Logical contextualism

dc.contributor.author	Antonsen, Pål Fjeldvig
dc.date.accessioned	2023-01-17T11:54:21Z
dc.date.available	2023-01-17T11:54:21Z
dc.date.created	2022-08-17T06:43:02Z
dc.date.issued	2022
dc.identifier.issn	0020-174X
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3043991
dc.description.abstract	This paper outlines a contextualist version of logical pluralism. One motivation for this idea comes from a desire to block a principal argument against pluralism called ‘the meaning-variance objection’. The paper also gives two contextualist analyses of validity: one according to which ‘is valid’ is use-sensitive, another according to which it is assessment-sensitive. It argues that local pluralists should accept the former, while global pluralists should accept the latter.	en_US
dc.language.iso	eng	en_US
dc.publisher	Taylor & Francis	en_US
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no	*
dc.title	Logical contextualism	en_US
dc.type	Journal article	en_US
dc.type	Peer reviewed	en_US
dc.description.version	publishedVersion	en_US
dc.rights.holder	Copyright 2022 The Author(s)	en_US
cristin.ispublished	true
cristin.fulltext	original
cristin.qualitycode	2
dc.identifier.doi	10.1080/0020174X.2022.2075917
dc.identifier.cristin	2043658
dc.source.journal	Inquiry (Oslo)	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Inquiry. 2022	en_US

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