Shame and Gender

Skam og kjønn

Spring/Vår 2021

Name: Kristina Miklavic

Advisor: Kristin Sampson

FILO350

Master Thesis in Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

University of Bergen

Abstract

This thesis deals with the notion of shame and how it operates as a norm regulator for expressing masculinity and femininity, and, thus, forms constructions of idealised gendered subjectivities. As an individual experience, shame is mostly thought of as a negative emotion that debilitates and contributes to suffering. I examine how productive notions of shame can be understood as subjugating, but also transformative, for the individual in light of Foucauldian power and drawing on Manion's work on moral shame. Further, I look at how shame experiences are gendered and, consequently, provide for gendered subjectivities and transformations. It is my aim to show that shame produces subjectivities and that it does so in a gendered way. Lastly, I examine shame and guilt in relation to morality, and how shame can at times falsely present itself as a moral regulator. I specifically look at gender when examining this.

Keywords: shame, gender, subjectivity, power, morality

Abstrakt

Denne masteroppgaven tar for seg skam og hvordan skam opererer som normregulerende i forhold til det å uttrykke maskulinitet og femininitet, og, dermed, konstruerer kjønnede idealer for subjektivitet. Skam er som oftest tenkt som en negativ følelse som svekker et individ og bidrar til lidelse. Jeg utforsker hvordan de produktive sidene ved skam kan sees som subjugerende, men også transformerende, for individer i lys av Foucaults maktbegrep og Manions arbeid med moralsk skam. Videre påpeker jeg hvordan skam erfares kjønnslig og, dermed, bidrar til kjønnede subjektiviteter og transformasjoner. Mitt mål er å vise at skam produserer subjektiviteter og at denne produseringen er kjønnet. Til slutt ser jeg på skam og skyld i forbindelse med moralitet, og hvordan skam kan på falskt grunnlag fremstå som moralsk. Jeg ser spesifikt på kjønn når jeg undersøker dette.

Nøkkelord: skam, kjønn, subjektivitet, makt, moralitet

Acknowledgements

Contents

Introduction

In this thesis, I examine the concept of shame. Further, I analyse shame through Michel Foucault's[1] notion of disciplinary power. I use his conception since it explains how this type of power potentially informs and regulates us from within. I engaged with this inquiry because I believe shame can have a highly negative impact on our lives. Growing up with a foreign-sounding surname in the Norwegian countryside, I was at times shamed by other children.[2] Sometimes, I was called a "fucking foreigner," or "jævla utlending" in Norwegian. Even though I had a happy childhood, this shame has periodically followed me into adulthood. Particularly, when I have experienced microaggressions.[3] In many ways, the underlying message was that I was not a good person because I, apparently, was not Norwegian. It was not just my name; I was told, directly and indirectly, that I was stupid because of my gender. Even though it angered me, a part of me started believing it and as a result, I did not think I was smart enough to attend upper secondary school.[4] Furthermore, it was during my bachelor studies that I realised how I have conformed to feminine gender norms. I still do, but now I am more aware of it. I realised that I tried to conform because I did not want to be an outcast, I wanted to avoid shame, I thought that it was connected to whether I was a morally good person or not.

Feelings of shame and low self-esteem can contribute to exclusion in society. In the West, certain groups that historically were stigmatised and shamed, now receive higher recognition politically and legally. Legalisation of same-sex marriage is an example of this. However, political and judicial acceptance does not necessarily mean an absence of shame. Being queer, I never had a coming out process because I did not feel a need for it. I am not ashamed of my sexuality, but I keep being introverted in this regard. Specific ideas of what it means to be queer, such as having a coming out process and needing to be loud and proud, made me question if I was indeed queer. On occasions, others have questioned my sexuality

---

[1] French historian and philosopher.

[2] One specific incident that stands out was when I was swimming at the local lake with some friends and some older boys splashed water on me while calling me a "fucking foreigner."

[3] For instance, when I was renewing my membership at a gym once, my gym card did not work. When I called in to fix it, we realised that my name was incorrectly spelled. My reply was a simple "ah yes, that can happen" because I am used to that happening and saw it as a quick fix. The response I received was "you cannot expect us to know how to spell the names you people have." Norwegian peers have also told me that I am exotic when they hear my surname.

[4] Fortunately, I also had people around me who encouraged me to apply to United World College for the last two years of upper secondary school. There, I met friends who told me I was smart and could apply for a bachelor's programme where I met people who encouraged me to apply for a master's degree. I was fortunately easily convinced when it came to a master's degree even though I have had my doubts while writing this thesis. Without these people insisting that I give it a try and that I am smart enough, I do not know if I would be writing this thesis.

because I did not conform to their idea of queerness. Through these instances, I have felt like a fraud and ashamed of not being "queer enough." Thanks to the psychology classes I took that had feminist perspectives, I learnt that I was not the only one who felt that I did or did not live up to societal ideals or standards and wondered how this was connected to me as a morally good person. I wanted to learn more about this from a philosophical perspective, so I decided to analyse shame's disciplinary power in a gendered perspective in this master's thesis. I do recognise positive aspects of shame. Therefore, I also explore how shame can be beneficial.

In relation to Foucault's disciplinary power, I examine how it is a force that produces and regulates subjectivities. Here, I analyse how we experience who we are in relation to normative ideals. By normative ideals, I mean standards of being that are valued by the communities we participate in; standards that we, supposedly, ought to strive for and embody and we communicate through norms. I study how we convey our subjectivities to the people in our shared social practice through shame, how we express ourselves and behave in specific ways to try to show that we embody the ideal or at least we are working to achieve it. Specifically, I focus on how these forms of expressions and behaviours are gendered. A gendered expression might be the type of clothes you wear or how you work to change your body in accordance with masculine or feminine body ideals. A gendered behaviour can also be how you act out your sexuality. I argue that shame as a disciplinary force contributes to regulating these gendered expressions and behaviours in accordance with societal norms of what is the standard or valued ideal. To illustrate, we often hear about young adults with eating disorders, high rates of depression, and low self-esteem because they do not feel thin, strong, feminine, or masculine enough. A disproportionate number of people worldwide feel inadequate in light of their respective society's definition of masculinity and femininity, which has a debilitating effect on their lives. When you fail to live up to those ideals, you might feel ashamed of who you are because you might be seen as an outsider of the social group. To stop feeling shame, or to avoid feeling shame altogether, you might try to regulate your behaviour or your expressions so that others, and you, see yourself as feminine or masculine enough.

Moreover, I critically evaluate how our gendered ideals are falsely given a moral value thus reinforcing a regulation of our gendered subjectivities. I identify how shame has moral relevance, but also how we mistake shame's social regulation for moral regulation. In doing so, gendered ideals can seem beneficial for specific social regulations. Further, I look at how falsely portraying gendered ideals as moral reinforces the social regulation of gendered ideals. To illustrate, a society that focuses on reproduction of children might proclaim that women ought

to stay at home while men are out working. In this society, people might shame each other as a means of social control and regulation if you step outside of the role assigned to women or men. Further, in this society, the different roles of man and woman can be used as a justification to state that what it means to be a good person varies depending on your gender. Such society might say that a woman is morally good if she stays at home to nurse the children into adulthood because this would be in line with the ideal of what a good woman is, and that a man is morally good if he is working and provides for his family. Here, adding a moral aspect to who we are as men and women, can reinforce the social regulation since we want to be good human beings. In such a way, I will sustain how gendered ideals of what it means to be a good woman or a good man are falsely given moral value.

Concepts and Central Perspectives

This thesis inscribes itself in the fields of phenomenology, moral psychology, gender theory, and feminist philosophy. It discusses within the field of phenomenology because I look at how we experience shame. It is within moral psychology because I examine how we internalise moral ideas and develop a sense of moral self through shame and disciplinary power. Further, this thesis is within gender theory because I explore how gendered subjectivities are produced and regulated through shame and disciplinary power. Lastly, my thesis has a feminist perspective in my exploration of how gendered subjectivities are produced.

I examine shame in relation to guilt because shame and guilt are feelings that often occur simultaneously. When differentiating shame and guilt, I use Gabriele Taylor[5] and Sandra Lee Bartky.[6] They are similar in their definitions of guilt, but they disagree when it comes to shame. They both argue that feelings of guilt occur when you did something forbidden. Taylor argues that you have to agree with the shamer's, or audience of your shame, values to feel shame. This view is supported by Dan Zahavi.[7] Bartky argues that you do not have to agree with the shamer's values to feel shame. Cheshire Calhoun[8] agrees with Bartky and adds that a shared moral practice with our peers can explain why we feel shame even if we disagree with the shamer. I discuss the arguments for and against having to agree with the shamer's values to feel shame, and submit to Barkty and Cheshire's view that you do not have to agree with the shamer

---

[5] British philosopher that focuses on moral psychology and ethics.
[6] American philosopher that focused on phenomenology and gender studies.
[7] Danish philosopher that focuses on phenomenology.
[8] American philosopher that focuses on moral psychology, ethics, and philosophy of emotion.

to feel shame. Then, I illustrate how we internalise the values of the shamer, even when we do not necessarily agree with them. This is an important aspect, because feeling shame without agreeing with the shamer can make us more prone to shame's regulatory force than we might be aware of.

I use Zahavi to analyse shame's social and isolating characteristics. Specifically, I engage with aspects pertaining to the integration and learning of social norm when exploring the social characteristics. Regarding shame's isolating characteristics, I look at how you might feel excluded and alone if you deviate from the social norms. Regarding my hypothesis, I argue that Zahavi's social and isolating characteristics of shame contribute to disciplining us as individuals.

With respect to disciplinary power, I examine Michel Foucault's notion of power as productive. Traditionally, power is regarded as a force administered by an authority upon its subjects. Power is often considered a relationship between the powerful and the powerless. Foucault brings in a new perspective on power when he connects it to notions of disciplinary production of bodies, knowledge, sex, and subjectivities. Through his genealogical study of power, he brings forth a new perspective that focuses on power as discourse and an omnipresent force. For instance, he looks at how different power relations throughout history influence truth-knowledges.[9] According to Foucault, power is a relation and not a thing; power is exercised in a network of relations and not necessarily a thing that is possessed.[10] When power is exercised in a web of relations, power can come from anywhere. It can come from the doctor, the school, a friend group, or through media messages. Power and knowledge are intertwined in their relation, so when knowledge is produced so is power, and vice versa. I examine how power and knowledge are discursive in that there are ways of speaking that allow for certain statements to be expressed.[11] I look at how power and knowledge regulate which subjectivities we can express, and how power and knowledge are disciplinary in their regulation. I analyse shame in relation to Foucault's notion of power in how shame can regulate which statements, ways of being, or subjectivities are considered appropriate. Instead of shame being between the powerful and the powerless, I look at how shame can come from a network of relations and contribute to knowledge production and what we consider as true ways of expressing

---

[9] Foucault specifically focuses on Western from 17th century to mid-20th century, and Roman and Greek antiquity.

[10] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Group, 1991)

[11] Claire O'Farrell, "Key Concepts," *Michel-Foucault.com*, 2007, last modified October 30, 2010, http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ .

subjectivities. I use Barkty to look at how feminine bodies are produced differently compared to masculine bodies. Even though I agree with Bartky, I also think of feminine bodies outside of the female body. I use Judith Butler[12] when exploring feminine bodies outside of the female body. I briefly examine her concept performativity in relation to shame as disciplinary power. I use Butler to look at the way in which we perform our gender and how we experience shame regulates our subjectivities.

Shame can vary according to gender. I use Bartky to understand if feelings of shame vary according to gender; if the same setting might make a woman feel shame but not a man, and I support her claim that feelings of shame can vary depending on gender. I also use Ullaliina Lehtinen[13] when investigating gender and shame. I look at how she differentiates between two types of gender-specific shame, aristocrat and underdog, and how she argues that men and women, respectively, experience them. I challenge her arguments by examining if gender-specific shame can be intersectional depending on power relations. I examine this intersectionality to see if there are situations where women might feel aristocrat shame and men underdog shame.

I use Jennifer C. Manion[14] when I examine shame's beneficial characteristics. I examine her argument that shame can instigate a transformation of an individual. She argues that shame can force you to self-reflect on what values you have internalised and whether you agree with these values. I look at how such self-reflection and transformation can contribute to a wider range of gendered subjectivities where men and women are not restricted to masculine and feminine expressions, respectively. I find Manion's transformative notion of shame to be crucial because it can contribute to overcoming shame's debilitating aspect, furthering moral development, and breaking gender norms.

I examine shame and guilt in relation to morality to explore where they might have moral relevance. I examine responsibility and honour as moral notions. I look at how R.E. Lamb[15] examines whether shame or guilt is morally relevant when he explores responsibility as a central moral notion. Further, I use Anthony O'Hear[16] as a contrast to Lamb since O'Hear explores honour as a moral concept. I examine ways in which responsibility and honour might account for moral guilt compared to moral shame. I also examine what type of moral

---

[12] American philosopher who focuses on feminist philosophy, political philosophy, ethics, and gender theory.
[13] She is Swedish and employs an epistemological and feminist perspective in her work on shame.
[14] She is American and focuses on feminist philosophy and gender theory in her philosophical work.
[15] He focuses on phenomenology and moral philosophy.
[16] British philosopher who focuses on moral philosophy and philosophy of mind.

information we get from shame and guilt. Here, I examine Jan-Olav Henriksen [17]and Terje Mesel's[18] claim that shame ought to have minimal space. However, I also examine how they can claim that shame ought to have minimal space in society when they also recognise shame's positive aspects, like that of Manion's transformative power of shame. In light of this I examine how shame can, at times, present itself as a false moral regulator, specifically regarding gendered subjectivities.

Chapter Overview of the Thesis

In the first chapter, I distinguish between shame and guilt. However, I focus on the former. I argue that you do not have to agree with the shamer's values and ideals to feel ashamed and that the shamers do not have to be present physically or imaginary to feel shame. Then, I look at how shame influences our social relationships as it can motivate us to act normatively to feel included. As feelings of shame can separate us from others by making us aware that we are not like the rest of the social group, acting in such a way can still be isolating. I explain some of the beneficial aspects of shame. For example, it can protect the self and motivate integration and self-growth through its transformative power. Lastly, I focus on gender-specific characteristics of shame by looking at experience-based shame and episodic shame. I use Bartky and Lehtinen when examining gender-specificity to shame.

In the second chapter, I explore Foucault's notion of power, knowledge production, and subjectivity. By looking at how shame relates to the exercise of power and knowledge and contribute to forming subjectivities, I argue that the knowledge produced through shame can function to inform individuals' behaviour within the social body. Thus, shaming informs through surveillance by the other, imaginary or real, and contributes to self-regulating our ways of being to fit the standardised body. Via Foucault's *Scientia Sexualis*, I analyse how it contributed to new discourses on sexual subjectivity. I demonstrate shame's shared characteristics with *Scientia Sexualis*, including the importance of confessions to gather information when we feel ashamed and how that information reinforces a truth about sexual subjectivities by exploring abnormalities. I take an intersectional approach to sexual subjectivity so as to argue that shame varies depending on gender, sexuality, race, and social class. Lastly, I argue that women and men can have different corporealities in light of how they

---

[17] Norwegian theologist who focuses on philosophy of religion.
[18] Norwegian theologist who focuses on ethics and health care.

might be subjugated differently and how that influences gendered expressions of subjectivity. I use Bartky and Judith Butler when examining gendered expressions of subjectivity.

In the third chapter, I explore moral aspects of shame and guilt and argue that shame has moral relevance since guilt cannot account for all aspects of morality. I use R.E. Lamb to explain responsibility as a moral notion and its relation to shame and guilt. Lamb argues that only guilt is essentially connected to morality, and shame is only contingently related to morality.[19] I then explore honour as a notion of morality. Anthony O'Hear argues that honour has an aspect of shame that guilt does not necessarily have.[20] To challenge O'Hear, I argue that honour can also have elements of guilt. However, I also argue, along with O'Hear, that moral shame can provide an internal motivation for our behaviour. Next, I examine Henriksen and Mesel's argument that shame ought to have minimal space in human societies because shame cannot necessarily show us what or why something is wrong, only that something is wrong.[21] Further, I explore how they can claim that shame can have a minimal space when recognising that shame can be positive through Manion's argument that shame can be transformative. Lastly, I examine if and how moral shame shapes normative ideals of gender as a regulation of subjectivity's expression. I argue that shame can, especially regarding gender, falsely present itself as a moral regulator.

[19] R.E. Lamb, "Guilt, Shame, and Morality," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 43, no. 3 (1983), 329-346.

[20] Anthony O'Hear, "Guilt and Shame as Moral Concepts," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 77 (1976-1977)

[21] Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, *Shame's Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study* (NOASP, Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2021), 336.

Shame, Guilt, and Gendered Experiences

My master thesis deals with the notion of shame and how it shapes normative ideals of masculinity and femininity as a regulation for expressing subjectivity. Internalised societal norms of what ideals are to be achieved by boys and girls, men and women, can evoke feelings of shame in a person. Particularly when you break social norms and feel that you do not live up to the ideals and expectations constructed by society. As such, shame becomes a productive notion of subjectivity. I draw on a Foucauldian notion of productive power here, where shame is productive in how it manufactures and disciplines what form of subjectivity is considered appropriate and legitimate.

Shame is often associated with "a painful, sudden awareness of the self as less good than hoped for and expected, precipitated by the identification of others (imaginary or real), or simply by the ashamed self, of a seemingly significant character shortcoming[;]"[22] the person does not measure up to a certain standard or ideal. Such notions of shame are thought of as debilitating for the individual as the subject is in a state of suffering. However, regardless of how a person is weakened in a shamed state of being, I argue that a person is also informed of how to act through subjugation where only certain forms of expressing subjectivity are approved of. Further, I argue that what are considered the appropriate forms of expressing subjectivity are gendered. What are often considered legitimate forms of subjectivity for males are ideals connected to that which is traditionally linked with masculinity and activity, and females' legitimate forms of subjectivity are often connected to that which is traditionally linked with femininity and passivity.[23]

In this chapter I will, first, briefly distinguish between shame and guilt, as the two are often present simultaneously and can therefore be confused in their characteristics. I will then

---

22 Jennifer C. Manion, "Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of Shame," *Hypatia* 18, no. 3 (2003): 21.

23 I say "traditionally" because you find such associations amongst the Ancient Greeks (see Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasures. History of Sexuality: Volume Two*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 2006) 84; specifically, "…immoderation derives from a passivity that relates it to femininity."), in much of Chinese philosophy on yin, associated with femininity, passivity, submissiveness, etc., and yang, associated with masculinity, activity, dominance, etc. (see Mark Cartwright, "Yin and Yang: Definition," *Ancient History Encyclopedia*, Nov. 26, 2012; http://www.ancient.eu/Yin_and_Yang/), and more recent work like that of Adie Nelson (see "The Pink Dragon is Female: Halloween Costumes and Gender Markers," *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 24 (2000), 137-144). Further, I also say "traditionally" because there is also a body of work that challenges such notions of femininity (see, for instance: Amy C. Wilkins, "'So Full of Myself as a Chick:' Goth Women, Sexual Independence, and Gender Egalitarianism," *Gender and Society* 18, no. 3 (2004), 328-349; Jessica L. Willis, "Girls Constructing Identity and Transforming 'femininity:' Intersections between bmpirical and theoretical understandings of 21st century girlhood" (Dissertation, Clark University, 2008)).

elaborate on the notions of shame in relation to the debatable importance of a group's views and values, and the transformative power of shame. Finally, I will draw on the work of Ullaliina Lehtinen and go further into a gendered account of experiences of shame.

Shame and Guilt

My project concerns shame as a norm regulator for expressing gendered ideals of subjectivity. In order to argue why shame operates as a norm regulator, I first need to discuss shame and some of its different manifestations. In this discussion I will draw on Gabriele Taylor because of her focus on shame as an emotion of self-assessment. Shame as an emotion of self-assessment is relevant for my thesis because norms become internalised and play an important role in determining our social interactions. Shame is a method of assessing the self in relation to these norms. I will use the works of Sandra Lee Bartky because she introduces a gendered aspect to shame. Further, Both Bartky and Cheshire Calhoun show that a person does not have to agree with the audience's views and values to feel shame in a public or private situation. The audience can be both imaginary and real to induce shame. This stands in contrast to Taylor, who believes a person must agree with the audience to feel shame. By comparing these viewpoints, I intend to show that even though norms of idealised subjectivity are internalised, we do not have to agree with the internalised ideal of how we ought to express our subjectivities. I will also highlight a gendered aspect to these idealised subjectivities. It is not necessary that the gendered norms of subjectivity are internalised, in order to feel shame. When viewing shame in its pervasiveness in regulating norms of subjectivity – where we can feel shame, despite disagreeing with or lacking the internalised views and values of those we engage with in society – I think we can open for a discussion on shame as a Foucauldian notion of power. I will go into this discussion in chapter two. First, an account of shame and guilt.

In her book *Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment*, Taylor classifies shame as occurring when an individual is, in the audience's view, deviating from a norm when the individual agrees with the audience's view. Bartky characterises shame similarly to Taylor when she highlights in *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* that: "When you lack what you do not want, there is no shame."[24] An audience does not actually have to be physically present to induce feelings of shame, it is enough for the

---

24 Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 90.

person to think of herself through the eyes of the audience for shame to occur.[25] Taylor characterises guilt, on the other hand, in the context of legality. Feelings of guilt occur when a person accepts that he or she did something forbidden and accepts the authority that forbade the action.[26] A punishment to reprimand the guilt is, therefore, in response to a person's actions rather than his or her character.[27] What is troubling with this statement is that sometimes action can be linked to a person's character which, in turn, shows that it is difficult to separate shame and guilt absolutely. A person who is virtuous in character acts more virtuously than a person who is vicious in character. However, a person who does more virtuous acts can also become a person who is virtuous in character. Whether our actions make up our character change or not are ontological questions which I will not try to answer here. I bring them up merely to show that the potential answers to these questions challenge the characteristics and our definitions of shame and guilt.

Taylor further claims that a form of repayment is due in relation to guilt: "If I have done something wrong then there is some way in which I can make up for it, if only by suffering punishment,"[28] but she claims this is not the case for shame. I am hesitant to agree with Taylor on this point because there are cases when you are shamed by someone, and feel shame because of it, but can make amends to alleviate your shame. However, perhaps Taylor thinks that repayment and punishment are necessarily linked with guilt, while they are not necessarily, but sometimes linked with shame. She does not make any clarification on this, so I am only speculating what she might think. I am again hesitant to agree if she does indeed think that. There are cases where individuals feel guilt, whether guilt is perceived as the appropriate feeling or not. For instance, a person, Sally, who was raised to believe that it is a sin against God's law to masturbate is caught masturbating by someone who does not believe it is against God's law. Sally feels guilty about committing a sin against God's law and wants to apologise (as a repayment for her sins), promising to go to confession to help her refrain from masturbating.[29] The other person, however, sees belief in God and masturbation as compatible, and does not see the necessity of any form of punishment or repayment.

---

25 Gabriele Taylor, *Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment* (New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 1985), 57.
26 Ibid., 85.
27 Ibid., 89
28 Ibid., 90.
29 There will most likely also be an element of shame present, but I will come back to a more detailed discussion on shame later. The presence of shame simultaneously with guilt further highlights the entanglement of shame and guilt.

Instead of being punished or repay for one's actions, it could be that changing the view on the law, where one still accepts the authority of the law (i.e., God), is also an option. It must be noted, though, that Taylor does not specify what law she is referring to. It could be that she only means judicial law, but it seems that would mean a rather narrow understanding of guilt. The expression "Catholic guilt" in Catholic societies, seems to be an indicator that guilt does not only occur if one breaks the judicial law enforced by an authority which a person accepts. An authority that enforces a law can be found outside of the judicial system, such as the family and religion, and I do not think Taylor would deny the authoritative roles of family and religion in the lives of many individuals. If Taylor would not deny such a claim, then her earlier claim that repayment and punishment are necessary components of guilt would not necessarily hold true. Sometimes we feel guilt when we break rules (or laws) in our family. For instance, my younger brother once texted his mother for permission to go to the lake, but she said no. He then texted his father for permission and received a "yes." It was not specified in the text that it also had to be okay with his mother, but it was later, for obvious reasons, revealed that it was implied. Later in the day his mother and father realised what had happened and my brother felt guilty for going against their "law." His punishment was to extract every nail, there were a couple of thousand nails, from a fence that was to be demolished. Once it was done, the situation was laid at rest and his guilt was alleviated. He did not really feel that much shame since he said that he knew he was guilty in doing what was wrong. He also said he knew that did not make him a bad person with lots of flaws, when him and I reflected on his actions. He felt more ashamed that people might think he was not an honest person.[30]

Bartky notes that "shame is called forth by the apprehension of some serious flaw in the self, guilt by the consciousness that one has committed a transgression."[31] Bartky's distinction between shame and guilt reinforces shame as Taylor's conception of global assessment of the self, and guilt as pertaining to the individual's actions. By "global" I mean all the aspects of the self. That shame, on Taylor's view, assesses the entire self and not solely parts of the self. Further, Bartky claims that "shame and guilt are alike in that each involves a condemnation of the self by itself for some failure to measure up; it is the measure that differs."[32] The different measures are shortcomings versus wrongdoings for shame and guilt, respectively. However, it seems that shame and guilt can involve a condemnation of the self by others as well. Let us

---

30 I have received permission via text from my younger brother to use this as an example.
31 Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 87.
32 Ibid.

stick with Sally as our example. It could be that she is out with friends and one of them says that people are immature if they still play with Barbies at their age. It so happens that Sally plays with Barbies and she highly admires the person who made the statement about Barbies. In this case, it seems that Sally feels shame because one of her friends condemned her, perhaps without their knowing, and deemed her immature. Her condemnation of herself would occur shortly after she feels shame from her friend's disapproval. Hence, shame and guilt can occur when condemnation of the self develops internally and autonomously, and it can occur when it is driven by externalities (Sally's friends). This makes shame potentially highly pervasive in our daily lives since episodes of shame can occur both alone and in social settings.

Taylor emphasises that the individual must agree with the audience's view on norms and values in order to feel shame. Taylor's conception of shame as a global self-assessment highlights the pervasive character of shame that is important for my project since I here argue that shame is a norm regulator for gendered subjectivities. If shame was not pervasive in the human experience, it would not necessarily have the same effect as a regulator of who we are and how we express our ways of being. Our internalisation of values and ideals would then not necessarily have such a strong grip on us. Further, if shame was not an emotion of self-assessment pertaining to what we value, who we are and want to be, shame would not necessarily be a regulatory force for our subjectivity. However, I disagree with Taylor's claim that a person must agree with the shaming audience's values and norms in order to feel shame. Both Bartky and Calhoun demonstrate different ways in which a person can feel shame without agreeing with the point of view of the audience.

To summarise, shame is a painful awareness of oneself as falling short of an expected standard or ideal perpetuated by societal norms,[33] and it distinguishes itself from guilt in that guilt occurs when an individual breaks the law to which he or she accepts the authority of.[34] Action and a character's entanglement in the make-up of a person, pose a challenge to these definitions to shame and guilt. Because action and character are so intertwined, it is difficult to provide absolute categorisations which distinguish shame and guilt.

---

33 Jennifer C. Manion, "Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of Shame," *Hypatia* 18, no. 3 (2003): 21.

34 Gabriele Taylor, *Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment* (New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 1985), 85.

To support her argument against the importance of agreeing with the audience's view, Bartky discusses a classroom setting from her own teaching experience. In her class, women, who lacked a sense of inferiority to their male peers and felt strong in their sense of self, felt inferior and apprehensive when handing in papers. Bartky attributes this sudden sense of inferiority to reinforced gender-specific behaviours and expectations of competence by professors who expect higher competence from their male students, since this is also supported by research.[35] Additionally, Bartky theorises that self-shaming was easier to handle than the shame they might feel from Bartky's external criticism. The female students can then at least choose the time and place of their suffering.[36] This example is at odds with Taylor's view because the women in Bartky's classroom setting did not agree with the view that they are inferior to their male counterparts and yet they still felt shame. One of the reasons they felt shame, might be because they had been exposed, as Bartky highlights, to different behaviours from their professors compared to male students. More poignantly, though, it could be because of an internalisation of the messages of inferiority that, over time, create associations between their sense of self and incompetence. This holds true even if they do not believe in, or are directly aware of, these internalised associations.

Internalisations of repeated messages of inferiority contribute to a person acting inferior even though she does not necessarily believe herself to be inferior. The messages might not be intended to shame someone, but the person on the other end might still feel shame because the messages of shame pertain to a person's sense of self. Being told, either implicitly or explicitly, that one does not have the same academic qualities as one's male peers, ignites a sense of failure to live up to a standard or ideal, and hence, the person feels shame. To stop feeling shame, and avoid future acute feelings of shame, we may strive to achieve the standard set by one's male peers.[37] However, most likely you end up reaching for a different standard that is reinforced and internalised as achievable by the social subgroup you belong to. Bartky's discussion on shame highlights how shame influences behaviour and sense of self despite an individual's disagreement with the audience's values and standards. Her discussion is important for my project because it demonstrates that shame is relevant regardless of our individual views. We are not immune to shame as we might hold onto underlying ideas of who we ought to be, due

---

35 Ibid., 89.
36 Ibid.
37 Set either presently or historically

to the internalisation of societal norms. Bartky's example of her female students with a strong sense of self, demonstrates how we are not immune. Here, shame operates on a level where we must dig deeper into a person's values and sense of self, in order to recognise that shame is an important regulator in our expression of self in society.

Parts of Cheshire Calhoun's points can also explain why Bartky's students felt shame, even though their belief in self indicates that they would not feel it. In "An Apology for Moral Shame" Calhoun argues that "a person could be shamed by criticism … that she thinks is plainly wrong … [because] in sharing a moral practice with us, others' views come to have practical weight in the sense that they articulate moral interpretations of our character and actions that any number of others within the practice might share."[38] To illustrate this, Calhoun uses the example of Adrian Piper's experience when she was applying to graduate school and identified herself as black.[39] During a meet-and-greet for the graduate students, a highly acclaimed faculty member exclaimed that Piper is as Black as he, a White professor. Piper does not share the view of the professor, who is the shamer in this case, "that she is manipulative and deceitful."[40]

However, the moral criticism from the professor has what Calhoun calls practical weight. "Moral criticism has practical weight when we see it as issuing from those who are to be taken seriously because they are co-participants with us in some shared social practice of morality."[41] Hence, Piper's shame does not come about because she shares the view of the professor, as Taylor would argue. Rather, she is forced to enter a shared moral practice based on the social setting she finds herself in, and she therefore feels shame because "the social practice generates shared understandings about … how to interpret when basic moral obligations, like the duty of truth-telling, have been fulfilled."[42] Here, Piper is accused in a public setting of not having fulfilled the moral obligation of truth-telling. Shame is therefore considered by Calhoun to be an emotion of the practitioner of morality and not that of the normatively reflective emotion of self-assessment as posed by Taylor. Piper does not agree with the norm of Blackness expressed by the professor, but she shares a moral practice with her professor who expresses a disapproving evaluation of her as Black.[43]

---

38 Cheshire Calhoun, "An Apology for Moral Shame," *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no. 2 (2004): 142.
39 To read the full narrative I refer the reader to Adrian Piper, "Passing for White, Passing for Black," *Transitions* 58 (1992): 4-32.
40 Cheshire Calhoun, "An Apology for Moral Shame," *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no. 2 (2004): 137.
41 Ibid., 139.
42 Ibid., 140.
43 Heidi L. Maibom, "The Descent of Shame," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80, no. 3 (2010):

Further, Calhoun would consider Piper to display moral maturity because Calhoun "thinks that vulnerability of feeling ashamed before those with whom one shares a moral practice, *even when one disagrees with their moral criticisms*, is often a mark of moral maturity."[44] Calhoun's point on feeling shame when being disapproved of by those we share a moral practice with, is important in relation to my thesis. It is important because there are values and ideals in society that we cannot escape from interacting with. Values that are held by people we may or may not agree with, but who we engage with in our daily social interactions. In these situations, feelings of shame can occur, and shape how we continue to act socially and view ourselves, even where we do not expect it (like Piper). While shaming can be very visual and clear in certain social situations, shame can also be invisible in its action because we do not expect it and can be surprised by our reaction to it as demonstrated through Piper's example. Shame operates in places and situations where we do not expect it to influence us. Calhoun's discussion on shame and Piper's example, contribute to demonstrate shame's pervasive nature and regulatory force in our expression of self.

Dan Zahavi, however, disagrees specifically with Calhoun and thinks that the characterisation of shame in her example is a case of humiliation because it did not lead to an overall decrease of self-esteem.[45] Zahavi thinks global decrease of self-esteem is a necessary feature of shame that comes about if the individual accepts the audience's assessment.[46] According to Zahavi's view of shame, Piper is feeling shame because she was being judged by someone she respected.[47] I can understand Zahavi's argument that Calhoun and Piper's reason for Piper's shame is misplaced. However, I think Zahavi is ignoring a point Piper brings up herself: "For this kind of shame, you don't actually need to have done anything wrong. All you need to do is care about others' image of you and fail in your actions to reinforce their positive image of themselves. Their ridicule and accusations then function to both disown and degrade you from their status, to mark you not as having done wrong but as being wrong."[48] So even though Piper does not agree with the shamer's view, she cares about her presentation and

---

571.

44 Ibid., 192; emphasis in original.

45 Zahavi speficially mentions that he disagrees with Calhoun but, as will soon become clear through Piper's example that Calhoun also uses, it seems he has not done proper groundwork before disagreeing with Calhoun.

46 Dan Zahavi, *Self & Other: Exploring Subjectivity, empathy, and Shame* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 228.

47 Ibid., 227.

48 Adrian Piper, "Passing for White, Passing for Black," *Transitions* 58 (1992): 6.

legitimacy in the eyes of fellow academics. She presented herself as Black, but is revealed, based on the opinion of the acclaimed professor, as White.

Zahavi's disagreement with Calhoun is a little surprising since he claims himself that there exists a "kind of shame that is induced by a deflation and devaluation of our public appearance and social self-identity, by the exposure of a discrepancy between who we claim to be and how we are perceived by others."[49] Piper's experience shows that there can still be a decrease in self-esteem and inducement of shame without having to agree with the audience's opinion. Her experience poses challenges to both Taylor's and Zahavi's view on the importance of identifying with the audience's view. In relation to my thesis and the aforementioned distinction on guilt and shame by Taylor and Bartky, where guilt pertains to transgression of actions and shame in relation to a failure to a certain standard of being, we see that shame influences our self-identity in relation to ourselves and how we present ourselves to others. Shame does not occur because of something wrong you have done, as Piper pointed out, but because your being is perceived as wrong. If the focus was on the wrongdoing, emotions of guilt would be felt. However, that is not the case in this example, which shows the intricacies of guilt and shame in everyday interactions often occur simultaneously.

To summarise, when feeling shame an individual often agrees with the audience's view and values. This agreement with the audience, however, is not compulsory to feel shame since shame can be evoked by someone whose opinion and values you disagree with, but who is a member of your social subgroup, as illustrated with the example of Piper.

<div align="center">Social and Isolating Aspects of Shame</div>

Zahavi also addresses Taylor's idea of shame as an emotion of self-assessment in his book *Self & Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame* and argues that shame is isolating in a way where we do not let others in on our experience of it.[50] He distinguishes guilt from shame in that shame "is about shortcomings whereas [guilt] is about wrongdoings. In guilt the focus is on specific actions of the self, whereas the focus of shame is on the self as such."[51] Shame is, according to Zahavi and like Taylor also says, an emotion of self-assessment in relation to the audience whose viewpoint we are in agreement with. Further, shame is "a painful awareness of

---

49 Dan Zahavi, *Self & Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 212.
50 Ibid., 223.
51 Ibid., footnote 6, 217.

personal flaws and deficiencies;"[52] but also, and more importantly according to Zahavi, an emotion that affects our relationship to everybody. It is because of the isolating character of shame, that Zahavi finds it more plausible that "shame, rather than simply involving a global decrease of self-esteem and self-confidence, is also essentially characterised by the way it affects and alters our relationship to and connectedness with others in general."[53] The social isolation of shame is a result of, amongst others, "the conviction that others would not have done or been like [ourselves]."[54] In lieu of Piper, her relationship to the White professor and her peers was altered when he implied she had not been truthful on her application. However, she did not necessarily have a global decrease of self-esteem or self-confidence. The essential aspect here, according to Zhavi's theory, was how her relationship to others was altered. A global decrease in self-esteem and self-confidence could also occur but does not have to in order for feelings of shame to occur.

Further, Zahavi stresses the importance of others in shame and selfhood because he thinks that we become our social selves by experiencing and internalising the other's perspectives on ourselves and our emotional response to them.[55] Sometimes we feel shame when we are ignored or overlooked by someone. Shame is, in this view, related to a loss of social recognition,[56] it "is essentially about our lives with others, about our identity in a group, and our standing within it."[57] In our social interactions, we often measure ourselves to the norms of how others act. We can feel exposed or overlooked by others if we fail to meet the standards set forth by those norms, whether we agree with them or not. In our failures we lose standing with our peers or with ourselves; often both. We feel like we have done something others would not have done and, therefore, we often feel different and more distant from others, but perhaps also distant from ourselves.

For example, Sally asks a group of her girlfriends about masturbation and the girls are quick to reply that they do not masturbate, that they do not have a need for it, and that they think it is something boys do and not girls. Sally will here most likely feel shame about her own masturbatory habits. Because the others expressed that they do not masturbate, no matter if they actually do or do not masturbate, Sally feels different than the others, and cut-off from them in

---

52 Ibid., 210.
53 Ibid., 223.
54 Ibid., 218.
55 Ibid., 238.
56 Ibid., 224.
57 Heidi L. Maibom, "The Descent of Shame," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80, no. 3 (2010): 576.

relation to masturbation and her status as a dignified girl. It is something everyone in her social peer group communicates is not acceptable for a girl to do or have a need for. Sally, usually thinking that she is an acceptable girl,[58] feels shame and isolation in relation to her friends given her open communication about her thoughts and behaviours that deviate from theirs. She also feels shame in relation to herself because it has been communicated to her that she is not the acceptable girl that she thought she was. Hence, shame influences Sally's relationship with herself, as Taylor would have it, and her relationship to everybody else,[59] as Zahavi adds to Taylor's analysis. With regards to my thesis, Zahavi highlights how shame is a participatory force in our subjugation in how it shapes our relation to self and others. Shame regulates our subjectivities to fit our own values, but also the norms of our different societies so that we can participate in life as useful and approved-of individuals.

To summarise, shame influences our relation to those around us in that it socialises us in our motivation to act according to the same norms, but shame also isolates us in that we feel separated from our social subgroup since feelings of shame often include a feeling that others would not be the way you are. So far, most of the focus in my analysis has been on the repressive aspect of shame. I will now move forward to focus on some of shame's beneficial characteristics.

<div align="center">Beneficial Characteristics of Shame</div>

One beneficial aspect of shame is its protective form given its "respect for boundaries of intimacy."[60] If something intimate is publicly revealed about yourself that you wish to remain private, you might feel shame because of the exposure. Shame is also protective in its preventative form to avoid having parts of ourselves exposed to "the [violence] that public scrutiny might cause."[61] In this respect, shame is, according to Zahavi, "a guardian of dignity [because] it puts us on guard against undignified behaviour that would place us (and others) in shaming situations."[62] Even though shame is often considered to paralyse an individual from action and can be associated with overwhelming feelings of helplessness,[63] shame can also be

---

58 As she should!
59 At least those around her.
60 Dan Zahavi, *Self & Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 214.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 215.
63 Jennifer C. Manion, "The Moral Relevance of Shame," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39, no 1 (2002): 78; Leonard Boonin, "Guilt, Shame and Morality," *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 17 (1983): 300.

constructive in socialisation and individual development. When considering socialisation, shame is constructive because it can promote social conformity, which facilitates integration into a society. In terms of individual transformation and development, shame can challenge their understanding of themselves and force them to re-evaluate their core values and beliefs. Manion advocates for such a positive and transformative notion of shame in "The Moral Relevance of Shame."

In her article, Manion highlights how experiencing shame can be a positive notion for the moral self since it forces the individual to intensely self-reflect on and identify the standards, or regulations, that he or she currently endorses.[64] Shame can require an assessment of the self that goes beyond your specific actions. Shame requires an evaluation of your individual character, or what you wish to care about and who you wish to be. Manion argues that shame can therefore contribute to individual transformations. Even though shaming socialises and individualises the self through norms in relation to others, it can also transform the individual in relation to him- or herself.[65] Because feelings of shame "are unanticipated, [they] *interrupt* our expectations of our capabilities and how we fit in the world in a particularly dramatic way: they suspend our confidence in ourselves."[66] For instance, our friend Sally might meet someone who challenges her to reflect on her core values and why she feels ashamed that she plays with Barbies or masturbates. Sally may actually come to realise that she needs not be ashamed. However, this is not an easy feat, but "working through feelings of shame might very well help us shape new, more positive ideals of who we can still be in the future."[67] Through Manion's transformative notion of shame, we see how shame can bring forth resistance against subjugation caused by shame. For instance, resistance to adhere to current ideals and norms. However, through this transformation, new forms of ideals will spring out and shame will continue to operate as a norm regulator because we find other forms of subjectivity that we internalise as the new legitimate ways of being. As such, shame can be a point of resistance to current norms of gendered subjectivities, but it can still be a regulatory force for new gendered norms of subjectivities, that most likely will be shaped in the future.

To summarise, shame can protect the self and motivate integration and self-growth. The protective quality of shame includes characteristics such as preventing us from exposing details

---

64 Jennifer C. Manion, "The Moral Relevance of Shame," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39, no 1 (2002): 84.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 83; emphasis in original.
67 Jennifer C. Manion, "The Moral Relevance of Shame," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39, no 1 (2002); 84.

about ourselves which can induce violent social scrutiny. In terms of integration, shame socialises us to conform to a norm which can be beneficial when trying to integrate into new societies. Lastly, shame has the potential for individual transformation because it can challenge our understanding of ourselves and force us to re-evaluate our core values and beliefs.

<center>Gendered Experiences of Shame</center>

I have briefly touched on gender in relation to shame, but Lehtinen takes a particularly interesting gendered approach to shame in her dissertation *Underdog Shame: Philosophical Essays on Women's Internalisation of Inferiority*. She argues that the experience and knowledge of shame is gender-specific.[68] She thinks that shame involves "reflections on 'what one is and how one is related to others' – the core of what shame is about – must therefore also encompass reflections of oneself as a social individual, as part of, positioned in, and psychologically conditioned by, a social hierarchy."[69] Hence, Lehtinen reflects on an intersectional notion of shame – her basis for gender-specificity starts with a discussion in a conference in Denmark. There was a disagreement concerning a picture of a woman running with her baby through rows of people scorning her because she was accused of having a sexual and romantic relationship with someone from the German forces during World War II.[70] The vast majority of the women in the audience agreed that the woman in the picture felt shame. The men in the audience, however, argued that we could not know if the woman felt shame and they argued she might feel morally superior to her perpetrators. That the shame observable on the picture was only an outside shame that did not resonate with her internally.

Based on this discussion, Lehtinen purports to distinguish between two types of experiences: episodic experiences, which can be of a wide variety and denotes mental events, processes etc.; and life experiences which are more general and enduring. Episodic experiences and life experiences also differ with respect to time. An episodic experience has specific cut off points, while this is not necessarily the case for life experiences.[71] An episodic experience, such as knitting, may happen for 20 minutes. However, we gather life experience over years of living. A person may have known knitting for the last 30 years of her life, but she has not continuously

---

68 Ullaliina Lehtinen, *Underdog Shame: Philosophical Essays on Women's Internalisation of Inferiority*, Röda Serien, no. 37 (Göteborg, Sweden: Filosofiska Meddelanden, 1998).
69 Ibid., 59.
70 Ibid., 100-101.
71 Of course, an end point for life experiences would be death, but it is harder to identify the one specific episode that changes the experience into life experience.

been knitting for those 30 years.[72] In relation to knowledge, Lehtinen claims that a single episode seldom suffices for knowledge and that the majority of what we can claim to justifiably know is based on life experiences. She states that "our knowledge of ... [an] episode springs not from the incident itself but from the … general [life] experience that we bring to the situation."[73]

However, it seems Lehtinen neglects to extricate that our knowledge which comes from life experience must also come from somewhere. She is steadfast in that knowledge cannot come from a single episode, but I think it can come from many recurring episodes. After all, in light of knowledge claims stemming from life experiences, Lehtinen specifies that different socialisations of women and men, particularly in that of shaming, open the likeliness of gender-specific knowledge of shame. Gender-specific knowledge can explain the disagreement between the women and the men in her conference audience.[74] So, it could be that recurring episodes of shame and socialisations contribute to overall life experience.[75] I do not see how else we can gather life experience from the events of our lives. Women, she argues, experience a deeper shame than men, who will experience what she calls an aristocrat shame. She characterises the aristocrat shame as "a revelation of a fall and a lowering of self-respect."[76] Lehtinen describes underdog shame, or the deep shame of women, as one of Bartky's aspects of shame, namely, "internalisation of pervasive intimations of inferiority."[77]

Aristocrat shame is episodic, occurring as a discreet event where the person who feels shame is often free to express pride about how the person matures through the process of remorse or reflection. As such, shame is more easily alleviated in aristocrat shame compared to underdog shame.[78] This is because individuals who feel aristocrat shame are most likely more privileged in the social hierarchy. Through their apologies for their behaviours, those who feel aristocrat shame demonstrate a level of mastery that reinstates their belonging to a privileged position, sustaining the social hierarchy and resolving their shame.[79] This so-called easiness does not take away from the actual pain and difficulty a person who experiences aristocrat

---

72 Ullaliina Lehtinen, "How Does One Know What Shame is? Epistemology, Emotions, and Forms of Life in Juxtaposition," *Hypatia* 13, no. 1 (1998): 65.
73 Ibid., 117.
74 Here, gender-specific does not mean that the experience of shame is limited only to women, but that women's experiences of shame have different characteristics when seen in relation to men's experience of shame in the man-woman power dynamic.
75 I would also add that shame is part of the socialisations of individuals (as is guilt, education, etc).
76 Ibid., 47.
77 Ibid.; Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 7.
78 Ullaliina Lehtinen, *Underdog Shame: Philosophical Essays on Women's Internalisation of Inferiority*, Röda Serien, no. 37 (Göteborg, Sweden: Filosofiska Meddelanden, 1998), 46.
79 Ibid., 46-47.

shame might indeed feel. Rather, it is simply in comparison to underdog shame. The shame in aristocrat shame "is perceived as a fall, a lowering, and as a sudden, painful and unexpected change in the state of things."[80] These latter characterisations are in line with the basic characterisations of shame discussed in the first section of this chapter, while the paralysing aspect and feelings of inferiority connected with shame, discussed in the first section, relate more to Lehtinen's characterisation of underdog shame.

Underdog shame is a life experience that is more enduring and general, and usually happens to those in an underprivileged position in society. A person who feels underdog shame is reduced to an object and the shame carries with it "an aspect of internalisation of pervasive intimations of inferiority."[81] Further, "the underdog shame brings no new, altered understanding of self, but rather forms a pervasive affective attunement to the social environment."[82] As such, "underdog shame forms a confirmation, affirmation, or rediscovery of what [the person] has already known or on numerous previous occasions has learnt to be true: that she is a person of lesser worth."[83] Lehtinen's description of underdog shame's pervasive character makes it difficult to see how a person can move beyond the attunements of the social environment or internalised social norms. Manion's argument on shame's transformative power challenges Lehtinen's notion that underdog shame does not provide a new and altered understanding of the self. If a person feels underdog shame, a transformation might be harder to achieve compared to aristocrat shame, but there is still a potential there in light of Manion's point that shame forces a person to intensely self-reflect. The reflection might lead to a transformation of the self or perhaps an attunement to the social environment. If experiencing underdog shame, I believe that the process of undergoing a positive self-transformation is still possible, in light of Manion's arguments, but is much harder because of underdog shame's pervasive character.

Hierarchal positions of women and men in society make women more prone to feelings of underdog shame because there have been so many – almost a continuous flow – of instances that informed them that they are of lesser worth. This has shaped their life experiences. The enduring aspect of underdog shame is one of the characteristics which makes it difficult for women to experience the transformative notion of shame, as proposed by Manion. The understanding of themselves as a person of lesser worth, a person who is wrong in their being, also inhibits a potential transformation through shame. These characteristics are so pervasive

---

80 Ibid., 49.
81 Ibid., 47.
82 Ibid., 48.
83 Ibid., 49-50.

that the belief of oneself as inferior comes automatically and makes it difficult to change that pattern of thought and belief. It does not mean it is impossible for those experiencing underdog shame to question their values and the societal norms. Instead, it indicates that a more extensive effort from the self and others might be necessary for an individual to intensely self-reflect as a result of shame and transform into a person with a new sense of self.

Further, Lehtinen talks about aristocrat and underdog shame in relation to man and woman. I, however, would like to take an added intersectional approach and highlight that aristocrat and underdog shame are not bound to man and woman. Depending on the different hierarchical structures in different societies, a man might feel underdog shame in relation to a woman. Especially in the White West, it is not unimaginable to see how a Black man might feel underdog shame in relation to a White woman who will feel aristocrat shame, or a Black woman in relation to a White woman. Where we are socialised differently with regards to gender, we are also, unfortunately, socialised differently with regards to skin colour and messages of who is worth more; with the prevailing message being that White is the ideal standard.

We can find similar patterns in terms of sexuality. In episodes of shame, the heterosexual is more likely to feel aristocrat shame because we are socialised into norms of heterosexuality. The heterosexual is less likely to be shamed for his or her sexuality compared to the, for instance, homosexual who will feel underdog shame. Further, race, gender and sexuality will intersect and create different relations of aristocrat shame where a Black homosexual man is more likely to feel underdog shame compared to a White homosexual man because homosexuality is much more stigmatised in Black communities.[84] Here, I am not even accounting for how different religious views might play into this dynamic. Men might also feel more deep shame compared to women when it comes to expressing emotions and feeling vulnerable. In the case of rape, a highly stigmatised topic, both women and men can feel underdog shame. It would be difficult to categorise in terms of gender if women or men feel underdog shame versus aristocrat shame if they have been raped. Who would feel underdog shame in the relation between the raped woman and the raped man? Would a raped woman feel underdog shame and a raped man feel aristocrat shame compared to the raped woman? Or vice versa? Rape is a power dynamic and I honestly believe that it should not be categorised if only a raped man or a raped woman fits the underdog shame category. They both fit this category. The case of rape can show that both women and men can be categorised together.

---

84 This is based on generalities.

Bartky also argues that women have different experiences of shame than men because women are situated differently in society compared to men. Women are thought to be more prone to feelings of shame compared to men because of how they are situated differently in society.[85] For instance, body ideals are different for women and men, and vary across cultures. The media constantly bombards us with images of what body types are of value that people should strive to have. For women in the West these bodies are usually White, thin, with a thigh gap, and due to recent trends, with toned – but not too bulky – muscles. For men in the West, it is usually a White body that is either a V-shaped body inspired by the value we place on athleticism and sports and the eroticism of a pornographic body, called spornosexual, or a combination of the hipster and lumberjack; but overall, the bodies are muscular, fit, and groomed. Further, women are highly objectified in society, constantly receiving messages of their dehumanisation. While men are less frequently objectified, this does not mean that men are never objectified. There has been an increasing trend with the objectification of men and, consequently, body dissatisfaction and eating disorders.[86] However, objectification of men is not as pervasive on all societal levels as it is for women; a recent study found that the brain registers men as whole but women as parts, most likely a result of our internalisation of the societal objectification of women.[87]

Because of these gendered differences in body ideals and differences in societal relations for men and women, where men usually stand in a more privileged position than women, feelings of shame will be different when confronted with not having or failing to achieve the societal body ideal. For example, if a man shames a woman for her body type, both the man and the woman can feel shame. The man might feel shame because someone tells him that it is wrong to shame people for their body type and engage him in a discussion about the objectification of women and unrealistic body ideals. This man recognises his mistake and feels ashamed, but also remorse as he wishes he could take it back. To alleviate his shame, he apologises to the woman and explains how his act of shaming her was ignorant. Afterwards he might feel proud of his transformation; how he was open to listen to perspectives on objectification of women, how he owned up to his mistake and apologised, and that he feels himself to be a person with better values going forward in the future (very characteristic of

---

85 Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 83, 85.

86 Antonios Dakanalis et al., "Male body dissatisfaction and eating disorder symptomatology: moderating variables among men," *Journal of Health Psychology* 20, no. 1 (2013): 80.

87 Stephanie Pappas, "Brain Sees Men as Whole, Women as Parts," *Live Science*, Jul. 24, 2012, http://www.livescience.com/21806-brain-male-female-objectification.html

Lehtinen's aristocrat shame).

The woman's shame, however, is characteristic of Lehtinen's underdog shame. She has already internalised recurring messages telling her that she is not good enough, that she does not uphold the standards of what a woman should look like, and that she is not a whole person. The shame she feels from the man's confrontation does not inform her of something new, but affirms what she has already known on numerous occasions: That she is someone of lesser worth. Being the underdog, she does not stand in the same privileged position as the man where she can go and apologise or have someone tell her on one occasion that she is wrong, for her shame to be alleviated. Because this shame is a result of recurring shamed episodes, more work is required to alleviate her shame, if at all possible. However, in lieu of Manion's transformative aspect of shame, the woman who experiences underdog shame will be forced to evaluate what norms and ideals she has internalised and what value she places on these norms and ideals. Perhaps she thinks that she is wrong, and the norms and ideals are right since innumerable social interactions – media messages, body shaming among friends, etc. – constantly tell her that she is wrong. However, she can also recognise that the ideals are constructed and start a process of self-transformation in which she no longer feels that same type of shame again, or at least the shame will be short-lived and quickly alleviated in similar subsequent situations. Even if she undergoes such a transformation, she is not immune to feel ashamed again because objectification is so pervasive and persistent. However, the next time she feels such shame she will most likely, and hopefully, not be stuck in it for as long.

To summarise, because of women's and men's different positions in society, they have different experiences from life. These factors influence a gender-specific experience of shame where men are more likely to experience aristocrat shame, an episodic event that reveals a descent in his moral and social standing. Women are more likely to experience underdog shame, a more enduring life experience that is characterised by internalisations of inferiority. Lehtinen's account of gendered experiences of shame will also influence my analysis of activity/masculinity and passivity/femininity because of how we associate masculinity with men and femininity with women. I will also account further for Manion's transformative character of shame, where both women and men can recognise the source of their shame and take action to alleviate their respective types of shame, to move forward, and to try and become a better person for their future selves. Further, in its regulation and shaping of individuals, shame mirrors aspects of Foucault's notion of a productive and disciplinary power, but I will elaborate on this in the next chapter.

Summary

Shame distinguishes itself from guilt in that guilt is a legal concept in relation to when an individual breaks the law to which he or she accepts the authority of,[88] while shame is a painful awareness of the self as less than the expected standards or ideals.[89] Because of differences in life experiences, we can find a gender-specificity to shame. According to Lehtinen, women experience a deep shame, called underdog shame,[90] that is characterised by an "internalisation of pervasive intimations of inferiority,"[91] and men experience an aristocrat shame that is characterised as "a revelation of a fall and a lowering of self-respect."[92] However, power dynamics can influence who feels aristocrat shame and who feels underdog shame, depending on the social situation. Further, shame has the potential for individual transformation because shame forces you to reflect on yourself, your values and your held beliefs. Such a transformation can come easier to someone who experiences aristocrat shame than someone who experiences underdog shame. This is because the underdog shame is more enduring compared to the episodic trait of an aristocrat shame.

Here, I have provided a distinction between shame and guilt, extrapolated more on the social, isolating and positive characteristics of shame, and provided a gendered account of shame. In the following chapter I will go into detail about Foucault's notion of power, how it relates to shame, and discuss connections to feminine corporealities.

---

88 Gabriele Taylor, *Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment* (New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 1985), 85.

89 Jennifer C. Manion, "Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of Shame," *Hypatia* 18, no. 3 (2003): 21.

90 Ullaliina Lehtinen, *Underdog Shame: Philosophical Essays on Women's Internalisation of Inferiority*, Röda Serien, no. 37 (Göteborg, Sweden: Filosofiska Meddelanden, 1998).

91 Ibid., 47; Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 7.

92 Ullaliina Lehtinen, *Underdog Shame: Philosophical Essays on Women's Internalisation of Inferiority*, Röda Serien, no. 37 (Göteborg, Sweden: Filosofiska Meddelanden, 1998), 47.

Foucault, Shame, and Feminine Corporealities

My thesis focuses on shame as a norm regulator for gendered subjectivities. I argue that we can understand shame as an aspect of a Foucauldian notion of power in relation to its disciplinary and productive characteristics. Power, specifically when applying Foucault's understanding of power, is an important factor in the production of truth in the different societal institutions. Societal institutions like schools, prisons, work factories, and hospitals. Foucault's genealogical method investigates and critiques how truth-knowledges are influenced by different power relations historically; how truths are not *a priori* truths. In this chapter I will first consider Foucault's notion of power and explain it in relation to discipline and the production of knowledge and subjectivity. Then, I will elaborate on Foucault's account of power and sexuality in relation to subjectivity. Throughout my discussion on discipline, production of knowledge, and sexuality, I will highlight shame as an aspect of Foucauldian power and discuss how shame relates to a production of subjectivities. Lastly, I will address how feminine bodies have different subjugation through the power of disciplinary shame.

Power and Subjectivity

Foucault brings a new perspective on power in his theories. He specifically does so in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*[93] and *The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One*,[94] where he connects power to notions of disciplinary production of bodies, knowledge, sex, and subjectivities. Through his genealogical method of analysis, Foucault analyses the history of power and brings a new perspective that focuses on power as discourse and as being omnipresent. In this chapter, I will elaborate on Foucault's notion of power and its subjugation of bodies by specifically looking at discipline, knowledge, sex, and subjectivities. I focus on these sections of Foucault's work because of how they relate to my understanding of shame as an aspect of a Foucauldian notion of power. Shame's normative and subjugating force are particularly relevant here.

Power, in Foucault's analysis, is "not a thing, but a relation... [;] not simply repressive but it is productive... [;] not simply a property of the state... [,] localised in government... [, but it] is exercised throughout the social body... [;] power operates at the most micro levels of social

---

[93] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Group, 1991).

[94] Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1998).

interactions. Power is omnipresent at every level of the social body."[95] In his claim that power is a relation and not a thing, Foucault further claims that power is not something that can be possessed but something that is exercised in a network of relations.[96] By exercising power, power is produced. The exercise of power also produces knowledge. However, knowledge also implies power in the following sense: There is "no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations."[97]

In my understanding, this does not necessarily mean that power and knowledge are the same things, but that power and knowledge are intertwined in their relation. Knowledge and power produce each other, and they verify each other. In exercising power relations, different kinds of knowledges are produced and communicates to the individual how we are to behave and live in society. The knowledge we gather of how we behave and live in a society, is taken as justification for furthering our exercise of power in the same manner as we have previously exercised it.[98] Even though power communicates knowledge of how we are to behave and live in society, it does not mean that power is coercive. It does not mean that power have be understood as something external, like a judicial law, which imposes on us how we are to behave.[99] Rather, power is discursive in that there are ways of speaking which allow for certain statements to be expressed.[100] The statements, ways of speaking, that are possible to be expressed, influence what knowledge claims can be made and how we relate to "truths." For instance, when a health product is advertised as scientifically proven in the science crazed societies of present day, many people trust that the product is legitimate and the usage of it will have the desired effect. We believe that there is a truth to the product. The language of science influences a production of truth and the regimes we engage in for our health. Scientific discourse is one of the ways in which "truths" and knowledge are produced. These are not *a priori* truths, but truths that are subject to change along with the change in the mechanisms we use "to distinguish true and false statements."[101] Over the years, we can see changes in the

---

[95] Claire O'Farrell, "Key Concepts," *Michel-Foucault.com*, 2007, last modified October 30, 2010, http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ .

[96] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Group, 1991), 26.

[97] Ibid., 27.

[98] Claire O'Farrell, "Key Concepts," *Michel-Foucault.com*, 2007, last modified October 30, 2010, http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ .

[99] "Foucault: Power is Everywhere," *Powercube*, accessed April 12, 2017, https://www.powercube.net/other-forms-of-power/foucault-power-is-everywhere/ .

[100] Claire O'Farrell, "Key Concepts," *Michel-Foucault.com*, 2007, last modified October 30, 2010, http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ .

[101] Michel Foucault and Paul Rainbow, *The Foucault Reader* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1984), 73.

patterns of "truths" in correlation to changes in the historical mechanisms that measure the criteria for what qualifies as scientifically proven.

Shame is also part of the production of "truths." What has been shameful has also changed over the years. This shows that shame is also genealogical, even though it seems we can find traces of some of the same elements throughout history. As Foucault points out in *The Use of Pleasure. History of Sexuality: Volume Two*,[102] during times of the Ancient Greeks "the wife, as mistress of the house, is a key figure in the management of the *oikos* and she is essential for its good government."[103] "Oikos" means "Economy" and relates to management of the house.[104] Even though this is not as strongly present today in many Western communities, we still find traces of it and a woman is often shamed, to varying degrees, if she is not a good housewife. This can be found in more traditional religious communities where gender roles are more distinctly separated. Foucault does not mention shame in relation to the wife and the management of the household. However, considering the heavy focus of shame as a moral regulator in Ancient Greek societies, I do not think it is a controversial claim to say that a wife in Ancient Greece would bring shame upon herself and lower her status as a woman if she did not manage the *oikos* well. She might also bring shame on her husband because her status was tied directly to him. People from the same social practice might have thought that the husband did not manage his wife and house well, since the wife did not uphold the management of her tasks within the household.

Further, shame can also be understood beyond a power that we possess. For instance, shame can be understood as a power in its exercise and its production of knowledge, and its relationality. I will attempt to show how we can understand shame in these three ways. Firstly, to address how we can understand shame as an exercise rather than solely a power we possess, we can think of shame in relation to societal ideals. When you shame a person, you do not necessarily possess the power of shame. Rather, you can exercise shaming, or power, in relation to societal ideals and values that you do not think the person is upholding. In this sense, you are not a person who owns societal ideals and values, but you communicate and repeat their standards through shame. In your communication, you are exercising shame, or shaming.

---

[102] Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure. History of Sexuality: Volume Two*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1992).

[103] Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure. History of Sexuality: Volume Two*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1992), 154. Emphasis in original.

[104] I advise the reader to read the following article for a brief, but further elaboration: Samie Al-Achrafi, "Oikos: The Origin of the Economic Thought," *The Huffington Post*, November 11, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/samie-alachrafi/oikos-the-origins-of-econ_b_8520644.html

Exercising shaming can be done between people but also within a person. When social norms are internalised, a person might exercise shame upon themselves if he or she is about to do something that deviates from social norms.

Secondly, we can understand shame as a power in its production of knowledge through the exercise of shame. To exemplify the exercise of shame, and better understand shame in its production of knowledge, we can go back to the example of Sally in "Shame, Guilt, and Gendered Experiences" who was shamed by her friends in relation to masturbation and her status as a girl. We remember that her friends' reactions were an act of shaming which caused Sally to feel shame. Sally's friends say, in reply to Sally's question about masturbation, that they do not masturbate, that they do not have a need for it, and that they think it is something boys do and not girls. Here, they are not open to discuss the topic and they are communicating that such action is not appropriate for a girl, that being active in one's sexuality is not a girl-like quality. In their shaming, they are (re)producing some characteristics of what it means to be a girl. Considering this, shame can, like power, be a production of knowledge. In the example of Sally and her friends, the power of shame can produce knowledge about what a girl is and is not, what she can and cannot do. By exercising shame in communicating knowledge of what it means to be a girl, shame also plays a role in the production of knowledge and the production of subjectivity.

Thirdly, to understand shame in its relationality it can be helpful to think of where power and shame comes from. According to Foucault's description, power is omnipresent in the sense that it comes from everywhere; "because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another."[105] This means that power does not come from only one location, e.g. from the sovereign who represses its subjects where the force relation becomes top-down. Power comes from every location and has many force relations. Sovereign power is not power itself; it is merely a modality of power, or a way, a mode, in which it can be exercised.

Shame has the potentiality to come from everywhere and not just one location, even though it is not necessarily omnipresent like power. I say this because shame can be felt from different sources for different individuals. If we add that Sally is White, she will most likely not have her skin colour be a source of shame the way a Black person feels. Like Piper did, when confronted with the colour of her skin in a mainly White community. Sources of shame can

---

[105] Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1998), 93.

also include media messages in a community that is mostly inhabited by people whose skin colour is different shades of brown/black. Most media showcase White as beautiful and create a narrow ideal of beauty. Shame does not have to stem from a person's skin colour, but because of the different relations of the social hierarchy, skin colour can, unjustly, be a source of shame.[106] Further, shame can come from different locations in the forms of your peers, your family, your doctor, your boss, etc. The different groups/locations might shame you if you do not conform to the standards and values that dominate the social group you participate in. Based on the shaming situation, your behaviour might be modified based on your avoidance of being shamed and feeling shame even when the presence of the shamer is only in your head.

Another modality of power is discipline, which is one of the modes of power Foucault analyses in depth. It is in the analysis of disciplinary power, we see that power is not only the negative and repressive form of the sovereign state which we usually associated with power. Disciplinary power "regulates the behaviour of individuals in the social body;"[107] it works "to forge a 'docile body that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved;'"[108] and its mechanism and effects are clearly seen in institutions such as the prison, schools, and hospitals. In many prison systems, which Foucault also highlights, we see strong traces of Jeremy Bentham's model of panopticon at play.[109] Bentham's panopticon is structured as the following:

> The panopticon consists of a large courtyard, with a tower in the centre, surrounded by a series of buildings divided into levels and cells. In each cell there are two windows: one brings in light and the other faces the tower, where large observatory windows allow for the surveillance of the cells. The cells become small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. The inmate is not simply visible to the supervisor; he is visible to the supervisor alone-cut off from any contact. This new power is continuous and anonymous. Anyone could operate the architectural mechanisms as

---

[106] I say that it is unjust because we are not responsible for the pigments in our skin, and I justify this statement with my belief that the burden of proof lies on the racist.

[107] Claire O'Farrell, "Key Concepts," *Michel-Foucault.com*, 2007, last modified October 30, 2010, http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ .

[108] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Group, 1991), 136; Michel Foucault and Paul Rainbow, *The Foucault Reader* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1984), 17.

[109] http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1925/lf0872-04_figure_009.jpg , accessed on February 20,2017.

long as he was in the correct position, and anyone could be subjected to it. The surveillant could as easily be observing a criminal [or] schoolboy. … The architectural perfection is such that even if there is no guardian present, the power apparatus still operates effectively. The inmate cannot see whether or not the guardian is in the tower, so he must behave as if surveillance were perpetual and total. If the prisoner is never sure when he is being observed, he becomes his own guardian.[110]

In addition to this style of continuous collectively individual surveillance which Bentham describes, there are elements of time and registration which also nurtures norms of bodily behaviour. The prisoners have certain hours of the day that they do manual labour, specific hours when they eat. Everything they do, including visits to the health care physician and visitors who come to see them (no matter the social standing of the visitor, whether it be a lawyer or a child), is registered and included in the prisoners' individual files. The panopticon "serves to reform prisoners, … to put beggars to work … [, and] it is a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization."[111] Its rigorous pattern of behavioural regulation is translated into the schools and medical care system: "Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must be imposed, the panoptic schema must be used."[112] As a child in the school system, the ringing of the bell tells us when to sit and when we can play. The teacher supervises what we learn and makes sure that we uphold a certain standard of education based on certain methods of examinations. As a patient, the doctor tells us if there is something seriously wrong with our body or, for instance, if we are just having a passing ache. All our medical examinations are kept on record. Our histories of measurements and examinations tell us who we are as individuals. We are subjectivised, but we also become objects of knowledge. Information of what the normal body and standard of what students of excellence should be like, are extracted from the multiplicity of all these examinations. Through the exercise of power relations we are disciplined, by ourselves, our peers, by the institutions, and the knowledge discourse, into certain forms of behaviour. These "systems of surveillance and assessment no longer require force or violence, as people learn to discipline themselves and behave in expected ways,"[113] and not deviate from the norm.

---

[110] Michel Foucault and Paul Rainbow, *The Foucault Reader* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1984), 19.
[111] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Group, 1991), 205.
[112] Ibid.
[113] "Foucault: Power is Everywhere," *Powercube*, accessed February 20, 2017, https://www.powercube.net/other-forms-of-power/foucault-power-is-everywhere/ .

Shame echoes Foucauldian power and its disciplinary modality in, amongst others, how we shame each other and how, through internalisation, we shame ourselves. The 'we' here refers to individuals as much as groups and institutions. Shame is a form of disciplinary power in the sense that it subjugates bodies into normative subjectivity. Remembering from the previous chapter "Shame, Guilt, and Gendered Experiences," section "Shame and Guilt," shame involves painful feelings related to a "sudden awareness of the self as [being] less good than hoped for and expected, precipitated by the identification of others (imaginary or real), or simply by the ashamed self, of a seemingly significant character shortcoming."[114] We also remember that, despite its suffering, a person is also informed of how to act through shamed subjugation where only certain ideals of expressing subjectivity are accepted as norm. Where the panopticon serves to produce and discipline beggars and prisoners in specific ways, shame is one of the forces that plays a role in reforming, and keeping in place, all individuals at different hierarchical positions in society. To subjugate individuals into, amongst others, gendered subjectivities. In the panopticon the surveillant cannot be seen by the prisoner. In shame, however, the shamed individual can have both a physically seen shamer and imaginary shamer. Experiencing the shame of being called abnormal (directly or indirectly, in the physical presence of a shamer) and seeing oneself through the eyes of the shamer, a person starts self-surveilling and self-disciplining. The presence of an actual surveillant, or shamer, is no longer necessary as the shamed person learns to behave in the expected, standardised, and "normal", ways.

Further, our feelings of shame and actions of shaming each other is closely linked with the knowledge production of the disciplinary practices. The gathering of information and the regulations within the different institutions, contribute to provide the ideals and values we supposedly should strive to uphold. Such knowledge gives us incentive to shame each other, or feel shame, if we see someone, or if we are, deviating from the constructed norms we believe are good for our society. Norms which contribute to maintaining a certain status quo. If we shame someone else, we can often be perceived as individuals who embody the norms and be valued by society and rise, or at least be respected, in the social hierarchy. One reason for why we might be perceived as such an embodiment is because we portray ourselves as an authority when we shame someone else.[115] However, in shaming someone else, we can also run the risk

---

[114] Jennifer C. Manion, "Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of Shame," *Hypatia* 18, no. 3 (2003): 21.

[115] Even though we portray ourselves as an authority, perhaps knowingly or not, that does not mean that we in fact are an authority on the topic.

of being shamed. Sometimes the shamer is also shamed for his or her shaming. Our false portrayal of authority might be called out. A bystander might ask who we are to make others feel down about themselves, point out how the standards are harmful, or point out ways in which we ourselves do not uphold the standards we proclaim others should uphold. When the shamer is shamed, the initial shamed individual might start questioning their internalised beliefs and start a path of transformation, as briefly described in the previous chapter in the section "Beneficial Characteristics of Shame."[116]

To summarise, I have here tried to show that power is not something that can only be possessed, it is something that can be exercised. Knowledge is produced in shame's exercise. The knowledge produced through shame can function to inform the individual of how to behave within the social body. One modality, or type, of power is disciplinary power which regulates and subjugates individuals to fit into norms through surveillance, examinations, and recordings. The stored and gathered information in the recordings from the surveillance of our bodies, tell us who we are as individuals and as groups of individuals. Collectively, the recordings produce a construction of a standardised body. As with power, so with shame. Shaming informs the individual of how to behave and disciplines individuals to fit norms. Shaming informs through means of surveillance by the other and contribute to self-regulating our ways of being to fit the standardised body. The other here is both imagined and real. Foucault's work focuses mainly on one type of body's individuation and objectification, so his work hugely neglects what different reality is produced for the female body and sex. I will explore this further in my last section of this chapter, but now I will move on to a discussion on power and sex.

Sexuality

Power can also produce subjectivity and objectify through sex. In, amongst others, his book *The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One*, we find that Foucault explores how power is a function of the knowledge of sex. He aims to "define the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality in our part of the world."[117] Foucault talks about how the development of different knowledges historically has created certain understandings of different concepts and ideas labelled as truths. He starts off dealing with the Repressive Hypothesis which says that since the 17th century, and into the 20th century,

---

[116] Shame's transformative power will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
[117] Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1998), 11. Emphasis in original.

sex was silenced, and it became a topic secluded to procreation that was only appropriate in the home. Sex was seen as a sin and so many believed that is should be repressed; "Sexuality was carefully confined; the [Victorian bourgeoisie moved it] into the home. The conjugal family took custody of it and absorbed it into the serious function of reproduction. On the subject of sex, silence became the rule."[118] Sex was not considered appropriate as a topic of discussion, but Foucault challenges the idea of sexuality being silenced by highlighting how there was a burst of investigations relating to sex. *Scientia Sexualis*, or the science of sexuality, included work done by scholars, theoreticians, and doctors which focused on topics surrounding sex, but which always, in some sense, hid that their work was in fact about sex. It is "a science made up of evasions since, given its inability or refusal to speak of sex itself, it concerns itself primarily with aberrations, perversions, exceptional oddities, pathological abatements, and morbid aggravations."[119] When investigating and exploring that which they considered abnormal, it seems they must have had an idea of what was considered normal. Further, by stating what ways of being are amongst the abnormalities, they were also, indirectly, pointing towards what was considered normal.

Scientia Sexualis also concerned that of confession in the sense that the gathering of information concerning the perversions and pathologies, etc., required that people confessed their sexual preferences, emotions, and thoughts. In their confessions, hidden truths about sex were not uncovered, but instead "they [actually] *produced* sexuality as a new category of knowledge, a historically specific field[,]"[120] and contributed to producing our subjectivities. These confessions, the study of the aberrations etc., and their participation in the new knowledge production brought forth a so-called "truth" of sex. However, as mentioned earlier, Foucault did not consider these confessions as some *a priori* truth. Rather, the "truths" people confessed to were effects of the power regime in which they lived in:

> [B]ehaviours and choices that today we would understand as 'sexual' mean different things at different periods and in different locations. 'Sexuality', as we think of it today, is an invention of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, produced by specific techniques for eliciting confession about individual desires and classifying and interpreting what was disclosed.[121]

---

[118] Ibid., 3.
[119] Ibid., 53.
[120] Lisa Downing, *The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 89. Emphasis in original.
[121] Ibid., 86.

Sexuality has historical, geographical, religious, cultural, political, etc. specificities and has different meanings accordingly. For instance, two grown men holding hands in India is usually seen as a sign of friendship, but in Norway it usually indicates a romantic relation. Even though confession is mostly associated with Catholicism, and for some, psychiatry and psychology, confession was also a practice in the medical and judicial field. The practices of confession evolved into knowledge discourse of "pedagogy, relationships between adults and children, family relations, medicine, and psychiatry [that called] for therapeutic or normalising interventions."[122] Our confessions functioned in some ways as "truth" bearers of what is "right" and "wrong," and the constructed ideals and standards as brought forward by our confessions, by power and sex-knowledge, regulate our behaviour through individuation and objectification. We, the individuals, also regulate behaviour and subjectivate through our internalisation of these constructed ideals as accepted norms. When we shame someone, we are, in one way, also communicating different "truths." In the same ways that *Scientia Sexualis*' investigations of what was deemed abnormal also produced a knowledge of what was considered normal, shame also communicates what is considered normal through shaming that which is outside the norm or standard. A person shames someone, and that someone very often feels shame. The shamer often shames others because they see those others as less than or different than that which is expected according to standards and norms. The others are seen deviating from the ideals set forth by the historically created "truths."[123] In their shaming, in the communication that a person is someone less than expected and outside of the norm, they are also producing a knowledge of what is considered normal.

Shame also has an aspect of the power of confessions to it. Its presence can be found, amongst others, in the church, in psychiatry, and within peer relations. Shame renders you silent, and one method of alleviating shame is through confession and receiving forgiveness or understanding from the other party; such a pattern is typical between the catholic and the pastor, the patient and the psychiatrist, and two close friends.[124] Some of the other methods of alleviating shame, include changing your way of being to fit the norms of society and recognising that the ideals of subjectivity are constructed and that you do not have to be ashamed of yourself. One might believe that this would mean that if we confess everything,

---

[122] Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1998), 68.

[123] There can be many different additional reasons why a shamer is shaming someone. Often it can be insecurity in self and by shaming others they divert the attention away from their own shortcomings and shift the focus over to others' believed shortcomings.

[124] In Catholicism there is also a notion of Catholic guilt. I will not go into a discussion on that here since I have already laid grounds for distinguishing shame and guilt in my previous chapter.

then there will no longer be any shame. By everything, I mean that which we might feel ashamed about. If we consider the enduring aspect of underdog shame as discussed the chapter "Shame, Guilt, and Gendered Subjectivities," section "Gendered Experiences of Shame," confession and forgiveness does not guarantee that your shame is alleviated. It could be that your shame is alleviated when you are around the person you confessed to and who still approve of you. However, when you are around others or are alone and think about a peer-group that does not approve and support of how you are, your shame painstakingly makes its presence known.

For instance, because there has been an increase in acceptance and respect of people with a different sexuality than the heterosexual norm, which for many has been a good experience, there has also been a spread of a glorification of the coming-out process for many homosexuals. The stories about those who do not benefit from coming out do not receive much attention. Many people who have come out as homosexuals still often feel a shame in relation to how their sexual orientation is now a focus of how others primarily see them. That this way of being is for many considered a wrong or a specific way of being, which often feels constricting for many homosexuals.[125] Confessing does not guarantee a relieve of shame. Further, the case of the homosexual also shows that underdog shame is not situated strictly in the woman. The location of underdog shame varies depending on the domination relations. A homosexual who feels shame about his sexuality, will most likely feel underdog shame because of the strong presence of a heteronormative society. In this relation, the heterosexual will be in the position of feeling aristocrat shame. Like Foucault says:

> [T]he manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole. These then form a general line of force that traverses the local opposition and links them together; to be sure, they also bring about redistributions, and convergences of the force relations. Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations.[126]

The force relations that come into play in the machinery of production have many effects,

---

[125] I advise the reader to read the following Norwegian article piece: André Bjugstad, "Jeg misliker å være homofil. Stempelet tar knekken på meg," *Aftenposten*, October 23, 2016, http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/sid/Jeg-misliker-a-vare-homofil-Stempelet-tar-knekken-pa-meg-607210b.html

[126] Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1998), 94.

including domination relations which are not only limited to the relation between man and woman. The hegemonic effects of domination relations extend to sexual orientation, race, and social class amongst others. I highlight these relations because in my argument of shame as a Foucauldian power, the productions of gendered subjectivities that shame reinforce are influenced by ideals of masculinity and femininity in an intersectional matter. Understandings of race, sexuality, and social class have influenced different forms of expressing subjectivity.[127] Still, it seems that in his volumes on the history of sexuality, Foucault believed that sex, in its production, came to be one of the most signifying forces in subjectivation: "It is through sex – in fact, an imaginary point determined by the deployment of sexuality – that each individual has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility […], to the whole of his body […], to his identity."[128] It seems then that the thought is that in sex, in the knowledge of a person's pleasure, a person's identity and nature is revealed.[129] This revelatory "nature," however, seems laden in that *Scientia Sexualis* has historically categorised "right" and "wrong" kinds of nature – "normal" and "abnormal." Shame also operates with categories of "right" and "wrong," "normal" and "abnormal." When we shame each other, we communicate about "right" and "wrong" ways of being. Especially in relation to sex, shame seems to subjectivate the individual in that it reveals to the individual what is the "right" way of being when shaming for the "wrong" way of being. As such, shame disciplines the individual.

To recapitulate, there was an increase during the 17th century and into the 20th century of investigations relating to sex using methods of collecting information about individuals through their confessions. Foucault calls this specific method for *Scientia Sexualis*. The development of *Scientia Sexualis* contributed to the evolvement of new knowledge-productions and specific forms of discourses, such as that on sexual subjectivity. In the analysis of the data collected from the confessions, categories of "normal" and "abnormal" sexualities and ways of being were produced. In this production process, the individual was treated as an object to be studied, as someone where "truth" could be withdrawn from. However, the individual could also learn about him- or herself. In this learning process a person was objectified and individualised – knowledge of sexual subjectivities was produced. Further, I have tried to show that shame shares characteristics with *Scientia Sexualis*. Some of these characteristics include that of confessions and how shame reinforces sexual subjectivities. One way of potentially

---

[127] I elaborate on this in the section further below.

[128] Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1998), 155.

[129] Lisa Downing, *The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 88.

alleviating shame is through confession. By confessing what I am ashamed of, I am admitting something about myself that is "abnormal" or "wrong" – something about myself that I believe (perhaps wrongly) that I should not be. If I did not feel less than what is expected or feel that my being is wrong in some way, I would most likely not feel shame and the need to alleviate that shame. By ways of confession, information is produced that becomes part of the knowledge discourse and, also, the production of sexual subjectivities (when the confessions, as they often do, relate to sex). The sexual subjectivities vary depending on gender, sexuality, race, and social class. Because Foucault does not include all these depending factors in his theories, my discussion on Foucault and power will now move on to look at what different reality is produced for the female body and sex, and notions of femininity.

<div align="center">Feminine Corporealities</div>

My thesis deals with how shame shapes normative ideals of subjectivity, and I argue that shame can be understood in aspect of a Foucauldian power. The normative ideals of subjectivity seem to be different for women and men, and shame contributes to such gendered norms of subjectivity. In exploration of normative powers of subjectivity, I will now go further into a gendered analysis of disciplinary power, docile bodies, and sexuality because Foucault focuses mainly on male bodies in his discussion on disciplinary power, docile bodies, and sexuality. Further, I employ a gendered analysis to highlight how female docility has a different subjugation and a different performativity by showcasing specific examples from everyday life. Bartky argues that there is a lack of feminine corporeality in Foucault's work as she points out that "Foucault treats the body throughout as if it were one, as if the bodily experiences of men and women did not differ."[130] I will here explore accounts of how feminine corporealities are disciplined differently. However, I will also show cases where we might say that Foucault discusses feminine corporealities. For instance, his work on homosexuality as femininity shows that femininity does not have to exclusively belong to the female body.[131] Lastly, when considering shame, we can get an insight into the production, exercise, and experiences of feminine corporealities.

Bartky argues that Foucault treats the body in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the*

---

[130] Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 65.

[131] It needs to be noted that homosexuality does not have to be feminine. It can be feminine; it can be masculine. It does not have to be simply one way of expressing.

Prison as if it was only one body, as if "men and women bore the same relationship to the characteristic institutions of modern life."[132] Further, Bartky highlights three categories of disciplines that aim to produce a feminine body: (1) dieting and exercise, (2) body movements, and (3) body decoration. These practices are often enforced and reinforced through individuals shaming each other. Shame does not only produce gendered subjectivities, but also gendered bodies; we are not born feminine or masculine.

Dieting and exercise routines are supposed to subjugate the body into specific shapes. In the Western world, the beauty ideal for women includes Whiteness, thin, a thigh gap, and there has been an increase in acceptance of a muscular and lean body that is not too bulky. If it is too bulky, it seems the body is deemed too masculine and the woman will lose traits of her womanhood. The skinny body ideal is not limited to the West. In China, the pressure to be thin for women is so high that there even was a Collarbone Challenge where the number of coins you can balance against your collarbone indicates your level of sexy and skinniness – levels of supposedly ideal womanhood. Bartky's first category of disciplining the body for femininity is dieting, which monitors the bodies appetite, and exercise, which regulates the body's fitness level.[133] Where men's bodies should be big and strong, women's bodies should be small and slender.[134] When other's shame you for what you eat, or for the shape of your body, you very often become subjugated into dieting and exercising, or overeating, for unhealthy reasons such as trying to live up to unrealistic standards of what it means to be feminine. Reasons which often lead to eating disorders, which can increase the chances of depression and suicidal thoughts. I would add cosmetic surgery to Bartky's category of dieting and exercise that subjugates the female body into specific feminine body shapes. Body shaming leads many to seek the knife to, for instance, increase their breasts, reduce their breasts, get face lifts to reduce wrinkles, and tighten their labia to become ever more closer to a female feminine body ideal and to avoid shaming. It should be noted, though, that in her arguments, Bartky is focusing on feminine as female. I think in her narrow focus of feminine, she falls short in a similar manner to Foucault. Where she argues Foucault is neglecting feminine bodies, she neglects that feminine bodies do not have to be exclusively female.

As for bodily movements, which also includes posture and gestures, Bartky argues that

---

[132]Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 65.

[133] Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 66.

[134] This is when we look at men's and women's bodies in a heteronormative perspective. There can be different expectations of this depending on, for instance, queer communities, race, and intersectionality of these.

women's bodily movements are more restricted, but that it also should be graceful: "Woman's space is not a field in which her bodily intentionality can be freely realised but an enclosure in which she feels herself positioned and by which she is confined."[135] During a woman's menstruation she must make sure that what she does to her body and the activities she engages in does not expose that she is on her period. She must keep herself clean and not appear soiled in society, she must maintain a level of grace, and, according to Sonia Kruks:

> In such ways, a young woman learns how to develop those practices of self-surveillance and self-discipline that Foucault attributes to the panoptic gaze. But they are not the direct effect of the gaze itself, so much as of the shame with which it forces her to see "herself." Shame, as what we might call a primary structure of a woman's lived experience, extends far beyond her relationship to menstruation, and it becomes integral to a generalized sense of inferiority of the feminine body-subject.[136]

Kruks' analysis resonates with both Manion's notion of shame where we are forced to evaluate what we value, and Lehtinen's underdog shame which is pervaded by feelings of inferiority that are a result of enduring life events. I would add that the panoptic gaze is a shaming gaze for marginalised groups of people. Shame is a feeling, like Kruks points out in its force to see ourselves, but in that sense it is also an action. Through the action of forcing us to see ourselves, shame also shows that it is an action. For instance, the shaming gaze of others can force us to make sure that we are adhering to social norms, such as beauty regimen. Regimens take up our time and mental capacity that we could use on other things. We can choose to look away from what we have seen about ourselves and keep on with the beauty regimens (sometimes it feels easier to just follow and be accepted as one of the group), or we can choose to evaluate what we are seeing and reflect on whether we should make some changes or not to our beauty regimen. The panoptic gaze operates differently for women and men, for people of different races and sexualities because of different norms and ideals within the different groups and communities. Often, we do not belong strictly to one social group and it can therefore be difficult to navigate how to express ourselves and still feel like we belong.[137] The shaming gaze can therefore produce different gendered bodies and gendered subjectivities. Through this

---

[135] Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 67.

[136] Sonia Kruks, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 64.

[137] Of course, we can question if "needing to belong" should be an aim, and what exactly defines the different ways in which we can belong. I will not explore this further here, but it is important to note since needing to belong in some sense seems important to many of us as human beings.

shaming gaze we can see the force of shame in Foucauldian power.

Concerning body decorations, Bartky argues that a woman's body is an ornamented surface where the role of make-up, skin care and clothing become forces of subjugating women. There is a whole industry with competing companies catering to women so they can ensure that their skin is soft, smooth, hairless (legs, thighs, pubic hair, eyebrows should be plucked, moustache can be waxed) and with little to no sign of aging.[138] There are methods which require regular maintenance, but also painful and expensive procedures which have more long-lasting effects, and some that remove hair permanently. There are many instructions for how to provide good hair and skin care, how to keep your hands and feet smooth and feminine with pedicures and manicures. Women must learn the proper manipulations of the relevant tools to maintain the regimen of feminine beauty, including curling iron, flat iron, eyeliner, eyelash curler, mascara brush, "and the correct manner of application of a wide variety of products – foundation, toner, … eye gloss, blusher, lipstick, … hair dye, … "hair relaxer," etc."[139]

While there has been an increase in beauty products and grooming for men, it is not to the same volume as it is for women. However, this can differ according to race and sexuality. For instance, there might be more of a pressure for heterosexual Black men and homosexual men to groom compared to White heterosexual men, which again highlights the importance of intersectionality. Focusing on the female body, grooming practices are part of disciplining and subjugating the female body into a feminine body, and feminine beauty regimens also vary depending on culture. With a White beauty ideal being prevalent worldwide, many women of colour avoid being out in the sun or they try to bleach their skin which can cause nerve, kidney, or liver damage. There is also a massive usage of hair relaxer among the female Black community, which can be seen as a way to emulate traditionally European looking hair.[140] Underdog and aristocrat shame can be a dynamic between women, in addition to be a dynamic between women and men. A White woman will most likely feel aristocrat shame in relation to a woman of colour, who will most likely feel underdog shame when trying to conform to specifically White standards of beauty. This dynamic of underdog and aristocrat shame, where White women most likely feel aristocrat shame and Black women most likely feel underdog shame, does not have to be the case, though. It is more of a general trend on a macrolevel in the

---

[138] Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 69.

[139] Ibid., 71.

[140] However, there is disagreement and continuous discussions if hair relaxer is an assimilation into Whiteness or not.

world. However, this trend is changing. Black Girl Magic is a great example of how the White-other dynamic is changing. Black Girl Magic is a movement and way of being that celebrates "the beauty, intelligence, and power of Black women everywhere."[141] It is a movement of empowerment that recognises Black women in their own right and not in comparison to White people.

As I have noted previously in this chapter, feminine bodies are not just female bodies. As earlier quoted from Bartky, "we are born male or female, but not masculine or feminine."[142] Bartky's quote challenges her own claims that Foucault does not discuss feminine corporealities. Foucault discusses passivity – associated with femininity – in relation to erotic pleasures between men during the times of the Ancient Greeks, amongst others.[143] If a homosexual man's sexuality is accepted for who he is, it is very often on the basis of his femininity. The stereotype is that a man can be homosexual if he is feminine. This is mostly related to heteronormative ideals that indicate that he is not a "real" man because a "real" man is masculine. The femininity stereotype of homosexuals is not threatening to the heterosexual man, and many find it then easier to wrap their head around understanding that a man can be homosexual. Feminine homosexuals also undergo a beauty regime for grooming their bodies, some of which overlap with female bodies as mentioned above, whilst some are more common in the white homosexual community such as anal bleaching. Further, you also have heterosexual men who are feminine as well as masculine, such as drag queens who volumize the performance of femininity. Many of whom are shamed for their feminine performance. The male feminine bodies experience a different corporeality compared to female feminine bodies.

Transgender people also experience a different corporeality. For instance, someone who was labelled male by birth, but have gone through a transformation and express their identity as a woman must often be even more diligent with their beauty regimen and feminine performance because they are constantly shamed into fear of expressing and performing who they are as a woman. Many transgender people put a lot of work into passing in our heteronormative society because they are constantly policed. The toilet and wardrobe debate are prime examples of this. Transgender people often struggle with feeling confident in which

---

[141] Sydney Gore, "44 Women Weigh in on the Meaning of 'Black Girl Magic,'" *Nylon*, accessed on March 20, 2021 https://www.nylon.com/articles/meaning-of-black-girl-magic

[142] Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 65.

[143] Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure. History of Sexuality: Volume Two*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1992); Michel Foucault, *The Care of the Self. History of Sexuality: Volume Three*, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1990).

toilet they should use in public restrooms or which wardrobe they should use if at a gym. Also, they are often prone to receive comments that question if they belong in that public space. The examples of what transgender people experience, what people of colour experience, what the members of the queer community experience in the heteronormative world, show that different types of feminine bodies have different experiences of shamed subjectivities contingent on different power relations. Different feminine corporealities can experience underdog shame and aristocrat shame contingent on power relations; these two types of shame do not belong strictly to the woman-man relation.

When transgender people perform femininity, when we all perform different expressions of gender, race, and sexuality, it is not a theatrical performance I refer to. It is Judith Butler's term performativity, and she explores the term particularly through that of gender. According to Butler,

> [t]o say that gender is performative is to say that it is a certain kind of enactment; the 'appearance' of gender is often mistaken as a sign of its internal or inherent truth; gender is prompted by obligatory norms to be one gender or the other (usually within a strict binary frame), and the reproduction of gender is thus always a negotiation with power; and finally, there is no gender without this reproduction of norms that risks undoing or redoing the norm in unexpected ways, thus opening up the possibility of a remaking of gendered reality along new lines.[144]

When Butler states that "gender is often mistaken as a sign of its internal or inherent truth,"[145] she means that gender is not an *a priori* truth. It is not a fact beyond its construction. Since gender is constructed, its construction can also change. For instance, what is stereotypically associated with feminine is female, but transgender people challenge this association. However, as Butler points out, we live in a strict binary frame (male vs female). So, if we try to change how we express gender to create new constructions, it will be very difficult and met with a lot of resistance. There is a negotiation with power, a question of who gets to express what gender norms. In light of *Scientia Sexualis* and the different knowledge productions discussed above in relation to shame, gender norms are reproduced through internalised ideals and norms. Ideals and norms that are communicated as "truths" we should strive to uphold. With these internalised "truths" as our guides, women stereotypically pick out clothes to pass as feminine so not to

---

[144] Judith Butler, "Performativity, Precarity and Sexual Politics," *AIBR: Revista de Antropología Iberoamericana* 4, no. 3 (2009), i.
[145] Ibid.

deviate from the norm. Deviating from the norm opens the possibility to be exposed to shaming and pain. When buying from the women's department in the clothing store, our purchase habits are tracked and fed back to production companies that these are the clothes women want. This consumer and producer cycle of gender categorisation in the clothing industry, contribute to reproducing the binary gender norms and the possibilities of creating new gender roles.

Even though it may seem impossible to break gender norms and create new constructions because of the strong power relations at play, I think that Manion's transformative power of shame has the potential to contribute to creating new constructions of gender norms. Let us imagine an adult man named Edgar who wants to wear nail polish to his office, but he has never dared to in fear of being labelled less of a man, ridiculed, and shamed by his colleagues. The discussions at his office sometimes convey that if you are a feminine man, you are less of a man and you are usually a homosexual. Discussions which state that a feminine man and a homosexual man are not fully men. Unfortunately, these are not uncommon beliefs and I have witnessed and challenged such discussions myself. Edgar's effort to avoid being shamed publicly by colleagues is in conflict with his desire to wear nail polish whenever he wants to. He might even feel ashamed for having the desire to wear nail polish. If he wears nail polish he does not pass as full man. The conflict of his shame and his desire can bring about a state of torment or of questioning his own beliefs. What does he most desire? Be accepted and respected by his colleagues or follow his passion for nail polish? The conflicts bring about a reflection about how to express himself. If he wants to conform with expectations, he will reproduce gender norms since females stereotypically wear nail polish. If he sees his desire to wear nail polish is stronger and decides to act upon it, he will break the pattern of gender norms and contribute to creating new ones. Norms which open for more people to wear nail polish without it diminishing their sense of manhood. Even though it might take a while for Edgar to feel confident wearing nail polish and his colleagues to get over the fact that Edgar wears nail polish, it is a start.   However, it should be noted that there is change among the younger generation regarding gender norms compared to older generations. There is a much wider respect and acceptance for boys to wear nail polish, skirts, or dresses. This can vary geographically across national borders and within national borders. Stereotypically, there are more traditional gender norms for boys in the countryside.

Further, I use the example of nail polish for men because nail polish might seem like such a small thing that there are bigger issues concerning gender that should be handled. However, I believe the example of nail polish show how strict gender norms are. When we

question someone's manhood based on a small thing as nail polish, it can point to how difficult it is to create new and more inclusive gender norms on a larger scale. When shame forces us to reflect on why we feel shame, we are forced to choose between at least two things: if we want to conform with norms to stop feeling shame or if we want distance ourselves from strict norms and create new ways of being and expressing ourselves. By choosing to create new ways of expressing ourselves that challenge gender norms, we can see that shame has the potential to break strict gender norms and contribute to creating new ones.

To summarise, I have tried to show that women and men can have different corporealities when exploring how they might be subjugated differently, something it seems Foucault neglects to give proper attention to in his analysis. I have here tried to show how feminine docility can have a different docility than masculine docility. Women have a very strict and extensive beauty regiment to follow in trying to adhere to the beauty norms for a feminine body. If women do not adhere to this, if they stray too far away from the feminine ideals, they are often shamed back into a "proper" femininity. Body shaming does not only happen for female feminine bodies, but for transgender people and male feminine bodies as well. Because of the different relations to femininity that different bodies express, there is also a difference in the type of shame they experience. For instance, female bodies from different cultures can experience underdog and aristocrat shame in relation to each other and ideals of feminine subjectivity, depending on their individual placements in the social hierarchy. Those outside the heteronormative binary, such as transgender people, will often also experience underdog shame because of a different corporeality when expressing their subjectivity; their performance "needs" to pass as legitimate, and it does so by not threaten heteronormative society.

Summary

Foucault understands power as something that is exercised rather than possessed. In its exercise, knowledge which also informs the individual how to behave within the social body, is produced. Disciplinary power regulates and subjugates individuals to fit into norms through surveillance, examinations and recordings. With regards to my thesis of understanding shame as a Foucauldian notion of power in producing gendered subjectivities, shaming also informs the individual on how to behave and disciplines individuals to fit norms through surveillance by shaming, and self-regulating our ways of being in accordance to the standardised body ideal. Power objectifies and subjectifies in its gathering of information and production of individuals. Disciplinary power is one modality of power in which this occurs, so is sex. By collection of

information from people's confessions and the discourse that evolved, a sexual subjectivity was produced, and this demonstrate how intimately power and knowledge are intertwined in the exercise of power at all levels of society. Foucault calls this *Scientia Sexualis*. Shame has characteristics of Foucault's *Scientia Sexualis* in its relation to confessions, but also in the way shame reinforces sexual subjectivities. The sexual subjectivities vary depending on gender, sexuality, race, how it is understood differently through history, and social class.

In much of his work on disciplinary power and sex, Foucault treats the body as male throughout. Bartky and Kruks argue for a different subjugation of the female body where the disciplinary practices for women are very strict and extensive in its relation to beauty and femininity. If women do not adhere to this, if they stray too far away from the ideals of femininity, they are shamed back into femininity by men, but also by fellow women. Because the female body looks different from culture to culture but there is an overarching beauty ideal of the White Western body, women can experience underdog and aristocrat shame in relation to each other depending on how close they are to the beauty ideal of femininity. Lastly, the experiences and shame of feminine corporealities do not only belong to the female body as there are transgender people and other male feminine bodies who also experience shame for trying to adhere to, or being too close to, the strict regimen of feminine gender norms. Even though it is difficult to create new gender norms, partly because of a strict binary notion of gender, there is the potential to create new and more inclusive gender norms though the transformative power of shame.

Shame and its Moral Relevance

So far in my thesis, I have analysed how shame operates as a norm regulator for expressing gendered subjectivities. I have demonstrated how we can create new and more inclusive constructions of gender through the transformative power of shame. In the previous chapter, I looked at how we can view shame through a Foucauldian notion of power by examining shame in relation to disciplinary power, subjugation, and the history of sexuality. I explored how shame informs individuals about how they ought to behave to fit norms. Particularly, I looked at how we regulate our ways of being in adherence to gendered norms of subjectivity through shaming each other and self-shaming.

Furthermore, I investigated feminine corporealities in relation to Foucault's work and how shame gives an insight into the production of different feminine corporealities. Productions of different feminine corporealities show that shame can contribute to the production of hierarchical structures. Additionally, depending on the hierarchical relations between different social groups, it will vary who feels underdog shame and who feels aristocrat shame.[146] An individual can feel underdog shame in relation to one social group and aristocrat shame in relation to another social group, depending on the individual's social standing within the two different social groups. A White woman might stereotypically feel underdog shame in relation to a White man, but she might feel aristocrat shame in relation to a Black woman who stereotypically feels underdog shame in this relation.

In this chapter, I will look at moral shame and guilt and how they guide our behaviour. Generally, we want to be better human beings and improve society. Morality is a guide for how we can improve society and ourselves. It can be difficult to distinguish moral shame and moral guilt since they often occur simultaneously, and they can overlap in their qualities. To understand moral shame, I also need to present aspects of moral guilt. I will explore moral shame and moral guilt because my thesis deals with how shame shapes normative ideals of expressing gendered subjectivities, and how moral shame can falsely present ideals to strive for. Moral shame has at least two sides to it: a false moral shame and a more legitimate moral shame. In regulating behaviour, shame can falsely portray that certain ideals and values have moral weight. This is particularly present in specific ideals of masculinity and femininity. I believe that being a good person is not dependent on your gender; that how masculine or

---

[146] For a discussion on underdog and aristocrat shame, see chapter "Shame, Guilt and Gendered Experiences," section "Gendered Experiences of Shame" of this thesis or read Ullaliina Lehtinen, "How Does One Know What Shame is? Epistemology, Emotions, and Forms of Life in Juxtaposition," *Hypatia* 13, no. 1 (1998).

feminine you are does not dictate how good of a human being you are. When we give gendered ideals moral value and shame each other if we do not adhere to gendered ideals, shame is not morally relevant and present itself as a false moral shame. I will explore this further in the last section of this chapter.

However, a more legitimate moral shame is where we feel ashamed for not living up to moral values such as honesty, kindness, and honour. Moral shame can be beneficial. For instance, shame can help prevent stealing. If you are caught stealing a banana, you will be guilty of the act, but you might also feel ashamed of what your action might reflect on you as a person. Stealing could imply that you are a dishonest person with no respect for other people's properties and that you are leeching from others in society. Being labelled a thief, you might not get the same access to participate in society and do other things that you want. For instance, you might not attain the jobs that you want because you have a criminal record, and your potential employer might not trust you. You might feel ashamed of your past and how it could determine your future if others found out. So, to avoid feeling shame, you avoid stealing.

I will first explore moral guilt and moral shame by looking at how shame and guilt are connected to different moral notions. Through the work of R.E. Lamb, I will analyse shame and guilt in relation to responsibility. Since Lamb claims only guilt is essentially connected to morality, I will use Anthony O'Hear to investigate honour's relation to morality and shame. Through O'Hear, I intend to illustrate that different notions of morality, e.g., responsibility and honour, can prompt different moral guides, i.e. guilt and shame, for our behaviour. O'Hear highlights the challenges of developing a sense of moral guilt without elements of law and authority, thus arguing that moral guilt cannot cover morality on its own accord. I will challenge O'Hear's notion of honour by showing how honour can be connected to guilt as well as shame.

Next, I will draw on Jan-Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel's investigation on shame in moral transgressions and how they place value on moral guilt instead of moral shame.[147] I will explore if moral shame can provide us with any information about how we can behave. Henriksen and Mesel conclude that shame ought to have minimal space in society, since it cannot provide us with much useful information. I will examine why they make this claim when they also recognise Manion's positive aspect of shame through its transformative power. Lastly,

---

[147] Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, "Shame and Morality," in *Shame's Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study* (NOASP, Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2021), 269-336.

I will look at how shame might falsely present itself as a moral guide, by specifically looking at regulations of gendered ideals.

Moral Shame, Moral Guilt, and Responsibility

As discussed in chapter "Shame, Guilt, and Gendered Experiences," section "Shame and Guilt," shame and guilt are very much intertwined even though we try to distinguish them. Feelings of shame and guilt can often be present simultaneously which makes it difficult to distinguish them. Sometimes we feel shame over our actions even though it is guilt we usually associate as the appropriate feeling when we have done something wrong. In distinguishing between moral shame and moral guilt, I will draw on Lamb's distinction and look at why he claims only guilt is essentially connected to morality.[148] Lamb specifically looks at responsibility as a central notion to morality when exploring the moral relevance of guilt and shame. According to Lamb, guilt is essentially connected to moral notions, whereas shame is contingently connected to moral notions. Lamb argues that we morally judge ourselves and others on whether we have fulfilled the responsibility of acquiring abilities we ought to have.[149] By linking the assessment of moral behaviour to responsibility he concludes that it is guilt that ought to act as our moral system. He concludes that shame-systems can be successful ways of regulating behaviour, but that to call shame moral is simply a confusion.[150]

Lamb looks at how both guilt and shame are systems of regulating behaviour. He further looks at how they are moral emotions in relation to responsibility since he highlights responsibility as one of morality's central notions. I will distinguish moral shame from guilt by looking at how he claims that shame is contingently connected to notions of morality and that guilt is a system that is essentially connected to notions of morality.[151] Lamb says that "morality may suffer no essential injury when the possibility of shame is removed, but the excision of guilt cuts off its head."[152] To explain, Lamb argues that "a state which one can bring *only* upon oneself is precisely the *sort* of state required by [guilt or shame to be moral]."[153] He claims that since others can shame us, and we can put others to shame through our actions, shame is not something which we can only bring upon ourselves. Guilt, according to Lamb, is not something

[148] R.E. Lamb, "Guilt, Shame, and Morality," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 43, no. 3 (1983): 329-346.
[149] Ibid., 341.
[150] Ibid., 346.
[151] Ibid., 345.
[152] Ibid., 342.
[153] Ibid., 339. Emphasis in original.

you can bring upon others and others cannot bring guilt upon you. He argues that you do "not manage to put someone *else* in the 'state' or 'condition' of guilt, *solely* by virtue of what [you do yourself]."[154]

He looks at a specific case of shame where we feel shame because of our actions and responsibility, when claiming that shame is only contingently connected to morality. To illustrate, Lamb differentiates between being shamed and doing something shameful. People are not in themselves shameful, but Lamb points out that we can say that they ought to feel ashamed if they have done something shameful.[155] However, people might be shamed "irrespective of whether [they] have done anything shameful, irrespective of whether [they] ought to be ashamed. By contrast it is necessary" that for someone to be guilty, they themselves must perform an action of a certain type.[156] The certain type of action Lamb refers to here is an act where only you bring a state upon yourself and not others, and this is essential to morality. Since others can put you in a state of shame even when you have not done something shameful, Lamb claims morality suffers no essential injury when the possibility of shame is removed, but morality does suffer essential injury if guilt is removed.

Additionally, he claims that shame is not essentially connected to morality since others can shame us when we are not responsible for the act that puts us to shame.[157] Lamb argues that:

> [W]e are not, in general, *morally* obliged to *have abilities* or *capacities*, even though we may be morally obliged *to take certain steps* to acquire, i.e., with the *aim* of acquiring, abilities. Consequently, we do not blame, i.e., morally censure, people for *not having* abilities, though we do blame them when they do nothing by way of an attempt to acquire abilities they ought to have.[158]

To illustrate, sometimes we are shamed by others for not being honest. In this case, we are responsible for not being honest, and if honesty is a moral virtue, then we should rightly feel ashamed. However, Lamb highlights that we cannot hold people morally responsible for abilities they are unable to acquire or do anything about. This aspect of accountability, however, does not stop people from shaming each other in situations where individuals are not

---

[154] Ibid., 340. Emphasis in original.
[155] Ibid., 331.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid., 339.
[158] Ibid., 341. Emphasis in original.

responsible for the acts that put them to shame. In these instances, shame is not moral but rather a means of social control to obtain cohesion and a specific order within a society. Since it can be confusing for an individual to differentiate when shame is moral or not, Lamb thinks that it is a confusion to say that shame is moral.

Furthermore, he claims that we feel ashamed of our actions when we believe that we ought to have the ability or capacity to do otherwise in a moral sense.[159] Here, we feel a sense of responsibility though Lamb say we are not necessarily morally responsible for the act. Lamb does not give an explicit example to illustrate this. He does specify that it is a case where we feel ashamed about an action that is our own and where we do not bring shame on others. I will try to illustrate a case where someone might feel shame for an action that is their own but where they might not be responsible for their actions. Imagine that Sally witnessed someone rob a person named Edgar. For the sake of the argument, let us imagine that Sally was stronger than the robber, the robber did not have any weapons, and that Sally was also faster than the robber. When she witnessed the robbery, Sally froze with fear and was not able to act or do anything to help Edgar. In the aftermath, she feels ashamed because she believes she ought to have been able to help Edgar to prevent the robbery; that she might not be a good person for not helping Edgar. Let us also imagine that others shamed Sally because they also believe she ought to have acted in some way to help prevent the robbery, instead of simply being a bystander witness. In Sally's case she did not have the capacity to help Edgar because her fear was hindering her. Sally might feel ashamed that she was not able to help, but she was not responsible for not having the capacity to help. According to Lamb, we do not morally censure her because she lacked the capacity to act due to her fears. However, others might still put her to shame for being a bystander witness. Lamb therefore claims that since you can put someone to shame, regardless of the action being moral or not, shame is only contingently connected to morality.

Following Lamb's argument, we would blame her if she did nothing to try to overcome her fears so she could potentially help others who suffer injury in the future. Sally might feel ashamed that she was not able to help, but she was not responsible for not having the capacity to help. However, if she in the future does not take actions to acquire the capacity, Lamb would think that it is more logical to say that Sally is guilty of not following up on her moral responsibility. In addition to guilt, she might feel ashamed for not following up on her moral obligations. However, feeling ashamed does not tie directly to her responsibility to acquire the capacity to act or overcome her fears. According to Lamb, feeling ashamed is secondary to

---

[159] Ibid., 341.

being guilty since she might stop feeling ashamed even if she does not follow up on her fears. In line with Lamb's argument, the absence of shame would not take away her responsibility to overcome her fears so she can act in the future. If she does not follow up on her responsibility, we blame her for not doing anything to acquire the capacity to act. We, according to Lamb's argument, find her guilty of not taking action. In this regard, Lamb finds that guilt is essentially connected to the moral notions while shame is only contingently so. He concludes that shame-systems can be successful ways of regulating behaviour, but that to call shame moral is simply a confusion.[160]

Additionally, Lamb highlights that shame is something you can bring upon yourself as well as others because of your actions. Here, he distinguishes shame as an emotion and shame as non-emotion.[161] For instance, let us imagine Sally. Let us say she was dishonest in a setting where she was representing her family. Through her dishonest acts, Lamb would claim that she might put her family to shame. She might not feel ashamed herself (shame as an emotion), but her dishonest acts might put her family to shame by "bring[ing] dishonour on the family name."[162] She might also put herself to shame without feeling shame. When she puts her family name, or herself, to shame, shame operates as a condition or a state rather than an emotion. However, since Lamb claims that the action that is essential to morality is one where only you bring a state upon yourself and not others, shame as a state is a moral confusion.

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, Lamb focuses specifically on responsibility as a moral notion. It is not controversial to claim that responsibility is central to morality, but that does not mean that other notions, such as honour, can be central notions of morality. Lamb briefly mentions honour but does not explore if honour can be a central notion of morality.[163] He dismisses honour because he claims we cannot think that what we did was honourable if we are ashamed of that action, but we can think that what we did was honourable even though we are guilty of a crime.[164] If he had explored honour more in depth as a central notion of morality, it might be that he had seen that shame is more morally relevant than he initially claims. O'Hear examines honour in relation to shame and morality.

---

[160] Ibid., 346.
[161] Ibid., 332.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid., 332 and 338.
[164] Ibid., 338.

O'Hear explores morality in relation to honour. He argues that shame can account for aspects of morality which guilt cannot. According to O'Hear, moral guilt is too legalistic and therefore does not account for all aspects of morality. He does not dismiss guilt as morally relevant but claims that since guilt is very legalistic with its connection to the authorities we adhere to and actual laws, there are non-legalistic aspects of morality that shame can account for instead. O'Hear writes that "The difficulty…is to develop a sense of moral guilt which can do without the elements of law, authority and liability to punishment which characterise guilt in the legal Judaeo-Christian context."[165] According to O'Hear, the elements of guilt are similar to Judaeo-Christian ethics and they are characterised by "law, authority and [that] punishments are prominent."[166] Since he likens moral guilt to the legal elements of Judaeo-Christian ethics, he finds that it is difficult to develop a sense of moral guilt that is not too legalistic. By legalistic, O'Hear means that guilt "involves the notions of a broken law, a relevant authority and consequent liability to punishment."[167] He states that these features are present in the Judaeo-Christian ethic and that the moral guilt in this ethic and legal guilt are strikingly similar.[168] When exploring if moral guilt can exist outside the legal context, He goes through Rawls three stages of the development of genuine moral sense of guilt and compares how they are similar to legal guilt as characterised by Judaeo-Christianity.

The first stage O'Hear refers to is the authority stage which "is felt by children when they disobey the commands of their parents."[169] Parents can also be replaced by God as an authority of command. Here, O'Hear claims that "clearly, authority guilt shares with legal and 'Judaeo-Christian' guilt the central elements of an authority, its commands and punishments."[170] The second stage is association guilt which "arises from group participation in joint activities, such as games or social institutions. On breaking mutual bonds…one will show a willingness to admit what one has done, accept reproofs and penalties and seek reinstatement."[171] Again, O'Hear claims it "is a clear similarity between association guilt and legal guilt, the group here being the authority imposing its laws and punishments."[172] The third

---

[165] Anthony O'Hear, "Guilt and Shame as Moral Concepts," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 77 (1976-1977): 82.
[166] Ibid., 73.
[167] Ibid., 73.
[168] Ibid., 74.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Ibid.

stage is principle guilt which is when "we feel guilty about acting against the spirit of existing just institutions or about resisting reforms required to set up new institutions required by the principles of justice."[173] O'Hear draws similarities to the third stage of guilt to legalistic aspects of guilt by looking at how "just institutions already suggest a quasi-legal perspective."[174] He looks at two factors here. The first is that what we consider unjust might also "be forbidden by a law one feels bound by."[175] The second factor is that we might "feel bound by a divine command to help those in need, and so feel guilty [for] not contributing to famine relief."[176] However, he questions these three stages through the "case where a man does not see himself as being under any prescription to be just, and he is not acting illegally."[177] In this example, O'Hear asks what justifies calling the man's feelings like that of guilt instead of, for example, shame.[178] Based on these three stages and their characteristics of guilt, O'Hear finds that guilt alone cannot account for all aspects of morality. There are instances where we are not morally guilty, but where we might be unkind in our actions. In these instances, shame, honour, and conduct of character might be more explanatory in accounting for some aspects of morality which moral guilt does not account for. Further, he claims that guilt is what we feel when we do something which others would condemn. Shame, on the other hand, is something we can feel without the need for others' condemnation.

O'Hear argues that "shame is logically dependent on something 'dishonouring, ridiculous, or indecorous in one's own conduct or circumstances (or in those of others whose honour or disgrace one regards as one's own)."[179] In light of this, O'Hear claims that shame has a broader scope of what we can feel ashamed about compared to feelings of guilt. He explains that this is because we can "feel shame at doing something illegal or immoral, [but also] be ashamed of a bad piece of work,….of failing in a supererogatory ideal,….aspects of one's character or taste, elements of one's upbringing."[180] According to O'Hear, shame is the primary moral feeling when you fail to live an honourable life within your society in accordance with the values that have been imparted on you through your upbringing in that society.[181] Further,

---

173 Ibid.
174 Ibid., 75.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid., 76.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid., 79

he claims that "shame can be felt privately and because of privately held ideals, [and] feeling shame involves more than being subject to external sanctions of shame."[182]

O'Hear writes that "once certain types of conduct or character are seen as valuable in themselves, independently of their appreciation by others, shame too can operate independently of public condemnation of fantasies of public disapproval."[183] A type of character O'Hear refers to is one of honour. According to O'Hear, when striving to achieve ideals of the society you live in, you lead an honourable life. At first you may try to live by the societal ideals because you have been told that this is what is honourable and to be a good person you must live by the society's ideals. If you do not live by the societal ideals, you are at risk of being shamed for not being a good person. So, you strive to live according to society's ideals in order to avoid shame.

However, there is also a less socially dependent form of honour according to O'Hear. A concept of honour where "shame is not tied to fear of exposure, but to a fuller view of personal growth, involving ideals such as those of reliability, fairness, decency and fidelity."[184] In this case of honour, you act according to ideals of what is considered good because you recognise the ideals as good and the right thing to act according to, and not because of fear of being publicly shamed or praised. This form of honour is not tied to acting according to a society's ideals, but to higher ideals that you act according to because you recognise that what you do is good independent of what you grew up learning.

To illustrate what O'Hear means, let us look at when women in Saudi Arabia were legally allowed to drive in 2018. Women still knew how to drive in Saudi Arabia before this. These women had family members, usually fathers, who recognised that even though the law states women cannot drive, they felt it was right that women do learn to drive because it would provide more freedom for the women. These fathers taught their daughters how to drive a car because they believed it was the right thing to do regardless of what the law said and what societal norms said. To maintain a sense of personal honour, they taught their daughters to drive. Even though women are now allowed to drive, many women and men still do not think it is right because by learning to drive a woman might be led astray of her duties as a good woman, a good wife, and a good daughter.[185] Conservative groups of Saudis believe that they are maintaining their sense of honour by not agreeing with the law that women can drive. I will

---

[182] Ibid., 77.
[183] Ibid., 81.
[184] Ibid.
[185] *Saudi Women's Driving School*, directed by Erica Gornall (2019; USA: Home Box Office Nordic, 2020), Online streaming.

assume here that were they to express that they agreed with this law, they would be afraid of public ridicule in their communities.

In this sense, their honour is still socially dependent on fear of public exposure and shaming, and I would therefore claim that their honour is not of the form that is less socially dependent; it is the one that is tied to fear of exposure. In the example of fathers teaching their daughters to drive even though it was illegal, moral shame gives a better account for moral behaviour compared to moral guilt. The fathers' drive to conduct themselves with honour as a father was bigger than following the law. For them, the shame they would have felt if they would deny their daughters freedom was bigger than the risk of being caught guilty of breaking the law or fear of exposure.[186] This example illustrates that shame can be a driving force in regulating behaviour in accordance with ideals of who we ought to be. It also shows that there are different levels of regulations of who we ought to be and how we ought to behave, that occur simultaneously within different subgroups of societies. The higher ideals the fathers followed, contribute to produce a subjectivity that they regard as honourable. Indirectly, they also contribute to a production of what it means to be a woman; that a woman can have the same opportunities as men since the fathers encouraged them to drive to expand their freedom. The norms that prevent women to drive, also produce a subjectivity; a subjectivity that is different for women and men, but also a subjectivity of fatherhood. A subjectivity where being a good father means protecting women from driving since that is not considered part of their role as a woman. However, shame's potential to force you to self-reflect on these norms, made some of the fathers reflect on their values and what it means to be a good father compared to what the State indirectly said it means.

Even though O'Hear connects honour to shame, I find that he does not adequately succeed. When distinguishing between the socially dependent and less socially dependent forms of honour and using my example of the fathers of the Saudi women, it seems that the honourable fathers are following some higher authority of what is right and wrong. O'Hear claims that moral guilt occurs when breaking a relevant authority.[187] The honour code the fathers follow could be a relevant authority here. On such an understanding of honour, honour would be connected to moral guilt if breaking the honour code. However, O'Hear does link guilt to punishment and suggests that you are free of your guilt if you make a payment through

---

[186] Ibid.

[187] Anthony O'Hear, "Guilt and Shame as Moral Concepts," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 77 (1976-1977): 73.

some form of punishment. Since you do not have to be punished or make repayment if you break an honour code, honour is not connected to guilt, according to O'Hear's argument. Then again, O'Hear does not explore guilt extensively. If you do break an honour code, or do not conduct yourself honourably, there are instances where you are faced with some form of punishment. For instance, if you conduct yourself with dishonour, you might be stripped of your social position or cast out of the community to live in exile. So, the fathers of the Saudi women could be guilty of not following their honour code. However, they could also feel ashamed for not being the honourable person that they thought they were; feel ashamed for not living up to their own ideals. The question of punishment is more challenging when the honour code is personal and not dependent on social norms. It is this form of honour that O'Hear focuses on regarding the honour that follows higher ideals. However, I think it is worth noting that honour can also have associations of guilt. O'Hear's work can show us that it is difficult to distinguish between moral shame and guilt, but there are instances where shame can better account for morality compared to guilt.

In his account for moral shame, O'Hear adds that moral shame can provide an internal motivation for our behaviour. By having a sense of honour without fear of public exposure, but perhaps a fear of self-shaming, moral shame can add an internal motivation to our conduct of behaviour. By focusing on the legal aspects when moral guilt guides our behaviour, we can find that there are external factors that motivate our moral behaviour. Here, it is in order to avoid punishment that we do the morally right thing. This can be true for moral shame as well. We try to do what is right and be good to avoid shaming. On that note, shame is also an external motivator for moral behaviour. However, according to O'Hear, shame has the aspect of honour which guilt does not necessarily have. By having a sense of honour where we strive to uphold ideals for personal growth, instead of fear of public exposure, honour can be an internal motivator for being morally good. Further, if failing to be honourable, we might not care about what others think of us, but we care about how we have failed to live up to our own expectations of ourselves. By failing to live up to our own expectations, we will most likely feel shame about who we perceive ourselves to be. By looking at honour as a central notion to morality, we can see that shame has moral relevance in guiding our behaviour.

Moral Shame, Moral Guilt, and the Information they Provide

According to Henriksen and Mesel, shame ought to have minimal space in human societies because shame cannot necessarily show us what or why something is wrong, only that

something is wrong.[188] They do not specify if they mean that shame can never show us what or why something is wrong, but I interpret them not to be absolute in their use of "necessarily." I interpret it this way because they claim that we cannot abolish moral shame since it does provide us with some information.[189] They argue that shame cannot provide us with information about what to do or not to do, but shame tells us only that "we have not met our own or others' expectations and ideals."[190] In this regard, shame tells us that something is wrong and, therefore, Henriksen and Mesel argue that it has some space in human societies. Even though it is only a minimal space, they recognise its positive function since shame can provide individual transformation and self-growth. It seems like a contradiction to recognise self-growth and individual transformation through shame, while also claiming that shame ought to have minimal space. I will explore how they can state both of these things.

Henriksen and Mesel argue that shame mainly provide us with information that says something is wrong, but not what or why something is wrong.[191] They write:

> Among the risks of employing shame in the context of morality is that it makes the shame-experiencing individual self-occupied or too self-absorbed to achieve the necessary distance and clarity that can lead to genuine moral insight and assess the moral challenges in ways that are not conditioned by the agent's concerns for him or herself.[192]

To develop genuine moral insight, Henriksen and Mesel argues that it is important to have a resistance to shame's influence since they argue that shame should not be morally relevant. To have that resistance, they state that you need to be self-reliant in a way where you recognise that the interrelations with and dependencies on others contribute to your individuality, increase in self-trust, and that the other is an important part of your process of becoming yourself.[193] It is under these conditions that an individual "can receive the necessary affirmation and recognition to create the fundamental conditions for self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem."[194]

---

[188] Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, "Shame and Morality," in *Shame's Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study* (NOASP, Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2021), 336.
[189] Ibid.
[190] Ibid., 335.
[191] Ibid., 336.
[192] Ibid., 296.
[193] Ibid., 296.
[194] Ibid., 287.

Furthermore, they claim that shame will not contribute to a self-reliance where you see yourself and your growth in relation to others.

On my reading, I do not find that they extensively explain how shame makes the individual too self-absorbed.[195] However, considering Dan Zahavi's isolating aspect of shame, where shame can be isolating in that it makes us think that others would not have done or been like us,[196] shame can make it hard for us to feel connected to others.[197] When we do not feel connected to others, we can become self-absorbed when feeling shame and not be able to assess our actions or who we are from a distance, like Henriksen and Mesel refer to. When we are self-absorbed, it is hard to see our thoughts and opinions of ourselves from the point of view of others. Additionally, when we are self-absorbed it is harder to believe others' positive opinion about us if we have a highly negative view of ourselves. Keeping Zahavi's argument of shame's isolation in mind, I can see that a resistance to shame can foster self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem, on Henriksen and Mesel's argument. Especially when shame is portrayed as a moral guide when it indeed might not be moral. Henriksen and Mesel argue that self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem may still develop if you feel guilt. An individual might be less self-absorbed when feeling guilty because feelings of guilt can help differentiate between the action and the agent, whereas shame concerns who the individual is.[198] When differentiating between the action and the agent, it can be easier to see yourself from a distance. In this sense, they argue that "moral competencies are better enabled by guilt than by shame.[199]

Henriksen and Mesel highlight that shame does not provide us with moral insight since it cannot provide us with information about what is wrong or why something is wrong. They argue this case by contrasting shame with shamelessness. Where shame is supposed to subject an individual to a moral standard, a shameless person would be unwilling to subject their character to the same moral standards.[200] The "ideals that help us measure the conditions of a

---

[195] Also, Henriksen and Mesel do not specify what they mean by self-absorbed. You can be self-absorbed in a way where you are overly confident in yourself and believe that others think you are the most wonderful person, when they actually might think less of you. However, I do think they mean self-absorbed in the sense where you think incredibly negative of yourself and being connected to others might help you see that you are a good person. This interpretation would be more beneficial for their argument.

[196] Dan Zahavi, *Self & Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 218. I have discussed the isolating aspect of shame in more depth in "Shame, Guilt, and Gendered Experiences," section "Social and Isolating Aspects of Shame" in this thesis.

[197] Ibid., 223.

[198] Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, "Shame and Morality," in *Shame's Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study* (NOASP, Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2021), 297.

[199] Ibid., 334.

[200] Ibid., 333.

good life" are not on the radar for the shameless person.[201] Further, the shameless person might take joy in not following those standards. In this sense, shame provide us with information that we have not met the standards or ideals of others; shame makes us attentive to a feeling that something is wrong. Shamelessness, on the other hand, shows us that there might not be a clear moral reason as to why we should follow them, or which ideals are good or bad.

Even though they discredit shame as providing moral insight, they agree with Manion on shame's positive function through its transformative power. When shame tells us that we have not met expectations and ideals, "shame may occasionally also function positively as a motivating factor to establish deep-going and necessary change."[202] According to Manion, experiencing shame can be a positive notion for the moral self as it forces the individual to intensely self-reflect on and identify the standards, or regulations, that he or she currently endorses.[203] Manion argues that shame can contribute to individual transformations in that shame can make us aware of whether we agree with the values that made us feel shame. Since Henriksen and Mesel specifies that shame does not give us any information about what to do or not to do, their view on Manion would be that the shame which forces us to undergo an individual transformation, does not give us any information on which direction the individual transformation should go. So, shame is only helpful in telling us that something is wrong and can motivate us to intensely self-reflect and undergo change, but "shame does not in itself provide us with genuine moral insight."[204] The individual transformations do not guarantee a genuine moral transformation even though it has the potential to "occasionally mediate it."[205] It is because of this uncertainty regarding shame's transformative power that Henriksen and Mesel acknowledge its presence, while also arguing that shame should have minimal space.

On Henriksen and Mesel's argument, I can recognise that Manion's notion of transformative power of shame can point to a more uncertain aspect of understanding the moral self. I would add that shame's transformative power might be considered moral where we only see in hindsight if what we did and who we are makes us good or bad. In defence of Manion, I argue that when shame makes us aware that something is wrong and it makes us self-reflect, it might not provide a clear answer about whether what I did was bad or not, but it can give a

---

[201] Ibid.
[202] Ibid., 334.
[203] Jennifer C. Manion, "The Moral Relevance of Shame," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39, no 1 (2002): 84.
[204] [204] Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, "Shame and Morality," in *Shame's Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study* (NOASP, Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2021), 334.
[205] Ibid., 295.

sense of it, and it can provide for more introspection that can help us going forward as individuals. When we feel shame, we ought to explore why we feel shame. Even though we might not get a definite answer about why we feel shame, if what we feel shame about is right or wrong, and what we should do going forward, we might get a sense of what we should do. My suggestion here might be criticised as a guessing game. Even so, experience can teach us what might be the good thing to do. When we look back at our own and other's actions and ways of being, we can use that as a standard to guide our future actions. I do not say that it should be the only way to base behaviour, but that it could be a way of understanding how moral shame might be useful even though it does not provide for distinct answers. For instance, let us say Sally encounters another injustice where someone is being verbally attacked. When she witnessed Edgar being robbed, she felt ashamed for not helping, even though she was not able to help him. After reflecting on her shame and concluding that her behaviour in Edgar's situation did not reflect what kind of person she wanted to be, she decided to be better and help to the best of her ability in any future event.

Now, a person is being verbally attacked and Sally is witnessing it. Because she has learnt from a previous incident of shame, she now decides to speak up and support the victim in this situation. Her previous experience and self-reflect on shame have transformed her as a person. Regardless of the size of the transformation, she has used previous shame to help guide her future behaviour. This has real merit, especially for the person that was verbally attacked. Sometimes we might make choices based on previous occasions where we felt shame that led to a bad outcome. Perhaps there were factors in the previous situation that we had not encountered before or did not have enough knowledge about that influenced our decision. I do not think these uncertainties will dismiss moral shame as a guiding behaviour altogether. Being aware of uncertainties and learning from previous decisions can be steppingstones for our future choices.

Even though Henriksen and Mesel methodologically explore different aspects of moral shame, they do not extensively discuss guilt. Concerning guilt, their focus is that it helps separate the agent from the action. They conclude that because moral shame does not provide enough information about moral behaviour, moral guilt is the better option and moral shame should have minimal space. I find that they do not explore or challenge whether moral guilt sufficiently covers enough grounds for information on how to behave morally. As we have seen with O'Hear's argumentation for honour and shame, and as I have argued through my example of Sally and Manion's transformative power of shame, moral shame helps accounts for moral

behaviour that moral guilt does not adequately account for alone. So, even though Henriksen and Mesel make valid points, moral shame might have more space than just minimal.

Moral Shame and Gender

Since my thesis deals with how shame shapes normative ideals of expressing gendered subjectivities, I will now look at how and if moral shame can be a guide for gendered expressions of normative ideals. My claim is that shame can falsely present itself as moral when it comes to gendered ideals. I will show this by going through Lamb's morality and responsibility, O'Hear's morality and honour, and Henriksen and Mesel's argument that moral shame only tells us that something is wrong, not necessarily what and why something is wrong. I will examine each of these three perspectives in relation to gendered ideals of subjectivity.

Lamb specifically focuses on responsibility as a moral notion. According to Lamb we are morally accountable for acquiring abilities we ought to have.[206] However, he also claims that essential to morality is an action where only you bring a state upon yourself and not others.[207] Because of this, he claims only guilt is essentially connected to morality. Others cannot put you in a state of guilt, but they can put you in a state of shame. In light of this, shame is only contingently connected to morality. Since it is a matter of chance whether shame is connected to morality, Lamb claims that moral shame is a confusion.[208] If moral shame is a confusion, then our gendered expressions seem to have little moral significance when examining if shame can be a moral guid for our gendered behaviour. Since shame is a painful awareness of oneself as falling short of an expected standard or ideal perpetuated by societal norms,[209] then it does not morally matter if your gender expression meets the standards and ideals of societal norms.

On Lamb's argument, the way you express your gender does not define if you are a good or a bad person. However, even though it would not matter morally, it does not take away from shame's successful way in regulating social behaviour. We might think that we are a better person if we follow societal ideas of gender expressions, but that is not necessarily true. Even though shame falsely presents itself as moral, shame still brings forth feelings of inferiority and

---

[206] R.E. Lamb, "Guilt, Shame, and Morality," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 43, no. 3 (1983): 329-341.
[207] Ibid., 339.
[208] Ibid., 346.
[209] Jennifer C. Manion, "Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of Shame," *Hypatia* 18, no. 3 (2003): 21.

shame still brings the potential consequences of feeling less than we ought to be. Even though some recognise that we are not good or bad if we choose to wear a skirt or pants regardless of our gender, there are others in society who thinks such genderbending choices will matter; others who think that you are not a good man, that you have some sort of perversion, if you put on clothes that are traditionally women's clothes. When perpetually shamed for not following society's gender norms and giving gender norms moral value, risk of suicide and other types of self-harm increases, lower self-esteem and sense of self-worth can follow. Regardless of whether or not we recognise that these actions and ways of expressing gender do not define you as a morally good person, portraying them as moral highlight the pervasiveness of shame in regulating our behaviour. So, to avoid feeling shame, many will follow societal ideals of expressing gendered subjectivities in order to avoid feeling shame and be labelled as an outcast, a person of lesser worth. This speaks to Lamb's claim that shame can be a successful way of regulating behaviour despite not necessarily being moral.

However, Lamb does point out that we are morally responsible for acquiring abilities. If we define gender as an ability, then we could be morally accountable for our gender if our gender ability only brings shame upon ourselves. Gender as an ability could mean your skill at performing your gender role. If you are a woman your intellectual or nurturing ability could be claimed to be different than a man's. On this understanding of gender, it could be said that moral shame can be a guide for gendered behaviour. However, others would be able to put you to shame if you did not adhere to your gender role, and in this regard, shame would not be the morally right emotion. Instead, this might be more of a case for guilt, but that does necessarily not mean gender is a moral behaviour. Furthermore, such an understanding of gender could be used as justification for limiting people's freedom based on gender, as is the case with the Saudi women who were not allowed to drive.

O'Hear uses the notion of honour when examining moral shame. In his account of the less socially dependent form of honour, he connects honour to a shame without ties to fear of public exposure, but rather involving ideals that contribute to personal growth.[210] In this case of honour, you act according to ideals of what is considered good because you recognise the ideals as good. On O'Hear's argument, shame is morally relevant in regulating expressions of gendered subjectivities if you value the gendered ideals as morally good; if you think they will contribute to you being an honourable person. It might be that gendered ways of expressing

---

[210] Anthony O'Hear, "Guilt and Shame as Moral Concepts," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 77 (1976-1977): 81.

behaviour are morally good, but I would claim that tying them strictly to different sexes or genders for expressions is not a case of morality. For instance, I do not think that it is a case of morality to say that only women who can be nurturing and if they are not nurturing, they are not morally good. However, if we label certain forms of showing love as feminine, for instance motherly love, then that form of expressing love can be labelled as gendered. Here, motherly love does not have to belong strictly to females or mothers alone. Males can emulate motherly love into their own way of expressing love. It is important to note that I do not think that this type of love necessitates that you lead an honourable life. It could be that someone has a personal honour code where they think that specific gendered ideals come from a higher authority that they value.

O'Hear also points out that gendered ideals are problematic. He states that "[i]n practice, a man's honour has usually been seen in the light of his membership of a particular group… This has led if not actually to exaggerated concentration on the *machismo* aspect of honour, to a rather wooden and at times inhumane interpretation of honour."[211] By restricting a man or woman's honour to specific gendered ideals, what it means to be good can be inhumane. It restricts the individual to specific ideals they can recognise as good depending on their gender. This would also restrict the personal growth they could achieve while trying to follow ideals they find honourable. They would only be able to grow as moral human beings in gender-specific ways. This is not what O'Hear intended and if what is morally good depends on what gender you are, we move further away from a society that provides as much equal opportunities for all genders as it possibly can.

Henriksen and Mesel claim that shame ought to have minimal space in society because it does not provide us with much moral insight. They claim that shame does not give us information about what or why something is shameful or wrong. Instead, shame provides us with information that something is wrong, since it makes us aware that we have not met an expectation or ideal.[212] In light of Henriksen and Mesel's analysis, shame would not provide us with much useful information regarding what is wrong with not meeting the gendered ideal or why we have not met a gendered ideal. Shame would mainly tell us that we have not met a gendered ideal. For instance, in a heteronormative relationship, a woman is often expected to be sexually submissive while a man is expected to be sexually dominant. If a woman takes

---

[211] Ibid., 82. Emphasis in original.
[212] Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, "Shame and Morality," in *Shame's Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study* (NOASP, Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2021), 335.

charge of her sexuality, expresses it with confidence, initiates sex frequently and with many partners, she is often characterised to be more like a man than a woman. Further, she is often characterised and shamed as an impure woman with loose morals. Shame informs her that she has not met the expectation of what is means to be a woman sexually. On Henriksen and Mesel's argument, we do not get any substantial moral information as to why it is shameful for a woman to be sexually dominant, why a woman is impure if she has several sex partners, but a man is celebrated for the same reason. Because shame does not give us substantial information about why we should be ashamed, it does not sufficiently provide us with information about what is shameful. On the surface, we get an answer to it: the shameful act is sleeping with several partner. However, others can disagree and say that it is not shameful. Instead, they can say it is empowering that she takes charge of her sexuality and has as many sexual partners as she would like.[213] I would say that it is not morally bad of her to have several sex partners and that it is not morally good. How many sex partners she has says nothing about her morality and the same goes for how many sex partners men have. On Henriksen and Mesel's argument, shame does not say on a moral basis what is and is not shameful regarding gender ideals of expressing subjectivity. Shame falsely present itself as a moral regulator in expressing gendered ideals of subjectivity when it socially regulates expressions of gendered subjectivities. When adding the aspect of morality to gender ideals, there is a hightened expectation to behaviour compared to social pressure without the moral aspect. Social pressure should not be taken lightly, but morality, even when it is a false morality, puts more pressure on individuals regarding expectations for gendered behaviours.

Summary

In this chapter I have explored moral shame and guilt. I have analysed moral shame in relation to gendered expressions of subjectivity. Lamb argues that guilt and not shame is essentially tied to morality since he explores responsibility as a central notion of morality. He therefore concludes that we ought to rely on guilt as a moral system. However, Lamb mainly explores responsibility and does not account for other notions that can be central to morality. O'Hear looks at honour as a central notion to morality and argues that guilt alone cannot account for all aspects of morality. He argues that shame can explain aspects of morality that guilt cannot. O'Hear has a very legalistic definition of guilt which depends on reprimand or punishment. In

---

[213] With consent, of course.

light of his definition of guilt he claims that since honour is not dependent on reprimand or punishment, shame accounts for morality in ways guilt cannot. A person does what is honourable because the person recognises the ideals and values as good, not because an external law or authority told us it is right. Through honour, O'Hear claims we strive to uphold ideals for personal growth instead of fear of public exposure. Furthermore, moral shame can provide an internal motivation for doing what is good. I have demonstrated how O'Hear's account of honour in relation to shame can be problematic since an honour code could be another form of authority. Understanding honour as another form of authority, it can also be connected with guilt. I have highlighted that his account of honour, shame, and guilt, show that shame and guilt can be difficult to separate as they can often occur simultaneously. Even though they are difficult to separate, shame can account for aspects of morality which guilt cannot. But this does not exclude the one or the other as morally irrelevant.

Henriksen and Mesel argues that shame does not provide us with any moral insight. Shame tells us that something is wrong, but not what is wrong and why it is wrong. Because of the lack of moral information from shame, they conclude that shame ought to have minimal space in society. However, they do acknowledge that shame can have positive aspects through Manion's transformative power of shame. Manion argues that shame forces individuals to intensely self-reflect about their values and ideals that they have internalised. Still, Henriksen and Mesel conclude that guilt ought to be the basis for guiding moral behaviour since shame does not provide a clear answer to what and why something is shameful. I illustrated that even though morality based on guilt can be a guide for moral behaviour, morality based on shame in light of Manion's transformative power can provide some insight into how we ought to behave. However, the moral insight on what to do and how to be does not provide an immediate answer to whether it is the right or good thing to do. We can use our previous experiences to guide our future behaviour. Previous moments where we have experienced shame that made us reflect on our ideals and values can provide a background for what to do in the future. However, we might not know immediately if the act was good or bad, and we might end up doing something we meant as good but turned out to be bad. In this case, our bad action can provide a new opportunity to reflect on and provide new insight for future behaviour.

Lastly, I have gone through the different aspects of moral shame explored in this chapter and examined if they can provide a backdrop for morally regulating expressions of gendered subjectivities. I have highlighted how shame falsely present expressions of gendered subjectivities as a moral notion, but that shame still regulates our gendered subjectivities in light

of social norms.

Bibliography

Al-Achrafi, Samie. "Oikos: The Origin of the Economic Thought," *The Huffington Post*, November 11, 2015.

> http://www.huffingtonpost.com/samie-alachrafi/oikos-the-origins-of-econ_b_8520644.html

Bartky, Sandra Lee. *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression*. New York: Routledge, 1990.

Bjugstad, André. "Jeg misliker å være homofil. Stempelet tar knekken på meg," *Aftenposten*, October 23, 2016,

> http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/sid/Jeg-misliker-a-vare-homofil-Stempelet-tar-knekken-pa-meg-607210b.html

Boonin, Leonard. "Guilt, Shame, and Morality." *The Journal of value Inquiry* 17 (1983): 295-304.

Butler, Judith. "Performativity, Precarity and Sexual Politics." *AIBR: Revista de Antropología Iberoamericana* 4, no.3 (2009): i-xiii.

Calhoun, Cheshire. "An apology for moral shame." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no. 2 (2004): 127-146.

Cartwright, Mark. "Yin and Yang." World History Encyclopedia. World History Encyclopedia, published May 16, 2018,
https://www.worldhistory.org/Yin_and_Yang/

Cranny-Francis, Anne., Wendy Waring, Pam Stravropoulos, and Joan Kirkby. *Gender Studies: Terms and Debates*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Dakanalis, Antonios, Assunta M Zanetti, Giuseppe Riva, Fabrizia Colmegna, Chiara Volpato, Fabio Madeddu, and Massimo Clerici. "Male body dissatisfaction and eating disorder symptomatology: moderating variables among med." *Journal of Health Psychology* 20, no. 1 (2013): 80-90.

Downing, Lisa. *The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan
　　　　Sheridan. London: Penguin Group, 1991.

----. *The Care of the Self. History of Sexuality: Volume Three*, trans. Robert Hurley,
　　　　Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1990.

----. *The Use of Pleasure. History of Sexuality: Volume Two*, trans. Robert Hurley,
　　　　Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1992.

----. *The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One*, trans. Robert Hurley.
　　　　Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1998.

"Foucault: Power is Everywhere," Powercube, accessed February 20, 2017,
　　　　https://www.powercube.net/other-forms-of-power/foucault-power-is-
　　　　everywhere/

Foucault, Michel., and Paul Rainbow. *The Foucault Reader*. New York, NY: Pantheon
　　　　Books, 1984.

Gore, Sydney. "44 Women Weigh in on the Meaning of 'Black Girl Magic.'" *Nylon*,
　　　　accessed on March 20, 2021,

　　　　https://www.nylon.com/articles/meaning-of-black-girl-magic

Gornall, Erica, dir. *Saudi Women's Driving School*. 2019; USA: Home Box Office
　　　　Nordic, 2020. Online Streaming.

Henriksen, Jan-Olav, and Terje Mesel. "Shame and Morality." In *Shame's Unwelcome
　　　　Interruption and Responsive Movements: Body, Religion, Morality – an
　　　　Interdisciplinary Study*, 269-336. NOASP: Cappelen Damm Akademiks, 2021.

Kruks, Sonia. *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist
　　　　Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Lamb, R.E. "Guilt, Shame, and Morality." *Philosophical and Phenomenological
　　　　Research* 43, no. 3 (1983): 329-346.

Lehtinen, Ullaliina. *Underdog Shame: Philosophical Essays on Women's
　　　　Internalization of Inferiority*. Göteborg, Sweden: Röda Serien, no. 37
　　　　Filosofiska Meddelanden, 1998.

----. "How Does One Know What Shame is? Epistemology, Emotions, and Forms of
Life in Juxtaposition," *Hypatia* 13, no. 1 (1998): 56-77.

Maibom, Heidi L. "The descent of shame." *Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research* 80, no. 3 (2010): 566-594.

Manion, Jennifer C. "Girls blush sometimes: moral agency and the problem of
shame." *Hypatia* 18, no. 3 (2003): 21-41.

----. "The Moral Relevance of Shame." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39, no. 1
(2002): 73-90.

Mortensen, Ellen., Cathrine Egeland, Randi Gressgård, Cathrine Holst, Kari
Jegerstedt, Sissel Rosland, Kristin Sampson. *Kjønnsteori*. Oslo: Gyllendal
Akademisk, 2011.

Nelson, Adie. "The Pink Dragon is Female: Halloween costumes and Gender
Markers." *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 24 (2000): 137-144.

O'Farrell, Clare. "Key Concepts." Foucault News. 2007. Last modified October 30,
2010,

http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/

O'Hear, Anthony. "Guilt and Shame as Moral Concepts." *Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society* 77 (1976-1977): 73-86.

Pappas, Stephanie. "Brain Sees Men as Whole, Women as Parts." *Live Science*,
published July 24, 2012,

https://www.livescience.com/21806-brain-male-female-objectification.html

Picture of a model of the Panopticon. Accessed on February 20, 2017,
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1925/lf0872-04_figure_009.jpg

Taylor, Gabriele. *Pride, shame, and guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment*. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1985.

Wilkins, Amy C. "'So Full of Myself as a Chick:' Goth Women, Sexual
Independence, and Gender Egalitarianism." *Gender and Society* 18, no. 3
(2004): 328-349.

Willis, Jessica L. "Girls Constructing Identity and Transforming 'femininity:' Intersections between empirical and theoretical understandings of 21st century girlhood." Dissertation, Clark University, 2008.

Zahavi, Dan. *Self and other. Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014.