International investment agreements, Constitution and Political Autonomy. An analysis of the protection of investments in the Norwegian Constitution Section 97 compared to the current Norwegian model investment agreement

Abstract

This thesis compares the regulation of future political decisions and legislation in the Norwegian model investment treaty of 2015 with investment protection based on the Norwegian Constitution. It is an analysis of whether the Norwegian model investment agreement's Article 5 provides a stronger protection of investors than Section 97 of the Norwegian Constitution, and thus also restricts the Norwegian authorities further than what would be the case after Norwegian law. The thesis illustrates the different interpretative traditions in domestic and international law and how this may influence the outcome. It includes a problematization of what happens if there is a conflict between the constitution and an international investment treaty. These findings shed light on how to create functional and balanced international investment agreements, as the balance that has developed in the Norwegian legal tradition can serve as a benchmark for how far the agreements should go in restricting the states' right to regulate.