Wittgenstein Nachlass Ts-226: A case of Wittgensteinian (Self-)Translation

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Abstract: Wittgenstein engaged in translating his Austrian German philosophical writings into English in various ways and at different levels. One notable example is the commitment of R. Rhees' to translate the *Philosophical Investigations* "Frühfassung", and Wittgenstein's revisions to Rhees' translation draft of part of it in Wittgenstein Nachlass Ts-226. The main objective of this contribution is to draw the reader's attention to this relatively little studied and discussed item and to encourage translation research on it. The contribution offers transcriptions of selected portions of Ts-226 in parallel with their sources in Ts-239.

Introduction

Wittgenstein engaged in translating his Austrian German philosophical writings into English in various ways and at different levels. Some notable examples are the following: his input for the translation of the *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (TLP 1921) into English (TLP 1922),[1] the 1935-36 work on a second philosophical book in parallel German-English based on the *Brown Book* (Pichler 2004, p. 130),[2] his work with T. Redpath on the 1938/39 translation of the preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1953) "Frühfassung" version (Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-247, see

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[1] See CCO 1973, WC 2008 and LPA 2016 for primary sources and research studies on this project.

[2] For a list of correspondences (parallel corpus) between the English original in Ts-310 and the German in Ms-115 see Pichler & Smith 2013.

Venturinha 2010), and finally the 1938 commitment of R. Rhees' to translate the "Frühfassung" itself and Wittgenstein's revisions to Rhees' translation draft of part of it. It is the texts of this translation project of (part of) the "Frühfassung",[3] begun but not completed by Rhees and revised by Wittgenstein in cooperation with Y. Smythies, that is the focus of this contribution. This project is preserved in the Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-226.[4]

By the beginning of November 1936 when Wittgenstein was residing at his house over the Eidsvatnet in Skjolden, he had dismissed not only the project of translating the *Brown Book* into German (Ms-115, second part) but also the *Brown Book* project in its entirety (Pichler 2004, pp. 132ff). Then in 1936-37 he wrote a first compact version of what we today know as PI §§1-188. This text is today called the PI "Urfassung" (PI 2001) and preserved in the Nachlass as Ms-142. A typescript with a clean version of Ms-142, Ts-220, was begun and probably also completed in the summer of 1937 at the latest. It is Ts-239, a later version of Ts-220, which eventually formed the basis for Rhees' English translation draft in Ts-226.[5]

Ts-226, as it is preserved in the Nachlass, consists of 72 sheets (plus half a sheet at the beginning containing the famous citation from Augustine's *Confessiones* about the learning of language) and corresponds to PI §§1-107. The entire typescript contains numerous revisions in Wittgenstein's hand, and it is common opinion that these revisions are all corrections to Rhees' translation draft, something that Wittgenstein himself suggests in his letter to G.E. Moore from February 2, 1939 (ICE 2011):

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[3] The PI "Frühfassung" consists of Ts-220 and Ts-221, the first corresponding roughly to PI §§1-188/189. The latter contains a synopsis of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics 1937-38 and was published in its later version Ts-222 in Part I of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (1956).
[4] On the Wittgenstein Nachlass see von Wright 1969.
[5] See Pichler (1996, p. 93) and Schulte in PI 2001: 1100.

Dear Moore,

I had a p.c. on Wednesday from Keynes saying that he would like to see the English version of my book, or whatever is ready of it. I needn't say the whole thing is absurd as he couldn't even make head or tail of it if it were translated very well. But as a matter of fact the translation is pretty awful as I saw today when I tried to go through it in order to correct it before giving it to Keynes. Though I worked quite hard on it the whole day with Smythies we only did 12 pages, because masses of it had to be altered. Tomorrow I must go on with it because tomorrow night Keynes ought to get it. So I'm afraid I shan't be able to come to you in the afternoon. I have written to Keynes that you have read the first half of my first volume & could give him some information about it; for obviously you must be able to get more out of reading the original than Keynes could get out of a bad translation <u>& in a hurry</u>. So I <u>hope</u> he'll ask you to give him your opinion. By the way, please don't mention to <u>anyone</u> that I don't think highly of the translation. Rhees did his very best & the stuff is damn difficult to translate.

I hope to see you soon. Best wishes!

Yours Ludwig Wittgenstein

It must be pointed out that many of Wittgenstein's revisions in Ts-226 may be regarded as revisions to the German source text itself and to introduce new meanings as much as corrections to the translation. Wittgenstein was, at least partly, clearly not only correcting Rhees' translation but also used it as a basis for developing the PI text and project *itself* further. Cases where Wittgenstein introduces new meanings include in my view the following replacements:

- "What is the meaning of the word 'five'? – There was no question of any here; ..." → "But what's the meaning of the word "five"? – There was no question of such an entity 'meaning' here; ..." (§ 2); Wittgenstein replaces "any" with "such an entity 'meaning'".

Ts-239, § 2 the German original had read "Was ist aber die Be-
deutung des Wortes 'fünf'? – Von einer solchen war hier gar nicht
die Rede; ..."

- "kinds" → "cases" (§ 8); the German original read "Arten" (Ts-
  239, § 6)
- "long string" → "a whole lot" (§ 73); the German original read
  "eine ganze Reihe" (Ts-239, § 70)
- "correspondence" → "similarity" (§ 73); the German original read
  "Entsprechungen" (Ts-239, § 70)
- "cannot characterize these similarities better than by" → "can't
  find a better || a more appropriate name for these similarities
  than" (§ 74); the German original read "kann diese Ähnlichkeiten
  nicht besser charakterisieren, als durch" (Ts-239, § 71)
- "But if someone wished || were to say" → "But if someone said"
  (§ 74); the German original read "Wenn aber Einer sagen wollte"
  (Ts-239, § 71)
- "In fact, can one always replace an indistinct photograph by a dis-
  tinct one to advantage?" → "In fact, is it always desirable to re-
  place an indistinct picture by a sharp one?" (§ 78); the German
  original read "Ja, kann man ein unscharfes Bild immer mit Vorteil
  durch ein scharfes ersetzen?" (Ts-239, § 75)
- "place" → "street" (§ 78); the German original read "Platz" (Ts-
  239, § 75)
- "an indirect means" → "an indirect way" (§ 78); the German orig-
  inal read "ein indirektes Mittel" (Ts-239, § 75)
- "expression" → "language" (§ 99); the German original read
  "Ausdruck" (Ts-239, § 95).[6]

Wittgenstein's revisions didn't eventually seem to have any significant
bearing on his further reworking of the German text because the final PI
"Endfassung" in Ts-227 (1944-46) is in its wording again much closer to
Ts-239 than to the revised text of Ts-226. The entire revision project in
Ts-226 seemed then to have been more or less simply forgotten or left

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[6] Note that the section numbering of Ts-226, added by Wittgenstein, skips number 99.
There is also a mistake in the pagination which jumps from 65 to 67.

aside. This fits with what J. Schulte generally says about Wittgenstein: "...now and then, Wittgenstein disregarded the reworked text and went back to an earlier version." (1992, p. 36)

In the following, I offer transcriptions of selected portions of Ts-226 in parallel with their sources in Ts-239.[7] I have selected parts of which I thought it was reasonable to assume that they were of considerable importance to Wittgenstein:

- First, the discussion of Augustine's description of the learning of language, including Wittgenstein's transition to using it positively as the framework for introducing "primitive languages" / "language games" as means for seeing clearly the functioning of our language (Ts-226, 3).
- Second, the introduction and discussion of what in Wittgenstein research is standardly called "family resemblance" but Wittgenstein here, correcting Rhees, himself calls "family likenesses" (Ts-226, 48).
- Third, the discussion of the role and nature of achieving a clear view of our language, especially as it relates to the idea of philosophical analysis in the *Tractatus* sense – thus an "übersichtliche Darstellung" which (again in the wording of Wittgenstein's revision) makes the structure of language "capable of being all seen at a glance" (Ts-226, 65).

The transcriptions start with a section here presented *en face*, "I: From German Ts-239 to English Ts-226":

- The verso page offers the German Ts-239 §§1-6, 69-71, 75, 94-96, along with their section numbers (= ¤239).

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[7] To include the entire Ts-226 along with its counterparts in Ts-220 / Ts-239 would naturally have by far exceeded the limits of this publication. The reader has access to the entire Ts-226 as also all other Wittgenstein Nachlass items edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) through IDP 2016 (transcriptions) and BNE 2015- (facsimiles).

- • The recto page offers Rhees' English translation of the same passages, thus Ts-226 §§1-8, 72-74, 78, 98-99, 100-101 (the section numbering deviates from the numbering in Ts-239 *post* §3) – *before* Wittgenstein's revision in hand (= ¤226^{-w}).

The subsequent section "II: Wittgenstein's text additions and deletions in ¤226" renders the Ts-226 selection *as revised in Wittgenstein's hand* (= ¤226^{+w}) on *text* level – text added is marked green, text removed pink. With Sections I and II, it should be possible to study Rhees' translation and Wittgenstein's revisions to it in not too cumbersome a way. At the same time, the first two sections should not be taken as a substitute for a thorough study of the sources for which I in a concluding section offer "III: Diplomatic transcription of ¤226^{+w}". Naturally, the reader is encouraged to take the further step of also consulting the facsimile of Ts-226 on Wittgenstein Source, http://wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ts-226_f, and using the diplomatic transcription as help for reading in the original.

I should add a word about how the text renderings were produced – and how they can be reproduced and verified by the reader:

The transcription of ¤239 in *I: From German Ts-239 to English Ts-226* was produced from the Bergen Wittgenstein Archives' (WAB) open access "Nachlass transcriptions" site which offers "interactive dynamic presentation" access to WAB's transcriptions of the Wittgenstein Nachlass (IDP 2016). Here I select "Ts-239" from the drop-down list and run it through the linear transformation scenario (option "Display original line breaks?"[8] clicked to Yes) thus producing a linear and slightly normalized version of the document. Subsequently I copy the selected portions into a MS Word document. ¤239 thus gives a reader-friendly version of the text: orthography is gently normalized; deficiencies due to typewriter limitations (such as "Aepfel" in stead of "Äpfel", "weiss" in stead of "weiß") are tacitly

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[8] Phrasing of these options as of January 2019. Please note that the rendering of the original line breaks is not flawless, neither on the online site nor in the transcriptions included here.

corrected; indentation is unified; deleted text is omitted; undecided alternatives are however still retained and marked … | | … .

The transcription of ¤226^{-w} on the recto page was produced on the same IDP site by picking "Ts-226" from the drop-down list and likewise running it through the linear transformation scenario (option "Display original line breaks?" clicked to Yes); this time however additionally the option "Exclude handwritten revisions in typescript?" was clicked to Yes. Thus a text was produced that *omits* Wittgenstein's corrections and revisions. *In toto*, the ¤239 and ¤226^{-w} transcriptions permit the reader to easily read the German translation source and Rhees' English translation in parallel and without being distracted by the many additions in Wittgenstein's hand since both columns offer linearized renderings.

II: Wittgenstein's text additions and deletions in ¤226 was produced by running linear versions of both ¤226^{-w} and ¤226^{+w} through the *"Compare two documents"* function of MS Word and having MS Word mark both additions and deletions. Text additions were marked green, text deletions pink and with strikethrough.[9]

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[9] The MS Word "*Compare two documents*" function occasionally produced an unhappy word order that I put right. Please note that pasting the HTML output of WAB's transcriptions from the web browser into a MS Word document can produce faults in the text rendering; for example, markup features such as colouring of lines and underlinings as well as the lines and underlinings themselves can get lost, and separate words can be joined together by MS Word. Unfortunately this also affects *III: Diplomatic transcription of ¤226^{+w}* which does not always distinguish between deletions of typed text made by Wittgenstein in hand (which should consistently be marked by a strikethrough line in olive green) and deletions of typed text already made by Rhees in typewriter (which are marked by strikethrough lines in black). MS Word seems to throughout render strikethrough lines in the colour of the underlying text. For a rendering of the sources as intended please consult the IDP 2016 site. With regard to different writing pens used by Wittgenstein in his typescript revision (see for example Ts-226,65 which contains revisions not only in pencil, but also blue ink and black ink), please note that these currently are not distinguished in WAB's transcriptions; thus, independent of whether a handwritten revision in typescript is in pencil or pen or this or that colour, all will be rendered in olive green.

The final section III: "Diplomatic transcription of ¤226⁺ʷ" was pro-
duced by again using IDP 2016 but this time Ts-226 was run through the
diplomatic scenario (option "Original line breaks" on), and Wittgenstein's
additions in hand included (option "Handwritten revisions in typescript"
on). This part thus gives a diplomatic version of ¤226 and marks all cor-
rections and additions, be they in typescript by Rhees or the result from
Wittgenstein's later revision. For a detailed guide to the markup please
consult the legend available from the output produced on the IDP 2016
site.

The main objective of this contribution is to draw the reader's attention
to the relatively little studied and discussed Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-
226 and to encourage translation research on it. Though Baker and Hacker
(2009) pays attention to them, a thorough study of Wittgenstein's changes
to Rhees' translation is to my knowledge still lacking. It could reveal pat-
terns which might help us understand better not only Wittgenstein's trans-
lation and translation revision practices, but also contribute to obtaining
better insight into his overall manuscript and text revision and composi-
tion practices. My first impression is that some of Wittgenstein's revisions
clearly answer to what often is called the "accessibility" requirement of
translation while Rhees' translation itself seems mostly to have tried to
follow the "equivalence" requirement and is thus often simply more faith-
ful to the original than Wittgenstein's revision.[10]

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[10] About these two requirements see further P. Oliveira's contribution in this volume. – I
am indebted to Konrad Bucher ad Nivedita Gangopadhyay for comments and corrections
to an earlier version of this paper. The transcriptions of selected parts of Ts-226 and Ts-
239 are published by kind permission of the Master and Fellows of Trinity College
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[Appendix]

I: From German Ts-239 to English Ts-226

¤239
(Ts-239: §§ 1-6, 69-71, 75, 94-96
from pages 1-3, 49-51, 53-54, 67-68)

1   A u g u s t i n u s , in den Confessionen I/8
cum ipsi (majores homines) appellabant rem aliqam, et cum
secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam,
et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum
eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis
aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium,
quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum
actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in peten-
dis, habendis, rejiciendis, fugiendisve rebus. Ita verba
in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita,
quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque
jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enun-
tiabam.
     In diesen Worten erhalten wir – so scheint
es mir – ein bestimmtes Bild von dem Wesen der menschlichen
Sprache. Nämlich dieses: Die Wörter der Sprache benennen
Gegenstände – Sätze sind Verbindungen von solchen Benennun-
gen.
     In diesem Bild von der Sprache finden wir
die Wurzeln der Idee: Jedes W o r t hat eine B e d e u -
t u n g . Diese Bedeutung ist dem Wort zugeordnet. Sie ist
der Gegenstand, für welchen das Wort steht.
     Von einem Unterschied der Wortarten spricht
Augustinus. Wer das Lernen der Sprache so beschreibt,
[[p. 2]] denkt – so möchte ich glauben – zunächst an Hauptwörter,
wie "Tisch", "Stuhl", "Brot"
und die Namen von Personen, erst in zweiter Linie
an die Namen gewisser Tätigkeiten und Eigenschaften, und
an die übrigen Wortarten als an etwas, was sich finden wird.

2   Denke nun an diese Verwendung der Spra-
che:- Ich schicke jemand einkaufen. Ich gebe ihm einen
Zettel, auf diesem stehen die Zeichen: "fünf rote Äpfel".
Er trägt den Zettel zum Kaufmann; der öffnet die Lade, auf
welcher das Zeichen "Äpfel" steht; dann sucht er in einer
Tabelle das Wort "rot" auf und findet ihm gegenüber ein
färbiges Täfelchen; nun sagt er die Reihe der Grundzahl-
wörter – ich nehme an, er weiß sie auswendig – bis zum
Worte "fünf" und bei jedem Zahlwort nimmt er einen Apfel
aus der Lade, der die Farbe des Täfelchens hat.- So, und
ähnlich, operiert man mit Worten.- "Wie weiß er aber, wo
und wie er das Wort 'rot' nachschlagen soll und was er
mit dem Wort 'fünf' anzufangen hat?" - Nun, ich nehme an,
e r h a n d e l t , wie ich es beschrieben habe. Die Er-
klärungen haben irgendwo ein Ende.- Was ist aber die Be-
deutung des Wortes "fünf"? - Von einer solchen war hier gar
nicht die Rede; nur davon, wie das Wort "fünf" gebraucht
wird.

¤226⁻ᵂ
(Ts-226: §§ 1-8, 72-74, 78, 98-99, 100-101
from pages 0-3, 46-49, 64-67 - without Wittgenstein's revisions)

1   A u g u s t i n u s , in den Confessionen I/8
    cum (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum
    secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam,
    et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum
    eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis
    aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium,
    quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum
    actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in peten-
    dis, habendis, rejiciendis, faciendisve rebus. Ita verba
    in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita,
    quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque
    jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enun-
    tiabam. [[p. 1]]
        In these words we have - it seems to me - a definite
    picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words
    of the language designate objects - sentences are combinations of
    such designations.
        In this picture of language we find the root of the idea:
    every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word.
    It is the object which the word stands for.
        Augustine does not speak of a distinction between parts of
    speech. Whoever || Anyone who describes the learning of language in this way
    thinks - I should imagine - primarily of substantives like "table",
    "chair", "bread" and the names of persons; and of the other parts
    of speech as something that will work out all right.
2   Consider this application of language: I send someone
    shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which are the marks:
    "five red apples". He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens
    the box that has the mark "apples" on it; then he looks up the word
    "red" in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now
    speaks || pronounces the series of cardinal numerals - I assume that he knows them
    by heart - up to the word "five" and with each numeral he takes an
    apple from the box that has the colour of the square. - This is
    how one works with words. - "But how does he know where and how
    he is to look up the word 'red' and what he has to do with the
    word 'five'?" - Well, I am assuming that he acts as I have described.
    The explanations come to an end somewhere. - What is the meaning of
    the word "five"? - There was no question of any here; only of the
    way in which "five" is used. // Nothing of that sort was being
    discussed, only the way in which "five" is used.

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[Appendix]

3   Jener philosophische Begriff der Bedeu-
tung ist in einer primitiven Vorstellung, von der Art und
Weise wie die Sprache funktioniert, zu Hause.
[[p. 2a]] Man kann aber auch sagen, es sei die
Vorstellung einer primitiveren Sprache, als der unsern.
      D e n k e n wir uns eine Sprache, für die
die Beschreibung, wie Augustinus sie gegeben hat, stimmt:
Die Sprache soll der Verständigung eines Bauenden A mit
einem Gehilfen B dienen. A führt einen Bau auf aus Baustei-
nen; es sind Würfel, Säulen, Platten und Balken vorhanden.
B hat ihm die Bausteine zuzureichen, und zwar nach der
Reihe, wie A sie braucht. Zu dem Zweck bedienen sie sich
einer Sprache, bestehend aus den Wörtern: "Würfel", "Säule",
"Platte", "Balken". A ruft sie aus; – B bringt den Stein,
den er gelernt hat, auf diesen Ruf zu bringen.
      Fasse dies als vollständige primitive
Sprache auf.

4   Augustinus beschreibt, könnten wir sagen,
ein System der Verständigung; nur ist nicht alles, was
wir Sprache nennen, dieses System.
      (Und das muß man in so vielen Fällen sa-
gen, wo sich die Frage erhebt: "ist diese Darstellung brauch-
bar, oder unbrauchbar?" Die Antwort ist dann: "Ja, brauchbar;
aber nur für dieses eng umschriebene Gebiet, nicht für das
ganze, das Du darzustellen vorgabst." Denke z.B. an Theorien
der Nationalökonomen.) [[p. 3]]
      Es ist, als erklärte jemand: "Spielen besteht darin,
daß man Dinge, gewissen Regeln gemäß, auf einer Fläche ver-
schiebt ..." – und wir ihm antworten: Du scheinst an die Brett-
spiele zu denken; aber das sind nicht alle Spiele. Du kannst
deine Erklärung richtigstellen, indem du sie ausdrücklich auf
diese Spiele einschränkst.

5   Denk' dir eine Schrift, in welcher Buchstaben zur Be-
zeichnung von Lauten benützt würden, aber auch zur Bezeichnung
der Betonung und als Interpunktionszeichen. (Eine Schrift kann
man auffassen als eine Sprache zur Beschreibung von Lautbildern.)
Denke dir nun, daß Einer jene Schrift so verstünde, als ent-
spräche einfach jedem Buchstaben ein Laut und als hätten die
Buchstaben nicht auch andere Funktionen. So einer – zu
einfachen – Auffassung der Schrift gleicht Augustinus' Auf-
fassung der Sprache.

6   Wenn man das Beispiel (2) betrachtet, so ahnt man vielleicht
inwiefern der allgemeine Begriff der Bedeutung der Worte das
Funktionieren der Sprache mit einem Dunst umgibt, der das
klare Sehen unmöglich macht. Es zerstreut den Nebel, wenn wir
die Erscheinungen der Sprache an primitiven Arten ihrer Ver-
wendung studieren, in denen man den Zweck und das Funktionieren
der Wörter klar übersehen kann.
      Solche primitiven Formen der Sprache verwendet das Kind,
wenn es sprechen lernt. Das Lehren der Sprache ist hier kein
Erklären, sondern ein Abrichten.
                                    ...

3   That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive notion of the way in which language functions. But one might also say it is the notion of a more primitive language than ours.

4   Let us <u>imagine</u> a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language shall help a builder A to make himself understood by an assistant B. [[p. 2]] A is constructing a building out of building stones; there is a supply of cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the building stones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: "cube", "column", "slab", "beam". A ==shouts || calls== out the words; – B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call.
      Take this as a complete primitive language.

5   Augustine describes, we might say, <u>a</u> system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system.
      (And this must be said in ever so many cases where the question arises, "can this description be used or can't it be used?". The answer is, "Yes, it can be used; but only for this narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you were professing to describe." Think of the theories of the economists.)

6   It is as though someone explained: "Playing a game consists in moving things about on a surface according to certain rules ...", and we were to answer him: You are apparently thinking of games played on a board; but those aren't all the games there are. You can put your description right by confining it explicitly to those games.

7   Imagine a ==way of writing || type== in which letters are used to indicate sounds, but also to indicate emphasis and as marks of punctuation. (One can regard a ==way of writing || type== as a language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone understood this ==way of writing || type== as though it were one in which to every letter there simply corresponded a sound, and as though the letters did not have other very different functions as well. – An oversimplified view of the type like this one resembles, I believe, Augustine's view of language.

8   If one considers example (2) one may perhaps begin to suspect how far the commonly accepted concept of the meaning of words surrounds the functioning of language with a mist that makes clear [[p. 3]] vision impossible. It scatters the fog if we study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application, where the simplicity enables one to get a clear view of the way the words function and of what their purpose is.
      Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.
               ...

69   Hier stoßen wir auf die große Frage, die hinter
allen diesen Betrachtungen steht. – – Denn man könnte mir nun ein-
wenden: "Du machst dir's leicht! Du redest von allen mög-
lichen Sprachspielen, hast aber nirgends gesagt, was denn das
Wesentliche des Sprachspiels, und d.h. der Sprache, ist. [[p. 50]]
Was allen diesen Vorgängen gemeinsam ist und sie zur Sprache,
oder zu Teilen der Sprache macht. Du schenkst dir also gerade den
Teil der Untersuchung, der dir selbst seinerzeit das meiste Kopf-
zerbrechen gemacht hat, nämlich den, die a l l g e m e i n e
F o r m   d e s   S a t z e s   und der Sprache betreffend."
          Und das ist wahr. – Statt etwas anzugeben, was allem,
was wir Sprache nennen, gemeinsam ist, sage ich, es ist diesen
Erscheinungen gar nicht Eines gemeinsam, weswegen wir für alle das
gleiche Wort verwenden, – sondern sie sind miteinander in vielen
verschiedenen Weisen   v e r w a n d t . Und dieser Verwandtschaft,
oder dieser Verwandtschaften, wegen nennen wir sie alle "Sprachen".
Ich will versuchen, dies zu erklären.

70   Betrachte z.B. einmal die Vorgänge, die wir "Spiele"
nennen. Ich meine Brettspiele, Kartenspiele, Ballspiele, Kampfspiele,
u.s.w. Was ist allen diesen gemeinsam? – Sag nicht: "es
m u ß ihnen etwas gemeinsam sein, sonst hießen sie nicht 'Spiele'";
sondern   s c h a u ob ihnen allen etwas gemeinsam ist. – Denn wenn
du sie anschaust, wirst du zwar nicht etwas sehen, was a l l e n
gemeinsam wäre, aber du wirst Ähnlichkeiten, Verwandtschaften,
sehen, und zwar eine ganze Reihe. Wie gesagt: denk nicht, sondern schau! –
Schau z.B. die Brettspiele an, mit ihren mannigfachen Verwandt-
schaften. Nun geh zu den Kartenspielen über; hier findest du viele
Entsprechungen zu jener ersten Klasse, aber viele gemeinsame Züge
verschwinden, andere treten auf. Wenn du nun zu den Ballspielen über-
gehst, so bleibt manches Gemeinsame erhalten, aber vieles geht ver-
loren.– Sind sie alle 'u n t e r h a l t e n d '? Vergleiche Schach
mit dem Mühlfahren. Oder gibt es überall ein Gewinnen und Verlieren,
oder die Konkurrenz von Spielenden? Denke an die Patiencen. In den
Ballspielen gibt es Gewinnen und Verlieren; aber wenn ein
Kind den Ball an die Wand wirft und wieder auffängt, so ist dieser [[p. 51]]
Zug verschwunden. Schau, welche Rolle Geschick und Glück spielen.
Und wie verschieden ist Geschick im Schachspiel und Geschick im
Tennisspiel. Denk nun an die Reigenspiele: Hier ist das Element
der Unterhaltung, aber wie viele der anderen Charakterzüge sind
verschwunden! Und so können wir durch die vielen, vielen anderen
Gruppen von Spielen gehen. Ähnlichkeiten auftauchen und verschwin-
den sehen.
          Und das Ergebnis dieser Betrachtung lautet nun: Wir
sehen ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander
übergreifen und kreuzen. Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen.

72   Here we come up against the big question that lies behind all
      these considerations: For one might object to me: "You take it
      easy! You talk about all sorts of language games, but you have
      [[p. 47]] never said what it is that is essential to || about a language game,
      and that means to language. What it is that is common to all these
      processes and makes them language or parts of the language. You
      treat yourself to precisely that part of the enquiry, therefore,
      which at one time gave you the greatest puzzlement, namely that
      concerning the <u>general form of the proposition</u>."
          And that is true. – Instead of stating something which is
      common to all that we call language, I say there is no one thing || nothing
      common to these phenomena in virtue of which we use the same name for all of them,
      – they are related || akin to one another in many different ways. And
      on account of this relationship, or these relationships, we call
      them all "languages". I will try to explain this.

73   Consider for a moment the processes that we call "games",
      for instance. I mean games played on a board, card games, ball
      games, contests in the ring || prize fighting, etc. What is common to all these? –
      Don't say, "there <u>must</u> be something common to them, otherwise they
      would not be called 'games'"; but look and see whether something
      is common to all of them. – Because if you look at them you will not
      see something common to <u>all</u> of them, but you will see similarities,
      connections, – a long string of them. As I say: don't think, but
      look. – Look for instance at the games played on a board, with
      their various connections. Now pass to card games; here you find
      many points of correspondence to the first class, but many
      characteristic || common features disappear, and new ones appear. If you now
      pass to ball games, much that is common remains, but a lot is lost.
      – Are they all "amusing"? Compare chess with   . Or
      is there in every case such a thing as winning and losing or
      [[p. 48]] rivalry between the players? Think of the games of patiences.
      In ball games there is winning and losing, but if || when a child throws
      the ball against the wall and catches it again this feature has
      disappeared. See what part skill and luck play. And what a
      difference there is between skill in a game of chess and skill in
      a game of tennis. Think now of round games: here there is the
      element of amusement, but how many of the other character-
      istic features have disappeared! And so we may go through the
      many, many other groups of games. Watching similarities show
      themselves and disappear.
          And now the result of these considerations is: We see a
      complicated net of similarities which overlap and cross one another.
      Similarities in large respects and in small.

71   Ich kann diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisie-
ren, als durch das Wort "Familienähnlichkeiten"; denn so übergrei-
fen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen
den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augen-
farbe, Gang, Temperament, etc. etc. – Und ich werde sagen: die
'Spiele' bilden eine Familie.
        Und ebenso bilden z.B. die Zahlenarten eine Familie.
Warum benennen wir etwas "Zahl"? Nun etwa, weil es eine – direkte –
Verwandtschaft mit manchem hat, was man bisher Zahl genannt hat;
und dadurch, kann man sagen, erhält es eine indirekte Verwandt-
schaft zu anderem, was wir auch so nennen. Und wir dehnen unseren
Begriff der Zahl aus, wie wir beim Spinnen eines Fadens Faser an
Faser drehen. Und die Stärke des Fadens liegt nicht darin, daß eine
Faser durch seine ganze Länge läuft, sondern darin, daß viele Fasern
sich übergreifen.
        Wenn aber Einer sagen wollte: "Also ist allen diesen
Gebilden etwas gemeinsam, – nämlich die Disjunktion aller dieser Ge-
meinsamkeiten" – so würde ich antworten: hier spielst du nur mit
einem Wort. Ebenso könnte man sagen: es läuft E t w a s durch den
ganzen Faden, nämlich das lückenlose Übergreifen dieser Fasern.
                                    ...
75   Man kann sagen, der Begriff 'Spiel' ist ein Begriff mit
verschwommenen Rändern. – "Aber ist ein verschwommener Begriff über-
haupt e i n   B e g r i f f ?" – Ist eine unscharfe Photographie
überhaupt ein Bild eines Menschen? – Ja, kann man ein unscharfes
Bild immer mit Vorteil durch ein scharfes ersetzen? Ist das unscharfe
nicht oft gerade das, was wir brauchen?
        Frege vergleicht den B e g r i f f mit einem Bezirk und
sagt: einen unklar begrenzten Bezirk könne man überhaupt keinen Bezirk [[p. 54]]
nennen. Das heißt wohl, wir können mit ihm nichts anfangen.
Aber ist es sinnlos zu sagen: "Halte Dich ungefähr hier auf!"
Denk dir ich stünde mit einem Andern auf einem Platz und sagte
dies. Dabei werde ich nicht einmal i r g e n d eine Grenze
ziehen, sondern etwa mit der Hand eine zeigende Bewegung machen –
ganz als zeigte ich ihm einen bestimmten P u n k t . Und gerade so
erklärt man etwa, was ein Spiel ist. Man gibt Beispiele, und will,
daß sie in einem gewissen Sinne verstanden werden. – Aber mit diesem
Ausdruck meine ich n i c h t : er solle nun in diesen Bei-
spielen d a s   G e m e i n s a m e   s e h e n , welches ich –
aus irgend einem Grunde – nicht aussprechen konnte. Sondern –
er solle diese Beispiele nun in bestimmter Weise v e r w e n -
d e n . Das Exemplifizieren ist hier nicht ein i n d i r e k -
t e s   Mittel der Erklärung, – in Ermangelung eines Bessern. –
Denn, mißverstanden kann auch jede allgemeine Erklärung werden.
S o   spielen wir eben das Spiel. (Ich meine das Sprachspiel mit
dem Worte "Spiel".)
                                    ...

74   I cannot characterize these similarities better than by the
expression "family similarities"; for that is the way the different
similarities overlap and cross one another which hold between the
members of a family: build, facial characteristics, colour of
the eyes, walk, temperament, etc. etc.– And I shall say the
"games" constitute a family.

    And in the same way the kinds of numbers, for instance,
constitute a family. Why do we call something a "number"? Well,
perhaps because it has a – direct – kinship with many things which
we have called numbers in the past; and thereby, we may say, it
receives an indirect connection with other things which we call
by the same name. And we extend our concept of number as we twist
fibre on fibre in spinning a thread. And the strength of
the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the
[[p. 49]] whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres
overlap.

    But if someone wished || were to say, "Then there is something common
to all these creations; namely the disjunction of all these common
features", then I should answer: Here you're merely playing with a
word. One might just as well say: something runs through the
entire thread, namely the uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.
                                ...

78   We may say the concept "game" is a concept with hazy edges. –
"But is a hazy concept a concept at all?" – Is an indistinct photo-
graph a picture of a person at all? – In fact, can one always
replace an indistinct photograph by a distinct one to advantage?
Isn't what is indistinct often just the thing we want?

    Frege compares the concept with a district, and says: a
district without clear boundaries you could not call a district
at all. That means no doubt, we couldn't do anything with it.
But is it meaningless to say, "Stay approximately here"? Imagine
I were standing with another person in a place and said this. In
doing so I shall not even draw any boundary, but rather
make say a pointing movement with my hand, – just as though I were
pointing to a particular point. And in just this way we may ex-
plain what a game is. We give examples and want them in a certain
sense to be understood. – But by this expression I do not mean
he is supposed to see what is common in these examples, – which for
some reason or other I could not express. Giving examples is not
an indirect means of explaining, – in want of a better one. – For
any general explanation can be misunderstood too. That just is how
we play the game. (I mean the language game with the word "game".)
                                ...

94   Es ist uns, als müßten wir die Er-
        scheinungen d u r c h s c h a u e n : unsere Unter-
        suchung aber richtet sich nicht auf die E r -
        s c h e i n u n g e n , sondern – wie man sagen
        könnte – auf die ' M ö g l i c h k e i t e n '   der
        Erscheinungen. Wir besinnen uns, heißt das, auf die
        A r t   d e r   A u s s a g e n , die wir über die Er-
        scheinungen machen. Daher besinnt sich auch Augustinus
        auf die verschiedenen Aussagen, die man über die Dauer
        von Ereignissen, über ihre Vergangenheit, Gegenwart,
        oder Zukunft macht. (Dies sind natürlich nicht
        p h i l o s o p h i s c h e Aussagen über die Zeit,
        Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft.)
            Unsere Betrachtung ist daher eine
        grammatische. Und diese Betrachtung bringt Licht in
        unser Problem, indem sie Mißverständnisse wegräumt.
        Mißverständnisse nämlich, welche den Gebrauch der
        Wörter unserer Sprache betreffen und hervorgerufen
        sind durch Analogien, welche zwischen unseren Aus-
        drucksformen bestehen. – Und diese Mißverständnisse
        kann man dadurch beseitigen, daß man gewisse Aus-
        drucksformen durch andere ersetzt; dies kann man ein
        "Analysieren" unsrer Ausdrucksformen nennen, denn
        der Vorgang hat manchmal Ähnlichkeit mit dem einer Zer-
        legung.
95   Nun aber kann es den Anschein gewinnen,
        als gäbe es so etwas, wie eine letzte Analyse unserer
        Sprachformen, also e i n e   vollkommen zerlegte Form [[p. 68]]
        des Ausdrucks. D.h.: als seien unsere gebräuchlichen
        Ausdrucksformen, wesentlich, noch unanalysiert; als
        sei in ihnen etwas verborgen, was ans Licht zu beför-
        dern ist. Ist dies geschehen, so sei der Ausdruck da-
        mit vollkommen geklärt und unsre Aufgabe gelöst.
            Man kann das auch so sagen: Wir be-
        seitigen Mißverständnisse, indem wir unsern Ausdruck
        exakter machen: aber es kann nun so scheinen, als ob
        w i r e i n e m b e s t i m m t e n   Z u s t a n d ,
        der vollkommen Exaktheit, zustreben; und als wäre
        das das eigentliche Ziel unsrer Untersuchung.
96   Dies drückt sich aus in der Frage nach
        dem W e s e n der Sprache, des Satzes, des Denkens.-
        Denn wenn wir auch in unsern Untersuchungen das Wesen
        der Sprache – ihre Funktion, ihren Bau – zu verstehen
        trachten, so ist es doch nicht d a s , was diese
        Frage im Auge hat. Denn sie sieht in dem Wesen nicht
        etwas, was schon offen zutage liegt, und was durch
        Ordnen ü b e r s i c h t l i c h wird. Sondern etwas,
        was u n t e r der Oberfläche liegt. Etwas, was im
        Innern liegt, was wir sehen, wenn wir die Sache durch-
        schauen und was eine Analyse hervorgraben soll.
            ' D a s W e s e n i s t u n s
        v e r b o r g e n ' : das ist die Form, die unser
        Problem nun annimmt. Wir fragen: "Was ist die Sprache?";
        "Was ist der Satz?". Und die Antwort auf diese Fragen
        ist ein für allemal zu geben; und unabhängig von jeder
        künftigen Erfahrung.

98   It is as though we had to look through the phenomena: our
enquiry, however, is directed not upon the phenomena but rather –
as we might say – upon the "possibilities" of phenomena. We
recollect, that is, the kind of statements that we make about
phenomena. Thus Augustine calls to mind the various statements
which one makes about the duration of events, about their past,
present or future. (These, of course, are not philosophical
statements about time, past, present and future.)
        Our view || examination is thus a grammatical one. And this
view || examination brings
light into our problem by clearing away misunderstandings. Mis-
understandings, namely, which concern the use of the words of our
language and which are brought about by analogies which hold
between our forms of expression. – And one can remove these
misunderstandings by replacing a certain form of expression by
[[p. 65]] others. We may call this "analysing" our forms of expression,
since the procedure sometimes bears a resemblance to taking some-
thing to pieces.
        It may now seem, however, as though there were something
like an ultimate analysis of our forms of speech, one completely
analysed form of the expression. That is: as though our usual
forms of expression were, essentially, still unanalysed; as though
something were hidden in them which has to be brought to light //
which has to be brought out into the light. // Once this has been
done, the expression is completely explained and our problem is
solved.
        We may put it also in this way: We remove misunderstandings
by making our expression more exact: But it may seem as though
we were trying to reach one particular state, that of perfect
exactness; as though that were the real aim of our inquiry.
100   This is expressed in the question as to the essence of
language, of the proposition, of thinking. – For if we try in our
inquiries also to understand the essence of language – its function,
its construction – still it isn't that which that question has in
view. For it sees the essence, not in something that is already
open to view, and which by being put in order becomes visible at a
glance. But rather something which lies beneath the surface.
Something which lies within; which we see when we look through the
thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.
101   "The essence is hidden from us": that is the form which our
problem takes now. We ask, "What is language?", "What is the pro-
position?". And the answer to these questions is given once and
[[p. 67]] for all, and independent of all future experience.

II: Wittgenstein's text additions and deletions in ¤226

1   A u g u s t i n u s , in the Confessions I/8: ~~cum~~ Cum (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium, quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, rejiciendis, faciendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita, quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enuntiabam. [[p. 1r]]

    In these words we ~~have~~ get – it seems to me – a definite picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words of ~~the~~ language ~~designate~~ name objects – sentences are combinations of such ~~designations~~ names.

    In this picture of human language we find the root of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word. It is the object which the word stands for.

    Augustine however does not speak of a distinction between parts of speech. ~~Whoever || Anyone who~~ If one describes the learning of language in this way, one thinks – I should imagine – primarily of substantives, like "table", "chair", "bread" and the names of persons; and of the other parts of speech as something that will ~~work~~ come out all right. eventually..

2   Consider now this application of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which ~~are~~ I have written the ~~marks~~ signs: "five red apples". He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens the ~~box~~ drawer that has the ~~mark~~ sign "apples" on it; then he looks up the word "red" in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now ~~speaks || pronounces~~ says out loud the series of cardinal ~~numerals~~ numbers – I assume ~~that~~ he knows them by heart – up to the word "five" and with each numeral he takes an apple ~~from the box~~ that has the colour of the square from the drawer.– In this way & in similar ways~~.~~ ~~– This is how~~ one ~~works~~ operates with words. – "But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he has to do with the word 'five'?" – Well, I am assuming that he acts, as I have described. ~~The explanations~~ Explanations come to an end somewhere~~. – What is.~~– But what's the meaning of the word "five"? – There was no question of ~~any~~ such an entity 'meaning' here; only of the way in which "five" is used. ~~// Nothing of that sort was being discussed, only the way in which "five" is used.~~

3   That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive ~~notion~~ picture of the way in which our language functions. But ~~one~~ we might also say that it is ~~the notion~~ a picture of a more primitive language than ours.

4   Let us imagine a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language ~~shall help~~ is to be the means of communication between a builder A ~~to make himself understood by an~~ and his assistant B. [[p. 2]] A is constructing a building out of building ~~stones~~ blocks; there ~~is a supply of~~ are cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the building stones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: "cube", "column", "slab", "beam". A ~~shouts || calls~~ calls out the words; – B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call.

    ~~Take~~ Regard this as a complete primitive language.

5   Augustine describes, we might say, a system of communication; ~~only~~ not
everything, however, that we call language is this system.
           (And this one must ~~be said~~ say in ~~ever~~ so many cases ~~where~~ when the question
arises~~, "can~~: "is this an appropriate description ~~be used~~ or ~~can't it be used~~
not?". The answer is, "Yes, it ~~can be used~~ is appropriate; but only for this
narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you ~~were professing~~ professed
to describe ~~by it~~." Think of the theories of ~~the~~ economists.)

6   It is as though someone explained: "Playing a game consists in moving things
about on a surface according to certain rules ...", and we ~~were to answer~~ answered
him: You ~~are apparently~~ seem to be thinking of games played on a board; but ~~those~~
these aren't all the games there are. You can put your description right by
confining it explicitly to those games.

7   Imagine a ~~way of writing || type~~ script in which letters ~~are used to indicate~~
stand for sounds, but are used also ~~to indicate emphasis~~ as accents and as ~~marks
of~~ punctuation signs. (One can regard a ~~way of writing || type~~ script as a
language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone ~~understood this way
of writing || type~~ interpreted our script as though ~~it were one in which to every
letter there simply corresponded a sound~~ all letters just stood for sounds, and as
though the letters here did not also have ~~other very~~ quite different functions ~~as
well. - An~~. Such an oversimplified view of ~~the type like this one resembles~~ our
script is the analogon, I believe, to Augustine's view of language.

8   If ~~one considers~~ we look at our example (2) ~~one~~ we may perhaps ~~begin to
suspect~~ get an idea of how ~~far~~ the ~~commonly accepted~~ general concept of the
meaning of ~~words~~ a word surrounds the ~~functioning~~ working of language with a mist
that makes ~~clear~~ [[p. 3]] ~~vision~~ it impossible to see clearly~~. It scatters the~~
The fog is dispersed if we study the ~~phenomena~~ workings of language in primitive
~~kinds~~ cases of its application, ~~where the simplicity enables one~~ in which it is
easy to get a clear view of the ~~way~~ purpose of the words and of the way they
function ~~and of what their purpose is~~.
     Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it
learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but
in training.

                                   ...

72   ~~Here~~ And here we come up against the ~~big~~ question ~~that lies~~ lying behind all
~~these considerations: For~~ the enquiries we have been making: for one might object
say to me: "~~You take~~ You're taking it easy! You talk ~~about~~ of all sorts of
language games, but you have [[p. 47]] never said what it is ~~that is~~ that's
essential ~~to || about~~ to a language game, and ~~that means~~ thus to language~~. What it
is that is~~; what's in common to all ~~these processes~~ these processes || procedures
and makes us call them ~~language~~ languages, or parts of ~~the~~ a language. ~~You treat
yourself to precisely~~ That means you don't bother now about that part of the
enquiry~~, therefore,~~ which at one time gave you the greatest ~~puzzlement, namely~~
difficulty, that concerning the general form of the proposition ~~and of language~~."
           And ~~that~~ this is true. - Instead of ~~stating~~ pointing out something which is
in common to all that we call language, I say there is no one ~~thing || nothing~~
thing in common to these phenomena ~~in virtue of which we~~ that makes us use the
same ~~name~~ word for all of them~~,~~ - they are related || akin to each ~~one an~~other in
many different ways. And ~~on account~~ because of this ~~relationship, or these
relationships,~~ kinship we call them all "languages". I ~~will~~ shall try to explain
this.

73   ~~Consider for a moment~~ Let us consider, e.g., the processes ~~that~~ which we call "games"~~, for instance~~. I mean board-games ~~played on a board~~, card games, ball games~~,~~, athletic contests ~~in the ring~~ ‖ prize fighting, etc. What is in common to all these? – Don't say~~:~~: "there <u>must</u> be something in common to them~~, otherwise~~ all, or they ~~would not~~ wouldn't be called 'games'~~"~~ "– but ~~look and~~ see whether something is in common to ~~all of~~ them. – ~~Because~~ all. For if you look at them, though you ~~will not~~ won't see ~~something~~ anything that's common to all of them, but you will see similarities, connections~~, – a long string~~ – a whole lot of them. As I ~~say~~ said: don't think, but look. — Look ~~for instance~~ e.g. at ~~the games played on a~~ board~~, with their~~ games and the various connections between them. Now pass to card games; ~~here~~ you will find many points of ~~correspondence to~~ similarity between this group and the first ~~class~~; but many ~~characteristic~~ ‖ common features disappear~~,~~ and new ones appear. If you ~~now~~ pass to ball games, much that ~~is~~ there was in common remains, but a ~~lot~~ great deal is lost. – Are they all ~~"amusing"~~ 'entertaining'? Compare chess with Noughts & Crosses. Or is there ~~in every case~~ always such a thing as winning and losing or [[p. 48]] ~~rivalry~~ a competition between the players? Think of ~~the games of~~ patiences. In ball games there is winning and losing, but ~~if~~ ‖ when a child ~~throws the~~ is bouncing a ball against ~~the~~ a wall and ~~catches~~ catching it ~~again this feature has disappeared. See what~~, there is no winning and losing. Look at the part which skill and luck play. And what a difference there is between skill in ~~a game of~~ chess and skill in ~~a game of~~ tennis. ~~Think now of round~~ Now think of singing & dancing games: here ~~there is~~ we have the element of ~~amusement~~ entertainment, but how many of the other characteristic features have disappeared! And so we may go through the many~~, many~~ other groups of games. ~~Watching~~ seeing similarities ~~show themselves~~ appear and disappear.
     And ~~now~~ the result of these ~~considerations is: We~~ observations is: we see a complicated ~~net~~ network of similarities ~~which overlap and cross one another.~~ overlapping and crossing each other. Similarities in the large ~~respects~~ and in the small.

74   I ~~cannot characterize~~ can't find a better ‖ a more appropriate name for these similarities ~~better~~ than ~~by the expression~~ "family ~~similarities~~ likenesses"; for this is how the various similarities~~"; for that is the way the different similarities overlap and cross one another which hold~~ between the members of a family overlap and cross: build, ~~facial characteristics,~~ features, the colour of the eyes, ~~walk~~ gait, temperament, etc. etc.– And I shall say the ~~"games"~~ 'games' constitute a family.
     And in the same way the kinds of numbers~~, for instance,~~ (e.g.) constitute a family. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a — (direct)— kinship ~~with many~~ to some things which ~~we~~, up to the present, have been called numbers ~~in the past~~; and thereby, we may say, it ~~receives an indirect connection with~~ gets related indirectly to other things which we call by the same name. And we extend our concept of number, as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre ~~in spinning a thread~~. And the strength of the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the [[p. 49]] whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres overlap.
     But if ~~someone wished~~ ‖ were to say~~,~~ someone said: "Then there is something common to all these ~~creations; namely~~ objects – the disjunction of all these common ~~features", then~~ properties", I should answer: Here ~~you're merely~~ you are just playing with a word. ~~One might~~ You may just as well say: <u>something</u> runs through the ~~entire~~ whole thread~~, namely~~ – the uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.

           ...

78   We ~~may~~ might say the concept "game" is a concept with ~~hazy~~ blurred edges. –
"But is a ~~hazy~~ blurred concept a concept at all?" – Is ~~an indistinct photograph~~ a
blurred photo a picture of a ~~person~~ man at all? – In fact, ~~can one~~ is it always
desirable to replace an indistinct ~~photograph~~ picture by a ~~distinct~~ sharp one ~~to
advantage~~? Isn't ~~what is~~ an indistinct one often just ~~the thing~~ what we want?
      Frege compares the concept ~~with~~ to a district, and says: a district without
clear boundaries you ~~could~~ cannot call a district at all. ~~That~~ This means ~~no
doubt~~, I suppose, we couldn't do anything with it. But is it meaningless to say~~,~~
~~"Stay approximately here"?~~ "Stand roughly there"? Imagine ~~I were~~ yourself standing
~~with another person~~ in a ~~place~~ street with someone and ~~said~~ saying this. In ~~doing
so I shall~~ saying it you will not even draw ~~any~~ boundary, but ~~rather~~ just make ~~say~~
a pointing ~~movement with my hand, – just~~ gesture – exactly as though ~~I~~ you were
pointing ~~to~~ at a particular ~~point.~~ spot. And in just this ~~way we may~~ way ⎮⎮ this
is how we explain to someone, say, what a game is. We give him examples and want
them ~~in a certain sense~~ to be understood in a certain way. – But by this
~~expression~~ I do not mean: that he is ~~supposed~~ now to see what is in common ~~in~~ to
all these examples, the common factor being one which, for some reason or other ~~I
could not express.~~, I am unable to point out – but I mean that he is to use these
examples in a particular way. Giving examples is here not an indirect ~~means~~ way of
explaining, ~~– in~~ used for want of a better one. – For a~~ny~~ general explanation can
be misunderstood ~~too. That~~, just ~~is~~ as examples can. – That's how ~~we play~~ the
game~~,~~ is played (I mean the language game with the word "game~~".)~~").

                                      ...

98   It is as though we had to ~~look~~ see through the phenomena: our enquiry,
however, is ~~directed~~ not ~~upon~~ one into the phenomena, but ~~rather –~~, as we might
say ~~– upon~~, into the ~~"possibilities"~~ 'possibilities' of phenomena. ~~We recollect,
that is~~ That's to say, we call to our mind, the kind of statements ~~that~~ we make
about the phenomena. Thus Augustine calls to mind the various statements ~~which one
makes~~ made about the duration of events, about ~~their~~ events past, present or
future. (These statements, of course, are not philosophical statements about time,
past, present and future.)
      ~~Our view ⎮⎮ examination is thus~~ Our investigation is therefore a grammatical
one. And this ~~view ⎮⎮ examination~~ investigation brings light into our problem by
clearing away misunderstandings. Misunderstandings, ~~namely, which concern~~
concerning the use of ~~the~~ words of our language ~~and which are~~, brought about by
analogies ~~which hold between our~~ between different forms of expression. ~~– And one
can remove~~ these misunderstandings can be removed by replacing ~~a~~ certain ~~form~~
forms of expression by [[p. 65]] others. ~~We~~ This may ~~call this~~ be called
"analysing" our forms of expression, ~~since~~ for the procedure sometimes ~~bears a
resemblance to taking something to pieces.~~ resembles that of an analysis.
      ~~It~~ Thus it may ~~not~~ seem~~, however,~~ as though there were something like an
ultimate analysis of our forms of ~~speech,~~ expression, ⎮⎮ linguistic forms, &
~~therefore one~~ completely analysed ~~form of the expression.~~ state of these
expressions. That is: it may seem as though our usual forms of expression were,
essentially, ~~still~~ unanalysed; as though something were hidden in them which has
to be brought to light ~~// which has to be brought out into the light. // Once~~: if
this ~~has been~~ were done, ~~the expression is~~ language would be completely ~~explained~~
clarified and our problem ~~is~~ solved.

We may put it ~~also~~ in this way: ~~We~~ || This can be put as follows: we remove misunderstandings by making our expression more exact: ~~But~~ thus it may seem as though we were trying to reach <u>one particular state</u>~~, that~~ of perfect exactness; and as though ~~that~~ this were the real aim of our ~~inquiry.~~ investigation.

...

100   This is what's expressed in the question as to the <u>essence</u> || nature of language, of ~~the~~ a proposition, of thinking. – For ~~if we try~~ although in our ~~inquiries also~~ investigations we are trying to understand ~~the essence~~ the essence || nature of language ~~–~~ (its function, its construction ~~–~~), still it isn't <u>that</u> which ~~that~~ the question has in view. For ~~it sees~~ this question does not see the essence~~, not in~~ as something ~~that is~~ which already ~~open to view~~ lies open before us, and which by a process of ordering becomes transparent – I mean capable of being ~~put in order becomes visible~~ all seen at a glance~~. But~~: but rather as something which ~~lies beneath~~ lies <u>under</u> the surface~~. Something~~, which lies within~~,~~, which we see when we ~~look through~~ see into the thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.

101   "<u>The essence</u> || <u>nature is hidden</u> ~~from~~ to <u>us</u>~~": that~~": || The essence is what's hidden: this is the form ~~which~~ our problem now takes ~~now~~. We ask~~,~~: "<u>What is</u> language?", "What is ~~the~~ a proposition?". And the answer to these questions is to be given once and [[p. 67]] for all, and independent of all future experience.

III: Diplomatic transcription of ¤226⁺ʷ

¤226⁺ʷ

(Ts-226: §§ 1-8, 72-74, 78, 98-99, 100-101
from pages 0-3, 46-49, 64-67 - with Wittgenstein's revisions)

1   A   u   g   u   s   t   i   n   u   s   , in [~~den~~| **the**] Confession[~~en~~|**s**] I/8:
[~~e~~|**C**]um (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam et cum
secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam,
et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum
eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis
aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium,
quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum
actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in peten-
dis, habendis, rejiciendis, faciendisve rebus. Ita verba
in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita,
quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque
jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enun-
tiabam.

1

        In these words we ~~have~~ ᵍᵉᵗ – it seems to me – [[In these words we are given, it seems to me,]] a definite
picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words
of ~~the~~ **l**anguage ~~designate~~ ᵑᵃᵐᵉ objects – sentences are combinations of
such ~~designations~~ ⁿᵃᵐᵉˢ.
        In this picture of ˋʰᵘᵐᵃⁿ **l**anguage we find the root of the idea:
every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word.
It is the object which the word stands for.
        Augustine ˋʰᵒʷᵉᵛᵉʳ does not speak of a distinction between parts of
speech. ~~Whoever ʰᵃʸˢ ⁱⁿ~~ ˋⁱᶠ ᵒⁿᵉ describes the learning of language in this way, one
thinks – I should imagine – primar[i̶l̶ | **il**]y of substantives, like "table",
"chair", "bread" and the names of persons; and of the other parts
of speech as something that will ~~work~~ ᶜᵒᵐᵉ out all right~~.~~ eventually.

2.   Consider ˋⁿᵒʷ this application of language: I send someone
shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which ~~are the marks~~ ⁱ ʰᵃᵛᵉ ʷʳⁱᵗᵗᵉⁿ ᵗʰᵉ ˢⁱᵍⁿˢ
"five red apples". He takes it to the groce[e̶ | **r**]; the grocer opens
the ~~box~~ ᵈʳᵃʷ that has the ~~mark~~ ˢⁱᵍⁿ "apples" on it; then he looks [ʏ̶ | **u**]p the word
"red" in a table, and finds opposite it a co[l̶o̶ | **lo**]ured square; he now
~~speaks~~ ᵖʳᵒⁿᵒᵘⁿ ˢᵃʸˢ ᵒᵘᵗ ˡᵒᵘᵈ the series of cardinal ~~numbers~~ˢ ᵃˡᵒᵘᵈ – I assume ~~that~~ he knows them
by heart – up to the word "five" and with each numeral he takes an
apple ~~from the box~~ that has the colour of the square ˋᶠʳᵒᵐ ᵗʰᵉ ᵈʳᵃʷ.– ~~This is
how one works~~ ⁱⁿ ᵗʰⁱˢ ʷᵃʸ & ⁱⁿ ˢⁱᵐⁱˡᵃʳ ʷᵃʸˢ ᵒⁿᵉ ᵒᵖᵉʳᵃᵗᵉˢ with words.– "But how does he know where and how
he is to look up the word 'red' and what he has to do with the
word 'five'?" – Well, I am assuming that he a[e̶ | **c**]ts, as I have described.
~~The~~[e̶ | **E**]xplanations come to an end somewhere.– ˋᴮᵘᵗ [ʷ̶ | **w**]hat[s̶ | **'**]s the meaning of
the word "five"? – There was no question of ~~any~~ ˋˢᵘᶜʰ ᵃⁿ ᵉⁿᵗⁱᵗʸ ˋᵐᵉᵃⁿⁱⁿᵍ here; only of the
way in which "five" is used. ~~// Nothing of that sort was being
discussed, only the way in which "five" is used.~~

3.   That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a
primitive ~~notion of~~ ˋʷᵃʸ ᵒᶠ ᵈᵉˢᶜʳⁱᵇⁱⁿᵍ ˋ?⁰ʸ? ˋᵖⁱᶜᵗᵘʳᵉ ᵒᶠ the way in which our language functions. But
~~one ʷᵉ~~ might a[e̶ | **l**]so say ˋᵗʰᵃᵗ it is ~~the notion~~ ˋᵃ ᵖⁱᶜᵗᵘʳᵉ of a more primitive language
than ours.

4.   Let us <u>imagine</u> a language for which the description which
Augustine has given would be correct. The language ~~shall help~~
ⁱˢ ᵗᵒ ᵇᵉ ᵗʰᵉ ᵐᵉᵃⁿˢ ˋᵒᶠ ᶜᵒᵐᵐᵘⁿⁱᶜᵃᵗⁱᵒⁿ ᵇᵉᵗʷᵉᵉⁿ a ~~bilder~~ builder A ~~to make himself understood by an~~ ᵃⁿᵈ ʰⁱˢ assistant B.

2

assistant B. A is constructing a building out of building ~~stones~~ blocks;
there ~~is a supply of~~ are cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to
hand him the buildingstones in the order in which A needs them.
For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words:
"[c|c]ube", "column", "slab", "beam". A ~~shouts~~ calls out the words; – B
brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call.
        ~~Take~~ Regard this as a complete primitive language.

5   Augustine describes, we might say, a system of communication;
~~only~~ not eveything, ˈhowever, that we call language is this system.
        (And this ~~must be~~ one must sa[i|y]d in ever s[i|o] many cases whe[r|n]e the
question arises. "~~can~~ is this ˈan appropriate description ~~be used or can't it be used?~~ or ˈ not?".
The answer is, "Yes, it ~~can be used~~ is appropriate; but only for this narrowly
restricted field, not for everything that you ~~were~~ profess[ing|ed] to
describe ˈby it." Thi**n**k of the theories of ~~the~~ economists.)

6   It is as though someone explained: "Playing a game consists
in moving things ab[i|o]ut on a surface according to certain rules ...",
and we ~~were to~~ answered him: You ~~are apparently~~ seem to be thinking of games
played on a board; but th[e|e]se aren't all ~~games~~ the games there are.
You can put your description right by confining it explicit[yl|ly] to
those games.

7   Imagine a ~~way of writing~~ ˈa script in [h|w]hich ˈsome letters ~~are used to~~
~~indicate~~ stand for sounds, but ˈare used also ~~to indicate emphasis~~ as accents and as ~~marks of~~
punctuation ˈsigns. (One can regard a ~~way of writing~~ ˈa script as a language for the
description of sounds.) Now suppose someone ~~understood~~ interpreted ~~this~~ ˈa ~~way of~~
~~writing~~ ˈa script a[d|s] though ~~it were one in which to~~ every ˈall letters ~~there simply~~
~~corresponded a~~ˈjust stood for sounds, and as though the letters ˈhere did not ~~have other~~
~~very~~ also have quite different functions ~~as well.~~ – ˈSuch [A|a]n oversimplified view of ~~the~~
~~type~~ our script ~~like this one resembles~~ is the analogue, I believe, ˈto Augustine's view of language.

8.   If ~~one considers~~ we look at our example (2) ~~one~~ we may perhaps ~~begin to suspect~~ get an idea of
how ~~far~~ the ~~commonly accepted~~ general concept of the meaning of ˈa word~~s~~
surrounds the ~~functioning~~ writing of language with a mist that makes ~~clear~~

3

~~clear vision~~ ˢⁱᵗ impossible ˈ to see clearly . ~~It scatters the~~ The fog ˈis dispersed if we study the ~~phenomena~~workings of language in primitive ~~kinds~~ cases of ˈits application, ~~where~~ ~~the simplicity enables one~~ in which it is easy to get a clear view of the ˈpurpose of ~~way~~ ˈthe words ~~function~~ and of ~~what their purpose is.~~ the way they function.

    Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.

                  ...

...

72   And [H|h]ere we come up against the ~~big~~ question ~~that lies~~ `lying` behind all
~~these considerations~~ `'the enquiries we have been making:` [F|f]or one thing might ~~object~~ `say` to me: "You're tak[e|**ing**] it
easy! You talk ~~about~~ `'` all sorts of language games, but you have

                                          47

have never said what it is that's ~~is~~ essential to ~~them~~ `a` language game,
and th[at|**us**] ~~means~~ to language[.|;][W|**w**]hat's ~~it is that is~~ `in` common to all these
processes `procedures` ~~and~~`th` ~~that~~ makes `'us call` them languages, or parts of the `a` language. ~~You
treat yourself to precisely~~ `'That means you don't bother now about` that part of the enquiry~~, therefore,~~
which at one time gave you the greatest ~~puzzlement~~ `difficulty`, ~~namely~~ that
concerning the general form of the proposition~~.~~ `'` and of language."
     And th[at|**is**] is true.– Instead of ~~stating~~ `pointing out` something which is in
common to all that we call language, I say there is no one thing ~~which~~ `in`
common `'to these phenomena` ~~which~~ ~~in virtue of which we~~ `'that makes us` use the same ~~name~~ `word` for all of them~~,~~
– they are ~~related~~ `akin` to ~~one~~ `each` another in many different ways. And
~~on account~~ `'because` of this ~~relationship, or these relationships,~~ `kinship` we call
them all "languages". I ~~will~~ `shall` try to explain this.
73   Let us [C|c]onsider ~~for a moment~~ `. e.g..` the processes ~~that~~ `which` we call "games"~~,~~.
~~for instance.~~ I mean games ~~played on a board~~ `board-games,` card games, ball
games, `'athletic` contests ~~in the ring~~ `''in fighting`, etc.. What is `in` common to all these? –
Don't say~~:~~ "there must be something `in` common to them `all`, ~~otherwise~~ `'or` they
would_ n[o|'] be called 'games'"~~.~~ – but ~~look and~~ `'see` whether something

is `in` common to all ~~of~~ them . – ~~Because~~ `for` if you look at them, `though` you ~~will not~~ `won't`

see ~~something~~ `'anything that's` common to all of them, but you will see similarities,
connections~~,~~ – a ~~long string~~ `whole lot` of them. As I sa[y|**id**]: don't think, but
look. – Look ~~for instance~~ `e.g..` at the `'board` games ~~played on a board, with~~ and
their various ~~connections~~ `'similarities between them.` Now pass to card games; ~~here~~ you `'will` find
many points of ~~correspondence~~ `''many similarity` ~~to~~ `'between this group and` the first ~~class~~[.|;] but many
~~characteristic~~ `common` features disappear~~,~~ and new ones appear. If you ~~now~~
pass to ball games, much that ~~is~~ `there was in` common remains, but a ~~lot~~ `great deal` is lost.
– Are they all ~~[A|'!]amusing~~[''|'] `'entertaining'`? Compare chess with Noughts & Crosses. Or
is there ~~in every case~~ `always` such a thing as winning and losing or

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or rivalry a competition between the players? Think of the games of patience[.|s].
In ball games there is wi[ll|nn]ing and losing, but if when a child ʳis throw[s|i]ng bouncing
the a ball against the a wall and catch[es|ing] it, again this feature has
disappeared there is no winning and losing. See what look at the part ʳwhichskill and luck play. And what a
difference there is between skill (in ʳ a game of) chess and skill in
(a game of) tennis. ʳNow [T|t]ink now of round ʳsinging & dancing games: here there is we have the
element of amusement ᵉⁿᵗᵉʳᵗᵃⁱⁿᵐᵉⁿᵗ, but how many othe of thee other character-
istic features have disappeared! And so ᵒⁿ ᵃⁿᵈ ᵒⁿ we may go through the
many, many other groups of games[.| -] Watching ˢᵉᵉⁱⁿᵍ similarities show
themselves ᵃᵖᵖᵉᵃʳ and disappear.

And now the result of these considerations observations is: [W|w]e see a
complicated net ʷᵒʳᵏ o[d|f] similarities which overlapping and crossing one each another.
Similarities in ʳthe large respects and in ʳthe small.

74   I can[no[']t characterise these similarities better than by the
word ʳᵉˡᵃᵗⁱⁱ find a better a more appropriate ᵘˢᵉ name for these similarities than "family similarities likenesses"; for th[at|is] is the way the
different how the

various similarities overlap and cross one another which hold between the

members of a family : build, facial characteristics ᶠᵉᵃᵗᵘʳᵉˢ, ʳthe colour of
the eyes, walk ᵍᵃⁱᵗ, temperament, etc. etc.- And I shall say the
[ᴬ|ᵃ]games[ᵃ|ᵃ'] constitute a family.

And in the same way the kinds of numbers, for instance, (ᵉ·ᵍ·)
constitute a family. Why do we call something a "number"? Well,
perha[o|p]s because it has a — (direct) — kinship with many ᵗᵒ ˢᵒᵐᵉ things which,
ʳup to the present, we have ʳbᵉᵉⁿ called numbers in the past; and thereby, we may say, it
receives an ᵍᵉᵗˢ ʳᵉˡᵃᵗᵉᵈ indirectly connection with ᵗᵒ other [w|t]hings which we call

by the same name. And we extend our concept of number, as we twist

fibre on fibre in spining spinning a thread . And the strength of
the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the

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through the whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres
overlap.

But if someone ~~wished~~ ~~to~~ sa[y,|**id**]: "Then there is something ˈin common
to all these ~~creations;~~ ᵒᵇʲᵉᶜᵗˢ ˈ ~~namely~~ˀ ~~ ~~ the disjunction of all these common
~~features~~ ᵖʳᵒᵖᵉʳᵗⁱᵉˢ ", ~~then~~ I should answer: Here you'~~re~~ ᵃʳᵉ ~~merely~~ ʲᵘˢᵗ playing with a
w[₊|**o**]rd. ~~One might~~ ʸᵒᵘ ᵐᵃʸ just as well say: <u>something</u> runs through the
~~entire~~ ʷʰᵒˡᵉ thread, ~~namely~~ ˈ the uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.

...

78   We ~~may~~ ᵐⁱᵍʰᵗ say the concept "game" is a concept with ~~hazy~~ ᵇˡᵘʳʳᵉᵈ edges.–
"But is a ~~hazy~~ ᵇˡᵘʳʳᵉᵈ concept a <u>concept</u> at all?" – Is a~~n~~ ~~indistinct~~ ᵇˡᵘʳʳᵉᵈ photo-
graph a picture of a ~~person~~ ᵐᵃⁿ at all? – In fact, ~~can one always~~ ⁱˢ ⁱᵗ ᵃˡʷᵃʸˢ ˈᵈᵉˢⁱʳᵃᵇˡᵉ ᵗᵒ
replace an ~~indistinct~~ ~~photograph~~ ᵖⁱᶜᵗᵘʳᵉ by a ~~distinct~~ ˢʰᵃʳᵖ one ~~to advantage~~?
Isn't ~~what is~~ ᵃⁿ ~~ ~~ indistinct ˈᵒⁿᵉ often just ~~the thing~~ ʷʰᵃᵗ we want?
Frege compares the concept ~~with~~ ᵗᵒ a district, and says: a
district without clear boundaries you ~~could~~ ᶜᵃⁿ'ᵗ not call a district
at all. Th[at|**is**] means, ~~no doubt~~ ᴵ ˢᵘᵖᵖᵒˢᵉ, we couldn't do anything with it.
But is it meaningless to say, "~~Stay~~ ˢᵗᵃⁿᵈ ~~approximately~~ ʳᵒᵘᵍʰˡʸ ᵗʰere"? Imagine
~~I were~~ ~~ ~~ ~~standing~~ ~~ ~~ ʸᵒᵘʳˢᵉˡᶠ ˢᵗᵃⁿᵈⁱⁿᵍ ˈ ⁱⁿ ᵃ ˢᵗʳᵉᵉᵗ with ~~another person in a place~~ ˢᵒᵐᵉᵒⁿᵉ ◇◇◇ and sa[id|**ying**] this. In
~~doing so~~ ˢᵃʸⁱⁿᵍ ⁱᵗ ~~I shall~~ ʸᵒᵘ ʷⁱˡˡ not ~~draw any~~ even draw <u>any</u> boundary, but ~~rather~~ ʲᵘˢᵗ
make ~~say~~ a pointing ~~movement with my hand,~~ ᵍᵉˢᵗᵘʳᵉ – ~~just~~ ᵉˣᵃᶜᵗˡʸ as though ~~I~~ you were
pointing ~~to~~ ᵃᵗ a particu[₋|**l**]ar ~~point~~ ˢᵖᵒᵗ. And in just this way ᵗʰⁱˢ ⁱˢ ʰᵒʷ we ~~may~~ ex-
plain ˈᵗᵒ ˢᵒᵐᵉᵒⁿᵉ, ˢᵃʸ, what a game is. We give ˈʰⁱᵐ examples and want them ~~in a certain~~
~~sense to be understood~~ ˈⁱⁿ ᵃ ᶜᵉʳᵗᵃⁱⁿ ʷᵃʸ. – But ~~with~~ b[h|**y**] this ~~expression~~ ʷʰᵃᵗ ᴵ ˢᵃʸ ᵗʰⁱˢ I do <u>not</u> mean:
that he is ~~supposed~~ ʰᵒʷ to <u>see what is</u> ˈⁱⁿ comm[i|**o**]n ~~in~~ ˈᵗᵒ ᵃˡˡ these examples,~~—~~ ˈ ᵗʰᵉ ᶜᵒᵐᵐᵒⁿ ᶠᵃᶜᵗᵒʳ ᵇᵉⁱⁿᵍ ᵒⁿᵉ which, for
some reason or other, I ~~could not~~ ᵃᵐ ᵘⁿᵃᵇˡᵉ ᵗᵒ ~~express~~ ᵖᵒⁱⁿᵗ ᵒᵘᵗ – ᵇᵘᵗ ˈᴵ ᵐᵉᵃⁿ ᵗʰᵃᵗ ʰᵉ ⁱˢ ~~ ~~ ᵗᵒ ˢᵉᵉ these examples in a particular way. Giving examples
is ˈʰᵉʳᵉ not ◇◇◇
an <u>indirect</u> ~~means~~ ʷᵃʸ of explaining, – ~~in~~ ˈᵘˢᵉᵈ ᶠᵒʳ want of a better one.~~—~~ For
a~~ny~~ general explanation can be misunderstood~~ too~~ ~~ ~~ ~~.,~~ ˈʲᵘˢᵗ ᵃˢ ᵉˣᵃᵐᵖˡᵉˢ ᶜᵃⁿ. – That's ~~just is~~ how
~~we play~~ the game ˈ ⁱˢ ᵖˡᵃʸᵉᵈ. (I mean the language game with the word "game"₋.)

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98   It is as though we ha**d** to ~~look~~ *""* through the phenomena: our
enquiry, however, — ʳᵒⁿ ᵗʰᵉ ᵒᵗʰᵉʳ ʰᵃⁿᵈ, ⸍⸍ is⸍ᵈⁱ⸍ⁱᵃ⸍ⁿᵏ ⁱˢⁿ'ᵗ⸍ ~~directed not upon~~ ʹⁱˢ ⁿᵒᵗ ᵒⁿᵉ ⁱⁿᵗᵒ the phenomen**a**, but ~~rather~~, —
as we might say, — ~~upon~~ ⁱⁿᵗᵒ the [⁽ᶜ⁾|ʹ]possibilities[⁽ᶜ⁾|ʹ] of phenomena. ~~We~~
~~recollect~~ [**t**|**T**]hat's ~~is~~ ʹᵗᵒ ˢᵃʸ, ʷᵉ ᶜᵃˡˡ ᵗᵒ ᵒᵘʳ ᵐⁱⁿᵈ, the ~~kind~~ o[**e**|**f**]statements ~~that~~ we make about ~~the~~
phenomena. Thus Augustine calls to mind the various statements
~~which one~~ ma[**t**|**d**]e~~r~~ about the duration of events, about ~~their~~ ᵉᵛᵉⁿᵗˢ past ~~event~~,
present or future. (These⸍ ˢᵗᵃᵗᵉᵐᵉⁿᵗˢ, of course, are not philosophical
statements about time, past, present and fu[**t**|**t**]u[**t**|**r**]e.)
        Our ~~view⸍ ᵖᵒˢˢⁱᵇⁱⁿᵗᵉ ʹⁱⁿᵛᵉˢᵗⁱᵍᵃᵗⁱᵒⁿ~~ is th[**us**|**ere**]fore a grammatical one. And ~~this~~ᵛʰ ~~view ⸍ ᵖᵒˢˢⁱᵇⁱⁿᵗᵉ ʹⁱⁿᵛᵉˢᵗⁱᵍᵃᵗⁱᵒⁿ ⁱᵗ~~ brings
li**g**ht into our problem by clearing away misunderstandings. Mis-
understandings~~, namely, which~~ concern**ing** the use of ~~the~~ words of our
langu**a**g**e**, ~~and which are~~ brought about by analogies ~~(which hold)~~⸍
between ~~our~~ ʹᵈⁱᶠᶠᵉʳᵉⁿᵗ forms of expression. — And ~~one can remove~~ these
misunderstandings ʹᶜᵃⁿ ᵇᵉ ʳᵉᵐᵒᵛᵉᵈ by replacing ~~a~~ certain form**s** of expression by

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others. ~~We may call this~~ This may be called "analysing" our forms of expression,
~~since~~ for the procedure ~~s~~ometimes ~~bears a~~ resembl[an|es]~~ee to taking some-
thing to pieces.~~ that of an analysis.

~~It may now~~ Thus it may seem~~, however,~~ as though there ~~were~~ᵗʰ ⁿᵒ something
like an ultimate analysis of our fo~~r~~ms ~~of speech,~~ expression, linguistic forms ¹, & therefore one compl[t|e]tely
analysed ~~form of the expression~~ state of these expressions. That is: ¹it may seem as though our usual
forms of expression were, essentially, ~~still~~ unanalysed; as though
something were hidden in them which has to be brought to light: //
~~which has to be brought out into the light. // //Once~~ if this ~~has been~~ were
done, ~~the expression is~~ language would be completely ~~explained~~ clarified and our problem ~~is~~
solved.

We may put it ~~also~~ in this way: This can be put as follows: [We| we] remove misunderstandings
by making our expressions more⊖ exact: ~~[B|b]ut~~ ¹thus it may seem as though
we were trying to reach one ⁿ particular state~~, that~~ of perfect
exactness; ¹and as thought[at|is]ᵗʰ were the real aim of our ~~inquiry.~~ investigation.

This is ¹what's expressed in the question as to the essence ⁿᵃᵗᵘʳᵉ of
language, of ~~the~~ ⁿ proposition, of thinking.~~ For ~~if we try~~ although in our
~~inquiries also~~ [~~investigations we try are trying~~|investigations we are trying] to understand the essence ⁿᵃᵗᵘʳᵉ of language — (its function,
its ~~construction~~ structure), — still it isn't that which th[at|e] question has in
view. For ~~it~~ ¹this question does not seek the essence~~, not in~~ ᵃˢ something ~~that is~~ [~~which is~~|which] already lies
open ~~to view~~ [~~before us~~| before us], and which by [~~a process of~~|a process of ordering] ~~being put in order~~ becomes ~~visible at a
glance.~~ ¹transparent - I mean capable of being all seen at a glance: [B|b]ut rather ¹ᵃˢ something which lies ~~beneath~~ [~~under~~| under] the surface[.|,]
~~something~~ which lies within[,|,] which ~~~~~ⁱⁿ we see when we ~~look~~ ⁿᵉ ~~through~~ ⁱⁿᵗᵒ the
thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.

"The essence ⁿᵃᵗᵘʳᵉ is hidden ~~from us~~ to us": The essence is what's hidden: th[at|is] is the form ~~which~~ our
problem ⟦takes now⟧ . We ask~~,~~: "What is language?", "What is ~~the~~ ⁿ pro-

position?". And the answer to these questions is [~~~~~| ¹to be] given once and

and for all, and independent of all future experience.[67]

...