



PARADEIGMATA
Studies in Honour of Øivind Andersen

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
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Editors' preface

Øivind Andersen, who turns seventy in October 2014, is Professor of Ancient Greek at the University of Oslo (1997–), the current secretary general of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters (Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi) and president of the Union Académique Internationale.

His career as a classical scholar started more than forty years ago. He acquired his doctoral degree from the University of Oslo in 1975 with his thesis *Paradeigmata. Beiträge zum Verständnis der Ilias* ('*Mythological Examples: Contributions to the Interpretation of the Iliad*'). In this work he explored how stories from the mythological past are incorporated in Homer's *Iliad*. Ever since then, Prof. Andersen has been making his mark on Homeric studies with, among other works, a monograph about the Iliadic hero Diomedes and various seminal articles on mythological examples and the shaping of the past in Homeric poetry – many of which are still cited and discussed by Homerists. More recently, Prof. Andersen has been preoccupied with allusion in Homeric poetry and has co-edited an anthology on relative chronology in the early Greek epic corpus (Cambridge University Press 2011).

Prof. Andersen has, throughout the years, shown his keen interest in ancient philosophy through his numerous articles and translations. He has contributed to the study of Plato through his work for the series *Platons Samlede verker* (Vidarforlaget 1999–2008), both as a translator and as a member of the editorial board. His translation record also includes authoritative versions of Aristotle's *Poetics* (Vidarforlaget 2008) and Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* (Gyldendal 1985). He also pioneered the revival of interest in ancient rhetoric through the pedagogically exemplary monograph *I Retorikkens Hage* (Universitetsforlaget, 1995/2004), which has been reworked into a German version (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2001) – a publication which has received international acclaim.

Øivind Andersen's role in the continuation of classical scholarship in Norway has been invaluable. From his positions in Trondheim (1980–1996) and Oslo (1978–1979 and 1997–present) he has not only written profusely about this in the press, but he has also been a key-player in the development of the field. He played a fundamental role in the establishment of The Norwegian Institute at Athens in 1989 (Det norske institutt i Aten), of which he was the first director (1989–1993). He also played a central role in the Norwegian Research Council-funded programme for ancient studies (Antikkprogrammet 1996–2001), thanks to which the recruitment of a whole new generation of classical scholars was secured. Øivind Andersen has also been an active member of Platonselskabet-Nordisk selskab för antikens idétradition. In terms

of both his scholarship and his broad academic vision, Øivind Andersen is one of the grands hommes of Scandinavian classical philology and an example to future generations of classicists. With this volume, we want to acknowledge in a proper scholarly manner his position and efforts on the occasion of his 70th birthday. The title of the volume alludes to Professor Andersen's pervasive interest in examples – literary, philosophical or rhetorical – but also to his own example as a broad-minded classical scholar. In the latter sense he might be seen, as the sketch on the cover by the Danish sculptor Bertel Thorvaldsen, as a Scandinavian Diomedes.

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Abbreviations of ancient authors and works follow *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, while abbreviations of journal titles follow the *L'Année Philologique* standard.

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Part I
Literature



Does Homer doubt the existence of ghosts?

Iliad 23.103–104

MATTHEW W. DICKIE

Achilles, after the ghost of Patroclus flees his embrace, says: ὃ πόποι, ἦ ρά τις ἐστὶ καὶ εἰν Ἄϊδαο δόμοισι ψυχῇ καὶ εἰδῶλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν (*Il.* 23.103–04).¹ His response might be paraphrased in English as: ‘Although there is after all even in death a spirit and a likeness, it utterly lacks intelligence’. The emphasis in the exclamation is, accordingly, on the lack of intelligence shown by the ghost of Patroclus. Achilles’ expression of recognition that there are ghosts after all is really just a foil to the true burden of what he wants to say, which is that he is frustrated and disappointed by the behaviour of the ghost in fleeing his embrace.² Even though the focus of what Achilles says is not on the existence of the spirits of the dead, it may still be worthwhile to take a closer look at the form of expression he uses when speaking of the continued existence of the spirits of the dead in the form of a likeness of the living person and related forms of expression. The question that I should like to address is what the existence of such forms of expression tells us about the attitudes of those who employed them and, more specifically, whether Achilles’ use of this way of speaking is some indication that in the world out of which the *Iliad* emerged not everyone was fully confident of the existence of ghosts.

The form of expression employed by Achilles is characteristically used in both Greek and Latin literature when portraying the response of persons on whom the truth of a proposition is borne home by circumstances. It is above all the existence or non-existence of the gods that such expressions are used to affirm.³ What generally prompts speakers to express themselves in this way is not a god showing himself clearly and palpably, or failing to do so, but an indication of the existence or non-existence of the gods in the form of a wrongdoer meeting with misfortune or virtue visited with good fortune or, on the other hand, wickedness flourishing or virtue suffering a catastrophe.

1 There is a case to be made for reading *τι* in *Il.* 23.103. It is found in some manuscripts instead of *τις*. Richardson 1993, 178 remarks that *τις* sits rather oddly with *εἰδῶλον* and cites as a parallel Pl. *Phd.* 63c5: *εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι*. Latin has the same form of expression: *si sunt aliqu(uid) infer[i]* (*CIL* 6.3221.9). In Greek, the idea that there may be nothing after death is expressed with the neuter singular *οὐδέν* or *μηδέν*: *εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι* (Pl. *Phd.* 91b3); cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 8.7.17: *οὐ γὰρ δήπου τοῦτό γε εἰδέναι ὡς οὐδέν ἔτι ἐγὼ ἔσομαι, ἐπειδὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπινου βίου τελευτήσω*.

2 Essentially the explanation of *Schol.* bT on Hom. *Il.* 23.104.

3 See Oakley 1998, 422–3 for a collection of instances.

Misfortune consequent on a failure to give the divine the honours it is due also leads to men openly acknowledging the existence of the gods.

Those who are moved to give immediate expression to their realization that the gods exist do so in the form of a simple declarative sentence in which the third person of the verbs εἶναι or *esse* is used.⁴ The second person may also be used.⁵ As for ghosts, there is only one other case in all of Greek and Latin literature, besides that in the *Iliad*, of a person being persuaded by events, again by the appearance of a ghost, to utter a declarative sentence acknowledging the existence of the spirits of the dead. This is Propertius' declaration that the spirits of the dead amount to something, made once he has been visited in his sleep by the spirit of his dead mistress Cynthia (Prop. 4.7.1). What he says is: *sunt aliquid manes*. It is generally assumed that Propertius finds the inspiration for Cynthia's visit in the episode in the *Iliad*. If that is the case, as it seems to be, Propertius 4.7.1 is not exactly an independent witness to the pattern of expression.

The simple declarative sentences in which a speaker, confronted by what he takes to be the truth of a proposition, acknowledges the truth, go hand in hand with sentences in which the proposition or the conditions taken to prove its truth are expressed as a hypothetical. The hypotheticals are, as it were, expressions of the doubt that those who voice their acknowledgment of the truth had hitherto entertained. Such sentences are used of the existence of the gods, of their interest in upholding justice on earth, then of the existence of ghosts, of the existence of intelligence on their part, and finally of the existence of a place that receives the spirits of the dead or of a special place in the underworld set aside for noble and pious spirits.⁶ So *sunt aliquid manes* has as its counterpart *si quae sunt manes* (CLE 2170.6) or *si qui estis manes* (CLE 132.1) or *si tamen at manes credimus esse aliquid* (CLE 1190.3) or *si sunt aliq[ui]d infer[i]* (CIL 6.3221.9), while *est caeleste numen; es, magne Iuppiter* (Livy 8.6.5) is matched by *si numina divum sunt aliquid* (Ov. *Met.* 6.542–3).

Expressions of the form 'if anything remains of us after death' or 'if there are spirits of the dead' are found predominantly in Latin verse-epitaphs of the Roman Empire.⁷ There is only one instance in Greek of a conditional sentence

4 Men. *Dys.* 639: εἰσιν θεοί, μὰ τὸν Διόνυσον. Cf. Alc. 1.34–6 PMG: ἄλαστα δὲ | ἔργα πάσον κακὰ μησαμένοι. ἔστι τις σιών τίσις. I owe the reference to J.G. Howie.

5 Hom. *Od.* 24.351–2: Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ ῥ' ἔτι ἔστε θεοὶ κατὰ μακρὸν Ὀλυμπον, | εἰ ἐτέον μνηστῆρες ἀτάσθαλον ὄβριον ἔτεισαν.

6 Existence of the gods: Ov. *Met.* 6.542–3; Sen. *Thy.* 404–07; concern of the gods with justice: Soph. *Phil.* 1035–6; Catull. 76.17–21; Verg. *Aen.* 1.603–05, 2.536–7, 689, 5.688–9; Ov. *Met.* 6.542–4. Cf. Ov. *Pont.* 2.9.21–6, *Tr.* 1.2.97–8.

7 CLE 130.1, 1057.15, 1190.3, 1323.1, 1328.3, 2146.1, 2170.6–7. There are besides Ov. *Am.* 3.59–60, *Met.* 6.543–5.

in this form.⁸ What Greek has are sentences of the form: ‘if the dead retain their powers of perception (αἴσθησις), then they will respond in such and such a way’.⁹ The form is copied in Latin, either more or less verbatim with *si superest aliquis post funera sensus* (Ov. *Pont.* 1.2.111) or with *si sapiunt quicquid post funera manes* (CLE 428.14) or some variation on it.

There are, in sum, a set of declarative sentences in which speakers give expression to their recognition of the existence of gods, because the conditions that, to their way of thinking, guarantee their existence have been fulfilled. Corresponding to these declarative sentences are the conditionals whose subject is the existence of the gods or the existence of any concern on their part for justice. Matching these declaratives and conditionals are the set of declaratives and conditionals whose subject is the existence of the spirits of the dead. The declarative utterances of those moved to acknowledge the existence of gods or ghosts have not engaged the attention of scholars interested in the religious beliefs of the ancients. It is quite another matter with the conditional sentences that are their formal counterparts. Some scholars have taken them to express a degree of reservation;¹⁰ others have asserted that they are no more than rhetorical devices for emphasizing the confidence the speaker feels in life after death.¹¹

Of the conditional sentences, it may be observed that without knowing what a speaker believed and what reservations he may have had we cannot say whether hypotheticals of the kind examined here should or should not be taken to be expressions of reservation. In the mouths of some speakers they may have been a standard and unthinking formula used in certain situations; others may have used them to express their reservations. Context in some instances makes it virtually certain that the speaker frames what he has to say as a hypothetical, just because he is not quite, or at all, certain about the matter. When the orator Hyperides says that if death is akin to not-existing, then the dead are free of the ills and misfortunes afflicting mankind, but if understanding persists into the House of Hades and if the gods feel concern, as people imagine they do, then the dead, because they have defended the honour of the divine, are likely to meet with the greatest consideration from the gods, it very much looks as if he puts what he says into a conditional form

8 Soph. *El.* 245–6: εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θανάων γὰ τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὄν | κείσεται τάλας.

9 Isoc. 9.2, 19.42; Hyp. 6.43; Dem. 19.66; 20.87; Lycurg. *Leocr.* 136; Philemon fr. 118 Kassel-Austin; [Pl.] *Menex.* 248b7; Aristid. *Or.* 3.440, 661 Lenz-Behr; *GVI* 231.4; Lib. 6.52, 9.52; Greg. *Naz. Or.* 4.4 (PG 35.532).

10 Cumont 1922, 18; Lattimore 1962, 59–61; doubt whether the dead perceive: Dover 1974, 243.

11 Brelich 1935, 78; Pascal 1923, 9–10.

because he feels he does not know what comes after death.¹² When Seneca in a consolatory letter says that there may perchance (*fortasse*), if what the wise maintain is true, be a place to which the deceased has gone on ahead and which he and his correspondent will soon reach, it is difficult to believe there is not an element of doubt in what is said, not only because of the qualification, *fortasse*, but also because, as a Stoic, Seneca can hardly have endorsed the idea of a place in the underworld to which the spirits of the dead departed.¹³ Again, the character in a fragment of New Comedy who says that if the dead really perceive, as some men say they do, gives the appearance of having grave reservations about the proposition.¹⁴ The writer of a consolatory letter to a father on the loss of his son displays a greater degree of confidence in the likelihood that the spirits of the virtuous have a special place in the underworld, by saying of the proposition he presents as a hypothetical that it is likely to be true (ὡσπερ εἰκὸς ἔχειν).¹⁵ The qualifying clause, nonetheless, shows that the speaker is hedging his bets.

Uttering a conditional sentence of the form under discussion creates, accordingly, something of a presumption of reservation; some speakers may try to dispel it and others may try to emphasize it. In the case of one particular sub-set of conditionals, those whose subject is consciousness after death, it is not difficult to imagine what gave rise to the apparent withholding of judgment inherent in their use. First of all, there is evidence that it was quite possible in a public forum to deny that men retained consciousness after death: Aeschines says without further ado to an Athenian jury in 346 BC that whoever is dead is unaware of the benefits conferred upon him in death.¹⁶ Demosthenes does not deny the possibility, but poses the possibility in a conditional sentence in such a way as to suggest it would be hard to credit.¹⁷ The picture of life after death that we find in Homer, of a shadowy existence devoid of understanding,

12 Hyp. 6.43. Cf. the two conditionals that Socrates employs in succession to each other at Pl. *Phd.* 91b2–7 εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὲ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι, εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἔστι τελευτήσαντι ... He argues that if the latter proposition is true and not the former, then the misguided beliefs he had entertained about the existence of an afterlife will shortly perish with him. It follows that Socrates employs conditionals because he does not know what happens after death.

13 Sen. *Ep.* 63.16: *cogitemus ergo, Lucili carissime, cito nos eo perventurus quo illum pervenisse maeremus; et fortasse, si modo vera sapientium fama est recipitque nos locus aliquis, quem putamus perisse praemissus est.* For the collocation *fortasse si*, cf. Cic. *Brut.* 87, *De or.* 3.88, *Orat.* 40, *Fin.* 2.5, *Leg.* 3.29, *Att.* 15.12.2; [Quint.] *Decl. maior.* 5.14, 6.6.

14 Philemon fr. 118 Kassel-Austin εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν οἱ τεθνήκοτες | αἴσθησιν εἶχον, ἄνδρες ὡς φασὶν τινες.

15 [Plut.] *Cons. ad Apoll.* 120b. Cf. Hyp. 6.43: εἰ δ' ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ ἐπιμέλεια παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὡσπερ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, εἰκὸς τοὺς ταῖς τιμαῖς τῶν θεῶν βοηθήσαντας πλειστής κηδεμονίας ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τυγχάνειν.

16 Aeschin. 1.14: τελευτήσαντα δὲ αὐτόν, ἦνίκα ὁ μὲν εὐεργετούμενος οὐκ αἰσθάνεται ὧν εὖ πάσχει.

17 Dem. 20.87.

should also be brought into the equation; it persists into later times: it is found in Euripides, possibly in Sophocles, and much later in Ovid.¹⁸ The belief that the dead lack understanding, although they may enjoy some other vestigial form of existence, may then be part of what lies behind the rather precise way in which the clause εἴ τις ἔστιν αἴσθησις τοῖς τελευτήσασιν and variations on it are framed.

I come finally to what inferences are to be drawn from declarative sentences sometimes being used in speaking of the existence of gods and ghosts, and sometimes hypotheticals. Men conspicuously did not, when faced with a table or a dog, feel moved to say: ‘There are dogs or tables after all’. Nor do they in their absence speak of their existence as hypothetical. That suggests that people did not feel the same way about the existence of gods and ghosts as they did about what they took to be brute physical realities. It would be a mistake to argue that such forms of expression reflect a deep-seated and widespread scepticism. These forms of expression do, on the other hand, seem to indicate that the confidence people felt in the existence of the divine and the spirits of the dead fell rather short of unquestioning certainty and that, in consequence, they were ready to welcome such proof as came their way of their existence and also to hedge their bets when they spoke of that existence and the form it took.

18 Hom. *Il.* 23.103–04, *Od.* 10.492–4; later evidence: Eur. fr. 532 (*Meleager*) Kannicht: τοὺς ζῶντας εὖ δρᾶν· κατθανόν δὲ πᾶς ἀνὴρ | γῆ καὶ σκία· τὸ μηδὲν εἰς οὐδὲν ῥέπει (cf. Soph. *El.* 245–6: εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θανὼν γὰρ τε καὶ οὐδὲ ὄν | κείσεται τάλας); Ov. *Am.* 3.9.59–60: *si tamen e nobis aliquid nisi nomen et umbra / restat, in Elysia valle Tibullus erit.*

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Odysseus at sea

RUTH SCODEL

The misfortunes of Odysseus after Poseidon notices him on his boat at Od. 5.282–90 constitute a bewildering sequence, especially the intervention of Ino-Leucothea, a divinity who plays no other part in the poem. Odysseus does not trust the goddess and follows her instructions only when he has no choice. The narrative sequence thereby ignores a common pattern of folktale: Ino-Leucothea's instructions do not constitute an interdiction whose violation has negative consequences nor is it a test.¹ This part of the poem is also unusual because it includes an unparalleled series of monologues (although, of course, since Odysseus is by himself, monologue is the only plausible form of speech). This paper will attempt to elucidate the structure of this section, especially Ino's intervention. Most interpretations of the scene with Ino-Leucothea examine it for its symbolism and in isolation; this paper will argue that its basic shape needs to be understood within the entire narrative sequence in which it is located.²

The entire journey falls into a set of discrete episodes. (1) Poseidon, after delivering an angry monologue, causes a storm, and Odysseus reacts with a despairing monologue in which he wishes he had died at Troy (299–312). The raft is then hit by a wave that knocks Odysseus off and destroys the boat's rudder and superstructure. Though weighed down by Calypso's clothing, Odysseus makes his way back to the raft, which is driven around aimlessly. (2) Ino appears and tells him to strip, leave the raft, and swim, relying on the *krêdemnon* that she gives him.³ She enters the water, and Odysseus' second monologue debates whether to trust the goddess or not. He decides to wait as long as the raft holds (356–64). But even as he thinks, Poseidon sends another great wave that breaks the raft into pieces. At this point, Odysseus removes the clothing, puts on the *krêdemnon*, and begins to swim. Poseidon, after a brief monologue expressing his continuing anger, drives to Aegae. (3) Athena calms the conflicting winds, so that Odysseus swims on for two days and

1 Propp 1968 discusses interdiction (26–7) and the pattern whereby the hero is tested and receives a magical agent (39–50).

2 The episode has sexual overtones according to Nagler 1974, 46, and Pucci 1987, 64–5; Newton 1984, 12, sees Odysseus' nakedness as part of a rebirth after his 'death' on Calypso's island (compare Holtsmark 1966, for whom the veil is 'umbilical'). Kardulias 2001 examines Odysseus' wearing of the *krêdemnon* as ritual transvestism.

3 Scholars have debated whether the gods in bird-epiphanies are only being compared to birds or actually take the form of birds (Dirlemeier 1967; Bannert 1978). It is unlikely that Ino-Leucothea is in bird form here, since in that shape she could hardly give Odysseus her veil.

nights. On the third day he sees land, but the coast is rocky and is being hit by pounding surf. Odysseus delivers a monologue debating whether to try to swim to land or try to find a more favourable spot, thereby exposing himself to Poseidon's further intervention. Even as he thinks, a wave drives him against the land, but Athena gives him an idea of how to save himself, by clinging to the rock until the wave retreats. (4) He almost drowns, but Athena then gives him the idea of swimming parallel to the shore, and he eventually reaches a river. Praying to the river, he swims upstream – the unnamed river god has answered his prayer by stopping its current – and comes to land. His final monologue debates whether to sleep by the shore or in the grove of trees, and he decides to enter the trees (465–73).

Certain repetitions emerge immediately from this summary; the sequence is an excellent example of the methods of elaboration available to Homer. Indeed, some ancient critics complained that the poet's φιλοτιμία led him to elaborate too much on Odysseus' sufferings (*Schol.* HP on *Od.* 5.401), and analysts assumed that one poet had incorporated and expanded the work of another.⁴ It is immediately obvious that the entire sequence is composed of variants on a theme. First, although the first of Odysseus' four monologues is reflective, and the others deliberative, all are introduced by the same formula, ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν (298, 355, 407, 464), and all four begin ὦ μοι (298 and 465 likewise both end with the otherwise unattested τί νύ μοι μήκιστα γένηται).⁵ The sequence is defined by waves: a wave knocks Odysseus from the boat; a wave breaks the boat into pieces; a wave drives Odysseus onto the rocks. The river god's current, held back in response to Odysseus' prayer, functions as the reversal of these dangerous waves. In the two central sections, Odysseus ponders what to do, but the wave comes before his decision can have any effect. Furthermore, each section presents a different interaction between Odysseus and the gods. In the first, Odysseus recalls the predictions of Calypso, but attributes his present difficulties to Zeus (following Jörgensen's rule that characters attribute the interventions of gods named by the narrator to Zeus or an unnamed god⁶). Then, when Ino intervenes to help him, he suspects deceit and hesitates to follow her directives. Only when the wave has shattered his boat does he obey her. When he sees land but realizes that there is no good place for him to swim ashore, his monologue is framed by his reference to Zeus, who has allowed him to reach land, and Poseidon,

4 Fenik 1974, 143–5 discusses the doublets as a typically Odyssean technique. One analytic treatment (Wilamowitz 1884, 135–9) imagines a Calypso-Leucothea poem and an Athena-poem that have been merged.

5 On these monologues, see de Jong 2001, 140–1.

6 Jörgensen 1904.

whose hatred he fears if he is pulled out to sea. Athena intervenes by giving him ideas, but does not appear herself, nor does Odysseus seem to recognize her interventions, although the narrator twice comments that he would have perished without her help (426–7, 436–7). Finally, Odysseus prays to the river-god and supplicates him, and his prayer is answered.

So there is actual development, marked by the monologues. The first monologue is simply an expression of misery. Odysseus has managed to save his life by clambering back on the boat, but his craft is no longer navigable – an implicit metaphor for his inability to control events. In the next two monologues, Odysseus deliberates, but his deliberations are entirely futile. When he considers whether to follow the instructions of the goddess, Odysseus reaches a conclusion (to stay on the broken boat as long as it holds together), while when he approaches land he has not yet decided whether to try to climb the rocks or risk being carried back out to sea when a great wave overwhelms him. Yet the same formula marks the pointlessness of his choice in each passage: εἴς ὁ ταῦθ' ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν (363, 424). The waves make his deliberations, whether he has made a decision or not, completely pointless. Finally, he makes a decision about where he should sleep, with the regular formula for ending a deliberation, ὦδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι (474) – a formula which refers to Odysseus five times out of the seven it occurs in the *Odyssey* – and is able to carry it out. Similarly, only in the last section does Odysseus ask for a god's help and receive it. Ino helps him spontaneously, because she pities him (336); Athena intervenes once Poseidon has left.

It is essential for the larger plot that Odysseus be wrecked, so that when he arrives among the Phaeacians he is exhausted and naked. It is not essential, however, that the difficulties he confronts take exactly this stylized form. It appears, then, that the entire sequence is at least in part designed to represent situations in which deliberation, a characteristic Odyssean behaviour, is or is not effective. Odysseus' mistrust of Ino is not just typical of him, but is actually required by the sequence, because if he immediately followed her instructions, he would not deliberate, and part of the point of the sequence seems to lie in the futility of the deliberation. From the moment Poseidon raises the storm until he reaches the river, Odysseus is unable to plan effectively. He survives the first wave by swimming back to the remains of his boat, while he is able to survive the next two waves with the help of the goddesses. Odysseus' inability to make and carry out a reasoned decision is a pointed demonstration of his broader inability to act effectively.

Divine help, the second theme of the sequence, is thus closely related to the first theme. Ino-Leucothea expresses her pity for Odysseus by asking why

Poseidon hates Odysseus so inordinately, ὠδύσατ' ἐκπάγλως (340). The echo of Odysseus' name marks the situation as particularly Odyssean.⁷ Scholars have emphasized Ino's similarity to Athena and have treated her as an alternate form of Athena because she emerges and descends from the sea 'like a sea-crow' (αἰθυίη εἰκυῖα, 338, 353) and 'Aithuia'⁸ was an epithet of Athena at Megara.⁹ The narrator, however, clearly wants to mark Ino as very different from Athena. She intervenes before Poseidon departs; she does not recognize Odysseus or know why Poseidon is hostile to him.

The interaction with Ino emphasizes the individuality of Odysseus even as it renders it unimportant. The goddess puns on the hero's name without knowing it. Her special function as a goddess is to protect men at sea, and she helps Odysseus as she might help any man. At the same time, Odysseus' fear that he is being tricked is entirely characteristic of his shrewdness (he has already shown his suspicion of Calypso at *Od.* 5.178–9), but his mistrust is misplaced. Athena's help then enables Odysseus to act in a typically Odyssean way. We generally assume that such psychological intervention indicates an amplification of the character's own choices. In this passage, however, the narrator stresses twice in 10 lines that only Athena's mental intervention rescued Odysseus.¹⁰ In the complex and rhetorically shifting balance between divine and human motivation, the narrator in this passage stresses the divine side. So instead of invoking 'double motivation' in a way that effectively makes Athena only a conventional way of emphasizing Odysseus' own cunning, we should treat this as a genuine divine intervention, even though Odysseus' actions are exactly what we would expect of Odysseus. The octopus-simile at 432–5 brings out this ambiguity. The self-camouflaging of the octopus makes it a natural and perhaps a traditional figure for the versatile Odysseus, but the octopus of the simile is not successfully hiding. It is being pulled from its lair; in this situation it is helpless.¹¹ In any case, Athena has also provided external aid by controlling the winds as soon as Poseidon departs (382–477). Odysseus

7 There is an extended discussion of the name in Perradotto 1990, 120–42, but this passage is not mentioned. Clay 1983, 63–4, points to the repeated play here and at 5.423.

8 Hsch. α 1892-3, Paus. 1.5.4, 1.41.6.

9 Vernant and Détienne 1978. Versions of this interpretation appear in Nagy 1985, 80; Murnaghan 1995, 66 and 79, n. 10; and Ahl and Roisman 1996, 45–6; cf. Bergren 1980, 119. According to *Schol.* HPQ on *Od.* 5. 337, the line was absent from most ancient texts (ἐν τοῖς πλείοσι) and Aristarchus considered athetizing it (διστάζει); the comparison recurs at 353.

10 Schmitt 1990, 49–50, cites this passage and 293 against the claim that the characters of the *Odyssey* are more independent of the gods than those of the *Iliad*: Schmitt, in accordance with his usual view of such interventions, sees Odysseus' particular capability here as the ability to pay attention to and receive Athena's help. Cairns 2001, 14–20 points out that the allocation of divine and human agency in particular passages is often rhetorically motivated.

11 Nagy 1985, 74–6, discusses Odysseus and the octopus as figures of versatility.

certainly demonstrates his endurance while at sea, but in the storm and its aftermath his intelligence cannot effectively be deployed.

Athena's help, then, belongs in a series of variants of the divine helper: Ino, the helper of men at sea, motivated by pity, provides a magical object; Athena, who requires no special motivation because she is Odysseus' patron, calms the winds that Poseidon has raised and provides Odysseus with ideas that enable him to survive; the river-god, unnamed, responds appropriately to Odysseus' supplication and calms his flow.

Formally, this series of episodes does not resemble a paradigmatic narrative at all. It is presented by the main narrator, not a character. Unlike a paradigm, it has no persuasive purpose for characters in the text. Its place in the chronology of the narrative is its place in the chronology of the story. Indeed, only the omniscience of the external narrator makes it a coherent story at all. However, in one respect it functions very much as character-narratives often do: it invites immediate interpretation from the external audience and encourages the hearer to treat it as exemplary for the narrative yet to come. The stories that Helen and Menelaus tell about Troy (*Od.* 4.240–64 and 269–89), for example, do not just disagree about Helen. They invite the audience to consider how far the ambiguity of Helen should be generalized to all women, and in particular they invite comparisons to Penelope; they create expectations about ways in which the main narrative could develop.¹²

Similarly, the storm-sequence, by offering a series of similar misfortunes, each of which Odysseus survives in a slightly different way, serves to invite the audience to wonder how much control even the cleverest man has over events. The earlier part of this book shows Odysseus at his most capable: he has demanded an oath from Calypso that she is not plotting against him; he has built his raft and navigated by the stars until he is within sight of the Phaeacians' land (*Od.* 5.160–281). At sea, his deliberation is useless. The episode thus serves the secondary, 'key' function of a paradigmatic insert – it serves as a sign of what is to come.¹³

The sequence at sea, like the stories about Helen and Odysseus, turns out to be mainly a misdirection. Only when Odysseus is at sea, the element of his enemy Poseidon, are his wits of no real use to him. His final deliberation about where to sleep is more typical of the rest of the narrative, where he will make decisions and carry them out.

¹² Olson 1989.

¹³ On this function, see Andersen 1987, 5–7.

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Tongue-tied Aphrodite: the *paradeigmata* in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*¹

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The presence of mythological examples in Aphrodite's speech to Anchises is one of the traits which impart to the (fifth Homeric) *Hymn to Aphrodite* its distinctive character as the 'most Homeric' of the early hexametric hymns. Without assuming or claiming a direct link between the *Hymn to Aphrodite* and Homer, this paper simply sets out to explore the interpretative perspectives that may be gained if Aphrodite's mythological examples are considered in the light of the scholarly discussion on Homeric *paradeigmata*.²

The poetics of the Homeric paradeigma

A mythological example (*paradeigma* or *exemplum mythicum*) in Homer is 'a myth introduced for exhortation or consolation'.³ Malcolm Willcock's classic definition has been refined by Øivind Andersen as follows: 'the paradigmatic use of myth entails the application of mythical precedent to illustrate, understand or affect a situation; in the last case the paradigm may be used for exhortation or dissuasion.' According to Andersen, 'essential to the paradigmatic function is a certain similarity or analogy ... even if difference and contrast may also play an important part ... In each case, the actual situation is seen in the light of a mythical situation.'⁴

The salient traits of the Iliadic *exempla*, identified by Willcock, may be extended to the Homeric *paradeigmata* in general:

1 Thanks to the participants of the Greek seminar at the University of Uppsala, especially to Dimitrios Iordanoglou and Johan Tralau, for their perceptive remarks on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to Mathilde Skoie, Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, Nick E. Allott, David Leith and Ian Rutherford who read through it and gave suggestions for improvements.

2 Podbielski (1971, 71) suggested that this approach might be fruitful. However, he did not follow it through but rather treated the examples as 'parables' on a par with the stories of the goddesses who do not submit to Aphrodite (7–33) and Aeneas' upbringing by the mountain nymphs (256–2). Smith (1981, 69) and Lenz (1975, 111–12) have drawn attention to the paradigmatic character of the stories but have reached partly different conclusions.

3 Willcock 1964, 142.

4 Andersen 1987, 3.

(a) The mythical example is commonly used in speeches ... when one character wishes to influence the actions of another; (b) The form in which the *paradeigma* appears is often what is called ring-composition. ‘You should behave in this way. A famous mythological figure was once in the following situation (surprisingly parallel to yours); he behaved in this way. Therefore you also should behave in this way’; (c) The parallelism between the mythological story and the immediate situation often appears to be the creation of the poet; (d) Homeric invention is sometimes marked by some phrase which is irrational in the context, but whose provenance can be explained; (e) When Homer is inventing, he tends to use stock motifs.⁵

The story of Niobe, cited by Achilles to Priam in Il. 24.601b–19a, has served as a token of Homeric exemplarity.⁶ Having promised to release Hector’s body, Achilles urges Priam: ‘now you and I must remember our supper’ (601b ... νῦν δὲ μνησώμεθα δόρπου) pointing out that ‘even Niobe, of the lovely tresses, remembered to eat, whose twelve children were destroyed in her palace’ (602–03 καὶ γάρ τ’ ἠύκομος Νιόβη ἐμνήσατο σίτου | τῆ περ δώδεκα παῖδες ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ὄλοντο). Achilles then relates how and why Apollo and Artemis slew Niobe’s children, concluding the narrative with Niobe ‘who remembered to eat when she was worn out with weeping’ (613 ἦ δ’ ἄρα σίτου μνήσατ’ ἐπεὶ κάμε δάκρυ χέουσα). Having wrapped up the example, Achilles renews the invitation to Priam: ‘Come then, we also, aged magnificent sir, must remember | to eat’ (618–19 ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ καὶ νῶϊ μεδώμεθα διε γεραῖε | σίτου).

Aphrodite’s examples

The *Hymn to Aphrodite* includes not one but two consecutive mythological examples. The first example (202–17) relates how Zeus carried off Ganymede and made him the wine-pourer of the immortals and how the sorrow of Ganymede’s father at the mysterious disappearance of his son turned to joy when he received news of his son’s fate and immortal horses from Zeus. The second example (218–38) relates how Eos carried off Tithonus and asked Zeus that he be granted immortality, how Eos enjoyed her love with him until he started growing old, and how at the end, when Tithonus had become utterly enfeebled, she shut him away in a chamber (although she still took care of him).

The examples are quoted by the divine protagonist, Aphrodite, to the Trojan prince Anchises at the end of their single day of love-making. In what

⁵ Willcock 1964, 147.

⁶ Willcock 1964, 141–2; Andersen 1975, 179–230. The translation of the Iliadic passage is Lattimore’s (1969).

precedes, Aphrodite develops a great passion for the Trojan prince who, in this poem, spends time as a shepherd on Mount Ida. Having adorned herself, the goddess heads to Ida and seduces the gullible man by telling a false tale – she is a Phrygian princess who has been transported there miraculously by Hermes as Anchises’ intended wife. The audience, however, are in the know, having been informed by the hymn’s narrator that Aphrodite’s infatuation has been instigated by Zeus, whose ulterior aim is to restrict her ability to mock the other gods and boast of her hold over them.⁷

45–52⁸

τῆ δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ Ζεὺς γλυκὺν ἴμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ
 ἀνδρὶ καταθνητῷ μιχθήμεναι ὄφρα τάχιστα
 μηδ’ αὐτὴ βροτέης εὐνής ἀποεργμένη εἶη
 καὶ ποτ’ ἐπευξαμένη εἴπη μετὰ πᾶσι θεοῖσιν
 ἦδὺ γελουήσασα φιλομειδῆς Ἀφροδίτη
 ὥς ῥα θεοὺς συνέμιξε καταθνητῆσι γυναιξὶ
 καὶ τε καταθνητοὺς υἱεῖς τέκον ἀθάνατοισιν
 ὥς τε θεὰς ἀνέμιξε καταθνητοῖς ἀνθρώποις

But upon Aphrodite herself Zeus cast sweet desire to be joined in love with a mortal man, to the end that, very soon, not even she should be innocent of a mortal’s love; lest laughter-loving Aphrodite should one day softly smile and say mockingly among all the gods that she had joined the gods in love with mortal women who bore mortal sons to the deathless gods, and had mated the goddesses with mortal men.

Like Homeric *paradeigmata*, Aphrodite’s examples have a rhetorical frame – they form part of the lengthy speech (192–290) which the goddess gives to her mortal lover when she resumes her divine form after their love-making. This turns out to be her farewell speech to Anchises. The rhetorical frame directs attention to the speaker’s reasons for using the examples and the poet’s reasons for putting examples in Aphrodite’s mouth, i.e. to the primary or ‘argument’ function and the secondary or ‘key’ function of the mythological examples respectively.⁹

Beginning her speech, Aphrodite is at pains to reassure a terrified Anchises

7 The different interpretations of Zeus’ aim are summed up in Clay 20062, 165–6 (and n. 43–5). Van der Ben’s (1986, 6–7) and Clay’s (20062, 170) proposal that Zeus’ aim was to put a permanent stop to affairs between gods and mortals, not to Aphrodite’s boasting only, has received critical scrutiny in Faulkner 2008, 10–18.

8 Text citations are from Càssola’s edition (1975) with some deviations. Translations are from Evelyn-White’s translation (1914), or are slight adaptations of this translation.

9 The terms have been coined in Andersen 1987, 3–7.

that no harm will befall him as a consequence of his consorting with a goddess (192–5). She then announces that a son will result from their union, Aeneas, and explains his name as a reminder of her terrible distress (αἰνὸν ... ἄχος) at having ‘fallen in the bed of a mortal man’ (196–9). There follows the pivotal couplet which bridges the actual situation with the mythical past conjured up through the examples:

200–01

ἀγχίθιοι δὲ μάλιστα καταθητῶν ἀνθρώπων
αἰεὶ ἀφ’ ὑμετέρης γενεῆς εἶδός τε φηὴν τε

Of all mortal men those of your race
are always the closest to gods in beauty and in appearance.

Anchises – Ganymede – Tithonus

The verses set the scene for the first level of analogy operating in the examples, that between Anchises and his ancestors, Ganymede and Tithonus. Anchises, whose name partly resonates in the first component of the programmatic ἀγχίθιοι (200),¹⁰ remains steadily in focus throughout Aphrodite’s examples. The multivalent syntax and semantics of the adjective¹¹ convey multiple aspects of Anchises’ connection with the human protagonists of the examples. Like Ganymede and Tithonus, Anchises possesses godlike beauty: he is ἀγχίθεος ... εἶδός τε φηὴν τε. His exceptional beauty captivates Aphrodite instantly and spurs her into action (55–6), as Ganymede’s and Tithonus’ good looks once prompted Zeus and Eos to take action (203 ἤρπασε ὄν διὰ κάλλος and 218–19 ἤρπασεν ... | ... ἐπιείκελον ἀθανάτοισι). What is more, Anchises is a member of a family that time and again yields men to whom gods are attracted and with whom the gods develop intimate relations (ἀγχίθιοι ... αἰεὶ ἀφ’ ὑμετέρης γενεῆς).¹²

However, the analogy between Anchises and Ganymede/Tithonus is asymmetric in one major respect, i.e. Ganymede and Tithonus were transported to the divine sphere and became immortal (ἀγχίθιοι in an absolute sense), but neither of these things will happen to Anchises. Given that Aphrodite’s programmatic statement announces a comparison between men in terms of beauty (perhaps an ironic reversal of the famous beauty contest on Ida that

¹⁰ Van der Ben 1986, 24 (comm. on 200–01) and Faulkner 2008, 261 (comm. on 200). The adjective, an emendation proposed by Barnes (1711), is clearly superior to the manuscripts’ ἀγχι θεοί.

¹¹ Van der Ben 1986, 24 (comm. on 200–01).

¹² Podbielski (1971, 66–75, esp. 71, and 102) views this thematic line as ‘principe compositionnel’.

caused the Trojan War?) and also that the main topic of the *exempla* is the immortality of beautiful men from Anchises' lineage who have caught the eye of immortal gods, the paradigmatic expectations are seriously thwarted when Aphrodite concludes at the end of her short analeptic narratives:

239–46

οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε σὲ τοῖον ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἐλοίμην
 ἀθάνατόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ζῶειν ἤματα πάντα
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτος ἐὼν εἶδός τε δέμας τε
 ζῳοῖς ἡμέτερός τε πόσις κεκλημένος εἴης
 οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτά μ' ἄχος πυκινὰς φρένας ἀμφικαλύπτου
 νῦν δέ σε μὲν τάχα γῆρας ὁμοῖον ἀμφικαλύψει
 νηλεῖς τό τ' ἔπειτα παρίσταται ἀνθρώποισιν
 οὐλόμενον καματηρόν ὃ τε στυγέουσι θεοὶ περ.

I would not have you be deathless among the deathless gods and live continually after such sort. Yet if you could live on such as now you are in looks and in build, and be called my husband, sorrow would not then enfold my careful heart. But as things are, hostile, merciless old age will soon enshroud you, which attends men in the time to come, accursed, wearisome, most certainly abhorred by the gods.

τοιοῦτος ἐὼν εἶδός τε δέμας τε in 241 picks up ἀγχιθεοὶ ... εἶδός τε φηγήν τε (200–01) and signals that Aphrodite's paradigmatic thinking and reasoning have come full circle. The correspondences and responses between 200–01 and 241–2 indicate that the two examples in Aphrodite's speech form a paradigmatic unity. Consequently, they should be viewed not as two contrasting examples¹³ but as interlocking parts in a unified train of thought and argument explaining why Aphrodite cannot and will not transport her lover to the realm of the gods.

In terms of 'argument function' then Aphrodite's examples are artfully ambiguous. Ostensibly directed at Anchises, they ultimately (by virtue of the pivotal adjective ἀγχιθεοὶ) pertain primarily to Aphrodite herself. Their purpose is to explain and justify her departure from the scene without her lover. Contrary to most Homeric examples, here the *prima facie* addressee, Anchises, is the silent and passive recipient of the goddess' decision. There is no question of the examples serving to persuade or dissuade him.¹⁴ As the decision-maker,

13 Richardson 2010, 28. Lenz (1975, 111–12 and 128) has stressed the 'einheitliche Rammung' of the examples.

14 Contra Smith 1981, 69 'We should be alive to the possible persuasive intentions of Aphrodite's speech; when we have heard from her about Ganymede and Tithonos, we should be ready to perceive how, from Anchises' point of view, they might apply to his own case.'

Aphrodite merely explains to him what the situation is. Her point of view, inscribed in the second component of the programmatic ἀγχιθῆοι, imbues her *paradeigmata* and shapes the conclusion, to which I now turn.

Aphrodite – Zeus – Eos

Aphrodite's conclusion is permeated by negative forms of expression (οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε ... ἐλοίμην, οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτά μ' ἄχος ... ἀμφικαλύπτοι), obscurities and logical cracks. The negative formulations tally with the negative conclusion: Aphrodite will not seek to immortalize Anchises. However, this is nowhere stated in unambiguous terms. The goddess touches upon it in 239–40 only as a possibility which is contingent upon a fate similar to that of Tithonus (subsumed under τοῖον in 239). One may reasonably object here, as many scholars have done already, that it would not be necessary for an immortal Anchises to age like Tithonus, if the former's divine lover knows what to watch out for when seeking to make him immortal.¹⁵ The goddess' final words on the matter (244–6) dwell on the unavoidability of aging for Anchises but stop conspicuously short of mentioning the reason, i.e. that Aphrodite will not seek to challenge the limits of mortality and appeal to Zeus for immortality for her lover.

Aphrodite's fragmented discourse and her reticence to spell out her decision may become more comprehensible if we consider how the mythological examples pertain to her and how the past is presented with her, and her situation, as a point of reference. This vantage point brings Zeus' presence and role in the two mythological examples into sharp focus and renders them hermeneutically meaningful at story level. The pair Zeus – Ganymede in the first example replicates the pair Aphrodite – Anchises in the actual situation. Shown in a situation similar to that of Aphrodite, Zeus transports his favoured member of Anchises' family to the divine realm and accords him a position of honour among the immortals. He also has the power to amend any negative repercussions of the immortalization, turning the sorrow of Ganymede's father into joy when he sends him news of his son and gifts (207–17).

The constellations in the first mythological example, however, miss out something of the actual situation in which Zeus is Aphrodite's secret

¹⁵ Most succinctly formulated by Clay 20062, 190: 'Her contention, however, is flawed by the simple fact that there is no reason why Aphrodite should repeat the foolish mistake of Eos' and Olson 2012, 253: '... why could she not have repeated Dawn's experiment, with the flaw in the plan corrected?' From a slightly different angle Bergren 1989, 35 asks 'And why does she not at least mention to Anchises the possibility of appealing to Zeus, if only to insist upon its futility?' For an overview of options and proposed solutions see Olson 2012, 253–4.

opponent, as the narratees are aware by dint of 46–52. The triangle Aphrodite – Anchises – Zeus is replicated accurately only in the second mythological example. This stages a lovelorn Eos transporting Tithonus to the realm of the immortals with Zeus’ consent, only to discover that she forgot an essential dimension of his human nature, aging. Eos does not have the power to remedy the consequences of her lover’s ultimately unsuccessful immortalization. She watches helplessly as he is gradually enfeebled and reduced to a mere voice until, in the end, she cannot even bear the sight of him. Interpretations of the poem have raised the question of whether Aphrodite is aware of Zeus’ part in her adventure.¹⁶ Indeed, Zeus’ position of power in matters of immortalization is acknowledged in Aphrodite’s examples. It may, moreover, be projected onto the actual situation by dint of the example’s ‘key function’ as ‘a *sign* of the main story and a *comment* on its own context’.¹⁷ Should Aphrodite wish to transfer Anchises to the realm of immortality, Zeus would have to appear in the story to sanction it. His record suggests that he would consent, but this is not what matters most for Aphrodite.

Aphrodite’s relation to Eos in the hymn also rests on the ‘key function’ of exemplarity. In addition to Eos’ miscalculation being a deterrent for Aphrodite, both goddesses are on the losing end of affairs with mortals and also in their dealings with Zeus. I suggest that the paradigmatic relationship between Aphrodite and Eos may include a further dimension which is rooted in the goddesses’ partly overlapping identities in terms of religious–mythological tradition and origins. The Greek goddess Eos is the fully fledged counterpart of the PIE goddess of Dawn, *H₂éusōs. Aphrodite’s divine identity is complex. Although her main realm of action is different than that of Eos and *H₂éusōs, and many of her divine traits derive from the Semitic/Phoenician goddess Ištar/Astarte,¹⁸ part of her identity overlaps with that of the PIE Dawn goddess.¹⁹ Should the connection be accepted,²⁰ Eos may be upgraded from a mere external parallel, a scatter-brained predecessor of Aphrodite in the business of seducing male members of the Trojan royal family, to an *alter ego* of, and a stand-in for, Aphrodite. Of course, more than speculation is hardly possible concerning issues involving divinities and story patterns that migrate across time and cultures. There is, furthermore, no denying that aspects of

16 Clay 20062, 190–1.

17 Andersen 1987, 5.

18 Càssola 1975, 234–9; Breitenberger 2007, 7–20.

19 Boedeker 1974, 1–42 and 64–84; Friedrich 1978, 9–54, esp. 47–9; Kölligan 2007; Janda 2010, 247–8. Friedrich’s balanced weighing of the possibilities as well as Kölligan’s comparative study of the Greek epithets of Aphrodite and their counterparts in the Vedic tradition are particularly convincing.

20 The possibility has been raised *en passant* in Friedrich 1978, 67 but has not been explored further.

Aphrodite's representation in the hymn relate to Near Eastern motifs²¹ or that elsewhere in the Greek epic tradition she holds roles that point back to Ištar.²² More importantly, even scholarly consensus on Aphrodite's origins would not automatically resolve the most crucial issue of all when such connections are ventured – the issue of whether the relationship is consciously exploited in the hymn, or whether the two figures cross paths in this story as a result of traditional mythological undercurrents and narrative concatenations circulating freely. Be this as it may, the hermeneutic legitimacy of the connection rests instead on the observation that the second mythological example, and especially Eos' part in it, fills in the blanks in Aphrodite's subsequent reasoning. That Aphrodite's conclusion and decision may be articulated as though what happened to the couple Eos – Tithonus would necessarily also happen to her and Anchises shows, at the very least, how intensely the goddess identifies with Eos and her fate. That Aphrodite is able to avoid mentioning her going up to Zeus to ask for immortality for Anchises, as well as her encapsulation of her unwillingness in the opaque and pregnant-with-possibilities *vñv δέ* (244), is feasible because the scene of approaching Zeus to ask for immortality for one's mortal lover has already been enacted in the mythological past by her stand-in, Eos. The traditional identification with Eos allows the goddess to hide thoughts and also avoid mentioning what gives her discomfort.

A reticence to name and reveal (or conversely, an intense preoccupation with hiding) marks every step of Aphrodite's thought and discourse in the aftermath of her adventure with Anchises. Following the markedly evasive conclusion of her *paradeigmata*, the goddess stresses her resulting inability to mention that she enmeshes gods and goddesses in affairs with mortals (252–3).²³ The living proof of her union with Anchises, Aeneas, will remain 'hidden away' for the first years of his life with the forest nymphs (256–80) and will be later presented as the offspring of one of them (281–5). Anchises is most insistently enjoined not to reveal the affair (281–90).

Accordingly, Aphrodite's language foregrounds not-naming, voicelessness and negative forms of voice/sound: Tros 'groaned' (*γόασκε*, 209); Eos is *νηπίη* (literally 'voiceless', 223); the aged Tithonus' 'voice flows indescribable' (*φωνή ῥέει ἄσπετος*, 237); the goddess describes her own situation as *ᾄνειδος* (247 '[words bringing] shame')²⁴ and *ἄχος* ('distress'). The latter word, *ἄχος*, is etymologically akin to the participle *ἄχέων/ἄχεύων* meaning 'crying

21 Càssola 1975, 547 (comm. on 68–74); Faulkner 2008, 19–22.

22 As argued in e.g. Andersen 1997.

23 Faulkner 2008 14–18.

24 *LfrE* Vol. 3, 710 s.v. 'Schimpfwörter', 'Schmäungen', 'Vorwürfe die man äußert od. (als Tadel der Öffentlichk.) über sich ergehen lassen muß'.

mournfully²⁵ and resonates with ἀχέω, which means ‘to proclaim loudly’, ‘to sing’, ‘to make (an instrument) sound’.²⁶ This connection is most interesting and may even be echoed in Aphrodite’s description of her future inability to name her triumphs over the other gods, if Buttmann’s emendation of the manuscripts’ unsatisfactory *στοναχίσεται* is adopted in 252²⁷ (252–3 νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκέτι μοι στόμ’ ἀχίσεται ἐξονομῆναι | τοῦτο μετ’ ἀθανάτοισιν ἐπεὶ μάλα πολλὸν ἀάσθη | σχέτλιον οὐκ ὀνομαστὸν²⁸ ‘my mouth will no longer sound to name this among the immortals since I was greatly blighted, a terrible blight, not to be named ...’). Quite apart from the other factors that recommend the emendation,²⁹ the poet’s predilection for punning on Anchises and Aeneas (192 Ἀγχίσις – 200 ἀγχίθιοι, 198–9 Αἰνεΐας – αἰνόν ἄχος) increases the plausibility of yet another pun, associating Aphrodite’s ἄχος with her for-ever-tied tongue (198–9 οὐνεκα μ’ αἰνόν | ἔσχεν ἄχος and 243 οὐκ ἄν ἔπειτα μ’ ἄχος | πυκινὰς φρένας ἀμφικαλύπτει – 252 οὐκέτι μοι στόμ’ ἀχίσεται ἐξονομῆναι). Further examples of silences and prohibitions in the last part of Aphrodite’s speech include the nymphs’ silent presentation of Aeneas to Anchises (275 δειξουσὶ τε παῖδα)³⁰ and the warning not to boast of or mention the affair for fear of Zeus’ anger (286–8, esp. 286 εἰ δέ κεν ἐξείπῃς καὶ ἐπεύξῃς and 290 μῆδ’ ὀνόμῃς). Ironically, the latter mode of expression picks up Zeus’ thoughts on Aphrodite (48, καὶ ποτ’ ἐπευξαμένη εἶπῃ). Zeus’ plan, to tie Aphrodite’s tongue forever, has been fulfilled, and in a final ironic turn the poem reveals it all by means of Aphrodite’s own voice (Aphrodite’s initial address to Anchises is aptly introduced (176) with the formula ἔπος τ’ ἔφατ’ ἐκ τ’ ὀνομάζεν).

Paradigmatic adaptations

In Homer the comparison between the actual situation, the past conjured up in an *exemplum*, and other known versions of the same mythological story suggests that the paradigmatic past is malleable and is often adapted to the actual situation.³¹ This may also be true as regards Aphrodite’s *paradeigmata*. In the first mythological example Ganymede is carried off by Zeus, not by the

25 *LfrE* Vol. 1, 1751–2 s.v. ‘voll Trauer und Klage’, ‘traurig klagend’.

26 *LfrE* Vol. 1, 1750–1 s.v. ‘verkünden’, ‘besingen’, ‘ertönen lassen’.

27 Editors are divided between Matthiae’s στόμα τλήσεται ‘my mouth will dare’ (Cassola, Faulkner, Richardson) and Martin’s στόμα χεῖσεται ‘my mouth will open wide’ (Allen, Halliday and Sikes, Humbert, West, Olson).

28 Another emendation, by Martin, of the manuscripts’ ὀνομαστὸν (Clarke ὀνομαστὸν ‘to be blamed’).

29 Kamerbeek 1967, 392–3.

30 On 276–7, a rhapsodic alternative couplet which is at odds with Aphrodite’s preoccupation with hiding the affair, see Faulkner 2008, 291–2 (comm. on 274–7).

31 Willcock 1964, 152–3. The malleability of the past has been discussed more generally in Andersen 1990.

gods as in the version of the story told by Aeneas in the *Iliad* (20.232–5 και ἀντίθεος Γανυμήδης | ὃς δὴ κάλλιστος γένετο θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων· | τὸν και ἀνιρέψαντο θεοὶ Διὶ οἰνοχοεῦειν | κάλλεος εἵνεκα οἷο ἴν' ἀθανάτοισι μετεΐη). Since there is no reason why Aeneas would alter his family history in this way, a plausible scenario is that Zeus' active role in this version of the hymn derives from his looming position at story level as a more powerful parallel to Aphrodite.³²

According again to Aeneas' genealogical account in *Il.* 20.230–41, Tithonus belonged to the same generation as Anchises. Aphrodite's example implies a different chronology: should sufficient time be allowed for Tithonus to age at Eos' side, he must have belonged to (at least) the generation preceding that of Anchises. Again, since Aeneas would not have had any reason to alter his family history, it is likely that Tithonus is transposed back in time in order to serve as a *comparandum* to Anchises. Podbielski has argued that Eos' request to Zeus was modelled on her request on behalf of her son, Memnon in the *Aethiopsis*.³³ Be this as it may, it is worth noting that early poems on Tithonus focus either on his relationship with Eos (Hom. *Il.* 11.1–2 = *Od.* 5.1–2, Hes. *Theog.* 984–5) or on his aging. Mimnermus presents Tithonus as endowed with 'an imperishable evil, old age, something to shudder more than the trouble that death is' (fr. 4 West, *IE*² Τιθωνῶι μὲν ἔδωκεν ἔχειν κακὸν ἄφθιτον < – x > | γῆρας ὃ και θανάτου ῥίγιον ἀργαλέου). Describing old age as an evil worse than death is typical of Mimnermus (fr. 1 and 2 West, *IE*²), while the subject of the verb cannot be ascertained.³⁴ In Sappho's fr. 58, Tithonus is transported by Eos to the ends of earth: '... being young and beautiful; yet, even him who had an immortal bedfellow grey old age conquered in time' (Sappho fr. 58.9–12³⁵ και γάρ π[ο]τα Τιθωνον ἔφαντο βροδόπαχυν Αὔων | ἔρωι φ..αθειςαν βάμεν' εἰς ἔσχατα γᾶς φέροισα[ν] | ἔοντα [κ]άλον και νέον ἀλλ' αὐτον ὕμως ἔμαρψε | χρόνῳ πρόλιον γῆρας ἔχ[ο]ντ' ἀθανάταν ἄκοιτιν). Eos' immortal youth makes the aging of her once-beautiful partner seem even uglier.³⁶ In both Sappho's and Mimnermus' poems then the emphasis seems to be firmly on Tithonus' aging. Tithonus' immortality is not hermeneutically required, although it may be implied in Mimnermus' κακὸν ἄφθιτον and in Sappho's ἐς πέρατα γαίης³⁷

32 Richardson 2010, 246 (comm. on 202–17) considers the versions as 'essentially the same', while Van Eck 1978, 74 maintains that the Iliadic version is secondary.

33 Podbielski 1971, 69.

34 The last foot has been supplied with ὁ Ζεὺς by Gesner (Ζεὺς by Trincavelli) or αἰεὶ by Schneidewin.

35 Text as in West 2005, 5.

36 West 2005, 6 'He [sc. Tithonus] lived on, growing ever more grey, frail, and decrepit, while ever beholding, and measuring himself against, the unfading beauty of his consort – even as Sappho grows old in the face of a cohort of protégées who, like undergraduates, are always young.'

37 Brown 2011, 22.

and ἀθανάτων ἄκοιτιν. Tithonus' youth and beauty, Eos' love for him, his transportation to her realm and then his inevitable aging, which is even more conspicuously sad at the side of an immortal and eternally youthful partner: these elements would have been in the common source of the poems, if indeed a common source ever existed.³⁸ The episode of Eos approaching Zeus to ask for immortality for Tithonus is suited to and derives from the paradigmatic logic because it introduces the supreme god in the role which Aphrodite is unwilling not just to accord him but even to speak of in the story.

Conclusion

The *Hymn to Aphrodite* offers a masterful representation of psychological and rhetorical evasion. When examined in the light of the poetics and 'rhetorics' of the Homeric *paradeigmata*, Aphrodite's mythological examples offer glimpses into the cognition of the humiliated and tongue-tied goddess in the wake of her affair with the mortal Anchises. Ostensibly concerned with Anchises, these analeptic tales are primarily shaped by Aphrodite's point of view as they jointly argue her decisions to leave her lover behind and to suppress the embarrassing affair. This strategy of suppression – a veritable triumph for Zeus' plan to curb Aphrodite's tongue – is effected in the examples which bring the supreme god into centre stage, only in the past instead of the present, and on one occasion set him up face to face with a goddess who has a traditional kinship with Aphrodite, thus enabling Aphrodite to express her dilemma as though it concerned somebody else. The hymn's handling of exemplarity matches the complexity of Aphrodite's situation and thought-processes at the moment when she suffers a case of 'the biter bit'. Thus, although it is illuminated by Homeric exemplarity, exemplarity in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* ultimately surpasses the Homeric paradigm in terms of its shifts in perspective and cognitive subtlety.

38 The relationship between the hymn, Mimnermus fr. 4 and Sappho fr. 58 is the subject of a complex scholarly debate that cannot be summarized here. Some scholars consider the hymn as Sappho's intertext (Rawles 2006) while others are inclined to postulate a common source, perhaps a narrative in which Tithonus featured as immortal and ageless (Bettarini 2007). Review of the discussion in Faulkner 2008, 270 (comm. on 218–38).

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Bacchylides 5 and the theme of non-recognition on the battlefield

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The myth of Bacchylides' fifth ode recounts an encounter between Heracles and Meleager in the underworld (56–175). In a highly efficient way, Bacchylides manages to use both heroes to illustrate the *gnômê* οὐ γάρ τις ἐπιχθονίων π[άντ]α γ' εὐδαίμων ἔφου, 'no mortal on earth is fortunate in all things' (53–5). Meleager recounts his fate himself: he was successful in killing the Calydonian boar but died in the aftermath, during the battle between Aetolians and Curetes over the boar's hide, through the magic of his mother who was angry because in the confusion of that battle he had killed two of her brothers. Heracles is at the height of his heroic career, but his death is adumbrated when Meleager promises him his sister Deianeira as bride who, as the narratees know, will kill her husband through magic. Both *gnômê* and narrative are held up to the ode's *laudandus*, Hieron: he is a model of human success (50, 190), and the dark fates of Meleager and Heracles at first blush stand in contrast to his glorious career, but they should still remind him that he too is subject to the mutability of fortune and the inevitability of death for mortals.¹

In this paper I will take a closer look at the beginning of the narrative, Heracles' arrival in the underworld and the opening exchange between the two heroes (56–84). The point I will argue is that commentators have failed to notice that Heracles does not know who Meleager is and has to ask for his identity. This theme of non-recognition, which has a Homeric antecedent, prefigures an important moment in the ensuing story of Meleager's death.

The narrator starts his narrative by recounting how Heracles went down to the underworld, in order to fetch Cerberus (63–4):

¹ See Lefkowitz 1969, 64 and 87–90; Goldhill 1983, 79; and Grossardt 2001, 68. Cairns 2010, 226–7 also suggests that the narratees may think of Heracles' initiation and eventual apotheosis and connect this to Hieron.

ἔνθα δυστάνων βροτῶν
 ψυχὰς ἐδάη παρὰ Κωκυτοῦ ῥέεθροις, ...

There he [Heracles] saw the ghosts of wretched mortals by the waters of the Cocytus, ...²

With anaphoric ἔνθα the narrator refers back to ‘the house of Persephone’, i.e. the underworld (59), and then proceeds to zoom in on one of its rivers, the Cocytus. Three commentators, Lefkowitz, Goldhill, and Cairns, take ἐδάη to mean ‘he learnt about’ and place much weight on the choice of this verb: Heracles’ *katabasis* would involve a process of learning, the hero gradually gaining insight into the mortality of human beings, including his own mortality.³ I would suggest slightly rephrasing this: when Heracles descends into the underworld he of course already knows that he, like all human beings, is mortal. What he does learn from his descent is what it means to be dead. This starts with his actually seeing dead mortals. Thus, I follow Jebb, Maehler, and Campbell and take ἐδάη to mean ‘he saw’, with the connotation of acquiring first-hand experience of something.⁴

The verb ἐδάη forms the first in a string of verbs of seeing (cf. μετέπρεπεν, ἴδεν), which signal that Heracles is focalizer. He, naturally, considers the dead ‘wretched’, just as Odysseus does in *Od.* 11.80, when he addresses Elpenor as ὦ δύστηνε. Heracles’ focalization of the dead as ‘wretched’ prepares us for his outburst of tears after hearing the story of Meleager’s death (155–8).

The picture of the ghosts is elaborated in a simile (65–7):

..., οἷά τε φύλλ’ ἄνεμος
 ἴδας ἀνὰ μηλοβότους
 πῶνας ἀργηστάς δονεῖ.

... like the leaves that the wind swirls on the bright sheep-pasturing headlands of Ida.

Who is the focalizer of this simile? Most commentators connect it with Heracles. The simile recalls the famous Iliadic one: ‘As is the generation of leaves, so is that of humanity’ (6.146–9), which opens with οἷη περ φύλλων γενεή and describes the mortality and ephemerality of men. Its evocation here

² The text is that of Maehler 1997, and the translation my own, but it is based on those of Campbell 1992 and Cairns 2010.

³ Lefkowitz 1969, 65; Goldhill 1983, 72; Cairns 2010, *ad* 5.63–4 (‘But Heracles does not simply see or recognize the ψυχὰί: he learns how numerous they are, how their multitude expresses human mortality, and how miserable it is to be mortal.’).

⁴ For this connotation of first-hand experience (after first only knowing in theory or from hearsay), cf. e.g. Hom. *Od.* 3.208 and 4.26–8.

would add to the picture of Heracles learning how the multitude of ghosts expresses human mortality.⁵ There is a problem with this interpretation, however. Heracles, of course, does not know the *Iliad*. What he sees is a host of fluttering ghosts, and even if this would remind him of leaves being swept by the wind, he cannot think of the Iliadic simile of the leaves nor be reminded of its connotation of mortality. It is more likely that it is the Bacchylides-narrator who expands Heracles' view of the ghosts in an—intertextually loaded—simile.⁶ He wants to remind his narratees of the central point of the myth, which had been announced in the *gnōmē* preceding it, that 'no mortal on earth is fortunate in all things'. Indeed, the simile of the leaves in the *Iliad* not merely stresses the 'precariousness of the human condition', but it is followed by the story of Bellerophon, another hero who dies unheroically. His fate thus resembles that of Meleager and Heracles. Soon we will see that this Iliadic scene is relevant for Bacchylides' ode for another reason, too.

Heracles' gaze next zooms in on one man among the swarm of ghosts (68–76):

ταῖσιν δὲ μετέπρεπεν εἶδωλ-
 ον θρασυμέμνος ἐγ-
 χεσπάλου Πορθανίδα·
 τὸν δ' ὡς ἶδεν Ἀλκμή<v>ιος θαυμαστός ἦρωσ
 τ[ε]ύχεσι λαμπόμενον,
 νευρὰν ἐπέβασε λιγυκλαγγῆ κορώνας,
 χαλκεόκρανον δ' ἔπειτ' ἔξ
 εἴλετο ἰὸν ἀναπτύ-
 ξας φαρέτρας πῶμα·

Among them stood out the ghost of the bold-hearted, spear-brandishing son of Porthaon [Meleager]. And when the son of Alcmena, amazing hero, saw him shining in his armour, he put the shrill-ringing string on his bow-hook, and then opened the lid of his quiver and took out a bronze-headed arrow.

Heracles spots a very martial ghost and reacts with the heroic Pavlovian reaction of stringing his bow and making ready to attack. In my view, this reaction makes clear that Heracles *does not know* that the ghost is Meleager; for if he had recognized Meleager, why would he attack him, a fellow-Greek?⁷

5 Cf. Lefkowitz 1969, 65–6 ('the inevitability of death'); Goldhill 1983, 72; Maehler 2004, *ad* 5.65–7 ('the precariousness of the human condition'); Cairns 2010, *ad* 5.65–7 ('human mortality and ephemerality').

6 This is a regular Homeric technique, cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 22.25–32, where the Homeric narrator expands Priam's focalization of Achilles running fully armed and hence glittering through the Trojan plain with a simile of a dazzling star.

7 We may recall here *Od.* 11.601–27, where the ghost of Heracles himself is described by Odysseus as being very frightful since he holds his bow at the ready and an arrow on the string, yet upon recognizing Odysseus he talks peacefully with him.

Indeed, soon he will ask the man before him who he is (86–8).⁸ Commentators so far have either missed this crucial point of Heracles not recognizing Meleager, or have failed to give it its due weight.⁹

I analyse the passage as follows. Heracles sees a ‘bold-hearted’ man who is brandishing his spear and is clad in shining armour. He does not know who the man is and hence sets out to attack him. His focalization of the unknown man gives, in typical Bacchylidean fashion, full, contextual weight to the epithet ἐγγεσπάλου (which Lefkowitz called ‘a merely generalized heroic epithet’¹⁰).¹¹ It is also suggested by τ[ε]ύχεσι λαμπόμενον, an expression which in the *Iliad* is twice used to describe frightening heroes that are focalized by other characters (17.214; 20.46). It is, however, the narrator Bacchylides who adds, for the sake of his narratees, that the man is the son of Porthaon, i.e. Meleager. In other words, the narrator intrudes on the focalization of his character, Heracles, in order to add a name, a phenomenon found regularly in Homer too, e.g. in *Iliad* 3.191–2:

δεύτερον αὐτ’ Ὀδυσῆα ἰδὼν ἐρέειν’ ὁ γεραίός
 ‘εἶπ’ ἄγε μοι καὶ τόνδε, φίλον τέκος, ὅς τις ὄδ’ ἐστί·’

Secondly, seeing Odysseus the old man asked:
 ‘Come, dear child, tell me also about this man, who he is.’

Priam does not know the identity of the man he is seeing and has to ask Helen for his name, but the narrator informs the narratees that it is Odysseus, in order that they can appreciate Priam’s ensuing positive description of this hero.¹²

At this point it may be relevant to ask ourselves *why* commentators

8 That Heracles does not recognize Meleager is not surprising, since commentators agree that a meeting between the two heroes was no traditional element but most probably an invention of Bacchylides. Also, Meleager is not one of the famous inhabitants of the underworld (though he does feature in Hesiod’s *Peirithou Katabasis*, Fr. 280 Merkelbach–West). I owe this reference to Ettore Cingano.

9 Lefkowitz 1969 is not consistent: on pp. 66 and 70–1 she assumes that Heracles knows who he is facing, but on p. 68 she writes ‘Heracles’ reaction to the shining figure’ (my italics). Segal 1976, 116 assumes that Heracles recognizes Meleager (‘in his reaction to Meleager’s shade’). Goldhill 1983, 73 merely writes ‘Meleager appears to Herakles’. Only Cairns 2010, 88 notes explicitly ‘Heracles does not know Meleager, but Meleager knows him’, but does not follow up on this observation. See also below on Heracles’ question at 86–8.

10 Lefkowitz 1969, 66.

11 For Bacchylidean epithets having concrete, contextual value, see Segal 1976. The other epithet, θρασυμένονος, has a double significance: for Heracles it adds to the frightening view of the martial man he spots, while the narratees may note that this is an epithet commonly used by Homer for Heracles himself, and this may alert them to the affinity in fate between the two heroes, such as the rest of the myth will make clear.

12 See discussion in de Jong [1987] 2004, 104.

have failed to note that Heracles does not recognize Meleager. I think they have been put on the wrong track by the anaphoric pronoun τόν in τὸν δ' ὡς ἴδεν (71), which picks up (*kata sunesin*) εἰδῶλον θρασυμένυνοσ ἐγγεσπάλου Πορθανίδα. This suggests that Heracles sees 'him', i.e. Meleager. But here we should realize that the pronoun functions on the level of the communication between narrator and narratees. Putting it somewhat exaggeratedly, we should analyse τὸν δ' ὡς ἴδεν as 'when he saw him, i.e. the martial ghost whom I, the narrator, just told you, the narratee, was Meleager'. An exact parallel is found in *Iliad* 5.144–78: the narrator recounts how Diomedes kills many Trojans (144–65); he, i.e. Diomedes, is spotted by Aeneas (τὸν δ' ἴδεν Αἰνεΐας ἀλαπάζοντα στίχας ἀνδρῶν: 166), who in the ensuing speech exhorts Pandarus to shoot an arrow at the man *whose identity he does not know* (τῷ δ' ἔφεσ ἀνδρὶ βέλος ... , ὅς τις ὄδε κρατέει: 174–5). The τόν at 166 anaphorically refers back to Diomedes, but the focalizing character Aeneas does not know who 'him' is. In the same way, Heracles in Bacchylides 5 sees 'him', but does not know who 'him' is.

The narrator now switches to Meleager (76–84):

τῷ δ' ἐναντία
 ψυχὰ προφάνη Μελεάγρου,
 καὶ νιν εὔ εἰδῶς προσεῖπεν·
 'ὑιὲ Διὸς μεγάλου,
 σταῖθί τ' ἐν χῶρα, γελανώσας τε θυμὸν
 μὴ ταῦσιον προῖει
 τραχὺν ἐκ χειρῶν ὀϊστὸν
 ψυχαῖσιν ἔπι φθιμένων·
 οὐ τοι δέος.'

But the ghost of Meleager appeared close to him and, knowing him well, addressed him: 'Son of great Zeus, stay where you are and, making your heart smile, do not in vain shoot a harsh arrow from your hands at the ghosts of dead men. You have nothing to fear.'

As is apparent from my translation, I connect (with Jebb) νιν as object with εὔ εἰδῶς,¹³ whereas most other commentators prefer to take εὔ εἰδῶς absolute, 'in full knowledge', 'in his full experience'. Their analysis ties in with the thesis already referred to above, that Heracles is portrayed in this myth as a learner: during his visit to the underworld he comes to understand what being dead is. Meleager, εὔ εἰδῶς, already has this superior form of knowledge: 'Meleager's

13 Lefkowitz 1969, 69 also seems to follow Jebb, paraphrasing the lines as 'Meleager's approach, recognition of Heracles, use of the patronymic title "son of great Zeus", and specific request' (my italics).

knowledge in particular is of the futility of Heracles' action; he does not know that the dead are mere insubstantial shades'.¹⁴ Thus, shooting arrows at ghosts is futile ('in vain'), since they are dead already, and Heracles has 'nothing to fear' because dead ghosts are too insubstantial to kill him.

I agree that Meleager in his speech imparts knowledge to Heracles, but, as in the case of ἐδάη, I think commentators are reading too much into the Greek, here into εἶ εἰδώς. The interpretation I prefer, taking νιν εἶ εἰδώς together as 'knowing him well',¹⁵ signals that Meleager recognizes Heracles, as also transpires from the opening of his speech: 'Son of great Zeus'.¹⁶ To mark his recognition is important, in that it stands in contrast to Heracles, who, as his reaction now makes explicitly clear, does *not* know whom he is facing (84–9):

θάμβησεν δ' ἄναξ
 Ἀμφιτρωνιάδας,
 εἶπέν τε· τίς ἀθανάτων
 ἢ βροτῶν τοιοῦτον ἔρνος
 θρέψεν ἐν ποίᾳ χθονί;
 τίς δ' ἔκτανεν;

And the lord, the son of Amphitryon was amazed, and said: 'What god or mortal nurtured such an offshoot, and in what land? Who killed you?'

Rather than countering Meleager's vocative 'Son of Zeus' with a vocative of his own, Heracles enquires after his interlocutor's identity: 'What god or mortal nurtured such an offshoot?' Commentators have failed to give this question its due weight. Lefkowitz does not discuss it at all, and Goldhill writes that Heracles 'wants to know the nature of Meleager's parentage and birth, not precisely who he is' without explaining why this would be so.¹⁷ Maehler, rightly, calls it a variant of the epic τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; – the standard question to ask who someone is – but does not consider the fact that the question therefore implies that Heracles, so far, has not recognized Meleager.¹⁸

When we *do* take the fact that Heracles asks for Meleager's identity

¹⁴ Cairns 2010, *ad* 78; similarly Goldhill 1983, 72 and Maehler 2004, *ad* 78.

¹⁵ Maehler 2004, *ad* 78 notes that 'In Homer εἰδώς never refers to a person as object'. But we do find οἶδα +personal object at Hom. *Od.* 6.176–7.

¹⁶ This vital point of Meleager's instant recognition of Heracles remains, even when one does not accept the construction νιν εἶ εἰδώς. Why does Meleager immediately recognize Heracles? I would suggest that it is his famous bow which gives away the hero.

¹⁷ Lefkowitz 1969; Goldhill 1983, 73.

¹⁸ Maehler 2004, *ad* 86–8. He adduces Pind. *Pyth.* 9.33–35 as parallel for a question arising out of amazement and admiration (and we may add: ignorance): there, Apollo comes across a girl wrestling with a lion (whom the narratees know to be the nymph Cyrene), and asks Chiron τίς νιν ἀνθρώπων τέκεν;

into account, we have the following situation at the opening of the myth in Bacchylides: one hero, Heracles, does not recognize his ‘opponent’ and has to ask who he is, while the other, Meleager, does. We now realize the additional relevance of the Iliadic intertext, the meeting between Glaucus and Diomedes in *Iliad* 6, to which οἴά τε φύλλ’ had directed us. There too we have one hero, Diomedes, who, challenging his opponent to fight, first asks him who he is, and then another hero, the Lycian Glaucus, who does know whom he is facing (as is clear from his opening vocative: ‘great-hearted son of Tydeus’) and explains who he is,¹⁹ which leads to the peaceful conclusion of the meeting.²⁰ Thus, the Homeric intertext does not merely provide a parallel for the outcome of the meeting between Heracles and Meleager, as Goldhill suggested,²¹ but also for the theme of (non-)recognition on the battlefield.

We may now ask ourselves *why* Bacchylides worked this theme into the opening section of his myth. My suggestion is that in so doing he foreshadows an important detail in the ensuing story of Meleager’s death. The hero’s death is precipitated by the fact that he unintentionally kills two of his own uncles on the battlefield (127–35):

‘ἔνθ’ ἐγὼ πολλοῖς σὺν ἄλλοις
 Ἴφικλον κατέκτανον
 ἐσθλὸν τ’ Ἀφάρητα, θοοὺς μάτρως· οὐ
 γὰρ καρτερόθυμος Ἄρης
 κρίνει φίλον ἐν πολέμῳ,
 τυφλὰ δ’ ἐκ χειρῶν βέλη
 ψυχαῖς ἐπι δυσμενέων
 φοιτᾷ θάνατόν τε φέρει
 τοῖσιν ἄν δαίμων θέλη.’

‘On that occasion I killed, among many others, Iphiclus and noble Aphares, swift brothers of my mother. For hard-hearted Ares does not distinguish a friend/relative in battle, but blind do the missiles go from one’s hands against the souls of one’s enemies and bring death to whoever god wants.’

19 Just like Meleager, Glaucus does not give his name but identifies himself by referring to the name of his father: cf. Hom. *Il.* 6.206 and Bacchyl. 5.97 and 101.

20 The meeting of Glaucus and Diomedes is splendidly analysed by Andersen 1978, 95–110.

21 Goldhill 1983, 72, n. 23.

Commentators are not clear on what exactly happens, and they merely state that Meleager inadvertently kills his uncles.²² There are, in principle, two possible ways of reading the incident: Meleager aimed at an enemy but hit his uncles instead,²³ or in the *mêlée* of the battle Meleager did not recognize his uncles and, taking them to be enemies, killed them – an instance of what is known in military history as ‘friendly fire’. In my view, the phrasing of the *gnômê*, with the verb κρίνειν and the epithet τυφλά for the arrows, favours the second interpretation: in the heat of the fight, with dust rising and men clinging together, it would be difficult ‘to distinguish’ friend from foe, and spears, metonymically standing for the men who throw them, are ‘blind’. Meleager killing his two uncles is a case of ‘friendly fire’: he failed to recognize them and thus accidentally killed them.

If I am right about this interpretation of lines 127–9, we can understand why Bacchylides shaped the beginning of his myth the way he did: there too we are dealing with the situation of one hero not recognizing another and aiming his bow at him. Thus, Bacchylides has turned it into an anticipatory doublet:²⁴ the climactic and fatal event of the myth, Meleager killing his two uncles because he does not recognize them (and dying himself as a consequence), is effectively prepared for by a minor and innocent rehearsal at the start, when Heracles, not recognizing Meleager, sets out to ‘kill’ him.²⁵ Bacchylides’ intertextual play with the Iliadic meeting between Glaucus and Diomedes turns out to be even more brilliant, since that scene, too, deals with the theme of (non-) recognition on the battlefield.

22 Maehler 1997, *ad* 136 writes ‘he has killed his uncles “aus Versehen”’; this becomes in the English version (2004, *ad* 136) ‘not intentionally’. He and other commentators adduce Hom. *Od.* 11.537 (ἐπίμυξ δὲ τε μαινεται Ἄρηος) and *Il.* 18.309 (ξυνὸς Ἐνούλιος, καὶ τε κτανέοντα κατέκτα), but both passages merely express the ideas that war makes many casualties and that one’s luck can always change since the man who has killed may soon be killed himself. The situation in Bacchylides 5 is different, however.

23 This is the situation we find in another description of a boar hunt, where Adrastus inadvertently kills the son of Croesus instead of a boar (*Hdt.* 1.43), and of course it occurs quite often on the Iliadic battlefield (e.g. *Il.* 4.491–2).

24 Such anticipatory doublets are a Homeric device and are found regularly in Bacchylides, e.g. *Ode* 17: Theseus in his self-introduction to Minos briefly recalls how Nereids gave his mother a golden veil at the moment of her marriage to Poseidon (37–8), an event which is replayed at 112–18, when Amphitrite gives him a purple cloak and garland.

25 I thank my audience at the University of Ca’Foscari, Venice, for their helpful comments.

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The bloody dust of the nether gods: Sophocles, *Antigone* 599–603¹

DOUGLAS CAIRNS

I

νῦν γὰρ ἐσχάτας ὑπὲρ
ρίζας ἐτέτατο φάος ἐν Οἰδίπου δόμοις· 600
κατ' αὖ νιν φοινία
θεῶν τῶν νερτέρων ἀμᾶ κόνις,
λόγου τ' ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς.²

Though current editions of the plays of Sophocles (Dawe's Teubner, Lloyd-Jones's and Wilson's OCT, and Lloyd-Jones's Loeb) all print the emendation κοπίς for MSS' κόνις in *Antigone* 602,³ there can be little doubt that κόνις is what Sophocles wrote.⁴ Emendation is supported mainly by unease regarding the mixed metaphor that (on most interpretations) results if κόνις is read;⁵ but the metaphor remains mixed in many interpretations of the emended text too; and in any case it is by no means clear that mixed metaphor should be grounds for emendation, especially in this most Aeschylean of Sophoclean odes.⁶ The inadequacy of the alternative, κοπίς, is widely noted: whether as 'scimitar' or as 'chopper' the word seems inappropriate in register for *this* context; and why the nether gods should wield such a weapon in this case has not been satisfactorily explained.⁷

1 It is a pleasure to offer this small token of esteem for Øivind Andersen, a fine scholar and a gracious interlocutor. For help in its preparation I am indebted to Patrick Finglass, Alessandro Iannucci, and Andrea Rodighiero.

2 See below, *ad fin.*, for translation.

3 Among recent commentators on the play, Müller 1967, 143, and Brown 1987, 173 defend κοπίς, while Kamerbeek 1978, 120, Griffith 1999, 226, and Susanetti 2012, 276 argue for κόνις. The conjecture is normally attributed to the ecclesiastical historian John Jortin, but Professor Finglass advises me that it was first proposed by Reiske (1747, 727–8). It seems to have been independently suggested also by Askew, *apud* Heath 1762, 119.

4 See recently e.g. Ferrari 2010, 52–8 (in detail) and Gagné 2013, 367–8 (briefly).

5 The point is made with greatest vehemence by Platt 1910, 249–50. Jebb was similarly convinced in his 1st ed. (1888, 601–02), but more hesitant in the 2nd (1890, 114–15 and in the Appendix, 253–4); cf. Brown 1987, 173. Lloyd-Jones 1957, 17 is right to recognize that the objection is not decisive. In favour of the mixed metaphor, see esp. Tyrrell 1888, 139; also Campbell 1879, 508–09 on 603; Booth 1959.

6 See Tyrrell 1888, 139; Easterling 1978, 146.

7 See Tyrrell 1888, 139; the force of his argument against κοπίς is granted, at least partially, by Jebb 1890, 115, though he is able to show that the term is not alien to tragic diction (*ibid.* 253–4; cf. Platt 1910, 250; Lloyd-Jones 1957, 18; Long 1974, 213 n. 2). See also Easterling 1978, 146–7; Griffith 1999, 226 on 601–03 (though he retains reservations about κόνις).

Though Jebb thought that the prominence of ‘dust’ in the preceding scenes of the play might explain a copyist’s slip, κόνις for κοπίς, in 602,⁸ others have recognized that the term is in fact emblematic of Antigone’s action in burying her brother’s body.⁹ Someone, according to the Guard in the first episode, has sprinkled the body with ‘thirsty dust’ (τὸν νεκρὸν τις ἀρτίως | θάψας βέβηκε κἀπὶ χρωτὶ διψίαν | κόνιν παλύνας, 245–7); the corpse was thus covered in a light coating of dust, as if someone had attempted to avoid pollution (λεπτὴ δ’ ἄγος φεύγοντος ὡς ἐπῆν κόνις, 256). This is the dust that the Guard and his fellows swept off, as he tells us in his second report, 409–10, exposing the rotting corpse (μυδῶν, 410),¹⁰ only for Antigone to repeat her previous action by once more covering the body with ‘thirsty dust’ (καὶ χερσὶν εὐθὺς διψίαν φέρει κόνιν, 429). The corpse is thus bloodied and rotting, and the dust is dry and absorbent; well might it be described as φοινία in 602. And as dust is an agent in 602, so it is ‘thirsty’, i.e. quasi-personified, in 246 and 429.

In the Guard’s second narrative, moreover, Antigone’s return to the corpse is facilitated by a dust-storm, an οὐράνιον ἄγος (418) or θεία νόσος (421) that fills the air, so that, even though the sun is high in the sky, the Guards cannot see (415–21).¹¹ When it clears, Antigone is seen (καὶ τοῦδ’ ἀπαλλαγέντος ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ, | ἢ παῖς ὁρᾶται, 422–3); she sees the body denuded of dust (426), curses those who uncovered it (427–8),¹² and immediately restores its covering of thirsty dust. As a result, she is captured and sentenced to death. The interplay of light and darkness in this scene prefigures the imagery of the second stasimon, in which Antigone’s act of sprinkling the bloody dust is said to extinguish the light of hope in the House of Oedipus.¹³

The Chorus-leader suspected that the first burial might be divinely inspired (278–9). The second burial is facilitated by a sudden, uncanny, and perhaps god-sent storm (421). The sprinkling of dust is a ritual act to ward off ἄγος (ἀφαγιστεύσας ἂ χρῆ, 247; ἄγος φεύγοντος ὡς, 256). The Guard’s second narrative, in which the dust-storm facilitates Antigone’s renewal of the corpse’s coating of dust, forms the immediate prelude to Antigone’s defiance of Creon (441ff.). In the second line of her first continuous speech in defence

8 Jebb 1890, 115.

9 See Booth 1959, 77; Easterling 1978, 148; Gagné 2013, 368; cf. Hermann 1825, 63 (quoting Triclinius; see Dindorf 1852, 316.24–6). For what follows in section I of this paper, cf. Ferrari 2010, 56–7.

10 Cf. Tiresias at 1022.

11 On the association of the god-sent dust storm and Antigone’s sprinkling of dust on the corpse, cf. Linforth 1961, 212–13.

12 A decisive objection against those, from Adams 1931 *via* McCall 1972 to Honig 2013, who maintain that Antigone did not perform the first burial.

13 Booth 1959, 76 is right to emphasize that the essential contrast in 599–602 is between ‘light’ (and the upper world), the subject of the first sentence, and ‘dust’ (of the nether gods), that of the second. This contrast is destroyed if we read κοπίς.

of her act she invokes ἡ ξύνοικος τῶν κάτω θεῶν Δίκη (451; cf. her references to Hades and the gods below at 519, 521, 542). Her act is one of dusting the blood-stained corpse of her ὄμαιμος (512–13), one that brings about her death, a further stage in the terrible history of her family, whose immediately previous stage is the mutual bloodshed of her brothers, including the one who wanted to taste the blood of his compatriots and kin (120–2, 201–02). She performs this act out of devotion to the nether gods (and in full acceptance that it means her death, 460–4, 497–9, 546–7, 555, 559–60). This will – as far as the Chorus know, since Creon has declared his intention also to put Ismene, her ξύναιμος (488), to death (488–90, 580–1) – put an end to the House of Oedipus. Whatever they think of her deed, moreover, the Chorus did not, in the second episode, approve of the defiance that sealed her fate: for them, it reveals the savage character that she has inherited from her father (471–2). According to Creon (562) she has been ἄνους from birth. No one who has succeeded in remaining sentient during the performance of the play so far could fail to understand the Chorus’ statement that the burial of the body (‘the bloody dust of the nether gods’), together with Antigone’s defiant words, indicative of the delusion and derangement that have beset a family so afflicted by inter- and intragenerational strife (λόγου τ’ ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινός), spells the end of the House of Oedipus.¹⁴

II

It is thus clear that κόνις is the correct reading. But if doubt remains, it may be dispelled by external evidence, for the contribution of intertextuality to the resolution of this issue is substantial, and it has been almost entirely ignored.

First, there is the evidence of Aeschylus’ *Septem*. This is a major intertext for the play in general and for the second stasimon in particular.¹⁵ Significantly, the latter’s echoes of the choral ode at *Septem* 720–91, though spread throughout the stasimon, exhibit a marked clustering at lines 599–603.¹⁶ In that passage of *Septem*, Aeschylus’ Chorus, like Sophocles’ in the *Antigone*’s second stasimon, place the family’s current woes in the context of its history.

14 Regardless, for the moment, of the difficulty over the precise sense of καρ’ ... ἄμα. See Section III below.

15 See (on the parodos) Else 1976, 35–40; Davidson 1983, 41, 43–8; Dunn 2012, 268–70; Rodighiero 2012, 108. On the specific debt of the second stasimon to *Septem* 653ff., 720–91, and 875–1004, see Else 1976, 16–24 (esp. 16–18), 28; cf. Bowra 1944, 87; Ditmars 1992, 77–9; Cairns 2014, 17–19. Gagné’s scepticism on the latter point (2013, 373) is misplaced; one does not have to go all the way with Else’s interpretation (which is in some particulars dubious) to see that the second stasimon’s relation to *Septem* is an intimate one.

16 As shown by the table in Cairns 2014, 18.

Most striking for our purposes are the terms in which the Chorus foresee the mutual fratricide at 734–7:

ἐπει δ' ἂν αὐτοκτόνως
αὐτοδάκτοι θάνωσι καὶ γαῖα κόνις
πή μελαμπαγὲς αἷμα φοίνιον,
τίς ἂν καθαροὺς πόροι;

When they die, slain at each other's hands, and the earth's dust drinks the black and gory stream of their blood, who could provide purification?

Here is the link between the 'thirsty dust' of *Ant.* 246–7 and 429 and the 'bloody dust' of 601–02. The collocation of κόνις and φοίνιον in particular argues for φοινία ... κόνις in the latter place. Throughout the song in *Septem*, moreover, the mutual fratricide is traced to the twin causes of mental impairment and the Erinys that recur in our *Antigone* passage. These are its opening words (*Septem* 720–6):

πέφρικα τὰν ὀλεσίοικον
θεὸν οὐ θεοῖς ὁμοίαν,
παναληθῆ κακόμαντιν
πατρὸς εὐκταίαν Ἐρινὺν
τελέσαι τὰς περιθύμους
κατάρας Οἰδιπόδα βλαψίφρονος.¹⁷
παιδολέτωρ δ' ἔρις ἄδ' ὀτρύνει.

I shudder that the un-godlike goddess, destroyer of houses, the all-true prophet of evil, the Erinys invoked by the father, has brought to pass the angry curses of deranged Oedipus.

The notions of Oedipus' derangement, his curse, and the Erinys recur in ring-composition at the end of the ode (778–91), but a further reference to mental impairment at 753–7 is of particular relevance for our purposes. Here, it is παράνοια ... φρενώλης that leads Oedipus to couple with his mother (756–7); and the children that result from his 'sowing the sacred field of his mother, the place where he had been reared' (753–4) are a 'bloody root-stock' (ρίζαν αἱματόεσσαν, 755).¹⁸ Though the second stasimon's debt to *Septem* 720–91 has been much noted, it does not seem to have been remarked that the language of *Ant.* 599–603 in particular forms such a dense cluster of allusions

17 The term βλαψίφρων is a frequent gloss for ἀεσίφρων, cognate with ἄτη, the key concept in the Chorus's song at *Ant.* 583–625. See Apoll. Soph. *Lex. Hom.* 2.7 Bekker; Hsch. *a* 28; *Etym. Magn.* 20.49–50; Schol. bT on *Il.* 23.603; βλαψίφρων also qualifies ἄτη at Triphiod. 411. On βλάβη-words as glosses for ἄτη, see Dawe 1968, 101, 105; Stallmach 1968, 44; Cairns 2012, 42 n. 100.

18 'ρίζα of a family is a common poetic metaphor', Finglass 2011, 468 on *Aj.* 1178 (with refs).

to the central concepts of that ode. The occurrence of *ρίζα*, *κόνις*, and *φοίνις* in both places, given the similarity of their reference, the proliferation of other points of contact, and the thematic similarity between Aeschylus' ode and Sophocles', in itself strongly suggests that *φοινία ... κόνις* is genuine in *Ant.* 601–02.

Dust's thirst for blood (*Septem* 735–6) is also found in two passages of the *Eumenides*. At 647–8, Apollo reminds the Erinyes that

ἀνδρὸς δ' ἐπειδὴν αἷμ' ἀνασπάσῃ κόνις
ἅπαξ θανόντος, οὔτις ἔστ' ἀνάστασις.¹⁹

When once the dust has sucked up the blood of a man that died, there is no resurrection.

Later in the play, the Erinyes, now reconciled, pray that the dust should not, in pursuit of revenge killing, and to the ruin of the city, drink the citizens' blood (980–3):

μηδὲ πιῶσα κόνις μέλαν αἷμα πολιτῶν
δι' ὄργαν ποινᾶς
ἀντιφόνους, ἄτας
ἄρπαλίσει πόλεως.

And may the dust not drink the black blood of the citizens, angrily pursuing vengeance in retaliatory killing, the city's ruin.

Again, *κόνις* is personified, and the thematic similarity between these passages and the contexts of *Septem* 735–6 and *Ant.* 599–603 helps corroborate the conclusions that we have drawn from the relation between *Antigone* and the *Septem*.

But the association between blood and dust goes back further, all the way to Homer. Already in 1959 Booth cited 'the Homeric stock phrase αἷματι καὶ κονίησι πεφυρμένος' in support of *κόνις* at *Ant.* 602.²⁰ That phrase does not in fact occur,²¹ but the words αἷματι καὶ κονίησι are regularly associated with death in battle,²² and blood and dust also co-occur in other locutions.²³ One

19 For the thought, cf. *Ag.* 1019–21; slightly more remotely *Cho.* 66–7; other passages in the *Oresteia* and beyond in Fraenkel 1950, ii. 459.

20 Booth 1959, 77.

21 The nearest thing is *πεφυρμένον αἷματι πολλῶν* at *Od.* 9.397 (echoed in *Eur. Alc.* 496 and *Bacch.* 742; *Hdt.* 3.157.1; *Xen. Ages.* 2.14; *Theoc. Id.* 26.25).

22 *Il.* 15.118, 16.639–40, 795–6, *Od.* 22.383–4 (*αἷματι καὶ κονίησι*).

23 See *Il.* 11.163–4, 13.617. The motif of the earth soaked with blood is, of course, more common, as are locutions which have warriors falling or lying (etc.) in dust; I restrict myself here to phrases that combine *κόνις* or *κονίη* with some term for blood.

of these is perhaps worth quoting as a possible inspiration, even if only as a verbal echo, for *Ant.* 601–02. This is *Od.* 18.97–8:

αὐτίκα δ' ἦλθεν ἀνὰ στόμα φοίνιον αἶμα,
καὶ δ' ἔπεσ' ἐν κονίησι μακῶν.

Immediately the red blood filled his [Irus'] mouth, and he fell bleating in the dust.

For the expression 'bloody dust', however, the nearest Homeric parallel comes in two Iliadic passages in which the fall of a warrior (first Asius, then Sarpedon) is compared to the felling of a tree (*Il.* 13.389–93 = 16.482–6):

ἦριπε δ' ὡς ὅτε τις δρῦς ἦριπεν ἢ ἀχερωῖς,
ἢ ἐ πίτυς βλωθρή, τὴν τ' οὔρεσι τέκτονες ἄνδρες
ἐξέταμον πελέκεσσι νεήκεσι νήϊον εἶναι·
ὡς ὁ πρόσθ' ἵππων καὶ δίφρου κείτο τανυσθεὶς,
βεβρυχῶς, κόνιος δεδραγμένος αἱματοέσσης.

He fell, as when an oak or a white poplar falls, or a tall pine, that in the mountains carpenters have cut down with newly sharpened axes, to provide timber for a ship. So he lay stretched out in front of his horses and chariot, roaring, grasping the bloody dust.

These are important lines. The simile and death description are not only memorable in themselves; their repetition in the context of two significant deaths – especially the second, which marks the completion of a stage in the great sequence of conflicts that culminates in the deaths of Patroclus and Hector and looks beyond the poem to the death of Achilles – reinforces their memorability.²⁴ Now, κόνις αἱματοέσση is not φοινία κόνις. But still I think we can prove that these passages were, at some level, in Sophocles' mind when he wrote *Ant.* 601–02.

The perfect participle, δεδραγμένος, is rare. It is the only part of the verb δράσσομαι ('grasp') to occur in Homer, and it occurs only in these two passages.²⁵ Its first extant occurrence in post-Homeric literature is in the *Antigone*. It occurs once more in Attic verse in line 1413 of Euripides' *Orestes*, and not thereafter until Dionysius of Halicarnassus cites Homer's verses four centuries later (*Comp.* 4.27, 4.29). The word's occurrence in *Antigone* comes in the Guard's speech at 235, where he describes himself as 'clinging to the hope' that he cannot suffer what he is not fated to suffer (τῆς ἐλπίδος γὰρ ἔρχομαι δεδραγμένος, | τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ἂν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ μόρσιμον). Ten lines

²⁴ See Janko 1992, 97 on 389–93.

²⁵ Janko 1992, 97 observes that 'falling in the dust and grasping it in handfuls' is relatively common, but this is the formula ὁ δ' ἐν κονίησι πεσὼν ἔλε γαῖαν ἀγοστέῳ (*Il.* 13.508, 13.520, 14.452, 17.315).

later he breaks the news that someone has sprinkled ‘thirsty dust’ on the corpse of Polynices (245–7). The Guard describes himself as clinging to hope in a phrase whose only Homeric precedent involves the grasping of bloody dust; the Chorus in the second stasimon attribute the annihilation of hope for the House of Oedipus to the bloody dust of the nether gods. The Homeric phrase κόνιος δεδραγμένος αίματοέσσης has combined with the more obvious debt to key passages of the *Septem* to produce Sophocles’ φοινία κόνις.²⁶

That sources for Sophocles’ phrase should be found in Aeschylus’ *Septem* and in the *Iliad* does not merely support the reading κόνις at *Ant.* 602. The links to *Septem* (where ρίζα at 755 represents the family line that now ends with the deaths of Eteocles and Polynices, and where, at 735–6, the γαῖα κόνις drinks their αἶμα φοίνιον) and Homer (where the dust is regularly bloodied by the dying warrior) indicate that the resonances of the *Antigone* passage include not only Antigone’s act of sprinkling dust on the corpse but also the death of Polynices and his brother in fratricidal combat. The associations of φοινία κόνις belong with the passage’s other affinities with *Septem* in reinforcing the ode’s central perspective, that Antigone’s act and its consequences replicate a pattern of disaster and derangement that has beset more than one generation of the Labdacids.

III

To conclude, I need to say a little more about how we are to understand φοινία κόνις in its immediate context. First, its relation to λόγου τ’ ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινός in 603. It is debated whether this phrase should be regarded as in apposition to κόνις in 602 or as giving two further items in a list that begins with κόνις in 602.²⁷ If, as I argue, φοινία κόνις refers primarily to Antigone’s act of burial (though with resonance also of her brothers’ mutual slaughter as portrayed in *Septem*), then λόγου ἄνοια might be regarded as a further cause of the family’s extinction, namely Antigone’s defiant speech in defence of that act in the second of these episodes. Antigone herself expects that her defiance will be regarded as μωρία (469–70), the Chorus-leader comments on the temperament that she has inherited from her father (471–2), and Creon sees

26 The participle βεβρυχός also appears in Homer only in these two similes, though the finite verb βέβρυχεν occurs at *Il.* 17.264 and *Od.* 5.411–12 (both of the roar of the sea); cf. cognates at *Od.* 5.319, 12.241–2. The association with the sea in these passages is a more obvious inspiration for the description of man ‘passing through the roaring swell’ (περιβρυχίουσιν | περὸν ὑπ’ οἴδμασιν) at *Soph. Ant.* 336; but if *Hom. Il.* 13.389–93 and 16.482–6 were in Sophocles’ mind, then the influence of βεβρυχός in these passages might just be felt here too.

27 See esp. Lloyd-Jones 1957, 18–19; Long 1974; Easterling 1978, 148; Kamerbeek 1978, 120; Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 1990, 129; Ferrari 2010, 54; Gagné 2013, 368.

her words as ὕβρις that compounds the ὕβρις of the original offence (480–3; cf. his reference to her ἄνοια at 562). This, I think, must be the proximate reference of the phrase, and so λόγου τ' ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς are the second and third causes of the extinction of hope for the House of Oedipus.²⁸ Yet λόγος is not merely speech, but also reason, and if we take the phrase in that sense, then λόγου τ' ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς can explain, in apposition, the twin causes of Antigone's action in burying her brother – her own lack of reason and the influence of an Erinys on her mind. Though the former explanation is the more immediately relevant, the latter is also possible; both connotations may be present, and we need not be forced to choose between them.

But what precisely is it that the personified κόνις does? The real problem with the passage is not with κόνις, but with κατ' ... ἀμά. Most scholars translate the verb as 'harvest' or 'cut down'. Recently, however, both Ferrari and Gagné have revived the argument that in this case the verb has the sense 'scrape up, heap up, heap upon', (*LSJ s.v.*) attested for καταμάομαι at *Il.* 24.165 in the context of Priam's mourning for Hector (24.163–5):²⁹

ἀμφὶ δὲ πολλή
κόπρος ἔην κεφαλῇ τε καὶ αὐχένι τοῖο γέροντος,
τὴν ῥα κυλινδόμενος καταμήσατο χερσὶν ἐῆσι.

Much dung lay on the head and neck of that old man, which he had heaped up on himself with his hands as he rolled in it.

Many have insisted that ἀμάω, 'harvest', and ἀμάομαι, 'gather' (normally in the middle voice) are different verbs.³⁰ The clearest indications that this might be the case are to be found in passages such as *Od.* 9.247, where the object of ἀμησάμενος is the milk of Polyphemus' herds; but where the object of ἀμάομαι (or a compound) is also something (such as a crop) that can be harvested or reaped the two senses are easily assimilated.³¹ Among the compounds of

²⁸ So, most neatly, Gagné 2013, 368.

²⁹ Ferrari 2010, 54–5; Gagné 2013, 367; cf. Campbell 1879, 508 on 602–03, followed by Kamerbeek 1978, 120. The debate is an ancient one, since the two senses of ἀμάω/ἀμάομαι clearly lie behind the scholiast's suggestions θερίζει καὶ ἐκκόπτει· ἢ καλύπτει (*Schol.* on 602; cf. on 599: νῦν γάρ, φησὶν, ὅπερ ἦν λείψανον γενεᾶς τοῦτο μέλλει καλύπτειν ἢ κόνις).

³⁰ See (with varying degrees of confidence) Bechtel 1911, 36–7; Chantraine 1968–80, 72; Irigoien in *LfgreE* i. 606–07, 613–14; Frisk 1960, 88–9; Beekes 2010, 82, 84; cf. West 1966, 332 on Hes. *Theog.* 599.

³¹ So Jebb 1890, 253; West 1978, 354 on Hes. *Op.* 775. Cf. e.g. Hdt. 3.98.4, 4.199.1; Ar. *Thesm.* 494; Eur. fr. 419.4 Kannicht (*Ino*); Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 1.688, 3.858–9 (comparing Soph. fr. 534 Radt, with Hunter 1989, 90 *ad loc.*); cf. the proverb ἄλλοι μὲν σπειροῦσι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἀμῆσονται, Diogenianus 2.62, Leutsch-Schneidewin i. 205.

these verbs, ἐπαμάομαι is regularly used of heaping up earth and is found several times (in later authors) with κόνις.³² In a few cases, the active voice has the same sense, as, for example, when Diogenes Laertius 6.79 reports the final request of his namesake, the Cynic philosopher, that after his death those who survive him should simply throw his corpse into a ditch and sprinkle a little dust over it (εἷς γε βόθρον συνῶσαι καὶ ὀλίγην κόνιν ἐπαμῆσαι).³³ In the case of καταμάω, the compound used in *Ant.* 602, the sense ‘gather, heap up’ is found only with the middle voice.³⁴ In two such cases, both in Josephus, the substance in question is κόνις. At 2.322 the high priests, in a gesture of supplication, appear before the people of Jerusalem ‘their heads sprinkled with dust’. The manuscripts are divided between καταμωμένους μὲν τῆς κεφαλῆς κόνιν and καταμωμένους μὲν τὴν κεφαλὴν κόνει, but the former is the better attested construction, one that is in fact found as a variant in section 601 of the same book.³⁵ The simple verb ἀμάω, on the other hand, does occur in the active voice, and in the same sense, in an epigram of the Late Hellenistic poet, Antipater of Sidon, *AP* 7.241.3–4, where the grieving tutor of a deceased Ptolemy ‘gathers dark dust in his warlike hands and pours it over his head’ (χερσὶν ἀμήσας | ἀνδρομάχοις δνοφερὰν κρατὸς ὑπερθε κόνιν). Though none of the relevant occurrences of the active verbs, ἀμάω or ἐπαμάω, with the middle sense (‘gather’, ‘heap up’, ‘pour’) is as early as Sophocles, there is perhaps enough here to suggest that, had he wanted to use κατ’... ἀμᾶ to refer to the gathering and pouring of dust, he could have.

But did he? In none of the other locutions in which (ἐπ)αμάω, ἐπαμάομαι, or καταμάομαι refer to the heaping up or pouring of dust (*vel sim.*) is the dust (*vel sim.*) the subject of the verb. We can envisage ἀμᾶ standing for ἀμᾶται with κόνιν as object, but can we construe κατ’ αὐτὸν ... ἀμᾶ κόνις in a way that makes the verb passive (‘dust is gathered over it’) or intransitive (‘dust gathers over it’)? There is no parallel for a move as bold as this.³⁶ With either of these senses, moreover, one might expect a genitive after κατά rather than

32 Earth: Thgn. 428; Hdt. 8.24.1; Xen. *Oec.* 19.11 (etc.); κόνις: Philo, *De Josepho* 25, *De vit. Mos.* 1.29; Lucian, *Anach.* 2; Origen, *C. Cels.* 6.15; Julianus Arianus, *Comm. Job* 34.7. Cf. Odysseus’ piling up leaves to make a bed at *Od.* 5.482. ἐπαμάω is the compound that is found most frequently in the sense ‘gather’, ‘heap up’; ἀπαμάω and ἐξαμάω, by contrast, both active and middle, are found almost exclusively in the sense ‘cut’, ‘reap’, ‘harvest’.

33 Cf. Epiph. *Panarion* 1.343.27 (contrast the use of the middle at 2.514.20). Cf. also the use of the active with earth as object at Iambl. *VP* 31.192 and of a covering of leaves at Heliod. *Aeth.* 2.20.3.

34 Pace Ferrari 2010, 55, who finds the active verb in this sense at Posidippus 19.13–14 Austin-Bastianini, where Poseidon is said to be capable of sinking an entire island in the sea (βεῖα καταμήσεις εἰν ἀλί νήσον ὄλην). But this is much more likely to be καταμάω, ‘mow down’ (so Austin and Bastianini 2002, 41).

35 καταμησάμενος τῆς κεφαλῆς κόνιν in MS L and in the quotation, *Suda* κ 651 s.v. καταμησάμενος. The other MSS read καταπασάμενος. Cf. n. 36 below.

36 See Jebb 1890, 253, against Campbell 1879, 508.

an accusative.³⁷ And, for what it is worth, of the five other instances of ἀμάω or its compounds attested for Sophocles, none involves the sense ‘gather’ or ‘heap up’.³⁸ The use of the passive at *Aj.* 1178 is particularly suggestive: here, as he positions Eurysaces at Ajax’s corpse in supplication, Teucer prays that anyone who might attempt to drag the child away should be ‘cast unburied from the land, the root of his whole family extirpated’ (ἄθραπτος ἐκπέσοι χθονός, | γένους ἄπαντος ρίζαν ἐξημημένος).

All these considerations suggest that the primary sense of κατ’... ἀμῶ in *Ant.* 602 is ‘cuts down’. Its subject, κόνις, is, as we have noted, a metonymy for Antigone’s action in sprinkling dust on the bloody and defiled corpse of her brother. Since that is the case, however, the association (from Homer onwards) of both καταμάομαι and κόνις with death and mourning probably permits us to assume that the sense ‘heap up (over)’, though not part of the verb’s denotation in this context, is nonetheless felt as an active connotation. The verbs (κατ)αμάω/(κατ)αμάομαι occur in prose as well as in poetry; they are not especially rare; and as their denotations, ‘reap’ and ‘gather’, are both common and relatively stable, the verbs cannot quite be seen as what Michael Silk has called ‘iconyms’.³⁹ But since there is a degree of overlap and assimilation between these senses, it seems possible that a given instance may well have the denotation of one and a connotation of the other – especially in a context in which the influence of Aeschylus is so clear and so strong and Sophocles’ language is at its most dense and suggestive.

Let us assume, then, that κατ’... ἀμῶ in *Ant.* 602 means ‘cuts down’ (appropriate to ρίζας in the previous sentence), but with overtones of ‘covers’, ‘conceals’ (appropriate to φάος). The reference of νῦν in 601 is not certain, but since φάος is the subject of the previous sentence, it is more likely to be

37 As in the Josephus passages above, if we read καταμωμένους/καταμησάμενος τῆς κεφαλῆς κόνιν (cf. n. 34 and text *ad loc.*). Cf. Pherecr. 126.2–3 Kassel-Austin; also the epigram of Antipater quoted above (where κρατὸς ὑπερθε expresses the same idea). As the examples quoted above have shown, moreover, it is the substance that is gathered or poured, not the object onto which it is poured, that is the object of ἀμάομαι, ἐπαμάομαι, καταμάομαι, etc.

38 See *Trach.* 33 (ἐξαμῶν, ‘reaping’), *Phil.* 749 (ἀπάμησον, ‘cut off’), fr. 534.7 Radt (ἦμα, ‘harvested’); even the bare citation ἀμάσεται (fr. 625) is glossed by Hesychius (who quotes it from Sophocles’ *Troelus*) in the sense ‘harvest, i.e. kill’. For *Aj.* 1178 see text above.

39 An iconym is ‘an archaic and poetic word which has lost its denotation, and thus is used with various connotations in a range of applications which defy classification as discrete but related senses of the same word’. This is my paraphrase (Cairns 1998, 62) of Silk’s own, lengthier definition at 1983, 311–12. See esp. his page 311: ‘An iconym is a word which has lost its denotations. Its usage is unpredictable and unstable. It has certain properties which ordinary words do not have, but it has less meaning than any ordinary word has.’

‘light’ than ‘root’.⁴⁰ Lines 599–600 offer two metaphorical notions: the root that is the Labdacid line and the light (of hope) represented by Antigone (and Ismene). The expectation that the dust cast by Antigone on the corpse should extinguish the light is not entirely disappointed – it is there in the secondary connotation of *κατ’... ἀμῶ* that we identified above. But rather than meet that expectation in full, Sophocles has done something more interesting: the light is not extinguished in a layer of dust, but cut down, as if the light spread over the root were the root itself and the dust that extinguishes it a knife.⁴¹ Antigone is the main referent of the *φῶς* that represents the hope of the continuation of the line through the offspring she might have had; but she also belongs to the *ρίζα qua* family line, and it is her act in sprinkling the bloody dust that extinguishes the light and extirpates the root. The lines constitute a particularly dense and rich example of the well-attested phenomenon of interaction in Greek poetic imagery;⁴² it would be a great pity to lose that through emendation.

The remaining puzzles that are sometimes raised in connection with this passage are more easily solved. The presence of *viv* in 601 confirms the asyndeton between 599–600 and 601–03 and rules out the attempt to introduce a relative pronoun (whether by reading *ὄπερ* for *ὕπερ* with Laurentianus 31.10 *supra lineam* and Hermann in 599 (cf. Schol. *ad loc.*) or by restoring *ὃ* before MSS’ *τέτατο* in 600, with Hermann).⁴³ Ferrari believes that *τέτατο* in 600 can stand, giving - - ~ ~ ~ | ~ ~ ~ - | ~ - ~ - (a cretic instead of an iamb in the second metron) in responsion with - - ~ ~ ~ | ~ ~ ~ ~ - | ~ - ~ - (a regular trimeter) in 588.⁴⁴ But whether we restore responsion with *ἐτέτατο* (Brunck) or keep *τέτατο* makes no difference to my argument here. And so we can translate (rendering *κατ’... ἀμῶ* by the passive in English for the sake of word order):

For, as it was, a light had been extended over the last root in the house of Oedipus; it in its turn is cut down by the bloody dust of the nether gods, folly of speech, and a Fury of the mind.

40 So Kamerbeek 1978, 120 on 599–603; Tyrrell and Bennett 1998, 82–3; that the reference is to *ρίζας* is stated already in Schol. *Ant.* 601; cf. Platt 1910, 250; Easterling 1978, 147; Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 1990, 129; Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 1997, 74.

41 Cf. Tyrrell 1888, 139; Booth 1959.

42 See Silk 1974.

43 In defence of the asyndeton, see Lloyd-Jones 1957, 17, with parallels; cf. Kamerbeek 1978, 120 on 599–603; Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 1990, 129; Ferrari 2010, 53. As Lloyd-Jones and Wilson observe, with a relative clause in 599–600, we should expect a demonstrative pronoun rather than *viv* in 601.

44 Ferrari 2010, 53, citing other Sophoclean cases (*Aj.* 369/384, *OT* 867/877, *OC* 1454/1469) in which such alleged freedom of responsion in lyric iambs is similarly removed by emendation.

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Translating a *paradeigma* in Sophocles: *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1193

OLIVER TAPLIN

I am at present preparing a translation of the tragedies of Sophocles for publication in the Oxford World's Classics series – thanks to the time liberated by reaching retirement! In attempting the lyric passages I have tried to follow the sentiment of Joseph Brodsky, who, reviewing versions of Mandelstam, wrote in the *New York Review of Books* for 7 Feb, 1974: 'Translation is a search for an equivalent, not for a substitute ... A translator should begin his work with a search for at least a metrical equivalent of the original form.' The verse-forms that I have used, even employing rhyme, are (of course) specific to English, and might well not be at all suitable for other languages. I hope that, nonetheless, they may be of some interest.

The word *paradeigma* is used of Oedipus by the chorus in *Oedipus the King*, at line 1193. So a draft of the choral ode, lines 1186–1223, which is surely one of the greatest in Sophocles, seems an appropriate offering for Øivind Andersen. Here it is, with no further prevarication:

Human generations,
in my calculations
your whole life-sum, worked out,
comes to nothing, naught.
Who can add up, after all,
happiness in total
reaching more than seeming,
and decline from seeming?
With your fate before me,
paradigm before me,
yours, Oedipus, I boast
nothing human blest.

Your arrow-shot, so certain,
won you happy fortune;
you brought down the maiden
of the clutching talon;
stopped her riddling power,
shielding as a tower
death-blows from my country.
So we called you mighty
king, and heaped upon you
all the highest honours,

and you ruled as lord
of this great Theban land.

Now, though, what a different story!
Who is housed with wilder grief,
who sunk in deeper misery,
with this changing of your life?
All-too-famous Oedipus,
you have made the voyage twice
into one engrossing harbour:
as a child you grew there,
then you plunged in as a husband,
coming back as groom there.
How could they, your father's furrows,
mauled in marriage by your plough,
how endure so long in sorrow,
never crying out aloud?

Time all-seeing has uncovered,
and, despite you, lit on you,
showing that the selfsame mother
bore you and your children too,
wretched son of Laios.
Oedipus incestuous;
judged your union no union.
How I wish I'd never met you –
never set my eyes upon
you, as I now lament you,
from my mouth keen sorrow pouring.
I tell you the bitter truth:
you gave back my breath, restoring,
and you've closed my eyes in death.

Ist bei Euripides Medea als heroisch-männliche Persönlichkeit geschildert?

WOLFGANG KULLMANN

In der Beurteilung der euripideischen *Medea* hat sich in der Forschung eine Auffassung weitgehend durchgesetzt. Diese besagt, daß die Figur der Medea wie ein männlichen Held, etwa der *Ilias*, als eine heroische Persönlichkeit geschildert werde, die weitgehend durch ihre Sorge um ihre Ehre bestimmt werde, was sich in der Ermordung ihrer Kinder zeige, und im Widerspruch zu ihren mütterlichen Gefühlen stehe.¹ Diese Auffassung soll kritisch hinterfragt werden.

Hierbei ist zu berücksichtigen, daß ein griechischer Dichter der klassischen Zeit bis zu einem gewissen Grade vom Mythos bestimmt wird und diesen zu seinem Thema in Bezug setzen muß. Das Thema ist offensichtlich das Schicksal einer Frau, die von ihrem Mann wegen einer neuen Beziehung verlassen wird. Euripides hat sich offensichtlich durch die Argonautensage dazu anregen lassen, die Medea als eine Frau kennt, die durch ihre Zauberkünste aus Liebe zu Jason diesem bedingungslos zum erfolgreichen Bestehen vieler Aufgaben, vor die er gestellt wird, verhilft. Nach der Sage flieht sie mit ihm aus Kolchis bis zur Rückkehr Jasons in das thessalische Iolkos. Dieser Erzählstrang führt bis zur Ermordung des Pelias, der Jason zu seiner wenig hoffnungsvollen Fahrt zur Rückholung des Goldenen Vlieses veranlaßt hatte. Nach Euripides muß das Paar von dort fliehen und läßt sich in Korinth nieder. Diese Stadt gehört zu einem anderen Sagenstrang, mit dem Medea auch verbunden ist:

Wie durch den korinthischen Dichter Eumelos in seinen *Korinthiaka* [fr. 3 Bernabé, PEG] überliefert ist, stammt Medeas Vater Aietes aus einer Verbindung des Gottes Helios mit Antiope und erbt Korinth. Die Erbschaft ging auf Medea über, und durch sie wurde Jason König von Korinth. Sie versteckte ihre Kinder im Heratempel und hoffte, sie durch irgendeine zauberhafte Behandlung unsterblich zu machen, was mißlang. Jason stellte sie zur Rede und verzieh ihr nicht, sondern trennte sich von ihr und reiste nach Iolkos [Eumelos fr.5 Bernabé, PEG aus Pausanias]. Man kann mit gutem Grund vermuten, daß Euripides durch diese Erzählung angeregt wurde. Die Motive „Tötung der eigenen Kinder“ und „Scheitern der Ehe“ kehren in anderem Zusammenhang und anderer Deutung wieder. Nach einer anderen Erzählung jagen die Korinther die Medea fort. Sie läßt die Kinder in Korinth zurück. Die Korinther töten sie; es wird aber das Gerücht verbreitet, Medea hätte sie selbst getötet [Kreophylos fr. dub. 9 Bernabé, PEG]. Die Motive „Weggang Medeas von Korinth“ und „Tötung der eigenen Kinder“ tauchen also ebenfalls in anderem Zusammenhang auf.²

1 Knox 1977; Bongie 1977; Hose 2008, 49–54.

2 Page 1952, xxi–xxv.

Es ist denkbar, daß diese Sagenversionen Euripides zu seiner Schilderung assoziativ veranlaßt haben, aber sie können zur Klärung der angeblich heroisch-männlichen Schilderung der Titelheldin nichts beitragen, ebenso wenig wie die Morde des Apsyrtos und des Pelias. Bestimmte Details der Sage können nicht verschwiegen werden, auch wenn sie mit dem mehr „bürgerlichen“ Thema des Ehestreits im Grunde nicht zu vereinbaren sind. Das Problem besteht schon für den Iliasdichter, dessen aufgeklärter Polytheismus mit einem Sagenstoff wie dem Parisurteil nur schwer in Einklang zu bringen ist. Und es besteht in der einen oder anderen Form in den meisten Tragödien, und natürlich besonders bei einem so modernistischen Dichter wie Euripides. Dies muß bei der Interpretation bis zu einem gewissen Grade toleriert werden.

Die euripideische Medea besitzt andererseits Eigenschaften, die als eher weiblich galten, wie aus Aristoteles, *Hist. an.* IX 1,608B 9–13 hervorgeht, der vielleicht dieses Drama kennt: Sie ist eifersüchtig, unzufrieden mit ihrem Schicksal und neigt zu Lüge und List.

Es stellt sich daher die Frage, ob wir berechtigt sind, hier nur einfach eine dichterisch fragwürdige Übertragung männlicher Ehrvorstellungen der Helden der *Ilias* auf die Frau Medea zu konstatieren, oder ob wir doch Medeas Verhalten als aus ihrer Zeit, dem 5. Jahrhundert vor Christus, heraus als weibliches Verhalten verständlich machen können.

In das Zentrum des Problems führt Medeas berühmter Monolog 1021–80. In ihm wird das Schwanken Medeas sichtbar, ob sie die Kinder töten soll oder nicht. In fünf Abschnitten ringt sie sich dazu durch, sie zu töten.³

Im ersten Abschnitt läßt sie erst zum Schluß verschlüsselt ihre Tötungsabsicht erkennen, wenn sie zu den Kindern sagt, sie würden ihre Mutter nicht mehr wiedersehen, weil sie in eine andere Lebensform abträten (1039–40). Im zweiten Abschnitt wird sie vom Anblick der Kinder durch ihre mütterlichen Gefühle veranlaßt, wie es scheint, ihren Tötungsplan aufzugeben. Sie sagt wörtlich (1040–5):

Ach, ach, was schaut ihr ich mit euren Augen an, Kinder? Was lacht ihr mich zum letzten Mal an? O weh, was soll ich tun? Meine Beherztheit war dahin, Frauen, wie ich die leuchtenden Augen der Kinder sah. Ich kann es doch nicht. Fort mit den bisherigen Plänen. Ich führe meine Kinder aus dem Land! ...

Im dritten Abschnitt wird das Motiv, das sie zum Kindermord treibt, genauer sichtbar (1040–8). Sie sagt (1040–5): „Doch, wie geht es mir? Soll ich meine Feinde unbestraft lassen und mich verlachen lassen? Ich muß dies durchstehen.“

³ Kullmann 2002, 191–2.

Wie feige, meinem Sinn zärtliche Worte zu gestatten! Geht aus dem Haus, Kinder, ... Ich werde meinen Arm nicht aufhalten.“...

Im vierten Abschnitt spricht Medea ihren Thymos an, also das Organ für irrationale Regungen und Affekte (1056–8): „Thymos, tue dies nicht, Armer! Schone die Kinder! Wenn sie dort mit uns leben, wirst du deine Freude an ihnen haben!“

Schließlich folgt dann im 5. Abschnitt doch der endgültige Tötungsentschluß: „Ich begreife durchaus, was ich für schlimme Taten zu tun im Begriff bin. Aber mein Thymos ist stärker als meine vernünftigen Überlegungen, der Thymos, der schuld an dem größten Unheil für die Menschen ist.“

Was hier im 3. Abschnitt als Motivation zu dem Entschluß erscheint, ist das, was den größten Anstoß erregt hat und als heroisch-männlich interpretiert wird. Aber ist dieses Ehrbewußtsein und die Angst, sein Gesicht zu verlieren und zum Gespött der Menschen zu werden, wirklich auf das Männerbild der *Ilias* und verwandter Dichtung reduzierbar? Im Epos selbst, in der es um Krieg und Kampf geht, ist es schwierig, ein Gegenbeispiel zu finden. Immerhin finden wir Vergleichbares unter den Göttinnen.

In *Ilias* IV 50ff. reizt Zeus Hera und Athene mit dem Gedanken, den Krieg um Troia friedlich zu beenden. Hera ist bereit, ihre drei liebsten Städte, Argos, Sparta und Mykene, deren Einwohner sie verehren, zerstören zu lassen, wenn Zeus nur nicht von der Zerstörung Troias abläßt, wobei sie auch betont, daß sie Kronos' ältestes Kind ist. Offensichtlich ist Hera bereit, alles, was ihr lieb und teuer ist, vernichten zu lassen, weil sie sich durch das Parisurteil in ihrer Ehre gekränkt fühlt. Ihr Gedanke ist in jedem Fall ganz maßlos.

Auch Sappho's höhnische Worte über ihre Konkurrentin in fr. 55 Voigt sind hier zu erwähnen, die fast so klingen, wie manche „Nachrufe“, die die Helden der *Ilias* gegenüber ihren sterbenden Gegnern abgeben. Sappho malt sich aus, wie Andromeda (oder eine andere Konkurrentin) ruhmlos sterben wird. Ihr Haß und ihre Verachtung sind maßlos.⁴

Aber auch in der Tragödie ist der vermeintlich „männliche“ Charakter Medeas nicht singulär, sondern begegnet auch bei anderen Frauen. Es geht um die soziale Sprengkraft des Lachens. Bezeichnend ist Sophokles' Schilderung der Reaktion der Göttin Athene angesichts des wahnsinnigen Aias, der eine Rinderherde als seine vermeintlichen Feinde getötet hat. In Aias 79 sagt sie zu Odysseus: „Ist es nicht das süßeste Lachen, über seine Feinde zu lachen?“ Dieses Lachen ist genau das, was Aias aus Furcht in den Tod treibt. Athene's Lachen hat nichts Männliches an sich, sondern ist Ausdruck

4 Page 1955, 133–5.

der (gegebenenfalls aggressiven) ‘shame-culture’ des 5. Jahrhunderts,⁵ die geschlechtsübergreifend ist. Vergleichbar ist die Äußerung Elektra’s in Sophokles’ gleichnamigem Stück (Soph. *El.* 1153–4): „Es lachen die Feinde. Meine mütterliche Unmutter ist rasend vor Freude.“ Es ist keine Schuld der Mutter, die Elektra’s Gefühle bestimmt, sondern eine Ehrverletzung.“ Auch Antigone kommt es auf die Ehre an: Sie fühlt sich in Ant. 839 durch das Niobebeispiel des Chores verlacht, d.h. verspottet.

Wir müssen zur Kenntnis nehmen, daß es in archaischer und klassischer Zeit einen rauerer Umgang der Menschen miteinander gegeben hat, auch wenn natürlich in der Dichtung wie immer nur Extremfälle zur Sprache kommen. Der Mensch hatte noch nicht oder nur unvollkommen gelernt, sich auf sein Gewissen zurückzuziehen und fühlte sich in seinem Selbstbewußtsein viel stärker als heutzutage von dem Urteil seiner Umwelt abhängig und hatte Angst, sozial ausgegrenzt zu werden. Mit der Zunahme des Schuldgedankens ist der Mensch stärker gegen die öffentliche Meinung gefeit. Auch die zeitgenössische Komödie des Aristophanes liefert uns für Ehrverletzungen viele Details. Es verbirgt sich dahinter ein interessantes anthropologisches Problem, das wir hier nur skizzenhaft erwähnen können.

Wir haben uns ausführlicher mit dem Fragenkomplex in einem Aufsatz über „Die antiken Philosophen und das Lachen“ beschäftigt, der zu zeigen versucht, daß die geschilderte Ehrmentalität noch weit über das 5. Jahrhundert hinaus in der Antike wirksam ist.⁶ Wir bringen dazu hier nur ein paar Beispiele.

Selbst für Platon hält das Verlachtwerden für etwas Gefährliches. Der Philosoph, der von der Schau der Ideen in die Politik zurückkehrt, hat Furcht verlacht zu werden und bei der Umsetzung seiner Ideen umgebracht zu werden (*Resp.* VII 517A 2ff.). Auch wenn Sokrates in *Resp.* VI 506D–F vor dem Verlachtwerden Angst hat, als er sich anschickt, das Sonnengleichnis zu erzählen, ist dies wohl nicht als bloße Koketterie zu deuten. Wie Platon über das (Ver-)Lachen denkt, wird deutlich, wenn er darlegt, daß die Wächter nicht lachlustig sein sollen (*Resp.* III 388E 5). Damit ist zweifellos kein Lächeln verboten, sondern ein schmähendes asoziales Verlachen anderer.

Im Hellenismus ist ein besonderes Phänomen das kynische Lachen.⁷ Die schamlosen Provokationen des Diogenes bezeugen indirekt das Fortbestehen der ‘shame-culture’ auf einer niederen sozialen Ebene. Eine große Rolle spielt das kynische, auf Menippos zurückgehende Verlachen der Mächtigen und Reichen, das wir in der Weiterbildung des Lukian, etwa in den Dialogi mortuorum, kennenlernen, so im 22. Dialog, wo die drei Kyniker Antisthenes,

5 Zu den Gegensatz von ‘shame-culture’ und ‘guilt-culture’ vgl. Dodds 1951, 28–63.

6 Kullmann [1995] 2010, 203–22.

7 Kullmann [1995] 2010, 214ff.

Diogenes und Krates über die jämmerliche Ankunft einiger Toter lachen. Das kynische Lachen ist also Therapeutikum für die Armen, die sonst im Leben verlacht und erniedrigt werden. Es ist die proletarische Umkehr der amüsierten Arroganz, die derartige Personen im Leben zeigten. Es setzt zwingend das Fortbestehen der 'shame-culture' voraus, um diesen Terminus pauschal zu gebrauchen, obwohl er in größerem Zusammenhang der Vertiefung bedürfte. Selbst bei den vornehmen Neuplatonikern findet sich das aggressive hämische Lachen über diejenigen, die im „Aufstieg“ auf einer niedrigeren Stufe stehen (Plotinus *Enn.* I 6,7,17ff.; VI 6,18,31ff.). Das Lachverbot im frühen Christentum ist kein Zeichen von Weltfeindlichkeit, sondern Ächtung des aggressiven Lachens, das auch in der Spätantike noch die Bedeutung der Ehrverletzung belegt, gegen die das Christentum angeht.

Um zur Medeagestalt des Euripides zurückzukehren: Medea sagt nicht „Ich ermorde die Kinder (an denen und deren Fortkommen Jason so sehr hängt) wegen seiner Gewissenlosigkeit mir gegenüber“ bzw. sie verzichtet im Bewußtsein ihrer moralischen Überlegenheit nicht ganz auf den Mord, sondern „Ich ermorde sie, weil ich durch Unterlassung einer Rächung mein Gesicht verliere.“

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‘Logos’ and ‘episodion’ in Aristotle’s *Poetics*

ADOLF KÖHNKEN

‘Logos’ and ‘episodion’ are central terms in the *Poetics* but their interpretation is highly controversial, although Aristotle offers a definition by contrast in chapter 17 (1455a34–b23).¹ Two recent translations of this chapter, which have strikingly little in common given that they are supposed to reproduce the same Greek text, may serve to illustrate the point:

(1) Stephen Halliwell²

... the poet should lay out the general structure of his story, and then proceed to work out episodes and enlarge it. What I mean by contemplating the general structure can be illustrated from *Iphigeneia*. A girl was sacrificed and mysteriously vanished from her sacrificers; she was planted in another land ... Subsequently, it happened that the priestess’s brother [i.e. the brother of the girl who had become priestess] came to the place (the fact that a god’s oracle sent him, and the reason for this are outside the plot).³ Captured on his arrival, he was on the point of being sacrificed when he caused his own recognition ... The upshot was his rescue. [Thus far the outline of the *Iphigeneia*]. The next stage is to supply names and work out the episodes. But care must be taken to make the episodes integral – as with the fit of madness which occasions Orestes’ capture ... Now, in drama the episodes are concise, while epic gains extra length from them. For the main story of the *Odyssey* is short: a man is abroad for many years ... [he] launches an attack, his own safety is restored, and he destroys his enemies. This much is essential; the rest consists of episodes.

(2) Arbogast Schmitt⁴

Die Geschichten (logoi) ... soll man in einer Grundskizze entwickeln, dann erst soll man sie so <wie eben beschrieben> in Szenen einteilen und <bis ins Detail> ausführen. Wie man sich die Anlage einer Grundskizze vorzustellen hat, kann man am Beispiel der Iphigenie-Handlung klarmachen: Ein Mädchen wird geopfert und, ohne dass den Opfernden klar ist, was geschieht, entrückt. Es wird in ein anderes Land versetzt ... Einige Zeit später geschieht es, dass der Bruder der Priesterin [i.e. des Mädchens] kommt. Dass er dies auf Weisung eines Gottes tut – der Grund für diese Weisung liegt außerhalb des Handlungsrahmens – und mit welcher Aufgabe, gehört nicht zum darzustellenden Handlungsverlauf.⁵ Er kommt

1 See Köhnken 1990, 129–49.

2 Halliwell 1987, 50–1.

3 Apparently Halliwell accepts, like Rudolf Kassel (1965), the variant ἐξω τοῦ μύθου as against the alternative ἐξω τοῦ καθόλου: however, the context demands ἐξω τοῦ καθόλου, which is the topic discussed in chapter 17 (see 1455b1–2 ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου and θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ καθόλου); see also Neschke-Hentschke 1975, 292 and Köhnken 1990, 138 n. 48, cp. 136 n. 40. Elizabeth Belfiore’s attempt (Belfiore 1992, 360 with n. 10) to keep both versions is not convincing. λόγος in 1455b17 is not to be identified with μῦθος (although Kassel maintains this in his index).

4 See Schmitt 2008, 24–5. See also Köhnken 2009 and Heath 2013.

5 The transmitted Greek text is disputed, see Kassel’s edition (1965) ad loc. It is not clear which version is presupposed by Schmitt (cf. above n. 3).

also, er wird gefangengenommen, und in dem Augenblick, in dem er geopfert werden soll, kommt es zur Wiedererkennung ... Das ist dann der Anfang der Rettung [thus far the ‘Grundskizze’]. ‘Der nächste Schritt ist bereits, den Figuren Namen zu geben und die einzelnen Szenen auszuarbeiten. Dabei muss man darauf achten, dass auch diese kleineren Handlungseinheiten charakteristisch sind, wie z.B. im Orest der Wahnsinnsanfall, der zu seiner Festnahme führt. Im Drama sind die Einzelszenen kurz, die epische Dichtung erreicht durch sie ihren großen Umfang. Die Odyssee-Geschichte ist ja nicht lang: Jemand ist viele Jahre von zu Hause weg ...’ [‘Grundskizze’ of the Odyssey, ending with] ‘er geht zum Angriff über, bleibt selbst unversehrt und vernichtet die Feinde.’ Das ist das, was zur Geschichte gehört, das andere gehört zur Ausgestaltung der einzelnen Szenen.

Is Aristotle talking here about the essential ‘general structure’ of a story as against (inessential) ‘episodes’ (Halliwell) or about the ‘Grundskizze’ von ‘Geschichten’ and their ‘Ausgestaltung’ (‘distribution’) into ‘einzelne Szenen’ (Schmitt)?

The meaning given to λόγος (λόγοι) and ἐπεισόδιον (ἐπεισόδια) in the two translations quoted is evidently different. Is the wording of the original τοὺς τε λόγους ... δεῖ ... ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου, to be understood as ‘lay out the general structure of a (specific) story’ (Halliwell) or as ‘(gegebene) Geschichten in einer Grundskizze entwickeln’ (Schmitt)? Does εἶθ’ οὕτως ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν suggest ‘then proceed to work out episodes and enlarge’, sc. the story (Halliwell) or rather ‘dann erst sie’, sc. die Geschichten, ‘so wie eben beschrieben, in Szenen einteilen und bis ins Detail ausführen’ (Schmitt)?⁶ Does Aristotle say ‘The next stage is to supply names and work out the episodes’ (Halliwell) or rather ‘Der nächste Schritt ist bereits, den Figuren Namen zu geben und die einzelnen Szenen auszuarbeiten’ (Schmitt). Does he call for ‘care ... to make the episodes integral’ (Halliwell) or ‘darauf (zu) achten, dass auch diese kleineren Handlungseinheiten charakteristisch sind’ (Schmitt)?

Schmitt rightly accepts Klaus Nickau’s demonstration⁷ that the term ‘episodion’ means ‘Szene’ (‘Einzelszene mit Handlungsfunktion’). To translate it by ‘episodes’, as Halliwell consistently does, is certainly misleading because it suggests ‘mere (i.e. inessential) episodes’, which is hardly what is meant by Aristotle, as the context shows. Halliwell himself makes this clear

6 I chose the two translations quoted because they show the main problems more clearly than others; but see also Manfred Fuhrmann’s translation of chapter 17 (Fuhrmann 1994, 54–7): ‘Die Stoffe ... soll man ... zunächst im allgemeinen skizzieren und dann erst szenisch ausarbeiten und zur vollen Länge entwickeln ...’ (where e.g. ‘Stoffe’ for λόγοι is strikingly against Aristotelian usage) or Malcolm Heath’s paraphrase (Heath 1991, 390–1 on ch. 17): ‘... in approaching a story one should set it out in universal terms ... It is important to realise that ... [Aristotle] is not talking ... about the plot of Euripides’ play ... he is talking about a preliminary outline ... it is only when Aristotle sketches the way in which this outline has been “episodised” in Euripides’ play that causal connections are indicated’ – a strange claim that is incompatible with the text and also ignores essential scholarship on ‘episodion’ (see next note).

7 Nickau 1966. See also Fuhrmann 1994, 54–7 ‘Szenisch ausarbeiten’, ‘Szenen’ and Köhnken 1990, 136ff.

by his understanding of ὅπως δὲ ἔσται οἰκειὰ τὰ ἐπεισόδια. Here, his 'integral' for οἰκειὰ is much more to the point than Schmitt's strange 'charakteristisch'. The latter's translation of this phrase, by 'man muß darauf achten, daß diese kleineren Handlungseinheiten charakteristisch sind' is hardly correct (nor is Fuhrmann's 'die Szenen müssen auf die Personen zugeschnitten sein'); οἰκειός cannot have this meaning.⁸ Thus, these translations fall short of doing justice to the meaning of the components of chapter 17 within their immediate context and also in terms of their relationship to other parts of the *Poetics*.

In the context of chapter 17 of the *Poetics*, Aristotle discusses how a poet should proceed when composing his poem, and he takes as his examples the *Iphigeneia* and the *Odyssey*. In both cases he distinguishes between the 'logos' and the 'episodia' of the dramatic and epic poems respectively. In both cases the meaning of 'logos' is defined by a quotation of the basic facts of the stories of the *Iphigeneia* and *Odyssey* in anonymous form (first stage: consider τὸ καθόλου) and contrasted with the detailed plots of the *Iphigeneia* and the *Odyssey* as we have them (second stage: adding the names and developing the ἐπεισόδια). To develop the basic constituent facts of a story (τὸ καθόλου) into a specific tragedy or epic is called ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν in Aristotle's terminology. Consequently, the scenes or parts of a developed drama or epic poem are called 'episodia' (see 1455b13, for the *Iphigeneia* plays; 1455b16 and 23 for epic poetry/the *Odyssey*). What Aristotle calls 'logos' in 1455b17 is replaced by 'idion' in 1455b23, the characteristic outline (τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον τοῦτο) as against the actual developed scenes (τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐπεισόδια). Aristotle's two examples (the 'logos' of the *Iphigeneia* and the 'logos' of the *Odyssey*) are framed by corresponding sentences. On the one hand, 'the "logoi" should be set out in general form and subsequently be developed into episodion ...' (preceding the '*Iphigeneia*-logos'),⁹ and 'after that specific names should be added and the episodion be composed, while, most importantly, care should be taken that the episodion are integral parts' (closing the '*Iphigeneia*-logos').¹⁰ On the other hand, 'in dramatic poetry the episodion are short, while the epic poetry finds its length by them' (preceding the '*Odyssey*-logos'),¹¹ and 'this is the essential outline, everything else is scenic elaboration (episodia)', (the closing sentence of the '*Odyssey*-logos').¹²

The sense and implications of λόγος and ἐπεισόδια become even clearer when these terms are compared to the terminology in other passages of the

8 See Bonitz 1870 s.v. and *LSJ*⁹1940, 1202 s.v.

9 1455a34-b2 τούς τε λόγους ... δεῖ ... ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν.

10 1455b12-13 μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδιοῦν ὅπως δὲ ἔσται οἰκειὰ τὰ ἐπεισόδια.

11 1455b15-16 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δράμασιν τὰ ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ἢ δ' ἐποποιία τούτοις μῆκονεται.

12 1455b23 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον τοῦτο, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐπεισόδια.

Poetics. In chapter 9 when comparing ‘poiesis’ (its subject is τὰ καθόλου, ‘the universals’) and ‘history’ (its subject is τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον, ‘the particulars’) Aristotle gives a definition of καθόλου which adds to our understanding of chapter 17: ‘universal is what a certain type of character will probably or necessarily say or do which is what poetry aims at by adding names only afterwards;¹³ the particular, on the other hand, is what Alcibiades did or experienced’ (i.e. the name has priority; primary is a particular person). Likewise, in chapter 17, there are no names in the general outline of the *Iphigeneia* and the *Odyssey* (their ‘logos’ is equivalent with τὸ καθόλου and τὸ ἴδιον), the names only come in with the scenic elaboration (ἐπεισοδιοῦν) of a specific play or epic (Euripides’ *Iphigeneia in Tauris* or the *Odyssey*). Thus, the position of ‘history’ in chapter 9 is, in chapter 17, taken by the established plots (μῦθοι) of Euripides’ *Iphigeneia* and Homer’s *Odyssey*.

Of the terms used by Aristotle in chapter 17 (‘mythoi’, ‘logoi’/‘logos’, τὸ καθόλου, ἐπεισόδιον/-α, τὸ ἴδιον) ‘mythos’ is applied to a developed and finalized plot. ‘Logos’ is applied to the starting outline of such a plot (one which is set out in general form: specific names are avoided). It is equivalent to τὸ καθόλου and τὸ ἴδιον (the essential characteristic subject-matter) and contrasted with τὰ ἐπεισόδια, the specific scenes of the completed work.

¹³ This is sometimes misunderstood, see e.g. Halliwell 1987, 41: ‘... which poetry aims at despite its addition of particular names’.

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Between mythography and historiography: Diodorus' *Universal Library*¹

SUZANNE SAÏD

Between 60 and 30 BC, Diodorus Siculus composed his *Universal Library*² and attempted to 'give a full account of all the events that have been handed down to memory and took place in the known regions of the inhabited world' (1.9.1).³ He began with the legends of both Greeks and barbarians and covered the affairs of the known world 'down to the beginning of the war between the Romans and the Celts' (1.4.5–7), i.e. until 60 BC.

Gods and heroes are therefore included in Diodorus' history. This inclusion is made possible because, as opposed to 'the celestial gods who always existed' (1.2.10), 'others, as they say, first lived on earth as mortals and were granted immortality only after their death because of their cleverness and their benevolence to mankind' (1.13.1). Indeed, these gods belong by right to human history. Accordingly, there is no reason to distinguish between 'le temps des dieux' and 'le temps des hommes' in Diodorus' *Universal Library*.⁴ For him, as for his contemporary Varro,⁵ it is only the criterion of knowledge that determines a distinction between various periods. First, there was a totally unknown time (Varro: ἄδηλον) that left no memory; second, an ancient time which is only dimly known through the myths of both Greeks and barbarians (Varro: μυθικόν); and third, a 'historical' period (Varro: ἱστορικόν) beginning with the Trojan War, for which a chronology has been established by Apollodorus. This explains why Diodorus explicitly set apart the first six books in which he recorded 'the events and legends prior to the Trojan War'; for, as he said, 'in these we have not fixed the dates with any precision'.⁶

When he deals with mythology, Diodorus is aware of the difficulties experienced by the historian, as demonstrated by the preface to book IV. First, 'the antiquity of the events recorded makes them hard to find out and causes much embarrassment to the historians' (4.1.1). Again 'the dates reported cannot be checked accurately and as a consequence this "history" is held

1 It is a great pleasure and an honour to contribute to the volume for Øivind Andersen, a dear friend and a well-known scholar. Given the broadness of his expertise, which also includes historiography, I hope he will have some interest in a paper devoted to the status of mythography in Diodorus' *Universal Library*.

2 On Diodorus' handling of the genre of 'universal history', see Sulimani 2011, 21–55.

3 Translations are by Oldfather 1935.

4 Vidal-Naquet 1981.

5 Quoted by Censorinus, *DN* 1.1.2.

6 *Diod. Sic.* 40.8.

in contempt by the readers' (4.1.1). Moreover, 'the number and variety of the heroes, demigods and men whose genealogy is traced make the account difficult to follow' (4.1.1). Last but not least, 'there is no consensus among the written sources relating the ancient deeds and legends' (4.1.1). This is the reason why the Hellenistic historians 'avoided the history of fabulous times' (4.1.3).

Beginning his narrative on the labours of Heracles, Diodorus also draws attention to another set of problems: 'because of the antiquity and the lack of plausibility of the facts which are related about this hero, the historian is compelled either to omit his greatest exploits and clean up in some way his glory or, by telling the whole story, to make it unbelievable' (4.8.2). As opposed to Plutarch who, in his *Life of Theseus*, chose to 'clean up the mythical through reason, and compel it to submit to us and take on the appearance of history' (Plut. *Vit. Thes.* 1.5.), Diodorus decided to give up plausibility and criticized those who apply the false 'principle of current things'⁷ to Heracles:

some readers set up an unfair standard requiring in the accounts of ancient myths the same exactness as in the events of our own time and, using their own experience as a norm, estimate the might of Heracles by the weakness of the men of today so that they refuse any credibility to the account of these deeds because of their excessive magnitude. (4.8.3)

Reading these lines, one is tempted to think that Diodorus turned his back on critical historiography and that his purpose and method were the same as those of the first historians who wrote before the Peloponnesian War, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his treatise *On Thucydides* 5:

Keeping in view one single and unvarying object, that of bringing to the common knowledge of all whatever records or traditions were to be found among the natives of the individual nationalities or states ... and to deliver these just as they received them without adding thereto or subtracting therefrom, including the legends which had been believed for many generations and dramatic tales which seem to men of the present time to have a large measure of silliness.

Actually, Diodorus' handling of mythology is more complex: if he relates some myths without comment, he also often happens to 'historicize' and rationalize them. I propose in this paper to account for this complexity, first explaining *why* Diodorus chose to include myths in his universal history, and then examining *how* he did it.

⁷ Veyne 1988, 47.

1. *Why Diodorus tells myths*

An initial answer to this question has been suggested to me by a recent paper of K. Clarke, 'Universal Perspectives in Historiography'.⁸ By going further back into the past, Diodorus wants first to demonstrate the superiority of his work over all the other universal histories, as he says in his preface to book I: 'Although the profit which history affords to its readers lies in its embracing a vast number and variety of circumstances ... only a few writers have undertaken, beginning with the earliest times and coming down to their own days, to record the events connected with all peoples' (1.3.2), as well as in his preface to book IV:

For instance Ephorus of Cyme, the pupil of Isocrates, when he undertook to write his universal history, passed over the ancient myths and began his history with a narrative of the events which took place after the return of the Heraclidae. Likewise Callisthenes and Theopompus who were contemporaries of Ephorus avoided the history of fabulous times. (4.1.3–4)

Diodorus also aims to establish in this way the continuity and unity of human history by demonstrating the links between the most ancient past and the present. While separating clearly the most ancient past (books I–VI) from the historical past which begins with the Trojan War (books VII–XL), he illuminates the existence of a continuum with a series of prolepses and etiologies in the mythological books, as well as analepses in the historical books.

1.1. Prolepses and etiologies in books I–VI

Diodorus often mentions in books I–VI events which will happen later on and will be related in books VII–XIV. When, in book IV, he narrates how 'Tlepolemus, the son of Heracles, divided Rhodes into three parts and founded there three cities', he also reminds the reader that 'in later times he took part with Agamemnon in the war against Troy' (4.58.8). The foundation of Alesia gives him the opportunity to remind his readers that this city 'remained free from the days of Heracles and was never sacked until our own time' (4.19.2), when it was taken by storm by Caesar.

Diodorus systematically uses etiology: many cities, peoples, and places got their present names from ancient heroes. In book IV for example, after Iolaos' victory over the natives in Sardinia, we read 'the plain is called to this day Iolaeium' (4.29.5) and 'he gave his name to the folk of the colony he founded

⁸ Clarke 1999.

there' (4.30.2). This link between the mythical past and the present often relies on fanciful or approximate etymologies: Alesia is supposed to be a derivative of ἄλη 'the "wandering" of Heracles on his campaign' (4.19.1) and the name of the harbour Caietes, which is said to be a distortion of the name Aietes, Medea's father, becomes a token of the return voyage of the Argonauts by way of Italy (4.56.6).

The mythical past left material traces also in physical geography, flora, and fauna. The pillars of Heracles were set up by the hero (4.18.2). The breed of Diomedes' horses, which were once captured by Heracles, continued down to the reign of Alexander (4.15.4). Conversely, not a single wild beast is to be found in Crete since it was freed by Heracles of the wild beasts which infested it (4.17.3).

Some existing cults are also linked to ancient myths. The triennial festival held by the Greeks in honour of Dionysus is explained by his journey to India, which lasted three years (3.65.8), and the sacrifices of the Rhodians, performed without fire, reproduce the behaviour of their founders, the Heliadae, who forgot to light fire under the victims (5.56.6–7).

1.2. Analepses and mythical digressions in books VII–XL

Memories of the mythical past explain some historical events in books VII–XL. The ancient prestige of Thebes, 'a city widely known both for its achievements and for the myths that had been handed down about it' (19.53.2) is the reason why Cassander undertook to re-establish it after it was destroyed by Alexander (19.51.1–8). Conversely, the destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans in 364/3 BC is explained not only by the help given at this time by the knights of Orchomenus to the Theban refugees who attempted to change the constitution of Thebes to aristocracy, but also by the tribute Thebes paid to the Myniae in the heroic age (15.79.5).

As C. P. Jones demonstrated in his book *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World*, the mythical past played a major part in contemporary diplomacy. His book actually begins with an example borrowed from Diodorus (17. 96.1–2).⁹ The Indians called Sibians, descendants of the soldiers who came with Heracles to the rock of Aornus, welcomed Alexander who was also descended from Heracles (17.96.2 'they met the king, renewed their ties of kinship, and welcomed him enthusiastically in every way, as being their relatives, and brought him magnificent gifts'). Alexander himself used the same argument to win over the Thessalians 'by reminding them of his ancient relationship to them through Heracles' (17.4.1).

⁹ Jones 1999.

The mythical past also surfaces in the ‘historical’ books in a series of digressions linked to placenames. For instance, the march of the Persian commander Memnon of Rhodes across Mount Ida and the encampment of Alexander near the Caucasus are used as a pretext to allude to the judgment of Paris and the Idaean Dactyls, and Prometheus’ punishment respectively (17.7.3–5, 83.1).

1.3. A tentative explanation

This proliferation of mythical stories in Diodorus’ *Universal Library*, and more generally in Hellenistic historiography, may first be explained by a change in the tastes and interests of the readers. As E. Gabba has pointed out:¹⁰

The mythical and legendary phases of Greek prehistory and proto-history with their store of divine and heroic genealogies, which had been eliminated by Thucydides’ history, recovered a role and function in works of history, as demonstrated by the fragments of the Athidographers, Timaeus, Theopompus, the criticisms of Ctesias or Ephorus expressed by Plutarch or Strabo and the *πραγματικὴ ἱστορία* of Polybius, which is the exception that proves the rule.

Diodorus himself explicitly acknowledges his taste for the unusual at the beginning of book IV: ‘In the three preceding books we have recorded the fabulous deeds among other nations and what their histories relate about the gods ... speaking generally we have described everything which was worthy of mention and marvellous to relate’ (4.1.5). This is also demonstrated by the large number of occurrences (346 in total) of this word-family in his work. The historian’s taste for the unusual is also the reason why he decides to report the courage of the Libyan Amazons, which ‘presupposes an amazing pre-eminence when compared with the nature of the women of our days’ (3.52.4) and did not omit the story of Zeus changing the colour of the bees, precisely ‘because it is most astonishing of all’ (5.70.5).

Diodorus’ integration of myths into his *Universal Library* can also be explained by the purpose he assigns to history in the prologues of books I and IV, which is often recalled in his narrative. According to him, universal history is useful to all men because it gives to its readers ‘the most excellent kind of experience’ (1.1.1.) and uses the mistakes and the successes of others as examples. By portraying the evil as well as the noble deeds of men of the past, by praising the good and conferring on them immortal glory (1.1.5, 1.2.2, 23.15.1, 31.15.1, 37.4.1) and degrading the bad (1.1.5), the historian urges men to virtue and deters them from vice, as did the epic poets before him

¹⁰ Gabba 1981, 53.

who also provided examples to follow and avoid, as T. P. Wiseman pointed out.¹¹ This is why Diodorus twice uses metaphors for history which are usually applied to poetry: history has ‘the most divine voice’ (1.2.3) and ‘celebrates forever in her songs (καθύμνησεν¹²) all the past heroes with the appropriate praises’ (4.1.4). At 4.1.4 he states: ‘We expensed all the care within our power to the ancient history. For very great and most numerous deeds have been performed by the heroes and demi-gods and by many good men likewise.’

This moral aim also explains why Diodorus does not hesitate to add a more edifying version to the traditional story. In book V he prefaces the traditional story of Zeus’ accession to power with another one: ‘some say that he [Zeus] succeeded to the kingship ... not by overcoming his father with violence, but in the manner prescribed by custom and justly, having been judged worthy of that honour’ (5.70.1).

According to Diodorus, myths not only provide examples, they also demonstrate their effectiveness. The last Dionysus, son of Zeus and Semele, and Heracles, son of Alcmena, both emulated their prior namesakes.¹³ In the same way, Jason emulated the campaigns of Perseus (4.40.2) and Theseus the labours of Heracles (4.59.1).

2. *How Diodorus relates myths*

2.1. *The place of myths*

In a history that goes from the earliest times to the beginning of the war between the Romans and the Celts, the ‘organization of the work’ (οικονομία) is critical. Actually, Diodorus often points out in books I to VI, which are devoted to the most ancient times (i.e. to the events prior to the Trojan War), that he is aiming at due proportion in his account.¹⁴ Yet he has omitted nothing from the myths concerning Heracles:

On the one hand, he often acknowledges that he has ‘dwelt overlong’ (πεπλεονάκαμεν) on some topics in order to be thorough (1.90.4, 4.49.4), to give the gods their due (4.83.7), or to delight the lovers of reading (2.54.7). On the other hand, he points out that he will deal briefly (συντόμως)¹⁵ with the myth told by the Indians about Dionysus, the extraordinary island discovered in the Ocean by Jambulus, and other stories. He sometimes justifies the omission of many among the myths told about Medea, ‘considering it unnecessary and

¹¹ Wiseman 1979, 144.

¹² This verb is used elsewhere for poets (Diod. Sic. 11.11.6) and choruses (Diod. Sic. 17.50.6).

¹³ Diod. Sic. 3.74.1: Dionysus and 5.76.2: Heracles.

¹⁴ Diod. Sic. 1.9.1, 1.9.4, 1.29.6, 4.5.4, 4.68.6, 6.1.3: στοχαζόμενοι τῆς συμμετρίας.

¹⁵ Diod. Sic. 2.38.3, 2.55.1, 3.62.3, 5.6.1, 6.1.3.

long to tell all of them' (4.56.2) and will be content to add those items that have been passed over concerning the history of the Argonauts (4.56.2).

2.2. *The organization of Diodorus' mythological books*

After reading the preface to book I one may conclude that these books are exclusively concerned with mythology, which is wrong. Actually the first three books about the deeds and the legends of the barbarians, beginning with the Egyptians, combine ethnography and history with mythology in the manner of local historiography. Book V, which is devoted to the islands, is structured in the same way. Only in book IV can one find mythology pure and simple, that is 'the stories told among the Greeks concerning the most renowned heroes and demi-gods of the ancient times' (4.1.5). As for book VI, given that we have only fragments or summaries, it is difficult to assess precisely the organization of its content. Moreover, some myths are set out in various parts of his work, as demonstrated for instance by J. Fabre-Serris in relation to Dionysus.¹⁶

To better understand the way in which Diodorus deals with myths, it is worth comparing the structure of book IV with the three complete books of pseudo-Apollodorus' Library. The mythographer systematically arranges his work according to genealogies. In book I he includes Ouranus and the gods (1.1–6.3), Prometheus, his son Deucalion (7.1–2), and his descendants down to Jason and the Argonauts (7.2–9.28). In Book II he covers the family of Inachus from Belus down to the Heraclidae. In book III he follows the family of Agenor (1–7), Pelasgus (8–9), Atlas and his daughters (10–12.6), Asopus (12.6–13) and Cecrops down to Theseus (14–16).

The structure of Diodorus' book IV is more complex. It does not follow any chronological or genealogical order, but rather moves from one topic to another by free association, and the propriety of the transitions is more asserted than demonstrated. It begins with Dionysus (4.1.6–5.4) for chronological as well as logical reasons: 'we shall begin with Dionysus because he not only belongs to a very ancient time but also conferred very great benefactions upon the race of men' (4.1.6). There follows an appendix devoted to the gods associated with him: Priapus (4.6.1–4), Hermaphroditus (4.6.5) and the Muses (4.7.1–4). He then turns to Heracles (4.7.4–39.4), who is followed by the Argonauts (4.40.1 'since Heracles joined them in their campaign, it may be appropriate to speak of them in this connection'). Then he introduces a digression which is devoted to the sons of Helius, Aietes and Perses and their daughters Hecate, Circe, and Medea (4.45.1–46.5). He gives a detailed account of the Golden

¹⁶ Fabre-Serris 2006.

Fleece (4.47.1–6) ‘in order that nothing which belongs to the history we have undertaken may remain unknown’ (4.46.5) before resuming the story of the Argonauts (4.48.1–56.8). From 4.57.1 to 58.6, the story of the Argonauts and Heracles’ deeds are appropriately followed by a narrative on the deeds of Heracles’ sons. The transition between Heracles and his descendants and Theseus (4.59–62.4) is justified by their likeness (‘since Theseus emulated the labours of Heracles’, 4.59.1). Then Diodorus decides to relate the rape of Helen and the wooing of Persephone by Peirithous (4.63.1–5), ‘for these deeds are interwoven with the affairs of Theseus’ (4.63.1). But there is no justification whatsoever for the introduction of the stories of the Seven against Thebes and the Epigonoï (4.64.1–67.6), Salmoneus, Tyro and their descendants down to Nestor (4.68.1), the Lapiths and the Centaurs (4.69.1–70.4), Asclepius and his descendants (4.71.1–4), or the story of the daughters of Asopos and the sons who were born to Aiacus (4.72.1–7). These stories are often introduced by the same formula: ‘now we shall endeavour to set forth the facts about’ (4.68.1, 71.1, 73.1, 84.1). But at 4.73.1 Diodorus goes back to earlier times in order to tell the stories of Pelops, his father Tantalus, and Oenomaus (73.1).¹⁷ Since Tantalus was driven out by Ilus, son of Tros, his story is followed by the tale of Ilus and his ancestors (4.75.1–76.5). But the ending of book IV and the stories of Daedalus, the Minotaur and the expedition of Minos into Sicily (4.76.1–79.7), the myth of the mothers (4.80), Aristeus (4.81–82), Eryx (4.83), Daphnis (4.84), and Orion (4.85) can be explained by geography, since Sicily is the setting of all these legends.

With few exceptions, in this book Diodorus keeps to his distinction between the most ancient history and the truly historical times that begin with the Trojan War. The story of the Heraclidae ends with Tlepolemus who ‘later on took part with Agamemnon in the war against Troy’ (4.58.8). The same goes for the descendants of Salmoneus and Tyro, a line that ends with Nestor (4.68.6), the Asclepiads (Podaleirios and Machaon 4.71.4), the descendants of Aiacus (Achilles and Ajax 4.72.7), and the lineage of the Trojan kings (Memnon and Hector 4.75.4). The two exceptions are linked with Sicily and its cults, with the arrival of Merion after the end of the Trojan War (4.79.6), and with Aeneas’ visit to Eryx (4.83.4).

¹⁷ ‘To do so we must revert to earlier times and give in summary the whole story from the beginning.’

2.3. *The narrative of myths*

As he points out in his preface to book IV, Diodorus is well aware of the existence of various versions of myths. But as opposed to Hecataeus, who was selective and only reported ‘what seemed to him true’,¹⁸ Diodorus, like Strabo and Pausanias after him, often gives many versions of the same story and leaves his reader the choice: ‘As it is not easy to set forth the precise truth on such matters, the disagreement among historians must be considered worthy of record, in order that the reader may be able to decide upon the truth without prejudice’ (1.56.6). This is the reason why, as he says at 3.62.1, ‘after having made mention [at 1.23.7] of the birth of Dionysus and of his deeds as they are preserved in the local histories of that country [Egypt], we consider as appropriate in this place to add the myths about this god which are current among the Greeks’, even if there is no agreement among sources. He begins with ‘those authors who use the phenomena of nature to explain this god and call the fruit of the vine Dionysus’ (3.62.3). He then quotes ‘the mythographers who represent the god as having a human form’ (3.61.3). After stating ‘the accounts of the birth of Dionysus that are generally agreed upon by ancient writers’ (3.66.1), Diodorus echoes the rival claims of Greek cities and Libyan Nysa to the birthplace of Dionysus (3.66), and ‘in order not to omit anything which history records about Dionysus’ (3.66.5) he presents in summary what is said by the Libyans and those Greek historians whose writings are in accord with these.

2.3.1. *Registering diversity*

Diodorus sometimes contents himself with registering that ‘generally the ancient myths do not give a simple and consistent story’ (4.44.5), be it about the names of the gods (1.25.1), the location of their tombs (1.27.3–6), the origins of the cities (2.56.3–4), the identity of their eponymous hero (4.55.2–3), or their first inhabitants (5.6.1).

Faced with this multiplicity, Diodorus adopts various strategies. At the beginning of book I he states his principle: ‘Concerning the myths which are told about each of the immortals, we shall refrain from setting forth the most part in detail ... yet whatever on these subjects we may consider as relevant to the several parts of our history we shall present in a summary fashion’ (1.6.1). But he does not always stand by it.

He may sometimes refrain from bringing to his readers’ attention the existing contradictions between various accounts if these accounts are given

¹⁸ Hecataeus Fr. 1 Fowler: ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι.

in various parts of his work. In book III, for example, he relates the usual story of the death of Semele (3.64.3–4). But in book V he quotes a different version, which was given by the Naxians who transformed her death into an apotheosis (5.64.3–4).

When he reports some variants of the same myth side by side, the difference is usually limited to mere details. At 4.13.1, for instance, he offers three descriptions of the way in which Heracles was able to bring back the golden-horned doe, but stresses that ‘this labour was in any case accomplished without using violence or running into perils’.

At times he also gives two explanations of the same event and leaves the decision to the reader, as when he reports the setting up of the Pillars by Heracles: ‘On this question, however, it will be possible for every man to think as he may please’ (4.18.5).

It is interesting to note that Diodorus sometimes attempts to vindicate the existence of heterogeneous versions of the same myth. For instance, he explains the existence of various locations for the tombs of Isis and Osiris by relating the priests’ refusal to divulge the truth to the masses (1.27.6). He also accounts for some mythical transpositions: the long passage of time explains why the Libyan Amazons have been superseded by the Amazons of the Thermodon, who were more recent and better known (3.52.2) and why the latter Dionysus as well as the latter Heracles have inherited the life plan and the exploits of their homonymous predecessors (3.74.3).

2.3.2. *Choosing a version*

When Diodorus chooses among various mythical versions, he sometimes accounts for his choice by stressing that he has chosen to follow ‘those who give the more plausible account and are the most trustworthy’ (5.80.4). Actually Diodorus often gives weight to his choice by stressing the number or the reputation of his sources: for instance, at 4.7.1–2 he agrees that the Muses were the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne, since this is said by the majority of the mythographers and those who enjoy the greatest reputation, and he also agrees that the Muses were nine, based upon the authority of the most distinguished men such as Homer and Hesiod and others like them.

Some of his choices may clearly be explained by parochialism. In the dispute between the Egyptians, the Athenians, and the Sicilians over who was the first to be given the gift of corn by Demeter (5.69.1–3), it is obvious that the Sicilian Diodorus decides in favour of his countrymen by echoing their arguments at greater length than the others.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to look for systematic consistency in the

Library, as demonstrated by a comparison of Diodorus' narrative on some metamorphoses. At 5.23.3–5 he clearly rejects the myth of the metamorphosis of the sisters of Actaeon into poplars shedding tears of amber:

The creators of these fictitious tales are wrong and have been disproved by facts at later times and we must give ear to the accounts which are truthful. Actually the amber is gathered on the island we have mentioned [Basileia] and is brought by the natives to the opposite continent and it is conveyed to the regions known to us.

But the metamorphosis of Derceto at 2.4.3, which is introduced as 'a legend told by the most learned among the inhabitants of the region', is not followed by any negative comment. Diodorus even concludes the story of the metamorphosis of Actaeon by saying: 'we may well believe that, once he had been changed into the form of one of the animals he was wont to hunt, he was slain by the dogs which were accustomed to prey upon other wild beasts' (4.81.5).

2.3.3. *Historicizing myths*

As a historian Diodorus also attempts to validate myths. He often relies on existing monuments, a phenomenon which has been well analysed in connection with Livy by Emilio Gabba:

In the first two books of Livy legendary or historical events are in a certain sense validated by reference to monuments, in particular statues, still visible in the time of Livy or his sources. Such references were intended to guarantee the historicity or at least the credibility of the legend or event in question. It seems clear that these monuments were at first invested with fantastic meanings of different kinds but always related to legendary episodes. In a complete reversal of roles, the monuments then became documents which guaranteed the historicity or credibility of the legends or stories which had grown up.¹⁹

Existing cults and customs, as well as place names, may be used for the same purpose. Actually the first six books of Diodorus are replete with 'indications' (σημεῖα), 'proofs' (τεκμήρια), 'demonstrations' (ἀποδείξεις), or 'testimonies' (μαρτύρια) of this kind. Most instances are to be found in book I. The Egyptians draw on the existing tombs of Osiris and Isis located either at Memphis or on the border between Egypt and Ethiopia (1.22.1–2) to prove the existence of these gods. They also rely on existing rituals and cults to demonstrate that many Greek myths originated in Egypt: 'many other things of which mythology tells

¹⁹ Gabba 1981, 61.

are still to be found among the Egyptians, the name being still preserved and the customs actually being practiced' (1.97.1). For instance 'to prove that the discovery of the corn took place in Egypt, they offer the following ancient custom which they still observe' (1.14.2), i.e. they dedicate to Isis the first stalks of grain. They even combine various pieces of proof. To demonstrate e.g. that Athens was an Egyptian colony, they successively rely on vocabulary ('for the Athenians are the only Greeks who call the city *astu* a name brought over from the city called *Astu* in Egypt', 1.28.4), political organization (the Athenians like the Egyptians are divided into three categories, *eupatrids*, *geomoroi* and *demiourgoi*, 1.29.4), onomastics (Menestheus was the son of Petes, an Egyptian name, 1.28.6), religion ('their *Eumolpidai* were derived from the priests of Egypt and the *Kerykes* from the [Egyptian] *pastophoroi*', 1.29.4), and external appearance and manners (1.28.4). Yet Diodorus is not convinced, 'since they offer no precise proof whatsoever for these statements and no trustworthy historian testifies in their support' (1.29.6).

Yet many similar pieces of evidence are endorsed elsewhere in Diodorus' work, or at least he does not openly question them. He refers in book I to certain proof of Dionysus' expedition in India given by the Indians: the existence of a city called Nysa and the ivy 'which is still to be found only in that region' (1.18.7). In book III he adds: 'Furthermore, there are pointed out among the Indians even to this day the place where the birth of the god came to pass, as well as cities that bear his name in the language of the natives, and many other notable testimonials to his birth among the Indians' (3.63.5). Diodorus is also aware that 'those inhabitants of Libya who dwell on the shore of the Ocean lay claim to the birthplace of the god, and point out that Nysa and all the stories which the myths record are found among themselves, and many proofs of this statement remain in the land down to this day' (3.66.4), given that 'many ancient Greek writers of myths and poets and not a few of the later historians agree with this account of the Libyans' (3.66.4). The same is true for some Greek cities:

The inhabitants of Teos advance as a proof that the god [Dionysus] was born among them the fact that, even to this day, at fixed times in their city, a fountain of wine, of unusually sweet fragrance, flows of its own accord from the earth. And as for the peoples of the other cities, they in some cases point out a plot of land which was sacred to him, in other cases shrines and sacred precincts which have been consecrated to him from ancient times. (3.66.2–3)

In book V Diodorus reports the Sicilian traditions about Demeter and Core, who made their first appearance on this island. Relying upon 'the best authorities among historians', he tells us that 'in the plain of Leontinoi the wheat men call "wild" grows even to this day' (5.2.4), points out the importance of their

cult in Sicily (5.2.5), locates the rape of Core in a meadow close to Enna and proves it by a lengthy description of this place – it is strikingly beautiful and, to one’s amazement, violets bloom throughout the entire year (5.3.3).

Diodorus is not the only one who uses this type of argument. In book IV, he quotes ‘many among the ancient historians as well as later ones, including Timaeus’ (5.56.3) who similarly demonstrated that the Argonauts, on their way back, made their course to the west. He points out that the Celts who dwell along the Ocean particularly venerate the Dioscuri (4.56.4), lists a series of place names, such as harbours called Argoön and Telamon, thus attesting that the Argonauts sailed about the Tyrrhenian sea (4.56.6), and he refers to objects such as the bronze tripod that was presented to Triton and inscribed with ancient characters which stood among the people of Euesperis in Libya until recent times (4.76.6).

It is not only through Diodorus’ attempt to argue the validity of some myths but also through the attention paid to chronology that Diodorus demonstrates that he remains a historian even when he deals with mythology. In book I his Egyptians rely on relative chronology to demonstrate that Heracles was an Egyptian by birth: it is generally accepted by the Greeks that the hero fought with the Olympians against the Giants, which is inconsistent with his late birth (one generation before the Trojan War) (1.24.2), since the Giants were born from the earth at the beginning of the world. Likewise, his primitive weapons, as well as his ridding the earth of its monsters, suggests that he lived when mankind first appeared on earth and not, as the Greeks say, one generation before the Trojan War (1.24.3).

2.3.4. Rationalizing myths

Following Christopher Pelling, I shall distinguish between two kinds of rationalization: ‘The first tries to make sense of legends by explaining how they come about ... it explains away a legend’, the second consists of ‘contextual explaining’: ‘the essence of the story remains, but it comes to make literal sense by being plausibly contextualized’.²⁰ Actually Diodorus makes use of both of these kinds of rationalization.

²⁰ Pelling 2002, 174–5.

2.3.4.1. *Explaining away mythical implausibilities*

I will begin with the second type of rationalization – that is, ‘an attempt to get rid of the corrosion of the legend and recover the hard core of history’.²¹ Like former historians, Hecataeus, Herodotus (in his preface), or Thucydides (in the ‘Archaeology’), Diodorus implicitly rationalizes the myth by omitting implausible details such as a divine mother or the miraculous transportation of a corpse. His Memnon is only ‘the son of Tithonus’ (2.22.1). His divine mother, Dawn, has disappeared. When he died, ‘the Ethiopians recovered his body, burnt the corpse, and took his bones back to Tithonus’ (2.22.4).

Sometimes Diodorus puts two versions of the story side by side, the mythical and the true one, without making his choice explicit. At 4.70.4, after quoting the writers who say that the Hippocentaurs were born from Centaurs having sex with mares, he mentions those who say that ‘they were called Hippocentaurs because they were the first to ride on horses and were then made into legendary beings combining two natures’.

More often, Diodorus clearly indicates his preference for the true, i.e. the plausible story by the way he introduces it. At 2.10.1–2 he gives two versions of Semiramis’ end: the first one, the apotheosis, is given in direct discourse (‘she at once disappeared, as if she were going to be translated to the gods, as the oracle had predicted’), whereas her metamorphosis into a dove is put in inverted commas and is ascribed to mythographers. Again he introduces with a mere *φασί* (‘they say’) the rationalized version of the death of Icarus: he fled from Crete in a boat and ‘disembarking carelessly he fell into the sea and perished’, whereas he introduces the marvellous story of his flight with ‘some writers of myth say’ and justifies his reporting of the legend by mentioning that he shares a taste for marvellous stories with his audience (‘even if this is a tale of marvels, nevertheless I have thought it best not to leave it unmentioned’ (4.77.6).

Sometimes Diodorus explicitly corrects the traditional myth and replaces it with a more plausible story: ‘Prometheus, son of Iapetus, did not steal the fire from the gods and gave it to mankind, as some mythographers say. The truth is that he was the discoverer of the firesticks from which it may be kindled’ (5.67.2). The same is true for Atlas, Aeolus and Hyperion. ‘They say that Atlas perfected the science of astrology and was the first to bring forth the doctrine of the sphere, and it was for this reason that they thought that the entire heaven was supported by him’ (3.60.3).

In book IV, after relating at length the 12 labours of Heracles according to tradition (4.11.3–28.4), Diodorus proposes a rationalized version:

Since he was admired for his courage and his skill as a general, he gathered

²¹ Bowersock 1994, 1.

a most powerful army and visited the entire inhabited world, conferring his benefactions upon the race of men, and it was in return for these that with general approval he was given immortality. But the poets, following their custom of giving a tale of wonder, have told the myth that Heracles, single-handed and without the aid of armed forces, performed the labours which are on the lips of all (4.53.7).

Like the 4th-century mythographer Palaephatus, who rewrote the story of Pelias' murder by transforming the sorceress into a clever woman who discovered a red-and-black plant-dye and the benefit of steam baths for men,²² Diodorus also rationalizes the killing of Pelias by Medea by replacing miracles with make-believe (4.51.1–52.2). To persuade Pelias that she was able to rejuvenate him, Medea disguised herself as an old woman and then washed her body to appear again as a maiden. Then she promised to transform an old ram into a lamb. But here also there is no miracle, for she drew out of the cauldron not a living lamb but 'an image of a lamb' (4.52.2).

Diodorus also uses the natural allegoresis to replace the myth (μῦθος) with the truth (ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος). In book I he quotes the first Egyptians, who call the spirit Zeus (1.12.2), the fire Hephaistos (1.12.3), the earth Demeter (1.12.4), the wet element Oceanus (1.12.5–6), and the air Athena (1.12.7). 'Whereas the myths relate that Plutus was the son of Iasion and Demeter, the truth is that he is the wealth of corn given to Iasion because of Demeter's association with him at the time of the wedding of Harmonia' (5.49.4). He also substitutes a true explanation for the mythical origin of Rhodes, which supposedly resulted from the love of Helios for the Nymph: 'The truth is that the island which was originally muddy and soft was dried up by the sun and gave birth to living creatures' (5.56.3).

These interpretations are sometimes supported by 'etymology', i.e. the 'analysis of the original meaning of names [which] enables the Stoic philosopher to recover the beliefs about the world held by those who first gave the gods their present names',²³ a method which is best illustrated by Diodorus' interpretation of Athena in book I. At 1.12.7–8 the equation of Athena with the air is based first on some details of her myths: 'she is considered as the daughter of Zeus born from his head and conceived as a virgin because the air is by its nature uncorrupted and occupies the highest part of the universe. This is the reason why the myth tells that she was born from the head of Zeus', an interpretation that relies on the two meanings of the Greek verbs φθείρειν and διαφθείρειν 'to corrupt', but also 'to deflower a woman'. This allegoresis of Athena as the air is

²² See Stern 1996.

²³ Long 1992, 54. See also Most 1989.

also supported by her epithets which are proper to air: ‘she is called Tritogeneia “thrice born” because the nature of the air changes three times in the course of the year, in the spring, summer and winter’ and ‘she is called Glaucopis “blue eyed” not because she has blue eyes, as some Greeks have held – a silly explanation indeed – but because the air has a bluish appearance’ (1.12.8).

2.3.4.2. *Explaining the origin of myths*

Diodorus usually chooses to explain away the myths by telling us how they originated from some confusion between proper and common nouns, from a misunderstanding of homonyms, or from literal interpretation of metaphors. This is the case for the story of Heracles killing the eagle which was devouring Prometheus’ liver (1.19.1–4). Actually, Prometheus was governor of an Egyptian district flooded by a river, which was given the name ‘Eagle’ because of the violence of its water. Prometheus was about to commit suicide when Heracles speedily stopped the flood: ‘This is the reason why some Greek poets worked this fact into a myth’ (1.19.3).

Confusion between homonyms also accounts for other ‘monstrous myths invented by the Greeks’ (4.47.2). The stories about the cruelty of the Colchi, their fire-breathing bulls, and the sleepless dragon guarding the Golden Fleece all originated from a confusion of names: the soldiers stationed there, who were Taurians originating from the Thracian Chersonese, were made into fire-breathing bulls because they had killed foreigners. ‘Similarly the guardian of the sacred precinct, who was a man called Dracon, was transformed by the poets into the monstrous and fear-inspiring beast’ (4.47.3). There are many other instances of such an explanation relying on the confusion between names and common words or between homonyms: the χρυσᾶ μῆλα of the Hesperids were either golden apples or flocks of sheep that were called golden because of their beauty or because of the colour of their fleece which was like gold, and the δράκων who guarded them was not a monstrous dragon but a shepherd called Dracon (4.26.3); the golden fleece was not a ram’s (κρίος) fleece but rather the gilded skin of Phrixus’ slave, who was named Krios (4.47.6).

Other myths originated from a metaphor taken literally. First the ‘true facts’ according to Diodorus: ‘they say that Lamia was a queen of surpassing beauty whose appearance became, with the passing of time, bestial on account of the savagery of her heart’ (20.41.3). After the death of her children she would put to death all the new-born babies unless she was drunk (20.41.3). Then the myth: ‘for that reason some have invented the myth that she threw her eyes into a flask, metaphorically turning the carelessness produced by the wine into the aforesaid measure, since it was wine that took away her sight’ (20.41.5).

Some myths originated from some material detail of the true story (4.47.4).

The mythical Phrixus was said to have been borne through the sky by a ram (κρίός) with a golden fleece together with his sister, Helle, who fell into the sea called Hellespont. Actually, 'he made his voyage upon a ship which bore the head of a ram upon his bow and Helle feeling seasick while leaning far over the side of the boat fell into the sea' (4.47.4).

The story of Proteus is rationalized by a combination of the methods that were used to explain away the myths of Aeolus and Ammon. According to Diodorus' Egyptians, the Odyssean Proteus was actually an Egyptian king called Cetes (1.62.2):

some traditions record that Proteus was experienced in the knowledge of the winds and that he would change his body sometimes into the form of different animals, sometimes into a tree or fire or something else, and it so happens that the account which the Egyptians give of Cetes is in agreement with this tradition'

since this king

from his close association with the astrologers had gained experience in such matters; and from a custom which has been passed down among the kings of Egypt has arisen the myth current among the Greeks about the way Proteus changed shape. For the kings of Egypt were used to wear upon their heads the forepart of a lion, or bull, or snake as symbols of their rule; at times also trees or fire [Ammon]. (1.62.3)

In book I, Egypt is twice said to be the source of Greek mythology: first at 1.9.6 'it is in Egypt where mythology places the origin of the gods', and second at 1.23.8: 'in general, they say, the Greeks appropriate to themselves the most renowned of Egyptian heroes and gods as well as the colonies sent out by them'. Actually the Egyptians say that some gods and heroes were transferred from Egypt to Greece: 'They say that Perseus was born in Egypt and that the origin of Isis was transferred to Argos by the Greeks, who invented the myth of Io metamorphosed into a heifer' (1.24.8). This is also true for the Greek myths of the underworld which imitate some Egyptian customs, since in Egypt the corpse, once embalmed, crosses a lake (1.92.2) called Acherusia [hence the Acheron] 'in a boat whose ferryman is called Charon by the Egyptians in their language' (1.92.2). So, 'Orpheus, they say, who in the old days travelled in Egypt and witnessed this custom, invented his mythical description of Hades, reproducing it in some respects but in others inventing on his own account' (1.92.3).

The best illustration of these transfers is the explanation given by Diodorus' Egyptians – i.e. Diodorus in the guise of an Egyptian – of the legend of

Dionysus. In the beginning (1.23.3–6), one is faced with an unfortunate accident: Semele, the daughter of Cadmus, who is said to be Egyptian instead of Phoenician, ‘was raped by someone, became pregnant, and after seven months gave birth to a child whose appearance, according to the Egyptians, was like Osiris’ (1.23.3). When Cadmus found out what had taken place, having at the same time the reply from an oracle commanding him to obey the laws of his fathers, he both gilded the infant and paid him the appropriate sacrifices, as if he were an epiphany of Osiris. ‘He attributed the fatherhood of the child to Zeus, both magnifying Osiris and averting slander from his raped daughter’ (1.23.6). This lie, motivated by self-interest, is followed by the decisive intervention of the poet Orpheus – also to be explained by personal motives:

At later times Orpheus, who was held in high regard among the Greeks for his singing, initiatory rites, and instructions on things divine, was entertained as a guest by the descendants of Cadmus and accorded unusual honours in Thebes. And since he had become conversant with the teachings of the Egyptians about the gods, he transferred the birth of the ancient Osiris to more recent times and, out of regard for the descendants of Cadmus, instituted a new initiation, according to which the initiates were told that Dionysus had been born from Semele and Zeus. (1.23.7)

The combination of the gullibility of the people, the reputation of Orpheus, and self-interest explains why the Greeks first welcome this myth:

the people observed these initiatory rites, partly because they were deceived through their ignorance (partly because they paid attention to the reliability of Orpheus and his reputation in such matters and most of all because they were glad to receive the god as a Greek. Later, after the writers of myths and poets had taken over this account of his ancestry, the theatres became filled with it and among following generations the belief in the story became strong and immutable. (1.23.7–8)

Conclusion

This interest in the origins of mythology makes Diodorus a forerunner of Fontenelle, whose treatise *On the Origin of Fables (Sur l’origine des fables, 1724)* has been called ‘the cornerstone of modern mythology’.²⁴ Moreover, his book, despite or maybe because of its discrepancies, helps us to better understand the complex reception of myths at the beginning of the Empire, the importance of which was demonstrated by my colleague Alan Cameron in his book *Greek Mythography in the Roman World (2004)*.

²⁴ Graf 1993, 14.

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‘One size to fit them all’: the reader in Galen’s Hippocratic commentaries

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Galen was a prolific writer whose texts were read by many readers; but who did Galen himself think his readers were? In this paper, I look at the references to the audience in Galen’s commentaries on several Hippocratic texts.¹ Galen’s voluminous commentaries on selected texts from the *Corpus Hippocraticum* provide important information about Galen’s views on the readers of his writings. This is even more so since the commentary, as a genre, is meant to assist the reader of the text on which it comments. My main argument will be that Galen reflects actively on what it means to write for a broader audience and takes into account a variety of possible readers of his text. Galen realized that he had a varied readership, not all of whom had the same level of preparation or intelligence. Galen’s approach to his readers is, however, more varied than a simple dichotomy. At the same time, he retains the topical fiction of writing for a small group or even for a specific individual, allowing himself to make use of traditional *topoi* of modesty.

1. Galen and his Hippocratic commentaries

Among other works dealing with the medical tradition before him, Galen wrote several commentaries on Hippocratic works.² Some of these texts have prefaces, while others do not (though of course in some cases the prefaces may have been lost). In some of the prefaces, Galen describes how and why he wrote them. These comments throw light upon how Galen thought of the relationships between author and reader and between teacher and student.

Galen’s Hippocratic commentaries are not dedicated to specific persons, like e.g. *On my own books* (dedicated to Bassus), *On the order of my own books* (to Eugenianus) or *The exercise with the small ball* (to Epigenes), but to anonymous friends and followers. Galen’s relationship with this important

1 I will cite Galen’s Hippocratic commentaries from the editions in the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum (CMG)*, except for the commentaries *On fractures* and *On joints*, which are cited from Kühn’s edition. When citing from the *CMG* editions, I give the page numbers in Kühn’s edition which are printed in the margins of the *CMG* texts. A Roman numeral indicates the volume number in Kühn’s edition, which is marked by a capital K after the page number.

2 Ihm 2002, 88–121 conveniently collects the information on Galen’s various works of Hippocratic commentary.

group of readers has been studied recently by Mattern.³ At the same time, Galen explicitly mentions other kinds of readers.

We are lucky that Galen left two short works in which he discusses his own works. These are *On my own books*⁴ and *On the order of my own books*.⁵ In the first of these texts Galen describes how his commentaries fall into two groups: an early group written for friends only and a later group written for wider circulation. The early group of commentaries also differed from the later in that Galen mostly gave his own views on the Hippocratic texts and did not always note the views of earlier commentators. The fact that Galen did not have his library at the start of his stay in Rome would have contributed to this.⁶ The later group of commentaries were, according to Galen, ‘composed with an eye to general publication’.⁷

Unfortunately the section dealing with the Hippocratic commentaries in *On the order of my own books* is partly lost. In the preserved part of the text Galen states that he has written commentaries on some Hippocratic texts and intends to comment on all of them if time permits. In the case of this not happening, Galen recommends some earlier commentaries (those by Pelops, Numisianus, Sabinus and Rufus of Ephesus) and warns against others (those by Quintus, Lycus and Satyrus).⁸

The question of the intended audiences of Galen’s Hippocratic commentaries is complicated by the way Galen presents their genesis. Galen begins the section about Hippocratic commentaries in *On my own books* with the words: ‘As with my other works written for friends, so especially with the works of Hippocratic commentary, I had no expectation that they would reach a wider audience (*pollous hexein*).’⁹ Some were written for friends (*philoï*) or followers (*hetairoi*).¹⁰ Some of the texts written in this way were later distributed more widely against Galen’s own will, or at least without his knowledge, while others were written for publication (*ekdosis*). It is difficult to know to what extent this claim reflects reality or whether it is part of a common prefatory *topos*. Mattern, in the most extended recent discussion of Galen’s relationship with his readers, notes that the scenario described above is extremely frequent

3 Mattern 2008, 14–21.

4 XIX: 8–48K.

5 XIX: 49–61K.

6 Galen assigns the commentaries on *Aphorisms, Fractures, Joints, Prognosis, Regimen in Acute Diseases, Wounds, Injuries to the Head* and book I of the *Epidemics* to this group (XIX: 35K).

7 This group includes the commentaries on books II, III and VI of the *Epidemics, Humours, Nutrition, Prediction, Nature of Man, In the Surgery* and *Places, airs, and waters*.

8 XIX: 57K.

9 XIX: 33K.

10 Mattern 2008, 15 argues that the meanings of these two terms often overlap.

in Galen's writings.¹¹ Galen's 'friends and followers' are clearly important to him, but as I will show below, Galen also openly acknowledges the existence of another group of readers. In order to gain a better understanding of the commentaries as didactic texts, both groups must receive equal attention.

To get a clearer picture of Galen's audience, we should turn to his actual practices. Galen's commentaries contain references to the reader not only in the prefaces, but also in the body of the texts. Galen not infrequently addresses his reader in ways which show that he is present in the mind of the author and the exegete.

2. *The schema isagogicum*

The prefaces and introductory discussions in the Hippocratic commentaries provide us with much of our information about Galen's conception of his public. In his book on the history of the *schema isagogicum* in Antiquity, Jaap Mansfeld has shown how Galen's commentaries may illuminate the form and methods of ancient exegesis and philosophical education.¹² The commentaries are didactic texts which exemplify many of the traits of later exegetical works in the philosophical tradition, although in a less systematic fashion.

The goal of Mansfeld's study is to gain a better understanding of the methods of philosophical education in Late Antiquity, but his conclusions are still relevant to Galen's brand of medical education as well. Even though medicine and philosophy had different sets of canonical texts, he detects pervasive parallels between the two fields. Thus, Mansfeld places Galen squarely in the mainstream of ancient exegesis. The broadness of Galen's own educational background is well known,¹³ and this lends credibility to Mansfeld's claim about the inspiration for Galen's didactic practices:

Likely enough, his hermeneutical reflections and his ideas on the proper qualifications and aims of the exegete as well as on the qualities and preparation to be required of one's students were much more stimulated by the classes in philosophy he had attended in his youth and the philosophical exegetical literature he had seen than by his medical education or the commentaries on Hippocrates he knew.¹⁴

11 Mattern 2008, 15.

12 Mansfeld 1994.

13 See e.g. Nutton 2004, 216–29.

14 Mansfeld 1994, 175.

The *schema isagogicum* consists of points to be discussed at the outset of the study of a text. They include the following:¹⁵

- the theme, aim, and purpose of the text (*prothesis, skopos, operis intentio*);
- the text's position within a corpus;
- its utility (*khrêsimon, utilitas*);
- an explanation of its title;
- its authenticity;
- the division of the text into chapters, sections, and parts.

Mansfeld demonstrates convincingly how elements of the *schema isagogicum* can be found in Galen.¹⁶ Although Galen never uses an explicit introductory schema, he touches upon most of its contents in various places in his exegetical works. Galen discusses the authenticity of Hippocratic texts in the preface to the first commentary on book VI of the *Epidemics*, for example.¹⁷ He explains titles, as for example in the preface to the commentary on the *In the Surgery*¹⁸ and in the commentary on *Prorrhetic*.¹⁹ As we will see below, he also comments frequently on the utility of the texts of the Corpus Hippocraticum.

The *schema isagogicum* presupposes a reader who is interested in approaching a text in a specific, (educational) context and in a specific (methodical) way. The fact that Galen touches on so many of the same points indicates that Galen himself has this kind of reader in mind even though his commentaries are not written as part of a formal curriculum.²⁰

3. Readers in the Hippocratic commentaries

Let us first take a look at how Galen refers to different types of readers in his prefaces. Galen's typical way of presenting them can be seen in the following example:

ἔμοι μὲν οὐδ' ἄλλο τι βιβλίον ἐγράφη χωρὶς τοῦ δεηθῆναί τινας ἢ φίλους ἢ ἐταίρους καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς εἰς ἀποδημίαν μακροτέραν στελλομένους, ἀξιώσαντας ἔχειν ὑπόμνημα τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ρηθέντων αὐτοῖς ἢ δειχθέντων ἐν ταῖς τῶν ζώων ἀνατομαῖς κατὰ <ταῖς

¹⁵ Mansfeld 1994, 10–11.

¹⁶ Mansfeld 1994, 131–47.

¹⁷ XVII/1: 793–7K.

¹⁸ XVIII/2: 629K.

¹⁹ XVI: 490K.

²⁰ As noted by Nutton 2004, 228f., Galen and his works were known throughout the Roman Empire shortly after his death. For the use of Galenic texts in the medical curriculum in Alexandria in Late Antiquity, see Iskandar 1976.

ἐπισκέψεσι τῶν νοσοῦντων. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκπεσόντα τινὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἔδοξεν ἄξια σπουδῆς εἶναι, προτρεψαμένοις με καὶ αὐτοῖς ἅπαντα τῆς ἰατρικῆς τέχνης τὰ μέρη συμπληρῶσαι, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὃν ἤδη τισὶν ἔδωκα καὶ τούτοις ἔπραξα. γινώσκων δ' ἑμαυτὸν ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἐγεγράφειν ἐξηγησάμενον αἰεὶ τὴν Ἱπποκράτους γνώμην, ἅμα τῶ καὶ τὰς ἐπικαιροτάτας αὐτοῦ τῶν ῥήσεων παραθεῖσθαι, περιττὸν ἡγούμην εἶναι γράφειν ἐξηγήσεις ἐν ὑπομνήμασι καθ' ἐκάστην λέξιν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἕως τέλους ἁπάντων αὐτοῦ τῶν βιβλίων.²¹

I haven't written any other book without some friends or followers asking me and especially those who were going away on a long journey, wanting to have a memory (*hypomnēma*) of things I had told them or things I had demonstrated at animal dissections or visits to the sick. But since some became known and were taken seriously by others, when people turned to me to cover all the parts of the art of medicine, I did this for them in the same way as I have already given (books) to others. Knowing, however, that I myself in everything I had written was always explaining the doctrine of Hippocrates, and at the same time adding the most fitting of his words, I thought it superfluous to write commentaries to every single word from the beginning to the end in all his books.

In this quote from the preface to the second commentary on the third book of the *Epidemics*, Galen presents a typical (and idealized) picture of his readership; he returns to it often. The work in question, he claims, was written for a specific reason. Friends or followers, especially those going away on a trip, have asked him for a *hypomnēma* of things he has already said or demonstrated. Galen mentions different contexts: a) animal dissections and b) visits to patients. Others have asked Galen to cover other aspects of the medical art in written form and some have even asked for commentaries on Hippocratic texts, but Galen initially thought this unnecessary because he had written other, general works on Hippocrates' views.

We may note some recurring themes here. First, the written text is in a sense secondary: it is a *hypomnēma*, an aid to remembering what Galen has already said or written. The reason why a written text is necessary is purely practical: the reader cannot be present to listen to Galen himself and/or will not have access to his other written works (in the case of Hippocratic exegesis). Secondly, the genesis of the text is presented in an individual context. Galen writes for a specific individual who will take the text that he receives with him on his journey.

Galen then recounts how his writings became known not only to his friends, but also to other doctors who subsequently encouraged him to write commentaries on all the Hippocratic texts. Here, Galen takes up the same point that we met in *On my own books* (XIX: 35K): while his Hippocratic commentaries were originally only meant for himself or for a small circle of

²¹ XVII/1: 576–7K (= Wenkebach 1936).

friends, at some point Galen chose to publish them. Accordingly, the texts from this point on have a twofold nature consisting of both individual instruction and public argumentation.

Further on in the preface to his second commentary on book III of the *Epidemics*, Galen relates that many friends asked him to discuss and refute earlier interpreters of Hippocrates. This leads Galen to defend himself against accusations of exceeding length, a criticism he also touched upon in his introduction to his second commentary on the first book of *Epidemics*. There is a slight discrepancy between Galen's words here and in *On my own books*: in the latter text, the fact that wrong explanations of Hippocrates are praised is given as the reason for explicitly mentioning and criticizing earlier commentators (XIX: 35K). In the commentary on book III of the *Epidemics*, other doctors are said to have asked Galen to do this. The end result, however, was the same, and the different versions indicate that the question of whether commentaries should include discussion of the views of earlier commentators was on Galen's mind.

This preface provides us with a picture of an audience that was steadily growing and gradually becoming more varied. Galen's fame grew as well. His audience consisted not only of friends and students who were eager to learn about Hippocratic medicine but also of Galen's peers, other doctors competing in the same marketplace.

This first group of readers (friends and followers) has a particular function in Galen's texts: they explain why the text was written to begin with (although, as he stresses in *On my own books*, the ultimate origin of the texts was his own personal study notes on the works of Hippocrates). Galen more often talks *about* these model readers than *to* them.²² They are invoked to explain the nature of the text to another kind of reader: the one who is reading it after it was published.

In his preface to the second part of the commentary on book I of the *Epidemics*, Galen again comments on the different kinds of readers who might read his text.

ὡς ἂν οὖν ἐκείνων μεμνημένων ἡμῶν, ὅσα τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἐξηγήσεως δεῖται προσθήσω, στοχαζόμενος οὔτε μόνων τῶν ἐσχάτως ἀμαθῶν οὔτε μόνων τῶν ἱκανῶν ἐχόντων τὴν παρασκευὴν· πρὸς ἅπαντας γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἔξει μετρίως. τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὁ μὲν τοῖς ἐσχάτως ἀμαθέσιν οικεῖος ἀνιάσει τοὺς ἐν ἔξει διὰ τὸ μῆκος, ὁ δὲ τοῦτοις ἐπιτήδειος ἀσαφής

²² Galen addresses his reader(s) using both the second person singular and plural. The second person plural often (though not always) refers to the first group of readers discussed above, namely friends and followers who have asked for the text in question. Searches of the TLG show that Galen uses the second person singular more frequently than the second person plural. The singular may of course be generic in some cases (cf. German 'man').

ἔσται τοῖς ἀμαθέσιν. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ χρή τοῖς τοιούτοις ὑπομνήμασιν ἐντυγχάνειν ἀγαπῶντας, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο παρ’ ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλως ἀκούσαντες πλατύτερον πολλακίς ταῦτ’ ἀν> ἄνευ παρακοῆς ἐκμανθάνειν τι χρηστόν.²³

As regards those things of what is said now that need explanation, I will add it [sc. the explanation], aiming not only at those who are utterly uneducated nor at those who have sufficient preparation. For such a text will be balanced towards everybody. But of the alternatives, the one suited to those who are utterly uneducated will trouble those who are trained because of its length while the one suitable to them will be unclear to the uneducated. But even they should not be content with using commentaries such as these, but hearing the same things from others in other ways time and again more broadly they would be able to learn something useful without mistake.

Galen recognizes that different readers may have different needs. Galen promises to explain what is in need of explanation. His use of the verb *stokhazomai* ‘aim’ is significant. Galen has a clear conception of the diversity of his readers: they have different levels of preparation but will be served by the same text nonetheless. This is the paradox of writing for the masses: one size will have to fit all (*hapantas*). Among potential readers we find at the bottom *hoi eskhatōs amatheis* (‘those who are utterly unlearned’) and at the top the *hoi hikanēn ekhontes tēn paraskeuēn* (‘those who have sufficient preparation’). Galen emphasizes that catering too much to either group will make the text unappealing to the other.

In his short prefaces to the individual parts of his Hippocratic commentaries, Galen addresses his readers in a more direct way. While the function of the audience in the main prefaces is to explain (to a reader who may not be part of this original audience) why Galen has chosen to compose his commentaries the way he has, here Galen speaks to a reader who is actually in the process of reading his text. Before starting on the next part of the commentary, Galen says, we should remember what was said earlier: ‘If anybody doesn’t remember this, he should read it carefully again and only then start on the explanation of the present text’.²⁴ This kind of comment envisages a much more active reader than the one described as the original readership.

In his preface to the first part of the commentary on the sixth book of the *Epidemics*, Galen returns to the question of how to deal with the earlier exegetical tradition. He relates this explicitly to the length and level of detail proper for a commentary. Whenever Galen discusses length, the question is always of the proper length in relation to a group of potential readers. Galen’s usually chooses the middle way, and this shows his understanding of

23 XVII/1: 84–5K (= Wenkebach 1934).

24 <μη> μεμνημένος δὲ τις ὄν εἶπον <αὔθις> ἀναγνοὺς ἐπιμελῶς αὐτὰ πρὸς τὴν τῶν νῦν προκειμένων ἐξήγησιν ἀφικνεῖσθω (XVII/1: 647K = Wenkebach 1936).

the dilemmas facing an author who is writing for a heterogeneous audience. Again, the needs of the reader are central to his argument.

πότερον μὲν οὖν ἅμεινόν ἐστιν ἀπάντων αὐτῶν ἢ μόνων τῶν εὐλόγως μεταγραφημάτων ἢ μηδενὸς ὅλως μεμνήσθαι, σκοπούμενος εὖρον, εἰ μὲν τῷ μήκει τῶν ὑπομνημάτων οὐδεὶς ἔμελλε <τῶν> ἀναγνωσομένων αὐτὰ δυσχεραίνειν, ἀπάντων μεμνήσθαι κάλλιον εἶναι, μεμφομένων δὲ πολλῶν οὐ τοῦτοις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς συμμέτρως ἔχουσι καὶ μόνα σπουδαζόντων τὰ χρήσιμα, μέσην τινὰ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν καὶ τοῦτο εὐθέως ἐν ἀρχῇ προειπεῖν, ὅπως ἀπαλλάττονται τῶνδε τῶν ὑπομνημάτων οἱ μὴ χαίροντες τούτοις. ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ, ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλα πάντα πολλοῖς τῶν δεηθέντων ἐταίρων χαριζόμενος ἐποίησα, καὶ τὰς ἐξηγήσεις ταύτας ἐκείνων ἕνεκα συνέθηκα. θεωρῶν δ' εἰς πολλοὺς ἐκπίπτοντα τὰ γραφόμενα προοιμίων τοιούτων ἐδείθην.²⁵

Considering whether it is better to mention all or just the sensible ones or none at all, I have found that if none of the readers would take offence at their length, it would be better to mention everyone. But since many criticize not just these, but also those which are more concise and only care about what is useful, I decided to make my interpretation in the middle between both of them and to say this right at the beginning, so that those who do not like them can stay away from these commentaries. For just like I made all my other writings in order to gratify many of my followers who asked me for it, I have put together these explanations as well for their sake. But seeing that the writings became known among the masses I needed prefaces such as these.

Since readers criticize not only long and detailed commentaries (which provide information on textual criticism and the views of earlier commentators) but also the commentaries which are written more *symmetrōs* ('concisely'), Galen will try and write something which is in between these extremes. He warns those readers who are only interested in what is (practically) useful right from the start, so that they can choose others types of texts. Here, Galen is actually dissociating himself from a group of potential readers. This is necessary because his commentaries are now falling into the hands of many people.

In the first part of his commentary on *Fractures*, Galen again distinguishes between pupils and a more general reading audience, as shown in the following example:

ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν μὲν παρὼν παρόντι συναγινώσκω τι βιβλίον, ἀκριβῶς στοχάζεσθαι δύναμαι τοῦ μέτρου τῆς ἐξηγήσεως, ἀποβλέπων ἐκάστοτε πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μαθητῆτος ἕξιν. ὅταν δὲ γράφω πᾶσιν, οὔτε τοῦ ἄριστα παρεσκευασμένου οὔτε τοῦ χειρίστα στοχάζομαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πλείστοις ἀσαφές ἐσται, τὸ δὲ ἀνιάται χρονίζοντας ἐν τοῖς σαφέσιν. ἄριστον οὖν ἡγοῦμαι τῶν μέσην ἕξιν ἐχόντων στοχάζεσθαι· τούτου δὲ ἀποτυγχάνων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐκτικωτέρους ἐπόπτειν μᾶλλον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅλως ὑπομνήμασιν ἐντυγχάνειν ἀξιώ, τοὺς

²⁵ XVII/1: 795–6K (= Wenkebach 1940).

κατωτέρους τῆς μέσης ἕξεως, οἷς ἀγαπητόν ἐστι παρὰ διδασκάλων ἀκούσασαι πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ κατ’ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην λέξιν ἐρμηνευόμενα συνιέναι τῶν λεγομένων.²⁶

For whenever I read a book with someone, I am able to aim precisely at the proper measure of explanation, each time considering the level of training of the learner. When, however, I write for everybody, I aim neither for the best equipped nor for the worst. For the former procedure will be unclear for most people while the other makes trouble for those who must spend a long time with things that are evident. So, I think it best to aim for those who are moderately equipped. And if I miss that, rather to look to those who are a little better equipped. For I don’t think those who are below the mean should use commentaries at all. For they prefer to hear the same things many times from their teachers and understand what is being said through various reformulations.

On the one hand, Galen envisages a situation in which he personally (*parôn paronti*) teaches a certain text (*sunanaginôskô*). In this case, it is possible to aim precisely for the most fitting level of exegesis on the basis of the level of the pupil (*tên tou manthanontos hexin*). When one is writing for everybody (*pasin*), on the other hand, it is impossible to please all readers at the same time. In this case, Galen aims for the middle. Galen considers written commentaries to be more suitable for those who are above average. Still, Galen recognizes that not all of his readers will belong to the group of suitably intelligent learners.

It is striking that when Galen describes his potential readers, the heterogeneity of this group is almost always underlined. Galen’s Hippocratic commentaries are not written to function as didactic texts at a specific level of education. Different readers will be interested in reading Galen’s explanations, and their reaction to the text will be determined by their background and level of preparation. It is noteworthy that Galen envisages readers of his commentaries on the Hippocratic texts *On joints* and *On fractures* as people who have no experience of anatomy.

πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξήγησιν ἴωμεν αὐτοῦ τοσοῦτον προειπόντες ἔτι, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς περὶ ἀγμῶν ἐξηγήσεως προείπομεν, ὡς ἔστιν ἡ ἐρμηνεία τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους ἰκανῶς σαφῆς ἐλαχίστης ἐξηγήσεως δεομένη τῶ τὰ πρῶτα μαθήματα μεμαθηκότι καὶ εἰθισμένῳ λέξεως ἀκούειν ἀνδρὸς παλαιοῦ· καὶ εἴ τις οὕτως παρεσκευασμένος ἐπ’ ἀνθρωπειῶν ὀστέων θεάσασαι τὰς κατὰ τὰς διαρθρώσεις συνθέσεις ἢ πάντως γε ἐπὶ πθηκείων ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτῷ σαφῆ φανεῖται τὰ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον. εἰ δὲ καὶ μῶν ἀνατομῆς ἐμπείρως ἔχοι καὶ ἄλλως εἴη φύσει συνετὸς, οἶδ’ ὅτι καὶ τούτῳ πολλὰ τῶν ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι γεγραμμένων φανεῖται περιττὰ φθάνοντι νοεῖν τὴν λέξιν τοῦ παλαιοῦ καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐξηγήσεων. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ μὴ μόνον τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ὑπομνήματα γράφομεν, ἅμεινον εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ τῶν ἄλλων στοχαζομένῳ, εἰ καὶ βραχεῖά τις ἀσάφεια φαίνοιτο μὴ παρέρχεσθαι ταύτην.²⁷

26 XVIII/2: 318–22K.

27 XVIII/1: 303–04K.

Let us move to the exegesis of it, having said before as much as we said also in regard to the exegesis of fractures, that the interpretation of Hippocrates is sufficiently clear and needs very little explanation for the one who has learned the basics and is used to reading texts of an ancient author. And if someone is prepared and has looked at the compositions of joints in human bones or at least in the bones of apes, the themes of this book will appear even clearer to him. If he also has experience of the anatomy of muscles and in addition is intelligent by nature, then surely for him many things written in these commentaries will appear unnecessary since he has already understood the text of the ancient writer even before my explanations. But since we don't write commentaries only for this kind of person, it seems better to me, as I aim for the others, even if a small unclarity should turn up, not to bypass it.

We have seen above that there are some students who, in Galen's view, will not profit from reading commentaries. In his comments on the beginning of the *Prognostic*, Galen indicates that he does not intend all readers to read the whole text of his commentary. Discussing different types of *exegesis* 'explanation, interpretation', Galen writes:

ἄχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦδε τὴν ἐξήγησιν ἐποιήσαμην τοῦ προοιμίου πλὴν τοῦ κατὰ τὸ θεῖον σημαυνομένου διὰ βραχυτάτων, ὅπερ εἶδος ἐξηγήσεως λόγων ἀρμόττει τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις μὲν τὰ πρῶτα, σπεύδουσι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ χρήσιμον τοῦ βιβλίου. τοῖς δ' ἤτοι λέξεως Ἑλληνικῆς ἀήθεσιν ἢ καὶ τοῖς <τῆς> ἐν λόγοις ἀκολουθίας ἀμαθέσιν ἢ οἱ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων μὲν ἀμελοῦσι, διατρίβουσι δὲ καὶ νῦν ἐκόντες ἐν τοῖς σοφιστικωτέροις τῶν λόγων, ἕτερος ἴδιος ἐξηγήσεών ἐστι τρόπος ὃ διὰ μακροτέρου περαινόμενος, ὃν ὑπερβαίνειν ὅλον ἔξεστι τοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ χρήσιμον σπεύδουσιν ἐπειλίζασιν τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ βιβλίου, μέχρι περ ἂν ἐπ' ἐκείνην ἀφίκωνται τὴν ῥῆσιν, ἧς ἡ ἀρχή· 'σκέπτεσθαι δὲ ὧδε χρὴ ἐν τοῖσιν ὀξέσι νοσήμασι'.²⁸

Until now we have given the exegesis of the preface except for the meaning of *theon* concisely. This type of exegesis of the words is fitting to those who are learning the basics and looking for what is useful in the book. But for those who either are unused to Greek expressions or also for those who have not learned about the sequence of arguments or those who are not interested in what is useful, but are already by their own choice spending their time with more sophistic arguments, there is a separate mode of exegesis which is more expansive. The whole of this may be skipped by those who are looking for what is useful if they roll past the part of the book until they come to that lemma which begins 'In this way one must investigate in the acute diseases...'.²⁸

In this passage, Galen addresses two different groups of readers in the same practical manner that we saw earlier. Galen states that his mode of explanation so far has been suitable for those readers who are learning the basics and are interested in the usefulness of the book. As we have seen above, usefulness (*to khrésimon*) is a keyword in the *schema isagogicum*.

²⁸ XVIII/2: 6–7K (= Heeg 1915).

There is, however, another separate type of explanation which is more detailed. Galen's description of the type of reader who might be interested in this form of explanation includes the following: a) those who are unfamiliar with the Greek language (*lexis Hellēnikē*), b) those who do not know logic, and c) those who practise sophistic arguments. It is noteworthy that the second group of readers envisaged here by Galen is again quite varied. They are opposed to readers who only seek practical, useful instruction and are characterized by their apparent willingness to engage with Hippocrates' text in a more detailed way, either through philology or philosophy.

In a final example from the third part of the commentary on the *Prognostic*, Galen returns to his familiar account of the genesis of his Hippocratic commentaries:

δύο πραγματείας ἔχετε (πρὸς ὑμᾶς γὰρ λέγω τοῦτο τοὺς ἐταίρους, ὅσοι καθηναγκάσατέ με μὴ προηρημένον ἐξηγήσεις γράψαι περὶ Ἱπποκράτους συγγραμμάτων), ἐν αἷς ἅπαντα περὶ τε κρισίμων ἡμερῶν εἰρηται καὶ κρίσεων. ἴστε δ' ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰς οὐχ ὡς ἐκδοθησομένης, ἀλλ' ὡς παρ' ὑμῖν μόνοις ἐσομένης ἔγραψα. συνέβη δ' ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτὰς καὶ παρὰ πολλοῖς εἶναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ὑμῖν γενομένων. ὅθεν οὐδ' ἐξηγεῖσθαι προηρούμην ἐν ὑπομνήμασιν οὐδὲν τῶν Ἱπποκράτους βιβλίων. ὅσα γὰρ εἰς τὴν τέχνην χρήσιμα παρ' αὐτοῦ μαθεῖν ἔδει, γέγραπται μοι κατὰ πολλὰς πραγματείας ἅμα ταῖς οἰκείαις ἐξηγήσεσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι τῶν λέξεων ἀσαφέστερον εἰρημέναι μοχθηρὰς ἐξηγήσεως ἔτυχον, ὡς ἀρέσκειν ὑμῖν μηδένα τῶν γραφάντων ὑπομνήματα, βέλτιον δὲ αὐτῶν στοχάσασθαι τῆς Ἱπποκράτους γνώμης ἐδόκουν ὑμῖν ἐγώ, διὰ τοῦτό με καὶ διὰ γραμμάτων ἠξιώσατε, παρασχεῖν ὑμῖν, ἅπερ ἐν ταῖς διὰ λόγων συνουσίαις ἠκούσατε. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ προεῖπον ὑμῖν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τὰς ἐξηγήσεις ἀνωμάλους ἔσεσθαι μὴ πάσας ὁμοίως ἐξηγουμένου μου τὰς λέξεις, ἀλλὰ τελεώτερον μὲν, ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδαμῶθι τῶν ἐμῶν πραγματειῶν ἐμνημόνευσα, διὰ κεφαλαίων δέ, περὶ ὧν ἤδη τελέως ἐν ἐκείναις διήλθον, ἵνα μὴ πολλὰκις ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀναγκάζωμαι γράφειν.²⁹

You have two treatises; I am saying this to all you followers who have forced me against my will to write explanations of Hippocratic writings. In these everything concerning critical days and crises has been said. But know that these too I wrote not for publication, but for you only. They happened to come out and be in the hands of many, just like many others which were made for you. For this reason I did not choose to explain in the form of commentaries any of the books of Hippocrates. For what one should learn from him that is useful for the art of medicine, has been included by me in many treatises together with the relevant explanations. But since some of the words which had been expressed rather unclearly received bad explanations, so that none of the texts of those who have written already were sufficient for you, and since you thought that I could hit the target of Hippocrates' opinion better than them, for this reason you asked me to provide you in writing too with those things you had heard in discussion when we were together. And I have told you before exactly this, that it is necessary that the explanations will be uneven since I will not explain

²⁹ XVIII/2: 229–31K (= Heeg 1915).

all passages in the same way, but more completely those things which I haven't mentioned in any of my treatises, more concisely those things which I have gone through thoroughly in those books, so I won't be forced to write many times about the same topics.

In this passage Galen returns to themes which we have already met in other prefaces to commentaries. He addresses directly the followers (*hetairoi*) who have made him write explanations of Hippocratic texts and points them to two other works which are relevant to the *Prognostic*. He insists again that his writings were not originally meant for a wider audience and that he himself did not choose to write them. The faulty interpretations of other writers have forced him to put into writing the teaching which originated in an oral context (*haper en tais dia logôn sunousiais êkousate*). The present commentary will supplement his earlier writings and will therefore go into more detail on some points and less detail on others.

The two groups of readers are kept strictly separate. In the passage just discussed, Galen remarks that his comments will differ depending on whether or not he has already treated the questions in other works. There is, however, no mention of the different levels of understanding which different readers bring to the text.

Unfortunately, we do not know much about the specifics of how Galen's texts were studied in his own lifetime or in the century following his death.³⁰ In later times, Galen's texts entered the formal curriculum of medical students.³¹ The references to and discussion of their likely audiences within the texts themselves do, however, provide us with a glimpse of who Galen thought his readers would be. Galen consistently describes two different groups of readers. On the one hand, we find his friends and followers, to whom a written text is a substitute for personal instruction; on the other, we find a surprisingly varied group of readers who are dependent on Galen's written text alone. Galen shows himself to be conscious of the varied needs of this second group of readers and so indirectly provides us with a picture of how his texts were used in his time.

³⁰ It is clear that they were spread widely, cf. Nutton 2004, 228f.

³¹ See Iskandar 1976.

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Ibsen and Sallust

EGIL KRAGGERUD

When Øivind Andersen, as the first director of the Norwegian Institute at Athens, arranged a pioneering conference on ‘Antiquity in Norwegian Literature’ in November 1992 with his Bergen colleague Asbjørn Aarseth, the result was a thorough and useful survey.¹ However, the most conspicuous example of influence I am aware of was only superficially touched upon.² I will try below to fill that lacuna now, basing my article on my study *Catilina og Ibsen*.³

On the face of it, one might think that Henrik Ibsen would interest a classicist primarily because his modern dramas quite often convey a spirit akin to Greek drama and to Euripides in particular.⁴ But this influence is hard to pin down in detail. As was his wont, Ibsen reveals very little about his influences. He probably never saw a Greek play performed on stage and none was ever staged in Norway before Ibsen’s death, as far as I know.⁵ As for ancient literature, then, Ibsen’s use of the historians, Sallust and Ammianus Marcellinus, in his so-called ‘Roman dramas’ is much more evident than the possible general influence from Greek tragedy.⁶ Whereas Ammianus is important to every student of *Kejser og Galilæer*,⁷ Sallust has hardly received the attention he deserves in Ibsen’s biography.⁸ Indeed, had it not been for Sallust or, to put it bluntly, had it not been for that notorious villain Lucius Sergius Catilina, I am not sure that Ibsen would have become a dramatist or, at least, he would not have made his debut early enough to attract the attention of the violinist Ole Bull, who recruited him for his newly established Norwegian Theatre in Bergen in 1851, thus giving Ibsen the mandate to write dramas to be produced each year.⁹

At the age of 15, Ibsen had been sent by his bankrupt father from the town of his birth, Skien, to the tiny town of Grimstad further down the coast in order to become an apprentice at the local pharmacy. Hopefully, he would in due time be able to enter university and become a medical practitioner.

1 Andersen and Aarseth 1993.

2 Haugan 1993, 151.

3 Kraggerud 2005.

4 Kraggerud 2013.

5 See Kraggerud 2013, 1101, n. 3.

6 The designation stems from Rudolf Sokolowsky’s 1902 article in the German periodical *Euphorion*.

7 See in particular HIS 6K.

8 e.g. Figueiredo 2006, 70.

9 See Kroepelien 2006, 123–49.

While he was going about his duties in the pharmacy, literary interests took up much of his spare time. In the third year, 1846, Ibsen received the shock (and humiliation) of his life: at 18 years old he became a father. The mother of the child was a maid in the pharmacist's house who was 10 years older than him. Ibsen was sentenced to pay maintenance for his son for 14 years. This new obligation in his life, which was disclosed in detail only some years ago,¹⁰ is reflected more or less dimly several times in his plays.

At the age of 20 he began to prepare for entrance to university. Latin, which he already had a basic knowledge of from his time in Skien, was a crucial subject for an external candidate. He hired a private tutor to assist him with the most demanding parts of the curriculum. But in the winter of 1848/49 the preparations came more or less to a halt; the cause of this educational derailment was his urge to write a play about Catiline, in verse as convention then required. Catiline was prominent in his Latin reading;¹¹ 25 years later, Ibsen found the play essential enough to his production to revise it for a second edition. It is in this edition that he offers us a rare glimpse into his past and discloses why he had been so fascinated by Catiline. The preface gives us a highly interesting, but somewhat one-sided, account of the background to his first play. Ibsen tells us about the agitated times back in the late 1840s, about the February revolution which led to a call for emancipation among oppressed people across Europe, and about Denmark's war with mighty Prussia in Schleswig. He was himself ablaze on behalf of liberty and was at odds with his own little community, where he felt much constrained by his circumstances. 'Then I read Cicero and Sallust on Catiline and I devoured these writings. As can be seen, I did not share their opinion about Catiline's character and behaviour.' Ibsen vents his contempt for the demagogue Cicero 'who did not dare to attack Catiline unless he could do so safely'. By 1875 Ibsen had far more knowledge about Roman history than in 1848/49. In the sixties he had read that great masterpiece, Theodor Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte*.¹² Ibsen would probably have subscribed to Mommsen's low opinion of Cicero's personality. But when Ibsen gives us the impression that he himself by and large disapproves of Sallust, this is at best insufficient. Being a historian, Sallust had a basic advantage over Cicero, since history had a stronger appeal to Ibsen than rhetoric. Sallust had, moreover, chosen to deal with Catiline as his first main character of Roman history because he wanted to direct attention to a particularly ugly excrescence on Roman society. Sallust had seen his own society in a very critical light. The historian's philosophical

10 Dahl 2000.

11 On *Catilina* see Eitrem 1940, 103–26 and 147–51, and Larson 1999, 85–106.

12 *HIS* 12, 323.

bent makes his account of Catiline a valid diagnosis of the Roman society of his youth, whereas Cicero's scornful attacks contain no such analytical dimension. Ibsen, however, had no intention of writing a correct account of the crisis that occurred between early November 63 BC and early January 62 BC, the time which was covered by his play. He felt free to reshuffle some events and even alter others deliberately. For instance, Lentulus, Catiline's second in command, appears just before the last battle and tries to assassinate Catiline because Ibsen wanted to dramatize a tension between them, a tension which is hinted at by Cicero (*In Catilinam* 3. 9). In his play, the envoys from the Allobrogian Gauls meet Catiline himself in Rome, i.e. before Catiline's hasty departure from the city and contrary to the historical record.

It is easy to distinguish Ibsen's primary concern: his play is very much about Catiline's tormented soul. Ibsen's attention is focused upon a deeply divided character who is unable to control the conflicting forces in himself. His protagonist cherishes an idealism that cannot be reconciled with his gross ambition. His admiration of noble love alternates with hedonistic lust and egoism. These conflicts enable us to observe the hallmark of Ibsen's genius – a penetrating analysis of character combined with a critical scrutiny of his own self. A couple of Ibsen quotes are particularly relevant here: in an untranslatable epigram he says: 'To live is war with trolls | in the vault of the heart and brain. | To write – that is to experience personally the Day of Judgement.'¹³ In a letter he writes: 'All I have written has in the closest way to do with what I have lived through'.¹⁴ Ibsen bears witness to this self-diagnosis in the first act where we meet Catiline the seducer, a scene blowing up Sallust's short piece of information about Catiline's affair with a noble lady and with a Vestal virgin (*Sall. Cat.* 15. 1). In Ibsen's play the Vestal Virgin is pivotal. The clandestine encounter between Catiline and the priestess is disclosed. She, called Furia by Ibsen, is seized and condemned to death, whereas Catiline escapes. She is later saved from her dungeon and becomes the sort of demon for Catiline which her name had foreboded. Ibsen has doubled the motif of seduction by giving the priestess a sister who was driven to suicide by Catiline. Without knowing who the culprit was, Catiline is induced by Furia to swear a solemn oath to take vengeance on her sister's seducer, whereupon it is revealed that he himself is the guilty man. Thus, Catiline condemns himself to death. This self-inflicted curse comes true at the end of the play when Catiline survives the battle; as for the curse, it is implemented in an intricate arrangement involving the demonic Furia. Catiline murders his loving wife Aurelia, Furia kills him while

¹³ *HIS* 11, 613, see also 11, 452 and 14, 47.

¹⁴ *HIS* 14, 47, 14–16.

Aurelia's forgiving love saves his soul, and he can die on her dying breast while the vanquished Furia retreats from the scene.

In this way Ibsen enhanced one passage in Sallust, making ruthless and sacrilegious lust a core element in Catiline's tragedy. With open eyes he also incorporated into his drama other destructive traits of the reckless man portrayed by both Sallust and Cicero. But as Aristotle taught us in the *Poetics*, a bad character is no fit subject for tragedy, so the Catiline of the sources was no tragic hero. Ibsen's Catiline is a mixed character. His Don Juan nature and roguish side are at war with a genuine social conscience which is unable to accept the injustice caused by greed and exploitation. But his political idealism is not allowed to outshine his darker sides. On the contrary, the better part of his nature does not stand a chance of prevailing in the course of the drama.

Sallust was in fact able to provide the young playwright with all he needed for his character, mostly because of Sallust's technique as a historian. Sallust uses speeches to demonstrate the motives of his protagonists in the Thucydidean manner, by inserting the speeches, and even letters, with the effect of activating the forensic principle *audiatur et altera pars* and thereby introducing a true dialectic element in his history. This element contributes to shed light on the rebellion, however criminal its leaders were in the eyes of the historian. The revolutionary feelings beneath it all are interpreted rather well by Sallust in chapter 20, where Catiline expresses strong indignation over people's living conditions. The only possible escape from their slave-like existence is to seize liberty. The ruling class exploits the whole world and sprawls in its own riches. The virtues and merits of the common people count for nothing. Catiline's followers are called proletarians (*miseri*), but that may have been only partly true since some may well have lost their livelihood due to their own incompetence and extravagant lifestyle. But Sallust must have acknowledged that the call for the abolition of debt was widespread and justified. A serious revolt cannot be explained only as a result of low morals and bad character. Ibsen had a sharp eye for both sides of the case. His main point was, however, that true, unselfish idealism and a just cause may well be represented by a more-than-dubious character; and Ibsen has no need to step outside of Sallust's treatise to create such a self-contradictory protagonist. In chapter 28, Sallust mentions the subversive political activity of Gaius Manlius in Etruria. Manlius had much success because of people's poverty and resentment. Equality and justice served as a muster call. This resentment is elaborated in Manlius' letter to Q. Marcius Rex, who was sent by Rome to quench the rebellion (chapter 33). Manlius explains to the general that the aim of the revolt is to restore what people have lost due to their economic ruin, namely their *liberum corpus*. A prerequisite for being a Roman citizen is that

you have that basic liberty, a fundamental human right. Neither power nor wealth is the insurgents' aim according to Manlius. His appeal is followed by a harsh attack on the corrupt practices of the praetors. Similarly, in his letter to Catulus in chapter 35, Catiline emphasizes his efforts on behalf of impoverished people.

In this indirect way, Sallust concedes that the arguments of Catiline and Manlius are significant factors in explaining the strength of the revolt. Likewise, the episode of the Allobrogian envoys in chapter 40 reveals the same indignant dissatisfaction with being oppressed by debt and taxes. Ibsen avails himself of these passages: he uses the same notions and apparently feels no need to add anything to the arguments used by Catiline and Manlius in Sallust. Ibsen's analysis of Roman society is simply what can be distilled in clear terms from Sallust. In fact, Ibsen's version helps us disclose the ambivalence in Sallust's account. Nobody at that time was more aware than Sallust of the faults and vices flourishing in Roman society. But, for the ancient historian, Catiline is only a hideous symptom of the society's moral decline, and he refrains from calling for a policy to mend gross social injustice. Thanks to the dialectic technique, however, Sallust is at least an indirect mouthpiece for justified social dissatisfaction. Sallust inspired the young pharmacist's assistant to think for himself and call for a radical improvement of society and an end to oppression and inequality. The deplorable thing is that only Catiline was the champion of that vision.

Ibsen does not gloss over an essential point contained in Sallust's analysis: that Catiline had been corrupted by the times in which he lived. As a politician he is a victim of immense ambition, and to gain power through election he uses bribery (which is made possible by the misuse of his wife's money). Such behaviour he tries to excuse because it is the only way to realize a radical programme in a corrupt society. At the same time, Ibsen illustrates Catiline's altruistic generosity when he portrays him giving away the last of his money to an old, needy soldier. But whereas Sallust is close to splitting up his main character into irreconcilable figures and making the criminal rebel respond – hypocritically, of course – to the plight of the masses, young Ibsen deliberately gives his protagonist a highly complex, not to say self-contradictory personality in which positive and negative sides are constantly at war with each other. Ibsen's protagonist is no chance result of elements that the author has culled from his sources. Rather Ibsen has recognized in the Roman rogue a genuinely human character whom Ibsen felt to be akin to himself in his own situation. As a consequence, his Catiline has become a *mixtum compositum* of rather incompatible *personae*, a peculiar feat that in some ways characterizes many of his main scenic characters. Ibsen would have received no approval for this

from Aristotle, and hardly any from Sallust. On the other hand, his protagonist is nonetheless truer to life than the characters envisaged by Aristotelian theory.

This aspect of the protagonist's personality is emphasized in a mature way in Catiline's opening monologue. In only five lines (*HIS* 1, 137, lines 9–18), Ibsen introduces the three *personae* of Catiline: the Catiline with idealistic dreams in politics; the brutal and egoistic libertine, an emblem of Roman decadence who ousted his early idealistic ambitions; and finally the escapist who is on the point of withdrawing from society:

I must! I must! Deep down within my soul
a voice commands. And I will do its bidding;
I feel I have the courage and the strength
to lead a better, nobler life than this,
one endless round of dissipated pleasures!
No, they can never still my inner urge!
Mad ravings! All I crave is to forget.
It is too late! I have no aim in life!
Ah, what became of all my youthful dreams?

Ibsen's Catiline is a tragic hero whose idealism ends in total defeat, although his soul is finally redeemed by his loving wife.

Ibsen's Catiline is a leader who is spurred on to his seditious role by his friends, but since his friends are led by all sorts of low motives that pervert the purity of Catiline's ambitions, he is a tragic figure in that respect as well. The informed spectator would undoubtedly have thought beforehand that Catiline was no great leader, no Gracchus, and so a beneficial result could never have come out of it all. That is probably what young Ibsen thought too.

We have yet to discuss the deeper, and perhaps the most important, inspiration which Ibsen took from Sallust. This inspiration is found in the first four chapters of *Bellum Catilinae*, which deal with Sallust's own political career before he became a writer. These chapters contain not only a highly interesting account of Sallust's change of career but also a succinct philosophy which is applied to Roman history. Sallust presents himself as an unsuccessful politician. As a young man he was unable to adapt himself to the often corrupt, ruthless and greedy ways that prevailed in politics. Indeed, he confesses that he himself, being an inexperienced young man, was infected by the low morals of the times. This kind of greedy and corrupt life was far from what a human being should aspire to, according to this honest self-examination. Admittedly it is laid down in our nature to have ambition, he says, and we should not allow ourselves to pass our life in obscurity, but we should seek true *gloria* through *animi virtus* ('excellence of mind'), which, being the divine part of

the soul, must be our guiding principle. History itself bears witness to the truth of this. The strength of nations is due to men's intellectual abilities and moral strength, both in times of peace and in war. When vices are on the increase in society it loses its strength and is doomed unless the vices are halted. The same law of life holds good on an individual level as well. In all activities of life the *animi virtus* is a decisive factor. If a man succumbs to the body and gives in to pleasures and lust, he will forfeit *gloria*. Instead he must try to achieve something great. Our possibilities are, in principle, as many as there are noble professions. Which one to pursue depends on the individual talent. Sallust goes on to compare two of these professions: the political career is traditionally regarded as the best way to serve one's country; but against this he holds up the writer's profession which means one can serve one's country equally well, since words are not to be rated below actions. To finish the argument Sallust refers to himself as an example: to achieve the right form of *gloria* in accordance with his own talent, he luckily came to his senses, left politics, and turned to writing history instead.

Proceeding from this philosophical preface to the following account of Catiline's life, one might view the politician Catiline as the negative counterpart to Sallust: the historian, in time, applied his talent to a noble profession, whereas his protagonist misused his indubitable talents to pervert politics. Catiline is indeed a warning example. Ibsen was, above all, fascinated by Sallust's preface. As he later said, he was already writing verses at the time, trying to encourage the Swedish king to join the Danes in defending Denmark. He must have sympathized from the bottom of his heart with Sallust's elevation of the writer's role. One of Ibsen's slogans was that one must venture to entertain great thoughts. An angry young man could channel his radicalism into an ambitious literary genre. The choice must have been obvious: no genre could depict and structure life with its human agents and their choices like drama. At the same time this genre could also give Ibsen's own life meaning and direction. Under the influence of Sallust, Ibsen points to a political programme he sympathized with, that is, in its ideal form; but the politician who had activated the programme, Catiline, came to a tragic end for obvious reasons. More importantly, Catiline is a man whose character Ibsen recognizes in himself, but like Sallust, Ibsen chooses a literary vocation.

It now remains for me to say something about what came out of Ibsen's *Catilina*. A couple of devoted friends were privy to this undertaking, and one of them made a fair copy and went to Christiania to have the play printed under a pseudonym, but this was unsuccessful in so far as the friend had to pay for the printing from his own purse. Nor would the theatre put on the play. Although the men of the board offered praise, they did not believe that it could

be a box-office success. Ibsen was nevertheless persuaded by his friend to leave Grimstad and pursue his career in the capital. While earning his living by writing for magazines and composing occasional poems, which came easily to him, Ibsen failed the entrance exam at the university. The next year tipped the scales in his favour, however. He wrote in haste another play which was better suited to the tastes of the bourgeoisie. In early autumn 1851 he met the violinist Ole Bull, whose earnings abroad had allowed him to realize his dream of establishing a Norwegian, not Danish-speaking, theatre in Bergen. Ibsen's *Catilina* had already come to Bull's attention. He deeply sympathized with the young, versatile playwright and was convinced of his potential. They met, and Bull hired him on the spot for his theatre, both to take part in the productions and to stage plays of his own. Ibsen even got the opportunity to go abroad to study theatre in Denmark and Germany. The six years spent in Bergen gave him first-hand knowledge of the repertoire and all the practical experience he needed. And last, but not least, he met his Suzannah there, and she became his greatest ally in his future career.

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Politische Organisationsform und menschliches Verhalten in der griechisch-römischen und altchinesischen Geschichtsschreibung¹

FRITZ-HEINER MUTSCHLER

Herodot, der sogenannte Vater der (westlichen) Geschichtsschreibung war von erstaunlicher interkultureller Offenheit. Dies zeigt schon die Anlage seines Werks. In dem es nicht um rein griechische, sondern um griechisch-nahöstliche Geschichte geht und in dem zahlreiche Exkurse nicht nur über die Frühgeschichte griechischer Poleis wie Athen und Sparta, sondern auch über die Bräuche von Skythen und Indern, die kulturellen Hervorbringungen der alten Ägypter und Babylonier und die politischen und militärischen Leistungen der Perserkönige informieren.

Andererseits ist in der Darstellung der Perserkriege, die mehr als die Hälfte des Werkes ausmacht, die Sympathie Herodots für die griechische Seite nicht zu übersehen. Sie ist unmittelbar mit dem Menschenbild verknüpft, das Griechen und Persern zugeordnet wird. In diesem Menschenbild sind Freiheit auf der einen, Gehorsam und Zwang auf der anderen von entscheidender Bedeutung. Zum ersten Mal wird es in einer der historischen Retrospektiven entfaltet, die das Werk allenthalben durchziehen. In einem Rückblick auf die innere Entwicklung Athens fasst Herodot das Ergebnis der Befreiung der Stadt von der Tyrannis der Peisistrastiden folgendermaßen zusammen (5,78):

Die Athener waren nun groß geworden; und es zeigte sich nicht nur in einer Hinsicht, sondern in jeder, dass die politische Gleichheit eine gute Sache ist, da die Athener, solange sie unter der Herrschaft der Tyrannen standen, im Krieg nicht besser als irgendwelche ihrer Nachbarn waren, aber nachdem sie sich von den Tyrannen befreit hatten, bei weitem die besten von allen wurden. Das zeigt, dass sie sich, solange sie unterdrückt waren, absichtlich nachlässig verhielten, weil sie für einen Herrn tätig waren, aber nach der Befreiung jeder einzelne für sich selbst bestrebt war, etwas zustande zu bringen.²

1 The past of the past and in particular the past past's present as example and paradigm have been the subject of many important contributions by Øivind Andersen. At the same time, the honoree of this volume is one of the most widely travelled of academics, a knowledgeable appreciator of many countries and cultures. In view of these two facts I hope that the above modest remarks may pique my old friend's benevolent interest.

2 Alle Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen und Lateinischen sind meine eigenen.

Das auf diese Weise gestärkte Athen erweist seine moralische und militärische Stärke auch in der Auseinandersetzung mit den Persern. Als im Jahr 490 v. Ch. Dareios sein Heer nach Griechenland schickt, „um Eretria und Athen zu versklaven“ (6,94,2), widerstehen die Athener auch, nachdem Eretria durch Verrat gefallen ist, und besiegen das Heer des Großkönigs bei Marathon. Der Sieg der Griechen im Ersten Perserkrieg ist für Herodot der Sieg des freiheitlichen Athen über die Untertanenarmee des Großkönigs.

Auch den Zweiten Perserkrieg stellt Herodot unter das Signum von Freiheit und Sklaverei, wobei auf griechischer Seite in diesem Fall besonderes Augenmerk auf Sparta liegt. In der Mitte von Buch 7 will Xerxes, der Nachfolger des Dareios, nicht glauben, dass wenige hundert oder tausend Spartaner es wagen werden, sich seiner Riesenarmee entgegenzustellen, zumal sie nicht der Kontrolle eines einzelnen unterworfen sind und so zur Not in den Kampf gepeitscht werden können (7,103). Der in seiner Entourage befindliche ehemalige Spartanerkönig Demaratos klärt ihn auf, dass es für freie Bürger einen stärkeren Zwang gibt als die Furcht vor einem König (7,104,4–5):

Denn obwohl sie frei sind, sind sie es nicht in jeder Hinsicht; denn über ihnen steht als Herr das Gesetz, das sie noch viel mehr fürchten als dich deine Untertanen. So tun sie, was immer das Gesetz ihnen gebietet; es gebietet aber immer dasselbe: vor keiner Menge von Menschen aus der Schlacht zurückzuweichen, sondern in der Schlachtordnung zu verharren und zu siegen oder zu sterben.

Einige Wochen später erweist die Schlacht bei den Thermopylen den Wahrheitsgehalt der Worte des Demaratos.

Mehrere Kapitel später kommt es zu einem Dialog zweier spartanischer Gesandter mit einem persischen Heerführer, der den Spartanern mit Verweis auf die eigene komfortable Position rät, die Oberherrschaft des Großkönigs anzuerkennen und in dessen Namen in Griechenland eine führende Rolle zu spielen. Die Antwort der Spartaner lautet (7,135,3):

Dein Rat an uns, Hydarnes, ist nicht ausgewogen. Denn du gibst ihn, nachdem du das eine erprobt hast, aber ohne Erfahrung des anderen. Ein Sklave zu sein, verstehst du, aber die Freiheit hast du noch nicht gekostet, ob sie süß ist oder nicht. Hättest du sie gekostet, würdest du uns raten, nicht nur mit Speeren für sie zu kämpfen, sondern auch mit Beilen.

Es ist offenkundig. Herodot sieht die Perserkriege nicht zuletzt als eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen Freiheit und Autokratie, zwischen wohlorganisierter, aber gleichwohl restriktiver Alleinherrschaft auf der einen und der Freiheit von

Polisbürgern, die nur sich selbst und den selbst gegebenen Gesetzen verpflichtet sind, auf der anderen Seite. Welcher politischen Organisationsform nach Meinung Herodots der Vorzug zukommt, steht ebenso wenig in Frage, wie dass er die unterschiedlichen Lebensordnungen und die mit diesen verbundenen unterschiedlichen Verhaltensweisen als einen entscheidenden Grund für den Erfolg der einen und die Niederlage der anderen Seite ansieht.

Im Folgenden möchte ich – auf Herodots interkulturellen Spuren wandelnd – der Frage nachgehen, ob die Opposition „Freiheit vs. Autokratie“ sowie die Vorstellung eines Zusammenhangs von Lebensordnung und politisch-militärischer Leistungsfähigkeit auch in der Geschichtsschreibung Roms und des alten China eine Rolle spielen und, wenn ja, welche. Was Rom betrifft, so sind – kaum überraschend – zwei Wendepunkte der „nationalen“ Geschichte von besonderem Interesse: der Übergang vom Königtum zur Republik und der von der Republik zur Kaisertum. Auf den ersten geht Sallust prononciert ein, der zweite ist ein zentrales Thema des Tacitus.

Sallust gibt sich trotz seiner mehrjährigen Anhängerschaft an Caesar in seinen nach Caesars Tod verfassten Werken als entschiedener Fürsprecher republikanischer Freiheit. In seiner Monographie über die Catilinarische Verschwörung bietet er kurz nach Beginn einen knappen Abriss der römischen Geschichte. In diesem beschreibt er die Wirkung der Abschaffung des Königtums und der Etablierung der Republik folgendermaßen (*Cat.* 7, 3–7):

Unglaublich klingt es, wie sehr sich das Gemeinwesen nach erlangter Freiheit in kurzer Zeit entwickelte. Ein solches Verlangen nach Ruhm war aufgekommen. ... Jeder bemühte sich, einen Feind niederzustrecken, eine Mauer zu ersteigen und gesehen zu werden, während er eine solche Tat vollbrachte. ... Gierig nach Ruhm waren sie freigebig mit Geld; Ruhm wünschten sie sich ungeheuren, Reichtum nur rechtmäßigen. Ich könnte berichten, an welchen Orten das römische Volk in kleiner Zahl größte Streitkräfte der Feinde in die Flucht schlug, welche durch ihre natürliche Lage geschützten Städte es im Kampf einnahm; aber das würde mich zu weit von meinem Thema abführen.

Sallusts liberalistisches Credo ist eindrucksvoll. Die republikanische Verfassung setzt die Kräfte der einzelnen frei, die unter der Monarchie an ihrer Entfaltung gehindert wurden. Auf diese Weise kommt es zu einem intensiven Wettbewerb um soziale Anerkennung, um Ruhm, und dieser Umstand bedingt eine Steigerung der militärischen Leistungsfähigkeit des Gemeinwesens, der kein Gegner gewachsen ist. Zusammen mit anderen Eigenschaften wie Eintracht und Selbstbeschränkung im Inneren sowie Vertragstreue und Gerechtigkeit nach außen hin führen das frei sich entfaltende, aber nicht ausufernde Ruhmesstreben und die von ihm stimulierte *virtus* zur

kontinuierlichen Ausdehnung der römischen Herrschaft, bis schließlich, alle Länder und Meere offenstanden“ (*Cat.* 10,1).³

Die Veränderung der Verhältnisse von der Republik zum Prinzipat und die Wirkung, die diese Veränderung auf das Denken und Verhalten der politischen Handelnden hat, sind anderthalb Jahrhunderte später eines der großen Themen des Tacitus (c.55–120 n. Chr.). Seine Sicht der Dinge ist geprägt durch die persönliche Erfahrung der entartenden Herrschaft Domitians, des letzten Flavierkaisers, deren Überleben für viele mit dem Verlust des eigenen moralischen Selbst verbunden war.⁴ Die Bedingung der Möglichkeit einer solchen Entwicklung sieht Tacitus in der Ablösung der republikanischen Staatsform durch die Monarchie. Dementsprechend negativ beschreibt er diesen Vorgang zu Beginn seines letzten Werkes, der *Annalen*. Seinen Anfang nimmt alles mit der raffinierten Machtergreifung des Augustus und der unwürdigen Reaktion der senatorischen Führungsschicht darauf (*Ann.* 1,2,1):

Sobald er die Soldaten durch Geschenke, das Volk durch eine Getreidespende und alle durch die Süßigkeit des Friedens verlockt hatte, erhob er sich allmählich und zog die Befugnisse der Konsuln, des Senats und der Gesetze an sich. Dabei leistete niemand Widerstand, da die Tapfersten in den militärischen Auseinandersetzungen oder durch die Proskriptionen umgekommen waren und die übrigen Adligen, je eher einer bereit war, sich zu versklaven, desto mehr durch Reichtum und Ehrenämter gefördert wurden.

Auch der Tod des Augustus bringt keine Änderung. Vielmehr stürzen sich „in Rom alle, Konsuln, Senatoren und Ritter in die Sklaverei“ (*Ann.* 1,7,1). In den ersten Senatssitzungen nach dem Tod des Kaisers überbieten sich Tiberius und die Senatoren in wechselseitiger Schmeichelei und Unehrlichkeit, bis Tiberius – vorgeblich gegen seinen Willen – dem liebedienerischen Drängen der Senatoren nachgibt, „zwar ohne offen zu bekennen, dass die Herrschaft von ihm übernommen werde, aber doch, indem er aufhörte, sie zurückzuweisen und sich bitten zu lassen“ (*Ann.* 1,13,5). Die Verhältnisse in den ersten Senatssitzungen sind symptomatisch für die gesamte Herrschaft

³ Im weiteren Verlauf seines historischen Abrisses skizziert Sallust dann freilich, wie nach der endgültigen Etablierung dieser Herrschaft alsbald eine moralische Degeneration einsetzt, in deren Verlauf die genannten Tugenden vernachlässigt werden und ungezügelter Geltungssucht und schrankenloser Habgier sowie Hochmut und Grausamkeit an ihre Stelle treten (*Cat.* 10–13). Die drohende Gefahr des Verlustes der innenpolitischen Freiheit hat Sallust noch nicht im Blick. Doch dass in seinen Augen die moralische Entwicklung für Rom die Gefahr des auch politischen Niedergangs und des Verlusts der imperialen Macht in sich birgt, unterliegt keinem Zweifel.

⁴ In den ersten Kapiteln seiner Erstlingsschrift, der kleinen Biographie seines Schwiegervaters Agricola, beschreibt Tacitus die Situation und legt dabei auch die eigene Verstricktheit in die Umstände offen. Unter anderem spricht er davon, dass während der fünfzehnjährigen Herrschaft Domitians „viele durch Zufall, gerade die Entschlossensten durch das Wüten des Prinzeips zugrunde gegangen seien“ und dass die wenigen Übergebliebenen wie er selbst, „nicht nur die anderen, sondern auch sich selbst überlebt hätten“ (3,2).

des Tiberius. Was der Kaiser den Senatoren ab und an gewährt sind *simulacra libertatis*, „Scheinbilder von Freiheit“ (*Ann.* 1,77,3). In Wahrheit beobachtet er ängstlich und misstrauisch, was wer sagt und was er daraus für dessen Einstellung gegenüber sich selbst erschließen kann. Auf Seiten der Senatoren führt dies zu kontinuierlicher Heuchelei und Selbsterniedrigung sowie bei sich zuspitzender Gefahr immer wieder zu Akten gemeiner Niederträchtigkeit. Die innenpolitische Situation hat außenpolitische Konsequenzen. Ängstlich darauf bedacht, keinen seiner Amtsträger zu erfolgreich sein zu lassen, beruft der Kaiser fähige Heerführer wie seinen Neffen Germanicus ab. An der Erweiterung der Grenzen des Reiches ist er nicht interessiert. Tacitus sieht die historiographischen Konsequenzen dieser Situation und beklagt sie (*Ann.* 4,32,2):

Mein Bemühen bewegt sich in einem engen Bereich und ist ohne Glanz und Ruhm. Denn der Frieden blieb unangetastet oder wurde nur leicht gestört, die Verhältnisse in der Hauptstadt waren bedrückend und der Kaiser an der Erweiterung des Reiches nicht interessiert.

Den Leser muss der Geschichtsschreiber so notwendigerweise enttäuschen (*Ann.* 4,33,3):

Die örtlichen Verhältnisse von Völkern, der wechselnde Verlauf von Schlachten, der ruhmreiche Tod von Feldherrn fesseln und erfrischen den Geist der Leser. Ich reihe grausame Befehle, beständige Anklagen, treulose Freundschaften, das Verderben Unschuldiger und die immer gleichen Ursachen ihres Untergangs aneinander, wobei die Ähnlichkeit der Verhältnisse und der entsprechende Überdruß offensichtlich sind.

Fassen wir kurz zusammen. Auch in der römischen Geschichtsschreibung spielt die Opposition von Bürgerfreiheit und autokratischer Alleinherrschaft eine zentrale Rolle, allerdings nicht in der Entgegensetzung römischer und nicht-römischer Lebensordnung, sondern bei der Deutung allein der eigenen, römischen Geschichte. Einander gegenübergestellt werden die freie Republik und – bei Sallust – die Schlussphase der Königszeit sowie – bei Tacitus – die Anfänge der Kaiserzeit. Beide Römer sehen wie Herodot einen unmittelbaren Zusammenhang zwischen der Form der politischen Ordnung, der Denk- und Verhaltensweise der Mitglieder des Gemeinwesens und seiner Durchsetzungsfähigkeit nach außen hin: Die Etablierung der Republik führt zur Freisetzung einer ungeheuren kompetitiven Energie und Leistungsbereitschaft, die sich nicht zuletzt in militärische Schlagkraft umsetzt und damit den Aufstieg Roms zum Weltreich ermöglicht; die Ablösung der Republik durch das Kaisertum führt zu einer Situation, in der die politischen Akteure einander

in ängstlichem Misstrauen und kontinuierlicher Heuchelei begegnen, in der die Aktivitäten der einzelnen sich in hohem Maß auf die Sicherung des eigenen Überleben konzentrieren, während die Belange des Staates in den Hintergrund treten und der entscheidende politische Handlungsträger, der Kaiser, für die imperiale Aufgabe Roms keinen Sinn mehr hat.

Wie stellen sich die Dinge bei den chinesischen Historikern dar? Ich konzentriere meine Ausführungen auf Sima Qian (c. 140–85 v. Chr.) und sein *Shiji*, die *Historischen Aufzeichnungen*, in das die gesamte vorausliegende historiographische Tradition Eingang gefunden hat, und beschränke mich auf drei Beobachtungen.

Erstens: die Opposition Freiheit vs. Autokratie spielt in Sima Qians *Shiji* keine Rolle. Republikanische Formen der politischen Organisation liegen außerhalb seines Horizontes. Die Form der Herrschaft ist sowohl in den Fürsten- und Königreichen, als auch im Gesamtreich, soweit dieses besteht, die der Monarchie. Alternativen kommen nicht in den Blick.

Daraus ergibt sich zweitens, dass das Wohl der einzelnen Staaten nicht als von der Form ihrer Organisation und im Zusammenhang damit von den Verhaltensweisen, die diese Form befördert, abhängig gedacht, sondern auf die Art und Weise, wie die Herrscher und ihre Berater und Helfer ihre Aufgaben erfüllen, zurückgeführt wird. Die einschlägige Beurteilung der politischen Handlungsträger ist dementsprechend ein wesentliches Anliegen des Werkes.

Drittens ist festzustellen, dass bei dieser Beurteilung die Herstellung und Bewahrung von innerer Ordnung sowie die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen der Bevölkerung die entscheidende Rolle spielen, während der militärischen Schlagkraft der Politie nach außen hin nur untergeordnete Bedeutung zukommt.

Grundlage für diese Beobachtungen sind einerseits Sima Qians Darstellung der drei am ausführlichsten geschilderten Herrscherfiguren am Anfang des *Shiji*, andererseits seine Darstellung Wendis, des Sohnes und indirekten Nachfolgers des Begründers der Handynastie, der in Hinblick auf seine Stellung in der historischen Entwicklung mit Tiberius, dem Stiefsohn und Nachfolger des Augustus, vergleichbar ist.

Die legendären Kaiser Yao und Shun und der Begründer der Xia-Dynastie Yu sind für Sima Qian wie für die Tradition, der er folgt, Idealfiguren, an denen spätere Herrscher gemessen werden können. Bei Yao stellt Sima Qian seine erfolgreichen Bemühungen um Ordnung und Harmonie sowie seine Verdienste um die Etablierung des landwirtschaftlichen Kalenderjahres heraus (*Shiji* 1, Nienhauser 1,6). Dazu würdigt er die Gewissenhaftigkeit, mit der Yao seine Nachfolge regelt: Er übergeht seinen eigenen Sohn, weil er ihn für charakterlich minderwertig hält, und entscheidet sich für Shun, einen

Mann einfacher Herkunft, der sich bei den ihm auferlegten Proben vorzüglich bewährt. Shun selbst widmet sich, einmal im Amt, intensiv der Auswahl seiner Minister. Seine Sorgfalt trägt Früchte (*Shiji* 1, Nienhauser 1,15):

These twenty-two people all achieved their merits. Kao-yao became the Grand Adjudicator and he was fair. ... Po Yi was in charge of rites and people above and below all yielded to one another. Ch'ui was in charge of ...

Auch Shun hält seinen Sohn als Nachfolger für ungeeignet und „empfiehlt dem Himmel Yu“, der sich als einer der großen Zivilisationshéroen der chinesischen Überlieferung in jahrelangem Bemühen durch die Regulierung der Flüsse und Kanäle und das Anlegen von Straßen, d.h. modern gesprochen durch die Entwicklung der Infrastruktur, um das Wohl des Reiches und seiner Bevölkerung verdient gemacht hat.⁵

Was Sima Qian hier in enger Anlehnung an das *Shangshu*, eines der fünf Werke des konfuzianischen Kanons, über Yao, Shun und Yu berichtet, kann gewiss nicht für historisch bare Münze genommen werden. Doch darauf kommt es hier nicht an. Von Bedeutung ist, dass die drei Herrscher offensichtlich als *exempla* empfunden werden und dass ihre Musterhaftigkeit in der verantwortungsvollen, auf gutes Gedeihen ausgerichteten Verwaltung des Reiches zum Wohle seiner Bevölkerung gesehen wird und nicht in der Entfaltung militärischer Macht nach außen hin.

Dass in den Abschnitten des *Shiji* über die frühen Herrscher kulturelle Muster von allgemeiner Gültigkeit greifbar werden, wird daran sichtbar, dass in der Darstellung der Regierungszeit eines historischen Herrschers wie Wendi ganz ähnliche Tendenzen zum Tragen kommen.⁶ Wendi wird von Sima Qian ohne Zweifel positiv gesehen. Was ihn auszeichnet, ist zunächst sein Verhalten bei der Regierungsübernahme. Anders als im Fall des Tiberius in den *Annalen* des Tacitus ist seine mehrmalige Ablehnung des ihm angetragenen Herrscheramtes für Sima Qian nicht Heuchelei, sondern Beachtung der zeremoniellen Korrektheit, des *li*.⁷ Sodann zeichnet er sich in der Folgezeit dadurch aus, dass er in Konsultation mit seinen Ministern, aber gleichwohl in eigener Verantwortung seine Entscheidungen bei der Verwaltung des Reiches trifft und dass diese Entscheidungen durchgehend von dem Bemühen um Gerechtigkeit und um die Förderung des Wohls der Bevölkerung geleitet

5 Vgl. *Shiji* 2, Nienhauser 1,32 über das Ergebnis der jahrelangen, ausführlich geschilderten Bemühungen Yus unter Shun: 'The world was then greatly ordered.'

6 Zum Vergleich der Darstellung Wendis bei Sima Qian mit der des Tiberius bei Tacitus s. Mutschler 2006 und Mutschler 2007.

7 Vgl. *Shiji* 10, Nienhauser 2,152.

sind.⁸ Diese Ausrichtung bestimmt auch Wendis Politik gegen die Barbaren des Nordens, die Xiongnu, im Verhältnis zu denen er sich in stets neuen Anläufen für die Etablierung und Sicherung friedlicher Koexistenz einsetzt. Bezeichnend für diese Politik ist etwa folgende Passage aus einem Schreiben Wendis an den Shanyu, den Herrscher der Xiongnu (*Shiji* 10, Nienhauser 2,152):

... Our two great nations, the Han and the Xiongnu, stand side by side. ... Now the world enjoys profound peace and the people are at rest. We and the Shanyu must be as parents to them. When we consider past affairs, we realize that it is only because of petty matters and trifling reasons that the plans of our ministers have failed. No such matters are worthy to disrupt the harmony that exists between brothers. We have heard it said that Heaven shows no partiality in sheltering mankind, and Earth no bias in bearing it up. Let us, then, with the Shanyu cast aside these trifling matters of the past and walk the great road together, wiping out former evils and planning for the distant future, in order that the peoples of our two states may be joined together like the sons of a single family.

Zusammenfassend können wir somit folgendes sagen. Die altchinesische Geschichtsschreibung unterscheidet sich von der griechisch-römischen unter anderem dadurch, dass sie die positiv konnotierte Vorstellung einer frei über ihr Schicksal mitbestimmenden und aus dieser Freiheit ihre Kraft gewinnenden politischen Gemeinschaft nicht kennt, sondern ausschließlich mit dem Modell der Alleinherrschaft als der gewöhnlichen staatlichen Organisation befasst ist. Dies macht sie indes nicht zur Befürworterin einer sozusagen „persischen Zwangsherrschaft“. Vielmehr entfaltet sie das Ideal einer paternalistischen, von Verantwortungsbewusstsein und der Verpflichtung auf das Gemeinwohl geprägten Herrschaft eines einzelnen, in das sich Ratgeber und Helfer als Minister einbringen, um in loyaler Zusammenarbeit mit dem Herrscher das Gedeihen des Staates und das Wohlergehen der Bevölkerung zu fördern. Ein weiterer Unterschied zur griechisch-römischen Geschichtsschreibung liegt darin, dass nach dem Verständnis eines Sima Qian die Staatsräson zwar die *Sicherung* der eigenen Grenzen, aber nicht deren permanente *Ausdehnung* verlangt und dass in Bezug auf die umgebenden Politien weniger an *Eroberung* und *Unterwerfung* gedacht wird als an friedliche *Koexistenz*.

8 Vgl. als Beispiel für eine solche Beratungsszene etwa *Shiji* 10, Nienhauser 2,155–7: ‘In the twelfth month ... the sovereign said, “The laws are the rectification of administration and the means of restraining violence and guiding good men. Today though a man who violates the law is already sentenced, still we cause his innocent parents, wife, children, and siblings ... also to be prosecuted for it, and take them as slaves. ... Let this be discussed.” The authorities concerned all said, “The commoners are ...” The sovereign said, “We have heard that ...” The authorities concerned said, “Your Majesty exerts great kindness. Your virtue is so grand that your ministers could never attain it. We beg to act on your edict and abolish the statutes and ordinances prosecuting and enslaving criminals’ relatives.” ...’

Eine schöne, wenn auch rein imaginäre Vorstellung ist, dass Herodot, wenn es ihm denn vergönnt gewesen wäre, diese weitere Form „asiatischer Herrschaft“ kennenzulernen, ihr sein Verständnis und seine Sympathie vielleicht nicht versagt hätte.

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Part II

Philosophy



Greek gods and the Archaic aesthetics of life¹

STEPHEN HALLIWELL

At the wedding-feast for one of Zeus's serial marriages (probably to Themis, divine symbol of order and rectitude, or possibly to Hera, his final consort), Zeus himself asked the rest of the assembled gods whether there was anything of which they felt a lack in their universe. They responded by proposing that he should bring into being a further group of deities whose purpose would be to adorn with words and music the world-order Zeus had put in place as leader of the Olympians. This account of the creation of the Muses was presented, and conceivably invented, by the poet Pindar in the *Hymn (to Zeus?)* (fr. 31 Snell-Maehler) which the scholars of Alexandria subsequently placed at the beginning of the complete book of his hymns (and perhaps at the head of the collected edition of his works). Since the hymn has not survived and we have only scanty references to this part of it in later sources, much remains inevitably obscure about the moment at which the idea of the Muses was first conceived on Olympus. But it is legitimate to wonder whether there is an important sense in which Pindar's imagination – the inheritor of complex Archaic traditions of thought and feeling – was giving shape in this mythological vignette to a notion of something that might count as the 'birth of aesthetics' among the society of the gods.

In his speculative reconstruction of Pindar's hymn in *The Discovery of the Mind*, Bruno Snell suggested that 'if we had this episode in Pindar's own language..., it would surely be among the most famous in Greek literature'. He continued: 'Pindar could not have expressed more fittingly what poetry means to the world. On the day when the world attained to its perfect shape he affirms that all beauty is incomplete unless someone is present to celebrate it.'² Although one might have reservations about other elements of Snell's reconstruction, he is right that Pindar's lyric narrative appears to have represented the birth of the Muses as answering and remedying a sense of 'incompleteness' among the gods. The Muses are conceived of in this context as adding something that was previously missing from Olympian society. What they bring to it is a value of a different kind from the operations of divine power and will

¹ It is a pleasure to contribute this short article to a celebration of the work of Øivind Andersen, a scholar who has made so many subtle contributions to our understanding of ancient Greek culture.

² Snell 1953, 78. For more recent reconstructions see Hardie 2000 (claiming a Pythagorean background) and D'Alessio 2005 and 2009; both argue for Apollo not Zeus as the addressee of the hymn.

in action: something which can be used to reflect and glorify that power but which nonetheless converts it into material for the distinctive realm, and the second life, of song. For Pindar and for the cultural conglomerate of Archaic Greece in general, the Muses, together with other divine musicians (especially Apollo, lyre-player and singer, and various groups of female singers/dancers, including the Graces), embody the idea of a divine aesthetic of self-reflective beauty.

Such ideas of the ‘music’ of Olympian society have become so overfamiliar – in part through their constant adaptation in the vocabulary, imagery and tropes of many later phases of Western culture³ – that it is worth reminding ourselves just how remarkable they are from the viewpoint of comparative mythology and religion. The role of the Muses within a conception of the community of the gods has no clear precedent or parallel in either Indo-European or Near Eastern evidence, despite the fact that the conception in question owes a great deal in other respects to those cultural zones. Even if one casts the net further afield, it is difficult to find in other religious and mythopoeic traditions a substantial equivalent to the way in which Archaic Greek culture ascribes to its gods a collective commitment to the arts of the Muses. It is a pervasive assumption of Greek religious myth that the gods can experience shared fulfilment, both as performers and audiences, in the ravishing beauty of music, song and dance. Greek gods, it appears, *need* the Muses’ values to exist in their world in order to satisfy the more contemplative side of their nature.

Consider now, however, a different but cognate image of this divine aesthetic. The *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* celebrates a god who precociously demands a lyre, *kitharis*, for himself (as well as a bow: unlike the Muses, he is a god of both action and song) on the very day of his birth (130–2). The journeys he undertakes thereafter are marked at critical junctures in the poem by musical performances; they are, in a sense, travels in song, a divine analogue to the itinerary of a travelling musician, such as the blind Chian bard (often equated in antiquity with ‘Homer’) who identifies himself as the singer of the hymn and refers to his own wanderings across the earth (165–78).

The particular scene I want to focus on here is a passage which describes the moment (to be thought of as one of an indefinite number of such moments) when Apollo arrives on Olympus from his shrine at Delphi to take part in the society of the gods. His arrival is marked by a spontaneous impulse on the part of the whole divine community to express itself in song and dance. In that regard the scene is a counterpart to Pindar’s image of how the Muses were

³ Curtius 1953, 228–46.

called into being to complete the needs of the gods. But in the *Hymn to Apollo* the scene takes a striking twist which discloses a deep question lurking within the ‘divine aesthetic’ I have so far outlined.

αὐτίκα δ’ ἀθανάτοισι μέλει κίθαρις καὶ αἰοιδῆ.
 Μοῦσαι μὲν θ’ ἅμα πᾶσαι ἀμειβόμεναι ὅπι καλῆ
 ὑμνεῦσιν ῥα θεῶν δῶρ’ ἄμβροτα ἢδ’ ἀνθρώπων
 τλημοσύνας, ὅσ’ ἔχοντες ὑπ’ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
 ζώουσ’ ἀφραδέες καὶ ἀμήχανοι, οὐδὲ δύνανται
 εὐρέμεναι θανάτιό τ’ ἄκος καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ. (188–93)

At once the immortals’ minds are occupied with lyre and song.
 The Muses, answering as a group with their lovely voices,
 Sing of the divine gifts of the gods and of humans’
 Sufferings – all the things that at the hands of the immortal gods
 Humans live through in their folly and helplessness,
 Incapable of finding a cure for death or a defence against old age.

Apollo’s movement from Delphi to Olympus (‘like an instant of thought’, 186, because, for all their anthropomorphized trappings, the gods inhabit a special plane of consciousness) might be expected to take us, by means of the hymn’s own imaginatively mobile focus, into a domain entirely set apart from the human world. Yet the Muses celebrate Apollo’s arrival by singing precisely about the lives of human beings – focusing, what’s more, on the misery, helplessness, and mortal finitude of their existence. The paradox of the moment is reinforced when the passage proceeds to describe an accompanying dance by nine goddesses and two male gods: Apollo himself, bathed in a light of divine radiance, plays the lyre at the centre of the ensemble while his parents, Zeus and Leto, derive intense delight from watching the whole performance (194–206).

If we have here, in part, the same divine aesthetic found in Pindar’s account of the wedding-feast for Zeus and his bride, it is an aesthetic which the hymn darkens and complicates by its ascription to the gods, in a setting of exquisite performative beauty, of a song about the miseries of human life. The irony is made more pointed by the phrase ‘divine gifts of the gods’ (θεῶν δῶρ’ ἄμβροτα, 190), which has caused some scholarly disagreement. But whether it refers to the gods’ own immortality (making the song’s themes counterbalance divine and human spheres) or to the good things they sometimes bestow on humans (so that the song then deals with both positive and negative sides of human existence), or indeed to *all* the conditions of human existence (as the idea of the gods’ ‘gifts’ certainly does in Achilles’ famous parable of Zeus’s two jars at *Iliad* 24.528), the result in any case throws heavy emphasis onto the

paradox of divinely beautiful song as a medium in which to express thoughts of human frailties, limitations and sufferings.

What are the implications of this paradox? Surely we are not meant to draw the grotesque inference, as some have supposed, that the Olympians derive self-satisfied pleasure, almost *Schadenfreude*, from contemplating the sheer miserableness of mortal existence. Greek gods, with only special exceptions, are not like that: capable though they are of gloating and destructive cruelty, they rarely if ever derive pleasure directly from observing the ephemerality of human life.⁴ On the contrary, Archaic Greek culture posits gods who are emotionally absorbed by, even obsessed with, the contents of human lives, finding them a suitable object for fascinated viewing (as well as partisan interventions). The *Iliad* imagines even Zeus himself as moved to concern and pity over human affairs, not just in a unique case like that of his son Sarpedon (for whom he sends down a shower of his own tears of blood at 16.458–61) but also in more wide-ranging ways. At the start of Book 20, for instance, Zeus expresses general concern for the destruction of both Greeks and Trojans, but then announces his intention of staying on Mount Olympus (while the other gods go down to join in the fighting) to take pleasure from watching events below (20.20–30). Once again, this is not a matter of anticipated pleasure at the sheer fact of human conflict and suffering. Rather, the scene evokes a typically ambiguous divine perspective, one which not only is unstable in the operations of its sympathy for human agents but also has the capacity to remove itself to a more reflective vantage point and observe human life as an object of quasi-aesthetic interest. As well as being a supreme agent in the poem, Zeus is, on another level, a kind of ultimate ‘audience’ of the *Iliad* itself.

The *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, despite its later (and probably compound) authorship, exhibits the same fundamental understanding of the gods as the Homeric epics. That the terms of this world view permit the Muses and Apollo to perform songs about human sufferings betokens a complex conception both of the gods themselves and of the nature of song. This conception encodes an Archaic Greek aesthetic in which human and divine impinge on one another. If the practices of a human song-culture are projected onto the society of the gods, and if human life is translated into a subject somehow worthy of the gods’ own songs, the divine realm itself symbolizes values which can in turn be predicated of human song. This is illustrated by the intense ‘radiance’ (αἴγλη) which surrounds Apollo in the Homeric hymn as he plays the lyre and dances (202). That same word is found in some of Pindar’s evocations of the transformative radiance which can be bestowed on human existence at

4 Halliwell 2008, 337–9.

moments of special, divinely sanctioned success. One such instance occurs in a famous passage at the end of *Pythian* 8 (Pind. *P.* 8.95–7), where the pessimistic depiction of human life as ‘a dream of a shadow’ (σκιᾶς ὄναρ) is momentarily transfigured by the radiance of a Zeus-sent light (αἴγλα διόσδοτος). That example is doubly apt for my purposes, since Pindar’s own song implicitly purports to be a transmitter of that light. This underlines the way in which the attribution of a song-culture to the gods themselves is always a gesture of dialectical imagination designed to construct an ‘aesthetics of life’ in which human song itself aspires to participate.

At the heart of that aesthetic, I submit, lies a sense of the transformative power of song: the power to convert even suffering and negativity into beauty and expressive intensity, though without thereby erasing the significance of suffering itself. Some such power is implied in the invocations to the Muses at the very start of both Homeric epics, in the *Odyssey*’s retrospective glimpse of the Muses’ involvement in the mourning for the dead Achilles (*Od.* 24.60–4), and also (at least on my own rather heterodox reading) in the two songs about the Trojan war sung by the blind Demodocus for Odysseus in Book 8 of the *Odyssey*.⁵ My present thesis is that the transmuted suffering into the beauty of song lies at the heart of the paradox of the Archaic aesthetic in which gods themselves are both performers and audiences of such song. The gods cannot need song for the same reasons as humans, but they can exemplify the transformative power that humans experience in song as one form of the divine.

As a complement to this compressed argument, I would like at this point to juxtapose the Archaic sensibility I have tried to characterize with Nietzsche’s famous pronouncement in Chapters 5 and 24 of *The Birth of Tragedy* that ‘only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified’ (‘nur als *aesthetisches Phänomen* ist das Dasein und die Welt ewig *gerechtfertigt*’ [Nietzsche’s original emphases]).⁶ Nietzsche’s own thinking in *The Birth of Tragedy* is of course extensively influenced, in ways too complex to rehearse here, by elements of Archaic Greek thought and imagery. But it usually goes unnoticed that the aphorism just quoted has the suggestive imprint of an Archaic sensibility. In his later ‘Attempt at Self-Criticism’ prefaced to the 1886 edition of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche connects the aphorism with the idea of an ‘artist-god’ (‘Künstler-Gott’).⁷ Now, it is true that for this Nietzschean

5 See discussion of all these passages in Halliwell 2011, 55–92.

6 Nietzsche [1872] 1988, 47. Ch. 24’s wording is subtly different: ‘only as an aesthetic phenomenon does the world *appear* to be justified’ [my emphasis], ‘...gerechtfertigt erscheint’ (Nietzsche [1872] 1988, 152). For some discussion, see Silk and Stern 1981, 294–5.

7 Nietzsche [1872] 1988, 17.

artist-god or ‘world-artist’ (‘Weltenkünstler’)⁸ the whole world, including human beings, is his ‘work of art’ – a notion for which there is no ready-made precedent in Greek conceptions of the Olympians. In fact, Nietzsche associates this quasi-artistic force (which destroys as well as creates), in heavily metaphysical fashion, with the ‘Dionysiac’ nature of primal being, the opposite pole to everything he associates with Apollo and the rest of the Olympians. On the other hand, it seems clear enough that the principle of ‘justifying’ the world aesthetically is not tied exclusively to Dionysiac creativity; it is also applicable to the opposite artistic-cum-aesthetic pole, the Apollonian. It is indeed easier to see how the principle applies to the Apollonian than to the Dionysiac, since the idea of an ‘aesthetic phenomenon’ fits the sphere of Apollonian image-making and beautiful illusions more closely than it does that of Dionysiac oneness. Moreover, Nietzsche understands the Olympian gods themselves as a projection of aesthetic ‘illusionism’: in Chapter 3 of the *Birth*, he calls the world they inhabit in the Archaic Greek mind an ‘artistic middle-world’ (‘künstlerische *Mittelwelt*’, Nietzsche’s emphasis) interposed between themselves and the underlying horror of existence.⁹ In a paradoxical sense, the Olympian realm to which the Greek god Apollo belongs is itself a product of the ‘Apollonian’ aesthetic drive.

The threads of thought which connect Nietzsche’s early conception of an ‘aesthetic justification’ of existence with what I have termed Archaic Greek ‘aesthetics of life’ are tangled, for sure. It is significant, for one thing, that *The Birth of Tragedy* barely acknowledges Greek myth’s own image of the Olympian gods as susceptible to certain kinds of aesthetic experience. Nietzsche does refer in passing, in Chapter 2, to Apollo as himself a music-god, though only in order to contrast the supposedly limited nature of Apollonian music (a kind of Doric architecture in sound, as he puts it) with the overwhelming power of Dionysiac music.¹⁰ Similarly, Apollo’s close relationship with the Muses is glanced at only once, in Chapter 4,¹¹ and nowhere does Nietzsche ponder the gods’ capacity to find the flawed, tragic conditions of human life a suitable subject for their own ‘aesthetic’ attention.

Nietzsche’s peculiar reworking of Archaic Greek ideas can sharpen our awareness of certain unresolved tensions in the myth-making imagination which originally produced those ideas. Greek gods do not help humans to solve the problems of existence; indeed, they reflect, magnify and (in part) cause those problems. (That, of course, was one of Plato’s fundamental reasons for

8 Nietzsche [1872] 1988, 30.

9 Nietzsche [1872] 1988, 36.

10 Nietzsche [1872] 1988, 33.

11 Nietzsche [1872] 1988, 41.

refusing to believe in such gods.) But the gods are also sources, for these same humans, of possible experiences of deep, transformative, and consoling value: the arts of the Muses, which Greeks came eventually to call simply ‘music’, *mousikê*, are one of the most important of those sources. The song-culture ascribed to the gods themselves is both an authenticating mirror of human song and yet also the projection of an ideal beauty which can never be fully possessed by humans, only aspired to. An essential intuition of Archaic Greek aesthetics lies in the problematic space between those two things.

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Περὶ Φιλίας:
The interpretation of Plato's *Lysis* 212a8-213d51¹

EYJÓLFUR KJALAR EMILSSON

The *Lysis* is one of Plato's short 'Socratic' dialogues. Socrates converses with the teenage boys Lysis, Menexenus, Ctesippus and Hippothales in a wrestling school. Menexenus and Lysis are buddies, but Hippothales is infatuated with the younger boy Lysis and bores the other boys with endless praise of him. This friendship and love among the boys sets the topic of the dialogue: what is friendship, φιλία? The dialogue as a whole is a paradigmatic example of Socratic *paideia*. Socrates clearly understands more about friendship than he is letting on to the youths. Rather than telling them what he thinks he asks them tricky questions, the result of which is that they become confused. The confusion is painful for them and forces them to do the only thing that could relieve it: to think for themselves. Although my friend Øivind Andersen is no longer a teenager and has long ago entered the rank of the wise who have seen, and seen through, most human affairs, I thought he might be pleased by a little discourse on friendship. So in what follows I shall seek to elucidate aspects of this old dialogue.

Socrates makes some unexpected moves in the conversation, and there are places where one may suspect that he is less than completely honest. Not that he intentionally forces falsities upon the youths – they agree to them themselves – but the questions are sometimes very tricky and misleading. There is good reason to suppose, however, that all this is fully intentional on Plato's part; we see indications of this in the text itself. After the exchange between Socrates and Menexenos at 212b8 to 213d Socrates summarizes the conclusions they have reached: “Then what are we going to do”, I said, “if friends are neither those who hold dear (οἱ φιλοῦντες) nor those who are held dear (οἱ φιλούμενοι) nor those who both hold and are held dear? Are there any other besides these of whom we can say that they become each other's friends (φίλους ἀλλήλοις γιγνομένους)?”² Menexenus says he cannot think of other possibilities. Socrates then asks if they have perhaps been looking at the matter in the wrong way. At that point Lysis, who is said to have been paying close attention to what was being said all along, breaks into the conversation expressing strong agreement that they have been looking at this in the wrong

1 I wish to thank Hallvard Fossheim, Anastasia Maravela and Camilla Serck-Hanssen for comments on a draft of this paper. The paper originated from a presentation I gave at a reading of the *Lysis* at The Norwegian Institute at Athens in 2008. I am grateful for comments I received on that occasion as well.

2 All translations here are author's own.

way. Socrates says he thinks he is right, which strongly suggests that Plato himself saw something suspect in the procedure. I shall first consider aspects of the exchange between Socrates and Menexenus in some detail, and then I shall venture a hypothesis about what went wrong.

As we have already seen, in lines 212a8–13d5, Socrates and Menexenus explore various possibilities concerning the necessary features of A's being a friend of B: the given premise of the conversation is that A φιλεῖ B, i.e. holds B dear. The questions are all about what inferences we are entitled to make about the friendship relation from this fact. There will be four proposals in all.

- (1) If A φιλεῖ B, then A is a friend of B and B is also a friend of A (212b2–c8). How does Menexenus come to think that this is at all plausible? Nothing is said about this, but Menexenus may be thinking along the following lines when he agrees to this: I φιλεῖ you; by virtue of that you become for me φίλος, someone dear. But I too am φίλος for you, because since I hold you dear, I am well disposed to you. You will appreciate that and I become dear to you. So from your viewpoint too, I am φίλος. This proposal is refuted by the counterexample of unrequited love and even hatred from the loved one. So a new proposal suggesting mutual φιλεῖν is made:

- (2) If A φιλεῖ B, then A is not a friend of B and B is not a friend of A, unless B also φιλεῖ A (212c8–e6). That is to say, neither one is a friend of the other unless each φιλεῖ the other. Menexenus does not explain why he finds this option attractive, but we may speculate. In order for B to be A's φίλος, A's friend, A has indeed to hold B dear; but not only that, in order to count B as his friend, B has to be well disposed towards A; but if B is so disposed, that is most likely because B holds A dear. So, from A's point of view, his counting B as a friend presumes that he thinks he is dear to B. In the refutation of this, Socrates appeals to the many φιλο-words in the Greek language and to a poem by Solon: there are those who hold horses, dogs, wisdom, quails, wine, gymnastics, etc. dear. These are loved, φιλούμενα, and οἱ φιλοῦντες, those who love, hence have them as their friends, even if these do not return the attitude. There are some questionable aspects in this refutation that I shall let lie. But given this, it seems natural to propose that the friend is the φιλούμενος, which becomes the next hypothesis.

- (3) It is the loved one, the φιλούμενος, who is the friend of ὁ φιλῶν, whether ὁ φιλούμενος φιλεῖ back or not (212e6–13b5). Why would this look plausible at all? The support given for this proposal is that children whom the parents describe as their dearest, φίλτατα, may be unable to return the love of, or they may even hate, their parents when they are being disciplined. The implication is that their being held dearest qualifies them as friends of the parents. This looks like the passive aspect of the adjective φίλος, which just means 'dear', is being taken as grounds for saying that the φίλος in this sense is a friend. In other words, this is playing on a certain ambiguity of the word φίλος, which we shall consider more closely below. The refutation brings in hate and the ἐχθρός, the enemy, a word which is similar to φίλος in its grammatical behaviour in that it sometimes takes the guise of an adjective, sometimes of a substantive. The word ἐχθρός also has an active and a passive sense, can mean both 'hostile' and 'hated'. Socrates

stipulates here that the enemy is the object of hatred since the friend, on the present hypothesis, is the object of love. The conclusion of the refutation is the supposedly impossible claim that one can be an enemy to one's friend and a friend to one's enemy. I shall postpone the discussion of this refutation until later.

- (4) The one who φιλεῖ is a friend of the loved (213b5–c5). So if A φιλεῖ B, A is a friend of B. Analogously with hatred and the enemy: if B hates A, B is A's enemy. But if so, one is often a friend of non-friends and even of one's enemies, and an enemy of one's non-enemies and even of friends. The refutation of this is just a mirror image of the one in (2).

As previously mentioned, all these claims are refuted. So neither the one who φιλεῖ nor the loved one is a friend; nor are those who love and are loved in return (213c5–7). Socrates and Menexenus agree that this exhausts the possibilities. Moreover, Socrates agrees with Lysis that 'if we were looking at things in the right way, we would not be so far off the course' (213e2–3). The way this is phrased suggests their suspicion is not just about particular mistakes that may have been made but that there is something fundamentally wrong about the way they have proceeded.

As a first step, let me make some brief remarks about the words φίλος and φιλεῖν. First, let us note that the verb, φιλεῖν, just means 'to be well disposed to', 'to hold dear', 'to love'. Often, perhaps in the majority of cases, the word φίλος functions as an adjective meaning 'dear', 'beloved' and suchlike: if A loves, φιλεῖ, B, then B is a dear one, φίλος, to A. Secondly, and much less commonly, the adjective φίλος has an active use. According to this use, it describes someone or something as well disposed towards something, welcoming or inviting. There are several examples of this in *LSJ*, especially from the poets.³ Thus, we find in Hom. *Iliad* 17.325, φίλα φρεσὶ μήδεα εἰδώς, ('with a friendly mind'). Thirdly, φίλος, has a substantive meaning as 'friend' or something very close to that. Often it is not obvious whether the substantive or the adjective is intended. The issue between Socrates and Menexenus is the notion of a friend, the substantive. This is eminently clear from the start of their conversation and indeed from the *Lysis* as a whole, even if appeals are made to the adjective and the verb in the attempts to illuminate the friend.

The passive and active uses of φίλος that *LSJ* distinguishes are no doubt non-incidentally connected: we have a tendency to be fond of that which is well disposed towards us. And in the case of beings capable of intentional action, if they are well disposed towards me, that is at least to some extent an indication that they hold me dear; and, conversely, if a being capable of intentional action holds some other such being dear, the former will, if everything is normal, be

³ *LSJ*⁹ 1940, 1939 s.v. φίλος.

friendly towards the latter. This is, I suppose, generally true. But, sadly, there are exceptions, and most dramatically so in the case of unrequited love among human beings.

I take it that the English word ‘friend’ contains in its meaning both aspects of the Greek adjective φίλος. If A regards B as his friend, B must be dear to A but A must also see B as well disposed towards him. Suppose I am to consider whether a given person is my friend. I might then first of all see that this person is dear to me. But I may note in addition that this person was a great support to me during a difficult period. I may comment on this by saying that he or she showed himself to be a true or trustworthy friend. In this case, I am not expressing my kind feelings towards this person, I am noting something about him. And I am not simply implying that he is dear to me, and that I am evidently dear to him too – rather I am saying that this other person behaved towards me as only a friend would behave. I take it that the Greek substantive φίλος has the same shades of meaning: surely someone I call a φίλος is someone dear to me, but he is also someone of whom I expect only good things with regard to me. This shade of meaning is shown by the occurrences of phrases such as πιστὸς φίλος, a trustworthy friend, which make it clear that a φίλος is not merely someone who is held dear and who holds one dear in return but also someone from whom certain friendly behaviour is expected.⁴

So what is wrong about the procedure? It is noteworthy that all four propositions considered and refuted have the same antecedent: if A φιλεῖ B, which conclusions are we to draw about who is a friend or friends with whom? I suggest that what is wrong in the procedure is the assumption that it is possible to decide about friendship relations from this antecedent alone. Lysis presumably realized this. The fact that Plato suggests this indicates that he thought that we, the readers, could see this too. It is best, however, that we realize this the hard way by thinking for ourselves.

My suggestion is that even if B being A’s friend indeed involves φιλεῖν on the part of A, this is not enough: what Lysis realizes is *that no definite inferences about who is a friend of whom can be drawn from the mere fact that A φιλεῖ B*. One aspect that is crucially missing is reciprocity. Socrates and Menexenus admittedly try to take reciprocity into account in (2), where the proposal is: if A φιλεῖ B, then A is not a friend of B and B is not a friend of A, unless B also φιλεῖ A (212c8–e6). In other words, there is no friendship unless the φιλεῖν is mutual. This is dismissed on the grounds that there are people who love horses, wine, etc. and hold them dear, even if none of these loves

4 Eur. fr. 271b.1 (*Auge*) Kannicht: τίς δὲ νῶν πιστὸς φίλος; ‘But who is a trustworthy friend of us two?’ The expression is fairly common.

them back. Arguably, these things are friends only in an extended sense which does not apply to relationships between people. Leaving that aside, there is a notorious omission which concerns reciprocity in Socrates' proposals. He asks: is it the case that if there is not mutual φιλεῖν, then there is no friendship relation? What he does not ask, and never considers, is 'if A φιλεῖ B, are A and B friends if B φιλεῖ A in return?' In other words, nowhere is reciprocity shown not to be a sufficient condition of friendship.

Reciprocity is again indirectly at stake in the refutation of (3). The way the conclusion is harvested here again makes use of the fact that there are cases where the φιλοῦμενος hates the φιλῶν.⁵ So if A φιλεῖ B, B is A's friend; but B hates A, which makes A B's enemy. So B is a friend to his enemy! One way of interpreting this is to suppose that Plato wants us to understand the phrase 'friend to his enemy' as meaning that one person regards another person both as a friend and as enemy. The premises of the exchange do, however, not warrant this understanding; if Plato wants to lure his readers to understand it in this way, then he is trying to cheat blatantly in the argument. This is a conclusion one seeks to avoid if there are good alternatives. I believe that indeed there are: I suggest that Socrates means what he says in the very sense that is actually warranted by the presuppositions of the conversation, and I also suggest that he and Menexenus find this absurd enough. Supposing that A φιλεῖ B and B hates A, from the premises of the refutation here Socrates does obtain that A is an enemy of his own friend and that B is a friend of his own enemy. There is nothing strictly contradictory about this, given merely what they have explicitly agreed on. The case may, however, strike Socrates and Menexenus as an impossibility *given what they – and we – understand by a friend*, which is, of course, what they wish to capture: How could someone who really is a friend of mine have me as his enemy? If he really is a friend of mine, I am entitled to expect good things from him – that is at least a part of what makes him a friend. But I cannot expect anything good from someone for whom I am an enemy. Surely I could not regard him as a trustworthy friend. So he cannot be my friend after all. In saying this I am assuming that Socrates is making appeals to some necessary mutuality in friendship, tacit appeals to the fact that a friend must be friendly, which is not what you can allow yourself to expect from your enemy.

5 There is another possible grammatical construction of ... οἶμαι καὶ ἀδύνατον, τῷ τε φίλῳ ἐχθρὸν καὶ τῷ ἐχθρῷ φίλον εἶναι: In one case, the obvious one, followed in the main text here, we have an accusative with infinitive where the dative of τῷ φίλῳ is governed by ἐχθρὸν, 'enemy to a friend'. But we can also translate 'it is impossible for the friend to be an enemy', where the dative of τῷ φίλῳ is governed by ἀδύνατον. Also, in this construction the result is that the friend is an enemy and the enemy a friend, which superficially smacks of a contradiction, but no more than in the other construction does this constitute a real contradiction.

It may seem fair to ask if it is not a mere commonplace that friendship involves some mutual endearment. Not only is this something people readily come to think of – I have tried this out with some friends and acquaintances – it seems to have become a sort of commonplace as early as Aristotle’s time, half a century or so after the *Lysis* was written.⁶ Nevertheless, given the strong association that lies in the language itself between the friend, ὁ φίλος, and the cognate verb, φιλεῖν, and especially given the equally strong semantic connection between the latter and φίλος, the adjective, according to which anyone who is loved, φιλούμενος, counts as a dear one, φίλος, the narrower notion of a *friend* can be said to be hidden in a semantic jungle. It is no wonder that the matter is not entirely clear to the adolescents.

⁶ See Arist. *Rh.* II 4, 1381a1–2.

Method and soul-shaping in the *Protagoras*

HALLVARD J. FOSSHEIM

I wish to suggest an explanation for why Plato lets Socrates present – and force those present to agree to – the hedonist theory in the *Protagoras*. My suggestion is that the *Protagoras*, by means of a combined effort on an argumentative-structural level and on a dramatic level, lets us see and experience central facets of the two methodologies defended by Protagoras and Socrates, respectively: while Protagoras' sort of speechmaking lets the listener be lured in by a loose and semi-digested vision, Socrates' favoured form of question-and-answer activity comes with a built-in defence against such psychological shaping, making it, in this respect, a safer way of submitting to pedagogical soul-forming. This quality of his activity has to do both with the format itself and with the sort of mode in which it sets those who are exposed to it.

While I think that the hypothesis constitutes a believable explanation for the presence of the hedonist theory, I think that it (the hypothesis) is also worthy of interest independently of a need to explain that theory.

A question of method

The bulk of the *Protagoras* constitutes a battle of wits between Socrates and Protagoras. Crucially, the open disagreements concern both theses/truths and methodology. Perhaps surprisingly, it is on the methodological level that the disagreement creates the most drama. At the point where this disagreement surfaces most forcefully, we have already had a taste of Protagoras' penchant for longish monologues and Socrates' desire to carry out his investigation by means of short questions and answers. And Socrates goes as far as to threaten to leave the company and the conversation altogether if he does not get his way.

As you can argue in both styles, you should have made me some concession, so that we could have had a conversation. But now, since you are not willing to do so, and I have an engagement, and couldn't wait for you to spin out these long speeches – I have to go somewhere – I shall go. (*Prt.* 335C)¹

¹ All translations are by Taylor 1996.

Socrates adds emphasis to his threat by actually getting up as if to leave (*Prt.* 335D). His ultimatum provokes a series of methodological comments and suggestions from several of those who are present. The comments also have the function of bringing home what has already been indicated by Socrates' words at this point – namely that the two methodologies are well known among those present as alternative ways of communicating.

The drama of the dialogue also lets us appreciate how the difference between 'shortspeaking' (βραχυλογία) and 'longspeaking' (μακρολογία),² i.e. a difference in methodology, may additionally be related to differences in character that are not altogether accidental. This point is emphasized by Plato when he lets Prodicus and Hippias dramatize themselves in the course of the methodological discussion, thus reminding us that the method of each is intimately linked to the personality or character of each. But the role of character is the most emphatic in the contrast between Protagoras and Socrates – the one jovial and friendly, but easily distressed by attempts to undermine his authority, the other sharp and shift, but always willing to go through an extra round of testing in order to get rid of mistakes and move closer to the truth.

So what are the two interlocutors' preferred methodologies? The method of instruction favoured in this case by Protagoras is exemplified in his so-called Great Speech. He presents what is supposed to constitute an explanation by combining mythological storytelling with elucidations or arguments pertaining to certain parts, and he does so without interruptions in the course of the presentation. The result is a rather grand vision, fleshed out in very broad outlines with little detail. In addition, the replies are presented mainly in a mythical format that hides which mechanisms or causal relations are really in play (provided, of course, that the individualized figures of Epimetheus, Prometheus, and Zeus are not to be taken literally as the ultimate explanations offered).

The method of instruction favoured by Socrates is exemplified not least in the long section (from 351B on) where he drags the others along the path towards hedonism. By contrast with the Protagorean approach to imparting putative knowledge, Socrates' method requires dividing the package to be delivered into small fragments and forcing the interlocutor to consider and agree to them one by one before proceeding to the next one. Formally, this process consists of Socrates posing leading or hypothetical questions, interspersed with explanatory notes, and the interlocutor indicating that he agrees to the step being taken for each move. (Presumably, as long as the

² The terms are used by Socrates in a parallel discussion in *Grg.* 449C.

interlocutor follows the exposition and does not arrive at a point where he is clear that he is no longer willing to accept the consequences of what has gone before, the instruction's success does not depend entirely on his saying his responses out loud. But since the audience for most people, including Protagoras, provides extra motivation for being careful about what one agrees to, the inclusion of some public affirmation will have a sharpening effect on the respondent.)

The danger in soul-shaping

The ridiculousness of the setting where all the sophists are introduced (*Prt.* 314E ff) makes for quite a contrast with the opening of the *Protagoras*' main bulk (i.e. following the framing sequence); the main dialogue's opening possesses an unambiguous, down-to-earth earnestness which we find only rarely in Plato. Says Socrates to his eager young companion:

Don't take chances in a matter of such importance. For you know, there's much more risk in buying learning than in buying food. If you buy food or drink from a pedlar or a merchant you can carry it away in another container, and before you actually eat or drink it you can set it down at home and call in an expert and take his advice on what you ought to eat or drink and what you ought not, and how much, and when you ought to take it. So there is no risk in buying. But you can't carry learning away in a jar; you have to put down the price and take the learning into your soul right away. By the time you go away you have already assimilated it, and got the harm or the benefit. (*Prt.* 314A–B)

At the point when Socrates says these words to Hippocrates, the young man has tried to pull Socrates along to meet Protagoras, so eager for the meeting that he has arrived at Socrates' place while it is still too dark to see. (This fact is used by Socrates as an argument for them to wait for daylight before setting off, and it is the excuse which makes it possible for Socrates to have a proper tête-à-tête in order to warn Hippocrates before confronting the great sophist in *Prt.* 311A).

What is conveyed by Socrates in the opening sequence is the fact that through our being educated, we are, partially through our own agency or engagement, affected by the educator in such a way that we become something we were not, without knowing beforehand what it is we will become, or whether that development is for the better or for the worse. For the sophistic forms of soul shaping, the normal state of affairs is one where the person does not know what the education does to him before it has already entered and become an integral part of him (if even then). In other words, the issue framing the drama of the *Protagoras* is that of being altered by someone. This is something Socrates

clearly believes to be possible – in fact, that possibility is the source of his worries. (When at *Prt.* 319A–20C he says he does not believe that virtue can be taught, he thinks of teaching in a narrow sense as systematic instruction, in contradistinction to Protagoras’ much wider understanding of teaching as socialization).³

There is a humorous little reminder of the difficulty involved in identifying types of educators at the stage where Hippocrates and Socrates try to enter Callias’ house. The person opening the door mistakes them for sophists, a fact which immediately shifts the mood from the seriousness of the preceding scene into something almost farcical, since he slams the door in their faces (*Prt.* 314C–E). While this episode functions as a coda for the scene confronting them inside, it also illustrates how it is not obvious who is who in matters of education.

Protagoras shares Socrates’ understanding of what is at stake, in the sense that Protagoras in his public self-presentation places himself in the company of all sorts of educators up to his own time.

I maintain that the craft of the sophist is an ancient one, but that its practitioners in ancient times, for fear of giving offence, adopted the subterfuge of disguising it as some other craft, as Homer and Hesiod and Simonides did with poetry, and Orpheus and Musaeus and their followers with religious rites and prophesies. Some, I have heard, went in for physical training, like Iccus of Taras and, in our own day, Herodicus of Selymbria (originally of Megara), as good a sophist as any. Your fellow citizen Agathocles, a great sophist, used music and literature as cover, and so did Pythocleides of Ceos and many others. (*Prt.* 316D–E)

The most interesting feature of this passage is not that Protagoras refers to all educators as sophists – that is a ploy to provide himself with the legitimacy and authority of tradition and acknowledged expertise – but that he presents himself as an educator. With this in mind, it is easy to appreciate the intimate relation between the opening part and the main part of the dialogue.

Method and substance

So why the hedonist section? The presentation of this theory does not forcefully dramatize that people are changed by instruction, because in the end no one seems to comfortably believe that theory. I suggest that the function of that presentation may be the very opposite of persuading anyone of its truth, namely, that of illustrating for us that there is a safety valve in Socrates’

³ The qualities are described and named in different ways in the *Protagoras*, but at least from 320A on ‘virtue’ (ἀρετή) figures prominently.

manner of teaching, consisting of the fact that this methodology forces the pupil, interlocutor, or reader to face rationally whatever is introduced before making it part of his/her soul.

This suggestion has the merit of fitting perfectly with the opening's description of how most soul shaping is dangerous precisely because the teaching goes on in a manner such that elements are assimilated into one's soul before one can examine them. This was, as we remember, Socrates' greatest worry. The dialogue dramatizes, through the interlocutors' hesitant reactions and the reader's own reactions, that the worry is nowhere near as acute if we stick to the Socratic manner of teaching.

Which qualities of this brand of βραχυλογία make it so different to Protagorean μακρολογία when it comes to the possibility of imparting (putative) knowledge with a lower risk of unhealthy assimilation? Two features in particular stand out when the two methods are contrasted as they are in the *Protagoras*. First, there is the analysis of the content into minimal packages, which can then be considered in isolation. And secondly, there is the demand that the interlocutor take an active stance towards each parcel, deciding then and there whether or not he or she is willing, for now, to accept each proposition.⁴ In contrast, Protagorean μακρολογία gives one a feeling that one is in the presence of a grander vision of something, with few details even visible; and instead of critically examining that vision, one accepts it – if it is accepted – on a combination of trust in the speaker's insight and some kind of admiration of his ability to conjure up the apparently seamless image in the first place.

The dialogue indicates, then, that one form of education is safer than the alternative with which it is contrasted, while at the same time it reminds us that we are the sort of beings that are susceptible to different kinds of education. The final hedonistic tour de force lets us experience this difference first-hand.

A final remark on form and content

We can make sense of one additional feature of the *Protagoras* by adopting the suggested interpretation. Plato's *Protagoras* is made to present a view of education, and of human beings, as not only rational but multi-faceted even on the best of days. One thing that might strike the reader of the dialogue is the extent to which this vision, at least superficially, resembles the complex view of humanity and moral psychology that Socrates details in certain other

⁴ This also suggests another aspect of dialectic in the sense of critical, leading questioning: it is a method of inquiry whereby the participant and audience do not just learn during the interaction, but whereby important parts of the learning process normally take place after the actual interaction is over.

dialogues.⁵ Protagoras holds that our qualities are more like the parts of a face than they are like pieces of gold (*Prt.* 329D–E). A version of this view is what we find in e.g. the *Republic* – a version which operates with three politico-ethically relevant soul parts, each with its distinctive function and dynamics, analogous to the relation between, say, eyes and mouth (only by each doing its unique job properly and in coordination with the other can most of us function in everyday life). Similarly, Protagoras is made to conjure up a vision of education as socialization, that is, as something which is the prerogative of the city as a whole and which takes place through a thousand nudges from a thousand directions, not only from a specific kind of rational interaction with a teacher (although that activity is what can bring someone to the final, higher realizations of reason). Again, this is more or less the gist of the *Republic*'s version of how to produce a decent human being.⁶

I take it that this otherwise baffling and confusing feature of the *Protagoras* makes perfect sense if the primary aim of the dialogue is not to present a given content ('Here's the truth about ...'), but rather a certain form ('This is how you ...'). Precisely by letting the sophist wander closer to a believable version of the truth about moral psychology and education, while Socrates is made to present a theory that is over-simplistic and alien to most of what the author pays attention to in his other works, Plato manages to bring out the difference between the two. In the *Protagoras*, the central issue is not which theory to believe, but which methodology to abide by.

The *Protagoras* forcefully demonstrates how Plato focuses on questions of methodology not only when he lets his characters stop in their tracks and discuss it explicitly, but also – and not least – when the reader is lulled into thinking that only the theses and arguments under consideration define what is going on in the text.

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⁵ For a corresponding argument that the hedonist theory presented by Socrates is a natural consequence of Protagorean relativism and constructivism, see Rowett 2013.

⁶ I argue that a correspondingly complex moral psychology is in play in the *Laws* as well in Fossheim 2014.

Civilized communication of culture: παιδεία and πειθώ in the *Republic*

PÁL RYKKJA GILBERT

I have never seen the *Republic* referred to as a treatise on rhetoric, nor is it the first, or the second, place one would look for a Platonic account of the concept of persuasion. We are fortunate to possess the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*, where the art of rhetoric is treated at length, although ἡ λόγων τέχνη must compete for the title of primary subject in both works. Disregarding the question of art, the concept of ‘λόγος’ receives its fair share of attention in both the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*. In the *Republic* the art of persuasion works in subtler ways, but it still plays an important role, as I hope to show presently.

My point of departure is the concept of persuasion (πειθώ). I shall briefly consider the boundaries of the concept as employed in the *Republic* before I attempt to connect the concept itself with the education of the guardians by way of the notion of cultivation.

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates makes a distinction between two forms of persuasion: one will produce belief (πίστις) without knowledge, and the other will in fact produce knowledge (ἐπιστήμη); in the latter sense, ‘to persuade’ (πείθειν) is synonymous with ‘to teach’ (διδάσκειν), while ‘to be persuaded’ (πειθεσθαι) equals ‘to learn’ (μανθάνειν) (*Grg.* 454c7–5a7). The distinction is repeated in the *Theaetetus*, the only difference being that ‘belief’ is exchanged for ‘opinion’ (δόξα).¹ The *Gorgias* is not concerned with elaborating on this distinction through an exploration of the nature of knowledge or the difference between knowledge and belief, while the *Theaetetus*, as we know, does not succeed in defending a definition of knowledge, even though it is precisely this division within the category of persuasion which leads Socrates to discard the second definition and Theaetetus to propose the third and final definition: true opinion based on *logos* (μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆς δόξα).²

We stumble across a similar categorization of persuasion – although more or less incidentally – in *Resp.* 3.412e5–13c4, during the separation of the guardians proper from the auxiliary guard. Socrates tries to illustrate the different ways in which opinion may exit someone’s thought (διάνοια). The only voluntary exit occurs when false opinion is changed by way of learning

1 *Tht.* 201a4–c7. Similarly we find δοξάζειν instead of πιστεύειν. Since the reference to persuasion is made during a discussion of δόξα and the proposed definition of ἐπιστήμη as δόξα ἀληθῆς, it would be silly to read much into this difference.

2 The distinction is also alluded to in *Pl. Plt.* 304b1–d10 and *Phdr.* 277e5–8a5.

(μεταμανθάνειν). Involuntary loss of opinion befalls *true* opinion in particular,³ and there are three possible ways this can happen:

1. Theft:⁴ Opinion is removed by stealth, in one of two ways:
 - a. Persuasion (μεταπειθείν) through the agency of speech (λόγος),
 - b. Forgetting (ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι) through the agency of time (χρόνος).
2. Violence: Pain makes one change one's opinion.
3. Sorcery: This category comprises change of opinion in those who are:
 - a. Spellbound by pleasure,
 - b. Seized by fear.

Although voluntary change through learning is not referred to as a form of *πειθώ* in this passage, it is easy to recognize that this way of changing opinion corresponds to epistemic persuasion in *Grg.* and *Tht.* Of the involuntary modes only 1a is entitled persuasion, and the question is whether this category is congruous with the 'pistic' form of persuasion in *Grg.* It all depends on what – and how much – one reads into the qualification 'by stealth' (λανθάνειν). There is a difference between being unaware of changing one's opinion and being ignorant of exactly *how* one was induced to change it. If one is unable to render account of one's change of heart, even if the change is for the better, Socrates would hardly consider it a case of 'learning'. Moreover, although it is presented as a form of *involuntary* change, being unable to prove the rational basis for one's conviction would certainly make it count as involuntary from the Socratic perspective, considering the lack of self-transparency, i.e. the lack of self-knowledge.

Disregarding the case of memory lapse for now, the categories of violence and sorcery are significant in their own right, particularly in relation to a wider concept of persuasion than that which is invoked in the category of theft. There is no reason to doubt that persuasion is indelibly tied to the medium of *logos*, but *logos* in the strict sense of speech or argument rests on a more elusive foundation. When Aristotle makes his clear distinction between λόγος, ἦθος, and πάθος, he emphasizes that these are all modes of persuasion (πίστεις) which affect the audience *in the medium of speech*. By means of speech alone

3 One could get the impression that Socrates considers false opinion immune to involuntary exit, but there is no reason why his categories should not apply equally well to the change from false to true opinion, or to the exchange of one false opinion for another. Involuntary loss of false opinion is of no importance in the context because the discussion concerns the ability of the potential guardian to hold onto true opinion.

4 In *κλαπέντες* we can note a toying with the poetic use of this verb in the sense of 'deception'. That Plato intends this becomes quite obvious with Socrates' confession that *πραγτικῶς ... κινδυνεύω λέγειν* (*Resp.* 3.413b4), although this should *also* be understood as an apology for the use of metaphors. Adam 1963², I, 191 correctly refers to *κεκλέμμεθα* in *Soph. Ant.* 681.

the speaker can convey an impression of his own character, leading the auditor to put more, or less, faith in what he hears *regardless of the strength of the actual rhetorical syllogism*. This attuning of trust is not usually something which the auditor is able to account for, and if he is, it is doubtful whether his account could ever reach ‘straight to the bottom’, achieving complete transparency. Then again, the speaker can construct his speech so as to more directly affect the mood of the auditor, raising his spirits or striking fear into him. His mood, and his reaction to the perceived character of the speaker, will determine the extent to which the auditor is taken in by the speech, what weight he puts on particular arguments, strictly speaking, and perhaps even his capacity to appreciate argument. The truly good speech leaves the audience entranced, spellbound, and captivated.

In all probability, *these* modes of persuasion are already included in category 1a above. The reason he considers pain, pleasure, and fear separately is that he has in mind instances where these emotions are *not* aroused by speech, but rather by exposure to bribery (pleasure) and afflictions upon the battlefield (pain, fear). Even when they are not conveyed by speech, character and passion can lead to involuntary change of opinion. This does not mean they are not at work in speech.

It is therefore all the more interesting that violence (*βία*) and persuasion form an inseparable pair of contrasts, popping up throughout the entirety of the *Republic*.⁵ In a passage from book 8, Socrates describes the psyche of the oligarchic person:

Is it not clear from this that such a person, in other transactions, where he enjoys the reputation of being a just man, suppresses other base appetites residing in him by means of a so to speak decent act of violence (*ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ*): that he does not attempt to convey through persuasion that it is not the better choice, nor does he cultivate by means of words, but through necessity and fear (*οὐδ’ ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ*), as he is himself anxious for his remaining fortune?⁶

⁵ Most noticeable are *Resp.* 3.411d7–e2 and 8.554c11–d3, but the contrast is present at 3.399a5–c4, 3.403b6, 7. 519e4 and arguably in the passage where Socrates envisages persuading the philosophers to return to the cave (7. 520a6–e3). Cf. 2.359c5–6, where *βία* is applied – but not by Socrates – to νόμος as opposed to φύσις.

⁶ *Resp.* 8.554c11–d3. Translations are my own, based on the text of Burnet 1900–1907.

This less-than-honourable display of self-restraint is a fascinating illustration of self-cultivation. One is reminded of the vulgar virtue in the *Phaedo*, where desire restrains desire and fear repels fear.⁷ What is of particular interest here is the contrast between two modes of cultivation.

The verb ἡμεροῦν means ‘to make ἡμερος’, ἡμερος being an adjective which was applied to ‘tame’ animals and ‘cultivated’ plants. There is, in other words, a strong connotation of subduing or bringing under control. But more importantly, there is a connotation of organization and society, of cooperation, and of a way of being which makes cooperation possible. The opposite of ἡμερος is ἄγριος, the wild, the savage, the loner, lacking in shame and devoid of respect for others: the lion, the wolf.⁸ The social sense of ἡμερος is effectively illustrated when Socrates in the *Phaedo* groups together bees, wasps, ants, and humans as πολιτικὰ καὶ ἡμερα γένη, to which those who have practised the vulgar (δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ) non-philosophical virtue will return via reincarnation.⁹ In the famous passage in *Pol.* 1.2 where Aristotle proclaims the human being a political animal, the bee, along with ‘every other gregarious animal’, is recognized as possessing a lesser share of the political.¹⁰ What renders the human being so outstandingly political is, based on the most natural interpretation of the text, its capacity for *logos*. It is no coincidence that *logos* in the above quote follows immediately after ἡμερῶν, while necessity and fear – although dependent on the same verb – are separated in an elliptical clause of their own: the latter terms connect only with one half of the concept of cultivation.

7 I agree with Adam 1963², II, 228 that this is how we should understand this passage, hence the superiority of reading ἐπιεικεῖ τι as an attribute of βίη, rather than as a self-contained expression (‘a decent element’). See *Phd.* 68b8–9d6, with a description of vulgar σωφροσύνη as appetite conquering appetite at 68e2–9a5, and 82c2–4a2, where there is a mention of the money-lover’s fear for his fortune at 82c5–6.

8 The spirited element is likened to a lion in *Resp.* 9. 588d3–5, harbouring the possibility for savagery, in which case the wolf is the more appropriate image (3. 416a2 – b4), or for civilized loyalty in the manner of the dog (ibid. cf. 2.376a2–c6). The tyrant is likened to a wolf in 8.565d4–6a5. See ὀφειδὲς at 9.590b1 with Adam’s note 1963², II, 365–6.

9 *Phd.* 82a10–b9. Also worth noting, with a view to the opposite ἀγριότης, is that 81a3–a6 suggests that τούς ... γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτινῶν γένη [sc. εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι]. In *Resp.* tyranny, lawlessness (παρανομία, see esp. 4.424d1–5a1, 9.571a5–2b9), injustice, violence and savagery are intimately connected concepts. In *Dem.* 21.49 ἡμερος is coupled with φιλόανθρωπος, with reference to the Greeks, in spite of experiencing many an injustice at the hands of the barbarians, in spite of being born into enmity with them, still forbidding violence against (barbarian) slaves. Moreover, the fact that ἡμερότης in *Resp.* is so obviously associated with σωφροσύνη, which is defined in Book 4 as ‘friendship’ between the political classes/psychic elements, further strengthens my claim that there is a social connotation to the concept.

10 The image of the bee and the beehive is moreover strongly ingrained in the *Republic* itself. The philosopher rulers are likened to ἐν σμήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας at 7.520b6, and then the hive and, more importantly, the drone (κηφήν) is the primary simile employed during the description of degenerate regimes and persons in Books 8–9.

Let us now take a closer look at how this cultivation operates in the Platonic soul. In *Resp.* 3.410a7–12b1, as the education in music and gymnastics culminates, all eyes are on ἀγριότης and ἡμερότης, savagery and culture. Although these two qualities are initially paired with σκληρότης and μαλακία, hardness and softness, at 3.410e1–3 it is made clear that softness is the *excess* corresponding to culture, while savagery seems to be more like the raw material for, or the obscure origin of, the mean courage and excess hardness (3.410d6–9). Culture is naturally associated with the philosophical aspiration of the soul (3.410e1), while savagery originates in the spirited element (3.410d6–7). In fact, in Book 9 (588b1–92b6), as the main argument of the *Republic* reaches its climax – a chunk of text which should be read in conjunction with this part of Book 3 – the philosophical or ‘logistic’ element of the soul is actually referred to as τὸ ἥμερον (9.589d2, 591b3). One might say it is *the* cultured element, since in the same passage Socrates also applies this term attributively both to the spirited element and to parts of the desiderative element: when a person is punished for an unjust deed, ‘the spirited element is calmed and tamed (ἡμεροῦται), while the cultured element is set free (ἐλευθεροῦται)’ (9.591b2–3). Two pages earlier, Socrates compared the ‘materialist’ desires to a multiform beast with a circle of heads ‘of other animals, *both wild and tame* (ἥμερα)’ (9.588c8–9), before he went on to liken the rational element – when it functions at its best – to a farmer ‘nurturing and domesticating (τιθασεύων) the cultivated (ἥμερα), while hindering the growth of the wild ones’ (9.589b2–3). Whatever the nuance of τιθασός,¹¹ in my opinion this apparent ‘doubling’ of cultivation suggests that some desires already possess an affinity with the cultured element in the strict sense of the word, an affinity which may be further cultivated. As for the members of this group, one should refer to the distinction between ‘necessary’ or ‘lucrative’ and ‘unnecessary’ or ‘wasteful’ desires in 8.558d8–9d3, and the further isolation of certain ‘perverse’, ‘lawless’, ‘beastly’ and ‘savage’ desires within the group of unnecessary desires at 9.571a5–2b9.

While the notion of culture is explicitly connected with the philosophical element in Book 3, the emphasis is on *origin*: culture *springs from* the philosophical element. But the very point of the education, as is reaffirmed in Book 9, is to *harmonize* the elements. Even if culture and civilization primarily

11 Chantraine 2009, 1077 has some interesting comments on the application of ἥμερος vs τιθασός, with reference to this passage. It is also worth noting that he follows Adam 1963², II, 364 in taking ὡσπερ γεωργός as belonging to the following clause, not to the one preceding. Hence ‘*il s’agit de plantes*’, with Shorey 1930–1935, II, 403, but *contra* Ferrari and Griffith 2000, 309, Grube and Reeve 1997, 1197, Emlyn-Jones and Preddy 2013, II, 379. In my opinion, the image of the γεωργός loses much of its *raison d’être* if one does not consider the following clause an expansion on the image.

originate with the capacity to reason, once present they may affect the rest of the soul. And when they do, when a man cultivates his own spirit and his own desires, or when he educates a child who ‘is not yet able to seize λόγος’ (3.402a2), this process of cultivation need not be a matter of force (βία), but it can be – and it should be – one of *logos* and persuasion, πειθῶ διὰ λόγων (3.411d8). Not only spirit, but also a certain part of the large, desiderative element of the soul, should not simply be repressed, but rather appealed to with words. The possibility of this scenario hinges on the fact that although the soul *may* consist of sharply distinct and even contrary ‘parts’, it is *qua* possibility a more or less unified whole. One could even add that it is unified with the rest of the ‘logical’ world – how else could a child not yet itself in command of *logos* (cf. 9.590e2–1a4) be amenable to education?

This originary unity is designated throughout with the word ἡμερος. It depends on the possibility of communication, which reaches its most extreme form in human *logos*. This *logos* is not only a medium for outward communication, but a basic determination of the human soul. Hence Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 1.1102b25–03a3) allows the psychic aspect originally entitled *alogon* a share in *logos*, in a passage adorned with a string of words which evoke the notion of persuasion.¹² The same logical relationship of persuasion, I contend, is present in the account of the human being in the *Republic*. And just as in Aristotle the practical *logos* is conceptually inseparable from character as seated in desire (ὄρεξις), we may entertain the idea that also in Plato’s *Republic* reason’s capacity for persuading desire rests upon an affinity between thought and that aspect of character which is expressed in spirit and the lower appetites, with the implication that reason does not enjoy the complete conceptual integrity suggested by the digression on philosophy in Books 5–7. The affinity reaches perfection in the fully cultivated soul, when all the psychic elements are united in the ‘friendship’ that constitutes *sophrosyne* (4.430c8–2b1, 4.442c10–d3), based not on force, but on mutual respect. In Kallipolis it may very well be this friendship which in the end persuades the philosophers to temper their philosophical *eros* and return for a while to the world of politics and social interaction.

¹² πειθαρχεῖ, εὐηκόότερον, ὁμοφωνεῖ, κατήκοον, πειθαρχικόν, τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων ἔχειν λόγον, πείθεται πως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, ὅσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.

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Sophistic appearances¹

ØYVIND RABBÅS

The *Sophist* begins with the need to distinguish the philosopher from two other characters with whom he appears to be identical: the statesman and the sophist (216c). While the philosopher's appearance becomes the topic of the *Statesman*, the sophist is the subject of the eponymous dialogue. After six failed attempts to define the essence of the sophist (221c–31b), the Eleatic Visitor and his interlocutor, young Theaetetus, reach an impasse (in ἀπορία) about what the sophist is (231b9–c2). They then decide to begin a new attempt (232b), starting from the observation that the sophist characteristically engages in controversies (ἀντιλέγειν), (b6; cf. 225a–6a, 231e1–2). In fact, he has the ability to engage in controversies about every subject, which makes him seem 'wiser than everyone else about everything' (233b1–2; cf. 233c1–2, 233c6), without actually being so (233c8). By analogy with a painter, who makes pictorial representations, the sophist uses words (λόγοι): he makes 'spoken images of everything' (εἰδῶλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, 234c6) (cf. 240a1–2). But since he does so without having any real knowledge about these things, he is 'a kind of cheat who imitates [or represents] real things' (τῶν γοήτων ἐστὶ τις, μιμητὴς ὢν τῶν ὄντων, 235a1) and 'makes our souls believe what is false' (240d2–3).² What can justify this harsh characterization?

The starting-point is a distinction between the production of originals or the things themselves (τὰ αὐτά), and the production of images or representations (εἰδῶλα), i.e. things that are similar to the originals (ὁμοιωμάτων τινῶν) (235d–36c). These representations are similar to the originals or, as I suggest here, they are appearances of them: they make the originals appear. But the category of representation is then subdivided into two species: likenesses (εἰκόνα) – their production is called εἰκαστικὴ τέχνη (235d6–36b3) and apparitions (φαντάσματα), which are produced by an εἰκαστικὴ τέχνη (236b4–c5). Since the sophist is defined as a species of apparition-maker, it is important to note the difference between these two kinds of representation, but unfortunately this is neither easy nor uncontroversial.³

1 One of Øyvind Andersen's main interests is rhetoric and its history, especially in Antiquity. The sophists are crucial in this history, and Plato's dialogue devoted to this topic is therefore an appropriate subject for my contribution to this *Festschrift*.

2 Translations are from White 1993, sometimes emended.

3 I follow Notomi's reading; see Notomi 1999, 147–55. The choice of 'image' for εἰδῶλον and 'apparition' for φάντασμα is due to Notomi; White 1993 has 'copy' and 'appearance'.

Likenesses and apparitions are distinguished by two criteria: (1) their inherent correctness and (2) the viewpoint from which they are apprehended. A likeness is defined as *correct* if it keeps ‘to the proportions of length, breadth, and depth of the model, and also by keeping to the appropriate colours of its parts’ (235d7–e2). The likeness is correct because it represents the properties of the model as they are, independently of how they are seen by (or appear to) the addressee of the representation. An apparition, on the other hand, will *distort* the properties of the original; the example given is a large sculpture whose upper parts are in fact larger than that of their model. The reason for this intentional distortion is that in this way the sculpture will in fact better represent its model to the intended spectators, since they will see it from a low viewpoint. Thus the distortion is motivated by the desire to make the model appear the way it is. But, and this is the problem, while a likeness is in itself correct, an apparition is not – the latter depends on the spectator being appropriately situated (at a good viewpoint; cf. 236b4–5) for it to truly represent, and it is thus held hostage to his competence and understanding.⁴

To represent something is to make it appear, i.e. to make it apparent or (somehow) present. Something can be represented, i.e. made to appear to somebody, either by using pictures or by using ‘speeches’ (*logoi*): we have pictorial and logical representation. A pictorial representation will represent by being *perceptually* like the original being represented: a picture of my car looks like my car. But a logical representation does not represent in virtue of this kind of similarity: a proposition does not look like what it represents. (The proposition ‘Theaetetus sits’ does not look like the sitting Theaetetus, or Theaetetus’ sitting.) Nevertheless, we may say that the logical representation (the proposition) is *structurally* like what it represents in that its form, ‘*a* is *F*’, is somehow isomorphic to the property *F*’s inhering in the object *a*. The person asserting this proposition (the speaker) can see, i.e. understand or intellectually grasp, this isomorphism, and so can the addressee of this assertion. When the speaker produces his proposition, he aims to make the fact (*F*’s inhering in *a*, or *a*’s being *F*) apparent (intellectually visible) to the addressee, and he can do this only if the latter is able to understand it (‘see the point’). Moreover, he is able to do so in virtue of his mastery of the concept of *F*, and of representing to himself *a*’s falling under this concept. This kind of representation is not imagistic/pictorial, but it is a matter of seeing or grasping structural similarities nevertheless (the visual metaphors are neither arbitrary nor misleading here), and it is this common feature of grasping similarities that justifies treating pictorial and logical representation as two species of the same genus.

4 Cf. Notomi 1999, 149–50.

Even with these distinctions in hand, however, there is unclarity about the sophist (236c9–d4), and the main reason for this is that all this talk of representation, likeness, and apparition raises deep problems about appearance, not being and being, and false speech (236d9–7a4). It is precisely these difficulties that a sophist would latch onto if he were presented with this argument (239c9–d5). These problems therefore occupy the interlocutors for a good 20 Stephanus pages (241b–64b), before they return to the account of the sophist as a maker of apparitions (264c–8e). But however important these topics may be in their own right, they are taken up in this dialogue because this is necessary in order to determine the nature of the sophist and meet his counterattack against the proposed definition of him as a maker of apparitions.

The problem is as follows. Any statement is saying something. A false statement is taken to be saying that which is not. But that which is not is nothing, i.e. not something. So a false statement seems to be saying nothing, i.e. not to be a statement at all, i.e. to be impossible. And if representations (images, likenesses, and apparitions) are false or illusory, they too will seem to be representing nothing, i.e. not be representations, i.e. be impossible.

The solution to this puzzle is controversial, but I follow Michael Frede and assume the following.⁵ For the purpose of this discussion, we can take a statement to have the form ‘*a* is *F*’. Here ‘*a*’ denotes the subject of the statement (the object talked about), and ‘*F*’ (the predicate term) the property ascribed to the subject. If the statement is true, then *F* is ‘about [περί]’, or ‘with reference to’, *a* – *F* is present in, or appears in, *a* – and this is what the statement says. This means that *F*’s presence/appearance in *a* is made apparent by the statement; the statement is a true appearance of an appearance. However, if the statement is false, then *F* is not about/with reference to *a* – *F* is not present in, it does not appear in, *a* – although this is what the statement says. Thus, the statement appears to be making the presence/appearance of *F* in *a* apparent, without actually doing so; the false statement is a ‘mere appearance’, i.e. a false appearance of an appearance.

How can this solve the problem of defining the sophist? The sophist, remember, was defined as a maker of ‘spoken images’ or ‘apparitions’, without a real knowledge of what he makes appear. However, when the interlocutors discuss the problem of false statement – or, rather, false *logos* – the examples they use are simple, individual propositions: ‘Theaetetus is sitting’ and ‘Theaetetus is flying’. Thus the question is as follows: How can a philosophical analysis of these statements, and in particular of the latter, false statement, help us understand what we want to understand, namely what a sophist is?

⁵ Frede 1992, section III, esp. 417–23.

The activity of the sophists is essentially tied to rhetoric, i.e. to public speaking in the assembly or court of law, or at special public events such as funerals. This context is what gives us the three rhetorical genres that Aristotle identifies in the *Rhetoric* (I 3). The sophists are either orators themselves or they write speeches for orators, as well as educating them and giving them advice. So their *logoi* are speeches, orations before an audience, and their purpose is to persuade the audience that their case is the right one, that their claim is true or justified. But if that is so, it seems that the problem with the sophist is not that he presents us with straightforward lies, i.e. individual propositions that he knows are false – that would be too risky as a rhetorical strategy. Rather, the problem is that he can speak falsely without uttering a single false proposition. The falsity of his activity is therefore a property of his speech (*logos*) as a whole, not of any individual proposition produced as part of this speech. However, this raises the following questions: What is the relation between such a *logos*, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the *logoi* (statements) discussed in the digression on non-being and false statement? And how can an analysis of false statements help us understand the nature of untruthful or deceitful speeches?

Perhaps a place to start is with a very basic assumption about language or *logos* that seems to underlie the entire discussion, and, in fact, the origins of philosophy with the Greeks. On this assumption, the purpose of language – i.e. assertive speech, *logos* – is to make reality apparent to us, so that we can represent reality to each other by means of it. Thus, the function (task, *ergon*) of *logos* is practical: we want to tell (or show) each other (and ourselves) how things are so that we can conduct ourselves accordingly; and true *logos* represents reality as it is. This can be done in simple cases, in the form of individual propositions that are true or false, but it can also be done in complex cases such as when we describe a house, tell a story about what happened, summarize the contents of a book or a movie, explain what causes water to freeze, or argue why a certain course of action is better than the alternative because it is more prudent or just. All these cases are examples of *logos*, and they represent – or present themselves as representing – reality: the way things are. And they do so in order to affect us: to make us act in certain ways, to make us take up certain attitudes towards certain people, or to make us understand a certain part of reality. But the difference between these complex cases of *logos* and the simple cases exemplified in the dialogue is that the relation between the *logos* and the way things are, the relation of representation, is much more subtle in the complex cases than in the simple cases. A single statement or proposition is true or false, period, but a speech can be more, or less, adequate, truthful, objective, balanced, informative, reliable, trustworthy, etc.

We may get a better handle on this point if we imagine that the sophists' *logos* can be condensed, as it were, into a single proposition. What kind of proposition could this be? Here are a few possibilities: (1) 'We ought to sack Troy'; (2) 'Those who fell at Marathon were heroes'; (3) 'Raising the taxes is unjust'; (4) 'Euaeon is guilty of murder'. These seem to be representative examples of statements that an orator might make in one of the Classical rhetorical contexts, and they can all be schematized in the same way as the examples used in the *Sophist*, in the form '*a is F*'. If so, even a rhetorical *logos* can be seen as a matter of subsuming an object under a concept, or of ascribing a property, conceptualized by the predicate-term, to the object. In the simple cases discussed in the *Sophist*, this ascription is a straightforward matter: Theaetetus is either sitting or he is not, and he is either flying or he is not; the concepts of sitting and flying are easy to apply. But in the rhetorical cases we imagined, the relevant concepts ('ought to be sacked', 'hero', 'unjust' (or 'just'), 'murder') are not so easily applied. A concept is a rule, containing criteria for its application to all cases belonging to a certain class. Sometimes, as in the case of sitting or flying, these criteria are more, or less, straightforward. But in other cases they are not, and then the concept can only be applied after a rather elaborate process involving the survey of a large amount of relevant information that must be interpreted before one can reach a balanced overall judgement. The conclusion may be stated in the simple form '*a is F*', as in the examples given, but the statement expressing this conclusion may perhaps better be regarded as a condensed summary of the entire judgement, rather than as the judgement itself – it is the case in a nutshell, as it were.

So how can this line of reasoning justify the proposed account of the sophist as a maker of 'apparitions' or of 'spoken images of everything'? The sophist's *logoi* appear – are made by him to appear – to represent the way things are, in particular in ethical, legal, and political contexts. That is, we could say, they appear to be representing the way certain properties, picked out by our concepts (in particular ethical, legal, and political properties), are present in, or appear in, the cases he is discussing; but this appearance of representing this presence is false, deceptive. Thus, the sophist's speech – (1) what he *says* – is deceptive: it merely appears to be true. But that also means that (2) what he *does* in presenting these speeches appears to be to speak truly; and that (3) what he *is*, insofar as he engages in this activity, appears to be wise.⁶ So the sophist's deceptive appearance is threefold, and he is in every way an 'apparition-maker' and 'a kind of cheat who imitates [or represents] real things'.

⁶ Cf. Notomi 1999, 120f, 134.

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Qualities in Aristotle's *Categories*

MONIKA ASZTALOS

It is commonly taken for granted that Aristotle's main concern in *Categories* is to propose a classification in which each thing occupies one, and only one, place in a hierarchy consisting of genera that are divisible into species. Any passage in this work that seems to contradict this assumption is considered perplexing or even taken as evidence of 'a weakness in the foundations of Aristotle's theory of categories'.¹ So strong is this belief that the authenticity of 11a20–38, which comes at the end of the discussion of qualities in chapter 8, has been doubted.² The purpose of this contribution is to show that there is indeed a weakness, not, however, in Aristotle's theory but in the commonly held assumptions about it. A full investigation of all problems involved and of previous research requires much more space than is available on this occasion. Thus, my main focus will be on chapter 8, and I will refer to the translation and commentary by J. L. Ackrill, a work that has been, and still is, hugely influential on determining how *Categories* is understood.³

This is how chapter 8 begins:⁴ 'I speak of that in accordance with which men⁵ are spoken of as some sort of men (ποιοί τινες λέγονται) as a quality' (8b25–6). In other words, the qualities to be discussed are those of particular men (τινες), that is to say, some accidental qualities as opposed to substantial (or essential) ones. The latter are qualities in accordance with which all members of a class belonging to a certain genus differ from all members of another class (or of other classes) of the same genus. At *Categories* 1b18–19 Aristotle gives examples of classes of the genus *animal*: *animal with legs*, *winged animal*, etc. The species *man* can be spoken of as some sort of animal, not as some sort of man; some man (i.e. a particular man) can be spoken of as some sort of man (hence also as some sort of animal). In the first case we produce a definition involving a substantial quality, in the second case we make a predication involving an accidental quality.

This is Ackrill's translation of *Categories* 8b25–6: 'By a *quality* I mean that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified somehow'. The differences between this translation and the one proposed above are considerable and

1 This is the verdict of Ackrill 1963, 109.

2 One important instance is in Frede 1987, 13.

3 Günther Patzig's appreciation has in all likelihood contributed to the influence: 'Als eine Erklärung des Textes, die auch Sachfragen erörtert, hat Ackrill's knappes Buch einen neuen Standard für die Interpretation antiker philosophischer Text gesetzt.' Patzig 1996, 105.

4 All translations are my own unless attributed to someone else.

5 I consistently use the word 'man' in the sense of human being.

important. First of all, Ackrill takes this sentence as a *definition* of a quality, but if it were a definition intended to cover all types of qualities, *ποιοί τινες* (some sort of men) would represent an unacceptable restriction; this is presumably the reason for Ackrill's 'things', as if the original had *ποιά τινα* (some sort of things). Secondly, 'are said to be' is a possible translation of *λέγονται*, but there are other possibilities; as I will suggest below, 'are spoken of as' conveys a sense of duration attached to the predication of 'some sort of thing' (*ποιόν*), as opposed to the predications of 'doing' (*ποιεῖν*) and 'being affected' (*πάσχειν*).

The chapter on quality in *Categories* should be read against the passage that deals with the proprium of substances at 4a10–b19. A substance is something that is capable of admitting (*δεκτικόν*) contraries like sickness and health, whiteness and blackness, while remaining one and the same thing. Substances alternate between, for instance, being sick and in good health, hot and cold. A change of this kind is an alternation (*μεταβολή*), and it occurs when a substance has undergone an affection (*πάθος*). To admit contraries (e.g. to be able to become cold after having become hot) is to change (*κινεῖσθαι*). A *μεταβολή* is not just any kind of change,⁶ but a change that comes about when one and the same substance alternates between contraries.

From the very beginning of the discussion of qualities, Aristotle is concerned with alternations. If A and B are things between which substances alternate, the alternation is not always symmetrical so that it is equally quick from A to B as from B to A. The first example is an alternation between a disposition and a possession, e.g. a disposition for knowledge and a possession of knowledge. A man who is disposed for knowledge is inferior at first but changes quickly to less inferior and by degrees to excellent, and once he has reached the point of excellence, he is no longer merely disposed for knowledge but in possession of it. When men are closer to a possession, they are better disposed; when they have a longer way to go, they are less disposed (9a7–8). Once knowledge has become a possession, the man possessing it usually remains excellent, 'unless there is a grand-scale alternation (*μεγάλη μεταβολή*) through a disease or something else of that nature' (8b31–2).

When the pendulum swings quickly in both directions, both A and B are dispositions:

Things are spoken of as dispositions if they are easily changed (*εὐκίνητα*) and alternate quickly (*ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα*), as, for example, heat and refrigeration, and sickness and health and any other things like that. For *man* is disposed in some way in accordance with them, but a man who comes into existence alternates quickly from hot to cold and from being in good health to being sick. (8b35–9a1)

⁶ Ackrill's 1963 translation is confusing since 'change' is used for both *μεταβάλλειν* and *κινεῖσθαι*.

One very important feature of this statement is the contrast between ὁ ἄνθρωπος (the species *man*⁷) and γινόμενος, that is to say, any man who comes into existence (and eventually dies). This is not brought out in Ackrill's translation: 'It is what are easily changed and quickly changing that we call conditions, e.g. hotness and chill and sickness and health and the like. For a man is in a certain condition in virtue of these but he changes quickly from hot to cold and from being healthy to being sick.' The translation blurs the crucial distinction between how the species *man* and a particular man are spoken of. The species *man* is only disposed for things, it never possesses them. The implication of Aristotle's text is that different species are disposed for different alternations: the species *stone* (like *man*) is disposed for heat and refrigeration, the species *man* (unlike *stone*) for sickness and health.

Why does Aristotle say that possessions are also dispositions, whereas dispositions are not necessarily possessions (9a10–13)? Not, as Ackrill suggests, because he would consider possessions a sub-class of dispositions.⁸ The reason is rather that something like knowledge, which exists in the soul of someone (1b1–2), is a disposition when that someone is only disposed for it but both a disposition and a possession when he possesses it. Why both a disposition and a possession? I can think of at least two reasons. (1) When a man has reached the point of possessing some knowledge, he does not cease to be disposed for it. If he ceased to be disposed for whatever knowledge he possesses, any knowledge that he had once possessed but later forgotten would be irretrievably lost because he would no longer be disposed for it, i.e. capable of acquiring (admitting) it again. (2) If the species *man* is disposed for certain qualities, the members of the species cannot cease to be disposed for those same qualities.

In men, some things are both dispositions and possessions (as, for instance, knowledge), while other things are merely dispositions. Among the latter are heat and refrigeration: no man who becomes cold remains cold for the rest of his life, and a man who becomes hot does not stay hot forever.

To say that someone is better disposed or less well disposed is not to compare one man to another; it is to pass a judgement on, for example, how close a man's disposition for knowledge is to the possession of that same thing. By contrast, the second kind of quality accounts for differences between

7 This is how ὁ ἄνθρωπος is used here as elsewhere in *Categories*.

8 Ackrill 1963 uses the terms 'state' and 'condition' for ἔξις and διάθεσις. He thinks that there is a difference between ἔξις ('state') as opposed to διάθεσις, and ἔξις ('possession') as opposed to στέρησις ('privation'). I think that it can be argued that ἔξις is the same in both cases, a possession, but viewed from different perspectives, either in relation to a disposition or in relation to a privation. I intend to produce arguments for this position elsewhere.

men: some men are born with an ability to do something (ποιεῖν) and to avoid being affected by something (πάσχειν) with greater facility than others. Since the species *man* is disposed in some way in accordance with health and sickness, any man is always somewhere on a scale between these two contraries. But this does not account for individual variations, for whereas most men are disposed in fairly similar ways, some men are born healthy and others are born sickly. This ability/inability is not something that the species *man* possesses but something that some men (τινες) – i.e. men who are born and pass away – possess.

Thus, one and the same thing, knowledge, can be counted both as a disposition and as a possession. It is simply not possible to draw up two lists, one for dispositions and the other for possessions and decide – using duration and changeability as criteria – which quality goes where (see Ackrill’s efforts in 104–05). What *is* possible is to draw up two lists: one for dispositions for X, Y, Z, etc., the other for possessions of X, Y, Z, etc., but there would be no point in making such a list other than to determine which things can be both dispositions and possessions and which things can only be dispositions in a certain kind of substance. As for the ability that some are born with, Ackrill translates ‘natural capacity’, and as a result of this choice he finds fault with Aristotle: ‘it is surprising that Aristotle treats this as a distinct type of quality while saying nothing about capacities in general. One may have or lack an aptitude for trigonometry; but to say that someone is capable of learning trigonometry is not to ascribe or deny an aptitude to him’ (105). This is unfair: the first type of quality, disposition, *is* a capacity in general, and the second type, ability, is an aptitude.

The predications of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν are central to the discussion of the second kind of quality but even more so to the discussion of the third kind, affective quality (ποιότης παθητική), which is treated together with affections (παθή), which are not qualities at all. In a comment on this passage Ackrill complains (107): ‘How can Aristotle include hotness and coldness in this group of qualities (9a30) when he has already classified them as conditions (8b36–9)?’⁹ The complaint is unjustified. First of all, Aristotle speaks of κατάψυξις, ‘refrigeration’, at 8b36, i.e. something that conveys the idea of alternation in one and the same substance that can be hot at one time and cold at another, but of ψυχρότης, ‘coldness’, at 9a31, i.e. a permanent quality in some things (Aristotle gives no example, but one could think of snow and ice). But more importantly, men become cold because they are disposed for getting chilled, so in the case of men refrigeration is a disposition. But things like ice

9 As mentioned above, ‘condition’ is Ackrill’s 1963 translation of διάθεσις.

and snow are not disposed for getting cold; they have admitted coldness once and for all. They are, in Aristotle's terminology, δεδεγμένα (9a32, 36, 9b4), not things that are capable of admitting an alternation, δεκτικά. Aristotle's example of the former is honey, which has admitted sweetness once and for all. Ackrill translates τὰ δεδεγμένα 'things that possess them', an expression which blurs the distinction between, on the one hand, τὰ δεδεγμένα and τὰ δεκτικά, and on the other, things that are disposed for something and things that possess it. Only things that are δεκτικά are disposed for something. As we saw above, the species *man* is merely disposed for knowledge; in the chapter on relatives, the species *man* is spoken of as capable of admitting knowledge (ἐπιστήμης δεκτικός 7a37). Now we have an answer to Ackrill's frustrated question that was quoted at the beginning of this paragraph: in men coldness is a disposition (condition in Ackrill's terminology), and when it occurs it is an affection that causes a change, an alternation; in things that have admitted coldness once and for all (like snow), coldness is a quality.

By now it should be clear why 'are spoken of as' is preferable to 'are said to be' as a translation of λέγεται at the beginning of the chapter on qualities. We speak of honey as something sweet¹⁰ and of ice as something cold, but we do not speak of a man who is scantily dressed on a cold day as someone cold, for we cannot divide men into cold men, hot men, and men who are lukewarm. We can say about the scantily dressed man that he is cold, but then we are not thinking of a quality of his but of an affection he is undergoing.

Men blush when they are affected by shame. The reason why this can happen at all is that the species *man* is disposed for different skin colours. But how about the second kind of quality, the inborn disability in some men not to be easily affected? Is there a Greek expression that indicates that someone is born with a disability not to be affected easily by shame or fear? I believe that there is. At 9b31–2 Aristotle has introduced what seems to be two new words in Greek (to judge from *LSJ*): ἐρυθρίας and ὀχρίας. They appear to function like some other Greek words ending in *-ias*, e.g. *emias* = one who is inclined to vomit, ὄξυθυμίας = one who is quick to anger. They should probably be translated 'one who is inclined/quick to blush' and 'one who is inclined/quick to become pale'. Arguably Aristotle wants to demonstrate here that men who are spoken of as inclined/quick to blush, or as inclined/quick to become pale, are spoken of in this way in accordance with a disability not to be affected by anything, that is to say, in accordance with a quality. Thus, 9b28–33 should be translated as:

¹⁰ Cf. how we speak of sweets and sweeteners.

Things that come about from things that are easily dissolved and quickly removed are spoken of as affections. For men are not spoken of as some sort of men in accordance with them. For one who blushes when he is ashamed is not spoken of as someone who is inclined/quick to blush, and one who becomes pale when he is afraid is not spoken of as someone who is inclined/quick to become pale, but rather as having been affected somehow.

LSJ translates ‘of ruddy complexion’ with a reference to 9b31, and ‘one of a pale complexion’, with a reference to 9b32; accordingly Ackrill translates ‘ruddy’ and ‘pallid’, probably from a conviction (erroneous to my mind) that Aristotle is here contrasting temporary blushes with permanent complexions, when he is in fact contrasting affections (not qualities) with a disability not to be affected (the second type of quality).

We have repeatedly seen that the notion of classification, with each thing in its own place and in one place only, is undermined by the text. We have seen that knowledge can be a disposition or a possession, and in either case a quality. But we also know from the chapter on relatives that Aristotle counts knowledge, disposition, and possession (among other things of the same kind) as relatives (6b2–3). At 11a20–38 he demonstrates that species of knowledge (such as knowledge of grammar or music) are always qualities, for we are spoken of as knowledgeable in grammar or in music in accordance with them, that is to say, because we are disposed for them or possess them. When knowledge is predicated, as when we say ‘knowledge of grammar is knowledge’, it is spoken of in reference to something placed below (a ὑποκείμενον).¹¹ By contrast, when the genus *knowledge* is not predicated in reference to something placed below, but is what we would call a ‘grammatical subject’, it is a relative, for knowledge is knowledge of something capable of being known. Co-relatives (knowledge and something capable of being known) are placed opposite one another; they are ἀντικείμενα, and this is surely one reason why Aristotle, having reached this point in the *Categories*, sets out to discuss different kinds of ἀντικείμενα, relatives being one kind (11b17–14a25). We may now turn to Ackrill’s objection which was mentioned at the beginning of this paper:

The claim that a genus that is a relative may have species that are not relatives seems to conflict with Aristotle’s whole idea of a genus-species classification and categorial ladders. ... Thus there is a nasty dilemma, and its existence points to a weakness in the foundations of Aristotle’s theory of categories. (108–09)

¹¹ Cf. 1b1–3.

The answer to this objection is simply this: When knowledge is spoken of (predicated) in reference to a species placed below it, it is a quality; when it is spoken of (predicated) as something in relation to something else which is placed opposite it, it is a relative (πρός τι). This is how the categorial ladder is to be understood. When the first step (knowledge of grammar) is a quality, the next step (knowledge) is also a quality, and so is the following step (disposition or possession), until we reach the top of the ladder, quality. But no such ladder is involved in relatives. They exist side by side and are simultaneous. Thus, there is no reason to suspect the authenticity of 11a20–38.

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Some Aristotelian concepts: practical inference

OLAV GJELSVIK

Among Aristotle's philosophical contributions that attract a lot of interest, his approach to practical inference is a prime example. Elizabeth Anscombe, one leading modern contributor on that topic, came to the conclusion that Aristotle had kept clear of confusions that still dominate this field, confusions she herself had been subject to.¹ However, Anscombe does not provide detailed representations of how the account of practical inference is supposed to work. She does not go into questions of how the central Aristotelian terms of προαίρεσις and βούλευσις are to be understood, or the interesting relations to εὐδαιμονία.

One very important point, according to Anscombe, is that Aristotle did not think formal correctness conditions were any different in the practical case than they were in the theoretical case. That means that the difference between the practical and the theoretical is to be captured in the use we make of the contents we relate to in inferring. Add to this that the conclusion in the practical case might simply be the action, and you have a challenge. It follows directly that we must see the action as a way of relating to a propositional content.

I am far from being a scholar of Aristotle, and I claim no expertise whatsoever in Aristotle scholarship. There is nevertheless a possibility that some of the things that we modern philosophers pursue might help us understand him. In this chapter I shall suggest a way of thinking about practical reasoning that satisfies the basic points identified by Anscombe as Aristotle's view. I leave it to scholars of Aristotle to judge whether this is interesting for interpreting his works.

Fregean inferential structures

I shall use the Fregean judgment stroke to represent the way we relate to a content and index the stroke so as to mark whether it is a normal theoretical judgment we are speaking about, or whether we are speaking about the Aristotelian practical way of being related to a propositional content. In the first case, I index with a 'J' for judgment; in the latter I use a 'P' for practical. To see inference as a transition from some judgments to another is the Classical way, and this was upheld by Frege but mainly lost from view in philosophy

¹ See Anscombe 1995, 21.

after him.² Let us start with a case of simple *modus ponens*, and let us also note that there are some delicate issues with how to express the propositions that describe what we do in English, issues that are less pressing in some other languages. The second premise must not be read as a habitual.

- 1a. |-J (I am driving to Stockholm)
- 2a. |-J (If I am driving to Stockholm, I am turning left at crossing X)
- 3a. |-J (This is crossing X)
-
- 4a. |-J (I am turning left)

What is extra here, compared with the standard way of thinking about inference, is the presence of the indexed judgment stroke. Let us work with the aim of capturing the concept of legitimate inference, where inference is such that one reaches a conclusion legitimately when everything is correct (and thereby legitimate) in each premise. The added level brings with it the possibility that each premise is legitimately held, and also that legitimately held premises yield a legitimately held conclusion when the inference is legitimate. In that case, the inference is knowledge extending. We can therefore note the possibility of raising the issue of legitimacy on at least two levels. We can, especially if we do virtue epistemology, move further onto levels of aptness in terms of the way we relate to contents, and also in terms of inferring.

This example above is deliberately chosen because we can also use it in a case of practical reasoning. The only difference between the two cases is in the way we relate to the propositional contents or thoughts, not in the thoughts or the way they relate semantically and formally. Here is the example (with the same stipulation about premise 2).

- 1b. |-P (I am driving to Stockholm)
- 2b. |-J (If I am driving to Stockholm, I am turning left at crossing X)
- 3b. |-J (This is crossing X)
-
- 4b. |-P (I am turning left)

Most of the things said about legitimacy in the cases of the theoretical inference above carry over to this inference as well. The main difference is that here we have a practical way of relating to one premise and also to the conclusion. I

² The main conception these days starts from a notion of logical consequence, seen as holding between propositions. I will not go further into this or Frege scholarship here, and I refer to Nicholas Smith (2009) for discussions and references.

shall maintain that we need a practical way of relating to a premise in order to find a practical way to the conclusion, and I argue in some detail for this in Gjelsvik 2013.³ The richness of this quasi-Aristotelian approach becomes even more striking when one considers a practical inference on the model of the theoretical.

The practical case

Let me make some remarks about the practical case. First, the practical case as exhibited here is very close to Anscombe's late account of practical inference.⁴ In fact, or so I shall claim, the '|-P' symbol stands exactly for what Anscombe in *Intention* called *practical knowledge* – something she claimed philosophy had forgotten all about, i.e. a legitimate way of being practically related to a content.⁵ When you are thus related to a proposition, you are, in the central case, engaged in doing intentionally the propositional content to which you relate. (This is phrased awkwardly, but that should not deter us). In our example there are two such propositional contents, 'I am driving to Stockholm' and 'I am turning left'. In both cases – the practical premise and the practical conclusion – we take the whole premise to represent an intentional action. I agree with Anscombe that being so related to a propositional content, i.e. 'I am driving to Stockholm', implies an awareness of me being engaged in driving to Stockholm. This awareness is a way of knowing that I am driving to Stockholm. Doing something intentionally thus carries non-observational knowledge of what you are engaged in doing with it. This knowledge is propositional.

There are further issues here concerning the point that an intentional action exemplifies knowledge of how to do the thing in question. Such knowledge must be employed with success for the intentional action to be there. I shall not take a stand here on how to think about knowing how to x, and at this point I want to remain neutral on the contested and controversial questions about the relationship between knowledge how to something and knowledge that.⁶

Intellectualists, philosophers who advocate the reduction of knowledge how to do something to knowledge that, operate with practical ways of being related to constituents of propositions or thoughts. That is, however, not the same as the practical way of being related to the whole proposition

3 See Gjelsvik 2013. Jay Wallace made a good case for this in Wallace 2001.

4 In 'Practical Inference' (Anscombe 1995), first written for the von Wright volume of *Library of Living Philosophers*.

5 See Anscombe 1957, 57.

6 Jason Stanley (2011) is an important new contribution I shall not engage with here.

about which I am speaking. As I said, I will not be going into issues about knowledge how to do something, I just stress the need to operate with a practical way of being related to whole propositions when thinking about doing something intentionally. This illustrates some of the complexities in the relationship between Anscombe's Aristotelian use of practical knowledge and the discussion about Ryle's distinction between knowing how to do something and knowing that.⁷

Enkrasia (and akrasia)

Let me close with some detailed examples of a theoretical and a parallel practical inference, before going on to show how enkratic inference (the opposite of akratic) can be dealt with on the present approach. The first example is interesting because it shows how to extend the practical way of relating to a proposition to the case of intentions. There are no conditional actions, but there are conditional intentions. The central case, the case of doing something intentionally, thus needs to be extended to intentions and conditional intentions. A great deal of practical reasoning, as Michael Bratman has shown, concerns plans within plans, and relations between intentions. Without discussing all of that, I shall just provide an example with intentions.

5a. \neg_j (If I ought to take a break, then I shall take a break)

6a. \neg_j (I ought to take a break soon)

7a. \neg_j (I shall take a break soon)

The practical analogue to this must be reasoning between two intentions, which is shown by the way 'shall' enters the actual content. We still represent the reasoning in the same way as that of action:

5b. \neg_p (If I ought to take a break, then I shall take a break)

6b. \neg_j (I ought to take a break now)

7b. \neg_p (I shall take a break now)

The enkratic case is Broome's case, in which you move by inference from the recognition that you ought to take a break to the intention to take a break (see Broome 2013). 'B' stands for the attitude of believing by this rendering of

⁷ As discussed in Stanley 2011.

Broome's approach, and has a parallel, but not a full parallel, in the judgement stroke on my approach. The 'I' stands for the attitude of intending on Broome's approach, and has a parallel, but not a full parallel, in the practical stroke on my approach. I use the letters in this way for comparative purposes; I do not think it causes any problems. (I use the strokes to indicate legitimate ways of being related to propositions). This is the practical inference according to Broome:

8. B (I ought to take a break)

9. I (I shall take a break)

To be precise: in Broome's view this reasoning is enthymematic: I also need to believe that it is up to me whether I take a break or not. The full and correct representation of the inference is something like this:

8. B (I ought to take a break)

8*. B (It is up to me whether or not I take a break.)

9. I (I shall take a break)

According to the view I am pursuing, this is not correct reasoning, and Broome is wrong. There is a logical step from the modal verb 'ought' to the modal verb 'shall' which is not correct – satisfying the one modal predicate does not entail satisfying the other. (But there is a sense of 'shall' which is close to the predictive sense of 'will', as that notion enters first person intentions.)

This is the correct practical inference in my view:

10. |-P (If I ought to take a break then I shall take a break)

11. |-J (I ought to take a break)

12. |-P (I shall take a break)

Without the first premise being true of you, you will not reach the conclusion. We should note that it is not enough to judge the first premise to be true – you have to have adopted the practical way of relating to the first premise to be able to infer this conclusion. If you only judge the propositional content of the first premise to be true, but do not relate to it practically, then you might exhibit akrasia or weak will in this case. This shows that weak will is not typically a failure of reasoning (as it would be in Broome's account), and it also indicates why we need a practical way of relating to a premise in order to reach a practical conclusion.

We should also note that we may endorse different general truths from which different actions would follow, like ‘taking a break is good’, ‘eating something sweet is good’. It cannot be practically known that more than one of them ought to be acted upon at a particular time. And we might, in real life, be practically committed to the wrong one at one time, and at that time eat something sweet instead of taking a break when we know (theoretically) that we ought to take a break. In that case we fail to exhibit the practical knowledge of 10 above, something which is compatible with theoretical knowledge as exhibited in 5a. This distinction between ways of knowing therefore seems to do the work of Aristotle’s distinction between different ways of knowing in his account of *akrasia*.

This demonstrates the ability of the present approach to practical inference to handle some of the most contested issues in the discussion of practical inference. And there is more: in recent discussions, the role of rationality requirements in practical inference, their form, whether they are wide in scope or narrow, and so forth have been dominant.⁸ I submit from the perspective of the present approach to inference that we have all the resources we need in terms of relating to propositional content, and there is no point in going into the issue of rationality requirements when accounting for inference. Or rather, all the work that can be done by rationality requirements will be done by the resources we already have at our disposal by what goes into the legitimate ways of relating to propositional content, both practical and theoretical.

Work is also done by the interaction between judging and inferring, and the recognition that inferential connections may force us to reconsider some of the judgments to which we are committed: if a conclusion of a valid inference must be rejected, we must reject at least one premise. That goes for both theoretical and practical inference. The great virtue of the present approach is the way we get a full parallel between practical and theoretical inference in this matter, and a full parallel in the way entailment relations matter. This was indeed Anscombe’s Aristotelian aim. If we were to extend the present approach to hypothetical thinking, then we might, as an additional benefit, be able to see the structure of *reductio* arguments as fully parallel and as arising out of some hypothetical premises that lead to unacceptable conclusions. Of course, we engage in such reasoning all the time. Any full approach to inference needs to deal with that. I return to this kind of extension in the concluding overview, but let me just say that I want to remain neutral on *how* to extend to hypothetical judgments, and also that from the present perspective we start from the

⁸ There is now a huge body of literature on this topic. Important contributors are Broome 2003, 2010 and 2013, and Kolodny 2005.

categorical in both the theoretical and the practical case. The extension to the hypothetical may take quite different forms in the two cases.

This concludes the discussion of enkratic inference. Let me end by appending one further point. Keeping the practical case in sight makes it easy to see how difficult it is to think of inferring as something that we do intentionally. If we do, it will result in a vicious regress in the practical case: if we think of inferring as a way of being practically related to a propositional content, as we would be if the action was intentional, then it should also be possible for that intentional action of inferring to be able to be a conclusion of another practical inference, and so forth. The problem is not solved as long as you think of the transition as something that we do intentionally, and think of doing something intentionally along the present lines.

Upshot and some hypotheses

With this outline in mind, let me briefly indicate my current guess as to how this relates to understanding concepts like βούλευσις, προαίρεσις, and εὐδαιμονία. (Guessing is, of course, always more fun than serious scholarship!) Dogmatically put, the practical way of relating to a content stands to εὐδαιμονία as the theoretical stands to truth. Truth essentially characterizes judging something to be a certain way, as its formal end, and intentional action is similarly characterized by having εὐδαιμονία as its formal end. Virtue will then be characterized as the legitimate or right way of relating to such an end. The issue of whether εὐδαιμονία is entirely formal or also an external end in some sense of material end is not an issue which will be dealt with here – the point is that it is an end that we do pursue in some sense of pursuing.

Βούλευσις is thus seen as resulting in a theoretical way of relating to a practical issue – a theoretical conclusion about the means to the end you pursue/are pursuing. It is essentially related to truth, and is a product of inquiry (when that is needed). It is also typically what we reason about, since we reason from the point of view of the end we pursue/are pursuing. But the end we pursue is typically also a means to a higher end, and we can, therefore, relate practically and theoretically to the same propositional content at different times. We can also relate to the same content in different ways at the same time when we relate theoretically to what we are doing in being aware of what we do.

Προαίρεσις is thus seen as integrating what βούλευσις provides into a new action through practical reasoning: the conclusion as that is here conceived of (and in doing so generates a new βούλησις that makes up the motivation with which one acts in the action that makes up the conclusion). The standard translation into English of προαίρεσις is often ‘choice’. We can now see

how that translation carries with it some difficulties, since modern thinkers typically read into choice something different from this. Προαίρεσις may not, for instance, involve a choice between alternatives. On the other hand, it is an achievement in action to continue to pursue a higher end in light of the reasoning you carry out about how to do that. This achievement can also be subjected to considerations relating to virtue in how to go about it, as βούλευσις can be subjected to quite different virtue considerations. I shall not go into these here, however, or theorize about them.⁹

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The joy of giving: Seneca *De beneficiis* 1.6.1

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The exchange of gifts or services was a central part of Roman social life, and Seneca's *De beneficiis* ('On Benefactions'), is a lengthy and rich work that takes up such commerce in various contexts, from presents bestowed on friends to the hierarchical reciprocities of the patronage system. Although the work had for a long while been largely neglected, it has recently been the subject of several important investigations, and an excellent new English translation is now available as well.¹ In this paper, I wish to examine one detail in the text that has not, I think, received entirely adequate discussion. This is all the more surprising since the passage in question is none other than Seneca's definition of *beneficium*. His definition is quite unusual and to my knowledge has no precedent in the Greek or Roman traditions concerning mutual benefits. After considering the definition itself, I shall propose a possible explanation for how Seneca came to adopt it. Here, then, is Seneca's definition of a benefit:

Quid est ergo beneficium? Benevola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque tribuendo in id, quod facit, prona et sponte sua parata. Itaque non, quid fiat aut quid detur, refert, sed qua mente, quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo (Ben. 1.6.1)

What, then, is a benefaction? It is a benevolent action that bestows joy and receives it in the bestowing, inclined toward what it does and primed on its own. Therefore what matters is not what is done or given, but with what attitude, since a benefaction consists not in what is done or given but in the very mind of the one who is doing or giving.²

In the Introduction to their translation, Griffin and Inwood comment:

This definition is the key to the most important novel claims in the treatise. The fact that genuine joy for both parties is an integral component of any benefit is a crucial feature, one that returns to influence debate at various points in the work. Even more important, the definition relies on a sharp distinction between the material object which may be the raw material of a benefit ... and the *action* which is the actual benefit.³

1 Griffin and Inwood 2011. See also Picone et al. 2009; Li Causi, 2012; Picone, 2013; Griffin 2013.

2 Author's translation.

3 See Griffin and Inwood 2011, 4. How much Seneca's view reflected Roman practice is, of course, debatable. Coffee (forthcoming) remarks: 'Yet the remainder of Seneca's discussion in *De Beneficiis* demonstrates that his emphasis on pleasure as integral to the exchange of gifts and favours (*beneficia*) was largely aspirational. Gift exchange was crucial to Roman social cohesion, but the institution was in danger precisely because its affective dimension was lacking. Hence Seneca's repeated exhortations to preserve the exchange of *beneficia* as something beyond the merely instrumental.'

It is true that *gaudium*, or joy, is mentioned in several significant passages in the treatise: the noun and its associated verb, *gaudeo*, occur 17 times in all. For example, in the second book Seneca raises the question of anonymous gifts, where the recipient is not in a position to feel the appropriate gratitude. He argues that the giver should be content (*contentus*) in the knowledge of what he has done; otherwise, his delight (*delectat*) is not in doing the service but in being seen to have done it. Seneca grants that we should, when conditions permit, take note of the joy (*gaudium*) that derives from the recipient's goodwill (I take it this is the giver's joy); but it is bad form ever to remind a beneficiary of his debt to you (2.10). In a similar vein, he advises the recipient of a benefaction to manifest his joy (*gaudium*), so that the benefactor may gain the reward for his service (2.22): if we take cheer (*laetitia*) in seeing a friend cheerful, we take it all the more if we have made him so; indeed, he who accepts a benefaction graciously (or gratefully: *grate*) has paid back the first instalment. Again, Seneca argues that our aim in giving a benefaction is to help the recipient and grant him pleasure; the mutual joy that results is the fulfilment of this intention, and no further return is required, lest the transaction smack of commerce rather than generosity (2.31).⁴

The joy in bestowing a benefaction, according to Seneca, lies both in perceiving the cheer that it brings to the recipient, and in the knowledge that we have brought about that cheer, even if it is not manifested in the form of overt gratitude toward the benefactor (as in the case of an anonymous gift). In these passages, the benefit bestowed is not synonymous with the joy that results from it, whether for the donor or the recipient. What is given is assistance, which is certainly a cause of good cheer in the recipient when it is granted freely and without condescension, and this should bring delight to the giver as well; but the giver should also take delight independently in the mere knowledge of having done the service. The distinction is particularly clear in the final paragraph of Book 2, where Seneca affirms that the return of good will is not sufficient to repay a benefaction; rather, material compensation for the good received is also required. He writes:

Gratitude (*gratia*) is returned for that benefaction which the action (*actio*) has accomplished if we receive it with goodwill (*benevole*), but we have not yet paid back that other [sc. debt] which consists in the value (*res*); rather, we wish to pay it back. We have compensated the intention (*voluntas*) with our intention, but we still owe value for value. (2.35)

4 Cf. 3.17: 'If having received [a benefaction] is pleasing [*iuvat*] to a person, he enjoys a fair and continual pleasure [*voluptas*] and feels joy [*gaudet*], looking to the mind [*animus*] of the one from whom he received it, not to the value [*res*].' The life of a grateful person, Seneca affirms, is cheerful and merry [*laetus, hilaris*], and he takes great joy [*gaudium*] from anticipating the chance to pay back the debt of gratitude [*occasionem referendae gratiae expectans*]. For other passages concerning joy in the context of benefactions, cf. 2.5, 3.3, 3.31–2, 4.29, 5.20, 6.13.

Yet Seneca's definition of benefaction seems to strike a different note; for in affirming that a benefaction is 'a benevolent action that bestows joy and receives it in the bestowing', he would seem to be making the joy itself the gift: it is joy that is bestowed, and the benefactor's joy derives precisely from granting this joy, as such, to the recipient. Rather than drawing a 'sharp distinction between the material object which may be the raw material of a benefit ... and the *action* which is the actual benefit', as Griffin and Inwood put it, it seems to me that Seneca is instead collapsing the difference between the actual service and the joy it brings. He does not say that a benefaction is a gift that causes joy; instead, Seneca boldly affirms that it is an act that grants precisely joy. What has induced Seneca to substitute joy for the gift that brings it?

Before attempting to answer this question, it is worth taking a closer look at Seneca's definition to be sure that he has, as I am claiming, elided the substantive or material dimension of the benefaction. He asserts that a benefaction is 'a benevolent action that bestows joy and receives it in the bestowing': is the action [*actio*] distinct from the joy that is bestowed [the verb here is *tribuere*]? The action, we might argue, consists in giving the thing or service, that is, the *res*, whatever that may be; in the process, one person bestows joy on the other and receives it in so doing. Seneca goes on to say that, as a consequence of this definition (*itaque*), what counts is the attitude or disposition [*mens*] of the benefactor, not what is done or given [*fiat, detur*]: here, the subject of the verbs *fiat* and *detur* must be the service or gift, not the joy: clearly Seneca is aware here, as elsewhere, that a benefaction is a two-sided phenomenon, involving both a material transfer and the bestowal of joy that accompanies it. And yet, the bare definition seems to isolate joy as the essential element in the benefaction, occluding the practical benefit and return. A benefaction is an action that bestows *gaudium*: that is what is given, and it is in that coin that the benefit is repaid, even if the beneficiary should fail to express gratitude, much less pay back the material debt, as in the case of anonymous gifts.

A sufficient explanation of Seneca's phrasing may be his desire to render benefactions by their very nature both non-commercial and reciprocal. But there may be a further influence upon his thinking, deriving from his interpretation of traditional views of favours and the gratitude they ought to inspire in the recipient. Aristotle devoted a chapter of his *Rhetoric* to gratitude, in which he affirmed that a favour (*kharis*) is 'a service to one who needs it, not in return for anything, nor so that the one who performs the service may gain something, but so that the other may'.⁵ In return for such an altruistic

⁵ That the chapter is concerned with the *pathos* of gratitude rather than kindness or benevolence is argued in detail in Konstan 2006, ch. 7.

benefaction, one is expected to feel gratitude, which in Greek is expressed by the phrase, ‘to have *kharis*’ (*kharin ekhein*): the idea is that receiving the benefaction or *kharis* puts one in the position of owing it in turn – not, to be sure, in the same coin as it was given, since the gift was by definition wholly disinterested, but rather in an emotional sense, as a feeling that reciprocates the good intentions of the benefactor. Latin has a similar usage: *gratia* may signify a favour, whereas *gratiam habere* is the standard expression for gratitude (where there is no danger of ambiguity, *gratia* alone may signify gratitude).

Much of what Seneca will have to say about benefactions is already implicit in Aristotle’s brief treatment, including the notion that they must look wholly to the benefit of the recipient and that recompense takes the form of gratitude rather than material compensation. Nevertheless, the favour itself is understood to take the form of a concrete service or gift. As Aristotle explains in his customary crisp style (*Rhetoric* II 7, 1385b6–9):

One must also consider all the categories. For it is a *kharis* either because it is this particular thing or of such a quantity or sort, or at such a time or place. An indication of this is if they did not do a lesser service [when it was needed], and if they did the same things or equal or greater for one’s enemies: for it is then obvious that what they did for us was not for our sake. Or if they knowingly did an unworthy service: for no one will confess to have needed what is unworthy.

The Stoics would seem to have treated *kharis* in this context in much the same way, at least to go by the one clear example I have found. According to Plutarch,⁶ the Stoics maintained that the unwise neither receive favours nor have benefactors [*euergetai*]; hence, there is no such thing as ingratitude, since the good acknowledge a favour (*kharis*) and the bad are incapable of receiving one. They reason that a favour (*kharis*) is among middle or indifferent things; truly to help or be helped pertains to the wise, but ordinary people too can receive a favour (*kharis*), though they will not make good use of it.⁷

There is, however, another sense of *kharis*, which signifies something more like ‘gratification’ or ‘delight’.⁸ For example, in Euripides’ *Trojan Women* (1108), *erôs* is said to bring ‘sweet *kharis*’, where the meaning is plainly ‘joy’ (cf. *Medea* 227, Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 865; in prose, Plato

⁶ *SVF* 672 = Plutarch *De communibus notitiis* 1068D.

⁷ It should be emphasized that our knowledge of earlier Stoic treatments of benefactions is scanty; Griffin 2013, 24 notes that Seneca mentions Chrysippus and Hecato, another Stoic, but concludes that, although it would be illuminating to know more about Seneca’s working methods and his treatment of his sources, ‘the evidence is not there’.

⁸ *LSJ* s.v. *kharis*, def. IV.

Gorgias 462D: *khara kai hêdonê*, ‘joy and pleasure’).⁹ In this latter usage, the meaning approximates that of the related word, *khara*, which properly signifies ‘joy’.¹⁰ Now, *khara* plays a special role in Stoic ethics: it is one of the three so-called *eupatheiai*, that is, the positive emotions or sentiments that the sage experiences, as opposed to the *pathê* to which ordinary people are vulnerable.¹¹ The Latin equivalent of *khara* is *laetitia*, as we can see in Lucretius, who thus renders Epicurus’ use of the term; in the *De beneficiis*, in turn, Seneca treats *gaudium* and *laetitia* more or less as synonyms, as we can see from 2.31 (quoted above).

I would like to suggest, then, that Seneca may have read – or more strictly, have chosen to read – *kharis* in Aristotle, or in a text indebted to Aristotle’s analysis, as signifying not just a favour, nor again, in the manner of Chrysippus, a gift that falls short of a benefaction because the receiver is incapable of using it well, but rather took it in the sense of *khara* or ‘joy’. He thus had a model of sorts for his affirmation that a benefaction resides precisely in the bestowal of joy. This is the currency in which the exchange takes place, as opposed to the material service. The joy of giving, then, arises not from the benefactor’s awareness of having brought cheer to the recipient, but is the very thing given and received.¹² In reconstruing the idea of a benefaction in these terms, Seneca has rescued it for Stoic ethics.

9 In *SVF* 1181 = Plutarch, *De communibus notitiis* 1065D, the term is employed rather in the sense of ‘grace’ or ‘charm’: expressions ugly in themselves may nevertheless produce *kharis* in a poem as a whole.

10 For a survey of *khara* in classical Greek and early Christian thought, see Ramelli and Konstan 2010, 185–204.

11 See *SVF* 431 = Diogenes Laertius 7.115; 439 = Plutarch *On Moral Virtue* 449A.

12 Li Causi 2008, 97–8 makes the astute suggestion that the material exchange in a benefaction can be considered a signifier in relation to the attitude or *voluntas* of the giver, which serves as the signified: ‘Quello che accade, in altri termini, è che nel momento stesso in cui il *beneficium* viene – per così dire – spiritualizzato, la dimensione della materialità, lungi dall’essere del tutto ripudiata (come invece accade per i seguaci del platonismo), viene di fatto relegata in secondo piano, dal momento che alle *res* scambiate o elargite si assegna la funzione strumentale di *significanti* per mezzo dei quali “comunicare” il beneficio vero e proprio, che viene identificato con la *voluntas* di beneficiare.’

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The sceptic's luck: on fortuitous tranquillity

SVAVAR HRAFN SVAVARSSON

Sextus Empiricus twice asserts that, having suspended belief, Pyrrhonian sceptics become tranquil, but that they do so τυχικῶς. This statement is something of a poser, since the Greek adverb has invariably been translated as ‘fortuitously’ or ‘by chance’. If this translation is correct, Sextus’ assertion – that the sceptic’s tranquillity is the result of chance – seems to embroil him in severe philosophical difficulties. Now, he would not be the first to be so embroiled, or the last, and perhaps we should let the matter rest. But out of respect for the sceptic’s reputation, I shall suggest that Sextus – when offering his readers tranquillity – is not actually promising a chance event.

First, I shall examine the difficulties I take Sextus to face if he is indeed stating that chance rules the sceptic’s tranquillity. I shall then submit two ways of saving Sextus from these difficulties. First, I suggest that the Greek adverb may be ambiguous and justify another translation of it, namely ‘fortunately’ or ‘happily’. I shall eventually find what I take to be a fatal flaw in this suggestion. But I shall then argue that, even if we opt for the traditional translation, Sextus only claims that the sceptic’s becoming tranquil resembles a chance event.

The difficulties with translating τυχικῶς as ‘fortuitously’

What philosophical difficulties arise when the adverb τυχικῶς is translated ‘fortuitously’? In his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (= *Pyrr.*) 1.12, Sextus offers an explanation of what he calls ‘the causal principle of scepticism’. At the outset of their quest, seekers of truth are confronted, wherever they look, with unresolved conflicts of appearances. This state of affairs makes them anxious. Explaining this original anxiety, Sextus says:

Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς αἰτιώδη μὲν φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ἀταρακτῆσειν· οἱ γὰρ μεγαλοφνεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταρασσόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀνωμαλίαν, καὶ ἀποροῦντες τίσιν αὐτῶν χρηρῆ μάλλον συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἤλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν, τί τε ἀληθές ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τί ψεῦδος, ὡς ἐκ τῆς ἐπικρίσεως τούτων ἀταρακτῆσοντες.

We say that the causal principle of scepticism is the hope of becoming tranquil. Men of noble nature, anxious because of the anomaly in things, and at a loss as to which of them they should rather assent to, came to seek what in things is true and what false, thinking that by deciding among them they would become tranquil.¹

¹ All translations are author’s own.

This is a description of those thinkers who happen to end up being sceptics. What they have in common is their original motivation. Confronted with conflicts of appearances, which they have difficulty resolving, they fall prey to anxiety. Their hope is that by succeeding in resolving the conflicts, their anxiety will disappear. Although Sextus never uses the terms τέλος here, his idea may be that the future sceptic's end is tranquillity, simply because the sceptic is anxious in the face of unresolved conflicts of appearances.

In *Pyrr.* 1.25–30 Sextus then attempts to elucidate the tranquillity of sceptics explicitly in terms of their end (1.25):

ἔστι μὲν οὖν τέλος τὸ οὗ χάριν πάντα πράττεται ἢ θεωρεῖται, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν. φαμὲν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξίαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν.

Now an end is that for the sake of which everything is done or considered, while it is not itself done or considered for the sake of anything else; or an end is the final object of desire. Up to now we say that the end of the sceptic is tranquillity in matters of belief and moderate affection in matters forced upon us.

There are two ends. First, Sextus seems to refer to the already familiar tranquillity or absence of anxiety caused by the sceptic's inability to resolve the conflict of appearances, i.e. his inability to commit to beliefs. The second end is different: the sceptic hopes – in the absence of beliefs – to be moderately affected by things that necessarily happen to him.

Sextus explains the first end, tranquillity in matters of belief, and it is here that we encounter the claim that the advent of tranquillity is fortuitous – if that is what Sextus means – for the first time (1.26):

ἀρξάμενος γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰς φαντασίας ἐπικρῖναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν, τίνες μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὥστε ἀταρακτῆσαι, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαφωνίαν, ἣν ἐπικρῖναι μὴ δυνάμενος ἐπέσχευ· ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ **τυχικῶς** παρηκολούθησεν ἢ ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία.

For having begun to philosophize in order to decide appearances and apprehend which were true and which were false, so as to become tranquil, he [the sceptic] fell upon equipollent dispute, and being unable to decide this he suspended belief. Tranquillity in matters of opinion followed him closely, as he suspended belief, fortuitously.

This explanation refers back to the hope of the noble seeker of truth (expressed in *Pyrr.* 1.12); it does not seem to describe the end of someone who is already a sceptic, but rather of someone who may yet become a sceptic. When the person in question, faced with unresolved conflicts of appearances, suspended

belief, he found tranquillity thrust upon him fortuitously, i.e. by chance or by accident. The sceptic who suspended belief must have been surprised.

The problem with this explanation is this: what happens by chance is not wont to happen always; if it always happened, it would hardly happen by chance. One cannot expect something to happen if it only happens by chance. Nor can one aim at achieving some outcome if the outcome is only a matter of chance. But this is what Sextus offers at this point, if the correct translation of τυχικῶς is 'fortuitously': the person who suspended belief in the face of an unresolved conflict of beliefs became tranquil by chance, i.e. he achieved the very outcome he had hoped to achieve by resolving the conflicts of appearances.

In another work, *Against the Professors*, Sextus seems very much aware of the pitfalls of explanations in terms of chance (*Math.* 5.46–7):

ἐπεὶ τῶν γινομένων τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεται τὰ δὲ κατὰ τύχην τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς, πάντως οἱ Χαλδαῖοι, εἰ δυνατῆς ἐφίενται προρρήσεως, ἤτοι ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀνάγκην ποιήσονται τὰς προαγορεύσεις ἢ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τύχην ἐκβαίνουσιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀνάγκην, ἀνωφελεῖς εἰσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀνάγκην συμβαῖνον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκκλίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τε θέλωμεν ἐάν τε μὴ θέλωμεν, ἐκβῆναι δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο ... εἰ δ' ἐν τοῖς τυχηροῖς, ἀδύνατόν τι ἐπαγγέλλονται· ἄστατα γὰρ τὰ τυχηρῶς γινόμενα, τῶν δὲ ἀστάτων καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐκβαίνόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐστῶσαν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν προαγόρευσιν.

Since of things that happen, some happen by necessity, others by chance, and others by our own means, if the Chaldeans aim at possible prophesies, they will at all events either make their forecasts about those things that happen by necessity or those which occur by chance or those that occur by our means. And if they do so about necessary things, they are useless in life; for it is impossible to avert what occurs by necessity, but that must occur whether we like it or don't like it ... If it is about things that happen by chance, they profess what is impossible; for what happens by chance is unstable, and of things that are unstable and occur differently at different times it is not possible to make a secure forecast.

At this point, Sextus offers another explanation of the connection between suspension of belief and tranquillity. Before we turn to that explanation, let us first consider an objection to the above account. If, by this account, Sextus does not intend to offer his explanation in terms of the motivational source of a novice philosopher, but rather as the end of a mature sceptic, he must be saying that by suspending belief the sceptic aims for tranquillity in matters of belief, having realized that this does work, even if only by chance. This interpretation is challenged by the fact that Sextus explicitly references 'the causal principle of scepticism' (*Pyr.* 1.12) as an explanation of the sceptic's end: the person who turned out to be a sceptic aims for tranquillity in the sense that this is how he started on the road which led him to scepticism. But

the following point favours the interpretation that follows: the sceptic aims at moderate affection in matters of necessity. And this end is not presented as a part of a causal principle of scepticism, although it may be understood as such.

Admittedly, Sextus claims (*Pyrr.* 1.25):

φαμέν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξίαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν.

Up to now we say that the end of the sceptic is tranquillity in matters of belief and moderate affection in matters forced upon us.

The qualification ‘up to now’ appears to refer to the – thus far – successful acquisition of tranquillity through suspension of belief. So perhaps Sextus is not only describing what the noble novice hopes to achieve through finding the truth, but also what the mature sceptic achieves through suspending belief, i.e. both tranquillity and moderate affection.

Nevertheless, if the traditional translation of τυχικῶς is correct, Sextus has only explained the onset of tranquillity as being fortuitous or by chance. I have already indicated the problems with this line of thought: In what sense can one hope to achieve something by chance? In the same sense as a lottery ticket buyer hopes to win the jackpot? Is tranquillity the intended result of suspending belief, although it only comes about fortuitously?

If it is indeed the case that tranquillity is the intended result of suspending belief, although it comes about fortuitously, it will in fact turn out that the chance which brings about tranquillity is fairly reliable, according to Sextus, because it is possible to explain why it does so (*Pyrr.* 1.27–8):

ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοξάζων τι καλὸν τῆ φύσει ἢ κακὸν εἶναι ταρασσεται διὰ παντός· καὶ ὅτε μὴ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὰ καλὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὑπὸ τε τῶν φύσει κακῶν νομίζει ποινηλατεῖσθαι καὶ διώκει τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ὡς οἶεται· ἄπερ κτησάμενος πλείοσι ταραχαῖς περιπίπτει, διὰ τε τὸ παρὰ λόγον καὶ ἀμέτρως ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ φοβούμενος τὴν μεταβολὴν πάντα πράσσει, ἵνα μὴ ἀποβάλλῃ τὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ δοκοῦντα εἶναι. ὁ δὲ ἀοριστῶν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καλῶν ἢ κακῶν οὔτε φεύγει τι οὔτε διώκει συντόμως· διόπερ ἀταρακτεῖ.

For he who believes that something is good by nature or bad is forever anxious. And when he lacks those things that seem to him good, he both thinks that he is persecuted by natural evils and he pursues what he thinks are goods. When he has acquired these things he encounters more anxieties, both because he is elated beyond reason and measure and fearing change he does everything in order not to lose what seem to him to be goods. But he who determines nothing regarding natural goods or evils neither avoids anything nor pursues intensely. Hence he is tranquil.

So, the sceptic is tranquil because he does not have beliefs about what is by nature good or bad, unlike the dogmatists, who end up anxious because of their beliefs. This actually explains the sceptic's tranquillity, which nevertheless arrives τυχικῶς. If this adverb means 'fortuitously', the explanation in terms of value beliefs is unintelligible.

The sceptic can look forward to being tranquil, and it turns out that this is because he suspends belief. In order to explain the sceptic's *aiming* for tranquillity, Sextus then offers an analogy by telling the story of the painter Apelles (*Pyr.* 1.28–9):

ὅπερ οὖν περὶ Ἀπελλοῦ τοῦ ζωγράφου λέγεται, τοῦτο ὑπῆρξε τῷ σκεπτικῷ. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἵππον γράφων καὶ τὸν ἄφρον τῷ ἵππου μιμήσασθαι τῇ γραφῇ βουλευθεὶς οὕτως ἀπετύγχανεν ὡς ἀπειπεῖν καὶ τὴν σπογγίαν εἰς ἣν ἀπέμασσε τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ γραφείου χρώματα προσρῖψαι τῇ εἰκόνι· τὴν δὲ προσασαμένην ἵππου ἄφρου ποιῆσαι μίμημα. καὶ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ οὖν ἠλπίζον μὲν τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀναλήψεσθαι διὰ τοῦ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων ἐπικρῖναι, μὴ δυναθέντες δὲ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο ἐπέσχον· ἐπισχοῦσι δὲ αὐτοῖς οἷον τυχικῶς ἢ ἀταραξία παρηκολούθησεν ὡς σκιά σώματι.

What is said about Apelles the painter applies to the sceptic. For they say that while painting a horse and wanting to imitate in the picture the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up and threw the sponge, with which he wiped the colours of his brush, at the picture; when the sponge hit the picture it created an imitation of the horse's foam. And the sceptics, then, hoped to achieve tranquillity through deciding the anomaly of appearances and thoughts, but being unable to do this suspended belief. As they suspended belief, tranquillity followed closely as if fortuitously, like a shadow follows a body.

The lesson of the story is apparently this: suspend belief and you will find that you fortuitously become tranquil in matters of belief. Sextus uses the imagery that Diogenes Laertius, who refers it to Aenesidemus and Timon (9.107), will later use:

τέλος δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ φασὶ τὴν ἐποχήν, ἣ σκιάς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἢ ἀταραξία, ὡς φασιν οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Τίμωνα καὶ Αἰνεσίδημον.

The sceptics say that the end is suspension of belief, which is followed by tranquillity like a shadow, as those around Timon and Aenesidemus say.

It is noteworthy that according to Diogenes the end is not tranquillity, but rather the suspension of belief that is attended by tranquillity.

In all, if Sextus claims that tranquillity follows suspension of belief fortuitously or by chance, his other explanations of the connection between suspension and tranquillity are surprising. One explanation is in terms of value

beliefs; this explanation actually eliminates the element of chance. Sextus also suggests that one may hope for tranquillity if one suspends belief, even if one achieves it by chance. Finally, Sextus seems to say that tranquillity follows suspension of belief fortuitously, but he also says that shadows follow bodies in the same fortuitous manner. Is it likely that Sextus would offer shadows following bodies as an example of a chance event? Furthermore, consider Sextus' choice of verb when describing tranquillity *following* suspension of belief. He uses the verb παρακολουθεῖν, 'to follow closely', just like a shadow follows a body. The verb can even indicate the inseparability of cause and effect (cf. e.g. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 99a17).

Is it charitable to foist this view on Sextus? I suggest that it is uncharitable and also that the idea that Sextus would have suggested it defies belief. Hence I shall tentatively suggest two ways out for Sextus. Let us first consider the possibility of translating the adverb differently.

Another translation of τυχικῶς

The strange faults in Sextus' accounts may hinge on translating the adverb τυχικῶς as 'fortuitously' or 'by chance'. The adverb is both late and rare. In Sextus it only occurs in his description of sceptical tranquillity. If we translate it as 'fortunately' or 'happily', we remove much of Sextus' difficulties. He is at liberty to offer an explanation of a causal relationship between suspension of belief and tranquillity if the outcome is merely fortunate or happy, as opposed to fortuitous or by chance. Indeed, for the sceptic, achieving tranquillity is a happy outcome. Also, it is more reasonable that the sceptic hopes for an outcome which turns out not to be a chance outcome, but rather a happy outcome. But even if this translation, which treats the adverb as a value term referring to good fortune as opposed to chance, yields a reading more sensible than the previous translation, is it justified?

First, we should consider the meaning of the noun τύχη. It may refer to a successful outcome, or fortune, both good and bad, as well as chance. This term, then, is ambiguous. The adverb, however, is not the noun. Let us also consider the fact that the adverb τυχηρῶς, which is slightly more common and certainly older than τυχικῶς, is ambiguous in exactly this manner, between 'fortuitously', as in Sextus 5.47 (cited above), and 'happily', as in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* 250 and *Thesmophoriazusae* 305. The corresponding adjective, τυχηρός, is ambiguous in the same manner.

Let us now turn to our adverb. In three examples, it seems ambiguous, namely in Polybius (28.7.1; he also uses the adjective τυχικός in 9.6.5), and Diodorus Siculus (2.19.4 and 16.35.5). Other examples include the Epicurean

Diogenianus (4.17), where the translation ‘fortuitously’ does seem necessary, as is true of pseudo-Plutarch, *Placita philosophorum* 906E (5.12). Other examples of the adverb are much later. In short, one might suggest that Sextus may not have meant ‘fortuitously’, but rather ‘happily’.

Going against this suggestion, however, is not so much the other uses of the adverb, but rather the analogy that Sextus uses to explain the advent. He follows Timon and Aenesidemus in saying that tranquillity follows suspension of belief *like shadows follow bodies*, since it is unacceptably peculiar to insist that shadows happily or fortunately follow bodies.

Fortuitously and as if fortuitously

Let us then assume that it is correct to translate τυχικῶς as ‘fortuitously’. As indicated above, Sextus refers twice to the advent of tranquillity. In *Pyr.* 1.26 he says: ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ τυχικῶς παρηκολούθησεν ἢ ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία, and in *Pyr.* 1.29 he claims that ἐπισχοῦσι δὲ αὐτοῖς οἷον τυχικῶς ἢ ἀταραξία παρηκολούθησεν ὡς σκιὰ σώματι. There is a difference between the two statements: the second statement is qualified in a manner that the first statement is not. According to the latter statement, tranquillity follows suspension, not quite fortuitously, but *as if* fortuitously or *as it were* fortuitous. What does this qualification add?

By qualifying the statement in this manner Sextus seems to be saying that *strictly speaking* tranquillity does not follow suspension of belief by chance, but that its advent is *like* that of a chance event. One might ask in what respect this outcome is like a chance event. Surely the answer would be that the outcome is unexpected, unintended; it is in this respect that it is like a chance event. The future sceptic did not intend to assuage his anxiety by suspending belief. On the contrary – hence the unexpectedness – he intended to rid himself of anxiety by actually resolving conflicts of appearances. Hence, it came as a surprise to him that he managed to rid himself of anxiety by suspending belief.

Sextus even offers an explanation as to why the sceptic, having suspended belief, ends up finding himself tranquil. This explanation refers to the absence of beliefs in natural values. It turns out that the sceptic unexpectedly ended up tranquil because he suspended belief about there being natural values.

According to this account, Sextus does not claim that the advent of tranquillity is a chance event; rather he claims that it resembles a chance event. If we accept this account, we may be in a better position to understand in what sense tranquillity is the end of the mature sceptic (but not only of the future sceptic). The sceptic qua sceptic, i.e. one who juxtaposes opposing

appearances and fails to resolve their conflict, suspends belief and finds that tranquility, which he hoped for in the beginning, ensues. And since tranquility is his end, he continues to suspend belief because it makes him tranquil.

Part III
Rhetoric



Rhetoric in early Stoicism

HÅVARD LØKKE

When Zeno of Citium established the Stoa in Athens around 300 BC, one presumably could not establish a philosophy school without offering a course in rhetoric. Zeno is said to have divided the part of philosophy that concerns *logos* into two parts, namely *dialectics* and *rhetoric*.¹ But even from our scanty evidence for early Stoicism, it is clear that the first Stoics were not very interested in rhetoric. In fact it seems that Zeno and his first successors were against rhetoric in the conventional sense, for reasons which I will return to later. This raises some big questions, in particular the question of how Zeno could encourage his students to engage in politics, as we know he did, for which rhetorical skills are crucial, at least in democratic *poleis*. I do not pretend to answer this question here. I just focus on one fact that I believe can shed some light on this question, namely that a course in Stoic rhetoric seems to have been a course in what we now call lobbying. That is, rhetoric in early Stoicism was not about learning to speak at large political meetings, but rather about learning to have conversations in smaller circles, much like the conversations Socrates had with leading figures in Athens. Thus, I will suggest that Stoic rhetoric is based on the sort of method that Socrates used. I will also suggest that the early Stoics used their fairly strange sort of rhetoric on the sort of questions to which the answers are more or less plausible, i.e. the sort of questions that Aristotle discussed in the *Topics*. What I am suggesting, in short, is that rhetoric in early Stoicism is related to Socratic *elenchos* and Aristotelian dialectics.

This means that rhetoric in early Stoicism was rhetoric for philosophers. Cicero, too, had a notion of what we may call philosophical rhetoric, but the Stoics and Cicero seem to have meant rather different things by this. Cicero's main point, as far as I understand, is that orators need to acquire a degree of philosophical wisdom in order to really master their art.² He also seems to be urging contemporary philosophers to engage in oratory, as he claims the ancients philosophers did, and to do so in order to gain some political influence, as he thinks they deserve to have. In any case, what the Stoics emphasized, by contrast, is that a wise man will engage in oratory and politics only in order to make other people more virtuous. Hence the philosophical rhetoric of the Stoics is not about using language in such a way that people are

1 See Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* 2. 7 (= Long and Sedley 1987 31E). See also Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum* 7. 41 (= Long and Sedley 1987, 26B4).

2 See e.g. his *De Oratore* 1. 84.

moved to make certain decisions, or in such a way that political ideals can be implemented; rather, it is about using language in such a way that people learn what they need to know in order to make well-informed decisions. These are strange ideas, no doubt, but I will try to make sense of it all in this article. That is to say, I will try to put together a jig-saw puzzle consisting of four pieces. First, I look at Cicero's objections to Stoic rhetoric. Then I discuss the relation between rhetoric and dialectics in the philosophical system of the Stoics. I then try to reconstruct what a Stoic speech may have been like. Finally I return to the question of why the early Stoics were so critical of traditional rhetoric, as I have claimed they were.

Standard objections to early Stoic rhetoric

Cicero's critique is harsh:

[H]ow much less refined is the Stoic style when compared with the glittering prose [of the early Peripatetics and the Academics]! ... This whole area was completely ignored by Zeno and his followers, whether through lack of ability or lack of inclination. Cleanthes wrote an 'Art of Rhetoric', and so did Chrysippus; these works are perfect reading for those whose burning ambition is to keep quiet. Look at how they proceed: coining new words and discarding the tried and tested ones. ... You say that the audience will be inspired to believe [the Stoic doctrine that 'the whole universe is our village']. A Stoic inspire anyone? More likely to dampen the ardour of the keenest student. ... The Stoics' own pronouncements on the power of virtue are poor stuff indeed. Is this what they suppose will bring about happiness through its own intrinsic force? Their little interrogations have all the efficacy of pin-pricks. Even those who accept the conclusions are not converted in their hearts, and leave in the same state as when they came.³ (*De finibus* 4. 5–7.)

Notice, in particular, that the Stoics, according to Cicero, used 'little interrogations' in their speeches. It seems that any kind of rhetorical question can be an *interrogatio*. In the language theory of the early Stoics, however, an *erōtēma* is defined as a specific sort of speech act and a specific sort of rhetorical question, namely the act of asking a yes-or-no question; it is probably this technical Stoic term that Cicero here translates as 'interrogatio'. If this is right, Cicero is saying in the passage above that brief yes-or-no questions played a key role in Stoic rhetoric. He is also saying that these questions 'have all the efficacy of pin-pricks'. This must be an ironic comment on Cicero's part, for he regarded Stoic rhetoric as having no sting at all. So it was probably the early Stoics themselves who described their brief rhetorical questions as having the efficacy of pin-pricks. (It is possible that what the Stoics had in

³ Trans. Woolf 2001.

mind is the sort of effect that Socrates had on the people he came into contact with, i.e. paralyzing them with his poisonous sting.⁴ But as far as I know, this is not recorded.) Both the yes-or-no questions and the sting are found in another of Cicero's comments on Stoic rhetoric:

Cato, in my view a perfect specimen of a Stoic, holds opinions that by no means meet with the acceptance of the multitude, and moreover belongs to a school of thought that does not aim at oratorical ornament at all or employs a copious mode of exposition, but proves its case by using little interrogations like pin-pricks.⁵ (*Paradoxa Stoicorum* 2.)

This passage is about Marcus Cato the younger, who according to Cicero is one of three 'Stoic orators' (the two others are Publius Rutilius and Gaius Fannius, both of whom were students of Panaetius, around 140–130 BC). Of these three, only Cato was any good, according to Cicero, and this was not because of his Stoic training but in spite of it. We should note that Cicero complains here that the Stoics do not aim for oratorical ornament and we should also note that he, in the passage I cited above, says that they invent new words and disregard the old ones. Thus, Cicero is also criticizing the Stoics for their rhetorical style, their *lexis, dictio*.

From these two passages in Cicero, Stoic rhetoric comes across as terribly boring: a 'Stoic speech' is without elegance or wit. I can see no reason to believe that Cicero is lying. Yet we should balance what he says against two other facts. First, Cicero may have had strategic reasons for emphasizing the less attractive features of Stoic rhetoric, namely the fact that he regarded this theory as a competitor against his own theory of philosophical rhetoric. Secondly, we must not forget that the Stoics had achieved considerable political influence by Cicero's time, which seems to presuppose that Stoic orators must have had some means of persuading people in political matters. Cicero gives no information about what these means might have been, but I will try to illustrate later how a 'Stoic speech' could be persuasive. First, however, we should try to clarify how the early Stoics conceived of rhetoric, i.e. where they placed it in their philosophical system.

⁴ See e.g. the *Meno* 80a–b.

⁵ Trans. Rackham 1942.

How to use logos: dialectic and rhetoric in Stoic philosophy

We will gain some clarity about how the Stoics conceived of rhetoric and its place in philosophy if we look at two passages. The first is again from Cicero:

Torquatus [who defends Epicureanism] said, ‘An end to questioning, if you please. I told you my own preference right from the beginning, precisely because I foresaw this kind of dialectical quibbling.’ ‘So you prefer to debate in the rhetorical rather than dialectical style?’ I asked. ‘As if’, he replied, ‘continuous discourse is only for orators and not for philosophers!’ ‘Zeno the Stoic shared your view’, I said. ‘He declared, following Aristotle, that the art of speaking is divided into two categories. Rhetoric is like an open palm, because orators speak in an expansive style; dialectic is like a closed fist, since the dialectical style is more compressed. I bow, then, to your wishes, and will use, if I can, the rhetorical style, but it shall be the rhetoric of philosophers rather than lawyers.’⁶ (*De Finibus* 2. 17.)

Many issues are raised in this passage, but I want to focus on only two of them.⁷ First, Cicero implies that, according to the early Stoics, orators and philosophers are in agreement about the usefulness of continuous discourse. Secondly, he says expressly that Zeno compared rhetoric with an open palm, while dialectics is like a closed fist. We know that Zeno used a similar hand analogy also in his epistemology. But what does he mean here? In what sense is rhetoric like an open palm? Let us turn to the next text.

[According to the Stoics], rhetoric ... is the science of speaking well in regard to continuous discourses (*peri tōn en diexodōi logōn*); and dialectic ... is the science of correct discussion in regard to discourses conducted by question and answer (*peri ton en erwtesei kai apokrisei logon*); ... [rhetoric] is divisible into invention, phraseology, arrangement, and delivery. A rhetorical discourse [is divisible into] introduction, narrative, replies to opponents and peroration. ... There are five virtues of language (*aretai logou*) – correctness, clarity, conciseness, appropriateness, ornament. conciseness is a style that employs no more words than are necessary for setting forth the subject in hand ...⁸ (Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum* 7. 42–3, 59)

As far as I can see, everything in this passage is quite conventional, except for two things. (1) There are many similarities between dialectics and rhetoric. Not only can both orators and philosophers make use of continuous discourse,

⁶ Trans. Woolf 2001.

⁷ There is also the question of whether Cicero meant to say that the Stoic drew the distinction between rhetoric and dialectic in the same manner as Aristotle had done, which does not seem to be right. As far as I can see, what the Stoics call ‘the art of speaking’ consists of two parts: (i) the art of speaking in such a way as to give proofs, and (ii) the art of speaking in such a way as to reason from premises that are likely to be true, where the former belongs to dialectics and the latter belongs to rhetoric. In my reading of the passage above, then, Stoic rhetoric corresponds to Aristotelian dialectics.

⁸ Trans. Long and Sedley 1987.

as we have just seen, but Stoic dialectics is said to make use of a question-and-answer method, and we saw in the former section that rhetoric does, too. Note also that the five above-mentioned virtues of language seem to apply to *both* uses of language – argumentation as well as persuasion – and written as well as oral discourse. So a Stoic seems to have thought that he should use the same sort of language when he is giving a proof and when he is giving a speech. No wonder it was boring! (2) One of the Stoic virtues of language is unconventional, at least when applied to rhetoric, namely conciseness. And the Stoics seem to have emphasized this virtue. Not only should an orator be concise in the preamble, so as to get to the point quickly, and in the conclusion, so as not to make the audience impatient; no, the entire speech should be as concise as possible. This means, in plain English, that an orator should say no more than he needs to say in order to convey information: there should be no elaborations, no unnecessary examples, just a clear statement of the information that the audience needs to have in order to make a good decision. The reason for this ideal is simple: manipulation should be avoided. I will come back to that, but it is now time to try and get a better grasp of what a ‘Stoic speech’ may have been like. We will then be better able to understand how this conciseness was expressed in practice.

An attempt at reconstructing a ‘Stoic speech’

We have seen that Cicero had a notion of ‘Stoic orators’. But what sort of speeches did they give? In other words, what was a ‘Stoic speech’ like? How was it constructed? Neither Cicero nor, as far as I know, anybody else gives examples of Stoic speeches. But I think we can imagine how a Stoic would have spoken if we look more closely at some well-known Stoic proofs. Take Cleanthes’ proof that the soul is corporeal, for example:

No incorporeal interacts with a body, and no body with an incorporeal, but one body interacts with another body. Now the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body with the soul; thus when the soul feels shame and fear the body turns red and pale respectively. Therefore the soul is a body.⁹ (Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 78, 7–79, 2)

⁹ Trans. Long and Sedley 1987.

I suggest that, given the brief analysis of Stoic rhetoric above, we can detect the rhetorical elements in this proof if we reconstruct it as a Socratic dialogue along the following lines:

- Wouldn't you agree that no incorporeal entity can interact with a body?
- I would.
- And that no body interacts with an incorporeal entity?
- That, too.
- Rather, what interacts is one body with another body. Isn't that so?
- Yes.
- Now, doesn't the soul interact with the body when the body is sick and being cut?
- It does.
- And likewise the body with the soul?
- Maybe.
- Isn't it the case that when the soul feels shame and fear, the body turns red and pale respectively?
- Granted.
- So you must concede that the soul is a body.

This is a row of yes-or-no 'pin-prick' question that together make up a continuous discourse, a line of thought. But who is supposed to answer the questions? It depends, perhaps, on the size of the audience. If the audience is fairly large – say, 10 to 15 people – then each person would perhaps be expected to speak to himself, as it were, without saying anything out loud. But if the audience was very small – say, 2 or 3 people – then maybe one or two of them could have answered aloud. It is these small audiences, these closed circles, that the Stoics were mainly interested in, or so I have suggested. Note that this would virtually obliterate the distinction between rhetoric and dialectics, speaking and teaching, giving a lecture and holding a seminar. That is what I meant at the outset when I said that Stoic rhetoric was aimed at making students good lobbyists. Note also that if this is what a 'Stoic speech' was like, then we can understand why it was so boring. In fact I think it is fair to say that the outcome is neither a piece of good thinking nor an example of good rhetoric; but it may have made good seminars, as the many examples in Epictetus testify.

Why the early Stoics were so critical of conventional rhetoric

Julia Annas seems to think that the Stoics' reason for being against conventional rhetoric was that, in their view, it is required of agents that their actions spring from the right sort of motive, not superficially or shiftily.¹⁰ Annas even seems to think that a Stoic agent must act with the right sort of motives in a rather Kantian sense, which I believe is partly right, but partly wrong. It is wrong if it is taken to mean that, according to the Stoics, one cannot perform one's task (one's *kathēkon*, officium) without having a perfect moral insight, which, after all, is the prerogative of the wise man alone. But it is right that, according to the Stoics, acting from superficial and shifty motives is bad for the agents themselves – one should live with constancy ('constanter') – and also for other people in one's environment, since the behaviour of a shifty person is hard to predict and such a person cannot be trusted. So I believe Annas is quite right to suggest that the Stoics were against conventional rhetoric, because the aim of such rhetoric is to influence people in such a way that they change their minds for no good reason.

Another way of putting this would be to say that the Stoics were against conventional rhetoric because, in their view, we should never be governed by our emotions. But we should be careful not to understand this in the wrong way. It is true that according to the Stoics we ought to avoid irrational emotions such as fear, hope, enthusiasm, erotic desire, and so on. We also ought to avoid using language in ways that manipulate other people's emotional lives, even in situations where we may achieve worthwhile results by doing so. (We could lie, but that is a different story.) Irrational emotions should be avoided for the reasons I have mentioned: since they are shifty, they ruin the constancy of our lives. But it is important to realize that not all our emotions are irrational, according to the Stoics. There are reasonable emotions, for instance joy, caution, care, and benevolence. According to the Stoics, we may well be governed by them. We may even use language to influence such emotional reactions in others: a speech may create benevolence towards the speaker, caution against an upcoming danger, and so on. What we should not do is use language in such a way that the audience feels enthusiasm rather than benevolence, fear rather than caution, and so on. In short, as orators we should not appeal to other people's emotions but to their reason.

¹⁰ See n. 9 in Annas 2001, 92.

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Romance across social barriers: Xanthias and Phyllis in Horace, *Ode* 2.4¹

TOR IVAR ØSTMØE

Horace's *Ode* 2.4 is a poem about love: an unnamed speaker addresses a certain Xanthias about the latter's attraction to a woman called Phyllis. At the core of this poem and its interpretations is the assumption that it is dealing with two lovers who have different statuses. In Roman comedies the intrigue is usually based on this kind of problem, and the ending is happy but unrealistic: their true identity having been revealed, the lovers are free to unite. My interest lies with the following question: Can the poem be interpreted as opening for a union of the lovers? If it can, how does it deal with the problem of status? I will approach this issue from a rhetorical angle.

Phyllis is identified in line 1 as an *ancilla*, a maidservant; as such she could be either slave or free. Further on, at line 20, her parentage is discussed, and reference is made to her mother and not to her father; this could mean that she is a slave, since in the Roman system slave status followed the mother. Xanthias' status is not made explicit but since he possesses Greek *paideia* and, moreover, places himself above his beloved, he is probably upper class.²

The poem is written in Sapphic metre and has six stanzas. In the first three, the anonymous speaker tells Xanthias not to be ashamed of his love; he refers to heroes in the *Iliad* who have fallen for slave women. In the last three stanzas he praises Phyllis' personality and looks, and he argues that obscure origins should not be an obstacle. He also assures Xanthias that, at forty, he is too old to be attracted himself.

What is the speaker's intention? The poem bears resemblance to Hellenistic epigrams and parodies Homer's epic style. On this basis, recent commentaries explain that the speaker's intention is to tease Xanthias for his love.³ I see three difficulties with this interpretation: first, it seems odd for an older man to tease a younger one about this subject; secondly, it seems especially odd if his implied message is, as it seems to be here, that the younger man should simply follow his urges; and thirdly, if the speaker is out to tease, his irony seems, at least to me, out of place.⁴

1 I thank the editors for their useful suggestions on the draft.

2 There being no indication of a real-life Xanthias or Phyllis in Horace's milieu, I read the poem as fiction.

3 This seems to be the consensus in Page [1881] 1960, Valle 1974, Nisbet and Hubbard 1978, Quinn 1980, West 1998, Syndikus [1973] (2001³) and Holzberg 2009, 138–9; see also Davis 1991, 19–22.

4 Nisbet and Hubbard 1978, 68 find 'something disquieting' in the poem. In 1834, Peerlkamp proposed that part of it should be deleted; *Repertory of Conjectures on Horace* lists 17 more conjectures on the poem.

I shall attempt a rhetorical reading of the poem, one that starts not from its relations with earlier literary works but from its embodiment of a speech act, that of giving advice. In my reading, the speaker's intention is to give advice; in my interpretation of this advice, I shall pay special attention to his rhetorical strategies and his use of names.

I shall begin my examination with a translation issue. Halfway through, beginning with the fourth stanza (lines 13–16), commentators have pointed to a transition in the poem, from a mode of consolation to one of congratulation:⁵

nescias an te generum beati
Phyllidis flavae decorent parentes:
regium certe genus et penatis
maeret iniquos.

A recent translation reads as follows:

You never know: your flaxen-haired Phyllis may have well-to-do parents who would reflect glory on their son-in-law. Without a doubt the family she weeps for has royal blood, and its gods have turned unfairly against her.⁶

In this translation, the stanza's first word *nescias* is translated as 'you never know'; while in a second translation, we read 'for all you know'.⁷ As I read these translations, they convey a somewhat cynical form of irony, one that emphasizes Phyllis' lack of ancestry in order to belittle her. But, since the poem's motivation is that Xanthias loves Phyllis, this seems out of place. What if we try a different translation? As a second person subjunctive *nescias* can also convey a polite order.⁸ Furthermore, when used as it is here with *an*, *nescio* can mean not 'I do not know whether' but rather 'I am inclined to think that perhaps'.⁹ Thus, the stanza's first words could also be translated as 'you should think that perhaps your flaxen-haired Phyllis has ...'. In this translation, the phrase is a politely formed challenge to Xanthias to think the best of his beloved. With this translation, then, the second half of the poem opens not with ironic congratulation but with a recommendation, and the irony is milder because it makes Xanthias reflect on his own perception of the affair.

Recent commentators on the poem assume that it was acceptable for an elite

5 Nisbet and Hubbard 1978, 68.

6 Rudd 2004.

7 West 1998.

8 Menge 2000, 161, §111.

9 *OLD* 1173, s.v. *nescio* 4a.

Roman male to have affairs with servant girls.¹⁰ Older commentators do not. In the 19th century, Mitscherlich (1817) and Doering (1838) both explained that the speaker is trying to persuade Xanthias that the opprobrium attached to these affairs is unfounded. Thus, although they find the poem witty, they see Xanthias' love as problematic.

Two 12th-century accessuses (introductory texts to Classical authors for use in schools) take different approaches. The first explains that the poem 'teases and censures' (*deridet et uituperat*) Xanthias 'for being deeply in love' (*quod [...] graviter estuabat*). The message to Xanthias, which reflects an ideal of self-restraint that could be both Christian and pagan, seems to be to be responsible and to stay away. The second accessus, which constructs a narrative around the poem, turns the poet into a villain: Phyllis has cheated on Xanthias and he has left her; she, offering any service he wants, asks for the poet's help in winning him back; he complies. The poem 'brands all those who take bribes to give advice to friends that they know to be neither useful nor honourable for them' (*notantur omnes illi qui precorrumpi ea commendant amicis, in quibus sciunt nichil eorum esse utilitatis nec quicquam honestatis*).¹¹ Both the first and the second accessus, then, see love between persons of different status as problematic; moreover, assuming that he has authority vis-à-vis Xanthias, they see the speaker as fundamentally offering advice.

In Roman Italy, people of different status lived next to each other. In wealthy households there seems to have been less of an 'upstairs-downstairs' division than in some modern cases, and in the city landscape the rich and the poor did not live in separate zones but rather resided in the same blocks.¹² Thus, it may have been common for *jeunesse dorée*-persons to be in love with persons from other social groups, and vice versa. The late Republic and early Empire were also characterized by social mobility. Records from Herculaneum documenting conditions in Horace's time indicate how so-called 'Junian Latins', who were freedmen, gained access to Roman citizenship.¹³ Upward mobility in the Late Republic is also documented by funerary reliefs of freedmen. Although the iconography used by aristocrats is imitated in these reliefs, the freedmen's origins are not concealed; instead their ascent is highlighted by displaying the privileges of freedom such as the right to marry, the right to wear a toga, and the right to hang a *bulla* from a son's neck.¹⁴ It seems then that in Horace's time social barriers remained important but also became more permeable.

10 Syndikus [1973] 2001³, 358; Nisbet and Hubbard 1978, 67.

11 The texts are edited in Friis-Jensen 1988.

12 Beard 2008, 61–2, on Pompeii.

13 Wallace-Hadrill 2011, 138–40.

14 Zanker 2007, 44–5; Stewart 2008, 65–8.

That would have made life more difficult for Xanthias: he could marry Phyllis (although, if she was a slave, she would have to be freed), but would that mean a loss of status for him?

I now continue my exploration of the poem as advice by discussing the speaker's rhetorical strategies and his use of names. I begin with its disposition. In conventional rhetorical disposition, the speaker first tries to secure the audience's attention and next recommends a course of action. In my reading, *Ode* 2.4 follows this disposition. In the first half, the speaker sympathizes with Xanthias' plight and cites exempla from the Greek epic tradition (Achilles, Ajax, and Agamemnon, who all loved slave women); in the second half he recommends a course of action. Thus, following a conventional rhetorical disposition, the speaker first positions himself, and next goes on the attack.

Also interesting with regard to the poem's disposition is the manner of address, the vocative forms *Xanthia Phoceu* at line 2. In Rome, by virtue of the system of the *tria nomina* (three names = full citizen, one name = slave), your status could be inferred from the length of your name. Thus, when Xanthias is addressed with two names, this confirms his social position, and by implication his superiority to Phyllis.¹⁵ However, the second name is not a name but a poetic-sounding epithet; in the poem's conversational setting, it jars. Thus, while confirming Xanthias' status at first, the speaker is hinting that it will be qualified eventually.

The thrust of the speaker's argument is to be found in the fourth and fifth stanzas. Here the speaker tells Xanthias that Phyllis is a good woman. The stanzas are also formally connected. The fourth was reproduced in full above, and its first word is *nescias*, which I interpret as a polite recommendation. The fifth stanza also begins with a recommendation, the imperative verb form *crede* 'believe'. Together, the two form a chiasmus – the fourth stanza treating Phyllis' money and parentage in that order, and the fifth treating the same topics but in reverse order. In terms of argumentation, however, the stanzas present a progression. The fourth stanza challenges Xanthias to think the best of Phyllis, even for no good reason; the fifth stanza tells him that he does have good reason, namely his own feelings and admiration for her. Furthermore, while the fourth stanza is fanciful and entertaining, the fifth is realistic and insistent. I paraphrase: 'Believe that your choice is not from the rabble, that her mother is not a disgrace to somebody who is so true and so unselfish'. Thus, the stanza presents the facts and incidentally exposes Xanthias' prejudice: he has been too focused on appearances. In the second half of the poem the speaker is on the attack, going step by step.

¹⁵ Hall 2009, 8–13 examines strategies of politeness used in the conversational style of Roman aristocrats in Cicero's time, focusing inter alia on 'politeness of respect' that acknowledges an interlocutor's status.

The speaker's irony should be connected with his intention to give advice. The fourth stanza, with its spin on Phyllis' background, has already been discussed, but commentators have found irony in two other places. The first consists of the exempla in the first half of the poem, which are 'mock-grandiloquent',¹⁶ i.e. they are stylistic parodies of Homer and ironical in the sense that they compare Xanthias, an ordinary man, to the grand heroes of epic. However, assuming that Xanthias is in love with Phyllis, it seems odd to use these exempla just to make fun of him. If we read the poem as advice, however, these exempla could have functions beyond that of teasing. One function has already been mentioned: they help secure his attention. A second function would be that they help him gain the insight that his situation is different from that of the Homeric princes: for them, concubines were primarily status symbols and marriage was not an option, but Phyllis has the right to expect a stronger commitment from him.

The second place where irony has been found is in the poem's last stanza, where the speaker says that he is too old to be attracted himself. This sounds unconvincing.¹⁷ In the commentaries, two explanations are to be found: the stanza is taken as a reference to the poet's age at the time of writing,¹⁸ which to my mind seems unreasonable if we consider the poem as a whole; or it is viewed as part of the speaker's teasing.¹⁹ As a form of teasing, however, it would be an attempt to make Xanthias jealous; if he is the speaker's friend, this is odd. What I would also like to emphasize is that with both these approaches the speaker's implied message to Xanthias in this stanza would be to follow his urges and not think of the consequences. Again, that seems unexpected from a friend and older man.

Focusing on humour, I shall try to ascribe a different message to the speaker's words in the last stanza. If his irony is meant to make Xanthias laugh, he will probably not succeed. But a flat joke could be a way of signalling that a discussion is at an end. Thus, the denial of self-interest can perhaps be interpreted as the speaker's signal that his advice (which Xanthias has presumably asked for) has now been delivered. However, the denial of self-interest could also serve a different purpose, since the stanza also refers to Phyllis' sexy looks. If the speaker turns to this topic after the subjects of money and parentage, the aim could be to rouse Xanthias to action by making him visualize something which is most tantalizing. Rousing the audience to action is of course one of the main tasks at the end of an advice-giving speech.

¹⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978, 70; also West 1998, 30.

¹⁷ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978, 68.

¹⁸ Page [1881] 1960; Nisbet and Hubbard 1978, 76–7.

¹⁹ Syndikus [1973] 2001³, 360.

Since they belong to different parts of the poem and have different targets, the three cases of irony may now be interpreted as reflecting the poem's rhetorical disposition, as outlined above. The speaker starts with an apostrophe to Xanthias to secure his attention; next he discusses Phyllis and tries to broaden Xanthias' perception; finally, he uses self-irony to 'defuse' the situation and at the same time draw attention to Phyllis' good looks. All in all, then, several of the poem's rhetorical strategies seem compatible with its interpretation as a form of advice, and as I read this advice, Xanthias should treat Phyllis right. He should also see that although she has neither money nor ancestry, she does have characteristics that should count for more in a wife: a good personality and healthy looks.

I shall now discuss the speaker's use of names. One such case, the apostrophe *Xanthia Phoceu*, has already been discussed as an indicator of status. But since the poem plays out in a setting that is Roman, but both lovers have names that are Greek, there is also a cultural subtext.

As mentioned previously, the poem is structured in two parts which are of same length. In the first half of the second lines, both parts have a name and an adjective: in line 2, *Xanthia Phoceu*; in line 14, *Phyllidis flavae*. The name Xanthias is related to the adjective ξανθός, which like the Latin *flavus* means 'blonde', and so one interpretation of these word-pairs is that the lovers are a good match. But the placement of the pairs could also suggest a transition from one culture to another. In the poem's first half, we find Greek place names and heroes' names and epic Greek social organization, but in the second everything is Roman: household gods (line 15, *penatis*), social (line 18, *plebs*) and family organization (lines 14 and 15, *generum, parentes*). There is also a stylistic break when the complex Homeric syntax in the first half gives way to simple, end-stopped stanzas in the second.²⁰ It seems, then, that we pass from a Greek context that is mythological and remote to a Roman one that is practical and centred on household and home. Reading the poem as advice, the transition may suggest that Greek *paideia* as represented by epic poetry is not quite suited to guiding Xanthias in his present life in Rome.

The names also suggest something about Xanthias' and Phyllis' more personal attitudes. Let us assume that they have both moved, or have been moved, from Greece to Rome. In the 1st century BC it was common for enfranchised foreigners to take the *praenomen* and *nomen gentis* of the person or family responsible for their citizenship and keep their original name as a *cognomen*.²¹ If Xanthias is a Roman citizen, he probably also has a Roman

²⁰ Nisbet and Hubbard 1978, 71; Quinn 1980 on 13–24.

²¹ Dickey 2002, 47–8.

name. But if he does, the speaker does not use it, and instead it is replaced with the Greek, poetic-sounding epithet *Phoceus*, ‘from Phocis’. The effect is to highlight Xanthias’ pride in his old homeland and culture. However, while *Xanthia Phoceu* are Greek vocative forms that seem learned and artificial in a Latin context, Phyllis’ epithet *flavae* is native Latin, and although her name is Greek, it is inflected with a Latin genitive ending: *Phyllid-is*. Thus, of the two, Phyllis is perhaps more at home in Rome.

Finally, the names can signify a reversal of roles. The first half’s Homeric heroes are identified by personal names and patronymics: *Achillem*, *Aiacem Telamone natum*, and *Atrides*, whereas their women are identified by common nouns: *serva*, *captivae*, *virgine*. The same pattern applies in the first reference to the two lovers: *Xanthia Phoceu* vs *ancillae*, thus confirming Xanthias’ social position and revealing the asymmetry of his relation to Phyllis. But in the second half the *ancilla* reappears, and with a vengeance: now she also has a name and an epithet, she is *Phyllidis flavae*. In official contexts, Roman slaves were listed by their first name followed by that of their owner in the genitive. If we place the names of the two lovers next to each other, we get *Xanthia Phoceu Phyllidis flavae*, ‘O Xanthias from Phocis, [slave of] flaxen-haired Phyllis’. The reversal of roles could refer to Xanthias’ romantic subjection to Phyllis, to Phyllis’s skills as the leader of a household, a *matrona*, or to both. In any case, in the second half of the poem she is not a Homeric concubine but a woman with a name – somebody to be reckoned with.

In my reading of Horace’s *Ode 2.4* the unnamed speaker has a message for Xanthias. That message is the following: Rome is now your home; when in Rome, do as the Romans do; if you love Phyllis, treat this good woman right and ask her to marry you.

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The *Ad Diognetum* and contemporary rhetorical practice

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The text to be discussed here is traditionally known as the *Letter* (or *Epistle*) to *Diognetus*, *Epistula ad Diognetum*, *Diognetbrief*, etc. and is often classified with the writings of the Apostolic Fathers of the 2nd century AD.¹ However, lacking the formal characteristics of an ancient letter, it cannot be categorized as such, nor as an ‘epistle’ if, as Deissmann and Meecham would have it,² letter and epistle are to be distinguished as two different literary genres. More appropriately, it can be described as a pamphlet defending and explaining the author’s Christian faith to an addressee who is a non-Christian and presumably a Roman magistrate, or, with Jefford’s term,³ as a ‘protreptic discourse’. With that content and that objective it rather belongs with the writings of the Apologists of the 2nd and 3rd centuries, who addressed themselves to leading personalities of the empire, in particular the emperors,⁴ whereas the Apostolic Fathers wrote with their fellow Christians in mind in order to confirm and strengthen their faith. Some scholars consequently prefer a more neutral title, such as *Ad Diognetum*, which we use here (with the abbreviation *Diogn.*), simply translating the title πρὸς Διόγνητον given in the manuscript, or at least they avoid the word ‘letter’ and its synonyms.⁵

The author of *Diogn.* cannot be identified with any known person. As for the addressee, only his name Διόγνητος is known, but nothing else. In the opening sentence of the letter he is addressed as κράτιστε, which may be the Greek equivalent of a Roman title (*egregius* or *clarissimus*)⁶ and indicate an elevated position in the imperial society.⁷ The date of the composition of the text cannot

1 For more exhaustive discussions on the origin of the text, authorship, date, literary character, theological content, etc., cf. Geffcken 1928, Meecham 1949, Marrou 1965, Lake 1976, Wengst 1984, Lindemann and Paulsen 1992, Ehrman 2003, Jefford 2013.

2 Deissmann 1923, 194–6, Meecham 1949, 7. The distinction is hardly necessary in this context, because the ancients did not make it but used the word ἐπιστολή as the predominating term in the relevant texts, occasionally substituting it with γράμματα etc. for the sake of variation; cf. Stirtewalt 1993, 67–87, Reed 1997, 171, n. 1.

3 Jefford 2013, 56.

4 e.g. Quadratus (Κοδρᾶτος), apparently bishop of Athens c. 125–129 and reckoned as the earliest among the Apologists, addressed his apology to Hadrian (Euseb. *Hist. eccl.* 4.3.1–2). Comparable writings were addressed to Antoninus Pius and his sons (Aristides of Athens, Justin Martyr), or Marcus Aurelius and Commodus (Apollinaris Claudius, Athenagoras, Melito).

5 Marrou 1965 (*A Diognète*), Wengst 1984 (*Schrift an Diognet*).

6 *LSJ*⁹1940, 991–2 s.v. κράτιστος 2b.

7 Luke’s κράτιστε Θεόφιλε (*Ev. Luc.* 1.3) may have the same implication.

be determined with certainty. Content and – as will be shown below – style indicate a close relationship to other Apologists, so a date between the mid-2nd and the early 3rd centuries seems plausible.

The text was preserved by a single manuscript, eventually ending up in the possession of the Bibliothèque municipale of Strasbourg, where it was destroyed by wartime fire in 1870. Fortunately, it had been studied and copied by a number of scholars since the 16th century, and reliable collations have been preserved. The text was damaged, so that emendations or conjectures are called for in several passages. The concluding chapters, 11–12, constitute a particular problem. The manuscript indicated a lacuna in the text after ch. 10. According to most scholars, chs. 11–12 deviate so much in content, language and style from the preceding chapters 1–10 that they are likely to belong to a different work or may even have been written by a different person. These scholars conclude that the lacuna between chs. 10 and 11 covers the final portion of *Diogn.* proper and the beginning of another treatise, the pitiable remnants of which now appear as chs. 11–12. In my view, the divergences in language and style are not great enough to warrant the conclusion that chs. 11–12 were not written by the same person as chs. 1–10.⁸ They could, however, possibly belong to a different treatise, and they will be used here mostly as an object of comparison for bringing stylistic and linguistic features of chs. 1–10 into relief.

Diogn. has found a great number of readers through the centuries, and new editions, translations and commentaries keep appearing. Commentators with a theological or clerical background appreciate it as a valuable religious document, illustrating early Christian thought and still relevant to Christians of modern times.⁹ It is noticeable, however, how often and how emphatically these commentators draw attention to the formal characteristics of the text, its literary qualities, the author's skilful handling of the language and of rhetorical devices. The following study will be an attempt at characterizing the rhetorical practices of *Diogn.* compared to some texts from the same period. It could be described as a short case study on the impact of traditional Greek rhetoric on early Christian literature.

8 Marrou 1965, 219–27 vigorously defends the authenticity of the two chapters, and Hill's careful investigation of the problem ends with the conclusion that the arguments used against the authenticity of chs. 11–12 are not decisive (Hill 2006, 106–27).

9 Cf. e.g. Marrou 1965, 89 (approvingly translating an utterance by H. B. Swete): '*il n'y a pas d'œuvre chrétien, en dehors du Nouveau Testament, qui touche autant le cœur du public moderne*'.

The preface

The author's acquaintance with the literary tradition is apparent already from the opening chapter of *Diogn.* It forms a developed and rather longish proem to the treatise.

ἐπειδὴ ὄρῳ, κράτιστε Διόγνητε, ὑπερσπουδακότα σε τὴν θεοσέβειαν τῶν Χριστιανῶν μαθεῖν καὶ πάνυ σαφῶς καὶ ἐπιμελῶς πυνθανόμενον περὶ αὐτῶν τί τε θεῶ πεποιθότες καὶ πῶς θρησκεύοντες αὐτὸν <τόν> τε κόσμον ὑπερορῶσι πάντες καὶ θανάτου καταφρονοῦσι, καὶ οὔτε τοὺς νομιζόμενους ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων θεοὺς λογίζονται οὔτε τὴν Ἰουδαίων δεισιδαιμονίαν φυλάσσουσι, καὶ τίνα τὴν φιλοστοργίαν ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τί δῆποτε καινὸν τοῦτο γένος ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα εἰσηλθεν εἰς τὸν βίον νῦν καὶ οὐ πρότερον, ἀποδέχομαί γε τῆς προθυμίας σε ταύτης, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ – τοῦ καὶ τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν ἡμῖν χορηγοῦντος – αἰτοῦμαι δοθῆναι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ὡς μάλιστα ἂν <ἀκούσαντά> σε βελτίω γενέσθαι, σοὶ τε οὕτως ἀκοῦσαι ὡς μὴ λυπηθῆναι τὸν εἰπόντα.¹⁰

Syntactically, it is one unified sentence, structured into three sections:

- (i) The author first notices the interest displayed by the addressee in the subject matter: ἐπειδὴ ὄρῳ ... πυνθανόμενον περὶ αὐτῶν.
- (ii) He then specifies the particular questions that have been asked by the addressee and will be answered in the treatise: τί τε θεῶ πεποιθότες ... καὶ οὐ πρότερον.
- (iii) Finally he asks for God's assistance in order to bring the enterprise to a successful end: ἀποδέχομαί γε τῆς προθυμίας ... μὴ λυπηθῆναι τὸν εἰπόντα.

Being a Christian, the author may be supposed to have been inspired by the preface of Luke's Gospel. The appearance of the polite address κράτιστε in both texts is a detail that suggests interdependence between them.¹¹ However, as appears in particular from Loveday Alexander's investigations, there are numerous parallels in extra-Biblical and pagan texts as well.¹² Some of them contain elements that reappear in *Diogn.* But are absent from Luke's

¹⁰ 'Since I see, most excellent Diognetus, that you are extremely eager to learn about the religion of the Christians and are making such an exacting and careful inquiry about them, wishing to discover which God they obey and how they worship him, so that they all despise the world and disdain death, neither giving credence to those thought to be gods by the Greeks nor keeping the superstition of the Jews, and what deep affection they have for one another and just why this new race or way of life came into being now and not before, I welcome this eagerness of yours and ask God – who enables us both to speak and to hear – that I may be allowed to speak in such a way that you derive special benefit by hearing, and that you hear in such a way that the speaker not be put to grief.' I use throughout the translation of Ehrman (2003), sometimes with slight adaptations.

¹¹ Commentators are of course aware of the parallelism between Luke and *Diogn.*

¹² Alexander 1993; cf. also Alexander 2005, 21–3.

prefaces. According to Luke, it is on his own initiative that he sets out to write his account; his addressee Theophilus is not reported (or alleged) to have shown any previous interest. In *Diogn.* the opening ἐπειδή-clause states that it is Diognetus' interest in the matter that has inspired the writer. Prefaces with similar declarations appear in Greek scientific writings from the late 4th century BC onwards; the earliest known example comes from a medical treatise of Diocles of Carystus, addressed to King Antigonus I of Macedonia,¹³ and there are several later examples.¹⁴ Also the Apologist Melito opened his *Ἐκλογία* with an ἐπειδή-clause stating that the reason for his writing the text was the addressee's repeatedly expressed interest.¹⁵

Detailed specifications of the content of the following text were also common in scientific prologues, often in the form of a string of indirect questions.¹⁶ The address κράτιστε, that links *Diogn.* with Luke, was not uncommon in comparable contexts.¹⁷

Avoidance of hiatus

The parallels existing between the prologue of *Diogn.* and the extra-Biblical material indicate that the author was acquainted with the Greek literary tradition and its stylistic conventions. His models were not only the Biblical texts. Another indication of his ambition is the relative scarcity of hiatus in the text. The author does not pedantically avoid hiatus but allows it, as many writers do, after common words (e.g. the article, καί, ἢ, περί), before ἐν and οὐ, and at syntactic junctures. Disregarding those cases and passages where the elision of a final, short vowel would remove a hiatus, there are only about 17 hiatuses in *Diogn.* chs. 1–10 (compared to about 15 in the much shorter, divergent chs. 11–12).¹⁸

13 Diocles fr. 183a van der Eijk. Alexander 1993, 46–50, 213–14. The preface started with an ἐπειδή-clause describing the king as φιλοσοφίας πάσης ἔμπειρον ὄντα and τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς πρωταγωνιστήν.

14 Later examples include Apollonius of Citium's *περὶ ἄρθρων* (prologue of book 1: participle phrase describing the addressee as φιλιάρτως διακείμενον), Artemidorus' *Onirocritica* (prologue of book 3: ἐπειδή-clause referring to τὸ μεγαλεῖον τῆς σῆς σοφίας of the addressee), Diophantus' *Arithmetica* (prologue: τὴν εὔρεσιν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς προβλημάτων, τιμιώτατέ μοι Διονύσειε, γινώσκων σε σπουδαίως ἔχοντα μαθεῖν) and Galen's *De constitutione artis medicae ad Patrophilum* (ἐπεὶ-clause praising Patrophilus for a 'divine' quality, i.e. the striving for learning and προθυμία).

15 Melito, fr. 3 in Perler's edition = Euseb. *Hist. eccl.* 4.26.13.

16 Alexander, *loc. cit.* Cf. Diocles' preface: ... γέγραφέ σοι, πόθεν αἱ νόσοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συνίστανται, καὶ τίνων προγενομένων σημείων, καὶ πῶς ἂν τις αὐταῖς βοηθῶν ἐπιτυχάνοι.

17 Cf. the prefaces of: Dionysius of Halicarnassus *De antiquis oratoribus* (ὦ κράτιστε Ἀμμαῖε), Josephus *Ap.* (κράτιστε ἀνδρῶν Ἐπαφρόδιτε), Galen *Meth. Med.* (book 2: Ἰέρων κράτιστε) and *Libr. Propr.* (κράτιστε Βάσσειε), ps.-Galen *De theriaca* (κράτιστε Παμφιλανέ), and Nepualinus, *περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἀντιπάθειαν καὶ συμπάθειαν* (κράτιστε Σέκστε).

18 Chs. 1–10 cover 270 lines in Marrou's edition, chs. 11–12, 52 lines.

The author also seems to use word order to prevent hiatus. He usually places genitives of personal pronouns after the substantive (with article) that they qualify.¹⁹ This illustrates a tendency of contemporary Greek whereas the classical prose texts more often have them before the article.²⁰ By using the more ‘classical’ word order, the author avoids hiatus in two passages: 6.4 ἀόρατος δὲ αὐτῶν ἢ θεοσεβεία μένει and 7.6 τίς αὐτοῦ τὴν παρουσίαν ὑποστήσεται. But his avoidance of hiatus is not total, and in one passage a pre-positioned genitive creates a hiatus that would have been avoided with the alternative word order: 10.4 μμητῆς ἔση αὐτοῦ τῆς χρηστότητος.

In Hellenistic Greek there is a tendency to add a γε after καίτοι and μέντοι when a hiatus would otherwise occur.²¹ In *Diogn.* there is one possible example: 8.3 καίτοι γε εἴ τις ...

The preparatory particle μέν occurs 26 times in *Diogn.*²² In 10 cases, a disproportionately great number, the particle prevents a hiatus: 1.2 ἐμοὶ μὲν εἰπεῖν, 2.3 ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν, 2.8 εἰ μὲν αἰσθάνονται, 3.2 εἰ μὲν ἀπέχονται, 4.2 ἄ μὲν ὡς καλῶς, 6.3 οἰκεῖ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι, 6.4 γινώσκονται μὲν ὄντες, 6.7 ἐγκέκλεισται μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ, κατέχονται μὲν ὡς ἐν φρουρᾷ, 9.2 πεπλήρωτο μὲν ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀδικία. The frequent use of the particle in these particular contexts is likely to indicate a striving to avoid hiatus.

The conjunction ὅτι occurs four times in *Diogn.* In one passage the author uses its synonym διότι instead, thereby preventing a hiatus:²³ 6.5 ἀδικουμένη διότι. Cf. ἀδικούμενος ὅτι, which follows in the next line.

These observations suggest that there is a partial avoidance of hiatus in chs. 1–10, but not in chs. 11–12. Thus, the author of chs. 1–10 tried to apply a rule of literary Greek, but failed, which testifies to his ambitions but not to his competence.

19 Or after an adjective that qualifies the substantive, as, e.g. 4.6 τῆς ἰδίας αὐτῶν θεοσεβείας, 8.10 τὴν σοφὴν αὐτοῦ βουλήν. This is the normal word order in nominal phrases with this structure; see Kühner and Gerth 1904, I.619, BDR, § 284:1c.

20 Wifstrand 1949. Wifstrand’s observations on enclitic personal pronouns apply to the accented genitives (ἡμῶν, ὑμῶν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῆς, αὐτῶν) as well.

21 See Blomqvist 1969, 29–34 and 43–5.

22 Counting the textually uncertain μὲν ὄντες in 6.4, where the manuscript had μὲνοντες. In chs. 11–12 there are no examples of μέν at all.

23 Meecham 1949, 15.

Rhythmical clausulae

Geffcken claimed to have observed a striving for the same types of rhythmical clausulae in *Diogn.* that were common in rhetorical prose, in particular in the writings of Clement of Alexandria.²⁴ He identified a number of examples of cola ending in the same syllabic sequences that are common in literary prose of the 2nd and 3rd centuries. The examples presented by Geffcken are too few to show with certainty that the author used prose rhythm deliberately as a stylistic device, but a systematic analysis of colon endings in chs. 5–7 offers a certain confirmation of his observations.

Disregarding those cola that are too short for a meaningful analysis, Marrou's text of chs. 5–7 contains about 100 cola.²⁵ 27 of them end in cretic + trochee, 14 in trochee + trochee, and seven in cretic + cretic, i.e. nearly half of them exemplify three clausula types that belong to the most common ones in Greek oratorical prose. Of the remaining *c.*50, 10 have a final cretic preceded by varying syllable sequences (e.g. 5.4 διαίτη καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ βίῳ, 7.7 παραβαλλομένουσ θηρίοις). The hexameter final (dactyl + spondee or trochee), which was mostly avoided, occurs in eight cases. The remaining cola finals are unclassifiable or irrelevant in this context.

The sequence cretic + trochee appears in more than a fourth of the investigated cola. In 5.1–2 e.g. four successive cola end with the sequence:

... διακεκριμένοι τῶν λοιπῶν εἰσιν ἀνθρώπων.
 οὔτε γάρ που πόλεις ἰδίας κατοικοῦσιν,
 οὔτε διαλέκτῳ τινὶ παρηλλαγμένη χρῶνται,
 οὔτε βίον παράσημον ἀσκοῦσιν.

Its frequency indicates that this particular sequence was intentionally sought for by the author. The same may apply to some of the other combinations, but as they are fewer in number pure chance cannot be ruled out. The conclusion regarding rhythmical clausulae will be approximately the same as regards the avoidance of hiatus: the author strove to comply with the conventions of literary prose but was not entirely successful.

²⁴ Geffcken 1924, 349–50 and Geffcken 1928, v.

²⁵ All the figures are, of necessity, inexact. Syntax and punctuation offer some guidance, but identifying the colon boundaries basically depends on the analyst's subjective judgement (e.g. Jefford's division of the text into cola does not coincide with mine).

Rhetorical figures

The most conspicuous stylistic feature of *Diogn.* is the frequency with which easily recognizable figures of speech recur in the text. They exemplify a whole spectrum of devices, most of which are in particular associated with the so-called ‘Asiatic style’. The commentators provide extensive lists of these devices with references to the relevant passages.²⁶ Geffcken, in his analysis of the rhetorically elaborate ch. 9, notes *polyptoton*, which is used in order to bring home the important ideas of God’s power and righteousness (the stems *δυνα-* and *δικαι-* recur repeatedly, e.g. 9.1 ἀδύνατον εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ θεοῦ δυνατοὶ γενηθῶμεν and 9.5 ἵνα ἀνομία μὲν πολλῶν ἐν δικαίῳ ἐνὶ κρυβῆ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ ἐνὸς πολλοὺς ἀνόμους δικαιοσύνη), *isocola* with *homoeoteleuton* (9.1 ἐφηδόμενος ... ἀνεχόμενος, συνευδοκῶν ... δημιουργῶν), strings of exclamations (9.5 ὦ τῆς γλυκειᾶς ἀνταλλαγῆς, ὦ τῆς ἀνεξιχνιάστου δημιουργίας, ὦ τῶν ἀπροσδοκῆτων εὐεργεσιῶν), and *antitheta* (often *isosyllabic*, with nine or 10 syllables in each colon: 9.2 τὸν ἅγιον ὑπὲρ <τῶν> ἀνόμων, τὸν ἄκακον ὑπὲρ τῶν κακῶν, τὸν δίκαιον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδίκων, τὸν ἄφθαρτον ὑπὲρ τῶν φθαρτῶν, τὸν ἀθάνατον ὑπὲρ τῶν θνητῶν). In other sections of the text we find series of rhetorical questions (4.2–5), *anaphora* (7.4 ὡς βασιλεὺς πέμπων υἱὸν βασιλέα ἔπεμψεν, ὡς θεὸν ἔπεμψεν, ὡς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἔπεμψεν, ὡς σώζων ἔπεμψεν, ὡς πείθων, οὐ βιαζόμενος), *praeteritio* (4.1 <οὐ> νομίζω σε χρῆζειν παρ’ ἐμοῦ μαθεῖν), or *chiasmus* (2.7 ἐγκλείοντες ταῖς νυξί, καὶ ταῖς ἡμέραις φύλακας παρακαθιστάντες, 11.1 ἀποστόλων γενόμενος μαθητῆς γίνομαι διδάσκαλος ἐθνῶν, and, possibly,²⁷ 4.5 ἄστροις καὶ σελήνῃ ... τῶν μηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν).

Sentence structure

The first sentence of *Diogn.* (quoted above) comes close to a structure that could be described as a period: a sentence consisting of several hierarchically structured constituents, forming a syntactically unified whole and complete only when the last constituent is in position. Such sentences are not common in *Diogn.* Even if a sentence starts with a fairly complex and regular structure, it normally dissolves into something else. There is an illustrative example in 9.6. The sentence starts with two coordinated participle phrases: ἐλέγξας οὖν ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ τὸ ἀδύνατον τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν ζωῆς and οὖν δὲ τὸν σωτήρα δείξας δυνατὸν σώζειν καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα. The temporal

²⁶ Cf., in particular, Geffcken 1928, 21–2, 24–5, Meecham 1949, 13–15, and Marrou 1965, 126–7, plus their notes on the individual passages.

²⁷ Provided we accept the somewhat intricate interpretation of Otto 1852, 103 as Meecham 1949, 13, 105 and Jefford 2013, 213, n. 79, do.

ἀλλ' οὐ κοινήν.²⁸
 ἐν σαρκί τυγχάνουσιν,
 ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ σάρκα ζῶσιν.
 ἐπὶ γῆς διατρίβουσιν,
 ἀλλ' ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτεύονται.
 πείθονται τοῖς ὀρισμένοις νόμοις,
 καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις βίοις νικῶσι τοὺς νόμους,²⁹ etc.

The author is fond of constructing long strings of short sentences, phrases or even individual words, which would not normally count as a sign of literary skill or linguistic competence. However, even these, mostly tedious, concatenations are not totally devoid of artistry. The individual items often appear in groups of three. The author is likely to have deliberately tried to achieve a certain symmetry. In some sentences he creates variation by rounding off an enumeration with a syntactically divergent, longer unit, such as the concluding infinitive phrase *περὶ ἐνδύσεως καὶ τροφῆς μὴ μεριμνᾶν* 9.6 (discussed above). By combining five tripartite sections he creates this elaborate structure in one passage (7.2; part of the quasi-periodic sentence discussed above):

ᾧ πάντα διατέτακται
 καὶ διόρισται
 καὶ ὑποτέτακται,

28 κοινήν was the reading of the *codex unicus*. Most recent editors prefer Maran's conjecture κοίτην (in his edition of 1752), which gives the meaning 'they provide a common table, not a common bed'. Maran thought that the antithesis between common table and common bed was intended as a defence against allegations of promiscuity, directed against the Christians; he compared Tert. *Apol.* 39.9 *omnia indiscreta sunt apud nos praeter uxores* 'among us all things are common except wives' (with a following polemic). However, the sentence appears in a passage which is not primarily a defence of Christians against particular pagan accusations but which points out a series of paradoxical features of the Christians' own situation in the Roman society. It is not alien to the author's rhetorical style to exploit the double meaning of κοινός for a wordplay that highlights one of those paradoxes; he uses word-play also in *πᾶσα ξένη πατρίς ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, καὶ πᾶσα πατρίς ξένη* and *ἐν σαρκί ... οὐ κατὰ σάρκα*. With 'common table' the author of *Diogn* refers to the Eucharist. Justin (*Apol.* 66.2) also denies that the food and drink served at the Eucharist meal could be classified as something κοινόν: *οὐ γὰρ ὡς κοινὸν ἄρτον οὐδὲ κοινὸν πόμα ταῦτα λαμβάνομεν* 'we do not take this as ordinary bread or as ordinary drink'. In early Christian literature the adjective κοινός was used about 'impure' food and drink (*Ep. Rom.* 14.14–17, *Act. Ap.* 10.14, 11.8, Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 20.3, *Proteuangelium Iacobi* 12; cf. BDAG, s.v. κοινός 2b), so the readers of *Diogn.* would easily understand its intended meaning here. Cf. Otto 1852, 106 and Blomqvist and Blomqvist (forthcoming) [2014], n. 73.

29 'They live in their own countries, but as expatriates; | they take part in everything as citizens and endure everything as aliens; | every foreign country is their homeland and every homeland is foreign; | they marry like everyone and have children, but they do not throw away their offspring; | they provide a common table but not common food; | they exist in the flesh but do not live according to flesh; | they spend their lives on earth but are citizens in heaven; | they are obedient to the established laws but surpass the laws with their ways of life.'

οὐρανοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν οὐρανοῖς,
 γῆ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῆ,
 θάλασσα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσει,
 πῦρ,
 ἀήρ,
 ἄβυσσος,
 τὰ ἐν ὕψει,
 τὰ ἐν βάθει,
 τὰ ἐν τῷ μεταξύ.

Thus, the sentences of *Diogn.* mostly consist of strings of short cola, joined to each other either asyndetically or by the most common connective particles (καί, δέ), which do not specify their logical relationships. The preferred style of composition is an extreme form of the λέξις εἰρομένη. The preponderance of short cola allows the author to embellish the text with a variety of rhetorical figures, in particular isocola, homoioteleuta, anaphora, and similar devices. The series of short units are also arranged in a way that avoids the monotony of plain enumerations and reveals the author's artistic ambitions.

In a few cases the author has created sentences that come close to periods but are partly constructed from the same strings of short units that dominate most of the text. The author is likely to have been acquainted with periodic sentence structures (λέξις κατεστραμμένη), but in his text they are virtually absent, whether by deliberate choice or not.

Models and parallels

The rhetorical ambitions of *Diogn.* are immediately clear to the reader. From the very beginning, when *Diogn.* became known to scholarship, those qualities were noticed. It was also recognized that *Diogn.* was different, in that respect, from a number of other early Christian writings. The writers of the New Testament and the Apostolic Fathers offered nothing like it, and the commentators found no obvious parallels in the writings of the Apologists either. The *codex unicus* ascribed the text to Justin Martyr but stylistic differences became an important argument against Justinian authorship.³⁰

When searching for stylistic parallels to *Diogn.*, earlier commentators often pointed to Clement of Alexandria.³¹ Just like *Diogn.*, Clement's writings reveal the rhetorical schooling of their author. However, Clement differs stylistically from *Diogn.* The sentence structures consisting of short, more or

30 The definitive rejection of Justin as the author of *Diogn.* came with Otto's third edition of the text in 1879. Cf. the discussion of the linguistic evidence in Otto 1852, 36–41. Cf. also Jefford 2013, 102–03.

31 e.g. Geffcken 1924, 350, Geffcken 1928, v and 13, Meecham 1949, 62–4.

less artistically, arranged cola that dominate in *Diogn.* do not appear with such frequency in Clement. His sentence construction is more varied, and periods are not a rarity in his texts. He is well acquainted with the usual rhetorical figures but, also in that area, he is more varied than *Diogn.* and uses such devices with more moderation.

Clement was also influenced, not only stylistically but also as regards linguistic details, by the Atticist movement,³² while *Diogn.* was not. While Clement's prose abounds with duals and optatives, such Atticist niceties are next to absent from *Diogn.*³³ Other characteristics of Atticism do not appear either.³⁴ On the contrary, *Diogn.* exemplifies a number of features denounced as non-Attic by the 2nd-century Atticist lexicographer Phrynichus. These include the lexical-morphological items ἦτω (for ἔστω in 12.7), καθάρας (for καθήρας in 2.1), γενηθῶμεν, γεν[ν]ηθείς(?) (9.1, 11.2, with a passive aorist instead of medium γενόμεθα, etc.),³⁵ πάντοτε (for διὰ παντός *vel. sim.* in 11.4) and τυγχάνουσιν (for τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες in 2.1, 5.8 and 10.7). If we can trust the manuscript in these matters, *Diogn.* always prefers a non-Attic phonology in words like θάλασσα (16 instances),³⁶ γίνομαι/γινώσκω (six times), and σήμερον (11.5). Clement, on the other hand, uses the aorist ἐκάθηρα and the imperative ἔστω (ἦτω only in quotations) and varies between -σσ- and -ττ- and between γιν- and γιγν-. At least he knew the Attic rules and sometimes respected them. Thus, although both writers had a rhetorical education, the author of *Diogn.* does not exemplify the same literary and rhetorical tradition as Clement.

More relevant material became available for comparison when Campbell Bonner published his reconstruction of a sermon by Melito of Sardis, delivered on the occasion of an Easter celebration.³⁷ The text was improved considerably when Papyrus Bodmer XIII was published by Testuz in 1960.³⁸ The same dominant, conspicuous rhetorical devices are manifest in this text, too, just as in *Diogn.* The sentence structure is dominated by short units. Pairs or strings of isocola, homoioteleuton, and antitheses are plentiful, and rhetorical figures embellish the text. Series of exclamations and rhetorical questions occur, anaphora abounds. The general character of the style may be illustrated by sentences such as these:

32 On the necessary distinction between style (λέξις) and language (φράσις) see Norden 1915, 349–51, Fabricius 1967, 187, n. 2.

33 On linguistic and stylistic differences between the 2nd-century Apologists and Clement see Wifstrand 1962, 63–4 and Fabricius 1967, 195.

34 Except for some potential optatives (2.3 (*bis*), 2.4, 2.10 (*bis*), 3.3, 3.4, 7.3, 8.3), the 'principal markers' of Atticist usage enumerated by Horrocks 2010, 138, are absent from *Diogn.*

35 The thematic aorist ἐγενόμην etc. occurs nine times in *Diogn.*

36 *Diogn.* has ἐλαττούμενον once (10.6), but that verb never occurs with -σσ-; cf. BDR, § 34:1b.

37 Bonner 1940.

38 See Testuz 1960.

2.7–12: οὕτως ἐστὶν καινὸν καὶ παλαιόν,
 αἰδῖον καὶ πρόσκαιρον,
 φθαρτὸν καὶ ἄφθαρτον,
 θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον τὸ τοῦ πάσχα μυστήριον.

71.494–504: οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀμνὸς ὁ φονευόμενος·
 οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀμνὸς ὁ ἄφωνος·
 οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τεχθεὶς ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς καλῆς ἀμνάδος·
 οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐξ ἀγέλης λημφθεὶς,
 καὶ εἰς σφαγὴν συρεῖς,
 καὶ ἐσπέρας τυθεῖς,
 καὶ νύκτωρ ταφεῖς,
 ὁ ἐπὶ ξύλου μὴ συντριβεῖς,
 εἰς γῆν μὴ λυθεῖς,
 ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστάς,
 καὶ ἀναστήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τῆς κάτω
 [ταφῆς.

In particular the latter example illustrates how Melito, just like *Diogn.*, avoids monotony by varying his expression. The result is a sentence structure reminiscent of the portion of *Diogn.* 7.2 quoted above. Just like *Diogn.*, Melito creates variation in what might have become a monotonous enumeration by concluding it with a colon longer than the immediately preceding ones.³⁹ On the other hand, Melito's predilection for anaphora sometimes results in immoderately long sequences of similar cola, e.g. in 93.680–91 (12 cola starting with forms of *πικρός*) or 103.769–79 (11 occurrences of *ἐγώ*). These have no counterpart in *Diogn.* Melito also uses more metaphorical language. That was a characteristic of the Hellenistic variety of Asianism.⁴⁰

When Melito's sermon first became known, scholars expected to find its stylistic models among the Biblical texts. The *parallelismus membrorum*, which is a common feature of the poetic texts of the Old Testament, seemed similar to the bipartite, antithetical sentences of Melito. However, in an important article from 1948, Wifstrand demonstrated that there was a fundamental difference between the sermon and Biblical poetry: in the Biblical texts, the members of the parallel pairs are normally not antithetical but express the same thought twice over, while Melito's sentence pairs display a sophisticated formal parallelism that is, on the whole, lacking in the Biblical parallels. The short cola with antithetical content, of equal length and with assonances rather belong to the Greek – i.e. non-Jewish and non-Christian – rhetorical tradition often denoted as Asianism, a term that seems to have been coined

39 Cf. *Diogn.* 9.6 (quoted above).

40 Norden 1915, 137.

as a deprecatory designation for a stylistic school that stood in opposition to Atticism. The Asianic style originates from the experiments of the earliest known Greek rhetoricians, Gorgias of Leontini and his immediate followers. It had a vogue in the Hellenistic period when it dominated oratory, but its stylistic ideals were condemned by the Atticist movement and it gradually went out of fashion. Still, in the 2nd century AD there were Greek writers whose style was clearly influenced by Asianism. They included Maximus of Tyre, Polemo, Lucian in his declamations, and the authors of a couple of orations wrongly attributed to Dio Chrysostom in the manuscript tradition (nos. 37, probably by Favorinus, and 64, possibly by Herodes Atticus).

Melito's sermon and *Diogn.* show traces of having been influenced by the stylistic ideals of Asianism. Wifstrand, in his article, mentions only chs. 11–12 of *Diogn.* and describes them as 'part of a sermon that is added as an appendix' to the main text and as written in 'a style very closely akin to that of Melito'.⁴¹ The same could be said about chs. 1–10 of *Diogn.* Later commentators recognize the stylistic and rhetorical affinity of *Diogn.* with Melito and with the second sophistic.⁴² It is possible to find influence of such stylistic ideals also in other early Christian texts, e.g. in Polycarp's writings and the homilies of Asterius of Amasea.⁴³

Diogn. and, in particular, Melito represent a rather extreme form of Asianism. The characteristic features of the style are unusually prominent in the two texts. In the texts of pagan writers of the 2nd century which they have been compared to, the typical stylistic devices are used with more restraint and discretion. The style of Melito is suitable for a sermon to be delivered before devotees of the same faith as the speaker. Its emotional language is apt to affect the audience only if they are positively predisposed to the message. The style is for oral performance, both in a pagan and in a Christian context, and not primarily for a written pamphlet such as *Diogn.* Its author is likely to have been inspired both by his rhetorical training and by Christian preachers. It is even possible that he took over portions of actual sermons and included them within his own text, after adapting them only partially for a different purpose.⁴⁴

41 Wifstrand 1948, 219. Also Jefford 2013, 57 notes the similarity of Melito's homily with chs. 11–12. In Wifstrand 1962, 63–4, chs. 11–12 do not seem to be distinguished as a separate part of the text.

42 e.g. Jefford 2013, 6, 97–8.

43 On Polycarp see Hill 2006; on Asterius see Kinzig 1997, 648–50.

44 On chapters 11–12 as part of a sermon see Wifstrand 1948, 219. Jefford (2013, 33–42, 111–26) argues that not only chapters 11–12 but also other extensive portions of *Diogn.* originate from orally performed texts.

Conclusion

The style of *Diogn.* and its literary qualities have usually been highly praised by the commentators. Marrou is probably the most enthusiastic among them, when he claims that educated readers could be ‘séduits par l’élégance et la simplicité de sa langue, par l’art très adroite qui utilise sans effort les ressources de la rhétorique traditionnelle et, pour tout dire, par la beauté du style.’⁴⁵ Meecham speaks of a ‘language at once simple and stately’ and a ‘style throughout ... elegant and graceful’ and quotes verdicts of others such as ‘among the finest remains of Christian antiquity’ (Neander), ‘the noblest of all Christian writings’ (Lightfoot), and ‘indisputably, after Scripture, the finest monument we know of sound Christian feeling, noble courage, and manly eloquence’ (Bunsen).⁴⁶ Also later commentators with a theological or clerical background make similar comments.⁴⁷ Even leading classicists clearly saw such merits in the text. Eduard Norden, in his *Die antike Kunstprosa*, after denouncing another Apologist (Theophilus) for serious failings in ‘Inhalt, Disposition, Stilistik und Sprache’, declares that *Diogn.* ‘nach allen diesen Gesichtspunkten zu dem Glänzendsten gehört, was von Christen in griechischer Sprache geschrieben ist’, and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff in his *Griechisches Lesebuch* chose *Diogn.* as an appropriate illustration of early Christian literature.⁴⁸

A discordant note is struck by Johannes Geffcken. In an early work on the Apologists he calls *Diogn.* ‘dieses leichte Machwerk’, characterized by ‘Abgedroschenheit’, although at the same time dutifully paying reverence to Norden. His characterizations of passages in *Diogn.* in his edition of 1928 range from ‘immerhin ... etwas eintönig’ to ‘eine durch starke Antithesen, Variationen u. dgl. Rhetorika bis zum Übermass aufgeputzte Ausführung’. Geffcken describes the author as one to whom ‘das Sachliche nur als Fundament für seine Formalistik dient’ and who ‘allen Fleiss wesentlich darauf verwendet, dem Ganzen ein formell möglichst vollkommenes Äusseres zu geben’.⁴⁹

The last two quotations are strangely reminiscent of Denniston’s verdict on Gorgias: ‘Starting with the initial advantage of having nothing in particular to say, he was able to concentrate all his energies upon saying it.’⁵⁰ Geffcken

45 Marrou 1965, 90.

46 Meecham 1949, 3, 13.

47 e.g. ‘seine Bildung zeigt sich schon an seiner glänzenden Rhetorik’ (Wengst 1984, 305), ‘das hohe sprachliche Niveau’ (Lindemann and Paulsen 1992, 304), ‘highly educated, rhetorically trained’ (Ehrman 2003, 126), ‘its lucid and flowing style reflects the abilities of an educated author’, ‘educated literary style’ (Jefford 2013, 3, 14).

48 Norden 1915, 513, n. 2, Wilamowitz 1902-1908, I:2, 356-63, II:2, 225-7.

49 Geffcken 1907, xli. The following quotations are from Geffcken 1928, iv (n. 3), vi, 14, and 17.

50 Denniston 1952, 12.

obviously says something essential about the author of *Diogn.*, also in this respect he continued the tradition of Gorgias; form was at least of equal importance to him with content.

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Hermogenes' *On Staseis*: rhetoric as legal philosophy

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The aim of this article is to shed some light on certain points of Hermogenes' work *On Staseis*. These points, in my opinion, show that behind the practical orientation of the rhetorical theory of this work, rhetoric emerges as a philosophy of law.

The most basic new feature in Hermogenes' treatment of the subject of *stasis* is the full-scale adoption of the method of division¹ which pertains to the whole system. Through a series of dichotomies he connects the different *staseis* and creates a subordinating system in which 12 *staseis* derive from their previous ones and ultimately from the first *stasis* of conjecture.² Hermagoras' system was, as far as we can tell, a coordinating system, and his four main *staseis* were placed on the same level.³ Hermogenes also proceeds to the division of each *stasis* into *kephalaia*, heads of arguments, which constitute the basis for a full exposition of legal arguments in a dispute. This method of division, via which Hermogenes moves downwards step by step until he pinpoints the relevant *stasis* for any given case, is regarded as bearing traces of a Stoic influence, while the general approach to the basic four traditional *staseis* is considered as following Aristotle's list of four judgments.⁴ At the

1 See the remark (at the very beginning of the first chapter of his work *On Staseis*) that there are many important elements which constitute rhetoric, and that the most important of them is what has to do with division and demonstration. Hermogenes seems to imply that demonstration without division is unthinkable. He explains that he does not mean either the division of rhetoric into its genres or the division of a speech into its parts, and continues: 'The present discussion deals with the division of political questions (*politika zetemata*) into what are known as heads (*kephalaia*). This subject is almost identical with the theory of invention, except that it does not include all the elements of invention'. The translation is that of Heath. See Heath 1995. If I do not mention the origin of the translation, then the translation is my own. That the method of division must be carefully applied so that it will result in correct divisions is clearly stated (see 68. 2–4). At the same time, when Hermogenes proceeds to a wider explanatory discussion, he feels the need to clarify that at this point he does not follow the principle of division: 'We have made these comments not as a division... but just so as to indicate the nature of the heads' (67. 20–1); see also 81. 15–16; 86. 15–17.

2 See Lindberg 1997, 1979–2021, cf. 1991. See also Heath 1995, 71; Kennedy 1994, 209–11; Kennedy 1983, 83.

3 Hermagoras is generally regarded as the father of the system; see Lindberg 1997, 1991; Nadeau 1959, 52–71, cf. 67. Mathes 1958, 58–204, cf. 165. The basic four-part system of *staseis* attributed to Hermagoras (which Hermogenes incorporated into his own) included: *stochasmos*, conjecture (about the facts: did it happen in fact?), *horos*, definition (there is an agreement that something happened, but how can we define the act?), *poiotes*, quality (the examination is about the quality of the act: is it just, good, etc?), *metalepsis*, objection (objections of a procedural character: is the case judged by the right person, at the right time, etc?).

4 See Aristotle, *Topics* 100a20–02b26. See also Jaeneke 1904, 27–78; Nadeau 1959, 67; Nadeau 1959a, 248–54; Lindberg 1997, 1991.

same time, however, one cannot deny that above all Hermogenes' system 'represents a practical approach, useful for the student who has just chosen a case on which to produce a declamation', as Lindberg has put it.⁵

Hermogenes makes clear from the beginning of his introduction that his discussion is concerned with the division of 'political questions' into 'heads of arguments'. It is obvious from the definition of 'political question', as well as from the explanations he gives and the nature of the examples he adduces, that his thoughts are focused on judicial rhetoric, while the deliberative rhetoric – which is supposed to be also covered by this theory – has only a very limited role in the system. The first step is to explain what a 'political question' is: 'It is a logical dispute on a particular matter which is arising under the established laws or customs of any given society and is concerned with what is considered to be just, with what is honourable, what is advantageous, or all of these together or some of them' (29. 1–4). Immediately after this he points out that 'it is not the function of rhetoric to investigate what is in reality and universally honourable or advantageous or things like these'.

Hermogenes does not mention philosophy here, but when he makes the distinction between the particular and the general, the specific and the universal, in connection with his discussion of rhetoric, he implicitly differentiates philosophy from rhetoric. Philosophy addresses theoretical issues and seeks what is just, honourable, and advantageous in a universal sense. Rhetoric obviously deals with the particular case at hand; but what does it mean when Hermogenes says that it is not rhetoric's function to investigate these (or other similar) topics in general terms? Hermogenes, in my opinion, does not attribute this function to philosophy alone in this statement. Rhetoric also deals with theoretical and general questions in various cases and one such case appears in the course rhetoric follows when educating young orators. The most advanced preliminary exercises (*progymnasmata*)⁶ included the *thesis*, where one had to support or refute a general position, e.g. whether one should teach rhetoric or whether there are many worlds. The next step for the student was to deal with a *hypothesis*,⁷ in which concrete circumstances were specified (e.g. whether Aristotle should teach rhetoric in the Academy) and which, for that reason, was regarded as more difficult. Moreover, in his discussion on the *staseis* later on, Hermogenes includes *thesis* as a head of an argument in which the particular case is supported on the basis of a general principle.⁸ Thus, it seems that what Hermogenes means is that rhetoric does

5 Lindberg 1997, 1991 and n. 91.

6 See Kennedy 1994, 202–07; Kennedy 2003; Heath 2003, 129–60.

7 On thesis and its relation to hypothesis see Thorm 1932; Matthes 1958, 123–32; Heath 1995, 18.

8 See e.g. *On Staseis* 49. 15–19; 67. 13–17.

not regard the theoretical discussions on general subjects as its main task, as an end in itself, but that it deals with them as far as they are practically useful for defending a particular case either in education or in actual disputes.

This well-known focus of rhetoric on the particular cases is stressed here in connection with special reference to law and justice. The specific dispute that rhetoric has to settle arises in the context of a certain society which functions on the basis of its own laws and customs. This dispute is about what is considered just, about what is honourable, etc. Hermogenes does not speak of 'what is just' (as he does in the case of the honourable and the advantageous), but of 'what is considered to be just', which is equivalent to 'what the enacted laws regard as just', as some of his scholiasts also assert.⁹ At the same time, Hermogenes does not explicitly include 'the just' in the list of topics that are not investigated in general terms by rhetoric.¹⁰ It is obvious that, when mentioning 'what is regarded as just', Hermogenes makes a distinction between law and 'what is really just'. He also seems to accept that, when we speak of the honourable and the advantageous, the general background against which they are judged in each particular case is that of the society's laws and customs, whilst in the case of 'the just' this general background appears to be threefold: that of the customs, that of the enacted laws and that of a more general investigation about justice, i.e. the one that allows the orator to refer to universal law or the law of nature. Since Aristotle himself had left open the possibility that an orator could take refuge in the notion of universal law, given that the laws of the city were against his case,¹¹ we are entitled to suppose that Hermogenes' intention here was not to deprive the orators of such a possibility, as his scholiast seems to believe.¹² Besides, some of the *nomikai staseis*, e.g. (see *rheton kai dianoia*, letter and intent or *sylogismos*, assimilation) are possible exactly because a more general interpretation of law is possible.

If we accept the previous interpretation of Hermogenes' words in his definition of 'political question', then the interplay between the general and the particular becomes more prominent in the case of judicial rhetoric, because it may seek its arguments (*pro et contra*) outside the field of established laws

9 Walz, 1833; see 74 for the scholia of Syrianus and 80 for the similar ones of Sopatrus.

10 One could argue that *ta toiauta*, things like these, include also 'the just', but we cannot ignore the fact that Hermogenes avoids mentioning it explicitly.

11 See Aristotle *Rhetoric* I 13, 1373b2–18.

12 In his scholia to Hermogenes' *On Staseis* Sopatrus writes that what is just in a city is defined on the basis of law and asserts that 'the orators do not follow what is just by nature, but the just enacted by law; but philosophers deal with the former; for what has prevailed by law (in a given city) is not necessarily in accord with what is just by nature'. See Walz 1833, 80. Sopatrus accepts that Hermogenes makes the distinction between what is just by nature (law of nature) and what is just by convention (enacted law). This distinction (in a political context) goes back to Aristotle; on this distinction and the possibly different meaning of 'natural right' in Aristotle from the meaning the term took later in the Stoics see Johnston 2011, 78 ff.

or customs, where the dispute arose, in the more general sphere of what is universally right. In rhetoric, however, as Hermogenes seems to accept in his discussion about persons and acts, the probative value of an argument is directly proportional to its degree of concreteness and specificity. This is the reason why determinate proper names, for example, have greater argumentative force than simple appellative terms, such as general, politician, etc.¹³ This means that the rhetorical arguments gradually lose their force as they become more and more general, and they move away from the particular case under investigation. At the same time, however, Hermogenes does not fail to add that one ‘should assess the force of each and use it as occasion allows’. By this position he confirms that particular instances govern rhetorical argumentation, and that the particular case is the beginning and the end of any rhetorical theory. At the same time he mitigates the rigidity of his own rule and appears to advocate the rather relativist position that the probative value of the general and/or the particular cannot be absolutely fixed by any rule and that it ultimately depends on the occasion. But, if this is the case, then, what is the place of *stasis theory* in this interplay between the general and the specific, the universal and the particular? Besides, what is the place of law in this *stasis* system, given that the application of the law encounters similar problems (see e.g. the connection between a general law and a particular case)?

Hermogenes believes that the method of division can answer these questions. It is his conviction that division can solve the problem of rhetoric’s scientific approach to its subject. I think that this conviction of his (irrespective of the influences one can discern in his practical application of the method) could be the result of a rather direct Platonic influence. Plato believes that it is only through dialectic, and especially through its branch of division, that the person who aspires to become an orator can proceed in an artful way and become a successful orator.¹⁴ The fact that division is the sole method used in *On Staseis*, as well as some explicit relevant statements of Hermogenes make it clear, in my opinion, that he shares this Platonic conviction.¹⁵

Hermogenes does not apply division to the greatest matter of rhetoric, i.e.

13 See *On Staseis*, 29. 17–30, 9.

14 See Pl. *Phaedrus* 271C–72B.

15 See n. 1 above. Compare also, for example, *Phaedrus* 266B ‘Believe me, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover of these divisions and collections, that I may gain the power to speak and to think...’ and *On Staseis* 35. 2–5 ‘but it is of course impossible for anyone who has not yet studied the pure division of questions into the so-called heads, or who is unfamiliar with what are known as the issues of problems (i.e. *staseis*, which are again a product of divisions) to have a sound grasp of the things I have just mentioned’ (Heath’s translation). Or, again Plato’s warning against unnatural or incorrect divisions which is also found in Hermogenes; see *Phaedrus* 265E and *On Staseis* 35. 15–17. For Platonic influence on Hermogenes more generally see Wooten 1987, 131; North 1991, 201–19, cf. 216–18.

soul, as Plato demands, but he follows the tradition of rhetoric in this respect. In this tradition the orator used to form only a rough empirical idea about the 'type or types of soul' in the audience and was mainly concerned with the content of the speech and the way of presentation which were regarded as the main producers of persuasion. Moreover, in judicial oratory of the 2nd century AD, when the law system imposed stronger limitations on the members of a jury than in Classical times, discerning types of soul in this body of judges was not essential and what counted most was undoubtedly the quality of the legal arguments – under the condition of course that the judges were allowed to decide according to the law without any external pressure. Thus, Hermogenes had to use the method of division in order to construct a system that could help the orators pinpoint the subject with precision and find out the most relevant, strong and persuasive arguments in a given political and legal context.

The problem Hermogenes encountered was related to the nature of rhetorical subjects. He had to deal with a vast number of particular (practically uncountable) instances which could possibly become subjects of rhetorical investigation and declamation. First, he gathers all these particulars under the general term *politikon zetema*, political question. The division, however, which follows, cannot lead to a certain particular that is practically unknown in a theoretical examination of this kind. But even if it were known, a division that could lead to a full definition of the particular case by enumerating all the inherent characteristics that connect it to the general category would be of little practical use, since it could lack reference to the wider social, political, and legal contexts, and, besides, it would require a new theory of pinpointing particular arguments for or against. The solution to this problem was twofold. First, various criteria related to social context were used as a basis for the divisions employed and, secondly, the divisions did not end in a particular case, but in what was called *kephalaia*, or heads of arguments. The heads of arguments are also general notions with a certain degree of abstractness, but Hermogenes tries to show that dividing a 'political question' into its *staseis*, and each *stasis* into *kephalaia*, is the best way to approach theoretically a particular case and relate the heads of arguments to the specific demands of this case.

Before proceeding to the division of a 'political question' into *staseis*, Hermogenes makes some preliminary clarifications which he regards as necessary for a clear understanding of the divisions of questions into heads. One such preliminary but basic division is that of 'political questions' into *synestota*, those that are capable of *stasis* (they have an issue) and can be divided into heads, and *asystata*, asystatic questions, those that are not capable of *stasis* (they do not have issue). To these basic groups he also adds a third

group consisting of questions that are *close to being asystata*, near *asystatic*, (they are *almost* lacking issue).¹⁶ Hermogenes enumerates the conditions that a ‘political question’ must satisfy in order to be capable of *stasis*, i.e. in order to be a possible subject of a rhetorical investigation/declamation.¹⁷ In this connection it is important to note the new points which Hermogenes seems to have introduced into the system. He brings forward eight types of *asystatic* questions: *one-sided*, *wholly equivalent*, *reversible*, *insoluble*, *implausible*, *impossible*, *disreputable*, *uncircumstantial*. If the reconstruction of Hermagoras’ system is correct,¹⁸ then he had provided four *asystatic* questions: *deficient*, *one-sided*, *wholly equivalent*, *insoluble*. Hermogenes’ innovation includes not only the addition of four more types, but also the enrichment of the criteria employed in this division. He changed the first part of the list of *asystatic* questions by adding the *reversible* and taking away the *deficient* (*one-sided*, *wholly equivalent*, *reversible*, *insoluble*). Then he formed the second part of the list by adding the rest of them (*implausible*, *impossible*, *disreputable*, *uncircumstantial*) and absorbing the *deficient* into what he called *aperistaton*, *uncircumstantial*. It is true that the first half of the list includes *asystatic* questions which can be easily justified by reference to their lack of compliance with the conditions prescribed.¹⁹ The addition of the new four types, however, created some problems with classification and this is the main reason why Hermogenes’ treatment of *asystatic* questions has been regarded as an unsatisfactory ‘body of theory’.²⁰ What is a problem from a clearly theoretical point of view, however, becomes an advantage when seen from the point of view of a practically oriented classification. Hermogenes’ criteria are in fact concerned in part with the resources offered for argumentation and in part with the potential conclusion.²¹ The first four types, however, seem to focus more on the lack of arguments that results from the specific circumstances of the case at hand, while in the four last *asystatic* questions the focus is more on the wider social context, which plays a significant role in the invalidation of the argumentation. In Hermogenes’ examples, the *implausible* question (Aristides acts unjustly), for example, is invalid not because Aristides

16 *On Staseis* 31. 19–34, 15.

17 See the relevant discussion in Heath 1995, 66–70. The conditions mentioned (31, 19–32, 9) are the following: (i) The questions include person and act or one of them, (ii) There are persuasive arguments on both sides that (a) are different from those of the other party, and (b) have probative force, and (iii) the verdict (which is to be pronounced by the jury) is (a) not self evident, (b) not prejudiced, and (c) not unreachable.

18 Nadeau 1959, 66–71.

19 See n. 17 above.

20 See the discussion in Heath 1995, 67.

21 Heath 1995, *ibid.*

could not have proceeded to an unjust act under certain circumstances, but because people cannot be persuaded that such a man proceeded to such an act.²² The term used for the last *asystatic* question, *uncircumstantial*, denotes the absence not only of more general circumstances but also of necessary particular circumstances that could give rise to relevant arguments and result in a resolution being reached. The fact that Hermogenes abandons the term *deficient* and uses the broader term, *aperistaton*, *uncircumstantial* (if he was the one who originally introduced the term) illustrates, I think, the point of view from which he approached the matter of *asystatic* questions. He seems to point out the power of society's convictions as to what is implausible, impossible, or disreputable and the impact of these convictions on the validation or invalidation of relevant arguments. Moreover, the introduction of these new *asystatic* questions (as well as that of the near *asystatic* ones) in this period, when law literature was increasing²³ and a systematic exposition of the elements of Roman law appeared,²⁴ could probably be the rhetorician's reaction to the new developments in the field of law.²⁵ It would be catastrophic for a professional orator, an *advocatus*, if he did not recognize the *asystatic* nature of a question and tried to build arguments, for or against the case at hand, which would ignore the peculiarity of the situation.

Hermogenes' major division is of course that which discerns the *staseis* and their relation to each other. He applies the method of division, as it was introduced by Plato, as faithfully as he can.²⁶ He starts from the general class *politikon zetema* and then, taking as his basis the possible nature of the *krinomenon*, the subject which is being examined, he devises a division of the whole class into two mutually exclusive sub-classes; these sub-classes are distinguished by the fact that one possesses a certain characteristic while the other lacks it. Then he repeats the procedure by dividing the sub-class which possesses the characteristic (in a tree-like representation it would be on the right) in the same way into two parts, and so on. The sub-class or any subdivision which does not permit further division (in principle the ones to the

22 The difference between *implausible* and *impossible* is clear I think. The *impossible* refers to cases which simply, according to reason or common belief, do not exist. For a rather different view see Heath 1995, 67.

23 Emmett 2008, 114–62, cf. 118–19.

24 See Muirhead 1880.

25 This point obviously needs further investigation, but there is evidence for other changes in rhetorical theory which seem to have been introduced as a consequence of the rhetoricians' need to adapt their theory to contemporary court practice. See Heath 2003a, 1–91, cf. 19–23.

26 Plato elaborates on his method of division in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. See cf. the *Sophist* 218D–237A.

left) constitutes the *staseis* of a *politikon zetema*.²⁷ In this way he distinguishes 13 *staseis*.²⁸

The whole system of *staseis* represents the structure of social reality and the place of law within it, as it is understood by a rhetorician. Above everything there is the level of existence (*stochasmos*) and then the rest (of the levels) dependent on it follow: that of placing something that exists in a class (*horos*) in order for men to understand it and be certain that they speak of the same thing; that of the qualities of the thing under discussion (*poiotes*), which are understood as either inherent to it in some way (*logike*) or as imposed on it by a legal provision (*nomike*). From that point onwards, reality becomes the very concrete one of the law courts. With the exception of *pragmatike*,²⁹ all the divisions and subdivisions of *logike* try to put the complex net of intentions and subjective understanding that covers the human acts into some order. They bring together into one system various manifestations of a basic human tendency that gives rise to various argument strategies or, from another point of view, a tendency that sheds more light on the acts that are under legal investigation. It is the psychological tendency which tries to give moral content to a bad act through the belief that the victim deserved the punishment, that somebody else bears the responsibility for one's deeds, or that the wrong act was a departure point for great benefit. The final point of this course is the *stasis* of *syngnome*, where the accused asks for forgiveness and practically employs his last argument by addressing his fellow man's feelings of pity and expecting the punishment to be mitigated. On the other hand, the division of *nomike* does not follow the pattern of successive subdivisions into two parts anymore, but is directly divided into four *staseis* (or five if we also count the *metalepsis* here, which is first added at the end as if it is outside the system,

27 The lack of space does not allow me to present a diagram here. For an excellent diagram showing the whole system of Hermogenes' division with the branches leading to the right see Kennedy 1983, 83. *Phanes*, however (in the first division) and *teles* (in the second one) should be corrected to *phaneron* and *teleion* respectively.

28 Kennedy counts 14 *staseis* in his diagram. In the same way many later Greek commentators count 14 *staseis* in Hermogenes' system. Marcellinus, however, in his *Prolegomena* counts 13, because of the double meaning of *metalepsis*, objection (documentary and non documentary). See also Kennedy 1994, 210, n.

14. Hermogenes keeps the four basic *staseis* (*stochasmos*, *horos*, *poiotes*, *metalepsis*, see n. 3 above), but divides *poiotes* into two parts: *logike*, rational, and *nomike*, legal, and by subdividing both successively he brings forward the following *staseis* (in the order he treats them): *antilepsis*, *antistasis*, *antenglema*, *metastasis*, *syngnome*, *pragmatike*, *rheton and dianoia*, *sylogismos*, *antinomia*, *amphibolia*.

29 The only exception is the mention of *pragmatike*. *Logike* is divided into two branches on the basis of whether the subject which it deals with refers to the future or the past: if it refers to the future, the *stasis* is the *pragmatike* which is related to the deliberative genre; if it refers to the past, then we have *dikaialogia*, related to judicial rhetoric, which is not a *stasis*, since it is further subdivided.

and then treated separately).³⁰ The *nomikai staseis* actually comprise a rather exhaustive list of cases of legal argumentation, which is practically nothing but various cases of law interpretation. For the rhetoricians, law could not be simply applied without further discussion. Aristotle had already observed that the laws are necessarily expressed in general terms and because of that they apply to broad classes of deeds and wide groups of individuals.³¹ It is the judge, according to Aristotle, who will link the general provisions of law with the particular case at hand. But the rhetoricians never left this role to the official judges alone, and the interpretation of law was always a useful weapon when trying to defend their cases or when helping the judge dispense justice.

Through the system of *staseis* rhetoric recognizes that nothing can be certain or known beyond any doubt in social reality, that change predominates, and that everything has to be established in each case from the beginning, irrespective of the existing legal system. The laws which are an established and stable point of reference cannot be the point of departure in the process of administering justice. Moreover, the *stasis* system allows rhetoric to move effectively between the general and the particular, and helps justice administration to bridge the gap between the general law and the particular case. Consequently, Hermogenes' hierarchical system illustrates the steps which should be followed not only by the student of rhetoric who wants to be successful in his declamation, but also by the orator or judge who in practice tries to find out the truth behind a particular case and dispense justice.

³⁰ See on *metalepsis* *On Staseis* 42. 10–43, 7 and 79. 19–82, 3. The four *staseis* mentioned here are: *rheton* and *dianoia*, *sylogismos*, *antinomia*, *amphibolia*. See also n. 3 above about *metalepsis*.

³¹ Aristotle *Rhetoric* I 1, 1354a12–b22.

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Interpretatio and *inventio*:
the case of Servius' commentary
on Virgil's *Eclogues*¹

MATHILDE SKOIE

Views on the relationship between rhetoric, poetics, and hermeneutics have varied greatly throughout the ages, and the precise nature of this relationship is still a topic of debate. Similarly, the relationship between the Late Antique rhetorician and the Late Antique grammarian is complex and competitive. Despite different attitudes, it is uncontroversial to claim that the three disciplines and the two professions meet in the realm of *elocutio*; they share the technical vocabulary of style, figures and tropes. In this article, I want to argue that further exploration of common ground, namely that of *inventio*, may be worthwhile. I shall begin by opening up this avenue of research with a reading of two passages from what is perhaps the most important extant example of Late Antique literary criticism in Latin – Servius' commentary on Virgil.

Grammar, rhetoric and Servius

Grammar and rhetoric were fundamental parts of the ancient educational system. The *grammaticus* held an important position between that of the *litterator* and the *rhetor*.² While the *litterator* taught the students their basic knowledge of letters and the *rhetor* taught composition and how to deliver speeches, based inter alia on literary form and structure, the *grammaticus* held the middle ground, teaching both morphology, syntax, and the reading and interpretation of authors. Though the grammarian and *rhetor* shared the technical vocabulary of styles, figures and tropes, their perspectives on these differed. While the grammarian often treated figurative language as a deviation from normal language, the rhetorician treated it as ornament.³

1 I am grateful to Øivind Andersen for having reintroduced classical rhetoric as a teaching subject in Norway. Through teaching rhetoric these last years, first as an assistant on his course and later on my own, I have not only gained insight into a vital field, but also become a much better reader of ancient texts. Though Andersen himself leaves the chapter on poetics to the nestor of modern studies of ancient rhetoric, George A. Kennedy, in his book *I Retorikkens Hage (In the Garden of Rhetoric)*, I still hope the relationship between the two is a matter of interest to him as a literary scholar and rhetorician. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the University of Oslo, Anastasia Maravela and Tor Ivar Østmoe, for valuable help along the path through what sometimes seemed more like a rhetorical wood than a rhetorical garden.

2 On grammar and its development as well as the relationship between the *litterator*, *grammaticus* and *rhetor*, see Irvine 1994.

3 See e.g. Copeland and Sluiter 2009, 28–38.

Servius is the most famous Late Antique grammarian that we know of; he is even a character in Macrobius' fictional dialogue *Saturnalia*, where he is presented in the text as standing above the *plebeia grammaticorum cohors* (1.24.8).⁴ His most famous work is his huge commentary on Virgil, which is perhaps the most important work both in the history of Virgilian criticism and in the genre of literary commentaries in the first millennium. His work has had an impressive influence, particularly since his commentary physically framed almost every Renaissance edition of Virgil.⁵

Servius' style of commentary is perhaps surprisingly recognizable to the modern reader, though the technical vocabulary might not be so easily recognizable. After an introduction, the commentary follows a lemmatic form. Like many commentaries, his interest is more in the collection of interesting details than the pedagogical placement of these within a wider landscape, though it does not necessarily follow that there is no broader purpose behind the comments. His commentary is certainly magisterial in many senses of the word, though scholars have debated whether it is more directed towards teachers than pupils.⁶ In the commentary Servius' interest in a wide range of topics is illustrated, and he often gives more information than necessary.⁷ Robert Kaster lists the following categories: comments on 'punctuation, metre, uncertain readings, myth or other *Realien* and especially on the language'; he further remarks that the comments on language dwarf the others, representing two notes for every three.⁸ However, the category 'language' must be understood broadly and should include comments on figurative language and other issues that many would categorize as literary criticism.⁹ Likewise, as in modern commentaries, the commentary is peppered with references to parallel passages. Yet there is an important difference between Servius and modern commentaries which is worthy of note. His commentary was intended for an audience who used Latin as their main academic language, and thus his comments on proper usage were of more immediate relevance than they are today.

Scholarship on Servius has, for a long time, been meagre due to the

4 His method is also visible here, though Kaster 1988, 171–2, finds significant differences between this presentation and the actual commentary.

5 Cf. Wilson-Okamura 2010, 32.

6 Kaster 1988, 170 argues that the intended audience must have been *pueri*, while Marshall 1997, 20 and Stansbury in McDonough et al. 2004 argue for teachers.

7 On commentaries and *copia*, cf. Gumbrecht 1999. For a brief description of the concept of commentaries underlying the argument of this article, see Skoie 2002, 14–19.

8 Kaster 1988, 170. For another way of describing the range of topics, see the analysis of Servius' commentary on the first ten lines of the *Aeneid* in Marshall 1997, Appendix B.

9 Cf. Sharrock 2008.

complicated transmission of the text and the lack of modern editions.¹⁰ However, this situation is starting to change, and nuanced readings of different aspects of Servius are appearing – not least as a consequence of the rise of reception studies.¹¹ However, surprisingly little has been written so far on rhetoric or, indeed, on the commentary on the *Eclogues*.¹²

Although Servius' commentary has achieved exemplary status, his was not the only way of writing commentaries in Late Antiquity, nor were grammarians the only ones who were commenting on Virgil. Servius' near contemporary, the rhetor Tiberius Claudius Donatus, comments in the preface to his *Interpretationes Virgilianae*: 'If you adequately pay attention to Virgil's poetry and suitably understand its purpose, you will find in the poet a great *rhetor* and hence understand that *orators* especially should teach Virgil, not *grammatici*'.¹³ However, as I shall attempt to show, there is much more rhetoric in Servius than such a statement would indicate – even though Servius does not regard Virgil as a *rhetor*, but as a poet.

Servius' approach to the Eclogues

The intention of the *Eclogues* is, according to Servius' preface, to imitate Theocritus and 'in some places' to allegorically thank Augustus (*Intentio poetae haec est, ut imitetur Theocritum Syracusanum ... et aliquibus locis per allegoriam agat gratias Augustuo et aliis nobilibus, quorum favore amissum agrum recepit*).¹⁴ Thus, we have two rhetorical concepts at the core of Servius' approach: *imitatio* and *allegoria*.

10 The text of Servius that we have today is a conflation of Servius and what is called 'Servius auctus' or 'Servius Danielis'. On the textual transmission, see Murgia 1968. There is still no complete modern edition of Servius, the so-called 'Harvard Servius' so far consists only of the commentary on *Aen.* 1–5. Meanwhile Cambridge has reprinted the Thilo–Hagen edition from 1887 as late as 2011, and this is the edition used for the *Eclogues* in this article. This is also the text which is used on the Perseus website.

11 The main recent works on Servius were, for a long time, Kaster 1988 and Marshall 1997. However, a new trend seems to be emerging, the most recent example of which is Casali and Stok 2008. Likewise, the translation of Servius' commentary on *Aeneid* 4 has made parts of the commentary available to a completely new audience; see McDonough et al. 2004. For studies of Servius from the point of view of reception, see especially Patterson 1987, Fowler 1992, Thomas 2001 and Kaster 2012.

12 There are of course exceptions; Patterson 1987 and Thomas 2001 deal with Servius on the *Eclogues* in general, Zetzel 1984 focuses on history and – more specifically – Calcante 2011 deals with rhetoric in the *Eclogues* (*recusatio* in *Eclogue* 6).

13 *Si Maronis carmina competenter attenderit et eorum mentem congrue comprehenderit, invenies in poeta rhetorem summum atque inde intelleges Vergilium non grammaticos, sed oratores tradere debuisse.* Quoted from McDonough et al. 2004, XVIII.

14 In this article I refer only to passages from Servius, unless otherwise stated. All quotations from Servius are from the Thilo–Hagen edition, 1887/2011.

Imitatio is of course a key concept in poetics and in rhetorical pedagogy and practice. Aristotle's theory of mimesis is fundamental to the understanding of poetry in general. For the Latin poets, imitation or *aemulation* of Greek literature is essential. In rhetoric, imitation is considered by some as a separate fourth factor (in addition to nature, art, and training) in bringing the faculty of speech to perfection, and according to Quintilian imitation is an important part of the art of rhetoric.¹⁵ Servius' observation on imitation is important for his exposition of the *Eclogues*; this is evident in the intertextual references to Theocritus in the text. Allegory is, however, the rhetorical term that appears most frequently in the commentary to the *Eclogues* (15 times), and in general it is the rhetorical concept most discussed in relation to Servius.¹⁶ According to Servius, the allegorical dimension distinguishes Virgil's *Eclogues* from Theocritus' *Idylls* as it reveals more poetic complexity and is a sign of an urban or sophisticated poetics.¹⁷ In Servius' reading, allegory is primarily linked to the biographical reading of *Ecl.* 1, 2 and 9. According to Marshall, this reading 'did serious damage to subsequent readers of Virgil'.¹⁸ However, I tend to agree with Patterson, who thought that it was the critics who had been naïve.¹⁹ As stated above, Servius only reads Virgil allegorically in some places (*aliquibus locis*).²⁰ And in some places he explicitly rejects allegorization (e.g. at 1.28 and 3.20) or claims that you can read something allegorically or not (e.g. 1.27).

As a further key to Servius' general interpretation of the *Eclogues*, a third rhetorical topic is important – that of style or 'character' in Servian terminology. In his preface, Servius famously places the *Eclogues* in the lowest of the three styles, the humble style (*humilis*), while the *Aeneid* is written in the grand style (*grandiloquus*) and the *Georgics* in the medium style (*medius*). This generic label is an important premise for the further interpretation and is explicitly referred to in the later explanation of lemmata, e.g. on *Ecl.* 1.2 the *tenuis*

15 Cf. Quint. 3.5.1: *Facultas orandi consummator natura arte executione, cui partem quartam adiciunt quidam imitationis, quam nos subicimus.* ('The faculty of speech is brought to perfection by Nature, Art and Practice, some add a fourth factor, Imitation, but I include this under Art.' Trans. Russell, 2001).

16 Cf. e.g. Jones 1961 on Servius in general and Levis (1993) on Servius' *Eclogues*.

17 *Hoc autem fit poetica urbanitate* ('But his makes for a poetic urbanity', *prooem.*).

18 Marshall 1997, 22.

19 Patterson 1987, 35.

20 Even when it comes to a single character in the *Eclogues* he does not necessarily go for a consistent allegorical reading, as he famously comments on *Ecl.* 1.1: *... hoc loco Tityri sub persona Vergilium debemus accipere; non tamen ubique, sed tantum hoc exigit ratio.* ('Here we ought to read Virgil behind the character of Tityrus, though not always – only where this makes sense.')

avena is explained as a choice of instrument precisely because this should be understood within the framework of the humble style.²¹

On the level of figurative language, the rhetorical technical vocabulary is – not unsurprisingly – frequent. As is the case for most commentators at this time, Servius’ technical terms are those of Herennius and Quintilian. In several places he notes how expressions are simply figurative speech (*figurata ait*), without specifying the type of figure. Kaster notes how this phrase is often framed by the pedagogical *non debuit* (‘should not’) or *debuit enim dicere* (‘should have said’), but I do not find that this is the case to the same extent in the commentary on the *Eclogues*.²² Of the 12 instances of the phrase, none are framed by *non debuit* or its cognates, though some are paraphrased in ‘normal’ language. Kaster’s examples are all from the *Aeneid*. This might signify an interest in pointing out precisely the figurative quality rather than the ‘unorthodox’ usage, when it comes to the *Eclogues*. I would therefore like to suggest that this might be Servius’ way of underscoring his differentiation of the *Eclogues* and Theocritus’ *Idylls* and of supporting the idea of the *Eclogues* as poetically more complex and sophisticated.

The parallels listed might also indicate a rhetorical disposition. Cicero is mentioned about 20 times, and seven of these are references to his speeches. Of course mythology, history and colourful – perhaps even humorous remarks on everyday issues also fill up the commentary. *Eclogue* 6 in particular provides an opportunity to delve into mythology. In his lemma on the child in *Eclogue* 4.21, on the other hand, Servius exhibits a less learned tenor. He comments on the appropriateness of the baby being given milk: ‘after all, what is more apt for a child?’²³ On this occasion, however, I want to highlight the rhetorical tenor and Servius’ idea of Virgilian complexity in his general approach to the *Eclogues*.

21 In the explanation of the first lemma on *Ecl.* 3 he refers to another triad of *characteres*, this time *characteres dicendi* based on the type of narration in the tradition from Aristotle’s *Poetics*: *novimus tres characteres dicendi: unum in quo poeta loquitur ... alium dramaticum, in quo nusquam poeta loquitur ... tertium mixtum* (‘we know of three genres of narration, one in which the poet speaks ..., another dramatic where the poet never speaks ... and a third mixed’) and he places *Ecl.* 3 in the dramatic genre. He also uses more specific literary generic terminology when he labels *Ecl.* 4 a *genethliacon*.

22 Kaster 1988, 177 ff.

23 The writing on trees in *Ecl.* 5.13, today often considered an important metapoetic event, is similarly described as apt due to the rustic character of the speakers – *ubi enim debuit magis rusticus scribere?* (‘where else should a rustic write?’).

Inventio: two examples

So far I have shown that rhetorical theory is crucial to Servius' discussion of intention (imitation and allegory) and to his explanation of issues of language as understood in a broad sense (levels of style and figurative language). The basic canon of rhetoric present is, so far, that of *elocutio*. An exception to this is imitation, which in the rhetorical system is referred to most often as a pedagogical method and in poetics as a founding principle. Following on from the latter, imitation might also be regarded as part of *inventio*, as a generator of discourse. However, it may be fruitful to also look for traces of *inventio* in a more traditional sense, as I would like to argue in the following.

Inventio is most often defined as the technique of finding ideas and arguments to be used in a speech. In terms of modes of persuasion, this is primarily related to the realm of *logos* – proofs based on reasoning, analysis and argument. Stasis theory and topics fall under this heading. I will now focus on two instances in Servius where his analysis refers to issues that fall under this umbrella.

My first example is from Servius' commentary on *Ecl.* 1. This is the famous dialogue between the herdsmen Tityrus and Meliboeus. While Tityrus has been able to keep his land and now enjoys life in a leisurely state (*otium*) Meliboeus is driven away, and their different situations make up the topic of their conversation. Tityrus comments that a god gave him his *otium*. When Meliboeus questions Tityrus about who this god is, Tityrus answers in a rather roundabout way, starting with the city of Rome which he describes as follows (19–25):

Urbem quam dicunt Romam, Meliboee, putavi	
stultus ego huic nostrae similem, quo saepe solemus	20
pastores ovium teneros depellere fetus.	
sic canibus catulos similes, sic matribus haedos	
noram, sic parvis componere magna solebam.	
verum haec tantum alias inter caput extulit urbes	
quantum lenta solent inter viburna cupressi.	25

The city men call Rome I reckoned, Meliboeus,
Fool that I was, like this of ours, to which we shepherds
Are often wont to drive the weanlings of the ewes.
So puppies are like dogs, I knew, so kids are like
Their mother goats, so I'd compare big things to small.
But she has raised her head among the other cities
High as a cypress-tree above the guelder-rose.²⁴

²⁴ Text and translation Lee 1984.

Servius reads the poem in the context of the land confiscations and he reads Tityrus as Virgil in some, but not all instances, of this poem. In his comments on this passage he addresses the question of why Tityrus answers Meliboeus' question of who this god is with a description of Rome (19). He explains this either as a sign of the rustic simplicity of Tityrus, since 'he does not possess the perfect order of narration but addresses questions by long detours' (*ordinem narrationis plenum non teneat, sed per longas ambages ad interrogata descendat*), or because in order to describe a person you need to locate him in a place. In any case, according to Servius, we are dealing with a very long hyperbaton, *urbem quam dicunt Romam. hic illum vidi Meliboeae*. Very long, indeed, since the last part, *hic illum vidi, Meliboeae* does not come before verse 42! Yet what I want to focus on here is how Servius deals with the comparisons in vv.22–4:

[22] SIC CANIBUS CATULOS SIMILES SIC MATRIBUS HAEDOS N. S. P. C. M. S. vult urbem Romam non tantum magnitudine, sed etiam genere differre a ceteris civitatibus et esse velut quendam alterum mundum aut quoddam caelum, in qua deum Caesarem vidit. qui enim comparat cani catulum vel haedum capellae, magnitudinis facit, non generis differentiam; qui autem dicit, leo maior est cane, et generis facit et magnitudinis differentiam, sicut nunc de urbe Roma fecit. putabam, inquit, ante, ita Romam comparandam esse aliis civitatibus, ut solet haedus caprae comparari; nam quamvis maior esset, tamen eam civitatem esse ducebam: nunc vero probavi eam etiam genere distare; nam est sedes deorum. hoc autem eum dicere, ille comprobatur versus 'quantum lenta solent inter viburna cupressi': nam viburnum brevissimum est, cupressus vero arbor est maxima. hoc autem genus argumentationis et apud Aristotelem lectum est, et apud Ciceronem. COMPONERE comparare.

[22] SIC CANIBUS CATULOS SIMILES SIC MATRIBUS HAEDOS N.S.P.N. he means that the city of Rome differs from other cities not only in size, but also in kind and that it is like some other world or heaven in which he saw Caesar as god. For he who compares puppies to dogs or kids to mother goats is differentiating in size, but not kind. However, he who claims that a lion is bigger than a dog makes a difference both in kind and size as he now has done with Rome. I thought before, he says, that Rome could be compared to other cities in the same way as it is usual to compare a kid with a mother goat; for although it is bigger, I still thought it a city, but now I have seen for myself that it is also different in kind; for it is the seat of gods. That this is what he says is proven by this verse '*lenta solent inter viburna cupressi*', because a guelder-rose is very small while a cypress is a very tall tree. This is a type of argument found both in Aristotle and Cicero. COMPONERE compare.

These comparisons are not given any space in the most recent commentaries on the *Eclogues*, but here they are given much more space.²⁵ The fact that they are comparisons is highlighted by Servius in both the long paraphrase

25 By recent commentaries, I refer to Coleman 1977 in the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series (reprinted many times since then, most recently in 2003) and Clausen 1994.

and in the extra example. The essence, according to Servius' paraphrase, is that Tityrus realizes that Rome cannot be compared to other cities, because it is a kind of heaven, a home for gods. While the first comparisons are of size, the final comparison is a comparison of a hedge-shrub to a tree, and thus is of both size and kind (a similar comparison would be that of a lion and dog). His comment is rounded off with a reference to Cicero and Aristotle.

Comparison is the final topic in Cicero's *Topica* (68–71). Here he treats comparisons of the following categories: quantity, quality, value, and relation to things.²⁶ As I read Servius, his explanation of this passage follows Cicero's reasoning, especially that of quantity, though Cicero does not deal specifically with the issue of kind (*genus*). My point here, however, is not necessarily to prove a direct use of this Ciceronean passage, but only to point out the fact that Servius deals with topics at some length in his explanation of this poetic text, and given the amount of space he devotes to this passage, he obviously finds this important. This is moving far beyond the level of *elocutio* and into the realm of invention.

In his explanation of *Ecl.* 8, the issue is not comparison, but what Servius calls a 'syllogism'. This eclogue consists of the two songs by the shepherds Damon and Alpheisiboeus, introduced by a narrator who also dedicates the poem to an unnamed patron, probably Pollio. The shepherds' songs are both about love, the first includes ideas borrowed from Theocritus' *Id.* 3, while the latter is more closely modelled on Theocritus' *Id.* 2.1–62. Both songs are divided into stanzas with refrains. Damon sings about his love for Nysa, who is now to marry Mopsus. The seventh stanza of Damon's song deals with pitiless Love (47–50):

Saevus Amor docuit natorum sanguine matrem
 commaculare manus; crudelis tu quoque, mater:
 crudelis mater magis, an puer improbus ille?
 Improbus ille puer; crudelis tu quoque, mater.

Pitiless Love once taught a mother to pollute
 Her hands with blood of sons; you too were cruel, mother.
 Who was more cruel, the mother or that wicked boy?
 That wicked boy was; yet you too were cruel, mother.²⁷

²⁶ *numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio*, Cic. *Top.* 68.

²⁷ Text and translation in Lee 1984.

These lines, and in particular the final two, have puzzled commentators, primarily because of the triple repetition of *mater* and *crudelis*. Related to this is also the question of whether *mater* refers to the same person throughout the passage. This has troubled scholars to such an extent that textual corruption and suggested emendations.²⁸ Servius, however, defends the text and explains the passage rather extensively:

[47] SAEVUS AMOR DOCVIT quasi novam artem insinuavit et infudit. et bene fabulam omnibus notam per transitum tetigit: quis enim ignorat Medeam, ab Iasone contemptam, suos filios interemisse? utitur autem optima moderatione: nam nec totum Amori imputat, ne defendat parricidam, nec totum matri, ne Amo- rem eximat culpa; sed et illam quae paruit, et illum qui coegit, incusat.

[50] IMPROBUS ILLE PUER C. T. Q. M. non est superflua haec verborum iteratio: nam syllogismus est plenus, qui constat ex propositione, assumptione, conclusione.

[47] SAEVUS AMOR DOCVIT: As if he introduced and presented a new art. And he successfully alludes indirectly to a well-known story: for who does not know that Medea, scorned by Jason, killed her children? However, he uses an excellent moderation of this: for he neither ascribes all to Amor defending the killer of her own; nor does he ascribe all to the mother exempting Amor of guilt; but he accuses both her who obeyed and him who forced.

[50] IMPROBUS ILLE PUER C.T.Q.M. the repetition of words is not superfluous: for this is a full syllogism which consists of proposition, minor proposition and conclusion.

Servius assumes that *mater* refers to Medea throughout the passage, though Servius auctus here adds to his text that others also read *mater* as Venus (*alii hoc loco cum Amore matrem Venerem culpari volunt*). The final sentence in his lemma on 47 is a neatly and symmetrically balanced explication of the distribution of guilt between the two (*nec ... ne ...; nec ... ne ...*); and far from doubting any corruption, Servius calls this an ‘excellent moderation’ (*utitur autem optima moderatione*) of a well-known story.²⁹

In his comment on 50, Servius explicitly addresses the issue of repetition and argues that this is due to the fact that this is a syllogism. The term *syllogismus* in Latin is a rare term, but it is used to refer to a form of deductive reasoning in which a conclusion is drawn from two premises in tune with

28 For an overview of the situation, see Coleman 1977 and Clausen 1994 *ad loc.* Coleman clearly argues for textual corruption.

29 This is perhaps also an indication that Servius has understood the Callimachean nature of the use of mythology in the *Eclogues*, see Clausen 1994 *ad loc.*

Aristotelian logic.³⁰ Servius even goes on to make it clear that this is a perfect (*plenus*) syllogism which consists of three parts and is named according to the terminology used in Quintilian (5.14.5). Yet it might not be so clear to all his readers whether all the premises are explicitly there or whether we are dealing with an *enthymema* where the major premise is supposed. A possible syllogism could go like this:

P1: It is cruel to teach someone to commit parricide and it is cruel to perform parricide.

P2: Amor taught Medea to commit parricide and Medea committed parricide.

C: Amor and Medea are both cruel.

My point here is not necessarily to be convinced by Servius' interpretation or to figure out the exact nature of his idea of a syllogism or this syllogism, but rather to point out how he uses elements from the logical toolkit in his interpretation and exposition of this poem, and thus he moves far beyond the realm of *elocutio*.

In a similar way, Servius refers to logic in his explication of *Ecl.* 8.69. In this passage the other singer, Alpheisiboeus, refers to another mythological woman, this time to Circe. Since one might argue that the allusion to Medea is a rather dramatic comparison for Damon's beloved Nysa, one could claim that Circe's spells to get Daphnis home might be a bit over the top. Acknowledging this, Servius explains the allusion as an *argumentum a maiore ad minus* ('an argument from bigger to smaller'). In modern logic this is known as an argument *a fortiori*, and it may be traced back to Aristotle's topics (*Rh.* II 23, 1397b 12–19) and can be found in Cicero (*Top.* 23).

Further down the garden path?

In the chapter on poetics in Øivind Andersen's book *I Retorikkens Hage* ('In the Garden of Rhetoric'), George Kennedy remarks that in Late Antiquity poetics was simply looked upon as a kind of rhetoric. My brief discussion of Servius' commentary on the *Eclogues* clearly supports this claim. However, as I have tried to show, any further exploration of exactly how embedded his literary criticism is in the rhetorical tradition should not only focus on the acknowledged common ground of *elocutio*, but should also pursue the area of *inventio*. To stay within the metaphor of the title of Andersen's book, I hope this might be seen as an invitation to go further down precisely that garden path.

³⁰ *Syllogismus* is a post-Augustan term, e.g. used in Quint. 1.10.38 and 5.14.1. Cicero uses *ratiocinatio* for deductive reasoning in general, cf. *Inv. rhet.* 1.57.

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Kant, rhetoric, and *paideia*

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Kant is commonly seen as a hostile critic of rhetoric,¹ and for good reason, since in his writings we find several critical remarks on the subject. Most well known, perhaps, are two claims from the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* (*KdU*):

Die Beredsamkeit, sofern darunter die Kunst zu überreden, d.i. durch den schönen Schein zu hintergehen (als *ars oratoria*), und nicht bloße Wohlredenheit (Eloquenz und Stil) verstanden wird, ist eine Dialektik, die...die Gemüther vor der Beurtheilung für den Redner zu dessen Vortheil zu gewinnen und dieser die Freiheit zu benehmen...²

Beredtheit und Wohlredenheit (zusammen Rhetorik) gehören zur schönen Kunst; aber Rednerkunst (*I*) ist, als Kunst sich der Schwächen der Menschen zu seinen Absichten zu bedienen (diese mögen immer so gut gemeint, oder auch wirklich gut sein, als sie wollen), gar keiner Achtung würdig. ... Wer bei klarer Einsicht in Sachen die Sprache nach deren Reichthum und Reinigkeit in seiner Gewalt hat und bei einer fruchtbaren, zur Darstellung seiner Ideen tüchtigen Einbildungskraft lebhaften Herzensantheil am wahren Guten nimmt, ist der *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, der Redner ohne Kunst, aber voll Nachdruck, wie ihn Cicero haben will, ohne doch diesem Ideal selbst immer treu geblieben zu sein.³

In recent years, however, several scholars have argued that Kant did not have anything against rhetoric *per se*.⁴ They point out that Kant was not only well educated in Classical and contemporary rhetoric, he was also a great admirer of writers like Horace and he draws explicitly on Hugh Blair in his writings.⁵ Moreover, Kant was an enthusiastic supporter of Basedow's *Philanthropinum*, an experimental school which included rhetoric among its subjects.⁶ Some scholars have gone even further and argued that rhetoric has a positive and indeed indispensable function in Kant's practical philosophy.⁷ In this paper I shall advance a new argument that supports the latter view.

My argument is divided into two steps. First, I show that in the infamous attack on rhetoric (quoted above) there are in fact three senses of 'rhetoric' at

1 Cf. e.g. Kennedy 1999, 274–5.

2 *KdU* 5:327.

3 *KdU* 5:328n.

4 Cf. Garsten 2006, 93–98; Stroud 2005, 328–54; Ercolini 2010.

5 Cf. Kuehn 2001, 48; Ercolini 2010, 54, 202.

6 Stroud 2011, 420, n. 5.

7 Cf. Stroud 2011. To some extent, Ercolini's 2010 reading can also be counted among such positive reinterpretations, but, as opposed to Stroud, she does not attempt to give any systematic argument for why Kant would need to include rhetoric in a certain sense.

work. In addition to the two commonly recognized senses of ‘rhetoric’, i.e. on the one hand a negative and on the other a positive, albeit morally insignificant sense,⁸ I argue that there is also a positive and morally significant sense of ‘rhetoric’. Secondly, I show that in the positive and morally significant sense, rhetoric fulfils its role by virtue of its commitment to an illusion, an illusion which poetry, according to Kant, merely plays with.⁹ As we shall see, it is precisely by means of the illusion that certain examples which can be shown to play a crucial role in Kant’s understanding of moral education acquire their required moral force.¹⁰ The illusion makes the imagined cases and scenarios presented by the speaker appear as if they were real events, in light of which the auditor’s moral disposition to distinguish between right and wrong is quickened and his motivation to carry out moral acts becomes strengthened.

Kant’s three senses of ‘rhetoric’

The first, negative sense of ‘rhetoric’ is as *ars oratoria*. This art has a negative status in two ways. First, qua art, *ars oratoria* is inferior to poetry. The reason is that while it is beautiful, art for Kant must be without any purpose or intention;¹¹ *ars oratoria* has a purpose, namely to persuade. To understand why *ars oratoria* also has a morally negative status, it is crucial to note that Kant defines it as a technique whose purpose is to persuade others by ‘winning their minds and robbing them of their freedom by means of a beautiful illusion’.¹² For Kant, autonomy and moral worth are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, it is quite obvious that a technique which aims to turn the minds of the listeners into machines that automatically accept the views of the orator, is morally objectionable and hence is ‘worthy of no respect’.

The second, positive sense of ‘rhetoric’ is simply as a skill in talking (*Beredheit*) combined with well-spokenness (*Wohlredenheit*), which again is defined as eloquence and style (*Eloquenz und Stil*). In Kant’s own terminology, the term ‘rhetoric’ (*Rhetorik*) is restricted to designating the combination of these features.¹³ In this sense, rhetoric does indeed *belong* to beautiful art. But

8 Ijsseling 1976, 84–85; Ercolini 2010, 3.

9 *KdU* 5:327.

10 For a good analysis of the role of examples, see Stroud 2011.

11 This much follows from his analysis of beauty and the justification of the claims of the pure judgment of taste – a topic which I have to leave aside here.

12 *KdU* 5:326–7.

13 This point is obscured in the English translation of *KdU* by Guyer and Matthews (2000). In the quoted passages *Wohlredenheit* is first translated as ‘skill in speaking’ and the next time as ‘well-spokenness’. *Beredheit* is translated as ‘eloquence.’ Unfortunately, this sloppiness makes one lose track of Kant’s fine distinctions.

it is not thereby a beautiful art *in itself*. Rather it denotes certain capacities that can be put to the service of true art, viz. poetry.

The third sense of ‘rhetoric’ can be found by looking carefully at Kant’s distinction between the orator who performs according to *ars oratoria* and the true *vir bonus dicendi peritus*. As opposed to the former, the latter speaker clearly does not employ a technique that aims to persuade the listeners. Nevertheless, this does not imply that this speaker, who is ‘without art but full of vigour’, is simply involved in rhetoric in the morally neutral sense of *Rhetorik*. The first thing to note is that according to Kant a *vir bonus dicendi peritus* must not only have an insight into the facts and a mastery of the language in its richness and purity; he must also ‘through a fruitful imagination capable of presenting his ideas, partake vividly with his heart in the true good’.¹⁴ Hence, in addition to relevant knowledge and rhetorical skills in the morally neutral sense, this good speaker affects himself by means of the imagination and thereby improves his own relationship to the good; when presenting his ideas through imagination in the appropriate kind of way, he will take part in the true good, i.e. the moral law, not only through reason but also through his heart (*Herzenantheil*). Somewhat less poetically we can say that such a good speaker is a speaker who has the capacity to quicken his own moral sensibility by means of his imagination. As Kant says elsewhere, ‘Rhetoric is a business of the understanding animated through sensibility’.¹⁵ As such, being a good speaker can clearly be morally significant for the speaker himself, but what about the audience? As we know, for Kant no one can be persuaded to be good, since goodness must be the result of an autonomous will. The crucial question for us is, however, not whether morality can be furthered in others by any means besides persuasion, but specifically whether and how the rhetorical features of the speech of a *vir bonus dicendi peritus* can contribute to moral education.

The answer to this question is suggested in Kant’s claim that the moral effect of the speaker on himself is brought about by the process of a *Darstellung* (presentation) of his ideas. By *Darstellung* Kant means presenting a concept or idea in sensible intuition. For geometrical concepts, the relevant *Darstellung* would be the construction of the corresponding geometrical object in space. For ideas, presentation is a more complicated issue, since, strictly speaking, they do not have any corresponding spatio-temporal object. Instead, an idea will have to

14 Again, the English translation is inaccurate. ‘[L]ebhaften Herzenantheil am wahren Guten’ is translated as ‘feels a lively sympathy for the true good. While Kant clearly wants to claim that the heart’s partaking in the true good happens *through* the fruitful and able (*tüchtige*) imagination’s presentation of ideas, the English translation says that the feeling of sympathy for the true good must be *alongside*; cf. KdU, 205.

15 Kant 2007, 246–7.

be presented through some other kind of sensible representation which functions as a symbol or proxy for such an object. We shall return to this point below. For now, the most important point is to notice that there is a constraint placed on any presentation qua *Darstellung*, to wit that it can be shared by others.¹⁶ In other words, in order for the speaker to quicken his own moral sensibility he must present (*darstellen*) the ideas so that they can be shared and affect others in the same way. This should suffice to show that Kant does indeed acknowledge the possibility of a form of rhetoric that affects (also) the audience in a morally appropriate and significant way. To see how this is supposed to happen I shall now turn to the second and final part of my argument.

The role of illusion in moral rhetoric

My aim is now to show that although *ars oratoria* exploits an illusion in an objectionable way in order to win the minds of others, a rhetorical illusion can also have an indispensable positive function in moral education.¹⁷ To see how, we must first look briefly at Kant's understanding of illusion and error.

In the most general sense, an illusion for Kant is a representation that presents what is merely a subjective representation of an object as if it were the object itself.¹⁸ Prime examples are optical illusions, as for instance when the moon seems to become larger when it is closer to the horizon, although in fact the moon itself does not change its size.¹⁹ A typical feature of illusions is that they are robust and insensitive to change even when one knows that things are not really as they appear. The optical illusion just mentioned is illustrative, because in spite of our knowledge that the moon's size does not change, the moon continues to look larger on the horizon.

According to Kant, all error builds on illusion and consists of being taken in by the semblance in a way that affects our judgment or beliefs. Hence, to use the same example again, the error lies not in seeing the moon as larger (this is unavoidable) but in believing that the moon is larger.²⁰ But what is the illusion and resulting error in the case of rhetoric?

¹⁶ Indeed it is particularly in the KdU, the context of our present *analysandum*, that Kant emphasizes and discusses this feature, the so-called *sensus communis*.

¹⁷ The idea that illusions can play a positive role is most explicitly advocated by Kant in the Appendix to the Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*KrV*). However, as I have shown elsewhere, illusions can play a positive role in the practical realm as well. Cf. Serck-Hanssen 2012.

¹⁸ Here I have generalized Kant's point in *KrV* A 297/B 354, where he talks specifically of transcendental illusions. But the analogy with optical illusion in the very same paragraph shows, I believe, that such a generalization is warranted.

¹⁹ *KrV* A 297/B 353–4.

²⁰ For a good study on Kant and illusion see Grier 2001.

The illusion involved in rhetoric is clearly that the orator's subjective representations, e.g. his presentation of deeds and events, appear to the listeners as if they were objective states of affairs. An error, however, only occurs if the auditor also forms the corresponding belief without seeing any need to think for himself. In this case, the auditor has been deceived and has mistakenly taken what is in fact a merely subjective representation of the orator as an object to which he, the auditor, relates as an eyewitness in need of no further examination. As we have seen, the aim of *ars oratoria* is precisely to produce such a state of mind in the audience, namely that the orator's way of seeing things is the way things really are and therefore need not be critically examined. To achieve this aim, *ars oratoria* not only exploits the illusion, but also uses 'artful trickery'.²¹

As should be clear from this brief presentation of the distinction between illusion and error, if there is to be room for a rhetorical illusion that has a morally positive function, it must be due only to its presentation of the subjective *as if* it were objective, and not to any resulting erroneous beliefs (be they intended or not). To understand the potentially positive function of the illusion, we must, however, note that a rhetorical illusion can have an 'as-if character' in three ways. The first we have already touched upon, namely that the orator's 'lively presentation in examples'²² can appear to the listeners *as if* they are real things, persons, and events. The second is that if the examples are fictions of the imagination, they can include descriptions of the inner states of agents, e.g. a person's inner battle with his conscience, and make such inner properties appear *as if* it they were epistemically accessible states of affairs.²³ Thirdly, the semblance of seeing real things, persons and events, combined with the as-if insight into the emotions, thoughts and intentions of the agent(s) yield the semblance of directly perceiving to the actuality of moral agency.

We are now finally in a position to see how the rhetorical illusion can play a role in moral education. Earlier in this paper we saw that the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* affected his own moral sense by means of a presentation (*Darstellung*) of his ideas and that this presentation must be sharable by others. We also saw that, strictly speaking, no corresponding real object or state of affairs can serve this purpose and that its place must be filled by some kind of proxy; but which?

From what has already been established, it follows that if the lively 'presentation in examples' of our good speaker has the properties of an illusion described above, such examples could in fact function as a proxy in the desired way; for first, by means of their illusory nature, the audience would indeed

²¹ *KdU* 5:327.

²² *KdU* 5:327.

²³ Bear in mind that for Kant we cannot in fact have such insight, not even into ourselves.

‘see’ the examples as if they were an objective state of affairs, and as such the examples fulfil the requirement of being shareable. Moreover, as we have just seen, by using fictional examples the audience can ‘have before their eyes’, to use a Kantian expression, what can never be given through experience, namely exemplary cases of people who act in the right way, at the right time, with the right means for the right reasons.²⁴ The illusory nature of the speaker’s examples thus confers upon them a capacity for a truly moral effect also on the audience, for the examples’ twofold character of presence and transcendence contains a tension that is suited to awakening the auditors’ natural disposition for moral and autonomous reflection. In the examples they ‘see’ and indeed ‘feel’ the presence of morality, and at the same time they realize that it can only be comprehended by serious engagement in moral reasoning. In other words, as opposed to persuasion, which aims at mechanically generated opinions, the morally appropriate kind of rhetoric entertained by the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* prompts moral reflection and reasoning in the audience – it opens their hearts to the moral law, it sharpens their moral judgement and motivates them to act truly morally.

If the above reading of a third sense of ‘rhetoric’ is correct, it implies that, for Kant, rhetoric can play a significant role in moral education precisely because of its peculiar commitment to and use of illusions, for by such means rhetoric can lead the audience to the kind of reflection, judgment and motivation that *paideia* should aim for.²⁵ As such, rhetoric in fact offers a more promising means to moral education than do both poetry and moral pedagogy. Poetry on the one hand, only ‘plays with illusions’ and hence reminds us throughout of their merely fictive status. Poetry is thus less suited than rhetoric to bring about serious and lasting reflection in the audience. Moral pedagogy, on the other hand, tends to take its examples from real life. Since such examples can only portray the observable conduct of people, they can easily lead to unreflective imitation rather than genuine moral agency, according to Kant.²⁶ Not only that, but due to our propensity for self-love, Kant also believes that when confronted with examples of those who are said to be better than ourselves, we are easily filled with envy and even with hate towards them rather than with the motivation to improve our own moral character.²⁷ In conclusion then, despite Kant’s harsh remarks about rhetoric, there is a positive lesson to be learned: to be a *vir bonus dicendi peritus* is something which we should all strive for.

24 For this point, see also Stroud 2011.

25 For a good analysis of moral education in Kant, see Sticker forthcoming.

26 Kant 4:408, 6:479–80. For this point see also Stroud 2011, 424.

27 Kant 6:480, 27:694. Also referred to in Stroud 2011.

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Reconceptualizing *kairos*

JENS E. KJELDSSEN

We learn more from the ancient *auctores* and their concepts, writes Øivind Andersen ‘if we study how they unfold in their own age, in their own environment, on their own terms’.¹ It would certainly be foolhardy to question Andersen on the ancient *auctores*, but a quick glance at contemporary rhetorical research reveals that no other contemporary field of research turns to concepts developed in antiquity as much as the study of rhetoric. Fortunately, Andersen acknowledges that the ancients also ‘offer huge potential for modern theory, provided they are reconceptualized into modern terms’.²

While you do not expect current students of medicine to read the works of Hippocrates to become good doctors or medical scholars, you cannot become an acknowledged scholar of rhetoric unless you have read Aristotle and Cicero. Humans still seek to influence each other by appealing to ethos, logos and pathos, and we still seek the available means of persuasion in much the same way. Therefore many of the ancient rhetorical concepts are still relevant today. However, as Andersen advises, these concepts must be reconceptualized. One such concept is *kairos*.

Kairos in antiquity

Kairos is a complicated term with a complex web of meanings. Most scholars, however, agree that the two central aspects of the concept are the right or opportune moment to do something and the proper measure of something. It also seems to be generally agreed that *kairos* is a counterpart of *chronos*.³ While *chronos* is the view of time as a continuous flow, an understanding of time in a linear fashion as ‘time passing’, *kairos* is understood as the puncturing of *chronos*; it is an opening providing an opportunity. Onians, for instance, explains that the earliest Greek uses of the term in contexts of combat and weaving referred to an opening through which a weapon could find its way or through which a woof-thread could be shot through the warp.⁴

The rhetorical understanding of *kairos* is thus a combination of dimensions. On the one hand, there is a spatial dimension that indicates an opening of a

1 Andersen 2011, 248.

2 Andersen 1997; Andersen 2011, 248.

3 Smith 1969; Kinneavy 1986, 80; Kinneavy 2002; Sipiora 2002, 2.

4 Onians 1973, 343–8. See also Miller 1992, 313 and Miller 1994, 83–4.

rhetorical void, a ““problem-space” that a rhetor can occupy for advantage⁵: an archer must make the arrow hit exactly the place in the armour where there is an opening that can be penetrated. On the other hand, *kairos* has a temporal dimension that indicates a time to act: a weaver must send the shuttle through at the exact moment there is an opening in the weaving threads. In this temporal sense, the puncturing of *chronos* opens up a limited amount of time, allowing an orator to seize the moment, before opportunity again disappears.

The idea of ‘proper measure’ provides a third dimension. If a window of opportunity opens up, then seizing the moment depends on what we say and how we say it. We may lose the moment if we wait too long or if we do not adapt to the possibilities of the situation and then provide the wrong kind or measure of rhetoric. Andersen calls this ‘the aptum-correlated concept of *kairos*’, the weaker (or internal) *kairos*-concept, because it is about ‘taking into account the circumstances, the audience, oneself and the subject as required by the rules of what is *prepon* and *aptum*’.⁶ This internal concept belongs to system or method. However, there is also a stronger *kairos*-concept that belongs to theory. It concerns ‘the very foundations of what determines and characterizes rhetorical discourse’. While the weaker concept is concerned with what one does in rhetoric, the stronger is concerned with what rhetoric does in the world.⁷

Reconceptualizing kairos

Even though *kairos* is an ancient concept, it should be obvious that these kairotic dimensions and circumstances are equally relevant today. Nonetheless, reconceptualizing *kairos* in a contemporary context still poses challenges. For one thing, *kairos* – much like rhetoric in general – deals with fleeting matters that defy being tied down as a *techne*. It is no coincidence that Lysippus’ (c.360–c.320 BC) statue of *Kairos* has winged feet.

While it may be possible to create a general rhetorical *techne* of the stronger *kairos*-concept, it is difficult to do the same for the weaker concept. The stronger concept teaches us about the indeterminacy and situatedness of communication; it emphasizes the uniqueness and unpredictability of situations. As noted by Sipiorea, such conditions make it

⁵ Miller 1994, 84.

⁶ Andersen 2011, 242.

⁷ Andersen 2011, 241–2.

impossible for speakers to control discourse by planning or by previous theory. Since each discourse must be shaped in immediate response to the present occasion, instruction in *kairos* becomes virtually impossible. While theory, grounded in successful past discourse, provides models of right and wrong strategies, rhetorical theory cannot cast its net over the unforeseen, unpredictable, and uncontrollable moments.⁸

This is why attempts to develop a *techne* for the weaker concept mostly end up in platitudes claiming that you should always say the right thing at the right moment. It is not difficult to disagree with such general tenets. However, *when* exactly the time is right and *what* exactly may be the right thing to say is not easily determined and cannot be put into a formula.

Kairos and rhetorical situation

This raises the question of whether it is possible to reconceptualize *kairos* as a contemporary rhetorical *techne*? Most scholars who try to do so put forward Lloyd F. Bitzer's account of the rhetorical situation as a contemporary theory of *kairos*.⁹

Kinneavy equates *kairos* with the rhetorical situation, which he calls 'situational context'.¹⁰ This is stretching it a bit too far, according to Andersen.¹¹ And he is right. *Kairos* and Bitzer's theory both deal with situation, but in different ways. The concept of *kairos* focuses on situation as an opportunity seen from the viewpoint of the orator (the weaker concept), and it generally describes the roles of changeability, indeterminacy, and uncertainty that form the precondition for rhetorical communication (the stronger concept). The theory of rhetorical situation, on the other hand, describes certain structural circumstances, which bring about rhetoric.

However, in both the notion of *kairos* and the theory of the rhetorical situation, a rhetorical space opens up and creates a rhetorical situation. The *kairotic* perspective emphasizes the openness and opportunities that such rhetorical spaces offer a speaker, while the perspective of the rhetorical situation emphasizes the exigencies and constraints of such spaces, which invite – and almost prescribe – a fitting response. Both are seen from the perspective of an orator, but Bitzer's account of the circumstances for rhetoric makes it almost a social scientific theory. His first article from 1968 accounted for the constitutive elements of the rhetorical situation (exigency, constraints,

⁸ Sipiara 2002, 6.

⁹ Bitzer 1968.

¹⁰ Kinneavy 1986.

¹¹ Andersen 1997, 2011.

and audience). Bitzer later developed the theory in his 1980 article. Even though this article mentions neither *chronos* nor *kairos*, its description of the stages of the rhetorical situation is actually a description of the elements of *chronos*. A rhetorical situation has four stages: 1) origin and development, 2) maturity, 3) deterioration, and 4) disintegration. The stage of *maturity* is the stage of *kairos*. This is the moment where the situation is ripe for rhetorical intervention. The development of the four stages fits with the characteristics of *chronos* as described by Smith: 1) motion and process, 2) measuring units ‘numbering’ the movement and the elapsed time, and 3) a serial order.¹²

In opposition to the traditional understanding of the kairotic moment, stage two in Bitzer’s theory can last for a second, for a century, or even forever. So, while rhetorical situations can persist, ‘conceivably some persist indefinitely’,¹³ the kairotic, in contrast, is normally understood in terms of swift, shifting conditions.

Contemporary reconceptualizations of kairos

The rhetorical situation has evolved into a theory of recurring situations. Because ‘comparable situations occur, prompting comparable responses’,¹⁴ we have developed a rhetorical genre theory which is both descriptive and normative. It describes how we normally respond to situations and prescribes what would generally be the fitting responses to the different kinds of recurring situations. Rhetorical genres are conventionalized kairotic moments. In this way, it is not so much the orator who seizes the moment but rather it is the moment that directs the orator to talk. There is not enough indeterminacy or unexpectedness in the situation for rhetorical genres to be kairotic moments in the originally Classical sense. Because genres represent recurring situations, they can be anticipated and controlled, which is exactly why it is possible to create a *techne*, a theory, about them.

Kairos, on the other hand, is about that which cannot be controlled: the indeterminacy and changeability of fleeting moments. This may help to explain the peculiar fact that several of the reconceptualizations of *kairos* in contemporary rhetorical studies examine phenomena that appear to be most typical of contemporary society and most removed from the ancients: science, technology, risk society, visual activism, and media.¹⁵ For instance, in her study of the rhetoric of science, Carolyn Miller explored how *kairos*

¹² Smith 1969, 2–3.

¹³ Bitzer 1968, 12–13.

¹⁴ Bitzer 1968, 13. Cf. Jamieson 1973, who was among the first to connect situation and genre.

¹⁵ Miller 1992; Miller 1994; Scott 2006; Stephenson 2009; Sheridan et al. 2009; Kelly et al. 2014.

created ‘opportunities for belief’. New scientific discoveries can only be communicated – or perhaps only be made – when the difference between novelty and tradition opens up a kairotic opportunity. *Kairos* in science, Miller writes, can be understood as operating in two arenas:

it is both a conceptual or intellectual space, understood as the opportunity provided by explanatory problems, and a social or professional space, understood by the opportunity provided by a forum of interaction. Both of these spaces change constantly and are always subject to appropriation and redefinition.

As Miller points out, *kairos* teaches us about ‘the complex nature of rhetorical context, or situation’. It makes us see not only the temporal aspect of context, but also the spatial; it points not only to the objective, but also to the subjective dimensions of rhetorical situations.¹⁶

In a later piece on technology, Miller illustrates how ‘*kairos* in technical discourse functions primarily to create opportunities for opportunity’.¹⁷ Appeals to seize the opportune moment are pervasive in technology-talk, Miller explains, because they promise predictability, control, and advantage to what otherwise would be an uncertain and unknowable future. Technological change is different from scientific progress because the kairotic moment is not now but in the future, which is why the ‘technological forecasting’ of threats or advantages is a way of creating opportunities for opportunity.¹⁸

Scott makes similar observations in his treatment of ‘Kairos as Indeterminate Risk Management’ in relation to the pharmaceutical industry’s response to bioterrorism after 9/11. Instead of a ‘modernist’, grounded notion of *kairos* as a controlling agent seizing an advantage, he proposes an alternative notion of *kairos* as ‘the indeterminate response to unbounded, immeasurable, unpredictable, and ultimately uncontrollable global risks’.¹⁹

The sophistic condition

I am not sure how a classicist would regard such reconceptualizations of *kairos*, but there is no doubt that the kairotic perspective helps the contemporary researcher to understand the rhetoric of our time, because the

¹⁶ Miller 1992, 320 and 322. Bitzer has been accused by Richard Vatz (1973) of having a deterministic, objective view of rhetoric that leaves only limited agency to the orator. In contrast with this view, Vatz claims that it is not the situation that determines the rhetorical response, but the orator that defines the situation. For this reason, Vatz’ position has been called subjective (Miller 1992; Miller 1994).

¹⁷ Miller 1994, 93.

¹⁸ Miller *ibid.*

¹⁹ Scott 2006, 137.

concept of *kairos* seems remarkably well suited to the study of contemporary society. Part of the explanation for this, I think, is that we are in many ways now returning to a sophistic condition. In a world of globalization, pluralism, convergence, mediatization, and technological changes, rhetorical situations have become more complex, fragmented, changeable, and incalculable.²⁰ This contemporary sophistic condition revives questions of rhetorical agency and relativism, and provides new importance to *kairos*.

Modern media have added situational complexity by transforming the public sphere into a rhetorical arena of multi-mediated communication, thus obscuring the traditional sense of communicator and audience. Mass media and new media have created a plurality of situations, wherein speakers simultaneously address many different groups of audiences and situational exigencies. This became obvious in the cartoon crisis of 2005 and 2006, when the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed (30 November 2005). The editors meant to initiate a local Danish discussion on freedom of speech, but in a globalized and mediated world, such manifestations quickly gain a life of their own – completely independent of the intentions of the communicator.

Communicators – especially political speakers – are victims of journalistic framing and the mediated fragmentation of their utterances. The traditional political speech is afforded little space or time. It has been replaced by forms of dialogue such as the interview, the debate, or the press conference. These forms of communication are constrained by the management of journalists and editors, and thereby limit the orators' influence on what he or she is saying and on the mediated journeys of his or her words. Journalists, observers, and commentators use quotations out of context, and they frame, prime, and set their own agendas. When the words have been disseminated, new players throw themselves into debates, and the use of decontextualized utterances set their agendas. Thus, the space for rhetorical action is constantly changing and, consequently, so is *kairos*.

Utterances, conduct, everything that can be represented through words, sounds, and pictures take on a life of their own in a fragmented, uncontrollable public sphere. Utterances are disseminated to audiences outside the initial communication situation, to unintended recipients. This creates new rhetorical situations, while new responses to different groups of audiences are also demanded; these situations produce rhetoric, which is not discrete or intentional in the traditional sense, but rather is a mosaic marked by a continuous flow, bricolage, and constant change.

²⁰ Kjeldsen 2008a and 2008b.

This changeability is simultaneously forming and being formed by the increased speed and compression of time in society and communication.²¹ We used to think about travel time in weeks or months, now we mostly think in minutes and hours. It used to take days to deliver a letter; an email arrives in less than a second. Newspapers used to give us the latest news every morning, but now we have the story of the politician's gaffe online only minutes after it happened – with pictures from the cell phones of observers. A youth – and many adults, for that matter – who does not respond to a text or a Snapchat within a few minutes, or even seconds, does not demonstrate the appropriate online behaviour. The proper time for answering has already passed. The time between *kairos*' puncturing of *chronos* seems to be becoming constantly smaller and smaller. Almost every moment becomes a moment that can be seized or lost.

While all this probably sounds far away from the ancient concept of *kairos* – and of course in many ways it is – some circumstances are similar to the circumstances that the ancients mention when discussing *kairos*. *Kairos*, as Isocrates, Plato, and Alcidamas used it, was tightly connected with the communication situation of the spoken word, where changes and turns dominated, and swiftness and the ability to adapt was essential. In his text *On Those Who Deliver Written Speeches* or *On Sophists*, for instance, Alcidamas writes that for people who ask for 'speedy help in their law-suits', producing written speeches is too slow (Alcidamas. *Soph.* 10).²² And would it not be ridiculous if, when a citizen is asked to speak or when the 'water-clock in the courts was already running', the speaker 'were to proceed to his writing tablet in order to assemble and con his speech?' (Alcidamas. *Soph.* 11). No, the speaker must be able to appropriately express things on the spur of the moment and make good use of the critical moment, and to do this he must have a 'flexible mind and a well-stocked and ready memory ... keen to acquire an ability to make speeches which correspond to the needs of life' (Alcidamas. *Soph.* 34). As Andersen points out, Alcidamas' horizon is the courtroom or the people's assembly; here 'the speaker needs to respond immediately, discuss unexpected arguments, and in all things to be capable of adapting himself to the exigencies of the moment'.²³

There is much talk these days of the dialogical possibilities of interactive IT-technology, online communication, and the dynamic character of social media. Such traits of modern media are often viewed in contrast with the most ancient of all rhetorical means: speech and dialogue. However, as suggested

21 Virilio 2006; Kelly *et al.* 2014.

22 All translations are from Muir (2001).

23 Andersen 2011, 244.

by Alcidamas' text, speechmaking and dialogue can be every bit as interactive, changeable, and dynamic as any online activity. The spoken word is inherently dialogical. It allows for swift changes and immediate responses: something is said and we react instantly. These traits are also characteristic of new media. Online communication is a place for quick response, unprepared comments, swift changes, dialogue, and shifting opportunities. The changeability, speed, and relativism that in this way seem to dominate our times and create a contemporary sophistic condition are the reason why *kairos* is as relevant now as it was in antiquity.

This sophistic condition is also the reason why the scholarly study of rhetoric and *kairos* are still relevant even now: perhaps more than ever before we find ourselves in a situation where the human situation cannot be captured by fixed rules. Humans cannot be understood only in the light of research trying step by step to uncover elements of what a human being consists of or how one persuades another. Much has changed since the time of the ancients, but the human condition is still largely the same as it was 2500 years ago.

Of course, Andersen is right in saying that we should study how the ancient *auctores* and their concepts unfold in their own age, in their own environment, and on their own terms. However, even though there is a risk of untimely anachronism, there is no doubt, I think, that contemporary reconceptualizations of *kairos* can teach us much about our own times.

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