

Roles and Rationales in the Negotiations of the First
Review Conference of the Treaty of Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
1973-1975



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I ask you to stop and think what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance for effective disarmament.

John F. Kennedy, 1963. In Glenn Seaborg, 1987: 57.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

HMG	Her/His Majesty's Government (the United Kingdom)
ACDD	Arms Control and Disarmament Department (at the FCO)
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-1978)*
EC	European Community
ENDC	Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (1962-1968)*
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (the United Kingdom)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPT	The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG	Nuclear Supplier Group
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (El Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe)
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly

* The name of the multilateral negotiation body in Geneva was changed to Committee on Disarmament in 1979, and to Conference on Disarmament in 1984.

Timeline

1945	August 6 August 9 October 24	Little Boy A-bomb attack on Hiroshima. Fat Man A-bomb attack on Nagasaki. UN Charter is ratified by World War II victors.
1949	September 23	The Soviet Union tests a nuclear explosive device.
1952	October 3	The United Kingdom tests a nuclear explosive device.
1954	March 1	The Bravo-test results in nuclear fallout that creates international protests against atmospheric nuclear tests.
1960	February 13	France tests a nuclear explosive device.
1961	December 4	The Irish Resolution sets up the UN ad hoc Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC).
1962	October 20- November 21	The Sino-Indian War.
1963	August 5	The Partial Test Ban Treaty (also called the Limited Test Ban Treaty) is signed in Moscow.
1964	October 16	China tests a nuclear explosive device.
1968	July 1	The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is opened for signature in Washington, London and Moscow.
1970	March 5	The NPT enters into force.
1973	October 16 December 18	Raising prices on oil start an international oil crisis. A United Nations resolution calling on a Preparatory Committee to set up the Review Conference for the NPT is passed in the UN General Assembly.
1974	April 1-8 May 18 August 26- September 6	The Preparatory Committee meets for its first session. India tests a nuclear explosive device. The Preparatory Committee meets for its second session.
1975	February 3-14 May 5-30	The Preparatory Committee meets for its third session. The first Review Conference of the NPT is held in Geneva.

Introduction

Contemporary Importance – Historiographical Negligence

A curse fell on the whole future of mankind when the atomic bomb fell.¹

Alva Myrdal, Swedish Ambassador to Disarmament (1962-1973)

1.1 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

When the American President, Harry S. Truman, authorized the drop of nuclear bombs over the two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in August 1945 he changed the face of international politics forever: the world was introduced to a weapon of devilish capacity, which effectively brought about Japan's capitulation and the conclusion of the Second World War.² Consequently, other states found themselves compelled to acquire this newfound weapon technology for national security purposes. The Soviet Union was first to follow suit in 1949, and during the next fifteen years the United Kingdom, France and China also demonstrated their nuclear weapon capabilities.³

The political responses to the discovery and usage of nuclear weapon technology have occupied historians ever since the first nuclear bomb was dropped, for apparent reasons. During the Cold War, fear of nuclear annihilation was an inherent component of the every-day life until the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, made a retreat in a superpower nuclear confrontation.⁴ The Cold War is generally used to label the ideological conflict between the communist East-bloc led by the Soviet Union and the capitalist West-bloc led by the United States. Illustratively, how to manage nuclear weapons was an every-day challenge for all political leaders in the post-war world. Consequently, modern world history touches on the subject of nuclear politics in one way or another; without it the history of the post-war world is incomplete.

¹ Seaborg 1987: 71

² Reed and Stillman 2009: 25

³ United Kingdom 1952; France 1960; China 1964.

⁴ It is clear that the fear of nuclear annihilation has varied greatly, both in scope and geography, and is perhaps best documented the United States, where it was an important motive in much American prose literature from the Cold War period, documented by Daniel Cordle (2006).

Yet, one dimension of nuclear politics remains largely understudied, despite being of great historical relevance. Diplomatic efforts to control nuclear arms and the establishment of an international non-proliferation regime have only recently received the attention of historians.⁵ This regime was established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly labeled the Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1968.⁶ Its normative guideline is that while the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology should remain accessible to all, the spread of nuclear weapons is perceived as a serious danger to international security that should be prevented. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, hereafter only referred to as the NPT, restricts the number of legitimate nuclear weapon states to the five states that had tested nuclear explosives prior to January 1967. Under the treaty these states are obligated not to transfer nuclear weapons or associated technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Non-nuclear weapon states on the other hand, commit to forgo a nuclear defense and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct inspections of their nuclear energy facilities. Inevitably, the output of any peaceful nuclear power reactors, plutonium, is the input of nuclear weapons.⁷ The normative guideline of the non-proliferation regime is therefore fundamentally contradictory, and as a consequence, a system of institutions, treaties and national legislation has been designed to restrict nuclear technology to peaceful purposes.

According to the American historian Francis J. Gavin, the NPT has made "...nuclear non-proliferation a shared value of the international community in the same way human rights, anti-terrorism, and maintaining a stable economic order have come to be seen as globally shared interests".⁸ The aim of this research project is to contribute to the knowledge of the institutionalization of the nuclear non-proliferation norm by examining the first Review Conference of the NPT. According to a stipulation in the NPT, five years after the treaty entered into force, a conference to review the operation of the treaty was organized in Geneva. The conference set the precedent for a periodic review system of the NPT, and as such it was a continuation of the process of stepwise build-up of national commitments to nuclear arms control. The periodic review system established an unprecedented enforcement

⁵ Regime is hereby understood as an authoritative arrangement among states that facilitates the accomplishments of specific goals through a process involving coordination of expectations and modifications of certain behavioral patterns. This broad definition is borrowed from, McMorris Tate 1990: 402.

⁶ *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT), GA Res. 2373 (XXII), 12 June 1968. GAOR, 22nd Sess, Suppl. No. 16 (A/6716/Add. 1), pp. 5-7. (Attached in the appendix)

⁷ Plutonium is central to the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, inevitably; it is an output of the first and an input of the second. When uranium is bombarded with neutrons in a fission energy reactor, some of the neutrons are captured by the atom. Because the neutron is divisible, it will split and part of it will add to the atom as a negatively charged electron, another part as a positive proton. The element is thereby changed and forms instead of Uranium (92) Plutonium 94 (or Neptunium 93). See Moss 1981: 24.

⁸ Gavin 2010: 415

mechanism for international law.⁹ Its main function is to focus public and diplomatic attention on the operation of a treaty, relying on the idea that world opinion is the chief sanction behind compliance with international law. According to the political scientist John Simpson, the periodic review currently functions as a core governance institution in the international system of nuclear technology governance.¹⁰ Consequently, this research may also have great current explanatory value.

The purpose of this introductory chapter is to give reasons for why and how this historical research of the first Review Conference of the NPT is conducted. To serve this purpose the chapter commences with a presentation of the historiography of the non-proliferation regime that constitutes a substantial part of this introductory chapter for two good reasons. First, by presenting existing literature, I intend to limit the field of research. Second, and more importantly, by explaining how the institutionalization of a non-proliferation norm is explain in the existing literature, it will become apparent how this particular research may contribute towards expanding knowledge of the non-proliferation regime. After presenting the historiography, the chapter continues with a presentation of the research question, periodization and actor demarcation. Thereafter, the source selection is presented and discussed. Finally, an outline of the thesis is included.

1.2 Historiography – A Narrative of Lost Opportunities

This presentation of the historiography of nuclear arms control is partly intended to limit the field of research, but more importantly to position this research project according to existing literature, which hereunder been divided into two subcategories: Cold War history and institutional history. As stated, despite broad interest in nuclear history, the history of nuclear arms control remains largely understudied. Historians have only recently begun to explain the stepwise build-up of national commitment to nuclear arms control. Instead, historians have been preoccupied with explaining why nuclear disarmament efforts have failed. Consequently, a narrative of “lost opportunities” that overlooks the obvious accomplishments of nuclear diplomacy dominates most of its history. Recent research is contributing to the gradual transformation of this narrative; however, it still dominates the current plot of the first Review Conference of the NPT.

⁹ Carnahan 1987: 229

¹⁰ Simpson 2004: 7. The periodic review system is still functioning. The previous Review Conference was held in New York in 2010; the next is set to 2015.

1.2.1 Cold War History

Nuclear politics and efforts to control nuclear weapons is a central theme in Cold War history. According to the Norwegian Cold War historian Odd Arne Westad, the Cold War may be broadly defined as “...the period in which the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international affairs, roughly between 1945 and 1991”¹¹. Thus, history that somehow attempts to explain this conflict may be characterized as Cold War history. This is most definitely so in the case of nuclear weapons which have been regarded as both a cause and a means of the militarization of the ideological conflict between the two ideological adversaries.¹²

Cold War historiography is largely influenced by the simple fact that most Cold War history was written during the process that is analyzed. As a consequence, Cold War history has to a great extent focused on blame and responsibility for the Cold War conflict.¹³ As a part of Cold War history, the historiography of nuclear arms control largely mirror that of general Cold War history; according to the European historian, Susanna Schrafstetter, “[t]he need to explain why the international community failed to establish a nuclear-free world has exercised Cold War historians for many years”¹⁴.

Three schools have done so in different ways, and according to the Norwegian Cold War historian Geir Lundestad, each has proven “disappointingly subjective and ‘presentist’.”¹⁵ The orthodox school, which Lundestad characterizes as a product of the early American Cold War climate, places responsibility for both the conflict and the arms race with the Soviet Union. According to Schrafstetter, the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union made inspections, which were integral in all disarmament plans, impossible.¹⁶ Soviet Union proposals to ban nuclear weapons, on the other hand, were regarded as ruses “...designed to delay proceedings in the UN until Moscow had acquired nuclear weapons.”¹⁷ As a reaction to the Vietnam War, a revisionist school emerged to challenge the pro-American orthodoxy. The real barrier, the revisionists argued, was not the monolithic nature of the USSR, but “the intransigence of the United States”.¹⁸ US proposals to abolish nuclear weapons are rejected by the revisionists as being attempts to manipulate world opinion. The third position represents

¹¹ Westad 2007: 3

¹² Gaddis 2005: 25-27

¹³ Lundestad 2000: 70. It should not be ruled out that there are other schools that are non-Western. However, in the East bloc the field of history was censored, thus the historiography is predominantly Western.

¹⁴ Schrafstetter 2004: 204

¹⁵ Lundestad 2000: 66

¹⁶ Schrafstetter 2004: 204

¹⁷ Schrafstetter 2004: 204

¹⁸ Schrafstetter 2004: 205

the middle ground. The post-revisionist school apportions blame to both superpowers, and according to Lundestad the position is a reflection of the contemporary policy of *détente*.¹⁹

The Cold War history that has been produced after the collapse of the Soviet Union, collectively labeled *New Cold War history*, has attempted to shift focus from blame to change. This new approach, combined with access to previously closed East bloc archives, as well as a number of additional West bloc archives, has contributed towards slowly transforming depiction of the Cold War.²⁰ Both Odd Arne Westad and Geir Lundestad are representatives of this new approach in Cold War history. The same development has occurred in the history of nuclear diplomacy. During the last twenty years, both Cold War historians and political scientists have shown greater interest in the development of a non-proliferation regime.

Representatives of this relatively recent trend in nuclear arms control history are scholars like Thomas Risse²¹, Vojtech Mastny, Susanna Schrafstetter and Leopoldo Nuti. Risse and Mastny have separately analyzed the proceedings of the Partial Test Ban Treaty²² (PTBT) negotiations from a British and Soviet perspective, respectively. These negotiations were the first concrete nuclear arms negotiations between the Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union, and resulted in a treaty that prohibits nuclear explosives tests in the atmosphere, signed in 1963. However, the treaty allows underground tests and therefore did not contribute towards reducing the total number of nuclear tests or the development of more advanced nuclear weapons technology, though it may have contributed towards raising the threshold to join the nuclear club.

While previous scholars had approached the test ban negotiations with an aim to explain why the superpowers failed to agree on a comprehensive test ban treaty which was hailed as the ambition of these negotiations, Risse and Mastny made it their focus instead to explain what instigated these negotiations, and to explain their outcome. Mastny analyze the role of the political leadership in the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev.²³ Risse stresses the importance of the special Anglo-American relationship.²⁴ According to his analysis, the negotiations were instigated because of close cooperation between American and British

¹⁹ See Lundestad 2000: 66. The policy of *détente* was a relaxation of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. The policy will be explained in more detail in chapter two, when the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in the review of the NPT are analyzed.

²⁰ Westad 2000: 5

²¹ Thomas Risse has previously been published as Thomas Risse-Kappen. In the text, I will only refer to him by his current name, however, in the footnotes and bibliography, I use the name that he himself has been using in the given publication.

²² Note that the Partial Test Ban Treaty is also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which is most common in the United States.

²³ Mastny 2008: 24

²⁴ Risse-Kappen 1995: 105

researchers and bureaucracy. While the researchers were imperative for putting a nuclear test ban on the political agenda in the wake of the 1954 Castel Bravo accident²⁵, the bureaucracy was imperative for getting the negotiations going.

Equally, the two European Cold War historians, Susanne Schrafstetter and Leopoldo Nuti, have examined and explained the origins of the NPT. According to Nuti, the Chinese nuclear test explosion in 1964 is generally perceived as the event that laid the foundations for the NPT.²⁶ Prior to the Chinese nuclear test explosion, the United States was deeply entrenched in NATO plans for a multilateral nuclear force. However, the sudden horizontal spread of nuclear weapons to China caused a change in the priorities of the American administration. In the wake of the Chinese test, the United States decided to pursue a non-proliferation treaty, and in order to see this policy through, they agreed to Soviet demands to forbid all types of nuclear sharing, including sharing within defensive alliances. The Soviet Union was opposed to any arrangement that would provide the Federal Republic of Germany, hereafter referred to as West Germany, with nuclear weapons, in the light of the multiple historical conflicts between the two near-neighbors.

Thus, according to both Schrafstetter and Nuti, the position of West Germany is significant in order to explain the NPT. The importance of the West-German signature is confirmed by the special concessions made to West Germany over the issue of inspections. A special arrangement was negotiated between the IAEA and the European Atomic Community²⁷, hereafter referred to by its acronym Euratom, in response to West-German fears about industrial espionage. According to Schrafstetter, the United Kingdom played an important role as a mediator in securing this outcome, motivated by British interests to join the European Community²⁸ and ambitions of past great power glory.

Another factor that supports West-German significance for the NPT was the lack of concern for other near-nuclear weapon states. Schrafstetter, who has based her analysis on

²⁵ Castel Bravo was the code name of an American test of a thermonuclear hydrogen bomb on the Bikini atoll in the Pacific on 1 March 1954. Fallout from the test poisoned the islanders, as well as a crew on a Japanese fishing boat, and created international concerns about atmospheric nuclear testing.

²⁶ Nuti 2010: 91

²⁷ The European Atomic Energy Community, more commonly known by its acronym Euratom, is a regional organization that was established on 25 March 1957 along with the European Economic Community, by the Treaty of Rome. The purposes of Euratom was to create a specialist market for nuclear power and distribute it through the Community and to develop nuclear energy and sell surplus to non-community states. It was being taken over by the executive institutions of the European Economic Community in 1967, after the Merger Treaty, however, it was, and still is legally distinct from the European Union, which was established by the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union that replaced the Merger Treaty in 1992. See Bache and Geroge 2006: 602

²⁸ Originally, the integration of Europe was in three communities, the European Steel and Coal Community (ESCE), European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). In April 1965, a Merger Treaty was signed agreeing to merge the three institutions. See Bache and Geroge 2006: 596

both West-German and British sources, emphasizes how Indian demands for positive security guarantees, meaning that the nuclear weapon states would intervene on behalf of non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT if the latter were exposed to nuclear blackmail or nuclear attack, were dismissed by the superpowers.²⁹ This was a concern for the United Kingdom, because the former British colony India had remained an important member of the British Commonwealth after gaining its independence. India's demands for positive security guarantees were largely motivated by India's strained relationship with its northern neighbor, China, as a result of the unresolved Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962.³⁰

However, the superpowers did not meet the demands of India. Instead of offering positive security guarantees in the NPT, which were primarily in the interests of the countries outside of the Cold War alliance system,³¹ a security guarantee was offered by a United Nations Security Council resolution.³² However, this resolution was considered worthless by most states, particularly after China replaced Taiwan in the United Nations, thereby becoming a permanent member of the Security Council in 1971,³³ because the resolution could be vetoed by any member of the council. India consequently decided not to sign the NPT, denouncing it as an inherently discriminatory treaty, as did both France and China, the other two legitimate nuclear weapon states according to the NPT.³⁴

1.2.2 Institutional History

The Cold War is an important conceptual framework for understanding nuclear arms control efforts. However, the Cold War is not the only conceptual framework through which attempts have been made to explain nuclear arms control. As Westad puts it, the intention to operate with a broad Cold-War definition is not to say that everything during this time period was caused by the Cold War; the Cold War "...is a separate, identifiable part of a much richer spectrum of late twentieth century history, but one that gave shape to an international system."³⁵

²⁹ Schrafstetter 2004: 168

³⁰ Seaborg 1987: 117-118

³¹ Gavin 2010: 412

³² Security assurances are provided for by the Security Council Resolution 255. See for instance Epstein 1976: 244

³³ The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 of October 1971 recognized the representatives of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as "the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations".

³⁴ The French decision to not sign the NPT, and to insist to remain unassociated from nuclear weapons talks cannot be fully understood without regards to the political leadership in France under Charles de Gaulle at the time of the NPT-negotiations, and the French departure from NATO in 1966.

³⁵ Westad 2007: 4

Nuclear arms control has also been explained from the perspective of the post-war world order. The efforts made to ensure that nuclear technology would only be used for peaceful purposes have been of a distinct global character, typical of the world order that was instituted after the Second World War. Originally designed to reintegrate the defeated Axis states³⁶ and the victorious Allied states³⁷ into a unified international system,³⁸ the post-war world order instituted a deep-rooted logic of “shared authority over the global system”³⁹. The relegation of Germany and American isolationism in the wake of the First World War was largely considered to have caused the second. The establishment of the United Nations (UN) was a prime symbol of the new norm of global governance, and the UN regarded it as being its task to use universal treaty regulations for address challenges to international security.

Institutional history explains nuclear arms control from the perspective of the UN. According to its representatives, such as the political scientist Josef Goldblatz, the NPT derived from a change in the United Nations approach to disarmament.⁴⁰ Recognizing in the mid-1950s that the abolition of nuclear weapons was not tenable due to the ideological rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union, general and comprehensive disarmament proposals were replaced by gradual disarmament schemes that aimed to control and halt nuclear proliferation.⁴¹ The new disarmament approach was instituted through the passing of the Irish Resolution⁴² in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1961. The resolution called on all states, and nuclear states in particular, to “use their best endeavors to secure the conclusion of an international agreement” halting horizontal nuclear proliferation.⁴³ An Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) was set up to see the task through. The composition of the ENDC reflected the contemporary composition of the UNGA: Canada, France,⁴⁴ Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States represented the Western bloc; Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia represented the

³⁶ Germany and Italy

³⁷ The United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States

³⁸ Ikenberry 2008: 24

³⁹ Ikenberry 2008: 30

⁴⁰ Goldblatz 1994: 77

⁴¹ Schrafstetter 2005: 206

⁴² The Irish Resolution of 1961 was the fourth in a line; the first Irish resolution was presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 1958. According to Glenn Seaborg, with each of the superpowers unable or unwilling to come forward with ideas that had the chance of being accepted by the other, the initiative was passed over to Ireland, whose Foreign Minister, Fred Aiken, had adopted non-proliferation as a personal specialty. However, it was not simply the personal commitment of Aiken that enabled Ireland to present the resolution that established the ENDC. Irish neutrality, neither a member of the NATO nor the Non-Aligned Movement, was an important factor why Ireland, on the fourth go, succeeded in presenting a resolution that was approved by both superpowers. See Seaborg 1987: 78

⁴³ Seaborg 1987: 79

⁴⁴ As mentioned, France denounced the notion of a non-proliferation treaty as inherently discriminatory, and therefore never participated in the negotiations of a non-proliferation treaty on behalf of NATO in the ENDC.

Eastern-bloc; Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and Sweden represented the neutral states.

1.2.3 Explanation Models – Towards Mutual Casualty of Agency and Structure

The presentation above illustrates how historians have approached nuclear arms control differently. In general they have wavered between privileging material and ideational factors, power or norms, in their explanation models. Orthodox and revisionist Cold War history have largely privileged ideational factors, by attributing the historical development to the ideology of the Eastern bloc and the Western bloc, respectively. Institutional history has also privileged ideational factors. The institutionalization of nuclear diplomacy is explained as a result of cooperation and global governance, while political conflict is largely absent in the explanation models of institutional history.

Cold War post-revisionists on the other hand have privileged martial factors. Post-revisionists have explained the stability of the Cold War as a result of a bipolar international system. This emphasis on bipolarity was not unique to the field of history, but influenced by the contemporary trends in international relations, which have studied the same subjects with an aim to develop and test general theories. According to political scientist and historian Richard Ned Lebow, political science neither made change its principle focus during the Cold War conflict: “For international relations scholars in the 1980s, the preeminent problem in the security subfield was ‘the long peace’ between the superpowers”.⁴⁵ Similar to the post-revisionists, the bipolar world system was given much explanatory power by the international relations community. The dominant theory was structural realism.⁴⁶

The sudden and unforeseen fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent conclusion of the Cold War brought about new conceptualization to both history and international relations. “In the aftermath of the Cold War, during which a bipolar material structure appeared to explain so much of international politics,” political scientist Douglas J. Macdonald explains, “... scholars are becoming more interested in ideational causation.”⁴⁷ Thus, the pendulum has returned to ideational factors. This is illustrated by Vojtech Mastny and Thomas Risse’s contributions to *New Cold War history*. Both Mastny and Risse put great emphasis on the ideology and rationality of agency in their explanations. For instance, in Risse’s analysis of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, change is presented as a result of transnational cooperation. This

⁴⁵ Lebow 2000: 105

⁴⁶ Structural realism advocates that national interests and the international balance of power determine global politics and that an international community is a fiction. See Amstutz 2008: 17.

⁴⁷ Macdonald 2000: 181

conceptualization was explicitly intended by Risse as a criticism of the international relations theory of structural realism, which was considered to have failed by not predicting the end of the Cold War.⁴⁸ As a political scientist, Risse is a representative of another international relations theory usually referred to as constructivism.⁴⁹ Constructivist theory advocates that human beings are the major actors in the international community, and that state behavior reflects self-recognition of a national elite. Depending on such self-recognition, every state may behave alike, or completely differently.⁵⁰

History however is not a generalizing but a synthesizing science that rejects the general application of theory, arguing that historical explanations are unique because of the changing historical context. Although historical explanations may give priority to either norms or power, the two are not regarded as conflicting explanation factors, but complementary. According to Karl Marx's famous maxim, individuals attempt to decide history through their own efforts, but they do not do so in the situations of their own choosing; social and political structures restrict and present occasions for human behavior.⁵¹ The task of the historian is therefore to explain the mutual causality of agency and structure, of both ideational and material factors.

The most recent contributions to the historiography of nuclear arms control have attempted to explain the mutual causality of agency and structure. Leopoldo Nuti stresses how international politics has a certain logic that can only be understood "... by looking at both the domestic and the foreign policy sides of the story and analyzing their connections with each other."⁵² Thus, in his analysis of the origin of the NPT, he puts much emphasis on both West German interests and the transformation from bipolarity to polycentrism. In contrast to post-revisionists, both Nuti and Susanna Schrafstetter regard the balance of power as much more delicate, and therefore as a source of change. According to the Cold War historian, John Lewis Gaddis, post-revisionists calculated power almost entirely on monodimensional terms, focusing only on military indices and not economic power, ideological power or cultural power, and Gaddis suggests that this was the reason why post-revisionists failed to foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁵³

⁴⁸ Risse-Kappen 1995: 145

⁴⁹ Amstutz 2008: 16

⁵⁰ According to constructivist theory, the "...international community is not an ideal to be pursued but a reality that is expressed in the increasing role played by international institutions and structuring international relations." See Amstutz 2008: 17

⁵¹ Macdonald 2000: 180

⁵² Trachtenberg 2003: ix

⁵³ Gaddis 1998: 284

Several authors agree with Nuti and Schrafstetter that the emergence of a multi-polar world system that laid the ground for change. For instance, political scientists Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, who have analyzed continuity and change in the foreign policy of Russia in the twentieth century, argue that the international balance of power is an essential factor for explaining foreign policy behavior. Donaldson and Noguee agree that it is impossible to make a formula that predicts foreign policy:

The factors that shape foreign policy behavior are multiple. Some are internal, such as government and its political elites, the culture, economy geography, and democracy of a country. Others are external, such as foreign threats, political vacuums, and the changes in the balance of power. These different factors are always changing in substance and weight, thus making it impossible to come up with a formula or model to explain or predict foreign policy. In short, foreign policy, like all politics, is dynamic.⁵⁴

Thus, although institutional history has rightfully identified the United Nations as an important component in order to institutionalize an international non-proliferation norm, by creating an arena for negotiations and a channel for multilateral pressure, in order to properly explain the institutionalization of an international non-proliferation norm historians must also examining the interests of the negotiating parties, the state actors. This has been demonstrated by the research of both Nuti and Schrafstetter, who represent a relative new trend in nuclear history. Their research is gradually contributing to remove the narrative of lost opportunities that has been dominant in history of nuclear arms control. However, the first Review Conference of the NPT remains a more or less white canvas to historians.

1.3 Research Question and Demarcation

1.3.1 Research Question

As stated, the aim of this research is to contribute to broaden the knowledge of the institutionalization of a non-proliferation norm by examining the first Review Conference of the NPT. The outline of the nuclear arms control historiography above has served both to confirm that the first Review Conference is an appropriate research subject, and to inspire how a research of the Review Conference may be structured. The research of Leopoldo Nuti and Susanna Schrafstetter have demonstrated how it is necessary to examine both national interests and the dynamics of the multilateral negotiations in order to best explain the institutionalization of the non-proliferation norm. An approach that neglects to include national interests and political conflicts may risk overlooking material factors, while purely

⁵⁴ Donaldson and Noguee 2005: 3

focusing on political conflict may risk overlooking the ideational factors. Thus, in order to explain how the first Review Conference contributed towards the international institutionalization of a non-proliferation norm, this research aims to answer the following research questions:

Which roles and rationales of the parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were decisive for the conduct and outcome of the negotiations of the first Review Conference of the Treaty, 1973-1975?

By uncovering what roles the different actors played in the negotiations of the Review Conference, and what rationales that motivated and enabled these states to play such roles, this research aims to explain how a stipulation in the NPT, for a conference to review the operation of the treaty five years after its entry into force, resulted in the establishment of an entirely new mechanism of international law enforcement that has served to institutionalize nuclear non-proliferation as an international norm.

1.3.2 Periodization

In order to answer the research question above, the analysis stretches over a two-year period, from the summer of 1973 until the spring of 1975. The summer of 1973 marks the starting point for the analysis because this was approximately when the United Kingdom and the United States began to share concrete plans on how to set up a Preparatory Committee for the review. This Preparatory Committee negotiated the Rule of Procedure for the Review Conference. Consequently, in order to properly examine the interests that were decisive for the Review Conference Rule of Procedure, the analysis must include this process. The conclusion of the Review Conference on 30 May 1975 marks the conclusion of the periodization.

1.3.3 Actors

The actors in this analysis are the parties to the NPT, meaning states that had both signed and ratified the NPT, because only parties were allowed to take part in the decision-making in the review negotiations. Consequently, several powerful states are excluded from the list of actors; as either signatory states or non-parties they only influenced the review negotiations indirectly depending on how their attitudes toward the NPT influenced the

actors. Thus, non-parties such as France, China and India do not appear as actors, however, their nuclear status certainly presents highly relevant contextual factors.

When the Review Conference was convened in Geneva on 5 May 1975, the group of parties was comprised of almost one hundred members. However, a much smaller number took an active part in the negotiations. A total of 58 NPT parties participated in the first Review Conference,⁵⁵ and of these, the following played a prominent role. First, the list of actors includes the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, who were the depositary powers of the Treaty because the NPT was opened for signature in their respective capitals. Second, their close allies in the Western and Eastern blocs showed an interest in the review. From the latter group, Poland was most predominant, while from the Western bloc, Canada, Australia and the members of the European Community: Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West Germany, stood out. Of these European states, Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West Germany only deposited their ratifications of the Treaty on 2 May 1975, just in time for the Review Conference, which opened on 5 May. Thus, throughout the preparatory negotiations, these states were signatory states and were only able to influence the negotiations indirectly. Finally, Sweden, Mexico, Yugoslavia and Nigeria showed much interest in the review negotiations and acted as the representatives of the group of non-aligned states whose members generally remained in the background.

The decision to use states as main actors in this analysis is primarily methodical. The level of analysis has been made necessary by the extensive list of actors in the negotiations, the time available for this research, and the fact that the Review Conference has not been subjected to any previous historical research. Due to these factors, an in depth analysis of how state positions in the review negotiations were products of individual initiative has not been given priority. As explained when introducing the research question, I am giving priority to analyzing the dynamics between the states, expecting this approach to offer both ideational and material explanations, because a purely interstate perspective may overlook the significance of conflict. However, I do not reject that an interstate perspective may add to the explanation put forth here. The research of Thomas Risse, presented in short in the previous

⁵⁵ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq (attended only as an observer at its own request), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

section, illustrates how states are not unitary; state interests are products of the interpretations of individuals that compose different domestic interest groups. However, in this research, I generally regard all the individuals, both diplomats and politicians, as representatives of the state. According to Norwegian sociologist Iver B. Neumann, diplomats do not experience negotiations as taking place on behalf of themselves, "...they see their role as that of incorporating the Minister, their Ministry, their government, their state."⁵⁶ Thus, I have not made my selection of sources based on an interest to explain how national foreign policies are the result of domestic group interests, and I have not approached the sources with this as an aim. However, when the sources have offered such explanations, it has not been my intention to exclude them from the analysis.

There are a few disarmament politicians and diplomats that stand out in the analysis. These individuals will be briefly introduced here. Alva Myrdal and Inga Thorsson, both representing Sweden in the review negotiations, are individuals that stand out in my analysis. Alva Myrdal was appointed Swedish Ambassador to the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) when it was first set up in 1962, and continued to serve as Swedish Ambassador to Disarmament when the ENDC was enlarged and changed its name to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Inga Thorsson succeeded Myrdal as Ambassador to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, hereafter only referred to as the CCD during the review negotiations, early in 1974. The Mexican CCD Ambassador, Alfonso Garcia Robles, and Victor Isrealyan, the head of the Soviet delegation to the Review Conference are also individuals that stand out in the analysis. Finally, due to my reliance on British sources, which I will turn to shortly, there are several British diplomats who stand out in the analysis, particularly the head of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Arms Control and Disarmament Department and the British CCD Ambassador. The first position was held by David Summerhayes when the review negotiations commenced, however, before the Review Conference, Summerhayes was succeeded by John Christopher Edmonds. Equally, the ambassadorial position was first held by Henry Hainworth, who was succeeded by Mark Allen during the review negotiations. All other individuals will be properly introduced in the analysis when their introduction is called for.

⁵⁶ Neumann 2008: 153

1.4 Sources

In a field of modern international history, where there is an extensive number of actors, each with a strong tradition of producing written records, the availability of sources is overwhelming. Consequently, the main task for a historian in this field is not to retrieve material that may offer insight into a historical event or process, but to select the material that is considered to be most appropriate in order to produce new historical knowledge.

To expand knowledge of the first Review Conference of the NPT, which is the broad objective of this research, I have primarily made use of the extensive British record of the review negotiations, as well as the official record from the Review Conference, and a broad selection of autobiographic accounts and literature. The following section presents the sources and the analytical risks connected with basing the analysis on British material primarily.

1.4.1 The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office – “Songs of Self-Praise”⁵⁷

It is the official British record from the Review Conference that creates the basis for the analysis presented in this thesis. The record derives from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), because nuclear diplomacy and international nuclear arms control were part of the British diplomatic service which sorted under the Arms Control and Disarmament Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The FCO file consists of interdepartmental correspondence mainly, between the London office, the Geneva UN disarmament mission, the British IAEA delegation in Vienna, the New York UN mission and the main British embassies, for instance the British Embassy in Washington. Onto several of the machine-typed letters there are handwritten messages. This suggests that the documents are relatively informal, which is a likely result of their confidential status.

The British record is absolutely adequate for answering the research question that steers this thesis. As the analysis shows, the United Kingdom was not only in a special position to be well informed of the interests that steered the review negotiations, being both a depositary power and a member of the European Community, but was also keen to play an active role and thus put much emphasis on wide consultations in the review negotiations. As a result, the British record includes many observations and assessments of other NPT parties and their intentions and interests in the negotiations, as well as letters and statements that have

⁵⁷ The head of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Arms Control and Disarmament Department during the Review Conference, John Christopher Edmonds, used this phrase to title a letter to Frederick Jackson, the British representative in IAEA, in which he denies the possibility of an Australian presidential draft initiative, and implicitly accredits the initiative to the United Kingdom. See FCO 66/738: Letter from J. C. Edmonds, FCO ACDD, to Fredrick Jackson, the British Embassy in Vienna, 20 June 1975.

been written by representatives from other national delegations. Additionally, the record includes many official documents from the review negotiations, produced by the United Nations secretariat, as well as other UN documents and newspaper cuttings that were considered to have some sort of relevance for the Review Conference. Thus, the British record is considered to be very suitable for researching the first Review Conference of the NPT.

However, this heavy reliance on the FCO file also presents a few analytical hazards. Inescapably, the selection of sources determines how a story will be told. The United Kingdom will naturally dominate sources of British origin. It is to be expected that the British diplomatic corps somewhat exaggerate its own role in its reports of the Review Conference, not intentionally, but due to its perspective. Thus, in analyzing these sources, it is necessary to be attentive to self-flattery. Illustratively, the inclusion of British sources in Cold War studies has, according to the Norwegian Cold War historian Geir Lundestad, reintroduced the perspective of three “superpowers”.⁵⁸ Equally, the actors that are most prominent in this analysis are the actors that stand out as especially active on the British record, and had another national record been consulted the list of actors may have looked different. However, considering the role and position of the United Kingdom, it is reasonable to assume that they have not excluded important actors, though they might have included a few that were of particular importance to the United Kingdom, such as the members of the European Community.

1.4.2 Biographical Accounts

In addition to the British official record there are two biographical accounts of the first Review Conference that will function as sources for this research. While historians largely neglected the field of nuclear diplomacy during the Cold War, participants saw it as their task to describe and explain the outcome of multilateral nuclear arms control negotiations.⁵⁹ The first review of the NPT is covered in one chapter of William Epstein’s book about nuclear proliferation and arms control published in 1976, and in one chapter in Mohammed Shaker’s three-volume description of the whole non-proliferation negotiation process, published in 1980. While William Epstein was a Canadian UN disarmament consultant during the first

⁵⁸ Lundestad 2000: 66

⁵⁹ E.g. William Epstein (1976) *The Last Chance, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control*; Alva Myrdal (1977) *The Game of Disarmament, How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race*; Mohammed I. Shaker (1980) *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Origin and Implementation 1959-1979*; Glenn Seaborg (1987) *Stemming the Tide, Arms Control in the Johnson Years*; Victor Israelyan (2003) *On the Battlefields of the Cold War, a Soviet Ambassador’s Confession*.

Review Conference of the NPT, who is on occasion mentioned on the British record, Mohammed Shaker was not directly associated with the review negotiations. As an Egyptian diplomat Shaker took part in the negotiations of the NPT; however, Egypt decided not to sign the Treaty and was therefore not an actor in the review.

1.4.3 Single-Archival Research

The main reason for my single-archival approach is that Masters' research is only a limited research project, with strict time constraints. Consequently, multi-archival research could run the risk of being largely cosmetic; the greater the source selection, the greater the methodological challenges. This was an evident risk when going into this particular Masters' project, first because the first Review Conference was only described in brief in the accounts of Mohammed Shaker and William Epstein, and it was initially a time-consuming task to map out the order of events that together made up the negotiation process. Secondly, the British record that I have based my research on has only been made available during the last five to seven years, and to my knowledge not yet been extensively used. Therefore, simply sorting out the extensive material was a substantial part of my research. Due to these reasons, attempts to make a multi-archival analysis could run the risk of being unequally weighted, drawn primarily from one archive, while other archives would be incorporated only to test the findings from the first.

However, a single-archival approach does not exclude other sources. Historians must consult different types of sources in order to secure their accounts. According to the Norwegian historian Knut Kjedstaldi, sources must be tested for external consistency.⁶⁰ To test the external consistency of the British sources, the documents have been crosschecked with the published Final Document from the Review Conference, produced by the UN secretariat, which gives a short description of the conference, its general conduct, and a list of all the participants. As such, these documents have been helpful in associating individuals that have not been fully introduced by the British record. Some of these Review Conference documents are also included in the British record, as are some of the official documents from the Preparatory Committee, thereby suggesting the reliability of the British record. In addition to primary sources, much literature is excellent for testing outer consistency and for offering suggestions on the relevant international context of the review negotiations and the general positions and interests of the actors in the review negotiation.

⁶⁰ Kjedstaldi 1999: 181

1.5 Structure of Thesis

In order to analyze the roles and rationales of the NPT parties in the review negotiations, this thesis is divided into five chapters: this introductory chapter, three analysis chapters and a concluding chapter. Chapter two presents an analysis of the interests of the NPT parties in the NPT and its Review Conference. In doing so, the analysis serves to explain both the main divisions regarding issues of substance and the formal organization of the Review Conference, and which states were in position to play pivotal roles in the review. Thus, this chapter provides a necessary foundation for the analysis of the dynamics of the review negotiations in the following two chapters.

Chapter three presents an analysis of how the roles and rationale of the NPT parties in the negotiations of the Rule of Procedure, which were conducted in the Preparatory Committee. Thus, the chapter commences with an analysis of how the Preparatory Committee was set up, and thereafter explains how the two major conflicting issues regarding the Rule of Procedure, the rule of access and the rule of decision-making, were settled. Chapter four presents an analysis of the roles and rationales of the NPT-parties in the negotiations in the Review Conference. These negotiations were primarily concerned with the formulation of a Final Document.

The three analysis chapters are concluded with a short summary that highlights the main findings in each chapter. These summaries provide the basis for chapter five, which presents the conclusions of this research; how a vague and contested stipulation in the NPT resulted in the establishment of a periodic review system for the treaty. As the next chapter demonstrates, while the review negotiations were in a sense a continuation of the NPT negotiations the historical context was changed, and thus, the roles and rationales were altered.

CHAPTER 2:

Revision or Reinforcement

Opposing Interests in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

...most Non-Nuclear Weapon States would argue that the treaty ought to have as much to do with “vertical proliferation” as with “horizontal proliferation”.⁶¹

Henry Hainworth, British Ambassador to Disarmament, 5 October 1973.

2.1 Introduction

The broad objective of this research is to explain how a stipulation in the NPT, for a conference to review the operation of the Treaty five years after its entry into force, resulted in the establishment of an entirely new mechanism of international law enforcement that has served to institutionalize nuclear non-proliferation as an international norm. Virtually everything about the Review Conference, apart from its broad objective, found no regulation in the Treaty.⁶² As a result, both the organization and purpose of the conference were subjected to multilateral negotiations, both prior to, and during the Review Conference.

In order to explain the outcome of these multilateral negotiations, knowledge of what motivates state behavior in multilateral negotiations is a precondition. Generally, state behavior is considered to be motivated by power potentials; states seek to increase their international influence and prevent one-ended dependency. However, as discussed in the introductory chapter, to serve this purpose states may choose from a variety of methods; power is not monodimensional. The purpose of this chapter is to explain what interests the parties to the NPT had in the review of the Treaty, and those factors that may account for these interests. In doing so, this chapter suggests which states were in positions to influence

⁶¹ FCO 66/469: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 5 October 1973.

⁶² Article VIII, paragraph 3 in the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* reads: “Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purpose of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty”⁶²

the review negotiations, and it thereby provides a necessary foundation for the analysis of the dynamics of the review negotiations in the following two chapters.

This chapter is divided into two main parts: part one analyzes the interests of the large and heterogeneous group of non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT in the Review Conference. Part two analyzes the interests of the three nuclear weapon states party to the NPT, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The chapter concludes with a short summary of the chapter findings.

2.2 General and Comprehensive Disarmament

According to the Egyptian diplomat, Mohammed Shaker, a conference to review the operation of the NPT was first suggested in an American NPT draft dating back to 1965.⁶³ The suggestion was intended to curb the concern expressed by members of the of the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee, where the NPT was negotiated, that the treaty did not properly secure the obligation of nuclear weapon states to take part in disarmament negotiations in “good faith”.⁶⁴ As explained in chapter one, the ENDC derived from a change in the UN approach to disarmament. William Epstein also agrees that the intention of the Review Conference was to ensure that the nuclear weapon states were fulfilling their commitments.⁶⁵ While IAEA safeguards were a means of verifying that the non-nuclear parties were living up to their pledges not to go nuclear, the Treaty contained no means of verifying that the nuclear weapon states were abiding by their pledges to promote peaceful usage of nuclear energy and to halt nuclear testing and reverse the nuclear arms race.⁶⁶ Thus, the non-nuclear weapon states regarded it to be the purpose of the Review Conference to ensure that the nuclear weapon states were fulfilling their treaty commitments by reaffirming their commitment to the NPT as a gradual disarmament scheme aimed towards general and comprehensive disarmament.⁶⁷

However, despite their shared interpretation of the broad purpose of the NPT and its Review Conference, the group on non-nuclear weapon states was heterogeneous, divided politically, economically and militarily. While the majority of the industrialized non-nuclear weapon states were members of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact, and thereby protected by

⁶³ Shaker 1980: 872

⁶⁴ Article VI, *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

⁶⁵ Epstein 1976: 244

⁶⁶ Epstein 1976: 244

⁶⁷ FCO 66/469: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 5 October 1973.

the nuclear umbrella of their respective superpowers, the developing non-nuclear weapon states were loosely organized in the Non-Aligned Movement. Due to these differences, the non-nuclear weapon state did not approach the Review Conference in unison; their priorities in the review and their position to realize them varied greatly.

2.2.1 The Industrialized Alliances

The majority of the industrialized non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT were united by one common feature; they were organized in military alliances according to ideology. Consequently, maintaining amicable relations within these alliances, which were considered to guarantee the national security of each member, was of major importance to these non-nuclear weapon states. However, despite this one obvious similarity, little united NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The two alliances were based on completely opposite systems of power. While the non-nuclear weapon states in the Warsaw Pact were Soviet satellites under authoritarian rule, whose foreign policies were largely formulated in Moscow, NATO was composed primarily of liberal democracies. Contrary to the Soviet Union, the United States could not dictate NATO's foreign policy; NATO's members were free to criticize the actions of the United States. Thus, they were also in a position to influence American actions. Therefore, in order to explain the outcome of the first Review Conference of the NPT, accounting for the actions of the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO is given priority; the actions of the Soviet satellites are generally covered in the analysis of the Soviet Union later in this chapter.

Western Demands for Endorsement

The Western non-nuclear weapon states regarded it to be the purpose of the Review Conference to endorse the NPT as a means toward achieving general and comprehensive disarmament. This was expressed by Canada already during the preparations for the Review Conference, who warned that the disarmament commitment of the nuclear weapon states was an issue that could not be overlooked at the conference.⁶⁸ Canada thereby signaled to her allies that she was inclined to take part in criticizing the disarmament efforts of the nuclear weapon states. There are several factors that may serve to explain why the Western non-nuclear weapon states opted for this position. With regards to Canada, it should not be ruled out that Canada's position as a significant uranium and nuclear technology supplier enabled

⁶⁸ FCO 66/590: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes in the FCO, 22 January 1974.

Canada to put pressure on the United States in respect of nuclear issues.⁶⁹ Another reasonable assumption is that the independent position of Western Europe during the early 1970s encouraged the Western non-nuclear weapon states to test their powers opposite the United States in the review.

The relatively independent position of the Western European states in the early 1970s was partly a result of the NPT. Since the end of the Second World War, the relationship with America was of fundamental importance to the Europeans. According to the historian Marc Trachtenberg, the "...United States was the protectors of West Europe; the freedom of Europe, it was generally believed, depended on American military power."⁷⁰ The NPT however, transformed the relationship between the United States and Europe. As explained in the introductory chapter, the American decision in 1965 to give priority to a non-proliferation treaty, at the expense of NATO's plans for nuclear sharing, was badly received in Western Europe.⁷¹ According to Leopoldo Nuti, this turn was regarded as a sign that Europe's role in US foreign policy was decreasing. The Western European governments believed that the American motive for pursuing a non-proliferation treaty was to achieve an honorable peace in Vietnam. In the mid-1960s, the United States increased its involvement in the decolonization war in Indo-China to prevent the spread of communism in Asia. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was threatening to assist the North Vietnamese communists. Thus, an honorable peace was only thought possible with the diplomatic help of the Soviet Union.⁷² A non-proliferation treaty was a means to this end, because one of the Soviet Union's main goals was to prevent a revanchist West Germany armed with nuclear weapons.⁷³

Initially, the only Western European state that supported the NPT was the United Kingdom, whose nuclear weapon status was endorsed by the NPT. Reactions were particularly resentful in the states that had been defeated in the previous war, Italy and West Germany. West German politicians went as far as to characterize the NPT as "a Versailles of cosmic proportions"⁷⁴, because it instituted West Germany as a secondary power. They found it especially difficult to accept the NPT because it forced them to come to terms with the partition of Germany.⁷⁵ Prior to the NPT, West German politicians regarded the nuclear

⁶⁹ Canada has large deposits of uranium; and was the world's largest uranium exporter in 2008, according to the Canadian Nuclear Association. The significance of Canada as a nuclear supplier is illustrated by the inclusion of Canada in the exclusive Nuclear Supplier Group, see Wilmshurts 1984: 28.

⁷⁰ Trachtenberg 2003: vii

⁷¹ Nuti 2010: 95

⁷² Nuti 2010: 100

⁷³ Donaldson and Noguee 2005: 95

⁷⁴ Nuti 2010: 96

⁷⁵ Nuti 2010: 97

option as leverage and a potential bargaining chip in order to achieve German reunification. The United States and the United Kingdom did eventually succeed in convincing their Western allies, including West Germany, of the political and economic significance of NPT membership; however, as explained in the introductory chapter, substantial concessions were necessary in order to secure the European signatures.

The Western European governments responded to the perceived downsizing of Europe's role in US foreign policy by consolidating their position opposite the United States. First, regional integration was strengthened in 1973 when the United Kingdom joined the European Community.⁷⁶ Second, West Germany adopted a conciliatory tone towards East Germany and the Soviet Union, known as the policy of *Ostpolitik*.⁷⁷ These political efforts, combined with the strong position of the West German economy, may serve to explain why the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO decided to criticize the United States in the review.

Additionally, domestic pressure may also serve as a possible explanation for the actions of NATO's non-nuclear weapon states in the Review Conference. As liberal democracies, it is reasonable to assume that the elected governments within these states were exposed to both popular demands for nuclear disarmament and domestic political pressure to challenge the United States to signal discontent with American disregard of European politics.⁷⁸

However, the Western non-nuclear weapon states' position opposite the United States should not be exaggerated. Their demand was that the Review Conference should reaffirm the political significance of the NPT and thereby legitimized the European decisions to sign the Treaty. However, the NATO states did not demand revision of the Treaty, accepting that provisions for amendments were covered in another paragraph in the NPT.⁷⁹ This position was confirmed in a meeting of the European Community group at an early stage of the review negotiations. Thus, the European states stood by the Dutch position, that the purpose of the review was to reinforce, rather than to rectify the Treaty, expressed during a NATO disarmament meeting held back in October 1973.⁸⁰ At the time, the Netherlands, West Germany, Luxemburg, Belgium and Italy had not yet ratified the NPT.

⁷⁶ Dobson 1995: 140

⁷⁷ See for instance Michal Smith (1984) *The Western Europe and the United States. The Uncertain Alliance*.

⁷⁸ The analysis of the interests of the United Kingdom later in this chapter reveals that this was a case of concern for the strategists in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that other Western Allies were also influenced by such concerns.

⁷⁹ The procedure for amendments is covered by Article VIII, paragraph 2, *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

⁸⁰ See FCO 66/469: NATO Disarmament Expert's Meeting, 9-10 October 1973.

2.2.2 The Non-Aligned Movement

Contrary to the allied non-nuclear weapon states, the non-aligned non-nuclear weapon states demanded revision of the NPT in the Review Conference. These states were loosely organized in the Non-Aligned Movement, which was founded on a pledge of neutrality in the Cold War alliance system. This group was predominantly composed of former European colonies whose decision to pledge neutrality upon independence was motivated by a fear of neo-colonialism. Because the majority of the non-aligned states were developing countries, they were also known as the Group of 77. This name was first used in 1960, when 77 developing countries came together in the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development.⁸¹ By the 1970s, this number had risen to over a 100, although they still retained the original label. These developing states considered it to be the fundamental purpose of the Review Conference to address, and correct, what they regarded as being inherently discriminatory character of the NPT. The following paragraphs discuss how the non-aligned states proposed to correct the NPT and how their actions in the review may be explained.

To ensure that the nuclear weapon states kept their treaty commitments, to provide technical nuclear assistance and to engage in negotiations for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of the arms race, the non-aligned states proposed that the United Nations, as the body most representative for the whole world community, should organize the NPT review.⁸² This idea was raised back in 1973, at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The vocal frontrunners of the non-aligned group, Mexico, Yugoslavia and Sweden, suggested that the United Nations should establish an International Disarmament Organization with a mandate to monitor compliance with disarmament agreements, and as such function as a means for making major powers accountable to the international community. It was argued that if the organization of the review was left to the depositary governments, all of which were nuclear weapon states, the review would risk strengthening the discriminatory features inherent in the Treaty, when it

⁸¹ Epstein 1976: 248

⁸² There are several references to the proposals for an International Disarmament Organization in the British record of the Review Conference. (E.g. FCO 66/468: Letter from Noël Marshall in the FCO ACDD, to Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 15 August 1973; FCO 66/468: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall, FCO ACDD, 25 August 1973; FCO 66/470: Priority Telegram no. 101 from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva (in New York), to FCO, 30 October 1973.) According to these accounts, the proposal was originally Swedish, however, Sweden traditionally aligned with the developing states in disarmament issues, thus it is reasonable to count the International Disarmament Organization as a non-aligned proposal.

should instead contribute to “...get away from the precedent that had been established under the NPT of the Three Depository Powers being the three nuclear weapons states.”⁸³

The motivation for the non-aligned group in suggesting that the review of the NPT should be organized by the United Nations seems fairly obvious. The non-aligned states had little leverage in international politics. Insisting on remaining neutral in the Cold War alliance system, yet hardly economically independent, the movement was not in any position to impose its will on the superpowers. However, they did have one major advantage. In the 1970s, the non-aligned states constituted a majority in the United Nations. As a result of a wave of colonial independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the size of the Non-Aligned Movement had increased, and the balance of power in the United Nations had shifted to their advantage.⁸⁴ Thus, the United Nations General Assembly was the one place in which the non-aligned states actually enjoyed some power.

However, the size of the non-aligned states did also pose a disadvantage. The large group was heterogeneous; the priorities of its members in the Review Conference were diverse. While a few non-aligned states had joined the NPT because of its promise of nuclear disarmament, others had signed the Treaty primarily because of its promises of technological assistance for nuclear energy. Most developing countries were interested in nuclear energy in order to promote their developing industries, and this interest was strengthened by the Arab oil embargo in 1973, which raised the price of oil by 70 percent. The embargo caused an international oil crisis, with serious implications for the economies of the developing countries.⁸⁵ Consequently, most non-aligned states valued the NPT because it promised to remove their oil-dependency.

There is a second reason that suggests that the confrontational demands expressed by the group’s few vocal frontrunners, Mexico, Yugoslavia and Sweden, were not necessarily representative of the entire non-aligned group. According to the historian Glenda Sluga, postcolonial states sought affirmation of their national independence through the offices of the United Nations and the treaties endorsed by the United Nations.⁸⁶ Thus, it is possible that international recognition was a major motive for many developing states to sign the NPT, and that nuclear disarmament was secondary.

⁸³ According to the British record of the review of the NPT, the non-aligned proposal for an International Disarmament Organization was originally a Swedish proposal, raised by the Swedish Ambassador to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in 1973. See FCO 66/469: Priority Telegram no. 90 from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva (in New York), to FCO, 23 October 1973.

⁸⁴ Sluga 2010: 223

⁸⁵ Burman 1991: 135-136

⁸⁶ Sluga 2010: 224

While the non-aligned states were divided regarding their priorities of interests in the review negotiation, there is one non-aligned state that stands out because of strong incentives not to contribute to this division. The contradictory position of Sweden, as being both Western and neutral, suggests that Sweden had a special interest in the review to simply affirm its position among the non-aligned states. Sweden's dual role as both an industrialized European and a non-NATO member was the reason why Sweden traditionally sided with the Non-Aligned Movement in matters regarding disarmament. In order to explain the position of Sweden in the field of nuclear diplomacy during the 1970s, it is essential to understand the unique logic of Swedish neutrality policy during the Cold War.

Sweden – Neutral and Industrialized

Sweden was not the only industrialized and neutral non-nuclear weapon state in the Review Conference; several other industrialized non-nuclear weapon states were not official members of military alliances, including Australia, Austria, Finland and New Zealand. However, nuclear weapons and non-alignment played an essential role in Swedish neutrality policy, and as a result Sweden became a widely respected actor in the field of nuclear diplomacy, among both the non-aligned states and the nuclear weapon states.

Swedish policy on neutrality has long traditions. Neutrality in military conflicts originated in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars in the early 19th century, when Sweden was transformed from a major power to a small state, and has been pursued by Sweden ever since.⁸⁷ However, Swedish pursuit of militarily neutrality was not synonymous with ideological impartiality. As a Western style democracy, Sweden had an expressed preference for the Western political system during the Cold War and less sympathy for the governments of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, in order to make military neutrality credible to the eyes of the outside world during the Cold War, Sweden declared itself as being non-aligned in peacetime and developed a strong military force.⁸⁸ It was considered essential that the international community would be convinced of Sweden's serious determination to defend her security by her own military means.

⁸⁷ Sweden officially declared her intentions to remain neutral in military conflicts in accordance with the Hague Convention of 1907 after the establishment of NATO in 1949. The only recognized exception to neutrality was that of taking part in sanctions decided by the United Nations Security Council. See Prawitz 1995: 3

⁸⁸ According to Jan Prawitz, contrary to the policy of neutrality, there existed Swedish plans to take sides with NATO if the Warsaw Pact attacked Sweden. Thus, the speculation that Sweden was in reality protected by the NATO nuclear shield have largely been confirmed, however, this was denied during the Cold War. It should not be ruled out that such a security guarantee made a difference in the Swedish decision to sign the NPT, however, it did not affect the neutrality strategy of Sweden, which was intended to convince outsiders that such an agreement was inexistent. See Prawitz 1995: 3-5.

According to Jan Prawitz, who served as an advisor in the Swedish disarmament delegation in Geneva from 1962 to 1992, it was from this rationale that the Swedish nuclear weapon option developed. Based on the assumption that Swedish security had no value to either bloc, but that control of Swedish territory might be of value for either bloc in support of its actions against the other, Sweden developed a sizable military defense, which included extensive nuclear weapon research. The Swedish decision to explore the nuclear weapon option was initially without special political meaning. According to Jan Prawitz, during the first decade of the Cold War, the Swedish decision-makers and the Swedish public simply considered nuclear weapons to be more powerful conventional weapons, and it was argued that Sweden, as a modern and developed country, should not be forced to fight with weapons inferior to those of an enemy. However, during the 1950s and 1960s, several political parties split over the issue, among them the Social Democratic Party which had been governing Sweden with a large majority since the end of the Second World War.

The Swedish nuclear weapons research serves to explain why Sweden became a widely respected actor in the field of nuclear diplomacy, according to Jan Prawitz.⁸⁹ The Swedish decision to research a nuclear weapon option produced extensive technical nuclear competencies which enabled Sweden to be a constructive party in international arms control negotiations. For instance, Swedish seismology competencies, partly acquired in order to make a Swedish underground nuclear weapon test possible, enabled Sweden to propose schemes for seismic verification for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The same technological competency also qualified Sweden to control compliance by the nuclear weapon states with existing arms control treaties. The Swedish ability to be both constructive and controlling enabled Sweden to adopt a leading position among the non-aligned states in arms control negotiations. The majority of the non-aligned states were developing countries that did not possess the technology to challenge the scientific arguments of the nuclear weapon states, thus they probably welcomed Swedish representation.

It is also reasonable to assume that the political implications of the Swedish nuclear weapons research contributed towards making Sweden a significant actor in the field of nuclear diplomacy. The nuclear option was a subject of much political debate in Sweden, and consequently most Swedish politicians were both engaged and trained in nuclear weapons politics. The issue of nuclear non-proliferation particularly attracted Swedish women, and the Social Democratic Women's Association was active in the national debate. This may serve to

⁸⁹ Prawitz 1995: 28

explain why the first two Swedish ambassadors to Disarmament in Geneva were female. In order to indicate the political importance of nuclear diplomacy to Sweden, the Swedish CCD Ambassador was a political position. While serving in Geneva, Alva Myrdal was ranked as Minister of State, while Inga Thorsson was ranked as Secretary of State, junior to the Minister.⁹⁰ Both these women had their political background from the Social Democratic Women's Association, and as such, the mobilization against Swedish nuclear weapons partly contributed to pave the way for female participation in Swedish and international politics.⁹¹

The Swedish decision to sign the NPT in 1968 was based on the assessment that Swedish security was best served without nuclear weapons. By 1968, Swedish acquisition of nuclear weapons was considered to put Swedish security at risk, instead of strengthening it. This decision marks a shift in the Swedish neutrality policy, from relying on hard power based on weapons, to soft power based on mediation.⁹² The nuclear option was no longer considered necessary for convincing the outside world that Sweden was militarily non-aligned; Swedish research to this effect had enabled Sweden to accomplish its status as neutral through the means of diplomacy.

2.3 A Pandora's Box

The three nuclear weapon states had a very different interpretation of the Review Conference than that of the Non-Aligned Movement. Firstly, neither the superpowers nor the United Kingdom accepted that the NPT was discriminatory. David Ennals, the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, expressed this accordingly:

HMG [Her Majesty's Government] have never regarded the NPT as just a one-sided or 'discriminatory' treaty, since it surely goes without saying that the spread of nuclear weapons in the world poses an even

⁹⁰ In conversation with Jan Prawitz during the fall 2010, I was told that the idea to make the Swedish Ambassador in Geneva a political position was adopted from the United Kingdom. The intent was to signal that the issue of disarmament carried considerable political weight to Sweden, and Alva Myrdal was thus made Minister of State, reporting directly under the Swedish Prime Minister, when she was appointed the Swedish representative to the ENDC in 1962. Inga Thorsson however, was only made Secretary of State, not because disarmament carried less political weight, but because contrary to Myrdal, Thorsson was largely active in domestic politics as well, and the Swedish Prime Minister at the time, Olof Palme, did not wish to give Thorsson an opportunity to take a seat in the Swedish parliament and meddle in domestic affairs. This is shortly referred in the Lars Lindskog's biography of Inga Thorsson, *Att förändra verkligheten: porträtt av Inga Thorsson*, 1990.

⁹¹ See for instance Sondra R. Herman (1998) *The Woman Inside the Negotiations: Alva Myrdal's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1961-1982*, about her role as the sole female negotiator in multinational disarmament negotiations.

⁹² The concepts of soft power and hard power were first presented by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2007) He defines soft power as "getting others to want the outcome that you want" through persuasion, instead of coercion.

greater threat, if anything, to non-nuclear weapon states than to those, like ourselves, which already have nuclear weapons.⁹³

The Soviet Union was equally categorical, expressing in a tripartite meeting with the two other depositary powers that “[t]he only weakness with the whole non-proliferation idea was that the NPT was not universal; the USSR did not accept that there were any loopholes in the Treaty.”⁹⁴ Consequently, the purpose of the review, according to the nuclear weapon states, was not to review the Treaty, but to review the operation of the Treaty.⁹⁵ The nuclear weapon states were united in their interests to keep the conference from amending the Treaty. The Americans argued that amendments were premature, and could weaken the Treaty.⁹⁶ Revision, however well intended, was regarded as opening a “Pandora’s box of unmanageable difficulties”⁹⁷; in order to strengthen the Treaty, revisions would require unanimous support.

The nuclear weapon states were also opposed to the United Nations organizing the conference to review the NPT.⁹⁸ Both the United States and the United Kingdom insisted that the conference was principally wholly independent of the United Nations, because the NPT was not a United Nations’ product. Although the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee was set up by the UN, it was an ad hoc organization. There are two factors that may serve to explain why the nuclear weapon states wished to keep the review independent of the United Nations. First, the formal association of the Review Conference with the United Nations could reduce the possibility for the nuclear weapon states to influence the terms of the review. As explained above, the recent numerical expansion of the United Nations had shifted the balance of power in the General Assembly in favor of the developing states. However, more importantly for the nuclear weapon states perhaps, a discussion of the Review Conference in the United Nations could result in unwanted confrontations with non-parties who would be able to express their opinions if the matter was raised in a United Nations setting. Both the

⁹³ FCO 66/597: Letter from D. Ennals, to N. A. Sims, London School of Economics and Political Science, 22 July 1974.

⁹⁴ FCO 66/735: Record of the UK/US/USSR Consultations on the NPT Review Conference, held at FCO on 21-22 April 1975.

⁹⁵ FCO 66/469: Letter from Freddy Jackson at the British Embassy in Vienna, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 15 October 1973.

⁹⁶ FCO 66/468: Points Based on NPT Review Conference Position Paper, 21 August 1973.

⁹⁷ The general meaning of “opening Pandora’s box” is to create evil that cannot be undone. FCO 66/469: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 19 September 1973.

⁹⁸ See for example the American position paper, FCO 66/468: Points Based on NPT Review Conference Position Paper, 21 August 1973, FCO 66/468: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall in the FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 22 August 1973, or FCO 66/468: Letter from A. E. Montgomery in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 18 September 1973.

Soviet Union and the United States were also opposed to any follow-up mechanism of the review, and regarded it best if there was no further Review Conferences, although recognizing that this could prove difficult to avoid.⁹⁹ The second part of paragraph 3 of Article VIII provides that the parties may meet at intervals of five years with the same objective to review the operation of the treaty, if a proposal to this effect is submitted by a majority of parties.¹⁰⁰

Despite general agreement on both purpose and organizational structure, the three nuclear weapon states approached the Review Conference rather differently. This became clear when the three nuclear weapon states attempted to align their positions just before the Review Conference was convened. The British records of these meetings serve as the basis for the analysis presented in the following sections.

2.3.1 The United States – Evasion

The aim of the United States in the review negotiations was to play down the political significance of the NPT and instead keep the focus on the technical provisions of the Treaty. There were multiple reasons why the United States wished to evade the political meaning of the NPT. First and perhaps foremost, the United States saw no reason to give into the demands of the non-nuclear weapon states for political measures, such as disarmament commitments or security guarantees, convinced that the signatory-states would ratify the Treaty before long, regardless of any actions undertaken by the nuclear weapon states.¹⁰¹ The US administration regarded the potential of the NPT as spent; the treaty was not considered to have any inhibiting effects on action by the non-parties. They were certain that disarmament would create a lively debate in the review, however, they were convinced that “...it was not likely that anyone would withdraw from the NPT because the best NWS [nuclear weapon states] could produce on this subject was not considered good enough.”¹⁰²

Recalling the assessment of the British Minister of State, David Ennals, the nuclear weapon states regarded the NPT to be more important for the non-nuclear weapon states than for themselves. There is little doubt the American administration under Richard Nixon, and later Gerald Ford shared this point of view.¹⁰³ According to Thomas C. Reed and Danny B.

⁹⁹ FCO 66/735: Record of the UK/US/USSR Consultations on the NPT Review Conference, held at FCO on 21-22 April 1975.

¹⁰⁰ Article VIII, paragraph 3, *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

¹⁰¹ FCO 66/734: Letter from T. C. Orr, ACDD, FCO, to C. J. Makins, UK Embassy in Washington, 28 March 1975, and enclosed reports.

¹⁰² FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at FCO, meeting at 3.00 PM on 20 March 1975.

¹⁰³ Richard Nixon became the President of the United States in 1969. During his second period, his Vice-President Gerald Ford, replaced Nixon as president, when Nixon resigned as a consequence of the the Watergate

Stillman's contribution to the literature on nuclear proliferation, Richard Nixon spoke against American ratification of the NPT as a presidential candidate in 1968, and once in office he executed an internal national security decision memorandum instructing the bureaucracy to refrain from active support of the treaty.¹⁰⁴ Equally, one of Nixon's many biographers, Robert Dallek, has written that President Richard Nixon's commitment to arms control was strategic, and carried no political or economic costs.¹⁰⁵

Second, keeping focus on the technical provisions of the NPT could prove advantageous because it could serve to split and weaken the non-nuclear weapon states. As explained in the section on the Non-Aligned Movement, the promise of technical assistance was the main motivation for many developing states to sign the Treaty. Thus, the American opening speech for the Review Conference was designed to present the NPT attractively in light of the recent energy crisis: "It would be designed to leave the impression that those who wished to get the best deal on energy should be members of the NPT."¹⁰⁶ In the speech, the United States proposed the establishment of regional or multi-national nuclear fuel cycle centers. The idea was that these regional plants could give non-nuclear weapon states the technology to reprocess plutonium or enrich uranium. Thus, the non-nuclear weapon states did not need to depend on the nuclear weapon states for nuclear fuel for their energy plants. However, the American offer did not stretch far beyond promises. The United States said that there remained a period of two or three years before such arrangements would be needed and that this would give time to discuss how a rational market could be developed to meet the proposal.

However, it was not only consideration towards the NPT parties that was important in shaping US actions in the review negotiations. In order to explain the underlying reason why the United States wished to play down the significance of the NPT, it is essential to take into account the relative decline of American power in the world in the early 1970s.

Détente - Damage Limitation

The relative decline of American power in the 1970s was partly a result of the American commitments in Vietnam which had severely damaged America's reputation as the protector of democracy both internationally and domestically and was partly the result of

Scandal in 1973. Nixon was accused of having knowledge about the break-in to the Democratic headquarter during the 1972 election, and in order to avoid trial, he resigned.

¹⁰⁴ Reed and Stillman 2009: 121

¹⁰⁵ Dallek 2007: 136

¹⁰⁶ FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at FCO, meeting at 11.15 AM on 20 March 1975.

general American economic decline.¹⁰⁷ This economic decline was marked by several indicators; the share of US world trade was decreasing, as its rate of growth was below that of Japan and Western Europe.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, to add to the relative decline of American power, the Soviet Union had invested greatly in reaching nuclear parity with the United States after the Cuban Missile Crisis and by 1970 the United States had lost its long-enjoyed advantage in respect of nuclear capacity.¹⁰⁹

To cope with the situation, the American administration under President Richard Nixon and President Gerald Ford pursued a foreign policy usually referred to as *détente*, which is French for relaxation of political tension.¹¹⁰ The policy attempted to limit the damage caused by declining American power by relaxing tension between the Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States was not in a position to afford superpower confrontation, thus their aim was to convince the Soviet Union that confrontation was unfavorable. The chief benefit of *détente* was to secure Soviet assistance in extricating the United States from the war in Vietnam under conditions that would not constitute a defeat.¹¹¹ There had been previous signs of *détente* between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the American President and Soviet Chairman installed a telephone line between their offices in order to enhance dialogue and prevent repetition of the previous event. However, it is particularly the disarmament negotiations of the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) that began in 1969 and the Helsinki Accords in 1975 that are considered the mileposts of Soviet-American *détente*.

As the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks suggest, nuclear diplomacy was an important component of the damage limitation policy of *détente*. In the field of nuclear arms control, the United States and the Soviet Union had shared interests that enabled them to engage in constructive dialogue. For instance, both superpowers had an economic interest in ending the arms race which consumed much of the national budget.¹¹² However, contrary to the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Americans saw no prospects of improving US relationships through the NPT review. Instead the US feared that the review negotiations could damage the superpower *détente*. First, the conference could damage the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitations Talks by forcing the superpowers to take hastened stands in disarmament

¹⁰⁷ Burman 1991: 132

¹⁰⁸ Burman 1991: 131

¹⁰⁹ Gavin 2010: 189

¹¹⁰ Burman 1991: 138

¹¹¹ Donaldson and Noguee 2005: 96

¹¹² According to estimates presented by Alva Myrdal (1977), upwards of \$300 billion was spent each year in the armament race, of which the Warsaw Pact and NATO were responsible for 4/5. See Myrdal 1977: 4.

matters that were in the process of being negotiated bilaterally.¹¹³ Second, the United States feared that the Soviet Union would attempt to use the NPT negotiations to criticize China, in order to challenge China's strong position opposite that of the Soviet Union. Another important component of *détente* was the United States' relationship with China. After the official Sino-Soviet split in 1964, China had replaced the United States as the Soviet Union's most threatening enemy, because China challenged Soviet leadership in the communist bloc.¹¹⁴ China's acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964 had further strengthened China's position opposite that of the Soviet Union. Thus, in order to make superpower confrontation unfavorable for the Soviet Union, the United States actively pursued undermining Soviet power through a policy of Sino-American *détente*. Thus, going into the negotiations of the review of the NPT, US bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union and China were given great priority by the American administration.

This US concern about containing disagreement with the Soviet Union about the Review Conference in order to prevent spill-over into other areas of importance for US relations with the Soviet Union was communicated to the British when the United Kingdom suggested the organization of a tripartite meeting to coordinate the positions of the three nuclear weapon states in advance of the fast approaching Review Conference. The US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, agreed to the British proposal on the condition that the United States and the United Kingdom met and aligned their positions in advance of the tripartite meeting, because he was anxious that the Soviet Union would attempt to use the tripartite meeting to press for the adoption of joint positions that could constitute pressure on China.¹¹⁵ As explained in the introductory chapter, China had decided not to sign the NPT for reasons of principle. Thus, it seems reasonable that in order not to put the Sino-American *détente* at risk, the US would oppose any endorsement of the Treaty which could potentially be considered offensive by the Chinese. The US had already hinted at this early on in the review preparations when they suggested that a final declaration should not attempt to anger or attack the Chinese.¹¹⁶ Considerations relating to Chinese attitudes may also serve as an

¹¹³ This argument is used in the rejection of the British proposal for a Quota Test Ban, which will be explained in more detail as this chapter turns to the British interests in the review. See both FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at FCO, meeting at 3.00 PM on 20 March 1975, and FCO 66/735: Record of the UK/US/USSR Consultations on the NPT Review Conference, held at FCO on 21-22 April 1975.

¹¹⁴ Small 1999: 100

¹¹⁵ Kissinger's reply was communicated by his deputy, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, to the British Ambassador in Washington, Peter Ramsbotham: FCO 66/734: Priority FCO telegram nr. 854 of 8 March, into Moscow, routine UKDIS Geneva and Vienna.

¹¹⁶ FCO 66/591: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes, FCO ACDD, 8 February 1974.

explanation as to why the United States was opposed to discussing the NPT in the United Nations General Assembly.

This interpretation of the importance of China to Kissinger is in accordance with the historian, Jeremi Suri's analysis of Kissinger. According to Suri, China and the perception of polycentrism is a paradigm in any explanation of international politics in the 1970s because polycentrism was an essential component of the geopolitical vision of Henry Kissinger.¹¹⁷ Suri explains how Henry Kissinger was inspired by the *realpolitik* of the late 19th century German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. According to Kissinger, the German chancellor had correctly recognized that peace did not come from universal claims of authority, but emerged from coordination among diverse sovereigns. Kissinger made this the premise of his own foreign politics. Inspired by Bismarck's *realpolitik*, Kissinger argued that bipolarity was not a source of strategic stability. He dismissed the argument, held by many of his contemporaries, that bipolarity was a source of stability because it created a set of shared interests for the two adversaries in preserving the status quo. Instead, he insisted that bipolarity "...encouraged risk taking by a leader who was convinced of his counterpart's aversion to such behavior".¹¹⁸ To Kissinger, a case in point was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Instead of suggesting that bipolarity was the reason why the Cuban Missile Crisis did not result in nuclear war, Kissinger argued that bipolarity had caused the Cuban Missile Crisis.

However, it was not only the triangular policy designed to deal with the Soviet Union and China that concerned the American administration. In Kissinger's response to the British request for tripartite meetings, similar political considerations arose in respect of the French attitude towards the NPT. However, these were not motivated by *détente*. Considerations relating to France were given priority by the United States in the review of the NPT because France played a key role in the US non-proliferation strategy that was prompted by the Indian nuclear test in May 1974.¹¹⁹ The Indian nuclear test explosion was the biggest step towards nuclear proliferation since the signing of the NPT in 1968. Prior to the Indian nuclear test, no country had joined the nuclear club since China in 1964. The Indian government insisted that the test was of a purely peaceful nature, and that it was not the Indian intention to build a military nuclear program. However, these reassurances were of little value to the international community, and Pakistan in particular dismissed such guaranties.¹²⁰ Regardless of their

¹¹⁷ Suri 2010: 174-175

¹¹⁸ Suri 2010: 180-181

¹¹⁹ On May 18, 1974, India tested a nuclear device in the desert of Rajasthan.

¹²⁰ Pakistani reactions to the Indian nuclear test are recorded in FCO 66/604: Implications of Indian nuclear test for Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference 1975.

intentions, the Indian nuclear test explosion signaled a commencement on India's part to strengthen its nuclear option. Inescapably, India's newly acquired technology was leverage in the ongoing border disputes between the two neighboring countries.

France and the Nuclear Supplier Group

Finally, considerations relating to France may also serve to explain why the United States attempted to play down the political significance of the NPT in the review negotiations. In the wake of the Indian nuclear test explosion in 1974, the United States commenced pursuing a policy designed to establish a uniform code for nuclear export behavior.¹²¹ The Indian nuclear test, which was codenamed "the Smiling Buddha", had exposed the need for additional nuclear export regulations. The Indian test was not technically a breach of the system of control established by the NPT.¹²² The test was conducted with plutonium that had been produced in a reactor supplied by Canada for peaceful purposes.¹²³ The conditions of supply imposed by the Canadians called for "peaceful use". However, they did not specify against peaceful nuclear explosions which the Indians claimed to have conducted. The fuel, however, was of Indian origin and because India was not a party to the NPT, it was not subject to IAEA safeguards. Thus, in order to keep non-parties from acquiring nuclear weapons, it was necessary to make all nuclear exports subject to the control system that was at the time only applied to NPT parties. The United States made it a priority that new nuclear export regulations were applied uniformly, in order not to present a commercial disadvantage.¹²⁴ It was precisely for this reason that France acquired a position to from which the country could influence the review. France was a major supplier of nuclear technology.

¹²¹ The Nuclear Supplier Group is described by Michael. J. Wilmshurst, who was a British diplomat in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Energy Department during the first Review Conference of the NPT, in John Simpson and Anthony G. McGrew (ed.) *The International Nuclear Non-Proliferation System, Challenges and Choices*, The McMillan Press Ltd, Great Britain: 1984. In 1984, he was heading the British delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

¹²² Wilmshurst 1984: 24

¹²³ Wilmshurst 1984: 24

¹²⁴ The commercial interest in the Nuclear Supplier Group is confirmed by British interdepartmental document in preparations for the Review Conference. The British expected Swedes to demand that the safeguard (INFCIRC 153) that applied to parties of the NPT should be required for all nuclear technology transfers, also to non-parties. According to the British assessment, if the French were open to such persuasion the result would be very welcome, but if not, they would have to consider very carefully whether they could afford, commercially, to take action, which might divert all nuclear trade with non-parties to France. Such a result was considered to be unwelcomed on non-proliferation grounds as well as on commercial grounds. See for instance FCO 66/735: Draft Brief NPT Review Conference Article III: Safeguards; FCO 66/733: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, Geneva May 1975, Brief No 6 Article III: Safeguards. FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 1 May 1975; FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at FCO, meeting at 3.00 PM on 20 March 1975.

In the fall of 1974, the United States issued an invitation to attend a secret meeting of the major suppliers of nuclear technology, Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. However, by the time the United States and the United Kingdom met in order to prepare for the tripartite meeting shortly in advance of the Review Conference, France had still not confirmed its intention to participate. France did not wish to be associated with formal non-proliferation talks. France, like China, had decided not to sign the NPT for reasons of principle. France considered it to be immoral to deny others the nuclear option, when having itself pursued this option. This was a major concern for the United States. In the negotiations with the British, the US referred to the French reluctance to participate in the planned Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) as a reason for playing down the political significance of the review. For instance, the United States warned against criticism of India's actions, because such criticism could corner France into taking the line of the developing world which the Americans argued could be disastrous. The United States agreed that there was a need to raise some criticism against India in order to prevent the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion from becoming accepted and imitated by others. However, the US argued that such criticism should be voiced by the developing countries, and not "...pinned on the US or UK"¹²⁵. According to the United States, any attempts to isolate India could backfire and isolate France along with the least developed countries.

It is possible that France and the prospects of a Nuclear Supplier Group for securing non-proliferation were only substitute motives used by the United States in the negotiations with the British, and that their major concern was not French but Chinese reactions to criticism of India. One factor that supports this assessment is that the United Kingdom would be less convinced by considerations relating to China than considerations relating to France. The United Kingdom did not agree with the United States that a final declaration should not attempt to anger or attack the Chinese, as suggested by the United States early on in the review negotiations. This is clear from the British response to the US suggestion: "if we are faint-hearted about of own Treaty we are hardly likely to gain adherents."¹²⁶

However, if French attitudes did influence the position of the United States, the position above give reason to expect that the United States handled the demands from the developing states with some care in the review negotiations. Still, this argument should not be exaggerated as it was in any case only valid for a short time period. Shortly after the bilateral

¹²⁵ FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at FCO, meeting at 11.15 AM on 20 March 1975.

¹²⁶ FCO 66/591: Letter from H. Hainworth UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, FCO ACDD, 8 February 1974.

consultations between the United States and the United Kingdom, France agreed to a meeting with the Nuclear Supplier Group and the meeting was hosted in London before the Review Conference commenced. Both the United States and the United Kingdom regarded the meeting a success and it is therefore probable that they did not pay much attention to France while the conference was being conducted.

Regardless of whether the prospect of a Nuclear Supplier Group was only an American substitute motive to play down the political significance of the NPT in the first review of the Treaty, American claims to this effect in the negotiations with the United Kingdom prove that there was one final factor that influenced the actions of the United States: the opinions of the Western allies, in this case the United Kingdom. It was not in the United States' interests to distance itself additionally from its ally, on whom it depended for containing disagreement with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union however, did not have to make any attempts to accommodate its allies in the Warsaw Pact; political protests in the Eastern bloc were quailed by military means. The most recent example of this during the review negotiations was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.¹²⁷

2.3.2 The Soviet Union – Cooperation

The section above presented the pursuit of *détente* as a major underlying factor in accounting for American actions in the Review Conference. Equally, the pursuit of *détente* may also account for the actions of the Soviet Union in the Review Conference. According to Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, Soviet-American military parity and the stagnation of the Soviet economy necessitated a rethinking of Soviet foreign policy, and made the policy of superpower *détente* favorable to the Soviet Union. Yet, the most important condition for explaining the foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the 1970s, according to Donaldson and Noguee, was the emerging global tripolarity, the growth of polycentrism in the international communist movement which resulted in China replacing the United States as the Soviet Union's chief enemy. According to Donaldson and Noguee, "...no development so profoundly affected the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s as its conflict with China."¹²⁸

In short, Donaldson and Noguee explain the Sino-Soviet split as a result of both a conflict of ideology and a personality clash between the leaders of the Soviet Union and

¹²⁷ In response to a period of political liberalization in the Soviet satellite Czechoslovakia, which began on January 5, with the election of the reformist government, the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact invaded Prague to halt the reforms on 21 of August 1968.

¹²⁸ Donaldson and Noguee 2005: 6 and 92

China, Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. For instance, Mao was both disturbed by Khrushchev's doctrinal revision and attack on Joseph Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist party in 1956, and disagreed with the Soviet decision to remain neutral in the escalating Sino-Indian border conflict.¹²⁹ According to Donaldson and Noguee, by 1970 both parties regarded each other, and no longer the United States, as their chief security threat, and from the perspective of balance of power politics the logic of the situation called for both sides to turn to the United States for assistance against the other.

Thus, during the 1970s substantial debates were taking place in the Warsaw Pact over the issues like the value of security through consultations, and more broadly, how far Soviet trade and diplomacy should cooperate with the capitalist world.¹³⁰ It seems reasonable to assume that from this premise, the main interest of the Soviet Union in the Review Conference was to reaffirm its position as a superpower vis-à-vis China, and in order to do so, the Soviet Union would cooperate with the United States, and the United Kingdom if necessary. This may have been the Soviet motive for engaging in tripartite meetings with the two other nuclear weapon states and why the Soviet Union in the Review Conference abandoned its traditional Kosygin formula of negative security assurances. According to William Epstein, during the NPT negotiations the Soviet Union proposed that nuclear weapons should not be used against non-nuclear weapons states. The United States however, had throughout the NPT negotiations opposed any pledge of non-first use of nuclear weapons and in the review the Soviet Union changed its position in accordance with that of the United States.¹³¹

2.3.3 The United Kingdom – Reinforcement

Contrary to the United States, the third nuclear weapon state party to the NPT, the United Kingdom, did not want to play down the political significance of the NPT. Instead, the United Kingdom wished to "...dispel any impression that the depositary states were simply concerned to get through the Review Conference with the least possible political excitement."¹³² The United Kingdom rejected the US interpretation of the NPT as a spent non-proliferation means and advocated that endorsement of the NPT could serve to reinforce the Treaty. The British argued that non-parties had relationships in many fields with parties to

¹²⁹ Donaldson and Noguee 2005: 92

¹³⁰ Holden 1989: 98

¹³¹ Epstein 1976: 250

¹³² FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at FCO, meeting at 11.15 AM on 20 March 1975.

the NPT, and they might therefore feel that their broader interests would suffer if they took action in the nuclear field that was unwelcome to the parties. According to the United Kingdom, the fact that the latter constituted the majority of all countries in the world provided strong leverage which could cause those who made decisions “...in Delhi and elsewhere to reassess their positions”.¹³³

In order to explain why the United Kingdom opposed the US approach to the NPT review, it is important to recall that the United Kingdom’s premise in the review of the NPT was quite different from that of the two superpowers. Contrary to the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom was not the leader of an ideological and military bloc in the Cold War, but a former great power that was slowly adjusting to its lesser status in the bipolar post-colonial world.¹³⁴ In the 1970s, the special Anglo-American relationship had reached an all-time low; in response to the US pursuit of *détente* with the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom had turned towards Europe and consolidated its position through partnership in the European Community. The fall of British significance in US foreign policy was particularly illustrated by the bilateral character of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. During the negotiations of both the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United Kingdom had been able to play an active and influential role, and both treaties were opened for signature in London. However, the United Kingdom was excluded from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

There were at least three separate reasons why the British attempted to draw attention to the political provisions of the NPT. First, the United Kingdom had strong incentives for playing an active part in the review because the United Kingdom was under considerable pressure, both inside and outside the parliament, to do more than merely support agreements between the superpowers.¹³⁵ It was in the interests of the United Kingdom to express sentiments close to those of the European Community and the Commonwealth members. As explained in a previous section, the Western European states approached the review with the objective of endorsing the NPT, in order to legitimize their decision to sign the Treaty. Second, the United Kingdom wished to reaffirm her position as a depositary power and

¹³³ FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at FCO, meeting at 11.15 AM on 20 March 1975.

¹³⁴ The position of the United Kingdom in the post-war world is well described by Alan P. Dobson (1995) *Anglo-American Relation in the Twentieth Century*.

¹³⁵ See FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at FCO, meeting at 3.00 PM on 20 March 1975. The letter from Nicholas A. Sims, a lecturer of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, addressed to the Minister of State, David Ennals, on 20 June 1974, in which Sims comments on the British non-proliferation policy in the wake of the Indian nuclear test explosion, may be one example of such pressure. See Sims’ letter enclosed in FCO 66/597.

thereby a great power, and restore its relationship with the United States. Just like the continental Europe, the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom was strained by the American pursuit of *détente* with the Soviet Union. Thus, by attempting to convince the superpowers that they were underestimating pressure from the non-aligned states and the sophisticated countries like Sweden and Canada in the review,¹³⁶ the United Kingdom was probably attempting to get in a position as an indispensable contributor to the strategy of the superpowers.

This aim to be an indispensable partner in the Review Conference is closely related to the third separate reason why the United Kingdom wished to emphasize the political aspects of the NPT. Because the United Kingdom was excluded from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the United Kingdom, despite having the smallest nuclear arsenal of the three depositary powers, was the only nuclear weapon state that had nothing to present during the review of the disarmament article. In order to get out of this position, which made the British particularly vulnerable to criticism, the British sought to propose a Quota Test Ban in the Review Conference.¹³⁷ The superpowers, however, strongly objected to this idea, claiming that it placed an extra burden on the ongoing bilateral threshold negotiations.

2.4 Summary

This chapter has presented an analysis of the interests of the parties to the NPT in the review of the Treaty. The analysis has shown that the interests of the NPT parties were largely divided. While one caucus, the non-aligned states, which were not shielded by the nuclear umbrella of either of the superpowers, demanded revision of the NPT, the nuclear weapon states and their allies considered revision to be off the table because it could open a Pandora's Box of unmanageable difficulties. However, the conflicts of interests were not only limited to the outcome of the Review Conference; the parties to the NPT did also have largely diverting interests regarding the organization of the review. Going into the review, the non-aligned states demanded that the review should be organized by the United Nations, through the establishment of a new International Disarmament Organization. The nuclear weapon states and their non-nuclear allies however, were largely opposed to this suggestion because it would include non-parties who were highly critical of the Treaty.

¹³⁶ FCO 66/735: Letter from J. A. Thomson, to Weston, 25 April 1975.

¹³⁷ See both FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at FCO, meeting at 3.00 PM on 20 March 1975, and FCO 66/735: Record of the UK/US/USSR consultations on the NTP Review Conference, held at FCO on 21-22 April 1975.

Furthermore, this chapter has revealed how contrary to the interests regarding the conference outcome, the divisions regarding the process were not only between, but also within the caucuses. Among the nuclear weapon states, the United Kingdom stands apart from the two superpowers, not because British interests regarding the outcome diverted, but because the United Kingdom wished to put emphasis on the political significance of the Review Conference. Contrary to the superpowers, the United Kingdom was insistent that the Review was an opportunity to reinforce the Treaty and not just a damage limitation operation as sought by the United States. It is suggested in this chapter that the motive behind this position was British interests to both contribute towards the American position in the review negotiations and to accommodate their partners in the European Community who were demanding that their nuclear weapon state allies should endorse the NPT. Thus, the United Kingdom had strong incentives simply to be an actor in the review negotiations, whereas the United States conversely wanted to play down the significance of the Review Conference and keep consultations to a minimum, in fear that it could upset the carefully orchestrated balance of *détente*.

While the United Kingdom stands out compared to the United States and the Soviet Union, it is possible that the United Kingdom shared its interest in playing an active and conciliatory role in the Review Conference with one of the non-nuclear weapon states, namely Sweden. Sweden too had strong incentives to play an active and conciliatory role in the review negotiations, regardless of the outcome, because Sweden was an odd member of the neutrals. Sweden was relying on nuclear diplomacy as a means for confirming its ties with the Non-Aligned Movement, thus it is possible that this motivated Sweden to approach the review negotiations more actively and vocally than other non-nuclear weapon states.

The dynamics of the negotiations of the formal organization of the Review Conference are subjected to analysis in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3:

Access is Substance

Roles and Rationales in the Negotiations of the Rule of Procedure

The most satisfactory solution might be for the depositaries to retain control of the preparation and organization of the Conference in their own hands, but such an oligarchic arrangement would be unacceptable to many states.¹³⁸

David Summerhayes, head of the FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 27 September 1973.

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explained the compound interests of the NPT parties in the conference to review the NPT. The non-aligned states regarded the purpose of the review to hold the nuclear weapon states responsible to their disarmament commitments and therefore demanded revision of the Treaty. The nuclear weapon states, however, warned that revision would open a Pandora's Box of unimaginable difficulty and that revision therefore was off the table. However, apart from wanting to prevent revision and contain criticism, the interests of the nuclear weapon states were largely diverting. While the United States wanted to play down the significance of the NPT, the United Kingdom in particular was eager to use the review to reaffirm her position as a depositary power of the Treaty.

The purpose of the following two chapters is to explain how the conference to review the NPT was implemented. Despite largely opposing interests regarding the general purpose of the review and virtually no regulations in the Treaty, the parties to the NPT were able to organize a Review Conference that became a model for a periodic review of the NPT and as such an entirely new mechanism for international law enforcement. In order to explain how this was achieved, this chapter analyzes how the NPT parties overcame conflicting interests regarding the organization of the Review Conference. Thus, this chapter is limited to the negotiations of the Review Conference Rules of Procedure. These negotiations were

¹³⁸ FCO 66/469: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 27 September 1973.

conducted in a Preparatory Committee, composed of 26 NPT parties,¹³⁹ which preceded the Review Conference. How the NPT parties overcame conflicts in the Review Conference is analyzed in the third and final analysis chapter.

In the analysis in the following chapter, the focus of attention is on the two procedural rules that created considerable disagreement among the NPT parties in the Preparatory Committee, the rule of access and the rule of decision-making. This chapter will discuss why the negotiations of these two rules proved particularly demanding and explain how they were concluded. In doing so, this chapter suggests which states and which underlying interests were influential in producing a model for the periodic review system for the NPT.

This chapter is divided into three main parts. Part one is a presentation of how the Review Conference Preparatory Committee was set up. Part two and part three present an analysis of those factors and actors that were influential in the negotiations of the Review Conference rule of access and rule of decision-making, respectively. Finally, the chapter is concluded by a short summary of the chapter findings.

3.2 The Preparatory Committee

The idea to establish a Preparatory Committee to set up the Review Conference of the NPT was originally an American one. Part of the motivation to set up a Preparatory Committee was to secure smooth sailing through the United Nations Plenary Session. Despite both American and British discontent with involving the United Nations in the review, the two depositaries found themselves compelled to use a United Nations General Assembly resolution to summon the Review Conference.¹⁴⁰ There was one particular reason for this. Recalling paragraph 3 of Article VIII in the Treaty, Geneva was stipulated as the venue for the Review Conference, and in order to make the UN Secretariat in Geneva available for the conference, authorization from the General Assembly was considered necessary.¹⁴¹ The American suggestion was that a resolution to summon the Review Conference should also call upon a geographically and politically balanced Preparatory Committee to set up the

¹³⁹ The following 26 states were qualified to participate in the Preparatory Committee: Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, USSR, US, UK, and Yugoslavia. For the list, see FCO 66/595: United Nations Press Release M/90, 8 April 1974.

¹⁴⁰ FCO 66/468: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall in the FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 22 August 1973.

¹⁴¹ FCO 66/469: Letter from Freddy Jackson at the British Embassy in Vienna, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 15 October 1973.

review.¹⁴² If a consensus could be reached amongst the members of the NPT on the composition of the Preparatory Committee prior to the General Assembly, the Americans believed the resolution could be turned into a successful means for keeping questions on the scope and substance of the Review Conference out of the United Nations,¹⁴³ and take some heat away from Alva Myrdal's demands for an International Disarmament Organization, as presented in the previous chapter.¹⁴⁴

In setting up a Preparatory Committee, the American objective was to create "...a manageable preparation commission, which could be controlled by the depositary powers without unduly alienating significant Non-Nuclear Weapon States such as Sweden and Mexico."¹⁴⁵ In order to secure this objective, they proposed that the Preparatory Committee ought to be based on a combination of parties to the NPT from the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. With this membership formula both Sweden and Mexico qualified for membership of the Preparatory Committee. In addition, the signatory states in the European Community, Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West Germany, would qualify for membership, if they ratified the NPT. Thus, the formula also addressed to American and British interests not to exclude their Western allies, and it could serve as an incentive for ratification.

3.2.1 Machiavellian Intentions

The United Kingdom objected to the American membership formula in bilateral consultations with the United States. The primary British argument against the American proposal was that the membership formula was arbitrary; there existed no constitutional basis for suggesting that the committee should be composed of members from the IAEA Board of Governors or the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Thus, the membership formula gave non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT grounds for accusing

¹⁴² The British stressed how it was important that the committee included African countries, suggesting they would otherwise have "trouble with black Africa at the conference itself." See FCO 66/469: Immediate Telegram no. 628 from Laskey, British Embassy in Vienna, to FCO and UKDIS Geneva (in New York), 24 October 1973.

¹⁴³ Referred in both FCO 66/468: Letter from W. J. A. Wilberforce at the British Embassy in Washington, to David Summerhayes, 20 September, 1973, and FCO 66/469: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 27 September 1973.

¹⁴⁴ FCO 66/468: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall in the FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 22 August 1973.

¹⁴⁵ FCO 66/468: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 19 September 1973.

the depositaries of using their positions to shape the review to the detriment of the non-nuclear weapon states.¹⁴⁶

Instead, the British insisted that all states member to the NPT should be regarded as members of a Preparatory Committee.¹⁴⁷ Open membership, the British argued, was favorable because it would give no ground for criticism or protest, as it did not discriminate. The British recognized that the committee could prove hard for the depositaries to control,¹⁴⁸ but they referred to how open membership had been successfully applied to create the IAEA safeguard committee in 1970 because only half of the members attended.¹⁴⁹ According to British assessment, equally, only a limited number of states would want to have their say in the Preparatory Committee.¹⁵⁰ The British stressed that open membership in any case was the fallback solution if the combination formula was not acceptable to the non-nuclear weapon states, and the British argued that if open membership would come about as the result of acrimonious debate, it would lay the ground for a far less manageable committee than if there had been open membership from the outset.¹⁵¹

British objections to the American membership proposal support the analysis of the United Kingdom in the previous chapter. The previous chapter suggested how the British decision to oppose the Americans may be explained partly by British interests to play a contributory role in American policy in order to restore its special relationship with the United States and reaffirm its position as a depositary power, and partly because the United Kingdom, as a medium size state was more vulnerable to accusations of “Machiavellian intentions”¹⁵².

¹⁴⁶ In interdepartmental correspondence, David Summerhayes in the FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, stressed how the “...depositary powers may have an obligation to initiate the Conference, but the text in no way empowers them to organize committees of parties to the Treaty on an arbitrary basis.” FCO 66/469: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 27 September 1973.

¹⁴⁷ FCO 66/469: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 27 September 1973.

¹⁴⁸ FCO 66/468: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 27 September 1973.

¹⁴⁹ FCO 66/468: Priority Telegram no. 536 from Laskey, British Embassy in Vienna, to FCO, 3 September 1973.

¹⁵⁰ FCO 66/469: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 5 October 1973.

¹⁵¹ FCO 66/469: Letter from Nick Fenn in the Industry, Science and Energy Department, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 26 September 1973.

¹⁵² According to the FCO, the nuclear weapon states could be accused of “a breach of faith” or “Machiavellian intentions”. The latter formulation was used in connection with basing the formula for the membership to the Preparatory Committee on membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, in light of the recent enlargement of the Board. Five parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had agreed to serve only one year on the Board, in order to ensure appropriate rotation, as result of behind the scenes urging by the Americans, and to a lesser degree the British. However, conflict on this particular issue was prevented as both current IAEA Board members and states that would become Board members in September 1974 were allowed to

3.2.2 United Nations General Assembly

The American combination proposal won through in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom. The Americans countered by arguing that the assumption that only a small number of states would attend the meetings of the Preparatory Committee was unfounded. Open membership, they claimed, would transform the intended preparatory committee into a full-scale conference.¹⁵³ Neither did they believe the combination formula would cause any bitterness among members of the NPT; the problem of bitterness would rather be among non-parties.¹⁵⁴

Thus, when the United Nations General Assembly commenced in New York in October 1973, the American membership formula was included in the depositary draft resolution intended to summon the Review Conference. To reaffirm its position as a depositary power, the United Kingdom took on an active role to lobby for its support. The British first discussed the resolution with Mexico and Sweden, who both objected to the draft, but not on the grounds that the United Kingdom had predicted. The primary objection of the non-aligned states was that the depositary resolution presented the depositary governments as the rightful organizers of the review. The Mexican Ambassador to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Alfonso Garcia Robles, stressed that it was for the General Assembly to establish a preparatory committee for the review. The Swedish delegation expressed that they would approve the depositary draft resolution as long as it made no special references to the depositaries. Thus, in response to an American suggestion, the reference to the depositaries was used as a bargaining chip to secure Swedish co-sponsorship for a resolution that called on the Preparatory Committee. The depositary states thereby succeeded in securing support for the proposed Preparatory Committee, first among the states party to the NPT, and thereafter in the General Assembly on December 18, 1973.¹⁵⁵ As predicted, China voted against the resolution in the General Assembly and denounced the NPT as a conspiracy by the superpowers to maintain their nuclear hegemony.¹⁵⁶

qualify for membership in the Preparatory Committee. FCO 66/469: Immediate Telegram no. 628 from Laskey, British Embassy in Vienna, to FCO and UKDIS Geneva (in New York), 24 October 1973.

¹⁵³ FCO 66/469: Letter from C. J. Makins at the British Embassy in Washington, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 12 October 1973.

¹⁵⁴ FCO 66/469: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 5 October 1973.

¹⁵⁵ FCO 66/470: Routine Telegram no. 1687 from Maitland, UKMIS New York, to FCO, 18 December 1973.

¹⁵⁶ In the tripartite meeting between the US, the USSR and Great Britain on October 29, the USSR made an argument that it was useless to aim for a completely uncontentious resolution by providing as few opportunities as possible for the opposition to criticize the NPT, because according to the USSR, the Chinese would attack the resolution no matter what. See FCO 66/469: Letter from Duncan, UKDIS Geneva (in New York) to Noël Marshall, FCO ACDD, 29 October 1973.

The Preparatory Committee met three times in order to negotiate the Rule of Procedure for the Review Conference, first in April 1974, second in late August and early September the same year, and third in February 1975. The first session was only used to decide the procedural rules of the Preparatory Committee, such as when and where the committee would meet, which states that would chair each session, and that the committee would make its decisions based on consensus. During the first session, it was also decided that the Review Conference would be held in Geneva during the month of May.

However, the session also served to expose the conflicting interests of the NPT parties relating to the purpose and procedure of the Review Conference. Already during the first couple of days of the first preparatory session, a pattern of antagonism emerged between the three nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned states, Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁷ With Mexico as their frontrunner, the non-aligned states expressed that they regarded it as the purpose of the review to highlight the failure of the nuclear weapon states and that they would therefore make considerable efforts to press for the widest possible participation in the review conference, including non-governmental organizations, to suit this purpose.¹⁵⁸ The nuclear weapon states, however, whose aim was to contain criticism and prevent revision, wanted the Review Conference to be for NPT parties only. Consequently, one of the British delegates reported to London from the first session of the Preparatory Committee in Geneva on 3 April 1974: "It is obvious that the question of participation in the RC [Review Conference] will prove one of the most difficult to resolve."¹⁵⁹ The following section suggests those factors that contributed towards settling this conflict.

3.3 The Rule of Access

The rule of access proved one of the most challenging matters in the Preparatory Committee negotiations because access was regarded as an issue of substance.¹⁶⁰ The rule of access would send out signals about the purpose of the review. By accepting the non-aligned demands for wide access, the nuclear weapon states would implicitly approve of their interpretation of the purpose of the review, to hold the nuclear weapon states accountable to the world community. The nuclear weapon states, however, whose interests were to contain

¹⁵⁷ FCO 66/595: Letter from Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall, FCO, 2 April 1974.

¹⁵⁸ FCO 66/595: Letter from Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall, FCO, 2 April 1974.

¹⁵⁹ I. C. Sloane, British diplomat in Geneva, reporting from the first session of the Preparatory Committee. See FCO 66/595: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 3 April 1974.

¹⁶⁰ This is explicitly states in the British Steering Brief, prepared for the Second Preparatory session, see FCO 66/598: "NPT Review Conference - PC2 Steering Brief".

criticism and prevent revision, insisted that the review of the NPT was not the concern of the entire international community, but only its parties. The United States, who wished to play down the political significance of the NPT, was particularly motivated to keep the review behind closed doors. Thus, the three nuclear weapon states insisted that participation should only be limited to parties to the Treaty insisting that they were the only rightful participants according to Article VIII which specifically called on the parties to the Treaty to organize a Review Conference.¹⁶¹

Yet despite the obvious conflict, the NPT parties managed to come to an agreement before the Review Conference. A combination of factors contributed to the untraditionally detailed final outcome. First, the depositary powers approached the negotiations with a concerted strategy. Second, Mexico moderated its position in the second session of the Preparatory Committee, and the Mexican draft proposal was positively received, both among the non-aligned states and several Western states.

3.3.1 From Depositary Division to Concerted Action

An important contributory factor to the outcome of the negotiations on the rule of access was the antagonism that evolved during the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee. This antagonism served to align the positions of the three nuclear weapon states and lay the foundations for their concerted strategy in the second and third session.

Efforts to coordinate the approach of the depositary states were initially British. In order to restore its position as a great power, yet remain accommodating to the interests of its Western allies, the United Kingdom consistently pushed for a concerted depositary approach based on widespread consultations with the non-nuclear weapon states throughout the review negotiations.¹⁶² However, prior to the first session of the Preparatory Committee, they had limited success. As the conflict over the Preparatory Committee membership formula above illustrates, the United States was not especially receptive to the suggestions made by the United Kingdom prior to the first session of the Preparatory Committee.

Nor did the Soviet Union approach the Review Conference with a cooperative attitude. The Soviet Union kept a low profile right up until the United Nations General Assembly and never brought any drafts to the negotiating table of the depositaries.¹⁶³ After the General

¹⁶¹ FCO 66/598: Letter from A. White, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 4 September 1974.

¹⁶² FCO 66/597: Letter to Mr. Thomsen, "Instruction on Washington visit", from David Summerhayes, FCO, 15 March 1974.

¹⁶³ The Soviet delegation in Geneva received few instructions from Moscow during the first round of negotiations, and did not bring their own resolution draft for the tripartite drafting meeting. The USSR wanted to

Assembly, however, the Soviet Union became more involved, but continued to overlook the demands of the United Kingdom. In response to a British proposal to include the three non-aligned states, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico in the process designed to summon the Preparatory Committee for its first session, both the Soviet Union and the United States were dismissive. According to the Soviet Union, it was only the depositary powers that had the right to take the necessary preparatory action; co-sponsorship of the UN resolution did not alter this position.¹⁶⁴ Recalling the section above, Sweden was convinced to sign on as a co-sponsor by the United Kingdom in order to attract the support of other states in the Non-Aligned Movement. The US reactions were equally disapproving. According to the Americans, it was the United States' interests to diminish Mexican, Swedish and Yugoslav status as senior partners in the conference, "...given their capacity for making trouble on substantive issues".¹⁶⁵

The British strategy to advocate wide consultations and treaty reinforcement was not only criticized by the superpowers; In London, officials outside the Foreign and Commonwealth Office also questioned the strategy. In March 1974, a month before the first session of the Preparatory Committee, F. Panton at the British Ministry of Defense commented that he increasingly saw "...the RC [Review Conference], and therefore the PC [Preparatory Committee], as no more than a necessary evil"¹⁶⁶, and that he did not see any real prospect of persuading non-parties to join. Yet, having found no thoughts of this type reflected in UK policy and objectives, Panton was not surprised to note that the Americans had proved difficult to work with.

After multiple exchanges over the issue, the United States decided, in response to upon Soviet Union insistence, that only the superpowers, rather than all three depositary powers, should summon the Preparatory Committee.¹⁶⁷ Subsequently, the United Kingdom decided to underline to the members of the Preparatory Committee that the notification was not a three-power decision, and prepared to intervene "tactfully to smooth over hurt

postpone the resolution one year, however, if the NPT review conference were to be included in the 1975 UN calendar of conferences, the resolution had to be passed in the 1973 General Assembly. The US and Great Britain that non-aligned action made it impudent to deal with NPT review immediately. See FCO 66/469.

¹⁶⁴ FCO 66/591: Immediate Telegram no. 168 from Garvey, British Embassy in Moscow, to FCO, 15 February 1974.

¹⁶⁵ FCO 66/591: Routine Telegram no. 586 from Sykes, Washington, to FCO, 14 February 1974.

¹⁶⁶ FCO 66/594: Letter from F. Panton, ACSA (N) (British Ministry of Defense), sent in copy to A. E. Montgomery in the FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, March 21, 1974.

¹⁶⁷ FCO 66/591: Priority Telegram no. 395 from Douglas-Home, FCO, to Washington and UKMIS New York, 13 February 1974.

feelings”¹⁶⁸. Thus, early in the review process, British insistence on paying special attention to the non-aligned states did not serve to reaffirm the United Kingdom’s position as a depositary power; however, it did allow the United Kingdom to appear more accommodating towards the non-nuclear weapon states, compared to the United States and the Soviet Union.

However, the antagonism in the first session served to transform the relationship between the nuclear weapon states. Shortly after the first session of the Preparatory Committee, the Soviet Union approached the United Kingdom with the aim of coordinating strategies for the second session. The British noted the Soviet invitation with both surprise and satisfaction; “[a]s far as our present delegation memory goes, it is some years since the Russians have been so punctilious in consulting us on tactics, and we should surely do our best to encourage this process.”¹⁶⁹ Thus, the antagonism served to strengthen the position of the United Kingdom. From the second session of the Preparatory Committee, the British delegation in Geneva reported to London that both the American and the Soviet delegations were very cooperative and that there were no suggestions of the two of them operating bilaterally.¹⁷⁰ This must have been considered as a great affirmation of the United Kingdom’s status as a valuable partner. According to the same British report, the superpowers were more than ready to receive and act on suggestions from the United Kingdom, and the superpowers were interested in continuing to cooperate.

3.3.2 The Mexican Proposal

As promised in the first session of the Preparatory Committee, the Mexican Ambassador, Alfonso Garcia Robles, readdressed the issue of participation when the Preparatory Committee convened for its second session in Geneva in late August 1974.¹⁷¹ During the second week of the session, Garcia Robles tabled a draft proposing that special rights of attendance in the Review Conference should be given to the five following categories: 1) signatory states, 2) non-parties, 3) the IAEA and the UN Secretary General, 4) the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean¹⁷² and UN specialized agencies, and 5) non-governmental organizations that had consultative

¹⁶⁸ FCO 66/591: Priority Telegram no. 395 from Douglas-Home, FCO, to Washington and UKMIS New York, 13 February 1974.

¹⁶⁹ FCO 66/596: Letter to Barbara Richards, FCO, from Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, 15 May 1974.

¹⁷⁰ FCO 66/598: Letter from A. White, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 8 September 1974.

¹⁷¹ The second session of the Preparatory Committee opened on August 27, 1974, under the chairmanship of Eugeniuez Wyzner from Poland. Ethiopia, Lebanon, Gabon and Costa Rica were absent. See FCO 66/598: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 10 April 1974. 27 August 1974.

¹⁷² OPANAL (from el Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe) was created as a result of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, ratified in 1969, and forbids its signatory nations from use, storage, or transport of nuclear weapons.

status at the United Nations and were recognized by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).¹⁷³

The Mexican draft was presented as a basis for negotiation, and was not complete in all its formulations. It asked that signatory states be allowed to participate in the deliberations in the Review Conference, but not to take part in decisions, and that non-parties and international organizations should have the right to submit their views and comments in writing.

The draft received a wide measure of support in the Preparatory Committee. The Non-Aligned Movement endorsed the proposal, with Yugoslavia, Sweden, Romania and Sudan signing on as co-sponsors.¹⁷⁴ Several Western non-nuclear weapon states also supported the Mexican call for the widest participation possible, among them Canada and Australia.¹⁷⁵ Canada had already indicated that it was flexible on the issue of participation during the debates in the first session of the Preparatory Committee.¹⁷⁶ This Canadian behavior may have been one of the reasons why the Soviet Union approached the United Kingdom after the first session. It seems fair to suggest that the Soviet motive for approaching the United Kingdom was to quell controversial demands. The Soviet Union was perhaps under the impression that the United Kingdom could be talked into convincing its allies to fall into line with the positions of the nuclear weapon states.

However, there were also objections among the non-nuclear weapon states to the tabled draft. Several delegations asked to postpone the decision to the third session of the Preparatory Committee, for various reasons. Nigeria objected to the draft because it did not include the participation of liberation movements.¹⁷⁷ The motivation behind the Nigerian objection is explained by Nigeria's postcolonial status. As explained in chapter two, the postcolonial states sought the affirmation of their national independence through the office and protocols of the United Nations.¹⁷⁸

Denmark and Ireland also asked for postponement, expressing that they lacked instructions on the issue.¹⁷⁹ However, there is good reason to believe that they acted partly on

¹⁷³ The Mexican Working Paper "...containing the text suggested for section X of the draft rules of procedure": NPT/PC.11/15 3 September 1974. (In FCO 66/598)

¹⁷⁴ FCO 66/598: Letter from J. G. Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to B. Richards, ACDD, FCO, 11 September 1974.

¹⁷⁵ FCO 66/598: Letter from A. White, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 4 September 1974.

¹⁷⁶ FCO 66/595: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 3 April 1974.

¹⁷⁷ FCO 66/598: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 5 September 1974.

¹⁷⁸ Sluga 2010: 224

¹⁷⁹ FCO 66/598: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 5 September 1974.

the instructions of the United Kingdom which had invested in close consultations with Denmark and Ireland in advance of the session in order to get them more involved in the work of the Preparatory Committee.¹⁸⁰ Denmark and Ireland were the only two other participants in the Preparatory Committee from the European Community, and the United Kingdom therefore considered it appropriate to approach the two with an aim of getting them more involved on behalf of the interests of the European Community. Why did the United Kingdom convince Ireland and Denmark to demand postponing a decision on the matter of access?

3.3.3 The American Stalling Strategy

The British decision to postpone agreement on the matter of access was part of an American strategy of stalling. Actually, all the three nuclear weapon states considered the Mexican draft far more reasonable than they had expected.¹⁸¹ However, the United States considered the position of the depositary states best served by not making any concessions until the end of the third preparatory session. If the depositaries accepted the Mexican proposal before other important issues were resolved, they would not be in a position to use access as a bargaining chip for resolving other issues that constituted a greater challenge to the Americans, for instance the division of costs. Recalling chapter two, the negotiations of the Review Conference were conducted in the wake of a economic crisis, and the non-aligned states demanded that the nuclear weapon states should cover the conference financially, insisting that the purpose of the conference was to hold the nuclear weapon states responsible for their disarmament obligations. The United States could not accept this, partly because it would be tantamount to approving the non-aligned states' interpretation of the purpose of the conference, and partly because the United States also suffered severely from the economic crisis. Thus, the United States refused to go beyond its traditional United Nations scale.

The idea to link access with other contagious issues in a “package agreement”¹⁸² was put forth by the American Ambassador, J. Owen Zurhellen, at a tripartite meeting with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union during the second preparatory session. The Soviet Union responded to the American proposal with great hesitation. According to the Soviet Ambassador, Roshchin, the Soviet Union considered it important to meet the demands of the non-nuclear weapon states in respect of this issue and avoid postponement if possible.

¹⁸⁰ FCO 66/597: Letter from D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, to I. T. M. Lucas, UK Embassy Copenhagen, 1 July 1974.

¹⁸¹ FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 1974.

¹⁸² FCO 66/598: “Record of a meeting in the secretariat on Monday 2 September”.

Roshchin explained that he was detecting a spirit of compromise in the committee, and if no gesture was made by the nuclear weapon states then the uncooperative attitude of the nuclear weapon states might degenerate into a spirit of division that could affect the United Nations General Assembly debate later that fall.¹⁸³ As a matter of tactics, therefore, the Soviet Union was prepared to be firm, but if it seemed tactically worthwhile, they would also be prepared to give way, Roshchin said.¹⁸⁴ It should not be rule out the Soviet behavior was motivated by an interest to put pressure on the United States in the review negotiations.

External pressure may also have made it favorable for the United Kingdom to signal its approval of the Mexican proposal. Just like the Soviet Union, the British did not have any substantial objections to the Mexican proposal as long as non-parties were not permitted to take the floor or to take part in decisions.¹⁸⁵ However, it was not only the United Nations General Assembly that put pressure on the United Kingdom to signal its approval of the Mexican proposal. In the wake of the Indian nuclear test explosion only a few months before the United Kingdom had come under considerable pressure from its European partners, thereby presenting the United Kingdom with a strong incentive to be responsive to the demands of the non-nuclear weapon states. According to the United Kingdom, the implications of the Indian test should have served to convert those concerned to the need to pay greater attention to the concerns of the non-nuclear weapon states in the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference.¹⁸⁶

The Indian nuclear test shook the framework of the newly established non-proliferation regime, not only because it exposed the limitations of the NPT as a means to prevent nuclear proliferation, but also because it questioned the validity of the NPT. The NPT only recognized two categories of states, legitimate nuclear weapon states that had tested nuclear explosives prior to 1 January 1967, and non-nuclear weapon states. The initial reaction of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office was to not allow the event to pass by default because such could seriously reduce the deterrent to future proliferation.¹⁸⁷ However, this idea was moderated, and the official British response was mild in its character. The response did not meet the expectations of the Western European states, with West

¹⁸³ FCO 66/598: "Record of a meeting in the secretariat on Monday 2 September".

¹⁸⁴ FCO 66/595: Letter from J. G. Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to B. Richards, ACDD, FCO, 11 April 1974.

¹⁸⁵ For the British assessment, see FCO 66/595: Letter from J. G. Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to B. Richards, ACDD, FCO, 11 April 1974. For the Soviet assessment, see FCO 66/598: "Record of a meeting in the secretariat on Monday 2 September".

¹⁸⁶ For the British reactions to the Indian nuclear test, and the implications for the British position towards the Review Conference, see FCO 66/604 and FCO 66/598.

¹⁸⁷ FCO 66/604: Draft, Letter from D. Summerhayes, "Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: India's Nuclear Test" FCO ACDD, to Mr. Thomson and Mr. Cole, 6 June 1974.

Germany suggesting that the United Kingdom, in its capacity as a depositary of the treaty, should condemn India's actions.¹⁸⁸

As previously explained, there may be multiple reasons why the nuclear weapon states attempted to play down the significance of the Indian test. The United States did not want to criticize India because such criticism could have damaged their plans for a Nuclear Supplier Group. It was for much of the same reason that the United Kingdom did not denounce the Indian test. According to the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, "...the view that the nuclear test had shattered the restraining effect of the N.P.T. and that it has dealt a mortal blow to the efforts already made to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons [was] too pessimistic."¹⁸⁹ The United Kingdom considered it favorable to preserve good relations with India in order to incorporate India into the Nuclear Supplier Group at a later stage.¹⁹⁰ India could not commit to non-proliferation by signing the NPT unless the Treaty was revised, or unless an additional means for non-proliferation was set up, such as the Nuclear Supplier Group.

Another British motive that comes across on the British record is that the interests involved in building a close working relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union for the Review Conference affected the British decision not to denounce India's actions, as well as close historical, cultural and economic ties with India as a member of the British Commonwealth. Interest involved in cooperating closely with the United States may also serve to explain why the Soviet Union did not protest the Indian action. Another possible reason, suggested by the Indians themselves, was that the Soviet Union was relieved to see China challenged by a nuclear power on her southern border.¹⁹¹

The nuclear weapon states' treatment of the Indian nuclear test explosion as a "fait accompli"¹⁹² and their attempts to play down the significance of the incident produced nearly the opposite result in Europe. While West Germany told the British Ambassador in Bonn that they believed that the whole concept of non-proliferation was "...on the verge of being destroyed by the Indian action",¹⁹³ the Italian government stated that they were reconsidering

¹⁸⁸ For the reactions to the Indian nuclear tests explosion, see FCO 66/604: "Implications of Indian Test for NPT Review Conference" for instance: Letter from D. Summerhayes, "Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: India's Nuclear Test" FCO ACDD, to Mr. Thomson and Mr. Cole, 6 June 1974.

¹⁸⁹ FCO 66/604: Prime Minister's Personal Message: Indian Nuclear Test, 28 June 1974.

¹⁹⁰ Such an idea is touched upon in the speaking notes prepared for David Ennals, submitted by David Summerhayes on 3 September 1973, in response to a call by Lord Kennet on the Minister of State: Non-Proliferation and the NPT Review Conference, in FCO 66/598.

¹⁹¹ FCO 66/604: Letter from George B. Chalmers, FCO South Asian Department, to the FCO, 3 June 1974.

¹⁹² The Indian nuclear explosion is referred to as a *fait accompli* on multiple occasions on the British record. See FCO 66/604: "Implications of Indian Test For NPT Review Conference."

¹⁹³ FCO 66/604: Letter from B. L. Crowe, British Embassy in Bonn, to FCO ACDD, 20 June 1974.

Italian accession to the NPT as a result of the Indian nuclear test.¹⁹⁴ The Italian position threatened to postpone the ratification of all the other four states that were members of Euratom, Belgium, West Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands, who were intending to ratify the treaty together.

Signs that the Euratom states would not ratify in time for the Review Conference caused considerable concern at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. British interest in the review did not involve distancing itself from the other European Community members, but serving as a mediator between them and the superpowers. This was the reason why the United Kingdom, from the outset of the review negotiations, had put great emphasis on the need to reinforce the NPT through additional accessions. The British even used the Indian nuclear test explosion to legitimize this approach, claiming that if there were no new adherences, existing parties would gain the impression that the universal non-proliferation regime could be breached with impunity, and support for the implementation of the treaty and its safeguards system would decline. As a worst-case scenario, the British warned that the Review Conference might then "...merely perform the last Rites over the treaty and become the occasion for the proposals for radical and unacceptable revision of the Treaty."¹⁹⁵

However, despite strong incentives to accept the Mexican proposal straight away, the British had two strong incentives for postponement. Firstly, this was the position advocated by the United States, with whom the United Kingdom wished to restore a special relationship, and perhaps more importantly, because the United Kingdom was not satisfied with the potential rule of decision-making that had been suggested during the second preparatory session. Nor did Mexico's Garcia Robles object to postponing the matter of access, expressing that he had not expected the Preparatory Committee to make a decision during its second session.¹⁹⁶ Thus, it was also tactically favorable for the Soviet Union not to give way, but to keep a firm position against wide access.

Consequently, the three nuclear weapon states responded negatively to the Mexican proposal during the first round of negotiations on the matter. In the Preparatory Committee, the American Ambassador, J. Owen Zurhellen, expressed that the United States supported postponing a decision in the matter of access until right before the Review Conference, in

¹⁹⁴ FCO 66/597: Letter from B. Richards, ACDD, FCO, to A. J. Hunter, British Embassy in Rome, 19 July 1974.

¹⁹⁵ FCO 66/604: Letter from D. Summerhayes, "Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: India's Nuclear Test" FCO ACDD, to Mr. Thomson and Mr. Cole, 6 June 1974.

¹⁹⁶ FCO 66/598: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 5 September 1974.

order to preserve the incentive for signatory states to ratify the NPT.¹⁹⁷ This was the same argument that had been used to postpone discussion of the matter in the first session of the Preparatory Committee, then by the Soviet Union and Poland.¹⁹⁸

3.3.4 Participatory Rights in Exchange for Openness

Throughout the fall, and right up until the third session of the Preparatory Committee in February 1975, efforts were made by the nuclear weapon states to moderate the Mexican draft on the rules of access. In doing so, their main aim was to restrict rights to participate in exchange for openness. In order to explain how attempts were made to exchange openness with participation rights, a short outline of the structure of the Review Conference may be helpful. What is presented here is the final structure; however, during the preparatory negotiations the number of main committees and their designated specific topics had not yet been settled. This was only settled, as were all other procedural issues, during the third session of the Preparatory Committee.

The work of the Review Conference was to be divided into a total of five committees. After the conclusion of a general plenary debate, negotiations on the provisions of the Treaty would be conducted in two main committees. Disarmament and security issues would be negotiated in Main Committee I; safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy would be negotiated in Main Committee II.

Meanwhile, a General Committee, a Drafting Committee and a Credentials Committee would also meet in order to assist the conference in its work. Unlike the main committees, these three committees would have restricted membership. The Credentials Committee was smallest, both in size and in respect of political significance.¹⁹⁹ Its function was purely of a formal nature.²⁰⁰ Its purpose, however, was more substantial. The General Committee was intended to assist the President of the conference in the conduct of the conference. The General Committee would thus be chaired by the Conference President, composed of the chairmen of the other four committees, as well as a number of vice-chairmen. Finally, the Drafting Committee would be composed of the same members, meaning states and not

¹⁹⁷ FCO 66/598: Letter from A. White, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 4 September 1974.

¹⁹⁸ FCO 66/595: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 3 April 1974.

¹⁹⁹ The Credentials Committee was composed of the following six states, on the proposal of the Conference President: Gabon, Ghana, Jamaica, Jordan, the USSR, and the United States of America.

²⁰⁰ The function of a Credential Committee is to examine and report to the conference in question, without delay, on the credentials of the delegations of the conference participants. In this context, credentials means identity and title.

necessarily individuals, as the General Committee. Its purpose, as the name suggests, was to draft language for the Review Conference Final Declaration.

Openness was discussed at some length among the depositaries. The three nuclear weapon states knew that they would be subjected to heavy criticism in the Review Conference. Their initial preference was therefore to keep both the plenary session and the meeting of the committees private.²⁰¹ However, during the fall, the three nuclear weapon states changed their positions. By November, the United States had dramatically moderated its stance, believing that it was perhaps necessary to agree to public attendance at both the plenary sessions of the Review Conference, and its main committees, in order to achieve better conditions in respect of other issues, such as participation rights.²⁰²

Mexico agreed to make additional moderations regarding the right of non-parties and NGOs in exchange for openness in the main committees. Thus, when the third session of the Preparatory Committee was organized during the first two weeks of February 1975, the committee agreed that the plenary and main committee meetings would be held in public unless the body concerned decided otherwise, and that three sub-committees would meet in private.²⁰³ Furthermore, it was decided that the five categories of participants introduced in the first Mexican proposal, 1) signatory states, 2) no-parties, 3) the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 4) other specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations, and 5) non-governmental organizations, were allowed to participate in these open meetings, but with different rights.²⁰⁴

According to the final rule of access, signatory states were entitled to participate in the deliberations of the conference, address the meetings, receive conference documents and to submit their views in writing to the conference. Their views would then be considered as conference documents. However, they were not allowed to take any part in the adoption of decisions. Non-signatory states were allowed to apply for observer status, and their attendance would be subjected to a decision by the conference. As observers, non-parties would be entitled to appoint officials to attend open meetings, to receive conference documents and to submit documents to the conference participants.

The UN and the IAEA constituted the third category of participants. Their representatives would be entitled to attend open meetings and to receive conference

²⁰¹ See e.g. the British Steering Briefs produced for the second and third session, FCO 66/598 and FCO 66/730, respectively.

²⁰² FCO 66/598: Record of the Meeting about the NPT Review in the UK Mission on Monday 4 November 1974.

²⁰³ FCO 66/730: NPT/CONF/3 Annex IV

²⁰⁴ FCO 66/730: NPT/CONF/3 Annex IV

documents, and to submit material both orally and in writing. Other specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations were also allowed to apply for observer agency status to the Secretary-General of the conference. This included the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the European Commission and any specialized agencies of the United Nations. Similar to observer states, the status of observer agencies would be subjected to a decision by the conference. Finally, non-governmental organizations were also allowed special rights to attend the conference. Upon request, NGOs would be entitled to receive conference documents. None of the categories above were allowed to attend the private meetings, unless especially invited.

The final rule of access was largely favorable to the United Kingdom. The Mexican category of regional and intergovernmental organizations would allow the European Commission to send representatives to the Review Conference. This was favorable to the British, both because the United Kingdom was a member of the European Community,²⁰⁵ and because it served as an additional assurance to the UK's European allies that they would be well-represented if they did not complete the ratification process in time for the Review Conference. Equally, Euratom would be allowed access as a specialized agency, because it was in charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in the European Community.

Finally, the British were very interested in including the International Atomic Energy Agency. From the outset of the review preparations, the United Kingdom had planned that the IAEA should play an extensive role in the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.²⁰⁶ It was the IAEA that was in charge of the safeguard system designed to ensure that non-nuclear weapon states only used their nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. This specific and prescribed responsibility was explicitly placed with the Agency in the NPT. According to the British delegation in Vienna, the Review Conference without IAEA attendance would bear a close resemblance to Hamlet without his most trusted friend, Horatio.²⁰⁷

Presumably, the underlying reason why the United Kingdom wanted the IAEA to be formally associated with the Review Conference was to draw attention to the technical, rather

²⁰⁵ This idea to have both Euratom and the European Commission associated with the NPT Review Conference was touched upon in during the drafting of the UN resolution to call upon the Review Conference Preparatory Committee, which is recorded in FCO 66/469.

²⁰⁶ See e.g. FCO 66/469: Letter from M. R. Eaton, FCO Legal Advisor, to A. E. Montgomery in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 2 October 1973.

²⁰⁷ FCO 66/592: Immediate Telegram no. 77 from Brash, British Embassy in Vienna, to FCO, UKMIS New York and UKDIS Geneva, 22 February 1974.

than the political character of the Treaty in the review.²⁰⁸ Even though it was in the United Kingdom's interests to emphasize the political significance of the NPT in order to accommodate its European allies and reaffirm its position as a great power, the United Kingdom wished to avoid criticism of its disarmament efforts and prevent revision of the NPT. A formal association of IAEA would serve this purpose because the Agency was responsible for the technical implementation of the Treaty.

3.4 The Rule of Decision-Making

The second issue that created considerable disagreement in the review negotiations was the rule of decision-making. As explained above, disagreement over the rule of decision-making was one of the reasons why the agreement over the rule of access was postponed until the third session of the Preparatory Committee. Why was the rule of decision-making a big challenge in the Review Conference?

As mentioned, consensus was a top British priority.²⁰⁹ After the first session of the Preparatory Committee, the United Kingdom had come to the conclusion that if the non-aligned states resisted a consensus decision in the Review Conference to make use of their potential voting power, the depositaries might consider giving up every other procedural point for this one.²¹⁰ The British were concerned that a vote on substantial issues could serve to highlight the division among the members of the Treaty, and in turn weaken the non-proliferation regime. If a majority happened to succeed in deciding Treaty amendments or protocols, this would be even more harmful for the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

However, during the second session of the Preparatory Committee, the nuclear weapon states were made aware that their objective of consensus was possibly unobtainable. Sweden and Australia had tabled a proposal that allowed for voting if consensus was not obtainable, based on the formulation from the procedural rules for the Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958.²¹¹ Sweden argued that the prospect of voting could increase the chances of consensus. This was a fair argument; if a qualified majority of 2/3 existed, states that were on the fence would probably feel hesitant about being held responsible for causing a division that would be damaging, but would not change the outcome of the vote. Sweden warned that if

²⁰⁸ FCO 66/469: Immediate Telegram no. 37 from Douglas-Home, FCO, to UKDIS Geneva (in New York), 23 October 1973.

²⁰⁹ FCO 66/598: "NPT Review Conference - PC2 Steering Brief"

²¹⁰ FCO 66/595: Letter to Barbara Richards, FCO, from UKDIS Geneva, 11 April 1974.

²¹¹ FCO 66/598: Letter from A. White, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 3 September 1974.

consensus could not be achieved on this rule, it would be widely seen as proof that the Review Conference was also unlikely to achieve very much by consensus.

The Swedish-Australian draft acquired many co-sponsors during the second session of the Preparatory Committee.²¹² After the session, the nuclear weapon states were prepared that they would have to give up their insistence on consensus and accept the Swedish-Australian draft for decision-making. In order to make such a concession as advantageous as possible, the nuclear weapon states put great efforts between the second and third session of the Preparatory Committee into lobbying for the bureau of the Review Conference. If they were going to agree to partial vote-operation, the nuclear weapon states considered it essential that the conference president would carry out a strict interpretation of “not obtainable”, and not jump to a vote.²¹³ In other words, the choice of the conference president would be crucial for flexibility on decision-making procedures.

3.4.1 The President

The nuclear weapon states first began to seriously consider names for the position of president during the second session of the Preparatory Committee, where the subject was raised in the corridors with some interest. According to the British CCD Ambassador, Henry Hainworth, there seemed to be a strong sentiment that the president should be the head of a national delegation, rather than a somebody selected “out of international life”, and preferably an African or an Asian.²¹⁴ The incentive to choose an African or Asian candidate was strong and it would not attract criticism from the non-aligned states which any given candidate from either the Western or the Eastern block would do. Several states and individuals were suggested, although none of them were African or Asian.

The Soviet Union advocated in favor of Ireland because of Ireland’s role as the initiator of the non-proliferation negotiations. It was the Irish Resolution, presented in, and approved by, the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 that set up the ad hoc Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in which the Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated. Also Austria and Finland were suggested, as were the names of Alva Myrdal and Garcia Robles.

²¹² FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 1974.

²¹³ FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 1974.

²¹⁴ FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 1974.

Alva Myrdal, however, was quickly eliminated on the grounds that she was retired.²¹⁵ The British suggestion that Garcia Robles could be president, because an honorary position might serve to mollify him, was also turned down.²¹⁶ The idea of neutralization was touched on by the Americans; however, the Soviet Union opposed the idea entirely.

The depositaries finally decided to favor the Swedish CCD Ambassador Inga Thorsson, who had succeeded Alva Myrdal after the United Nations General Assembly in 1973. Although Inga Thorsson did not have the status of Foreign Minister, she was a Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister, with great ambitions for the post.²¹⁷ There were several reasons why the nuclear weapon states decided to nominate Thorsson for the presidential position. First, as a Swede, she would not attract criticism from the Non-Aligned Movement. Second, the British considered Thorsson both highly qualified and someone with whom they could cooperate. When Thorsson was introduced to the British delegation in Geneva in January 1974, the British made the following observation:

Mrs. Thorsson who has excellent English gives the impression of being thoroughly competent and likely to be someone with whom it will be easier to do business than with Mrs. Myrdal because she seems less emotional about the whole matter.²¹⁸

Thus, it is possible that the British believed that they would be able to influence Inga Thorsson. Recalling Sweden's position among the non-aligned states, if the depositaries succeeded in influencing the Swedish position, they would be in a good position to influence the position of the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole.

Several other personal traits may have served to make Thorsson favorable for the position as president of the Review Conference. Though never explicitly stated on the British record, the fact that Inga Thorsson was female may have contributed to her nomination in two ways. During the 1970s, feminism was a considerable force in Western domestic politics; however, in international politics women were in the minority. Thus, by electing Thorsson, the Conference could possibly muster some good will from the feminists. However, it is also

²¹⁵ Alva Myrdal was quickly eliminated as a candidate because she was retired, see FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 1974. Thus, although she had a record of raising controversial issues, there is nothing to suggest that the nuclear weapon states would oppose her candidacy if she were still the Swedish representative in Geneva. While personality may have been of some importance to the nuclear weapon states, it should not be exaggerated; just like Inga Thorsson, Myrdal was representing the Swedish government in disarmament negotiations.

²¹⁶ FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 1974.

²¹⁷ FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 1974.

²¹⁸ FCO 66/590: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to A. White and I. C. Sloane, 25 January 1974.

possible that the depositaries believed they would be able to influence Thorsson because she was a woman in a male dominated arena.²¹⁹

Second, Inga Thorsson's background as a Swedish head negotiator in respect of population, technical and scientific cooperation and environmental issues may also have made her attractive as a candidate for the presidency. Because of Thorsson's previous focus on third world development, selecting Thorsson as president could signal sympathy with the non-aligned states that demanded technical assistance for nuclear energy to fuel their developing industries. Nor should it be ruled out that Thorsson's background as the Swedish Ambassador to Israel may have played in her favor in some way or another, for instance because Israel was not a member of the NPT.

Yet there was a final strategic reason why the depositaries settled on a Swedish president instead of an African or an Asian, as initially intended. If a Swede was nominated and accepted as the president of the Review Conference, the nuclear weapon states were in a position to argue in favor of a continuation of the bureau for the Preparatory Committee.²²⁰ The bureau for the Preparatory Committee consisted of the three chairs for each session, William Barton from Canada who chaired the first session, Eugeniewicz Wyzner from Poland who chaired the second, and the Swedish diplomat Carl Lennart Eckerberg who was going to chair the third session. If Thorsson was chosen as president, the choice would imply that Canada and Poland should be assigned the chairmanship of the main sub-committees in the Review Conference. From a depositary perspective, it was considered highly advantageous that the Review Conference main committees should be headed by a Western and an Eastern representative, in order to restrict contentious political debate in the Review Conference.

3.4.2 The North South Dimension

When the Preparatory Committee convened for its third session in February 1975, the nuclear weapon states agreed to adopt a concerted hard line during the first week in order to resist alternatives to consensus and keep the Swedish-Australian draft as a fallback, depending on the president.²²¹ In contrast to the two previous sessions, most of the activities took place at informal meetings between delegations, and decisions were only reached on the final day of the meeting after an exchange on the composition of the bureau.²²²

²¹⁹ For a description of gender in multilateral disarmament negotiations, see for instance Sondra R. Herman (1998) *The Woman Inside the Negotiations: Alva Myrdal's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1961-1982*.

²²⁰ FCO 66/599: Minute from A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, to Mr. Martin, UNE, FCO, 11 November 1974.

²²¹ FCO 66/599: Taylor, "Record on a meeting with the ACDA," 25 November 1974.

²²² FCO 66/730: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to J. C. Edmonds, ACDD, FCO, 25 February 1975.

The problem concerning the bureau was relatively simple. The nomination of the Swedish Ambassador Inga Thorsson as president of the Review Conference was only met with negligible opposition; lobbying of the depositaries in favor of her candidacy in both New York and Geneva following the second preparatory session thereby proved highly successful.²²³ However, Mexico demanded that the South be given a greater role in the bureau because the South was not represented in neither the Preparatory Committee Bureau, nor by Thorsson's presidency.

Therefore, during the debate on the bureau, Mexico's Garcia Robles suggested that the heads of the main committees should be from the South rather than from Europe or North America. As a compromise, it was decided that William H. Barton from Canada, who had chaired the first session of the Preparatory Committee, would chair Main Committee II, while the chairmanship of Main Committee I would be designated to B. Akporode Clark from Nigeria.²²⁴ Eugenieux Wyzner from Poland, who had chaired the second session of the Preparatory Committee, was instead appointed Chairman of the Drafting Committee, while the chairmanship of the Credentials Committee was also given to the South, to Hortencio J. Brillantes from the Philippines. Finally, it was decided to increase the number of vice-chairs, and thereby the size of the General Committee, in order to accommodate more representatives from the South.²²⁵

After the composition of the bureau was decided, the nuclear weapon states agreed to the Swedish-Australian proposal. Thus, the final rule of decision-making for the Review Conference read that "[d]ecisions on matters of procedure and in elections shall be taken by a majority of representatives present and voting."²²⁶ However, in issues of substance "...every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by a means of consensus. There should be no voting in such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted."²²⁷

Thus, just like Mexico, Australia and Sweden were able to influence the Review Conference Rule of Procedure. The latter was in an especially influential position, having been given the presidency of the Review Conference. The reason why the depositaries agreed

²²³ FCO 66/730: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to J. C. Edmonds, ACDD, FCO, 25 February 1975.

²²⁴ NPT/CONF/35/I, p. 4.

²²⁵ Vice-presidents were elected from the following states: Australia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Ireland, Honduras, Hungary, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Peru, Romania, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. See NPT/CONF/35/I, p. 4.

²²⁶ Shaker 1980: 877

²²⁷ Shaker 1980: 877-878

to the Swedish-Australian formulation was perhaps due to their conviction that the majority of non-nuclear weapon states shared their interest in not exposing the Treaty to criticism that could undermine its validity. As explained in the previous chapter, the nuclear weapon states considered the NPT to be of greater value to the non-nuclear weapon states than to themselves.

3.5 Summary

This chapter has presented an analysis of how the NPT parties resolved the conflicts of interest regarding the formal organization of the Review Conference, the Review Conference Rule of Procedure. There were particularly two conflicting issues regarding the Rule of Procedure, the rule of access and the rule of decision-making. Because both of these issues were settled before the Review Conference began, by a Preparatory Committee, the chapter commences with a short analysis of how the Preparatory Committee was set up. The analysis shows how the Preparatory Committee was generally an American product. The United States disregarded British warnings that the arbitrary membership formula could cause non-nuclear weapon states to accuse the depositaries of harboring Machiavellian intentions. However, these British concerns, regardless of whether they were honest or strategic, proved unfounded. The non-nuclear weapon states had no substantial complaints about the Preparatory Committee.

The rule of access was made an issue already during the first session of the Preparatory Committee, when Mexico's CCD Ambassador, Alfonso Garcia Robles, warned that the non-aligned parties would opt for the widest possible participation to the Review Conference, to include both non-parties and NGOs. The nuclear weapon states were firmly opposed to the idea, arguing that the review of the NPT was only the concern of its parties. Thus, when the Preparatory Committee reconvened for its second session, Garcia Robles had largely moderated his proposal, no longer suggesting that non-parties or NGOs should be allowed to enter the floor in the review negotiations, nor to take part in decision-making. Garcia Robles' proposal received much support from both non-aligned states and Western allies, and even the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were tempted to agree to the proposal. However, in response to an American suggestion, a decision on the issue was postponed until the last session of the Preparatory Committee.

The American suggestion to postpone agreement on the issue of access was strategically motivated and only made possible by close cooperation between the nuclear

weapon states, in stark contrast to how the Preparatory Committee was set up, and possibly the Mexican acceptance of the postponement, because particularly the Soviet Union considered access an unnecessary conflict to bring into the UN General Assembly. The nuclear weapon states agreed that a decision on the rule of access was a valuable bargaining chip in regards to other procedural issues and did therefore not wish to comply with the Mexican proposal until the very end of the procedural negotiations. Thus, agreement on the rule of access was made conditional on agreement on another contentious issue, the rule of decision-making.

During the second preparatory session, Sweden and Australia had forwarded a proposal for decision-making that would allow a vote on substantial issues in the Review Conference if all efforts for consensus had been exhausted. The nuclear weapon states strongly opposed the proposal, claiming that consensus was the only appropriate rule of decision-making. However, because the proposal received much support in the Preparatory Committee, the nuclear weapon states set out to select and lobby for a Conference President, who they trusted not to “jump to a vote”. Their decision fell on Inga Thorsson, the Swedish CCD Ambassador. There were several factors that favored the nomination of Thorsson, but most importantly, Thorsson was chosen because Sweden was aligned with the neutrals. Thorsson’s nomination meet no substantial protests in the third session of the Preparatory Committee, and after her election, the committee reached an agreement on both the Mexican proposal for the rule of access, and the Swedish-Australian proposal for the rule of decision-making.

The next chapter presents an analysis of how the NPT parties resolved their conflicts of interest in the Review Conference, with particular focus on the role of the Conference President, Inga Thorsson.

CHAPTER 4:

Turning Confrontation into Consensus

Roles and Rationales in the Negotiations of the Final Declaration

I would sum this [the Review Conference] up as a serial melodrama, directed by Inga Thorsson, with a script by anonymous writers, based on a book by HMG [Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom]. Since not all the cast knew their parts, there were passages of farce and others of near-tragedy. But a happy ending came with the Final Act.²²⁸

John Christopher Edmonds, Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 2 June 1975.

4.1 Introduction

The Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was convened at the Palais des Nations in Geneva on May 5, 1975, for a period of four weeks.²²⁹ As its first task, the conference elected Inga Thorsson as its president by acclamation. In her opening address to the conference, Thorsson emphasized the importance and uniqueness of the event: “For the first time in the modern era,” Thorsson proclaimed, “...a treaty regulating conditions relating to armaments and the performance of parties to that treaty would be the subject of a thorough scrutiny.”²³⁰ According to Thorsson, it was a historic moment: “The Conference was embarking on a momentous task, the results of which might well extend far into the future.”²³¹

The British delegation shared Thorsson's excitement about the Review Conference. According to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office's assessment, the conference was a “day of reckoning”²³²; either it could strengthen the NPT, or reveal dissension among its parties and weaken it, perhaps fatally. And as the negotiations commenced, it was the latter alternative that seemed most likely. Just as Mexico's Ambassador, Alfonso Garcia Robles, had promised in the Preparatory Committee, the nuclear weapon states came under instant

²²⁸ FCO 66/740: Letter from J. C. Edmonds, FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Mr. Coles, 2 June 1975.

²²⁹ The Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty came to a close on May 30, 1975.

²³⁰ NPT/CONF/SR.I, p. 2.

²³¹ NPT/CONF/SR.I, p. 2.

²³² FCO 66/740: “The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing” by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 3, 17 June 1975.

attack from the non-aligned states for having neglected their Treaty obligations. However, the non-aligned states were forced to see all of their disarmament proposals rejected by the nuclear weapon states and their allies.²³³ Consequently, by the third week of negotiation, the conference was at a complete deadlock over Article VI, the issue of disarmament.

The purpose of this final chapter of analysis is to explain how the stalemate in the Review Conference was overcome. Despite the apparent conflict of interests, the parties to the NPT agreed on a Final Declaration two hours into overtime on the last day of the Review Conference.²³⁴ While the Final Declaration was in itself not a groundbreaking document, it did reaffirm the commitment of the parties to nuclear non-proliferation.

The chapter is divided into two main parts. Part one analyzes the role of the Conference President, Inga Thorsson, in seeing the Review Conference through. This particular focus was chosen because the biographical accounts of William Epstein and Mohammed Shaker both portray Thorsson as the sole driving force behind the Final Declaration, but without properly explaining how Thorsson was able to resolve the apparent conflicts of interest.²³⁵ The premise of this research is that this type of methodological individualism is reductionist; in order to fully explain how Inga Thorsson was able to secure a consensus for the Final Declaration, historians must examine how the structure presents occasions for human behavior. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is not to discredit Inga Thorsson's successes with the Review Conference. However, the findings from the previous chapter give reason to expect that there were in fact multiple actors that assisted Thorsson, because it was not in the interests of the NPT parties to put the NPT under additional pressure after the Indian nuclear test. The opening quote of this chapter suggests that the United Kingdom was one state which did act as a driving force behind the Final Declaration, thus part two presents an analysis of how the United Kingdom contributed to the outcome of the Review Conference. The chapter is concluded with a short summary of the chapter findings.

²³³ The Group of 77 put forth a number of specific demands for action by the nuclear weapons states to live up to their commitment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. William Epstein (1976) lists them accordingly: 1) An end to underground nuclear tests (these were the only ones that were allowed by the Partial Test Ban Treaty), 2) a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenal, 3) a pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 4) concrete measures of substantial aid to the developing countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy 5) creation of special international regime for conducting peaceful nuclear explosions 6) an undertaking to respect all nuclear-free zones.

²³⁴ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 11, 17 June 1975.

²³⁵ See the accounts of William Epstein (1976) and Mohammed Shaker (1980).

4.2 The Role of Inga Thorsson

The biographical accounts of the first Review Conference present Inga Thorsson as the sole driving force behind the Final Declaration. According to William Epstein the conference nearly collapsed because the nuclear weapon states approached the review with a “stonewalling” strategy.²³⁶ In other words, they were committed to making as few concessions as possible. It was only the efforts and character of the Conference President, Inga Thorsson, which prevented the conference from breaking down, according to both Shaker and Epstein. Thorsson presented the participating states with a Final Declaration and two options: to sign, or to take the blame for the failed negotiations. According to Epstein, her Final Declaration succeeded in attaining a consensus, but a great number of participants issued interpretive statements revealed that a consensus was in reality non-existent.²³⁷ In order for this chapter to examine the roles and rationale that secured an agreement regarding a Final Declaration, this section first presents a critical analysis of why Inga Thorsson has been portrayed as the savior of the NPT review. The chapter thereafter continues by discussing alternative interpretations of Inga Thorsson’s role in the review, made possible by the British official record.

4.2.1 A Political Portrait

The portrayal of Inga Thorsson as the savior of the first Review Conference, and in effect the savior of the NPT, derives from the narrative of lost opportunities that has dominated in the history on nuclear arms control for a long period of time. As explained in the introductory chapter, one of the reasons for this is that historians made little effort to explain change during the Cold War. Their primary concern regarding nuclear arms control was to explain which superpowers were responsible for the arms race. Thus, participants account for the main contributions to the literature on the origin and implementation of the non-proliferation regime.²³⁸ There may be several reasons why their contributions to the literature have fueled the narrative of lost opportunities, instead of challenged the narrative. For instance, practitioners have put great emphasis on agency in explaining the evolution of nuclear diplomacy; structure is presented as a constraint that in the case of the Review Conference, Inga Thorsson was able to overcome. This model of methodological

²³⁶ Epstein 1976: 246

²³⁷ Epstein 1976: 254

²³⁸ E.g. William Epstein (1976) *The Last Chance, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control*; Alva Myrdal (1977) *The Game of Disarmament, How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race*; Mohammed I. Shaker (1980) *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Origin and Implementation 1959-1979*; Glenn Seaborg (1987) *Stemming the Tide, Arms Control in the Johnson Years*; Victor Israelyan (2003) *On the Battlefields of the Cold War, a Soviet Ambassador’s Confession*.

individualism that is currently used to explain the outcome of the first Review Conference of the NPT is challenged in this thesis.

Biographical accounts call for critical reading; attention should be paid to the premise, past experiences and intentions of each author. For instance, the majority of practitioners did not have any professional training in the field of history. This may explain why biographical accounts base their explanations on methodological individualism. Because of their lack of professional training, they have not been taught to identify historical processes or the significance of structure, and consequently they may be more inclined to emphasize actors. This may particularly be true in the case of practitioners, in comparison to other non-historians. Having taken close part in the negotiations, they may have been especially exposed to the individuals and therefore identified differences in style and personal commitment as decisive explanatory factors. This is for instance the case of Glenn Seaborg, who was appointed Chairman of the American Energy Commission from 1961-1971 by John F. Kennedy, “...significant arms control achievements can be brought about only when the [American] president takes a personal and an affirmative interest.”²³⁹

However, a lack of professional training does not explain why biographical accounts have contributed to the narrative of lost opportunities alone. Another important factor is the limited availability of appropriate sources. Both Epstein and Shaker largely base their analyses of the Review Conference on its Final Documents, which were made public after the review. However, these documents are of limited value for explaining the outcome of the review negotiations. This is illustrated by the nuclear jurist Carlton Stoiber’s analysis of the evolution of the NPT Review Conference Final Documents from 1975 to 2000. Stoiber explains how a Final Declaration does not necessarily indicate what issues those issues that were of great importance during a Review Conference. Final Declarations are considered to carry some legal implications,²⁴⁰ thus only language that has been agreed on is included in a Final Declaration and disagreements remain hidden. Equally, in the case when a Final Declaration has not proven obtainable, agreement remains hidden. According to Stoiber, the failure to recognize that Review Conferences that failed to reach consensus on a Final Declaration, “...negotiations in the main committees produced texts with many paragraphs that were ‘unbracketed’ – meaning that the language was generally acceptable to all

²³⁹ Seaborg 1987: 450

²⁴⁰ According to Carlton Stoiber, there are generally two interpretations of the status of the final documents of the Review Conference. One view is that the consensus documents are nonbinding political statements that indicate desirable, but not compulsory, interpretations of the treaty. The second view, which finds support in the 1980 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is that the consensus documents have a legally binding effect.

parties”,²⁴¹ has contributed to criticism of the NPT regime as having failed to develop truly global non-proliferation norms.

While Final Declarations hide disagreements because of their legal status, other documents included in the first Review Conference Final Documents may have exaggerated disagreements. During the first Review Conference, parties that had reservations about the Final Declaration were allowed to register them for inclusion in the Final Documents. The current portrayal of Inga Thorsson as the conference savior may have been inspired by some of these reservations. In the interpretive statement of Mexico, the Mexican delegation stated that they had only “...agreed not to oppose the consensus (...) as a token of their great appreciation for the praiseworthy and unceasing endeavors of the President of the Conference, to whom we owe the preparation of the draft declaration”²⁴². It is on this statement that Epstein bases his conclusion that consensus in the Review Conference was non-existent,²⁴³ without even discussing the discussing Mexico’s motives for making this reservation.

The Mexican delegation’s motives for including this particular formulation in their interpretive statement were unquestionably political. In my opinion, the statement must be considered partly as an attempt on Mexico’s part to save face, as each of the Mexican proposals for nuclear disarmament were dismissed by the majority in the Review Conference negotiations, and partly as a strategic move in the continuous debate on nuclear disarmament. Instead of admitting to a compromise, which could be regarded as accepting the rationale of the nuclear weapon states, Mexico only accredited the outcome of the Review Conference to its President.

The Mexican interpretative statement is an excellent source to the political disagreement in the first Review Conference, which was unquestionably an important aspect of the NPT review. However, it is not a sufficient source to explain the outcome of the review negotiations. This leads me to a third possibility as to why the biographical literature fuels the narrative of lost opportunities. It may be that practitioners have intentionally overlooked the Mexican motive because of personal political motives. Alva Myrdal, for instance, who has not written in detail about the Review Conference, but about nuclear arms control in general, was a vocal critique of the nuclear weapon states in her role as Swedish CCD Ambassador, and her book, *The Game of Disarmament*, was clearly intended to blame the lack of nuclear disarmament on superpower arrogance in the contemporary political debate on nuclear

²⁴¹ Stoiber 2003: 126-127

²⁴² NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex II, page 1

²⁴³ Epstein 1976: 254

disarmament. This may for instance also have applied to William Epstein, who worked as a United Nations disarmament official during the review process.

The above account of the political portrayal of Inga Thorsson confirms why biographical accounts, and especially biographical accounts written shortly after the event that is described, serve best as a source to a historical phenomenon. This is additionally confirmed by the following analysis of how Inga Thorsson was able to turn the Review Conference from confrontation to consensus. The analysis suggests that the narrative of lost opportunities is not appropriate to explain the first Review Conference. The establishment of a model for a periodic review system of the NPT was not simply a lucky coincidence; multiple actors contributed to the outcome of the Review Conference. A short presentation of the participants in the Review Conference will pave the way for the analysis.

4.2.2 Size and Structure

The Review Conference was large in scale. When the Review Conference was opened on 5 May 1975, there were 95 parties to the NPT,²⁴⁴ and 58 of these parties decided to participate in the conference to review the Treaty.²⁴⁵ This group included the five Euratom-states, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands, who deposited their ratification of the Treaty in London on May 2, just in time for the conference.²⁴⁶ Japan however, did not ratify the Treaty in time, but was as a signatory state allowed to participate in the deliberations of the Conference, but without the right to take part in decisions. In addition to Japan, 6 other signatory states of a total of 15 sent delegations to the Review Conference.²⁴⁷ On average, each delegation was composed of between four and eight diplomats.²⁴⁸ However, some of the delegations were stronger in number, among them the delegations of the three nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty. The Soviet Union participated with 17 diplomats, while the United States and the United Kingdom each sent 12 diplomats. Of the non-aligned states, Sweden had the largest delegation of 16 delegates.

²⁴⁴ Shaker 1980: 875. The number of adherents rose during the conference, see NPT/CONF/SR I.

²⁴⁵ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq (attended as observer upon its own request), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. See NPT/CONF/35/I p.4.

²⁴⁶ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 4, 17 June 1975.

²⁴⁷ Egypt, Japan, Panama, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Venezuela.

²⁴⁸ For the detailed list of all the participants, see NPT/CONF/35/I Annex VI.

There were several profiled states that did not take any part in the Review Conference. The three nuclear weapon states, China, France and India, were absent, as was Pakistan, which was considered a near-nuclear weapon state. Also Taiwan was not present. Taiwan happened to be a party to the NPT, but had not been invited to the Review Conference on the account of the fact that it was neither a member of the United Nation nor of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In 1971, the People's Republic of China had replaced Taiwan in the United Nations. This acknowledgement of Communist China was part of the foreign policy of the American administration under President Richard Nixon.²⁴⁹ In order not to put the newfound Sino-American relationship at risk, the Americans had successfully persuaded Taiwan not to participate.²⁵⁰ However, 7 of the 40 states that had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty did send delegations to the Review Conference. In accordance with the rule of access, paragraph II of Rule 44, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Israel, South Africa and Spain were granted observer status, which allowed them to attend the public meetings of the main committees and the plenary sessions, and to receive Conference documents and to submit documents to the other participants in the Conference.

Finally, several international agencies and non-governmental organizations were present in Geneva for the Review Conference, as provided for by paragraph III, IV and V of Rule 44, among them the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the League of Arab States and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). 29 non-governmental organizations were also granted access to the Conference,²⁵¹ including several profiled nuclear disarmament organizations, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).²⁵² However, according to the attendance list, the European Community was not represented by any of its agencies: neither the European Commission nor Euratom sent delegates to the Conference.

As described in the previous chapter, the work of the Review Conference was divided into a total of five committees. After the conclusion of the opening week of general debate, on 12 May, the review was moved into two main committees. Disarmament and security issues were negotiated in Main Committee I, under the chairmanship of B. Akporode Clark from

²⁴⁹ Dallek 2007: 617

²⁵⁰ The issue of Chinese participation was discussed between the second and third session of the Preparatory Committee, as illustrated for instance by FCO 66/599: Letter to Mr. White, FCO, from Mark Allen, UKDIS Geneva, 13 December 1974.

²⁵¹ For the detailed list of all the participants, see NPT/CONF/35/I Annex VI.

²⁵² NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex VI, pp.43-46.

Nigeria; safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy was negotiated in Main Committee II, under the chairmanship of William H. Barton from Canada.²⁵³ However, during the negotiations in the main committees, there was extensive activity in the corridors. The content of the final declarations was discussed in private meetings both within and between representatives from the major caucuses, the Western group, the Eastern group and the Non-Aligned Movement. Thus, both official and unofficial channels were used in order to exercise influence on the final outcome of the Conference.

4.2.3 Confrontation and Presidential Intervention

The non-aligned aim for the Review Conference was to put the nuclear weapon states in a “straight-jacket”²⁵⁴ by setting a timeframe for the completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. They launched their strategy early into the review. During the first days of plenary debate, the non-aligned states presented three additional protocols addressing the issues of nuclear disarmament and security assurances, and three resolutions addressing aspects of technical nuclear assistance for peaceful purposes. Both the protocols and resolutions acquired multiple non-aligned sponsors, however, neither the nuclear weapon states nor their developed non-nuclear weapon states allies accepted any of the proposals.²⁵⁵ The United States, and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, took a very hard line against the non-aligned states.²⁵⁶ Thus, when the work of the main committees was concluded on 26 May, Inga Thorsson commented in the plenary session that, “[j]udging from the reports of the main committees, (...) it would appear that the bulk of the work of the Conference still lay ahead and the prospect of an optimum result was not bright.”²⁵⁷

Thorsson saw her gloomy prediction confirmed three days later when the Drafting Committee completed its work. The Drafting Committee had held numerous meetings during the Conference proceedings in order to draft a Final Declaration, but was unable to reach any conclusion following the procedural objections of non-aligned minority groups.²⁵⁸ These objections were Mexican demands for Conference endorsement of the “aims pursued by” the

²⁵³ NPT/CONF/35/I, p. 4.

²⁵⁴ Formulation by the Mexican representative in Geneva, Miguel Marin, see FCO 66/737: Letter from J. G. Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to A. White, FCO, 4 April 1975.

²⁵⁵ All of these proposals, including list of co-sponsors, are included in NPT/CONF/35II, 30 May 1975.

²⁵⁶ FCO 66/740: “NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁵⁷ NPT/CONF/SR/12, p. 128.

²⁵⁸ FCO 66/737: Immediate FCO Telegram no. 108 of 29 May 1975 info immediate UKDEL NATO (for Thomson), routine Washington, Moscow and saving to Vienna.

sponsored draft protocols.²⁵⁹ On the day that the Drafting Committee completed its work, on 29 May, Thorsson expressed her grave concerns about the situation in a meeting of the General Committee. In the meeting, Thorsson explained that she did not believe the text produced would enable the Conference to reach agreement in the time available. For technical reasons, only one more plenary meeting was possible, and it would be held on the afternoon of the following day, on 30 May. A new initiative was required, Thorsson told the General Committee, and only she could take it. Thus, in the plenary meeting later that afternoon, she submitted her own draft of a Final Declaration to the Conference.²⁶⁰

What enabled Inga Thorsson to intervene as she did, and what made her intervention successful? The following sections discuss possible answers to these two questions. According to the head of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Arms Control and Disarmament Department, John Christopher Edmonds, Inga Thorsson received much assistance in preparing the draft Final Declaration that she introduced to the Review Conference that afternoon.

4.2.4 A Horse Race

The deadlock in the Review Conference forced the head of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Arms Control and Disarmament Department, John Christopher Edmonds, to leave London and join the British delegation in Geneva for the last ten days of the Review Conference.²⁶¹ Upon his return to London, Edmonds wrote a report in which he made an effort to explain the emergence of the Final Declaration.²⁶² According to Edmonds, during the weekend of 24 and 25 May, only days before the conclusions of the main committees, Thorsson called upon the two Chairmen of the main committees and the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, and asked each of them to produce some text for her in confidence. According to Edmonds, the three Chairmen responded very differently to the President's request.

²⁵⁹ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 11, 17 June 1975.

²⁶⁰ FCO 66/737: Immediate FCO Telegram no. 108 of 29 May 1975 info immediate UKDEL NATO (for Thomson), routine Washington, Moscow and saving to Vienna.

²⁶¹ John Christopher Edmonds gives this information in an interview on his career in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with Malcolm McBain, conducted on Thursday 21 May 2009, (p. 24). The interview is part of The British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (BDOHP), which Malcolm McBain established in 1995. The material is preserved at the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge, and it is also available online: <http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Edmonds.pdf> [accessed on Thursday 10 March 2011]

²⁶² FCO 66/740: "The Emergence of the President's Draft" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

The Chairman of Main Committee I, B. Akporode Clark from Nigeria, was according to Edmonds reported to have responded with only three lines. Why did the Nigerian Chairman not offer Inga Thorsson more concrete text? First, it is evident that the negotiations in Main Committee I made it difficult for Clark to offer Thorsson anything. It was in this committee that the battle over Article VI, the disarmament article, was fought. However, it is also possible that Clark intentionally chose not to contribute to a concluding document, as part of the Nigerian strategy in the Review Conference. In another summary report of the Review Conference, written by Mark Allen, the British Ambassador in Geneva, some of the non-aligned states, among them Nigeria "...were out to pillory the NWS [nuclear weapon states] and commit them to specific measures of disarmament within fixed timetables."²⁶³ It is thus possible that Clark, as Chairman, welcomed criticism instead of encouraging compromises, and that he as such only added to the difficulties of his committee. Edmonds' description of the Nigerian performance in the Review Conference, which he formulated in a brief summary of the conference intended for the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Ennals, confirms the uncompromising attitude of the Nigerians at the Review Conference. According to Edmonds, the Nigerian performance in the Review Conference was "grotesque", and the conference did not do much for Anglo-Nigerian relations, meaning it did not strengthen the relationship between the two states in any way.²⁶⁴ It should not be ruled out that the uncompromising Nigerian behavior was influenced by the recent OPEC-crisis, which had created an economic boom in oil-exporting Nigeria, or the political anxiety that arose in the wake of this boom.

According to Edmonds, the Polish Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Eugeniewicz Wyzner, did a little bit better. Wyzner handed Thorsson a draft, which he had received from the delegation of the Soviet Union. This, Edmonds knew, was because the Russians had also given the draft to the delegations of the United Kingdom and to the United States, "in confidence"²⁶⁵.

The third Chairman however, "did much better"²⁶⁶, Edmonds remarked. According to Edmonds, William Barton from Canada, who chaired Main Committee II, set to work with a couple of Canadians, a couple of Australians and probably one Swede, and produced a very suitable draft, which was thereafter delivered to Inga Thorsson. According to Edmonds,

²⁶³ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 4, 17 June 1975.

²⁶⁴ FCO 66/740: Letter from J. C. Edmonds, FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Mr. Coles, 2 June 1975.

²⁶⁵ FCO 66/740: "The Emergence of the President's Draft" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁶⁶ FCO 66/740: "The Emergence of the President's Draft" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

Barton and his “fellow-conspirators”²⁶⁷ were able to contribute constructively for the following reasons: first, Barton had all the language he needed for the technical articles from his own committee’s work.²⁶⁸ Contrary to Main Committee I, Main Committee II conducted its work in an efficient and businesslike manner.²⁶⁹ The material proved not to be particularly contentious and the negotiations were therefore not marked by much difficulty. According to the British representative in the committee, Fredrick Jackson, who was sent to Geneva because of his knowledge of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguard system from his work with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, by the end of its work, Main Committee II had reached a large measure of agreement on a number of texts. According to Jackson, the only reason why it was not able to send anything forward by consensus to the plenary session was because of last-minute objections by Mexico and Alfonso Garcia Robles.²⁷⁰

Secondly, Edmonds explains, William Barton knew about the draft language that the United Kingdom had worked out with the Canadians regarding Article VII and security assurances, and on which NATO, Australia and Japan had agreed. Thus, the only “stumbling block”²⁷¹ was articles VI, the contentious disarmament article. According to Edmonds, the group kept their option for this Article open until they had a clear understanding of what the nuclear weapon states would accept of non-aligned language.

Edmonds’ account of the emergence of the president’s draft is confirmed by Robert Furlonger, the Australian Ambassador to Vienna and head of the Australian delegation to the Review Conference. After his return to Vienna, Furlonger met with Fredrick Jackson, the British representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose headquarters were, and still are, in the Austrian capital. In conversation with Jackson, Furlonger revealed that the Australians, together with the Canadians, had settled down and done a draft.²⁷² Furlonger however, suggested that the draft was an Australian/Canadian initiative, and that they had gotten hold of the Swedes after the draft was prepared, and in a formed body told Inga

²⁶⁷ FCO 66/740: “The Emergence of the President’s Draft” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁶⁸ These articles are article III, IV and V in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article III refers to the safeguard regulations in the treaty; Article IV refers to each parties’ inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; Article V refers to the non-nuclear weapon states right to technical assistance. See *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT), GA Res. 2373 (XXII), 12 June 1968. GAOR, 22nd Sess, Suppl. No. 16 (A/6716/Add. 1), pp. 5-7.

²⁶⁹ FCO 66/740: Letter from Fredrick Jackson, the British Embassy in Vienna, to Mark Allen, UKDIS Geneva, 10 June 1975.

²⁷⁰ FCO 66/740: Letter from Fredrick Jackson, the British Embassy in Vienna, to Mark Allen, UKDIS Geneva, 10 June 1975.

²⁷¹ FCO 66/740: “The Emergence of the President’s Draft” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁷² FCO 66/738: Letter from Fredrick Jackson, the British Embassy in Vienna, to J. C. Edmonds, FCO ACDD, 12 June 1975.

Thorsson that the only way of saving the conference was for her to put forward the draft on her own authority. Edmonds, however, who was told of the conversation by Jackson, rejected that the initiative for the presidential draft was Australian and Canadian. How did Furlonger explain the activities of Clark and Wyzner, Edmonds asked in his response to Jackson.²⁷³ According to Edmonds', it was clear that several "horses ran in the race"²⁷⁴ to help Inga Thorsson "lead the conference by the nose"²⁷⁵, but the starter was Inga Thorsson herself.

Inga Thorsson presented her draft Final Declaration to the Review Conference in the plenary session on 29 May. According to Edmonds' account of the emergence of the draft, Thorsson probably received some final assistance from the Conference Secretary General, Ilka Patinen, a United Nations official, in order to polish the text.²⁷⁶ In Edmonds' opinion, the final draft was contained "...practically no trace of Nigerian and Polish offerings and [was] largely based on Barton's work"²⁷⁷. Recalling Edmonds' poetic comparison of the Review Conference with a serial melodrama, used to introduce this chapter, it seems valid to suggest that Edmonds, by accrediting the final Declaration to Barton and Canada, at least in part implies that the final document was by and large a British product. According to Edmonds, it was Barton's knowledge of the Anglo-Canadian work to draft appropriate language that enabled Barton to produce the draft, which in turn was adopted by Thorsson. Is it possible that the United Kingdom acted as a major driving force behind the successful outcome of the Review Conference, or is this simply an expression of British officials exaggerating the role of the United Kingdom in their internal documents? The second part of this chapter is devoted to explaining the role of the United Kingdom in the Review Conference.

4.3 The Role of the United Kingdom

From a perspective of motive, the United Kingdom was undoubtedly interested in playing the role of mediator in order to achieve conference consensus. Recalling the analysis in chapter two, the United Kingdom was more vulnerable to criticism than the two other nuclear weapon states. Despite being the smallest nuclear power, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Arms Control and Disarmament Department feared that the United Kingdom would come under attack for not having participated in any negotiations on nuclear

²⁷³ FCO 66/738: Letter from Fredrick Jackson, the British Embassy in Vienna, to J. C. Edmonds, FCO ACDD, 12 June 1975.

²⁷⁴ FCO 66/738: Letter from J. C. Edmonds, FCO ACDD, to Fredrick Jackson, the British Embassy in Vienna, 20 June 1975.

²⁷⁵ FCO 66/740: "The Emergence of the President's Draft" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁷⁶ FCO 66/740: "The Emergence of the President's Draft" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁷⁷ FCO 66/740: "The Emergence of the President's Draft" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

disarmament. The nuclear disarmament negotiations that had been conducted after the NPT entered into force were of a bilateral character only, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor was the United Kingdom in a position to simply disregard the demands of their non-nuclear weapon state partners in the European Community. The following analysis of the British record of the conference negotiations confirms that this was the case, and that British efforts to this effect were of great significance for the final outcome.

4.3.1 “Holding Out the Olive Branch”²⁷⁸

Going into the Review Conference, the strategy of the three nuclear weapon states, including the United Kingdom was to secure an appropriate conference outcome by mustering approval for the draft declaration they had produced in preparation for the Conference. The strategy was to get together a few “sympathizers” who could circulate their draft and thus function as a contact group between the nuclear weapon states and other delegations.²⁷⁹ The depositaries probably considered it useful to lie low to prevent that non-aligned states from dismissing their draft simply because of its origin. According to a British description of the strategy, the sympathizers were neither bound to accept the drafts themselves, nor authorized to agree to amendments; they would simply be asked to encourage other delegations to go along with the general tenor of the draft, without suggesting that the three depositaries, whose authorship of the draft would not be explicitly stated, would be prepared to amend it.

However, the depositary strategy to make use of a small group of sympathizer to ease in their preferred language for a Final Declaration failed already during the first week of general debate, when the Soviet delegation attempted to pressure two of the intended “sympathizers”, Belgium and Austria, to join Czechoslovakia into sponsoring the depositary draft.²⁸⁰ According to the British Ambassador to Geneva Mark Allen’s summary of the event, which was instantly telegraphed to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, the Russians had acted “somewhat clumsily” in a vain attempt to get priority for the depositary draft declaration over Mexico’s proposed draft additional protocols.²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ FCO 66/740: “NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁷⁹ FCO 66/737: Priority Telegram no. 69 of 8 May 1975, to FCO, info Washington, Moscow and Vienna, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen.

²⁸⁰ FCO 66/737: Priority Telegram no. 73 of 9 May 1975, to FCO, info Washington, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen.

²⁸¹ FCO 66/737: Priority Telegram no. 73 of 9 May 1975, to FCO, info Washington, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen.

Partly to repair the damage, Mark Allen explains, the United Kingdom arranged a meeting with its partners in the European Community the following morning.²⁸² At this meeting, the British presented the genesis of the depositary draft, stated their own preferences and invited comments from their partners. According to Mark Allen's assessment of the meeting, the European states expressed general agreement that protocols, such as the Mexican proposals, should be rejected and that a Final Declaration was the best possible outcome of the Review Conference. However, according to the British reporter, there was a "good deal of feeling that to table the draft [of the depositary powers] in the near future would risk sharpening confrontation". While the Germans, the Danes and the Belgians seemed to have little difficulty with the depositary draft, the Italians, the Dutch and the Irish wanted considerable, yet unspecified additions. Thus, at British suggestion, it was agreed to hold a meeting of the NATO delegations on 12 May, the final day of general debate, to discuss the draft and to concert tactics for the work of the main committees.

The British proposal to discuss the draft declaration in a NATO setting was motivated by British interests to play the role of mediator in the Review Conference. According to Mark Allen's telegram report to London, the delegation considered it desirable to expose the Americans to European views; otherwise there was a chance that the Americans would be content to let the United Kingdom become "...the filling in a sandwich with the Russians on the one side and the European/Canadians/Swedish on the other."²⁸³ In other words, the United Kingdom did not wish to play the part of the sole Western advocate for the depositary draft. Such a role would be hugely disadvantageous for the United Kingdom, whose primary interest was to appear accommodating towards its European partners. This interest was best served if they negotiated alongside the Americans, because the interests of the United Kingdom were closer to those of the European states than those of the United States.

The British had good reason to believe that the Americans would be content to leave them with the undesired task of convincing the Europeans. As explained in chapter two, one of the main interests of the United States in the review was to preserve bilateral relationships of *détente*. Thus, by leaving it to the British to talk the European states, Canada and Sweden into the depositary draft, the United States would be able to avoid negotiations in which it

²⁸² The NPT parties that were also members of the European Community are regularly referred to as *the Nine* on the British record, or in French (*à Neuf*) in accordance with the number of members (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom). In international diplomacy it is common costume to refer to caucuses by their number of members. The *Group of 77* is another case in point. FCO 66/737: Priority Telegram no. 73 of 9 May 1975, to FCO, info Washington, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen.

²⁸³ FCO 66/737: Priority Telegram no. 73 of 9 May 1975, to FCO, info Washington, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen.

would be cornered into choosing between showing allegiance to its European allies or the Soviet-American *détente*.

The NATO members in the Review Conference met on 12 May. A number of representatives, among them Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey, expressed the need for a draft that was closer to the centre, and in response to a German suggestion, it was decided that an open-ended Western drafting group be set up.²⁸⁴ Consequently, in the meeting of the Western Group²⁸⁵ the following day, a small group was established, composed of a German chair, Ireland, the Netherlands, Australia and the United States. The United Kingdom decided not to be represented in the group, "...leaving that task to the United States", remarking that several Western delegations had said that the declaration should contain much more "meat", and that the United States thus would have a hard time trying to contain this movement.²⁸⁶

Not only did the United Kingdom succeed in playing a responsive and cooperative role towards her European partners and her partners in the Commonwealth; the United Kingdom also succeeded in adopting a cooperative role towards the non-aligned states.²⁸⁷ According to John Christopher Edmonds' report on the cooperation between the depositaries at the Review Conference, written upon his return to London after the conclusion of the Review Conference, the relatively mild British attitude towards the non-aligned states at first frustrated the Soviet Union, who complained that the British were not backing them and required that the United Kingdom "shout as loudly as themselves".²⁸⁸ According to Edmonds, the United Kingdom responded to the Russian criticism by emphasizing that the obvious requirement was to break the developing deadlock between the nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned states, and that the British believed they had a role to play in this, without any disloyalty to the other two depositaries, if they took a position of some "individuality".²⁸⁹

According to Edmonds, the Americans at once accepted the United Kingdom in this role, but the Russians took their time. However, eventually, Edmonds explained, the Soviet

²⁸⁴ FCO 66/737: Priority Telegram no. 78 of 12 May 1975, to FCO, info Washington, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen.

²⁸⁵ The Western Group was composed of the NATO members, Austria, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. However, during the Review Conference the Group was enlarged to cover virtually the full Western European and Others Group (WEOG), allowing Sweden, Finland and Switzerland to participate. The WEOG is one of several unofficial Regional Groups in the United Nations.

²⁸⁶ FCO 66/737: Letter from J. G. Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to B. Richards, FCO ACDD, 13 May 1975.

²⁸⁷ FCO 66/740: "NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁸⁸ FCO 66/740: "NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁸⁹ FCO 66/740: "NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

Union agreed to an arrangement where they played the “super-heavy”²⁹⁰, the Americans played the points more briefly and moderately, and the United Kingdom was seen to be bridging the gap between the three nuclear weapon states on the one hand, and NATO, Australia, Japan, Sweden and even Romania and Mexico on the other, “so far as the ‘market’ would stretch.”²⁹¹

Thus, according to Edmonds’ account, the United Kingdom succeeded in playing its preferred role as consolidator and mediator, a role that Edmonds suggests contributed towards breaking the deadlock between the nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned states. He equally accredits the Soviet Union with the favorable outcome of the negotiations. In Edmonds’ words, “[o]nce the three depositaries had agreed on their respective roles, Russian ‘villainy’ was an essential complement to our holding out the olive branch”.²⁹² The following section examines how the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom worked together to ensure that the Final Declaration was in a language that was considered acceptable by both the nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned states.

4.3.2 “A Troupe of Actors”²⁹³

When she presented the Review Conference with her allegedly self-produced draft Final Declaration, Inga Thorsson also asked the Conference to cut its plenary session short in order for the delegations to study and reflect on the document.²⁹⁴ Meanwhile, she would hold a meeting with the representatives of a selected group of states to consider possible changes to the draft. The states that Thorsson invited to this meeting were: Canada, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Romania, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, the Pole Eugeniewicz Wyzner.

The President’s negotiating committee met later that day in an attempt to negotiate the final wording of the document. At the meeting, neither the United Kingdom nor the United States made any reservation. Shortly after the conclusion of the plenary session they had met with their NATO colleagues, Australia and Japan, and agreed that Thorsson’s document was

²⁹⁰ FCO 66/740: “NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁹¹ FCO 66/740: “NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁹² FCO 66/740: “NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁹³ FCO 66/740: “NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁹⁴ NPT/CONF/SR/13, p. 132.

reasonable and that the fewer changes that were made to it, the better.²⁹⁵ This was perhaps not surprising, seeing that the draft was by and large Western. The Soviet Union, however, was not equally pleased with the presidential draft. According to Mark Allen's report on the committee meeting, included in his summary report on the entire Review Conference, the Soviet Union was infuriated by the final paragraph of the draft, which would have the conference "commend to the attention of all States and of the UN General Assembly the text of this declaration and the appended resolutions adopted by the conference".²⁹⁶

The phrase was inspired by a Mexican procedural resolution, presented during the final week of the conference, which would have the conference endorse the "aims pursued by" the draft protocols which had sponsors. According to Allen, the Russians exploded over the proposal, and "...hit the roof, refusing to contemplate the possibility that the conference should adopt the Mexican resolutions or commend them to the world." Allen recalls that "[a]fter a tight-lipped exchange between a tired Mrs. Thorsson and an over-tense Mr. Israelyan [head of the Soviet delegation], the group adjourned to sleep on the situation."²⁹⁷

Before she suspended the meeting, Inga Thorsson agreed to delete the final paragraph in her draft declaration, and invited the concerned delegations to consider how to deal with the Mexican additional protocols and other documents on which there was no consensus, overnight.²⁹⁸ Thus, the next day, the United Kingdom met with the United States and the Soviet Union to discuss possible solutions to the remaining unsettled point. According to Mark Allen's report on the morning meeting, the Russians were, in a dramatic contrast to the prior evening, "all sweetness". The previous "evening of vigorous haggling, with a great show of Soviet intransigence"²⁹⁹, was simply a performance. This was explicitly revealed by the head of the Soviet Delegation himself, Viktor L. Israelyan. According to John Christopher Edmonds' recollection of the tripartite morning meeting, "...a smiling Israelyan said 'Let me *perform* just once more'"³⁰⁰. However, there was never a need for a second Soviet performance. The Russians had themselves prepared a simple draft resolution to replace the crucial final paragraph, which accordingly was brought to the conference general-secretary,

²⁹⁵ FCO 66/737: Immediate Telegram no. 109 of 29 May 1975, to FCO, UKDEL NATO, info Washington and Moscow, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen.

²⁹⁶ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 11, 17 June 1975.

²⁹⁷ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 11, 17 June 1975.

²⁹⁸ FCO 66/740: "The Emergence of the President's Draft" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

²⁹⁹ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 10, 17 June 1975.

³⁰⁰ *Perform* is written in italics by Edmonds. See FCO 66/740: "The Emergence of the President's Draft" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

Ilka Pastinen, and presented as a British resolution that was believed to be acceptable to the Russians.³⁰¹ Pastinen, however, had just completed the declaration on the President's instructions, and this final draft went even further to meet the Russians than their own proposal. In the final draft, Inga Thorsson had settled on a procedural arrangement whereby "...the Mexican resolutions, and a number of other unadopted drafts, would be appended to the final report of the conference and go forwards, unendorsed"³⁰². The Russian proposal was accordingly dropped.

Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that the Soviet "performance" effectively secured a procedural resolution which was more acceptable to the nuclear weapon states than what the British had dared hope for. An appropriate follow-up question is: to what extent was the Soviet performance directed by the United Kingdom? The British record suggests, perhaps not surprisingly, that the United Kingdom was largely to thank for the tactics of the nuclear weapon states. According to John Christopher Edmonds, once the Soviet Union accepted that the United States and the United Kingdom had to use different tactics to secure the sympathy of their NATO allies and others, the Soviet delegation actively helped the United Kingdom to play the part of mediator, "...for instance by letting us [the United Kingdom] stage a shouting match with them [the Soviet Union] when the president suspended her limited meeting on the night of 29 May."³⁰³ In Edmonds' words, the Soviet delegation was a "troupe of actors – each playing his appointed role for all it was worth"³⁰⁴, to the advantage of both themselves and the United Kingdom.

Victor L. Israelyan's songs of praise for the British delegation after the conclusion of the Review Conference partly confirms that the United Kingdom was the major strategist among the nuclear weapon states. These compliments were conveyed partly in Geneva, and partly upon Israelyan's return to Moscow, to the British Ambassador in Moscow, Terence Garvey. According to Garvey, who forwarded the Russian compliments to John A. Thomson, the British Assistant Under-Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Viktor L. Israelyan had expressed that what pleased him most about the Review Conference was the full understanding and grasp of the subject shown by the British.³⁰⁵ Israelyan was particularly

³⁰¹ FCO 66/737: Immediate Telegram no. 112 of 30 May 1975, to FCO, UKDEL NATO (for Thomson), info Washington and Moscow, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen.

³⁰² FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 11, 17 June 1975.

³⁰³ FCO 66/740: "NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

³⁰⁴ FCO 66/740: "NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days" by J. C. Edmonds, 4 June 1975.

³⁰⁵ FCO 66/470: Letter from T. Garvey, British Embassy in Moscow, to J. A. Thomson, FCO, 3 June 1975.

content with the tripartite meeting in London prior to the Review Conference, which he recalled as being a British idea. According to Israelyan, "...experience had shown what an excellent idea it was, enabling the three depositaries to proceed in complete harmony."³⁰⁶ The Soviet diplomat believed it was John A. Thomson who was the architect behind the meeting, and he therefore implicitly accredited the conference outcome to Thomson.

Was John A. Thomson the British strategist in the Review Conference? On the one hand, it is possible that Israelyan simply directed these compliments to Thomson out of politeness, because of Thomson's superior position as a junior minister. On the other hand, in his position as British Assistant Under-Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Thomson was in charge of the British diplomatic service and had the authority to shape the British foreign policy. There are also sources from within the British delegation that confirm Thomson's impact on the delegation's work. According to John Taylor, a Geneva-based representative with the British Review Conference delegation, the idea to expose the United States to European views in order to take some heat off themselves originated from Thomson: "We considered that it was very much in the spirit of John Thomson's advice to us that we contrived not to be represented on this group [the Western drafting group]."³⁰⁷

The United Kingdom did not only end the Review Conference on good terms with the other two nuclear weapon states; several other delegations also expressed their satisfaction with the efforts of the British delegation, thus additionally confirming the influential role of the United Kingdom. According to John Christopher Edmonds, the British delegation was warmly thanked for its contribution to the Review Conference by "...the NATO-allies, Japan and – perhaps most significant of all – Mrs. Thorsson herself and the Swedish delegation."³⁰⁸ According to Edmonds, the British even finished on friendly terms with "...Mexico, Romania, and some of the less extreme non-aligned."³⁰⁹ The praise enabled Thomson to conclude that the tactics pursued by the British delegation to the Conference had broadly "...enhanced British standings."³¹⁰ Thomson had three good reasons to base his final conclusion on. Firstly, large parts of the Final Declaration were based on British drafting.³¹¹ Secondly, according to Thomson, the United Kingdom had succeed in raising general

³⁰⁶ FCO 66/470: Letter from T. Gravey, British Embassy in Moscow, to J. A. Thomson, FCO, 3 June 1975.

³⁰⁷ FCO 66/737: Letter from J. G. Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to B. Richards, FCO ACDD, 13 May 1975.

³⁰⁸ FCO 66/740: Letter from J. C. Edmonds, FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Mr. Coles, 2 June 1975.

³⁰⁹ FCO 66/740: Letter from J. C. Edmonds, FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Mr. Coles, 2 June 1975.

³¹⁰ FCO 66/740: Letter from J. Thomson to Private Secretary, 2 June 1975.

³¹¹ FCO 66/740: "Non-Proliferation (N.P.T.) Review Conference", for FCO and Whitehall distribution, by James Callaghan, Secretary of State of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, p. 2, 9 June 1975.

acceptance that while they “...stood with the US and USSR on some major questions of substance,” they were “...notably nearer than either of the superpowers the views of the Western Europeans, Australians, Canadians and sensible non-aligned.”³¹² Thirdly, while Anglo-Soviet relations have been strengthened by the exercise, they had not weakened Anglo-American relations.³¹³

In sum, the argument presented in the section above supports the idea that the United Kingdom greatly influenced the outcome of the first Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by playing the part of mediator. The United Kingdom was able to play this part with great success, partly because it managed to convince the superpowers of this role. However, the United Kingdom’s success was also dependent on other factors, one of which was the limited leverage of the non-aligned states in the Review Conference, for which the United Kingdom was partly responsible.

4.3.3 The Limited Leverage of the Non-Aligned States

There were several factors that enabled the United Kingdom to influence the outcome of the first Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. One important factor that contributed to the British success was the weak negotiating position of the non-aligned states. Recalling the analysis in chapter two, both the United Kingdom and the United States were convinced that the non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty would not inflict any considerable damage on it, because the Treaty was of great value to the non-nuclear weapon states. The British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Ennals, hinted at this when he expressed: “...it surely goes without saying that the spread of nuclear weapons in the world poses an even greater threat, if anything, to non-nuclear weapon states, than to those, like ourselves, which already have nuclear weapons.”³¹⁴ However, it was not simply the lack of an effective bargaining chip that weakened the negotiating position of the non-aligned states in the Review Conference. The non-aligned states did not succeed in extracting even the vaguest sort of apology from the nuclear weapon states in the Final Declaration because they were effectively neutralized in the Review Conference. How were the non-aligned states neutralized?

The neutralization of the non-aligned states in the Review Conference was to a large extent a tactical victory for the nuclear weapon states and the Conference President, Inga

³¹² FCO 66/740: Letter from J. Thomson to Private Secretary, 2 June 1975.

³¹³ FCO 66/740: Letter from J. Thomson to Private Secretary, 2 June 1975.

³¹⁴ FCO 66/597: Letter from D. Ennals, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to N. A. Sims, London School of Economics and Political Science, 22 July 1974.

Thorsson. Each contributed towards the neutralization in different ways. As previously discussed, the policy of the nuclear weapon states going into the Review Conference was to emphasize the technical aspects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was partly motivated by an aim not to draw attention to disarmament, and partly an aim to divide the non-aligned states. The majority of the non-aligned states were developing countries, and their main motive for signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not nuclear disarmament, or to contribute to the establishment of an international non-proliferation norm, but technical assistance to improve their developing industries. According to the United Kingdom, these states were the most likely to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but at the same time the states whose demands it was easiest for the nuclear weapon states to accommodate.

The United Kingdom had this assessment confirmed in a meeting between the British and the Mexican delegations in Geneva, one month in advance of the Review Conference. At this meeting, the Mexican representative, Miguel Marin, let the difficult negotiating position of the non-aligned states slip to the British representative, John Taylor. Marin told the British representative that it was becoming practically impossible to coordinate action within the non-aligned group, and that this was both because it had become too large, and because there were too many heterogeneous interests.³¹⁵

The nuclear weapon states' strategy to divide the non-aligned states proved a to be a success. According Mark Allen's summary report of the Review Conference, the non-aligned states did not act as a monolithic group in the Review Conference.³¹⁶ While some of its members, particularly Mexico, Nigeria and Romania took a political view, others, led by the Philippines, saw the conference in economic terms, as an opportunity to get more nuclear technical assistance.

The maneuverability of the non-aligned states was additionally limited by the President of the conference, Inga Thorsson. Thorsson's decision to negotiate her draft Final Declaration with representatives from Canada, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Romania, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, effectively kept the non-aligned states from mobilizing against her draft. The selection put much pressure on Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines and Romania, who constituted a minority in the negotiating committee. Unless they were able to find an agreement with the remaining representatives in the committee, they would be fully exposed as the wreckers of the Review Conference, Mark Allen explained in a

³¹⁵ FCO 66/737: Letter from J. G. Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to A. White, FCO, 4 April 1975.

³¹⁶ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 3, 17 June 1975.

telegram report to London from the committee meeting.³¹⁷ Thus, while the Soviet Union was most uncompromising with the non-aligned states, the non-aligned states showed surprising flexibility.³¹⁸

For much the same reason, it was a great tactical maneuver by Thorsson not to include Yugoslavia in her Presidential negotiating committee. Recalling the previous chapters, Yugoslavia was along with Mexico and Sweden, one of the most profiled critiques of the nuclear weapon states at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva; however, in the Review Conference, Yugoslavia was not allowed to play a major part. Evidently, Thorsson believed that it would be easier to reach agreement by excluding Yugoslavia from her negotiating committee. Instead, she tackled the Yugoslavs privately and persuaded them grudgingly to allow the consensus on the Final Declaration.³¹⁹ When summarizing the Review Conference for the British Government, the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,³²⁰ James Callaghan, concluded that the Final Declaration was “...above all due to the determination of the President (...) and her skills behind the scenes”, because the Final Declaration was drafted under her direct supervision, and she “...carefully controlled the opportunities for argument about it.”³²¹

Thus, in the end, the non-aligned states were not in a position to demand any concrete commitments by the nuclear weapon states, and they gave into the mediating efforts of the United Kingdom. This was partly because of the neutralizing efforts of the industrialized states. However, the tactics deployed by the non-aligned states may also be of some explanatory value. According to Fredrick Jackson, the British representative on Main Committee II, British readiness to get down to the solid work of drafting was invaluable to the British influence on the final outcome of the Review Conference. In his attempt to list what lessons should be learned from the Conference, Jackson particularly stressed that “...you cannot exercise influence without getting down into the *mêlée*.”³²² *Mêlée* is French, for either conflict or batter, thus Jackson suggested that the only way to influence was by actually dealing with the substance, which in this particular case was the draft language. The non-

³¹⁷ FCO 66/737: Immediate Telegram no. 112 of 30 May 1975, to FCO, UKDEL NATO (for Thomson), info Washington and Moscow, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen.

³¹⁸ FCO 66/737: Immediate Telegram no. 111 of 30 May 1975, to FCO, UKDEL NATO, info Washington and Moscow, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen.

³¹⁹ FCO 66/740: Letter from J. C. Edmonds, FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Mr. Coles, 2 June 1975.

³²⁰ Contrary to the Swedish system, the British Secretary of State is a senior position to the Minister of State.

³²¹ FCO 66/740: “Non-Proliferation (N.P.T.) Review Conference”, for FCO and Whitehall distribution, by James Callaghan, Secretary of State of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, p. 2, 9 June 1975.

³²² FCO 66/740: Letter from Fredrick Jackson, the British Embassy in Vienna, to Mark Allen, UKDIS Geneva, 10 June 1975.

aligned states, however, generally spoiled their chances of contributing draft language. When requested to produce some text for the Final Declaration, the single non-aligned Chairman, B. Akporode Clark from Nigeria, was reported to only have handed Thorsson three sentences.

It is hard to say whether this was non-aligned tactics, or the result of deficient cooperation among the non-aligned states. According to Mark Allen's summary report of the Review Conference, Alfonso Garcia Robles, who was the self-appointed leader of the non-aligned, was not renowned for biddability or suppleness of tactics;³²³ thus it seems reasonable to suggest that this was imply a bad tactical call. However, the fact that Mexico contributed with the majority of the non-aligned language to the Final Declaration suggests that Mexico recognized the value of drafting. However, that does not necessarily make Clark's actions a sign of non-aligned division; the Mexican language in the Final Declaration may simply be explained by Mexico's role as the leader of the non-aligned. Yet, the United Kingdom's negative experience with the Nigerian delegation, and surprisingly positive experience with the Mexican delegation, seems to finally suggest that the two non-aligned states were not in perfect harmony. With Clark spoiling his opportunity to submit drafts on behalf of the non-aligned, the non-aligned were worse off attempting to influence the final outcome of the Review Conference. As long as Inga Thorsson relied on the Committee Chairmen when she set out to draft the Final Declaration, the numerous non-aligned vice-chairmen in the General Committee, which non-aligned states had pressed for in the preparation of the Review Conference Committee, hardly made a difference.

In addition to the limited leverage of the non-aligned states there were two more factors that enabled the United Kingdom to succeed in the role of mediator. The first one, which has been described to some extent, was the active role taken by the industrialized non-nuclear weapon states, particularly Canada, Australia and Sweden. These states had remained relatively mute in the Preparatory Committee, and on occasion sided with the non-aligned states in their demands for nuclear disarmament. Sweden in particular was known to side with the non-aligned in matters of nuclear disarmament, as Alva Myrdal's confrontational statements at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, recounted in chapter two, illustrated. However, in the Review Conference, the Swedish role was dramatically moderated, because like the non-aligned, Sweden and other non-nuclear weapon states were not served with by a conference failure. The United Kingdom was right to partly take credit for this, because recalling the previous analysis of the origin of the Review Conference Rules

³²³ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, pp. 3-4, 17 June 1975.

of Procedure, it was partly the British who launched the candidature of Inga Thorsson towards the end of 1974.³²⁴

The final factor that enabled the United Kingdom to play the role of mediator was, according to Jackson's lessons from the Review Conference, personal relations. In Jackson's opinion, the successes in Main Committee II, which discussed safeguards and peaceful nuclear technology, were largely achieved because many of the actors were so well known to each other, remarking that, "...in a conference of this magnitude, personal relations, and trust, count for much."³²⁵ Thus, Jackson's lessons from the conference serve as an important reminder not to underestimate the significance of individuals. This reminder brings me back to this chapter's starting point: the role of the Conference President, Inga Thorsson. Regardless of the assistance that she received, it is very evident that Inga Thorsson's style of leadership contributed towards secure the successful outcome of the Review Conference. The British Ambassador to Geneva, Mark Allen, leaves no doubt about this in his analysis of the final outcome of the negotiations: "It was largely because of Mrs. Thorsson's determination and strength of character that the Conference reached any conclusion."³²⁶

4.4 Summary

This chapter has presented an analysis of how the NPT parties managed to come to an agreement regarding a Final Declaration, despite the deadlock between the nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned states over the issue of nuclear disarmament. The chapter first analyzed the role of Inga Thorsson in the Review Conference, because Thorsson is portrayed as the conference savior in the existing literature. This analysis demonstrated that although Inga Thorsson's qualities as Conference President were, undoubtedly, of great significance, she did also receive much assistance in seeing the conference through, which enabled her to secure a consensus for the Final Declaration. In sum, the factors that contributed to the success of the first Review Conference of the NPT are characterized by both state constellations and individual initiative.

In the analysis, Canada and Australia stand out as two states that offered Thorsson invaluable assistance in drafting the Final Declaration. In his role as Chairman of Main

³²⁴ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 6, 17 June 1975.

³²⁵ FCO 66/740: Letter from Fredrick Jackson, the British Embassy in Vienna, to Mark Allen, UKDIS Geneva, 10 June 1975.

³²⁶ FCO 66/740: "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing" by Mark Allen, FCO, p. 6, 17 June 1975.

Committee II, Canadian William Barton was called upon by Inga Thorsson to draft text for a presidential draft of the Final Declaration, and he made much use of this opportunity. The second part of the analysis, which examines the role of the United Kingdom, suggests that the British played an instrumental role in securing a consensus for the draft, not only because the United Kingdom took on the role of mediator during the Review Conference, but also because of British efforts to concert the strategy of the three depositary powers prior to the Review Conference. According to the Soviet head negotiator, Viktor L. Israelyan, the initiative behind the preparatory tripartite meeting derived from the British Assistant-Under Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, John Thomson. Thomson consequently appears as the invaluable strategist behind the successful outcome of the Review Conference.

While Sweden, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom exercised much influence during the Review Conference, this chapter has explained how the leverage of the developing countries, the Group of 77, was more limited. Their limited negotiating position is explained, partly a result of the strategy of the nuclear weapon states to feed into the opposing interests within the non-aligned constellation. They eventually found themselves forced to yield to Inga Thorsson's ultimatum, to approve the Final Declaration instead of carrying the responsibility for a conference failure which could draw the validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty further into question.

However, despite their limited leverage, the non-aligned states did succeed in slightly moving the nuclear weapon states. They gained acceptance for their additional protocols and resolutions to be appended to the final report of the Conference and were allowed to include interpretative statements of the Final Declaration. By drawing attention to such achievements, this analysis has demonstrated that the narrative of lost opportunities, which presents the non-aligned states as being completely powerless when faced with the arrogance of the superpowers, is in fact unfitting. The non-aligned states' role as victims must be understood as a self-imposed political maneuver; the Review Conference Final Document was in large a multilateral compromise.

CHAPTER 5:

Conclusion

“A Peaceful Diplomatic Revolution”

That experience [the midnight negotiations in the Presidential Committee] gave rise to some valuable friendships – with several US officials, with Madame Thorrson (sic.) who had great influence among the neutrals and told me afterwards that the conference had been a great lesson in “realpolitik”, and with Victor Israelyan the de facto Soviet leader.

John Christopher Edmonds, interviewed by Malcolm McBain, 2009.³²⁷

5.1 Introduction

The post-war period has been characterized by both national and international efforts to restrict nuclear technology to peaceful purposes. When the nuclear bombs were dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the world entered a new era in which the survival of humanity can no longer be assumed.³²⁸ The ambition of this thesis has been to expand knowledge of the institutionalization of an international nuclear non-proliferation norm by examining the first Review Conference of the NPT. Despite its obvious historical relevance as both the first conference to review the operation of an arms regulating treaty, and as the model for the periodic review system, an unprecedented enforcement mechanism for international law that is of great current importance, the first Review Conference of the NPT, has not been subjected to historical research.

I hereunder present the conclusions of this research. My main objective has been to explain what roles and rationales of the NPT-parties that were decisive for the conduct and the outcome of the review. The research question was designed in order to account for the mutual causality of agency and structure to explain what ideational and material factors that enabled Inga Thorsson to keep the conference from collapsing. The recollection of the British diplomat John Christopher Edmonds’, used to introduces this chapter, expressed in an interview Edmonds gave about his diplomatic career nearly 35 years after the review took place, suggests that both political conflict and friendship are appropriate for explaining the outcome of the first NPT review. The conclusion of this research is that particularly the roles

³²⁷ McBain 2009: 25

³²⁸ Sherwin 2003: 3

played by Sweden and the United Kingdom were decisive for the conduct and outcome of the review negotiations. Two factors presented these two states with the opportunity to play pivotal roles in bringing about the conference compromise. Both Sweden and the United Kingdom had a special incentive to act as mediators in the review negotiations. However, a precondition for their maneuverability was the character of the conflict between the superpowers, the *détente*.

5.2 The Achilles' Heel

First, this research concludes that, paradoxically, conflict was a precondition for the cooperation and compromises in the review negotiations. The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had the definite upper hand going into the review negotiations, not from strength in numbers, but due to their economic and military superiority, and the simple fact that neither of them wanted to change the status quo. According to his biographers, the Republican Administration under President Richard Nixon did not believe that state behavior was steered by international norms and therefore showed little interest in the NPT. From the perspective of both superpowers, there was no need for a review conference; they only agreed to organize one because it was mandatory by the NPT.

However, in spite of their apparent superiority, the superpowers had an Achilles' heel. As the analysis has demonstrated, the superpowers were throughout the negotiations primarily concerned with their position vis-à-vis one another, which was in turn affected by their positions vis-à-vis China. While attempting to remain friendly, the adversaries were constantly challenging each other in fear that the other would seek to take advantage of the *détente*. Advantage was of course the aim of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, the carefully orchestrated *realpolitik* of the United States and the US-Soviet *détente* largely restricted the maneuverability of the superpowers in the review negotiations and contributed to increase the maneuverability of the United Kingdom and Sweden.

In order not to “upset the *détente*”, both the United States and the Soviet Union were hesitant about going into situations in which they could not foresee the outcome. For instance, the United States was initially skeptical about tripartite meetings that included the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union was hesitant about approaching the United Nations General Assembly with unresolved conflicts with the non-aligned states. As discussed in the analysis, it is possible that this Soviet behavior was motivated by an interest to put pressure on the United States in the review negotiations, however, regardless of motive, it demonstrates how

the United Nations, the institutionalization of a world community, was an actor that put pressure on the superpowers. Throughout the negotiations, there was a general tendency among the nuclear weapon states not to engage in any battles in the United Nations; attempts were made to settle all conflicting issues beforehand. This was evident in setting up the Preparatory Committee, when Swedish threats to present an independent resolution to call on an International Disarmament Organization caused the nuclear weapon states to remove the reference to the depositaries in their draft resolution.

The lack of superpower interest and self-confidence in the NPT review was a precondition for the influential roles of Sweden and the United Kingdom in the review. The major triggering factor, however, apart from the United Nations General Assembly, was the conflict between the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states in the first session of the Preparatory Committee. The antagonism that was directed towards the nuclear weapon states prompted the Soviet Union to agree to British proposals for a concerted depositary approach to the review. With the mediation of the United Kingdom, the Cold War adversaries, the Soviet Union and the United States were able to align their strategies for the Review Conference. The cooperation between the three nuclear weapon states, made possible by the political atmosphere of *détente*, was essential to the final outcome of the review. The close cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union was a significant change from the negotiations that had produced the Non-Proliferation Treaty, less than a decade before. Equally, the inclusion of the United Kingdom was a remarkable change from the SALT negotiations.

Though the Soviet Union reached out to the United Kingdom prior to the Indian nuclear test explosion, it should not be ruled out that the nuclear proliferation to India increased the favorability for concerted depositary action. The Indian nuclear test put much pressure on the infant non-proliferation regime, and it is apparent from the British record that there were deep concerns about how to respond to the Indian test. However, the United Kingdom decided that admitting to these concerns could further undermine the non-proliferation regime, and it was therefore decided not to act on them. Equally, the mild response of the United States and the Soviet Union does not necessarily reflect a lack of concern.

According to this research, it is also apparent that the Indian nuclear test had a conciliatory effect on the non-nuclear weapon states. This is, for instance, suggested by the Mexican moderation in the second session of the Preparatory Committee. It was also in the interests of the non-nuclear weapon states to preserve the credibility of the frail regime. By

moderating its proposal for a rule of access, and as the front figure of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Review Conference, Mexico was able to exercise a great deal of influence in the review negotiations. However, the two states that really stand apart from the other actors are Sweden and the United Kingdom.

5.3 The Road is the Goal

The second conclusion of this research is that roles of Sweden and the United Kingdom were decisive for the conduct and outcome of the review negotiations. As described above, the United Kingdom played a pivotal role in organizing consultations between the nuclear weapon states, while Sweden influenced the review negotiations as a vocal representative of the non-aligned states and eventually in the capacity as president of the Review Conference. The underlying reason why it was Sweden and the United Kingdom that happened to possess such roles in the review negotiations was their shared interest in being actors.

As explained in chapter two, and clearly confirmed by the initiative of the United Kingdom throughout the review negotiations, the British had a strong interest in the negotiation process. Contrary to the United States, the United Kingdom emphasized the necessity of negotiations. This position was motivated by the British interest in both appearing to be accommodating to their partners in the European Community, and to contributing to the position of the United Kingdom in order to reaffirm the British position as a depositary power. Assured that revision was considered unacceptable by the two superpowers, the United Kingdom was free to focus on its appearance in the negotiations process.

Motivated by concerns regarding its position vis-à-vis the United States and its partners in the European Community, the United Kingdom contributed to the special role of Sweden. Throughout the review, the United Kingdom put much emphasis on close consultations with the frontrunners of the non-aligned states, one of which was Sweden. Similarly to the United Kingdom, Sweden had strong incentives to play an influential role in the review negotiations. As a Western state opting for neutrality in a military conflict of the Cold War, Sweden had an interest in reaffirming its position as non-aligned. Nuclear diplomacy was a pivotal component in Sweden's neutrality strategy. Sweden's appearance as a frontrunner for the Non-Aligned Movement in nuclear diplomacy served to reaffirm Swedish neutrality. This was the primary interest of Sweden in the review negotiations;

interests regarding technical assistance and nuclear disarmament must be considered secondary. Correcting the discriminatory features of the NPT was of great interest to Sweden primarily to gain the confidence of the non-aligned states. However, as an industrialized nuclear supplier, Sweden did not have any national interests in technical assistance. This priority of interests is illustrated by Sweden's behavior in the review negotiations. While the confrontational tone of Alva Myrdal during the preparations for the review negotiations served to secure non-aligned confidence in Sweden, the conciliatory and business-like appearance of Inga Thorsson served to convince the depositary powers that Sweden was an appropriate candidate for the conference presidency. In contrast, Mexico's Alfonso Garcia Robles was considered to be too unpredictable for the position.

The combination of interest and position, the first being a direct consequence of the second, motivated and enabled the United Kingdom and Sweden to seek compromise solutions in the review negotiations. They contributed to the compromises of the review conference both directly and indirectly. As the research has demonstrated, a significant component of how Sweden and the United Kingdom exercised influence during the review negotiations was what states they decided to be responsive to, and what states they decided to exclude from informal negotiations during the Review Conference. Especially Canada, Australia and Mexico were allowed to contribute to the final outcome. In drafting a Final Declaration, Sweden relied on Canadian and Australian assistance, while Swedish responsiveness to Mexican pressure resulted in the inclusion of proposed additional protocols in the Final Documents.

The United Kingdom also contributed to the Final Declaration of the Review Conference. First, the United Kingdom prepared extensive amounts of language for the Final Declaration, which was used by the Canadians and the Australians, and thereby contributed directly to the concrete wording of the Final Declaration. Indirectly, the British contributed to a solution in part because of calls for wide Western consultations to coordinate the Western position during the Review Conference. These consultations served to expose the United States to the demands of the Western non-nuclear weapon states. Yugoslavia, however, which both Sweden and the United Kingdom paid much attention to prior to the first session of the Preparatory Committee, was completely sidelined.

Combined, the two conclusions presented above suggest that the first Review Conference and the institutionalization of a periodic review system for the NPT was a result of both the superpowers' sensitivity to the United Nations and Sweden and the United Kingdom's interests in using nuclear diplomacy as a means to affirm their positions in this

world community. Consequently, the existence of a world community constitutes an important component in my explanation model. This may be an important step in an epoch-making development. As presented in short in the introductory chapter, during previous disarmament negotiations the United Nations had largely been an instrument of the superpowers. In the 1950's, the United Nations General Assembly was used as an arena for ideological competition. The superpowers attempted to outshine each other by advancing nuclear disarmament proposals that they knew were unacceptable to their opponent.³²⁹ The bipolar conflict reduced nuclear disarmament initiative to propaganda, and the United Nations to a passive observer. Although the United Nations introduced resolutions and set up ad hoc organizations with an aim to pursue nuclear arms control measures, such as the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee, their success was conditioned on superpower commitment. The negotiation in the ENDC for a non-proliferation treaty only commenced after the Chinese nuclear test, although it had been running for two years already. However, during the review negotiations, Soviet-American and Sino-American *détente* limited the maneuverability of the superpowers. Consequently, the United Nations became an instrument for the non-nuclear weapon states, although the non-nuclear weapon states only succeeded in moving the position of the superpowers slightly.

5.4 “A Peaceful Diplomatic Revolution”

The findings presented above support the introduction of a new narrative of nuclear diplomacy that combines both the political conflicts and the diplomatic accomplishments. According to the historian Martin J. Sherwin, the Manhattan Project scientists who built the first nuclear weapons expected that the revolution in weapons technology could lead “...either to a peaceful diplomatic revolution or a nuclear-armed world.”³³⁰ Partly to justify their own contribution to the nuclear attack on Japan, they claimed that the bombing was intended as a warning shot, a deterrence that could bring other states, especially the Soviet Union, to accept the international control of nuclear weapons. In the short term these noble intentions failed. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fueled the emerging Cold War conflict between the two ideological adversaries and instigated a nuclear arms race that eventually included multiple states. It also provided the basis for the historical narrative of lost opportunities. In

³²⁹ Seaborg 1987: 456

³³⁰ Sherwin 2003: xxxiv

the long term however, the nuclear technology did unarguably give rise to a diplomatic revolution, though perhaps not entirely in the way that the nuclear scientists had envisioned.

Nuclear weapons did to some extent instigate a diplomatic revolution. In the wake of inconvincible destruction and faced with potential nuclear annihilation, the architects of the post-war world order institutionalized global governance as an international norm. This norm increased the significance of soft power, understood as the ability to steer the behavior of others through persuasion instead of coercion. Profit-warfare is no longer considered legitimate state behavior. This research has clearly demonstrated how consideration of appearance in the United Nations affected the actions of the superpowers, and how the United Kingdom and Sweden attempted to reaffirm their position, not through the acquisition of material resources, but by mediation. Multilateral conferences have in a sense become the modern battlefield. According G. John Ikenberry, “[i]n the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven change has been abolished as a historical process.”³³¹ Thus, a narrative of a peaceful diplomatic revolution is perhaps more appropriate than that of lost opportunities.

The appropriateness of a narrative of a peaceful diplomatic revolution is additionally strengthened by the longevity of the non-proliferation regime. In accordance with the NPT, the parties to the Treaty met in May 1995, 25 years after the Treaty entered into force, to decide if the NPT should be extended for a longer period, or indefinitely. The decision fell on the latter. Paradoxically, the 1995 Extension and Review Conference was not able to agree on a Final Declaration. This confirms how political conflict in review negotiations is not necessarily a sign that there is no consensus for non-proliferation, but instead used as a channel to direct protests regarding other issues. Another solid symbol of the international character of the non-proliferation norm is adherence to the NPT, which today is nearly universal. Only Pakistan, India, North Korea and Israel are not members of the NPT.³³²

³³¹ Ikenberry 2008: 31

³³² Of these four states, Israel has never officially denied or declared to be in possession of nuclear weapons, though the latter is generally assumed. According to Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, Israel had nuclear weapons on hand in June 1967, and could have tested, see Reed and Stillman 2009: 83. For additional information on the Israeli nuclear program, see for instance Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*. Columbia University Press, New York: 1998. The three others have officially tested nuclear explosives, and therefore cannot sign the NPT unless they remove their nuclear defense.

5.5 Final Reflections and Future Research

The recent availability of the extensive official British records from the review negotiations has presented me with the opportunity to describe the first Review Conference very differently from how it has been portrayed in biographical accounts. According to the findings presented in this thesis, the review negotiations were characterized by a large degree of consultations, cooperation and compromise, not only within, but also across the caucuses. Thus, contrary to William Epstein's account of the first NPT review, the nuclear weapon states did not "stonewall" all the demands of the non-nuclear weapon states. This research has thereby contributed towards broadening knowledge of a largely understudied phenomenon in modern history. However, this thesis only represents a first step in addressing the lacunas in the nuclear historiography; multiple issues remain unattended and ought to be subjected to future research. To conclude this research, I wish to draw attention to two subjects that have been made particularly relevant by the findings of this research.

When analyzing a subject that had not previously been analyzed by historians, it was natural to give priority to analyzing the dynamics between the actors, instead of producing an in depth analysis of each actor. However, a more in depth analysis of each actor is of course called for, and in the light of the conclusion presented here, the official records of Sweden could prove particularly interesting. In this thesis, the motives of Sweden have been analyzed on the basis of Sweden's behavior in the review and knowledge of Sweden's general interests regarding nuclear weapons. An analysis of the Swedish official records could add to the analysis presented here, by expanding knowledge of Swedish strategy in the first review.

Second, it could be of great interest to further examine the effects of the Indian nuclear test explosion on American-European relations. This thesis has revealed how the Indian nuclear test put great pressure on the United Kingdom, because the European non-nuclear weapon states expected the nuclear weapon states to condemn the Indian actions. However, the British sources do not explain how the news of the Indian test was received in Washington, or whether the European states put direct pressure on the United States as well, and if so, how this was received. Both of these perspectives may serve to additionally expand knowledge of the first Review Conference of the NPT that set the precedence for a periodic review system of great current value.

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United Nations

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Part I: Organization and Work of the Conference (NPT/CONF/35/I)

Part II: Documents of the Conference (NPT/CONF/35/II)

Part III: Summary Records (NPT/CONF/35/III)

Both the text of the NPT and Final Document are available online at the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, in PDF format, latest accessed on 25 April 2011:

http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT_Review_Conferences.shtml

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Appendix

The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the worlds human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties

to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the

Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

Signatories and Parties as of January 2010

Country	Date of Signature	Date of Deposit of Ratification	Date of Deposit of Accession (A) or Succession (S)
Afghanistan	1/7/68	4/2/70	
Albania			12/9/90(A)
Algeria			12/1/95(A)
Andorra			7/6/96(A)
Angola			14/10/96(A)
Antigua and Barbuda			17/6/85(S)
Argentina			10/2/95(A)
Armenia			21/7/93(A)
Australia	27/2/70	23/1/73	
Austria	1/7/68	27/6/69	
Azerbaijan			22/9/92(A)
Bahamas, The			11/8/76(S)
Bahrain			3/11/88(A)
Bangladesh			31/8/79(A)
Barbados	1/7/68	02/21/80	
Belarus			9/2/93(A)
Belgium	20/8/68	2/5/75	
Belize			9/8/85(S)
Benin	1/7/68	31/10/72	
Bhutan			23/5/85(A)
Bolivia	1/7/68	26/5/70	
Bosnia & Herzegovina			15/8/94(S)
Botswana	1/7/68	28/4/69	
Brazil			18/9/98(A)
Brunei			26/3/85(A)
Bulgaria	1/7/68	5/9/69	
Burkina Faso	25/11/68	3/3/70	
Burundi			19/3/71(A)
Cambodia			2/6/72(A)
Cameroon	17/7/68	8/1/69	
Canada	23/7/68	8/1/69	
Cape Verde			24/10/79(A)
Central African Republic			25/10/70(A)
Chad	1/7/68	10/3/71	
Chile			25/5/95(A)
China*			9/3/92(A)
Colombia	1/7/68	8/4/86	
Comoros			04/10/95(A)
Congo			23/10/78(A)
Costa Rica	1/7/68	3/3/70	
Cote d'Ivoire	1/7/68	6/3/73	
Croatia			29/6/92(S)
Cuba			4/11/2002(A)
Cyprus	1/7/68	10/2/70	
Czech Republic			1/1/93(S)
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea**			12/12/85(A)
Denmark	1/7/68	3/1/69	

Djibouti			16/10/96(A)
Dominica			10/8/84(S)
Dominican Republic	1/7/68	24/7/71	
Ecuador	9/7/68	7/3/69	
Egypt	1/7/68	26/2/81	
El Salvador	1/7/68	11/7/72	
Equatorial Guinea			1/11/84(A)
Eritrea			16/3/95(A)
Estonia			7/1/92(A)
Ethiopia	5/9/68	5/2/70	
Fiji			14/7/72(S)
Finland	1/7/68	5/2/69	
France			2/8/92(A)
Gabon			19/2/74(A)
Gambia	4/9/68	12/5/75	
Georgia			7/3/94(A)
Germany***	28/11/69	2/5/75	
Ghana	1/7/68	4/5/70	
Greece	1/7/68	11/3/70	
Grenada			2/9/75(S)
Guatemala	26/7/68	22/9/70	
Guinea			29/4/85(A)
Guinea-Bissau			20/8/76(A)
Guyana			19/10/93(A)
Haiti	1/7/68	2/6/70	
Holy See			25/2/71(A)
Honduras	1/7/68	16/5/73	
Hungary	1/7/68	27/5/69	
Iceland	1/7/68	18/7/69	
Indonesia	2/3/70	12/7/79	
Iran	1/7/68	2/2/70	
Iraq	1/7/68	29/10/69	
Ireland	1/7/68	1/7/68	
Italy	28/1/69	2/5/75	
Jamaica	14/4/69	5/3/70	
Japan	3/2/70	8/6/76	
Jordan	10/7/68	11/2/70	
Kazakhstan			14/2/94(A)
Kenya	1/7/68	11/6/79	
Kiribati			18/4/85(S)
Kuwait			01/31/92(A)
Kyrgyzstan			5/7/94(A)
Laos	1/7/68	20/2/70	
Latvia			23/1/92(A)
Lebanon	1/7/68	15/7/70	
Lesotho	9/7/68	20/5/70	
Liberia	1/7/68	5/3/70	
Libya	18/7/68	26/5/75	
Liechtenstein			20/4/78(A)
Lithuania			23/9/91(A)
Luxembourg	14/8/68	2/5/75	
Madagascar	22/8/68	8/10/70	
Malawi			18/2/86(A)

Malaysia	1/7/68	5/3/70	
Maldives	11/9/68	7/4/70	
Mali	14/7/69	10/2/70	
Malta	17/4/69	6/2/70	
Marshall Islands			30/1/95(A)
Mauritania			26/10/93(A)
Mauritius	1/7/68	8/4/69	
Mexico	26/7/68	21/1/69	
Micronesia			14/3/95(A)
Monaco			13/3/95(A)
Mongolia	1/7/68	14/5/69	
Montenegro			3/6/2006
Morocco	1/7/68	27/11/70	
Mozambique			4/9/90(A)
Myanmar (Burma)			2/12/92(A)
Namibia			2/10/92(A)
Nauru			7/6/82(A)
Nepal	1/7/68	5/1/70	
Netherlands	20/8/68	2/5/75	
New Zealand	1/7/68	10/9/69	
Nicaragua	1/7/68	6/3/73	
Niger			9/10/92(A)
Nigeria	1/7/68	27/9/68	
Norway	1/7/68	5/2/69	
Oman			23/1/97(A)
Palau			14/4/95(A)
Panama	1/7/68	13/1/77	
Papua New Guinea			16/2/82(A)
Paraguay	1/7/68	4/2/70	
Peru	1/7/68	3/3/70	
Philippines	1/7/68	5/10/72	
Poland	1/7/68	12/7/69	
Portugal			15/12/77(A)
Qatar			3/4/89(A)
Republic of Korea	1/7/68	23/4/75	
Republic of Moldova			11/10/94(A)
Romania	1/7/68	4/2/70	
Russian Federation	1/7/68	5/3/70	
Rwanda			20/5/75(A)
St. Kitts and Nevis			6/11/84(S)
St. Lucia			28/12/79(S)
St. Vincent & the Grenadines			16/11/84(S)
Samoa			17/3/75(A)
San Marino	1/7/68	10/8/70	
Sao Tome & Principe			20/7/83(A)
Saudi Arabia			3/10/88(A)
Senegal	1/7/68	17/12/70	
Serbia			1/1/93(A)
Seychelles			12/3/85(A)
Sierra Leone			26/2/75(A)
Singapore	5/2/70	10/3/76	
Slovakia			1/1/93(S)
Slovenia			7/4/92(S)

Solomon Islands			17/6/81(S)
Somalia	1/7/68	5/3/79	
South Africa			19/7/91(A)
Spain			5/11/87(A)
Sri Lanka	1/7/68	5/3/79	
Sudan	24/12/68	31/19/73	
Suriname			30/6/76(S)
Swaziland	24/6/69	11/12/69	
Sweden	19/8/68	9/1/70	
Switzerland	27/11/69	9/3/77	
Syrian Arab Republic	1/7/68	24/9/68	
Tajikistan			17/1/94(A)
Thailand			7/12/72(A)
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia			30/3/95(S)
Timor-Leste			5/5/2003(A)
Togo	1/7/68	26/2/70	
Tonga			7/7/71(S)
Trinidad & Tobago	20/7/68	30/10/86	
Tunisia	1/7/68	26/2/70	
Turkey	28/1/69	17/4/80	
Turkmenistan			29/9/94(A)
Tuvalu			19/1/79(S)
Uganda			20/10/82(A)
Ukraine			5/12/94(A)
United Arab Emirates			26/9/95(A)
United Kingdom	1/7/58	29/11/68	
United Republic of Tanzania			31/5/91(A)
United States	1/7/68	5/3/70	
Uruguay	1/7/68	31/8/70	
Uzbekistan			7/5/92(A)
Vanuatu			24/8/95(A)
Venezuela	1/7/68	25/9/75	
Vietnam			14/6/82(A)
Yemen	14/11/68	1/6/79	
Zambia			15/5/91(A)
Zimbabwe			26/9/91(A)

Dates given are the earliest on which a country signed the Treaty or deposited its instrument of ratification or accession – whether in Washington, London or Moscow. In the case of a country that was a dependent territory which became a party through succession, the date given is the date on which the country gave notice it would continue to be bound by the terms of the Treaty. Data from the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs.

*China – On 27/1/70, an instrument of ratification was deposited in the name of the Republic of China. Effective 1/1/79, the United States recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. The authorities on Taiwan have stated that they will continue to abide by the provisions of the Treaty and the United States regards them as bound by the obligations imposed by the Treaty.

**Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea – On 10/1/2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT. On 9/10/2006, North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device.

***Germany – The former German Democratic Republic, which was united with the Federal Republic of Germany on 3/10/90, had signed the NPT on 1/7/68 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 10/31/69.

Norsk Abstrakt

Denne masteroppgaven er et bidrag til å øke kunnskapen om institusjonaliseringen av en internasjonal ikkespredningsnorm. Atomteknologi gjør utslettelse av alt menneskelig mulig. Det internasjonale samfunn har derfor bygget et regelverk som i størst mulig grad begrenser atomteknologien til fredelig bruk. Regelverket er basert på flere traktater, deriblant ikkespredningstraktaten, Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) som trådte i kraft i 1970. NPT forbyr alle land som per 1. januar 1967 hadde atomvåpen å bidra til spredningen av atomvåpenet, mens alle land som ikke har atomvåpen, forplikter seg til å avstå fra å tilegne seg eller utvikle atomvåpen eller andre kjernefysiske eksplosiver.

Ikkespredningsregimet er et understudert tema i moderne historie. Fremforhandlingene av internasjonal atomvåpenregulering er hovedsakelig beskrevet av politikere og diplomater som har deltatt i prosessen. Deres bidrag setter i liten grad forhandlingsforløpene inn i en historisk prosess, og fremstiller diplomatiet som preget av konflikt og nederlag. Spesielt er dette tilfellet for den første tilsynskonferansen for ikkespredningstraktaten. Fem år etter at NPT trådte i kraft ble det avholdt en tilsynskonferanse for traktaten i Genève. Konferansen var angitt i traktaten, men utover konferansens generelle formål inkluderte NPT ingen veiledning til hvordan tilsynet skulle avholdes. Denne masteroppgaven har derfor hatt som formål å forklare hvilke aktører og interesser som var avgjørende for utformingen og gjennomføringen av denne konferansen

Ved å analysere aktørenes tilnærming til, og oppførsel under fremforhandlingene av både tilsynskonferansens prosedyre i forkant av konferansen, og forhandlingene under konferansene, bidrar denne masteroppgaven til å nyanse fremstillingen av den første tilsynskonferansen for ikkespredningstraktaten. Oppgaven viser hvordan forhandlingene var preget av en stor grad av samarbeid og kompromiss, ikke bare internt, men også på tvers av grupperingene. Mangfoldet av konflikt var forutsetning for dette samarbeidet. Politiske motsetninger i forhandlingene, *détente* mellom USA og Sovjet Unionen, samt Kinas gjenintegrering i verdenssamfunnet og den første indiske atomvåpenprøvesprengningen i forkant av konferansen bidro til å skape et handlingsrom som spesielt Storbritannia og Sverige maktet å utnytte.

Den første tilsynskonferansen satt presedensen for et periodisk tilsyn av ikkespredningstraktaten. I dag fungerer dette tilsynet som et internasjonalt styringsorgan for ikkespredningsregimet, og funnene presentert her har derfor stor aktualitet.