


Divine Intervention: The Influence of Pentecostal Sermons on Democratic Values

Evidence from Zambia

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ABSTRACT

Pentecostalism has grown immensely over the last 20 years in many African states, but we have little systematic understanding of how this growth affects democratic development. Drawing on democratic theories that emphasise the impact of individual values on democratic consolidation and Hirschman's theory of exit, voice and loyalty, this thesis explores how the growth of Pentecostalism may have implications for citizen political attitudes in countries experiencing democratic backsliding. Specifically, it asks how Pentecostal teachings might influence attitudes towards democracy in Zambia. I begin the empirical analysis by exploring survey data collected on Pentecostals in sub-Saharan Africa, indicating that Pentecostals hold political preferences that on average, differ from other Christians'. The survey data suggest an ambivalence concerning Pentecostals democratic values, where both explicit support for democracy and illiberal political preferences are expressed. Seeking to explore and understand the noted ambivalence, I analyse sermons to gain insight into the spiritual, cultural, and political content and its consequences on democratic values. As a robustness test of the content analysis of sermons, I conducted interviews with pastors to validate the findings from the sermons.

Methodologically, this thesis mostly draws on a qualitative framework, but also includes a preliminary quantitative analysis to justify the need for an in-depth analysis of Pentecostal religious teachings in Zambia, a Christian nation. The analyses are built on data accessed from Pew Survey (2010), recordings of sermons in Lusaka city and interviews of pastors. I present a cross-sectional analysis and content analysis with limited ability to illuminate or prove causal relationships. This thesis aims to analyse relevant religious content that helps justify the need for further research and the expansion of more recent survey data on Pentecostals in the region. The ambivalence found in the survey data is furthered exhibited in the analysis of sermons and through interviews with pastors. The thesis concludes that Pentecostalism draws congregants into an individual worldview that embodies both pro-democratic and anti-democratic values.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Question

In the late twentieth century, Samuel P. Huntington (1993) argued that a third wave of democratisation had reached (former Eastern) Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Following from here, the actor-centred scholarship on democratic transitions found that the church played an instrumental role in transition, from the Catholic church in Poland (Eberts 1998) that functioned as a defender of freedom and a source of protection from the communist regime; to Latin America where the Catholic church embraced a liberation theology challenging the structures in place that reinforced marginalisation of the poor (French 2007); and to Africa, where the major ecclesiastical bodies worked together with the broader civil society to overthrow autocratic leaders and to facilitate for democratic transition (Sperber and Hern 2018; Gifford 1995).

However, many democracies established as a result of this democratic wave are now experiencing an unexpected and extensive backlash (Rakner 2018; Freedom House 2018). Democracy is challenged from all angles, where freedom of speech, association and information, free and fair elections, rule of law, protection of personal integrity and private life are all democratic gains now under threat (Rakner 2018). The African countries are very much a part of this trend and have been for a while. Today, most African countries have multi-party elections and have a clear division between electoral, legislative, executive, and legal institutions. In other words, power is not wielded by one actor (Rakner 2018). However, behind the electoral curtains, authoritarian powers thrive, as few countries have been able to alter their level of civil and political rights (Bleck and van de Walle 2012). There is a consensus among scholars that this democratic wave produced few liberal democracies (Bratton et al. 1997; Crawford and Lynch 2012; Elone 2013; Arriola et al. 2021). The role of churches in this backsliding becomes then interesting to unpack. With being so active during the democratic transition, where are they now?

Mobilisation against democratic backlash requires that people have pro-democratic values and a world view in which they understand the problems of democratic erosion, how serious they are and what the causes are. Religion matters then because it provides believers with a worldview that shapes and informs believers views of political events, messages, and actions

(Glazier 2015, 460). However, this democratic erosion raises questions regarding the church's relationship to democracy. Do different church denominations hold different roles? Is there a regional dimension? Moreover, how does religion, and particular types of religion, influence democratic values?

I seek to contribute to this discussion, aiming to provide insights as to which religious mechanisms within, Pentecostalism, a growing and influential religious branch, that shape individuals' democratic values. By basing my main empirical research on analysing sermons, I am seeking to complement, rather than substitute for, other perspectives on the role of Pentecostalism in shaping democratic attitudes. The research question for the thesis will be the following:

How does Pentecostalism influence democratic values that help shape political actions of exit, voice, and loyalty?

This introductory chapter will first address and discuss the term democratic backlash. Second, I will address the religious change and the so called 'mushrooming' of Pentecostalism in Zambia and argue for why this change is essential to study in a democratic backlash context. In the last part of my chapter, I present the original contribution of this chapter, my main argument, and the thesis structure.

1.2 Why Study Pentecostalism in the Context of Democratic Backsliding?

1.2.1 Democratic Backlash

1.2.1.1 Defining Democracy

Larry Diamond identifies two primary concepts of democracy evident in the literature: electoral and liberal democracy. Electoral democracy descends from Joseph Schumpeter, who defined democracy as a system "for arriving at political decision in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people's vote"(Schumpeter 1976, 250).

A liberal democracy, however, refers to a political system that in addition to electoral competition, entails qualitative elements of political freedom, such as free speech, a free and independent media, and the right to free association, necessary to render electoral participation meaningful (Elone 2013). Additionally, the euphoria of the third democratic wave settled, concerns about “low intensity democracies,” “electoral democracies,” “defective democracies” or “illiberal democracies” started to occur. It became essential to differentiate between merely formal democracy or electoral democracy and genuinely effective and liberal democracy. As Diamond (1999) highlights, “this gap between electoral democracy and liberal democracy, which has become one of the most striking features of the “third wave,” has serious consequences for theory, policy, and comparative analysis” (Diamond 1999, 22).

I argue that a minimalist conception of democracy is not sufficient and risk exemplifying the “fallacy of electoralism.” Democracy should not only be in effect every other four years or so. Hence, if not otherwise defined, a maximalist definition of democracy, i.e., liberal democracy, is utilised throughout this thesis as it captures vital dimensions of freedom within a democracy.

1.2.1.2 Defining Backlash

The term "democratic backsliding" has been eminently conceptualised by Nancy Bermeo (2016), and is characterised as an organised undermining of, and attack on the political opposition and systematic erosion of liberal democratic principles over time (the term has also been utilised by e.g., (Alemán and Yang 2011; Erdmann and Kneuer 2013; Waldner and Lust 2018). The term indicates that the executive power becomes increasingly concentrated on fewer hands by the undermining of electoral processes and gradual removal of democratic rights from the people.

The consolidation literature stresses that these young semi-democracies are plagued with corruption, uneven electoral playing field and dishonesty at the ballot box, coercion of opposition movements, socioeconomic inequalities, ethnic and religious polarisation, clampdowns on the free media, weak institutions and legislatures, fragmented party systems, and an increasing executive arrogation of power against representative institutions (L.J. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995; L. Diamond et al. 1997). Consequently, the liberal democracy is eroding in most African countries, where political leaders are undermining

political freedoms. This increasing regulation of the civil society sector indicates “a return to autocratic practices and a backlash against democratization” (Elone 2013).

However, the term democratic consolidation is a contested term. For the purpose of this thesis, I follow Schmitter and Karl (1991) who conceptualise democratic consolidation within the context of social relations, where social values become regular social occurrence and are independent of the internal functions of the society. I argue that conceptualising democratic backsliding or diminishing democratic consolidation as something triggered by bad leaders who have won elections and seeks to stay in power by dismantling democratic institutions through legal and fiscal processes, and stopped by good leaders winning elections, seems insufficient to "capture the long-term, slower, and more complex forms of democratic erosion" (Cianetti and Hanley 2021, 71). As Cianetti and Haley remind us "there are several mechanisms underpinning backsliding," and focusing solely on the elite-level fails to capture underlying factors that make up a regime and help us understand how troubled democracies work.

Actions made by citizens may make or break political regimes and understanding the values that motivate different type of political responses becomes imperative in order to understand what makes democracy work. Indeed, scholars have long recognised that adherence to a democratic culture is necessary for the survival and function of new democracies (Lipset 1959; Almond and Verba 2015 [1963]; Dahl 1971; Diamond et al. 1997; Diamond et al.1995; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) and have thus been interested in identifying factors that facilitates for such a culture. The media, education, ideologies, culture, history, and religion have all been recognised as factors shaping political behaviour, and understanding their effects helps us recognise what makes democracy thrive and what crushes it.

Today, there is a broad agreement among scholars that religion influences political activity in numerous of ways - from the correlation between church attendance and civic skills (Verba et al. 1995; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001), the link between religious tradition and vote choice (Layman 2001), the influence on political behaviour (McClendon & Reidl 2019), the influence on foreign policy attitudes (Djupe and Calfano 2013; Glazier 2013), to charitable giving (Lunn, Klay, and Douglass 2001; G. McClendon and Beatty Riedl 2021). Yet still a lot remains to be done to uncover the mechanisms through which religion influences democratic values.

1.2.2 Religious Change

In Zambia, Christianity infiltrates and shapes every part of daily life. According to the 2010 Census of population and Housing Reports, 75,5 % of Zambians population classifies themselves as Protestant Christian, 20,2 % as Catholic, 0,5 % as Muslim, 2 % as other and 1.8 % as other (ZCSO 2012). The introduction of Christianity on the African continent and in Zambia is famously linked to the arrival of Dr. David Livingstone in the 19th century. Since then, Christianity has flourished, and if demography is any indication, Christianity's future lies in Africa (Pew 2010).

Christianity in Africa is diverse and pluralistic, and since the 1970s, there has been a major religious demographic shift. By the 1990s, Pentecostalism grew immensely, and churches began “mushrooming”, or expanding rapidly in several African democracies (Sperber & Hern 2018, 840). With over 500 million adherents worldwide, Pentecostalism has promptly become one of the main branches of Christianity, with most of its followers living in the Southern Hemisphere – in the heart of Christianity's new centre gravity (Allan Anderson et al. 2010, 1, 3; Bompani and Valois 2018, 1).

Since the late 1980s, the Pentecostal church has gone from being a modest church among the mainline churches, to becoming a force to be reckoned with. Some of the Pentecostal ‘big men’ bishops – highly influential leaders within the religious movement, like Joe Imakando – have created rich mega-churches containing vast congregations, challenging the popularity of the mainstream houses of worship (Cheyeka et al. 2014, 1032). We need to look no further than the traditional churches to understand the remarkable impact Pentecostalism has had on culture, civil society, and the public, as movements within these churches have to a large extent adopted Pentecostal beliefs and practices (M'fundisi-Holloway 2018, 53).¹

The separation of church and state and how strong religious views can influence and shape individuals' political preferences and state policy have been thoroughly covered in political science literature (Sperber & Hern 2018). Yet, scholarship on African democracies have focused on the Catholic and mainline churches and their role in the "third-wave" democratic transition and have consequently downplayed the role of evangelical churches, such as the

¹ This influence also flows the other way, as Pentecostal churches have been open to ecumenical collaboration with mainline churches and to gain knowledge, skills, and expertise in civic areas important to the church.

Pentecostal church. Indeed, according to Paul Freston, in Africa, "little is really known about the role of the churches beyond the leadership of the mainline churches" (Freston in Grossman 2015, 340). The implication for the growth of Pentecostalism remains a puzzle. More specifically, we know little about the consequences of people's increasing exposure to Pentecostal teachings. Zambia poses as an interesting case for research as during Zambia's transition to democracy, the Pentecostal churches corroborated with the mainline churches and the rest of civil society in overthrowing the one-party rule led by Kenneth Kaunda, situating the case of Zambia in a unique position compared to other sub-Saharan countries. At the same time, similarly to many other nations that transitioned in the region, Zambia has experienced a democratic backlash.

Although the strong presence of Pentecostalism in the African public sphere is largely uncontested in the literature, there is a deep scholarly disagreement of the democratic implications of this religious movement. The ambiguities in the literature on Pentecostalism represent a more general and long-term debate concerning the relationship between religion and politics: how and to what extent does religious adherence influence individual's values that shape political behaviour.

The more recent literature that exists on the spread of Pentecostalism in Zambia and elsewhere seeks to answer this question by building on theoretical assumptions of how changes at the individual level, such as lifestyle, behaviour, and values, will bring about change at the societal and political level (Bjune 2016, 16). By identifying the worldview presented during sermons and analysing how the Pentecostal church may prime value orientations towards democracy and (re)produces a Christian citizenship, I seek to contribute to this literature.

It is worth noting, however, that although Pentecostalism has had exceptional growth in Africa in the last three decades, the Pentecostal church has by no means elbowed out the mainline churches or other independent churches. According to Cheyeka et al. (2014), Pentecostalism has not become the representative of Christianity in Zambia. Neither am I seeking to portray such a message as it ignores the complex and diverse religious landscape on the ground. Pentecostalism should not be used as the dominant analytical lens through which we study democratic backsliding in Africa, but it should be studied as a part of a bigger picture. Although it has not outcompeted other Christianity branches, it remains one of the

most significant ideological reformations to have reached Africa in a generation (Gifford 2004). Additionally, according to a Pew analysis (2006;2010), Pentecostal members have become increasingly visible in conventional politics, bringing their community into the public debate with real consequences for government processes.

1.3 Contribution

The thesis is located at the crossroad between two different literatures. The first strand of literature deals with how mass values have imperative implications for democracy. The foci of this literature include an emphasis on how individualism leads to democratic values of freedom and liberty (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) and the role of religion in shaping such values (Weber 2012 [1905]). The second line of literature is the Pentecostalism literature which focuses on the democratic implications of this religious movement.

I use Hirschman (1970) as the basis for my theoretical expectations regarding the relationship between religion and individual values. The argumentation states that to the extent that religion offers divergent viewpoints on the role of the individual within the political landscape, it may also shape people's values. Values that guide political participation, especially how congregants understand their role as citizens and their ability or obligation to exercise exit, voice, or loyalty.

What distinguishes this thesis from much of the literature is the theoretical framework, where the democratic values, as defined in Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) Postmaterialist theory, is expected to shape political actions of exit, voice, and loyalty. Methodologically, this thesis also stands out among the rest. By focusing on the religious worldview and teachings communicated through sermons, I offer an original way of conducting research. Apart from Gwyneth McClendon and Rachel Riedl (2019; 2020) and Naomi Haynes (2015), political scientists have primarily paid attention to organisational structures and resources of the Pentecostal churches on the politicisation of moral issues and group boundaries (Grossman 2015; Sperber 2017 ; McCauley 2017), and on the link between religion and material, recourses, social capital, and skills (Verba and Nie 1987; Verba et al. 1995; Putnam 1995; Campbell 2004; Lewis et al. 2013), rather than the link between religious teaching and political values.

No single analysis or empirical ‘evidence’ in this thesis constitutes a “smoking gun” for theory of religious influence on political participation and the values that shape them. Nonetheless, the collective impact of the findings gives powerfully suggestive evidence for the individual implication of Pentecostal religious teachings and complements recent literature regarding the ambivalence of Pentecostalism’s political implication in backsliding democracies.

1.4 Main Argument

This thesis suggests that Pentecostal religious ideas have a considerable political impact, especially concerning influencing individual democratic values that shape political participation. I propose that exposure to sermons can influence political values that shape Christian citizenship by providing metaphysical instruction that influences how believers respond to government actions. Combined, my analyses paint a picture of an individualistic religious ideology that values a minimalist form of democracy, but simultaneously produces a Christian citizenship characterised by self-efficacy.

Summing up, this thesis mostly draws on a qualitative framework, but also includes a preliminary quantitative analysis to justify the need for an in-depth analysis of Pentecostal religious teachings in Zambia, a Christian nation. The analyses are built on data accessed from Pew Survey (2010), recordings of sermons in Lusaka city and interviews of pastors. I present a cross-sectional analysis and content analysis with limited ability to illuminate or prove causal relationships. However, the thesis shows the importance of further research on the relationship between religious adherence and the level of democracy, especially the relationship between democracy and a new and emerging religious movement, *Pentecostalism*.

1.5 Chapter Outline

In chapter 2, I focus on the primary theoretical considerations that inform my analytical framework. I present central scholarly perspectives and expectations as to how mass values impact democracy and how religion may prime such values. Secondly, I will discuss my

theoretical expectation of change in relation to how the worldview and values presented in sermons may have implications for political behaviour.

In chapter 3, I present the methodological framework of this thesis. I discuss the central aspects of my methodological approach and the choice of Zambia as a case. I further discuss the shortcomings of my method and what is gained. I then present the technicalities of my data collection process during COVID-19 to show how the data collected represent a “best approach” for collecting data during a pandemic.

In chapter 4, I turn my focus to the case of Zambia. I offer a contextual backdrop of Zambia’s political trajectory from 1991 until present, with a focus on the role of the church. I further introduce Zambia as a case and discuss why Zambia represents a unique case, but at the same time a typical case when it comes to the political implications of Pentecostalism in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter 5 is devoted to the analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data gathered, as well as a discussion of the findings in both analyses.

Finally, in chapter 6, I outline the main conclusions of the thesis. I present the main findings of the thesis and suggestions as to how these can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the influence of Pentecostal teachings, as well as further development of analytical perspectives on how religion and religious change affect democracies.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The spread and rising popularity of Pentecostalism in Zambia poses questions of how the church may impact liberal democratic ideals in this backsliding electoral democracy (E. Sperber and Hern 2018, 836). Hence, my thesis will seek to contribute to the literature by investigating the religious teachings in sermons and their effect on democratic values.

This chapter aims to show why mass democratic values are necessary for democratic consolidation, why religion, and especially sermons, is seen as a driver for political value priming, and how actions of exit, voice and loyalty may be shaped by values communicated in sermons. First, I elaborate on the theoretical perspectives mentioned, which goes beyond elite and institutional explanations and redirects our attention to citizens political behaviour and the values that guide them. I then present the existing literature on the growth of Pentecostalism and its political consequence. The religious change and its impact on the individual's personal life remain uncontested – the scholarly deviation lies in the interpretations of how and to which degree this change has significance for political outcomes, such as individual democratic values and the behaviour they shape. First, however, I will define the central term to this thesis, *Pentecostalism*.

2.1 The Research Subject: Zambia's Pentecostal Believers

Historically, Pentecostalism has its origins in North America and is thought to be as American as the apple pie (Kalu 2008, 11). Most researchers argue that its beginnings can be traced back to the Azusa Street Revival in 1906 in Los Angeles. As it is a religion that is meant to travel through a strong missionary impulse, it has spread across the world. It has become a multimillion religious enterprise and is today one of the main branches of Christianity (Anderson et al. 2010, 1; Kalu 2008, 11). Prominent scholars, such as Paul Gifford, Terence O. Ranger and Paul Freston, cast the net broadly and incorporate Pentecostals, Evangelicals, African Independent Churches (AIC) and Charismatic Christians into the term Evangelical Christianity or Renewalist Christianity, and use the different terms interchangeably. Gifford suggests that Renewalist Christians in Africa are “not the Roman Catholics, not the mainline Protestants..., not the classical African Initiated Churches, but the rest” (Grossman 2015, 342).

These categorical distinctions may be blurred in reality, and some believers are “doubly affiliated,” meaning that they attend a variety of houses of worship (Sperber and Hern 2018, 832). However, the broad concept used by Gifford, Ranger, Freston and more, fails to capture the uniqueness of each denomination and the different role they may play in shaping political attitudes. I choose, therefore, to climb somewhat down the ladder of abstraction and focus on one movement to capture its unique role in shaping attitudes of Christian citizens, namely the Pentecostal movement.

However, even the term Pentecostalism is widely used as a concept that embraces extensively diverse churches such as the celibacy-practising Ceylon Pentecostal Mission, The Sabbatarian true Jesus Church in China, with a “Oneness” theology, Brazil’s vast and ritualistic, prosperity-oriented Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, and the equally ritualistic Zion Christian Church in southern Africa (Anderson et al. 2010, 13). This variation makes it conceptually challenging to generalise about the phenomenon. Some scholars emphasise the need to focus the research on the diversity within Pentecostal traditions (Cheyeka et al. 2014). However, in this thesis, I follow the conceptualisation of influential scholars and leading theologians and demographers (see Sperber and Hern 2018; Freston 2001, 2008; Ranger 2008; Pew Forum 2010; 2006; WCD 2015) in defining churches and believers as Pentecostal if they believe in being transformed, or born again, through actively receiving the “gifts of the Holy Spirit,” and endorse a personal experience with God.

In relation to the African context, Asamoah-Gyadu (2000, 25) argues that Pentecostalism in Africa should not be seen as “mere clones, consumers and imitators of western innovations.” Similarly, Kalu (2008, vii) makes a valid point for not viewing African Pentecostalism as a “product of Azusa or an extension of the American electronic church.” Instead, African Pentecostalism should be conceptualised more broadly so that it is inclusive of the various cultural contexts of African Christianity. Here Pentecostalism refers to both the newer churches formed by indigenous Zambians and mission-related churches like the Pentecostal Assembly of God Zambia (M’fundisi-Holloway 2018). A term that is frequently used by African Pentecostals themselves is the term ‘born again,’ and refers to an individual who has accepted Jesus Christ as the son of God and their saviour through repentance from sin and attends a Pentecostal or Charismatic church (M’fundisi-Holloway 2018, 23). In the Nigerian context, Ruth Marshall (2009, 265) sees Pentecostalism as capturing the “central aspect of a

religious movement that is extremely diverse, from the doctrinal, institutional and sociological point of view, and constitutes the central experience that enables converts to identify their religious co-religionists despite internal differences and conflicts.” She argues that both classical Pentecostals, Neo-Pentecostal and Charismatics exhibit the characteristics of a born again Christian and can thus fall under the same term; Pentecostal, I argue that the same can be said for Pentecostalism in Zambia

Similarly, I argue that consistencies prevail within Pentecostalism, which enables us to define the movement within the family-resemblance analysis. By using the family resemblance structure, I allow for the absence of a given characteristic element to be compensated for by the presence of another (Goertz 2006, 45). The family resemblance categorisation strategy will be useful then by combining the “ideal” with the deviations. The term Pentecostalism in this study refers then to churches with a family resemblance that emphasise the importance of the Holy Spirit (Anderson et al. 2010, 15). What links these Pentecostal churches all together is the similar liturgical form, the similar patterns of congregational life, the dualistic worldview, the literal interpretation of the Bible, the emphasis on the current gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the doctrine within each church that incorporates a strict moral code which entails restrictive rules to control individual behaviour, such as abstaining from premarital or extramarital sex, homosexuality, drugs and alcohol (Bompani and Valois 2018, 5).

Typically, Pentecostals have been associated with the poorer and more rural part of the population. However, Pentecostalism in Zambia emerged among white elite miners on the Copperbelt. From the 1950s, there was a surge in the number of Pentecostal mission churches that entered the country, where the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada (now the Pentecostals Assemblies of God in Zambia) were the most important influential one (Burgess 2006, 294). Today, Pentecostals are found among all segments of society. Although Zambia is a generally conservative country, Pentecostals do stand out with their traditional views on social and moral issues, such as abortion, opposing same-sex marriage, alcohol, divorce, and birth control (Pew 2006;2010). While most Christians in Zambia are religiously active, Pentecostals also stand out in the intensity of their belief. For instance, Pew (2006) find that most Pentecostals believe that the Bible is the word of God and that it is to be taken literally. Further, many Pentecostals believe that religious miracles happen today just like in the testaments. Pentecostals also make an effort to evangelise and to share their faith with non-

believers. This effort is closely linked to their belief that Jesus Christ represents the only path to eternal salvation (Pew 2006).

Further, Pentecostals have been viewed to differ significantly from other religious groups in their political attitudes. Traditionally, Pentecostals have been categorised as mainly a-political, seeking to engage primarily in the spiritual world rather than this world. However, from being marginalised churches devoid of political aspirations, the Pentecostal churches have, with their strengthened position in the public space, become profoundly more active politically and significantly impact politics and society throughout Africa (Bompani and Valois 2018). From being preoccupied with evangelising and preparing for the second coming of Jesus Christ, “it is now the case that the movement pays attention to practical concerns without neglecting the message of salvation and eternal life. An example of such a change includes the growth in emphasis on civic engagement” (M’fundisi-Holloway 2018).

2.2 Democratic Values

Almond and Verba (1989) eminently highlighted that political values play a crucial role in strengthening democracy, suggesting that if the structure of the government conflicts with the political culture, regimes lack legitimacy to survive over a longer period of time. Likewise, Eckstein (2015), in his study of democracy in Norway during the 60s, argued that democracy would only be viable and stable if the public is driven by democratic norms and practice them in their daily life. Correspondingly, an authoritarian regime is unlikely to sustain if it experiences strong pressure from civil society that seeks to institutionalise human autonomy and choice.

Understanding the relationship between religion, citizenship, participation, and democracy draws our attention to the difference between active and passive citizenship and the democratic values that citizens hold. Theorists such as Schumpeter dwelled on the question of whether active citizenship driven by democratic ideals was a necessary condition for effective democracies or if the existence of good institutions and a political elite was enough (Flew 2009, 980). Although he rendered it unnecessary, among many, Inglehart and Welzel concludes that “genuine democracy is not simply a machine that, once set up, functions by itself. It depends on the people” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2).

Scholars recognise that formal democracy can be implemented everywhere and anywhere, but to the extent that it produces genuine autonomous choice to its citizens depends predominantly on mass values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 150). Hence, the survival of democracy is based on the context in which democracy is implemented. The culture, the economy, the political history, the ethnic makeup, and the religion(s) that characterise the country has implications for mass values held by the population. Do the governed value liberal democracy with free and fair elections, the ability to organise, to speak freely, and rights to protect their individuality and freedom? Or does democracy or being ruled mean something entirely else. The values that people hold will characterise the actions made to fulfil them.

Contrary to what often has been assumed, Inglehart and Welzel argue that the causal link between values and democracy does not run from institutions to culture but rather from culture to institutions. One cannot assume that democracy can be easily established in any society and that pro-democratic values will consequently follow. Although it is tempting to turn the causal arrow the other way to gain an easy fix to the political problems in this world, history has shown us that adopting a democratic constitution does not automatically lead to a happy ever after. As Inglehart and Welzel point out “even the best-designed institutions need a compatible mass culture. Institutions cannot function well unless the public internalizes a set of norms consistent with these institutions” (160). Similarly, Norris (1999) points out that the political culture has severe implications for the consolidation of democracy. If people are disenchanted with the perceived performance of democratic governments over successive administrations, the very belief in democracy among the public may erode. This perspective sees the failure of performance as something that flows upwards to undermine democratic values.

In their redefinition of the modernisation theory, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) develop the Postmaterialist thesis that argue that the cultural shift that economic prosperity and a rising level of security and autonomy brings with it, changes peoples life experiences fundamentally, foster individualism, and leads them to emphasise goals previously not deemed important, such as the pursuit of freedom. This, they argue, give rise to a syndrome they define as self-expression values which are democratic values that emphasise civil and political liberties that constitute democracy and that shape political behaviour.

Hofstede defines self-expression with an emphasis on personal autonomy and self-fulfilment as central of individualism. Similarly, Schwartz's find that intellectual autonomy and affective autonomy capture core elements of self-expression values. Both definitions reflect an emphasis on autonomous human choice – central to democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2001, 136). According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 152) self-expression values emphasise human emancipation and value liberty over discipline, diversity over conformity, and autonomy over authority.

Although Inglehart and Welzel links democratic self-expression values to socio-economic development, there is also a widespread literature that addresses how religion causes political changes from below. This literature argues that because citizens base much of their social engagement on religious practices and resources, there is a need to bring religion into the study of civil society, especially for analysing what motivates political behaviour (Grzymala-Busse 2012; Bjune 2016). Indeed, the secularisation thesis has proved itself only to be half true. It is the case that the role of religion became less important in the western industrial phase, and in post-industrial societies, the power of religious authorities is to some extent disintegrating. Nevertheless, religion has had a new awakening in the Global South and spiritual concerns, broadly defined, are not vanishing but rather becoming more widespread. While the support for the old hierarchical churches is waning, “spiritual life is being transformed into forms that are increasingly compatible with individual self-expression” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 22). Similarly, Jenkins claims that the social and political world many African Christian experiences is similar to the Biblical world. Because Christians in Africa identify with the suffering of those who Jesus came to liberate, they are inspired to work for liberation themselves.

2.3 Religious and Spiritual capital

The seminal work of Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1995) guides in many ways the research on political activity today. They, and others (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Djupe and Gilbert 2006), find that the impact of religion is first and foremost visible through the civic skills learned through church attendance. Civic skills that they argue spill over into politics.

These civic experiences have often been referred to as “religious capital”² and have been studied with reference to the broader literature on social capital. Social capital as a theoretical perspective was first introduced by Pierre Bourdieu and Richard Nice (1977), further developed by James Coleman (1988), and popularised by Robert D. Putnam (1994; 1995; 2000), who defined social capital as networks of relationships within and between groups and individuals. Relationships that contribute to a higher level of trust between people which ultimately lays the foundation of a well-functioning society and economy and facilitates a better quality of democracy (Putnam 1995).

Scholars have, however, in the last decades, abandoned the term religious capital for the term “spiritual capital” (Ganiel 2009). The term spiritual capital still retains the emphasis on the individual present in earlier discussions of religious capital and explores how religious ideas and activities have a broader social and political impact. Berger and Hefner (2003) refer to the varieties of spiritual capital within religions and argue that each denomination disseminates different values, producing diverse worldviews with implications for democratisation and development. There is then a need to identify and understand the variety of spiritual capital generated, focusing on and identifying the worldview produced within church societies and the consequences that worldview has for democratisation. This theoretical perspective relates to the Postmaterialist thesis highlighting the consequence of individual changing value orientations for democracy (Inglehart 2015 [1977]; 1990, 2012 [1997]; Norris 1999; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

The main work within this debate stems from Max Weber and his theory of Protestantism and capitalism. Weber argued that the Calvinist religion or other reformed Protestant religions brought a work ethic that encouraged piety and saving and discouraged excessive spending (Weber 2012 [1905]). For Weber, cultural values have an enduring influence on society. He argued that the key difference between Protestants and Catholics was the individual focus of the former and the collective focus of the latter. The Calvinist tradition brought with it a this-worldly understanding of their religious “call,” which led them to live by a divine rationale for “a life of good works.” This contrasted with the Catholic tradition where the focus was laid on the cycle of “sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin” (Weber 2012 [1905], 71). As a result, Weber argued that the “Protestant ethic” facilitated

² See Rodney Stark and Roger Finke’s book “Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion” for further discussion regarding “religious capital.”

industrialisation and capitalism in late 16th- and 17th century Europe. Indeed, much of the literature on Pentecostalism rests on the assumptions of how changes in religious affiliation leads to changes in individual's behaviour which in turn leads to changes at the societal and political level. Following the argument by Weber (2012 [1905]) in the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, this thesis suggests that Pentecostal religious ideas have a considerable political impact, especially concerning shaping individual democratic values.

2.4 More or Less Democratic?

Two schools of thought have dominated the debate regarding the socio-political influence of the church in sub-Saharan Africa. The first argues that the church have strengthened the authoritarian political tradition in the region. The second contends the church has furthered and strengthened the democratic processes in new democracies.

The first perspective is based on how the church is seen to advocate for an a-political life by preaching prosperity gospel that encourages people to pour all their times and resources into the church rather than in the civic sphere, in addition to holding generally more religious conservative values. Values that lead church followers to be political quietist with no interest in the condition of democracy (Ganiel 2009, 1172). Additionally, some scholars see Pentecostalism as unlikely to contribute to movements of social change (Woodberry 2006; Gifford 2004) and point to the unwillingness to create conflict with civil authorities. Others have pointed out a trend of defending "big man" authoritative figures (McCauley 2013).

In his book, "Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa," Ranger (2008) divides the history of Africa's democracy process into three phases, the 1950-60, the late 1980s, and the last democratic revolution he dates to the early 1990s. In every revolutionary era, he looks at the role of the church. Ranger observes that the mainline denominations – the Catholic church and the mainstream Protestant churches – and the African Independent Churches (AICs) were the most important religious actors in all the three phases, contributing to the democratisation of several African states. When it comes to the newer charismatic churches, such as the Pentecostal church, Gifford notes that while the mainline churches challenged Africa's dictators, the newer evangelical and Pentecostal churches provided their support for the incumbent leaders (1995, 5).

The latter perspective seeks to connect Pentecostalism and active citizenships by searching for explanations through social capital theory concentrating on civic engagement and social trust. This literature emphasise that Pentecostalism has the potential to generate social movements and change through religious capital (Martin 1993; Patterson and Kuperus 2016; David Maxwell 2000; Ranger 2008).

Freston (2001) argues that although, Pentecostalism in certain circumstances have taken a turn for the right politically, with being associated with the most conservative part of the Republican Party in the US, and supporting authoritarian leaders such as Augusto Pinochet in Chile, and Ríos Montt in Guatemala, arguments claiming that the Evangelical and Pentecostal churches are not protecting democratic gains, are not grounded in reality. Freston contends that it is unrealistic to expect churches of the poor, without a robust institutional network internationally, to play the same role as mainline churches in opposition to authoritarian regimes (Freston 2001, 111). The mainline churches may have been part of tearing down leaders from their hegemonic thrones, but Freston (2001, 111) highlights that the "decentralised congregations were better at creating the values needed for democratic sustainability." Even if Pentecostalism is less critical for the democratic inauguration, Charismatic and Pentecostal churches may be better than in their overall effect on democratic consolidation.

Similarly, according to Ranger (2008) charismatic Christianity, such as Pentecostalism, cultivates the spirit of capitalism through microlevel moral and cultural change, and the spirit of democracy, through faith-based civic engagement. Echoing this, Maxwell (2000), claim that highly participatory charismatic churches facilitate the learning of skills necessary to become democratic citizens. Here, one can find solidarity, shelter, psychological support, and financial advice, which creates a religious community with a support mechanism that helps one reinforce oneself. Abilities and values learned and the behavioural change that comes from attending the church can be brought to bear to restructure the political society.

The literature makes a couple of broad points that are particularly relevant here. First, a part of the literature has documented that the African Pentecostals do not recognise the distinction between the personal and political (Sperber & Hern 2018, 835; for discussion see Bompani and Valois 2018). Instead, they may see their practice of faith, and especially their attempt to evangelise their religion and prayer as their primary mode of political participation (Sperber and Hern 2018, 835). In his book, "City of God: Christian Citizenship in Postwar Guatemala,"

O'Neill (2010) identifies how neo-Pentecostal Christian practices have become acts of citizenship. Actions such as prayer and speaking in tongues become political actions where the goal is to combat the ills of the nation. The belief among Pentecostals, he argues, is that praying for the soul of the nation is an act of Christian citizenship that have real political consequences (O'Neill 2009, 24). Similarly, to Sperber and Hern, O'Neill finds that the private becomes political and the political becomes private. Such can be linked to the Pentecostal view on politics and how bad governance and corruption only can be relinquished by a morally pure society and by political leaders embracing transformative religious change, i.e., by becoming born-again (Sperber and Hern 2018, 835). The personal becomes political then insofar it reflects moral religious commitments that define political behaviour, even if leading Pentecostal pastors may not have an interest in the world beyond the Church, their moralising religion have inevitably public effect (Sperber and Hern 2018; Gifford 2016; Comaroff 2012)

In his study of Ghana's "new Christianity," Gifford, (2004) argues that the main consequence of the religious shift is the preaching of the prosperity gospel and the 'demonic possession' paradigm. According to Gifford (2004), these paradigms undermine human agency by ascribing them to demons. Clergy poses only salvation through devotion to the church and diverts attention away from structural challenges within the society. He finds that Pentecostals tend to think in terms of spiritual causality in two ways. The first is an "enchanted" approach, where demons are made responsible for the political situation, which entails that their powers must be broken. The second approach is biblical and argues that the country's fragile state is caused by apostasy, particularly the failure to worship God properly (Gifford 2004, 162). Similarly, Kwabena Asamoah-Gyadu argues that emphasis made on how one can transform politics spiritually may result in people ignoring the structural challenges that cause the corruption and poverty they wish to abolish (2005, 93, 111).

At the same time, Pentecostals today have become increasingly visible in "conventional politics" (Pew 2006; 2010). Although the Pentecostal message may shift the focus away from the political world towards the godly one, the idea that if your faith is strong enough, God will help you, may manifest itself in people's actions as public citizens. As Gwyneth H. McClendon and Rachel Riedl (2019) illuminate in their book, "From Pew to Politics; Religious Sermons and Political Participation in Africa", this idea is beneficial for people as it

gives them self-efficacy which can be translated into the realm of formal politics. Feeling that God supports you in your faith can lead believers to think that change is possible in the world, while Mainline churches, on the other hand, may disempower people with a worldview that focus on how transformation happens through the changing of structures and not through individual change. Recent, and robust research of case studies where scholars have refined operationalisations of religion and Pentecostalism as independent variables, show that the Pentecostal members are equally politically active as other religious groups (Bjune 2016; Sperber and Hern 2018). According to Birgit Meyer (2011, 156), Pentecostal leaders have gradually left the sole focus on holiness in the private realm and moved onto encouraging political action by emphasising the importance of God's light in the public realm. The idea is that "the world requires actions and transformation" and that "anything can be imbued with the Holy Spirit," even poverty, capitalism, and politics (Meyer 2011, 156). A new "Christian citizenship" is created by placing moral born-again in positions of power to lead the country as way of healing a struggling nation (Gifford 1998; Bompani and Valois 2018; Sperber and Hern 2018)

Secondly, recent literature emphasises an ambivalence in African Pentecostals' democratic values and political behaviours. Summarising this literature, Naomi Haynes concludes in her study of hierarchies within the Pentecostal church, that "Pentecostal ritual life draws believers into democratic, open-ended and largely egalitarian communities, *and* produces clear distinctions between individuals, resulting in differentiated, hierarchical structures" (Haynes 2015, 274). Hence, Pentecostalism in Africa is seen to embody "a tension between democratic and authoritarian instantiations of the Holy Spirit" (Haynes 2015, 289). In other words, new findings suggest that Pentecostalism may instantaneously encourage both pro- and anti-democratic values. Here the Catholic church has an internally hierarchical structure, while this structure is argued to be more egalitarian within the Pentecostal church (for further discussions see Miller and Yamamori 2007). Hence, the Catholic church is argued to not be internally democratic, while the openness and the focus on empowering the individual within the Pentecostal church has been linked to democratisation. How they use their voice to support a competitive system parallels their own political economy of their marketplace. Whilst they are traditional and conservative, this openness within the church allows for a certain type of competitive voice that is valued in the broader civil society.

In their extensive experiment of how sermons affect political behaviour, McClendon and Riedl (2019) find that when exposed to the Pentecostal message, four per cent of the Catholics became more critical of the political system than they were initially, which indicates that exposure to Pentecostal sermons slightly boosted rates of participation across the board, echoing the social capital and civic engagement argument made by Martin (1993), Maxwell (2000) and Freston (2001). However, as Gifford (2004) anticipates, participation did not challenge existing institutions, structures, or rules. When people already inclined to attend Mainline/Catholic churches were exposed to Mainline/Catholic sermons, the participation rates were less impressive, but the rate of participation that was evident was directed towards structural changes (McClendon & Riedl 2019,124). The focus of Pentecostals lies on what the individual can do, and on being the best version of themselves rather than "reforming institutions, enforcing rules on elites, or creating structural incentives for leaders to work in citizen's interest" (Riedl & McCledon 2019, 127). In contrast, Mainline Protestants and Catholics were more likely to join efforts to call for a structural change in the political system when they were politically active. This study is perhaps closest to understanding the churches' ambivalent role in developing democracies and how the answer is complex.

Research on the Pentecostal church and its influence on democratisation processes has, as we have seen, produced diverging answers to whether the church strengthens democracy and democratic values, or weakens it. A similar argument made in both debates, however, is that the Pentecostal church as a prominent focus on the individual within the church. If these churches are more individualised, does that give them a more democratising force or an autocratic force, or both? According to the Postmaterialist thesis by Inglehart and Welzel, this focus on individualism produces individuals with self-expression values. In other words, individuals that value freedom, liberty, and private rights and that will act to defend these attributes.

Without disputing the findings described above, I seek to complement them by exploring how Pentecostals may express distinctive views about democracy and by analysing the attitudes that are communicated in sermons. I further elaborate on how such attitudes may affect and shape the (re)production of the "Christian citizen" within Pentecostalism. I find that arguments for a pro-democratic religious movement *and* arguments for a movement that draws people into an anti-democratic worldview are valid, and that the individual focus of

Pentecostalism produces a Christian citizenship defined by both self-efficacy based on democratic values and illiberal preferences.

2.5 Theoretical Expectations

2.5.1 Exit, Voice, and, Loyalty and the Values that Guide Them

I argue that the spiritual capital generated through the church helps shape different citizenship practices. Following Elizabeth Sperber (2018) -Bompani, I adopt an inclusive definition of citizenship where the focus is made on the individual's attitudes towards voluntary participation in activities intended to influence social, economic, or political norms and institutions (Sperber 2018, 63). I conceptualise then Christian citizenship in terms of the use of explicitly Christian ideas and beliefs to influence democratic values and the role of sermons in encouraging and shaping citizens mobilisation and political expressions when it comes to responding to social, economic, and political outcomes (Sperber 2018, 63).

Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty (1970) becomes relevant as a part of my theoretical framework. Hirschman describes three responses citizens usually choose between when faced with a political regime: exit, voice, or loyalty. Although writing in the context of organisations, exit, voice, and loyalty are also distinctive responses observed in political spheres. People can either choose to exit a regime with which they disagree with, use their voice as a means to change and challenge the current political authorities, or remain loyal to the government of the day.

For Hirschman, choosing to exit is "essentially a private and also a typically silent decision and activity" (1970, 194). Moreover, where exit is easy, voice is less likely. Exit is seen here as the activity that requires the least amount of risk and coordination with others. Unless it is

an exist by the masses, this form of reaction is the minimalist way of expressing dissent, and any potential political significance it might have had is concealed by its conflation with a purely private and unremarkable act of withdrawal (Brito Vieira 2021). Exit means either emigrating an organisation, or in this case, a regime, or turning to a competing organisation, or in this case, a political party. Although it entails a role of “silence,” it represents to Hirschman a minimalist way of expressing dissent, where one does not act in concert with others, but individually leaving an organisation for purely instrumental reasons “without noise” (Langton 1993 in Vieira 2021).

Using one’s voice to participate in the political sphere is seen as a fundamental tenet of liberal democracy, and the participation of the public in the decision-making process is essential as “the institutions of constitutional freedom are only worth as much as a population makes them” (Habermas 1994, 27). Indeed Hirschman (1970, 31-31) captures the importance of voice in liberal democracies and observes that “it has long been an article of faith of political theory that the proper functioning of democracy requires maximally alert, active, and vocal public.” Hence, voice – voting, demonstrating, complaining, organising etc. – are shaped by democratic values and becomes the political act in which one is able to generate real change when faced with anti-democratic actions by the government, and is the inevitable action followed by individual’s pro-democratic values.

Loyalty, on the other hand, is less a response than it is a psychological disposition. Hirschman observed that “the likelihood of voice increases with the degree of loyalty” and that loyalty hinders the possibility of exit. Yet, loyalty is also seen as the commitment to an organisation, or in this instance, a regime, and is first and foremost exhibited through silence. A silence that manifests the workings of the current power structure and that represents a form of private withdrawal: an exit within that adversely affects the possibilities of voice (Vieira 2021, 372). For the purpose of this thesis, loyalty is then conceptualised as an act of silence that hinders collective political action.

Note that exit, voice, and loyalty all constitute political actions beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse or measure. Mainly due to limited access to the field and lack of robust and contemporary data. I elaborate further on this in chapter 3. Instead, I am interested in identifying the political values that may guide such actions and the Christian citizenship (re)produced within Pentecostal churches.

2.5.2 The Effect of Sermons

The TV shows we watch, how and from which source we receive our news, works of literature, commercials, podcasts, social media etc., are all forms of communication that help shape the way in which we view the world. There have been numerous studies, especially as to how the media influence voting behaviour and attitudes towards democracy (Tesler 2015), but little is known about the political influence of sermons. I argue that just as media can influence political values and thus behaviour, so can sermons people are exposed to.

Churches, in general, have for centuries been seen as actors that instil values and norms in people. Hence religious communities become a prominent place to look to understand the source of general conceptions about how the world works and, perhaps more importantly, how it ought to work (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 644-645). As highlighted by Djupe and Calfano (2013, 645), “religious values sit in the most obvious, credible purview of clergy – to communicate how people should order their lives, and how religious communities should orient themselves to the world.” However, to the extent sermons have a priming effect on political values for listeners is often reliant upon how clergy delivers their messages. Djupe and Gilbert (2009) find that congregants systematically misinterpret the political cues given in sermons based on their values on attitudes. Additionally, congregants project their own views onto the political attitude of the pastor, and speaking openly about political issues, especially if listeners disagree, creates a defensive motivation in information processing and promotes confirmation bias (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 645).

Paradoxically, clergy have little credibility when they overtly communicate political messages. However, when they communicate religious messages, their impact on value orientations, including political values, is seen to be greater (Djupe and Calfano 2013; McClendon and Riedl 2019). Echoing this, McClendon Riedl (2019, 5) argue that “all else equal, sermons have the potential to shape political participation, even when they are not explicitly political because they provide interpretative maps for understanding cause, effect, and possibility in the world.” This indicates that effective clergy communication will take an indirect route to influence democratic values. This might incorporate agenda setting, priming, and framing rather than direct persuading (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 645). I focus on such a

possibility here: sermons shape democratic values through the priming of religious values. To the extent that clergy, during sermons, make explicit arguments about how the world should function and give advice as to how one should bring this change about, they shape the values people hold. Values that work to inform how believers might live and behave in society (Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Djupe and Calfano 2013). McClendon and Riedl also suggest that by providing a metaphysical picture of how the world works. In many ways, sermons speak to every spectre of life and gives direction as to how one should lead it.

For many, religious teachings may influence political attitudes and motivate political participation. For example, Margaret Wanjiru and other political candidates in Kenya related their decision to run for office to their experience in the church, arguing that the content of their religion led them to seek political office (G.H. McClendon and Riedl 2019, 1). Similarly, in Ghana, people seemingly influenced by sermons sought to clamp down on petty bribes, and journalists were quick to link religious teaching to political action (McClendon & Riedl 2019, 1). This phenomenon could also be seen in the United States during the civil rights movement of the 1960s, where black leaders were driven by the “re-imagination of Christian thought” which they were exposed to in sermons lead by black clergy (Harvey 2016 in McClendon & Reidl 2019, 1). It is also not uncommon for political action to occur in close proximity to religious services. In Kenya, political rallies are often held on Sundays, while street protests are organised on Mondays. Similarly, in Muslim countries, calls for political action are often delivered right after Friday sermons (Munro 2010; Manson 2014; Chibber and Sekhon 2015 in McClendon & Riedl 2019, 8).

Rebecca Glazier (2015) describes a bridge between religion and politics constructed and built by congregation leaders. She argues that clergy members often have a more coherent worldview, making them “particularly effective opinion leaders... (who can) frame grievances in a way that makes them politically relevant to parishioners” (Wald and Calhoun Brown 2010 in Glazier 2015, 463). Pastors and clergy members who deliver sermons provide then congregants with a religious lens through which to see the world and, in turn, political issues.

Sermons tend to tackle important and profound questions about the causes of the problems of the world and individual people and provide a guide for change. They seek to answer life’s most pressing and complex questions: Why is the world like it is? Why have certain problems

occurred? How do we fix the problems in our life – from poverty, unhappy marriage, infertility etc.? Where should we look for help? The answers given, primarily since they are delivered by authoritative, trusted people with close connections to God, are likely to influence how people view the world and, in turn, how they engage with the world materially, socially, and politically (McClendon and Riedl 2021, 5). The way sermons answer these big questions can inform listeners of what kind of political change is necessary and if it is doable (McClendon and Riedl 2019, 5). If the religious message portrayed characterise the world as shaped by people’s characters, or instead by structures and norms in which people are embedded, they might shape the way people analyse and respond to political problems (McClendon and Riedl 2019). Thus, religion can not only shape political values but also mobilise or demobilise political activity. Turning the focus to sermons as ideological frames that influence their listeners may help us understand the pathway through which religion shapes democratic attitudes and behaviour. As argued by McClendon and Riedl (2021, 5), “sermons provide authoritative interpretative maps about how the world works and are thus strong candidates for influencing political attitudes and behavior.”

2.5.3 How Sermons Might Encourage Actions of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty

I argue that there are several factors that can facilitate values that trigger exit, voice, and loyalty responses. The Postmaterialist thesis is based on how an individualistic worldview, often associated with Pentecostalism, emphasises individual autonomy and self-expression values that lead listeners to emphasise liberty and freedom, values that constitute democracy and motivate political action. However, as McClendon and Riedl (2020) propose, how this individualistic worldview is portrayed, and what is emphasised when it comes to the individual and the relationship with divine affects the type of Christian citizenship that is shaped through the spiritual capital produced within the church.

Because, as further proposed by McClendon and Riedl (2020), religious teachings that emphasise individual transformation may lead people to seek political change through their own individual conversion and not through structural change. Listeners may be more attuned to the discussion of rights, liberties, and freedoms, however, less inclined to engage in civic actions such as public demonstrations. Here, my arguments also rest on Marshall (2009) observations in her ethnographic study of Pentecostalism in Nigeria. Marshall argues that the Pentecostal conversion’s political significance is evident in so far that it creates “the ideal

citizen, one who will provide a living incarnation of the nomos of an ordered political realm” (Marshall 2009, 211). Change is therefore rather portrayed to happen through citizens and political leaders becoming better people of faith. Similarly, McClendon and Riedl (2019, 21) find that messages preached in Pentecostal churches in Africa promise change through personal transformation. This, they argue, contrasts with the Catholic and Mainline churches that provide a worldview that focuses on the structures in which people are embedded, rather than simply on people’s internal lives. This way of seeing the world may lead citizens to exit a regime or withdraw (silently) the support of a party or leader with which they disagree, rather than exercising their voice.

Further, I follow McClendon and Riedl (2019) arguments about how sermons provide listeners with a worldview that emphasises that the world is a product of individual and collective action and that we all have a responsibility to bring about the change we want, will lead to higher self-efficacy. The expectation is that listeners inhabit democratic values and will be more inclined to use their voice to protest political policies and regime actions that they condemn. McClendon and Riedl (2015) find that religious teachings that portray an empowering worldview that emphasise the possibility of change being achieved by anyone, given the opportunity, make listeners feel empowered to act boldly and embody the change they want to see in the world. They refer then to listeners of Pentecostal teachings as “empowered players” in the political game.

Sermons that argue that leaders are elected and rule by divine intervention and blessing may lead listeners to be loyal to the leaders in power. This taps into the minimalist understanding of government, where you only practice your democratic citizenship with each election. Schumpeter terms this *modus procedendi*, which entail that democracy is solely a political method characterised by political competition in the form of free elections (Møller and Skaaning 2013, 31). For example, Sperber and Hern (2018) note that Pentecostal clergy regularly embrace the notion that God selects the executive leader. They, therefore, argue that the role of the churches is to support the “government of the day.” This worldview might cultivate regime loyalty among the listeners, as sermons may argue for God’s divine intervention in the elections of leaders and extoll absolute authority in leaders, which may incline congregants towards greater tolerance of increased executive power (McClendon and Riedl 2021, 30).

2.6 Summary of the Relationship Between Pentecostalism, Democratic Values and Political Behaviour

The growth of Pentecostalism in Africa has inspired an abundance of researchers to investigate the political outcome of a radical change in the religious demographic. In this chapter, I first sought to offer a coherent definition of a religious movement that scholars perceive as a highly heterogeneous phenomenon and that people experience and practice in a variety of ways. I then presented the literature on the democratic implications of citizen values and how religion may shape them. Further, I presented relevant literature on the role of Pentecostalism within the political realm and its influence on individuals. I find the literature, among other aspects, has identified a prominent individualistic worldview within Pentecostalism. However, the scholarly divergence that this thesis focuses on lies in the effect such a worldview has on democratic values. Thirdly, I have presented a theoretical expectation of how religious change holds consequences of an individual's political values and behaviour. I argue that the worldview presented in sermons shape people's values. Values that guide political participation, and especially shape how congregants understand their role as citizens and their ability or obligation to exercise exit, voice, or loyalty.

In the next chapter, I turn to the methodological framework of my research, seeking to introduce the reader to how a combination of methodological considerations and the types of data available have fed into the development of my two-step analysis.

3 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY AND METHODS

The influence of religion on democratic values and political behaviour has gathered much attention in the literature and has resulted in a lengthy and still-ongoing debate about causality. Do religious teachings and ideas influence political values and behaviour? Or are they just a symptom of people's pre-existing political ideas? Within this debate, there is no escaping the pioneers' Max Weber and Èmile Durkheim. In "Protestant Ethic", Weber (2012 [1905]) argues that Calvinist teachings influenced economic behaviour and led to the industrialised development of many western countries. Contrarily, Èmile Durkheim's (2008 [1912]) "Elementary forms of Religious Life" argues that religion is a symptom rather than a cause for people's attitudes and behaviour. On one side of this debate, religion is seen to shape values and behaviour, while on the other side, religious teachings only reflect social and material conditions.

In developing the research design for this MA thesis, I sought to identify an approach and a set of methods that could expand on and complement the existent literature on the relationship between religion, and more specifically, Pentecostalism and democracy. Therefore, I chose to identify values held by Pentecostals in several Christian Sub-Saharan countries and then narrow the scope on the influence of Pentecostal sermons on individual's democratic values in Zambia.

The previous chapter presented the theoretical framework implemented to address the research objective. In this chapter, I present the empirical approach, the methods, and ways of accessing primary and secondary data. First, I discuss the choice of choosing two methods and why I have chosen to define my methodological approach as a two-step method rather than multimethod. I further deliberate on the pitfalls of selecting a single case study and what is gained with my methodological approach. I further discuss the central aspects of the methodology and the data gathered. Lastly, I elaborate on my position as a researcher as well as the challenges of conducting research during a pandemic.

3.1 Methodology

In this thesis, I seek to uncover how sermons, even when not explicitly political in nature, might shape citizens' democratic values and, thereby their political actions. This thesis is conducted in two steps and combines cross-case analysis with an in-depth case study. Specifically, I draw on survey data from sub-Saharan Africa conducted in 2009/2010 and original qualitative research conducted in the officially Christian state of Zambia in 2021 to explore the enactment of 'Christian citizenship.'

I firstly conduct an exploratory quantitative analysis to explore the significance of Pentecostalism in African politics. Using a survey that measures respondents' attitudes towards government and authorities, I want to see if Pentecostals differ systematically in their views on democracy and politics from other Christians in a cross-national perspective. Although this survey does not directly tap into questions about political actions of exit, voice, or loyalty, it indicates Pentecostals' political preferences and how they view their role in a political regime. For my main contribution to the research, I zoom in on an interesting case, Zambia, to dig deeper into this phenomenon.

Goertz (2016) conceptualises multimethod research as doing cross-case causal inference together with within-case qualitative causal inference in the form of case studies. The cross-case method is here combined with an individual case to explore causal mechanisms. Similarly, the main goal of the case study of Zambia is to identify causal mechanisms that might influence democratic values among Pentecostals. As Daniel Steel points out, "mechanisms are generally understood as consisting of interacting components that generate a causal regularity between some specified beginning and end points" (in Goertz 2016, 10). I argue, therefore that content delivered in sermons represent a good example of such mechanisms in action. Although, I am not able to test for the effect of this content, I am able to shed some light as to what mechanisms that may shape political behaviour and explain the results from the survey analysis.

Conducting a multimethod analysis may increase the credibility of the findings. It can further shed light on multiple explanations and identify and analyse the explanatory power of various factors. Yet, according to Beach (2020), two divergent approaches cannot be mixed and fails to compensate for each other weaknesses. However, in this analysis, they are not meant to.

Different approaches are implemented to supplement each other's findings by shedding light on mechanisms at play by using different methodological approaches and types of evidence. Further, if a research is to be truly multimethod, there needs to be a balance between the methods, and one method should not be overemphasised on behalf of the other (Goertz 2016). As this thesis utilises an old survey data (2010), the survey analysis is used as a preliminary analysis, or as a steppingstone, to justify the need for an in-depth analysis of Pentecostal religious teachings in sermons, I am therefore careful with defining my method as multimethod, rather, it is perhaps best explained as a two-step analysis.

I focus then on the influence of sermons and use contemporary Pentecostal sermons in Zambia as my primary empirical vehicle for analysing the effects of religion on political values. Here the individuals' democratic values are the dependent variable and the religious sermons they are exposed to becomes the independent variable. I am cautious about making causal claims as the data I have collected cannot directly prove causality between religious teachings and political values. Nevertheless, analysing the content of sermons and interviewing Pentecostal pastors as a robustness test may indicate what kind of Christian citizenship is produced by the spiritual capital within the church and may help illuminate findings from the survey. Analysing these churches' religious and political messages is imperative to understand the political implications of an expanding and influential religion such as Pentecostalism.

3.1.1 Single Case Study

As the study of Pentecostalism concerning democratic values, in general, remains understudied, choosing a case study is beneficial as, although regarded as limited in generating generalisations, it is often understood as "the first line of evidence" where a phenomenon needs to be studied further in-depth before comparisons and generalisations can be thoroughly made (Gerring 2007, 5). Additionally, for practical reasons, one being an information-poor field, a single case study might be the only viable option. However, one of the implications of case studies is that it suffers problems of representativeness as it includes, by definition, only a small number of cases of a more general phenomenon (Gerring 2007, 43). Here, myopia, "the tendency to exaggerate the impact of short-term micro-causes", becomes a crucial problem that researchers choosing single case studies should be aware of (Bogaards 2019, 62). Further, due to the minor variation of outcomes and causes, it is

challenging to distinguish causality properly from coincidence and spurious relationships (Bogaards 2019, 63). Hence, the research objectives of this thesis concern internal validity. It aims not to generalise findings beyond this case but to explain a particular case thoroughly. In line with Gerring (2007) and Bogaards (2019), I argue that this is perhaps the virtue of the case study, as case studies may offer a solid conceptual and internal validity as well as unravel causal mechanisms often lost in large-N studies. According to Gerring (2007, 49), “case studies are thus rightly identified with “holistic” analysis with the “thick” description of events.”

At the same time, the purpose of a case study is at least in part, per Gerring (2007, 20), to “shed light on a larger class of cases,” and my research is also motivated by how analysing the democratic implications of Pentecostalism in Zambia may provide insights and inspiration of explanatory variables and interactions for further research on the democratic backlash in newly developed democracies. According to Rohlfing, “the case is not interesting in itself (at least not in the first place), but for learning something about the population of cases from which it is drawn.” (Bogaards 2019, 63).

By choosing Zambia as a case study, I have chosen a case that I argue is most likely to fit the theory of religious influence among sub-Saharan African countries. I argue then that Zambia becomes a crucial most-likely case. As discussed in chapter 2, Pentecostalism is known for its individualistic worldview, which, if we follow the Postmaterialist thesis, should lead to an active Christian citizenship based on values of liberal democracy and self-expression. And the fact that the Pentecostal church was active in overthrowing the one-party rule and facilitating democratisation and that Zambia’s first elected President was a passionate born-again Christian situates Zambia in a unique place compared to other African states historically (Sperber & Hern 2018, 839). Therefore, I argue that Zambia becomes a most-likely case to fit the theory that Pentecostalism has a positive influence on democratic values. Suppose we are to find Pentecostal churches on the African continent that communicate pro-democratic values to its congregants. In that case, it should then be “easiest,” due to its distinct role during the transition, to find such a church in Zambia. For this study then, the selection of Zambia as a case is in line with the crucial case method, as first represented by Harry Eckstein. Eckstein (1975, 118) describes the crucial case as one “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed.” Hence, the selection of a case should be made on the basis of the facts of

that case that are central to the confirmation or disconfirmation of a theory (Gerring 2007, 231). However, in chapter 4, I elaborate further on the selection of Zambia as a case for analysis and present evidence for how Zambia as a case in the context of Pentecostalism is both unique and typical in the sub-Saharan region.

3.2 Reflection on Methodology – What is Gained and What is Lost

3.2.1 Survey

The methodological problems of surveys are evident in the fact that surveys seek to restrict not only the frame of questions but also the answer frame. Of course, this helps us aggregate and summarise a large number of responses, but at the same time, researchers pay a price. Norman (1973 in Cicourel 1982) notes that questions may be framed in such a manner that respondents may either misinterpret them or not understand them. This, he calls the “paraphrase problem,” and argue that the “best” reply to these questions may be another question seeking to clarify the question’s intention. However, this happens seldom when surveys are conducted (Cicourel 1982). In the case of surveys, one is further faced with the limitation of not getting explanations as to why the respondents have given a particular answer. Such information would also have given clues as to how respondents understood the questions (Cicourel 1982, 13). Here, the content validity is under threat, and one cannot be sure that respondents have defined the questions in the manner that was intended. I elaborate further on this in my analysis of the survey. There is also a problem with utilising secondary survey data. By not being the enumerator of the survey, one also has to depend on and trust that those that conducted the interviews understood the questions as those who designed the survey intended.

Further, one cannot entirely take account of the fallacy of desirability bias, where respondents’ answers are not their own opinions. However, simply a reflection of what they think is expected of them. For example, it may be “politically correct” to answer that you prefer democracy, however, when in reality, you prefer a “strong leader.” This may happen the other way around as well, where respondents are afraid to answer questions truthfully if it may result in a government clamp back.

Surveys alone cannot comprehensively elucidate complex religiopolitical dynamics. Nevertheless, they are essential indicators of political preferences and beliefs, and when combined with rigorous qualitative studies, they may shed more light on the relationship between religious beliefs and democratic values. To my knowledge, however, there exists few, if any, up to date, large-scale academic survey data that have tapped into questions about democratic attitudes, political preference, and engagement of African Pentecostals.

Many of our answers regarding the influence of Pentecostalism on political behaviour in sub-Saharan Africa remain unanswered partly due to lack of data. Comprehensive and large surveys that tap into questions of political values, behaviour, and attitudes on the African continent, such as Afrobarometer, typically lack large samples of Pentecostals. And vice versa; smaller surveys that focus on minority religious groups often excluded questions about political values and behaviour (Sperber and Hern 2018, 831). Afrobarometer also suffers from conceptualisation faults, as it has not reliably distinguished Pentecostals from other Christians. Because Afrobarometer offers an alternative for respondents to identify simply as Christian in addition to Catholic, Protestant, Anglican, Pentecostal, Orthodox etc., respondents are able to pick an undefined religious label (Christian). Pentecostals often consider their churches to be non-denominational and may be more inclined to consider themselves as simply Christian rather than Pentecostal (Sperber and Hern 2018, 834). Hence, categories of Christian and Pentecostal are challenging to interpret in existing data. Surveys asking questions about religious affluence and political attitudes and activity also struggle to capture the essence of how different denominations affect individual behaviour, as most religious belief measures are either too complex or too particular to include in surveys (Glazier 2015, 459). This lack of comprehensive data is problematic, not only for researchers interested in religion and its societal and political influence but also for researchers interested in mechanisms that drive and shape political behaviour.

Pew Forums' 2010 survey offers a more refined measure of religious affiliation and identity than Afrobarometer. Therefore, this thesis will rely on data from the Pew Survey. However, this survey was conducted over ten years ago, which is problematic as I seek to understand the influence of sermons on political attitudes today. This lack of up-to-date data further constrains my ability to make any causal claims.

3.2.2 Sermons

It is challenging to study the effects of religion on democratic values for many reasons, one of them being that religion is not a singular entity and is unlikely to have a single directional effect on political values/behaviour (McCledon and Reidl 2021, 1). As an object of study, religion presents a multifaceted, internally heterogeneous category of analysis that lacks coherent boundaries (McCledon and Reidl 2021, 1). The study shares many similarities and is plagued by the same issues the study of cultural influence on political values, namely spurious relationships. As with any methodology, there are trade-offs to the choice of analysing sermons, especially with no access to the field and possibility for interviews with the congregants in the immediate aftermath of the service. First, there is no need for believers to listen and absorb the messages of the sermons, and different people might attribute different teaching out of the same sermon (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), they might ignore ideas that contradict their own prior beliefs (Djupe and Calfano 2013) or perhaps just doze off through the whole thing. Further, people might not see the link between religious teachings and politics and might be unaffected by the messages delivered during sermons regarding their political beliefs and values – they might see religion as limited to the spiritual realm (McClendon and Riedl 2019, 3).

3.3 Method

3.3.1 Logit Regression

The data of Pentecostals democratic values and religiopolitical attitudes were generated from existing survey data by Pew Forum in 2010. I run two simple logit models on each of the questions discussed below where I elaborate on the data gathered and seek to examine whether Pentecostal differ systematically from other Christians in their political values across the sub-Saharan continent. The survey data are categorical in nature, and applying an ordinary least square (OLS) would not yield precise estimation. I, therefore, conduct a logistic regression through the maximum likelihood technique, as it is a sufficient method of estimating categorical data (Oladipo and Grobler 2019, 175). Since the rationale for this study lies in the impact of being Pentecostal on democratic values, I code Pentecostal as one and if belonging to any other denomination as zero. In order to isolate the effect of being Pentecostal, I follow the approach of Sperber and Hern (2018) by first calculating the crude

effect of being Pentecostal. In the second model, I apply recommended controls, such as gender, education, and rural vs urban population, as a robustness test of this effect. All models also include country-level fixed effects.

Including a country-fixed effect in the models is appropriate with data containing individual-level data nested in a higher level (countries), as it lets me control for discrepancy related to country level (Möring 2012). It also constitutes a suitable way to overcome small-N at highest level in the hierarchical dataset. Specific-country error term is then treated as a fixed number in the models, which overcomes the postulation that the error term must be independent of other variables in the models, as is the case for random-effects models (Möhring 2012).

3.3.2 Content Analysis

According to Klaus Krippendorff (2004), content analysis is neither deductive nor inductive but abductive. I find this to be true as well, because although I moved from theory to data, and the existing literature highly inspired my themes, I found myself recognising new themes I deemed significant to my research question that was not emphasised by previous literature, such as the emphasis on respecting authorities, especially those anointed by God, and being submissive. I moved then back and forth from theory to data and used a mixture of theory, experience, and intuition to seek to answer my research question (Krippendorff 2004, 38).

Content analysis refers to «any methodological measurement applied to text (or other symbolic materials) for social science purposes» (Shapiro and Markoff 1997, 14 I (Roberts 2020 [1997])), and what becomes central to this methodological framework is the emphasis made on the language in human cognition (Duriau et al. 2007, 6). Content analysis assumes that groups of words expose underlying themes and provides a methodology to uncover deep individual or collective structures such as values, intentions, attitudes, and cognitions (Duriau et al. 2007, 6). As such, content analysis is applicable to study how sermons may prime believers political value orientations.

Although it can be, the content analysis did not become a wholly unobtrusive technique of gathering data. With the exception of the sermons I analysed from YouTube, the sermons which my research assistant recorded were delivered by pastors who were aware of being observed by a researcher. They were also aware of my research question as they had read a

short description of my thesis and signed a consent letter. This might have shaped and influenced the content delivered during that sermon as well as how it was delivered. This limitation is also evident in the interviews conducted with the same pastors. I cannot as an observer and interviewer expect to not influence my informers

However, content analysis has the advantage of perceiving the conceptions of the data's sources, which structured methods largely ignore. The method is context-sensitive and allows me to process data texts that are significant, meaningful, and representational to others. Content analysis also recognises that the data are absorbed in one form or another by others and make sense to others. Hence, "inferences drawn through the use of such methods have a better chance of being relevant to the users of the analysed texts" (Krippendorff 2004, 41-42). As the data gathered consisted of a relatively small corpus of sermon texts, I am able to code by hand. This type of analysis may suffer from researcher demand bias, which would have been overcome by a machine (Woodrum 1984 in Duriau et al. 2007, 7).

However, coding by hand allows for a more nuanced reading of how the sermons portray relationships between the spiritual and physical worlds. While the quantitative method captures and reveals manifest content of the text through statistics, qualitative content analysis encompasses both description of the manifest content, close to what has been conveyed in the sermon, as well as interpretations of the latent content, the deeper meaning embodied in the text or the "the red thread" evident between the lines, which require human interpretation (Graneheim et al. 2017, 30; Duriau et al. 2007, 6).

As discussed in chapter 2, I code the main themes of each sermon by identifying emphasis made on individual transformation, individual responsibility, individual empowerment, self-expression values, and divine intervention. These themes may help shape individuals' understanding of voice, exit or loyalty (Hirschman 1970). Where sermons emphasise individual transformation, listeners may be less inclined toward collective action and civic responsibility and may choose to exit a regime with which they disagree. Where sermons provide listeners with a worldview that understands the world as a product of individual and collective responsibilities as well as emphasises individual empowerment and self-expression values, listeners might be more inclined to use their voice in an anti-regime mobilisation. Whereas sermons emphasise divine intervention in elections and politics, listeners might be more easily inclined to showcase regime loyalty (McClendon & Reidl 2021, 29). I also focus

on how sermon guidance delivered in the church may impact regime preferences and the idea that strong – implicitly undemocratic – leadership is occasionally warranted. Additionally, I note whether sermons mentioned explicitly political topics: peace before elections and free and fair elections; specific politicians, candidates, or policies; political actions (encouraging people to vote/ speak against authorities); political institutions. However, few sermons were overtly political, and few mentioned only political topics.

3.3.3 Interviews with Pastors

Interviewing the pastors of the churches where my research assistant recorded the sermons allowed me to collect additional meta-data about the houses of worship, such as self-identified denomination and ties with other churches, which helped me understand in which contexts the sermons were delivered. It also worked as a robustness test to verify that I had understood the ideas behind the messages delivered in sermons. The role of the interviews was then to ensure the quality of my interpretation of the sermons.

Although I had prepared questions, I chose a somewhat conversational form, which led the interviews to be semi-structural. I had identified a set of themes I wanted to address and formulated a set of questions to address these themes. All interviews were recorded after I had clarified this with each interviewee. The quotes used in the thesis was sent to the interviewees after for validation. Kapiszewski et al. (2015, 228) stress that recorded material should be transcribed as soon as possible after the interview to capture the interview's content. This method was followed, and I was able to type down my observations and reflections alongside the transcripts.

The selection of my interviewees was based on my overall research aim of identifying religious values, ideas and worldviews, and political values communicated in sermons. Hence, the pastors were able to shed light on their own religiopolitical views, in which arenas (spiritually, politically, economically, in personal relationships etc.) they do guide their congregants, and in which arenas the congregants expect them to guide them, giving me a better understanding as to which type of Christian citizenship the pastors seek to produce within the church.

3.4 Data

3.4.1 Pew Survey

The Pew survey, “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa,” was published in 2010 and updated in 2020 and is a cross-sectional, cross-national, individual-level survey study conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although a more recent survey would be preferable to showcase recent trends, it is the only survey, to my knowledge, that reliably differentiate between Pentecostals and other denominations and that asks questions about democratic values. The questions that are of interest to my research question asks respondents to report on their views on (1) the desirability of democracy over other forms of regime types, (2) to the extent to which respondents believed that strong – implicitly undemocratic – leadership is occasionally warranted, (3) if people like them should have any say on government practices, (4) the desirability of “Biblical Law,” (5) if leaders should have strong religious beliefs, (6) if religious leaders should stay out of political matters, and (7) if it is okay that leaders adhere to a different religion.

The choice to include the question about preference for “Biblical Law” is based on the assumption that support for religious legal codes generally challenges conventional liberal, Western conceptions of democracy (Sperber and Hern 2018, 856). However, it should be noted that the survey does not specify what is meant by “Biblical law.” Pew Survey used this term to counterbalance the question posed to Muslim participants about the support of Sharia Law. However, the way I interpret it is that it asks if you would like the laws of your country to be based on religious values. And for the purpose of this thesis, I am interested in whether Pentecostals answered this question differently than other Christians.

As I am interested in looking at Christian denominations, specifically Pentecostals, I exclude countries where Christians make up for less than 30% of the population (Sperber and Hern 2018, 854). Therefore, I only include Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. I exclude Cameroon as they have a history of repressing Pentecostals, and as such, respondents may be less likely to identify as Pentecostal (Sperber and Hern 2018, 854).

3.4.2 Sermons in Lusaka

By deriving content from locally delivered sermons, I can analyse the local message of sermons set aside from the official doctrine (McCledon and Riedl 2021, 5). To assess the influence of Pentecostalism on political values, one needs to understand how ideas are being disseminated by local churches in a particular time and place. Disintegrating religion to focus on sermons recognises that the content of religion, even within a specific religious branch, fluctuates greatly (McCledon and Riedl 2021, 5). I am, however, not able to gather data from sermons with a significant time difference. The sermons gathered are from the time between March and the beginning of June in 2021. However, what is worth noting is that May and June represent the months leading up to the general election in August 2021. One can then expect that sermons may address explicitly political themes at a higher rate than in between elections.

I have chosen to focus on four of Zambia's largest Pentecostal churches and their leaders and pastors. These were identified on the basis of the size of the churches and how frequently the churches and the pastors appear in the national press alongside state officials. The names that stood out among the crowd were Bishop Dr Joseph H.K Banda, senior pastor at the Northmead Assembly of God (NAOG) and presiding bishop at Pentecostal Assembly of God Zambia (PAOG-Z), Dr Bishop Joe Imakando, pastor and general overseer at the Bread of Life Church Zambia, Bishop Charlton Kakene, of the Pentecostal Holiness (PHC) Church, and Bishop Moses Mulenga of the United Pentecostal Church of Zambia (UPCZ). These churches are relatively active on social media platforms and Northmead Assembly of God and The Bread of Life Church broadcast sermons through their own media channels that are available on YouTube and Facebook. Here the legacy from the Pentecostal and Evangelical churches in the USA, who have practised tele-evangelisation for decades, lives on. Generally, but perhaps particularly in times of COVID, these practices have been advantageous for me as a researcher. It allowed me to gather information while diversifying the sources of information and allowing me to monitor the public messages of elite individuals within the church from Norway. When it comes to gathering data from the two other churches, PHC and UPCZ, I hired a research assistant in Zambia who recorded sermons and facilitated and organised interviews with leading figures within the churches.

3.4.2.1 Northmead Assembly of God (NAOG)

Northmead Assembly of God (NAOG) belongs to the Pentecostal Assemblies of God – Zambia (PAOG-Z), which again was established at the Mwambashi Mission Station in 1955 by the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada (PAOC) missionaries. However, it should be noted that the origins of PAOG-Z and the date of its establishment are disputed. The PAOG-Z does not define itself as a denomination, but as a fellowship of “self-supporting, self-governing and propagating Assemblies which believe, obey and propagate the full gospel message.” (Kilde) This autonomous nature has led the PAOG-Z movement to maintain a variety of worship systems, including the classical Pentecostal approach and the neo-Pentecostal type of spirituality (Kaunda 2016, 24). There is also a variety of rich and poor congregations within this fellowship. PAOG-Z is also the largest single Pentecostal church body in Zambia with over 1600 congregations across the country and a membership of approximately 120,000 (M’fundisi-Holloway 2018, 44). Here, the most prominent figure in the church is Bishop Joshua Banda, who is the senior pastor at the NAOG, the presiding bishop at the PAOG-Z, a National House of Prayer Advisory board chairman, the president of the Southern Africa Region Chapter of the Pentecostal Assemblies of Africa (PAOA), former chairman of the National AIDS Council of Zambia and former principal of TACU.

3.4.2.2 Bread of Life Church

Bread of Life Church was founded from a prophetic word on 13th September 1992 from a small Baptist Church, Emmasdal Church, with 120 members in Lusaka Zambia. The prophecy was as follows: “I am giving you thousands, you will possess the land and feed the people with the Bread of Life” (M’fundisi-Holloway 2018, 49). According to their website, it is one of the biggest Charismatic neo-Pentecostal churches in Zambia with over 9,500 members, which according to their website, “includes people of different status” (blci.info). The denomination has 101 mission churches in Zambia and 12 based in other countries such as DR Congo, South Africa, Australia, Malawi, United Kingdom, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tanzania. Additionally, the church holds a weekly television ministry called “Hour of Blessing” (Kaunda 2016). Bishop Joseph Imakando is the presiding bishop and is a famous and respected preacher in Zambia. However, in the beginning, being a former Baptist pastor, Bishop Imakando was sceptical of developing a charismatic church. However, this changed after attending a Conference at Rhema Church, a neo-Pentecostal church, in South Africa

(M’fundisi-Holloway 2018, 49). When an American reverend, Pastor Tim Storey, preached, Imakando was ready to leave the sermon but suddenly felt the Holy Spirit’s power rushing through him and remained. As well as being chairman for the EFZ Board, Bishop Joseph Imakando is also the president of the Association of Evangelicals in Southern Africa (ASEA). Bread of Life International can be characterised as both charismatic and neo-Pentecostal church and was one of many that began “mushrooming” after the reintroduction of democratic rule in Zambia (Kaunda 2016, 31).

3.4.2.3 Pentecostal Holiness Church (PHC)

The Pentecostal Holiness Church (PHC) was the second Pentecostal church in Zambia and was founded in 1948. According to M’fundisi (2014, 42), migrant Zambian miners in South Africa converted to Pentecostalism because of PHC evangelism, which inspired them to expand their mission to their home country. The church thus has classical Pentecostal roots. Holiness Pentecostals stems from the nineteenth-century holiness movement and is based on a belief that there is a second work of grace called sanctification, followed by the third experience of Spirit baptism (M’Fundisi-Holloway 2018, 41). Her emphasis was at the beginning placed on holiness and divine healing. Members were also not encouraged to concern themselves with matters relating to politics, business, and education, which became evident in songs and sermons indicating that life on earth was fleeting and that people should instead focus on their second life with God (M’fundisi-Holloway 2018, 41). The church grew minimally in its first decade. This changed with the introduction of Bishop Samson Phiri who brought with him a bigger focus issues of this world. Bishop Samson Phiri was a televangelist who regularly preached on Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN), the only Christian network in Zambia in the 1990s (M’fundisi-Holloway 2018, 41). Here, Bishop Samson Phiri shared the gospel of PHC and as his reputation grew, so did the church. Bishop Samson Phiri was appointed National Overseer of PHC from 2004 until his death in 2011 (M’fundisi-Holloway 2018, 41).

3.4.2.4 United Pentecostal Church of Zambia (UPCZ)

United Pentecostal Church of Zambia (UPCZ) is a bible-based church that is closely affiliated with a larger organisation of churches, called the United Pentecostal Church International

(UPCI), with headquarters in Missouri US. UPCI was established in 1945 by the merger of the Pentecostal Church Incorporated and the Pentecostal Assemblies of Jesus Christ. The organisation has over 42,000 churches, 41,000 credentialed ministries, and 5.2 million members worldwide (UPCI.org). According to its website, the organisation emerged out of the Azusa Street Revival in Los Angeles, California, in 1906, and its organisational roots can be traced back to 1916 when a large group of Pentecostal pastors united under the teachings of the oneness of God and the water baptism in the name of Jesus Christ. Oneness Pentecostals reject the doctrine of Trinity and argue that the Holy Spirit, Jesus Christ and God are all the same (Anderson 2010, 18). The United Pentecostal Church can then be classified as classical Pentecostalism that belongs to the subcategory within this definition, namely Oneness Pentecostalism.

3.5 My Position as an Outsider Researcher

As a researcher, being objective is crucial to uncover the truth about causalities. However, as researchers also are humans, we will always have our own biases, biases that will impact the ways in which information is presented and interpreted. According to Norman Denzin (1989), researchers need to take into account certain presuppositions when conducting historical qualitative research, which includes class, family background, gender, ethnicity, and lived experiences. The fact that I am a white woman, born and raised in Norway, introduced to the Pentecostal faith in my early teens, and now an atheist, will influence the way in which I process and interpret information. According to Anderson (2007, 5), “it is impossible to write a value-free account of the past as it is always a selective and subjective interpretation of it.” However, being conscious of my own limitations and biases has then helped me to be aware of the temptation to write a subjective and biased thesis

3.6 Gathering Original Data During a Pandemic

In an ideal world without a pandemic hindering international travel and human contact in general, my research question would perhaps be best answered by conducting research in the field. At the same time, when given the hand I was dealt, I sought to make the best out of the situation and decided to hire a research assistant through my contacts in the field. This research assistant recorded sermons that were not available on social media platforms or

elsewhere and facilitated and organised interviews with the pastors of these churches. In many ways, this pandemic has decided the methodological routes of this thesis. Nevertheless, it led me to think creatively when it came to gathering data and have made me better prepared as a researcher to adapt when the situations are not preferable for qualitative analysis of individual values and attitudes.

3.7 Summary of the Methodological Approach

The main contribution of this thesis is to advance our understanding of Pentecostal Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa and its influence on democratic values and, in turn behaviour by analysing original data gathered by “non-participant” observation of religious sermons in Lusaka. Methodologically, then, this thesis draws primarily on a qualitative framework. However, to complement the primary data, a logistic analysis of survey data is used to show how Pentecostals differ in regard to their democratic values from other Christians in a cross-national perspective. This analysis justifies the need to dig deeper into this phenomenon and shows the need to apply different methods to understand the ambivalence of the Pentecostal influence on the Christian citizen. In this chapter, I have elaborated and discussed the different approaches utilised to address the research question and given a detailed account of how and why I conduct my research. I have presented the data, the analytical tools, and I have reflected on the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen research design.

I recognise that ways in which churches impact individual values, and thereby their political behaviour, must be analysed in the light of the specific political systems of which they are a part of. It is, therefore, not enough to analyse the practices, beliefs, and relationships within the church. Hence, there is a need to further discuss the specific context of Zambia and to look at the relationship between Pentecostalism and democratic values. In the next part, I turn to the case of Zambia.

4 THE CASE OF ZAMBIA

4.1 Church-State Relations and Democratic Erosion

On behalf of the nation, I have now entered into a covenant with the living God. . . . I submit the Government and the entire nation of Zambia to the Lordship of Jesus Christ. I further declare that Zambia is a Christian Nation that will seek to be governed by the righteous principles of the Word of God.

— Then President Frederick Chiluba
(Hinfelaar 2011, 50).

According to Pew Forum (2010), Pentecostalism and Charismatic Christianity is the fastest-growing religious group in sub-Saharan Africa, and over 26 per cent of the regions 565 million Christians identify as Pentecostal or neo-Pentecostal.³ According to Pew Forum (2010), Pentecostalism and Charismatic Christianity is the fastest-growing religious group in sub-Saharan Africa. Over 26 per cent of the regions 565 million Christians identify as Pentecostal or neo-Pentecostal. Although the increasing presence of Pentecostals in the Sub-Saharan African public remains an uncontested fact, there is little agreement among scholars as to what kind of political change Pentecostalism has brought with it, if any at all. In seeking to answer such a question, national context is essential. I choose to limit my analysis to the single case of Zambia, a country that is overwhelmingly Christian and officially a Christian nation.

Paul Gifford notes that while the mainline churches challenged Africa's dictators, the newer evangelical and Pentecostal churches provided their support for the incumbent leaders (1995, 5). In general, it was the Catholic and the mainstream Protestant churches who were the pushers for democracy. This trend was evident throughout sub-Saharan Africa. In Cote D'Ivoire, Pentecostal elites with connections to the ruling party have promoted electoral

³ More recent descriptive statistics indicating the percentage of Pentecostals in sub-Saharan Africa was difficult to attain. According to World Christian Database (2015) 36% of sub-Saharan African Christians identify as Catholic, roughly 21 % identify as members of African Independent churches, while 38% identify as Protestant, which include Anglican, Evangelical, and Pentecostal.

violence in order to secure the ruling party's tenure in office (Sperber and Hern 2018, 837). Furthermore, in several African countries, Pentecostal clergy have been associated with electoral manipulation and illiberal constitutional amendments (Gifford 2004; Cheyeka 2008). Further, Pentecostal leaders often express and advocate for illiberal reforms, such as the criminalisation of LGBTQ rights and the abortion ban. According to van Klinken, the campaign against the LGBTQ community has been so prominent among Pentecostals in Africa that it has become a new form of Pentecostal nationalism where "homosexuality is considered to be a threat to the purity of the nation and is associated with the Devil" van Klinken 2014, 259; also see: Bompani and Valois 2017; Grossman 2015). Maxwell (2006) finds in his historical analysis on Pentecostalism in Zimbabwe that the relationship between Pentecostal elites and politicians has enabled politicians to prolong undemocratic policies and has led to financial gains for Pentecostal elites.

The case of Zambia is particularly interesting because whereas Pentecostal churches largely supported the incumbent leaders during the third wave democratisation process on the African continent, the Pentecostal churches in Zambia were, alongside the Catholic and Protestant churches, prominent actors who contributed to the transition to multi-party democracy at the beginning of the 1990s. Additionally, Zambia's first elected president after the transition to democracy was a born-again Christian, further situating the country in a unique place compared to other sub-Saharan countries. At the same time, the Pentecostal community have also expressed support for the anti-democratic behaviour of governments following democratisation. However, I argue that Zambia meets the broad criteria as a case where I would expect to observe pro-democratic values being communicated in religious teachings, both explicitly and implicitly.

In the following chapter, I will discuss the role of the church in Zambia's democratisation process. I then offer a contextual backdrop of Zambia's political trajectory from democratisation until today, focusing on the democratic backlash experienced and the role of the Pentecostal church. Thirdly, I consider how Zambia is similar to and different from other African states and argue why I argue Pentecostalism in Zambia represent a case that is most likely to facilitate pro-democratic values among its congregants.

4.1.2 Zambia's Democratisation Process

Zambia gained independence from Great Britain in 1964, and its first independent government was led by President Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP). For a short period – until 1971-, the country held multi-party elections but transitioned shortly after to a single party regime under Kaunda (Rakner 2003). However, after the end of the Cold War and during an economic crisis that shook the nation, Zambia started its democratisation process. Zambia became then one of few African countries that experienced a peaceful democratic turnover when transitioning to multi-party rule in the early 1990s. In this transition, pro-democracy movements consisted of broad coalitions of representative actors from civil society, such as trade unions, academia, law associations, business associations and the church, who put pressure on Kaunda and forced his one-party state to the ballot box (Elone 2013; Rakner 2011, 1107; Sperber & Hern 2018, 840). In 1991, Kaunda competed in an election against his political rival, former trade union leader, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) leader, and an enthusiastic Pentecostal, Frederick T. Chiluba. October 1991, the MMD won the Presidential election by a landslide, and the third inauguration of the Third Republic under the presidency of Frederick T. Chiluba could begin (Rakner 2003, 11, 195).

Although the unions were instrumental during the democratic transition in Zambia, the political landscapes of post-colonial African states the different religious congregations played a significant part in the democratic transition (see Hinfelaar 2008; Bompani and Valois 2018). During the one-party era, the Christian churches were among few formal organisations “with the capacity to mobilize large sections of the population without recourse to government resources or control” (Green et al. 2003, 8). Jimmy Carter, former US president who took an active part in the presidential elections of 1991, applauded the church, saying that due to the trust they have from the people, they were able to make a pivotal contribution to the reestablishment of democracy in Zambia (Phiri 1999, 323). This mobilisation shows the strength and the capacity of civil society to unite and demand democratic change (Phiri 2003, 423).

While the mainline churches were the most instrumental religious bodies pushing for democracy in most sub-Saharan countries in the 1990s, as highlighted by Freston and Gifford,

the mainline churches in Zambia had the support of the country's then relatively small but significant body of Evangelical/Pentecostal churches (Sperber & Hern 2018, 839).

The church bodies pushing for democratisation in Zambia consisted then of the Zambian Catholic Churches who operated through the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC), the Protestant churches united under the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ), and the more decentralised Evangelical churches, and now, increasingly Pentecostal churches, who joined forces under Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ). These three religious bodies were key supporters of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia (Sperber and Hern 2018, 841). They sought to influence conceptions of civic rights, legitimate governance and national belonging. They represented the "norms of community cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication" that characteristically define civil society (Bratton 1994 in Sperber 2018, 66).

During the process of democratisation, the churches mentioned above also came together and formed Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC), which aim during the transition was to "train army soldiers on how to monitor elections in polling stations, provide voter education, offer guidelines in responsible voting, urge voters to avoid bribes, intimidation and disruption, to attend rallies so as to have informed choices about candidates and to cooperate fully with law enforcement agencies" (M'fundisi-Holloway 2018, 116). ZEMCC was initiated by politicians who wanted neutral people to monitor the elections to ensure they were conducted free and fair. Elite churchpersons were appointed to lead this organisation, and Bishop Joseph Imakando, a famous Pentecostal clergy and the then Executive Director of EFZ was chosen to be secretary (M'fundisi-Holloway 2018, 116). The churches came together then, not only to overthrow an autocratic leader but to further facilitate the country's democratic transition.

4.2 Political Change and Pentecostal Elites Vis-à-vis the State

As the case selection in this analysis is based on the Pentecostal church's role in overthrowing autocracy in Zambia at the start of the 1990s, it becomes essential to take into consideration the political changes that have taken place after Zambia's democratic transition. In the following part, I introduce what I consider to constitute central aspects of the political landscape and the democratic backlash in Zambia after transitioning to multi-party democracy and the political role the Pentecostal church has taken since the transition.

4.2.2 The Reign of Chiluba and the MMD

The first few years after transitioning to a multi-party democracy looked promising for Zambia. Chiluba sought to restructure both politics and the national economy. He emphasised the need for a liberal economy, strong institutions, and a determination of the people to bring about this change (Rakner 2003). Chiluba also stressed the importance of the rule of law as the basis for a thriving society characterised by individual's success and the transformation of political structures and institutions (M'fundisi-Holloway 2018, 115). His efforts to strengthen civil and political rights gave Zambia a reputation as a model for newly developed democracies. However, like many other third-wave democracies, alternation of power did not necessarily lead to liberal political norms or supporting institutions required for democratic consolidation.

Already in the first decade of democracy, political rights and civil liberties were curtailed to the extent that Zambia looked more like a one-party authoritarian state than a free multi-party democracy (Faust et al. 2012, 446). Indeed, the 1990s represents a challenging decade for many Zambians, as economic liberalisation and Structural Adjustment Programs led to massive unemployment and limited state services (Sperber 2017, 87). Paradoxically, Chiluba, a former trade union leader, introduced neoliberal reforms and IMF's structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), which very much altered the "availability of space in Lusaka, including land and infrastructure, and access to markets" (Hansen 2008, 216). At the same time, it is widely recognised that religion plays a crucial role in the political economy of African societies today (van Klikken 2014), and the fact that Chiluba became a born-again Christian may have had economic consequences for the country as a whole.

Obadare (2016) finds that Pentecostalism creates an individual worldview that situates Pentecostalism "firmly within the orbit of neoliberalism." Through the 'prosperity gospel' that promises material wealth in this world, Pentecostalism creates individuals that seek to live the "Pentecostal dream" and value free-market competition and a capitalist economic structure. Similarly, Jean-François Bayart (in Obadare 2016, 2) argue that Pentecostalism "emancipates the individual by hailing his personal ascent, blesses capitalist accumulation and

the relation to merchandise” and by doing so, it goes against the former pietist Christian notion of linking “wealth with evil-doing and poverty to sanctity.”

However, neoliberal development policies that encouraged foreign investment has in many ways resulted in opening the markets to external competition rather than facilitating local participation., the decades following the IMF/World Bank innated SAP programs have been characterised by growing inequality and higher rates of unemployment (Hansen 2008, 216).⁴ Further, as Chiluba oversaw the massive privatisation of Zambia’s state-owned mining sector, ruling elites enriched themselves by exploiting the privatisation of the former public assets (Sperber and Hern 2018). Only three years in power and Chiluba’s policies resulted in s GDP per capita reaching its all-time low, worth only 54% of its 1967 value (World Bank 2016).

According to Gifford (1998), Zambia became “an uncaring Christian nation” due to the high rise in poverty. Historically, the Roman Catholic church has been the most dominant voice in the Zambian public sphere and has had a strong prophetic role in matters of governance and civic concern (M’fundisi-Holloway 2018, 7). Especially in Latin Amerca, but also in Africa, the Catholic church has adopted a liberation theology that argues that abolishing poverty, feeding the hungry, educating the uneducated should not just happen through charitable work but by forcing the state to take its responsibilities of caring for the poor seriously (French 2007). Moreover, in August 1993, as a response to government malpractices, the pastoral letter “Hear the cry of the poor” was issued by the Catholic churches, criticising the social consequences of the government economic policies (Rakner 2003, 195).

In conjunction with political and economic liberalisation, Pentecostalism “mushroomed” throughout the Zambian state in the late 1980’ and early 1990s, and several scholars (Comaroff 2012; (Freeman 2012; Yong 2010) links the rapid growth of Pentecostalism with the neoliberal socio-economic intervention from the West. In many ways, the economic liberalisation provided the base for another form of state-church relationship with the Pentecostal church where the capitalist individual became the focus and not the collective marginalised.

⁴ If and how the SAP programs deteriorated Zambia’s economy is an ungoing debate, and perhaps controversial one, and other scholars have argued that the SAP programs in themselves were not problematic, the problem rather lied in the way they were implemented.

4.2.1 The Declaration

Chiluba became born again in the 1980s while imprisoned for political activities, and in January 1992, only months into his first term, Chiluba, in the presence of the Pentecostal elite, declared Zambia as a Christian nation without consultation with his own government (Phiri 2003; Gifford 1998; Rakner 2003). He called for a “celebration of praise” and declared on national television that:

I have entered into a covenant law with the living God. ... I declare today that I submit myself as President to the lordship of Jesus Christ. I likewise submit the government and the entire nation of Zambia to the lordship of Jesus Christ. I further declare that Zambia is a Christian nation that will seek to be governed by the righteous principles of the Word of God (Chiluba in Hinfelaar 2011, 50).

According to van Klinken, this declaration needs to be understood against the backdrop of Zambia’s post-colonial history. President Kaunda ruled Zambia under a one-party democracy that promoted the philosophy of ‘Zambian humanism.’ A philosophy that included scientific socialism, nineteenth century liberalism, Christian morality, and Asian spirituality (Hinfelaar 2011, 55). This philosophy was not purely secular and had strong religious undertones and “promoted itself as a religion, with Kaunda as its chief prophet”– a ‘religion’ that presented a threat to the Christian churches (Gordon 2012, 165). The fact that President Kaunda looked to Eastern religious traditions for spiritual inspiration was not welcomed by the religious institutions in the country, especially not by the Pentecostal church, who associated this behaviour with Satanism (van Klinken 2014).

For Chiluba then, and for most born-again Christians, it was the nation’s Christian moral state that was critical for Zambia to prosper. Chiluba called this declaration a code of conduct with God, bringing his blessing and forgiveness to the Zambian people (M’fundisi-Hollowa 2018, 124). It is not uncommon for Pentecostals to have a spiritualised approach to politics - the Devil is the reason for Zambia’s economic despair, not poor government performance and corruption, and this view was evident during Chiluba’s term. To Chiluba, the solution to the corruption problem was straightforward; “what people need is the word of the Lord, then there shall be no corruption” (Chiluba in Cheyeka 1995, 170). Chiluba also believed that

declaring Zambia a Christian nation would boost the economy because a nation whose leader fears God prospers economically (Phiri 2003).

Consequently, Pentecostals welcomed the declaration, whereas other Christian churches saw it as a threat to social cohesion and deemed it undemocratic. Especially was the lack of consultation with the church bodies criticised (M'fundisi-Holloway 2018, 123). ZEC and CCZ argued that if Chiluba truly wanted to make Zambia a Christian nation, he should do so in deed – by caring for the poor and stop the government corruption – and not through an excluding declaration constricting religious freedom (Sperber and Hern 2018; Gifford 1998).

The declaration, in many ways, reflected and generated what has been characterised by the American Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong (2010, 9) as 'Pentecostal nationalism.' It echoes a distinctly Pentecostal political theology, as it subjects the country as a whole to the discourse of being 'born again Christian' and to the battle against the influence of Satan (van Klinken 2014). Phiri (2003, 402) identifies that the declaration enabled the emergence of an Evangelical civil society, which became "increasingly ready to play political roles." Many Pentecostal leaders also saw the declaration as something that would boost their social and political status and material resources. This anticipation was not misplaced. Chiluba appointed several Pentecostals to key government positions, such as Vice President Godfrey Miyanda, Pastor Dan Pule, Reverend Peter Chintala, Reverend Stan Kristoffer, Reverend Anosh Chipawa, and Bishop Kaunda Lembalemba (Cheyeka 2008, 157), and established a Ministry of Christian Affairs, often referred to as "Chiluba's slush fund," which was used to funnel public resources to Pentecostal opinion-makers (Gifford 1998, 201; Cheyeka 2008; Sperber and Hern 2018). Pentecostals were also granted airtime on the state-run television production, while Catholics Media Services' applications for a TV station was disregarded for almost a decade (Sperber and Hern 2018, 842).

However, according to Isabel Phiri, the fact that Chiluba declared Zambia a Christian nation established "the criteria by which his presidency would be judged and ultimately found wanting" (2003, 401). Because, although Chiluba was praised by Pentecostals initially, this excitement slowly dimmed in his last years, as many did not appreciate the direction the country was heading in. Being in a covenant with God did not stop Zambia's increasing poverty levels, the corruption, the human rights abuses or drug smuggling among high-level ministers and officials or a failing national economy (M'fundisi-Holloway 2018, 117).

Chiluba failed to deliver the expectation of being led to the “Promised Land.” This change of support was significant in terms of how Pentecostals judged his leadership. When Chiluba showcased anti-democratic actions, Pentecostals largely turned the other cheek. However, as he strayed as a moral Pentecostal, they did not blindly follow him. This was evident when Pentecostal Christians were united in their criticism against his leadership and condemned his divorce from his wife, Vera Chiluba (Phiri 2003, 425). Chiluba was seen as lacking integrity as a Pentecostal leader and was in many ways judged by the standards he himself set. This supports the idea that the focus is put on the individual, the transformed Christian, and perhaps not the liberal democratic practices of the government. This idea of good leadership is evident in the Pentecostal Bishop Dr. Nevers Mumba’s criticism of Chiluba:

Zambians and people worldwide have lost confidence in politics and politicians. The abuse of office, the high levels of selfishness and overall lack of character in politicians have impeded economic growth in our nation... The only hope for Zambia is to insist on putting into office leaders of proven morality whose values are faith-based and anchored in Godly values. The delivery of goods and services to the citizens depends on the morality of its leaders (Phiri 2003, 413- 414).

Nevers Mumba clearly connects good political leadership with the belief in God. But is most of all preoccupied with the moral character of the people in power.

According to some scholars, the declaration has proved to be a double-edged sword: facilitating a Christian demographic growth, but at the same time remained an elusive religiopolitical phenomenon (Chammah J. Kaunda 2017, 297). For Cheyeka, the declaration is a “myth at best and heresy at worst.” For him, this declaration was a manoeuvre made by Chiluba to “divert people’s attention from issues of accountability, democratic governance and transparency to spiritual matters, to the extent that even naturally inevitable events such as the reintroduction of multi-party politics was described as a spiritual event” (Cheyeka 2008, 173). For a period, it worked until his Pentecostal character was questioned.

4.2.3 Tipping the Level Playing Field

The consequences of Zambia’s economic liberalisation left MMD highly unpopular, and in an effort to secure victory in the upcoming 1996 elections, Chiluba forced through constitutional amendments where he sought to disqualify his main political rival, former President Kaunda

(UNIP), from running for office (Sperber 2017, 87). The uneven electoral playing field exhibited in this election led the international donor community to question the legitimacy of the 1996 elections (Rakner 2003, 13). Moreover, in 1996 February, the first bilateral donors announced a partial withdrawal of aid, citing the governance situation as their main reason, damaging Zambia's economy further. The Catholic and mainline churches condemned the amendments as undemocratic and issued a Pastoral letter urging citizens to reject these anti-democratic reforms that sought to eliminate democratic competition.

The Pentecostals and the EFZ, on the other hand, were willing to overlook these undemocratic practices in order to ensure the survival of a born-again leader (Sperber 2017, 88). This signalises a shift in the collaboration between the Christian church bodies. Whereas they before got together to facilitate a democratic shift, they were here divided in their response to undemocratic practices, where the Pentecostal church remained supportive of the incumbent leader. According to Sperber (2017), the active work of the Catholic church and other older churches to hinder democratic backsliding threatened Chiluba and his fellow Pentecostal ministers. This became evident when articles by state-owned newspapers published articles describing this activism as “un-Christian, worldly, self-interested, unpatriotic, and even directed by Rome,” and argued that Christians should instead pray for their leaders and trust that God selects the ‘rightful’ leader of the country (Sperber 2016, 89). This uncritical loyalty to “the government of the day” by Pentecostal clergy has led to a break in the traditional church-state cooperation where churches have traditionally taken the role as government ‘watch dogs’ (Cheyeka 2008). It very much highlighted the fact that Pentecostals at times portray the government as “God’s chosen leaders, rather than leaders in need of oversight by the ‘watchdog’ pro-democracy major churches” (Sperber 2017, 24).

At the same time, the country's situation did facilitate anti-government movements within the Pentecostal church as well. As governance issues continued to deteriorate, the famous tele-evangelist Nevers Mumba decided to turn the ship around by entering politics. In 1996, he formed a National Christian Coalition (similar to the Christian Coalition in the US) alongside other Evangelicals and Pentecostals, which aimed to guide the president in matters concerning the church (Phiri 2003, 413). However, it morphed into a political party, called the National Citizen Coalition (NCC), that sought to represent an opposition to the current leadership and to nurture potential political leaders of morality for the presidency (Phiri 2003, 413). Here we see a type of Pentecostal response to the governance of Chiluba that was critical in nature.

However, the NCC became later part of the MMD, and Nevers Mumba served as vice-president from 2003-2004 under MMD rule and is today the president of the party.

4.2.4 The Third Term Bid

In the running up to the presidential election of 2001, Chiluba, although not explicitly pronouncing it, seemed ready to be President for a third term. However, the Zambian constitution, which came into effect in 1996 during his presidency, limits presidents to two terms in office as a way of defining democracy. In his book, *Democracy: Challenge of Change*, Chiluba commended his party's effort to limit the presidential office to two five-year terms (Phiri 2003, 421). Nonetheless, in 2000 he refused to name a successor and warned his party members against pursuing a presidential ambition under the excuse that it would create intra-party conflicts (Rakner 2003, 113). Moreover, by 2001, a campaign was launched to remove the two-term limit. Again, Chiluba sought to amend the constitution in his favour. Nevertheless, again, Chiluba had the outspoken support of most Pentecostal churches, while mainstream churches actively opposed the attempted unconstitutional move (Cheyeka 2008, 161). Though, it should be noted that these political circumstances led to a divide within the EFZ and the broader Evangelical and Pentecostal community in which leaders of the older Evangelical churches opposed the bid for a third term, while leaders of the newer Pentecostal churches were in favour (Sperber 2016, 90).⁵

Important televangelists, Evangelical and Pentecostal government appointees, and clients vocally supported the bid. Joe Imakondo, for instance, argued on TV that the term limits interfere with God's plan and his decision as to who should lead the country (Sperber 2016, 107). In the final hour of the election, and after both international and national pressure from civil society, Chiluba announced he would not run for a third time. He nevertheless acted undemocratically yet again and fired ministers within his cabinet who opposed the bid for a third term (Phiri 2003, 423; Rakner 2003, 201).

The socio-economic devastation worse than what the country had suffered under Kaunda's one-party rule and a shrinking democratic space led to diminishing support for Chiluba. However, Chiluba managed to somewhat keep his popularity afloat for large parts of his

⁵ Note that some scholars, such as Shishuwa (2020), argue that the effort made by the unions and the churches to defend democracy, especially during the bid for the third term for Chiluba in 2011, has been overstated.

presidency. Scholars points here to the President's cultivation of a new religiopolitical constituency centred on Pentecostals (Sperber and Hern 2018).

4.2.5 The Political Trajectory after Chiluba

Following Chiluba, as his failed third term bid, was his hand-picked successor, Levy Mwanawasa, who won the 2001 election in what has been characterised as a highly disputed election (Rakner 2003, 13). The MMD leaders also ensured that the vice president's office was held by the country's most prominent Pentecostal, Dr Nevers Mumba, who had now joined forces with the incumbent party. As this election was widely seen as tipping the level playing field in the MMD's direction, Zambia could no longer be characterised as a liberal democracy by international actors, and suspicion of Chiluba's influence on his successor started to arise. According to the MMD's statutes, Mwanawasa should have been elected at the party's National Convention and not by the National Executive Committee, as was the case (Rakner 2003, 114). Consequently, the election of Mwanawasa led to a strong division within the MMD, with the departure of the prominent politician, Michael Sata, who felt overshadowed after being a loyal supporter of Chiluba's bid for a third term.

With a decade of seeking political liberalisation, democracy was then far from consolidated in Zambia. Nevertheless, under Mwanawasa's presidency, political rights and civil liberties improved somewhat, and Mwanawasa was elected again in 2006 under an election that has widely been judged as free and fair (Faust et al. 2012, 446). However, due to his death, Mwanawasa was followed by the then-vice President Rupiah Banda in 2008, and the country entered another phase of democratic stagnation or, perhaps, decline. In 2010, two years after Banda ascended the presidential throne, Freedom House downgraded Zambia's score on civil liberties (Faust et al. 2012, 446).

Moreover, in the 2011 election, MMD more or less collapsed after a devastating defeat against the Patriotic Front (PF) and former MMD politician Michael Sata. This seemed to represent a new religiopolitical era, as the PF government in many ways "underscored the salience of religion in politics in new ways." Sata, a lifelong Catholic, went against the tactic of Chiluba and sought to deregister the most politicised and pro-MMD Pentecostal churches to court the Catholic church in an attempt to prevent them from criticising the PF. (Sperber

2017; Sperber and Hern 2018, 843). However, this did not curtail the Pentecostal presence in politics, and with the election of Lungu, they became as relevant as ever.

4.2.6 Further Democratic Erosion and New Political Alliances for Pentecostals

In recent years, Zambia has been continuing down the autocratic spiral. In addition, to continue to feature an electoral playing field notably in favour of the incumbent party, the general election of 2016 also marked a break with Zambia's positive trajectory of peaceful elections. The sitting President, Edgar Lungu of the Patriotic Front (PF), won over Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development in what has been characterised as a violent and unfair presidential election (Goldring and Wahman 2016). The opposition also mounted an unsuccessful legal challenge to the final results (Hinfelaar et al. forthcoming). After the announcement of a new "national church," which would give Pentecostals a new sacred space in which to hold national events other than the Anglican or Catholic Cathedrals, and despite being Baptist himself, Lungu became the first politician in Zambia to receive the active endorsement of the Pentecostals, who call themselves "Christians for Lungu" (Sperber and Hern 2018, 844). Indeed, Lungu has continued to work closely with Pentecostal leaders on religiopolitical policy initiatives, including creating a Ministry of religion. And in many ways, Lungu is taking notes from Chiluba's playbook to manufacture political support. In contrast to Stata, he has recognised the important and growing Pentecostal constituency.

According to the country itself, Zambia is a "liberal democratic society" guided by values that underpin the concept of liberal democracy, such as values of rational and moral autonomy, liberty, fairness and equality (Kaunda 2017, 298). Indeed, Zambia may be called a democracy due to its record of multi-party elections and its near-seamless record of peaceful transitions of power. However, the introduction of electoral processes did not limit executive power or curtail state malpractice and corruption. Instead, there has been a piecemeal chipping away of democratic and legal institutions that are meant to protect civil society, opposition parties, the level playing field during elections, and the level of democracy (Hinfelaar et al. forthcoming). Zambia has repeatedly shown poor governance, undemocratic practices related to abuse of human rights, social injustice, and efforts to diminish civil and political rights (Kaunda 2017, 298).

4.3 Case Selection

In many aspects, Zambia can be seen as a typical case in the sub-Saharan region, as it is a country that shares many similarities with its surrounding countries, such as a relatively peaceful democratisation process in the 1990s, where the country went from single to multi-party elections, and neoliberal privatisation and public-sector retrenchment occurring at the same time, followed by increased unemployment and inequality (Gould in Sperber and Hern 2018, 839). As a majority of sub-Saharan states, Zambia is majority Christian, and according to Zambia's most recent available census (ZCSO 2012), approximately 85 % of Zambians identify as Christian. Similarly to many other African countries, the traditional mainline churches were one of the key actors in facilitating the country's democratic transition (Toft et al. 2011, 96). And as in numerous other sub-Saharan states, the share of Pentecostal churches started to grow rapidly by the 1990s (Sperber and Hern 2018, 840). However, in contrast to several other countries, the mainline churches had the support of the country's then relatively small but significant body of Evangelical/Pentecostal churches (Sperber & Hern 2018, 839). This makes the case of Zambia unique in the context of Pentecostalism Sub-Saharan African states and makes Zambia an interesting case to study. The fact that the first elected president was a born-again Pentecostal situates Zambia further in a distinct place compared to other sub-Saharan countries.

However, although the EFZ played an essential role in organising and "representing" Pentecostals in the transition to democracy, the membership that EFZ has "commanded" has, through the years, changed drastically. Since the early years of Chiluba's reign, EFZ's political positions have been influenced by what can be viewed as sometimes antidemocratic positions that some Pentecostal leaders have endorsed. Hence, although Zambia can historically be considered a unique case, it represents perhaps today, rather a typical one, where Pentecostal leaders show support for the "government of the day." Notwithstanding, these findings of undemocratic practices among Pentecostal elites do not claim that instrumental reasoning trumps expressive political motivation led by democratic values of individual Pentecostals; rather, they illuminate the instantaneous reality that many prominent Pentecostals have engaged in illiberal affiliations with Zambian politicians (Sperber and Hern 2018; 837).

Nevertheless, Zambia does represent us with a case where one should, due to its unique democratic history compared to other sub-Saharan contexts, be most likely to find democratic values being communicated both implicitly and explicitly. I argue, therefore, that Zambia becomes a most likely case to fit the theory that Pentecostalism encourages pro-democratic values. Suppose we are to find Pentecostal churches on the African continent that communicate pro-democratic values to its congregants. In that case, it should then be “easiest,” due to its role during the transition, to find such a church in Zambia.

4.4 Summary of the Case of Zambia

During the reign of Kaunda, the churches were united against a government they saw straying away from Christianity towards scientific socialism and Asian spirituality and came together to support the movement for multi-party democracy. Within his ten years of power, however, the support for Chiluba and MMD altered. The church, especially the Catholic church, was very outspoken in public when it came to matters of the poor and marginalised and have continued to be a government’ watchdog’ through the years.

The threats to a free civil society and the politicisation of religion have generated a stark resistance from the Catholic and mainline Protestant churches, often supported by the leadership of older Evangelical churches through the EFZ. Mainline churches have mobilised grassroots movements to promote democratic reform and prevent democratic erosion. They have, among several things, trained thousands of Zambians to register and sensitise voters to their rights through the Catholic Church’s Peace and Justice Commission and have observed elections to make sure they are free and fair (Sperber and Hern 2018, 845). The relative success of the 2011 elections, where MMD lost the election for the first time after 20 years in power, has by many been credited to the activism of the traditional churches, especially the Catholic Church.

The formation of NCC, by Nevers Mumba, and other Pentecostals and Evangelical Christians should also be seen as a protest of bad democratic practise (Phiri 2003, 425).

Moreover, at first glance, Pentecostalism in Zambia may seem to fit into the category of ‘watch dog’ churches, like the Catholic and other mainstream Protestant churches. However, although the Pentecostalist movement in Zambia exhibited pro-democratic values in the early

1990s by helping to overthrow the one-party rule, the political trajectory of leading Pentecostal clergy indicates a shifting attitude towards liberal democratic practices.

Pentecostal leaders became instead somewhat divided in their political stand, and as Phiri (2003) points, many were “silent in the midst of corruption because of the belief that the president is ‘a brother in the Lord’ and is chosen by God to be the leader of Zambia.” Chiluba’s presidency’s failure to maintain democratic freedoms and improve the economy was not seen as the result of declaring Zambia as a Christian nation, instead as a result of his failure to live up to Christian moral standards. As the Third Republic evolved and transcended down an autocratic spiral, Pentecostal churches and leaders have often turned the other cheek and shown their support to the government of the day. Again, this does not entail that Pentecostal individuals have pro-authoritarian values. Nevertheless, it raises questions of how the church may impact liberal democratic ideals in backsliding electoral democracies, such as Zambia.

This chapter has provided a series of complementary analyses of church-state relations in Zambia since the 1990s. I have aimed to set the scene for the following chapter that will assist the reader in following my analyses. Building on the history of Pentecostal involvement in Zambian politics, I seek in the following chapter to investigate the Christian citizenship produced within the church.

5 ANALYSES

This analysis seeks to answer the question, “How does Pentecostalism influence democratic values that help shape political actions of exit, voice, and loyalty?” The analysis will proceed in two main steps: first, I conduct an analysis on the survey data to get an impression on how Pentecostals differs in their democratic attitudes from other denominations in several African countries. Second, I will analyse sermons to understand better what values and ideas might shape the political attitudes showcased in the survey and actions of exit, voice, and loyalty.

In the first part of my analysis, I present findings from the Pew Survey (2010) regarding Pentecostal’s democratic values in a number of sub-Saharan countries. As discussed in chapter 3, each question taps into individual’s political attitudes and indicates how Pentecostals may distinguish themselves on these issue areas from other Christian denominations. However, although the survey indicates what types of regime preferences Pentecostals have and their views on political issues, it does not tell us how Pentecostals define democracy, what they deem as good governance, or how they may have understood the questions in general. I find through the survey that Pentecostals inhabit both pro-democratic values and, to some extent, anti-democratic preferences. Hence, to unpack and understand this ambivalence, I conduct a content analysis of sermons to uncover the mechanisms that influence Pentecostals political values and seek to shed light on how Pentecostals might have understood the questionnaire. I also conduct interviews with pastors as a robustness test to the findings from the content analysis. Combined, my analyses paint a picture of an individualistic religious ideology that values a minimalist form of democracy but simultaneously produces a Christian citizenship characterised by self-efficacy.

5.1 Survey Analysis

As discussed in chapter 4, due to the church leader’s history of overthrowing autocracy and their close relationship with the MMD, one might expect Pentecostals in Zambia to have a unique pattern of political attitudes. Yet, the evidence presented below from the sub-Saharan region suggests that Pentecostals have distinct patterns of political attitudes in other countries as well. Despite the lack of thorough and available surveys (as discussed in chapter 4), data collected by Pew survey (2010, updated 2020) allows me to assess whether Pentecostals

political attitudes tend to, on average, differ from other Christians across several sub-Saharan countries. Though the specific country context is essential for understanding how these patterns manifest in each country, it gives us an indication of how the *Zambian* context may explain the survey results and how *Zambia* might present a case distinct from other cases. In other words, it helps us understand the *Zambian* case in the sub-Saharan context. Can the qualitative analysis explain Pentecostals distinctive democratic values across the sub-Saharan region, or does *Zambia* represent a unique case that has little explanatory power for the broader population of Pentecostals?

Through running two logit models on each question deemed relevant to this the research question (discussed in chapter 3), I examine whether Pentecostals differ systematically from other Christians in their political values across the sub-Saharan continent. In order isolate the effect of being Pentecostal, I follow the approach of Sperber and Hern (2018) by first calculating the crude effect of being Pentecostal, and in the second model, I apply recommended controls, such as gender, education, and rural vs urban population, as a robustness test of this effect.

All models included country-level fixed effects. Figure 1 represents models with coefficients of interest regarding democratic values, both when I examine the crude support and when I examine the adjusted support. Figure 2 represents models with coefficients of interest in religiopolitical values, both when I examine the crude support and when I examine the adjusted support. (Hollow) dots represent the coefficient of interest on each bivariate model (crude support), while the filled dots on the variable Pentecostal represent the coefficient of interest when controlled for gender, education and rural vs. urban (adjusted support).




FIGURE 5.1. *Pentecostals democratic values*

Notes: Data from Pew Forum (2010). The (hollow) dots represent the coefficient on the variable Pentecostal in a logit regression with country fixed effects in a bivariate model. The x symbols represent the coefficient on the control variables. The filled dots represent the coefficient on the variable Pentecostal in a logit regression with country fixed effects where I control for gender, education and rural vs. urban.




FIGURE 5.2. *Pentecostals religiopolitical values*

Notes: Data from Pew Forum (2010). The hollow dots represent the coefficient on the variable Pentecostal in a logit regression with country fixed effects in a bivariate model. The x symbols represent the coefficient on the control variables. The filled dots represent the coefficient on the variable Pentecostal in a logit regression with country fixed effects where I control for gender, education and rural vs. urban.

5.1.1 Findings

I compare Pentecostals to every other Christian denomination, and I am aware that there most likely exists a great variation within the reference group (coded as 0). However, I am interested to see if the Pentecostals differ systematically from other denominations as a complete population, not if they differ from a specific denomination. What becomes evident is that the effect of being Pentecostal is strong on all the questions and is only affected minimally by the control variables.

On the one hand, I find that being Pentecostals are more in favour of democratic government compared to the other denominations, these findings are statistically significant. They are also more likely to disagree with the notion that people like them should stay out of government business and abstain from speaking their minds, which is also statistically significant.

Although not statistically significant, there is also a trend where they disagree with the notion that strong leadership is sometimes warranted and agree that religious leaders should stay out of politics. This suggests that Pentecostals are more likely to hold pro-democratic values and perhaps also more inclined to use their voice to protest government actions with which they disagree. This is in keeping with Inglehart and Welzel's argument that spiritual life may have the same effect as socio-economic development, where an individual worldview is compatible with individual self-expression values.

On the other hand, Pentecostals are more inclined to support the notion that the nation should be run based on Biblical law and are more likely to report that they would only vote for politicians that share the same religious views, which I argue goes against the notion of a liberal democracy. The analysis also suggests that it might be necessary for Pentecostals that leaders have strong religious beliefs. However, this finding is not statistically significant. Interestingly, Pentecostals embody both pro-democratic and anti-democratic values. These findings present a curious paradox that needs to be further discussed and analysed.

5.1.2 Discussion

When it comes to only voting for co-religionist politicians, it is unclear what they deem as co-religionist. Is it enough that the person is Christian, or does it have to be a born-again Pentecostal? Especially in Zambia, a Christian nation, only being inclined to vote for someone that is also Christian is not an uncommon attitude to have. At the same time, this finding might support the notion that Pentecostals believe that voting for born-again leaders is the solution for the ills of the country.

It can also be discussed how Pentecostals act out their voice. Pentecostals report that they should have something to say about what the government does. This echoes McClendon and Riedl's (2019) argument about how Pentecostal sermons might boost self-efficacy. However, we know little about what path this self-efficacy takes. Using one's "voice" might entail demonstrating or protesting, but, as Sperber (2017) and O'Neill (2010) highlight, it might also mean praying for change or evangelising to create transformation – all represent different forms of political actions.

The fact that Pentecostals report that religious leaders should stay out of politics indicates a wish for the separation of church and state, an innately liberal view of democracy. However, it may also be a reflection of Catholic leaders' long trajectory of being loud critics of the government and meddling in government actions, as discussed in chapter 4. Pew survey does not ask which type of religious leaders should stay out of politics, all, or just clergy from other denominations?

Further, as discussed in chapter 3, I argue that support for Biblical law entails that the laws of the country should be in line with biblical foundations and that support for strong religious laws challenge liberal, Western conceptions of democracy where church and state are separated (Sperber and Hern 2018, 856). However, these results indicate that Pentecostals do not see the notion of Biblical law as ruling out the ideal of democracy. This suggests that the way Pentecostals (and other religious groups) interpret the question of "Biblical law" may be ambiguous.

However, this begs the question, what is their ideal democracy? The survey asks if they prefer democracy over other forms of governance but never asks the respondents to define what they argue democracy is. The discussion of how to define democracy revolves around the range and extent of political attributes encompassed by democracy (Diamond 1999, 21). Do they have a minimalist view of what democracy is, an electoral democracy where electoral competition and participation constitute the very essence of democracy? Or do they value a liberal democracy that also requires qualitative elements of political freedom, such as free speech, a free and independent media, and the right to free association, necessary to render electoral participation meaningful (Elone 2013)? Or perhaps their definition falls somewhere in the middle? The survey gives us an indication as to how Pentecostal congregants value democracy and democratic attributes, but it leaves us in the dark when it comes to concept validity and how the ambivalence showcased can be explained; How may the respondents have understood the questions posed and how did they emphasise their response?

The analysis indicates that Pentecostals support democracy but also have illiberal preferences. This juxtaposition is consistent with the idea that Pentecostalism embodies political ambivalence, as Naomi Haynes and Gwyneth McClendon and Rachel Riedl argued (see chapter 2). The ambivalence accentuates the need to triangulate our analysis methods to

unpack how Pentecostals may have understood the questions posed and uncover the mechanisms at play.

In other words, there is a need to dig deeper to understand how Pentecostals interpret these questions and the notion of democracy. Here, analysing sermons and interviews may offer insights into how pastors engage in similar questions and the worldview they portray help shape democratic values and actions of exit, voice, and loyalty among congregants.

5.2 Content Analysis

As discussed in chapter 3 and 4, it might be expected that Pentecostal churches in Zambia, due to their unique role in transition to democracy, where Pentecostal churches and leaders worked together with other churches and the broader civil society, are more likely to embody pro-democratic values in their religious teaching. Additionally, by being an individualistic religion with a focus on what each individual can achieve, we can expect democratic values to be manifested, as such a worldview may boost self-expression values and self-efficacy. However, the evidence found in the content analysis of Pentecostal sermons in Zambia suggests that Pentecostal's congregants may embody the same ambivalence as evident in the survey conducted throughout the sub-Saharan region. Indicating that the results from Zambia has a generalising effect and can be applicable beyond this case. This analysis also sheds light on how Pentecostal congregants might interpret and understand the questions asked in the survey and how these patterns might be manifested in the democratic values of the listeners. The subsequent paragraphs will discuss in turn the results of the hand-coding before looking into the message portrayed in sermons.

After I finished collecting and transcribing the sermons from the churches, I analysed the corpus of sermon transcription through hand-coding. I sought to summarise the categories and main themes of the sermons through tables, indicating the share of sermons that fit into each category and theme. My observations were from March 2021 until mid-June 2021. Table 1 summarises the results of hand coding the sermons for mention of political categories such as peace, elections, specific candidates or policies, government offices or institutions, voting, and other types of political actions. One can see from the summary that such categories are seldomly mentioned. In the months leading up to the election, one sermon mentioned “tribalism” and “favouritism” among politicians and talked about the importance

of principles in leadership both in church, in business and in government. However, generally, the sermons rarely addressed political topics. It would be here interesting to observe sermons delivered in closer proximity to the election in August 2021. Although no sermons prayed for peace in the country during the election, Pentecostal churches are known to do this.

McClendon and Riedl (2019) find in their analysis that these types of prayers happen in close proximity to elections, and it might be that the time period under study was not close enough to the upcoming election.

With the exception of one sermon that encouraged its listeners to vote for good leaders in the upcoming election, no other sermon encouraged voting or any other type of political action. Political topics, such as homosexuality and abortion, was also rarely mentioned apart from one sermon connecting the uniqueness of each individual to abortion. Another sermon also mentioned the importance of only being friends with people of the same sex so as not to be tempted by friends of another sex. This can be interpreted as a traditional way of looking at gender relationships. Nonetheless, although such topics may not be talked about much during sermons, it is known that the Pentecostal, along with most other churches in Zambia, have taken a highly conservative stance on homosexuality and abortion. Grossman, for example, links the hostility and clampdown on homosexuality in Christian African countries partly to the growth of Pentecostal and Charismatic churches.

However, as discussed in chapter 2, sermons do not need to be explicitly political to have a political effect. Instead, as Djupe and Calfano (2013) and McClendon and Riedl (2019) point out when clergy communicate political messages, they lose credibility. The real political influence is rather evident when clergy communicate religious messages, as this impact value orientation, including democratic values to a greater extent.

Table 5.1 Content analysis: categories

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Percentage of sermons</i>
<i>Prayed for peace in the country</i>	0 %
<i>Mentioned election credibility</i>	0 %
<i>Mentioned specific candidates/policies</i>	7 %
<i>Mentioned govt offices or institutions</i>	0 %
<i>Encouraged voting</i>	7 %
<i>Encouraged other types of political action</i>	0 %

When coding the themes, I sought to code them as individually empowering, connecting individual faith to earthly problems, mentioning structural injustice, emphasising self-expression values, mentioning divine intervention in the election of leaders, and emphasising respect for authorities linking good leadership to God. Table 2 summarises the results of the hand-coding exercise. Each cell reports the share of sermons that were coded as consistent with a particular theme. These results corroborated the findings from the survey and previous literature on the ambivalence of Pentecostalism's influence on the individual.

Table 5.2 Content analysis: themes

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Percentage of sermons</i>
<i>Individual responsibility and individually empowering</i>	53%
<i>Individual transformation (through being born again)</i>	67 %
<i>Individual faith to earthly problems</i>	87 %
<i>Mention of structural fairness/injustice</i>	20 %
<i>Discouraged that problems were related to structural injustice</i>	7 %
<i>Respect for authorities/ don't question leaders</i>	20 %
<i>Divine intervention in relations to who has been appointed as leaders</i>	13 %

5.2.1 Individual Transformation, Democracy Lite and Exit

Overwhelmingly, the sermons brought up individual transformation, and frequently, the sermons focussed on individual success. Proclamations such as “nothing will be impossible with God. Every possibility in my life will be possible in Jesus’ name, amen!” were not uncommon in the sermons and was regularly brought up in one form or another.⁶ The sermons tended to emphasise positive thinking in relation to God and prophetic gospel, arguing that when you embody the right kind of faith, success will come to you – and God will make it happen. There is an overt emphasis on that every person has a hidden potential within and that as a person of destiny, there is a purpose that God wants to fulfil in your life. These findings underscore what Gifford (2009) and others characterise as the 'gospel of success', which they argue Pentecostals in Africa advocate to a large extent – both when it comes to individual success and national success. Indeed, sermons often connect individual faith with material well-being and encourage congregants to seek success through faith in God. As Bishop Joe Imakando preaches in his Sunday sermon:

The Holy Ghost will overshadow you. You will conceive a business, you will conceive a ministry, you will conceive a job, you will conceive a marriage, whatever it is, you will conceive it, but it will not be by human or natural ways, it will take God. The God-factor means that it will take God. Whatever you are going through, stop looking at men, stop looking at the government, stop looking at your uncle, begin to look up to God. Some of you have been looking to your husband – they are limited. Some of you have been looking to your brother – he is limited. Some of you have been looking up to the government – it is limited. Look up.⁷

These types of encouragements support Gifford arguments about how the Pentecostal churches redirect people's attention away from politics and structural injustices. Instead of looking to the government for a change, you need to look up to God. Implicitly, the government cannot change your situation, but God can. The overwhelmingly focus throughout nearly all sermons was on how change happens through the personal

⁶ Sermon, Bread of Life Church, 11 April 2021.

⁷ Sermon, Bread of Life Church, 11 April 2021.

transformation that happens by being born again, which is linked to Hirschman's theory of exit. It represents a worldview in which the focus is explicitly turned to the individual's internal life and emphasises that well-being, especially material well-being, comes with a change from within. Your situation is not caused by the structures surrounding you but by yourself and your faith. Although this political attitude may not represent itself as a massive exit of the regime by people who are inclined to it, it can represent itself in the exiting of "party affiliation", and by supporting another candidate than the incumbent leader, as mentioned in chapter 2.

This was perhaps evident when Chiluba did not live up to the standards of a moral Pentecostal at the end of his reign, as discussed in chapter 4, and the support for him among Pentecostal societies diminished. Chiluba was not a true born-again who had experienced a change from within, through his belief in God, because riches and good governance did not follow him. Here the possibility of using one's voice to generate a structural change in society diminishes – instead, one seeks a leader who is a true born-again Pentecostal. This finding might explain why Pentecostals value democracy and the right to choose one's leader; because it entails choosing a transformed, born-again, leader who has the blessing of God and that represent the same religious values that you do. The emphasis is thus made on choosing the right leader, not seeking to change the structures that constrain and guides this leadership. Pentecostals are then instead “starting with the man in the mirror.” Although that might not be a problem in itself, it might create attitudes that blind people to the socio-political problems that reinforce their marginalisation.

The interviews supported the notion that Pentecostals may embody a minimalist definition of democracy and showcased further what Pastors deemed the church's role would be in relation to fostering democratic citizens. Reverend Mulenga of the UPZ painted a describing picture of his democratic views and argued that:

As Christian we should always be careful about how we use our voice. So, the only thing they can do is to encourage the church to respect the government, respect the constitution, respect the rule of law that is there, and apart from that they can go and vote – and that is their biggest voice. I would not encourage them to go in the streets to demonstrate or go on the radio and begin advocate for their rights, marching, riots – we don't encourage that. There are better ways of expressing yourself, and one of

them is through your vote. When you vote it means that you have trust in the leadership you have chosen. You have to endure the whole of that process. If at all you are not happy with anything follow other channels rather than letting your voice be heard, going on the radio or TV or you go in the streets. For me personally, I feel I cannot do that, I cannot tell my church members to do that. What I tell them is to pray for the leaders of today and follow the laws that have been set.⁸

Although it was evident throughout the interview that reverend Mulenga valued democracy, his understanding of what democracy differs from the liberal view and resembles a minimalist understanding as conceptualised by Schumpeter as *modus procedendi* – democracy characterised only by political competition in the form of free elections (Møller and Skaaning, 31). This finding also underscores the argument made by McClendon and Riedl (2019) in their study of Pentecostalism and Catholicism in Kenya, indicating that Pentecostals were inclined to be critical towards the government, which, through their experiment, slightly boosted rates of political participation, but that this participation did not challenge existing structures or institutions in place. Instead, they become political actors who play within the existing rules. This stands in contrast to the more structural perspective that the Catholic church has been known for (Hinfelaar 2008). This perspective has been evident especially within the Catholic Church in Latin America, but also in Zambia, where the church has embodied a liberation theology that recognises that “[p]eople do not simply happen to be poor; their poverty is largely a product of the way society is organized” (Berryman 1987 in French (French 2007, 410). Instead, as we have seen, salvation from poverty in the Pentecostal perspective is found through God. Challenging the structures that surround you might then feel redundant.

5.2.2 Individual Responsibility, the Gospel of Self-Efficacy and Voice

It is at the same time evident that the worldview within these sermons place the responsibility on the individual, and as theorised, this may again promote the political action of voice. If you see a problem, you need to fix that problem yourself. As one pastor preached, “if you know someone who will die in sin, and you don’t show him the word of God, I will surely blame you for his blood.” Another stressed that “you are as great as the problems you solve on this

⁸ Interview, Moses Mulenga, 27 April 2021.

highway (life).”⁹ He further argued that Christians should stop analysing and start solving problems, and that people cannot rule until they have dealt with Goliath. Nations are, according to this pastor, suffering, as they lack individuals who are problem solvers. Because “Great people don’t wait for the conditions to be perfect,” he preached, “they make the conditions perfect.”¹⁰ Also, here God’s plan for each individual is linked to the success of leaders.

Nevertheless, as O’Neill (2009) argues, the call for all Pentecostal believers to practice their citizenship through their faith in acts of prayer and communal church events “place the moral responsibility for societal problems... onto the shoulders of the believer. This moral ownership ultimately privatised, or better yet internalises” the political failures of the state while making Pentecostal believers responsible for fixing and changing the society (O’Neill (O’Neill 2010, 24). It is not only their responsibility but because they have God by their side, they are destined to succeed. This indicates that Pentecostalism does not only shape individual’s beliefs but, more significantly, their actions. Pentecostalism boost then the self-efficacy of the individual, and Pentecostals become then “empowered players” in the political game, as highlighted by McClendon and Riedl (2019). Empowered players may see it as their responsibility to use voice to protest regime actions and damaging policies.

As we see through the survey, Pentecostals are not less inclined to speak up against government than other people belonging to other denominations. Because instantaneously as Pentecostal sermons links individual faith to earthly problems, they also underscore the importance of good leaders and good governance, and encourage people to participate in democracy, especially through voting:

Great leaders, like Jesus, have a deep love for people. This motivates them to save to go beyond duty and obligation. Jesus saw the large crowd like sheep without a shepherd. Jesus is described as a good shepherd. A good leader. A leader must have deep love for people. A leader must provide direction to people. A leader takes care of people. A leader protects people. The other day I heard on social media that a man was speaking in an interview, this man was aspiring for political office, and he said: ‘members of parliament are paid good salaries, gratuity, and a Range Rover.’ Politics

⁹ Sermon, Northmead Assembly of God, 6 June 2021.

¹⁰ Sermon, Northmead Assembly of God, June 6 2021.

is a service, not a platform to get rich. Zambia desperately needs good leaders. Selfless leaders. Servant leaders. Leaders who deeply love the people. Leaders who are concerned for the suffering of the people. As we approach the August 12 elections, look for leaders who have compassion for people. Look for leaders who deeply love people. Look for leaders who will provide direction. Look for selfless leaders. Leadership is about service.¹¹

Further, in my interview with reverend Kakene, it was also underscored that the church does have a responsibility to encourage democratic behaviour:

The responsibility of the church is to encourage citizens to take part in politics, so that we choose good leaders. Leaders who are able to rule for the people. Because leaders are there for the people. You know. And therefore, it is important for our people to know that we don't just choose anyone, we have to choose because we want those people. We want to rule through them. Power is given to people to choose their leaders. To choose who should rule them.¹²

This finding might support the idea that Pentecostalism fosters democratic values geared towards liberty and freedom and boost self-efficacy. It also supports the findings from the literature.

5.2.3 Divine Intervention and Loyalty

As per Table 2, 20 % of the sermons also highlighted the importance of respecting authorities and not question the words of leaders chosen by God. As mentioned in chapter 2, Pentecostal leaders have been known for saying that they will work with and pray for the government of the day. One of the pastors interviewed, preaching in the Northmead Assembly of God church, underscores this political view:

¹¹ Sermon, Bread of Life Church, March 28 2021.

¹² Interview, Charlton Kakene, 4 May 2021.

When the general overseer disposes a message to you, you won't even oppose the message because you are in the word. Did you know that when you pray for your leader all the time it becomes very easy to connect with the message that he carries? But if you don't pray for your leader, even when he ministers to you, sometimes you may be off tune. As you pray you are connecting spiritually.¹³

Another sermon argued that we all should be submissive to God and other authorities. Although this is one of few sermons that addresses free will, and argues that no one controls you, it encouraged you to choose to be submissive, especially to God.¹⁴ Being submissive is here not looked upon as a weakness, but as the only way you can have a relationship with God. God gave us the will to choose, and therefore we must choose him.

Other sermons also mention that great leaders, being head of family, business, or nations, are anointed by God and argued that God has made them feared. The pastor also prayed that these leaders would not be cheated. Often underneath these messages, but also unequivocally, there exist an emphasis on divine intervention when it comes to who becomes leaders. Everything that happens in life is a direct result of individuals relationship with God. Both good and bad things. However, everything that God does is for good. One sermon explicitly talks about the ways of God, and also linked the pandemic to the actions of God. Here, as in many of the other sermons, there is an underlying theme that embraces submissiveness in the presence of authority, more specifically here, godly authority:

All these Corona things and everything happening and the new rules and the new normal and everything, and we may think that God is not at work, you know what, all things work together for what? For good. You may say, but this Corona thing. God is amazing, maybe he allowed it. All things work together for what? For good. What if he allowed it to just purge the church? To cleanse the church, who knows? But my point is, no matter what we are going through there is a revival that is coming. We got to prepare ourselves for the mighty move of God. There is a new sound that is blowing.¹⁵

¹³ Sermon, Bread of Life, 23 April 2021.

¹⁴ Sermon, Pentecostal Holiness Church, 2 May 2021.

¹⁵ Sermon, Bread of Life, 25 April 2021.

Although these messages did not always explicitly link their argument to politicians, they nevertheless might manifest as unconditional respect for leaders overall, especially those who are seen as chosen by God. This, as discussed in chapter 2, may lead to a greater tolerance for increased executive power that manifests itself in listeners, which again cultivates regime loyalty. These findings are in keeping with Gifford, who argue that this type of “prophetic politics,” as he calls it, is a means to reinforce and legitimise the rule of corrupt leaders as Pentecostal clergies have a “willing attitude to offer fervent prayers and praise for such leaders they deem godly due to their use of biblical rhetoric” (Gifford 1995, 5).

At the same time, another sermon also directly addressed structural injustice and argued that there are principles and laws that every leader must follow. The pastor connected this to Zambia’s problem of favouritism and tribalism, and stressed that “when principles are not there, the leadership that’s there will be leadership of favouritism,” and that “every organisation or nation are destroyed by failure by leaders to follow principles.” Here problems of corruption are not only recognised, but also challenged. One sermon also addressed the dependent relationship many African countries has to Western countries through aid. The pastor, Bishop Joe Imakando, argued that “until Zambia breaks the chain of dependence, we are not going to develop. No western country will develop Zambia, only Zambians can develop Zambia.”¹⁶ This is the only time, in the data collected, that one of the pastors talk about foreign policy and criticises, although mildly, government practices. Nevertheless, it shows that Pastors, will, when deemed necessary, use voice to criticise the “government of the day” and even the governments of the past.

Nevertheless, leadership is heavily connected to God. One sermon emphasised that “every successful leader has got a number of good habits – it is a must. Leaders should read the Bible every day, always listening to the preaching tape and gospel music, friends should be member of the same sex, don’t watch too much TV, and pay you tithes every month.”¹⁷ Therefore, good leadership and good governance are directly connected to the individual leaders’ faith and how they practice their faith. This is also a conception that the survey highlights as relevant, as Pentecostals prefer having leaders who share the same faith as them, or more specifically, leaders who have been born again. Reverend Kakene further highlights the

¹⁶ Sermon, Bread of Lice Church, 21 March 2021.

¹⁷ Sermon, Pentecostal Holiness Church, 2 May 2021.

importance of being born again in his interview, but at the same time argue that being born again is not necessarily linked to being Pentecostal:

We don't go to the extreme like other who might say 'we want somebody like this,' but we insist that basically that person should have that inclination spiritually. Where they are able to know that they have been given privilege by God to service people. If you ask me personally: 'For you, as a Christian, what kind of a leader do you want?' Honestly, I would tell you that I want a leader who is Christian, because we have the same principles. We are working for the people. We are working for God and for his people. Even the mainline churches they understand, a Baptist is born again, a seventh day Adventist is born again, A Catholic must be born again, so that is the bottom line. The salvation process is the same. But the worship, that is where we have a divide. I can go anywhere as long as I know that this is the church who believe in God the creator.¹⁸

Birgit Meyer (2011) also sees this in her study and argue that Pentecostal emphasise the importance of God's light in politics. This does represent an illiberal religious view. At the same time, in the context of Zambia, this is not unexpected as Christianity infiltrates every part of life in Zambia, even politics.

However, the sermon analysis was not able to shed light as to what Pentecostals deem as Biblical law and how they conceptualise this in the context of a democratic regime. However, one can assume that because Pentecostalism links democratic leadership with godly leadership, they would be inclined to communicate support for nation laws grounded in the Bible. Nevertheless, further research on how Pentecostals might have understood the questions posed is necessary.

¹⁸ Sermon, Pentecostal Holiness Church, 2 May 2021.

5.3 Summary of The Results and Concluding remarks

How does Pentecostalism influence democratic values that help shape political actions of exit, voice, and loyalty?

The results from the analysis do not entirely fulfil the expectations of the postmaterialist argument regarding the positive democratic effect of individualism. However, it does support recent literature arguing that Pentecostalism exhibits a democratic ambivalence that embodies both pro-democratic and anti-democratic values that help shape individual's responses to government actions. Combined, my analyses paint a picture of a Pentecostal religious capital that produces an individualistic worldview, and a Christian citizenship characterised by self-efficacy, but simultaneously value a minimalist form of democracy. The political action of voice, exit and loyalty seem to be all encouraged in church to different extents. Leaving us with a complex answer as to how Pentecostals act out their citizenship.

The most striking themes of the sermons are about God's plan for you, linking individual faith to material change, focusing on how each individual can achieve anything with the help of God. The sermons emphasised individual's internal attributes and internal faith as the source of earthly problems and promised change in this life if individuals strengthen their own faith and promote good internal character. As O'Neil (2010) emphasises, this individual worldview puts the responsibility of the world's problems on the shoulders of each person and empowers everyone to generate change through action and faith. This in keeping with Marshall's (2009) view of the political Pentecostal individual, whom she calls the "ideal citizen."

At the same time, it becomes evident that the use of "voice" outside of elections is not encouraged. Pentecostals are encouraged to practice their citizenship, but that encouragement is limited to casting their vote each election and through praying for the government. Hence, this Christian citizenship generates activity, as is the point of McClendon and Riedl's (2019) argument about self-efficacy. However, it seems to limit what the individual can do as a citizen and, to an extent, redirects attention away from other traditional modes of citizenship, such as organising and demonstrating. I argue, however, as O'Neill (2010) that this does not depoliticise the Pentecostal, rather repoliticise them. How they use their voice is perhaps not in line with a western view of how political participation should unfold itself. However, the

practices are nonetheless constitutive experiences connecting individual agency to institutional change.

Nevertheless, a couple of sermons also explicitly emphasised the importance of being submissive to God and the leaders He chooses, which underscore the notion that Pentecostal leaders have previously proclaimed that they “support the government of the day” and that “leaders are chosen by God” (Sperber and Hern 2018; Nevers Mumba 2020).

These findings corroborate the findings in the Pew survey and much of the previous literature: Pentecostals embodies both pro-democratic and anti-democratic values. Although they value democracy, they still, to some extent, inhabit illiberal preferences as to how democracy should work. This gives reason to believe that Zambia might present a typical case in the context of Pentecostalism and politics in the sub-Saharan region and indicates that findings from the case of Zambia have a generalising effect.

Without drawing any strong conclusion or making strong claims about causality, it seems that the democratic values exhibited in sermons may cause Pentecostals to inhabit a minimalist view of democracy, or what Schumpeter calls electoral democracy.

6 CONCLUSION

Both the political trajectory of the Pentecostal church in Zambia and the analyses gives us an indication as to how Pentecostals move within the realm of democracy and democratisation. In Zambia, they are very much a part of it, which is exemplified by being part of the collective effort to democratise Zambia and by pastors encouraging congregants to vote and to vote for good leaders. Nonetheless, their individual set of beliefs and practices are mediated through how they practice their citizenship. Even though they are a part of democracy, they seem to be actors who play within the existing rules and do not further challenge structures in place that might reinforce their marginalisation.

While my data constrain my ability to make any causal claims, I have demonstrated that Pentecostals exhibit some political preferences that are distinct from other Christians in the region and that Pentecostalism embodies a democratic ambivalence in their religious teachings. However, this thesis's most important takeaway is a call for more extensive research and a broader and more recent data collection concerning the relationship between Pentecostalism and democratic values and political behaviour in sub-Saharan states. While other scholars of African politics have studied other elements of identity and governance for understanding democratic backlash, the role of different types of Christianity, especially new charismatic Christianity, remains a puzzle. My findings indicate a need for more fine-grained analyses of religion to illuminate the Christian citizenship produced within places of worship and how this citizenship might have implications for democracy.

6.1 Drawbacks and Suggestions for Further Research

This thesis has given a further understanding of what type of political influence sermons can have on listeners. However, there are some obvious drawbacks to the analyses made, which points to the need for future studies that are able to make stronger causal claims.

The first drawback of the thesis is the lack of recent survey data on Pentecostals political preferences and attitudes towards democracy, which restricts any efforts of making causal claims. Such data should be gathered and made available so that researchers can conduct more systematic analyses of the relationship between Pentecostals political values and behaviours

and the exposure to sermons. Here, more comparative analyses would be interesting to conduct, to better understand the political implications of the 'born again' religious resurgence in the Global South.

Another drawback is the lack of access to the field. It would be interesting to observe and talk to and interview Pentecostal congregants in the aftermath of sermons to check for their immediate effects on democratic values and their perception of how they can create a better society. Future studies should benefit from combining sermon content analysis with up-to-date, comprehensive survey data, in-depth interviews, and ethnographic studies.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Survey Questions Pew Survey 2010

ASK ALL

Q10 And which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? (INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: read statements in language of interview, but always read “democracy” in English. Translate “democracy” into local language only if respondent does not understand English term) (READ LIST) (SHOW CARD)

- 1 Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
- 2 In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable
- 3 For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have
- 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

ASK ALL

Q11 Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statements.

- a. There are clear and absolute standards for what is right and wrong
- b. People like me don't have any say about what the government does
- c. It is the responsibility of the government to take care of very poor people who can't take care of themselves
- d. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

- 1 Completely agree
- 2 Mostly agree
- 3 Mostly disagree
- 4 Completely disagree
- 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

ASK ALL

Q12 Some feel that we should rely on a democratic form of government to solve our country's problems. Others feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems. Which comes closer to your opinion?

- 1 Democratic form of government
- 2 Strong leader
- 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

ASK ALL

Q12a In your opinion, should religious leaders keep out of political matters - or should they express their views on political questions?

- 1 Should keep out
- 2 Should express views

- 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

ASK ALL

Q14 And how do you feel about this statement: It's important to me that political leaders of our country have strong religious beliefs. Do you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with it?

- 1 Completely agree
- 2 Mostly agree
- 3 Mostly disagree
- 4 Completely disagree
- 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

ASK ALL

Q15 And would it be okay with you if the political leaders of our country have a different religion than yours, or do you only want political leaders who share your religion?

- 1 Okay if political leaders have a different religion than yours
- 2 Only want political leaders who share your religion
- 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

ASK IF CHRISTIAN

Q94 And do you favor or oppose the following?

- a. making the Bible the official law of the land in our country
- b. allowing leaders and judges to use their religious beliefs when they decide family and property disputes
- c. punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery
- d. stoning people who commit adultery

- 1 Favor
- 2 Oppose
- 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

Appendix B: Regression Models

Table. B1

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>													
	Q10		Q11B		Q12		Q94A		Q12A		Q14		Q15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Pentecostal	0.198** (0.087)	0.186** (0.086)	-0.177*** (0.055)	-0.169*** (0.055)	-0.095 (0.063)	-0.087 (0.063)	0.164*** (0.059)	0.171*** (0.058)	-0.040 (0.056)	-0.041 (0.056)	0.108 (0.076)	0.106 (0.075)	-0.115* (0.060)	-0.120** (0.059)
Gender	-0.045 (0.062)		-0.073* (0.042)		-0.042 (0.046)		-0.192*** (0.043)		-0.003 (0.042)		-0.123** (0.054)		0.082* (0.046)	
Education	-0.177** (0.076)		-0.213*** (0.049)		-0.146*** (0.055)		-0.199*** (0.051)		-0.021 (0.049)		0.009 (0.066)		0.133** (0.055)	
RuralvsUrban	0.085 (0.068)		-0.006 (0.046)		0.027 (0.051)		0.052 (0.048)		-0.064 (0.046)		-0.002 (0.062)		0.086* (0.050)	
Constant	1.941*** (0.133)	1.829*** (0.119)	0.679*** (0.151)	0.495*** (0.142)	-0.892*** (0.216)	-0.998*** (0.208)	0.790*** (0.165)	0.573*** (0.155)	-0.541*** (0.103)	-0.577*** (0.097)	1.570*** (0.281)	1.510*** (0.278)	0.776*** (0.217)	0.928*** (0.204)
Observations	9,162	9,274	10,320	10,436	10,196	10,312	10,087	10,203	10,294	10,411	10,183	10,292	10,003	10,117
Log Likelihood	-3,586.593	-3,634.095	-6,644.357	-6,733.668	-5,699.117	-5,762.817	-6,295.577	-6,390.972	-6,628.889	-6,709.555	-4,470.556	-4,533.012	-5,692.635	-5,778.680
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,185.187	7,274.190	13,300.710	13,473.340	11,410.230	11,531.630	12,603.160	12,787.940	13,269.780	13,425.110	8,953.112	9,072.024	11,397.270	11,563.360
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	7,227.924	7,295.595	13,344.170	13,495.090	11,453.610	11,553.360	12,646.470	12,809.630	13,313.210	13,446.860	8,996.483	9,093.741	11,440.530	11,585.030

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix C: List of Sermons

Table C1

Church and pastor	Date
Bread of Life Dr. Bishop Joe Imakando	21 March 2021
Bread of Life Dr. Bishop Joe Imakando	28 March 2021
Northmead Assembly of God Bishop Dr Joshua H.K. Banda	4 April 2021
Bread of Life Dr. Bishop Joe Imakando	11 April 2021
Northmead Assembly of God Bishop Dr Joshua H.K. Banda	11 April 2021
Bread of Life Church Dr. Bishop Joe Imakando	18. April 2021
Bread of Life Church Dr. Bishop Joe Imakando	25 April 2021
Pentecostal Holiness Church Charlton Kakene	2 May 2021 Recorded by Catherine Likando
Pentecostal Holiness Church Mrs. Kakene	2 May 2021 Recorded by Catherine Likando
United Pentecostal Church of Zambia Moses Mulenga	4 May 2021 Recorded by Catherine Likando

United Pentecostal Church of Zambia Mrs. Mulenga	09 May 2021 Recorded by Catherine Likando
Northmead Assembly of God Bishop Dr Joshua H.K. Banda	16 May 2021
Bread of Life Church Dr. Bishop Joe Imakando	16 May 2021
Bread of Life Church Dr. Bishop Joe Imakando	30 May 2021
Northmead Assembly of God Bishop Never Muparutsa	6 June 2021
Bread of Life Church Guest Bishop	6 June 2021

Appendix D: List of Interviews

Table D1

Name	Date	Occupation
Reverend Moses Mulenga	27 April 2021	Ordained minister at United Pentecostal Church Zambia
Reverend Charlton Kakene	4 May 2021	Pastor at Pentecostal Holiness Church
Reverend Leanord Banda	11 May 2021	Pastor at United Pentecostal Church Zambia

Appendix E: Interview Guide

Hello, my name is Caroline Bjelland and I am a master student at the University of Bergen. I am writing a master thesis on the influence of Pentecostal sermons on democratic values. This master is part of a bigger project called “BREAKING BAD: understanding backlash against democracy in Africa.” The data from this interview and the data gathered during your sermon will be used in my analysis of the Pentecostal church in Zambia.

1. Can I use your name in my thesis?
2. Is it okay that I quote you in my thesis?
 - I will send my quotes to you for verification on email afterwards.
3. Unless you are not comfortable with it, I will be taking notes during this interview.
4. Can you tell me a little about yourself and the church you are associated with?
5. How long have you been there? What role do you have?
6. Have you been associated with other church communities before?
7. Have you received any training?
8. Does the church you belong to have any international ties?
9. What role do sermons play in the church for the believers?
10. Do sermons have a role in shaping peoples’ perception of the world?
11. Do sermons shape political views?
12. What is the most important reason for why you chose to join the Pentecostal movement?
13. What separates the Pentecostal churches from the more traditional churches?
14. Some people say that the Pentecostal church has another relationship with the state than traditional mainline churches have, do you agree? And why?
15. Do you feel like the church bears a responsibility to encourage people to be political active through voting or running for political posts? Why? Why not?
16. Can you give examples of how you work to encourage people to lead a political active life?
17. Do you believe it is important to teach democratic values in church, or is this something that is not suited for spiritual teachings?
18. Do you think Pentecostal sermons shape peoples understanding of politics?

