dc.contributor.author | Lømo, Teis Lunde | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-08-03T12:20:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-08-03T12:20:54Z | |
dc.date.created | 2021-02-08T14:26:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-1765 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2766040 | |
dc.description.abstract | A manufacturer who offers secret contracts faces an opportunism problem: She undercuts her own input prices and fails to offset retail competition. I show that this problem diminishes when retailers are risk averse and face demand uncertainty. Risk aversion and uncertainty create a bilateral risk sharing incentive that raises equilibrium input prices above marginal cost. The manufacturer can therefore profit from downstream risk aversion when retail competition is fierce. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.rights | Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | Vertical control, opportunism, and risk sharing | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | Copyright 2020 The Authors | en_US |
dc.source.articlenumber | 109114 | en_US |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109114 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1887716 | |
dc.source.journal | Economics Letters | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Economics Letters. 2020, 191, 109114. | en_US |
dc.source.volume | 191 | en_US |