

A Peaceful Resolution is a Victory for the Resistance

*The Relationship between Hizbullah Rhetoric and Possible
Peaceful Resolutions in Lebanon*

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November 2010




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Foreword

I would like to thank the people of Lebanon whom I have met during my journeys, the Department of Foreign Languages for giving me this opportunity and the Beirut Exchange Program for widening my horizons.

A note on transliteration: I have chosen to spell words in common usage in the English language, such as “Hizbullah” and “Shia” in their commonly used form. Otherwise I use a version of the transliteration system of the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.

Map of Lebanon



Map 4282 United Nations
January 2010

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Prologue

“Terror, violence, conflict, carnage, chaos, cruelty and mayhem are evoked by the mere mention of Lebanon. For those who have known Lebanon in better times, and even for those of us who have known only a strife-torn country, the fact that Lebanon had become synonymous with bloodshed is a source of deep sadness for us. Lebanon, even in the worst of times, can be a remarkably seductive place.

In my judgement, no other Middle Eastern Country, perhaps no country in the world, is as enthralling as Lebanon. It's social and political complexity, the keen skills of its citizens in dealing with (and manipulating) foreigners, it's lovely climate and splendid food combine to imbue on those who have known it- in good times or bad- with a sense of emotional attachment that is hard to shake.

Lebanon entices and snares even the wary. Though the encounter is often bittersweet, it is long savored (...) As the reader has correctly deduced by now, I have not escaped this syndrome. I too have succumbed...”

A.R.Norton¹

Lebanon has been and continues to be a theatre of regional conflict, dating back to the Phoenicians and beyond. Lebanon has been conquered repeatedly. The geography of the country, with its snow-peaked mountains and deep green valleys, has enticed countless armies to conquer and reconquer. It has been a safe haven, welcoming minorities to seek refuge from persecution and death, making the Lebanese population something exquisite in the region and decidedly complex. It consists of 18 official sects, all trying to intermingle in the name of solidarity and sectarianism, simultaneously. Similar to Israel's 'Jewish Democracy' endeavors, which negate each other, the Lebanese Constitution itself hinders political democracy and effectivity, as the domination of one party is plainly impeded. Lebanon will continue to be an epicenter of geopolitical conflict as long as foreign powers continue their unrelenting 'war on terror' in the region. Lebanese nationality only exists on an individual

¹ Augustus Richard Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987): xiv

consciousness level. The country's citizens have been reduced to so-called "non-citizens,"² letting the elites (of all sects) plunder the states resources. Lebanon is also rising in global awareness and media coverage again, and many forces may be pushing towards renewed conflict. If so, there will be no winners among the Lebanese, just like there will be no winners among the Iraqi, Palestinians or Afghans, in this ongoing global war.

No other player within the Lebanese mosaic has risen to such infamy or receives as much ambiguous analysis as Hizbullah,³ the 'Party of God.' Rising as a resistance guerrilla group against Israel, among the poor and neglected Shia in the eighties, the party has advanced through substantial political and ideological change to encompass a fully functional democratic opposition party in government, a resistance wing, and a social services infrastructure rumored to several million dollars a year. Party supporter demographics are diverse, ranging from hardcore religious members to non-Shia members voicing their support for the resistance against Israel and the West, to the women (Christian, Druze and Sunni) with whom the author spoke on the streets of Beirut and Tyre, supporting Nasrallah for his expansive social services, hospital networks, garbage collection, electricity generators and clean water, without which their standard of living would be greatly reduced.

The southern parts of Lebanon (*al-Junūb*) have been subjected to international and governmental negligence, bombarded and under threat by a neighboring state, and they contain widespread Hizbullah presence. Ever since the Party of God's inception, the area has seen multiple wars, an ongoing "interim" United Nations (UN) presence, and a multitude of factions and parties all vying for support. The area receives literally no social services and very little official presence from the central government in Beirut. The majority of the infrastructure is from Hizbullah, international aid following conflicts, or UN humanitarian aid. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been in place since 1978, with its force size fluctuating from between 2,000 troops to the present 12,000. It offers traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, truce observation and conflict de-escalation. Being the constant international presence in the South, UNIFIL is a vital player in the future of Lebanon.

² Karim Makdisi, "In the Wake of the Doha Truce," *Counterpunch*, May 17/ 18, 2008, accessed October 5, 2010, <http://www.counterpunch.org/makdisi05172008.html>

³ This transliteration - Hizbullah - will be used throughout this paper. There are other common transliterations: Hezbollah, Hizballah, Hezbollah, Hisbollah, and Hizb Allah.

International peacekeeping missions have been forced to undergo extensive operational reforms due to the changing contexts of conflict and rules of engagement (ROE) since the UN was established in 1948. Opining that these reforms are far from being perfected, or even remotely near the realities on the ground of the twenty-first century, is the UN Security Council Resolution 1701⁴ implementation in Lebanon solving the problem or part of the problem?

This paper carefully asserts that the Security Council's present, ambiguous Resolution 1701 is contributing to UNIFIL's long-term *inability* to fulfill its mandate. In addition, due to inadequate ROE and impossible operational demands on the ground, the mission is unsuccessful and futile to all actors involved, both in New York and on the ground. If UNIFIL continues to be the traditional peacekeeping force it has been all along, prior to its upgrade following the July War (*Ḥarb Tammūz*) in 2006, it can protect the peace in Southern Lebanon without the unrealistic expectations of an extended mandate, which has proven to be impossible to implement.⁵

The prolonged peace along the Southern borders with Israel during the last four years since *Ḥarb Tammūz* is not “a great success,” as Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Michael Williams has stated earlier this year.⁶ The main argument as to why calm prevails in Lebanon today is not because of stability, a lack of craving a new conflict, or a lack of players. The fear that the next conflict will escalate out of control to extreme levels of violence causes all to await.⁷ The neoconservative foreign policy towards Lebanon that has been prevalent in the past is possibly causing more damage than development. The United States has missed several opportunities in the past to engage Hizbullah in dialogue, and these chances keep arising, thus suggesting “that between direct diplomatic engagement (...) and direct military

⁴ United Nations, “SC Resolution 1701,” August 11(2006), accessed August 5, 2010, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1701%282006%29

⁵ Eugene Yukin, "Unifil's Mandate and Rules of Engagement," *Middle East Policy and Society*, Volume 1 (2009):12, accessed September 12, 2010, http://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/ifi_saj/Documents/saj2009/unifil_mandate_rules_of_engagement_yukin.pdf

⁶ Omayma Abdel-Latif, "Mission Not Impossible," *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 984 (2010), accessed August 30, 2010, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/984/reg31.htm>

⁷ International Crisis Group, "Drums of War: Israel and The “Axis of Resistance,” *Middle East Report No 97* (2010): 1, accessed August 22, 2010, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-lebanon/lebanon/097-drums-of-war-israel-and-the-axis-of-resistance.aspx>

confrontation, a number of other strategies of containment are available to policymakers when the statuses of the actors permit containment in the first place.”⁸

This paper proposes that a peaceful resolution to the numerous entangled conflicts emanating from within Lebanon may be resolved through engagement with all factions. In light of the current situation in Lebanon, it is especially important to involve Hizbullah, who, as a heavyweight within Lebanese politics today, will be a vital player in the future of the country. Not involving the party in future scenarios, as seen in the Israeli and Palestinian negotiations excluding Hamas,⁹ will most certainly involve renewed violence and the continued need for resistance.

Hizbullah is an ambiguous entity whose ideology and rhetoric are often incoherent with previous sentiments, and at times, in complete negation of the other. There is a need for a clearer view of the Resistance, and how it may be an organic part of a solution, not an impediment. Hizbullah is a prime example of the transformation process from terrorist group to legitimate political participant. This argument is based on the theory that “There is ample evidence that participation in an electoral process forces any party, regardless of ideology, to moderate its position if it wants to attract voters in large numbers.”¹⁰

As Staten argues, if this is a viable proposal, the decision by a so-called ‘terrorist group’ (who, by definition, represents extremist positions) to participate in the legitimate political processes can alter a party’s goals. Beyond the expanse of this paper, which basically raises more questions than answers, it is very important to “identify and study the factors which are conducive to or create not only an opportunity for a terrorist group to become a legitimate participant in a relatively open political process but also, over time, to become an active and engaged political participant.”¹¹

The second viable question then could be: Is the continued use of Western democracy and peacebuilding tools in Lebanon’s complex environment a realistic solution to the Lebanese crisis? The Western rational secular field of peace building is not necessarily

⁸ Nicholas Noe, "The Relationship between Hizbullah & the United States in Light of the Current Situation in the Middle East", MA thesis, *University of Cambridge*, 2006

⁹ This is symptomatic of neoconservative foreign policy, mainly US, not engaging parties deemed ‘terrorists’. Beyond that, it would be unjustified to compare Hamas and Hizbullah, which are two completely different entities regarding political, financial, and military power and scope.

¹⁰ Cliff Staten, "From Terrorism to Legitimacy: Political Opportunity Structures and the Case of Hezbollah," *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, 8,1(2008): 32-49, accessed November 5, 2010, www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/8_1staten.pdf

¹¹ *Ibid.*

applicable in the Islamic theological and spiritual traditions of Islamic peace building. Like their religious counterparts, Islamic scholars must deal with how violence is associated with the faith tradition and how contemporary politics shape the debate on Islam.¹² The most common trap into which Western peacemakers enter is to introduce Western conflict resolution theories in a region distrustful of both them and the theories. Most of these areas are previous colonies, and the distrust of the West's intentions may manifest itself in resistance. Islamic leaders deal with conflict resolution theories daily within Madrasas and mosques all over the world. Negotiation, reconciliation and dialogue between families and tribes are all based on faith-related theories. Can Western peace and conflict resolution tools be altered in these regions by also using Islamic conflict resolution tools? The answer to this falls outside the scope of this paper, although it is a necessary question to ask if peacebuilding in the region is to be revamped and brought out of the neoconservative rhetoric that has prevailed since September 11, 2001, and failed so utterly.¹³

Hizbullah's polemic remains Islamic in ideology, but the polemics of the party politics contribute to the overall democratic political milieu. Looking at Hizbullah's aspirations to build a democratic state structure inevitably contributes to the party's democratic actions. Democratic state-building and peacebuilding missions are easily confused; the one involves building a solid structure on a stable foundation of human resources and economic development, whereas the other focuses mainly on human security. Weak Third World states recently emerging from violent conflict cannot be coerced into democratic elections. Unwavering U.S. support of pro-Western parties in the name of democracy have proven this. The so-called democratic Western designed systems do not promote equality, fair representation or justice in a country with absolutely no democratic collective mentality. Albeit, many parties promote the *desire* to reform and redesign the political system, but none as clearly as Hizbullah.

This study attempts to examine selected Hizbullah rhetoric concerning future peacebuilding and state-building within Lebanon. Hizbullah's leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, following the end of the Israeli occupation in 2000, the 2006 July War, and the subsequent enhancement of UNFIL and current developments in the South, frequently hints at

¹² Qamar ul-Huda, "Enhancing Skills and Capacity Building in Islamic Peacebuilding." in *Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam*, ed. Qamar ul-Huda, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010) 206-207

¹³ Gerard Baker, "The Neocons Have Been Routed. But They Are Not All Wrong," *The Sunday Times*, April 13, 2007, accessed October 5, 2010, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/article1647410.ece>

the possibilities of a peaceful solution in relation to UNIFIL, UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, and foreign policy intervention. Hizbullah's 'changing face of terrorism'¹⁴ will become evident, as well as international pressure on the Lebanese government to force the party to disarm. Looking at these few selected sources, perhaps one can see the outlines of a viable foreign policy to integrate the Resistance into the army, while Hizbullah can continue being the political party it is today. On the other hand, building a state based on national unity, sovereignty and state institutions that cover all regions is far from the current reality. Would Nasrallah let the government take over vital areas of social services if they were capable? If the state takes out the garbage and builds schools, would this loss of power bring more resistance, or would the Hizbullah institutions merge with the public sector?

Nasrallah has said that "A peaceful resolution is a victory for the resistance."¹⁵ As a double-edged sword, intervention in Lebanon is inevitable. The issue of Iran's weapons, the Palestinians and the 'war on terror' has not succeeded, nor has the U.S. policy become any more transcending or imaginative when dealing with the country's foes.

It is probable to believe, after considering the general environment within Lebanon, that a conflict is plausible in the near future. In the name of humanity, one should always search for the solution that avoids extensive loss of life. How long this present front can hold is on what everyone is betting, but for the Lebanese Shia in the South and the Israelis in the North, the situation is deteriorating.

Primary sources are selected speeches by the Secretary General of Hizbullah, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, from Arabic, all of which concern the party's stance on state-building, UNFIL and/or UN and foreign intervention in Lebanon. These are supported by commentaries, articles and interviews from within the political sphere in Lebanon, in addition to information from three trips to the field in May 2007, July 2009 and June 2010, respectively. Endeavoring to understand a little more from the ground up implies traveling and experiencing the realities on the ground. These short visits have been limited in time and scope, and even though they have ignited the passion for the region of which Norton speaks, they have also eased the language and cultural barriers. In addition, they have fueled the

¹⁴Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*, Second ed. (London: I.B. Tauris and Co.Ltd., 2005)

¹⁵ Nicholas Noe Ed, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, Trans. Ellen Khouri (London: Verso, 2007), 220

enthusiasm and curiosity that is essential if one is to attempt a study of *Ḥizb Allāh*. It is rumored that if an individual ever thinks he understands Lebanese politics, then he has not been explained it properly. This paper reinforces that belief.

I. مقاومة Resistance

ايها الإخوة والأخوات, لبيروت العاصمة الأبية الحبيبة, للجبل العزيز للشمال والبقاع للجنوب المقاوم والصامد لكل بلدة وقرية في لبنان, لكل حزب وطائفة في لبنان لكل جماعة وفئة في لبنان لكم في عيد المقاومة والتحرير محبتنا وتقديرنا واحترامنا وبيدنا الممدودة الحاضرة دوما للتعاون لبناء لبنان القوى العزيز العادل المنيع القادر على الصمود الشامخ بشموخ جباله الخالد بخلود أرزه والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته.

“ O Brothers and Sisters, to Beirut, our proud and beloved capital, to the mighty mountain, to the North and the Bekaa, to the South resistant and steadfast, to each town and village in Lebanon, each party and sect in Lebanon, to each group and faction in Lebanon, to you in the festival of Resistance and Liberation, we extend our love, appreciation, our respect and our outstretched hand that is always ready for cooperation to build a strong, mighty, just, invincible Lebanon capable of steadfastness and standing tall as its mountains stand tall, eternal as its cedars are eternal. Peace be with you, and the mercy and blessings of God.¹⁶

The Lebanese State gained its independence in 1943. The colonial power of France divided the areas of Lebanon and Syria, enlarging the mainly Christian area of Mount Lebanon to encompass more Muslims, including Druze, and established the unwritten National Pact (*al-Mīthāq al-Watānī*), the political system in Lebanon built on a unique political system of confessionalism, political sectarianism or power sharing among sects (*al-tā'ifiyya al-siyāsiyya*). The (supposedly) largest sect controls the most important positions in government, and political seats are appointed to several minorities according to demographic proportions. In the Lebanese case, the *Mīthāq* has stated that the ratio for members of parliament was 6-to-5 of Christian to Muslim, which was later ratified to 50/50 in 1990, while the top three positions were delegated along sectarian lines: the President being a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the House of

¹⁶ Muhammed Abdullah, "السيد نصرالله يرحب بخطاب سليمان ويبشر بتحرير للاسرى", *Al-Manar TV*, 26 May, 2008, accessed November 1, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=44512&language=ar>

Representatives a Shiite Muslim. Political parties do not actually exist in the Lebanese political arena; rather, political blocs are based on confessional and local interests or family/religious allegiances. Private personal matters such as rules of marriage, divorce and inheritance are under the jurisdiction of religious courts for each sect. Efforts to abolish or alter the political system have been at the centre of Lebanese political discourse for decades. Those favored by the 1943 *Mithāq* wish to preserve it, whereas those marginalized by it wish to ratify it with new key demographic data or abolish it entirely. The Tā'if Agreement in 1989 further codified sectarianism, making it the pivotal centre of Lebanese political life, despite its endeavors to further commitment in abolishing the confessionalist system in the future.

This political status quo, intended to promote fairness in a complex sectarian environment, has created even greater segregation across the social spectrum. The lack of regular interaction has resulted in even greater feelings of injustice. Much discontent has thus slowly been evolving, as the Muslim population (both Shiite and Sunni) has become a much larger demographic proportion than at the time of the last consensus taken in 1932. The secularized sectarian government has failed to receive ample support among the growing Shiite communities and failed to care for their needs and failed to redistribute power to better match the Muslim majority in Lebanon. Conditions in Southern Lebanon deteriorated, many Shiites lost their homes and livelihoods during Israeli incursions, becoming refugees and being forced to flee to major cities, and the Lebanese central government continuously neglected the South both financially and in creating public awareness. The growing number of Palestinian refugees in the South added to the volatile and fragile political environment.

As the 1967 Arab-Israeli war passed, the 1970s saw a strong global resurgence to a more politicized, traditional Islam: an Islam that would cover all aspects of life, from national identity, to state governance, to homemaking. Its most extreme is what the West has termed “Islamic fundamentalism.”¹⁷ A new group of religious clerics emerged on the scene in Lebanon, the majority of whom were educated at the al-Najaf religious seminary in Iraq. They attracted young Shiite men, radical thinkers, the poor and uneducated, forming religious congregations based in Southern Lebanon, the Bekaa valley and in the suburbs of Beirut (*al-dāhiya*). These groups were all concerned with Islam’s role in life, as opposed to the much more secular, cultural and political scene in Lebanon at the time.

¹⁷ Harik, *Hezbollah*, 9

The Party of God's Inception and Ideology

Five major events radicalized Shiite politics in Lebanon after the 1960s: the Lebanese Civil War (1975-89), Imam Musa al-Sadr's disappearance in 1978, the Iranian Revolution in 1978-79 and the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982.

Imam Musa Sadr, a religious scholar whose activities originated in Šūr (Tyre) in Southern Lebanon and radiated to the suburbs of Beirut, received immense popularity and success. His extremely charismatic personality, complemented with a sound sense of logic, roused massive support. Sadr was a prominent figure, and at his disappearance in 1978, quite a cult hero. He had created a sociopolitical movement, which culminated in 1967 in the creation of the High Islamic Shiite Council. These movements were in opposition to the main Shiite politicians who preached moderation and multi-confessionalism. The Cuban resistance leader Che Guevara described the guerrilla as *"a crusader for the people's freedom who, after exhaustive peaceful means, resorts to armed rebellion. He aims directly at destroying an unjust social order and indirectly replacing it with something new."*¹⁸ Unfortunately, the need for an equivalent force to look after the concerns of the Shi'ites in Lebanon arose, and Sadr founded the "Movement of the Oppressed," which also included a resistance wing: 'The Ranks of Lebanese Resistance' acronym AMAL (*afwāj al-muqāwama al-lubnāniyya*), whose main objective was to resist Israeli occupation. The Maronite Christian and Sunni-dominated government was a main obstacle in Sadr's endeavors to secure Shiite rights and securities. Sadr's disappearance during a trip to visit Qaddafi in Libya breathed new life into AMAL. However, by 1982, Sadr's successor Nabih Berri had pursued a more moderate, pragmatic policy, maintaining relations with Lebanon's Christian-dominated government and Western powers. Quite quickly, a faction within AMAL separated.

After the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, the Shia of Lebanon began leaning towards a pure Islamic resistance. It was evident that none of the existing Islamic factional frameworks were adequate for the situation. A manifesto was drafted and signed by representatives of the main Islamic groups, including AMAL and the clerical congregations in the Bekaa Valley. The Iranian Revolution had summoned massive support in Lebanon under the banner of "Supportive Committees to

¹⁸ James B Love, "Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power," Joint Special Operations University, Report 10-5, June 2010, accessed November 20, 2010, www.paxtu.org/html/recent_pubs.htm

the Islamic Revolution in Iran.” Thus, the head of the Islamic community (*Umma*) in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Jurist-Guardian (*al-walī al-faqīh*), became the legitimate leader for the organization Hizbullah (*Hizb Allāh*), as it was named, and became directly linked to its resistance wing. Hizbullah’s motto: “The party of God will surely be the victors” was taken from the Qur’an: “Now surely it is The Party of *Allāh* who are the Successful!” (*al-mufliḥūn*).¹⁹ This opposed the “Party of the Evil One”, who will lose, whether it be Christian militias, Israeli forces, Western Imperialism, or even AMAL.

Shiite identity in Lebanon is thus heavily dependent on with whom one affiliates. The Shiite identity and beliefs are based on their history of suffering and that they deserve a more privileged position in the state, that they are the most loyal Lebanese citizens and not a majority in any Arab country, and that Arabic is their national language. While *de facto*, both AMAL and Hizbullah consider Christians as people of the book (*ahl al-kitab*) to be protected under Sharī‘a, they define sectarian relations differently. AMAL supporters, following Sadr’s example, view Islam and Christianity as two equal world religions, each thus safeguarding the other in their interpretation. Neither group should be politically and socially sidelined without justification. Hizbullah views Islam as superior, and Christians’ rights as citizens being defined through Sharī‘a; thus, they will be marginalized both politically and socially.

“ AMAL and Hezbollah have represented quite different applications of Shiite identity and belief in Lebanon.”²⁰ Hizbullah more rigorously espoused an Islamic-based identity and ideology, opposed to AMAL, who increasingly became multiconfessional and represented a pluralistic, lay-dominated organization.

The majority of Shia in Lebanon are called “Twelvers” (*ithnā ‘asharī*), who agree on there being Twelve Imams, the last one hidden by God and who will return in a messianic form (*Mahdī*). This Imam is considered the rightful successor to the Prophet. The martyred Imam Husayn fits nicely into the cultures of martyrdom and ‘*jihād*’ needed during the Iranian Revolution and in Lebanon at the time. Iran saw two foreign policy goals in its connections and support to Hizbullah: fight Israel through a proxy with direct access to the Arab/Israeli conflict, and to expand Shiite Islam. Thus, “Many have questioned Hezbollah’s loyalty to the Lebanese nation because of the dense transnational ties on various levels that it maintains

¹⁹ The Holy Quran (58:22)

²⁰ John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, Exp. Second Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 186

with Iran.”²¹ The party continues to receive substantial funding by the religious elite in Iran. During the 1982 Israeli invasion, Iran was the only country that sent troops to assist. When the conflict did not escalate regionally, the Iranian troops departed, “...leaving behind a few Revolutionary Guards” sent to the Beqaa Valley, to provide support, training and moral motivation for Lebanon’s confrontation with Israel.²² Iran financed the advanced organization of Hizbullah military training, gave financial aid and salaries to the men and their families, and financed religious/social activities. At one point, Iran was the largest employer in Lebanon. Based in the Beqaa Valley, by the ancient ruins of Ba‘ albak, this new order was extremely active in the border areas. Young Shiite men, clergy and students were in social decline here. Their situation justified Hizbullah’s interpretation of a religious, personal and political struggle (*jihād*) from political oppression, imperialism, social injustice and martyrdom (*istishhād*).²³ It is important to stress that even though the funding and inspiration was Iranian, Hizbullah has been Lebanese since its inception. This culture of *jihād*, martyrdom and active resistance against Zionism is absent in AMAL’s nationalism. Hizbullah’s vision for Lebanon’s political identity overlaps with AMAL on several areas, but it differs most importantly on its view of secularism, which Hizbullah considers a weakness and lack of faith in God. Hizbullah represents the disempowered/downtrodden (*al-mustaḍ‘afūn*) in opposition to the immoral rich. Thus, they must break the Sunni and Maronite hegemony over the nation.

In short, Hizbullah’s three pivotal foundations are: First, Islam as the foundation for a better life; religiously, intellectually, ideologically and practically. Second is the:

“Resistance against Israeli occupation, which is a danger to both the present and future, receives ultimate confrontation priority given the anticipated effects of such occupation on Lebanon and the region. This necessitates the creation of a jihad (holy war) structure that should further this obligation, and in favor of which all capabilities are to be employed.”²⁴

²¹ Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, *Shi'ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 37

²² Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 224

²³ Harik, *Hezbollah*, 39

²⁴ Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within*, Trans. Dalia Khalil (London: Saqi, 2005), 19

This is later seen as a general condemnation of the West. The third foundation is the legitimate leadership by the Jurist-Guardian in Iran.²⁵

The 1985 Open Letter presented by Hizbullah's head at the time, and later printed as an open letter to the downtrodden in Lebanon in the *Al-Akhbar* newspaper, was the first Islamic ideological foundation of the Party of God. This original Hizbullah Manifesto reflects various views by the founders, as well as the political thinking of senior Shia cleric Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. Some in *al-Dāhiya* still call the late Fadlallah 'the father of Hizbullah,' not for his active party involvement, which has never existed according to Hizbullah sources (his name on the U.S. terrorism list notwithstanding), but for his public speeches and sermons that inspired a generation of Resistance fighters in Lebanon and the region and continue to do so.

Indeed, the introduction of the Open Letter can easily be used to smear the party as religious fanatics and as appearing too 'foreign' and too Iranian:

We are often asked: Who are we, the Hezbollah, and what is our identity? We are the sons of the umma (Muslim community) - the party of God (Hizb Allah) the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard succeeded to lay down the bases of a Muslim state which plays a central role in the world. We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and Faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. God save him! (...) By virtue of the above, we do not constitute an organized and closed party in Lebanon. Nor are we a tight political cadre. We are an umma linked to the Muslims of the whole World by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam, whose message God wanted to be fulfilled by the Seal of the Prophets, i.e., Muhammad. This is why whatever touches or strikes the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and elsewhere reverberates throughout the whole Muslim umma of which we are an integral part. Our behavior is dictated to us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading jurist (wilayat al-faqih). As for our culture, it is based on the Holy Koran, the Sunna and the legal rulings of the faqih who is our source of imitation (marja'

²⁵ Equally important is the special role of the clergy.


*al-taqlid). Our culture is crystal clear. It is not complicated and is accessible to all.*²⁶

It should be emphasized that none of Hizbullah's websites have published the full text of the letter, preferring to publish the 1996 electoral program, which was intended for the specific propaganda campaign, before the Lebanese parliamentary elections in 1996.

²⁶ "An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program," slightly abridged trans., *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 48, Fall 1988, accessed 21 Nov. 2010, http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/Hezbollah_program.pdf

United Nations Peacekeeping

Peace support operations include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. The spectrum from peacekeeping to war is thus:²⁷



The role that peacekeeping plays in global politics is important to understanding the nature of peacekeeping. Three key points emerge: first, in political discourse, peacekeeping involves many types of operations, secondly, peacekeeping operations perform different tasks simultaneously, so boundaries between different tasks may be unhelpful (or even destructive, as in UNIFIL's case), and lastly, peacekeeping operations change over time. Early peacekeeping history can be linked to three ideas that have developed along with the society of states: The first is that great powers have the special responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Second, the UN's new role in collective security and preventive diplomacy, and third, early peacekeeping was influenced by the growing importance of humanitarian concerns in international society.²⁸ The 'holy trinity of traditional peacekeeping,' which are consent, impartiality and minimum use of force, are widely accepted today as crucial to peacekeeping, although quite restricted. "It is neither proactive as

²⁷ R. Thakur and A. Schnabel, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement* (Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2001), 131.

²⁸ Alex J. Bellamy and Stuart Griffin and Paul Williams, *Understanding peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 73

a creative force in wider conflict-resolution processes, nor as a coercive instrument in defence of such processes.”²⁹

As the Cold War deepened in the 1950s, the UN had an opportunity to expand its role in international conflict resolution in the complex Suez Crisis. The UN Emergency Force sent to the Sinai in 1956 produced a set of peacekeeping concepts that remain influential today. It was the first practical demonstration of the UN’s worth in such situations as a neutral third party. Prior to the Suez Crisis, the UN experiences had been limited to observer missions, attempting to monitor a situation with the consent of the concerned parties. The organization was usually deployed in periods after a ceasefire agreement to provide an impartial international presence until a political settlement was reached. During the Cold War, it was difficult for the UN to play its role in collective security. “Although the architects of the UN Charter had envisioned a powerful institution capable of enforcing collective security, the rapid deterioration of relations between its two most influential superpower members, the US and USSR, created lack of consensus in the Security Council.”³⁰

The second generation of peacekeeping was characterized by the transition peacekeeping forces being deployed to areas where there is no peace to be kept. A lack of consent exists from one or all parties and frequent, ongoing violence. The weaknesses experienced in wider peacekeeping imply that ‘peace enforcement’ and ‘peace support operations’ may be necessary to accomplish the expanded mandates. It is said that the strict adherence to the ‘holy trinity’ restricts imaginative thinking in the problems of consent.³¹ Furthermore, impartiality is an issue, as it has been loosely synonymous with neutrality, although it idealistically treats all parties equally in relation to their adherence to the mandate.

Hailing the oncoming media age, television images of conflict areas, hunger and war could be seen in every home after the Cold War, resulting in a drastic increase in member countries’ contributions. Peacekeeping became interventionist, large-scale and with considerable, often pressing humanitarian claims. These transitions to a new peace-building *modus operandi* stretched into the nineties all over the globe and whose mandate did not demand consent from all parties. The complex emergencies the UN faced exploded. These

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 96

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 98

³¹ *Ibid.*, 128.

demanded a well-trained, disciplined, effective military force, if those intervening were not to become a part of the problem.

Vera Hayes' essay states that the difficulty of deploying troops on peacekeeping missions to areas where there is no true peace to keep needs to be addressed. The classic peacekeeping missions are very unlikely to occur, for they imply consent on all levels in post-interstate conflict. Rather, in increasingly common intrastate conflicts, not all parties can be expected to accept an accord or abide to one. A coercive peace enforcement force would be necessary.³² However, this theory has proven to be flawed, as one can see in the history of UNIFIL.

In March, 1978, al-Fatah guerrillas kidnapped a civilian bus on a highway close to Tel Aviv, resulting in 34 Israelis being killed. Israel followed by invading the entire Southern Lebanon, except the town of Tyre and surrounding areas. "Operation Litani" was launched by the current Prime Minister to be rid of "the arm of evil" (the PLO).³³ The UNSC, greatly persuaded by U.S. interests in the region, passed Resolutions 425 and 426 for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops and the establishment of UNIFIL. It had three initial objectives: to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security, and lastly, to assist the Lebanese government to ensure the return of its effective authority.³⁴ Israel invaded Lebanon again in 1982, reaching Beirut. For three years, UNIFIL existed behind Israeli lines, with limited capabilities beyond immediate protection and humanitarian aid. A partial withdrawal was begun in 1985, with a large area to be controlled by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the Southern Lebanese Army, Israel's on-the-ground proxy. The Security Council pressed for Lebanese territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. The Lebanese government also demanded complete Israeli withdrawal, not according to UN Resolution 425. In the pressed situation, UNIFIL was unable to carry out its mandate, which was extended by request of the Security General and the Lebanese government on a regular basis.

Hizbullah's party program, the Open Letter, came in 1985. Its rhetoric regarding international meddling in Lebanon was absolute and violent. It rejects both the USSR and the

³² Thakur and Schnabel, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 132

³³ Marianne Heiberg, *Peacekeeping in Southern Lebanon: past, present and future*, (Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1991), 2

³⁴ "Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426," UN.org, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/6094847.91755676.html>

US, both Capitalism and Communism, for both are incapable of laying the foundations for a just society. International forces were deployed to Muslim territories to form a security barrier obstructing the Resistance Movement and protecting Israel, according to Hizbullah, they will not follow the commitments to imposed Phalangists regime, and “other countries must think carefully before they get immersed in the swamp in which Israel has drowned.”³⁵

Although the rhetoric has been modified over the following 25 years, Naim Qassam, Deputy Secretary General to Hizbullah, reiterated in 2007, during the formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, that meddling would lead to internal conflict and the UN Security Council should remain neutral if they want a state of Lebanon.³⁶

UNIFIL “is a notorious example”³⁷ of what happens when a traditional peacekeeping operation is only partially accepted by the warring factions and does not fully honor its mandate. Thus, one of the main reasons this mission was so unsuccessful is the incoherence between the ROE and initial mandate given to UNIFIL. The initial classical peacekeeping mission was supposed to have the consent of all warring parties, which was impossible in Lebanon during the civil war, “a peacekeepers nightmare.”³⁸ The lightly armed peacekeeping mission came to manage conflict and supervise the truce. UNIFIL was unsuccessful, if its mandate was to be taken seriously, as it was not present in the 1982 Israeli invasion, or in the July War (*Harb al-Tammūz*) in 2006.

The original mandate of 1978 had a broad focus on civilian outreach programs in the South. This success was mainly due to operational practicalities as simple as troops living within the villages, resulting in closer ties to village leaders and more daily contact with the locals. Despite these efforts to win the hearts and minds of the South, which continues to this day as a major goal, UNIFL was no match for the Party of God.

³⁵ Norton, “Nass al-risala al-maftuha”, 181-182

³⁶ Naim Qassam, “Hizbullah says UN Role could create ‘Chaotic Lebanon’,” *The Daily Star*, April 14, 2007, 1

³⁷ Frederick Fleitz, *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions and Us Interests* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 54

³⁸ Yukin, Unifil’s Mandate, 4

Hizbullah Winning Hearts and Minds

The West's focus on Hizbullah is mainly on its guerilla activities, but the party owes much of its growth and achievements to its performance in the social arena. Hizbullah is often termed a "state within a state," although author and journalist Cambanis puts it more succinctly by stating that it is a "state surrounded by the ruins of another, the failed state of Lebanon."³⁹ Lebanon has its own standing army, the Lebanese Armed Forces, and Ministry of Defense, and still Hizbullah has repeatedly been able to initiate and fight wars independently, engulfing the entire country in conflict. Hizbullah's international baptism followed the aforementioned atrocities in the refugee camps in 1982. The United States seemed downright embarrassed about how they could let the tragic event occur. Therefore, they sent in the Marines, part of a multinational force (MNF). They only lasted two years, as the hard facts of occupation resulted in serious casualties followed by violent retributions on both sides. The bombing of the U.S. Embassy, killing 66, and the Beirut barracks bombings in 1983, which killed 299 American and French servicemen, forced the MNF to withdraw. These major attacks were claimed by the Islamic Jihad Organization. The United States has accused it as being a *nom de guerre* of Hizbullah, although the party has never claimed responsibility, but rather denied involvement.

In lead with its international war on terrorism, the United States has renewed its terrorist charges, stating that "*Hizbullah remains the most technically capable terrorist group in the world,*"⁴⁰ and the country is trying to shut the group down. This contradictory view on a popular, moderate, mainstream, political party in an upcoming national state creates an incredible widening blockage to a future dialogue, which has direct influence on UN Security Council rhetoric. Consequently, current foreign policy toward Hizbullah "is not driven by an effort to halt terrorist attacks against the Israelis as purported, but rather an attempt by the American administration to settle old scores and relieve pressure on its ally..."⁴¹

Looking at Hizbullah's activities in Lebanon provides a more nuanced view of such a complicated entity, its evolution and its deliberate implementation of strategies to alter this stamp of terrorism:

³⁹Thanassis Cambanis, *A Privilege to Die. Inside Hezbollah's Legions and Their Endless War against Israel* (New York: Free Press, 2010), 13

⁴⁰ Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Chapter 6: Terrorist Organizations" in *Country Reports on Terrorism*, April 30, 2008, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm>

⁴¹ Harik, *Hezbollah*, 2

*Not one aspect of aiding the poor was neglected as the Party worked towards achieving joint social responsibility, answering to urgent needs and introducing beneficial programs.*⁴²

Hizbullah understood early the importance of offering social and public services to its supporters. The creation of independently run organizations within education, culture, health, media, agriculture, construction and other domains, all complied with the party's general goals and guidelines.⁴³ Participation in various societies and circles required different levels of direct party participation, but public social services were open to a broader public. Hizbullah was based on an organizational framework specially designed to maintain a hierarchical pyramid structure, taking into account the diverse society of Lebanon. The intention was to encompass the fundamental believers honoring the party's goals, while at the same time honoring and maintaining intersegmental differences. Hizbullah's capacity to fight Israel is dependent on a positive relationship with the state and broad public support. The scope of these programs makes Hizbullah a unique case among Lebanese political parties and other Islamic organizations in the region. It is said that Hizbullah's social and health programs are worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually.⁴⁴

During periods of conflict and war, militia leaders have been forced to create mini-public administrations in their areas of control, taking charge of essential tasks such as electricity, water, education, and road repairs. Hizbullah differed from the other militias in that it was funded from abroad. They were not exploiting the declining Lebanese government during the civil war, like their Shiite rival AMAL did.

The major areas in social welfare were:

- Distribution of water to tanks across *al-Dāḥiyya*, making drinking water available on a daily basis to 15,000 families. This service has been in effect since 1990 until today and is still the major source of water for *al-Dāḥiyya* residents.⁴⁵ This also includes the laying of pipes and use of generators in power outages to pump water from cisterns. This is of acute importance in periods of conflict. Water resources in Lebanon are a constant predicament.

⁴² Qassem, *Hizbullah*, 83

⁴³ *Ibid.* 61

⁴⁴ IRIN, "Lebanon: The Many Hands and Faces of Hezbollah," *Humanitarian News and Analysis: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, March 29, 2006, accessed October 19, 2008, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=26242>

⁴⁵ Qassem, *Hizbullah*, 64

The fact that this was all financed by a foreign country and undertaken by a political party, and the fact that the Lebanese government never assumed this duty, leaves no doubt that the government has no intention of removing Hizbullah's public services to undercut political appeal. Harik, a long-term Beirut resident and Hizbullah scholar, asserts that they have, in fact, done the government a favor, avoiding a great social disruption in *al-Dāḥiyya*, as those wishing to accuse the government of sectarian discrimination have only to mention that the non-Shiite areas have a constant flow of clean water.⁴⁶

- Health services include several fixed and mobile infirmaries in the South and healthcare centers, including the large Iranian-backed hospital *al-Rasul al-Azam* Hospital/Mosque, based in *al-Dāḥiyya*. Hizbullah fighters and civilians wounded due to conflict have all their medical bills paid there, but the hospital is also widely used by the locals of all sects. The prices are low, and the health services modern and clean. Since there are no public hospitals in the area, the importance of such an Islamic institution cannot be overestimated.⁴⁷ Although some of the more secular in the Shiite community find Hizbullah a little too "straitlaced," for example, the mandatory use of headscarves to enter the hospital, the meeting of material needs might override these feelings and encourage political loyalty after all. This includes medical professionals in particular, thousands of whom depend on Hizbullah for their livelihood and are loyal supporters.
- Waste removal from the *al-Dāḥiyya*. The suburbs have been growing quickly due to mass urbanization since the sixties by rural Shiites. Averaging 65 tons a day, solved the problem of government neglect and environmental preservation. This service was also free of charge.
- Rebuilding homes, shops and public structures, due mainly to Israeli bombing or, in the northern Beqaa Valley, torrential rain flooding. The Association for Construction and Development (*Jihād al-Binā*) was founded less than three years after the party's creation. They are a major force in Lebanon, responsible for large housing projects for which the government should have been responsible. They also equip schools in *al-Dāḥiyya* and the South with sanitation facilities, drinking fountains, desks and lights.
- Active networking and dialogue with different sects, especially Christians. Arranging open discussion forums, lunches and other catered events and agricultural networks for farmers and offering professional guidance and staff.

⁴⁶ Harik, *Hezbollah*, 85

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 83

Iranian influence and relations to the party question its national loyalty and local authenticity, in a party seemingly bought and paid for by a foreign power. The recent visit by Iranian President Ahmadinejad shows growing sympathies (possibly bought and paid for as well). Hizbullah has often tried to refrain from practices damaging to Islam's reputation and gained them good will from secular Shiite and non-Shiite Lebanese. An illustrative example worth mentioning is Hizbullah members' refrain from hitting *haydar*. This ritual of self-flagellation is to commemorate and mourn the death of Imam Husayn (d.680), the grandson of the prophet Muhammad, on the tenth day of Muharram (*yaum 'ashūra*) and the battle of Karbala. It involves cutting the skin of the forehead with knives and swords and beating the wound continuously while crying out "*Haydar*," one of the names of Imam Ali, the father of Imam Husayn.' They wear white *kafans* that quickly become stained with blood. This commemoration is a Shiite ritual, based in Nabatiyya in Southern Lebanon. Up to five thousand men have participated and 150,000 people attended the festivities. It became a very important economic factor for the locals and grew in popularity in the 1970s. A clash between Israeli soldiers and 'Ashūra commemorators in 1983 politicized the practice, and the ritual practice became a stage for the newly created Hizbullah to attract followers. AMAL and Hizbullah began to stage separate processions, and participators wore headbands or scarves to show their affiliation. In 1994, the Iranian supreme spiritual leader, Khamenei issued a *fatwa* that demanded a stop to self-flagellation among Shiites worldwide, encouraging blood donation instead. Hizbullah stopped their practices. Khomeini issued a similar opinion before his death in 1989, of a correct and authentic form of commemoration, so the *fatwa* was not difficult to pass. Many Shiite leaders, including Fadlallah, have discouraged the ritual and questioned whether self-flagellation is the proper way to commemorate Imam Husayn or if that was how he would have liked his martyrdom remembered and if it is an effective practice of spiritual intercession. AMAL does not consider Ayatollah 'Ali Khamenei their *marja* ' and continued the ritual. They saw in the continuation of the practice their independence from Iranian dominance over Shiite affairs in Lebanon.⁴⁸ In addition, they were the bearers of local traditions, opposed to the foreign influenced Hizbullah. Violent clashes were staged in Nabatiyya between the two groups. AMAL presented Hizbullah's submission to the *fatwa* as proof of their ties to Iran. In the late 1990s, Iranian-AMAL relations improved and AMAL officially dissociated itself from the ritual, claiming intellectually that it was also a foreign

⁴⁸ Shaery-Eisenlohr, *Shi'ite Lebanon*, 135

imported tradition not rooted in Lebanon. The Red Cross and hospitals in the South and Beirut certainly welcomed blood donation and literally shut their doors to patients suffering wounds from *haydar*.

This ritual performance is thus intimately related to interpretations of Lebanese nationalism, asking what is local tradition versus what is inauthentic innovation imported by foreigners.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, refraining from a practice that has caused such outcries on Shiite backwardness from non-Shiites in Lebanon might be viewed as one of the most successful strategies to positioning itself as a respectable, rational and capable player in the Lebanese nation and in the running of the country.

The Palestinians in Lebanon are a constant factor intermingled with the future of the country, at the same degree of urgency as Lebanese governmental sovereignty, the anticipated Special Tribunal for Lebanon indictment and the Hizbullah arms conundrum. Lebanon hosts more than 380,000 refugees,⁵⁰ who are still “living in cages”,⁵¹ victim to alienation from civil, political and cultural society. The majority live within 13 official camps, built for an original 50,000 inhabitants. The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), established specifically to cater to Palestinian refugees, assists with very limited humanitarian aid, and is responsible for the cleaning and maintenance services in the camps and, for example, rebuilding the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in Tripoli, north of Beirut in 2008.⁵² Financing is always the major hurdle, with individual projects often rising and falling on the random goodwill of donor states. Being born in exile, forced to move from camp to camp, and subject to violence and repression, the once large and politically powerful community is almost completely fragmented. They are labeled foreigners, with limited rights to documents and papers and limited access to the workforce.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 137

⁵⁰ Wadie Said, "The Obligations of Host Countries under International Law," in *Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return*, ed. Nasser Aruri (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 123

⁵¹ Visiting Nahr Al-Bared in June 2010, the Palestinians inhabitants echoed the same phrase Jimmy Carter used speaking with Hamas in Damascus later the same year: <http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast//Article.aspx?id=192011>

⁵² Don Duncan, "As Rebuilding Begins in Lebanon's Nahr Al-Bared: Displaced Refugees Eager to Return," *World Politics Review*, Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, March 11, 2008, accessed October 15, 2010, <http://pulitzercenter.org/articles/rebuilding-begins-lebanons-nahr-al-bared-displaced-refugees-eager-return>. Nahr al-Bared was subject to intensive bombardment, areal shelling and violent ground force incursions by the Lebanese Army, in its attempt to clear out Fatah al-Islam militants, which had taken refuge within the camp. Approximately 31,000 refugees were forced to flee, finding temporary housing within the other camps in the near vicinity or moving south to Tripoli and Beirut. Reconstruction is underway by UNRWA.

The official Lebanese stance is the recurrent mantra uttered by Rafiq al-Hariri in 1998 that “Lebanon will never, ever integrate Palestinians. They will not receive civic or economic rights or even work permits. Integration would take the Palestinians off the shoulders of the international agency which has supported them since 1948.”⁵³ Simultaneously, they stated that “...if we did so, we feel that we are implementing the plan of Israel.”⁵⁴ The ongoing dispute of Palestinians’ right to *tawṭīn*, naturalization, is deadlocked. The argument to withhold rights is fourfold; ⁵⁵ economic: Lebanon is a small country with limited resources; political / historical: Lebanon feels it has already suffered a great burden and blames the Palestinians for much of the grievances; original intent: the refugees were to be temporary, and lastly, demographic: the *tawṭīn* of several 100,000 Palestinians would upset the delicate confessional balance based on sectarian demography (real or assumed). This fear manifests itself primarily with Christian groups, who have demographically already lost power.

Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah has always voiced support for the Palestinian cause, and ‘voiceless’ Palestinian groups have formed alliances with the party, who provides support to residents within selected refugee camps. Nasrallah has shown restraint from becoming engaged in conflicts between Palestinian factions and internal or external forces, as in Nahr al-Bared or ‘Operation Cast Lead’, Israel’s war on Gaza in December 2008/January 2009. The Israeli operation was thought to have wrought a reaction from the Party, but did not happen, albeit the Hamas representative in Lebanon told me that the “relations between Hizbullah and Hamas are good.”⁵⁶ Hizbullah supports the moral right to return and the freedom of Jerusalem, although Nasrallah’s political ambitions within Lebanese politics reveal that his stance towards the Palestinians is far more Machiavellian and subtle than al-Hariri Junior’s blatant fear policies. He assumes that a new aggression from Israel will be launched:

يمكن بعد عشر سنوات، عشرين سنة، ثلاثين سنة، الله أعلم. هل يستطيع أحد أن يحلف يمين ويقول أبداً لن تحصل
حرب على لبنان

⁵³ Simen Haddad, "The Palestinian Predicament in Lebanon," *The Middle East Quarterly* VII, 3 (2000): 29-40, accessed November 6, 2010, <http://www.meforum.org/68/the-palestinian-predicament-in-lebanon>

⁵⁴ Said, “The Obligations of Host Countries,” 139

⁵⁵ Haddad, “The Palestinian Predicament”

⁵⁶ Meeting with Hamas representative in Lebanon, Osama Hamdan, Beirut 25 June, 2010

...maybe after 10 years, 20 years, 30 years, Allah knows best. Is it possible anyone can take an oath and say a war on Lebanon will never happen?⁵⁷

In 2009, Nasrallah stated that the Lebanese people only had two choices: to surrender, or prepare for war. The first option, to surrender, would involve “great disadvantages” and “high risk.” It would also involve disarmament, as Israel would not accept armed resistance in Lebanon, and as Israel has declared itself a ‘Jewish State’, it will claim the naturalization of the Palestinians in the countries where they are refugees. Other “endless conditions” and “security commitments,” along with the water resource crisis, will arise, deeming:

إنّ الخيار الأول هو الاستسلام لشروط العدو لإرادة العدو لمشروع العدو وهذا ليس وارداً

“If the first choice is to surrender to the conditions of the enemy, the will of the enemy, and the project of the enemy, this is not going to happen.”⁵⁸

Following the expulsion of Palestinians from Libya in 1998, the Lebanese politicians held a stringent line, denying all entry of Palestinians, despite it being a pressing humanitarian crisis. They were afraid that opening the borders would admit up to 15,000 refugees. The debate within the country was heated, prompting one minister to state that “Lebanon would not become a dumping ground for human waste” (*nufāyāt bashariyya*). This reference is a comparison to the “expulsion from Libya and that of illegal dumping of toxic waste by certain right-wing militias during the Lebanese civil war, which was *cause célèbre* in the Lebanese press at roughly the same time.”⁵⁹ Comparing toxic waste (*nufāyāt sāmma*) with human waste (*nufāyāt bashariyya*) demonstrated that Lebanon had already been “dumped on” enough by the International Community, and specifically the UN.

During the 1980s, Syria’s interest in Lebanon deepened, based on the possible retrieval of the Shebaa Farms in the South and the Golan Heights, backed by the UN, and the overall wish to “take back” Lebanon, which they still considered a part of Syria. The Syrians

⁵⁷ Al-Manar, “السيد نصر الله: اذا قصفت الضاحية او بيروت” Lebanese Communications Group, August 14, 2009, accessed September 24, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=99092&language=ar>

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Said, “The Obligation of Host Countries”, 149

witnessed a diplomatically and tactical breakthrough⁶⁰ in 1987 when Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss and his cabinet requested Syrian troops into West Beirut to control the feuding militias. President Assad stated: “We were invited, we will stay until confessionalism is replaced and when stability prevails.” Syria’s interest in Lebanon resulted in an almost 30-year ‘occupation’ of the country, bolstered by between 15,000 and 40,000 troops, intelligence and a vast corruption network, characterized by an outright dominance during the 1990s. The agreement covered, among other things, the establishment of social relations between Lebanon and Syria, epitomized by a statement in the Lebanese press by the security chief of the Syrian troops, Ghāzī Kan‘ān:

*Create light industries. Engage in trade and commerce. Indulge in light media, which does not affect security. Shine all over the world by your inventiveness, and leave politics to us. Each has his domain in Lebanon; yours is trade; ours, politics and security.*⁶¹

Damascus and President Hafez al-Assad controlled much of Hizbullah, exploiting their leaders to create domestic popularity and a strategic alliance with Iran, based on their mutual support for Hizbullah.⁶² The United States was willing to live with Syrian occupation, as long as it maintained peace in the region. Syria and Lebanon became interdependent in all aspects, their economies intermeshed with each other on various levels. Approximately 300,000 Syrian workers live in Lebanon, and that number more than doubles during large-scale construction projects, for example, after the civil war and the 2006 war with Israel. Major trade routes go through Damascus, approximately 35 percent of Lebanese exports.⁶³ Equally important, Syria is dependent on Lebanese banking services, especially following U.S. economic sanctions on the country. The two economies are both characterized as ‘crony capitalism,’ an informal power system based on corruption and bribery. The system favors businesses and politicians based on sectarian and family ties instead of establishing a strong state institution:

⁶⁰ Harik, *Hezbollah*, 44

⁶¹ Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 246

⁶² Mona Yacoubian, "Syria's Role in Lebanon," *United States Institute of Peace*, November 2006, accessed November 12, 2010, <http://www.usip.org/publications/syrias-role-lebanon>

⁶³ *Ibid.*

*Society is hopelessly fragmented along clan, family, regional, social and ideological lines; there are no genuinely sovereign, credible and strong state institutions; and above all, a corrupt patronage system has created vested interests in perpetuating both sectarianism and a weak central state.*⁶⁴

The concept of patronage is alive and thriving in contemporary Lebanon. A person's identity is not defined by being a citizen of a state with equal rights, or by education or ability. Rather, it is dependent on who knows whom, on owing favors and services, and buying others' loyalty. In a comment posted on the NowLebanon's blog by Angie Nasser on September 8, 2010, she says: "*You are not protected by laws, you are protected by guns. You are not protected by parties, you are protected by militias. You are not protected by politicians who believe in real change.*"

In this case, Lebanon is a failing state. With the administration effectively paralyzed, most 'Beirutis' have resorted to a kind of traditional feudalism, taking their problems to powerful local families. In (Rafiq) Hariri's time, these feudal families lowered their profile, as Timur Goksel said in 2008: "But in the absence of the state, in the vacuum, we went back to our good old ways. The country is really running by itself."⁶⁵

The signing of the Document of National Reconciliation (*ttifāqiyyat al-Ṭā'if*), known as the Ṭā'if Agreement,⁶⁶ in 1989, ended the 15-year civil war in Lebanon. The United States acceded to be a part of the ambiguous agreement, hoping to end the hostilities and turn all attention towards establishing a peace process to finally end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ironically, this gave Syria the necessary conditions President Assad needed to sustain Hizbullah's jihād against Israel in Southern Lebanon and continue its disruption of the same peace process.⁶⁷ The challenge was to decipher whether the agreement is a "settlement that ensures the final and definitive resolution of the Lebanese conflict," or simply a pact, as

⁶⁴ International Crisis Group, "Lebanon at a Tripwire," Middle East Briefing No 20, December 21, 2006, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-lebanon/lebanon/b020-lebanon-at-a-tripwire.aspx>

⁶⁵ Joshua Hammers, "Precarious Lebanon," Smithsonian Magazine, July 2008, accessed November 6, 2010, <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/precious-lebanon.html>

⁶⁶ Ṭā'if Agreement "اتفاق الطائف", Wikipedia Arabic, accessed November,5, 2010, http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%81_%281989%29

⁶⁷ Harik, *Hezbollah*, 45

Lebanese scholar Krayem states.⁶⁸ Tā'if provided Arab and American support for Syrian hegemony covering Lebanon, except for territory in the South overlaid by Israel's army and its Lebanese surrogates, the SLA. Paragraph 3 states the desired liberation of Israeli occupied ground:

ج- اتخاذ كافة الاجراءات اللازمة لتحرير جميع الاراضي اللبنانية من الاحتلال الإسرائيلي وبسط سيادة الدولة على جميع اراضيها ونشر الجيش اللبناني في منطقة الحدود اللبنانية المعترف بها دوليا والعمل على تدعيم وجود قوات الطوارئ الدولية في الجنوب اللبناني لتأمين الانسحاب الإسرائيلي ولاتاحة الفرصة لعودة الامن والاستقرار إلى منطقة الحدود.

Taking all necessary steps to liberate all the Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, to deploy the Lebanese army in the internationally recognized border area, making efforts to reinforce the presence of the the international emergency forces in South Lebanon to ensure Israeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.⁶⁹

The initial intent in 1989 was already to work to deploy the LAF to the South, marking state sovereignty against foreign aggression. It's fundamental task was described as follows:

ان المهمة الأساسية للقوات المسلحة هي الدفاع عن الوطن وعند الضرورة حماية النظام العام عندما يتعدى الخطر قدرة قوى الامن الداخلي وحدها على معالجته.

The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland and if necessary to protect order when the danger exceeds the capability of the Internal Security Forces to intervene on their own.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Hassan Krayem, "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement," *American University of Beirut*, accessed November 3, 2010, <http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html>

⁶⁹ As in the Nahr al-Bared conflict. "اتفاق الطائف"

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

All militias were to be disarmed within six months, which did not happen. UNIFIL continued its “ineffectual truce watch”, while cross-border rockets between Hizbullah and Israel ceased to quiet down and the United States’ “calls for democracy and free markets camouflages its policy of a weak but stable Lebanon.”⁷¹ Lebanese society entered post civil-war torn between two daunting challenges: the withdrawal of foreign military or reforming the government. One paralyzed the other, whilst Hizbullah had free reign in the South.

The civil war in Lebanon may have radicalized Shiite politics, but the importance of the civil war regarding Hizbullah’s development into a mainstream political party in Lebanon’s post-war political order is of equal importance. The party made the move slowly and consciously. Both parties involved had to accept the other’s legitimacy, as difficult as that might be practically or ideologically. This meant that the Lebanese government (mainly anti-Syrian, pro-Western Sunni) would have to accept Hizbullah’s alliance with Iran and close coordination with Syria, and that the Southern borders would be off-limits to the Lebanese Army. Hizbullah’s leaders, on the other hand, had to cooperate with a secular government, instead of the religious ideology to overthrow it.⁷² They were to be in opposition to the sitting government, but a ‘loyal’ opposition with a resistance wing. Despite this turn away from the ‘Open Letter’ rhetoric, they were able to retain the support of the true believers, those who put the ideological purity and principle above the demands of practical politics.⁷³ This was possible due to the ongoing holy war on Israel and respect for the clergymen in command, who maintained the Islamic credentials from the Najaf religious seminary in Iraq and the geopolitical factors in the area, which deemed the party a fighting resistance against imperialism.

The ‘strategic decision’⁷⁴ to participate in parliamentary elections was as an official “instrument” for change.⁷⁵ The organization resorted to a peaceful political process to obtain

⁷¹ Gil Gunderson, "The Minefield Remains," *Digest of Middle East Studies* 6,4 (1997):28, accessed November 1, 2010, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1949-3606.1997.tb00761.x/pdf>

⁷² Harik, *Hezbollah*, 48

⁷³ Harik, *Hezbollah*, 53

⁷⁴ William K. Mooney, "Stabilizing Lebanon: Peacekeeping or Nation-Building," *US Army War College Quarterly* XXXVII, 3(2007): 32, accessed October 20, 2010, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/07autumn/contents.htm>

⁷⁵ Qassem, *Hizbullah*, 189

its goals, which were becoming increasingly national and less ideological in nature.⁷⁶

Hizbullah's legitimacy is supported by most of the Arab world, including the Lebanese government, as a resistance movement to occupation. In the first elections after the Civil War in 1992, Hizbullah ran in the elections and experienced a landslide win of seats in Parliament, while all 68 percent of the public said they would elect a member of the opposition. Secretary General Mussawi was assassinated on the cusp of the elections, and since then, Hizbullah's Secretary General has been the eloquent, charismatic Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah. The 1992 election program is often rendered in appendixes and references, along with the 1996 program. The program was phrased to the oppressed Lebanese; it was easier to swallow for the opposing parties and summed up the political objectives of the opposition well:

Resistance, abolishing political sectarianism, amending the electoral law (widest possible electoral base), political media freedoms, reform within education and culture, administration, developmental infrastructure and social securities.⁷⁷

Geopolitical tensions in the region and vital factors within Israel resulted in the final Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000, in accordance with Resolution 425. A UN special envoy was sent to Lebanon, led by Terje Roed-Larsen, to discuss the technical issues. A cartographical map was drawn up, defining a border line. It became UNIFIL's responsibility to hold this line, dubbed 'the Blue Line.' UNIFIL deployed into the previous occupied territories, and the withdrawal turned into a major 'victory' for Hizbullah and its standing among its constituents, all of Lebanon and all over the Arab and Islamic world. The Lebanese Army also deployed to the South, asserting Lebanese sovereignty for the first time in 30 years. Following June 2000, the UN claimed Israel had followed up on UNSC Resolution 425, a claim to which Hizbullah objected. UNIFIL remained as a buffer force between the two states which were still officially in a state of war. Hizbullah was effectively becoming prominent within the opposition, its social service institutions were being perfected, and its latest victory (*naṣr*) proved it was a success.

Syria began to lose footing in Lebanon, and its relationship to Hizbullah turned to a "more" equal partnership. Two key factors shaped Syria's new role in Lebanon; first, the ascendance of Hizbullah into the political arena was the first alternate power to gain popularity, which was not previously involved in these corrupt networks, second is the Syrian

⁷⁶ Mooney, "Stabilizing Lebanon"

⁷⁷ al-Manar TV, "The Electoral Program of Hizbullah 1996", accessed November 5, 2010, <http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-platform.html>

withdrawal according to UN Resolution 1559 in the spring of 2005, following the assassination of the anti-Syrian former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. Despite the UN eviction order and withdrawal of 30,000 troops, Syria's long-standing political, economic and social ties to Lebanon still constitute a vast network of influence.⁷⁸ The Syrians have played a key role in the shipping of arms from Iran to Hizbullah across the borders and will continue to do so in the future. According to American researchers, Syria will most likely work against the establishment of a strong, democratic government in Lebanon, relying on Hizbullah to protect its interests and its networks of patronage and corruption.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Yacoubian, "Syria's Role in Lebanon"

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

II. ثورة Revolution

The Cedar Revolution (*Thawrat al-Arz*) was a term coined by the United States, imitating the prior color revolutions that occurred in Georgia, Iraq and the Ukraine. It described the political situation leading to the massive demonstrations in Beirut following the Sunni businessman and ex-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's assassination in February 2005. Prominent journalist, anti-Syrian campaigner and democracy advocate Samir Kassir preferred to call it the 'Independence Uprising' (*intifādat al-istiqlāl*) to better affiliate it with the Arab/Palestinian cause and to give it a 'liberation' focus. In June 2005, Kassir himself was victim to the string of assassinations that followed al-Hariri's,⁸⁰ which was widely blamed on an increasingly pressured Syrian regime. The Mehlis report was blamed by the opposition as "being used as a pretext to chastise Syria for a crime in which it has not so far been implicated and as a means of punishing it for strategic and political choices it has made."⁸¹

The al-Hariri empire has had already begun to rot from within, due to a vexed population, widespread corruption, large spending associated with al-Hariri's reconstruction program putting the country in high debt, Syrian control, and close-knit ties with the Saudis. Syrians had, as mentioned above, gerrymandered the elections in 1996 and 2000, allowing limited representation of the anti-Syrian opposition. In addition, Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services still controlled large aspects of public and political life. The pro-Western Hariri coalition movement returned to the limelight on February 14, 2005, when the ex-president was assassinated along with 22 others in his cortège and a random passersby of the massive car bomb. The scene occurred right below Hariri's monumental reconstruction project downtown, the recreational area Solidère, not far from the seafront Corniche.

The event prompted the country to go into mourning. The symbology flourished, people were uniting across sects and divides, and weeping at Hariri's memory. That he was simply a finance tycoon billionaire with ties to Saudi Arabia was forgotten, although not for long. The "joyous" mourning took an abrupt turn as the opposition, headed by Hizbullah, AMAL and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) organized an astounding

⁸⁰Nicholas Blanford, "Journalist's Murder Rattles Beirut," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 3, 2005, accessed November 13, 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0603/p06s01-wome.html>

⁸¹Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 365

demonstration in downtown Beirut, on Martyrs Square on March 8. This demonstration collected thousands of supporters, who, in a peaceful manner, thanked the Syrians for their aid in the resistance against Israel. The pro-governmental bloc arranged a counter-demonstration on the 14th of March. Dubbed the March 14 bloc, they blamed Hariri's assassination on Syria, and demanded its immediate withdrawal from Lebanon. These terms are now all but spent. March 14 and ultimately al-Hariri Junior's Future Party (*al-Mustaqbal*) had not moved beyond their parochial, sectarian rhetoric since UN-enforced Syrian withdrawal in May 2005. Their promises to 'build a strong state' ring hollow, as the State continues to neglect the South, when it comes to both compassion and services.⁸²

In May, as the alliances in the political sphere in Lebanon polarized again, the first elections to be held without a Syrian presence were won by the Hariri coalition. The Resistance, mainly AMAL and Hizbullah, politically cooperated in a joint opposition bloc. This gave Hizbullah almost 11 percent of the parliamentary seats. The election's second round in the South showed an almost 55 percent voting turnout, opposed to 28 percent in Beirut. As AMAL leader and speaker Nabih Berri expressed: "The area has declared clearly and before international observers, it's backing for the resistance as a path for the past, present and future."⁸³

Jerusalem Day (*Al-Quds*) was originally used by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini as an annual reminder of the future liberation of Jerusalem. However, the 2005 October commemoration in Lebanon was instead employed by Sayyed Nasrallah to publicly counter a number of challenges facing Hizbullah. The most prominent was UN Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen, and his (Assistant to the Secretary General) semi-annual reports on the implementation of SC Resolution 1559,⁸⁴ mainly concerning Hizbullah's problematic disarmament:

While the inclusion of Hizbollah in the Government and such recent statements by the group's leadership underline the significance of an internal dialogue and of the possible transformation of Hizbollah from armed militia to political party, it should be noted that operating as a political party and as a militia is

⁸² Lecture by Karim Makdisi, Beirut, June 23, 2010

⁸³ Angus Reid Global Monitor, "Election Tracker Lebanon," May 2005, accessed October 20, 2008, <http://www.angus-reid.com/tracker/view/6962>

⁸⁴ "Security Council Resolution 1701," United Nations, August 11, 2006, accessed November 5, 2010, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1701%282006%29

*contradictory. The carrying of arms outside the official armed forces is impossible to reconcile with the participation in power and in government in a democracy.*⁸⁵

Using Sayyid Nasrallah's speech, the quandaries Hizbullah has outstanding with the UN, and the United States, the epitome of the relations with the UN system, are exemplified:

*Larsen's words seek to sow fear. It is very regrettable that Mr. Larsen's role is evident. (...) Larson is the new high commissioner who carries the 1559 sword and uses it to chase after the Lebanese, the Palestinian, and the Syrian authorities.*⁸⁶

All of the demands on the Lebanese government by Terje Roed-Larsen are simply demands by Israel, Nasrallah stressed again in August (27), 2006. Larsen's star role in the Oslo Accords was also seen as pro-Israeli, and the general mood surrounding the Security Council's Special Representative for the implementation of Resolution 1559 is one of disdain and mockery in the South.

In early 2006, General Michel Awn of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), who attended the March 14 demonstrations, signed a Memorandum of Understanding⁸⁷ with the opposition, officially joining the Resistance bloc. Some points in the memorandum (e.g., anti-corruption reforms) merely restate positions that Hizbullah and the FPM have held for many years, while others were hammered out over weeks of negotiations. 'Awn has received much criticism for his switching sides to simply gain votes, though the most avid supporters, and especially young students in the FPM, say he is the only real reformist among the various parties. The fact that Hizbullah could go into these agreements show its ability to be a democratic actor on a very pragmatic and flexible level, and it justifies Nasrallah's answer to whether the party is Lebanese or Islamic: "We are a non-sectarian Islamic Party, and we are a Lebanese Party that is not isolated within the borders of this country."⁸⁸

⁸⁵"Second Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary-General"

⁸⁶ Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 352

⁸⁷ "Memorandum of Joint Understanding between Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement," *Mideast Monitor*, February 2006, accessed November 5, 2010, http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0602/0602_3.htm.

⁸⁸ Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 183

***Ḥarb Tammūz*⁸⁹ and the Aftermath**

The Lebanese government disavowed the war in the early days, blaming Hizbullah. However, as the Israeli response became disproportionately large in comparison, the government changed its orientation, accusing Israel of waging outright war on Lebanon.⁹⁰ Hizbullah was hailed victorious for merely surviving the IDF's wanton and unreasonable⁹¹ retribution for their much smaller scale border kidnapping. During the war, a majority of the Lebanese supported the resistance, 86.9 percent, and over half of the population believed that Israel would not be able to defeat Hizbullah.⁹² Nasrallah was quick to term it a 'divine victory' (naṣr ilāhī).⁹³ This was a conscious, vital amendment from the use of simple "victory" pertaining to Israeli withdrawal in the year 2000.

The strategic victory⁹⁴ included massive damage on the Lebanese infrastructure. As the dust settled, this 'divine' victory was tainted by the ultimate destruction of mainly Shiite areas, dealing a definite blow to Lebanon, equivalent to \$7 billion or 30 percent GDP. A substantial setback to a country barely treading water, paying back debt equivalent to 180 percent GDP. During the 33-day war a total of 1,200 people died (almost one-third of them children), 4,000 were wounded and a million displaced. Over 130,000 housing units were destroyed, and thousands of factories, roads, bridges, major electricity plants and other vital infrastructure were also destroyed or damaged.⁹⁵

Israel's miscalculations were of vital consequence for the failed IDF invasion of Southern Lebanon. Hizbullah, as a guerilla group utilizing classic unconventional warfare, surprised the IDF by using distributed maneuver⁹⁶ techniques in Southern Lebanon. Classic

⁸⁹ What the July War in 2006 is called within Lebanon. Called the "Second Lebanon War" in Israel. 12 July-14 August 2006

⁹⁰ Paul Salem, "Hezbollah in a Corner." *Project Syndicate*, July 23, 2010, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/salem6/English>.

⁹¹ Nicholas Noe, "Craving." *Tablet*, June 15, 2010, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://www.tabletmag.com/news-and-politics/35848/craving/>

⁹² Poll taken on July 24-26, http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/8730/lebanese_support_resistance_against_israel/

⁹³ Al-Manar TV. "السيد نصر الله: اذا قصفت الضاحية او بيروت"

⁹⁴ Mooney, "Stabilizing Lebanon," 28

⁹⁵ Paul Salem, "The Future of Lebanon," *Foreign Affairs* (2006): 18, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://carnegeieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18837>

⁹⁶ Justin Kelly and Mike Brennen, "Distributed Maneuver: 21st Century Offensive Tactics," Land Warfare Studies Center, June (2009), accessed August 12, 2010, <http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/WP134.asp>

guerilla tactics are surprise attacks with no specific importance to geographical area, which was not the case here. Hizbullah had both the ability to attack using surprise guerilla tactics, and the ability to hold their positions, as in the infamous case of the symbolic border village of 'Aytā al-Sha'ab:

من بين المنازل المسوّاة بالارض خرج عدد من المقاومين لملاقاة المراسلين الاجانب الذين عبروا عن صدمتهم من بقاء خمسة عشر مقاتلا من المقاومة الاسلامية من بين انقاض المنازل التي سوي معظمها بالارض. احد المقاومين يحمل بندقية لاحد الضباط المظليين الاسرائيليين وهو يقول "هذا السلاح استولينا عليه وهو لضباط المظليين بعد هربهم وهم يصرخون ولا ابالغ ان قلت كالاطفال. وعندما أتوا ليسحبوا القوة التي هاجمناها جاؤوا با لجرافات التي واجهناها، وسترون بعض الاجزاء المتبقية منها، وهم حاولوا اكثر من مرة الدخول الى بلدة عيتا لكن فشلوا والحمد لله".

From among the leveled with the ground houses emerged a number of resistance fighters to meet the foreign journalists, who expressed their shock to see 15 fighters from the Islamic resistance alive in the ruins of the houses (most of which leveled with the ground). One of the fighters, carrying the gun of an officer of the Israely paratroopers said: This weapon we took from one of the officers of the paratroopers we defeated. They were screaming, I would not exaggerate if I say, like children. When they came to withdraw the troops we attacked, they came with bulldozers and we fought against it (too). You can see some parts left. They (the Israely troops) tried to enter the village 'Aytā more than once but did not succeed, praised be the Lord.⁹⁷

The IDF had extensive knowledge of and full access to this area of only 900 square kilometers, due to years of intelligence and surveillance. Despite this, the IDF failed to engage Hizbullah on their own ground. Hizbullah was initially the defender, and the IDF became the Israeli 'offensive' Force, as al-Saffar, a Hizbullah media personality, repeatedly referred to them.⁹⁸ Hizbullah used traditional guerilla tactics, which meant the IDF could not recognize their small fighting units, or single them out from the civilians, thus granting the Resistance the upper hand and the initiative for surprise offensive. This discord between the

⁹⁷ Lebanese Communications Group, "هنا الجنوب، هنا عيتا الشعب" Al-Manar TV, August 15, 2006, accessed August 29, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=1290&language=ar>

⁹⁸ Meeting with Zeinab As-Saffar, al-Dāḥiyya, Beirut, June 18, 2010

strengths of defense and perceived offense existed on all levels of warfare: intelligence, air-force, ground-force, political war and media. It was won by Hizbullah, and the IDF ultimately 'lost' their incursion into Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

Speaking with al-Saffar in June this year, she pointed out that reports on planned invasions exist, that Israel used any pretext to initiate such a conflict, and that this war was planned by both Tel Aviv and Washington, awaiting the right opportunity. After the ceasefire was established, Nasrallah stated in an interview a clear distance from the "premeditated" theory on Hizbullah's part, and his first public *mea culpa*:

وقال نصر الله "لو سألتيني إذا كان لدينا شك واحد بالمتة في 11 يوليو تموز بأن عملية الخطف ستؤدي إلى حرب هل كنت ستمضي في هذا الطريق؟".

واستدرك قائلاً "كنت سأجيب قطعاً بالنفي لأسباب إنسانية وأخلاقية واجتماعية وأمنية وعسكرية وسياسية"

Nasrallah said: "If you were to ask me, if there was a 1% doubt on the 11 of July that the kidnapping would lead (in)to a war, would I continue on this road?" He amended saying: My answer would be a definite negative for humanitarian, moral, social, security, military and political reasons.⁹⁹

Nasrallah's *mea culpa* at the time was merely the start of difficulties to come for the next few years. The war had ultimately undermined the fact that Nasrallah was supposedly too intelligent to expose Lebanon to violent attack, and the promise that the party's weapons could deter Israel from launching a war were proven wrong. In Nasrallah's 'surprise' at the IDF's wanton excessiveness, he attempted to call on Israel to return to the 1996 Understanding,¹⁰⁰ regarding Israel as abstaining from hitting civilian targets in return for not firing from civilian launch sites. Despite widespread criticism, a poll conducted in November showed that an average of 64 percent of the Lebanese thought that Hizbullah had become stronger after the war (92% of the Shia, and approximately 50% of the Sunnis and Christians).¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ BBC "BBCArabic.com, 27 August, 2006, accessed September 12, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/arabic/middle_east_news/newsid_5291000/5291504.stm

¹⁰⁰ Agreement known as "The April Understanding." Full text can be found here: http://telaviv.usembassy.gov/publish/peace/documents/ceasefire_understanding.html

¹⁰¹ Poll taken 21 November 2006: http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/6431/hezbollah_stronger_after_war_say_lebanese/

Nasrallah knew Hizbullah would have to focus its energies inwards. It was clear that the next few years would be focused on reconstruction. *Jihād al-Binā`* moved in the day after the ceasefire started. Bulldozers were at work removing debris and tearing down the buildings that had not been demolished. The administration already had clear insight into procedural needs and had mapped out the extent of damage. As Klaushofer wrote, they had done continual assessments and damage control since day one, to decide where to begin first “as if it was the most natural thing for a guerrilla group to do, during a war.”¹⁰² Allowing Hizbullah to be the first to administer humanitarian aid and relief is losing the central government’s race to win the hearts and minds of the population. Nasrallah’s speeches post-war were one of a national president addressing his people after dire conflict.

Resolution 1701¹⁰³ was an alternative to an international force mandated under Chapter VII by the UN.¹⁰⁴ Neither the Lebanese government nor Hizbullah wanted to see a Chapter VII intervention, and even a “classic” peacekeeping mission required persuading and probing to convince European contributing countries to send troops on a mandate, implicating taking on a guerilla movement even Israel had been defeated by. Italy and Spain finally emerged as the main contributing contingents, introducing peacekeeping again to Europe. In the midst of the war, Hizbullah quickly accepted Prime Minister Siniora’s plan, even though it included provisions – most notably, the dispatch of the Lebanese Army to the South – which the movement had long resisted. Then, reportedly over Syrian and Iranian objection, it signed on to Resolution 1701,¹⁰⁵ which not only called for a bolstered international force and Lebanese Army presence in the South, but also reiterated the need for full disarmament of all militias. Hizbullah accepted a ceasefire despite the continued presence of Israeli soldiers on Lebanese soil, something it had vowed never to do.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Alex Klaushofer, *Paradise Divided: A Portrait of Lebanon* (Oxford: Signal Books, 2007):257

¹⁰³ “Security Council Resolution 1701”

¹⁰⁴ Karim Makdisi pointed out to me in Beirut, June 2010, that in reality, the Chapter VII rhetoric is present in the Mandate, shining through unofficially.

¹⁰⁵ Al-Manar, “الحكومة اللبنانية توافق "بالاجماع" على قرار مجلس الامن حول لبنان” Lebanese Communications Group, August 13, 2006, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=1189&language=ar>

¹⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, “Lebanon at a Tripwire”, 4

Nasrallah promised there would be “no armed manifestations at all” of Hizbullah south of the Litani River¹⁰⁷ and reinforced the LAF’s right to disarm and detain anyone carrying weapons south of the Litani. This blessing in disguise is a characteristic guerrilla trait valid today: the difficulty of recognizing and deciphering who is a civilian and who is a soldier.

وقال نصر الله "إذا واجه الجيش اللبناني أي شخص مسلح، فله الحق في مصادرة أسلحتهم".

And Nasrallah said “If the Lebanese Army encounters anyone armed, has the right to confiscate their weapons.”¹⁰⁸

UNIFIL II arrived on the beaches of Lebanon in August 2006, fully equipped and mandated to disarm Hizbullah and handle the crisis. The newly enhanced mission is now a fully equipped, heavily armored 10,000-troop strong force with armored personnel vehicles, tanks (which are not in use) and anti-aircraft weapons charged with additional tasks and given new ROE. Resolution 1701 states one of the main tasks as assisting the Lebanese Army (LAF) deploy and take control of Southern Lebanon, south of the Litani River, prevent Hizbullah armed presence south of the Litani River, and it:

Authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.¹⁰⁹

This has proven impossible. In reality, UNIFIL has no jurisdiction on the ground or among the locals. “Actually, nothing has changed except that UNIFIL now has better armed units that still won’t use their guns unless they are attacked,” as Norton stated in front of the

¹⁰⁷ Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 386

¹⁰⁸ BBC, "لو عاد الزمن لما اختطف الجنديان",

¹⁰⁹ “Security Council Resolution 1701”

Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2006. “It would be unrealistic to believe that any contingent could disarm Hizbullah or diminish its appeal. If UNIFIL is going to succeed, it will need cooperation, not the animosity, of Hezbollah.”¹¹⁰

Harb Tammūz left the country divided in two, despite the fact that Hizbullah received widespread respect, even admiration, for its success in confronting Israel. Where much of Arab public opinion saw an unambiguous Hizbullah ‘divine victory,’ the March 14th forces sensed serious vulnerability.

A year-and-a-half political feud ensued in Lebanon, involving Hizbullah MPs withdrawing, sit-ins and massive camp-outs by the opposition, paralyzing downtown Beirut, followed by violent clashes between anti- and pro-government forces with strong sectarian overtones, car-bombs, assassinations and massive demonstrations. All brought the country perilously close to a breakdown into violent sectarian conflict. Two decrees pushed on the party, with the backing of the United States in May 2008, provoked Hizbullah to turn its weapons inwards. The official dictate turned a once highly effective private Hizbullah communications network pivotal in a war against Israel into a threat, overnight. The forced resignation of the Chief of Security at Rafiq al-Hariri International Airport due to surveillance cameras found on the runway for executive jets was equally provocative. Two main arguments present themselves as to the reason for such a push. Was it to test Hizbullah’s resolve or the resolve of Hizbullah’s allies: Syria and Iran? Regardless, Nasrallah knew the consequences of choosing to act, just as well as he knew that he would lose the faith of the people of Beirut, breaching his promise to never turn the party’s weapons inward. The pro-government Christian militias the opposition faced on the streets of Beirut, could also turn against them again in a future war. These groups have been supported as a counterweight to Hizbullah by external sponsors. All domestic conflict tends to turn geopolitical in Lebanon, dependent on who is sponsoring who, even though the 2008 violence was unplanned, Timur Goksel claims:

Someone in the lower echelons was responsible. Opened fire, being hard on the demonstrators, hard for the army. It was not a party sectarian affair. They

¹¹⁰ Full hearing can be found here: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006_hr/060913-norton.pdf

were not trained. It was Sunday, the local command could not control the situation, and street dynamics took over.¹¹¹

Retrospectively, Hizbullah responded in an utmost professional way, in control and calmly, and neither violently nor wantonly. The images broadcast by the media show smaller groups from both camps erecting roadblocks and igniting tires. The March 14/pro-U.S. majority suffered an embarrassing rout at the expense of Hizbullah-led militias in Beirut and the Shouf Mountains. Three hundred are believed to have been killed in the conflict. A Qatari-led delegation came to Beirut to discuss a truce and to invite the parliamentarians supportive of a peaceful solution to Doha to discuss a new national unity government, elect a new president (the best alternative being Michel Suleiman, ex-chief of Army), adopt new electoral law, and pledging to abstain from the use of force in political conflicts.¹¹²

The Doha Agreement¹¹³ was passed in May 2008. Hizbullah received (as demanded) veto power in Parliament with one minister, and controls 11 of 30 seats in the cabinet. Weapons were hidden away, stores and schools reopened, and the Lebanese returned to 'normalcy'. The fact that the ruling political class again needed to undertake negotiations in another country in order to resolve internal political disagreements illustrates the core problem in the Lebanese political sectarian system¹¹⁴ and the lack of national unity. The Christian-Sunni national vision revealed that Hizbullah and AMAL could only be Lebanese patriots if they submitted to being marginalized both politically and culturally. Their insistence on representation in the cabinet, parliament and civil service proportional to the population, and using brute force if necessary, has been accused of being sectarian and having anti-national attitudes.¹¹⁵ Despite these fears among other communities, and despite strong international pressure on the government to disarm its 'terrorist cell,' Al-Saffar said in an interview: "Lebanon is Hizbullah, Hizbullah is Lebanon, up to a million supporters. This

¹¹¹ Radio Adelaide, "Interview with Timur Goksel," *Backstory*, February 10, 2008, accessed October 12, 2010, <http://www.backstory.org.au/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Lebanon%20-%20Timor%20Goksel.mp3>

¹¹² Makdisi, "In the wake of the Doha Truce"

¹¹³ "Doha Agreement," *NowLebanon*, May 21, 2008, accessed October 12, 2010, <http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=44023>

¹¹⁴ Makdisi, "In the wake of the Doha Truce"

¹¹⁵ Shaery-Eisenlohr, *Shi'ite Lebanon*, 204

resistance is the only resistance that can stop the Israeli aggression to Lebanon. The Zionist threat is a big threat.”¹¹⁶

As-Saffar repeated the same opinions in a meeting held in Beirut in 2010: that Hizbullah has the support they need, and that they have faith in the support from Iran and Syria. People support Hizbullah for the weapons, with little or no faith in the LAF’s ability to resist Israeli aggression:

Look, the Israeli entity we see as an enemy, now look, we have lots of issues between us and Israel. You cannot just disband, people will not let them just disarm. They do not feel secure and that the Lebanese Army will not be able to protect Lebanon from Israel. The people will never agree to let Hizbullah lay down their arms. Lebanon is a multi-cultural society, you cannot have just three colors in the Government to create a national unity government!¹¹⁷

If the argument is that the people will not let the party disarm, several other important issues remain that could be resolved, removing a vital *raison d’être*. ‘The four bleeding wounds’ augmenting continued resistance are: Hizbullah prisoners, the continuous illegal Israeli overflights, the issue of unknown Israeli land mines, and occupied territories like the Shebaa Farms. Along with these, analysts fail to address the lacking protection of cross-border water resources, the Palestinians, the long-term deterrence of The Jewish State against Lebanon, and most importantly, as Noe points out, “the key factor that will determine whether or not the removal of the four bleeding wounds provides a viable roadmap for Hizbullah’s normalization: a national defense strategy.”¹¹⁸

If these issues were to be resolved, how would general support for the party appear?. The theory that they would reach a critical crisis is now replaced by the fact that if they were to be resolved, the issue of national security would remain unresolved. This became very vivid after the May incidents, prompting an alternative view on the militant resistance, ensuing that if a real change was about to happen in Lebanon, “The U.S. should do everything

¹¹⁶ Radio Adelaide, “Hezbollah-Interview with Zeynab as-Saffar,” *Backstory*, 15 July, 2007, accessed October 12, 2010, <http://www.backstory.org.au/programs.html>

¹¹⁷ Meeting with Zeynab al-Saffar, Beirut, June 15, 2010

¹¹⁸ Nicholas Noe, "Healing Lebanon's 'Four Bleeding Wounds' Will Not Be Enough for Hezbollah to Disarm," *The National*, June 17, 2008

to encourage this process. It should accept a greater role for Shiites in the Lebanese government as long as Hezbollah agrees to start, however gradually, decommissioning.”¹¹⁹

The tension between the Loyalist March 14 alliance and the March 8 Opposition Bloc remains strong. Street politics had already solidified Shiite support, creating a highly polarized post-war environment, where Hizbullah’s weapons were their best defense. There is little doubt that the Doha Truce averted a descent into the nightmare of a large-scale civil conflict that most Lebanese were dreading, and as such, was welcomed by all. However, there is equally little doubt that this truce represents anything more than a temporary pause in an ongoing regional war. The attempt to overthrow a Sunni government lost them many Christian and Sunni supporters, as Hizbullah more closely resembled a Shia rather than a national movement. This image was not necessarily what Nasrallah desired; he has repeatedly called on people to show restraint, worried that internal forces will bring the country into “undesired consequences.”¹²⁰

وثانياً دعوة إلى الناس، أدعوهم إلى الصبر، أدعوهم إلى الهدوء، أدعوهم إلى التحمل، أدعوهم إلى الانضباط، أدعوهم إلى عدم الانجرار مع أي دعوات إلى الشوارع، لأن هذا الأمر لن يجدي نفعاً، إذا كان المطلوب أن تصل رسالة معينة فقد وصلت، إذا كان المطلوب من هؤلاء الناس أن يضغطوا على الحكومة، أعتقد أن الضغط الذي حصل كاف وإذا حصل أكثر من ذلك لن يجدي نفعاً، وغالباً الأذى يلحق بالناس الذين تقطع طرقاتهم ويتعرضون للأذى وما شاكل. أنا أتوجه بكل مودة وبكل محبة إلى الناس في كل المناطق حتى نتعاون ونصبر ونتحمل ونتنبه أن الظرف حساس

Second: A call to the people. I ask them to show patience, tolerance, endurance. I ask them to keep discipline; I ask them not to allow being drawn out in the street because this would not benefit them. If it was necessary to deliver a message, it has been done, if the people had to press the government, the pressure was enough, and if the pressure is more it would not benefit (anyone). It is the people who are hurt when they are robbed, harmed or exposed to problems. I appeal with all affection and love to the

¹¹⁹ Daniel Freedmen, "The Axis of Weakness," *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, June 2, 2010, accessed October 12, 2010, <http://www.dfreedman.org/5311/the-axis-of-weakness>

¹²⁰ Muhammed Abdullah, "السيد نصرالله يؤكد أن هناك من صنعَ شهود الزور ويدعو لبنان لبناء مفاعل نووي," *Al-Manar-TV*, August 24, 2010, accessed October 12, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=151521&language=ar>

people in all regions let us cooperate, let us be patient and enduring, let us be attentive to the sensitive moment¹²¹

The May takeover could be more a show of power, a domestic deterrent. Why else did they not finish their coup? If so, such a move towards being a predominant political actor is possible, even probable, although the choice between that and resistance will have to be made. Stating that Hizbullah will never abandon their Islamic ideology is naïve, as:

*Everyone promises never to negotiate with their enemies, but everyone has their price. The PLO promised to never recognize Israel. Israel promised never to recognize the PLO. And so on. While the PLO certainly didn't start off negotiating in good faith, the political process helped gradually changing their stated ideological aims.*¹²²

Hizbullah's twenty-four hour sweep of Beirut has been compared to the Israeli invasion of 1982. This is condemning, to say the least, with all the horror that the invasion entailed for the Lebanese and Palestinians. It is not a comparable, but the sentiments prompting this sort of criticism from the March 14/Future bloc show the ongoing neglect of Southern Lebanon. Many voiced opinions that March 14's terminology of "a strong state" has lost its content and rings hollow in reality.¹²³ A recent clash between two individuals belonging to different factions got out of hand, apparently over a parking space. This kind of climate is prevalent in Lebanon today. FPM Michel 'Awn claims the following:

Security between states is held by politics, but such clashes are often misused and exploited by various factions, both domestic and international. All parties and the Lebanese seem to acknowledge this, but very little is done to commend transparency or reconciliation, or public debate. (...) But why did the clash expand? When there is something prompting fear, the simplest incident in any

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Freedmen, "Axis of Weakness"

¹²³ Makdisi, "In the Wake of the Doha Truce"

peaceful village can make people take to the street while carrying arms. This is the climate in which we are currently living.¹²⁴

The lack of reconciliation is characteristic of Lebanese post-conflict mentality: “I do not want to talk about it. This issue is over. There has been reconciliation.”¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Lebanese National News Agency, “عون بعد اجتماع تكتل التغيير والإصلاح الاسبوي” August 31, 2010, accessed August 31, 2010, http://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/phpfolder/loadpage_ar.php?page=31-08-2010/JOU132.html

¹²⁵ Manal Sarrouf, “Opening up to NOW: Talking to Tawhid Movement leader Wiam Wahhab,” *NowLebanon*, September 4, 2009, accessed October 30, 2010, <http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=112561>

War of Deterrence

The disbanding of militias as the civil war ended incorporated many into the army. Even though Hizbullah was allowed to maintain its weapons already in 1989, as a deterrent to Israel¹²⁶, today a second major key to deterring Israel is national unity, as Nasrallah pleads:

الأمر الثاني الذي نقدر أن نعمله سويا ويمنع الحرب هو التضامن الوطني، الخروج من الأزمات والتوترات الداخلية، هناك كلام قيل وهو كلام وطني ومشكور، هذا إذا سُمِعَ من كل القادة السياسيين في لبنان أنه أي حرب إسرائيلية على المقاومة سنكون جميعا مع المقاومة وإلى جانبها، إذا كان هذا هو المنطق الوطني في لبنان سوف ينظر الإسرائيلي ويتساءل: أنا إلى أين ذاهب، هو يفكر فينا أننا ضعفاء ويفكر في عزل الناس والمناطق عن بعضها البعض لكن إذا وجد أن هناك تضامنا وطنيا فلا يعود عنده خيار الحرب .

A second thing that we can do together and that can prevent a new war is to achieve national unity/solidarity; we can abstain from internal tensions and crisis. This has been said and these are patriotic praiseworthy words. If this can be heard by the political leaders in Lebanon in any Israeli war against the resistance we all will be together with the resistance and on its side. If this were the national logic in Lebanon the Israeli will look and start asking himself: Where am I going. He thinks we are weak, he intends to separate people and areas from each other. But if he finds out that national solidarity exists, he would not think of war.¹²⁷

This famous speech from 2009, on the third-year anniversary of *Ḥarb Tammūz*, shows Nasrallah's rhetoric at its best, speaking to a large crowd in *al-Dāḥiya*, (one of hundreds of Lebanon's 'ground zeros') and broadcast on a large screen.

ونقول له : في حرب تموز قلنا لكم إذا قصفتم بيروت سنقصف تل أبيب واليوم نقول لكم إذا قصفتم بيروت الضاحية الجنوبية سنقصف تل أبيب. ندما نفهم العدو كما فهم جيدا ، إذا شنتم حربا على جنوب لبنان وتصورتكم أنكم تستطيعون أن تقصفوا أي مدينة في لبنان أو أي قرية في لبنان ، أقول لكم نحن اليوم قادرون أن نقصف أي مدينة أو قرية في كيانكم الغاصب وعلى امتداد المساحة، "روحو عملو مناورات للجبهة الداخلية لتشبعو".

¹²⁶ Traboulsi, *History of Lebanon*, 243

¹²⁷ Al-Manar TV. "السيد نصر الله: اذا قصفنا الضاحية او بيروت". Lebanese Communications Group, August 14, 2009, accessed September 24, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=99092&language=ar>

And we say to them: in the July war we told you if you bomb Beirut, we will bomb Tel Aviv, and today we tell you if you bomb Beirut or the Southern *al-Dāhiya* we will bomb Tel Aviv. We make it clear to the enemy as he knows that well. If they launch a war on Southern Lebanon, and they imagine they are capable of bombing any town or village in Lebanon, I say to them we have the power to bomb any town or village in your usurping entity and on the expanse of the area.¹²⁸

Nasrallah's rhetoric has consistently matched its actions, Norton said in 1998, prior to both the Israeli withdrawal and *Ḥarb Tammūz*. History has proven many promises to be correct, and in such case, one should not take lightly Hizbullah's boasted fire power range, or in this case, promises "that we have inaugurated a new era in which we will be bombed and we will bomb, we will be killed and we will kill, we will be displaced and will displace."¹²⁹

The war of words between Nasrallah and his antagonist goes both ways. Israel will not willingly enter into a new conflict. Hizbullah will wait for Israel to make the first move. As Harik said earlier this year, "I think it will be Israel's move next,"¹³⁰ knowing they will procrastinate and acutely aware that the 'home-front' is no longer safe. This is their "current strategic weakness."¹³¹ Neither will Hizbullah take the first step; the Lebanese have barely finished painting their new houses. Ultimately, this is "the war no one wants, but craves," as Noe wrote in July this year.¹³²

Aware of Israel's ultimate dependence on the IDF, and concerning all aspects of the future, Nasrallah asks the rhetorical question that politicians, military experts and analysts all over the world are asking themselves. Does the Israeli government and the IDF have the strength and ability to eradicate the resistance in Lebanon? Nasrallah's answer is, of course, no.¹³³ This self-assurance of their ability to win the possible next war is neither humble nor

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Conversation with J.P.Harik, Beirut, 19 June, 2010

¹³¹ Muhammed Abdullah and Ahmed Sha'ytū. "السيد نصرالله يعلن معادلة جديدة في المواجهة"، *al-Manar*, May 25, 2010, accessed September 12, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=138980&language=ar>

¹³² Noe, "Craving"

¹³³ *Al-Manar TV. "السيد نصر الله: اذا قصفت الضاحية او بيروت"*

insecure, patronizing those who even dare question Israel's 2006 defeat. The Winograd Report¹³⁴ admitted to certain Israeli failings during the war, and the political environment within Israel is one of learning from one's mistakes. Nasrallah is aware of this.

هو يعمل في الليل وفي النهار منذ ثلاث سنوات، الغريب للذين لا يزالون يعتقدون أن إسرائيل لم تهزم، ما هو هذا الجيش المنتصر الغير مهزوم الذي منذ ثلاث سنوات يتدرب ليلاً نهاراً ويغير قياداته وجنرالاته ويتسلح ويعمل لجان تحقيق ويأخذ العبر والدروس وهو منتصر فكيف إذا كان غير منتصر ماذا كان يفعل؟!

إسرائيل تعمل في الليل وفي النهار لتكون قوية، ولا تستطيع ألا أن تفعل ذلك، مثلما يقول بارك بدقة في تصريح قبل عدة ايام عندما ذهب هو ومنتيا هو لزيارة قاعدة سلاح جو، واضح جداً أنه يقول للحكومة وللقوة والسياسية وللتسوية والشروط والمفاوضات والمستقبل السياسي لدولة إسرائيل كله مبني على قوة هذا الجيش، هذا الجيش كيف خرج من حرب تموز؟ كيف سيدخل إلى حرب جديدة؟!

Israel has been working day and night for the past three years to become strong. For those who still believe that Israel did not lose the war it is strange what is this victorious and undefeated army that trains day and night, changes leadership and generals, and arms. Commissions are appointed and lessons are learned. And this is an army that won. What it would do if it has not won?

Israel is working day and night in order to become strong and it is not possible to do anything but that. Like what Barak said a few days ago when he went together with Netanyahu to visit an airbase. He says to the Government, military and politicians, to the negotiators (working with the conditions for the peace process) that the entire political future of Israel is built on the strength of this army. This army, how did it walk out of the July war and how it would get into a new war¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Government Press Office, "Winograd Commission Submits Interim Report," *Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, April 30, 2007, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Winograd+Inquiry+Commission+submits+Interim+Report+30-Apr-2007.htm>

¹³⁵ Al-Manar TV. "السيد نصر الله: اذا قصفت الضاحية او بيروت"

Nasrallah rarely makes public appearances due to security reasons.¹³⁶ During the July War, Israelis used this as an argument to prove that Hizbullah's victory was flawed, since their leader was forced to retreat to a bunker and subsequently avoid the public in fear of being assassinated. Although this is true, Nasrallah still demands all eyes whenever he speaks. People of all sects, both supporters and non-supporters alike, in all regions of the country stop and listen when his speeches are broadcast. His genuinely supernal erudition and concomitant charismatic media performances enthrall the masses and is *de facto* able to have an impact on a larger audience, ranging from the pure aficionados to the commonly found non-members but faithful admirers of the Resistance. Not to mention that his speeches may be edited, in real time or not, to obtain maximal effect.

The party's proficiency in the media was never more visible than the broadcasting of his first of many speeches during the July War. Initially, only a press conference was held the same day of the kidnappings, proclaiming the demanded exchange of prisoners. However, as Israel's bombing intensified, the IDF's fervent campaign became apparent. The need to rally the Hizbullah resistance fighters and raise spirits was evident. The July 13 live satellite audio speech was "...simply, a masterstroke of war, politics, and theater."¹³⁷ He had previously promised the people surprises and announced they would begin momentarily:

*Now, in the middle of the sea, facing Beirut, the Israeli warship that has attacked the infrastructure, people's homes and civilians – look at it burning," he said calmly, almost matter-of-factly. As he spoke, out at sea, an Iranian-made C802 missile crashed into the warship. We could see an orange glow, like flares, shooting up from the sea to the sky.*¹³⁸

This had never been done before: moving the war into the media sphere of sensationalism, propaganda and, in the enemy's eyes, psychological warfare. A snapshot of the bombed ship is plastered up on a large billboard as one drives on the Tyre-Naqoura Road. This kind of propaganda usage is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Hizbullah's

¹³⁶ AFP -Naharnet, "Nasrallah Plants Tree in Haret Hreik in 1st Public Appearance since 2008," *Naharnet*, October 8, 2010, accessed November 1, 2010, <http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/getstory?openform&2E898D1170F3ADB2C22577B60061A1D8>

¹³⁷ Noe, "Craving"

¹³⁸ Annia Ciezadlo, "Sheik Nasrallah, Superstar" *dallasnews.com*, August 13, 2006, accessed November 12, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/points/stories/DN-nasrallah_06edi.ART.State.Edition1.2be112e.html

greased ideological machine. Immediately after the July war, “Illuminated advertisement hoardings were filled with Hezbollah material. Each carries the slogan ‘Divine Victory’ in Arabic, English or French on a tomato red background beneath an iconic image of a man, woman child or a piece of military hardware.”¹³⁹ Hizbullah has always been the master of incorporating all events into their narrative of “matyrolgy.”¹⁴⁰

The party’s physical presence is not obvious to the naked eye, but they are ‘*shāk al-salāh*’ (armed to their teeth¹⁴¹), as a university student was explaining that “everyone knows someone in the resistance.”¹⁴² The Resistance paraphernalia’s omnipresence compensates. Every street corner and haywire electricity mast in al-Dahiyyeh and the South has its mandatory yellow and green flag, martyr poster or beaming oil-painted leadership portrait. Nasrallah rallied not only resistance fighters and Hizbullah supporters. He was also able to rally the Lebanese people. In the 2009 speech mentioned earlier, the Lebanese people were given two choices: the first was to surrender (which was not even worth mentioning), and the second was ‘war preparation’ to avoid conflict:

الخيار الثاني، ليس أن نصنع حرباً، أبدأً، الخيار الثاني أن نستعد ونعزز عناصر القوة لنمنع وقوع الحرب، ستقولون لي هل نستطيع أن نمنع وقوع الحرب؟ أجيبكم، نعم، هناك احتمال قوي وكبير، إذا تعاوننا كلبنانيين نستطيع أن نمنع إسرائيل من أن تشن حرباً على لبنان. فإذاً الخيار الثاني هو أن نعمل سويماً لمنع العدو من شن حرب جديدة على لبنان، ولكن إذا شن حرباً جديدة أن ننتصر فيها، هذا الخيار الثاني. كيف يمكن أن نصنع الخيار الثاني؟ هل نستطيع أن نمنع العدو من شن حرب على لبنان؟ نعم. هل نستطيع أن نمنع العدو من أن يفكر بالحرب على لبنان؟ نعم، لكن علينا أن نعمل، ليس بالتمني وإنما بالعمل.

The second choice, is not to stage a war, by all means, the second choice is we get ready and strengthen our power elements to prevent (the occurrence of) the war. You ask me is it possible to prevent (the occurrence of) a war? I answer you, yes, there is a strong probability, and if we cooperate as Lebanese (people) we are able to prevent Israel from launching a war on Lebanon. So,

¹³⁹ Klaushofer, *Paradise Divided*, 253

¹⁴⁰ Cambanis, *A Privilege to Die*, 81

¹⁴¹ Hans Wehr, *The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, ed. J.M. Cowen (Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, 1994): 563

¹⁴² Visits in Tyre, June 2010

the second choice is to work together to stop the enemy from launching a new war on Lebanon, but if a war is launched, we have to be victorious in it. This is the second choice, how may we make initiate the second choice? Is it possible for us to prevent the enemy from launching a war on Lebanon? Yes. Is it possible to prevent the enemy from thinking of a war on Lebanon? Yes, but we must work, not wishing, but only through work/ action.¹⁴³

This ‘action’ that Nasrallah rallies manifold is of deterrence and national unity state-building. Nasrallah has mastered the power of psychological warfare. He depends on Israel’s fear of human and economic loss as a vital deterrence pawn. During the war, 4000 rockets sent over the border managed to displace half a million Israelis. This creates fear. Rejective of any sort of ‘normalization’ with Israel, Nasrallah prides himself that the ‘Axis of Resistance’ has brought far more results and concessions out of Israel than the group of Arab pro-Western ‘Axis of Accommodation’ leaders. Even though he propagates the notion that it is ‘better to fight and die with dignity, than live comfortably without it,’¹⁴⁴ he uses rhetoric doubly, by at the same time rallying to deny Israel its war through deterrence.

“We will turn any threat into an opportunity,”¹⁴⁵ he has stated. Could these threats be turned to *nonviolent* opportunity? In 2000, Nasrallah reiterated that ‘normalization’ would not be an option, but that violence would no longer be a *modus vivendi* for them in the future. On the question of possible future settlement, he replied:

*Of course the door would be open (...)we actually estimate that a peaceful resolution is a victory for the resistance and its logic.*¹⁴⁶

This ‘peaceful resolution’ of which he speaks is questionable. If taken literally, as one should with Nasrallah, such a notion could imply a settlement, if all the pieces were in place. These pieces are disputable. Which alliances would be most feasible, and would the Iran-Syria-US be able to initiate it? It seems that Nasrallah is negating himself again, using changing polemics as a weapon of choice in this war of deterrence, to fathom as many

¹⁴³ Al-Manar TV. "السيد نصر الله: اذا قصفت الضاحية او بيروت"

¹⁴⁴ Cambanis, *A Privilege to Die*, 8

¹⁴⁵ Al-Manar TV. "السيد نصر الله: اذا قصفت الضاحية او بيروت"

¹⁴⁶ Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 220

supporters as possible and continue to do the impossible: be a resistance and a secular mainstream political party, simultaneously.

Hizbullah's 2009 Manifesto

In summary, Hizbullah's foreign policy had not changed in its substance between 1985 and 2009, and countries that deal with the organization should be mindful of this strategic continuity.¹⁴⁷ Its ideology withholds such that "If any group today can claim the mantle of Revolutionary Islam in the Middle East, it is Hezbollah,"¹⁴⁸ although its move towards domestic, mainstream, democratic, and political participation has become more accommodating in terms of lifestyle, politics and business. All the same, some party officials, as well as supporters, felt that Hizbullah needed to issue a new document that would provide a clearer and wider vision on the resistance and its current political work and future social and ideological plans. From the day it was promulgated, some have been advising the party to amend and 'tone down' the 1985 language, which reflects a different period of Lebanese history and international conflict. Others avert that we are still in the same period, only more deeply.¹⁴⁹ Against this backdrop, Hizbullah's seventh Party Conference drafted a more contemporary 32-page manifesto, reflecting 28 years of political maturity.

Significantly, the manifesto, in Arabic called 'the Political Document' (*al-Wathiqah al-Siyasiyah*)¹⁵⁰, which Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah presented in a speech in November 2009, omits the call to create an Islamic state, and recognizes that the Lebanese political system is the most suitable environment in which for Hizbullah to operate for the time being. The new ideological platform should be seen in the context of the group's post-electoral efforts to reposition itself within Lebanon. Although the Hizbullah-led March 8 opposition forces lost the June 2009 parliamentary elections to March 14, the elections still awarded Hizbullah thirteen parliamentary seats and reconfirmed their political importance and popular support as a Lebanese-Shia armed resistance organization.

In truth, however, this shift in domestic priorities does not come as a surprise to those who have observed Hizbullah's political evolution over the past decades. As early as 1992,

¹⁴⁷ Benadetta Berti, "The "Rebirth" Of Hizbollah: Analyzing the 2009 Manifesto." *Strategic Assessment* 12, 4, February (2010):yy, accessed on October 5, 2010, [www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1267609505.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1267609505.pdf)

¹⁴⁸ Cambanis, *A Privilege to Die*, 11

¹⁴⁹ Frankin Lamb, "Hezbollah's New Manifesto: The "Rebirth," *The Palestine Chronicle*, February 12, 2009, accessed October 5, 2010, http://www.palestinechronicle.com/view_article_details.php?id=15588

¹⁵⁰ Muhammed Abdullah, "وثيقة حزب الله"، *al-Manar*, 29 November, 2009, accessed October 1, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=113293&language=ar>

when the organization first decided to join the political system and participate in the parliamentary elections, it had started to underplay the goal of creating an Islamic state, describing it as a long-term desideratum more than a practical, political objective and, in effect, recognizing that the political reality of Lebanon did not allow for the realization of an Islamic republic.¹⁵¹ Calls to reform and amend the political system do exist. The document affirms:

إنَّ المشكلة الأساسية في النظام السياسي اللبناني، والتي تمنع إصلاحه وتطويره وتحديثه بشكل مستمر هي الطائفية السياسية

The main problem in the Lebanese political system which stops reform, development, and modernization, is the political sectarianism.¹⁵²

While ranking the abolition of confessionalism¹⁵³ among its key priorities, Hizbullah also claims that until the achievement of this goal, “The consensual democracy will remain the fundamental basis for governance in Lebanon.”¹⁵⁴ Their political role within Lebanon is more secure than ever, both through the National Unity agenda and the executive cabinet, and through the government’s guarantee that it would not (and cannot) actively pursue disarmament. The detailed four-part document provides many specifics on how Hizbullah plans to work with the new unity government to improve Lebanon and the lives of its entire population, intentionally staying within the realms of the ‘rotten’ political scene with an agenda to revise it, since the time to enforce a true Islamic ‘just society’ in Lebanon is not ripe.

إنَّ لبنان هو وطننا ووطن الآباء والأجداد، كما هو وطن الأبناء والأحفاد وكل الأجيال الآتية، وهو الوطن الذي قدّمنا من أجل سيادته وعزته وكرامته وتحرير أرضه أغلى التضحيات وأعزّ الشهداء. هذا الوطن نريده لكل اللبنانيين على حد سواء، يحتضنهم ويتسع لهم ويشمخ بهم ويعطاءاتهم.

¹⁵¹ Berti, “The “Rebirth of Hizbollah”, 96

¹⁵² Abdullah, “Hizbullah Manifesto”

¹⁵³ Also phrased “Consociationalism” (*al-Tawafuqiyyah or al-Tawafuqiyyah al-tawa'iffiyyah*), a current Lebanese euphemism for the more traditional, but increasingly disparaged "confessionalism."

¹⁵⁴

اتفاق الطائف

Lebanon is our homeland and the homeland of our fathers and ancestors. It is also the homeland of our children, grandchildren and all the coming generations. It is the country for which sovereignty, might, honor/dignity and its freedom, we made the most valuable sacrifice and gave the most beloved martyrs. This is the homeland we want for all Lebanese equally – it embraces them and has room for them, and is proud of them, and what they give to it.¹⁵⁵

“In fact, Hizbullah did not – contrary to what several commentators have suggested – release its renewed ideological platform during a phase of weakness, as an ‘accommodation tool’.”¹⁵⁶ As prominent scholar Berti assessed, the current situation is one of power, and this manifest reflects the organization’s growing understanding of international politics and reveals its attempt to employ terminology and notions that are commonly associated with the ‘anti-globalization’ and ‘leftist’ movements, to transcend its national and regional boundaries and identify as an international movement.¹⁵⁷ Sayyid Nasrallah addresses the West’s imposition on the Arab countries as US hegemony and remnants of colonialism.

This universal war against terrorism¹⁵⁸, he claims, is an attempt to remove the Resistance’s legitimacy and thereby seek to remove their fundamental right as a nation to defend their rights to live and national sovereignty. This is coherent with governmental policy, and not only the rantings of a guerilla leader. Sayyid Nasrallah is clear that the United States has indirectly created the Resistance, giving them little choice but to resist, at least if they are to have better and secure life and future. Future, build on brotherhood, diversity and mutual responsibility as reflected in the best historical traditions.¹⁵⁹

Renewed rhetoric in the manifest includes a few vital turnarounds on frequently used phrases such as the constant struggle against the Jewish State, stating “Our problem with them is not that they are Jews. Our problem is that they are occupiers who have usurped our land and sacred places.” Cambanis argues that even though the party has excised hatred of Jews

¹⁵⁵ Abdullah, “وثيقة حزب الله”

¹⁵⁶ Berti, “The “Rebirth of Hizbollah”, 93

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Abdullah “وثيقة حزب الله”

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

since the original Letter, anti-semitism does not distinguish Hizbullah. It has attracted supporters and poses such a strategic, theoretical threat due to the uncompromising and violent opposition of any peace negotiations. It is committed to destroying the Jewish State of Israel.¹⁶⁰ Nasrallah “went out of his way”¹⁶¹ to call the Jewish State by its name Israel, as do other Hizbullah leaders. This sensitivity to public opinion is ultimately politically pragmatic, and observes that the resistance is against the Zionist Policy and not Jews or the religion of Judaism. Nasrallah contradicts himself, though, as was the case in an infamous speech of 1998, where Nasrallah called Zionist Jews “the descendants of apes and pigs.”¹⁶² He had previously voiced a contradictory rhetoric, claiming:

*Islamic intellectualism and religion have throughout Islamic History never laid the foundation for a hostile attitude against Judaism and Jews. The war between ourselves and Israel is a war against Zionism and its plans, and not against Judaism as a religion or against those who believe in that religion.*¹⁶³

This contradiction enormously complicates, as Noe stresses, any possible reconciliation or normalization between the two in the future. It could maintain a level of ‘contained’ hostility, of permanent ceasefire on Hizbullah’s terms, but the rhetoric suggests that the skepticism of Judaism “may have run so deep as to become dangerously mired in what amounts to racial hatred.”¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ Cambanis, *A Privilege to Die*, 10

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* 8

¹⁶² Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 193

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 187

III. قرارات Resolutions

Local Peacekeeping

UNIFIL's presence today is equally obvious to the naked eye, but far from subtle. The white trucks racing through traffic, standing outside the hip Costa coffee shop or parked at the Tyre Rest House¹⁶⁵ is a reminder of the thousands of civilian and military personnel present. The contingents themselves do not live in the villages any longer, as they did in the early days of the mission. Now, they rumble through the streets in armored personnel vehicles on patrol, rarely engaging with locals on a daily level.

"You cannot do peacekeeping if you don't meet with people," Timur Goksel stressed in June 2010. "We asked our authorities if we could meet this new group called 'Hizb Allah', back in the early eighties. They said officially no; UNIFIL was only to deal with the official factions in the region, not guerilla groups, but unofficially they said yes. At our own risk. So we did."¹⁶⁶ Hizbullah's relations to UNIFIL have evolved from the Open Letters threat of dealing "with them exactly as we deal with Zionist invasion forces"¹⁶⁷ to a more pragmatic side-by-side 'We won't touch you, you don't touch us' approach. UNIFIL has issued repeated press releases on how the enhanced UNIFIL presence in the South has a "positive(ely) impact on the local economy" and the approximate 40 million USD that has gone back into the Lebanese economy, increased commodities, tourism, medical insurance to national staff members.¹⁶⁸

However, this is not nearly enough. In the time of crisis, the "first with the most" is often the winner of the hearts and minds, as mentioned earlier. Hizbullah's social services section is already integrated into Lebanese society; the Lebanese Shia view Hizbullah's services as an essential part of everyday life. This was one of the major failings in post-2006 aid to Lebanon, as mentioned earlier. International aid was too slow and uneven in disbursement. Thus, Hizbullah's organizations were more effective. U.S. aid after 2006 was \$108 million, of which ten percent was direct to the aid of the government. The rest was

¹⁶⁵ Meeting point for everything Western in Tyre. UNIFIL safety compound in case of emergency.

¹⁶⁶ Meeting with Goksel, Beirut, June 2010

¹⁶⁷ Norten, "Nass al-risala al-maftuha", 182

¹⁶⁸ "UNIFIL: How it Benefits the Local Economy", *UNIFIL Press Release*, October 5, 2006, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?grm2catid=174&tabid=1840>

disbursed through NGOs, which does not enhance the Lebanese government's capacity or legitimacy, but is the most cost-effective for donors.

Nasrallah clearly spells out UNIFIL's role in the South in the 2009 rally. This media uproar, or rather unnecessary noise, he claims are powers trying to amend the UNIFIL mission

The Lebanese government's ability to replace Hizbullah and become the "defenders of Lebanon" is highly dependent on taking control of the national borders and the full deployment of the LAF to the Blue Line. The mandate states UNIFIL's is to "accompany and support" the LAF, which has not been fully developed, trained or equipped. This would involve actual patrolling together, or at least in clear view of each other. As it is now, UNIFIL and the LAF have separate check points and patrols, and UNIFIL is at the mercy of the LAF in the case of any incidents. UNIFIL has also been unable to stop arms shipments from reaching Hizbullah from its main supplier, Iran. An arms shipment recently intercepted by the Israelis showed the massive quantities being transferred and that this apprehension was merely a practical 'nuisance' to the party, as they are already stronger than they were before the war in 2006.¹⁶⁹

The fault lies not in the troops, but in the mandate's incoherence with reality on the ground. Major impediments to following their ROE result in a classic Catch 22. The new engagement rules enhance military mobility to act beyond self-defense, but are denied in all circumstances by either requiring the LAF's presence before engaging and the tendency of UN officers to first having their orders cleared with their national governments, causing an indirect chain of command, which is greatly complicated when the UNIFIL mission consists of so many multiethnic contingents. Thus, they are prevented from using force to implement their mandate, according to their own mandate.

Despite these realities on the ground, and the ineffectiveness and unsuccessful resolution, the 'traditional' peacekeeping mission still withstands, and is improved since its birth in 1978. UNIFIL now has consent from all parties involved and has maintained understanding and cooperation from local civilians. This would not be the case if UNIFIL had begun to implement its mandate aggressively; it would quickly become a disaster "...because expanded peacekeeping missions are more robust and are usually impartial, they alienate the

¹⁶⁹ Reuters *et.al.*, "Israel Navy chief: Hezbollah-bound Iran ship carried hundreds of tons of arms", Haaretz.com, November 4, 2009, accessed November 1, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-navy-chief-hezbollah-bound-iran-ship-carried-hundreds-of-tons-of-arms-1.4791>

local population and often make civilians hostile towards peacekeeping troops.”¹⁷⁰ These new peacekeeping missions suffer from the same general problems, and tend to fall victim to following ‘template missions’, not a suitable starting point for successful missions.¹⁷¹

Although Resolution 1701 is regularly criticized and violated on all sides, the parties involved continue to value the framework it provides as an “integral component of the status quo.”¹⁷²

Hizbullah is acutely aware of realities on the ground, as Nasrallah clearly states UNIFIL’s area of operation: “namely, to support the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese legitimate forces. That is all.” Consequently, UNIFIL “cannot erect checkpoints, raid houses, or search places, for that is the task of the sovereign institutions.”¹⁷³

Nasrallah was clear in his speech in August 2009 on the dealings of the international community to exploit incidents, to amend the Resolution into a multinational force, as proposed in 2006. Hence, this push collapsed due to Lebanese unwillingness to amend the mandate. A cessation of hostilities was attainable greatly due to the presence of UNIFIL II, but is now fraught with conceptual problems, after the 2006 war. The mission may be procedurally flexible, but without any operational planning, how the ambitious goals set out in the mandate are to be achieved, “The mission simply goes on in time and becomes part of the scenery.”¹⁷⁴

As Haenni said, “The Shia stick with Hizbullah because of the weapons.” Shia mentality has shifted in recent years from being marginalized or poor to being a political target, and “Being a target, no matter who the enemy is, makes you gravitate towards weapons.”¹⁷⁵ Broad public support for the resistance far outdoes any faith in UNIFIL’s ability

¹⁷⁰ Yukin, “Unifil’s Mandate”, 12

¹⁷¹ Mads Berdal, *Building Peace After War* (London: Routledge/ IISS, 2009):177

¹⁷² International Crisis Group, “Drums of War: Israel and the axis of Resistance,” Middle East Report no 97, August 2, 2010. accessed August 4, 2010, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-lebanon/lebanon/097-drums-of-war-israel-and-the-axis-of-resistance.aspx>

¹⁷³ Al-Manar TV. “السيد نصر الله: اذا قصفت الضاحية او بيروت”

¹⁷⁴ Alexander Mattelaer, “Europe Rediscovered Peacekeeping? Political and Military Logics in the 2006 Unifil Enhancement,” *Egmont- The Royal Institute for International Relations*, October (2009):32 accessed September 5, 2010, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/sum/ep34.html>

¹⁷⁵ [Now](#) Staff, “Talking to Patrick Haenni”, NowLebanon, October 12, 2007, accessed August 25, 2010, <http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=16115>.

to protect or prevent a future conflict; the same goes for the much respected LAF, who is too split along sectarian lines, to actually be of any use.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ Magnus Norell, "A Victory for Islamism? The Second Lebanon War and Its Repercussions," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, November 2009, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=319>

Foreign Intervention

لا شك أنّ الإرهاب الأميركي هو أصل كل إرهاب في العالم

No doubt, that the US terror is the root of all terror in the world.¹⁷⁷

U.S. involvement is of vital importance in the case of, if ever, a future conflict between the party and Israel erupts. Strong forces within the U.S. policy think tanks recommend supporting such a conflict, if it were to occur, to “break(ing) Hizballah’s military capabilities and reduce-(ing)e its political power; disabusing Syria of the notion that it can act in Lebanon to further its own interests without significant cost; and removing the potent Hizballah proxy from Iran’s foreign policy arsenal.”¹⁷⁸ According to this recent policy report and similar other briefings issued from Washington, only successful IDF operations can achieve those goals and “Israel will most likely prevail in this scenario.”¹⁷⁹

The push to give the IDF both the time and political space it needs to carry out those objectives has been done before. In the last few days of *Harb-Tammuz*, the IDF initiated ‘Operation Litani’, with U.S. blessings, causing unnecessary civilian loss and destruction the last weekend in a final attempt to subdue the Resistance. The obsession with Iran manifests itself into the conflagration of fear in the region in the case of a war. Continuing along the neoconservative track as of late 2010, some are pushing to aid and support pro-Western forces within the Lebanese government to hinder Hizbullah in staging a slow coup of the state, and thwarting any attempt by Tehran to take advantage of the situation created by a Lebanon war.”¹⁸⁰ Recommendations that “The US must demonstrate (that) it will use force if necessary” is most certainly not in the best interests of the Lebanese. Ever since the offer from Iran to negotiate an understanding in 1998, which included reduced support to Hizbullah, was rejected by the Bush Administration, the United States has been losing chances of possibly

¹⁷⁷ Abdullah “وثيقة حزب الله” ,

¹⁷⁸ Jeffery White, "If War Comes: Israel Vs. Hizballah and Its Allies", *Policy Focus: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, September (2010):xi, accessed October 10, 2010, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=334>

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* xii

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.* xi

building a better relationship with pre-Ahmadinejad Iran. Which may have been precisely what Bush's neoconservative speechwriters intended.¹⁸¹

The question Noe asks is “why the US approach to containing Hizbullah was ultimately so narrow and unsuccessful?” As suggested above, the last question is perhaps the most important, since it directly addresses what might have been done differently. On this account, several answers present themselves. Foremost, the United States consistently saw the issue of Hizbullah through a regional geopolitical lens that focused, sometimes exclusively, on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. If Syria and Israel, in particular, could negotiate a compromise, then the issue of Hizbullah would most likely vanish – or top officials from the Reagan administration through even to the beginning of the G.W. Bush administration believed. This macro-diplomatic approach necessarily meant that robust methods of dealing with the party in and of itself were not as urgently sought as that they might have been in conflict elsewhere.”¹⁸² This is best exemplified by the Geneva deal that broke down in 1999 between Israel and Syria, which *might* have brought Israel and Hizbullah to an agreement indirectly, although not promoting ‘normalization’, but a deal nonetheless.

Declaring a ‘war on terror’, and not exclusively on 9/11 perpetrators, wrongly viewed terrorism as a military problem, instead of one that is best addressed through patient intelligence efforts, domestic security measures, and quiet collaboration with like-minded governments. Hizbullah is not at the same polemic level as say Al-Qaida, as they place great emphasis on their political participation and do not solely promote pure jihadism and martyrdom without the accompanying respect and desire to maintain public support on a secular level. The party’s information and intelligence apparatus is extensive. The media and released information is followed closely, in English as well as Hebrew, along with possible sources of classified information from, among others, high-ranking officials within the American intelligence system.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Stephen M. Walt, "Delusion Points." *Foreign Policy*, November 8, 2010, accessed November 8, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/08/delusion_points?page=0,0

¹⁸² Noe, “The Relationship,” 8

¹⁸³ Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, "Hezbollah: Signs of a Sophisticated Intelligence Apparatus," *Terrorism Intelligence Report*, December 7, 2007, accessed October 12, 2010, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/hezbollah_signs_sophisticated_intelligence_apparatus. Individuals have been exposed and accused of being spies and Hizbullah information gatherers.

Moving from the current status of a ‘cessation of hostilities’ to a ceasefire seems to be distant. The UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon has raised this issue in meetings with Lebanese politicians and Hizbullah, and is quoted wishing it to happen by the end of 2010. He also added that the "three-and-a-half years since the resolution was issued in August 2006 there has been remarkable stability along the Blue Line with Israel, contrasting with the previous 30 years when there was some incident every year."¹⁸⁴ The year of 2010 has not been without its internal challenges. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was a hotly disputed topic from the start. The four years since its inception have been riddled with the “political rangles of setting up such a big institution”,¹⁸⁵ in addition to its domestically debated unconstitutionality. The president did not sign on to the decree, albeit the majority did, and it has a broad basis within the Lebanese legal system.

At any rate, an unusual UN tribunal was initiated to investigate the assassination of one man, as opposed to the other international tribunals, ie in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, which are open for all crime committed within a given timeframe. Several assassinations have been committed over the years, without justice. “One does not make tribunals for friends,”¹⁸⁶ as Beirut journalist Nashabe put it. This “unique experiment” is an ongoing point of conflict, which has escalated in intensity ever since it has been leaked that possible Hizbullah affiliated members could be indicted, already in March 2011. Nassrallah issued a speech in August, insinuating that Israel was involved in the al-Hariris assassination, pointing to drone video footage dating back to 1996. The statement cannot be seen as an accusation, more likely leading the focus away from their arms, and questioning the STL’s ‘justice’ as long as Israel was never formally investigated. He has aired repeated rallies to boycott the STL, and accuses it of being a hand of the United States and/or Israel, as the indictments now have possibly turned toward the party itself, Nasrallah has turned away from the will to call to legal justice as he did in 2005 and has opined a full boycott of the STL.

Terje Roed-Larsen, SRSG, just recently termed this a “hyper dangerous situation”, in danger of escalating out of control. Storms or not, major forces of Lebanese political restraint are in motion, the first being the restraint the ministers and governmental blocs have shown this past year on multiple occasions that could have quickly escalated.

¹⁸⁴ Abdel-Latif, “Mission Not Impossible”

¹⁸⁵ Radio Adelaide, “Interview with Timur Goksel”

¹⁸⁶ Meeting with Al-Achbar journalist Omar Nashabe, Beirut, June 14 2010.

These incidents could all have been exploited, internally or externally, to initiate a conflict. Despite this, they did not. A major functional conflict de-escalation factor, which is seldom aired in the media, is the 'tripartite' dialogue that UN officials immediately set up following an incident, with UNIFIL top officials, the IDF and the LAF. These dialogues assess what happened, why and how to move on, avoiding one side being stigmatized or forced to seek revenge.

Epilogue

*“You want to know the future. Well, I do not see the United States or Israel in the region. Israel does not have the necessary means of survival in this region for more than a few decades, and those who live long enough, will be witness to that.”*¹⁸⁷

Despite the prolonged ‘peace’ along the Southern borders since the implementation of Resolution 1701 in 2006, the situation has been deteriorating into a ‘war of deterrence,’ and the only aspect preventing a new war is the fear that the next one will be all-engulfing. This so-called ‘remarkable stability’ has been a time of rearmament, deterrence, posturing and weapons-cache building. The Lebanese Army has of yet to build up a decent base, and is dependent on U.S. aid, or other, possibly Iranian and French, now that the United States has frozen transfers to Lebanon. Hizbullah’s International Public Relations representative said the U.S. aid is “throwing ashes in the eyes. Real military aid would be anti-air craft missiles, but no one is ready for that. Especially since they will and can be used against the IDF.”¹⁸⁸ Deterrence is a method to maintain peace. Although it is not necessarily what Hizbullah wants in the long run, it is postponing a war that will be both larger on a regional and intensity scale. The reoccurring trend to view Lebanese conflicts as geopolitical in the region has funneled massive funding and an obsessive focus on the symptoms of the problem: Hizbullah, and not the root: the weak Lebanese government. Thus, the reality on the ground is a constant proxy to whoever sees it in their own best interest, in relations with Iran or Israel.

The core reasons the civil war began are the same reasons that peace-building in Lebanon is so difficult: poverty, sectarianism and confessionalism.¹⁸⁹ UNIFIL challenges are also rooted at the core of the UN political system, even though the possibilities for a containment policy without negating state-building or peacekeeping operations do exist. Numerous times, Nasrallah has opened for imaginative intervention on the part of the UN or the United States, and the ongoing hatred of being fueled in the South between Israelis and the Shia can be resolved using alternate conflict-resolution tools. As in any conflict, the

¹⁸⁷ Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 231

¹⁸⁸ Meeting with Omar Moussawi. al-Dahiyyeh, Beirut, June 15 2010

¹⁸⁹ Are Knudsen, "Precarious Peacebuilding," *Christian Michelsen Institute Working Paper*, December (2005): 18

challenge is to think outside the box into which the parties have boxed themselves.

Comparing the two, Israel and Hizbullah, it is tempting to claim that Hizbullah is most lenient to change and evolution in ideology, far surpassing the Israeli's ability to reflect and alter strategy.

The disarmament of Hizbullah is one of the chief quandaries. Hizbullah defines itself as a resistance movement, not a "militia" (as was stated in UN Resolution 1559), and it will not disarm itself unless presented with a "viable alternative to resistance."¹⁹⁰ The International Crisis Group has recommended that the various parties involved accept Hizbullah's armed status and find ways to contain it instead. Hizbullah's weapons must be dealt with in a way that neither completely ignores the problem, nor entirely resolves it. Disarmament is not an option. Some see their weapons as a shield, whereas others in the nation consider them a threat.¹⁹¹ Hizbullah will hang onto its justifications for armed resistance. Addressing the problem of direct threat: returning the Shebaa Farms, ending provocative overflights, land mines/ cluster bombs and the release of prisoners would indeed make their arguments less tenable, but the indirect threats are equally important such as the 'front of refusal' which rejects Israel and all U.S. influence, and the endemic lack of national unity. Timor Goksel has added that if these problems were resolved, Hizbullah would find other valid causes such as water resources, as mentioned previously.¹⁹²

نعود للقوة ، للجيش والشعب والمقاومة التي يجب أن نسميها المعادلة الذهبية لحماية لبنان.

Nasrallah, he calls the "Power-Army-People-Resistance" the golden formula that protects Lebanon.¹⁹³ A mantric term, it has been used to praise the unity of the official Lebanese stance simultaneously incorporating all citizens into the resistance narrative against the enemy. This is masterfully clairvoyant of a future conflict, as Nasrallah senses the pressures being pushed on him will not be in the best interest of the Lebanese people. The governmental support for this tripartite cooperation is evident:

¹⁹⁰ IRIN, "Lebanon"

¹⁹¹ International Crisis Group, "Hezbollah and the Lebanese Crisis," Middle East Report N.69, October 10, (2007): 23, accessed March 15, 2010, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-lebanon/lebanon/069-hezbollah-and-the-lebanese-crisis.aspx>

¹⁹² *Ibid.* 23

¹⁹³ Abdullah. "السيد نصرالله يؤكد أن هناك من صنعَ شهود الزور ويدعو لبنان لبناء مفاعل نووي"،

اليوم نؤكد المعادلة التي صنعت الانتصار: الجيش والشعب والمقاومة، كما يقول البيان الوزاري وكما قال أمس الرئيس سليمان وقالها بحق، أولاً هو يعبر عن الموقف الرسمي اللبناني الذي يعبر عنه البيان الوزاري وليس موقف من يعترض هنا ويتحفظ هناك وهذا يحق له أن يبدي رأيه

Today, we confirm the equation that secured victory: The army, the people and the resistance, as it was said by the ministerial statement and was reiterated by President Suleiman who expressed the official Lebanese stand in this statement... Suleiman conveyed his convictions and experience, while voicing the opinion of the majority of the Lebanese people because there is no Lebanese consensus over or against the resistance.¹⁹⁴

Referring to the Lebanese as a generic population, often in lofty terms of noble and the like, creates a general sense of belonging. Just like the confessionalist system, if there is no consensus, he then creates the reality to his best interest. Israeli scholars and analysts have also realized the ‘steadfastness’ of the Resistance speeches.¹⁹⁵

These reoccurring terms are a trademark, and the continued exploration of Nasrallah’s speeches and statements would presumably shed even more light on a muddled view of the Resistance. Through the selected speeches used, it seems viable to presume that Resolution 1701 is a catalyst to ongoing tension and deterioration into a ‘war of deterrence’ with Israel and governmental ineptitude in Lebanon.

These mandates must be rethought as soon as possible to hinder external players from “using Lebanon as the match to ignite a conflagration of violence in the region.”¹⁹⁶ Resolution 1701 underlines the need for “territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon.”¹⁹⁷ This requires a holistic approach. The compartmentalized nature of the UN structure reflects a view that the UNIFIL mission is separate from, and unrelated to, the missions of providing humanitarian aid or investigating the Hariri murder. These separate

¹⁹⁴ Abdullah and Sha’ytū. “السيد نصرالله يعلن معادلة جديدة في المواجهة”

¹⁹⁵ Amos Harel, "Hezbollah Chief's Speeches Sways Israeli Opinion More Than Any Arab Leader," *Haaretz.com*, 12 August, 2010, accessed August 29, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/hezbollah-chief-s-speeches-sway-israeli-opinion-more-than-any-arab-leader-1.301347>

¹⁹⁶ Noe, “Craving”

¹⁹⁷ “Resolution 1701”

institutions are all facets of a single state-building mission in the midst of an insurgency.¹⁹⁸

William Moony recommends appointing a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Lebanon, encompassing all offices of the UN in the country, which would greatly reduce bureaucratic costs and enhance holistic operational planning.

One of many required reforms for successful UN operations is greater knowledge acquirement, with a deeper focus on regional and local experiences, if the UN is to become a credible peace support force. Knowledge acquisition must be in focus, and all levels of the mission must have access to this ever-changing information at all times, to understand and monitor an ever-changing society.¹⁹⁹ This is not years of study, Pouligny claims, but rather a collection of what all social sciences can contribute: geography, political science, economy, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and so on. “Locals are not passive recipients to international involvement; neither are they obstacles to successful operations.”²⁰⁰ Often, the importance of this relationship is underrated. The nature between the two is a decisive element in determining the operation’s success or failure. A relationship characterized by mounting hostility, suspicion and lack of communication is sufficient cause for failure. Without reform, the new robust force “will retain a major deficit that characterizes almost any international force, namely an endemic lack of local knowledge and language skills.” Enhanced and better equipped peacekeepers is not the answer. The conditions within the country that produce the Resistance should be addressed. If Lebanon is to avoid spiraling back to violence of civil war proportions, and if the international community is to avoid using sovereign Lebanese land as a theatre of war, as has been done so many times in the past, a new approach must be taken by the Security Council, and thus ultimately, by the United States. There is a critical need for fundamental political reform. The mounting differences and tribulations in confessionalism have remained unhealed ever since the civil war. The power-sharing foundation should also be ratified. If not, it will result in “cyclic crisis, governmental deadlock, unaccountability and sectarianism.”²⁰¹

Writing in 2009 on Islamism's victory, analyst Norell accurately forecasts the conflagration of small-scale wars. If these implementations are not successful,

¹⁹⁸ Mooney, “Stabilizing Lebanon”

¹⁹⁹ Beatrice Pouligny and Centre d'etudes et de recherches Internationales, *Peace Operations Seen From Below: UN missions and Local people* (London: Hurst, 2006): 273

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰¹ International Crisis Group, “Hezbollah and the Lebanese Crisis”, ii

but perhaps are the state-building processes necessary to create a strong Lebanese state, they do not negate Hezbollah gaining power within the government. He said the rise of Islamism is the use of ‘victories’ to justify the “armed resistance” and keep it alive and simmering.²⁰² In this case, a future scenario cannot use the same logic that Norell claims the Resistance uses against it. There is a fundamental need for a clearer view of the Resistance. What are Nasrallah’s changing ideological priorities, as he moves further towards mainstream political participation, the more difficult his and the parties ideology is to define. Hezbollah’s state-building capabilities are at such an awe-inspiring level of success, being a state within a state, that all possibilities to slowly merge the Resistance into the army, and keep the party should be addressed sagaciously and promptly. Peace and conflict resolution theories built on Islamic traditions, opposed to Western secular rational thought, *might* be a tool to discovering the third alternative, the imaginative one. This transcends²⁰³ other options and is not based on compromises, but rather new ideas, floated on logic and imagination, and avoiding animosity due to resulting ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.

There will be no *sustainable* peace without a solution that addresses the relations to Syria, Iran, the United States and Israel. Lebanon is a mirror of the region, in constant movement. Lebanon will most likely continue to survive the intrigue and ambition of its more powerful neighbors to the East and South, just as it has survived foreign interlopers for centuries. The Lebanese people must unite, collectively supplant the sectarian confessionalist government, introduce state sovereignty, and avoid sectarian provocations and incitements. Today, nobody can impose domination over the other, so all parties try to find outside sponsors:

Boils down to accord between Saudi Arabia and Syria, then the Lebanese situation will be solved. We need the regional outside powers to agree. Israel would be happy if Lebanon was run by Syria. They do not care about democracy. They tried in 1982, they will not get involved in the inner politics (again), they are looking at the security angle, they would love to see the backside of Hezbollah, but the Shia community cannot be removed.²⁰⁴

²⁰² Magnus Norell, "A Boatload of Trouble," *Foreign Policy*, November 9, 2009, accessed October 5, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/09/a_boatload_of_trouble?page=0,0

²⁰³ See <http://www.transcend.org/> for this type of conflict resolution theory.

²⁰⁴ Radio Adelaide, “Interview with Timur Goksel”

The government of Lebanon should be bolstered in order to commit to welfare and extend sovereignty to the impoverished South and *al-Dahiyyeh*. A mental shift is needed internally, as Goksel stated in 2007 that many people would like to see Lebanon continue as a failing state, so they can continue to live their feudal, tribal luxuries. The state is only needed to issue passports, manage the airport and handle the money.²⁰⁵

Historical memories of injustice are inhibiting the Shia from moving forward; they need to be welcomed into the future governing of the country, and introduced into civil society. A direct connection exists between economic development and the armed resistance: the poorer the society, the greater resistance. One cannot coerce a weak state just recently reemerging from violent conflict into democratic governance. One must invest first in human capital, creating human and economic development.²⁰⁶ The current culture of peace and conflict resolution is mostly founded on human security, which is a vital element of intervention and crisis management, but moving on from this rhetoric is vital to avoid stagnation.

Moving into a permanent stable ceasefire with Israel would be a first step, the resolution of the 'four bleeding wounds', water issues. This would ease anxieties on both the North and South front. People could continue with their lives, paint their houses, and invest without the fear of the next 'hot' summer. A peaceful resolution would be a victory for all the people in the region. It would be based on human security, sovereignty, and with time, a sort of normalization. The alternative is a scenario that will only create violence in an ongoing global war on 'terror'. Make no mistake, they are all preparing for it, and Hizbullah will undoubtedly survive, but it is difficult to imagine Nasrallah justifying another disastrous war on the Lebanese civilian population.

An accord between Syria and Israel is a key element of all proposed scenarios for Arab-Israeli peace. In exchange for returning the occupied Golan Heights, Israel and the United States will insist on the disarmament of Hezbollah. Although both Hezbollah and Iran still argue, perhaps correctly, that Israel will not return Golan Heights or allow the emergence of a Palestinian state, the possibility of peace cannot be ruled out. If it does occur, Syria will push Lebanon into a peace treaty with Israel, forcing it to adjust to the new realities.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*.

²⁰⁶ ul-Huda, "Enhancing Capacity Skills", 229

²⁰⁷ Paul Salem, "Hezbollah in a Corner." *Project Syndicate*, July 23, 2010, accessed November 5, 2010, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/salem6/English>

Given its popularity, Hizbullah will continue as an influential party, and regardless of the outcome or its international stamp as a terrorist organization, it is a vital, undeniable player in the future of a free Lebanon. Nasrallah has stated that “A peaceful resolution is a victory for the resistance.”²⁰⁸ Hopefully he is right.

²⁰⁸ Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 220

ABSTRAKT

Dette studiet hadde som hensikt å undersøke utvalgte taler og manifest fra Hizbullah, for å finne freds retorikken, og en mulig fredlig løsning på konfliktene i Libanon. Det har blitt understreket, at det som tidligere var uoppnåelige krav fra Hizbullah, bl. de ‘fire blødende sår’: fanger i Israel, Israelske overflygninger, mangel på kart over miner og klasebomber og den siste, okkuperte områder, selv om disse nå i dagens politiske bevegelser, kunne ha blitt oppfylt, gjenstår det en hovednøkkel til Hizbullah’s mulige avvæpning og overgang til å være et rent politisk parti; nemlig mangelen på en fungerende regjering, og statens manglende evne til å yte forsvar og samfunnsikkerhet.

Hezbollah’s General Sekretær Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah har sagt “en fredlig løsning/ resolusjon er en seier for motstandsbevegelsen”. Som med de fleste taler til Nasrallah, skal de tæs med et klype salt, og alvorlig, simultant. Nasrallah holder som oftest det han lover, som kan sees gjentatte ganger i den siste tid.

FN’s innsats og mandater i landet synes å være svak utrustet med lokal kontekst, uoppnåelige krav og fraværet av et holistisk tilnærming. Til tross for stempelet som ‘terror-organisasjon’ er Hezbollah en relativ demokratisk politisk parti, en massiv velferdsstats institusjon, og en uungåelig viktig brikke i fremtiden til et fritt Libanon.

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