Trust in central government in Uganda: the importance of institutional outputs.

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Administration and Organisation Theory University of Bergen, Norway in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Philosophy in Public Administration.

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Table of Contents

List of tables

List of figures

Abstract

What explains trust in government and how can political institutions ensure that they are trusted by citizens? This study explores how perceptions of the economic, political and social performance of government translate into citizen confidence in the institution of central government. Using a qualitative methodological approach involving 12 focus group discussions with ordinary citizens; and in depth interviews with a carefully selected set of key informants, the study explores how perceptions of government outputs among everyday citizens in Uganda affect how much people trust the government. The findings of the study reveal that confidence in government is mainly a result of perceptions of tangible outputs in terms of health care, education and security. At the same time, the study found that perceptions of corruption in government have the most trust eroding effect among everyday citizens.

Key Words: political trust, institutions, performance, Uganda.

Abbreviations

A4C	Activists For Change
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
	Constituent Assembly
EC	Electoral Commission
EU	European Union
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
GAVI	Global Alliance foe Vaccines and Immunisation
HIV	Human Immune Virus
IGG	Inspector General of Government
KCCA	Kampala Capital City Authority
LCs	Local Councils
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UPDF	Uganda Peoples Defence Forces
USE	Universal Secondary Education
WHO	World Health Organisation

Dedication

This work is dedicated to my brother David Ssigenda, whose resilience and dedication challenges me to be a better person everyday. *Webale Nyo!*

Acknowledgements

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1.   Introduction

"The wealth of information and the statistical significance of the correlations of trust are too tempting to resist, and; therefore, trust has become a focus of scholarly attention and a presumptive cause various desirable political outcomes" Clearly and Stokes, 2009:309)

Over the years, there has been growing perception, especially in the developed world, that trust in government is decreasing. There have also been many explanations for this decrease in trust, and varying prescriptions on how it can be restored. Some scholars have argued that this should not be taken as distrust in government, but rather as healthy scepticism[1], engrained in the Lockean doctrine of institutionalised distrust (Levi and Stoker, 2000,). Subsequent studies carried out in the developing world, most notably the various Afro barometer surveys, have also attempted to convey growing disquiet among African citizens towards their governments. Opposition politicians have also used the dismal scores on trust as political capital to discredit incumbents. Why is trust garnering so much attention, and under what conditions do governments gain trust of citizens? This study explores these questions in general terms.

In this section, I introduce the research problem that the thesis addresses, and advance arguments as to why the issue of trust is at the heart of current scholarship on democratic practice and governmental processes, and especially why I ask the trust question in regard to the current political environment in Uganda.

1.2 Why the focus on trust?

Why has trust become such a buzz word in the study of democratic processes? What does it mean for people to trust institutions? What makes people trust or distrust political institutions? What are the likely consequences of declining trust in institutions? This thesis addresses a study entitled 'Trust in Central government in Uganda: the importance of institutional outputs.' The question raised is, 'How do institutions impact on political trust among citizens?

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[1] Nye notes that skepticism about government is a healthy tenet of democracy. Nye, Joseph(1997) In Government we don't trust. Foreign Policy.99-111

The aim of the research is to investigate, analyze and document the meaning of political trust and what institutional characteristics enhance political trust among people. The research develops a theoretical framework that places public institutions at the centre of production and or destruction of trust.

1.3 Problem Statement

Many studies have documented the growing state of distrust in the way democratic institutions work in the developed world (Putnam, 2000, Dalton, 2007, Uslaner, 2001, Mishler and Rose, 2002). Indeed, political trust has become a core concept in recent empirical research on mass political attitudes and a critical indicator of good governance in the mass media and public debate (Dekker, 2011:1). Stokes and Clearly (2009:309) have also pointed out that 'the wealth of data and statistical significance of the correlations on trust are too tempting to resist; therefore, trust has become a focus for scholarly attention and a presumptive cause of various desirable political outcomes.'

In the developing world, growing unrest and revolts may be a signal of the increasing distrust that ordinary citizens have for political institutions. Recent revolts such as in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and growing unrest in a number of countries on the African continent have called into question how much people trust governments to deliver on the promise of good and inclusive governance.

In Uganda, the National Resistance Movement[2] that has been in power for the last 27 years is facing growing voices of discontent from citizens that point to credibility problems in the ruling class. A sense is within the country that the democratic experiment which held immense promise following the turbulent 1980's is faltering, and continued public protest echoes voices of dissatisfaction with the way democratic institutions in the country operate. Indeed, political commentators have pointed out issues such as rampant corruption, breakdown of infrastructure and aggressive government crackdown of dissenting voices as signs of a regime that is facing legitimacy issues (Golooba-Mutebi, 2011). This study therefore, seeks to understand the reasons for the growing dissent and to explore the institutional characteristics necessary for public trust in government.

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[2] The National Resistance Movement is the ruling party in Uganda. It came to power in 1986 after a protracted five-year guerrilla war.

1.4 Purpose of the study

This study aims to understand, using a qualitative research approach, how citizens' perceptions of performance of political institutions impact on political trust. The research attempts to develop a theoretical framework that places public institutions at the centre of production and or even destruction of trust.

1.5 Research Motivation and Outcome.

The motivation for this study is to offer a theoretical and empirical basis that specifies the relationship between citizens' perceptions of the performance of government institutions and political trust. The central hypothesis of this thesis is that trust relates to the perceived trustworthiness[3] of institutions which arises from citizens' satisfaction with institutional performance. What makes for trustworthy institutions? Levi and Stoker put forward three main features that make an institution trustworthy. First, transparency, which means that an institution performs its duties according to set rules and is open to public scrutiny. Second, fairness, reflected in the choice of policies that cater for the common well being, and third, absence of corrupt practices, reflected in accountable and open institutional practices (Levi and Stoker, 2000:485). It is through the evaluation of these features that citizens will rate political institutions as trustworthy or not.

In essence, the institutional theory of trust adopted for this thesis supports an argument that it is the degree of perceived fairness and impartiality in the institutions that are responsible for public policy implementation which serves as an important foundation for the building and maintenance of high political trust. Experiences of impartial, inclusive, just and fair political institutions are the most important factors for the development of this trust. This research contributes empirical evidence from Uganda to such an argument.

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[3] Levi defines trustworthiness (of a person, institution) on two dimensions; the first, as commitment to act in the interests of the trustor because of moral values that emphasize promise keeping, care and incentive compatibility; and the second dimension, as competence.

1.6 The Research Question

Maxwell (1996) notes, "any form of research is triggered by certain ideas in either the researchers mind, or an issue in society that one feels needs attention." Layder (1998:30) also observes that 'one need not necessarily have a clear research question, and that the formulation of research questions may have a rather haphazard evolution.' Indeed, Maxwell, (1996:51) points out that a research question is central to any study since 'it explains specifically what the study will attempt to learn and understand.' It is also an indication of what site or informants to choose, what data to collect, and how to analyze it (Ibid:51). Cresswell, (2009:129) also recommends that a researcher reduces the entire study to a single overarching question and several sub-questions.

As stated earlier, the central question this thesis addresses is, 'How does the perceived performance of political institutions impact on political trust among citizens? This I break further into sub-questions:

What is the nature and role of the central government in Uganda and how are these related to citizen's responsibilities? What are the important institutional characteristics for generating trust among citizens? What is the connection between perceptions of service delivery and trust in government? What is the significance of social demographic variables for political trust and how much variation do they bring[4]?

King, Keohane, & Verba, (1994:15) point out two major features that should mainly guide the choice of research questions; first, their importance in the real world, and second, their likely 'contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some' aspects of the world[5].' They argue that for a research question to be substantive, these two features need to be incorporated. My choice of the research questions had these two recommendations in mind; Let me elaborate. Firstly, there are various programs in Africa, Uganda inclusive, which aim at 'democracy building' that take the form of encouraging the growth of 'civil' society and associations. This follows the logic of 'making democracy work' through encouraging voluntary association (Putnam, 1993). However, as Newton (1999) notes, there is little empirical evidence to support that associational membership improves trust. This research addresses the problem from the

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[4] (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005)
[5] The authros argue that the first criteria is mainly an issue of societal judgement, while the second, 'means explicitly locating a research design within the framework of existing literature'

supply side and shows, especially in the Ugandan context, how institutions can be the basis of the building or destroying political trust.

Secondly, there is a paucity of literature on trust in institutions, in Sub-Saharan Africa. Notable exceptions include Askvik and Bak's (2005) *'Trust in Institutions in South Africa,'* Hutchison et al's (2011) *'Capacity to Trust? Institutional Capacity, Conflict and Political Trust in Africa'*, Lavallee et al's (2008) *'Corruption and Trust in Political Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa' and the Afro Barometer surveys which tap into the trust variable.*

More so, some of this literature addresses the issues from mainly macro level variables combining aggregated survey data from a number of African countries, with only few country specific studies. While this has the advantage of providing a general picture on the nature and extent of the political environment in many African states, it has fostered essentialist arguments, where findings in one country from the African continent are generalised to hold for others, as well.

With such an approach, studies on democracy in, for example, Kenya or South Africa are usually generalised as studies on 'African' democracy, and such an approach continues to proliferate in the way concepts are used, without much effort to carry out context-specific research. This research attempts to contribute to discerning the concept of trust in the context of Uganda. Choosing a specific country enables us to understand specific nuances that are likely to be lost in aggregated multi-country studies.

In addition, given that trust in institutions is a product not only of institutional design but also of institutional performance[6'] a research agenda along these lines enriches the interdisciplinary dialogue between political science and public administration while improving our understanding of and the impact of public administration on democratic practice (Guillermo, 2006). This research and the questions raised contribute to this dialogue.

1.7 Background to the Study

1.7.1 Uganda-country Profile
Uganda, ideally termed the 'pearl of Africa', sits astride the equator in East Africa. The country as it stands today is a colonial creation of the British, with boundaries that grouped a

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[6] Guillermo(2006) makes a strong case for a dialogue between political science and public administration in his review of Stokes and Clearly's study of political trust in Argentina and Mexico.

wide range of ethnic groups[7] with different political systems and cultures (Anouk, 2013). It is in the Great Lakes Region, neighbouring Kenya to the East, Democratic Republic of Congo to the West, Tanzania and Rwanda to the South, and Southern Sudan to the North. It covers a total area of 241.038sq kilometres, with an estimated population of 35 million people (July 2012 estimates, CIA world fact book). The capital city Kampala has an estimated population of 1.5 million people.

1.7.2 Brief political History of Uganda

Pre-colonial Uganda can be categorized into two broad political systems; centralized states and sedimentary societies. In the centralized states, the political system was premised on well-defined hierarchy with an ultimate authority at the top compared to sedimentary societies, which thrived on egalitarianism and absence of hierarchy. By use of military conquest and in some cases cunning negotiations, pre-existing centralized states like Ankole, Bunyoro and Buganda, together with a host of sedimentary societies, which had prior to colonialism co-existed but did not identify politically, nor socio-economically were forced into a marriage of convenience to become a British protectorate.[8]

Uganda remained under colonial occupation until 1962 when it became a juridical state (Mutengesa and Hendrickson 2008). British colonial rule in Uganda left a typically complex legacy regarding longer term prospects for economic and political development. Lwanga (1989) notes that the manner in which "protection" was effected, the nature of administration established and the colonial economy imposed were basic elements of the recipe for the chaos created in the post-colonial period.

At independence in 1962, the political elites in Uganda, (headed by Prime Minister Milton Obote), inherited a divided state. It was an amorphous state of different political systems; some areas were fully federal (Buganda was a state within a state), some semi federal (Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro), some confederation (Busoga) and others especially the previously sedimentary societies, districts. This created multiple centers of power, which became breeding ground for further chaos, the most prominent being military takeovers which created a political power base for the central government (Ibid).

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[7] Uganda facts and Information. Accessed from http://goafrica.about.com/od/uganda/a/ugandafacts.htm.
[8] In British colonial empire, a protectorate was, ideally a territory which is not formally annexed but in which, by treaty , grant or other 'lawful' means, the crown has power and jurisdiction. The protectorates were usualy administered under a system of indirect rule. Uganda became a British protectorate in 1894.

This turbulent political history includes the most catastrophic rule of Idi Amin (1971-1979) in which state violence, intimidation and coercion became the only instrument of sustaining power and keeping citizens in suppression. In addition to this, parliament was dissolved and power vested in the military defense council as a supreme state decision-making body (Okoth 1995). Despite Amini's fall in 1979, there was no much change as political violence orchestrated during successive governments continued to rip Uganda apart.

The year 1986 is considered a political epoch in the political history of Uganda as a relatively disciplined regime replaced malevolent military regimes after a protracted guerrilla warfare. Following the takeover of power in 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) instituted a form of broad-based government, banned political parties and initiated a grassroots-based system of administration based on local councils (then known as resistance councils).

In its 10-point programme, the NRM declared that the people of Uganda had the right to defend themselves against those who threaten the democratic order and human rights and that the state would no longer be used to violate the rights of the people (Sejjaaka, 2005). In his inaugural speech to crowds outside parliament in 1986, Museveni, leader of the NRM famously said,

> *'The people of Africa, the people of Uganda, are entitled to a democratic government. It is not a favor to them from any regime. The sovereign must be the public, not the government. No one should think that what is happening today is a mere change of guard; it is a fundamental change in the politics of our country[9].'*

Museveni was constantly praised in the following years for introducing key institutional reforms. Among these reforms, Tripp (2010) notes, were his single minded pursuit of economic growth, fiscal discipline and the free market. From the onset, therefore, the NRM won a large number of admirers, both within and outside Uganda for its pursuit of rebuilding a nation whose institutions had collapsed under previous administrations (Ibid). A new constitution was promulgated in 1995, with many observers thinking that Uganda was indeed on a path to both political and economic transformation.

However, many Ugandan political observers held a skeptical view; Ssenkumba (1998, cited in Tripp, 2010) notes,

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[9] Yoweeri K. Museveni (1997), Sowing the Mustard Seed, London: Macmillan

'To many Ugandans, the widespread conception, mainly by outsiders, that their country is an oasis of stability, economic progress and democracy is a frustrating mirage[10]. For those without the privileged protection from the unilateral exercise of government authority, however benign or enlightened this authority may appear to be, this image of Uganda as an arena of boundless political openings and relentless economic growth is grossly deceptive[11] '(172)

In 1996, the first presidential and parliamentary elections held after his 10-year reign, President Yoweeri Museveni, the leader of the NRM, won with a big margin, gathering 75.5% of total votes cast. In a closely contested election in 2001, Museveni won 69% of the vote. Notably, his main challenger was a his former personal doctor and retired soldier of the NRA, who had earlier released a dossier in which he accused the ruling government of abandoning democratic ideals that were agreed on during the bush war and betraying the trust of the people.

Following growing demands to open political space, the NRM, through and amendment of the constitution, freed political parties to operate in 2005. In the same year, parliament passed a bill to remove presidential term limits, amidst accusations of coercion and bribery, a move that many observers interpreted as a way of keeping the incumbent in power. An editorial of the government owned 'The New Vision' was indicative on this matter,

'....a new element was introduced into our parliamentary methods of work, whereby the legislators of a particular persuasion, namely the NRM, were given large sums of money[12] outside of their remuneration in order to 'facilitate' their voting for some proposals, particularly the removal of term limits!' (The New Vision, 23, 08, 2005).

In the following election in 2006, Museveni's lead declined to 59%, amidst reports of widespread harassment of the opposition and voter intimidation[13]. The following years saw increased tensions, with widespread riots in 2009 almost threatening to plunge the country into chaos. In the 2011 general election, Museveni won with 68% of the vote, but voter apathy meant that less than 60% of voters turned up for these elections. There were also widespread complaints about voter registers, intimidation by the army, and widespread vote buying by the incumbent government (ICG, 2012). Following the election, the country was plunged into acute inflation, which sparked off widespread protests in the city. Movements such as 'Walk

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[10] Tripp(2010:3) uses this argument to illustrate the 'paradox of the hybrid regime' in Uganda
[11] Tripp (2010:3) Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime
[12] Tripp (2010) actualy mentions that 70% of the MPs were each bribed with 5million shillings(about 2500US dollars) in exchange for the vote to remove term-limits.
[13] Poll Violence Team lines up Museveni,' The East African, 28, February, 2006.

to Work', 'Free Uganda now' and pressure groups such as 'Activists for Change', 'For God and my Country', put increasing pressure on the ruling regime. A sense was within the country that the government had stopped 'listening' to people and is using the police and military to subdue them, with many describing Kampala as 'teargas city.' Indeed, Tripp (2010) characterizes the type of governance in Uganda today as a clear manifestation of a 'hybrid' regime whose dynamics present a conflicting picture for political analysts.

How does this historical narrative inform my study of political trust in Uganda? How weighty are current events to my argument that trust results from perceptions of positive institutional performance? Scholarship on trust advances an argument that 'if major political institutions are deemed trustworthy, citizens are more likely to cooperate with unpopular decisions necessary for the long-term benefit of a society. On the other hand, if institutions are distrusted, citizens may refuse to cooperate or ignore laws and regulations, and the effectiveness of government is thereby reduced[14] In other terms, while public trust is a key factor of successful government processes, its existence depends on factors that go beyond formal democratic procedures and include the government's proven or, at least, perceived capacity to deliver on citizens' expectations.

In the proceeding discussion, I try to navigate the broad literature on trust, and illuminate the varius strands that have informed the framing of trust studies. Focussing on the sociological, economic and political view points, I endaver to sieve through the implications of these view points for the study of political institutions. I conclude the chapter by elaborating on political trust, placing it in an African institutional environment, and the movement system in Uganda.

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[14] UN Globa Forum for Reinventing Government: Elections, Parliaments, and Citizen Trust, Vienna, 2007, Page 3.

Chapter 2: Mapping the Trust Debate

2.1 Introduction.

This chapter continues as follows; first I present a discussion of the concept of trust as understood in various disciplinary strands in the literature. I then address the concept of political trust as used in this thesis and the theoretical debate over the origins of political trust, locating this squarely within an African institutional environment. I then continue to examine the unique legacy of the 'movement' system in Uganda and how it has shaped the country's institutional apparatus, and what this implies for the study of trust in the country.

2.2 Geographies of trust in 'The Trust Debate'

The question of whom to trust and how far is as central a question of political life as it is of personal life...(John Dunn, 1993:641)

As earlier noted, there is widespread agreement that citizens today view most of their governments with distrust (Norris, 1999). These perceptions are notably widespread, especially in the developed world, and specifically in the United States, although various studies have also found similar trends in other trilateral[15] countries. But what is this 'trust' that features so prominently in countries' political health? When we are told that citizens trust some institutions and 'distrust' others, what is meant by those descriptions? On what bases are these judgements of 'trust' or 'distrust' made[16]? And what are the implications of 'trust' or 'distrust' for institutions? In other words, should we be concerned that the public apparently sees many institutions through jaundiced eyes?

Political science literature provides answers to only a few of these important questions. The consequence, Seyd (2010) argues, is that 'we are poorly positioned to understand what people

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[15] Tri-lateral countries include countries in North America, Europe and Japan.
[16] Seyd (2010) offers an important account of trends in existing literature on trust.

mean when they say they trust or distrust political institutions, the criteria that underpin such judgements, and the implications of judging a political institution as trustworthy or not'[17]

In this section, I attempt to map out, using both empirical and theoretical illustrations, the nature of trust in institutional settings. Drawing on a mass of multi-disciplinary authored theoretical and empirical works of scholars from fields such as economics, sociology, political science and psychology, I elaborate on both the various understandings of trust, and what it means for the study of government institutions. In particular, I borrow heavily from Rothstein's (2011) institutional theory of trust, Mollering's (2006) neo institutional theory of trust, and Putnam's (1993) empirical study of Italian regional governments, 'Making Democracy work.' These studies provide two particular relevant features for developing a more substantive research agenda on trust in institutions in the African context.

First, they devote considerable attention to the analysis of the conceptual nature of trust, and elaborate, albeit in more abstract terms, what trust means and what it consists. Second, they address issues of conceptual measurement, devoting attention to how trust can be empirically studied and understood. Indeed, Putnam's study is important as a foil for the development of my study of trust in public institutions in Uganda. It is against the cultural[18] perspective of trust that informs his study that I adopt an institutional performance perspective (heavily informed by Rothstein 2011) of understanding institutional trust in the Ugandan context.

2.3 The Conceptual Nature of Trust

'The social science literature on trust has grown enormously in recent years, partly in response to the perception that political and social trust, deemed essential to a good society, are in decline' (Levi and Stoker, 2000:495). This interest is also coupled with competing views and diversity in conceptualisation of trust, given the multi-disciplinary nature of the concept. Nannestad (2008:415), has noted 'the wide gap between much of the theoretical and conceptual work on trust in the bulk of empirical studies.' Much of the recent empirical work on trust, he notes, be it based on surveys or experiments, does not seem to proceed from what is meant by trust in the first place. Rather, he argues, trust is taken to be what is measured by

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[17] Although Seyd(2010:1) raises these concerns mainly in reference to studies in Britain, they are relevant for trust research in general.
[18] The argument here is that trust is a result of deeply rooted social norms. These determine how much the public engages in civic life, and the attendant attitudes of trust and reciprocity that develop in civic activity. When citizens disengage from civic life and its lessons of social reciprocity, they are unable to trust the institutions that govern political life (Keele, 2006).

one or more of the survey questions (Cited in Dekker, 2011:5). Indeed, social scientists have used widely diverging meanings of the term trust[19], ranging from faith to confidence.

Trust definitions have ranged from beliefs about predictable bad behaviour to faith in the good intentions that lie behind unpredictable behaviour. Seligman, (1997:16-30) describes trust as the belief in the good will of another. Hardin, (in Cook, 2001), talks about trust as an expression of encapsulated interest. In his view, A trusts B to do X if A believes that B has a reason to act in A's interest or at least to take strong account of A's interest. To Hardin, the trust dilemma is a principle-agent dilemma, 'in which the trustee has to do something on behalf of the trustor' (Castillo, 2005:3)

Coleman (1990) proposes an understanding of trust as a problem of utility maximisation, while for Williamson (1993), trust implies giving someone the possibility to harm one's interests. To him, trust is calculative on a higher self interest level. In other words, people decide to make a calculative limitation on their calculativeness -by trusting.

Ostrom and Walker (2003 Cited in Castillo, 2005:4) offer a somewhat more encompassing view of trust, when they point out that trust arises when "boundedly rational individuals are assumed to enter situations with an initial possibility of using reciprocity based on their own prior training and experience." In this way then, 'trust is a product of reputation as well as other contextual variables such as institutions and the physical environment' (Castillo, 2005:4).

Echoing this institutional view, Mollering (2006:356) notes 'trust is a matter of embedded agency, where trustors and trustees, as actors, interpret the social context in which they are embedded.' The key element in his argument is that trust is a leap of faith; it is more than just a social process, but an idiosyncratic accomplishment, actively constituted in more or less institutionalised contexts. Research on trust, he insists, must consider the leap of faith, because it is what gives trust its original meaning, and ignoring the leap of faith in trust research could make findings superfluous.

Echoing the 'leap of faith' characteristic, Kim (2005:621) defines trust as the willingness of the trustor to be vulnerable based on the belief that the trustee will meet the expectations of the trustor, even in situations where the trustor cannot monitor the trustee. In this way, trust in

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[19] Mcknight and Chevany (1996) attribute this to the sodid, apriori conceptualisation of trust.

government institutions is treated as normative, and concerned mainly with "the extent to which citizens are willing to follow government decisions even without sufficient information, but under the assumption that those decisions are legitimate and protect their interests.' Walker, et al (2008) defines trust in terms of its constitutive characteristics such as benevolence, credibility, consistency, honesty, integrity, openness and reliability (1).

Macknight and Chervany (1996) note, 'the definitions of trust in the literature tend to reflect the paradigms of the particular academic discipline of the researcher.'[20] While sociologists tend to see trust as structural in nature[21], found in structurally embedded relationships among people (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967; Shapiro, 1987, Granovetter, 1985), some psychologists have viewed trust as a personal attribute (e.g., Rotter, 1967).

On the other hand, social psychologists are likely to treat trust as an interpersonal phenomenon (e.g., Deutsch, 1958; Holmes, 1991, cited in Mcknight and Chervany, 1996). They frame their assessments of trust in terms of attributes of the trustors and trustees, and a host of internal cognitions that personal attributes yield. Economists are more inclined to view trust as institutional or as a rational choice mechanism (see Hardin, 1999, Williamson, 1993). These divergent viewpoints suggest inherent conceptual conflict and divergent assumptions at work (Rousseau, et al, 1998:393).

Scholarly attention has also been focused on trust as a meso-level concept (ibid: 393), integrating micro-level psychological processes and group dynamics with macro level institutional arrangements. In essence, 'to study trust in institutions is to ride the institutional 'elevator' up and down on a variety of conceptual levels' (Ibid: 394). At this point, it is important to examine in broader terms the various disciplinary strands that inform these definitions and understanding of trust. What are their commonalities, if any, and divergences? How can these approaches help us understand the way trust studies are framed?

2.4 Understanding Trust- Multi-disciplinary Approaches.

How has trust been conceptualised in various disciplines? I must say at the onset that I do not intend to offer a comprehensive discussion on all strands of scholarship on trust, and as a way of making this task manageable; I concentrate on three approaches that are particularly more

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[20] (see also Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Lewis & Weigert, 1985 cited in same source)
[21] For an expanded discussion, see Mcknight and Chevany, 1996.

valuable for this thesis. I will discuss the economic, sociological and political science approaches to the study of trust, keeping in mind institutions as my focal point of reference.

2.4.1 The Economic/Rational Choice Approaches

Economists view trust as based on the expectations about choices made by another agent that may have an impact on one's own choices. In the economists' approaches, the need for trust arises out of scarcity of resources and the impossibility of monitoring other people's behaviour. The fact that such people are aware of this and may use this knowledge to cheat, and the temptation for those who have access to the resources to commit aggression and cheating makes trust indispensable for the allocation of these scarce resources (Casson and Guista, 2006). For economists, institutions emerge as a mechanism for coordinating the actions of less reputable people. Given that people will have an interest in promoting their selfish ends, institutions can promote a value system conducive to trust and encourage people to commit to it, supported by legally binding sanctions and norms.

Adopting a game theoretic approach, Putnam (1993) argues that the decision to invest in trust (by creating a reputation of trustworthiness) facilitates transactions by reducing transaction costs. Suppliers of goods may refrain from opportunistic behaviour and nurture a reputation because it is in their interest to do so. Ortmann (1996) notes, 'it may make sense to trust someone not because he or she is more trustworthy per se, but because the incentive structure is such that living up to his or her promise to deliver is in the person's own interest." Such a person may thus deliver on quality since short run opportunism could lose them customers and hence revenue when the 'game' comes to be repeated. In this way, trust becomes enlightened self interest, or what Hardin (2001) calls encapsulated interest, sustained by laws and morals which induce selfish people to behave in a socially responsible way.

In respect to political institutions then, we can infer that institutions as 'agents' act as a guard against defaulting behaviour in the allocation of resources. Using economic theory logic, we can then argue that political institutions such as central government, will strive to hold up to their promises to the public and deliver on services out of fear of losing the people's mandate during the next '*game*' (read election).

The criticism with such a view is that it assumes there are legally sanctioned contracts, perceived as meaningful and enforced by the state. In cases where the state is the biggest

defaulter then, what happens? What happens, for example, when the 'game' is manipulated to appear in such a way as benefiting the general public when it's actually not (such as through manipulating public information by state agencies, or cheating in elections)?

In addition, Rothstein and Stolle have argued that in public institutions, trust as encapsulated interest is more unproductive for it erodes the principal of impartiality. They note, "*imagine a soccer match in which the referee acts as an agent of the teams. The teams could not trust her. In fact, it would ruin the whole game. The teams trust the referee because she is supposed to be impartial and competent. They may accept a loss only on the condition that the referee has been impartial* (2001:10)." These are issues that the economic approach fails to address adequately, and therefore make it inadequate on its own in explaining trust in both personal and institutional settings.

2.4.2 The Sociological Approach

In the sociological approaches to trust advanced by scholars such as Granvotter (1985), Zucker (1986), Sztompka (1999), Giddens (1994, cited in Mollering, 2006) trust is defined as the taken for granted assumption of reliability that underlies social relations and transactions. Departing from the purely rational economic accounts of trust, sociologists do not deny rationality, but treat it as just one of the variables rather than the axiom. From Durkheim's (1984, cited in Mollering, 2006) observation that behind every contract is a host of tacit agents, Giddens (1994) suggests that the concept of trust be understood as presumed reliability and emphasises the taken for granted-ness of the behaviour of others. He uses the term 'blind trust' to depart from the rational choice approaches that misleadingly reduce trust to a matter of risk assessment.

In the sociological view, trust is seen not simply as developing through mutually advantageous interactions mediated through the market, but as socially embedded, supported by a normative structure whose distinctiveness from calculativeness is the very aspect that facilitates trust. Sztompka (1999) ably notes that the condition of human nature is the very foundation that necessitates trust. He notices a 'perennial epistemological gap' (19), the condition of lacking knowledge, certainty and control regarding the bases and future consequences of our own and others' actions. 'Trust,' he argues 'is a bet about the future contingent actions of others' (25) and active agency, that is, believing and committing, is the

human response to an uncertain future. In this way, he stresses that trust is 'intimately related to risk' (29).

From the sociological perspective then, institutions as systems of rules and meanings provide common expectations which define actors as social beings. These institutions come to reproduce roles and rules, and trust is based on the expectation of the reliability of the routine to continuously reproduce itself, and for actors not to deviate from it, for whatever reason (Mollering, 2006). We can then conclude from these postulations that in the case of political institutions, expectations of technically competent role performance are the basis upon which trust is built. In other words, citizens will trust institutions because they believe that the role bearers not only share their values and belief systems, but also because they are competent to do so.

One of the most important contributions of sociological theorising on trust is the development of distinctions among varieties of trust. Zucker, (1986 cited in Mollering, 2006:360) identifies three modes of trust production; that is, process based trust, tied to past exchanges between actors, which may be first hand or through reputation, characteristics based trust, produced through social similarity between actors, (such as age, sex, ethnicity), and institutional based trust, derived from formal social structures such as professions or associations. In this perspective, unlike in rationalist accounts, institutions are more than just third party guarantors, but systems of rules and meanings that provide common expectations for social beings.

However, one of the criticisms that have been raised against this approach is that it is built on the premise that trusts rests on shared values and experiences, but tends to explain agency away in explaining how values come to be shared. Indeed, institutions cannot be assumed to be infallible and immutable, and as Mollering (2006) notes, role negotiability is one of the features that necessitates trust. Indeed, in the rapidly complex world of modern institutions, taken for granted-ness and predictability seem to imply more institutional inertia. As Seligman (1997) argues, it is the complex nature of institutional environments and the absence of familiarity that necessitates trust in the first place.

Mollering (2006:355) also faults sociological accounts of trust for concentrating solely on institutions, and attributing a marginal role to trusting and trusted actors. He notes "actors

interpret and question institutions and do not merely reproduce them passively. Therefore if a theoretically sound case can be made for why institutions become the source of trust between actors, it also needs to be recognised again that institutions become the object of trust for trustors who exercise their agency by relying on them,"

From his argument, Mollering (2006) is adamant that "analytical distinction needs to be drawn between the influence that institutions have on the trustor-trustee relationship on one hand, and the trust that actors have in institutions on the other." The latter, trust that actors have in institutions, is what this thesis here is mainly about, and has also been the main subject of political science oriented research.

2.4.3 Political Science Approaches- The centrality of Social Capital

Political theorising on trust can be traced through Alexis De Toqueville's postulations on civicness, Almond and Verba's(1989) 'The civic culture' and a number of other scholars, such as Coleman, (1990) and Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) who have given a prominent role to the role of voluntarism in building social capital, whose most important ingredient is trust. Almond and Verba (1989) tie voluntary association to feelings of political efficacy. They note, 'attitudes favorable to participation within the political system play a major role in the civic culture, but so do non-political attitudes such as trust in other people and social participation in general,'(31). To them, trust enters the equation implicitly because those with civic virtue have the willingness and ability to act in a civic fashion.

Coleman, (1990) also argues for voluntary associations as assuming an instrumental role; that of facilitating social connections and cooperation, and by virtue of repeated interactions, engendering trust. Building on Coleman's work on voluntary associations, Putnam (1993) zeros on social cultural factors, in pursuing the question of explaining differences in performance of regional governments in north and south Italy.

His major finding is that the differences in institutional performance are related to the presence of social capital (Putnam, 1993:102). The underdevelopment of the southern region, he argues, was directly linked to the low levels of civic community that manifested through patronage and hierarchical organization (105) whereas in the north where people actively engaged in social clubs and reading newspapers and debate, the level of development was much higher. According to Tarrow,(1996) Putnam "actualizes on what he has dubbed

civicness or a sense of civic community, and argues that its creation and sustenance is provided by a "dense network of secondary associations," (see also Putnam, 1993: 176).

Arising out of these findings, Putnam identifies trust and the lack of social capital as the major dilemmas of collective action. He states, "it is necessary not only to trust others before acting cooperatively, but also to believe that one is trusted by others…"(:164). In the absence of this trust, he argues, defection becomes the best equilibrium strategy for all involved. He therefore concludes that "the success of a democratic government depends on the degree to which its surroundings approximate the ideal of civic community"(Tarrow, 1996). Reflecting on institutions then, the social capital logic prescribes societal-centered interventions to build trust, such as formation of more voluntary associations and social clubs. This, it is assumed, will create horizontal networks of trust that in turn will spur on institutional functioning.

One of the fundamental arguments against the logic adopted especially in 'Making Democracy Work' is that Putnam neglects the way political institutions shape political culture (Stolle, 2003). Levi and Stoker (2000) also criticize Putnam's bottom up model for concentrating on societal factors, and ignoring policy performance which can be just as well a source of trust. Indeed, Tarrow (1996) also points out that the state plays an important role in shaping civic attitudes, while Rothstein (2011) has demonstrated the important role that state welfare institutions play in fostering trust among citizens in Scandinavian countries.

 Rousseau et al argue that regardless of the differences in disciplinary approaches to trust, there are salient features along which trust has come to be understood. These include the willingness to be vulnerable (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1996) and confident, positive expectations by the trustor (Lewicki, et al). Arising out of this understanding, Rousseau, et al (1998) proposes a definition of trust as "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon the positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another"(395). They however point out that despite identification of similar meanings, the operationalization of trust must depend on the focal object (Ibid). This brings me to the subject of this thesis, political trust, the trust that people put in political institutions.

Table 1. Summary of trust approaches and assumptions

Trust Approach	What trust is and its roles	Assumption on role of Institutions	Critique
Economic	• Trust as an individual disposition	• Institutions emerge to coordinate actions of less reputable people. Reliability in transactions	• Assumes that there are always legally sanctioned contracts enforced by the state, which may not always be the case.
	• Economic lubricant that enables cooperation(the difference between Nash Equilibrium and Pareto optimum		• Games can be manipulates by more powerful individuals to the disadvantage of others.
	• Trust arises out of scarce resources		• Trust as encapsulated interest erodes the principle of impartiality in institutions.
	• It is enlightened self interest		
Sociological	• Trust is a social construct. It is embedded in social relationships, that produce common norms and values	• Institutions provide common expectation about future contingent actions of others.	• Explains away agency
	• It is a bet on the future contingent actions of others	• Institutions are systems of rules and meanings that provide common expectations for social beings.	• No clear explanation on how norms come to be shared.
	o Taken for granted assumption that sustains relationships		• Taken for granted-ness seems to imply institutional inertia, yet change happens.
	• Reduces social complexity	• In other words, citizens will trust institutions because they believe that the role bearers not only share their values and believe systems, but also because they are competent to do so.	
Political science/social capital approaches	• Form of civic virtue that arises out of voluntarism	• Trust facilitates cooperation and enables proper functioning of institutions	• No clear causal direction between social capital and positive outcomes
			• Role of individual level interactions on collective action problems exaggerated.
			• Ignores critical role of state institutions by focusing on civil society.

2.5 Elaborating Political Trust.

Political trust, a global affective orientation towards government (Rudolph and Evans, 2005) is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour by citizens from political institutions. In most common formulations, political trust is seen as some function of perceived conditions with the assumption being made that political trust is a consequence of these (Ibid). Scholars have also profitably defined political trust as a basic evaluative orientation towards government founded on how well the government is operating according to people's normative expectations (Hetherington, 1998:791). This understanding was largely developed from David Easton's (1965) work on political support, where he distinguished between diffuse and specific support. Diffuse support refers to the public attitudes towards regime level political objects regardless of performance, while specific support refers to the satisfaction with government outputs and the performance of political authorities (Hetherington, 792).

As a result, political trust has been widely studied as subjective support given to a regime and it is widely accepted that support is associated with evaluation of institutions. Such evaluations are made of government and its affiliated institutions in respect to its policies, promises, efficiency, fairness and justice (Miller and Listhaug, 1990). The core meaning of trust here is that institutions will act in the interest of the trusting and low levels of trust are seen as symptomatic of alienation between the government and citizens, signalling a crisis of legitimacy. Because of this definition of trust, it may not be possible to trust political authorities who have previously violated probity (Mishler and Rose, 2002).

Arising from this understanding are two debates that dominate the extensive literature on the origins of political trust. The institutional performance approach and the social trust approach. Both approaches attempt to theoretically grasp the sources of trust in political institutions and provide empirical evidence of the impact of performance or social trust respectively. I will elaborate.

2.5.1 Institutional Vs Social-Cultural approach

Many scholars have argued that politics is structured by institutions (Thelen & Steimo, 1992). Scholars working in different disciplines have all focused on the significance of institutional variables for explaining outcomes in their respective fields "*Institutions affect the ways in which*

individuals and groups become activated within and outside established institutions, the level of trust among citizens and leader, the common aspirations of political community, the shared language, understanding, and norms of the community, and the meaning of concepts like democracy, justice, liberty and equality,"(March and Olsen, cited in Putnam, 1993, page17).

It can be argued from Putnam's accounts of the roots of civic culture in Italy that institutional variables have a lasting influence on trust in society. Explaining regional differences in performance of governments in 20th century Italy, Putnam invokes 11th century institutional legacies,

> *"throughout the peninsula during the 11th century, the time honoured imperial system of government-byzantine in the south, German in the north, passed through a time of strain and weakness, ending in virtual collapse, which handed the initiative to local forces. in the south, the breakdown of the central government was relatively short-lived, and a powerful Norman kingdom built upon Byzantine and Arab foundations emerged. In the north on the other hand, the attempts to revive imperial power all ended in failure and local particularism triumphed all but completely. It was in this region, stretching from Rome to the Alps, that characteristic Italian society of the middle ages was free to evolve most fully; here, the communes became in effect city states, so that the area maybe conveniently described as communal Italy, (Putnam, 1993:121-122)."*

In the same vein, Rothstein (2011) makes a convincing case for political trust as a dependent variable that arises out of citizens' experiences of fair, just and uncorrupted government policies.

Arising from these arguments, are questions that are relevant to today's institutional legacy; if the Norman kingdom had such lasting impacts on southern Italy, just as the self organizing communes had on the north, what parallels do we find in today's political institutions? What role do institutions play in fostering, maintaining and destroying trust? The institutional perspective in this sense would suggest that the way institutions function will determine if citizens will trust them or not.

In the Cultural theorists' perspective on the other hand, trust is the main independent variable, affecting the level at which institutions will perform. This perspective has been furthered especially through studies that emphasise the centrality of social capital. One of the major points of departure in the social capital theory is that trust is created through dense networks of voluntary cooperation (see Putnam, 1993). It is in these associations, Putnam argues, that norms of reciprocity and moral resources that result in the creation of institutional capital is

developed (1993:169). He writes, "trust lubricates cooperation; the greater the level of trust in the community, the greater the likelihood of cooperation."

In his study of regional governments in Italy, Putnam asserts "the power of historical continuities to affect the odds of institutional success" (161). These historical continuities included a culture of distrust, especially in the South, that negatively affected the success of newly created institutions.

In sum, while culturalists (such as Putnam, Mancur Olsen) believe that trust exists prior to functioning of democratic institutions, institutional performance theorists (such as Rothstein, 2011, Rothstein and Stolle, 2001, Newton, 1999) suggest that trust is a consequence of institutional performance and thus does not constitute a prerequisite for democratic institutions.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that questions of trust in general, and political trust in particular, have received much scholarly attention. It is also clear that much of this attention has focussed on the western world and industrialised democracies, with insufficient focus on the African institutional context. Given that my research setting is a sub-Saharan African country, Uganda, it is prudent to place this theorising on trust in the African institutional context. The discussion that follows attempts to do this, and to foreshadow the arguments that I raise later in the theoretical framework adopted for this study.

2.6 Understanding political trust in the African institutional context

In order understand the trust dilemma in Africa, it is important to proceed by offering a brief synthesis of the theorization that has defined the problematic of the African state and its institutions to date, and to locate political trust within an understanding that Hyden (2006) characterizes as institutional embeddedness. This is important for two reasons; first, it provides a framework through which African institutional arrangements can be understood, and at the same time enables us to understand the trust dilemma in Africa on its own terms.

A number of scholars have attempted to study and understand the character and nature of the 'African state' and its institutional characteristics. Theorists such as Weber, (1947 cited in Wolf, 1966) Hyden, (2006) Bayart, (1993) mainly characterise the African state as 'extractive' and linked through patronage systems that directly connect to the political actors that are involved in the political process. Max Weber uses the concept of 'prebendalism', to characterize the intensive and persistent struggle to control and exploit the offices of the state

(Wolf, 1966). Prebendalism encompasses malignant ethnicity as a mask of class privilege and as the most viable means of mass mobilization. According to Weber (cited in Wolf, 1966), "state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kinships". In this way, politics is fundamentally about the struggle for control over decision rights to the allocation of scarce resources.

Hyden, (2006:232-34) notes that African political institutional arrangements can be understood only through an appreciation of the underlying social logic that determines political behavior and choice. This logic has facilitated the growth of the 'movement legacy, a lack of separation between the public and the private, with state institutions firmly embedded in society, and zero-sum political games with face to face trust that does not allow the growth of secondary institutions. Such an environment has been breeding ground for wide spread political instability and predatory regimes, resulting into a difficult and often dysfunctional relationship between the state and society (Hutchinson, 2011). Alluding to state-society relations, Ekeh (cited in Hyden, 2006:53) argues that Africans have no loyalty to the civil institutions of the state, but instead nurture their relationships in the local community based on primary social organization such as the clan or tribe. It is this primordial realm, he argues, that commands loyalty in African societies. Formal institutions created by colonialism are only milked of material resources to feed communities.

Other scholars of Marxist orientation such as Ogude, (2009) Mamdani,(1996), Fanon (1963) have characterised the post colonial state in Africa as a 'vampire state'. They stress that the modern state in Africa has alien roots, having been introduced from abroad as the coercive and legal instrument of European colonial rule. This peripheral state within the capitalist economy thus performs principally as an instrument of 'adjustment' to the changing demands of global capital. As such, the relationship between the state and society in Africa is incorrigibly rough and exploitative and citizens continue to have an ambivalent attitude towards the state (Mamdani, 1987).

Badie and Birnbaum (1979, cited in Bayart, 1993) more critically argued that 'societies in the third world tackle the construction of the state by mimicry, by a more or less forced acceptance of exterior models originating in the industrial societies of east or west, artificially

grafted onto economic, social and political structures which probably required a different type of organization (8).

Although their assertion that the state in Africa is *'a purely imported product, a pale imitation of the diametrically opposite European social and political systems, which is moreover overweight, inefficient and a source of violence'* has been criticized as overly stretched and Eurocentric[22], they nevertheless tackle an important facet of social political exclusion of majorities in many governance systems in Africa. Williams (1987:4) captures this situation aptly in describing the situation of the post independent African state,

> *'the colonial period made the state in Africa a focus of aspiration without engendering any widespread sense of loyalty or legitimacy... pressure from expectations led to the fortifying of the castle gate, and access increasingly allowed those who could pay admission charges. This led to the emergence of a class of intermediaries and fixers who knew which doors to open and which guards to bribe.'*

Writing about the role of the state in Africa, a number of other post colonial writers created an analogy of a dead buffalo; with different hunters scrambling with sharp knives to carve out a piece for themselves[23]. Bayart (1993) went ahead to describe the "politics of the belly" that characterise political processes in Africa. These analogies are important for they locate patronage systems as directly connected to the political actors that are involved in the political process.

Indeed, one of the most defining features of the state in Africa continues to be its use as a tool for the accumulation of resources, and, unlike Marxist formulations that "those who govern do so because they are rich," in most of Africa, those who are rich are so because they govern. In the imagination of Africans, the state, and state power becomes a resource in itself (Ogude: 2009:7). The distribution of state resources is done through 'big' men (and women) connected to state power, and patronage is dispensed through them rather than directly to the people. Such a situation convinces ordinary people that they can access wealth and resources through

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[22] Bayart(1993:8-14) especially critiques the arguments of the developmentalists and dependency school that depict African societies as passive and being only acted upon, and the arguments of the ' paradigm of the yoke' as rooted in systematic ahistoricisation of the African State. While acknowledging that colonialism and subsequent interactions of African states within the wider world system have significant implications for the social imagination of the state in Africa, Bayart argues that the state in Africa rests upon autochthonous foundations and a process of re-appropriation of institutions of colonial origin which give it its own historicity.

[23] A number of post colonial literaly texts highlight this theme of disechantment with the way the post colonial state was turned into an arena of sharing spoils. Notable writings include; Imbuga, Francis(1987) Betrayal in the City.East African Publishers; and Okot p'Bitek (1966) Song of Lawino. Hainemann Publishers, to mention but a few.

these men and women. In Uganda for example, President Yoweri Museveni, when faced with strong calls from the opposition to step down, retorted to his tormentors thus,

'It is me who hunted, and after killing the animal, they want me to go. Where should I go[24]?'. Commenting on this statement, Obbo (2008) notes,

> *'Museveni is right. In reality, a country like Uganda is a vast abattoir. Its wealth and opportunities are like a giant carcass laid out on the chopping table. Becoming president and being a member of the ruling party entitles you to getting a knife for carving out your portion. The president usually gets the biggest knife, and the opportunity for the first and largest cut. The Opposition and most of the ordinary folks usually don't get any knives at all, or a chance to slice their bit.'*

Moreover, the phenomenon of 'big man' rule in many African countries, to which Uganda is not exempt, also tends to create an environment where institutions and role bearers become fused, in such a way that the citizens will expect reciprocities for their allegiance to a role bearer within that institution. As Hyden (2006:102) notes, clients and followers expect something in return for their royalties. Such a situation means that the failure of the role bearer to reciprocate these royalties will eventually lead to a loss of trust by the followers. It is therefore possible to understand why citizens are more likely to trust institutions only if they see tangible outputs from them, and for them to view the institutions using the same political grammar which reduces the state (and its institutions) to the zero-sum game of 'eating.'

Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, (2005), Hutchinson, (2011), build on Marxist theorising about the origins and nature of the African state, and argue that, because the state is a colonially imposed system that has not necessarily evolved from the social fabric, for it to have any legitimacy, it needs to demonstrate its ability to deliver on services in order to be trusted by citizens. Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, (2005) succinctly note that political attitudes in Africa are formed pragmatically, and trust levels reflect society's overall assessment of legitimacy derived from perceptions of how well institutional performance matches functional expectations.

How important are these accounts to a research agenda that aims to understand political trust in Uganda? One of the major contributions of such theorising is its explicit treatment of the origins and nature of the African state. It must be noted that studies of trust in the western

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[24]Uganda: It is not always the best hunter who takes home the choice cuts. *The East African, Tuesday, 19, February, 2008.*

world interface mainly with a state that has evolved from indigenous society structures. In the African context however, we need to understand the problematic nature of the state, and the fact that its evolution is less path dependent than its western counterparts. This understanding then illuminates the kind of conflictual state-societal relations, and perhaps it helps us understand why citizens would have a more pragmatic attitude in evaluating state institutions. In other words, such an understanding would make sense of why African citizens would only appreciate institutions in functional terms, basing on their usefulness in delivering services. In this context, Rothstein and Stolle's argument that political institutional performance matters for generating trust among citizens is very relevant to the African context and to this thesis.

Here it is important to relate these African realities in the specific context of Uganda, and for the purposes of this study, I will briefly reflect on the 'movement legacy' and how it has shaped the current political discourse.

2.6.1 Political trust and the legacy of the 'movement' in Uganda

It would be insufficient to discuss issues of politics and institutional performance in Uganda without illuminating on the legacy of the 'movement system'. As earlier noted, the criminalisation of the state that followed decades of one-party rule had left the country divided not only along ethnic but party lines too. Upon capturing power, Uganda under the NRM chose a broad-based, individual merit and inclusive road to no party democracy, known locally as *omugendo*[25] (Mugaju and Onyango, 2000:1). This was rationalised as giving breathing space to heal the wounds of war, rehabilitate and reconstruct the economy and return the country to constitutionalism. It was also argued that this would give the country time for developing "constitutional and institutional mechanisms in the hope of building viable and durable democratic values and practices that would guarantee political stability,"[26] economic development, peaceful and orderly change of government, rule of law and respect for human rights (Tripp, 2010). In his justification of the no-party movement system, Museveni argued that political parties are necessary in societies with social economic cleavages, but, since African countries have only one class, the peasant class, they do not need parties (Museveni, 1997:195). Movement democracy was defined as 'popular councils, parliament and adequate standards of living (Kasfir, 2000:68)

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[25] Omugendo is Luganda for 'Movement system'.
[26] Maseko Thulani Rudolf (2005) The writing of a Democratic Constitution in Africa with Reference to Swaziland and Uganda. Master Thesis. Makerere University.

Though the movement began as a radical and unprecedented attempt to empower Ugandans in both town and countryside, the NRM government subsequently used it to enhance its legitimating and position of power. Political commentators were especially critical of the way that the regime had manipulated the constitutional making process to keep its grip on power. Oloka, (2000), notes

'The movement is neither unique nor is it an exemporary expression of the democratic ideal. It is guided democracy of old in which political expression is both dictated and suppressed by the ruling political organisation of the day. For those who believed that the dawn of an African renaissance was neigh, represented in part by the effusive praise for Africa's new breed of leadership, the disappointment has been swift and bitter (43). Mujaju (2000) adds, 'there are inconsistencies in arguments proposed by its proponents, their aim reduced to self perpetuation and entrenchment.'

Indeed, during the constitutional making process, the Constituent Assembly was accused of constitutionalising the continuation of the no party system and accusations of helping NRM to hold its grip on power. Over time, the NRM which began as a mass[27] political party was turned to patron[28] client cleavages, and the opening of political space in 2005 did not make things any better. As Kasfir (2000:61) notes, over time, the main issue in the general elections was reduced to a candidate's proximity to the president rather than his or her ability to deliver in the political sense (Kasfir, 2000:61).

On the economic side, although the country continued to experience economic growth, the income inequalities between the rich and poor continued to rise, and reports of constant graft and corruption in public institutions continued to appear regularly in the public media. Subsequent elections saw increasing tensions with reports of massive rigging, and matters were not helped by acute inflation, poor infrastructural developments and increasing unemployment rates especially among the youth. Many are now questioning the 'fundamental change' and recent research by Afro barometer (2012) indicates that 72% of Ugandans believe that the country is heading in the 'wrong' direction. Against such a background, it important to assess the reasons behind these perceptions, and to what extent they can be explained by perceptions of institutional performance.

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[27] Mass political parties claim to represent all people, have strong institutional leadership, are disciplined and are singularly focussed on building a new nation by using organisation as a principal instrument (Morgenthau, 1961).
[28] Patron political parties on the contrary rely on personal leadership and do not make the same concerted effort to foment a new nation (Hyden, 2006).

This research therefore conceptualizes political trust as a function of institutional performance in the study of citizens' trust in political institutions in an African country, Uganda. The assumption is that people perceive these institutions as a combination of people, positions, procedures and processes. People trust these entities depending on how they perceive and assess their actions. People develop these perceptions according to their expectations of how these institutions should function, and if their actions will benefit certain social groups and how. These institutional images that they create (either through the media, personal experiences or through campaigns) then become the basis upon which their evaluation and trust depends (Askvik and Jamil, 2011:4).

In other words, if this hypothesis is true, then bad images or poor performance perceptions lead to limited trust and low participation in institutional activities and thus reliance on non-sanctioned actions and processes. On the other hand, good images will lead to positive perceptions, reflected in participation in institutional activities, avoidance of actions and processes that are not approved by institutions such as reporting cases to police instead of using mob justice, reflecting institutional provisions as legitimate.

The above dialogue with the literature on trust in general and political trust in particular aimed at helping me develop a theoretical framework for the study of political trust in Uganda. This framework should be consistent with prior evidence about the research question posed (King, et al: 19). The next section therefore is an elaboration of the theoretical framework that was used to guide this study and to address the study questions.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

Arising from the discussion of the various debates that inform trust studies, this chapter is an attempt at explicating a clear analytical framework for the study of trust in government in Uganda. Arising out of this literature, a theoretical framework for the understanding of political trust in Uganda, and a strategy to measure trust in the central government of Uganda is presented. The chapter also offers a brief discussion of the institutional and cultural approaches, and delineates specific variables that are adopted for this specific study as illustrated in figure 1.

3.2 Choosing a theoretical framework

While choosing a theoretical framework to adopt in one's research, it is pertinent to choose a theory that is falsifiable, (King, Keohane, Verba: 1994: 19) that is, a theory that has as many observable implications as possible. This, they argue, "makes it possible to collect data so as to build strong evidence for the theory." Neuman, (2007:25) also notes that an explicit and clear discussion of the theory helps to produce better designed, better conducted and an easier to understand study.

The theoretical framework adopted for this study derives from Easton's (1965) concept of specific support, which encompasses two main elements; process and output. The process part concerns how decision making processes are organized, in terms of rules followed, competence of government personnel and participation of affected parties (Christensen and Lægreid, 2006:492). Process based specific trust may be high even when the output is unfavorable for the actors affected, as long as the process is perceived as appropriate.

Output based specific support concerns the question of who gets what, and means that people's trust in government depends on the perceived gains, regardless of the process. This thinking informs the performance model of trust in government, which treats institutions as devices for achieving certain purposes. Institutionalists treat trust as a dependent variable, mainly arising out of citizens perceptions of fair, just and impartial public institutions. Rothstein and Stolle note, "it is the degree of perceived fairness and impartiality in the institutions responsible for the implementation of policies which serves as an important foundation for trust," (2001:3). Following this line of argumentation, Newton (1999) notes that the nature of institutional trust today differs from that of Tocqueville's America, because,

whereas then trust was mainly based on social identities and ideological loyalties reinforced by personal ties and similarities, trust now seems more pragmatic, instrumental and dependent upon second hand political information and performance. He notes, "politicians are less likely to be trusted because they are 'one of us', but because of their policy record and personal performance and appearance."

Indeed, whereas in society -centred models of trust in government, such as that advanced by Putnam in 'making Democracy Work' , dense networks of associations build trust that fosters the proper functioning of democratic institutions (Huchinson, et al, 2011:742), I argue, in the context of this research project, that it is institutional performance that fosters political trust for institutions among citizens. I put forward two reasons for adopting the institutional performance model as my major frame of reference.

First, Putnam's model, which gives precedence to the existence of trusting societies before institutions that perform well, is modelled on Euro-America-centric thinking about the path of state building. This model works well in societies that have evolved on a path dependent mechanism (Ibid). In the African context such as Uganda however, the state is a colonially imposed system that has not necessarily evolved from the indigenous social fabric. For it to have any legitimacy therefore, it needs to demonstrate its ability to deliver on services in order to be trusted by citizens. As Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, (2005) note, political attitudes in Africa are formed pragmatically, and trust levels reflect society's overall assessment of legitimacy derived from perceptions of how well institutional performance matches functional expectations.

The second reason is empirical, and it is reflected in the developments that have characterized African states since independence. In Uganda's case for example, the overwhelming optimism that came at independence quickly crumbled following successive coups. Consequently, following the coming to power of the National Resistance Movement, there were renewed hopes of a new order and democratic dispensation that would be ushered in. However, after almost 30 years in power, and with growing disillusionment among the population, the trust that people had in this liberating force seems to be on a downward spiral, as a reflection of the governance that people have experienced under the regime, and as expectations of political and economic performance fall below citizens' expectations. These two arguments lend

credence that this study correctly models the relationship between institutional performance and political trust, at least with respect to the direction of causality in the Ugandan context.

3.3 Developing an analytical model for the study of political trust and institutional performance in Uganda

The debate on institutional performance has a long tradition in international academic literature; but Putnam's (1993) study of Italian local governments provides perhaps the best example of a comprehensive analysis conducted in the past two decades. It must be noted that measuring institutional performance is a big task since one has to deal with multiple variables and indicators at different levels (Castillo, 2006:1). Shepsle (1988) argues that in order to evaluate a representative institution, one needs to consider both its responsiveness to its constituents and its efficiency in conducting the public's business. Castillo further adds that one of the most important dimensions of institutional performance is accountability, that is, the extent to which a political system is responsible to popular demands.

In addition, while it is important that any measure of institutional performance relate to the two fundamental criteria for democratic government, that is, effectiveness and responsiveness, Putnam (1993) has also argued that any measure of institutional performance must correspond to the evaluations of institutional protagonists and constituents: the argument here is that before making any conclusions about success or failure of institutions, one needs to check the judgments against the views of the people whom the institution serves. This is meant to avoid imposing standards that are alien to the constituents.

3.3.1 Measuring Institutional Performance

In my analysis of institutional performance in Uganda, I adopt a subjective evaluation, focusing on the **perceptions** of the common citizens regarding the performance of central government. In this way, evaluating trust in the Central government of Uganda focuses more on the perceived institutional outputs, than on empirical evaluations of actual performance. In broad terms, three propositions aid this analysis. I argue that the more institutions are perceived as fair, accountable and responsive by citizens, the more citizens will trust them. These three are further narrowed down to more vivid and measurable indicators below:

3.3.1 Perceptions of corruption

Corruption and trust seem to be polar opposites (Uslaner, 2004:2). While trust is built on cooperative moral sentiment, corruption thrives on expropriating what rightfully belongs to others (Ibid). Using this variable, the study aimed to investigate perceptions of corruption in the central government that citizens feel in distribution of resources and treatment from central government. The aim then is to understand people's perceptions of corruption and political clientlism, which have important consequences for the development process. Corruption is an important issue for discussion and is always cited by the World Bank reports as increasing a specific 'tax' on economic activities. More so, as Rothstein, (2011:156) notes, corruption transfers resources from the mass public to the elites, leaving less money for public expenditures and therefore negatively affecting institutional performance. Putnam (1993) also argues that corruption reduces trust, an important precondition for development. In trying to understand performance in terms of perceptions of corruption for this study, the assumption is that citizens' perceptions of uncorrupt institutions (central government) generates and increases trust in these institutions. Thus,

Hyp.1. *The more citizens perceive that central government is corrupt, the more they may see it as poorly performing and may trust it less.*

3.3.1 Perception of government delivery of basic services-(Responsiveness to citizen priorities)

Politics and public policy takes on a critical redistributive dimension when politicians and bureaucrats are charged with not only implementing prepackaged policies but also collecting money and deciding how it should be spent. They are faced with fundamental trade-offs, and the question becomes as to wether government invests in policies demanded by the general public, or those that feed the interest of elites to keep them in power. A government's ability to successfuly resolve this dilenma is an important part of what good performance is. In this study, policy considerations are discussed in terms of respondents' perceptions of to what extent citizens' priorities resonate with where they perceive those of government to be, in terms of government delivery of basic services. A variation to this discussion is whether some services are more significant than others in creating satisfaction and trust. Different groups of people may be concerned with different services, in leiu of their needs and expectations. In assesing this indicator, the aim is to try and understand citizens' perceptions about how government is performing in the deliverly of basic social services such as

education, health and roads. (Miller and Borreli cited in Hetherington, 1998) argue that the farther citizens' priorities are from where they perceive those of government to be, the less they will trust government. The assumption here then is that the more citizens percieve government as performing well in delivering basic services, the more they will trust it.

Hyp.2. *Positive perceptions of government performance in basic services may lead to positive evaluations of overall government performance and trust.*

3.3.1 Perceptions of tax payment

Tax effort represents the transfer of individual resources from the population to the government. Taxation is theorised as one of the ways that legitimacy and trust in government can be manifested. Tax effort also reflects the perceptions that citizens have towards their government's ability to perform its functions (Fjeldstad, 2004). People's willingness to pay tax is likely to be based on their perceptions of whether government is doing its functions and reflects their trust in government capabilities. Consequently, individuals have to believe that these resources will be utilised effectively in order to pay tax, or that non-compliance will result in substantial consequence. Individuals willing to part with resources make this choice based on both experiences and expectations of institutional performance (Hutchinson and Johnson, 2011). This measure represents a rational and non-normative base for reflecting on individual evaluations regarding government performance. This indicator is used as a hypothetical question, and respondents are asked if they would be willing to pay more tax if it would help improve services. The thinking behind this question is that positive expectations on the uses of tax monies will lead people to be willing to pay tax, and reflect peoples trust in the system. As Fjeldstad (2003) found in his study of non-payment of service charges in South Africa, one is most likely to obey the law if they feel that they are sure that they will be treated fairly. In this case, reported tax compliance would reflect trust in the system.

Hyp.3. *Perceptions that tax payments are properly used may inspire people to be willing to pay more, and reflect trust in the government. On the other hand, if tax money is perceived as being misused, people would be hypothetically unwilling to pay more tax.*

3.3.1.4 Perceptions of tribalism/Ethnic cleavages.

Ethnicity has been one of the most widely regarded factors in African politics. Indeed, many studies of politics have intimately tied ethnic cleavages to national politics in ways that

suggest a relationship that is both supplemental as well as conflictual to national political landscapes. I use the term ethnic identity here from Erickson's, (1962) definition, as a process located on the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a process which establishes, in fact, the identity of these two identities and ethnic consciousness; what it takes to recognise this identity and use it for one's ends; what propels behaviour." While it is mainly looked at it as parochial, ethnic determination of people's political choices continues to have a large influence in many post colonial states, attached mainly to an ethnic group's power of brokerage.

Brokerage, as used by Young (1976)) refers to the power of ethnic elites to negotiate a share of resources not only for themselves but for their constituents as well. Ethnicity is important in the study of trust in Uganda, given the diversity of ethnic composition, and the power of ethnic elites in allocation of resources. My main proposition here is that one's perception of ethnic group favouritism will have a big impact on how much they trust the central government. That is, the more central government is perceived as favouring a particular ethnic group, the less it will be trusted by citizens. However, it is also possible that these perceptions maybe affected by in-group out-group location. That is, if one belongs to the ethnic group that is favored, they are more likely to trust the government while those outside are likely to show distrust. Favor to one's ethnic group compromises the principles of impartiality, uniformity and standardization. The less these principles exist in government, the more the state will be considered biased towards a particular group and the less it will be trusted.

Hyp.4. perceptions of tribalism may lead to distrust of government by those who feel left out and do not belong to the favored ethnic group. Tribal favoritism is also likely to result in poor overall evaluations of government performance.

3.3.1.5 Perceptions of political Stability

In Uganda, evaluations of government performance cannot be complete without addressing the issue of national security. The country has been scourged by war for decades, and, although there is relative peace now, there are still pockets of instability. Observers of Ugandan politics have always argued that one of the reasons the current regime has been able to keep in power is because it has managed to maintain a semblance of security within a once chaotic nation (Krutz and Logan, 2011). The security factor therefore becomes a key indicator of performance. Perceptions of political stability by citizens, in this case I assumed would

override other factors in evaluating government performance, and positive perceptions would thus lead to more trust among citizens. Focus group participants were asked to evaluate the government in its delivery of peace and security, and how important this is to them. In pursuing this question, I was interested in finding out the disparities in perception among the different age groups, especially I assumed that young people who lived in relative peace would not have reservoirs of the past to draw from, and therefore this would mainly be a significant factor among older people.

Hyp.5 perceptions of political stability may more human security and societal peace and may lead to more trust in the government by citizens.

3.3.1.6 Accountability (understanding government roles and citizen responsibilities)

Accountability is the degree to which governments have to explain or justify what they have done or failed to do (Swianiewicz, 2000) One of the theoretical advantages in a democratic system is improved information about citizens' needs and preferences, but there is no guarantee that leaders will actually act on these preferences unless they feel some sort of accountability to citizens (WorldBank, 2001). Elections are the most common and powerful form of accountability, but even these must be free and fair for them to hold any meaning for citizens. In trying to discuss governmental performance in terms of acountability to citizens, first i tried to understand how citizens view the roles of central government as an institution, what it does, and whether they perceive it to be working in line with these roles. In addition, I also tried to discuss and understand whether citizens feel they have any power to hold government accountable for its actions. The assumption here was that the more citizens feel they can hold the central government accountable for its actions, the more they will have trust in it and the more powerless they feel regarding what government does or does not do, the less they will trust it.

The question then that arises in trying to understand these perceptions and trust evaluations is, how are they formed? And what do people mean when they say they trust an institution or not? The following section tries to address political trust, the dependent variable, and how it was measured in this study.

3.3.2 Measuring Political Trust

Scholars have argued that trust evaluations are influenced by a number of factors, including but not limited to, the extent and nature of media exposure (ibid), the level of political engagement, political leaning, ethnic alliances and a number of other social demographic characteristics. Media exposure is important because the distribution of negative or positive information about government institutions affects the way in which individuals make performance evaluations about government. This information, becomes the basis for forming judgments regarding the expected role of government against the perceived outputs. The discrepancy between the two may result into reduced trust.

With this in mind, In the framing of this study, my aim was to try and understand trust from the discussants point of view, therefore the first question that was addressed was what it means to trust, and what characteristics are necessary for an institution to be held as trustworthy. The discussion aimed to delineating the concept of political trust through understanding local metaphors and images, and then further discussion to address how these trust evaluations are made. It was also important to get a normative evaluation frame that disregarded issues such as one's party belonging, ethnic alliances and other issues by allowing respondents to draw their own frame of reference on what a trustworthy government looks like.

In order to understand how trust evaluations were made, two variables were considered. These were,

a) Confidence in the electoral commission and the electoral process,
b) Confidence in government.

3.3.2. Political engagement-Confidence in the electoral commission and electoral Process

Political engagement has been widely acclaimed as one of the markers of civicness. Putnam (1993) asserts that one of the indicators of civic community is the level of citizen interest in community affairs. The critically disengaged, he argues, are also more suspicious and distrustful of government. Indeed, Schildkraut (2005) also notes that when people are politically engaged, their issues are likely to be addressed by the political system. At the same time, she argues that politically active citizens are more likely to make favorable evaluations

of the political process. In trying to shed light on this issue, I chose the variable of perceptions on the electoral process and the electoral commission because it represents the main avenue through which citizens interact with the electoral system, not only by electing their leadership, but also by rejecting those that they feel have not fulfilled expectations. Trust in the electoral process would also mean that the regime is more likely to be seen as legitimate even by those that do not support it. The hypothesis therefore is that trust in the electoral process and the electoral commission would reflect regime legitimacy and political trust in central government as a whole.

Hyp.6. The more the citizens perceive the electoral commission as competent and the electoral process as free and fair, the more they will have trust in government.

3.3.2.2 Confidence in Government

This indicator was used subjectively as a direct question of whether citizens have confidence in central government or not and why. This variable was used as a check against the other indicators being used, for it captured a direct, non obtrusive gauge on whether or not people trust the central government, and what characteristics they think a trustworthy institution should have. Confidence in government is also directly related to people's belief in the competence of government institutions.

3.3.3 Demographic variables

I also add a set of demographic variables such as age, gender and education that have been found to have an influence on trust(Kuenzi, 2008).

3.3.3 Age

Seligson (2002) views age as an important factor in explaining political trust. In his thinking, young people might be expected to exhibit greater trust because, unlike their elders, they have not accumulated the years of disappointment with institutions and may have an idyllic view of democracy. The counter argument in Uganda's case, may be that younger people may be less likely to trust the government than the older people. This may be explained by the fact that they have grown up with higher expectations from government, and their access to information through social media may make them more demanding of government. In addition, youth unemployment in Uganda is at an all time high, at 36 % compared to the

national average of 3.2. Some have even described this as a 'ticking time bomb[29].' The older people on the other hand are more likely to value government outputs in areas such as security, and therefore may trust the government more.

Hyp7. Young people may be less trusting of government than older people.

3.3.3. Education

It has been argued that citizens grant or withhold trust based on their evaluation of the performance of the actors or institutions of government (Alvarez and Hall, 2008). As such, it can be assumed that educated people, given their greater capacity to accurately assess the level of issues like corruption, coupled with a stronger commitment to democratic values, are likely to be more critical of government. Secondly, citizens with more education are not only more likely to be better able to identify practices that undermine the smooth functioning of government, they are also more likely to be normatively troubled by practices such as corruption. Seligson (2002) also argues that more educated people are likely to be more informed about government and therefore more critical. This is likely because educated people are exposed to more information about government and are therefore in a better position to compare how government is doing in relation to its responsibilities. They are also likely to be more demanding of government due to this exposure and access to information. Counter arguments are that because of the cognitive factor, educated people have greater knowledge about the political administrative system, can distinguish between its various components and understand how public services are organised and function, something that supposedly furthers trust (Christensen and Lægreid, 2003:494). The less educated, it can be argued, are more likely less engaged in political debate, are less likely to put political elites to task and have limited information about government to be able to critically evaluate it.

The study therefore hypothesised that those who were highly educated were more likely to be critical about government performance and less trustful of government, while those with lesser education were assumed to be likely to evaluate the government in a more positive light.

Hyp8. The more educated one is, the more critical and less trustful of government one may be.

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[29] Rising Youth unemployment in Uganda, a ticking time bomb. *The Daily Monitor, Saturday, April 7, 2012*.

3.3.3 Gender

Gender is also a key determinant of political trust, with scholars like Chang and Chu, (2006) arguing that women are less likely to trust political institutions. This argument is based on various studies, especially from Europe and north America, that have documented the different levels of both information access and resources to engage in political activity between men and women. In these studies, women's roles as house mothers and their limited access to the public sphere, it is argued, limits their access to information about government and their disaffinity for politics. Women may also find public organisations such as bureaucracies to be more masculine and hence less sensitive to their issues (See for example studies such as Norris,2002, Burns, 2007 and Dalton, 2008). In my study, I also adopt an alternative hypothesis, with an assumption that women would be more likely to trust government than their male counterparts. This thinking is informed both by various studies that have documented the progressive role that the current movement regime in Uganda has played towards women empowerment (Ahikire, 2003, Tripp, 2000) which has also been reflected in women as a big voting block for the current regime. It is also likely that the relative security enjoyed during the current NRM government is more appreciated by women, given the past indicators that showed women and children as the biggest causalities of war. Consideration of a positive security environment may therefore lead to more trust in government by women.

Hyp.9. Women are more likely to trust government than men

Independent Variable   **Dependent variable**

Institutional performance   **Trust in Government**

<table>
<tr><td>

Perception of government delivery of services
Perception of political stability
Perceptions on tax payment
Perceptions of corruption
Perception of tribal ism

</td></tr>
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Demographic Variables

<table>
<tr><td>

Gender
Age
Level of education

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Confidence in the electoral commission and electoral process
Confidence in national government

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
Source: Author's synthesis derived from literature

The model presented is a synthesis of ideas borrowed from Lavalee, et al (2008), Hutchison and Johnson (2011), Putnam (1993) and Hetherington (1998). The main Independent Variable, institutional performance, is operationalized in terms of perceptions of corruption, perception of tax payment, perception of fairness reflected in low tribal favouritism in allocation of resources, and perceptions of government delivery of services, while the Dependent Variable, trust in government, is operationalized in terms of confidence in national government and confidence in the electoral process. To address the above theoretical

39

propositions a research strategy was adopted as a way to identify the respondents, scope and methodology for the conduct of the research. This is what I discuss in the next chapter.

Chapter 4 : Methodology

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I discus the various methodological considerations that have been adopted for the study. The chapter gives detailed information about the thought processes that informed the study, the research strategy adopted, methods used and types of respondents that were targeted for the study. A strategy to ensure quality of the study is discussed, also keeping in mind ethical issues since the study targets human subjects. The chapter also highlights some of the methodological challenges that were encountered during the course of the research and how they were addressed, and outlines the data analysis techniques that were adopted for the thesis. The chapter concludes with a critical reflection on the whole process and usefulness of research that targets human subjects as social and reflective beings.

4.2 The Research Design

When designing a research project, one needs to ask; given this research question, what type of evidence is needed to answer it convincingly? A research design is therefore the logic that links the data to be collected and the initial questions of the study (Yin, 2009:26). The main purpose of the research design is to reduce ambiguity of research evidence. Indeed, a good research design eliminates rival explanations of the evidence and seeks evidence that could falsify the theory. Yin describes five components of a research design: the study's questions, its propositions, its unit of analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions, and the criteria for interpreting the findings (2009:27). In the same vein, King et al (1994:13) divide research designs into four components: the research question, the theory, the data and the use of the data. They however stress that these do not necessarily follow a predestined order, and their structuring depends on the research environment. I have already discussed the research questions and the theoretical framework used in this study, the discussion that follows below elaborates the research strategy adopted for the study.

4.3 Research Strategy

This research adopts a qualitative methodological tradition, specifically using FGDs and in depth interviews as the primary data gathering techniques and an interpretive approach in data analysis. Qualitative research, Creswell (1998) notes, is an inquiry process of understanding based on a distinct methodological tradition of inquiry that explores a social phenomenon or human problem. The research takes place in a naturalistic setting where the researcher is an

instrument of data collection who gathers words or pictures, focuses on the meanings of participants and describes a process that is expressive and persuasive in language. The reason for adopting this approach in the study of trust is that trust is a complex concept (Newton, 1999) and using this approach is a useful way of building a holistic, complex picture, where the researcher becomes an active learner who can tell the story from the participants' view other than as an expert who passes judgment (Creswell, 1998:18). Moreover, this approach to the study of trust recognizes the intentionality of consciousness, and the refusal of the subject object-dichotomy so often found in research works, by being cognizant of the fact that the reality of a concept can only be perceived within the meaning of the experiences of an individual.

4.4 Research Location

To address the above propositions, I carried out the study in three Divisions of Kampala city. These are Kawempe Division, Central Division and Rubaga Division. The choice of Kampala city was based on its diverse demographic characteristics, which gives a more nuanced picture of citizens' views from different economic, ethnic and political backgrounds. It is also the political and administrative capital, and therefore it is assumed that citizens here are more at grasp with what government does. In addition, and unlike other districts of Uganda whose management is under local government, Kampala is placed solely in the hands and authority of central government through the Kampala City Council Authority Act 2010 (Karyeija and Kyohairwe, 2012:684). It was therefore an appropriate site to study political trust.

The choice of the three divisions also followed a closely related logic. Central Division is in the heart of the city and most commercial, political and social activities take place here. It is multi ethnic, has people from various economic and educational backgrounds, and is the centre of power. It was therefore interesting to 'feel the beat' at the centre. Rubaga Division, just adjacent to central division, is important as the seat of one of the main centres of power, the kingdom of Buganda. It is important to note that the kingdom politics has significant impact on central government, as evidenced in the 2009 September[30] riots. Here the ethnic factor was important as it was aimed at determining how ethnic tensions affects the views of citizens on government institutions. Kawempe Division is chosen because of its diversity in

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[30] The september 2009 riots took place after confrontation between the central government and the kingdom of Buganda. The riots erupted after the central government blocked the king of Buganda from travelling to Kayunga, a part of the kingdom of buganda that is highly contested. The riots broght the city to a standstill, and left more scores dead.

population demographics. More so, Kawempe's demographics consist of a population of youth, both educated, as evidenced from the presence of various higher institutions of learning (State of Uganda population Report, 2007), and those with low education, mainly doing semi skilled jobs such as boda boda[31] riding. I also discovered in the course of the research that this is one of the most politically charged divisions in the city, where the opposition holds key positions, and where people are actively involved in following the political events that are shaping the Ugandan state today. It was therefore fruitful for an investigation of political trust as it provided fertile ground for discussions on issues of political trust.

4.5 Methods of Inquiry

'Truth lies at the confluence of independent streams of evidence' Karl Deustch, cited in Putnam, 1993:12)

The range of methods and techniques of data-gathering include the use of qualitative or quantitative data, or some combination of the two (Layder, 1998:42). In fact, Yin (2009:115-122) proposes three principles to be followed in data collection; the use of multiple sources of evidence (this allows the researcher to address broader range of historical and behavioral issues), creation of a database and maintaining a chain of evidence during the inquiry. He further points out that the use of various methods in data collection can permit investigators to address more complicated research questions and collect a richer and stronger array of evidence than can be accomplished by a single method (63). In order to underline the value of this consistency in my inquiry, I employed focus group discussions as my major data collection technique, supplemented by in-depth interviews and media content analysis. These I elaborate below.

4.5.1 Focus group discussions

A focus group is a carefully planned series of discussions designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening, non judgmental way. The purpose of conducting a focus group is to listen and gather information. Participants are selected because they have certain characteristics in common and relate to the topic of the focus group. The researcher does not do one focus group; the discussion is conducted several times with

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[31] Boda bodas are essentially motor cycles used to transport people. It is one of the most unique features of kampala city, used mainly as a way of beating the constant traffic jam. Many youths that have emigrated to the city are involved in this activity.

different participants so that the researcher can identify trends and perceptions (Krueger and Cassey, 2009:2).

Focus groups work well to determine perceptions, feelings and the thinking of people towards particular issues, services or opportunities (Ibid:8). However, a researcher has to be cognizant of the disadvantages associated with focus groups, such as the tendency for dominant members to hijack the discussions and influence results, and a tendency for members to offer dishonest opinions just for the sake of appearing informed (ibid:14). Patton(2002, cited in Krueger and Cassey, 2009:21) also advises about choice of participants for the focus groups, to choose from "those from whom one can learn a great deal about the issues of central importance to the purpose of the research." Three or more focus groups are recommended because focus group data is analyzed across groups to find patterns and themes across groups (21).

For the purpose of this study, a double layer[32] focus group design was employed, and twelve (12) focus groups were conducted. This included the multiple category design, with participants of various characteristics in different geographical locations(Ibid, 27).

Focus group participants were mainly purposively selected, for example, the educated youth groups mainly consisted of participants who are students at higher institutions of learning. I was able to recruit them because I lived in an area with a high student population, and so I talked to different individuals about joining a discussion on issues affecting everyday citizens in Uganda. Those who agreed mainly formed these youth focused groups. I worked with Local Council leaders to access participants for the older people and uneducated youth focus groups. I talked to the LCs and they informed me when they normally hold village meetings, and I would then talk to various people after the meetings to recruit them for a focus group that would take place a few days later. It also happened that some of the participants that I invited to the focus group would invite along a friend, and if in my discussion with them that person fitted the characteristics of the group, I let them join, or asked them to come to another group which they would fit in. This selection of course has implications for the findings of my study. First, given that the people I mostly selected were those that usually come to village meetings, it is possible that I selected the most active citizens of the population, or also that

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[32] A double layer design involves selecting participants from diferent geographical areas as one layer and different participant types as another. In essence the analyst can compare and contrast based on geographical regions or between participant types(Krueger and Casey, 2009:26).

my having talked to the chairman first would influence the way the discussion was framed. I however tried to organise the groups in the most open manner, and at all times assured my respondents that they were free to air their views as they would only be used for academic purposes. Moreover, recruiting people from village meetings was advantageous because most of them were already acquainted with each other and therefore had some level of rapport, an issue that I felt was important given that the topics to be discussed could be perceived as sensitive. We also held discussions mainly in neutral places such as a school room on the weekend, or in a relatively quiet open space especially when the group was small. These steps ensured that at most an environment of free expression was facilitated. The discussions for the educated focus groups were held in English, while the ones for the uneducated were held in Luganda, a widely spoken language in Kampala. It was also advantageous that all the focus group participants could understand at least one of these two languages.

 In the focus groups, there were animated discussions about government, including its roles, performance and issues such as corruption, infrastructure, voting, protest and tax payment. Other issues raised included how citizens understand trust, and their views on how a government can make people trust it. There was also discussion of what characteristics citizens think are important for institutions if they are to generate trust (that is, what does it mean when citizens say they trust an institution? What sort of evaluation are they using? What has the institution done that makes it trustworthy? What are their perceptions on corruption in central government? In what areas do they think government is performing well? What is it failing to do? The discussions in the various focus groups were useful in providing insights on the various ways in which people perceive institutional trust, and what institutional characteristics are important for citizens to trust institutions.

For the focus group discussions, a discussion guide was used, and the researcher moderated the discussion and also took notes, with the help of a research assistant who also took notes. The use of an assistant in note taking was as a result of concerns raised by various group discussion members about recording their voices. Since I take seriously the concerns of the discussants about their anonymity, the recorder as a tool was therefore discarded and careful and elaborate note taking was used instead. Here I must mention that the use of a research assistant has its own shortcomings. The assistant may not understand the questions, or may make the moderator lose control of the conversation during the focus group (RiDNet, 2012). These potential challenges were however overcome because I recruited someone that I knew

and had earlier worked with, whose competence I had firsthand experience of. We also went through the guide together after I had clearly explained the purpose of the study. Indeed, she also read through the thinking process (Proposal) so as to familiarise herself with the concepts. An attempt was also made to use clear, short, open ended, one-dimensional discussion questions. This helped to evoke open conversation among discussants.

4.5.2 In-depth Interviews

In-depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of people to explore their perspectives on a particular idea, program or situation (Boyce and Neale, 2006). This method was employed to gather data from purposively selected public opinion leaders including intellectuals and politicians. The main purpose of the interview was to gather insight on the political process in the country, and also raise questions about the relationship between institutions and citizens. The aim of interviewing these respondents was to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between government institutions and the people. The instrument used had a set of predetermined open ended questions that guided the interview sessions. A defect of the interview method is that the researcher takes the lead and the interviewee takes a more passive role, information of high value may not be disclosed and the data obtained is as likely to embody the preconceived ideas of the interviewer as much as the attitudes of the subject interviewed (Kruger and Casey,2009:2). I interviewed individuals who in my thinking have experience on Uganda's political situation, and effort was made to allow for an open expression of ideas and interaction. The results from these interviews will be used to supplement those of the average citizen.

I must mention here that including politicians in this sample appears problematic, because it is likely that they will have partisan views, this was mainly intended as a way of gauging how much partisanship affects evaluations of government performance and trust, especially focussing on where government is performing well or not.

4.5.3 Media Content Analysis

To supplement data generated from primary sources secondary sources of data were also used. These include mainly issues from mainstream media, the Government owned The New Vision, and The Monitor which is more opposition sympathetic, and also content from radio and Television talk shows to supplement the main data collected. I noted down the major news stories that related to government activities during the time of data collection, and also

devotedly watched the 10 o'clock news popularly known as *'agataliiko nfuufu'*(loosely translated as unedited or uncensored news). The purpose of using this source is because it has become a major avenue for ordinary citizens to vent their frustrations with the regime, and one can easily pick a trend in the political and social economic situation of the country through closely following the bulletins. The use of these multiple sources was also intended to try and gauge my findings against the general issues that were being raised everyday by the wider Ugandan public and collect as many observable implications of perceptions of government performance as possible to be able to present substantive line of argument.

4.6 Sampling Method and Target Respondents

I used both random and purposive sampling techniques. Selection of respondents was put into two main categories. The first category consisted of 44 ordinary citizens above 18 years and they were selected for the focus groups. I employed both purposive and stratified random sampling[33] technique to select this group. It is important to note that the intent of focus groups is not to infer but to understand, not to generalise but to provide insights about how people in these groups feel about a topic under discussion. The use of randomisation therefore was mainly intended to prevent selection bias and to obtain respondents with varying social, political, ethnic and educational background. As I already mentioned, I built rapport with most of my respondents who lived in my vicinity while others were identified after attending some Local council meetings and requesting the leaders if I could talk to some of their people.

The second category of respondents consisted of five key opinion leaders and academics. These were purposively sampled in order to obtain deeper insight and information about the subject matter of trust and governance as well as insights regarding Uganda's political landscape. Krueger and Casey (2009) recommend in the selection of individuals for in-depth interviews and focus groups that one should select what one considers 'information-rich cases' or 'those from whom one can learn a great deal about the issues of central importance to the purpose of the research'(21). In essence these two groups of respondents were selected

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[33] This is method of sampling that involves the division of a population into smaller groups known as strata. In stratified random sampling, the strata are formed based on members' shared attributes or characteristics. A random sample from each stratum is taken in a number proportional to the stratum's size when compared to the population. These subsets of the strata are then pooled to form a random sample. Here it is important to note that due to time and financial constraints, I could not attain a proportional sample size, but the aim is to capture the varied characteristics.

because they appeared to posses relevant information that were key in answering the research questions of posed in the study.

4.6.1 Sample Size

Creswell indicates that it is very important for a researcher to identify the population in the study (Creswell, 2009). The total sample for my research was 49 respondents. 44 respondents were for focus groups and five respondents for in depth interviews. I conducted 12 focus groups each comprising an average of four people, and five in-depth interviews. Of the 12, five focus groups were for men, four for women and three for youths. These categories were further subdivided into educated and non educated. The reason for dividing the groups according to age, education and gender was because, as I earlier discussed, these characteristics may have important effects on both political trust and evaluations of performance (Marien and Hooghe, 2008) and I therefore wanted to find out if these were significant in the case of Uganda. In addition, grouping people with similar characteristics was meant to facilitate more open discussion, and to make people more comfortable in relating to each other in the focus group.

Each focus group lasted on average two and half hours, while the in-depth interviews were conducted within one hour each. Although I had originally planned to conduct only 4 focus groups, I realised that for my analysis to be more informed and broad, and in order to be able to capture views from diverse categories of people, I had to conduct more focus group discussions. Another reason for conducting more focus groups is because focus group data is analysed across groups, and the analyst looks for patterns and themes across groups (Krueger and Casey, 2009:21). Conducting more focus groups also helps to determine whether the discussion reaches a point of saturation[34]. In addition, each group comprised an average of four people in order to facilitate a more interactive discussion. As Krueger and Casey (2009:6) note, the focus group must be small enough for everyone to have an opportunity to share insights and big enough to provide diversity of opinions. Conducting smaller groups was important for participants to feel more comfortable to share ideas (67) while too big focus groups would have limited participants' opportunity to share insights and observations.

In addition, the five in-depth interviews were conducted. Of these two are political scientists from the highest institution of learning, Makerere University, two are leading figures in

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[34] Saturation is a term used to describe the point where one has heard a range of ideas many times and there is no new information arising(Krueger and Casey, 2009:21)

political parties, and one is a director in a political advocacy group. These respondents were selected purposively to gather more varied and deeper understanding of the broader issues related to trust in government institutions in Uganda. Indeed, conducting in-depth interviews in addition to focus groups facilitated the opening up of multiple lines of inquiry that help to compare findings and improve the quality of findings and conclusions.

Table 2. Profiles of Focus Groups

Area	No. of Groups	Gender	Education profile	Number of participants per group		
Rubaga Division	2	Female	Uneducated	5	2	
Kawempe	2	Female	Educated	3	2	
Central Division	2	Youth(mixed male and female)	Un educated	7	4	
Rubaga	1	Youth (mixed male and female)	Educated	5		
Central Division	3	Male	Uneducated	3	5	3
Kawempe	2	Male	Educated	3	2	
Total number	12			44		

Source: Field Data July-August 2012

Table 3. Profiles of key informant Respondents

No.	Respondent gender	Profile
1	Male	Political Scientist from Makerere University (Government sympathetic)
1	Male	Lecturer ethics Makerere University
1	Male	Opposition Politician from Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)
1	Male	Opposition Politician From Conservative Party
1	Female	One of leading advocates in Activists for Change (A4C)

Source: Field Data July-August 2012.

4.7 Data Analysis

A data analyst has an obligation to do the very best with full intellect to fairly represent the data and communicate what the data reveal given the purpose of the study (Patton, 2002:434, cited in Krueger and Cassey, 2009:113). Krueger and Casey (2009:114) emphasize that the analysis of Focus group data should be strongly guided by the purpose of the study which helps the researcher avoid getting lost in the amount of information received from the discussions. They point out that for analysis to be credible, it must be systematic, verifiable, sequential and continuous (116). A constant comparative analytic framework has been adopted for the analysis of focus group data for this study. It involves grouping data together on a similar dimension, categorizing these dimensions and arranging patterns in a relationship to each other. This technique is used because it helps to identify patterns in the data and to discover relationships between ideas and concepts. In addition, elementary data analyses also happened during the focus group discussions, as arguments and counter arguments were

raised by the participants in different groups. This has been very useful for me as it has helped sort out inconsistencies and ambiguities within the data.

In addition, "hermeneutics as 'interpretation' will further be used as a method for interpreting and analyzing the data. This approach can promote understanding of the nature of contexts, and our own self-understanding. According to Gadamer[35], interpretation should take place within distinct historical, cultural and intellectual contexts. He argues that the various frameworks that have been invented or created by human beings over the course of their history should be the fundamental objects of interpretation[36]. Gadamer encourages us to be self-conscious to and appreciate the fact that we all find ourselves in the world as products of specific historical, cultural and intellectual contexts (Kwasi, 2004). Although hermeneutics has not been commonly used in the analysis of trust, it is important in this context especially since my study addresses issues relating to application of concepts and adopts a qualitative methodological stance and seeks meaning behind the concepts being studied. This is important for my research because the aim is to understand political trust in the specific context of Uganda. Presentation of the data has been done through narration.

The question then arises, what procedures were followed to ensure that the study meets the standards of scientific research? How was the quality of the study ensured and how am I handling data analysis in order to present substantive arguments? I address these concerns in the following discussion.

4.8 Quality of the study

King et al.(1994) offer four criteria for judging the quality of a study, that is, the goal should be inference, the procedures should be public, the conclusions should be uncertain, and the content is the method(7-9). Yin (2009) proposes evaluation based on validity (construct, internal, external) and reliability.

4.8.1 Validity

This refers to the extent to which we measure what we think we are measuring (King, et al: 25). It reflects both the internal and external logic that links concepts to observable indicators.

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[35] Gadamer's approach is one of dialogical openness, trying to learn the truth, even if it contradicts ones own expectations. Indeed, he considers the study of 'other' cultures as a hermeneutical problem and that hermeneutical reflection sheds light on this task (Palmer,E. 2006;16).
[36] (Kwasi, 2004) A companion to African Philosophy.

4.8.1 Construct validity

in this case deals with deeper issues of adequacy of indicators that are employed to represent the concepts being measured, (Layder, 1998:79), that is, identifying correct operational measures for concepts being studied. The logic of the choice of indicators I use for institutional performance is linked to theoretical assumptions of what an effective institution looks like. It also relates to the two fundamental criteria for democratic government, effectiveness and responsiveness. In addition, the indicators are linked to citizens own perceptions of what an effective institution must look like. As Putnam (1993:80) notes, people everywhere recognize the distinction between good and bad government, using essentially the same basic standards of efficiency, responsiveness, and practical achievement. It is therefore not enough for governments to say that they are doing their job, the people must perceive them as doing so too.

The indicators that I used for political trust are also related to democratic theoretical postulations on civic life. Measures like confidence in government, confidence in electoral process and engagement and interest in political affairs reflect whether citizens will trust or not trust political institutions depending on the context in which these interactions take place. In addition, these measures have been tested and internationally used, in varying ways, in the study of trust (see, Hetherington,2004; Hutchison,2011; Dekker,2011; Uslaner, 2005; Rothstein and Stolle, 2001). They have also been found to correlate with political trust.

4.8.1 Internal Validity

Internal validity mainly deals with issues of inference and development of causal relations, that is, that certain conditions lead to certain results and no other spurious relationships exist , that is (A causes B)and not C. I have to note at this point that given that my research is located within the reformist school of social science research (also known as narrative research)[37], I treat issues of validity as a prototype rather than a definitional concept. In other words, in narrative research, such as this one, validation is not a mechanical but an argumentative process, and a knowledge claim is not treated as intrinsically valid, rather, its validity is a function of inter-subjective judgment, and rests on the consensus within a

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[37] The major argument of this school is that there are important aspects of the social and personal realms that cannot be investigated within the realm of the limitations of what has been conventionally accepted as evidence and arguments used to justify knowledge claims. It therefore adopts naturalistic research paradigms in which the researchers 'observe, analyse and intergrate into the research process unexpected, constantly changing and other potentially influential aspects of what is being studied' (Polkinghorne,2007:3)

community of speakers (Pilkinghorne, 2007:4). Also, in narrative research, the concern is with clarification of what the storied text is intended to represent, in other words, the 'truths' sought by narrative researchers are narrative truths, rather than historical truths. Stories are gathered not to determine if events actually happened, but about the meaning experienced by people whether or not the events are accurately described (Ibid). In addressing issues of validity at the data collection stage, I adopted mechanisms in data collection that reduce threats to internal validity. King et al.(1994:19) advise researchers to collect as many observable implications of a theory as possible to allow for falsification and build strong evidence. This was done by conducting a series of FGDs so as to gather as many ideas as possible, and to be able to build a strong case for the arguments I raise. Indeed, multiple sources of data were used in order to enhance the depth and accuracy of the findings. For example on the question of perception of government delivery of basic services, besides the data collected from FGDs, I was able to review multiple documents, policies and reports, and also to observe for myself how government was performing in service delivery. In addition, having focus groups of different categories of people ensured that data on a particular issue was obtained from various sources.

It is also important to note that the research instruments had been refined and data analysis were done together with the guidance of my supervisors and discussions in class seminars. Also as earlier mentioned, the indicators used in the study of trust and performance and how it is influenced have been tested and commonly used in the understanding of the two concepts. Yin (2009:43) proposes that a researcher adopts analytic tools such as pattern matching, explanation building and addressing rival explanations as a way of reducing threats to internal validity. During the analysis, progression of evidence is used through means such as citing quotations from the text and providing explanations of why other interpretations which were tried during the research process are not as adequate as the presented interpretative claims.

4.8.1 External validity

External validity refers to the generalisability of results (Yin, 2009). Put in more pedestrian terms, external validity is the degree to which the conclusions in a study would hold for other persons in other places and at other times (Trochim, 2006). I have to note here that my study is aimed more at analytical rather than statistical generalization. Adopting analytic generalization, a study of some phenomenon in a particular set of circumstances is used as evidence to support, contest, refine, or elaborate a theory or a model. In this instance, the

study aims to contribute to the theoretical argument that links political trust to institutional performance, and to provide empirical evidence from the context of a developing country. In a more general sense, the findings from this study are likely to be useful in understanding the concept of trust in other African countries, and one would also argue that these findings can be a step towards contributing to statistical generalization by providing specific society studies.

4.8.2 Reliability

Reliability in research means that applying the same procedure in the same way will produce similar measure (King et al, pg, 25). This is also related to replicability, meaning that if a study is replicated at a later time using the same methodology and research questions as well as the same theories and reasoning process, other researchers will get the same general results (King, 1994, pg, 26). To aid reliability, a researcher needs to document every step of the research process clearly. As a way of ensuring reliability, I drew up a proposal as the first step towards this goal, where I provided a detailed discussion of the reasoning process behind the research and also the methodological tools adopted for the study. During the research, I kept a research journal in which I documented the fieldwork process and research instruments were drawn up and made available and data analysis processes have been clearly documented. This thesis is the culmination of this whole journey.

4.8.3 Ethical Considerations

Given that social research, and focus groups in particular are targeted at human subjects, it is important to inform them of the study's rewards and risks, that the study is voluntary and confidential and that they can opt out at any time(Cassey and Krueger, 2009:29). This is important to uphold the integrity of the results and also of the human persons involved. In conducting this study, I sought permission from the local leaders in the divisions where I went, after presenting letters of introduction form both the University of Bergen and my home institution, Makerere University. I also explained to the participants that the study was for academic purposes only and that their anonymity would be ensured. I sought permission to use a recorder, which was rejected so I used note taking as the main way of recording data. Respondents were also assured of the voluntary nature of their participation, and that they were free to opt out at any stage of the discussion. These assurances of strict confidentiality enabled respondents to freely discuss issues, and I was able to gather data useful to addressing my research questions.

4.9 Challenges

In carrying out this study, a few methodological and technical challenges were encountered. I had originally planned to do only four focus groups, but realised that I needed more groups in order to aid data analysis. This also meant that time and resource constraints had to be factored in. On the logistical side, recruiting focus group members was also a challenging process. This was partly as a result of the NGO culture that has deeply penetrated people's psyche, where they expect some kind of financial reward for attending any form of 'workshop'. It was a long process just getting people to show up to the venue for the discussion without expecting any financial reward for it. Also given the nature of my topic and the political environment in Kampala city where my research was conducted, some respondents were concerned about how safe it was to air out their views regarding political issues. Some of these challenges actually enriched my research because I could get the feel of how the political environment in the country is actually perceived by the ordinary citizens. I was able to overcome some of the challenges and also work within the constraints and managed to collect data as I kept on assuring my respondents about confidentiality and the purpose for which their views would be used.

Data analysis also proved to be an ominous task, given the bulk and diversity of opinions. Interpreting the findings also offers difficulties, as I am conscious of my role as a researcher immersed within an environment, for which my own opinions can greatly affect how I interpret the respondents' narratives. I am constantly trying to overcome these challenges by following the logic of the purpose of the study, my research questions and constantly cross checking various focus group data to establish a clear line of argument.

4.9. 1 A critique of the research proposal as a social form[38]

The research proposal is not a natural, self evident step in the process of intellectual labour. It is a specific technology, with a history and social political content. Its intricacies demand that the researcher discipline their intellectual project within particular categories; background, statement of the problem, methodology, findings, conclusions and sometimes policy or theoretical relevance. Through the research proposal, scholarship adopts a specific social form, it is a mode of professionalization and expertisation, in which the intellectual(in this

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[38] I must admit that I was driven to critically think about what I was doing during the process of research while attending a seminar at Makerere Institute of Social Research on 'seeking Political Futures from Uganda's Northern War.' The ideas raised by Dr Adam Branch led me to think about my own intellectual project during this period of fieldwork.

case master student) is to manage and appropriate to his or her own genius what is in fact a social product that is extracted from others through unrecognised structures of inequality. The 'others' in this case are particularly the 'subjects' who are interviewed, others who have written on the topic, all the way to what has been called the general intellect.

In the specific case of Uganda, there is no shortage of studies seeking to determine 'local perceptions'. It is also true that there is widespread resentment towards such research, and even inducements, such as transport refund, lunch, that are given to participants do not compensate for the time and energy that respondents are required to give. The question then one has to ask, does one give up doing field research? Given that the answer is likely no, I feel that a deeper thinking of what research is needs to be done, and perhaps the figure of the researcher be replaced with a social being whose relations with others is not primarily mediated through the rigidity of the 'methods' of research, and whose productive act is writing.

On that same note, I am perhaps more gratified that this study does not primarily seek policy relevance, something that has been revived as a demand made of intellectual production in Africa. Is an academic a courtier of those in power? The demand for policy relevance would assume so. What I hope through this research is that its form not only unsettles its readership, but also seek its relevance to the autonomous logic of scholarship in itself.

Chapter 5: Study Findings and Discussions.

5.1 Introduction

The following two chapters present findings from the study of institutional performance and political trust in Uganda. The findings are from 12 focus groups; five of men, four of women and three of youths and five in-depth interviews. The groups were further divided into highly educated and lowly educated, and highly educated were defined as those respondents who had attained an Ordinary level certificate[39] of education or higher, while low-educated as those below the Ordinary level certificate of education or none. The findings are divided into two sections, with section 1 mainly on the dependent variable and section two on the independent variable.

In the study, I present the views as they appear to emerge from the various discussions. I recognised early on in the research that the study participants might merely repeat catch phrases or expressions commonly used in the media or political rhetoric, and present them as their own ideas. 'Tukooye' (we are tired), 'twebaka otulo' (we can now sleep) and 'abali mukintu' (those in the thing), 'modernisation' are some such phrases. The discussions were therefore designed to be expansive enough to allow for clarification of meanings wherever such phrases were used, and I also kept in mind that certain political messages were only likely to acquire meaning if they resonated with people's experiences,

I start the findings on a discussion of what government is and who owns it as perceived by citizens so as to establish a background upon which to evaluate perceptions of its performance.

In this chapter, I use a lot of text in the local language, which I translate in brackets in order to capture the real meaning as it emerged from the discussions. I also need to mention that my discussion of these findings is affected by the fact that I am a Ugandan, and have own political views and experiences, which may influence how I understand the various discussions. I therefore try as much as possible to present the findings as they are, while hoping that if my respondents were to read this piece, they would be able to recognise their ideas.

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[39] The Ordinary Level Certicicate of education is achieved after eleven years of schooling, seven of which in primary school, and four in lower secondary school.

Section 1

5.1 What is central government?

Discussions with focus group respondents yielded detailed ideas of what central government is. The findings strongly suggest a politically active citizenry, although at times especially among the low educated groups, government is looked at with apathy[40].

Definitions of what central government is often stressed its 'big man[41]' attributes. Central government is seen as *'that which rules us'* by majority of the groups. It was also evident especially among the low educated groups that government seemed like a personal entity of the regime in power. Low educated men in Central division defined the central government as **'***the government of Museveni, Mbabazi and all the Banyankoles. They own the country, rule it, and take all the taxes plus the land that belonged to our ancestors.'* At the same time, educated men in Kawempe division defined central government normatively as the regime in power that is composed of the executive, judiciary and the legislature. However one member argued that even though that is the ideal, central government is composed of the NRM party. He opined **'***ekintu kyabwe, ate who owns it? Not even fellow Banyankoles anymore but the NRM party as a group. Kyebasalawo kyekikola munsi eno...'* (**The thing is theirs, now who owns it? it is not even those from the Ankole tribe anymore but just the NRM clique. Whatever they decide is what works in this country).** It was also evident that the person of the president is widely identified with what central government is. In majority of the groups, there were echoes of central government as '*Museveni's government, or Mzee's government'*, participants widely attributed the figure of the current ruler as an embodiment of central government, with powers to '*run the whole country and control everything'*.

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[40] During discussions, there was marked indifference towards central government especially among the low educated groups, with discussants claiming that wether government is functioning or not, there wouldnt be any much effect on their lives. Such political apathy has been discussed in many studies as a reflection of political stagnation.

[41] Big man rule is a term that has been used widely to describe governance processes in sub-Saharan Africa. It can be defined as a form of highly autocratic rule that is highly personalised and restrained little by modern institutions, making the supremacy of politics risky. It also involves a great degree of uncertainty for the general public (Hyden, 2006:949)

5.2 Who owns central government?

Central government is owned by the citizens…noooo…it is owned by those with long noses[42]…(discussants in low educated group of women, Rubaga Division)

The discussions yielded various contestations to whom the ownership of central government belongs. While it emerged from all groups that ideally Central government is owned by citizens who vote the leaders into power, discussants were quick to add that the reality is different. Among the low educated women group in Rubaga division the general feeling is that even though the government is supposed to be owned by all citizens, the current leadership has personalised it. Majority of the discussants regard the central government as an all-powerful entity, whose power is even rising more. It is widely viewed that this power comes from the backing of the army, even though routine voting takes place, *'…it is for the president and his army. It is for Museveni[43], his family, Amama Mbabazi[44] and the so-called Kayihuras[45]…you know, those people with long noses..'* while the educated youth in Rubaga Division argued that the regime in power owns the central government… *'it is owned by the president and his ministers..'* In most cases, there was evidence that central government was seen as clearly identifiable with the personality of the president, and a few of his more powerful ministers strongly attached to his tribe[46].

5.3 Roles of central government

In respect to the roles of central government, the majority of groups viewed government role as chief service provider. The political discourse among the discussants is that government is responsible for providing tangible social, economic welfare and development outcomes. As the discussants made clear, government role is mainly to**…***look after its citizens so they don't lack anything..* In all groups, provision of education, roads, health and security were mentioned as the chief roles of government. It is also interesting that discussants usually referred to collecting taxes as one of the major roles of government. Low educated women in Rubaga perceived of the government as existing on collecting taxes.. '*This government only*

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[42] The term **long noses** is used in a somewhat derogatory form to refer to people from Ankole region and Rwanda. It is used mainly as a differenciation because of their pysical features especialy relative to the baganda, whose noses are relatively flat and short.

[43] Current Ugandan President

[44] Prime minister and long-term confidant of the president

[45] Inspector General of Police who is also from the Western region

[46] I use tribe here instead of ethnic group to clearly demarcate the differences, although for example the Banyankoles and Baganda belong to the same ethnic group, the Bantu, tribal lines are clearly demarcated. In this case I will use tribal identity instead of ethnic identity to spell out the differences.

*collects taxes; I think it has even improved the ARV[47]s for aids patients so that it can have a bigger population to tax. That is all it does…'*one discussant opined. Government is also seen having the role of providing employment for the people. Among the educated youth in Rubaga division mention was made of the role of government as *'to create new districts so as to bring services closer to the poor' and to 'take youths to Iraq[48] and Somalia[49]..' so that they can have employment.* There was also emphasis on *'fighting rebels'* as one of the most important roles of central government.

The perception among most groups was that government is expanding in size and reach, but there were mixed feelings over whether this was a good thing or not. Government was cast as a big patron, with the head of government usually referred to as **Mzee[50]**, with the implied acceptance of duty and care. What can be inferred from the various discussions is that government is mainly looked at distinctly as ensuring the delivery of practical needs for the citizens. This is in contrast with many views especially of western citizenship, where governments are mainly evaluated in terms of their ability to ensure the protection of civil liberties. It is clearly in line with Chatterjee (2004), who detects a contrast between the civic and political rights stressed in western citizenship norms, and the emphasis for government as a welfare provider among postcolonial populations. Mattes and Gymah Boardi (2008) advance the same argument for sub-Saharan Africa citizens, and argue, like Chatterjee, that citizenship for many is a matter of governmentality, and citizen's evaluation of government performance is rather pragmatic, based on how much it can deliver tangible economic goods. Indeed, results from Afro barometer survey (2008) in Uganda indicate that 54% of respondents perceived citizens as children, and that government should take care of them, while 53 percent responded that government's most important role is to improve the economic conditions of the poor. It is no coincidence then, that in a survey carried out by in 2012, amidst biting inflation and economic hardship, the government approval rating fell from 64% in 2008 to only 24% in 2012, with over 80% respondents believing the government is doing very poorly in the management of the economy.

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[47] Anti-retroviral drugs that help HIV from progressing into AIDS.

[48] Uganda youths were drafted to work as guards alongside US soldiers from 2005. Youth minister Mwesigwa Rukutana estimated that Iraq earnings bring in over USD 90million a year, more that the country's main export, coffee. Iraq was seen by many as a profitable prospect, given earnings of between 600-1000USD a month, compared to the average income of 250 USD a month in Uganda.

[49] Somalia is now known widely among Ugandans because of the Uganda People's Defence Force leadership role in the African Union backed mission, AMISOM.

[50] Mzee is a Kiswahili word used to show defference and respect to elders

5.4 Citizen's perceptions of their roles and responsibilities

What the state needs from the citizenry cannot be secured by coercion, but only cooperation and self restraint in the exercise of private power….Cairns and Williams, 1985:43.

What then do Ugandans think of the roles and responsibilities of citizens? The study aimed to address the question of whether ordinary citizens were aware of roles and responsibilities that they play to contribute to government performance and how important they thought these roles were. Much of the current debate in citizenship theory has been focused on virtues that are distinctive to modern pluralistic liberal democracies, relating to the basic principles of a liberal regime, and to the political role of citizens within it (Kymlicka, 2002:289).These virtues, which include the willingness to question authority and to engage in public discourse are precisely what distinguish citizens within a democracy from the subjects of an authoritarian regime (Ibid). It is hypothesized that citizens' role perceptions are related to the relationship they have with the state, and this relationship has implications for how they will evaluate government performance. The aim of including this discussion in the study was to try and establish the kind of relationship that exists between the citizens and the government, because this has implications for both perceptions of government performance and trust in government. These discussions therefore created a baseline upon which understanding of citizens' perceptions of performance and trust is based.

5.4.1 Paying taxes

It was widely echoed in the various groups that payment of taxes is one of the most important roles that citizens have, since government activities cannot run without funding. Highly educated women in Kawempe echoed this and added that besides payment of tax, taking children to school is also one of the most important responsibilities of a citizen. There was also mention of reporting terrorism and being a spy for each other from one discussant among the low educated men in Central division. Such perhaps is indicative of the situation that arose after the July 11, 2010 bombings in Kampala that claimed the lives of over 80 people. Ordinary citizens now feel they have responsibility to be vigilant even to spy on each other. Arising out of this same idea, there was mention of '*joining the army to go to Somalia*' especially among the youth groups, as one of the roles that citizens have.

5.4.2 Voting

It is interesting to note that even though among the groups there was constant mention of voting as one of the roles a citizen has, some respondents objected, claiming that the government has deprived them of any meaningful roles, since voting had become a mere formality. It was however recognized that fulfilling these various roles, especially paying taxes, helps to build the nation, *'without paying tax, how will government build hospitals? We as citizens are the ones that can make government function,'* one respondent among the highly educated males in Kawempe pointed out. Indeed, this reflected that citizens are quite aware of the symbiotic relationship between government performance and active citizen participation. 'Obeying rules and regulations' was constantly mentioned as an important way of helping government maintain security,

'these days people are vigilant on taking their sons and daughters to the army, so we may end up like America where at least every child is trained, which improves our security..' one discussant observed.

These various observations perhaps point to what Uslaner (2003:4) conceives of as the 'thin view of citizenship' where citizenship is viewed as a contract with the state. In this way, the state provides basic services and people have 'thin' responsibilities which include obeying the law and paying taxes. Citizens thus have a 'condiment contract' with the state; they agree to obey the law and pay taxes if government provides basic services. This contrasts sharply with the western notion of citizenship based on citizen participation and communitarian values.

Uslaner (2004:8) also argues that this more formalistic criteria of good citizenship, obeying the law and paying taxes, and also the obligation to vote, is more strongly linked to evaluations of government, while more communitarian criteria such as being self-critical and thinking about others, should be more strongly linked to values such as trust, and tolerance. We can thus argue from the findings above that Ugandans' conception of citizens' obligations stem from their perceptions of performance of the government, contingent upon its deliverables other than the bonds people share.

Having established the baseline about what government is, what its roles are and how they relate to those of citizens, it is then possible to go ahead and examine citizen's perceptions about government and how it is doing its job. In the next section, I present findings and

discussions on the trust in government and its performance evaluation according to the perceptions of ordinary citizens.

Trust in government was investigated using two simple yet important variables. Trust as confidence in the electoral commission and electoral process and confidence in the current government as an institution. Confidence in the electoral process combined people's perception towards the electoral commission and how it performs its duties and their perceptions regarding voting as a way of expressing citizen preferences. The questions that were posed sought to find out citizens' perceptions on how the electoral commission is doing its job and whether voting is important for ordinary citizens.

5.5 Confidence in the electoral commission and process and trust in government

In democratic settings, the electoral process, and voting in particular, is a major way holding government accountable as well as expressing citizens' priorities[51]. It has been argued that one of the ways that citizens keep their leaders in check and demand for accountability is through regular and periodic elections. Voting becomes a mechanism to reward good performance, and also to air out important preferences of citizens. As a channel of both expressing preference and discontent, voting becomes a major avenue through which citizens communicate to their governments. This implies that for voting to have meaningful impact, the electoral process has to be fair, transparent and trustworthy[52].

It was therefore important to find out whether the citizens of Uganda feel they have power to influence the government through the electoral process. This has implications, as I will later show, for political trust. In using this indicator, I pursued two aims. One was to find out if the electoral process is perceived as free and fair and if voting is perceived as a viable option for those who feel left out by the system, and if it can be used as an instrument of change. Secondly, the study investigated the perceptions that Ugandans have towards the electoral commission. Discussants were asked whether they perceive the electoral commission as free from influence peddling, and also if voting is a viable way of getting performing individuals in office. The assumption was that if the electoral process is seen as free and the electoral

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[51] Chabal (1998:296) notes that as an instrument of democratisation, elections are key to establishing a democratic political order. For this to occur, he argues, there must be the establishment of an independent electoral commission, the elections must be seen as free and fair and the results of the elections must be accepted by all and immediately executed.

[52] See Chabal, Patrick,(1998) A few Considerations on Democracy in Africa. *International Affairs,* 74, 289-303.

commission as competent, and if voting is seen as legitimate and a viable option for citizen participation, it would reflect trust for the regime and its institutions.

5.5.1 Constitutional mandate of the EC

In relation to the electoral process and electoral commission, the 1995 constitution of the republic of Uganda stipulates thus, "Every citizen of Uganda of eighteen years of age or above has a right to vote Article 59(1),....there shall be an Electoral Commission which shall consist of a chairperson, a deputy chairperson and five other members appointed by the president with the approval of parliament, Article 60(1) ......subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the commission shall be independent and shall, in the performance of its functions, not be subject to direction or control of any person or authority (Article 62).

Discussions revealed quite varied perceptions among people regarding both the electoral commission as an institution and voting to influence government policy. Whereas it was acknowledged by the majority of the groups that voting is an important arena for airing their views, many were skeptical about its effectiveness, and they mainly cited the electoral process as a fraud. There were those who held the skeptic view

> *'no no no no…voting cannot change anything in Uganda, maybe in other countries. How can a president of the whole country stand on his two legs and say that a vote is a mere piece of paper, it cannot get him out of power! My daughter, don't you live in Uganda?'***(Discussant from low educated women group, Rubaga)**

The electoral process is widely perceived as unfair and it was claimed certain leaders use money to influence the outcome of results, contrary to people's preferences. An example was cited in Rubaga, where there were battles between the police and the people when the government-supported contestant, Katongole Singh, was declared winner against Kasibante, his opponent from the opposition. Constant riots in the area only subsided when Kasibante was declared as the rightful winner by the courts of law. A discussant in Rubaga commented

> *'We had to protest. It was clear Kasibante had won, and then the electoral commission said Singh had won. They even had to go to court, but for what? That chairman of the electoral commission is an old man but he has no morals. He should be ashamed…okay…if they think that people had elected Singh, why doesn't he come back to his constituency and see!...'*

One also mentioned the constant strikes after the 2011 elections, as an indicator of a flawed electoral system thus,

> *'people have been disenfranchised, elections were rigged and people were very angry. People also lost confidence in courts of law because before, Besigye had taken the EC to court and the court had recognized that Museveni had rigged, but they said it doesn't change the results. People now know the only way to get what you want from this government is to strike. People are very angry* (Key informant, Political Advocacy Group)

Others observed that voting at the presidential level would never change anything, but bring more chaos. They opined that it would be better if the presidential elections were cancelled, so that money would go to services such as health and education. It was also apparent from the discussions that perceptions of vote rigging and voter intimidation are looked as reasons as to why voting will never change anything…

> *'Museveni just rigs that vote..and the military police is always on the street, when you see them, just tick Museveni or go back to the bad old days of war'*

Among the educated youth in Rubaga however, the dominant feeling was that if the ground was leveled (meaning free and fair), voting would influence a lot of policies. In fact, many opined, even now at the local levels and at parliamentary level, voters were channeling their grievances to government by voting MPs who oppose government

> *'it was the power of the vote that brought Nambooze and Lukwago and Kasibante[53] to parliament!. It is possible to vote the people we want especially if Museveni is doing his own presidential campaign, because then he can't intimidate us…'*

These findings echo arguments from elsewhere, (Hooghe,Marien and Pauwels, 2011) where empirical research has provided convincing evidence that a lack of political trust affects electoral behavior. Low trust levels will affect the way citizens will behave when they have an opportunity to voice their preferences. There are three likely options; the first is exit, where voters abstain from participation, the second is to vote for populist parties, and the third, is to opt for loyalty by supporting a mainstream party, especially if there is no viable exit option.

Evidence here clearly shows that voters' attitudes and preferences in voting reflect the three trends, where at presidential level, voters either exit or support the mainstream NRM due to lack of viable options, and yet vote for populist MPs and councilors at local levels. This may be an indication of low levels of political trust among the population for the government. Evidence of exit, or voting with their feet has also been reflected in the decreasing numbers of

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[53] The three are opposition politicians, and constantly put government to task about its various policies

registered voters that are actually casting their vote in presidential elections over time. Voter turnout has decreased from 72% in 1996 presidential election to 70% in 2001, 69% in 2006 and to only 59% of registered voters in 2011 presidential election(IIDEA, 2013).

Yet, others have opted to vote opposition MPs as a way of protest. A discussant pointed out that the presence of the president at any rally where an MP was campaigning was a signal to the voters to vote out that MP. A discussant in the same group observed,

> *'Those MPs who are wise distance themselves from Museveni, they tell him not to come to their rallies, he is bad luck because the people are tired…'*

Others noted that voting can only influence government if the voters are informed. Youth in Central Division were in agreement that the reason government isn't responding to citizen's demands is because it relies on an uninformed rural population who keep voting the current regime. An interesting case was pointed out in the poor eastern region of Busoga, where voters are said to have been manipulated into voting the incumbent president in the 2011 elections

> *'the NRM cadres went to Busoga, the Basoga were very angry and vowed not to vote Museveni, so the NRM people got one of their people to go to rallies telling people that, when you get the ballot box, the person you don't want, tick them so they can be kicked out of power..gwotayenda muteeko tick agolole..They went and ticked Museveni, he won by a very large margin and they couldn't believe it..isn't that ignorance? Such people shouldn't be allowed to vote!'*

The above observations point to various perceptions that citizens have in regard to how much they can hold government accountable through voting, and how they view the electoral commission. It is also reflective of low trust levels especially at the presidential level, as evidenced in apathy and skepticism towards elections as a means of influencing government. It has also been documented by various analysts of Uganda's electoral process that the institutional design of the electoral commission itself is flawed, while others have pointed out the various electoral mal practices that characterize the elections in Uganda.

Tripp, (2010) notes that the requirement in the constitution that the chairman be appointed by the president, even with approval of parliament, creates a conflict of interest, which has mainly led to the president appointing his own people. And, she adds, given that the NRM has the majority in parliament, it is less likely that the parliamentarians will oppose the president's choice. In similar fashion, Muhumuza, (2009:34) laments of Uganda's electoral situation,

'elections held under the NRM government in 1996, 2001 and 2006 have been afflicted by rampant acts of bribery. Money and material things were reported to have been extensively used to woo voters. The EC has become a subject of serious contention, especially because the commissioners are appointed by the president. This explains why it has been organizing disputed elections that are characterized by inflated voter numbers, faulty registers and rigging…

Indeed, the European Union observation Mission also noted of the 2011 elections in Uganda, '…the power of incumbency was exercised to such an extent as to compromise severely the level playing field between the competing candidates and political parties,'(cited in Helle, Makara and Aagedel Skage, 2011).

5.5.2 Influencing the government....voting with their feet

As already mentioned, one of the measures that can be used as an approximation of the public's distrust in government is the increasing decline in voting behavior in elections (Boxill, et al, 2007), and the increase in unconventional participation over time. Within the context of the aforementioned issues, we will be examining the factors that account for this reality.

The study went on to investigate to what extent this assumption held, and the likely reasons for such unsanctioned participation, and whether it has close ties to perceptions of government performance. What other ways outside the electoral process do citizens influence government? Theories of representative democracy tell us that dissatisfied citizens should regularly be given a chance to express their discontent towards those in power. This, it is argued, makes representatives aware of citizens' demands, and makes democracy 'work' (Kumlin, 2008). I sought to find out whether average citizens in Uganda have avenues for expressing their views and discontent with government other than through the electoral process, and how effective they think these avenues are. It was interesting to note that 'rioting' was mentioned repeatedly by different groups as the most effective way of expressing discontent. A male discussant in the low educated group in Central division observed critically,

'this government is stubborn; it only understands the language of riots. Nogamba nogamba, oyatikire omutwe…tebakuhuura...konkashi abantu kubakwekarakasa, gavument yatiina nekikoraa..! don't you remember last year the riots of traders, they closed the shops for three days, and government responded…' **(You talk you talk, until your head bursts, they don't listen. But when people riot, the government fears and responds)**

Some discussants however observed that there were avenues for expressing discontent, but most of them are not being listened to by the government. They singled out programs like 'ekimeeza' (round table) a local talk show program on radio that was banned by government because of the way people were debating government issues.

> *'They said that if they find any gathering talking about the government, that is treason, and anyone involved will be imprisoned, don't you see how they put Besigye on house arrest?' 'sometimes the MPs lie to the president that the people want this, when it is not true, that is why ordinary people want to talk to Mzee face to face, they don't trust MPs..Museveni himself would be good, but his people betray him..'*

However in the educated women group in Kawempe, some discussants believed that government listens to people unlike that of Amin, citing the example of new districts as evidence.

'People even ask for new districts and get them, that is why we have many new districts, it's because government listens to the people…' one discussant pointed out.

In general, the discussions revealed an affinity amongst the population for non-institutional means of engaging with the government. But what could explain the leaning towards rioting as an acceptable arena of discussion? In the literature, two forms of competing claims about political trust and participation accrue. While some argue that trust is a perquisite for any form of political participation to occur, others claim that distrust can be a motivating factor for participation in non-institutional forms of participation (Hooghe and Marien, 2012).

The study hypothesized that if citizens trust government, they would be more willing to abide by institutional decisions and policies especially in relation to electoral processes. If they did not however, they would be more likely to adopt unconventional means as a way of expressing dissent.

A significant finding here is that non-institutionalized means of participation reflect people's skepticism towards the ability of institutional processes to deliver viable outcomes. A major question posed in the literature on political trust and political participation continues to be, 'will low levels of political trust be associated with low participation or rather with different patterns of participation? (Hooghe and Marien, 2012). Findings in this study seem to confirm the latter hypothesis, that is, low levels of trust are positively associated with active participation in non-institutionalized activities such as strikes and riots. It is also a reflection of perceptions of poor performance on the part of institutions responsible for electoral

processes, the electoral commission, such that citizens feel they can neither rely on it as a means of holding government accountable nor view its conduct of elections as an expression of citizens' aspirations.

5.6 Confidence in Government and trust/competence

It is important to remember that in framing this study, I drew upon two research traditions, the cultural and the institutional. The central notion of the cultural argument is that a set of internalised norms structure political behaviour and that widespread presence or absence of those norms dictates the chances of any society having a successful or unsuccessful governmental regime. One of those norms was identified as trust. The institutional perspective however looks at trust as a consequence of proper functioning governmental institutions.

As a way of making the task manageable and clear the study included a normative question on what citizens understood by trust and what citizens would consider being an institution that is trustworthy. The aim of asking the meaning of trust in general was not meant to set the Ugandan experience apart as exceptional or exotic, nor did I intend to absorb it in a broad corpus of trust theory as routine and banal. The endeavour is meant to establish the historical legitimacy of the Ugandan political experience as a valid analytical location. The responses regarding what to trust is were quite revealing. Let's start with trust definitions.

Trust was variously defined as *'believing in someone or something without doubt'*; being sure that one says the truth, 'putting confidence in something or someone'. In the group of low educated women in Rubaga, there were responses such as *'trust means knowing that someone will not let you down'* doing what one is entrusted to do, and *'to appear honest and reliable.*

The men in Kawempe however recognise that trust can be 'with strings attached.' while the educated youth in Rubaga defined trust as *'having no doubt about someone that when they say they are going to do something they do it'*

What is most interesting in most of these definitions is that trust was defined in relation to the likelihood that someone or something would do what they promised to do. This was important for I was trying to relate political trust to the performance of government. I then endeavoured to find out what people think are the qualities of a government that citizens are likely to trust.

Discussants were quick to mention a corruption free government, absence of tribalism and nepotism, transparency, fulfilling promises, as the qualities that a government that citizens

trust would look like. It was also echoed in the groups that there is no trust in anymore, not just in government but society as a whole. On whether they trust government, most respondents said that they had lost trust in the government especially due to the rampant corruption and unfair treatment in the allocation of resources. Some discussants however identified security as a reason they still trust government even if other areas were not doing well...

> *'this is the only government where you can at least go home and sleep in your house without worrying about soldiers coming to your house, they have given us a chance at life, other things may be bad, but we are secure, that's what matters* '(respondent from low educated men, central Division)

Others differed, arguing that although security was generally good, they are being threatened by poverty which is another disease that could kill them. A number of discussants in the various groups wondered how one could trust a government that is so corrupt, and even accused their counterparts of *'mwe mutusibyeeko obukenuzi'*(you are the ones who are making corruption continue).

It was interesting that whereas some groups of respondents evaluated government performance as not being good, when it came to the question of whether they trust government or not, their responses reflected that they trust the government. Most such respondents identified the poor record of past governments as the reason they trust the current government.

Others were of the thinking that they can only trust this government because they are not sure what change in government would lead to; many voiced concerns over likely instability as the reason they still trust this current government, *'what is the reason of expecting more when you aren't sure it is going to be better, at least these ones we know!'*(female respondent, Kawempe). However, some argued that they would be able to trust government if it reduced on corruption, stopped giving jobs to only 'westerners[54]' and improved on social services. Such an outlook is a clear indication of the importance of improved performance of government institutions as a way of building political trust.

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[54] In this case connotes people from the south-western part of Uganda, a region where president Museveni hails from.

Section 2

Chapter 6: Findings and discussions on perceptions of central government Performance

6.1 Introduction

How then do citizens evaluate government performance, given those trust ratings? This chapter presents findings and discussions on the independent variable, institutional performance. The study tested institutional performance perceptions using five basic indicators. These are; perception of government delivery of basic services, perceptions of corruption, perceptions of tax payment, perception of political stability and perceptions of fairness. The findings largely indicate that government is perceived as performing well in providing security and free education, but failing in infrastructure, fighting corruption and health care.

6.2 Perception of government delivery of basic services

This indicator is used to gauge on the whole how citizens feel the government is doing in the delivery of basic services. I used this indicator with the realization that government performance in the context of a young democracy like Uganda may be less evaluated on normative ideals such as democracy, civil and political rights, and more on basic social services. It is also was in line with various scholarly attempts that have found that African citizens use a more pragmatic evaluation of their governments than their western counterparts, due to the differing relationship and dynamics between the state and society, (Mattes and Gyimah Boardi, 2005). Discussants were asked how they perceive government to be performing in delivery of social services, and whether this has changed over time. The assumption was that if citizens perceived government to be doing well in the delivery of basic services, then they will see it as a performing government and trust it, and perception of poor delivery would lead to poor performance evaluations and low levels of trust.

6.2.1 Improved HIV/AIDS care

The discussants credited the government with improving the welfare and health of people living with HIV/AIDS. Even though in their assessment general health services were discredited, the area of AIDs treatment seemed to be prioritised by government according to the participants' assessments. It emerged from the uneducated men in Central Division for example that AIDS medication is free and available… *'People now live longer, those on*

ARVs just wake up and die[55] *but after living for long. They don't have to go through the pain of diarrhoea, skin rushes like it used to be in the 80's.'* While the highly educated youth in Rubaga division also hailed the government policy on HIV/AIDS, arguing that *'health is wealth.'* It is notable that efforts to combat HIV/AIDS led to prevalence rates dropping from 18% to 6.5% between 1990 and 2000, but a recent report (2012) from the ministry of health shows that the infections are on the rise again, with a prevalence rate of 7.5 percent (MOH, 2012).

6.2.2 Education-UPE and USE

Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Universal Secondary Education (USE) were also recognised as major areas of achievement for the government. Even as they pointed out the various weaknesses of the UPE programme such as overcrowding in classrooms and poor quality of education, the general feeling among the educated youth in Rubaga division was that UPE has given an opportunity even for the very poor to get education and increase their life choices…*now children go to school for free …olaba twalaba ku TV nga nobuzeeyi obulina abazzukulu nga buzzeeyo busome..(*we even saw on TV very old people with grandkids going back to school)…*even Saleh* (the president's brother) *went back to get his certificate.'*

6.2.3 Peace and security

In all the groups, security seemed the most important area where government was credited. Low educated women in Rubaga held the view that now unlike in other regimes, there is enforcement of the law and if one is attacked, one just has to make an alarm and will be helped. The highly educated women in Kawempe also argued that security is the most important achievement of the government…

> *'With peace and security, you are safe with your money…even though most people shout that this government has done nothing, but it has worked on security, that is the most important thing!'*

The low educated men in central division seemed to agree with this assessment, with one participant pointing out,

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[55] Direct translation from local vanacular, meaning that people can live with the virus until their sudden death without being bedridden for long like it was before.

'I remember there was a thief called Black. That guy was a pro. He had a gang who could move from one division to another, taking people's property and killing them. But when the government introduced 'Operation Wembly' that was the end of him. Even the Iron bar criminals[56] will be finished!

Echoes of '*twebaka kutulo*' (**we can at least sleep**) were also common among the groups of men and women when talking about the security issue, perhaps in reference to the previous war time regimes where most people were always on the run due to war and insecurity. It is quite interesting to note that these assessments reflect findings from numerous surveys conducted in Uganda, where respondents were asked to evaluate how secure they feel in their day to day activities. A 2008 survey by Afro barometer revealed that 80% or respondents have not been physically threatened or attacked in the whole year. This is a big improvement compared to Uganda's tumultuous past.

Some of the groups also mentioned freedom of speech and movement as important areas that the government had scored in. It was interesting to hear a long running discourse of… *'Now you can even slap a soldier and he doesn't do anything to you. You can even walk at 4.am in the morning without anyone bothering you!* (Discussant, low educated women, Rubaga Division) *Now people talk badly about the president on radio and they stay alive, but let them try that in Rwanda...'* (highly educated women, Kawempe Division). Among the group of educated men from Kawempe however, it was acknowledged that this freedom of speech was limited when it comes to opposition leaders.

6.2.4 Getting women from the kitchen

There were also occasional mentions of the government 'getting women from the kitchen[57]' in response to the women emancipation policies. Indeed, the statistics for women emancipation in Uganda are encouraging. According to the 1995 constitution, Article 78(1), it is stipulated that there shall be one woman representative for every district. This means that at the current count of 112 districts, Uganda has 112 directly elected women member of parliament. The current speaker of parliament, Rebecca Kadaga is also a woman. Through UPE, the proportion of girls to boys enrolled in primary school improved from 44.2% in 1990 to 49.8% in 2006 (JARD, 2009).

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[56] A new wave of criminal activity in Kampala in 2011 and 2012 of hitmen using iron bars in various robberies and killings. This kind of crime was quite rampant during the times of Idi Amin.

[57] This expression is used to refer to the traditional roles of women as being caretakers of the home, with the main job as cooking, and in this sense, the government is credited for changing that, getting women from the private domestic sphere to the public sphere.

However, among the highly educated women in Kawempe, the feeling was that the government has only used women as a large voting bloc and later discarded them. A comment from one of the discussants in this group is instructive,

...yatujja mukiyungu netumuywereza mubuyinza, natuzzaayo...kati yatusibila eyo..tolaba bweyatuleka kufiira muzzaliro?...nebisumuluzo yasuula dda munyanja! ha ha ha (**he got us from the kitchen, we kept him in power and he locked us back in the kitchen and even threw the keys in the lake. Don't you see how he leaves us to die in labour?**).

The assessment regarding women dying in labour is not surprising. Uganda is among the eight countries with the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. Uganda's Maternal Mortality Ratio is 505 per 100,000 live births and the MDG target is 131 per 100,000 live births (WHO 2008). In addition, only 47% of expectant mothers in Uganda go for the recommended four antenatal checkups and many of these go for the first check up after their fifth month of pregnancy (JARD, 2009). It is highly probable that the country will not be able to meet the Millennium Development Goal of reducing maternal mortality rate by three quarters. In the same way, Golooba-Mutebi, (cited in Mbatudde, 2011:8) also argues that politicians in Uganda co-opted women in the era of inclusive politics, but abandoned them as voting demographics change, with issues affecting women's lives such as maternal health given lip service.

The government was however credited for bringing peace and stability to the neighbouring countries and maintaining a good international image so that the donors could continue bringing in aid. Youth respondents in Rubaga noted that the government, by fighting wars in Somalia and Congo, was not only creating employment, but also bringing *'peace for our neighbours'*. Some groups argued however that this 'good' international image is what has kept the government in power because '*the donors think that Museveni is blameless, while we suffer, that's why they can't take him like they did to Ghadafi.'*

From the above responses, it is evident that government is credited as doing well in delivering services such as free education, stability, HIV/AIDS care and women emancipation policies. Indeed, the study observed significant appreciation especially of the free primary and secondary education, even though there was acknowledgement that the system still had significant hurdles to overcome.

6.3 Areas of poor performance

6.3.1 Maternal health

> *'Batuyambye naye kale kati katulye security!kale katufe obwavu! Ha ha ha banange, buli ddagala kati lyona tulina ddigula buguzi?naye lwaki edda tebyali bwebityo? Olaba ne Amin eyali omubi naye yalwarilako e mulago, naye bano museveni abaana be bazaalira Germani, kati anaafaayo atya?'*
> **(they have helped us but well, let us now eat security! Let us die of poverty! Ha ha ha, my dear, now all the medicine in hospital is for buying! How come it wasn't like that before? You see even Amin whom they say was bad fell sick[58] in Mulago, but this Museveni, his daughters give birth in Germany, how can he know and care about what happens in local hospitals?)**(Discussant from low educated women, Rubaga)

The above quotation is reflective of ideas in various focus groups about the way government had prioritized what it worked on and what was neglected. Discussants in all focus groups were of the view that while government was spending a lot of money on defense and security, it has totally neglected the general health sector. Low educated women in Rubaga division were very critical of the way government had neglected maternal health, arguing that women were dying in hospitals while the daughters of the president were giving birth abroad because of the better health facilities there. The educated men in Kawempe were in agreement, they pointed out that the health sector is so poorly facilitated that patients were sleeping on the floor. A member observed,

> *'recently on Bukedde TV on agataliiko nfuufu, they showed Jinja referral hospital with so many sick people, but most were lying on the floor. There was also no electricity for a whole month! What about those on oxygen, don't they just die? I don't understand this government!'*

Discussants also complained that while treatment at the major referral hospital, Mulago is supposed to be free, the medicine is never there and doctors always have to refer patients to their private clinics to buy the medicine, which is expensive. There also continue to be frequent media reports[59] about the breakdown of health equipment at Mulago, a situation that is causing wide public outcry.

6.3.2 Potholes...potholes...poor roads

There was also general agreement in all the groups that the government had neglected the road network, especially Kampala. Discussants constantly pointed out the issue of potholes in

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[58] Meaning, sought treatment from Mulago.
[59] Two dead as Mulago closes Intensive care Facility, The Daily Monitor, October, 31, 2012.

city roads as one of the indicators of government failure to perform its roles. In all the groups, it was noted that most of the work done on the roads in the city is shoddy, and that the money was diverted by 'big men.' One respondent actually noted that when travelling from upcountry areas, *'you know you have reached the city when you start to feel the potholes!'*(low educated women, Rubaga). Interestingly, a group of canny Ugandans have even set up a Facebook[60] group. Calling itself 'operation Kampala no pothole' the leader invited members in 2010 to showcase the finest pothole, with the winning pothole to be kept in a pothole museum 'for posterity'. During one demonstration in Kampala in 2010, a man appeared to be fishing from one such pothole, to the amusement of onlookers as showed in the caption below.

Figure 2: Are Kampala's potholes big enough to fish in?

Source: AOL news

It was however pointed out that the government had tried to construct better roads in the countryside even though the city was neglected.

6.3.3 Unemployment

There were also strong sentiments, especially among the groups of educated men and women, that distribution of jobs by the government was unfair. All the jobs are going to those with '*long noses'*, it was frequently echoed, '*while the Baganda get nothing!'*

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[60] Facebook is a social networking site

> *'Museveni should remember that it is our children who died in the bush, not westerners[61], it is us who died for this peace, look at all the names you hear in big positions on TV, and they all sound the same…omuntu alabye!* (highly educated men, Kawempe Division)

Discussions with youth groups also revealed that rampant unemployment was something the government had failed to address while the uneducated men in Central Division revealed that instead of helping poor people start up business by giving them small loans, government was perceived as only giving them to its 'own' people who are already well off. They pointed out one of the richest businessmen in the city as being a constant beneficiary of government funding, while the poor *'cannot even get 100.000 shillings[62] loan as startup capital!'* It was also mentioned by several groups that government is doing nothing to reduce corruption which many discussants argued was like 'AIDS' killing the country,

> *'they are selling this country in bits, sente zonna bazibbye, airport baagitunda, olaba museveni yali ayagala kutunda mabira, okwo gattako enyanja!* (**They have stolen all the money, the airport was sold, you see Museveni wanted to sell Mabira forest, even the lake!**)
> (low educated women, Rubaga)

And that even taxes were getting higher and higher, combined with spiraling inflation. Even the free education in primary and secondary was so underfunded, they pointed out, teachers are not given enough salary and the education quality is so low.

These assessments by the respondents reflect a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the transport system, general health care and the employment situation in the country among the respondents.

6.4 Changes in Government Performance since 1986
'There is 'modernization' now…but the government no longer has ears…'(respondents from low educated women group, Rubaga)

There were differing views expressed by various groups about the changes in performance of the central government since 1986. Discussants were asked to elaborate on how they perceived government performance to have evolved since 1986. While most groups especially of men and women agreed that there was better security provision unlike in the 1986 when

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[61] Westerners is used in the Ugandan context mainly to refer to people from south-western Uganda, and specifically Museveni's tribe.
[62] 100.000 Uganda shillings is roughly equivalent to 50 US dollars.

road blocks[63] were everywhere, some were quick to note that the security situation is now changing for the worse,

> *'this government is becoming tough, unlike before, now every small thing calls for tear gas! Iron bar criminals are also on the loose, they spend money on teargas, why don't they put the same security they put in Kololo[64] everywhere instead of these ridiculous expenditures on fighter jets?* (Highly educated women, Kawempe).

Some groups even periodized government performance, arguing that from the moment elections started being held in 1996, government performance had become poorer. Government was now concentrating money on winning elections, they argued. Uneducated women in Kawempe noted that unlike before where *Mzee* would listen to people, now the government no longer has 'ears' and those who talk about it just disappear. However, the government was praised for allowing a 'free' market economy and 'modernization' through introducing many phone companies which did not exist before.

These sentiments can be summed up by a comment from a male key informant when asked to evaluate government performance since 1986,

> *'From 1986-1995, there was a lot of optimism. We had the 10 Point program, women taking up leadership positions and a disciplined army. From 1996-2006, government started sliding, rigging of elections was rampant, militias like Kalangala Action Plan were created by government to harass people, UPDF[65] was implicated in looting of Congo, and government lies became unsustainable. From 2007-todate, we have a Museveni who is a complete dictator. We have extra constitutional organizations like 'kiboko squad[66]' backed by government, corruption is like corruption. People say if Museveni of today met the Museveni of the 1990s, they wouldn't be able to recognize each other...'*(Political scientist, Makerere University*)*

Youth groups were particularly unimpressed by the trend government was taking. It is important to note that most of the discussants in the youth groups grew up in the 1990s when the tumultuous times were almost over, so unlike in the other groups where security was a big issue, the youths looked mainly to issues like employment, education, and general political

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[6363] These were mainly check points manned by soldiers, who usualy stopped citizens to check if they were a security threat. They were very common during Amin and Obote's regimes, and the early years of the current regime.

[64] Kololo is a Kampala suburb where most diplomats and politicians and the well-off live.

[65] Uganda People's Defence Forces

[66] A paramilitary group with government links that usualy moves with heavy sticks during demostrations, to cane rioters.

environment as their points of evaluation. Discussants in the youth groups were in agreement that the government record on unemployment was getting worse.

It was also pointed out that the tax system has become tougher and unbearable. It emerged among uneducated men in central Division that the taxes were perceived as chasing ordinary people out of the city and the government is doing nothing to stop the increasing inflation. Unlike before, they argued, now even 10.000 Uganda shillings cannot buy you anything! It is also interesting that they directly associated the inflation to government increase in taxes other than external economic factors and argued that if taxes were lowered, inflation would go down.

From the discussion above we can note that the general feeling is that apart from the security situation, which was appreciated as improved in comparison to that of past regimes, discussants felt that the general performance of government was worsening. Despite the diversity of views among the discussants in regard to what government was doing or not, they shared a common opinion that government had particularly performed well in the early years.

These evaluations are telling. Commentators on Ugandan politics have pointed at the evolution of the current leadership, personified by president Museveni, from a benevolent, progressive regime to more suppressive tendencies. Indeed, Museveni was once during the early 1990s referred to by the then US secretary of State Madeline Albright as a 'new breed' and 'beacon of hope' among African leaders. However, after the strong economic and social indicators in the 1990s, the country has registered slower progress, both politically and economically, and sometimes even regressed. Muhumuza (2009:29) explains this trend thus,

> *'While between 1986 and 1996 Museveni had a lot to prove, like fronting himself as a democrat and adopting neoliberal policies so as to get aid from donors and also undercut influence of traditional parties, after 1996 he had spent enough time in power to consolidate his power base. It was therefore no longer necessary for him to implement populist policies…'.*

In an earlier assessment of Museveni's political regime, Kasfir (2000) notes, *'the twists and turns in Museveni's 'movement' no-party democratic doctrine and its application since 1986 more closely reflect the political realities of legitimizing and maintaining state power than they do to the emergence of a novel form of democracy.'*

It is also widely remembered during the 2001 elections that the president encouraged people not to vote members of parliament who would be very active, but dormant ones as long as

they can 'wake up and vote.' It is therefore safe to conclude that citizen's evaluation of government delivery of services reflected the type of services they have experienced over the 26 year period that the current government has been in power, and overall they perceive it as declining.

6.5 Perception of political stability

In countries such as Uganda, evaluations of government performance cannot be complete without addressing the issue of national security. The country has been scourged by war for decades, and although relative peace returned to the country, there are still pockets of instability. Observers of Ugandan politics have always argued that one of the reasons the current regime has been able to keep in power is because it has managed to maintain a semblance of security within a once chaotic nation (Krutz and Logan, 2011). The security factor therefore becomes a key indicator of performance. Perceptions of political stability by citizens, in this case I assumed would override other factors in evaluating government performance, and positive perceptions would thus lead to more trust among citizens. Focus group participants were asked to evaluate the government in its delivery of peace and security, and how important this is to them.

Respondents were mainly positive in their assessment of the government delivery of political stability. They mainly commended the government on the pacification of the army, end of the war in northern Uganda and its role in 'securing' neighboring countries. The thinking was widespread, especially among the groups of men and women that the government had performed well in stabilizing the country compared to all the past regimes. It was also pointed out by respondents that this is the most important achievement of the current government. A respondent among the educated group of women in Kawempe noted,

> *'During the times of Obote and Amin, when your husband goes out of the house, your heart was never at peace before he came back, if someone knocked on your door, you couldn't just open, everywhere you went, you were never sure you could go back home alive, but now, we have peace…apart from a few areas where you hear war, my children have grown up not knowing what war looks like…who could have imagined this?!'*

From the low educated men in Central division, a respondent had this to say in response to the security situation, *'bano abaana benakuzino bazzanya nokuzanya. Edda nga otambula ezo saawa zettumbi? Twabeelanga ku yoleke, nga amasasi gesooza bwesooza! Nze bano abaana bamuseveni simanyi nakyebagala! Ensi eno nga yali ntabufu!'* (**you see these people who**

80

have grown up under museveni's regime have no idea what it was like before. It was constant war! this country was a mess, I don't even know what these children want!)

The feelings from the youth groups however were less optimistic. Noting that the old generation have been duped into accepting the 'pseudo' peace, a respondent from the educated youth group in Rubaga reasoned that that is the very reason the government is reluctant to 'democratise'

> *'Museveni knows very well that those people fear war, so he is always threatening them with war. Look at the north, is that stability? Now he stopped the war so that he can get votes. Wait when he needs something else, he will threaten to cause another war, or say there are ADF rebels in the opposition'*

This comment is similar to the one advanced in the low educated youth group in Central Division, although in a more cynical approach,

> *'Peace? Which peace? With all these iron bar criminals, child sacrifices, teargas, you talk of peace? Where do you live? That talk of we sleep is spoiling people. You are sleeping while they are taking everything. Who killed people in Kannungu[67]? Is that also peace? We are causing wars everywhere, Somalia, Congo, Rwanda. Anyone who says that is peace must be joking!'*

Clearly the issue of stability features prominently in shaping Uganda's political discourse. In a recent rebuff of opposition politicians who were putting the government on pressure, the president warned them 'not to *joke with peace or the army can take over*[68]' to which one of his critics cynically replied.. '*you can joke with money meant for HIV patients, relocation of troubled northerners and other health related issues, but not peace and security. Mzee, spot on! thank you for providing peace and security to the patients, in the end, you will be providing security to the deceased'*

But perhaps what sums up Uganda's security discourse is the image of the personality of the president himself. Reflecting on Museveni's autobiography of 'sowing the mustard seed,' Ogot (2000) notes thus,

> *'the concise oxford dictionary of current English defines narcissism as a 'tendency to self worship, absorption in one's own personal perfections.' it is derived from the name of a Greek youth, Narkissos, who fell in love with his reflection in the water. Museveni's autobiography shows him as the Ugandan Narkissos who has fallen in love with his reflection in Ugandan muddy political waters. He has turned Uganda's historical record as a narrative of self justification, and although all autobiographies are narcistic to some degree, the careful shaping of a public self image, monuments to self love built for*

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[67] Kannungu became a centre of world attention after a religious massacre that led to over 1000 deaths in 2000. Conspiracy theories abound that government was also culpable.
[68] Don't joke with peace-Museveni. The new vision, 26, nov.2012.

posterity- not all are trapped in narcissism as this book is. For Museveni, it is not so much how the past dictates the present that is important, but rather how the present manipulates the past'

It is therefore not surprising that there were clear differences in the way that the old and young groups evaluated the performance of government in the security sector. While the older generations evaluated the security situation in relation to the past regimes, such as that of Idi Amin and Obote and gave favorable ratings to the government,(a reflection of the present manipulating the past), the younger people looked at the current security situation as the basis for evaluation.

This finding has important theoretical implications for our study of trust. If, as is claimed by the institutional performance model, political trust originates from the direct experiences with institutions, increased trust can be generated by providing better services (Mishler and Rose, 2001). In our case, the experience of very poor security under previous regimes, and the subsequent improvement in security by the current regime, leads to more trust for the current regime among the older generation. How then can we account for the difference in satisfaction by different age groups?

One way is to argue that the current generation of young people have grown up with very high expectations, and therefore have no appreciation of the improvements since they have never experienced the turbulence of the early years. The other would be that dissatisfaction with various other government services, such as employment programs and basic health care especially among the youth is mainly used to discount the gains that have been attained in the security sector. In essence evaluations of security were mainly hinged on the experiences that different age groups had experienced over time. Overall, there were variations in perceptions over political stability and security. While most of the older groups had positive ratings of government performance, the younger ones seemed to have less enthusiasm towards the security credits of government, which were mainly hinged on their overall dissatisfaction with general government performance. One can conclude from these findings that while positive security evaluations were are an important factor for generating political trust among the older people, the young generation considered overall government performance and showed less trust in government.

6.6 Perceptions on Tax payment

Tax effort represents the transfer of individual resources from the population to the government. Taxation is theorised as one of the ways that legitimacy and trust in government can be manifested. Tax effort also reflects the perceptions that citizens have towards their government's ability to perform its functions (Fjeldstad, 2004). People's willingness to pay tax is likely to be based on their perceptions of whether government is doing its functions and reflects their trust in government capabilities. Consequently, individuals have to believe that these resources will be utilised effectively in order to pay tax, or that non-compliance will result in substantial consequence. Individuals willing to part with resources make this choice based on both experiences and expectations of institutional performance (Hutchinson and Johnson, 2011). This measure represents a rational and non-normative base for reflecting on individual evaluations regarding government performance. In adopting this as an indicator of government performance, respondents in groups were asked the hypothetical question of whether they would be willing to pay more taxes if it could help improve services. The reasoning behind was that if citizens felt the taxes they were paying were being sufficiently used, they would be willing to pay more tax, and the reverse would be true. This indicator is also used at the same time to reflect political trust, and it is assumed that if citizens trust government to put their taxes to good use, then they would be willing to pay more, and unwillingness would reflect a lack of trust in government. In the study, citizens were asked to discuss the hypothetical question of whether they would be willing to pay more tax if it would enable government to better improve the delivery of services.

The responses from various groups reflected a negative attitude towards tax payment. Most respondents were of the view that the current failure to deliver services is not in any way related to lack of enough resources, but rather misuse of those resources. One of the discussants among the highly educated women in Kawempe argued noted,

> *'Even if we pay tax, corruption will take all of it. The money we give then, they use it to fly the first family abroad on useless trips, they take special hires all the time, so they want more money for that? In fact, they will just divert the money to buy teargas! Why would someone in their right mind give them more money?'*

While another among the low educated women in Rubaga was more vehement,

> *'no no no no, more tax for what? Let them use the money we have given them well, then they can convince us that they need more. Emmere gyolina ekulemeddewo ngate osaba ndala?(you have failed to*

83

eat the food you have, why would you ask for more?). Even a child can see that! If they had showed good will that they would provide services, I would be willing to pay. But for all these years, we have been paying tax and nothing has changed!'

There were also concerns in the groups that while the taxes levied on water, toilet use and electricity had been increased, delivery of those services had not improved, so it was not logical to think of paying more tax as a way to improve services. Others also claimed that the government had purposely made them poor, so even if they were willing to pay the tax, they would not have means of paying it.

It is instructive to note that there was recognition of the importance of paying tax to contribute to government functioning, and educated youth in Rubaga acknowledged that government needs money to be able to improve services like health and education. However, there was a general feeling that the taxes were already high and the money was not put to good use therefore it is not logical to pay more tax.

Echoing similar sentiments, a respondent from civil society organisation noted,

'They already collect too much tax, they brag about it. Previously the government used to collect 5 billion shillings (approximately USD 2million) tax but services were provided. Now they say they collect 7 trillion shillings(approximately USD 2 billion) and on top of that get foreign aid, but services have deteriorated. It is a contradiction, but that's mainly because they steal, what is the use of announcing that you collect 7 trillion when civil servants are striking everyday over low pay..?.'

Another respondent echoed similar sentiments. He noted,

'Government has not proved honest in managing the revenues collected, so why would someone give them more money to give them another burden of accounting? They failed to account for Malaria funds, Gavi funds and no one is sure whether the oil money is not yet spent even before oil is extracted. In fact, there are names of government officials, am sure you know them, from the same region that keep appearing on cases of misallocation of funds, and nothing happens. So you cannot expect anyone to see the rationale for adding more money to the government'

My impression from the discussions was that there was a general feeling that whereas it was a citizen's duty to pay tax so that government can get revenue to deliver services, respondents felt that the government was not using those taxes effectively. There were constant mentions of 'they will just use it to fill their stomachs' or 'they will just embezzle it' and so respondents did not think that the promise of better service delivery would encourage them to pay tax. These findings are not very different from Fjeldstad's (2004:11) findings in a survey of tax

evasion and compliance in local governments in Tanzania, where he found out that more than 58% of his respondents argued that the most serious problem hampering tax collection is that the collected taxes are not spent on public services. In the same study, 51% of the respondents argued that people should refuse to pay taxes until services are provided. However, unlike their Tanzanian counterparts who say they are willing to pay more tax if services are improved, the findings in Uganda reveal that people have little hope of service improvement even with more taxes. Indeed, these findings emphasize similar arguments made by Levi (1997, cited in Fjelstad, 2004:7) that the relationship between a taxpayer and government is mainly based on fiscal exchange, where taxpayers pay in expectation of the government fulfilling its contractual obligation of provision of services.

6.7 Perceptions of Corruption and trust in government

As earlier discussed, literature on governance has documented the negative effects of corruption on delivery of services (Uslaner, 2004, Tøndel and Søreide, 2008). A Transparency International report described corruption as 'one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world; it undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and particularly hurts the poor' (Amundsen, 1999). In the same vein the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption also recognises the devastating effects of corruption on the social, political and cultural stability of African states (Lavallee, et al, 2008:1). While economists who advance the 'efficient grease'[69] theory have laid claim to the beneficial effects that corruption can have on performance, most literature suggests a negative correlation between corruption, performance and trust. It has been noted by scholars such as Uslaner (2004), Chang and Chu, (2006) that corruption has consequences for trust. While the causal chain is contested, in this study I address issues of corruption, trust and performance because they have a reciprocal relation.

Corruption is an important indicator of performance of government, and high levels of perceived or actual corruption reduce trust in political institutions. As a symptom of ill functioning institutions, corruption can affect citizens' trust either directly, via citizens' experiences of or perceptions of corruption, or indirectly, via its adverse effects on economic growth (Lavalee et al, 2008).

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[69] The main argument of efficient grease theory is that corruption can strengthen citizen's trust since bribe paying and clientism open the door to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies, and that this increases institutional trust (Lavallee, et al, 2008).

Discussants were asked first to give their own understanding of what corruption is, what they think about corruption in the government, and how they think corruption affects government activities. The hypothesis is that citizens' perception of rampant corruption in government would lead to low or no political trust.

In the study, the hypothesis bears in mind the old Chinese maxim of *'the fish rots from the head'* that is, perceptions of corruption within government will lead to low performance evaluations and low trust. This variable is also important because, as Banerjee (2001) argues, corruption transfers resources from the mass public to the elites- and generally from the poor to the rich. It was therefore an important indicator of both performance and trust. First, I wanted to find out how everyday citizens understand corruption, before looking at what they thought of corruption in central government.

6.7.1 What is corruption?

The discussions were quite interesting; corruption was defined in varying ways, from using public money for private good, to nepotism and immoral behaviour. Responses among the educated youth in Rubaga defined corruption in terms of 'misallocation of funds and donations, segregation, and as 'where the minority take what would have been for the majority.' For the highly educated men in Kawempe, corruption is also nepotism, favouring some regions and neglecting the rest and sexual harassment, while the low educated youth in Central Division defined corruption as 'something done in the dark.' The low educated men in central division variedly defined corruption as 'embezzling public money', 'tribalism', 'unfair judgement in court' and 'favouritism in resource allocation,' while another respondent defined corruption as 'satisfying your stomach alone..' What comes out clearly in these definitions is that citizens perceive corruption as an expression of selfishness. These definitions are also in sync with most scholarly understandings of corruption as 'expropriating what rightfully belongs to others (Uslaner, 2004:2).

6.7.1 Corruption is a virus..a cancer

The discussions revealed a wide spread perception that corruption is rampant in central government. Most discussants were of the view that the president and his top ministers are the most corrupt, while others argued that the whole society has become corrupt and everything is run on corruption. Various discussions also revealed that corruption is the biggest impediment to government performance, because money that would be used to deliver services is embezzled and that for one to access public services, one needs to give a bribe. It is

instructive to note that even respondents who appeared sympathetic to the ruling regime noted that corruption is rampant. A discussant from the highly educated women group in Kawempe candidly described her experiences of corruption thus,

> 'it is a virus in this country. It is like AIDS and it is going to kill this country, it starts from the big man himself up to the bottom. When you go to Mulago[70], they ask you, where do you come from? Are you from Ngalo Nkalu[71](empty hands) or Kasawo[72](bag)? Have you come with the person to take care of you? You think they are asking for a person yet they are asking for money. I took my daughter to Mulago and the doctor asked where I come from; I said I come from Makerere then the doctor checked the child and prescribed panadol. When I went to Rubaga[73], the doctor said my child had hernia and needed to be operated on. I paid money. Corruption is a big problem.

Another viewed corruption as reflected in the discrepancy in the distribution of opportunities. Commenting on how corruption had frustrated people, a male respondent from the educated group in Rubaga commented thus;

> 'All the money we pay for tax is consumed by a small group of people while the rest suffer. MPs earn more than 20 million a month, yet they represent poor people, professors earn 5 million, judges, 5million, and junior doctors 600.000thousand, the director of KCCA 36million, the mayor of Kampala 16million. That lady even earns more money than the mayor of New York! Where does that money come from? There is no formula on those discrepancies, and that is a root for corruption. A school teacher earns 200.000 thousand, a policeman 260.000 thousand, yet they have to educate their children too...'

It was also claimed in one of the groups of the low educated in Rubaga that because of the wide spread corruption, most citizens now want to talk to the president face to face, for they cannot trust the parliamentarians who are only there for *'God and my stomach'*(**that is, diverting from Uganda's motto of for God and my country).**

While other discussants also recognised corruption as a *'very, very big problem,'* noting that one of the things that Uganda is most famous for in the world is corruption. A discussant among the youth group in Rubaga recalled an incident,

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[70] Mulago is the national Referral hospital

[71] This is in actual sense a name of a village in Uganda, which can be literally translated at 'empty hands' so for those who are not familiar with corruption talk, they would assume that someone is asking for the place they come from.

[72] Kasawo is also a village in the district of Mukono. Kasawo can be literally translated as a small bag, so for someone asking a bride, the question is whether you have come from 'empty hands' or with a 'bag'.

[73] Rubaga is a catholic owned private hospital located in Kampala

'the corruption trend in Uganda is alarming, the top government people have even started to accuse each other. Remember the war between Amama Mbabazi[74] and major Tumukunde[75]. Tumukunde was telling Mbabazi to step down to allow investigations concerning bribe money to do with Tullow oil, but Mbabazi refused. These things are difficult, and this won't stop until Museveni and his gang are gone.'

The observations above reflect the wide spread perceptions among respondents that corruption is a rampant vice in the government. It was interesting to note though that some respondents viewed corruption as inescapable and useful if you need to get something done. A man from the group of low educated men in Central Division commented thus,

'Madam, these days jobs are given on the basis of technical know who. But what is good is that if someone you know gets a job, even if it is corruption, you are happy. It even rescued me from the police once. I was parking the taxi badly and the police officer wanted to fine me, I gave him 'kitu kidogo' and he let me go. Do you know how much money I would have paid if I went to court?'

This observation is particularly important for it points to the multifaceted nature of corruption. In his study of corruption in Local Administration in rural Kenya, Onyango (2012) found that corruption practices feed off each other, creating a web that involves both bribe seekers at the administrative and political level to the bribe givers who usually are everyday citizens. Bayart (1993) also cautions us on how we understand 'the politics of the belly' not just as instances of corruption but as a 'figuration' of actions of interdependent actors mediated by particular forms of institutions and the situation that it engenders.

What do these perceptions mean? Could it be, as De Sardan (1999) and Ackerman(1999) argue, that the practice of corruption is not to be understood outside the societal cultures of tipping and gift-giving, and, could this type of corruption be giving off positive benefits, such as Khan and Jomo[76] (2000) have argued for the case of East Asia?

While there is a semblance of truth in De Sardan and Ackerman's arguments, the discussions from the field reveal that people have a somewhat clear conception of what can be determined as a gift and a bribe. That is why several discussants defined corruption as *'something done in the dark'* and *'robbery and taking what belongs to others for yourself,'* none of which, have a close relation with the conception of gift giving and tipping. What could be close to the

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[74] Amama Mbabazi is current prime minister and close confidant of the president
[75] A prominent soldier who is also nephew to president Museveni's wife, Janet
[76] Khan and Jomo have argued that in the case of Asian Democracies, rents associated with corruption do not necessarily undermine growth because they are allocated competitively among 'enterprenuers' on a performance basis.

society-culture arguments could be traced to some perceptions of corruption as *'satisfying your stomach alone...'* This definition is closely implicated in the practice that characterises most African democracies, where politics and the implementation of public policy has reduced offices to the political grammar of *'eating'*. What is interesting here is that politicians are normally not vilified if they share some of the 'meat' (*njawulo*) with their constituents.

6.7.2 Intricacies of corruption....it's our turn to eat syndrome

Indeed, as Kisseka-Ntale (2011) noted in his study of the 2011 parliamentary election contest in Mawokota-North constituency in Uganda, voter rationality and choice was strongly attached to getting someone in office who *'would give us a chance to also eat.'* Ogude (2007) has also argued that one of the most defining features of the state in Africa is its use as a ready tool for the accumulation of resources. In the imagination of Africans, the state, and state power becomes a resource in itself (Ogude: 2007:7). Closely related to this is the existence of patron client capitalism. The distribution of state resources is done through 'big' men (and women) connected to state power, and patronage is dispensed through them rather than directly to the people. Such a situation convinces ordinary people that they can access wealth and resources through these men and women. It is therefore possible to understand why voters, in explaining their choice of candidates, expressed themselves using the same political grammar which reduces the state (and electoral processes) to the zero-sum game of eating (ibid: 13).

In Kisekka-Ntale's study, respondents used the language of 'eating' in various ways, "we shall also get a chance to be remembered by the president" our area was 'starving' because the president didn't like the MP," you cannot bite a hand that feeds you" to explain the political choices they made during the elections. Moreover, those who did not vote for the then incumbent Member of Parliament argued that they could not give someone a vote who had already "eaten' big things.

Given these diverging perceptions, how do citizens think corruption affects government services? The study investigated how citizens feel corruption is affecting government activities. There were various views, but mainly recognising that many government activities had been slowed down or even damaged due to corrupt tendencies. Many recognized that programmes are not implemented because funds are diverted through embezzlement, a discussant among the educated men in Kawempe lamented,

'How can one even start talking about corruption? Where do I start from? I am so bitter! Can you imagine they released 20 national identity cards costing 2 billion shillings? They embezzled NSSF money, AIDS money, government eno nsilu nyo! Nebba nesente zabagenda okufa?! Wano bamemba ba parliament yomukaaga ensi bagitunda million ttaano!(**this government is so stupid! It even steals money for those who are about to die! See the MPs of the 6th parliament were bribed to remove presidential term limits for 5 million**)*

Others were also bitter,

'Corruption kills a person who wouldn't have died. How many people have died in Mulago because of corruption? It retards the country. Take the case of Jinja where a pregnant woman died because she had no money to pay the doctor to be operated on. Can you imagine when the doctor was arrested, the nurses and doctors striked? How can you strike because a doctor wanted corruption and did not get so he neglected the patient?(comment from low educated women group, Rubaga)

This observation is not unique to the Ugandan scene; Rothstein, (2011:59) cites several examples from India, eastern Europe and Africa (Tanzania) to demonstrate the widespread corruption in the health sector. In his argument, the health sector as a *'killing field'* for corruption not only demonstrates problems with the quality of government, but also has direct implications for the general success of a society, given that health enhances individuals' abilities to pursue their goals (61).

In the discussions, youth groups were also bitter, with many discussants reflecting dissatisfaction with the way employment was given out. Most of them were of the view that you had to know someone from the 'west' to get a job, and that even money that was meant for the youth fund had been embezzled.

It was also recognised that corruption has adverse effects on income between people. Discussants echoed that because of widespread corruption, the rich are getting richer and the poor, poorer, and those without access to services are badly affected most. There were also mentions of misallocation of resources resulting from corrupt tendencies, one discussant commented,

'money that would have been used for malaria is diverted to buying fighter jets, what is a plane worth trillions going to do for a poor Ugandan...even money used in the presidential election recently, where did they get the money they used to measure in kilos? People used to get kilogrammes of money to go and organise rallies, I wonder how many malaria patients died because of this; we just left everything to God now!

The above examples show the kind of desperation and widespread perception that ordinary citizens have towards the state of corruption in government. On the whole, the findings on corruption reveal that people have a perception that there is rampant corruption in central government, especially among the politicians who are said to demand *'enjawulo'* (kickback) on everything they are involved in. The persistent potholes, collapsing buildings were also blamed on corruption. These assessments may not be surprising, given the widespread reports in both the electronic and print media[77] of the continuous scandals related to embezzlement involving top government politicians[78], although, one cannot say that only media influence has shaped these perceptions, given various incidents where discussants said they had first-hand experiences of bribery and corruption themselves.

Indeed, a recent report (2011) from the Inspectorate of Government, an institution responsible for fighting corruption in the country, recognises that 'whereas the country has made efforts at establishing systems to fight corruption, the implementation of corruption prevention and detection and anti-corruption enforcement has been particularly weak.' In a related incidence, an afro barometer survey (2008) found that 1 in every 4 members of the household surveyed reported paying a bribe to access services from government departments. Amundsen (2006) has also extensively documented the various instances of political corruption in Uganda, citing lack of political will, patron-clientism and poor institutional framework as some of the reasons for the rampant corruption in Uganda.

But does this perceived corruption affect trust? Fukuyama (1995), Covey and Uslaner (2005) are some of the scholars that have argued for a reciprocal relationship between trust and corruption. Bourne (2010), using a cross sectional survey of 1338 Jamaicans also finds that corruption affects trust. Closer home, Transparency International's corruption index places Uganda as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, while a recent (2012) afro barometer study of citizens in Uganda over 18 years and above ranked most public institutions as not trusted. In essence, whether using TI's operational scale, Uslaner's or perceptions, we have evidence that corruption affects trust, and perceptions of rampant

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[77] As recently as 2012, the European Union, UK, Norway and Ireland have announced a stop on aid disbursements after the Auditor General found substantial evidence detailing how aid from these countries was transferred to unauthorised accounts in a scam which resulted in the theft of atleast Ug.Shs 50billion (The Daily Monitor, November 1, 2012).

[78] In early 2011, Akankwasa, the then Director of National Forestry Authority was suspended after being involved in swindling 900million Uganda Shillings. His successor was later implicated in the dissapearance of 2billion shillings(The Independent, Friday, July 11, 2011)

corruption in institutions will lead to low trust since positive expectations do not derive from corruption. As Bourne (2010) succinctly puts it, corruption is the hallmark of a dysfunctional system.

Perceptions of rampant corruption in government in Uganda's case could also explain citizens' apathy towards tax payment, and support the argument that corruption leads to poor government performance and low trust.

6.8 Perceptions of tribal favouritism in allocation of resources and opportunities

Various scholars have used ethnicity to define the character of African politics, and ethnicity has been one of the most widely regarded factors in African politics. Indeed, many studies of politics have intimately tied ethnic cleavages to national politics in ways that suggest a relationship that is both supplemental as well as conflictual to national political landscapes (Hyden, 2006, Mamdani, 1996, Englehart, Basanez & Moreno,1998). In the Ugandan context, the term ethnicity and ethnic group however need to be rethought especially in studying the character of current politics. I use a more uncomfortable term 'tribe[79]' to make explicit the various loyalties. Whereas the ruling government is led by a man from the Bantu[80] ethnic group the Banyankole[81], discussions with other Bantu groups such as the Baganda[82] and Basoga[83] did not identify with him as 'their son' because he belongs to a different tribe. Tribal cleavages are therefore more pronounced than ethnic cleavages.

The question asked in the groups was whether discussants feel that all the people of Uganda have equal opportunity to contribute and share in government activities regardless of where they come from. The main assumption here was that citizens' perception of tribal group favouritism will have negative effects on their performance evaluations and on how much they trust the central government. That is, the more governments is perceived as favouring a particular tribal group, the more it will be seen as biased and poorly performing and thus less trusted.

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[79] Tribe has its roots in colonial anthropological foundations, but it is used here to refer to societies organised on the basis of kinship.
[80] The Bantu is an ethno-linguistic category comprising a number of linguistically related peoples of central and southern Africa.
[81] Peoples from the Ankore region of south-western Uganda
[82] The Baganda are the largest tribal group in Uganda, organised around 52 clans and the institution of kingship.
[83] From the bantu speaking kingdom of Busoga in eastern Uganda

Discussions yielded very strong sentiments regarding feelings of tribal favoritism in central government. There was a general feeling among those from other tribes that most of the 'juicy' posts were going to westerners, specifically the Banyankore of Museveni's tribe. Respondents gave various examples especially of cabinet ministers, arguing that the most powerful posts are being given to the Banyankore. A discussant among the low educated youth from central Division (my observation was that he is a Muganda) commented thus,

> *'Maama, njagala obeere ku radio owulirize amannya geboogerako nga bali mu bifo ebinene, Kuteesa[84], Muhwezi[85], Mbabazi[86], Bassajjabalaba[87], Nyakayirima, Muhoozi, namenyaki nalekaki! Gwe abo omanyi kyebeddira? Leeka naawe eno ensi yo yaabwe....'***(madam, I want you to sit on radio and listen to which names occupy the biggest posts in government, how many sound like Baganda names? This country is theirs!)**

Another added,

> *'Gwe kati njagala ogende mu offiisi yonna wano mukampala, owulire lulimiki olwogerwamu! Ela bwoba elinyalyo silyeyo, nga omulimu ogwelabira!'***(I want you to enter any office here in Kampala and tell me which language is spoken there. The moment they realize you aren't from the west, forget about the job!)**

However, among some respondents who come from the west, where the President comes from, the feeling was that although a few people had benefited, not all of them were sharing the tribal privileges. It emerged from the discussions that the feeling of benefit was among the small sub-group of Bahima[88], but not all Banyankore and westerners were benefiting.

It was also constantly echoed in various groups that even when government listens, it listens to particular groups and types of people. A discussant among the low educated women in Rubaga claimed that government only listens to NRM cadres and the donors. Another pointed out

> *'Things became only for the Banyankore and Banyarwanda, if you cannot speak the language of 'twalire (we won)', twateera embundu[89], you cannot say anything to the government and it listens.*

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[84] Long serving foreign affairs minister and Museveni's inlaw.
[85] Army general, former minister and museveni's inlaw implicated in the Global fund scam.
[86] Uganda's prime minister and Museveni's close confidant, also from the west
[87] Bussinessman from the west, implicated in a number of government corruption cases.
[88] A small subtribe among the banyankore where museveni comes from. They are mainly pastoralists
[89] A common reference from Kinyankore language, meaning 'we fought with the gun, now we have ultimate power', used mainly by NRM cadres to counter opposition.

People have been dying without medication in hospitals, they asked government many times, but this government chose to buy fighter jets, tell me, who do you think it listens to?'

'Segregation' and 'nepotism' was widely echoed by groups of educated women in Kawempe. Indeed, some discussants commented that the reason people were rioting frequently is because they were not getting a share of the national cake, while others were 'eating'

'There are names that have been on the cabinet since 1986, and they all sound the same. Does Museveni want to say that other Ugandans are not intelligent enough to occupy those posts? The government gives all statehouse scholarships and loans to banyankore while others suffer.We just have to force them out…'(female discussant, highly educated group, Kawempe).

And yet interestingly, some of the discussants, especially those belonging to the president's tribe, objected to this generalization

'People say it's the Banyankore who are in the thing, but it's not all of us, just a small click of bahima, even us we protest against the NRM…'(male discussant, low educated Central Division).

Indeed, tribal sentiments were rife in the discussions, with constant references to 'those with long noses' as being the reason people were striking. In a related observation, disrespect for traditional leaders also featured prominently as a reason for continued discontent with government. There was constant mention of the September 2009 riots in which the central government clashed with the kingdom of Buganda loyalists, and, especially among the groups from Rubaga, this was a strong source of resentment for central government

'they came here as paupers, now they even see our king in the mouth! Nanti bagamba sselwajja okwota lusinga nanyinimu ensitama! Naye ekikutte obudde kijja kubuta!' **(You see you can give someone refuge and they take over your house and wife, but well, this condition won't be permanent)**

Other respondents however advanced an argument that the other tribes were just envious of the work ethic of the westerners, especially accusing those from central Buganda of laziness. A respondent from the educated youth group in Rubaga reasoned thus, *'abavubuka abaganda badda kukuba bukubi matatu, bwebamala nga bagamba mbu abanyankore batutte buli kimu!'*(**the Baganda youths are always playing cards, then after they say that the Banyankore have taken everything!).**

It is worth noting that tribal loyalties have a very deep rooted history in Ugandan politics. The current government came to power after unseating a mainly northerner-dominated government. Museveni then argued that ethnic politics was what was killing Africa and used it as a basis for keeping a hold on political parties. He instituted what he termed a broad-based government (Muhumuza, 2009) . However as Mamdani (1998) observed, 'Museveni's claim that the opposition in Africa tends to be ethnic, and by implication illegitimate, explains little, for, where the opposition is ethnic, it is more likely that the government is no less ethnic.' If we take the findings from this study as a reflection of the perception of Ugandans, Mamdani's assessment could not be more right.

There also various reports in the media[90] arguing that Museveni's family runs the government. His wife, Janet, is a member of parliament and a minister, his brother was a long serving minister and army general and his son heads the Presidential Guard Brigade, while so many of cabinet ministers are known to have blood relations with him[91]. Lindeman (2010:3) uses similar arguments in his analysis of the reasons for recurrent civil wars in Uganda. He argues that the elite bargain, based on the distribution of political, military and economic power has been biased in favor of ethnic groups from Western and Central Uganda.

On the whole, the study findings in general indicate that there is a strong feeling that the government resources are distributed in favor of Museveni's tribe. But it also came out that there was recognition that not all westerners have benefited equally. What is interesting is that though most discussants criticized the government for what they perceived as tribal favoritism, most of them utilized ethnic tropes themselves to express the type of change that they would like to see… *'at least he should give the Basoga something! We the Baganda are neglected! It is not fair, the Banyankore are filling their stomachs, let them wait when we get our chance!'*

My interpretation of these discussions was that there were widespread perception of tribal-favoritism in government allocation of services and opportunities, but this was mainly among those who come from outside his tribe. Most of these discussants also evaluated government performance as not so good and it seems plausible that perceptions of ethnic group favoritism play a role in this assessment.

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[90] The independent, March, 6,2008. Does Museveni favour Bahima Kinsmen?
[91] Museveni Government's family tree. 'The independent, Wednesday, march 25 2009.'

One cannot be led to simply accept that the idea of "tribal-eating" is a phenomenon in Uganda, or among the Banyankore alone. This understanding is rooted in concrete experiences that many African peoples have experienced overtime. In Uganda's history, ethnic groups in power have appropriated resources to their kin and kith, to the exclusion of others to the extent that gaining state power is looked at by people as having one's turn to eat. In Kenya, ethnic tensions came to the fore in 2007 electoral debates that almost shook the foundations of the once peaceful nation.

In Rwanda, the genocide that shook the nation pitted the Hutu against the Tutsi, bringing the nation on its knees and changing the political landscape of the country forever. In Sudan, the Arab North constantly found the black south, to a point where two nations have now been born, and ethnic tensions in the dubiously named 'Democratic' Republic of Congo have partly contributed to one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters. What can be said of these ethnic rivalries and alliances however is that far from being driven by irrational primordial behaviour, they are rooted in rational self interest, with serious considerations linked to past experiences of inclusion and exclusion.

6.9 Conclusion

The findings from the study showed varied attitudes towards central government. In general, the government received more positive evaluations for providing human security and relative peace, HIV/AIDs care and provision of free primary and secondary education. It was however highly criticised on policies of maternal health, poor road infrastructure and rampant unemployment. It is also notable that government was seen as highly corrupt, with many officials cited as incompetent. The electoral commission was criticised as being highly biased in favour of the ruling party, although there was relatively high belief that elections were effective ways of holding lower level politicians accountable. Tribalism and nepotism are also perceived as pervasive, with technical know 'who' replacing know 'how'. On the whole, respondents reflected a moderate level of trust in government, mainly arguing that compared to past governments, it has been better performing, and also because, as one respondent opined *'one cannot be sure if a different government will not take us back to the past.'*

Chapter 7 : Summary, theoretical Implications and Conclusions from the Findings.

7.1 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the entire study of political trust and institutional performance in Uganda. I briefly highlight the study problem and methods used, and go on to provide a recap of the major findings while trying to link them to the research questions. I also highlight the theoretical implications of the study in lieu of the existing literature on trust, and its contributions to this body of knowledge. I close by pointing out some limitations of the study and thus suggest potential areas for further research.

7.1.1 Purpose of the study

The study had two main purposes. The primary task was that of investigating how institutions impact on political trust among citizens, while the secondary aim was that of testing an institutional performance framework for explaining political trust developed by scholars such as Mishler and Rose, 2001, Uslaner, 2005 and Lavalle, et al 2011. The overall idea of the thesis stemmed from and was subsequently based on the institutionalists belief that trust is not merely an endogenous variable that societies possess or not and project out to their environment as Putnam (1993) suggests, but is and can be a consequence of the actions and inactions of political and public institutions and actors (Newton, 2007).

7.2 Overview of the research problem

Uganda's political landscape can be characterized as typical of many post independence sub-Saharan African countries. The nation was riddled with conflict for almost three decades after independence, and the reign of terror experienced during the Amin and Obote years only worked to intensify many of the existing social ethnic divisions (Mutibwa, 2008). Social and economic infrastructure was run down following the economic war where Amin expelled Asian businessmen as a move towards Africanisation. At the same time, political institutional structures were almost non-existent, with rampant corruption, mass murders and continuous civil strife engulfing the country for years.

It was therefore with much eagerness and hope that civilians welcomed the guerrilla outfit of the NRM that took over power in 1986 (ibid). After taking over power, the NRM and its leadership embarked on various radical measures that were geared at restoring legitimacy, economic rejuvenation and social reconstruction. Through their idea of a 'fundamental change', the leadership embarked on a policy of economic liberalization, political

mobilization and an all inclusive political campaign aimed at creating broad based legitimacy. Indeed, many commentators of African politics characterized Uganda's leadership as the 'new breed' of African leaders, and Uganda enjoyed widespread international and local support in its recovery programme. A new constitution was promulgated in 1995, and presidential elections were held in 1996 after 16 years. During this period, the country experienced rapid reforms in the economic sector followed by high economic growth rates, decentralization was also introduced to bring services closer to the people, and education reforms were carried out, not least among others the introduction of Universal primary education in 1997.

However, despite these important gains, critics continued to argue that the design of the political system which suffocated political parties, growing income inequalities and the increasing rate of corruption would undermine the progress of the country (Trip:2010:17). Indeed, as the country moved into the 2000s, the no party experiment faltered, while the reforms in the public sector were marred by cases of massive corruption. Subsequent elections were riddled with strife, and observers continue to argue that the country is on the downward spiral due to increased neglect of public priorities by government, lack of political will to fight corruption and breakdown of social and economic infrastructure (Mwenda, 2009). Mass demonstrations are common especially in urban areas, and there is common talk among ordinary citizens that the government cannot be 'trusted'.

It is on the basis of this paradox that I was interested in designing a study that explored the meaning of political trust among citizens. In other words, following the claims by scholars such as Putnam (1993) that institutions can only thrive in societies with reservoirs of civic virtue, could the perceived breakdown of institutional capacity in a country like Uganda be a symptom of a broken society? Given the enthusiasm and trust that had been given to the NRM following the war years, I felt that Putnam's explanation was inadequate in explaining a case like Uganda. This is because a society whose social fabric had been torn by war was still able to put their hope (I want to say trust) in a mildly known guerrilla outfit, out of expectations of better living conditions.

I was then convinced that the current state of affairs which manifests itself as dissatisfaction with the regime has arisen out of the experience that citizens have endured under the current regime. The study therefore sought to advance an argument that when the institutions of

government are perceived to be performing well in terms of delivering basic services such as education, health, security, this will increase trust for government among citizens.

In this line of reasoning, I adopted the institutional performance approach as an alternative explanation for political trust, and went ahead to test some of this thinking following the question; How do political institutions impact on political trust among citizens? This was then further broken into several sub questions that guided the study on political trust and institutional performance in Uganda;

1. What is the nature and role of the central government and how are these related to citizen's responsibilities?

2. How much do citizens trust the electoral process and the electoral commission?

3. What is the connection between perceptions of service delivery and political trust?

4. What is the relationship between corruption, tax payment, security and political trust?

5. What is the significance of social demographic variables for political trust and how much variation do they bring?

After a review of both cultural and institutional perspectives to the understanding of political trust, informed by such scholars as Putnam, almond and Verba, and Rothstein, Newton, Norris, Lavalle, respectively, I was able to derive a theoretical framework consisting of six independent variables. These are: perceptions of corruption, fairness and ethnicity, perception of political stability, perception of basic service delivery, and perception of tax payment. The following hypotheses were then derived and guided the study.

a) Perceptions of rampant corruption in central government may lead to low levels of trust among citizens, and also reflect the government as performing poorly.

b) If the government is perceived as delivering well on basic services such as health and education, it will be trusted by citizens, even if other sectors such as civil rights may not be doing well, but if it is perceived as doing poorly in delivering basic services, it will not be trusted.

c) The more the government will be perceived as favoring a certain ethnic group, the more it will be viewed as unfair and therefore less trusted. However, those who feel that their ethnic group is favored will be more trusting of government.

d) Perceptions of political stability will lead for trust for government regardless of evaluations of performance in other sectors.

e) Perceptions regarding tax payment will reflect trust for central government if citizens indicate that they are willing to pay more taxes. It will show that they trust the government to use their money well.

f) Trust in the electoral commission and electoral process will reflect trust for government, indicating that citizens do view the government as legitimate, regardless of whether they support it or not.

7.3 Study context and Methodology

As elaborated in chapter three, the unit of study is the central government of Uganda, and the study was carried out in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda, in three of its five administrative divisions of Kawempe, Rubaga and Central Divisions. I relied on a qualitative methodological approach to collect data for this study. I conducted 12 focus groups, including men, women and youth, subdivided into highly educated and lowly educated groups. The participants in the groups were selected using both stratified random sampling and purposeful sampling. The total FGD sample consisted 49 adults. This data from focus groups was used to explore the perceptions of Ugandans towards government performance and trust issues. In addition, I also conducted five in depth interviews with purposely selected key informants, mainly academics and political commentators. I also reviewed some documents and media content. This data was used to supplement the FGD data and to also get a more nuanced analysis of Uganda's political environment.

7.4 Summary of the Key Findings

I present a summary of the key findings with respect to the individual research questions raised in this study thus;

1. *What is the nature and role of central government and how is this related to citizens' responsibilities)*

Two definitions on the nature and role of central government emerged from the discussions. The first was neutral, concentrating on government as that responsible for the management of public affairs 'the body that runs the country' (according to the lowly educated men in Kawempe), or as the 'body that rules us' (according to various women groups). The second was normative, relating to the kind of responsibilities that government had towards the general public. Central government was also mainly defined in terms of the elected political leadership, with major emphasis on the president who was constantly referred to as *Mzee*, by various discussants. The picture of government is that of a big patron who is able to give or withhold privileges at its will, depending on how the citizens 'behave'.

Thus, government was seen as having the role of 'looking after its people so that they do not lack anything' by majority of the discussants. The general feeling was that government is responsible for delivering tangible social services such as health, education and security to the people, while the primary responsibility of the citizen is seen as paying tax and voting in elections.

One recurrent idea in the discussions was the general feeling that government is now owned by 'few people' who do what they want regardless of people's preferences. There is a clear sense that the overall operation of central government is biased towards a particular tribe, and a few wealthy individuals. This finding should not be taken solely as a negative attitude towards the present government. There are indications that indeed the present government is unpopular with many people, but that may be in part due to the fact that the level of media freedom in the country allows robust discussions of critical views on a wide range of media outlets which urban dwellers are exposed to.

It is also possible that people look at government in negative light because of the type of expectations they have had over a long period of time. As earlier discussed, the present regime has been in power for 27 years, and perhaps people are using this accumulated knowledge about its performance to assess it. It is worth noting that long periods of comparative economic and political stability contribute to confidence in government, particularly when this can be contrasted with periods of instability which they clearly recall. Uganda has had such an environment, stagnation in the 1980's and relative stability in 1990s and 2000's, and perhaps the current ambivalence towards government is related to the now escalating economic and political instability.

7.4.1 Do people then not trust the government?

But why is this bleak picture not followed by strong sentiments of distrust towards government? One productive way of thinking about this is to understand that the political imagination of Ugandans has been formed in a context of extreme insecurity in the post independence period, where ordinary people suffered most under brutal regimes. Just like in countries like Bangladesh, ordinary people may have lost faith in radical politics, so that 'unless change is definitely proved to be a better alternative, the masses for the time being prefer to maintain the status quo (Jahan, 1980:217, cited in Ali and Hossain, 2006:21). Compared to the past governments of Amin and Obote then, it is not surprising that people, despite seeing the current government as largely unresponsive, would rather stick to it that face an uncertain change in regime.

2. *What are people's perceptions on government delivery of basic services?*

Discussions of the role of government largely centered on how well the government was doing in terms of delivering on basic social services. Governmental performance was judged largely on how it had delivered on peace and stability, education and economic growth. Universal Primary Education, and recently Universal Secondary Education, was largely used as an example of an area that government had registered much progress. In addition, government was commended for its policy on HIV/AIDS, with many discussants arguing that more people now have access to life saving drugs usually at no cost, 'people no longer die like before, and AIDS is not something that you cannot talk about' argued the highly educated women in Kawempe. More involvement of women in the public sphere and education were also noted, with constant references to the government getting 'women from the kitchen.'

There was also constant reference to people being able to 'sleep' perhaps in contrast to the early 1980s where war had displaced people out of their homes. It is plausible that this is also the long running discourse of the regime, that always reminds people about the peace that was brought to the country. The youths however rarely shared this optimism about sleep, arguing that with the pervasive unemployment and hunger, sleeping' can no longer be something one aspires to.

The worst government failure was noted as road infrastructure. Animated discussions pointed to the presence of potholes in most regions in the city, and the constant road accidents that arise from such a situation. There were those who noted however that in the countryside, the

main roads were being worked on, but the city had been neglected because it 'always votes opposition.' There are also big concerns over maternal health, especially among the groups of highly educated women, with many blaming the government for remembering women only when its election year, and discarding them after wards. The main referral hospital, it was argued, has no drugs, and yet the government was investing large amounts of money in buying fighter jets. Perhaps this argument shows the diverging priorities between those of everyday citizens and those in power. Some have argued that concentrating on national defense spending at the cost of basic social services is symptomatic of a regime trying to hold onto power by all means, with no respect for people's needs (Golooba-Mutebi, 2011). There were those in the discussions however who felt that defense spending is helping the government to stay safe, and also stabilize the neighboring countries.

3. *What perceptions do citizens have about corruption in government?*

Corruption was discussed as a very big problem affecting government. Many invoked the images of 'a cancer', like 'AIDS' to describe the state of corruption in the country. There were constant references to people in government offices asking for 'kitu kidogo' or something small in exchange for a service. Corruption was more among the 'big men' in government, especially the politicians, it was claimed, and there was a feeling that it had now become a way of life such that if someone is not corrupt, it will be so hard to progress in any field. There was little hesitancy about criticizing the top government leadership. Unlike in Hossain's (2005) study of poor people's perceptions towards government in Bangladesh, where the poor were reluctant to discuss corruption in high places due to visions of politicians as 'benevolent and charitable' the ordinary citizens in Uganda vehemently point to big men with big stomachs in central government, who are 'eating' all their money and 'satisfying their stomachs alone.' This is perhaps not surprising given wide spread media coverage of cases of grand corruption in offices such as that of the prime minister, the parliament, the health ministry and even the judiciary.

Perceptions of corruption are one of the major factors that affect the feelings towards government. One interesting finding is that even for those respondents who admitted to benefiting from corrupt practices, they still noted its devastating effect on government activities. Many blamed corruption for the poor roads, a fledging school system and lack of medicine in health facilities. There was a general feeling that the government had no political

will to fight corruption, since it was one way of dispensing patronage and only selectively punish those opposing it (It is not surprising that a recent conviction of one of the ministers involved in loss of Gavi funds was met with wide spread protest from his home area, with his constituents claiming that government was 'persecuting their son,' while the other two culprits who come from the same region of as the president were set free).

People's ambivalence makes sense in light of recent scandals involving loss of billions of shillings in international aid due to corruption, leading the EU to suspend aid to Uganda over allegations that officials in the office of the prime minister embezzled over USD 13 million (Rueters, Dec, 4, 2012).

It is also indicative of the corruption trend that Transparency International's (2012) corruption perception Index places Uganda as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Discussants constantly expressed hope that if the government fought corruption, it would be able to fulfill most of its functions, and they would be able to trust it although they had little hope that this would be done.

4. *Perhaps that explains the attitudes towards tax payment…..*

Although there was generally a recognition that citizens need to pay tax in order to enable government fulfill its functions, on the question of whether they would be willing to pay more in order for this to be done, most discussants expressed negative responses. The general feeling was that there was no accountability for the taxes being paid, and that most of it was being misused by corrupt government officials. The ambivalence towards tax payment were directly connected to perceptions of wide spread corruption in government, and people's feeling that the taxes did not translate into tangible social benefits. Some discussants among the lowly educated women in Rubaga division blamed politicians who 'want to tarnish the name of the president' for misusing tax payers' money, and argued that if the president punished them, maybe then they could pay taxes.

5. *Could accountability be enforced through the electoral process?*

There was moderate faith in democratic accountability as a source of forcing government to respond to citizen needs. The youths talked proudly about being able to unseat strong government backed members of parliament through the vote and 'teaching the president a

lesson.' This optimism was however limited to other levels other than the presidential elections. It was strongly argued that it is highly impossible that the president can be removed through the vote, citing incidents of voter intimidation and massive rigging as means through which the presidential vote is manipulated. It may be for this reason that people cited voting for opposition candidates as a way of getting their revenge. Others argued that voting out the current president is risky because it may cause war, and yet they are not sure if someone new would perform any better. This is coupled with fledging faith in the electoral commission, which many accused of being biased in favor of the current regime.

It is possible that these evaluations of the electoral process and the electoral commission were affected by respondents' partisanship. It however emerged that even those who claimed to have voted in the president then decided to vote opposition MPs, because, 'it is possible to have change there' according to the uneducated men in Central division. Under conditions of last resort, collective action in form of riots and strikes was noted as a means of pressuring an unresponsive government. A number of respondents admitted to being involved in some form of demonstration in the past year, mainly as a result of a rigged election, and the acute inflation that followed the 2011 presidential elections. Strikes are always talked about as 'the fast way for the government to listen' and there were claims among the discussants that more money is spent on tear gas to quell rioters than on social services.

6. *What significance do social demographic variables have on valuations of trust and performance?*

The study found that age and ethnicity had a significant impact on the way people evaluated government performance, and their subsequent trust in government. While older people were more predisposed to evaluate government positively, the young ones seemed less enthusiastic about the progress of government. Notable areas of disagreement were in evaluations of political stability, where majority of people in groups of older people had positive evaluation of government, with many basing on good security environment as the reason they trust the government. The youth groups however did not consider this as a major point of government performance, and even pointed out that there is constant insecurity especially in the city. These differences relate to the variations in the security environment under which different generations have grown up. While the old are more likely to value security, especially in comparison to past regimes, the youth groups have grown up under the current regime and

therefore are more concerned with problems of unemployment and infrastructure. Trust levels were therefore expressed as being higher among the older people than the youth.

Ethnic differences also played a role in evaluations of government performance. Generally speaking, tribal favouritism was negatively evaluated by those who did not belong to the tribe that was 'eating'. The feeling among most respondents was that the current government had stayed so long in power and that only one particular tribe was eating. It would be good, they suggested, if another person would rule so that others can also get the chance to eat.

What is interesting is that there were no marked gender nor educational differences in the way respondents evaluated government. Groups of both women and men, lowly and highly educated manifested a wide knowledge of government activities and political events in the country. This could perhaps be explained by the fact that the respondents were from an urban population that is both politically informed and exposed to different kinds of political contestations among them. Groups showed marked interest in politics, with women surprisingly being vehemently critical of the regime, especially in how maternal health is being handled. This can be also perhaps explained by the vibrancy of the political environment within the city, and at the time of research, various types of political activism in form of demonstrations were taking place.

7.5 Relating the Findings to the theoretical Framework and research Questions.

The study posed the research question; how do of institutions impact on political trust? I then developed a theoretical framework that identified the perceptions of performance as the major determinants of political trust. Drawing from the theoretical perspectives of the study, institutional performance (the independent variable) was operationalized in terms of five criteria; the first is perception of delivery of basic services. The assumption is that positive perceptions regarding service delivery in areas of health, education, and basic infrastructure would lead to positive evaluations of performance and more trust for government.

Second, was perceptions of corruption, and the assumption was that if citizens perceive the central government as corrupt, they will feel that it is not performing well, and will therefore trust it less. This in turn will affect tax payment as citizens will feel that their money is not being used well . fourth is perceptions of political stability, and it was assumed that positive perceptions of political stability will lead to more trust for government. The fifth criteria was

perceptions of fairness, measured by perceptions of tribalism. The study assumed that perceptions of tribalism in government allocation of resources would affect trust in government. For those who feel excluded, there would be less trust, while those who benefit will trust more.

The study findings indicate a positive relationship between perceptions of good performance and political trust. It was clear from the discussions that the government enjoyed only a limited level of trust, mainly arising out of perceptions of poor delivery of services such as health, employment and roads. Miller's(1974) advice in the case of United states is important in the case of Uganda's situation today. Miller is convinced that only policies of social change can solve existing social problems and reduce political cynicism. He advocates for creative and constructive' action that will benefit the majority of the people and diminish feelings of frustration. The results of this study accept Millers conclusion that policy related discontent is a source of political cynicism among people. For those sectors such as security that were evaluated as performing well, citizens showed some level of trust for government, and often suggested that reduction in corruption would go a long way in restoring citizens trust in government.

On perceptions of corruption, the study findings show perceptions of widespread corruption. Many discussants blamed pervasive corruption for failures in many government sectors, and often cited this as a reason they have very little trust in government. Others often suggested that fighting corruption would help restore the credibility of government, and ensure that government services reach the intended recipients.

As Miller and Listhaug (1999) have also posited, corruption has a corrosive effect on political trust and regime legitimacy. This occurs because corruption undermines institutional effectiveness and fairness which serve as key indicators of government performance. In a study of Japan, Phillipines, Taiwanand Thailand, Chang and Chu (2006) also demonstrate that political corruption has strong trust eroding effects regardless of contextual factors. The findings of this study are also consistent with findings of Lavalle, et al(2011:19), who, using Afro-barometer data from surveys in 18 sub-Saharan African countries (including Uganda) found that perceptions of widespread corruption have a negative impact on citizens' trust in political institutions. In a similar study, Armah-Attoh, GyimahBoadi and Chikwanha (2007:12) in their study of corruption and institutional trust in Africa, found that even after

taking into account the endogenity issue, perceived corruption still maintained its trust eroding effect.

It also emerged from the findings that perceptions of tribalism are widespread, and have a negative effect on evaluations of government performance and political trust. While it was recognized that tribalism could benefit some people, the overall feeling was that it has led to neglect of various groups of people and undermined trust in the regime. It is no surprise then that those who feel left out of the system distrust the government and look at unconventional means of expressing their discontent.

Muller (1972) indicates that a low degree of trust in political authorities is strongly related to 'readiness to engage in acts of unconventional dissent against the state' while Citrin's (1973) study of alienation in the San Fransisco Bay area found a strong relationship between feelings of disaffection from the national regime and self reported involvement in political protest.

More generally, the findings from this study indicate that 'citizens are not fools' and contrary to Citrin's (1974) argument, the expression of anti political rhetoric is not just a fashionable way of thinking. Rather, as Mishler and Rose (2005) also found for the case of Russia, citizens appear to base their evaluations of a regime on its political and economic performance.

In summary, the findings reveal that there is a moderate level of trust in government in Uganda and it is clearly related to perceptions of government performance in delivering services and political stability. Perception of government delivery of basic services, political stability and perceptions of corruption in government have the most impact on people's reported trust or distrust in government. Perceptions of rampant corruption seemed to have a highly corrosive effect on people's trust in government, coupled with the perceived neglect of basic social services such as health and road networks especially in the city. The moderate levels of trust expressed were, to quote a respondent from a lowly educated women group in Rubaga, *'only because, unlike past governments, people can now sleep, they don't have to spend nights from bushes hiding away from soldiers.'*

Table 4. Summary of major findings indicating the relationship between perceptions of performance and Trust in government

Independent variable	Trust in government(major findings)
Corruption	Corruption was perceived to be widespread and to have a corrosive effect on trust in government. Respondents often cited corruption as the main reason they did not trust government.
Delivery of basic services	Government was perceived to be doing poorly in most sectors, especially roads, maternal health and employment. It was however credited for promoting primary education and HIV care. These perceptions had a big impact on trust, and perceptions of poor service delivery has a negative effect on trust in government.
Tax payment	Tax payment was perceived as necessary, but most respondents felt that the taxes paid are not properly used, citing corruption as the major reason for this. Most respondents did not trust the government to account for the taxes paid, and indicated that they would not be willing to pay more.
Perceptions of tribalism/favoritism	It was widely perceived that most opportunities in government were given to a particular tribe, where the president comes from. Some respondents however argued that it is only a small clique 'eating'. Perceptions of tribalism seemed to have a negative impact on trust in government, especially for those who felt that they did not belong to the 'eating' tribe.
Political stability and security	The government was evaluated positively especially among groups of older people for providing political stability. This seemed to be the biggest factor for the existing moderate trust in government. There were however those that argued that there is increasing insecurity in form of robberies and child sacrifices which were affecting human security.
The electoral process	The electoral process was perceived as unfair especially at the presidential level, although some respondents noted that at parliamentary level, it is possible to have meaningful elections. The electoral commission was mainly seen as biased towards the ruling NRM.
Demographic variables (age, gender, education)	Age appeared to have a significant impact on evaluations of performance and consequently expressed trust in government. Older people, perhaps using their experiences from past regimes, seemed to have more positive evaluations and more trust in government than young people. There were no marked gender or education differences in evaluations of government performance and trust.

Source: Author's derivations from field data.

7.6 Contributions of the study to Trust Research

The study makes an important contribution to existing literature on trust in general and more importantly in Sub Saharan Africa. As has been mentioned, there is a paucity of literature focusing on trust on the African continent and this study is a move towards improving on these lacunae. Additionally, the study goes beyond the usual quantitative approaches and use

of multi-country aggregated survey data (such as Afro barometer) to adopt a qualitative and more nuanced study of the intricacies of trust, and the meanings that people attach to trust evaluations that are often not explored using survey data.

Equally important, the study findings contribute to the institutional argument advanced by scholars such as Uslaner (2005), Askvik, Jamil and Dhakal (2011), Rothstein (2011) and Gymah-Boadi (2008) regarding the relationship between trust and the performance, of government institutions. Uslaner has specifically advanced an argument that cites corruption as the most detrimental to public trust in government, while Rothstein argues that the quality of government institutions determines how much trust people will have in them. In the case of Uganda and many other sub Saharan African countries, the implication is that it is not enough for government to enhance its legitimacy only through electioneering, its institutions must be seen to work to improve the general well being of society for it to be trusted.

On a theoretical note, the study contributes to developing more concrete indicators of institutional performance and political trust in case of developing countries. Unlike in the majority of studies where the generic question to measure trust in government is 'how much can you trust the government to do the right thing? And is government run by a few people looking for their own interests? The indicators that I develop from the literature address more concrete issues such as corruption, trust in the electoral system, perceptions of tribal favoritism, perceptions of tax payment, which not only tap into the original generic questions(both of them address issues of corruption and fairness) but also make evaluations of perceptions of trust and performance more concrete.

7.7 Study limitations

The imbalance of power relations is likely to affect research that seeks the views of everyday citizens on the powerful institution of government, thus affecting the way in which individuals air their views (Hossain, 2008:9). Moreover, without measures of partisanship or ideology in the data set, I could not fully test the possible explanations for institutional confidence. Clearly, partisanship is an important explanation for trust in government, where those who share the ideology of the party in government express greater trust than those from opposition parties. There is no way to know the nature and effect of omitting the partisanship variable. On a positive note, research by Uslaner (2004) offers some assurance, as he found surprisingly weak effects for partisanship and ideology in explaining trust in the state government generally.

There are also limitations with measuring citizens' perceived performance of institutions that should be taken into account. Nye, Zelikow, & King, (1997) note, 'people say they are dissatisfied with the performance of government, and in a democracy that is one important measure. But performance is more complicated than it first appears. Performance compared with what? Expectations? The past? Other countries? And what are people willing to pay for government efficiency?....' Other scholars argue that citizens may not always have adequate knowledge about the roles and functioning of government institutions (Van de Walle, Van Roosbroek and Bouckaert, 2008). Future studies could address this anomaly by attempting to develop more objective indicators of performance of government.

I must also note that one of the limitations of the study is that it used a generic measure of trust, and did not ask respondents about their level of trust in specific institutions such as parliament, police, or the judiciary. It is also possible that other qualitative methods such as a comparative case study of rural urban differences in attitudes, or maybe choosing one specific institution of government such as police could have helped a deeper understanding of government-citizen relationships. Measurement was limited to 'trust in central government' only and did not take into account respondents' trust in local governments which have an influence on the everyday delivery of various services. It would be important for future research, adopting a qualitative methodology, to explore trust in these different agencies to provide a more comprehensive analysis and understanding of citizen's trust.

With a small sample, further work will be needed to explore the extent of the generalisability of these results; nevertheless, I felt that the issues of trust and institutional performance were interesting enough to study and it has been possible to make sense of the findings within the limitations of the approach I used.

7.8 Suggestions for further research
Future research should develop more concrete indicators of subjective orientations towards the political system and specify more precisely the cognitive process that link policy dissatisfaction to political distrust. It would be useful to distinguish operationally between attitudes towards incumbent office holders, outcomes of ongoing policies and rejection of the entire political system.

This research focused solely on perceptions of an urban population which is relatively more informed and politically active. It would also be useful to do comparative studies between

rural and urban populations to see what similarities or divergences there are towards policy satisfaction and trust in institutions.

7.9 Conclusion and reflections

The study uses a foundation of rich qualitative data to shed light on the link between perceived government performance and trust in government in Uganda. More specifically, the study sets out to test the institutional performance theory that suggests that citizens' trust for government arises out of perceptions of positive outputs in service delivery. The findings from the study by and large support this theoretical argument. The perception that government is performing poorly in delivering basic services, is corrupt and unfair usually lead to less trust political institutions by citizens.

Overall, the findings from this study should come as good news for Uganda and the performnce of democracy in general. Since institutional performance influences trust in political institutions, better performance is likely to generate more trust. In contrast, if demographic variables had been found to greatly influence trust, then demographic change would have been essential to foster trust and sustain democracy. This however is not the case in Uganda as found in other contexts too. Demographic change is not possible by deliberate institutional and social change. In contrast, institutional performance can be augumented through political commitment and institutional design.

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Appendix 1: Focus Group Guide for 'Institutional performance and political trust' Research.

Questions:

1. Let's start the discussion by talking about central government. What is central government?

    a) Who owns it?

    b) What does it do?

    c) Where can you see it working?

2. Of the things that central government is doing, what is most important to you?

    a) Which services do you think government has excelled in providing?

    b) What are some things that central government is not doing that are important to you?

    c) In your opinion, has there been any changes in the way government has been providing services since 1986. Explain.

    d) Suppose government could do more if tax was raised, would you be willing to pay more tax? Explain.

    e) If government failed to do what citizens ask, can they force it to do it? How?

Citizen Responsibilities

3. Do citizens have any roles and responsibilities in government? What are these?

a. How important are these for the proper functioning of government?

b. Do citizens have any avenues of voicing their issues to government? What are these?

c. Does government listen? Whose views does government listen to?

4. **Participation and Protest**

    a) What are your comments on the electoral commission

    b) In your opinion, to what extent is the electoral process free and fair?

    c) Are there any other avenues for expressing discontent?

    d) In your experience, what are the reasons people protest against central government?

Corruption

5. Let's talk about corruption now. What do you understand by corruption?

    a) What do you think of corruption in central government?

    b) How does corruption affect government activities?

6. Fairness

    a) In your opinion, does every citizen have equal access to government services?

    b) In your opinion, to what extent does tribalism/nepotism influence access to government services?

    c) How does tribalism affect government service provision?

Security

    a) How important is security to you?

    b) In your opinion, what do you think of the security situation in Uganda for the past 20 years?

    c) Where do you see Uganda in the next 10 years?

Trust

7)What does trust mean to you?

    a) What are the qualities of a trustworthy institution?

    b) Would you say you trust the central government of Uganda? Why? Or why not?

    c) What makes citizens lose trust in the government?

    d) What can government do for it to gain the trust of citizens?

    e) In general what is your opinion on the political environment in the country?

7) Any other comments?

That concludes our focus group. Thank you so much for coming and sharing your thoughts and opinions with us. If you have additional information that you did not get to say in the focus group, please feel free to write it on a piece of paper.

Appendix 11: Interview Schedule for Key Informants (modified depending on who is being interviewed).

1. A recent Afro-barometer survey indicated that 74% of Ugandans do not trust government, and that support for the government had declined from 62% before the 2011 election to 47% now. What is your take on this?

2. In your opinion, what do you consider have been the most important phases in the NRM regime? What have been the most important roles of central government? How have these roles changed over time?

3. The government recently banned the pressure group A4C(Action for Change), what do you think of this development? What does it mean for organised protest?

4. What is your take on the ongoing public protest since the 2011 elections?

5. Turning to economic issues now, how have you felt the impact of inflation in this country for the past year? What do you think are its political and economic implications?

6. What is your take on corruption in central government?

7. In your opinion, to what extent has the NRM regime lived up to its promises?

8. Where do you see Uganda in the next 10 years?

Appendix 111 Location and political map of the republic of Uganda(excluding new districts)

Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/maps/uganda-political-map.jpg

Appendix IV. Official Authorisation for Field work.

UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN
*Department of Administration and Organization Theory*

LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

To Whom It May Concern

This is to introduce Mbatudde Suzan who is a student of mine. She is pursuing an MPhil degree in Administration at the Department of Administration and Organisation Theory, University of Bergen, Norway.

"Political Trust and Institutional Performance in Uganda"

She is conducting the research on this topic in his home country Uganda. As an important part of the exercise she has to interview various persons and collect relevant documents. I hope you may assist research. The information provided to him is for academic purposes only. Any assistance given to highly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Ishtiaq Jamil
Supervisor

Bakira Emmaneli
chairman LC I Zone 6A
Makerere University
0772593174
E. ....

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