if he should wish “to ruin some enemies at small expense, he will injure just and unjust alike with certain evocations and spells. They, as they say, persuade the gods to serve them” (364c3-5). Had Cephalus been exposed to such men? Could this be the reason for his vague utterance about the pleasures of wealth? It could very well be so, and Cephalus did find support for his opinions by quoting the poets, as Adeimantus stresses. These

¹⁴ The same distinction (private versus poets) is also present in the *Laws* (890a).

beggar-priests and diviners do not only persuade private persons but cities as well. They present a babble of books by Orpheus and people are led to believe that ...

... through sacrifices and pleasurable games there are, after all, deliverances and purifications from unjust deeds for those still living. And there are also rites for those who are dead (τελευτήσασιν, 365a1). These, which they call initiations (τελετή, 365a2) deliver us from the evils in the other place; while, for those who did not sacrifice, terrible things are waiting (364e6-365a3).

What Adeimantus describes here is a perverted twist on the Orphic tradition, where the words τελευτάω (ending life) and τελετή are connected, because they seem to mean that the sensations of dying resembled those of initiation into the Great Mysteries.¹⁵ Thus the beggar-priests and diviners are delivering solutions which are perverting and poisoning the religious life in Athens and the common opinions of the gods by making people believe that “anything goes” if they pay the fee for the rites and make the prescribed offerings.

4.2.3 Arguments threatening the souls of the young (365a4-c6)

It now turns out that Adeimantus has presented all these examples because he is concerned and worried on behalf of the youths: “My dear Socrates,” he says, “with all these things being said—of this sort and in this quantity—about virtue and vice and how human beings and gods honor them, what do we suppose they do to the souls of the young men who hear them?” (365a4-7). Adeimantus ponders what will become of the youths with good natures (εὐφρεῖς, 365a7) and the capacity (ικανοί, 365a7) to search the path that will give them the best life? The ones with good nature are the ones with the capacity to fly (ἐπιπτόμενοι, 365a8) around like bees collecting honey. When this seeker has collected his “honey,” he will most likely listen to Pindar who asks, “Will I ‘with justice or with crooked deceits scale the higher wall’ where I can fortify myself all around and live out my life?” (365b2-5). Adeimantus is convinced that in all the things said so far—by Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and himself—there is nothing which indicates that being just is an advantage, and “the labors and penalties involved are evident” (365b6-7).

¹⁵ Cf. Schleiermacher and Kurz (1990, 115n16); Bloom (1991b, 447n14); and Adam, note on *Rep.* 365a.

At this point, Adeimantus changes his use of pronouns; he switches from the third person “he” to first person “I.” This could indicate that he identifies with the seeker mentioned above: “But if I’m unjust, but have provided myself with a reputation for justice, a divine life is promised” (365b7-c1). Because he would have chosen to listen to the wise ones, he would have lent his ear to the saying “the seeming overpowers even the truth” (365c2),¹⁶ and because “seeming” seems to be the master of happiness, he would surely have turned to it. What would such a life be like? Adeimantus’ answer to this is worth listening to: “As façade and exterior I must draw a shadow painting¹⁷ of virtue all around me, while behind it I must trail the wily and subtle fox of the most wise Archilochus” (365c3-6). This textual “I” now develops a thought experiment, and then continues as a collective “we” in the next section. Using a variant of the method creating “an imaginary interlocutor,” Adeimantus presents a severe critique against the general opinion in Athens.

4.2.4 Adeimantus creates “an imaginary interlocutor” (365c6-366b3)

Like Socrates did, when discussing with Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, Adeimantus now creates an imaginary interlocutor called “someone,” whereas the collective “we” provides the answers. In using one part of the well-known “Socratic method,” Adeimantus discloses that he is familiar with the concept of “doing philosophy.” This implies that Adeimantus now sets out to investigate (ἐξετάζω) the dominant opinions in contemporary Athens, a society he identifies with through his use of the collective “we.”

“But,” says someone, “it’s not always easy to do bad and get away with it unnoticed.”

“Nothing great is easy,” we’ll say. “But at all events, if we are going to be happy we must go where the tracks of the arguments lead. For, as to getting away with it, we’ll organize secret societies and clubs; and there are teachers of persuasion who offer the wisdom of the public assembly and the court. On this basis, in some things we’ll persuade and in others use force; thus, we’ll get the better and not pay the penalty” (365c6-d6).

¹⁶ This saying is attributed to Simonides. Cf. also the *Laws*, 950c.

¹⁷ σκιαγραφίαν (365c4) translates “shadow painting” which also denotes “perspective drawing;” cf. 523b and 602d. σκιαγραφίαν with its cognate words is continually used to denote things unreal, counterfeit, or illusory. cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 365c, cf. also *Theaetetus* 208e.

In this imaginary word exchange, there are strong allusions to the political life of Athens,¹⁸ and the statement given by “someone” also alludes to the Spartan ideal in which boys were not punished for doing a crime, but for being caught doing so.¹⁹ The “we” proposes that happiness is secured by following the tracks of the argument set forth by “someone.” If we want to do bad and get away with it, we organize secret societies and clubs where we foster conspiracies.²⁰ Such conspirators are always a threat to the political establishment; and when the teachers of persuasion (sophists and rhetoricians) also, offer to help one get around the public assembly and courts, it is possible to get away unpunished. Consequently, it is possible to plan a strategy for getting away when it comes to people and society, but is it possible to lure the gods?

“But, says someone, “it surely isn’t possible to get away from the gods or overpower them.”

“But, if there are no gods, or if they have no care for human things, why should we care at all about getting away?” we’ll say. “And if there are gods and they care, we know of them or have heard of them from nowhere else than the speeches²¹ and the poets who have given genealogies; and these are the very sources of our being told that they are such as to be persuaded and perverted by sacrifices, soothing vows, and votive offerings.²² (365d6-365e6).

This is a clever answer from “we,” presented as what seems to be a material implication (“if p then q ” or “ p only if q ”). The first variant of the implication invites to two versions: “If there are no gods, then we do not have to care,” and “if the gods do not care for human things, then we do not have to care.” So, if we do not believe that there are gods, then we are safe and can do whatever we want without fear. It seems to me that we here find an allusion to Protagoras, who was charged with impiety in Athens for suggesting that there are no gods, and to the natural philosophers who

¹⁸ Cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 365d. cf. also *Apology*, 36b; *Theaetetus*, 173d; and Thucydides, VIII: 54.

¹⁹ Cf. p. 142n7 above.

²⁰ One example of such a conspiracy is the coup of 411 where the Four Hundred overthrew the democracy. These secret societies and clubs are prohibited by the Athenian Stranger in the *Laws* (856b ff.).

²¹ Bloom (1991b, 447-48n18) points out that at this point there are discrepancies in the manuscripts; the version I relate to (Émile Chambry) reads *logoi* (speeches), while Bloom is following Burnet and reads *nomoi* (laws). I choose to follow Chambry.

²² Cf. the *Laws* 885b. These three classes of heretics are severally refuted in the passages 886a-907b.

claimed the same.²³ Thus, I take this to be an implicit critique regarding these positions. The second variant of the implication casts doubt into the equation: “We do not have to care only if there are no gods.” This implies that we can never be quite sure, so what if there are gods after all? Again, “we” argue well: If there are gods, we have learned about them from the poets, and the poets tell that we can persuade the gods through offerings.

Adeimantus concludes his argument by stating that “Either both things must be believed or neither” (365e6-7). By his next reflection, he foreshadows the conversation between him and Socrates (A₁) which is developing from 376d5, where they start their construction of the “true city.” According to Adeimantus, the alleged dilemma can be sorted out quite easily: If these things “are to be believed, injustice must be done, and sacrifice offered from the unjust acquisitions” (365e7-366a1). There is no reason to fear because if we are just, we will not be punished by the gods. That is all, he claims. Within this scenario, we will also refuse all the benefits of injustice. However, “if we are unjust, we shall gain and get off unpunished as well, by persuading the gods with prayers when we transgress and make mistakes” (366a2-4). Still, the last theme is the afterlife, what will happen there?

“But, someone will say, “in Hades we’ll pay the penalty for our injustices here, either we ourselves or our children’s children.”

“But, my dear,” will the man who calculates say, “the initiations and the delivering gods have great power, as say the greatest cities and those children of gods who have become poets and spokesmen of the gods and reveal that this is the case.” (366a5-b3)

From the claim presented by “someone” in this scenario, it seems like the fear of Hades is present either way, and in this case “we” does not answer, but “the man who calculates.” This is a man who finds it in his best interest that the people believe in the gods, as they are presented by certain poets who claim to be spokesmen for the gods; for example, the beggar-priests and likes who Adeimantus attacked earlier. Against this backdrop he addresses Socrates, “Then, by what further argument could we choose justice before the greatest injustice?” he asks (366b4-5). His conclusion in this

²³ Cf. *Apology* 18c.

section is somewhat resigned: “For, if we possess it with a counterfeited seemingly exterior, we’ll fare as we are minded with gods and human beings both while we are living and when we are dead, so goes the speech of both the many and the eminent” (366b4-8).

4.2.5 Adeimantus’ summary (366b8-367a4)

From what is said so far, he claims, it follows that someone must show us that what is said is false, and this someone must have adequate knowledge and be able to argue that justice is best. If there is such a person, he will undoubtedly have great sympathy for the unjust, and he is not angry with them. On the contrary, this person “knows that, except for someone who from a divine nature cannot stand doing injustice or who has gained knowledge and keeps away from injustice, no one else is willingly just, but because of a lack of courage or old age or some other weakness, men blame injustice because they are unable to do it” (366c6-d2). This is the case, and it is plain, Adeimantus argues. The person he is searching for is, of course, Socrates. Also, by this appeal, Adeimantus is also probing for a new kind of *paideia* and thus a profound turnaround of the established opinions regarding religion and afterlife. He pinpoints the main problem when he rounds off his summary: There is no one who ever has, neither in poetry nor prose, adequately developed the argument that when a soul possesses injustice, and when the injustice is not noticed by gods and men, that it is the greatest of evils embedded in a soul that a man can have, and justice the greatest good. If youths were told from the beginning and persuaded that the result would be that they “would not keep guard over each other for fear injustice be done, but each would be his own best guard (φύλαξ, 367a3), afraid that in doing injustice he would dwell with the greatest evil” (367a2-4). When Socrates and Adeimantus later (369a ff.) decide on the method for the great investigation, they will first look for justice in the city and then in the individual. Hence, the city’s justice is supposed to be mirrored in the individual’s justice. It is the guardian (φύλαξ) who is given the task to guard the justice in the city, and as Adeimantus says here—each one of us is the best guard of justice in each individual soul. Thus, Adeimantus is foreshadowing the mirroring regarding justice in the city versus the individual. Also, he is anticipating the definition

of justice as it is formulated at 433b3-5 (justice is the practice of minding one's own business).

4.2.6 Adeimantus' challenges to Socrates (367a5-e5)

When Adeimantus explicitly presents his challenge to Socrates, he emphasizes that he speaks his own opinion (contrary to Glaucon who stressed the opposite and took on the role as “the devil’s advocate”). Adeimantus also stresses that Thrasymachus’ opinions were in accordance with people in general, and what he and possibly several others say about justice and injustice are “vulgarly turning their powers upside down” (367a7-8). Adeimantus wants to be frank and hides nothing from Socrates, and because he desires to hear the opposite opinion from Socrates, he will speak as vehemently as he can.

His first challenge is that Socrates shall not only show by argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but also show what justice in itself—as well as its counterpart, injustice—does to a man who possesses it and how it makes one man bad and the other man good. In accordance with Glaucon, Adeimantus also stresses that reputation is not relevant. He is also implicitly in agreement with Glaucon regarding the discrepancy between Socrates’ words and deeds, but Adeimantus puts it forth as a threatening appeal:

For if you don’t take the true reputation from each and attach the false one to it, we’ll say that you aren’t praising the just but the seeming, nor blaming being unjust but the seeming; and that you’re exhorting one to be unjust and to get away with it; and that you agree with Thrasymachus that the just is someone else’s good, the advantage of the stronger, while the unjust is one’s own advantage and profitable, but disadvantageous to the weaker (367b6-c6).

Adeimantus’ second challenge is for Socrates to show what profit justice in itself is to the man who possesses it, and what harm injustice does to the man who possesses it. On this point he demands that Socrates leaves out both wages and reputation—that is for others to praise. Adeimantus will expect no less from Socrates because he has spent his whole life considering nothing but this. This statement recalls Cephalus and the life-traveling theme introduced by Socrates earlier; Cephalus was not able to elaborate on the road he had traveled, but Socrates’ road is well known—at least to Adeimantus who concludes: “So, don’t only show us by the argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what each in itself does to the man who has it—

whether it is noticed by gods and human beings or not—that makes the one good and the other bad” (367e1-5).

The narrator now informs us that Socrates had always been full of wonder at the nature of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but at this point, he was particularly delighted. Socrates’ first response to their enactment is to congratulate them with a reference to their two fathers; first with reference to Thrasymachus, their spiritual father, “you children of that man (ὧ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, 368a2)”²⁴ and then a reference to their physical father, Ariston. Are these two paternal references meant to be just a joke? I think they are set forth with a smile, but there is a degree of seriousness behind them. It is by now obvious that the conversation between Thrasymachus and Socrates triggered the brothers. Through Thrasymachus, they recognized that his opinions concerning justice and injustice were in accordance with people in general and with the political establishment in particular. They are not willing to accept the way Socrates met Thrasymachus’ claims. Thrasymachus did not present his “private opinion” as Socrates implied; quite the contrary. Thrasymachus presented a common view, and the two brothers now want to hear explicit arguments supporting justice. Thus, they force Socrates to start displaying his concealed topos. In this way, Thrasymachus is the one who sets the main conversations of the *Republic* in motion, and in this way, Thrasymachus is to be viewed as the brother’s spiritual father. The reference to Ariston is somewhat more playful. Socrates refers to a poem made by Glaucon’s lover, about how the two brothers distinguished themselves in the battle at Megara: “Sons of Ariston, divine offspring of a famous man” (368a5). By this reference, Socrates couples the negative forces of Eros to Glaucon, and when this, in turn, is coupled to Glaucon’s role as ‘the devil’s advocate,’ I assume that Socrates anticipates that Glaucon will be the hardest one to convince. Socrates concludes that something quite divine (θεῖον, 368a5) must have happened to them since they remain unpersuaded that injustice is better than justice; and he compliments them for being able to speak so well on behalf of justice. This mirrors Glaucon’s response to Socrates

²⁴ Cf. Schleiermacher and Kurz (1990, 123n2); Adam, note on *Rep.* 368a; and Bloom (1991b, 448n21). They all suggest that τοῦ ἀνδρός (that man) points to Thrasymachus.

when he said that Thrasymachus was being enchanted by Socrates like a snake; the two brothers show that neither Thrasymachus nor Socrates managed to enchant them.

4.3 The case is settled (367e6-369b4)

Despite the compliments, Socrates seems to be a little uncomfortable. He says that Glaucon and Adeimantus both seem—truly—not to have been persuaded. Nevertheless, he distrusts them if they claim that this has to do with the arguments set forth. Rather, he infers that it is due to their character (τρόπου, 368b2). This creates a dilemma because the more Socrates trusts (πιστεύω, 368b3) them, the more he is at a loss as to what he should do. On the one hand, he cannot help out: In his opinion, he is not capable of it because they did not accept his arguments. In Socrates' opinion, he ascertained his case when he showed Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice. At this point, Socrates is not willing to admit his failure further than what he already confessed in his summary regarding the conversation with Thrasymachus. On the other hand, he cannot help out, because he is afraid it might be impious to be present when “justice is being spoken badly of and give up and not bring help while I am still breathing and able to make a sound. So, the best thing is to succor her as I am able” (368c). The narrator now reports that Glaucon and the others begged Socrates “in every way to help out and not to give up the argument, but rather to seek out what each is and the truth about the benefit of both” (368c4-d1). After the well-known “leaving threat and begging-to-stay ceremony”²⁵ is done with, Socrates again takes the floor, speaks his opinion and presents a proposal for further investigation:

It looks to me as though the investigation (ζήτημα, 368c7) we are undertaking is no ordinary thing, but one for a man who sees sharply. Since we're not clever men (δεινοί, 368d1) [...], in my opinion we should make this kind of investigation (ζήτησιν, 368d2) of it: If someone had, for example, ordered men who don't see very sharply to read little letters from afar and then someone had the thought that the same letters are somewhere else also, but bigger and in a bigger place, I suppose it would look like a godsend to be able to consider the littler ones after having read these first, if, of course, they do happen to be the same (368c7-d7).

²⁵ This “leaving threat and begging-to-stay ceremony” is very common and presents a turning in the texts where it is used. For example, in the *Republic*, we have already witnessed that Thrasymachus threatened to leave but the others all begged him to stay; in the *Parmenides*, Parmenides threatens to leave but is begged to stay; in the *Protagoras*, Socrates threatens to leave and is begged to stay.

Socrates has now turned the tables and presented his famous “big-small-letter” metaphor. This undertaking is not an ordinary thing, he says. It is a task for a man who sees sharply (the philosopher) because the weak-sighted (ordinary) men can recognize only small letters at a distance *if* they have studied the same letters on a larger scale. They (the philosophers) shall advocate this as the method for the inquiry: First study justice on a larger scale and then in a smaller. Adeimantus understands this example, but he does not understand what it is *in* the investigation of justice that is like this. Socrates does not explain; instead, he proposes that they will first investigate (ζητήσωμεν, 369a2) what justice is like in the cities; then they will consider (ἐπισκεψώμεθα, 369a3) justice in the individuals before they will consider the likeness of the bigger in the idea (ιδέα, 369a4) of the littler. How are they to conduct this project? Through a thought experiment,²⁶ and Socrates elaborates: “If we should watch a city coming into being in speech (εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, 369a6-7), would we also see its justice coming into being and its injustice?” (369a6-8). After the thought experiment is completed, Socrates argues, they will be able to see (ιδεῖν, 369a10) what they are searching for (ζητοῦμεν, 369a11). Adeimantus gives his consent to this procedure. Socrates responds by asking: “Is it resolved that we must try to carry this out? I suppose it’s no small job, so consider it” (369b2-3). Despite Socrates’ warning, Adeimantus replies: “It’s been considered, don’t do anything else” (369b4).

The Prologue is now over. We have found it bracketed by the phrase “it is resolved.” The phrase alludes to the political assembly in Athens where it was used to announce that the sovereign authority had passed a law or a decree. Socrates used it first in a conclusive way when he and Glaucon decided to stay in Piraeus (cf. 328b3).

²⁶ It is central for me that the construction of the upcoming states is apprehended as thought experiments, and as I use the translation of Bloom (1991) I do not think this point comes forth due to the word θεασαίμεθα, which is undermined in Bloom’s translation. θεασαίμεθα translates to *look on, gaze at, view, behold*, and it is coupled to viewing as *in to view like spectators* and to *the spectators in a theatre*. I will, therefore, give three other examples where this word is highlighted: 1) Jowett: “And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.” 2) Schleiermacher/Kurz: “Wenn wir in Gedanken eine Stadt entstehen sehen, so würden wir dann auch ihre Gerechtigkeit und Ungerechtigkeit mit entstehen sehen?” 3) Mørland: “Hvis vi nå i tankene ser for oss hvordan en stat oppstår, vil vi vel også kunne se hvordan rettferdighet og urettferdighet oppstår?”

Toward Adeimantus the phrase was formulated as a question and answered confirmatively. Socrates used it twice to state implicitly that the authorities were Glaucon and Adeimantus, respectively. Also, there was an element of force involved, first, when Socrates concluded it was so resolved that they had to stay in Piraeus, after giving in to a threat from Polemarchus and a decision uttered by Glaucon and secondly, after the challenges set forth by the two brothers, Socrates asked if it was resolved that the investigation had to be carried out—he even warned them about the work involved. Adeimantus said that it had been considered and demanded Socrates to start the investigation (don't you do anything else).

However, it now turns out that there is a second bracketing. In the upcoming Interlude stretching over the passages 449a1-451b8, Socrates is arrested by the particular audience and accused of not telling them all he knows. Adeimantus argues that by holding back in this manner, Socrates is robbing them of a whole section (εἶδος) of the argument. The reason for this robbery is that Socrates takes it all too easy and is not willing to go through it all (cf. 449c2-3). Adeimantus states that they have now resolved that Socrates is not to be released until he has gone through the rest of what he has heard (cf. 450a). Hence, the third time the phrase “it is so resolved” is uttered, it is voiced by Adeimantus, who at this point confirms that he has heard these arguments previously. It is also imperative for the further development that Adeimantus now actually confirms that Socrates warrants his claims and arguments in a topos outside of the ordinary. The consequence of Adeimantus' demand in this context is that we also find the sections 369b5-445e4 bracketed by the phrase “it is so resolved.” The impact of the second bracketing is, I suggest, that these upcoming sections serve as a preparation²⁷ that eventually will allow us to enter the realm of philosophy. The whole situation as it now develops can be viewed as a trial: Socrates must defend Justice by his own terms; the accuser is Glaucon, who has taken on the role of “the devil's advocate” and is defending Injustice; Adeimantus is taking on the

²⁷ During my readings, I will give reasons for denoting the upcoming sections' “preparations.” Here I will underline that some scholars have indicated the same thing, although not so sharply. Craig (2001, 270-71) argues that to become a philosopher depends on the warrior's virtues, and he states that the turning toward philosophy happens in Books VI-VII. I argue that this turning happens when we enter Book V. Kochin (1999, 403) argues that the education on warfare in Book V “inculcates the orientation to philosophy necessary to achieve a just polity” (Frank 2007, 464n10).

role of a judge watching out for the consequences of possessing justice and injustice. The *raison d'être* for the whole trial is Thrasymachus, who now belongs to the jurors as a part of the particular audience.

Chapter 5: Founding cities—making (ποιοῦμεν) guardians (369b5-451c3)

As stated above, the sections 369b5-445e4 are bracketed by the phrase “it is so resolved.” I take this second bracketing to be a significant textual hint or clue, and it will be the leading guide for the close readings I execute in this chapter. In total, Socrates is engaged in five conversations with each brother, and in this chapter, I will read the first three in sequences.¹ When we arrive at the third conversation with Glaucon, G₃, at 449a1, the particular audience interrupts. In this interlude, Socrates is arrested, and he will not be released until he has presented the whole argument for them or all that he has heard on this matter. The arrest marks the end of this chapter. Thus, G₃ continues in chapter 6: *The demiurges of freedom*. My aim in chapter 5 is to show that it is possible to read these sections as preparations which will guide us into the realm of philosophy and eventually make us turn toward philosophy. By “us,” I now mean readers, in addition to Glaucon and Adeimantus, that is, both the particular and the universal audiences. My point of departure is the claim that Socrates has not yet revealed his topos, but during the upcoming sections, it slowly but surely becomes clear that his opinions on politics and *paideia* are outlandish compared to those held by his contemporaries. I also suggest that it is through these preparatory stages that philosophy emerges as a new cultural practice. This entails that Socrates shows how a philosopher’s view on *politeia* contrasts the existing ones and in this way is the first imperative step toward defining philosophy. That Socrates’ arguments are out of the ordinary is confirmed by Adeimantus, who also will demand that he tell all that he has heard (cf. 449c-450b). For Socrates, the challenges and demands set forth by Glaucon and Adeimantus are the point of departure, and the relevant question is how he meets them.

As a construct for the search for justice in the city and man, Socrates chooses to set up two contrasting cities, in close collaboration with each brother. Such an idea

¹ I have defined the sequences as follows: A₁ is Adeimantus and Socrates’ first conversation, and it develops within the sections 369b5-372c2. G₁ is Glaucon and Socrates’ first conversation, and it develops within the sections 372c3-376d4. The next sequences are: A₂ (376d5-398c6); G₂ (398c6-417b10); A₃ (419a1-427d8); G₃ (427d8-487a8).

was, according to Karel Thein (2015, 221), not a new undertaking, but “an ancient philosophical discussion.” The characteristic of this discussion was to superpose “two cities and merging them into one, with a hope that some new quality will arise, and violent conflict will be made absent from the city” (ibid). When Socrates, at this point, awakens the two-city topos, he also, in turn, evokes the poetic topos, especially Homer,² Hesiod,³ and Aristophanes.⁴ In addition, he evokes the war-peace topos.⁵ Related to the latter, I lean on Raaflaub (2011, 7-8), who has validated how both tragic and comic playwrights in the fifth century “openly criticized the brutality and senselessness of war and, undercutting the warmongering politicians and the Athenian ideology of war, emphasized the desirability of peace.” I argue that these three topoi function as imperative subtexts in and backdrops for the following sections. From this perspective, I further suggest that Socrates is primarily doing two things. First, he and Adeimantus found a city in speech, or they construct a thought experiment; this is a city in peaceful harmony, which from the beginning Socrates denotes as the “true

² In the *Iliad*, Homer contrasts the modes of war and peace through the description of Achilles’ shield where one side pictured a city in peace, the other a city at war, cf. lines 490-540.

³ In Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, during lines 320-34, “we are shown a wicked city whose denizens “like harsh violence and cruel acts,” and where “Justice is dragged perforce” by “bribe-eating men” who “judge their cases with crooked decisions”—no doubt like those judges that Hesiod charges with having taken bribes to favor Perses’ side in his legal dispute with Hesiod. On the other hand, Hesiod presents a virtuous city where judges “issue straight decisions to their own people and to strangers.” The cities’ destinies are likewise different: Those in the just city fare well: “Their city flourishes” under the reign of “Peace, who brings boys to manhood;” as for those in the unjust city, Zeus “ordains their punishment,” for Justice “brings a curse upon all those who drive her out.” Thus, “Justice wins over violence ... in the end.” This summary is taken from Long (2015). I return to this theme below, in section 5.4.5: The “noble lie,” pp. 190-96, and in chapter 6: *The demiurges of freedom*, section 6.2: Second wave, pp. 218-19.

⁴ In the *Birds*, (414) we meet the old Athenian Peisetaerus (“Persuader of His Comrades”) who leaves Athens together with his friend Euelpides (“Confident”) in order to escape debts and because they are fed up with Athenian politics. They head out in search of “a peaceable place (τόπον ἀπράγμονα, 44)” which they hope to find somewhere far away from Athens. In due time, Peisetaerus infers that they are unlikely to find this “peaceable place” anywhere on earth, so he convinces himself and Tereus that this place is to be found among the birds in the sky (162 ff.). He proposes to “encircle the whole atmosphere, all the area between earth and sky, with a wall of big baked bricks, like Babylon” (551-53). The new polis is named “Cloudcuckooland” (819), and when performing the founding sacrifices, “a parade of pests and profiteers, most of them satirizing familiar Athenian types, arrive seeking admission to the new polis: but none is admitted.” Henderson (2000, 5).

⁵ With regard to war, Frank (2007, 444) points out that “[t]aking seriously the many references to and images of warfare in the *Republic*, a rich recent scholarship has demonstrated that there can be not adequate account of the philosophy of the *Republic* without a due consideration of the dialogue’s treatment of war.” Cf. Kochin (1999), Craig (2001), Baracchi (2002, 133-76).

city.” Glaucon is not interested in the thought experiment. He wants to investigate a city where men live nowadays. His city is modeled after contemporary Athens, a *polis* characterized by violent conflicts. Glaucon’s city is then purged until it superposes on the true city and finally surfaces as the “beautiful city.” These conversations create a mirroring movement in the text: The features described in the first are transported into the second and so on. This pattern is consistent, and Socrates underlines it by referring to “our city,” “your city,” “our guardians,” “your citizens,” and so forth. I will not comment upon all instances, but I will highlight them through italicizing. Secondly, I argue that Socrates uses this two-city construct as a pedagogical tool to make us turn toward philosophy, because, put in Howland’s words, “the *Republic* is, among other things, a pedagogical drama” (1998b, 638). Regarding the particular audience, I take it that they are somehow bewildered due to what they have witnessed so far, but with three exceptions. We have already seen that Polemarchus⁶ and Adeimantus⁷ are on their way. Glaucon is more of a puzzle. He obviously knows of philosophy, nevertheless, at this point, he still appears to be an empirical thinker⁸ who—perhaps due to political ambitions—stands at a crossroads where he can choose between the paths of sophistry or philosophy. An important question is whether Socrates will succeed in making him take the right choice, and it is by paying close attention to Glaucon that the universal audience understands the complexity and implications of a turning.

5.1 A₁: Socrates, Adeimantus, and the true city (369b5-372c2)

Socrates assumes that a city “comes into being because each of us isn’t self-sufficient [...]” (369b5-7), and from that outset, he invites Adeimantus to partake in a thought experiment where they will “make a city in speech from the beginning” (369c9). In speech, they found a healthy city based on the primary and necessary needs of its

⁶ Cf. chapter 2: *Prologue II: Father and son*, pp. 80-90, where Polemarchus made his turning.

⁷ Cf. Chapter 4: *Prologue III: The tide is turning for Thrasymachus*, pp. 149-52, where Adeimantus performed the method “creating an imaginary interlocutor” that is a part of practicing philosophy.

⁸ By “empirical thinker” I mean that Glaucon relates to the world he lives in and makes his inferences from experiences—somehow he resembles his “spiritual father,” Thrasymachus (cf. 368a2), cf. chapter 4: *Prologue III: The tide is turning for Thrasymachus*, p. 154n24. This is in accordance with the presentation of Glaucon in chapter 1: *Preparing the stage*, p. 54-5, where he was described as being courageous in everything (cf. 357a), loving victory (cf. 368a, 548d), and unskilled in philosophy (cf. 533a).

inhabitants and make sure that the city is self-sufficient. Socrates denotes this construct the *true city* (372e6). The division of labor is “one man, one job,” or one man does the job he is most apt for, according to nature (i.e., his inherent talent). On this basis, Socrates asks, “Has *our city* already grown to completeness?” (371e8-9). Adeimantus is not sure, nor can he identify justice and injustice in the city unless “it’s somewhere in some need these men have of one another” (372a2). Socrates does not respond directly to Adeimantus’ suggestion.⁹ Instead, he summarizes by describing the manner of life in this community. The inhabitants will live simple lives; they worship earth and the gods through dancing and singing. Socrates describes their nutrition, their pleasures, and claims that they “will live out their lives in peace (εἰρήνη) and health (ὕγιαιος) [...] dying as old men, they will hand down other similar lives to their offspring” (372d2-3).¹⁰ Nevertheless, he urges that they must be aware of a potential danger; they must “keep an eye out against poverty (πενίαν) and war (πόλεμον)” (372c2).¹¹ At this point, a fiery Glaucon interrupts. He does not like the food in the true city. This is a “city of sows” (372d4), he proclaims.

5.2 G₁: Socrates, Glaucon, and the feverish city (372c3-376d4)

When Glaucon dismisses the “true city” with reference to food and lack of relishes, he signals that he is not interested in partaking in a thought experiment; he prefers to investigate a conventional city where men live nowadays (cf. 372d7-e2). Socrates is willing to join, because in a feverish city—or a luxurious city—they “could probably see in what way justice and injustice naturally grow in cities” (372e5-6). Socrates draws a picture of the life the inhabitants lead in such a city (cf. 372e-373d).¹² From

⁹ On Socrates’ silence, see p. 66n3 above. His silence here, I take to be a pointing forward to the definition of justice proposed in G₃ at 441d-e.

¹⁰ Socrates’ description of the healthy city is in accordance with the Athenian Stranger’s description of the men who were “inexperienced in the many beautiful things that go with urban life [...]” (678b); during that time, “civil war and war were destroyed” (678e). The men “weren’t compelled by poverty to differ with one another,” and “since they lacked gold and silver, they didn’t ever become rich” thus “the most well-bred dispositions [i.e., human beings] usually spring up in a home [i.e., society] when neither wealth nor poverty dwell there; for neither insolence nor injustice, nor again jealousies and ill will come into being there” (*Laws*, 679b-c).

¹¹ This is the first time the link between poverty and war is stated.

¹² The inhabitants of the feverish city demand much more than those in the true city: couches, tables and other furniture, relishes, perfume, incense, courtesans, all sorts of cakes, painting, embroidery, gold, ivory. There will also be hunters, imitators (concerned with figures, colors and music), poets and their helpers, rhapsodes, actors, choral dancers, contractors, craftsmen of all sorts of equipment,

this he infers that the consequence of this lifestyle is war. Compared to the healthy city based on necessity (cf. 372a-b), the feverish city is like dough rising uncontrolled.¹³ The politically ambitious Athenian Glaucon obviously does not find this disturbing. The problem of war and peace¹⁴ is carefully lifted to the forefront through Socrates' next response: "[...] let's not yet say whether war works evil or good,¹⁵ but only this much, that we have in its turn found the origin of war (πολέμου αὐ̃ γένεσιν ἠϋρήκαμεν)—in those things whose presence in cities most of all produces evils both private and public" (373e6-9).¹⁶ As Glaucon does not comment on this, Socrates goes on and states that "the city must be still bigger,¹⁷ and not by a small number but by a whole army, which will go out and do battle (στρατοπέδῳ) with invaders (ὁ ἐξεληθὼν ὑπὲρ), for all the wealth and all the things we were just now talking about" (373e11-374a2). Glaucon is surprised when it dawns on him that the inhabitants of the feverish city are not self-sufficient, which was the case in the "city of sows." Socrates reminds him that both he himself and the others already agreed on the principle "one man one art." Hence, Glaucon exhibits that he was not satisfactorily attentive when he listened to Adeimantus and Socrates' former conversation. Despite this reminding, Glaucon apparently does not pull himself together— yet. He will get more reminders of the same kind later, and by this forgetfulness and inattentiveness he signals a nature opposite to the philosopher, who is a man of good memory (cf. 413c-d). For now, Glaucon does not have any objections regarding the consequences of the lifestyle in

for feminine adornment, as well as other things. They will need more servants, teachers, wet nurses, governesses, beauticians, barbers, relish-makers, cooks, swineherds, and a greater need for doctors.

¹³ Rosen, (1965, 465) argues that "Glaucon objects to this city that it is fit only for pigs because of the absence of meat and relish, and so he forces Socrates to enlarge the city [...]." I cannot agree that Glaucon "forces" Socrates to enlarge the "healthy city," on the contrary, I argue that from the outset we are presented with two distinct models.

¹⁴ I call it the problem of war and peace in accordance with Bazaluk (2017).

¹⁵ Whether "war works evil or good" is not explicitly discussed further in the *Republic*; however, if we turn to the *Theaetetus* and the section where Socrates explains the implications of the difference between a philosopher and the non-philosopher to Theodorus (174a-e), Theodorus concludes: "Socrates, if your words convinced everyone as they do me, there would be more peace and less evil on earth" (176a2-3). Here, it is confirmed that peace is good and war evil, and in this context Socrates continues by outlining why it is impossible to destroy evil.

¹⁶ This argument on war, Socrates also set forth in the *Phaedo*, cf. 66c. It is also in accordance with the Athenian Stranger in the *Laws*, cf. p. 162n10 above.

¹⁷ The perspective of the city in continuously growth is pointing forward to A₃ (403c) where they set down a law that restricts growth.

the feverish city; hence no objections to war. Because he does not signpost any willingness even to reflect on the matter, he at this point resembles the prominent politicians of Athens, who, according to Price (2007, 68), considered “war a part of nature, as unavoidable as the weather, not bad in itself, even possibly good as a creative force or process, and in any case, a fixture in human experience.”¹⁸

In the feverish city it is *pleonexia* that is the origin of war; put in Frank’s words: “the desire for more—more territory, more goods, and more power” (2007, 443).¹⁹ So far, Socrates has implicitly launched two different perspectives on warfare. On the one hand is war as attack. From this perspective, war is unavoidable due to the uncontrolled expansion; that is, the city is forced to attack the land of its neighbors to supply its inhabitants’ endless craving. This feature alludes to the Peloponnesian War and aggressive war-waging imperialistic politics of Athens,²⁰ which in turn awakens the topos of autochthony, wherein the topos of same-mindedness is embedded.²¹ At this point, I consider these topoi to be sub-narratives, which will gradually surface and give reasons to claim that during these preparatory sections we witness a profound—but implicit—criticism of the established Athenian political regime. On the other hand is war as defense. Socrates stresses that they will need an army to fight invaders, that is, to defend the city. I take this to be an allusion to the narratives describing the wars fought against the Persian invaders. According to Sissa (2011, 5), the Persian war was

¹⁸ That war is “a part of nature,” is also exposed by Kleinias in the *Laws*: “For what most humans call peace he [i.e., the lawgiver] held to be only a name; in fact, for everyone there always exists by nature an undeclared war among all cities” (626a2-5). This view is refuted by the Athenian Stranger.

¹⁹ Frank further underlines: “With both an aggressive and defensive aspect, *pleonexia* generates the rule “take from another before another takes from you,” a rule characteristic of “apprehensive” states of war of all kinds.” Thucydides also indicates that *pleonexia* was the cause of the war: “The truest explanation was the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which brought fear to the Lacadaemonians and forced them to war” (1: 36). On the corrupting effects of *pleonexia* in Athens, see Balot (2001).

²⁰ I pointed out in chapter 1: *Preparing the stage*, throughout section 1.3.2: Socrates’ prayers, pp. 57-61, that some aspects of this war transgressed the conventional rules of war. I will also return to this in chapter 6: *The demiurges of freedom*, section 6.2: Second wave, p. 218-19. However, as this is not the place to elaborate on the conventional laws of war; I at this point give my main references from where I have developed my understanding on this topic: Thucydides; Price (2007), Lendon (2010), Strauss (1993), Wolpert (2002), Ober (1994), and Lanni (2008).

²¹ The topos of autochthony and the topos of same-mindedness will be discussed below in section 5.4.5: The noble lie, pp. 190-96. The topos of same-mindedness will also be discussed in chapter 10: *The Apology*, p. 354-56.

“the paradigmatic war: defensive, intrepid, and altruistic.”²² I suggest that this allusion surfaces at 470a5-471c2.²³ At this point in the text, the distinction attack versus defense is stated, but neither Socrates nor Glaucon comment further on it here. However, when Socrates later introduces the guardians (φυλάκων, 374d8), I argue that it is the latter form of warfare that is their ultimate aim. In this regard, we are enlightened by Socrates when he later states that the aim is “making (ποιουόμεν) true guardians, men least likely to do harm to the city” (421a9-b1). This “making of true guardians” points explicitly toward guarding and protection. Therefore, the guardian they set out to make is of a new kind, a breed not previously seen. Socrates emphasizes the importance of this new breed when he states that “to the extent that the work of the guardians is more important, it would require more leisure time than the other task as well as greater art and diligence” (374d8-e2). If he and Glaucon are able, their job now is to choose “which are the natures, and of what kind they are, fit for guarding the city” (374e4-5). Without deliberation, Glaucon gives his consent to partake, but Socrates signals reluctance toward the forthcoming task when he suddenly swears: “By Zeus [...] it’s no mean thing we’ve taken upon ourselves. But nevertheless, we mustn’t be cowardly, at least as far as it’s in our power” (374e11-12).

5.2.1 The nature of the guardians (374d8-376c7)

When Socrates swears, it usually is a warning sign pointing toward a textual turn, this time to leave the reflections on the “feverish city” behind and instead pay attention to the guardians. I assume that the outset is the conventional concept of the “guardian,”²⁴

²² Cf. chapter 1: *Preparing the stage*, section 1.3.2: Socrates’ prayers, p. 57-61, where I outlined how the goddess Artemis lent support to the Greeks during the Persian Wars and was absent during the Peloponnesian War.

²³ The theme attack versus defense and the difference between the Persian Wars (*polemos*) and the Peloponnesian War (*stasis*) will be a theme discussed at 470a5-471c2. I return to this in chapter 6: *The demiurges of freedom*, section 6.2.2.3: Third consideration: War and faction, p. 229-34.

²⁴ The conventional guardianship and the outlet of the redefinitions, I understand as the following: “The development of the law of guardianship in Greece was influenced by the change in the conception of guardianship itself, which began as a right of preserving and protecting the ward’s property in the interest of the whole kin (as contingent heir of the ward), but became gradually a duty of the guardian in the interest of the ward himself. This explains the restrictions imposed upon the guardian with regard to his control over the child’s property, and the increasing supervision of public authorities over his activity as guardian. The Greek guardian was either ἐπίτροπος of boys and girls until their majority—18 years in the case of the boys—and registration in the citizen list, or κύρις

hence, when Socrates now sets his redefining process²⁵ in motion, he starts with something Glaucon knows very well. When it comes to guarding, Socrates argues, there is no significant difference between “a noble puppy and that of a well-born (εὐγενοῦς) young man” (375a2-3).²⁶ I think this much-discussed analogy²⁷ is laid before Glaucon with a specific purpose. As Glaucon relates to the empirical world, and as he is a dog breeder (cf. 459a2-3), Socrates invites him to make an inference on similar natures from something well known to him—a noble puppy and well-born men. However, he is not able to; “What do you mean?” Socrates elaborates (with a twinkle in his eye, I think), “As for the body’s characteristics, it’s plain how the guardian must be” (375b5-6). The guardians must have sharp senses, speed, and strength—just like a horse or a dog, and their soul must be courageous and spirited. Still, there is a problem to be solved: A gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one, so the risk is that the nature of the guardian so far described could turn out to be a savage to the citizens. Socrates ponders: “Where will we find a disposition at the same time gentle and great-spirited?” (375c6-7); whereupon he pronounces that a good guardian is impossible to find. “I’m afraid so,” Glaucon agrees. Even the narrator confirms this, “I too was at loss (ἀπορήσας),” he says. This implies that they have already worked their way into an aporia. However, by looking back over the argument,

of women for lifetime or until marriage.” (*The Oxford Classical Dictionary* 1991, eds. N.G.L Hammond and H.H. Scullard. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, p. 483).

²⁵ The conventional concept of the guardian will be redefined two times. First, the guardian by nature must be “be philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong” (376c4-6). Second, “the young, whom we were calling guardians up to now, we shall call auxiliaries and helpers of the rulers’ convictions” (414b4-6); cf. p. 191 below.

²⁶ The terms noble (γενναίου) and well-born (εὐγενοῦς) allude forward to the presentation of the “noble lie” at 414d1-e6, hence the *topos of autochthony* is subtly hinted at.

²⁷ For example, Saxonhouse (1978), who in an elusive and interesting study analyzes the use of animal imagery throughout the *Republic*. Her findings give way to quite a different conclusion than the one I will reach. She argues: “Through a study of the language and metaphor which Socrates uses during his discussion of his supposed utopia, particularly the animal imagery which is used throughout, we find that Socrates’ Kallipolis imitates the comic art. This ugly city does not reveal how best to organize men and women into political units. It does not clarify the justice of a political system, even the best political system in words, but rather its necessary injustices. Socrates’ city is founded on a series of injustices, according to this own definition as it occurs in the *Republic*. Her demands injustice to the city’s rulers, injustice to its women, and injustice to its neighbors,” p. 888. Regarding the analogy “a noble puppy” and “a well-born young man,” my argument is less sophisticated. I simply suggest that this analogy is used as a pedagogical device to make Glaucon, the dog-breeder (cf. 459a), understand the required nature of the guardians they are about to make.

the narrator reports that Socrates suddenly worked his way out. The reason for the aporia in the first place was that the premises laid down were recognizable in “a noble dog,” because “when it sees someone it doesn’t know, it’s angry, although it never had any bad experience with him. And when it sees someone it knows, it greets him warmly, even if it never had a good experience with him” (376a6-8).²⁸ Thus, the nature they are in search of is possible and not against nature after all (cf. 375e), and the apparent aporia is resolved. In addition to being spirited as a noble dog, the guardian must “be a philosopher in nature” (375e10-11). Again, Glaucon does not understand. This deepened explanation of the analogy is aimed to make Glaucon acknowledge what the concept “according to nature” entails. As a dog-breeder, he ought to be able to recognize the nature of a noble puppy, and from that recognition infer what concrete tasks the puppy is apt to, according to its nature. Nonetheless, Glaucon does not grasp the impact of the analogy, nor does he respond to it. Socrates continues by summarizing and states that the nature of a fine and good guardian of the city must “be philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong” (376c4-6). I suspect this summary to be also a description of Glaucon’s (potential) nature. If this notion is right, it entails that (according to Socrates) he has presented the nature required for becoming a guardian-philosopher and indicated that Glaucon’s inherent nature is of this kind.²⁹

Socrates leaves the analogy and launches rearing and education as a new theme. How will they rear and educate these new guardians? Also, will a consideration of this in any way contribute to the overall aim, that is, to discover how justice and injustice come into being in a city? Adeimantus now interrupts. When he states rather ironically that “I most certainly expect that this present consideration will contribute to that goal” (376d5-7), he implicitly confirms that Glaucon did not understand that the noble-dog-

²⁸ On this point, see the comments set forth by Rosen (1965, 469) where he argues: “In this case, the knowledge of the dog is equivalent to its good breeding; in the guardian, good breeding is the result of the laws of the city, which, in turn, are established by philosopher-kings like Socrates. Spiritedness and gentleness in themselves are opposites (cf. 375c6-8); they can be mediated or harmonized only by philosophy.” This description of a spirited “noble dog” actually resembles the description of the fierce and guarding dogs used in ancient warfare, cf. Forster (1941). The theme will be re-emphasized by Socrates later; first, when he defends the idea of the community of women and children at 466d ff., and secondly at 473c11 when he introduces the philosopher-kings.

²⁹ At this point, it is unclear if the guardian and the philosopher are of identical natures. This ambivalence is the first hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling all he has heard. The solution will be stated when Socrates launches the third wave at 473c.

philosopher analogy was a simile on recognizing inherent natures. However, as Glaucon did not take it, and because Adeimantus interrupted, the analogy now becomes a hanging metaphor, which Socrates will hint at throughout the upcoming sections.

Through these two encounters, two distinct features of two distinct cities have been outlined. In A₁, the “true city” was launched as a thought experiment; this city is self-sufficient, a peaceful harmony, and functions according to nature due to the division of labor (one man, one job according to his inherent potential). Glaucon was not interested in this thought experiment. Therefore, he and Socrates decided to investigate the “feverish city” as described in G₁. Due to the inhabitants’ endless craving, *pleonexia*, the origin of war was identified, and two perspectives on war came to light. Socrates presented the dog-philosopher analogy and, on that basis, he tried to make Glaucon infer how the nature of men fit for guarding ought to be; but Glaucon failed. G₁ ended with Socrates’ conclusion that the guardians’ natures ought to “be philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong” (376c4-6). The definition of the nature of the guardians is transported into the equation when Adeimantus and Socrates now set out to educate the guardians in speech. This is where Adeimantus and Socrates aim to decide how such a nature can be preserved through *paideia*. They pick up on Adeimantus’ former challenges, and their approach is an evaluation of the conventional *paideia*; the impact of their course of action is the start of the purging of the feverish city. The running theme in A₂ is lies and lying.

5.3 A₂: Socrates and Adeimantus on education and rearing (376d5-398c6)

We now return to the thought experiment. “Come, then, like men telling tales in a tale and at their leisure, let’s educate the men in speech (376d11-e1),” Socrates suggests. The point of departure is the convention “gymnastic for the bodies and music for the soul” (376e4-5),³⁰ hence, when educating the men in speech, they implicitly start to purge Glaucon’s feverish city. Therefore, the new *paideia* surfaces negatively by highlighting the conventions which are to be prohibited in the true city. They start with

³⁰ The final alteration of the conventional view “gymnastic for the bodies and music for the soul” ends when Glaucon and Socrates discuss the subject “gymnastic” in G₂ (403c ff.), p. 184n78 below.

the beginning—the children.³¹ Setting themselves down as lawgivers, it becomes their duty to supervise the makers of tales and the tellers of stories (cf. 377b11-c1).³² Homer and Hesiod “ought to be blamed first and foremost” (377d4) and the lies they told about the gods and the heroes “mustn’t be spoken in *our city*” (378b1-2). When Socrates stresses that above all “it mustn’t be said that gods make war on gods, and plot against them and have battles with them” (378b8-c1), this may be the first act to prevent war. The stories discussed are not true and must be prohibited if those “who are going to guard (φυλάξειν) the city for us” should consider “it most shameful (αἴσχιστον) to be easily angry with one another” (378c1-3).³³ This entails that if youths learn that gods make war on gods and that the gods plot against each other, then war-waging among humans can be argued to be a God-given matter and, as such, not to be disputed.³⁴ Also, if the stories of war among the gods are told to children and presented on woven embroideries and friezes, then war is apprehended as being a familiar necessity.³⁵ The conclusion is that if the children are to be reared with respect to virtue, they must hear the finest tales first (cf. 378e).

Nevertheless, a problem arises. Such fine tales are not on the market, Adeimantus infers, so if someone should ask what these tales are, what is the answer? Socrates now

³¹ Their outlining of rearing and education stand in stark contrast to Protagoras’ outlining of the same subject. I return to this in chapter 7: *Preparing the stage*, section 7.6: Protagoras, the teacher, p. 267 ff.

³² They will start to “persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved tales to their children and to shape their souls with tales more than their bodies with hands” (377c2-5). The consequence of this supervising is that most of the stories that at present are told to children must be thrown out. Examples are Hesiod and Homer (and other poets) who have “surely composed false tales for human beings and used to tell them and still do tell them” (377d5-6).

³³ This implies that the inhabitants of the true city are bound to take the danger of war seriously, but only from a defensive point of view. On shame and aggression, see Roisman (2005), especially chapter 3: “Manly Shame,” pp. 64-78, where he argues that aggression and “physical violence unconnected to war and sport could also tarnish manliness in ancient Athens.” (72).

³⁴ This is a view that opposes the claim that war is natural and/or god-given. Cf. the *Laws* 628c ff. Cf. also Scodel (2008) who points out that within the anti-Trojan War tradition, the Trojan War was characterized as “frivolous, unnecessary, and stupid,” quoted in Raaflaub (2009, 227) who also underlines that this view is best known from Herodotus’ detailed argument on the matter (2.115-6; cf. 1.4).

³⁵ In addition, Socrates will prohibit stories where the poets tell about sons punishing their fathers (cf. 378b) and fathers beating mothers (cf. 378d). The main reason for these bans is that the stories are sometimes told in a hidden sense, and sometimes not (cf. 378d), and the children are not yet competent interpreters. Socrates stresses this when he states that “a young thing can’t judge what is hidden sense and what is not; but what he takes into his opinions at that age has a tendency to become hard to eradicate and unchangeable” (cf. 378d-e).

underlines that this is not their responsibility: “Adeimantus, you and I aren’t poets right now but founders of a city. It’s appropriate for founders to know the models (τύποι) according to which the poets must tell their tales. If what the poets produce goes counter to these models, founders must not give way; however, they must not themselves make up tales” (378e8-379a4). So, because it is not suitable for founders of a city to act as poets, Adeimantus and Socrates must restrict themselves to providing models for the poets—sorts of guidelines for the poets allowed in the true city. They give these models and, set them down as laws (cf. 383c).³⁶ The arguments that these laws are founded on are controversial compared to conventions, and hence worth a closer look.

5.3.1 Models and restrictions for the poets (379a5-383c7)

At the outset, Adeimantus asks what the models (τύποι) for speech about the gods (θεολογίας) will be (cf. 379a5-6). Here he asks for the *science of things divine* (theology), which has a wider meaning than simply how the poets are to make speeches on the gods. “The god must surely always be described such as he is,” Socrates demands, “whether one presents him in epics, lyrics, or tragedies” (379a7-9).³⁷ Socrates makes us understand that for the good things we can safely assume that the cause is the god, but when it comes to the bad things, we must look elsewhere. Therefore, poets who are foolishly making the mistake that both good and evil things come from the god, cannot be accepted. This includes parts of Homer and other unnamed poets. Also, because the voices of the traditional poets are taken to be authorities,³⁸ their listeners are left (unwillingly) in ignorance about the gods. Socrates lists several examples. I will highlight one which is of special interest for my line of argumentation. Socrates says that Homer tells that “Zeus is the dispenser to us ‘of

³⁶ Later, in G₂ at 403d7-e2, Socrates changes his procedures. Here Adeimantus and Socrates first describe the models and then set them down as laws; Glaucon and Socrates will only show the way to the models, cf. p. 184 ff.

³⁷ How the god *is* (ὅν) is not elaborated on, instead Socrates provides us with some general indications: “[...] the god, since he’s good, wouldn’t be the cause of everything, as the many say, but the cause of a few things for human beings and not responsible for most. For the things that are good for us are far fewer than those that are bad; and of the good things, no one else must be said to be the cause; of the bad things, some other causes must be sought and not the god” (379c2-7).

³⁸ Cf. Cephalus who depended on the poetic topos in all his reflections. On poets as authorities, see Robb (1994), cf. also p. 18n34 above.

good and evil alike.” However, in the *Iliad*, we hear that ‘Zeus is the dispenser of war.’³⁹ This Socratic reformulation alludes back to the passage when Socrates and Glaucon stumbled over the origin of war, and Socrates stated that they should not say yet if war works evil or good (cf. 373e). Viewed from this perspective, the impact of Socrates’ reformulation is double: on the one hand, he claims straightforward that this is a lie about the god, on the other, he indirectly (for those who know their Homer) denies that war is either natural or God-given. Adeimantus solemnly agrees and even uses a formula of the political assembly⁴⁰ when replying: “I give my vote to you in support of this law [...] and it pleases me” (380c5-6). Socrates concludes his reasoning by stating that “this would be one of the laws and models concerning the gods [...]: the god is not the cause of all things, but of the good” (380c7-9).

The argumentation regarding the second law is broader. Socrates’ preliminary questions concern the features of the gods regarding their ability to change. Is the god to be detained as a wizard, able deceitfully to reveal himself at different times in different ideas? Will the god at one time be himself and then change and pass from his own form into many shapes? Will the god deceive us and make us think such things about him?⁴¹ Or is he simple and does he least of all depart from his own idea? (cf. 380d). Adeimantus confirms the latter and argues that the god “remains forever simply in his own shape” (381c8-9).

The next passage indicates that Adeimantus also has somehow been exposed to inculcation through these stories about the gods—but he is not fully aware of this. Hence, Socrates is given a puzzle to solve.⁴² It starts as a test, where the first argument is that the gods themselves cannot be transformed. This premise they have already agreed upon. However, despite their agreement, Adeimantus signals uncertainty when

³⁹ See Bloom (1991b, 450n47). Bloom refers to *Iliad* IV: 84 and points out the resemblance between Homer’s and Socrates’ account.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 450n51.

⁴¹ These three questions are briefly problematized at the start of the *Sophist* (cf. 216a-d). I return to this in chapter 9: *The Eleatic Stranger: A turning point*, section 9.2: The prologue, pp. 327-32.

⁴² I call this incident a puzzle for Socrates to solve because he employs different approaches toward the two brothers. Earlier, when Glaucon was not able to grasp the analogy on natures (cf. 376c4-6), Socrates left the problem by changing the theme; and when Socrates silently leaves a problem, he returns to it later (cf. p. 66n3 above). Here, when Adeimantus does not recognize that he—as all Athenians—has been indoctrinated, Socrates continues and aims to make Adeimantus understand without having to tell him explicitly. The puzzle is to find the best way to do this.

Socrates asks if the gods “make us think they appear in all sorts of ways, deceiving and bewitching us?” (381e9-10).⁴³ He seems to be surprised or even shocked when Adeimantus answers “perhaps.” His first response is: “What?” The follow-up questioning proceeds like this (382a1-11):

Socrates: “Would a god want to lie, either in speech or deed by presenting an illusion?”

Adeimantus: “I don’t know.”

Socrates: “Don’t you know that all gods and human beings hate the true lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) if that expression can be used?”

Adeimantus: “What do you mean?”

Socrates: “That surely no one voluntarily wishes to lie about the most sovereign things to what is most sovereign in himself. Rather, he fears holding a lie there more than anything.”

Adeimantus: “I still don’t understand.”

That Adeimantus is not able to follow Socrates’ reasoning now strongly signposts that Socrates is presenting new and controversial thoughts in this matter; henceforth, he modifies and elaborates. First, he says that surely Adeimantus supposes that Socrates means “something exalted” (382b1), but such a supposition is wrong. He stresses that what he meant was “that to lie and to have lied to the soul about the things that are, and to be unlearned, and to have and to hold a lie there is what everyone would least accept; and that everyone hates a lie in that place most of all” (382b2-5). Socrates further argues that it is correct to call this truly a lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) because it denotes “the ignorance in the soul of the man who has been lied to” (382b8-9). He explains that the “lie in speeches is a kind of imitation of the affection in the soul, a phantom of it that comes into being after it, and not quite an unadulterated lie (ἄκρατον ψεῦδος)” (382b9-c2). Thus, he concludes, “the real lie (ὄντι ψεῦδος) is hated not only by gods but also by human beings” (382c4-5).⁴⁴ Socrates solved the puzzle, and as Adeimantus understood this elaboration, and agreed, I take it that he passed the test. However, it now turns out that not all lies in speeches deserve to be hated; from time to time they can be useful (χρήσιμον)—but when and for whom? They can serve like a drug (φάρμακον) and be preventive against enemies. It is worth remembering

⁴³ The theme of bewitching will be of importance in *G*₂ at 413b f. On the vocabulary on magic, see Belfiore (1980).

⁴⁴ Cf. also the *Laws* 916d-917a.

that in connection with the discussion of the second law, this line of argumentation presents us with three kinds of lies: the “real lie (ὄντι ψευδός)” and the “true lie (ἀληθῶς ψευδός)” will not be mentioned further; but the “useful lie,” which is acceptable in certain instances, is a point returned to. From here on “lies” is a recurrent theme.

After a short discussion, they conclude and formulate the second law: “The demonic and the divine are wholly free from lie” (382e8). This law is given a confirmative appendix: “the god is altogether simple and true in deed and speech, and he doesn’t himself change or deceive others by illusions, speeches, or the sending of signs either in waking or dreaming” (382e10-13). It is noteworthy that the “demonic” is an included element in the second law. This is equivalent to Socrates’ inner voice that is “a kind of demonic thing” (Bloom 1991b, 450n55).⁴⁵ This feature makes Socrates a kind of intermediary character between gods and humans, a point explained later (cf. 496c f.). For now, Socrates concludes that about gods there are things that should and should not be heard from childhood on “[...] and we’ll not let the teachers use them for the education of the young, if *our guardians* are to be god-revering and divine as human being can possibly be” (383c2-5). Adeimantus supposes that this impression is right (cf. 386a). They are now in agreement on what the poets in the true city are prohibited to say, and they have laid down two laws in this regard. This is now the grounding premise when they change the perspective and ask: How are we to secure that the guardians become courageous?

5.3.2 Courageous guardians (386a1-388a3)

Again, Socrates turns to the stories told children and argues that they must “be told things that will make them fear death least” (386a7-b1). Is it impossible to believe that anyone who fears death will ever become courageous, or does Adeimantus suppose that “anyone who believes Hades’ domain exists and is full of terror will be fearless in the face of death and choose death in battles above defeat and slavery?” (386b4-6).⁴⁶

⁴⁵ The theme of the demonic I take to be the second hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. p. 167n29 above). It will be touched upon—with reference to Hesiod—at 469a, and explained in *A*₄ at 496c f. See also *Apology* 27d-e and 31d.

⁴⁶ This alludes back to Cephalus. He had heard these stories of Hades and the afterlife there from childhood on. However, it was as an old man he first started to reflect on the message—and it

The seven examples Socrates lists are presented in a parodic mode and I suggest they can be read as an ironic outburst toward Cephalus' and the poetic topos. Nonetheless, many liked to hear these Homeric lines, but Socrates stresses that "the more poetic they are, the less they should be heard by men who must be free and accustomed to fearing slavery more than death" (387b3-4). Also, he indicates that such lines can be useful, but for other purposes. This indication is foreshadowing the concepts of pleasure and pain that will be introduced as an important feature regarding the testing of the guardians (cf. 413e, 429c). What occupies him at this point, is the fear "that *our guardians*, because of such shivers, will get hotter and softer than they ought" (387c3-4). Therefore, Socrates will apply a model opposite to the examples listed, because "the men we say we are rearing for the guardianship of the country (*χώρας*) won't be able to stand doing things similar to those such people do" (388a1-3). It is imperative that Socrates now expands the rearing of the guardians not only to apply to *the city*, but for *the country*,⁴⁷ and it is interesting that this expansion is not commented on.

5.3.3 Requirements for the content of stories (388a4-392c5)

Their next challenge is to give guidelines for how the guardians are allowed to speak about human beings, the gods, demons and heroes, and Hades' domain. Because the aim is that the guardians are to fear slavery more than death (cf. 386a1-387c11), all the descriptions where death is depicted in manners that potentially can make the guardians fearful are to be banned. From this, it follows that they must get rid of the

frightened him. Secondly, it is foreshadowing the myth of Er. The afterlife described there is a corrective to the conventional descriptions of Hades. Thirdly, it foreshadows the introduction of the third wave where Socrates suggests that philosophers are the ideal guardians and thus the only ones fit to rule. This creates a line to the *Phaedo* where we learn that "the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death" (64a3-4) and further that philosophy itself is a kind of "training for dying" (67e). Fourthly, it alludes to the *Apology* where Socrates demonstrates that as a philosopher he does not fear death. This indicates that if fear of death is removed, then courage is possible. So, courage understood within the frames of philosophy, is a virtue that contradicts the conventional perception. Consequently, they must supervise those who compose stories of Hades "because what they say is neither true nor beneficial for men who are to be fighters (*μαχιμους*)" (*Rep.* 386b10-c2).

⁴⁷ This picks up on the distinction made on the two kinds of warfare (attack versus defense) alluded to in G₁, pp. 164-65 above. The expansion from the city to the country is foreshadowing the passages on war versus faction that will be elaborated on in G₃ (470b ff.). This uncommented expansion I take to be the third hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. p. 167n29, and p. 173n45 above). I return to this in chapter 6: *The demiurges of freedom*, p. 232n4.

terrible names applied to Hades. Gods and heroes are not to be portrayed as lamenting and wailing (cf. 387d1-389b2), or as imprudent and not truthful (cf. 389b3-392a2). When it comes to how human beings are depicted, it is, among other things, prohibited to tell that happy men are unjust (cf. 392a3-c5).⁴⁸ Further, the guardians are not to be lovers of laughter (cf. 388e-389b), and they must take the truth seriously (cf. 389b-d). The latter is essential, because if what they have said so far is correct, and “a lie is really useless to gods and useful to human beings as a form of remedy, it’s plain that anything of the sort must be assigned to doctors while private men (ιδιώταις)⁴⁹ must not put their hands to it” (389b4-7). The useful lie is now explicitly restricted to doctors, and to be avoided by ordinary men. However, Socrates is quick to modify this restriction and says that it is “appropriate for rulers to lie for the benefit of the city in cases involving enemies or citizens” (389b9-11)⁵⁰ and underlines once again that “all the rest must not put their hands to anything of the sort” (389b11-c1). Socrates now abruptly introduces a guard who guards against lying⁵¹ and demands that if “he catches anyone else in the city lying [...] he’ll punish him for introducing a practice as subversive and destructive of a city as of a ship” (389d4-5). This special guardian is not mentioned further, and that makes me infer that his function is limited to this passage only because of the diversity of possible lies cataloged above. It is only the “useful lie” Socrates allows, but its use is strongly restricted. Therefore, this specific guardian serves as a reminder and a point of reference connected to the “useful lie.”⁵²

Adeimantus and Socrates further demand that the young guardians are not allowed to be receivers of gifts or be lovers of money (cf. 390d); hence, they need

⁴⁸ This statement is presumably addressed directly to Thrasymachus and Glaucon’s challenge to Socrates.

⁴⁹ On ιδιώταις, and on the opposition between the ‘private’ and the ‘public/common,’ see Bloom (1991b, 445-46n41). Here, though, with regard to “the useful lie,” the doctor is compared to the ruler, the public man, whose art, or knowledge, gives the title to rule; the private man, in principle, is the man who does not know and these individuals are not permitted to make use of the “useful lie,” cf. Bloom (1991b, 451n17).

⁵⁰ This statement is foreshadowing, on the one hand, the presentation of the “noble lie” in G₂. I return to this below, in section 5.4.4: The noble lie, p. 190 ff. On the other, it points to 459c8-d3 where Socrates explains how “useful lies” are used for the benefit of the rulers. I return to this in chapter 6: *The demiurges of freedom*, section 6.2.1: The benefits of the second law, p. 219 ff.

⁵¹ Cf. Bloom (1991b, 451n19).

⁵² The “useful lie” used as a remedy by the rulers is picked up again in G₃ at 459c8-d3.

moderation (σωφροσύνης, 389d7).⁵³ The most important elements of moderation for the multitude though, are being obedient to the rulers and being themselves rulers of the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating (cf. 389d-e).⁵⁴ The effects of the new models now start to be thinkable for the reader. If the guardians (*our youngsters*) are to be reared and educated as Socrates and Adeimantus suggest, they will develop a cultural mindset that contrasts starkly the conventional. That is, they will have assimilated different cultural references, which in turn signal cultural change. This changed mindset is still in its making, and we have to witness yet some discussions before the guardians are fully made. Regarding the ongoing investigation, Socrates and Adeimantus have now decided on what must be said and how it must be said, but the deliberation is not complete before they also reflect on style (λέξις, cf. 392c). Why is this necessary?

5.3.4 The style of the speeches (392c6-398c6)

Adeimantus does not understand the relevance (cf. 392d), so Socrates elaborates. All stories told are narratives on the past, the present, or the future; and they are accomplished with either a simple narrative or produced by imitators or both together (cf. 392d). Adeimantus still does not understand. Socrates then states that he seems to be both a ridiculous and an unclear teacher “just like men who are incompetent at speaking, instead of speaking about the whole in general I’ll cut off a part and with it attempt to make plain to you what I want (392d-e).⁵⁵ Adeimantus comes back on track, and after the amplification on imitation, he is asked to “reflect on whether *our guardians* ought to imitate or not” (394e1-2). The result of his reflection is a restriction,⁵⁶ and they stress that if “we are to preserve the first argument—that *our*

⁵³ The primary sense of σωφροσύνη is “the control over the bodily pleasures.” However, throughout the conversations in the *Republic*, the concept gains a broader sense and gradually comes to apply to a control of certain pleasures of the soul, cf. Bloom (1991b, 451-52n21).

⁵⁴ This alludes back to 367a3 where Adeimantus argued that each individual is the best guard when it comes to his own affairs.

⁵⁵ This is the first time Socrates refers to himself a teacher. In G₂ at 413b f. when Glaucon does not understand that an opinion departs unwillingly from our minds, he apologizes to Glaucon for being an unclear speaker, but does not denote himself as a teacher. As far as I know, these are the only instances that Socrates explicitly talks about himself in this manner. This could be taken as a concrete hint with regard to Socrates’ approach to the two brothers: He is Adeimantus’ teacher, but not Glaucon’s because he has not made his turning yet.

⁵⁶ Their guardians can imitate “what’s appropriate to them from childhood: men who are courageous, moderate, holy, free, and everything of the sort; and what is slavish, or anything else

guardians must give up all other crafts and very precisely be craftsmen (δημιουργούς) of the city's freedom and practice nothing other than what tends to it, they mustn't imitate nothing else" (395b9-c1). As they further undertake also "to educate the soldiers (στρατιώτας, 398b4)," ⁵⁷ they must also exhibit songs and melodies. In this sequence, Socrates uses the concepts "guardians" and "soldiers" as synonyms; hence, I assume that the soldiers also are educated in the art of defense, and that at this point the guardians are equivalent to soldiers. ⁵⁸ From this, it follows that they are not only making a new breed of guardians, but also a new breed of soldiers. ⁵⁹ The education of soldiers versus guardians is not a theme discussed further, therefore Socrates maintains that by now everyone could "discover what we have to say about how they (i.e., songs and melodies) must be if we're going to remain in accord with what has already been said" (398c4-6). Glaucon laughs when he now interrupts and states that he is no longer included in "everyone," but, even if he, at present, is not able to say what ought to be said about songs and melodies, he has his suspicions.

Through A₂ Socrates met Adeimantus' challenges by getting rid of the causes for his initial frustration. This was done through a cleansing of poetry, and the restrictions became visible when the lies voiced by some of the celebrated poets were highlighted and prohibited. They decided on two laws containing concrete models for the poets: a) the god is the cause of the good, b) the demonic and divine is free from lie. ⁶⁰ Further,

shameful, they must neither do nor be clever at imitating, so that they won't get a taste for the being from its imitation" (395c2-d3). Examples on things not to be imitated are: Since the guardians are men, they should not imitate women, either young or older ones, or a woman who abuses her husband or a woman who strives with gods and boasts because she supposes herself to be happy. Further, not slaves, women or men doing slavish things, bad men who are cowards and doing the opposite of what Socrates and Adeimantus have stated, madmen (both in speeches and deeds), men exercising any other crafts, and horses neighing.

⁵⁷ Liddle and Scott: Generally, a στρατιώτης denotes a professional soldier; a citizen bound to military service; also a soldier in general.

⁵⁸ The distinction "guardians" versus "soldiers" is not discussed further; hence I take it that my assumption at this point holds. In G₂ at 414b4-6 this changes because Socrates here presents the second alteration of the concept "guardian," and states that "the young, whom we were calling guardians up to now, we shall call auxiliaries and helpers of the rulers' convictions. I return to this below, p. 191.

⁵⁹ In these reflections on the education of soldiers, Syse (2010) finds the origin on thoughts of the just-war-doctrine.

⁶⁰ It is noticeable that Socrates and Adeimantus did not ban Homer and Hesiod totally, they ruled out what Socrates denoted as lies about the gods and some passages that presented heroes and humans

we learned that the gods and humans hated both the “real lie (ὄντι ψεῦδος)” and the “true lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος)” and that the “useful lie” could function as a remedy used by doctors and rulers. However, as the doctors belong to the multitude, this entails that lying is prohibited for the rest of the inhabitants. Also, we learned that there are different demands laid upon the guardians versus the multitude; a pointing forward to 434c ff. where the three-class conception is almost fully explained. According to the argument, they should now turn to songs and melodies, but as Glaucon interrupted, this theme is the point of departure in G₂.

5.4 G₂: Purging the feverish city (398c7-417b10)

We now return to the investigation of the empirical feverish city, and Socrates urges Glaucon to consider how the harmonic mode and the rhythm must follow the speech (cf. 398d). He is required to consider that the speeches must be spoken in accordance with the models (τύποι) set down by Adeimantus; hence the work executed in A₂ will be paradigmatic for G₂. Glaucon, who is familiar with musical conventions, is now forced to admit that the modes he knows off are not suitable for the guardians. After Glaucon has agreed to prohibit most of these modes, the only thing left is those suited for war-making men (πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν, 399a1). He is further requested to leave out the mode that appropriately imitates the sounds and accents of a man who is courageous in warlike deeds (πολεμικῆ πράξει) and every violent work (βιαιῶ ἐργασίᾳ), and also the mode for a man who performs a peaceful (εἰρηνικῆ) deed (πράξει) that is voluntary (ἐκουσίᾳ). When Glaucon also rules these out, he is left with nothing. All the modes known to him are banned. Socrates then swears and summarizes, “And, by the dog, [...] Unawares we’ve again purged the city that a while ago was luxurious” (399e5-6), and Glaucon concludes that this is a sign of their moderation (399e7).⁶¹ Socrates’ underlining of “unawares we’ve again purged” implies that the first unaware purging was done in A₂, and the second by making Glaucon acknowledge that none of the conventional modes and rhythms were suitable for the guardians. Therefore, when he now suggests, “Come, then [...] let’s purge the

in an unfavorable light. Therefore, I cannot agree with the scholars who at this stage argue for “the expulsion of poetry,” cf. Rosen (1965, 467).

⁶¹ Regarding moderation, the question is if Glaucon at this point understands this concept as Socrates does. This will be answered in section 5.4.2: Glaucon is tested (402d1-403c8), pp. 181-84.

rest” (399e8), he indicates that he and Glaucon start the third purging in awareness. The next thing to consider is if Glaucon apprehends moderation in the same manner as Socrates.

5.4.1 The true rule for modes and rhythms (399e8-402c9)

The hypothesis is that if they follow the harmonic modes, they will be able to find the true rule about rhythms and thus find the rhythms of an orderly and courageous life (cf. 399e). Glaucon is now supposed to tell what these rhythms might be, just as he did with the harmonic modes. However, he is not able to decide “which sorts are imitations of which sort of life” (400a8-9). Because Socrates rather quickly decides that these things are to be turned over to the music theorist Damon⁶² (cf. 400a-c), it could indicate that he again recognizes Glaucon’s lack of ability to reflect beyond conventions. That Socrates made the right choice regarding music and rhythms, will be confirmed in A₃, 424c.

Socrates now permits that Glaucon attends to conventions. He makes an indirect reference to Thrasymachus’ concept of a “good disposition”⁶³ and states that “good speech, good harmony, good grace, and good rhythm accompany good disposition (εὐηθεία), not the folly that we endearingly call ‘good disposition,’ but that understanding truly trained to good and fair disposition” (400d12-e2). From the discussion of being truly trained, it follows that it is no longer sufficient to supervise the poets; they must also supervise the craftsmen and prevent them from impressing “bad disposition, a licentious, illiberal, and graceless one, either on images of animals or on houses or on anything else that their craft produces” (401b4-7). These craftsmen and their craft are prohibited because “our guardians won’t be reared on images of vice [...] and unawares put together some one big bad thing in their soul” (401c1-4). To form a good disposition, they need to make the guardians musical men, hence, they must search for “craftsmen who are able to track down the nature of what is fine and

⁶² On Damon, see Wallace (2015), especially chapter 2: “*Êthos* theories of music and poetic metre.” See also Nails (2002, 121-22) who claims “that the Athenians found Damon’s influence too dangerous and ostracized him” in 428, p. 122.

⁶³ When Thrasymachus used the term “good disposition (εὐηθεία)” at 348c, he described the just man and it was rendered as “innocence.” According to Bloom (1991b, 454n53), Socrates now uses it in its literal and etymologically precise sense.

graceful, so that the young, dwelling as it were in a healthy place (ὕγιεινῷ τόπῳ), will be benefited by everything” (401c4-6). These craftsmen can recognize the nature of the guardians, and this ability points toward the philosophers (maybe toward Socrates himself and his demiurgic craft).⁶⁴ I take the healthy dwelling place to be the unawakened soul that receives visions and hearings, unaware, from childhood onwards. This is foreshadowing the discussion in G₄ (518b ff.) regarding the craft of the philosopher and the awakening of the soul.⁶⁵ Because at this point we are at a preparatory stage, the task for Glaucon is to understand why and how the rearing in music is most sovereign (cf. 401d54-5).

Socrates gives two accounts. First, rhythm and harmony are what “most of all insinuate themselves into the inmost part of the soul and most vigorously lay hold of it in bringing grace with them” (401d5-7). If a youth is correctly reared, rhythm and harmony make him graceful, if not—the opposite happens.⁶⁶ Second, the man “properly reared on rhythm and harmony would have the sharpest sense for what’s been left out and what isn’t a fine product of craft or what isn’t a fine product of nature” (401e2-5). The effect of his ability to discriminate is that he would always praise the good things; he takes pleasure in them and receives them in his soul. However, there is more to it, Socrates proclaims:

So, in the name of the gods, is it as I say: we’ll never be musical—either ourselves or those whom we say we must educate to be guardians—before we recognize the forms (εἶδη) of moderation (σωφροσύνης), courage (ἀνδρείας), liberality (ἐλευθεριότητος), magnificence (μεγαλοπρεπείας), and all their kin, and, again, their opposites, everywhere they turn up, and notice that they are in whatever they are in, both themselves and their images, despising them neither in little nor big things, but believing that they all belong to the same art and discipline? (402b10-c8).

⁶⁴ This alludes to the theme of recognizing different natures as Glaucon was not able to do in G₁ during the sections 374d-376c, thus, it is a new test of Glaucon’s attentiveness. In the *Euthyphro* (11b-d), Socrates claims that he possesses the same kinds of skills as Daedalus, his ancestor and famous demiurge; see Introduction, section 3.1: The demiurge at work, p. 20-3.

⁶⁵ In chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.1.1: Turning *toward* and *into* philosophy, pp. 283-84, I suggest that Socrates is awakened from his dwelling place.

⁶⁶ The latter is what happened to Charmides, whom we will meet in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.3: Charmides, pp. 306-23.

These are the premises Socrates lays down to become a musical man at all, and the demands set forth signal a thorough philosophical investigation of the virtues.⁶⁷ The statement claiming that neither they nor the guardians will be musical men unless they recognize the forms (εἶδη) of the virtue and their opposites, now explicitly confirms that Socrates is warranting his argument in a concealed topos. And from here on, parts of Socrates' concealment start to surface.⁶⁸ But before he starts on that journey, he performs an interesting test on Glaucon's attentiveness and his ability to levitate his reasoning. This element is imperative for this line of philosophical investigation.⁶⁹ The outlet of this test is the fine disposition, moderation, and the musical man. We are now entering the erotic field and its forces, which also is a theme well-known to Glaucon.

5.4.2 Glaucon is tested (402d1-403c8)

The premise for this elenchus is that the musical man will first and foremost love harmonious human beings; he will not love those who lack harmony. Thus, the fairest is the most lovable (ἐρασιμώτατον, 402d6).⁷⁰ Glaucon agrees, but with a reservation. He would not love a man with a defect in his soul, but if "there were some bodily

⁶⁷ Socrates' demand for a procedure on how they are to investigate the virtues is similar to the method for inquiry suggested by Parmenides when he taught Socrates. This we are introduced to in the *Parmenides* which I return to in chapter 7: *Setting the stage*, section 7.1.2: Parmenides, the teacher, p. 250 ff.

⁶⁸ Adeimantus later confirms that Socrates' arguments are out of the ordinary (cf. 449c ff.), and I take this to be the fourth hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, and 174n47 above).

⁶⁹ This point is exposed in the *Parmenides* during the five steps Parmenides leads Socrates through. However, it was easier for Parmenides to make Socrates elevate his reasoning than it is for Socrates to make Glaucon do the same.

⁷⁰ According to Prauscello (2014, 41-2), ἐράσιμος means originally "at home" particularly in the "sphere of erotic." "The use of the adjective ('desirable/lovable') in this context is quite interesting. Before Plato, it is attested only three times (Semon. 7.52 W2, Anacr. *PMG* 375 and Aesch. *Ag.* 605) and always with an overtly erotic meaning. Within Plato's *corpus*, the adjective occurs (only in the superlative form) three times: apart from this passage of the *Republic*, it also appears in *Phaedrus* 250e1 and *Timaeus* 87d7-8. In all three instances, ἐρασιμώτατος is used with reference to the erotic desire provoked by *human embodied* beauty. The verbal and thematic echoes between the passage of the *Republic* quoted previously and the passages of the *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus* are remarkable. In *Tim.* 87d7-8 the human being whose soul and body are both beautiful and well-proportioned is "the most beautiful and desirable spectacle of all for who has eyes to see it." Although it is the *Timaeus* that comes closest to the *Republic* in terms of intertextual resonances, the overall context of *Phaedrus* 250b1-e1 seems to provide the underlying explanation (only hinted in at *Resp.* 3.402d1-9) of why embodied beauty, in this earthly world, is the most vividly perceived form and hence the one that triggers in us the greatest degree of desire."

defect, he'd be patient and would willingly take delight in him" (402d10-12).⁷¹ We now understand that Glaucon bases his answer on experience, and from this, it follows that Socrates' reflections on harmony between soul and body are not an issue for Glaucon. Thus, Socrates starts by referring to Glaucon's own erotic predicament.⁷² He indicates knowing that Glaucon has or has had such a boy; therefore, he does not problematize this theme any further. Instead, Glaucon is asked to consider if "excessive pleasure has anything in common with moderation [...] or with the rest of the virtues" (402e2-5). On this Glaucon answers negatively and confirms that excessive pleasure is related to insolence and licentiousness; he further confirms that there is no greater "pleasure than the one connected with sex" (403a4-5). Glaucon also responds positively to the next two questions: Is "the natural right kind of love (ὀρθὸς ἔρωϛ) to love in a moderate and musical way what's orderly and fine?" (403a7-8). Or, is it that "nothing that's mad or akin to licentiousness must approach the right kind of love (ὀρθῶ ἔρωτι)?" (403a10-11). Socrates rounds off with a conclusive question: "Then this pleasure mustn't approach love, and lover and boy who love and are loved in the right way (ὀρθῶϛ ἐρῶσι) mustn't be partner to it (i.e., sexual pleasures)?" (403b1-3).

The passage 402d-403b is worth observing. Lucia Prauscello (2014) made me aware that the semantic mode changes notably in this passage. She argues that "it is only when Socrates' discourse switches from the perceptual recognition of some universal qualities to the perception of the embodied beauty of human beings that the language of *erōs* kicks in" (ibid, 42). So far, the love has been described in terms of generic *philia*, and strictly speaking it has, as Prauscello notes, been "promoted to the level of passionate desire (*erōs*) among the fledging guardians only when applied to the sphere of interpersonal relationships, and, more to the point, to same-sex relationships" (ibid, 43). Contrary to Prauscello,⁷³ I suggest that Socrates now has

⁷¹ This alludes to Protagoras' distinction on evils that are due to nature or chance versus lack of cultivation, cf. *Protagoras* 323d f. I return to this in chapter 7: *Setting the stage*, section 7.6.2.1: The consequences of the myth, pp. 270-73.

⁷² On Glaucon as an erotic man, cf. 368a, 458d, 468b, 474c-475a.

⁷³ She claims, p. 43, that the argument develops as the following: "In fact, what follows at 3.402d10–e2 is Socrates's playful reference to Glaucon's well-known homoerotic entanglements (3.402e1 παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα). This becomes explicit at 3.403b1–c6, when Socrates defines the form of "correct

awakened the *paidierastia* topos or the Athenian political practice of *paidierastia*.⁷⁴ Thus, I suggest that Glaucon is now confronted with his own ways, as he mirrors the Athenian practice. The answer he gave Socrates (cf. 402d) also indicates that maybe he has not understood the full concept of the musical (harmonic) man either. However, Glaucon concludes in accordance with Socrates that sexual pleasure (the most insane pleasure) cannot approach the “correct love” (ὀρθῶ ἔρωτι). But what exactly is “correct love”?

Prauscello argues that Socrates “defines the form of ‘correct *erōs*’” at 403a7, but does he do that? At 403a7 he says that the correct kind of *erōs* is to love in a moderate and musical way and that this is orderly and fine, but I do not take this to be a definition. I rather suggest that the definition is set forth in the proposed law and that Socrates is ambiguous when he infers that it seems like Glaucon will set down a law in the city that’s being founded.⁷⁵ Viewed in light of the argument, I am not able to see that the law is Glaucon’s suggestion. This law states that ...

... a lover may kiss, be with, and touch his boy as though he were a son, for fair purposes, if he persuades him; but as for the rest, his intercourse with the one for whom he cares will be such that their relationship will never be reputed to go further than this. If not, he’ll be subject to blame as unmusical and inexperienced in fair things (403b6-c2).

Socrates’ inference may rather be viewed as a Socratic correction to what Prauscello denotes as “Glaucon’s well-known homoerotic entanglements,” because Socrates here

Eros” (ὀρθὸς ἔρως 3.403a7, a11; cf. also ὀρθῶς ἐρῶσι at 3.403b2) among *erastes* and *eromenos* to be promoted in Callipolis. Because there cannot be any “communion” (3.402e3 κοινωνία) between “moderation” (σωφροσύνη) and “excessive pleasure” (ἡδονῆ ὑπερβαλλούση), and because sexual pleasure (3.403a4–5 ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια) is, by its nature, the ‘keenest’ (3.403a4 ὄξυτέραν), greatest, and “most insane” pleasure (3.403a6 μανικωτέραν) experienced by man, then the relevant law (νόμος) will be established in Callipolis (3.403a10–c2).”

⁷⁴ On the subject of pederasty, my main sources are Dover (1978) and Thornton (1997). One concern regarding pederasty is that “[p]art of the problem is that homosexuality, contemporary as well as ancient, is not easier for us so-called moderns to understand than it was for the Greeks. One of our difficulties when reading about ancient Greece is that the most common manifestation of homosexuality in the evidence concerns pederasty, the quasi-ritualized, transient, physical and emotional relationship between an older male and a youth” (Thornton 1997, 100). For a profound survey of the literature, see Thornton pp. 263-65.

⁷⁵ The underlining of “the city that’s being founded” I take to be a reminder to Glaucon (and the readers) that by the profound purging of the “feverish city,” they are on their way to found a new city, and in this regard Adeimantus’ “true city” is the paradigm.

restricts the relationship between an older and a younger man to resemble that between father and son.⁷⁶ Thus, “correct love” is defined by this law, which, in turn, entails that Socrates has declined the Athenian practice of *paidēra*. After this law is launched, Socrates abruptly proclaims that the argument about music has reached an end, and it ended exactly where it ought to end. When he underlines that “surely musical matters should end in love matters (ἐρωτικά) that concern the fair (τοῦ καλοῦ)” (403c6-7), I assume that he refers to the latter prohibition because the relations developed through *paidēra* are, I take it, to be a political inculcating practice aiming toward same-mindedness (*homonoia*), which is incompatible with the Socratic practice.⁷⁷ It is interesting that the argument of music found its end in testing Glaucon’s understanding of moderation, which at this point is not in accordance with Socrates’. Therefore, I take this to be a moment foreshadowing the redefining of virtues coming up in G₃. Glaucon did not pass the test, but by being corrected and given a new law, Socrates showed him the consequences of being moderate. This implies that Glaucon now should be more disposed to partake in a philosophical investigation than he was when they set out. They now turn to gymnastic and the harmony between body and soul.

5.4.3 The path toward excellent models (403c9-410a4)

Socrates’ next point of departure is his view that it does not look “as though it’s a sound body that by its virtue makes the soul good, but the opposite: a good soul by its own virtue makes the body as good as it can be” (403d2-5).⁷⁸ This is a turning around of the conventional view that said “music for the soul and gymnastic for the body,” and it is this upending Socrates in the following sections will be stating reasons for.

⁷⁶ In the *Symposium* (217a-e), Alcibiades confirms that Socrates himself lived by this law. Here he tells about his master-plans to let Socrates seduce him, but Alcibiades failed this mission three times. I will comment on this in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.2.5: Alcibiades’ swan song, p. 305. The restriction set forth is also in accordance with the Athenian Stranger when he argues that “the pleasures given according to nature, it seems, when the female unites with the nature of males for procreation. Males coming together with males, and females with females, seems against nature, and the daring of those who first did it seems to have arisen from a lack of self-restraint with regard to pleasure” (*Laws*, 636c).

⁷⁷ This is a practice both Alcibiades and Charmides have been exposed to. I return to them in chapter 8: *Saving youths*. The *paideia* program launched by Protagoras, has same-mindedness at its core; I return to that theme in chapter 7: *Setting the stage*. The *topos of same-mindedness* will be discussed in chapter 10: *The Apologies*.

⁷⁸ This theme was the point of departure in A₂ at 376e4-5 when Adeimantus and Socrates started their evaluation of the conventional *paideia*, cf. p. 168n30 above.

If the guardians are to be guardians, they must receive precise training from childhood throughout life. According to Socrates, this is imperative because, “It doesn’t look to me as though it’s a sound body that by its virtue makes the soul good, but the opposite: a good soul by its own virtue makes the body as good as it can be” (403d2-5). As this premise now is laid down, Socrates suggests a new course of action: “If we gave adequate care to the intellect (διάνοιαν) and turned over to it the concern for the precise details about the body, while we, so as not to talk too much, showed the way only to the models (τύπους), would we be doing a the right thing?” (403d7-e2) For Glaucon, this suggestion is momentous because Socrates now demands that they first and foremost should take care of the intellect (make Glaucon upraise his thoughts) and take on the task of showing the way to new models. Now that Socrates has launched a new procedure, it is the *way toward* that is imperative, not the models themselves. This is a turnaround, which implies that Socrates now starts to prepare Glaucon (unaware) for partaking in a new thought experiment that will follow after the two cities are superposed; that is, Adeimantus’ “true city” and Glaucon’s purged “feverish city.” These paths will eventually lead to the beautiful city - Kallipolis.

5.4.3.1 First path—health (403e4-410a4)

In addition to prohibiting drunkenness, they must clarify whether the habit and diet of ordinary athletes will be proper for the guardians (cf. 404a). Socrates quickly discards this theme because it “is a sort of sleepy habit and not a very steady one so far as health is concerned” (404a4-5).⁷⁹ Instead, he proposes the best gymnastic to be of a

⁷⁹ Texts on diet have been difficult to track down; the one I found refers to Pausanias and Philostratos. It is interesting that the earliest athletes lived their lives in a manner similar to that which Socrates is about to propose for the guardians. The exceptional long-distance runner Dromeus of Stymphalos won all the PanHellenic games in the mid-5th century, and he “[...] is said to have been the first who thought of eating meat as part of his training diet. Until then, the food for athletes was cheese fresh out of the basket. (Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 6:7:10). Philostratos, writing later than Pausanias, compared and contrasted early and contemporary athletic diet through the years: These athletes [in olden times] washed in rivers and springs [...] learned to sleep on the ground [...] others on beds made of straw they gathered from the field. Their food was bread made from barley and unleavened loaves of unsifted wheat. For meat, they ate the flesh of oxen, bulls, goats, and deer; they rubbed themselves with the oil of the wild olive and *phylia*. This style of living made them free from sickness and they kept their youth a long time. Some of them competed in eight Olympic Games, others for nine; they were also excellent soldiers. [...] They made war a training for athletics, and they made athletics a military activity (Philostratos, *Concerning Gymnastics* 43).” Quoted from Grivetti and Applegate (1997, 862).

kind of the simple music they have already described. Glaucon does not understand this. The backdrop for this discussion (403e-409e) is the subjects Socrates introduced in relation to the extensive need of doctors and judges in the feverish city (cf. 373d). Despite Glaucon's indications that he does not understand all of Socrates' suggestions, the latter continues and sketches a way that leads to the famous healer-doctor Asclepius,⁸⁰ now viewed as a politician (πολιτικόν, 407e3).⁸¹ In the tradition established by Asclepius, Socrates finds an ideal for the art of medicine and judging that potentially will fit the purged city. The question is if Glaucon is willing to ...

... set down a law in the city providing as well for an art of medicine such as we described along with such an art of judging, which will care for those of *your citizens* who have good natures in body and soul; while as for those who haven't, they'll let die the ones whose bodies are such, and the ones whose souls have bad natures and are incurable, they themselves will kill (409e5-410a4).

This is the first law that concerns the multitude, and from my point of view the content of the law seems at first to be both controversial and somehow gruesome.⁸² However, as I also notice that Socrates here talks of “*your citizens* (πολιτῶν σοι),” and as I take these citizens to allude to the Athenians, my first impression begins to alter. When Socrates earlier mentioned “the citizens,” he used the term in a general sense. This is the first time he denotes them as “yours,” and he will do so one more time toward Glaucon in G₃ (463d). This gives way for two equal interpretations. First, we can read it literally and state that all the citizens in the feverish city that do not have good natures in bodies, the doctors will let die and the ones that do not have good natures (cf. lack of harmony) in their souls, the doctors will kill. Secondly, we can read it as yet another Socratic challenge or test of Glaucon. As he now partakes—aware—in the purging of the feverish city he initially wanted to investigate, and—unaware—is preparing himself for participation in a thought experiment, Socrates once again tries

⁸⁰ Planeaux (2001, 181), explains that “[...] When Asclepius entered Attica (after the Peace of Nicias), he promptly established himself both in Piraeus and in the asty. Upon entering Athens proper, furthermore, Asclepius settled under the Acropolis in the area of Amynos, and soon Asclepius overshadowed the older healing cult.”

⁸¹ This I take as an allusion to Parmenides who also was a healer-politician and legislator. I return to Parmenides the healer in chapter 7: *Setting the stage*, section 7.1: Parmenides, the legislator, p. 250.

⁸² This law alludes to the law code Protagoras launches as a threatening element connected to his *paideia* program. I return to this in chapter 7: *Setting the stage*, section 7.4: Protagoras the teacher, p. 267 ff.

to wake him up and make him see this distinction. The question is if Glaucon recognizes it.

Glaucon's response to the proposed law is not a simple *yes* or *no*. His answer is politically ambiguous: "Well [...] that's the way it looked best for those who undergo it and for the city" (410a5-6). From this cloudy response, Socrates infers that *your young* will then "plainly beware of falling into need of the judge's art since they use that simple music which we claimed engenders moderation" (410a7-10). We (the universal audience) now understand that the denotation "your young" refers to the guardians in their making. Hence, we also understand that we are on our way to ascend to a new thought experiment. Glaucon does not grasp the latter, but he understands that the explicit threats of the last law will work. Through the next line of questioning, we learn that the musical man will need neither a doctor nor a judge. Thus, the law proposed above will be dismissed.

When doing his exercises, the musical man will look less to strength and more to the spirited part of his nature—as opposed to the other kinds of athletes who treat diets and labors as means to force. Hence, there is no need for doctors in the guardian class; a preventive diet and gymnastic will be sufficient. Socrates now starts to pick up the loose ends. First, he returns to the starting point of their evaluation—the traditional view that music cared for the soul and gymnastic for the body—and asks if those (i.e., a reference to the 'sons of Asclepius') who established this education did not do it for other purposes? It is more likely "that they established both chiefly for the soul" (410c5-6), Socrates concludes. Again, Glaucon is at loss, and Socrates elaborates by an analogy pointing back to their discussion on the nature of the guardians (cf. G₁, 374d-376c). Now his theme is savageness and hardness versus softness and tameness. He explains that savageness stems from the spirited part of nature, and if correctly trained it will be courageous, it will not become cruel and harsh (cf. 410d); the philosophic nature will become tame and orderly if properly trained. He reminds Glaucon that according to their demand, the guardians ought to have both these natures and these needed to be harmonized (cf. the noble dog-philosopher analogy at 375a2-3). They have already shown that the harmonized soul is moderate and courageous, and the opposite is cowardly and crude. Socrates now asserts that ...

... some god gave two arts to human beings for these two things, as it seems—music and gymnastic for the spirited and the philosophic—not for soul and body, except incidentally, but rather for these two. He did so in order that they might be harmonized with one another by being tuned to the proper degree of tension and relaxation (411e5-412a2).

As Glaucon concedes, Socrates can give his overall conclusion on the themes discussed so far. “Then the man who makes the finest mixture of gymnastic with music and brings them to his soul in the most proper measure is the one of whom we would most correctly say that he is the most perfectly musical and well harmonized, far more so than of the man who tunes the strings to one another” (412a3-6). If the regime is to be saved (πολιτεία σώζεσθαι, 412a9-10), this is the kind of man they always need as a supervisor of training (ἐπιστάτου, 412a9) in the purged city. These are the models (τύποι) of education and rearing, Socrates says, and they must be followed. Because they are clearly stated, they are “no longer difficult to discover” (412b6), Socrates concludes. It is significant that in his response to Socrates’ conclusion Glaucon again signals hesitancy: “Perhaps, they aren’t,” he says. This indicates that Glaucon understood that they decided on the models (τύποι) for a new *paideia*, but did he understand that the important issue was *the path toward* the models?

5.4.3.2 Second path—testing the guardians (410a5-414b7)

Socrates does not pick up on Glaucon’s ambivalence. Instead, he wants to go on by determining “who among these men will rule and who be ruled” (412b9-10). To enable himself to make this decision, he once again picks up on the discussion on the nature of the guardians. Since they are to be rulers, must they not be the best of the guardians and the most skillful in guarding the city? (cf. 412c). Socrates’ argument develops like this: Because a man always cares most for what he loves, the guardian must, to begin with, be prudent, powerful, and care for the city (cf. 412c-d). He then makes a distinction with regard to selection: “[...] we must select from the other guardians (τῶν ἄλλων φυλάκων) the sort of men who, upon our consideration, from everything in their lives, look as if they were entirely eager to do what they believe to be advantageous to the city and would in no way be willing to do what is not” (412d9-e3). This entails that not all guardians are suited to rule, and it is now Glaucon and

Socrates' job to rule out those who are not.⁸³ Thus, their intention is to lay down procedures for a selection praxis within the class of guardians (or soldiers).

In Socrates' opinion, the guardians are to be watched at every age, from childhood on. In this way, they will be able to find those who are skillful according to this dogma (δόγματος, 412e6). The word δόγμα means "an opinion," and usually an authoritative opinion, a decree of assembly, or the opinion or consensus of the rulers of the people. According to Bloom (1991b, 455n64), the word here has both senses: "an opinion" and "a public agreement or law." This must entail that Socrates refers to an already established law (δόγμα) concerning selections.⁸⁴ Further, they must secure that the guardians never—under the influence of wizardry or force—forget and thus banish this dogma. That is, it is all a matter of what is best for the city (cf. 412d-e). Glaucon does not understand what is meant by 'banish.' Socrates expounds and tells that "an opinion departs from our minds either willingly or unwillingly; the departure of the false opinion from the man who learns otherwise is willing, that of every true opinion is unwilling" (412e-413a).⁸⁵ Glaucon understands the case of "the willing departure," but he needs to learn more about "the unwilling." "What?" is the response, whereupon Socrates declares that men are unwillingly deprived on true opinion.⁸⁶ "Don't they suffer this by being robbed, bewitched by wizards, or forced?" Socrates asks next. Glaucon is still at a loss: "Now I don't understand again," he says (413b3). At this point, Socrates apologizes (cf. his apology to Adeimantus at 392d-e): "I'm afraid I am speaking in the tragic way" (413b4), he says, and continues by carefully defining the three concepts.⁸⁷ Glaucon is again on track and Socrates starts anew:

⁸³ The question regarding who will rule and who are to be ruled will be answered when Socrates launches the third wave at 473c ff. Hence, I take this to be the fifth hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, and 181n68).

⁸⁴ By this implicit law, Socrates is again warranting his argument in a *concealed topos*, and I take this to be the sixth hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, 181n68note, and 189n83).

⁸⁵ Cf. *Euthyphron* (11b-d); see also Introduction, section 3.2: The demiurge at work, pp. 20-3.

⁸⁶ This we learned in A₂ (cf. 370a f.), and the reason was lack of proper education. Thus, this is yet another hint toward Glaucon's inattentiveness.

⁸⁷ By "being robbed" Socrates meant "those who are persuaded to change and those who forget, because in the one case, time, in the other, speech, takes away their opinions unawares" (413b5). By "being forced," Socrates meant "those whom some grief or pain causes to change their opinions" (413b6). By "bewitched" Socrates meant "those who change their opinions either because they are charmed by pleasure or terrified by some fear" (413c1-3). It is noteworthy that in the Interlude

Now then, as I said a while ago, we must look (ζητητέον) for some men who are the best guardians (ἄριστοι φύλακες) of their conviction (αὐτοῖς δόγματος) that they must do what on each occasion seems best for the city. So, we must watch them straight from childhood by setting them at tasks in which a man would most likely forget and be deceived out of such a conviction. And the man who has a memory and is hard to deceive must be chosen, and the one who's not must be rejected, mustn't he? (413c5-d2)⁸⁸

From this statement, it looks like they within the class of guardians already live by the dogma as a law, and it is among these they must look for the best. Socrates has also presented two additional demands—they must have a good memory because then they are less likely to be deceived, and the potential rulers “must be set to labors, pains, and contests in which these same things must be watched” (413d4-5). Glaucon agrees. From this, it follows that the selectors must especially be aware of wizardry: “Just as they lead colts to noises and confusions and observe if they're fearful, so these men when they are young must be brought to terrors and then cast in turn into pleasures, testing (βασανίζοντας) them far more than gold in fire” (413d8-e2). As I understand this unique form of testing, the guardians, right from childhood on, will be scared and then comforted to balance out pleasure and pain. If they manage this task throughout life, they have proved themselves not to be easily bewitched; more precisely, they have shown themselves to be musical men who possess rhythm and harmony in all occasions—these men will be useful for the city. When they have passed the tests untainted as children, youths, and men, they “must be appointed ruler of the city and guardian” (414a1-2). The men that do not pass are rejected. According to Socrates, this “selection and appointment of the rulers and guardians is [...] something like this, not described precisely, but by way of a model (τύπη)” (414a5-7).⁸⁹ He then announces that it is “truly most correct to call these men complete guardians (φύλακας παντελεῖς, 414b1-2).” As a whole, the guardians can watch over enemies from without and

(449a1 ff.) Socrates is accused by Adeimantus for robbing the gathering of a whole section (εἶδος) of the argument.

⁸⁸ This is a pointing forward to the third wave and the explicit introduction of the philosopher-kings.

⁸⁹ With regard to this specific kind of testing, there are at this point some ambiguities—especially what models Socrates is referring to here—which will be clarified when Socrates launches the third wave, and further during the curriculum of the philosopher. This indicates that Socrates is again warranting his argument in a concealed topos, and I take this to be the seventh hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, 181n68, 189n83, and 189n84).

friends from within,⁹⁰ and the beauty of the selection and, hence, the distinction, is that the friends from within will not wish to do harm, while the enemies from without will not be able to. From this argument, Socrates presents the second redefinition of the concept “guardian,” he says that “the young, whom we were calling guardians up to now, we shall call auxiliaries and helpers of the rulers’ convictions (τῶν ἀρχόντων δόγμασιν, 414b4-6).”⁹¹

At this point, I will summarize the conversation so far. First, Glaucon was forced to prohibit all the conventional modes and start searching for the “true rule” concerning the rhythms fit for a harmonious man. He was tested, but it turned out that he had not grasped the full meaning of the musical man. Secondly, Socrates urged him to leave details regarding physical experiences (the body) behind and start to take care of the intellect. From this urging, they started a search for the paths leading to new models. They described two: first, the way to health which led them to Asclepius, second, the testing of the guardians which led them to the true rulers. With regard to the latter, we can infer that three classes were identified implicitly: the multitude; the guardian/soldier-class that through a profound testing will be divided into two: the class of auxiliaries/helpers/soldiers, and the class of rulers.⁹² There is one more question to attend to, though, and this is related to the Athenian topos of autochthony.

5.4.4 The noble lie (414b8-417b10)

The “noble lie” as presented in the upcoming sections is broadly discussed.⁹³ I do not deviate from the orthodox readings and interpretations regarding the content of Socrates’ story, but I will claim that the “noble lie” is not transported into the “beautiful city.” On the contrary, I think that Socrates repeals it in G₃ (444a4-6).⁹⁴ The two-part myth Socrates now is about to tell is of major importance. The point of departure is Socrates asking: “Could we [...] somehow contrive one of those lies that

⁹⁰ This distinction I take to be a pointing forward to G₃ 470b. Here, Socrates makes a distinction between *polemos* (external war) and *stasis* (internal war). I return to this in chapter 6: *The demiurges of freedom*, section 6.2.2.3: Third consideration: War and faction, pp. 229-34.

⁹¹ Cf. p. 166n25.

⁹² This last point is foreshadowing G₃ where the three classes will be made explicit.

⁹³ For a summary of recent debates, see Dombrowski (1997) and Lay Williams (2013).

⁹⁴ I have not found any scholar who takes the statement of Socrates in 444a4-6 into consideration when discussing and concluding with regard to the “noble lie.”

come into being in case of need, of which we were just now speaking, someone noble (γενναῖόν)⁹⁵ lie to persuade, in the best case, even the rulers, but if not them, the rest of the city?” (414b8-c2). The word γενναῖόν has connotations that point strongly toward the Athenian myth of their origin, so Socrates is hesitant to speak when he now awakens the topos of autochthony,⁹⁶

I shall speak—and yet, I don’t know what I’ll use for daring or speeches in telling it—and I’ll attempt to persuade first the rulers and the soldiers, then the rest of the city, that the rearing and education we gave them were like dreams; they only thought they were undergoing all that was happening to them, while, in truth, at that time they were under the earth within, being fashioned and reared themselves, and their arms and other tools being crafted. When the job had been completely finished, then the earth, which is their mother, sent them up. And now, as though the land they are in were a mother and nurse, they must plan for and defend it, if anyone attacks, and they must think of the other citizens as brothers and born of the earth” (414d1-e6).

“It wasn’t [...] for nothing that you were for so long ashamed to tell the lie” (414e7), Glaucon responds. Socrates replies that his disinclination was indeed appropriate. This little word exchange indicates that both Socrates and Glaucon apprehend the Athenian myth of autochthony to be a lie. Thus, it suggests that they both, at this point, turn their back on the significant topos sustaining the political ideology of their native city.⁹⁷ Autochthony,⁹⁸ as self-representation, was imperative and reinforced in Athens through the rituals of the Panathenaea festival.⁹⁹ The story tells that it was king

⁹⁵ Bloom (1991b, 455n65) points out that γενναῖόν is, primarily, “noble” in the sense of “nobly born” or “well bred” (cf. 375a and 409c). According to Liddle and Scott, the word γενναῖόν means *true to one’s birth* or *descent*; of persons, *high-born, noble, noble in mind*; of animals, *well-bred*; of things, *good of their kind, excellent*.

⁹⁶ According to Loraux (1994, 41), this is a civic myth. She maintains: “To give it its historical moment, let us call it a myth of the “classical city,” or even better, a myth of the fifth century. [...] It is true that in this period, the domain of politics appropriates all representational space, the language of all illustration: it takes over the tragic stage, where the *logos* becomes a spectacle, and the Athenian cemeteries, where the private *stēlai* give way to public monuments. During this great movement of political appropriation, when visual representation is taken over by the spoken word, it is not surprising that the civic myth of autochthony should find its prestigious place.”

⁹⁷ Cf. I have reformulated Rosenstock (1994, 368); his formulation is uttered like this: “In the *Republic*, Plato turns his back on the political ideology that sustains his city.”

⁹⁸ On thorough examinations on the myth of autochthony, see Loraux (2006), (2000), and (1994); on the importance of autochthony generally to Athenian thought, see especially Loraux (1994), chapter I: “Autochthony: An Athenian Topic,” pp. 37-71.

⁹⁹ Prior to the Panathenaea, the Athenians celebrated the Arrhephoria festival. “The ritual of the Arrhephoria recalls the biological unity of Athenians as children of one mother, the land of Attica,”

Erichthonius who founded the festival. He was “born from out of earth” and “was claimed by the Athenians to be their autochthonous progenitor.”¹⁰⁰ Josiah Ober (1989, 288) links autochthony as self-presentation to the powerful topos of same-mindedness (*homonoia*)¹⁰¹ and claims that “paradoxically, ‘same-mindedness’ on a political plane threatened to tear the society apart” (ibid). He refers to Lysias (one of the men gathered) who, in his *Funeral Oration*, activated the topos of autochthony and orated on “how the autochthonous ancestors of the Athenians threw out their rulers (*dunasteias*) and established a democracy ‘believing that the freedom of all is the greatest consensus’” (ibid, 298).¹⁰² Ober (ibid, 299) points out that for Lysias it was no problem to link autochthony, same-mindedness (*homonoia*), and freedom (*eleutheria*):

Far from facing the contradiction squarely and deciding which concept was of greater utility or how each might be moderated, the Athenians continued to believe that both freedom and consensus were simultaneously good, valuable to state and society, and attainable. [...] Any attempt to limit either one by constitutional means might have been constructed as an intolerable assault on basic Athenian values.

When Socrates has introduced the myth and denoted it as “a noble (*γενναῖόν*) lie,” it is difficult not to see it as a direct attack on basic Athenian values.¹⁰³ However, there is

Rosenstock (1994, 365). It is also noteworthy that in the two dialogues, the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus*, where the principles of philosophy are discussed and explicitly voiced, the dramatic backdrop is the Panathenaea.

¹⁰⁰ Rosenstock (1994, 364-65) gives a summary of the myth: “The festival that Erichthonius founded celebrates his ascension to power as kings, and it is dedicated to the goddess Athena who, in the mythic narrative of Erichthonius’ birth, functions as his foster mother. Athena, the story goes, was sexually assaulted by Hephaistos and, after having repelled his attack, wiped his seed off herself with a piece of wool and threw the wool to the earth. The earth became pregnant with the seed and produced a child, the half-human and half-serpent Erichthonius. Athena took up the child and charged the virgin daughters of the king (Kekrops) who ruled in Attica at that time with responsibility for watching over the covered basket that concealed the infant. Although instructed not to open the basket, all the girls but one disobeyed and, in punishment, the disobedient daughters were driven mad by the child. They leapt to their deaths from the rocky heights of the Acropolis.” It is the myth of these virgin daughters that is reenacted every year in the ritual of Arrhephoria.

¹⁰¹ I will return to the topos of same-mindedness when I read the *Apology* in chapter 10: *The Apology*, section 10.1 The ideal of same-mindedness, or the *homonoia* topos, pp. 354-56.

¹⁰² Ober (1989, 298n13) stresses that in this passage the context is that of *eleutheria*, the “throwing out of the rulers,” and this “suggest that freedom here is meant to be constructed as the freedom of the citizens to engage in political action, rather than freedom of the state from external domination.”

¹⁰³ Socrates also awakens this topos in the *Alcibiades I* (131e10-132a7) when he warns Alcibiades and urges him to be aware of the corrupted Athenian politicians. I return to this in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.2: Alcibiades and Socrates.

yet another attack beneath the surface; the female aspect, which will come to light later when Socrates introduces the first wave. The myth of autochthony excludes half of the Athenian population, as women are not part of the myth that explains the origin of the city.¹⁰⁴ Saxonhouse (1986, 259), among others, has pointed this out:

For the most part, a founding myth of autochthony suggests the exclusion of women from the origins of the city. The city and its public space is the realm of male warriors sprung from the earth. They are not to be divided by their ties to separate mothers, to separate wives, returned to a private realm that may raise questions about the universality of the *polis* and its goals.¹⁰⁵

As I argue that the myth of autochthony is taken out of the equation, I will not pursue this discussion here. However, I return to the exclusion of women in my next chapter. For now, Socrates admits to Glaucon that he was disinclined to tell this lie, nevertheless, it does not hinder him from continuing. “All the same,” he says, “hear out the rest of the tale” (415a1-2),

All of you in the city are certainly brothers, we shall say to them in telling the tale, but the god, in fashioning those of you who are competent to rule, mixed gold in at their birth; this is why they are most honored; in auxiliaries, silver; and iron and bronze in the farmers and the other craftsmen. So, because you’re all related, although for the most part you’ll produce offspring like yourselves, it sometimes happens that a silver child will be born from a golden parent, a golden child from a silver parent, and similarly all the others from each other. Hence, the god commands the rulers first and foremost to be of nothing such good guardians and to keep over nothing so careful a watch as the children, seeing which of these metals is mixed in their souls. And, if a child of theirs should be born with an admixture of bronze or iron, by no manner of means are they to take pity on it, but shall assign the proper value to its nature and thrust it out among the craftsmen or the farmers; and, again, if from these men one should naturally grow who has an admixture of gold or silver, they will honor such ones and lead them up, some to the guardian group, others to the auxiliary, believing that there is an oracle that the city will be destroyed when an iron or bronze man is its guardian (415a2-c8).

This second part of the story is a Socratic twist of Hesiod’s story on decay through the ages.¹⁰⁶ By this Hesiodic allusion, Socrates also alludes to the topos of peace. As

¹⁰⁴ On the exclusion of women with regard to the myth of autochthony, see especially Loraux (1994, 37-143), and Saxonhouse (1986). The exclusion of women is also a theme in the *Laws* (805a3-b2). The Athenian Stranger refers to statistics when he argues that it will be a tremendous mistake if the lawgiver leaves out half of the population. See Appendix IV: The *Laws*, pp. 398-405.

¹⁰⁵ Some objections on Saxonhouse’s view are set forth by Rosenstock (1994, 365-66).

¹⁰⁶ This Hesiodic allusion, among numerous more in the *Republic*, makes Noorden (2015, 106) argue that Socrates is “playing Hesiod,” because he “in this dialogue is set the challenge of proving the

pointed out by Raaflaub (2011, 7), Hesiod “characterizes his Golden Age by abundance and peace, while the Bronze Age and the Iron Age are plagued by incessant war.” The Socratic twist is to grip Hesiod’s metallic metaphor of the ages and transform it into an image illustrating the souls of the citizens. Socrates will elaborate on this transformed metallic metaphor at 423d2-6. The rulers have a soul mixed with gold. Because they are the most honored and by having gold mixed in their souls, they, in turn, allude to peace. The auxiliaries’ souls are mixed with silver, while the farmers’ and craftsmen’ are mixed with bronze and iron. These metal souls are to remain pure, that is, they are not to be mixed. The worst-case scenario is bronze and iron mixed with gold. If this happens, the citizens are to believe—by means of the ‘noble lie’—that due to an oracle prediction, the city will be destroyed. This demand of purity within the classes is also an element embedded in the topos of autochthony. Athens employed strict rules with regard to citizenship and, thanks to their extraordinary origin and their rearing and education, they grow—from generation to generation—capable of preserving a collective prowess. Sissa (2011, 5) suggests that this combination of birth and personal virtue creates true nobility within the Athenian culture.

When Socrates now asks Glaucon if he can suggest some device that can persuade the citizens of this tale, Glaucon has none that can contribute to convincing the first generation; “however for their sons and their successors and the rest of the human beings who come afterward,” it is easier (415d1-2). Socrates finds himself in agreement: “Well, even that would be good for making them care more for the city and one another. [...] For I understand pretty much what you mean” (415d3-4).

So far in the text, the reformed *paideia* seems to go hand in hand with the myth of the soul-metal as an argument for keeping the classes pure, but—as stated earlier—I argue that the myth of autochthony will be taken out of the equation. The questions discussed further indicate that this is the case. When Socrates next asks how these earth-born guardians are to be settled and educated, Glaucon believes they already have been educated. Nevertheless, Socrates states that this is not the entire picture.

value of justice but without mentioning its material rewards, *unlike* Hesiod [...] The basic task that aligns Socrates in the *Republic* with ‘Hesiod’ in the *Work and Days* is that of persuading certain individuals, who are inclining toward injustice, to choose to be just.”

“It’s not fit to be too sure about that [...] However, it is fit to be sure about what we were saying a while ago, that they must get the right education, whatever it is, if they’re going to have what’s most important for being tame with each other and those who are guarded by them” (416b9-c1). Socrates now speaks in an ambiguous manner; “whatever this education is” signals that there are more to come. From this ambiguity, I infer that this is a pointing forward to the third wave, where the philosophers are introduced as rulers and their education is subsequently described in detail.¹⁰⁷ At this point Adeimantus interrupts.

5.5 A₃: The apology (419a1-427d8)

It is thinkable that someone will argue that these men are not made happy. In such a situation, “what would your apology¹⁰⁸ be, Socrates,” Adeimantus wants to know (419a1-2). Taking on his role as a judge, he sets forth an accusation. For an outsider, these blessed men look exactly like mercenary auxiliaries who sit in the city and do nothing but keep watch. They, to whom the city in truth belongs, are deprived of the goods the other citizens have access to—conventionally, it is the latter that seems to be blessed (cf. 419a-4120a). When meeting this accusation, Socrates makes a little twist: He does not take full responsibility, but includes the two brothers in his apology—a twist that may indicate, on the one hand, that none of them have yet grasped the full picture, and on the other, reminds both that they have been partaking in the making of these men; “You ask what *our apology* will then be?” he asks (420b1) before he elaborates.

We’ll say that it wouldn’t be surprising if these men, as they are, are also happiest. However, in founding the city, we are not looking to the exceptional happiness of any one group among us but, as far as possible, that of the city as a whole. [...]

¹⁰⁷ This simultaneously indicates that Socrates is again warranting his argument in a concealed topos, and I take this to be the eighth hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, 181n68, 189n83, 189n84, and 190n89).

¹⁰⁸ Bloom (1991b, 455n1) gives the following reflection on what is about to happen, and I think it is noteworthy: “This is a trial: Socrates is accused. The fact that Socrates was a man who finally really was accused, who presented an apology in a court, and who was put to death play an important role in this drama, all uses of the word apology in the *Republic* refer to this event and cast light on it. Socrates’ outlandish way of life and the consequences of his thought somehow injure the men and the regimes in existing cities; and from the various instances in which he is forced to make an apology, one can piece together the true reasons for Socrates’, and hence the philosopher’s, conflict with the city. This is a valuable supplement to the dialogue, *Apology* [...]”

Now then, we suppose we're fashioning the happy city—a whole city, not setting apart a happy few and putting them in it. [...] So now too, don't compel us to attach to the guardians a happiness that will turn them into everything except guardians. [...] But don't give us this kind of advice, since, if we were to be persuaded by you, the farmer won't be a farmer, nor the potter a potter [...] But you surely see that men who are not guardians of the laws and the city, but seem to be, utterly destroy an entire city, just as they alone are masters of the occasion to govern it well and to make it happy. Now, if we're making (ποιουόμεν) true guardians, men least likely to do harm to the city [...] we have to consider whether we are establishing the guardians looking to their having the most happiness. Or else, whether looking to this happiness for the city as a whole, we must see if it comes to be in the city, and must compel and persuade these auxiliaries and guardians to do the same, so that they'll be the best possible craftsmen (δημιουργοί) at their jobs, and similarly for all the others, and, with the entire city growing thus and being fairly founded, we must let nature assign to each of the groups its share of happiness (420b3-421c6).

In this apology, Socrates at one level lectures Adeimantus for bringing the happiness of the guardians into the equation. On account of my reading (and argument), this is an interesting turn. For the universal audience, Adeimantus' interruption and Socrates' response are enlightening because now the whole project is explicitly clarified. Socrates does not want Adeimantus to attach happiness to the guardians because that will turn them into everything except guardians. Nor does he want Adeimantus to give this kind of advice, because if they were to be persuaded by him, the farmer would not be a farmer, or the potter a potter. This means that by including happiness into the discussion at this point, Adeimantus is about to deconstruct the idea of the division of labor—or the premise “one man, one job.” If I understand Socrates correctly, he indicates that Adeimantus does not fully understand that they are actually “making (ποιουόμεν) true guardians” and that these men are a new breed. They are not earth-born Athenians but are coming into being through speech. That this initially was a thought experiment, Socrates never forgets. He aims to make “the best possible craftsmen (δημιουργοί)” for the whole city.¹⁰⁹ Adeimantus takes it all into silent consideration, “You seem to me to speak finely” (421c7), he says.

The situation is now stabilized, and Socrates is prepared to speak about something akin to what he just said. He will do this in a manner that also seems

¹⁰⁹ That Socrates now denotes the guardians demiurges, is a pointing forward to the demiurges of freedom which, in turn, points toward the philosopher-kings. Therefore, I take this to be the ninth hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, 181n68, 189n83, 189n84, 190n89, and 196n107).

sensible to Adeimantus. Socrates asks him to consider if wealth and poverty corrupt the other craftsmen (cf. 421d).¹¹⁰ Adeimantus acknowledges that due to poverty the craftsmen are unable to provide themselves with tools, and thus they make poorer products, and their sons and other apprentices, therefore, turn out to be bad craftsmen. Socrates now observes that they have found yet another task for the guardians to guard: they are to secure that poverty and wealth in no way “slip into the city without their awareness” (421e8-9).¹¹¹ Due to poverty and wealth, both the craftsmen and their products are getting bad; wealth “produces luxury, idleness, and innovation,” while poverty “produces illiberality, wrongdoing, and innovation” (422a1-3). Adeimantus has no objections to this; however, an additional thought strikes him: War is expensive so “how will *our city* be able to make war when it possesses no money, especially if it’s compelled to make war against a wealthy one?” (422a5-7). Socrates’ solution is original and controversial. He reasons that if the guardians are forced to fight, it will be as “champions in war fighting with rich men” (422b3-4). Because their rich enemies are not champions, it follows that they have less knowledge and experience of the art of war. Therefore, “*our champions* will easily fight with two or three times their number” (422c8-9). If they told the others the truth and persuaded them that gold and silver are prohibited in their city, no one would wage “war against solid, lean dogs” (422d6). They would rather join the dogs and wage war against “fat and tender sheep” (422d6-7). This is a strategy that aims toward avoiding war, but Adeimantus is not at ease: “But if the money of the others is gathered into one city, look out that it doesn’t endanger the city that isn’t rich” (422d8-e2). In his reply, it looks like Socrates once again lectures Adeimantus, though not so harshly this time; “You are a happy one [...] if you suppose it is fit to call ‘city’ another than such as we have been equipping” (422e3-5). It is plain that when Socrates denoted their city as the true city, Adeimantus’ city was the only city that deserves this name. What should one call the other cities?

¹¹⁰ The mentioning of “the other craftsmen” picks up on A₂ and the discussion of the craftsmen that was supposed to be banned from the city (cf. 395b9-c1), pp. 176-77 above.

¹¹¹ This picks up on the “true city” founded in A₁; one of the two things the inhabitants had to look out for was poverty (cf. 372b-c). In the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger denotes wealth and poverty as the sources to *stasis* (cf. 690d1).

5.5.1 The board game (422e7-423d7)

To elaborate on this, Socrates refers to a game of draughts where the two halves of the board were called “cities.”¹¹² Against this backdrop, Socrates explains that there are one poor and one rich, and within each part there are many. If one chooses to approach the many as though they were one, the game is lost. However, if one chooses to approach the many as many, the game is won.¹¹³ The lesson learned is that there is always use for many allies and few enemies. So Socrates assures Adeimantus that “as long as *your city* is moderately governed in the way it was just arranged, it will be biggest” (423a6-7). The city will be truly biggest, even if it should be made up of only one thousand defenders (προπολεμούντων). “This would also be the fairest boundary for *our rulers*” (423b4-5), Socrates states. They must allow the city to grow to the point where it is willing to be one, and not beyond that size (cf. 423b6-7). By this they have found a further command that they will set on the guardians, who must “guard in every way against the city’s being little or seemingly big; rather it should be sufficient and one” (423c3-5). To prohibit endless growth is a war-preventive suggestion, but Adeimantus thinks that this is perhaps a slight task. However, Socrates argues that the task set forth in the story on the metallic-souls (cf. 415a-c) was even slighter. He now states that the intention with this myth was “to make plain that each of the other citizens too must be brought to that which naturally suits him—one man, one job—so that each man, practicing his own, which is one, will not become many but one; and thus, you see, the whole city will naturally grow to be one and not many” (423d2-6). By his clarification, Socrates has confirmed that the metal-metaphor was meant to envision the strict and distinct responsibility and work-division within each of the three classes.

5.5.2 Further preparations (423d8-427d8)

They agree that they have not imposed many commands on their guardians, but these are all insignificant if the guardians do not guard the most sufficient thing, their education and rearing. In his continuous reasoning, Socrates is preparing Adeimantus

¹¹² Bloom (1991b, 455n5) points out that in this passage there is a play on the similar sound of the words for “many” and “cities.” Also, Socrates picks up on the conversation with Polemarchus and the section where they discussed the usefulness of justice, peacetime, and partnerships, cf. 333a-b.

¹¹³ This is a pointing forward to the upcoming second wave and how the guardians conduct war.

and the particular audience (and the readers) for the upcoming three waves and the entrance into the realm of philosophy.¹¹⁴ His first step is, again, to underline education and, hence, he is foreshadowing the first two waves: “If by being well educated they become sensible men, they’ll easily see to all this and everything else we are now leaving out—that the possession of women, marriage, and procreation of children must, as far as possible, be arranged according to the proverb that friends have all things in common” (423e5-424a2). The following arguments gradually point toward the philosopher, and hence the third wave. As overseers of the city, the guardians must guard the education against all newcomers because “there must be no innovation in gymnastic and music contrary to the established order” (424b5-7), and “they must beware of change to a strange form of music, taking it to be a danger to the whole. For never are the ways (τρόπον)¹¹⁵ of music moved without the greatest political laws being moved, as Damon says, and I am persuaded” (424c3-6). Also, Adeimantus is persuaded. So, it is here in music “that the guardians must build the guardhouse” (424d1-2), Socrates concludes. Adeimantus adds, “this kind of lawlessness (παρανομία)¹¹⁶ easily creeps in unawares” (424d3-4). The children, or *our boys* as Socrates now calls them, are to take part in lawful play right from the beginning, because if play becomes lawless, they will not grow up to be law-abiding men. The lawfulness is received from music and will accompany them in their growth and “setting right anything in the city that may have previously been neglected” (425a5-6).¹¹⁷ During this section, they work their way toward an agreement that the education

¹¹⁴ Socrates’ following reflections I take to be the tenth hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, 181n68, 189n83, 189n84, 190n89, 196n107, and 197n109).

¹¹⁵ The word *τρόπον* original means a “turning,” a “direction,” or a “way,” and from there a moral sense evolves; it is the word for “character”—“the way of a man.” It has a technical sense in music, referring to various kinds of songs. They are called *tropoi* because they evoke certain dispositions of the soul, cf. Bloom (1991b, 456n7).

¹¹⁶ The word is *παρανομία*; lawlessness in music is a paradoxical notion, but it is made to sound more plausible by using a word that reminds of the musical *nomos* as well as the political, cf. Bloom (1991b, 456n8). Cf. also 365e.

¹¹⁷ These things that have been neglected I take to be an implicit reference to Athens. Examples are: “Such as the appropriate silence of younger men in the presence of older ones, making way for them and rising, care of parents; and hair dos, clothing, shoes, and, as a whole, the bearing of the body and everything else of the sort” (425b2-4). It is also an allusion to Cephalus’ reference to the complaining of his friends.

itself will preserve a decent conduct of life, so setting down laws that dictate gentlemen is foolish.¹¹⁸ The last thing they do with regard to legislation is to implement the laws of Apollo for all sacred domains (cf. 427b-c). This conversation ends with Socrates' conclusion:

So then, son of Ariston, *your city* would now be founded. In the next place, get yourself an adequate light somewhere; and look yourself—and call in your brother and Polemarchus and the others—whether we can somehow see where the justice might be and where the injustice, in what way they differ from one another, and which the man who's going to be happy must possess, whether it escapes the notice of all gods and humans or not (427d1-8).

We do not learn what the others might have said because at this point Glaucon interrupts and delivers his accusation to Socrates. In A₃, Adeimantus advocated his initial role as judge. On behalf of the inhabitants of his city, he presented two concerns: The first regarded their happiness, and the second regarded warfare. Socrates settled the first by arguing that the main thing was to prevent poverty and wealth among them, and he settled the second by referring to restricted growth, securing an unbreakable unity, and preserve the right education and rearing. He concluded that Adeimantus' city was fully founded. The vision of it was described so vividly that we must assume that Socrates takes for granted that all the men gathered have imprinted a clear image of it. They are all invited to make their own search for justice and injustice. When Glaucon now interrupts, he takes on his previous role as the devil's advocate and sets forth his concern regarding justice.

5.6 G₃: The just city (427d9-449a6)

“You’re talking nonsense. You promised you would look for it because it’s not holy for you not to bring help to justice in every way in your power” (427d9-e2). Socrates confirms that Glaucon is right and meets his outburst with an assumption: If *our city* (i.e., the cleansed feverish city) has been correctly founded, then it is perfectly good—that is, it is wise (σοφῆ), courageous (ἀνδρεία), moderate (σώφρων), and just (δικαία).

¹¹⁸ Cf. 348c. Examples on this are: market business, the contracts individuals make with one another in the market, contracts with manual artisans, and libel, insult, lodging of legal complaints, the appointment of judges, and whatever imposts might have to be collected or assessed in the markets or harbors, or any market, town, or harbor regulations, or anything else of the kind (cf. 425c-d).

The situation now implies two things. First, the devil’s advocate is back, which signals that Glaucon has not yet fully grasped that Adeimantus’ city was founded in speech. Nor has he grasped that the work laid down in G₂ was executed in continuance of A₂, hence, he is not fully aware of the impact of the purging process of the feverish city. Secondly, Socrates states that if his and Glaucon’s city, that is *our city*, had been correctly founded, that city would also be perfectly good. However, since this is not the case, and since Glaucon is unaware that Socrates implicitly tries to prepare him for partaking aware in an upcoming thought experiment, it now seems like Socrates has decided to set this last undertaking on hold. Instead, he invites Glaucon into Adeimantus’ city to investigate, or evaluate, the virtues that secured the perfectly good city.

5.6.1 The city being wise (428a3-429a7)

When they enter the city, Socrates states that wisdom (σοφία) comes easily to light.¹¹⁹ However, there is something strange (ἄτοπον, 428b) about it, Socrates argues. Glaucon does not understand what is outlandish about it. Hence, Socrates performs an elenchus to make him understand. “The city we described is really wise [...] because it is of good counsel (εὐβουλία)¹²⁰ [...] good counsel is plainly a kind of knowledge. For it is surely not by lack of learning, but by knowledge, that men counsel well. [...] on the other hand, there’s much knowledge of all sorts in the city” (428b4-5). As Glaucon concedes, Socrates continues by making him decide upon which kind of knowledge leads to good counseling (cf. 428b-c). Glaucon answers satisfactorily, and Socrates presents the final question: “Is there in the city *we* just founded a kind of knowledge [...] about how the city as a whole would best deal with itself and the other cities?” (428c13-d4)¹²¹ Glaucon confirms that it is “the guardian’s skill” and that this is

¹¹⁹ Here σοφία is given an exclusively political character, and as described in this passage, it means φρόνησις. Further this is taken to be the essentially Socratic character of this virtue. See also *Protagoras* 352b and *Laws* 689b. Cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 428b.

¹²⁰ Cf. the discussion on “good counsel” in the conversation with Thrasymachus (348d ff.). I will return to “good counsel” in chapter 7: *Setting the stage*, section 7.2: Protagoras; and in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.2: Alcibiades and Socrates.

¹²¹ “The political wisdom described here is akin to the βασιλική τέχνη of *Euthydemus* 291c ff. It is also akin to Aristotle’s view of πολιτική as the architectonic art (*Eth. Nic.* I, 1, 1094b27). It knows what is good and evil, and legislates for the other arts, but the good which it knows is a political and moral conception, not (as yet) the metaphysical Idea of Book VI.” Adam, note on *Rep.* 428d.

observable “in those rulers whom we just now named perfect guardians” (τελέους φύλακας, 428d7-8). This is worth noting, as the guardians have not been so named before.¹²² This is the only place in the *Republic* they are denoted as “perfect.” When Glaucon now states that the guardians are fully constituted, this must be, on the one hand, due to his inference from the elenchus, and hence, he understands that he is evaluating the virtues in Adeimantus’ fully founded city, and on the other, due to Glaucon’s interpretation of Socrates’ statements in his apology, as it was presented to Adeimantus (cf. 421a). Therefore, Glaucon now signals that he has grown more attentive. I take this to be confirmed by Socrates when he simply goes on and lets Glaucon conclude that the city is now of good counsel and wise (cf. 428d). This conclusion leads to another task for Glaucon to consider: “[...] do you suppose [...] that there will be more smiths in *our city* than these true guardians (ἀληθινούς φύλακας, 428dd12-e1)?” I notice that Socrates now denotes the guardians as “true,” not “perfect.” I interpret this to be a silent indication that the guardians are not yet fully constituted but still in their becoming. Hence, this is also foreshadowing the third wave, where the assignment of the guardian merges with that of the philosopher. For now, Socrates and Glaucon agree that there will be far more smiths in the city, and “among those who receive a special name for possessing some kind of knowledge,” the “guardians will be the fewest of all in number” (428e3-5). “Therefore,” says Socrates,

it is from the smallest group and part of itself and the knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) in it, from the supervising (προεστῶτι) and ruling part (ἄρχοντι), that a city founded according to nature would be wise as a whole. And this class, which properly has a share in that knowledge which alone among the various kinds of knowledge ought to be called wisdom, has, as it seems, the fewest members by nature (428e7-429a3).

This conclusion is fascinating. The man that never touches music and philosophy becomes a misologist (μισόλογος)—a hater of speech or reason—and unmusical, we learned in G₂ (411c-d). The opposite man will be a λογιστικόν—a man endowed with

¹²² Generally, they are just denoted as “guardians.” Prior to Glaucon’s naming here, the notion of “true guardians” has been used once—in Socrates’ apology when he stated that “if we are making ‘true guardians’ [...]” (421a). Socrates will speak of “true guardians” two more times: at 428e and 464c. Socrates once called them “complete guardians” (414b).

reason—hence musical. Here, in the discussion of wisdom, the city is denoted wise because its guardians are wise, and the guardians are in turn wise due to their λογιστικόν, which is wise. Thus, the wisdom of the whole city is constructed based on the knowledge of quite few guardians.¹²³ The outlandish feature of wisdom that was the starting point must be that the city is wise due its smallest class, which is according to nature. Through this layout of wisdom, the structure of the new *politeia* is beginning to dawn, but there is still much more to consider before it can be fully grasped. Socrates states that they now have found how one of the four virtues is, and where it's seated in the city, and that what counts for wisdom also counts for courage.

5.6.2 The city being courageous (429a8-430c7)

According to Socrates, it is also easy to find what courage is, and where it is situated in the city (cf. 429a). However, it is not easy for Glaucon, because Socrates obviously describes this virtue in a way unknown to him. “I didn’t quite understand what you said” (429c4), Glaucon admits, whereupon Socrates explains that “courage is a certain kind of preserving” (429c5). This is a preservation of the opinions produced by law, through education of what is terrible (429c7-8)—this statement alludes back to the discussion of pleasure and pain and testing in *G*₂, 413e. Socrates now states that “by preserving through everything I meant preserving that opinion and not casting it out in pains and pleasures and desires and fears” (429c9-d1).¹²⁴ Glaucon is not quite at ease with this definition either, so Socrates offers to give an example which will illustrate that they are now doing something similar to “when we selected the soldiers (στρατιώτας) and educated them in music and gymnastic” (429e8-430a1). After the example is presented (cf. 429d-430b), Socrates concludes that what he calls courage is the “kind of power and preservation, through everything, of the right and lawful opinion about what is terrible and what not” (430b2-5). By Glaucon’s response, it becomes clear that Socrates has presented a redefined and new kind of courage. He says, “[...] you regard the right opinion about these same things that come to be without education—that is found in beasts and slaves—as not at all lawful and call it

¹²³ Cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 428d.

¹²⁴ This definition points forward to the discussion of legislation and pleasure and pain that will take place later, at 462a ff.

something other than courage” (430b7-9). When Socrates confirms that he was right in his doubt, Glaucon accepts Socrates’ definition of courage. However, Socrates stresses that he must accept it only as “political courage” (πολιτικὴν ἀνδρείαν, 430c3).

5.6.3 The city being moderate (430d1-432b7)

Moderation is “a certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires [...]” (430e6-7), Socrates pronounces and elaborates further through the ridiculous¹²⁵ phrase “stronger than himself.” However, the phrase can still exemplify that in the soul there is something better and something worse and has meaning when it is used to describe “that which is better by nature is master over that which is worse” (431a6-7). If Glaucon now is willing to take a “glance at *our young city*” (431b4), he will find that the city is “designated stronger than itself” because the rulers (the ones born with the best natures and best educated) are moderate. The reference to *our young city* is a two-fold reminder. First, Glaucon is reminded that he now is visiting the city founded by Adeimantus and Socrates and, second, that they now are evaluating the virtues in this city. This is confirmed by Socrates’ next question. “Don’t you see that all these are in *your city* too and that there the desires (ἐπιθυμίας) in the common many (τοῖς πολλοῖς) are mastered by the desires (ἐπιθυμιῶν) and the prudence (φρονήσεως) in the more decent few?” (431c9-d2). Glaucon claims to see this.

5.6.4 The city being just (432b8-435a4)

Socrates now insists that by the initial rule of their city-founding—that each man must function in accordance with how his nature made him naturally most fit (cf. 433a)—they have from the beginning formulated one form (εἶδος) of justice.¹²⁶ So, when justice comes into being, it is through the practice “of minding one’s own business” (433b9). The premises for Socrates’ inference at this point are that after they considered moderation, courage, and prudence, they found justice to be left over. Justice was the virtue that provided the power (δύναμιν) by which the other three came

¹²⁵ The phrase is ridiculous because “the one who is stronger than himself would also be weaker than himself, and the weaker stronger. The same ‘himself’ is referred to in all of them” (430e11-431a2).

¹²⁶ This was a proposal when Adeimantus and Socrates constructed the “true city;” in addition it picks up on 372a2 when Adeimantus was not able to tell where justice and injustice were to be found. Hence, this statement shows that Glaucon has—through his purging—assimilated the laws proposed by Adeimantus.

into being. When this was the result, it became clear that justice provided them with preservation as long as it was in the city (cf. 433b). This consideration indicates that Adeimantus' true city was just in its becoming right from the start. The inhabitants lived in peace, and to preserve the peace they had to watch out for poverty and war.

It now turns out that the power of justice is a potential rival to wisdom; moderation, and courage (cf. 433d-e). To enable themselves to judge in this matter, they divide the city into three classes—money-making, auxiliary, and guardian—and Socrates proclaims that “meddling among the classes [...] and exchange with one another is the greatest harm for the city and would most correctly be called extreme evil-doing” (434b10-c2). This evil-doing is denoted as injustice, and when each class does what is appropriate and is minding its own business, the city as a whole is just. They now set out to investigate whether the bigger thing (the city) agrees with the smaller thing (the single man). If it should turn out that this is not the case, they will go back and test (βασανιοῦμεν) the whole city. “Perhaps, considering then side by side and rubbing them together like sticks, we could make justice burst into flame, and once it's come to light, confirm it for ourselves” (435a1-4). They agree that this is the way to proceed.

5.6.5 No more need for telling lies (435a5-449a6)

They have hardly started the testing before Socrates observes that “now it's a slight question about the soul we've stumbled (ἐμπεπτώκαμεν) upon” (435c4-5). Glaucon does not think that this is a slight question, and he is right. The investigation related to the soul goes on from 435e to 444a. During these considerations, they find that justice is the power that produces just men and cities, and Socrates can conclude that “the dream of theirs had reached its perfect fulfillment” (443b8). He goes on, “I mean our saying that we suspected that straight from the beginning of the city's founding, through some god, we probably hit upon an origin (ἀρχήν) and model (τύπον) for justice” (443b8-c2). If they in one way or another should be in doubt with regard to justice in their city, Socrates has already suggested that “we could reassure ourselves completely by testing our justice in light of the vulgar standards” (442e1-3).

In his summary, Socrates highlights that justice is that a man minds his own business concerning what is within—“what truly concerns him and his own” (443d2).

The just man “arranges himself” and harmonizes the three parts of his soul “exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, highest and middle” (443d6-7). It is precisely the same parts that harmonize the city. Now that this investigation is completed, and justice is identified both in man and city, he concludes, “If we should assert that we have found the just man and city and what justice really is in them, I don’t suppose we’d seem to be telling an utter lie” (444a4-6). This conclusion entails that by evaluating the virtues in Adeimantus’ city of speech, Glaucon understands that these features are also present in his feverish city, that by now is fully purged, and hence the two cities are superposed. Further, the devil’s advocate can rest his case because they have turned the tables and reached a definition of justice, which they also have tested and evaluated. This new concept of justice enables them to assert that both city and men are just. Finally, this turnabout also entails that there is no longer a need for the rulers to tell “noble lies” to its citizens (cf. 444a4-6). Hence, the Athenian lie is taken out of the equation.

The next thing to consider is injustice. Glaucon states that by now such an inquiry seems to be ridiculous (*γελοῖον*, cf. 445a). Socrates insists anyway and will look into how many forms of vice there are. The easiest way is to assert that there are as “many types of souls as there are types of regimes possessing distinct forms” (445c9-10). At this point the narrator interrupts.

5.7 Interlude (449a1-451b8)

The narrator informs us that Polemarchus, who was sitting at a little distance from Adeimantus—stretched out his hand, took hold of his cloak from above by the shoulder, and began to draw him toward himself and, as he stooped over, said some things in his ear, of which the others overheard nothing other than him asking, “Shall we let it go or what shall we do?” Socrates understood that something was brewing and asked what was going on. Adeimantus addresses Socrates and states that in their “opinion you’re taking it easy [...] and robbing us of a whole section (*εἶδος*) of the argument, and that not the least, so you won’t have to go through it” (449c2-3). He confronts Socrates rather harshly: “And you supposed you’d get away with it by saying, as though it were something quite ordinary, that after all, it’s plain to everyone that, as for women and children, the things of friends will be in common” (449c3-5).

Adeimantus now confirms what Thrasymachus suspected: that Socrates is warranting his claims and arguments in a topos out of the ordinary. It is starting to dawn on everyone that the community Socrates is arguing for—and especially the things related to women and children—they need to know more of. Once more, he challenges Socrates because the men gathered “think it makes a big difference, or rather, the whole difference, in a regime’s being right or not right” (449d5-6). Hence, they have resolved not to release him until he has told them the entire story he has heard on the matter. Again, Socrates warns them against arresting him in this manner:

How much discussion you’ve set in motion, from the beginning again as it were, about the regime I was delighted to think I had already described, content if one were to leave it at accepting these things as they were stated then. You don’t know how great a swarm of arguments you’re stirring up with what you are now summoning to the bar. I saw it then and passed by so as not to cause a lot of trouble (450a7-b3).

As they all stand behind the resolution, Glaucon sees it fit to underline that for “intelligent men [...] the proper measure of listening to such arguments is a whole life” (450b7-8). This is a bold statement coming from Glaucon, and it indicates that his brother’s interruption somehow had an impact on him, because from here on, Glaucon starts to signal a profound interest and, hence, he starts to be fully attentive. He urges Socrates to go on. “Never mind about us,” he says, “and as for you, don’t weary in going through your opinion about the things we ask: what the community of children and women will be among *our guardians*, and their rearing when they are still young, in the time between birth and education, which seems to be the most trying. Attempt to say what the manner of it must be” (450b8c5). Socrates still hesitates and states that it is not easy to go through these arguments they request:

Even more than what we went through before, it admits of many doubts. For it could be doubted that the things said are possible; and, even if, in the best possible conditions, they could come into being, that they would be what is best will also be doubted. So that is why there’s a certain hesitation about getting involved in it, for fear that the argument might seem to be a prayer [...] (450c7-d3).

Glaucon now assures him that his audience will not be hard-hearted, distrustful, or ill-willed. Socrates correctly interprets this to be encouragement, and concludes that it has exactly the opposite effect:

If I believed I knew whereof I speak, it would be a fine exhortation. To speak knowing the truth, among prudent and dear men, about what is greatest and dear, is a thing that is safe and encouraging. But to present arguments at a time when one is in doubt and seeking—which is just what I am doing—is a thing both frightening and slippery. It’s not because I’m afraid of being laughed at—that’s childish—but because I’m afraid that in slipping from the truth where one least ought to slip, I’ll not only fall myself but also drag my friends down with me. I prostrate myself before Adrasteia,¹²⁷ Glaucon, for what I’m going to say. I expect that it’s a lesser fault to prove to be an unwilling murderer of someone than a deceiver about fine, good, and just things in laws. It’s better to run that risk with enemies than friends. So, you’ve given me a good exhortation (450d9-451b2).

Now Glaucon laughed, and the word exchange before Socrates starts to speak signals a sort of nervous joyfulness that picks up on the theme “arresting Socrates” for the second time. The first time happened through the challenges set forth by Glaucon and Adeimantus (cf. 357a1-369b4). Through the sections that followed after these challenges, Socrates did not reveal his concealed topos. Instead, he continued to warrant his arguments there, but as the conversations developed, the particular audience now concludes that to be able to judge whether the new-founded regime is just or not—they need Socrates to reveal all that he has heard on the matter. Hence, the second “arrest” resolved by them all, forces Socrates to be transparent and show that his concealed topos is the topos of philosophy (the particular audience does not know this yet). Glaucon calms Socrates and says: “But, Socrates, if we are affected in some discordant way by the argument, we’ll release you like a man who is guiltless of murder, and you won’t be our deceiver. Be bold and speak” (451b2-5). Socrates is not quite confident¹²⁸ and states that “the man who is released in the case of involuntary murder is indeed guiltless, as the law says. And it’s probably so in this case too, if it is in the other” (451b6-7).¹²⁹ After this pronouncement, Socrates admits that something

¹²⁷ On the reference to Adrasteia, see Bloom (1991b, 458n6).

¹²⁸ The reason for Socrates’ reluctance to reveal that his arguments are warranted in the topos of philosophy, could point back to his initial encounter with Parmenides who told him that a philosopher would meet severe problems in convincing a non-philosopher on grounds of philosophical arguments. The non-philosopher would reject the arguments, and thus remain unconvinced. This I return to in chapter 7: *Setting the stage*, section 7.1.2: Parmenides, the teacher.

¹²⁹ Bloom (1991b, 458n7), points out that this legal terminology is “referring to the treatment of men who commit accidental homicide. The killer was believed hateful to the gods and polluted by his act. The punishment under the Athenian Draconian law was exile, the killer could be absolved and purified by a member of the victim’s family, or by the victim himself before he died (cf. *Laws*, 865 ff., and 869e).”

was left out, and says that “Then [...] I must go back again and say what perhaps should have been said in its turn” (451b9-c1). His intention now, after having completed the male drama, is to complete the female.¹³⁰ Hence, Socrates starts to speak, and we are now prepared to be lead into the realm of philosophy.¹³¹

¹³⁰ Bloom (1991b, 458n8), states that this is “A probable allusion to Aristophanes’ *Ecclesiazusae*, which also proposed the emancipation of women and communism.”

¹³¹ My notion that we now are entering the realm of philosophy is in accordance with Brann (2002) who proposes that Books V-VII constitutes the center of the *Republic*, cf. Howland (1998b, 634n3).

Chapter 6: The demiurges of freedom

So far, the readings have shown that the two initial cities have superposed and the new ideal city¹ is now in its becoming and, starting to surface as a thought experiment designed for Glaucon. This city is to be strengthened by a sustainable *politeia* which must be secured and preserved by *paideia*. At this point, we are ready and well prepared, to hear “all of what Socrates has heard” and to learn what happens when he openly activates the topos of philosophy. In the first part of this philosophical elaboration, Socrates launches the three famous, paradoxical, and controversial waves.² The first wave (454c1-457c11) proclaims the same way of life for women and men; the second (457c12-473c5) concerns the community of wives and children, and the third (473c6-487a8) pronounces the rule of the philosophers. These are radically new thoughts both for the particular and the universal audiences, and they have given rise to multiple and long-lasting discussions.³

As I now continue my reading of G₃, the aim is three-fold. The overall premise is that I will follow Socrates’ arguments consistently. This is in accordance with his

¹ If I understand the argument Howland (1998b, 640) sets forth, I think this “new ideal city” is equivalent to the one he denotes as the “Second Just City.”

² The word κῦμα translates “wave,” and Bloom (1991b, 459n16) explains that this also means “foetus.” He refers to the *Theaetetus* (149 ff. and 210b) where the words are related to the latter. Here, “Socrates claims (at 210b) that he is only an intellectual midwife and not himself capable of a pregnancy. That statement may not be wholly adequate, for here we are to see three of his own brainchildren.” At this point, I disagree due to Adeimantus’ underlining that Socrates must tell them all he has heard on the matter. This entails that it is not Socrates’ own “brainchildren” we are about to learn about, but something he has heard. Thus, Socrates’ outlining is consistent.

³ Because it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to enter these discussions, I will give examples on two influential lines of interpretations: The first signals strong hostility toward the idea of female rulers. The tone was “set by Schleiermacher who forcefully expresses his distaste for Plato’s abolition of conventional marriage and elevation of women to leadership roles [...] in the numerous translations, explanations, and ‘companions’ that have continued to appear down to our day, hostility toward the Platonic suggestion of equality persisted” (Bluestone 1994, 110). For a survey of this hostility-interpretation line, see Bluestone (1994). The second line holds “that the material on women is meant to indicate that the entire political proposal is ‘ironic’” (Nussbaum 1995, 210n15). Bloom (1991a) follows this line of interpretation when he argues that the two first waves Socrates launches in the *Republic* “are the absurd conceits of a comic poet [i.e., Aristophanes] who only suggested them [i.e., the waves] in order to ridicule them [i.e., the women],” p. 380. Halliwell (1993) intends to give a conclusive refutation of this position. According to Nussbaum (ibid), Halliwell “thus confirms Susan Okin’s account to Plato (in *Women in Western Political Thought*) [...]: Plato is best read as making serious, if radical proposals for the reform of women’s education.”

premise, as he stresses that he will follow the argument consistently and make sure that everything proceeds according to nature. It is not directly relevant for my argument to go in depth regarding the content of the waves. Thus, I will instead highlight the considerations made after they are launched. Regarding the first consideration, Socrates explains that due to the power of the contradicting art, women have been prevented from partaking in the society as men's equals; the result of this consideration is that the distinctions between sophistry (i.e., eristic) and philosophy are sharpened. Related to the second, a new kind of warfare is disposed, and also, the concepts "war" and "stasis" are redefined compared to conventions. This I take to be an important support of my claim that in the *Republic* we find a profound criticism targeted against Athens, which at the bottom promotes a pro-peace argument. Lastly, Socrates promotes that the philosophers are to be the rulers of the new regime. This is because the *politeia* as exposed in contemporary cities does not work satisfactorily, and the discussion shows that the ideal city and the contemporary cities are completely incompatible. The introduction of the third wave marks the end of my reading.

6.1 First wave: Same life for women and men (451c1-457c11)

In Socrates' opinion, the argument so far has not been sound because as human beings, born and educated in the way described hitherto, there has been "[...] no right acquisition and use of children and women other than in their following their path along which we first directed them" (451c5-7). According to Socrates, the argument erred when they attempted to establish only the men as guardians of the herd. Therefore he will now follow this up. To make Glaucon grasp the picture, Socrates sets up the human-dog analogy once more and thus reminds him that their arguments will be consistent according to nature: "Do we believe the females of the guardian dogs must guard the things the males guard along with them and hunt with them, and do the rest in common; or must they stay indoors as though they were incapacitated as a result of bearing and rearing the puppies, while the males work and have all the care of the flock?" (451d4-9). This time, Glaucon can infer, and from the analogy, he concludes that if men and women are given the same kind of education and rearing, they also can do the same things. They agree that music, gymnastic, and "what has to do with war must be assigned to the women also" (452a4-5). Socrates underlines that

even if these things sometimes appear to be ridiculous, it is only so when they are compared to habit (παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, 452a7-8). At this point, I must make a comment due to some remarks from learned scholars.

Socrates says this: “What’s the most ridiculous thing you see among them? [...] Or is it plain that it’s the women exercising naked with the men in the palaestras, not only the young ones but even the older ones too, like the old men in the gymnasiums who, when they are wrinkled and not pleasant to the eye, all the same love gymnastic?” (452a10-b3). The tendency among commentators is to stress that it is the older women that are highlighted as “wrinkled and not pleasant to the eye,” but this is not what Socrates states.⁴ He states that old men are (nowadays) present in the gymnasiums because they love gymnastic, despite that they are “wrinkled and not pleasant to the eye.” The same would be the case for old women—not more, not less. It is only the habit of not seeing women present at gymnasiums that makes women laughable, that is, the thought of them partaking; and according to Socrates’ general proceedings, it is a valuable and necessary lesson to learn why we must rid ourselves from old habits.

However, when the consequences⁵ of this agreement start to dawn on Glaucon, he lingers and swears, “By Zeus [...] that would look ridiculous in the present state of things” (452b4-5). This reaction calls for some Socratic reminders. First, that the

⁴ Here are three examples, and I am not able to see that these are actual comments on Socrates’ statement; they are interpretations that allude far beyond. Lampert (2010, 312): “Socrates focuses on an erotic upshot, women exercising naked with men, and fixes attention on a comic aspect: even old women, wrinkled and not pleasant to the eye, exercise naked with men.” Rosen (2005, 172) states: “And this has laughable consequences, prominent among them the aforementioned sight of women wrestling naked with young men, but also with older wrinkled ones who love gymnastics but are not pleasant to the eyes. One wonders immediately whether this part of the education may not stimulate sexual desire in ways that are harmful to the city.” Howland (2004b, 113) makes the following comment referring to the laughter in this sequence: “That he has comedy in mind is clear from his repetition of the word *laughable* (it appears six times in 452a-d); his explicit mention of making comic drama at 452d; and his introduction of the typically comic themes of sexuality and bodily ugliness. Glaucon’s shock (“By Zeus!”) at the notion of hideous old ladies exercising in the nude (452a-b) calls to mind Aristophanes’ *Assemblywomen* (976ff), in which one old hag after another demands sex from a younger man. The latter situation result from the fact that the women of Athens, having commandeered the Assembly and established that property and women shall be held in common—measures enacted in the Kallipolis as well—have made a law requiring men to have sex with the ugly women first.”

⁵ If such a change took place, some laughable consequences could be found with regard to gymnastics, music, bearing of arms, and the riding of horses (cf. 452c).

philosophers are courageous, and as Socrates now openly voices philosophical arguments, that it is imperative not to be afraid of all the jokes (σκώμματα, 452b6-7). Secondly, habits are changeable. For example, Socrates explains, “not so long ago it seemed shameful and ridiculous to the Greeks [...] to see men naked” (452c7-8).⁶ Thirdly, “what was ridiculous to the eyes disappeared in light of what’s best as revealed in speeches” (452d6-8). This is the first time Socrates explicitly hints to Glaucon that he is partaking in a thought experiment.⁷ Socrates continues and suggests that they must first come to an agreement about “the opportunity to dispute whether female human nature can share in common with the nature of the male class in all deeds or in none at all, or in some things yes and in others no, particularly with respect to war” (452e6-453a4). It seems like Socrates senses that Glaucon’s preoccupation is the atopos aspect of the argument. Hence, Socrates suggests that they start with the contra-arguments “so that the opposing argument won’t be besieged without defense” (453a8-9). He further reminds Glaucon that regarding the city they now are founding, the initial agreement was that “each one must mind his own business according to nature” (453b4-5). To this reminder, Glaucon responds, “I suppose we did agree. Of course” (453b6). At this moment, Glaucon signals hesitation, and this I take to indicate that he now acknowledges a turn in the argument which he is not sure he can or wants to handle. He is about to enter foreign territory, and that makes him uncomfortable, “I shall beg you and do beg you to interpret the argument on our behalf too, whatever it may be” (453c8-10).

Socrates reassures him that he had anticipated this reaction, “This, Glaucon, and many other things of the sort [...] foreseeing them long ago (πάλαι),⁸ is what I was frightened about, and I shrank from touching the law concerning the possession and

⁶ The nakedness refers to the men and boys exercising naked in the palaestras. When the Cretans originated the gymnasiums, and the Spartans followed, it was possible for the urbane of the time to make a comedy of all that, today this habit seems ridiculous to many among the barbarians (cf. 452c8-d3).

⁷ This explicit hint will be explained later when Glaucon demands arguments for the regime to be empirically realized, pp. 234-37.

⁸ Cf. Thrasymachus’ when he pronounced that he recognized a change in Socrates’ behavior and asked what nonsense had possessed him for so long (336b8-c1); see chapter 3: *The tide is turning for Socrates*, section 3.1: Displayed and concealed topoi, pp. 92-4. Thrasymachus then used the term πάλαι, as Socrates is doing now. This entails that Socrates recognized the controversial feature of this proposal long ago, as well as right here and now.

rearing of the women and children” (453c11-d3). They agree that this will be a difficult task; nonetheless, Socrates insists that they jump into the sea and start swimming—maybe a dolphin will rescue them?⁹

6.1.1 The power of the contradicting art (454a1-457c11)

The first task is to find the reason why the situation of women and children is laughable. “Come, then,” he says, “let’s see if we can find the way out” (453e2). The premise “one man, one job according to nature” has functioned as a grounding assumption for the discussions hitherto. Although women and men are different, it does not follow that within the class of men we cannot identify different natures, and within the class of women, all are of the same nature. Hence, according to their agreement, the problem is that they now, regarding women, “are asserting that different natures must practice the same things” (453e4-5). Both Socrates and Glaucon acknowledge that this is an accusation against them if they are to follow the argument consistently. The way out is to investigate the power of the contradicting art (ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης, 454a1-2), which, according to Socrates, is a grand and deceiving art. The distinction that surfaces is habit (ἔθος) versus nature (φύσις). When the sophists defend *paideia*, it is from the premise that the shaping of a cultural mindset is done by making the students’ habits uniform; in this process, they employ the art of eristic.¹⁰ This is contrary to the philosophers, who leave the habits behind and argue that the aim of *paideia* is an individual shaping according to nature; they employ dialectic to display each student’s inherent potential. According to Socrates, eristic is deceiving because it allows many to fall into it—even unwillingly, and it leads men to think they are discussing when they are indeed quarreling. We learn that this happens because “they are unable to consider what is said by separating it out into its forms (διαιρούμενοι, 454a5-6).”¹¹ Instead, they pursue contradiction in the mere

⁹ Cf. Herodotus, I: 23-24.

¹⁰ Cf. the encounter between Thrasymachus and Socrates, and my argument that they are activating incompatible *topoi*. Socrates is now explicit on this distinction, by clarifying the difference between eristic and dialectic.

¹¹ Bloom (1991b, 453n50); διαιπέω is the term used for the activity of discerning the forms or classes to which things belong. Bloom stresses that “it is the fundamental task of dialectic to define things according to the natural division existing in the world; diairesis is the way of discovering such definitions.”

name of what is spoken about. In this pursuing they are “using eristic (ἐριστι), not dialectic (διαλέκτω), with one another” (454a8). Glaucon understands that this happens to many men, but he does not see the relevance of mentioning it in this context, “this doesn’t apply to us too at present, does it?” (454a11), he asks. Socrates claims that it certainly is relevant. When entering the discussion regarding women, the eristic man will follow the name (i.e., woman) alone;¹² he will also insist that natures which are not the same must have different practices. From this, it follows that he fails because he too quickly assigns different practices to different natures and the same ones to the same. The readers now understand that if such arguments are to be consistent, it is permissible to ask, for instance, whether the nature of the bald and the longhaired is the same or opposite. If it turns out that the eristic man should agree that it is opposite, and if he states that it is the bald men who are shoemakers, then the consequence is that the longhaired are not allowed to be shoemakers and vice versa. In agreement with Glaucon, we find this deduction ridiculous. Socrates also agrees, but he finds it ridiculous for no other reason “than that we didn’t refer to every sense of same and different nature but were guarding only that form of otherness and likeness which applies to the pursuits themselves” (454c8-d1). Furthermore, we are reminded of the earlier agreement that a man and a woman whose souls were suited for the art of medicine have the same nature. From this, it follows that ...

... if either the class of men or that of women shows its superiority in some art or other practice, then we’ll say that that art must be assigned to it. But if they look as though they differ in this alone, that the female bears and the male mounts, we’ll assert that it has not thereby yet been proved that a woman differs from a man with respect to what we’re talking about; rather, we’ll still suppose that our guardians and their women must practice the same things (454d7-e5).

We again turn to the eristic man, who most certainly will claim the opposite concerning what art or what practice are connected with the organization of a city and

¹² Bloom (1991b, 458n14) reminds us that in the *Seventh Letter*, in the “Philosophical digression” (342a6-345c2), we are given a description of the requisites for the attainment of knowledge of a thing. “There are three; name (for example, circle); definition (for example, ‘that in a plane which is everywhere equidistant from the extremities to the center’); presentation or image (for example, the circle drawn by the geometer, which is only an imperfect example and an aid to learning, not the real circle).” The point is that an eristic disputant misleads his interlocutors by looking only to names, in this case the names “man” and “woman,” and not to their definition.

assert that he will also claim that the natures of women and men are different (cf. 455a). Socrates suggests that he and Glaucon should beg the man who contradicts to follow them, and hence investigate how they can point out to him that there is no practice relevant to the government of a city that is peculiar to woman (cf. 455a-b). This is also an invitation to the readers who contradict this claim to free themselves and follow the argument. Socrates sets this forth in the form of “an imaginary interlocutor,”

Come, now, we'll say to him, answer. Is this what you meant? Did you distinguish between the man who has a good nature for a thing and another who has no nature for it on these grounds: the one learns something connected with that thing easily, the other with difficulty; the one, starting from slight learning, is able to carry discovery far forward in the field he has learned, while the other, having chanced on a lot of learning and practice, can't even preserve what he learned; and the bodily things give adequate service to the thought of the man with the good nature while they oppose the thought of the other man? Are there any other things than these by which you distinguished the man who has a good nature for each discipline from the one who hasn't? (455b5-c3)

Glaucon gradually accepts that Socrates' arguments hold, and he admits that the male class has dominated the female class in virtually everything. He also recognizes that women traditionally have been identified through female practices such as weaving and cooking, not according to their nature. He even admits that “many women are better than many men in many things” (455d4-5).

The consequence of the argument so far is that there is no practice that belongs to a woman because she is a woman, and the same principle goes for men. Instead, “the natures are scattered alike among both animals; and woman participates according to nature in all practices, and man in all, but in all of them, woman is weaker than man” (455e1-2). Is the fact that women are physically weaker than man an argument for assigning all tasks to men and none to women? This Glaucon declines, and according to Socrates, there are also different natures within the female class just as in the class of men. One is apt for medicine, another is not. One is apt at gymnastic and war, another is unwarlike and no lover of gymnastic (cf. 456a). From this, it follows that one woman is fit for guarding, another is not. This is consistent with the earlier claim that the men fit for guarding should be selected in accordance with their nature, and

the conclusion is that men and women of the same nature are apt with respect to guarding the city (cf. 456a). Therefore, such “women [...] must also be chosen to live and guard with such men, since they are competent and akin to the men in their nature” (456b1-3), and the same practices must be assigned to the same nature. Socrates rounds off and states that by now they “have come around full circle to where we were before and agree that it’s not against nature to assign music and gymnastic to the women guardians” (456b8-10). For those who mark the argument as being unsound, his conclusion may be received as provocative: “[...] the way things are nowadays proves to be, as it seems, against nature” (456c2-3).

When they now have concluded that women are fit for guarding, the women will also partake in the same education as men, and because of their same nature, the education will not produce men or women but guardians (cf. 456c-d). The women are now ready to strip, Socrates says. Instead of clothing themselves in robes, they shall now clothe themselves in virtue. They must—as the male guardians—take part in war, and the rest of the city’s need for guarding, and they must not do other things (cf. 457a). After having gained Glaucon’s content by demonstrating that women were left out due to eristic arguments that did not consider the nature of human beings, the initial denotation “the female drama” is now changed to “the woman’s law.” By this law, they are not “swept away” by the first wave, but on the contrary, they have by law secured “that *our guardians*, men and women, must share all pursuits in common” (457b9-c1). As the argument is in “agreement with itself,” Socrates claims that what it says is both possible and beneficial. “It is not a little wave you’re escaping” (457c5), is Glaucon’s final remark in this section. However, Socrates indicates that when Glaucon hears the next, he will not consider the first a big one.

6.2 Second wave: The community of women and children (457c12-473c5)

The law that follows the second wave is that “All these women are to belong to all these men in common, and no woman is to live privately with any man. And the children, in their turn, will be in common, and neither will a parent know his own offspring, nor a child his parent” (457c12-d2). Glaucon’s reaction when Socrates presents this law is peculiar. One might have expected him to be shocked over such a controversial suggestion. Instead, he serenely observes that this wave is far bigger than

the other and states that this law will implicate doubt with regard to both its benefit and possibility (cf. 457d3-4). Socrates does not suppose that the benefits of the community of women and children will be disputed, but he supposes “that there would arise a great deal of dispute as to whether they are possible or not” (457d7-9). Glaucon does not share Socrates’ optimism and repeats that “There could [...] very well be dispute about both” (457e1). Referring to the arrest, he demands an argument for both benefits and possibilities (cf. 457e). Socrates submits to his penalty and argues that it is his “desire to put off and consider later in what way it is possible” and will begin with a consideration on “how the rulers will arrange these things when they come into being and whether their accomplishment would be most advantageous of all for both the city and the guardians” (458b2-8). Glaucon admits Socrates first to consider the benefits and return to the possibilities.

6.2.1 The benefits of the second law (458b10-466d5)

Socrates’ argument on the benefits of the second law develops as follows. At the outset, he lays down two conditions. First, he supposes that if the rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of their names, the latter will be willing to do what they are commanded and the former to command (cf. 458b-c). In “some of their commands the rulers will in their turn be obeying the laws; in others—all those we leave to their discretion—they will imitate the laws” (458c2-4). Secondly, Glaucon is now explicitly denoted as “their lawgiver” (458c6), hence he is upgraded, and this position gives him the responsibility to set down the laws for selecting the women in the same manner as they earlier proposed to select the men,¹³ and turn them over to natures that are as similar as possible.¹⁴ When the selection is done, the first law advises that all the men and women will be together, they will have no private possessions of any kind, they will have common houses and mess, they will be mixed in gymnastics and training, and lastly, Socrates supposes that they will be led by an inner natural necessity to sexual mixing with one another. The next law proposal is that all marriages must be

¹³ This refers back to the testing of the guardians discussed in G₂, cf. chapter 5: *Founding cities making (ποιουόμεν) guardians*, section 5.4.3.2: Second path—testing the guardians, pp. 188-90.

¹⁴ This implies that Socrates acknowledges that Glaucon finally has grasped the concept “according to nature.”

sacred,¹⁵ and especially the most beneficial (cf. 458e), but how will some marriages be more beneficial than others? To answer this question, Socrates again employs the human-dog analogy, but this time with a twist. He now explicitly addresses Glaucon, the dog breeder; and in the discussion that follows, Socrates infers that if it is the same with the human species as with dogs, horses, and other animals, then they need eminent rulers (cf. 459b). These eminent rulers will be introduced in the third wave, but Socrates already now proclaims that it is “likely that *our rulers* will have to use a throng of lies and deceptions for the benefit of the ruled. And, of course, we said that everything of this sort is useful as a form of remedy” (459c8-d3). Here he recalls the useful lie, which is necessary because all that they have agreed upon so far “must come to pass without being noticed by anyone except the rulers themselves” (459e2-3).¹⁶ The main aim is to secure that the community of the guardians is to be as free as possible from faction.

After they have specified the rules regarding procreation and offspring, Socrates concludes: “So, Glaucon, the community of women and children for the guardians of *your city* is of this kind” (461e6-7). Socrates further concludes that the community of women and children is consistent with the rest of the regime and by far the best. However, this last claim must be secured by arguments and agreement. Hence, Socrates proposes the following procedure:

[...] the first step toward agreement for us is to ask ourselves what we can say is the greatest good in the organization of a city—that good aiming at which the legislator must set down the laws—and what the greatest evil; and then to consider whether what we have just described harmonizes with the track of the good for us and not with that of the evil (462a2-7).

¹⁵ The sacred marriage “ἱερός γάμος” alludes to the marriage between Zeus and Hera and was celebrated throughout Greece; cf. Bloom (1991b, 459n18). According to Scheid and Svendbro (2001), this celebration was connected to peace through the political topos of weaving. They argue that to “weave is really ‘to give order to a great tangle of matters’ in order to ‘put each matter in its proper place.’ It is to interweave what is different, contrary or hostile, in order to produce a unified, harmonious textile, worthy of covering the great goddess of Olympia herself” (p. 12). I take this allusion, in turn, to be a reference to the topos of peace, which I will return to in my final conclusion.

¹⁶ That this “throng of lies” is identified as “a form of remedy” points directly to the “useful lie,” and I take that as yet another confirmation that it is not the “noble lie” that is transported into the ideal city, cf. my argument related to 444a, pp. 206-07. There is scholarly precedence to argue the opposite, but then this distinction is not taken into consideration; see for example Pettersson (2014, 19-22), Lay Williams (2013), Price (2007), Carmola (2003)—among others.

With regard to the first step, Socrates identifies the greatest evil to be what splits and makes many instead of one, and the greatest good is what binds it together and makes it one (cf. 462a9-b2).¹⁷ The greatest good is secured by “the community of pleasure and pain” (462b9) because here “all the citizens alike rejoice and are pained at the same comings into being and perishings” (462b5-6).¹⁸ From this Socrates infers that privacy dissolves unity.

6.2.1.1 Considering the first step

When Socrates earlier presented the myth of autochthony and denoted it a “noble lie,” he stated that when the city was attacked and needed protection, the earthborn men had to “think of the other citizens as brothers and born of the earth” (414e5-6). This demand he is now about to alter by suggesting more specific etiquettes related to habits of addressing. To secure unity and strengthen kinship, the inhabitants of the new regime must address one another in specific ways. This entails new names, which in turn create new habits and attitudes. Socrates pictures this by a comparison to other cities. In a democracy (i.e., Athens), people call the rulers “rulers,” the rulers call the people “slaves,” and the rulers call one another “fellow rulers.” This creates the habit of addressing fellow rulers as kin and the others as outsiders, thus the phrase “my own” is used in relation to a kin while the outsider is “not my own.” This, in turn, creates faction. To avoid this, Socrates and Glaucon work their way toward an agreement, holding that in *their city* the people will call the rulers “saviors and auxiliaries,” they will call the people “wage givers and supporters,” the rulers will call one another “fellow guardians.” The inference Glaucon makes from this is that when fellow guardians meet, they hold that they are meeting “a brother, or a sister, or a father, or a mother, or a son, or a daughter, or their descendants or ancestors” (463c6-7). Socrates emphasizes that it is “only the names of kinship” (463d2) Glaucon has set down in the laws for them. This is not sufficient; he also must take all the actions that go with the names into consideration. He lists examples, such as shame before fathers, providing for parents and obeying them, pain of not being in good stead with gods or

¹⁷ This refers back to the example of the board game discussed in A₃, cf. chapter 5: *Founding cities making (ποιουόμεν) guardians*, section 5.5.1: The board game, p. 199.

¹⁸ Cf. the discussion of “pleasure and pain,” pp. 174, 190 and 204.

human beings, and he argues that when these sayings (φῆμαι, 463d6)¹⁹ are singing in the ears of the children, they will from early age understand the difference between doing well or badly. Regarding the phrase “my own,” they will also be aware that “‘my own’ affairs are doing well or badly” (463e4).

Socrates and Glaucon’s discussion on this first step exhibit three things. First, he has made it explicitly clear that the greatest evil is faction, and the greatest good is unity. Secondly, the laws set down by Glaucon—with some guiding help from Socrates—aim toward securing this unity. In this process the addressing language had priority. The language used to mouth the names of kinship and the deeds that consequently followed resulted in sayings (φῆμαι), which would ring in the ears of the children and thus teach them right from wrong. These specific consequences points back to an earlier discussion. In that context, rearing and education were received as dreams (cf. 414d), and the φήμη (415d6) ringing in the children’s ears was the myth of the earth-born men. This would entail that rearing and education were unaware undertakings, related to an oracle or a source of mysterious and obscure origin. These φῆμαι gradually changed their status, and bit by bit denoted what men said about such things, and then finally became tradition. This tradition, the Athenian myth of autochthony, is what Socrates earlier denoted a “noble lie” (cf. 414c). In this context, however, he dismisses it for the second time by making rearing and education an aware undertaking. Due to the demands set forth to the new φῆμαι, the guardians and their children learn by experience, through pain and pleasure.²⁰ Thirdly, by stressing that the phrase “my own” in this context means “my own affairs,” Socrates has reformulated the phrase “my own” and connected it more tightly to the definition of justice presented at 441e2, where it was said that justice was to mind one’s own business (according to nature). Together, these three elements lead to the proposed agreement regarding the first step. Hence, they can give a two-fold conclusion: first, that the community of pain and pleasure is the greatest good for the city, and secondly, that the community of children and women among the auxiliaries has “turned out to be the cause of the greatest good to *our city*” (464b).

¹⁹ Bloom (1991b, 455n67) elaborates on the meaning of the term φήμη, cf. Pettersson (2014, 24).

²⁰ This education stands in stark contrast to the practice recommended by Protagoras, to whom I will return in chapter 7: *Setting the stage*, section 7.2.2: Protagoras, the teacher, p. 267 ff.

6.2.1.2 *Considering the second step*

In step two, they aim to consider whether what they already have described harmonizes with what they set down as the good for their city. This consideration is undertaken to secure that their agreement does not harmonize with the greatest evil—faction. Socrates recapitulates and starts anew with the premise that the guardians must not be owners of private houses, nor land, nor any other possession. Instead, they should receive “livelihood from the others, as a wage for guarding, and use it up in common all together, if they are going to be guardians” (464c1-3). Further, the phrase “my own” they had to use “with one conviction about what’s their own, straining toward the same thing, to the limit of the possible, they are affected alike by pain and pleasure” (464d3-5). Because they do not possess anything private except for their bodies and have all the rest in common, there will be no lawsuits and complaints among them, and on this basis, they will be free from faction (cf. 464d).²¹ Socrates also supposed that “unless rulers command it, it’s not likely that a younger man will ever attempt to assault or strike an older one. [...] For there are two sufficient guardians hindering him, fear and shame: shame preventing him from laying hands as on parents, fear that the others will come to the aid of the man who suffers it [...]” (465a8-b4). The result of these laws, Socrates assumes, is that they will all live in peace with one another in all respects (cf. 465b6-7).²² The conclusion on these considerations is that “Since they are free from faction among themselves, there won’t ever be any danger that the rest of the city will split into factions against these guardians or one another” (465b9-11). Thus, they have reached an agreement that the laws prescribed harmonize with the good. Socrates is especially happy that they are rid of the greatest of all evils, which is poor men flattering the rich (cf. 465c f.). The guardians will live a life more blessed than the lives of Olympian victors, Socrates claims enthusiastically. Nevertheless, despite all his enthusiasm, he does not forget that Adeimantus previously questioned the happiness of the guardians (cf. 419a ff.); hence, he addresses Adeimantus’ objections as he earlier promised he would. The

²¹ This refers to the discussion in G₂ when Socrates and Glaucon described the paths toward a new *politeia*; this led them to the healer-doctor Asclepius who Socrates suggested should be viewed as a politician, see p. 186 above.

²² This is the same conclusion Socrates made after he and Adeimantus founded the “true city,” cf. 372d.

argument has developed, and contrary to the manner in which it was presented then, Socrates argues, “now we were making guardians (φύλακας ποιοῖμεν) guardians and the city as happy as we could, but we were not looking exclusively to one group in it and forming it for happiness” (466a3-6). Nonetheless, Socrates admits that there is a possibility that a “guardian attempts to become happy in such a way that he is no longer a guardian [...] and (as we assert) best life won’t satisfy him; but, if a foolish adolescent opinion about happiness gets hold of him, it will drive him to appropriate everything in the city with his power, and he’ll learn that Hesiod was really wise when he said that somehow ‘the half is more than the whole’” (466b5-c3). Glaucon is not willing to consider this possibility but promptly states that if he follows his advice, he will stay in this life. As Glaucon now accepts the benefits of the second law, which is the premise of the community of women and children, Socrates announces that this part of the discussion has come to an end. The next thing to consider is the possibility of realizing this project.

6.2.2 The possibility of the community of women and children (466d6-468a1)

What remains is to determine if this proposed law on the community of women and children, is possible. As his point of departure, Socrates supposes that such a community can come into being among other animals, but in what way is it possible among human beings? (cf. 466d7-8). To enable themselves to reach an agreement on the probability of realizing such a community, their starting point is warfare.²³ The implicit premise in the upcoming discussions is that human beings are the only animals that wage war.

In accordance with the argument as it has developed so far, Socrates supposes that by now it is “plain (δῆλον) how they’ll make war (τρόπον πολεμήσουσιν, 466e1). They (women and men) will carry out their campaigns together, and also they will “lead all the hardy children to the war, so that [...] they can see what they’ll have to do

²³ In the commentary literature, there is a tendency to warn readers to take the upcoming sections seriously. The statements in Syse (2010, 119) can serve as a general example: “It could be objected here that it is problematic to put *too* much emphasis on the direct moral lessons we can draw from—or the concreteness of the criticism of Athens (and other Greeks) implied by—this particular section of the dialogue. After all, it appears right after the famous discussion of the equality of women and the commonality of property, easily the most utopian and some would even say ironic (albeit attractive and lively) part of the work.”

in their craft when they are grown up” (466e5-467a1). I assume that this argument is in accordance with the conventional view on rearing: all craftsmen made their children observe how the crafts are done with an expert’s touch, in this way they are educated in practice by observing their future duties. Regarding the children of the guardians and their observation of the art of war, Socrates considers this particular partaking also to be an advantage for the parents because the children will “help out and serve in the whole business of war, and care for their fathers and mothers” (467a1-2). To get Glaucon’s consent, he again refers to the human-dog analogy and concludes that “every animal fights exceptionally hard in the presence of its offspring” (467a10-b1). Nevertheless, Glaucon is concerned, and his worry is related to the risk of defeat in war. If the campaign fails, then both parents along with the children are lost, and how will the city then be able to recover? Socrates is not concerned. On the one hand, the safety of the children will be secured by the most experienced tutors (παιδαγωγούς, 467d7); on the other hand, the risk-evaluation will be done by those who are “knowledgeable about all the campaigns that are risky and all that are not” (467c10-d1).²⁴ From this, it follows that they lead their children to some campaigns and take precautions toward others (cf. 467d3). Also, the children are to be trained on horses, and thus, if needed, they can make the surest escape following their experienced leaders. Again, by following his argument consistently, Socrates has now pinned down that its consequence is an army composed in a way not seen (or thought of) before and, that in turn, entails a new and controversial way of making war.

Ober (1994, 14) underlines that in antiquity there was no canonical list of rules concerning war, but claims that it is possible to trace some important “unwritten conventions governing interstate conflicts.”²⁵ When Socrates now continues by

²⁴ Socrates stresses that the παιδαγωγούς are not the most ordinary men, but those adequate by experience and age (467d5-7). In contrast, Adam, note on *Rep.* 467d, points out that the tutorial office in Athens was assigned to slaves, while in this context it is exercised by the very best of the citizens. This gives reason to emphasize the revolution which Socrates’ arrangement involves in the education of the young, cf. Bloom (1991b, 460n27).

²⁵ Ober (1994, 14) presents a list of twelve unwritten conventions. Lanni (2008, 470) categorizes these conventions and highlights “three observations that help explain why the laws of war may have been more effective than generally thought First, everyday domestic Greek law was very different from our own in that it included unwritten, customary law. For the Greeks, the notion of applying a customary international law based on state practice was familiar and completely uncontroversial. Second, the importance of honor and status in the ancient world meant that reputational sanctions

presenting three considerations on war and warfare, his deliberations, through the next three sections, are firmly connected to these conventions of warfare, and he highlights some of those that were severely transgressed during the Peloponnesian War.²⁶ Socrates first deals with the business of war, then with how their guardians are to deal with enemies, and lastly, when considering the practice of ravaging the Greek countryside and, the burning of houses, he proposes a radically new way of understanding the concepts of “war” versus “faction.”

6.2.2.1 First consideration: The business of war (468a2-469b4)

After having claimed that by now it is obvious how the guardians are to make war, it is noteworthy that Socrates makes a point of asking Glaucon how *your soldiers* must behave toward enemies. “Is the way it looks to me right or not?” (468a3-4), Socrates asks. It is also noteworthy that Glaucon’s enthusiasm at this point fades; he is not willing to take part in the discussion of the matter: “Just tell me [...] what it is” (468a5), he responds. This unenthusiastic and dismissive attitude corresponds to how he responded when the origin of war was identified in his feverish city; his reaction then was silence.²⁷ Socrates continues to follow the argument consistently, and in this section, that implies at least two things. First, the army on this war campaign stands forth as a united family—all reared within the ideal community of pleasure and pain. Secondly, the children are present as observers, and the aim is that they shall learn and understand the art of warfare. These two elements entail that the soldiers (fathers and mothers) must behave both toward one another and the enemies in a manner that does not contradict the premises grounding their rearing and education. Thus, it is the consequences of behavior that now are highlighted.

for violating the laws of war could be effective even in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms. Third, for the most part, the Greek laws of war grew out of religious customs. The laws of war were therefore naturally part of the culture and values of constituent states and, as such, could more easily encourage compliance than laws whose legitimacy was based on a theory of consent or on the fairness of the procedure by which they were enacted.” In addition, he gives a survey of what we know about the laws of war in ancient Greece; and he addresses the sources of the Greek law of war, their enforcement, mechanisms, and the content of the laws themselves.

²⁶ Cf. chapter 1: *Preparing the stage*, Section 1.3.2: Socrates’ prayers, pp. 57-61.

²⁷ Cf. chapter 5: *Founding cities making (ποιούομεν) guardians*, section 5.2: G₁: Socrates, Glaucon and the feverish city, pp. 162-68.

Socrates starts with the opposition cowardly versus courageous behavior. If a soldier on the campaign chooses to leave the rank or throw away his arms, he signals a cowardly attitude and must be punished. The punishment is, on the one hand, to be downgraded to a craftsman or a farmer. If this cowardly man, on the other hand, is taken alive by the enemy, he will be considered a gift to those who took him—and they are free to use their catch for the purpose they see fit (cf. 468a).²⁸ Hence, the children learn by observation that cowardly behavior in no way is rewarded, and also that the cowardly individual is not offered any help what so ever. He or she is cut off and deported. They will also observe and learn the benefits of being courageous: They will be hailed and paid tribute to. Unengaged, Glaucon agrees that “[...] the man who has proved best and earned a good reputation must first be crowned by each of those who made the campaign with him, youths and boys in turn” (468b3-6). However, there is a limit for Socrates. He does not suppose that Glaucon would go so far as to accept the opinion that the honored man should kiss all and be kissed back by each (cf. 468b). To his surprise, this is what Glaucon most of all is willing to accept. Now, he even wants to add to the law that “as long as they are on that campaign no one whom he wants to kiss be permitted to refuse, so if a man happens to love someone, either male or female, he would be more eager to win the rewards of valor” (468b13-c4). I find Glaucon’s law suggestion very peculiar, and I take it to be a pointing back to section 402d-403b where Socrates laid down a law connected to “correct love.” The moment that Socrates refers to “kissing,” Glaucon is back; he signals attentiveness by suggesting an appendix for the earlier Socratic law proposal. Thus, Glaucon has now reinforced his erotic desires and circumscribed them to the guardian’s war-campaigns, and further, juxtaposed them to a desire of winning honor.

The praising of courageous soldiers belongs to a long-lasting tradition, and therefore, in this regard, they are not out of joint with the conventions. Socrates refers to the Homeric narrative on the hero Ajax and states that “according to Homer too, it’s just to honor in such ways whoever is good among the men” (468c10-d1). Therefore, they will believe Homer in these cases (at least) and “give the good men and women what is conducive to their training at the same time as honoring them” (468e1-2). Of

²⁸ Cf. the Spartan ideal; see pp. 142n7 and 150 above.

those who die in the campaign and by their deaths earn a good reputation, they will say they are members of the golden class. In this case, they will believe Hesiod (cf. 468e-469a). Glaucon gives his consent, and later he approves and states that “if the females join in the campaign too, either stationed in the line itself, or in the rear, to frighten the enemies and in case there should ever be any need of help—I know that with all this they would be unbeatable” (471d4-7).

6.2.2.2 Second consideration: Dealing with enemies (469b5-470a4)

Socrates now ponders how *our soldiers* are to deal with enemies. This collective addressing makes Glaucon partake, and the view they present on this matter is the opposite of the conventions which have the moral topos (do good to your friends and harm your enemies) as its grounding premise.²⁹ Lanni (2008, 479) points out that “[t]he absence of humanitarian impulses in Greek military values is most evident in the norms surrounding the treatment of captives.” The established convention was that the “victorious state had complete discretion over how to treat the soldiers and civilians of its vanquished enemy” (ibid, 480).³⁰ Xenophon reports that “there is an eternal law among all mankind, that whenever a city is taken in warfare, both the people and their possessions belong to those who captured the city.”³¹ When Socrates wants to hear Glaucon’s opinion on enslavement, his questions allude to these conventions: Does it seem just (δίκαιον, 469b8) that Greek cities enslave Greeks? Or should they, “insofar as it is possible, not even allow it but make it a habit to spare the Greek stock, well aware of the danger of enslavement at the hands of the barbarians?” (369b9-c2). Glaucon decides that the latter is “wholly and entirely superior” (469c3), and Socrates proposes that as they do not possess a Greek as slave, they should “give

²⁹ We remember that Socrates dismissed this topos during his conversation with Polemarchus.

³⁰ Lanni further explains: “There was no convention requiring fighters to show mercy to enemy combatants defeated in battle. This was true even if they attempted to surrender. The victor had the option of killing the enemy soldiers on the spot, enslaving them, or exchanging them for ransom. All three practices are well attested in our sources. Massacres could be gruesome. The Spartans set fire to a forest where fleeing Argive fighters had taken refuge, killing thousands (Herodotus, 6.80). In another episode, the Athenians stoned to death the surviving enemy soldiers (Thucydides 1.106). The killing of captives on the battlefield was so well-accepted that our sources generally don’t bother to comment on why the victorious army chose this option. It seems likely that the choice was made based on self-interest: Execution would prevent enemy soldiers in a long-running conflict from fighting again, while enslavement and ransom brought financial rewards.”

³¹ Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 7.5.73. Quoted Lanni (2008, 480).

the same advice to the other Greeks” (469c5). This entails that Socrates and Glaucon’s view on this topic is a severe break with Greek conventions. Also, they launch themselves as counselors for the Greeks and thereby also contradict Pericles who declared Athens an education to Greece.

Further, Socrates allows their soldiers to strip dead enemies of their arms, but plundering corpses for anything else is viewed as a pretext for cowards (469c-d) and thereby prohibited (469e).³² The last thing mentioned is respect for the temples. It is prohibited for their soldiers to bring enemies arms to temples as votive offerings. Socrates concludes that this is how *our soldiers* will deal with enemies (469b).

6.2.2.3 Third consideration: War and faction (470a5-471c3)

The last thing to consider, is the ravaging of the Greek countryside and burning houses, and again Socrates probes for “[w]hat sort of thing will *your soldiers* do to the enemies?” (470a6-7), and once more Glaucon backs off. He will not discuss, but states that “I would be glad [...] to hear you present your opinion” (4708a), whereupon Socrates responds, “Well, in my opinion [...] they’ll do neither of these things, but they’ll take away the year’s harvest; and do you want me to tell you why?” (470b1-3). Socrates now proposes an innovative distinction between war (πόλεμος) and faction (στάσις):

It seems to me that, just as there are two different words, *polemos* and *stasis*, so in fact there are two different things which are distinguished by two different criteria. The two things are the domestic and blood-related, on the one hand, and the foreign and external, on the other. *Stasis* is applied to the enmity of the domestic, *polemos* to the enmity of the foreign (470b5-11).³³

³² According to Lanni (2008, 478), “Stripping a dead soldier to claim his armor was standard practice, but by the early classical period it was considered contrary to international law to mutilate or harm the body in any way (Herodotus 9.78-79; 4.202-205).”

³³ Here I follow the translation used by Price (2007, 68-9). In Greek, the passage reads: φαίνεται μοι, ὡσπερ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δύο ταῦτα ὀνόματα, πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσις, οὕτω καὶ εἶναι δύο, ὄντα ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινοῖν διαφοραῖν. λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον καὶ συγγενές, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον καὶ ὀθνεῖον. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκεῖου ἔχθρα στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος. Bloom translates it in the following way: “It appears to me that just as two different names are used, war and faction, so two things also exist, and the names apply to differences in the two. The two things I mean are, on the one hand, what is one’s own and akin, and what is alien, and foreign, on the other. Now, the name faction is applied to the hatred of one’s own, war to the hatred of the alien.” The reason why I deviate from Bloom here is his choice to translate οἰκεῖον καὶ συγγενές as “one’s own and akin,” and τοῦ οἰκεῖου as “one’s own.” The phrases “one’s own and akin” and “one’s own” in this

This much-discussed passage, Price (2007, 68) denotes as “problematic,” and maintains that “Socrates’ words here are most certainly not ‘a formal declaration of Plato’s political faith in the Panhellenic ideal’” (ibid, 69).³⁴ This seems a sturdy verdict, and it represents a long and well-constructed reflection based on the assumption that the “noble lie” still dwells under the surface. This assumption leads Price to conclude that Socrates’ distinction between faction and war, and “especially the premise [i.e., the noble lie] on which it is based, are endorsed neither by Socrates, who speaks the words nor by Plato, who wrote them” (ibid, 70). Due to my argument that the “noble lie” is no longer a part of the equation, I can present an alternative understanding of this passage. However, let us first observe what happens next in the text. Maybe surprisingly, Glaucon is back and states that what Socrates is saying “is certainly not off the point” (470b11). Socrates signals excitement when he wants to hear whether Glaucon has the same opinion regarding the follow-up argument:

Then when Greeks fight with barbarians and barbarians with Greeks, we’ll assert they are at war and are enemies by nature, and this hatred must be called war; while when Greeks do any such thing to Greeks, we’ll say that they are by nature friends, but in this case Greece is sick and factious, and this kind of hatred must be called faction (470c5-d1).

Glaucon’s response is: “I, for one [...] agree to consider it in that way” (470d2). Now that Glaucon gave his consent to both proposals, let us take a closer look at what Socrates is doing here. First, he applies faction to the enmity of the domestic and blood-related and war to the enmity of the foreign. Secondly, he maintains faction to include all Greeks which entails that any conflict between them must be called faction, while war proper is conflicts with barbarians because they are enemies by nature. Summarized, Socrates has redefined the concepts “faction” and “war.” Hence, what do the consequences of these new concepts entail within this context?

First, regarding war, I take this Socratic perspective as alluding to the narratives describing how a uniform Greek army victoriously battled in the Persian War. With its

passage gives unfortunate allusions given Socrates’ recent emphasis on how that particular phrase is supposed to be understood.

³⁴ Price here quotes J. Adam and D. Rees, *The Republic of Plato I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963, 323), and on that ground he argues that this is a widely accepted opinion.

heroic and celebrated battles at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, the Persian War was, according to Sissa (2011, 5), “the defining event for the history of the city [i.e., Athens] in the fifth century.” The external threat was the Persian kings Darius and Xerxes, who threatened to enslave the whole of Greece. Thus, the war was defensive, fought for freedom (cf. *ibid.*, 5-6)³⁵ and, throughout history it stands forth as “the paradigmatic war: defensive, intrepid, and altruistic.”³⁶

Second, regarding faction, I take this Socratic perspective to be, on the one hand, a specific pointing back to the “noble lie” and thus to the myth of autochthony, and on the other, it is a general reference to the Peloponnesian War.³⁷ Hence, I suggest that this is Socrates’ final dismissal of the myth and his final critique of war-waging politics. My argument for this develops as follows. The point of departure is Ober’s list of the five central holdings of the Athenian democratic ideology, whereof the first is of utmost relevance: “A belief in the autochthonous nature of the Athenians, their innate intellectual superiority vis-à-vis all other peoples, and the necessity of maintaining the exclusivity of the citizens” (Ober 1989, 33). The belief in their “autochthonous nature” made them convinced that the Athenians were the only natives in the Greek world. This conviction is confirmed by Lysias. In his *Funeral Oration* (17) he says of the Athenians:

Now in many ways it was natural to our ancestors, moved by a single resolve, to fight the battles of justice: for the very beginning of their life was just. They had not been collected, like most nations, from every quarter, and had not settled in a foreign land after driving out its people: they were born of the soil, and possessed in one and the same country their mother and their fatherland.

From Lysias’ tribute to his ancestors, it follows that the other Hellenes were, according to Sissa (2011, 4-5), viewed as “just a collection of disparate people, who originally migrated from elsewhere into a foreign territory.” This, in turn, entails that the

³⁵ Sissa maintains, that the loss of freedom “was the danger to which the Athenians were the first, and the fiercest, to respond—for the sake of all Greeks—because of their idiosyncratic aspiration to freedom. They were exceptional eager to stand up for liberty, their dearest value, but a value they were also ready to shield, on behalf of their friends.”

³⁶ Cf. chapter 5: *Founding cities making (ποιούομεν) guardians*, section 5.2: G₁: Socrates and Glaucon, and the feverish city, pp. 164-65, where I, when referring to the narratives describing the Persian War, quoted the same passage from Sissa (2011, 5).

³⁷ Cf. chapter 1: *Preparing the stage*, section 1.3.2: Socrates’ prayers, pp. 57-61.

Athenians were “citizens of an ethnically pure and legitimate city [...] at each new generation, the Athenians *become* worthy men, *andres agathoi*, because as children they learn the goodness (*agatha*) of their ancestors, as young men they cultivate that heroism and, finally they come to emulate it with their own excellence, *aretē*” (ibid). During his discourse, Socrates has already dismissed this Athenian idea of purity, and in light of his new-grounded *paideia*, he has also cast serious doubt about the value of the Athenian ideal on how to *become* worthy men. Further, it is not unreasonable to argue that the myth of autochthony was a political tool,³⁸ aiming toward same-mindedness, and from Ober’s argumentation, we have learned that same-mindedness on a political level threatened to tear the society apart.³⁹ This is confirmed by Ryan K. Balot (2008, 59), who has demonstrated the dangers of Athenian political life. He argues that ...

... Athenian politics was acrimoniously competitive. Political rivals used the courts to wage political warfare against one another. The orators emphasized the dangers of free speech and wanted credit for their civic courage. [...] Athenian political leaders seem in the sources to devote an extraordinary energy to trying to get each other executed.

The situation Balot describes points to faction. How to avoid violent internal political warfare and corruption, and hence faction, we find in the core of Socrates’ argumentation in this context, and more broadly, throughout his philosophical practice as we know it from the dialogues. Therefore, he is bound to dismiss the myth of autochthony because it is incompatible with the *politeia* he now is about to construct. Faction is usually understood as civil war splitting a city internally, but Socrates expands its meaning and includes the whole of Greece.⁴⁰ The Persian War was fought against natural enemies, and Socrates underlines that all Greeks are friends by nature, thus, when Greeks hate Greeks, this kind of hatred leads to splitting, and therefore it

³⁸ This is demonstrated by Loraux (1994, 41), see chapter 5: *Founding cities making (ποιούομεν) guardians*, p. 192n96.

³⁹ See p. 193 above.

⁴⁰ A little reminder: Earlier, Socrates told Glaucon that he feared *our guardians* would get hotter and softer than they ought due to the wrong kind of rearing (cf. 387c). Therefore, he proposed a model opposite to the former because the men they are rearing is the guardianship of the country (χώρας). At that point, Socrates expanded the rearing of the guardians to go from *the city to the country*, this I took to be foreshadowing these arguments, cf. p. 174 above.

must be called faction—the greatest evil. That the Peloponnesian War was fought for twenty-eight years, where democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta battled for Greek hegemony,⁴¹ demonstrates that—as Socrates says—Greece is sick and factious (cf. 470c). These reflections should entail that Socrates, contrary to Price’s argument quoted above, is in accordance with Thucydides, who Price (2007, 69) claims “presented the inter-Hellenic struggle as fundamentally stasis.”⁴²

The initial problem Glaucon and Socrates set out to investigate in their third consideration was related to the ravaging of the Greek countryside and the burning of houses. Should this be allowed? Socrates clarifies a few things after the redefinitions, and states,

Now observe [...] in what is nowadays understood to be faction, that wherever such a thing occurs and a city is split, if each side wastes the fields and burns the houses of the others, it seems that the faction is a wicked thing and that the members of neither side are lovers of their city. For, otherwise, they would never have dared to ravage their nurse and mother. But it seems to be moderate for the victors to take away the harvest of the vanquished, and to have the frame of mind of men who will be reconciled and not always be at war” (470d3-e3).

Glaucon admits that the city he now is founding will be Greek, and this entails that his citizens will be lovers of the Greeks and consider Greece their own and hold the common holy places along with all the Greeks (cf. 470e-471a). Socrates underlines again that they must consider the differences with Greeks to be denoted as faction, and not use the name war (cf. 471a). The result of this will be that they “correct opponents in a kindly way, not punishing them with a view to slavery or destruction, acting as correctors, not enemies” (471a6-7). Socrates now gives his final summary:

Therefore, as Greeks, they won’t ravage Greece or burn houses, nor will they agree that in any city all are their enemies—men, women, and children—but that

⁴¹ Cf. Lendon (2010, 60-72). The continuum of this war does not deal with in the *Republic*, but I will still briefly mention it: Athens was defeated and victorious Sparta placed the Thirty oligarchs in office in Athens. The gruesome rule of the Thirty resulted in a devastating civil war, which found its end in Piraeus. This substantial period of war, damaged the *politeia* of Athens, which in Platonic terms is the soul of the city.

⁴² On quite different grounds, Thein (2015) argues for a connection between Thucydides and Plato’s arguments. They have the same preoccupations (p. 221), and they both are keenly aware of the same danger: “they both realize that there is only a very thin line separating destruction from self-destruction. In fact, for these authors, there is a sort of unbreakable *moral continuum* between the political and the personal conflict” (p. 222).

there are always a few enemies who are to blame for the differences. And, on all these grounds, they won't be willing to ravage lands or tear down houses, since the many are friendly; and they'll keep up the quarrel until those to blame are compelled to pay the penalty by the blameless ones who are suffering (471a8-b6).

Glaucon's concluding remark is approval, "I for one [...] agree that *our citizens* must behave this way toward their opponents; and toward the barbarians, they must behave as the Greeks do now toward one another" (471b7-9). They agree that they will set down as a law for the guardians that they shall never waste countryside nor burn houses on Greek soil (cf. 471c).

6.2.3 Will the regime come into being? (471c4-472b2)

Glaucon has given his consent, and he has concluded that what has been said so far was fine. Nevertheless, he is still concerned and troubled: "But, Socrates, I think that if one were to allow you to speak about this sort of thing, you would never remember what you previously set aside in order to say all this" (471c4-7). He lists the things Socrates left out in his initial description and further stresses that the domestic (good) consequences were also left out in Socrates' account. He now wants to know if it is "possible for this regime (πολιτεία) to come into being, and how is it ever possible?" (471c7-8). Glaucon acknowledges that such a πολιτεία would be good. Nonetheless, he suggests that they do not talk more about it, and "rather, let's now only try to persuade ourselves that it is possible and how it is possible, dismissing all the rest" (471e3-5). Socrates' reaction is to prepare the coming of the third wave. He prophesizes that when Glaucon hears it, he will "be quite sympathetic, recognizing that it was, after all, fitting for me to hesitate and be afraid to speak and undertake to consider so paradoxical an argument" (472a5-7). Glaucon dismisses this, and promptly states, "The more you say such things [...], the less we'll let you off from telling how it is possible for this regime to come into being. So, speak and don't waste time" (472a8-b2).

Socrates now sees it is necessary to explicitly explain to him that he is partaking in a thought experiment and the reason why. He reminds him that, initially, this whole undertaking was a search for justice, and this search is still ongoing: "[...] if we find out what justice is like, will we also insist that the just man must not differ at all from justice itself but in every way be such as it is? Or will we be content if he is nearest to

it and participates in it more than the others?” (472b7-c3). Glaucon responds that they will be content with that, and his content whirls up the waters, hence, this calls for a few comments.

First, the city where men live nowadays—the feverish city modeled on Athens—is fully purged. Socrates has dismissed its conventions regarding *paideia*; further, he dismissed the authority of the poets in two aspects, on the one hand, their religious authority due to their lies about the gods that leave people unwillingly in ignorance, and on the other, their moral authority by demonstrating how the Athenian moral topos (do good to your friends, and harm your enemies) was embedded in the poetic topos. Socrates also demonstrated that the new teachers, the sophists, are not trustworthy due to their art of eristic; also, he dismissed the powerful Athenian topos of autochthony and denoted it a “noble lie,” hence, he altered traditional views on politics and warfare. Thus Glaucon, the politically motivated and proud Athenian, is left with nothing. Is this the reason why he does not want Socrates to talk about the new *politeia* anymore? Secondly, it has been a long and thorough discussion where Socrates all along demanded attentiveness. From Glaucon’s point of view, being an empirically oriented young man, he recognizes that concrete answers regarding his initial challenges have still not surfaced. Alternatively and metaphorically stated, Glaucon stays grounded while Socrates ascended. Maybe this observation makes him uncomfortable, even a little bored and tired? However, we can still detect a desire to learn more, but perhaps not on Socrates’ terms. Socrates anticipated this uneasiness, and explains:

It was, therefore, for the sake of a pattern (παραδείγματος) that we were seeking both for what justice by itself (αὐτό δικαιοσύνην) is like, and for the perfectly just man, if he should come into being, and what he would be like once come into being; and, in their turns, for injustice and the most unjust man. Thus, looking off at what their relationships to happiness and its opposite appear to us to be, we would also be compelled to agree in our own cases that the man who is most like them will have the portion most like theirs. We were not seeking them for the sake of proving that it’s possible for these things to come into being (472c5-d4).

To this Glaucon agrees. Nonetheless, I would like to point out two things. The formula “justice by itself” picks up on Adeimantus’ earlier challenge. There, he argued that those responsible for rearing children “don’t praise justice by itself (αὐτὰ δικαιοσύνην) but the good reputation that comes from it” (363a1-3). In that context, the formula

meant merely “justice apart from its consequences.” Here, however, it points to “abstract justice,” but it has not yet, according to Adam (note on *Rep.* 472), developed into a metaphysical idea as it will during Books VI and VII. Further, the “pattern (παραδείγματος)” they are seeking must be understood in a strict sense as a pattern to be followed, a “standard.”⁴³ Therefore, the question now is whether Glaucon at this point fully understands what he was agreeing to. I do not think so; he still has a long way to go. We have to wait until G₅ before he signals a deeper understanding of the city in speech; here he says, “I understand. [...] You mean he (i.e., the truly musical man) will remain in the city we have now gone through, the one that has its place in speeches since I don’t suppose it exists anywhere on earth” (592a10-b2).

For now, Socrates strives to get Glaucon on track, and their following word exchange is clarifying with regard to the ongoing thought experiment. Socrates first asks if they did not assert to make a paradigm (παράδειγμα) in speech of a good city (cf. 472e1-2). He continues by asking if Glaucon supposes “that what we say is any less good on account of our not being able to prove that it is possible to found a city the same as the one in speech” (372e4-6). Socrates signals annoyance when he points out that to gratify Glaucon he must meet his demand by striving to prove how and under what condition the city could be empirically realized. He urges Glaucon to grant him the same points for proving this in speech (cf. 472e8-11). Glaucon does not understand which points Socrates refers to, hence, yet another underlining is necessary: “Can anything be done as it is said? Or is it the nature of acting to attain to less truth than speaking, even if someone doesn’t think so?” (473a1-3). This emphasizing triggers Glaucon to reflect on the following: Does he believe that what has been said so far is less true than what could be accomplished by acting in the empirical world? Or does he believe that everything that is said in speech can be

⁴³ Cf. *ibid.* Adam argues that in the *Theaetetus* 176e we find the same meaning. Here, Socrates, in a conversation with the geometrician Theodorus, argues that, in reality, there are two such patterns or standards: one is divine and supremely happy, the other is the pattern of deepest unhappiness. A reflection on the term παραδείγματος is given by Rosen (2005, 201-06). Rosen indicates “some of the problems that arise when we try to sort out the meaning of *paradeigma*,” and his intention here is “to show the background complexity to what will shortly be introduced as the doctrine of Platonic ideas” (p. 205). When the term is viewed in light of this doctrine, I agree with Rosen. However, in this particular context, I will argue that it points to an ideal city (a model/standard) and, hence the thought experiment.

realized in the empirical world? He eventually gives up his demand for empirical proof and concrete examples on how the city in speech can be realized. Rather harshly, Socrates ends this intermezzo:

Then don't compel me necessarily to present it as coming into being in every way in deed as we described it in speech. But if we are able to find that a city could be governed in a way most closely approximating what has been said, say that we've found the possibility of these things coming into being on which you insist. Or won't you be content if it turns out this way? I, for my part, would be content (473a5-b2).

After Glaucon again gives his consent, Socrates unveils his next task, which is to “try to seek out and demonstrate what is badly done in cities today” (473b5-6). This investigation has a future aim, and therefore, it is a preventive act that will secure the best ruling. Socrates intends to show how a transformation is possible. Thus, he hesitantly launches the third wave. This launching turns out to take place at the center of the dialogue and, according to Howland (1998b, 634n3), the “thematic elements in the *Republic* are arranged in opposition around the third wave.” Hence, Howland sets out to show that “[t]he centrality of the third wave suggests that the relationship between philosophy and politics constitutes the foremost theme of the *Republic* as a whole” (ibid, 636). So far, my readings of the *Republic* have moved toward this center around which it all evolve. However, there are yet some elements to consider.

6.3 Third wave (473c6 ff.) and the third consideration

Socrates acknowledges that his argument will be apprehended as paradoxical.⁴⁴ The much-discussed argument goes as follows:

Unless [...] the philosophers rule as kings or those now called kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately philosophize, political power and philosophy coincide in the same place, while the many natures now making their way to either apart from the other are by necessity excluded, there is no rest from ills for the cities [...] nor I think for humankind, nor will the regime we have now described in speech ever come forth from nature, insofar as possible, and see the light of sun (473c11-474e5).⁴⁵

⁴⁴ According to Howland (1998b), Plato scholars have followed two main lines of interpretation when approaching the third wave. For a survey and discussion, see pp. 636-38.

⁴⁵ In the *Seventh Letter* (326a-b), Plato launches exactly the same reflection: “At last I came to the conclusion that all existing states are badly governed and the condition of their laws are practically incurable, without some miraculous remedy and the assistance of fortune; and I was forced to say, in

The argument is indeed innovative, and never before proposed.⁴⁶ We can deduce some elements from it. First, if educated philosophers gain political power, they will be able to secure a just city, as opposed to those in office today. Secondly, they will be the remedy cities need to get rid of ills; these “ills” include *stasis* and war-waging politics.⁴⁷ Thirdly, such a regime is according to nature; but will never surface without philosopher-kings.⁴⁸ Glaucon’s reaction to the third wave and Socrates’ response to him are significant because this word exchange offers some hints toward the turning of Glaucon. He first foresees all the trouble Socrates will meet when men in power hear about this proposal; they will attack him with every weapon available, and if Socrates does not defend himself in speech and gets away, he will really pay his penalty. Due to this prediction, he offers to be an ally in battle, and his enthusiasm is now growing: “[...] I won’t betray you, and I’ll defend you with what I can. I can provide goodwill and encouragement, and perhaps I would answer you more suitably than another. And so, with the assurance of such support, try to show the disbelievers that it is as *you* say” (474a6-b2).

Regarding his political ambitions, maybe it is a new opportunity that now starts to dawn on Glaucon; maybe he transforms his visions from Athenian politics to the prospect of becoming a king in a new regime. This interpretation is made possible due to Socrates’ response. He acknowledges that support for this controversial view is necessary in the beginning, but he also recognizes that Glaucon’s goodwill and

praise of true philosophy (τὴν ὀρθὴν φιλοσοφίαν), that from her height alone was it possible to discern what the nature of justice is, either in the state or in the individual, and that the ills of the human race would never end until either those who are sincerely and truly lovers of wisdom come into political power, or the rulers of our cities, by the grace of God, learn true philosophy.”

⁴⁶ I find Howland (1998b) very enlightening and inspirational when I briefly consider the third wave. My readings have had the aim to show that it is in Book V we enter the realm of philosophy. Even if Howland highlights the launching of the third wave as the focal point, I think I am not out of joint when I claim that the entrance into Book V is essential and a turning-point in the text. Howland further states: “The centrality of the third wave constitutes the foremost theme of the *Republic* as a whole. The placement of the third wave is furthermore a key to the organization of the dialogue. [...] the paradoxical character of the relationship between philosophy and politics can be grasped most directly through an examination of certain fundamental oppositions that are systematically arranged around the third wave as the primary thematic and dramatic focal point of the *Republic*” (p. 636).

⁴⁷ I take this to be pointing back to 373e11-374a2, where Socrates stated that they at that point should not consider whether war works good or evil. At this point the question is clarified by the considerations that followed the second wave.

⁴⁸ Cf. the short discussion in the *Timaeus* (19e-20c), see p. 239n49 below.

encouragement are not sufficient in the long run. When the philosophers come to light, they will be able to defend themselves, Socrates argues.⁴⁹ They will be able to show “that it is by nature fitting for them both to engage in philosophy and to lead a city, and for the rest not to engage in philosophy and to follow the leader” (474c1-3). Thus, Socrates’ aim now is to bring philosophy, and hence, the philosophers, to light. This implies that he does not need an ally in this battle; therefore, Glaucon’s offer is politely rejected. That Glaucon is not there yet, as a philosopher, is confirmed in the next section when Socrates picks up the former discussion on the erotic man, and also, the lover of honor. It now turns out that Glaucon does not remember adequately, and states, “I need reminding [...] For I scarcely understand” (474c12-d1). What Socrates now tries to do is to make an analogy between the erotic lover’s desire and that of the philosopher. However, as we have witnessed before, Glaucon is not always able to infer. This conversation is concluded with an explicit spelling out: Philosophers are just like the lovers of honor and the erotic man because they have learned to love the whole and not only the distinctive parts. Also, when it comes to the philosophic nature, Socrates wants Glaucon to understand “that they are always in love with that learning which discloses to them something of the being that is always and does not wander about, driven by generation and decay” (485a10-b3). Summarized, the philosopher must be, by nature, a person with an excellent memory, a good learner, magnificent, charming, and a friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage, and moderation. These

⁴⁹ This statement is somehow confirmed in the *Timaeus* (± 429); when Socrates shared the thoughts on a radical new regime with his philosopher friends, he met enthusiasm and excitement. From the summary Socrates gives of his speech yesterday, we understand that his theme was one similar to the three waves of the *Republic*. Today, when they meet again, he gives a survey of his feelings regarding the political structure of the city he described (cf. 19b). He states: “I’d love to listen to someone give a speech depicting our city in a contest with other cities, competing for those prizes that cities typically compete for. I’d love to see our city distinguish itself in the way it goes to war and in the way it pursues the war: that it deals with the other cities, one after another, in ways that reflect positively on its own education and training, both in word and deed—that is, both in how it behaves toward them and how it negotiates with them” (19c1-d1). However, he does not trust that the poets would be able to do the city justice in such a completion, and neither the sophists; he is “afraid their representations of those philosopher-statesmen would simply miss their mark. Sophists are bound to misinterpret whatever these leaders accomplish on the battlefield when they engage any of their enemies, whether in actual warfare or in negotiations. So, that leaves people of your sort [i.e., philosophers]. By nature as well as by training you take part in both philosophy and politics at once” (19e2-20a1). Hermocrates confirms Socrates’ enthusiasm: “Yes indeed, Socrates, you won’t find us short on enthusiasm, as Timaeus has already told you” (20c4-5).

natures are to be cultivated and perfected by education and age (cf. 487a), thus, according to Socrates, there is no risk in turning the city over to them alone. Adeimantus' interruption at 487a9 marks the end of G₃, and of my reading; to paraphrase Socrates: It ends exactly where it ought to. I will round off with a few comments.

6.4 Some remarks on the continuance

Adeimantus' interruption marks the beginning of A₄ (487a9-506d1). After having listened to Socrates' elaboration on the nature of the philosopher and his claim that they are the highly recommended rulers, Adeimantus is concerned. His considerations are worth listening to and Socrates responds likewise. Adeimantus argues that no one will contradict what has been said so far. This truth is not affected by his distress as he now looks into the present case:

Now someone might say that in speech he can't contradict you at each particular thing asked, but in deed he sees that of all those who start out on philosophy—not those who take it up for the sake of getting educated when they are young and then drop it, but those who linger in it for a longer time—most become quite queer, not to say completely vicious; while the ones who seem perfectly decent, do nevertheless suffer at least one consequence of the practice you are praising—they become useless to the cities (487c4-d6).

This is an objection that needs to be addressed, but surprisingly, Socrates does not do so directly. Instead, he refers to the men he has heard it all from and asks, “Do you suppose that the men who say this are lying?” (487d7-8). Adeimantus wants to hear Socrates' opinion, which is harshly stated, “You would hear that it looks to me as if they were speaking the truth” (487e1). Adeimantus does not take Socrates' response at face value, but continues his probing: “Then, how [...] can it be good to say that the cities will have no rest from evils before the philosophers, whom we agree to be useless to the cities, rule in them?” (487e2-4). When Socrates claims that this question needs an answer given through an image (εἰκόνας), Adeimantus obviously experiences a new facet of Socrates when he gives the image of the ship (cf. 487e7-489e2). This image is meant to resemble the cities in their disposition toward the true philosopher, and Socrates asserts that they do not need to scrutinize it because he takes it for granted that Adeimantus understood. He confirms he did. Now Socrates makes a turn.

Instead of elaborating further, he gives Adeimantus two arguments which he is supposed to use when confronting opponents. First, he shall teach the image of the ship “to the man who wonders at the philosophers’ not being honored in the cities and try to persuade him that it would be far more to be wondered at if they were honored” (489a8-b1). Secondly, he shall admit to telling the truth “in saying that the most decent of those in philosophy are useless to the many” (489b3-4). Socrates further argues that by far the greatest and most powerful slander comes from competing sciences; it is they who argue that philosophers (the most decent ones) are useless. However, philosophy itself is not to be blamed for this. The elaboration on the difference between the philosophers and the non-philosophers does not satisfy Adeimantus. During A₄, Socrates elaborates thoroughly on this theme, but does he convince Adeimantus? Toward the end of the conversation, Socrates asks: “Won’t *our* regime be perfectly ordered if such a guardian, one who knows these things, oversees it?” (506b1-2). Adeimantus believes it is necessarily so, but he does not understand if Socrates by “the good” refers to knowledge, pleasure, or something else. Socrates does not signal surprise; he just states that by now “it’s pretty transparent all along that other people’s opinions about these things wouldn’t be enough for you” (506b6-7). Again Socrates made a reference to what he has heard, hence, it is not the content Adeimantus disapproves of, but that Socrates does not speak his own mind: “It doesn’t appear just to me, Socrates [...] to be ready to tell other people’s convictions but not your own when you have spent so much time occupied with these things” (506b9-11). This is an accusation, and Socrates defends himself by asking if it, in Adeimantus’ opinion, is just to speak about things one does not know and, pretend one knows. To this, Adeimantus answers: “Not at all as though one knew [...]. However, one ought to be willing to state what one supposes, as one’s supposition” (506c3-4). Socrates is in trouble now and responds with yet another question: “Do you want to see ugly things, blind and crooked when it’s possible to hear bright and fair ones from others?” (506c10-d1) Because Glaucon interrupted, this question marks the end of A₄. On behalf of his brother, Glaucon answers negatively to Socrates’ question and now demands him to go through the good as he has done with justice. They will be satisfied *even* if he does it in the same manner (cf. 506d2-5).

When entering G₄ (506d2-548d8), Socrates at the outset makes it clear that he is not willing for the time being to tell what the good itself *is*; due to the lack of trust he will not attain his own opinion. However, he is willing to tell what looks like a child of the good (cf. 506d6-e5). I take this to entail that throughout G₄ we gradually get in touch with the philosopher's opinion.⁵⁰ However, I do not think it is a spelling out on what philosophy *is*, but rather a showing of the path toward becoming a philosopher. Through the parable of the sun (508b-509c), and the divided line (509c-511e), Glaucon (and we) are carefully trained in how to elevate our thoughts and, thus be able to conduct abstract thinking. After having presented the allegory of the cave (514a-517c), Socrates starts to elaborate on education that is based on his grounding assumption that there is a "power which already exists in each man's soul"⁵¹ and, "the instrument with which each learns [...] must be turned around from that which *is coming into being*, together with the whole soul until it is able to endure looking at that which is and the brightest part of that which is" (518c4-10). There are some preliminary studies (arithmetic, astronomy, geometry)⁵² by which this power is "purified and rekindled," but "destroyed and blinded by the other practices" (527d7-e1), and further, this power is "more important to save than ten thousand eyes" (527e2-3). So, when the other practices (i.e., sophistry) try to put knowledge "into a blind eye," Socrates' educational practice will try to purge the eye of the soul of its blindness by turning it around. How does he do this?

There would [...] be an art (τέχνη) of this turning around (περιαγωγῆς) concerned with the way in which this power can most easily and efficiently be turned around, not an art of producing sight in it. Rather, this art takes as given that sight is there, but not rightly turned nor looking at what it ought to look at, and accomplishes this object" (518b8-d7).

⁵⁰ This inference I make due to Socrates' allusion to the arrest, and further that he is afraid to be ridiculed. As it is, this is the last mentioning of the arrest. Therefore, I assume that this problem is solved.

⁵¹ Bloom (1991b, 465n3) underlines that when translating this clause, he follows J. H. Kells who translates the clause as follows: "[...] that this power is the power which already exists in each man's soul [...]"

⁵² It is noteworthy that when Protagoras proclaims the efficiency of his educational program, he states that others abuse the young terribly when they teach them arithmetic, astronomy, and geometry. The narrator reports that when uttering this Protagoras glanced at Hippias (cf. *Protagoras*, 318d-e).

This art is the art of dialectic, and the power of dialectics is elaborated on. Socrates now invites Glaucon to partake in an investigation on how philosophers come into being: “Do you want us to consider in what way such men will come into being and how one will lead them up to the light, just as some are said to have gone up from Hades to the gods?” (521c1-3) As Glaucon concedes, Socrates explains the procedure: “Then, as it seems, this wouldn’t be a twirling of shell, but the turning (περιαγωγή) of a soul from a day that is like night to the true day; it is that ascent to what *is* which we truly affirm to be philosophy” (φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ, 521c4-8). They work their way through the studies necessary for this particular becoming, and of these, geometry is essential, and as Glaucon conceives it, “geometrical knowing is of what is always” (527b7-8). Socrates supplements this statement and explains that geometry “would draw the soul toward truth and be productive of philosophical understanding in directing it upward what we now improperly direct downward” (527 b9-11). Glaucon does not seem to be quite convinced when he replies that “[i]t does so [...] to the greatest extent possible.” Socrates, on the other hand, signals enthusiasm when he concludes that “to the greatest extent possible [...] the men in *your* beautiful city (καλλιπόλει) must be enjoined in no way to abstain from geometry” (527c1-2). Hence, Socrates now states that Glaucon’s city has become beautiful and, it will be preserved in this condition in so far as the men ruling uphold their geometrical training.⁵³

6.5 Summary

As the grounding premise of this chapter, I argued that we now entered the realm of philosophy. The two cities (“the true city” and “the feverish city”) were superposed, and a new alternative was allowed to surface. The founding of this city developed (and continues to do so) as Glaucon’s thought experiment and, as I see it, a vital part of the theme “educating Glaucon.” The question is whether he makes his turning and become educated in Socratic terms. Through my reading of G₃, I have tried to follow Socrates’ argument consistently (as he urges us to do). From this outset, I highlighted Socrates’ considerations following the first wave and showed that women were excluded from partaking in politics due to old habits constituted by men. Socrates argued that there

⁵³ The necessity of decay is set in motion when the geometrical training of the rulers starts to dissolve, cf. 545d ff.

are no sound arguments—according to nature—to support such a view; hence, he referred to the art of eristic to demonstrate how these old habits were grounded in the first place. In his considerations following the second wave, Socrates' grounding principle was that men are the only animal that wage war. He did not reflect upon whether war was good or evil but on how war is conducted. Hence, he launched a new kind of warfare, and redefined the concepts “war” and “stasis.” Through these redefinitions and the discussions throughout these sections, I infer that war as a defensive act is necessary while war-waging is not.

I also paid close attention to Glaucon and the question related to his turning and education. His attitude and behavior has been continuously in movement; he alternated in that he was sometimes fully attentive and sometimes the opposite; he signaled both enthusiasm and boredom; sometimes he was eager to discuss, and sometimes he did not want to talk at all. I am not convinced regarding his philosophical abilities, because Socrates strived hard to make him partake in a thought experiment and thus make him elevate his thoughts. That he also offered to be Socrates' ally in battle and was politely excused (contrary to Polemarchus who was invited and Adeimantus who was given advice on how to stand up against arguments contra philosophers), I take to be a sign of him not turning toward philosophy. It is also indicated in the frame story (±400) of the *Symposium* that Glaucon had no direct contact with Socrates at that point, and further, we learn from the *Apology* that Glaucon was not present in court.

Part II

Historical touch- downs – the dialogues

Chapter 7: Setting the stage

I am now entering Part II: Historical touchdowns—the dialogues.¹ When reading them as historical touchdowns framed as philosophical-literary dramas, and when reading them chronologically from the outset of their (internal) dramatic dating,² the reader experiences a kind of philosophical-literary time-travel. The overall focus in Part II is *paideia*, and the theme is “saving youths.” I will try to show how the new *paideia* grounded in Socrates’ practice stands forth as a powerful alternative to the sophistic. I begin with the beginning, which is a hunt for facts about Socrates. This hunt leads us to a travel wherein we are allowed to witness Socrates’ work throughout fifty years. Because the two first touchdowns, the *Parmenides* (450) and the *Protagoras* (432), have a significant impact on the whole literary-philosophical universe, I will make them a point of departure.

This chapter contains two distinct parts: the *Parmenides* and the *Protagoras* sections. Before I start my readings, I will, as an introduction to each section, very briefly present the dialogues and, through a transitory sketch, indicate their impact on the whole corpus. Regarding the *Parmenides*, I will first briefly present *Parmenides*, the legislator, before I read the conversation between him and Socrates as a five-step dialectical procedure. I suggest that this proceeding marks the founding of Socrates’ philosophical practice. I then turn to the *Protagoras* where I first present *Protagoras* the city-founder and legislator, and then present the *paideia* program he launches. The overall aim is to present two contrasting procedures (philosophy and sophistry) related to *paideia*. Both educators propose a lifelong path for their teachings, but this is where the similarities end. *Parmenides* stands forth as a guide advocating dialectic as his pedagogical tool; the ultimate aim is to lead students toward the final result which is free and autonomous individuals. Because the student enters and stays on this path voluntarily, the burden of learning belongs to the student. *Protagoras* stands forth as an inculcating teacher, advocating threats and punishment as parts of his pedagogical

¹ Again, a reminder: the dialogues as spoken about here do not include the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

² On the chronology, see Appendix I: The chronology of the dialogues and their participants, pp. 384-95.

method. Within his *paideia* program the aim is to rear and educate all students through the same doctrines; viewed from a political point of view, it is utility-based and guided by the ideal of same-mindedness.

7.1 The *Parmenides*

In the Prologue of the *Parmenides*, dramatic date ± 382 , the readers are led to believe that about seventeen years after the death of Socrates, a rumor reached the philosophical milieu in Clazomenae. This rumor told that there was only one man still alive who was able to voice the narration of the meeting between Parmenides and Socrates which allegedly took place some sixty-eight years prior. This man turns out to be Plato's brother Antiphon who once heard the story from Pythodorus, the host of the gathering. Antiphon voiced the story to Cephalus from Clazomenae, who now voices it to us. This entails that it all starts with a hunt for facts about Socrates, and also it is a foreigner, named but unknown, who introduces us to the beginning of Socrates' journey.

The reason why Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens in 450 was to join the celebration of the Great Panathenaea. Socrates meets Parmenides at a gathering in a private house outside the city wall in the Potters' Quarter in Kerameikos. Besides Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, and some of his unnamed friends, Pythodorus of Athens and Aristotle of Thorae were also present. We do not hear more of the latter two in the corpus, but they both serve as pointers forward to the Peloponnesian War and the upcoming political climate in Athens. By the naming of Aristotle of Thorae³ and the information that he later became one of the Thirty (127d3), he can be taken to symbolize the time span from 450 to the Athenian defeat in 404, and he also represents a direct connection toward the devastating civil war. Pythodorus is said to have been a student of Zeno. He later became a prominent politician in Athens. Both he and Aristotle had military careers. Aristotle was the commander of twenty ships that sailed to Peloponnese in 426/5,⁴ and as a commander also in 426/5,⁵ Pythodorus was sent to

³ Aristotle of Thorae is approximately 15 years old here and about the same age as the young Socrates when the latter encounters the Eleatic Stranger in the *Statesman* (399). The choice of names on these two characters is puzzling.

⁴ For further information on Aristotle, see Nails (2002, 57-8).

Sicily where he superseded Laches whom we meet in the *Laches* (424) around a year after these military campaigns. Thus, Pythodorus represents an implicit connection to the *Laches* where Socrates meets the military commanders Laches and Nicias.

Zeno is presented as Parmenides' student; however, some clues indicate that he left philosophy. When Socrates does not understand how to employ the method proposed, he asks Parmenides to go through the whole exercise (cf. 136c7-9), but Parmenides refers to Zeno and asks if he can do so. Parmenides regards himself too old for such an undertaking. On this request, Zeno laughed scornfully (*γελᾶσαντα*, 136d5). He finds it too difficult and suggests that they ought to beg Parmenides to take on the assignment. Zeno's attitude and utterings at this point suggest that he has not practiced, trained, or received guidance for quite some time. This is somehow confirmed when eighteen dramatic years later we hear of Zeno in the *Alcibiades I*. Here we are told that both Pythodorus and the politician Callias from Aexone⁶ became wise and famous experts after they paid him a hundred minas each (cf. 119a). In the *Phaedrus* (421/16), Socrates states that Zeno "is such an artful speaker that his listeners will perceive the same things to be both similar and dissimilar, both one and many, both at rest and also in motion" (261d7-10). This could, in turn, indicate that he was seduced by might and money; a danger Socrates was aware of and later warned against.

Parmenides himself is present throughout the corpus as a point of return in several conversations. In the *Symposium* (416), Phaedrus—the first speaker—refers to Parmenides as an authority and claims that he once said, "The very first god [she] designed was Love" (178b10). Agathon finds himself in disagreement with Phaedrus and his reference to Parmenides (cf. 195b-c). In the *Theaetetus* (399), Socrates states that compared to the wise men of the past Parmenides is exceptional (cf. 152d-e); his teachings are investigated and discussed by Theodorus and Socrates at 180e-184a; in

⁵ Cf. Nails (2002, 259-60). On his return to Athens, Pythodorus was banished for having been defeated.

⁶ According to Nails (2002, 74) Callias proposed a decree in ±435 that concerned public works, and another decree in 434/3 that concerned the repaying of money owed to the gods. The two decrees are sometime together called the "Callias Decrees"—aimed at putting Athens on a war footing. Callias fell in the battle at Potidaea in the fall of 432.

the *Sophist* (399) he is mentioned by Socrates at 217c, and the Eleatic Stranger commits his father-murder on Parmenides at 216a-258c.

7.2 Parmenides, the legislator

In 1962, at the cult site of Elea, an inscription was found which reads: *Parmenides son of Pyres Ouliades Physikos*. Patrick Lee Miller (2011, 54) suggests that by being denoted as a *physikos* it is likely that Parmenides was known for being both a physician and a natural philosopher. *Ouliades* suggests that he was not only Pyres' son, but also the spiritual son of Oulios, which in turn indicates that he was a priest of Apollo. Richard G. Geldard suggests that *Ouliades Physikos* could denote either a physician in a traditional sense or something more esoteric, such as a natural healer. *Physikos* has a broader meaning than "natural philosopher," and when combined with *ouliades*, according to Geldard, it may "refer to a local cult in which Parmenides was a leader or guardian of ritual items or a leader of ceremonies" (2007, 19). Lee Miller and Geldard agree that Parmenides was highly respected by the whole community of Elea as a healer-philosopher. From Diogenes Laertius (*Lives*, 9: 3) we learn that in mature age Parmenides was called upon to revise the laws of Elea.⁷ In this process, he earned respect from his townspeople and beyond. The city itself earned a reputation of religious and intellectual tolerance, and it is said that "the citizens of Elea began each year by swearing to abide by Parmenides' laws" (Nails 2002, 217). The lawgiver also lived an exemplary life. This became an ideal and later known among the Greeks as a "Parmenidean life" (Geldard 2007, 9). Parmenides' fame and extraordinary reputation due to his exemplary life-style alludes strongly to the mindset of the philosopher-kings Socrates was trying to form in the *Republic*.

7.3 Parmenides, the teacher

When Socrates and some unnamed companions went to Pythodorus' house, they aimed to hear Zeno read from his book that he and Parmenides brought to Athens for the first time. Socrates was seemingly not enthralled because after he had heard the reading, and after he had discussed some issues with Zeno, he concluded that Zeno had written the same thing as Parmenides only with some minor alterations. Addressing

⁷ On the story of the founding and development of Elea, see Geldard (2007, 1-3).

Parmenides, Socrates argues that “by changing it round he tries to fool us into thinking he is saying something different. You say in your poem that the all is one, and you give splendid and excellent proof of that; he, for his part, says that it is not many and gives a vast array of very grand proof of his own” (128a7-b3). Socrates concludes that when Parmenides says “one” and Zeno says “not many” they are practically saying the same thing, but in different ways, thus Zeno fools us and gives nothing more than a paraphrase. Addressing Zeno, Socrates states that he would be “much more impressed if someone were able to display this same difficulty (ἀπορίαν), which you and Parmenides went through in the case of visible things, also similarly entwined in multifarious ways in the forms themselves—in things that are grasped by reasoning” (129e5-130a3). By these words, Socrates got Parmenides’ attention, and the conversation which develops between them is, viewed from my perspective, as imperative. On the one hand, the reader here witnesses how a student of philosophy is tested and then guided into entering the next level; on the other hand, the reader gets a first glimpse into how a dialectical practice unfolds and how it is performed in an encounter between a teacher and a student devoted to philosophy. This is quite different from the practice Socrates is advocating later because most of the time he does not encounter dedicated students. On the contrary, his practice is part of his mission to awaken fellow citizens. He acts like a gadfly and, if possible, he will make them turn toward philosophy. So, how did the conversation between teacher and student develop?

Cephalus of Clazomenae (our narrator) tells us that Antiphon (Cephalus’ narrator) said that Pythodorus (Antiphon’s narrator) said that when Socrates uttered his doubt about Zeno’s work, he was “from moment to moment expecting Parmenides and Zeno to get annoyed” (130a4-6). However, Socrates’ assumption was wrong because neither of them got upset. Instead, the narrator reports, “they both paid close attention to Socrates and often glanced at each other and smiled, as though they admired him” (130a6-8). Pythodorus’ account of the situation was confirmed by Parmenides when he turned to Socrates and said that “you are to be admired for your keenness (ὀρμητικότητα) for argument” (130b1). This “keenness” that Parmenides referred to contains the meaning of “a rapid motion forward.” It therefore looks like it is only Socrates’ swiftness in

discussions Parmenides tributes at this point because it also turns out later that he is not quite content. I take it that the philosopher instantly notices Socrates' philosophical potential, and thus he was prepared to test and guide him further. This is exhibited through Parmenides' questioning, which is designed as a five-step procedure.

7.3.1 Step one: Testing

Parmenides first asks Socrates if he “himself has distinguished as separate things [...] certain forms (εἶδη) themselves [...]” (130b1-2). Socrates insists he has, so Parmenides goes on: But “is there a form, itself by itself, of just, and beautiful, and good, and everything of that sort?” (130b7-9), and further, “what about a form of human being, separate from us and all those like us? Is there a form itself for human being, or fire, or water?” (130c1-3). Socrates signals uncertainty toward this set of questions. He admits that “I’ve often found myself in doubt (ἀπορία) whether I should talk about those in the same way as the others or differently” (130c4-6).⁸ I take it that Parmenides recognized that Socrates himself acknowledges that a reflection on these subjects results in an aporetic state of mind, but he does not pay attention to it. Instead he goes on. What about things “that might seem absurd (γέλοια δόξειεν), like hair and mud and dirt, or anything else totally undignified and worthless? Are you doubtful whether or not you should say that a form is separate for each of these, too, which in turn is other than anything we touch with our hands?” (130c7-d2). Socrates stresses that he is not doubtful regarding these mirth-provoking and amusing things, on the contrary. His opinion is that these things are in fact just what we see, and he states with confidence that “surely it’s too outlandish (ἄτοπον) to think there is a form for them” (130d4-5).

When Socrates, with this high degree of certainty, claims that it is *atopos* (outlandish) to think that there is a form for things like hair, mud, and dirt, we can identify a reference to a topos for the first time.⁹ Parmenides' questioning regards the topos of the forms (or the doctrine of the forms) that I take to be a sub-category of the topos of philosophy. Hence, when Socrates argues that there is no form for

⁸ Socrates' answer at this point resembles the answer Theaetetus will give to Socrates some seventy dramatic years later. Socrates' response to Theaetetus also resembles Parmenides' response to Socrates.

⁹ The *Republic* is the exception, so by “the first time” I am here referring to the other dialogues—or the historical touchdowns.

“undignified and worthless thing” he is actually stating that these things do not belong to the forms.¹⁰ Even so, he quickly modifies his confidence. This is hinted at when he states that he has been troubled from time to time if this assumption holds in all cases. He explains that when this troubling thought bothers him and “when I get bogged down in that, I hurry away, afraid that I may fall into some pit of nonsense and come to harm; but when I arrive back in the vicinity of the things we agreed a moment ago have forms, I linger there and occupy myself with them” (130d5-9). This is yet another confession. When confronted with a problem of this particular kind, the strategy of the swift young Socrates is to pause. That is, he hurries away from the problem and chooses to enter a more familiar place because he is afraid he could be harmed. It is when he (after a while) returns to the vicinity he left that he can occupy himself with the problem. Parmenides concludes rather sympathetically that the reason for this conduct is that Socrates is still young (cf. 130e1), “philosophy has not yet gripped you as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you begin to consider none (ἀντιλήψεται) of the cases beneath your notice. Now, though, you still care about what people think,¹¹ because of your youth” (130e2-5). Parmenides’ observations and his firm elucidation of Socrates’ demeanor is revealing because it all mirrors Socrates’ ways when he later stands forth as a philosophical guide. This calls for a little detour.

The first point to notice is Parmenides’ claim that “philosophy has not gripped you (ἀντείληπται) yet.” The term “ἀντιλαμβάνω” means to “receive instead of.” I understand this to be a hint that can be related to the phrases “turning toward philosophy” versus “turn into philosophy.” It is obvious that Socrates in his encounter with Parmenides has already “turned toward philosophy,” that is, he has started the road toward his final turning. In the *Seventh Letter* (cf. 340c), we are told the first turn signals a transformation, and from that point forth, the student pushes himself and urges his teacher until he has reached the end of the journey or has become capable of doing philosophy without a guide and finding the way himself. However, this road is

¹⁰ We have already seen that Socrates gave—very reluctantly—a more groundbreaking elaboration and exhibition of the topos of philosophy in the *Republic*. Hence, when reading the other dialogues, I assume it to be known to the readers (cf. my back-drop-argument).

¹¹ These are almost the exact words Socrates utters to Glaucon when they discuss education: “You are like a man who is afraid for the many [...]” (*Republic*, 527d5-6).

not for everyone to travel we are told in the *Republic*. Why is that? First, the candidates must have a talent or inherent potential. To secure that the potential candidates have this talent embedded, they are tested.¹² It is testing with regard to “the turning toward philosophy” I think is the work Socrates performs in his meetings with the youths he will encounter later.¹³ Secondly, through the *paideia* program and the curriculum as displayed in the *Republic*, it is a long-lasting and demanding travel for a philosopher in his/her becoming. The student’s progress is firmly tested throughout the study, whereas the last and final test concerns the entrance into the study of dialectic. For the candidates who pass the test, this study lasts for about twenty years, and the educated philosopher is then supposedly around the age of fifty. We are also told in the *Seventh Letter* that the “turn into philosophy” happens “suddenly (ἐξαίφνης), like a light flashing forth when a fire is kindled; it is born in the soul which straight away is nourished by itself” (314c). At this moment, the flashing light lays hold of the soul, and clarity is reached. Then, philosophy has replaced something else—or as the term “ἀντιλαμβάνω” suggests—one has received something that replaces something else. So “turning into philosophy” resemblances a rebirth. I suggest that Socrates experiences this final turning in the course of the *Protagoras*, where we witness him acting out of place¹⁴—that is, he acts atopos.

With this perspective in mind, I return to Parmenides and Socrates. Parmenides makes Socrates’ last confession the point of departure when he presents a set of new problems for him to consider. “Is it your view that, as you say, there are certain forms from which these other things, by getting a share in them, derive their names?” Socrates replies that there certainly is (130e5-131a1). It looks like Parmenides is seeking to steer up the ground of Socrates’ certitude when he, after a short sequence of questioning, states: “Socrates, how neatly you make one and the same thing be in many places at the same time! It’s as you were to cover many people with a sail, and

¹² Cf. the various tests we witnessed in the *Republic*; see chapter 5: *Founding cities making (ποιῶμεν) guardians*, section 5.4.3.2: Second path—testing the guardians.

¹³ Cf. Introduction, section 3: Displaying the path toward philosophy—two Socratic practices, pp. 18-26. I will also elaborate on this in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, when I study Socrates’ encounters with Hippocrates, Alcibiades, and Charmides.

¹⁴ Cf. Kastely (1996, 37). I return to this in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.1: Hippocrates’ dream, p. 282 ff.

then say that one thing as a whole is over many. Or isn't that the sort of thing you mean to say?" (131b7-10) Socrates is again somewhat reluctant, but he admits that perhaps it is so. Parmenides' follow-up questions are puzzling: "In that case would the sail be, as a whole, over each person, or would a part of it be over one person and another part over another?" (131c2-3) Socrates now works himself into more trouble and Parmenides wonders if he is willing to say "that our one form is really divided" (131c9-10). As Socrates strongly denies this, they continue until Parmenides forces him to decide "in what way, then, will the other things get a share of your forms, if they can do so neither by getting parts nor by getting wholes?" (131e4-6). In the core of this question, there is a hint that Socrates is on his way to define the concept of the forms in his manner (cf. "your forms"). This hint helps him because he does not answer but exclaims: "By Zeus! It strikes me that's not at all easy to determine" (131e7-8). What occurred now? To me, it seems like Socrates worked his way out of the aporetic state, and my assumption is somewhat confirmed by Parmenides who at this point gives the conversation a new direction.

"I suppose you think each form is one on the following ground: Whenever some number of things seem to you to be large, perhaps there seems to be some one character, the same as you look at them all, and from that, you conclude that the large is one" (132a1-3). Socrates agrees in Parmenides' presumption, whereupon Parmenides strategy alters in that he now problematizes Socrates' answers until Socrates stops him: "But, Parmenides, maybe each of the forms is a thought and properly occurs only in minds. In this way, each of them might be one and no longer face the difficulties mentioned just now" (132c4-7). Here it seems that Socrates now—by himself—found the solution that he at the outset stated that Zeno lacked (cf. 129e5-130a3). That is the distinction between visible things versus things grasped by reasoning.¹⁵

With this suggestion, Socrates is on the right track, but not quite there yet. So, Parmenides problematizes firmly until Socrates presents a new suggestion: "[...] what appears most likely to me is this: These forms are like patterns (*παράδειγματα*) set in

¹⁵ It was this distinction Socrates, in the *Republic*, strove to make Glaucon acknowledge. Then Socrates worked during the whole night until sunrise.

nature, and other things resemble them and are likeness, and this partaking of the forms is, for the other things, simply being modeled on them” (132d1-4). Parmenides does not problematize further; instead, he concludes that “other things don’t get a share of the forms by likeness” (133a5), and then he sets the next task before Socrates: “We must seek some other means by which they get a share” (133a6). So far, Socrates has found his way out of the aporia but has only partially been able to work his way through some severe difficulties. Hence, the continuation is to evaluate if he understands the impact of his proposed solutions and where they went wrong.

7.3.2 Step two: Evaluation

When Parmenides now sets down specific problems for Socrates to consider, he signals that this is a kind of evaluation and the aim is to make Socrates “scope it out.”¹⁶ Parmenides first points out that it is important for Socrates to understand why he failed to solve the former problems and how it happened. He says, “Then you see, Socrates, how great the difficulty is if one marks things off as forms, themselves by themselves?” (133a8-9). He continues by assuring Socrates “that you do not yet, if I may put it so, have an inkling of how great the difficulty is if you are going to posit one form in each case every time you make a distinction among them” (133a11-b2). At this point, Socrates’ eagerness and swiftness is calmed down. Instead, he starts to wonder why it is so. Hence, Parmenides explains and makes Socrates (and the reader) understand:

There are so many reasons, but the main one is this: suppose *someone were to say*¹⁷ that if the forms are such as we claim they must be, they cannot even be known. If anyone should raise that objection, you wouldn’t be able to show him that he is wrong, unless the objector happened to be widely experienced and not ungifted, and consented to pay attention while in your effort to show him you dealt with many distant considerations. Otherwise, the person who insists that they are necessarily unknowable would remain unconvinced (133b4-c2).

This explanation opens quite a few questions that point toward Zeno’s underlining of the importance of the method (cf. 136e1-4), which will be exhibited later through the

¹⁶ This is exactly what Socrates does to Hippocrates 18 dramatic year later, cf. *Protagoras* 311b.

¹⁷ My italics. This way—“if someone were to say”—of illuminating an important topic for the purpose of making an interlocutor grasp a point is one of the proceedings Socrates later uses frequently. I have called it “to create an imaginary interlocutor,” see Introduction, section 3: Displaying the path to philosophy—two Socratic practices, pp. 18-26.

conversation between young Aristotle and Parmenides. The point now is that a philosopher claims that the forms are such as the philosopher claims, but a non-philosopher will then claim that the forms cannot be known. Further, the philosopher will not be able to show the non-philosopher that he is wrong. The result is that the non-philosopher would remain unconvinced.¹⁸ Socrates ponders why that is. “Because I think that you, Socrates, and anyone else who posits that there is for each thing some being, itself by itself, would agree, to begin with, that none of those beings is in us” (133c4-7), Parmenides answers. Socrates is not yet convinced and asks, “Yes, but how could it still be itself by itself?” He is complimented on that question, and Parmenides answers this question at length. I will also quote at length because I think what Parmenides sets forth here is of relevance when we later encounter the Eleatic Stranger. This is what Parmenides tells Socrates:

All the characters that are what they are in relation to each other have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. And whether one posits the latter as likeness or in some other way, it is by partaking of them that we come to be called by their various names. These things that belong to us, although they have the same names as the forms, are in their turn what they are in relation to themselves but not in relation to the forms; and all the things named in this way are *of* themselves but not *of* the forms (133c9-d5).

Because Socrates did not fully grasp this explanation, Parmenides suggests that it may be clearer through an example:

If one of us is somebody’s master or somebody’s slave, he is surely not a slave of master itself—of what a master is—nor is the master a master of slave itself—of what a slave is. On the contrary, being a human being, he is a master or slave of a human being. Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is of slavery itself; and, in the same way, slavery itself is slavery of mastery itself. Things in us do not have their power in relation to forms, nor do they have theirs in relation to us; but, I repeat, forms are what they are of themselves and in relation to themselves, and things that belong to us are, in the same way, what they are in relation to themselves (133e7-134a1).

Socrates understood this example, and I suppose so do the readers. Parmenides gives more details when he, in the next step, argues that the same principle also goes for knowledge itself (cf. 134a). So, what is knowledge? Or more precisely: What have we

¹⁸ Cf. the *Republic* (487b-506d) where Socrates displays and defines the fundamental difference between the philosopher and the non-philosopher.

learned regarding knowledge so far? Particular knowledge is knowledge of a particular thing or knowledge about what that thing *is*.¹⁹ Knowledge that belongs to us is the truth about things that belong to our world. From this, it follows that each particular knowledge, which belongs to us, is in turn knowledge of some particular thing in our world. However, this is getting more complicated when Parmenides continues, “We neither have the forms themselves nor can they belong to us. [...] What each of them *is*, are known by the form of knowledge itself, [...], and this is the very thing we do not have” (134b3-9). Does this lead to a paradox? Or does it point toward the limits of philosophy itself? For the reader, it certainly looks like—as the consequence of this outlining so far—that none of the forms is known to us because we do not partake in knowledge itself. The implication of this, Parmenides explains, is that “the beautiful itself, what it is, cannot be known to us, nor can the good, nor, indeed, can any of the things we take to be characters themselves” (134b13-c2). So, what can be known to us then? At this point, there is no answer to this. Hence, this conclusion indicates that the reader now experiences an aporetic state of mind. It gets even more complicated and shocking when Parmenides proclaims that “even if god partakes of knowledge itself, the god is not able to know things that belong to our world” (134d1-2). Still, according to Parmenides, “this is because those forms do not have their power in relation to things in our world, and things in our world do not have theirs in relation to forms, but that things in each group have their power in relation to themselves” (134d5-7). From this line of reasoning, it is possible to identify a material conditional that says: If this most precise mastery and this most precise knowledge belong to the divine, so can the gods’ mastery can never master us. Further, if this most precise mastery and this most precise knowledge belong to the divine, so the gods’ knowledge can never know us or anything that belongs to us. The implication of this is that just as we do not govern the gods by “our governance and know nothing of the divine by our knowledge, so they in their turn are, for the same reason, neither our masters nor, being gods, do they know human affairs” (134e3-6). This is awe-inspiring reasoning that displays yet another level of the topos of philosophy, and by grasping this, the reader can now calmly assume that the former did not lead to a paradox nor was it pointing toward the limits

¹⁹ Cf. the *Seventh Letter* and the teachings displayed in the “Philosophical digression” (342a6-345c2).

of philosophy. On the contrary, it starts to dawn on the reader that turning toward philosophy entails a willingness to enter and work within a completely foreign territory. One must be willing to challenge and investigate all previous convictions, refute them and establish a new way of reasoning that replaces the former one. In this way, the limit of philosophy reveals itself in quite an unexpected way: The limit is rejection. Rejection from those who are not willing to work hard and accept that within the territory of philosophy the burden of learning belongs to the student. From this, it follows that a student cannot gain philosophic insight through inculcation, but by training and guidance.²⁰

Socrates is also blown away after this last revelation: “If god is to be stripped of knowing (ἀποστερήσει τοῦ εἰδέναι), our argument may be getting too bizarre (θαυμαστός)” (134e7-8), is his reaction. When listening to the arguments for the first time, this is a reasonable conclusion. Parmenides apparently understand this—maybe he even anticipated this reaction, because his next step is to reassure that such a response is inevitable: “[...] the forms inevitably involve these objections and a host of others—if there are those characters for things, and a person is to mark off each form as “something itself” (135a1-3). The result of this is that ...

... whoever hears about them is doubtful and objects that they do not exist, and that, even if they *do*, they must by strict necessity be unknowable to human nature; and in saying this he seems to have a point; and [...] he is extraordinarily hard to win over. Only a very gifted man can come to know that for each thing there is some kind, a being itself by itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable still will discover that and be able to teach someone else who has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself (135a3-b3).

Socrates agrees and confirms that this is in accordance with the way he is thinking right now. By this preliminary introduction to the topos of the forms, Parmenides, on the one hand, has prepared Socrates for the future criticism he can anticipate. This perspective of the criticism that awaits the philosopher was displayed and discussed in the *Republic*. From the other dialogues, we learn that Socrates encounters both doubtful men and men who are extraordinarily hard to win over. Further, Parmenides visions Socrates’ aim. I take it that Socrates surpasses “the very gifted man” and

²⁰ Alcibiades is an excellent example on this topic.

represents the prodigy who will eventually examine the difficulties and then be able to teach others.

7.3.3 Step three: Decision-making

Parmenides' next step is to dare Socrates to take a stand. This is the challenge: There are some that have an eye on all the difficulties just brought up and other problems of the same sort. What will happen if they are not willing to allow that there are forms for things? What happens when they are not willing to mark off a form for each one? Parmenides answers himself and explains that "he won't have anywhere to turn his thought; since he doesn't allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same" (135b7-9). This can be taken as a summary so far, and this "someone" I take to be Socrates. The lesson to be learned now is where to turn his thoughts. But what is the consequence of being occupied with these difficulties and simultaneously not willing to allow that there are forms for all things? Parmenides concludes that "in this way, he will destroy the power of dialectic entirely (*διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ*). But I think you are only too well aware of that" (135c1-3).²¹ Socrates agrees, and Parmenides presents his last question: "What then will you do about philosophy? Where will you turn (*τρέψη*) while these difficulties remain unresolved?" (135c5-6). Socrates does not have a clear view on that at present, and Parmenides tells him the reason why. It is "because you are trying to mark off something beautiful, and just, and good, and each of the forms, too soon, before you have been properly trained" (135c7-d1).²² Parmenides drew this inference when he observed the other day a conversation between Socrates and young Aristotle. He was impressed by the impulse (*ὄρμη*) Socrates brought to the argument; he even calls it noble and divine. However, as Socrates still is young, he is recommended to put his "back into it and get more training (*γύμνασαι*) through something people think is useless—what the crowd call idle talk" (135d4-5).²³ If he does not follow this advice, the truth will escape him. Socrates listens and wants to know the manner (*τρόπος*) of the training Parmenides

²¹ On the "power of dialect," cf. the *Republic* 511b ff., and 532d ff.

²² Cf. the *Protagoras* 314b where Socrates urges Hippocrates to be patient because they both are too young to be making a decision on such great matters.

²³ On philosophy as a useless undertaking, see A₄ (487a9-506d1), the conversation between Adeimantus and Socrates, *Republic* (487d ff.).

refers to. Parmenides points to Zeno and says that the manner is what Socrates just heard from him. This reference to Zeno is enlightening because during his encounter with him Socrates was trained and tested quite from the outset without noticing it himself. This piece of information also alludes to the part of the conversation between Theaetetus and Socrates when Socrates tells about his “secret art” that enables him to test if youths are pregnant or barren.²⁴

Parmenides observed the conversation between Zeno and Socrates and concluded that Socrates passed the test. He was “impressed by something you had to say to him; you didn’t allow him to remain among visible things and observe their wandering between opposites. You asked him to observe it instead among those things that one might above all grasp by means of reason and might think to be forms” (135e1-4). Socrates explains that he did that because he thought that here, among visible things, it is not at all hard to show that things are both like and unlike and anything else you please. However, Parmenides now states that this is not adequate, there is something in addition: “if you want to be trained more thoroughly, you must not only hypothesize if each thing is and examine the consequence of that hypothesis; you must also hypothesize if that same thing is not” (135e8-136a2).

7.3.4 Step four: The method

Socrates did not understand the additional demand, so Parmenides explains. He exemplifies through Zeno’s hypothesis “if many are.” The preliminary steps of the recommended method are as follows:

- 1) On consequence. What must the consequence be both for the many themselves in relation to themselves and in relation to the one, and for the one in relation to itself and in relation to the many?
- 2) On the hypothesis: if many are not, you must again examine what the consequence will be both for the one and for the many in relation to themselves and in relation to each other.
- 3) If you hypothesize: if likeness is or if it is not, you must examine what the consequence will be on each hypothesis, both for the things hypothesized themselves and for the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other.

²⁴ Cf. Introduction, section 3: Displaying the path to philosophy—two Socratic practices, pp. 18-26.

We are told that the same method applies to unlike, to motion, to rest, to generation and destruction, and to being itself and not being. Parmenides elaborates that concerning whatever Socrates might ever hypothesize as being or as having any other property, he must examine the consequences for everything he hypothesizes in relation to the thing itself and in relation to each one of the other things he selects. Further, he must examine them “in relation to several of them and to all of them in the same way; and, in turn, you must examine the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to whatever other thing you select on each occasion, whether what you hypothesize you hypothesize as being or as not being” (136c2-6). All this must be done if Socrates wants to achieve a full view of the truth after he has completed his training.

7.3.5 Step five: Observing how the method is practiced

After this elaboration, Socrates finds the task Parmenides described as “scarcely manageable,” and he does not quite understand the method. However, he is eager to get a grip of it and asks Parmenides to instruct him, “To help me understand more fully, why don’t you hypothesize something and go through the exercise for me yourself?” (136c7-9). As I said above, Parmenides was reluctant due to his age and the great work involved in such an undertaking. However, as both Zeno and Socrates beg him, he takes on the task. Cephalus of Clazomenae tells us that Antiphon said that Parmenides agreed to demonstrate his procedure. He is anxious to make his way “across such a vast and formidable sea of words,” (137a7) and when he now has decided to “play this strenuous game (παίξειν)” (137b2), he prefers to begin with himself and his own hypothesis. Further, he prefers that the younger answers his questions because “he would give the least trouble and would be the most likely to say what he thinks” (137b7-9). At this point Socrates takes on the role as an observer, just as he will do fifty-one dramatic years later when he observes how the Eleatic Stranger plays his game with Theaetetus and the young Socrates. But now we change the subject and turn to Protagoras.

7.4 The *Protagoras*

In the *Protagoras*, we are witnessing a sophistic gathering around the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Here we meet the crème de la crème of the sophistic intellectuals of the fifth century. Many commentators have called this dialogue a literary masterpiece, and recently Andrea Capra suggested that the *Protagoras* is a dialogue constructed to resemble the Aristophanic comedy the *Clouds*. It was aimed “for hearers or readers who would have been thoroughly familiar with the dramatic theater and its conventions and who would immediately have recognized the allusions to comedy in setting, action, even characterization” (Rowe 2002, 521).²⁵ Contrary to this claim, Tore Frost (1999, 78-9) shows in his introduction to the *Protagoras* that the textual structure of the dialogue juxtaposes the genre of tragedy, or stated with my terminology, Frost demonstrates that the generic subtext of the *Protagoras* is tragedy. If these arguments hold, and the *Protagoras* can be viewed as a mixture of comedy and tragedy, and therefore the impact of its structure is double.²⁶ This mixture may entail that on a textual surface the characters on stage partake in a sophistic summit and do their “business as usual,” however, under this sparkling (comic) surface the subtext is in movement, and a tragedy lies in wait—that is, a devastating war and, ultimately, the death of the only philosopher present. Thus, this dialogue also has a strong proleptic impact, and through the men present it alludes to the political Athens in a unique way.

In this dialogue, we are introduced to an ideological fight, which had many spectators. In addition to Protagoras and Socrates, four of the men present received a dialogue bearing their name: Hippias, Alcibiades, Charmides, and Phaedrus, and

²⁵ Andrea Capra, *Άγνων Λογών: Il Protagora Tra Eristica E Commedia*. (Milan: LED (Edizioni Universitarie di Lettere Economia e Diritto), 2001). Because I do not read Italian, I here trust the review by Rowe (2002).

²⁶ Here, I follow Asper (2005) who states that the “function of Old Comedy has usually been described as *critical*, i.e., as aiming at the exposure of some intolerable state of public life or political affairs with the intent to change it” (p. 6). Contrary to tradition, Asper argues that as two forms of drama, comedy and tragedy are complementary: “Comedy was an affirmative discourse concerned with civic identity [...] tragedy evidently has a problematic effect which means its impact will have caused a limited feeling of uncertainty with regard to basic norms of behavior. [...] comedy, by its own affirmative purpose, was meant to balance the problematic effect of tragedy. [...] their impact, taken together, may be described as a complex affirmation, a direct affirmation by comedy, and indirect one by tragedy” (p. 27).

beside this, Socrates later encounters many of the men and boys present. Hippias we meet again in *Hippias Minor* (421/16) and *Hippias Major* (412/16). Alcibiades is the main character in the *Alcibiades I* and *II*; he also turns up drunk in the *Symposium* (416) singing his swan song at the age of thirty-five. Charmides is fourteen years old in the *Protagoras*, and we meet him again in the *Charmides* (429) three years later. Phaedrus was even younger, only twelve years old in the *Protagoras*; when we meet him again in the *Phaedrus* (418/16), he is twenty-six/twenty-eight years old. In the *Symposium* (416) he is one of the speakers. Critias from Athens was twenty-eight years old in the *Protagoras*; we meet him three years later in the *Charmides* (429) where he is presented as Charmides' guardian, and he is present in the *Euthydemus* (≥ 407) approximately at the age of fifty-three. Eryximachus was sixteen years old in the *Protagoras* and Agathon was fifteen; we meet them both again in the *Symposium* (416) as thirty-two and thirty-one years old, respectively. The host, Callias of Alopece,²⁷ was around eighteen years old in the *Protagoras*. He is discussed in the *Cratylus* (422) when his brother Hermogenes and Socrates discusses the sophists (391c1). In the *Theaetetus* (399), Theodorus tells that Callias is the guardian of Protagoras' relicts (165a1). In the *Apology* (399) we hear that Callias alone has spent more money on the sophists than everybody else put together (20a). Protagoras himself is discussed in the *Cratylus* (422) at 385e-386e; he is mentioned in the *Hippias Major* (421/16, 282d) and the *Meno* (402, 91e); his teachings are discussed in the *Theaetetus* (399) at 152a-154c, 161d-165e, and 169d-171c, and he is briefly discussed in the *Republic*, 600c. There is also an implicit connection to the two brothers we meet in the *Euthydemus* (407). These had been residents in Thurii (like the brothers from the *Republic*) and are now living in exile in Athens.

7.5 Protagoras, the legislator

Around 444-43, Greek settlers founded Thurii (or Thourioi)—a city in southern Italy.²⁸ Fleming (2002, 5) argues that Thurii “does appear to have been planned as a kind of

²⁷ On Callias, see Nails (2002, 68-74).

²⁸ The first century B.C.E. author Diodorus Siculus' *The Library* (12.9ff) is the main ancient source on the story of Thurii. For modern accounts, see Muir (1982), Ehrenberg (1948), and Freeman (1941). Ehrenberg (1948, 156) argues that the founding of Thurii was a function of rivalry between

model polis and is usually so described by modern scholars.” In Athens at this time, Pericles had reduced the power of the aristocratic Areopagus, instituted pay for jurors, and provided works for ordinary Athenians by building up the public spaces of Athens. According to Victor Ehrenberg (1948, 170), Pericles “tightened the criteria for Athenian citizenship, making the state essentially a closed society, monopolized power in his own person for nearly a generation, and followed a brazenly imperialistic foreign policy toward allies and enemies alike.” With regard to the founding of Thurii, Fleming suggests that it looks like Pericles “had a higher purpose in mind for the town [...] something that prompted him to invite men like Hippodamus of Miletus and Protagoras to help him” (ibid, 9). However, what was Pericles’ higher purpose, and what design indicates that Thurii was planned along sophistic or Protagorean, lines?

We have already learned that Hippodamus of Miletus was known as the father of town-planning; and before he was involved in designing Thurii, he had “cut up” Piraeus.²⁹ We have also learned that the idea of straight streets alludes to correctness (*orthos*) and truth. Fleming argues that it is the term *orthos* which establishes the link between Pericles and Protagoras (cf. ibid, 15). In both Pericles’ depiction of Athenian decision-making (cf. Thucydides 2.40.2), and in Protagoras’ theory on civic discourse, *orthos* meant not just right-angled or straight, but also upright, correct, true, and just (the opposite is “crookedness”—*skolios*). Thus, the important thing about the town grid is “the way it divides a city into uniform precincts or lots” (Fleming, 2002, 16).³⁰ Ehrenberg explains that the plan of Thurii was “an expression of democracy because its houses were of equal size” (1948, 166), and Fleming that “the most important feature of Hippodamus’ work is his integration of physical town planning with political philosophy” (2002, 17).³¹

democratic Athens and aristocratic Sparta; and further that the ambitious Pericles used the colony to extend Athenian influence in the West in order to establish its leadership over the Greeks (cf. p. 163).

²⁹ On Piraeus, see chapter 1: *Preparing the stage*, section 1.3.1: Piraeus—the land beyond, pp. 55-7.

³⁰ In the *Politics* (7.11), Aristotle states that “private dwellings are thought to be more pleasantly arranged, and more usefully with a view to other activities, if they are neatly divided in the more recent and Hippodamean fashion.”

³¹ In addition, I suggest that this particular town-design is found at the core of the planning and design presented by the Athenian Stranger when he plans and constructs Magnesia (cf. *Laws*, 848d-850c).

Fleming argues that Hippodamus' ideas are especially compatible with sophistic thinking and practice, and regarding Thurii, he highlights three such notions. First, the city was founded as a Panhellenic colony which gave Thurii an international character, and this is "extraordinary in the history of Greek city-founding" (ibid, 20).³² He further points out that "[a]s itinerant teachers, cultural relativists, theorists of political life and language who constantly emphasized the social construction of beliefs and values and the need for flexibility in civic affairs—the sophists would presumably have been comfortable in such a diverse community" (ibid, 20). Secondly, the "rational and humanistic spirit that seems to have informed it" (ibid), and thirdly, it is compatible with the sophistic movement due to "the political ideology behind Thurii" (ibid, 21). Thus, Thurii can be viewed as a Periclean experiment, where the project's idealism mirrors the political thoughts of all three men involved. This assumption is somewhat confirmed by Fleming when he argues that it is plausible to assume that Protagoras "brought to Thurii a theory of civic discourse perfectly keyed to both Periclean politics and Hippodamian space" (ibid). According to Fleming, Protagoras' discourse informed the law code of Thurii and the laws (*nomoi*) "occupy a kind of middle ground between pre-literate *mythoi* and philosophical-scientific *logoi*" (ibid, 23). These laws are defined by Susan Jarratt (1991, 74) as "provisional codes (habits or customs) of acceptable behavior, socially constructed and historically and geographically specific." Regarding Protagoras' law-code, the ancient sources overlap, and on the basis of these overlaps, Fleming reconstructs its main features. First, "a

³² Fleming highlights the uniqueness of Thurii with reference to Diodorus who "tells us that ten tribes participated in the project: three from the Peloponnese (Arcase, Achais, Eleia), three Dorian groups from outside of the Peloponnese (Boeotia, Amphictyonis, Doris), and four from other races (Ias, Athenais, Eubois, Nesiotis)." This initial mix of tribes makes the project of Thurii extraordinary, cf. Freeman (1941, 56 ff). However, Magnesia in the *Laws* signals an extraordinary mix of tribes. When the legislation of Thurii is compared with the foundation that the Athenian Stranger designs and institutes the laws of Magnesia on, there is a fundamental difference. As Protagoras' law code demonstrates a pronounced concern for punishment, the Magnesian law code demonstrates quite the opposite. "Should the lawgiver only rise up in the state and threaten all mankind?" the Athenian Stranger asks. "Should he not rather, when he is making laws for men, at the same time infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words, and mitigate the severity of them as far as he can?" (*Laws*, 890b-d). When demanding that the legislator should "mitigate the severity" of the laws, the Athenian Stranger stresses that the laws should never offer threatening arguments to the citizens—they should be rational and applicable to rearing and education. The Athenian Stranger also differs when in regard to education and rearing. The aim is that one must in every way "manifest the power to make bodies and souls the most beautiful and the best possible" (*Laws*, 788c).

shared commitment to democracy, to self-rule by ordinary individuals,” second, “there is a countervailing concern for order, punishment, and restraint,” and third, there is an “interest in the care and education of children” (ibid, 23-4). These features mirror the rearing and education proposed in the *paideia* program launched by Protagoras.

7.6 Protagoras, the teacher

Due to Thucydides’ description of Pericles as a man “most able in speech and action” (1, 139: 4), Pericles stands as an excellent example of Protagoras’ abilities as a teacher. Protagoras himself praised Pericles when he described how he, despite the deaths of his sons through the plague, still managed to “appear dry-eyed before the assembly and give a speech; this is maybe a confirmation on Protagoras’ admiration of the ‘nobility of spirit’ which he saw emerged in this great statesman.”³³ However, it is not only as a great teacher that Protagoras earned his fame. He was also a writer who composed famous pieces such as the “man-measure doctrine:” “Man is the measure of all things, of those that are, that (*or* how) they are, of those that are not, that (*or* how) they are not.”³⁴ That this form of writing—a bold statement of general truths, ambiguous, and unsupported by discussion—struck someone as being reminiscent of the oracular, is shown in the *Theaetetus* through Socrates’ reference to Protagoras’ fragment B1. Socrates says it is uttered “from the inner sanctum of his book.”³⁵ This Socratic expression tenaciously recalls the practice of Delphi, and maybe it was the lawgiver of Thurii—who wrote in such a style—that Socrates, when displayed as a sophist in Aristophanes’ comedy the *Clouds* (line 331), referred to as “the Thurian seer/prophet (Θουριομάντεις).”

First and foremost, Protagoras taught his students how to make good decisions (εὐβουλία),³⁶ and a theory of civic discourse. This civic discourse is twofold. On the one hand the “two-sided thinking” (*anti-logic*), and on the other the correctness of language and belief, or *orthos logos* (cf. Kerferd 1981). To get in touch with Protagoras the teacher, and the method he proposed for education, the *Protagoras* is our main source. From my perspective, this creates a problem because I view all the

³³ O’Sullivan (1995, 31) in his commentary to Protagoras’ fragment B9.

³⁴ Protagoras, fragment B1. Quoted in ibid, p. 18.

³⁵ *Theaetetus*, 162a. Cf. also ibid.

³⁶ On *eubolia*, see Woodruff (2013).

dialogues as historical touchdowns, which are parts of a philosophical-literary universe. Within this universe, the conversations are fictitious, and the historical personas are put on stage at a specific date to communicate a message for the readers to decode. It follows from this that the information on Protagoras we can deduce from this text cannot be taken at face value. Therefore, I cannot view the *Protagoras* as a historical source with regard to the historical Protagoras, but rather as an outlining of the sophistic *paideia* program, narrated by Socrates to display the ideology he fights against. Thus, I refer to the experimental feature of my text when I try to create an image of Protagoras, the teacher. In the opening scene of the dialogue, we learn that Socrates arrives somewhere and narrates his encounter with Protagoras to someone. Hence, Socrates, the narrator, does not address a universal audience as he did in the *Republic*. Here he addresses an anonymous friend. Thus, the readers are now somehow reduced to eavesdroppers.³⁷ In this reading, I will literally take on the role of eavesdropper and listen to how the narrator claims that Protagoras presented himself and his methods. This should give us an idea of why his ideology, stature, and inheritance are returned to throughout the corpus.

7.6.1 Hippocrates is introduced to Protagoras

When Socrates, the narrator, approached Protagoras on a particular day in 432, it was on behalf of young Hippocrates, who had had a long-lasting dream of becoming a student of this famous teacher. From Socrates' narration, I get the impression that Protagoras was very obliging when he addressed the hopeful Hippocrates: "young man, it will assuredly be the case for you, if you associate with me, that on the day on which you come into association with me you'll go home having become better, and the same things will happen on the following day, and each day you'll make continual progress for the better" (318a6-9). Coming from a teacher, this is a tremendous promise. However, Socrates tells that he was not impressed because this is what all sophists claim. So, what is it that makes Protagoras stand out?

³⁷ Cf. Introduction, section 2: Plato, the architect, p. 18.

I understand that Protagoras' greatness is that, contrary to others, he does not waste time by teaching his students arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music.³⁸ Socrates reports that when Protagoras said this, he laid his eyes on Hippias from Elis. Thus, from Protagoras' point of view, this must mean that Hippias is an inefficient teacher, who wastes the student's time; therefore, he is not recommendable. It can be taken as a warning. Instead, Protagoras pronounces that the thing to be learned "is how to make good decisions (εὐβουλία) [...] so he can be the most powerful (δυνατώτατος) in his city's affairs in both action (πράττειν) and speaking (λέγειν)" (318e6-319a2). He even promises Hippocrates that he can make all men good citizens (ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας, 319a5). But now a problem dawns on me. Must one not possess virtues to be a good citizen? From other sources, I have learned that justice is a virtue, and I remember Clitophon, who reported that Socrates once said that "you won't find anyone to teach you justice, if indeed it is learnable; and if it is acquired by training and practice, you won't find anyone to give you the thorough practice and training that it would take" (*Clitophon* 407b). Meno was troubled by the same question: Is virtue teachable or not? (cf. *Meno* 70a). Also, I have taken for granted that one of Socrates' preoccupations has been the distinction between the learnable and the teachable (cf. 319c).³⁹ So, why does not Protagoras take this distinction into consideration? Socrates admits and underlines that this question also bothers him. He even asked Protagoras if these matters are teachable. If so, Socrates pondered, why is it that men considered wise and virtuous are not able to make their sons the same? It was fortunate that Protagoras decided to give a demonstration. For a moment he wondered if he ought to demonstrate it "the way an older man does to younger ones, by telling a story (μῦθον, 320c4) or by going through an argument (ἢ λόγῳ διεξιελθὼν, 320c4)." This is a reasonable worry due to the mixed ages of the public he is about to address.⁴⁰ He is considerate and decides to do both. He starts with the myth.

³⁸ When Protagoras states that such teachings are a waste of time he starkly contrasts the curriculum posted for the philosopher in the *Republic*, 524a ff. Here these four subjects are of major importance.

³⁹ I will return to this distinction in chapter 8: *Saving youths*, section 8.1: Hippocrates's dream, p. 282 ff.

⁴⁰ With regard to the ages of the men and boys gathered in Callias' house, see Appendix I: The chronologies of the dialogues and their participants, p. 386.

7.6.2 Protagoras' myth

Protagoras presented a myth of the origin of civilization. Another eavesdropper, Robert Zaslavsky (1982, 79), effectively explains what Protagoras was doing when he told this story; he “equates virtue with justice, which arose out of the interaction of nature (Epimetheus and the subterranean gods), art (Prometheus), and convention (Zeus and Hermes).” The lesson learned so far is that, due to Zeus’ demand, Hermes established justice (δίκην, 322c4) and shame (αἰδῶ, 322c4) so that all humans have an equal share in them. Protagoras claimed that Hermes’ assignment was imperative because if only a few humans possessed justice and shame, neither cities nor arts would have come into being. This must mean that justice and shame are inherent. If that is the first premise, is it then necessary to teach—is not cultivation the preferred option, as I learned from the *Republic*? This, as the story goes, is not a choice reflected on by Protagoras. Socrates tells that he, instead, established Zeus’ demand as a law, and the punishment for not abiding by it, is gruesome as Zeus demands: “[...] make it a law from me to put to death anyone incapable of sharing in a sense of shame and of the right, as a plague on a city” (322d4-5). This is both punitive and harsh, and my worry now is that if Hermes, on Zeus’ demand, gave all humans an equal share in justice and shame, how is it that some are incapable of partaking? Or, is it only the ones not capable to partake that Protagoras teaches? But how are some incapable when all have an equal share? Is this not a contradiction? As Socrates does not elaborate on his mention of this unclearness, I am left in the dark. The only way I can find my way around this is by assuming that, as Protagoras warrants his law in Zeus’ demand he simultaneously warrants his teachings in the god. Hence, from Protagoras’ perspective, the righteousness of both law and teachings are indisputable. This implies that he has taken upon himself a God-given mission which is to save what he acknowledges as incapable youths or to make them better in the face of fear of capital punishment.⁴¹

7.6.2.1 The consequences of the myth

Still eavesdropping, I hear that Protagoras also described the consequences of the myth. His pronounced law is the reason why he, as well as the Athenians, takes for granted that virtues are teachable. As I know this does not go for Socrates, I assume

⁴¹ Socrates’ mission is also God-given. However, his calling came directly from Apollo who appointed him to be the gadfly in the city in order to awake his fellow citizens.

Protagoras views him as an outsider (*atopos*). However, I start to shiver when I learn that it is due to the threat of being sentenced to death that Protagoras and the Athenians argue that virtues are teachable. Why does not anyone interrupt at this point? And what about giving advice, is it likely that all Athenians can give good advice? No, Protagoras said, but then he claimed that when it comes to giving “advice (*συμβουλήν*) on political virtue (*πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς*), which must all go the way of justice (*δικαιοσύνης*) and moderation (*σωφροσύνης*), it’s reasonable for them to permit every man to give it” (323a1-3). This is a strange pronouncement, but Protagoras maintains that this is so because everyone has a share in this sort of virtue. Hence, the contradiction is upheld, and it becomes almost bizarre when Protagoras repeats himself and states that the proof for the claim that everybody can give advice is the existence of cities, if humans did not have a share, there would be no cities. I ask myself once again, was it not justice and shame that all had a share in? What sort of proof is this? Protagoras seems not to have elaborated on this, and no one questioned this except Socrates who says he tried to probe on it; he reports that Protagoras addressed him directly and promptly concluded, “This, Socrates, is the cause of the matter” (323a4-5). Hence, he also was left unanswered, and as a soundless eavesdropper, I am at this point left with a fair amount of unanswered questions.

After this relatively harsh conclusion addressed to Socrates, Protagoras seems to have altered his rhetorical mode. According to Socrates, he now presented a proof positive to make it clear that we are not misled if we believe that all people think this—that all men have a share in justice and the rest of the political virtues. Is an argument based on what all people think a sound argument? Is it sound to warrant an argument in an imaginary reference group? No one seems to care, so Protagoras continued by demonstrating the validity of proof through an analogy: flute-playing versus justice and the rest of political virtue. He asked, what happens when a man claims to be a good flute player, and it turns out that he is not? People will either laugh at him, or they will be angry. His family will warn him. Protagoras explained that the best thing for this man would be to admit that he is a bad flute player, that is—it is best to tell the truth. Protagoras denoted this as sane moderation. What does that imply? However, when it comes to justice, it is different. I wonder why it is so. Socrates

reports that Protagoras said that even if both people in general and the family acknowledge that a man is unjust; they all would regard it as craziness if the man told the truth and admitted he was unjust. In this case, they all “declare that all people have to claim to be just, whether they are or not, and that anyone would be crazy not to make that pretense, since they think no one at all could have no share of justice in one way or another, or he wouldn’t be included in the human race” (323b6-c2).⁴² According to Socrates, this is a fact which pronounces “that it’s a reasonable thing for people to accept every man as an advisor on this sort of virtue because they regard everyone as having a share of it, that’s what I have to say” (323c2-4). At this moment, I am confused, and I am beginning to take into consideration that a lot of very young men were present and listened to this. What impact did it have on them? I think especially of Alcibiades, who leans on this line of reasoning when, a few days later, he meets up with Socrates. Another problem arises: How does Protagoras understand justice? Do I have to listen to Glaucon’s exposure to understand him, or perhaps Thrasymachus’ outlining can be enlightening? Socrates’ report is not helpful because Protagoras at this point has made ambiguity an art, and it looks to me like he assumes that everybody listening is attuned to his opinions.

Protagoras’ last point was to demonstrate that people regard justice as something that does not come by nature or something that pops up on its own.⁴³ On the contrary, justice is a teachable thing, which becomes present because of painstaking effort (περάσομαι ἀποδείξαι, cf. 323d5-8). Again, this seems to be at odds with his previous claims that all humans partake in justice. Nevertheless, what is this painstaking effort? Socrates elaborates, and to make us understand he says that Protagoras highlighted two kinds of evils which he argued all men possess. The first is due to nature or chance.⁴⁴ Socrates explained that when people recognize this kind of evil, they pity those who possess it; in these cases, people never try to reprimand, lecture, or discipline. Here

⁴² This line of argumentation is in accordance with Thrasymachus’ presentation of justice.

⁴³ This stands in stark contrast to Socrates’ practice where, as we learned from the *Republic*, one of the aims was to show that justice was inherent and “according to nature.”

⁴⁴ Denyer (2008, 111) points out that “everything not ascribable to human activity was standardly ascribed to either nature or chance. [...] *Laws* 892b objects that the standard way of understanding these contrasts can blind us to the possibility that so-called ‘natural’ things are ‘subsequent to and derivative from artifice and reason’—the artifice and reason of God.”

Protagoras asked, “Who would be so senseless as to try to do any of those things with people who are, say, ugly or small or weak?” (323d3-5). The second evil is due to lack of cultivation because these things are believed to come by effort, training, and teachings. When recognized, they result in a flare-up of feelings, disciplinary measures, and reprimands. According to Socrates, Protagoras exemplified this through injustice and impiety; but are not injustice and impiety generally regarded as the opposite to political virtue? This must entail that when we react the way we do, it is because virtue is something one can get by effort and learning. The evil related to the body is accepted,⁴⁵ but the evil related to the soul can be mended through training and teachings—and here Protagoras claimed to be of help.

7.6.2.2 Reflections on discipline

Socrates now tells that Protagoras challenged him once more. He demanded that Socrates take the trouble to reflect on discipline, and especially to consider how the power of discipline can be exerted on unjust people (cf. 324a3-6). Protagoras stated that such a reflection would, by itself, teach Socrates that human beings *think* virtue can be imposed. When Protagoras connected his argument on injustice to retribution, he again warranted it in the imaginary reference group, and he based it on the fact that it is impossible to undo things that are done. This last point is self-evident. A question now is how one proceeds when it is recognized that injustice has been done? According to Socrates, Protagoras elaborated and claimed that it is irrational to discipline someone who has committed injustice for that sake alone. It is equally irrational to try to discipline with rationality because then one does not take retribution for the sake of the bygone act of injustice. One must rather discipline for the sake of the future, so that neither the person himself nor anyone else who sees him punished, will commit injustice again. Here, discipline seems to be imposed for the sake of being preventive, and those who have such a thought think that virtue is obtained by education. My assumption is confirmed by Protagoras as Socrates goes on. I hear that Protagoras even stressed that everyone who holds this opinion is engaged in retribution, privately or in public; “the rest of mankind take retribution and impose

⁴⁵ This reflection is similar that set forth by Glaucon when he was tested by Socrates. Then, Glaucon stated that he would not love a man with a defect on his soul, but if “there were some bodily defect, he’d be patient and would willingly take delight in him” (*Republic*, 402d10-12).

discipline on those they believe commit injustice” (324c1-2). The impact of hearing this is that this kind of discipline is randomly imposed. That is, if someone believes that a man has committed injustice—he is free to discipline him. And when this, in turn, is connected to retribution, it may be dangerous to act in a political setting. This impression recalls Balot (2008, 59), who described the dangers of Athenian political life.⁴⁶ I do not claim that Protagoras is responsible for this kind of conduct, but I think sophistic teachings might have had an impact.

When rounding off his myth, Socrates reports that Protagoras again addressed him directly, and stated that his opinions are valid for all Socrates’ fellow citizens because the Athenians are among those who regard virtue to be something that can be imposed and taught. Due to this, it is reasonable for the Athenians to permit craftsmen to give advice on matters of civic concern. He closed the myth and stated that he now had sufficiently demonstrated that virtue can be taught, at least in his opinion (cf. 324c5-d1). It is difficult for me to agree that this demonstration was sufficient. However, it was sufficient for grasping the difference between Socrates’ and Protagoras’ perspectives of the matter. We were promised an argument also, and Socrates reports that before Protagoras went on, he returned to Socrates’ initial question on why “good men have their sons taught all the other things that are in the scope of teachers and make them wise, but don’t make them better than anyone else in that sort of virtue by which they themselves are good” (324d2-6). To answer this, he turned to the argument.

7.6.3 Protagoras’ *logos*

As I hear it, Protagoras now equates punishing toward virtue with the teaching of virtue. Socrates’ question, or puzzlement (*ἀπορία*, 324d2) as Socrates claims Protagoras called it, found its solution after Protagoras gave an answer to whether there is “[...] or is not some one thing that it’s necessary for all citizens to share in if there’s going to be a city” (324d9-e1). However, how does Protagoras intend to help Socrates out of the aporetic state? Socrates tells that he prepared his help through four steps. During the first, the premise was that it was not necessary for all to have a share in carpentry, blacksmithing, pottery, and so forth, but it was necessary for everyone to

⁴⁶ Cf. chapter 6: *The demiurges of freedom*, section 6.2.2.3: Third consideration, pp. 229-34.

have a share in “man’s virtue, that is justice (δικαιοσύνη, 325a1), moderation (σωφροσύνη, 325a1), and being pious (τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, 325a2).” The second followed from the first. If it turns out that someone does not have a share in “man’s virtue” there is a need “to teach (διδάσκειν, 325a6) and disincline (καλάζειν, 325a6) [...] whether it’s a child, a man, or a woman, until the one who’s disciplined becomes a better person” (325a6-b2). The third gave the consequence of the second; the consequence for those who do not respond when being disciplined and taught is to be viewed as incurable, and one “needs to cast them out of the cities or put them to death” (325a9-b1). This I see is in accordance with the law Protagoras proposed in the myth, and it is a foreign thought for me. According to Socrates, Protagoras further presumed that “if this is the way it is and even if it is this way by nature, good men teach their sons everything else—but not this” (325b2-3). With this concrete reference to the myth, he claimed that he, through that discourse, demonstrated that good men regarded virtue as something “teachable both in private and in public” (325b4-5). In the fourth step, he concluded, “virtue is teachable and can be instilled by attentive care, the good men teach their sons all other things for which there are not death penalty if they do not know them” (325b6-7). When Socrates tells about Protagoras’ next initiative, I find it rather shocking. He addressed it to Socrates. Does Socrates believe that parents do not teach their children virtue when “there is a penalty of death or exile for their children if they don’t learn it [...] and not only death but confiscation of property and, to put it all in one phrase, the overthrow of households?” (325c1-3). If this is the proposed penalty for disobedient children, I am inclined to agree with Protagoras when he concluded that one would have to assume the parents will teach to their best ability. Of course, they will act in accordance with their best ability; they are too scared and frightened to do otherwise. Nonetheless, I am very sympathetic toward the conclusion reached by Polemarchus and Socrates when they agreed that punishment harmed and made both humans and animals worse. However, how does Protagoras himself teach, and what do the children learn?

7.6.3.1 Reflections on education

Again, according to Socrates, the aim of the Protagorean educational program is that every child advances to be most excellent (ὄπως βέλτιστος, 325d1), which I think, at

the outset, is a noble aim. The program displayed holds pedagogical demands and spans throughout a life-time. Also, it gives guidelines for how to teach (διδάσκουσι, 325c7) and how to admonish (νουθετοῦσιν, 325c7). The requirements for this lifelong learning, Protagoras exhibited through four levels. The first level starts as soon as the child understands what is said. Then the nurse, the mother, the tutor, and the father strive mightily by pointing out every deed and word (ἔργον καὶ λόγον, 325d2). In this manner, the child learns through examples; one deed is just, and another unjust; this is beautiful, and that is shameful; this is pious, and that is impious; one does some things and not others (cf. 325d3-5). Nonetheless, it is possible that the child is persuaded (πειθῆται, 325d6) willingly, but if not, Protagoras suggested the following procedure, “just as with wood that’s warped and bent, they straighten him out with threats and beatings” (325d6-7). The second level starts when the child is sent off to teachers. At this stage, the aim is to teach the children to write, read, and introduce them to music. However, discipline is to be prioritized. The fathers, or the good men as Protagoras called them, command (ἐντέλλονται, 325d8-e1) the teachers to take much greater pains so that their children learn orderly behavior or good conduct (εὐκοσμία, 325e1). Protagoras underlined that it is imperative that the teachers take these pains (ἐπιμελοῦνται, 325e2-3). The third level starts when the child has learned to read and write and is “on the point of understanding written things just as well as they understood spoken ones before” (325e4-5). The teachers now set before them on their desks works of good poets; these works are to be read and required to be learned by heart. These works contain “lots of admonitions and lots of detailed descriptions and praises of and tributes to good men of ancient times, so that the child will be eager to imitate them and will long to become that kind of person” (325e6-326a3). Besides the teachers who teach the child how to imitate, the harp teachers take pains in similar ways over moderation (σωφροσύνης, 326a4) so that the youngsters do not behave badly in any way. Once the children have learned to play the harp, they are taught the works of good poets who composed songs. The children will now learn how the songs are set to the music of the harp (cf. 326a8-b1). The teachers compel (ἀναγκάζουσιν, 326b1-2) the children to absorb the rhythms and harmonies into their souls. This will make them more civilized (ἡμερώεροι, 326b2-3). It is by becoming in tune with rhythm

and harmony that the children will be fitted to speak and to act. According to Socrates, Protagoras claimed that this is a necessity because for the whole life a human being needs to be rhythmic and harmonious to be in good condition (εὐαρμοστίας, 326b5-6). Also, the good men send their children to an athletic trainer, so that they will have better bodies in service of their thinking (cf. 326b6-c1). When their bodies are in fit conditions they will not be forced to be cowards, neither in war nor other actions (cf. 326c1-3). It is the most powerful people that do these things the most—and it is the richest people who are the most powerful. Their sons start going regularly to teachers at the earliest age and are freed from them the latest (cf. 326c3-6).

The fourth level starts when the child is set free from teachers. Now, the city compels (ἀναγκάζει, 326c8) them to learn (μανθάνειν, 326c8) the laws and live by them as standards (παράδειγμα, 326d1). By this, the child learns not to act randomly at the prompting of his whims, “but in literally the same way that writing teachers give those children who aren’t yet skilled at writing a tablet with letters they’ve already traced out with stylus and make them write along the guiding lines” (326d2-5). The city has, in the same manner, traced out the laws written down by good lawgivers of earlier times; hence, “the city compels the youths to rule and be ruled along these lines, and disciplines whoever strays outside them” (326d5-6). The name for this disciplinary process (εὐθουούσης, 326e2) is corrections (εὐθῦναι, 326e2), Protagoras stated and claimed that judicial punishment produces correctness. He summarized his curriculum with a question: “So when there is so much painstaking care (ἐπιμελείας, 326e3) about virtue in private and in public, are you wondering and puzzled Socrates whether virtue is something teachable?” (326e2-4). Socrates reports that in Protagoras’ opinion there should not be any wonder in that at all, on the contrary, it should be more to wonder about if virtues were not teachable.

Socrates further reports that Protagoras claimed that Socrates was spoiled, because in Athens “everyone is a teacher of virtue to the extent each has the power to be” (327e1-2). Protagoras found it remarkable that for Socrates it appeared that no one is; he further claimed that this is the same as if “you were looking for someone who’s a teacher of Greek, there wouldn’t appear to be even one” (327e3-328a2). Socrates says that as a necessary follow-up Protagoras added that everyone should be delighted

if there were anyone who surpassed the multitude in leading people to virtue. He concluded that “it’s exactly in this category that I believe myself to be, someone who is better than other human beings at helping people come toward the beautiful and good” (328b2-4). On this ground, Protagoras believed himself to be worth the fee he charges.

7.7 Summary

We are told that when Protagoras finished his speech, Socrates was spellbound for a long time (cf. 328d). He addressed Hippocrates and thanked him deeply for having talked him into coming along. During Protagoras’ speech, Socrates argued that he learned something of value:

For in all the time before this, I used to think it was not by any human effort that good people become good, but now I’m persuaded. Except there’s one little thing standing in my way, which obviously Protagoras will easily explain away [...] For if one were to go to any of the public speakers too about these same matters, one would probably hear speeches like this from either Pericles or any of the others who are competent at speaking. But if one were to press any of them with any question, then like books they have no answer to give and no question to ask themselves (328e1-329a4).

Socrates had learned that people become good also by human effort, and this insight, when connected to *paideia*, must be at least partly negative. From my point of view, Socrates had been persuaded that there are pedagogical tools which do not work. This because it is contrary to the Socratic practice to use threats and beatings to make young children understand right from wrong; it is also an alien thought to inculcate youths to make them civilized. This Protagorean practice points toward same-mindedness, which is an ideal incompatible with Socratic teachings. However, as Socrates points out, these teachers do not reflect on the matter; they are like books: They neither ask questions nor do they answer. They repeat themselves using readymade speeches. Thus you will hear the same message from whomever you ask. In this regard, Socrates’ utterance is noteworthy: “Protagoras, you’re saying nothing surprising in this, but just what’s likely, since even you, even at your age and as wise as you are, would become better if anyone were to teach you something you happened not to know” (318b1-4). Hence, Socrates aims to teach Protagoras something he does

not know, while Protagoras aims to prove himself better than others. Such a drama is bound to end in aporia.

In this chapter, I have highlighted the roles of two teachers and legislators that have an impact on the whole corpus. Compared to the paradigmatic regime established in the *Republic*, I suggest that Parmenides' city and rule alludes to the best regime, while Protagoras' alludes to a city in need of a purging. Through the reading of the Prologue of the *Parmenides*, I have shown how Parmenides made Socrates turn toward philosophy in his late teens. I argued that the proceedings employed by Parmenides will be recognizable when Socrates later encounters youths, where his ultimate aim is to lead students toward the final result which is free and autonomous individuals. This dialectical procedure stands in stark contrast to the Protagorean method as it was launched through Protagoras' *mythos* and *logos*. In the next chapter, we will witness Socrates' encounter with three youths who were all present and listening to the encounter between Protagoras and Socrates.

Chapter 8: Saving youths

Right at the beginning of the corpus, we witness Socrates' encountering three youth: Hippocrates, Alcibiades, and Charmides. They were all present at the sophistic summon in Callias' house as this is displayed in the *Protagoras*. The conversations with Hippocrates and Alcibiades take place around the outbreak of the war (432), while the meeting with Charmides takes place after Socrates' return from the battle of Potidaea (429).

In section 8.1: Hippocrates' dream, I perform a close reading of the Hippocrates section (309a1-314e2) in the *Protagoras*. At this point, eighteen dramatic years have passed since our last encounter with Socrates. We must assume that he has studied philosophy during these years, and if the curriculum designed for philosophers in the *Republic* is noteworthy here, Socrates at this point has studied dialectic for several years. This is the point of departure for my present reading. I argue that we are about to witness philosophy's first appearance in the distinctive form of the Socratic practice. From what we have learned so far, it is not surprising that the architect saw it fit to place Socrates' debut on a stage crowded with champions of sophistry. In addition to witnessing how Hippocrates "turns toward philosophy," the readers will also witness Socrates' own "turning into philosophy." During a simple line of questioning, it will be exposed that, according to Socrates' practice, the burden of learning rests with the student *as* learner, rather than with the teacher *as* inculcator, which is according to Protagoras' practice. This simultaneously entails that the learnable is not necessarily teachable.¹

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In section 8.2: Alcibiades: A lion reared in the city, I read parts of the *Alcibiades I*. Alcibiades is close to the age of majority, and because he has decided to enter the stage and give political advices to the Athenians, Socrates will try to awaken him. I assume that the arguments he heard from Protagoras' *logos* were contributory factors for his decision. In this dialogue, the problem of peace and war is explicitly put on stage, and the main theme in this dialogue I take to be Socrates' first attempt to turn Alcibiades toward philosophy. I argue that Socrates succeeds in his attempt, but, as Alcibiades's entrance in the *Symposium* shows, Alcibiades did not manage to endure the work Socrates laid upon him. Hence, he ended up as the student Socrates was prohibited by the god to associate with any further.²

In section 8.3: Charmides: Beauty on stage, I read parts of the *Charmides*. Socrates and Alcibiades have now both been on a campaign together where they are bound to have made some shocking experiences.³ When Socrates is back, he is warmly welcomed by his friends and treated almost like a celebrity. At least Charmides seems to be somewhat star struck. In this section, I intend to show two things. First, we witness how Socrates loses himself when confronted with physical beauty manifested through young Charmides, and we learn how Socrates—little by little—gains control. Secondly, when conversing with Charmides, Socrates finds a youth who is not willing to take on the burden of investigating his own opinions. Hence, regarding Charmides, the outer beauty does not correspond to the inner. I suggest that he ends up in the group of students who are in no need of Socrates. The overall aim of this chapter is to show how Socrates encounters and, tries to guide different youth. The conclusion points to the core of the Socratic practice where we find the demand that the burden of learning is the student's responsibility.

¹ The distinction between the "teachable" and the "learnable" is of importance here because the main question in the dialogue is: "Is virtue teachable?" I take it that if virtue is teachable, then the student can get knowledge of virtue through instructions (only) from a teacher; the teacher is then an inculcator and the knowledge is inculcated in the student; thus, the student being capable of being instructed. If not teachable, virtue can still be learnable. In this case, the student takes on the burden as a learner and is gaining knowledge and skill by studying, practicing, and experiencing. In this instance, the teacher is not an inculcator, and the knowledge is not inculcated; instead, knowledge is gained by experience through proper guidance.

² Cf. Introduction, section 3.2: The midwife at work, pp. 23-6.

³ Cf. Chapter 1: *Preparing the stage*, section 1.3.2: Socrates' prayers, pp. 57-61.

8.1 Hippocrates' dream—a reading of *Protagoras* 309a1-314e2

Through their undertakings as “speakers of words and doers of deeds,” both Protagoras and Socrates have connections to the oracle of Delphi. Due to Protagoras’ wisdom, the oracle *recommended* him for the pioneering enterprise in Thurii, and the same oracle is said to have *defined* Socrates as the wisest man of all. Then again, as his name implies, Protagoras was the first to the agora, thus, when Socrates enters the stage with his new ideas on *paideia*, Protagoras was already set and famous for his. Therefore, when the two oracular teachers meet in the *Protagoras*, I take the overall theme of the dialogue to be a battle of ideas concerning *paideia*.

8.1.1 The turning *toward* and *into* philosophy

In the *Republic* (521c ff.), Socrates clarified that the turning of the soul *toward* philosophy is the start of a process where proper studying, training, and guidance are imperative undertakings. The moment of the turn signals transformation, or a rebirth. We are told in the *Seventh Letter* (340c) that when this happens, the student pushes himself and urges his teacher until he has reached the end of the journey or had become capable of doing philosophy without a guide and finding the way himself. This is a momentous turn, as we saw when we met young Socrates in the *Parmenides*. When Socrates, eighteen dramatic years later, discusses the teachings of the sophists with Hippocrates, he says, “Let’s consider these things with our elders too, since we are still too young to be making a decision on so great a matter” (314b4-6). Supposedly, Socrates has trained for many years, but at the outset of the *Protagoras*, he reflects himself *still* too young for being a proper solitary guide for Hippocrates. Thus, I suggest that Socrates at this point still considers himself to be a trainee. However, during the drama evolving in the *Protagoras*, this changes and the alteration on behalf of Socrates can be detected through three steps: First, his state of mind signaled in the prelude; secondly, his awakening in the “bedroom scene;” thirdly, his final turning *into* philosophy which is something that happens suddenly: “Suddenly (ἐξαίφνης), like a light flashing forth when a fire is kindled; it is born in the soul which straightaway is nourished by itself” (*Seventh Letter*, 341d1-2). This element of suddenness will be a recurring theme. So far, however, I suggest that Socrates’ turning

can be seen through the “great *aporia*” in the last scene of the dialogue, and Hippocrates’ turning through the “small *aporia*” in the “courtyard scene.”

8.1.2 The prelude (309a1-310a7)

The *Protagoras* is bracketed by the movements “arriving” and “leaving.” The last word of the dialogue is ἀπῆμεν, which literary means “we went away, or we departed;” the first word is πόθεν,⁴ which literally means “from where?” Hence, already through the first word uttered, the readers understand that Socrates has been somewhere; he left something behind and arrived at quite another place. Through the last word it is stated that Socrates left; but where did he go?⁵ One answer can be given if the readers turn to the first page and start reading the dialogue all over again. Then we learn, once again, that Socrates has been somewhere, he is arriving at a place not named and populated by anonymous people. These movements embrace Socrates’ extraordinary experience, which makes the *Protagoras* something like a circular dialogue, a closed universe.

This movement theme is traceable in the prelude where the opening line is constructed as a question put forth by Socrates’ anonymous friend, who also is gathered with someone, somewhere: “From where, Socrates, are you appearing (πόθεν, ὃ Σώκρατες, φαίνει, 309a1)?” The friend answers the question himself: “No, don’t tell me. It’s pretty obvious that you have been hunting the ripe and ready Alcibiades” (309a1-2). Why is this obvious? Is it due to Socrates’ behavior? Is he acting oddly? From the friend’s two utterances we can detect at least three things: First, the friend has observed something, sometime, which gives him reason to conclude that Socrates was hunting Alcibiades for sexual pursuit.⁶ Secondly, the friend’s attitude signals he is convinced that when Socrates is approaching a young man, it is with seductress intents; an attitude which in turn suggests—at a personal

⁴ This is an interrog. adv. *whence*? 1) of place: who, from what, from where? 2) of origin: from what source? 3) of the cause, *whence*? From where?

⁵ The last utterance of the dialogue says: “we went away [...]” Who Socrates left with has been a theme of long-lasting speculations and will not be touched upon here. It is certain that Socrates did not leave alone, and thus, it also is certain that he left.

⁶ “Socrates was hunting Alcibiades for sexual pursuit,” is due to the hunting metaphor *κυνηγεσίῳ* (309a2), cf. Denyer (2008, 65).

level—a validation of Socrates’ reputation in the city.⁷ Thirdly, the friend is hunting for gossip or, at this point, news with a sort of spicy content. However, Socrates is not quite willing to enter this hunting-Alcibiades discourse. He admits coming from Alcibiades right now and states that “I want to tell you something really strange (ἄτοπον) though: even with him present, I paid no attention to him and often forgot that he was there” (309b7-9). By this reply Socrates himself—implicitly—confirms the existence of a rumor regarding Alcibiades; however, and more important here, is the phrase “something really strange” which translates the term “ἄτοπον,”⁸ and understood as “something illogical.” It signals a contradiction and thus creates a tension concerning Socrates’ state of mind at this point. The friend is surprised: “Surely you didn’t meet up with someone else more beautiful, not in this city anyway” (309c2-3). Socrates holds that the wisest thing appears more beautiful than Alcibiades and makes known that he has just met Protagoras. When hearing that Protagoras is in town, the friend’s attitude changes: he is now eager to learn what went on in this meeting, whereupon Socrates replies: “I’d count it as a favor (χάρις) if you’d listen” (310a5). Coming from Socrates as we know him, these statements are somewhat rare—and as such—they may present an affirmative hint toward Socrates’ mood in this prelude. It is of importance to bear in mind that the prelude is presented as a postscript regarding Socrates’ encounter with Protagoras. It seems like Socrates is, to some extent, upset and, therefore needs to tell someone about what caused the distress. This—in turn—points toward a general human need to share with others when having experienced something extraordinary.

However, what is this extraordinary or this “something really strange” (ἄτοπον) that happened? I think the “really strange” is the first clue enabling the readers to expose Socrates’ awakening and turning. A second clue we find at the end of the

⁷ I conclude that the rumor Socrates’ friend relies on is false. This is due to the law for sexual pursuit Socrates set down in the *Republic* 403b6-c2, and it is confirmed by Alcibiades later. I will return to this below, in section 8.2.5: Alcibiades’ swan song, p. 305 f. Socrates’ rumor in the city is also a theme in the *Apology* which I return to in chapter 10.

⁸ Cf. Eide (1996, 59-60) who argues that “ἄτοπία is the quality of being ἄτοπος, a favorite adjective in Plato, around 230 instances (including the adverb ἀτόπως) being found in his work” and further that *atopos* “had its origin in Greek science ‘contrary to τόπος’ (τόπος being the mathematical concept of ‘geometrical topos’), thus ‘illogical,’ ‘inconsistent,’ ‘contradictory,’ and that this sense should be given to the word” (p. 60). On the “*atopos* theme,” see also Songe-Møller (2017).

dialogue when things are so confused and displaced that Socrates and Protagoras apparently have changed their respective positions without being aware of it—their authority is not confirmed but rather put into question. This confusion detectable toward the end makes James L. Kastely (1996, 36) state that “this is one of the few dialogues in which I am not sure that Socrates is always in control of himself.” I agree with Kastely, but I think that “the Socrates out of control” at the end indicates that he understood the awakening and the turning in the fullest extent: He was mystified by himself because he found himself insensible to physical beauty and under the attraction of his new Eros, philosophy.⁹ This insight perplexed him. To elaborate on the first step of this process, we need to do a close reading of the Hippocrates section.

8.1.3 The Hippocrates section (310a8-314e2)

According to John S. Treantafelles (2013, 149-50), the Hippocrates section is not well recognized in the literature on the *Protagoras*. Michael Gagarin (1969, 135), argues that the dialogue’s opening scenes serve only as literary devices to bring Socrates and Protagoras together. C.C.W. Taylor (1976, 64-8) recognizes the Hippocrates section, but only to analyze the questions Socrates asks, as does Beversluis (2000, 245-56), but his agenda is to defend Hippocrates’s answers against the questions which he argues are designed to silence rather than persuade Hippocrates on the merits. Also, Charles L. Griswold Jr. (1999, 283) claims the Hippocrates section to be a “classic and successful little example of Socratic dialogue.” Shannon Dubose (1973, 15-21) claims that the *Protagoras* is a dialogue with no serious philosophical intention, and in accordance with H.D.F. Kitto (1966, 284), she argues that it is a work in need of revision, for example, to reintroduce Hippocrates at the end of the dialogue, whom Plato apparently forgets along the way. Plato’s forgetting of Hippocrates is mentioned by Eugenio Benitez (1992, 231) in relation to Socrates’ first elenchus on Protagoras and is also pointed out by Marina McCoy (1999) in relation to the discussion evolving around the poem of Simonides. Treantafelles (2013) examines the Hippocrates section to understand the activity of philosophy from the perspective of “Socratic testing.” I

⁹ With quite a different outcome, this point is also touched upon by Kastley (1996, 32). Further, in the *Republic*, we are told that a man experiencing the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light, can appear most ridiculous (cf. 517d-518a).

find parts of Treantafelles' paper very inspirational due to his elaboration of details, but contrary to him, I develop my reading of this section from the perspective of Socrates' awakening and Hippocrates' turning as suggested above.

8.1.3.1 The character Hippocrates

Hippocrates is largely unknown as a historical figure, but Nails (2002, 160-70) argues that there is evidence to suggest that he was a nephew to Pericles and, besides this interesting piece of information; we get to know Hippocrates quite well during this section. He is very enthusiastic, has a fighting spirit, he is bold, he knows and trusts Socrates.¹⁰ Also, he knows that Socrates has met Protagoras on an earlier occasion, and thus he begs Socrates to help him to get introduced. Hippocrates apprehends Protagoras as the wisest man in the Greek-speaking world, and he possesses a long-lasting dream: He wants to become a student of Protagoras, the famous teacher. He developed his dream based on what he heard from people in the city and through these stories he made up his mind regarding Protagoras and his wisdom. He is so eager to fulfill the dream that he is prepared to bankrupt both himself and his friends. When his brother, at supper one night, tells him that Protagoras is in town, it instantly dawns on Hippocrates that this is the opportunity to realize his dream. He experiences an almost sleepless night, and supposedly long before daybreak, he has made his decision. He then rushes into the night with the intention to find his friend Socrates to whom he now really needs to talk to.

8.1.3.2 The bedroom scene (310a8-311a7)

The first specified place in the *Protagoras* is the bedroom scene. Hippocrates stands forth as noisy, loud, and very eager. During this scene, Socrates calms him down, and toward the end, Hippocrates is noiseless. Hence, it seems like he has gained self-control. So, what happened here?

Very early, before daylight, Socrates hears shouting and heavy banging on the door. In the dark he recognizes the yelling voice of Hippocrates: "Socrates, are you awake or asleep?" (310b3-4). The earsplitting Hippocrates stumbles into a dark room,

¹⁰ These characteristics make him fit the demands set forth in the *Republic* (376c4-6) with regard to the nature of the philosopher. This means that Hippocrates has an inherent potential for becoming a philosopher.

tumbles toward a bed and places himself by Socrates' feet—but why this underlining of the noise and shouting? From Hippocrates' perspective, the answer is given when the narrator reports that he roared: “Have you heard? Protagoras has arrived!” (310b7-8). But what can be said from Socrates' perspective? Treantafelles (2013, 158) points out that almost without exception it is assumed that Socrates is (1) at home, and (2) that he is asleep,¹¹ but according to him, there is no textual evidence to support these assumptions. Is Socrates at home? The narrator reports that someone opened the door for Hippocrates (310b2). Who is this someone? According to Nicholas Denyer (2008, 68), in this context, someone (τίς) probably refers to a slave. But is there any evidence to suggest that Socrates had a full household; that is, family and slaves? I think not. So, what about the sleeping Socrates? Hippocrates found him on a simple bed,¹² but was he asleep? Surely, Socrates is somewhere, but it is not for certain that he is at home, and it is not for certain that he is asleep. I suggest that this is a symbolic clue regarding Socrates' awakening, and hence, the “bedroom scene” can be viewed as an allegory related to the cave-dwellers in the *Republic*. How? The development here is similar to that of the cave parable: An instance of suddenness (ἐξαίφνης) initiated an action.¹³ We are *not* told explicitly what exactly frees the prisoners in the cave from the passive gazing on the drifting shadows in front of them. We are just told that something “suddenly” happens: “One was compelled to stand up suddenly (ἐξαίφνης) and turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light” (*Republic*, 515c6-8). From this perspective, I suggest that Socrates, in the *bedroom scene*, also is dwelling, somewhere in the dark, and by Hippocrates' entrance, he is suddenly forced to wake up and start his ascent toward “the light of the veritable day” (*Republic*, 521c8).

Now, the very loud and eager Hippocrates wants them to leave immediately because he is afraid to miss out on Protagoras. However, Socrates is holding back:

¹¹ See for example Zuckert (2009, 218), and Beversluis (2000, 246). They both place Socrates at home as well as asleep, and they put forth the assumption that “at home” means communal living, cf. also Coby (1988, 26). However, there is no textual evidence to support such living arrangements for Socrates, cf. Treantafelles (2013, 158n26).

¹² This bed is a (σκήμτοδος) which denotes a cheap and low bed, light enough to be used as a stretcher for invalids, cf. Denyer (2008, 69).

¹³ Cf. the *Republic*, 515c7, 516a4 and 516e5, cf. also Wyller (1984, 49).

“Let’s not go there just yet. It’s too early (πρῶτι γάρ ἐστιν, 311a3).” The obvious reference here is the early hour of the day, but this phrase may also suggest that any meeting with Protagoras would be intellectually premature regarding Hippocrates’ current state (cf. Denyer 2008, 71). So, trying to calm him down, Socrates suggests: “Why don’t we go out here into the courtyard and stroll around until its light? Then we can go” (311a5).

8.1.3.3 The courtyard scene (311a8-314c2)

Socrates pushes Hippocrates into the courtyard. This is the second place explicitly named. At this point, Socrates employs two proceedings to make Hippocrates realize that he has made up his mind through doxa, and hence, he does not understand the danger he is in. So, here, outside, in the hour when night becomes day, Socrates decides to see what Hippocrates is made of (311b1-2). He sets out to “test” Hippocrates to see if he can “scope it out.” The term “test” translates the verb ἀποπειράζω which points toward an athletic context, meaning to evoke a wrestler by tentatively “trying” his opponent in a competition. The phrase “scope it out” translates the verb διασκοπέω which means to “look at thoroughly.” So, Socrates—it seems—is preparing Hippocrates for entering a kind of “wrestling game.” Thus, it is imperative that he can pay close attention to the opponent’s alleged set of trickeries.¹⁴ It is obvious that Socrates considers Protagoras to be Hippocrates’ opponent in an upcoming wrestling game, and through the tests, he is about to perform on Hippocrates we witness the birth of the Socratic activity/questioning. The aim is to prepare Hippocrates for the encounter with the great sophist and learn the importance of taking a stand of his own. Socrates starts the preparation by employing two different (well-known) proceedings, the elenchus and “creating an imaginary interlocutor.” He starts with the elenchus:

(a)

Socrates: “[...] you’re making an effort now to go to Protagoras and pay him money as a fee on your own behalf; what’s your idea? Who will you be going to

¹⁴ I am indebted to Professor Hayden Ausland for making me aware of the depth of meaning in these two verbs.

and what will you become? [...] Tell me, if you're going to pay Hippocrates from Cos, and someone asked you this, what would you answer?"

Hippocrates: "He is a doctor, and I'll become a doctor."

(b)

Socrates: "But if you were intending to go to Polycleitus the Argive or Pheidias the Athenian to pay them on your behalf, what would your answer be then?"

Hippocrates: "I'd say because they're sculptors, I'll become a sculptor."

(c)

Socrates: "[...] What other name do we hear spoken about Protagoras, the same way 'sculptor' is about Pheidias and 'poet' about Homer—what do we hear like about Protagoras?"

Hippocrates: "Well, Socrates, what people say, anyway, is that the man is a sophist."

Socrates: "Then you're going to Protagoras, what will you become?"

Hippocrates: "If it's anything like the previous cases, it's obvious so I'll become a sophist" (311b-312a).

The elenchus turned out to be effective because it made Hippocrates able to distinguish between different arts and also he became aware of one simple fact: by seeking the teachings belonging to one particular art, you will become an expert within the field in question. So, he now understands that by paying Protagoras for studying with him, he will eventually become a sophist. Socrates' response to Hippocrates' last answer is to swear by all the gods before asking: "What? You? Wouldn't you be ashamed to present yourself to the Greek world as a sophist?" (312a5-7). Hippocrates admits he would. At this point, the narrator reports that as "he spoke, he was turning red—for a bit of day was just breaking, so he became clearly visible" (312a2-4). Hippocrates's blushing did not occur when he understood he would become a sophist *but* by the thought of presenting himself as a sophist to the Greek world. This is noteworthy because here the physical dawn of the day coincides—both in time and color—with Hippocrates' blushing, and it can indicate that something is also starting to dawn upon him, intellectually (cf. Denyer 2008, 74). Put another way—he finds himself in an aporetic situation.

However, through his questioning, Socrates also did something else: When he enumerated the artisans to identify their abilities for Hippocrates, he started with the doctor at step (a), at step (b) the doctor is excluded and replaced by the sculptor. At step (c), Protagoras is grouped with the poet and sculptor—that is, Protagoras is placed

within the imitative arts. In this way, Socrates performs a little twist,¹⁵ but did Hippocrates notice this? Apparently not, because the result of this questing turns out to be just a preliminary step and by no means satisfactory. Consequently, at this point, Hippocrates failed. Socrates now claims that Hippocrates does not understand what he is about to do: He is about to expose his soul to something he does not understand. Thus, Socrates starts anew:

Socrates: “[...] What do you consider the sophist to be?”

Hippocrates: “I’d say he’s just what the name says; someone who knows wise things” (312c5-7).

At this point Hippocrates performs a fallacy by deriving a person’s capacity, ability, or skill from the name.¹⁶ Maybe this is the reason why Socrates now chooses to employ the second proceeding, to create “an imaginary interlocutor.” It goes like this: What if someone asked us, what would we answer? I would probably say [...], what would you say?

Socrates: You could say the same thing about the painters [...] that they understand the wise things. But if someone asked us ‘wise in what respect’, we would probably answer ‘wise as far as making images’ [...] so what about the sophist—what would we answer? [...]

Hippocrates: The sophist is wise concerning good speakers. [...]

Socrates: True answer, but not sufficient. On what subjects does the sophist make you a clever speaker?

Hippocrates: I don’t know. [...]

Socrates: Are you aware of the danger you are about to put your soul in?

Hippocrates: I don’t know (312b-313c).

Using “an imaginary interlocutor,” we have learned that it had a didactic impact. We also witnessed that the *Socratic activity/questioning* was effective: In the mode of a sophist, Socrates posed questions which made Hippocrates blush; he virtually started to acknowledge the shame rising from the instantaneous moment one starts to grasp that the opinion first stated was wrong. Hence, Hippocrates realized the emerging aporia; and when he appreciated the aporetic condition, Socrates redirected his

¹⁵ This “little twist” alludes to the *Republic* (595a-601a) where Socrates also assigned sophistry to the imitative arts, arguably far away from the truth. The connection between the imitative arts and sophistry is also repeatedly established by the Eleatic Stranger in the *Sophist*. Him I return to in chapter 9: *The Eleatic Stranger: A turning-point*.

¹⁶ Theaetetus makes the same mistake in his encounter with the Eleatic Stranger.

ambition away from the dream career in sophistry through a set of questions which enabled Hippocrates to reveal his ignorance. This is an important revision of his earlier statement where he claimed that the sophist Protagoras was the most “clever speaker” and most skilled in wise things. It is noteworthy that at this moment Socrates decides to meet Hippocrates’ initial request, but before they set out, he gives some last warnings concerning the sophist:

He [i.e., the sophist] is a kind of merchant who peddles provisions upon the teachings which nourish the soul, and thus the sophist can deceive us. [...] So, if you are knowledgeable (ἐπιστήμων), you can buy teachings (μαθήματα) safely from Protagoras or anyone else. But if you’re not; please don’t risk what is most dear to you on a roll of a dice [...] (313a ff.)

So, when being knowledgeable he can buy teachings, the teachings will not be inculcated in his soul—if not knowledgeable, the teachings will be inculcated. This is the real danger; and as such, the situation calls for yet another form of preparation.

8.1.3.4 In front of the entrance to Callias’ house (314c3-8)

The area outside Callias’ house is the third specified place in this section, and here Socrates employs his third and last proceeding. When arriving at the door of Callias’ house, they do not enter but stay outside for a while, engaged in a “dialectical conversation” (διελεγγόμεθα).¹⁷ We are not told what this conversation is all about, what they actually discussed, or how the conversation developed, but it must have been something important because they did not want to leave the subject unsettled before entering the house. Hence, the content of the conversation is concealed for the readers, so the important element here is the narrator who explicitly reports that the conversation was dialectic. In this context, that is a piece of important information. In the *Republic*, Socrates explained to Glaucon that “only the dialectical way of inquiry proceeds in this direction, destroying the hypotheses, to the beginning itself in order to make it secure, and when the eye of the soul¹⁸ is really buried in a barbaric bog,

¹⁷ On the term “διελεγγόμεθα,” see Benitez (1992) and his discussion on dialectical versus dialogical conversations.

¹⁸ Regarding the “eye of the soul” Socrates says: “It’s not scarcely an ordinary thing, rather it’s hard, to trust that in these studies a certain instrument in everyone’s soul—one that is destroyed and blinded by other practices—is purified and rekindled, an instrument more important to save than ten thousand eyes,” *Republic*, 527d6-e3.

dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up above” (*Republic*, 533c9-d4). If we can assume that Socrates’ use of dialectic in the case of Hippocrates is similar to the explanation given to Glaucon, it is reasonable to conclude that, through the three proceedings; the philosophical pedagogue managed to guide Hippocrates and, thus, turned his soul toward philosophy. The closure of the dialectic conversation marks the end of the Hippocrates section.

8.1.4 The three-fold door knocking

Through the reading of the Hippocrates section, three specific places (the bedroom, the courtyard and the area in front of Callias’ house) have been isolated. Simultaneously, three different ways of the Socratic activity/questioning have been identified. Also, we find that the Hippocrates section is bracketed by door-knocking, a motif Treantafelles, among others, relates to the genre of comedy.¹⁹ But what will be the result if this door-knocking motif is viewed from quite a different perspective? I think that this three-fold door knocking can be viewed as symbolizing the three-fold way of learning.²⁰ This way is the guided process leading to doing true deeds and possessing true beliefs. When this training is done, it will eventually lead to true insight.²¹

When Hippocrates first knocked on the door and entered the dark bedroom, he could be symbolizing the releasing power forcing Socrates suddenly (*ἐξαίφνης*) to start an ascent from his dwelling in the dark into the light. On behalf of Hippocrates, the consequence of this first knocking was entering a new state. He was transformed *from* being a rather noisy character *to* an individual signaling self-control. Socrates further led him from the dark into the daylight, by enabling him to start the process of correcting his own beliefs. Hence, Hippocrates experienced a dramatic transformation. By partaking in Socrates’ elenchus, he proceeded from a nescient knower to an

¹⁹ See Treantafelles (2013, 154, and 154n14).

²⁰ Generally, the philosophers divided the life of all things into three distinct parts: growth, maturity, and decay, which imply that between the twilight of dawn and the twilight of evening is the high noon of resplendent magnificence, and according to Wyller (1984, 51), Plato often displays a “threefold” (*trehetlig*) development regarding learning. One example is the *Seventh letter* (342a) where it is said that “every object has three things which are the necessary means by which knowledge of that object is acquired; and the knowledge itself is a fourth thing; and as a fifth one must postulate the object itself which is cognizable and true.; first of these come the name; secondly the definition; thirdly the image” which, in turn, leads to the fourth—knowledge. Cf. also the *Laws*, 895c, where essence, definition, and name are enumerated; cf. also the *Parmenides* (142a).

²¹ Cf. *Republic* (521c) quoted above, and the *Seventh Letter* (342a).

embarrassed inept, by taking a stand through “an imaginary interlocutor” he proceeded from the embarrassed inept to a self-conscious questioner, and through a “dialectical conversation” his soul turned and became strengthened toward the upcoming meeting with the sophistic assembly at the house of Callias. So, when Socrates initially claimed that Hippocrates did not understand what he was about to do, that is, he was about to expose his soul to something he did not understand—maybe this three-fold guiding-process can be viewed as a soul-preparation. If so, Hippocrates’ soul is no longer in severe danger, and the teachings of Protagoras will not be inculcated in it.

When they—together—are doing the second knocking on the door of Callias’ house, Hippocrates is supposedly equipped and well-armed. His turning is contrasted by the eunuch doorkeeper who instantly inferred they were sophists, and this inference was due to the dialectic conversation he overheard. Hence, he slams the door in their faces. His inference was unsound because the premises grounding the inference were unsound, but he could not do otherwise because this kind of conversation had not been overheard before. He was the first, and he did not understand it.²²

The third knocking is done by Socrates alone on the door of Callias’ house. By just stating that they are not sophists, the eunuch let them enter. No questions asked. I think this third knocking and Socrates’ entrance onto the stage overcrowded by sophists marks Socrates’ descent—a necessary turmoil in the process leading to his final turning. The gathering in the house of Callias *is* a sort of unworldly situation,²³ and as such Socrates’ entrance may equalize the descent to Hades which is followed by the ascent to the light, an occurrence Socrates tried to explain to Glaucon in the *Republic* (521c).

²² This is also in accordance with the experience Thrasymachus made in the *Republic*, cf. chapter 3: *The tide is turning for Socrates*, pp. 91-133. In addition, when reading the dialogues chronologically according to their dramatic dates, it follows that the *Protagoras* is the first *Socratic dialogue*, and consequently—within Plato’s dramatic universe—this is the first incident of the *Socratic activity*. So, no one could have overheard such a conversation earlier. It should also be noted that the *Parmenides* is the first dialogue. Both the dialectic and the conversations exposed there are different from that of the *Protagoras* because, in the *Parmenides*, Socrates is a youth (18-20 years old) questioned and guided by Parmenides, the mature philosopher; in the *Protagoras* it is Socrates who questions and guides the young Hippocrates. Thus, the two first dialogues expose two different entrances into philosophy.

²³ I am indebted to Professor Paul Woodruff for pointing out this “unworldly situation.”

8.1.5 Some concluding remarks

When three times trying to expose Protagoras to the same procedures which worked toward Hippocrates, Socrates experiences them as ineffective. Why? Maybe because the Socratic activity has an aim: to lead the student toward philosophy, and through this process, the burden of learning rests with the student as learner. Hippocrates, as we have seen, took on that burden, but Protagoras is not that kind of student. Furthermore, during the dialogue, Protagoras demonstrates that he presents the inculcating teacher, contrary to Socrates who stands forth as a philosophical pedagogue/guide. Thus, through the famous *aporia* at the end—Socrates realizes this contrariness, and he instantly recognizes the abyss between the old and new ideas concerning *paideia*. How did this happen? In the *Protagoras*, we witness two productive *aporias*; both signaling a “transition by suddenness.” The first is related to the student (Hippocrates), the latter to the teachers: Protagoras the sophist versus Socrates the philosophic pedagogue. The first *aporia* occurred in the Hippocrates section where Hippocrates, by appreciating his *aporetic* situation, started his turning *toward* philosophy, a turning which exposed that confrontation with one’s beliefs and convictions is the necessary first step. The second *aporia* led Socrates toward his final turning *into* philosophy. Gaining this kind of insight is, according to descriptions given in the *Republic* and the *Seventh Letter*, a perplexing and confusing experience. I take it that a man in such a state can appear to be comical, out of control, and clowning around, but not for long (cf. Kastely 1996, 36). The clarity returned when Socrates—in his last reply to Protagoras, invited him to start the discussion all over again, but Protagoras declined. So, Socrates left, and maybe he even closed the door behind him. For certain, he arrived at quite another place where he met someone, gathered somewhere.

8.2 Alcibiades: A lion is reared in the city

According to Edmund F. Bloedow (1991, 49) the Athenian debate over Alcibiades gained in intensity in 405; the same year in which the Alcibiades theme was brought on stage by Aristophanes in his comedy the *Frogs*. After Dionysus had declared that Aeschylus is superior to Euripides, and after he had set forth the wish that his Great Festival ought to have continued in its former splendor, he acknowledges that this

could only have taken place within the frames of a prosperous polis—but as the Athenians did—also the god recognized that the polis at present was in great jeopardy. This is the situation when he poses a crucial question to each of the tragedians: “What would you do about Alcibiades?”²⁴ Euripides’ answer is straightforward: No matter how bad the situation is for Athens, he is not willing to give Alcibiades a new chance. The reason for this is twofold. First, Euripides argues that Alcibiades’ demeanor had mainly been shown to be disadvantageous to Athens. Secondly, he underlines that Alcibiades’ actions were all motivated from selfish aims: “I hate a citizen who is slow to serve his country, but swift to do her great harm, who is resourceful when it comes to himself, but helpless when it comes to the *polis*” (*Frogs*, lines 1427-29). Aeschylus approves, but his answer to Dionysus is not so straightforward: “Rear a lion in the polis? By no means! But should you do so, then its whims you must humor” (*Frogs*, lines 1431-32). This metaphorical reply places the problem of Alcibiades vis-à-vis the city in a broader perspective and, as Bloedow argues, for “those who knew their Homer, this powerful metaphor would have been entirely self-explanatory” (1991, 63). The underlining here is that one ought not to rear a lion within a community. However, Athens reared a lion, and it is this lion Socrates tried to discipline and turn toward philosophy twenty-seven dramatic years prior to this discussion in Hades.

8.2.1 Alcibiades encounters Socrates

Socrates had for many years observed Alcibiades at a distance.²⁵ He had noticed how the rich, handsome young man arrogantly treated the men who pursued him. The more they held themselves in high esteem, the more bigheaded he rejected them. It is Alcibiades’ feeling of being superior Socrates wants to address when he, on this particular day, approaches him for the first time. Alcibiades had also for many years observed that Socrates was always around and did not understand why he never pursued him. He had often wondered why. So, one day when he saw Socrates

²⁴ For a bibliography on scholarly discussions on this subject, see Bloedow (1991 49n1, and 49n2).

²⁵ This observation was noticed and misunderstood by others, as for example the anonymous friend Socrates talked to in the prelude of the *Protagoras*.

unaccompanied, Alcibiades sent his guards away and prepared the ground for a conversation.²⁶

When Socrates utters his first words to Alcibiades, he says that “I was the first man to fall in love with you [...] and now the others have stopped pursuing you I suppose you’re wondering why I’m the only one who hasn’t given up” (103a1-3). Socrates had been prevented to approach him by a divine being (cf. 103a5-6) because such a conversation would have been pointless earlier (cf. 105e7). Alcibiades is seemingly shocked by Socrates’ frank speech as he responds, “[...] now that you’ve started talking, you seem more bizarre to me than when you followed me in silence” (106a2-3); however, he is interested to hear what Socrates has to say. Socrates is still frank when he tells that he knows Alcibiades is planning to present himself for the Athenian people, and by that presentation, he intends to show them that he “deserves to be honored more than Pericles and anyone else who ever was” (105b2-3). After that, he reasons that he will be the most influential man in Athens, Greece, and beyond. But Socrates will prove to him that he has very different plans in mind, Alcibiades just does not know it yet.

“Suppose one of the gods asked you: Alcibiades, would you rather live with what you now have, or would you rather die on the spot if you weren’t permitted to acquire anything greater?” (105a4-6). Socrates believes he would choose to die. So, what is Alcibiades’ real ambition in life? His overall plan is to come forward and advise (συμβουλεύσων, 106c4-5) the Athenians in the near future. Suppose “I stopped you as you were about to take the podium and asked: ‘Alcibiades, what are the Athenians proposing to discuss? You’re getting up to advise them because it’s something you know better than they do, aren’t you?’ What would you reply?” (106c5-9). Alcibiades answers somewhat arrogantly that “I suppose I would say it was something that I know better than they do” (106d1), and he states also that he considers himself to be a good adviser (σύμβουλος).²⁷ This is their point of departure.

²⁶ Alcibiades tells this in *Symposium*, 217b, hence, according to him, it was he who carefully planned their first encounter.

²⁷ I bear in mind that Alcibiades attended the great sophistic summon in the house of Callias. There he heard Protagoras stating that everyone could give advice to the city, and the rich ones were especially suited.

8.2.2 What does Alcibiades know?

I assume that Alcibiades has received his formal education within a milieu influenced by sophistic teachers. This assumption is due to the links between Alcibiades' guardian Pericles and Protagoras among others. Alcibiades has learned how to write and read, and he learned lyre-playing (music) and wrestling (gymnastic). He did not want to learn flute-playing, though (cf. 106e). If measured against Protagoras' curriculum, he has reached the third level and, thus starting to harmonize body and soul. If stated in Protagorean terms, he is in his becoming to become civilized. I think that Socrates makes implicit references to Protagorean teachings on *orthos logos* (correctness in language and belief) when he through the upcoming exercises wants Alcibiades to state what is correct according to rules. Even if I assume that Alcibiades ought, through his education, to know about these rules, Socrates strives to make Alcibiades utilize this knowledge. This, in turn, might indicate that the knowledge he possesses is a result of cramming, which points to inculcation. Hence, when encountering Socrates and his procedures, Alcibiades gives the impression of being a slow learner.

The first thing Socrates does is to probe into Alcibiades' attitude toward learning. This initial line of questioning is similar to how Parmenides set out when Socrates himself was questioned as a youth at the same age Alcibiades is now. After Alcibiades agrees that the only things he knows he has learned (ἔμαθες, 106d5) from others or found out (ἔξηδρες, 106d6) by himself, Socrates asks, "Could you ever have learned or found out anything without wanting to learn it or work it out (ζητεῖν, 106d9) for yourself? [...] Would you have wanted to learn or work out something that you thought you understood (ἐπίστασθαι, 106d11)?" Alcibiades has not bothered to investigate anything, nor has he ever learned something he did not want to learn (cf. flute-playing). There are two important elements embedded in these two questions. The first is the question of whether Alcibiades wants to learn or not. In the Protagoras section above, we learned that inculcated education brings about an element of force and punishment, and we will learn later that Alcibiades left his teachers early.²⁸ As

²⁸ In *Protagoras* this is hinted upon. Socrates tells that Pericles was afraid that Alcibiades should corrupt his younger brother Cleinias, so Pericles wanted to keep the two brothers apart and placed Alcibiades in Ariphon's family so he could be educated there (cf. 320a-b).

Alcibiades confirms that he has not learned anything unwillingly, he confirms that he in no way is willing to respond to things he does not appreciate. This indicates that he did not respond to inculcation, and this Socrates had recognized a long time ago. Secondly, Alcibiades also confirms that he has never tried to work things out (ζητεῖν) by himself—that is, he has never tried to find the sources for what he claims to know. Socrates attempts to change this. He continues probing and wonders if there was a time when he did not think he knew what he now understands. Alcibiades believes that there must have been (cf. 106e).

After they have agreed on the summary of Alcibiades education, Socrates asks if he intends to give the Athenians advice about correct writing (ὀρθῶς γράφοιεν, 107a2). Or could it be that Alcibiades is considering the notes of the lyre? Wrestling? Building? Divination? Socrates' guessing does not lead anywhere, so Alcibiades reveals his intentions and states that he will advise the Athenians “about war (πολέμου, 107d4), or about peace (εἰρήνης 107d4), or about other concerns of the state (πόλεως πραγμάτων, 107d5).” He intends to give advice on whom the Athenians ought to make peace with and whom they ought to wage war on, and how they should do it. But “if they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better (βέλτιον, 107d9) to go to war [...] when is it better [...] and is it for long better?” What does the term “better” mean? The line of questing that Socrates now develops is interesting because it shows that Alcibiades at the outset does not understand much, and he does not seem to be very keen on expanding his knowledge. However, due to Socrates' patient work, he gradually gets a grip on it, and he also starts to enjoy it. Therefore, I will work my way through these passages.

8.2.3 Alcibiades awakens

Socrates first presents some analogies (wrestling, playing the lyre) for Alcibiades to consider. Rather quickly it is revealed that Alcibiades is not able to answer anything satisfactory. Hence, Socrates tries another approach. Alcibiades is now confronted by the following: “Since you used the term ‘better’ in both cases—wrestling and in playing the lyre while singing—what do you call what’s better in lyre-playing, as I call what’s better in wrestling ‘athletic’? What do you call that?” (108b1-5). As Alcibiades does not get it, Socrates urges him to try to follow his example, and stresses: “My

answer was, I think, ‘what is correct (ὀρθῶς) in every case’—and what is correct, I presume, is what takes place in accordance with the skill, isn’t it?” (1096-9). The skill was athletics, and what was better in wrestling was “athletic,” so “tell me what the skill is for singing and dancing and playing the lyre correctly. What is it called as a whole? Aren’t you able to tell me yet?” (108c6-9). Alcibiades is not. Socrates now tries to make him see the problem from another perspective: “Who are the goddesses to whom the skill belongs?” (108c11). Alcibiades guesses the Muses, and Socrates then asks the name of the skill that is named after them. Alcibiades suggests it is music, which is the correct answer. Now, they are almost there. He just has to consider one more thing: “[...] what is ‘correctly’ for what takes place in accordance with this skill? In the other case, I told you what ‘correctly’ is for what takes place in accordance with the skill, so now it’s your turn to say something similar in this case. *How* does it take place” (108d4-7)? Alcibiades suggests that it takes place musically, which also is the correct answer.

They now return to the question of war and peace. “[...] what do you call what’s better in both going to war and keeping the peace? In the last two examples, you said that what was better was more musical and more athletic, respectively. Now, try to tell me what’s better in this case, too” (108d9-e3). Alcibiades is not able to. Socrates presents food as the third analogy and points out that Alcibiades could have answered healthier or tastier—hence he implicitly points out that a variety of answers is possible. Syse (2006, 294) calls Alcibiades’ effort so far disappointing and argues that there could be two reasons for this: Either he does not know what to say, or he is thinking of an answer but is not sure that Socrates would accept it. I think both suggestions are reasonable, and I add a third. As I suggested above, Alcibiades had learned by inculcation; he was trained in giving correct answers when confronted with questions. However, by Socrates’ proceedings, he must reason himself, or he must start to hypothesize, and this has not been part of his former training. Socrates is trying to make him infer from the singular to the universal, and this distinction is not merely a grammatical one; it is also a fundamental philosophical (or metaphysical) one. Thus, a speculative inference on my part will be that Alcibiades, who is trained only to concentrate on correctness in language and hence give correct answers, is now

challenged by Socrates to use his general knowledge as a basis for further reasoning. That is, Socrates is trying to make Alcibiades start to philosophize. Alcibiades also showed that he was not able to apply the same method on different examples even when this method was thoroughly explained, and the use of it was applied in three ways. I think this supports my assumption. These proceedings are both imperative for the kind of training Socrates proposes, and the question now is whether his patient mode holds.

As Alcibiades did not manage to solve any of the questions laid before him, Socrates tries to appeal to him. Alcibiades must realize that when he intends to give advice on what is better than something else, and it turns out that he does not know what the term “better” means, his argumentation will be embarrassing, and that is shameful (*αἰσχρόνῃ*, 109a2). Maybe the factual appealing to embarrassment and shame will serve as a wake-up call, and Alcibiades will realize that, if this happens, it is a result of his own doing. So, Socrates now urges him to “think about it, and try to tell me what the better tends toward, in keeping the peace or in waging war with the right people” (109a4-6). Alcibiades states that he *is* thinking, but he cannot get it. “But suppose we’re at war with somebody—surely you know what treatment we accuse each other of when we enter into a war, and what we call it” (109a8-b1). This is a new starting point, and once again, Socrates begins with something Alcibiades supposedly knows. Socrates’ mentioning of the accusations brought forth before entering a war alludes to Homer and the quest for the just cause of war. According to Raaflaub (2011, 2), such a quest is “probably as old as the history of warfare” and that “such efforts also offer a long and sad story of futility and propagandistic deception.” The origin of the Trojan War was the love-story of Alexandros (Paris) and Helen (wife of Menelaus from Sparta) that resulted in Helen leaving her husband and child and following Alexandros to Troy. We learn that the Greeks sent off ambassadors to Troy. They demanded Helen’s return and some sort of compensation. Homer does not mention that they threatened with war if their demands were refused, but Raaflaub reasons that there is no doubt they did (cf. *ibid*, 5). Alexandros talked the matter over with Helen who did not want to return to Sparta; when her decision was passed on to the Trojan assembly, they sided with the couple, and king Priam promised to protect them. When

the Greeks understood that their effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict failed, they assembled and went to war. The Greeks were now fighting for a just cause that “guaranteed divine support and justified hope for victory” (ibid). This way is a pattern²⁹ that also applies to the Peloponnesian War.

If Alcibiades knew his Homer, he also knew this. However, I do not suppose he did.³⁰ In his answer to Socrates, it rather seems that he is referring to contemporary discussions, and back on track he now states that he knows what the enemies are accused of before entering war: “[...] we say that they’re playing some trick on us or attacking us or taking things away from us” (109b2-3). Alcibiades’s answer is according to the contemporary pattern, where the first step before waging war was for the city to accuse its enemy affront, so Socrates takes hold on Alcibiades’ answer and urges him to go on, “Hold on—how do we suffer from each other of these treatments? Try to tell me how one way differs from another way” (109b4-5). In his question, Socrates first implies that there are various ways to insult proposed enemies, that is, to construct enemies, but Alcibiades does not give any examples on that. Instead, he responds to the second part: “When you say ‘way,’ Socrates, do you mean ‘justly’ or ‘unjustly’?” (109b6-7)—and this is precisely what Socrates meant. According to Alcibiades, this makes all the difference in the world. “Really?” Socrates replies. “Who will you advise the Athenians to wage war on? Those who are treating us unjustly or those who are treating us justly?” (109b10-11). Alcibiades has now proven himself able to partake in an investigation; instead of just answering, “I don’t know,” he now first complains and, then reflects: “That’s a hard question you’re asking. Even if someone thought it was necessary to wage war on people who were treating us justly, he wouldn’t admit it” (109c1-3). This answer is telling with regard to justice and injustice because it is relatively clear that Alcibiades understands these concepts

²⁹ On these kinds of discussions and negotiations, see Raaflaub (1997, 3-8).

³⁰ This inference is done due to a little piece of information found in the *Phaedrus*. In their discussion on rhetoric, Socrates asks if Phaedrus has heard of “the rhetorical treatises of Nestor and Odysseus—those they wrote in their spare time in Troy [...]” (261b8-9). Phaedrus answers: “No, by Zeus, I haven’t heard of Nestor’s—unless by Nestor you mean Gorgias, and by Odysseus, Thrasymachus [...]” (261c1-2). This implies that the names of the great heroes from Homer are now used as references to the great rhetors and sophists. This is a reduction which implies that the authorities of the poets as teachers, are fading conventions, cf. Cephalus and the way he advocated the poetic topos, and also the three generations we met in the *Republic*.

according to contemporary conventions.³¹ Hence, the one who will wage war on someone who is thought to treat us unjustly, he would not admit it but *pretend* to have a just cause. But that is unlawful, and it will not be considered a proper thing to do, Socrates points out. Alcibiades agrees. The one imperative element set forth so far is that an advice on waging war or protecting peace must, one way or the other, be related to justice. So, when asked if these are the terms that will frame Alcibiades' future speech, he admits that this is what he has to do.

Socrates returns to the question of what is "better." Maybe Alcibiades is more able now? Socrates ponders, "Then this 'better' I was asking you about—when it comes to waging war or not, on whom to wage war on whom not to, and when and when not³²—this 'better' turns out to be the same as 'more just,' doesn't it" (109c9-11)? This last concluding remark is a puzzle, and Alcibiades recognizes it—"it certainly seems so," he states. But how could it be something that is 'more just' or 'less just'?³³ "Don't you realize that this is something you don't understand" (109d1)? Even if Alcibiades argues that he had known about justice from childhood on, Socrates argues that this is something that cannot be known without a thorough investigation. As Alcibiades now, quite half-heartedly, admits that if he is to give the Athenians advice on whether they ought to wage war or make peace, he must know justice. But does he? This they set out to investigate.

8.2.4 What Alcibiades has learned

Not long gone, Socrates gets Alcibiades to question the knowledge of his former teachers: "But aren't you giving credit to teachers of this sort who, as you yourself

³¹ How these concepts are received, we have learned from Thrasymachus and Glaucon in the *Republic*, and from Protagoras' outlining of the same theme.

³² In this Socratic line of reasoning, Syse (2006, 293) makes some interesting observations: "First, we are reminded of the need to give advice when the city deliberates *about whom to make war against* and *whom to remain (or become) at peace with*—what much later in the tradition becomes the *ad bellum* question; and second, Socrates points out that the manner in which war is fought and peace is made must also be discussed—this corresponds more closely to what we today know as *in bello* reasoning."

³³ At this point, Socrates continues by saying: "Or perhaps, when I wasn't looking, you've been seeing some teacher who taught you how to tell the difference between the more just and the less just. Have you? [...] Well, who is he? Tell me who he is so that you can sign me up with him as well" (109d1-5). Alcibiades apprehends this as teasing.

admit, have no knowledge” (112d5-6)? Alcibiades agrees that he does, but he has a hard time understanding that by answering Socrates’ questions the answers come from within himself. “[...] given that your opinion wavers so much, and given that you obviously neither found it out yourself nor learned it from anyone else, how likely is it that you know anything about justice and injustice” (112d8-10)? Alcibiades responds that “from what you say, it’s not very likely.” This marks a turning point because, during the following discussion (112d-114e), Alcibiades gradually starts to see the point. When challenged to consider whether just things are advantageous, he says that “I’d better answer—I don’t think I’ll come to any harm (βλαβήσεσθαι, 114e10-11).” I suggest that at this point Alcibiades signals that he starts to free himself from his inculcated knowledge, and hence, he is more alive (or awakened) when he answers. From here on through the first half of the dialogue, Socrates leads Alcibiades to conclude (and understand) that the problem of war and peace is related to justice in an imperative manner. Their next major theme is the relation between body and soul. Alcibiades strives hard to accept that it is the soul—not the body—that is at stake, and that care for the soul is the most important business of all.³⁴ By this, we pick up on the opening lines of the dialogue.

“Now, if there were someone who loved Alcibiades’ body, he would love something that belonged to Alcibiades. [...] But someone who loved you would love your soul” (131c4-8), Socrates claims and, by this statement he is underling the first words he uttered. “Do you remember when I first spoke to you [...] and that you were just about to say something: you wanted to ask me why I was the only one who hadn’t given up on you” (131e6-8, cf. 104c-d). Socrates now gives Alcibiades the reason why and, a warning:

Well, this is the reason: I was your only lover—the others were only lovers of what you had. While your possessions are passing their prime, *you* are just beginning to bloom. I shall never forsake you now, never, unless the Athenian people make you corrupt and ugly. And that is my greatest fear, that a lover of the common people might corrupt you, for many Athenian gentlemen have suffered that fate already. ‘The people of great-hearted Erechtheus’ might look attractive

³⁴ This alludes to the *Republic* and the upending of the conventional thought “gymnastic for the body, music for the soul,” cf. chapter 5: *Founding cities making (παιδοῦμεν) guardians*, section 5.4.3: The path toward excellent models, pp. 184-88.

on the outside, but you need to scrutinize them in their nakedness, so take precaution (131e10-132a7).

The precaution for Alcibiades ought to be first to get into training and to learn what he needs to know before entering politics. This training and learning will give him an antidote against the terrible dangers (cf. 132b1-3). Alcibiades promises to do so. However, as we have learned, he did not.

8.2.5 Alcibiades' swan song

The ambitious Alcibiades allowed himself to be corrupted by fame and might. So, when sixteen dramatic years later, he enters the *Symposium* and delivers a speech in which he praises Socrates, it turns out that Socrates does want to speak with him. This little passage is noticeable. The drunk and cheerful Alcibiades laid his eyes on Socrates and pronounced: “Good lord, what’s going on here? It’s Socrates! You’ve trapped me again! You always do this to me—all of a sudden you’ll turn up out of nowhere where I least expect you” (213b8-c2). Socrates’ reaction on Alcibiades’ entrance is to address Agathon and beg protection from him, the “fierceness of his passion terrifies me,” Socrates says. It is Alcibiades who explains the problem. He had heard many great orators, including Pericles, and admired their speeches. Alcibiades complains: “they never upset me so deeply that my very own soul started protesting that my life—*my* life!—was no better than the most miserable slave’s” (215e4-6). This means that Socrates’ proceedings had an effect on Alcibiades, but still, he did not choose the path of philosophy. Why is that? He explains himself, and because this is the only place in the corpus that we are given this kind of confession, I quote it in length.

Socrates is the only man in the world who has made me feel shame—ah, you didn’t think I had it in me, did you? [...] I know perfectly well that I can’t prove him wrong when he tells me what I should do; yet, the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways: I cave into my desire to please the crowd. My whole life has become one constant effort to escape from him and keep away, but when I see him, I feel deeply ashamed, because I’m doing nothing about my way of life, though I have already agreed with him that I should. Sometimes, believe me, I think I would be happier if he were dead. And yet I know that if he dies I’ll be even more miserable. I can’t live with him, and I can’t live without him. What *can* I do about him? (216b2-c4)

The lesson learned, from Alcibiades' point of view, is that Socrates' conversations with him had an impact. Everything was in harmony when he accompanied Socrates, but when left alone, he fell back into old habits. Nevertheless, Alcibiades gained insight, and he experienced that Socrates' advices were accurate, but still, he preferred the tributes from the crowd. He acknowledges that being a celebrated commander is not the measure of being a harmonious man. He admits that he is doing nothing to change his life as he and Socrates agreed upon. The result is that he feels ashamed.

When Socrates asked Agathon for protection, his request can indicate that Alcibiades is one of the students Socrates is prohibited by his inner *daimon* to take back after they have left him (cf. *Theaetetus*, 150e). Some students are allowed back more than once, but at one point the divine sign ($\delta\alpha\mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\iota\omicron\nu$) forbids him to associate with them any further (cf. *Theaetetus*, 151a).³⁵ As Alcibiades did not have the discipline to contemplate on his own, the philosopher finally rejected him. The paradox of this situation is that when the future city wonders what to do with Alcibiades, Alcibiades wonders what to do with Socrates.

8.3. Charmides: Beauty on stage

Socrates had been away for nearly three years, together with Alcibiades, on the campaign at Potidaea. Nails (2002, 311) underlines that “[w]hat started out as an invading army, became a besieging army, then a defeated army, before its return” to Athens in 429. The day after his return, Socrates sought out his “accustomed haunts with special pleasure” (153a3). He went straight to the palaestra of Taureas. At his arrival, he was greeted warmly by his old friend Chaerephon who had heard that “the fighting was very heavy and many of our friends were killed” (153c1-2). He wants to know how Socrates had experienced it all. Socrates took his seat, greeted Critias and the rest, and told them what they wanted to hear. When Socrates' story was done, he wanted to know about the “affairs at home, about the present state of philosophy and about the young men, whether there were any who had become distinguished for wisdom or beauty or both” (153d4-6).

³⁵ Cf. Introduction, section 3.2: The midwife at work, pp. 23-6.

8.3.1 The entrance of Beauty

Critias is very eager to tell about Charmides whom Socrates knew of. We have already learned that Socrates met him in Callias' house around three dramatic years prior. Charmides was then fourteen years old and partook in the second flank dancing around Protagoras. Critias describes Charmides as the most beautiful youth ever. Socrates is at ease because everyone at Charmides' age strikes him as beautiful (cf. 154b). When Charmides came, his calmness disappears. The narrator reports that ...

... at that moment Charmides came in he seemed to me to be amazing in stature an appearance, and everyone there looked to me to be in love with him, they were so astonished and confused by his entrance, and many other lovers followed in his train. That men of my age should have been affected this way was natural enough, but I noticed that even the small boys fixed their eyes upon him and no one of them, not even the littlest, looked at anyone else, but all gazed at him as if he were a statue (ἄγαλμα, 154c1-9).

The narrator's description of the men's reaction to Charmides' entrance is both intriguing and telling. The word ἄγαλμα means more than a mere statue; it also denotes a *statue in honor of a god*.³⁶ Thus, it alludes to *Phaedrus* and the passage where Socrates, some eight to thirteen dramatic years later, will describe to Phaedrus what happens when gazing upon beauty:

[...] first he shudders and a fear comes over him like those he felt at the earlier time; then he gazes at him with the reverence due a god, and if he weren't afraid people would think him completely mad, he'd even sacrifice to his boy as if he were the image of a god (ἄγάλματι). Once he has looked at him, his chill gives way to sweating and a high fever, because the stream of beauty that pours into him through his eyes warms him up and waters the growth of his wings (*Phaedrus*, 251a2-b1).

This could very well be a description of what happened to Socrates when he first laid eyes on Charmides. Charmides also fits the description from the *Phaedrus*. When Chaerephon asks Socrates what he thinks, the response is that Charmides' face is extraordinary. "But if he were willing to strip, [...] you would hardly notice his face, his body is so perfect" (154d3-4), Chaerephon adds. Maybe Socrates finds these ovations a little over the top because he swears and states: "By Heracles, you are describing a man without equal" ((154d6), whereupon he wonders if Charmides also

³⁶ Cf. Liddle and Scott.

has a well-formed soul. Critias confirms that Charmides is also distinguished in that respect. Not only is he a philosopher,³⁷ but many also hold him to be quite a poet. The question now is how Socrates can be suitably introduced to this youth. It turns out that yesterday Charmides had complained about a returning morning headache, so maybe Socrates could pretend to have a remedy.³⁸ Socrates goes along, if that what it takes. It worked, and Charmides came and sat down between Socrates and Critias. What happened is worth a closer look:

And then, my friend, I really was in difficulties, and although I had thought it would be perfectly easy to talk to him, I found my previous brash confidence quite gone. And when his full gaze upon me in a manner beyond description and seemed on the point of asking a question, and when everyone on the palaestra surged all around us in a circle, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught on fire and was quite beside myself. And it occurred to me that Cydias was the wisest love poet when he gave someone advice on the subject of beautiful boys and said the ‘the fawn should beware lest, while taking a look at the lion, he should provide part of the lion’s dinner,’ because I felt as if I had been snapped up by such a creature. All the same, when he asked me if I knew the headache remedy, I managed somehow to answer that I did (155c5-e1).

In this description, the narrator is addressing an anonymous noble friend twice, and again, as a reader, I again get the notion of being eavesdropping. It is as if the description of this upsetting reaction was meant for the friend only. We are told that Socrates lost his initial confidence, he was paralyzed by Charmides’ gaze, and when he got sight of Charmides perfect body by an accidental glimpse inside his cloak—he caught on fire and was quite beside himself. It is easy to understand that he barely managed to talk. The narrator continues and tells that Charmides was led to believe that the remedy “was a certain leaf and that there was a charm to go with it. If one sang the charm while applying the leaf, the remedy would bring about a complete cure, but without the charm the leaf was useless” (155e4-7). Charmides allegedly believes this; he even asks if he can—with Socrates’ permission—write down the charm at his

³⁷ Critias’ enthusiasm alludes to Theodorus’ when he describes the Eleatic Stranger as a philosopher in the opening lines of the *Sophist*.

³⁸ This “remedy” that Socrates now is about to pretend to have, alludes to the “useful lie” proposed in the *Republic*.

direction (cf. 156a).³⁹ Socrates goes on by describing the nature of the charm. It is not able to cure the head alone. He refers to the good doctors who always “plan a regime for the whole body with the idea of treating and curing the part along with the whole” (156c4-6).⁴⁰ Charmides confirms that he has heard of this principle, and he accepts it. The narrator tells that when Socrates heard this approval, his former confidence, little by little, was revived—he began to wake him up (ἀνεζωπυρούμην, 156d2-3). What happened here, and what is Socrates doing?

First, he found himself seduced by Charmides’ beauty. This was such an upsetting experience that he had to tell it—in detail—to a friend.⁴¹ The description of this experience resembles the one Socrates is to explain to Phaedrus; when gazing upon bodily Beauty of Charmides’ kind, one is blinded and somehow lead into a trance. However, Socrates was able to awake himself, that is, he was able to rekindle his soul gradually. This alludes to the *Republic* (527d-e) when Socrates explains to a rather skeptical Glaucon that one must trust the studies proposed in the curriculum for the philosophic education. Through these studies, a certain instrument of everyone’s soul is purified and rekindled (ἀναζωπυρεῖται). This instrument is destroyed and blinded by other practices, but it is only by this instrument that the truth is seen. This entails that when the specific studies rekindle the soul, a philosopher so educated is able to rekindle himself over and over again, hence, light up his soul over and over again. I think that it is such an experience we have witnessed in the encounter between Socrates and Charmides. Secondly, it seems like Socrates has an easy match when it comes to persuading Charmides with regard to the remedy, or the charm. However, this is not necessarily so. Charmides has a strong effect on people, regardless age, as we learned from the narrator’s description of his entrance. Moreover, Critias, his proud guardian, is a friend of Socrates who, according to Charmides, appears to be quite a celebrity; he tells that Socrates is “no small topic of conversation among us boys”

³⁹ That Charmides wants to write down the charm to remember it correctly, indicates that he is trained by an inculcating teacher, cf. Protagoras’ teachings.

⁴⁰ This alludes to the *Republic* and the path leading to health, hence to the healer-politician Asclepius, cf. p. 186. That Socrates claims to have heard of this remedy from a Thracian, points to the hero Deloptes who was a “Thracian Asclepius,” cf. p. 57-8n34.

⁴¹ After the upsetting encounter with Protagoras, Socrates also needed to tell of his experiences to a friend, cf. the *Protagoras*, 310a.

(156a5). These elements may indicate that Charmides is flattered and excited by receiving Socrates' full attention on this particular day. It is, after all, Socrates' reunion with his friends after a long absence. Due to this, it is possible that Charmides is not lured but determined to show himself in company with a celebrity, and hence, he plays along. If this is the case, then Charmides fits the description of a man being easily bewitched. That is, he belongs to those who change their opinions either because they are charmed by pleasure or terrified by some fear (cf. *Republic* 413c). I think this is the case, and it will be confirmed as we read a little further. Thirdly, in the heat of the moment, Socrates agrees to lie to make conversation with this beautiful youth. It is noteworthy that after Socrates rekindled himself, or gained control, he also left the lie behind. He does not pretend to be a doctor anymore. Now, he argues that he learned it from a Thracian doctor of Zalmoxis when he was away in the army. This doctor belonged to a tradition that could make men immortal. Most diseases are beyond the Greek doctors because they do not pay attention to the whole, Socrates claims. They do not understand that "the soul is the source both of bodily health and bodily disease for the whole man, and there flow from the soul in the same way that the eyes are affected by the head" (156e7-157a1). So, Socrates insists that it is of most importance to cure the soul if the bodily parts are to be healthy. He even states that the Thracian doctor had urged him not to let "anyone persuade me to treat his head with this remedy who does not first submit his soul to you for treatment with the charm" (157b1-5). So, how is the soul to be treated? Socrates tells that the soul "is cured by means of certain charms, and these charms consist of beautiful words. It is a result of such words that temperance (σωφροσύνην) arises in the soul, and when the soul acquires and possesses temperance; it is easy to provide health both for the head and for the rest of the body" (157a4-b1). The question is now whether Charmides is willing to submit his soul first to be charmed with the Thracian charm, and then apply the remedy to his head.

Charmides is not permitted to answer because Critias interrupts rather vulgarly. It does not seem to me that he understood what Socrates was suggesting. Hence, he also starts to fit the description of a bewitched man (cf. *Republic*, 413c1-3). "The headache will turn out to have been a lucky thing for the young man, Socrates, if, because of his

head, he will be forced to improve his wits (διάνοιαν)” (157c6-d1). He is acknowledging that Charmides can improve his reasoning, and that is a sound reflection. Nevertheless, he next reveals that he at this point is not preoccupied with what is best on behalf of Charmides. His occupation is to convince Socrates that Charmides is the best. He “not only outstrips his contemporaries in beauty of form but also in this very thing for which you say you have a charm” (157d2-3). What was it Socrates had a charm for? It was temperance, was it not, he must ask Socrates. When Socrates confirms that it was temperance, Critias replies, “Then you must know that not only does he have the reputation of being the most temperate young man of the day, but that he is second to none in everything else appropriate to his age” (157d4-7).⁴² What are we to infer from this? I understand it at this point to be an overdone boasting on behalf of Charmides and, maybe Socrates also suspects it is so.

Socrates response is to state that the reason why Charmides is superior to anyone else is that he descends from two prominent Athenian aristocratic families. By the description of Charmides’ lineage, which also included Critias’—Socrates has flattered them both, and he can return to his task. The situation now, according to Socrates, is that “if temperance is already present in you, as Critias asserts, and if you are sufficiently temperate, you have no need of the charms [...] and you may have the remedy for the head straightaway” (158b5-c1). If Charmides finds that he lacks these things, he must be charmed before he is given the remedy. Hence, Socrates challenges him, “Do you agree with your friend and assert that you already partake sufficiently of temperance (σωφροσύνης, 158c4), or would you say that you are lacking it?” The narrator now tells that at first Charmides blushed (ἀνερυθρίασας, 158c5) and looked more beautiful than ever, and that his bashfulness was becoming at his age. Charmides blushing is of another kind than the one Hippocrates experienced. When Hippocrates blushed, it was a result of an instant insight; Charmides’ blushing indicates rather that he is placed in an awkward situation. The narrator reports that this was how Charmides responded. He said it was not easy for him, in the present circumstances, either to

⁴² Critias’ ongoing defense of Charmides alludes to the way Theodorus defended the Eleatic Stranger; neither Critias nor Theodorus quite know what they are defending.

agree or to disagree with what had been asked. But, the narrator tells, Charmides answered in a way that was quite dignified when he said ...

... if I should deny that I am temperate, it would not only seem an odd (ἄτοπον) thing to say about oneself, but I could at the same time make Critias here a liar, and so with many other to whom, by his account, I appear to be temperate. But if, on the other hand, I should agree and should praise myself, perhaps that would appear distasteful. So, I do not know what I am to answer (158d1-6).

Now Socrates starts to investigate whether there is a beautiful soul hiding within this beautiful body.

8.3.2 Shallow beauty

“What you say appears to me to be reasonable, and I think we ought to investigate (σκεπτέον, 158e1) together whether you do or do not possess the thing I am inquiring about [...] If this is agreeable to you, I would like to investigate the question with you, but if not, we can give it up” (158d6-e4). Charmides would like this above all things, and he allows Socrates to “go ahead and investigate the matter in whatever way you think best” (158e5-6). Socrates proposes a method (σκέψις, 158e8). If temperance is present in him, Socrates supposes that Charmides has some opinion about it. Moreover, if the case is that it recedes in him, it necessarily provides a sense of its present. From these presumptions, Charmides is asked to form an opinion on that he has it and of what sort it is (158e7-159a4).

8.3.2.1 The opinion of the many

Charmides is now challenged to probe within, but he is very reluctant. Therefore, Socrates tries to appeal, “Well, then, since you know how to speak Greek [...] I suppose you could express this impression of yours in just the way it strikes you” (159a5-6). Perhaps, Charmides replies. Socrates now tries to plead, “Well, help us decide whether it resides in you or not, say what, in your opinion, temperance is” (159a7-b1). Now, the narrator informs us that he was rather unwilling to answer. Finally, “he said that in his opinion temperance was doing everything in an orderly and quiet way—things like walking in the streets, and talking, and doing everything else in a similar fashion” (159b-5). From this, Charmides infers that “taking it all together, that what you ask about is a sort of quietness.” (159b5-6). Socrates acts surprisingly

patient when he signposts that this is an opinion of the many for “at least they say [...] that the quiet are temperate” (159b7). They must see if this opinion could be right. Charmides is asked to consider whether temperance is an admirable thing. This he confirms immediately. After having performed an elenchus on him (159c2-160b2), they agree that temperance is not a sort of quietness. The reason why, Socrates explains, is that “both in soul and body, we think that quickness and speed are more admirable than slowness and quietness” (160b3-5). Socrates suggests that they start again, and this time he urges Charmides to “look into yourself” (σεαυτὸν ἐμβλέψας, 160d6) with greater concentration.

8.3.2.2 The opinion of Homer

Socrates tells him that after he has looked into himself, he shall decide what effect the presence of temperance has upon him and also state what sort of thing it must be in order to have this effect. Finally, he shall put all this together and tell clearly and bravely, what temperance, in his opinion, appears to be (cf. 160d6-e1). Maybe the narrator signals irony when he tells that Charmides paused and looked into himself very manfully (ἀνδρικῶς, 160e2). The tension of irony is indicated when I imagine this young man, not sure what to think or answer, pretends and tries to look like he is making a mature effort to do this introspection. It is possible I am wrong, but for me, that comment had an ironic and, hence, comic ring to it. When finished with this exercise, Charmides says, “Well, temperance seems to me to make people ashamed and bashful, and so I think modesty (αἰδῶς) must be what temperance is” (160e1-4). Socrates is not satisfied with that answer, and with reference to what has been said so far, he reminds Charmides that they already agreed that temperance was a good and admirable thing. Charmides now admits that he agrees with Homer when he said that “modesty (αἰδῶς) is not a good mate for a needy man” (161a3). From that concession, Socrates infers that modesty, it seems, both is and is not good. Thus, it is not compatible with temperance. Charmides is quick to give in and asks if Socrates can give his opinion of another definition on temperance.

8.3.2.3 *The opinion of Critias*

Charmides explains that he suddenly remembered having heard someone say that “temperance is minding one’s own business” (161b3-4). He wants Socrates’ opinion on this definition, and he also wants to know if Socrates thinks the person who said it was right. Socrates immediately recognizes this definition and proclaims, “You wretch (ὦ μισροῦ), you’ve picked this up from Critias or some other wise man” (161b6-c1). Critias instantly responds, “I guess it was from some other [...] because it was certainly not from me” (161c2). Socrates is not—at this point—very keen to explore the originator of the definition; the main issue “is not who said it, but whether is true or not” (161c5). “Now you speak correctly” (νῦν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, 161c6), Charmides replies, whereupon Socrates suggests that “[...] if we succeed in finding out what it means, I should not be surprised, because it seems to be a sort of riddle (αἰνίγματι)” (161c7-8).

This minor word exchange is telling on at least two textual levels. First, when Socrates addresses Charmides, he uses the word μισροῦ (μισρός). This means *defiled*, *polluted*, and in a moral sense it means *abominable*, *foul*.⁴³ Hence, Socrates’ reaction to Charmides’ request points to Critias whom Socrates now suspects to have polluted his protégé. When Socrates states that the issue is whether the proposed definition is true or not, Charmides compliments Socrates by the concluding words “you speak correctly.” This indicates that he wants to witness a Socratic investigation, and (I think) such an undertaking would be even more pleasing for Charmides as he is the one staging the whole enterprise. Surely, he has heard rumors of these proceedings, and he once observed—from distance—the grand debate between Socrates and Protagoras. Further, the word μισροῦ alludes to the *Apology*. When Socrates comments on the charge against him, he argues that his fellow citizens claim that “That man Socrates is a pestilential fellow (μισρώτατος, 23c9) who corrupts the young.” Hence, the accusation Socrates sets forth toward Charmides backlashes thirty dramatic years later. Secondly, Socrates claims that the author of the definition may have presented a riddle (αἰνίγματι). The word αἰνίγματι means *dark saying* or *riddle*. Critias will soon

⁴³ Cf. Liddle and Scott. In *Republic* 562d accused oligarchs (μισρούς τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς); this term is frequent in Aristophanes, cf. Adam, note on *Rep.* 562d.

use this meaning of the word when he, through his argumentation, refers to the Oracle of Delphi. However, it also alludes to the *Apology*, this time to Meletus who Socrates states “is like one who composed a riddle (αἴνιγμα) and is trying it out [...]” (27a1). Hence, the accusation Socrates sets forth toward Critias also backlashes thirty dramatic years later. These two instances make me suggest a third connection toward the *Apology*. This suggestion is related to the old rumors, but before I get into that, we need to return to the text and read a little bit further.

Through a short elenchus, Socrates demonstrates for Charmides that temperance cannot mean “minding your own business,” and he subsequently shows that the man who stated this apparently had been riddling, because, Socrates says, “I don’t suppose he was quite so simpleminded (εὐήθης, 162b1), or had he heard it from a silly fellow? No, on the contrary, Charmides apprehended him to be very wise. “Then I think he must certainly have tossed off a riddle since it is difficult to know what in the world this ‘minding your own business’ can be” (162b3-5). We, the readers, know that this is the way Socrates defined justice in the *Republic*, but is Charmides able to figure it out? “I’m at a total loss,” he says, “but perhaps the one who said it didn’t know what he meant either” (162b6-8). When Charmides uttered this, he gave a sly laugh (ὕπεγέλα, 162b9) and looked at Critias.

The narrator now takes the floor and tells that Critias had for some time been at unease because he was eager to impress Charmides and the rest who were there. He had held himself in with difficulty earlier, but now he could no longer do so. It is the narrator’s opinion that by now he was convinced that Charmides had picked up the definition of temperance from Critias. However, he explains that when Charmides gave in and stated he was in total loss, he intentionally tried to provoke Critias—as the author of the definition—to take over the argument. Critias, on the other hand, did not like this and seemed to be angry with Charmides. So, he gave him a look and said, “Do you suppose, Charmides, that just because you don’t understand what in the world the man meant who said that temperance was ‘minding your own business,’ the man himself doesn’t understand either?” (162d3-6).

8.3.3 Investigation and the Socratic topos

Socrates defends Charmides and responds rather rudely, “Well, my dear Critias, there would be nothing remarkable in his being ignorant (ἀγνοεῖν, 162e1) of the matter at his age, but you, because of your age and experience, are very likely to understand it.” It is remarkable that no one addresses the elephant in the room. The three men on stage now perform a false game of pretending. As Charmides was lured by Socrates and Critias to approach them, now Critias is lured by Socrates and Charmides. Charmides gave Critias away by a sly laugh and a gaze, we were told by the narrator that Critias was the author, but Critias believes that all believe that Charmides had heard the definition by someone else. This is the situation when Socrates addresses Critias and suggests, “if you agree that temperance is what the man said it was and take over the argument, I would be very happy to investigate (σκοποῖμην, 162e4-5) with you the question whether what was said is true or not.” Critias gives his consent, and Socrates compliments him, “I admire you for that,” he says.

After Critias deepened his understanding of temperance as “minding your own business,” Socrates means to have identified the problem: Critias’ failure was not to distinguish between *making* (ποιεῖν) and *doing* (πράττειν)—he called them the same thing. With reference to Hesiod and many other men of sense, Critias tries to prove Socrates wrong. However, because Socrates had heard “Prodicus’ discourse on the distinction in words a hundred times” (163d4), he understood the first part of Critias’ explanation, but not the last part. Critias now refers to the inscription at Delphi and claims that “know thyself” is a riddle that means “be temperate.” Surely Socrates does not disagree in that temperance is to know oneself? Throughout Critias’ speech (164c6-165b4), we can detect a tone that becomes gradually more and more polemic—and I take it that it is this tone Socrates addresses when he replies and awakes the Socratic topos,

But Critias, [...] you are talking to me as though I professed to know the answers to my own questions and as though I could agree with you if I really wished. This is not the case—rather, because of my own ignorance, I am continually investigating in your company whatever is put forward. However, if I think it over, I am willing to say whether I agree or not. Just wait while I consider (165b5-c2).

Critias gives him time to consider. When done, Socrates presents an assumption with a twist compared with Critias' reference to the Delphic imperative, "[...] Well, if knowing (γινώσκειν) is what temperance is, then it clearly must be some sort of science (ἐπιστήμη) and, must be of something, isn't that so?" From the distinction "knowing" and "science" he creates some analogies for Critias to reflect on. For instance, medicine is the science of health, and it produces health; housebuilding is the science of building houses, and it produces houses, what is temperance the science of and what does it produce? Critias is not able to answer. Instead, he presents a counterclaim and stresses that Socrates is trying to refute him and ignoring the real question at issue (cf. 166c5). I think Critias has a point, but Socrates ignores it, and once again he activates the Socratic topos,

Oh come, how could you possibly think that even if I were to refute everything you say, I would be doing it for any other reasons than the one I would give for a thorough investigation of my own statements—the fear of unconsciously thinking I know something when I do not. And this is what I claim to be doing now, examining the argument for my own sake primarily, but perhaps also for the sake of my friends. Or don't you believe it to be for the common good, or for that of most men, that the state of each existing thing should become clear? (166c6-d6)

From this statement, we understand that Socrates possesses a groundbreaking fear of unconsciously thinking that he knows something that he does not know. This fear is the prime mover when he engages himself in an investigation, and hence, the investigations he sets in motion is primarily for his own sake. He also has the benefit of his friends in mind, but in this particular instance—is his concern related to Critias or Charmides? Critias has polluted Charmides, but will Charmides be able to learn anything substantial as an observer? Why does Socrates not pursue and make him probe into himself—as he did with Hippocrates and Alcibiades? Charmides was asked three times to perform this inner probing, but the only thing he did was to remember sayings on temperance that he had heard from others. Does this mean that Socrates has given up on him and thus chooses to confront the one responsible for the definition? I think the latter is the most probable. This preliminary conclusion points toward the third allusion to the *Apology* and the old rumors Socrates refers to in his defense. There Socrates explains how he gained enemies through his investigations. The men

questioned got angry with him, and the by-standing youngsters were amused. I take it that this situation—Charmides versus Critias—is an example of how the old rumors set off. Thus, we are about to witness how the politician is exposed in front of the crowd.

8.3.4 Critias and Socrates on stage

It takes courage to admit that maybe the entire body of what one thinks to know, is not to know at all. Therefore, Socrates starts with an appeal and asks Critias to be bold. He must answer the questions as the argument develops, and not pay so much attention to who is being refuted or not, “Give your attention to the argument itself to see what the result of its refutation will be” (166e2-3). For Socrates and the bystanders to be on the right track, Critias is asked to remind them what he earlier said that temperance was. Critias states that temperance is “the only science that is both a science of itself and the other sciences” (166e6-7). He follows Socrates’ appeal and through the discussion (cf. 166e-169b) they follow the argument without digression and work their way into an aporia. This is a difficult situation, so Socrates summarizes, whereupon he asks Critias to clarify some elements before they can conclude: “Do you then [...] since the definition of temperance as the science of science and, more especially, of the absence of science belongs to you, first clear up this point, that what I just mentioned is possible and then, after having shown its possibility, go on to show that it is useful. And so, perhaps, you will satisfy me that you are right about what temperance is” (169b5-c2). We do not learn what Critias answered to this demand, because the narrator again takes the floor.

He declares that when Critias heard this and recognized that Socrates was in difficulties (*ἀποροῦντα*, 169c3), he seemed to be affected by Socrates’ troubles and it further looked like he was seized by them. However, Critias does not have the courage to admit that he was incapable of dealing with the question posed, the narrator tells because his consistently high reputation made him feel ashamed in the eyes of the company. Critias said nothing clear. Instead he concealed his predicament. Nevertheless, Socrates wanted the argument to go forward. He therefore suggested that

the question whether the existence of a science of science is possible⁴⁴ was an issue they could investigate on some other occasion. At this point, it seems like Socrates rescues Critias from an awkward situation, but he does not cut him loose. Before he again introduces the problematic question, he encourages Critias to view the initial distinction “knowing oneself” versus “temperance” from another perspective, “Come then [...] is it possible to know what one knows and does not know? We did say, I think, that knowing oneself and being temperate consisted in this?” (169d2-8). This, Critias tries to explain, but Socrates is still at loss. “It is not this point on which I am confused, that whenever someone possesses this thing which knows itself, he will know himself, but how the person possessing it will necessarily know what he knows and what he does not know” (169e6-8). Critias claims that these elements are the same thing. Socrates is not content. Perhaps Critias is right, but—Socrates states, “I’m in danger of being as confused as ever, because I still don’t understand how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same thing as knowledge of self” (170a1-4). Critias now admits that he does not understand what Socrates means; hence, Socrates reintroduces the question of the possibility to claim that temperance is a science of science. Through an elenchus and, by using the same analogies as above, Socrates manages to complete the first part of refuting Critias’ definition of temperance. He launches medicine and politics as two distinct sciences. This is unproblematic. The problem arises as they are “concerned with science pure and simple” (170b3), because the person who lacks knowledge of the science of health and justice but knows science only (i.e., temperance)—and sees that this is the only knowledge he has—is it not likely that he knows that he knows something? But “how will he know whatever he knows by means of this science? Because he will know the healthy by medicine, but not by temperance, and the harmonious by music, but not by temperance, and housebuilding by that art, not by medicine [...]” (170b9-c4). Further, if temperance is merely a science of science, how will this person know the healthy, or housebuilding? Hence, the man ignorant of these additional sciences will not know *what* he knows; only that he knows (cf. 170c6-7). This gives way for the following conclusion: “This

⁴⁴ The problem of a science of science—or an art of art—Socrates also discussed with Thrasymachus, cf. *Republic*, 342b ff.

would not be being temperate and would not be temperance: to know what one knows and does not know, but only *that* one knows and does not know—or so it seems” (170d1-3). Critias agrees to this.

During the second part of Socrates’ refutation (170d-172d), Critias does not oppose Socrates’ proposals. Nevertheless, Socrates is not content because “what we were saying just now, about temperance being regarded as of great benefit (if it were like this) in the governing of households and cities, does not seem to me, Critias, to have been well said” (172d3-6). Critias does not understand where they failed. The failure was that they “carelessly agreed that it would be a great good for men if each of us should perform the things he knows and should hand over what he does not know to those others who do” (172d6-9). From my perspective, it would have been a paradox if Socrates had not commented upon this careless agreement. However, Critias was convinced that they had agreed and signals confusion for the first time, “You certainly say some queer things (ἄτοπα λέγεις), Socrates” (172e2). Socrates admits this atopos speaking—an admission that is yet another allusion to the *Apology*—where we will learn that the philosopher’s words and deeds are apprehended this way by the many.

When Socrates now proceeds, we recognize the philosopher at work. Strange things come to light if such an investigation is not correctly conducted, and this is exactly what he feared at the outset (cf. 166c). The problem now, according to Socrates, is that, so far, the investigation has demonstrated that no one benefits from temperance; at least this is what it looks like to the philosopher for the time being. Critias does not quite get it, and maybe he senses that Charmides is at loss too. Therefore, he appeals to Socrates, “Tell me, so that we can both understand what you are saying” (173a1-2). Socrates’ response to this appeal is an indirect hint toward the topos of philosophy and the importance of soul-caring. He states, “I think I am making a fool of myself (ληρεῖν με) [...] but all the same, it is necessary to investigate what occurs to us and not to proceed at random, if we are going to have the least care for ourselves” (173a2-5). Critias agrees. Socrates’ next move is to prepare the final refutation. He invites Critias to listen to his dream in order “to see whether it comes through horn or through ivory” (173a6-7). If they find it coming through horn it is

true; if it comes through ivory, it is deceitful.⁴⁵ Socrates presents his dream (173b-d), but the following discussion does not lead to a solution. On the contrary, the investigation failed, and after having stated the reasons why (175b-c), Socrates concludes that “there could be nothing more irrational than this” (175c6-7). Their investigation has not discovered the truth. According to the philosopher, it made fun of the truth in that it exposed temperance as useless. Therefore, Socrates is not so much vexed on his account as he is on Charmides.’

8.3.5 Charmides’ future education

Socrates now addresses Charmides, “I am very vexed indeed, if, with such a body and, also, a most temperate soul, you should derive no benefit from this temperance nor should it be of any use to you in this present life” (175d6-e2). He is even more vexed regarding the Thracian charm if it also should turn out to be useless and of no worth. He does not believe that temperance is useless, though, hence, he again appeals to the young man, “see whether you do have it and are in no need of the charm—because if you do have it, my advice to you would rather be to regard me as a babbler, incapable of finding out anything whatsoever by means of argument, and yourself as being exactly as happy as you are temperate” (176a1-4). What are we to make of this appeal? Charmides has observed the conversation between Socrates and Critias. He had listened to all the arguments, and he had heard Socrates explain where and why the investigation failed. Therefore, after this demonstration, he is better equipped and ought to be able to start his inner probing. If he, after this contemplative work, concludes that he possesses temperance, he is in no need of the charm and can view Socrates as a babbler. In this case, he will find himself to be in harmony; as happy as he is temperate. What happens next? Charmides once again argues that he does not know if he has temperance, whereupon he asks how he would know the nature of a thing when neither Socrates nor Critias were able to discover it (cf. 176a6-8). He adds that he does not really believe what Socrates said. Nevertheless, he says, “I think I am very much in need of the charm, and as far as I am concerned, I am willing to be charmed by you every day until you say I have had enough” (176b1-3). It is Critias,

⁴⁵ This is a reference to Homer, *Odyssey*, XIX: 564-67, cf. explanatory note from the translator, p. 660n9.

not Socrates, who responds to this. Critias applauds Charmides' answer and states that if he submits himself to Socrates' charm, Critias will be convinced that he is temperate. Charmides concludes that this is a course to follow; he would be acting badly if he fails to obey his guardian who instructs him to listen to Socrates. Without discussing the matter with Socrates, they decide between themselves that Socrates is going to be Charmides' teacher. When Socrates asks if they are going to use force and not give him "a preliminary hearing," Charmides confirms that they will force him. However, this is not the way it works.

Viewed from my perspective, I have witnessed the demiurge at work. First, he tried three times over to make Charmides think for himself whether he possessed temperance. Charmides was not able to. Instead, he referred to what others (the many, Homer, Critias) had said about the issue. This entails that the demiurge could not perform his procedure, that is, he could not set the false opinions in movement and help Charmides to hold on to the true ones. When Charmides' last suggestion was recognized by Socrates, Socrates turned to Critias who denied being the originator of the definition. Socrates did not give him away; instead, he tried to discuss the matter. Because Critias' occupation was to uphold his reputation and impress Charmides and the bystanders, the demiurge's work was cut off. Hence, the discussion led nowhere, and this made Socrates conclude that the investigation failed. Viewed from the philosopher's perspective, Critias—the guardian and mentor—was on his way to corrupt Charmides. Charmides, on the other hand, showed no intention to change his course. He was satisfied to receive inculcations, and that was also what he expected from Socrates. This implies that Charmides was barren and without the will to take on the inner probing, he had no need of Socratic guidance. From these indications, I think it is reasonable to conclude that Charmides belongs to the group of young men which Socrates declined.⁴⁶ In addition, Critias proclaimed that Charmides was both philosophic and temperate. When it now has been revealed that he was neither, this demonstrates that Critias was ignorant. In this regard, he is a manifestation of those men who claimed to know philosophy, and hence, gave Socrates and philosophy a

⁴⁶ Cf. chapter 1: *Preparing the stage*, section 1.2 The participants of the *Republic*, p. 52, and Niceratus whose father Nicias more than once asked Socrates to be engaged in Niceratus' education, but Socrates always suggested other teachers.

fabricated and false reputation.⁴⁷ The result of this was later picked up by Aristophanes and manifested in the comedy *Clouds* (424), as Socrates hints toward in the *Apology* when he describes the old rumors.

8.4 Summary

Regarding the main theme of this chapter—saving youths—I have presented three young men whom we meet at the outset of the corpus. What happened to Hippocrates we do not know because he is not mentioned later. However, it is possible to speculate. As the *Protagoras* is bracketed with the words “arriving” and “leaving,” the interesting question is who Socrates left with. Through the opening scenes, we witness two arrivals. First, Socrates arrives and meets his anonymous friend; second, Hippocrates arrives and knocks at Socrates’ door. When Socrates’ last word in the dialogue is “we left,” a consistent speculation would be that he left with Hippocrates because this closes the circle created by the movement and happenings enclosed between arriving and leaving. If this holds, then Socrates made Hippocrates turn toward philosophy and, thus, saved the nephew of Pericles from the sophistic teachings. Alcibiades, another nephew of Pericles, also turned toward philosophy. However, he was not sufficiently disciplined to take on the burden of learning. He was keen when he enjoined Socrates’ company, but when left alone, he was not able to uphold the training and rid his old habits. I think Alcibiades is an example of the young men who left, came back, and left again until Socrates declined him. Charmides was a lost case at the outset due to Critias. They were both barren, and neither of them showed signs of being able or willing to take on the work that fosters change. Hence, I think they were both declined by Socrates. Critias ended up as a member and leader of the Thirty in 404/03. According to Nails (2002, 110), Critias “appeared to have been one of the extreme members and personally to have plotted some of its most reprehensible measures: murders, confiscation, banishments, [and] mass execution of the citizen population of Eleusis.” He was killed at Munychia in battle with the returning democratic forces of Thrasybulus in May of 403. Charmides followed his

⁴⁷ Cf. the discussion in the *Republic* (A4, 490c ff.) on philosophers and non-philosophers.

mentor and became one of the ten who were chosen by the Thirty to govern the Piraeus in 404-03.⁴⁸ He was killed in the same battle as Critias.

⁴⁸ Cf. Nails (2002, 92). She underlines that it is a common mistake in the literature to mistake Charmides for being a member of the Thirty; on Charmides, see pp. 90-4.

Chapter 9: The Eleatic stranger: A turning point

When we now are about to be introduced to the Eleatic Stranger, we arrive at quite a different time and we will experience quite a different atmosphere. The dramatic dating is 399. The Peloponnesian War is over; the Athenians have lived through *stasis* and the gruesome rule of the Thirty, and started the restauration of democracy. Yesterday, after his conversation with Theaetetus, Socrates left in a hurry and, went to the King's Poarch to meet the indictment brought against him by Meletus (cf. *Theaetetus*, 210d). Today, when he meets his friends again, Theodorus has invited the Eleatic Stranger to come along. I apprehend the Eleatic Stranger to be a confusing character; hence I launch "confusion" as a theme. Moreover, this theme expands also outside the text. First, it is detectable within the history of the dialogue's reception,¹

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¹ This confusion is sort of manifested within the reception of the dialogue, and becomes visible when we ask what the *Sophist* is all about. The early grammarians assigned it to Plato's logical investigations. The Neo-Platonists prized it for a theory of ontological categories they preferred to Aristotle's. Modern scholars sometimes court paradox and refer to the *Sophist* as Plato's dialogue on not-being (because the question of not-being occupies much of the dialogue). Whitehead (1933) took the *Sophist* to be primarily about 'power' (δύναμις) and found in it many of the central ideas of process theology. Cornford (1935) argued that the *Sophist* is mainly about truth and falsehood. Both Ackrill (1957) and Frede (1967) claimed that the *Sophist* was about predication. Rosen (1983) treated it as a metaphysico-aesthetic dialogue: in his view it was about the relation of images to originals. Frede (1996) argues that the *Sophist* reveals the difference between the sophist and the true philosopher through their use of aporia. The aporia of the *Sophist* are used constructively, to help us get clear on the subject. Notomi (2007, 1) argues that the issues discussed are "so problematic and so important in the history of philosophy that philosophers have hardly ever asked what problem the *Sophist* really confronts [...] they have taken the 'problems' for granted." Most readers isolate particular parts and thus ignore the context; but according to Notomi "the whole context alone can fix the meaning Plato originally gave to each particular issue, and present us with living problems of philosophy" (ibid, p. 9). Brown (2010, 170) concludes that the *Sophist* has revealed to the reader a great deal about the contrast between the approach and interests of the sophist, but it has "done so *not* by producing a definition-by-division of the sophist that is intended to be correct; it leaves open the question how high Plato's hopes were for the method if used on a more promising subject-matter than sophistry." Ambuel (2007, 4) argues that the *Sophist* is an "examination of Eleaticism and sophistry" and that the dialogue is "systematically ambiguous, it invokes a method that it does not correctly follow. If so, then the dialogue ties, rather than unties, a philosophical knot: it is aporetic," (ibid, p. 11). Zuckert (2000, 97) addresses the differences between the philosopher and the sophist revealed in the *Sophist*, and concludes that "If philosophy consists in knowledge—either of the whole or merely of self—by the end of this dialogue, we see, neither Socrates nor the Stranger is

and secondly, it is supported through the two opposing manuscripts which I return to below. Thus, how are readers to understand the main speaker of the *Sophist*? Who is he? Or, what is he? For many decades it has been commonly assumed that the Eleatic Stranger simply speaks for Plato,² a consensus about to dissolve.³ For example, Seth Benardete (1993, 750) argues that “in the first half of the *Sophist*, the Stranger presents himself as a hunter of the hunter sophist [...] and the Stranger is himself the model for the sophist.” At the outset of his reading, Howland (1998a, 189) claims that the Stranger “imitates the sophist in cloaking his method in the appearance of knowledge.” Later, he “faults the Stranger, ultimately, for employing this quasi-mathematical method in a ridiculously rigid manner and for neglecting Socratic concerns with Eros and the human soul.”⁴ Victorino Tejera (1999, 201) and (1978a) does not talk of the Stranger at all, but of the Elean Sophist; and further, he also identifies the Stranger as a sophist in the *Statesman* and accuses him for fabricating clever arguments in a pseudo-Socratic manner (1978b). Benitez (1996, 37) reaches the conclusion that “it appears as though the Eleatic ξένος is a sophist. If he is Plato’s mouthpiece, then Plato is a sophist.” So, who is the Stranger? Plato’s mouthpiece, thus a philosopher, a model for the sophist, an imitator of the sophist, or is he a sophist?

Following this introductory backdrop, my aim in this chapter is to show that in the *Sophist*, the Stranger *appears* as a sophist. I will state reasons for this argument through a two-step-reading. First, the reading of the prologue intends to divulge the setting which the upcoming drama evolves from. Secondly, I will perform a close reading of the paradigm division and the upcoming three divisions. The paradigm division—modelled on the angler—is presented by the Stranger as *the method* that will

a philosopher. If philosophy consists merely in the search for wisdom, Socrates and the Stranger represent different routes, each able to give an account of some of the relevant phenomena, neither able to give an account of the whole.” By examining the Stranger’s methodology in contrast to that of Socrates in the *Theaetetus*, McCoy (2008, 139) argues that the *Sophist* and *Theaetetus* as “a pair demonstrate that the philosopher-sophist contrast is relative to the way in which one constructs a positive understanding of philosophy,” and concludes that “while the Stranger defines sophistry in such a way that he would separate his own activity from that of the sophists, the drama of the dialogue suggests that Socrates would not consider the Stranger to be a philosopher.”

² Some examples on scholars employing and defending mouthpiece-theories: Friedländer (1929-30), Whitehead (1933), Cornford (1935), Ackrill (1957), Vlastos (1991).

³ Some examples on scholars questioning the mouthpiece-theory: Rosen (1983), Benitez (1992), Howland (1998a), Tejera (1999), Gonzalez (1995a).

⁴ Summarized by Zuckert (2000, 95n74).

enable him and Theaetetus to hunt down the sophist. The slow reading of the upcoming three divisions will reveal how the proposed method is gradually abandoned. So by paying attention to what the Stranger is actually doing, I suggest that due to discrepancies between deeds and words,⁵ he himself slowly but surely starts to look like a hunting sophist, and consequently Theaetetus starts to appear as the hunter's prey. The impact of this unhurried turnabout is progressively dawning on the reader. The hunting method camouflages a hunting metaphor which conceals a threefold hunt: as a reader I start hunting the Stranger in order to grasp who he is or what he is; Theaetetus believes he is hunting the hunter sophist, while the Stranger, in a deceptive hunt—as a last resort—is hunting Theaetetus. So, let us enter the prologue.

9.1 The Prologue (216a1-217b9)

As stated earlier, the prologue of a dialogue is always significant because it sets the stage by presenting the characters and, hence, the theme of the dialogue is revealed.⁶ The prologue of the *Sophist* is rich and gives the readers several hints and clues regarding the identity of the Stranger. Practically before starting to read, we are presented to an ambiguity due to two manuscripts which give us two versions of the opening lines stated by Theodorus, one manuscript read,

Socrates, [...] we're bringing a Stranger, he's from Elea and he's *a companion* (ἑταῖρον) of the group who gather around Parmenides and Zeno [...] ⁷

and the other,

Socrates, [...] we're also bringing this Stranger who comes from Elea, *but he's different from* (ἕτερον) the group who gather around Parmenides and Zeno [...] ⁸

⁵ Cf. Howland (1998a, 173): "Plato leaves no doubt that the *Sophist* cannot be understood without attention to what the Stranger shows of himself in his *deeds* as well as what he says in *argument*." I agree with Howland when he argues that the Stranger's deeds and arguments ought to be central issues when reading the *Sophist*, but our readings do not reach the same conclusion.

⁶ On the importance of the prologues of the dialogues, see Gonzalez (2003, 16). On the importance of establishing the "dramatic setting" and "place" of the dialogues, see especially Hyland (1994) and (1995).

⁷ Codex Oxoniensis Clarkianus 39 - 895 AD; this manuscript is widely used and defended, and commonly used by commentators and scholars.

⁸ Vindobonensis 21 (saec. XIV); this manuscript is strongly defended by Nestor-Luis Corderos, *Le Sophiste*, (Paris, Flammarion, 1993), and Emilsson (2004, 231-47).

These two versions of the opening-lines hold quite different allegations as the first states that the Stranger is a companion (ἑταῖρον) of those who gather around Parmenides and Zeno, and the second that he is different (ἕτερον) from them. The first gives reason to view him as a philosopher belonging to a philosophical tradition, the latter does not. Together this creates a puzzle which I choose to leave undiscussed at this point, however, I bear it in mind and will conclude after the reading.

When introducing the newcomer to Socrates, Theodorus⁹ sets the atmosphere of the prologue by his excited and enthusiastic mode. Theodorus appears delighted when he points out that the visitor “is very much a philosopher (μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον, 216a4).” Socrates’ reaction to Theodorus’ delight is noteworthy. Maybe, by his response, Socrates’ intention is to tone down Theodorus’ eagerness, and thus neutralize the situation: “Are you bringing a Stranger, Theodorus? Or are you bringing a god without realizing it instead, like the ones Homer mentions? He says gods accompany people who are respectful and just” (216a5-b1). Here we identify a dual Homeric allusion, both related to Zeus, the god who protects all travelers. The first can be taken simply as an appeal to treat all visitors respectfully (cf. *Odyssey*, 9: 269-71). The second transports us to a particular situation at the end of the *Odyssey*: after Antinous knocks down the still unrecognized Ulysses who at this point is disguised like a tramp, he receives a negative reaction from the others present:

Antinous, you did ill in striking that poor wretch of a tramp: it will be worse for you if he should turn out to be some god – and we know the gods go about disguised in all sorts of ways as people from foreign countries, and travel about the world to see who does the right things (*Odyssey*, 17: 483-7).

⁹ Theodorus is a teacher of mathematics; he had known Protagoras and the Heraclitenas (*Theaetetus* 161c, 164c, 179e-180c); he might therefore be expected to have developed some convincing mixture of geometry and the partitive sophistic of his friends. And, Theodorus does not give general cases by dividing oblong from square numbers; instead he proves individual cases (*Theaetetus* 147d) and furthermore, at 165a Theodorus confesses he turned too early from dialectic to geometry, and at 180c he hopes to analyze the problems of universal motion as if they were purely geometrical, thus he is unable correctly to apply his mathematics to the concrete philosophical situation, cf. Plochmann (1954, 226). Theodorus takes on the same role in the prologue of the *Theaetetus* when he very eager and passionate is trying to initiate a meeting between his old friend Socrates and his most promising student, Theaetetus.

This can be interpreted at least in two ways. First, it could be read as a warning from Socrates to Theodorus. It is as if Socrates is asking Theodorus: Are you sure you know who the Stranger is? Or, are you sure that the Stranger is what he appears to be? Secondly, it can be taken as an ambiguous clue for the readers toward the Stranger; a clue which is underscored twice by Socrates. First, when he questions Theodorus' judgment by indicating that he has brought "a god without realizing it," and thereafter when he states rather ironically: "Your Stranger might be a greater power following along with you, a sort of god of refutation to keep watch on us and show how bad we are at speaking—and to refute (ἐλεγκτικός) us" (216b7-8). The ironic underlining hits the reader when Socrates is connecting the Stranger and "a god of refutation." In Socrates' first reply to Theodorus, the dual Homeric allusion was identified as pointing toward Zeus, but this second reply points toward quite another direction: here he alludes to Hermes. Hermes, the god of transitions and boundaries, quick and cunning, who moves freely between the worlds of the mortals and the gods, a protector and patron of travelers, orators and wit, invention and trade, and more. But he is also a trickster and outwits others for his own satisfaction. The impact of Socrates' two replies indicates that he, through these allusions and ironic outbursts, somehow suggests that he recognizes the Stranger, that he has met his kind before: He is a man reminiscent of a sophist, quick, cunning, sort of a trickster. Theodorus does not agree: "That is not our Stranger's style (τρόπος), he is more moderate (μετριώτερος) than those who are eager to debate (ἔριδας), or do combat with words" (216b7-8). Theodorus quickly adds that he does not hold the Stranger to be a god, but he is divine—as Theodorus holds all philosophers to be. The ones "eager to debate" points to the new breed of sophists,¹⁰ but if one is more moderate than them does it follow that one is a philosopher? Theodorus seems to think so, but it looks like Socrates disagrees when he claims that the "family" (γένος, 216c3) of philosophers is as difficult to distinguish as the family of the gods. This, he explains, is because the "genuine philosophers (ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, 216c6)," by contrast to the fake ones, take on all sorts of different appearances due to the ignorance of people. Is Socrates, by these comments, implying that Theodorus is ignorant, or is this a hint related to the

¹⁰ By "a new breed of sophists" I mean for example the two brothers we meet in the *Euthydemus*.

purported recognition of the Stranger? Or does he signal both? At this point I want to recapitulate for a moment and look into the prologue of the *Theaetetus*.

Theodorus signaled the same enthusiasm when he tried to arrange a meeting between Theaetetus¹¹ and Socrates. In their initial talk, Socrates complimented Theaetetus and said: “For although Theodorus often gives me flattering testimonials for people, both Athenians and foreigners (ξένους), I assure you I have never before heard him praise anybody in the way he has just praised you” (149b6-9). Theaetetus suspected this was uttered as a joke, but Socrates assured him it was not. “That is not Theodorus’ way,” he says. Theodorus’ “way” translates τρόπος which in this context relates to the ordinary ethical meaning “character” or “temper,” thus, it looks like Socrates knows Theodorus better than Theaetetus knows him. When Theodorus, in the prologue of the *Sophist*, is echoing Socrates’ words, it gives the impression that Theodorus knows the Stranger better than Socrates does. But we know Socrates’ way from various dialogues, and according to that knowledge, is the meaning of the words uttered by Socrates in the *Theaetetus* transferable to the words uttered by Theodorus in the *Sophist*? I think not. Socrates recognizes the words uttered, and he also recognizes a certain kind of man (as suggested above). By repeating Socrates’ words, Theodorus appears to be an imitator of sorts, but the imitation backlashes. The impact is that the enthusiastic Theodorus does not know the Stranger as well as Socrates knows Theodorus.

As we know, Theodorus is not a philosopher but a well-known expert in geometry, and it seems reasonable to infer that Socrates does not look upon him as a person who is able to tell the difference between a genuine philosopher and a fake one. However, Theodorus’ rather vague differentiation between “philosophers” and “the ones eager to debate”—that the former are more moderate than the latter—points to the *Euthydemus*, where the two brothers from Thurii are presented as men “eager to debate or do combats with words.” They practice the art of eristic, which literally means “designed for wrangling.” No matter how one attempts to refute eristic

¹¹ Theaetetus is a student of mathematics and he knows some Eleatic doctrines. Theodorus is his teacher. The emphasizing of Theaetetus’ geometrical training is significant because—implicitly—he is presented as a person filling the qualifications of the *Republic*’s superior students (cf. *Republic*, 485b-487a, 503a ff.), pointed out by Plochmann (1954, 226).

arguments, the argument is designed so that any means of refutation will fail. When Socrates is describing the expertise of the two brothers to his friend Crito, he says,

They are both absolutely all-round fighters [...]. These two are first of all completely skilled in body, being highly adept at fighting in armor and able to teach this skill to anyone else who pays them a fee; and then they are the ones best to fight the battle of the law court and to teach other people both how to deliver and how to compose the sort of speeches suitable for the courts [...] not a single man can stand up to them, they have become so skilled in fighting in arguments and refuting whatever may be said, no matter whether it is true or false [...]. They can make any other person clever at the same things in a short time (*Euthydemus*, 271c8-272b4).

Could this be the kind that the Stranger differs from, according to Theodorus? And could this be the kind of man Socrates purportedly recognizes? Before concluding, let us read the last section of the prologue.

After Socrates stated that the “family” (γένος, 216c3) of philosophers is as difficult to distinguish as the family of the gods, he proclaimed that he would like the Stranger to explain what the people from his hometown thinks about the difference between the sophist, statesman, and philosopher. Theodorus quickly interrupts: “What, or what kind of thing, especially makes you consider asking the question? What special problem about them do you have in mind?” (217a4-5). How are we to understand this interruption? Theodorus knows Socrates’ way, so is he anxious and concerned that Socrates will make the Stranger uncomfortable? Socrates elaborates, “[...] did they think that sophists, statesman, and philosophers make up one kind or two? Or did they divide them up in three kinds corresponding to the three names and attach one name to each of them?” (217a6-8). Socrates’ elucidating explanation makes Theodorus at ease, “I don’t think it would offend him to tell us about it. Or would it, sir?” The Stranger does not have any objection, and agrees to communicate what Socrates requested. The enthusiastic Theodorus’ last utterance in the *Sophist* is telling, “Luckily, Socrates, you’ve gotten hold of words that are very much like the ones we happened to be asking him about. And he made the same excuse to us that he made to you just now—since he’s heard a lot about this issue, after all, and hasn’t forgotten it” (217b5-9). These words actually give further clues towards the identity of the Stranger. First, Theodorus comprehends the Stranger’s answer as an excuse. Secondly,

Theodorus says that the Stranger have told him that he *had heard* a good explanation which he still *remembers*. Both instances could suggest that the Stranger has nothing original to present and that he might be using a procedure which he once heard of and remembers. If Socrates at the outset recognized the Stranger's kind, the posed question which he laid before him could be understood as a test or a sort of trap. That is, Socrates probably already knows what they used to think about these things in Elea (note that Socrates also asks about these things in past tense: what *did* they think? [...] how *did* they divide [...]). Socrates' silence from this point forward also corresponds to this alleged recognition.¹²

9.2 Paradigm for the hunting-method (218b6-219b7)


The Stranger and Theaetetus have now decided that they will hunt down the sophist. As an introduction to the hunt, the Stranger presents a petition. Since it is “hard to hunt down and deal with the kind (γένος), sophist, we ought to practice our method (μέθοδος) of hunting on something easier first. [...] Do you want us to focus on something trivial and try to use it as a model (παράδειγμα) for the more important issue?” (218d3-9). Theaetetus finds the suggestion of practicing the method on something easy, agreeable. The Stranger then recommends the angler as a fitting, trivial issue because he is recognizable to everybody, and not worth being too serious about (218e4).¹³ Theaetetus' first task is to decide whether the angler is a kind of

¹² The assumed Socratic recognition can perhaps also be warranted through the fact that it is Socrates who set forth the issue discussed in the *Sophist*. The argument may find support in Notomi (2007). Notomi argues that in the *Sophist* Plato addresses the problem philosophy versus sophistry in order to set forth the worth of philosophy, which I also think is a theme in the *Protagoras*. Notomi claims that “Plato found that, without serious criticism of the sophist, there could not be philosophy” (301). This fundamental distinction is the backdrop of Socrates' upcoming trial. Thus, through the Stranger, Socrates seeks a defense against his Athenian accusers that can distinguish him from the teachings of the sophists. This last point is also made by Miller (1980, 2-11); Sallis (1996, 464), Gonzalez (2000, 163). And further, the difference between Socrates and the Stranger in this regard is, for example, commented on in detail by Rosen (1983, 20-8), and (1995, 2-4, 41-2, 50, 91, 154), Zuckert (2000, 97), and Gonzalez (2000, 168).

¹³ The angler “not worth being too serious about,” is a theme touch upon in Book VII of the *Laws*; the Athenian Stranger sets out the rules for hunting – which he treats as the last part of *paideia*. His listing is reminiscent of the Stranger's paradigm-division, except the items distinguished at, moves beyond, the fifth bifurcation (land-hunting and aquatic-hunting) in the upcoming paradigm-division. These items are, in the *Laws*, characterized as unworthy activities; and as such – the activities are not suitable for building the excellent character which the education in the *Laws* is aiming at; the practicing of enclosure- and strike-hunting are regarded as the most damaging undertakings. When

expert or not, “Tell me, shall we take him to be an expert (τεχνίτην) at something, or a non-expert (ἄτεχνον) with another sort of capacity?” (219a4-6). Quite confident, Theaetetus states that the angler is certainly *not* a non-expert. If so, the Stranger continues – what sort of expertise does he possess? He claims that “expertise (τεχνῶν) as a whole falls pretty much into two types,”¹⁴ the “art of production” (ποιητικὴν, 219b11) and the “art of acquisition” (κτητικὴ, 219c6). Agreeing upon the main categories of expertise, the first conclusion is reached: the angler is a kind of expert placed within the “art of acquisition.” On this ground they work their way through the first division which is supposed to be a paradigm (παράδειγμα) for the method (μέθοδος) that eventually will enable them to hunt down the sophist.

9.2.1 The paradigm-division (219b7-221c3)



formulating the prelude (προοίμιον) to the law on hunting, the Athenian Stranger states that “we hope you’ll never be seized by a desire or passion to fish in the sea or to angle or indeed to hunt water animals at all; and don’t resort to creels, which a lazybones will leave to catch his prey whether he’s asleep or awake” (823e1-4); thus, the subject in the paradigm-division – the angler – performs an activity labeled as unworthy by the Athenian Stranger, but the Stranger of the *Sophist* claimed that the angler was chosen because his expertise is trivial, and “not worth being too serious about.” So, in this regard, the two Strangers in the Platonic corpus contradict each other.

¹⁴ The phrase “two types” translates εἶδη δύο (219a8).

When the division is done with, the Stranger presents the summary in accordance with the division's succession,

Within expertise as a whole one half was acquisitive (κτητικὸν); half of the acquisitive was taking possession (χειρωτικὸν); half of possession-taking was hunting (θηρευτικὸν); half of hunting was animal-hunting (ζωοθηρικὸν); half of animal-hunting was aquatic hunting (ἐνυγροθηρικόν,); all of the lower portion of aquatic hunting was fishing (ἀλιευτικὸν); half of fishing was hunting by striking (πληκτικὸν); and half of striking was hooking (ἀγκιστρευτικὸν). And the part of hooking that involves a blow drawing a thing upward from underneath is called by a name that's derived by its similarity to the action itself, that is, it's called draw-fishing or angling—which is what we're searching for (221b2-c3).

Because the Stranger launched this division as a paradigm for the method, and because they both agreed upon using it for hunting down the sophist, it is worth examining its structure in depth. The paradigm-division falls into three sections, with three items in each section (cf. Benardete 1993, 758).¹⁵ The bifurcations of the three sections follow the same procedure and, thus establish a coherent pattern. In section 1 (cuts 1, 2, 3) they are dealing with the *manner* of the art, and the first question asked is, *what* kinds of expertise are there? When the Stranger performs cut 1, he claims that expertise (τεχνῶν) as a whole is usually divided into “art of acquisition” (κτητικῆ, 219c7) and “art of production” (ποιητικῆν, 219b11). Hence, at the outset he presents two main categories of expertise: production and acquisition. The dividing of the latter in cut 2 answers to the question, *where*, or within which areas, does the expertise unfold? He explains that it unfolds within “exchange” which is mutually willing exchange through gifts; wages or purchase (219d6 f.) and by “taking possession,” which denotes expertise in taking possession; or bringing things into one's possession by words or action/deed (219d7 f.). When he divides the latter in cut 3, the third question we pose is, *how* is the expertise executed? The Stranger elaborates: It is executed through the “art of combat” (ἀγωνιστικῆ, 219d12) which is conducted openly, and the “art of hunting” (θηρευτικῆ, 219e1) which is done secretly.

In section 2 (cuts 4, 5, 6) the Stranger establishes the *object* of the art; and his point of departure in this section is the secretive “art of hunting” (cut 3). From this

¹⁵ Benardete (1993) suggests that the paradigm-division falls into three sections where the manner-, object- and mean of the art are described, respectively. I found this suggestion to be very useful and have developed it further.

outset we now can ask, *what* kind of object is hunted for? Through cut 4 we learn that there is one kind without a name (ἀνώνυμον, 220a2) where the hunter is pursuing lifeless things, opposed to animal-hunting (ζωοθηρικὴν, 220a4-5) where the hunter is pursuing living things; thus the main object is animals alive. But *where* is the object hunted? First there is the land-hunting (πεζοθηρικόν, 220a9), the Stranger claims, where the hunter hunts animals with feet, opposed to aquatic-hunting (ἐνυγροθηρικόν, 220a10) where the hunter hunts animals that swim; this is displayed in cut 5. He further divides the latter and, thus answers a new question, *how* is the object hunted down? Cut 6 shows that it is through the “art of bird-catching” (ὀρνιθευτική, 220b5) or the “art of fishing” (ἀλιευτική, 220b7).

In section 3 (cuts 7, 8, 9) the Stranger establishes the *means* employed to catch the prey hunted for; and thus answers to, *what* kinds of means are used in the hunt? The “art of fishing” (cut 6) is now the point of departure and when divided (cut 7) into “enclosure-hunting” (ἔρκεσιν, 220b12) and “strike-hunting” (πληκτικὴ, 220d1), two main categories are exhibited. First “enclosure-hunting” which denotes the kind-all that surrounds and encloses anything to prevent egress, such as twig baskets, casting nets, nooses, creels. Then “strike-hunting” which is practiced by a blow with hooks and three pronged spears. The latter is further divided (cut 8) into nighttime hunt which is done by the “art of torching” (πυρρετικὴν, 220d7) and daytime hunt which is called “hooking” (ἀγκίστρευτικόν) as a whole (220d10). This explains *where* the means are used, and when. Daytime hunt is further divided (cut 9), and the Stranger gives answer to the question, *how* are the means used? On one hand there is “spearing” (220d10), which is done by striking a spear downward from above; the spear strikes any parts of the prey’s body; on the other hand there is “angling” (220d10) which is done with hooks; they are striking the prey’s head and mouth and pulls it upwards from below. This is what they are searching for, the Stranger concludes.

What is the Stranger doing here? Apparently, he is establishing a rather strict—and to a certain point inflexible—method. But he also creates the ground for an interesting game which exposes a further part of the Stranger’s own identity. For instance, after having agreed upon cut 6 (“art of bird-catching” versus “art of fishing”), and when about to perform cut 7 (“enclosure-hunting” versus the “art of strike-

hunting”), Theaetetus is asked if he has a better suggestion for the name “art of striking.” His reply in this is, “Let’s not worry about the name, that one will do (220d4).”¹⁶ The Stranger does not pay attention to the reply but continues and states, without being contradicted, that there actually *is* an “art of striking,” from which torching and hooking split off. According to Benardete (1993, 762; cf. Wallace 2007)¹⁷ an “art (τέχνη) of striking” did *not* exist as such in the empirical world and, thus the Stranger at this point is “laying himself open to the charge of making phantoms of the real.” The point taken, it is reasonable to conclude that this is a kind of “phantom-making,” which is going on throughout the divisions, and especially in the upcoming “hunter-division” (221d7-223b7). In addition it is pointing toward the dialogue’s last definition which states that the sophist belongs to the ‘blood and family’ of “imitation of the contrary-speech-producing, insincere and unknowing sort, of the appearance-making kind of copy-making, the word-juggling part of production that’s marked off as human and not divine” (268c8-d3). Does the Stranger at this point fit his own description?

Maybe, because long before the sophist is explicitly set in the class of image-making, the Stranger himself already here appears to belong to ‘the word-juggling part of production,’ the kind who uses nets made up by imitation which he initially set in the “art of production” (ποιητικὴν, 219b11). As we shall see, the two main, originally mutually exclusive, categories of “expertise”—“art of production” and “art of acquisition”—are blurred in the later exchange-division (cf. 223b8-224d3), which in turn undermines the paradigmatic function of the imperative paradigm division. In other words, the Stranger’s “phantom-making” at this point might not be accidental, but rather a hint pointing to the game he is about to initiate; and, thus a sign for

¹⁶ This quest which Theaetetus did not respond upon, can be read as a clue towards the Stranger and his “phantom-arts” which he is about to create – and especially in regard to the “art of striking.”

¹⁷ Benardete (1993, 758) states that the Stranger here “starts to duplicate the historical development of the *ικη*-suffix from being an ethnic to a skill.” That is, the discussion regarding “art” (τέχνη) going on in the fifth century denoted abilities such as “striking” related to hunt, an ability generally known; for example the knowledge of how to use a spear was a knowledge handed down from father to son (being an ethnic and an ability *generally* known), thus, not an “art” (τέχνη) which denotes an expertise, skill or a craft learned by a student from a master. The same instance we find if my father teaches me how to use a hammer and a spike, my father is teaching me a bit of general knowledge; but that kind of knowledge does not make me a carpenter (an expert within an art).

revealing his identity. Yet another element in this regard is his emphasizing on the *movements* concerning angling and spearing (cf. cut 9). *Spearing* is said to be done by striking downward from above and aims to strike any part of the prey's body (cf. 220e). *Angling*, on the other hand, is done with a hook, striking the prey's head and mouth and pulling it upward from below (cf. 220e-221a). Also in the summary these movements are underlined. First, when pinpointing the nature of angling as a method which involves a blow and drawing a thing upward from underneath, stating that it is called by a name which is derived by its similarity to the action itself, and, secondly, when concluding that the procedure is “called draw-fishing or angling – which is what we’re searching for.” Why this triple underlining of movements? The movement of the draw-fishing-procedure (angling) is in accordance with the movement of the Socratic dialectical method as we know it from various dialogues: Socrates activates an upward movement, from the particular to the general.¹⁸ The Stranger, however, advocates a method involving the opposite movement—from the general to the particular.¹⁹ In other words: when the Stranger performed the paradigm dividing, he underlined the angling-procedure, but performed the spearing-procedure. This emphasis on two opposite movements indicates not only a break with the familiar Socratic dialectics, but also that the art (τεχνή) as the point of departure of his divisions might be illusive, since they do not allow for a consistent method. Thus, the alleged outcome of the paradigm division, which was supposed to be an applicable method, is somewhat ambiguous and does not quite provide the simplicity which the Stranger anticipated, or pretended to anticipate. But still, it is the paradigm for the method. When the Stranger

¹⁸ Plochmann (1954, 230n17) points out that “the whole problem of the nature of dialectic is so intricate that it would be folly to do more than offer a working definition of it here. We are given many accounts, a number of them highly figurative: a) dialectic is a way of beating up game (*Republic*, 432b-e); B) dialectic is like a sight (*Republic*, 532a); c) dialectic is a copingstone (*Republic*, 534e); d) dialectic is of carving at the joints (*Pheadrus*, 265e); e) dialectic is a net (*Sophist*, 235b); f) dialectic is the harmless amusement of old men (*Laws*, 820c). Nearly every utterance in the dialogues is dialectical in this sense: every main speaker seems to have a dialectic, even if it be foreshortened incoherent obscure.”

¹⁹ Cf. Emilsson (2004, p. 323n21), comments on the method employed in the dialogue generally, and especially on the science of dialectic when mentioned at 253d1-4: Just prior to this point the Stranger is pondering: “What if we, when hunting the sophist, have found the philosopher? [...] Aren’t we going to say that it takes expertise in dialectic to divide things by kind and not to think that the same form is a different one or that a different form is the same?” (253c8-d4). Regarding the science of dialectic Emilsson (2004) is in agreement with Plochmann (1954).

underlined the “art of striking” as an art (τεχνή) he went against the truth of the arts, and when making “phantoms of the real” he simultaneously started to set forth phantom-speeches (cf. Benardete 1993, 758-60). However, Theaetetus believes that he is prepared to start the hunt for the sophist within the “art of acquisition” where the Stranger placed him, but the Stranger is, in addition, starting a parallel hunt rooted within the “art of production” (ποιητικήν), which he set aside at 219b11. How does it develop?

9.3 First interlude

The Stranger now creates a small interlude which serves as a steppingstone for a series of twists and turns and, he moves faster than before, “Well then, let’s use that model (παράδειγμα) to try to find the sophist, and discover what he is” (221c5-6). This is a sort of clarifying moment because now the reader realizes why they undertook the particular division, and further, comprehends exactly what Theaetetus and the Stranger are searching for. But this flash of clarity is not long lasting due to the Stranger’s next remark. It is problematic, and signals a new twist: “The first question, then, was whether we should suppose that the angler is a layman (ιδιώτην), or that he’s an expert (τέχνην ἔχοντα) at something “ (221c8-10). The problem is that this was not the first question. The first question was posed at 219a4-5, framed in terms of an opposition between the expert (τεχνίτην) and the non-expert (ἄτεχνον). The Stranger now pretends to refer to an earlier question, and Theaetetus does not notice that he by that pretending is given quite a different opposition to consider. The opposition now is whether the angler is a layman (ιδιώτην) or an expert (τεχνίτην). By introducing a new opposition just by substituting one of the initial main categories, the Stranger transports the angler into a different domain. As Theaetetus does not respond to the substitution, the Stranger goes on, “Well, shall we suppose that the sophist is a layman (ιδιώτην) or completely and truly an expert (ἄληθῶς σοφιστήν)?” (221d1-2). When responding, Theaetetus seems to be awake: “He’s not a layman at all. I understand what you’re saying: he has to be the kind of person that the name sophist indicates” (221d3-4). If this little word exchange can be read as a test, then Theaetetus appears to be clever—but is he? According to the agreement and the conclusion reached at 221c1, a name was to be derived from an activity; not the other way around. Does he stretch

this point by assuming that a person's capacity can be derived from the name?²⁰ Why does not the Stranger comment on this apparent fallacy? From a logical point of view, the question posted could be read as a tautology: Is the sophist truly a sophist? If this is the case, then it would be pointless to deny it—but Theaetetus did not see this. It is also possible that the Stranger's agenda, by this twist, is aiming to prepare Theaetetus for the upcoming division. By introducing the opposition “layman versus skilled man,” he points towards the fourth bifurcation. If so, the twist gives reason to ask if the Stranger is being programmatic. In other words, is he following some kind of pre-designed and readymade procedure?²¹ If this is the case, it suggests that the Stranger holds pre-determined schemes and as such these operations, or separations, are directing us—once more—toward a sophistic performance, similar to the one we can witness in the *Euthydemus*.²²

The conclusion reached in this Interlude, is that the sophist is skilled, and Theaetetus now wants to know what the expertise of the sophist really is (cf. 221d6). The Stranger's response to this is remarkable, “For heaven's sake, don't we recognize that the one man belongs to the same kind (συγγενῆ) as the other?” (221d7-8). He now gives the impression to be surprised! By the outbreak “for heaven's sake,” he signals to have gained some insight through the paradigm dividing. Did he just now realize that the angler and the sophist both appear to be hunters? I do not think so. As I find the Stranger's arguments very similar to the classifying of hunting and hunting techniques displayed by Xenophon in *On Hunting*, I take the “sophist-hunter” to be a well-known metaphor of sort. By launching the kinship between the sophist and the hunter, the Stranger also offers the same routine as Xenophon when he gives a detailed submission of hunting in course of his twelve first chapters; and leaving the last chapter to a profound comparison between the hunter and the sophist, through which

²⁰ The young Hippocrates makes the same inference in the *Protagoras*. When asked what the sophist is, he answers: “as the name suggests, he is someone who has an understanding of wise things,” cf. 312c; thus, he derives skills from the name. The same fallacy is pointed out in the *Republic* with regard to the women, cf. chapter 6: *The demiurges of freedom*, section 6.1.1: The power of the contradicting art, pp. 215-18.

²¹ Plochmann (1954, 227) argues that the Stranger's lists are ready made in advance.

²² Protagoras presents a list at 334a2-c7 that resembles these “pre-determined schemes” when he argues that he knows a lot good things that are not of advantage to human beings. The narrator tells that when he said this those present broke into applause as though he had spoken well.

we learn how the sophists hunt down their preys. According to Xenophon, the sophists are ...

... engaged in robbing private persons of their property, or plundering the state, they render less service than private persons when plans for securing the common safety afoot, and in body they are disgracefully unfit for war because they are incapable of toil. But huntsmen offer their lives and their property in sound condition for the service of the citizens (13: 11).²³


Xenophon completes his comparison by stating the while huntsmen “attack the wild beasts, those others [i.e., the sophists] their friends. And whereas those who attack their friends earn infamy by general consent, huntsmen by attacking wild beasts gain a good report” (13: 12). Related to the *Sophist*, Xenophon confirms the coining “angler versus sophist,” and by this he further confirms that this was an issue discussed in contemporary Athens.²⁴ Thus, the Stranger’s surprise is not trustworthy. A more plausible conclusion regarding the alleged surprise is that he tried to camouflage that he had forgotten the course of a pre-designed scheme.

Therefore it is no wonder that Theaetetus at this point seems to be troubled. The worry is detectable in his next initiative: “We said which kind of hunting the angler does. What kind does the sophist do?” (221e1-2). His question is not answered. Instead the Stranger refers to the paradigm division, fifth bifurcation (land-hunting versus aquatic-hunting) and explains that when the angler went to the ocean, the rivers, and lakes to hunt the animals there, the sophist went to the land and different kinds of rivers, which are like plentiful meadows of wealthy youths, to take possession of the living things there. This is the point of departure for a new division. The subject is the hunter, and the division develops from land-hunting, the fifth bifurcation in the paradigm division.

²³ The same theme is discussed in Isocrates, *Against the Sophists*, where he pronounces: “Now as for the sophists who have lately sprung up [...] although exhorting others to study political discourse (they) neglected all the good things this study [i.e. the study of rhetoric] affords, and became nothing more than professors of meddlesomeness and greed” (19-20). The new kinds of sophists are aggressive word-twisters, quite different from the ones from the past. The teachings of the older sophists are discussed by Isocrates in the *Antidosis*.

²⁴ On this, see Wallace (2007).

9.4 Division 1 of 3: The Hunter (221d7-223b7)



Already from the start, at cut 1 “hunting wild animals” versus “the art of hunting tame animals” (222c3), Theaetetus signals some kind of doubt, or surprise, when he asks: “Is there any such things as hunting tame animals?” (222b6). The Stranger answers that “there is if human beings are tame animals, at any rate” (222b7). He continues by giving Theaetetus some options, and tells him to decide,

Either, there are no tame animals, or
 there are tame animals but humans are wild, or
 humans are tame but are not hunted.

These options are presented in a disjunctive form (either ... or), but the disjunction seems less than exhaustive of the possibilities. Is this something that requires a response? Is it a trap, or is it a test? If this can be read as a test directed toward Theaetetus, he at this point emerges quite clever. He chooses *none* of the options offered him; instead he confirms the Stranger’s first suggestion: “I think we’re tame animals and I’ll say that humans are in fact hunted” (222c1-2). Without further remarks, they proceed from an agreement that there *is* a kinship between the angler and the sophist. The angler and the sophist are joined in the “art of acquisition” but

split off when the division reached animal-hunting. This premise suffices to allow the Stranger and Theaetetus to divide without further interruptions.

The “art of hunting tame animals” is divided (cut 2) into “violent hunting” (βίαιον θήραν, 222c5) versus the “art of persuasion” (πιθανουργικήν, 222c9-d1). The former includes piracy, enslavement, tyranny and everything that has to do with the “art of war” (πολεμικήν), whilst the latter sums up arts such as legal oratory, political oratory and conversation. The “art of persuasion” is further divided (cut 3) into “persuasion in public” (δημοσία, 222d5) and “persuasion in private” (ιδίᾳ, 222d5). So far the Stranger has followed the method put forth in the paradigm dividing, hence section 1 (cut 1, 2, 3) exhibit the *manner* of the land-hunting and the questions related to the manner of the art, *what-*, *where-* and *how-*, has been dealt with respectively. According to the proposed method in the paradigm it would now be reasonable to expect the Stranger to continue by displaying the *object* of the art,²⁵ however, he does not, and at this stage he actually abandons the paradigm altogether. How? The expectation would be that the “art of persuasion in private” (cut 3) should have been cut off further, but instead the “art of persuasion in public” and the “art of persuasion in private” are now cut off separately. Thus, it looks like he is starting to duplicate the paradigm structure within this hunter-division.

Persuasion in public (cut 3) is done by gift-giving (cut 3.1); this is the art of love (ἐρωτικῆς), and the hunt for lovers (ἐρώντων θήρα). But, still, it is not quite clear what the Stranger actually states here. The reason for this puzzle is a genitive construction pointed out by David B. Robinson (1999, 141),²⁶ and it makes me at unease. Straight forward, the construction means “giving gifts is a species of erotic pursuit;” but it is also possible to understand it as a definition: “giving gifts constitutes erotic pursuit.” However, the latter could be taken as the whole of erotic pursuit is gift-giving, and then all gift-giving is erotic pursuit. The ambiguity of this statement is not commented on, and the hunt of lovers is not discussed further. Thus, this is obviously a major

²⁵ Cf. section 2 in the paradigm-dividing.

²⁶ Robinson points out this puzzle with regard to the genitive-construction as he asks: “Should logic prevail over humor, or vice versa?” I do not think that this is an example on Plato’s humor; I think the matter is quite another.

deviation from the proposed method, and the clarity that these divisions were supposed to contribute to, is dissolving.

The opposite, persuasion in private (cut 3) is done by wage-earning (cut 3.2), and called “the art of private hunting” (ιδιοθηρευτικῆς, cut 3.2.1). The Stranger now wonders: The one who claims to deal with people for the sake of virtue, does not he deserve to be called by another name? Theaetetus’ answer is peculiar: “It is obvious. I think we have found the sophist” (233a9-11). So, according to him they have now captured the sophist for the first time. However, the Stranger does not allow Theaetetus’ conclusion; instead he moves on to summarize.²⁷

According to this argument (λόγον), it seems that this sort of expertise belongs to the art of appropriation (τέχνης οικειωτικῆς), the art of acquisition (κτητικῆς), the art of hunting (θηρευτικῆς), the hunting of the living (ζωοτηρίας), the hunting on footed animals (πεζοθηρίας), animal living on dry land (χερσαίας), the art of hunting tame animals (ήμεροθηρικῆς, cf. cut 1), human hunting (ἀνθρωποθηρίας, cf. cut 1), hunting privately (ιδιοθηρίας, cf. cut 3), the art of wage-earning (μισθαρνικῆς, cf. cut 3.2), the art of money-changing (νομισματοπωλικῆς), the art of opinion teaching (δοξοπαιδευτικῆς) which is performed by the hunting of rich, prominent young men. And according to the way our account has turned out, it’s what should be called the art of the sophist (σοφιστικῆ, cf. 3.2.1.2).²⁸

The terms underlined above are the “new arts” presented in the summary only, and Theaetetus’ reaction to this, is approval. However, the Stranger’s summary is not a summary of the argument; it just appears to be. It is presented as if the Stranger had just performed one division; he does not take into consideration that he doubled the division after cut 3. In addition, there are arrivals of terms in the summary which were not part of the argument, such as the “art of appropriation,” the “art of money-

²⁷ Regarding this summary there are some manuscript-discrepancies, but according to Benardete (1960, 129) “all the original readings are defensible [...] it looks at first as if the summary (223b1-7) should show a progressive narrowing of the range within which the sophist is contained; but since it does not, the text has been changed to make it conform with our expectations.” According to Robinson (1999, 141), in this summary “confusion reigns [...]: (i) terms are present which were not used earlier, and (ii) in the mss. text there is undoubtedly some redundancy; there are too many terms in this resume to fit the preceding division.” The explanation for these discrepancies is twofold: “(a) Plato had varied his terminology in making the resume, but (b) some redundant terms were glosses added by scholiasts from the original terminology.” (ibid.). One of the most spectacular cases of agreement with this judgment can be found in Cornford (1935, 170) who omits to translate the division-sections because “the modern reader [...] might be wearied.”

²⁸ *Sophist*, 223a12-b5. The translation of the summary is partly mine, and thus it differs slightly from White’s due to the Greek additions as I use Auguste Diès.

changing,” and the “art of opinion teaching.” It is also noteworthy that these arts do not have equivalents in the empirical world, so why does not Theaetetus comment on these alleged new arts? What is the impact of these discrepancies? In order to answer, I will try to reveal, step by step, what the Stranger is doing in course of this summary.

He starts by deriving the “art of acquisition” from the “art of appropriation (τέχνης οικειωτικῆς).” This does not sound right, because the art of appropriation is not distinguishable from the art of acquisition unless, with Benardete’s words, “we realize that a pair of terms is needed to point up the double way the class of acquisition was originally defined” (1960, 131). So, what was the double way of the original definition? All arts, said the Stranger, fell under two kinds (εἶδη δύο, cf. 219a8); the art of production handled “being” (ὄντα) and “becoming” (γεγονότα), versus the art of acquisition in which nothing was produced. These two were set as main categories, and a main category cannot be derived from a sub category. In addition, the art of acquisition established the manner of the art (in accordance with the paradigm); hence, the art of appropriation must refer to the object of the art (i.e., what is to be appropriated?). Therefore, the deriving executed by the Stranger, is unsound. However, what about the impact of this mistake?

Theaetetus believes they are equipped with a paradigmatic method and therefore he also apprehends himself to be a hunter hunting the hunter-sophist—but as a pure hypothetical being, and because he has never experienced meeting a sophist,²⁹ he does not himself know exactly what kind of creature he is trying to hunt down. The result of Theaetetus’ ignorance is that as a hunter he also believes he has captured the sophist for the first time and, his ignorance is further displayed when he accepts the deviations of the hunter-division as well as the discrepancies between the presentation of the division and the summary. The Stranger also appears to be a hunter—but now placed within the phantom-art of striking.³⁰ He has also started to display a grave discrepancy between his “words and deeds”—he is not doing what he says he is doing. He has

²⁹ *Sophist*, 239e1, cf. Benardete (1993, 750), and Plochmann (1994, 226). They both argues that compared with the other youths we meet throughout various Platonic dialogues, Theaetetus – who has never met a sophist – stands as the most innocent in this regard.

³⁰ The “art of striking” as such, does not exist in the empirical world – thus, it is denoted here as a phantom-art.


abandoned the method and his last summary does not summarize what he claims it is. Theaetetus' silence and total acceptance, makes him start to appear as a prey. In addition, it also starts to dawn on the reader that Theaetetus is being exposed to a kind of manipulation not recognizable to him, but which has an impact on the reader who recognizes the Stranger's phantom-speeches through which he is presenting phantom-arts with ridiculous names.³¹ The manipulation can also be sensed as the Stranger moves faster and faster. It is noticeable how the speed or tempo, *in* the summary, has increased compared to the summary of the paradigm division. This is visible through the disappearance of conjunctions.³² From here on forward, textual twist and turns are to become more frequent and the textual tempo is increasing. These incidents create a set of discrepancies which gives reason to suspect that the originally proposed method was abandoned almost at the outset. That is, the methodical hunt which the Stranger initiated is now transformed into a metaphorical hunt where the hunted prey is Theaetetus. And, by paying attention to the movements initially underlined, I noticed that the movement in the summary went down from above, which is in accordance with spearing. Thus, the hunted prey Theaetetus seems to be hit by the spear for the first time.

9.5 Division 2 of 3: Exchange (223b8-224d3)

They now take a short break, and during the pause the Stranger creates a new situation, which denotes a momentum that becomes visible as they move towards a new division. The point of departure is cut 4.2 in the previous hunter-division and the subject now is exchange.

³¹ The Stranger himself denotes some names as "ridiculous"; especially at 224b4 when referring to the art of soul-wholesaling (ψυχεμπορικῆς), and at 227a4-5 when referring to the cleansing of nonliving bodies "which have lots of specialized and ridiculous names".

³² By "disappearing of conjunctions" I mean that in the summary of the paradigm-dividing, the Stranger said, for example: half of the [...], and [...]. The impact in that regard was that the Stranger was patient and progressed slowly so that Theaetetus would be able to follow him. In course of this summary the easy-going is no longer present, and now the impression is that the tempo in the text – the dramatic tempo – is rapidly increasing.



The structure of this division resembles the paradigm division, but the use of phantom-arts is similar to the previous, except this time the phantom-arts are introduced in course of the division itself.³³ The “art of acquisition” is once again established as a main category, and is now cut off into “hunt” (θηρευτικόν, 223c7) versus “exchange” (ἀλλακτικόν, 223c7). “Exchange” is cut off into “giving gifts” (δωρητικόν, 223c10) versus “sale and commerce” (ἀγοραστικόν, 223c10). The latter includes the “art of selling” versus the “art of purveying,” that is, purveying of things other people make (μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικὴν, 223d3). It is interesting to note that the former, “art of selling,” is sale of things the seller himself makes (αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν, 223d2-3). The initial definition of the “acquisitive art” included the clause “the seller does not produce anything” (219c1-8). In other words, to be acquisitive was to be not-productive the Stranger then argued, but now he seems to be arguing the opposite: the “art of production” and the “art of acquisition” are no longer presented as mutually exclusive, as the initial definitions suggested. Why does not Theaetetus comment on this obvious contradiction? My suggestion is that he now is so confused by the Stranger’s many twists and manipulations that he is no longer able to follow him.

³³ Regarding this and the next dividing I will not comment upon the manner-, object- or mean of the art because this pattern which was presented systematically in the paradigm-dividing, is now abandoned pretty much in the same way as explained in the previous division.

The Stranger moves to cut 4 where the “art of purveying” is divided into the “art of retailing” (καπηλική, 223d5) versus the “art of wholesaling” (ἐμπορικῆς, 223d6). The former is purveying within the city, whilst the latter is exchange between cities, which in cut 5 is divided into the “sale of nourishment for the body in exchange for cash” (223d12-e2) versus “soul-wholesaling” (ψυχεμπορικῆς, 224b4). Let us take a closer look at bifurcation five and onwards. The Stranger elaborates, “Wouldn’t the right thing to say be that the art of display is one part of soul-wholesaling? And don’t we have to call the other part of it, the part that consists in selling knowledge, by a name that’s similar and also equally ridiculous?” (224b4-7). We are by now used to Theaetetus’ passive agreement, but what is he agreeing upon this time? That the “art of display” (ἐπιδεικτική, 224b4-5; cut 6) is one part of soul-wholesaling (cut 5), or that the name is ridiculous? He derives these names directly from an action, which obviously is an effective turn: Theaetetus becomes attentive and replies that he now has located the sophist for the second time. When noticing Theaetetus’ partaking, the Stranger quickly presents the summary,

We’ll say that the expertise of the art of acquisition (κτητικῆς), the art of exchange (μεταβλητικῆς, cut 1), the art of selling (ἀγοραστικῆς, cut 2), the art of wholesaling (ἐμπορικῆς, cut 4), the art of soul-wholesaling (ψυχεμπορικῆς, cut 5) dealing in words and learning that have to do with virtue—that’s sophistry (σοφιστική, cut 7) in its second appearance (224c8-d2).

The summary is selective because it is lacking some essential elements; the lacking of the sixth bifurcation (“art of display” versus “art of knowledge-selling”) is especially noteworthy due to the details given in course of the division (cf. 224a1-7 and 224b4). During this division and its summary, the reader is able to understand somewhat more of whom the Stranger is by noticing what he is doing. It may be read as a new illustration of how the Stranger is allowed to perform a sort of language manipulation by mixing categories, twisting words and presenting it all in a speeding litany. The only indication of alertness is Theaetetus’ relief for having located sophistry for the second time, but he himself has, simultaneously and metaphorically, been hunted down and hit by the spear for the second time.

9.6 Second interlude (224d4-e6)

The Stranger's next step is fascinating, and signals another kind of turn when he says: "I think you'd call somebody just the same thing if he settled here in the city and undertook to make his living selling those same things, both that he'd bought and the ones that he'd made himself; and thereby you have met the sophist for the third time" (224d4-8). Theaetetus agrees, but what happened here? According to the exchange division and its summary, the sophist belonged to the subcategory of wholesaling, and just by transporting him into the subcategory of retailing, the Stranger here performs yet another turn by picking up on a slightly altered definition of the "art of acquisition." By now claiming that the sophist "makes his living selling things he'd bought and the ones that he's made himself" the sophist does not only belong to the "art of acquisition," he is *also* belonging to the "art of production." Here, the mentioned contradiction is stated even more bluntly: the sophist belongs to both of the originally two main, mutually exclusive, categories. After having conducted the transport of the sophist from wholesaling to retailing, the Stranger himself concludes that they have encountered the sophist for the third time. So, subsequently he presents his summary in accordance with this turn,


So apparently you'll still say that sophistry (σοφιστικόν) falls under acquisition (κτητική), exchange (μεταβλητικόν), and selling (ἀγοραστικόν), either by retailing things that others make (καπηλικόν) or by selling things that he makes himself (αὐτοπωλικόν). It's the retail sale of any learning (μαθηματοπωλικόν γένος) that has to do with the sorts of things we mentioned (224d10-e3).

This summary is a confirmation on the Stranger's manipulative strategies, and as such it is eye-opening in order to observe how he, by transporting the sophist, has managed to abolish the two initial main categories. In this summary both are present, but mixed together. This turn simultaneously conceals the twist which makes Theaetetus responsible for the conclusion: "So apparently you will still say that [...] (224e3)." Theaetetus' response at this point signals that he is rather tired,³⁴ and his acceptance of having come across the sophist again is rather submissive when he states that it has to be so "since we need to stay consistent with what we said before." But is this

³⁴ Theaetetus indicated himself that this could happen, cf. *Sophist*, 218b1-5.

consistent with what they said before? No, this is a break with several things said before. And it is due to manipulation, twists and turns that Theaetetus admits the third encounter with the sophist, and by this act he is once again—metaphorically—hit by the spear, for the third time. They move on, and this time a new aim is set: By dividing the “art of combat” they are now supposed to create ground for later comparisons.

9.7 Division 3 of 3: The art of combat (225a1-226a6)



Prior to this division, Theaetetus and the Stranger decided that the “art of combat” (ἀγωνιστική, 225a2) was a part of the “art of acquisition.” This is in accordance with its previous definition as open attempts at mastery,³⁵ which accordingly makes the sophist no longer a secret combatant or hunter.³⁶ The “art of combat” is now cut off into the “art of competition” (ἀμιλλητικόν, 225a6) versus the “art of fighting” (μαχητικόν, 225a6-7). This is an opposition questioning how the contest is carried out, rather than what it is about. Cut 2 divides the “art of fighting” into “violence” (βιαστικόν, 225a11) versus “controversy” (ἀμφισβητητικόν, 225b1). The “art of violence” denotes one body fighting against another and the “art of controversy” denotes the pits of words against words. This refers to the *means* of the arts, which the manner of “forensic speeches” and “disputation” (ἀντιλογικόν, 225b10) is derived from. The former is a long public speech directed against another which deals with

³⁵ Cf. *Sophist*, 219e1-2, 225a2.

³⁶ Cf. the paradigm-division, third bifurcation where the “art of hunting” (done secretly) was opposed to the “art of combat” (done openly). See also Benardete (1960, 134).

justice and injustice; the latter is private discussions chopped up into questions and answers. “Disputation” is by cut 4 divided in “controversy about contracts” (225b12-c4) versus “debating” (ἐριστικὸν, 225c9). The former is not carried out in any systematic or expert way; the latter is done expertly and involves controversy about general issues, including what is just and unjust. It turns out that the “art of debating” is the artful “disputation,” but according to Benardete (1960, 134) this is “absurd since its anonymous opposite discusses contracts artlessly. Yet it is supposed to be a subdivision of the ‘art of acquisition.’” The “art of eristic” is cut into the “art of wasting money” versus “making money.” The latter is cut into “chatter” versus the “art of the sophist.” After the completion of this division, Theaetetus appears to be impressed: “How could anyone go wrong in saying that the amazing sophist we’ve been after has turned up for the fourth time?” (225e3-5). The Stranger does not answer Theaetetus, instead he presents the summary—or again—what appears to be a summary,

It seems his type is precisely the money-making branch of expertise (cf. cut 5) in debating (cf. cut 4), disputation (cf. cut 2), controversy (cf. cut 2), fighting (cf. cut 1), combat, acquisition (226a1-3).

The movement in the division was, apparently, in accordance with the paradigm, downward from above (spearing-procedure), but this changes because the summary now moves upward from below. This is the draw-fisher-procedure which was what they initially were looking for, and it is being practiced as the hunt no longer done secretly. So, now the draw-fisher strikes for the first time, and the impressed Theaetetus—metaphorically—swallows the hook, and is, like a prey now pulled in, upward from below, in accordance with the primary aim of the hunter.

9.8 Toward a conclusion

On account of the given hints toward the *Euthydemus*, especially 277d1-278e1, the conclusion will be framed with help from Socrates where he observed, off stage, what happened on stage when young Clinias met the sophist Euthydemus. Socrates reports: “Euthydemus was hastening to throw Clinias for the third fall, when I, seeing that he was going down and wanting to give him a chance to breathe so that he should not turn coward and disgrace us, encouraged him [...]” (277d1-3). Socrates stopped that

combat, consulted Clinias and told him that when meeting a sophist, one must imagine oneself to be hearing the first part of the sophistic mystery, pay attention to the use of words, especially the correct meaning of words and, one must always think of the performance of the sophists as a game. After the first part—involving several falls—the sophists will let one rest; in the pause they will doubtless display some serious things, before they start the game all over again.

Is Socrates' description of this performance of the sophists somewhat similar to the Stranger's performance in the *Sophist*? Contrary to Clinias, Theaetetus was not explicitly told to view his assignment as partaking in a game. Trained in mathematics he approached his task—the alleged hunt which he approached in a purely hypothetically manner, and thus, he did not pay attention to the meaning and use of words. Hence, the Stranger was offered the opportunity to set his game into play. Theaetetus did not comprehend that the Stranger abandoned the proposed method and, therefore Theaetetus did not grasp that he himself was hunted, manipulated and, gradually appeared as a prey. After three falls (stroked by the spear) he—metaphorically speaking—swallowed the hook and was pulled in.

So, the readers' hunt of the Stranger revealed that the proposed hunting method camouflaged a metaphorical hunt: Theaetetus thought he was hunting the hunter-sophist within the “art of acquisition,” according to the method. The Stranger pretended to do the same, but his own hunt was partly carried out within the “art of production”—which he set aside at the outset, but later transported the sophist into. Further the Stranger, as a hunter working secretly, stroked his prey down three times with the spear; and when this hunter no longer hunted secretly,³⁷ Theaetetus swallowed the hook and was pulled in. Through this slow reading of the prologue and by the analysis of four divisions, a specific problem concerning the Stranger has been revealed: there is a severe discrepancy between his words and deeds—that is, a discrepancy between what the Stranger says he is doing versus what he actually is doing. As the prologues of the Platonic dialogues, according to Francisco J. Gonzalez (2003, 16) “provides the foundation for the subsequent investigation by drawing our attention to specific problems [...] that have a bearing on the main subject of the

³⁷ This was revealed at the outset of “Division 3 of 3: The art of combat.”

dialogue,” it is imperative to note this discrepancy—not only in the prologue—but throughout the dialogue. The Stranger will set his game into play over and over again, and due to his twists and turns he appears to be a sophist more than the philosophical man Theodorus initially claimed him to be. This leads me to conclude that the Stranger from Elea is different from the men gathered around Parmenides.

Chapter 10: The *Apology*

Through a literary and rhetorical reading of the *Apology*, I do not intend to conclude whether Socrates was guilty or not;¹ my aim is rather to show that he presented a coherent defense both as a philosopher and as a citizen. When confronted with the *Apology* a point zero is reached. This is a point where the Platonic narratives and the Athenian reality are merging. The problem, if a problem, is that Socrates, the main literary character throughout the narratives, is put on trial on a stage in the real (empirical) world and, in addition Plato, the author, is present *in* the narration as an eyewitness to the events unfolding on stage. Hence, the correlation between Socrates, the character and, Plato the author, is severely altered and, furthermore, the borders between narration and reality are being blurred; or maybe the case is that there are no borders anymore. This blurring represents a displacement, or a dislocation, a movement in which the reader gradually experiences being lead from narration into reality, so to speak. It is a textual fact that Socrates is in court in Athens and that Plato is present; it is a bibliographic fact that Plato has written this text; thus, these facts present a forced change in perspective. I will take this point zero as an invitation to step into the limbo between narration and reality. From this place, I will inquire into a few rhetorical aspects of the *Apology* and try to answer two questions.

First, Socrates' position when entering the stage is that at the age of seventy this is his first appearance in court (cf. 17d1-3). At this place Socrates is a stranger (ξένος) and an unskillful man (ἀτεχνῶς) because he does not know the conventions of how to

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¹ Gonzalez (2009, 117), argues that in the disagreements regarding the *Apology* a central concern is whether Socrates' defense is to be seen as ironic or sincere. The first group argue that Socrates is not seriously defending himself; and that he was guilty as charged; cf. West (1979); the latter group argue that the defense is sincere and that Socrates is innocent; cf. Reeve (1989). Gonzalez himself argues that "neither view is correct, but that instead the defense is ironic in the true sense of the word; neither literal not deceptive, but ambivalent."

speak (cf. 17d3); but he knows very well the excellence (ἀρετή) of a judge and a speaker, and he knows what makes a speech just (δίκαια λέγω, cf. 18a4-5). So, how does Socrates the “dislocated”² philosopher and, Socrates the citizen, structure the defense in court? Secondly, during the period 403-399, three types of civic discourse³ served as powerful *topoi* in the forensic rhetoric employed by Athenian orators: the *homonoiia*-*topos*, the *demos*-*topos* and the reconciliation-*topos*. How does Socrates—in his defense—respond to these *topoi*? Or, how does Socrates employ this new rhetoric which was developed during the restoration of the democracy?

10.1. The ideal of same-mindedness or the *homonoiia*-*topos*

According to Wolpert (2002, 78), the Athenians’ fear of factional parties can be traced back to the origin of Greek notions of citizenship, and Ian Morris (2000, 3) maintains that as the polis emerged during the eight century, the Greeks “began to define their communities as groups of ‘middling’ citizens.” These middling citizens were “not a class but ‘an ideological construct’ allowing citizens to locate themselves in the middle and to suppress those traits and characteristics that distinguished them from other citizens” (Wolpert 2002, 78). Wolpert stresses that this ideological construct was not limited to a specific political system or a polis; on the contrary, it could be seen throughout ancient Greece. J. E. Lendon (2010, 32) shows that besides Athens, Sparta presents an example where the full citizens “proudly called themselves the *homoioi*, ‘the peers’ or ‘the similar’” and, Rosenstock (1994, 367) argues that in Athens *homonoiia* (literally: same-mindedness) denoted a “hoped-for consensus which would protect Athens’ democratic institutions from dissolving into factional parties seeking power at each other’s expense.” In addition, the Athenians also signaled their unity through the laws and decrees passed by the Athenian Assembly, which all began with the phrase “The people resolved (*edoxe toi demoi*).”⁴ Hence, in Athens participation in political affairs depended on an ideal of same-mindedness “and this characterized

² I could also denote Socrates the philosopher “placeless” or as “having no place,” cf. Baracchi (2009, 274).

³ The term “civic discourse,” I have borrowed from Wolpert (2002, xiii-xiv). He uses the term to “refer to speeches delivered in a civic setting to a mass audience, whether at an official public ceremony or in one of the political institutions of the city.” I follow him.

⁴ Cf. Wolpert (2002, 78). This phrase is also discussed by Bloom (1991b, 441n6), and Howland (2004b, 36-7).

those men who possessed citizenship which again distinguished them from those individuals prohibited from politics: resident aliens, slaves, and women” (Wolpert 2002, 78). This ideal had a definite function: “in order to avoid the citizens to visualize conflicts as a necessary part of the city, they constructed screens between themselves and the outer world” (ibid, 79). Wolpert presents a literary example of this: the chorus, at the close of Aeschylus’ *Euminides* (984-87), prays that the citizens of Athens should “repay joy with joy in the thought of common love and hate with one heart; for this is the remedy of many griefs for mortals” (quoted in ibid). This remedy—common love and hate with one heart—created a dichotomy and the main point was to uphold “a collective hostility and hatred directed outward, and a unified *philia* inward” (ibid). By placing hatred and *philia* in two distinct spheres, the Athenians managed to create harmony instead of *stasis*, strife or discord, which would destroy the polis. With *stasis*, the hatred was misdirected inward against the community and destroyed it rather than strengthening it outward (cf. ibid). In addition, Ober (1989, 298-99) has showed that the ideal of same-mindedness was at odds with both liberty and freedom of thought and speech. He argues “that the values of *homonoia* on the one hand and of the *eleutheria* and *parrhêsia* on the other, although theoretically in conflict, were accepted by Athenians as simply two aspects of a single lived political reality.”⁵

Throughout the Platonic corpus we have witnessed how Socrates practiced philosophy; we have seen how Socrates was doing philosophy when he met a variety of people distinctively named (i.e., historical personae) who—one way or another—have had an impact on culture, education or politics in ancient Athens. Hence, it is safe to assume that the ideal of same-mindedness is not in accordance with the philosopher’s words and deeds (cf. Frede 1992, 217). On the contrary, with regard to the Athenian *homonoia*-topos Socrates stands forth as being *atopos*.⁶ However, in his defense he uses the values of the *eleutheria* and *parrhêsia* in order to claim that it is his god-given right not to be attuned to the Athenian ideal of same-mindedness.

⁵ Ober (1989, 298-99). Quoted in Rosenstock (1994, 367).

⁶ *a-topos*, as I use it here, denotes a negation related to the *homonoia*-topos.

10.2 The men of Piraeus—or the *demos*-topos

The crimes of the Thirty and their supporters were so terrible that it was nearly unthinkable that anyone would ever be able to repeat them; and as the Thirty were responsible for the civil war, the democratic resistance alone was given recognition for the restoration of the democracy. Viewed as a group named “the men of Piraeus” the democratic resistance gradually came to be serving as paradigms of excellence and, thus, as an illustration of how the Athenians should and should not act (cf. Wolpert 2002, 133). Further, these new paradigms of excellence helped the Athenians “to bracket the period of civil unrest and *stasis* from their past and future” (ibid, 136). At the time of Socrates’ trial “the men of Piraeus” were referred to as the *demos* (the people) and the Athenians claimed that during the *stasis* the *demos* were in exile.⁷ This phrase—the *demos* in exile—became a new topos in forensic speeches, which I denote as the *demos*-topos. Because of this topos “the men of the city” (those who had not left the city during the *stasis*) experienced a new kind of pressure. They had to deny any involvement in the crimes of the Thirty—not only by professing their innocence—but also by declaring that their intent was to adhere to the laws of the restored democracy. So, as the Athenians praised “the men of Piraeus,” they simultaneously made it very difficult for many individuals who belonged to the group named “the men of the city.” Socrates fitted the latter. In his defense Socrates is not at odds with the *demos*-topos, on the contrary; he activates this topos right at the outset and, employs it later in order to convince the jury that he is, and has always been, loyal toward the democrats.

10.3 The amnesty—or the reconciliation-topos

The amnesty from 403 served as a condition to end the *stasis* and to reunite the opposing parties; it was a necessary concession for allowing a transition from a state of *stasis*, to a state of peace (cf. ibid, 77). Nicole Loraux (1998, 87) explains that the democrats proclaimed the general reconciliation with a decree and an oath: “The decree proclaims the ban: *mè mnēsikakeîn*, ‘It is forbidden to recall the misfortunes.’ The oath binds all the Athenians, democrats, oligarchs, important people and, quiet people who stayed in the city during the dictatorship, however, it binds them one by one: *ou mnēsikakēsō*, ‘I shall not recall the misfortunes.’” Edwin Carawan (2002, 3)

⁷ On “the *demos* in exile” see Wolpert (2002, 91-5).

shows that the phrase μή μνησικακεῖν is usually understood as a general amnesty: granting immunity from prosecution for the wrongs of *stasis*. Wolpert (2002, 77) emphasizes that the phrase does not mean that the Athenians were prohibited from *speaking* about the past, but from initiating certain types of legal procedures. Loraux (1998, 88) stresses that the phrase is also “a way of proclaiming that there is a time limit for seditious acts” and further that the “aim is to restore a continuity that nothing breaks, as if nothing had happened.” Thus, the amnesty can be viewed as “an admission that the city had no alternative way of resolving the *stasis* fairly” and, because “the purpose of the amnesty was to prevent individuals from seeking revenge for the wrongs that they had suffered, this concern was not with the act of recounting the past, but rather with the possibility that someone would get revenge by recalling the past” (Wolpert *ibid*, 77). The possibility to *get revenge by recalling the past* also implies that remembering the past could be used as a weapon against others. With this in mind, there is yet another matter to consider. Robin Waterfield (2009, 33) argues that due to the amnesty and the reconciliation agreement, it would not “be safe to rule out the kind of political subtext that impiety trials made possible. It even begins to look as though a prosecution for impiety could be a prosecution for ‘un-Athenian activity.’” He maintains that on examination, a surprisingly high portion of known impiety trials has been revealed as involving a strong political agenda. Not to recall past wrongs on the one hand and, the concealed political agenda on the other, turns out to be a twofold perspective, which Socrates makes use of when implicitly referring to the reconciliation-topos; thus, this topos is present at the core of the defense.

10.4 The accusers

Meletus, Anytus and Lycon were the three men prosecuting Socrates. We do not know much about them, and the little information available is partly found within the Platonic corpus and, partly outside (cf. the limbo in between narration and the real world). How are these men described?

In the *Euthyphro* (399) Meletus is described by Socrates as a young and, unknown man, with long hair, scraggly beard, and a somewhat hooked nose (cf. 2b10-

11). Meletus is said to have prosecuted Andocides⁸ of impiety in 400 and, according to Waterfield (1990, 37n1), “it may be safe to infer that he was a champion of traditional piety.” In the *Apology* Socrates states that Meletus brought charges on behalf of the poets (cf. 23e6); it was him who laid down the charges of impiety (35d1-2); and he ridiculed Socrates’ δαίμόνιον, divine or spiritual sign (31d1-3).

We meet Anytus in the *Meno* (402) where we learn that he is educated to the satisfaction of the Athenians who elected him to the city’s highest offices; we further learn that Anytus cannot stand sophists, and that he is warning Socrates: “I think, Socrates, that you easily speak ill of people. I would advise you, if you will listen to me, to be careful. Perhaps also in another city, and certainly here, it is easier to injure people than to benefit them. I think you know that yourself” (94e4-95a1). Socrates’ reply to this warning is somewhat arrogant when he addresses his answer to Meno (not to Anytus): “I think, Meno, that Anytus is angry. He thinks that I am slandering those men, and he believes himself to be one of them. If he ever realizes what slander is, he will cease from anger, but he does not know” (95a2-6). Anytus also appeared as a character witness for Andocides⁹ when he was charged with impiety. In the *Apology* Socrates states that Anytus prosecuted him on behalf of craftsmen and politicians (cf. 23e6-24a1); and further, that Anytus said in court that maybe Socrates should not have been brought to trial in the first place, but now that he is here the jury cannot avoid executing him (cf. 29c1-6).

Lycon was a prominent democratic politician whose son was executed by the Thirty. According to Nails (2002, 189) Lycon may have believed that Socrates had

⁸ Andocides was first prosecuted in 415 as one of the men having mutilated the herms and for profanation of the mysteries. In this case he was granted immunity for providing information against his accomplices. Later the decree of Isotimides was enacted; this decree prohibited those who once had committed impiety from entering holy places and the agora. Andocides now went into exile and returned to Athens after the restoration of the democracy where he once again was prosecuted for impiety; this time he was accused of having participated in the Eleusinian mysteries when he was prohibited from doing so due to the decree. In his defense Andocides argued that the decree of Isotimides had been annulled due to the amnesty and the law reforms. Even if it was well known that he had oligarchic sympathies and was distrusted by the democrats, he maintained in court that he was and would continue to be a loyal democrat; he claimed this although he could not point to any services that he had performed during the *stasis*; he declared that the Thirty would have killed him if he entered the city, and he argued they considered him a serious threat to their rule. Thus, he rendered his absence from Athens as a proof of his loyalty, cf. Wolpert (2002, 65-7).

⁹ See previous note.

been aligned with the oligarchy responsible for his son's death; this is a case the amnesty forbade mentioning, but the incident can possibly help explain both Lycon's participation in the prosecution and, Socrates' silence toward him. Socrates states in the *Apology* that it was Lycon who prosecuted him on behalf of the orators (cf. 24a1), but what Lycon might have said during the trial is not mentioned in the *Apology*.

Regarding the accusers, it is noteworthy that after having received the verdict of guilty and, after Meletus has asked for the death penalty, Socrates stressed that he himself supposed that he had been cleared from the charges of Meletus. And not only did he suppose that, he was also convinced that if Anytus and Lycon had chosen not to join Meletus, it would have been the latter who "would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth of the votes" (36a6-b1).

10.5 Preparing for trial

At the end of the *Theaetetus* (399) Socrates departs because he "[...] must go to the King's Porch to meet the indictment that Meletus has brought against" him (210d1-2). At the beginning of the *Euthyphro* (399) Socrates runs into Euthyphro, who is surprised to hear about the indictment. Socrates, who has just heard Meletus presenting the charge for the first time, also signals a kind of surprise when he says the following: "Strange things (ἄτοπια), to hear him tell it, for he says that I am a maker of gods, and on the ground that I create new gods while not believing in the old gods, he has indicted me for their sake, as he puts it" (3b1-4). "This is because you say that the divine sign (δαμόνιον φῆς) keeps coming to you" (3b5-6), is Euthyphro's response. This reply strongly indicates that Socrates' "divine sign" was a well-known theme discussed in Athens and, which had probably resulted in a lot of slander, as Socrates later will highlight in his defense.¹⁰ It is also likely that the discussions concerning Socrates and his upcoming trial, increased during the two months' interval between Socrates' preliminary hearing and trial.¹¹ It is imaginable that the fronts between Socrates' devotees and his opponents toughened in this period. Such a climate usually

¹⁰ The first mention of Socrates' "divine sign" we find thirty-three dramatic years earlier in the *Alcibiades I* (432) when Socrates explains it to the young Alcibiades; and in the *Theaetetus* (399) where he elaborates on it, see Introduction: section 3.2: The midwife at work, pp. 23-6. It is also referred to in the *Republic* (496c2-3) where he states the following: "My case—the demonic sign—isn't worth mentioning, for it has perhaps occurred in some one other man, or no other, before."

¹¹ On the interval of two months, see Nails (2002, 321).

creates conflicts and, thus, the controversies connected to Socrates could have been taken as a confirmation that he was a potential source of faction; this is in turn a reaction connected to the Athenians' fear of conflicting parties and the *homonoia*-topos as sketched above. During this period of time Meletus gained support from Anytus and Lycon who joined him in the prosecution against Socrates. Nevertheless, also Socrates gained support. In his defense he names a cluster of prominent men who are willing to speak in his favor and, an anecdote relates that the famous speech writer Lysias actually composed a defense speech which Socrates declined to use.¹²

10.6 Socrates introduces his defense

The point zero is now reached; not only within the Platonic corpus, as mentioned above, but also in Athens where the trial must have denoted a critical moment packed with tension. The first time Socrates heard the charges against him they were put forth by Meletus alone. Now, in court, prior to his defense he has listened to the deposition and heard how the three prosecutors have joined forces against him; but whatever the impact their speech was, it is not with discouragement Socrates enters the stage. He marks his distance toward his accusers by drawing three distinctions which, creates the first foundation for his defense. The first distinction is between fabrications and truth; this he launches through the opening lines: "I do not know, men of Athens, how my accusers affected you; as for me, I was almost carried away in spite of myself, so persuasively did they speak" (17a1-3). He goes on by insisting that most of what the accusers said was lies and, he promises that from him they will hear the whole truth (cf. 17b7-8). The second distinction, between styled rhetoric and everyday-language, rests on the first; Socrates proclaims that the "whole truth" will not be "expressed in embroidered and stylized phrases like theirs" (17b9), but "things spoken at random and expressed in the first words that come to mind" (17c1-3). This, he says, is imperative because it would not be fitting at his age, as it might be for a young man, to toy with words when appearing before the jury (cf. 17c4-5). By rejecting "embroidered and stylized phrases" he discards forensic rhetoric and, and by arguing that it might be fit for a young man to play with words in front of the jury he signals that he does not

¹² Lysias was involved as a speech-writer when Andocides was prosecuted for impiety in 400, cf. p. 359n11 above.

intend to take Meletus seriously. By this maneuver, he simultaneously pinpoints Meletus as his main target, so that right at the outset he succeeds in a distinct manner to belittle Meletus. The third distinction, between the Socrates described by the accusers and, the Socrates “*you gentlemen*” know, rests on the two former and is launched through an appeal to recognition: “One thing I beg of you gentlemen: if you hear me making my defense in the same language as I am accustomed to use in the marketplace by the banker’s tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, do not be surprised or create a disturbance on that account” (17c5-d1). These three distinctions are used by Socrates as rhetorical devices for appealing to the jury’s common sense: Meletus is young and unknown, Socrates is old and well-known; Meletus has ridiculed Socrates through embroidered and stylized phrases, Socrates has excused Meletus’ conduct referring to young men’s manners; the Socrates described is not the Socrates *they* know; so, when listening the gentlemen of the jury can nod among themselves and, hopefully they recognize this.

Socrates continues by stating that he is forced to defend himself not only against the new accusations, but against old ones as well (cf. 18a6-b3); it is the latter he fears the most. Whether the mentioning of the old accusations is an allusion to the reconciliation-topos or not, is a matter of speculation. But there was some whispering that many in Socrates’ circle had participated in the mutilation of the herms and profanation of the mysteries in 415 (cf. Nails 2002, 17-20); some also whispered that he had participated in the oligarchic revolutions of 411 and 404 (cf. Wolpert 2002, 64). Xenophon even states that Socrates’ accusers mentioned his association with Critias and Alcibiades and further that “Socrates’ accuser” holds him responsible for all the faults executed by the two later in life (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.12). Mentioning these events would be a violation of the amnesty, so if these whispering rumors have some truth to them, Socrates could not have been prosecuted on these accounts; thus a speculative conclusion at this moment is that there was a political agenda underlying the indictment (cf. Waterfield 2009, 33). But if we listen carefully to Socrates’ own words when he is confronting Meletus, the grade of speculation decreases.

10.6.1 The old accusations (19a8-24b4)

With a desire to try—in a short period of time—to remove the slander of him from the minds of the Athenians (cf. 18e4-19a2),¹³ Socrates the philosopher addresses the old accusations. This defense is a necessary shadow-fight due to the slander on the basis of which Socrates claims that the Athenians have already convicted him. Long before the trial started it had been a widespread opinion that “Socrates is guilty of wrongdoing in that he busies himself studying things in the sky and below the earth: he makes the worse into the stronger argument, and he teaches these same things to others” (19b4-c1). The momentousness of this threefold charge can be enlightened by Socrates’ elaboration to Euthyphro some weeks previous: “[...] the Athenians do not mind anyone they think clever, as long as he does not teach his own wisdom, but if they think that he makes others to be like himself they get angry, whether through envy [...] or for some other reason” (*Euth.* 3c6-d2). So, in addition to trying to prove that he differs both in words and deeds from the famous sophists and philosophers, he also has to refute that he possesses a wisdom of his own which he teaches others. This threefold undertaking is the main aim in this section of the defense.

Socrates sets out by creating a distance to the philosophers by claiming that the slander began with the Aristophanic comedy the *Clouds* (first produced in 423). In this play many of the Athenians had seen “a Socrates swinging about there, saying he was walking on air and talking a lot of nonsense about things of which I know nothing at all” (19c3-5). Does Meletus think that he is prosecuting Anaxagoras of Clazomenae?, Socrates asks (cf. 26d). Or does Meletus believe that Socrates pretends that these absurd theories are of his making? (cf. 26e). Socrates strongly refuses to have any part of this kind of knowledge; on this he boldly calls on the majority of the jury as his witnesses when arguing that “I think it is right that all those of you who have heard me conversing [...] should tell each other if anyone of you has ever heard me discussing such subjects to any extent at all. From this you will learn that the other things said about me by the majority are of the same kind” (19d1-7). He uses the same strategy

¹³ The seriousness of this desire becomes clear when Socrates continues: “I wish this may happen, if it is in any way better for you and me, and that my defense may be successful, but I think this is very difficult and I am fully aware of how difficult it is. Even so, let the matter proceed as the god may wish, but I must obey the law and make my defense” (19a2-7).

toward the sophists. He rejects that he possesses their kind of knowledge and he strongly denies that he has ever undertaken “to teach people and charge a fee for it” (19d9-e1).¹⁴ To underline this Socrates refers to Callias who allegedly had spent a lot of money on the sophists, who Callias and others considered to be experts on excellence and received fees for their teachings: “I would certainly pride myself and preen myself if I had this kind of knowledge, but I do not have it, gentlemen” (20c2-4), Socrates argues. So, in addition to having proved that he differs both in words and deeds from the famous sophists and philosophers, he has in this manner also refuted that he possesses a wisdom of his own which he teaches others. But he acknowledges that the slander has a cause; all these rumors and slanders would not have arisen unless he did something other than most people (cf. 20c8).

Socrates argues that the cause of his bad reputation is due to a certain kind of wisdom, which he denotes as “human wisdom” (ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία, 20d7). He stresses that he *might* be in possession of this wisdom; but is reluctant because the story connected to it did not originate with him. So in order to present a trustworthy source he calls “upon the god at Delphi as witness to the existence and nature” (20e7-8) of this wisdom. Socrates now points to the late Chaerephon who was a friend of his from childhood; he was well-known and respected in the city especially because he had shared the exile and return of the men of Piraeus (cf. 21a1-2).¹⁵ Then he presents a story relating that Chaerephon once ventured to ask the oracle of Delphi if anyone was wiser than Socrates. The oracle allegedly stated that no one was wiser. As Chaerephon now is dead, Socrates maintains that “his brother will testify to you about this” (21a7-8).

This is a critical point in the defense for at least three reasons. First, so far, Socrates has distanced himself from a certain kind of philosophical knowledge and denied that he possesses the knowledge of the sophists. Hopefully, the jury is now convinced that he does not teach others what the accusers claim he does. Secondly, he

¹⁴ Later Socrates even argues that he has never been anyone’s teacher at all (cf. 33a6). However, in the *Republic* (392d f.), he implied to be Adeimantus’ teacher—however he does not charge a fee.

¹⁵ In Greek this reads: οὗτος ἐμός τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ’ ὑμῶν κατήλθε. Compared to the translation of Grube which I use, Harold North Fowler translates this with some differences in the nuances: “He was my comrade from youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you.”

has activated the *demos*-topos by connecting himself to Chaerephon, the celebrated pro-democrat who took part in the democratic resistance, and who shared the exile and return of the men of Piraeus. Thirdly, according to the story of Chaerephon the oracle of Delphi has witnessed to Socrates' kind of wisdom. Thus, by calling upon two highly respected witnesses (the god of Delphi and the men of Piraeus) Socrates can claim to be telling the truth. The implicit question is: How can I not be telling the truth, for who would dare to call on these authorities in vain? Whether the jury accepted this or not, is not easy to decide upon; but noticeably their reaction was loud: In this short section Socrates twice asks them not to "create a disturbance" (cf. 20e4, 21a5). He continues by entreating the jury to consider his version because his intent was *only* to inform them about the origin of the slander. Now he wants to tell them how he reacted when Chaerephon delivered the oracle's words.

His first thought was, "Whatever does the god mean? What is his riddle? I am very conscious that I am not wise at all; what then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For surely he does not lie; it is not legitimate for him to do so" (21b3-6). For a long time he was at loss, but after a while he—again very reluctantly—decided to investigate and "attach the greatest importance to the god's oracle" (21e5). He went to one of the city's public men "reputed wise" in order to "refute the oracle" (cf. 21b8-c1). When Socrates investigated this man, and when he tried to show him that he only *thought* himself to be wise, the man and many of the bystanders came to dislike Socrates. So he concluded, "I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know" (21d2-7). Socrates has now established a God-given authority regarding his systematically performed investigations of the wisdom of his fellow citizens. Hence, he is in the position to claim that all his investigations were performed in service of the god. In his enquiry he himself experienced that "those who had the highest reputation were nearly the most deficient, while those who were thought to be inferior were more knowledgeable" (22a4-6). Again, he stresses that these labors were undertaken solely to prove the oracle irrefutable (cf. 22a6-8). After having investigated the poets, the

craftsmen and the politicians he found a shared error: “each of them, because of his success at his craft, thought himself very wise in other most important pursuits, and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had” (22d6-e1). The result was that Socrates “acquired much unpopularity, of a kind that is hard to deal with and is a heavy burden; many slanders came from these people and a reputation for wisdom, for in each case the bystanders thought that I myself possessed the wisdom that I proved that my interlocutors did not have” (23a1-5). Nonetheless, despite the unpopularity and slander he continued as the god bade him (cf. 23b4-5). For the first time he stresses that it was because of this occupation that he had no leisure to take care of his own affairs but lived in great poverty due to his service to the god (cf. 23b8-c1). The underlining premises here are: if it were not for my service to the god, I would have had the leisure to take care of my household and other affairs. And, if I had been teaching my own theories to others and received a fee, I would not have been poor.

His next step is to comment briefly on the charge of corrupting the young. The young men who have been following him around were the sons of the very rich, the ones who had most leisure and the ones who have taken pleasure in hearing him questioning people now started to imitate him by trying to question others themselves. His comment to their imitating praxis is that he thinks “they find an abundance of men who believe they have some knowledge but know little or nothing. The result is that those whom they question are angry, not with themselves but with me” (23c5-9). When asked, these men who were questioned by the youths imitating Socrates, presented ignorant answers and just repeated the old accusations, which are available against all philosophers (23d4).¹⁶ They were not willing to admit that it had been proved that they laid claim to knowledge that they did not possess. These offended men are now identified as one concrete course of the slander and they are dangerous, “ambitious, violent and numerous; they are continually and convincingly talking about me; they have been filling your ears for a long time with vehement slanders against me” (23e2-4). Socrates infers that it is from the perspective of these offended men that his three accusers now attack him. Once more he stresses that he has told the jury the

¹⁶ Socrates here refers to an ancient, deeply rooted, and essentially imponderable hostility against philosophers; and in this situation especially against Socrates, the philosopher. On this perspective, see Baracchi (2009).

truth—and if the jurors themselves are willing to investigate, they will find exactly what he now has explained (cf. 24b1-2).

So far, his strategy has been to elaborate on the cause of his bad reputation and the origin of the slander against him. He has tried to convince the jury that his human wisdom is of another kind than the one possessed by the philosophers and the sophists: “What is probable, gentlemen, is that in fact the god is wise and that his oracular response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing” (23a5-7). By arguing that the “human wisdom” has little value, he implicitly urges that there is no wisdom that he can teach others. He barely touches upon the charge of corrupting the young; but when he does, he claims that he only was obeying the god’s order and the youths were imitating him. From this argument, the jury is implicitly requested to infer that he has actually never taught anything to anyone. In addition, by implying that the oracle of Delphi has warranted his human wisdom, and simultaneously activating the *demos*-topos through his dear friend Chaerephon, he has gradually widened his foundation. In addition, when he through Chaerephon emphasizes his belonging to the democratic *demos* (cf. the *demos*-topos) and simultaneously distances himself from his fellow citizens (cf. the *homonoiia*-topos) he has managed to situate himself both as citizen and philosopher: The loyal citizen belongs to the democratic *demos*, whilst the philosopher’s right to live a life in opposition to the *homonoiia*-ideal is warranted in the god. This he will both utilize and conceal in the next section of his defense; and it is from this grounding he encounters his new accusers. The condition for him to succeed is that the jury is convinced that he has told them the truth. It seems like Socrates is comfortable when he changes his strategy from elaboration to attack and attempts to substantiate that he is brought to trial on false presumptions.

10.6.2 The new accusations (24b4-35d9)

The three accusers argue that “Socrates is guilty of corrupting the young and of not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other new spiritual things” (24b8-c1). Instead of dealing directly with this twofold charge, Socrates presents a countercharge: “Meletus is guilty of dealing frivolously with serious matters, of irresponsibly bringing people into court, and of professing to be seriously concerned with things about none of which he has ever cared” (24c4-8). Socrates’ questioning of

Meletus may have an odd ring to it compared with how his questioning is executed throughout the Platonic corpus.¹⁷ But contrary to what is the case in these well-known procedures, his aim here is to show that Meletus has a concealed agenda and hence that the real charge is not in accordance with the charges of the deposition (cf. the twofold perspectives of the reconciliation-*topos*). How does he do this? When confronting Meletus, after having dealt with the charge of corrupting the young (cf. 24d2-3), he concludes and claims to have shown that Meletus, through the questioning, has made it sufficiently obvious that he has never had any concern for the youths of Athens and has given no thought to the subjects about which he brought Socrates to trial (cf. 25c1-4). Addressing the jury, Socrates stresses that what he “said is clearly true: Meletus has never been at all concerned with these matters” (26a9-b2). The same happens when he turns to the charge of impiety. After the questioning, and after Meletus has upheld twice that Socrates does not believe in gods at all (cf. 26c7-d1, 26e4), Socrates urges: “The man appears to me, men of Athens, highly insolent and uncontrolled. He seems to have made his deposition out of insolence, violence and youthful zeal” (26e6-27a1) and “he appears to contradict himself” (27a8). This sequence ends when Socrates concludes: “You must have made this deposition, Meletus, either to test us or because you were at loss to find any wrongdoing for which to accuse me” (27e3-5). Socrates seems to be at ease and very self-confident when he utters his last words to Meletus: “There is no way in which you could persuade anyone of even a small intelligence” (28e5-6). His last address to the jury in this sequence looks like a closing argument: “I do not think, men of Athens, that it requires a prolonged defense to prove that I am not guilty of the charges in Meletus’ deposition, but this is sufficient” (28a2-4). Socrates’ rhetorical use of the countercharge turns out to be his main defense against Meletus’ twofold charge, and Socrates signals intensely that he himself thinks he in this way has refuted Meletus. He has also (apparently) refuted that he has a wisdom that he teaches to others. But it does not mean that he is finished and comfortable, because he now presents a reservation: “On the other hand, you know that what I said earlier is true, that I am very unpopular with many people.

¹⁷ Socrates’ “refutation” of Meletus has been a theme broadly discussed, and there has been severe disagreement about what Socrates accomplished through this questioning. For a survey and discussion, see Gonzalez (2009, 118-24).

[...] This has destroyed many other good men and will, I think, continue to do so. There is no danger that it will stop at me” (28a5-b1).

The defense now takes a new turn. In this section Socrates argues implicitly that he does not present a potential political threat because he is law-abiding and loyal to the superior—be it god or men. He starts with posing a hypothetical question: “Someone might say: ‘are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have followed the kind of occupation that has led to your being now in danger of death?’” (28b2-4). He answers by referring to the heroes who died in Troy and especially Achilles who “despised death and danger and was much more afraid to live a coward who did not avenge his friends” (28d1-2). From this reference he reminds the jury that “wherever a man has taken a position that he believes is the best, or has been placed by his commander, there he must I think remain and face danger, without a thought for fear of death or anything else, rather than disgrace” (28d5-9). So, when Socrates was ordered, at Potidaea,¹⁸ Amphipolis¹⁹ and Delium,²⁰ by commanders elected by the Athenians, would it not have been a dreadful thing to abandon the post out of fear of death? And when Socrates was ordered by the god (as he thought and believed) to live the life of a philosopher, to examine himself and others, would it not have been a dreadful thing to abandon the post out of fear of death? (cf. 28d10-29a1). If this had been the case, Socrates argues, then he might “truly have justly been brought here for not believing that there are gods, disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking I was wise when I was not” (29a1-5). He has now made “the fear of death” into a steppingstone which enables him to exemplify for the jury his way of philosophizing: “To fear death, gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know. No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings for a man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. And

¹⁸ In the *Charmides* (429) we meet Socrates when he just has returned from Potidaea (cf. 153a). In the *Symposium* (418/16) Alcibiades states that Socrates saved his life when they served together at the battlefields of Potidaea (cf. 220d-e). On a discussion of Socrates’ partaking in the battle of Potidaea, see Woodbury (1971).

¹⁹ On a discussion of the controversies regarding Socrates’ partaking in the battle of Amphipolis, see Woodbury (1971).

²⁰ In the *Symposium* Alcibiades gives Socrates credit for the coolness and determination that he showed in the retreat from Delium (cf. 220e-221a). On a discussion of Socrates’ partaking in the battle of Delium, see Woodbury (1971).

surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know” (29a6-b3). This is an instruction which in turn enables him to activate the *homonoia*-topos directly: “It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ (διαφέρω) from the majority of men, and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have” (29b3-6). After having explicitly situated himself as a genuine philosopher, Socrates goes on; even if he is different from them and not attuned to their ideal of same-mindedness—he shares their values because he knows “that it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one’s superior, be he god or man” (29b6-8).

When Socrates at this point turns his attention indirectly towards his second accuser, Anytus, he once again refers to the *homonoia*-topos: he now presents a proposition: What will happen if the jury stated that they do not believe Anytus now? What will happen if the jury acquits him on the condition that Socrates stops his investigations and promises not to practice philosophy? And if caught in doing so, then he will die? In his answer, he maintains that it is his duty to be different from them; he will continue his God-given mission because it is the god’s order; it is for the Athenians sake he is doing this—he is a gift to the city; a gadfly placed there by god. He lectures them and he threatens them: “I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you [...]” (29c1-e2). What Socrates is describing is his well-known approach when meeting and questioning people; this approach is confirmed by the famous general Nicias twenty-five dramatic years earlier when he in the *Laches* (dramatic date 424) defended Socrates’ questioning and actually recommended his procedure to Lysimachus.²¹ That Socrates is now forced to explain how he practices philosophy to

²¹ Nicias: “You don’t appear to me to know that whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something quite different in the first place, keep on being led about by the man’s arguments until he submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has lived hitherto. And when he does submit to this questioning, you don’t realize that Socrates will not let him go before he has well and truly tested every last detail. I personally am accustomed to the man and know that one has to put up with his kind of treatment from him, and further, I know perfectly well that I myself will have to submit to it. I take pleasure in the man’s company, Lysimachus, and don’t regard it as at all a bad thing to have it brought to our attention that we have

the Athenians, could indicate that the mood in Athens had changed during the restoration of the democracy and especially due to the fear of factions and the highly valued ideal of same-mindedness. In this regard, Socrates the philosopher is placeless (atopos). He ends his exhortation with a promise: “I shall treat in this way anyone I happen to meet, young and old, citizen and stranger, and more so the citizens because you are more kindred to me” (30a2-4); whereupon he reassures his jury that they can be sure “that this is what the god orders me to do, and I think there is no greater blessing for the city than my service to the god” (30a5-7). He then, for the second time, touches upon the reason why he has not taken part in public affairs: His divine sign which never tells him what to do, but what not to do, has ordered him: “This is what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, and I think it was quite right to prevent me” (31d5-7). And since he has lived his philosophical life as a soldier fighting for justice, he stresses for the third time that he could not live a public life. He states: “A man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public, life if he is to survive for even a short time” (32a1-3).

Socrates the philosopher now rests his case; and Socrates the citizen takes the stand. Somehow, Socrates is convinced that if he had been a part of the public life, he would have been executed long ago. Nevertheless, he stresses that as a citizen he once served as a member of the Council. During this period he experienced that ten generals failed to pick up the survivors after a naval battle—this was an illegal act according to the democratic laws in 406 (cf. Nails 2002, 79-82). Socrates explains that he was the only member of the presiding committee to oppose when the others wanted to try the ten general as *one* body; he recognized that this was an act contrary to the laws, thus he voted against it (cf. 32b). He states the following: “the orators were ready to prosecute me and take me away, and your shouts were driving them on, but I thought I should run any risk on the side of law and justice rather than join you, for fear of prison or death, when you were engaged in an unjust course” (32b-c). This is a

dome or are doing wrong. Rather I think that a man who does not run away from such treatment but is willing, according to the saying of Solon, to value learning as long as he lives, not supposing that old age brings him wisdom of itself, will necessarily pay more attention to the rest of his life. For me there is nothing unusual or unpleasant in being examined by Socrates, but I realized some time ago that the conversation would not be about the boys but about ourselves, if Socrates were present. As I say, I don't myself mind talking with Socrates in whatever way he likes.” *Laches*, 187e6-188c3.

citizen's underlining of the righteousness of following the laws; and by being law-abiding he has also rescued several Athenian democrats from wrongdoing. By this example he expresses his loyalty to the democratic rules and laws; and he also manages to leave the impression that he was even more righteous towards the democratic laws than the democratic leaders themselves.

His next example is from the period when the oligarchy was established and the Thirty summoned him and four others to arrest Leon of Salamis (cf. 32c4-d8). The Thirty gave many such orders, he says, in order to implicate so many as possible in their guilt. But, he continues, "then I showed again, not in words (ὁ λόγῳ) but in action (ἔργῳ) that I did not fear death" (32d); even the powerful and violent government did not frighten him into any wrongdoing; either unjust or impious, he says. The others brought Leon in, but Socrates went home. If the government had not fallen shortly afterwards, he might have been put to death for not obeying orders. These two instances show that also the citizen Socrates saw it fit to employ the new rhetoric of the *demos*-topos; while the philosopher used it to present his wisdom as warranted by the oracle of Delphi through reference to the celebrated democrat Chaerephon, the citizen uses it first by putting forth that he saved democrats from a potential wrongdoing (I am a democratic sympathizer), and in the latter he marks his distance to the Thirty (I am not a sympathizer with the oligarchs).

10.7 Summary

From my perspective in the limbo between narration and reality, I have presented a reflection on how the new forensic rhetoric can be traced in the *Apology*. Through the three activated topoi Socrates has used the *homonoiia*-topos in order to situate himself as a philosopher and claim his right to live the life of a philosopher in accordance with the god's demand—that is, he argued for his right to live as atopus; he implicitly activated the reconciliation-topos (cf. the twofold perspective mentioned above) in order to claim that he should not have been prosecuted in the first place; and he activated the *demos*-topos both as philosopher and citizen in order to argue that he first and foremost had been law-abiding and had lived in accordance with the orders given him from both men and god. I will not conclude whether Socrates was guilty or not according to the charge. Instead I will once again quote Socrates when he signals

surprise when receiving the guilty verdict: “I think myself that I have been cleared of Meletus’ charges, and not only this, but it is clear to all that, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him in accusing me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth of the votes” (36a6-b1). Maybe Socrates’ self-confidence and sometimes arrogant tone signals a seventy-year-old man not attuned to the new waves and frames of mind within the society he is a part of? Or, maybe Socrates was right when arguing that he was prosecuted on false assumptions? His prosecutors did not harvest honor for their victory. According to one anecdote the Athenians were so angry at the death of Socrates that they put Meletus to death without trial (Diodorus 14.37.7); and another tells us that the Athenians repented, executed Meletus and banished Anytus and Lycon, meanwhile commissioning Lysippus to cast a bronze statue in Socrates’ honor (Diogenes 2.43).²²

²² Both anecdotes are taken from Nails (2002, 202). She calls them “equally false tales.”

Conclusion

With this dissertation I aimed to give a contribution to the field “peace and war thematic,” and throughout my readings I have tried to state plausible reasons for the dissertation’s hypothesis which is that it is possible to read the Platonic corpus as a body of critique where Plato, in the end, stands forth as a spokesperson for peace or as a powerful anti-war voice. I have presented two main arguments in this regard: First that the *Republic* can be read as a dramatic backdrop for the dialogues. Second that the dialogues can be read as dramatized historical touchdowns wherein the readers are invited to study what happens when Socrates, the philosopher, encounters various historical personae that, one way or another—could have had or have had— an impact on Athenian culture, *paideia*, and politics.

Regarding the first argument, I gave grounds for the backdrop-claim, on the one hand, by showing that the *Republic* is not equipped with a dramatic date, and, on the other, that through the three generations present—who all are related to Athenian politics and hence implicitly signify momentous instances that occurred on the Athenian political stage—a profound critique of Athenian values surfaced. Through a close-reading of the Prelude (327a1-328c5) I evaluated the arguments that made Socrates and Glaucon stay in Piraeus. Further, I suggested that Socrates took on the task of legitimizing philosophy by contrasting it with sophistry. This legitimizing I have identified as a three-fold process.

I found two parts of the *Republic* bracketed by the phrase “it is so resolved.” The first bracketing I denoted as the Prologue (331d10-362d2), and this was the first part of the three-fold legitimizing process. During the Prologue Socrates first encountered old Cephalus (328c6-331d3). I showed that it was detectable how Socrates implicitly started his criticism of the authoritative poetic topos. When Cephalus’ son, Polemarchus (331e1-336a10) interrupted, Socrates immediately started his explicit attack on the poetic topos and, in addition, he showed that the Athenian moral topos (do good to your friends and harm your enemies) was embedded in the first. Through the proceedings Socrates employed in his encounter with Polemarchus, I suggested that he made him turn toward philosophy. Socrates third conversation was with Thrasymachus (336b1-354c5). This encounter exhibited how the two parties warranted

their arguments, in sophistry and philosophy, respectively, which are two incompatible special topoi. The consequence was that they created an unsolvable violent discourse. This led to the interruption of Adeimantus and Glaucon where they lended support to Thrasymachus (357a1-369b4). In their opinion Thrasymachus had, honestly and openly, warranted his arguments on politics in the opinions of the many, and methodologically in the topos of sophistry. With regard to justice his warrant was the Athenian moral topos, thus—according to the brothers—Socrates had to find another way to persuade them and the particular audience. Therefore, the assembly resolved that Socrates would not be released until he told them the entire story on the matter. This marked the end of the prologue.

The second part of the three-fold legitimizing process started with the second bracketing (369b5-451b8) which I denoted as preparations for entering the realm of philosophy. In order to meet the challenges set forth by the brothers, I showed how Socrates awaked the two-city-topos which was grounded in an old discussion where the aim was to superpose one city in war and one in peace; when merged the new alternative would be freed from violent conflicts. In A₁, the “true city” was launched as a thought experiment. This city was self-sufficient; a peaceful harmony that functioned according to nature due to the division of labor (one man, one job according to his inherent potential). Glaucon and Socrates decided to investigate a “feverish city” as described in G₁. Due to the inhabitants’ endless craving, the origin of war was identified as *pleonexia*, thus two perspectives on war came to light. Socrates also presented the dog-philosopher analogy and, on that basis, he tried to make Glaucon infer how the nature of men fit for guarding ought to be; but Glaucon failed. G₁ ended with Socrates’ conclusion that the guardians’ natures ought to “be philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong” (376c4-6). The nature of the guardians as defined in G₁ was transported into the equation when Adeimantus and Socrates in A₂ set out to educate the guardians in speech and, aimed to decide how such natures could be preserved through *paideia*. They picked up on Adeimantus’ challenges, and their approach was to evaluate the conventional *paideia*; the impact of their course of action was the start of the purging of the feverish city. The running theme in A₂ was lies and lying. Through A₂ Socrates met Adeimantus’ challenges by getting rid of the causes

for his initial frustration. This was done through a cleansing of poetry, and the restrictions became visible when the lies voiced by some of the celebrated poets were highlighted and prohibited. They decided on two laws containing concrete models for the poets: a) the god is the cause of the good, b) the demonic and divine is free from lie. Further, we learned that the gods and humans hated both the “real lie (ὄντι ψεῦδος)” and the “true lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος);” however, the “useful lie” could function as a remedy used by doctors and rulers.

In G₂ the “noble lie” was introduced, and from here the reformed *paideia* seemed to go hand in hand with the myth of the soul-metal as an argument for keeping the classes pure. When Socrates wanted Glaucon to probe into how the earth-born guardians were to be settled and educated, Glaucon believed they already have been educated. Still, Socrates argued that this was not the entire picture. “It’s not fit to be too sure about that [...] However, it is fit to be sure about what we were saying a while ago, that they must get the right education, whatever it is, if they’re going to have what’s most important for being tame with each other and those who are guarded by them” (416b9-c1). At this point Socrates started to speak in an ambiguous manner; and his utterance “whatever this education is” signaled that there was more to come. From this ambiguity, I suggested that this was a pointing forward to the third wave, where the philosophers are to be introduced as rulers and their education will be subsequently described in detail. At this point Adeimantus interrupted and in A₃ Adeimantus started to advocate his initial role as judge. On behalf of the inhabitants of his city, he presented two concerns: The first regarded their happiness, and the second regarded warfare. Socrates settled the first by arguing that the main thing was to prevent poverty and wealth among them, and the second by referring to restricted growth, securing an unbreakable unity, and preserve the right education and rearing. He concluded that Adeimantus’ city at this point was fully founded. Glaucon interrupted and at the outset of G₃ he took on his previous role as the devil’s advocate and presented his initial concern regarding justice.

Socrates met his concern and highlighted that justice is that a man minds his own business concerning what is within—“what truly concerns him and his own” (443d2). We learned that the just man “arranges himself” and harmonizes the three parts of his

soul “exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, highest and middle” (443d6-7). Glaucon was explicitly told that it is precisely the same parts that harmonize the city. Now that this investigation was completed, and justice had been identified both in man and city, Socrates concluded that “If we should assert that we have found the just man and city and what justice really is in them, I don’t suppose we’d seem to be telling an utter lie” (444a4-6). I argued that this conclusion entailed that by evaluating the virtues in Adeimantus’ city of speech, Glaucon understood that these features were also present in his fully purged feverish city. This entailed that the two cities were superposed. The devil’s advocate could now rest his case because they had turned the tables and reached a definition of justice, which they in addition tested and evaluated. This new concept of justice enabled them to assert that both city and men are just. Finally, this turnabout also entailed that there was no longer a need for the rulers to tell “noble lies” to its citizens (cf. 444a4-6). I also showed that the movements between Adeimantus’ thought-experiment and Glaucon’s feverish city was used, by Socrates, as a pedagogical tool in order to make Glaucon (and the readers) turn toward philosophy. Thus, these preparatory stages, viewed from a pedagogical perspective, were to make us (both the men gathered and the readers) understand that we were on our way to philosophy.

In the third part of the three-fold legitimizing process, I argued that we had entered the realm of philosophy. Here we first encountered the three paradoxical waves where I discussed Socrates’ considerations which followed them. I suggested that in these considerations we witnessed the final dismissal of Athenian values, and that the contrast between philosophy and sophistry was sharpened. Through the reading of the second part of *G*₃, I tried to follow Socrates’ argument consistently (as he urges us to do). From this outset, I highlighted Socrates’ considerations following the first wave and showed that women were excluded from partaking in politics due to old habits constituted by men. Socrates argued that there are no sound arguments—according to nature—to support such a view; hence, with reference to the art of eristic he demonstrated that these old habits were warranted there. In his considerations following the second wave, Socrates’ grounding principle was that men are the only animal that wage war. He did not reflect upon whether war was good or evil but on

how war is conducted. Hence, he launched a new kind of warfare, and redefined the concepts “war” and “stasis.” Through these redefinitions and the discussions throughout these sections, I argued that war as a defensive act was necessary while war-waging was not. Further, in order to make these new controversial thoughts even thinkable, Socrates suggested that philosophers must be appointed rulers of the new-born regime.

I also paid close attention to Glaucon and the question related to his turning and education. His attitude and behavior has been continuously in movement; he alternated in that he was sometimes fully attentive and sometimes the opposite; he signaled both enthusiasm and boredom; sometimes he was eager to discuss, and sometimes he did not want to talk at all. I stated reasons for why I have not been convinced regarding his philosophical abilities. That he in addition offered to be Socrates’ ally in battle and was politely excused (contrary to Polemarchus who was invited and Adeimantus who was given advice on how to stand up against arguments contra philosophers), I took to be a sign of him not turning toward philosophy.

Overall, due to the showing of the long and hard road toward philosophy, and due to the exhibition of parts of the topos of philosophy, I have stated reasons for how the *Republic* can be read as a backdrop of the other dialogues; and I have also showed how the *Republic* contains a profound critique of Athenian values that lead to war. Thus, this long road toward philosophy is simultaneously a path toward peace and prosperity because the education proposed on an individual level leads to a *politeia* incompatible with war-waging politics.

When turning to the other dialogues—or the historical touchdowns—the guiding premise for the readings was that it all started as a hunt for facts about Socrates. I highlighted the theme “encountering youths,” and concentrated on the *Parmenides*, the *Protagoras*, the *Alcibiades I*, the *Charmides*, the *Sophist*, and the *Apology*. By reading the Prologue of the *Parmenides*, I showed how Parmenides made Socrates turn toward philosophy. I contrasted the dialectical procedure employed by Parmenides to the grounding premises in Protagoras’ *paideia*-program as it is launched in the *Protagoras*. In addition, I briefly touched upon Parmenides versus Protagoras as city-founders and legislators. Compared to the paradigmatic regime established in the

Republic, Parmenides' city and rule alludes to the best regime, while Protagoras' alludes to the feverish city in need for a purging. Thus, the incompatibleness between philosophy and sophistry has been stated.

Through the reading of the Prelude and the Hippocrates-section of the *Protagoras*, I showed that by preparing Hippocrates for meeting Protagoras, Socrates made him turn toward philosophy. In addition, based on Socrates' own upsetting experience and the detectable hints regarding him acting out of character (atopos), I suggested that we witnessed his final turning. I also suggested that Socrates made Alcibiades turn toward philosophy; however, the effect was not long lasting because when left alone he returned to his old habits. When encountering the beautiful youth Charmides, it turned out that he was barren and his beauty shallow. I argued this entailed that Alcibiades belonged to the group of students leaving and coming back, and which Socrates at one point was forced by his inner daimon to dismiss, and that Charmides belonged to the group of students dismissed at the outset. Charmides was corrupted by his ignorant guardian Critias who was exposed by Socrates and thus an example on the enemies Socrates refers to in the *Apology*.

When I encountered the Eleatic Stranger, I launched "confusion" as a theme. I suggested that due to discrepancies between deeds and arguments, he himself slowly but surely started to look like a hunting sophist, and consequently Theaetetus started to appear as the hunter's prey. The impact was that the hunting-method camouflaged a hunting-metaphor which in turn concealed a threefold hunt. As the reader was hunting the Stranger; Theaetetus thought he was hunting the hunter-sophist while the Stranger in a deceptive hunt was hunting Theaetetus. With the proceedings of the Eleatic Stranger, the Socratic way of practicing philosophy started to fade away.

When I addressed the *Apology*, my point of departure was to give a brief sketch of the three types of civic discourse—the *homonioia*-topos, the *demos*-topos and the *reconciliation*-topos—which after the *stasis* became three powerful topoi employed in forensic speeches. I inquired into how Socrates activated and made use of them in his defense; during this investigation, I showed how the defense as a whole was structured around these topoi. Through this literary and rhetorical reading, I showed that he presented a coherent defense both as a philosopher and as a citizen. Socrates argued

that he was a part of the city as a law-abiding citizen, but as a philosopher he defended his right for taking on an outsider status.

My overall conclusion will be that through my readings I have showed that the corpus contains an implicit critique of the values that led to the decay of Athens. The critique launched in the *Republic*, provides a background that mirrors the dramatic staging—in the historical touchdowns—of prominent personas not willing or able to change, hence the past was made responsible for the conditions of the present. By launching an alternative *politeia* and *paideia* that is not compatible with war-waging, and by showing the multiple and, thus individual, paths toward philosophy, Plato in the end stands forth as a powerful voice pro peace.

Postscript: Weaving—the topos of peace

When Hesiod advises women to “weave closely; make good cloth, with many woof-threads in short length of wrap” his words—according to Rosenstock (1994, 363)—“represents explicit imperatives for all manner of fastenings and constructions that sustain the social and cosmological order.”¹ According to John Scheid and Jesper Svendbro (2001, 10) “Weaving demonstrates for both the hand and the eye a possible, or desirable, way to conceive life in society,” and further, weaving “symbolizes and enacts a certain conception of society and the cosmos” (ibid). This conception says something about “how relations of exchange, always fraught with the potential for dissolution and conflict, can be made stable” (Rosenstock, 1994, ibid). As the “wrap” is masculine and the “woof” is feminine (cf. Scheid and Svenbro 2001, 12)² these “fastenings and constructions” which sustain the social order also points toward the necessity of intertwining the spheres of the masculine and the feminine; and when related to the peace-topos, weaving the masculine is coupled with the public (δημόσιος) sphere and war, whilst the feminine is coupled to the private (ἴδιος) sphere and peace. In the corpus it is not Socrates who speaks in favor of this necessary intertwining, but two unnamed strangers: the Athenian and the Eleatic.

In the opening scenes of the *Laws* we learn that through his two sons Minos and Rhadamantus, it is Zeus who is given credit for laying down the laws among the Cretans; guided by his father’s oracles Minos established the laws for the cities, and Rhadamantus regulated the judicial affairs. All the practices of the Cretans exist with view to war, and the lawgiver had war in view of everything he did (cf. 625e).

¹ Rosenstock is here quoting and referring to the anthropologist Annette Weiner, “Why Cloth? Wealth, Gender and Power in Oceania,” in *Cloth and Human Experience*, (eds.): A. Weiner and J. Schneider (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989, pp. 33-66).

² They further point out that “every *huphasma* (woven robe) or *huphos* (web) is made of a vertical *stēmōn*, a stiff tread sometimes called *mitos* (both of these Greek words, meaning wrap, are masculine), and of a horizontal, supple *krokē*, sometimes called *rhodanē* (these words, meaning “woof,” are feminine in Greek). The threads of the vertical wrap were held in position by stones that served as weights, *laiai*, which Aristotle compares with testicles (similarly, the Orphics considered that the *mitos* or “wrap thread” represented sperm, while Seneca speaks of the “coitus” of the wrap and the woof). We should therefor see the crossing of the *stēmōn* and *krokē*, their “interlacing” (*sumplokē*), as the union of man and woman, this first *sunōikismos* (cohabitation), of which the political *sunōikismos* seems to be the extension or multiplication,” p. 13.

Kleinias, the Cretan, argues that he believes the lawgiver “condemned the mindlessness of the many (τῶν πολλῶν), who do not realize that everyone (ὡς πάντες) throughout the whole of life an endless war exists against all cities” (625e). When all the laws are set down with view to war, and when those opposing war are being condemned and referred to as mindless, then there is no room for thinking and discussing peace. The view is that war between cities exists by nature and a city’s prosperity and the well-being of citizens is measured by counting victories and losses in war. Within such a climate the potential voices of peace are silenced. Indeed, peace is just a name used for denoting the periods between wars; or for denoting the periods used to prepare for the next upcoming war. However, it turns out that the Athenian Stranger does not share the view of the Cretan lawgiver, on the contrary, he launches a strong defense for peace: “The best, however, is neither war (πόλεμος) nor civil war (στάσις)—the necessity for these things is to be regretted—but rather peace and at the same time goodwill towards one another” (628c). Regarding the happiness (εὐδαιμονίαν) of a city or of a private person, no one who think along these lines will “become a correct statesman” and the one who first and only looks to external wars will “never become a lawgiver in the strict sense,” the Athenian Stranger argues. The correct statesman and lawgiver must “legislate the things of war for the sake of peace rather than the things of peace for the sake of what pertains to war.”(628c-e).

In order to gain peace and secure the happiness of the polis, he argues strongly that this is not possible if women are left out of the equation (781a ff.). The equation is the legal and politically framework the Athenian Stranger is about to prescribe for Magnesia. The construction of whole legal and political framework the Athenian Stranger compares to weaving: “Now, it is impossible, when dealing with a web or any piece of weaving, to construct the warp (masculine) and the woof (feminine) from the same stuff: the warp must be of a superior type of material (strong and firm in character, while the woof is softer and suitably workable)” (734e-735a). The metaphor developing here is that in a just, peaceful and happy society a necessary premise is that masculine and feminine forces are intertwined.

When the Eleatic Stranger in the *Statesman* is searching for a paradigm that can enlighten the search for true statesmanship which he and young Socrates is about to perform, he suggests weaving for this purpose:

So what model (παράδειγμά, 279a7), involving the same activities as statesmanship (πολιτικῆ πραγματεία, 279a7-8), on a very small scale, could one compare with it, and so discover in a satisfactory way what we are looking for? By Zeus, Socrates, what do you think? If there isn't anything else to hand, well what about weaving? Do you want us to choose that? Not all of it, if you agree, since perhaps the weaving of cloth from wool will be suffice; maybe it is this part of it, if we choose it, which would provide the testimony we want.

The Eleatic Stranger is very particular when he proposes weaving as the model (παράδειγμά), and he suggests “the weaving of cloth from wool” as the appropriate starting-point because wool-working is “a great metaphor for an entire process of classification and organization, of hierarchy and government, of interlacing and social bonds.” This specific metaphor is—according to Scheid and Svendbro (ibid, 3)—eloquently employed by authors like Aristophanes, but pushed to its extreme by the Eleatic Stranger.

Nonetheless, by activating the metaphor of weaving in order to describe a prosperous society, and by juxtaposing statesmanship with weaving, both strangers awakened an old topos of peace brilliantly uncovered by Scheid and Svendbro (2001) through the story of the sixteen weaver-women of Elis. After years of warfare the conflicts and “hostilities between Pisa³ and Elis were put to rest thanks to the intervention of a first ‘college’ of sixteen aged, noble, and respected women” (ibid, 11). This story demonstrates that working for peace was a womanly (feminine) undertaking, and it tells that as part of the upcoming reconciliation each of the sixteen cities of Elis was urged to choose one noble and especially respected woman willing to take on a specific task. They were assigned a special house⁴ located in the Agora of Elis where they worked together aiming to settle the differences between Pisa and Elis: thus, their task were to weave peace. A reminder in this regard is that the word for

³ Pisa was located in the western Peloponnese; the *polis* controlled the area Pisatis which included Olympia. Pisa and Pisatis were conquered by Elis in 572 B.C.E.

⁴ This house is “comparable to the Chitōv in Sparta, where the garment of worship for Apollo was made” (ibid, 11).

weaving, *hyphainein*, literary means “to bring to light” or “make visible on a surface.” So when transferring the work of the sixteen women into political terms, the chaos of war between cities gave way to peace due to weaving, and the cities found “themselves reunited into a small federation thanks to the intervention of feminine wisdom” (ibid, 12).⁵ The weaving of the political peace fabric was the beginning of a more long lasting ritual weaving because later on these women “were entrusted with the management of the Heraean games,⁶ and with the weaving of the cloak for Hera.”⁷ Every fourth year this cloak—where the peace of the entire country was woven and then rewoven—was carried from the house of the sixteen women in Elis to the temple of Hera at Olympia (cf. ibid, 11). This means that the initial disorder (symbolized by the raw wool) was being replaced by a new reorganized fabric, in which each fiber was given its right place. Thus, to weave is to reunite; it is “to interweave what is different, contrary or hostile, in order to produce a unified, harmonious textile” (ibid, 11).

⁵ They further stresses that “unlike the famous synoecism brought about by Theseus in Athens, which assembled the various “hamlets” (*dēmoi* or *kōmai*) of Attica into a great city, this unification is the work of women, and it therefore seems logical that the bonds of the new federation should be those of a collective weaving, in which each weaver represents a given city “tribe”; to ensure the permanence of the federation, the operation is repeated every four years.”

⁶ In *Description of Greece* 5.16.2-3, Pausanias reports: “Every fourth year there is woven for Hera a robe [*peplos*] by the Sixteen Women, and the same also hold games called Heraea. The games consist of foot-races for maidens. [...] These too have the Olympic stadium reserved for their games, but the course of the stadium is shortened for them by about one-sixth of its length. To the winning maidens they gave crowns of olive and a portion of the cow sacrificed to Hera. They may also dedicate statues with their names inscribed upon them.” Quote taken from Scheid and Svendbro (2001, 10), cf. p. 174-5n3.

⁷ Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 5.16.5-6. Quote taken from ibid, 11; cf. p. 175n5. They further point out that “of the sixteen cities, *poleis*, which originally sent the women to weave Hera’s dress, there remained at the time of Pausanias only eight “tribes,” *phulai*, each of which therefore sent two women.”

Appendix I: The chronology of the dialogues and their participants

Under this heading I first present the dialogues (the historical touchdowns) chronologically, and in addition I have listed a few historical notes. The titles bracketed as (...) marks the dialogues which are commonly taken as spurious whilst the titles bracketed as [...] marks the dialogues disputed, dialogues marked n.d. have no dramatic dates. Thereafter I will present each individual dialogue and their participants. My main source for this outlining is Nails (2002). I will not go into all the detail regarding the arguments for deciding on the dramatic dates, however, I will briefly comment on the controversial dates.

Dates	Dialogues	Historical notes
450	<i>Parmenides</i> .	± 450: Pericles in office. 451: The birth of Alcibiades. ± 449: The Peace of Callicles. ± 444/443: Founding of the colony Thurii.
432	<i>Protagoras</i> , [<i>Alcibiades I</i>], [<i>Alcibiades II</i>].	
		431: Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.
± 429	<i>Charmides</i> , <i>Timaeus</i> , <i>Critias</i> .	429: The plague in Athens. Death of Pericles.
424	<i>Laches</i> .	424: Aristophanes' <i>Knights</i> .
		423: Aristophanes' <i>Clouds</i> .
≤422	<i>Cratylus</i> .	422: Aristophanes' <i>Waps</i> .
		421: The Peace of Nicias. 421: Aristophanes' <i>Peace</i> .
421/16	[<i>Hippias Maior</i>], [<i>Hippias Minor</i>], <i>Phaedrus</i> , [<i>Clitophon</i>].	
416	<i>Symposium</i> .	
		415: The profanation of the Elysian mysteries and demolition of the herms.
		414: Aristophanes' <i>Birds</i> .
413	<i>Ion</i> .	
		411: Aristophanes' <i>Lysistrata</i> . 411: The oligarchic coup – Socrates is arrested for the first time.
± 409	[<i>Theages</i>], <i>Lysis</i> .	
≥407	<i>Euthydemus</i> .	
±405	<i>Gorgias</i> .	405: Aristophanes' <i>Frogs</i>
		404: The end of the Peloponnesian War.
		404-03: <i>Stasis</i> .
		403: Restoration of democracy.
402	<i>Meno</i> .	
401/00	<i>Menexenus</i> .	
399	<i>Theaetetus</i> , <i>Euthyphro</i> , <i>Sophist</i> , <i>Statesman</i> , <i>Apology</i> , <i>Crito</i> , <i>Phaedo</i> .	Death of Socrates.
352	[<i>Seventh Letter</i>]	
n.d.	<i>Philebus</i> , [<i>Minos</i>], [<i>Rival Lovers</i>], [<i>Hipparchus</i>], [<i>Epinomis</i>].	

The individual dialogues

Parmenides (±382/450)

<u>Date of the frame-story:</u> ±382. ¹		<u>Dramatic date of main-action:</u> August 450.	
<u>Participants of frame-story:</u> Cephalus of Clazomenae (late 430s->382). Adeimantus of Collytus (±432->382). Glaucou of Collytus (≤429->382). ² Antiphon of Athens (≤422-382).	<u>Age:</u> ±55 ±50 ±47 ±40	<u>Participants of main-action:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Parmenides of Elea (±515->450). Zeno of Elea (b. ±490). Pythodorus of Athens (≤479->414). Aristotle of Thorae (±465->403).	<u>Age:</u> 19 ±65 ±40 ±29 ±15
Cephalus' anonymous friends.		Socrates' anonymous friends.	

The *Parmenides* is a narrated dialogue with a frame-story. The narrator of both is Cephalus of Clazomenae. He heard the narration from Antiphon (Plato's brother) who heard it from Pythodorus who was present at the gathering.

In the frame-story two dramatic settings are identifiable: First the Agora of Athens, where Cephalus and his friends from Clazomenae (incidentally) meet Adeimantus and Glaucon. The group leaves the Agora and went to Antiphon's house in Melite, which is the second setting. The main-action takes place in Pythodorus' house in Kerameikos during the greater Panathenaea which was held in Hekatombaion, the end of July and most of August.

In the *Parmenides*, the dramatic date of the first two dramatic settings are set to be ±382, a date that coincides with both the ending of the era of the Peloponnesian war and the early period of the Academy (founded around 387). The third dramatic setting marks the prologue to the main action which is set to 450. Thus, viewed together these dates indicates that the *Parmenides* juxtapose the era of the Peloponnesian war, as the corpus as a whole does.

¹ Nails (2002, 309) points out that "[w]e do not know how much time elapsed between the action described in the frame and Cephalus' account of it, which I treat as occurring within the same year, a conjecture." Then, if we assume that Antiphon is around forty, the date for the frame-story can be set to ±382.

² On the controversies and discussions regarding the biography of Glaucon, see Nails (2002, 154-56).

Protagoras (432)

<p><u>Date of the prelude:</u> Set later the same day as the main action.</p>	<p><u>Dramatic date of main-action: 432.</u>³</p>	
<p><u>Participants of the prelude:</u> Socrates. An anonymous friend. Others.</p>	<p><u>Participants of main-action:</u>⁴ Socrates of Alopece (469-399).</p> <p><u>Arriving with Socrates:</u> Hippocrates (born ±452).</p>	<p><u>Age:</u> 37</p> <p>±20</p>
	<p><u>First flank following Protagoras:</u> Callias of Alopece (ca. 450-367). Paralus of Cholargos (<455-29). Charmides of Athens (±446-403).</p>	<p>±18 ±23 ±14</p>
	<p>Protagoras (ca. 490-411/08).</p>	<p>±58</p>
	<p><u>Second flank following Protagoras:</u> Xanthippus of Cholargos (b. ≤460/57-429). Philippides of Paeania (b. ±450). Antimoerus of Mende (?); active in 433/2 Some unnamed locals and foreigners followed behind the two flanks.</p>	<p>±28 ±18 ±20? ±20?</p>
	<p>Hippias of Elis (±470s->399).</p>	<p>±38</p>
	<p><u>Surrounding Hippias of Elis:</u> Eryximachus of Athens (≤448-≥415). Phaedrus of Myrrhinus (≤444-393). Andron of Gargettus (±445-≥410).</p>	<p>±16 ±12 ±13</p>
	<p>Prodicus (5th century).</p>	<p>±33?</p>
	<p><u>Surrounding Prodicus:</u> Pausanias of Cerameis (active late 5th century). Agathon of Athens (>447-±401). Adeimantus of Athens (?). Adeimantus of Scambonidae (b. 450s/440s->405).</p>	<p>±35? ±15 ? 16?</p>
	<p><u>Last arrivers:</u> Alcibiades of Scambonidae (451-404). Critias of Athens (≥460-403).</p>	<p>19 ±28</p>

³ According to Nails (2002, 310) there is some controversy in the secondary literature regarding the dramatic date of the *Protagoras*; and it consists of the following: Athenaeus (218b-e) criticized dramatic elements of the *Protagoras* in the 2-3rd C.E.; his views were systematically refuted by Morrison (1941), and later resuscitated by Walsh (1984) and Wolfsdorf (1997). Wolfsdorf concluded that no consistent dramatic date is possible. Lampert (2010, 9) decides on 433, and Taylor (1976, 236) sets the date to ≤433. I follow the majority and decide on 432 in accordance with Nails (2002, 310), Guthrie (1956, 27), Lamb (1924, 87n1), Morrison (1941), and Zuckert (2009, 8).

⁴ The participants in the *Protagoras* are here listed in accordance with the description given by Socrates, the narrator, when arriving in the house of Callias.

The *Protagoras* is a narrated dialogue with a prelude. The narrator is Socrates who tells the narration to his anonymous friend who he met somewhere after the main action took place.

The dramatic setting for the prelude is an unnamed place where Socrates meets some anonymous friends; the main action takes place in the house of Callias in Athens.

[*Alcibiades I*]⁵ and (*Alcibiades II*) (432)

<u>Dramatic date of main-action: early 432.</u>	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Alcibiades of Scambonidae (451-404).	<u>Age:</u> 37 19

Both dialogues are direct dialogues (dramatic). [*Alcibiades I*] is not equipped with a dramatic setting. The dramatic setting for (*Alcibiades II*) is Socrates and Alcibiades on their way to an unnamed temple.

Charmides (May 429)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: 429.</u>	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Chaerephon of Sphettus (≥469-403/399). Critias of Athens (≥460-403). Charmides of Athens (±446-403).	<u>Age:</u> 40 ±40 ±31 ±17

The *Charmides* is narrated dialogue. Socrates is the narrator, and tells the story to an unnamed friend.

The dramatic setting is the palaestra of Taureas. Socrates himself explicitly locates the place: “I went straight to the palaestra of Taureas (the one directly opposite the temple of Basile)” (153a3-4).

Timaeus and *Critias* (429)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: 429.⁶</u>	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u>	<u>Age:</u>

⁵ The strongest argument against Plato’s authorship regarding *Alcibiades I* is “that Plato never wrote a work whose interpretation was as simple and straightforward as that of *Alcibiades I*” (Hutchinson (1997, 558). Today it is a minority view that Plato is the author of *Alcibiades I*. The majority argue that the dialogue “resembles Plato’s ‘Socratic’ dialogues in its plain conversational quality,” and further that if Plato is not the author “the signs point to an Academic philosopher writing in the 350s or soon after” (ibid).

⁶ The dramatic date is broadly discussed due to the scholarly argument that there is a close connection between the *Republic* and *Timaeus/Critias* (see Nails 2002, 324-26). Many scholars maintain that Socrates’ reference to the Kallipolis in the *Timaeus*, signals that we here find a proto-*Republic*. Thus, it is a question of the date of the *Republic*. When the proto-*Republic*-argument is taken out of the equation then, according to Nails (ibid, 326), the earliest date possible is 429 because Socrates was out of town on a campaign, returning this year. If the date is pushed forward, then Critias becomes unreasonably old. Zuckert (2009, 9) sets the dramatic date to 409-08, which entails a problem with regard to the age of Critias.

Socrates of Alopece (469-399).	40
Timaeus of Lorci (active from ca. 450).	±50?
Critias of Athens (±520->429).	±91?
Hermocrates of Syracuse (±455-407).	±26

The *Timaeus* and *Critias* are direct dialogues (dramatic). The dramatic setting for the dialogues is the Panathenaea (as the *Parmenides*), and the action takes place in the house of Critias of Athens.

***Laches* (winter 424)**

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue:</u> 424.	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u>	<u>Age:</u>
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).	45
Lysimachus of Alopece (480s-≥423).	56-66
Laches of Aexone (±475-418).	±51
Nicias of Cydantiade (±475-413).	±51
Melesias of Alopece (≤475->403).	±51
Aristides of Aexone (440s-11).	±16
Thucydides of Alopece (b. ±439).	±15

The *Laches* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is an exhibition of a soldier fighting in armor.

***Cratylus* (≤422)**

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue:</u> ≤422. ⁷	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u>	<u>Age:</u>
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).	47
Hermogenes of Alopece (>450->392).	±28
Cratylus of Athens (b. 450s-440s).	20-28

The *Cratylus* is a direct dialogue (dramatic), and not equipped with a dramatic setting.

[*Hippias Maior*] and [*Hippias Minor*] (421/16)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue:</u> 421/16.	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u>	<u>Age:</u>
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).	48/53
Hippias from Elis (470-399).	49/54

⁷ Nails (2002, 313) argues that “[t]he dramatic date is before the death of Hipponicus (+422/1) as discussed by Cratylus and Hermogenes, including references to the several modern contributions to the question. Attempts to set the dialogue nearer *Euthyphro* (e.g. Burnet’s), taking the conversation represented in *Euthyphro* to be the very one mentioned in *Cratylus* (396d), have foundered.” Howland (1998a, 285n1) sets the dramatic date to 399. He follows D. j. Allan, “The Problem of *Cratylus*” (*American Journal of Philology* 75, 1954: 271-85) who argues that the *Cratylus* takes place the same day as *Euthyphro*.

[*Hippias Maior*] and (*Hippias Minor*) are direct dialogues (dramatic). The dramatic setting for [*Hippias Maior*] is a public place in Athens, (*Hippias Minor*) takes place two days later and the action unfolds at Phidostratus' school.

Phaedrus (421/16)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: 421/16.</u> ⁸	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopecce (469-399). Phaedrus (≤444-393).	<u>Age:</u> 48/53 23/28

The *Phaedrus* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is outside the city walls, along the Ilissus River where Socrates and Phaedrus discuss sitting in the shadow of a plane tree.

(*Clitophon*) (421/16)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: 421/16.</u> ⁹	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopecce (469-399). Clitophon of Athens (≤452->404)	<u>Age:</u> 48/53 31/36

The *Clitophon* is a direct dialogue (dramatic), and is not equipped with a dramatic setting.

Symposium (February 416)

<u>Date of the frame-story: Around 400.</u>		<u>Dramatic date of main-action: 416.</u>	
<u>Participants of frame-story:</u> Apollodorus (b. ≤429). An anonymous friend.	<u>Age:</u> ± 29	<u>Participants of main-action:</u> Socrates of Alopecce (469-399). Agathon of Athens (>447-±401). Alcibiades of Scambonidae (451/404).	<u>Age:</u> 53 ±31 35
Aristodemus of Cydathenaeum Glaucou ¹⁰ of Collytus (≤429->382); they are mentioned.	± 50 ± 29	Aristodemus of Cydathenaeum (450s-<400). Aristophanes of Cydathenaeum (±450-±386). Eryximachus of Athens (≤448-≥415). Pausanias of Cerameis (±460-390). Phaedrus of Myrrhinus (≤444-393).	±34? ±34 ±32 ±44 ±28

⁸ The dramatic date of the *Phaedrus* has been actively controversial for some time, see Nails (2002, 314). Nails (ibid) argues that "any date between late 415 and 407 is ruled out because of Phaedrus' involvement in the profanation of the mysteries and subsequent exile. Phaedrus, whose life is more easily reconstructed than most, would have been in his mid-twenties at the time of the dialogue." Zuckert (2009, 9) decides on 415.

⁹ I follow Nails (2002, 313). Zuckert sets the dramatic date for the *Republic* to 411 and, because she reads the *Clitophon* as an introduction to the *Republic*, she also sets the date of *Clitophon* to 411 (cf. 2009, 9).

¹⁰ "The lack of any further specification of Glaucou by demotic or patronymic makes it almost certain that the reference is to Plato's brother" (Nails 2002, 315).

The *Symposium* is a narrated dialogue with a frame-story. The dramatic date of the frame-story is around 400, and the action unfolds between Apollodorus and an unnamed companion who wants to hear about the speeches given at a symposium around sixteen years ago. The companion had heard a version from someone who had heard a version from Phoenix, son of Philippus. Apollodorus had heard the story from Aristodemus who was present the symposium in question. He agrees to retell what he told Glaucon two days earlier. Thus, here is a structural link to the *Parmenides* and the theme “hunt for facts about Socrates.” Compared to the *Parmenides*, the line of the narrators are narrowed in that Aristodemus tells Apollodorus the correct version whereas there obvious are many fake ones in circulation. The action of the frame-story unfolds in an unspecified place.

The main action moves from a public place in Athens to the house of Agathon who the day before had won first prize in tragedy at the Lenaeen festival.

Ion (±413)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: 413.</u> ¹¹	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopecce (469-399). Ion (active late 5 th century).	<u>Age:</u> 56 ?

The *Ion* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is an unspecified public place.

(Theages) (±409)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: ±409.</u> ¹²	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopecce (469-399). Democus of Anagyry (<455-≥399) Theages of Anagyry (?)	<u>Age:</u> ±60 ±46 ?

The *(Theages)* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is the portico of Zeus the Liberator; a portico or colonnade near that of the King Archon, close to the Agora.

¹¹ Nails (2002, 316) argues that the *Ion* must be set during the Peloponnesian War, but before the Ionian revolt of 412 (Thu. 8.15.1) because Ephesus was afterwards not under Athenian rule (*Ion*, 541c3-4), as pointed out by Paul Woodruff (1983, 5) in *Plato, Two Comic Dialogues: Ion and Hippias Major* (Indianapolis: Hackett). Nails (ibid) narrows “the date to 413 because Athens was faced with an acute shortage of leadership, materials, and manpower after the Sicilian disaster and sought creatively the means to effect a recovery. Famously, she replaced tribute with import-export duties and, notably, increased the use of *extra ordinem* commands: generals (stratēgoi in name) on discrete assignments who were not regular members of the board of ten generals elected by tribe and apparently did not have to be citizens [...]. Socrates mentions three foreigners as ‘Generals or other sorts of officials’ for Athens (541c-d): Apollodorus of Cyzicus, Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whose careers are detailed.”

¹² The dramatic date of this spurious dialogue can be set around 409, however, it involves much anachronisms. Another option is to view the dialogue without a specific date within the last decade of Socrates’ life. It is not of great importance; hence I choose to set the date at the beginning of this decade. According to Nails (2002, 329) there is arguments in favor for both alternatives.

Lysis (±409)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: ± 409.</u>	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u>	<u>Age:</u>
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).	±60
Hippothales of Athens (±425-?).	±16
Ctesippus of Paeania (±425-?).	±16
Lysis of Aexone (≥422-≥350).	±13
Menexenus of Athens (≥422-?).	±13

The *Lysis* is a narrated dialogue. The narrator is Socrates. The dramatic setting is a newly erected palaestra outside the east wall of Athens at the Panops spring near the Eridanus River.

Euthydemus (≥407)

		<u>Dramatic date of main-action: ≥407</u>	
<u>Participants in the prelude:</u>	<u>Age:</u>	<u>Participants of main-action:</u>	<u>Age:</u>
Socrates of Alopece	±62	Socrates of Alopece (469-399).	±62
Crito of Alopece	±62	Ctesippus of Paeania (b. ±425).	±18
		Clinias of Scambonidae (b. ±424).	±17
Set one day after the main action.		Euthydemus of Chios and Thurii (?).	?
		Dionysodorus of Chios and Thurii (?).	?
		<u>Spectators:</u>	
		Crito of Alopece (±469->399).	±62
		Some of Clinias' lovers.	
		A group unidentified spectators.	

The *Euthydemus* is a narrated dialogue. Socrates is the narrator telling the story to Crito.

The dramatic setting of the prelude is a quiet place, and it takes place one day after the main action. The dramatic setting for the main action is in the Lyceum.

Gorgias (±405)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: ±405.¹³</u>	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u>	<u>Age:</u>
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).	64
Gorgias of Leontini (±485-±385).	±80
Chaerephon of Sphettus (≥469-403/399).	±64
Callikles of Acharnae (450/45-404/399).	45/40
Polus of Acragas, Sicily (ca. 440-?).	±35?

¹³ Nails (2002, 326-27) demonstrates that *Gorgias* has a variety of indicators of dramatic date, thus some commentators have subordinated some and featured others. On these ground she settles and sets the date throughout the Peloponnesian War. I choose to follow Lamb (1925, 350n1) who took Socrates' mention of the Arginusae trial "last year" (473e) to set the date clearly at 405; and in addition Euripides' *Antiope* (probably produced in 408, but not earlier than 411) is known (485e). Zuckert (2009, 9) also decides on 405.

The *Gorgias* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is outside a public place where Gorgias has given a display, and taken questions.

Meno (402)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: 402.</u>	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Anytus of Euonymon (≤443->399). Meno of Thessaly (±423-400). A slave-boy not named. Several Meno's slaves.	<u>Age:</u> 67 ±42 ±21 ? ?

The *Meno* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is an unspecified public place.

Menexenus (winter 401/00)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: 401/00¹⁴</u>	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Menexenus of Athens (b. ≥422).	<u>Age:</u> ±68 ±21

The *Menexenus* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is off the Athenian agora.

Theaetetus (spring 399)

<u>Dramatic date of frame-story:</u> Spring 391		<u>Dramatic date of main-action: 399.</u>	
<u>Participant of frame-story:</u> Euclides of Megara (±450-380) ¹⁵ Terpsion of Megara (active late 400 to early 300).	<u>Age:</u> ±59 ?	<u>Participants of main-action:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Theodorus of Cyrene (?). Theaetetus of Sunium (±415-391). Young Socrates of Athens (around 415->360). A few other youths.	<u>Age:</u> 70 40-50? ±16 ±16

The *Theaetetus* is a narrated dialogue with a frame-story. The dramatic date for the frame-story is set to spring 391, and the dramatic setting is the house of Euclides in Megara. The structural pattern is similar to that of the *Parmenides* and *Symposium*, and to the theme "hunting facts about Socrates." However, it turns out that when Euclides and Terpsion meet, Euclides has written down the narration, and Socrates has checked out the details; the dialogue is read to them by a servant.

The main action takes place in a gymnasium in Athens.

¹⁴ Zuckert (2009, 9) sets the date of the *Menexenus* to 387-86. From my perspective this is odd because this is a direct dialogue; a discussion between Socrates and Menexenus, and in 387-86 Socrates has been dead for many years.

¹⁵ On Euclides in later tradition, see Nails (2002, 145).

Euthyphro (spring 399)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: 399.</u> Later the same day as <i>Theaetetus</i> .	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Euthyphro of Prospalta (around 440-?).	<u>Age:</u> 70 ±41

The *Euthyphro* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The action takes place later the same day as the *Theaetetus*, and the dramatic setting is stoa of the king archon.

Sophist (spring 399)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: 399.</u> The day after <i>Theaetetus</i> and <i>Euthyphro</i> .	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Theodorus of Cyrene (?). Theaetetus of Sunium (±415-391). Young Socrates of Athens (around 415->360). The Eleatic Stranger (?)	<u>Age:</u> 70 40-50 ±16 ±16 ?

The *Sophist* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The action takes place the day after the *Theaetetus* and *Euthyphro*, and the dramatic setting is the same as *Theaetetus* - in a gymnasium in Athens.

Statesman (spring 399)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: 399.</u> Later the same day as <i>Sophist</i> .	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Theodorus of Cyrene (?). Theaetetus of Sunium (±415-391). Young Socrates of Athens (around 415->360). The Eleatic Stranger (?)	<u>Age:</u> 70 40-50? ±16 ±16 ?

The *Statesman* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The action takes place later the same day as the *Sophist*, and the dramatic setting is the same.

Apology (May-June 399)

<u>Dramatic date: May/June 399.</u>	
<u>Participants:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Meletus of Pithus (b. ≤443-?).	<u>Age:</u> 70 ±44.

The *Apology* is a monologue (trial speech) with elements of dialogue. The dramatic setting is a court in Athens.

Crito (June-July 399)

<u>Dramatic date of the dialogue: June/July 399.</u> Twenty-eight or twenty-nine days after the trial.	
<u>Participants of the dialogue:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399). Crito of Alopece (±469->399).	<u>Age:</u> 70 ±70

The *Crito* is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The action takes place twenty-eight or twenty-nine days after Socrates' trial, and the dramatic setting is just before dawn at the prison southwest of the agora.

Phaedo (June-July 399)

<u>Dramatic date of the prelude: 399.</u> A few weeks/months after the execution.		<u>Dramatic date of frame-story: June/July 399.</u>	
<u>Participants of prelude:</u> Phaedo of Elis (b. ±419/8): Echecrates of Phlius (active 399).	<u>Age:</u> ±20 ±20?	<u>Participants of frame-story:</u> Socrates of Alopece (469-399).	<u>Age:</u> 70
		<u>Socrates' family:</u> Xanthippe of Athens (±440->399) Sophroniscus of Alopece (b. >410). Lamprocles of Alopece (≥416-?). Menexenus of Alopece (≥402-?).	±41 ±11 ±17 ±3
		<u>Athenians:</u> Crito of Alopece (±469->399). Hermogenes of Alopece (>450->392). Antisthenes of Athens (±446->366). Apollodorus of Phaleron (b. ≤429-?). Critobulus of Alopece(±425->early 4 th century). Aeschines of Sphettus (425- d.≥356) Ctesippus of Paeania (b. ±425). Menexenus of Athens (b. ≥422). Epigenes of Cephisia (?).	±70 ±51. ±47 ±30 ±26 ±26 ±26 ± 23 ?
		<u>Thebans:</u> Simmias of Thebes (b. 430s). Cebes of Thebes (430s->354). Phaedondas of Thebes (?).	± 35? ± 35 ?
		<u>Megarians:</u> Euclides of Megara (±450-380). Terpsion of Megara (active late 400 to early 300).	± 51 ?

		<u>Others:</u> Women from Socrates' household. Attendant of the prison. Poisoner, a public slave.	
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The *Phaedo* is a narrated dialogue with a prelude. The dramatic date for the prelude is 399, and set a few weeks or months after the execution of Socrates; the dramatic setting is a Pythagorean community at Philus. The participants in the prelude are Phaedo of Elis and Echecrates of Phlius.

The main action takes place in the prison, one or two days after the *Crito*.

The narrative structure of the dialogues

Direct dialogues:	Narrated dialogues with frame-story:	Narrated dialogues with a prelude:	Dialogues as narrations:
<i>Laws</i>			<i>Republic</i>
	<i>Parmenides</i> (450)		
[<i>Alcibiades I</i>] (432) [<i>Alcibiades II</i>](432)		<i>Protagoras</i> (432)	
<i>Timaeus</i> (429) <i>Critias</i> (429)			<i>Charmides</i> (429)
<i>Laches</i> (424)			
<i>Cratylus</i> (422)			
(<i>Cleitophon</i>) (421/16) (<i>Hippias Major</i>) (421/16) [<i>Hippias Minor</i>] (421/16)			
<i>Phaedrus</i> (418/16)			
	<i>Symposium</i> (416)		
<i>Ion</i> (413)			
			<i>Lysis</i> (409)
		<i>Euthydemus</i> (407)	
<i>Gorgias</i> (405)			
<i>Meno</i> (402)			
<i>Menexenus</i> (401/400)			
<i>Euthyphron</i> (399) <i>Sophist</i> (399) <i>Statesman</i> (399) <i>Apology</i> (399) <i>Crito</i> (399)	<i>Theaetetus</i> (399)	<i>Phaedo</i> (399)	
<i>Philebus</i> (?)			

Appendix II: Dramatic chronology—Eduard Munk (1857)

The following schema displays Munk’s ordering of the dialogues. This chronology is also presented in Zuckert (2009, 17-18n30).

	Period 1: Socrates’ dedication to philosophy and his battle against sophistry:
446	<i>Parmenides</i>
434	<i>Protagoras</i>
432	<i>Charmides</i>
421	<i>Laches</i>
420	<i>Gorgias</i>
420	<i>Ion</i>
420	<i>Hippias Major</i>
420	<i>Cratylus</i>
420	<i>Euthydemus</i>
417	<i>Symposium</i>
	Period 2: Socrates’ true wisdom:
410	<i>Philebus</i>
410	<i>Republic</i>
410	<i>Timaeus</i>
410	<i>Critias</i>
	Period 3: The truth of Socrates’ teaching and his martyrdom:
405	<i>Meno</i>
399	<i>Theaetetus</i>
399	<i>Sophist</i>
399	<i>Euthyphron</i>
399	<i>Apology</i>
399	<i>Crito</i>
399	<i>Phaedo</i>

Munk sets aside *Alcibiades I*, *Lysis*, *Hippias Minor*, *Laws* and *Menexenus*, and Zuckert (ibid) observes that he “has to recur to the chronology of composition he himself criticized in accounting for some Platonic writings, and he entirely omits others – including the *Phaedrus*.”

Appendix III: Dramatic chronology—Catherine Zuckert (2009)

Zuckert’s approach clearly positions Socratic philosophizing as developing in distinction from the Athenian Stranger and Parmenides and, in addition, as responding to other possible philosophical approaches represented by the remaining philosophers: Timaeus and the Eleatic Stranger. This schema is present in Zuckert (2009, 8-9).

460-33	A pre-Socratic period
460-50	<i>Laws</i> (Followed by the <i>Epinomis</i>)
455-50	(Socrates’ turn from the study of nature or the beings to the examination of the <i>logoi</i> , related to the <i>Phaedo</i>)
450	<i>Parmenides</i>
450-33	(Socrates’ turn from the <i>logoi</i> to the <i>doxai</i> , related in the <i>Symposium</i> and <i>Apology</i>)
433-20	A period where Socrates interrogates his contemporaries about the noble and good
	<i>Protagoras</i>
433-32	<i>Alcibiades I</i> and <i>II</i>
432	<i>Charmides</i> (after the battle of Potidaea)
429	<i>Laches</i>
423	<i>Hippias Major</i> and <i>Minor</i>
421-20	
416-09	A two-fold period: a) 416-409 where Socrates articulates his positive doctrine. b) Socrates encounters the challenge presented in the <i>Timaeus</i> and <i>Critias</i> .
416	<i>Symposium</i>
415	<i>Phaedrus</i>
413	<i>Ion</i> (treated thematically in note to the <i>Republic</i>)
411	<i>Republic</i>
n.d.	<i>Philebus</i> (thematically related to the <i>Republic</i>)
409-08	<i>Timaeus-Critias</i>
409-01	A period where Socratic practice is exhibited
409	<i>Thaeges</i>
407	<i>Euthydemus</i>
406	<i>Lysis</i>
405	<i>Gorgias</i>
402-01	<i>Meno</i>
399	A two-fold phase: a) Socrates faces the challenges of the Eleatic Stranger. b) Presentation of Socrates’ trial and death.
399	<i>Theaetetus</i> , <i>Euthyphro</i> , <i>Cratylus</i> , <i>Sophist</i> , <i>Statesman</i> , <i>Apology</i> , <i>Crito</i> , <i>Phaedo</i>
387-86	<i>Menexenus</i>

Appendix IV: The *Laws*

At the outset, I follow V. Bradley Lewis (1998, 332-33), who argues that we must see the *Republic* and the *Laws* “as distinguished chiefly by differences of perspective rather than of doctrine.” The transition from the *Republic* to the *Laws* and, the connection between them, I think we can view metaphorically through the concepts of “darkness” and “light.” As the Athenian Stranger and Kleinias in the opening sections of the *Laws* describe the visual setting of the dialogue, the readers are, according to Pangle (1988a, 381), given their “first vivid indication” on the relation between the two dialogues. How? In the *Republic* Socrates comes down from Athens to Piraeus—the seaport founded by Pericles and designed by the famous architect Hippodamus of Miletus. Piraeus was a dark place and marked the devastating end of the Peloponnesian War. The Great Walls connected the city to its seaport, and metaphorically speaking, they were Athens’ umbilical cord. It was through this cord the philosopher descended into darkness. Socrates and Glaucon were on their way home after having watched the new-founded celebration of the goddess. However, instead of going home, they went to Polemarchus’ house. Set in the house, they forgot the celebration. Instead, they discussed. In a dream-like state of mind, enclosed by the darkness of Piraeus, the philosopher and his interlocutors founded a beautiful and just city. Through this foundation, and in their search for justice, they were also seeking enlightenment. After his summary at the beginning of book VIII, Socrates prays to the muses so they can tell about the necessity of decay. In the *Republic* it all culminates with the myth of Er. If we are persuaded by this myth, it could save us, Socrates tells. Moreover, if we are persuaded by Socrates and hold “that soul is immortal and capable of bearing all evils and all goods” we shall fare well both here and in the thousand year’s journey described in the myth (cf. 621c-d). With this conclusion, the night is over.

The sun is dawning when the philosopher in the *Laws* ascends from the city and starts his walk toward a divine sanctuary; the cave of Zeus at Crete. Withdrawn from all the disturbances of the city, disturbances such as youths, sophists, politicians etc.; three old men set out on a journey that results in the founding of a righteous city. This

transition from darkness to light can indicate that as a backdrop the *Republic* spans from 432 to 404, which is the time-span of the darkness and the decay resulting from the war. Thus, the *Laws*, with its radically new perspectives on the practice of politics and *paideia*, can be viewed as a new dawn.¹

The *Laws* as dramatic backdrop

The following passage from the *Seventh Letter* alludes to the context of Athens after the civil war and brings to light why it seems impossible to make a fundamental change in society by entering politics:

For it was not possible to be active in politics without friends and trustworthy supporters; and to find these ready to my hand was not an easy matter [...] The laws too, written and unwritten, were being altered for the worse, and the evil was growing with startling rapidity. Finally, it became clear to me, with regard to all existing communities, that they were one and all misgoverned. For their laws have got into a state that is almost incurable, except by some extraordinary (miraculous) reform with good luck to support it (325d-326a).

History has learned us that the extraordinary or miraculous reform wished for, did not happen. Hence, I suggest that the *Laws* could be read as a suggestion (or backdrop) for this wished-for reform. The theme of legislation runs throughout the whole corpus and, is present both explicitly and implicitly. In this regard, it is worth noticing that Socrates, quite at the outset of his journey, not only meets the old celebrated philosopher in the *Parmenides* (450) and the famous sophist in the *Protagoras* (432)—he also encounters two legislators: Parmenides, the lawgiver of Elea, and Protagoras, the lawgiver of Thurii.

When the three old men we meet in the *Laws* have decided to walk from Cnossos to the cave of Zeus, they have by that decision stated that they are on their way to the laws. The time spent is one day. From dawn until noon, they talk about laws; a conversation that eventually leads them to establish the Magnesia. This city represents

¹ Aristotle's claims that contrary to the *Republic*, the *Laws* presents a constitution "more suitable for adoption by actual cities" (*Pol.* II: 1264a1-4). On the relation between the *Republic* and the *Laws*, Lewis (1998, 331) argues that "the two dialogues do not oppose each other, but constitute two stages in a larger inquiry into the nature of politics looking neither to the rule of philosophy nor the rule of law simply, but to the good itself as the rule and measure of both," and further, that "neither the standard of philosophy nor that of law is final for Plato; both philosophy and law look to a further telos, which is the measurement of them both" (p. 332).

the second best *polis* next to an ideal (παράδειγμα, 739e, 807b, 875d). As the just and beautiful *polis* from the *Republic*, Magnesia also comes into being in speech. “Let’s construct a city in speech, just as we were founding it from the very beginning” (702d1-2), the Athenian Stranger suggests. Kleinias makes the task explicit, “So let’s try now, first in speech, to found the city” (702e1-2). It is noticeable that the founding of the city happens after three imperative observations. First, the historical survey that leads the Athenian Stranger to conclude that in the golden past times “for a variety of reasons, then, civil war and war were destroyed” (678e6-7) and that “the most well-bred dispositions usually spring up in a home when neither wealth nor poverty dwell there. For neither insolence nor injustice, nor again jealousies and ill will, come into being there” (679b5-c1).² Secondly, the Athenian Stranger noticed that “it’s likely that we’ve stumbled unawares, as it were, upon the origin of legislation (ἀρχῇ δὴ νομοθεσίας οἷον ἐμβάντες ἐλάθομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, 681c4-5).” Thirdly, he identifies wealth and poverty as the source of civil war (στασις, 690d1). It is after these observations that the Magnesia comes into being. Later the Athenian Stranger states that this thought-experiment is to be realized: “Not only have I made it [i.e., Magnesia]; but I’ll act on it as far as I’m able” (752a6). When noon is reached, he summarizes and gives guidelines for the further development:

Something which has emerged, by the aid of some god, out of the very things about which we’re now carrying on a dialogue! We began to discuss laws about dawn, and it has become high noon and we’ve paused in this altogether lovely resting place. In all this time we’ve been having a dialogue about nothing but laws. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we have only just begun to enunciate laws, and that everything said before consisted of our preludes to laws (722c6-d2).

From noon until afternoon, they promote a method for how to formulate the laws. The laws must be persuasive; that is, the laws themselves must persuade (πείθειν)³ the citizens to act in the manner the laws prescribe. As means for doing this, the Athenian Stranger proposes to attach preludes (προοίμια) to each particular law and to the legal

² This alludes to Hesiod and his story of the Golden Age, an age that did not know war – only peace. Cf. Hesiod, *Theogony*, lines 901-02. On this theme, see Nagy (1990).

³ On what is meant by “persuasion” in this context, see Bobonich (1991). Bobonich (p. 365n4) underlines that Plato’s practice of persuasion in the *Laws* involves several important differences from the ethical and political philosophy in the *Republic*.

code as a whole. Such preludes will supplement the sanctions attached to the laws; and these will aim at persuading the citizens to act in the way that the laws direct—and for reasons other than fear of sanctions.⁴ This practice is an innovation, and the Athenian Stranger argues that this is something no lawgiver has ever thought of doing before:

[...] All speeches, and whatever pertains to the voice, are preceded by preludes – almost like warming-up exercises – which artfully attempt to promote what is to come. It is the case, I suppose, that the songs sung to the kithara, the so-called “laws” or *nomoi*,⁵ like all music, are preceded by preludes composed with amazing seriousness. Yet with regard to things that are really “laws”, the laws we assert to be political, no one has ever neither uttered a prelude or become a composer and brought one to light – just as if it were a thing that did not exist in nature. But [...] such a thing really exist; and the laws which were talked of as double seemed to me just now to be not simply double but rather composed of two different parts, a law and a prelude to the law. [...] for it became clear to me that this whole speech, which the speaker gives in order to persuade, is delivered with just this end in view: so that he who receives the law uttered by the legislator might receive the command – that is, the law – in a frame of mind more favorably disposed and therefore more apt to learn something. That’s why, according to my argument at least, this would correctly be called a “prelude” rather than an “argument” of the law (722d3-723b2).

This adaptation of the “double laws” goes on the whole afternoon, and from afternoon until sunset, they discuss the infusion and mitigation of the laws:

But then what should the lawgiver do when this evil is of long standing? Should he only rise up in the state and threaten all mankind? [...] Should he not rather, when he is making laws for men, at the same time infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words, and mitigate the severity of them as far as he can? (890b3-c8)

When demanding that the legislator should “mitigate the severity” of the laws, the Athenian Stranger stresses that the laws should never offer threatening arguments to the citizens—they should be rational and applicable to rearing and education. His demand is that the legislator should “infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words,” and according to Christopher Bobonich (1991, 373) this entails:

⁴ See further 721e, 722e-723a, 853b-d, cf. *Ibid.*, p. 365. The suggestion of an educational program where the citizens learns without fearing sanctions, stands in stark contrast to the program launched by Protagoras.

⁵ Pangle (1988b, 526n26) points out that *nomos* was also a word for a form of poetry, a song sung by a chorus or by soloists to the accompany of the *kithara*. This word play regarding *nomos* (law versus song) also occurs at 700b and 775b.

(a) what the person who is to be persuaded is asking for is to be ‘taught’, that is, to be given a good argument for adopting what is required by the laws (e.g. 885d2-3). The laws are requested to show that the beliefs they recommend are truth (885e), and that the course of action they prescribe really is in the interest of the citizen. (b) What the laws and preludes actually do is characterized as ‘teaching’, that is, giving an argument to the citizens and bringing it about that they ‘learn’ (e.g. 718c8-d7, 720d3-6, 723a4-5, 857d-e and 888a2). (c) Plato never suggests that the laws should offer bad but plausible arguments to the citizens. Although we cannot expect the preludes to offer full-scale philosophical arguments for all of their conclusions, Plato clearly requires them to offer good reasons and recommends that they use arguments that ‘come close to philosophizing’ (857d).

Through these three pointers, Bobonich effectively summarizes how the laws are to be vital parts of the citizen’s rearing and education. This is in accordance with the conclusion that follows from Socrates’ encounter with Protagoras. In course of that debate, it becomes clear that the burden of learning is placed on the student, and further, that the learnable is not always teachable. Thus, in that context Socrates denies that virtue is teachable because it cannot be inculcated in a student by a teacher. Material suitable for teaching is neither touched upon in the *Protagoras*, nor in the discussions on education in the *Republic*,⁶ but the Athenian Stranger is quite clear on this matter. The major aim of the subject of the *paideia*-program launched in the *Laws* is to make righteous and virtuous citizens in order to prevent *stasis*. Hence, the first step is to teach the citizens to write and read. The second step is for the students themselves to study the laws and the preludes of the laws, which will provide the citizens with arguments that enable them to learn. Therefore, the Athenians Stranger underlines to Kleinias that it is crucial that the laws are continuous and remains the same from one generation to next:⁷

The fact that we are confidently legislating for men who lack experience, without any fears as to how they’ll ever accept the laws that are now being laid down. After all, Kleinias, this much at least is obvious to almost everyone, even to someone who isn’t very wise: they won’t easily, at any rate, accept any of them at the beginning. What is needed is for us to survive, somehow, for a long enough time so that the children who have grown up tasting the laws from an early age,

⁶ In the *Republic*, the focus is rather what material that is not suitable, thus it can be argued that the material not mentioned is approved.

⁷ From this point of view, the *Laws* can be read as a corrective to the law-reforms in Athens during the civil war and the legislators work during the restoration of the democracy in 403.

having been reared under them and having become sufficiently accustomed to them, have taken part in the selection of magistrates for the whole city. If in some way, by some device, what we're now describing could come to pass correctly, I at least think that the city that had been given such a childhood training would, after this period of time, remain very stable (752b9-c8).

In addition to use the laws as educational material aiming towards a silent persuasion of the citizens, the Guardian in charge of education is also recommended to introduce supplementary material in the form of conversations written down. The Athenian Stranger suggests:

When I look back now over this discussion of ours, which has lasted from dawn up till now, it is just like a literary composition. [...] of all the addresses I have ever learned or listened to [...] it is these that have impressed me as being the most eminently for the ears of the younger generations. So I could hardly recommend a better model than this to the Guardian in charge of education. And if he comes across similar and related material, conversations similar to ours today, he must not let them slip through his fingers, but have them committed to writing (811d2-e5).

From this it is a plausible inference that it is the dialogues, or maybe the whole corpus, that is recommended as suitable material for the education of virtual citizens in their becoming.

The peace-theme in the Laws

Right from the outset, the Athenian Stranger creates connections that ties legislation to education, and civil strife (*stasis*) to poverty and wealth. After Kleinias' account of how the Cretan lawgiver ordained all legal usages, both public and private, with an eye to war (*πόλεμος*), and after a brief discussion of this account, the Athenian Stranger wonder if not the right thing to do for the lawgiver is to "set up all his lawful customs for the sake of what is best?" (628c6-7). As Kleinias agrees, the Athenian Stranger continues:

The best, however, is neither war nor civil war [...] but peace [...]. Moreover, it would seem that the victory we mentioned of a State over itself is not one of the best things but one of those which are necessary.⁸ For imagine a man supposing that a human body was best off when it was sick and purged with physic, while never giving a thought to the case of the body that needs no physic at all.

⁸ Cf. 757d6 ff., 858a2-6, 876b6 ff., 880e3-6, 922b. On the discussion on the best things versus those that are necessary, see also *Republic* 493c ff.

Similarly, with regard to the well-being of a State or an individual, that man will never make a genuine statesman who pays attention primarily and solely to the needs of foreign warfare, nor will he make a finished lawgiver unless he designs his war legislation for peace rather than his peace legislation for war (628c9-e1).

The demand that a lawgiver must design his legislation for peace makes Kleinias at unease because if this argument is right—then the lawgivers of both Crete and Sparta were wrong. Kleinias’ reaction indicates that such a demand was controversial, and after having launched it, the Athenian Stranger is forced to calm down the situation: “we should not fight harshly with one another, but should rather make a calm inquiry about the present matters, since we, as well as they, are very serious about these things” (629a1-3). Through their conversation, they agree that civil strife and war is harmful, and again, with allusion to past times, the Athenian Stranger argues that the people then were different from the people now with regards to war:

They didn’t know all the present-day arts of war on land or on sea, or in a city all by itself, which are called lawsuits and civil wars, and in which every sort of contrivance of words and deeds is devised in order to do mutual mischief and injustice. So, for the reason we already have explained, shouldn’t we say that they were simpler and more courageous and also more moderate and in every way more just? (679d4-e4)

The strongest arguments the Athenian Stranger uses for convincing his interlocutors, are similar to this; they are retrospective and through this backward-looking he manages to show that an act of war is not according to nature as Kleinias argued at the outset, rather it is a result of bad politics, education and legislation. Thus, the legislation of the forefathers belonging to a very distant past is the ideal because as lawgivers they designed healthy societies with stable laws and traditions. It is therefore of utter importance that the laws are designed with thoughts on a peaceful future, and that the laws demand a stable and continuous constitution which survives and lasts from generation to generation.

The *paideia*-program, as launched in the *Laws*, is practical and feasible as it exposes a suggestive road towards a just society where the citizens themselves take on the burden of studying the laws, learning the course of action they prescribe by understanding that this is in their best interest. The potential for change is embedded in this understanding, and the Athenian Stranger proposes his vision for the future:

Every man and woman should spend life in this way, playing the noblest possible games, and thinking about them in a way that is the opposite of the way they're now thought about. [...] Nowadays, presumably, they suppose the serious things are for the sake of the playful things: for it is held that the affairs pertaining to war, being serious matters, should be run well for the sake of peace. But the fact is that in war there is not and will not be by nature either play or, again, an education that is at any time worthy of our discussion; yet this is what we assert is for us, at least, the most serious thing. Each person should spend the greatest and best part of his life in peace (803c6-d8).

In view of a peaceful future, it is stressed that men and women should be treated equally. Moreover, the Athenian Stranger provides "statistics" as part of his argument when he claims that he has made some calculation with regard to these matters, and from these calculations, he deduces:

I assert that if, indeed, it is possible for these things to turn out this way, then the way they're now arranged in our lands – where it's not the case that all the men with their entire strength, and united in spirit, practice the same things as the women – is the most mindless of all. For this way, almost every city is just about half of what it might be, when with the same expenditures and efforts it could double itself. And this would be an amazing mistake on the part of the lawgiver (805a3-b2).

The Athenian Stranger presents a strong case and he convinces his two interlocutors that the laws must be formulated with peace as the future aim. The work displayed in the *Laws* and the arguments presented pro peace, is yet an argument for suggesting that the author presents a strong anti-war-voice.

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